## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 10 2002 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

HOLLI LUNDAHL,

Plaintiff - Appellant, and M.R. CHRISTONSON and CHRISTIAN LUNDAHL, Plaintiffs, Nos. 01-4105 and 01-4139

v. MARKUS B. ZIMMER, United States District Court Clerk, Central District of Utah, and LOUISE YORK, United States District Court Chief Deputy Clerk, Central District of Utah,

Defendants - Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH (D.C. No. 2:00-CV-477-B)

Submitted on the briefs: Holli Lundahl, pro se. Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, and Jill N. Parrish, Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendan ts-Appellees.-2-

Before SEYMOUR , HENRY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.

HENRY , Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The case is, therefore, ordered submitted without oral argument. Holli Lundahl, proceeding pro se, appeals (1) the d istrict court’s dismissal of her civil action brought against defendants Markus B. Zimmer and Louise York (appeal number 01-4105) and (2) the district court’ s subsequent denial of her motions, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) an d 60(b), to alter, amend, or vacate that judgment (appeal number 01-4139). Beca use the district court properly dismissed Ms. Lundahl’s action on mootness and absolute immunity grounds, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND In March of 1998, Ms. Lundahl filed suit – under he r maiden name, Holli Telford – in a case captioned Telford v. Kunze , No. 2:98-CV-176-B (D. Utah). On September 15, 2000, Ms. Lundahl sought to have M r. Zimmer and/or Ms.-3-

York, the Clerk and Chief Deputy Clerk, respectivel y, of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, enter a de fault judgment against certain defendants named in the Telford case. Mr. Zimmer and Ms. York, however, each declined to enter such judgments; instead, Mr. Zimm er and Ms. York referred Ms. Lundahl’s request directly to the district court judge presiding over the Telford

case. Ms. Lundahl, seeking to compel Mr. Zimmer and/or Ms . York to enter the requested judgments, filed this lawsuit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Ms. Lundahl’s suit seeks injunctive relief (an order compelling Mr. Zi mmer and/or Ms. York to enter the requested default judgments) and money damages (compensatory and punitive, based upon the failure of Mr. Zimmer and Ms. York t o file the requested judgments in a timely manner). The district court dismissed Ms. Lundahl’s lawsuit; the court noted three grounds for the dismissal: (1) mootness, given the Telford court’s subsequent dismissal of that case for lack of subject matter j urisdiction; (2) absolute immunity, given that court clerks “are absolutely i mmune from suit in the performance of their duties, including entry of def ault judgment pursuant to FRCP 55(a)”; and (3) qualified immunity, given that Ms. Lundahl “failed to make a threshold showing of constitutional or statutory de privation.” Rec. doc. 38, at 1-2-4-

(Supplemental Order, filed Mar. 3, 2001). Ms. Lund ahl filed a timely appeal (appeal number 01-4105). Besides appealing the district court’s dismissal of her case, Ms. Lundahl also filed, in the district court, motions pursuantto Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b), respectively. In these motions, Ms. Lundahl sought to re-open her case, introduce new testimony, and otherwise obtain a newjudgment. The district court denied both motions; Ms. Lundahl timely appealed th ese denials (appeal number 01-4139). We consolidated appeals number 01-4105 and 01-4139.

II. DISCUSSION
A. The District Court’s Dismissal of Ms. Lundahl’s Ca se Ms. Lundahl first argues that the district court er red in dismissing the case. While the relevant district court opinions are not entirely explicit on the matter, we – noting that the district court looked outside the pleadings in dismissing Ms. Lundahl’s action (e.g., considered the judgment entered in the Telford case) – construe the dismissal as a grant of summary judgme nt in favor of Mr. Zimmer and Ms. York. “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court.” Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Durango Air Serv., Inc. , 283 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002). We-5-

consider, in turn, Ms. Lundahl’s requests for injun ctive relief and money damages. 1. Injunctive Relief As to Ms. Lundahl’s claim for injunctive relief, we agree with the district court that the Telford court’s dismissal of that case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rendered moot Ms. Lundahl’s request for injunctive relief in this case. As the district court noted, between the time Ms. L undahl filed her First Amended Complaint and the time the district court dismissed her suit, the Telford court dismissed the Telford case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The dismissal of the Telford case left Mr. Zimmer and Ms. York without any auth ority to enter a default judgment in that case; this lack of authority necessarily rendered moot Ms. Lundahl’s request for an order requiring the entry of such a default judgment. 2. Money Damages As to Ms. Lundahl’s claim for money damages, we agr ee with the district court that Mr. Zimmer and Ms. York enjoy absolute i mmunity from such relief with regard to their respective failures to enter adefault judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. Except where a judge has acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,” the doctrine of judicial immunity sh ields that judge from liability for the judge’s official adjudicative acts. Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 356- 57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in exces s of his authority; rather, he-6-

will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This doctrine is grounded in “a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice[: i.e.,] that a judicial officer, in exerci sing the authority vested in him, should be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Id. at 355 (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine of judicial immunity applies not only to judges but also to any judicial officer who acts to either “[1] resolv[e] disputes between parties or . . . [2] authoritatively adjudicat[e] private rights.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson,
Inc. , 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993). “[I]mmunity which derives from judicial immunity may extend to persons other than a judge w here performance of judicial acts . . . is involved. . . . [A]bsolute judicial immunity has been extended to nonjudicial officers where their duties had an integra l relationship with the judicial process.” Whitesel v. Sengenberger , 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Court clerks, entrusted with the entry of default j udgments pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, fall within that category of judicia l officers who, through the performance of “judicial acts,” “authoritatively ad judicate private rights.” Whitesel , 222 F.3d at 867; Antoine , 508 U.S. at 435-36. The entry of a default judgment unquestionably constitutes a judicial act; indeed, little could be thought-7-

a more quintessential judicial act than the entry of a legal judgment. See , 10A
C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT , ET AL , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 2683, at 27 (3d ed. 1998) (“‘[T]he clerk, in entering judgment, is acting in place of the judge.’”) (quoting United States v. Herlong , 9 F.R.D. 194, 196 (W.D.S.C. 1949)) . Just as clearly, the entry of a default judgment adjudicates private rights. See,
e.g. , Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren , 913 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The default [judgment] conclusively establishes the lia bility of [the party against whom the judgment was entered].”); Buchanan v. Bowman , 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The effect of a default judgmentis that the defendant admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, i s concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal t he facts thus established.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because, then, Mr. Zimmer and Ms. York enjoy absolute immunity as to their decision to ref er Ms. Lundahl’s applications for entry of default judgment to the judge presidin g over the relevant case, the district court correctly dismissed Ms. Lundahl’s lawsuit in so far as that suit sought money damages.

B. The District Court’s Denial of Ms. Lundahl’s Motio ns Filed Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) We review the denial of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 6 0(b) motions for an abuse of discretion. See Phelps v. Hamilton , 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir.-8-

1997) (“We review a district court’s ruling on a Fe d. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion under an abuse of discretion standard.”); Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc. , 214 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We review the di sposition of Rule 60(b) motions for an abuse of discretion.”) (internal quo tation marks and alterations omitted). We are likewise unpersuaded that the district courterred in failing to grant Ms. Lundahl’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) motio ns. Rule 59(e) permits a district court, upon motion of a party, to “alter o r amend” the court’s judgment; Rule 60(b) permits a district court to “relieve a p arty . . . from a final judgment.” Here, because the district court correctly conclude d that (1) Ms. Lundahl’s claim for injunctive relief is moot and that (2) Mr. Zimm er and Ms. York are absolutely immune from Ms. Lundahl’s claim for monetary damage s, the district court necessarily did not abuse the court’s discretion indeclining to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment in favor of Mr. Zimmer and Ms. York.

III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district c ourt’s dismissal of Ms. Lundahl’s lawsuit (appeal number 01-4105) and AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Ms. Lundahl’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 6 0(b) motions (appeal number 01-4139). We DENY Ms. Lundahl’s outstanding motion , her motion “to reinstate-9-

for good cause [a] petition for writ of mandamus as signed Tenth Circuit appeal number 01-4197 and to consolidate th[is] writ proce eding[] with pending appeal case numbers 01-4105 and 4139.” We originally dism issed the referenced writ petition – a petition that, in any case, appears to have involved facts entirely distinct from those decided in this case – based up on Ms. Lundahl’s failure to pay the appropriate filing fee; Ms. Lundahl now asserts that she indeed paid the relevant fee. Ms. Lundahl, however, provides no ev idence of such payment (e.g., a cancelled check or the results of a money order t race). We are, then, not persuaded that we erred in dismissing the reference d writ petition and thus decline to reinstate that petition.