U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

64–901cc WASHINGTON : 2000

THE CORPORATE WELFARE

REFORM COMMISSION ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JUNE 8, 2000

Serial No. 106–11

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio, Chairman

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia,

Speaker’s Designee

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

WALLY HERGER, California

BOB FRANKS, New Jersey

NICK SMITH, Michigan

JIM NUSSLE, Iowa

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania

JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

JIM RYUN, Kansas

MAC COLLINS, Georgia

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin

ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky

GARY MILLER, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

PAT TOOMEY, Pennsylvania

JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina,

Ranking Minority Member

JIM MCDERMOTT, Washington,

Leadership Designee

LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi

DAVID MINGE, Minnesota

KEN BENTSEN, Texas

JIM DAVIS, Florida

ROBERT A. WEYGAND, Rhode Island

EVA M. CLAYTON, North Carolina

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin

BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky

RUSH D. HOLT, New Jersey

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL III, Pennsylvania

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

WAYNE T. STRUBLE, Staff Director

THOMAS S. KAHN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held in Washington, DC, June 8, 2000 ................................................... 1

Statement of:

Hon. Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the State

of California ................................................................................................... 2

Jill Lancelot, Cofounder, Taxpayers for Common Sense ............................... 6

Thomas A. Schatz, President, Citizens Against Government Waste ........... 10

Peter Sperry, Fellow, Federal Budgetary Affairs, Heritage Foundation ..... 14

Stephen Moore, Adjunct Fellow, Cato Institute ............................................. 18

Prepared statement of:

Congressman Royce .......................................................................................... 4

Ms. Lancelot ...................................................................................................... 8

Mr. Schatz ......................................................................................................... 12

Mr. Sperry ......................................................................................................... 17

Mr. Moore .......................................................................................................... 20

Hon. Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress From the State

of New Jersey ................................................................................................ 29

(1)

THE CORPORATE WELFARE REFORM

COMMISSION ACT

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 12 noon in room 210,

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John R. Kasich (chairman of

the committee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Kasich, Gutknecht, Sununu,

Knollenberg, Ryan of Wisconsin, Collins, McDermott, Rivers, Bentsen, Lucas, Holt, and Hoeffel.

Chairman KASICH. The committee will come to order.

Today, we are just going to hear from a couple of witnesses, and

I think a panel on the issue of corporate welfare defined, at least

by me, as a program that benefits a special interest without accruing to benefit the general public. We are lucky today to have Ed

Royce, Mr. Sanders; and then there will be a second panel that we

can get to later.

Mr. Hoeffel actually asked me whether we could have a hearing,

because he has a bill on creating a commission and asked whether

we could do a hearing. I said we could, and, voila, here it is. So

if the gentleman would like to make a couple of comments, that is

fine, but I think we want to get going, because we are going to

have votes here, and I would like Mr. Royce to be able to get his

testimony in, if he can.

Mr. Hoeffel, you are recognized.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

holding this hearing, keeping your word to do so, and thank you

for 20 years of leading the charge to try to eliminate corporate welfare.

The legislation that the chairman has cosponsored with 28 other

members, my bill, H.R. 3221, would create a commission to study

corporate welfare, to make recommendations to the House and Senate, and would require—after the ability to amend by the members

on the floor of the House and Senate, would require a vote by the

Congress on such recommendations.

As we talked yesterday, Mr. Chairman, one man’s corporate welfare is another man’s desperately needed government program,

and—I guess we are being summoned right now.

Chairman KASICH. Why don’t you go ahead?

Mr. HOEFFEL. The reality is these direct frontal assaults that we

have made in the past on individual programs are worthy. I want

to join the Chair in pursuing some of those amendments on the apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:45 Jul 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\HEARINGS\106-11\HBU160.000 HBUDGET1 PsN: HBUDGET1
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propriations bills this year, but I think we also need a mechanism

for dealing with these problems.

In fact, in 1998, the budget resolution contained a recommendation that a commission be formed to create a fast-track process to

consider recommendations to eliminate corporate welfare. I think

that it is time to do that.

I welcome the chairman’s interest in this. I think it is time, if

Congress can reform welfare, which we have done, that we also

ought to be willing to reform corporate subsidies that are wasteful,

that allow unfair competitive advantages or financial windfalls,

and cost more to the taxpayer than any public benefit that results.

So I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witness.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KASICH. I want to recognize Mr. Royce. Ed, how long

is your statement?

Mr. ROYCE. I am going to be brief enough that you can make this

vote.

Chairman KASICH. OK. I want to recognize Mr. Royce, who has

been a leader in the effort to try to rein in some of the subsidies,

particularly the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Ed, you

are recognized for whatever statement you may make.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you for your leadership on this issue, as well.

Let me just make a couple of observations. One is that the Federal Government spends about $65 billion

each year on programs that provide subsidies basically to private

businesses, and this is a huge drain on the Federal Treasury at a

time when the impending Social Security crisis looms closer.

Our current national debt problem pales by comparison to the some $19.8 trillion in unfunded liabilities already committed to

current and future Social Security recipients, and if these subsidies, really corporate welfare, were eliminated entirely over the

next 5 years, we could save over $300 billion. That would provide

some of the resources necessary to find a long-term solution to our

Social Security crisis.

In addition, government has no business favoring certain companies with tax breaks and with subsidies at the expense of others.

The free market is there to allocate resources in the most efficient

way possible. Federal involvement only serves to distort the marketplace. By giving selected businesses special advantages, corporate subsidies put other businesses that are less politically wellconnected at a disadvantage.

Corporate welfare has led to the creation of what some have

termed the ‘‘statist businessman’’ who has been converted from

capitalist to capital lobbyist. Furthermore, corporate welfare is

anticonsumer. For example, the sugar subsidy costs Americans billions of dollars a year in higher prices.

The sugar program is an affront to the American consumer

whose tax dollars are diverted to prop up a select group of producers through an ill-conceived government policy. Price controls and

import quotas are used to keep the price of sugar artificially high,

thereby doing great harm to American consumers and much of the

3

domestic sugar industry. The sugar program unfairly guarantees

sugar producers a minimum price for their product. The U.S. Department of Agriculture secures loans for processors using sugar as

collateral. This allows producers to simply forfeit their sugar rather

than repay the loan. Therefore, it is in the USDA’s interest to keep

the price floor for sugar as high as possible to allow producers to

profit. Otherwise, processors will opt for forfeiture, leaving the

USDA with unprocessed sugar.

Unfortunately, for consumers, this means keeping the price for

sugar well above the open market price. Is that what our constituents back home sent us to Washington to do?

As you may know, in 1997, I joined a coalition of members and

citizens groups from across the political spectrum to target ‘‘corporate welfare’’ programs for elimination. The coalition is called the

Stop Corporate Welfare Coalition. It features Members of Congress,

including you, Mr. Chairman, and taxpayer groups like Americans

for Tax Reform, and ‘‘watchdog’’ organizations like Citizens Against

Government Waste, as well as environmental and consumer

groups.

The programs we target provide businesses, usually big and politically well-connected ones, with subsidies, financial underwriting

and other support. Each program has a constituency and each has

powerful interests supporting it.

I endorse and support companies, by the way, in their efforts to

expand and compete globally. I have always worked to lessen the

burden of regulation and taxation on American businesses. I just

believe private businesses should earn money through the marketplace, not through taxpayer subsidies.

Every year, Congress must approve 13 appropriations bills which

fund the government and every corporate welfare program. I, along

with Chairman Kasich and others have been working to end corporate welfare programs. The Stop Corporate Welfare Coalition has

had some legislative successes. We have cut timber roads funding,

the International Monetary Fund New Agreements to Borrow requested by President Clinton were denied, and we have also reduced fossil fuel subsidies.

The Coalition has also brought the country’s attention to the

process of using taxpayer money for private gain. But more needs

to be done.

Mr. Hoeffel’s bill will create a Corporate Welfare Commission, an

independent body that would focus our priorities and raise public

awareness on this issue. In the last Congress I introduced a bill to

establish a government waste commission, and I am currently

working on a bill for this Congress. So I recognize the need and the

value of a commission to provide for increased accountability and

rein in wasteful government spending.

As T.J. Rogers said in testimony before the Senate a few years

ago—and I want to submit that testimony for the record; he has

also testified before the House before. It is one of the most cogent

and well-thought-out programs that I have read, it is called Declaration of Independence, end corporate welfare. T.J. Rogers, as you

might know, is CEO of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation. As he

says, ‘‘The best way to shut down corporate welfare is to have a

yes or no vote on a package of corporate subsidies identified for

4

elimination by an independent commission, as we did in the military downsizing. CEO’s would support a fair package proposal to

cut corporate subsidies.’’ He did this work in tandem with many CEO’s from the Silicon

Valley, who have a history of knowing how to create real wealth

in the economy.

So I really urge every member attending today to please get a

copy of what we will submit, but most importantly, this oversight

of government management by T.J. Rogers, his ‘‘declaration of

independence’’ to end corporate welfare.

The best thing the government can do to promote economic

growth is to get out of the way. Let entrepreneurs and the mechanisms of the marketplace determine how the economy’s resources

will be directed. Terminating corporate welfare programs and reforming the Tax Code are necessary to level the playing field and

reduce government interference.

In conclusion, private industry can flourish without corporate

welfare. Just as Congress has weaned many families off of welfare,

it can do the same for corporations. We can stop subsidizing corporations and focus our efforts on real needs and on the things that

we in Congress need to be planning for the long term.

Chairman Kasich, more than anybody else, I want to thank you

for leading the effort to do exactly that.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to speak here today.

The Federal Government spends about $65 billion each year on programs that

provide subsidies to private businesses. This is a huge drain on the Federal treasury

at a time when the impending Social Security crisis looms closer. Our current national debt problem pales in comparison to the $19.8 trillion in unfunded liabilities

already committed to current and future Social Security recipients. If these tax subsidies, really corporate welfare, were eliminated entirely, over the next 5 years we

could save over $300 billion. This would provide some of the resources necessary to

find a long-term solution to our Social Security crisis.

In addition, government has no business favoring certain companies with tax

breaks and subsidies. The free market is there to allocate resources in the most efficient way possible. Federal involvement only serves to distort the marketplace. By

giving selected businesses special advantages, corporate subsidies put other businesses that are less politically well-connected at a disadvantage. Corporate welfare

has led to the creation of what some have termed the ‘‘statist businessman,’’ who

has been converted from capitalist to Capitol lobbyist.

Furthermore, corporate welfare is anti-consumer. For example, the sugar subsidy

costs Americans billions of dollars a year in higher prices. The sugar program is an

affront to the American consumer, whose tax dollars are diverted to prop up a select

group of producers through an ill-conceived government policy. Price controls and

import quotas are used to keep the price of sugar artificially high, thereby doing

great harm to American consumers and much of the domestic sugar industry.

The sugar program unfairly guarantees sugar producers a minimum price for

their product. The U.S. Department of Agriculture secures loans for processors using

sugar as collateral. This allows producers to simply forfeit their sugar rather than

repay the loan. Therefore, it is in the USDA’s interest to keep the price floor for

sugar as high as possible to allow producers to recoup their costs. Otherwise processors will opt for forfeiture, leaving the USDA with unprocessed sugar.

Unfortunately, for consumers, this means keeping the price for sugar well above

the open market price. Is this what our constituents back home sent us here to

Washington to do?

Corporate welfare is also unconstitutional. Our Founding Fathers envisioned a

limited government. The Constitution was written to enumerate specific powers for

a reason. Corporate subsidies are outside Congress’s limited spending authority

5

under the Constitution. Nowhere in this document does it grant Congress the authority to subsidize industry.

As you may know, in 1997, I joined a coalition of members and citizens groups

from across the political spectrum to target ‘‘corporate welfare’’ programs for elimination.

The coalition is called the Stop Corporate Welfare Coalition and it features Members of Congress, including you Chairman Kasich, taxpayer groups like Americans

for Tax Reform, and ‘‘watch-dog’’ organizations like Citizens Against Government

Waste. The programs we target provide businesses—usually big and politically wellconnected ones—with subsidies, financial underwriting, and other supports. Each

program has a constituency and each has powerful interests supporting it.

Don’t get me wrong. I endorse and support companies in their efforts to expand

and compete globally. I have always worked to lessen the burden of regulation and

taxation on American business. I just believe that private businesses should earn

money through the marketplace, not through taxpayer subsidies.

Every year, Congress must approve 13 appropriation bills, which fund the government and every corporate welfare program. I, along with Chairman Kasich and others, have been working to end corporate welfare programs.

The Stop Corporate Welfare Coalition has had some legislative successes. We have

cut timber roads funding, the International Monetary Fund New Agreements to Borrow that were requested by President Clinton were denied, and we have also reduced fossil fuel subsidies. The Coalition has also brought to the country’s attention

to the practice of using taxpayer money for private gain. But more needs to be done.

Mr. Hoeffel’s bill would create a Corporate Welfare Commission, an independent

body that would focus our priorities and raise public awareness on this issue.

The best thing government can do to promote economic growth is get out of the

way. Let entrepreneurs and the mechanisms of the marketplace determine how the

economy’s resources will be directed. Terminating corporate welfare programs and

reforming the tax code are necessary to level the playing field and reduce government interference.

The business world can flourish without corporate welfare. Just as

Congress has weaned many families off welfare, it can do the same for corporations. We can stop subsidizing corporations and focus our efforts on real needs.

Thank you.

Chairman KASICH. Thank you. Questions for Mr. Royce?

Mr. HOEFFEL. Congressman Royce, one question: You spoke favorably of a commission approach that would have a series of recommendations with a take-it-or-leave-it, single up-or-down vote.

Senator McCain had a similar proposal in the Senate.

My version is a little different. It would still allow members to

amend the recommendations on the floor.

Can you comment briefly on the two versions?

Mr. ROYCE. Having talked with Dick Armey about this as we

were attempting to craft legislation on it, one of the most important elements, in his view, of the Base Closure Commission was

the fact that it was a sole package.

In terms of the CEO’s in Silicon Valley that sat down with T.J.

Rogers to prepare his analysis, they felt the same thing, that in

point of fact we needed to take an approach where we combined all

of the corporate welfare programs and offered them up at one time.

Otherwise, there was too much incentive to basically logroll and

trade off votes, to eliminate one program in exchange for somebody

else eliminating another program that—basically to present before

the public one complete set of work that would give the maximum

potential; and I will let you read his analysis. But for members to

vote up or down on corporate welfare per se, that would focus the

attention on one vote and would focus the pressure.

As people like to say, when they feel the heat, they will see the

light, and this is the way to bring the heat, one vote.

Chairman KASICH. I want to thank you for your testimony, Mr.

Royce.

6

What we are going to do is break for a vote, come back and get

our panel. So if the gentlelady and the two people that I see that

are here for the panel will just be patient, we will be back very

soon.

And thank you for your testimony, Mr. Royce.

[Recess.]

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN [presiding]. The committee will come to

order. We are going to get started; we have a quorum.

We will first announce Panel II: Jill Lancelot, Cofounder of Taxpayers for Common Sense; Steve Moore—I believe Steve is on his

way over here, is an Adjunct Fellow for the CATO Institute; Tom

Schatz, President of Citizens Against Government Waste—good to

see you, Tom. And Peter Sperry, Fellow, Federal Budgetary Affairs,

Heritage Foundation, will be joining us on this panel.

STATEMENTS OF JILL LANCELOT, COFOUNDER, TAXPAYERS

FOR COMMON SENSE; THOMAS A. SCHATZ, PRESIDENT, CITIZENS AGAINST GOVERNMENT WASTE; PETER SPERRY, FELLOW, FEDERAL BUDGETARY AFFAIRS, HERITAGE FOUNDATION; AND STEPHEN MOORE, ADJUNCT FELLOW, CATO INSTITUTE

Ms. RIVERS. Is it good to see all of the panel?

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. It is good to see every one of the panelists.

Jill, it is especially good to see you. I guess we will slot Steve

Moore in when he gets here.

We will start with you, Jill, and go through, and when Steve

comes, we will put him in on the end. Please enlighten us, Jill. We

look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF JILL LANCELOT

Ms. LANCELOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman, Mr.

Chairman. My name is Jill Lancelot, and I am Cofounder and Legislative Director of Taxpayers for Common Sense. We are a nonprofit, nonpartisan advocate for the American taxpayer. We are

dedicated to cutting wasteful spending and subsidies in order to

achieve a responsible and efficient government that lives within its

means.

Again, we thank you for inviting us to testify once again and to

present our views on corporate welfare to this committee. Today we

are also here to comment on H.R. 3221, the Corporate Welfare

Commission Act of 1999, which has been introduced by Representative Hoeffel.

Since the establishment of the lofty principles of representative

governance for ensuring the Nation’s common welfare, citizens

have had to stand vigilant in preventing abuses of the system for

the private gain of special interests. There always has been and,

sadly, always will be the temptation to cater to special interests

that are able to influence the system for their own welfare at the

expense of taxpayers. Such is the case with corporate welfare.

In recent decades we have witnessed an extraordinary giveaway

of billions of taxpayers’ hard-earned dollars through what can only

be termed ‘‘corporate welfare.’’ simply defined, corporate welfare is

having the tab for normal business expenses picked up by the NaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:45 Jul 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\HEARINGS\106-11\HBU160.000 HBUDGET1 PsN: HBUDGET1
7

tion’s taxpayers. While it is common business practice to use other

people’s money to grow an enterprise, this should occur only in the

marketplace where the risks of gains or losses help investors determine the worthiness of a venture. It is not the role of government

to bypass the rigors of the marketplace. Neither elected officials

nor agency personnel are adept, let alone more insightful, in selecting market preferences or technology winners.

It is instructive to see what has happened in the past 30 years.

Who could have imagined that within 30 years since the defining

of the Fortune 500, 238 firms on the list have disappeared, with

another 143 firms disappearing just 5 years later? In every industry in which the market has been the basis of competition, dramatic change has taken place. In short, picking and choosing winners should be left to the market.

The practice of subsidizing an industry often props up that industry in incidences when it cannot sometimes compete on its own.

Let’s look at the nuclear industry.

Forty-three years ago the government stepped in with the PriceAnderson Indemnity Act, removing the rigors of the marketplace

because the commercial nuclear industry said the risk of commercializing nuclear power was too high; $47 billion later and with no

reactor orders since 1974, the government continues to subsidize

the industry. In fact, just a year after the new program was funded, even though the year before the Science Committee declined to

authorize that program, the industry stepped up its pressure, and

today we have the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, NERI. The

NERI program is funded today with almost $50 million, a program

that is actually already being carried out by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As an industry that has revenues in excess of

$140 billion, does it really need the Nation’s taxpayers paying for

their duplicative research?

Taxpayers for Common Sense thinks not. In fact, we think the $35 million requested by the President this year is ripe for the Energy and Water Appropriation Budget Axe.

Let’s look at the mining industry. We have all heard many times

how the anachronistic mining law allows the hard rock mining industry to take precious metals, like gold and silver, absolutely free

when they mine on taxpayer-owned land. However, taxpayers get

shafted again. The industry leaves the taxpayer holding the bag for

the toxic mess that they leave.

There are over half a million hard rock mines that have been

abandoned that will cost taxpayers anywhere up to $72 billion to

clean up. Moreover, reclamation bonding, which is the mechanism

designed to address waste from currently operating mines, is woefully inadequate. The potentially unfettered liability of all operating mines in western States presently exceeds over $1 billion because current rules allow bonds to fall short of the full cost of

cleanup.

Then there is the advanced technology program that I think I

will leave others to talk about. I know that Citizens Against Government Waste will be addressing that program today. We too

agree it is a program that should be eliminated.

So it is, I think, quite apparent that corporate welfare is alive

and kicking, but fortunately, Representative Hoeffel and the chairVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:45 Jul 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\HEARINGS\106-11\HBU160.000 HBUDGET1 PsN: HBUDGET1
8

man of this committee aim to do something about it, and we applaud that.

Representative Hoeffel has offered an innovative piece of legislation that could actually put an end to business as usual. Mr.

Hoeffel’s legislation creates a Corporate Welfare Commission that

will examine and recommend to Congress a list of programs that

would fall under the category of corporate welfare.

Taxpayers for Common Sense is pleased that Representative

Hoeffel remains committed to eliminating corporate welfare as we

know it and has fashioned a bill that provides a mechanism that

will implement reform responsibly and quickly. We applaud Representative Kasich and this committee for once again tackling this

issue of corporate welfare that so often is swept under the rug. We

believe that this hearing and the legislation introduced by Representative Hoeffel will refocus the spotlight on this issue.

Thank you.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Thank you, Jill. I appreciate it.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lancelot follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JILL LANCELOT, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, TAXPAYERS FOR

COMMON SENSE

My name is Jill Lancelot. I am cofounder and Legislative Director of Taxpayers

for Common Sense (TCS). Taxpayers for Common Sense is a nonpartisan advocate

for American taxpayers. We are dedicated to cutting wasteful spending and subsidies in order to achieve a responsible and efficient government that lives within

its means.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for inviting Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS) to once

again present our views on corporate welfare. Today we are also here to comment

on H.R. 3221, the Corporate Welfare Commission Act of 1999, which has been introduced by Representative Hoeffel.

Since the establishment of the lofty principles of representative governance for ensuring the nation’s common welfare, citizens have had to stand vigilant in preventing abuses of the system for the private gain of special interests. There always has

been and, sadly, always will be the temptation to cater to special interests that are

able to influence the system for their own welfare, at the expense of taxpayers. Such

is the case with corporate welfare. In recent decades we have witnessed an extraordinary giveaway of billions of taxpayers’ hard-earned dollars to corporate welfare.

Corporate welfare, simply defined, is having the tab for normal business expenses

picked up by the nation’s taxpayers. The free handout bypasses the rigors of the

marketplace in determining the full risks and real worth of the business endeavor.

While it is common business practice to use other people’s money to grow an enterprise, this should only occur in the marketplace where the risks of gains or losses

help investors determine the worthiness of a venture.

However, it is not the role of government to bypass the rigors of the marketplace.

Neither elected officials nor agency personnel are adept, let alone more insightful,

in selecting market preferences or technology winners. The market operates at a

completely different pace, scale and complexity than government. It’s instructive to

see what has happened in the past thirty years. For example, who would or could

have imagined that within 30 years since the defining of the Fortune 500, 238 firms

on the list had disappeared, with another 143 firms disappearing just 5 years later!

In every industry in which the market has been the basis of competition dramatic

change has taken place. Fifty percent of the firms trying to compete in traditional

modes have declined dramatically or disappeared within a decade. Of the 43 companies identified by Tom Peters and Robert Waterman as models for the new business

age in their 1984 book, In Search of Excellence, only 12 remain in good shape; some

have been disasters. Only 6 of the top 20 discount chains in 1980 were still in business in 1990. Clearly, picking and choosing winners is best left to the market.

Using Federal taxpayer dollars to subsidize private industry is not only unfair,

but it distorts the market, reducing economic efficiency. The practice of subsidizing

an industry often props up that industry in incidences when it cannot compete on

its own.

9

NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

Beginning in the late 1950’s, when the nuclear industry testified that the risk of

commercializing nuclear power was too high, the government removed the rigors of

the market with the passage of the Price-Anderson Nuclear Indemnity Act that subsidized the risk of major accidents. That legislation prematurely pushed the nuclear

power industry into the market place. Forty-three years and $47 billion dollars later and with no reactor orders since

1974, the government continues to subsidize this industry. And in fiscal year 1998,

an historical event occurred in the appropriations process when Congress did not

fund any direct subsidies for the industry. This was quickly reversed in fiscal year

1999 when Congress provided $19 million for the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI). Not only is this program duplicative of research already being conducted by the government’s Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but with revenues in excess of $141 billion, this mature industry hardly requires hard-earned taxpayer

dollars going to improve its profit margin.

MINING INDUSTRY

The granddaddy of all subsidies is the 1872 Mining Law that entitles the hardrock mining industry to take, free of charge, gold, silver, platinum and other precious metal found on public lands. In addition, the law allows these often multi-national corporations to take full title to mineral-rich lands for no more than $5.00

an acre.

Furthermore, mining companies all too often leave the American taxpayer to pay

to clean up the waste created from mining operations. There are currently over a

half million hardrock mines that have been abandoned that will cost taxpayers anywhere from $32 billion to $72 billion to clean up. Moreover, reclamation bonding—

the mechanism designed to address waste from currently operating mines—is woefully inadequate. The potentially unfunded liability of all operating mines in western States presently exceeds over a billion dollars because current rules allow bonds

that fall short of the full costs of cleanup.

For example, in Nevada 29 mine sites have been left unreclaimed by mining companies that have declared bankruptcy. According to the Department of the Interior

it will cost $60–100 million to clean up just one of those sites. In Montana, a company walked away from a gold mine and although it left the State with a $60 million reclamation bond, it is far short of the $180 million cost estimate of cleanup.

THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM

The Advanced Technology Program (ATP) was created in 1988 with the objective

of ushering in new technological advancements by awarding support grants for research and development to various corporations and joint ventures. Though the program may have had a worthy objective, there is no proof that ATP subsidies are

essential for encouraging investment in research and development. According to a

March 1997 report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), almost half of ATP

grants near-winners ‘‘continued their research and development projects despite a

lack of ATP funding.’’ And according to an April 2000, General Accounting Office

report, three completed ATP-funded projects, which were approved for funding in

1990 and 1992, addressed similar research goals to those already funded by the private sector. Some of the recipients of these funds have been major corporations such

as General Electric, Xerox, Dupont, Caterpiller, and United Airlines. Surely these

wealthy companies do not need any hard-earned taxpayer dollars.

INLAND WATERWAYS SYSTEM

According to the Congressional Budget Office, inland navigation is the most highly subsidized mode of transportation in the United States. The benefits of this subsidized system go primarily to six corporate agribusinesses, who combined own more

than 50 percent of U.S. barges.

Funded by a 20-cent per gallon tax on barge fuel, the Inland Waterways Trust

Fund is supposed to pay 50 percent of new construction and major rehabilitation

projects. However, the fund contributes nothing to projects authorized prior to 1986

and numerous other projects Congress exempts from normal cost-sharing rules. Despite the existence of a trust fund, the Federal Government collects less than $100

million per year in fuel taxes on barges, but pays out more than $800 million each

year to expand and maintain the nation’s sprawling waterways system.

Even with projects the navigation industry does contribute funds towards, fiscal

accountability in project selection and project design are regularly absent. For example, the Port of New Orleans continues to push a $641 million dollar project to reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:45 Jul 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\HEARINGS\106-11\HBU160.000 HBUDGET1 PsN: HBUDGET1
10

place a single lock on the Industrial Canal. Project proponents state a new lock is

required to accommodate large increases expected in barge traffic and reduce delay

times. However, Army Corps of Engineers statistics show a 30 percent decrease in

traffic since 1988. At the same time, barge delays have also declined. Much of this

nation’s senseless spending and subsidies are found in the inland navigation industry.

These are but a few examples of special interest, corporate welfare programs. Although Congress at various times has addressed the unfairness of corporate welfare,

unfortunately very little has been done to correct these abuses. As Congress begins

to tackle the annual appropriation bills it is an apt time to bring the grievances of

corporate welfare to the forefront.

CORPORATE WELFARE REFORM COMMISSION ACT OF 1999

Representative Hoeffel has offered an innovative piece of legislation that could actually put an end to business as usual. Mr. Hoeffel’s legislation creates a Corporate

Welfare Commission that would establish a Congressional advisory commission to

examine and recommend to Congress a list of programs that would fall under the

category of corporate welfare. Although TCS has concerns that often times a commission can create the illusion of reform and give Congress something to hide behind, certainly the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) was a good

idea and could be viewed as a model. It is important that the commission maintain

its integrity with the least amount of political influence possible throughout a cradle-to-grave operation.

TCS is pleased that Representative Hoeffel remains committed to eliminating corporate welfare as we know it and has fashioned a bill that provides a mechanism

that will implement reform responsibly and quickly.

We applaud Representative Kasich and this Committee for once again tackling

this issue of corporate welfare that so often is swept under the rug. We hope that

this hearing and the legislation introduced by Representative Hoeffel will refocus

the spotlight on this issue.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Mr. Schatz.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. SCHATZ

Mr. SCHATZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am Tom

Schatz, the President of Citizens Against Government Waste. I am

happy to be here this morning to once again speak about corporate

welfare.

There has been some progress, certainly, over the years. We have

rated through our lobbying operation, the Council for Citizens

Against Government Waste, a number of votes on the floor of the

House and Senate; and of course, last year the House Appropriations Committee saw fit to zero out funding for the Advanced Technology Program. We certainly hope that they will do the same this

year, and that the Senate will follow suit.

While that is one of the major topics of my discussion today, I

do want to point out that the preamble of our Constitution outlines

the foundation of our government by stating its purpose to promote

the general welfare. This is quite different than distributing selective benefits for the specific welfare of selected companies, organizations and individuals.

Thomas Jefferson noted that the policy of the American government is to leave their citizens free, neither restraining them nor

aiding them in their pursuits. Jefferson’s words have never been

more true than when looking at special interest business subsidies

or, as many call it, corporate welfare. The government takes our

tax dollars and redistributes a portion of it to those who can find

money elsewhere or who often don’t need it at all.

There are many agencies that house these business subsidy programs, but the most notorious is the Department of Commerce. It

has been described by its own Inspector General as a loose collecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:45 Jul 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\HEARINGS\106-11\HBU160.000 HBUDGET1 PsN: HBUDGET1
11

tion of more than 100 programs delivering services to about 1,000

customer bases. The General Accounting Office says the Department has the most complex web of divided authorities and shares

missions with at least 71 Federal departments and agencies. More than $609 million was spent last year by three of the Department’s many subsidy programs: the Advanced Technology Program, the Economic Development Administration, and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership. These funds and similar government handouts penalize successful companies by forcing them to

subsidize their competition.

For example, a few years ago, a company had developed video

compression technology after years of its own investment and research and development. This new technology promises to reshape

picture transmission for television, computers and the Internet.

Once the technology began to take off and the company started to

make a profit, the Department of Commerce funded one of the company’s competitors through the Advanced Technology Program in

order to develop the exact same technology.

Defenders of these subsidies claim that they are necessary because the programs that they fund are not adequately pursued by

private investors due to their high degree of risk. T.J. Rogers, who

was quoted by Congressman Royce earlier, said that the high risk

argument used by the Department of Commerce is usually justification to subsidize poor investments. He emphasizes that the

important evaluation is the return on investment, not risk. Investments with a reasonable or low risk and a good return are enthusiastically supported by private investors because they are seen as

a wise use of money. But investments with high risk and ordinary

or low return are often given government subsidies.

High definition TV is a clear example of the failure of government technology handouts. Japan and France each spent more

than $1 billion to develop this technology in the late 1980’s, and

they sought to use existing analog technology. Here in the United

States, $1.2 billion in government subsidies was denied. In the absence of government handouts, American companies went on to develop an alternative technology with their own money. In the end,

the Japanese and French adopted U.S. technology, which was done

without any government help.

The $609 billion for ATP and the other Commerce Department

programs is a lot of money, but it pales in comparison to investment in R&D in the private sector. According to the National Venture Capital Association, more than $38 billion was invested in

high technology in 1999, so government subsidies amounted to

slightly more than 1 percent of this amount. Clearly, the private

sector is truly driving research and development in technology.

The appropriate way to enhance the competitiveness and productivity of American industry is to minimize government interference

and to substantially reduce tax rates and regulatory burdens. The

Silicon Valley venture capitalist, Tim Draper, said ‘‘Government

subsidies, winners and losers selected by nonmarket forces, simply

distort the market. It is not a waste; it is plain wrong. The government’s job should be to let the market do its job.’’

Last year, when the House Appropriations Committee eliminated

ATP, it said after many years in existence, the program has not

12

produced a body of evidence to overcome these fundamental questions about whether the program should have existed in the first

place. The report said, given the tremendous financial constraints

under which the committee is operating, the question becomes

whether it is worthwhile to continue to fund a program of questionable value, particularly when it costs over $200 million a year. The

General Accounting Office has also weighed in on ATP with a report this past March.

Let me conclude by emphasizing Citizens Against Government

Waste is not antibusiness. Industrialist J. Peter Grace, who founded CAGW, understood the importance of the private sector’s leading role in the economy. CAGW supports a strong and vibrant economy based on the skills and sweat of entrepreneurs, not the arbitrary system of picking winners and losers by the Federal Government through special interest business subsidies.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I certainly

look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schatz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. SCHATZ, PRESIDENT, CITIZENS AGAINST

GOVERNMENT WASTE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify

today. In particular, I would also like to thank Mr. Hoeffel for addressing the issue

of corporate welfare with H.R. 3221. My name is Tom Schatz. I am the president

of Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW), a 600,000 member nonprofit organization dedicated to eliminating waste, fraud and abuse in government. Citizens

Against Government Waste has never received any Federal grants and we do not

wish to receive them at any time in the future.

CAGW was created 16 years ago after Peter Grace presented to President Ronald

Reagan 2,478 findings and recommendations of the Grace Commission (formally

known as the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control). These recommendations provided a blueprint for a more efficient, effective and smaller government.

Since 1984, the implementation of Grace Commission recommendations has

helped save taxpayers more than $625.4 billion. CAGW has been working tirelessly

to carry out the Grace Commission’s mission to eliminate government waste.

The preamble of the Constitution outlines the foundation of our government by

stating its purpose to ‘‘promote the general welfare.’’ This is quite different than distributing selected benefits for the specific welfare of selected companies, organizations and individuals.

Thomas Jefferson articulated the premise of the Constitution and the genius of

our political and economic system by noting that: ‘‘The policy of the American government is to leave their citizens free, neither restraining nor aiding them in their

pursuits.’’

Jefferson recognized all things do not flow from a central government, nor does

every conceivable human endeavor need a department to manage its activity or

guarantee its continued vitality. Not only is it unnecessary, it’s harmful.

Jefferson’s words have never been more true than when looking at special interest

business subsidies, or as it is more commonly known, corporate welfare. American

taxpayers earn a living by creating wealth. The government then takes some of the

wealth in the form of taxes and redistributes a portion of it to those who can find

money elsewhere or who don’t need it at all.

There are many agencies that house these business subsidies, but the most notorious is The Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce is a classic example of a rudderless, ever-expanding bureaucracy. According to its own Inspector

General, the department has evolved into ‘‘a loose collection of more than 100 programs delivering services to about 1,000 customer bases.’’ The General Accounting

Office says the Department has ‘‘the most complex web of divided authorities,’’ and

‘‘shares missions with at least 71 Federal departments, agencies, and offices.’’

Former Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher said the Department is ‘‘nothing

more than a hall closet where you throw everything that you don’t know what to

do with.’’

13

More than $609 million was spent last year by just three of the Department’s many subsidy programs: the Advanced Technology Program, the Economic Development Administration and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership. Those who

support using taxpayer money to fund benefits to the politically favored will assuredly claim that this is a small percentage of the Federal budget and isn’t much

money. Any taxpayer will tell you that the $609 million is quite real. This $609 million is being siphoned away from the taxpayer so that Washington

can dole out favors. Every dollar taken in taxes so that Washington can determine

who gets subsidized is one less dollar that can be invested in the private sector.

Government handouts also penalize successful companies by forcing them to subsidize their competition. Promising technology and companies are well funded by

private investors. Poor investments and less-promising companies can’t attract private investment, so they seek government subsidies instead. This forces the successful companies who have paid their dues, taken risks and incurred losses for many

years to subsidize their competition with their tax burden.

For example, a few years ago, a company had developed video-compression technology after years of investment in R&D. This new technology promises to reshape

picture transmission for television, computers and the internet. Once the technology

began to take off and the company started making a profit, the Department of Commerce funded one of their competitors through the Advanced Technology Program

to develop the same technology.

Defenders of these subsidies claim that they are necessary because the programs

that they fund aren’t adequately pursued by private investors due to their high degree of risk.

T.J. Rogers, founder of Cypress Semiconductor, notes that the ‘‘high-risk’’ argument used by the Department of Commerce is usually justification to subsidize poor

investments. He emphasizes that the important evaluation is the return on investment (ROI), not risk. Investments with a reasonable or low risk and a good return

are enthusiastically supported by private investors because they are seen as a wise

use of their money. Investments with high risk and ordinary or low return are those

that are given government subsidies.

High-definition TV is one of the clearest failures of government technology hand- outs. Japanese businesses, with subsidies that totaled $1 billion in the late 1980’s,

sought to develop HDTV using existing analog technology. The French did the same. In the United States, $1.2 billion in government subsidies requested to compete

with these foreign rivals was denied. In the absence of government handouts, American companies went on to develop an alternative technology with their own money.

In Japan, HDTV was transmitted by satellite. The picture quality was only marginally better than their standard signal, and special televisions were required to

receive HDTV. The Japanese people responded to this massively subsidized technology by doing nothing: they refused to purchase the televisions required to receive

the signal.

Alternatively, the digital technology developed by the American companies made

the Japanese analog system obsolete. As a result, the Japanese announced plans to

adopt the American system. The Japanese and European taxpayers lost $2 billion

because their governments handed out subsidies. The U.S. relied on the market, and

the results proved that the market works.

Defenders of centralized technology policy will claim that ATP and other hightechnology handouts are essential to maintain our nation’s research and development. Hogwash. While the $609 million distributed last year by Washington is a lot

of money, it pales in comparison to actual investments made by the private sector.

According to the National Venture Capital Association, more than $38 billion was

invested in high technology in 1999. Government subsidies amounted to slightly

more than 1 percent of this amount. Clearly, the private sector is driving R&D.

Economic growth and technical innovations are not a result of selective government subsidies; they are the result of the genius and insight of the American people

operating in the free market.

High taxes and large subsidies fuel each other’s growth. In 1993, the largest tax

increase in history was enacted. In 1994, the Advanced Technology Program was

funded at its highest level ever. Increasing the tax burden on American families and

industry so that bureaucrats can give some of it back to the politically powerful is

not right, nor is it economically beneficial (except, of course, to those receiving the

subsidy).

The appropriate way to enhance the competitiveness and productivity of American

industry is to minimize government interference in the marketplace and substantially reduce tax rates and regulatory burdens.

Tim Draper, a Silicon Valley venture capitalist, flatly states that ‘‘government

subsidies * * * winners and losers selected by non-market forces * * * simply disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:45 Jul 18, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\HEARINGS\106-11\HBU160.000 HBUDGET1 PsN: HBUDGET1
14

tort the market. This is not just a waste; it is just plain wrong. The government’s

job should be to let the market do its job. The best thing bureaucrats and politicians

can do is leave us alone.’’

Agencies like the Department of Commerce and programs such as ATP distort

and harm the relationship between business and government. Last year the House

Appropriations Committee called for the elimination of ATP, stating: ‘‘After many

years in existence, the program has not produced a body of evidence to overcome

those fundamental questions about whether the program should exist in the first

place.’’ The report continued, ‘‘Given the tremendous financial constraints under

which the Committee is operating, the question becomes whether it is worthwhile

to continue to fund a program of questionable value, particularly one that costs over

$200,000,000 a year.’’

The General Accounting Office (GAO) weighed in on ATP in March of this year.

GAO identified three completed ATP projects that addressed goals similar to those

already funded by the private sector: an on-line handwriting recognition system, a

system to increase the capacity of existing fiber optic cables, and a process for turning collagen into fibers for human prostheses.

The Department of Commerce set up a peer review process to study distribution

of ATP funds to ensure prudent spending. Unfortunately, this process is flawed. According to GAO, ATP’s conflict-of-interest provision limits its ability to identify similar research. Federal Government employees, who are general experts in the particular field, are utilized to review grant applications. The problem is that these reviewers are not directly involved with the proposed research area, limiting their

ability to identify similar research. The second problem identified by GAO was that

information regarding research by other companies was not available because it was

proprietary. Early release of any information could damage a firm’s ability to get

to the marketplace first.

GAO understands these concerns and suggests that these two peer-review safeguards remain in place to ensure that private sector research is protected.

If these precautions cannot guarantee a wise expenditure of funds, there should

be no expenditure of funds. The Federal Government cannot award grants without

compromising the secrets of the private sector. In other words, ATP simply can

never function effectively, and the government should bring an end to this unsuccessful intervention into the high tech marketplace.

Let me conclude by emphasizing that Citizens Against Government Waste is not

antibusiness. Industrialist Peter Grace, who founded CAGW, understood the importance of the private sector’s leading role in the economy. CAGW supports a strong

vibrant economy based on the skills and sweat of entrepreneurs, not the arbitrary

system of picking winners and losers by the Federal Government through special

business subsidies.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today before the Committee. I will be

happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Thank you, Tom, and thank you for all

the work you and CAGW have done. And you, as well, Jill.

I might add, the ATP program was zeroed out in last year’s appropriations process, only to be leveraged back in at the insistence

of the administration in the end of the year wrap-up appropriations

bill. So Congress has acted on this already.

I hope we will act similarly on this new appropriations cycle, but

we have to hope the administration would share the viewpoints

that you two have expressed here. We will go to Peter Sperry, and

then, Steve, we will go to you after Peter.

STATEMENT OF PETER SPERRY

Mr. SPERRY. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for inviting me here

today to discuss corporate welfare. It should be noted the following

testimony is my own view and does not necessarily reflect that of

the Heritage Foundation.

I too would like to focus on the Advanced Technology Program

as a singular example of corporate welfare that benefits no one except the corporations receiving government funding and, quite honestly, not them very much.

15

ATP is a competitive cost-sharing program that since 1990 has funded 486 projects at a cost of about $1.5 billion in Federal matching funds. According to ATP’s Web site, the Advanced technology

program bridges the gap between the research lab and the marketplace stimulating prosperity through innovation. Through partnerships in the private sector, ATP’s early-stage investment is accelerating the development of innovative technologies that promise

significant commercial payoffs and widespread benefits for the Nation—at least that is what their Web page says.

The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which established the ATP program, states that the ATP should not fund

existing or even planned research that would be conducted in the

same period in the absence of ATP financial assistance.

The clear intent of Congress is that ATP funding should be provided only to private sector partners who have the technical capability to develop beneficial new technologies but lack either financing or motivation. Nevertheless, the roster of ATP grant recipients

reads like a Who’s Who of Corporate America, including 3M Company, AT&T, Bell Labs, Advanced Micro Devices, Alcoa, Amoco,

British Petroleum, IBM, and Sun Microsystems, to name just a

few.

The financial ability of these corporations is unquestioned. IBM alone spends over $5 billion per year in research and development,

three times the amount that ATP has spent in a decade; they hardly stand in need of financial assistance from the taxpayer. Nor do

ATP’s grant recipients need Federal funding to motivate their interest in research projects.

According to their Web site, the single largest ATP grant has been $31 million for Miniature Integrated Nucleic Acid Diagnostic

Development, or MIND, a project sponsored by Affymetrix, Incorporated, of Santa Clara, California. MIND is essentially a DNAbased diagnostic device. Affymetrix’s Web site reveals that the company was founded and exists to develop and market DNA-based diagnostic devices. In fact, that is the company’s only business, a reasonably compelling motivation to conduct research, with or without

government assistance.

Furthermore, 22 percent of their stock is owned by Glaxo

Wellcome, a leading pharmaceutical corporation, providing Affymetrix with both ready access to venture capital for research products and additional motivation to develop and expand their product

line.

The second largest project funded by ATP, at $28 million, is to

develop the critical technologies needed to enable production and

delivery of high definition television. The project is being conducted

by Sarnoff Corporation, a research affiliate of RCA, which has both

strong corporate motivation to develop HDTV on its own and more

than enough financial capability to do so. Additional partners in

this venture include IBM, MCI, NBC, and Sun Microsystems. Any

single company in this group could easily finance the entire project,

and each of them has a vested interest in the outcome.

As early as 1996, the General Accounting Office examined

whether research projects would have been funded by the private

sector if they had not received funds from ATP, and concluded that

many of these projects would have been funded with or without

16

ATP participation. The GAO also noted most applicants did not

even look for funding from other sources before applying to ATP.

Many ATP projects would be comical if they did not represent

such a misuse of tax revenues. Between March 1995 and August

1998, ATP provided the Koop Foundation, Inc., $14 million for a

health informatics initiative. Dr. Koop, the former Surgeon General, according to press remarks, made about $14 million when

Drkoop.com went public last year; and investors, according to more

recent reports, may have lost nearly as much when they ran out

of cash early last month.

IBM is listed as the lead sponsor on a project to develop a product-based family framework for computer-integrated manufacturing. ATP is contributing about $1.8 million to the project, about

0.04 of 1 percent of what Big Blue spends each year on research

and development, and less than what they spend on a single 30-

second commercial during the Super Bowl. ATP lists 23 projects it has funded with over $10 million and 63 funded at over $5 million, but the bulk of its grants have been

under $5 million, an amount which any serious technology company with an attractive proposition should have no problem raising

in the private sector if they are willing to make the effort.

Mr. Chairman, the Advanced Technology Program does not expand the resources available for applied research and development.

It merely serves as a convenient source of petty cash for technology

companies. The projects that have real value would be funded with

or without Federal funding. In many ways, the ATP is like a takea-penny, leave-a-penny-tray found in convenience stores. We could

all reach into our pockets and find some spare change, but if the

pennies are free, we are all the more than willing to use them and

we generally take more pennies than we leave.

I would like also to extend the example of the ATP program to

other forms of corporate welfare, relating them to the proposed

Commission. Corporate research and development programs are

rarely dependent on government funding. The same is true of many

other programs. Last year Kevin McNew, Assistant Professor in

the Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics at the University of Maryland, examined agriculture subsidies and pointed

out, not all farmers are created equal. The average 500-acre Illinois

grain farmer actually is barely breaking even under agriculture

subsidies, while the 1,500-acre farm enjoys a $68,000 profit. Again,

they are subsidizing the competition.

Corporate farmers make their decisions based on their contracts

with Cargill, ADM, Monsanto and General Mills. Most corporations

will strive also to gain or hold a place in the world market with

or without the market access program. A BRAC-like commission

examining corporate welfare should approach this issue with the

recognition that this interest is broad, but not necessarily very

deep.

Almost every industry qualifies for some form of government assistance; very few of them are dependent on it. Corporate lobbyists,

farmers, small businessmen, labor unions and other special interests will bombard the Commission, but in the end, they will live

without the subsidies.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Thank you, Mr. Sperry.

17

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sperry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER SPERRY, FELLOW, FEDERAL BUDGETARY AFFAIRS, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss corporate welfare.

It should be noted that the following testimony is my own view and does not necessarily reflect that of The Heritage Foundation. I would like to focus on the Advanced Technology program as a singular example of corporate welfare that benefits

no one, except the corporations receiving government funding. ATP is a competitive

cost-sharing program that since 1990 has funded 486 projects at a cost of about $1.5

billion in Federal matching funds.

According to ATP’s Web site: ‘‘The Advanced Technology Program (ATP) bridges the gap between the research

lab and the market place, stimulating prosperity through innovation. Through partnerships with the private sector, ATP’s early stage investment is accelerating the

development of innovative technologies that promise significant commercial payoffs

and widespread benefits for the nation.’’ The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100–418), which established the ATP program, states that the ATP should not fund existing or even

planned research that would be conducted in the same time period in the absence

of ATP financial assistance.

The clear intent of Congress is that ATP funding should only be provided to private-sector partners who have the technical capability to develop beneficial new

technologies but lack either financing or motivation.

Nevertheless, the roster of ATP grant recipients reads like a who’s who of corporate America including 3M Company, AT&T Bell Laboratories, Advanced Micro

Devices, Alcoa, Amoco, British Petroleum, IBM, and Sun Microsystems, to name just

a few. The financial ability of these corporations is unquestioned. IBM alone spends

over $5 billion per year in research and development, three times the amount that

the ATP has spent in a decade. They hardly stand in need of financial assistance

from the taxpayer.

Nor do ATP’s grant recipients need Federal funding to motivate their interest in

research projects. According to their Web site, the single largest ATP grant has been

$31,478,000.00 for Miniature Integrated Nucleic Acid Diagnostic Development

(MIND), a project sponsored by Affymetrix, Inc., of Santa Clara, California. MIND

is essentially a DNA-based diagnostic device. Affymetrix’s Web site reveals that the

company was founded and exists to develop and market DNA-based diagnostic devices. In fact, that is the company’s only business, a reasonably compelling motivation to conduct research with or without government assistance. Furthermore, 22

percent of their stock is owned by Glaxo Wellcome, a leading pharmaceutical corporation, providing Affymetrix with both ready access to venture capital for research

projects and additional motivation to develop and expand their product line.

The second largest project ($28,421,489) funded by the ATP is to develop the critical technologies needed to enable production and delivery of high-definition television (HDTV). This project is being conducted by Sarnoff Corporation, a research

arm of RCA which has both a strong corporate motivation to develop HDTV on its

own and more than enough financial capability to do so. Additional partners in this

venture include IBM, MCI, NBC, and Sun Microsystems. Any single company in

this group could easily finance the entire project, and each of them has a vested

interest in the outcome.

As early as 1996, the General Accounting Office examined whether research

projects would have been funded by the private sector if they had not received funds

from ATP and concluded that many of these projects would have been funded with

or without ATP participation. The GAO also noted that:

‘‘Most applicants did not look for funding from other sources before applying to

ATP; 63 percent of applicants (77 of 123) said they had not.’’

IBM is listed as the lead sponsor on a project to develop a Product-Family-Based

Framework for Computer Integrated Manufacturing. The ATP is contributing

$1,864,000.00 to this project, about 0.04 percent of what Big Blue spends each year

on research and development and less than what they spend on a single 30 second

commercial during the Super Bowl.

The ATP lists 23 projects it has funded with over $10 million and 63 funded at

over $5 million, but the bulk of its grants have been under $5 million, an amount

which any serious technology company with an attractive proposition should have

no problem raising in the private sector if they were willing to make the effort.

Mr. Chairman, the Advanced Technology Program does not expand the resources

available for applied research and development. It merely serves as a convenient

18

source of petty cash for technology companies. The projects that have real value

would be funded with or without Federal funding. In many ways the ATP is like

the ‘‘take a penny/leave a penny’’ tray found in convenience stores. We could all

reach into our pockets and find some spare change; but if the pennies are free, we

are all more than willing to use them, and we generally take more pennies than

we leave.

I would like to close by extending the example of the ATP program to other forms

of corporate welfare and relating them to the proposed commission. Corporate research and development programs are rarely dependent on government funding.

The same is true of many other programs. Last year, Kevin McNew, Assistant Professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University

of Maryland, examined agriculture subsidies and pointed out that:

‘‘* * * not all farmers are equal when it comes to production costs. A 1996 University of Illinois study illustrates this fact. It finds that the average 1,500-acre Illinois grain farmer enjoys 15 percent lower production costs than a 500-acre Illinois

farmer. In real terms, this means that a $2.30 corn price would result in a $7,000

loss for a 500-acre farm, but at that same price, the 1,500-acre farm would enjoy

a $68,000 profit.’’

Government policy has failed to recognize this fact, however, when designing farm

program payments. Farm program payments are made in terms of prices, not the

measures of a farm’s profitability. Thus, a farm program payment of 20 cents per

bushel would mean a $15,000 payment for a 500-acre farm, thereby turning a marginally unprofitable farm into a marginally profitable one. In contrast, that same

subsidy to a 1,500-acre farm would be a $45,000 payment, creating an extremely

profitable situation. On the aggregate level, there is significant evidence that larger

farmers enjoy most of the farm program benefits. For example, farms that have annual sales of $100,000 or more receive 70 percent of farm program payments, and

their net-worth averages nearly $1 million per farm.

Corporate farmers, like their technology counterparts, will base their investment

decisions on private-sector forces such as their contracts with Cargill, ADM, Monsanto, or General Mills. Those who are providing value to the market will prosper

with or without government funding; but if free money is available, they are not

going to turn it down.

Similarly, most U.S. corporations will strive to gain and hold a place in the world

market. Those with quality products and services will succeed regardless of the activities of the Market Access Program; but, again, if MAP can throw some marketing dollars in their direction, they’ll take them.

A BRAC-like commission examining corporate welfare must approach this issue

with the recognition that corporate interest is broad but not deep. Almost every industry or corporation in America qualifies for some form of government assistance.

Very few of them are dependent on it. Corporate lobbyists, farmers, small businessmen, labor unions, and other special interests will bombard the commission with

subsidy success stories, examples of market failure, dire predictions of economic

hardship, and promises of electoral revenge if their pet program is eliminated. Two

year after the program is gone, they will find they are better off without it. Just

ask Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which used all of these arguments in an unsuccessful attempt to save Pease Air Force Base and now enjoys an industrial campus

which employs more people at high wages.

Corporate welfare benefits no one; it merely distorts the market and drains taxpayer resources.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Mr. Moore.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN MOORE

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to give special

thanks to Chairman Kasich and to Congressman Hoeffel for their

leadership on this issue throughout the years.

Before I begin my testimony, I will state for the record in accordance with the Truth in Testimony requirement that neither I nor

the Cato Institute receives any government funding nor do we seek

any.

Let me give you just a quick review of where we are with our

project on corporate welfare. This has been one of our biggest fiscal

projects that we have undertaken ever at Cato, and I thought what

19

might be most helpful for you is to just give you an overview of

what we are finding in our studies.

First, we estimate today that if you include tax subsidies and the

spending subsidies in the Tax Code and the Federal budget, and

if you were to eliminate those, you could save about $100 billion

a year. So we are talking about a fairly sizeable element in the

budget. Most of that is in direct spending subsidies, but Congressman Hoeffel is right, there are a number of loopholes in the Tax

Code that should be abolished as well.

I thought I would give you some examples of programs that we

think are real prominent examples of corporate welfare. These include the Export-Import Bank, Economic Development Administration, the Small Business Administration, and the International

Monetary Fund. I wanted to mention two other programs that may

not be on your radar screen that you ought to look at with respect

to corporate welfare, and those are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,

the government-sponsored enterprises which are receiving, according to the Congressional Budget Office, billions of dollars of subsidies to the shareholders of those companies. I hope that would be

included in any Corporate Welfare Commission.

We estimate there are about 125 separate programs that provide

direct business subsidies. We looked at the last budgets, the 1999

and 2000 budgets, to try to find out whether these programs are

going up or down in the budget. What we found is that Congress

appropriated about a 3 percent increase in these programs in the

last fiscal year, despite the rhetoric about attacking corporate welfare. We also found that President Clinton’s budget recommended

about a 10 percent increase in these programs.

In terms of what we might be able to do in terms of trade-offs,

if we were to get rid of corporate welfare, just to give you an estimate of how big these numbers are, with the $100 billion we could

save by getting rid of corporate welfare, we could do a 10 percent

across-the-board income tax cut, we could virtually entirely eliminate the capital gains tax, or we could entirely eliminate the death

tax. I would make the case to all of you today, if we were to get

rid of either of those last two taxes or cut income taxes across the

board by 10 percent, that would do much more for our economic

competitiveness than by giving out favors to special industries.

So what is to be done? How do we attack this giant problem in

the budget? I am a proud member as I think everyone at this table

is, of John Kasich’s Stop Corporate Welfare Coalition. What is it?

For about 3 or 4 years now we have been trying to attack corporate

welfare through the appropriations process, and we have had, at

best, mixed success.

It is for this reason that although I have had some reservations

about the idea of a Corporate Welfare Elimination Commission, I

think I am becoming much more open-minded to it, because we

have failed in other direct types of ways of getting rid of corporate

welfare. So I kind of reluctantly endorse this legislation, and I

think ultimately that it can do real good in terms of getting rid of

a lot of these programs.

Let me just suggest a few things you might want to consider, Mr.

Hoeffel, in terms of things that should be included in your bill.

20

First, I think we ought to eliminate double-dipping so that corporations cannot receive more than one form of corporate welfare.

Second, I really like the idea of enacting time limits on corporate

welfare. We did this with social welfare legislation. We said, what,

3 years and off? We ought to do that with corporate welfare subsidies as well, with programs like the Small Business Administration.

Third, we should require firms to report to Congress all of the

Federal money they receive each year and from what programs and

agencies they receive money. One of our frustrations we have had

in trying to tackle this monster is just getting a sense of how much

money is going to corporations. It is very difficult to track all of the

various grant agencies and to figure out who is getting what. I

think it would be a real advance if we had better data on what corporations are getting money from what sources.

Fourth, we ought to look at what the proper congressional oversight of the GSE’s is, as I mentioned before. This should fall under

the area of corporate welfare. I hope you will include the GSE’s in

your legislation.

In conclusion, I would just like to congratulate Mr. Hoeffel for

taking on this bill. This issue—I know you don’t make a lot of

friends when you take on the corporate welfare state, but you are

doing exactly the right thing and I hope we can help.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Thank you, Mr. Moore.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN MOORE, ADJUNCT FELLOW, CATO INSTITUTE

Thank you Chairman Kasich for the opportunity to testify before the Budget Committee on Congressman Hoeffel’s proposal to create a national commission to eliminate corporate welfare in the Federal budget. I want to congratulate both of you for

your leadership on this issue.

Before I begin my testimony, I will state for the record in accordance with the

Truth in Testimony requirement that neither I, nor the Cato Institute, receive any

government funding.

Corporate welfare in the tax code and in the Federal budget costs in excess of

$100 billion a year, according to latest estimates by the Cato Institute. Most of these

subsidies are direct outlays to Fortune 500 companies. Prominent examples of corporate welfare include: the Export-Import Bank, the Economic Development Administration, the Small Business Administration, farm subsidies, public housing construction programs, and the International Monetary Fund. I believe that the Government Sponsored Enterprises, most notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are

also multibillion dollar forms of Federal assistance to corporate shareholders.

In all, there are about 125 business subsidy programs in the Federal budget and

they can be found in virtually every cabinet agency of the government—including

the Defense Department.

Our latest survey of corporate welfare indicates that for Fiscal Year 1999, corporate welfare subsidies increased by roughly 3 percent. President Clinton recommended a gigantic 10 percent hike in corporate welfare spending for FY2000. The

attached table identifies the budget totals for FY1999 for what we regard as 30 of

the most egregious examples of business subsidies. The total budgets for these programs exceeds $25 billion.

We have also found that many Fortune 500 companies are double and triple dippers. In our analysis of the 1996 grants awarded to corporations, we found that in

1996 General Electric Co. won 15 grants for $20.1 million. Rockwell International

received 39 grants for $25.4 million. Westinghouse Electric Corp. received 14 grants

for $26.1 million. Yet each of these companies had profits of at least half a billion

dollars that year.

If Congress got serious about eliminating unwarranted business grants and subsidies, the savings could be used to finance large and meaningful tax relief. With

$100 billion a year, we could eliminate the death tax or the capital gains tax entirely. Alternatively we could reduce income tax rates by 10 percent across the

21

board. These supply side tax reduction policies would have very substantial positive

impacts on the U.S. economy.

The members of this Committee should recognize that corporate welfare reduction

would be a major step toward campaign finance reform. With $100 billion of special

corporate favors for sale in Washington, the wonder is not that corporate America

spends so much, but so little to chase down this Niagara Falls of benefits. We could

also eliminate the incentive for corruption of our political process if corporate welfare programs were terminated. Our studies indicate that the corporations that receive corporate grants also tend to be large money pipelines for both hard and soft

campaign dollars.

Although it is said that corporate subsidies are necessary so that U.S. firms can

compete with their subsidized rivals in other nations, more than 90 percent of

American businesses manage to stay in business without ever receiving government

grants, loan guarantees, insurance, or airplane seats on Commerce Department

trade missions around the globe. But they pay higher taxes, which lowers their competitiveness, to support those businesses that do. Agricultural price supports are a

case in point. Farm programs are alleged to be critical to the survival of American

farmers. The truth is that of the 400 classified farm commodities, about two dozen

receive more than 90 percent of the assistance funds. Over 80 percent of the subsidies enrich farmers with a net worth of more than half a million dollars.

This brings me to the question of how we tame the corporate welfare beast? I

have said before to this committee that I wish a commission were not necessary.

The Republican party is said to be for free markets and against European industrial

policy interventions. Yet, what Germany and France have found to be a spectacular

failure on a grand scale, is now experimented with on a smaller scale in the U.S.

By funding corporations with tax dollars the GOP only has reinforced the public’s

suspicion that this is the party of the rich, the privileged, and the well-connected.

The discredited mercantilist policies of the Commerce and Agriculture Departments

are the antithesis of the free market policies Republicans say they espouse.

Meanwhile the Democrats have been equally, if not more, reluctant to shut down

Federal corporate welfare programs. Yet, corporate welfare exacerbates the disparities in wealth between the rich and the poor. The Progressive Policy Institute has

shown that corporate subsidies are regressive: most of the benefits go to wealthy

and well-connected businesses and shareholders. Where is the ‘‘fairness’’ in that?

One last point. Most of the corporate subsidies that Congress appropriates each

year are outside the proper spending powers of the Congress as designated in the

Constitution. The enumerate spending powers as laid out in Article 1, Section 8 of

the Constitution say nothing about creating business hand-outs to help some groups

at the expense of others. The founding fathers would be aghast to see Congress

passing out dollars to favored business interests each year

So what is to be done? I am a proud member of Chairman Kasich’s Stop Corporate

Welfare Coalition. We have elevated this issue in Federal budget deliberations and

have created a sense of outrage among voters. But our victories have been disappointingly few and far between.

Congressman Hoeffel’s idea of a bipartisan corporate welfare elimination commission may have merit. It is a shame that we may need an unelected commission to

do what Congress should have the courage to do itself. But clearly Congress lacks

that courage. A military-base-closings type of Commission, where Congress has to

vote up or down on an entire package of corporate welfare spending cuts, might be

the most promising tactic. Congress should require that the bipartisan Commission

recommend at least $20 billion (per year) in corporate welfare spending cuts. The

Commission should report its findings to Congress by July 1, 2000. Congress should

be required to vote up or down on this package within 60 days of its report.

As far as tax subsidies are concerned, my preference would be to have an entirely

separate commission to look at the special interest provisions in the IRS code. There

are thousands. This Commission should identify economically inefficient tax

breaks—such as the Ethanol subsidy—and then calculate how much we could reduce the payroll tax, the income tax, or the corporate tax if we eliminated all of

these loopholes. The basis of a good tax system is a broad tax base with low rates.

I like this particular feature of the Hoeffel bill. Mr. Hoeffel proposes that every

dollar raised through loophole closings would be used to cut unproductive high tax

rates. This is the essence of good tax policy. We want a broad base, and low rates.

I believe that we could lower the corporate income tax rate to 20-25 percent (from

35 percent today) if all unwarranted tax loopholes were closed.

I would hope that the Corporate Welfare Elimination Commission would advise

Congress to adopt guidelines with respect to business subsidies. These should include:

22

1. Eliminate double-dipping. Enact a law that says that companies are not entitled to more than one corporate welfare grant per year. Sorry, GE and GM. One

per customer.

2. Enact time limits on corporate welfare. With AFDC the Congress enacted ‘‘two

years and off.’’ We should have a similar time limit on corporate pork with companies.

3. Require firms to report to Congress all of the Federal money they receive each

year and from what programs and agencies. Currently it is virtually impossible to

keep an inventory of what companies are getting how much from how many agencies. The records simply do not exist. How much total money does AT&T receive

every year from taxpayers? The answer is we don’t know. But we should.

4. What is the proper Congressional oversight of the GSEs. These are among the

most egregious forms of corporate welfare. The GSEs are growing rapidly. But no

one in Congress pays much attention. The GSEs are proper targets of any commission.

Congratulations to Mr. Hoeffel for his courageous proposal to take on the corporate special interests. His bill is not perfect. But I believe that we will only prevail on this issue when fiscally conservative Democrats link together with Republican budget hawks to expose the massive fleecing of taxpayers that goes on every

year in business handouts provided by Congress. We need to regularly review the

wisdom of these corporate welfare policies. It makes no sense for the Federal Government to be breaking up fabulously successful companies like Microsoft at the

same time we are spoon feeding tax subsidies to the losers. That is a recipe for economic decline and inefficiency.

In 1996 Congress passed welfare reform which has been a major policy success

with massive reductions in welfare dependency. The tragedy of the Republican Congress is that over the past 6 years corporate welfare dependency has risen. Mr.

Hoeffel’s bill is far from perfect. But it may be our last, best opportunity on the

table to get corporate America off the dole.

TABLE 1.—HOW SOME OF THE WORST CORPORATE WELFARE PROGRAMS FARED

[Millions of dollars)

Agency/Program 1999 Outlays

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT:

Agricultural Credit Insurance Fund ................................................................................................................. $353.0

Agricultural Marketing Service ........................................................................................................................ 43.0

Agricultural Research Service ......................................................................................................................... 761.0

Commodity Credit Corporation Export Loans Program ................................................................................... 449.0

Conservation Reserve Program ....................................................................................................................... 1,576

Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service .................................................................... 919.0

Economic Research Service ............................................................................................................................. 58.0

Export Enhancement Program ......................................................................................................................... 550.0

Federal Crop Insurance Corporation ............................................................................................................... 1,303.0

Foreign Agricultural Service ............................................................................................................................ 136.2

Market Access Program ................................................................................................................................... 89.0

National Agricultural Statistics Service .......................................................................................................... 102.0

Public Law 480 Grants ................................................................................................................................... 1,058

Rural Community Advancement Program ....................................................................................................... 723.0

Rural Business-Cooperative Service (RBCS) ................................................................................................... 57.0

COMMERCE DEPARTMENT:

Economic Development Administration ........................................................................................................... 381.0

Advanced Technology Program ........................................................................................................................ 190.0

Manufacturing Extension Partnership ............................................................................................................. 128.0

International Trade Administration ................................................................................................................. 286.0

Minority Business Development Agency .......................................................................................................... 31.0

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: nonweather activities ................................................... 1,087.0

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT:

Army Corps of Engineers ................................................................................................................................. 4,209.0

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluations: applied R&D program:

Advanced Electronics Technologies R&D 1 .................................................................................... 264.6

Commercial Technology Insertion Program ................................................................................... 0.0

Computing Systems and Communications Technology R&D 1 ...................................................... 331.3

Dual Use Applications Programs 1 ................................................................................................ 36.0

Electric Vehicles 1 .......................................................................................................................... 9.0

Materials and Electronics Technology R&D 1 ................................................................................ 278.0

Next Generation Internet 1 ............................................................................................................. 50.0

23

TABLE 1.—HOW SOME OF THE WORST CORPORATE WELFARE PROGRAMS FARED—Continued

[Millions of dollars)

Agency/Program 1999 Outlays

Energy Department:

Energy Conservation Programs ....................................................................................................................... 560.0

Energy Information Administration ................................................................................................................. 70.0

Energy Supply Research Programs ................................................................................................................. 883.0

Fossil Energy Research and Development ...................................................................................................... 370.0

Science Programs ............................................................................................................................................ 2,534.0

Power Marketing Administrations ................................................................................................................... 185.0

INTERIOR DEPARTMENT:

Bureau of Reclamation ................................................................................................................................... 1,143.0

TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT:

Commercial Space Transportation Office ....................................................................................................... 6.0

Federal Highway Admin.: earmarked demonstration projects ........................................................................ 450.0

Grants-in-Aid for Airports ............................................................................................................................... 1,565.0

Maritime Administration: Guaranteed Loan Program ..................................................................................... 60.0

Maritime Administration: Operating-Differential Subsidies ............................................................................ 19.0

Maritime Administration: Ocean Freight Differential ...................................................................................... 24.0

Maritime Security Program .............................................................................................................................. 98.0

Essential Air Service Program (Payments to Air Carriers) ............................................................................. 50.0

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES AND OTHER:

Appalachian Regional Commission ................................................................................................................. 151.0

Export-Import Bank ......................................................................................................................................... 799.0

NASA/Aeronautical Research and Technology activities ................................................................................. 786.0

National Science Foundation: High Performance Computing and Communications ..................................... 301.0

Overseas Private Investment Corporation ....................................................................................................... 127.0

Partnership for a new Generation of Vehicles ................................................................................................ 235.0

Small Business Administration ....................................................................................................................... 12.0

Tennessee Valley Authority-Area and Regional Development ......................................................................... 53.0

Trade and Development Agency ...................................................................................................................... 60.0

Total .......................................................................................................................................... $25,999.1

Source: Cato Institute analysis based on the Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2000.

1 Numbers are from the respective appropriations bills.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Thank you to all the panelists.

We will start with a round of questions. I will begin by asking

each of the panelists, in this debate and in this bill, you have the

issue of tax expenditures and direct spending subsidies. There is

always an ongoing debate whether or not a tax expenditure is corporate welfare or not. I would like to hear your opinions.

Steve, I just heard you endorse the idea of closing tax loopholes

in an effort to close corporate welfare. If we could start with you,

Jill, and go down the line. Do you believe that tax expenditures are

a form of corporate welfare and spending, and if not or if so, why?

Ms. LANCELOT. We do believe that tax expenditures are a form

of subsidies and corporate welfare, and there are many loopholes

that we believe can be closed. So we would like to see that included, yes.

Mr. MOORE. I am glad you asked this question, Mr. Ryan, because I meant to clarify my position on this. This is an opportunity

to do that.

I think you and I and Mr. Hoeffel have had discussion on this

in the past. I think the original version of your bill I was much

more lukewarm on than this version. My opinion, Congressman, is

that if we were to eliminate corporate loopholes but use that money

to lower tax rates, for example, I mean, that is the essence of good

tax policy.

24

You know, the essence of good tax policy is a broad base and low

rates. So once Mr. Hoeffel put this provision in his bill that said,

look, if we do eliminate some of these corporate loophole closings,

then we are going to use that money for other tax cuts in other

places, I am on board with that. I think that is really good tax policy. I am not in the business to want to raise taxes on corporations,

but I think this bill gets around that problem.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Thank you for that answer, Mr. Moore.

I think that clarification is very important, because personally I believe tax expenditures are based upon a flawed premise, and it is

a flawed premise that essentially assumes this is the government’s

money unless they extend it back to the private citizen or private

corporation.

Personally, I think that is backwards. It is a private citizen’s

money until they send it to the government, not the other way

around. So I think that, personally, from a standpoint that tax expenditures and the closure of those things ought to be done in conjunction with a decrease in revenues or tax cuts associated with it,

because if we do close these loopholes, the way this place seems to

be working, as a new guy, it gets spent. So I hope this is done in

conjunction with offsetting tax cuts.

Mr. Schatz.

Mr. SCHATZ. I would certainly agree with the idea that there are

bad policies made in picking and winners and losers with the Tax

Code as there are on the side of spending, so it is certainly something that should be included in this Commission. It is the definition that will really make the difference and, of course, the ability

to amend those items when they come back through the Ways and

Means Committee or other committees and we can talk more about

what we feel about that particular aspect of the Commission.

But there is no question that unless that money is walled off

from being reused then it will not achieve its purpose. In fact, of

course, we have supported a Social Security lockbox where this

money is set aside. And the idea that over the years a lot of programs that we and others here have worked on have been eliminated, yet the money has gone and has been spent elsewhere, has

not been the best way to eliminate these programs. Something else

pops up in its place. So it is a very critical revision of any kind of

examination of that side of the corporate welfare ledger.

Mr. SPERRY. I would certainly agree that any tax expenditure

that benefits a single corporation or a narrowly defined business

interest could be considered corporate welfare. I am a little bit concerned, however, that some people define the ability to deduct legitimate costs of business and legitimate costs of production as a

tax expenditure and carried to the extreme corporations could be

taxed on 100 percent of their revenue rather than on their profit.

I think you need to draw a very bright line between tax expenditures that are targeted and that are only for certain special interests and those legitimate tax deductions which are a result of normal business practices.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Hearing these answers, it brings an

idea of a solution to your bill, maybe, Mr. Hoeffel, that if the savings from this Commission were dedicated and forced to be dedicated toward debt reduction, say, or tax reduction, meaning you

25

put a credit on a pay-go scorecard to force this to happen, you

would have a real winner there.

Ms. RIVERS. If the gentleman will yield, I am confused as I listen

to the panel. Because what I hear you saying is corporate welfare

is defined not by the context in which it operates but what is going

to be done with the money and that a tax expenditure should only

be closed if the savings are to be used for tax cuts rather than because it is unfair to treat some taxpayers differently than others.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Or debt reduction.

Ms. RIVERS. No, it strikes me it either is or isn’t unfair and

should be eliminated. But to say, well, definitionally, it is really not

corporate welfare, it is really not unfair if you are going to give the

money—capture the money for a particular use. It strikes me it

just either is or isn’t. I don’t understand the difference.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Reclaiming my time, I think there is

a very valid debate about whether it is or is not corporate welfare.

That is the question I posed to the witnesses. Seeing that there are

differences of opinion among the witnesses, it seems like you might

have some consensus among all of the groups pushing for corporate

welfare closure that you could capture all of these efforts, you could

then make sure that the savings from these efforts are not dedicated toward not new spending. If you believe corporate tax loophole closure is corporate welfare, then you are fine with that. But

if the savings then goes toward debt reduction or tax reduction and

not new spending, then I think you have a winner. That is what

I was getting at.

Ms. RIVERS. But what you are really saying is the definition is

a secondary one. The definition of whether or not you should proceed is based on what you are going to do with the money captured,

not the basic unfairness of the situation or the inefficacy of the favored tax cut.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Reclaiming my time, I think there is

a clear philosophical debate at the heart of this issue on the tax

expenditure side whereby some believe it is not corporate welfare;

some believe it is corporate welfare.

Ms. RIVERS. And there can’t be a clear definition that guides us

in policy making?

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. I think there should be, and I think

that is what this debate is about.

Mr. Moore, I just wanted to ask one quick question. I am on the

Banking Committee, and we are dealing with this issue on the

GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and I would like to ask you

to expound a little further on what you see as corporate welfare

with respects to these government-sponsored enterprises.

Mr. MOORE. Well, you know, Congressman Ryan, these GSEs

have become gigantic enterprises, yet no one in Congress is really

paying much attention. I just spoke at a conference at the American Enterprise Institute on this, and I noted that although you are

all applauding yourself quite rightly for reducing debts over the

last few years, how many of you are aware that virtually for every

dollar of debt we have reduced in terms of the national debt, the

GSEs are taking on an additional dollar of debt? We are treading

water when it comes to debt reduction because of these gigantic

GSEs.

26

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have tripled in size. The Congressional Budget Office has indicated, Congressman Ryan, that about

one-third of the subsidies we provide to these GSEs, the benefits

do not confer to the homeowners but the shareholders and the people that own Fannie and Freddie. So I believe this is a legitimate

area to look at, and I hope Congressman Hoeffel would consider at

least adding this under the purview of any commission.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, with respect to that debt question,

is that GSE debt full faith and credit debt of the United States

Government or not?

Mr. MOORE. That is a very good question, Congressman. The

markets sure act as if it is full faith and credit. It is interesting,

because what is happening with the debt markets right now, as I

am sure you are aware, as we are retiring Treasury bills, Wall

Street is very worried they are not going to have risk-free notes out

there to trade, and Fannie and Freddie have said we wanted to

jump in and take the place of the Treasury note as the risk-free

credit instrument out there. So certainly there is an impression out

there on Wall Street that this debt does carry with it the full faith

and credit of the United States Government. It is a very worrisome

situation, Congressman, because right now they have nearly $1

trillion of debt.

Mr. BENTSEN. If the Chairman will yield, I will wait for my time,

I will am eager to discuss that with you, because I think that is

somewhat of a broad statement. And we have looked at this pretty

closely, and I think there is a fairly significant rate differential between Treasury debt and GSE debts and a number of other factors.

I wanted to clarify that.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Mr. Hoeffel.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you, Mr. Ryan. I want to thank the panel

for being here and for your testimony. You have all made some

very good suggestions that I am very happy to consider as part of

the bill.

It seems to me, regarding the earlier discussion that the definition—I agree with Mrs. Rivers that the definition is really the key

to this process and that we ought to be looking at whether it is tax

preferences or spending subsidies or below market rate use of Federal resources, that we should not be rewarding activity with these

benefits that will happen anyway. One standard we can use is to

try to eliminate that where we can find it and encourage such benefits that have a broad public benefit that get good things to happen because of the Federal benefit.

It is still difficult to nail down in all cases, but I think that needs

to be part of the general approach.

I want to thank Ms. Lancelot and Mr. Moore for your support of

the bill. And let me risk a bad answer by asking Mr. Schatz and

Mr. Sperry whether you endorse the bill or the process or mechanism that the bill is suggesting to come up with a commission, with

a set of recommendations for Congress to then deal with?

Mr. SPERRY. Well, Heritage as a 501(c)(3) is limited in endorsing

specific legislation, but the concept I think is a good one, and I

think that it could repeat the success of the BRAC commission.

Particularly many of the most ardent foes of base closure found

within 2 years after the bases were closed that they were so much

27

better off without them, that their economy was better, there were

more people employed, et cetera.

When I look at the actual small percentage that this is contributing to corporations, I think that a commission where everybody’s

ox got gored equally, if you will, would leave them better off, because, if for no other reason, they would not have to come to Washington periodically to rattle a tin cup in order to get spare change

from the Federal Government.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Mr. Schatz, if it is easier for any of you to testify

individually, rather than on behalf of your organization?

Mr. SCHATZ. We have a 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4), so I can wear another hat, right. We have, of course, through the Council for Citizens Against Government Waste, our 501(c)(4), rated many votes

on these subjects over the years, the Advanced Technology Program, Market Access Program, peanut and sugar subsidies, a long

list. We have had some success, and, of course, in others we have

gone year after year after the same issues.

The change in the funding for advanced technology is a big success for everyone here and the people that have pushed to eliminate funding for that program. Of course, we would like to see it

eventually accepted by the White House, if not this one, maybe another one. But the fact is you do need to go on two tracks. We think

your bill makes a lot of sense. We would certainly support it and

endorse it through this committee and through the floor and on

into the Senate.

I think the only question is, dealing again with the tax expenditures, clearly that will be an ongoing debate. Also, the idea of

amending the bill when it comes back to the House, because the

success of the base closure commission which arose out of a Grace

Commission recommendation via Mr. Armey, who finally got it

through, was the fact that there was an up-or-down vote. We

talked briefly about the fact that some of these amendments

haven’t gone through and some have, and you would be repeating

that same scenario on the floor of the House and the Senate if it

were not an up-or-down vote. That would be the major change we

would recommend for the bill.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you. That was going to be my final question

to all four of you.

Senator McCain put a corporate welfare commission bill in the

Senate that was a single up-or-down vote like the BRAC approach,

and this version allows amendment on the floor of the House and

the Senate.

Mr. Schatz, I think you have just testified to your preference. I

would be interested in the comments of the other three. Which version, if either, do you think is better for the process and more likely

to be successful?

Ms. LANCELOT. I would like to say what our views are on this.

We do support the notion of your bill. We have a little bit of a reservation that a commission allows Congress to hide behind it and

say we have done it, and we do believe, though, the way you have

set up this Commission, I think you are sensitive to that, and I believe that you have tried to set this Commission up in a way that

it will move forward and it will get something done, so we appreciate that.

28

I do believe again one of our concerns is the same as Tom’s,

which is corporate welfare is subject to great amounts of political

pressure. That is what corporate welfare is really all about. Sometimes it is an unhealthy relationship between elected officials and

large corporations. So there needs to be a way to insulate this Commission from that kind of pressure.

Mr. MOORE. Just for point of clarification, to play it safe, I should

note I was endorsing this idea as an individual, not through CATO,

because we are in the same boat as Heritage.

I guess my inclination would be that I would prefer the Senate

version where there is no amendment to these, because I do think

that you run into some of the problems that Tom was talking about

with respect to the base closings, that once you start allowing

amendments, the whole thing just crumbles. My preference would

be a straight up-and-down vote and let Congress decide whether

they want the Commission’s recommendations or not.

Mr. SPERRY. I think a straight up-or-down vote would accomplish

a great deal and have a greater potential of passing. I think that

the Commission report that was subject to amendment would create a feeding frenzy on K Street that would be disgusting.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you. I just have a comment, then I will

yield my time.

The problem with the BRAC approach, the single up-or-down

vote, is it doesn’t look like Congress is ever going to do it again.

It worked, and it caused some pain in certain areas, but it worked,

but it doesn’t look like we can ever muster the courage to do it

again.

The idea behind allowing an up or down—I am sorry, individual

amendments on the floor of the House and Senate, frankly, was designed to make the process more attractive to Members, to make

the bill’s passage more likely. But we may then have a trade-off of

making it harder to actually eliminate the corporate welfare. But

I am afraid we will never do another BRAC and because of the difficulty with the single up-or-down vote.

Mr. SCHATZ. Congressman, the problem with BRAC was not necessarily the up-or-down vote, it was the politicization of some of the

closings by the White House that led Congress to distrust any future commission. So it was not necessarily the process, it was how

it was handled after the fact, even after Congress approved it, that

there were some promises made that really went against what Congress had actually—and the President had—signed into law. So

this might be a different area, it might be a different approach, and

I think it may be worth having a further discussion about whether

this subject matter would be subject to the same kind of pressures

that the base closing commission ended up in.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you all very much. Mr. Chairman, thank

you.

Mr. MOORE. May I add one more thing to the point Mr. Hoeffel

is making?

One of the things I find attractive—and I understand the political restraints you are under, but one of the things attractive about

the straight up-or-down vote idea is if you had a bipartisan commission, 12 or 15 members, of people well respected and there was

a near unanimous agreement on this Commission that these 20

29

programs or whatever it might be are corporate welfare that are

unjustified subsidies, then this would be a tough vote for Congress

to make.

How are you going to vote up or down on this bill? Everybody

knows what the bill is about. You are either for or against corporate welfare. And that is important. Because my frustration on

working on this issue now for about 8 years is every single one of

your colleagues says they are against corporate welfare, every single one of them. But we never win a vote. We never win a vote,

virtually, right? The reason is they always say this isn’t corporate

welfare, or that isn’t. So the real attractive thing about your bill

and your concept is everybody knows this is corporate welfare. Now

it is time to stand up and be counted.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Mrs. Lancelot.

Ms. LANCELOT. I would like to make a comment as well.

What makes a difference? There are two things in my opinion— press and public opinion. Let’s get this out to the public and let’s

make this a campaign so that folks understand when they are voting what it means to vote yes or no on this kind of issue. The polls

out there all say that the public hates corporate welfare. Taxpayers

certainly don’t want their hard-earned dollars wasted. Let’s let

them have their say. Let’s figure out a way to bring this campaign

to the public so that their voices can come back here and be heard.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Again, I would like to make one quick

clarification. I just reviewed the bill, and I noticed that it does have

a credit on the pay-go scorecard from tax loophole closures. I commend the gentleman for including that, meaning it could go toward

tax reduction or debt reduction. That is a very positive step in the

right direction in this bill.

I would like to ask unanimous consent at this time that a statement by Congressman Rob Andrews from New Jersey be inserted

in the record. Without objection, that shall be.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Andrews follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT E. ANDREWS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

I oppose corporate welfare. We have required poor families who receive welfare

benefits to support themselves if they are able to work—now it is time to tell major

companies receiving taxpayer funds to fend for themselves as well.

Corporate welfare programs use tax dollars to subsidize the profits of large corporations. It is time to stop this waste of taxpayer funds. We should not use taxpayer dollars to subsidize a $145 million insurance policy that allows General Electric to manufacture light bulbs in Hungary. We should not use taxpayer dollars to

loan McDonalds $14 million to build 16 fast-food restaurants in Brazil. We should

not use taxpayer dollars to build roads through our nations forests for profitable

timber companies.

In order to end corporate welfare as we know it, I have worked with my colleagues to create the ‘‘Stop Corporate Welfare’’ coalition. This diverse union of many

citizen organizations with different viewpoints has one common goal: to eliminate

government spending on wasteful corporate subsidies. This coalition will begin the

fight to stop the government handouts to companies which can afford to fend for

themselves, by mobilizing a broad spectrum of consumer, taxpayer, and environmental organizations to support this initial attack on corporate welfare.

Furthermore, I have written my own legislation (H.R. 332) to eliminate one specific egregious example of corporate welfare: The Overseas Private Investment Corporation. OPIC was created as a semi-private government agency that encourages

U.S. companies to expand into developing nations. I believe that U.S. taxpayers

should not be paying to subsidize the creation of jobs in other nations; domestic job

creation must be our top priority, not exporting jobs overseas.

30

OPIC has placed at high risk over $12 billion of taxpayer money to subsidize

many highly-profitable, Fortune 500 companies. At a time when we are reducing

welfare for the poor, we should not be increasing welfare for rich companies.

OPIC hurts American workers by encouraging American corporations to invest

abroad rather than reinvesting in America and creating jobs here at home. Some

of the companies receiving OPIC subsidies have been cited by the U.S. Labor Department for overseas trade adversely affecting their U.S. workers—yet these companies continue to receive OPIC loans and insurance.

I will continue the fight to eliminate OPIC as a Federal agency. The government

should not give loans to companies for their overseas operations, and taxpayers

should not shoulder the burden of risky investments in unstable countries. I hope

that Congress will vote for my bill, which would privatize OPIC once and for all.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Mr. Knollenberg.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Panel, welcome. I want to thank you for your oversight from the

outside. I think it is important we have that. I want to thank the

Chairman, obviously, and Mr. Hoeffel for his work in bringing this

to this point.

I really wanted to go down a route with a different track, because while I appreciate everything you are doing and I appreciate

what is being done here today, there are some things about the

goals we have I think that we ought to look at very, very carefully.

For example, we all can identify in our own minds examples of

waste, fraud, and abuse, and your job is to identify those things

and bring it to our attention. Our job is to take that information

and all the research that you can supply along with that to come

up with a solution. We have got to resolve it. All you have to do

is send us your thoughts, complaints, views, and observations to us.

Once you have identified them, I think what we have to do—and

this is where I would like to have your help on a couple of points— we have to further identify, put it all under the microscope, so

what we are doing is helping a broad group of Americans and not

necessarily just a couple of corporate giants, or maybe several corporate giants.

I have found defining corporate welfare to be very difficult. When

I first came here 8 years ago, I thought it was easy because I

bought into everything I heard about corporate welfare. Since I

have gotten here, though, I find that what some people will define

as corporate welfare is really perhaps, if you smooth it out, it is

not.

Now, I will give you an example. We have an energy policy. Actually, we don’t. For the record, I would like to suggest that we don’t

have one. To that extent, I would like to identify where our energy

comes from very briefly, and perhaps you can respond.

I don’t want to take all my time. How much time do I have, Mr.

Chairman? As much as I want?

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Yes.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. I won’t take that much.

I don’t believe we have an energy policy. I know, Ms. Lancelot,

you referred to nuclear, the subsidy there. What I would like to call

to your attention is this; that when you look at the energy mix of

what we do have, whether it is coal, where over 50 percent of our

electricity comes from—I sit on the Energy and Water Subcommittee and have been wading through this for 6 years. I am not

against unbalancing the various categories of energy, but coal is

over 50 percent. Nuclear is over 22 percent. It is growing. Yes,

31

there hasn’t been a plant built since ’74, but it is growing. Gas is

about 10 percent, hydro is about 10 percent, and the balance, it

gets pretty—if you are catching up on the numbers, there is not

much left.

It might interest you to know, and this is where I want your

help, when it comes to the subsidy that Congress grants per megawatt hour for coal, it is 5 cents. By the way, coal is our largest resource when it comes to energy supply, over 90 percent is coal.

There is a clean coal technology which might be, in your view,

something that is corporate welfare. I don’t know, but frankly, it

is energy too. It is only 5 cents. Nuclear is 5 cents. Gas is 41 cents.

I am talking about a megawatt hour. This is all constant, so we

are not changing anything. Oil is 51 cents, wind is $4,600. And guess where solar is? $17,000

per megawatt hour. I am not saying we should not have solar or

wind or biomass, but you know where all the energy source is? It

is in those first items.

Maybe you can help us. How do we go about strategizing to really do the job right and put—if we are going to subsidies and there

is a collection of people in this Congress that feel we should,

shouldn’t there be some balance to that? Shouldn’t there be some

way that we actually work with that which is commercially viable?

Maybe there is something that we can change on it to make it

cleaner.

Incidently, nuclear has no emissions at all. Coal has emissions

and contributes to the environmental problems.

So is there perhaps something you can brainstorm here for a moment and tell me—I am only focusing on this one area at the moment—what we might be able to do to illustrate that there is an

imbalance in how Congress subsidizes just in the energy arena?

I could talk about ATP. I happen to think you are right on target

with that. You are right on target with a great number of things.

I have a problem with you on OPIC, but we can work that out.

We can start, Ms. Lancelot, with you. Is there something that

you might comment on relative to this energy matter which would

help us maybe in a whole lot of ways and not just in budget matters but in policy for the future?

Ms. LANCELOT. Well, I have a simple answer that probably in today’s world is not going to happen, but in the future hopefully it

will, and that is that no energy source should be subsidized at all.

The marketplace should—— Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Zero.

Ms. LANCELOT. Yes.

Mr. MOORE. It is hard for me to improve on that.

Mr. SCHATZ. Three zeros.

Mr. SPERRY. Four zeros. But I would add that full and complete

energy deregulation so that the consumers can get power from the

most economical source would then pick winners better than the

government would, and privatization or sale of the power marketing administrations such that everybody is competing on a level

playing field and you do not have private sector utilities trying to

compete against public sector utilities which have tax deductions,

they don’t pay taxes, they have access—more ready access, to hydropower, et cetera.

32

If you complete the deregulation process so that the consumer

can make a choice, then I think you will see the dollars flow to the

most economical energy source very quickly, and the others will either compete or die.

Mr. MOORE. I didn’t want to seem overly cavalier in my answer.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. The answers are appreciated.

Mr. MOORE. I just wanted to add that one of the frustrations in

dealing with this issue, and I was thinking about this when you

were speaking, is a lot of the issues we all at this table have been

working on, to eliminate a subsidy, the businessman that gets that

subsidy says what about that guy over there? He is getting a subsidy, too. It is very frustrating, because it is like taxing the guy behind the tree, not me.

One of the things I like about the Hoeffel idea is to de-escalate

so we bring the subsidies down. You talk to the coal people, they

say they are getting a dollar subsidy, we are getting 5 cents, bring

us up to a dollar. We are saying bring them down, not up.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. What about two other things? One is the

PNGV—— My time has expired? You said I had unlimited. I need a new

chairman. I will be very quick. Just a minute.

PNGV, the Partnership for New Generation of Vehicles, what is

your feeling on that? I think I know your answer.

Ms. LANCELOT. Let’s get rid of it.

Mr. MOORE. Ditto.

Mr. SCHATZ. I think if you look at the R&D done by the companies and the percentage that comes out of the government, they

would do this on their own. It goes again to marketplace and consumer demand. If someone wants to buy a 80 mile per gallon car,

someone will figure out how to make it. There are a lot of hybrid

cars and fuel cells coming out already that are not subsidized, that

the companies are doing it. The government is not subsidizing it.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Do you support that?

Mr. SCHATZ. Whatever the companies want to do, if they think

it will sell in the marketplace, that is fine.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. I think I have one last comment. Would you

buy one of those vehicles, any one of you? Would you buy one?

Would you purchase one of those vehicles, the ones that Mr. Schatz

talked about, for example?

Mr. SCHATZ. If the price of gas goes up another 10 bucks.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. It may have since we have been talking.

Mr. SPERRY. A, I wouldn’t buy one of those vehicles right now.

B, I don’t think the Federal Government should subsidize the research in that area. But, C, neither do I think that government at

either the Federal or State level should require automakers to

manufacture those vehicles.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Thank you.

Ms. LANCELOT. I would like to add—this is not from my organization nor from any expertise at all—but I do think—isn’t it Toyota

or Honda, or maybe both, that already have them in the marketplace, and they didn’t get a dime, as far as I know.

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. A hybrid vehicle.

Ms. LANCELOT. A hybrid vehicle, yes. No, they didn’t get any

money.

33

Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Battery powered combined with the other.

Mr. Chairman, you have been kind.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. I am sorry, Mr. Knollenberg. I do want

to give the other members a chance to ask questions.

Ms. Rivers.

Ms. RIVERS. Just to follow up that last comment, my understand- ing is, is the Japanese subsidizes the Prius at about $18,000 a

copy. So in fact their government did underwrite the development

of the technology and the distribution of the first few cars.

But I want to go back to something that I started a few minutes

ago. One of you mentioned you are either for or against corporate

welfare. I agree, which is why I have some difficulty with the definitional of vagueness we got into when we were talking about tax

expenditures. What I want to hear from each of you is, some clarity

on the policy each of you believes should drive review of the treatment of corporate welfare in the Tax Code.

What I am really interested in, because of the conversation that

went on before, is whether or not the elimination of favored tax

status, corporate welfare in the Tax Code should be predicated on

the ultimate utilization of the proceeds from the changes or whether it should be used to address inequity, wasteful and anachronistic

problems with that favored tax treatment. In other words, I am

asking you whether the value is in the identification and elimination of corporate welfare on both sides of the budget structure

or whether it is only important on the tax side when you determine

how you are going to use the proceeds.

Ms. LANCELOT. Should I go first?

Well, first of all, we think that corporate welfare is a misuse of

taxpayer dollars. Our definition of corporate welfare is Federal subsidies to business through direct Federal payments as well as tax

breaks. We believe corporate welfare is unfair, whether it is Federal direct handouts or through the Tax Code and tax breaks.

Having said that, I have to say that—and this is very separate,

very separate from corporate welfare as the entity of corporate welfare, which is wasting taxpayer dollars through direct subsidies

and direct Federal handouts and tax breaks—but trying to plug

into the other discussion about where that money should go, that

certainly should not drive the definition or trying to get rid of corporate welfare. But we do believe—Taxpayers for Common Sense

believes—we tend to ‘‘forget’’ about the $5 trillion debt, so we are

very interested in paying down that debt.

Ms. RIVERS. As am I.

Ms. LANCELOT. I think it is not a bad idea to connect it in legislation, as Mr. Hoeffel did, where we identify these tax breaks and

these direct subsidies, we actually like the idea of a lockbox where.

It actually can go back to the Treasury.

Ms. RIVERS. The reason I am asking this is because I thought I

heard some people saying if you are not going to save the money

then you should let the inequity go on. You shouldn’t address it.

I want to understand exactly if that is what people meant.

Ms. LANCELOT. Let me just clarify for my organization. Let me

clarify that is not what we are saying.

Mr. MOORE. I endorse the provision of the Hoeffel bill that says

that if we raise tax revenues through loophole closings then we

34

ought to use that revenue for tax reductions elsewhere. The Federal Government has more money than it needs right now. We

have got $200 billion in surplus tax revenues this year. We should

not be in the game of raising taxes at this point of our fiscal history.

Ms. RIVERS. Excuse me, do you mean then that closing a corporate loophole, no matter how inequitable, constitutes raising

taxes on the organization that enjoyed the favored tax treatment?

Mr. MOORE. I believe so.

What we ought to do—Congresswoman, I am not sure what your

first year here in Congress was, but in 1986 we passed what I

think was an excellent piece of tax legislation when we passed the

Tax Reform Act, and we did in 1986 clean out a lot of the corporate

stuff. If you think the Tax Code is bad today, you should have seen

it pre-1986. You could get tax credits for bull sperm and windmills

and ridiculous things. I would like to see that model used again,

because a lot of things that I think you and I both view as being

inequitable, it is a good model for getting rid of these, but also

making the tax system work better and fairer for everybody.

Ms. RIVERS. Just so I am clear, if the money was going to be redirected to another use, you would not support the closing of the

loopholes?

Mr. MOORE. That is right.

Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Schatz.

Mr. SCHATZ. I think I agree with Mr. Moore. Of course, our focus

has always been on the spending cited, so the tax side, while the

very obvious examples of wasteful tax breaks have been out there,

the overall process is not something we have studied closely. So I

am interested in looking at this further and maybe answering in

further detail at a later date.

However, there is a point to be made when you are looking at

only the tax side that a tax expenditure is less revenue to the government and when you close it you do get more money in. So you

can look at it strictly from that basis.

You can also look at it from where you are talking about, the definition itself, and that is one of the things this Commission would

probably struggle with more than on the spending side. Because

the R&D tax credit I don’t think anyone would consider as corporate welfare, because anyone can use it. But if you are talking

about advanced technology where you are getting R&D money for

specific projects being carried on already in the private sector, that

is pretty close to a clear definition of corporate welfare.

Ms. RIVERS. Do you think if the company loses its favored tax

status, no matter how inequitable that was, that that constitutes

raising taxes on that company?

Mr. MOORE. They will have to pay more taxes, because they are

not getting the break. So, by definition, it is a tax increase.

Ms. RIVERS. Mr. Sperry.

Mr. SPERRY. I think the question of how any savings from closing

corporate welfare loopholes is used, rather than for paying down

the national debt or for reducing taxes, is an important but separate issue. It may motivate some individual members to support

the bill or oppose it.

35

The important question to look at in tax expenditures is, is this

a loophole which is only available to a small number of corporations, or is this a legitimate cost of doing business? I think the research and development tax deduction was a very good example.

Everybody can use it. It is a legitimate cost of doing business.

A specific tax deduction for, say, the dairy industry, that would

be a corporate welfare.

I would hope that once they got the savings that, yes, they would

use them for tax cuts, but that is a separate question.

Ms. RIVERS. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. GUTKNECHT [presiding]. My turn. I apologize. I wasn’t here

for most of the testimony. I had another hearing.

I want to, first of all, thank all of you for what you do every day.

When I came to Congress in the 1994 election, I came here committed to eliminating corporate welfare, and then I found out how difficult that is. I will tell you that part of the reason I was interested

in that—I want to get to a question, but, first of all, I want to compliment you for what you do.

I think it is important that we continue to put pressure on this,

because the pressure from a lot of people who spend a lot of time

up here on Capitol Hill is to expand loopholes. We all have different terms, but they see it as protecting their interests or advancing a particular cause, whatever the rationale. There are lots of rationales, and we have an amazing ability around this place to rationalize. So I thank you for what you do, and I thank you for your

testimony here today.

I do want to get to another issue, because really back in the

State of Minnesota—and this is something affecting every State,

and it strikes me as something perhaps we should address, and I

would like to have you at least explore this and maybe talk about

it today and think about what we might be able to do at the Federal level—and that is where literally—and I say this because I am

also an auctioneer. In fact, I am a little hoarse today because I did

an auction last night for Ducks Unlimited. But what auctioneers do

is they pit one against the other, and they bid things up.

A classic example of that happened several years ago when Saturn was in the process of looking at different places they were

going to locate their new facility. It literally almost became an auction between various States and local governments in terms of how

many different benefits they would provide. This has escalated, and

it depends on the company now. With unemployment at virtually

zero right now, that whole discussion has slowed down somewhat,

but it is still out there, where States are pitted against each other.

Another example is with sports franchises. It really is almost sinful what some of these sports franchises are now doing, essentially

extorting communities and States, saying unless you build me another $400 million arena or stadium or baseball field or whatever,

we are going to pick up stakes and move somewhere else.

It really strikes me there should be something we can do at the

Federal level to at least restrict the ability of these entrepreneurs

or auctioneers, if you will, from being able to pit one State against

the other with various tax benefits or other programs not available

to anybody else.

36

I do agree with your assessment of the R&D tax credit, that if

it is available to everybody, I think that is one kettle of fish. But

when specific incentives are created for one entity that no one else

in the world could take advantage of, it seems to me there ought

to be a way that the Federal Government could at least—and my

point of all of this is I think it would be a benefit to the State governments, because then they could say, hey, we can’t do that. We

are now restricted.

I just throw that out as an idea, and perhaps you would want

to respond to that and think about that.

Mr. MOORE. I agreed with everything you said until the end. You

are exactly right in your analysis of what is going on with these

bidding wars, but I think that Congress should stay out of this. I

think this is a real federalism issue.

I am a big believer to allow States to do stupid things if they

want to, and that is what they are doing, stupid things. But with

all due respect, I wish Congress would not stick their nose in this,

because this is really an issue that the States are going to have to

resolve themselves.

When I met with your Governor—what does he call himself, the

mind or the body now—Governor Ventura, I said, look, if you want

to attract businesses to your State, cut your corporate income tax.

That is the single best way to get businesses to come here. These

bidding wars are economically foolish, I think the evidence proves

that, but I would be very opposed if the Federal Government got

involved.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you.

Mr. SPERRY. I would second that, Mr. Chairman. Not all problems in the world can be solved by government, and even fewer

problems can be solved by the Federal Government.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. I want to be sure I write that down. That is a

great line.

Mr. SPERRY. A certain point you just have to back off and let the

citizens take it up with their State capital.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you. Seriously, I have had more than a

few disagreements with our Governor, but I think on this issue I

am in strong agreement.

He made a comment about our baseball stadium—and personally

I don’t like indoor baseball, never have, but that is what we have.

It is only 18 years old. He said, how many people would seriously

talk about knocking down a school building that was only 18 years

old and replacing it, especially at this enormous cost? For better or

for worse, he and the legislature and I think the people of the State

have said, hey, if you don’t want to play baseball or football in this

stadium, you will have to move.

When States and cities begin to say no, I guess I do agree with

you, perhaps Federal Government should stay out of this. But it is

frustrating, and particularly having been in the State legislature,

to watch this being pitted against another State or another city.

In any event, I just want to say I have no further questions, but

I appreciate what you are doing. Continue to keep the pressure on.

We will continue to peck away and hopefully not make matters

worse. I think if anything in this whole area, if I can take any credit, I think I can say since we have been here we have not made

37

things a whole lot worse as it relates to corporate welfare. We

haven’t made it much better, though, either. But, again, thank you.

I would entertain another round. Mr. Bentsen.

Mr. BENTSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have to say, being from Texas, I am a little reticent with this panel. I have to deal with the reproductive capabilities of bulls, the price of gasoline, and now talking about new baseball stadiums, being from Houston, I feel like I have had the

trifecta here.

But I do have a few questions for the panel. I will try and avoid

those.

If I could, though, ask a few broad questions and then some specific questions. We have had a recent run-up earlier this year in

the price of oil and subsequently gasoline prices. Do you believe

that is a result of subsidies in the Tax Code or research in fossil

fuels, or do you think that is a market fluctuation that is occurring?

Mr. MOORE. I think it is market fluctuation. I think there are

clearly subsidies in fossil fuels and all other areas of nuclear and

non-nuclear research that I would like to see you get rid of, but I

think the recent spike in prices is a result of OPEC and not a result of Federal subsidies.

Mr. BENTSEN. Would you consider things like the oil depletion allowance to be a corporate welfare, or is that just a provision in the

Tax Code?

Mr. MOORE. I am not an expert on this, so I probably—my belief

is this should be an allowable expense, just as when you are able

to write off capital purchases. But, again, I am not an expert at

this.

Mr. SCHATZ. Mr. Bentsen, I think the answer would be if it is

available to the entire industry and not, say, Shell or Mobil or one

specific company, it would be less likely to fall within the definition

of corporate welfare based on Mr. Hoeffel’s Commission or anything

else. Then I think people at the table would be examining——

Mr. SPERRY. I think in the case of the oil depletion allowance

that it is the type of tax break which is not available to, say, gold

miners, copper miners, coal miners. Other people who extract mineral wealth from the ground do not enjoy a similar benefit, so I

think the Commission may have a tendency to look at it as a specifically targeted tax break.

In answer to your earlier question about the run-up in the gas

prices, I think that there certainly has been some market fluctuation, but I think you do have an example there of where Federal

gas taxes are extracted from the driving public, and then we have

reached the point where much of our highway program is a subsidy

for the highway construction industry.

A number of years ago, I was in a committee hearing where they

were talking about, well, we have completed the Eisenhower highway system, we have got everything going north and south, odd

numbers going north-south, even numbers going east-west, but we

don’t have any good diagonal arterials across the country. At a certain point I think we need to stop laying pavement and cut the gas

tax and let some of the drivers keep their money.

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Mr. BENTSEN. Let me follow up on this, and so you know, I voted

against the highway bill. There might have been 81 of us that did

in the House, not the Senate. But I did so on budgetary reasons.

I thought for some reason we decided to exempt highway programs

out of that. Even though I come from a donor State, I thought we

should have reallocated between donor and donee States, but instead we decided to reenlarge the pie. But we do dedicate the vast

majority—and now all—at that time, the vast majority of the gas

tax, and now we allocate all the gas tax to highway construction.

But you are arguing that that—would the panel believe that is

not a function of the Federal Government in building the Federal

highway system, interstate highway system, that that is just purely a subsidy of highway contractors and real estate developers to

build roads where they see fit, as opposed to building a means of

transportation for the general public?

Mr. SPERRY. Building the necessary transportation infrastructure

is probably a legitimate function of government. Building extraneous transportation infrastructure when we have reached the

point where we have all we need and more, it becomes questionable.

I think right now, when you look at the highway program in particular, it varies from State to State, but, quite honestly, those are,

again, local issues. I would like to see Virginia spend money. I

would like to see the Federal Government spend less.

Mr. BENTSEN. Well, a lot of this is there is reallocation of tax dollars back to the State where they are collected. They are collected

at the Federal level. I guess what you would advocate is for us just

to get out of the Federal highway system and turn this back to the

States and let each State determine what they want to do in terms

of building highways, including interstate highways, and then just

have interstate compacts with respect to how highway 95 connects

between Virginia and North Carolina, or I–10 connects between

Texas and New Mexico, or 35 between Texas and Oklahoma?

Would that be it?

Mr. SPERRY. The original intent when it was passed under the

Eisenhower administration was the Federal Government would

build it and the States would maintain it, and I think it was a very

wise division of expenditure at that time. I think it is still a wise

division of expenditure. I think we have reached the point where

we can legitimately say that the Federal Government has completed its task within this agreement.

Mr. BENTSEN. Well, I would just add—and I hope we have another round because I have some other questions, I would just add

that the country is somewhat larger or somewhat more populated

today than it was back in 1952, would you agree?

Mr. SPERRY. Oh, yes.

Mr. BENTSEN. As a result, the demand on the highway system

has presumably increased some since 1952. Would you agree with

that?

Mr. SPERRY. I would agree with that. I would not say that there

is absolutely no role for continued highway construction, but I do

think that, as we have seen with many of these highway bills, we

have gone beyond what is really necessary, and we are spending

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more than is necessary, and we are taxing the driving public in

order to do so.

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to take up more time.

If there is going to be another round, I have a few questions.

Ms. LANCELOT. Could I just add one comment?

I agree with what Peter just said about the burgeoning of new

highway construction. I think we have to remember or just be

mindful that the existing infrastructure is in bad repair and there

is not enough money going to the maintenance of what we already

have. There is always a terrible story about the bridge that fell into

the river, et cetera. So I think some of that money needs to be

spent on maintaining what we already have.

Let me also be clear about my organization. That is really a personal viewpoint. My organization is narrowly focused on looking at

wasteful spending. We don’t go beyond that and talk about how

money should be spent. We believe in government. We believe in

good government. We believe in the wise use of tax dollars. But we

also believe that there are many organizations around the country

that have their views of how money should be spent, and we allow

them to be part of that debate. We simply just look and stop at the

waste.

Mr. BENTSEN. Your viewpoint is not all of the highway program

is—I mean, I grant you there are some add-ons on there that are

highly questionable as to whether or not they meet in the national

transportation program, but is it 2 percent, is it 5 percent, or is it

100 percent? Mr. Sperry seems to indicate maybe 100 percent, if

I understand, or let the States just decide.

Mr. SPERRY. I would not say it is 100 percent. I would say,

though, that we are reaching the point where it is probably over

50 percent. I think also that when you look at this you do have to

ask at what point does a contract become a subsidy? I think maybe

this was, you know, an area where some disagreement could be

there. But if you are letting out a contract for a project which is

unnecessary, is that a subsidy?

Mr. BENTSEN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back to you and wait for another

round.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. Mr. Hoeffel and I have no further questions, so we can just do a second round for you to go ahead.

Mr. BENTSEN. That is an interesting question. I am not going to

go into that. I think maybe in the economics department maybe

you can do that.

I have to say, some of you do remind me of a graduate school

professor of mine who said he wanted to be a Fed Governor because all he would do is go in in the morning, check in, pick up

his Wall Street Journal and then play tennis for the rest of the

day, and I think some of you all fit in that mold. He was a strict

monetarist. I don’t think there are any at the Fed right now. But

you don’t have to answer that question.

I do have a question with respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie

Mac. I think there is a subsidy. I think the subsidy occurs by an

implicit guarantee. However, I think that is pretty well determined. However, the debate has been over how much of that subsidy is passed on to the intended beneficiary, in this case American

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home buyers, above the level where there is a direct government

subsidy or indirect government subsidy through the Federal housing administration program.

In both instances, neither of the programs, neither the GSE program nor the FHA program, single-family program at least, result

in any direct Federal dollars subsidizing.

How does that type—if that is corporate welfare, if you are defining that as corporate welfare, how does that comport with a direct

Federal appropriation? Is it a distortion of the marketplace that is

your concern? And if in fact the program is working to provide a

subsidy to home buyers, why should we be against that? Should we

rather live in the perfect world where you are at the whim of the

market and constant fluctuations in price, constant fluctuations in

interest rate costs, and what good necessarily is that for the market?

Finally, I just have to say, because I have sat through hours of

hearings on the House Banking Committee on this issue, I really

think that this idea of—Mr. Ryan, I don’t want to speak for Mr.

Ryan; he can have his own opinion on this—but I think really this

idea of trying to compare GSE debtor Fannie and Freddie debt to

Treasury debt is misguided. I think it is really apples and oranges.

Because you have different levels of leverage, you have different assets than you do to other types of corporate debt. It is clear on the

face that it is not full faith and credit debt, although I will grant

you that the market views the implicit guarantee as something

that the Federal Government is not necessarily going to walk

away. But I also think the reason why you are seeing the market

look at GSE debt is they are looking for some stability as an indicator of how to set rates.

I don’t know that that is all that bad, and I don’t think—I think

the argument that those who see a problem here are trying to

make is that this will result in excessively cheap money going to

the GSEs, which, in turn, will seek more risky returns with that

cheap money, ultimately to the detriment of the taxpayer. I am not

sure that nexus exists there, because they do have a fairly narrow

definition of where they can put their money, and there is a limitation on the mortgage market, both legislatively as well as what will

be there.

But to my original question, is a subsidy in that effect bad if it

doesn’t involve dollars?

Mr. MOORE. I would love to have lunch with you sometime and

really thrash this thing out, because I think it is a very important

issue, and there are a lot of complexities here. It is not a simple

issue. And you are quite right, this isn’t like a subsidy that is a

direct appropriation.

You asked about, for example, who gets the benefit. Certainly

some portion of this benefit does go to the homeowners in terms of

lower interest rates than otherwise would be charged. The Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office have called

this a spongy conduit by which they mean that this is—I described

this as sort of a trickle-down housing policy, that it takes for every

dollar you are putting into this only, you know, maybe 50 cents is

actually trickling down to the actual homeowner.

41

I do believe that this is a form of corporate welfare, even though

it is not a direct appropriation, you are quite right. I am very worried, and I think Congress should be very worried, about the incredible expansion of debt that is being taken on at the GSEs. You

are right, they are not exactly comparable to Treasury debt. But

these have tripled in the last 10 years without anyone taking much

notice of it.

There is very solid evidence, Congressman, and I would love

again to sit down and talk with you more about this, that this is

a real danger to our financial markets. As long as things go swimmingly, we are fine. If there were some problems in the housing

market, you would see, I don’t think—I know you are the one here

asking questions, but I would sort of pose a question to you, and

that is imagine what would happen if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

did come under financial trouble? Certainly you would agree, I

would think, the Federal Government would step in and bail them

out. They have done that in the past.

So that is why I am nervous about it. You are right, it is not exactly comparable to the national debt, but it is something we

should worry about. I think it also does fall under the purview of

some of this benefit going to the shareholders. That is why I consider it a form of corporate welfare.

Mr. BENTSEN. That is a legitimate question, and no one has defined what those numbers are yet. But we are talking about assetbacked debt. This is not equity, this is not even Treasury debt that

is backed by the assets of all of us here, but it is asset-backed debt.

We have had fluctuations in the housing market, we went through

the 1980’s in Texas, for instance, and the early ’90’s in California

and New England where there were troubles. But, arguably, Congress has also responded to that with the 1992 act in creating

OFHEO, which was charged with creating sort of a rating standard, rating criteria to look at the portfolios behind them. But it is

a tough question. But I don’t think it is as simplistic as that.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. If I might just interject something, Mr.

Bentsen, since you invoked my name, I agree with you. I don’t

think GSE debt is the same as Treasury debt, and I think it would

be wrong for us to make that assumption as Members of Congress,

because I would hate to make an implicit guarantee, an explicit

one, through our comments.

But I think a valid concern to look into is the excess debt that

the GSEs are piling on top of their mission-critical debt. I think it

is important to note their debt will increase as the housing market

increases, as the secondary mortgage market increases, which is

their mission. Obviously, that debt is going to increase.

My concern is when you look at other things the GSEs are doing,

such as repurchasing mortgage-backed securities, piling on excess

debts on top of that, does that debt go toward putting somebody

into a home or go toward shareholders? I really don’t know the answer to that question, but you think that is a very valid question

to ask. I do not think it is the same debt as Treasury debt. You

are right. It is asset-backed.

Mr. BENTSEN. If the gentleman would yield, or whoever’s time it

may be, the question is whether or not the repurchase of secondary—the repurchase of asset-backed debts in the secondary market

42

enhances the liquidity in the secondary market and thus transcends a better rate to the primary market, which one would argue,

and also whether or not that fits within the function of the GSE.

So it is a complicated question. But I don’t think you can just argue

that supporting the secondary market through the repurchase of

asset-backed debt is necessarily outside the mission of the GSEs,

and it is asset-backed debts.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. That is a very good point. Given the

fact we believe, all of us, that this implicit guarantee exists and

therefore a bailout would occur, as has happened in the past, it is

a new form of risk. It is an interest rate risk on the books, a prepayment risk which does pose an additional risk to the taxpayer

should interest rate fluctuations occur that weren’t anticipated, if

they are not hedged properly. So those raise new questions. I think

that Mr. Moore’s comment is valid probably in that context. But I

don’t think we would equate GSE debt to Treasury debt.

Were there any questions?

Mr. SCHATZ. I just have a quick comment.

First of all, I will be testifying on Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac next

week, so I could do it here, but clearly we have run out of time.

Second, I think the fact that it has been brought up shows there

are very legitimate questions about this as it relates to the budget,

as it relates to their mission, as it relates to the future of what the

benchmark would be. These are all things that should be explored.

So that was my comment. I appreciate your interest very much,

Congressman.

Mr. SPERRY. I think the GSEs are obviously a very complex

issue, and determining whether or not they were specifically corporate welfare would be the work of a Ph.D. dissertation, as it

would be to determine whether excess contracts are indeed corporate welfare. But I think in the terms of this Commission that

is being proposed under the legislation being considered that they

probably would not—you would probably not want to include either

of those subjects simply because it would quickly end up dominating the commission and you would never—its work would never be

completed. The Commission should probably be more focused on

the traditional forms of corporate welfare, subsidy, tax breaks.

That will be more than enough to keep them occupied throughout

the life of the Commission.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. With no further questions——

Mr. HOEFFEL. No questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, panelists, for being here. You have given us over 2

hours, and we have all learned from you. I thank you for that.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your cooperation.

I think Ms. Lancelot said this needs to be a two-pronged attack.

We need a commission or some kind of a mechanism, but we need

to keep going after these projects in the appropriations process. I

certainly will pledge my support to temporary Chairman Ryan and

permanent Chairman Kasich to cooperate on that during this year.

Thank you all very much.

Mr. RYAN OF WISCONSIN. If there are no more questions, I would

like to thank the witnesses for your thoughtful testimony and

spending the time with us today.

This hearing is adjourned.

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[Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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