VIETNAM STUDIES 

Division-Level 

Communications 

1962 1973 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Library of Congress Cata logi ng in Pu blication Data 

Myer. Cha rles R. Division-level commun ica tions. 1962· 1973. 

(Vielllam studies) 

Includes index. 

Su pt. of Docs. no.: D I01.74 :C73/ 5/ 962·73 

I . Vietnamese Conflict. 1961-1975-Communicatio ns. 

2. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961 · 1975-United Sta tes. 

I. Title. II. Series. 

DS"9.8.C6M93 959.704 '38 81·607123 

First Printed 1982-CMH Pub 90-11 

For saIl' by thl' SUI)('lin\('nden! of l)ocuml'nts. U.s. Govcnullcnt I'linl.ing Oflice 

Internet: boo\ultorc.gpo.go" Phone: (202) 512-1800 FIIJI: 12021512- 2250 

Mail: Stop SSOI'. Washington. DC 20-101-0001 
Foreword 

The United States Army met an unusual ly complex challenge 

in Southeast Asia. In conj unctio n w ith th e other services, the Army 

fought in support of a national policy of assisting an emerging 

nation to develop govcrnmclllai processes of its own choosing, free 

of o utside coercion . In addition to the usua l problems o f wagi ng 

armed confl ict, the assignment in Sout heast Asia req uired 

superimposing the immensel y sophisti ca ted tasks of a modern 

aflll Y upon a n underdeveloped environment and adaptin g them to 

dema nds covering a wide spectrulll. These involved help ing to 

fulfi ll the basic needs of a n agraria n populatio n, dealing wi th the 

frustralions of antiguerrilla o perations. and con du cting conventional campaigns against we ll-trained and determined regu lar 

unit.s. 

Now that this assignment has ended, the U.S. Army must 

prepare for other challenges that may li e ahead. Whil e cogni za nt 

that histor}' never repeats itself exac tl ), and tha t no a rmy ever 

profited from trying to meet a new cha ll en ge in terms of the o ld 

o ne, the Army nevert heless stands to ben efit immensel), from a 

study o f its ex peri ence, its shortcomings no less than its achievements. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the officia l h istories 

wil l provide a detailed a nd objective a nalysis of th e experience in 

Southeast Asia, we hav/: sought a forum whereby some of the more 

sa lient aspects of that experie nce can be made ava i lable now. At lhe 

request of the Ch ief of Staff, a representative group o f senior 

officers who served in importa nt posts in Vietnam and \",ho still 

carry a heavy burden o f da y-to-da y responsibi lities have prepa red a 

series of monographs. These studi es should be of grea t value in 

helping the Army deve lop future opera tiona l concepts wh ile a lthe 

same time co ntributing to th e historical record and providi ng the 

A meri ca n public with a n interim report on the performa nce of men 

and officers who have respo nded, as o th ers have t hrough o ur 

history, to exacti ng and trying dema nds. 

The reader should be reminded that most of th e writing was 

accomplished w hile the war in Viet na m was a t its peak, a nd the 

III 
monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were 

laking place in the present. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on official 

records, with addit iona l malerial from published and unpubl ished 

secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

participants, a nd from the personal experience of the aut hor. To 

faci litate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography 

have been omilled from the published versio n; a fully documellled 

accoulll with bibliography is filed with the U,S. Army Center of 

Military History. 

Lieutenalll General Charles Robert Myer, o ne of the tOp 

communicators in the United States Army, was a professional 

communicaLOr during his entire career and served in a variety of 

assig nments with nonprofessio nal as well as professional 

communicaLOrs. From 1960 to 1963 he was involved in 

communications combat devciopmcllls as a starr officer in the 

DirecLOrate of Organization and Traini ng of the Army Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. In 1964 he assumed 

command of the 69th Signal Battalion at Fort Eustis, Virginia. In 

November 1965 the battalion was deployed to Vietnam, where it 

remained under Ge neral Myer's command ulHil he returned LO the 

Uni ted States in September 1966. Following command assignments included the II th Signal Group at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 

July 196B-August 1969: lhe U.S. Army Strategic Communicatio ns 

Command. Europe, January 1970-May 1972; the 1st Signal 

Brigade, Vietnam, June 1972-Novem ber 1972; and the U.S. Army 

Signal School/Training Center a nd Fort Gordon, Georgia, August 

1973-September 1974. On I October 1974 General Myer's title 

became Commandant, United States Army Signal School. and 

Commander. United Stales Army Signal Celller and Fort Gordon. 

In this post General Myer served as the training and comba t 

development proponent for com munica tions matters within the 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and worked close ly 

with the commandants of al l the other Army schools (Osee that the 

communications aspects of their fields of doctrinal responsibility 

were integrated into future operational concepts and developments. 

Genera l Myer subsequently served as Dil'ector, Telecommunications 

and Command a nd Control; Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 

and Plans, September 1977-0ctober 1978: Assistant Chief of Staff. 

Automation and Communications, U.S. Army. Washington, D.C., 

Onober 1978-July 1979; a nd Deputy Director General of NATO 

IV 
Integra led Communicalions Management Agency, July 1979- 31 

March 198 1. He was promoled 10 lieulenant general o n I August 

1979, and he reI ired from service o n 31 March 198 1. 

Washington. D.C. 

20 July 198 1 

v 

ROBERT M . JOYCE 

Brigadier Genera l. USA 

T he Adjutant Genera l 

Preface 

Concentrating on the Vi etnam communications ex perience at 

div ision level a nd lower, this mo nograph is a compa nio n vo lume 

to Major General T homas M. Rienzi's comprehensive Commu nicalions-Electronics. Com mu nicat io ns in Viet nam were so 

interrela ted and illl crwQven that familiari ty with the o verall a nd 

supporting situatio n as ponrayed by Genera l Ri enzi will promote 

bell er understa nding and appreciatio n o f the di visiona l communica tio ns SlOry. 

Communica tio ns is the primary missio n of the Sig nal Corps 

and ils members. Division-Level Comm un ications is a sto ry not 

o nl y o f some very fine Sig nal Corps uni ts a nd individua ls but a lso 

o f many o lher communica to rs from the Infalllry, Armor, Artill ery, 

a nd all o lher branches o f the Army. It is a combined arms story; on 

the battlefi eld. com mu nicat io ns is everybody's business. 

T he scope o f this study includes the stateside a lert and readying 

of units for Vietnam dut y and the reactio n of the Army trai ning 

base to supply the volume o f trained special ists needed to man the 

equipmen t associated with a mo dern communi ca tio ns system. T he 

tra nsitio n from peacetime status to ballle£ieid effectiveness is 

a lways difficult, norma ll y made more so because o f severe sho rtages 

of time, equipmelll, and skilled men. 

T he study po ints o u t examples o f errors a nd sho rtfalls without 

losing sight of the things tha t went ri g h t. V iell1am unit after-action 

repon s a nd senior o fficer end-o f-to ul' debriefin g reports were 

notable in their paucity o f complaints a bout communi catio ns 

diffi culties: things d id go rig ht in the commu nications fi eld most 

of the lime. Communi catio ns, mo bility, and fire power fo rmed the 

tri ad upo n which Vi etnam tactica l operations \."ere based. 

Da ta for this mo nogra ph was drawn prima ril y from aherac tio n repons and interv iews, documen ted lessons leClr ncd. o fficia l 

repol'lS, and recent interviews Clnc! lellers from numero us 

ind ivid uals who served with the seven di visio ns and five separate 

brigades and regiments whi ch were the hea rt of d ivisio nal 

commu ni ca tio ns. Si ncere ap precia tion goes to the many 

commun icators a nd comma nders. acti ve a nd re tired . who shared 

VII 
their experiences, phOlographs, and papers so thal this volume 

could be written. A special word of thanks is reserved for those 

members of the Signal School staff who assisted in researchi ng and 

organizing this mon ograph. 

20 Ju ly 1981 

V III 

C HARLES R. MYER 

Lieutenam General, U.S. Army 
Contents 

Choplr. I'agt 

J. EARLY INVOLVEMENTS AND 

DEVELOPMENTS . ......... , .............. , 3 

II. COMMITMENT OF AMERI CAN GROUND 

COMBAT FORCES . . ....................... 16 

III. BLUNTING THE ENEMY DRiVE.... ........... 23 

IV . SHIFT TO THE OFFENSIVE ............ . . . ... . 37 

V. RIVERINE OPERATIONS AND THE 

CAMBODIAN INCURSION . . ... . ......••... 49 

R iverine Operariolls ................ .. ... 49 

Cambodian ln cuTsiO'T .......... ,......... 55 

VI. PHASE·O UT ....................... .. ... . . . .... 60 

VII. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY THREAT . . ... 64 

VIII. SECURITY RESPON SE .. . .... . .. . ... .. .. . ...... 68 

IX. THE ART AND PROCESS OF 

COMMUNiCATING .... . ....... . . . .. . .... ,. 73 

X. LOG rICS ........ . , .......... , ., ...•... . .•. ,. 77 

XI. ADM I N ISTRATION ....... . ..........••.. ".... 84 

XII. THE TRAINING BASE .................... . •... 87 

XIII. COM BAT COMMUNICATIONS IN 

RETROSPECT ............................. 99 

APPENDIX A: SOME DIVISIONAL ENLISTED 

MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES. 

COMMUNICATIONS ... ,", .•. , ............... .. 103 

INDEX ......................... . ............. . ...... I. 

Table 

I. Phase·Out of Remaining U.S. Army Tactical Units. 

October 1970-June 1972 ......................... 60 

Maps 

I. Southeast Asia ....... . ..... .. . , .. ,',., .• . . ..••..... 4 

2. Geographic Regions. South Vietnam ..........•...... 6 

IX 
No. I'llg~ 

3. American Units in Vietnam ......................... 8 

4. l\'lajor Combat Operations, July 1965-June 1966 ....... 26 

III ustrations 

Radio Telephone Operator.... ..... ... . . . . . . . . .. . ..... . 9 

Ea rl y Command Communications Console With Airo·aft 

Radios ...................................... . .... 13 

Early Command Communications Console With VRC-12 

Series Radios ..................................... )4 

Men of the 13th Signal Ballalio n Operate Airborne Relay. 29 

Nui Ba Den. June 1966 .............. . ................. 30 

M RC-34J.i Configuration ........................... . .. . 32 

Division Tactical Operations Center Switchboard . ..... ,. 34 

Hi gh Frequency Radio Bunker . ........................ 35 

Rad io Wire Integration Sta tion ..................... . .. . 42 

Rotatable Anten na .... ... . .......... . .........•. .. . ... 50 

AN/ GRC/ TCC-3 Multicha nnel Equipment .... . •...•... 53 

SB-22 Switchboard ..................... . .....••• . .. . . . 53 

Students Eroct Antenna . . . . ... ... .. . . .. ................ 80 

Brant Hall ... ................. .. . ...... ........... . .. 97 

All illustratio ns are from Department of Defense files. 

x 
DIVISION-LEVEL 

COMMUNICATIONS 

1962-1973 

C HAPTER I 

Earl y Involvements and Developments 

O n 2'1 November 1963 a large Viet Long force <ll iacktxl Ihe 

Special Forces Camp at Hiep HO<l. Republ ic of Vietnam. Sergea nt 

First Class Ken nelll M. Roraback. working in the rad io room, 

immediately not ified higher hcadquancrs of the situation. I-lea,,), 

enemy fire damaged his gear a nd knocked out a portion of the rad io 

room, but Sergea n t Roraback rema ined at his station and 

a ttempted to repa ir his radio. When it became apparellt ,hal the 

rad io was beyond repa ir. he dcsl royf'd wha l was left of the 

equipment. ma neuvered throug h hostile rirc. and used a li gh t 

machi ne gu n 10 cover withd rawal. He was taken by the Vict Cong 

and died in captivity. He was aw;nded posthumously the Si lver 

Slar for gallaillry in action. 

Sergeant Rora back's Sloq' po ints up mo re tha n his lmlvery. T he 

early da te, 1963. is a remi nder that Army communicators wcrc on 

d ut y in Vie lll am, advising and su pportin g the Vietnamese Army, 

well before AmeriGlIl tactical un its \\'ere com milled in 1965. The 

techni cal proficiency of Sergean t Roraback exemplifies the 

tr<li n ing a nd dedi ca tio n of the Ameri ca n combat commu n icatol'-

the very fiber of commun ications in Viet nam. !-l is courageous fi g ht 

ollce he had accomplished h is technic.1i missio n says tha t combat 

communicators were figh ters as we ll as tech nic ia ns who played 

vital parts in operat ing a nd mai nt aining the link.ll that held 

A lllcrican com bat forces together. 

In lllostl<lctiGl1 opel' ,-uions in Vit'tn am. radio was till' primar)' 

mc;.IIls of c0l11111un iGlt io n. T elephone. teletypewri ter, da ta. fa csimile, tel evisio n, visual. a nd sou nd communi cati ons were a lso used. 

Tht' cl ima te a nd Icnain of the Republi c o f Vietna m challenged 

those means of cOllllll unica tion and the 1ne n wh o opera ted them. 

Vietnam is loc.lIed squarely in the torrid zone. (MlIP 1) High tempCl'aturt's prevail 1I11'oughout the yc;u. except ill a few mou nt ai nous are«s. The avcrage a nn ua l tcmperature vmil's on ly a few degrees between Hue in the north (77°F) and Saigon in (he sout h 

(8 1.5°F). wi th ge nera ll y h igh humid it y. The annual rainfa ll is 

heavy in all regio ns, torrcn tia l in some; it «veragcs 128 inches at 
4 DI VISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-1973 

SOUTHEAST ASIA 

o 500 Miles 

500 Kilometer, 

CHINA 

THAILAND 

BORNEO 

MAP } 
EI\RLY NVOLVE~IENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 5 

Hut: and abo ut 80 inches .11 Saigon. rhese condit ions had their 

effecl) 011 delicate dectroniccquipmt.'llt and tem l)eratt.' w ne troops. 

'rhe Rt.'public of Vietnam has Ihrcc major region): the 1\ lckong 

Delta, the Hig h la nds. and Ihe Celliral Lowland s. (Map 2) Tht: 

!\kkong Delta comprises the sOllt hern two-riftlb oftht:cou lIlry. l ts 

fertile a llu vial plains. favored by Il ea\') rainfall. make it o ncof the 

gre.lI rice-growi ng areas of I he world toeconomisls-and oneof Ihe 

world'S largest mud ho le) 10 1roop) tl ying to operate there. The 

dc lt a is interlaced wi th a strit) of ri\'crs consi)[ing of th e five 

brallches o flh e 1\lekong. whi ch total abouI300 III iles in lengt h. and 

thr('(' smaller rivers; the Dong Nai. th e Saigon. alld Ihe \lam Co 

Dong. ·rhi) low, le\"c l plaill is )cldom more th an tC11 feet above sea 

I('vel. and. during the flood season. the only dr y land to be found is 

generally that forming Ihl' b.mks of the ri\'ers a nd canals. rhese 

Icvees a nd dikes. built for flood cont ro l. a re used extensively as 

village sites. Des pitc its on~;lgc of solid ground. tht.· delta regio n is 

very heavil y popu lated. wi lh more Ihan 2.000 people per square 

mil e in )ome area~. rhe wa ter Il et\\'ork of rivers. slreams. a nd 

C<lIlaill: the rIat. soft tcrrain: and the dense popUlation in flucnced 

the nature of lIIililary opera tio ns that wcre undcrtake n 10 combal 

enemy forces there. 

'rhe 1-1 ighlands (0 1" the Ch<lille Annall1 it ique ) dominate th e arca 

of Vietnam nort hward fro m th c !\Iekong Delta 10 the dellla rc;:u ion 

Ii ne. The Chaim' An !lamil iq lie. wit h its several high platcaus. is an 

eXIl'nsion of the rugged Illoulltains Ihal o ri ginate ill Tioci and 

China. The Cha ine forms the border between the Republic o f 

Vielnam a nd the Khmcr Republi c (CamlxKlia ) to a point about 

fift y miles north of Saigon. This natura l border is irreg u lar in 

heig ht and shapl' wit h numerous sp u rs dividing Ihe coastal strip 

inlO a series of compart ments th aI make no rth-south communications difficult. Incl uded in the Chaine is a platl'au region known as 

the Central Highl ands Ihal covers approxima tely 20.000 sq uare 

mil es. The nort hern part cxtends from Ball 1\le Thuol about 175 

miles no rth to the Ngoc An peak. It v,uics in h eig ht from 600 to 

1.600 fee l \\' ith a few peaks rising mll ch hig her. T h is 5.400-sq uaremile area is covered ma in ly wilh bamboo a nd tropi ca l broadleaf 

forests interspersed with fa rms and rubber plantations. The 

southern part of the Centra l Highlands is genera II)' more than 

3.000 fe et abo\'c sea leve l a nd fealures broadleaf evcrgree n fo rests a t 

the higher ele"at ions an d bam boo on the lo \\'cr slopes. !\Iome La ng 

Via no ncar the mountain resort city of Da La!. is 7.380 feet h ig h. 

Th is sparse ly popu la ted . rugged terrain o f Ihe CClltrall-lighl ands 

was Ihe scene fo r major aCli on as Amcrican u nits a nd thei r alli es 
6 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962- 1973 

REGIONS 

SOUTH VIETNAM 

Highland. 

o 150 M il • • 

1-1 ----,-, -~, 

o , 50 Kilomet ... 

THAILAND 

CAMBODIA 

, 

, 

i\.,AP 2 
EARLY INVOLVEMENTS AN D DEVELOPM ENTS 7 

tried tu kee p the enemy from moving men a nd materiel in force 

toward the Cen tral Low la nds. 

T he Cen tra l Lowlands consist of a narrow coastal stri p wl-dged 

between the slopes of the Chaine Annam iliquc 10 its wcst and the 

South China Sea to the cast. The ('xt ensi\'C cu lti va tion o f rice and 

o ther cro ps in th is fert ile regio n and an act ivc fishi ng fl ec t suppon 

the heaviest po pu latio n concen trati on o ther tha n that o f thc 

Saigon and de lta reg ions. Numerous ports. a irfields. and mi lilary 

bases were developed in the Centra l Low lands 10 suppOrt U.S. 

m ili tary o perat io ns bo th there a nd in the CC: llIral I-l igh lands. 

Quang Tri. I-I ue. Phu Ha L Da New g. Chu Lai . Quang Nga i. I)h tl 

Ca t, Qu i Nho n. Tu y I-I oa. Nillh I-I oa . Nha T ra ng, Cam Ranh Hay, 

PheW Ra ng. a nd Phan T hi ct a rl' but a few of the Centra l Lowla nds 

pl aces which beca me famil iar to U.S. sold icrs and thc news medi a. 

T he land affected tacti cal communications i n se\'en di visions. 

fo ur sepa ra te brigades. and o ne armored cava lry im l. (Mal) 3) 

T he commitmen t of majo r U.S. combat fo rces to Vietnam in 

196.::> rollowed a dee pening Ameri can in volvement which had 

begun in 1950. In 1960 Vi et namese President Ngo Din h Diem, 

fa ced with a rapi d ly deteri ora ting situation in the countryside. 

decl arcd a Slat e o f all ,oul war against the Vi et Cong and as ked for 

increased Ameri ca n a id. In lat e 1961 President Jo hn F. Kenned y 

sanct io ned the operatio nal su pport o f Vie tnamese forces by 

American forces. Eight company-sizc aviatio n uni ts. 1\\'0 speci alt y 

aviation detachments. and two ma int cna nce suppOrt companies 

were deployed to Victnam d uri ng the fo llowing twelve months. 

T he size o f the new deployments a nd the new missio n made an 

increase in comm unicat ions support impcra tive. The first unit of 

the U.S. Army grou nd forces to arrive in Vietnam was a 

com mun icatio ns u nit. the 39th Sig nal Batt a lio n . commanded by 

Lit: utenant Colo nel Lotus H. Blackwel l. First contingen ts of the 

baualio n arri ved in Vietnam in February 1962; the compl ete 

ba tt a lion \vas there by J ul y. 

The batta lion's first job was LO esta blish a nd mai nta in a 

countrywide communi cations system to provide comma nd and 

contro l for the new operat io nal su p po rt a nd expanded advisory 

missions. Code-named BACK PORCH. a tro pos p heric sca tt er radio 

system extended the length of th c coun try. from the demil ita rized 

zone in the no rt h to the \' ng Delta in the south, a nd marked the 

fi rst time this type o f " mo u ntain hopping" eq uip mcnt was used in 

a combat environment. The batta lio n a lso operated telepho ne 

exchanges and commu nicatio ns cen ters thro ug ho ut the coun try to 
8 

MAP} 

DIVISION-LEVEL COMM UNICATIONS, 1962-1973 

AMERICAN UNITS IN VIETNAM 

1) 200 Mllu 

rl ----------,'C-----~' 1) 200 Kil om".11 

Long 

rl~ 

+

'90 SAIGON ',. + 

Vinh Long o 

O Ctln Tho 

x 

, i:2J' 

IOI 

(Am

~" erlcal) 

X X 

82 
EARLY INVOLVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 9 

RADIO TELEPHONE QPERJ\TOR 

tie the Mi litary Assistance Advisory Group headquarters to 

essemiaJ subordi nate o rga ni zations a nd Vietnamese agencies. 

Alt ho ugh much of this missio n involved communica tions well 

above the d ivision level. the 39th Signal Battalion was Ihe pioneer 

for ma ny divisio nal operations tha t followed. 

An early assig nment of the 39th wa s to help insta ll a speci al 

radio net for the village defense forces. The ne t tying the units 

together employed the amplitude mod ulated radio set ANI 

GRe-IOg at severa l subo rdi nate stations in each broad operational 

area , a ll controll ed (rom a centra l headquarters in Saigon. 

Although the net cont rol statio n remained open a round the dock 

for emerge ncy receptio n, norma l radio contact was made o nly on a 

schedul ed basis using international Morse code. 

Within the operational areas, a n internal communications 

system employed commercial am pli tude modulated (AM) voi ce 

radios, T R-20's, with other illlerested agencies, subordi nate 

operational bases, and selected vi llages. T hese lower nels worked 

twent y-four hours a day btl! with traffic controll ed to save battery 

power and to pennit emergency traffic. The net control station was 

genera ll y either ma ll il ed 01' mo nitored by American advisers; the 

village and other net radios were ope ra ted by trained loca l 

Vietnamese. Light man pack sets, whi ch would have enabled 

roving patrols to tie into the village radio nets, were in short supply 
10 DIVISION-LEVEL COMi\.WNICATIONS. 1962-1973 

at the time. According to one of the carly advisers. Major Ron 

ShacklelOn , Ihe old model AN/ PRC-6 a nd AN/ PRC-IO radios 

wcre tried but wercloo sho rt rangi ng: th ey did scc somc li mi ted lise, 

howc\'cr, by close- in obscrvat io ll tcams and listening pOSIS. Wit h in 

operational bases, telephone wire was insta ll ed between defe nsive 

po illls and command pOSts. 

Village defense radios had been insta ll ed large ly as pan of a 

special proj ect sponsored by the United Siaies Operat ions Mission. 

a componenl of the Age ncy for In ternationa l Developmen t. Ch ief 

WarralH Officer George R. i\.'IcSparrcll £Inc! a tca lll of [wenl y 

enlisted me n fro m th e 232d Signal Company. 39th Sig nal 

Ba ll a l io n . wo rked on the project for about six months duri ng 1962. 

but mo re help wa s needed. Then the 72d Signal Detachment 

(Provisioll::d). consisting of seventy-two enlisted men u nder the 

command of Capta in' Roben A. Wiggins, was scm o n temporary 

dut y to Viet ll am. It \\'as attached 10 the 39th Signa l Battalion 

duri ng la te 1962 and early 1963 to take over radio operations in the 

hamlets throughout the Republi c of Vicm am. In five mOll ths the 

operat io n was well unde r way, and the un it was awa rded the 

Meritorious Unit Cita tion for its efforts. 

Another earl y communica tio ns assignment involved avio ni cs. 

the application of e lectroni cs to aviation and astronau ti cs. Much o f 

th e early opera tio nal su pport o f the Vi etnamese armed forces 

centered 0 11 a irmobil ity. wh ich placed the hi g hest p remi u lll on 

good commun ications between a ircraft. parti cularl y hel ico pters, 

a nd be tween a ircraft a nd ground. To ensu re h igher echelon 

avio nics mai nte nance su pport for the ,wiation un its. six sig nal 

detachments (a vionics) arrived in Vi elnam duri ng 1962: the 69th. 

;Oth, 255th. 256th. 257t h . and 258th. T hesl' detachments fi ll <.'tl a 

vital nced in slippon ing t he commu n ications and el ectronics 

equipment of the av iation units already in Vit,tn am and of those 

that followed. T h is activity came under the sig n<ll officer of the 

Un ited States Army Support Croup. Vietn am, thecomponcn t U,S. 

Army headquaners withi n the Mili tary Assista nce Advisory 

G roup, who employed a qua li fied avioni cs oHiccr to coordi nate all 

avio nics support aClivit ies. A Ithough serious sho rtages o f qua l ified 

perso nnel beset the program at the stan , the problem wa s resolved 

and lhe av io n ics de tachments became a n invaluable pan of the 

communicat io ns tcam. 

As aviation support ex pandt:d a nd the ell emy began to adjust 

his operations a nd tac tics to co u n ter till' hel icopter threat. heavier 

and more freque nt ground fir e \'Vas encou ntered both in thea irand 

')n landing Wiles, causing a marked increase in damaged and 
EARLY INVOLV£,\IENTS AND DEVELOPi'v!I':NT S II 

desll'oyed ail'U"aft. Aircra ft and "\'ioni cs mechani cs and o thel' 

avaihlbll' gro und cre \\'llll'n took !Urns ridi ng "s ho tgun " at 

helicopter doorway positio ns 10 suppres~ the host il e fire, Thl' 

practi ce had an inevitable ill dlc( t 011 :.I\'ionic::s and helicopter 

maint ell<lllCc, a nd, ill the f<i ll 01 1962, \\'hell the Mil ita)'y Assistance 

Ad visory Gro up a~ked for help. a program W(lS started to trai n men 

fo r specific du t), as aeria l door gUll ll ers. The 25 th l nfantry Divisio n 

in 1-!a\o,Iai i lem ea rl y assistance by prov iding specia ll y trai ned 

vo lun teer~ on temporary duty as door g unll ers; they permitted 

avionics maint enance perso n nel to return 10 thei r spccia lti es. 

As the scope and com pl ex it y of Amc ri can involvemen t 

increased. a need arose for a n o rga ni ",Hion that could apply, tesl. 

a nd eva luate new met hods and techniques (incllHJing collllllunicati o ns) Gill ed fo r ill the comba t ellvironmelH o f cuunt erinsurgency 

warfare. This lcd. in la te 1962,10 Ihe t'~tablishlllt'n t o f the Army 

Concept T eam in Vi ctllam under Brigadier Ge llcral ldw<lrd L. 

Rowny. One o f the te .... n·s ea rli est projects was ge nera ted by pl eas 

from U.S. advisers for a bett er wa)' 10 contro l a nd coordimll e the 

communicatio ns means avai lable to the SOlLth Vi etnamese 

commanders they were a~s tin g. 

With thl' ro le of airmobilit y vastly ex panding. command and 

cOll ll'o l had assumed a new imponance. Because tht' usual reaction 

10 the hit-a nti-run tacti cs 01 til e Vi et Con!,;' was a quick airmo bile 

response. it demanded a hel icupter command post from whi ch the 

Vietnamese commander. IOgetht'1' with his adviser and a limi ted 

staff. cou ld get qui ckl )' 10 a n area un(kl' attack. d eve lop a plan of 

action. and commit reacti o n forces rapidl y. That procedure often 

meant briefing the reaction forces en route 10 the o bjective. 

coordi nating with other friendl ), forces. and husba nd ing 

additional support as needed; in shon. using several radios a t the 

same time. Trying 10 do that within the confines o f a helicopter 

passenger companmelll. where space. weight. and power wcre at a 

premium. wa s no sma ll task. 'r he com mander alld his smff had 10 

compe te wit h the high noise level in the cabin to ta lk 10 each other 

a nd to tht' crew mcmbers. They a lso needed some sort o f \"ork 

surface for map layouts and overlays. 

An earl y attempt to meet these needs wa s made by lashing d own 

three FM (frequency modulated ) radios (AN/ PRe- IO) toge ther in 

the passenger companmelll and moulHing the antennas a t 45-

degree a ng les on the skids. Alt hough such a " la sh up" was used 

with some success. it \\'as cumbersome a nd provided o nl y FM 

cha nnels when very high freq uency and h igh frequency sing le 

sideband wete also needed because of the exte nsive range and 
12 DlVISION·LEVEL COMMU NICATIO NS, 1962- 1973 

va rielY of acti viti es involved. The ex pedient also failed to provide 

for communica tio ns within the hclicoplt!r. 

In ca rl y 1963. the Arm y Concept Team defined the 

requirements for an aerial command post [or command control o f 

gro und a nd ai r operatio ns and submitted a proposed evaluation 

pl a n. T he plan was a pproved by the Commanding General of the 

U,S. Arm y Combat Developments Co mmand and the U,S. Army 

Electro ni cs Research and Developmen t Age ncy al Fort Monmo ulh, 

New Jersey, whi ch dispatched a two-man team to Vietnam in 

Aug ust to determine howlhe Eleclroni cs Laboratory might assist. 

In the end. four command post commun icatio ns system conso les 

for U H-I B hel icoplcrs were fabricated. Eaell incl uded an 

o pera lio ns table a nd a compact fi ve· positio n illlerpho ne system 

independen t o f the aircraft interpho ne but capable of entry into 

that system. Ea ch console also provided equipment for twO 

diHerent frequency modulated radio channels, an independent 

very high frequency amplitude modu lated radio circuit , a high 

frequency sing le sideband circuit. and access to the a ircraft 's ultra 

frequency amplitude modul ated comma nd radio- cert ainly a full 

spectrum of radio coverage to meet almost an y cont ingency. 

The £irst consoles arrived in Vi etl1 am in December 1963 and 

were issued 10 the 145th Avi .. ti o n Ba tta lio n a nd the Della Avi ation 

Battalion (provisional ) for (,,, .. Illati on. The battalions found the 

orig inal design to be too ambitious. Because of the size and weight 

of the c:onso lc, two sing le seats normally occupied by lhe aerial 

door g unners had 10 be remo ved. and the additiona l weight upset 

the heli copter's cemer o f grav ity. Nevcnheless, when the map 

board and table were eliminated a nd the singl e sideband radio 

reloca ted, the conso le performed so we ll thai in Jul y 1964 the U.S. 

Milit ary Assistance Command stated a n urgent requirement for a 

heliborne command POSt (HCP) fo r ea ch Vi etnamese divisio n and 

one each for the Vi etnamese II. Ill. and IV Corps. 

The console was ultimately desig nated the ANI ASC-6. The 

thirteen required, alo ng \\'ith tWO for backup. were fabricated a lthe 

Lexing to n· Bluegrass Army Depot in Kentuck y ana rushed to 

Vietnam. They were tested from late 1964 to earl y 1965 and were 

successfu ll y used in all sectio ns o f Vie tnam from Da Nang in the 

nonh to Pl eiku in the Gemral Highl ands and the Meko ng Delta in 

the south . Headed by Li eut ena n t Colonel Clarence H. Ellis, Jr .. a 

fi ve-ma n team conducting the eva luat io n incJ uded twO commu ni· 

catol'S, Major Cecil E. Wroten and Captai n Wilmer L. Presto ll. The 

test report co mmended the assistance of ano ther commu nicator, 

Capta in James A. Wea therman. a nd the Avionics Office o f the U.S. 
EARLY INVOLVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 13 

EARLY COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS CONSOLE with aircraft radios. 

Army Suppon Command, Vietnam. Eight y-five more consoles of 

the AN/ ASC-6 model would be obta ined and deployed 10 Vietnam 

over the next four years. 

Among conclusions noted in Ihe test repon was that standard 

aircraft radios and antennas were better suited for installation in 

the he liborne command post than were ground radios and 

amennas, a controversial conclusio n that would arise agai n laler. 

The report also noted that the command post fun ctioned most 

effectively at altitudes between 1.500 and 2,500 feet, a compromise 

between observing activity on the ground and avoiding ground fire 

and other aircraft. In response to another concl usion that the 

command post had 1O be C"dpable of longer flight time than troop 

transports or armed helicopters, a fifty-gallon auxiliary gas lank 

was placed in the space under the passenger sea ts. 

The utility of the helibornecommand post was soappareillthat 

even as the test was going o n. fifteen more were procured and 

placed in routine use. Tht: heliborne command pOSt, wrote 

Brigadier General John K. Boles. J 1"., in forwarding the test repon, 

..... is the single piece of new materiel which should ha\!e the 

most influence on improving the conduct of the war in Vietnam." 

While those steps to improve airmobility operations were be ing 

taken in Vietnam. parallel effons were under way at Fort Benning. 

Georgia. The 11th Air Assault Division was aCli "aled at Fort 

Benning on 15 February 1963 following recommendations made by 

a special board studying tact ica lmobilit y requirements, known as 
14 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-197!J 

EARLY COMMAND Cm.II\IUNICATIONS CONSOLE with VRC-12 series 

radios. 

the Howze Boa rd (ils chief wa s LicUlcnant Genera l Hamilton H. 

Howze). This extraordinary division was given a high priority on 

personnel and equipmeht; it was lasked to develop new and radical 

airmobile concepts and opera tio nal procedures. 

As an aelia n offi cer working in combat development o n the 

Department of Anny staff, I had Ihegood fortu ne loscrveon a tcam 

that visited the 11th Air Assault Divi.sion during this time. The 

division commander. Maj or General Harry W. O. Kinnard, in vi ted 

o ur lcam lO a Saturday morning " think lank" session, a weekl y 

practice within Ihe divisio n. At these sessio ns commanders a nd 

staff kicked around ideas. no malleI' how far·fe tched, that pertai ned 

to airmo bil e operations a nd improved command and control. Our 

tcam was deeply impressed to see a n entire division dedicated 10 

talking th rough and then trying o ut 1x>ld tacti ca l a irmobile 

concepts that were no more than vague ideas a few years before. 

From those sessions emerged much of Ihe embryo ni c doctrine thaI 

later guided the redesig nated lsI Cava lry Divisio n (Airmobile) to 

its dramatic combat successes in Vi etnam. 

Communi ca ti ons in airmobil e operations received considerable 

thought and auentio n. In early 1964, the divisio n signal officer, 

Lieutenant Colonel Tom M. Nicholson, asked the U.S. Army 

ElecLronics Command for assistance in designing and fabri ca ting 

an airborne tacti ca l operations celll er 10 Ix: installed in the UH-I 

helicopter. In the process, whe n the question o f air versus ground 

radios arose, the 11th Assault Division chose ground radios 

primaril y (or suppl y a nd maintenance reaso ns. Using the same 
EARLY INVOLVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS 15 

type of radios as used by grou nd maneuver units in the heliborne 

command consoles would pennil rapid replacement of a damaged 

0 1' inope rative rad io a t al most a ny supply poin t or baua lio n 

mai ntena nce faci lity wit hin the d ivision area. It would also case the 

problem of obtai ning spare pans. There were a lso opera tiona l 

advantages over the aircraft radios in tha t ground rad ios were 

compatible and had a greater range bt"e<tuse of their higher average 

power o utpu t. 

The Communi ca ti o ns Depan men t of the U,S. Army 

Eleclro nics Resea rch and Development Labora to ries at Fort 

Monmout h. New J ersey, directed by Roben S. Boykin. received the 

project. Built 10 11th Air Assault Division specifica tions, a model 

was delivered in i\larch 1964 and insta ll ed with (he assista nce of a 

labora tory team. Following limi ted opera tio nal testing at Fon 

Benn ing. the mode l unit was returned 10 the laboratori es in May 

wit h a list of proposed modifica tions. The un it was fina ll y 

desig nated the Airborne Commun ica tions Control AN/ ASC-5, 

and fifteen more \Vere buill for the division by LexingtonBluegrass Army Depot. T he AN ASC-5 served its pu rpose well at 

tha t time but was later modified "Ind redesignated the 

AN/ ARC- 122. 
CHAPTER II 

Commitment of American Ground 

Combat Forces 

Continued enemy buildup and the likelihood of South 

Vietnamese defeat. in the spri ng of 1965. led to a decision by 

President Lyndo n B. J ohnson to commit American ground combat 

LrOOps. A need quickly arose fora major communica tio ns buildup. 

and, because of cOlllingency planning, a quick response was 

possible. 

To facilitate the bui ldup, a li aison tcam from headquaners o f 

U.S. Army, Vi etnam, met wilh Department of the Army 

representati,·cs in Was hington a nd with members o f the 2d Signal 

Group. In detailed planning sessions. the conferees forecast the 

need for sig nal resources in Vietnam a nd drew up a timetable for 

their commitment . For communications purposes thecounlry was 

split in two. The newly arriving 41s1 Signa l Baualion lOok 

responsibility for the no rthern sector and the veteran 39th Signal 

Battalio n contro lled Ihe southern zone. A count rywide twe lvecha n nel VHF (very high frequency) system was inslalled which 

extended tactica l lails to key opera ti o na l areas from the more fixed 

tropospheric system extending no nh and south a long a mai n 

communi ca tio ns axis. 

In early June 1965. at the directio n of Brigadier General 

William E. DePuy. lit ary Assistance Command J-3. Li eutenant 

Colo nel Kenneth G. Ring, then serving as the U.S. Army, Vi etnam, 

signal officer, met with the J-3 staff for crucia l gu ida nce on 

upgrading communi ca tions suppOrt to the advisory mission. 

During these discussions, the requiremenls for FM a nd single 

sideband radio equipment. FM airborne rela ys, and addit ional 

tactica l mult ichannel Ii nks were reviewed. T he Military Assista nce 

Command needed a reliable 21-ho ur-a-day voice communi ca ti o ns 

net 10 each of the fon y-five province headquart ers. to each of the 

135 district headquarters. to Special Forces camps. 10 Vietnamese 

Army training centers, a nd to numerous other strategic locations. 

The expanded communi ca tions plan, as fi na ll y approved, 

involved some 1,000 additional spaces and someS20mi liio n wonh 
COMM IT M ENT OF AM ERICAN GROUND COMBAT FORCES 17 

of equipment , mOS t of whi ch went toward improved communications at the loca l (district a nd province) level. It was this basic 

network that the large combat units lied into for their 

communica tions support as they began arrivi ng in Vietnam. 

T he deploy ment of majo r combat units to Vie tnam spanned the 

period Aug ust 1965-July 1968. The first units 10 arri" e were those 

that stood h ig hest in prio rity for resources a nd, therefore. hig hest 

in combat readiness. One such unit was the newly organized 1st 

Cava lry Divisio n, commanded by Major Ceneral Harry W.O. 

Kinnard. T he 13th Signal Balla lion support in g the 1st Cava lry 

Division enjoyed those ra re advantages of high priorit y on 

personnel fill , reasona ble personnel sta bility, new equipment , and 

a n exceptional esprit de corps stcmm ing from the cha llenging new 

mission of airmo bil ity that had pro mpted the initial orga ni za tio n 

of the unit. It stood in marked contrast to the lasl combat 

organization to elllcr Vi elllam. the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry 

Divisio n (Mechani z.ed). The brigade, hard pressed to gel eno ugh 

men bee-d use of the severe dra i n by combat units a lready committed 

in Vi et nam, was uprooted from its parent division , kept an 

inordinately lo ng lime in its staging phase at Fo n Carson, and 

placed under the o peratio nal contro l of the 3d Marine Division 

when it arrived. 

Genera ll y speaking, the combat units that deployed to Vietnam 

fe ll into three g ro ups. T he first g roup included those units from 

high o n the existi ng readiness list and included, in addi ti o n to the 

173d Airborne Brigade, the 1st Cava lry Divisio n and the 1st a nd 

25th Infantry Divisio ns. The second gro up. arri vi ng during July 

1966-Ju Iy 1967, included the 4th Infantry Division. the 196th Light 

Infantry Brigade. the 199th Lig ht Infa lllry Brigade. the 11th 

Armored Cava lry Regimen t. and the 9th Infantry Divisio n. Among 

this second group, whi ch had no t enjoyed the higher priorit y of the 

ea rlier deployed units. the 9th Infantry Divisio n faced. perhaps. the 

most diHicult task o f preparatio n. The final buildup phase, 

spanni ng the period June 1967-July 1968. involved the rema inder 

of the IOlst Airborne Di visio n. the 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne 

Division, thc 11th Light Infantry Brigade. the 198th Light Infa ntry 

Brigade, and. fina ll y. the l SI Brigade of the 5th Infa ntry Divisio n. 

A revi ew of the histories of these units du ring their deployment 

phase depicts every conceivabl e circumstance regardi ng training. 

personnel. a nd equi pment. By a nd large, however, Lhey fo llowed 

the same genera l patterns. T he acquisitio n and ma nagement of 

personnel a nd equipment was understanda bly paramo ulll in a ll 

their pla nning. The ea rli er deployed units fared reasonabl y well. 
18 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUN ICATIONS, 1962·19711 

The 5 111h Signal Batta lion o f the 1st Cavalry Di vision (later 

redcsigmllcd the 13th Signal BallaliOll), for example, was a gro up 

that had been largel y stabl e for twO yea rs during ai r assau lt 

training. Li eutenant Colo nel Tom Nicholson. the baltal io n 

com mander. cited his good fonune at having had the opportunity 

10 organilc. form. a nd train the unit from the stan-certai nl y an 

exception to the ge neral ru le for units deployi ng to Vieillam. The 

di\'ision commander had also given Colo nel Nicholson fu ll 

rcsponsibi I it )' 10 assign or replace all sig na 1 officers in the division, 

including those at brigade and comba I anns batLai ion levels. 'rhis 

excepliona l control of imponalll personnel spaces by the sig nal 

battalion comma nder was, in his opin ion, a 1ll<ljor conll'ibuting 

factor in the cohesi\'eness of the COlllmun iollio ns struet ure within 

the division when it arrived in Vi etnam. Li eutenant Colo nel 

"Swedc " Nelso n, com manding the 50 lst Signal Battalion of the 

10Ist Airborne Di visio n. held the same view. He received. from the 

division chid of staff aild the G-I, full responsibility for signal 

officer assignmc nts wit hin thc division, and hc selected the most 

qualified people with prc\'iolls l'xpcri cncc in infantry comm uni cations as the COlllmllni c:':lIio ns officers for the brigades and 

battalio ns. I-Ie also required that officers spend some time in the 

di visio n sig nal batta lio n bdore assumi ng their duties with the 

comba t unit. 

Person nel stability is a lso cited ill the records of the division 

signa l bat tal ion of the 25th Infantry Divisioll . Lieutenant Colo nel 

Tom Ferguson. then the battalion commander. sta tes that ne;uly 75 

percent o f the officers and men who accompanied the balla lion to 

Vietnam had the opportun it y 10 train wi th the divisio n for nea rly 

eigh teen mo nths before their deployment. The 25th, like many 

other combat units, also reCl'ived man y you ng soldi ers st rai g ht 

from basic comba t training with the understanding that the unit 

would provide lhe advanced individual tmi ning from its own 

resources. Th(' signal bat ta l ion received close to a hund red of these 

soldi ers and proceeded to provide o n-the-job trai ning in radio and 

wire specialties. The battalion commander felt that lhese soldi ers 

were as well qual ified when thl'Y arrived in Vi etnam as were those 

from the formal schools. I observed, ill a sma ll wa)', the results of 

this cHari when the 1st Brigade o f the 25th In falllJ'y Di vision staged 

through the universit y stag ing area between Saigon and Long 

Sinh 011 its arrival in Vi et nam. 'r he 69th Signal Battal iOIl , \vhich I 

commanded, was tasked with establishi ng base cOlllllluni catio ns 

(or the division while they wcrt' in Ihl' stagi ng area so that the 

organic division signa l battalio n could devote its full time to 
COMMITMENT OF AMERICAN GROUND COMBAT FORCES 19 

preparations for its commitment in the initial divisio n base camp 

a t Cu Chi. T he efficiency with which the division, incl udi ng its 

sig na l units. moved in and through Ihis staging area was not hing 

shan o f remarkable. In my view it was probably the best planned 

transition into combat by a major combat un it to occur duri ng the 

enlirc confli ct. 

The personnel ex perience of the 9th Infantry Division, which 

camc in duri ng the second phase of the bu ildup. was in ma rked 

con trast to the ea rl ier units. Forecasts of fut u re requ irements in 

Viet nam called for more infantry divisions tha n were ava il able on 

the troop list, a nd the dec isio n was made to act iva Ie thc 9th Infantry 

Division a t Fort Ril ey. Ka nsas. on I February 1966. under the 

command o f Major Genera l George S. Eckhardt. Init ia l 

replacements came from ma n y sources, bu t most arrived directl y 

(rom civ ilian life through the rccept ion stations a nd remained with 

the d ivision from its activation th rough its traini ng cycle (Inc! into 

combat-a process that not too man y soldi ers had expe rienced 

since \Vorld War II. In the di vision signal batta lion. the batta lion 

commander. Lieut enant Colonel J ohn H. Reeder, found himse lf 

wit h a fun ctioning sig nal ba ttalion in \" hich he wa s the on ly 

officer and in which the total strength was aboLit 150 enlisted men. 

First se rgeants were used as company cOlllllla nders. and 

no ncommissio ned o ffi cers filled all the key ballal ion staff officer 

positions. With this skeleton crew, however, Colonel Reeder 

created a complete trai ning program a nd laid the groundwork for 

the eventual fill of the battalion. O fficer assignmen ts to the 

ballalio n were slow, and officers that \\'ere assig ned had. for the 

most part, no tactical communica tions experience. It \\'as necessa ry 

to establish both office r and senior noncommissioned officer 

schools wit hin the batta lion to make up fo r th is lack of ex perience. 

The same was also trlle of man y of the enlisted m en assigned 10 the 

batt alio n. Many of them thought of themse lves as fixed plant 

communi ca tors and were apprehensive abOll t the prospect of 

working with tactical cOl1lllluni e<uions equipme n t in combat . T he 

battalion commander, however, made the reluctan t ones "stick it 

out." a nd they proved. in the lo ng run. to be as competen t as their 

more experienced. tactica lly trai ned contemporaries. 

Major commll .units of sma ller Sill'. Stich as the 19Gth Light 

Infan try Brigade, fa ced simi la r rapid fi lls of untrai ned perso n nel. 

The 196th received 2.000 recrui ts that had 10 be given basic combat 

traini ng as well as advanced individual trai n ing with the brigade. 

This was a dema nding m ission for a separate brigade to assume 

while readying for combat deploymen t overseas. The 199t h Light 
20 DIVISION·LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-197! 

Infantry Brigade was no t fi lledoul with untrained me n until thirty 

days before ils schedu led deployment. The 1991h was fonunate. 

however, in being a l ForI Benning. Georgia; it could draw o n the 

Communi catio ns Department of the Infantry School and train 

communi ca tions personnel more easil y than some o ther units. 

A later deploying unit, the II th Infantry Brigade, formed al 

Scho fi eld Barracks, Hawaii. during 1966. experienced a simil ar 

problem. In its case, the majority of the initia l filler personnel were 

ViClIlam vetera ns who could nOI retur n to Vietnam with their new 

unit . The lime bcforedeployment was too short lo o blain men from 

the adva nced individuailrain ing schools. a nd aga in this training 

was conducted in the unit. The brig-dde communi cations plalOo n 

established a training program for the C- E spec ial ties. All courses 

were conducted on a one-I ime. six-\veek schedul e fo llowed by a 

brigade command pOSt exercise. According to the bri gade signal 

o ffi cer. Major Frederick R. Dart . the results were nOI so good as 

th ose of forma l advanced individua l traini ng but did pro vide the 

brigade with an adeq uat e communica tions capabilit y. 

As wi th personnel a nd training. a variety of equipment 

problems faced tactical sig nal units as they prepared for 

deployment. Perhaps the most eX len si "e and common problem 

was converting from the o ld radios (A N/ CRC-3 through -8 series) 

to the new AN / VRC- 12 series. Si nce the old and new series were 

no t compatible. the con version had 10 be made unit by unit . with 

the attendant probl ems o f training operalOrs and modify ing sig nal 

operation instructions. Other equipment conversions a lso were 

required at crucial points in the pl a nning. Many units had to 

accep t and become familiar wit h the new IO-ki lowa tt generators 

which were replacing water-cooled generators. These air-cooled 

generators were unusua l in many respects a nd required 

considerabl e cross-training even for o perators who were already 

qualified in that mi litary occupational specia lty. The same was 

true of the new multiruel vehicl es which were replaci ng Ihe o lder 

2li-ton trucks thro ug ho ut the divisio ns. Often these new vehicl es 

were in such short supply that they were shi pped directl y from the 

manufaCiurer to the unit as Ihey came orr the assem bl y line. The 

support system for the new trucks duri ng this init ial period was 

marginal a t best and further compli ca tcd the units' problems at a 

crucia l point in their deployment planning. In ma ny instances 

signa l units had to deploy with the o lder 5-kilowall water-cooled 

ge nera tor that had been in the invenlOry so lo ng that it was 

considered obsolete. Onc such unit was the 69th Signal Battalion 

during its first six mo nt hs inVielllam . Altho ugh the IO-kilowau 
COMMITMENT OF AMERICAN GROUND COMBAT FORCES 21 

replacement certainl y provided much-Ileeded addi tio nal power, 

the battal ion found the o lder PU -286 superior in some respects. It 

was far quiet er; it could be dug in and would run cool o n water; 

once it had been stabilized in a particul ar location and routine, it 

could be kept rU ll ni ng with less dai Iy attention than the air-cooled 

replacement. Funhermore, the pans rep lacement system in 

Vieillam was more than adequate to meet the needs of the walercooled generators until they were phased out. 

Air conditioning posed another probl em during the deploym CI1l phase, particularl y in the later units wh ich had picked up 

feedback from combal units ah'e<ldy in Vietnam concerning the 

imlX>rI<tncc of air conditioning to keeping communications 

shelters in continuous o peratio n. The 125th Sigmll Battalion of the 

25th Infan try Divisio n partially solved the problem by obtaining 

enough standard 16-inch electric fa ns to provide tWO {,illS for each 

major pi ece of sheltered communica tions eq uipment. Till S air 

circulatio n expedient was not idea l but did provide SO Illt' relief. 

U.S. units were not rea ll y prepared to operate communications 

equipment shelt ers in the hot. humid cl imate prevai ling 

throughout mosl of Vietnam. but the ingenuit)' of the American 

soldier compensated for this shortcoming in a large wa y. 

Ano ther equipment problem some units fact'(\ was that of 

pi ck ing up pre-positio ned equipment en route to the combal 

thea ler. In the case of the 251h Infa ntry Di\,isio n Sig nal Battalion. 

approximately one·third o f the unit's equipment wa s a float off 

Okinawa and another one-third was at Korat. Thai land. It is a 

tribute to the logistical system thai the ballal ion found the majority 

of this equipment to be in exce ll en t working order whe n it arrived 

in Viet nam. 

As the lat er combat clements began 10 deploy to Vietnam. 

equipment problems shift ed from replacing one type wit h another 

to the more serious problem o f havin g lit lle o r no equipmen t at all 

wit h which 10 train the fille r personnel arrivi ng shortl y befo re the 

unit was scill-duled to deploy. This was parti cLllarly true of the 

newly act iva tt'C\ units and of th ose units o f less than division size 

that wou ld possibl y funClion as separate brigades when 

commill cd. III mall y instances the table of organization and 

equipmellt signal support wa s nOt adequate for this fun ction and 

additio nal equipment was not auth ori zed before the uni ts 

deployed. Perhaps the most serious example o f this problem was 

the deployment of the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division. 

The brigade was placed under the operat ional control of the 3d 

Marine Di visio n and committed to combat operations very soon 
22 DI VISION-LEVEL CO ... -tM UNICATIONS. 1962- 1973 

after its arrival in Vietnam. Because of a lack of tactical communications augmemation, initial operations were haphazard ( 0 

say the leasl. T he brigade signal detachment was fragmented 

and sufTered severe equipment shortages. In addition, the assets 

of the organic marine division unit we re not adequate to support 

the brigade. After a period of considerable frustra tion U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, activated an additional signal company in Vietnam, the 298lh, to support the brigade. T he company was 

commanded by Captain Leland Hewiu and was formed from the 

brigade signal platoon and elements of Company B. 5th Signal 

Bau alion. which had accompanied the brigade to Vietnam. 

Because, in part. of some pe rsonal e fforts by Major Edward F. 

J ansen, the brigade sign:)1 officer, pe rsonnel and equipment to 

round out the unit were soon provided . Trying to get a signal 

unit trained and organized in a combat theater under these 

conditions was, at best, a touchy business. 

In addition to the other problems every unit experienced 

the agonies of working out a signal opera tion instruction that 

was easy to use. The 25th Infantry Division Signal Bau alion S-3 

developed a pocket-sized fonnat whi ch became widely accepted 

throughout the division. 
CHAPTER III 

Blunting the Enemy Drive 

As major combat units deployed to Vietnam, theyencou lllcred 

a tactica l environment that was alien to their training and 

experience. Traditionallarge-sca lc exercises, such as R EFORG ER in 

Europe and the Strike Command series throughout the conti nenta l 

Un ited States and in the Caribbean, provided ne ither the clima ti c 

conditi ons nor a tact ica l scenario approximati ng operations in 

Vietnam. The 25th Infantry Division had trained in jungle 

operations in a climate that approac hed that of Vietnam, but the 

simi lariti es were ma rgi nal. The war in Vi etnam was a diHerCIll 

kind o f war, in a different place. and would tax the stamina and 

ingenuity of the American soldier to the limiL 

Some chartlClcrist ics of combat tactics a nd deploymcllI 

contributed to this difference. During the early combat deployment, piecemea l com mitment of units to the theater was the 

rule, not the exception. Limited port facil ities, the absence of a 

definable battle line, and ot her faclOrs dictated this approach in all 

four corps :wnes o f operation. Divisional tables of organization and 

equi pment-and particu larl y signal tables, were not structured to 

suppo rt brigades o perating independentl y or deployed separately 

from a pa rent division. 

Once as hore, these early arri ving units experienced major 

problems in deployi ng to their assig ned tactica l areas of 

res ponsibilit y. Time spent in staging area s was o ft en extended by 

waiting for the de li very of combat equi pment th ro ugh port 

bottlenecks and a limited number of airfields. The movement of 

advance panies to base camps from the staging areas resu lted in 

tenuous and vu lnerable lines of communication that often 

stretched the unit's o rganic communica ti o ns capability beyond its 

limits. The combination of o ppressive hea l and stifli ng hum idity 

sapped the strength of the troops and impaired the opera tio n of 

sensitive electroni c eq uipment. Even the ground itself mirrored the 

inhospitable na turc of the COU lltry. Cu ltivated low lands offered 

little dry ground fo r base camps, and the higher elevations oHered a 

choice bctween powder-fi ne dust during the dry season and 

clinging red mud during the monsoons. 
24 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUN ICATIONS, 1962·197:1 

Major combat units wert normally assigned much large!' 

taclical arcas of responsibility than those visualilcd in previous 

doctrine and II'<lining. Furthermore, th eir as~ig ll d areas wcre 

nothing more than large patches of ground with 110 discernible 

forward edge ami. in many instan ces. 110 discernible lille of 

communications 10 the rear. As a result. units tended 10 operate 

frolll a cen tra l base camp. cXlcnsivc fire SUppOI'l bases. ;-tnt! 

temporary base camps established hastil y in \dli c h('ver dircuioll a 

Viet Cong threat wa s dcveloping. Ext ended distances. couph.'d 

wit h the speed of movcment from one location to allother. placed 

demandi ng tasks on the organic commu ni cations capabi lit y of the 

unit and often exceeded it. 

Command and control requiremellts often di ctated (lir('ct 

communications links from i\ lilil'u) Assistanc(' Command 

headquarters in Saigon 10 individual brigade and battal ion act ions 

conducted ill Ihe remotest regions. This requiremellt is difficult 

when baule lines arc dearly drawn but of len impossible umi('r 

flu id combat cond itio ns in steaming forests and ri ce patldit''i. 

Security was a lso d ifficult. Friend and loe were often 

indistinguishable. and the secrecy of major operations was often 

compromised. Rapid concentration of forces in remote areas was 

essentia l but could not be accomplished under radi o silence. 

Planning and executing major operations became a trade off 

be tween the need for concentrating quickly and the likelihood of 

tipping off the enemy about the operation whi le communicating 

inSll"uctio ns to Ihe clements invoh·ed. 

Coordi natio n of external fire support was especiall y difficult. 

Close ai r support a nd B-S2 strikes were needed where friend ly a nd 

Viet Cong units were intermixed in hea\')' fo liage or ju ngle cover 

tha t made ident ification and location difficult and limited the 

range o f UHF (ultra high frequency) and HI radios. 

Si nce there were no batt le lines. there were no secure areas 

outside base ca mp and fire base pcrinwters. An y high ground 

occup ied as a communi ca tions site had to be totall y secured. a 

necessity that drained combat resources sorely needed ciseh'herc. 

The first majo r combat elemell t to arrive in Vi et nam. the li3d 

Airborne Brigade, quite early fa ced the problem of communicating 

over extended distances. The brigade's logisti cs base \\'as on 

Okinawa. and voice communiGlliOlls were maintained by using 

organic single sideband radio equipment over a distance far 

beyond the p lan ning range o f this scI. Early in 1965. the unit had 

also built an FM command and contl"Ol console for mounting in 

the U H-ID helicopter. The use of this airborne relay in the early 
BLUNTING THE ENEro-tV DRIVE 25 

days of the unit's com mitment was, according to di"ision 

commander Major General Ellis W, Williamson, " nothingsho n of 

fantastic." During its ea rl y deploymen t phase. the bri gade also had 

to rely o n the old series of FM radio equipment-a partial reason 

for stro ng depe ndence o n the heli copter radio re lay. In late 1965 

this equipment was replaced with the AN/ VRC- 12 family and the 

AN/ PRC-25 radios. The brigade relied heavily o n hig h frequency 

radio teletypewriter between brigade and baualio n ; twO AN/ VSCI sets were avai lable 10 each battalion. The brigade he.ldquaners 

used lhe shelter-mounted AN / G RC-16 configuration. 

The 173d was followed in rapid order by a brigade o f the IOlst 

Airborne Division, a brigade of the 1st In fantry Division. and the 

25 th Infa lllry Division. Six major combat operatio ns involvi ng 

these troops occurred during the first year of com bat. Five of the six 

were in the central th reat area. (Ma p 4) 

An early communica tio ns problem which faced most of these 

units was that of frequency ava ilability. Lieutena nt Colonel T om 

Nicholson. commander of the 13111 Signa l Battalio n of the 1st 

Cava lry Di visio n. a nd Lieutenalll Colo nel Tom Ferguson. 

commander of the 125th Signal Balla lio n of the 25th Infalllry 

Division. both commented at leng th on the initia l impact that the 

lack of adeq uate preplan ned freq uenci es had on divisio n combat 

opera tions. The 1st Cavalry Division, for example, att empt ed to 

establish and resolve frequency requirements bcf{)re its departure 

from the United States by sending messages and telephoni ng 10 the 

JOlllt headquart ers in Saigon whi ch controll ed frequenq' 

assig nments. Their eHons proved fr uitless until the sig nal 

battalion commander personally visi ted the frequ ency control 

agency a nd joint signa l o ((i cel'. He rcsoh'ed the problem 

suHicientl y to begin " legal" operat io ns in Viet nam. In the 25th 

Infantry Divisio n. Colo nel Ferguson fe lt th.1I frequency 

manageme nt \\'as nonexistent o utside the division. As he saw i(' 

U.S. Army. Vietnam. alloca ted freque ncies 10 the field force 

headquarters, which in turn suballoca ted them to it.s major combat 

elements. H is divisio n, fo r example, was give n some 8- 12 discrete 

frequencies which supposedly were adequa te to avoid a ll)' mutual 

interference. These same frequencies. however. were a lso assigned 

to avia tio n units \\'ell o utside the field forces. Once heli copter or 

fixed-wing a ircraft of these units were airborne and opera ting on 

frequencies. they sa tu rated entire areas where the same frequencies 

had been assig ned to ground combat units. Despite frcqll elll p leas 

for an authoritative frequency management agency at the U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, or Military Assistance Command le,'el. it never 
26 

CENTRAL 

THREAT 

AREA 

MAP ., 

DIV ISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962- 1973 

MAJOR COM BAT OPERATIONS 

July 1965 - June 1966 

o ISO M ilo. 

o

I f------r-~' l~O Kilomet.r. 

SILVER BAYONET 

=r ~SAIGON 

/t-~ ', ~' 

o Cen Th" 

C.m Rlmh 
BLUNTING T H E ENEMY DRIVE 27 

materialiled during the early days of the confli ct. As a result. what 

generally happened was ma ssive "bootlegging" with the ripple 

efrect of even more mutual interference througho ut the comba t 

th eater. 

At the same time that the first combat units were beginning to 

arrh'c in Viet nam, the 1st Signal Brigade was aCliva ted under the 

command of Brigadier General Robert Terry. All sig nal u nits no t 

organic to the field fo rces. divisions, or separate brigades were 

assig ned to this brigade. Whenever a major combat Lilli t received a 

mission or was assigned a tactica l area of responsibil ity which 

could not be adequately supported by its organi c sig na l mea ns, it 

became commo n practice to augment from the 1st Signal Brigade. 

Views differed o n how these augmelllation clemellls should be 

contro lled. Colo nel Nic ho lson ( 13th Sigmll Batta lio n commander. 

1st Cava lry Division) pointed out that these units often did nOI 

receive adequa te instructio ns before they an'ivcd in Vi etnam and 

could not sustain operati o ns. I-Ie argued stro ngly for the direct 

attachment of th is <lugmell tatio l1 to the org<lni c signa l battalio n of 

the dh'ision a nd for complete control over its operations and 

acti vities by the divisio n signal b<lttalion commander. He stated. 

"Too many times it appea red as if these units \\'cre abandoned by 

their headquart ers in that it was seldolll ihal a sen io r staff off icer o r 

commander appeared to check the opera tions o r welf,lre of his 

unit's men." Co lo nel Ferguson (commanding the 125th Signal 

Battalion. 25th Infantry Division) argued for the attachment of 

such augmentation to his batt alio n. basing his views on the fa ct 

that if this were nOt done there would be a split res po nsibility for 

communicat io ns ill the base camp. His division comander he ld 

him tota ll y responsibl e for <I ll comm uni ca lions whet her they were 

to the units wilhi n the division o r to rie ld force or U.S. Army. 

Vietnam, headqllaners. I-I e was dcpendelll on augmenta tio n from 

the signa l brigade which. if it fa iled. would be considered his 

responsibililY by the division commander. These examples of 

externa l commll ni ca t ions support applied 10 nearly every divisionsize fo rce in Vietnam. It seemed that all divisions needed o nc mo re 

fire base. one more base cam p. or o ne more tactical he.adquarters to 

support a seemingly endless expansion of their areas of operatio ns. 

T hey simply Olllgrew Iheir signal b<lllalions <lnd turned fo r help to 

an)' o ther source a\'ailable. The 69th Sig nal Baual ion. which I 

commanded, for exam pi c, had detachments of one type or anOlher 

from Hue in the north to Soc Trang illthedelw. Such detachme nts 

took some of the load off lhe organic divisio n signa l battal ions, 

mai nl y in the base c<lmp areas. The o rga ni c batlal ions then could 
28 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-197.11 

pump more of their own resources into the immediate support of 

the divisions' maneuver eicmclll$. which were always in the field 

and always all the move. The augmentations ranged all the way 

from an entire company supporting the command base campor Ihe 

1st Infantry Division at Di An to small hig h frequency radio 

detachments supporting Army and Marine clements in Da Nang 

;md Hue. They ,vere not division tactical cOllllll uni ca tio ns in the 

strict sense, but they enabled the organic sig nal battalions (0 

suppon more full y the combat clcmcllIs of the division. 

Genera l TCITY, 1st Signal Brigade comma nder. took an 

opposite view from Ihal of Colonels Nicholson and Ferguson 

regarding control of these augmentations. It was his opinion that 

communi c.u ions from the division upward to field force, U.S. 

Army. Vietnam. or Military Assistance Command were properly 

the respo nsi bilit y of the 1st Signal Brigade, which had been 

organized specificall y to prov ide this unquesti o ned COl1l rol. He 

could not tOlerate an upward communicatiolls link failure that was 

auributable to a 1st Signal Brigade unit at the division base camp 

and caused by the division sig nal batta lio n commander imposinga 

precedence mission or tasking o n the brigade unit. As the 

commander responsible for these upward commun ications links, 

he had to be made aware of and approve the division's additiona l 

taskings. I shared General Terry's view, Our baltalion had an 

entire company supportin g the 121st Signal Battalion of the 1st 

Infa ntry Division in its basecampat Di An. Thecompany worked 

in close a nd conti nuaus harmony with the compani es of the signal 

ballalion but with the clear u ndersta ndi ng that any tasking to that 

company had to come from me with the approval of the 1st Signa l 

Brigade commander. I insisted that the company commander be 

fully responsive in orreri ng assistance to the division signal 

baualion commander consistel1l with his own mi!lsion requirements, and I am convinced that Ihis arrangement worked sa tisfactorily for all pan ics concerned. 

The in iti a l deploymellt of the 1st Cavalry Division 10 the base 

camp at An Kh e pointed out the importance o f ca rl y involveme nt 

by the d ivision signa l battalion commander in p lanni ng fu ture 

command post locations, This need was well recogn ized by the 

division commander, Major Ceneral Harry W. O. Kinnard, who gave 

total responsibility for command pOSt select io n to the div ision 

signal officer and the G-3, Some t\\'eJvedifferellt loc<ltions within a 

ninety-mile radius of An Khe were physically tested for 

multichannel and F~I radio coverage, and these sites governed 

su bsequent command pOSt displaceme n ts. Colonel Nicholson was 
BLUNTING THE ENEMY DRI VE 29 

MEN OF TilE 13TII SIGNAL BATfALION OPERATE AIRBORNE RELAY /0 

gi~ tactIcal commwliclltors mort rangt. 

also adamant about the need for actually testing a site for 

communications su itabilit}' instead of drawingconc1usiollS from a 

tcchnica l analysis of profiles and olher paper data: 

ant' of tht' most discou raging things to mt' in the past was 10 hear some 

officer or noncommissionedofficers<l), that ·· .. ccording to Iheir 'lIlal),sisof 

the profile-communications \~'ere nOI possible"-I am a nrm disbclie\'er 

of man~' technical chans and well designed profiles of lerrain. It .... 'as a 

praclice to actuall), lesllransmissions b)' transporting r'ddiot'quipment 10 

Ihe site in qucstion. The eq uipment dOt'S not have to be the entirc radio 

rela)' SCI-in most cases a r .. dio-of similar emissioil oper.lling on the 

desired (requclle)' will do Ihe same job. Thert arc 100 man)' variablessuch as effeclS of tropospheric conditions. reflecting terrain (caltlres and 

freak conditions Ihat ma.ke Iransmitting and receiving possible al places 

the "profile" sa),s Ihal it cannot be dont'. 

The first full-scale combat commitment o[ lhe 13th Signal 

Battalion of the lSI Cavalry Division was in support ofdivisiollal 

elements during Operation SILVER BAYONEr (23 October-20 

November 1965) and included the battle of the la Orang Valley. 

This operation highlighted the importance of the FM airborne 

relay in supponing far·rangi ng and swiftly developing campaigns. 

The 13th employcd a rixed-wing aircrafl equipped with twelve 
30 DI VISION-LEVEL CO~ MUN CATIONS, 1962-197~ 

NUl BA DEN. JUNE 1966. H ome oj Grallite Romeo Ta"go. 

powedul FM radios. 'rhe aircraft flew in o rb it a t 10,000 feet o\'er the 

widel y dispersed combat units and rcnansmiued Fl\l voice 

messages for most of Ihe key command nels directing the operation. 

The 1st Infantry Division faced a si mil ar need soon aft er its 

arriva l al Oi An. The divisio n adopleda mo re permanent "aria lion 

o f the relay-the mountaintop reJa y_ The 121st Signal Battalion 

established a relay on Nui Ba Den. o r the Black Virgin i\lolllHain, 

in February 1966. The follow ing ex tract from a 121st Sig na l 

Battalion n Ch 'S art icl e poi nts up the illllx>nance of the mountain 

and th e res pect it garnered frolll tacli c;:aI comlllu niC<IIors: 

Nui Sa Dell-"This is Gr'lIlill.' Romeo fango. " h;!) ocen hC<lrd by 

\,inu<l1i y CVNy I rad io operator in the lSI Infantry Division. Granile 

Ro meo Tango is Ihe flIdio c<l11 sign of Ihe rclay Silt'Opt-Taltt! by Compa ny 

COil Nui Ba Den mount'lin. Nui Sa Den . the highesl point in III Corps 

lIrea. hlls proven 10 l>t: o f major imporlance to the Big Red One for 

relaying VHF and FM commLliliciltiollS. fhe'prima ry mission o f the 

cig hlmcll who nm Ihe site is 10 provide VIIF rclilY for Ihe 1211.1 Signa l 

Balllli io n and Fi\1 Tel nillsmissio n fo r Ihe llllilS of the di\'i)ioll, II hilS 1I iso 

provided reillY sen 'ices fOT sll ch un ils as Ihe 251h In fan tT} Division, I he 4th 

Infalllr)' Divisio n. Iht, 1961h Lighl Infantry Brigade, ;lIId Spt'cial Forct'S, 

Although very ft'w mtn in Ihe b:ulal io n ha\'c aCl ually SCI fOOl on Nui 

Ba Den, they ,III know of "The MOllntain." Mosl VI IF operlllurs alone 

lime Orllllol her ha\'c put in a shollo Nui Sa Den. \Vhen dblance orll'ITlIi n 

makes il impossible 10 eSlablish commun iC;lIio ns, Nui Ba Den pro\·ides 

Ihe needed boost. T o man y people illihe di visio n, Gr.lnile Romeo Tango 
BLUNTING THE ENEMY DRIVE 31 

is some kind of magical FM radio station. When no one else can hear 

thel11 , out of the sky comes "Th is is Gra nile Romeo Tango." 

The initial combat experiences of the 1st Cavalry and 1st 

Infanlry Divisions illustra te a comm uni cat io ns problem that 

recurred in most major combat elements throughout the Vietnam 

conUict-the need to cover by FM voice radio a tacti cal area of 

responsibility far exceed ing any encountered in previous conflicts. 

This expanded tactical area of responsibil ity. coupl ed wi th 

mushrooming base cam ps, moving firesuppon bases, and lheneed 

to rapidly reposi tion combat elements by air, burdened divisionleve l commu nications. T he FM command nets were the mobile 

backbone. a nd units were constan tl y seeking innovative ways to 

keep key elements "on the air." The 1st Cavalry Division solved its 

p roblem in part by an airborne relay, expensive to mai ntai n in 

terms of manpower and materiel but cenainlye ffective considering 

lhe obslades the division faced. T he 1st Infantry was fortunate in 

having a domina nt high point such as Nui Ba Den whi ch could be 

reasonably defended and which provided coverage (or the 

division's entire lOne. Later the Big Red O ne and other div isions 

erected towers to accomplish a similar purpose. What ever the 

technique. lhe sig nal baualio n commander had to develop 

somet hing to ensure the command and contro l communications 

that the division commander needed. The sig nal battalion table of 

orga nization and equipment. however. was not struclUred to the 

demands of SOlltheast Asia. In the lo ng run. it often boiled down to 

the ingenu it y o f the sig nal battalion commander in d eveloping 

ways and fi ndi ng means to ge t his a ll-important job done. 

Probably no o ther si ngle thing contributed more to the success of 

tactical communi ca lions in Vietnam than theabil ityoft hecombat 

communi calOrs 10 keep vit al FM nets working under the nea rimpossibl e conditions that were routi ne throughout the war. 

As the 25th Infantry Di"ision began building its base camp at 

Cu Chi. it was tasked to provide communications suppOrt to the 

173d Airborne Brigade during an air assault la nd ing into Song Be. 

(The sepa rate brigade-size units were frequent ly deployed wit h 

minimal o rganic communications support. a nd they needed 

augmentation if given any extensive combat missions.) The l25th 

Signal Battalio n responded with the first heli copter lift of a 6.500-

pound mu ltichannel radio shelter and power genera tors to the 

brigade forward location. T hough dropped from a height of fi ve 

feet because of difficu lty in determining ground level in the heavy 

foliage, the rad io worked and provided a vita l nlultichanne l link 
32 DlVISION·LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS. 1962· 197S 

MRG-S11i CONFIGURATION. 125th Signal Ba llafio", 25th Tn/llll/roy Divi· 

sio". 

back to brigade main at Bien Hoa Air Base. This s)'stem was relayed 

lhrough Nui Sa Den by men of the 121s1 Signa l Baua lio n of the lsi 

Infantry Division-one example of the mutual coopcralion that 

existed among the divisional sig nal units throughout Vietnam. 

This W ;:IS the first of man y inrorma l cq uipment-shming 

arrangements between Ihe sig nal troops of the 25th and the 151 

Divisio ns. 

By the end o f March 1966. the 125t h Signa l Batta lion \\'a5 fully 

com mitt ed, supponing clements of the 2d Brigade in th e 1-10 80 

Woods. the P lain of Reeds, and Ihe Mic heli n Plantation. il beC<IIllC 

commo n practi ce to install multi channel systems down to 

baualio n level a nd occasio nall y lO an artillery batt ery because of 

the dispersion o f the units a nd the independent nature of the 

missions they were assigned. This increasingly heavy rel ia nce on 

multichannel radio (with nocorrcspollding equ ipment augmentation to the table of o rganiza tion a nd equipment ) led to the 

fabricatio n of the highly mo bil e "MRC-34li's:' This terminal 

consisted o f o ne twelve-cha nnel system mOllnted in a ~j-lOn tra il er 

and was desig ned to meet the increasi ng airmobile demands o f the 

divisio n. h was far easier 10 move by helicopter than the 

cumbersome MRC-69 shelter. but once it was dropped. it remained 

in pl ace except for limit ed repositio nin g by a crcw of strong-backed 

pushers and pullers. Because o f the demand for these sllccessful 

fabrica ted ai rmo bil e Illulti channelterminals. the 1251h had lilli e 
BLUNTING THE ENEi'o'IY DRIVE 33 

requirement for its high frequency radio teletypewri ter equipment. 

Although improvisa tio n was commo nplace during early 

combat for these first arrivi ng u n its. much of their communications 

doctrine was in consona nce \\'it h lo ng-establ is hed procedures. 

There was littl e change for the sake of change a lo ne. Colo nel 

Ferguson's rema rks on this score. which fo llow. generally a pplied 

to communications operations in all the u nits comi ng into 

Vietn am during this period: 

The communica tions systems installed .11 eu Chi to suppon the 

division comm,lIld post follo\\'l'(l tht· di vision sl<lIlding operating 

procedure for comb,H, VI IF s),stems " 'ere insta lled in such a manner that 

the various shots could be picked up when required in an almost 360 

degree fashion. Thus, whtt! a s),stem came in. any movemellt or 

reloc.lIion at the distanl end did not req uire anything more than an 

antenna reorie ntation at th e division command post. No fun her antenna 

erection 01' movement of vehicles was required. All equipment was kept 

mour1lcd in the vans. relld}' for funitt'r movement if neccssary, The H F 

(high frequcncy) radio p<lCk was set lip at a distance well awa}' from the 

VI-IF ~)steml> 10 prevent radio frequency interference_ The ballalio n 

MTC-3 switchboard was initial I)' installed but this was later phasl.'(] out 

aher ,III MTC-I switchboard \\'as obminl.'(] from the 2d Signal Group. 

fwo S8-5ll patch panels wcre installed with a ll circuits wired straight 

thro ug h whereve r possible. Circuit p,ltching \\' ;lS discouraged but, 

unfort unately. could nOI be avoided. The battalion systems cont rol tied 

thc entire complex IOg('tlter 0)' intercommunicat ions. All in a ll, it was a 

"cT}' tightl)' controlled battalion-type system. The te lecom illunicdtio ns 

celllcr's MSC-29's were located close 10 til('dil'ision command POSt where 

they could serve both the opcr,ui ons and in tell igence sections as \\'cll as 

lIdjUiam genera l a nd o ther inter('Sted ag('ndes in lhe division 

headquarters. 

The ~ISC-29 comm uni cations ce nler terminal was one of the 

va n-mounted items most susceptible to th e high hea t and humidit y 

cha raClcristi c of th e lowlands in a nd around Sa igon where th e 1st 

and 25th Divisio ns were o pe rati ng, Ma lfunctions resulti ng from 

lack of air conditio ning for this va n arc me nt io ned in numerous 

reports, The shelter \\'it hits tc let ypewriter equipme n t. commu n i· 

ca tions securit y de" ices. a nd voi ce frequency con vcners was a real 

heat ge nerator. In addition, the racks o f equipment were very 

tightly packed and alloh'ed litt le a ir c ircu lation_ The compo nents 

tended 10 be m ore a ffected by o verheat ing tha n those in other 

shelters, II was no t unusual to find int erior temperatures of 

110° _1 20° during the day. condit ions which sapped the energy and 

lowered the cHi c iency of ('ven th e most ha rdy a nd dediGlIed 

soldi ers. Whene\'er possible. th e o perating sig nal unit d ismo u n ted 
34 DIVISION-LEVEL CO:\IM UN ICATIONS, 1962-197.'J 

D[\'1510:-" T f\CTICAL OI't: R.\ no:'\'s 

Ct. ;.<TER SWI rf:llKOARl>, 125111 SlglIal Balla/ioll. 251h Itl/al/try Dill;-

$1011, 

the equipment and operated 

from lenIS, quonset huts, anythi ng that would give some relief from the heal. The division 

ba se camps werc re latively 

fixed. how('\,er, ahhough the 

maneuver clemenls were moving 

consta ntly. so loss of mobility 

wa~ nOI crilical. Perhaps the 

mOSI cHcclive air condilioning 

syslcm devised during the war, 

not only for Ihe l\ISC-29 but for 

all van-mounted equipment, 

was the overhead grenade 

she ila. -nl('l><Uldbaggcd shelter, 

built aboul six-twelve inches 

above the roof of the communicalions van. provided a layer 

of insulating coole r air. This 

shel ler. combi ned with the nor· 

mal \'en tilating fans in the van, 

cou Id n:duce the i llI erior tempcratllrl' by .. IS III ueh a!) riftccn-t we lily 

degrees-if the team chids kept Ihe fan filters frce of dusl by daily 

cleaning, 

One of Ihc demands of comrHu ni cat ions uni ts during the e: .... I), 

days of Ihe troop buildup wa!) re~ponding 10 Ihe demallds of rapid 

rdiablt' voice circuits for the taclical operations C(,l1Il'I'S, As a I'ule, 

the urge llC) of voin'traffic ge ncnltl'd in t hCel'lIlcr wa~ !> uch thatlhe 

division signa l b'lllalion (ommandcl' i~olal('d it from the normal 

di\'i~io n ~\\'i hboard and rou lcd it on " hot li ne~" th rough a ~pecia l 

:.witchboard. In thc25th In fantry Divisio n, forexampic, t\\'oSB-22 

Swilchboard~ w('re in~lalied initiall) to handle Ihl' sole·uscr 

circui t:. that Wl're needed, ("h est:: :.wit chboards ~oon proved 

inadequaLl', howcvcr, and a ackcd SB-86 replaced them a nd <1.150 

~el"\ ed th l' fire :.upport coordination center adjacl'lIt 10 th e Cl'llIer, 

By this ml'ans therl' was an opt'rator 10 iTHl'n'etH.' immediately and 

rendcr a:.siSI<lIlCl' if an) of the hot lint::. de\eioped Irotlblc.~, The 

tactical operatioll!> cCllter:. Wl'll' a lso a colleui ng poirll fol' a n 

cndlcss array 01 FI\I. UIIF, and VHF ;Wlennalo, and ~ign<li units 

wcrc con:.ta 1lI1} i mprm i:.ing Wi.!} S 10 (011:.01 ida te aillt'lIna:. wi I houl 

n:ducing their radiati ng efficiclll}, 'rhe !'ligna I battalion of tht' 25th 

I nfanlry DivisiOll erectl'd a sixl} ·fool M:lf-loupponi ng masl neal' lhe 

division celltcr constructed from I i[Hllln, I){}\\'dcr conlai ncl':., Four 
BLUNTING THE ENEMY DRIVE 35 

HIGH FREQUENCY RAOIOB UNKERal25lh Infan try Division headquarters 

in Cu Chi. Anlemla mast was made from artillery power canisters. 

ante nnas were mounted on it and used simultaneously without 

interference. In addition to the ongoing major co mbat operat ions, 

there were many smaller but importa nt aCl ions. In these small unil 

operations, communi ca tions played a vital role in reporting 

information to hig her headquarters and in securing required 

support. The radiotelephone operators in small comba t teams not 

o nl y provided vila l communications but also performed their share 

of va lorous aCls. One of the most no table was the action of Private 

First Class Stephen Laier of Fon Wayne , Indiana , on <1 February 

1966 near Lai Khe. His 1st Infantry Division c ita tio n for valor 

reads, in pan, as follows: 

Pri va te First Class Laier was serving as radiotelephone o perator on a 

platoon ambush patrol. . .. The patro l encOll ntered cla ymore mi nes 

and intense sma ll arms Cire. Priva te First Class Laier lost both legsduc toa 

blast from a claymore mine and his radio \\'as knocked off frequency. 

Alth ough suf(ering intense pain. he was ab le to maintain 

conscio usness and to reca librate his rddio .. .. 

Rea lizing that dustoH (med ica l) helicopt ers could not la nd due to 

sma ll arms fire. he direcled reinforcements to his location by continuous 

radio contact. 

Continui ng to fight off uncon sciousness. Pri vate First Class Laier 

conti nued his heroic actions by directing dustoff pilolS to the proper 

landin g lOne a nd called them in one at a time . . . so his wounded 

comrades could be evacua ted. 

Having saved the remaining patrol members, Private Laier was 

evacuated to a fi eld hospital where doctors worked night and day to 
36 DIVISION·LEVEL COMM UN IC,\ TIONS, 1962· 1973 

save his life. He IOld doctors that during thecotn bat aClion he had 

kepi goi ng because he knew thai he \,'a5 the o nl y man st ill al ive in 

the patrol who was tra ined to lise the radio. Priva te La icr di ed 

fift een days after the rig ht. The division commander, Major 

Genera l Jonathan O. Seaman, reportedly \\'1'01(: a friend. "This is 

o lle o f the bravest soldi ers I have seen in thiny years a s a soldier: ' 

A v('tcran WClf correspondent wrOIC of the incident. "" you ng 

infantryman named Stephen Laicr has sho\\'n in fifteen pain-filled 

days that in some men the onl y limit to courage is death. The 

courage of Laicr ... almost clerics comprehension by men who 

have never been wounded in batik" 
CI-I APTERIV 

Shift to the Offensive 

The arriva l in Vietnam of five more major comba t clements in a 

six-mon th period begin n ing in Aug ust 1966 enabled the a llied 

forces 10 shih 10 the offensive. As t his second year of combat for U.S. 

Army forces began, the lsI Infa n try Division under its new 

commander, Major Ge nera l Wil liam L De Pu)', WilS wi nding up 

Operat ion EL PASO II. Plan n ing for this opera tion had started 

long before 2 J une 1966-lhe day ,he opera ti o n began-and much 

of it hi nged o n Ihe resolu tio n o f some knotty comm unica ti o ns 

problems. To begin with , the 121s1 Sig nal Ba tta lion cou ld no t sian 

to handle the eXlensivedeploymcll 1 planned for EL PASO II because 

large quantities o f its equ ipmclll were tied up s u pporti ng the large 

base camp complex at Oi An. To take this base camp load o ff the 

organic signal balla lion (the 12Ist). the 595th Signa l Su ppOrt 

Company. attached 10 the 69t h Signal Ba ttalion, was dil'ccted to 

deploy to Di An and ass ume most of the base camp commun icati ons m ission , but it remained under the command o f the 69th. 

"1"he a rriva l o f tht, compa ny al Di An was a trag ic o ne. O n the 

first ('ven ing. before th e men had com pl e ted the sandbag 

revetments arou nd their ten ts. a ISS- m ill. artillery ro und from a fire 

missio n d irected agai nst th e o uter perimeter o f the ca mp fell sho rt 

and burst in the company stree t between theS95th and Compa ny A 

of the 121st. Several men o f o ne platoon were wou nded severely and 

one was killcd. O nc man was left u nh ul'l bUI in a stale of shock 

when a two-i nch shell fragme nt we nt th rough h is p illow. As the 

commander of the 69th . I visi ted the company ea rl y the follow ing 

morn ing. T he genera l purpose medium telll close to the burst was 

tota ll y shredded. a nd the p la toon th at suffered th e C<lsua lt ies was 

understandably depressed. T he burst had been a rude shock for a 

un it going to ils fi rst rca ) communi catio ns assignment. 

Despite th is in itia l ach'ersiIY. Ihe 5951h we ill systema tic;:t ll y 

about its busi ness of working wilh the l2 1st to lake over the base 

camp communica tio ns. Mu ltichan nel links (0 replace th ose o f the 

121s1 were installed to Saigo n a nd to the ne ig h bori ng Korean 

division. Cable systems a nd wire frames , .. 'ere insta ll ed and 
38 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962- 191.' 

mainta ined to repl ace the 12 1s1 systems. T he base camp 

switch board a nd patch panel were insta ll ed and opera ted by the 

5951h. leaving o nl y the tactica l o pera tio ns ccm er commu nicatio ns 

to be o pera ted by the 121sI. The (21st was thus able to devote all its 

energy and reso urces to p la nning for EL PASO II. In this a nd other 

insta nces where the 69th wa s providing suPPOrt to di vision or 

brigade base camps, it was standard practice to o H-load all shelters 

and dig them in quickly. T hese base camps were perma nent, and 

the trucks o n whi ch the shelters were mo u n ted were mo re o f a 

lia bility tha n a n asset. T here were ma n)' side benefits of off-loadi ng 

besides the o bvio us o ne of protectio n. The trucks cou ld be used for 

genera l purpose hauling a nd were easier to ma inta in. Access to the 

shelter was easier and sa fer. The una irconditio ned shellers were 

cooled by mo unt ing a heat sh ield above the shelter roof. 

The assistance of the 595th freed the necessary comm unica ti ons 

equipment to su ppon EL p ,\SO iI, but it d id n 't solve the p ressing 

problem of packagi ng a nd mobil ity. T he ba lla lio n ado p ted the 

same technique tha t the 251h Infantry Divisio n had employed 

successfull y. The VHF multichan nel AN/ MRC-69 van s were 

modified. O ne stac k o f AN/ TRC- 24 rad io equipment a nd o ne 

stack o f AN/ T CC-7 carri er equipment (one- ha lf the ca pa bility of 

(he AN 1M RC-69) were removed from the n truck shel ler a nd 

insta ll ed in a n trailer. The modified set, termed the MR ~, 

proved high ly effective in providing VH F sy:Hems from forward 

a reas back to base camp areas. Also , because it was lig hter and less 

bulky tha n the AN/ MRC-69, it could I'cadil y be a irlihed into an y 

forwa rd a rea. 

EL PASO II dep loyed all the d ivisio n and brigade command 

elements to the fi eld o ver a n immense tactica l a rea of o pera tio n and 

for a n extended time. T en separa te command post loca tio ns 

(forward a nd rear for each o f the three brigades, plus division 

anillery a nd the d i" ision headquan ers) were suppon ed simullancously. Ma ny of these were inaccessible by road; but the light, 

h elicopter- lranspon a ble M 34~ was airlifted in , a nd EL PASO II 

was well su pported. 

As Ihe scope of the 1st In fa n try Divisio n 's op era tion s expanded, 

mo re a nd mo re communica tio ns inno vatio ns appeared as the 

tacti ca l signalmen la bored to keep pace with Genera l DePuy's 

aggressive leaders hip a nd pencha nt for establishing tactical 

comman d posts and (ire bases wherever ac tio n was heaviest. Nui Ba 

Den , the onl y mo untain o f an y size in the d ivisio n 's tactical ar ca of 

res po nsibilit y, p rovided relay for man y lo ng multi channel sho ts to 

forward command poSt loca tio ns. But o ne eleva ted po int was not 
SHIFT TO THE OFFENSIVE 39 

enough to accommodate the relatively flat and heavi ly forested 

terrain throughout the area. Although nOI no rmally found on Ihe 

signal ballalion table of organ izalion a nd equip ment, a numberof 

fixed towers began 10 appear al critica l poillls. The towers were 

genera ll y tWO standard issue items-the 45- to 65-foot AB-577 and 

the AB-216 whi ch could be erected LO over two hu ndred feel. 

Seldom did anyone ask where these unauthorized towers came 

from, but for the 1st Infa ntry Division and other major combat 

units they were the answer to the communicawf's prayer for keeping VHF and Fi\1 systems on the air. 

On occasion, the lOwers did double duty. A 121st Signal 

Battalio n yea rbook carried a slOry of the largeSl Christmas tree in 

South Vietnam. To celebrate the battalion's second Christmas. the 

men of Company A decorated lhe 120-foot tower a t Di An base 

camp with countless strings of colored lights and placed a huge star 

on the top. \-\lith the Big Red One communicalOrs ga thered a bout 

the LOwer. the commandi ng ge nera l of lhe division commended 

them for their olltstanding work as communi cators a nd, at the 

conclusion of his remarks. officiall y lit the "tree. " 

By using a combination of LOwers and g rou nd or airtra nspon able she ller configurations, the 12 1st Signa l Battalion 

installed. opera ted, and ma intained a backbone mult icha nnel 

tru n king and switching system. The system interconnec ted the 

division main command post at Di An with the brigade main 

com mand post at Phuoc Vi nh. It also interconnected the brigade 

command post and the division's fonvard comma nd poSl a t La i 

Kh e. It tied in the division suppon command and the brigade 

headquarters located at Oi An and maintai ned aj ump capability to 

tie in division a nd brigade tactica l command posts when deployed, 

which was rather frequently. To ga in worldwide access over this 

syStt'lll , th l' 1st Signa l Brigade brought in tWt'lH y-four cha nnelsof 

communi cations to Oi An and Ph uoc Vi nh. T hey were termi nated 

by the 595th Signal Compa ny a nd lied the d ivisio n into the entire 

1st Signal Brigade system and the OefenseComm unication System 

(DeS). For sw itch ing, an MTC-I was used at division 

headquaners and SB-86's were used at the division forward a nd the 

brigade command posts. Primary users of the system were the chief 

of staff a nd o ther staff members. The system wa s not very 

dependable beca use of the man ua l sw itch ing and because div ision 

headq uarters was sometimes split th ree ways, between its division 

mai n, forward. and tacti cal com ma nd pOSts. The division 

commander. lhe assistan t division commanders. and lhe brigade 

com manders se ldom used the multicha nnel system ot her than the 
40 DIVISION·LEVEL COM~ UN CAT ONS. 1962-1973 

dedicated tru nks to the tactical operations centcrs. This 

multichannel trun king and swi tchi ng system worked. but 

opercuions were marginal at best. Ceiling through the manual 

switchboard was a chore. Switch board operators were ro tated 

freq ucllll y: a ft er a mo nth o r I wo their effi ciency a nd abil ity to cope 

declined considerabl y. 

Thai the division and brigade com manders were frcquclHiy 

airborne. moving by helicopter from area to area, placed the main 

burden of command communi ca tions o n Ihe FM radio nels. Each 

of the comma nders had a helicopter equ ipped wilh two 

AN/ VRC-12 series radios, and the divisio n comnl<lndcr kepI his o n 

lhe division a nd brigade nelS. I-Ie a lso needed 10 l11onilOf the 

various maneuver ballalion nets. so a fun her innova tion was 

required. Thecommand hel icopter console was modified to take a 

third AN/ VRC- 12 with push-button tllning for prese lected 

channels. Thus Ihe commander'S aide cou ld vc ry quick ly give him 

a brigade net o n the second radio or a maneuver battalion net on the 

third radio, 01' both. 

Because o f the extensive maneuver area of the 1st Division. a 

highly dependable Fi\I command net was essenti a l. This net, 

however. required a n au tomalic retransmissio n station. which was 

a lso placed on top of Nui Ba Den. The position was fonified 

because Ihe enem} held all but the sum mit whe re the statio n was 

loca ted. But he seemed sa tisfied to leave the position alone, and 

even shared a walel'hole o n the mountain with sta tion personnel. 

General DePuy fu Il y recogn ized the need fo r good communi cations to su ppon the division'sconcept of hig h Iy mo bile opera tio ns 

and his need to be ne'lr the cri ti ca l actio n. Whenever ill tellige nce 

indi cated as enemy buildup, the com ma nding genera l would ca ll a 

conference- at any hour-of key staff o£ficers. and he a lways 

included the division signal officer. The choice of the command 

post locatio n was made by the G-3 and Ihe signal officer together. 

with the commander giving his approva l o nl y after he had been 

assured that it would accolllmodate the re(lUircd comm uni cat ions 

to su ppOrt the opera tions. He would then ensure that sufficient 

helicopter suppon was avai lable to mo\'(' the essential 

communicat io ns equ ipment into the loca ti o n. With this high 

priorit y g iven by the division commander. the signal battalion was 

always able 10 get the communications in when and \\'here the 

commanding ge neral wanted them. 

A pecu liar facet of tactic.1I commun icat io ns in South Vietnam 

was the slow accepta nce a nd, in many instances. the limit ed use o f 

radio wire integratio n (R WI ). a system that interconnects an Fl\! 
SHIfT TO THE OFfENSIVE 4 1 

radio subscriber with a telephone subscriber through one or more 

manua l switchboards. Every tacti ca l signa l uni t was authorized 

radio wire int egratio n equipment. but there seem ed to bean initial 

rel uctance to pu t it 10 genera l usc. As the scope of tactical 

operations expanded. however. and directio n of ground operations 

by di\·ision. brigade. and battalio n commanders from helicopters 

became the norm, the need fora system became paramount in many 

combat un its. 

The Big Red O ne was noexcepti on; when Li eutenant Colonel 

James M. Rockwell assumed command of the signa l ba tta lion in 

September 1966. he found no mea ningfu l radio wire integration 

system. It was fortu nate both for Colonel Rockwell a nd the 1st 

Infantry Divisio n that he was experienced in tactical integrat ion 

systems and knew what they cou ld offer an aggressive airmobile 

commalHJer. 

Before he went to Vietnam. Major Rockwe ll , as the execu tive 

o fficer of the 69th Signal Ba tt alion, was involved in exercise 

GOLDFIRI:: Wilh the U,S. Strike Command at Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri . The ballalion prm·ided exercise communica tions for 

Brigadier General Bob Pau lson. the .S. Strike Command J-6, 

over an area even larger than the taClica l area of responsibi lity o f 

the Big Red One. A key requirement for Ihe exercise was an 

extensive radio wire integratio n netwo rk spanning the who le area 

via a series of sOllle eight 200·foot towers, a ll erected by the 

battalion. Radi o wire integra tio n ca lls throughout thearea I>ca ked 

at close (0 len thousand per day at thecl imaxof the exercise. It was, 

therefore. re latively easy for Colonel Rockwell to spot the need for 

such a system, know ing the personal ity a nd mod us operandi of the 

1st Division commander, and to start developing it. It was easier 

sa id tha n done. however. as he rela ted : 

Naturally. I was ilot about to announce to (he division that we had an 

R WI system until I was certain it had been installed and was fully 

uperational. so \"C had .-, \'cnl l \\'cck:. uf tests .... Finally I was 

cunviw . .:cd that we had" guod uperational system and \\';lS PfCpitn.-d 10 

announce it ill one of the evening bficfi ngs when tht: followi ng incident 

occurred: I was aloft with General DcI'u y ... and it call C'd me in on the 

FM c:unullluu..l net from Ihe dil'isioll TOe stating that General DePuy "';IS 

[0 call Ihe II Field FUfce commander by telephone ASAP. 

The system was explained to Ge nera l DePuy and he allempted 

to put the call through from his helicopter. but there was no 

respo nse. T hey then had to fl y back to div ision forward to p ut the 

call through. That evening, after some friendly chiding at the starr 
42 DIVISION· LEVEL COMMUN ICATIONS, 1962· 19;3 

R ADIO WIRE I NTECRATION $T,\ T ION, 125th Signal Battalion, 25th 

h'/fHllry DivisIon. 

meeli ng about the excellence o r lhe system, Colonel Rockwell wc nl 

immcdialcly 10 the base camp todclennine the problem. which was 

. . . Ihe open . 101' \,'ho, VJIH.'II he found thai GcrH:rai Dd)u y him:.df was 

placing the ca ll . gOI panickt'd li nd JUSt clammed up and wal> afra id [0 

respond. Well that WilS casill' fixt'll a nd allOll l a week lalcl" we were again 

a10h and aga in had (0 makt· a telephone call. rhis timt he (General 

DePuy] suggested th a t RWI system. We initialed Ih e ca ll ami it \,'('111 

thro ugh be'lUlifu ll )'. 

This instance sold the division com mander on the system. and 

soon the assistant division commanders. brigade commalldel's. and 

staff were introduced to it and became freque nt users. II was even 

made avai lable 10 maneuver battalio n commanders. who bccmllc 

prime users. The)' soon learned that whell isolated in the middle of 

the jungle the)' could go Ihrough their AN/ PRC-25 radios to 

communicalC wilh their staffs. The G-4 found it especia ll y 

valuable in com muni cat ing with his people, who might even be 

back in Saigon on the docks. to improve resupply operat io ns. 

A never-ending source of fun hcr improvisa tion by the tacti cal 

signa lmen was antennas fo r the Fl\1 radios. As demands for FM 

coverage broadened, ingenuity often bordered on the fan tastic. The 
SHIFT TO THE OffENSIVE 43 

4th Infantry Division, arrivi ng in the Centra l H igh lands in late 

1966, contribu ted its bit to Vietnam FM folklore. Shortly before 

arriving in Vie tnam. the division received the new AN/ VRC-12 

series and the AN/ PRC- 25 rad ios. After arriving the division 

received the new KY-8 voice securi ty eq ui pment for use with the 

VRC-12 series. T he AN/ PRC-25 was a big improvement over the 

AN/ PRC-lO, providing increased range and eliminating ca libra· 

tio n problems. The K Y-8, on the o ther ha nd, alt ho ug h it provided 

complete voice security, a lso red uced the tra nsm ission ra nge of the 

radios. Whenever a battalion of the division was deployed a great 

dista nce from the command post. an RC-292 ante nna was usuall y 

erected. This antenna in conj unctio n with the AN/ VRC- J 2 series 

and the K Y -8combination p rovided good, secu re comm uni cat io ns 

over a ll distances the divisio n covered in its ope ra tions. 

T he short allien na (AT-892/ PRC-25) was the mOSt commonly 

used and reliable for units moving in the ju ngle and dense terra in. 

Communi cations wit hin a company presented no problem when it 

was used. T he an tenna, however, even though quite shon , drew 

fire , and lhe radio operator beca me a target for snipers. Tocounter 

this activi ty. units simply reversed the radios on the back packs so 

the antenna poi IlIcd down. This proccduredidn 't seem to affecl lhe 

ra nge of the radio, The long alllenna ((AT - 27 1) provided more 

than adeq uate capabili ty for the company to communi ca te with 

the ba tta lion when operati ng within a IOS· nun. artill ery fire fan 

from the batta lion fire base. When o perating beyond th is range or 

when hig h ground separa ted the company a nd ba t tal ion fire base. 

the company used an RC-292 amen na. In the moulllains of the II 

Corps area, usi ng th is antenna was a si mple ma iler because o nl y 

the head of the RC-292 was requ ired. A soldi er could climb a tree 

a nd secure the head to the treetop. a nd the RC-292 wo uld provide 

more than adequa te radio communi ca ti ons ra nge. Field exped ient 

anten nas were also successful. The best was the vertica l half· 

rhom bic. which was easy to assem ble and install o n the mo un ta ins, 

On several occasions, companies were abl e to transmit and receive 

over dista nces of twenty· five mi les using this a ntenna. 

Perhaps o ne of the best examp les of individ ual courage coupled 

with effective use of FM in a combat opera tio n occurred within the 

27th Infantry (Wolfhounds) of the 25th Infa ntry Division during 

Opera tion ATrU:BORO in late 1966 in War Zone C. T his major 

operation saw some hectic figh ting as the 9th Viet Cong Division. 

in a J"'dre change of tact ics, stood and fought. T he commander of the 

1st Bauaiion, 27 th Infantry, commanded eleven rifle compa ni es 

deployed around a rough la nd ing zo ne in the de nse jungle near the 
44 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962- 197~ 

Michelin Pla llla lio n. T he comma nder, Major G u y S. Meloy. was 

usin g an AN/ PRC- 25 radio with the short a nten na. He could talk 

wilh his units. but initi a ll y he had diffi cuhy relaying informatio n 

to support ing elements thro ug h his radio-equipped (A N / VRC-1 2) 

vchicl e whi ch he had leh ncar the anill ery position a l Dau Tieng. 

Heavy enemy fire had pinned down his command gro up and most 

of his initial forcc. SCl' gealll First Class Ray Burdett e, the batlalio n 

operations sergea nt. assembl ed a n RC-292 a ntenna whil e pro ne 

under fire. With the help o f a nother soldier, he muscl ed it u p to the 

vertica l a nd leaned it aga inst a tree. Using this pro pped-up 

antenna. lhe AN/ PRC-25 radio could reach the ANI VRC-1 2 radio 

location. With this relay and the temporary help of the forward air 

contro ller overh ead. externa l suppOrt was o bta ined as needed. 

Major Meloy rece ived his additio nal units. contro lled his 

o versized force, secu red artill ery a nd air suppo rt , and arranged 

medi cal evacua ti o n and resuppl y through lhe radio nets. For two 

a nd a half days the two fo rces slugged it o ut in the heavy 

o vergrowth. Radi o tra nsmission rema ined good throug ho ut the 

rest o f the fight and assisted in the coord inatio n of the linkup as 

o ther American forces mo ved in. Radio had been the o nl y link 

between Major Mcloy and ma ny o f the u nit commanders who 

fo ug ht this battl e under his control. 

The ) st Infa ntr y Division also counts as one of its top heroes a 

communi catOr who helped turn the tide o f ba ttle for his unit 

during this same o peratio n. The citatio n whi ch accompani ed the 

posthumous award of the Medal o f Ho nor to Ca pta in Euripides 

Rubi o, Jr. , for conspi cuo us ga llantry a nd intrepidit y a t the risk of 

life above a nd be)'ond the ca ll o f d ut y. reads in pa rt as fo llows: 

On 8 November 1966. Ca ptai n Rubio was serving as Commun ica tions 

a Hieer. 1st Balla tio n, 28 th Infa ntry, 1st Infantry Division, in Tay Ni nh 

Prov ince. Republicof Vi etn" m, when" numeriCd ll)' superior enemy force 

I" unched a massive a uad 'lg'd inst the ba llalio n defe nse posiLion. Intense 

enemy machine g un fire raked the area wh ile mon .. r ro und and ririe 

grenades exploded with in the perimeter. Lea ving the rel ative safety of his 

pOS t, Ca ptain Rubio recei ved two seriOliS wo unds as he braved the 

withering fire to go to the area of most intense action wh ere he dislTihuted 

ammunition, reesta blished positio ns and rendered ai d to the wounded. 

Disregardin g the pa inful wounds, he unh esit:ltingly assumed command 

when a rifle company comma nder was medica ll y evacuated. Caplai n 

Rubio was wounded a th ird time as he se lflessly exposed himself to the 

de\'asta ting enemy fi re to move among his men to encourage them 10 fight 

with renewed cHon . \Vhil e aiding the evac ua tio n of wounded personnel, 

he no ted that a smo ke grenade which was int ended to mark the Viet Cong 

position for air strikes h"d fa ll en dangerously d ose to the fri endl y lines. 

Ca pta in Rubioscoopcd up the grenade, ran thro ug h the deadly ha il of fire 
SHIf'I TO THE OFFENSIVE 45 

(0 within 20 mctcrs of ,heencmy position and hurled the already smoking 

grenade in to the midst of the enemy before he fe ll for the fina l time. Using 

(he repositio ned grenade as a marker. fri cndl y air str ikes were directed to 

destroy the ()~ (ilc positions .... 

T hroughou t all major combat units and in nea rl y every major 

operation the ingenuity and courage of the FM radio operator 

counted again and again. The FM command ne t was the life line, 

often o ne that had LO be susta ined despite the staggeri ng obstacl es 

of extended distances. excessive net congestio n. and nearimpenetrable vegetat io n. Man y o f the "j ury-rig" amenna lash-ups 

would defy technical logic or expl ana tion. but they enjoyed o ne 

com mon overriding characteristic: they worked. ami baul es were 

won. 

Like all wars, the Vietnam confli ct had its moments of humor_ 

Major General J ohn Norton. commander of the 1st Air Cavalry, 

initiated a small communi cations experiment 1O revive theanciellt 

technique of carri er pi geons. l-l e directed his signal officer, 

Lieutenant Colo nel Walter J. Bodman . to carry it out; a nd two 

pigeons. Ralph and Suzy, were obtained. The designated pigeo neer 

was Chi ef Warrant Officer James S. Steven, Jr .. probabl y the last of 

a va nishing breed. 

During Operatio ns PAUL RE VERE IV and T HAYER II in the 

Binh Dinh and Pleiku provinces, an int elligence officer from the 

2d Brigade spied Suzy, with a capsul e attached to her leg, sit ti ng o n 

a wire. Not knowing of the commanding genera l's experiment, he 

summoned a lrooper who shot the supposed Viet Cong messenger 

pigeon. The int ellige nce officer rushed eagerl y to the fallen bird 

and unfolded lhe thin paper ro ll ed up in the capsule. It bega n, "T o 

the Commanding General. 1st Cava lry Divisio n, ..... About the.: 

sa me time, Ral ph was reponed as either AWOL or missing in 

aClion. and the shon-lived experimelll ingloriously ended. 

Duri ng 1966-early 1967 occurred the o nl y aCli vadon of a major 

combat unit in Vi etnam-the Ameri cal Di vision. This division 

would opera te in the 1 Corps zone and reli eve the III Marine 

Amphibious Force and other mari nes in lhe Chu Lai area, The 1st 

Signa l Brigade provided troops a nd equipment to form the 

provisional signal battalio n to support Ihis ncw di visio n. Men and 

signal ri gs of all types wcre pulled from four sepa rate battalions 

and l\\'0 separate compani es; they went by road to Tan Son Nhut. 

Bien I-I oa. Pleiku . and Nha Trang a ir bases for air movement to 

Chu Lai, where the battalion formed. The batta lion was 

committed immedi a tely, with no o pportunit y to pull these diverse 

personnel together as a cohesive unit. T he situation was 
46 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-19n 

compounded by the delayed departure o f Marine Corps ground 

units in and around Chu La i, a delay which resulted in shared 

communications facilities and joint operat io ns of switchboards 

a nd communications centers during the transition. The 

orga nizational a nd training problems encoullIcred by this signa l 

batta lion during its forma ti ve period were probably without equal 

during the war. That the ba ttalio n was able to provide good 

communications suppor! to the newly formed America l Divisio n is 

a lTibule to Lieutenant Colo nel Edwa rd A. Ford. the first 

commander, and ( 0 the diverse signal personnel who rapidly 

learned [0 work LOgether as a u nit. The signa l batta lion and the 

communica tio ns platoons of the infantry brigades fou nd 

themselves overequipped and ovennanned - a far cry from ea rl y 

ex.periences o f units who were o ften required to deploy to Vielllam 

with acute shortages of equipment a nd personnel. 

In the earl y spring of 1967, the first combat parachute drop 

si nce the Ko rean War took place, a nd it was nOt without its 

communications problems. Operation J UNCTIO N CITY was a 

major encirclement operatio n of War Zo ne C, and one o f ni ne 

infa n try ballalions placed in blocking positions was dropped by 

parach ute. A securi ty cover pla n had been dev ised to concea l the 

identity o f the drop zone until the last possible moment. Pla nn ing 

was based o n another locatio n with somewhat si milar 

characteristics. The sig nal officer involved did not learn of the true 

loca tio n unti l twO days before the j ump. 

Visual communication devices played a n importan t part in the 

assem bly of the paratroopers a fter the j ump. Init ia ll y smoke was 

throw n to g ive d irection to those soldi ers who had become 

d isoriented duri ng descen t. During assembly bOl h smoke a nd sma ll 

gas-filled colored ba lloons were used to aid jumpers in qui ckly 

finding the assembly area of their un its. 

A heavy drop of eq uipment and supplies began at 0925 and 

conti nued into the a ft ernoon. Various types of suppli es were 

identified by d ifferentl y colored cargo chutes a nached to the 

contai ners. The brigade commun ications equipment was incl uded 

in the heavy drop. 

Initial communica tion a t the drop zone was by AN/ PRC- 25. 

By usi ng the RC- 292 a ntenna, FM comm unica tions were 

established to the 1st Infa lllry Divisio n forward at i"ti nh T hanh. 

Three heavy drop loads of commun ications equipmelll arrived on 

the drop zone intact. Each load could esta blish ll lere 

communications for a tact ica l brigade command post. The 
SHIFT TO THE OFFENSIVE 47 

condition of lhe ground in the drop zone, however, precluded the 

use o f this equipment. As soon as the vehicles were de·rigged a nd 

driven away, they became hopelessly mired. They rema ined in the 

drop zone ulllil late in the afternoon. w hen a rmored personnel 

carriers fro m Company D, l6li1 Armor, became ava ilable to pull 

them o ut. Early in th e aft ernoon on D·day, C H-47 helicopter 

sorties deli vered VHF radio equipment, high frequency radio 

telet ypewriter. secure tel ety pewriter, and FM radio she lters. Shortl y 

after the arrival of th is equipme nt, VHF communica tions were 

established to the 1st Infa ntry Di vision forwa rd a nd provided 

telephone circuits from th e brigade forward command post to task 

headquarters a nd telepho ne circ uits to Bi en H oa. Wire was laid to 

all u nits in the objective area before nightfall. T his was the first 

lime it had been possi ble to establish wire communic.ttion s to all 

subordi na te units, and it was possibl e because all units were 

deployed within th ree kil o me ters o f the brigade command post. 

The best synop sis o f what these years of communicat io ns 

innovation a nd experience mea nt to the major com ba t e lements is 

perhaps given in the remarks of Major Genera l Frederick C. 

Weya nd as he reflected on the accom plishments of the 25th 

Infaillry Di visio n : 

During tile past year of combat in Vietnam. tbe25tb In fa rH l'Y Division 

has co nstantly sought to improve its effectiveness in the fu ndamenta l 

cap .. bility to move, shoot, and communicate. OUl' opera tional planning 

gives specific a tt ention to the comma nd loca tions th at will provide the 

most effect ive COntrol. We are on guard to insu re that com mun ications. 

the means by which COnl and control is achieved. is not shu nted aside or 

neglected at the ex pense of a portion of the tactica l plan. My 

communicator [signal officer) is included in the pl anning cycle but thaI, 

of course, is not the whole Story. The com muni cator during an opt'ration 

must possess the capa bi lity to modify the plan to meet the u nfo r('S('(' n. He 

must continuall y keep abreast of the tactiCll1 situation to install o r reo 

route VHF systems. follow up to reduce message backlogs. monitor 

circ uits to insure topnotch quality. and a ll the oth er Ilumerous tasks 

connected with "gettillg the mess .. ge through." 

The modern communi catio ns systems employed in support of our 

operatio ns cxtCnd. as newr before, the voice of the commander on the 

battlefield. Appreciation of this vast network is pcrhaps newr greater 

than when a beleaguered tacticd l comma nder is able to aliI for and have 

artillery fire and airstrikes o n ta rget within a few minu tes. The responsi\'c 

Signal Corps systems that save v.tluable seconds haw doubtlessly saved 

lives a lso. 

To be witho ut rclhlble commun icat ions at critical moments could 

easil y afford the enemy the momentary ad van tage he seeks. I congratula te 
48 DIVIS ION·LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS. 1962·19H 

a ll of the commun ications person nel in Vietnam for their unceasi ng 

errorls 10 provide our tacti ca l commaurlers ill1 unrailing means 01 

exercising command and COI1\rol. 
CHAPTER V 

Riverine Operations and the 

Cambodian Incursion 

General Creighton Abrams's assumption of comma nd o f the 

U.S. forces in Vietnam in J uly 1968 prcs<lged major changes in Ihe 

directio n of American efforts thefe. T hese cha nges came in no 

small pan from Presiden t J o hnso n'sdccision in Ma rch 1l0l LOc n tCr 

the presidential race a nd a result ing pllsh toward OJ negot iated 

peace and American wit hdrawal. 

By a nd large this push posed no problems in division-level 

communications that had . not appeared in earlier tac ti ca l 

operat io ns. Two exceptio ns were riverine opera tions in the ri cerich della region SOll lh of Saigon a nd incursion into Cambodia. 

Both ca ll ed for exceptional ingenu ity a nd perseverance from 

tactical communicdtors. 

Hiverille Operallolls 

The Mobile Riverine Force was conducting Operat io n CORO· 

NADO I in the delta region as the third year o f combat began. The 

2d Brigade of the 9th Infa n try Division, com ma nded by Colonel 

William B. Fulton, combined with the U.S. Navy's River Assault 

Flo till a One. made up the force. The 9th Divisio n esta blished an 

advance com mand pOSt at Dong Tam from which the etssista nt 

division commander normally operated. A 204-foot AB-216 radio 

ante nna tower enabled him to rece ive radioed instructi o ns from the 

division comma nder and to pass on instructions to the Army element of the Mobile Riveri ne Force and o ther u nits operat ing in the 

region. Swamps and he~vy jung le of the delta regio n fo rced the 

tactica l units to rely on sma ll craft as prima ry transportatio n for 

conducting o perations. It WetS the 2d Brigade's responsi bility to 

patrol waterways, searching ou t and destroy ing the enemy. 

The brigade soon learned that tra nspo rt ati o n was not its o nl y 

problem. Because of the relati ve ly flat terra in and a large 

operational area that was predominately swamp and heavy foliage, 

line of site communicat ions were difficult at best. Few areas existed 
50 DIVISION-LEVEL COi\l1\IUN ICt\TIO NS. 1962-1973 

in lhe delta which could support radio relay ,Ind retransmission Sialions. The joi III riverine 

operations were relatively nch', 

so (here was no communicdlio ns experience from wh ich [0 

draw. Communiollions facil ities 

seemed plagued from Ihcotllsct. 

and innovatio n bCC<lTnc Ihe 

order of the da y. 

The USS Benewal!. which 

was outfitted in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. was the home 

"llhe illig-aLit: alld tlu' lIa/4"hip 

or the flotilla . II \\'a ... lat 110m 

idea l for communicati o ns. 

Space was limil cd, and the 

compartment set aside for 

housing the brigade COIllIllunicalions cquipmenl was 

, 

---- ROT,\ TA IlU: AN rF:,\Nr\, 9t h Signal 

Balla/ion. 91h III/autry Division. 

100 sma ll. On ly o ne Ih'clvc-channeJ VHF s)'stem (TRC-2'1. 

TCC-7. TCC-20) cou ld be illSlalled: it linked [he brigade 

hcatlquallcl ... abo;llti lilt' 8('lIt'wtli, II. tht, di\i..,i(1Il lH'atltlllHllt'l'" 

a ... hOl e. Whell t he V II F ..,y~tl'lII lai Inl. F;\I alld II F I .. dio pi o\'idni 

the o nl y communi cations 10 Ihe div ision. 

There wert' also problems with ill.'ltaliillg alltenl1~I.'I, Tht' 

majorit y of the a IItellllas Wt'l"C i nSIa I kd un t ht: fest rit tt'd .'I pact' of [he 

sh ip' s su perst ruuure, The dosel1t'ss cn:.'ated frt'li UL'IIL y in terkrellCt' 

and in some il1SlallCe.'l (.omplt:l e blockagcufratlio(UIllIlHlllic<ltioll.'l, 

Oper..ttoh of Ihc VIII-' .'I)'.'Itelll fount! that antc llna probklll.'l wcre 

funher compounded b) Ih e .'I h ip·s drifling a' allt.ho!', whiLh 

disoriented tht: highly direu ional TRC-2'! antt:nna. rhe 9[h 

Signa I Hallal ion obla i ned I \\po U I-I I-' urn II id i Il'( I iona I a IIlel1ll<1.'1 that 

wcre norma ll y used with the VRC-2·! air-grou nd radiu. ;\!oullling 

and coupling Oll t' ullInialllelltl<l 10 t-he TRC-2'! n.:cei\'t:1' 'lJlIt'lI11a 

and ont' to tilt: transmit a nt enna kcpt signub from latling. and 

communicat ions were pO.'l.'lible reganllt·.'I.'I of the .'Ihi p ':. pO.'litioll, 

A.'I the 9th Oivi.'l io n rctinetl il.'l o pcralio ll.'l. a 200-1"00t AH-216 

COIllIllUllic<t lioll.'l tower made tracking [ht: Be1Jewalt ea:.ier. but [ht, 

proccdure wa.'l .'II i]] cllmbef:.ome and Iritk). It rcqllired I \\'0 men to 

dimb atop the tower. 10Lalcd al [h ~ 91h IUrallll ) Di vi.'liou ba.'ll· 

camp. anti rotalc Ihe AN TRC-2-l anlenna ill a(.~ortlallce with 

i IISI ruct iun I"t:Lci ved from an o pera tur i Ibidc I hl' V II F slid Icr u n I ht, 
RIVERINE OPERAT IONS AND THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION 5 1 

ground. The ground operator watched his receive-strengt h leve l 

meter and directed movemen t of the ante nna to get a maximum 

sig nal level read ing. T his procedure was extremely dangerous 

beC<lUse of the high fr equency voltage on the tran smitting an ten na 

and the a nte n na heig ht. During the monsoon season the problem 

of tracking the Betlewah was furt her compounded by high winds 

and rain, which increased the possibi lity of seri ous injury to the 

men on the lOwer. To solve th is pro bl em, a rotatable a ntenna was 

constructed from scrap antenna mast secti ons, a nd a heavy-duty 

anle nna rotor was obtained from the division Military Affiliate 

Radio System (MARS) fa cility. The rotor was con tro ll ed from the 

ground with an a n tenna control box. T wo lengths o f spiral-four 

cable provided the necessa ry ro tor power. In itia ll y a step-up 

transformer was used to compensa te for the high line loss incu rred 

through the use of Ihe spiral-four cabl e. Experimentation showed 

that cable of less than two hundred fift y feet could be used with lhe 

rotor without too much voltage loss. Extensive modification 

eventually produced a basic a ntenna mou n t and fa stener 

arrangement which was stabl e and simpl e to erect. The 9th Signal 

Battal io n constructed and installed twO such rota table a ntennas. 

Space was limited in the tacLica l operations cen ter. An SB-22 

switchboard CUl down o n the number of instruments needed, and 

FM radios servin g the center were remoted through a patch panella 

give the subscriber in the center access to multiple neLS (rom his o ne 

remote sta tion. 

Multichannel communications be tween the battalions and the 

brigade were provided by smal ler. lig hterequi pment. The G RC-IO 

radio a nd TCC-3 multiplex eq uipment provided fo ur voice cha nnels between the Bellewah and the battal io ns. These VHF tra nsmissions, as we ll as the TRC-24 tra nsmissio n to divisio n, terminated on the brigade switchboard. 

The Navy normally hard-wires all its communicat ions equipment, so reconfiguring circuits is di(ficuit. For the brigade, with its 

ever changing communi cat ions requirement, this system JUSt 

would nOt suffice. On the request of the brigade signal o ffi cer. the 

Benewah was refitted so that the operator could patch equipment 

temporari ly where it stood. T his arrangement sa ved time by allowing the opera tor to bypass faulty equipmen t and pa tch inoperable 

equipment as needed; communi cations circuits could be rerouted 

quickly aboard ship, 

Original plans for tel ephone switchi ng called for a twelve· li ne 

capacity S8- 22 switchboard, which proved to be u nsatisfactory. 

Even after the insta llation of a stacked (additio nal jack field sec-
52 DIVISION-LEVEL COMM UNICAT IONS. 1962· 1975 

lio n) sixty-line S8-86 switchboard it was not uncommon lO find all 

cords in usc during peak LraHi c hours. The 58-86 provided swit ch· 

ing for all radiotelepho ne circuits as well as internal telepho nes 

a board the ship. ;\!I essengers who deli vered correspondence aboard 

ship by fOO L and between ships of th e flo tilla by launch reduced 

switch board (rarfie. 

Infantry ma neu\'cr cl ements of the brigade reli ed extensively o n 

FM and H F sing le sideband radios. Those conducting land opera -

tio ns used the manpack J>RC-25 radios: those i:.board barracks 

ships, attack boats, comma nd and conlro l boats. and monilOrs 

norma lly used the AN GRe -I06 and the VRC-1 2 series. F1\1 com· 

muni ca tio ns were provided 10 the widely dispersed maneuver 

elements operating beyond normal rad io ra nge by V RC-49 r('trans· 

missio n units install ed aboard comma nd <md com rol boa ts and by 

airborn e relays. Radi os install ed in command and cont rol helicop· 

tel'S allo \yed the brigade and battalion commanders 10 take ad va ntage o f a hilUde fo r increased line of site communicatio ns. 

Communica tions mai ntenance faciliti es for the brigade were 

also afloat; a n electronics maintenance team from the divisio n 

mailllenance team from the divisio n maint enance battali on was 

loca ted aboard the USS Ashar; 10 repair eq uipment there when 

needed. 

It was not commo n practi ce \\'ithin the di vision to establish a 

division a lt ern a te. The extra equipme nt was used 10 install a sec· 

a nd multichan nel system betwee n divisio n main and the brigades 

(excepting the 2d Brigade. loca ted aboard the Benewal!) as a hed ge 

aga inst enemy a llack or o ther unfo reseen tro ubl es. 

Division standing o perating procedures call ed for fo ur sole user 

circuits to brigade-three voice circuits. o ne from the di vision G- 2 

to the brigade S-2. o ne from the divisio n G-3 to the brigade S-3. 

a nd one from the division artill ery elemcnt in the tac tical o perati o ns c;c lll cr 10 cach anill cry ba ttalio n; the IOllrth (lrcuit wa ~ from 

the d ivision commu nicatio ns cent er to the brig'lde commun icatio ns center by teletypewrit er. These circuits were split between the 

two para ll el multi channel systcms. so spare channels were a\'ailable sho uld one system fail . Circuits could be rero ut ed a t the patch 

panels wit hin o neor two minut es. Since o nly the 9th and elemcnlS 

o f the 1st Signal Brigade were using the TRC-24 vans in this area, 

U.S. Army. Vi et nam, allowed the di visio n sig nal office r to coordinate mu ltichannel frequencies. Interference was as a res ult practica ll y no nex istent. 

The d h'ision a lso pl aced grea t command emphasis o n using 

systems conlrol and techni cal control 10 ensure grea ter reli a bilit y. 
RIVERINE OPERATIONS AND THE CAMBODIAN I NCURSION 53 

AN GRC TCC-3 i\1! n(;lI ."N ~1 [Ql ll ';\I~Nraboord Ihe Bmewoh. 

S8-Z2 SWI r CHIIO,\lUl l/board III(> 8e/lt'tuah. 
54 DIVISION-LEVEL COMM UNICATIONS, 1962-1 973 

One technique was to tiecha nnel1 20f the TRC-24 systems into an 

S8-22 switchboard at systems contro l for circuits terminatin g at 

d ivision headquarters a nd a t techni ca l comro l for those terminating a t the fo rward area signa l centers. 

As the divisio n ga ined more experi ence in riverine opera tio ns, 

the 2d Battalio n commander fo und tha I a sing le comma nd post 

a board the Benewah wo uld no t suffice. He esta blished a forward 

command p OS t with the command post o f the 3d Batt alion , 34th 

Artillery, his direct support unit , aboard a medium landing crart. 

T he only no rmal comm unica tio ns with th at 3nillery balla! ion 

Cloaling comma nd post were FM: telephone communi cati ons to 

the brigade forward command post were badl y needed. T he signa l 

batt alio n o bta i ned a medium la nd ing craft, installed a VH F terminal aboard it, and (racked the boa t fro m the Bellewah as it moved 

alo ng the ri,'ers and cana ls wit h the brigade fo rward command POSt 

landing craft . The fo rward command p ost wasac ti vat cd o n ly when 

the la nd ing cra rt \ ... as 1>C<lched or ancho red, a nd telepho ne communica tions were req uired onl y at th ose limes. T he V HF rad io system. 

howe\'er, was ma int ained at a ll times; anchorin g or beaching the 

mu lt ichannel boa t alo ngside the brigade comma nd POSt boa t. 

passi ng a twent y-six pair ca bl e across. a nd hooking the telepho nes 

, ... as a simple proced ure. 

As the enemy mod ifi ed tactics to coun ter the success of the 

riveri ne operatio ns of the 9th Divisio n , the d ivisio n a lso modifi ed 

tactics by placing o ne batta lion asho re 10 conduct a inno bileoperatio ns in coordinatio n with the riverine operatio ns bei ng ca rried o ut 

by the rema inder of the Riveri ne Brigade. Fire Support Base T IGER 

II , ap proximate ly seven kil ometers south o r Ben T rc. was the locatio n of the shore ba ttalio n headq uan ers a nd o ne company. The 

o ther compan ies were loca ted in smal l fire support bases five or six 

kilome ters from Ben Tre. which was in the hea rt of the enemy 

infi ltra lio n area. A fo ur-chan nel VHF system provided communica ti o ns betwee n battalio n headquarters a t Fire Sup port Base T IGER 

II a nd the brigade a t Ben Tre. The ballalion communica ted with 

the compa nies in the small fire support bases by wire. Experi ence 

had shown that despite doctrine. wire could not be used because the 

Vie t Cong wou ld cut it as soon as it was p ut in. In th is case, ho wever, bill fo r one exceptio n the spira l-fo ur cabl e proved effeclive 

even though there were larger numbers of the enemy operating in 

the area. 

T he geogra phy o r the delta regio n posed some specia l probl ems 

for the communicalOrs o f the 9th Di visio n. O ne o r these was 

grounding. Multi cha nnel and tel ephone equ ipment routi nely 
RIVERINE OPERATIONS AND THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION 55 

produced noisy communica tio ns twice a day. a l low tide. During 

hig h tide the water table was o nc foot below groll nd leve l; at low 

tide. thirteen feel. Of va riOlls methods attempted to solve the prob· 

lem. o ne success was we lding a large qualllity o f scrap metal to· 

gcther a nd burying it below water level at low tide. A lo ng ground 

rod welded to the scrap metal a nd extended to above grou nd leve l 

provided a connecti ng point. 

A spec ial problem for photographers was the absence of virtual· 

Iy any clean watcr. Water provided by engineer manned water 

poi nts and later the base water system left spots o n fi J III and prints 

from sediment. Fi lt ers used by the engineer water poi llls were in 

short supply a nd could no t be spared for photogra phic usage. A 

paper fi lter, found in usea t the hel icopter rearm and refue l poin ts 

initially proved unsuccessfu l. but water run throug h the fi lter in 

the reverse direction from tha t specifi ed forfucl came o ut clean and 

clear. A filter assembly was installed at the pho to lab, and a new 

problem developed-everyone ca me there to get good drinking 

water. 

At no place in Vietnam was the need for towe rs togain antenna 

elevatio n and extend range more criti cal tha n the delta. The ex· 

tremely na t terrain afforded no natural ele\'ation where FM and 

VHF radio ant ennas could be install cd to increase their range. 

Towers were the solUlion, but steel lowers were in short suppl y. 

Eventua ll y U.S. Army. Vi etnam. located a fcw 300' £001 towers 

installed at naviga ti o na l aid sites. T hese were offered to the 9th 

Division for the disma ntling and tra nsportatio n . T\\lo towers were 

disma ntled and moved to di\'isio n headquart ers with the assistance 

of a Navy large landing craft to transport heavy items. The basic 

pla n was to install 78·foot towers at selected batta lion base camps 

to ra ise FM and VHF rad io antennas. Battalion commanders rcsisted: they felt that the required red aircraft wa rning light wo uld 

provide a perfeci aiming stake for cncmy mortarmcn. After con· 

siderable persuasio n, o ne battalion commander agreed to let the 

signal ba tta lio n build a tower a t his base camp. He broke the ice. 

and the towers cro pped up at ot her loca tions througho ut the divi· 

sion to give lhe communi cators a much needed boost in getting 

some of their very demanding VHF links. 

Cambodia,z hz curs;o,z 

As America n wit hdrawal continued throug h 1969 and early 

1970 the cnemy buildup of suppli es JUSt across the Cambodian 

border posed a distinct threa t to U.S. rorces a nd to Saigon. This 
56 DlVISION·L.EVEL COMMUNICATIONS. 1962- 1973 

threat coupled with govcrnmt!nta i upheaval in Cambodia prompted the U.S. incursion into that COU ll try. 

T he 151 Air Cava lry Division's Oper<ll ion SI-lOE~ AKt R was the 

ultimat e ICS I of the division's abil ity to communica te. On 24 April 

1970, the division was instructed by II Fie ld Force headquarters 10 

begin p lanni ng for a possible combined U.S.-Vietnamese operalion into the "Fishhook," that sec tion of Cambodia which juts 

bel\veen War Zone C and Binh Long Province of South Vi etnam. 

The division \vas ordered to be ready to move with in sevent y-two 

hours with the mission of neulralizing th e Central Office o f South 

Vietnam (C05VN), the Commun ist high command fora11 act ivity 

in the Sout h Vietnam base area. The task force was under the command o f Brigadier Ge neral Robert Shoemaker. the assistant division commander fo r ma neuver. Genera l Shoemaker elected to 

loca te his task force headquart ers with the 3d Brigade at Quon Loi 

to reduce the personne l and equ ipmen t support requirement. The 

plan was simple in concept but difficu lt in execu tion . The rapid 

growth of the !ask (orce o utstripped the communicator's abil ity to 

respo nd. Initially the force consisted of the 3d Brigade. 1st Cavalry 

Division: the 3d Airborne Brigade of the Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam: and the II th Armored Cavalry Regiment p lus norma l 

support including arti ll ery a nd one assau lt helicopter company. 

This orga nization was reinforced on 30 April by one mecha nized 

infantry batta lio n from the 9th Infantry Division; one tank batt<l lion from thl' 25th Infantry Division; une b<ltmlion (t he :)th 

Battalion, 12th Infantry) from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade; 

a nd tWO ba tta lio ns from the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Divisio n. 

On I May Opera tion SI-I OJ::i\IAKER began. T he 3d Brigade struck 

north across the border. To the cast, in the deep fi nger o f the Fishhook. the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment adva nced to the northwest into the o bject ive area whi le simultaneo usly three ba lt alions 

o f the Vietnamese 3d Airborne Brigade were combat assau lting by 

helicopter imo three objectives north of the Centra l Office. Subseque n tly they were to move south . in a I<lrge pi ncer mOvement, to 

cut off enemy rou tes of escape. 

Comm unicat io ns al Quon Loi became more and more difficult 

as the burgeoning task force deployed. Frequency modulated rad io 

was <I major problem because of the SilC a nd diversity of the force 

but was still the primary means of communi ca ti on fo r eve r)' major 

<lnd minor unit in the opera tio n. In terference was commonplace 

up aud down the frequency spectrum as a resu lt in part of the 

secrecy req uired by the operation a nd i n part the commonality and 

overlap of freq uencies used throughout the III Corps zone. Dupli-
RIVERINE OPERATIONS AND T H E CAMBODIAN INCURSION 57 

catio n of frequency assignment mush roomed further as units from 

other div isions and separa te brigades joined the tas k force. The 

congestio n o f radios and associated ante nnas at Quon Loi was 

extreme. with at least a h undred FM radio nets in the immediate 

area o f the joint task force headquarters and many (if not most) 

a ntennas using the same AB-216 tower. At one time nine VH F. one 

UHF. seven log periodic. a nd thirty-six 292 antennas coul d be 

countlxl on o ne tower belongi ng to the 3d Brigade. Th is num ber 

was in additio n to anten nas mounted on the towers of the 11 th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment and S95th Signal Company (36th 

Signa l Ba tt al io n) which were loca ted less tha n three q uaners of a 

mi le away. The signalmen solved the FM problems by adjusting 

the receiver tra nsm itters for peak power output, utilizing airborne 

and ground relays on Nui Ba Den a nd Nui Ba Ra. switching frequencies, recon riguring a ntennas. a nd checking a nd rechecking 

til e avionics equipmen t. 

Very high frequency radio relay was in itially installed bet\\'een 

QUOIl Loi and Camp Gorvad (Phuoc Vi nh) by a four-channel ANI 

GRC-J63 system. After D-day multichannel communi ca tio ns were 

increased by additional cha nnels provided by the II Field Force and 

36th Signal Battalion (Area) communi ca tion systems. The CO Illmuni ca tio ns support concept of Operatio n SHOEMAKER call ed for 

telephone service off the 3d Brigade's SB-86 switchboard. With the 

rapid buildup of communica tions this board was soon saturated 

even though it had been expanded to ninety li nes. By the third day 

of opera tio ns the sig nalmen were forced 10 establish a separate 

switch boa rd gca red to the req uirements of the task force using 

personnel from the 13th Signal Battalion. Lieutena nt Colo nel 

Norman E. Archibald silid, "To put it bluntly-it was a hand to 

mo uth operation. Wc a lways kep t our fingers crossed hoping tha t 

nothing would happen to the division wire system while we diverted personne l and materia l assets to the nodal head at QUOIl 

Loi.·· 

Coordinating a nd controlling the signal activities of a ll the 

units involved in SHOEMi\KER was a diffi cult task for the signal 

stafL They were hindered. a lbe it unintcntionally. by the sc:crecy 

whi ch surrounded the opera ti on. For example, coordinating the 

signal operation instructions, cipher kcy lists. opera ti o n code 

material. and frequencies with elements of the 9th Infantry Divisio n, 25th Infant ry Division. and 1991h Light Infantry Brigade was 

a rea l nightmare. 

The rapid growth in the n umber of units assigned 10 Opera tion 

SHOEMAKER also complica ted coordination and control. As each 
58 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUN ICATIONS, 1962·1973 

of the units was assigned to the task force, it became increasingl y 

diffi cuh to meel individual communicatio n needs. This problem 

was evidenced by the increase of ca bl e a nd wire systems. insta ll alio n o f additional VHF circuits, a nd abundance o f RC-292 antennas with their requirement fo r frequ encies from the a lready 

crowded speclrum. By the fifth da y, the task force had increased to a 

size equivalent to nearly two d ivisio ns. At this point, command a nd 

com rol revert ed back to the divisio n at Phuoc Vinh a nd the o peralio n was reoriented toward the nort heast, north and no nhh'cst of 

the Cambodian border. 

The lst Cava lry Division conti Ilued to shi ft its forces, a nd o n 13 

May the 3d Brigade moved from the Fishhook in an a ir assault 

nort hwest of Bu Do p. The void left in the western portion of the 

Fishhook was filled by the U.S. 25t h Infantry Divisio n, wh il e the 

Viemamese Airborn e Division had its own area o f o peration in the 

southern Fish hook. T he 1st Brigade and the II th Armored Cava Iry 

Regime nt remained in the northern Fishhook adj acent to the 

" Fl atiron ," but a final realignment o n 19-20 May placed the 1st 

Brigade \vith two battalions in Cambodia near the town of 0 Rang. 

no rth of Bll C ia Map. The first tea m now had eleven battalio ns. 

three armored cava lry squadrons. and the 1st Brigade Tact ica l 

Command Post, loca ted at Fife Suppon BasI.' DAVID in Cambodia. 

The tacti ca l implications o f 0 Ran g \\'ere intel'<'sti ng primari ly 

because of the uncertai n ties involved. The division did not kn ow if 

the enemy force was still in the vicinity and was not completel y sure 

if communi ca tions could be established between 0 Rang and the 

division because of the distance ( 140 ki lometers), the mo untainous 

terrain, a nd the la ck of previolls recon naissa nce. On 20 Ma y 1970, 

the 1st Brigade air assa ulted into 0 Ra ng, and personnel from the 

13th Signal Battalio n were among the first to touch the ground. 

Their equipment included a n AN / GRC- 163 four-chan nel radio, 

two I.S-ki lowatt genera tors, and several batteries. The communica ti o ns issue remained in doubt until approximately folll' ho lll's 

aher tOlichdown. Fire SuppOrt Base D}\VJI) was a t the 3,000·foot 

leve l; this elevat io n plus lhea ng leof eleva ti o n from 0 Ra ng to Nui 

Sa Ra (where the VHF channels were rerouted to Phuoc Vinh) was 

sufficient to overcome a n}' terra in obstacles, and the s}'stcm was 

brought in. 

The 13th Signal Baualion cominued to provide backup to the 

1st Brigade communi cations platoon whill.' it was in Cambodia. 

Early in the morni ng o f 14 June the North Viet namese assaulted 

Fire SuppOrt Base OA VII) from three sides. The attackers werc 

driven off after a bitter fight. The brigade sig nal o ffi cer and several 
RIVERINE OPERATIONS AND THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION 59 

o ther communicators were severely inj ured, and considerable 

equ ipment was destroyed. Acting Sergean t Goldswonhy. who was 

in charge of the VHF element. not o nl y maintained communications throughout the firefight bu t ea rned the Silver Star for gallantry in action. 

Lieutenant Colonel Wi ll iam R. Rogers, th e division signal 

officer for the 25th Infantry Division and commander of the 1251 h 

Sig nal Battalion. noted that planni ng was so tightl y held tha t the 

commanders, including the signal oHicer. d id nOl know what was 

rea ll y happeni ng u ntil it happened and that the di vision did !lOt 

move ils headquaners closer to the area of openll io n, so the signal 

officer had to hold commun ications assels. vita ll y needed in other 

sectors. in reserve for a possible forward displacement thaI never 

materialized. These problems hig hlighted IwO recurring frustrations o f the div ision signa l officer throughout the conflict in 

Vietnam. 
CHAPTER VI 

Phase-Out 

As the Nixo n administratio n soug ht 10 mo v(: the confl ict in 

Vietnam fro m the battlefie ld to Ihe confercnce la bl e, the first major 

U.S. Army combat d ements began to withd raw. T he wilhdnl\\'al 

began in J lily 1969 wit h the 9th Infa lllry Divisio n, followed close ly 

by the 3d Brigade o f the 82d Airborne Divisio n, <I nti cllded h'it h the 

1961h Light (neaTHry Brigade in June 1972. ( Table /) 

\~U 1-1'111,, 01 I <II K I.\I.\INI ,>; C, l! . A~ \I\ I II III II 11" 11' 

0 1 lOll/I( 1970-JI x / (!In 

I ,,,, 

.:kI 8111(.1<1.-. 9 1h Inl.UlII ) U" '''' '' •••• . ..•.. . 

1!l'J 111I,fllII ) HII':,,<.I., •..•••••••••.••.••••••.•• .. . . 

I., I< 2J KIij( •• lk Ilh 1111 •• 1111 ) 1>11"1"11 ••••••• • • • ••••••• • • ••••••• 

25th Inr"lIlr) Hi.i,j"" (·2tl 111l1(.nl.·) ..••.••. • ••. • ••.••• ••• .••.••. 

Illh ,\ lI1m .... 1 C,,~I.) Hq(II Ilt'1l1 •.••.•• . • • .• • •. • ..•••. •• ..••..•• 

:1<1 KnJ.(.«Ic. 2:', h 1111 ... 111) 1)1\1,., 111 •• . •• . •• .•.. . • . . 

1" CJ •• lh y [)i"_,,,," «id Iln).:.«I,·) . . . . . .. ............ . 

I" Ilo iJ.(;" k :Jlh 1111." '11) I)i."i"" (i\I<"<h:''' 'lnl) 

17 d I\ j, h ...... ~ Iln.l(.uk ................. . .... , . . ........ . .. , .. .. 

2~tl l .. I."1I1 ) I);,j",,,, (· I% , h 10,1."'11 ) Ih l.l(Jd.·) . .. .. . .... . .. . 

:ki ll"lI:J.k. 101-1 ,\II!torlll' I)"."" " ..... . . . ... . ......... .. ..... . 

h i HII.I(:Ou.,. 101-. A;IIII" ... • 1l1 ' 1"olI ••.••.• .. •• .• ••..••.••• .••••. 

2d 1I'llI:Jd.·. 10hi ,\ lI h" " II' I)",,, .. ,, .. . .. . . . . . .. . .••...... 

:kl H1I1(,II.I<'. 1" ( AI\ JII , 11 1\",,,,, ., .......... .. ....... , ........ .. 

1!IU. h 1111:'11") HIII(:.,k ........................... .. .......... .. 

,>.0,. 

( )" " hn I9iO 

( )'II,I,,·, 19iO 

Ihumh':1 l!JiO 

n .u IIllk·' 19i O 

.\I.ndI 19i ' 

,\ p, il 1971 

,\ 1,1) 1971 

"ulI:",.1971 

" 111(11" 1971 

1\''''''11111''' 1971 

Ik, ... "",:, 1971 

J.lllu .. n 1912 

h ·I", .... " 1912 

Jllm' 19i2 

JUII" 1912 

HiSlOriGd records re\'eallittle Ihal was unusual a bout di visio n 

level communicalio ns as units withdrew. As a general rule, units 

and their signa l suppOrt dements co ll apsed into some central 

staging arca and their communicatio ns mission was graduall y 

tra nsrerred to units o r Ihe Fi rst Sigmll Brigade. This procedu re 

I)Cnniucd orga ni c sig nal u nits to lea ve willi the major combat 

eiemeills they were su p po rting. Theexperi cnceorthe3d BrigadcoC 

Ihe 82d Airborn e Divisio n is typical. The 36th Signal Battal ion o r 

the Firsl Signal Bri gade moved into thl' 82d's <lrt'a during the 

phase·out peri od and established a H.--s idual communi catio ns 
PHASE·OUT 61 

network that permitted the organic signal units to be withdrawn. 

Most of the comba t u nits that phased out in this Illallner me ntioned 

th ree problems in their after-action reports. 

The first wa s maintaining high moral e \\'hen the future of the 

unit was uncen ain. In many instances units did not know where 

they wo uld end u p; some. in fac t, were inactiva ted soon after they 

leh Viet nam. 

T he second problem was turning in equipment. whi ch often 

had to be split th ree ways: one part was transferred where it stood to 

Vi etnamese forces; another part was turned in a t a depot: and the 

th ird part was reta i ned. I nstrll ct ions often came at the last minute. 

Frequently the "pack rat" sy ndrome produced much more equipment on hand tha n unit records showed. Central distribut ion 

points had 10 be establis hed so that a ullit could turn in all of its 

equipmelll by a scheduled departure dat e. Many sol di ers keep 

anythi ng whi ch their experi ence tells them might be lIseflillatcr. 

Since some o f the major comba t uni ts had been in Viet nam a lo ng 

time. there werc some large hoards of "auxiliary" eq uipment. 

The third problem was excessive personnel turbul ence. Trying 

1O identify the troops who were to remai n behind and those who 

we re to leave was cum bersome in light of the various personnel 

poli cies then in effect. This a nd other problems frustra ted bol h lhe 

administrators a nd the affected soldi ers during lhe phase-oul. It is 

to each unit 's credit that. by and large. the debarkations we nl 

smoothly and remained fairl y close to the established schl-'dlile. 

The withdrawal of the major U.S. combat elements did not 

presage the end of hostilities. The fight was to be ca rried on by 

units o f the Sout h Viet namese Army with logistics and airsuppon 

provided by the United States from outside Vietnam. Chan nels for 

this assistance had to be maintained in the fo u r mili tary regions 

where the fi ghting was continu ing, and comrn un ic<lt ions suppOrt 

was a vit al faClor during the final months of combat. 

To ensure adequate support to the South Vietnamese forces 

a ft er the withdrawa l of the Ame rican combat troops. a regiona l 

assistance comma nd headquarters was se t up in each o f the four 

military regions. Its commander. normally a maj or general. 

worked closely with the senior Sout h Vi etnamese military commander in the regio n o n coordinating close air strikes. logistics 

suppOrt. a nd other combat support which the Un ited States was 

obligated to provide. Since a ll of the signal units organic 10 the 

major combat elements had been withdrawn . commun ica tions 

suppOrt to these four U.S. regional assistance commanders had 10 

be provided by residua l signal units o f the First Signa l Brigade. 
62 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962- 19H 

This communicatio ns network. a ustere by comparison with that 

provided for American comba t units, was vila l because it was the 

only link between the U.S. commanders in the four districts and the 

residual headquaners elements in Saigon, which could coordinate 

to direct air strikes and logisti cs su pport where they were needed. A 

signal unit, roughly o f compa ny size and comma nded by a captain, 

provided signal suppOrt in each of the four military regions. The 

unit genera lly provided a switchboard to sen'c the regional U.S. 

commander and his staff. a si mple comm unications center through 

which messages could be handled. and, perhaps most important,a 

narrow·ba nd secure voice terminal 10 permit the U.S. commander 

to call in air strikes through the J oi nt Operations Center in Saigon. 

T he telepho ne a nd comm unica ti o ns center functions were relatively clear-cut a nd caused fe\\! problems. The circuits went to the 

closest entry po int in the fixed backbone system that spanned Vietnam a nd which was at thaI time being run under contract by the 

Federal Electri c Corpora tion. From there the circuits rode the 

system 10 the residua l headquarters in Saigon. 

The requirement for secure voice communi ca tions was, however, ano ther mailer. If the Vietnamese comma nder was working 

from his ma in headquarters. the U.S. comma nder could track him 

wi thoUl much dirriculty and ca ll in the close air support missions 

as needed. The system was se l up so thaI the comma nding general 

had to place the ca ll and request the mission himself. The narrowband voice equipment traversed the fixed backbone network to the 

dose a ir support center in Saigon, which ca lled for missions from 

either Thailand or Guam as circumstances di cta ted. When a Vietnamese commander moved to the field, however. the process became more compli cated. Then the U.S. commander had to stay 

with him a nd. from whatever his location, place an immediate 

secure voice ca ll all the way to the operation center in Saigon. He 

often had to use tac ti ca l Fj\ll rad io equipmen t and rely o n retransmitting because o f lo ng distances and terrain obstacles. 

Some of Ihe most dema nding secure voice communi cations 

missions were placed o n the system after the majority o f U.S. tactica l communi ca tio ns units and equipment were gone. To meet this 

dema nd. FM retransmission aircraft began fl ying a lmost continuo us missions. in the first and second military regions where the 

mountainous terrain and enemy activity were heavily taxing the 

Vietnamese forces. These U- 2 1 aircraft stayed in con tinuous orbit 

o n sta ti o n until they had to rduel. This technique gave the commanders in all four regio ns a secure ,,,,'ay to ca ll in close air strikes 

from almost an y loca tion. 
PHASJ::·OUT 63 

At this lime the First Signal Brigade, which had once boasted 

over 25,000 troops, consisted mainly of a management oHice that 

monitored the cOntractor's wa ning operation and his maintenance of the backbone commu ni ca tions system. It a lso monitored 

me 39th Signal Battalion in Sa igo n, which provided minimal 

communi cat ions suppo r! to Ihe remaining Military Assistance 

Command headquarters and to the signal units in each of the four 

military regions. 

The final phase withdrawal was the departure of the regio nal 

assistance comma nds themselves; the four signal units that supported them were the last elementS to go. About lhe same time, lhe 

colors of the First Signal Brigade \\'ere officially retired and Iransferred to Korea. 
CHAPTER VII 

Communications Security Threat 

Few communicat ions subjects ca n arouse more controversy 

among professio nal soldiers than thai of securit y. T he argument 

centers o n security versus responsiveness. The points under debate 

usually invo lve the techniques used to try to gain some degree of 

communications security, such as changi ng ca ll sig ns a nd freq lien· 

des and using codes fo r the coordinates of locations a nd olher 

critical data. To many people, the ideal solution to all but the 

frequency problem would probabJ y be a small , lightweight , dura· 

ble. unclassified black box which would automatically scramble 

and unscramble transmissions so Iha l o nl y those people \\'ith a 

similar black box cou ld understand the transmission. The black 

box was nOl ava ilable when U.S. troops were committed in 

Vietnam. 

The securit y measure of changing call signs was \'ery controversia l on two poims. One was the con fusion created by changes. 

Colonel Sid Berry, the commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry 

Division, from June 1966 to February 1967, spoke for ma ny commanders when he sa id, "It simplifies comm un ications for units 

and individuals to keep the same frequencies a nd particu larly ca ll 

signs. Frequent changing o f call signs confuses friend s more effectively tha n enemies." The other point was that new ca ll signs frequently cast a poor image or were tOO long. Although there were 

many complaillls about the denigrating image refl ected by ca ll 

signs, one o f the most vivid was provided by Lieutenalll Colonel 

Norman E. Archiba ld when he reca ll ed his 1970 experiences as 

division sig na l officer of the 1st Cavalry Division : ''The signal 

battalio n still had a difficult time sell ing ca ll signs like 'Supreme 

Capon' ( .. , the commander sa id, 'What? You wam everyo ne to 

ca ll my troops castrated chickens?') .. " Brigadier Ge neral Wi lliam S. Coleman, in 1967-68 assistant commander of the 1st Infantry Division, expressed bo th objeClions: "'Another change that I 

hated to see was the fancy call signs that the di vision was orde red to 

adopt. Imagi ne be ing on the radio a nd saying, 'Sa il ing Gena Della 

One O ne Juli et. this is Mister Taboo Four Four." Wh y. by the lime 
COM MUNICATIONS S[CURIT Y THREAT 65 

you get the call signs OU t, you've forgouen what yo u wa nted to 

say. 

Alt hough these and o ther complaims were u nderstandable, a 

commun ica tions security pro bl em did exist in Vietnam and had to 

be dealt wit h. Early in the war. many people ap parently had assumed that the enemy was unsophisti cated and that comm uni cations security did !lot warra nt much concern. T h at may have been 

lIue \.;hen American troops first arrived. but the enemy quickly 

adjusted. 

h soon became evident that he was using poor communicatio ns 

security to good advantage; U.S. troops found their own radio 

equipment whe n they swept enemy positions; the enemy mig ht 

disappear from a locatio n j ust before a planned U.S. allack; B-52 

bomber strikes d id not produce expected results because lheenemy 

apparelllly a nt icipa ted them. Some plans pro bably leaked to 

enemy agcllls operating wit hin the Vietnamese politica l structure 

a t the province a nd district levels. where Americans had to gel 

political clearance for opera tiona l areas to ensure tha t there was no 

confl ict with loca l defense forces. But even these suspec ted leaks 

coul d no t exp lain the problems in esta bl ished free fire zones and 

already au thorized areas of temporary opef"d tions. T here had to be 

another source from which the enemy was obtai ning critical information. 

'I'here was. O n 20 December 1969 elcmcnts of thc2d Battalion, 

2d InfalHry, a nd of the 2d Bau al io n. 28th lnfalllry. both from the 

1st Brigade. 1st Infantry Division. overra n a n enemy installa tio n 

about four kilometers nort h of Ben Sue in the II Corps zone and 

raptured twelve enemy so ldiers. T hey a lso se ized an assortment of 

docume llls a nd comm unica tions eq uipme ill . including three U.S. 

Army FM radios of the AN/ PRC-25/ 77 va riety; o ne Chinese Communist AM rece iver. compatible wi th the U.S. AM radios of the 

AN/ G RC series; st.'Vt' n Suny tra nsistor rad ios; o ne Panasonic receiver; o ne homemade receiver: and one homemade transmiuer. All 

the equ ipmelll was in excellent operating conditio n. and the 

homemade receiver a nd tra nsmitter reflected a very hig h qua lity of 

wor kmans hi p. With th is equ ipment. th is Viet Cong and North 

Vietnamese Army rad io illlercept u nit could mo nitor and exploit 

virtua lly al l no nsecure voice a nd manua l Morse code communications among U.S. and allied tactica l u nits withi n receiving range. 

Interrogated prisoners indica ted that. along with buildi ng up 

equipment. the enemy had instituted a large number of English 

linguists. T hese linguists became an integral pan of many Viet 

Cong and Nort h Viet namese un its such as the intercept unit. 
66 D1VISION·LEVEL COMMUN ICATIONS. 1962- 19H 

Among the captured documents were several oooklets co mai ning extensive instructions o n proper intercept techniques a nd 

de tailed analyses of the com muni ca tions procedures a nd explo itable weaknesses of U.S . and a ll ied units. Spec ifi c comments were 

included o n the communi ca tions procedu res of the 1st Infantry 

Division. 1st Cavalry Division. 4th Infa ntr y Division, 25th Infantry 

Di vision, 11th Armo red Cavalry Regi men t, 5th Vicllwmcse Division, and the various Military Assistance Command advisory 

learns. T hese book lets were current. lengthy. a nd vcry detailed. On 

poi nt of origin codes the instruction was, " . _ . they usuall y use 

landmar ks o r a PO (poilll o f origin) from which they use LEI-- r. 

RIGHT, UP a nd DOW N to designate a position." In o ne journal 

ellirya 1st Infa ntry Di"ision unit message had been copied: "Presentl y my o ne six clement is at CPT Coutine (act ually Checkpo int 

Ca nteen) R.6 U 2.2." The actua l coordi nates we re written abO\'e the 

entry. T hat decoding po ints of origin and shackle codes appeared 

frequently thro ug hout the jo u rn a l indica ted that deci phering such 

codes apparently posed no major problem. 

The u nit a lso noted the impo rta nce of o bt a in ing information 

from warning nets. By monitoring these nets the enemy cou ld get 

data o n artillery and ai r attacks and transpon o f wou nded. He 

could ex tract all intelligence concerning the units engaged, fire 

bases, la nding zones. and air reconnaissance. He could also get 

info rma tion that would help a nalyze l he traffi c intercepted from 

U.S. infantry cOIllTllunica ti o ns. The journal iden tifi ed U.S. advisory and South Vietnamese u ni t nets as very pro ducti ve fo r intellige nce data. It further noted that the South Vietnamese made mo nitoring easy because they never changed ca ll signs o r encrypted 

messages. The journal gave examples of 8 -52 wa rning messages. It 

instructed the mo nitors to be sure to get the coordin ates because 

they represented the box. o r target area. which had to be reported 

for the security of their own troops. 

The captured radio intercept unit was one sma ll team targeted 

o n several America n and Republic of Vi et namesc u nits. A logica l 

assumption is that by 1969. when this unit wa scar>llIred, thecnemy 

could fi eld a number o f such teams. T h is attribute of the enemy in 

Viet nam must be accorded a ny future enemy: that is, his abil ity to 

adjust to American opera tio na l techniques and to improve his 

capacities. The enemy in 1969 was not wha t he had been. As lhe 

situation changed, he changed. 

These exam ples are but a few of how theenelll)' lIscd U.S. communications llleans a nd procedurcs to ga ther intelligence a nd to 

assist his operations. There are numerous instances o n record o f the 
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY TH REAT 67 

enemy jamming radio frequencies a nd sending false messages. 

These bogus transmissions used imitatio n to try to tu rn fires or 

forces to an area chosen by the enemy. In o ne case the enemy tapped 

the inter nal telephone li nes of a defe nsive base and diverted reserve 

forces from the area where he altacked. 

Genera l Abrams. then head of the Military Assistance Command, after examining the captured documents and bei ng briefed 

on the radio intercept tcam incident, summed up his reactio n : 

"Th is work is really rather startling; the a ttention to detail, complete accuracy. and thorough professionalism is amazing. T hese 

guys are reading our mail , a nd everyone wi ll be informed that they 

ale. 
CHAPTER VIlI 

Security Response 

In the history of strategic military operations, it has long been 

public knowledge that Allied operations in the Pacific during 

World War II were indebted to lhe breaking of (he Japanese operational communica tions codes. More recentl y il has been reo 

vealed that the Sri tish were abl e [0 break the stra tegic commu nicaLi ons code by which Hitler received information and issued 

directives 10 his senior com manders. High command levels should 

have and did gel lOp priority in American atlcmpts to safeguard 

communica tio ns aga inst similar breaches. Wi th the me n at the 

tactical leve l not really wanting signal security gear, there was a 

relatively modest attempt in the U.S. Army lodcvclop new equipment for that leve l lIllli ] the need became more evident. 

Signal securit y equa ls a combination of people, equipment, 

and systems. People panicipating in tactical operations have a 

natural dislike for signal secmi ty mea sures; Ihey prefer to conduct 

business in the simplest, mOSt direCl ma nner possible. Early in 

Vielllam, />ossible in most cases meant whatever superiors would 

pennit in the tactical situatio n involved . The people part of the 

equation did not improve untillhechain of comma nd became convinccd of the need for strict comm unica ti o ns d isc ipl ine. The conviClion grew in proportion to information about the threat. and 

interest and participation grew as equipment and systems improved. The sigll<l l securi ty problem was never full y resolved during the Vietnam era despite many improvements and much hard 

work. It was, and st ill is. o ne of Ihe most difficult problems 

facing tactica l communicators. 

Along with the need to communi ca te as rapidly a nd directly 

as possible during combat. another fa cwr worked against effec tive communica tio ns securi ty : a soldier in the thi ck of battle 

feels the need for friendly assurance. This assurance can come 

from talking-to anyone else who has a radio. When this happens, 

chances arc that lillie thought is given to what informa tion is 

aClUally being transmiued. 

Before secure voice equipment was in general use, oral communications requiring any secrecy had to be pa instakingly coded 
SECU RITY RES PONSE 69 

and decoded manually. All too often cod ing was circumvented in 

favor of simplicit y, speed, and assurance. The taCLica l communi -

GHor needed some type of voice encryption device. 

In 1965, when he was the U.S. Army, Vietnam. signal officer. 

Colo nel Kenneth Ring recall ed that there were some eight hundred KY -8 securit y devices in a stateside depot. These devices had 

no mounting brackets or connec ting cables because their appl ication had not been settled. Colonel Ring requested, on behalf of 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, that a new eq uipment training tea m be 

sent to Vi etnam to demonstrate the devices and discuss their 

tacti ca l uses; the team arrived in August 1965. From this slart, the 

security device applica tio ns and improvements p rogressed through 

some tortuous evolutions. 

Vo ice security devices were issued to the field units in Vietnam 

beginning in 1965 with the KY-8 for stationary or vehicular use; 

the KY-8 was fu lly distributed by the third qua rter of fisca l yea r 

1968. The KY-28 was iss ued for use in a ircraft beginning in 

1967 and ending a year later. The KY -38, for manpack or mobile 

use, also was issued initially in 1967 and was fully distributed 

in 1968. 

The voice security gear, like most new ly deve loped equipment, 

had its problems. The main cause of fa ilure was heat. TIle KY-8 

had to be kept in well venti lated surroundings and away from 

direct sunlight. During a 1969 presidential visit, an overhea ted 

KY-8 temporarily stopped secure voice commu nica tions between 

II Field Force headquaners and Tan Son NhUl. 

The 1991h Light Infantry Brigade station at Xuan Lac, in the II 

Field Force commanding genera l's secure FM voice net, continuall y broke down. Many pieces of equipment were generating 

heat in a poorly ventilated bunker and causi ng Ihe KY-8 10 fail. 

When it was moved to a cooler loca tio n , the K Y-8 opera ttd normally. Commanders and communicators became aware that. for 

reliable communications, Ihe security equi pme nt had to operate 

in the coolest possible environ ment. 

In al least one case the ingenuity of a wcll illlcntioncd communi ca tor backfired. First, he placed a filled Lyster (waler) bag 

over the KY-8 10 cool it, but the device still overhealed. Nexl, 

he removed the cover of the K Y -8 to increase vcnt i lation. Thai improved the operalion oC the K Y -8 but violated securi ty by exposing 

Ihe equipmelll to view and giving the enemy an opportunity to 

intercept intelligible signals. 

In a successful innovation, (he 125 lh Signa l Battalion engineered and installed a secure land line to expedite SpOt reports be-
70 DIVISION·LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962·1973 

tween the 372d Radio Relay Company and the 251 h Infantry Di· 

vision G-2. 'me banaJion, operating two KY-8's in essentially a 

back-to-back lcst mode, replaced the short badHo-back cable with 

spiral-four cable of the required length. This system worked with 

almost no trouble and wi th very high qualilY. 

During September 1968, (he PRC-77 and KY-38 combination 

was issued down to the infantry baualion level. providing for the 

first lime secure voice communications to infantry companies and 

in the battalion command nels. AI the company level plans and 

operations could be discussed rapidly, safely, and expl icitly with· 

QlIl fear of enemy detection. Field units used two mClhods to offset 

the weighl disadvantage (over 50 pounds) of the PRC-77/ KY-38 

package. One was to use the equipment fully by having one man 

carry the PRC-77 radio a nd anotherlhe KY -38. The second was to 

move the field unit as normal, then have supporting aircraft fly in 

the equipment for use in slatic or night defensive posilions. 

In th(' ("II of 1969, reports o n NES ro!?. (code nClrne gi \'en narrowband secure voice equipment) utililation wen: r('veaiing. Man y 

units under the operational control of the II Field Force were nOI 

using their KY -38's as much asdesiroo. The PRC-77/ KY-38 when 

carried by one man. as intended, was just 100 heavy. Other units 

reponed that they needed VRC-I2IKY -38 interconnecting cables. 

They wanted to use the sma ll er KY -38 in lieu of the KY-8. The KY8 was prone 10 overheat and ran on generated power. Power was 

limited at fire support bases, and the fi e ld 1I00pS thought it unwise 

to run the noisy generators at nighl. The K Y -38, on the olher hand, 

was ballery powered. Acting on this feedback, Electronics Command Laboratories went into an emergency production of inter· 

connecting cables for the VRC-12 and the KY-38 and by lale 1969 

had produced Ihree hundred. A substitlilion of the KY-38 for the 

KY-8 in vehicles was also agreed upon. 

One of the most serious equipment problems in the field was 

the lack of kits and special cables for installing NESTOR gear in 

aircraft and vehicles. The installation kits and most of Ihe cables 

was a supply responsibility of the Electronics Command . There 

was a variety of kils which adapted NESTOR equipment to the 

tactical series radios used in vehicles and aircraft. The initial supply of kits, o nce they had been develoJ:X!d. was adequale early in 

fiscal year 1969. As the use and uses of Ihe equipment increased, 

however, kits and cable components became increasingly hard 10 

find. The so-called X-mode cable for the KY-8 was also in short 

supply. Another aspcci of the kit shortage came 10 light during the 

U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Although retrieving the NESTOR 
SECURITY RESPONSE 71 

equ ipment from vehicles was no problem red istributing it was 

often haphazard . A similar situation existed with KY-28's in aircraft, principally helicopters. Losses and evacua tions of aircrafl 

which had been fitted for the eq uipment made the shortage worse, 

since most of the replacement aircra ft did not come with the kits 

installed. 

The number of KY -28 keying devices for the NESTOR familyof 

equipment was adequate when uniLS were opera ting in one locale; 

when divisiona l uni LS were dispersed (the normal practice), more 

keyi ng devices were nceded. The JOist Airborne Division recommended tha t keying devices for the K Y -28 and K Y -38 be supplied 

as required. In July 1969, II Field Force established a common 

NESTOR key list for a ll units opera ting in the III Corps zone. To 

maintain compatibility, key cha nges had to occur si multaneously 

in a ll units. The time chosen for this change was midnight, tactica lly Ihe worst possible lime because the gl'ea tcst number of 

enemy contacLS occurred from 2200 to 0200. Moreover, where 

several units shared the same keying device, having 10 move al 

night to cha nge key se ttings was inconvenient a nd da ngerous 

and added to the reasons for no t using the equipmcnt. Later 

thc time of the daily NESTOR key change was moved to 0600. 

As the use of communica tions security equipment increased in 

Vietnam, so did the need for logistical support. A reorganization 

was approved by the commanding genera l of U.S. Army, Vietnam, 

in mid-1967. The revised structure consisted of the Communications Security Logistics Support Center, Vietnam. which functioned as a general support faci lity serving U.S. Arm y, Vietnam, 

wi th six subordinate units strategica lly loca ted in the four corps 

areas. The center was also assigned the mission of organizing, 

training, and deploying seven contact detachments to augment 

direct support to the comba t divisions. Support began to improve. 

Securi ty codes were another problem. The ea rl y units had not 

been very conscio us of communi ca tions securit y, and the unauthorized practice of using homemade communi ca tions securit y 

codes and shackles eventually became widespread. This da ngerous 

practice, wh ich persisted throughout the confli ct and which gave 

users a false sense of security, was proba bly mo re dange ro us than 

commun icating in the clea r. As the number of units burgeoned and 

the need for compartmenting code systems grew, U.S. Army, Vietnam, requested and received from the National Security Agency a 

whole series of preprinted codes to cover the expansion. These 

codes, while no t perfect, were a great improvement in both the 

employment and distribution of such systems. Getting the inCan-
72 DIVISION-LEVEL CO~H .. IUN ICATIONS. 1962-1973 

lTyman under fire. or Lhe helicopter pilOi supporti ng him. 10 employ the codes was anol her mauer. 

The continui ng need for easier 3ulheIHic3 1ion a nd more reliable means for passi ng limited classified traffic led to a new development in the later stages of Ihe confli ct: the KAL-55B authentication wheel, or "whiz wheel. " a circul ar authenticat ion table in a 

plastic covered disc. This innova ti o n simplified communications 

securit y measures to a le"el acceptable to most users. 

Signal securit y. panicularly in voice rad io transmissions, was a 

major problem are-<I throughout the period of com ba t opera tio ns in 

VicUlam. Army Regul a tion 380-40, Department 01 tile Army Policy for Safeguarding Communications Security In/ormation, assigns responsibility for this type of securi ty to bOlh the com mander 

and the indi vidual. All use rs of com munica tio ns facilities were 

more or less awa re of their vul nerabi lity 10 enemy intcrccpt , ana lysis, and decoding, and of the need for authent ication and encoding. 

The gap between th is knowledge and actua l practice was immense, 

and in Viet nam it seemed at times an insurmountable problem. 
CHAPTER IX 

The Art and Process of Communicating 

Communicating derives from a Latin word wh ich ca rri cs 

dua l meanings of transmiuing a nd sharing. Merely sending a 

message a nd receiving an ack nowledgment is not communi cating. Communication is a vila l pan of combat and comb.'lI is a 

learn job. If the combat opera tio n goes awry. the entire uni t ca n 

suHer. The more each individual knows a nd understands about 

other individuals' jobs, the better will be the chances for success. 

The combat communica tor must do his share. 

During a ViclI1am era training exercise. a sta ff office r wrole 

a long messge which contai ned o ne short top secret paragraph . 

The rest of the message was of a lowerdassific3 tion. Si nce the classification of the message had to be the same as its highest clemenl, the entire message had to be encoded by ha nd. transmittcd. 

and then decoded by hand. The message reached iLS rec ipicllI 

some fort y-eight hours after it left the hands of its origi na tor. 

Had the staff officer been famil iar with the commu ni ca tio ns system supporti ng his particu lar headquarters, he could ha ve gotten 

his message through in a small f Taction of that ti me by spliuing it. 

T he lo nger pan of the message could have been transmitted qu ickly over o n-line teletypewriter circuits designed to ha ndle secret 

traffic while the shorter, lOp secret. part was being encoded by 

hand as a sepa rate transmission. The headquarters failed 10 

achieve o ne of its objectives; because it was a traini ng exercise 

no li ves were lost, nor were actual tacti ca l operations endangered. 

Communicating even face to face with a not her indi vidua l ca n 

be diffi culL Shari ng an understand ing of the thought be ing 

lransmiued depends upon the la nguage being lIsed, the cu ltura l 

experience of both individuals, a nd the expeClations of the recipient. Misunderstanding often comes from misi nterpretation because the parties involved are thinking of different subj ec ts. This 

can happen in combat in a very messy way. One example was ci ted 

by an adviser who was o n a combat opera tio n w ith a battalion of 

the 7th Regimenl, 5th Vietnamese Divisio n , near Trung Lap in 

January 1965. During a firefight with an enemy unit. the senior 
74 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS. 1962· 1973 

American adviser was killed and a young lieutenant had to take 

his place. American gunships were called in by radio to provide fire 

support. The inexperienced adviser managed lodescribe the enemy 

location to the pilots well enough to bring the first run in close to 

the target, then he discussed with the pilots the adjustments necessary to make the second run more effective. The adviser then 

abruptly switched subjeclsand indicated Ihal his column was moving out in a cenaindirection. The pilots, anticipating information 

about enemy activity, apparently did not comprehend the shift in 

subject and shol up the balta lion column. Seven soldiers were 

wounded before the gunships could be called oH. 

Not alluansmission mix-ups occur over the rad io. Messengers 

are a vilal part of the communications system, and their use does 

not always preclude misunderstanding. On 14 November 1965 

during the la Orang Valley operations of the 1st Cavalry Divisio n near the Cambodian border, Company A, 7th Cavalry, 

commanded by Captain Ramon A. Nadal II, took part in ah air 

assault into Landing Zone X-Ray. During the fighting that followed, Second Lieutenam Walter J. Marm of the 1st Platoon had 

his hands full conducting his first big fire£ight as a platoon leader, when a company runner came up to him with the message, 

"The CO's hit. You're in command." The young officer was 

stunned. For a few hecti c minutes he was underthe impression that 

he was commanding Company A. Then he heard Captain Nadal's 

voice on the radio. The runner, in his haste to dodge enemy bullets 

and to get the message to ManTI, had neglected to pass on the 

captain's fu ll message beginning with the simple word Ij.I 

In August 1966 a long-range patrol from the 2d Brigade, 

1st Cava lry Division, W<.lS operating near the Cambodian border 

and had not had any enemy contact when Company A, 1st Battalion. 5th Cavalry, air assaulted in on their location. Apparently a radio uansmission from a n aeria l observer indicating large 

groups of people a few kilometers away from the patrol's 10-

calion had come through garbled. Brigade headqua rters understood thal the patrol was being attacked by large groups of people. 

The two units were unscrambled. and Company A was airlifted out to execute its original mission for the day. several hours 

later than intended. 

Cultural differences can interfere with the proper transmission 

[The platoon auack [0 de:IT Ihe area was slalled by deadly fire from a machine 

gun bunker among the nees. Lieutenant Marm charged and silenced the enemy 

position: he was seriously wounded in the atlempt. For his heroic actions, Lieu· 

tenant Marm .... -as later awa rded the Medal of lionor. 
THE ART AND PROCESS OF COMMUNICATING 75 

of an idea from one mind to a nother. Brigadier General William 

A. Knowlto n, assistant division commander of the 9th Infantry 

Divisio n, made the point while discussing operations in the 

delta region a nd Vietnamese-Ameri can relationships: 

... jusl to give you an example of differences between America n customs and Vielnamese customs that ca n lead to all kinds of problems. 

T he blowing of the horn in an a utomo bile. In Vietnamese, Ihat means, 

"Don'l sweat. I see you upahead a nd I know where you are." In America n, 

it means. " I'm going: gel out of my way because I want to ge t by you." 

If a Vietnamese is rid ing down Ihe middle of the rood on his bicycle and he 

hears a horn behind him, he says. " How wonderful. He knows I'm here in 

the midd le of the road," and he relaxes. TIle Americd n. in turn, says, 

" He doesn' t understand my message. I to ld him to gel over because I 

want to go by." There had been a 10lal lack of communiCc1tion in 

blowi ng [he horn. Due 10 this lack of communication. Ihe res ults are 

that the American run s the Vietnamese into the ditch , the bicycle ge ls 

smashed up, and Ihe old man says. "The America ns are idiots; they are 

'barbarians: they're crucle and very imJX>li te to the Vietnamese .... " 

A cultural difference need no t mea n a difference in na tio na lity 

or educat ion. One noteworthy case occurred during the Vietnam 

era a l Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in screening people nominated for the Army officer candida te program. Pressure was strong 

to get every qualified candidate into the program. The screening 

process consisted of a n apli tude test, a unit commander's eva luation , and a board of officers' eva luation. When a numberof likely 

candida tes did not score high enough to qualify, a detailed inquiry 

revealed that the scoring key to the eva lua tion form used by the 

board members was faulty for about 20 percent of the questions. 

The key and the form had been prepared by civili an consulta nts 

who apparentl y were not familiar with Army word usage and 

attitudes. One inconsistency, fo r example, involved the personal 

appt'<lTiIllCe or the !.:illlditiates. The term clean-cuI. whi ch most 

board members had used in describing the appea rance of outstanding ma le candida tes, ea rned the candidate no points. but the term 

a ttractive would have scored a po i nt . The board and the ca ndida tes, 

all of whom were male, just did not think in those terms. The use of 

the scoring key and eva lua tion form had to be adjusted. 

Other understanding gaps come from using colloquia l la ng uage, scnice jargon, a nd tech ni ca l verbiage. All such gaps are a 

potential danger to effective communication. Add to this da nger 

mechanical communi ca tions devices. distance, static, stress, confusion, confli cting requirements, and the loss o f vis ual contact. 

T he chances for error rapidly multiply. 
76 DIVISION-LEVEL COM1\WNICATIO NS, 1962-191-' 

Many o f the military opera tio ns conducted in Vi clnam were 

combined operations with troops of other co untries and jo int 

operations with the V,S. Navy and Air Force. Under these conditi ons, great care had to be taken to e nsure that established procedures and terms were used by operations and communications 

personnel to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. For example, 

trai ned commun icators know thai the term repeat has long been 

o utlawed from normal milita ry radio usage. The reason is Ihal in 

both British and American artillery procedures. the Icrm is used to 

order repetitio n o f an associated fire missio n. Requests for repetilio n o f radio messages or pa n s o f them mUSt be made with say 

agam. 

The efficiency and professiona lism of a tactical unit can be 

judged accurately by mo nito ring its command nel. The command 

nel reflects the personal ity and character o f lhe unit. A frantic, 

nervous unit has a frantic, nervous command nel. A good unit's 

command net is quiC(, uncluttered, calm, a nd quick LO respond . 

The base station exercises firm control over the net, po li ces the net, 

requires legitimate users to use correct and efficient procedures. 

and commands trespassers 10 get off the ner. Operatinga com mand 

net professiona lly requires operators who are military professiona ls. Garbled communi ca tio ns were the exceptio n, no t the rule, in 

Vietnam. 
CHAPTER X 

Logistics 

The supp ly of repair pan s has lo ng been recognized as one 

of the major problems in the maintenance program of the U.S. 

Army. The volume of eq uipment furnished a modern army is 

lrcmendous and the slight differences between "identical" parts 

whi ch come from being produced by different manufac turers 

add (0 lhe pro bl em. Orderin g a nd rece ivi ng the rig ht pa rt be· 

comes a precision tas k. Updated ma nuals arc needed for pa n s 

identifica tion. and an error in olle digit on a slOc k number 

from an o utdated reference can result in the wrong part or no 

pans al all. The volume a nd complexity of the tas k is mind 

boggling. 

Many units in ViclIl am lisied acquiring spare pan s as one of 

their main logisti cal headaches. They tried different approaches to 

resolve the problem. Some units tried to bea t the supply system by 

having their men scour the depots 10 loca te parts and major items 

of equipment and requisition them on the spo t. Other units. such 

as the 25 th Infantry Division . tried to ma ke the system work. Colonel T om Ferguson in reflec ting on his experi ence as the division 

signal oHice r, stated. " We faithfull y followed the T echni ca l Ma nua1 38-750 concept at all times. and with excellent suppon from the 

division suppon comma nd a nd somewhat tenuous fai th in the 

Arm y suppl y system we were a ble to ma inta in our eq uipment." 

Some used the system a nd some used mod ifications of the system, 

and both were made to work sa tisfactoril y. The conscientious and 

u3ditiona lly ingenious Ameri can soldier would ma ke the system 

work-even if, a t times. he had to bend it slightl y. Higher echeJons 

soon a ttacked the problem from their levels and instituted a number of improvements. 

The closed loop suppon system was established to control the 

flow of critical components or assembli es to and from respec tive 

commands in hope of supponing prescribed le\lels of equipment 

readiness. Supply, retrograde, overha ul. a nd resuppl y were given 

specia l attention to ensure tha t critica l items were quickl y overhauled and rebuilt and then quickl y returned to the supply system. 

This system allowed units to exchange critical items directl y. The 
78 DI VISIO N-LEVEL CO"'-IM UN ICATIONS, 1962-1973 

system was genera ll y successful with radar and tc lclypewri tcr 

equipment but less so wi th radio equipment because replacement items were nOI avai lable for direct exchange. One innovalion that made the system mo rc effic ient was the "jiffy bag," a 

cushio ned paper bag in which sma ll modules and components 

could be shipped for repair and relul"1lcd sa fely and quickly. 

Problems in the receipt, issue, and distribution of communica -

lio ns-electroni cs equipment a nd repair pans grew from Ihe lack of 

signa l expertise aliogisti cs depots. Most people who worked these 

were not versed in Ihe increasing sophistica tio n and technical 

makeup of equipmenl and componenlsand the volumeof communications-electronics supply. 

At the division level. the primary logistica l organi za ti o n wa s 

lhe divisio n support comma nd (DISCOM ). With its suppl y and 

service, transportation, maint cnance, and med ical baualions, plus 

its administratio n company and its headquart ers company and 

band, the support command was both a cuslomer o f the communica ti ons s)'stcm and a major supporter. The suppl y and service. 

transporta tion . a nd the maimenance battal io ns played a major role 

in keeping thc communic-cllio ns equipment opera ting. They supplied repair parts and replacement itcms a nd maintained and 

repaired equipment ,,,,hen the units could not. 

The division signa l oHicer had to maintain a close relationship 

with the commander of the support command. Thc success of the 

communi ca tions system depended, to some extent , o n theeffective -

ness of support the command provided. The support commands 

were vital not o nl y in division communica tio ns but also in com bat. 

A number o f di vision commanders considered the support commands so important that they assig ned some of the ir most experi -

enced orfi cers to head them. Thedivision commander or command 

section did not always realize that the support comma nd was uilimately responsible for suppl y and repair pans for sig na l equipment within the division. The di visio n signa l o fficer frcquemly 

had to resolve suppl y problems which were beyond his scope. 

Most of the units in Vietnam centralized their ma intenance 

systems. Time a nd distance and the immedia te tactical situation, 

howcvc r. oftcn t1ic.:la tcd lIollll'thing lx:twl'l'1l compll'tl' (c lllral iLati on or decentra lization. 

Tactical units operating in Vi etnam received power for their 

comm uni cations equipment from fixed p la nt genera tors, portable 

generators. and batteries. Civilian contractors ope rated fixed genera tors in some of the base ca mps. Po rtable gcnera tors were used 

extensively and were importa nt in division communica tio ns. They 
LOGISTICS 79 

were usually three-, five-, or ten· ki lowa tt. When a ir condi tioning 

was necessary for the efficient operation of some communications 

equipment, the ten-kilowatt air-cooled generator became the workhorse. Origi na ll y the ten-kilowatt generators were used only for 

poweri ng signal equipment but the signal sections at base camps 

and other si tes had to provide power for ma ny o ther purposes, 

perimeter lights for example. On small er landing zones, signal 

often became synonymous with the responsibility for providing all 

electrical power at the location . 

Commands had to emphasize maintenance if the generators 

were to survive under heavy use. Heal, wi nd, and sand were constant enemies, and inadequately trained and improperly supervised operators often compounded the ma in tenance problem. 

Operators frequentl y were trained in the operation and ma intenance of the motor but not the generator or (rai ned to operate the 

system but not to maintain it. As a result, most units placed generators high on their list of problems. 

Balleries were used in every vehicle, every generator of five ki lowatts and above every telephone swi tchboard. every tacti cal (e lephone, and most tactical radios. The Vietnam climate was the 

biggest enemy of batteries, both wet- and dry-cel l. In the heat and 

humidity, Ihe wet·cell ballery reached its boiling point quick ly and 

Slopped worki ng. Operators had to service cables, bauery boxes, 

electrolytes, and conneCLOrs more frequentl y than normal to prolong battery life. Dry·cell balleries also were not immune from 

the Vietnam temperatures. They had to be kept in a cool, dry place. 

The recommendation thal balleries be stored under refrigeration 

until issued to the troops was not commonl y fo llowed al the 

lowe r levels, whe re a ny refrigerated space normally was reserved 

for perishable foods and medica l supplies. Dry-cell batteries were 

often stored in a ny ava ilable container. for example a steel Conex 

conta iner which changed temperature drastically from day to 

night. This storage medlOd gave man y units batteries thal operated for only a fract ion of ,he normal time. 

One of the heaviest users of the dry, zinc and ca rbon oxide batteries (BA-386) was the AN/ PRC- 25/ 77 man pack radio employed 

by most tactica l units. As voice secure transmission became 

more common , the usage requirements of these batteries. which 

had LO be used in both the radio and security device. increased significantl y. To increase dry-cell battery life, the magnesium battery (BA-4386) was developed a nd first used in early 1968. The 

magnesium ba ttery lasled a lmost twice as long as the zinc a nd ca rbon oxide battery a nd it did not have lO be refrigerated. The mag-
80 DIVISION-LEVEL COi\IMUN ICAT IONS. 1962-1973 

Snlm :NTS ERECT A NT ENl':A at IViliard T railling area. Fort Cordon, 

Georgia. 

nesiuITI ball cries. however, ge nera ted a hydroge n gas whi ch in a 

closed container built up and ca used (he ba tteri es lO explode and 

burn. Storing the mag nesiulll bal1eries in a we ll ve ntilated area 

solved this problem. 

Ba tteri es in storage were no t alwa ys ro tat ed to ensure that o lder 

slOck was used fi rst. and some became use less. T ho ug h the 

magnesium ba nery was a d istinct im provement and means were 

developed 10 reduce or eliminate pro blems, batteries as well as 

genera tors WCfe hig h on (he problem lists o f most units. 

From 196.r:. to the fi na l redeployment o f tac tical ullilS. num -

erous communica tio ns-electron ics assemblages were in troduced 

in Vietnam to upgrade the quality and quan tity o f tactical communicat io ns. In many cases. these assemblages consisted o f whole 

fa m ili es of equipment designed to replace o bsolet e gea r. The 

AN/ PRT-4 a nd PRR-9 squad radios replaced the AN / PRC-6. 

The AN/ PRC-25 and 77 shon-range FM radios replaced the 

AN/ PRC-8-1 0. The AN/ VRC-12 seri es Frvl rad ios replaced 

the RT-66-67-68/ C RC (i ncluding AN/ eRC 3-8, VRC 7-10, 

VRC 20-22. and VRQ 1-3 sets). And the AN/ CRC- l06 AM rad ios a nd teletypewri tel' replaced the AN / C RC-19. These four basic 

systems provided commu ni catio ns at spec ific levels or fi ll ed d istinct needs. 

The new two-piece, lighl\\'e ig ht sq uad radio g reat ly increased 
LOGISTICS 81 

the capacity of squad com munications. It consisted of a twocha nnel hand-held transminCf, the AN/ PRT -4. and an ultram iniature helmet-mounted receiver, the ANIPRR-9. Designed to provide shon-range (500-1,600 meters) tac tica l communi cat ions 

in the com ba t areas, it replaced thc ha nd-held receiver and transmitter which was used for communica tions between sq uad and 

platoon. The new radio was considera bly sma ller, lightcr, and 

more efficient than lhe older PRC-6 a nd could communicate with 

the VRC-12 a nd PRC-25/ 77 radios as well as with the PRC-6. 

It was used primarily within and between sq uads but could be used 

by larger units for other kinds of tact ical missions. llle squad 

radio was issued in early 1967 a nd by la te Ihal year was ava ila ble 

to all tactica i maneuver units. Units using Ihe new radio varied in 

their opinion of it. Most would tradc it for the AN/ PRC-25 / 77 

whenever possible for grea tcr rangc a nd reliability. TI1CY considered the squad radio most effective in re latively slatic situations 

such as perimeter defen se. 

T he AN/ PRC-25, a sha n -range FM radio. was modular and 

was tra nsistorized except for a power ampl ifier tube. The rad io was 

used in three basic configura tions. manpack (PRC-25), vehicular 

(VRC-53). and manpack or vehi cula r (G RC- 125). The first PRC25's in Southeast Asia (mid-1965) werc intended ror advisers. With 

their initial distribution came the first new equipmcllt tra ining 

(NET) team from the Electronics Command to begin instruction 

on the opera tion and maintcna nceof the VRC-1 2 and the PRC-Z5. 

The AN/ PRC-77 sel was a n improved version of the PRC-ZS. 

Completely solid state design made it more re liable. h a lso needed 

less power and could be used (or secure voice communications. The 

PRC-77 was basically a ma n pack radio but also cou ld be used in 

lhe three basic configura tions, ma n pack (PRC-77), manpack or 

vehicular (GRC- 160), and ve hi cu lar (V RC-64). The PRC-77 was 

compa tible with the VRC-12and PRC-25 families, with the ARC54 aircraft radio set a nd with the PRT -4 a nd PRR-9 squad radio. 

The PRC-77 was organ ic to batta lion-size un its a nd was issued 

through platoon level. 

The radio SCIS AN/ VRC- IZ and VRC-43 th rough VRC-19, 

commonl y referred to as the AN / VRC- 12 series. were the new 

vehicular radio communica tions equipment used extensively by 

comba t units. These FM radio sets replaced the AN/C RC-3through 

GRC-8 series. TIle new selS consistcd of various com binations of 

two basic components. a receiver-lransmiucr and an auxiliary 

receiver. The receiver-tra nsmitter ca me in two versions. the RT246 and lhe RT -524. The RT -246 could select o ne of ten frequen· 
82 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962- 1973 

cies preset by the operator. The operator had to se lect each frequency manually on the RT -542, which had a built-in loudspeaker in 

the space occupied by push buttons on the R T -246. The RT -524 

was developed primarily for use in veh icles where the operator 

could reach the cOlllrol panel easily; the R T -246 was designed for 

use in tracked vehicles where the operalOr could no t reach the 

control panel. In Vietnam this equipment was of len removed from 

vehicles for use in bases such as forward tactica l command posts. In 

most cases, major tactica l units were issued the VRC- 12 family of 

radios just before or shortly after their dep loyment to Vietnam 

during 1965 and 1966. 

The high frequency communications system within a divisional area of operations were used a lmost entirely for radio teletypewriter operation. The AN/ GRC-46 or the AN / VSC-l AM radio 

teletypewri ter sets gave the maneuver battalions their only mea ns 

of secure printed communications. At brigade and division leve ls, 

radio teletypewri ter for the most pa rt provided only a backup for 

the multichannel secure te letypewriter circuits. TIle GRC- 19 was 

replaced in 1966-67 by the newer high frequency single sideband 

radio set AN/ GRC-106 with its radio te letypewri ter configuralio ns, the half duplex AN/ GRC-142 (AN/ VSC-2) and the full 

duplex AN IG RC-122. 

The AN/ MRC-69 was a frequency division mu ltiplex radio 

relay ca rrier tennina l set which could provide twenty-four te lephone channels and twelve teletypewriter chan nels. It was normally used at division a nd brigade leve ls as a dual rad io carri er 

termina l providi ng two twelve-channel systems. T he set was the 

backbone for the divisions' mu ltichannel systems. It was available 

in numerous equ ipment combi nations (in addition to the basic 

MRC-69) such as the single termina l MRC-73, the tclegraphtelephone termina l MCC-6. and the radio repea ler MRC-54. 

The airmobi le and airbornc d ivisions needed a lighter, more 

mobi le system. With the organization of the lSI Air Cavalry Division. a trend toward lig hter systems began a nd resulted in the 

MRC- III and MRC- 11 2. Althoug h they cou ld be tra nsported by 

helicopter casily. thcy provided only four channe ls. T hesc 

were followed by the AN/ G RC- 163, a lig htweight, four-cha nnel, 

sing le termina l radio consisti ng of the VRC-47 a nd a mu ltip lexer 

(TCC-70). TIle GRC-163 had a communications planning range 

of fift y mil es and provided multi channel communi ca tions between brigade and battalion where wire lines were no t tactically 

feasible. The GRC- 163 was desig ned for use in airmobile operations and was compa ti ble with the VRC-12 a nd PRC-25 series of 
LOGISTICS 83 

radios. Unlike the larger, heavier MRC-69 and MRC-1l2, the 

se t was small enough to be airlifted in assault helicopters. Kits were 

also available for installing it in a quarter-ton truck or trailer. 

GRC-163 's were first shipped to Vietnam in January 1968 and 

were accompanied by a two-man training team from the Electronics Command. Another four-man team was sent to Vietnam in 

August 1968 to train personnel of the 1st, 4th, and 9th Divisions 

to install, operate, and maintain the set. 
CHAPTER XI 

Administration 

Administration allhc division level in Vietnam included a wide 

range of activities in lhe area of comba t service support. Finance, 

personnel. casua ll y reporting, information, IX>SIal, legal. chaplain, special services. inspcclOT genera l. and adjuta nt ge nera l 

admini~lra li, t' l'll'IIll'll t:!> Wl'rt' LUS Ol1ll"-~ of Ihl' <,olllmu ni catioilll 

system. 

Few things can lower a soldier's morale faster than errors in 

his pay. Accurate pay in Vietnam depended 0 11 acc urat e data and 

rapid notification o f adjustments. For soldiers assigned to lo nely 

radio re lay stations o r to ma neuver banalions and their supporting e lements. gelling to the fina nce offi ce 10 check out a pay 

discrepancy or 10 make a cha nge was nOl easy. Administrative personnel had to re ly on the communi cations system to assist the 

soldier with his pay problems. The radio. teletypewri ter, and 

telephone provided the means for them to in itiate and moni tor the 

fie ld soldier's paper work. 

Divisional fi nance orga ni za tions i ncluded a main o ffice a t the 

di vision headquarters a nd branch offices wilh major subordinate 

units at different loca tio ns. The main o ffi ce had to stay in 

close contact wi th these dispersed branches to sa fegua rd fu nds. 

maintain effic ient service. and keep acc urate records. Finance 

offices provided forward service learns 10 maneuver units on paydays or al processing poinls. Their functions ra nged from rocei\'-

ing pay inqu iries to providing payrolls to authorized (class A) 

age illS. The responsibiliti es involved in distrib ut ing millions o f 

dollars in military payment certifi ca tes each month a nd in 

accu ratel y m.aintaini ng from ten thousa nd to thirt y lilousa nd pay 

records made effec ti ve coordination a must. Com muni ca tions. 

primarily by telephone a nd telctype\\rriter, we re vi tal in the coordina tio n and efficient opera tion of the divisio nal and separate 

brigade finance offices. 

Some customers of the comm uni cations system had sporadic 

massive calls for coordina tion. One of these was the finance office on "C-day," or conversion day, w hen one color-coded military payment ce rtifi ca te series changed to another, a measure 
ADM IN ISTRATION 85 

to help control counterfei ting and black-marketing. Such conversions were well planned a nd were detailed in standing o pera ting procedures, but the plans did not adeq uate ly provide for 

the large increase in communi ca tions support requi red to ca rry 

them out efficientl y. 

During 1971 , the joi nt uniform military pay system (JUMPS) 

was impl emented througho ut Vi etnam. This system for paying 

military personnel was centra li zed and completely automa ted. 

The heart of the opera tion was a t the U.S. Army Finance a nd 

Accounting Center at Fort Benj am in Harrison, Indiana. Payrelated data from units a ll over the world . includi ng Vietnam, 

were fed into the center over high quality circuits of the a utomati c 

digital network (AUTODIN). In Vietnam, hO\\lcver, network 

terminals were not loca ted near a ll the fin ance offices. Where no 

such terminal was nearby, the fina nce office had to ge t its data to 

a terminal by messenger. The tactica l commu ni catio ns system 

could not provide the high quality circui ts needed to extend the 

network into the divisiona l areas. 

A fl ood of questions from fi eld uni ts a nd clarifica tions from 

higher headquart ers came inevitably as the new comprehensive 

pay system started. During the early stages of implementation in 

Vietnam, moSl of the finance offices there telepho ned lhe Finance 

and Account ing Celller in Indiana dail y, asking questions a bout 

implementing and coordinating the new system and receiving 

answers to the preceding day's questions. Considering the ever 

present possibili ty of a telephone preemption, this approach 

worked remar kabl}' well. The first pa yday under the system had 

produced a considerable number of disgruntl ed soldiers. The story 

went the rou nds in Vietnam that Genera l Abrams ca lled in the 

Military Assistance Comma nd finance offi cer for a report on the 

situa tion. Brushing aside some opti misti c fo recasts. Genera l 

Abrams reportedly said, " I want every effort made to see that the 

troops gel paid .... and lhen see if yo u ca n ge t me paid too." 

Hard work a nd busy phone lines got rid of the bugs. 

By the time of the Vi etnam war, the America n public had become accustomed lO rapid worldwide communi catio ns. T he people back home ex pected to hear within a matter of hours if a re lative or loved one had become a battle casualty. Procedures and 

communica tio ns support had to be established to mee t tha t expec tatio n. The si lUation was compli ca ted by air evacuation of 

wounded and dead. A casualty could be evacuated by helicopter in 

mi nutes from the battlefield to a hospita l a nd then , in some cases, 

by pla ne in ho urs back to the States. The addi tio na l distress and 
86 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-1973 

shock (0 parenlS if the body of their son should arrive in the United 

Sta tes before they were notified had to be avoided . Some units 

established separa te circuits reserved solely for casually reponing. 

It was and will remain a lOp priority adminislralive requirement 

upon the communications system, espec iall y during periods of 

heavy combat. 

Another major customer of the communi ca tio ns system was 

the division G-I or adjutant general, who ca rried out personnel 

and administrative functio ns. His ca lls to coord ina te ma uers with 

higher and lower headq uarters made up a major portion of the 

Iclephone traHic load. a lthough he a lso used messengers. couri ers, 

a nd the radio teletypewriter. The personnel work load in Vietnam 

was greater than the normal. both beca use of awards, decorations, 

casualty reponing, and rest and recuperation leaves amibutable 

10 comba t and beca use of deliberate cToss-tra nsfers to avoid ma ss 

rota tional losses thai wou ld cripple a specifi c unit. Such transfers 

were necessitated by the fixed lo ur and by the gro up arriva ls of 

members of incoming uni ts. 

The phase-down crea ted more personnel and communica tio ns 

work. Not o nl y did men from units being dosed o ut ha ve to be 

shifted to other units. but most units tri ed to assign each individual 

to the major unit o r his cho ice. The telepho ne service, the loca l 

lines and the long lines. received both praise a nd criti cism during 

the buildup and phase-down in Vietnam. In spite of some shortcomings, it more than adequately responded to the needs of the 

divisions. 

One development in management practices was beginning to 

have some influence on the communications system during 

the Vietnam ,,,"'ar but did not reach the impact that it wi ll have 

on a future con£iict if the trend continues. That development 

was the increased use of business machines and computers to 

assist in the support of comba t ope ra tions. In Vietnam, business machines such as the Na tio na l Cash Register Model 500 were 

used for stock and inventory work in logisti cs. and the Univac 

Model 1005 was used in personnel and finance. The divisional 

communications system was not able to extend the high quality 

circuits needed for the joint uniform military pay system, but 

future use of speedy data processors or their replacements may 

mean that the division will have to provide the circui ts. 
CHAPTER XII 

The Training Base 

If {he military organizatio ns are to survive for long on the 

field of balt ic, they must be consta ntly strengthened by trained 

men (0 replace those lost through rotatio n, promoti o n. sickness. or 

baul e. Bo th in quant ity and quali ty, the U.S. Army trainingestablishment measured up to the Vi etnam war expansio n and the 

demand for trai ned replacemems. To this end, many training 

courses had lO be Tu n on th ree shifts, arou nd the clock. Ski lled 

military instructors we re assigned first to the classroom, then to 

Vietnam, then to the classroom again. Ma ny worked not o nl y their 

full dUlY shifts but also added hours repa iring equipment and 

doing o ther work wh ich helped ensure that the tra ini ng program 

would go on. At a number of communica tio ns lTai ning insta llations. civi lian staff members a nd civilian instructors a lso played a 

crucial pan in the hercul ea n task of mee ting the demands for 

trained techni cians. Their corresponding stability, expertise, and 

dedication often made the difference between success and fai lure 

when the military starr was riddled by overseas levies. Together, the 

civilia n a nd military teams gOt the job done. 

Before the Vi elllam war, training in the tec hni ca l services 

Stich as the Signa l Corps had been the responsi bili ty of the chi ef 

of the service concerned. The chi ef signa l offi cer had under his 

command the Signal Tra ining Command at Fort Monmo uth , New 

Jersey, which directed a ll Signal Corps fi eld trai ning acti vities, 

including the Signal School at Fort Mo nmouth , the Signal Training Center a t Fort Gordon , Georgia, and the Training Command 

Detachment a t Fort Bliss, Texas. H e also held responsibil ities for 

signa l research a nd deve lo pment a nd for sig nal suppl y a nd procurement. 

Shortly after assumi ng his dUlies in 1961, Secretary of Defense 

Roben S. McNa mara directed a number of specia l studi es aimed at 

improving ma nagement practices within the Depa rtment of Defense. O ne of these spec ia l studies was Project 80, "Study of the 

Functi ons. Orga ni za tion and Procedures of Ihe Department of the 

Army." The study was made by a hand-picked task force or military 
88 DlVISION·LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962·197! 

men and civilians headed bydepulycomptrollerof the Army Leon· 

ard W. Hoelscher. The study began on 17 February 1961 upon the 

approval of the study plan by Army Chief of Staff General George 

H. Decker. As the Hoelscher commiuee neared compJclion of its 

report, representatives of IhedepUly eh ief of siaff for logisti cs raised 

sirong objections to some features. Brigadier General James M. llIig 

and Dr. Wilfred J. Garvin took panicular exccplion to the techni· 

ca l service chiefs' losi ng their responsibiii li es for the technica l 

training and career management of their personnel. Theyexpressed 

the view that combat arms agencies such as the Continenta l Army 

Command and the Office of Personnel Operations could not produce the kind of skilled technicians required in an era of rapid 

technological change for service throughout the Army and Depanmenl of Defense. 

The Hoelscher comm i lice submillcd ilS repan in OClOber 1961 

and was disbanded except for a small residual staff. General Decker 

appoillled a general staff commillce under Lieutenant General 

David W. Traub, Comptroller of the Army, to study the Hoelscher 

commiuee repon and recommend what actions the Army should 

take. The Traub commiuee supponed the recommendation that 

technical training be transferred to the Cont inenta l Army Command. 

Secretary McNamara pushed for action. Al a n 8 December 

1961 meeting with the Army technical selvices chief. he asked for 

their views on the broad aspects of the reorganization plan. Chief 

Signal Officer Major General Ralph T. Nelson concurred in the 

recommended changes. 

On 16 January 1962. President Kennedy SCnt the reorganization 

recommendations of Secretary McNamara to Congress. Under the 

provisions of the McCormick·Cunis amendment to the Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1958. the proposals went illlo effect on 

17 February 1962 when Congress failed to exercise its right to object wit hin thiny days. Secretary McNamara pushed implementation . On 1 August 1962 the chief signa l officer was placed 

under the genera l staff SU I>Clv ision of the deputy chief of staff for 

opera tions. The Signal Corps pan of the reorgani;r.3lion was 

completed on 28 February 1964 when the chief signal officer was 

divested of his remaining field activities and was integra ted into 

the staff of the deputy chief of staff for operations as Chi ef, Communications-EleClronics. under the provisions of Depanment 

of the Anny General Order 28. 

The U.S. combat support phase of the Vietnam war began in 

late 1961 and the comba t phase in mid-1965. Between these (wo 
THE TRAINING BASE 89 

crucial dates. direc t responsibility for the tramlOg of Signa l 

Corps technicians was transferred from the chief signa l officer to 

the commander of the Continenta l Army Command ; the procure· 

ment and distribution of Signal Corps equipment was transferred from the chief signa l officer to the commander of the 

new Army Materiel Command; and the responsibil ities for trai ning publica tions a nd techni ca l publications were transferred to 

the new Comba t Developments Command and Army Materiel 

Command. respec ti vely. 

Among the many schools run by the Contine nta l Army Command were schools representing most of the branches of the Army 

wi th the exception of those schools in the medical. lega l, and intelligence fields which were the responsibilities o f the appropria te 

Depanment of the Army staff members. The schools most closely 

associated with divisional communica tions were the Southeastern 

Signa l School at Fort Gordon. Georgia; the Signal School at Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey; the Field Artillery School al Fort Sill . 

Oklahoma; the Armor School a t Fort Knox. Kentucky; and the 

Infa ntry School a t ForI Benning. Georgia. All others, including the 

higher level staff coll eges a nd senior service schools. had an interest in the qua lity and utili zation of the product but lillie 

part in its development. 

The effectiveness of di visional communications depended heavily on the skills and dedication of the enlisted technicians who installed and manned the systems that ca rried the voice of command. 

The Southeastern Signal School a t Fort Gordon genera lly taught 

most of those enlisted mili tary occupationa l speciallies that fell in 

the tactical area while the Signal School at Fon Monmouth taught 

the stra tegic and fi xed stations skills. (See Appendix A.) Com· 

munications trai ning a lso we nt on a t a number of Army tra ining centers. For example, training in military occupational specialty 05B. radio telephone operator, was conducted under the 

doctrina l monitorshi p or proponency of the Southeastern Signal 

School at Fort Dix. New j ersey; Fort j ackson , South Carolina; 

Fort Knox, Ken tucky; Fon Huachuca. Arizona; and Fon Ord. California. Training in other heavy volume military occupa tional specialties was conducted under Southeastern Signal School 

proponency at Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Fort Dix; Fort j ackson; Fort Huachuca; a nd Fort Ord. 

When the Vietnam war began, a n expanding Army increased its 

divisional requirements. T he training load doubled . In 1962 the 

Southeastern Signal School gradua ted 16.643 tactica l communicators; in 1967 it graduated 42,901. Wartime training under the 
90 DIVISION-LEVEL CQMtl.WNICATIONS, 1962- 1973 

ground rules lha l were in effec t became a mammOlh task. 

Some of those rules esta blished for the Vie tnam war were to 

have a distinct impact o n the training establishmcm and differed 

from those existi ng in previo us wars. Some of these grou nd rules 

were imposed on the Arm y a nd some were, al least parti ally. self· 

imposed. 

In World War II, the draft period was "for the duration plus 

six months," For the ViclIlam war, it was for twO years. This 

ground rule for the Vi cillam war funher aggravated lhe training 

pro blem because the non-Regula r Army personnel who deve loped 

experience in a combat lOur did not have enough lime lef! in the 

serv ice to ma n other units or to act as instruclOrs. Nor could a 

draftee be sent to a unit ou tside the comba t area for any lengthy 

period of on-the-job seasoning after his school training and 

still have time left for a Viet nam to ur. T he trai ning establishment 

had to train peo ple to fill both requirements, comba t a nd noncombat. The twelve-month Vietnam tour, coupled with the loss 

ratc for a ll olhcrcauses. mealH a hea vy person ne l turnover. Th is, in 

tum, meanl a q uantity requirement agai nst the trai ni ng establishmen t, espec ially when the Ann y was expa nding rapidl y to meet 

ever-rising streng th levels in Vietnam. 

Experienced communications pe rsonnel who could be used as 

instructors were in shon supply. Th is undersnength was further 

aggrava ted by a ground ru le wh ich authori zed some instructors to 

be absent for half of each train ing day to attend civili a n job training unde r Project Transition. Th is well-in tentioned project was 

open to servicemen within six mOnlhs of the expiration of their 

term of se rvice a nd was designed to provide a more orderly tra nsition into the civil ian job ma rket. The top prio rity tas k of tra ini ng 

communica tors for the batt lefield wa s degraded by the loss of these 

experienced instructors. In 1968 the Southeastern Sig na l School 

estimated that over a hund red Ihou s~lIld hours had been lost to 

Projcct Transition a t a time when such a loss cou ld be il l afforded. 

The presidential decision not to ca ll up a ny significa nt number 

of reselve componenl elements o r individuals posed a number of 

problems. The impact on the tra ini ng establish ment was felt primarily in the junior officer and noncommissioned officer areas. 

Both the instructor corps and the stude nt suppon units needed 

more junior officers a nd noncommissioned officers of maturi ty 

and experience. T he ground ru les precluded looki ng to the reserve 

compo nents for assistance. 

Another problem was the lack of an adeq uate ground rule for 

lhedistribution of new equipment. For the t.rain ing base to deve lop 
THE TRAINING BASE 91 

operators and repairmen, i( must get a proper portion of the earl y 

production of new items of equipment to use for training. All too 

often the training base had to fight tooth and nai I for what should 

have been recognized as a normal requirement. Similarly, when 

new items of equipment come into the inventory to replace older 

models, the changeover frequently takes many years. Economic 

considerat ions concerning maintaining product io n lines, stretchingout costs over a numberof fiscal years, and gelting the moslfor 

the dollar by using the old equipment longer in lower priority 

units have a degree of validity. In the tra in ing establishment, these 

ground rules frequently resulted in having to instruct on more than 

one generat ion of equipment at the same time or in instructing 

students on a generation of equ ipmelll different from that which 

their unit of assignment would have, In eq uipment changeover, 

the ground rules on timing were frequent ly governed more by 

fiscal considerations rather than by training and opera tio nal 

needs. Student deferment was another of the ground ru les that 

afrcclcd the trai ning basco Thl' cx.islcnn' of a large college population meant that the input to the armed forces as a whole was not a 

aue cross-section of the talent which could have been ava ilable. 

Subtract from the available input those volunteers accepted by the 

Air Force, the Navy, and the reserve components, and a quality 

problem starts to appear. In training technicians for the communications field, the qua lity of input mallers. 

The personnel system managers at Department of the Army 

leve l maintained a strong emphasis on limiting the number of 

mili lary occupat ional special ties a nd related special ski II or training identifiers. This policy led to problems, especiall y in the communications field. The training base would provide specialized 

aaining of individuals to meet battlefie ld requirements, only to 

ha ve the individual end up in the wrong location. The personnel 

system could not identify the individuals well en ough to get them 

to where the need existed. This difficulty was noted by the Continental Army Command Training Liaison Team which visited 

Vietnam in August-September 1967. Colonel Edward E. Moran, 

the signal representative on o ne of the early li aison teams, stated in 

his trip report that procedure was required whereby individuals 

who received spccialized post-military occupational specialty 

functiona l training could be idcntified in Vietnam and be assigned 

to units requiring those specialized ski lls. Instances were noted 

where jobs requiring specialized training were filled by untrained 

personnel, while tra ined individuals were assigned elsewhere. 

Shonly after the combat phase of the Vietnam war began, liai-
92 D1VISION·LEVEL COMM UN ICATIONS, 1962-197.! 

son between Continental Army Command schools a nd baulefield 

elements was established by a number of methods. One was visits 

by the lraining li aison teams. Colonel Moran 's trip repon staled 

that the purposes of his trip and its overa ll objectives were to estab· 

lish a responsive system of feedback da ta from the field to responsible schools. determi ne the qua li ly of a nd specific deficiencies found 

in school gradua tes, asce rtain pOlemiai pro blem areas, and gather 

data which would be direc tl y applicable to courses of instruction. 

Li aison visits were as effective as the power of observation and 

ana lysis of the learn members, the effon expended, and the coopera -

tion of the host command. Colonel Moran 's summary comments 

reflect the effecti veness o f this early liaison visit. 

Colonel Moran 's team found tha t Continenta l Army Command 

~ignal School graduates performed well in Vi etnam. T he speed 

wi th whi ch they became fu lly effecti ve on the job depended directly 

upon their training o n specific equipment makes and models in 

use in Vi etnam, the extent to which their training was systems 

oriented, and the length of time between completio n of schooling 

a nd reporti ng to unit assignments in Vietnam. In the grea t majority of cases one week or less of o n-the-job training was sufficient. 

T he types and items of equipment used in Vietnam in some 

cases had been phased out of school courses in favor of newer 

equipment. Colonel Moran recommended tha I older equipment be 

reinstated in perti nent courses until its use had been discontinued 

in Vietnam. In other instances, grea ter emphasis should ha ve been 

placed on specifi c aspects of training to increase early effecti veness 

o n the job. 

Communica tions systems training should be emphasized, 

Colonel Moran found, a nd the requirement to fight as infa ntry as 

well as perform as technici ans sho uld be impressed upon the signal 

school student during trai ning. 

The team fo und signa l units genera ll y up to authorized personnel strength, a lthough critica l shortages existed in a number of 

specifi c military occupational specia lties. In ma ny insta nces, 

school graduates with post-military occupa tio na l specialty gradua tion functio nal training were not assigned to uni ts requiring the 

training. Cabl e splicer, 36£, school gradua tes were not avai lable on 

requisition. A course in Vietnam was necessary to fi ll this need. 

In many instances, Colonel Moran found , slow supply response 

to emergency ("Red Ball ") repair parts requisi tions delayed the 

repair of critica ll y needed communica tions equipment. 

The team thought the U.S. Army, Vietnam, headquar(ers bimonthly publica tion , "Comma nd Communi ca tions." esta blished 
THE TRAINING BASE 93 

in September 1966, was an effective organ for feedback on communications experience. 

Certain revisions or changes in emphasis of school courses were 

indicated. For exampl e, the fixed station technica lcontroller,32D, 

needed to be trained in specific fa cility comrol operations as performed in Vi etnam. Particularly important were circuit standa rds, 

equipment interfacing, loca l operation procedures, restoring 

circuitry, and opera tion of the AN/ MRQ-73. Communications 

cemer specialist, 72B, training required grea ter emphasis upon 

perforated tape reading, message transmission rather than reception , message format, and classified material accounting . 

. Another liaison channel was initiated on 22 August 1967 by 

Brigadier General William M. Van Ha rlingen when he wrote to 

Major Genera l Walter B. Richardson, the commander of the U.S. 

Army Training Cemer and Fort Gordon. Genera l Van Ha rlingen 

stated that since arri ving in Vi etnam he had felt a need forexcha nging informa tion with the Southeastern Signal Corps School, from 

his viewpoint both as the I st Signal Brigade commander and as the 

assistant chief of staff for communica tio ns-electronics for U.S. 

Army, Vietnam. He had some unusua l problems in training because of the environment a nd because of much new equipment 

being put to its first large-sca le use. On both counlS Genera l Van 

Harlingen suggested an informal monthly information exchange 

with the school. General Richa rdson enthusiastically endorsed the 

recommendation. 

As this liaison grew, detailed reports from the baule area came 

to the school and equally detai led replies returned. In a 13 October 

1967 Ieuer, Gene ral Va n Harlingen discussed d ifficulties in mai ntaining the AN / GRC- 106 radios. The deadline ra te increa sed from 

14.43 percent for the Ja nuary-June period to 16.6 percent for the 

June-September period. A shortage of repair pans contributed to 

approxima tely 50 percent of thaI rate during the first period but to 

less tha n 5 percent in the second period. The shortage of qua lified 

single sideband radio repairmen was most critical at that time. 

General Van Harlingen sent a tec hn ica l assistance leam from 

Genera l Dynami cs to the field to survey the training problem, give 

remedia l operator a nd ma intenance training, and observe repair 

shop procedure. The team would a lso give command staff orientation a nd eva luate the effectiveness of the new equipment tra ining 

team a nd lhe utilil.ation of repa irmen trai ned by the tea m. He 

hoped a lso to receive a n interim report on 1st Logistics Command 

repair fac ilities before 15 OClOber and to incl ude it in his next le ner. 

In earl y September a member of General Van Harlingen's staff 
94 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-1973 

auended a Distributio n and Allocation Commiuee meeting a t the 

office of the Army deputy chief of staff for logistics. At Ihal meeting, represe ntatives supported a recommenda tion to divert two 

hundred AN/ G RC- 106'5 plus a few AN/ G RC- 142's and 122's and 

AN/ VSC- 3's (0 Continental Army Command for immediate distribution to the schools. TIle hope was that this eq uipmcm would 

improve both ope rator and maintenance trai ning. 

tn his reply o n 26 October 1967, Genera l Richardson indicated 

thallhe Signa l School at Fort Gordon recognized the difficulty in 

maintaining the radio set AN/ GRC-106. There was a high deadline ralC for the training equipment; of the twenty-two se ts o n 

hand, only eleven were working. To compensa te, Conti nenta l 

Arm y Command had a llocat.ed thiny more set.s for the school from 

current production rullS. T his ac tion supported his view that if the 

Signal School was to provide tra ined, qualified men for new equipment, it must receive its training a llocation from ea rl y production 

runs. 

In a no ther leit er on 15 May 1968, General Van Harlingen noted 

tha t a Continental Army Command lia ison learn had recentl y 

completed its quarterly visit to Vielnam. Colo nel Theodore F. 

Schweitzer, the direc tor of instructio n at the U.S. Army Signal 

Center a nd School at Fort Monmo uth, was the signal represclllative on the tea m. The team visited Military Assistance Command, 

his headquarters, each fi eld force, five divisions, two separate infantry brigades, and the 1st Signal Brigade and several of its units 

throughout the command . Colonel Sch weitzer met and discussed 

signa l training wit h commanders, staffs, and enlisted communicatio ns spec ia lists in a ll these organiza tions. He made the fo llowing 

general observations: Enlisted and office r studellls did not receive 

sufficient instruction on the Arm y Equipment Records System 

(TAERS). Studems being trained o n communications equipment 

normally mo unted on a vehicle with a power genera tor as a part of 

the to tal package sho uld receive training in 1st echelo n maintenance of the vehicle, trailer, and power generator. Maimenance 

personnel in general were well tra ined in circui try, in read ing schemati cs, and in repairing equipment once the fault was fo und, but 

they shou ld be beller trained to identify and isolate trouble. There 

was a lag in receipt of tra ined operators and maintenance personnel for ncw equipmcl1l being introduced into Vietnam, but Southeast Asia Signal School was training se lected cadre personnel from 

units already in the coul1lry. Carrier wave, Morse code, was not 

being used in any uni t contacted, so continuing training in Morse 

code for the 058 and 05C sho uld be studied to detennine if it could 
THE TRAINING BASE 95 

be eliminated. Communications officers (MOS 0200) were particularly we ll trained to perform the comm unications functions within 

the combat batlalions, but they were also required in most cases to 

perform as duty officers in the battalion tactical opera tions centers 

and were not trained in thaI area. 

Colonel Schweitzer found the most frequent complaint about 

newly arrived radio relay and carrier attendants (MOS 31M) was 

that their school lra ining barely prepared them for the job in Vietnam. They were weak in knowledge of ereclingandconnecting the 

antenna; many indicated that training in antenna erection consisted of observing demonstrations. Personnel a lso needed training 

on the new AACOMS pulse code modulated (PCM)equipmentand 

in the maintenance of the vehicl es and generators associated with 

radio relay equipment. 

Colonel Schweitzer noted several deficiencies in the training of 

radio teletypewriter operators (MOS 05C). Personnel arriving in 

Vietnam lacked knowledge in the fundamen tals of HF operation. 

They were unfamiliar with space diversity operation, and their 

knowledge of antennas was genera lly poor. Most needed additional 

training on the KW-7 securi ty equipment. 

Colonel Schweitzer concluded that with these exceptions the 

training of communica tions personnel appeared to be satisfactory 

for operations in Vietnam. General Van Harlingen agreed with the 

observations and recommendations. This comprehensive report of 

the Continental Army Command liaison leam was studied in depth 

at the Signal School. The school was already aware of a !lumber of 

the problem areas and had made progress toward eliminati ng 

them. 

Troubleshooting by maintenance personnel was considered the 

most important aspect of all mailllenance training. The trend was 

toward less theory and more training with the actua l equipment to 

be used on the job. Evaluations during training were planned to 

delennine any deficiencies. The lag in the arri val of operators a nd 

maintenance personnel trained for newequipmentconlinued to be 

a problem and was constantl y addressed by the school. Tr.l.iningon 

pulse code modulated equipment appeared to be the major area of 

concern. The school's main problem in this area was the lack or the 

late receipt of sufficient quantities of new equipment to conduct 

adequa te training. As a pan of the effon to do everything possible 

to relieve Ihat problem and (0 provide the 31M course the minimum equipment required, the school consolidated the PCM 

equipment available in that course. 

Liaison by correspondence continued periodically for severa l 
96 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS. 1962-197j 

years. Further liaison came by way of senior members of the Signal 

Corps who spoke to g raduating offi cer classes a t the Southeastern 

Sig nal School. T hese occasions provided exce ll ent opJXlftunities 

for persona l exchanges of views wi th the school staff on tra ining 

problems related to tactica l communica tio ns and frequent ly reo 

suited in further discussions by correspondence. 

Major Genera l William 8. Latla, commander of the U.S. Army 

Electronics Command, visited Fort Gordon as a graduation speaker and examined the trai ning being conducted. H e la ter indica ted 

to Colonel Moran thai tra ining for the radio relay spec ialist, 31 M, 

was lack ing in three respects. The course was tOO short, even 

though it had been increased from twe lve to fo urteen weeks. Too 

much time was lost in the th ree-week tra ini ng on pu lse code modulated equipment a nd the losses from three-sh ift operation. The 

practical work was conducted on a parade grou nd and did not gi ve 

the necessary training for fi eld condilio ns. General latta recommended a two-week period in the fie ld . System tra ining was a 

necessity for the radio relay specia li st. On-the-job training was 

cited by General lana as essentia l " to pol ish previo usly atlained 

knowledge and ski lls." II was not acceptable to prepare men o nl y as 

apprentices for further tra ining in their units. 

Ma ny o ther means were used to make school tra ining as rele -

vant as possible. The rota tion of enl isted instructors between comba t duty a nd classroom duty provided realism. Incorpora tion of 

lessons learned and other opera tional reports from Vielllam into 

the traini ng program was pushed. Exit interviews made by Vi etnam veterans upon completing their tours were ana lyzed for their 

contri bution. Major Clark J onat han Bailey II, signal officer of the 

Illh Armored Cava lry Regiment, pointed out in his illlerview tha t 

he, the regimental officers. and the noncommissioned officers all 

felt tha t the military occupational spec ia lty trai ning was no t adequate. He specifica ll y ci ted the radio mechanic/ radio repa irman, 

MaS 31 B. and the rad io teletypewriter operator, OSc. Men in these 

specialties were trai ned to repair componen ts but they did not 

understand nor could they analyze communica tio ns systems. 

Major Bailey also no ted that the y did no t seem to understa nd the 

basic pri nciples of how to overcome adverse communi ca tions 

conditions and made litlle eHort to correc t problems be fore ca lling 

for a repai rman. 

'Within the lim itations of their funds, equipment, instructors, 

and facilities, the schools a nd training centers tried to respond to 

the fie ld. One limita tion on their abili ty to respond was a 10 percent restriction on changes in course coment. Any g rea ter change 
T H E TRAIN ING BASE 97 

I. 

-

BRANT HALL. new home of auionics mailltenallcf' courses at ForI 

Gordon. 

required ConlinelHa l Army Command approva l. The time required to process change requests and the questionable technical 

capabililY of the comma nd to evaluat e them provided difficulties 

for the schools. AnOlher source of confli ct in the repair fie ld was 

with the Army Materiel Command over the adequacy and timeliness of technica l manuals. Some of these difficulties could possibl y 

be attributed to the newness of the responsibilities assigned by the 

Projec t 80 reorganizatio n. but improvement in these a reas remai ned a high priori ty from the viewpoi nt of the schools throughout the war. 

On 12 September 1966, Continental Army Comma nd issued a 

letter. " Poli cy Guidance-Elec tronics Training." This leuer 

presented a traini ng formula that appli ed primarily to the repair 

field. In this formula the avai lable lime (for enlistments a nd training) and the average apti tude of trainees were, for the moment . 

constants; fhe method of train i ng was the only variable to manipu, 

late. The lener wen t o n to give specific Department of Defense 

guidance and o bjec tives, but what it a ll added up to was a major 

challenge to the training establishments. Through the dedication 

of ma ny indi"iduals, the training esta blishment overcame limita -

tio ns in the areas of equipment, pe rsonnel. fa ci lities, and funds to 

meet and suppor! the Vielllam war requiremen ts. 

One view of the lessons which sho uld have been learned by the 

training eSla blishment from these experiences is summed up in the 
98 DlVISION·LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 962-197~ 

following statement made by a senior officer who served a t one of 

the signa l schools d uring th e Vietnam wa r period: 

From the viewJX>int of a service school officia l, my priori ty list for three 

changes to improve on Vietnam War school experiences wou ld be: 

1. Higher Training ru ~m nl Priority: Earl y and adequa te issua nce of 

eq uipment IS essenua to 'hands on " eq ui pment orien ted operator and 

repair courses. 

2. Greater Cou rse Revisio n Authority: During time of war, the service 

school commanda nt must have grea ter responsibility for the adequacy of 

his instruction a nd grea ter authority to cha nge it. I wou ld propose 20% 

authority in course length and 40% a uthority in course content. 

3. Hi~h er Officer and Instructio n riorit~ : In time of war, there are few 

Slatesl e missions higher in rea l prioTi ty t an tha t of preparillg troops for 

combat. Upon completing their comba t duty, tOP performers from the 

combat zone must be brought back to the school system where their influence ca n be magnified . 
CHAPTER XIII 

Combat Communications in Retrospect 

There is much to learn from the len yea rs in Vietnam. The 

always constrained na ture o f the war affected taclica l camm unicalions in many ways. In World War II, four years when the technologica l might of the United Slales was full y commiued to the 

conflict , unbelievable advances were made in every fi eld. Radar 

progressed from infancy to a decisive wcapon. P ropeller a ircraft 

gave way 10 jet aircrafl. Radios were rapid ly desig ned to keep pace 

with the armored and mechanized divisions thai ultimately won 

the banle in Europe. Hirosh ima and Nagasaki marked the dawn of 

nuclea r war. 

In Vietnam, over a lime span more than twice thaI of World 

War II, there was no malching technologica l progress in communi ca tions-el ectronics equipment. Perhaps the nature of the war 

itself mi li tated against it. Perhaps the war's not bei ng considered 

one of national surviva l sti fl ed the motivation o f the technologica l 

base. Ri veri ne operations in the Mekong Delta and the incursion 

in to Cambodia in 1970 taxed the ingenuity and ski ll of the tac tical 

communicators to the limi t and they responded admirably, with 

the same equipment doi ng the same job that it d id in 1963. Some 

progress was made with si ngle sideband operatio n of newer high 

frequency radios, and a degree of voice security was fina ll y provided for FM radios. But telephone switchboards rema ined slow 

and unsecured. The promise o f tactica l satelli te terminals that 

could free U.S. troops from the constrictions of terrain never materia lized. H eliborne command and con trol co nsoles were still 

scarce, ma inl y "jury-rig" affairs whi ch never ach ieved a standard 

configuration because it seemed everyone wanted something just a 

liule bit different. Crypto keying of what few securi ty devices there 

were became a logistic, mailllenance, and operational nigh tmare. 

Preparation a nd transm ission of situatio n and i Ilte lligence reports 

were so cumbersome and time consuming that messengers were 

o ft en used instead of electrica l means. In shon, it was more a war of 

individual improvisation than of equipmen t modernization, at 

least for the tactical communicator. Yet, so handicapped, he did 
100 DIVISION-LEVEL COMM UNICATIONS, 962- 197~ 

well , getting more mi leage from wha t he had tha n the desig ners 

ever tho ught possible a nd seldom if ever causing a n opera tio n to 

fa il because of a lack of communica tio ns. 

T he scope of the improvisa tio ns was certainl y dri ven by the 

constantl y changing character of the conflict and the varied enviro nments in which it was waged. Major combat units were organized in Vi etnam. Some Arm y UniL'i were a llachcd 10 Ma rine uni LS; 

olhers fo und themse lves committed full time to wha t could o nl y be 

described as semiamphibious operalio ns in the Meko ng Delta. 

Divisio ns were g iven tactica l areas of responsi bility exceeding 

anyt hing in their past expe rience. These departures from conventiona l ways of doing things were orchestra ted over the full gamut of 

terrain a nd clima tic conditions tha t characterized South Vietnam. 

Another major factor which reflected in the individual initiative shown by the tactical communica tors was the peculia r struclUre of the combat zone outside of the division tactical areas of 

responsibility. There were never an y corps in the docHi nal sense of 

the word nor a field a rmy tha t could be identifi ed as such. When the 

division signa l ba tla lion looked to the rear (and the rea r, itself. was 

sometimes pretty ha rd to find ) it saw the multicha nnel systems and 

equipment of the First Signa l Brigade. The brigade networks 

normally did nOllink the di visions to the fi eld force headqua rters, 

the closest thing toa corps headquarters in Vie tnam , but generally 

to either U.S. Arm y, Vietnam, or Military Assistance Command 

headquarters in Sa igon. In a lmost every di vision, in fa cl, elements 

of the First Signa l Brigade were meshed with the ba ttalio ns because 

the division signal batta lion by itself was often unable to handle 

the large area that the division had been assigned. It is little wonder, then, that multichannel improvisa tions in the 9th Division in 

the delta varied grea tl y from Ihose employed by the 1st Cava lry 

Division in the highl ands. Each major comba t unit had its own 

story to tell. 

The workhorse of tactical communi ca tions in Vietnam was, 

without q uestion, the FM radio-bac kpack. vehicula r, and a irborne, If the FM nets fa il ed , the ba ltle had to be fought with reduced command and control, a not impossible tas k but risky at 

best. But, because of limited securit y devi ces which were ha rd to key 

and maintain , it was hard to make everyone radio securit y conscious. and the North Vietnamese, as Genera l Abrams put it, " read 

our mail " far too oft en, In the closing days of confl ict. after U.S. 

comba t forces had been withdrawn. the FM secure radios were still 

calling in B-52 stri kes. These radios o ften provided lhe onl y link 

be tween the a ir opera tions center a t Military AssislanceCommand 
COMBAT COMMUNICATIONS IN RETROSPECf lOl 

headquarters and the be leaguered military district where their 

letha l efficiency was so sorely needed. 

Communications comba t narratives consistentl y reflect the 

struggle between the FM radio operator and his unfriendly environment.It seemed always (hat the trees were tOO high. the ground 

was tOO fla t. lhe frequencies were too few. or the congestion was (00 

greal. But somehow he would ma ke the FM radio work in spite of 

these obstacles. it seems a lmost incongruous that, recognizing the 

importance of FM, a reliable radio wire integration system (RWI) 

was not developed and fielded duri ng the long war years. The need 

was grea t enough and the technologica l base was sound enough . 

Commanders at division and brigade level probably spent more 

lime in the air in Vietnam than they did o n the ground. and signal 

oHicers were constantl y agonizi ng over ways of keeping them in 

touch with subordi nate units and staffs when they were airborne. It 

seemed every major combat unit ended up with its own wa y of 

doing this. a nd some did nOl succeed in doing it at all. T hroughout 

thl' whoit' c.:o nrJic.:t. most radio wire integra tion was accomplished by a n SB-22swi tchboard married loa black box that linked 

the FM radio a nd the switchboard so the radio ca ll could be extCIl(.lcli . .to the appropriatl' telephone subscriber. The radio wire 

integra tion operalormani pulaloo this Ru be Goldberg conlIaption 

manually and 11 0t easil y. 

Multichannel radio ran a close second to FM in importance a nd 

varied methods of employment. If a division did not establish 

multicha nnel links to i LS brigades, task forces, and fire bases qui ckly, the FM nets become so overburdened that the crucia l combat 

information sometimes was lost in the shuHJe. On Ihe other hand. 

heavy vegeta tio n a nd flat terrai n oh en inhibited multichannel even 

more than FM tra nsmissio n. Many reports reflect the confli ct 

between the need to erect towers for be tt er multichannel and FM 

coverage a nd the need loconceal command posts. The uniLS. again. 

illl pro\·jsell. 

Thc finailiays that preccdeclthe withdrawal of rema ining U.S. 

f:,rround for(.es from Vietnam seemed an ironic.: flas hback, from a 

com muni cations po int of view, to 1962 and 1963. In the fo ur mi litary regions theslllal l military advisory group that remained was 

~uppo <.'tl by a com pany-siLe communications unit that ti ed the 

advisory headquarters at Da Nang. Plei ku, Bien Hoa . and Can Tho 

to the I\-I ilitary Assistance Command headquarte rs in Saigon. 'factical commu ni ca tions. in the context of providing command and 

wntrol for U.S. combat units. had p laYl'tl its role and had left the 

l>lage. The durable "backbone" communications system. for ye-drS 
102 DlVISION·LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-1973 

the hallmark o f the lcgcntl ary Fir t Signal Brigade. had undergo ne 

il IllClj o r tra nsit ion. oJJc ratcd fi rst by U. S. Army signa lmen. then by 

U.S. co nlra(:l or~. a nd fina ll y by SUluh Vielll a nlt:l>C forces. The fa -

miliar alll cn na-stlH.ldcu hi lh o p rdays relllained. bUI the reliabilit y 

and trad itional quality had l'rodcd to a po int where lise of thl'SYStem was a strugg le, nOI a vinue. Nt:\'crt hclcslI. thc l1 0n laclicai vuin: 

sc<.u rit y cq u ipmcllI thaI li n kcu these four reg io ns to Sa igon and 

pruvided the o nl y mea ll!> of \'('(.luring ill Ii-52 ll lrikcs "rode" this 

ten uo us system unti l Ihe w<tlli ng day!> o f o ur in vo ln :mcnt. 

Thus. Army cOlllllluniGlt iun s left Vi etnam ill Illll ch the ll<l lllC 

way as it a rri vctl - a !l ing le-thread um b ilica l suppo n ing a ll 

g ro u p o f mi I ilary atl vhe:rllo. ilu I I h (' i Illpa u of i b p rclIoe:II Le: and in £I u -

e:n c:e: 0 11 combat i II a re:llIo te: LOll n l fy <lgO:l i Ih l Ull u IIl100 p h illo l iCil le:d bu I 

e:~o urc: c:ful Cl lld te: ll ac iuu lIo elll'm y was e:lch ed ill a l1 t1l1arra

lives o f th is mOllo t d ifliuil t wa r. We may wel l fi g h t a~<till undl'rsilllilar conditi o ns-som e\\rherc:. If we do, th e t:~oUl'(d ln c:ss il nd 

in ge: n u ity of t he Alll eri<':<l n ta u ical Lomlllun iL<lIOr \\' ill surrace 

aga in , as it al wa ys a~, 
Appendix A 

SOME DIVISIONAL ENLISTED MILITARY OCCU PATIONAL 

SI)ECIALT IES. COMM UNICATIO NS 

Radio Telephone OperalOfs 

Linemen 

Telephone Switchboard Uperalor 

Communications Cenler Specia list 

Radio Relay and Carrier Auendenl 

Tactica l Circui t Controller 

Power Genera tion Equipment Opcl"mor/ wil--chanic 

Tactica l Communi ca tions Chief 

Area Communica tions Chief 

Combat Phologmpher 

Aerial Sensory Devices Operator 

Photographic LaboralOry Specialist 

Field Radio Mechanic/ Repairman 

Teletypewriter Repairma n 

Field Radio Relay Equipment Repa irman 

Manual Central Office Repairman 

05Band 05C 

36Cand 36 K 

72C 

72B 

31M 

31N 

S21! 

31C 

31Z 

84 B 

26E 

84G 

3IB . "d 3IE 

31) 

31L 

36G 

Surveillance Infrared Repairman 26N 

Airborne Survei ll ance Radar Repairman 26 M 

Radar Ma intena nce Supervisor/ Inspec tor 26W 

Avialio n Electronic Mecha ni c 35 K 

Aviation Electronics Communications Repairman 35L 

Aviation Naviga tion Equipmenl Repainnan 35 M 

Avionics Radar Equ ipment Repa irman 35R 

Aircraft Stabili za tion Repairman 35N 

Aviation Equipmem Mai ntena nce Supervisor 35 P 

Genera l Cryplo Repairma n 

Field Genera l COMSEC Repairman 

Tacticd. 1 COMSEC Maintenance 

3 1K 

315 

31U 

Index 

Abr.iroms. ~neral Creighton W.: -19. 67. 85. 

100 Advi~s. U.S.: 7. 9. 11 .66. 101. 102 

A8C'!)", for Imcnational Dtvtlopment: 10 

Air Anault Division. 11th: 1.5-15 

Air assault landi ngs: 31. -16. 56. 58 

Air conditioning: 2 1. .H-.H 

Airborne Brigarn-. 173d: 17.24-25.]1 

Airbotllt Division. 82d: 17.60 

Airborne Division. 101sl: 17-18. 25. 71 

Aircr.lft. 5« also Helicopters. 

B-52: H 100. 102 

fixtd·wi ng: 29 

U-2 1: 62 

Airmobility: 10-11, 14. 17 

An Khc: 28 

Antenna systems: II . I], ]]-]5. 42-4], 

-15--16. 50-51. 55. 57-58, 95. 102. Su 

IIlso Equipmmt, communications (try 

!USlgnlltion). 

Archibald. Liruttnant Colonel Nonnan E.: 

57, &f 

Armor. 16th: -17 

Armor School: 89 

Annortd Cavalry Regiment. 11th: 17. 

56-58. 66, 96 

Anny. Department of the: 16. 87 

Army Conctpt Team in Vittnam: 11-12 

Anny Equipment Records SYltem 

(fAERS): 9-1 

Army Matciel Command: 89. 97 

Army Regulation ]80--10: 72 

Artillery. ]4th: 51 

Aslta.i, USS: 52 

ATTLUOIIO operation: -I] 

Automatic digital network (AUTODlN): 

Avialion " Battalion. 1-15th: 12 

BACK POliCH system: 7 

Bai lty, Major Clark Jonathan II: 96 

Ban Me Thuot: 5 

Bast camps: 10.2]-24.27-28. ] 1. H 37-38. 

79 

Batteries: 70. 78-80 

Ikon Suc: M 

Btn Tre: 5-1 

Btntwllh. US5: 50-52. 5-1 

Jkorry. Colond Sid: &I 

Bim Hoa Air Ba~ : ]2. -15. ~7. 101 

Binh Dinh Provina:: 45 

Binh l.ollg Province: 56 

Bladr. Virgin Mounta in. Stt Nui Ba Den. 

Blackwtll. LittJtenanl Colonel LoIUS B.: 7 

Bodman. Lieutenant Colontl WalteT J.: 45 

Boles. Brigaditt Ctnaal John K .. Jr.: I] 

Boykin. Robert S.: 15 

Bu Dop: 58 

Bu Cia Map: 58 

Burdrlle. S«geant Finl Clan Ray : 14 

Business machil1t$; 86 

Cam Ranh Bay: 7 

Cambodia: 5 

Cambodian incursion: 49. 55-58, 99 

Camp Gorvad: 57 

Can Tho: 101 

CarriCT pigeons: 45 

Cavalry, 5th: 74 

Cavalry, 7th: H 

Cavalry Division (Airmobile), In: 14, 

17-18. 25. 27-29. ]1. ~5, 56-58. 64, 66. 

74, 82. 100 

Ctntr.ll Lowlall(b: 5, 7 

Ctntr.lI Offia:ofSouth Vittnam (COSVN): 

,. 

Chaine Annamitique: 5, 7 

Olief. CommuniGitions· Eleclronics: 88 

Olid signal 0£fi(t1': 87-89 

0111 L..ai: 7. -15-'16 

Climate: ], 5. 21. 2]. ll-]4, 69. 79-80 

Cola-nan, Brigadie'~ntr'lIl William S.: 64 

Combat Jkvelopm~m Command: 12.89 

Combined operations: 76 

Command. control. and organiLluion: 7. 

11-12.2-1. 27-28,]1. 100. 101 

"Command Gommunicalions" : 92 

Command posts: 10-14. 28-29. 3l-l4. 

38-40, 46-47,52.54,58, 76. 101 

Communications: 3, 10. 16- 17, -17, 54 

call signs: 64-65 

cuuahy reponing: 85-86 

codes: &\, 68-69. 71-72 

doctrine: ]1, II 

finance offia: use: 84-86 

freqUC' ncy allocations: 25. 27, 52. 56-58. 

64. 101 

line of sile: 49. 52 

mes~ngef5: 52. 7-1. 85. 99 

"mimndtrstanding" problems: 74-76 

for pc'Uonnrl actiom: 86 

Imain effect o n : 29-]0, 5-1-55.58. 62, 99. 

101 

\'oict: 16. H ]4. 52. 62, 65, 70-72. 79. 102 

withdrawal operationJ: 60-6]. 102 
106 DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS. 1962-1973 

C.omllllJlli.:-;uions Srturil}' i.ogislia SUJ~ 

pon Ccrllcr. Vietnam: 71 

Contin('lIIal Ann) CAlrmnand: 88-89.91-

92.9'1,97 

Conlint111;.1 '\IIllY Command Iralnil1~ 

liaison'leams: 91-92. 9·\-95 

CoROSA!)O I operation: ·19 

O)fI)S rorle. I I: 6:' 

COlpS mile. III: 56. 71 

C:u ali: 19. :II. 3~ 

I);. L:u: ;, 

I);, N:mg: 7. 12.28. 101 

Dan. Major Fredt'Tick R.: 20 

1).1ll Tieng: 4'1 

Dt'('kt-r, Ct,." cra] George H .: 118 

De/ense Coml1llJlll(3lion System (DCS): 39 

DcknSt' Rcorganil31iol1 ACI 01 19':'8: 88 

[kita AI'buion Ball:tl ion (l'rO\';sional): 12 

I)CPUlY <hid or staff ror logisdn: 94 

D(1)UIY chief 01 51:,1f ror opt'rations: 88 

l),;l'uy. r-lajOl' Gem'T;tl William E.: 16,37-

38. -10-<12 

Ili An : 211. :'10. j7. 39 

1);(111. Ngo Dlllh: 7 

Di\-ision suppon rOmnlillld (Dl5COM): 78 

Dong Nai RiH'r: 5 

OOl1g Tarn : 49 

t:d:hardt, 1'.l:ijor Gt'neral George S.: 19 

EL I'ASO II opn.nioll: 37-38 

EI{'('uoni('5 C.(lnulland: 14,70.81. 8.'1. 96 

Ell-ctronin Research ;md De"elopmenl 

Agtnc)': 12. 15 

Ellis, Lieulenanl C.olond Cl;.r('n~ I-I.. Jr.: 

12 

Equiprnt·nt. comrnunicatio ~ 

airlift of: 31-32. 38-40. 'l6-n 

dim'lle ('(fttl on: 5. 21. 23. 33-3'1. 6~. 79-

8IJ 

impm"isation: 11-12.21. 34. 42-43. 45. 

5G-51. 55. 69-70. 99- 100 

shortages: 22, 70-71 

Imining 11C'e-ili: ZO. 90-91. 91-95. 98 

Equipment, cornmuni('3lions (by 

aC'.ilgnlluon) 

A8-216 lo",,'r: 39. '19-51. 57 

A8-577 lo",n: 39 

ARC-51 ailer .. fl radio: 81 

ARC-I22 airborne comrol: 15 

ASC-5 airbornf' comrol: 14-15 

ASC-6 console: 12-13 

AT -271 anlenna: 43 

I\T-892 amenna: 43-H 

8A-386 bautry: 79 

8"-4386 magnesium hauer)': 79-80 

GRC-3 through -8 ",d;os: ZO. 80-81 

G RC-IO ",dio: 51 

G RC-19 mdio: 80. 82 

C RC-'16 radio leitl\'IX'",r;ler: 25. 82 

C RC-IOO radio Idet),pe,,'r;[cr; 52. SO. 82. 

93-94 

CRC-I09 roulio: 9 

GRC-I22 radio tell-type",!ite,: 82. 94 

CRe-125 \"('hicular ' <ldio: 81 

GRe-H2 r:ltlio t('it'tYIX'w,iler: 82. 94 

CRC-160 r.!dio: 81 

GRC·I63 radio: 57-58, 82-83 

KAL-55B authemication ,,'h('('I: 72 

KW-7 sceuril\' dc\'ic(': 9E1 

KY-8 ~t'nl!it)' dl'Vire: '13. 69-70 

KY-28 security device; 69. 71 

KY-38 sccurit\' dt""ice: 69-71 

MCC-6 wrrnimtl: 82 

MRC-31 ~ termina l: 32. 38 

MRC-El llermit1~I : 82 

MRC-69 terminal: 32. 38. 82-83 

MRC-73 lerminal: 82 

MRC-III lelmina l; 82 

MRC-112 It'rminal: S2-83 

MRQ-73 [ad;o: 93 

M5C-29 terminal: 33-34 

MT C-I swilchboard; 33, 39 

MTC-3 s,,'itchbo3rd: 33 

PRC-6 !~Idio: 10. 80-S1 

PRC tHO radios: 80 

['RC-IO radio; 10-11. 13 

[' RC-25 [Oldio: 25. '12-4'1. ~6. 52, 80-82 

['RC-2E1/77 r.ldio: 79, 81 

PRC-77 mdio: 70. 80-81 

PRR-9 S<IU" d radio: 80-81 

PII. T-4 s<luad radio: 80-81 

l'lT-286 generator: 21 

RC-292 arllel1 ~: H-H. 16. 58 

RT -66-67-68/C RC rt'Cri\"cr'lransmiu("f: 

80 

RT-246 rca-iv,'H rllmmiller: 81-82 

RT-524 r(oO'i"cHransmi ller: 81-82 

S8 -22 switchboard: 301. 51. 54. 101 

SB-86 switchboard: 301. 39. 52. El7 

S8-611 s"'itchboard palch pando 33 

TCC-3 multlple.:er: 51 

Tee-7 c~nier: 38. 50 

TCX:-20 cani!"r: 50 

TCC-70 multiplC1(cr: 82 

TR-20 r.idio: 9 

T RC-24 radio: 38. 5 1-52, 54 

VRC 7-10 radios: 80 

\lRC-12 radio: 20. 25. ·10. 43-'15. 52. 70. 

80-82 

\lRC 20-22 radios: 80 

VRC-24 r.ulio: 50 

VRC-'17 radio: 82 

VRC-'19 retrallsrnission unit: 52 

VRC-5l radio: 81 

VRC-6'1 r.ldio: 81 

\IRQ 1-$ radiO!;: SO 

VSC-I radio teletypewriter: 25. 82 

\lSC-2 radio lelclI'I)t'wriler: 82 

\lSC-3 radio teletypewriter: !H 

Froeral ElcelTic CorporaLion: 62 

FergUSOIl. Ueulenam ColonciTom: 18.25. 

27-28. 33, 77 
INDEX 

Fidd Artillcr y School: 89 

Fi d For . II: '\I. 56-58. 69-71.100 

Finan(r. and Aa:oumins Griller: 85 

Firt> suppon bases: 21. 27. 31. 34. 38. 43. 70 

0 ,\\'11): 58 

Trc:1:It II: 51 

Fishhook area (Cambodia): 56-58 

Flmiron area {Cambodia}: 58 

Fo rd. Lieurenanr (,.olonel Edward A. : '16 

Fort Benjamin ]-{ .. rrison: 85 

Fan Benning: 13. 15.20.89 

Forr Bliss: 87 

Forr c.1.rson: 17 

Fort Dill;: 89 

FOri Gordon: 87. 89. 93, 94, 96 

Forr Huadlu(a: 89 

Forr Jackson: 89 

Forr KnOll;: 89 

"orr ~(mard Wood: 41. 75, 89 

FOri Monmouth; 12. 15.87,89. 94 

Fall Ord: 89 

Fort Polk: 89 

FOri Rilt'Y : 19 

FOrt Sill: 89 

Fulton, Colonel Wi lliam S.: 49 

Garvin. Wilfred J.: 88 

Gen ral Dynamics: 93 

GrneratOTS: 20-21. 31, 58, 70. 78-80 

GOI.IlFrR[ exerds~: 11 

Goldswonhy. ACting S£olgtaru : 59 

Guam: 62 

Heliborne command pas! (HCP): 11-15. 

24-25.29. 40-41. 52. 99.101 

t'li(QPl rs : 10-11. 31-32. 38-40. 56, 71 

CH-47: 47 

VH-1 ; 1'1 

VB-IS: 12 

VH-lD: N 

Hewitt. Captain ~land: 22 

Hiep H oa: " 

Highlands: 5. 7, 43 

Ha Bo Woods; 32 

Hoelscher. Lronard W. : 88 

Hoelscher commiuee; 88 

How«:. Lieu!enarll Genrrall-lamillOn 1-1 .: 

14 

OW ~ Board: 13-11 

u~: 3. 5. 7. 27. 28 

I .. DranK Vallty: 29, H 

Illig. Srigadi~r General Jam~ 1\1.: 88 

Infamry 

2d: 65 

12th: 56 

27th (Wolfhounds): 13 

28th: 44. 65 

Infantry brig;uln 

11th Light : 17, 20 

196th Liglll : 17. 19.30. 60 

Ig8rh Lighr: 17 

1991h U ghr: 17. 19-20.56-57.69 

Infanrry divisions 

107 

Isr: 17. 25. 28 . .'I0-B . .'15 . .'17-42.44.46-'17. 

&1-66. 83 

'Ilh: 17,30.13,66,83 

5rh (Mechan iled): 17.21-22 

9rh: 17. 19. '19-52. 54-57. 60. 75. 83. 100 

25th: 17-18,21-23.25.27.30-3-1. 38. '1.'1. 

'17. 56-59. 66. 70. 77 

\m~'1"ical : 15- 46 

Infanlry School: 20. 89 

[melligel1(e. from radio inrercept: 65-67. 

72. 100 

Jansen. Major Edw;lrd F.: 22 

Johnson, Lyndon B. : 16, '19 

Joim oper .. lions: 50. 76 

Joil1l Oper:l1ions Cenler: 62 

Join t uniform milita ry pay sysrem 

(JUM PS): 85-86 

J!'NCno:.· CITY op<:r.llion: '16 

Kennedy. John F.: 7. 88 

Kinnard. MajO/" G r neral I-iany W. O. : H. 

17. 28 

Knowhon, Brigadit-r General William A.: 

75 

Koral. Th:.iland: 21 

Kor{'",!: 63 

Korean Army: .'17 

Lai Khe: 35. 39 

Lairr. I'r;vale FirS! Class Srrphen: 35-36 

Lalla. Major General Wi ll iam S.: 96 

LcxinglOn· Sl ul'gTiiss Army Depol: 12. 15 

Logisrics: JoI. 15, 20. 2~.12. 77-80. Sa auo Maintenance Hnd re]);,ir: Rel}(lir parts. 

l..(lgisrics Command. 1st: 93 

Long Binh: 18 

McNamara. Robt-rt S.: 87-88 

McSp.1.rren, alief Warr:lIlt Officer George 

R.: 10 

Maintenance and repair: 10-11. 14. 15.52. 

77-78,92-95. Su Dlso Repair parts. 

Marm. Second Ueuten:1Il1 Waliel J.: 74 

Mekong Oelia: 5. 12. '19. ~-55. 99-100 

Mekong River: 5 

Meloy. Majol Guy S.: H 

1o.ficht lin J>lantarion: .'12. 401 

Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS): 51 

Mi lirary A~sis ance AdvisO/"y Grou]). Vit.'t· 

nam; 9-11 

Mi litary Assisrance Command. Vietnam: 

12. 14. 16,24-25.28.6.'1.66-67,85.94-

100-101 

Minh T h:lIlh: 46 

Mobile Ri"erinc Force: '19 

MOnle Lang \'ian: 5 

Moran. Colonel Edwa,'d E.: 91-92. 96 

Morse code system: 9. 65. 91 
108 DIVISION·LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-1973 

Mycr, Ut\lt~nam G~nrnli Oladros R.: 18, 

27-28.37 

Nadal. Captain Ramon A. II: 74 

N31ional Cash Regisu r Model 500: 86 

National Security Agency: 71 

Nelson, Major Grolleral Ralph T .: 88 

I\'l'lroll. Lieutenam C.oJonel "Swedc" : 18 

~roR : 70-71 

New ('(Iuipmenl tr .. ining (NET) trams; 81 , 

NSIX " An peak: 5 

Nha Trang Air BiIM': 7. 45 

Nkhol~on, Uanenam CololM'1 Tom M .: 

14. 18.25.27-29 

Nmh Hoa: 7 

NIXon, Rkhard M.: 60 

NOrlon. Major General John: 45 

Nui Sa Dcn: ~-'2. 58, 10. 57 

Nui 8., Ra; 51-58 

o Rang (Cambodia): 58 

Office of Personnel C'r~lio : 8S 

Okinawa: 21. 24 

1'''''1. Kn 'EII.[ )V operation: 45 

PaullOn, Brigadier C('~I Bob: 41 

Phan Rang: 7 

Ph:Ul Thitl: 7 

Ph'OIograph)': 55 

Ph" Sa;; 7 

Phu eat: 7 

Phlloc Vi nh: 39, 57-58 

Plain of Rtcds; 32 

Pleiku; 12, 101 

Pleiku Air Base: ~5 

Plti ku Province: <IS 

Prt$lon, Captain Wilrnrr i..; 12 

!>roittl 80 r00r8".mi~t on ; 87, 97 

Projl'Cl Transilion: 90 

ul~ cotk modu latrd (PCM) t'qUlJxnmt: 

9S-96 

Quang Ngai: 7 

Quang Tri: 7 

Qui Nhon: 7 

Quon LQi: S6-S7 

Radio ntt5 and rela~ sySttlflS; 5, 7,12- 1$, 

16-17,2<1, 28-!1. !!, !7-<l1. SO, 54-S8, 

62,16, 102 

Radio wire imegration (RWI) I~$tem ; 40-

<12, 101 

Radios, Su (llso Equipmem, cornmuni(3' 

lions (by dl"signa/ion), 

fM: 24-2S, 28-31, <1O, <12. <IS, SO, ~2. 54-S7, 

62,9'J-IOI 

Hf: !3, SO, 52, 82, 99 

lTluhkhannel: 28. 32. 58--10, SI-S2, 

-SS, S7, 82, 101 

singlt' sidtband: 21. S2, 99 

UH f : 24 

VH f ; 50, 5" 58. '17. SO, ~4-S~, 57-S8 

Rt!'C'dtt, Ul'Utcnalll CoI()l'l('I John H.: 19 

RnOIl.C:EIl t"'treist: 23 

Repair pam: 14-1"'.21. 77-78. 92-93 

Rel)ublic of Vil'1nam Army 

I Corps; ~S 

II COIP!: 12. 13 

III Corps: 12, 30 

IV Corps; 12 

Sth Di"i~ion ; 66. 73 

Airborne Dj.,·ision; S8 

3d Airborne Bdg<lck-: !is 

communir.lliom suppOrt of: 3. II. 16. 

61-63 

Special Forcn: 16. 50 

"jllag:t tkftnso:- for("o : 9-10 

Richardson. Major GerlC.'tal Wale tt S.; 

93-91 

Ring. Colonel Kenneth G .: 16,69 

River Au.tuh "'Iotl ll:l Onl'. U.S. Na"~: 49-

Rh'e" rine Bdgade: S1 

Ri\·trine openuions: 19-54, 99 

Rod,wtJl, Litull'"nam Colonel J ames M .: 

41-42 

Rog{'rs. LieUltnalll Colonel William R,; S9 

Roraback. Sergeant finl Clau KenrlC.'lh M,: , 

Rowny. Brigildltf Gcntral Edward 1..: 11 

Rubio, Captain t:uripidn, Jr. : 44 

Saigon; 5, S, 7, 18. 21-2S, 5!. n 42. SS, 62-

63. 100-101. 102 

Salell ite Icrmina\s: 99 

Schofield s"nacks; 20 

Sehweilter. Colonel T hrodore F.: 94-9S 

Seaman, MajOI General Jo nalhan 0.: 36 

S«urily, $;lfeguarding: 24, 15. S7, S9, 62, 

61-67,68-72. 79, 9S. 99-100 

Sh:.cklttOfl. Major Ron: 10 

Shehns (tquipmelll); 31-32. 31. 38-39, 17 

Shonnaktr. Brigadin- Gelll'r.ll Rober!: S6 

SHOt!OlA,",U oper-ll ion: S6-S8 

Signa] oollaJions 

Slh: 22 

9th ; .sD-SI 

131h: 17-]8. 2S, 27. 29, !I7-S9 

!l6lh: S7, 60 

59th: 7. 9-]0,16.63 

11sI: 16 

69th: 18, 20, 27. 37-38, 11 

121s1: 28. 30, 32. 37-39 

1251h: 21. 2 .... 27. 3 ]-'2. S9. 69 

5oQ1s1: 18 

Si lth: ]8 

Signa] Brigade. l SI : 27-28, 59, 4S, S2, 60-6]. 

6'.93-9'1. 100, 102 

Signal com pan in 

252d: 10 
INDlX 

Slgn;.1 (ompani .... -(;ominlwd 

298.h: 22 

312d R:K1 io Relay: 70 

~::. .h Suppon: 37-~9. ::'7 

'iigna l C.orps pl"rsonnel:::'. 9-11.18. :'101. '10. 

'15.90,93. Su also TT;.ining. 

Signal dcwdllllCrIlS 

69th (Al'ionirs): 10 

70th (,,,"ionirs): 10 

72d (pm"isioll:,I): 10 

25:..h A~ionif!; ): 10 

2561h (,\I'ionif!;): 10 

257.h (,\\'ionics): 10 

258. h (Avionics): 10 

5jgn~1 Cmup. 2d: 16.33 

Signal operation irmruclions: 22. 57 

Sig nal School : 87. 89. 92. 9·\-95 

Signa l Training C.('Illl"r: 87. 93-94 

Signal Training Command: 87 

SII.I·tR B,\\'o:.a:r ope1ation: 29 

SO<" Trang: 27 

Song Be: 3 1 

Souch Chim. Sea: 7 

So,nhl"3S1 Asia Signal School: 91 

SoutheaSIl"rn Signal School: 90. y~. 96 

Sianding oper;u illg procedurt': 33 

SIC\'l"n. Chid Warr,l1l, OHiO'r j ;'111<'55 .. jr.: 

." Swilchboards: 33-31. 38-'11. 5 1-52. 5'\. 57. 

99. 101 

Tables of organi1A11 ion and t'CluiPnll"nI: 21. 

23.31-32.39.46.92 

TaoLcdl air SUPP0 rl : N. 61-62. 100-101 

Tolll Son Nhuc l\ iT Base: 45. 69 

Tay Ninh Pro,·juce: 4') 

Tdt'phQnt' s.:rl'ic(' Jnd equipml"nt : 3. 7. 10, 

35.4 1.54-55.62.79 

Telelypt ..... ·ritl·r W'n'ice ,II1d nlllipmt'lll : 3. 

25, 33, oJ7. 52. 73, 78. 82 

Tenain: 3. 5. 2~-2 1. 29-30. 51-55. 58. 62. 99, 

101 

T t'rry, Brig;.dit-r (;t"ner:.1 Robert: 27-28 

Thailand: 62 

TllAnR II opcT;mo n: 45 

TOI'o'cr$: 31. 39. 'II. '19-51. 55. 57. 101 

Tt;.ining 

109 

in comb; .. tlwat('r: 21-22. 46. 73. 81. 83, 

92-94 

prl'(kplo),mt'rII: 17-20.2'1. 87-91. 93-98 

I~hniriam \ 1X'cialis.s: 89. 91-96 

tr;.ining li'l·t:I[ III<·: 77. 97 

Tr" lIb.l.icuICnanl G CIll'T;.1 ))", itl W.: 88 

Trung Lap: 73 

Til)' 1I0a: 7 

llui1l.'d Sr:IIt'S I\ rmy 

IH)OIHkplo) 1III'nl: 7, 1 f>..21. 23-25, 27. 37 

I'o'irhlir.l l'o'al opcr,l[ ion\: 60-63. 70 

llt.ilt·d 5,:"t', l\ nllY. Vierrl:.m: 16. 22. 25. 

27-28.52. "". 69. 71. 92-93.100 

lIn itl'd 5c:ut'S Arm)' SIIPlxlIr C.ornm;ond. 

Vit'tnam: 12- 13 

llnit('tl Slitit', Almy Slippon CIOUP, Vici' 

nam: 10 

t !nitoo 5",11'5 ,\"'rin e C.orps 

[II .... hlri nt' Amphibious Forcl': '15-'16. 100 

3d ,\\;or;nl' Division: 17.21-22 

l1n ill'(l Sraws Navy: '1 9-50 

[ Iniled Slal('!i 0pt'l"adnns Mission: 10 

lIni,'"c L\ lodcJ 100,,: 86 

(1.5. Slrik(' C.omm:ond: 23. 'II 

V,ml r.o D()ng Ri" cr: 5 

Van J.brlingen. Hrig:odicr Cl'rlt'ral 

WilJi,1I11 M.: 93-95 

ViI.'I Cong: 3.10-11.43.65-67.72. 100 

War 7.0111' C: H. '16. 56 

W(':.eherman. O .p.a in j ames A. : 12 

\\'e)'aml. MajO! GI'Ilt'ral Frederick C.: 47 

Wiggi ns. C.apr:.in Roben A.: 10 

Willianuon. M,.jor G('ncT:.I Ellis W.: 2" 

WrOlen. Major Cedi L: 12 

Xlian Lo(: 69 

:""10 ,1.:b