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US-VISIT—A DOWN PAYMENT

ON HOMELAND SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, 

BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 18, 2004

Serial No. 77

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California

PHILIP G. KIKO, Chief of Staff-General Counsel 

PERRY H. APELBAUM, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana, Chairman

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan

GEORGE FISHMAN, Chief Counsel 

ART ARTHUR, Full Committee Counsel 

LUKE BELLOCCHI, Counsel 

CINDY BLACKSTON, Professional Staff 

NOLAN RAPPAPORT, Minority Counsel 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 18, 2004

OPENING STATEMENT 

Page 

The Honorable John N. Hostettler, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border 

Security, and Claims ............................................................................................ 1

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 2

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 3

The Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Iowa ................................................................................................................... 3

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims ..................................................................................... 31

WITNESSES 

Mr. Robert M. Jacksta, Executive Director, Border Security and Facilitation, 

Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Mr. Robert A. Mocny, Deputy Director, US-VISIT Office, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 8

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10

Mr. Alfonso Martinez-Fonts, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary for the 

Private Sector, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 17

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18

Mr. Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and 

Systems Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 20

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative 

in Congress From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims ................................................... 49

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress From the State of Iowa .............................................................................. 50

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Linda Sa ́nchez, a Representative in 

Congress From the State of California ............................................................... 50

Prepared Statement submitted by the Travel Business Roundtable .................. 52

Prepared Statement submitted by the Travel Industry Association of America 55

Prepared Statement by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce ..................................... 57

(1)

US-VISIT—A DOWN PAYMENT

ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 

Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John N. 

Hostettler (Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

Today, the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and 

Claims will examine the Department of Homeland Security’s new 

capabilities in the entry inspection of foreign travelers into the U.S. 

under the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator 

Technology—or US-VISIT—program and review its progress in 

meeting its statutory deadlines. The Subcommittee will also examine how US-VISIT has worked to prevent and deter alien criminals, 

terrorists, and immigration law violators from entering the United 

States while avoiding delays for legitimate travelers. 

With the recent terrorist bombings in Spain only a week ago, I 

am reminded of the horrible tragedy of 9/11 in our own country. 

Preventing and deterring terrorism in the U.S. lies at the very 

heart of why we have instituted the US-VISIT program and why 

we need to continue strengthening and improving it. 

Just as the terrorists arrested for the Madrid bombings are not 

natives of Spain, it is often noted that all of the 9/11 hijackers were 

temporary visitors who came to this country with visas. 

When DHS met its statutory deadlines to improve the process 

this past December, US-VISIT fused information from airline passenger manifests, criminal records, State Department visa records, 

and immigration data systems so that guests entering our country 

are screened in both a more effective and efficient way. 

US-VISIT has already proven its effectiveness in capturing numerous criminal aliens attempting to reenter the U.S. In January, 

US-VISIT detected a convicted Peruvian cocaine trafficker who has 

been at large since 1984 after escaping from prison. An El Salvadoran with an outstanding arrest warrant for a DUI hit-and-run 

homicide conviction was also caught by US-VISIT, even though he 

had previously used a false identity to successfully reenter the U.S. 

These examples also demonstrate the efficiencies gained from the 

newly integrated watchlist systems. Now foreign travelers are 

questioned at the ports of entry while scanning their fingerprints 
2

and having their photos taken in the same place that they were 

screened before. 

Through improved systems techniques, multiple databases are 

checked in a few seconds, including the IDENT fingerprint records. 

Inspectors are able to screen applicants for entry in a thorough 

manner without a discernable increase in waiting times. 

This is of significant benefit to private sector trade and tourism 

because efficient handling of people and cargo at our borders is 

very important to trade and tourism. While some foretold of extensive waiting lines, chaotic inspections, and unprecedented invasions 

of privacy, none have come to pass. 

What have the American people gained with multi-million-dollar 

investment, one might ask? Return to the bombing in Madrid and 

think of how this tragedy will damage Spain’s tourist industry and 

potentially its entire economy as a whole, just as the U.S. is still 

recovering from the economic damage of 9/11. As Spain has no 

equivalent to US-VISIT, how will the Spanish Government reassure those people who might be considering a vacation in Spain 

this summer? 

To use a private sector term, one might say US-VISIT is a ‘‘down 

payment’’ on building a secure border—one that deters or prevents 

terrorist attacks on the U.S. and at the same time assists the apprehension of criminals and immigration violators. These are significant benefits for a substantially small investment. 

The first stage of implementing this long-awaited entry-exit system was put into effect at the beginning of this year. Although 

there was a law enacted in 1996 that required the development of 

an entry-exit alien screening system, no executive agency made 

discernable progress on this mandate until the Department of 

Homeland Security, or DHS, took charge. The September 11th attacks and the hard deadline set by the Data Management Improvement Act, authored by my colleague Mr. Lamar Smith, also provided impetus for DHS to finally make US-VISIT a reality. 

Our guests here today include some of the DHS architects of USVISIT. Gentlemen, I must commend you on completing the first 

stage of this gargantuan task of putting the US-VISIT system together on time and within the 1 year the Department of Homeland 

Security has actually been in existence. Your incredible accomplishment provides inspiration for the employees of your new agency, 

and I invite you to present your views on the effectiveness, efficiencies, and private sector benefits of US-VISIT. 

At this time, I would like to recognize the gentleman from Texas 

for an opening statement. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll be brief. 

First of all, thank you for the mention. I do have a personal interest in this subject, and it really coincides with, once again, an 

opportunity to thank you for taking the initiative, as you have so 

often, on holding a hearing on such important issues as this one. 

I also want to acknowledge a long-time friend from San Antonio, 

Al Martinez-Fonts, who is a witness today. And having said that, 

I also have to apologize in advance. I have a markup with the 

Homeland Security Committee that I have to go to right now, so 

I will not be able to stay. But I just wanted to recognize Al, and 

thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll yield back. 
3

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for an opening statement. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our Ranking 

Member is introducing a witness at another hearing and couldn’t 

be here, so I would like to use that time because I have a hearing 

that I have to go to soon after 10:30. I was hoping either of the two 

Administration witnesses in the course of their opening statement 

could address one particular—the interconnection between USVISIT, a program which I think is a smart, sensible program to 

help us keep track of who is coming to this country, when they 

leave, what their status is while they’re—and where they are while 

they’re here, and NSEERS program, which I have some concern—

I have a number of concerns about. And let me just mention, there 

was confusion about whether NSEERS continues to exist and its 

interrelationship with US-VISIT. 

When Secretary Ridge announced the US-VISIT system, it was 

widely reported that it was replacing NSEERS entirely. Three 

months later, last December, it was widely reported that Department of Homeland Security had brought NSEERS to an end. Later, 

it was clarified that the death of the program had been prematurely reported, that it was the only—it was only the re-registration requirements that had been changed and not eliminated. 

The DHS question and answer release on US-VISIT clearly 

states that NSEERS will be subsumed entirely by US-VISIT in the 

future. Can you elaborate on this? What’s the timeline for the 

elimination of NSEERS? How does it tie into US-VISIT implementation? And will this apply to all aspects of NSEERS? In other 

words, and in conclusion, will we see parity in treatment at points 

of entry, no difference based upon nationality, and will the re-registration requirements disappear completely or become a part of 

US-VISIT? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate to the extent you 

could address any of that in your opening comments, only because 

my fear is that at 10:30 I won’t be around. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Iowa, Mr. King, for an opening statement. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will keep it brief. But 

I appreciate you holding this hearing today, and I’m happy to be 

here and looking forward to the testimony of the witnesses. I was 

concerned when Homeland Security announced that most Mexicans 

who currently hold a border crossing card will now be processed 

through US-VISIT, and I believe that they should be. Under current law, those who hold a border crossing card as a border crossing card can only travel for up to 3 days in a border zone. But how 

do we know whether these cardholders are complying with these 

restrictions? 

In addition, we don’t know whether any person is posing as a 

cardholder if fingerprints are not verified at each crossing. So currently DHS inspectors only check a border crossing cardholder’s 

picture by sight. 

So I look forward to the day when US-VISIT will ensure that no 

border crossing cardholder stays illegally in the country for over 
4

the allotted 72 hours, and I’m encouraged by the progress in implementing US-VISIT. 

Thank you. I look forward to the testimony. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now will introduce the panel before us. In 2002, the 

Commissioner of Customs designated Robert M. Jacksta as the Executive Director of Border Security and Facilitation, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection. Mr. Jacksta directs the day-to-day activities 

of Border Security and Facilitation at the ports of entry. Mr. 

Jacksta first joined the Customs Service at New York’s John F. 

Kennedy Airport in 1973 while attending college. During his long 

career, he has worked in the capacity of patrol officer, inspector, 

and senior inspector. Mr. Jacksta took an active role in the field, 

including work on national task forces and supervisory assignments, before transferring to Customs in Washington, D.C., in 

1991. Mr. Jacksta has also served as port director of Washington, 

D.C., based at Dulles Airport, and director of passenger programs. 

The Commissioner recognized Mr. Jacksta in 1995 by awarding 

him the Customs Service’s ‘‘Customer Service Award.’’ And in December 1999, he received the Commissioner Outstanding Performance Award. Mr. Jacksta received a bachelor of science degree from 

Buffalo State College in New York in 1976, where he majored in 

criminal justice. 

Mr. Robert Mocny is currently the Deputy Director of US-VISIT 

within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. He 

started his career in 1989 with the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service as an inspector at the port of entry in San Francisco, California. There he developed a series of automated management programs, later adopted by the INS for nationwide use. Mr. Mocny 

was also a special operations inspector, providing training in the 

detection of fraudulent documents. At INS headquarters in Washington, D.C., he established the Secure Electronic Network for 

Travelers’ Rapid Inspection, or SENTRI, program, the world’s first 

electronic border control program that expedites the entry of lowrisk border crossers at the southern border. Mr. Mocny received his 

bachelor degree from the University of California at Santa Barbara. 

Alfonso Martinez-Fonts, Jr., is the Special Assistant to the Secretary for the Private Sector at the Department of Homeland Security. His duties include providing America’s private sector with an 

avenue of dialogue with the Department. He has previously served 

in the private sector as chairman and chief executive officer of JP 

Morgan Chase Bank in El Paso, Texas, and president of the bank 

in San Antonio. Mr. Martinez-Fonts has also served on many 

boards, including the Greater El Paso Chamber Foundation, the 

Fannie Mae Advisory Board, and the American Bankers Association Communications Council. He received his undergraduate degree in political science from Villanova University in 1971 and his 

MBA in finance from Long Island University in 1974. 

Mr. Randolph Hite is the Director of Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues at the General Accounting Office, or 

GAO. During his 25-year career with GAO, he has directed reviews 

of major Federal investments in information technology, such as 

the IRS’ tax systems modernization—which must have been a Her-
5

culean task itself—FAA’s air traffic control modernization, the National Weather Service’s weather systems modernization, Customs’

import processing modernization, and DOD’s business systems 

modernization. Mr. Hite has a business degree from James Madison University and has completed graduate work at George Washington University, Carnegie Mellon University, Harvard University, and Syracuse University. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today. Before I 

begin, I would like to also recognize, if not embarrass, a former employee of this Subcommittee, Lora Ries, who has returned. We very 

much appreciate her work on this Subcommittee over the years and 

know she is doing a great job for the Department. So it’s good to 

have Lora here as well. 

Mr. Jacksta, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

BORDER SECURITY AND FACILITATION, OFFICE OF FIELD 

OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. JACKSTA. Good morning, Chairman Hostettler, Members of 

the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

I am Robert Jacksta, Executive Director of Border Security and Facilitation, Office of Field Operations within U.S. Customs and Border and Protection. I would like to discuss today the efforts of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection to secure our borders against terrorism and other criminal threats and how CBP has incorporated 

US-VISIT as a tool in this process. 

Prior to full integration into the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs historically shared the responsibility of protecting our borders with multiple agencies, our closest partner in 

this endeavor being the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 

Since March 1, 2003, the border inspection functions of the agency, 

along with the Agricultural Quarantine Inspections, have been 

merged into one border control agency. Through CBP, all people 

and goods entering the United States must legally enter through 

one of our over 300 land, air, and seaports of entry. In fiscal year 

2003, more than 400 million travelers passed these ports into the 

United States. 

CBP is committed to programs aimed at efficiently and reliably 

identifying compliant travelers while ensuring that all travelers 

are screened. The US-VISIT program has integrated well into the 

CBP’s existing programs to accomplish this mission. CBP has been 

a full working partner with the US-VISIT Program Office, and we 

continue to work with the Department of Homeland Security on 

this important issue. 

We have also been working with the Department of State, the 

Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies and have made 

great strides in improving overall border management. We do this 

through the collection of pre-arrival, arrival, and departure information on international travelers. To this end, CBP has been able 

to integrate US-VISIT with other CBP processes to increase the effectiveness of border management which includes biometric and biographical checks against law enforcement databases. 
6

In the fall of last year, in anticipation of US-VISIT implementation, 2,100 new work stations and document readers were deployed 

to each of the 115 airports and 14 seaports where US-VISIT is in 

place. In the fall of 2003, CBP trained over 4,700 CBP officers in 

the use of US-VISIT and the process and implementation changes 

needed to make this an effective program. 

Since the initiation of US-VISIT on January 5, 2004, CBP has 

processed over 2 million travelers through US-VISIT, with no interruption in the facilitation of legitimate travelers into the United 

States. The US-VISIT process of capturing biometrics, two 

fingerscans, and a digital photo takes less than 15 seconds. The 

Automated Biometric Identification System that stores this data, 

called IDENT, takes only seconds to capture the person’s information. Overall processing of those travelers has not significantly impacted flight processing. On the average, most flights are processed 

in less than 45 minutes. 

There have been over 195 verified lookout matches since January 

5, 2004. Those matches have enabled CBP to intercept rapists, 

drug traffickers, perpetrators of credit card fraud, and convicted 

armed robbers. Others who had been previously deported or denied 

entry and attempted to reenter using another alias have been 

intercepted and prevented from entering the country. 

One of CBP’s important tools is the Advance Passenger Information System which allows the traveler’s biographical data to be collected and vetted through law enforcement databases prior to their 

arrival. The biometrics collected upon arrival through US-VISIT allows CBP to verify the identity of the individual for whom the 

APIS data was transmitted. We have also established a National 

Targeting Center to use this information to generate advance queries and identify actionable targets. We have also provided important training to our officers, including anti-terrorism training, 

interviewing techniques, and document fraud training. 

With CBP’s officer intuition, integration of advance technology, 

and multi-agency coordination, we have enhanced the security and 

safety of all citizens, residents, and visitors. 

As we move forward toward the expansion of US-VISIT initiatives to the land border, CBP will continue to leverage our existing 

programs, such as our National Targeting Center, dedicated commuter lanes, license plate reader program, free and secure trade, 

and biometric verification system to assist in meeting the Department of Homeland Security mandates. 

In summary, the US-VISIT process at airports and seaports has 

demonstrated its capability to enhance the security of our citizens 

and visitors, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, and ensure the 

integrity of the immigration service, at the same time protecting 

the personal privacy of our visitors. In just the first 2 months, the 

first release of US-VISIT has improved the security of our citizens 

and visitors. CBP officers are actually excited about having this 

new tool in their arsenal. 

Thank you again, Chairman Hostettler and Members of the Subcommittee. I would also like to invite you and your staff out to Dulles Airport so we can give you a live demonstration of an operational environment and how US-VISIT is used on a daily basis. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jacksta follows:]
7

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT JACKSTA

Chairman Hostettler and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. I am Robert Jacksta, Executive Director for Border Security and 

Facilitation, Office of Field Operations. I would like to discuss the efforts of the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to secure our borders against terrorism and 

other criminal threats and how CBP has incorporated US-VISIT as a tool in this 

process. 

Prior to integration into the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Customs 

Service historically shared the responsibility of protecting our borders with multiple 

agencies, our closest partner in this endeavor being the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Since March 1, 2003, the border enforcement functions of 

the INS and Customs, along with the Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural 

Quarantine Inspections have been merged into one border control agency, CBP. 

Through CBP, all people and goods entering the United States through one of over 

300 land, air, or seaports of entry into the U.S. from foreign countries are subject 

to inspection. In fiscal year 2003, more than 400 million people passed through 

these ports into the United States. 

CBP is committed to programs aimed at efficiently and reliably identifying compliant travelers while ensuring that all travelers are screened appropriately. The USVISIT program has integrated well into CBP’s existing programs to accomplish this 

goal. CBP has been a full working partner with the US-VISIT Program Office within the Department of Homeland Security, and has committed to implement each 

phase of the US-VISIT mandate. 

We have also been working with the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and other federal agencies and have made great strides in improving overall 

border management through the collection of pre-arrival, arrival, and departure information on international travelers. To this end, CBP has been able to integrate 

US-VISIT with other CBP processes to increase the effectiveness of border management which includes biometric and biographical checks against law enforcement 

databases. 

In the fall of last year, in anticipation of US-VISIT implementation, 2,100 new 

workstations and document readers were deployed to each of the 115 airports and 

14 seaports where US-VISIT is now in place. CBP has trained 4,700 Officers in the 

US-VISIT process and implemented changes to include US-VISIT as part of the initial CBP Officers training at the academy in Glynco, Georgia. 

Since the initiation of US-VISIT on January 5, 2004, CBP has processed over 2 

million travelers through US-VISIT, with no interruption in the facilitation of legitimate travelers into the United States. There have been 195 verified lookout matches 

with the use of US-VISIT. Those matches have enabled CBP to intercept rapists, 

drug traffickers, perpetrators of credit card fraud, and convicted armed robbers. 

Others who had been previously deported or denied entry and attempted to reenter 

using another alias have been intercepted and prevented from entering the country. 

One of CBP’s important tools is the Advance Passenger Information System 

(APIS) which allows the traveler’s biographical data to be collected and vetted 

through law enforcement databases prior to their arrival. The biometrics collected 

upon arrival through the US-VISIT process allows CBP to verify the identity of the 

individual for whom the APIS data was submitted and identify those who may be 

utilizing multiple identities or false documents. We have also provided important 

training to our Officers including Anti-Terrorism training, interviewing techniques 

and document fraud. 

With the integration of advance technology, multi-agency coordination, and front 

line CBP Officer intuition, we have enhanced the security and safety of citizens, 

residents and visitors. 

CBP’s integration of US-VISIT at ports of entry has not come at the expense of 

legitimate travel. The US-VISIT process of capturing biometrics, two fingerscans 

and a digital photo, takes less then 15 seconds. The Automated Biometric Identification System that stores this data, called IDENT, takes only seconds to capture the 

person’s information. Overall processing of those travelers subject to US-VISIT has 

not significantly impacted flight processing. On the average, most flights are processed in less than 45 minutes; which is about the same time it took before we implemented US-VISIT. 

As we assist US-VISIT in meeting the next phase of mandates in the initiative, 

CBP will continue to leverage our existing programs, including Dedicated Commuter 

Lanes such as NEXUS and SENTRI, License Plate Reader programs, Free and Secure Trade and the Biometrics Verification System. 

In summary, the US-VISIT process at airports and seaports has demonstrated its 

capability to enhance the security of our citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate 
8

travel and trade, ensure the integrity of the immigration system and safeguard the 

personal information of visitors from theft or misuse. In just the first two months, 

the first release of US-VISIT has improved the security of our citizens and visitors. 

CBP Officers have said that the new tools we have put in place truly help them 

do their job more effectively. 

Thank you again, Chairman Hostettler and members of the Sub-Committee, for 

giving U.S. Customs and Border Protection this opportunity to testify. I would be 

happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Jacksta, and I look forward to 

that visit. 

Mr. Mocny, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MOCNY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, USVISIT OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MOCNY. Thank you, Chairman Hostettler. Before I begin, 

could you afford me some additional time to answer Mr. Berman’s 

questions, or do you want me to go through my opening statement 

first? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Without objection. He will be leaving in a short 

time. That would be very helpful. 

Mr. MOCNY. As you mentioned, the 30-day and 1-year provisions 

of NSEERS have been discontinued. By regulation, we stopped that 

as of December of last year. The registration at the ports of entry 

will continue for a period of time. That will continue until we can 

kind of meld into or develop into the US-VISIT program the additional questions that we would need to ask of any individual who 

might pose a particular threat. As you know, the five states that 

sponsor terrorism are some of the individuals who are a part of 

that extra questioning. The other countries are based on actual intelligence, and without getting into the exact criteria, those individuals are asked to provide additional information. 

We have always had that ability to ask additional questions of 

any individual who either poses a threat or, for whatever reason, 

cannot quite answer all the questions on the primary, so we ask 

those individuals to go back into a secondary area where we can 

spend additional time without holding up the traffic there. 

We will bring into US-VISIT the additional scrutiny that would 

apply to these individuals. I can’t give you a specific time. I think 

we’ve been on the record to talk about an award in May that we 

would give to the private sector who look at the long-term vision 

of US-VISIT and where we can fit into the current questioning 

process and the current processing of US-VISIT individuals how we 

might bring in a secondary piece of that. So it is true that the current process will continue as it has continued at the ports of entry. 

These people, of course, do not have to show up for a 30-day reinterview. They do not have to show up for a 1-year interview. And 

there is no more domestic registration. That was ended as well. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Mocny for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. MOCNY. Thank you, Chairman Hostettler and other distinguished Members. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s US-VISIT program. 

You have just heard from my colleague, Bob Jacksta, on the positive impacts this program has already had on the safety and security of the United States. In the next few minutes, I would like to 
9

share with you a glimpse of our vision and how we will achieve our 

goals of enhancing national security, facilitating the entry of legitimate trade and travel, ensuring the integrity of our immigration 

system, and protecting the privacy of our visitors. 

Before I do that, let me first thank this Committee for its leadership in establishing the statutory framework for US-VISIT. I would 

like to express my appreciation to Congressman Lamar Smith, as 

you did, for his vision of an entry and exit system and all the others who provided the discipline and focus that has resulted in the 

first successful increment of US-VISIT. I was in front of this Committee in 1998 testifying how technology could assist us in our 

entry and exit system. Today, we can all claim some victory, perhaps later than many of us would have liked, but victory nonetheless as we have begun to address the critical issues of illegal immigration and the safety and security of our Nation. 

The Department of Homeland Security has a vision for a virtual 

border. This vision involves not only our Department but also the 

Departments of State, Justice, Transportation, Commerce, and others. It depends on the active participation of the countries in the 

visa waiver program. Indeed, it involves the entire international 

community. 

In this vision, we see a decision-making process that begins far 

from the physical boundaries that define our sovereign national 

territory and long before any foreign national arrives at a port of 

entry. Border security will not occur at a defined point on a map, 

but through millions of lines of code in a computer system and millions of human decisions a day. 

Unfortunately, today many of these decisions are made without 

full information. Over the decades, we have amassed a great deal 

of information on foreign nationals, but that data is in separate 

databases in stove-piped systems and spread across the Federal 

Government. US-VISIT seeks to take account of that data, integrate where appropriate, and retire systems where appropriate, 

and create new business processes and use the latest technology to 

reform the entire system. This modernization effort will require the 

collective will and resources of many of the departments, agencies, 

and bureaus I mentioned earlier. We need to assimilate the right 

information and provide that information to the decision makers 

who grant visas, grant admission to the United States, grant benefits, and decide who to detain or release. 

This means that consular officials from the Department of State 

will have up-to-date information generated by the Department of 

Homeland Security, and the Department of State will establish 

identities through the use of biometrics and provide these biometrics and other visa information to the Department of Homeland 

Security. This will help us decide whom to move quickly through 

the clearance process and with whom to spend more time. 

If our mission is to reform our borders, we must build into the 

program the right enforcement mechanisms. By virtue of our name, 

US-VISIT, we want to remain a welcoming country. But we must 

also stand ready to remove those few individuals who violate the 

terms of their visa. US-VISIT will supply information to the Compliance Enforcement Unit of Immigration and Customs Enforcement so that through online searches of addresses supplied by the 
10

visitor and other contact information we have collected, agents will 

be able to locate and remove non-compliant visitors. 

The numbers are daunting. With over 400 million inspections 

each year, billions of dollars in trade, dependencies on tourism, and 

millions of foreign students attending our schools, the Federal Government cannot do this alone. So US-VISIT has reached out to the 

private sector. The transportation industry, port authorities, technology companies, and others will play a critical role in this new 

vision. You will hear shortly from Mr. Al Martinez-Fonts who will 

describe how US-VISIT engaged with the private industry. 

And speaking with the latest technology, our solution for the 

land border is dependent on it. As of December 31, 2004, foreign 

nationals requiring a visa arriving at one of the 50 busiest land 

ports of entry will have their two index fingers scanned and have 

a digital photograph taken. That’s the easy part. But for the millions of border crossing cardholders and other foreign nationals 

who may not require a visa and cross daily, we need a mechanism 

to efficiently capture their data. We need to digitize our borders. 

We will do this by building upon the successful SENTRI and 

NEXUS programs that use radio frequency technology. This technology has been tested, it is mature, and it is the solution that will 

enable us to secure our borders while we expedite the flow of legitimate trade and travel that we depend on for a strong economy. 

Since we last talked about this subject, as one would expect, technology has evolved, and within a relatively short period of time, we 

believe that we can combine radio frequency technology with biometrics so that individuals can be positively identified when they 

enter the United States and when they exit. We now have the opportunity and the will to make this a reality. 

US-VISIT is only getting started. We have a long way to go, but 

along that way we will be able to demonstrably improve the security of the Nation without harming our economy. The U.S. is a welcoming country. But we, as stewards of immigration, must continue 

to enhance our ability to protect the Nation and ensure the integrity of the immigration process. We believe that US-VISIT is a 

major step in reforming our borders. It is also the responsible thing 

to do. 

That’s the end of my testimony. I believe we now have a video, 

if we can, to show the US-VISIT process. These series of shots were 

taken at Atlanta’s Hartfield Jackson Airport. It is about 2 minutes 

long, Mr. Chairman. The volume might be a little bit low, so if we 

could have it as quiet in here as possible, that would be very helpful. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mocny follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT MOCNY

Chairman Hostettler, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and other distinguished 

Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Department of 

Homeland Security’s US-VISIT program and how this fits in with our commitment 

to protect the homeland. 

US-VISIT represents yet another major milestone in enhancing our nation’s security and our efforts to reform our borders. It is a major step towards bringing integrity back to our immigration and border enforcement systems. 

US-VISIT is a continuum of security measures that begins before an individual 

enters the United States and continues through arrival and departure from the 
11

United States. It incorporates eligibility determinations made by both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State. 

Using biometrics such as digital, inkless fingerscans and digital photographs, 

DHS is able to determine whether the person applying for entry to the United 

States is the same person who was issued the visa by the Department of State. Additionally, the biometric and biographic data are checked against watch lists, improving the DHS’ ability to make admissibility decisions as well as the Department 

of State’s ability to make visa determinations. 

US-VISIT procedures are clear, simple, and fast for foreign nationals. 

DHS deployed US-VISIT on time, on budget, and has met the mandates established by Congress, as well as the challenge by the Secretary of Homeland Security 

to incorporate biometrics (fingerscans) into US-VISIT ahead of schedule. By January 

5, 2004, US-VISIT entry procedures were operational at 115 airports (covering 99% 

of air travelers who use nonimmigrant visas to enter the United States) and 14 seaports, and we began pilot testing biometric exit procedures at one airport and one 

seaport. As of yesterday more than 2 million foreign visitors have been processed 

under the US-VISIT entry procedures. 

Already US-VISIT has prevented over 195 people from entering the United 

States—91 were stopped at the overseas visa-issuing post and 60 were identified at 

the port of entry, all because of a biometric match. 

Our border management system impacts the security of our citizens and our visitors, affects billions of dollars in trade and travel and helps define relations with 

our international partners. There is a need to improve this system and bring it into 

the 21st century with a new integrated system of technological processes that will 

keep our country’s economic and national security strong. This 21st century technology will provide an important step toward achieving the President’s goal of secure U.S. borders. 

In just a few months, the first release of US-VISIT has improved the security of 

our citizens and visitors. It seems clear that visitors appreciate the effort we are 

making to deliver security while simultaneously facilitating the process for law-abiding, legitimate travelers. US-VISIT is an effective deterrent,[UB1] for its biometric 

capabilities convince many criminals that they will not be able to hide their true 

identity. 

We must continue to respect our visitors’ privacy, treat them fairly, and enable 

them to pass through inspection quickly so they can enjoy their visit in our country. 

As people attempt to enter our country, we must know who they are and whether 

they intend to do us harm, the ability of US-VISIT to rapidly screen applicants’ biometrics and biographic information through watch lists and databases means we 

can have security and control without impeding legitimate travelers, and we can 

also help protect our welcomed visitors by drastically reducing the possibility of 

identity theft. Moreover, as visitors leave the country, we must know that they have 

not overstayed the duration of their visa. 

But we are not finished. This is a complicated job that will take time to complete. 

In fact, US-VISIT is designed to be rolled out in increments to ensure that the foundation is strong and the building blocks are effective. With the deployment of the 

entry components at air and sea ports, we have made a strong beginning, and going 

into 2004, we are on track to meet the December 31, 2004 deadline to integrate USVISIT procedures at the 50 busiest land border ports of entry. 

We are seeing that we can accomplish what we set out to do: keep out terrorists, 

enhance the integrity of our immigration system, facilitate legitimate travel and 

trade and help protect the privacy and identity of our visitors. To ensure the continued success of this important program, we are working with the National Institute 

of Science and Technology (NIST) and with the Departments of Justice, and State 

to enlarge our capability to identify criminals and terrorist prior to issuing a visa 

or granting entry to the U.S. 

MOVING TO A ‘‘VIRTUAL BORDER’’ SOLUTION

The vision of US-VISIT is to deploy an end-to-end border management program. 

This comprehensive view of border management leads to a virtual border. It elevates the requirement to develop the best processes to manage data on foreign nationals. It will provide an information-rich solution that better informs the border 

management decision makers and improves upon the information available to support the pre-entry, entry, status management, exit, and analysis processes. 

Much of the emphasis to date on the entry/exit system has focused specifically on 

the entry and exit processes at the ports of entry—thus the ‘‘port-centric’’ solution. 

One of the key initiatives of the US-VISIT Program is to adjust this focus to a ‘‘virtual border’’ solution, placing equal emphasis on the pre-entry, entry, status man-
12

agement, exit, and analysis processes associated with this Program. The virtual border will enhance national security by matching the identity of foreign nationals, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, and ensure the integrity of our immigration system by improving enforcement. DOS determines eligibility for a U.S. visa based on 

a review of all relevant information including information on criminal history and 

possible terrorism activity. 

THE ENTRY PROCESS WILL USE BIOMETRICS TO MATCH IDENTITY

Pre-Entry 

For millions of visitors, entry into the U.S. must be preceded by the issuance of 

travel documents at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad. The purpose of the preentry process is to determine eligibility for immigration status and/or visas at DOS 

consular offices worldwide or DHS immigration Service Centers. 

The pre-entry process is a critical component of the US-VISIT virtual border. The 

consular officers gather a large amount of information prior to a foreign national’s 

arrival at a port. This data will now be made available to appropriate border management agencies. In turn, the US-VISIT Program will provide additional information to the consular officer or Citizenship and Immigration Services adjudicators 

who are determining a foreign national’s eligibility, including a history of entries 

and exits, photographs, and fingerscans that can be used to search watch lists. 

Since the beginning of 2004, the pre-entry process includes analysis of the manifest supplied by the airlines for each international flight to determine the nonimmigrant visa holders on board the plane. This is done through the Advanced Passenger Information System or APIS. [UB2] This information is used by the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Officers to identify travelers of concern and pre-position information to support the inspectors at the port. 

Entry Process 

The purpose of the entry process is to determine the admissibility of foreign nationals requesting entry into the U.S. at air, land, or sea ports. The entry process 

can begin at a primary port inspection booth at an air, sea, or land ports, or at a 

temporary inspection location such as a ship lounge. Foreign nationals can also be 

inspected at certain pre-inspection locations overseas, such as Shannon Airport in 

Ireland. 

As part of the US-VISIT entry process, foreign nationals will be required to provide biometric data, biographic data, and/or other documentation, which provides for 

increased accuracy when making an entry/no exit decision.[UB3] This data is used 

to match identity, determine proper visa classification, and to query the watch list. 

Inspectors match identity of each foreign national collected by DOS, and determine 

the visitor’s admissibility. 

All ports share similarities in inspection processes and inspectors must quickly 

conduct a primary inspection and determine if the applicant should be recommended 

for a more in-depth review at the secondary inspection point. The average primary 

inspection for foreign nationals, lasts approximately one minute. 

Although all inspections involve certain basic tasks, there are marked differences 

between an inspection conducted at an air or sea port and one conducted at a land 

port because at a land port you have a very different physical environment. Land 

ports experience:

• A larger volume of inspections.

• Limited or non-existent advance access to data about approaching pedestrians, passengers, or commercial freight. Multiple modes of transportation, 

including commercial and private vehicles, buses, trains, and pedestrians. 

This commingling significantly increases the potential for traffic congestion

• A high volume of commercial freight traffic.

• Local commuters as a majority of persons arriving.

To expedite the flow of traffic at land ports, several technologies have been implemented in recent years that are listed below. With implementation of the virtual 

border, we will be able to match information on each foreign national when presented for inspection, and determine the risk of allowing entry.

• The Secure Electronic Network for Traveler’s Rapid Inspection (SENTRI or 

Dedicated Commuter Lane) program uses an electronic, radio frequency (RF)-

based technology to enable dedicated commuter lanes. This expedites the flow 

of low-risk, frequent border crossers through a port while maintaining the security of our borders. Users are pre-enrolled, and extensive background 

checks are conducted through a network of law enforcement databases. Each 
13

time a participant enters through the SENTRI lane, the system automatically 

accesses the database and displays all persons who are authorized to be in 

the vehicle. This system is vehicle-based rather than passenger-based and relies on transponders for RF transmission

• NEXUS (License Plate Reader) uses the same RF technology as SENTRI and 

includes a pre-enrollment process to screen applicants and then issues a proximity card that can be read as the car moves past the inspection station. The 

inspecting officer makes a positive visual identification of each participant 

based on the picture and personal information on screen. This system is individual passenger-based as opposed to being vehicle-based and uses proximity 

card technology for transmission of information.

For land borders, we are considering including expanded use of Radio Frequency 

(RF) technology to expedite processing of frequent border crossers using biographical 

data as a part of the virtual border solution. Also, we are currently looking at ways 

to use RF technology to facilitate travel and collect entry and exit data. To that end, 

we are planning to test RF technology at select primary entry and exit lanes of the 

50 busiest land border crossings. These plans are not part of the statutory mandate 

for December 31, 2004. Regardless, we will work to optimize the use of RF technology at our land ports of entry such that visitors can pass through the inspection 

point with minimal delay. 

STATUS MANAGEMENT INCLUDES IDENTIFYING OVERSTAYS

Managing the status of foreign nationals once inside the borders of the U.S. includes, but is not limited to:

• Monitoring the terms of their admission by matching the entry and exit 

records to determine if any foreign national has overstayed the terms of admission

• Identifying violations in terms of admission

• Referring watch list and visa compliance leads to agencies and organizations 

responsible for enforcement.

Maintaining the status of foreign nationals while in the United States is an integral part of border management and ensuring the integrity of the immigration system. One of the US-VISIT Program’s primary roles in status management will be 

the overstay calculation, and exchanging appropriate entry and exit information 

with case management systems, especially those managed by U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services. 

THE EXIT PROCESS WILL CAPTURE DEPARTURE INFORMATION

With the implementation of US-VISIT’s virtual border, the exit process at air and 

sea ports will require the visa holder to provide information to match against the 

information provided upon entry. One exit option currently being piloted captures 

two fingerscans, and transfers the data to IDENT to match the arrival and departure records. This information is also run against ADIS and IBIS. 

This one pilot process-consisting of automated kiosks—is being tested at Baltimore-Washington International Airport and at a Miami Seaport cruise line. USVISIT will test other departure confirmation alternatives and evaluate all of the options to develop the best exit solution. 

Implementation of an exit process at land borders has more complexities and has 

yet to be determined. 

With this virtual border, we will know who left the U.S. through a port of departure and who remains. 

THE ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION PROCESS WILL USE

US-VISIT INFORMATION TO EXTEND THE VIRTUAL BORDER

The purpose of the analysis of information process is to provide information that 

will aid border management in their decision-making process. Currently, the Arrival/Departure Information System (ADIS) system is the primary data source for 

use in these analyses. 

A visitors’ information is stored and routinely updated in the ADIS. Information 

compiled in ADIS will tell the officer if an individual has complied with the terms 

of his or her admission. ADIS illustrates a visitor’s travel history, information that 

the U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer can use to make admission determinations. If the history illustrates any immigration violations, the officer would 

give more scrutiny to the visitor. 
14

As the US-VISIT Program moves into the direction of the virtual border, this 

process will take on an ever-increasing level of importance. In migrating to the USVISIT virtual border solution, emphasis will be placed on providing an increased 

level of information to all border management personnel (e.g., the consular official, 

the inspector, the adjudicator, and the investigative officer) to aid them in making 

critical decisions. 

WE WILL SAFEGUARD THE PERSONAL PRIVACY OF OUR VISITORS

An obvious concern for all legitimate travelers is that criminals will use their lost 

or stolen travel documents to enter the United States. Biometric identifiers make 

it difficult for criminals to travel on someone else’s travel documents. This is a significant benefit that US-VISIT delivers for the millions of legitimate travelers we 

welcome each year. In addition, we must continue to respect our visitors’ privacy. 

Additionally, one of US-VISIT’s primary goals is to safeguard the personal information in a way that is responsible and respectful of privacy. US-VISIT will collect 

personal information of visitors in order to determine immigration admissibility. 

This information will be used for interactions with U.S. officials during the pre-arrival, arrival, stay and exit from the United States. 

We are complying with both the letter and the spirit of the Privacy Act of 1974 

and the E-Government Act of 2002. We are developing a comprehensive privacy program that ensures that we use personal information appropriately, that it is protected from misuse and improper disclosure, and destroyed when no longer needed. 

And, in spite of the fact that these laws do not require US-VISIT to have a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), because a PIA applies to U.S. citizens and lawful 

permanent residents versus non-immigrants, we have prepared one as we as we believe that all visitors’ information should be protected. The PIA is being reviewed 

by external audiences including several privacy advocacy groups. 

Additionally, we have developed a three-step redress process for visitors to have 

their records reviewed and amended or corrected to ensure accuracy, relevancy, 

timeliness, or completeness. 

This comprehensive privacy program is being spearheaded by DHS’s Chief Privacy 

Officer, Ms. O’Connor Kelly, to ensure that US-VISIT is in compliance with the appropriate privacy rules and regulations. Also, US-VISIT hired its own privacy officer 

to oversee its program. 

We have also done extensive outreach, meeting with numerous advocacy, privacy 

and immigration groups to solicit input and hear concerns, which have been taken 

into account in the development of the program. 

The US-VISIT PIA was hailed by many in the privacy community as an excellent 

model of transparency, including detailed information about the program, the technology and the privacy protections. 

US-VISIT’S VIRTUAL BORDER IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

US-VISIT is being implemented in increments, with the first on December 31 of 

last year. The other increments will be deployed over the coming years with the ultimate goal of having a robust system that can deliver all of the US-VISIT goals. The 

steps to this program include:

Increment 1 COMPLETED

• Collect and verify biometrics for foreign nationals arriving with nonimmigrant 

visas at air and seaports of entry by 12/31/03

• Check admissibility against watchlists using biographic and biometric data

• Establish exit pilots and complete testing by end of FY 2004 with implementation to occur in FY 2005.

Increment 2A—10/26/04:

• Issue U.S. biometric travel documents following International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) standards

• Deploy capability to read biometric travel documents in compliance with 

ICAO standards at air and sea ports of entry.

Increment 2B—12/31/04:

• Extend Increment 1 capability to 50 highest volume land ports

Increment 3—12/31/05:
15

• Extend Increment 2B to remaining land ports

Increment 4:

• Launch initial roll-out of US-VISIT envisioned program 

US-VISIT’S BUDGET

We deployed US-VISIT on budget and on schedule. During Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 

we used appropriated funds of $367 million to achieve successful deployment to 115 

airports and 14 seaports. Specifically we have:

• Implemented/interfaced systems to reduce redundancy and make more information available

• Upgraded our infrastructure to support added biometrics

• Deployed the US-VISIT program to 115 airports and 14 seaports on January 

5, 2004

• Initiated the exit pilot at one airport and one seaport

• Established the US-VISIT program office

During FY 2004, we have a total of $328 million plus an additional $10 million 

in no-year funds that we intend to use to continue meeting our goals. Currently, 

our FY 2004 Expenditure Plan is approved by the U.S. Senate and waiting approval 

from the U.S. House of Representatives, and when these funds are released we plan 

to:

• Analyze, field test, and initiate deployment of alternative approaches for 

verifying identity on exit at air and sea ports of entry

• Implement US-VISIT Increment 1 capabilities at the 50 busiest land border 

ports of entry by December 2004

• Install biometric readers at all air, sea, and land ports of entry

• Continue building our program management capabilities

In addition, we plan to award a contract to a prime contractor for further development of our end vision. This comprehensive approach to border management will 

lead to the creation of a virtual border and will set the course for improved processes for management of data on foreign visitors. 

THE SUCCESS STORIES OF US-VISIT

Since US-VISIT entry procedures were implemented, it has resulted in the interception of dozens of individuals who matched various law enforcement information. 

These included rapists, drug traffickers, credit card and visa fraud criminals, and 

a convicted armed robber. 

Here are details of a few examples. 

1) Interception of Drug Trafficker who escaped from Prison 

On January 14, 2004, at Miami International Airport, a man from Peru was 

traveling to the U.S. When he arrived at the CBP Officer’s booth for admittance, he was enrolled in US-VISIT. His fingerscans matched the ones already 

in a federal criminal database. This man was wanted by the U.S. Marshals for 

escaping from LaTuna Federal Correction Facility where he had been serving 

a sentence for a conviction of dealing cocaine. After his escape, an arrest warrant was issued. In May of 2003 he re-entered the U.S. without incident. Now, 

with the help of US-VISIT biometric processes, this man was caught and returned to federal prison on the warrant. US-VISIT prevented an escaped convict 

and drug trafficker from roaming the streets of Miami. 

2) Closing a Deportation Loop Hole 

On January 18, 2004, a man who has had four aliases tried to enter the U.S., 

even with a ‘‘failure to appear’’ warrant for him. DHS/ICE issued the warrant 

on August 8, 2003, and since then this man had entered the U.S. at least five 

times. Now, with the ability to match fingerscans with those in a criminal database, this man’s luck ran out. He was removed from the U.S. and put on the 

next flight back to Colombia. 

3) Passport Fraud Uncovered 

On January 14, 2004, a British West Indies Airways flight arrived at JFK 

International Airport in New York carrying a woman from Trinidad. Because 

US-VISIT begins at the visa-issuing post, a photo of the visitor was on file and 
16

accessible by the Customs and Border Protection Officer, who determined that 

she had used a false name. In reality, the traveler was a woman who had been 

arrested in April 2000 in New Orleans and convicted of passport fraud. At that 

time, the woman was placed on five years’ probation and ordered not to enter 

the U.S. without the attorney general’s written permission. The woman, whose 

husband lives in the U.S., then obtained a passport and U.S. visa by fraud in 

Trinidad for $2,000. 

4) Convicted Sexual Offender Identified 

In New York City, on February 19, 2004, a native of Trinidad and Tobago attempted to enter the United States. He was not listed as wanted for any crimes 

after standard biographic criminal data systems checks, but a biometric check 

under US-VISIT uncovered a prior conviction for having sex with a minor in 

2000, his registration as a convicted sex offender, and a removal from the 

United States in 2001 as an aggravated felon. He had also lived and worked 

illegally in the United States. He was placed in expedited removal proceedings. 

5) Rape Suspect Caught 

On February 22, 2004, at Miami International Airport, a man from Jamaica attempted to enter the United States after arriving on an Air Jamaica flight. Biographic and US-VISIT biometric checks alerted officers to an active warrant 

from New York City for strong armed rape. Criminal history checks also uncovered 3 prior convictions for possession or sale of marijuana in 1994 and 1995, 

as well as a 1998 rape arrest. He was turned over to Miami-Dade police for extradition to New York. 

A CBP Trainee Rises to the Occasion 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Trainee Rafal Izycki was working at 

primary inspection at Chicago O’Hare International Airport. An Albanian national 

seeking admission into the U.S. appeared before him and presented an Albanian 

passport. When Inspector Izycki compared the State Department photo image biometric provided by US-VISIT against the biometrics photographs on the passport 

and visa, he realized that the person in front of him was not the person who had 

obtained the visa. He immediately referred the Albanian national for a secondary 

inspection where it was determined that the passport had been photo-substituted 

and the non-immigrant visa had been altered. The capability to access the State Department biometric photographs of visa applicants provides a powerful tool for inspectors working to protect the U.S. 

AN UPDATE ON US-VISIT PROGRAM OFFICE

Secretary Ridge approved the creation of a US-VISIT program office, and positions 

have been approved to fill the organization and manage the program. The US-VISIT 

program team consists of representatives from the various components of DHS responsible for border security, including the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is also represented. Other DHS 

components that assist the US-VISIT team include the Directorate for Management 

and the Science and Technology Division. In addition, outside DHS, the team consists of representatives from the Departments of Transportation, State, Commerce, 

Justice, and General Services Administration. 

THE CONCLUSION

US-VISIT is critical to our national security as well as our economic security, and 

its implementation is already making a significant contribution to the efforts of the 

Department of Homeland Security to provide a safer and more secure America. But 

US-VISIT and the broader vision of a ‘virtual border’ cannot be left unfinished. It 

is the correct program at the right time, not only for the security of our country, 

but also for the integrity of our immigration system. We will build upon the initial 

framework and solid foundation to ensure that we continue to meet our goals to enhance the security of our citizens and visitors while facilitating travel for the millions of visitors we welcome each year. 

We want to ensure that we continue to be a welcoming nation, a nation that invites visitors to study, do business, and relax in our country. We also owe it to our 

citizens and visitors to deny entry to persons wishing to do harm, or who are inadmissible to the U.S. Few would dispute that these steps are necessary. These steps 

will be made easier because of US-VISIT and the information 

We are committed to building a program that enhances the integrity of our immigration system by catching the few and expediting the many, and we recognize that 
17

the U.S. is leading the way in helping other countries around the world keep their 

doors open and their borders secure.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Very good. Thank you. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Mocny. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Martinez-Fonts for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ALFONSO MARTINEZ-FONTS, JR., SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. MARTINEZ-FONTS. Good morning, Chairman Hostettler, 

Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and other distinguished Members of 

the Subcommittee. It is both a pleasure and an honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s 

US-VISIT program and how the Private Sector Office works with 

the US-VISIT program to engage the business community in this 

critical program. 

Under the charter given us by Congress and the President, the 

Private Sector Office was designed to provide America’s business 

community a direct line of communication to the Department of 

Homeland Security. With the guidance and assistance of Secretary 

Ridge and our Department colleagues, the Private Sector Office 

works directly with individual businesses, trade associations, chambers of commerce, and other professional and non-governmental organizations to share Department information, programs, and partnership opportunities. 

As mandated by the law, we are in the process of developing the 

capability to do economic analysis on the effect the Department’s 

rules and regulations will have on the private sector. 

As a provider of goods and services and the creator of tools and 

technologies that make our lives better, it is the private sector that 

helps make our Nation more secure. At the same time, it is the private sector that will be affected by many of the actions of the Department such as US-VISIT. Congress and the Administration duly 

recognize that the private sector plays a critical role in our Nation’s 

ability to prevent, respond, and recover from prospective incidents. 

Furthermore, all of us here today accept the fact that the private 

sector is a fundamental partner in the Department’s nationwide efforts to secure our homeland. The rewards of the Department’s 

growing relationship with the private sector are evident in the program we are here to discuss today. 

From the very beginning of the US-VISIT program, my office and 

our Department colleagues have worked to engage the private sector, to listen to their comments and to respond to their concerns 

every step of the way. Since the program began to take shape some 

months ago, the Department and the private sector have learned 

a great deal about one another and the challenges and opportunities we both have to contend with as we go about modernizing our 

borders, harmonizing our systems, and creating a better, faster, 

and more secure border. The lessons learned from this endeavor 

are making US-VISIT a better program and will help its future implementation at more ports of entry around the country. 

Our efforts in this program have also defined a performance 

measure by which the Department can assess the engagement, 
18

partnership, and cooperation with the private sector. With them as 

our partner and the guidance and support of this Committee and 

Congress, I am confident this success will continue and make our 

homeland even more secure. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be with you, and I look 

forward to addressing any questions that you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinez-Fonts follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AL MARTINEZ-FONTS

Chairman Hostettler, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and other distinguished 

Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Department of 

Homeland Security’s US-VISIT program and how the Private Sector Office works 

with the US-VISIT Program Office to engage the business community in this critical 

program. 

Under the charter given to us by Congress and the President, the mission of the 

Private Sector Office is to provide America’s business community with a direct line 

of communication to the Department of Homeland Security. With the guidance and 

assistance of Secretary Ridge and our Department colleagues, the Private Sector Office works directly with individual businesses, trade associations, and other professional and non-governmental organizations to share information about Department 

programs and opportunities. 

The private sector is a fundamental partner in the Department’s nationwide efforts to secure our homeland. The rewards of the Department’s growing relationships with the private sector are evident in the program we are here today to discuss. 

US-VISIT represents yet another major milestone in enhancing our nation’s security and our efforts to reform our borders. It is a significant step towards bringing 

integrity back to our immigration and border enforcement systems. Perhaps most 

importantly it represents our government’s commitment to leveraging 21st century 

technology to ensure we have both economic security and national security, because 

we cannot have one without the other. 

As head of the Department of Homeland Security’s Private Sector Office, it has 

been my job to engage all sectors of the business community. It is critical for the 

voices of the private sector to be heard during all phases of the development and 

rollout of US-VISIT. Their contributions and input have been essential in helping 

to ensure the effective deployment of US-VISIT. 

It is important to note that the private sector has been an important partner 

throughout the development and rollout of US-VISIT. As you know, the first increment of US-VISIT was completed on time and on budget, and we thank our partners 

in the private sector for helping to make this early success a reality. All facets of 

the aviation community were integral factors as we planned, piloted and launched 

US-VISIT last year. 

My colleagues Mr. Mocny and Mr. Jacksta have shared their thoughts and perspectives on US-VISIT in terms of the breadth and continuity of the security initiative. As the Department’s advocate for the private sector, I would like to share with 

you the three basic roles my Office has played in the formation of US-VISIT. These 

include: engaging the private sector; listening to their comments; and responding to 

their concerns. 

ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR

There are roughly 25 million businesses in the United States, and in order to 

reach as many of them as possible, our engagement and outreach strategy has been 

focused on leveraging our relationships wherever possible. These relationships include the various trade and industry associations who communicate with and educate their members and constituents on relevant business issues. By clustering our 

outreach into distinct segments, we have been able to communicate the relevant 

points about US-VISIT to these business groups. Groups such as the US Chamber 

of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, Business Executives for 

National Security, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and the 

Business Roundtable bring distinct voices and valuable perspective to the Department’s efforts but these voices and perspectives are not alone. 

Throughout Increment 1 of US-VISIT’s development and deployment, private sector members in the transportation, travel and tourism communities were not only 

impacted the most but had the most to offer in terms of input and feedback. Because this input has been vital to the Program’s success, we have focused much of 
19

our outreach on engaging these business groups on an on-going basis. In the months 

leading up to deployment of Increment 1 capabilities at airports and seaports, the 

Private Sector Office, in partnership with the US-VISIT Program Office, held frequent conference calls with the airline, airport, seaport and general travel and tourism community to ensure they were kept up-to-date and informed on a variety of 

aspects. The airlines and airports, in particular, were integral partners as we 

planned, piloted and launched US-VISIT last year. As you know, Increment 1 was 

completed on time and on budget, and we thank our partners in the private sector 

for helping to make this early success a reality. 

This focus on engagement continues as we prepare to accomplish the Program’s 

2004 milestones. Most notable of these is the on-going testing and evaluation of a 

departure confirmation system at airports and seaports, and the rollout of the USVISIT capability at the 50 busiest land ports of entry. Our efforts remain focused 

on engaging the trade and industry groups, mostly through meetings with one or 

more associations, as well as speaking engagements and panel discussions at town 

hall forums, conferences and conventions. I know that the US-VISIT Program Office 

maintains an in-depth database to manage the outreach and track the responses 

and feedback from hundreds of international organizations, trade groups, non-profit 

organizations and businesses, and communicates with the hundreds who have opted 

to receive regular US-VISIT updates through an e-mail newsletter. 

LISTENING TO THEIR COMMENTS

US-VISIT’s early focus on actively engaging the private sector has created enormous opportunities for the Department and the Private Sector Office to hear directly from these most important Program stakeholders. We have heard their concerns about our ability to implement the Program’s measures without sacrificing our 

freedoms or ability to conduct business. One thing I have found in my own personal 

involvement in this Program is that once accurate information is introduced to address rumors and misperceptions, concerns and fears subside and people once again 

focus upon our collective need and commitment to securing the borders without 

slowing the flow of commerce and people. 

As a result of our listening to our private sector partners, we have been able to 

take the first steps at successfully implementing US-VISIT at all of our nation’s air 

and sea ports of entry. This has created the kind of measure we as a Department 

need to continue to strive for in all of our efforts with the private sector. By communicating our commitment to the private sector and their interests throughout this 

effort, the Department and US-VISIT have been able to make a significant difference in the way we do business in America. From the US Chamber of Commerce 

to the airline industry, we have heard from most every sector in the private sector, 

each of them saying US-VISIT has exceeded their expectations. 

While the US-VISIT program has received praise for its execution and operation 

thus far, we have heard some concerns about the land border implementation. We 

have also been fielding questions about the departure confirmation system at airports and seaports. 

The area with the most concerns by far is along our nation’s southwest border. 

I have been actively engaged in reaching out to these border communities, most notably through key groups such as the Border Trade Alliance. From both personal 

and professional experience, I understand and empathize with many of the concerns 

the communities along the border have regarding any effort or program that might 

impact border operations and activities. My previous professional experiences as 

both a banker and not-for-profit founder providing job skills training and small business development in El Paso and San Antonio, Texas have helped me to understand 

and address the economic and personal concerns of the private sector. Furthermore, 

my experiences in living and working in Mexico for six years have provided additional perspective. Right now, some people in these affected communities are imagining clogged borders and economic disruption. My Office and others in the Department have routinely heard, ‘‘Don’t slow trade, don’t separate families, and don’t ruin 

the border.’’

We have no intentions of causing any harm to these border communities and take 

seriously President Bush’s and Congress’ direction that we implement a land border 

solution that does not slow the free flow of trade and people across our borders. 

While we all understand the challenges, it is important that these businesses understand the unwavering commitment of this Department to modernize our borders, 

harmonize our systems and create a better, faster, more secure border. 

DHS has been working closely with the US Department of Transportation as part 

of its on-going outreach to private sector groups to ensure that we listen to their 

concerns and apply them to the Program’s implementation. For example, integrating 
20

programs like FAST (Free and Secure Trade) with US-VISIT should enable truckers 

to move their goods across the border faster than they do today. 

RESPONDING TO PRIVATE SECTOR CONCERNS

Perhaps the most important thing DHS has done to respond to private sector concerns is to engage the brightest minds from the business community to develop the 

optimum solution for US-VISIT. We heard and acted upon those concerns during the 

Program’s kick-off this year. Rather than start the US-VISIT effort on January 1st 

at the height of holiday travel, the Program was initiated on January 5, 2004, allowing everyone a degree or two of flexibility. 

Thanks to a combination of policy and technology solutions, we are now starting 

to paint a very new picture of the border, one that includes faster travel without 

compromising security. In the Private Sector Office’s quest to communicate the 

truth about US-VISIT—at air, sea and land ports of entry—we are seeing that people can now begin to visualize this reality. This reality can only happen through 

continued and active engagement with the Department’s various public and private 

sector partners. By working together, we can all share with one another our commitment to keeping America’s doors open and our nation secure. 

As the US-VISIT Program continues to be implemented, the Private Sector Office, 

in partnership with the Department’s and Program’s leaders, will continue to identify ways to actively engage the private sector. As our partners in securing our 

homeland, the private sector should know at all times that the Department hears 

their voices and believes their opinions matter. As their advocate within the Department, my staff and I have pledged to use every tool available to us to demonstrate 

to them and to all others our commitment to use 21st century technology and innovation to create a 21st century border. With the guidance and assistance of the 

Members of this Committee and the Congress I am confident that we will be successful in that effort. 

I thank the Members for allowing me to share my comments today and I look forward to addressing any questions that you might have.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Martinez-Fonts. 

Mr. Hite, the Chair recognizes you for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ARCHITECTURE AND SYSTEMS ISSUES, 

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Mr. HITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As we have previously reported, the immense importance of USVISIT is undeniable. But as is the importance of US-VISIT, the 

need to manage it is equally important. With the recent deployment of the first increment, the time is right to examine the program’s management, and I commend you for holding this hearing. 

In addition, I would like to thank Congresswoman Jackson Lee for 

the invitation to participate today and note that my written statement draws heavily from our two issued reports on US-VISIT. 

In addition, I’d note that we have concluded audit work recently 

for the Appropriations Committees that build on these issued reports, and at their direction my written statement does not include 

the results of that work. However, they have permitted me to share 

this information orally. 

In summary, my testimony makes two primary points. 

Point 1, US-VISIT is a large, complex, expensive program aimed 

at supporting important missions: border security, privacy protection, immigration, trade and travel. In addition, the program’s 

scope touches multiple agencies, and estimates of its cost through 

2004 reach well into the billions of dollars. Just by virtue of what 

US-VISIT is and is to be, it carries an appreciable level of risk with 

it. 
21

Point number 2, large, complex, expensive programs and, thus, 

inherently risky programs, like US-VISIT, should be able to positively answer two basic questions. Question 1, are we doing the 

right thing? Question 2, are we doing it the right way? 

To be the right thing, which is Question 1, a program needs to 

be justified by sufficient fact-based, verifiable analysis showing 

that the program, as it is defined, including near-term increments, 

will produce mission value commensurate with expected costs. 

To be done the right way, which is Question 2, a program needs 

to be executed effectively, which means that it needs to employ the 

necessary mix of people, processes, and tools to reasonably ensure 

that promised program capabilities and expected mission value are 

delivered on time and within budget. 

The answer to Question 1—Are we doing the right thing?—is not 

clear at this juncture. The current plan is to deliver US-VISIT capabilities in four increments, the first three of which are intended 

to be interim solutions, with the fourth being a more strategic, yetto-be-defined permanent solution. However, DHS has not yet identified the tangible, measurable benefits that can be expected from 

the interim solutions, and it has not estimated costs associated 

with these interim solution. 

For large and complex programs that involve developing and implementing many things over many years, it is the best practice to 

break the program into smaller incremental parts and to economically justify the parts before investing significant resources in each. 

Without doing so, an organization risks learning too late whether 

interim solutions were a prudent use of resources. 

The answer to Question 2—Are we doing it the right way?—is 

clear. Unfortunately, the answer is that US-VISIT does not yet 

have in place and functioning the kind of industrial-strength program management capabilities to include people, processes, and 

tools that it needs. For instance, program management processes 

have not been defined, adequate staff have not been put in place 

to implement, and tools have not been established to support such 

things as effective acquisition planning, requirements development 

and management, contract tracking and oversight, test and evaluation management, and configuration management. 

The absence of these capabilities was evident on Increment 1 

where neither system testing nor the change control aspect of configuration management was effectively managed. For example, Increment 1 test execution preceded the development of test plans, 

test plans were missing important content, and testing was not finished before Increment 1 began operating. 

Our experience in reviewing other large and complex IT programs has shown that over the life of a program, this kind of go, 

get ready, get set approach ultimately will result in taking more 

time and money to implement less capability than promised. 

Our position is that these two points together paint a picture of 

a program at risk, and to address these risks, we have made a 

number of recommendations, examples of which are provided in my 

written statement, and additional recommendations will be in our 

soon-to-be-released report to the Appropriations Committees. 

To DHS’ credit, it has agreed with these recommendations, and 

it has committed to implementing them. Progress to date has been 
22

1 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–208 

(Sept. 30, 1996). 2 Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. 

L. 106–215 (June 15, 2000); Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. 106–396 (Oct. 30, 

2000). USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107–56 (Oct. 26, 2001); Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act, Pub. L. 107–71 (Nov. 19, 2001); Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 

2002, Pub. L. 107–173 (May 14, 2002). 3 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist 

Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. 107–206 (Aug. 2, 2002); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. 108–7 (Feb. 20, 2003); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 

Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108–90 (Oct. 1, 2003). 4 U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO–03–1083 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 

2003); Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, GAO–03–563 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2003). 

slow, and this is troubling because most of these recommendations 

are aimed at correcting fundamental limitations in the ability to 

manage the program in a way that reasonably ensures success. 

Before concluding, I would be remiss if I did not say that, despite 

the management challenges that face US-VISIT, the first increment was deployed and is operating largely as planned, and in my 

view, this is owing to the yeoman efforts of DHS and contractor 

staff, who deserve credit for their hard work, dedication, and commitment. However, reliance on a people effort alone cannot reasonably ensure program success. Rather, the more tried and proven 

approach is to take the necessary steps and apply the necessary resources to ensure that US-VISIT’s defined increments are the right 

thing and are done the right way. 

This concludes my statement, and I’d be happy to answer any 

questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hite follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the Subcommittee’s hearing on 

US-VISIT (the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology), 

a large, complex program that is intended to achieve a daunting set of goals: it is 

to enhance homeland security and the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and 

at the same time it is to facilitate legitimate border crossing and protect privacy. 

To achieve these goals, US-VISIT relies on information technology, as well as people, processes, and facilities. 

The genesis of US-VISIT was in 1996, when the Congress passed legislation that 

directed the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to develop a system to monitor the entry and exit of foreign nationals visiting this country.1 As a 

result of this and later related legislative direction,2 efforts were begun in 2002 to 

develop the system now known as US-VISIT. Subsequently, INS was merged into 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is now responsible for developing and implementing the US-VISIT program. 

In the last three appropriations acts governing the development and implementation of US-VISIT,3 the Congress prohibited the INS, and later DHS, from obligating 

funds until the agency submitted to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations expenditure plans that met several conditions, including being reviewed by 

GAO. We have accordingly issued two reports on US-VISIT4 and will shortly be 

issuing a third to the appropriations committees. All three reports were based on 

work performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. My testimony today is based on our two published reports and on more current public information on the program since the reports were issued. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF

The overall message of our testimony today is that the US-VISIT program is 

risky, both because of the type of program it is and because of the way it is being 

managed. US-VISIT is a large, complex, and expensive program aimed at supporting 

a multifaceted mission-critical area; thus, it is an intrinsically challenging effort. 
23

5 Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act, 2000, Pub. L. 

106–215 (June 15, 2000).

Several aspects of the program increase the risk that it will not meet its goals or 

its cost, schedule, and performance commitments:

• Multifaceted, critical mission. The program aims to prevent the entry of persons who pose a threat to the United States. Besides this critical security mission, the program also aims to achieve law enforcement goals regarding visa 

violations, while facilitating legitimate trade and travel and adhering to U.S. 

privacy laws and policies.

• Large and complex scope. Controlling the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of 

millions of travelers is a large and complex process.

• Challenging milestones. Progress and current status of the program make it 

difficult to satisfy legislatively mandated milestones: for example, that USVISIT be implemented at all ports of entry by December 31, 2005.5

• Significant potential cost. In February 2003, DHS estimated that the program 

would cost $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, but this estimate did not include all costs and underestimated some others.

Additionally, several factors related to the program’s management increase the 

risk of not achieving program goals or not delivering program capabilities on time 

and within budget. Our imminent report for the appropriations committees will discuss each of these factors, including why each is still an area of risk. Examples of 

the factors that we have reported on are as follows:

• Problems with existing systems. The program is to rely initially on existing 

systems with reported problems that could limit US-VISIT performance.

• Program management capability. The program office was not adequately 

staffed, roles and responsibilities had not been clearly defined, and acquisition management processes were not yet established.

• Near-term facilities solutions. Interim facility planning for high-volume land 

ports of entry must satisfy requirements that are both demanding and based 

on assumptions that, if altered, could significantly affect facility plans.

• Mission value of increments. The benefits versus costs were not yet known of 

the interim versions (or increments) of the program that are being implemented while the final version is being developed.

Our experience in reviewing large, complex, information-technology-dependent 

programs in other federal agencies has shown that such program management 

weaknesses typically result in these programs falling short of expectations. Accordingly, we have made several recommendations regarding the US-VISIT program to 

address these weaknesses and risks. 

BACKGROUND

The US-VISIT program is a governmentwide endeavor intended to enhance national security, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, contribute to the integrity of 

the U.S. immigration system, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by

• collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign nationals 

who enter and exit the United States;

• identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of 

their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) 

should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;

• detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and

• facilitating information sharing and coordination within the border management community.

The program involves interdependencies among people, processes, technology, and 

facilities, as shown in Figure 1.
24

6 Classes of travelers that are not subject to US-VISIT are foreign nationals admitted on A– 1, A–2, C–3 (except for attendants, servants, or personal employees of accredited officials), G– 1, G–2, G–3, G–4, NATO–1, NATO–2, NATO–3, NATO–4, NATO–5, or NATO–6 visas, unless 

the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly determine that a class 

of such aliens should be subject to the rule; children under the age of 14; and persons over the 

age of 79. 7The Miami Royal Caribbean seaport and the Baltimore/Washington International Airport.

8Secondary inspection is used for more detailed inspections that may include checking more 

databases, conducting more intensive interviews of the individual, or both. 9 In November 2003, DHS issued as planned a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a prime contractor for US-VISIT work beyond Increment 2A. 10 RF technology would require proximity cards and card readers. RF readers read the information contained on the card when the card is passed near the reader, and could be used to 

verify the identity of the card holder.

Within DHS, organizational responsibility for the US-VISIT program lies with the 

Border and Transportation Security Directorate. In July 2003, DHS established a 

US-VISIT program office with responsibility for managing the acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of the US-VISIT system and supporting people 

(e.g., inspectors), processes (e.g., entry exit policies and procedures), and facilities 

(e.g., inspection booths). 

DHS plans to deliver US-VISIT capability incrementally. Currently, it has defined 

four increments, with Increments 1 through 3 being interim or temporary solutions, 

and Increment 4 being the yet-to-be-defined end vision for US-VISIT. Increments 1 

through 3 include the interfacing and enhancement of existing system capabilities 

and the deployment of these capabilities to air, sea, and land ports of entry (POE).

1. The first increment includes the electronic collection and matching of biographic and biometric information at all major air and some sea POEs for 

selected foreign travelers with non-immigrant visas.6 Increment 1 entry capability was deployed to 115 airports and 14 seaports on January 5, 2004. 

Increment 1 exit capability was deployed as a pilot to two POEs on January 

5, 2004—one airport and one seaport.7

2. The second increment is divided into two parts—2A and 2B. Increment 2A 

is to include the capability to process machine-readable visas and other 

travel and entry documents that use biometric identifiers at all POEs. This 

increment is to be implemented by October 26, 2004. Increment 2B is to expand the Increment 1 solution for entry to secondary inspection 8 at the 50 

highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004. According to the USVISIT Request for Proposal (RFP),9 2B is also to include radio frequency 

(RF) 10 capability at the 50 busiest land POEs for both entry and exit processes. 
25

11 An indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract provides for an indefinite quantity, within 

stated limits, of supplies or services during a fixed period of time. The government schedules 

deliveries or performance by placing orders with the contractor. 

3. Increment 3 is to expand the 2B capability to the remaining 115 land POEs. 

It is to be implemented by December 31, 2005.

4. Increment 4 is the yet-to-be-defined end vision of US-VISIT, which will likely 

consist of a series of capability releases.

DHS plans to award a single, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity 11 contract to 

a prime contractor for integrating existing and new business processes and technologies. DHS plans to award the contract by May 2004. According to the RFP, the 

prime contractor’s scope of work is to include, but is not limited to, Increments 2B, 

3, and 4. 

US-VISIT IS INHERENTLY RISKY

By definition, US-VISIT is a risky undertaking because it is to perform a critical 

mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding implementation 

schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. 

Program Supports Multifaceted, Critical Mission 

In announcing the US-VISIT system, the DHS Under Secretary for Border and 

Transportation Security stated that the system’s goal is to ‘‘give America a 21st 

Century ‘smart border’—one that speeds through legitimate trade and travel, but 

stops terrorists in their tracks.’’ Achieving these goals is daunting: the United 

States shares over 7,500 miles of land border with Canada and Mexico, and it has 

approximately 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable waterways to protect. In fiscal year 2002, there were about 279 million inspections of foreign nationals at U.S. 

POEs. In these circumstances, preventing the entry of persons who pose a threat 

to the United States cannot be guaranteed, and the missed entry of just one can 

have severe consequences. Relatedly, US-VISIT is to achieve the important law enforcement goal of identifying those among these millions of visitors each year who 

overstay or otherwise violate the terms of their visas. 

Complicating achievement of these security and law enforcement goals are other 

key US-VISIT goals: facilitating the movement of legitimate trade and travel 

through the POEs and providing for enforcement of U.S. privacy laws and regulations. 

Scope Is Large and Complex 

US-VISIT is to provide for the interfacing of a number of existing systems. It is 

also to support and refine a large and complex governmentwide process involving 

multiple departments and agencies. This process involves the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers to and from the 

United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs. 

The interfaced systems included in Increment 1 are

• Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS), a database that stores traveler 

arrival and departure data received from air and sea carrier manifests and 

that provides query and reporting functions;

• Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), a system that captures arrival and departure manifest information provided by air and sea carriers;

• Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), a system that maintains lookout data, interfaces with other agencies’ databases, and is currently used by 

inspectors at POEs to verify traveler information and modify data;

• Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), a system that collects 

and stores biometric data about foreign visitors;

• Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), a system that contains information on foreign students;

• Computer Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS 3), 

a system that contains information on foreign nationals who request benefits, 

such as change of status or extension of stay; and

• Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), a system that includes information 

on whether a visa applicant has previously applied for a visa or currently has 

a valid U.S. visa.

Figure 2 shows these systems and their relationships.
26
27

12 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–173 (May 14, 

2002). 13Pub. L. 106–215 (June 15, 2000). 

In addition to integrating numerous systems, US-VISIT also involves complex 

processes governing the stages of a traveler’s visit to the United States: pre-entry, 

entry, status management, and exit. These processes for Increment 1 are as follows: 

Pre-entry process. Pre-entry processing begins with initial petitions for visas. 

When the Department of State issues the travel documentation, biographic (and in 

some cases biometric) data are collected and made available to border management 

agencies. The biometric data are transmitted from State to DHS, where the prints 

are run against the US-VISIT IDENT biometric database to verify identity and to 

check the biometric watchlist. The results of the biometric check are transmitted 

back to State. 

Commercial air and sea carriers are required by law to transmit crew and passenger manifests to appropriate immigration officers before arriving in the United 

States.12 These manifests are transmitted through APIS. The APIS lists are run 

against the biographic lookout system and identify those arrivals who have biometric data available. In addition, POEs review the APIS list in order to identify foreign 

nationals who need to be scrutinized more closely. 

Entry process. When a foreign national arrives at a POE’s primary inspection 

booth, biographic information, such as name and date of birth, is displayed on the 

bottom half of a computer workstation screen, along with a photograph obtained 

from State’s CCD. The inspector at the booth scans the foreign national’s fingerprints (left and right index fingers) and takes a digital photograph. This information 

is forwarded to the IDENT database, where it is checked against stored fingerprints 

in the IDENT lookout database. If the foreign national’s fingerprints are already in 

IDENT, the system performs a match (a comparison of the fingerprint taken during 

the primary inspection to the one on file) to confirm that the person submitting the 

fingerprints is the person on file. During this process, the inspector also questions 

the foreign national about the purpose of his or her travel and length of stay. 

Status management process. The status management process manages the foreign 

national’s temporary presence in the United States, including the adjudication of 

benefits applications and investigations into possible violations of immigration regulations. ADIS matches entry and exit manifest data to ensure that each record 

showing a foreign national entering the United States is matched with a record 

showing the foreign national exiting the United States. ADIS receives status information from CLAIMS 3 and SEVIS on foreign nationals. 

Exit process. The exit process includes the carriers’ submission of electronic manifest data to IBIS/APIS. This biographic information is passed to ADIS, where it is 

matched against entry information. At the two POEs where the exit pilot is being 

conducted, foreign nationals use a self-serve kiosk where they are prompted to scan 

their travel documentation and provide their fingerprints (right and left index fingers). This departure record is then stored in ADIS (along with the person’s arrival 

record) and used to verify if a foreign national has complied with the admission 

terms of his or her visa. 

Milestones Are Challenging 

Key US-VISIT milestones are legislatively mandated. For example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 13 requires that US-VISIT be implemented at all air and sea POEs by December 31, 

2003; at the 50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004; and at all remaining POEs by December 31, 2005. 

Because of limited progress during the 7 years following the legislation that originated the entry exit system requirement, DHS acknowledged that it could not complete permanent solutions in these time frames, and thus it planned to implement 

interim (temporary) solutions. For example, Increments 1 through 3 include the 

interfacing of existing systems and the design and construction of interim facilities 

at land POEs. Further, DHS officials have stated that it will be difficult to develop 

and implement even the interim solutions at some of the highest volume land POEs 

(such as San Ysidro, California; Otay Mesa, California; and Laredo, Texas) by December 31, 2004, because even minor changes in the inspection time can greatly affect the average wait time at these high-volume POEs. Moreover, achievement of 

interim solutions is based on assumptions that, if changed, could significantly affect 

facility and staffing plans. 
28

14The $2.9 billion is a parametric cost estimate. Parametric cost estimating is a technique 

used in the planning, budgeting, and conceptual stages of projects. This technique expedites the 

development of order of magnitude benchmark estimates when discrete estimating techniques 

are not possible or would require inordinate amounts of time and resources to produce similar 

results. Estimates such as this can vary ±30 to 50 percent. 15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO–03–174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002). 

Potential Cost Is Significant 

Despite DHS’s estimate in February 2003, that the total overall cost of the US- VISIT program would be about $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, the potential 

governmentwide cost of US-VISIT over just a 10-year period could be about twice 

as much. Although the DHS estimate included a wide range of costs, it omitted 

some costs and may have understated others. The estimate included

• system investment costs, such as information technology hardware and communications infrastructure, software enhancements, and interfaces;

• the cost of facilities and additional inspectors;

• system and facilities operation and maintenance costs;

• the cost of planning, designing, and constructing permanent facilities, which 

according to DHS was about $2.9 billion 14 (this estimate was based on the 

assumptions that (1) no additional traffic lanes would be required to support 

the entry processes and (2) exit facilities would mirror entry facilities—i.e., 

that a land POE with 10 entry traffic lanes would require 10 exit traffic 

lanes); 

• costs to design and construct building space to house additional computer 

equipment and inspectors; and

• costs for highway reconfiguration at land POEs.

However, the estimate did not include the costs to design and construct interim 

facilities at land POEs. DHS officials estimated that the cost of constructing the interim facilities at the 50 highest volume POEs was about $218 million. Moreover, 

the estimate is based on assumptions that, if changed, could significantly affect, for 

example, land POE facility and staffing needs. 

Finally, although the estimate did include the cost of implementing biometrics, 

these costs are understated, because they did not include, for example, State Department costs. Specifically, in November 2002,15 we reported that a rough order 

of magnitude estimate of the cost to implement visas with biometrics would be between $1.3 billion and $2.9 billion initially and between $0.7 and $1.5 billion annually thereafter. This estimate is based on certain assumptions, including that all 

current visa-issuing embassies and consulates will be equipped to collect biometrics 

from visa applicants. Assuming that biometrics are implemented by December 2004, 

this means that the recurring cost of having biometric visas through DHS’s fiscal 

year 2014 life cycle period would be between $7 and $15 billion. In contrast, DHS’s estimate for the entire program through fiscal year 2014 was about $7.2 billion. 

MANAGEMENT OF US-VISIT SYSTEM ACQUISITION

Compounding the risk factors inherent in the scale and significance of the USVISIT program are a number of others that can be attributed to its state of management and its acquisition approach. As described in our September 2003 report on 

US-VISIT, these include relying on existing systems to provide the foundation for 

the first three program increments (and thus having to accept the performance limitations of these existing systems), not having mature program management capabilities, not having fully defined near-term facilities solutions, and not knowing the 

mission value that is to be derived from US-VISIT increments. Our recently completed audit work for the appropriations committees addressed each of these factors, 

which our next report will discuss, including why each is still an area of risk. 

Problems with Existing Systems 

The system performance of the interim releases of US-VISIT (Increments 1, 2, and 

3) will depend largely on the performance of the existing systems that are to be 

interfaced to create the overall system. Thus, US-VISIT system availability and associated downtime, for example, will be constrained by the availability of the interfaced systems. In this regard, some of the existing systems have had availability 

and reliability problems that could limit US-VISIT performance. Two examples are 

SEVIS and CLAIMS 3. 

Problems have been identified with the availability and reliability of SEVIS, the 

system designed to manage and monitor foreign students in the United States. For 
29

16Statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, ‘‘Implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)’’ (Apr. 2, 2003). 17 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108–280, at 32 (2003). 18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness of 

Application Processing, GAO–01–488 (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001). 19The predecessor program office for the entry exit program was established within the 

former INS in March 2002. 20 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Software Acquisition Capability Maturity 

Model, Version 1.03 (March 2002). 21Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, First Annual Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: December 2002). 

example, in April 2003, the Justice Inspector General reported that many users had 

difficulty logging on to the system, and that as the volume of users grew, the system 

became increasingly sluggish.16 According to other reports, university representatives complained that it was taking hours to log on to the system and to enter a 

single record, or worse, that the system accepted the record and later deleted it. We 

are required to report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees by April 

1, 2004, on SEVIS performance, among other things.17

We also reported in May 2001 18 that CLAIMS 3 was unreliable. This system contains information on foreign nationals who request benefits and is used to process 

benefit applications other than naturalization. Specifically, we reported that INS officials stated that the system was frequently unavailable and did not always update 

and store important case data when field offices transferred data from the local system to the mainframe computer. 

Program Management Capability 

Our experience with major modernization programs, like US-VISIT, shows that 

they should be managed formally, which includes establishing a program office that 

(1) is adequately staffed (both in numbers and skill levels), (2) has clearly defined 

its staff’s roles and responsibilities, and (3) is supported by rigorous and disciplined 

acquisition management processes. 

DHS established a US-VISIT program office in June 2003 19 and determined that 

this office’s staffing needs were, in all, 115 government and 117 contractor personnel 

to perform key acquisition management functions. These functions fall into categories described by the Software Engineering Institute’s Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM ),20 which defines a suite of key acquisition 

process areas that are necessary for rigorous and disciplined management of a system acquisition program. These process areas include acquisition planning, requirements development and management, project management, solicitation, contract 

tracking and oversight, evaluation, and transition to support. 

Our latest report stated that the US-VISIT program’s staffing levels were far 

below its stated needs. Moreover, specific roles and responsibilities had not been defined beyond general statements. Further, the program had not yet defined plans 

and associated time frames for achieving needed staffing levels and defining roles, 

responsibilities, and relationships. According to the Program Director, positions 

were being filled with detailees from various DHS component organizations. 

Additionally, although the approved program office structure provided for positions to perform the SA-CMM  key process areas (including acquisition planning, 

requirements development and management, project management, and contract 

tracking and oversight), none of the process areas were defined and implemented. 

Until they are, the program office must rely on the knowledge and skills of its existing staff to execute these important acquisition functions. 

According to the Program Director, needed program staffing and key process areas 

were not in place because the program was just getting off the ground, and it would 

take considerable time to establish a fully functioning and mature program management capability. Until the program office is adequately staffed, positional roles and 

responsibilities are clearly defined and understood, and rigorous and disciplined acquisition process controls are defined, understood, and followed, DHS’s efforts to acquire, deploy, operate, and maintain system capabilities will be at risk of not producing promised performance levels, functionality, and associated benefits on time 

and within budget. 

Near-Term Facilities Solutions 

Work by the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force has shown that existing facilities do not adequately support the current entry exit process at land 

POEs. In particular, more than 100 land POEs have less than 50 percent of the required capacity to support current inspection processes and traffic levels.21 As a re-
30

sult, as part of US-VISIT (Increment 2), DHS plans to construct interim facilities 

at about 40 of the 50 highest volume land POEs by December 31, 2004, and construct interim facilities at the remaining portion of these 50 POEs by February 

2005. 

According to DHS officials, the department plans to design and construct interim 

facilities to (1) support the US-VISIT inspection process, technology, and staff requirements and (2) meet current traffic wait time requirements at each land POE. 

To plan for the design and construction of interim facilities that meet these requirements, DHS modeled various inspection process and facilities scenarios to define 

what inspection process to follow and what interim facilities to construct. The modeling was based on two key assumptions: (1) the current staffing level and (2) the 

current number of inspection booths staffed for each POE. According to preliminary 

DHS modeling exercises, small incremental increases in average inspection times at 

some high-volume land POEs could significantly increase average wait times. Moreover, any changes to decisions about which foreign travelers are subject to US-VISIT 

could significantly affect these assumptions and thus near-term facility requirements. 

Mission Value of Increments 

OMB Circular Number A–11, part 7, requires that investments in major systems 

be implemented incrementally, with each increment delivering tangible and measurable benefits. Incremental investment involves justifying investment in each increment on the basis of benefits, costs, and risks. Although DHS is pursuing US-VISIT 

incrementally, it has not defined incremental costs and benefits to justify its proposed investments in each increment. 

In the case of Increment 1, DHS’ 2003 expenditure plan stated that this increment would provide ‘‘immediate benefits,’’ but it did not describe them. Instead, it 

described capabilities to be provided, such as the ability to determine whether a foreign national should be admitted and to perform checks against watch lists. It did 

not describe in meaningful terms the benefits that are to result from implementation of these capabilities (e.g., X percent reduction in inspection times or Y percent 

reduction in false positive matches against watch lists). 

Also, DHS did not identify the estimated cost of Increment 1. The Program Director told us that the $375 million requested in the 2003 plan included not only all 

the funding required for Increment 1, but also funding for later increments. However, the plan did not separate the funds by increment, and program officials did 

not provide this information. 

While DHS developed a benefits and cost analysis for the former entry exit program in February 2003, this analysis had limitations, such as an absence of meaningful benefit descriptions. Program officials acknowledged that this analysis is out 

of date and is not reflective of current US-VISIT plans. According to these officials, 

an updated analysis will be issued in the very near future. 

Without a reliable understanding of whether near-term increments will produce 

mission value justifying its costs and whether known risks can be effectively mitigated, DHS is investing in and implementing near-term solutions that have not 

been adequately justified. 

To the credit of the hard-working and dedicated staff working on the program, an 

initial US-VISIT operating capability was deployed to major air and selected sea 

POEs at the beginning of this year. However, the US-VISIT program still faces the 

risk factors described in this testimony, each of which will be discussed in our soon 

to be released report. To address these risk factors, our published reports presented 

several recommendations regarding the US-VISIT program, including

• ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose US-VISIT system capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered;

• determine whether proposed US-VISIT increments will produce mission value 

commensurate with costs and risks;

• define performance standards for each increment that are measurable and reflect the limitations imposed by relying on existing systems;

• develop a risk management plan and regularly report all high risks;

• develop and implement a plan for satisfying key acquisition management controls and implement these in accordance with Software Engineering Institute 

guidance;

• ensure that human capital and financial resources are provided to establish 

a fully functional and effective US-VISIT program office;

• define program office positions, roles, and responsibilities; and
31

• develop and implement a human capital strategy for the program office that 

provides for staffing positions with individuals who have the appropriate 

knowledge, skills, and abilities.

Unless DHS addresses the risk factors described in this testimony, successful deployment of US-VISIT increments is doubtful, because achieving success will depend 

too much on heroic efforts by the people involved, rather than being the predictable 

outcome of sound investment and acquisition management capabilities. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be happy to answer any 

questions that you or members of the committee may have at this time. 

CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

If you should have any questions about this testimony, please contact Randolph 

C. Hite at (202) 512–3870 or hiter@gao.gov. Other major contributors to this testimony included Barbara Collier, Deborah Davis, Tamra Goldstein, David Hinchman, 

and Jessica Waselkow.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Hite. 

Before I turn to the Ranking Member for her opening statement, 

I would just like to make a point to the gentleman from the Administration. We did not receive testimony, this Subcommittee did not 

receive testimony until 6 p.m. last night, well under the 24-hour 

deadline that we require. We understand that while you folks have 

your testimony available long before that, it was at OMB for an extended period of time. We would just appreciate it if you could take 

back the message with you that it’s very difficult for us to prepare 

for such an important hearing without an understanding of what’s 

going to be discussed at this hearing. We thank you very much. 

At this time I would like to turn to the Ranking Member, Ms. 

Jackson Lee, for an opening statement. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

might I join in your commentary dealing with the receipt, the timely receipt of testimony, and indicate that, you being very kind, I 

think, in terms of his remarks, I have seen some instances in this 

Committee where a witness was not allowed to testify. So I want 

to associate with both the approach that the Chairman took and, 

as well, the admonition of making sure that we have these materials in a timely basis. 

However, let me express my appreciation for all of the witnesses. 

I am in the midst of three Committee hearings at this very moment, and I thank you for your indulgence. I may be yielding to 

my distinguished colleague from California if I am having to depart. 

But, Mr. Chairman, let me briefly say that I’ve had the privilege 

and the challenge of seeing in action the prototype of the US-VISIT 

and then actually seeing and standing while the system was being 

utilized both at Miami International Airport as part of the Homeland Security CODEL, trying to determine how it was affected—

being effective, rather, and also at the Houston Intercontinental 

Airport. 

My first comment is to compliment the employees and those who 

are utilizing the system because I believe, Mr. Hite, we are not 

suggesting, as both of us are raising some questions, that we believe that the employees that are utilizing the system are not doing 

the very best that they can. So I have—I think that the training 

seems to be moving along and also the effort of accommodating the 

individuals who have to utilize it. And so I want to go on record 

with respect to that, and for those employees that may be listening 
32

and within the sound of my voice, I would welcome any commentary from the field, because I have spent time in the field all 

over the United States, to be able to suggest to me otherwise or 

what they might additionally need. 

Let me just note that US-VISIT was launched at 115 airports 

and 14 seaports on January 5, 2004. The stated objective for USVISIT is to enhance the Nation’s security while facilitating the legitimate travel and trade through our borders. The security measures employed by this program begin overseas at the U.S. consul 

offices that issue visas. Digital fingerscans are taken at these offices and used to determine whether the applicant is on a database 

of known or suspected criminals or terrorists. 

When a foreign visitor with a visa reaches our border and seeks 

admission to the United States, the fingerscans are used to verify 

that the person seeking admission is the same person who received 

the visa, and another check is made for information about any involvement in terrorism or crime. 

I have heard positive things about the way the entry inspection 

part of the program is being implemented at airports, but the exit 

part of the program has not been developed fully yet. The real test, 

however, will be implementing the program at the land ports of 

entry. 

In FY 2003, 79 percent of all travelers seeking entry into the 

United States entered at a land port of entry. Land ports of entry 

are more problematic for US-VISIT, which includes the southern 

border as well as the northern border, than airports for a number 

of reasons. Traffic at these crossings consists of varying combinations of cars, pedestrians, bicycles, trucks, buses, and rail. And for 

any of you who have not been in particular or specifically to the 

southern border, I invite you to do so. It is an interesting challenge. 

Moreover, land ports pose difficult challenges to the creation of 

an automatic alien tracking system due to their location, infrastructure, geography, and traffic volume, which can vary extensively among ports of entry. 

And might I say, in citing the northern and southern border, the 

issue with that is that we have friends coming over the border as 

well as we may have those who wish to do us ill. It is difficult with 

the US-VISIT process to balance the friends versus those who may 

do us harm. 

Congress has mandated that an automatic entry program be implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 31, 

2004, all land ports of entry by December 31, 2005. I am particularly concerned with the viability of implementing the exit check 

piece of the program. I am also wondering about the additional 

need for staff. The ability to analyze the data at the existing facilities at land points may already be inadequate. According to a study 

performed by Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, 

more than a hundred of the land ports of entry have less than 50 

percent of the required capacity to support current inspection processes and traffic. And apparently DHS plans to address this problem by constructing interim facilities at 50 of the ports. 

I’ve asked the General Accounting Office to provide a witness to 

this hearing to discuss these and other problems. Mr. Hite, the 

GAO Director of Information Technology Architecture and Systems, 
33

will tell us about a report issued by the GAO on September 2003 

which describes the most significant challenges to implementing 

US-VISIT. According to this report, which Director Hite will update 

today, the scope of US-VISIT is large and complex. It must meet 

a demanding implementation schedule, and its potential cost is 

enormous. The report indicates that many of the difficulties are inherent to the program and cannot be easily changed, but others are 

attributable to an inadequate state of governance and management. The report casts doubt on whether US-VISIT will be able to 

measurably and appreciably achieve the Homeland Security Department’s goal of enhancing national security while facilitating legitimate travel and trade. 

Even if the Department of Homeland Security is successful in 

implementing US-VISIT, the program may not make our country 

more secure in any significant way. In 1998, a Senate Judiciary 

Committee report found that implementing an automatic entry 

visit and control system has absolutely nothing to do with countering drug trafficking, with halting the entry of terrorists into the 

United States, or with any other illegal activity. 

I’m willing to remain open, even with that report, because we 

had since that time 9/11. But I think it is truly important, keenly 

important, that as we represent to the American people that we’re 

working to secure the homeland, that we truly have a grasp of how 

best to do it and how to be effective and efficient. 

I close by simply saying we know that the securest homeland is 

to keep the terrorists out before they even enter into our borders. 

The question is how best to do it, and that is the responsibility of 

this Committee. 

I thank the distinguished Chairman, and I yield back my time. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair will now entertain questions. 

First of all, Mr. Jacksta, as you know, 1 week ago there was a 

horrible terrorist bombing in Madrid. The apprehended suspects, 

all of them were not native Spaniards. Can you tell us whether 

these aliens would have been able to enter the U.S. had they attempted to? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Sir, if we had information that was available to the 

U.S. Government, we would have been able to stop them at the 

border. The reason why we’d be able to do that is that we would 

have received the information regarding the individuals who would 

be on a plane. At the time that they were on that plane, we would 

have done our checks, and we would have had the plane met at the 

time that they arrived in the United States and had our inspectors, 

our anti-terrorism rovers up there and would have met the individuals, and at that time take appropriate action to address the issue. 

So addressing your question, if the information is available to the 

U.S. Government, we put it into our databases. The sharing of information that we currently have in place would allow us to identify these individuals and stop them from entering the United 

States. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Very good. I understand the visa waiver countries can pass through inspections without going through USVISIT. Would this have been the case for Richard Reid, who I un-
34

derstand is a British national, and Zacarias Moussaoui, who I understand is a French national? 

Mr. JACKSTA. What I’d like to express here is that if the traveler 

was coming in and they’re from a visa waiver country, they would 

not have been US-VISIT’d. However, when they do arrive in the 

United States, there’s a layered approach. As I indicated, we have 

advance information. If we have information regarding a specific 

person, we put it into our databases, and we would have identified 

that individual for an inspection. 

But I think it’s also important to note that we do train our inspectors in a number of areas—document fraud, interviewing techniques—and that training is important to make sure that we have 

a layered approach. We don’t count on one specific type of tool to 

identify individuals. We bring it all together so that we can respond appropriately. 

In the cases of Mr. Reid, hopefully we would have—if we had information, we would have stopped the individual from getting on 

the plane or arriving in the United States. Then we could have 

interviewed him at the time of arrival, and at that point, based on 

the information questioning, hopefully we would have been able to 

identify him as a concern to United States security. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you. 

Mr. Mocny, as was earlier indicated, the 1996 act initially required an entry-exit system to be put in place. Can you explain 

why it has taken so long to implement such an entry-exit system? 

Mr. MOCNY. Thank you for the question. If I can quickly just 

verify or just build upon what Mr. Jacksta said on the visa waiver 

countries, if they’re coming under the visa waiver program, they 

would currently be exempt under the process. If they come with a 

visa—a British national or a French national coming as a student 

perhaps—they would have to have a visa. They would go through 

the US-VISIT process. So it’s only under the 90-day-or-less visa 

waiver program. 

As to your question, I guess I referenced the last time I was in 

front of this Committee, I can only quote what was stated by an 

Administration official at the time, that there was opposition to 

section 110 at that time, and there was some disagreement as how 

to best implement that program. And so to give you kind of an honest answer here, it was—I think many who tried to move the program forward perhaps were met with some philosophical differences. Again, there was no 9/11, and so there was, I think, a debate within both sides of the aisle about whether or not this was 

the best thing to do. And so for that reason, a lot of progress was 

not made, and I can only then point to your point, which is after 

9/11 and after we moved to the Department of Homeland Security, 

the focus that the Secretary put on this program, he made it a 

number one priority for the Administration, so that we were able 

to meet the date that was put in place in 2000, a modified version 

of section 110, which still held us to those dates. We were able to 

meet that date. 

So I think for those reasons we were delayed, we were challenged, but we were, thank goodness, able to succeed with the first 

increment of the process. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you. 
35

And then, finally, Mr. Martinez-Fonts, can you describe whether 

US-VISIT has adversely impacted foreign travel to the U.S.? And, 

specifically, has there been any evidence that there is a significant 

reduction in travel to the U.S. after the implementation of USVISIT? 

Mr. MARTINEZ-FONTS. We don’t have any solid evidence that that 

has been the case or that has been the cause of it. We have a lot 

of information on the land borders that it will create it, but there 

is really nothing at this point that would indicate that, that it has 

caused any of the downturn in travel. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you. 

I now turn to the Ranking Member, Ms. Jackson Lee, for questions. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me follow the line of reasoning that I offered in my opening 

statement that what we’re trying to do is to make this better or 

to really determine, factually determine whether or not there are 

some alternative systems that we should be considering. 

Mr. Jacksta, one of the points that I did make in my remarks 

was the issue of staff, and so I would be interested in knowing 

what staff increases are you anticipating to implement the USVISIT program at land ports in particular, and how much money 

are we talking about? 

Mr. JACKSTA. At the present time, there is no plans to put additional staff specifically for US-VISIT. We’re still working the process to understand exactly how the outbound process is going to 

work. 

On the inbound side of the house, we believe that we can handle 

the workload that’s going to be created on December 31st. So at the 

present time, there is no additional staffing being put specifically 

at the land border locations. 

But I think what’s important to note is that we are doing a couple of other things, and one of the things that we are doing is that 

we are training our inspectors. Remember that on March 1, 2003, 

we brought the Immigration and Customs Service together, and as 

a fact, we basically added a larger number of inspectors available 

to do the job at the land port of entries. We’re training them right 

now in what we’re calling the ‘‘One Face at the Border,’’ giving 

them training so that they can do both the Customs and Immigration processing. In addition, we’re giving them additional training 

so that they’ll be able to do the full range of the jobs that were normally done by Immigration. 

So that’s one of the ways that we’re going to multiply the——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Training existing inspectors? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I’m going to come back to you, Mr. Jacksta. 

Mr. Hite, how does that—what does that sound like to you in 

terms of being able to—we like to be called multi-tasked, but does 

that sound reasonable not having an increased number of staff for 

this program and to meet the deadline by the 31st, 2004, I understand? 

Mr. HITE. Well, certainly for the entry process, which involves 

very few people who are non-immigrant visa holders coming in 

across land borders, and those people will be going to secondary, 
36

so the expectation is it’s not going to be a large increase in volume 

there. However, it does depend on certain assumptions as to who 

will be US-VISIT’d. And it does not include, for example, those 

with border crossing cards, or it also includes an assumption that 

it takes about 15 seconds to process someone through US-VISIT, an 

additional 15 seconds. 

So it depends on the validity of those assumptions, which time 

will tell. The pilot test in Atlanta showed that it required an additional 19 seconds as opposed to 15, and analyses have showed that 

a very slight increase in processing time then starts to impact wait 

times in lines. 

So it is not an unreasonable assumption at this point, and as this 

program has evolved over the last year and will evolve over this 

time, as more and more information becomes known and decisions 

get made as to how exactly it’s going to be implemented in the different ports of entry, then those questions will become clearer. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just say to you that—if you will answer this question. You had noted that more than a hundred land 

ports of the city—of entry, of ports of entry have less than 50 percent of the required capacity to support current inspection processes and traffic levels. So I want you to just elaborate on that 

problem and explain what is needed in this regard. And then if Mr. 

Jacksta could finish, if I can come back to him, and I’m going to 

throw the question out, then you can answer. 

You mentioned in your statement that there have been 195 

verified lookout matches using US-VISIT. How many of those 

matches related to suspected persons of terrorists—suspected of 

being terrorists? And then give me your sense and what you are 

doing about the President’s representation to President Vicente Fox 

that he’s going to have some sort of free-for-all down at the southern border? Are you all working on that structure? Are we going 

to be advised as Members of Congress, on this Committee or Homeland Security, on where we are on that? Mr. Hite, can you just talk 

about what you were speaking about on the 50-percent capacity? 

Mr. HITE. Yes, ma’am. That number, that over a hundred land 

ports of entry have less than 50 percent of the capacity that they 

need, that number came from the DMIA task force. That’s not the 

result of our analysis. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, how will you address the problem that 

that poses? 

Mr. HITE. To be honest with you, I don’t have an answer to that 

question. It’s probably more appropriately posed to the DHS witnesses to how they intend to address that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And so you have just made—you just will continue to make an assessment of the problem? 

Mr. HITE. We will continue to monitor that problem and see 

what’s being done to address that limitation? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But it is one that you have noted? 

Mr. HITE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Jacksta, what about it, how would you address that, but also if you will explain about the 195 and the USVISIT? 
37

Mr. JACKSTA. Okay. One of the things, first of all, the easy question is that as of right now the 195 have not been—none of them 

have been identified as specific terrorists. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. JACKSTA. But these were individuals that were of real concern, and obviously when they get into the United States, they 

could be a threat at any given time. So although we couldn’t relate 

them to terrorists right now, clearly we want to stop them at the 

border. 

Regarding the issue of capacity as we move forward with the 

land border locations, obviously that’s a concern to CBP, to DHS. 

We want to make sure that we have the capacity to make sure that 

trade and travel doesn’t get inhibited by the program. We’re working very closely with the US-VISIT office to make sure that any 

type of issues that do come up get addressed so that when we move 

the program out, we’re ensuring that we’re working together to address both the facilitation side of the house as well as the enforcement side. And I think that before we do move out, we will make 

sure that we address those concerns and see if the areas that we’re 

moving to have that capacity, and if not, what do we need to do 

to make sure that the capacity is there to do the job that’s necessary for protecting our borders? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Could you answer the President’s proposal? 

Mr. JACKSTA. I think I would defer to Bob on that one in the 

sense that we are working with the foreign governments, the Administration is working with the foreign governments to try to address the whole issue of the land border, making sure we have a 

number of different initiatives. The Secretary has been involved 

with the Mexican Government as well as the Canadian Government on these issues. And I know that there’s a number of discussions to make sure that once again we continue with the facilitation, and at the same time the enforcement side of the house. And 

I think we can achieve that working together and having a good 

working relationship. 

Mr. MOCNY. Just to answer your specific question, are we addressing the issues post the President’s announcement, yes, we are. 

There are several working groups that are looking at, you know, 

how we would get individuals into a program such as this, some 

of the enforcement mechanisms that would have to be in place, how 

we would work with the private industry, how the Department of 

Labor would select the individual companies who might benefit 

from a temporary guest worker program. 

So there is a lot of active discussion going on within the staff 

level to be able to look at all of the things that pertain to standing 

up a program such as this. Yes, we are. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d direct my questions to 

Mr. Hite. 

Mr. Hite, you’ve issued two reports that have highlighted the 

risks of US-VISIT, and largely because of the scale and complexity 

of the initiative, and you have testified, and more recently, because 
38

of management the office for US-VISIT is understaffed and underfunded. In fact, isn’t the underfunding of US-VISIT staff very much 

a reaction by the appropriators to GAO’s earlier reports that you 

drafted? 

Mr. HITE. Congressman, that’s not my understanding at all. All 

we have provided the appropriators are the facts and our analysis 

of the facts, and the way that they, in fact, have reacted and used 

them, I cannot speak to. 

Mr. KING. And you wouldn’t have an opinion as to why the appropriators might have not been as active as they would have otherwise on the funding for US-VISIT? 

Mr. HITE. My understanding and my experience in working with 

the appropriators is that they are supportive of US-VISIT and 

want it to be done properly and successfully. And it’s also my understanding that the funding that has been asked for through the 

appropriations process has been granted or is in the process of 

being granted. 

Mr. KING. That wouldn’t be mine, but as the appropriations have 

not been up to standards, as has been testified to here, wasn’t that 

actual result to increase the risks rather than decrease the risks? 

Mr. HITE. If there are insufficient resources to properly approach 

this program and manage it in a rigorous and disciplined fashion, 

yes, sir, that would increase the risks. 

Mr. KING. Criticisms of the complications of this process might 

add to that. 

Mr. HITE. From our perspective, we weren’t criticizing the fact 

that it’s a complicated process, only that it in fact is, and there is 

an element of risk associated with doing something very hard and 

difficult, which argues more for having the right resources and the 

right controls in place to do it right. 

Mr. KING. Are shortcuts necessary to meet the statutory guidelines? 

Mr. HITE. On any program, when you are schedule-driven, what 

you run the risk of is compromising on scope of program in order 

to meet schedule. So that is a possibility, and certainly for Increment 1, while it was delivered largely on time as promised, there 

were certain elements of it that weren’t delivered on time. And, as 

an example, the exit capability was intended to potentially be part 

of Increment 1, and it was not part of Increment 1. And there were 

certain—there was a sub-system that was to be part of the integration of the systems that was not ready January 5th for deployment 

and was implemented February 11th. 

Those are the kinds of consequences of not having the resources 

to bring to the table in order to complete something on time. 

Mr. KING. Will your office then continue to emphasize the risks 

associated? 

Mr. HITE. Yes, sir, we will identify the risks and try to identify 

ways to mitigate those risks, and in this particular case, to ensure 

that that program office gets the resources it needs in order to execute its job. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Hite. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I thank the gentleman. 
39

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. 

Sa ́nchez, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have an opening 

statement that I would just ask unanimous consent to include in 

the record. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sa ́nchez follows in the Appendix] 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. My first question is for Mr. Hite. In your testimony you discussed the interfacing of several databases as part of 

US-VISIT, including ADIS, APIS, and IBIS, among others. When 

this Subcommittee held a hearing on the CLEAR Act, one of the 

major concerns was compromising the NCIS database, which is a 

criminal database, with immigration violations. 

I’d like your opinion as to what would be the impact of interfacing all of these databases into one system and whether or not 

any of them would be compromised or overloaded as a result of 

compiling them, and, if so, how that could potentially impact our 

national security? 

Mr. HITE. That’s a very good question, and when you address 

issues like that as to what’s the appropriate level of integration associated with multiple systems and multiple databases, you can’t 

presume that full integration of these is the best solution. It’s all 

driven by need and requirements associated with the missions that 

those systems support. And there are legitimate reasons why you 

separate databases and you separate systems and functions. 

So my position on that would be, in order to make an informed 

decision about what’s the proper level of integration among multiple systems, you have to take a top-down approach to identifying 

what’s the set of mission needs that we’re trying to satisfy and 

what’s the best allocation of functionality and data associated with 

that, and then you apply the appropriate level of security around 

those data sets. So there’s not a one-size-fits-all answer to that 

question. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. But if the database were—if we were to err on the 

side of overinclusiveness with the database, could that potentially 

pose a risk to our national security? 

Mr. HITE. I think if you integrate databases without considering 

the implications of what mixed data portends in terms of access, 

then, yes, you increase the risk of the security problem, which 

would definitely—potentially be a national security risk. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. Your testimony also raises concerns about 

the interfacing of several agencies with DHS and how mismanagement can result in inefficiency. Has the GAO to date conducted any 

research on the interface between US-VISIT and intelligence agencies? And if so, how effective has the interface been? And how, in 

your opinion, could it be improved? 

Mr. HITE. No, ma’am, we have not done any work regarding USVISIT and its integration with intelligence agencies. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Do you think that a study like that would be potentially helpful? 

Mr. HITE. It’s certainly a relevant question, that if I was the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security I would be focused 

on it, so, yes, in that regard, from a congressional oversight standpoint, it’s a relevant question. 
40

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. Thank you. 

My next question is for Mr. Jacksta. I’m concerned about the following up, the tracking that US-VISIT does at the entry phase, 

what you call the status management phase, after a foreign national has already entered the country. How does US-VISIT work 

with Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies to determine and differentiate between who is a national security threat 

and who is a visa overstay that means no harm to the country? 

Mr. JACKSTA. If it’s all right with you, I’d like to defer to Mr. 

Mocny. He’s specifically working on that issue. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Okay. We will pass. 

Mr. MOCNY. Thank you. The status management piece, it does 

occur after the person is admitted into the United States. What we 

are trying to achieve with that is to make sure that the US-VISIT 

system, and particularly the ADIS, or Arrival and Departure Information System, has the most up-to-date information about any 

given foreign national. I use the analogy of someone who wants to 

come to school here, but they don’t know which school they want 

to go to. So they come in as a B–2 or visitor as an intending student. They look throughout the country, and they find the school 

that they want to go to, and now they want to adjust status to an 

F–1 or a student. They would go into the Citizenship and Immigration Services offices to adjust their status from a B–2 to an F–1. 

When they came into the United States, Mr. Jacksta gave them 

6 months to leave the country as a B–2 visitor. We have to know 

now that that B–2 doesn’t have to leave after 6 months; they are 

here for the duration of status. And so we update the record to ensure that that person is not sought after by the Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement agents for spurious reasons. 

With respect to the tie-in to the intelligence agencies, again, we 

will work with the TTIC as it begins to stand up and as we begin 

to consolidate all the watchlist databases that would enable—perhaps not in the instance I just gave you, which is perhaps the more 

common one, but perhaps if there’s an adverse action, if a foreign 

national is, in fact, encountered by a law enforcement agent and/

or an ICE immigration agent, would that agent have the resources 

available to him or her to make a decision about, as I said, to release that individual or not? 

That is where we need to go. We don’t have that information. 

And so, oftentimes, an adjudicator today will grant a benefit, not 

being fully informed about what other information we may have on 

that foreign national, and very similarly, an ICE agent or any 

other law enforcement agent may make a decision about a foreign 

national without that full information. That is what US-VISIT is 

trying to overcome. It’s trying to provide the decision makers with 

the appropriate information so that they make fully informed decisions. 

So I don’t think we’re there yet where we’d like to be. That is 

certainly some place that we want to get to in the very near future. 

Ms. SA ́ NCHEZ. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon, for 5 minutes. 
41

Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a question for all of you, and I recognize in asking the 

question that you’re focused on border control as opposed to internal criminality. But I met recently with a group of people who head 

organizations that deal with immigrants who are here sometimes 

legally, sometimes illegally, and pointed out to them that there’s 10 

to 20 times the criminality among those groups who are here illegally as we have in the rest of the population. And after talking 

about profiling and about how things would work, I asked them if 

they wouldn’t like to see something happen to help solve the problem of criminals who are here in America living today who are 

typically preying on their own ethnic group. 

And I was really actually quite surprised at the reaction. We 

talked about US-VISIT and whether that, if you applied the program and could identify criminals and you could do it without 

profiling, could they support the program. I was amazed at how 

positive they were at that suggestion. 

Can each of you, given your different perspectives, talk about 

what the cost would be and what needs to be done and what the 

possibilities are of using the US-VISIT program possibly by enabling the local police forces to get an evanescent fingerprint from 

somebody they pull over because they have a broken tail light or 

something? And then if they match a database and meet certain 

criteria, they can be stopped and turned over to the Federal forces, 

or let go and their fingerprint disappears? Is that a possibility? 

What would it cost? Do we have—what databases do we need to 

integrate into US-VISIT to make that work? And is it at all feasible? 

Thank you. I’ll just listen to all of your answers as you wish. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Okay. I’d like to just quickly jump in and say that 

if a person is coming into the border, we would identify those individuals and we would prevent them. And I think that’s important 

to note. So at least there is a safeguard there that we can utilize 

that information. 

I think also, as we move forward with US-VISIT and we start 

doing it on the outbound side of the house, where individuals are 

leaving the United States, we would also be able to stop them and 

identify them at the port of entries and take appropriate law enforcement action. 

Regarding, I guess, the domestic enforcement of the program, I’m 

not really capable of explaining all the issues that may come up regarding privacy issues and issues along those lines. So I’m not 

working on that specific issue. Maybe the US-VISIT office is thinking about how they’re going to work with the State and locals and 

might be able to give you a little bit more information on that. 

Mr. CANNON. Let me just point out, again, I recognize the difference between the border and internal enforcement, and that 

they’re complicated, also that they may be very expensive. The 

question is: Is there something here that’s worth looking at? And 

have we made any progress—have we done any thinking about 

that? 

Mr. JACKSTA. I think I might want to add that the system works 

very well, so what lessons we’ve learned over the years at the ports 
42

of entry, at the borders, are lessons that probably would be very 

valuable to any type of domestic program as we move forward. 

Mr. CANNON. Thank you. Let me just point out for the record, I 

agree with that point, that we have learned a lot of lessons. And 

Mr. Hite talked about the cost and the complexity of a program, 

and that was a very interesting contribution. But, in fact, we have 

learned a lot, and so in that context, I’d like to hear from the others about what the possibilities are. 

Mr. MOCNY. I’d be happy to. We talk about five main business 

processes within US-VISIT. There’s pre-entry, which is what happens with the Department of State, and anything that happens 

prior to the individual getting here. There’s entry, which, of course, 

happens at the ports of entry, and that certainly is the focus today 

because that’s the first increment that we rolled out, was the ports 

of entry. There’s also then the status management that Ms. 

Sa ́nchez raised, exit, and then analysis. 

So those are five main business processes that we attain to the 

program, and it certainly does entertain the issue of using ICE 

agents. 

I mentioned that we do have an overstay list; we now can provide that information to a unit stood up within ICE, the custody 

of Compliance Enforcement Unit. Those agents then prioritize 

through a list of those people that they cannot find a departure 

record for, and then use the information that we’ve provided to 

them, be it an address or other contact information to actually go 

out and locate those individuals. 

So we have already begun to see a benefit of having online, not 

just in paper form, but online immediate access to those overstay 

information. It’s not obviously where we want to be. As I said before, we have to improve upon this. And to say that we now have 

this opportunity to do all the things that you just mentioned, to 

provide this information to that Kansas City cop at 3 o’clock in the 

morning who may, in fact, have in front of him someone that we 

have interest in, and to have him write a ticket and let that person 

go when, in fact, that may not be the best interest. 

So we will continue to work with ICE, we will continue to work 

with the Department of State to actually stop people before they 

get a visa. 

Mr. CANNON. Let me just make a distinction of what you said. 

You said stop somebody that you may have an interest in. Your interests are more narrow than what I’m going after, because I think 

society has an interest in getting violent criminals out, and then 

there are more and more, larger and larger groups that we may define as having an interest in. But those will tend to not be the 

groups that you’re looking at as a high priority. And so could you 

just address the ability to actually use that database for priorities 

that we may set in Congress or that a State may set and that you 

have the data and ability to support the enforcement of? 

Mr. MOCNY. Absolutely. We on a regular basis get downloads 

from the FBI, from the NCIC’s wanted files. So on a regular basis, 

Mr. Jacksta mentioned a few of them, and most of the 195 that we 

have detained have had active warrants from a State. So there was 

a crime that was committed in New Jersey, in San Diego, in Atlanta, and then we would extradite that individual. More recently, 
43

we had someone just the other day from New York. That person 

is detained then because that warrant from the State of New York 

is part of the process, part of the NCIC process. We then—and the 

State of New York did extradite that individual. We put a detainer 

on that individual. So after they’re satisfied that they have gone 

through the prosecution for that particular individual, we can then 

take that person and deport them as appropriate. 

So we do work through the NCIC, through the FBI. We are 

working with the individual States who provide information to us 

so that we can then take appropriate action when either they show 

up at a port of entry or that we find them in the interior of the 

United States. 

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think the clock was reset, 

and I am loath to abuse my time, but I do have a couple more 

questions. I’d like to hear from the rest of the panel if we could do 

that. I don’t know how you want to handle the clock. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. We’ll have a second round of questions. 

Mr. CANNON. Okay. Have I finished my 5 minutes? 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Yes. 

Mr. CANNON. Okay. Setting the clock actually helps because we 

know where it is. Thank you. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Arizona, Mr. Flake, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the Chairman and thank the witnesses. 

I am still having a hard time distinguishing between, you know, 

what’s happening on the southern border with the border crossing 

card, what’s happening with US-VISIT, what the timetable is. It 

seems a little unclear. 

As I understand it, a DHS fact sheet recently said that laser visa 

readers will be deployed at all land border points. Does that apply 

to the southern border as well? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Yes, sir. We are deploying a border verification system to read the BCC card. We hope to have them out at the 50 

largest land border locations by the end of June. Clearly, we’re 

going to be putting our emphasis on putting them out in the land 

border locations on the southern border initially. 

Mr. FLAKE. For example, I toured the port at San Luis by Yuma 

where thousands upon thousands come through between the hours 

of 3 and 6 a.m. to work in the fields and then return. Some are 

U.S. citizens. Some are legal permanent residents of the U.S. but 

live in Mexico because it’s cheaper. You have a mix of a lot of people that come through. 

Right now their card is simply checked visually, the picture on 

the card and what-not. When that person returns to Mexico at 

night or the next evening—they are given 72 hours to return. Is it 

checked or entered or anything at this point? 

Mr. JACKSTA. When they’re leaving the United States? 

Mr. FLAKE. Yes. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Presently, sir, we don’t do that unless we have a 

special enforcement action. 

Mr. FLAKE. So there’s no way to know if they stayed the 72 hours 

or longer? 

Mr. JACKSTA. That’s correct. 
44

Mr. FLAKE. When the visa reader—the laser visa reader is installed, will it check whether they’ve been in 72 hours? Automatically that information will be downloaded every time the card runs 

through the reader, correct? 

Mr. JACKSTA. The information that we obtain at the time that 

the person comes into the United States will verify that the person 

who is crossing the border and the card that they have are the 

same person. So we’ll identify them through the biometric fashion. 

We will not, currently, in the process that we’re putting out there, 

be able to say whether that person has overstayed previous times 

unless we have additional information. 

Mr. FLAKE. No, no, previous times I understand. But from the 

point where the visa reader is employed, say if it’s employed in 

June, from June onward, when that person returns then home, it 

will—they’ll run it through again, correct? 

Mr. JACKSTA. That’s correct. 

Mr. FLAKE. Okay. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Not when they’re leaving the United States. Only 

when they’re entering the United States. 

Mr. FLAKE. But not when they’re leaving. 

Mr. JACKSTA. That’s correct. 

Mr. FLAKE. But the visa says they’re eligible to be here for 72 

hours. 

Mr. JACKSTA. That’s correct. 

Mr. FLAKE. If they overstay, then, it’s just a freebie. 

Mr. JACKSTA. There’s no—currently, there’s no mechanism to determine whether they have overstayed their 72 hours. 

Mr. FLAKE. Wouldn’t it be possible to actually just run the card 

upon exit? If it’s a biometric card and it can—there’s downloadable 

information. Is that not possible? Or is that envisioned at some 

point? 

Mr. JACKSTA. I think it’s clearly possible, sir, but it does create 

a tremendous amount of workload issues regarding individuals 

starting a process where everybody who leaves the United States 

is checked. And I don’t think we want to do that right now on a 

regular basis. We can do it on special enforcement actions. 

Mr. FLAKE. How will the primary inspection process differ from 

what we have today? Say a car pulls through the station, will every 

person in the car have their cards checked when we have the visa 

readers installed, or just the driver? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Initially, sir, when the vehicle comes up, the inspector will ask the individuals for their identification and see it. 

If he has any concerns regarding any individuals, he would direct 

them to a secondary area. In the secondary area, that’s where we 

would read the border crossing card, not at the primary vehicle 

lane. 

Mr. FLAKE. You stated that border crossing cards will continue 

to be utilized along the southern border. We won’t use the USVISIT program or it won’t be photographed every time. But how 

will we know—I mean, we’ll have the biometric information on the 

BCC as it is right now. Every time a person goes through they will 

run that through when we have the visa reader, correct? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Yes. 
45

Mr. FLAKE. And if there’s a failure, they’ll have to go in and get 

screened again or reissue the card or just deny entrance? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Well, once again, when a person’s coming across, 

we’re not going to do every individual that comes across the border 

with the reader. We’re going to basically put it in the pedestrian 

lanes in our secondary areas. When individuals come across, the inspector is going to make a decision on whether there’s any concerns 

regarding the border crossing card or the individual. He or she can 

use that device at the primary. If there are any concerns or if 

there’s a false read or if there are concerns regarding the documentation, we would send the individual back to the secondary 

area where a more intense inspection and questioning would take 

place. 

Mr. FLAKE. Okay. So not everybody will have it read, just those 

identified by the screener as a possible threat or something out of 

character? 

Mr. JACKSTA. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. The Subcommittee will now turn to a second 

round of questions, and I would like to follow on the gentleman 

from Arizona’s line of questioning. 

A concern that I have is the exploitation of loopholes that are 

created in these various systems, and the US-VISIT program is an 

entry-exit program. As the gentleman pointed out in his line of 

questioning, for BCCs, for crossing cards, we don’t have an exit at 

this point to verify the exit of an individual. That’s of a concern to 

me. 

But, also, if we could show the border crossing card that’s been 

made available to us, when we talk about the use of biometric data, 

we have a photo and a fingerprint. The laser readers will read the 

data that’s on the card. The Border Patrol agent will review the 

photo, but there will be no actual verification that the biometric 

data—namely, the fingerprint—matches up with the fingerprint of 

the individual that is presenting the card. Is that correct? 

Mr. JACKSTA. No, sir. I believe that when the individual brings 

the card, the inspector will take the card, put it through the reader. The individual will put his finger on a reader, just like this 

here, and at that point the card and the finger of the individual 

should match. If they do not match at that point, the inspector 

would say, okay, time out here, let’s make sure we refer this person 

to a secondary area and do further inspection. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. And that will be done on every individual that 

comes through? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Not every individual, sir. Based on the issue of 

during the inspection process, during specific times of the days, we 

would send—we would use the machine. But every individual coming across the border is not going to have their BCC read. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Okay. And that would be on a random basis, 

some basis where we would pull an individual aside to run them 

through that process that you just mentioned. 

Mr. JACKSTA. Right. And there are certain times during the day 

when we’ll be able to do it for every traveler coming across. It’s an 

important tool. The inspectors are going to be utilizing it. The issue 

it comes down to is does everybody have to be read through that. 
46

There are certain things that the inspectors use, their intuition. 

There’s also factors that have to be taken a look if there is any concerns regarding any type of delays, what type of travelers would be 

needed to be checked. So it’s risk management. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. It’s possible that every cardholder will assume 

that they may be put into a line that’s taken and analyzed. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. JACKSTA. That’s correct. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. That’s good. 

One of the other areas that we talked about was the visa waiver 

program. Now, with the visa waiver program, an individual that 

comes into the country—let’s take Mr. Reid once again, Richard 

Reid, a British national. If he was able to obtain a passport of an 

individual who was very similar looking as him, because a visa 

waiver does not go through the participant does not go through the 

US-VISIT program, that individual, Richard Reid may look like the 

individual on the passport but will not be subject to the biometric 

data. And is that the case? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Once again, if he is a visa waiver individual coming under the visa waiver program and he has all the—he presents 

himself at the port of entry, the inspector would take a look at it, 

since he’s currently a visa waiver program, visa waiver countries 

are exempt from US-VISIT. It does not prevent the inspector, if 

necessary, sending him once again back to the secondary area, 

doing an inspection, taking a closer look. We have equipment out 

there for our offices that helps them discover any type of fraudulent documents or any type of concerns regarding the documents 

that are being presented. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. But we’re placing that burden on the agent 

themselves—is that correct?—as opposed to the US-VISIT. And I 

just want to clarify that because we very much depend on the Border Patrol and others to do that wonderful job. And the purpose for 

these systems are to aid them in that. And what we don’t want to 

have happen is we don’t want a terrorist or criminal or whoever 

to be able to exploit these loopholes, that if, in fact, we need to look 

at ways to get rid of these loopholes, whether it’s similar to the border crossing card where every individual from a visa waiver program country knows that they may be subject to that—that’s probably very controversial, which I’ve just said. But, still, it is an opportunity for that to be exploited. 

Are there any other programs, Mr. Jacksta, that you are familiar 

with that could be possibly exploited because we will not be subjecting them to US-VISIT? 

Mr. JACKSTA. Well, we always want to make sure that we have 

as much information as possible regarding an individual, and if we 

have additional information, it allows us to make a decision. Good 

documents, documents that contain biometrics are clearly the way 

that we would like to go where we could have the ability to identify 

individuals, the documents that they’re presenting. And I think the 

Administration is taking a look at a long-term goal to make sure 

that documents that are issued by foreign governments as well as 

our documents in the United States have some type of biometric 

chip. Maybe the US-VISIT office could add a little bit more on exactly what—when that will be happening. But, clearly, from CBP’s 
47

perspective and having an officer at the port of entry, the more information they have, the capabilities to identify that the documents 

are legitimate documents, to identify that the person who’s presenting the documents is actually the person who owns the documents, all enhances our security at the border. 

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Very good. Thank you. 

I don’t think we have any others. In conclusion, I want to thank 

you gentlemen all for your presence here today, and especially for 

your service to our country, and remind Members that all Members 

have 7 legislative days to enter into the record extraneous material 

and make and revise their statements. 

The business before the Subcommittee being completed, we are 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

The Department of Homeland Security launched US-VISIT at 115 airports and 14 

seaports on January 5, 2004. The stated objective for US-VISIT is to enhance the 

nation’s security while facilitating legitimate travel and trade through our borders. 

The security measures employed by this program begin overseas at the U.S. consular offices that issue visas. Digital fingerscans are taken at these offices and used 

to determine whether the applicant is on a database of known or suspected criminals or terrorists. When a foreign visitor with a visa reaches our border and seeks 

admission into the United States, the fingerscans are used to verify that the person 

seeking admission is the same person who received the visa, and another check is 

made for information about any involvement in terrorism or crime. I have heard 

positive things about the way the entry inspection part of the program is being implemented at airports, but the exit part of the program has not been developed fully 

yet. The real test, however, will be implementing the program at the land ports of 

entry. 

In FY 2003, 79% of all travelers seeking entry into the United States entered at 

a land port of entry. Land ports of entry are more problematic for US-VISIT than 

airports for a number of reasons. Traffic at these crossings consists of varying combinations of cars, pedestrians, bicycles, trucks, buses, and rail. Moreover, land ports 

pose difficult challenges to the creation of an automated alien tracking system due 

to their location, infrastructure, geography, and traffic volume, which can vary extensively among ports of entry. 

Congress has mandated that an automated entry-exit program be implemented at 

the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 31, 2004, and at all land ports of 

entry by December 31, 2005. I am particularly concerned with the viability of implementing the exit check piece of the program. In addition to the need for additional 

staff for exit checks that are not currently being done, the existing facilities at land 

points are inadequate. According to a study performed by the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, more than 100 of the land ports of entry have less than 

50% of the required capacity to support current inspection processes and traffic levels. Apparently, DHS plans to address this problem by constructing interim facilities 

at 50 ports of entry. 

I have asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to provide a witness at this 

hearing to discuss these and other problems in the US-VISIT program. Randolph 

Hite, the GAO Director of Information Technology Architecture and Systems issues 

will tell us about a report issued by GAO on September 2003, which describes the 

most significant challenges to implementing US-VISIT (GAO–03–1083). According to 

this report, which Director Hite will update today, the scope of US-VISIT is large 

and complex; it must meet a demanding implementation schedule; and its potential 

cost is enormous. The report indicates that many of the difficulties are inherent to 

the program and cannot easily be changed but others are attributable to an inadequate state of governance and management. The report casts doubt on whether 

US-VISIT will be able to measurably and appreciably achieve the Homeland Security Department’s goal of enhancing national security while facilitating legitimate 

travel and trade. 

Even if the Department of Homeland Security is successful in implementing USVISIT, the program may not make our country more secure in any significant way. 

In 1998, a Senate Judiciary Committee Report (No. 105–197) found that, ‘‘implementing an automated entry-exit control system has absolutely nothing to do with 

countering drug trafficking, with halting the entry of terrorists into the United 

States, or with any other illegal activity at or near the borders. An automated entry-
50

exit control system will at best provide information only on those who have overstayed their visas.’’ In its present form, US-VISIT only will apply to foreign visitors 

seeking admission on the basis of non-immigrant visas. It will not include aliens 

presenting lawful permanent resident documents or visitors from the 27 countries 

participating in the Visa Waiver Program. Most Canadians are not subject to USVISIT. I do not believe that we can rely on such a limited program to secure our 

borders, and I question whether the benefits justify the enormous cost of the program. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVE KING, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

Chairman Hostettler, Thank you for holding this hearing today. I am encouraged 

by the progress made in implementing US VISIT. I will carefully monitor the implementation of this program because I believe it is an essential component of our national security. 

I was concerned when Homeland Security Under Secretary Asa Hutchison recently announced that most Mexicans who currently hold a Border Crossing Card 

(BCC) will not be processed through US VISIT. I believe BCC holders must be processed though US VISIT. 

Under current law, Mexicans who use a BCC as a border crossing card can only 

travel for up to three days in a border zone (within 25 miles of the California, Texas 

and New Mexico border, and 75 miles of the Arizona border). How do we know 

whether these cardholders are complying with these restrictions? In addition, we do 

not know whether another person is posing as the card holder if fingerprints are 

not verified at each crossing. Currently, DHS inspectors only check a BCC holder’s 

picture by sight. 

I look forward to the day when US VISIT will ensure that no BCC holder stays 

illegally in the country for over their allotted 72 hours. I am encouraged by the 

progress in implementing US VISIT and will continue to follow it as it develops. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

I’d like to thank Chairman Hostettler and Ranking Member Jackson Lee for convening this oversight hearing for the Subcommittee to look at U.S. Visitor and Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), another Bush Administration program related 

to immigration and homeland security. So far this session, the intersection of homeland security and immigration has been the common theme of this Subcommittee’s 

hearings. We have held two hearings on funding for immigration in the President’s 

budget, a hearing on alien removal under Operation Predator, and now this hearing 

on the US-VISIT program. 

I give credit to the DHS and US-VISIT agents for their hard work in screening 

visitors. I also commend DHS for recognizing that many travelers across the Mexican border do not need to be fingerprinted and photographed to improve our safety. 

It goes without saying that beefing up our homeland security should be our number 1 concern. The question remains, how do we do that efficiently? I find that all 

of the Bush Administration’s programs the Subcommittee has reviewed to date raise 

serious questions about whether the programs are effective in fighting terrorism, 

and whether the Administration’s programs are stifling legitimate immigration and 

trade. 

The US-VISIT program raises these concerns as well. First of all, US-VISIT is a 

very expensive initiative that is not improving our security enough to justify the 

money we are putting into the program. Second, the US-VISIT program wrongly 

equates immigration with terrorism, and diverts federal resources away from programs and proposals that will make our country more secure. And finally, there is 

a danger that US-VISIT will hamper legitimate travel and trade. 

US-VISIT IS COSTLY, BUT NOT EFFECTIVE

The US-VISIT program is like many other immigration ‘‘enforcement’’ initiatives 

proposed by the Bush Administration, ineffective yet very costly. Last year, the Department of Homeland Security estimated that US-VISIT will cost $7.2 billion 

through fiscal year 2014, and even this estimate may be low. Needless to say, that 

is an enormous amount of money. But even Department of Homeland Security offi-
51

cials have confirmed that the US-VISIT program is not successfully identifying terrorists. 

At the February 25th hearing on immigration spending in President Bush’s budget, I asked Eduardo Aguirre, the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and Michael Dougherty, the Director of Operations at U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, how many terrorists had been identified and captured using 

the US-VISIT system. Their answer: zero. 

While I was not surprised that no terrorists have been caught using US-VISIT, 

I am perplexed at how the President can request $340 million in his FY’05 for a 

program that has not caught or identified a single terrorist. So the question is: if 

US-VISIT is not capturing terrorists, what is it doing? 

The answer I hear most often is that US-VISIT keeps tracks of who enters the 

United States and who overstays a visa. I understand the argument that tracking 

immigrants that enter the country, knowing who is here and who overstayed a visa 

makes our country safer. But simply knowing who has overstayed a visa is not 

going to prevent terrorist attacks. The tragic events of 9/11 proved that. 

We all know that many of the perpetrators of those horrible acts entered the 

country on legitimate visas and overstayed. If our intelligence agencies don’t have 

the resources to identify and remove terrorists, then overstay tracking doesn’t help 

to protect us. Therefore, tracking and keeping a database of entrants and visa 

overstays, like US-VISIT does, would not have prevented the attacks of 9/11 from 

happening and will not prevent future attacks. 

The recent bombings in Madrid and yesterday’s bombing in Iraq show that mere 

tracking of travelers will not provide safety for any country. If we want our homeland to be safe, we need security at our ports, at locations where terrorists can 

transport weapons, and at the potential terrorist targets. We also need intelligence 

to identify those who want to carry attacks out. 

FOCUS HOMELAND SECURITY ON TERRORISTS, NOT IMMIGRANTS

Another important and needed change, if we really want to improve our homeland 

security we need to put funds into comprehensive immigration reform, and intelligence and federal law enforcement efforts to identify and apprehend terrorists. Our 

homeland will not be secure if we commit our resources to deporting immigrants 

who are here contributing to our country. 

I’ve joined my fellow Democrats in repeatedly saying to the President if you want 

to reform our system, support good immigration bills like the DREAM Act and the 

AgJOBS bill. Also, by providing an earned legalization program for the immigrants 

who are here working and following our laws, we identify those visitors who mean 

to do this country harm and those that don’t. Equally important, reducing the visa 

backlog and allowing families to remain together while immigration applications are 

pending minimizes the incentive for illegal immigration. By implementing these 

ideas into law we allow our intelligence agencies to do their job finding terrorists. 

Good intelligence is the key to preventing terrorism. We have to combine our intelligence agencies with our international allies’ intelligence agencies to eliminate 

terrorist cells abroad before they attack. Here in the United States, our intelligence 

agencies must work with federal law enforcement agencies to target, apprehend, 

and bring to justice those terrorists who have managed to get into the country. This 

kind of focused, intelligence-based effort will make our homeland safer. 

Too many of the Bush Administration’s homeland security efforts do not make us 

safer because they fail to draw the distinction between immigration and terrorism. 

For example, our hearings on President Bush’s budget showed that the Bureaus of 

Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement are 

seeking the largest increases, $257 million and $281 million respectively, over the 

amounts those bureaus received in FY ’04. 

If the President wants $538 million more to apprehend, detain, and deport immigrants in this country, most of whom are here to work and provide for their families, 

he is not drawing the distinction between immigrants and terrorists. Unfortunately, 

the US-VISIT program fails to draw that distinction too. 

The US-VISIT program will spend billions of dollars to fingerprint, photograph, 

and read the biometric passports of tourists, visitors, and immigrants who are not 

threats to our national security. The overwhelming majority of visitors who cross 

our borders are here for legitimate travel, work, or study, and fingerprinting and 

photographing these visitors is not going to prevent a future terrorist attack. 

Another problem with US-VISIT is that DHS does not have the human resources 

to follow through on the visa overstays that are identified. Locating, detaining, and 

deporting visa overstays takes time and federal agents. The testimony we have 
52

heard from DHS officials suggests that they only have the manpower to locate and 

remove a fraction of the visa overstays that the US-VISIT program will identify. 

US-VISIT MAY HARM THE ECONOMY

Another concern that we must consider with the US-VISIT program is how this 

initiative will impact our economy. The US-VISIT program has the potential to have 

a very damaging impact on our travel and trade industries. I have already heard 

stories of airplanes landing at LAX in my district and the passengers having to remain on the plane at the gate for hours because of passenger screening backups. 

That’s just one airplane. If you multiply the hours passengers on one plane have 

to wait by all of the commercial flights into American airports, the delays would be 

astronomical and our airline industry, airline workers, and their families would suffer. 

CONCLUSION

I want the Members of the Committee and our witnesses to know that I want our 

country to be safe and I want to bring every person who threatens our national security to justice. I think that the agents of the Department of Homeland Security, 

including the men and women who implement US-VISIT, are doing their jobs and 

working hard to protect our country. However, I think that the Administration 

needs to review how it goes about protecting our homeland, and how their programs 

will effect immigration and tourism. 

All of us agree that we don’t want the events of 9/11, or the recent attacks in Madrid and Baghdad to occur anywhere again. I hope that as we discuss programs like 

US-VISIT we don’t forget about securing our ports and protecting our communities. 

Again, I thank the Chair and Ranking Member for the opportunity to express my 

views. I also thank our witnesses for being her today. I look forward to their testimony and responses to our questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE TRAVEL BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE

OVERVIEW

The Travel Business Roundtable (TBR) would like to thank Chairman Hostettler 

and Ranking Member Jackson Lee for holding this important hearing, and is 

pleased to have the opportunity to submit a statement for the record regarding the 

US VISIT program. TBR is a CEO-based organization that represents the diverse 

travel and tourism industry, with more than 85 member corporations, associations 

and labor groups. The travel and tourism industry is an engine for economic development and job creation. Some 17 million Americans are employed in travel and 

tourism-related jobs with an annual payroll of $157 billion. Travel and tourism is 

the first, second or third largest industry in 29 states and the District of Columbia. 

In the last decade, travel and tourism has emerged as America’s second largest services export and the third largest retail sales industry. Our industry is in 50 states, 

435 Congressional districts and every city in the United States. 

It is impossible to stress enough how important international visitors are to the 

health of our industry as well as the overall U.S. economy. From 2001 to 2002, 

international travelers to the United States dropped from 44.9 million to 41.9 million. International visitor spending in the U.S. over that time decreased from $71.9 

billion to $66.5 billion. And our travel trade surplus of $26 billion in 1996 plummeted to $5.5 billion in 2002. This continued downward trend of international visitor patterns has caused federal, state and local government travel-related tax receipts to decline from $95.5 billion in 2001 to $93.2 billion in 2002. Moreover, U.S. 

travel and tourism industry payrolls have dwindled from $160.3 billion in 2001 to 

$157 billion in 2002, and industry job growth remained stagnant at 17 million workers. 

TBR vigorously supports the efforts of Congress, the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department and the Bush Administration to establish and implement programs such as US VISIT to protect our country. However, it is vital that 

the agencies incrementally implementing these programs consider their collective 

impact on the traveling public. Being ever mindful of DHS Secretary Tom Ridge’s 

admonition about the need to create the proper balance between protecting our 

homeland and promoting free and open commerce, TBR’s goal is to ensure that the 

paramount objective of protecting our nation’s security is pursued in a manner that 

is effective, coherent and does not unnecessarily compromise our economic vitality. 
53

US VISIT

The US VISIT program was officially launched on January 5, 2004 at 115 airports 

and 14 seaports. The system, created by Congress to better track foreign travelers 

crossing our borders, requires all visitors entering the U.S. with a visa to submit 

biometric identifiers at ports of entry. The initial phase requires two fingerprint 

scans and a digital photograph. 

Thus far in its implementation, significant delays have not been reported. However, TBR is concerned that the program’s technological ability may not be able to 

incorporate significantly more travelers during peak travel seasons. We are also concerned that, as more information is added to the database, search times may become 

lengthy and delays may occur. 

The exit component of US VISIT, a self-service kiosk, is currently in testing at 

Baltimore-Washington International Airport and Miami’s seaport. TBR has heard 

reports that the system, because it is voluntary in nature and many travelers are 

not aware of the need to ‘‘check out,’’ may require personnel to guide passengers 

through it in a timely manner. Thus far in the pilot program, many travelers have 

simply failed to notice the kiosks, which may create problems for them upon reentry in the U.S. through no fault of their own. 

In testimony before the House Select Homeland Security Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security on January 28, 2004, James May, president and CEO 

of the Air Transport Association of America and a TBR member, expressed concern 

that the burden of directing travelers through the exit program might fall on airline 

personnel. TBR agrees that the airline industry should not bear this responsibility. 

In the event of excessive wait times at airports and seaports, DHS has created 

a contingency plan for mitigating delays. The plan would exempt select travelers 

from US VISIT screening if delays exceed one hour. DHS Under Secretary Asa 

Hutchinson testified at the same subcommittee hearing that this system was developed as a precaution and has not been implemented to date. TBR is concerned that 

this contingency response does not adequately address security objectives and believes a more appropriate response would be the addition of staff and capacity during excessive wait times in order to conduct necessary screening. 

US VISIT at our land borders is still being evaluated, with deadlines for its capabilities to be in place at the 50 busiest ports of entry by December 31, 2004 and 

all remaining land borders by December 31, 2005. TBR believes that adequate staffing and technology must be put in place prior to implementation so that our land 

borders are not gridlocked. 

THE POTENTIAL NEXUS WITH BIOMETRIC PASSPORTS

The October 26, 2004 deadline requiring travelers from Visa Waiver Program 

(VWP) countries to present passports with biometric identifiers coincides with the 

extended deadline for all VWP passports to be machine readable. A potential crisis 

was avoided with the delay of the machine readable passport (MRP) deadline last 

October. However, the new biometrics deadline still looms on the horizon. While 

TBR supports the implementation of these technologies for strengthening security 

at our nation’s borders, we are concerned that enforcing such requirements without 

allowing sufficient time to meet them will harm our industry, the U.S. economy and 

our nation’s image around the world. TBR supports the immediate passage of legislation that would allow VWP countries sufficient time to meet the biometrics requirement either by postponing the deadline until a date when a majority of the 

countries estimate they can be compliant or by constructing an incremental waiver 

program whereby each country’s deadline is determined by its progress toward 

meeting the specified requirements. 

The Bush Administration is reportedly considering a solution to the biometrics 

issue that would involve extending the existing deadline to a yet-unspecified date 

while simultaneously requiring all VWP citizens to enroll in the US VISIT program. 

This would subject VWP visitors to the same fingerprint and facial recognition requirements that travelers who carry visas currently face. 

While the issue of the biometrics deadline for the VWP countries is significant, 

TBR believes that the inclusion of VWP travelers in the US VISIT system, by itself, 

could also create strong negative impacts. Attitudes abroad toward collection of personal data by the U.S. government and the suspect capacity of the US VISIT system 

to absorb another 13 million travelers without causing significant delays, could lead 

international travelers to eliminate the U.S. as a potential travel destination altogether. We urge Congress to pass a clean extension of the biometric passport deadline for VWP travelers that does not require their inclusion in the US VISIT program. 
54

CONCLUSION

According to reports from DHS, US VISIT has already uncovered 30 known criminals and is building on its suspected terrorist watch list. TBR is pleased with this 

success and with the lack of reported significant delays at ports of entry. However, 

it is critical that all aspects of the system function in accordance with one another 

in order to monitor our borders and protect our homeland effectively. Therefore, it 

is vital that DHS conduct a thorough evaluation of the US VISIT system in its initial implementation phase at airports and seaports to determine where problems 

might exist, develop projections of capacity for inclusion of additional classes of travelers, test concepts for future implementation phases before they are undertaken 

and set realistic staffing goals to ensure the success of this endeavor. 

A variety of other homeland security issues continue to dominate the travel and 

tourism industry’s legislative agenda. In addition to US VISIT, changes to the Visa 

Waiver Program (VWP) and other non-immigrant visa policies, the introduction of 

the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening (CAPPS II) initiative and other programs collectively place travel and tourism at the vortex. Unique challenges attendant to each, when combined with overlapping common concerns, demand a coherent 

and harmonized approach to problem solving. TBR has developed a white paper titled Homeland Security Policy and the Travel and Tourism Industry: Finding the 

Proper Balance, which examines these issues in greater detail. The paper is available on TBR’s website, www.tbr.org. 

TBR stands ready to work with Congress, the State Department, the Department 

of Homeland Security and other relevant federal entities to ensure that those who 

wish to do harm to our nation are prevented from traveling to the U.S., while those 

who seek to visit our country for legitimate reasons are treated respectfully and are 

admitted in an efficient manner. We appreciate the Committee’s attention to these 

pressing matters and offer our assistance in any way. 

MEMBERSHIP

Jonathan M. Tisch 

Chairman, Travel Business Roundtable 

Chairman & CEO, Loews Hotels 

Affinia 

American Airlines 

American Express Company 

American Gaming Association 

American Hotel & Lodging Association 

American Resort Development Association 

American Society of Association Executives 

Amtrak 

Asian American Hotel Owners Association 

ASSA ABLOY Hospitality 

Association of Corporate Travel Executives 

Business Travel News 

Capital Management Enterprises 

Carey International 

Carlson Hospitality Worldwide 

Cendant Corporation 

Choice Hotels International 

The Coca-Cola Company 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 

Delaware North Companies Inc. 

Detroit Metro Convention and Visitors Bureau 

Diners Club International 

Fairmont Hotels & Resorts 

FelCor Lodging Trust 

Four Seasons Regent Hotels & Resorts 

Greater Boston Convention & Visitors Bureau 

Greater Fort Lauderdale Convention & Visitors Bureau 

Greater Miami Convention & Visitors Bureau 

Gucci 

The Hertz Corporation 

Hilton Hotels Corporation 

Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union 

HRW Holdings, LLC 

Hyatt Hotels Corporation 
55

Inc Magazine 

InterContinental Hotels Group 

International Association of Convention and Visitors Bureaus 

International Council of Shopping Centers 

International Franchise Association 

Interstate Hotels & Resorts 

Interval International 

JetBlue Airways Corporation 

Las Vegas Convention & Visitors Authority 

Loews Hotels 

LA INC, The Convention and Visitors Bureau 

Lufthansa Systems North America 

Mandalay Resort Group 

Marriott International Inc. 

Maryland Office of Tourism Development 

McDermott, Will & Emery 

The Mills Corporation 

Nashville Convention and Visitors Bureau 

National Basketball Association 

National Business Travel Association 

National Football League 

National Hockey League 

National Restaurant Association 

Nederlander Producing Company of America 

New York University 

Northstar Travel Media, LLC 

NYC & Company 

Omega World Travel 

Pegasus Solutions, Inc. 

Philadelphia Convention and Visitors Bureau 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP 

Smith Travel Research 

Starwood Hotels & Resorts 

Strategic Hotel Capital Inc. 

Taubman Centers, Inc. 

Tishman Construction Co. 

United Airlines 

Universal Parks & Resorts 

United States Chamber of Commerce 

United States Conference of Mayors 

USA Today 

Vail Resorts, Inc. 

Virginia Tourism Corporation 

Walt Disney Parks and Resorts 

Washington D.C. Convention and Tourism Corporation 

Waterford Group, LLC 

WH Smith USA 

World Travel and Tourism Council 

Wyndham International 

Zagat Survey, LLC

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE TRAVEL INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

The Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) submits the following comments 

for the record. 

TIA is the national, non-profit organization representing all components of the 

$528 billion U.S. travel and tourism industry. TIA’s mission is to represent the 

whole of the travel industry to promote and facilitate increased travel to and within 

the United States. Our more than 2,000 member organizations represent every segment of the industry throughout the country. 

International business and leisure travel to the U.S. is a vital component of our 

national economy. In 2002, over 42 million international visitors generated $83.5 

billion in expenditures, $12 billion in federal, state and local tax revenue, and accounted for one million jobs nationwide. International travel and tourism to the U.S. 

is a service export, and in 2002, generated a positive balance of trade of $5.5 billion. 

International visitation has continually declined over the past three years. Overseas travel to the U.S. was down 31.8% in 2003 compared to 2000 levels. This de-
56

cline has drastically reduced the flow of tax revenue to all levels of government and 

reduced our international balance of trade. Since 2000, the loss of international 

travel to the U.S. has cost our economy $15.3 billion in expenditures. 

The decline in travel is due to a variety of reasons, including fear of travel because of terrorism, a downturn in the global economy and confusion over new U.S. 

visa and border security procedures. While some of the causes are beyond the reach 

of an individual country, actions by the U.S. government can either enhance or 

harm our nation’s ability to attract increased international travel to the U.S. and 

create more jobs and economic opportunities for states and cities across the country. 

For this reason, the US-VISIT program must be implemented with traveler facilitation as one of its primary goals. Otherwise, international travelers might not wish 

to return to the U.S., or may be deterred from visiting in the first place. 

TIA supports the US-VISIT program as envisioned for airports and seaports. TIA 

believes that the program meets the Department of Homeland Security’s dual missions of enhancing the nation’s security and protecting the economy. By developing 

a system that verifies the identity of travelers quickly and efficiently, US-VISIT 

adds to the protection of the homeland while ensuring the continuous flow of legitimate international travelers entering and exiting the country. 

However, TIA does have several concerns about the implementation of the USVISIT program. Congress should seriously consider these issues as the program 

moves forward. 

POSTPONE DEADLINE FOR BIOMETRICS PASSPORTS

The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 introduced a 

new security element to traveler documentation which is a fundamental component 

of the US-VISIT program: biometric identifiers. Capturing a person’s biometric and 

using it as part of the entry process will allow inspection officials to know the person before them is the same person to whom the passport or visa was issued. Biometrics are just now being incorporated into newly-issued U.S. visas. They will also 

be required in all new passports issued by the 27 countries participating in the Visa 

Waiver Program beginning on October 26, 2004. 

TIA supports the use of biometrics in travel documents. However, most of the Visa 

Waiver Program countries will not be ready to issue these newer biometric passports until late 2005 at the earliest. Missing the deadline would mean that many 

leisure and business travelers from those countries would have to obtain visas for 

entry into the U.S. The State Department estimates that as many as 5 million VWP 

travelers would be affected by this deadline. 

Forcing Visa Waiver Program travelers to get visas will deal a crippling blow to 

an already ailing travel industry. Approximately two-thirds of all overseas (excluding Canadian and Mexican) business and leisure travelers, or nearly 13.5 million 

visitors, enter the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program. Overseas travel to our nation is already down 32% over the past three years. Additional losses will send even 

more workers from the travel and tourism industry to the unemployment line. It 

is unrealistic to expect travelers accustomed to visa-free travel to spend the money 

and time to obtain a U.S. visa to visit our country. Especially when these travelers 

have many other appealing international destinations that are visa-free. Additionally, the State Department lacks the capacity to meet this potential increase in demand. A loss of those 5 million travelers would cost the U.S. economy $15 billion 

in sales and thousands of jobs. 

It is important to note that the U.S. Department of State will not be able to start 

issuing biometric passports until well after the October deadline. While the State 

Department is not required by law to do so, it is hypocritical for the U.S. to require 

other countries to do what we cannot. 

The October 26 deadline is a Congressional mandate. The Administration does not 

have the authority to extend the deadline. Therefore, TIA calls on the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims to support at least a oneyear extension of the October 26 deadline. By doing this, Congress will provide the 

time necessary to allow these important trade and political allies to begin producing 

passports in a way that will not discourage inbound international travel to the U.S. 

CONCERN OVER DELAYS

TIA is very pleased that enrollment in the program has only added an average 

of 10 to 15 seconds to the normal inspection process. We commend Homeland Security for their efficiency. 

It is critical that this level of performance be maintained during peak travel periods and also when the U.S. travel and tourism industry recovers its lost market 

share. As stated above, overseas travel to the U.S. has dropped by approximately 
57

one-third over the past three years. TIA is concerned that Homeland Security will 

not have sufficient personnel to maintain a 15-second US-VISIT inspection time 

when international visitation returns to 2000 levels. TIA urges Congress to provide 

adequate funding so that Homeland Security will have sufficient inspectors available to immediately meet the demands of peak travel periods. 

While TIA is pleased with the efficiency by which individuals are processed, TIA 

also believes it is important to process entire flights in a timely manner. The time 

an individual spends at primary inspection is not the only time issue. There is also 

the concern over how long an individual waits to finally reach a primary inspection 

booth. TIA supports the original Congressionally mandated goal of a maximum wait 

of 45 minutes per individual. Although this mandate was repealed in the Enhanced 

Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (PL 107–173), TIA believes it 

is still a useful and important goal for Customs and Border Protection inspectors 

to meet. TIA urges Congress to allocate funding to provide sufficient inspectors for 

the US-VISIT program both to meet the 15-second individual inspection time and to 

keep the wait in line to under 45 minutes. 

If primary inspection is perceived to be too much of a hassle, many visitors will 

be discouraged from returning to the U.S. in the future. Additionally, long lines at 

primary inspection can create a chaotic environment that is both disruptive and 

places pressure on inspectors to shorten their review of travelers. It is critical that 

the US-VISIT program have the requisite staff to keep wait times and inspection 

times to a minimum. Otherwise, both our security and our economy will suffer. 

OUTREACH TO TRAVELING PUBLIC

TIA urges Homeland Security to increase efforts to educate the international traveling public about the US-VISIT program. International travelers coming to the U.S. 

for business and pleasure should be told who is impacted, and who is not impacted, 

by this new program. Visitors need to understand in advance what to expect in the 

process, and what they can do to make the process go more smoothly. 

The international traveling public increasingly perceives that the myriad of new 

security rules is creating a ‘‘Fortress America.’’ International travelers do not just 

consider the impact of a single rule, but view all rules and programs in total. They 

have noted the increase in visa fees, new visa interview requirements and growing 

visa denials. They are also aware of machine-readable passport deadlines, the future 

use of biometric identifiers in U.S. visas and Visa Waiver passports, collection and 

use of advance passenger information, or API, along with US-VISIT. 

By and large, these new rules and requirements make sense from a homeland security perspective, and TIA supports these efforts to enhance national security. But 

for many prospective international visitors, wave after wave of new travel requirements paint a ‘‘big picture’’ that the United States is becoming a destination that 

is too difficult to enter, too expensive to visit and simply not worth the effort. In 

their opinion, the ‘‘welcome mat’’ has been pulled. TIA has heard accounts of how 

this negative perception has resulted in lost business. While the Department of 

Homeland Security cannot respond to every misperception and rumor, the opportunity exists to set the record straight on the US-VISIT program and tell international travelers exactly what the program is and who it affects. 

In conclusion, Congress must act in two areas to ensure the continued success of 

the US-VISIT program and allow the U.S. to remain a viable destination for international travelers. Congress must act immediately to extend the October 26 deadline on biometric passports by a minimum of one year. Congress also must ensure 

that the US-VISIT program has sufficient funds and personnel to meet security and 

efficiency objectives. TIA also urges the Department of Homeland Security to increase outreach and education efforts to the international traveling public.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDEL K. JOHNSON

On behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, I would like to request that this 

statement be made part of the record of the hearing entitled ‘‘US VISIT: A Down 

Payment on Homeland Security.’’ The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the world’s 

largest business federation, representing more than 3 million businesses. The 

Chamber’s federation includes state and local chambers throughout the United 

States and 96 American Chambers of Commerce overseas. The Chamber’s membership includes businesses and organizations of every size and in every sector of the 

economy. Chamber members with interest in the US-VISIT system include companies and organizations in the travel and tourism industries, companies that import 

or export goods and services through our ports of entry, companies that do business 
58

1 Americans for Better Borders, www.abbcoalition.org. 2Data Management Improvement Act Task Force Second Annual Report to Congress, Department of Homeland Security, December 2003. 3The Chamber’s concerns are no different from those expressed by Congress when it created 

the Department of Homeland Security. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the new Department, among other things, the mission to: ‘‘ensure that the overall economic security of the 

United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.’’ Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 101(b)(1)(F). In addition, the responsibilities of the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security specifically state ‘‘In carrying out the foregoing 

responsibilities [relating to border and transportation security], ensuring the speedy, orderly, 

and efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce.’’ Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 402(8). 

with international customers and clients, and companies that employ an international workforce. Chamber members on both the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada 

borders, including local chambers of commerce and American Chambers of Commerce abroad that conduct business between the United States and other countries, 

also have a great interest in the implementation and efficiency of the US-VISIT system. 

I am also the chair of the Americans for Better Borders (ABB) coalition, which 

unites regional business organizations and a wide array of companies and national 

trade associations representing manufacturing, hospitality, tourism, transportation, 

recreation and other industry sectors to work to ensure the efficient flow of exports 

and tourism across our borders while addressing national security concerns. The 

ABB coalition was originally founded in 1998 out of concern for the impact of implementation of the original entry-exit provision of Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.1

The Chamber and the ABB coalition were instrumental in the creation and passage of the Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000, which set the current deadlines for implementation of the US-VISIT program and established the 

DMIA Task Force, a public-private group chartered in 2001 by the Attorney General 

to evaluate and make recommendations on how the flow of traffic at United States 

airports, seaports, and land border Ports-of-Entry (POE) can be improved while enhancing security. I was privileged to be named by the Attorney General to represent 

the U.S. Chamber on the Task Force in 2002. The Task Force submitted two reports 

to Congress, one in 2002 and one in 2003. The 2002 report focused on what was 

then the entry-exit system and detailed numerous challenges to implementing such 

a system, including the differentiation required for the modes of entry, land, sea, 

and air, and differences between the northern and southern land border environments. In 2003, the Task Force report detailed the significant challenges facing our 

ports of entry in terms of infrastructure and technology and the need for greater 

cooperation and coordination among federal agencies with border responsibilities, 

with state and local governments, and the private sector. Significantly, in reviewing 

the progress to date on the US-VISIT system in 2003, the Task Force report included the following recommendation:

That the first phase at air and sea [Ports of Entry] be reviewed and evaluated 

no later than 6 months after implementation by an independent body. This 

evaluation must consider the program’s effect on national and economic security 

and international trade and travel. Congress should consider any recommendations from the independent review and evaluation and also reconsider deadlines 

for all other entry/exit statutory requirements. It is further recommended that 

any mandates in this area receive appropriate funding.2

The Chamber, its members, and the ABB coalition fully support the efforts of the 

Department of Homeland Security to improve the security at our ports of entry and 

borders. The purpose of my testimony today is not to denigrate the outstanding efforts of the Department to meet its difficult statutory and security mandates to protect our borders. We do not oppose the US-VISIT system; the Department has 

worked hard over the last year to listen to the concerns of business and has made 

significant strides in adopting systems that attempt to balance the need for security 

and the continued facilitation of legitimate travel at our ports of entry. However, 

the U.S. Chamber and its members remain very concerned that, if the US-VISIT 

system is implemented improperly, we risk serious economic harm by impeding the 

billions of dollars in cross-border trade (particularly at our land borders) and deterring the millions of legitimate visitors to our country, who also spend billions of dollars within our borders.3

Before moving into the details and the numbers, however, I do wish to emphasize 

that there is more at stake here than dollars and cents. As a member of the DMIA 

Task Force, I was privileged to visit many of the border cities, north and south, and 

to meet with businesses, chambers of commerce, and individuals which will be di-
59

4Technology is wonderful, but it will never be a complete panacea as we live in an imperfect 

world. As the Los Alamos technical support team noted in the DMIA Task Force’s 2003 report 

to Congress, ‘‘Border operations goals are dauntingly diverse and, therefore, present unusually 

challenging opportunities that cannot be addressed solely through technological means.’’ Data 

Management improvement Act Task Force Second Report to Congress, December 2003, Information Technology Consultant Analysis Summary Report, p. 32. 5 ‘‘ ‘It is a problem with the VISIT system that visa waiver travelers are not enrolled,’ [Assistant Secretary for border policy and planning at the Department of Homeland Security, Stewart 

Verdery] said. ‘We’ve been talking to [the visa waiver countries] about various options on how 

that can happen.’ . . . [Verdery] said a policy that allows U.S. citizens traveling within the 

Western Hemisphere and citizens of Canada and other neighboring countries to enter the 

United States without showing passports could soon change.’’ (Jeremy Torobin, ‘‘U.S. Proposes 

Stationing Passenger Screeners in Foreign Airports,’’ CQ HOMELAND SECURITY, February 

18, 2004). This would not be a small expansion of those covered as visa waiver admissions were 

more than 13 million in 2002 (2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, October 2003). 

rectly impacted by US-VISIT. From these visits, it is clear that there is more involved here than just commerce. These communities are so intertwined with those 

across the border that a way of life is endangered, a recognition that not just jobs, 

but whole lives will be changed along with the fabric and social underpinnings of 

communities. 

These visits also revealed a skepticism of government, its promises, and its understanding of not only what is at stake under US-VISIT, but the extreme practical 

difficulties that need to be dealt with in effectively processing the massive traffic 

at our borders, together with an unrealistic belief in the infallibility of technology. 

Technology in a laboratory operating under pristine conditions under the direction 

of a well-trained operator may work well in theory. But, will it be a solution that 

meets real life demands in outdoor, dusty, alternatively extremely cold and extremely hot conditions, staffed by personnel who will, despite their best intentions, 

encounter malfunctions and human error in the processing of millions of border 

crossers? 4

Phrased differently, will the promises of the government be met when the rubber 

really meets the road? They may be, but there is a skepticism that you will hear 

today wondering if it is all possible, particularly under existing deadlines. And it 

is not an overstatement to say that there is literally no room for error. 

Lastly, there is a concern that the government will act too hastily, without sufficient planning and testing, for fear that any delay in meeting deadlines will result 

in criticisms that ‘‘it is weak on security.’’ We would hope that this would not be 

the case, but this fear, in a political environment, is understandable. However, the 

stakes are simply too high to allow this to occur and we would hope that the very 

real concerns over US-VISIT can be weighed in a bipartisan manner. 

Air and Sea Ports 

We submitted comments to the Department of Homeland Security on its interim 

final rule implementing the US-VISIT requirements for visa travelers at air and sea 

ports on February 4, 2004. I believe the committee has copies of these comments, 

but I would briefly like to highlight some of our concerns regarding the air implementation here today. 

First, although major delays in international arrivals have not been reported from 

the implementation at US-VISIT at airports (we do not have information about the 

seaport implementation), we are extremely concerned about the capacity of the system to absorb additional travelers and additional data. This concern arises both on 

the technology and personnel, and infrastructure level. 

The US-VISIT program has so far been operational only during the lowest period 

for international travel to the United States during the year. As travel season picks 

up this spring and summer, we expect additional travelers to arrive requiring enrollment in US-VISIT. In addition, we understand that while the system currently 

is only required of persons holding visas entering the United States, the Department intends to eventually include all non-citizen entrants, with persons from the 

Visa Waiver Program countries next.5 To our knowledge, the Department has not 

demonstrated that its system can meet this extra load. 

We noted that Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as an insurance against 

delays, deployed additional personnel to airports in the initial days of the US-VISIT 

implementation. We also understand that some of this additional staffing has since 

been rescinded. If additional travelers during peak season or additional classes of 

travelers are required to be enrolled in the US-VISIT system, we would strongly 

urge CBP to devote adequate staff to ensure expeditious processing of all international travelers. 
60

6Transcript of Hearing before the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security of the 

Select Committee on Homeland Security, January 28, 2003, Dennis Carlton of the International 

Biometrics Group, LLC: ‘‘As the size of the database gets bigger, the limited amount of data 

that can be acquired from the two fingerprints means that the system is going to start returning 

more and more false matches, because there just isn’t sufficient data to find the matching record 

in the database.’’ 7Data Management Improvement Act Task Force First Annual Report to Congress, December 

2002, p. 11. 8Source: PAS G–22.1 INS Statistics, cited in Data Management Improvement Act Second Annual Report to Congress, December 2003, p. 15. 

We are also concerned about the technical capacity of the system to expeditiously 

process larger numbers of travelers. As more and more individuals are added to the 

US-VISIT biometric databases, in particular the ‘‘watch list’’ databases against 

which a traveler’s biometrics are checked, the time required to return a ‘‘match’’ or ‘‘non-match’’ is likely to increase, unless the capacity of the system is adequate. We 

do not know the specific technical capacities of the databases to support thousands 

of extensive searches conducted simultaneously at ports across the country and return accurate data, but the concern about the time taken for the database search 

and the accuracy of the data was expressed recently in testimony before the House 

Homeland Security Committee.6

We also have concerns about the proposed exit system for air and sea ports, which 

is still in the development phases. The current system of exit confirmation is the 

testing of self-service kiosks located near the passenger security checkpoints at airports. While the concept of a self-service checkout is appealing, and certainly is the 

least likely to cause disruption or additional backups for departing travelers, the 

lack of information provided to travelers and the seeming ‘‘voluntariness’’ of the system may, in fact, reduce the effectiveness of the exit system in actually recording 

departures. The self-service kiosk also provides the traveler with no documentary 

evidence that he or she has complied with the exit verification, and, therefore, 

should any discrepancy arise, the traveler will be at a loss to prove compliance. 

Given these discrepancies, any method of exit verification must include clear directions to the traveler upon entry as to the need to ‘‘check out’’ upon departure and 

the means by which to do so. Since initially the exit capability will not be available 

at all airports, we predict a great deal of confusion by travelers as to the exit requirement. We have already received questions via our American Chambers of Commerce overseas regarding whether travelers must exit from designated airports, and 

if they do not, how their exit will be registered and whether it will impact their ability to return to the United States in the future. A great deal of outreach to travelers 

(in multiple languages) must be made to avoid inadvertent noncompliance with any 

requirements for exit verification. We would strongly urge a period of time during 

which any negative impacts from failure to register are waived until it is clear that 

most travelers understand and are able to comply with the exit requirements. 

Land Borders 

Of course, the largest challenge to the US-VISIT program remains the land borders. The circumstances of travel at land borders are monumentally different than 

at air and sea ports and the hurdles are immeasurably higher. The unique situation 

of the land borders was discussed extensively in the 2002 DMIA Task Force Report 

to Congress. The report stated:

There is a marked difference between an inspection conducted at an air or sea 

POE [port of entry] and one conducted at a land border. Because of their varied 

status, divergent points of origin, unfamiliarity with requirements and regulations, and the increased risk to the U.S., most applicants for admission at seaports and airports receive a comprehensive inspection that includes mandatory 

data systems checks. In contrast, the great majority of persons arriving at land 

border POEs are residents of the border area who cross frequently and are familiar with requirements concerning their entry into the U.S. and receive an 

inspection that may include data systems checks. The vast majority of all border crossings into the U.S. occur at land border POEs. . . . Border traffic includes U.S. citizens who leave and reenter the U.S. multiple times daily, permanent residents who make multiple entries, and aliens who hold non-immigrant 

visas or border crossing cards and commute back and forth daily or weekly from 

Canada or Mexico. Individuals can cross land borders as pedestrians, on bicycles, in cars, rails, buses, trucks, or other vehicles.7

In fact 80% of all inspections take place at the land borders; over 358 million inspections in 2002 were conducted at land borders, compared to 78 million at airports 

and 12 million at seaports.8 The land borders also see the crossing of $540 billion 
61

9 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation, North American 

Merchandise Trade by U.S. State and All Land Modes, 2002, www.bts.gov/ntda/tbscd/reports/

annual02/state/us—trade—2002—all.html. 10 Response to survey by Miguel A. Conchas, President and CEO of the Laredo Chamber of 

Commerce, February 2004. 11Patrick, Dr. Michael, ‘‘The Price of Security,’’ Inlandport: The Laredo Chamber’s Business 

and Trade Magazine, January/February 2004. 

in surface trade between the United States, Canada and Mexico.9 As these facts and 

statistics reveal, the land borders represent a significantly larger challenge for the 

Department in order to ensure that the implementation of US-VISIT does not impede legitimate commerce and travel. 

This testimony has given us the opportunity to reach out to the state and local 

chambers of commerce on the land borders to assess the concerns they have about 

the impact of the US-VISIT system to their communities. In the short period of time 

we had to conduct our survey, we found that the volume of trade and economic activity that is at risk at the border is enormous, as are the parallel concerns over 

the possible impact of US-VISIT. We have attached to this testimony documents, including studies of economic impact and resolutions by some of these local chambers 

of commerce, but I would like to include in my statement a variety of the facts and 

concerns cited, from both the Canadian and Mexican borders. 

Texas 

The Laredo Port of Entry is the busiest commercial crossing on the U.S.-Mexico 

border, handling more than 9,000 trucks and over 900 rail cars each day. The Port 

of Laredo processed more than $32 million in exports and almost $47 million in imports from Mexico in 2002. In addition, the crossings in Laredo process almost 

25,000 pedestrians and more than 43,000 passenger cars daily. According to the Laredo Chamber, ‘‘[A]ny delay, no matter how small per entry, multiplies into major 

congestion.’’ 10 The Laredo Chamber estimates that at least 50% of local business 

is directly or indirectly tied to cross-border trade and traffic. 

A recent study by Dr. Michael Patrick, Director for the Texas Center for Border 

Economic and Enterprise Development at Texas A&M University concluded that a 

1% decrease in border crossings would cost the Laredo economy $19 million in annual sales, and increase local unemployment by 7.2%. Sales taxes alone would decline by $133,000. Across all of the major Texas ports, Brownsville, McAllen, Laredo, 

and El Paso a 1% decline in crossings would cost the border region $76 million in 

sales and 1,500 jobs, and decrease the Gross State Product by $1.2 billion.11

The Brownsville, Texas Chamber of Commerce reported an additional concern: 

Mexican citizens own approximately 50% of the resort condominiums at South 

Padre Island. Because the majority of Mexican border crossers hold so-called ‘‘laser 

visas,’’ Border Crossing Cards that also serve as visitor (‘‘B–1/B–2’’) visas that generally restrict their period of stay to 72 hours, the Chamber is extremely concerned 

that if border crossings become more difficult, many of these owners will divest of 

their real estate, costing the local economy millions of dollars. If the period of stay 

for ‘‘laser visas’’ is not extended, long border delays will limit the time that these 

vacationers can use their homes, making these investments less attractive. 

The El Paso international bridges handle almost one-fifth of all trade along the U.S.-Mexico border, more than $38 million in 2002. Local economists estimate between 15% and 20% of the city’s retail sales are derived from Mexican nationals. 

According to the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, Mexican nationals purchased approximately $170 million in retail goods in San Antonio last year. Two 

major malls in the area report that as much as 35% of all sales go to Mexican nationals. Further, according to Visa International, San Antonio has the second largest 

usage of their credit cards by Mexican nationals in the United States (second to 

McAllen), with 8.29% of total U.S. purchases. 

The Free Trade Alliance of San Antonio, the Greater San Antonio Chamber of 

Commerce and the communities of Brownsville, McAllen, Laredo, Del Rio, and El 

Paso have agreed to work together to address these issues. One common goal is to 

obtain a change to the limitation on the ‘‘laser visa’’ to allow Mexican nationals to 

stay for longer periods of time and to be exempt from US-VISIT enrollment, since 

they have already submitted to extensive background checks to obtain the cards, 

which contain the biometric identifiers required under the US-VISIT system. 

Washington 

Whatcom County, Washington has four border crossings, Peace Arch, Pacific 

Highway, Lynden, and Sumas, accounting for more than 2 million crossings per 

quarter. The region had almost a one-third drop in crossings since the fall of 2002. 

While some of this continued the downward trend since the Canadian dollar weak-
62

12Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Industry Day Briefing, July 2003, http://

www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/USVISIT—IndustryConfBrief.pdf. 13 Response to survey of border chambers, February 2004. 14 Ibid. 15Department of Homeland Security, US-VISIT Industry Day Briefing, July 2003, http://

www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/USVISIT—IndustryConfBrief.pdf. 

ened in the 1990s, it is worth noting that border activity has not increased in recent 

years as the Canadian dollar has strengthened. 

A survey conducted by Western Washington University in the summer of 2003 revealed that Canadian shoppers make approximately 10% of all retail sales in 

Whatcom County, estimated at over $35 million. In 2002 the total trading relationship between Washington and Canada was nearly $11.3 billion. The Blaine, Washington border crossings are the sixth largest crossing in value of trade on the Canadian border at $9.9 billion. 

According to Department estimates, an additional nine seconds of inspection time 

will result in over 700 additional minutes of cumulative vehicle wait time at the 

Blaine crossing.12 Delays at the border after September 11 and during periods of 

heightened security alert have caused Canadian residents, particularly in the Vancouver metropolitan area, to believe that border crossing is a hassle. There is discussion in British Columbia of running commercials on Vancouver area television encouraging Canadians to return north. Canadian press has reported stories about 

US-VISIT expressing great concern that it will cause additional delays when implemented. The local chamber of commerce in Bellingham, Washington reports hearing 

very little about how the Department is intending to implement US-VISIT and is 

very eager for local community outreach. 

Arizona 

The Yuma County, Arizona chamber has concerns about the impact of US-VISIT 

on the more than 20,000 agricultural workers that visit daily at the San Luis Port 

of Entry during the agricultural season. Yuma is a county of 170,000 people in the 

southwest of the state called ‘‘the lettuce capital of the country’’ and depends on this 

agricultural workforce for its more than $500 million agricultural industry. According to Ken Rosevear, Executive Director of the Yuma Chamber of Commerce:

It is extremely important that [these workers] are able to cross within a short 

window of time to be able to coordinate with the busses that transport them 

to their work areas. These areas may be as far as 50 miles and require another 

two hours of travel. Waiting times at the border during the season can reach 

2+ hours and that delay can cause shortages for that day’s labor force in the 

fields. . . . [T]hese delays can cost millions of dollars in lost revenue per day.13

According to the Yuma chamber, a new port of entry at San Luis East is in the 

early stages of development because of existing congestion at the port of entry, including a new highway to run from the port to Interstate 8. According to Mr. 

Rosevear, ‘‘As far as ability to absorb any further delay in either commercial, auto, 

or pedestrian traffic, absolutely NONE. This will bring total gridlock to our current 

port.’’ 14

The Douglas, Arizona Chamber of Commerce reports similar concerns. Douglas estimates that more than 60% of its retail volume is from Mexican customers, and 

it underpins the entire local economy. Currently crossing times coming into the 

United States range from 20 minutes to 2 hours, with lines backing up more than 

10 blocks into the town. This traffic backup creates air pollution problems. The regular crossers include employees of the more than 26 maquiladora plants across the 

border, and farm workers. These workers regularly cross the border each way daily, 

and sometimes several times. 

The Nogales Chamber of Commerce reports that 80% to 90% of business in the 

town is tied to the border. The largest employers include the more than 300 

maquiladora plants, produce companies, government agencies (most tied to the border) and merchants, who estimate that 80% of their revenue is from Mexican customers. Crossing times at the Nogales Port of Entry range from 20 to 40 minutes 

on average with longer waits during morning and afternoon commute times. According to Department estimates, a nine second increase in inspection times at the 

Nogales Port of Entry would result in an additional 500 minutes of vehicle wait 

time.15 Of significance is the fact that the Nogales Chamber was not aware of USVISIT or its pending implementation until informed by the U.S. Chamber. Apparently, there has been no outreach by the border agencies to the local Nogales business community. 
63

New York 

The Watertown Chamber of Commerce recently conducted a study of the Thousand Islands bridge crossing. The Thousand Islands crossing, which connects Interstate 81 to Highway 404 in Ontario is one of the fastest growing travel routes between Ontario, Quebec and the U.S. southern and mid-Atlantic states and cities, 

handling more than 2 million passenger cars per year, andforecasting 80% increase 

in traffic in the next 30 years. What makes this crossing unusual is that almost twothirds of crossings are for recreation, and 63% of the visits are for more than two 

nights. Commuter crossings dominate the other major ports of entry on the U.S.-

Canada border. As a major gateway between the recreational areas of upstate New 

York and the ‘‘cottage’’ areas of Ontario and Quebec, Thousand Islands is potentially 

more susceptible to declines in crossings due to delays, as vacationers may choose 

to spend their holidays on their own side of the border. The crossing also accommodates more than 1,500 commercial vehicles daily, comprising $29 million in trade 

per day, with more than 165,000 jobs in the U.S. and Canada dependent on this 

trade. 

According to the Plattsburgh-North Country Chamber of Commerce, the total economic impact of Canada on the Clinton County, New York area, surrounding the 

Champlain/LaColle border crossing, is more than $1.3 billion, including more than 

14% of all county jobs, almost $300 million in annual visitor spending on tourism 

and retail, and $8.7 million in county sales tax generated. The Champlain/LaColle 

border crossing is the only crossing in the eastern half of the continent that does 

not cross water, and is currently undergoing a major expansion. Yet, still, at the 

height of the summer vacation season, backups at this crossing can be over two 

hours. 

California 

The San Ysidro Port of Entry in California is the busiest border crossing in the 

world, processing over 40 million passengers and 15 million trucks and busses annually over the past three years. Its sister port at Otay Mesa, primarily a commercial 

port, handles more than $20 billion in two-way surface trade annually, averaging 

more than 5 million vehicles and 11 million people crossing annually in the last five 

years. 

According to the San Ysidro Chamber of Commerce, more than 60,000 people 

cross the border daily, and two-thirds of this volume are regular crossers, presumably workers. Inbound waits for crossing are often more than two hours, and the 

chamber estimates that if each car is stopped only 10 seconds longer more than nine 

hours of delay could result. In the days following September 11, businesses along 

Main Street in San Ysidro reported more than 90% lost business. Further, there is 

no infrastructure in place for exit inspections, and no room for expansion; the town 

of Tijuana starts literally adjacent to the port of entry. Even so, outbound traffic 

is often backed up more than one hour, even though Mexican customs usually 

waives most traffic through. 

At Otay Mesa, the local chamber of commerce estimates that 95% of business in 

the town is generated by cross-border trade, both directly and indirectly, much of 

it the maquila industries that operate facilities on both sides of the border, including Sanyo, Honeywell, Hitachi, Parker Hannifin, and others. One of the main appeals of the area is the availability of a skilled, legal workforce that enters from 

Tijuana daily. 

The El Centro Chamber of Commerce, located just north of the Calexico border 

crossing, is concerned with the impact on its retail economy. El Centro has a population of about 150,000, but the adjoining town of Mexicali has more than 500,000 

‘‘laser visa’’ holders. The local Costco and Wal-Mart retail outlets depend on this 

cross-border shopping, and ground has recently been broken on a large new regional 

mall with numerous national retailers to serve this Mexican market. Further, businesses in El Centro and farms throughout the Imperial Valley depend on Mexican 

labor. The El Centro chamber expressed concerns similar to the Yuma chamber of 

the impact of US-VISIT on the entry of agricultural workers to this vibrant growing 

center in California. 

The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce reports that total sales to Mexican 

citizens represented $3 billion in retail sales for San Diego in 2000 and 2001. After 

9/11, increased border security resulted in decreases in sales of up to 80% for several months. 

The Greater San Diego Chamber of Commerce, along with the City of Chula 

Vista, the City of San Diego, the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG), 

San Diego Dialogue, Sand Diego Regional Economic Development Corporation, the 

San Diego World Trade Center, San Ysidro Business Association, San Ysidro Chamber of Commerce, and the South San Diego Economic Development Council, has 
64

16Testimony of Dan Cherrin, former Director of Federal Public Policy of the Detroit Regional 

Chamber before the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology of the Parliament 

of Canada, November 1, 2001. 17Letter to Claudia Berry, Public Affairs Group, Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, from 

Neal Belitsky, Executive Vice President, Detroit and Canada Tunnel Corporation, February 26, 

2004.

formed the San Diego Alliance for Border Efficiency. One of its goals is to mitigate 

the impact of US-VISIT on southbound border congestion by ensuring the development of necessary infrastructure prior to implementation. 

Michigan 

The Detroit/Windsor border crossings account for more than 27 million inspections annually and almost $100 billion in trade. These crossings account for almost 40% 

of all U.S.-Canada trade, with the Ambassador Bridge being the single busiest border crossing along the northern border, handling 25% of U.S.-Canada trade itself. 

The automotive industry alone accounts for more than $300 million of this daily 

trade. More than 160,000 jobs in Michigan and 1.8 million jobs nationwide are tied 

to the export of manufactured goods to Canada. Thirty-eight states and Puerto Rico 

have Canada as their primary trading partner, and half of U.S. exports to Canada 

are produced in 14 states. Of the passenger crossings, the majority of noncommercial crossings are locals. More than 10,000 people cross the border in Michigan to 

work, including more than 1,600 nurses in the city of Detroit. One hospital estimates that 15% of its nursing staff, and 20% of its critical care nursing staff, cross 

the border from Canada.16

The efficiency of these border crossings is extremely fragile. Following the September 11 attacks, additional security at the Detroit border crossings resulted in 20 

mile delays on the Canadian side, taking five hours to enter the U.S. However, 

delays as little as 20 minutes for just-in-time parts deliveries can result in assembly 

line shutdowns, increased costs to reroute trucks or ship cargo by rail, barge, or air, 

and create emergency inventory stockpiles (the exact costs that just-in-time was 

supposed to replace). 

In a June 1998 Senate Judiciary Report on the original entry-exit system proposed by Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Dan Stamper of the Detroit International Bridge Company is 

cited as estimating that additional entry and exit procedures that would add only 

30 seconds per vehicle (for only half of the daily crossings) would still add 3,750 

minutes of extra processing time per day. Since there are only 1,440 minutes in a 

day, this effect would essentially shut down the border. In a February 26, 2004 letter to the Detroit Regional Chamber, Neal Belitsky, Executive Vice President of the 

Detroit & Canada Tunnel Corporation (which operates the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel), 

stated:

Our facility is typical of those at the other major crossings between Michigan 

or New York and Ontario. The Bridge & Tunnel Operator’s Association (BTOA) 

represents these crossings. Plazas were not designed for today’s traffic volumes 

or the post 9-11 environment. . . . We are concerned that the system may not 

be fully field tested prior to installation. This could lead to significant disruptions in cross border traffic and trade. Has an assessment been completed that 

will indicate both anticipated volumes and risk?’’ 17

These Concerns Are Not Limited to Border Communities 

While the above statistics, we believe, are compelling in terms of painting a realistic picture of what is at stake in our border communities if US-VISIT results in 

increased delays, we realize that it may be deceptively easy to dismiss all of this 

as a ‘‘border issue,’’ which perhaps only the members of Congress from northern and 

southern border regions need be concerned about. Unfortunately, this misimpression 

characterized much of the debate surrounding reform of the original Section 110. 

This would be a mistake. While we have not yet been able to quantify what the 

ripple effect increased border delays might have on downstream commerce and 

throughout the American economy far beyond our ports of entry, it can hardly be 

gainsaid that we do live in a nation in which virtually all parts of the economy are 

interdependent and that an adverse impact on one part will, like falling dominoes, 

adversely impact others. Perhaps the relatively recent 2002 West Coast port strike 

most vividly makes this point. There, a work slow down, as a result of a complex 

labor-management collective bargaining dispute at 29 West Coast shipping ports, 

delayed about one billion dollars in daily shipments. The adverse economic impacts 

of the delays rolled through the American economy, resulting in President Bush invoking the rarely used national emergency dispute procedures of the National Labor 
65

Relations Act. This one example alone demonstrates the obvious: that the concerns 

surrounding US-VISIT should be considered national in character. 

Conclusion 

As can be seen from the previous information, there is a great deal of concern 

among the communities along the border regarding the implementation of additional border controls. The economic activity dependent on the border in these communities is significant, and the trade and travel volumes also are important for 

states in the interior. Canada is the number one trading partner of the majority of 

states in the United States. Canadian tourism contributes $8 billion to the U.S. 

economy. U.S.-Mexico trade amounts to more than $200 billion and more than 10.8 

million Mexicans visit the U.S. annually. 

As stated in our comments to the Department of Homeland Security, we are concerned that the proposed implementation plan for US-VISIT at land borders, as outlined in the Department’s Request for Proposal for a Prime Contractor for the USVISIT program and as outlined today by Undersecretary Hutchinson, while taking 

into account some of the concerns of the business community previously expressed, 

will not be adequate for the challenges of the land border environment. 

As the government has testified before Congress, initial implementation at the 

land borders is planned to be limited-applying only to those holding visas, and conducted away from the primary vehicle and pedestrian inspection lanes in the secondary inspection facilities. The exit portion of the system is envisioned to be accomplished via radio frequency cards and readers in exit lanes. However limited this 

implementation may be, it may still result in additional delays to important border 

crossers—such as the thousands of agricultural workers that cross the Mexican border, or professional commuters at the Canadian border. Since many of these individuals cross on a daily basis, the Department must consider whether daily registration 

in the US-VISIT system is necessary. We have also expressed concerns regarding 

the capacity for even this limited implementation at the secondary inspection facilities at land borders. Finally, there is no assurance that this described implementation will in fact be that which is actually deployed in December 2004, and it seems 

likely that the universe of individuals covered will ultimately be significantly expanded. 

In summary, although the Department has taken the legitimate concerns of business and local communities regarding the implementation into account, there is a 

great deal of skepticism that the proposed system will not impede legitimate travel 

and trade. We have heard repeatedly from our local chamber affiliates that there 

has been a lack of outreach by Department officials, and many questions regarding 

the proposed system have yet to be answered. 

Thus we urge the Department and Congress to provide additional time for implementation of the land border portion of the US-VISIT system, unless the government can publicly and thoroughly demonstrate, in advance and with thorough testing under realistic conditions, that whatever entry-exit system it may impose can 

be implemented with no additional delays at the borders. 

I wish to thank you for this opportunity to share the views of the U.S. Chamber 

of Commerce.

Æ