evidence supports the verdict, Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 

20 (1981); see also NRS 193.330(1); NRS 200.380(1); NRS 200.400(2); MRS 

200.481(2)(b). Therefore, we conclude that Lorenzo's contention is without 

merit. 

Second, Lorenzo contends that the district court unreasonably 

restricted his defense by excluding surrebuttal evidence of photographs of 

the area where the crime occurred. Lorenzo claims that the State 

presented new evidence during rebuttal when the victim testified about 

the path he walked and that the photographs would have impeached the 

victim's rebuttal testimony and were relevant to the victim's credibility. 

The district court concluded that Lorenzo was not entitled to surrebuttal 

as the State did not re-open its case by presenting new evidence and that 

appellant was not denied his right to confront a witness. "We review a 

district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of 

discretion." Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (2008). 

In response to Lorenzo's detailed testimony of the path he walked, the 

victim further explained the path he walked on rebuttal. This was not 

new evidence. The victim testified about the path he walked during the 

State's case-in-chief, utilizing the State's pictorial exhibits of the area to 

explain his path, and his testimony on rebuttal did not differ but was more 

detailed. Lorenzo had the opportunity, both during the State's case-inchief and rebuttal, to cross-examine the victim regarding the path he 

walked Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by excluding Lorenzo's surrebuttal evidence. 

Third, Lorenzo contends that the district court limited his 

theory of self-defense by excluding any reference to the victim's military 

background or experience. The district court did not preclude testimony of 

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the victim's military background or experience. Instead, the district court 

held that Lorenzo must lay an adequate foundation to establish the 

relevance of the victim's military background or experience before 

reference to such could be made and determined that the victim's 

voluntary statement did not provide an adequate foundation to establish 

the relevance of the victim's military background or experience. At trial, 

Lorenzo did not ask the victim about his military background or attempt 

to establish an adequate foundation for admitting this evidence. We 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 

Fourth, Lorenzo contends that the district court erred by not 

allowing evidence that he made a statement to police to support the theory 

that he acted in self-defense and cooperated with police during the 

investigation. Lorenzo argues that the district court erred by relying on 

Glover v. State, 125 Nev. 691, 220 P.3d 684 (2009), because Lorenzo only 

sought to admit the fact that he gave a voluntary statement but not the 

statement itself.' The district court ruled that, because the statement was 

inadmissible hearsay, the evidence that Lorenzo gave a statement to the 

police was irrelevant and that the evidence led to a negative inference 

prohibited by Glover. We review the district court's decision for an abuse 

of discretion. Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 267, 182 P.3d at 109. Lorenzo fails to 

demonstrate that the evidence was relevant to support a theory of selfdefense or to "explain the resulting conduct of the police." Shults v. State, 

96 Nev. 742, 747-48, 616 P.2d 388,392 (1980) (determining that testimony 

by police officers that they had a conversation with a witness did not 

'To the extent Lorenzo asks this court to reconsider and narrow our 

holding in Glover, we decline to do so. 

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violate the hearsay rule because the officers did not divulge any specific 

statements and the testimony was offered to "explain the resulting 

conduct of the police"). Therefore, he fails to demonstrate that the district 

court abused its discretion. 

Fifth, Lorenzo contends that the State committed 

prosecutorial misconduct by disparaging Lorenzo and by shifting the 

burden of proof and that the district court abused its discretion by denying 

his motion for a mistrial. He argues that the State's closing argument 

informed jurors that defendants have a duty to confess and to cooperate, 

that all arrested persons must be guilty, and that Lorenzo's pre-arrest 

silence constituted evidence of guilt. 2Additionally, he claims that the 

State's argument was unsupported by the evidence and that the State 

suggested his defense was a "story." Lorenzo objected to the statements 

and moved for a mistrial after the State concluded its argument and after 

the case had been submitted to the jury. Because Lorenzo did not object to 

the statements at the time they were made, we review for plain error. 

NRS 178.602; Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003); see 

also McKague v. State, 101 Nev. 327, 330, 705 P.2d 127, 129 (1985) 

(providing that claims of error "need not be considered" where defendant 

fails to make a contemporaneous objection). 

When considered in context, the State properly responded to 

argument made by Lorenzo, commented on the evidence presented, and 

2Lorenzo challenges the following language: "The defendant doesn't 

want to get in trouble. It's only after he's arrested that he decides to talk 

to the police and at that point he blames the victim. He has a motive. He 

has a motive to tell that story. He doesn't want to get in trouble." 

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asked the jury to draw inferences from that evidence. See State v. Green, 

81 Nev. 173, 176, 400 P.2d 766, 767 (1965) ("The prosecutor ha[s] a right 

to comment upon the testimony and to ask the jury to draw inferences 

from the evidence, and has the right to state fully his views as to what the 

evidence shows."). Furthermore, the State properly commented on 

Lorenzo's motive to lie. See, e.g., Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 927, 803 

P.2d 1103, 1106 (1990). Both the State and Lorenzo referred to the 

different versions of events as stories, and Lorenzo fails to• demonstrate 

that the use of the word "story" affected his substantial rights. 

Accordingly, we conclude that there was no plain error and the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lorenzo's motion for mistrial. 

See Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 206-07, 163 P.3d 408, 417 (2007) (we 

review a district court's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial for an 

abuse of discretion). 

Sixth, Lorenzo contends that the district court's denial of his 

for-cause challenge of a potential juror constitutes reversible error. He 

argues that the potential juror demonstrated a manifest bias against the 

defense based on her experiences with her brother and the criminal justice 

system. The district court denied the for-cause challenge after clarifying • 

counsels' questions and extensively questioning the potential juror 

regarding any bias. Lorenzo exercised a peremptory challenge to remove 

the potential juror. Even if the district court erred, Lorenzo has not 

alleged or demonstrated that any jurors actually empanelled were unfair 

or not impartial. See Weber Ix State, 121 Nev. 554, 581, 119 P.3d 107, 125 

(2005) ("Any claim of constitutional significance must focus on the jurors 

who were actually seated, not on excused jurors."). Therefore, no relief is 

warranted on this claim. 

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Seventh, Lorenzo argues that the district court erred by 

denying his proposed "two reasonable interpretations" jury instruction and 

by denying his alternative jury instruction for robbery and instead giving 

one that lowered the State's burden of proof. "This court reviews a district 

court's decision settling jury instructions for an abuse of discretion or 

judicial error; however, whether the instruction was an accurate 

statement of the law is a legal question that is reviewed de novo." 

Funderburk v. State, 125 Nev. 260, 263, 212 P.3d 337, 339 (2009) (citation 

omitted). We have previously held that it is not error to reject the type of 

"two reasonable interpretations" instruction that Lorenzo proposed when, 

as here, the jury was properly instructed on the standard of reasonable 

doubt, and Lorenzo fails to demonstrate that the district court abused its 

discretion. Bails v. State, 92 Nev. 95, 96-98, 545 P.2d 1155, 1155-56 (1976) 

(citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954)); see also 

Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 754, 121 P.3d 582, 589 (2005) (holding 

that a defendant is not entitled to misleading, inaccurate, or duplicative 

jury instructions). Furthermore, Lorenzo's alternative instruction for 

robbery was not an accurate statement of the law and the instruction 

given was a correct statement of the law, see Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 

1013, 1030, 195 P.3d 315, 326 (2008), therefore, Lorenzo fails to 

demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 

Lastly, Lorenzo claims that his conviction for battery with 

intent to commit a crime is redundant to his convictions for attempted 

robbery and battery with substantial bodily harm and that it violates the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. Lorenzo concedes that Blockb urger v. United 

States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and this court's opinion in Jackson v. State, 

128 Nev. , 291 P.3d 1274 (2012) cert. denied, U.S. 134 S. Ct. 56 

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J. 

Pickering 

cm 

altita—czerParraa-uirre 

J. 

J. 

Saitta 

(2013), negate his argument but asks this court to reconsider our decision 

and return to the "same act" analysis. We decline to do so. Each of 

Lorenzo's convictions requires proof of an element that the others do not, 

compare NRS 200.400(2), with NRS 193.330(1), NRS 200.380(1), and NRS 

200.481(2)(b); therefore, Lorenzo's convictions do not violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause. Blockb urger, 284 U.S. at 304 (establishing an elements 

test for double jeopardy purpose). Furthermore, none of the statutes 

indicate that cumulative punishment is precluded; therefore, Lorenzo's 

convictions are not redundant. See NRS 193.330(1); NRS 200.380(1); NRS 

200.400(2); NRS 200.481(2)(b); Jackson, 128 Nev. at , 291 P.3d at 1278 

(applying the Blockb urger test to redundancy claims when the relevant 

statutes do not expressly authorize or prohibit cumulative punishment). 

Having considered Lorenzo's claims and concluded that no 

relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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