J-A28029-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MAURICE PRINCETON JOHNSON, SR.

Appellant No. 916 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of February 4, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0002971-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2014

Maurice Princeton Johnson, Sr. appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered February 4, 2014, following his jury conviction of possession with 

intent to deliver (“PWID”)—oxycodone, PWID—alprazolam (Xanax), and 

possession of drug paraphernalia.1 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the underlying facts of this case as follows:

On March 1, 2013, Detective Chad Cassel of the [Ambler] 

Borough Police Department executed a search warrant on a 

residence located at 27 Orange Avenue, Ambler, Montgomery 

County. Upon entering the home, the detective observed 

[Johnson] in the front living room. As a result of the search, 

Detective Cassel recovered an unlabeled prescription bottle 

containing 33 smaller green pills together with 51 larger white 

pills, which were later confirmed to be Oxycodone, 10 milligrams 

and Oxycodone, 15 milligrams, respectively. This unmarked 

prescription bottle was found inside a jacket that was hanging up 

____________________________________________

1 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (32). 
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in arm’s reach of [Johnson]. The detective also located another 

unmarked pill container containing pink pills on the back porch of 

the residence, underneath a pile of clothes. It was later 

confirmed that this prescription bottle contained 159 [Xanax] 

pills. Two cell phones, an iPhone and an HTC cellphone, were 

also located, for which search warrants were subsequently 

obtained.

On November 13, 2013, a Suppression Hearing was held. After 

th[e trial] court stated on the record its findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, suppression was denied. [Johnson] 

proceeded to a one-day jury trial on November 19, 2013. 

[Johnson] was found guilty of the aforementioned charges. 

Subsequently, on February 4, 2014, with the benefit of a 

presentence investigation and report, th[e trial] court imposed 

the following sentence. On the PWID Oxycodone conviction, th[e 

c]ourt imposed a sentence of 33 months’ to 10 years’ 

imprisonment. On the PWID [Xanax] conviction, th[e c]ourt 

imposed a term of 1 1⁄2 to 10 years’ imprisonment. 

Accordingly, [Johnson’s] aggregate sentence is [51] months’ to 

13 years’ imprisonment. A timely post-sentence motion was 

filed, raising a claim regarding the discretionary aspect[s] of 

sentencing. The post-sentence motion was denied on March 6, 

2014. This timely appeal followed.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 4/21/2014, at 1-2. Pursuant to the trial 

court’s order, Johnson timely filed a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on April 8, 2014. The trial court 

entered its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on April 21, 2014.

Johnson raises one question for our review: “Are [Johnson’s] 

convictions for possession of a Schedule II or IV controlled substance with 

intent to deliver supported by legally-sufficient evidence where the 

Commonwealth failed to present any evidence whatsoever of [Johnson’s] 

non-licensure to possess the particular Schedule II and IV controlled 

substances giving rise to the offences [sic]?” Johnson’s Brief at 4.
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In analyzing such claims, we must determine whether the 

evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Critically important, we must draw all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the 

Commonwealth as the verdict-winner. Where there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the 

crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail. Of course, the 

evidence established at trial need not preclude every possibility 

of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence presented.

Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

In order to prove the offense of possession with intent to deliver 

a controlled substance, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt both that the defendant possessed the 

controlled substance and had the intent to deliver. When 

determining whether a defendant had the requisite intent to 

deliver, relevant factors for consideration are the manner in 

which the controlled substance was packaged, the behavior of 

the defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and large 

sums of cash. Expert opinion testimony is also admissible 

concerning whether the facts surrounding the possession of 

controlled substances are consistent with an intent to deliver 

rather than with an intent to possess it for personal use.

Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 955 A.2d 411, 414 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, Johnson argues that “an accused’s non-licensure and/or nonregistration [is] an essential element of the offence [sic] of possessing a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver” and that “the Commonwealth 

failed to present any evidence whatsoever relating to Johnson’s alleged non-
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licensure and non-registration.” Johnson’s Brief, at 13. Thus, Johnson 

contends that his PWID convictions are legally insufficient and must be 

reversed. Id. We disagree.

In [Commonwealth v.] Sojourner[, 408 A.2d 1108 (Pa. 

Super. 1979)], this Court explained that the Commonwealth has 

the burden of proving every element of a criminal offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt, but the burden of going forward 

with evidence of every aspect of a criminal offense need not rest 

on the Commonwealth from the outset. Sojourner, 408 A.2d at 

1113 (citations omitted). With respect to those factors upon 

which the prosecution must bear the burden of persuasion, the 

prosecution may shift to the defendant the burden of production, 

in other words, the burden of going forward with sufficient 

evidence to justify a reasonable doubt on that issue. 

Sojourner, 408 A.2d at 1113-14 (citations omitted). “If the 

defendant’s evidence does not cross this threshold, the issue 

whether it be malice, extreme emotional disturbance, selfdefense, or whatever will not be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 

1114 (citation omitted). The Court in Sojourner concluded 

that, before the prosecution must disprove the accused was 

authorized to possess narcotics under the [Controlled Substance, 

Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. § 780-101 et seq.], the 

accused must establish some credible evidence of such 

authorization. Id. (emphasis added).

Commonwealth v. James, 46 A.3d 776, 779-80 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Johnson fails to identify any evidence of record that he made an 

attempt to establish credible evidence of authorization or licensure of the 

Oxycodone and Xanax recovered by Detective Cassel. See Johnson’s Brief 

at 21-25. At trial, Johnson presented no witnesses or exhibits. See Notes 

of Testimony (“N.T.”) Trial, 11/19/2013, at 59-62. Nowhere did he claim 

that he was authorized to possess Oxycodone or Xanax. Id. Thus, Johnson 

failed to adduce any evidence that would shift the burden to the 
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Commonwealth to disprove that he was authorized to possess narcotics 

under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. See 

James, 46 A.3d at 779-80. Accordingly, his argument does not merit relief. 

See id. at 780 (affirming judgment of sentence for PWID where “Appellant 

failed to introduce a prescription, testimony from a prescribing physician, or 

the actual pill bottle in an effort to support his claim that he was authorized 

to possess the pills pursuant to the burden shift described in Sojourner”).

Moreover, the Commonwealth adduced sufficient circumstantial 

evidence for the jury to conclude that Johnson was not licensed to possess 

the narcotics at issue. Specifically, Detective Chad Cassel testified that he 

recovered from Johnson’s jacket an unmarked, unlabeled pill container in 

which he found thirty-three, ten-milligram Oxycodone pills and fifty-one, 

fifteen-milligram Oxycodone pills, mixed together. N.T. Trial, 11/19/2013, 

at 16-18, 30. Detective Cassel also recovered an unlabeled bottle containing 

159 Xanax pills from Johnson’s back porch. Id. at 20. No evidence was 

found regarding a prescription. Id. Additionally, the Commonwealth 

published to the jury evidence of text messages sent by Johnson on March 

1, 2013, in which he offered Oxycodone and Xanax for sale in the sizes 

recovered by Detective Cassel later that day. Id. at 50-56.

Furthermore, Detective Erick Echevarria, who was admitted as an 

expert in drug trafficking and narcotics, testified:

Q. Detective, in your expert opinion regarding drug 

trafficking, what was recovered at [Johnson’s] residence, 27 

Orange Avenue, the Oxycodone pills, Xanax pills, the unmarked 
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pill bottles and different milligrams in the same bottle, do you 

have an opinion that this was possessed for personal use or 

possessed with the intent to deliver it?

A. Looking at all the information in this case, the way these 

are packaged, as well as the text messages that I reviewed, 

these pills are without a question in my mind intent to deliver.

Id. at 56.

The Commonwealth presented Detective Echevarria’s expert opinion, 

along with the evidence of unmarked pill containers, text messages, and the 

two cell phones, to adduce sufficient evidence of possession with intent to 

deliver. See Carpenter, 955 A.2d at 414. Thus, we agree with the trial 

court in concluding that “there was more than sufficient circumstantial 

evidence from which the jury concluded that [Johnson] was not licensed to 

possess and dispense either Oxycodone and/or [Xanax].” T.C.O. at 6. 

Johnson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his PWID 

conviction lacks merit. See Watley, 81 A.3d at 113. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2014