alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 60.181 Violations. ( a ) The Commission may obtain an injunction or other court order to prevent a violation of the provisions of— ( 1 ) The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
( 2 ) Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; or
( 3 ) A regulation or order issued pursuant to those Acts.
( b ) The Commission may obtain a court order for the payment of a civil penalty imposed under section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act: ( 1 ) For violations of— ( i ) Sections 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 82, 101, 103, 104, 107, or 109 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
( ii ) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act;
( iii ) Any rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to the sections specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section;
( iv ) Any term, condition, or limitation of any license issued under the sections specified in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section.
( 2 ) For any violation for which a license may be revoked under section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
[57 FR 55076, Nov. 24, 1992]
2002.100 Definitions.

Agency means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Agency Head or Head of the Agency means the NRC Executive Director for Operations, for the

purposes specified in the regulations in this chapter and the FAR. This delegation does not extend to

internal NRC requirements such as clearance levels and Commission papers which specify higher

levels of authority.

Commission means the NRC Commission of five members, or a quorum thereof, sitting as a body, as

provided by Section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5841).

Competition Advocate means the individual appointed as such by the Agency Head as required by

Public Law 98-369. The Director, Division of Contracts and Property Management, has been

appointed the Competition Advocate for the NRC.

Head of the Contracting Activity means the Director, Division of Contracts and Property

Management.

Senior Procurement Executive means the individual appointed as such by the Agency Head pursuant

to Executive Order 12352. The Deputy Executive Director for Management Services, has been

appointed the NRC Senior Procurement Executive.

Simplified acquisitions means those acquisitions conducted using the methods, policies, and

procedures of FAR part 13 for making purchases of supplies or services.

Task and Delivery Order Ombudsman means the Director, Division of Contracts and Property

Management, or designee pursuant to section 1004(a) of Pub. L. 103-355, the Federal Acquisition

Streamlining Act.

Parent topic: Subpart 2002.1 - Definitions
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 94-1783

SEBASTIAN C. SISTI, Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER AND SMITH, INCORPORATED; JOSEPH BELFIORE; GEORGE T. BASKERVILLE, III; ARTHUR SOBEL; MICHAEL S. DZIKOWSKI; WILLIAM A. SCHREYER; DANIEL P. TULLY, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-94-158) Submitted: February 7, 1996 Decided: February 14, 1996 Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frank George Uvanni, CHALKLEY & WITMEYER, Ashland, Virginia, for Appellant. James E. Farnham, Edward Joseph Fuhr, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Sebastian C. Sisti appeals from the district court's order granting the Defendants' motion to dismiss Sisti's civil complaint on res judicata grounds. Finding no error, we affirm. The parties in the current action are identical to those in Sisti's earlier federal suit; the individual Defendants in this action are employees or officers of the corporate Def endantC a Defendant in both the earlier federal suit and this action. See Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co. , 640 F.2d 484, 493-94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 454 U.S. 878 (1981). There is identity of thecauses of action between this suit and the former one. Sisti's attempt to raise the same claims under a different legal theory does not circumvent the res judicata bar. See Harnett v. Billman , 800 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied , 480 U.S. 932 (1987). And the judgment in the prior action was a judgment on the merits. Therefore, the district court properly found the current action barred by the principles of res judicata. See Keith v. Aldridge , 900 F.2d 736, 739-40 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 900 (1990). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO

18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF

THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In
connection with this Annual Report of STL Marketing Group, Inc. (the “Company”), on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2014, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Jose P. Quiros,
Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | Such
                                         Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2014, fully complies
                                         with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                                         and                               
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
| | (2) | The
                                         information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December
                                         31, 2014, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
                                         of operations of the Company.



|Date:
    February 18, 2016 | By: | /s/
    Jose P. Quiros                                                       
|--------------------------- | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                            |     | Jose P. Quiros                                                               
|                            |     | Principal
        Executive Officer
        STL
        Marketing Group, Inc.
§ 216.4 Evaluation by DOE of applications. ( a ) Based on the information provided by the applicant and other available information, DOE will: ( 1 ) Determine whether or not the energy program or project in connection with which the application is made maximizes domestic energy supplies and should be designated an eligible energy program or project; and
( 2 ) Find whether the described supplies of materials and equipment, services, or facilities are critical and essential to the eligible energy program or project.
( b ) In determining whether the program or project referred to in the application should be designated an eligible energy program or project, DOE will consider all factors which it considers relevant including, but not limited to, the following: ( 1 ) Quantity of energy involved;
( 2 ) Benefits of timely energy program furtherance or project completion;
( 3 ) Socioeconomic impact;
( 4 ) The need for the end product for which the materials and equipment, services, or facilities are allegedly required; and
( 5 ) Established national energy policies.
( c ) In finding whether the supplies of materials and equipment, services, or facilities described in the application are critical and essential to an eligible energy program or project, DOE will consider all factors which it considers relevant including, but not limited to, the following: ( 1 ) Availability and utility of substitute materials and equipment, services, or facilities; and
( 2 ) Impact of the nonavailability of the specific supplies of materials and equipment, services, or facilities on the furtherance or timely completion of the approved energy program or project.
( d ) Increased costs which may be associated with obtaining materials and equipment, services, or facilities without assistance shall not be considered a valid reason for finding the materials and equipment, services, or facilities to be critical and essential.
( e ) After DOE has determined a program or project to be an eligible energy program or project, this determination shall be deemed made with regard to subsequent applications involving the same program or project unless and until DOE announces otherwise.
[43 FR 6212, Feb. 14, 1978, as amended at 73 FR 10984, Feb. 29, 2008]
#### PEOPLE ex rel. SCHUTZ v. WILLIAMS.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

January 8, 1915.)

Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.

Mandamus by the People, on the relation of Joseph Schutz, against William Williams, as Commissioner of the Department of Water Supply, Gas, and Electricity of the City of New York. From an order granting a peremptory writ, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before JENKS, P. J., and BURR, THOMAS, RICH, and PUTNAM, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Order reversed, without costs. See People ex rel. Finch v. Williams, 151 N. Y. Supp. 271, decided herewith. Settle order before the Presiding Justice.

JENKS, P. J., and BURR, THOMAS, RICH, and PUTNAM, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Arne Lindland, Petitioner, v. Vincent L. Tofany, as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of New York, Respondent.

Proceeding pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR to annul respondent’s determination, rendered December 6, 1968, revoking petitioner’s chauffeur’s license for alleged refusal to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood. Determination annulled, on the law, with costs, and license directed to be reinstated. No questions of fact were considered. The determination was based on a finding that, while in a police car en route to his arraignment and “prior to such time that ’ * * [he] attempted to produce a specimen ”, petitioner refused to submit to a urine test by stating he *948did not have to urinate. In view of the circumstances under which the request was made, the finding of no prior attempt to produce a specimen was critical. In our opinion, however, it was not supported by substantial evidence and the revocation which followed must therefore be annulled. Brennan, Acting P. J., Hopkins, Benjamin, Munder and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
(88 Misc. Rep. 68)

#### COHN et al. v. WILSON.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.

December 17, 1914.)

1. Courts (§ 190*)—Municipal Court—Practice on Appeal.

On appeal from a default judgment in the Municipal Court of the City of New York, defendant may present affidavits to show that he was not served with summons.

[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Courts, Dec. Dig. § 190;* Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 103.]

2. Process (§ 149*)—Service—Proof—Impeachment.

Affidavits presented on appeal *held*to show that the summons in an action was not served on defendant.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Process, Cent. Dig. §§ 202-205; Dec. Dig. § 149.*]

. Whitaker, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Fifth District.

Action by William I. Cohn and Joshua Cohn, copartners as W. T. & J. Cohn, against John G. Wilson, trading as Tappe. Judgment for plaintiffs on default. Defendant appeals! Judgment reversed.

Argued November term, 1914, before LEHMAN, DELANY, and WHITAKER, JJ.

David Ross, of New York City, for appellant.

Samuel S. Breslin, of New York City, for respondents.

*

For other cases see same topic *&*§ number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Bep’r Indexes

LEHMAN, J.

[1] The defendant, on an appeal from a default judgment, presents affidavits to show that he was never served with the summons in the action. The Municipal Court Act undoubtedly authorizes this practice, and upon such an appeal we can consider only the question whether by service of process the Municipal Court ever obtained jurisdiction of the defendant’s person. If it never obtained such jurisdiction, the judgment is void, even though it appears that the person actually served was closely related to the defendant, and even though we may suspect that the defendant knew of the action, and is appealing only to escape a judgment for money actually due.

[2] In this case the affidavits presented by the plaintiff show that he does not personally know the defendant, but relied for his identification upon some unidentified employés of defendant. On the other hand, not only does the defendant deny the service, but his broth*578er and two other persons swear that the summons was served on the brother in defendant’s absence. Under the circumstances, I cannot see how we can reasonably hold that the defendant was ever served.

Judgment must therefore be reversed, with costs, and the complaint dismissed.

DELANY, J., concurs. WHITAKER, J., dissents, upon the ground that appellant should have applied to the court in which the judgment was entered in the first instance for relief, and that an appeal to this court, without having made such an application, is not the proper practice, and is without statutory sanction.
#### PEOPLE ex rel. FARRELLY, Appellant, v. WHITTLE, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

December 4, 1914.)

Proceeding by the People of the State of New York, on the relation of Edward J. Farrelly, against Thomas W. Whittle, as Commissioner, etc. J. F. Donnelly, of New York City, for appellant. T. Farley, of New York City, for respondent.

No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements, on the authority of People ex rel. Davison v. Williams, 107 N. E. 49, decided by the Court of Appeals November 17, 1914. Order filed.
§ 780.36 Conditions and issuance of license. ( a ) Upon receipt of the Board's decision and instruction to issue a patent license, the General Counsel shall issue a license which complies with the following: ( 1 ) The scope and durations of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized;
( 2 ) Such use shall be non-exclusive;
( 3 ) Such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill that enjoys such use;
( 4 ) Any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the U.S. market; and,
( 5 ) Authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the circumstances that led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.
( b ) The Board shall have the authority to review, on motivated request, the continued existence of these circumstances. The parties will propose and agree on a reasonable royalty fee within a reasonable time as determined by the General Counsel. A reasonable royalty shall provide adequate remuneration for the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization. If a party does not agree with the terms and conditions of the license as determined by the General Counsel or if a royalty fee cannot be agreed upon within the reasonable time period established by the General Counsel, any party may, within 30 days after the expiration of such time period, initiate a proceeding before the Board, in accordance with subpart E of this part, for a reconsideration of the General Counsel's determination. After the proceeding under subpart E of this part is completed, the General Counsel shall modify the patent license in accordance with the Board's determination.
[58 FR 68734, Dec. 29, 1993]
Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications.

 

I, J. Theodore Borter, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D

required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on

Form 10-K of the GS Mortgage Securities Trust 2013-GC10 (the "Exchange Act periodic

reports");

 

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a

whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to

state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of

the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading

with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other

information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered

by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

 

4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in

this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in

the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their

obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and

 

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for

asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment

of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required

to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB

and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to

this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material

instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in

this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information

provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:

 

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, LNR Partners, LLC,

as Special Servicer, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, Wells Fargo

Bank, National Association, as Certificate Administrator, Wells Fargo Bank,

National Association, as Custodian, TriMont Real Estate Advisors, Inc., as

Operating Advisor, CoreLogic Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc., as Servicing

Function Participant, and National Tax Search, LLC, as Servicing Function

Participant.

 

Dated: March 30, 2015

 

/s/ J. Theodore Borter

President

(senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
#### OZUT v. PIETROWSKI & KONOP CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

January 29, 1915.)

Action by Paul Ozut against the Pietrowski & Konop Company.

No opinion. Application denied, with $10 costs. Order signed. Motion denied, with $10 costs. Order filed.
(logo) WELLS 

         FARGO

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Corporate Trust Services

 

MAC R1204-010

9062 Old Annapolis Road

Columbia, MD 21045

 

Tel: 410 884 2000

Fax: 410 715 2380

 

 

 

 

 

Banc of America Merrill Lynch Commercial Mortgage, Inc. Bank of America Tower

One Bryant Park

New York, New York 10036

 

 

 

RE: Annual Statement of Compliance for Morgan Stanley Bank Of America Merrill

Lynch Trust 2013-C8, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series

2013-C8

 

 

Per the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of February 1, 2013 (the "Agreement"), the undersigned, a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Certificate Administrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies as follows as of and for the year ending December 31, 2014 (the "Reporting Period"):

 

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo's activities during the Reporting Period and of its performance under the Agreement has been made under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of such officer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

March 10, 2015

 

 

/s/ Brian Smith

BRIAN SMITH 

Vice President

 

 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
#### MORRELL, Respondent, v. RICHARDS & GASTON, Inc., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

June 19, 1914.)

Action by George W. Morrell against Richards & Gaston, Incorporated.

No opinion. For former decision, see 148 N. Y. Supp. 1131. Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied.
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 249 (Wednesday, December 29, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 82146]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-32655]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of Thrift Supervision


Appalachian Community Bank, FSB, McCaysville, GA, Notice of 
Appointment of Receiver

    Notice is hereby given that, pursuant to the authority contained in 
section 5(d)(2) of the Home Owners' Loan Act, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision has duly appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation as sole Receiver for Appalachian Community Bank, FSB, 
McCaysville, Georgia, (OTS No. 18033) on December 17, 2010.

    Dated: December 21, 2010.

    By the Office of Thrift Supervision.
Sandra E. Evans,
Federal Register Liaison.
[FR Doc. 2010-32655 Filed 12-28-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6720-01-M
H. Res. 748

In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

September 28, 2006.

Whereas at Yorktown, Virginia, on October 19, 1781, General George Washington and the American and French 

armies received the surrender of Lieutenant General 

Charles Cornwallis and nearly 7,100 British soldiers and 

sailors, ending nine days of siege operations against the 

British army; 

Whereas the victory at Yorktown concluded the last major 

battle of the American Revolution, effectively ending the 

war and securing for the colonies their independence by 

providing a military conclusion to the political declaration 

issued five years earlier; 

Whereas Virginia, as the largest and most populous of the 

original 13 colonies and the home of General Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Thomas Nelson, Jr., and other leaders of the American Revolution, 

is blessed with a rich history of noteworthy contributions 

to the struggle to secure liberty and democracy; 

Whereas in 1983 the Virginia General Assembly designated 

the 19th day of October of each year to be recognized 

and celebrated as Yorktown Day throughout the Commonwealth of Virginia; and 
2

•HRES 748 EH 

Whereas the 2006 observance of Yorktown Day celebrates the 

225th anniversary of the American and French victory at 

Yorktown: Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved, That the House of Representatives recognizes 

the 225th anniversary of the American and French victory at 

Yorktown, Virginia, during the Revolutionary War and reminds the American people of the debt the United States 

owes to its armed forces and the important role Yorktown 

and the Commonwealth of Virginia played in securing their 

liberty. 

Attest:

Clerk.