[Cite as In re V.J.P. , 2021-Ohio-1778.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY, OHIO

IN THE MATTER OF: : O P I N I O N V.J.P., II, DEPENDENT CHILD : CASE NO. 2020-L-123 :

:

:

Civil Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juveni le Division. Case No. 2019 DP 00613.

Jud g ment: Affirmed.

Charles E. Coulson , Lake County Prosecutor; Kristi L. Winner and Sarah R. Hronek , Assistant Prosecutors, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Bo x 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For A ppellee, Lake County Departmen t of Job and Family Services )

. Josephine L. Begin , Manning & Clair, Attorneys at Law, 38040 Euclid Avenue, Willou g hb y , OH 44094 ( For Appellant, Cassandra Gore )

. Maureen A. Sweene y

, 11805 Girdled Road, Painesville, OH 44077 ( Guardian ad litem )

.

MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J. {¶1} Appellant, Cassandra Gore (“Ms. Gore”), appeals the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting perma nent custody of her minor child, V.J.P., II (“V.P.”), to appellee, the Lake County Department of Job and Family Services (“LCDJFS”).2 {¶2} Ms. Gore contends that the trial court’s determination that it was in the best interest of V.P. to grant permanent custody to LCDJFS was again st the manifest weight

of evidence. {¶3} After a thorough review of the record, we find that it contains substantial competent and credible evidence supporting the trial court’s be st-interest findings. Therefore, the trial court’s best-interest determination is not against the manifest weight

of the evidence. {¶4} Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas,

Juvenile Division.

Substantive and Pr ocedural History {¶5} Ms. Gore is the biological mother of V.P., and her fiancé, Andr ew Pizzino (“Mr. Pizzino”), is the child’s b iological father. Ms. Gore an d Mr. Pizzino are also the biological parents of another child, who was born in May 2015. The trial court granted permanent custody of this child to LCDJFS in August 2016. Emergency/Temporary Custody {¶6} Ms. Gore gave birth to V.P. on May 8, 2019. V.P. was born prem ature and was treated in the neonatal intensive care unit for a period of time because of medical complications. At the hospital, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino got i nto an argument where Mr. Pizzino threw food across the room and hospital security interv ened. {¶7} LCDJFS moved for and obtained emergency temporary custody of V. P. on May 24, 2019, based on reported concerns regarding Ms. Gore’s a nd Mr. Pizzino’s mental health, past history of significant domestic violence, and hous ing instability. V.P. was placed in a certified foster home the next day.3 {¶8} LCDJFS filed a complaint in the trial court alleging that V.P. was a dependent child. The trial court appointed counsel for Ms. Gor e and Mr. Pizzino and appointed Attorney Maureen Sweeney as the guardian ad litem (“G AL”) for V.P. {¶9} Robin Suminguit (“Ms. Suminguit”) from LCDJFS was assigned as t he family’s case worker. She met with Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino to review the case plan, which included the following goals for both of them: (1) initi ating and completing a mental health assessment with a qualified service provider and followi ng all recommendations; (2) participating in a parenting education program with a quali fied service provider and following all recommendations; and (3) finding appropriate, sta ble, safe, and long-term housing. {¶10} On July 25, 2019, the trial court held an adjudication hearing, at which Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino agreed that V.P. was a dependent child. T he trial court granted temporary custody to LCDJFS and adopted the case plan as a cour t order. Housing/Employment {¶11} At the time of V.P.’s birth, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino resided w ith Ms. Gore’s sister in Mentor-on-the-Lake. After a physical altercation bet ween Ms. Gore and her niece, the couple moved in with a person they referred to as th eir “street mom” in Painesville. The couple eventually had a verbal altercation wi th their “street mom,” became homeless, and began living in a tent at an unidentified location in Lake County. At one point, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino separated romantically, and Ms. Gore’s new boyfriend lived with both of them in the tent.4 {¶12} In late December 2019, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino travelled to Xe nia, Ohio, to visit Mr. Pizzino’s family. Ms. Gore returned a few weeks l ater, but Mr. Pizzino decided to stay in Xenia to live. In mid-January 2020, Ms. Gore also m oved to Xenia. {¶13} In Xenia, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino moved in with Mr. Pizzino’s mother, Mary Yount (“Ms. Yount”), who resided with her husband, as well as her husband’s brother, wife, and two young children. The brother is a regist ered sex offender involving a child under the age of 11. {¶14} Ms. Yount eventually leased her own house, and Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino moved in with her. Ms. Yount’s husband initially lived with th em, but due to conflict with Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino, he moved back in with his brother. M s. Yount is the lessee under the lease, and she pays the monthly rent. According to M r. Pizzino, he helps with paying bills. {¶15} While living in Lake County, Mr. Pizzino was employed part-time at Arby’s, and Ms. Gore was unemployed. After moving to Xenia, Mr. Pizzin o became employed part-time at McDonald’s. Ms. Gore also worked at McDonald’s bu t was terminated after a co-worker found a syringe in the bathroom that Ms. Gore had u sed to inject herself with heroin. Ms. Gore was subsequently terminated from employment a t three other fast-food

restaurants in Xenia. {¶16} Ms. Yount provides the primary financial support for the family in Xenia. She previously worked full time for a substance abuse facility but lost her job and began working at McDonald’s with Mr. Pizzino. Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzi no reported to Ms. Suminguit that money was “very tight” and that they had to borr ow money from their pastor

to travel from Xenia to Paines ville to attend the permanent cus tody hearing.5 Mental Health Services {¶17} Prior to the adoption of the case plan, Mr. Pizzino obtained a diagnostic assessment from Kelly Christy (“Ms. Christy”) at Signature Heal th. He reported past diagnoses of bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder. Ms . Christy recommended that he follow up with a prescriber for a psychiatric evaluatio n and obtain individual counseling. {¶18} Ms. Christy was also Mr. Pizzino’s counselor for a period of ti me. She indicated that his physical presence was consistent with someon e who had a severe mental illness, including poor hygiene, oddity in his behavior and presentation, and emerging anger. During one session, she tried to understand wh y he and Ms. Gore were not able to obtain or secure stable housing. Mr. Pizzino becam e angry and abruptly walked out of the session. At another session, Mr. Pizzino app eared with a black eye, indicating he had been “jumped” by somebody but did not press c harges. He also reported arguments between himself and Ms. Gore, including one argument that escalated to the point where he pushed her. {¶19} Ms. Gore also obtained a diagnostic assessment at Signature Hea lth. The assessment report listed tentative diagnoses of PTSD and schizo affective disorder and recommended that Ms. Gore receive a psychiatric/medication eval uation and counseling. {¶20} Signature Health’s records indicate that both Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino either cancelled or did not attend several scheduled appointmen ts. In addition, both Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino were hospitalized on separate occasions at Windsor Laurelwood because of suicidal behavior, w ith Ms. Gore being hospitalized twice.6 {¶21} On November 8, 2019, LCDJFS filed motions to show cause in the trial court based on Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s noncompliance with their mental health goals. {¶22} Ms. Gore subsequently obtained a psychiatric evaluation at Sign ature Health. The assessment report listed a past history of ADHD, m ultiple personality disorder, schizoaffective, and paranoid schizophrenia. Ms. Gor e reported seeing things other people do not see and hearing voices that, at times, comm anded her to harm herself or others. The report also listed a past history of heroin use as well as a relapse after four years of sobriety. {¶23} On January 28, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on LCDJFS’s motions to show cause. By this time, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino had moved t o Xenia and did not appear. The trial court found them in contempt and ordered the m to reinstate services in Xenia within 14 days. {¶24} Mr. Pizzino reinstated mental health services in Xenia at TCN B ehavioral Health (“TCN”) and medication/psychiatry at Soin Family Health (“Soin”). He successfully completed a wellness group at TCN without further recommendatio n, and he was prescribed medication at Soin. He did not contact Soin for fol low up services until after LCDJFS filed its motion for permanent custody. {¶25} Ms. Gore did not reinstate services in Xenia within 14 days. A fter missing a scheduled appointment for a diagnostic assessment, Ms. Gore l eft an “irate” message at the provider’s office. {¶26} On March 3, 2020, LCDJFS filed a motion to impose sentence upon Ms. Gore. Ms. Gore eventually reinstated mental health services at TCN and medication/psychiatry at Soin. At her mental health assessment at TCN, Ms. Gore7 reported her heroin relapse at McDonald’s and also tested posit ive for THC. Ms. Gore was scheduled to participate in an intensive outpatient program (“IOP”) treatment plan, seek outpatient psychiatric medication management services, and begin individual counseling services. {¶27} Ms. Gore subsequently missed 12 IOP sessions. After she was tr ansferred to a dual diagnoses group, she missed 11 out of 22 of those ses sions. She also missed appointments for her counseling sessions. She attended her app ointments at Soin. {¶28} According to TCN’s records, Ms. Gore reported hearing her decea sed

mother’s voice “all the time” and once shared that she had not been taking her medications. In one report, the provider wrote, “Client appear s to have few healthy living skills or coping skills and insight is limited.”

Visitation {¶29} When Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino lived in Lake County, they had in -person visitation time with V.P. twice a week. After moving to Xenia, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino visited V.P. in-person on two occasions, in March and August 20 20, when they were in Lake County for court hearings. Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino do no t own a vehicle or have

driver’s licenses. {¶30} LCDJFS suspended in-person visits due to COVID-19 and offered v irtual visits. Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino participated in virtual visit s with V.P., which were held once a week for 10 to 15 minutes and were monitored by V.P.’s c ertified foster parents. Due to V.P.’s young age, he was not able to meaningfully commun icate. According to Ms. Suminguit, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino did not have enough in- person visits for her to say that V.P. developed a bond or attachment with them.8 Parenting Skills Education {¶31} According to Ms. Suminguit, hands-on parenting was key for Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino because they had not cared for a baby in quite some time. When Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino lived in Lake County, Ms. Suminguit referred th em to Karla Mendez (“Ms. Mendez”) from Crossroads Health (“Crossroads”) for instruction on parenting skills, which occurred during their visitation time with V.P. {¶32} When Ms. Mendez became involved, V.P. was two months old. She provided Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino with information regarding ba sic infant care, such as reading V.P.’s cues and meeting his basic needs. Both Ms. Sumi nguit and Ms. Mendez reported that it was difficult for Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino to read V.P.’s cues. During one of V.P.’s feedings, Ms. Gore would not remove V.P.’s bottle eve n though he did not want to take it and milk was spilling out the side of his mouth. {¶33} Both Ms. Suminguit and Ms. Mendez also reported concerning beha vior during these sessions. On one occasion, Ms. Gore was swinging V.P. up and down and accidentally hit his head on the wall. On other occasions, Ms. Gore became aggressive and raised her voice with Ms. Mendez during her instruction. M s. Gore once became so upset with Ms. Mendez or Ms. Suminguit that she asked Mr. Pizzi no to take V.P. because she did not want to accidentally hurt him. {¶34} Ms. Mendez and Ms. Suminguit also had to instruct Ms. Gore to a llow Mr.

Pizzino to have some time with V.P. so he could also learn the parenting skills. {¶35} Ms. Mendez concluded that her parenting education with Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino was not successful because she did not see them put the information she provided into practice during any of the visits unless prompted or suggested. In addition,9 despite V.P.’s development, Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino continued to treat him as if he were a two-month-old. Ms. Mendez also did not observe the couple pu tting V.P.’s needs over their own personal interests. {¶36} Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino had not completed the parenting servic es goal in their case plan prior to moving to Xenia. Ms. Suminguit provid ed Ms. Gore a list of service providers in Xenia. {¶37} Ms. Gore contacted Amber Benton (“Ms. Benton”) from Family and Children First to enroll in its six-week parenting class. Due to COVID- 19, the classes were held on Zoom for an hour as opposed to the typical two-hour, in-pers on classes. As a result, the program’s attendance policies were very strict. {¶38} Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino participated in the first class. Acco rding to Ms. Benton, Ms. Gore was very engaged. Mr. Pizzino appeared to be lying down and rolled his eyes during portions of the class. {¶39} Ms. Gore attended the second class but indicated that Mr. Pizzi no could not attend because he was working. Ms. Benton informed her that it was Mr. Pizzino’s responsibility to call if he was not going to attend. Ms. Gore became very upset, used profanity, and disconnected the Zoom call. {¶40} Ms. Gore later called Children and Family First to re-enroll in the classes. Ms. Benton’s supervisor was not willing to permit Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino to return to the class. Ms. Gore became very upset, began shouting, and use d profanity. Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino did not complete a different parenting course i n Xenia.10 V.P.’s Foster Placement {¶41} V.P. has resided with the same certified foster parents since h e was two weeks old. V.P. initially required numerous doctors’ appointme nts but has no current health issues. V.P.’s foster parents have also held visits bet ween V.P. and his sibling. V.P.’s foster parents intend to adopt him in the event LCDJFS o btains permanent custody. According to Ms. Suminguit, V.P. appears to have bonded with hi s foster parents. Permanent Custody Proceedings {¶42} In August 2020, LCDJFS filed a motion for permanent custody of V.P. {¶43} The GAL filed a report, findings, and recommendation, in which she concluded that it would be in V.P.’s best interest to grant per manent custody to LCDJFS. {¶44} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on November 16, 202 0. LCDJFS, Ms. Gore, and Mr. Pizzino all appeared with their respective co unsel, and the GAL also appeared. {¶45} LCDJFS presented the testimony of Ms. Suminguit from LCDJFS; Ms

. Christy from Signature Health; Ms. Mendez from Crossroads; Ms. Benton from Family and Children First; and one of V.P.’s certified foster parents. LCDJFS also submitted certified copies of Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s medical record s and the prior journal entry terminating the couple’s paren tal rights to V.P.’s sibling. {¶46} Ms. Suminguit testified that it would be in V.P.’s best interes t to grant permanent custody to LCDJFS due to Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s inconsistencies with their case plan goals. She reported concerns regarding the cou ple’s ability to keep appointments and take care of their mental health so that they are stable enough to care for V.P., as well as their lack of parenting skills, financial stability, and bonding and11 attachment with V.P. She acknowledged that Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s current housing appeared to be appropriate and that they had some suppl ies for V.P. {¶47} Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino both testified at the hearing. {¶48} Ms. Gore testified that it would be in V.P.’s best interest to come home with

Mr. Pizzino and her. She stated that she and Mr. Pizzino had “ grown up enough” to take care of V.P.; their house is suitable; they have supplies, incl uding a car seat, crib, clothes, diapers, and shoes, although she acknowledged that they forgot to bring the car seat with them; and they have food stamps to obtain food for V.P. Ms. Go re indicated that her prior noncompliance with the case plan occurred as a result of medica l reasons and work

commitments. {¶49} Mr. Pizzino testified that he would like to take V.P. home with him that day. He stated that he and Ms. Gore have adequate space and income, including assistance from their church and Ms. Yount. When asked why he did not com ply with his case plan, Mr. Pizzino responded that he did the best he could while tryin g to work as much as possible to save money. {¶50} The GAL did not provide testimony but indicated that she stood by the recommendation in her report. {¶51} Following closing arguments, the trial court issued its ruling from the bench, finding by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the bes t interest of V.P. that permanent custody be granted to LCDJFS and granting LCDJFS’s mo tion for permanent custody. {¶52} The trial court subsequently filed a lengthy judgment entry in which it set forth its summary of the evidence and made statutory findings. The trial court found by12 clear and convincing evidence, based upon the testimony and evi dence pres ented and the recommendation of the GAL, that it was in the best interest of V.P. that permanent custody be granted to LCDJFS. Accordingly, the trial court gra nted LCDJFS’s motion for permanent custody, committed V.P. to the permanent custody of L CDJFS, and completely and permanently divested Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’ s parental rights. {¶53} Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino both filed notices of appeal. 1 Ms. Gore presents the following assignment of error for our review: {¶54} “The trial court’s finding that V.P. II’s best interests would be served by granting the Lake County Department of Job and Family Services permanent custody of him was against the manifest weight of evidence because a legal ly secure permanent placement for V.P. II could have been achieved without a grant of permanent custody to

DJFS.”

Standard of Review {¶55} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial court’s pe rmanent custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.M.P ., 2018-Ohio-5072, 126 N.E.3d 200, ¶ 54 (11th Dist.). To apply th is standard, the appellate court weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consid ers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. Eastley v. Volkman , 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20.

1

. Mr. Pizzino is the appellant in the companion case of In re V.J.P., II , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-124.13 {¶56} “Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a re viewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co ., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus. Legal Principles {¶57} It is well established that a parent’s right to raise a child i s an essential and basic civil right. In re Hayes , 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997). The permanent termination of parental rights has been described as “‘the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.’” Id. , quoting In re Smith , 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45 (6th Dist.1991). Based upon these principles, th e Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that a parent must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows. Id

. {¶58} While the rights of a parent to his or her child are fundamenta l, they are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is t he polestar or controlling principle to be observed. In re Cunningham , 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979). Although the termination of the rights of a natural pa rent should occur as a last resort, termination is expressly authorized when necessary for the welfare of the child. In

re L.M.R ., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-096, 2017-Ohio-158, ¶ 33. Statutory Requirements {¶59} The trial court must apply a two-pronged analysis when ruling o n a motion for permanent custody. In re Krems , 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2003-G-2535, 2004-Ohio2449, ¶ 33. The trial court may grant permanent custody of a c hild to the movant if the court determines at the hearing, by clear and convincing eviden ce, that (1) one of the14 factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applie s, and (2) it is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “[C]lear and conv incing evidence is more than a mere preponderance of the evidence; it is evidence sufficient to produce in the mind of

the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts s ought to be established.” In re

Krems at ¶ 36. {¶60} In determining the best interest of a child, the trial court sh all consider “all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: {¶61} “(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with th e child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home provider s, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; {¶62} “(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the chil d or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; {¶63} “(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children service s agencies * * * for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *; {¶64} “(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of perma nent custody to the

agency; {¶65} “(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)- (e). {¶66} Also relevant here is R.C. 2141.414(E)(11), which involves whet her “[t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with re spect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section * * *, and the parent has failed to pr ovide clear and convincing15 evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the he alth, welfare, and safety

of the child.” {¶67} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he statute requires a weighing

of all the relevant factors.” In re Schaefer , 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 64. However, “[t]here is not one element that is given greater weight than

the others.” Id . at ¶ 56. The Trial Court’s Judgment {¶68} The trial court made the following statutory findings in its ju dgment entry: {¶69} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), V.P. has been in the tempor ary custody

of LCDJFS for at least 12 out of the last 22 months. {¶70} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e), LCDJFS was not required to make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, eliminate the continued removal of the child from the child’s home, and retur n the child to the child’s home, since Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino had their parental rights terminated with respect to V.P.’s sibling. However, LCDJFS did make reasonable efforts by preparing a case plan, with which Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino consistently failed t o comply. {¶71} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), it is in the best interest of V.P. that permanent custody be granted to LCDJFS based on a consideration of all relevant factors set forth in subsections (a) through (e). {¶72} Under subsection (a), V.P. does not have a strong relationship with Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino due to them residing in Xenia for several months, resulting in few16 in-person visits and limited video visitation. V.P. is strongl y bonded to his foster parents, who have been his caretakers since his discharge from the hospi tal after his birth. {¶73} Under subsection (b), V.P. does not have the skills to communic ate his thoughts or feelings regarding permanent custody due to his age . However, he has established a bond with his caregivers, with whom he has reside d since his release from the hospital. In addition, the GAL has recommended that granti ng permanent custody to

LCDJFS is in V.P.’s best interest. {¶74} Under subsection (c), LCDJFS was granted emergency custody of V .P. while he was in the hospital. Thereafter, V.P. was placed in a certified foster home, where he has remained since his placement. {¶75} Under subsection (d), permanency is unable to be achieved witho ut permanent custody being granted to LCDJFS. V.P. is less than t wo years old; is completely dependent upon his caregivers to provide his basic n eeds; requires constant supervision to stay safe; and needs a stable and permanent home to keep him safe and consistently provide for all of his needs. There are no relati ves who are willing, able, or appropriate to care for V.P., and an identified family will be able to ensure all his needs are being met. {¶76} There have been continued concerns regarding Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s follow through with mental health services and their ability to provide basic

needs for themselves and V.P. Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s inc ome is unstable, and they rely heavily on Ms. Yount for housing and financial suppor t. From May to December 2019, they were homeless and living in a tent. Mr. Pizzino has been working part-time. They are not able to support V.P. by providing him with food, s helter, clothing, or other17 necessities. Their mental health remains a concern, especially due to Ms. Gore’s inconsistency in mental health services throughout the entirety of the case. {¶77} Under subsection (e), the trial court found that R.C. 2151.414( E)(11) was applicable. Neither Ms. Gore nor Mr. Pizzino have shown, notwi thstanding the prior termination of their parental rights to V.P.’s sibling, that th ey are able to provide a legally secure placement for V.P. and that they have the ability to pro vide adequate care for V.P.’s health, welfare, and safety. {¶78} Ms. Gore does not dispute the trial court’s determination that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) was applicable, i.e., that V.P has been in th e temporary custody of LCDJFS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. Rather, Ms. Gore disputes the trial court’s best-interest determination. Legally Secure Permanent Placement {¶79} Ms. Gore challenges the trial court’s best-interest findings un der R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) and R.C. 2141.414(E)(11). {¶80} As indicated, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires the trial court t o consider “[t]he child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement an d whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.” R.C. 2141.414(E)(11) requires the trial court to consider whether “[ t]he parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of th e child pursuant to this section * * *, and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincin g evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”18 {¶81} Ms. Gore contends that she and Mr. Pizzino established these fa ctors in their favor by demonstrating: (1) suitable housing; (2) financ ial support from community, family, and government programs; (3) consistent employment on M r. Pizzino’s part and consistent efforts to find the right position for her; (4) enro llment in and regular attendance at mental health and medication programs from which they have n ever been expelled; (5) experience with parenting education; and (6) placement that inc luded “food, shelter, and a sufficient collection of baby supplies.” {¶82} Despite Ms. Gore’s positive characterization, the record contai ns substantial competent and credible evidence supporting the tria l court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) and R.C. 2141.414(E)(11). {¶83} As the trial court noted, V.P. was less than two years old at t he time of the permanent custody hearing and required a “stable and permanent” home to keep him safe and to “consistently” provide for all of his needs. The t estimony and documentary

evidence described above establishes that Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizz ino have a long history of instability and inconsistency in housing, employment, and me ntal health treatment, which resulted in the prior termination of their parental right s to V.P.’s sibling and a grant of emergency and temporary custody of V.P. to LCDJFS shortly af ter his birth. While more recent improvements in Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s life c ircumstances are certainly worthy of acknowledgment and commendation, they do no t reflect the stability required to establish a legally secure permanent placement for a young child such as V.P. or a long-term ability to adequate ly provide for his health, we lfare, and safety. {¶84} For instance, while she and Mr. Pizzino resided in Lake County, Ms. Gore exhibited significant symptoms of mental illness and was hospit alized on two separate19 occasions for suicidal thoughts or behavior. Although Ms. Gore eventually reinstated mental health services in Xenia, she consistently missed schedu led appointments. Her recent medical records demonstrate continuing struggles with he r significant mental health issues and resistance to following treatment recommendat ions. The fact that Ms. Gore has not been expelled from any mental health programs does not compel a contrary

conclusion. {¶85} Although Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino appeared to have suitable hou sing at the time of the hearing, it followed a substantial period of ti me in which they were homeless and living in a tent in Lake County. After moving to Xenia, the couple lived in a home with a registered sex offender for several months. In a ddition, the couple’s housing inconsistency in Lake County was motivated, at least in part, by conflict with other

individuals. After Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino moved into their c urrent home, Ms. Yount’s husband moved out due to conflicts with them, which reflects co ntinuing discord. {¶86} Ms. Gore has been consistently unemployed in Lake County and in Xenia. She was terminated from employment at several fast-food restaur ants in Xenia for inappropriate or irresponsible behavior, including one instance in which she relapsed on heroin while on the premises. This evidence reflects the exist ence of more serious issues than a mere failure to find the “right position.” {¶87} Although Mr. Pizzino has been consistently employed in Lake Cou nty and in Xenia, his employment has consisted of part-time work at fas t-food restaurants. Therefore, the couple relies on food stamps and on Ms. Yount to pay the rent for their current housing. At the time of the hearing, however, Ms. Youn t had recently lost her job20 and began working at McDonald’s. The couple had to borrow fund s from their pastor to make the trip to Lake County. {¶88} Accordingly, despite noticeable improvements, the evidence supp orts a conclusion that material aspects of Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’ s life circumstances

remained unstable. {¶89} Ms. Gore also does not acknowledge the seriousness of her failu re to successfully complete parenting skills education. According to Ms. Gore, she was “just a six-week online attendance certificate away from fully satisfyi ng that case plan goal.” {¶90} While the parents’ progress is measured in part by their comple tion of the case plan goals, the case plan is not the only measure by which a court determines whether to grant a motion for permanent custody. In re J.H. , 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L126, 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶ 103. The main issue considered by the c ourts is not whether the parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but, rath er, whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s r emoval. Id

. {¶91} Ms. Mendez and Ms. Suminguit both testified that they had serio us concerns regarding Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s abilities to ca re for a young child. After moving to Xenia, the couple no longer participated in hands-on parenting education, which the testimony indicated they needed the most. In additio n, the couple did not complete the online parenting class in Xenia because of Mr. Piz zino’s failure to attend and Ms. Gore’s angry outburst toward the service provider after being reminded of the attendance requirements. {¶92} Ms. Gore further contends that the trial court’s findings are i ncorrect based on its reliance on the GAL’s recommendation. According to Ms. Gore, the GAL’s21 conclusion that she is not “currently able to provide appropria te and necessary care for [V.P.] and will not be in the reasonable future” is not accurat e based on her circumstances at the time of the permanent custody hearing. {¶93} As indicated, despite some noticeable improvement in Ms. Gore’s and Mr. Pizzino’s life circumstances by the time of the hearing, the ev idence supports the GAL’s conclusion. Accordingly, the trial court’s reliance on the GAL ’s recommendation did not render its findings against the manifest weight of the evidence

. {¶94} Finally, Ms. Gore contends, in the alternative, that the couple established that they would be able to provide a legally secure permanent p lacement for V.P. and adequate care for his health, welfare, and safety “in a very re asonable amount of time.” {¶95} While we do not doubt the sincerity of Ms. Gore’s belief, this court has repeatedly emphasized the need to provide permanence for childr en. See In re J.L.S ., 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2020-P-0053 & 2020-P-0054, 2020-Ohio-51 43, ¶ 33. Speculative future plans do not justify failure to terminate parental right s when it is in the children’s

best interest. Id . The trial court was not required to deny V.P. the permanency that he needs, especially at such a young age, in order to provide Ms. Gore and Mr. Pizzino additional time to prove that they can provide a legally secure permanent placement for

him. See In re N.S.N ., 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 15CA6, et al., 2015-Ohio-2486, ¶ 5 0. The law also does not require the court to experiment with a ch ild’s best interest at the risk of great detriment or harm. See id

. {¶96} Accordingly, the trial court’s best-interest findings under R.C

. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) and R.C. 2141.414(E)(11) were not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.22 Ms. Gore’s Reply Brief {¶97} In her reply brief, Ms. Gore also challenges the trial court’s best-interest findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) and (b). It is well-esta blished that a party may not advance new arguments in its reply brief. Am. Fiber Sys., Inc. v. Levin , 125 Ohio St.3d 374, 2010-Ohio-1468, 928 N.E.2d 695, ¶ 21. Given the serious n ature of these proceedings and the gravity of the outcome, however, we will co nsider Ms. Gore’s additional arguments. The Child’s Interaction/Interrelationship {¶98} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) requires the trial court to consider “[t ]he interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, si blings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect

the child.” {¶99} According to Ms. Gore, the trial court “surmised” that V.P. cou ld not have formed any relationship with her via video chat due to his age and that he favored the bond with his foster parents. Ms. Gore contends that the trial court should have in stead viewed the “strength” of V.P.’s bonds “in the context of his ag e” and “the resiliency toward change that accompanies it.” {¶100} The trial court’s findings are supported by direct evidence fro m the hearing in the form of testimony from Ms. Suminguit and V.P.’s foster m other. By contrast, Ms. Gore’s resiliency theory was not presented in any evidentiary f orm. {¶101} Ms. Gore also contends that the testimony of Ms. Suminguit and V.P.’s foster mother was “conclusory” and “anecdotal” and thus not “co mpetent or credible.”23 {¶102} The credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trier of fact

. In re D.H ., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2017-A-0081, 2018-Ohio-630, ¶ 18. Accordin g to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the trial court “has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page.” Davis v. Flickinger , 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). “This is eve n more crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much eviden t in the parties’ demeanor

and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” (Emphasis sic.) Id . at 419. {¶103} The trial court appears to have determined that the uncontested testimony of Ms. Suminguit and V.P.’s foster mother was credible. Ms. Go re has not articulated the basis for her assertions and, thus, has not demonstrated how th e trial court lost its way in its credibility determinations. {¶104} Ms. Gore further contends that the trial improperly assigned mo re weight to the testimony of Ms. Suminguit and V.P.’s foster mother than to the fact that Ms. Gore had a “perfectly suitable living arrangement” for V.P. {¶105} In addition to credibility, the weight to be given to the evide nce is also primarily for the trier of fact. In re D.H . at ¶ 18. Further, the premise underlying Ms. Gore’s contention is incorrect. As discussed above, the trial court did not find that Ms. Gore’s “living arrangement” for V.P. was “perfectly suitable.” {¶106} Accordingly, the trial court’s best-interest finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) was not against the manifest weight of the ev idence.

The Child’s Wishes {¶107} Finally, Ms. Gore challenges the trial court’s best-interest fi nding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), which requires the trial court to consider “ [t]he wishes of the child, as24 expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child.” {¶108} Ms. Gore acknowledges that V.P.’s young age prevented him from comprehending the proceedings or expressing his wishes. Noneth eless, Ms. Gore

contends that the trial court should not have considered the GA L’s recommendation under this factor because her report was not admitted as an exhibit a t the hearing. In support, Ms. Gore cites Sup.R. 48.06(C)(2), a Rule of Superintendence fo r the Courts of Ohio, which provides that “[t]he court shall consider the recommendat ion of the guardian ad litem in determining the best interest of the child only when t he report or a portion of the report has been admitted as exhibit.” {¶109} Sup.R. 48.06 was not adopted until January 1, 2021, which was s ubsequent to the permanent custody hearing in this case held in November 2020. {¶110} Further, Ms. Gore quotes the rule out of its proper context. S up.R. 48.06(C) expressly applies to GAL reports in “proceedings involving the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, custody, and visitation.” (Emphasis adde d.) Sup.R. 48.06(C)(1). By contrast, Sup.R. 48.06(B) applies to GAL reports in “abuse, neg lect, dependency, unruly, and delinquency cases and actions to terminate parental rights ,” and it does not contain this requirement. (Emphasis added.) Sup.R. 48.06(B)(1). {¶111} Former Sup.R. 48(F)(2), which was in effect at the time of the hearing, contained the same requirement as Sup.R. 48.06(C)(2). However, Sup.R. 48(F)(2) expressly applied to “domestic relations proceedings involving the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities .” (Emphasis added.) Id . By contrast, Sup.R. 48(F)(1) applied25 to GAL reports in “juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency case s and actions to terminate parental rights ,” and it did not contain this requirement. (Emphasis added.) {¶112} Accordingly, the trial court was permitted to consider the GAL’ s report in support of its best-interest finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)( b). {¶113} In sum, our review of the record demonstrates that the trial co urt considered all required statutory factors and that substantial competent, credible evidence supports its best-interest findings. Therefore, the trial court’s best- interest determination was not against the manifest weight of the manifest. {¶114} Ms. Gore’s sole assignment of error is without merit. {¶115} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Cour t of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of V.P. to LCDJFS is

affirmed.

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J, MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.