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LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE

AVIATION PART I AND II

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC 

SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 13, 2005 AND JULY 19, 2005

Serial No. 109–31

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND

CYBERSECURITY

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex Officio) 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Georgia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack .............................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Security, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity: 

Prepared Opening Statement, July 13, 2006 ..................................................... 5

Oral Statement, July 19, 2006 ............................................................................ 87 

Prepared Opening Statement, July 19, 2006 ..................................................... 88

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 

Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity .................................... 2 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Prepared Opening Statement, July 13, 2005 ..................................................... 4 

Oral Statement, July 19, 2005 ............................................................................ 89

Prepared Opening Statement, July 19, 2005 ..................................................... 90

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Oregon ..................................................................................................... 31

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 27

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island ........................................................................................... 33

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 35

The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New Mexico ...................................................................................................... 108

The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Alabama ............................................................................................................ 38

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2005

PANEL I 

Mr. Allen Barber, President, L–9 Communications Security and Detection 

Systems, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15

Ms. Chathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 22

Mr. Michael Ellenbogen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Reveal 

Imaging Technologies, Inc.: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 38
Page

IV

Mr. Todd Hauptli, Senior Executive Vice President, American Association 

of Airport Executives, Senior Vice President, Airport Legislative Alliance: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18

Mr. Louise Parker, President and Chief Executive Officer, General Electric 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

PANEL II 

Mr. Deepak Chopra, President, OSI Systems, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 52

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 53

Mr. Anthony R. Fabiano, President and Chief Executive Officer, American 

Science and Engineering, INC.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 41

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 42

Mr. Cherif Rizkalla, President, Smiths Detection, Americas: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 56

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 57

Mr. Rick Rowe, Chief Executive Officer, SafeView, Inc.: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 71

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 72

Mr. John W. Wood, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, Analogic: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 48

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48

TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2005

PANEL I 

Mr. Clifford A. Wilke, Assistant Administrator and Chief Technology Officer, 

Transportation Security Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 91

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 93

FOR THE RECORD

Letter to the Honorable Edward J. Markey .......................................................... 37 
(1)

LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY TO 

IMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY 

PART I 

Wednesday, July 13, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder presiding. 

Present: Representatives Linder, Rogers, Sanchez, Markey, 

Dicks, DeFazio, Langevin and Thompson (ex officio). 

Mr. LINDER. The Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity will come to order. The committee is meeting here today to hear testimony on how technology 

can be leveraged to improve aviation security. 

I am John Linder. I am not the chairman of the subcommittee, 

but the chairman, Dan Lungren, has been kidnapped and is being 

held captive in the Judiciary Committee markup of the USA PATRIOT Act. 

I would like to welcome everybody to today’s hearing of the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and 

Cybersecurity. This afternoon, we will examine how current and 

emerging technologies may improve the efficiency and effectiveness 

of airline-passenger-checked baggage screening and checkpoint security. 

The Transportation Security Administration spends approxi- mately $4 billion a year to screen passengers and baggage. While 

that is undoubtedly a lot of money, I fear this country is not getting nearly the return it would hope on such an investment. The 

deficiencies of the current system are well documented. Checkpoint 

x-ray machines and metal detectors are outmoded technology and 

have limited ability to detect modern terrorist threats. 

The TSA also uses a Band-Aid approach to cover up the shortfalls with the technology, such as requiring passengers to empty 

their pockets, take off their coats, remove the laptop computers 

from their cases. They also strongly recommend that passengers remove their shoes. Moreover, TSA deploys thousands of screeners to 

provide an additional layer of secondary screening in the form of 

wandings and patdowns. 

To make matters worse, at airports where it does not have either 

the money or the space for an Explosive Detection System, TSA 
2

has deployed explosive trace detection systems, or EDTs. EDT machines require screeners to swab luggage surfaces for traces of explosives; and a sample collection is difficult to take correctly, taking 

an average of 8 minutes to fully swab each piece of luggage. The 

result is a checkpoint security system that is too slow, too costly, 

too labor intensive, inefficient and, quite simply, not effective 

enough. 

I am hopeful that emerging technologies could alter the current 

state of checkpoint security. I want to emphasize that no single 

technology will offer a 100 percent solution to the multitude of 

aviation security threats. I believe the American people are better 

served, however, through the automation of existing systems and 

the deployment of emerging technologies. We must develop plans 

and identify effective technologies that are suitable to the aviation 

environment and drive toward the goal of improving detection and 

reducing operating costs. They offer the best hope of improving 

TSA screening operation. 

I would like to thank all of our witnesses who are appearing before us today. We look forward to them providing the subcommittee 

with the testimony and insight on how this government may better 

protect the traveling public. After all, the worth of prevention in 

this case cannot be measured in ounces or pounds but rather in 

hundreds if not thousands of lives. 

I now recognize the ranking minority member, Ms. Sanchez, for 

any comments she chooses to make. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am very grateful that the majority has agreed to have this 

hearing because I think this issue of technology and how we can 

use it and having some experts in front of us who have been working with technology in these three-plus years where we have been 

trying to figure out a way to check more people and check them 

more effectively, I think it is an incredibly important topic. I know 

that you have a lot of varied experiences. 

I know from the very beginning when we began this committee 

as a select committee we have had plenty of meetings with many 

technology companies who tell us they have the solution to everything. I think in some cases we have spent some money fairly 

quickly and maybe didn’t get the result that we had hoped we 

would. But now we are really at a standpoint where we have had 

some years behind us, maybe more technology is available, and I 

think it is important, I think, in particular because, you know, 

there is so much frustration still at the airports. 

I know I was in line the other day and went through and did the 

whole works and my bag got—handbag got put, taken off and 

looked at, personal search and then they put the handbag back 

through the x-ray machine, and then they checked again by hand 

and then they put it through again through the x-ray machines 

and then they checked it again by hand. And by the third time I 

just said to the gentleman, do you think you might have found 

whatever you are looking for by now? He told me they thought they 

had seen a knife in there. I mean, it was just a little handbag. 

So when we have these occurrences there begins to be a real 

credibility problem, a credibility gap about what we as a govern-
3

ment are doing to protect people. So I am hoping we get some insight from you and we can begin to find some solutions to this. 

I am also pleased that my local airport, John Wayne International airport in Orange County, California, has the in-line Explosive Detection System, or EDS; and I think that LAX just received their letter of intent from the TSA for reimbursement to get 

that in-line EDS system there, also. But, unfortunately, there are 

a lot of airports that don’t have that. 

You know, I think we need to upgrade our two-dimensional x-ray 

machines. As I just indicated, I think implementation of in-line 

EDS is important, and it is going to help us. But I think there is 

just a whole bunch of reform that we need to do and really make 

a good plan now. I know that in our bill that we passed last year we had $250 million for research and development and installation of weapons detection equipment. We had $650 million for in-line EDS system installation. We had $100 million to research explosives detection 

technology in particular with respect to plastic explosives, which is 

a big concern not only at airports but at places like Disneyland and 

other places where they would really like to be able to screen people for that. $300 million to research and develop and install new 

air cargo security technology, a big issue for a couple of my colleagues in particular who have been pushing here on this side of 

the committee for that; and, unfortunately, the President’s budget 

for fiscal year 2006 did not include funding for these initiatives. 

So I hope that we have a candid discussion and testimony here 

with respect to these topics; and I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank the gentlelady. 

The gentleman from Mississippi seeks to inquire. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today. 

The creation of the Transportation Security Administration was 

one of the first actions Congress took in response to the September 

11, attack. Congress directed TSA to hire Federal screeners and install screening equipment to close security gaps and restore confidence among Americans that it was safe to fly again. Four years 

later, we now know, thanks to the Defense Contract Audit Agency, 

that TSA, in its rush to meet a congressional mandate, lost control 

of its $741 million contract to hire 60,000 screeners. Thanks to the 

GAO and the Department’s Inspector General, we now know that 

TSA, in its haste, purchased $4.5 billion worth of screening equipment that needs to be upgraded if we are to better screen our traveling public. In fact, the Inspector General said that significant improvement in performance may not be possible without greater use 

of new technology. 

What brings us to the subject of the hearing today is, what is 

TSA doing? Is it successfully identifying promising technologies? Is 

it providing R&D support? Is it moving the technologies in a timely 

fashion to the pilot or trial phase and then seeing the technologies 

through to development and installation? 

We want to hear from our witnesses today. I look forward to 

hearing that. 

I am particularly interested in hearing how the constant turnover at TSA and within the Border and Transportation Security Di-
4

rectorate has impacted development of aviation technology. TSA 

needs a plan for optimal deployment of in-line EDS and EDT machines to replace stand-alone systems at the Nation’s more than 

400 airports. That is why Congress in the 9/11 Act directed TSA 

to give high priority to developing, testing, improving and deploying airport checkpoint screening technologies, create a strategic 

plan for the deployment and use of EDS at airport screening checkpoints, and expediting the installation of in-line baggage screening 

equipment at airports. I would also like to hear how TSA is doing with the $100 million 

Congress authorized for investments in emerging explosive technologies at passenger checkpoints. TSA launched it last year. How 

are they doing? 

TSA cannot get a redo when it comes to securing the skies. We 

need to get it right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I look forward to the testimony. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

I ask unanimous consent for Chairman Cox’s statement to be 

made part of the record and remind the other members that if they 

have a written statement that it will be part of the record. 

[The statement of Chairman Cox follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

JULY 13, 2005

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Preventing terrorists from bringing or placing explosives aboard commercial aircraft is one of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) most important 

mandates. Sadly, the technology that TSA relies upon, including much of the new 

technology that has been deployed since September 11th, has limited ability to detect some of the most pressing terrorist threats, such as improvised explosive devices—although we now are much more likely to catch knifes, nail clippers, and 

other less critical items. 

Because of the deficiencies with the current screening machines, TSA has been 

forced to rely upon time-consuming and invasive procedures such as pat downs and 

opening up and swabbing of baggage. Furthermore, the system requires screeners 

to make judgments based upon limited information, introducing a large amount of 

human error into the system. 

In fact, testing conducted by the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector 

General and the Government Accountability Office raises serious questions as to 

whether the existing screening system can ever operate at optimal levels of efficiency or effectiveness. 

While TSA continues to spend the lion’s share of its budget on a deficient passenger and baggage screening operations, the development and deployment of new 

screening technologies have not received the priority attention that these important 

functions deserve. Almost four years after Congress charged TSA with screening 

passengers and checked baggage for threat items, TSA has yet to devise a comprehensive technology strategy to improve the efficiency or effectiveness of its aviation screening operations. 

Nor has TSA moved with urgency to use existing technology to reduce operational 

costs. As GAO has noted, TSA has gone about its technology deployment in a haphazard fashion, without rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The labor-intensive nature of 

operating the current equipment has made TSA the lead federal agency in on-thejob injuries. In fact, 30 percent of TSA screeners filed workers compensation claims 

during 2004, mostly related to lifting heavy baggage during the screening process. 

As long as TSA continues to employ a system that relies upon outdated equipment 

and the judgment and physical labor of thousands of screeners, we will continue to 

have a costly and ineffective system. TSA must promptly move to identify and 

prioritize investment in technologies that are best suited for each of its airports, 

bearing in mind each airport’s unique characteristics and passenger volume. 
5

The current system is a terrible waste of resources, an inconvenience to the traveling public, and is of questionable security benefit. I thank the witnesses in advance for appearing today to provide their expert views on these issues and I look 

forward to your testimony. 

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL E. LUNGREN

JULY 13, 2005

[Call hearing to order] 

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing of the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. 

This afternoon we will examine how current and emerging technologies may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of airline passenger checked baggage screening 

and checkpoint security. 

The Transportation Security Administration spends roughly $4 billion annually 

screening passengers and baggage. While that is a lot of money, it is what we get 

(or don’t get) for that price tag that concerns me the most. 

The deficiencies of the current system are well documented. 

Checkpoint X-ray machines and metal detectors are outmoded technology and 

have limited ability to detect modern terrorist threats. 

TSA uses a band-aid approach to cover up the short falls of its technology, such 

as requiring passengers to empty their pockets, take off their coats, and remove 

their laptop computers from their cases. They also strongly ‘‘recommend’’ that passengers remove their shoes. And TSA deploys thousands of screeners to provide an 

additional layer of secondary screening in the form of wandings and pat-downs. 

The result is a checkpoint security system that is too slow, too costly, too labor 

intensive, inefficient, and—most troubling—not effective enough. 

Emerging technologies—such as those we will hear about today—could alter the 

current state of checkpoint security. 

While serious concerns remain—including cost, operational integration, and privacy—these technologies offer the potential to improve checkpoint efficiency, enhance screening effectiveness dramatically, and reduce labor costs. 

TSA’s system for checked baggage screening is slightly better, but it is still mostly 

a patchwork of randomly placed machines. To meet the unrealistic deadlines of the 

2001 Congressional mandates, TSA was forced to deploy explosive detection systems 

(EDS) wherever they could find space without much regard for what would be optimal from an operational standpoint. 

The placement of the EDS machines has driven up labor costs and on-the-job-injuries and does not allow for automation that would make full use of their speed. 

To make matters worse, at airports where it does not have either the money or 

space for an EDS, TSA has deployed explosive trace detection systems (ETD). ETD 

machines require screeners to swab luggage surfaces for traces of explosives. Sample 

collection is difficult to do correctly, and it takes an average of 8 minutes to fully 

swab each piece of luggage. 

Automation of existing systems and the deployment of emerging technology offers 

the best hope of improving TSA’s screening operations. 

While this could require substantial upfront capital in some airports, the resulting 

reduction in labor and operating costs will pay back the initial investment, in most 

cases, in less than two years. 

Finally, it must be remembered that no single technology will offer a 100 percent 

solution to the multitude of aviation security threats.* The key is to develop a plan 

and identify effective technologies that are suitable to the aviation environment and 

drive towards the goal of improving detection and reducing operation costs. 

Every dollar wasted is an opportunity lost. 

I thank our all of our witness for appearing before us today and now recognize 

the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez.

Mr. LINDER. We are pleased to welcome our first panel. Thank 

you for coming. Thank you for being willing to take the opportunity 

to help us. 

We ask that, due to the number of witnesses on our panels, two 

panels, we will have, that you keep your opening oral testimony to 

3 minutes. Your written testimony will be made part of the record. 

All of the members of the panel will be allowed to testify before any 

questions. 
6

On the first panel, Louis Parker is President and Chief Executive 

Officer with General Electric Security. Allen Barber is the President of L–3 Communication Security and Detection Systems, Inc. 

Michael Ellenbogen of Reveal Imaging is still on an airplane. Hopefully, he can join us. Todd Hauptli, Senior Executive Vice President 

of American Association of Airport Executives and Senior Vice 

President of Airport Legislative Alliance; and Cathleen Berrick, Director of the Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

Thank you all for coming. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Parker. 

STATEMENT OF A. LOUIS PARKER 

Mr. PARKER. Thank you. 

I would like to thank the subcommittee for the invitation to discuss using technology to improve aviation security and reduce 

costs. The focus of this panel—and my remarks—is the benefits of 

automating checked baggage screening at our Nation’s airports 

with in-line Explosive Detection Systems, EDS. My written statement addresses a broader range of aviation security technology currently offered by GE and new technologies under development. 

Despite significant upgrades to aviation security since 9/11, there 

is much room for improvement in operational efficiency and cost reduction. The Washington Post recently reported that Dulles Airport 

incurs delays up to an hour on some flights due to slow screening. 

Lack of investment in in-line EDS screening will create adverse impact throughout the aviation system as air traffic continues to 

grow. 

The reasons to expedite EDS in-line bag screening are compelling 

because it provides the best security, is the most economical solution for many airports, offers a variety of time-tested screening solutions for both small and large airports. 

EDS technology, by definition, is certified to meet the highest 

standard of detection. The weak link in baggage screening is the 

human factor. We must minimize human intervention and maximize automation for effective security. EDS technology will clear 

congestion in many airport lobbies and reduce the risk of tampering with bags after screening. 

Since the origination of EDS certification in 1994, false alarm 

rates have halved and throughput has doubled. We anticipate an 

escalation of technology advancement, but little of this will be of 

any use in lobbies where throughput and efficiency improvements 

are limited by manual loading speed. 

Technology can provide both enhanced security and cost reduction. EDS is a non-intrusive screening method that minimizes bag 

openings, an enormous benefit. When coupled with the Yxlon x-ray 

defraction system added to the family of GE-certified EDS, we are 

one step closer to the goal of full automation. Using diffraction xray to resolve alarms of CT-based EDS greatly reduces bag openings and associated staff. Deploying diffraction technology pays for 

itself in 2 years. 

San Francisco airport is a pioneer in in-line EDS. They estimate 

that their $70 million infrastructure investment has saved approxi-
7

mately 600 TSA FTEs. The airport estimated that in-line EDS 

screening lowers the cost per bag from $2.35 to $0.38. 

It is also notable that TSA reports a 77 percent reduction in 

workmen’s compensation at SFO because of reduced baggage handing. 

Savings opportunities are not limited to large airports. Lexington, Kentucky, achieved an impressive return on its capital investment. Its in-line system results in an annual savings of $3 million in operational costs with a 16-month payback. 

Payback will take less than a full year for future small airport 

systems. As in-line projects at airports such as Dallas and Denver 

are completed, many machines currently in airline lobbies will become available. Hundreds of CTX2500 and 5500 machines can be 

reused in smaller airport in-line systems. Simple in-line applications can be done as little as $100,000 per machine. In March, the GAO reported that TSA estimates a $1.3 billion 

savings over 7 years with 1-year payback for the nine lucky airports federally funded through letters of intent, LOIs. 

Despite solid economic justification, funding for the capital investment remains a challenge. In-line EDS makes sense from a security, economic and operational perspective. We must continue to 

increase the efficiency of the system through implementation of 

technology. We must also explore financing options to accelerate 

the availability of funding for this much-needed investment in the 

safety and security of our Nation’s aviation system. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Parker. 

[The statement of Mr. Parker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF A. LOUIS PARKER

Thank you Chairman Lungren, Congresswoman Sanchez and Members of the 

Committee for this opportunity to discuss the benefits of leveraging technology to 

improve security at our nation’s airports. Securing our commercial aviation system 

remains a high national priority. We have experienced first-hand the devastating effects that inadequate security can bring. We recognize that increasing the effectiveness of security operations must be done in a cost-effective manner given the limited 

resources available—and GE is willing to work with the US government to increase 

security through effective and cost-saving technology. 

As reported on July 4, 2005 in the Washington Post, Dulles International Airport 

is experiencing increasing delays due to the baggage screening operation. This problem will escalate not only at Dulles but nationwide as traffic levels continue to rise. 

We believe that the solution is automating screening with In-line systems. I will discuss the economic justification for and benefits of In-line EDS screening; the need 

for adequate funding; future technology developments for aviation and transportation security and thoughts on how to accelerate achieving our goal of protecting 

the flying public and the aviation industry. 

Although much money has been spent on aviation security since the tragic events 

of 9/11, the job is not completed. The 9/11 Report by the National Commission on 

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States recommended: 

‘‘The TSA should expedite the installation of advanced (in-line) baggage screening 

equipment’’. There seems to be general agreement that this must be done, but little 

consensus on how to accomplish this task.

Background 

InVision Technologies, Inc. developed the first technology to be certified as an 

EDS in 1994. GE acquired InVision in 2004 as a major part of GE’s commitment 

to becoming a leading provider of security solutions. In the eleven years following 

this major achievement, a family of GE Security explosive detection products has 

been developed to meet the variety of needs at different size airports. This includes 

five, certified checked baggage EDS products. 

In addition to checked baggage EDS, GE trace detection portals and electronic 

trace detection (ETD) systems are deployed at airports and other facilities to detect 
8

explosives on people, their belongings and cargo. GE also provides cargo container 

security systems, biological detection, nuclear and radiological detection, access control, integration of security systems and other security products and services to the 

public and the private sectors worldwide. 

Continuing its history of innovation and as another first, GE received EDS certification for a diffraction based x-ray system last year. Ten years from the first EDS 

certification, a powerful, new technology has been added to the war on terrorism by 

combining CT with diffraction x-ray screening in a system-of-systems designed to 

optimize automation, efficiency and security.

Substantial improvements to EDS technology have been made over the years. 

Lower false alarm rates, higher throughputs and increased reliability have been 

achieved on a continuing basis. Features such as Multiplexing (MUX) and Remote 

Image Replay (RIR), that were made possible by networking the equipment, have 

provided impressive progress in process efficiency and cost savings. The San Francisco and Jacksonville airports have MUX and RIR and have seen staffing requirements decrease by as much as 70%.

The Business Case for In-line EDS 

In March of this year the Government Accountability Office (GAO) produced a report on In-line EDS at airports entitled ‘‘Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize 

the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems’’. GAO concluded that use 

of EDS systems was the most cost effective method of screening checked baggage 

at many of our nations’ airports. 

Only nine airports have received full (75%) Letter-of-Intent (LOI) funding for their 

In-line projects to date. All but one of these airports is a Large Hub facility requiring major construction to institute a screening system. Despite the substantial investment, GAO reports that TSA estimated that ‘‘in-line baggage screening at (the 

nine airports receiving LOIs) would save the federal government $1.3 billion over 

7 years compared with stand-alone EDS systems TSA would recover the initial investment in a little over 1 year’’. Given that many airports without In-line systems 

employ an even more labor-intensive and costly screening process using trace detection, the savings potential for the Large and Medium Hub airport system is likely 

to be even greater. 

Working closely with airports that have In-line EDS baggage screening with CTX 

equipment, GE has analyzed the cost savings and other benefits of such systems. 

As expected, these are substantial and produce models worth deploying at other airports. Not all airports are viable candidates for the most complex In-line EDS systems, that centralize screening to handle large throughput requirements; however, 

it does make sense for many airports and for the federal government. As GAO 

noted, even at an average cost of approximately $2.5 million in infrastructure cost 

per EDS, the payback is rapid. 

Our modeling for Large Hub airport baggage screening operations, defined as an 

average 5000 bag per hour peak, shows that a $57 Million dollar capital investment 

will result in a $20 Million dollars per year savings in operational expense. This 

analysis compares In-line EDS to a standalone type EDS screening operation currently conducted in ticketing lobbies. The savings are primarily in labor related 

costs. If one were to compare In-line EDS to using trace detection for primary 

screening of checked baggage in this model, the operational cost savings becomes 

an astronomical $70 Million dollars per year at a Large Hub size airport. Although 

trace detection as the primary checked baggage screening method at this size airport is not the preferred option, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

frequently relies on trace detection to varying degrees due to the inefficiencies inherent in lobby area EDS screening and the lack of available EDS equipment. 

Each airport is unique; therefore, modeling alone does not allow us to confidently 

extrapolate system costs.It is better to use actual airport cost estimates to obtain 

a valid projection of capital requirements. Since every airport will not be a candidate for In-line baggage screening systems, it is also more appropriate to limit discussions to those that are. Based on survey data gathered by the airport associations, it is estimated that the first sixty-four airports identified as benefiting from 

such an In-line system, would require $4 Billion in infrastructure capital from the 

federal government. Adding in new equipment costs, we estimate a total need of 

nearly $5 Billion. Although the larger airports require a larger investment, the operational savings are also greater, resulting in an estimated annual operational savings of $1 Billion dollars. 

San Francisco’s latest In-line project provides a real life example. The airport 

spent $16 Million in infrastructure costs to install 11 CTX 9000 EDS machines in 

Terminal T–3. This Terminal houses United Airlines domestic operation, handling 

over a third of the airport’s total checked baggage. This investment resulted in a 
9

reduction of over 70 TSA FTEs required to handle checked bag screening. The airport’s average infrastructure cost per EDS machine is $1.7 Million.

Small Airport Solutions 

Simpler and less expensive Mini In-line systems are a proven checked baggage 

screening option for smaller airports and airport operations with lower throughput 

requirements. These options can cost from as little $100,000 to $1.5 Million per machine in associated infrastructure costs. 

Blue Grass International Airport in Lexington, KY, Traverse City, MI and Ft. 

Walton Beach, FL screen all their checked bags with two CTX5500 EDS machines. 

Blue Grass estimates that its system saves $3.1 Million per year in operating expenses for the TSA, with return on its investment in just 16 months. Payback on 

the infrastructure investment required providing in-line systems to Small Hub size 

airports drops to less than one year if existing EDS are reused. 

Capital investment is minimized through reuse of EDS equipment. The federal 

government owns over 500 CTX2500 and 5500 EDS machines, many of which can 

be relocated and reused for In-line projects at smaller airports. As currently funded 

projects at airports such as Dallas-Ft Worth and Denver come online, these valuable 

EDS assets will become immediately available for use at other facilities. There are 

enough machines in existing inventory today to cover all the Small Hub airports 

without investing any additional dollars for equipment. There would even be machines left over for screening break cargo, mail or other screening applications at 

any high-risk site. 

Leigh Fisher, a well-established aviation industry consultant, has independently 

analyzed the checked baggage screening options. They reported their findings at an 

aviation industry conference in 2004. They found for the mid-range of airports the 

most cost effective solution is a small EDS In-line system. Their analysis shows that 

In-line EDS is appropriate even for airports originally considered too small to warrant such systems. 

This type of low cost In-Line installation option has existed for over a decade. The 

first In-line EDS was installed in United Airlines International check-in counter in 

San Francisco in 1995. Dozens of such installations were in place prior to the 9-

11 tragedy. Systems placed directly in bag conveyor lines were installed for as little 

as $110,000 per machine. Since these projects often involved one EDS per airline 

or airport, a project that covered an entire airport operation today would have an 

even lower cost per machine. This is because general costs such as design and permitting would be spread over more machines. These lower throughput solutions are 

every bit as viable today for small airport and low throughput requirement operations in large airports.

Safety Benefits 

An additional consideration and benefit of In-line EDS screening is the reduction 

of on-the-job injuries. TSA is experiencing the highest level of workman’s compensation claims in the federal government. Automating bag handling with In-line EDS 

systems will dramatically decreased this problem. The TSA reports that claims were 

down 42% and total cost of workmen’s compensation is down 77% with implementation of its In-line system in San Francisco.

Additional Security Considerations 

Crowded ticketing lobbies are an attractive and vulnerable target for terrorists 

and other criminals. Moving baggage screening away from this area is prudent in 

order to mitigate this risk. In-line baggage screening also minimizes the potential 

for serious operational impacts. Evacuating a ticketing area to resolve an unknown 

threat wreaks havoc on timely ticketing, boarding and aircraft departure. Even an 

hour delay at one airport can cost millions of dollars and produce a ripple effect in 

operational impact through the aviation system. 

Screening baggage in non-public, controlled access areas is also inherently more 

secure than in public lobbies. There is far better ability to prevent tampering with 

bags after they have been screened. The chain of custody of the bag is unbroken 

and all personnel handling the bag have undergone background checks in order to 

be given access to the secured areas of the airport.

Cargo and Mail 

Equipment installed to handle checked baggage can and does serve multiple purposes. The machines can be used to screen counter-to-counter packages, break bulk 

cargo and mail that is carried aboard commercial aircraft.

Creative Financing 

Public support wanes as time passes following a major security event. When this 

happens, competing needs often jeopardize security funding. Relying on the annual 
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appropriations process for the federal government to fund In-line EDS projects is 

problematic for airports and their communities. Delays and funding uncertainty result in excessive construction and redesign costs, as well as added complexity in executing capital improvement programs. Taxpayer monies are spent on inefficient and 

labor-intensive processes that do not provide the same level of security that can be 

achieved using the same funds more effectively. 

Congress and the industry, led by AAAE and ACI-NA, recognized the challenge 

of financing the capital expenditures required to install explosive detection systems 

in U.S. airports. The Letter of Intent Program (LOI) was an excellent first step in 

ensuring that airports would receive the necessary capital funds. This Program did 

not address, however, the fact that substantial funds would be needed in a relatively 

short timeframe. This has resulted in a funding shortfall. Only eight LOIs have 

been issued to date, covering only nine of the 429 certified airports. TSA has not 

issued a new LOI since FY04 and has no funding for additional LOIs in the proposed FY06 Budget. 

Other government capital programs, and almost all major investments by private 

industry, utilize longer term financing options to meet their needs. It is unusual and 

unnecessary to require up front funding from DHS annual appropriations of both 

EDS equipment procurement and EDS installation by airports (with LOI reimbursement). Multi-year leases with annual renewals and managed service agreements are 

but two of the financing tools used by other government agencies to fund their 

major capital projects. Such financing options must be explored as a method of solving these funding problems. 

Two examples of using long-term financing demonstrate the type of savings possible. Assumptions used: 

1. Private sector capital utilized 

2. Government repayment using annually appropriated funds 

3. A 7-year financing term 

4. A 10-year useful life for EDS equipment 

Applying a financing plan as described above to our Large Hub airport model, we 

can cover debt on the $57 Million dollars over 7 years with an approximate annual 

repayment obligation of $10 Million. The corresponding annual operational savings 

realized in the first year and each year of the 7-year financing term is $20 Million 

dollars. The resulting $10 Million per year in net savings begins in Year 1 and continues for the 7-year term of the financing. After completion of the 7-year financing 

term, the annual net savings would be $20 Million for the balance of the useful life 

of the assets. Total savings over a 10-year period to the federal government for financing an In-line EDS system versus retaining its standalone EDS lobby screening 

operation is $130 Million dollars. 

If we look at the project in total, it is estimated that a capital investment of $5 

Billion dollars is needed to fund both infrastructure and equipment to fully implement the In-line EDS solution. Full deployment of In-line EDS can result in annual 

operational savings of $1 Billion per year. For analysis purposes, if we were able 

to have a common financing start date for all airports requiring In-line EDS, the 

operational savings applied to repayment coupled with $500 Million per year authorized by Congress for construction of In-line EDS would result in a payback period of less than 4 years, at which point the annual saving to the Government would 

be $1 Billion dollars net per year.

Bag Delivery Services 

A promising potential for baggage screening involves the ingenuity of private entities. The business of baggage delivery for a fee is a growing enterprise. The public 

may well be willing to pay for the convenience of having their bags picked up in 

advance of a trip and transported by a private service to their destination. This 

business model may provide some answers to screening of bags and cargo. If the 

public pays for this service, the cost of security screening can be included in the fee. 

A centralized screening facility on-airport can also be used to screen cargo and as 

an overflow facility for airline baggage.

The Future 

Although great strides were made over the last decade in EDS performance, we 

anticipate that improvements and breakthroughs will escalate based on the existence of a real market need for better solutions. With GE’s entry into the aviation 

security arena, a substantial increase in resources, including technological expertise, 

has become available to apply to R&D efforts to advance the state of the art. 

GE is already leveraging its industry-leading position in imaging and other technologies to develop tomorrow’s solutions. Carry-on baggage screening, passenger 

portals combining multiple screening technologies, container security devices with 
11

multiple threat detection capability and standoff detection are only a few of the innovations in the works. 

To realize the benefits of such innovations and to spur research in advanced security technology solutions, there must be a plan and a path from research to development to deployment. Technologies developed for aviation are not only portable to 

other transportation industries, but can be used to mitigate threats in other areas 

such as our borders, ports, government buildings, nuclear facilities, chemical plants, 

and iconic structures. A timely example is millimeter wave combined with smart 

video used in standoff detection applications. This technology could be deployed unobtrusively in public areas such as metro and rail stations to detect explosives without requiring aviation security style portals. 

As the aviation industry continues its trend toward technology-driven automation 

critical to cutting expenses and improving efficiency, TSA must do the same. The 

airlines and airports are moving rapidly towards automating all of passenger processing, from printing boarding passes on home computers to common-use, self-serve 

kiosks. Processes that are expensive, labor-intensive or even simply frustrating for 

the customer cannot be supported in such an economically sensitive industry. 

The future of checked bag screening, as well as screening of passengers, carryon bags and cargo, must rely on automation. Not only does automation save lifecycle screening costs, it greatly improves the ultimate security of the system by 

minimizing the unknowns associated with the human factor. 

Reducing the human factor in the screening process will also minimize bag openings. One of the most attractive benefits of EDS is its ability to perform non-intrusive detection. The need to open bags for threat resolution, along with the associated 

opportunities for misplaced bag contents, can be almost eliminated by coupling CT 

and diffraction-based EDS technologies. Yxlon EDS diffraction x-ray is designed to 

resolve bags that alarmed on the CTX EDS and cannot be cleared by On Screen 

Resolution. We estimate the payback on implementing Yxlon EDS equipment at approximately two years. 

Another example of leveraging technology is implementing something as inexpensive and simple to install as Remote Image Replay for automatic electronic images 

of and data on alarms to be used in threat resolution. GE calls this feature 

ViewLink for CTX5500 and 2500 products and Passive Threat Resolution Information (PTRI) as part of a Multiplexed CTX9000 networked system. This screening automation feature saves San Francisco Airport’s security operation over $3.5 Million 

dollars a year in labor and consumables. 

Increased research with rapid testing and deployment of successful technology can 

provide continuous improvements to efficiencies and economics of security. Automation is the key to optimizing these systems. This is the direction in which we must 

continue.

Summary 

In-line EDS makes sense from a security, economic and operational perspective. 

We must continue to increase the efficiency of the system through technological advancements and flexible system designs that meet the needs of all stakeholders. We 

must also explore financing options to accelerate the availability of funding for this 

much-needed investment in the safety and security of our nation’s aviation system 

and the flying public.
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Mr. LINDER. Mr. Barber. 

STATEMENT OF ALLEN BARBER, PRESIDENT, L–3 

COMMUNICATION SECURITY AND DETECTION SYSTEMS, INC. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you. 

The L–3 Explosive Detection System was TSA certified in 1998. 

We have fielded 550 systems installed at our Nation’s airports. 

Thirteen other countries have also acquired this technology to assist in them their efforts to bolster aviation security. 

I would like to make three ints for the committee: 

One, aviation security continues to pose a significant risk. The 

use of trace detection systems for checked baggage screening at 

many U.S. airports continues at high labor costs and marginal security. Meanwhile, substantial improvements in in-line EDS have 

occurred over the last year to reduce cost. Baggage throughputs are 

up substantially. 

Boston Logan’s new terminal A, for example, has achieved well 

in excess of 600 bags an hour at peak periods this summer. We encourage the committee to visit the Nation’s first 100 percent in-line 

system at Logan airport to understand the challenges they face and 

the successes they have achieved. 

Installation of in-line EDS remains the highest priority, and we 

urge the committee to press for the necessary funding. In-line provides improved security and will recoup the total financial investment in a very brief period because of the tremendous labor savings it achieves. 

Second, technology improvements for checked baggage screening 

have also improved labor efficiency. For example, networking and 

on-screen resolution of alarms have improved performance significantly. There is almost 100 L–3 examiners networked now versus 

four last year at substantial labor savings of about 30 percent. Further reductions of false alarm rates by approximately 20 percent 

should be deployable by the end of this calendar year. These incremental improvements are very cost effective as they are primarily 

software changes and can be retrofitted to upgrade existing systems and provide significant labor savings. 

Third, the investment made in aviation security technologies has 

created a pool of relevant technologies that can now be applied to 

other transportation modes. The event of the last week in London 

was tragic. Transportation security is a tough task operationally 

because of its distributed nature. However, rail threats are not as 

difficult to detect automatically as aviation. Last year’s TSA TRIP 

program demonstrated that screening for rail threats in a terminal 

or a rail car can be done effectively and have very low false alarm 

rates. 

Thank you for opportunity to appear. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Barber. 

[The statement of Mr. Barber follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALLEN R. BARBER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am Allen Barber, President of L–3 Communications’ Security & Detection Systems Division. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today on 

the subject of leveraging technology to improve aviation security. We have been extensively involved in this field since the mid-1990’s and, following the 1998 initial 
16

certification of our eXaminer Explosive Detection System (EDS), we have delivered 

more than 550 systems to TSA for installation at our nation’s airports. Thirteen 

other countries, including Japan, Mexico and Korea, have also acquired our in-line 

EDS to assist them in their efforts to bolster aviation security. 

The tragic events of last week in London underscore both the continued threats 

we face from terrorism and the need to redouble our collective efforts to protect our 

citizens from such violent acts. Transportation security, including rail, is a daunting 

task operationally because of its distributed nature. However, I think it is fair to 

say that screening for rail threats may not prove to be as difficult a technical challenge as it was in the aviation environment. In fact, last year’s TSA TRIP program 

demonstrated that screening for rail threats in a terminal and on a rail car can be 

done effectively with existing high-throughput automatic detection technology and 

at very low false alarm rates. Addressing rail security is an operational question: 

where do you focus resources for fielding security systems? We believe that focus 

should be where the greatest economic and human impact would be—at the large 

hubs and the links to those hubs. TSA could field equipment and study concepts 

of operations at several key sites to determine the maximum benefits so passenger 

and baggage flows can be optimized while maximizing security and throughput. The 

investment made in aviation security technologies has thus created a pool of relevant technologies that can now be applied to other transportation modes. We do 

not need to re-invent the technology in order to address multi-mode transportation 

security. 

Aviation security continues to pose the greatest risk and cost. The use of explosive 

trace detection (ETD) systems for checked baggage screening at many U.S. airports 

continues at high labor cost & marginal security. Meanwhile, substantial improvements to in-line EDS have occurred over the last year. Baggage throughputs are up 

substantially at new in-line installations. Boston Logan’s new Terminal A has 

achieved well in excess of 600 bags per hour at peak periods this summer. We encourage the Committee to visit the nation’s first large in-line system at Boston’s 

Logan airport to understand the challenges they face and the tremendous successes 

they’ve achieved. 

In-line EDS is universally recognized as the most secure and cost-effective solution for checked baggage screening. Simply stated, lobbies were designed for the 

movement of people and, consequently, lobby installations of EDS do not realize the 

labor savings, particularly with the handling and resolution of alarms. We also have 

gained experience and knowledge from installing over 170 in-line systems in a variety of baggage handling systems. This now enables us to recommend simple and 

scaled down in-line solutions for less busy airports (i.e., Cat 2 and Cat 3 airports), 

which makes in-line EDS for these airports the cheaper, faster, and better approach 

as well. 

The funding and installation of in-line EDS, in my view, remains the highest EDS 

priority and will provide the greatest return on investment. We urge the Committee 

to press for the necessary funding and a concrete plan to accelerate these installations. In-line EDS will not only provide improved security for the traveling public, 

but will recoup the total financial investment in a very brief period because of the 

tremendous labor savings to be achieved. 

Technology improvements for checked baggage screening will also improve labor 

efficiency, but not to the same extent as in-line EDS. For example, networking and 

On-Screen-Resolution (OSR) of alarms has improved performance significantly. 

There are almost 100 L–3 eXaminers networked now, versus 4 last year at substantial labor savings of 30%. Further reductions of the false alarm rates by approximately 20% should be deployable by the end of this calendar year. These incremental improvements are very cost effective as they are primarily software changes 

and can be retrofitted to upgrade existing systems. 

As technology improvements are proven in a real operational environment, they 

should be fielded or back-fit on the basis of return on investment (ROI). There remains a clear need to invest in the R&D efforts necessary to develop new or improved technology, and we cannot afford to let ourselves focus so greatly on today’s 

needs that we fail to provide for tomorrow’s. There should be a continuing investment in R&D to generate the innovations that will provide cheaper and more effective security solutions. 

Another area where focus is needed is on aviation cargo security. I believe it is 

important that a roadmap be developed by DHS that leads to 100% air cargo screening in a way that does not unduly hamper air commerce. As part of this roadmap, 

it would be useful to ensure that the collective and sometimes disparate needs of 

affected DHS agencies are coordinated and effectively integrated into a unified set 

of equipment certification requirements and regulatory standards. Demonstrations 

to date show that existing EDS is very effective for screening break bulk cargo. A 
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variety of approaches for pallet and truck screening are also available. I believe it 

is time that we develop a more targeted approach towards conducting actual cargo 

screening on an accelerated basis. Hopefully, the development of a roadmap would 

facilitate this effort. The development of in-container security devices will begin to 

yield prototypes in FY 2006. Combined with trusted shipper programs, a reasonable 

layered cargo security road map is now feasible. 

Advancements in checkpoint screening is the area most in need of a system solution. We believe that efforts should be undertaken to integrate automated detection 

technology into the carry-on baggage screening equipment. Automatic detection of 

threats for carry-on screening systems will be available from L–3 by the end of the 

fiscal year in standard X-ray machines that fit the current checkpoint footprint. 

However, initially they will have high false alarm rates & should be used to ‘‘suggest’’ to operators where to look. With the spiral additions of other technology over 

time, this will be an excellent way to improve the security of checkpoints while 

learning the value of each new development. L–3 continues to evaluate numerous 

checkpoint technologies. Some are showing great promise. Continued support for 

evolving technologies is key to rapid development & subsequent fielding. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, thank you for permitting me to share my views on ways 

to leverage technology for aviation security. I would like to briefly summarize some 

of the key steps I believe are needed. First, there should be a stronger focus on accelerating in-line EDS. Finding the resources to get this job done now will improve 

security and will pay for itself rapidly. Second, the tools needed for air cargo screening largely exist, and a cohesive plan to initiate such cargo screening should be developed. Third, sufficient resources must be devoted towards R&D to continue to develop cheaper and better technology not only for checked baggage and cargo, but for 

checkpoint security as well. Adoption and fielding of improved technology should be 

based on ROI. And, last, although not an aviation issue per se, existing automated 

detection of threats can be applied to address existing security gaps in rail and 

other transportation modes. It is largely a matter of developing a plan for addressing the greatest risks—hubs, and finding the financial resources to do so. 

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.

Mr. LINDER. Welcome, Mr. Hauptli. 

STATEMENT OF TODD HAUPTLI, SENIOR EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT 

EXECUTIVES 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Thank you, Mr. Linder. 

Two major points I want to try and make, one on screening, the 

second on the Registered Traveler Program. 

On screening, as both Louis and Al have said, in-line EDS systems make a lot of sense. We need more of them. Ten systems in 

place today. Eight more in the queue with letters of intent. But literally dozens of airports across the country need these in-line systems. 

The multiplexing or networking that Al just talked about, very 

important; and you should see that in places like San Francisco 

and other locations. It really reduces the number of personnel that 

you need, dramatically driving down the personnel costs; and the 

costs of putting these systems in place is recouped in sometimes a 

year-and-a-half to 2 years. There is an up-front capital expenditure 

that is necessary. But that is an example how the Washington sort 

of arcane budget process gets in the way of technology helping 

aviation security. So we need a fix there. 

Now, not all airports need an in-line full-blown EDS system. 

Some of the small- and medium-sized airports just need better 

technology. And if Mr. Ellenbogen were here he would talk about 

his recently certified machines that hold great promise for some of 

the small—and medium-sized airports that don’t require as much 

terminal modification. So whether it is the in-line systems at some 
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of the larger airports or better technologies at some of the smaller 

airports, it is important to try and drive toward those technological 

advances. 

Registered Traveler Program, we need an interoperable nationwide Registered Traveler Program. Six million passengers account 

for the overwhelming majority of the 700 million enplanements 

each year, the proverbial if you need to find a needle in a haystack 

you have got to make the haystack smaller; and a Registered Traveler Program and the use of technology could do that and make a 

significant difference. 

I am pleased to report to the subcommittee that we have created 

a new Registered Traveler Interoperable Consortium, airports, the 

Transportation Security Clearinghouse, airlines and private sector 

technology partners working together on common business practices and on technical standards for a nationwide interoperable 

Registered Traveler Program. We need—with due respect to TSA 

and the Federal Government, we need to move at the industry’s 

pace and at the aviation systems pace, not at the Federal Government’s pace, to put a program like this in place. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Hauptli follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TODD HAUPTLI

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the subcommittee for holding this important hearing on leveraging technology to improve aviation security. I am testifying 

today on behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), Airports 

Council International—North America (ACI–NA), and our Airport Legislative Alliance, a joint legislative advocacy organization. AAAE represents the men and 

women who manage primary, commercial service, reliever, and general aviation airports. ACI–NA represents local, regional and state governing bodies that own and 

operate commercial airports in the United States, and Canada. 

Today’s hearing is especially timely given the situation that is emerging at a number of airports across the country this summer with air travel returning to and in 

many cases exceeding record levels. What travelers are finding—as many of you on 

the subcommittee can attest to as frequent fliers—is that the trip to the airport is 

quickly becoming a test of patience and endurance due in large part to the ongoing 

challenges TSA faces in meeting its passenger and baggage screening mandates. 

Overcrowding at ticketing areas due to increased passenger volume and the presence of SUV-sized explosive detection (EDS) equipment that has been parked ‘‘temporarily’’ in terminal buildings by TSA continues to be a problem at a number of 

airports, and passenger screening checkpoints at many locations resemble 

Disneyland on a busy day. In addition to being a major inconvenience for passengers, this situation represents a growing security threat that must be addressed 

as quickly as possible. 

Recognizing the problems inherent in the existing, labor-intensive passenger and 

baggage screening model, the airport community has for several years now been 

very vocal in encouraging the federal government to embrace technology as a means 

of expediting the passenger and baggage screening process and better utilizing 

scarce federal resources. While there are a number of new technological tools that 

merit serious consideration, we would like to highlight for the subcommittee today 

the case for moving forward with in-line installation of EDS equipment to screen 

checked baggage and the promise we believe programs like Registered Traveler offer 

in focusing limited resources on true threats to the aviation system. Moving quickly 

in these areas will provide enormous bang for the buck while greatly enhancing security. 

Federal Government Must Partner With Industry to Solve Security-Related Challenges

Moving forward, it is clear that airports and the aviation industry can and should 

play an active role in partnering with the federal government to design and implement meaningful solutions. The establishment of effective public/private partnerships has already proven extremely successful, for example, in building a system for 
19

processing fingerprint-based background checks and additional background screening for more than 1.6 million employees at airports through the Transportation Security Clearinghouse. Additionally, the airport community and its aviation industry 

partners are moving forward to create a permanent, interoperable Registered Traveler program that will bring screening consistency and improved security to the 

aviation system. These examples and others illustrate that the best path forward 

is one where federal resources and standards are combined with airport and aviation industry knowledge, expertise, and creativity. 

In-Line EDS Systems: Enhanced Security, Improved Efficiency, Reduced 

Personnel Costs

Perhaps, the greatest area of opportunity in terms of enhanced security, increased 

efficiency, and potential long-term TSA budget savings in the baggage screening 

arena comes from the permanent installation of explosive detection equipment in 

the nation’s airports—a fact that has been acknowledged by the 9/11 Commission 

and others. 

In order to attempt to meet congressional deadlines to screen all checked baggage 

placed aboard commercial aircraft, TSA quickly placed thousands of explosive detection system and explosive trace detection machines (ETD) in airports across the 

country. Many of those machines have been placed in airport ticketing lobbies without the kinds of integrated approaches that take maximum advantage of their certified throughputs and alarm reconciliation capabilities. The result, too often, is 

crowded airport lobbies (a safety and security hazard), major backups at a number 

of security screening checkpoints, and a huge increase in the number of TSA personnel necessary to operate the equipment. At many airports with ETD solutions, 

especially during peak times, TSA checkpoint screeners are directed to baggage 

screening, resulting in extremely long lines at the passenger checkpoints. 

While virtually everyone agrees that the best solution at many airports is to move 

EDS equipment from crowded lobbies and place it ‘‘in-line’’ as part of an airport’s 

integrated baggage system, making the necessary changes at airports—reinforcing 

flooring, electrical upgrades, building new facilities, etc.—are neither easy nor inexpensive. Current cost estimates run in the $4 billion to $5 billion range for airports 

nationwide. These upfront capital costs are modest, however, when compared to the 

extraordinary expenses necessary to pay for literally thousands of extra screeners 

year after year using today’s model. In-line screening in airports such as Tampa 

International Airport has also been shown to reduce the rate of TSA screener onthe-job injuries. The handful of airports that currently have in-line baggage systems 

report that they have paid for themselves with personnel cost reductions in as little 

as 16 months. The personnel saved by these solutions are then available for other 

airports or to accommodate growth at the host airport. 

The Government Accountability Office verified the benefits of in-line EDS installation in a March 2005 report (GAO–05–365) entitled ‘‘System Planning Needed to 

Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems.’’ Among other 

things, the report notes that at the nine airports where TSA has committed resources to moving EDS equipment in-line, these systems will save the federal government $1.3 billion over seven years through a dramatic reduction in personnel 

requirements. Specifically, it is estimated that in-line EDS systems at those nine 

airports will reduce by 78 percent the number of TSA baggage screeners and supervisors required to screen checked baggage from 6,645 to 1,477. The report further 

notes that TSA will recover its initial investment in in-line systems at those 

airports in just over a year. 

Despite the clear benefits of moving forward with in-line EDS installation, gaining 

the resources necessary to expedite the process at airports has been difficult. 

Through fiscal year 2005, Congress has appropriated $1.783 billion for EDS-related 

terminal modifications, although significant portions of those funds were used by 

TSA on the short-term challenges associated with getting EDS machines in airports 

to attempt to meet the original statutory deadlines. With conservative estimates 

that the federal government needs to commit a total of $4 billion to $5 billion to 

get the job done at airports that require these solutions, the federal government has 

met less than half of that need since September 11. 

Current Situation: Only a Few Airports Have In-Line Systems or Funding 

for In-Line Systems

Currently, only 10 of more than 430 commercial service airports currently have 

in-line EDS systems—Boise; Jacksonville; Lexington, Kentucky; Manchester; Tulsa; 

Boston; Harrisburg; San Francisco; John Wayne International; and Tampa. An additional eight have received commitments from TSA to fund in-line systems through 

the Letter of Intent (LOI) process—Atlanta; Boston (previously noted); Denver; Dallas/Fort Worth; Las Vegas; Los Angeles and Ontario International; Phoenix; and Seattle-Tacoma. 
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The LOI process allows interested airports to provide immediate funding for key 

projects with a promise that the federal government will reimburse the airport for 

those expenses over several years. At Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, for 

example, the airport used its strong rating in the financial market to leverage the 

LOI and to issue bonds to install these systems. This approach takes advantage of 

professional airport management capabilities and maximizes the use of limited federal resources to ensure that key construction projects get underway as soon as possible. 

Under the LOI process, the federal government has committed to reimbursing airports for these projects over a three to five year period. The following lists the LOI 

airports and the total project cost at those airports:

LOI Airports 

Airport Total Cost

Atlanta .......................................................................... $125 million 

Boston Logan ............................................................... $116 million 

Dallas/Fort Worth ......................................................... $139 million 

Denver International ..................................................... $95 million 

Las Vegas McCarran .................................................... $125 million 

Los Angeles/Ontario ..................................................... $342 million 

Phoenix ......................................................................... $122 million 

Seattle/Tacoma ............................................................. $212 million 

Total LOI Airports: ....................................................... $1.276 Billion 

Unfortunately, the prospects for gaining resources to move forward at airports beyond the nine LOI airports remain bleak. The TSA budget request for FY 2006 calls 

for only $250 million for EDS installation projects, the amount mandated in law by 

VISION-100 FAA reauthorization legislation. While $250 million is certainly a significant amount of money, the fact is that it will allow TSA to move forward at only 

a handful of airports. 

In fact, TSA has estimated that roughly $240.5 million of the $250 million requested will be used to meet existing commitments at the nine airports covered by 

the existing eight LOIs with the agency (the LOI for Los Angeles World Airports 

covers both Los Angeles International Airport and Ontario International Airport). 

The $240.5 million figure assumes that the agency is allowed once again to ignore 

provisions in law that require the federal government to pay for 90 percent of the 

costs of those projects, otherwise it will be much higher. 

While the projects at those nine airports are necessary, critical, and a top priority, 

the simple fact of the matter is that incremental installments of $250 million a year 

will not get projects started at additional airports in the foreseeable future. Clearly, 

more resources are needed to address the dozens of other airports that do not currently have LOIs with the TSA. To give the subcommittee an idea of the scope of 

current needs that exist beyond the LOI airports, we have included the latest data 

we have from a number of airports that have identified EDS installation as a major 

challenge facing their facility.

Airports Currently Without Funding in Place for EDS Installation (With Project Cost Estimate) 

Albuquerque $48 million Anchorage $27 million 

Biloxi $5 million Bismarck $20 million 

Bradley $35 million BWI $65 million 

Charlotte $40 million Chicago Midway/O’Hare $90 million 

Cincinnati $20 million Cleveland $45 million 

Colorado Springs $15 million Detroit $100 million 

Elgin AFB $2 million El Paso $15 million 

Ft. Lauderdale $85 million Grand Rapids $20 million 

Guam $14 million Honolulu/Kahului $78 million 

Houston $115 million Jackson $9 million 

John Wayne $12 million Kansas City $34 million 

Memphis $42 million Miami $200 million 

Milwaukee $35 million Minneapolis/St. Paul $30 million 
21

Airports Currently Without Funding in Place for EDS Installation (With Project Cost 

Estimate)—Continued

Nashville $40 million Newark $99 million 

New Orleans $14 million New York LaGuardia $98 million 

New York JFK $250 million Oakland $30 million 

Omaha $18 million Orlando $140 million 

Palm Beach $30 million Panama City $10 million 

Philadelphia $65 million Portland $45 million 

Port Columbus $22 million Providence $38 million 

Raleigh-Durham $40 million Richmond $30 million 

Rochester $10 million St. Louis $90 million 

St. Thomas $10 million Salt Lake City $20 million 

San Antonio $40 million San Diego $20 million 

San Francisco $22 million San Jose $172 million 

San Juan $130 million SW Florida $28 million 

Tampa $124 million Tucson $10 million 

Washington Dulles $121 million Washington Reagan National $52 million

Total: $3.019 billion 

We believe that there are dozens of additional airports not listed here that have 

yet to develop comprehensive cost estimates or that have not responded to our requests for information. 

Despite these overwhelming needs, the federal government does not yet have a 

long-term EDS solution at a significant number of airports across the country. The 

TSA’s task has not been made any easier by opposition from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to the issuance of additional LOIs to airports for these 

projects. It is our sincere hope that OMB will quickly move past what we believe 

is a short-sighted view of this problem and focus on the long-term benefits that can 

be achieved by immediately investing to make the terminal modifications necessary 

to accommodate EDS equipment. 

Mr. Chairman, in-line systems require up-front capital expenditures, but 

they pay for themselves in short-order through major reductions in personnel costs. This is an example of budget rules that are ‘‘penny-wise and 

pound foolish.’’ One need only look to the real-world example of the airports where 

EDS systems have been properly installed to get real examples of the dramatic personnel savings that can be achieved by moving forward with these projects. 

We continue to look for creative approaches to address the existing EDS installation funding shortfall, and look forward to continuing our work with you and your 

staff in that regard. Airports stand ready to support the LOI process, and airport 

managers have repeatedly expressed to TSA their ability to accommodate a wide variety of financing options to help the federal government fulfill its responsibility. 

Beyond additional resources, we urge TSA to continue its work with airport operators and managers to ensure that proposed solutions and changes are really the best 

course at an individual facility. Airport professionals understand the configuration 

and layout of their facilities better than anyone and are uniquely suited to highlight 

where pitfalls lie and where opportunities exist. In addition, TSA must continue to 

work with airport operators to optimize the use of limited space in airport facilities 

and to pay airports for the agency’s use of space in accordance with the law. 

Airports are pleased to see funding in the TSA budget request for ongoing maintenance of EDS machines. As the machines age and as their use continues to grow 

and their warranties expire, it is critical that funding is provided to keep the existing machines in operation and to restore machines that fail. 

Encouraging Development and Deployment of New EDS Technology 

In addition to investing in necessary infrastructure improvements and maintenance, the federal government needs to look toward the promise of new technology 

and invest in making those promises a reality. We remain convinced that there are 

a number of additional applications for new technology to improve baggage screening, for example. ‘‘On-screen’’ resolution using EDS equipment, for example, offers 

great promise in enhancing the efficiency of integrated in-line baggage systems, and 

the utilization of technology to achieve that goal should be encouraged. 

The key is for the federal government to encourage innovation in these areas and 

to make it a priority to investigate and approve new technology as quickly as possible. We are encouraged by the recent certification by TSA of smaller ‘‘next-generation’’ EDS equipment that can be more easily integrated into check-in areas. We believe this equipment holds tremendous promise at numerous smaller airports across 
22

the country as a possible replacement for personnel-intensive trace detection equipment. At many of these smaller facilities, in-line solutions will not be feasible for 

one reason or another, so the rapid deployment of this type of equipment will 

produce enormous benefits. We commend TSA for its efforts to certify and deploy 

this equipment at several pilot-program airports and urge that the results of these 

pilots be evaluated and incorporated into future practices. 

We must also look beyond our borders to learn from the experiences of the rest 

of the world. In many instances, the goals that we have been discussing over the 

course of the past several years both in terms of operations and technology are already a reality in many places. We would be wise to study those successes and incorporate best practices where appropriate. 

Passenger Screening: Implementation of Registered Traveler and Other 

Programs Critical 

In our view, one of the key components to improving the effectiveness and efficiency in the passenger screening arena is shifting the focus from finding dangerous 

‘‘things’’ to finding dangerous ‘‘people.’’ The most important weapon that the 19 terrorists had on September 11 wasn’t box cutters; it was knowledge—knowledge of our 

aviation system and existing security protocols, which they used to their advantage. 

Programs like Secure Flight and others can help identify threats before dangerous 

individuals have access to the aviation system and they must be pursued with careful consideration provided to a full range of individual privacy issues. Additionally, 

we must quickly take advantage of the opportunity that exists through deployment 

of a Registered Traveler program to greatly reduce the number of people subject to 

intense scrutiny at screening checkpoints. With more than 700 million passengers 

traveling through the U.S. aviation system each year—a number that is anticipated 

to grow to more than one billion annually within the next decade—we simply cannot 

afford to treat each passenger the same way. Six million passengers make up the 

overwhelming majority of all travel, and we should make every effort to provide a 

different screening protocol for this group of trusted travelers. The subcommittee 

has been apprised of the many benefits of the RT program during your recent series 

of hearings on the subject. 

The goal moving forward for TSA and industry should be to create a permanent, 

interoperable RT program that improves security, expedites passenger processing, 

creates screening consistency, and reduces the passenger ‘‘hassle factor.’’ We believe 

strongly that the program needs to move forward now operationally rather than 

wait for governmental or proprietary solutions to answer all the questions over time.

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to highlight a few areas in which 

the quick deployment of technology can produce enormous benefits in terms of additional security and greatly reduced costs to the federal government. The sooner we 

can move forward in these areas, the sooner we can shift resources to other homeland security needs—a priority that the tragic events in London last week tragically 

reinforced. 

Airports have aggressively and persistently attempted to develop a collaborative 

working relationship with TSA and DHS since the federal government assumed direct control of passenger and baggage screening in the wake of 9/11 with the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 108–176), and our efforts 

in that regard continue. In our view, a close working relationship makes perfect 

sense given the unique expertise of airport operators and the incentives airports 

have as public institutions to perform security responsibilities at the highest levels. 

Thank you for allowing us to testify today.

Mr. LINDER. Ms. Berrick. 

STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you, Mr. Linder and members of the committee. 

My testimony today focuses on potential efficiencies and increased security that can be achieved through the integration of 

Explosive Detection Systems with baggage conveyor systems to 

screen checked baggage for explosives and the need for better planning to deploy this equipment. 
23

TSA has made substantial progress in deploying Explosive Detection Systems at the Nation’s airports. However, due to the high 

cost and time required to integrate this equipment in-line with baggage conveyor systems, TSA deployed most of this equipment in a 

stand-alone mode, mainly in airport lobbies. This resulted in operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number of 

screeners and screening fewer bags for explosives each hour. This 

configuration also resulted in increased security risks due to crowding in lobbies where the machines were located. 

TSA also deployed explosive trace detection machines to conduct 

primary screening of checked baggage. Trace detection involves a 

screener swabbing a bag which uses chemical analysis to detect 

traces of explosives. Trace detection is used as a primary screening 

method at more than 300 airports Nationwide. Trace detection is 

more labor intensive and less efficient than screening using Explosive Detection Systems, and there are also some security tradeoffs. 

TSA and airport operators are taking steps to install in-line baggage screening systems to achieve efficiencies and enhance security. However, resources have not been made available to fund 

these systems on a large-scale basis, and the overall cost of installing these systems is not known. We found that TSA has not conducted a systematic analysis to determine at which airports they 

could achieve long-term savings and enhance security by installing 

in-line systems. 

At the nine airports where TSA helped fund the installation of 

in-line systems, TSA found the test systems could save the Federal 

Government over $1 billion over 7 years and that the government 

could recover its initial investment in little over 1 year. 

Although an in-line system can yield significant savings they 

may not be the best solution for all airports. At one airport where 

TSA helped fund an in-line system, TSA estimated after the installation began that the system actually resulted in a $90 million loss 

due in part to the significant up-front investment required to make 

airport modifications. TSA also has not determined whether greater use could be made of Explosive Detection Systems rather than 

relying on trace detection for airports where in-line systems may 

not be economically justified. 

An analysis of airport baggage screening needs would help TSA 

determine the optimal deployment of Explosive Detection Systems, 

potentially resulting in significant savings to the government and 

enhanced security. This analysis would also help TSA to determine 

how to effectively use new technologies such as the smaller and 

faster Explosive Detection Systems. 

This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions at the appropriate time. 

[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:] Maintained in the committee file. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you all very much. 

I will recognize myself for 5 minutes to begin the questioning period. 

The on-line EDS, is there any new technology here? Anybody 

take a shot at this. Mr. Parker, is there some new technology? 
24

Mr. PARKER. We have new technologies being added to on-line 

EDS. I mentioned x-ray diffraction which can be coupled with online EDS to actually make it almost completely automated. 

Mr. LINDER. And will it pick up plastic explosives? 

Mr. PARKER. Yes. 

Mr. LINDER. Will it pick up vials of anthrax? 

Mr. PARKER. Anthrax, no. Trace detection. We can do that 

through other forms but not through the checked bags. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Yes. And L–3 is also working a contract with TSA 

for x-ray diffraction to add—to reduce the alarm rates after the machine to further increase the automation and remove the operator 

from the scene as much as possible. 

Mr. LINDER. Is there a means to standardize aviation security 

technology benchmarks for the vendors to all be on the same page, 

or should we not do that? 

Ms. BERRICK. If I could add, I think where this needs to start is 

TSA needs to conduct risk assessments across aviation and all 

modes of transportation to determine what are the threats that 

they need to develop technologies to counter and then also what 

are the vulnerabilities and criticality. Once they conduct these 

threat assessments, which we found they haven’t completed in the 

aviation sector— 

Mr. LINDER. Have they started it? 

Ms. BERRICK. They have. They started and focused primarily on 

threat assessments. They have done much less related to vulnerability assessments and criticality assessments. Once they complete 

these assessments, they need to develop operational requirements 

and then establish benchmarks that technology companies should 

strive for to meet to fill security gaps. 

Mr. LINDER. I fear that the TSA has become a wholly owned subsidiary of the airline industry. 

Mr. Hauptli, tell me, of the six million regular travelers, how 

many of the 690 million flights do they make up? 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Mr. Linder, I don’t know that off the top of my 

head. I just know that those 6 million passengers make up—it is 

something like 60 or 70 percent of the enplanements for the year. 

So the point being that is a group of people that travel on a regular 

basis. They are willing—most, if not all of them, are going to be 

willing to submit to whatever sort of process people decide is necessary, additional background checks, whatever vetting needs to 

happen so that they can move through the system as efficiently as 

possible. 

Mr. LINDER. I expect you are working closely with that. 

Is there any expectation that if they get a fingerprint, a biometric and you have been checked, that you don’t have to go through 

the gates, don’t have to take your computer out of the case, don’t 

have to take off your shoes? 

Mr. HAUPTLI. We arm-wrestle with TSA all the time about that, 

sir, in terms of what they would be willing to sort of give up in the 

security process. And that is clearly one of the things that we focus 

on, is the whole notion of do you have to take your shoes off. Do 

you have to take your computer out of the case. 
25

Mr. LINDER. Well, what is the point? If you have to go through 

the same process, what is the point? 

Mr. HAUPTLI. And that is our point as well. We argue that there 

ought to be—that people still should be subject to screening and security, not to the secondary screening, and that there are things 

like whether or not you have to take your coat off, whether or not 

you have to take your computer out of your bag, whether or not you 

have to take your shoes off that TSA should look at. 

Mr. LINDER. Are we looking at a new version of technology coming along where you can walk through a magnetometer of some 

new development that will sniff everything—explosives, weapons, 

et cetera, vials of anthrax? Are we getting anywhere near the point 

of that? 

Mr. BARBER. There is a variety of technologies that are emerging, 

Congressman, that are potentially applicable. They are in the early 

stages in many cases. Others are in more mature stages of development. 

The technology right now for automated detection at a checkpoint is really centered around the CT that currently exists. Unfortunately, it is physically very large and would have a significant 

impact from a footprint standpoint on a checkpoint. But there is 

automatic detection that is available that is older technology, that 

if we look at spiral development of adding other technologies as 

they become available to reduce alarm rates down that may be a 

more practical or certainly more interim kind of a solution. Even 

if it doesn’t provide the solution, it may provide operator aids so 

that we can at least start to get some explosive detection into the 

checkpoint. 

Mr. LINDER. Either of your companies working on backscatter activity? 

Mr. PARKER. We are working on a technology, the millimeter 

waves, which is another—it is not backscatter, but it is something 

that competes with backscatter. It is faster. No ionization issues. 

Also, Congressman Linder, if I can also just make a comment on 

the sensors fusion, if you will, pulling things together, varying 

technologies together. You know, as an example, we recently were 

able to demonstrate pulling together a shoe scanner using 

quadrupole resonance technology along with trace detection, three 

access and networking as well as biometrics, networking all that 

together. So that capability is there. We just need to know what 

the standards are and the plans for deployment and we can work 

on those technologies. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

My time has expired. Ms. Sanchez, I recognize you for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to ask you, Ms. Berrick, a couple of questions. 

First of all, you mentioned that the TSA has not finished but it 

has begun to work on some risk assessment threat information 

with respect to the airports. Do you know if they have begun to do 

that for rail or mass transit or some of the other responsibilities 

that they have with respect to passenger transportation? 

Ms. BERRICK. To a much lesser extent, although they are beginning to. Right after September 11, TSA obviously focused on aviation security; and because of that the Department of Transpor-
26

tation really still had a role in security up until pretty much recently. They are still involved, but TSA is starting to become more 

involved in other modes of transportation. 

For example, in rail security they have conducted some threat assessments, but they have done much more limited vulnerability assessments identifying how vulnerable different stations are to potential threats. Then also criticality assessments, meaning how 

critical are different stations or trains in terms of loss of life or economic impact. 

So, to answer your question, they have primarily focused on aviation more so than other modes of transportation. They are starting 

to get involved more in other modes of transportation, but they still 

haven’t completed all of the risk assessments. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So from your, I would assume, somewhat limited 

view, because you are just one person and we have really never 

done this before and you are sort of breaking into the field, if you 

will, could you rate what, in your opinion, what percentage of airline plan risk assessment vulnerability they have done that you 

think they might have to do, what percentage of rail, what percentage of mass transit? 

Ms. BERRICK. In those three, estimating, I would say in aviation 

security they have probably done about 75 percent where they need 

to be. And TSA identifies continually and so does DHS that they 

need to follow a risk management approach. So they agree with 

this approach. It is just a matter of doing it, and it does require 

some time and resources. 

In rail, I would say that it is less, probably around 40 percent; 

and that is a combination of what TSA has done and also what the 

Department of Transportation has done related to rail. 

And I would say right about 30 percent also for mass transit. Because, again, the Department of Transportation has also been 

doing some vulnerability assessments that are useful. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. 

The in-line EDS system, we just heard that with the nine systems it is estimated that it is going to be about a billion dollars 

of savings over 7 years and that the initial investment would be 

recovered in a little bit over a year. If that is the case, have you 

talked to TSA? I mean, you know, when we see the budget that 

they have proposed, they have, quite frankly, failed to ask for funds 

for in-line EDS systems, even on some of the letters of intent that 

they have. Have they justified that to you as you have looked over 

their plans? 

Ms. BERRICK. In our review of their baggage screening program 

they have identified, first of all, it requires a huge up-front investment to install an in-line system; and, right now, with the letter 

of the intent agreement, it is a 75 percent/25 percent cost share between the Federal Government and the airport. So the airports 

would have to be willing to put up 25 percent to fund the in-line 

system. So TSA’s position is it is very capital intensive and airports 

have to agree to partner with us in these systems. 

Having said that, one of the things we recommended based on 

the work that we did was TSA really needs to conduct, basically, 

an analysis to develop a business case to identify and provide Congress information that you can use to make informed decisions 
27

about where would in-line systems make sense. In doing that analysis, they could identify what would be the benefits to the government in terms of reduced screeners and potentially enhanced security and also what would be the benefits to the private sector, the 

air carrier and the airports that also receive benefits from—because baggage is moving through the system much more quickly. 

So I think if TSA does an analysis, identifies to the Congress 

what the benefits are and which airports’ in-line systems make 

sense—because, again, it probably doesn’t make sense for all airports—then you would have the information that you need to make 

informed decisions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. One last question, very quickly. 

When you have been reviewing and taking a look at some of this, 

you know there is this whole issue of new technology and everybody comes through the door. They have got the latest and the 

best. Do you see a plan with TSA in partnership with some of these 

private companies to sort of almost in a visionary way look to see 

where the next new thing is that they need? I mean, are they 

thinking that far ahead? Or is it just like, this guy is in front me 

today; do I buy his product or not? 

Ms. BERRICK. We did do a study of TSA and DHS transportation 

security R&D programs and identified some areas for improvement. 

One was the plan that you are mentioning. TSA had not developed 

a strategic plan for research and development for transportation security. I am told that it is being drafted right now, and it is soon 

to be finalized. 

Everything we identified was that DHS and TSA were not managing the R&D programs very well. For example, when we asked 

for a listing of all of your R&D programs, it took a very long time 

to get that listing because it wasn’t centrally managed. Also, about 

90 percent of the programs didn’t have estimated deployment 

dates. So, although we got a listing, it was unclear when these 

technologies were ever going to come to fruition. So we made some 

recommendations to help them better manage their R&D program. 

But it looks like they are moving in the right direction with the 

strategic plan. Now they just need to put the management in place 

to make sure they follow through with that. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentlelady yield just on this for just a quick 

intervention? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. If the chairman will allow. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentlelady’s time has expired. But go ahead. 

Mr. DICKS. How much are they spending on R&D? 

Ms. BERRICK. In the 2006 President’s budget request, I am not 

sure exactly what they are requesting for R&D. It has been about—

I think last year was about $150 million for R&D. I am not certain 

what they have requested this year, but they have—if you look at 

all of their transportation security R&D and programs, they have 

about 200 right now; and about 70 percent of that is in aviation. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Gentleman from Mississippi. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

You need a little more time to ask. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, the other gentleman wanted to comment on this 

question, Mr. Chairman. 
28

Mr. HAUPTLI. Mr. Dicks, I was just going to make the point that 

in the previous budget TSA ended up using some of their R&D 

money to pay for screeners, much to the chagrin of Mr. DeFazio 

and Mr. Mica and the folks who had been overseeing that issue at 

the time. Because of the pressure that they had on their budget to 

pay for personnel, they robbed Peter to pay Paul, which was very 

disappointing to the industry. 

Mr. DICKS. I thought you were going to say robbed Peter to pay 

John. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Reclaiming my time, one of the questions, Ms. 

Berrick, is how—in your review of TSA, did you find how they went 

about identifying new technology as a department? 

Ms. BERRICK. That is one of the things we did look at. The first 

thing we looked at, it was to what extent did they do these risk 

assessments to identify what were the security holes that they 

needed to fix? And what we found there was that they were moving 

in the right direction. They had conducted some of these risk assessments, but there was more work that they needed to do. 

We also looked at their coordination with other Federal agencies 

that are involved in research and development and also with the 

private sector, and we found that TSA could do a better job in coordinating with other agencies in terms of research and development programs that they had undergone. For example, Department 

of Transportation and NASA had some related R&D projects. 

Then also we talked to some private sector stakeholders, and 

they felt that TSA could do a better job partnering with them on 

research and development programs that were out there. 

Another thing that we found in a lot of transportation security 

work that we have done is that the private sector often looks to 

TSA to identify promising R&D programs and promising technology that they could apply. Understanding that they have a role 

in homeland security, they are willing oftentimes to spend the 

money. It is just they need some guidance from TSA on what is the 

best place to spend it. So we also found that in the work that we 

have done. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

One of the things is the notion that all of our airports are the 

same and, therefore, they need all of the identical equipment. Did 

you find whether or not TSA had separated airports based on some 

review of what technologies might be best for individual airports? 

Ms. BERRICK. TSA has categorized airports based on the size and 

the amount of volume that the airports have. But in terms of doing 

a systematic analysis across the airports, because, as you mentioned, they are very different in terms of baggage screening, they 

have not done that. They have started to do it. We did make a recommendation that TSA do that. They started this analysis. 

But we think it is critically important because, as you mentioned, 

in-line systems may not be appropriate for every airport. We have 

over 300 airports that are relying primarily on explosive trace detection, and there are some limitations with that. So—and even as 

in-line systems are installed that sprang up from Explosive Detection Systems that potentially could be moved to some of these 

smaller airports in place of the trace detection. 
29

So we think it is critically important that TSA conduct this planning, and at the time of our review they had not done that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. For the people who are actually in the business, 

have you found the fact that DHS does not really have a technology 

plan—have you found that as a deterrent to doing business with 

them, or would you like for them to come forth with a technology 

plan that you could look at? 

Mr. PARKER. We work very closely together with TSA and DHS 

on technology and the plans going for the future. I think the only 

issue is that they tend to work on one technology at a time, as opposed to—just like Congressman Linder was asking on there is capability of putting multiple technologies together in a solution. And 

that is where it gets a little difficult because they just tend to work 

on one technology at a time, as opposed to a concurrence of technology. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Yeah. Our experience with TSA is if we bring an 

idea to them they are very receptive to it. The level of complication 

sometimes does become a deterrent when we are looking at beginning to add multiple technologies to what is currently available for 

in-line. However, if we can put together a reasonable business plan 

we have had a fair amount of success in working together with 

TSA. 

As the lady from the John Wayne area said, there is a lot of technologies out there, and everybody has got the latest and greatest 

thing. I think we are all looking at the technologies ourselves trying to find the best combination that fully automates these things. 

The better the partnership, the better we can achieve that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am not sure I know how to—can you hear me? So as we have it up here, GAO reported in 2004 that $126 million is spent on TSA 

aviation R&D, which was 80 percent of the entire amount of R&D 

done by TSA. That is our number. So the total R&D is about $155 

million. But a big significant part is being put into the aviation account, is that correct? 

Ms. BERRICK. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. And you are saying that part of that money was borrowed to pay the cost of the screeners? 

Ms. BERRICK. In some past years, the R&D budget that TSA received for R&D programs was moved to other areas, including paying screeners salaries. 

Mr. DICKS. Do you have any idea how much it was? 

Mr. BERRICK. I don’t have it off the top of my head. 

Mr. DICKS. Can you get us that for the record? 

Ms. BERRICK. Certainly. I will get that information. 

Mr. DICKS. Apparently, also we have a limit on the number of 

screeners. This is something that was imposed by Congress which 

I have a problem with because I think we are going to see a—you 

know, hopefully without another 9/11 type incident—a significant 

growth in passenger levels. They are going to expand. And I worry 

that with this congressionally imposed cap that we are not going 
30

to have the ability to properly screen these people or we are going 

to have tremendous lines at some of the key airports like Atlanta 

and Seattle, Portland and Los Angeles. 

Bennie, I can’t think of your airport down there. I am trying to 

work on it. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Jackson. 

Mr. DICKS. But isn’t that a problem if they continue this cap, 

that there is going to be a problem of getting the job done? 

Ms. BERRICK. That is a concern. 

One of the things that TSA recently did that I think will help 

address this problem is they developed a model to try to identify 

the optimal numbers of screeners at each airport. They are putting 

in different factors such as the time required for training, overtime, 

leave, things of that nature, to make sure they are coming up with 

the appropriate numbers at each airport. 

Another thing that they are doing is they established mobile 

screening teams. So if they have a particular high volume at a certain airport they can deploy these teams to that airport to help 

pick up some of the slack so—

Mr. DICKS. I must admit that has worked pretty effectively at Seattle-Tacoma. I mean, they have sent people there. They created a 

training center there. But there was a lot of congressional review 

of what they were doing. And Mr. Rogers helped us on that, by the 

way. 

But I just worry about this cap. I just think, you know, I would 

rather have another way of dealing with it rather than an arbitrary cap. I think some judgment to the agency about how many 

people to hire. You know, I realize there was a tremendous growth 

the first few years. But if we have a growth in traffic, I just worry 

about that. 

Ms. BERRICK. GAO has actually been mandated to look at this 

very issue about the screener cap and how TSA is allocating 

screeners among the airports and do they have enough. And we 

have started that. So, in the future, we will have more information 

to provide you on that subject. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

Mr. Parker, on the EDS system, that is your system, right, General Electric? 

Mr. PARKER. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. What is the problem? Is the problem just the cost of 

getting these things out there? That is the problem? What do we 

have? Eight airports now or nine airports that have ordered these 

systems? 

Mr. PARKER. Right. 

Mr. DICKS. Is it because of the change in structure at the airports, that these are large airports and therefore they have to do 

a major reconstruction of the airport to put the system in? Is that 

the biggest problem? And the 25 percent match, and I assume is 

part of the problem, too. 

Mr. PARKER. Well, I think it is a couple of things. Yes, there is 

a major investment in the baggage handling system to install it, 

and also the fact that today there is no financing alternatives that 

are being pursued to help with the up-front cost. 
31

Mr. DICKS. Well, the government does this letter of intent, right, 

and that means that they intend to put up 75 percent of the cost. 

Has that worked effectively or not? I mean, I guess if only eight 

or nine airports have done it, it has been limited in its success. 

Mr. PARKER. It is limited. 

Mr. DICKS. Is a big part the 25 percent? Is that the problem? Or 

is it the reconfiguring the airport that is the problem? 

Mr. PARKER. I think it is a factor of both, frankly. It is reconfiguring and the up-front cost. 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Mr. Dicks, if I could just add a couple of points on 

that. 

Part of the problem, the airports have been very frustrated. Congress authorized $500 million a year for this, and the administration has only asked for $250,000 a year or $250 million a year. 

Congress has provided somewhere in that range, and so there is a 

gap there. 

Mr. DICKS. This is the money for—

Mr. HAUPTLI. For installing—

Mr. DICKS. For fulfilling the letter of intent. 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Yes, sir, for installing the in-line EDS systems at 

the Nation’s airports. 

The biggest part of the expense is not the equipment itself. It is 

the modifications to the airport. Congress originally made it a 90 

percent Federal participation, 10 percent local matching share; and 

because the dollars had not been appropriated sufficient to meet 

that, Congress has in the appropriations process ratcheted that 

back or attempted to ratchet that back over the past couple of 

years to 75/25. 

Mr. DICKS. So that has had a negative effect. 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Gentleman from Oregon is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to follow up on that. My understanding—Ms. Berrick, have 

you looked at the return on investment for the installation of this 

equipment? My understanding is that we have some analysis on 

threat resolution here from General Electric. We have heard other, 

I think, testimony on this. The return on investment because of the 

diminution of labor costs is quite high for these in-line systems, is 

that correct? 

Ms. BERRICK. Right. We looked at TSA’s estimates, and they 

identified that the systems could pay for themselves in a little over 

1 year. And this is primarily due to the reduction in screeners that 

would be required to run an in-line system. Specifically, they estimated that they could reduce the number of screeners by 78 percent, which is very significant. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So if the administration spent a little bit more 

money in 1 year and installed the new equipment in cooperation 

with all the airports that are standing in line for equipment and 

just want the Federal Government to partner with them, the government would recoup within 2 years that total investment and 

begin saving money in the annual budget. 
32

Ms. BERRICK. Right. I should clarify that that is what TSA has 

estimated. We have gone to them and said, now that you have established some in-line systems, do you have actual data showing 

savings? And they haven’t done a lot of analysis on that end. But 

the front-end analysis based on the projections that they made and 

we also independently looked at those, there is opportunity for substantial savings. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So you were going to look at back-end analysis, 

real-world analysis? 

Ms. BERRICK. Right. We want to get that information after they 

have been installed. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. That would be very helpful. 

On the issue of diffraction-based resolution of threat, where 

would this be in the—I am thinking of the British system where 

you have two levels of automated threat and the third level is operator. Are you anticipating we run things through an EDS, operators would look at it, and then it would go to the diffraction-based 

system? Or, would it go through the regular EDS, go through the 

diffraction-based and only things that couldn’t be resolved there 

would be looked at by the operator? 

Mr. BARBER. The key is the technology needs to be fielded to help 

reduce alarms, and operationally I think what you are asking is 

what is the best bang for the buck to reduce labor cost. I mean, 

one could take the scenario that you just take out the operator and 

let the equipment do the resolution and then all bags go to search 

that are finally not resolved. But it is probably some combination. 

But until the technology gets fielded and we get some trials in conjunction with the improvements that are being made in the basic 

EDS then we will know what the best course of action is. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So this could tell the difference between a bomb 

and fruitcake for instance. 

Mr. BARBER. Yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Which the current systems have a little trouble 

with. 

Mr. BARBER. Sometimes, yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I for the life of me don’t understand why TSA 

doesn’t do a very general announcement when a person buys a ticket saying, don’t pack. . .and here is the things you shouldn’t pack 

or your bag may be opened and things might disappear or might 

arrive in disarray. But they are very resistant to doing that. I don’t 

know why. But that could help the problem, too, on the front end. 

Tell people not to pack this stuff because of those problems. 

Your return on investment estimates for threat resolution or 

these other investments, are they in line with what TSA has said? 

I mean, have you looked at those issues? 

Mr. BARBER. For example, networking in our case, Congressman, 

the networking and on-screen resolution, just as an incremental 

technology add-on, is on the order of 30 percent savings versus just 

having in-line. We have about 170 systems that are now on line out 

of the 550 that we have fielded; and a hundred of those are now 

networks, compared to four before. So it makes a big difference 

whether you are looking at incremental technology add-ons or just 

going in-line. But we believe also that the savings is significant 
33

just going in-line. That is the biggest bang for the buck, no questions. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Parker. 

Mr. PARKER. Yes, if you look at an example I gave on San Francisco, that is, 46 of our systems all networked together in one control room; and the savings that I articulated in my comments were 

specifically as a result of that. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Those are phenomenal savings. It seems like we 

are shorting the taxpayer here by not making an up-front investment one time that would save us money beginning 18 months out. 

Mr. Hauptli, just the Orlando model—we had some testimony—

Trusted Traveler. I agree with you. I would love to get specifics on 

how many people take what number of flights. Because the numbers are all over the place. But we all agree there is some small 

number of people that take a large number of flights, travel frequently. 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Most of them are right up here. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. There are others—but, yeah—who suffer as much 

or more than we do. 

But, on Orlando, do you—I have tremendous concerns that we have the $79.95 model, which is something that was market tested, 

is not being sold at or near cost, not regulated, and there is potential for a monopoly gouging the other airport profits in this and the 

airport might have an incentive to create really long lines for the 

people who haven’t bought their product and they haven’t profited 

from it. Do you have concerns about this poor profit model? 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Sir, I will go ahead and mark you as undecided in 

your view on the Orlando model. That is not an issue that we have 

really taken a look at. We haven’t focused on that specific example. 

Orlando is not part of this initial group of founding airports that 

is part of this consortium. They may try and come in later, and we 

would welcome them. 

But I think that you are going to find that it will probably, as 

this moves forward, vary from airport to airport as airports decide 

what additional sorts of benefits that they might want to provide 

to the people who sign up. In some instances, you could envision 

a situation where people would want to provide preferred parking 

as well as part of the whole travel experience. There is a whole 

range of possibilities. 

We are just really at the infancy in the creation of, again, these 

common business rules and technical standards. So I know that 

there is concern expressed by some about what Orlando is trying 

to do. They are sort of off on their own on that one. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to thank 

all of our witnesses for testifying today. 

I would like to turn my attention first to EDS equipment, and 

my first question is for Ms. Berrick. How is TSA determining which 

airports receive letters of intent for in-line EDS systems and do 

they use risk assessments in making these determinations or physical assessments of particular airports’ needs or some other method? In particular, T.F. Green airport in Rhode Island, my home 
34

State, has been eagerly awaiting its LOI for several years now; 

and, meanwhile, its stand-alone system is creating continuous hazards and problems for employees and travelers due to its placement 

right at the main ticketing area. So that question. 

My next question is for Mr. Hauptli. Do you think that letters 

of intent have been an effective way to construct public-private 

partnerships to enable development of in-line EDS systems and 

how do you think TSA should in fact prioritize which airports receive funds for in-line EDS systems construction? 

Ms. BERRICK. With respect to criteria for issuing letters of intent, 

initially, TSA’s criteria were really two points. The first was who 

was going to be requesting the LOI first. So it was really almost 

a first-come-first-serve basis. Along with that is who was willing 

to—what airports were willing to upfront the 25 percent cost share. 

So initially that was really the criteria, which airports were willing 

to do this and willing to make this up-front investment. 

Since that time, TSA has put some criteria in place; and that criteria is primarily if these airports did not have in-line systems 

would they fall out of compliance of electronically screening 

checked baggage for explosives. So it is, from a security standpoint, 

if we don’t have in-line systems, will airports not be able to screen 

baggage. 

And you asked about risk assessments, and they are starting to 

use that as a part of their criteria. But it is really in its infancy. 

They need to do more in that area. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So you are saying before it was first-come-firstserve with no assessment made at all. 

Ms. BERRICK. Right. That is what we were told by TSA. And now 

again they have started to develop criterion moving forward, and 

we recommended and they agreed that they need to develop a plan 

on which airports’ in-line systems would make sense in terms of 

savings and efficiency, and as part of that, they are developing criteria and moving forward. But the initial letters of intent they reported to us that it was based on which airports were willing to 

make the up-front investment and who came in first and requested 

it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. That indicates again how backwards the 

system is as far as I am concerned. 

Okay, Mr. Hauptli. 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Yes. Mr. Langevin, the question in part was how 

effective has the letter of intent program been. I would say if you 

look at 50 or 60 of them that have been received and for the only 

8 or 9 of them being issued and the Office of Management and 

Budget essentially sitting on the DHS and sitting on TSA and telling them not to issue any additional new letters of intent, which 

has been tremendously frustrating to the airport community—so a 

promising program. 

TSA asked for help in the creation of a letter of intent program. 

It was modeled after a similar kind of program that is used in the 

airport improvement program in the FAA and got going. But then 

OMB sort of came in and said, let’s not do any more of these; and 

so TSA hasn’t issued any more of them. 

There is—like I said, there is a bunch of airports chomping at 

the bit to get letters of intent. In the written testimony there is a 
35

whole list of those airports with dollar amounts associated next to 

it. 

Mr. HAUPTLI. Congress has not appropriated sufficient funds, so 

from an airport perspective this is a 4—to $5 billion program that 

Congress is appropriating 250—to $300 million a year to solve. At 

that rate, it will take 10, 15 years to get these in place, and we 

don’t have the luxury of that kind of time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. No, we don’t. Thank you, my time has expired, 

but I may have some questions for the record and I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

It is a national scandal that we do not screen cargo that goes 

onto passenger planes in any meaningful way. It is a scandal. And 

it will be a national tragedy if Al-Qa’ida exploits that weakness in 

our defense system, if the TSA is allowed to continue to use the excuse that the technology does not exist to screen cargo. 

Seventy-five percent of all cargo can be screened using existing 

technology that is already used to screen the baggage of passengers 

which is screened on those very same passenger planes. As you all 

know, a package this size doesn’t even have to go through the 

known shipper program to get onto a plane. If it was in our bags, 

they would take it out, they would wand it, they would look at this 

three different ways. If you put it on this cargo, not even the 

known shipper program is—

Mr. Barber, as you know, the RAND study in September of 2004 

determined that 75 percent of all commercial cargo transported on 

passenger planes could be inspected for screened luggage. 

Mr. Barber, I would like to start with you. L–3 worked successfully with the Massachusetts Port Authority at Logan Airport on 

an air cargo inspection program that began 2 years ago. This program demonstrated the feasibility of screening 100 percent of the 

cargo that is loaded on passenger planes. 

I expect that you are aware that the Bush administration and 

the airlines claim that the technology doesn’t exist to inspect 100 

percent of the cargo loaded aboard airliners, even though we currently inspect 100 percent of airline passengers, their check bags, 

their carry-on bags. The Bush administration would have us believe that screening 100 percent of the containers in the cargo bay 

is beyond the technological capacity of the Federal Government. 

NASA will be launching a shuttle, but we are told we can’t figure 

out how to screen bags, cargo, that is almost identical to passenger 

bags. 

In fact, when I made the amendment with Congressman Shays, 

Asa Hutchinson says, because of the significant technological limitations, there is no practical way to achieve 100 percent manual inspection of the air cargo. And that is absolutely untrue. Absolutely 

untrue. 

Mr. Barber, I understand that L–3 provides Dutch customs with 

equipment to inspect cargo that is carried aboard passenger planes 

and cargo planes in Amsterdam. Could this equipment be used for 

a similar purpose in the United States? 
36

Mr. BARBER. Absolutely, Congressman. It is a truck screener primarily, or a container screener; it does provide an image for an operator. It does not do explosive detection, but it could provide an 

image. And if we considered adding technology to that in a layered 

approach, that is a potential solution, yes. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Parker—

Mr. DICKS. For explosives, too? 

Mr. BARBER. Well, the current capability in cargo, large cargo 

screening, unlike the packages the Congressman has shown, would 

not be able to discriminate for explosives, but other technologies 

could be added on. I mean, you could do something as simple as 

put portals or holes in the cargo and try to draw off a sample to 

try and get at least some indication of it, like the trace equivalent. 

Plus, if you combine that with the trusted shipper kind of program, 

you can begin to build a layered security solution. And it may not 

be perfect, but it would be an approach. 

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Parker, do you believe that the technology currently exists to inspect 100 percent of air cargo carried onto passenger planes? 

Mr. PARKER. Certainly when it comes to break cargo, that technology does exist. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Parker, for that answer. 

I would like to read, if I may briefly, Mr. Chairman, something 

for the record that was sent to me by the head of the Massachusetts Port Authority, Mr. Craig Coy, who wrote to me in February 

of this year to update me on the results achieved by the cargo demonstration at Logan Airport conducted in coordination with L–3. 

In his letter, Mr. Coy said to me, quote: 100 percent screening 

of all air cargo on all types of aircraft is technically possible. Two, 

a Federal mandate for this is critical, both in order to deal with 

the liability issues and to provide the technical standards this complex screening challenge must meet. And third, a Federal mechanism needs to be established that fairly distributes the cost among 

the major players, the Federal Government, the shippers, the carriers and the airports. 

I ask unanimous consent that this letter in its entirety be placed 

into the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. Without objection. 

[The information follows:]
37
38

Mr. MARKEY. In the aftermath of the London bombings, for someone from Boston that had 10 people led by Mohammed Attah, who 

hijacked two planes 3 miles from my house 4 years ago, this is a 

very serious business. The next sleeper cell could very well right 

now be activated and getting ready to move, and this is a wideopen opportunity to recreate to a very large extent what happened 

on 9/11. And I believe that what you are telling us today is that 

the Federal Government, the Bush administration, has no excuse 

for not putting together a comprehensive program to ensure that 

no passenger flies in America that has their shoes screened and 

their bags screened, but the cargo under their feet unscreened that 

can be used as an opening for Al-Qa’ida. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. The hearing has come to an end; it will be adjourned. I want to thank our witnesses, you have been very helpful, 

your time has been very valuable to us—just this panel. We have 

another panel coming up. So thank you very much for your time. 

Mr. ROGERS. [Presiding.] At this point, due to the large number 

of the second panel that is here, we would request unanimous consent that the oral statements by each of our witnesses be limited 

to 3 minutes. Without objection, so ordered. 

I would like to thank the panel for their time. I know everybody 

is busy, and we really do appreciate your availability and your willingness to come and make statements and testify before this committee. 

[The statement of Mr. Ellenbogen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ELLENBOGEN

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Reveal Imaging Technologies, I would like to thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee to offer my observations on 

deployment of Explosive Detection System (EDS) technology to improve efficiency 

and enhance the effectiveness of airport security screening. As a relatively new company, this marks Reveal’s second opportunity to testify on our next generation aviation security solution, and we very much appreciate your invitation to appear before 

the Committee today. 

The enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was a defining moment in the history of aviation security and the security industry. For the 

first time Congress mandated 100 percent screening of all passengers checked baggage, along with other improvements to the aviation security system, such as 

screening of carry-on baggage for explosives. This law has dramatically improved 

aviation security. 

In addition to establishing the screening deadline, Congress provided clear direction by specifying that baggage screening must be performed using the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Certified Explosive Detection Systems. Based 

on ATSA’s clear direction, Reveal developed a next-generation EDS that was based 

on computed tomography (CT) technology, but at the same time was • less expensive; • smaller and lighter; and • in-line with the way an airport operates. 

ATSA had the unforeseen benefit of creating a climate whereby private funding 

became available for entrepreneurs with solutions to aviation security challenges. It 

was in this environment that Reveal was able to raise in excess of $20 million in 

private funds for one express purpose—to develop, certify, and manufacture a nextgeneration explosive detection system. 

Yet, even though we are privately owned, we consider the Transportation Security 

Administration our partner. We are making every effort to work with TSA to find 

innovative solutions to meet the national mandate to screen airline passenger baggage. Reveal counts on direction from TSA to improve our current product and develop future products that will fulfill screening requirements while meeting the 

operational needs of airports, airlines and passengers. This collaboration with TSA 

is essential if federal research and development (R&D) funds are going to be aug-
39

mented by private investment in the development of innovative solutions that provide not only the highest level of security, but also the highest possible levels of customer service to the millions of air travelers in this country. 

Now more than ever the aviation industry needs clear direction from TSA on the 

agency’s strategic plan. Without this direction, it is impossible to produce the detailed cost benefit analysis that is required by private investors before they provide 

funds to improve existing products or design new products. In this time of limited 

taxpayer dollars, both Congress and TSA should welcome the leveraging of federal 

R&D funds with private investment.

Checked Baggage Screening: Lessons Learned 

There are two broad categories of EDS machines currently available. • Stand-alone machines that are deployed in ‘‘lobby’’ installations. • Integrated machines that are deployed in ‘‘in-line’’ installations. 

The two primary advantages of the lobby installations are the quick implementation time and the fact that passengers will be present if their bag is flagged for 

physical search. This approach is labor intensive, uses valuable lobby space, and is 

not convenient for the passenger. It is clear to all that this is not an effective longterm solution. 

The current solution to the lobby problem is to install EDS machines directly into 

the baggage conveyor system. This option requires significant modification to the 

baggage conveyor system and airport infrastructure in order to add the EDS equipment, conveyors, and bag tracking systems. To implement this solution, most airports will be required to re-construct existing terminals to house the baggage 

screening equipment and personnel—or even create new buildings or extensions to 

do so. Government estimates project that up to $5 billion in additional equipment 

and airport infrastructure will be required to achieve the 100 percent inspection 

mandate using the in-line solution. 

This is not meant to imply that placing EDS equipment in-line is not a good approach. In fact, we believe that in-line screening is indeed the best option available 

to both airports and TSA. By placing EDS equipment in-line and networking the 

systems to a single screener, TSA will be able to realize substantial labor savings 

year after year. Your colleagues on the Appropriations Committee acknowledged 

this in the committee report (H.R. 108–541) accompanying the fiscal year 2005 

Homeland Security bill, by stating that ‘‘if TSA deployed inline Explosive Detection 

Systems (EDS) machines with multiplexing capabilities, TSA could save up to six 

FTEs for each suite installed.’’ Clearly there is a sound financial reason for the Federal Government to implement this solution. 

What about the other stakeholders? Does deploying EDS equipment in-line make 

sense to airports, airlines, and passengers. Again, I believe the answer is an unequivocal yes. This was clearly articulated last year in Congressional testimony by 

representatives of Airports Council International and American Association of Airport Executives. In their written testimony, Mr. David Plavin and Mr. Todd Hauptli 

stated,’’ nowhere can better improvements be made in aviation security and system 

efficiency than in the area of explosive detection (EDS) installation at airports. 

While the costs of moving EDS equipment out of crowded terminals lobbies and 

placing it ‘in-line’ as part of the airport’s integrated baggage system are significant 

with a price tag estimated between $4 billion and $5 billion nationally, investing 

now in this effort will improve security and service and produce significant personnel savings.’’

Next Generation Explosive Detection Systems 

Reveal has spent the last year working with Congress, TSA, airports, and airlines 

trying to answer the question, ‘‘Is it possible to deploy EDS in-line and gain the inherent personnel savings for TSA, while at the same time reducing the $4 billion 

to $5 billion airport installation price tag?’’ One doesn’t have to spend very much 

time with airports before you recognize that the needs and desires of each airport 

are different. For example, the screening issues confronting Los Angeles International Airport are different from those of Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport in 

Mississippi. Given this reality, how do you best solve this dilemma and still provide 

airports with the options they will ultimately require? 

Reveal has designed, certified, and built a product that not only provides a means 

for TSA to achieve their personnel savings, but also provides airports and airlines 

with a way to deploy EDS in-line at a fraction of the cost. It is also a true success 

story of how industry and government can work together to very quickly define, develop, and produce new and innovative technology. 

Briefly, Reveal developed a way to reduce the size of EDS machines without conceding detection performance. This allows next-generation EDS machines to be far 

smaller and less expensive than the incumbent generation of screening units. While 
40

sharing the same tunnel size as existing EDS products, these systems can now be 

built into the passenger ticket counter or check-in desk in a network of EDS scanners. 

This distributed architecture provides in-line EDS without forcing airports to undertake the costly redesign and rebuild of their baggage conveyor system. Because 

it is fully networked, this next-generation EDS solution provides screener labor savings identical to custom in-line rebuild programs, but without the billions of dollars 

in airport infrastructure reconstruction and disruption to airport operations. 

Furthermore, for some airports, the passenger check-in counter is a logical place 

to perform baggage screening since they typically wait about two minutes for their 

boarding pass. This ‘‘dead’’ time provides the next-generation EDS machines with 

a way to significantly reduce the false alarms being experienced by alternative installations that have only a few seconds to scan a bag. And because the bag stays 

with the passenger, any conflict resolution can occur while the passenger is with the 

bag, potentially increasing passenger satisfaction. These smaller next-generation 

units can also be used anywhere passengers and their baggage check in, including 

curbside and remote check-in or at self-serve kiosks.

Passenger Checkpoint: The Next Challenge 

I would like to very briefly discuss what I see as the next challenge for TSA and 

this Committee—screening carry-on luggage for explosives. Although at first glance 

this might not seem to be related to the deployment of in-line EDS, I believe they 

are very closely related. To a large extent, the issues TSA encounters for checked 

baggage will be replicated when they begin to investigate potential options for 

screening carry-on baggage for explosives. These are natural choke points in the airport security process and must be dealt with in a ‘‘distributed’’ manner at airports. 

Although deployment of EDS at checkpoints can improve the overall detection 

performance of the passenger screening process, as well as eliminate the need for 

redundant hand searching of selectee bags (pending protocol), simply replacing existing checkpoint X-ray systems with a traditional 100% EDS solution would be cost 

prohibitive and would likely further slow the passenger screening process. 

TSA has recognized the need to improve the security process at the passenger 

checkpoint. However, TSA and airports are struggling to keep up with passenger 

processing using today’s screening systems and procedures. We are all familiar with 

stories of how long lines formed during peak periods. These lines will continue to 

lengthen as air traffic grows and TSA enhances security at passenger checkpoints. 

Furthermore, in most locations airports do not have additional real estate to expand 

passenger checkpoints. 

The system Reveal has developed for checked baggage is a uniquely designed for 

passenger checkpoint screening. By applying similar protocols to those being developed for checked baggage, it is possible to improve security, increase passenger 

throughput, and reduce TSA labor by screening carry-on baggage with an EDS. I 

believe that airlines and airports would eagerly embrace a system that can significantly increase the throughput of the passenger checkpoint as a means to improve 

customer service while eliminating the need to expand checkpoints.

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, since the tragic events of 9/11, EDS manufacturers have primarily 

been focused on meeting and supporting the deadlines mandated for checked baggage screening deployment. As has been articulated in previous testimony before 

Congress by the airport community, ‘‘it is now time to move forward to ensure that 

limited federal resources are wisely utilized to enhance security, system efficiency, 

and passenger convenience.’’ I believe that the items outlined in my testimony are 

critical to this effort. In particular, 

• TSA must continue to work in close partnership with industry to encourage 

innovation and approve new technology as rapidly as possible. This is the only 

way that industry will be able justify the large investments required to develop 

new technologies that will ultimately enhance aviation security and improve 

customer satisfaction. 

• There is no ‘‘cookie cutter’’ formula that can be applied to every airport in the 

United States. As an airport director said to me once, ‘‘If you have seen one airport. . .you have seen one airport.’’ We must recognize the unique needs of individual airports and take their requirements into account as we continue to enhance aviation security. 

• Deploying EDS equipment ‘‘in-line’’ does not mean that airports need to exclusively undertake large, expensive, time-consuming construction projects. TSA 

and industry have contributed significant resources to develop next-generation 

EDS equipment that provides a lower cost alternative to the vast majority of 
41

the nation’s airports. There needs to be a plan for how to take advantage of this 

investment. 

I appreciate the Committee’s continued interest in this topic and look forward to 

working with you and TSA to accomplish our mutual goals.

Mr. ROGERS. And the first witness that I would call for any statement that you might have is Anthony Fabiano, President and Chief 

Executive Officer of American Science and Engineering, Inc. And 

we welcome your oral statement, and you could make a longer written statement for the record, if you would like. 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY FABIANO 

Mr. FABIANO. Thank you, sir. Congressman Rogers, I have an appendix that you all should have a copy of as part and parcel to our 

presentation. 

I would like to thank the Chairman, the Ranking Democratic 

Member, and members of the subcommittee on behalf of American 

Science and Engineering for this opportunity to speak about how 

to make our airports safer and our traveling public more secure. 

We believe security checkpoints at our Nation’s airports can and 

should be more effective. 

Today I would like to tell you about a technology invented and 

patented by our company, called Backscatter X-Ray Imaging. 

Backscatter can provide a much higher level of detection over a 

broader range of threats than any technology currently employed 

at airports for inspecting carry-on baggage and people. Backscatter 

can identify small metal objects such as detonator wires, nonmetallic weapons such as ceramic knives, and very small amounts 

of explosives in a sealed packet. 

The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, reported in its audit of passenger baggage screening procedures at domestic airports in 2004 and 2005, the most recent report 

revealed that the quantity of threats that go undiscovered through 

our current airport checkpoints is still unacceptable. The report 

concludes by encouraging TSA to expedite its testing programs and 

give priorities to technologies such as Backscatter x-ray that will 

enable the screening workforce to better detect both weapons and 

explosives. With current and contemplative technology used at airports, several classes of threats may go undetected and be carried 

on board aircraft. They include metal weapons, smaller than the 

metal detector threshold setting; sealed envelopes of explosives 

with no residue trace; nonmetallic weapons such as ceramic knives 

and composite pistols, weapons or explosives concealed in sensitive 

areas of the body. 

Backscatter Image x-raying, when used to scan people, is a safe 

and effective method to find almost all classes of threats, including 

those described above. It is almost impossible to hide a threat on 

the human body that goes undetected by Backscatter. Backscatter 

Imaging is very safe; the x-ray exposer from a Backscatter scan is 

equivalent to the exposure you receive from background, and only 

3 minutes when flying in an airplane at altitude. 

Figure 4, in your presentation, at appendix A is a Backscatter 

image of a person hiding several types of threats beneath their 

clothing. As you see, it would be difficult to hide something like a 

weapon or explosive. 
42

This unfiltered Backscatter x-ray creates a detailed image of the 

subject. Our company and TSA appreciate the sensitive nature of 

these images and have worked diligently together to develop approaches to address privacy concerns. AS&E has developed software algorithms for modifying the images to highlight potential 

threats and yet diminish the image in sensitive regions of the body. 

I draw your attention to figure 5 of appendix A, which shows a 

privacy-enhanced image, which is the only image seen by the reviewer. The reviewer never sees the original unfiltered image, nor 

do they have the opportunity to save or display the image elsewhere. 

In summary, American Science and Engineering stands ready to 

deploy its Backscatter personal scanners at airports today with 

software algorithms to address the privacy concerns. Backscatter 

detects all threats accurately and repeatedly, it is safe, privacy 

should no longer be an issue, it is cost effective to operate, it is 

available now. 

We urge the members of this committee to support DHS and 

TSA in their plans to deploy Backscatter at airports as soon as possible. The security of our Nation and the safety of its traveling public will be the better for it. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present, and I would be pleased 

to answer any questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. 

[The statement of Mr. Fabiano follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY FABIANO

Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Thompson and Members of the Committee on 

Homeland Security, on behalf of American Science and Engineering Inc., we would 

like to thank you for the opportunity to speak today about how to make our airports 

safer and our traveling public more secure. We believe security checkpoints at our 

nation’s airports can and should be more effective. Today, I would like to tell you 

about a technology invented and patented by our company, called Backscatter X-ray 

Imaging. Backscatter has been the technology of choice for protecting most high 

threat facilities around the World, including the Russell and Dirksen Senate Office 

Buildings. Backscatter can provide a much higher level of detection over a broader 

range of threats than any technology currently employed at airports for inspecting 

carry-on baggage and people. Backscatter can identify small metal objects, such as 

detonator wires, non-metallic weapons, such as ceramic knives, and very small 

amounts of explosives in a sealed packet. The U.S. Military is also using 

Backscatter to effectively find Improvised Explosive Devices hidden in vehicles and 

on people in the theater of operations, Iraq. Over 50 systems are currently deployed, 

with more on the way. 

TSA recognizes the advantages of using Backscatter X-ray Imaging for finding potential threats hidden on people and in carry-on baggage, and recently announced 

plans to pilot Backscatter for personnel screening at airport checkpoints. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported 

in September 2004 on its ‘‘Audit of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures 

at Domestic Airports’’. After suggestions by the OIG were implemented by TSA following this report, the audit was repeated and a follow-on report was issued in 

March 2005. The March 2005 report stated that the quantity of threats that go undiscovered through our current airport check points is still unacceptable. The 

study’s conclusion was that the ‘‘majority of screeners. . .were diligent in the performance of their duties’’ and that ‘‘the lack of improvement since [the] last audit 

indicates that significant improvement in performance may not be possible without 

greater use of technology.’’ The report concludes by ‘‘encourag[ing] TSA to expedite 

its testing programs and give priority to technologies, such as backscatter x-ray, 

that will enable the screening workforce to better detect both weapons and explosives.’’

First let me tell you briefly what Backscatter is and why it is unique. X-rays do 

one of three things when they impinge on an object or person: they pass through, 
43

get absorbed or scatter. If the object is not very dense, they would pass through 

without stopping. If the object is dense, like metal, they might get absorbed. The 

difference of what goes through versus what gets absorbed is used to map the dense 

contents of an object and to make a determination if there is something in the 

image worth worrying about. An example in medicine would be a conventional chest 

X-ray. This technique, called transmission X-ray, is also used today to determine if 

there is a threat in your carry-on bag. However, if the object is made of or contains 

an organic material, such as explosives, it might be very hard to see in Transmission X-rays. The difference between what gets through versus what gets absorbed is not great enough to make a good diagnosis. However, organic materials 

scatter X-rays in all directions, including backwards. By creating an image of the 

back scattered X-rays we can identify the presence of those organic materials, including explosives. 

At today’s airports two techniques are used for inspecting carry-on baggage, 

Transmission X-rays and Trace Wipes. First your bag is sent through a Transmission X-ray scanner. We’ve all done this, you put your bag on a conveyor, an 

image is taken as it goes through the machine and a TSA inspector determines if 

you are carrying a threat. If they can’t make a definitive determination, they might 

put your bag through a second time or send it to another station where a wipe of 

the outside of your bag would be analyzed for traces of explosive residue. If the explosive material is missed during the X-ray, it may never go to a secondary ‘‘wipe’’ 

screen and would be missed. 

Figures 1, 2 and 3 of appendix ‘‘A’’ illustrates how Backscatter helps identify objects missed in baggage by conventional X-ray imaging. Figure 1 is a Transmission 

X-ray image of a briefcase with a laptop computer containing 3 explosive devices. 

The image was taken with a system currently used at airport checkpoints. Figure 

2 shows the same image after ‘‘dual-energy’’ processing to highlight explosives. Only 

1 explosive is revealed. 

A Backscatter X-ray image of the same bag with the laptop is shown in figure 

3. In this image all three explosive devices are clearly seen. Today, two potential 

threats would likely have gone undetected. 

Let’s now consider threats hidden on a passenger. Backscatter technology is particularly well suited to identifying threats on a person. 

Today, airport security checkpoints primarily use metal detectors to find threats 

concealed on travelers. There are three fundamental limitations of metal detectors: 

1. First, they only alarm on metal objects, leaving many non-metallic weapons 

and explosive devices undetected. 

2. Second, the size of the metal object detected is subject to the nuisance alarm 

threshold setting. Small metallic objects, such as a plastic handled box knife 

may go undetected. 

3. Third, alarms need to be resolved by another person or device. Portable metal 

detector wands and pat-downs are often used. This slows the process, is labor 

intensive and is subject to the competency and thoroughness of the person performing the function. Pat-downs are considered by many to be very intrusive 

and have been met with substantial resistance by the traveling public. 

Recognizing that metal detectors can not find explosive devices, TSA has recently 

tested trace portals at airports. These devices can identify trace amounts of explosives if residue from one explosive material is present on the person or their clothing. If the explosives are sealed or if there is no residue, the explosives may go undetected, regardless of their size. In addition, there are classes of explosives that 

do not give off enough trace materials to trigger an alarm. 

Therefore, even when using both metal detectors and trace portals, several classes 

of threats may go undetected and be carried onboard aircraft. They include: 

—Metal weapons smaller than the metal detector threshold setting. 

—Sealed explosives with no residue trace. 

—Non-metallic weapons such as ceramic knives and composite pistols. 

—Weapons or explosives concealed in sensitive areas of the body. 

Backscatter X-ray Imaging though, provides the broadest range of detection capability when used to scan people, including those threats just described. It is almost 

impossible to hide a threat on the human body that goes undetected by Backscatter. 

Backscatter imaging is very safe. The X-ray exposure from a Backscatter scan is 

equivalent to the exposure received from background in only three minutes when 

flying in an airplane at altitude. 

The amount of radiation exposure given to the person during the procedure is extremely small. The National Committee for Radiological Protection & Measurement 

have determined that up to 5000 scans per year are safe for even the most sensitive 

class of people, including pregnant women and children. It is equivalent to the expo-
44

sure received from background when flying in an airplane at altitude for just a few 

minutes. 

Figure 4 of Appendix ‘‘A’’ is a Backscatter image of a person hiding several types 

of threats beneath their clothing. As you can see, threats including handguns, 

knives, and explosive material are clearly detectable. 

This unfiltered Backscatter X-ray creates a detailed image of the subject. Our 

company and TSA appreciate the sensitive nature of these images, and we have 

worked diligently with TSA to develop approaches to address privacy concerns. By 

physically separating the scanned person from the image reviewer and using gender-specific reviewers, some privacy concerns may be eased. However, AS&E has 

gone a step further and developed software algorithms for modifying the images to 

highlight potential threats and yet diminish the image in sensitive regions of the 

body. Figure 5 of Appendix ‘‘A’’ shows the privacy enhanced image which is the only 

image seen by the reviewer. The reviewer never sees the original unfiltered image 

nor do they have an opportunity to save or display the image elsewhere. Figure 6 

is another sample image in which the explosive is highlighted by the computer in 

red. 

American Science and Engineering stands ready to deploy its Backscatter personnel scanners at airports today with software algorithms to address privacy concerns. Backscatter X-ray Imaging detects the broadest range of threats, including 

metallic weapons, non-metallic weapons, and explosives by providing a clear and unambiguous image of the threat. With Backscatter systems there should be little 

need to resolve false alarms with a second security person or method, thereby improving the efficiency of the screening process. 

We urge the Members of this Committee to support DHS and TSA in their plans 

to deploy available Backscatter systems at airports as soon as possible. The security 

of our nation and the safety of its traveling public will be the better for it.
45
46
47
48

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes John W. Wood, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of Analogic. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. WOOD, JR. 

Mr. WOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Analogic came to the airport security business through medical 

imaging, and for more than 30 years we have developed CT-based 

technology. And to draw an analogy, no patient entering the hospital with a serious illness such as cancer or heart disease would 

expect to have an image taken of them with an old-fashioned, century-old, two-dimensional x-ray system. They would expect to be 

imaged with a CT or MRI, which provides a complete three-dimensional volumetric reconstruction of the organs in the body. 

We do the same thing with checkpoint carry-on luggage, and we 

have developed a machine called COBRA, developed with our own 

company’s funds. We are quite pleased with the TSA response to 

this new technology that offers several advantages. 

First, a two-dimensional x-ray in place in airports for 30 years 

now won’t recognize objects completely. A pistol at the wrong angle 

looks like a block, a knife at the wrong angle looks like a line. We 

provide a complete automated reconstruction of the image, and also 

use computers to recognize these threats: guns, knives, explosives. 

This eliminates the fatigue issue with screeners required to change 

out jobs every 20 minutes because it is an automated process. It 

does not require, for instance, that a laptop be removed from a 

briefcase. It is a powerful enough technique we can completely 

image it. This speeds the flow. 

And last, one of our machines could replace two or three of the 

existing scanners and save hundreds and millions of dollars by reducing the number of screeners, the 45,000 screeners there, because instead of having to look at a bag, an image of every bag, 

you might look at only every tenth bag, a bag that might have a 

threat in it. So we believe this offers many advantages. 

The TSA has just completed a 45-day test at Boston’s Logan Airport in which we imaged thousands of bags that led this week to 

a mildly humorous incident in which a traveler at Logan had in his 

briefcase a tequila bottle shaped like a Colt .45 semiautomatic pistol. It was not picked up by the conventional x-ray system. The 

glass and liquid are low density, but the shape jumped out in our 

system very clearly. So the fellow, I understand, had a nice talk 

with the Massachusetts State Police. 

So we have an excellent alternative here. We look forward to 

moving into advanced trials, and we can move into production of 

the system later this year. 

I appreciate any questions. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Wood. 

[The statement of Mr. Wood follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN W. WOOD JR. 

. . .It is a privilege and an honor to be with you this afternoon to discuss a subject where I believe my company, Analogic Corporation, can make a real contribution in leveraging our technology to improve not only aviation security, but other 

modes of transportation security as well. 

Analogic is an innovative, developmental engineering and manufacturing company 

based in Peabody, Massachusetts. Our revenue for the year 2004 was $355 million. 
49

We conceive, design and manufacture high-performance, proprietary medical and security imaging systems, principally for leading international Original Equipment 

Manufacturers (OEM’s). 

Members of the Committee most likely know Analogic through our relationship 

with L–3 Communications. Following 9/11 we supplied L–3 with our Explosive Assessment Computed Tomography (EXACTΤΜ) system, which was the second certified 

Explosive Detection System (EDS) to screen checked baggage. Our EXACT systems 

are the heart of the L–3 Communications’ eXaminer 3DX6000 EDS that is installed 

at airports across the country to comply with the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001. 

In 2003 we responded to requests from TSA to enhance those EDS units already in the field. We, along with Lockheed Martin, were awarded $3.85 million under the 

Phoenix Category 1 Program to design and develop a system upgrade that would 

increase throughput, reduce false positive alarms and reduce EDS operating costs. 

Our field-installable EDS upgrade kit was certified this spring and we will start upgrading EDS units in the near future. In addition to the important upgrade work, Analogic was awarded $1.15 million 

for the first phase of a multi-million dollar grant under TSA’s Phoenix Category 3 

Program to design a new generation of advanced, networkable EDSs with significantly higher throughput and detection capabilities, targeted for delivery in 2007. 

These new units will further reduce EDS operating costs while providing improved 

security. 

TSA also awarded us a cooperative agreement as part of its new Manhattan II 

Program to identify and develop revolutionary technologies into deployable systems 

that will significantly enhance automatic threat detection and discrimination capabilities for checked luggage for aircraft and other applications. 

I trust this background on our intensive work in finding explosives in checked luggage was helpful in understanding our success to date, and to describe the close 

working relationship we have developed with TSA. What I really want to talk to 

you about now is our in-house R&D efforts on a product called COBRA (Carry-On 

Baggage Real Time Assessment). We believe that this product has the ability to revolutionize today’s checkpoint. 

COBRA represents the next generation in aviation security as the first automatic 

explosives detection system designed to easily integrate into the operational flow of 

a checkpoint. Designed, developed, and manufactured with our own funding, 

COBRA is a revolutionary advance over today’s conventional line scan X-ray systems. It integrates Computed Tomography (CT) scanning and leading edge image 

interpretation software to automatically screen carry-on baggage/bins for explosive 

materials, guns and knives. In addition to automatic threat detection and analysis, 

COBRA provides high-resolution, 3-Dimensional (3–D) images that can be rotated 

on the screen for on screen resolution decisions. 

COBRA has just completed deployment of a pilot program with TSA at Boston’s 

Logan Airport. The unit was installed downstream of the conventional X-ray systems at the US Air Shuttle Terminal. The trial was part of a TSA project to assess 

operational performance and to determine if COBRA should replace the currently 

installed, but outdated X-ray machines. 

Early indicators and results from the successful trial are demonstrating that 

COBRA will save the screeners significant time. One of the biggest contributors to 

checkpoint bottlenecks is the need for the TSA screeners to double and triple check 

the one-dimensional images of the conventional systems. Screeners lose efficiency by 

repeatedly sending bags back through the conveyor because the conventional X-ray 

source is fixed and many objects that are on the same X-ray path are not imaged 

clearly or at all. Additionally, the orientation of an object is critical in how the 

image appears on the screen. A gun viewed from the wrong direction no longer appears as a gun, but instead appears as a rectangular block or stick. There are no 

hidden objects in the COBRA system. By rotating the X-ray source completely 

around the bag, a full-volume image is produced of the entire contents of the bag. 

All contents of the bag are imaged regardless of their orientation. 

Another positive aspect of the trial is the improved and automated detection using 

COBRA. At today’s checkpoints, detection of threats is almost always dependent on 

screener training, skill, attention level and is very dependent on object orientation 

and bag clutter. Small amounts of explosive materials are at best difficult to detect, 

and particular configurations are very difficult or impossible to detect. COBRA provides new capabilities of automatic threat detection and analysis for explosive materials in addition to guns and knives. This detection is computer based and does not 

rely on screener attention level. Detection is based on physical properties of the imaged objects. By automatically identifying and detecting explosives, weapons and a 

variety of other materials, the use of COBRA will reduce the need for screeners to 
50

view every bag which is a lengthy and tiresome process. The screener will only need 

to view those bags where the system indicates there is a suspect object which will 

increase throughput and reduce the number of screeners manning the system. 

Another major advantage we are hearing from the Logan screeners relates to the 

quality of the image on the screen. Today’s conventional X-ray systems provide a 

2–D colorized image. In addition to a similar 2–D image COBRA provides a real 

three-dimensional (3–D) color image that can be rotated 360 degrees with the touch 

of a fingertip. 

Other checkpoint issues are being addressed by COBRA. One of the main complaints for the business traveler is the requirement to remove their laptop computers from their briefcases. When using COBRA, these laptops and other electronic 

devices do not need to be extracted, saving time and improving efficiency. Prohibited 

items such as scissors, matches, and lighters present additional problems for screeners. With COBRA, these items are seen clearly in a 3–D image, and screeners can 

easily ask that they be removed, reducing the time taken to resolve prohibited items 

with hand searches. 

In addition to addressing security concerns, COBRA technology also represents a 

significant labor savings for TSA. The screener workforce, working at our checkpoints today, are doing an excellent job given the limitations of conventional x-ray 

systems and ETDs. However, more screener personnel are required than needed in 

light of these limitations. The technology developed in COBRA can, and will essentially reduce that number of screeners anywhere from 30–50%. 

COBRA is designed to be installed in less than four hours, is designed for serviceability and comes with a built-in tutorial. Its imaging and display technology was 

developed with TSA’s human factors personnel and is a dramatic improvement over 

today’s image-interpretation techniques. Perhaps one of the more ‘‘dramatic’’ reason 

for considering COBRA at today’s checkpoint (to shore up a chink in the armor) was 

summed up best by one of the candidates in their 3rd Presidential debate—he said, 

‘‘If we are employing CT EDS equipment for our checked luggage, why are we not 

then using that same technology at the checkpoint to inspect our carry-on luggage.’’

Furthermore, covert testing scores of our checkpoint screeners (that has been in 

the press of late) reveals that screeners, using the currently deployed equipment, 

are not up to the task of reliably finding explosives. Clearly, with using advanced 

technology such as COBRA that automatically detects explosives, those scores will 

only go higher and the public will benefit from the proportionate rise in security. 

Recent events in Moscow with the Chechen suicide bombers made us reevaluate 

where the threat is to our commercial airliners today. Since Pan Am 103, we have 

been focused on deploying the best technology to detect the smallest amounts of explosives in checked luggage. Unfortunately, the threat today is different. We have 

seen how passengers can now bring small amounts of explosives in their carry-on 

items or on their person. The threat is no longer limited to screening all the bags 

in the belly of the aircraft. An equal focus must be on the passenger and their carryon items. Our COBRA system, developed and leveraged from all our work on our 

checked baggage EDS systems, will provide TSA with the latest technology as advanced or even superior to the technology now installed for checked luggage. The 

time that passengers wait in lines will be reduced and the operating costs will be 

a fraction of what they are today. 

The next step is to provide this technology in a way that affords frictionless travel, an integrated checkpoint that is user friendly but at the same time is fully capable of detecting small amounts of explosives in a passenger’s hand bag or on his/

her person. Analogic is working with other companies in the security industry to 

provide an integrated secure checkpoint. TSA’s main focus to date has been to roll 

out products and test them. Significant progress has been made and it is my belief 

that our airports are much safer today than prior to 9/11. However, I also know that 

the 1266 EDS machines that were installed across the country were done in a way 

that emphasized speed of installment rather than the ease of travel for the flying 

public. Analogic is doing our part to improve the situation. We are working with 

TSA to not only enhance the systems currently installed, but to reduce the lifetime 

costs of ownership. We , as a company, see the checkpoint as a natural focus to 

bring all our technology to bear to not only improve their security, but to do it a 

way that is also in the best interests of the passengers and the TSA. 

We look forward to working with TSA and DHS in the future and to also address 

other venues such as rail stations, subways, ports and other critical infrastructure. 

Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
51

Attachment to John Wood’s Testimony on July 13, 2005 @ 2:00 PM 

Comparison between a Conventional Line Scan X-ray system and 

Analogic’s COBRA, an Advanced Explosive and Weapon Detection System 

Overview: Literally thousands of conventional X-ray systems are installed at airport checkpoints, office 

lobbies, agency entrances and other locations around the world. They are used for one purpose—to detect 

dangerous objects inside bags. They can provide an excellent image (sometimes colored for organic materials) and are relatively inexpensive ($30-$60,000). They operate on the principle of a Transmission X-ray 

(TRX) imaging system that has a source (an X-ray generator), detectors which capture the X-rays that have 

penetrated through the bag, and a monitor that displays the resulting projection image. A conveyor belt 

takes the bag through the system. 

Analogic’s COBRATM (Carry-on Baggage Real Time Assessment) represents a 

revolutionary advancement over these conventional systems in that it employs Computed Tomography (CT) scanning, the same technology currently deployed by the 

TSA to screen checked baggage. As objects (bags or bins) move through the COBRA, 

the system performs full-volume helical CT scans and analyzes the 3-dimensional 

images using advanced explosive and weapon detection algorithms. In addition to 

automatic threat detection and analysis, the high-resolution, 3–D images can be rotated on the screen to clearly identify hidden or obscured objects.

Conventional Systems COBRA 

Physics: A conventional X-ray system has a 

fundamental limitation in that the threedimensional volume of a bag is compressed to a 

two-dimensional image. Because of this, all the 

objects in a bag are superimposed on top of 

each other, which results in reduced detection of 

threat objects. Numerical values in the image 

represent summations along the line of the X-ray 

penetration. Image interpretation is difficult for 

both computer-aided (automatic) and operator 

detection. 

Physics: Recognition of the fundamental limitations of conventional X-rays led to the development of Computed Tomography (CT). COBRA 

uses volumetric CT, an advanced diagnostic imaging method in which X-ray measurements 

from many angles are combined into one image. 

In COBRA the combination of X-ray source rotation and bag motion produces true 3-dimensional images of all the contents of the bag. 

The numerical values at each point in space 

represent material specific properties of the 

contents of the bag.

Technology: 1970’s Technology: 21st Century

The hidden object—Because the X-ray generator is 

fixed (doesn’t move), X-rays go through a bag at 

a fixed angle. Any threat object that is on the 

same X-ray path as another item is not imaged 

clearly or at all. For example, if a threat object 

is behind (or in front of) a radio, the 

conventional TRX will show an image of the 

radio, but may not show the threat. This is why 

many operators using this technology will have 

the bag rescanned in a different orientation so 

that they can see behind the obscuring object. 

This re-scanning takes time and is inefficient. 

Additionally, the orientation of an object is 

critical in how the image appears on the screen. 

A gun viewed from the wrong direction no longer 

look like as a gun, but instead appears as a 

rectangular block or stick. 

No hidden object: There are no hidden objects in 

the COBRA system. By moving the X-ray source 

completely around the bag (on the rotating gantry), a full-volume rendering is produced of the 

entire contents of the bag. All contents of the 

bag are imaged regardless of their orientation.

Detection: Conventional systems may detect guns 

and knives as long as they are not obscured by 

other objects or in a difficult orientation. 

Detection is almost always dependent on 

screener training, skill, and attention level. 

Explosive materials are at best difficult to 

detect, and particular configurations are very 

difficult to detect. 

Detection: COBRA provides automatic threat detection and analysis for explosive materials in 

addition to guns and knives. This detection is 

computer based and does not rely on screener 

attention level. Detection is based on physical 

properties of the imaged objects.
52

Conventional Systems COBRA 

Certification: Conventional systems are not 

certified for automatic detection of explosives. 

Certification: CT is the preferred, ‘‘certified’’ detection technology used by the TSA for automatic detection of explosives in checked luggage. Analogic is one of three (3) companies 

who have passed the TSA certification testing 

for checked baggage EDSs.

Image on Screen: A 2–D colorized image Image on Screen: In addition to a 2–D image of 

the entire bag, COBRA provides a high-resolution, 3–D image that can be rotated with the 

touch of a fingertip.

Laptop Computers: Laptop computers must be 

extracted from bags using conventional X-ray 

systems.

Laptop Computers: Laptop computers do not need 

to be extracted while using COBRA. 

Conventional systems cost less than their CT counterparts, but given the severity 

of the threat and the acceptance of this certified technology, TSA should move 

quickly to adopt it in today’s checkpoints.

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Deepak Chopra, President of OSI Systems, Incorporated. 

STATEMENT OF DEEPAK CHOPRA 

Mr. CHOPRA. I want to thank the Chair for this opportunity for 

OSI, a parent company, and Rapiscan Systems, a global company 

which offers the world’s widest array of nonintrusive inspection 

systems for aviation, boats, border crossings, cruise lines, and 

cargo. We have installed more than 50,000 inspection systems in 

over 150 countries with 300 airports, and after 9/11, we currently 

provide nearly half of all U.S. airport for checkpoint screening systems. 

Today, nearly 4 years after 9/11, I can say that aviation security 

is stronger; however, there is still room for much improvement 

today. One of the things we keep talking about is this new technology and new technology. We want to talk about it, what we can 

do to the airports today. People are frustrated. The long lines generate confusion at the checkpoint. Shoes on, shoes off; greatest detection machine; and, finally, what I call the most humiliating experience of being spread eagle, getting patted down, searched in 

the middle of an open environment at the airport. It is very embarrassing. I get it done 30 percent of the time I find it. 

All the studies have shown that this is very frustrating for the 

passengers, some of you have said in the previous panel. I can tell 

you, my company makes the metal gates through which you walk 

through. None of those units can test anything but metal. That 

means that if there are sophisticated terrorist weapons, present 

technology as it exists will not pick that up. 

My fellow colleague from AS&E is absolutely right. We make the 

same device called the People Screener, it is very effective. As a 

matter of fact, 14 million passengers have been tested through that 

technology over the last 6 months at Heathrow Airport, and we are 

proud to say they have gone live. This is the only technology that 

can be utilized—and I know there is a lot of talk, we talked about 

privacy. The way the U.K. has taken care of it is they give the pas-
53

senger a choice. You will either want to get spread eagle and get 

searched or you want to take a scan. Guess what? Ninety percent 

of the passengers have chosen a scan. It is a very powerful technology, and it is the only deployable technology that is available 

today—not tomorrow, not the day after—that will do that job. 

We have also gone in and tried to improve the plight of the passengers as it stands today. EDS, as an alternative that people are 

talking about, I think it is a mistake. We have 2,000 machines that 

TSA paid for at 9/11. Those machines can be improved. We have 

been working with TSA. We have integrated a quadrapole resonance technology on one single platform. This system will do the 

automatic explosive detection deployed right in front of a passenger. Because the QRS system leverages currently installed QRS 

systems, there is little additional training and almost no additional 

operational requirements for TSA trainers to be retrained. Congress will not have to hire one additional screener or replace a single machine at an airport, but, most important, they will cost onethird the cost as proposed to EDS Checkpoint Technologies. 

Third, we are going live in L.A. right now to double the throughput at a checkpoint by what we call the Checkpoint Efficiency System. It is a simple system machine that can read out the bags so 

the lines don’t get stopped. We have a lot of airports crying for getting these units. It is a very simple thing, a win-win situation. 

We have heard a lot of things about the EDS. Our position is 

that we should be looking at the next-generation systems for checkpoint screening, even if they happen to be CT. The CT technology 

as it exists right now is 20-year-old medical technology. There are 

other technologies that are there. For example, we at Rapiscan, we 

have been developing over the last 2-1/2 years an electronic CT 

which would bypass and supersede to the tune of 1,400 bags an 

hour against the present existing technology. These units have 

been developed at multiple million dollars of cost, with zero funding from the U.S. Government. 

We believe that the current platform and technology for the 

checkpoint should be with the present machines that enhance technology that is available today, not 2 years from now, and get the 

other body screeners in place; because, like what happened in England, it can happen anywhere, and the present machines don’t 

work. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Chopra follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEEPAK CHOPRA

Thank you Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and members of the committee. 

I am honored to testify before this committee on the critical issue of improving aviation security. Sadly, as the events in London last week demonstrate, we are locked 

in an ongoing fight against terrorism and we must continue to harden and improve 

our defenses against these ever changing threats. 

I am Deepak Chopra, Chairman and CEO of OSI Systems. OSI Systems is the 

parent company of Rapiscan Systems, a global company based in Los Angeles, California which offers the world’s widest array of non-intrusive inspection systems for 

airports, seaports, land borders, mass transit modes and other secure locations. 

Rapiscan Systems has installed more than 50,000 inspection systems in over 150 

countries around the world. We currently provide nearly 50 percent of all U.S. airport checkpoint screening systems. Rapiscan also delivers border and sea port inspection systems for U.S. Customs and Border Protection and other international 
54

customs agencies. The State Department employs our systems at every office around 

the world. And the systems we all walked through to gain entry to this building 

were made by Rapiscan Systems. 

Rapiscan Systems invents, develops, manufactures, installs and services 

nearly every type of non-intrusive inspection technology in the world. We 

therefore understand better than anyone, the strengths and limitations of 

all these systems and can help security officials employ the best technology 

for any detection and operational requirement.

Rapiscan Systems is a leader in aviation security with installations at the world’s 

most secure airports 

Rapiscan Systems is the leader in providing aviation security technology globally. 

For example, Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv, Heathrow Airport in England, Dulles 

Airport, Taipei Airport, Kiev Airport, and over 300 other airports around the world 

rely on Rapiscan Systems’ technologies to protect passengers. After September 11, 

the United States government called on Rapiscan Systems for an emergency deployment of hundreds of additional systems to U.S. airports.

Air travel is more secure since 9-11, but relies too heavily on either old, 

slow or expensive technology 

Today, nearly four years after the 9-11 attacks, I can say that aviation security 

is clearly stronger. However, there is still much room for improvement. While much 

of the focus today will be on technological advances in explosive and weapons detection, we must pay equal attention to how technology affects airport operations and 

the traveling public. Passengers are frustrated with the slow pace of air travel and 

we should not just provide more inspection for inspections sake. One of the most 

significant errors in the post 9-11 world has been the rush to install checked baggage inspection equipment with too little attention to its impact on airport operations. The aviation industry and the traveling public clearly want a secure civil 

aviation system. But long lines, inconsistent inspection procedures, and a beleaguered airline industry are not acceptable outcomes of increased aviation security. 

I believe that we continue to focus too much on old technology solutions. Today, 

every U.S. airport uses the same technology for checkpoint, passenger and checked 

baggage screening that was in use before 9–11. More astonishing, is that not one 

new technology has been deployed aviation system-wide since 9–11. This is after 

Congress appropriated billions of taxpayer dollars to develop new baggage screening 

technologies. 

TSA and the aviation security industry should be evaluating and installing technology that not only improves detection, but also facilitates the flow of passengers 

and their baggage. The time of endless pilot programs and reluctance to move past 

old technology should be over.

Moving beyond the focus on EDS technology 

Today’s aviation passenger security checkpoint is an amalgam of various screening systems from transmission x-ray, metal detection, to trace detection. These systems have all been tested and approved by TSA but deployed as independent technologies at checkpoints. Some have suggested adding yet another stand-alone technology, EDS, to this mix, in essence deploying the technology used for checked baggage inspection to the checkpoint. 

I could not disagree more with this opinion. Clearly these systems have a role for 

checked baggage, as you heard from the first panel. However, EDS systems are either too big, too slow, and too expensive for passenger checkpoints. Installing EDS 

systems will reduce the number of checkpoints, slow the inspection process, impose 

massive infrastructure costs on airports, lengthen passenger lines and require even 

more TSA screeners without improving security.

Addressing aviation security from the passenger’s perspective 

At Rapiscan, we have addressed the challenge of improving checkpoints from the 

passenger’s perspective. We have asked how can we maximize the current technology install base and improve security without impeding passenger or baggage 

flow, or add huge infrastructure costs to airports. We have developed four answers 

to this question: 

(1) QXR-Integrate current systems with new automatic detection technologies in 

one common platform; 

(2) Secure 1000—Scan for multiple threats in one inspection; 

(3) Checkpoint Efficiency System—Automate the passenger checkpoint and double checkpoint throughput with no additional screeners; and 

(4) CXR—Use in-line next generation systems to quadruple baggage throughput.
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QXR—Integrate current systems with new automatic detection technology into one efficient airport checkpoint 

Rapiscan Systems has developed a new checkpoint technology utilizing our current transmission x-ray systems and integrating Quadrapole Resonance technology 

in one single platform. This system adds automatic explosive detection to deployed 

systems and provides nearly equivalent detection performance to checked-baggage 

EDS systems. QXR systems automatically detect explosives. Therefore, they can be 

installed without adding a single extra TSA screener. 

Because the QXR system leverages currently installed TRX systems, there is little 

additional training and almost no additional operational requirements for TSA 

screeners or airport personnel. These systems are simply added to the already deployed checkpoint x-ray systems. This allows TSA to leverage its install base instead 

of throwing out all the current machines and replacing them with costly and inefficient EDS systems. 

The QXR integrated system limits bag tracking and loss issues associated with 

multiple technologies at a checkpoint. And, most importantly, they would cost 1/3 

as much as proposed EDS checkpoint technologies in terms of both capital and operation costs.

Secure 1000—Scan for multiple threats in one inspection 

Currently, U.S. airports employ a complex system of metal detection gates, trace 

detection machines, and physical pat-downs to inspect passengers for weapons, explosives, and other hazardous materials. This process employs a number of imperfect technologies and invasive procedures that have known strengths and weaknesses. However, aviation security can be improved and passenger hassles reduced 

if we install fewer systems that achieve even better results. 

One such system is the Secure 1000, Backscatter Personnel Screener. This technology is the only commercially available, deployable system existing today that can 

inspect people for metallic objects, plastic and ceramic weapons, explosives, and nonmetallic threats like explosives and glass shrapnel. It would have detected the 

weapons used by the 9-11 terrorists and is being deployed to catch suicide bombers 

around the world. This technology has been successfully deployed by U.S. armed 

forces to combat areas around the world, as well as U.S. Customs and Border Protection and other homeland security agencies where improving security is the most 

important mission. Because of the worldwide deployments of Secure 1000, Rapiscan 

Systems is in the position to deliver it to U.S. airports today without the least bit 

of delay. 

In a recently completed pilot program at Heathrow Airport, British aviation security officials put the Secure 1000 through a four month test at a fully operational 

checkpoint. Passengers were given the option of being screened by the Secure 1000 

or by physical pat down search. Not only did the Secure 1000 show a dramatic increase in detection capability over pat-downs, but nearly 95 (93.7%) percent of all 

passengers opted to be screened by the Secure 1000 over a pat-down search. 

The British have found a way to answer the critics concerned about the Secure 

1000’s impact on passenger privacy. Using simple inspection protocols of employing 

same-sex screeners, non-archived images and other steps, British officials have developed an inspection system palatable to the traveling public. This has enabled the 

British to take the lead in passenger inspection security. It is important to remember that the Secure 1000 is an alternative to the very unpopular, less effective, and 

highly-intrusive physical pat down search. So while much has been made in the 

media about the potential privacy issues of backscatter inspection, the traveling 

public clearly prefers this method to invasive and imperfect physical searches. 

From a security standpoint, the Secure 1000 provides comprehensive primary or 

secondary screening for all threats in one machine, reducing training, maintenance, 

and operating costs. And since the Secure 1000 is designed specifically to fit within 

the aviation checkpoint footprint, it can seamlessly integrate with the metal detection gates at most airports.

Checkpoint Efficiency System—Automating the airport passenger checkpoint 

The modern airport checkpoint is a maze of lines and security systems packed 

into small throughways. Even the most seasoned traveler has trouble navigating 

this hectic environment. Rapiscan Systems has created a simple structure that 

helps screeners track bags and people requiring secondary screening while continuing to allow the checkpoint line to process additional passengers. 

A recent TSA analysis found that most of the delay at passenger checkpoints 

comes from screeners having to stop checkpoint lanes to move and inspect bags for 

secondary screening, taking more than two additional minutes per passenger on average. Rapiscan’s Checkpoint Efficiency System easily fits onto currently deployed 
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checkpoint x-ray equipment and automatically separates bags for secondary screening enabling the checkpoint to continue to screen passengers. The system is designed to double the throughput speed of a standard airport screening lane. 

Additionally, the Checkpoint Efficiency System only adds about a foot of width to 

a standard checkpoint while doubling capacity. This enables fewer checkpoints to 

process more passengers faster, with less bag tracking confusion and delay. The system also protects passengers from suspect baggage behind protective barriers. And, 

by automating the secondary screening process, the Checkpoint Efficiency System 

reduces labor costs and passenger wait times. 

Los Angeles International Airport will be installing the Checkpoint Efficiency System at its new terminal, and many airports have asked Rapiscan for these systems. 

We are awaiting final approval from TSA on their deployment.

CXR—Use in-line next generation systems to quadruple baggage throughput 

While most of the discussion on this panel has focused on the checkpoint, I wanted to take a moment to discuss one advance coming from Rapiscan Systems’ labs 

that is applicable to both the checkpoint and checked baggage inspection. This new 

technology, the CXR electronic CT, represents a dramatic leap forward in the basic 

EDS technology. 

EDS systems, even current in-line models, are hampered by an inherent limitation of the basic technology. In standard EDS machines, an x-ray head spins around 

on a metal ring to provide a 360 degree view of the target bag. However, this design 

limits throughput to the speed the x-ray head can spin. And, with such heavy reliance on a mechanical moving part, maintenance costs are high and reliability suffers. Due to their slow throughput, multiple EDS systems have to be deployed to 

meet standard throughput demands of the in-line conveyor systems in airports. This 

dramatically increases equipment purchase, installation, operation and maintenance 

costs. And as any airport executive can tell you, the infrastructure costs of installing 

all these EDS machines has been astronomical. 

Rapiscan Systems has been developing over the last 2 1/2 years an electronic, a 

non-mechanical CT, the CXR. We have done this development without any funding 

from the U.S. government. This system relies on a specialized glass tube ring filled 

with x-ray diodes that can within nanoseconds provide the same (if not better) 360 

degree image of a bag without the speed and reliability limitations of standard EDS. 

The CXR should provide scan speeds that will quadruple baggage throughput to almost 1,400 bags per hour. This is done without any moving parts thereby dramatically reducing maintenance costs and improving reliability. 

Rapiscan has already received significant interest from European aviation officials 

in this technology where speed of operation is paramount. The inspection speed and 

cost advantages are significant as a single unit can provide the inspection capacity 

of four current EDS machines. The system will work both for checkpoint and check 

baggage locations and represent a true next-generation solution for aviation EDS. 

I want to again thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss these important issues and technological advancements. Rapiscan Systems is proud to be part 

of the United States homeland security effort and we take seriously our role as a 

final line of defense. Rapiscan Systems has designed and deployed many of the systems we rely on to catch terrorists today. We look forward to continuing to work 

with Congress and the Department of Homeland Security to bring the newest and 

most advanced technologies from the laboratories to the front line. I am happy to 

answer any of your questions.

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Cherif Rizkalla, the 

President of Smiths Detection, Americas. 

STATEMENT OF CHERIF RIZKALLA 

Mr. RIZKALLA. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking 

Member, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. My 

name is Cherif Rizkalla, and I am the President of Smiths Detection, Americas, a New Jersey-based company providing security solutions to detect explosives, chemical and biological weapons, and 

contraband in homeland security and defense markets worldwide. 

In the National Capital region, Smiths has been a long-term 

partner in securing government facilities such as the one we are 

in right now. On the global scale, Smiths has also provided and 
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continues to provide detection equipment to our troops in Iraq and 

Afghanistan and to many, many foreign governments. 

The 9/11 Commission recommended that the TSA and Congress 

improve the ability of security checkpoints to detect explosives on 

passengers. While improvements have been made through recent 

legislation, it is beyond dispute that more can be accomplished, including the immediate deployment of high throughput portals that 

detect explosives on passengers. 

Over the years, Smiths has been and continues to be true partners as we work with TSA to develop products that improve aviation security without disrupting commerce. To that end, I would 

like to highlight a few of Smiths’ technologies that have enhanced 

security at airports. 

In response to the general interest in providing a full-value, nonintrusive explosive screening method at checkpoints in high-traffic 

volume environments, Smiths has developed a trace detection 

walkthrough portal to detect explosives on passengers. After nearly 

10 years, which is far too long given the present threats, a handful 

of walkthrough portals were deployed at test airports in the United 

States. In my opinion, this effort reflects the proper function of 

TSA in turning to the private sector to help solve a public problem. 

Finally, I wish to mention two cutting-edge technologies. The 

first one is the TADAR camera and the second one is the TSA Manhattan II Project. The TADAR is a passthrough system designed to 

detect contraband by measuring differences in millimeter wave energies emanating from the human body. This non-ionizing energy 

can penetrate clothing and many other concealing materials of passengers carrying an explosive or weapon. These objects will stand 

out on the TADAR image while continuing to afford passengers the 

level of privacy they expect and demand. 

The second project of note is TSA Manhattan II Project. Smiths 

and TSA have already begun working on next generation of check 

luggage security program. In its second phase, Smiths is combining 

state-of-the-art and emerging technologies to create a system that 

meets the goals of high detection rates, low false-positive rates, and 

sufficient throughput to satisfy the demands of the traveling public. 

Mr. Chairman, Smiths offers several proven and New Age technologies that greatly assist the TSA. Tests of Smiths detection 

technology establish that the products improve passenger safety 

without disrupting passenger flow. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify today, and we look forward 

to working with you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir, for your statement. 

[The statement of Mr. Rizkalla follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD BY CHERIF RIZKALLA

INTRODUCTION. 

Good Afternoon, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, and distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Cherif Rizkalla, and I am the President 

of Smiths Detection, Americas (‘‘Smiths’’), a Pine Brook, New Jersey-based company 

providing technologically advanced security solutions to detect and identify explosives, chemical and biological agents, weapons, and contraband. Employing trace detection technology together with Smiths-Heimann x-ray imaging, Smiths provides 

security solutions for customers in homeland security and defense markets worldwide. Here, in the United States, Smiths’ technology helps protect many of the nations buildings and airports. In the National Capitol region, Smiths has been a long-
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term partner in securing Government facilities such as the one we are in. Smiths 

has also provided and continues to provide detection equipment to our troops in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

It is a pleasure to testify before your Subcommittee today as you and your colleagues examine government and private industry efforts to leverage technology to 

improve transportation security in general, and aviation security specifically. The 

stakes are high and we have been challenged. We as a manufacturer have been 

challenged to continuously adapt to an ever-changing threat. We have been challenged to innovate and develop new products that are better adapted to the evolving 

needs of our customers. We have been challenged to relentlessly search for breakthrough technologies that will become tomorrow’s solutions. Governments worldwide 

are also challenged, challenged to identify and deploy the products and technologies 

that best respond to their specific needs. 

Smiths looks forward to continuing to work with this Committee, the Congress, 

the Transportation Security Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, 

and the Administration to meet the challenges that we all face in protecting aviation passengers and the commercial aviation system from physical threats. As the 

Committee is well-aware, the 9/11 Commission made several recommendations regarding passenger, baggage, and cargo screening to improve aviation security including recommending that ‘‘[t]he TSA and Congress give priority attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As 

a start, each individual selected for special screening should be screened for explosives.’’ While improvements have been made through recent legislation passed by 

Congress and signed into law, it is beyond dispute that more can be accomplished, 

including the immediate deployment of high-throughput portals that detect explosives on passengers. 

As a preliminary matter, I will present a quick vignette of Smiths Detection, 

which is one of four operating divisions of Smiths Group, plc. We are principally engaged in the development of high-sensitivity analytical instruments that detect 

chemicals and other substances found in explosives. In October 2002, Smiths acquired Heimann Systems, the world’s market leader in X-ray security systems 

whose products are primarily used in the transportation security arena to inspect 

luggage and freight. The acquisition of Heimann significantly expanded the capabilities of Smiths to conduct checkpoint and other types of screening in the transportation security markets. As a market leader, Smiths has successfully deployed its 

security solutions for the Department of Homeland Security, the United States 

Armed Forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and 

the Federal Protective Service as well as several foreign governments including 

Israel, France, the UK, Canada, Argentina, Hungary, Spain, U.A.E., Japan, Italy, 

and China.

I. HIGHLIGHTS OF SMITHS DETECTION’S IMPROVEMENTS TO PASSENGER CHECKPOINT SECURITY. 

The Transportation Security Administration (‘‘TSA’’) has the difficult task of deploying technologies that effectively provide adequate aviation security measures 

while not disrupting the flow of commerce, and must do so within budgetary constraints. Smiths has over the years, and continues to be, true partners with TSA 

as we work together to develop products that are both useful and efficient, and consistent with Congress and the TSA’s stated goals. 

Smiths is currently manufacturing dozens of security-oriented solutions that improve passenger screening; however, I will focus my remarks on three (3) particular 

product areas that I believe provide a good example of how Smiths not only develops 

security solution products for today’s threats but is continuously looking out to the 

future needs of government’s worldwide: 

1. Smiths’ IONSCAN technology and the Heinman X-Ray Security Systems, and 

their applications to efficient explosive detection efforts; 

2. Smiths’ efforts regarding the Sentinel II (‘‘Sentinel II’’), a trace detection walk 

through portal which is used to detect the presence of explosives on the bodies 

of passengers and which has been deployed at a handful of test airports in the 

United States, and is currently in operation at other security checkpoints 

throughout the world; and 

3. Smiths’ latest Millimeter Wave TADAR Camera innovation, which reflects 

the implementation of cutting edge technology to detect explosives through detection of differences in energy emitted by the human body.

1. The IONSCAN 400B. 
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2 A picture of the IONSCAN is included as Appendix B. 

3 Recently, TSA used the IONSCAN 400B in its Transit and Rail Inspection Pilot by implementing the product at the New Carrollton, Maryland train station. 4 A picture of the Sentinel II is attached as Appendix C. 

5 It is worth noting, however, that this collaborative effort took nearly ten years from its inception to deployment.

Smiths Detection’s original entre ́e into the world of passenger screening was with 

the IONSCAN 2 trace detection technology from the 1980s and 1990s which was developed in response to growing demands for technological solutions to narcotics 

problems. This technology has been deployed with numerous law enforcement agencies in the United States and throughout the world. More recently, the IONSCAN 

technology has been converted for the detection of explosives. The presence of trace 

explosives indicates that an explosives device may be present or that the person 

may have been handling explosive material in preparing a bomb and further investigation is necessary. 

Trace detection works by sensing the presence of microscopic amounts of target 

substances on the exterior surface of a package containing an explosive such as a 

backpack or cardboard box. These traces are collected and analyzed in a matter of 

seconds to provide the screener with nearly instant notification that an explosive 

is present. 

A simple wipe with a swab over items such as checked or carry-on luggage, portable electronic devices, and packages is all that is necessary to collect a sample 

which is then placed into the IONSCAN® for analysis. In 8 seconds the color-coded 

display presents results to the operator—red for a detection and green for the ‘‘allclear’’. If a contraband substance is detected, the specific name is identified on the 

display. Leading aviation organizations, including the FAA/TSA in the United 

States, Transport Canada, and the BAA in the United Kingdom, have evaluated and 

approved the IONSCAN® for their aviation security needs. In fact, nearly every federal agency and every major airport throughout the world uses the IONSCAN 400B 

and its related products.3

2. The Sentinel II Contraband Detection Portal. 

Another product of note is the Sentinel II,4 which was developed in collaboration 

with the FAA, TSA, and the Sandia National Laboratory in response to the general 

interest in providing a full body, non-intrusive explosive screening method for use 

on personnel at checkpoints in high traffic volume environments. The Sentinel II 

has proven to be an effective and efficient system that complements proven technologies with cutting-edge improvements to create an efficient and reliable detection 

system. The Sentinel II has withstood all TSA evaluations and tests and meets all 

applicable manufacturing specifications. Just this year, TSA began field-testing the 

Sentinel II at four major airports in the United States and additional deployments 

nationwide are expected. 

Despite the complexity of the technology behind the device, it is fairly simple to 

describe and understand its operation. The passenger steps into the Sentinel II for 

a period of only seconds. There are no true doors that must open or shut, it’s more 

like walking into and stopping in a conventional metal detector much like I walked 

through this morning when I entered this building. Once the passenger is in the 

Sentinel II, gentle puffs of air dislodge any particles trapped on the body, hair, 

clothing and shoes. These particles are then directed into the instrument for analysis. The passenger then continues through the security process. The time in the 

Sentinel II takes only seconds—IONSCAN® technology combined with pre-concentration technology developed by Sandia National Laboratories allows for the high 

throughput of screening up to 7 people per minute. Trace amounts of more than 40 

substances are detected and identified in seconds. Results are displayed in an easyto-understand fashion. 

I highlight the Sentinel II not only because it uses a proven effective technology 

for contraband detection but also because of the collaborative effort between Smiths 

and the FAA/TSA to implement the use of the Sentinel II. In my opinion, this effort 

reflects the proper function of TSA in turning to the private sector to solve a public 

problem.5 As I mentioned above, I believe that transportation security in general 

and aviation security in particular could be greatly enhanced by immediately increasing the presence of the Sentinel II at airport passenger checkpoints throughout 

the United States. 

3. The TADAR Camera. 

Smiths is currently working on several new cutting-edge technologies for checkpoints and other types of screening, but I would like to highlight one innovative 

product that we feel is of particular interest to the Subcommittee: the TADAR Cam-
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6 A picture of the TADAR Camera is attached as Appendix D. 

7Smiths is currently working with TSA regarding the ‘‘NexGen’’ Checked Luggage Screening 

program, named Manhattan II. In its second phase, Smiths is combining state of the art and 

emerging technologies to create a system to meet the goals of very high detection rates, very 

low false positive rates, and sufficient throughput to meet the demands of the traveling public. 8 A picture of the HI–SCAN 5180i is attached as Appendix E.

9 A picture of the EDTS is attached as Appendix F. 

era.6 The TADAR is a passive system designed to detect contraband by measuring 

millimeter wave energy. Its sensors detect differences in the energy naturally emitted or reflected by objects at a 3-millimeter wavelength. This nonionizing energy can 

penetrate clothing and many other concealing materials. An explosive strapped to 

the human body, for example, returns a different amount of energy to the TADAR 

than the body around it, therefore revealing the explosive. At the same time, the 

TADAR is unaffected by the presence of clothing because clothing is transparent at 

millimeter wave frequencies. 

Again, the technology is complicated, but the function is simple: A passenger 

would stand before the TADAR camera which would measure his body’s natural radiation of energy in comparison to a controlled background. If the passenger is carrying an explosive or a weapon, these objects will stand out on the TADAR image 

so that the screener can identify them. The image is processed to provide the passenger with privacy while still facilitating threat detection. 

The TADAR features several benefits that place it at the vanguard of explosive 

detection systems: • Passive Operation—TADAR uses natural, nonionizing millimeter wave energy 

to sense threat objects, which result in high quality images with no risk to the passenger. • High Quality Images—TADAR scanning mechanism produces high quality, real 

time images that can be further sharpened using proprietary ‘super-resolution’ software algorithms. • Simple Mechanics—TADAR employs a very novel and simple mechanical design 

that permits a passenger to be scanned very quickly and reliably. • Lowest Cost Solution—TADAR’s simple and efficient electronics and mechanical 

design makes it the lowest-cost solution available. 

The TADAR employs cutting-edge technology that has matured to the point where 

the TSA and Smiths can once again begin a collaborative effort to implement this 

technology at various test airport passenger checkpoints throughout the United 

States. Smiths recommends using the template from the successful collaborative effort between TSA and Smiths to develop the Sentinel II as a guide. In addition, 

Smiths would welcome the opportunity to continue research and development efforts 

of the TADAR or its offspring so that passenger screening technologies can continue 

to improve as threats to passengers become more sophisticated.

II. HIGHLIGHTS OF SMITHS’ DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR 

BAGGAGE SCREENING. 

In addition to Smiths’ improvements to worldwide passenger checkpoint security, 

I would also like to briefly bring to the Subcommittee’s attention the baggage 

screening solutions that we often provide in concert with our passenger screening 

technologies at security checkpoints. As with passenger screening, Smiths is producing dozens of baggage screening technologies, but in the interest of time, I will 

highlight two (2): 7

1. Smiths-Heimann X-Ray Systems. 

Smiths produces various x-ray driven technologies that provide useful cargo and 

baggage screening applications at security checkpoints. In fact, my briefcase was 

run through a Smiths-Heimann x-ray system this morning when I walked into this 

building, just as it’s done for nearly every visitor to the Capitol. These systems come 

in a variety of sizes that permit the technology to be used in any transportation setting, in any airport security area, regardless of size. The HI–SCAN 5180i,8 for example, is a newly designed X-ray inspection system for screening objects up to a 

maximum size of 20 inches wide, by 31 inches high. The system is perfectly suited 

to the inspection of check-in baggage in civil aviation, which is why so many airports worldwide have implemented such systems at security checkpoints. The compact dimensions, the low conveyor belt and the system technology ready for network 

operation make the HI–SCAN 5180i an outstanding basic system for integrated 

check-in counter systems featuring central image analysis. 

2. The Explosive Detection Tomography System. 

The Explosive Detection Tomography System 9 (‘‘EDTS’’) is another product that 

is commonly used to improve aviation security. EDTS is a multi-view tomography 
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system capable of screening up to 1,800 checked bags per hour. The EDTS employs 

multidimensional image evaluation to detect blasting agents, including industrial 

and military plastic explosives and utilizes sophisticated multiplexing techniques for 

image queuing and alarm resolution. The EDTS can accommodate passenger baggage of up to 42 inches wide and 32 inches high, reducing the need for manual inspection of oversized bags. 

EDTS technology is in use in airports throughout the world, except in the United 

States. However, EDTS has recently been judged a success in the United States following a successful pilot program at Washington’s Union Rail Station where TSA 

utilized Smiths’ EDTS technology to screen rail passenger baggage.

III. CONCLUSION. 

Mr. Chairman, Smiths Detection offers several proven and new-wave technologies 

that greatly assist the TSA and Department of Homeland Security in achieving its 

stated goal of improved aviation security. Our technologies provide reliable and costeffective means to detect the presence of explosives on passengers, in luggage, and 

in cargo. Tests of Smiths Detection’s technologies have established that they improve passenger safety without disrupting passenger flow and we are continually 

working to ensure that passenger flow is as efficient as possible while maintaining 

an effective checkpoint process. Smiths Detection appreciates the opportunity to testify before the Committee and looks forward to working with the Committee members in continuing to implement its technologies.
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Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rick Rowe, Chief Executive Officer of SafeView, Inc. 

STATEMENT OF RICK ROWE 

Mr. ROWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would like to echo some of the comments of the 

other panelists, particularly Rapiscan and AS&E, talking about the 

fact that there are technologies today that can be used to screen 

passengers very effectively. And the only thing that I would add 

from our case is we do use millimeter wave, which is what Mr. 

Parker talked about in the first panel, non-ionizing radiation nonx-ray. And the only thing that I would disagree with their testimony is that we also have our system available today. 

But what I wanted to really focus my comments on today was 

the way we go about fielding these technologies. We are a California-based start-up, using technology developed at U.S. Government. We are the exclusive licensee. When we made our decision 

of how we were going to go out and deploy these in the field, we 

actually made a conscious decision to spend the majority of our 

time outside the U.S., and the reason is that I think we all know 

that the U.S. is very slow to deploy technologies, and we felt we 

could get in the field faster and learn more by working directly 

with the users. 

So the bottom line to my testimony is really two things: One, encourage more fielding of pilot programs or whatever you want to 

call them, and get these things out in the field. And the second is 

to work very closely with the end users on the concept of operation. 

That is where you learn. You don’t learn in the lab with endless 

testing, you learn by getting into the field. 

We have been very aggressive in trying to do the field testing, 

and I will give you a couple of examples. But first of all, I think 

it has been said by many panelists, there is no silver bullet; there 

is no one technology. So we are really dependent on a number of 

different things to try and layer to provide a defense. 

In our particular case, we screen people for threats using millimeter waves, as I stated earlier. We are a totally safe technology, 

and we essentially also look at all materials and can detect those. 

But what enabled our speed to market, we started essentially 2 

years ago, and we are in the field today around the world, except 

the United States, and what we did was we essentially did our 

betas offshore. We spent a lot of time in Israel, Europe, and other 

Middle Eastern locations. 

The good news in our story is that we also have two systems 

today in Iraq at checkpoints operating today. And I am the person 

that goes out and spends hundreds of hours with our soldiers, as 

we have been up and running for the last several months, and we 

are essentially screening people, looking for suicide threats. 

As was said earlier, what we can do today is we have replaced 

hand-pat searches in Iraq. At the two checkpoints that we are operating at, there is no longer a U.S. soldier doing a hand-pat search, 

which is a very dangerous activity. 

When we go out with the users, we tend to be able to work with 

them and learn what that CONOP needs to be, the concept of operation, how to adjust the technology. Let me give you a real brief 
72

example. I was in Iraq last month working with the soldiers, and 

we decided we needed to adjust their technology. Through the miracle of technology, if you will, I was able to call on a cell phone 

back to the United States, talk to my engineers; in 24 hours they 

e-mailed me a new set of software which we dropped into place and 

changed that. We could not have done that if we were not out sitting with the users, working through the concept of operation. 

This doesn’t mean that technologies that we look at or agencies 

and labs don’t have a critical mission; I think they do. That is to 

ensure that these technologies have promise, but not to spend endless hours training engineers the final solution. Again, so we are 

advocates of getting out in the field very fast. 

And we would also say don’t try to pick a single technology. All 

your good companies here will work very hard for everybody over 

the next several years to develop our technologies, to improve 

them. So our belief is, field as many of them as you can. You will 

have some failures—that goes with the territory—but you will have 

more successes than failures. And that way we all learn the technologies will improve. If they sit in the lab they don’t go anywhere. 

So I thank you for the opportunity to talk to you about our company and about our beliefs on fielding. 

[The statement of Mr. Rowe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICK ROWE

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, and other Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for the invitation to testify before your Subcommittee today. 

My name is Rick Rowe, and I am the CEO of SafeView, Inc., a company that makes 

highly sophisticated security screening portals for checkpoints. I also serve our country as a member of the National Academy of Science’s Committee on Assessing 

Technology for Transportation Security, and I strongly recommend to you the work 

of our Committee and its subsequent reports, but I wish to clarify that I am here 

today in my capacity as SafeView’s CEO, and that my testimony is my own and not 

in any way to be construed as a position of the National Academy of Science. 

It is my privilege to be with you this afternoon to discuss security checkpoints, 

and the process changes that I believe are necessary to get more new technologies 

into the field to improve the safety, speed, and effectiveness of these checkpoints. 

These changes apply for any venue, be it airport, rail or subway, government or private building, nuclear power plant, prison, or military checkpoint. All checkpoints 

for screening people have a great deal of commonality. All have threats or contraband they are trying to control, and entry or exit that needs to be efficient. All have 

a rush hour—meaning, peak throughput requirements—and all have a need to be 

safe for use around human beings. 

I and members of my company have spent much of the last two years sitting at 

the most dangerous checkpoints in the world, principally in Israel’s Gaza strip and 

of late, in Iraq, working on these very issues. Safety, efficiency, and throughput are 

the driving needs at checkpoints. 

I truly believe that our nation does not deploy new solutions to address ever 

changing security threats and therefore improve our ‘‘checkpoints’’ as rapidly as it 

should or is able. This is critical not only to save lives, but to provide peace of mind 

that people are as safe as reasonably possible from tragic events such as those that 

just occurred in London. While not all attacks can be prevented, we can harden our 

targets and reduce our vulnerability. By hardening our targets, I mean making it 

obvious to all that this is a ‘‘hard checkpoint’’ to get through with hidden items. The 

technology and methods used need to create a very high probability that you will 

be caught. Terrorists and criminals do not like to try and get through ‘‘hard targets’’ 

and they know which ones they are. We all know that new technologies are needed 

to replace those of the 1970’s such as metal detectors, which is still our backbone 

of technological capability. 

As a small start-up with unique technology, we purposefully planned our testing 

and deployment of our technology in other countries first, because we knew that the 

United States government is extremely slow systemically in its implementation of 

new approaches. 
73

We are not alone. Many start-ups, often holders of the most sophisticated and advanced technologies, do this as a matter of course. We all tend to ‘‘prove our solutions’’ elsewhere, if for no reason than investor pressure for quick results. We do 

not have the luxury of years of endless lab testing driving toward some perfect engineering solution that all too often works in the lab, but not in the field, or, at worst, 

provides diminishing returns when compared to lost time to market. For example, 

in the years a developing technology sat in the lab going from say, 80% effective 

to 95%, or whatever criteria set, we lost all that opportunity to have at least a more 

effective solution than present methods, confuse our adversaries as they see targets 

harden, and learn what is important in the field, where it matters, to drive to higher levels of efficiency. In our view, there is no silver bullet. There is no single technology that makes us completely safe. Our view is to reap the benefits of developing 

solutions as they are perfected in the field, and layer them into an overall integration of systems that creates synergy so that the sum of the parts is greater than 

the whole. 

In our particular case, we screen people for threats using millimeter waves. This 

is a totally safe technology, not ionizing radiation that frightens many, and one that 

was developed at the Pacific Northwest National Lab in the late 90’s. It bounced 

around government labs for almost five years. But in just two short years, as a private company, we designed a commercial product, and, rather than wait for the 

United States to go through its motions, we actually spent the majority of our time 

in Europe, Israel, and other Middle Eastern locations, perfecting our design, because 

we knew we could quickly get into the field there. While we have worked with various U.S. agencies in parallel, we have, again, spent the bulk of our time with foreign governments, who are much more prone to encourage our use of what we call 

‘‘beta’’ field testing. Some call it demonstration projects or pilot projects. What it all 

boils down to is that we take systems that may be early in their maturity and not 

be perfect solutions in the lab, but we get them out of the lab and into the field. 

Then we can adjust and tailor them to the threat and throughput requirements. It 

was because these countries were willing to put new technology in the field that allowed us and them to learn while strengthening on-going security. 

There are successes in the military side. Shortly after the terrible bombing that 

killed our troops in Mosul, Iraq, last December, there was a rush as the U.S. military reached out to industry to look at technologies to protect U.S. troops from IED’s 

and, in our case, walk-in suicide bombers. To the eternal credit of key members of 

our military, I was able to convince them to let us, at only a transportation charge 

to the government, set up our systems to prove their worth in Iraq. 

Today we have two systems in Iraq at checkpoints that are exceeding anyone’s 

expectations, even mine. They have totally replaced hand pat down searches, which 

was the only previously used method of checking for everything from suicide bombers to normal contraband. It has been proven to be safer, faster, and more effective. 

I have spent well over 120 hours in the past two months, sitting side by side with 

our soldiers in Iraq. Observing, coaching, learning. . .and changing our technology 

design to meet their needs. I leave again this Sunday to sit at the checkpoints with 

them again. Not a five minute visit for an overview, but rather days to understand 

their needs and missions. This is because we are committed to helping protect them 

by providing the best technology possible. I think most of the companies here today, 

if given the opportunity, feel the same way. 

As an important aside, it is also critical to understand that hardening of checkpoints is as much about deterrence as catching someone. I often get asked about 

‘‘how many explosives have you discovered in Iraq or Israel.’’ This misses the point 

entirely. The worst checkpoint in the world for suicide bombers in 2004 was in 

Israel. They screened over 1.5 million people, yet had only 2 suicide bombers and 

two outright attackers. But these four incidents resulted in over 19 soldiers killed 

and scores injured. Some who were maimed forever. But everyone now knows this 

checkpoint is being hardened and the Concept of Operation changed. By Concept of 

Operation, I mean the method of how you run the checkpoint. It is the process or 

way of screening people, the melding of technology and people who operate the system. 

One of the biggest changes in systems today is that so much is software based. 

You can get the physical hardware into the field and keep improving and updating 

the software as you go. Enjoy the advantage of having faster time to market, knowing the system can keep getting better. We recently did this in Iraq. After sitting 

with the soldiers working the Concept of Operation at the checkpoint, we together 

decided they needed more ‘‘views’’ of the people being screened. I called back to the 

U.S. on my cell phone and our engineers emailed me a new software program, and 

within 24 hours I had that update installed and operating. 
74

This coupling of getting into the field early and working together on the Concept 

of Operation is where you learn what works and what does not. You learn and 

adapt both the Concept of Operation and the technology. What needs to be changed 

in each and what does not. You do not learn this in the lab. 

This doesn’t mean the agencies and labs don’t have a critical mission. They do. 

In my opinion they should concentrate on initial testing and review on an expedited 

basis to ensure they technology does indeed have promise and does have the potential to reach some threshold of efficiency, but let it be practical with room to improve. Don’t require perfection right out of the blocks. Prove that it is safe to use 

with and around people. We need our government agencies to be at the threshold, 

positively encouraging and helping industry provide the answers, not some onerous 

gatekeeper that refuses to let anything pass without enormous scrutiny and overengineering that serves no real purpose. Tell us in industry what the problem is, 

not the solution. We in industry are and need to be treated, as suppliers and solution partners, not as adversaries who cannot be trusted. 

What this country needs now, in our airports, in our subway and train stations, 

and in our buildings is more ‘‘pilots’’ or ‘‘beta-testing.’’ If we wait for our agencies 

and their labs to churn out the perfect solution. . .the silver bullet. . .we will have 

a very long wait. . .if it comes at all. In my past life in commercial and industrial 

businesses, we used to have a favorite expression. . .it is time now to end the engineering and deliver the product. It is time now for our Nation to adopt the same 

approach. We need rapid movement of technologies from the lab to the field. 

And please don’t pick a single technology. . .Don’t narrow your choices too 

soon. . .let good companies prove their mettle and get their technology out of the 

lab and into the field. We will all learn and grow from it and the best solutions will 

surely rise to the top and be the commercial successes companies hope for, and our 

Nation, its citizens, and our men and women in uniform will be safer.

About SafeView 

SafeView, Inc. is a privately held developer of systems using patented detection 

technology for various security applications, and is based in Santa Clara, CA. 

SafeView holds an exclusive license to commercialize the active millimeter wave holographic technology from Battelle, which manages the Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory for the Department of Energy. SafeView’s system uses an active millimeter wave technology that is safe and offers unique detection of objects made of 

metal, plastic, ceramic, and other materials that may be hidden under clothing without using ionizing radiation. SafeView’s system offers a more effective and less intrusive alternative to metal detectors, pat down searches, and other means used to 

ensure safety in public areas. Additional information about Safeview can be 

accessed from the company’s website at http://www.safeviewinc.com.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Rowe. 

You made a reference in the early part of your statement where 

you said that you decided to go overseas to implement some technology because this country was so slow in embracing technologies. 

And I get the impression from all of your statements that that is 

what you have experienced. 

What can we do and what can DHS do to improve the relationship—or what is the appropriate relationship between vendors such 

as yourself in new technologies and DHS, and ways that we can 

enhance that and make it more efficient and effective and get these 

technologies in the field more quickly? 

Mr. Chopra, I will invite you first. You seem the most aggressive 

on that point in your comments. 

Mr. CHOPRA. I don’t want to be called aggressive. I think it is the 

size of the country; some of the other places it is easier. And I 

think it is a little bit also of what I call a clique, that if—somebody 

made on the first panel that if you are in the EDS mode, the whole 

DSA or DHS for baggage, and now check baggage is being expanded into carry-on baggage, and there is also talk about cargo, 

so that it sort of goes into the same mode; and all the other technologies on the side, or new technologies that don’t follow that 

path, are more difficult to get through to get some funding. 
75

So people who are smaller companies, not the GEs or the big 

companies, we basically run to offshore. We have more success in 

the U.K. For example, we have got this unit actually deployed and 

being tested on a quarter million passengers, while here the debate 

is still going on between privacy. And they have already done that. 

They have found a way; women are checking women. There is no 

imaging being archived. People who are checking are not even looking at them, and they give a person a choice. 

So I agree with my companion that it is easier because of the 

size and the enthusiasms outside here. When it succeeds it becomes like you have got to get to it tomorrow, but to get there it 

takes a long time, and if you are not in the mainstream, forget it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Earlier in your statement you made reference to the 

fact that your company manufactures the same technology that 

was referenced by Mr. Fabiano and Mr. Wood in particular. You 

seem to feel like—or I understood your statement to say that rather than moving to those technologies now, you think we should 

take the existing systems and enhance them. Why? Is it because 

of cost? 

Mr. CHOPRA. Well, the two different things I said, for the people 

screening the present units that are deployed at the airport, we all 

know it don’t work. What Mr. Fabiano’s company has, what we 

have are actually deployable. We have sold more than 300 units, 

all known aviation, all over the world, that can be deployed today. 

Mr. Fabiano’s company makes the same thing. We can both deploy 

them today. 

What I meant on the other side is, 2,000 machines exist at the 

present checkpoint x-ray. Definitely they have limitations, but it is 

easier to enhance them and improve them than to obsolete them 

and bring other technology and teach the old screening force for 

EDS. 

Mr. ROGERS. Because of the procurement problems you described 

earlier? 

Mr. CHOPRA. Well, the procurement problem, new things have to 

be learned, and the present machines have done a good job. I have 

heard statements saying an incident hasn’t happened. Yes, there 

are weaknesses. We have done something right. Enhance them. 

People are already used to them. And we are working with DHS 

to come up with systems to enhance, and the cost may be one-third 

than to go back and replace 2,000 machines. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Fabiano, did you say that the Backscatter system that you have is available to go into the field today, or is it 

still in development? 

Mr. FABIANO. It is available today, yes. And I would like to specifically answer the question you raised to the others. 

What you can do is ask TSA today to expedite the tests that they 

are planning to qualify the Backscatter units for the airports. We 

have been waiting to have systems deployed in the Continental 

United States in two airports, as has my colleague, and we are 

waiting for the word to deliver those units, and to be told where, 

for several months. As soon as the testing is done, it can be done 

very rapidly, we believe it will be a positive outcome and those systems will be deployed. 
76

Mr. ROGERS. If the testing was complete immediately, how long 

it would take to deploy those systems? 

Mr. FABIANO. Weeks. 

Mr. ROGERS. Throughout the country? 

Mr. FABIANO. Yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, are we talking about portals here, 

or are we talking about baggage screening Backscatter? 

Mr. FABIANO. No. We are talking about personnel-scanning 

Backscatter system. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. RIZKALLA. If I may make a comment, currently there has 

been testing on the trace portals. Right now the weakest link in the 

aviation security—aside from the comments earlier made on the 

cargo, which is an issue—is really the explosives on individuals. 

Right now there is nothing deployed in the U.S. airports that allow 

us to detect explosives if they are on—specifically on the individual. 

If they are in his hand-carried luggage, there is a chance that the 

operator will recognize an issue and open the bag and find it. But 

if it is on the individual, right now there is nothing. 

There is a program in place, and testing has been made on five 

of our trace portals, and there is a deployment underway as we 

speak right now. We have shipped 25 units to TSA. Could this be 

accelerated? The answer is I am sure it could. And should it be? 

Absolutely it should. We are ready at Smiths to manufacture 50 of 

these per month. We have six teams ready to be deployed as we 

speak right now, to install these systems in the airports. 

We need TSA to accelerate this process. And it is not that they 

don’t want to; they don’t have the resources, the human resources, 

the people to go ahead and identify the different airports, prepare 

the different airports and install these systems. The technology exists, the testing is done, it is approved, it is going to be deployed. 

The question is how quickly. 

It has been stated that 147 of these portals that are manufactured by Smiths and by GE will be deployed by the end of the year. 

Right now, a total of 11—or I am sorry, 16 are currently deployed, 

with an additional 25 from our company that are going to be deployed. But a lot more could be done, and this could be done quickly. And this is an immediate solution ready, available, manufactured, sitting in our warehouse that could be deployed and resolve 

the biggest problem right now in aviation security in the United 

States, the possibility of having explosives on the individual literally walk through the checkpoint undetected. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the panel. My time has expired. 

The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member, 

the lady from California, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What do we expect our aviation screeners to do if they have a 

suicide bomber who is detected at the portal when they are coming 

through? I mean, does technology prevent them from a problem, 

and then blowing themselves up right there where all the people 

are at a bottleneck? 

Mr. ROWE. If I could take the first shot at that question, since 

that is what we are doing in Iraq today. We have been doing it in 
77

Israel for the last year. What you raise is really an excellent question. 

I think that one of the issues we have in a lot of checkpoints in 

the world is that we don’t experience bad people, and so we almost 

set up a concept of operations that does that. And the interesting 

question really to ask, that I like to ask people, is if there is a suicide bomber and you detect them, what do you do? And one of the 

issues is, is if the technology is something that I am this close to 

a suicide bomber, I am now dead. So one of the concepts is to take 

these technologies and do two things: One is to make them remote. 

So that is what we do in Iraq is, we actually—the system, the portal people walkthrough is remote from the operators, if you will, 

from our soldiers, to give them distance to react. 

The second thing is—and I talked earlier about technology and 

layers, so I think it is not about millimeter wave and Backscatter 

x-ray and trace, it is actually both quite often layered together. 

Now, millimeter wave is the same as Backscatter functionally. We 

just want the chance to be able to show that we also are delivering 

in the world, so we are also ready to go today. 

But we talk about trace portals. You actually can put those two 

together. Because if you go through a trace portal, you may detect 

explosives but you don’t know when or exactly where. If you go 

through an imaging system, you are not always sure it is trace. But 

if you put the two together, it shows that they feed off of each 

other. So if you get a hit on trace, you put them through a screening portal to see what and where it is; if you put the other one as 

a primary, you don’t know what it is, it may be an explosive, then 

you can run it through trace portal. 

Actually, the people perfecting that, if you will, are the Israelis 

today. And Smiths Detection and our company were involved in 

field trials in Israel early this year doing exactly that, putting the 

multiple technologies together, because none of us have the total 

solution. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Let me just—so, I mean, I am thinking about my 

experience, our experiences, when we go to the airport. I mean, everybody is together; we are all together, we are right behind each 

other. So one guy goes through, and maybe we detect that something is going wrong with him and he figures out that we detected 

that something is going wrong with him; I mean, what would we 

do at airports? Put everybody 20 feet apart as we put them through 

these systems? 

Mr. RIZKALLA. Your comments are absolutely accurate. The 

whole concept of aviation security right now as it stands is to avoid 

allowing explosives to make it on the plane. That argument could 

be exactly the same whether you are queueing in front of the airport or if you are queueing at the bank machine. Ultimately, 

whether it is at an airport or not doesn’t change. 

I would just like to make additional comments on what Rick was 

saying earlier. I am absolutely in agreement with this. These trace 

portals, or millimeter wave, allow you indeed—because you can remote the detection, and therefore you could isolate, if you wanted 

to, the threat and have the operator further away. But your comments are absolutely accurate. Right now the whole concept of 

aviation security is solely to avoid for that explosive to make it 
78

onto the airport. If he blows himself up at the checkpoint, right 

now there is absolutely nothing we can do about it. 

Mr. ROWE. One more comment on the same subject, since we are 

in agreement here. Of the things people are doing is they are pushing the perimeter farther out. So, for example, you can use a technology at the very front of the perimeter that starts to protect the 

building and the people in it, so you keep it out of the building, if 

you will. You are screening for large threats like large weapons, 

and you are screening for explosives or suicide bombers. The kind 

of explosives that people are worried about getting on the plane, as 

we said, are much smaller. You can do a further screen there. 

So again, not speaking for Israelis, one of their concepts is you 

do a screen at the very perimeter for a major threat of a suicide 

bomber or someone with a weapon, and then when you get inside 

the perimeter, you have a second check, if you will, more of what 

you are accustomed to when you are screening for all of the other 

things that we are looking for. 

Mr. FABIANO. Congressman Sanchez, just one quick comment. At 

American Science and Engineering we have over 50 of our 

Backscatter vans in Iraq looking for bombs and suicide bombers. 

And one of the other answers to the remote screening issue—because we can screen up to half a kilometer away and remotely operate our equipment—is to put in jamming technology as well. So 

assume, to your point, as a person is identified, a signal can be 

jammed that could cause them to not be able to activate their explosive. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, gentlemen. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. CHOPRA. If I could just add on to that. Iraq has taught us 

a lot about security and how to handle its suicide bombers. All of 

the people sitting there, our equipment is there, and we have 

learned a lot. I think the most separation you do from a crowd of 

people to this terrorist, the better off. And remote technology exists, and I think that we are moving in the right direction. The real 

frustration is how fast it can be implemented at home. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member 

of the full committee, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

This has been quite enlightening. What I fear is the notion of 

best practices; that if we put in place at TSA the notion of best 

practices, we can determine a number of situations about how we 

do it. So if it is working with the person to get on a plane, there 

is a best practice scenario for that; if it is to keep people out of the 

airport with explosives, there is another best practices scenario for 

that. 

I guess my question is, do we presently have equipment that can 

detect all of the potential dangers that a passenger might carry 

onto a plane at one time, or are we going to still have some layered 

system of detection? 

Mr. RIZKALLA. If I may try to answer that question. Currently 

there are several different technologies that exist, but none of them 

in itself—and, to my knowledge, that is under development—will 

be able to address all the threats that we are currently concerned 

about at U.S. airports. 
79

Now the approach nevertheless has to move from a single boxtype approach where we are looking at an x-ray unit and saying, 

well, what is the x-ray unit going to do; and then you look at the 

metal detector, this is what the metal detector is going to do; and 

you look at check baggage and look, well, are there any explosives 

in this? And we have to start looking at the airport as a whole. 

An example. We are going to be deploying trace portals in airports. Well, if we have a passenger that alarms and has traces of 

explosives on him, what have we done with his check baggage? Are 

we going to further inspect his check baggage? Traces on him does 

not necessarily mean that he has explosives physically on him. It 

can be in his hand-carried items, or it can be in his check luggage. 

Are we going to have a communication between this looking at the 

system, the entire security system, and have something that is 

going to alert that we need further inspection on his check baggage? Well, the future is that we have to start looking at the system in combination rather than isolated boxes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. And in your experience, gentlemen, do you see 

TSA promoting this kind of thought processes, or are you all having to bring the idea back to TSA? And if so, how is it being received? 

Mr. WOOD. I can give you a specific example of how the process 

could be accelerated in the case of our CT-based equipment for 

screening carry-on baggage. We have been ready for a year to have 

that system certified or qualified, but the TSA has not established 

standards and they are concerned about the accomplice effect. In 

other words, in the case of a check bag, the traveler loses control 

and contact with their luggage once it is checked. In the case of a 

carry-on bag, they retain control. And the concern is that you 

might have several people carrying on multiple components of an 

explosive. 

As a result, there has been a long delay, and is yet unresolved, 

as to what the standard should be as to the amount of explosive 

permitted. This was established shortly after 9/11 for EDS systems 

for check baggage, but not for carry-on. With that, those of us in 

the industry could submit equipment for certification, have it approved, and have this equipment operational. 

Mr. FABIANO. Congressman Thompson, clarifications of the gentleman from Smiths. I believe today with our Backscatter technology that any explosive or any bomb can be detected. The question, then, I think that you were alluding to is chemical and biohazards as well. What we can do is we see the vials or the canisters that they are in, so we can detect that there is an anomaly 

there that could be one of those threats as well. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. Anyone else? 

Mr. CHOPRA. Just to add, that trace definitely will work if the 

explosive is on the person; but there are other threats like ceramic 

knives—I mean, some of those are 18 inches long—or plastics, that 

needs what we call the body scanner. And the body scanner will 

do—as Mr. Fabiano has said, any object that should not be present 

on the human body is visible. So that it does work. 

And the answer to your question about it is—what can we do to 

deploy it? One of the problems is that what I am trying to push 

is, there are bits and pieces that exist. Suicide bombing is defi-
80

nitely a problem. In 4 years it has not been solved. Fortunately for 

us, no incident has happened on our soil. If you keep waiting for 

all the bits and pieces and wait for the 4 years, chances are there 

might be an incident. We need to start deploying, then. 

One of the colleagues here said, it is one thing to be in the lab; 

the other thing is to be in the field. We are always going to keep 

improving them. We must deploy some of the major elements of 

weaknesses in a present security system in aviation, cargo, wherever it is, and not wait for the ultimate system solution, because 

it might take a long time. And we need to keep plugging the holes, 

keep persevering and keep going at it from day to day to improve 

it. That takes a lot of guts. That is the problem. 

Mr. ROWE. Mr. Thompson, if I could have a real quick comment. 

I think we are sort of preaching to the choir here among ourselves, 

which is good that you see all this unanimity in the industry. But 

one of the things I just wanted to add to your question, I don’t 

think that it ever works very well for some group to say here is 

a solution, meet that. I think it is better to say what is the problem, and let industry come in and work directly to develop the concept of operation, and merge those. 

So the problem I see, and I think we have all seen in places like 

Iraq, which is a real learning place for us right now, is that when 

you go out in the field, they don’t know technology, they don’t know 

what to ask for. And when you are a technologist, quite often you 

are never in the field. 

So we need this combination where we sit down together and say 

we are pretty sure we know what you are afraid of. What are the 

best solutions, whether it is putting pieces together or whether it 

is a single box or what it is, and get it in the field and figure out 

what is important and what is not important. And you will never 

learn that in the lab. 

So what I worry about is if part of the message is if TSA is supposed to go off in its infinite wisdom and say here is the 18 threat 

vectors, here is exactly the right solution, you guys just go bid on 

it now. But that is not the right solution. It has got to be this combining and sharing together between industry, and here is the 

problem, and we will solve it together. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks, for any 

questions he might have. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. That approach that you just described is 

how the Defense Department normally does it. And we have found 

over the years—I have been on the Defense Subcommittee for 27 

years—that when we just say here is the problem, come back with 

a solution, we do a lot better; and it is a lot less expensive and it 

takes a lot less time to develop. So I completely agree with you. 

And I agree with your idea of getting out in the field as well. 

Now, let me ask, Mr. Rizkalla, you say that you have got this 

equipment ready to go for the enhanced screening process, right? 

Mr. RIZKALLA. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. What do you call it again? 

Mr. RIZKALLA. It is a trace portal. It is the Sentinel II explosive 

detention portal. 
81

Mr. DICKS. And what is the status with the TSA? Would you review that again? 

Mr. RIZKALLA. Yes. We had five units deployed in tests in various 

airports, and now have delivered 25 additional units for further deployment. 

Mr. DICKS. And you are saying that—so is this a money problem, 

that they don’t have the money? 

Mr. RIZKALLA. No, that is not the issue. I think TSA, they are 

trying really hard. And it is certainly not a criticism of TSA. They 

are really overburdened with all kinds of deployment processes, 

and to identify appropriately the airports and get the airports 

ready to receive the equipment is not something easy. And we are 

helping them in that. So we have a very high level of cooperation 

with the TSA to expedite the deployment of these units. They do 

need to deploy many more units than these 25. 

Mr. DICKS. How many, roughly, would you—thousands? 

Mr. RIZKALLA. Well, it always depends. If you decide that they 

are going to go at every checkpoint or if you are going to use them 

for cellar T. That remains an issue. If it is every checkpoint, then 

it will be in the thousands; if it is cellar T, then it is probably going 

to be 300 to 400 additional units. So that is a question that will 

be— 

Mr. DICKS. We were just discussing the question that properly 

was asked by Ms. Sanchez about the person coming through with 

a bomb, as we saw just a few days ago in London, tragically. The 

question is, what would be the incentive for the bomber when you 

could go to a football game or the supermarket where there is absolutely no security? I mean, that is what I worry about is that these 

people will not go, thank goodness, to the airport, but they will go 

to a place where they have the least resistance. 

Mr. ROWE. Mr. ROWE. I spent a lot of time in Israel in the last year, and 

I think Israel has probably seen more suicide bombers than anybody, so I would like to take a shot at that question. 

First of all, as you harden targets—which is another concept I 

think we would all believe in and as we have talked about—people 

know those checkpoints are hard. In fact, it is interesting when you 

sit and talk to Iraqi interpreters, they know which checkpoints are 

hard to get through and which ones are easy based on that. So as 

you harden targets, you do expose the softer targets. 

We take Israel as an example, though. All of their major places 

where people gather in large numbers are hardened. That is why 

you see them bombing night clubs, you see them bombing any target now because they have taken the hard ones away. Now, none 

of them are good, but you would rather have it be small than big, 

and then eventually in time they are going to keep doing that. 

The other thing you see that occurs in Israel is that they go after 

anyplace that would discourage people. So in this case, it is lines 

of people. Or in Iraq, people who are trying to go in and cooperate 

or do things. 

So I think you, unfortunately, have to start with harden your 

targets so it has a major economic and emotional disruption to the 

country, and you kind of work your way down. And hopefully, you 

know, 3 years or 4 years from now, the economy of scale will kick 
82

in, because if we were all very busy and making lots of units, the 

prices will fall and suddenly it will become very affordable to have 

these kinds of systems at all kinds of sites. 

Mr. RIZKALLA. If I may just make a quick comment on that. Indeed, the reason why the aviation industry is so interesting for the 

terrorists is because of its destruction on commerce. If a plane goes 

down tomorrow, there is going to be a real economic impact. If you 

blow up a market, outside market, you will have some impact, but 

the impact is not going to be as significant economically. That is 

why the profile of the aviation industry is so high. And that is why 

it is so imperative to not let suicide bombers get on these— 

Mr. DICKS. Well, and I agree with that because the economic consequences, as we saw in 9/11, there was just a tremendous drop in 

traffic; and the effect on the economy, tourism, all of it was devastating to the economy of the United States. We suffered billions, 

maybe even trillions of dollars of economic loss because of this one, 

tragic, awful incident. 

Mr. RIZKALLA. And the technology right now to avoid that exists, 

is ready to be deployed. We need to accelerate that process. 

Mr. DICKS. So we have got to sit down with TSA and talk to 

them about how to accelerate the deployment of what is available 

that would improve the situation. 

Mr. RIZKALLA. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I want to follow up on that. As I understand—

he asked about the deployment. As I understood it, it is the testing 

process that is the bottleneck; is that not correct? 

Mr. FABIANO. Correct. 

Mr. RIZKALLA. From our perspective, it is not, because the testing 

for the trace detection portals is completed. It has been improved, 

all the testing is done. We are beginning the deployment. So it is 

not our issue. It is not. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. 

DeFazio, for any questions he might have. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fabiano, as I understand it, I mean, for several years now, 

since I was exposed, so to speak, to your technology, I have been 

pestering the TSA about it. And they kept saying, oh, there is privacy concerns. I said, look, there has got to be an easy software fix. 

You know, people can choose their body; you will just show where 

the things are on that body, Arnold’s body, whatever body you 

want, it is fine. So you have solved that problem. They can no 

longer throw up the smoke screen: Oh, there is a horrible privacy 

concern here. 

Mr. FABIANO. They have clearly defined the problem, and we 

have solved it. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. And in Mr. Chopra’s case, when you haven’t 

even provided that privacy screen, people say I would rather than 

being handled by a person—and I have been through the Heathrow 

searches, they are much more intrusive than ours—they are saying 

90 percent of the time we don’t care. 

Mr. CHOPRA. Well, you know, the thing is that there is a compromise of security. It comes back to the same thing: There is no 
83

silver bullet. The more talking you do, the more games you play 

with the software, you are going to find some places that you can’t 

be very sure that there is a threat object on the human body. 

So one of the things, the European approach has been is yes, 

software has helped, but at the end of the day—I don’t know 

whether you have been subjected to it, but I fit the profile—35 percent of the time I am spread eagle in the airport. And that is a 

pretty embarrassing thing, whichever way people talk about privacy. But given the choice—and Britain has come up with this idea 

and they are deploying them all over the terminals. Just put a system in there; there is no archiving, and basically you have a 

woman looking at a woman, a man looking at a man, and you basically tell the person do you want to be pat-down searched or do you 

want a scan? 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I have used that with the TSA, too, and they are 

reluctant. I think either would help. 

Mr. Fabiano. 

Mr. FABIANO. Yes. There is a lot of emotionalism about this privacy issue. And you read a lot of things in the paper about people 

talking about they don’t want their daughter or their wife, because 

you can see private parts. I think the best thing is for us to live 

demonstration to folks like yourself and let you see exactly what 

the systems do. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. 

Mr. FABIANO. And I think it would be highly convincing for you, 

and you would be motivated to want to get it in the field. 

Mr. ROWE. And I just want to add to that same litany, but I 

think two added points. One was I think you will find out, number 

one, that these images aren’t that good; they are not photographic 

quality; they are not something you are going to want to send 

home. 

And the other thing is that when you train operators, they are 

not spending time—if they are doing their job that they are trained 

to do, they are looking for objects, they are not looking at bodies. 

We are banging through 420 people an hour in Iraq. You don’t have 

time to spend time doing that. 

So I think a lot of the comments about that—and I will make one 

challenge for you all—is that, you know, this isn’t just about airports, this is about congressional buildings like this building. I 

think it might encourage people if we started to see some of these 

systems tested in like this office building right here to show that 

you are willing and have the political will to screen people and see 

what their reaction is about privacy. And that would certainly encourage, I think, the people who are in airports to say, well, if they 

will do it at the Capitol, they will do it in the office building. And 

if you all will support it, have the political will to support it, it is 

not going to become an issue in the airport. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You are all experts on these metal detector portals 

we walk through. If I have a suicide belt that is composed of plastic 

and fabric holding it together and I have concealed a detonator 

elsewhere, not on my person, what will happen when I walk 

through that portal? Nothing, right? 

Mr. RIZKALLA. Nothing at all. 
84

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right; nothing at all. And that is the same, obviously, at airports as well as this office building. 

So that is—you are making a point; I am familiar with the trace 

portals. I am very supportive of that. We just need to move this administration and the TSA on this. 

Let me ask about another threat, because these people do seem 

to have patterns and come back to things. I assume most of you 

are familiar with Project Bojinka, which was Ramzi Yousef, and it 

was his idea to take down simultaneously a number of 747s over 

the Pacific, and he was only discovered by mistake. He had tested 

the bomb, had blown a hole in a 747, killed a number of people. 

Didn’t happen in quite the right place; the plane didn’t go down, 

but it worked. It was a contact lens cleaning solution, a container 

full of nitroglycerine and a very small detonating device using a 

digital watch. What are we doing to detect those sorts of things at 

our checkpoints today? 

Mr. WOOD. The CT-based cargo solution would be perfect for 

that. It will find the nitroglycerine, it will find a container that 

would have sufficient volume. In fact, I can show you—

Mr. DEFAZIO. But I mean, people do carry on—I was behind a 

guy who had six bottles of wine, and they said what is all this 

stuff, and he said oh, they are bottles of wine. Well, they don’t open 

the bottles of wine—and it is pretty easy with a certain kind of 

cork to remove it, put something in, et cetera. So you could tell it 

was a container, but we aren’t analyzing those containers. 

Mr. WOOD. No. There are other technologies that would discriminate between hydrocarbon and wine. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. The Japanese make one that I have heard 

of that can do the specific gravity or something. Whatever. 

Mr. Chopra. 

Mr. CHOPRA. If I could make a comment here. We have a technology that is based on thermo-neutron analysis, which actually 

was a demonstration, and detect the difference between 

nitroglycerine and a bottle of wine. It would detect it; it will do it 

in a very specific manner, with no false alarm rate. But again, it 

is another gadget, it is another set of equipment to be at the airport. 

And I think TSA in a right way has this nightmare that it will 

start looking like a Best Buy shopping center with 46 different 

gadgets that you have to go through and run a system. It needs 

to be evolved. Like I said, these technologies have to be brought 

from the lab out to the open. Everything exists. It is a question of 

putting them together and deploying them. And there is no silver 

bullet. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And accessing threats. I mean, we have also had 

attacks in the past where people just simply put gasoline in bottles. 

Mr. ROWE. I just wanted to add to that. I think what you said 

is sometimes is what I fear, in that we start to come up with scenarios that we can’t solve; and so we say, well, because we can’t 

solve an ounce of explosive or we can’t solve this problem, let’s not 

deploy anything. And yet if you look at all the history of suicide 

bombings, whether they are in Iraq or whether they are in Israel—

which is where the majority are—they still tend to be relatively 
85

crude. They are not that sophisticated. I think sometimes we overengineer the problem. 

And also if we would quit disclosing to the terrorists how our systems work, they are not going to know exactly what will get 

through and what doesn’t. So when we see USA Today or when we 

see CNN saying here is how this new technology works, that is a 

huge security risk. Kind of back to—if it ran like DoD, probably 

more things would be classified, because most of this information 

should not be out. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And the other thing is to introduce, as I think a 

number of you have offered, kind of a randomness factor; we are 

not going to use a uniform technology at every checkpoint for all 

threats. If you have trace at one place or you have the portals and 

the Backscatter portals in another, you create some uncertainty for 

these terrorists on exactly what—and they may study the airports 

and come back. But it just makes it a lot more difficult. If you have 

a trace and a Backscatter, you don’t know which portal you are 

going to go through, I think you create a success factor uncertainty 

for these people. 

This will be my last line because I am out of time. 

Mr. FABIANO. There is a common thread in both committees that 

we are here today. 

Mr. FABIANO. There is a common thread in both committees that 

were here today. One is the technologies are evolving because the 

threats are evolving and we are all investing in that. But the point 

today is let us not get into paralysis from analysis. Let us act. Because we have systems that can be highly effective today that are 

in order of magnitude better than what we have. Let us use them. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. Thank you. 

I think this a good note to end on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

I want to thank the panel for their time and the members for 

their questions. It has been very valuable. There are some members who aren’t here that may have some additional questions for 

the panelists, and we are going to leave the record open for 10 

days. If you do have any questions provided to you, I would ask 

that you would reply to them in writing. 

With that, the Chair would entertain a motion to adjourn. 

Mr. SANCHEZ. I make a motion that we should adjourn, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(87)

LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY 

TO IMPROVE AVIATION 

PART II 

Tuesday, July 19, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in Room 

2261, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Lungren [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Lungren, Cox, Linder, Pearce, Thompson, Sanchez, Dicks, and DeFazio. 

Mr. LUNGREN. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, Cybersecurity will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear the Transportation 

Security Administration’s testimony on how technology can best be 

leveraged to improve aviation security. 

I would like to welcome everybody to today’s hearing. This afternoon we will hear from the TSA following on the heels of last 

week’s hearing on current and emerging aviation technologies. 

Last week, we heard from leaders in the aviation technology sector to discuss checked baggage, passenger and carry-on baggage 

screening technologies. During the hearing, we discussed various 

technologies, from backscatter X-ray technology to screen passengers, to advanced computer tomography to scan carry-on baggage for explosives. These technologies are available for deployment today but their cost-effectiveness as part of an overall screening system remains somewhat unknown. 

The problem appears to be that TSA takes a technology-specific 

approach to testing and evaluation, and while this process may be 

rigorous, it appears to be somewhat slow-going and lacking an 

overall context or plan. 

Not surprisingly, we have made little headway in deploying the 

next generation of screening technology as we continue to rely on 

outdated technology of limited effectiveness. 

TSA, working in partnership with the leaders in aviation security 

technology, must develop a plan to develop an integrated system of 

technology to improve aviation security—plain and simple. As GAO 

noted last week, this will require airport-specific technology plans, 

given the differing risks, volume and infrastructure profiles among 
88

the nation’s many airports. Technology improvements should reduce operating costs and increase our ability to thwart a terrorist 

attack. 

Of course, we all know that no single technology will offer 100 

percent of the solution to the multitude of aviation security threats. 

The key, therefore, is to identify the most effective technology suitable to the particular aviation environment and to place them within a sound strategy for technology development and deployment. 

I look forward to hearing TSA’s views on how they plan to accomplish this and soon. 

I thank our witness for appearing before us today and now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez, for 

any statement she may wish to make.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONOABLE DANIEL E. LUNGREN

JULY 19, 2005

[Call hearing to order] 

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing of the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity. 

This afternoon we will hear from the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) following on the heels of last week’s hearing on current and emerging aviation 

technologies. 

Last week we heard from the leaders in the aviation technology sector to discuss 

checked baggage, passenger, and carry-on baggage screening technologies. 

During the hearing, we discussed various technologies—from Backscatter X-ray 

technology to screen passengers to advanced Computed Tomography to scan carryon baggage for explosives. 

These technologies are available for deployment TODAY, but their costs and effectiveness, as part of an overall screening system, remain unknown. 

The problem appears to be that TSA takes a technology-specific approach to testing and evaluation. While this process may be rigorous, it is entirely too slow-going, 

and lacks any overall context or plan. 

Not surprisingly, TSA has made little headway in deploying the next generation 

of screening technology, as we continue to rely on outdated technology of limited effectiveness. 

TSA, working in partnership with the leaders in aviation security technology, 

must develop a plan to deploy an integrated system of technology to improve aviation security—plain and simple. As GAO noted last week, this will require airportspecific technology plans, given the differing risk, volume, and infrastructure profiles among the nation’s many airports. 

Technology improvements will reduce operating costs and increase our ability to 

thwart a terrorist attack. 

Of course, no single technology will offer a 100 percent solution to the multitude 

of aviation security threats. 

The key, therefore, is to identify the most effective technologies suitable to the 

particular aviation environment, and to place them within a sound strategy for technology development and deployment. 

I look forward to hearing TSA’s views on how they plan to accomplish this, and 

soon. 

I thank our witness for appearing before us today and now recognize the Ranking 

Member of the Subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being before us today to testify. 

I am pleased that we are holding this part two hearing today to 

continue to discuss the importance of using technology to improve 

aviation security and security for other modes of transportation, 

which TSA is also responsible to some extent. 

Last week, we heard from the representatives of the screening 

technology industry about the technologies they are developing and 

their views of how it could be used, what has been the holdup on 
89

trying to get some of this deployed in a timely manner, et cetera. 

So today I am sure you have taken a look at that information, and 

today I hope we get some answers from this side. 

I am looking forward to hearing from you regarding TSA’s process for developing, testing and deploying new technologies, how we 

improve that process and how we can apply these technologies to 

the other modes of transportation security. 

We have been a little frustrated because we have seen billions 

of dollars invested in aviation and yet some of us still experience 

it ourselves when we go through that there are different practices 

in different airports, and depending on the person checking you or 

working security, you have a different experience each and every 

time. 

Some screeners have complained, as is the case, a lot of people 

recognize me when I go through the airport and the TSA employees 

will begin to tell me some of the problems they see firsthand, not 

having the right equipment, in particular, to check some of the 

things that passengers may be carrying through and of course the 

9/11 Commission recommendations and the 9/11 Act passed by the 

Congress at the end of this past year directed TSA to see the deployment of in-line technology to improve screener performance. 

I am happy that it is done at John Wayne Airport, which is the 

airport in my area, and that it does have EDS. And I know that 

LAX, which is an airport I use frequently, has revised a letter of 

intent from TSA for reimbursement for the installation of in-line of 

EDS, but there are still too many airports that do not have this, 

and I think we need to talk about what the delay is and where we 

really plan to have that. 

And I think, more importantly, we need to see some sort of a 

long-term strategy of not just what are we doing with aviation but 

with respect to what happened in London this last week, what are 

we doing here with respect to our other modes of transportation. 

So we look forward to hearing from you, and these are important 

issues, and I think we just need to be reassured that as big a task 

as this is, and we understand that, that we are making progress 

and we have some long-range strategies and plans on how to get 

this done. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentlelady for her statement. 

And the chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, 

the gentleman from California, Mr. Cox, for any statement he may 

have. 

Mr. COX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome our witness. I am looking very much forward to hearing your testimony as we meet this afternoon to examine how the Transportation Security Administration can leverage 

technology to improve our security screening operations. 

As we heard last week, a clear technology strategy is necessary 

if the private sector is going to help us to deploy the next generation of equipment. It is vital that new screening technologies that 

could fill critical security gaps and reduce operating costs at our 

nation’s airports move from TSA evaluation into the field. 

We want TSA to be relying on the very latest technology, not on 

outdated technology. We want to move beyond X-ray machines and 
90

magnetometers that did a good job at finding metal items but have 

a much harder time catching the more menacing terrorist threats, 

such as IEDs, improvised explosive devices. 

The deficiencies with older technologies are forcing taxpayers 

and the federal government to employ more time-consuming 

invasive secondary procedures—pat-downs and hand-conducted 

luggage searches. They also require screeners to make judgments 

based upon limited information, introducing more human error into 

the system than we would like. 

Testing conducted by the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General and by the Government Accountability Office puts 

questions before us that we can discuss this morning about how the 

current screening system can be changed to operate at more optimal levels of efficiency or effectiveness. 

The labor-intensive nature of current equipment has made TSA’s 

on-the-job injury problems larger perhaps than we would like them 

to be. Thirty percent of TSA screeners filed workers’ comp claims 

during 2004. That is a high number, and it is related, of course, 

to lifting heavy baggage during the screening process. 

Despite all of this, TSA, in my view, is poised to make big 

changes and big progress. We have to admit that many of the problems that TSA has experienced are due to mandates imposed by 

this Congress. To correct the situation, TSA and the Congress have 

to work together to identify and prioritize investment in technologies that can reduce TSA’s annual operating budget while improving its detection capability. 

I want to thank our distinguished witness in advance for appearing today to provide TSA’s views on these issues, express my willingness and this committee’s willingness to work very closely with 

you as we work together to achieve these objectives. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this second in a twohearing series on this very important topic.

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER COX

JULY 19, 2005

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We are meeting this afternoon to examine how the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) can leverage technology to improve its security screening operations. 

As we heard last week, TSA’s lack of a technology strategy has hampered private 

sector efforts to develop next generation equipment. As a result, new screening technologies that could fill critical security gaps and reduce operating costs at our nation’s airports are languishing in TSA labs. 

TSA continues to rely excessively upon outdated technology. X-ray machines and 

magnetometers do a very good job at finding scissors and nail clippers, but they 

have a much harder time catching the more menacing terrorist threats, such as improvised explosive devices. 

The deficiencies with the current screening machines have forced TSA to employ 

time-consuming and invasive secondary procedures such as pat downs and handconducted luggage searches. They also requires screeners to make judgments based 

upon limited information, introducing an excessive amount of human error into the 

system. 

In fact, testing conducted by the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector 

General and the Government Accountability Office raises serious questions as to 

whether this current screening system can ever operate at optimal levels of efficiency or effectiveness. 

Furthermore, the labor-intensive nature of current equipment has made TSA the 

lead federal agency in on-the-job injuries. In fact, 30 percent of TSA screeners filed 
91

workers compensation claims during 2004, mostly related to lifting heavy baggage 

during the screening process. 

Despite all of the shortcomings of its current screening systems, TSA has gone 

about its technology development and deployment in a haphazard fashion—and we 

must admit that this is partly due to mandates imposed by Congress. 

To correct the situation, TSA must promptly move to identify and prioritize investment in technologies that can reduce TSA’s annual operating budget while improving its detection capability. 

I thank the witness in advance for appearing today to provide TSA’s views on 

these issues, and yield back my time.

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the chairman. 

Other members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

We have to testify here today the Assistant Administrator and 

Chief Technology Officer for TSA, Mr. Clifford Wilke. He has a distinguished record of achievement in both the private and the public 

sector, one of the first few people who knew anything about smart 

cards, someone who then joined the federal government where he 

served in distinguished capacity in the Office of Comptroller of the 

Currency where for 5 years he served as Director of Bank Technology. 

We thank you for appearing. Let me just remind you that your 

prepared remarks will be included in the record in their entirety. 

We would ask you to attempt to limit your remarks to begin with 

for 5 minutes, and then we will go to a round of questioning. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Wilke? 

STATEMENT OF CLIFFORD A. WILKE 

Mr. WILKE. Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Representative 

Sanchez and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to have 

the opportunity today to discuss the vital role that technology plays 

in ensuring the security of our aviation system. 

We are working rapidly to deploy and develop the next generation of technology. Our work is focused on not only increasing the 

capabilities of our security but in providing the best tools available 

that improve the experience of the traveling public as they go 

through the security screening process. 

In general, TSA provides two distinctive types of screening: Passengers and the property they carry into the cabin of the aircraft 

as well as the checked baggage carried in the hold of the aircraft. 

These two types of screening require two different types of technologies. 

Frequent travelers are very familiar with the technologies used 

for checkpoint screening. Currently, TSA relies on enhanced walkthrough metal detectors, threat image projection equipment X-ray 

machines and explosives trace detection units. They are all intended to assist screeners in determining whether or not a passenger is trying to bring a weapon, explosive or a prohibited item 

on board. 

We are very excited about the technology that is in the research 

and development stage, such as the backscatter X-ray, automated 

explosives and weapons detection for carry-on baggage, bottle 

screeners and enhanced trace detection devices. 

We are also right now in the pilot phase of two technologies at 

selected airports: Explosive trace detection portals and explosive 

detection document scanners. The explosive trace detection portal 
92

is an automated passenger screening system using a whole body 

portal to inspect passengers for traces of concealed explosives. The 

portal conducts a trace sampling process with puffs of air when the 

individual enters the portal. We are conducting pilot tests right 

now at 14 airports and are operationally testing this in airports 

across the country. 

The pilots are quite successful and therefore we are proceeding 

with the purchase and installation of 147 more of these units 

across the country. TSA has identified potential airports around 

the country that will be receiving the majority of these portals later 

this year, and we are also working on site surveys for the remaining units. 

In our pilot test in explosive detection equipment, we deployed 

four scanners that require a screener take a travel document from 

a passenger, pass it through a sensor on the instrument to detect 

the presence of explosives. TSA found that this system would be 

more effective if the passenger themselves could use it and pass the 

document through the screening system without intervention from 

a screener. Right now we are working to further refine this technology for actual field use. 

I would like to discuss one other technology we are developing 

which is whole body imaging and backscatter X-ray technology. The 

technology would allow TSA screeners to visualize metallic and 

non-metallic items carried on a person without physical contact between the passenger or the screener. 

TSA is well aware of the privacy concerns raised by the media 

regarding this technology, and we are working very closely with the 

vendors to ensure that software algorithms are incorporated into 

the device to produce images that will access and really address 

the privacy concerns. We believe this technology can enhance privacy because passengers going through this process will no longer 

need to endure pat-down searches in the future. 

For fiscal year 2006, the administration has requested a total of $72 million for emerging checkpoint technologies. I respectfully ask 

the committee support our request. 

In the checked baggage area, TSA utilizes in-line as well as 

stand-alone explosive detection systems and explosive trace detection machines. Under our next-generation explosive detection system, Phoenix, we are making significant incremental improvements 

to the present generation of explosive detection technology. 

First, TSA certified the Reveal CT–80 in December of last year. 

This is a system that is smaller in size and can be used for smaller 

airports or it can be deployed as a stand-alone unit or as part of 

a small in-line solution to any airport that needs it. 

Another part of our Phoenix project is the Analogic 6400 machine, which is a software upgrade to enhance the capability of the 

eXaminer 6000 EDS system that is currently deployed. It gives us 

the ability for 3–D imaging and reduced false alarm rates. 

We are also looking at eight letter of intent that we have currently right now to provide multiyear financial assistance based on 

the availability of funds to nine airports across the country, enabling them to perform work on installing in-line systems. 

The request in fiscal year 2006 includes $264 million to support 

this existing letter of intent. We believe that the 75–25 cost-sharing 
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model right now is very equitable, and if it were to be change, it 

might create hardships for other parts of the industry. 

Mr. Chairman, technology development is a high priority for the 

agency and with the Department, and we are working very closely 

with these efforts with our technology vendors. This partnership is 

important as we pursue cutting-edge technologies and work on successfully deploying them. 

This concludes my opening remarks. I would be very pleased to 

answer any questions at this time. 

[The statement of Mr. Wilke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CLIFFORD A. WILKE

Chairman Lungren, Congresswoman Sanchez, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify regarding the deployment of checkpoint and 

checked baggage screening technologies at our Nation’s airports. With the summer 

travel season well underway and airline travel now exceeding the pre-September 

11th levels, it is an appropriate occasion to examine the role that technology plays 

in support of our mission of screening passengers and property, in a manner that 

not only ensures security but also operational efficiency. By measuring the capabilities we currently possess against emerging threats, we are able to conduct the necessary research and development to support the next generation of technology solutions that will continually increase our capabilities, minimize staffing requirements, 

and improve the experience of the traveling public. An element of TSA’s Office of 

Security Technology is our Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) at Atlantic 

City, NJ. The TSL is the premier laboratory leading the way in explosives and 

weapons detection in support of protecting the transportation infrastructure. I invite 

you to visit the TSL at your earliest convenience, so that you can get a firsthand 

glimpse of some of the technologies that I will be describing today.

Checkpoint Screening Technologies 

TSA’s technology program is designed to provide the optimal tools to our screeners. For checkpoint screening, TSA’s screeners conduct pre-flight screening of passengers and their property to ensure that they do not bring aboard a commercial 

flight any concealed weapons, explosives, or other threat items. The following are 

the tools currently deployed to support this part of our mission: 

• 1,910 enhanced walk-through metal detectors: Designed to alarm when a metallic item of sufficient weight and density is detected, these alert screeners to 

the need to perform secondary screening to ensure that the item causing the 

alarm is not a prohibited item. After 9/11/01, TSA established a new standard 

for airport metal detectors and replaced the units that had been previously deployed. 

• 1,904 threat image projection (TIP) ready x-ray machines: Designed to portray images of items being screened, these allow screeners the opportunity to 

use image interpretation to identify potential prohibited items. The incorporation of TIP into this technology allows TSA to randomly and covertly insert images of threat items into bags that are processing through the x-ray unit and 

measure screener alertness and effectiveness. As new threat concealment techniques are designed, TSA can design TIP images to educate screeners without 

removing them from their work station. 

• 1,273 Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) units: Designed to detect traces of explosives particles, these provide screeners with a technology to assist in the 

clearance of items that cannot be cleared through x-ray and/or visual inspection 

alone. This is a particularly effective technology with regard to screening bags 

i.e., a suspected false bottom or lining that reveals evidence of tampering, as 

well as shoes and electronic/electrical items. The screener uses a collection 

media to obtain a sample for the surface of the object to be screened and submits that media for analysis. The unit will alarm if the presence of explosives 

particles is detected. 

The effectiveness of each of these technologies is dependent upon screeners being 

alert and attentive to their duties 100 percent of the time and following established 

processes and procedures. For example, by definition, the use of metal detectors only 

alerts screeners to the presence of metallic objects, which would encompass most 

weapons and most prohibited items. Further, these devices alarm when detecting 

a broad array of metallic items, which then requires a more time consuming alarm 

resolution process to begin, to include use of hand held metal detectors to isolate 
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the area of concern and a limited pat down search to identify and resolve the item(s) 

causing the alarm. X-ray screening requires image interpretation as bags process 

through the unit, allowing only seconds to make a decision. Therefore, screeners 

must not only be well-trained but also continually alert. Finally, the ability of the 

screener to obtain a proper sample is critical to the effectiveness of ETD technology. 

Going forward, TSA’s checkpoint technology research and development program 

focuses on overcoming the shortcomings of existing technology, especially through 

automation of threat detection. In addition to improving detection capabilities, TSA 

also seeks to develop technology that has a minimal ‘‘footprint impact,’’ so that their 

installation or actual operations will result in minimal disruption to the flow of passengers and require minimal construction investments. TSA must also ensure that 

any technology that is introduced does not pose an unintended health or safety risk 

to passengers and/or screeners. Finally, TSA is mindful that with increased technology capabilities comes the responsibility for ensuring that such capabilities do 

not lead to undue intrusions into the personal privacy of passengers. 

TSA has conducted operational testing and evaluation of two new technologies 

that will enhance TSA’s ability to detect explosives at airport checkpoints. The first 

technology is Explosives Trace Detection Portals, designed to inspect passengers for 

concealed explosives using non-contact trace detection as passengers walk through 

the portal. The testing revealed that the portal offers a viable first generation solution for explosives detection on people. With the successful completion of 14 pilot 

projects, TSA is planning to purchase and install 147 of these portal units in calendar year 2005. 

The second technology undergoing testing and evaluation at four airports is a 

manual explosives detection document scanner. The four units currently deployed 

on a pilot basis require that a screener handle a passenger’s travel document and 

pass that document across a designated area on the unit to obtain a sample for 

analysis for the possible presence of explosives. TSA has found that while the underlying technology is effective, we would achieve more effective results if the system 

were designed to accept travel documents directly from passengers. Such a direct 

approach would not only streamline the screening process but would also preserve 

the integrity of any traces of explosives that might be present. TSA is therefore continuing to work with technology vendors to develop an automated explosives detection technology that will include a document scanner and expects to have a prototype to pilot in FY2006. 

TSA is also currently pursuing research and development on a number of next 

generation technology solutions to further expand our capability to detect weapons 

and explosives at the checkpoint. One technology that TSA finds especially promising is whole body imaging/backscatter X-ray technology, which would allow TSA 

screeners to visualize metallic and non-metallic items carried on persons without 

physical contact between the screener and the passenger. The device operates by 

producing an approximate body image that can highlight possible weapons or explosives on that individual without unduly infringing on personal privacy. TSA is currently developing an operational test and evaluation pilot project proposal for this 

technology, including techniques for protecting personal privacy. TSA is working 

closely with vendors to perfect software algorithms that would be incorporated into 

this technology to protect the personal privacy of individuals that would undergo 

backscatter screening. Simultaneously, TSA is evaluating other body imaging technologies, such as millimeter wave and terrahertz technology. We believe that if 

whole body imaging systems are successfully developed and deployed, with effective 

means to protect personal privacy, this technology could improve the secondary 

screening process and potentially minimize the necessity to conduct patdown 

searches. 

In addition to whole body imaging technology, TSA has a number of research and 

developments projects underway to identify increasingly effective and efficient 

checkpoint technologies, including: 

• Explosives Detection System (EDS) for carry-on baggage: TSA is conducting 

preliminary evaluations of an EDS for carry-on baggage that would automate 

the detection of explosives in carry-on baggage, similar to the capabilities TSA 

has achieved for checked baggage screening. TSA currently has one unit located 

at Boston Logan International Airport to collect engineering data needed to support further development of the technology. 

• Cast and Prosthetic Device Scanner: TSA is working to develop a technology 

solution to more effectively screen casts and prosthetic devices for weapons and 

prohibited items. 

• Explosives Detection Bottle Scanners: TSA is working with industry to evaluate the effectiveness of bottle scanners to screen for liquid explosives. TSA has 

issued a solicitation to industry to submit products for laboratory evaluation. 
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TSA plans to invest $28.3 million in FY 2005 and has requested $71.7 million in 

the FY 2006 budget for emerging technologies to begin to equip airports with additional explosives detection technologies for passenger screening. 

The FY 2005 purchase and deployment plan for explosives detection portals and 

document scanners is outlined below:

FY 05—$28.3M # of Airports # of Units Cost Per unit (does not include installation costs) 

Static Trace Portals 41+ 147 $175,500

For FY 2006, the Administration is requesting an increase of $43.7 million, for 

a total of $72.0 million, to direct additional resources to field emerging technology 

equipment at checkpoints. As emerging checkpoint technologies continue to be developed, operationally tested, and evaluated, we will be able to determine which 

other technologies are appropriate for deployment.

Checked Baggage Screening Technologies 

For checked baggage screening, TSA conducts pre-flight screening of all checked 

baggage that is carried on a commercial flight for the presence of explosives. Currently, TSA uses two types of devices to screen checked baggage for explosives: explosive trace detection machines (ETD) and explosive detection systems (EDS). ETD 

machines are roughly the same size as a common laser printer, with an average cost 

of $37,500. ETD machines can detect minute traces of explosive residue, which may 

have been transferred to surfaces through direct or indirect contact. While the ETD 

machines themselves have extremely high detection rates and very low false-positive 

alarm rates, the process for collecting trace samples is slow, very labor intensive, 

and susceptible to human error. ETD machines work best as a primary means of 

explosive detection at low-throughput airports and for alarm resolution when coupled with an EDS machine. As indicated earlier, this technology is also used to support screening at passenger checkpoints. 

In contrast, EDS machines scan objects in bulk and compare their density to the 

density of known explosives. The EDS can be highly automated and networked and 

can scan several hundred bags per hour. Currently, TSA has deployed at our nation’s airports over 1,300 EDS machines, which operate from a computed tomography (CT) technology platform, and all of which are manufactured by L–3 Communications Corporation or GE/InVision Technology, Inc. The greatest advantages of 

EDS over ETD are that threat detection is automated and their throughput rate is 

significantly higher. The EDS does produce higher rates of false alarms, and as a 

result, screeners must resolve those alarms by either using on-screen alarm resolution protocols, or by using ETD to inspect the item(s) causing the alarm. In addition, 

the current generation of EDS is generally large and bulky (weighing around 10,000 

pounds and measuring on average approximately 24’x6’x6’). EDS units are also costly to purchase (as much as $1 million per EDS machine). Finally, to accommodate 

the size and weight of the EDS machines, some airport terminals require facility 

modifications prior to installation. Installation costs vary but average approximately 

$340,000–420,000 per unit. 

Further efficiencies can be achieved at the Nation’s largest airports if EDS is integrated inline with an airport’s baggage conveyor systems. Inline screening solutions 

allow TSA to realize maximum efficiencies with regard to equipment throughput capacity. For example, a standalone EDS unit typically deployed in an airport’s lobby 

will process approximately 150 bags per hour, while that same unit installed inline 

will process approximately 450 bags per hour. Unfortunately, facility modifications 

needed to support inline EDS screening solutions usually entail extensive terminal 

modifications—such as reinforced flooring, IT networking, electrical upgrades, new 

conveyer systems, and construction of new facilities. 

To date, ten airports have moved to full inline screening systems. Many of these 

airports undertook this work using their own funds, funds from FAA’s Airport Improvement Program (AIP), or some combination thereof. Since 2003, TSA has also 

issued eight letters of intent (LOIs), covering nine airports (of which one, Boston 

Logan International, has completed full inline EDS installation), to provide assurance of a multi-year funding stream for selected airports to make the necessary airport infrastructure modifications to accommodate installation of inline EDS. To this 

point, TSA has issued the following LOIs, which will be paid over several years subject to the availability of funding:
96

Airport Total Project Cost 

Denver International $95 million 

Dallas/Fort Worth $140 million 

Los Angeles/Ontario $315 million 

Boston Logan $116 million 

Las Vegas McCarran $125 million 

Atlanta $125 million 

Seattle/Tacoma $212 million 

Phoenix $115 million 

The Federal Government’s total investment over the duration of the LOIs, at a 

75% Cost Share Rate, would be $957 million. 

The FY 2006 President’s budget request includes $264 million to support the ex- isting LOIs. This amount includes $240.5 million in direct reimbursements and an 

additional $20 million for equipment multiplexing and installation. The FY 2006 

President’s budget also includes $130 million for the purchase of EDS and ETD 

technology in support of checked baggage screening. 

TSA is also developing prioritization criteria that will result in a comprehensive 

strategic plan in which TSA will identify the universe of airports that may benefit 

from an inline EDS system or other physical modifications to support the optimal 

screening solution. This plan will identify estimated project costs and potential savings that could be achieved through minimizing staffing requirements, capital investments and maximizing technology capabilities. It is important to note, however, 

that inline EDS systems are not appropriate for all airports, from both operational 

and cost considerations. For example, in December, 2004, TSA certified the CT–80, 

which is manufactured by Reveal Imaging Technology. This unit operates from a CT 

based platform similar to the current L–3 and GE/InVision technologies, but it only 

weighs about 3500 pounds and will cost approximately $350,000 per unit The Reveal CT–80 provides TSA with a smaller and less expensive EDS unit to include 

in its planning. At certain airports, the Reveal CT–80 may be appropriate to install 

as standalone units within and/or immediately behind airline ticket counters at airports. They would replace screening currently performed using ETD. For FY 2005, 

TSA has available for obligation $30 million to purchase and install CT–80s, of 

which about $25 million would be used to purchase the actual units and $5 million 

would be devoted to installation. Pilot testing of the units is already underway at 

Gulfport Biloxi Airport and John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) and will 

soon be initiated at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR). The pilot testing 

will allow TSA to measure the operational impact associated with use of this new 

unit. TSA’s research and development efforts have also yielded a software upgrade 

that enhances the capability of the already deployed eXaminer 6000 EDS unit manufactured by L–3 Communications. This upgrade, known as the Analogic 6400, was 

certified by TSA in April of this year. The upgrade provides improved detection, increased throughput capacity, improved reliability, and reduced false alarm rates. 

TSA will pilot this technology at a number of airports to determine operational impact by the end of this year. 

The Reveal CT–80 and the Analogic 6400 are concrete examples of incremental 

improvements in existing EDS technology to provide greater flexibility in identifying 

the optimal solution for a variety of airport configurations, while also lowering 

alarm rates, increasing throughput, and improving detection capabilities. These enhancements to our checked baggage explosives detection capability fall under what 

we term the ‘‘Next Generation EDS—Phoenix Project.’’ In addition to this applied 

R&D, TSA is also undertaking basic R&D to explore emerging and revolutionary 

new technologies under the ‘‘Next Generation EDS—Manhattan II’’ project. The purpose of 

Manhattan II is to evaluate and develop next generation EDS technology and to 

challenge industry and academia to apply innovation in the development of new 

screening systems. Under Manhattan II, TSA has issued ten multiple proof-of-concept grants, totaling approximately $10 million in FY 2004 and FY 2005, which includes the following:

Technology Area Vendor Project Description 

TeraHertz L3 Communications THz Time Domain Spectroscopy

TeraView Applying THz to Checked Baggage Screening
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Technology Area Vendor Project Description 

Neutron SAIC Neutron-based system for Alarm Resolution

HiEnergy Stoichoimetric Explosive Detection & Confirmation

Trace Detection CyTerra Pressure Activated Sampling System-Luggage (PASS-L)

Nomadics Amplified Fluorescence Quenching

X-Ray Smiths Detection Coherent Scatter with CT imaging

Analogic Threaded Dual Axis Tomosysthesis (TDAT)

General Electric Stationary X-Ray Source (CT)

Xintek Nanotechnology Based X-Ray Imaging 

Upon completion of the proof-of-concept phase, TSA will evaluate the results and 

award system development contract(s) to those organizations with concepts and 

technologies that are proven and demonstrated. It should be emphasized, however, 

that Manhattan II is a long-term project that is not designed to yield technologies 

that would be deployable in the immediate future.

CONCLUSION 

Subsequent to the attacks of 9/11/01, TSA successfully undertook a massive investment and effort to not only hire, train, and deploy a Federal screener workforce 

but to also provide them with the necessary tools to perform their duties. Given the 

urgency in which TSA had to operate, the aggressive deadlines set forth by Congress, and the technology that was available at the time, deployment has been challenging. As the agency matures and as airline travel levels exceed the level that existed on 9/11/01, one of our main goals is to optimize all of our resources so that 

security is achieved in the most cost-effective and operationally efficient manner. 

Developing cutting edge technologies and successfully deploying them is a key component to this optimization and is being done in close coordination with the Department of Homeland Security’s Science & Technology Directorate and in partnership 

with technology vendors. We are developing strategic plans for both checkpoint and 

checked baggage screening technologies which will allow us to effectively design our 

road map to the future. Our efforts will focus on increasing our technological capabilities to keep pace with potential terrorists, whom we must assume are constantly 

examining how they can penetrate security at our Nation’s airports. 

Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and other Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased at this time to 

answer any questions.

Mr. LUNGREN. The chair recognizes himself for the first 5 minutes. 

Thank you very much for your testimony, we appreciate that. 

Let me just ask you a general overall question, and that is, is 

your technology development premised on the assumption that we 

are going to have most people who get on airplanes go through 

this, all the people, or do you make any calculations as to whether 

or not certain technologies would be changed with respect to their 

function if you were able to eliminate a significant number of people from that, for instance, through the Registered Traveler Program? 

Mr. WILKE. I think programs such as Registered Traveler do possess and give us a tremendous opportunity to, if you will, reduce 

the size of the haystack of what we really need to focus on. That 

is travelers that we need to spend additional time screening, going 

through the process of perhaps using all of our screening technologies on these citizens and traveling public that we should be 

focusing our attention on. 
98

I know from a policy perspective the agency is looking at this, 

and it is really more of a policy area than technology, but from a 

technology perspective, it would definitely help us in that process 

of raising the level of security for our traveling public. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The backscatter X-ray technology, you have indicated that there are privacy concerns, and you have talked about 

methods by which we can address those issues, and you used some 

technical words. How would you explain it in plain English to 

someone who is concerned about going through that machine and 

it exposing them, so to speak? I mean, in concrete terms, what 

about the approach would be used to alleviate the concerns that an 

average person would have after they have listened to the press 

about submitting to such a review? 

Mr. WILKE. I think we have learned and seen what the press has 

portrayed the technology as. However, during the past few months, 

we have been working very aggressively with our vendors to develop a new algorithm that, if you will, provides more of a cartoonlike image that shows any type of metallic devices, explosives carried on body, for example, or knives that are carried on person that 

would normally have to be checked and verified through a physical 

pat-down. 

Mr. LUNGREN. In the old days, I would understand what you are 

talking about, but some of the cartoons today are rather explicit. 

I mean, what are you really talking about? Are they like stick figures but they would actually show the areas of concern; that is, 

they would show if there are any metallic objects? What is it, because that is what I have got to answer to folks back home, right? 

Not algorithms or anything like that, I have got to tell them what 

it looks like. 

Mr. WILKE. It is basically an outline of the body, if you will, same 

as if you are silhouette would be there. And it would show any 

types of metallic objects or things that are non-organic that are actually carried on person at that time. 

Mr. LUNGREN. It would not show other outlines of the body??? 

Mr. WILKE. With the privacy algorithm developed, you would not 

have those type of things. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Last week we consistently heard from vendors 

that the government should set standards and benchmarks for 

technologies. In your opinion, what is the most effective means for 

TSA to standardize the benchmarks used by aviation security technology vendors? 

Mr. WILKE. I think the number one key is reliability. We want 

to be assured that a machine that is deployed out in the field meets 

the need of the traveling public and provides security. The worst 

thing we can do is deploy a technology out there, spend the money 

for it and then not have it meet the needs. 

Mr. LUNGREN. With your past experience in both the private and 

the public sector, what do you see as the appropriate relationship 

between technology vendors and TSA in their respective roles in 

development and deployment of aviation security technologies? 

Mr. WILKE. I have believed always in a public-private partnership, if you will. We did it in the Treasury when I was over there 

in working with our vendors on that piece, and I fully support it 

in our job here. 
99

In our two most recent FedBizOpps notifications looking at nextgeneration technology, we are basically going out and saying, ‘‘Here 

is the problem here is the solution, here is what we want to solve.’’ 

Vendors give us solutions that meet that need. And I think by having an open dialogue with our vendors, we can get ourselves a lot 

better, a lot higher quality of products out there in the marketplace 

to raise the level of security. 

A case in point, one of the technologies we are currently in very, 

very early development with based upon a meeting with one of our 

vendors is a technology that can actually sense explosives that are 

carried that a person has. So we can basically put a fingerprint 

down or put a handprint down and you can see if the person has 

touched or traced explosives, same as an explosive trace device but 

just furthering that technology out further. 

Mr. LUNGREN. What would you say to those critics of TSA who 

have suggested that you do not have a technology road map, you 

do not have an overall technology development and deployment 

strategy? Is that true, number one? And if so, what do you have 

as an alternative? 

Mr. WILKE. Okay. That might have been true at a period of time. 

When TSA was stood up, they did a Normandy-like, D–Day-like deployment of technology to all 450 airports across the country. The 

agency is now evolving to more of a strategic approach moving forward, putting together a strategic road map, if you will, to look at 

how various technologies can be used to actually meet the security 

traveling public’s needs. 

Mr. LUNGREN. My time has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to ask a question for you with respect to the aviation 

issue. Your own analysis has shown that nine airports now have 

the in-line EDS system, which would save the federal government 

about $1 billion over 7 years, and that the initial investment in 

those systems would be recovered in a little over a year. 

So my question is, why in your budget you did not request more 

money for us to get that to more airports? 

Mr. WILKE. The first thing I will say is I challenged the number 

that was given for the one-year payout on it. I mean, if you look 

at payout of just the machine alone, it depends on really how you 

use the calculator. I mean, you really need to look at the overall 

price of the entire system, all the things that are needed to put an 

in-line system in place. That includes not just the machine itself 

but baggage handling equipment, it also includes sorters and a lot 

of other things for an airport to really do its piece. 

So the payoff ROI piece in some of our calculations are further 

on down the line, maybe in the 2-to 3-, 4-, 5-year, depending on the 

airport, because every airport across the country is different, and 

it is not one type of solution that will meet that need of giving security. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Well, my information is that the one-year 

payout is actually coming from your agency. This is not an outside 

analysis, this is your analysis. So I guess what we need to find out 
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is who did that versus now what your numbers are. We need to 

take a look at both—

Mr. WILKE. We can get back to you on that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. —if you can provide those. 

Mr. WILKE. Sure. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. This is not an outside analysis. This is coming 

from your own agency. So what you are saying is whoever did it 

within your agency, at whatever point was just wrong or now you 

guys have figured out that that is wrong and you have got a new 

analysis. 

Mr. WILKE. We are putting together a new analysis model. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Because, again, we are trying to understand, I am trying to understand if this is going to work so well, 

why you are not coming to the Congress and saying, ‘‘Get this done 

as soon as possible.’’ We are borrowing for other things. Might as 

well borrow for something that really works. 

Do you think that letters of intent are effective to construct the 

public’s private partnership or do you have other methods you are 

thinking of in which we can get airports online quicker for this inline media technology? 

Mr. WILKE. Well, as we speak right now, 19 different airports 

around the country have operational in-line systems for the entire 

airport. Twelve other ones have them either under construction, 

planned or partially installed. Only nine of the airports are under 

the LOI program. 

Other airports have had public-private partnership, outside funding, and we have worked with the airports across the country to 

give them expertise as far as how the system should be put together, what type of equipment could be used, in some we have 

helped with payment of machines. Every one is really kind of different right now, and we are working to try to find out what is the 

actual best model moving forward to give the taxpayer the most return on their investment. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. What about the old EDS and ETD systems 

that larger airports have? Do you have a system by which you 

might get these to smaller airports who are not going to be in line 

or think they cannot afford an in-line EDS system? 

Mr. WILKE. Yes. We have ourselves a waterfall strategy, as we 

call it. For example, when one airport that might have a standalone system gets an in-line system involved, we will take those 

machines and actually coordinate with another airport to redeploy 

them somewhere else and actually looking at new technologies too 

for smaller airports, such as the Reveal CT–80, the smaller footprint machine that can be used for an airport that cannot afford 

a $1 million machine, if you will, and wants a smaller-priced machine. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Let me ask you something that I asked last week. 

If you have a suicide bomber who is hanging out at the security 

area where quite frankly that is a bottleneck, as most of us who 

use the airports understand, do we have any concerns, do we have 

any plans of what we do if a person is detected with a blow-up 

bomb on themselves as they are going through that particular bottleneck? 
101

Mr. WILKE. I think that is one of the challenges we face ahead 

looking at what the change in threats are based upon recent events 

around the world. 

As we speak today, if that person went through one of our trace 

detection portals, obviously then they would be detected. But at 

that point they might do something tragic, and I think it is something we need to look at down the road. 

And we are actually working with some other agencies within 

the federal government to look at how we can have better standoff 

detection down the road and using some of the things the military 

has learned for other venues in the public sector. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I see my time is up, and, again, I would just reiterate the desire 

to see the new analysis you have, and we can show you where we 

got the other information from your own agency. Thank you. 

Mr. WILKE. Be glad to. 

Mr. LUNGREN. All right. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Georgia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wilke, have you done an estimate in your department as to 

how much it would cost to give 100 percent of the travelers in the 

air 100 percent protection from terrorism? 

Mr. WILKE. What you are asking for is almost a guarantee? 

Mr. LINDER. Yes. 

Mr. WILKE. I am not sure if there is any security system built 

today that can give 100 percent guarantee. 

Mr. LINDER. I am not either. So how much are you looking for? 

Mr. WILKE. We are looking to put together a layered strategic approach using the best technologies that are out there today in the 

most efficient manner and use them in a layering approach to provide the best security based upon the actual threat that is out 

there today that we feel that we see. And that is based upon intelligence, based upon where the greatest threats are, where the emplacements are happening and also where the greatest threats are 

moving forward. 

Mr. LINDER. Do you believe the greatest threats are on airlines? 

Mr. WILKE. Based upon a lot of things we have seen in our intelligence, I think airlines are still an attractive target for terrorists 

today. 

Mr. LINDER. Are you aware that more people have been killed by 

terrorists in trains than in airplanes? 

Mr. WILKE. The facts state themselves. 

Mr. LINDER. And you are spending $200 million to $250 million 

a year on trains and $4 billion to $5 billion a year on airlines. 

Do you ever believe another airline is going to be allowed to hit 

a building? 

Mr. WILKE. I would expect that the traveling public would react 

differently than they did in the past. 

Mr. LINDER. I think you are right. 

Mr. WILKE. However, we still need to be aware of what might 

happen from the explosive detection piece if a passenger had explosives and did something catastrophic to a plane. 

Mr. LINDER. To that plane. What if the passenger was not a passenger but got into a train trestle over a huge river and as the Am-
102

trak full of 1,000 passengers was approaching it took out the track. 

What are you doing about that? 

Mr. WILKE. I think that rail security really has to deploy a different type of security model. By the way that rail is, it is an open 

system. I am not sure of a technology that could physically monitor 

every inch of track across the country today that we have available 

to us at a cost-effective price. I think we do need to look at what 

can be done to strengthen it. 

We have worked at TSA with a lot of the railroads, intermodal 

agencies, et cetera, looking at best practices. We had a project we 

called our TRIP project. We ran, actually had a screening car, if 

you will, on a rail car going back and forth up in Connecticut. And 

we did that to test out to see how it actually works in a real-world 

scenario, and we learned a lot through that process. And the open 

nature of rail and mass transit is one that does present a challenge. 

Mr. LINDER. So what you learned is that people who travel on 

mass transit are on their own; is that right? 

Mr. WILKE. I think there are things we can put in place to raise 

the area of security. I think when you look at rail, I think you can 

have things such as sensor devices possibly that can detect explosives in the future. I think you might be able to possibly look at 

some things such as canine that can possibly detect an explosive 

presence nearby or if someone is carrying something of danger. 

But I think there are technologies moving forward, and I think 

that we are trying to explore those and find out what are the best 

ones that actually work in this mode of transportation at an economical and not impede the flow of commerce. 

Mr. LINDER. I mean, if you are spending $4 billion a year on 

screening processes, how much are you spending on the rest of the 

detection devices? 

Mr. WILKE. I am not following you, sir. You said $4 billion? 

Mr. LINDER. What is your budget for TSA? 

Mr. WILKE. This year, our budget is about $917 million. 

Mr. LINDER. Does that include the screeners? 

Mr. WILKE. The screeners, no. I am talking about the technology 

piece that I am responsible for, sir. 

Mr. LINDER. Okay. That is on top of the $4 billion, right? 

Mr. WILKE. Okay. 

Mr. LINDER. How much are you willing to spend to, as you said, 

raise the level of security for travelers? 

Mr. WILKE. I think we need to look at what technologies can be 

used in other venues. For example, an explosive detection portal 

has been pilot tested, has been used actually in a rail environment, 

and the results were very nice. There is nothing out there precluding a rail authority or a rail association that is publicly funded 

or privately funded from engaging in installing these new types of 

technologies. 

Mr. LINDER. I just pray that you do not take TSA for airlines and 

use that as a model for trains, because I do not think it is succeeding in airlines. 

Mr. WILKE. We are actually looking at a new generation of technology that does use high-speed, high-capacity detection devices, 
103

because we realize that you do not have formal checkpoints in the 

mass transit, rail, even buses, for example. 

Mr. LINDER. How soon are you going to be able to look at the 

Registered Traveler Program and say, ‘‘If we have done a background check on that traveler and we have the biometric such as 

a fingerprint and we have made a decision that that person is not 

a threat to the airline,’’ how soon are you going to be able to say 

once they walk through that lane or that portal and put their fingerprint on and are recognized as the person you have done the 

background check on, they can walk right on the plane without 

going through any more screening? 

Mr. WILKE. That is probably a policy decision that needs to be 

addressed. I am really trying to focus on the technology solutions 

we have. So I am probably not the right person to ask for that 

question. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Wilke, in your testimony, I am pleased to see 

that the progress is being made with the installation of in-line explosive detection systems, which is either in progress or completed 

at 19 of our nation’s airports. TSA and people in the industry have 

been telling us for some time that the installation of EDS technology will lead directly to greater efficiency in baggage screening, 

freeing up resources for checkpoint screening and other tasks. 

It is my understanding that the Congress and the GAO are eagerly awaiting data from the first installation of in-line EDS technology to verify these claims. When will that data be available to 

the Congress and to the GAO? 

Mr. WILKE. My department has been working on it now for a 

number of months working. It has gone through a number of revisions within the department. It is currently in the process of getting reviewed by senior leadership, and at that point it will probably be ready for dissemination. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, the major airport in my area, Seattle–Tacoma, 

yesterday my staff with officials from Sea–Tac who advised that 

there have been significant delays with the expected reimbursement from TSA for work already completed installing their in-line 

systems. Now, who do we talk to about that? You are the R&D guy. 

You are not the guy who pays the money, right? Or are you? 

Mr. WILKE. This is true. My team does when the invoices come 

in they do take a look and review that the invoices and things are 

correct, and then they send it to procurement. But if you send me 

information, I will be more than glad to help you out and spearhead through it. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Well, good. That is what we need. It has been 

6 months now or longer since—you know, they sent these things 

in last December, as I understand it. But your willingness to help 

is appreciated. 

Mr. WILKE. You bet. 

Mr. DICKS. I am very concerned by the President’s budget re- quest for in-line EDS installation. Only $264 million is included in 

the budget for the project, which, as your testimony notes, is only 
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enough funding to continue work at the 8 airports that have already entered into an agreement with TSA. That is correct, isn’t it? 

Mr. WILKE. There is money in there for that, but I believe there 

is also discretionary money that was proposed. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, can you tell us about that? 

Mr. WILKE. Currently, TSA is working with Congress to determine what TSA’s budget is going to be, and I guess we need to wait 

until the DHS budget is finalized before we can make any further 

comment on it. 

Mr. DICKS. Last week, the American Association of Airport Executives provided the committee with a list of more than 50 airports that would benefit from the installation of online EDS technology, including Dulles, Washington Reagan, O’Hare, LaGuardia 

and JFK. 

If the benefit of installations are as great as TSA has been saying, why would we possibly take a year off from installation at 

other critical international airports? 

Mr. WILKE. Well, I can assure you, sir, we are not taking a year 

off for deploying equipment. Actually, as you know, up in the airports you just mentioned a second ago we are actually deploying 

equipment there I believe either last month or this month. Some 

CTX 5500 machines are being part of that waterfall strategy I 

mentioned earlier. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Mr. WILKE. They are being actually installed up there. So I can 

assure you that we are not planning to slow down in 2006, and we 

are really looking for where we can install technology to get the—

Mr. DICKS. It sounded like in your testimony that you are hoping 

that some of these airports are going to do this without the 75–25 

program. Is that correct? 

Mr. WILKE. Many airports across the country are doing it. They 

are using—

Mr. DICKS. So is the idea to slow down the money hoping that 

they will because of the emergency have to go and do this some 

other way? Could some people cynically think that is the approach 

of this administration, which has not been really exceedingly generous on these programs. 

Mr. WILKE. That is probably more of a policy question. I probably 

am not the right one to ask, I am sorry. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, you might mention that you heard this up on 

the Hill, okay, when you get back to your office. 

Let me ask you, almost all the R&D is being done in aviation. 

So here we have the London situation that has been mentioned by 

my colleagues here. I mean, don’t we have a responsibility to on 

transit, on rail, on ferries, out in my area we have a ferry system. 

I mean, I think we need to have something where people walk 

through to people that are walking on the ferry or we have dogs 

sniffing some of the cars. But I mean, there ought to be some level 

of R&D in these other areas. I do not think we should just focus 

all the money on aviation. 

Now, do you disagree with that? I know that some money is 

being spent but it is like 20 percent of the 100 percent. 
105

Mr. WILKE. All the money is not being spent exclusive on R&D 

or in the aviation sector. In fact, most of the technology aviation 

uses can be relatively deployed in other sectors. 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

Mr. WILKE. As you know, up in Seattle we are doing the test 

using a form of backscatter technology for cars going on the ferry 

system. That is part of an R&D initiative going on working with 

other agencies in the government today. 

I think, for example, backscatter technology that can be used for 

other modes of transportation moving forward. We actually have 

something we posted in FedBizOpps for our next generation, looking longer term. I thought we would use technology for a mass 

transit type of scenario, basically a turnstile, if you will, that has 

sensing capability for large groups of people going through on a 

mass transit. So it is an area that we are spending requirements 

for moving forward in that area, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. So we are making an effort. I mean, if you would like 

in the record to talk about what we are doing and how some of 

these technologies are applicable to other forms or modes of transportation, have at it. 

Mr. WILKE. We have a tremendous amount of projects going forth 

right now. I think we have, at last count, about 200 and something 

different R&D projects that we are doing that apply to all different 

areas of technology. It can be used for all different types of transit 

systems other than just aviation. Because aviation has been a primary focus of TSA coming out of the gate, a lot of the resources 

and things were applied for that area. 

However, even later on this week I am going out to Sandia National Labs to meet with the folks out there to find out technologies 

they are using for other ways that might be applicable to other 

modes of transportation. So it is part of our quest as an agency 

looking at all modes of transportation to keep things safe from a 

technology perspective. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. 

Cox, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome again, Mr. Wilke. 

Just to lay the foundation for a few brief questions I want to ask, 

could you put on the record for the committee and for the media 

and the public that are following this hearing the differences and 

the relevant acronyms between technologies that detect some explosives and technologies that detect essentially all explosives? 

Mr. WILKE. Okay. ETD, which is explosive trace detection, uses 

the swabbing mechanism, if you will. That goes in and basically the 

machine can be set to look at any number of chemicals that are out 

there that has a widest sloth, if you will. 

However, the downside is it is very manpower intensive to really 

look at an entire suitcase. It can take as long as 5 to 6 minutes 

to really do a good sample of that entire suitcase. 

EDS, explosive detection system, that is basically what we have 

in our in-line baggage system, stand-alone baggage system, and 

that is where the machines are actually set to look for the explosive 
106

types that we are aware of and moving forward that might be 

threats to the aviation piece. 

Another acronym we use is EMTD, which is enhanced walkthrough metal detectors, and those are basically magnetometers 

that people do walk through. 

Mr. COX. And so just to put a fine point on this, it matters where 

I am using EDT or EDS if I am looking for SEMTEX. 

Mr. WILKE. Well, for example, in that particular case, both types 

would be applicable. 

Mr. COX. So it does not matter. 

Mr. WILKE. For certain categories of explosives, it would not matter. 

Mr. COX. But for plastic explosives, such as SEMTEX, either the 

trace system or EDS would suffice. 

Mr. WILKE. Also, too, to be very candid with you, an X-ray would 

also do the trick, because when you think about it, if an X-ray goes 

through it, you are going to see a block that is an abnormality 

versus what is actually out there in the rest of the bag. 

Mr. COX. But a magnetometer obviously would not work, so if 

someone were seeking to bring plastic explosives onto the airplane, 

they could just wear it under their clothing and walk around the 

airplane. 

Mr. WILKE. That is why we are enthusiastically looking at technology such as the electronic trace portals and also backscatter 

technology that gives us the ability to check for explosives that are 

carried on person. 

Mr. COX. I am very interested in your Manhattan II Project, particularly in as much as you are looking at the form factors as well 

as the basic technology. To the extent that technology is racing forward, if I may analogize for people that are putting home theater 

in their house, they may regret if they hire a carpenter and design 

their whole bookshelf and so on around today’s coolest television 

because 7 years from now they are going to be embarrassed to be 

so retro. There will be some much better technology out there and 

they will have built the whole permanent setting for this. 

Well, we have to redesign airports in order to put these million 

dollar machines in place. I hope that in Manhattan II you are looking at not only the latest technology for, for example, explosive detection, but also ways to minimize the overhead costs of installing 

this equipment. 

Mr. WILKE. And that is one of the areas we are looking at. Actually, this year, we certified the Analogic 6400, which is basically 

taking an existing eXaminer 6000 machine, putting in new technology, putting in new types of sensing devices in, and basically 

you go from a 2–D type of image to a 3-dimensional type of image, 

which gives you better sensing, better ability to detect and also 

look what is actually in there. 

And part of our strategy is looking at machines that have good 

upward spiral development. For example, the Reveal CT–80 has a 

promising development for further upgrades of that machine. 

Mr. COX. And it is a much smaller footprint. 

Mr. WILKE. It is a much smaller footprint. However, for a larger 

airport, it would not meet the speed that is needed to get enough 

bags through. But for a smaller airport it is a great solution. 
107

It is the same for the trace portals. Those particular machines 

have an upward spiral development that, quite candidly, will probably mirror Moore’s Law with how fast the processor speed is, because as that processor can sense and process faster, as the technology gets better, you are going to have faster processing times. 

Mr. COX. Mr. Wilke, I want to thank you for that. My time has 

expired. 

Just a closing comment, if I may, Mr. Chairman. 

The question that Mr. Linder put I think is exactly the right 

question, and I recognize, Mr. Wilke, that you are here as a technology guy and not necessarily as a policy guy. I also observe that 

in your background of 17 years at Mobil before you came to the federal government that you have a lot of experience designing smart 

cards. 

And one of the things we need to look at is whether or not we 

are designing a system that is so big that it is not taking into account that we might get the population of folks that we have to run 

through these machines down to a much lower level than is presently the case. 

Mr. Chairman, is there an opportunity perhaps for a second 

round of questioning? 

Mr. LUNGREN. If the gentleman will stick around, I think that 

might happen. 

Mr. COX. All right. If I am here and you are here, maybe we can 

take this up later. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. 

The chair recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, 

Mr. Thompson, from Mississippi for 5 minutes. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate the witness. 

I would like to get some things on the records too, like our chairman talked. 

Congressman Dicks talked about the difficulty in getting airports 

reimbursed for expenditures. Can you provide this committee with 

a chronology of where that reimbursement for technology acquisitions stand at this point? 

Mr. WILKE. I can get that for you from our folks in the administrative area. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Okay. Fine. And I guess since you are here, let 

me ask you for a couple other things. 

You said that you have a strategic road map. You have made a 

couple references to that relative to technology and development. 

Well, GAO has indicated to us that they have been trying to get 

it for quite a while and been unsuccessful. Do you have it? 

Mr. WILKE. Yes, sir, we do. I have been with the agency now for 

about 4 months. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Good. 

Mr. WILKE. It was a process that started before I came on board; 

however, with my business background I think we need to have a 

good strategic plan moving forward. I have reviewed it, it has gone 

up to a number of folks to be reviewed, and we are still actually 

tweaking some parts of it to have concurrence among all the stakeholders that are vital to have full support for a model of this type. 
108

Mr. THOMPSON. So you do see the value of having a strategic 

plan, and I hope you can understand the committee’s interest in 

making sure that the Department possesses such a plan, because 

we are asked to do certain things. Any idea when we will get it? 

Mr. WILKE. As soon as the approvals are given by our senior 

leadership, I would be more than glad to share it. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me suggest that we 

write the secretary and ask him since it is already—the GAO report was 2004 December, and here we are 6 months later and we 

do not have it, and I think we need the strategic plan. 

Mr. WILKE. If you would like, sir, I can actually give you a verbal 

of what it kind of looks like and what we are wanting to do if you 

would like me to go and provide that for you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, things change around here, and I would 

love to have it in writing so we could take a look at it. 

The other situation is, are you aware that we do not have a transit security plan for the agency also? You are not. 

Mr. WILKE. I am not. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I guess then how can we provide and plan 

for technology in securing the transit system when we do not have 

a transit security plan for the agency? 

Mr. WILKE. I think the nature of rail and mass transit because 

the openness is part of a public-private partnership with the different people that are involved in it. For example, I know that for 

a fact when we had a symposium, I guess, back in April, over 35 

to 40 different transit authorities, train authorities were there, and 

we were sharing ideas about what best practices were, what we are 

doing in this area and how we can work together. 

Some actually stood up and said that they are taking the technology we have used in airport technology and considering using it 

for their own use. So I think the TSA has tried to engage the industry, if you will, in these particular areas. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you think transit systems can just go buy 

whatever they want off the shelf? I am trying to move us toward 

a transit security plan so that we can, as Members of Congress, 

evaluate our agency. But if we have no plan and we are going out 

buying all kinds of technologies, there is nothing to be in judgment. 

And I am trying to impress upon you that I find it very difficult 

to purchase equipment for transit security when we have no transit 

security plan from the agency, and I want you to hopefully go back 

to the secretary and tell him we really need that transit security 

plan if we are to do what we need to do here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Pearce is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Wilke. I am not always complimentary of many of the agencies and their presentations and TSA especially, but I think your presentation today has been pretty thorough and pretty informative, and many of the questions that generate an answer themselves in your presentation. 

I do have a couple of questions. 

There are reports that about a billion dollars in AIP funds have 

been used to scoot over into these new systems for protection. Do 

you know if that is true? 
109

Mr. WILKE. I am not sure of the exact numbers, sir, but I can 

get back to you on that. 

Mr. PEARCE. But money has been taken from AIP funding, Airport Improvement Program? 

Mr. WILKE. I am not positive, but I can find out for you. 

Mr. PEARCE. If you can find that out. And then if you find that 

out, find out if that was airports donating their own AIP money or 

if we are taking the money from other airports. And if that is the 

case, I would understand, but is there a plan to then level that 

funding out later to the airports that will never get any of this 

screening money? Do any of your systems work against plastic explosives protection? 

Mr. WILKE. A number of the systems do, and I would probably 

prefer to discuss that in a closed session with you if that would be 

possible. 

Mr. PEARCE. Okay. That would be fine. Are you doing anything 

for the trigger mechanisms? Do you anticipate anything where you 

being to pressurize baggage on the ground and then bring it back 

down, because the trigger mechanisms sometimes work off of a barometric presser. Are you doing anything on that? 

Mr. WILKE. Once again, I would be more than glad to discuss 

some—

Mr. PEARCE. Be happy to do that. 

Mr. WILKE. —more privately if that could be possible. 

Mr. PEARCE. When you are getting the information for the ranking member about transit security, could you also get the information about what France and England and some of the European 

countries are doing, because I think that looking at transit security 

we are going to have to accept some risk, and I think that we 

should be aware as a committee what other nations are doing for 

transit security when we are wanting to look at a plan from here. 

And if you could find that out, what the European nations are 

doing. 

I am looking at the chart on page 7. Do all of these firms that 

have been taking some of these proof of concept grants, do they all 

have a background in providing this kind of technology? 

Mr. WILKE. Before we will go through a process of giving a grant, 

we will be sure that the company has experience in that particular 

area or has been doing work for other parts of the government in 

that particular area. 

Mr. PEARCE. Okay. This is money that has already been given 

out in 2004 and 2005. 

Mr. WILKE. Yes, sir. For the ones we—

Mr. PEARCE. You say that you have gone through and proved 

them up. 

Mr. WILKE. Our folks in the lab, as part of the R&D process, they 

will validate that the vendor does have proof of concept, they have 

the technology capability to do it or have actually used this technology in other parts of the public sector or for government to be 

sure it is a technology that might work moving forward. 

Mr. PEARCE. The controls in the process then, you do not just 

give them the money. You make them reach certain points of completion before—
110

Mr. WILKE. Different grants have different timelines and 

deliverables based upon the actual grant itself. For example, some 

of the ones we spoke of earlier were actually asking for proof of 

concept that actually works before we will fund the grant money. 

Other ones that are for a longer term, science type of research, if 

you will, those type are basically taken from paper and then taking 

it to concept what actually works. So it is not a firm model what 

we use. It changes based upon the technology and the application. 

Mr. PEARCE. I appreciate that. I guess my concern, I do not know 

if you had a chance to read it, the June 30 article about the high 

cost of risk to security where the TSA starts out with $104 million 

concept to provide labor and it ends up costing $700 million. And 

the contractor, let’s see, they had $1,180 for 20 gallons of Starbucks 

coffee, rented 14 extension cords for $1,540, those kinds of things. 

Are your grant programs going to see that we do not have these 

kind of headlines and kind of articles as we try to really convert 

money into good security systems? 

Mr. WILKE. I think the concern that the other congressman mentioned a second ago regarding the scrutiny of invoices really underlines that my team does look at invoices before they pay them. It 

does take a little time to get them processed, but in this particular 

case, I think it was a little too long and we need to do a better job. 

Mr. PEARCE. There is good cause for concern. There was $239 

million for on-the-border detection devices that many did not get 

put in, many did not work when they got put in. So I mean it is 

just the history of a department that has been inept at best, maybe 

even worse, but my time has expired, and I will let you address in 

any way that you would those comments. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILKE. I can share with you in the area of the EDS equipment installed, checkpoint equipment installed, baggage handling 

equipment installed. We can go through and provide where the 

equipment is actually at, where it has been paid for, what has been 

done, because we do feel a sense of fiscal responsibility in being 

sure what we are doing is moving forward. 

And as the agency moves from the deployment that it was in the 

early years of TSA being formed to where it is now, I think we will 

get continued scrutiny, so we need to do a better job of looking at 

it and being sure. 

Mr. PEARCE. Just to come full circle, I do have that confidence 

when I listen to your report and when I listen to you. So, I mean, 

that is a rare personal presentation and knowledge. Your information is reassuring, but you are carrying a little bit of baggage 

around from previous people. I understand that. Thanks. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And just for the record, Mr. Wilke, you have been 

on the job how long? 

Mr. WILKE. Four months now. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. So we cannot hold you responsible for all 

of that. 

The gentleman from Oregon is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

However, we have had one administration during that timeline 

who we can hold responsible, and hopefully they are making better 

choices in their personnel and their procurement practices. 
111

Screener performance, I assume even though you have been 

there a short time you are aware of the evaluation of screener performance, the most recent evaluations. One of the comments made 

by I think it was the GAO report, and it was mirrored in I think 

the IG’s also, ‘‘Significant improvements in performance may not be 

possible without greater use of new technology.’’

When you walked in the building here today, did you have a 

briefcase with you? 

Mr. WILKE. No, just my notebook. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Did you put it through the machine? 

Mr. WILKE. Sure did. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Did you notice the machine? 

Mr. WILKE. Yes. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. Did you notice that it is not what our 

screeners are equipped with at the airport? Even though it may 

look similar, it has the capabilities of seeing things in multidimensions without asking you if they can put your notebook back 

through and turn it on its side or stand it out for that. 

I am concerned that some of the simplest technology we have 

equipped our screeners with is very outdated and that we are being 

very pennywise, pound-foolish by not replacing that equipment. 

That is off-the-shelf technology we have downstairs. The machines that the screeners are working with in the airports were 

thrown out nearly a decade ago as inadequate for the mission of 

the U.S. Capitol, United States White House, United States Treasury, United States Supreme Court, all federal facilities who have 

not been attacked and who have not been subject of this focus. 

I think certainly there is a threat, but the point is we have a 

known attack on aviation, an ongoing threat assessment, and yet 

I am in there, ‘‘Can I take your bag?’’ Can I interrupt the line, slow 

everybody down, slow down the throughput, require that the person who might have been doing trace is not doing trace because 

they are walking my bag back to the beginning of the line and 

turning it in a different dimension because they could not figure 

out of all the electronic junk I have got in there what it is. 

And if we just equipped our screeners with machines like we 

have downstairs here, they would not have to interrupt. They could 

have a throughput, they do not have to walk the bags back around. 

You could then have an extra screener to use the trace all the time. 

What I observe is we do not use trace very much except on selectees, because the trace machines sits there because that person 

is busy carrying bags back and forth the length of that conveyor 

belt. 

So I would hope you would look at what the savings might be, 

what the improvements in security might be if we asked for those 

well-proven machines. 

Again, you have not been there too long, and I am not certain 

of your historical interest in this. Are you familiar with Project 

Bojinka? 

Mr. WILKE. No. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Okay. This is a particular concern. 

There is a guy named Ramzi Yusef who had a well-developed 

plan to take down simultaneously, I cannot remember if it was 8 

or 12, 747s over the Pacific. He developed a bomb, he tested the 
112

bomb, the bomb went off, blew a big hole in the side of a 747, killed 

a number of people, but it was not placed quite right, did not take 

the plane down, just killed some people. But it worked, and then 

he was discovered by accident. He had a sloppy bomb maker, had 

a fire, fire department showed up, suspicious, Filipina policewoman 

said, ‘‘This is not right,’’ and the threat unraveled. 

But the point is we have not again equipped our people at the 

checkpoint to detect the bomb that he used, which was a liquidbased contact lense cleaning solution, nitroglycerin type explosive, 

digital watch, a few little wires, and I am concerned that there are 

patterns out there. They came back after the World Trade Center. 

I am worried that someone’s going to come back. 

Mr. Linder would say you can kill a lot more people in a stadium 

or something else, but you cannot kill a whole industry that way 

and cause a collapse of about 12 percent of the U.S. domestic economy and the world economy, and that is what aviation represents. 

And if someone were to have a simultaneous attack on a number 

of planes, just mirroring his plan, which was only discovered by accident, it would be absolutely economically catastrophic in addition 

to the horrific loss of life with large planes like that, 600 people or 

more in each plane. 

I noticed that you are modeling and looking at the liquid analysis 

devices. That is good. As far as I know, there is actually off-theshelf stuff available that the Japanese have developed and others. 

So I would just really encourage you to focus on carry-on explosives, continue the work on the checked explosives, move ahead 

with the portals, because we are doing nothing to detect the suicide 

belts that do not have metal embedded in them, and they are not 

going to put metal in it because they are not trying to wound people. They are just trying to take the plane down. 

There are many threats out there in all areas of transportation 

and everything else, but these are I think some that are particularly relevant in your area. I realize that was not a lot of questions, 

but I have been working on this since we created the TSA. I was 

a principal in that, and these are just enduring concerns that none 

of your predecessors have effectively addressed. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WILKE. Well, I think in the area of aviation security, both 

security and efficiency can be strengthened by a better use of technology and also using current technology and next-generation technologies together in a layered approach. And I think Secretary 

Chertoff is talking about that moving forward. So that is something 

we embrace and we will move on. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. I was impressed by our meeting with him and 

some of the ideas he has to do things differently, and I am willing 

to try and help him with that, give him some slack and expect 

things are going to be different, and that would be great. Thank 

you. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I think we will go through a second round here 

for those of us who waited. 

Mr. Wilke, let me start off. You have talked about the 

backscatter X-ray technology, you talk about the issues involved 

with privacy and the work that is being done there. I am no expert 

on this and you are the expert, but at least it has come to my at-
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tention that there is a technology that is currently available that 

is being used at the Moscow airport that has been used in the 

Netherlands at one time in their effort against, believe it or not, 

drugs. It is hard to believe with the Netherlands. It is also used 

for making sure that miners are not taking diamonds out of African mines. I think it is called SecureScan or something like that. 

Mr. WILKE. Using millimeter wave technology? 

Mr. LUNGREN. I am not sure if it uses millimeter wave—I have 

heard it is X-ray technology of some sort. Is there a reason we have 

not looked at that or are we looking at that? 

Mr. WILKE. We have looked at a number of technologies in that 

area; however, we are looking at ones that gives us the best image 

resolution that we can deploy on a short-term basis that also meet 

the privacy concerns. So it is almost like combining all the different 

requirements together to get something out there that is deployable 

and also deployable at a reasonable price. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Again, I am not an expert on this. It was at least 

presented to me that this would allow you not only to look at those 

metal features that you would find on someone but also if someone 

insisted something, and it also would show the shoes. And I just 

wondered if it had to be question of the amount of X-ray dosage 

exposure that one would be obviously exposed to if that were a concern? 

Mr. WILKE. Well, for backscatter, for example, we spend a lot of 

time with looking at right now, the actual dosage is about one-sixthousandth of what a normal X-ray would be. So, basically, it is the 

same as being on a plane for about 2 minutes. That is how much 

radiation you would be getting or if you were outside for about 10 

minutes. So it is within a very safe zone. 

Some of the other areas we will take a look at, and our lab has 

an open invitation for these companies to show their technologies 

to us, and if it passes certification, we would consider putting them 

out. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I guess that is the question I have. How do we 

know that once you start down the line with backscatter or any 

other technology that you do not become so tunnel visioned on 

proving that that you might not be taking a solid look at something 

else? 

Mr. WILKE. We are taking a look at all technology that come to 

us right now. That is why we have a number of projects ongoing 

within our R&D efforts, and right now we were looking what the 

actual deliverable is and what actually meets the requirement for 

detecting the threat in the best way. Also taking in mind too what 

the image looks like and what a screener would have to look at in 

order to detect that image is one of the criteria. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Again, I do not hold a belief for any particular 

product. It is just when people bring questions up like this to me 

I figure you are the guy that has got the answer on that. 

Mr. WILKE. We are looking at a number of technologies that will 

provide the solution. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank you. 

The gentlelady from California is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
114

I have so many questions to ask you and never enough time. I 

want to go back to the original issue that I brought up with respect 

to the fact that you are going to give us some new analysis about 

the in-line EDS system. 

In looking at our GAO report, the information that I gave you 

about it being paid, the return coming back within a little bit over 

a year on those systems comes from your own agency, and this report was just finished on the 13th of July, so that was last week. 

Mr. WILKE. We will have to check on that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So we need to coordinate. But I still want from you 

whatever analysis you have done as to what the payoff is. Because 

when we read something like this, we sit there and we say, ‘‘Why 

aren’t we getting this done?’’

You can probably note, and if you feel any hostility, this is not 

really about being hostile. We have been at this for 3 years, most 

of us on this committee, and in a normal situation, we would take 

a look at what the risks are and we would prioritize what we need 

to do and we would take the scarce resources we have and we 

would try to do the right thing with them. But in 3 years we do 

not have strategic plans out of this agency. 

Initially, it was just get anything up that would be safe first so 

that people will begin to fly again. Well, you know, now we are at 

the point where are we going to really spend the money and what 

is it that we need to do, and that is why we are looking to you, 

as well as if you can imagine the pressures that we have when 

every company comes knocking on our door wanting to sell us their 

off-the-shelf technology or their latest and greatest and why aren’t 

we buying this because this would make everything so much safer. 

And then we all are frequent travelers and we get subjected to 

everything that people see at the airport we actually feel. So this 

is about trying to find, hopefully, my colleague mentioned, an administration that really has fallen flat on these issues, in my opinion, and his, as he put it. 

So we are looking for people who we can trust, who want to stay 

there a while, who are going to help us figure it all out. And it 

seems to me, as Mr. Pearce said over there, that you may be one 

of those people we can hopefully see around for a while and we can 

get this straight. The first thing was that issue. 

Did you tell Mr. Thompson that you have a strategic plan for 

mass rail and rail travel? Is that what—

Mr. WILKE. Not one that we have developed in the technology 

area right now. It is one we are looking at, and it is probably more 

informal than formal, because we are still in the pilot stages of 

many of our rail pilots. 

We did one last year that was three-phased, and one was actually up here at New Carrollton where we had puffer machines in 

place. We used some detection capability. The second phase of it 

was using Union Station, for example. We had some things at 

Union Station here in D.C. And the third part was actually being 

a screening capability on a rail car up in Connecticut to see if it 

was possible to use it in a rail scenario to screen passengers in the 

rail environment. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Why don’t we have yet a strategic plan of what we 

are going to do with rail and mass transit, given that all sorts of 
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attacks have happened on other rail systems outside of our country, and that as an industry and as a government we are hopefully 

talking to our counterparts. Why hasn’t TSA, which is assigned to 

transportation passenger safety, not just in aviation, why don’t we 

have a strategic plan after 3 years of what we are going to do? 

And the reason that is a concern is because I heard you earlier 

say we had a forum where we had mass transit people in and we 

were talking about best practices, but it seemed to me like it is still 

all up in the air. 

Mr. WILKE. I think the real challenge in the area of rail is it is 

a different security model that needs to be employed based upon 

the openness of the entire system itself. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I understand that, but the openness exists in England, it exists in Madrid, it exists in India. I mean, this openness 

is everywhere. 

Mr. WILKE. We have learned a lot from the pilot test we have 

done now, and we are still trying to formulate what would be a 

good strategy that works in partnership with the goal of mass transit, to get a lot of people moved in short order while still having 

a security piece. And it is one that we are looking at, but it is one 

that is going to be more challenging than our traditional checkpoint airport type of thing that we have had that we are quite familiar with. However, we are going to continue to look at it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And why do you think the TSA has spent so little 

in the area of mass transit and rail versus aviation? Do you think 

it was just a bias because we were reacting to 9/11? Do you think 

it is because everybody that went into TSA came out of aviation, 

so it is a bias that way? Why isn’t there a strategic plan after 3 

years, and why is there such a bias, in your opinion? 

Mr. WILKE. That is a very controversial question. I really do not 

know. So I hate to even give a premise of what an answer to that 

might be, but it is one that based upon current events in Madrid 

and in London we are spending a lot more focus on. I mean, I can 

share firsthand that I have had a number of meetings in the rail 

area, and as I mentioned before, the rail conference forum we had 

up at our TSL lab back in April was before the events in London, 

because it is an area I think that we realize inside the agency we 

do need to focus more attention on moving forward and we want 

to do that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. PEARCE. [Presiding.] Chairman Cox? 

Mr. COX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wilke, I want to return to this question that was raised by 

Chairman Lungren, by Chairman Linder, and I mentioned it briefly at the conclusion of our last 5 minutes. That is whether or not, 

as we design the security systems for airports, we are looking at 

the right population of people that we want to run through these 

machines. 

If we can conceive of this project that we are building with new 

explosive detection technology as a house, and we are in the process of laying the foundation right now, I am questioning whether 

or not we have the right blueprint. I want to make sure we are 

building the right house, and it looks to me as if the house is too 
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big. It looks to me as if we are working from a model that requires 

every single passenger to go through the same EDS machine and 

that we are budgeting accordingly. 

The letters of intent, according to your testimony, that we have already signed in just the federal share total $1 billion and that is 

just eight airports, and that does not count even such major hubs 

as Houston, Minneapolis–St. Paul and so on. This is a lot of money. 

It is fantastically expensive, and as other members have mentioned 

in connection with transit or other homeland security priorities, it 

is crowding out other forms of transportation security. 

So I want to ask you in your capacity as the Chief Technology 

Officer some questions about another project that Homeland Security has underway and that is Registered Traveler, because the 

point of Registered Traveler is to reduce the number of people who 

have to go through this. If we could cut down by, say, 50 percent 

the number of people who are going through these machines, obviously we would not need as many of them. That $1 billion could 

be a half billion dollars. We could get a lot more security for our 

money. 

And I think I am correct in saying that in evaluating technologies for Registered Traveler, you are also the main man; is that 

right? 

Mr. WILKE. No, sir. 

Mr. COX. You are not. Even though you are the Chief Technology 

Officer, you are not in charge of that? 

Mr. WILKE. The Registered Traveler Program is actually a program that has been fast-tracked within our agency. We have actually a dedicated team that is working on that particular area. I 

have gone through briefings on it, if you will, and personally I fully 

support it. I think it is a great program. 

Mr. COX. Well, since you are obviously technologically literate 

and very familiar with it, let me just run through—I only have 3 

minutes or so here anyway, we will not get too deep into this, but 

let me just ask a few questions. 

A well-known software company that makes the operating systems for most of our computers has for the last year or so made 

it possible for us if we are willing to spend—$49.95 to have a fingerprint reader as the way not only that we log on to our system 

or have access to our computer but also the way we interface with 

Web sites. All those passwords that we have to remember at every 

Web site and so on now, you just use your finger and it automatically recognizes you—$49.95 for that. 

I understand that IBM laptops are coming equipped with this. I 

understand that the next version of Windows, so-called Longhorn, 

is going to have it built in. So this idea that this is not accepted 

in the West or it is not accepted in America or that there would 

be some consumer resistance it seems to me is given a lie by what 

is really going on in the marketplace, and this is something that 

you are very familiar with because of you are 17 years at Mobil include development of smart card technology that is now very much 

in use. This is simply the next step, and it is a very useful one. 

But just imagine if it is true that 8 to 10 percent of passengers 

in airports are responsible for 50 percent of the airport trips, and 

staff advises me that that is a relevant number, that we can get 
117

those 8 to 10 percent of the people in a Registered Traveler Program and they are just walking through and they are touching 

their finger and they are good to go onto the airplane. And we 

could cut in half the population of people that have to go through 

these machines. 

Wouldn’t that make sense, and wouldn’t that save us a whole 

heck of a lot of money? 

Mr. WILKE. I think, as you know, the agency supports that program, and I think we do see the benefits, and I think it does help 

us in our goals long term of who we need to focus our screening 

on. 

Mr. COX. All right. Now, let me ask you the next question. This 

is a technology question. Registered Traveler in the pilot that I am 

enrolled in as a Member of Congress, uses an iris scan, it uses fingerprint images, it uses all sorts of things that go well beyond and 

take a lot more time and are more elaborate than what I just described, which is I touch something and I go through. Now, maybe 

we need two-factor identification. Maybe I need a card. You are awfully familiar with that. Maybe I slide a card that has the same biometric on it that matches my fingerprint. 

But we do not need human beings involved in this, do we, if this 

is working? Why shouldn’t we just be able to touch something as 

we go through, and why does this have to be hundreds of millions 

of dollars or billions expensive when Microsoft is making it available for $49.95? 

Mr. WILKE. I think there are some technological solutions we 

should be looking at moving forward, and I think that the agency 

is looking at solutions of what does provide the best return. 

Mr. COX. All right. 

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Dicks? 

Mr. DICKS. Going back to this, the GAO summarized some of 

these things. Let me just go through a little of this just to summarize. Given the resources being provided for aviation security R&D, 

we would hope to see the stealthy deployment of various technologies under development. However, this has not been the case. 

Even though contrary to usual R&D standards, TSA has been almost solely focused on short-term development and deployment. 

It has been reported by the GAO that TSA has not estimated deployment dates for 133 of the 146 projects reported to be under development. There are various reasons for this failure to quickly deploy the optimal technology for aviation security. What is the reason for that? 

Mr. WILKE. Many of the technologies still are under development 

and they are not ready for deployment either because, number one, 

they—

Mr. DICKS. Well, the military does this. I have been on the Defense Appropriations for 27 years. They do a lot more R&D projects 

and basic research than ever gets deployed, but, again, do you want 

to elaborate for the record here why it is that so few of these have 

actually moved from R&D into deployment? 

Mr. WILKE. Many of the technologies are longer-term deployments. They need to be sure that they meet the needs of, one, de-
118

tecting the threat. It would be catastrophic, if you will, if we deployed a technology that people thought provided a level of security 

and in fact it did not. 

The second piece is, is it reliable? How does it hold up in a commercial environment? I have seen things submitted to our lab for 

evaluation and testing that were great for maybe 50 people, 100 

people, even 1,000 people, but when you look at what is needed for 

an airport checkpoint, if you will, the particular technology did not 

hold up under the rigors of a commercial environment where it will 

be getting a lot of use and a lot of abuse, if you will. 

Mr. DICKS. And one other thing on this strategic plan, the GAO 

again says one of your problems is because you do not have a strategic plan to ensure that the R&D funds are being used to address 

the highest priority transportation security risk. So in other words, 

without a strategic plan to say which ones of these are the most 

important, what should we do first, you have got all these hundreds of these R&D projects without much focus. Do you think that 

is a fair criticism or not? 

Mr. WILKE. It might have been at that time. I can share with you 

now that we have a strategic plan and based upon? 

Mr. DICKS. But it still has not been approved. 

Mr. WILKE. It is still going through the approval process. I am 

pretty confident it will. 

Mr. DICKS. It takes a long time to approve anything down there, 

we found out. Do you think it will ever be approved? 

Mr. WILKE. I am very hopeful it will, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. What is the timeframe? What do you think? Give us 

your best guess. A month? Two months? Three months? 

Mr. WILKE. From CTO perspective, as soon as possible. 

Mr. DICKS. From right now, when do you think the thing will be 

approved by your superiors? 

Mr. WILKE. I cannot speak for them, I am sorry. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, I know that, but what is your estimate? You 

have to give a—you are up here, you have got to testify. Tell us, 

give your best estimate of when you think they can approve this. 

Have you been talking to them about it? 

Mr. WILKE. It has been going back and forth through the administration as well as senior leadership in TSA, and—

Mr. DICKS. You have no idea when it is going to be approved. 

Mr. WILKE. I would hate to give you a commitment, sir, sitting 

here. 

Mr. DICKS. I am not saying asking for a commitment. 

Mr. WILKE. Well, but when I tell you something it is a commitment, and I appreciate that. 

Mr. DICKS. No. I am asking you to give me your best personal 

judgment. 

Mr. WILKE. I would say in the next few months. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Good. Well, that is hopeful. 

You also do not have a database for all your R&D projects. Why 

is that? 

Mr. WILKE. Well, I believe we do, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. You do? 

Mr. WILKE. I have seen an extract of it that I used for preparing 

for our testimony here. 
119

Mr. DICKS. Well, that is good. It says TSA and DHS do not have 

adequate databases to monitor and manage their spending of the 

hundreds of millions of dollars that Congress appropriated for 

R&D. What this means is that neither organization is correctly 

monitoring the cost, progress and status of many, if not most, of 

these R&D projects. This results in a lack of coordination then between the development and deployment of programs. So you are 

saying you do have databases with all these projects in them that 

you can call up. 

Mr. WILKE. Very much so. In addition, sir, I go—

Mr. DICKS. So if we send our bright staff down to see these databases, you can show it to them? 

Mr. WILKE. I would not see a problem with that. In addition, sir, 

I go through a personal quarterly review on the projects to ensure 

and find out the status on how they are moving forward. 

Mr. DICKS. You are looking at this, you have been here 4 months. 

Are you doing the best programs now, and do you have a sense of 

priorities of what is important, what should be developed and deployed first, kind of a list of the top 10 of things that we ought to 

do? 

Mr. WILKE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. So you are doing that? I mean, that is one of the 

other criticisms GAO had was that a lot of things are happening 

but there is not a sense of priority. You disagree with that. You 

think there is. You think you have got a sense of priority. 

Mr. WILKE. As you are aware, a GAO audit is like any audit, it 

is a picture in time. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Mr. WILKE. I am not sure when that time was. I can share with 

you, as I sit now, and what I am asking my staff to work on and 

focus on is more results oriented, is more priority focused on what 

we are doing moving forward. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilke, when you in your report list that we have got 1,910 

enhanced walk-through devices, 1,904 threat image detection devices, 1,273 explosive trace detection devices, how many of those do 

you suspect might be replaced in the next 2 years with better technology? 

Mr. WILKE. In fiscal year 2006, we put a proposal in to have 100 

of the WTMDs replaced, 149 of the handheld metal detectors that 

we proposed. However, the challenge you get into and one of the 

things that in working with the vendors is some of the machines 

can be almost retrofitted and built down to zero and then built 

back up again almost like a new machine. 

We met with some of our EDS manufacturers and asking them 

what is a good life cycle, and they say with proper maintenance, 

proper build-down, it is like taking care of a good antique automobile. It can work just the same, the same caliber, and if it meets 

our certification requirements, it does have an ability to have a 

longer life, but you need to have good maintenance on it. 

Mr. PEARCE. You would guess that the backbone then of our imaging fleet or our technology fleet is essentially finished and that 
120

we just have increments of technology to build on top of that. That 

is what it sounds like to me. 

Mr. WILKE. In some respects; however, there is an opportunity 

for upgrading. For example, airports that right now have all ETD, 

I think it is prudent to give them a higher level of explosive detection systems. That is why the Reveal CT–80 machine does fit that 

niche. There are also some other machines that are on the horizon 

that other manufacturers are making that might also make that 

same niche. So if their machines come through and they do meet 

the certification, we would be very enthusiastic to take a look at 

those. 

Mr. PEARCE. When do you think that we will actually hit another 

plateau of integrating a lot of the components of that new technology that is being explored right now? Would you have a guess 

about that? 

Mr. WILKE. Actually, I would probably say probably in the 5-to 

7-to 10-year mark of trying to get machines actually integrated. 

Through our partnership and working with different vendors, one 

of the challenges I face with them is the actual amount of floor 

space we have in the checkpoints. 

I would like to see a machine that has integrated, whether it be 

walk-through metal detecting capability, electronic detection of explosive capability, perhaps shoe detecting capability in the one footprint as opposed to three different footprints that we have today. 

However, we need to get the manufacturer to begin working closer 

together to develop these types of technologies in combination. 

Mr. PEARCE. Are you seeing any other nations that are investing 

anything in technology like we are for security purposes? 

Mr. WILKE. That is a hard question because of the scale of our 

airport system, having 450 airports that we support. Other countries are expending funds to raise their security also. 

Mr. PEARCE. But you do not see any advances in technology in 

other countries that we could simply piggyback off of? 

Mr. WILKE. My team has opened dialogue, through the lab and 

also through my scientific advisor, with a lot of our partners 

around the world to find out what the best technologies that they 

are looking at and how we can deploy them within TSA. 

Mr. PEARCE. Are all of the nations that fly into the U.S. going 

to eventually—let’s say that we had a new technology right now 

that we could test all passengers with. Do we have agreements 

with other nations with passengers coming into here so that they 

would screen people boarding flights for the United States? 

Mr. WILKE. That is probably more of a policy question. 

Mr. PEARCE. I understand, but if you could—

Mr. WILKE. From a technology perspective, the equipment will be 

available in the market and when we go through our certification 

process to show the machine meets our standard, other countries 

ask us informally as well formally which machines are certified, 

which ones we are using, and I am sure possibly some of them use 

those in their buying decisions. I cannot speak for those countries, 

obviously, but I am sure they look at it. 

Mr. PEARCE. Do you have any information, do they ever share information about the length of wait that passengers are finding 

right now, the length of wait to get through screening processes? 
121

Mr. WILKE. I have not personally seen anything; however, our 

folks in Aviation Operations who work with the actual line piece 

in screening folks, they might—

Mr. PEARCE. If you could track that information down and send 

it back with some of the other things, I would appreciate that. 

Mr. WILKE. Great. 

Mr. PEARCE. Well, I think that we have diligently questioned you 

today. We appreciate your presentation. I appreciate your service 

to the country and service in an industry that needs a tremendous 

amount of technology and frankly expertise. So thank you for 

bringing that. 

The members may have some additional questions, and we will 

ask you to respond these in writing. The hearing record will be 

held open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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