IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 18, 2018 Session 

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BOBBIE SUE MADDLE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Putnam County

No. 2016-CR-89B Gary S. McKenzie, Judge

No. M2017-01707-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Bobbie Sue Maddle, pleaded guilty to five counts of sale of less than .5 

grams of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and two counts of sale of more than .5 

grams of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed an effective 

fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it enhanced her sentences and when it denied her request for a sentence 

of split confinement with Community Corrections. The Defendant also contends that 

current sentencing law effectively denied appellate review on these issues. After review, 

we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN EVERETT 

WILLIAMS and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Brent Horst, Nashville, Tennessee (at hearing); Craig P. Fickling, District Public 

Defender and Benjamin D. Marsee, Assistant Public Defender (on appeal), for the 

appellant, Bobbie Sue Maddle.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Senior Counsel; 

Bryant C. Dunaway, District Attorney General; and Bret T. Gunn, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

 

This case arises from the Defendant selling methamphetamine to an undercover 

06/07/2018
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agent. For this offense, a Putnam County grand jury charged the Defendant with five 

counts of sale of less than .5 grams of methamphetamine and two counts of sale of more 

than .5 grams of methamphetamine.

The Defendant elected to plead guilty to the charges as a Range II offender with 

the trial court to determine her sentence and the agreement that her sentences would be 

run concurrently. The guilty plea transcript is not included in the record, so the following 

summary of the facts is taken from the presentence report:

On 02/24/15, agents of the Drug Task Force conducted an undercover drug 

purchase using a confidential source and confidential funds. Half a gram of 

methamphetamine was purchased for $50.00 from [the Defendant.]

On 02/25/15, 03/25/15, 04/23/15, 05/12/15, and 05/19/15, agents of the 

Drug Task Force conducted undercover drug purchases with the use of a 

confidential source and confidential funds. During each transaction, one 

(1) gram of methamphetamine was purchased for $100.00 from [the 

Defendant].

On 5/21/15, Detective Chuck Johnson with the Putnam County Sheriff’s 

Department, . . . executed a search warrant on the [Defendant’s residence]. 

The search warrant was the result of an investigation from several tips 

indicating illegal manufacture and sale of methamphetamine which resulted 

in several controlled purchases of methamphetamine from [the Defendant]. 

A search of the home yielded the following: ground up ephedrine, red 

powder believed to be red phosphorus, zepherex pseudoephedrine 58 tables 

still in blister packs, crystal drain opener, one quart jar half full of unknown 

liquid, Kingsford lighter fluid 1/8 full, crystal heat drain opener 3/4 full, 

cold pack opened and 1/4 full, full bottle of drain opener, three (3) red 

containers containing a substance that field tested positive for 

methamphetamine, various unidentified pills, drug paraphernalia used for 

smoking methamphetamine, and $462.00 in cash, $80.00 of which was 

found to be confidential funds used in previous controlled 

methamphetamine purchases. [The Defendant] and Eddie Maddle were 

both charged with possession of Schedule II methamphetamine for resale 

and transported to the Putnam County Jail.

B. Sentencing

The following evidence was presented at the sentencing hearing: The State 

submitted the presentence report into the record as an exhibit; the State declined to 
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present other evidence. On behalf of the Defendant, Linda Loftis testified that she 

worked at a “sober living” facility in Putnam County as a drug and alcohol counselor. 

Ms. Loftis met with the Defendant while she was in jail and said that the Defendant was 

able to identify her long-term addiction to methamphetamine and issues with “codependency.” Ms. Loftis acknowledged that the Defendant had never successfully 

completed a drug rehabilitation program. Ms. Loftis stated that an in-patient substance 

abuse treatment would be best for the Defendant, and stated that it was very beneficial 

that the Defendant had insurance that could presumably pay for such treatment. She 

testified that the Defendant’s insurance would pay for treatment over a period of fourteen 

to twenty-eight days, following which she would enter “intensive out-patient” treatment, 

for a cumulative amount of sixty hours of treatment. With “reasonable progress,” the 

Defendant could feasibly complete the treatment program in three months. Ms. Loftis 

recommended that the Defendant be ordered to live in a “sober living facility” where she 

would have access to a mental health component of treatment and allow her employment

throughout the treatment.

The Defendant testified that she had an extensive criminal record including 

convictions for methamphetamine and other drug-related convictions. She acknowledged 

having served twenty-three months in incarceration; she continued to sell 

methamphetamine after her incarceration period. The Defendant acknowledged having 

participated in several drug rehabilitation programs. She acknowledged selling 

methamphetamine to support her own drug habit, including selling to family members, 

but she stated that she had been sober for several months at the time of the hearing.

On cross-examination, the Defendant agreed that all of her prior felonies were

related to methamphetamine and that she had previously not complied with probationary 

sentences. She agreed that she had violated her probation twice. In the present case, the 

Defendant acknowledged selling methamphetamine to the confidential purchaser when 

her child was present. The Defendant agreed that she had been convicted of cooking 

methamphetamine in the past. She acknowledged using methamphetamine while out on 

bond in the present case.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court summarized the evidence and 

stated that its decision would be made in consideration of the evidence, the arguments 

made by the parties, the principles of sentencing and the argument in favor of alternative 

sentencing, as well as any enhancement factors, the nature and characteristics of the 

Defendant’s criminal conduct, the potential for rehabilitation, and statistics provided by 

the Administrative Office of the Courts used in the Risk Needs Assessment. The trial 

court stated that the Defendant was to be sentenced as a Range II offender. The trial 

court applied enhancement factor (1), that the Defendant “has a previous history of 

criminal convictions or criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the 
4

appropriate range,” T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1) (2014), finding the following:

The Defendant does have three prior felony offenses . . . [from 2002, 

2008, and 2009]. There’s an attempt to promote the manufacture of 

methamphetamine, that looks like it occurred in [2009]. There’s [a 2008] 

conviction in the report for initiation of the process to manufacture 

methamphetamine. And also, the 2002 [offense] is an attempt to promote 

methamphetamine manufacture, number three. So, there are three . . . 

felonies.

On top of that, the Defendant does have a criminal history that 

exceeds [those three felonies]. In 2013, [the Defendant was convicted of] 

simple possession . . . [as well as] criminal impersonation . . . in 2004, . . . 

misdemeanor theft [in 2000]. . . . So, I do place great weight on the 

criminal history, because [the Defendant has] an extensive criminal history.

The trial court also considered enhancement factor (2), that “the defendant is the leader in 

the commission of an offense involving two (2) or more criminal actors” and, based on 

the evidence presented that the Defendant’s husband was involved in the offense, the trial 

court found that this factor applied but declined to place great weight on the factor. 

T.C.A. § 40-35-114(2). 

The trial court next applied enhancement factor (8), that “[t]he defendant, before 

trial or sentencing, failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release 

into the community.” T.C.A. § 40-35-114(8). The trial court found:

[I]n the Presentence Report, we have a violation of probation in [2008], 

where [the Defendant’s probation was revoked] to serve her five year 

sentence. It looks like, again, [the Defendant’s probation was] revoked . . . 

to serve a two year sentence . . . in 2004 . . . and it looks like there [were] 

also revocations that have to do with failure to report.

And so she does have a history of not being able to complete 

probation, as she has been placed on probation before and then violated for 

various reasons . . . .

The trial court considered and applied mitigating factor (8), that “the defendant was 

suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced the defendant’s 

culpability for the offense,” based on the Defendant’s mental health issues, and set a 

fifteen-year sentence. T.C.A. § 40-35-113(8) (2014). Addressing the manner of service, 

the trial court found it necessary to protect society from the Defendant’s long history of 
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criminal conduct by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement. T.C.A. § 40-35-

103(1)(A) (2014). The trial court also found that “measures less restrictive than 

confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant,” 

based on the Defendant’s numerous probation violations and failures to comply with the 

terms of her probation. T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(C). The trial court stated:

[W]hat do we do with individuals? If we can grant some type of treatment 

to them, and we can address that issue and get rid of it, then that’s one 

thing. But I have to balance everything I do up here with protecting 

society. Because the problem that you have is that you’ve been through the 

system time and time again, and that culminates where you are, and that’s 

why you land at fifteen years. The first time offender doesn’t land at fifteen 

years. And once you have established that type of history inside the 

system, then the chances become even more and more narrow. . . . 

And also we have a cycle here, it concerns this Court that you’ve got 

your children that are involved in this same behavior. . . . . I agree with 

treatment, and I agree with rehabilitation. . . .

But there has to be some personal responsibility here, and I’m going 

to give you [a] fifteen (15) year sentence. You’re not a good candidate for 

Community Corrections, and it will be a fifteen (15) year sentence to serve.

It is from these judgments that the Defendant now appeals. 

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

because it improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentence by placing undue weight on the 

Defendant’s criminal history and prior record on probation. She further alleges that the 

trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to serve her sentence, as opposed to 

order a sentence of split confinement with Community Corrections, because of its 

erroneous reliance on her prior probation performance. Lastly, the Defendant contends 

that the sentencing cases Bise and Caudle effectively eliminate appellate review of 

sentencing and thus should be overturned. The State responds that the trial court properly 

sentenced the Defendant within the applicable range and in consideration of the 

enhancement and mitigating factors. The State further responds that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion when it declined to order an alternative sentence. As to the 

Defendant’s argument that case law removes appellate review of sentencing, the State 

responds that the Defendant’s argument is misplaced. 
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A. Enhancement of the Defendant’s Sentence

The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it enhanced 

her sentence because it placed undue weight on her criminal record and prior 

performance on probation. The Defendant states that this is insufficient to justify 

enhancement. The State counters that the trial court carefully considered the 

enhancement factors, noting the Defendant’s three prior felonies, one of which it used to 

enhance the Defendant’s sentence, and the Defendant’s two prior revocations of her 

probation sentences. The State argues that on these bases, the trial court properly 

enhanced the Defendant’s sentence. We agree with the State. 

“[S]entences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are 

to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of 

reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). A finding of abuse of 

discretion “‘reflects that the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed 

in light of the factual circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular 

case.’” State v. Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Moore, 6 

S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn. 1999)). To find an abuse of discretion, the record must be void 

of any substantial evidence that would support the trial court’s decision. Id. at 554-55; 

State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The reviewing court should uphold the sentence “so long as it 

is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise 

in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 

709-10. So long as the trial court sentences within the appropriate range and properly 

applies the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act, its decision will be granted a 

presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 707. The defendant bears “[t]he burden of 

demonstrating that the sentence is improper.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 

(Tenn. 1991).

The trial court must consider: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the 

sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and 

arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal 

conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on the mitigating 

and enhancement factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113 and -

114; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as 

to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; and (7) any statement the 

defendant made on the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing. See T.C.A. § 40-35-

210 (2014); State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

We conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. The trial court 

considered the relevant principles and sentenced the Defendant to a within range 
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sentence. The evidence presented at trial and during the sentencing hearing supports the 

trial court’s application of enhancement factors (1) and (8), based on the evidence 

presented that the Defendant had an extensive criminal history, including three felonies, 

and two failed opportunities to comply with a probation sentence. The Defendant’s 

record is sufficient to support the application of these enhancement factors and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in so doing. As such, the Defendant is not entitled to 

relief on this issue.

B. Alternative Sentencing

The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered 

the Defendant to serve her sentence in confinement. She argues that the trial court again 

relied on an “inaccurate assessment” of the Defendant’s performance on probation, which 

was based on “misinterpreted” facts. She contends that release into the community with 

drug and mental health treatment was the appropriate form of service. The State 

responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it clearly considered a 

sentencing alternative but concluded that it could not ignore the Defendant’s history of 

drug-related convictions and multiple failed opportunities to serve an alternative 

sentence, which supported its denial of the Defendant’s request. We agree with the State. 

As previously stated, “the abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a 

presumption of reasonableness, applies to within-range sentences that reflect a decision 

based upon the purposes and principles of sentencing, including the questions related to 

probation or any other alternative sentence.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79

(Tenn. 2012). We also reiterate that the defendant bears “the burden of showing that the 

sentence is improper.” Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169. A trial court’s decision regarding 

probation will only be invalidated if the court “wholly departed from the relevant 

statutory considerations in reaching its determination.” State v. Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 

473, 476 (Tenn. 2014). Under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court may not 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id. at 475.

With regard to alternative sentencing, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-

102(5) provides as follows:

In recognition that state prison capacities and the funds to build and 

maintain them are limited, convicted felons committing the most severe 

offenses, possessing criminal histories evincing a clear disregard for the 

laws and morals of society, and evincing failure of past efforts at 

rehabilitation shall be given first priority regarding sentencing involving 

incarceration.
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Every sentencing decision necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis considering 

“the nature of the offense and the totality of the circumstances . . . including a 

defendant’s background.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting 

State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tenn. 1986)). In determining if incarceration is 

appropriate in a given case, a trial court should consider whether:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant 

who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the 

offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective 

deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently 

been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.

T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1). A defendant who is sentenced as an especially mitigated or 

standard offender and who has committed a Class C, D, or E felony should be 

“considered as a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options,” if certain 

conditions are met. T.C.A. § 40-35-102(6)(A). The guidelines regarding favorable 

candidates are advisory. T.C.A. § 40-35-102(6)(D). The trial court must also consider 

the potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant in 

determining the sentence alternative or length of a term to be imposed. T.C.A. § 40-35-

103.

Initially, we note that the Defendant is not a favorable candidate for alternative 

sentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102(6)(A). 

Furthermore, after much thoughtful consideration, the trial court denied the Defendant’s 

request for alternative sentencing based on her prior history of criminal convictions and 

failure to comply with probationary terms. The trial court considered that the Defendant 

had been given multiple opportunities to address her drug problems outside of 

incarceration and had failed to do so. The trial court also expressed concern about the 

children in the Defendant’s life to whom she was exposing her drug use and involvement 

in illicit drug sales. The trial court considered these multiple factors, which it deemed 

weighed against the Defendant’s request.

The evidence presented at the sentencing hearing established that the Defendant 

had three prior drug felonies and numerous misdemeanors including simple drug 

possession. The evidence was that when committing the present drug-related offense, the 

Defendant brought along a minor child. Finally, the evidence was that the Defendant had 

been granted alternative sentences that had subsequently been revoked in two prior cases. 
9

Based on this evidence, we conclude that the Defendant has not established that the trial 

court abused its discretion by denying her an alternative sentence. The Defendant is not 

entitled to relief on this issue.

C. Bise and Caudle

Lastly, the Defendant contends that two opinions authored by our supreme court, 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012) and State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn.

2012) should be overturned because they “effectively eliminate any meaningful appellate 

review of a trial court’s sentencing decision.” The Defendant specifically refers to a 

dissent written in State v. Biggs, 482 S.W.3d 923 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015). The State 

responds that the Defendant’s reliance on the dissent in Biggs to argue against the 

sentencing frameworks laid out in Bise and Caudle is misplaced. 

We acknowledge the Defendant’s argument but would point out that this court 

lacks the judicial power to overturn a previous ruling of our supreme court, as it is the 

“supreme judicial tribunal of the state” and we are subject to its adjudications. Barger v. 

Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1976). Thus the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgments. 

_________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE