COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00179-CR

DALLAS CARL TATE APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 97TH DISTRICT COURT OF MONTAGUE COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 2013-0163M-CR

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DISSENTING OPINION

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This is a straightforward possession case requiring a straightforward 

sufficiency analysis under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 

2789 (1979), which the majority fails to perform. Because the majority’s analysis 

focuses on the links not proven by the State instead of on the links that were 

proven by the State; substitutes the majority’s own weight- and credibility-of-theevidence determinations for those of the jury; fails to view the evidence in the 
2

light most favorable to the judgment; and disregards controlling, well-established 

precedent from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concerning what evidence 

will sufficiently link a defendant to contraband found in a vehicle, I am compelled 

to dissent.

The lynchpin of the majority’s reverse-and-acquit sufficiency analysis is the 

absence of evidence that Officer Beckham observed the syringe of 

methamphetamine in the cubbyhole1in the front console of the car when he 

approached the driver’s-side door of the car after he had stopped Tate. From the 

absence of this evidence, the majority extrapolates that the syringe of 

methamphetamine must not have actually been located in the cubbyhole when 

Tate was stopped and instead must have been placed there by one of the female 

passengers2during an approximately five-minute interval after Tate was asked to 

step out of the car and before the women were asked to step out of the car. The 

errors in this analysis by the majority are threefold.

First, instead of analyzing the links that were proven by the State, the 

majority focuses on its own view of what was not proven. This type of sufficiency 

analysis in possession cases has been expressly disavowed by the Texas Court 

 

1Officer Beckham testified that he found the syringe in “the cubbyhole 

underneath the air conditioner, heater controls in that vehicle.” 

2

The two female passengers were friends of Tate’s. Bonita Proctor, the 

front-seat passenger, was Tate’s former girlfriend; Sherita Yvonne Hale, the 

back-seat passenger, was a friend of Proctor’s. The trio was on the way to 

Proctor’s house at the time of the stop. 
3

of Criminal Appeals. Compare Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006) (explaining that court of appeals’s sufficiency analysis erroneously 

discussed links that might have connected the defendant to the drugs but did not 

exist in the case and disregarded the links that were proven by the State), with 

Tate v. State, No. 02-14-00179-CR, slip op. at 8–9 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth May 

14, 2015, no pet. h.) (conducting sufficiency analysis by discussing links that 

might have connected Tate to the drugs but did not exist in the case and 

disregarding the links that were proven by the State––“there is no evidence that 

the syringe was in plain view or accessible to Tate”; “[a]lso absent from the 

record is any evidence that the syringe was not in the possession of Proctor or 

Hale”; “there is no evidence indicating when he [Officer Beckham] performed that 

search [of the purses]”; “[t]here is no evidence that Sergeant Beckham saw the 

syringe from his vantage point when he first approached the vehicle”; etc.); see 

also Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (explaining 

that in light of court of criminal appeals’s abandonment of “outstanding 

reasonable hypothesis methodology” in 1991, defendant’s link to drugs he 

allegedly possessed “need no longer be so strong that it excludes every other 

outstanding reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt”). 

Second, although reciting the proper standard of review, the majority fails 

to apply it; the majority fails to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

jury’s verdict and instead substitutes its own weight and credibility determinations 

of the evidence for that of the jury. See Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 
4

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (reversing court of appeals’s judgment of acquittal 

because court of appeals’s sufficiency analysis did not view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the jury’s verdict or give deference to the jury’s weightand credibility-of-the-evidence determinations). For example, the majority fails to 

mention that Tate testified that he had his driver’s license and proof of insurance 

out and ready when Officer Beckham approached the driver’s-side window of the 

car. Tate also testified that Officer Beckham’s first words to Tate were, “Step out 

of the vehicle.”3 A reasonable inference exists that the syringe of

methamphetamine was in the cubbyhole at the time Officer Beckham stopped 

Tate for outstanding warrants but that Officer Beckham did not notice it during 

the extremely short time he stood near the driver’s-side window before he asked 

Tate to get out of the car and escorted Tate to a position at the rear of the 

vehicle. Also, the syringe of methamphetamine was admitted into evidence. The 

jury was free to infer from viewing the syringe that it was small enough that it 

could roll deep enough within the cubbyhole that it would not be visible to a 

person standing at the driver’s-side window. Only Tate testified that it would be 

 

3On direct examination Tate testified:

Q. And did the officer speak to you when he arrived at your 

vehicle?

A. Yes. I think I already had my license and insurance ready. 

He walked up and immediately asked me to step out of the car.
5

visible; the jury was free to not believe his testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 

S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872 (1988).

Even more importantly, the jury rejected the very same view of the 

evidence that the majority accepts. At trial, Tate put forward his theory that one 

of the female passengers must have placed the syringe in the cubbyhole after he 

had exited the vehicle. Tate testified that the syringe could not have been in the 

cubbyhole when Officer Beckham stopped him because if it had been there, he 

(Tate) would have gotten rid of it. Tate testified:

Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Tate, when you were removed from the car, 

were you aware that there was a syringe in your car?

A. No, ma’am.

Q. If you had a syringe, what would your actions have been when 

you knew the police officer was pulling you over?

A. If I had had one?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I’m not sure. I probably would have thrown it out or, at least, 

squirted the contents out of it. I don’t know. I wouldn’t -- I would 

hate to answer that without being put in that position.

Q. So what you’re saying is, you basically would not have left it in a 

center compartment open to plain view if you had had it?

A. Absolutely not.

Tate testified that he had learned about the syringe of methamphetamine found 

in his car after he was placed in jail. He said that he wondered to himself which 

of the female passengers had placed it there. 
6

On cross-examination, the prosecutor undermined Tate’s theory by 

questioning why Tate––who admitted he had a prior conviction for possession––

would dispose of the syringe if he had known about it, but Tate’s two female 

friends—whom Tate testified also had prior possession convictions––would not 

have disposed of the syringe but would instead have set him up. Tate testified 

on cross-examination:

Q. And you said you were not aware of a syringe. You would have 

thrown it out or squirted its contents if you had been aware of it?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. You would have hidden it from police?

A. Hidden the syringe?

Q. Yes.

A. I wouldn’t say hide it. I just didn’t want it -- wouldn’t have it --

wouldn’t have had it on me.

Q. So you would have planted it on someone else?

A. Oh, no.

Q. No? You would have gotten rid of the evidence so you wouldn’t

--

A. True.

Q. -- have been charged; is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. So what you’re claiming is, even though you would have thrown 

the syringe somewhere or squirted the contents out or put it

somewhere where it couldn’t easily be seen, you’re saying that the 

other two women would have put it somewhere where it could have 
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easily been seen instead of doing the same thing [that you would 

have done]; is that right? 

Officer Beckham testified that after the stop, the women consented to a 

search of their purses; he searched the purses and found no contraband. The 

jury could have reasonably inferred that the women would not carry a syringe 

with a needle on their person or in their pockets and that because the syringe 

was not found in the women’s purses, it was in the cubbyhole all along. In short, 

the majority’s analysis fails to apply the proper Jackson v. Virginia standard of 

review; the majority’s analysis does not view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict and does not defer to the jury’s weight- and 

credibility-of-the-evidence determinations. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 164.

4

Third, the law is well-settled that links like the links that were proven by the 

State in this case are sufficient to meet the State’s burden of establishing that 

Tate exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the syringe of 

methamphetamine and knew that the syringe contained methamphetamine. See

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(38) (West Supp. 2014) (setting forth 

 

4

The court of criminal appeals in Evans reversed the court of appeals’s

judgment of acquittal in a possession case because:

The jury presumably went through exactly the same weighing 

of evidence, credibility assessments, and alternative-explanation 

exercises [as that set forth in the court of appeals’s opinion] and 

came to the opposite conclusion, i.e., appellant was connected to 

the drugs. . . . Under federal and Texas law, juries trump both trial 

and appellate judges on weight-of-evidence determinations.

202 S.W.3d at 164. 
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definition of possession). Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, 

the evidence establishes that the syringe of methamphetamine was found in 

plain view in an open cubbyhole in the car’s console, was conveniently 

accessible5to Tate––even Tate testified that the cubbyhole was accessible to the 

driver of the car, was found in a car that Tate claimed to own, and was found in a 

car driven by Tate. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12 (listing these possible 

links); Roberson v. State, 80 S.W.3d 730, 735 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (same); Villegas v. State, 871 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (same). Viewed in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence also establishes that about five 

minutes after Tate was asked to step out of the vehicle, the female passengers 

were asked to step out of the vehicle; that before the female passengers were 

asked to step out of the vehicle, their purses were searched and found to contain 

no contraband; that the female passengers themselves were subsequently 

searched by Trooper Rachel Russell when she arrived and that no contraband 

was found; and that although the front-seat passenger was moving around a lot 

 

5

The term “conveniently accessible” means that the contraband must be 

within the close vicinity of the accused and easily accessible while in the vehicle 

so as to suggest that the accused had knowledge of the contraband and 

exercised control over it. Robinson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).
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in the car before she was asked to step out of the vehicle,6 Officer Beckham did 

not observe her reach forward toward the front console near the cubbyhole. 

Thus, a reasonable inference exists that one of the female passengers did not 

remove the syringe of methamphetamine from her purse or off of her person and 

place it in the cubbyhole and that the syringe was in the cubbyhole all along.

Tate himself provided testimony allowing the jury to reasonably infer that,

even if one of the women had possessed the syringe of methamphetamine, she 

would have hidden it or ejected its contents, not placed it in plain view in the car. 

The logical force of the combined evidence and reasonable inferences 

therefrom––when viewed in its totality in the light most favorable to the verdict 

and with deference to the jury’s weight- and credibility-of-the-evidence 

determinations––is sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Tate exercised actual care, custody, control, or 

management of the syringe of methamphetamine and that his relationship to it 

was more than merely fortuitous.

7

 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 

 

6Proctor, the front-seat passenger, did not testify, so no direct explanation 

exists in the record for her movement within the car; however, Officer Beckham 

testified that there was a dog in the car with the trio. 

7

I cannot agree with the majority’s assertion that the facts here bear a 

striking resemblance to the facts in Roberson, 80 S.W.3d at 741–42. In 

Roberson, the drugs were not found in an area of the car conveniently accessible 

to the defendant-driver, like the syringe was conveniently accessible to Tate as 

the driver of the car. Id. (explaining that a “full cookie” of crack cocaine was 

found on the passenger side floorboard near the door and that a “half cookie” of 

crack cocaine was found on the roadway a few inches from the car on the 

passenger side). Additionally, in Roberson, evidence existed linking only the 
10

§ 481.002(38); see also, e.g., Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 163 (reversing acquittal 

judgment and noting that evidence—sixteen grams of cocaine was located on 

coffee table one foot directly in front of where defendant was sitting—constituted 

“two extremely strong ‘presence’ and ‘proximity’ links”); Deshong v. State, 625 

S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (holding evidence sufficient to support 

driver’s possession conviction based on baggie of marijuana found in defendant’s 

car in plain view on floor between driver’s seat and car door despite evidence

that defendant’s car was used by a business as a delivery car).8 

 

front-seat passenger to the cocaine, not the defendant-driver; while here, 

evidence exists linking only Tate to the syringe of methamphetamine, not the 

front-seat passenger. See id. (explaining that the evidence linked the front-seat 

passenger to the cocaine because the front-seat passenger appeared to be 

under the influence of drugs, was sitting where the “full cookie” of cocaine was 

found, and had exited the vehicle near where the “half cookie” of cocaine was 

found, and the driver never went to the passenger side of the exterior of the 

vehicle during the stop and appeared sober). 

8

The legal analysis concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to establish 

that a driver, driving a car he claims to own, exercised actual care, custody, 

control, or management over contraband found in his car in a location that is 

easily accessible to the driver coupled with other circumstantial evidence is so 

well-established that many cases on this issue are not published. See, e.g., Otto 

v. State, No. 08-04-00249-CR, 2005 WL 1940276, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

Aug. 11, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding evidence legally 

sufficient to support driver’s possession conviction based on evidence that he 

told officer he was the owner of the vehicle and that inventory search revealed 

contraband underneath plastic molding of gear shift console—a location in close 

proximity to and easily accessible by driver; court focused on the degree to which 

this evidence linked driver to contraband and declined to focus on the number of 

links or the lack of additional links, such as the absence of furtive gestures, 

incriminating statements, drug paraphernalia, fingerprints, weapons, or drugs 

found on driver’s person or that passenger had access to vehicle); McClanahan 

v. State, No. 05-03-00115-CR, 2003 WL 22663801, at *2 (Tex. App.––Dallas 

Nov. 12, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (holding evidence 
11

For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment 

of the trial court.

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PUBLISH

DELIVERED: May 14, 2015

 

sufficient to support driver’s possession conviction based on baggie of cocaine 

found in defendant’s car on driver’s seat although two passengers were in the 

car); Fowler v. State, No. 08-01-00409-CR, 2002 WL 1732598, at *3 (Tex. App.–

–El Paso July 25, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding 

evidence sufficient to support driver’s possession conviction based on marihuana 

found in cupholder in center console of defendant’s car although front-seat 

passenger was in the car); see also Parra v. State, No. 03-04-00643-CR, 2006 

WL 1649029, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (holding evidence legally sufficient to support driver’s 

conviction because the jury, as the exclusive judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses, was entitled to believe officer’s testimony that he was watching the 

passengers who remained in the car after appellant was arrested and placed in 

patrol car and that officer would have seen any attempt by the passengers to 

stash the drugs in the manner and location where they were found).