United States Government Accountability Office 

GAO Report to Congressional Committees


August 2004 COMBATING 


TERRORISM


DOD Efforts to 


Improve Installation 


Preparedness 


Can Be Enhanced 


with Clarified 


Responsibilities and 


Comprehensive 


Planning


On August 20, 2004, this report was reproduced for the Web 

version only because figures 1 and 2, pages 8 and 20, respectively 

a

should have appeared in color. 

GAO-04-855

Highlights of GAO-04-855, a report to 

congressional committees. 

Terrorist incidents in the United 

States and abroad have 

underscored the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) need to safeguard 

military personnel and facilities 

from potential terrorist attacks 

involving chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear weapons 

and high-yield explosive devices. 

In the 2003 National Defense 

Authorization Act, Congress 

directed DOD to develop a 

comprehensive plan to help 

guide departmentwide efforts 

in improving installation 

preparedness against such attacks. 

The act also directed GAO to 

assess DOD’s plan. DOD submitted 

its report to Congress in 

September 2003. This review 

addresses two questions: (1) Does 

DOD’s report represent a 

comprehensive plan that can guide 

installation preparedness efforts? 

and (2) What obstacles, if any, 

hinder DOD’s ability to develop 

and effectively implement a 

comprehensive approach to 

installation preparedness? 

GAO is recommending that a single 

authority be designated to integrate 

installation preparedness efforts, 

and that the roles of key 

organizations be clearly defined. 

It is also recommending that the 

2003 plan be updated to fully 

incorporate results-oriented 

management principles and 

describe what military response 

capabilities need to be developed. 

DOD agreed with all the 

recommendations in this report. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-855.


To view the full product, including the scope 


and methodology, click on the link above.


For more information, contact 


Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 


stlaurentj@gao.gov.


August 2004 

COMBATING TERRORISM 

DOD Efforts to Improve Installation 

Preparedness Can Be Enhanced with 

Clarified Responsibilities and 

Comprehensive Planning 

While DOD’s September 2003 report generally met the requirements of the 

act, it does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management 

plan that could help guide DOD’s installation preparedness efforts. For 

example, the report described annual performance goals that were general in 

nature and did not have good metrics to gauge progress; it did not describe a 

comprehensive process and total resources needed to achieve long-term 

goals; and it did not define an objective and formal process for evaluating 

results. As a result, it is unclear how improvement goals will be achieved, 

what resources will be required, or when improvements are expected to be 

completed. In addition, it did not fully describe the national, regional, and 

local military response capabilities that will be developed, or how these 

capabilities will be integrated with local civilian capabilities. As a result, it 

is unclear how duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will 

be avoided. DOD officials attributed the report's limitations to evolving 

organizational responsibilities, and a lack of resources and guidance. GAO 

believes that until a more results-oriented, comprehensive plan is developed 

that clearly articulates the military response capabilities to be developed and 

integrated with the civilian community, DOD’s ongoing initiatives and other 

opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be effectively or 

efficiently implemented. 

Two obstacles impede DOD’s ability to effectively develop a comprehensive 

approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. First, while a 

large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to improve installation 

preparedness, the responsibilities of two newly established organizations— 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the 

U.S. Northern Command—are evolving, and the installation preparedness 

related responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense is 

not clearly defined. Second, no single entity has been given the authority 

and responsibility to integrate and manage departmentwide installation 

preparedness efforts. In discussions with officials at the department, Joint 

Staff, service and installation levels, there was general agreement that a lack 

of a single focal point having the appropriate authority and responsibility to 

integrate overall installation preparedness improvement efforts among the 

many organizations involved has adversely affected their ability to 

effectively plan for and manage departmentwide installation preparedness 

improvements. As a result, DOD has faced difficulties in developing 

departmentwide standards and concepts of operations and in preparing a 

comprehensive plan for installation preparedness. Until organization roles 

and responsibilities are clarified, and an integrating authority is designated, 

DOD will be limited in its ability to develop a comprehensive approach, 

promulgate departmentwide guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing 

billion-dollar improvement initiatives at the installation level. 
Contents 


Letter 

Results in Brief


Background


DOD’s Report Does Not Represent a Comprehensive, 


Results-Oriented Plan to Improve Installation Preparedness 

Two Obstacles Hinder DOD’s Ability to Improve Installation 

Preparedness 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for Executive Action 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

1 

3 

5 

9 

15 

25 

25 

26 

Appendix I	 Section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2003 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

Related GAO Products 

Tables 

Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements 10 

Table 2: Key DOD and Joint Staff Organizations Involved in 

Installation Preparedness 16 

Table 3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations 

Visited or Contacted for this Assignment 31 

Page i GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 

28 

30 

33 

36 

37 
Figures 

Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise 8 

Figure 2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in 

Chemical/Biological Exercise 20 

Abbreviations 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield 

explosives 

DOD Department of Defense 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

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Page ii GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

August 12, 2004 


The Honorable John W. Warner


Chairman 


The Honorable Carl Levin 


Ranking Minority Member


Committee on Armed Services 


United States Senate 


The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 


Chairman 


The Honorable Ike Skelton 


Ranking Minority Member


Committee on Armed Services 


House of Representatives 


Terrorist incidents within the United States and abroad have underscored 


the Department of Defense’s (DOD) need to safeguard military personnel


and infrastructure from potential terrorist attacks involving weapons of


mass destruction (WMD).

1

 While many of the department’s past efforts


have focused on enhancing protection and response capabilities against 


high-yield explosives, the new security environment underscores the need 


for the department to expand its safeguards to include chemical, 


biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. To address these potential


threats, the department has begun to direct billions of dollars toward 


departmentwide initiatives designed to safeguard personnel and facilities. 


At the same time, the military services are continuing to pursue initiatives 


at specific installations to lessen their vulnerabilities to terrorist activities.


In recent years, both legislative actions and our prior work have focused 


on DOD’s need to develop an effective program to improve its installation 


preparedness against terrorists’ incidents. In response to a committee 


mandate2

 to review DOD’s plans for improving installation preparedness


1

 DOD defines weapons of mass destruction as weapons that are capable of a high 

order of destruction and are used to destroy large numbers of people. WMD can consist 

of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and high-yield explosives 

(CBRNE). 

2

 S. Rep. No. 107-62, at 352 (2001). 

Page 1 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
for WMD, we concluded in an April 2002 report that while the department 

had made some progress, it did not have a comprehensive plan or overall 

framework to guide its installation preparedness improvement efforts.3 

We also discussed with the department during the course of that work 

the importance of clearly articulating the national, regional, and local 

response capabilities that would be developed and integrated with the 

civilian community so that unnecessary redundant capabilities could 

be avoided. 

Following our initial assessment and report, in September 2002, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that called for the 

development of a departmentwide integrated CBRNE approach to 

installation preparedness, with complete integration of policies, 

technologies, equipment, and operational concepts. The memorandum 

noted that the department would begin providing all installation 

personnel, including military and civilian personnel, contractors, and 

others who live or work on base, with protection against the wider range 

of threats. 

Also following our initial report, Congress, in section 1402 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (see app. I),

4

 directed the 

Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive plan, with annual 

updates in 2004, 2005, and 2006, for improving the preparedness of military 

installations worldwide for terrorist incidents, including attacks involving 

weapons of mass destruction. The legislation also directed us to review 

DOD’s plan and provide our assessment to the Senate and House Armed 

Services Committees. In September 2003, the department complied with 

the section 1402 mandate by submitting its plan, entitled “Report to 

Congress on Preparedness of Military Installations for Preventing and 

Responding to Terrorist Incidents.” 

This report summarizes our assessment of DOD’s September 2003 report 

to Congress. Specifically, it addresses two questions: (1) Does the 

department’s report represent a comprehensive plan that can guide 

installation preparedness efforts? and (2) What obstacles, if any, hinder 

3

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Preparedness of Military 

Installations for Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, GAO-02-644R 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2002). 

4

 Pub. L. 107-314, §1402 (2002). 

Page 2 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
the department’s ability to develop and effectively implement a 

comprehensive approach to installation preparedness? 

In conducting our assessment, we examined DOD’s 2003 report to 

determine if it addressed the elements required by the act, and evaluated 

the quality of the information by comparing it to management principles 

embodied by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,5 

such as the desired characteristics for long-term goals and strategies to 

accomplish those goals, and performance criteria for measuring progress. 

We also discussed the content of the report with department officials 

who prepared it to better understand how it was developed. To identify 

obstacles, if any, that may prevent DOD from developing a comprehensive 

approach to improve installation preparedness, we discussed with 

department, service, and installation officials the roles and responsibilities 

of organizations and offices involved in the department’s installation 

preparedness efforts, as well as the challenges they faced in planning 

and implementing preparedness efforts. As part of our evaluation, we 

discussed and observed installation preparedness capabilities at 

13 military installations. Although the information obtained at these 

locations cannot be generalized to describe DOD’s worldwide installation 

preparedness improvement efforts, it provided us with insights on 

preparedness challenges at the installation level. We assessed the 

reliability of the data used in this report and determined that it was 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

We conducted our review between April 2003 and May 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further 

information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix II. 

Results in Brief
 While DOD’s September 2003 report generally met the requirements of 

section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2003 by discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the report 

does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management plan to 

help guide installation preparedness improvement efforts. For example, 

the report described annual performance goals that were general in nature 

and did not have adequate metrics to gauge progress, it did not describe a 

5

 Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act to provide for, among 

other things, the establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the 

federal government. Pub. L. 103-62 (2003). 

Page 3 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
comprehensive process and total resources needed to achieve long-term 

goals, and it did not define an objective and formal process for evaluating 

results. As a result, it is unclear how long-term goals will be measured, 

what resources will be needed to achieve the desired goals, when the goals 

are expected to be achieved, and how the results of improvement efforts 

will be evaluated. In addition, the report did not fully describe the national, 

regional, and local military response capabilities that will be developed, or 

how those capabilities will be integrated with local civilian capabilities. As 

a result, it is unclear how duplication of requirements and unnecessarily 

redundant capabilities will be avoided. Department officials acknowledged 

that the report does not reflect the results-oriented management elements 

we describe nor are military response capabilities clearly articulated in the 

report, because, in their opinion, DOD organizations’ roles and 

responsibilities were still evolving in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 

on September 11, 2001, and because they had limited resources and 

guidance to prepare the report. Officials also stated that responsibility for 

preparing the legislatively required annual updates to the plan has not 

been assigned, and that the department has not yet submitted the 2004 

update, which was required to be sent with materials supporting the fiscal 

year 2005 budget request in March 2004. Until a comprehensive plan is 

prepared that more fully incorporates results-oriented management 

principles and better defines the desired military response capabilities, the 

department’s installation preparedness improvement initiatives may not be 

implemented in the most effective and efficient manner, the department 

may be limited in its ability to determine if improvement efforts are 

achieving the desired outcome, and opportunities to improve installation 

preparedness may not be fully realized. 

Two obstacles impede DOD’s ability to effectively develop a 

comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. 

First, a large number of organizations are engaged in efforts to improve 

the preparedness of military installations, but the installation 

preparedness-related responsibilities of two recently established 

organizations—the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

and the U.S. Northern Command—are still evolving. On May 7, 2004, the 

U.S. Northern Command was assigned specific antiterrorism and force 

protection responsibilities for domestic installations, which was a 

significant step toward clarifying its installation preparedness role, but 

those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense are still 

undefined. Secondly, no single entity has been assigned the authority or 

responsibility to integrate and manage departmentwide installation 

preparedness efforts. As a result, DOD has not developed departmentwide 

installation preparedness policies, including integrated concepts of 

Page 4 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
operations and standards, as required by the Assistant Secretary in his 

September 5, 2002, memorandum; the comprehensive plan called for by 

the act was prepared by an organization that had no formal authority to 

integrate departmentwide efforts and resolve disagreements between the 

parties involved; and DOD has not taken any specific steps to evaluate 

the overall progress in implementing this plan. Until these obstacles 

are removed, the department will be limited in its ability to develop a 

comprehensive approach, promulgate departmentwide installation 

preparedness guidance, and effectively coordinate ongoing improvement 

initiatives. 

We are recommending the department take steps to fully incorporate 

results-oriented management principles in the next update to the plan, 

clarify the installation preparedness related responsibilities of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and designate a 

single integrating authority with the responsibility to coordinate and 

integrate worldwide installation preparedness improvement efforts. In 

comments on a draft of this report, the department agreed with our 

recommendations, and stated it will take specific actions to implement 

them. 

The department’s policies, programs, and organizational responsibilities 

related to installation preparedness for attacks involving weapons of mass 

destruction have been evolving over the last few years as the department 

adapted to meet new challenges arising from terrorist attacks. Especially 

since the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the general focus 

of the department’s installation preparedness activities emphasized 

antiterrorism, or defensive measures such as gates, fencing, perimeter 

lighting, and security patrols used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals 

and property. After the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, 

antiterrorism measures received even greater emphasis, resulting in 

additional standards and measures to better protect military forces. The 

September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States heightened the emphasis 

and focus on installation preparedness against a wider spectrum of 

threats. 

Background 

DOD’s Antiterrorism/Force In August 2003, DOD updated its directive signed by the Deputy Secretary 

Protection Policy and of Defense that provides DOD’s antiterrorism policy and assigns 

Guidance responsibilities to defense organizations implementing antiterrorism 

initiatives.6 This directive places responsibility for developing 

6

 DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18, 2003. 

Page 5 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
antiterrorism policy and guidance with the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. In 

this capacity, the Assistant Secretary of Defense issued an instruction that 

established 31 antiterrorism standards that DOD organizations, including 

the services, are required to implement.7

 These standards address 

antiterrorism planning, training requirements, physical security measures, 

and related issues. The Assistant Secretary also issued a handbook 

containing additional detailed guidance on antiterrorism policies and 

practices, including guidance on assessing these practices, which was 

updated in February 2004.

8

 Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

manage antiterrorism funding, conduct inspections, and work with the 

Assistant Secretary to develop DOD antiterrorism policies. Additionally, 

each of the military services has issued regulations, orders, or instructions 

to implement the DOD guidance and establish its own specific policies and 

standards. Overseas, the geographic combatant commanders have 

ultimate antiterrorism and force protection authority and responsibility 

within their areas of responsibility.9 

DOD Installation 

Preparedness Guidance 

and Improvement 

Initiatives 

In a September 5, 2002, memorandum, DOD clarified its policy to protect 

military installations from CBRNE attacks, respond to these attacks with 

trained and equipped emergency responders, and ensure that installations 

are able to continue critical operations during an attack and resume 

essential operations afterwards.

10 The policy also required DOD to 

approach preparedness from a departmentwide perspective, with 

complete integration of policies, technologies, equipment, and operational 

concepts. The memorandum noted that the department would begin 

providing all installation personnel, including military and civilian 

personnel, contractors, and others who live or work on base, with 

protection against the wider range of threats. 

DOD’s September 2003 report to Congress was the first to offer a 

definition of installation preparedness. It was defined as a collective, 

7

 DOD Instruction 2000.16: DOD Antiterrorism Standards, June 14, 2001. 

8

 DOD Handbook O-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9, 2004. 

9

 DOD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards § E3.1.1.11 (June 14, 2001). 

10 Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Preparedness of U.S. Military Installations and Facilities 

Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive 

(CBRNE) Attack,” Memorandum, Sept. 5, 2002. 

Page 6 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
proactive effort to prevent, detect, respond, and protect department 

bases, personnel, their families, and infrastructure critical to mission 

accomplishment against terrorists’ use of weapons of mass destruction. 

This definition combines the fundamental elements of antiterrorism— 

defensive measures to prevent and detect attacks—with elements related 

to responding to and mitigating the effects of an attack. 

DOD has recently committed significant resources and undertaken a 

number of initiatives to improve installation preparedness to protect 

personnel and facilities. For example, in September 2002, the department 

began a $61 million project called the Joint Services Installation Pilot 

Project, to provide equipment and training to enhance chemical and 

biological detection and emergency response capabilities on nine diverse 

DOD installations. In October 2003, it started the Guardian project to 

improve the detection and protection against chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear threats at 200 domestic and overseas installations 

at an estimated cost of $1.6 billion over the next 5 years. The project is 

designed to tailor requirements according to installation needs, and will 

include the design and installation of detection systems. Figure 1 

illustrates a decontamination operation during a recent installation 

training exercise responding to a chemical/biological incident. 

Page 7 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Figure 1: Decontamination Operation during Installation Exercise 

Source: Navy Region Southwest. 

In a number of reports that we have issued during the past few years, 

we have underscored the need for DOD to institute sound management 

principles to guide its installation preparedness efforts. Such management 

principles are embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act 

of 1993 and consist of a number of critical elements considered essential 

in developing an effective strategy, guiding resource allocations, and 

monitoring results. In this previous work, we concluded that without 

sound management principles, DOD faces, among other things, the 

potential for inappropriate or redundant allocation of resources and 

limited or lost preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, 

Congress and DOD managers may not be able to determine if desired 

program outcomes are being achieved. 

Page 8 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
DOD’s Report Does 

Not Represent a 

Comprehensive, 

Results-Oriented 

Plan to Improve 

Installation 

Preparedness 

While the department’s report generally met the requirements of 

section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2003 by discussing all of the legislatively required elements, the report 

does not represent a comprehensive, results-oriented management plan to 

help guide installation preparedness improvement efforts. The legislation 

required the department to address nine elements—seven associated with 

management principles and two associated with military response 

capabilities. The department’s report described each of these nine 

elements, but the management elements were not addressed in a 

results-oriented manner, and the military capability elements were not 

discussed in a manner that provides a clear description of the response 

capabilities needed, or how they will be integrated with civilian 

capabilities. As a result, installation preparedness improvement goals, 

objectives, resource requirements, and methods to evaluate the outcome 

of new initiatives remain unclear, as well as how the department intends 

to develop national, regional and local military response capabilities that 

are coordinated with civilian response capabilities. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required DOD 

to develop a comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of 

military installations for terrorist incidents. Specifically, it required the 

department to address five elements of a preparedness strategy, and four 

elements of a performance plan. We analyzed these nine requirements and 

found that seven of them were collectively related to management 

principles, and two of them were discussion points related to the 

development of military response capabilities. Table 1 lists these nine 

elements. 

Page 9 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Table 1: GAO Analysis of Legislative Requirements 

Seven management-related elements 

1. Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving the preparedness of 

military installations for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks. 

2. Description of the process, together with a discussion of the resources, necessary to 

achieve those goals and objectives. 

3. A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals and objectives of the 

strategy. 

4. Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary that could impede the 

achievement of these goals and objectives. 

5. Identification of budget and other resource requirements necessary to achieve those 

goals and objectives. 

6. Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those goals and objectives. 

7. A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving those goals and 

objectives. 

Two military response capability discussion elements 

8. A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national military response 

capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and used. 

9. A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the capabilities referred to in #8 

above with local, regional, or national civilian and other military capabilities. 

Source: GAO analysis of section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. 

DOD’s September report to Congress discussed each of the nine 


required elements and was therefore technically in compliance with 


the requirements of the act. However, the report did not address the 


seven management-related elements in a manner that fully incorporates 


results-oriented management principles so that the report could serve as a 


useful tool in guiding installation improvement efforts. The following is 


our assessment of the adequacy of the information provided in the 


department’s report when compared to results-oriented management


principles: 


• 	 Long-Term Goals—Long-term goals should explain what results are 

expected, should be results-oriented, and should be expressed in a way 

that allows them to be assessed in terms of achievement. They should 

also describe how managers are to be held accountable for achieving 

such goals. Although the department’s report identifies four long-term 

goals, which it calls “preparedness strategy elements”—prevention, 

detection, protection, and emergency response—it does not clearly 

express these goals in a way that would allow the department to 

measure progress toward achieving them. For example, the 

prevention strategy element was described as “The Department’s 

Page 10 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
antiterrorism (AT) strategy is to maximize efforts to prevent, deter, and 

detect terrorist attacks against DOD personnel, their families, facilities, 

installations, and infrastructure critical to mission accomplishment as 

well as the preparation needed to defend against and respond to the 

consequences of terrorist incidents.” This description does not provide 

the information necessary to explain what results are to be expected 

nor is it described in a way that allows progress to be assessed. 

Furthermore, the report did not identify the organizations accountable 

for achieving the goals. 

• 	 Process to Achieve Goals—The act required that the plan describe 

the process, together with a discussion of the resources, necessary to 

achieve those goals and objectives. In describing how the installation 

preparedness improvement strategy would be achieved, the 

department’s report provided some general narrative such as 

“DOD...policies support this...strategy by ensuring a comprehensive 

and integrated approach that continuously identifies and overcomes 

vulnerabilities, thereby reducing risk to our personnel and resources; 

enhancing the planning, training and equipping of the force; and 

providing prudent guidance and direction...” The department’s report 

also describes ongoing improvement initiatives such as the Joint 

Service Installation Pilot Project and the Guardian Program.11 Because 

of the general nature of the discussion in the report, it was not clear the 

extent to which the goals would be met with the cited initiatives, or, as 

discussed below, the full extent to which resources would be required 

to achieve each goal. 

• 	 Schedule with milestones—The act required the plan to include a 

reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the installation 

preparedness long-term goals. Such a schedule should include details 

on incremental performance goals that are tangible, measurable, and 

objective; usually expressed within certain timeframes such as “by the 

end of 200X, at least 95 percent of commanders will have completed 

required annual terrorism risk assessments.” The department’s report 

contained 25 performance goals identified in the report as strategic 

objectives. These objectives were general in nature, and most 

contained a specific year in which the goal was to be either started or 

achieved. However, as discussed in the performance criteria section 

below, they all lacked specific targets that could be used to measure 

progress. For example, one strategic objective listed in the plan states 

11 Referred to in the report as the “Chemical, Biological Installation/Force Protection 

Program.” 

Page 11 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
“beginning in fiscal year 2003, improve robotic vehicles for 

[antiterrorism] operations as well as for emergency responders.” 

• 	 External factors that could impede achievement of the 

long-term goals—External impediments should be identified, and the 

actions needed to mitigate these impediments should be addressed. 

Although the department’s report identifies a number of external 

impediments (e.g., the feasibility, availability, and affordability of 

technological solutions and the degree to which state and local 

responders are trained and equipped), it does not clearly describe how 

these factors may affect the department’s ability to achieve its goals, or 

ways of reducing the potential impact of these impediments. 

• 	 Identification of budget and other resources—Good management 

principles call for the identification of resources, including funding, 

personnel, and equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level 

of performance. Although the department’s report identifies funding 

resources needed for antiterrorism and consequence management12— 

for example, $8.5 billion in fiscal year 2004—the report indicates that 

this amount is part of a larger funding requirement, but it does not 

provide further details. In addition, the report does not include any 

information on additional personnel or equipment that would be 

needed. 

• 	 Performance criteria—Performance criteria or measures are 

indicators used to measure progress in achieving goals and objectives. 

They should be objective and outcome-oriented with specific target 

levels to meet performance goals. The department’s report identifies 

25 performance indicators (one for each performance goal), which 

it calls measures of effectiveness. However, many of them are not 

outcome-oriented and all of them lack specific targets or baselines 

that could be used to measure progress. For example, as discussed 

previously, although the report notes that robotic vehicles will be 

improved, it does not provide a quantifiable target, nor does it present a 

baseline to assess progress. In another example, a strategic objective 

listed in the plan is “develop standardized installation CBRNE scenario 

exercises for training and equipment requirements.” The related 

measure of effectiveness described in the report is “standardized 

12 Consequence management is defined in DOD Directive 2000.12 as those measures taken 

to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide 

emergency relief to governments, business, and individuals affected by the consequences 

of a CBRNE situation. 

Page 12 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
exercise scenarios will improve efficiencies and consistency in 

equipment and training, leading to improved interoperability.” This 

measure of effectiveness is highlighting the potential benefit of 

achieving the objective; it does not provide specific criteria for how it 

will be measured, or any baseline data that can be used to measure 

progress in achieving the stated goal. 

• 	 Process for evaluating results—Program evaluations are defined as 

objective and formal assessments of the results, impact, or effects of a 

program or policy. Such information can be used to assess the extent 

to which performance goals were met and identify appropriate 

strategies to meet those goals that were not met. The department’s 

report indicates that it will provide general oversight, semiannual 

review of action plans, and annual reviews of antiterrorism plans. 

However, the report does not define how it will evaluate the impact of 

current initiatives or describe how such evaluations could be used to 

improve the department’s overall efforts to improve installation 

preparedness. 

In addition to the seven management-related elements, the legislation 

required DOD to discuss two elements related to military response 

capabilities. In the first element, the department was required to discuss 

the extent to which local, regional, or national military response 

capabilities were to be developed, integrated, and used. In our view, it is 

important that DOD articulate the extent to which it will develop such 

capabilities because national and regional capabilities can supplement 

or enhance those available at individual installations and redundant 

capabilities could be avoided. In the report, however, DOD discussed 

non-military capabilities, such as the Federal Response Plan, which 

provides a government-integrated response to disasters through the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. The report also discussed the 

department’s Joint Task Force for Civil Support, which serves as a military 

headquarters unit responsible for coordinating department activities 

supporting civil authorities, but does not have specific operational 

response capabilities of its own. 

In the second discussion element, DOD was directed to discuss how it 

would coordinate its proposed military response capabilities with civilian 

capabilities. Such a discussion would provide information on how overlap 

and duplication of efforts between military and civilian organizations at all 

levels could be reduced. However, DOD’s report discussed the need to use 

memorandums of agreement between, for example, military installations 

and civilian local-community first responders to fill in the gaps in 

Page 13 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
emergency response capabilities on and off base. However, because it did 

not address how military regional and national response capabilities were 

to be developed, integrated, and used, the report did not describe how 

those capabilities would be coordinated with those of the civilian sector. 

Furthermore, while the report discussed a national-level response 

exercise, called “Top Officials,”13 involving cooperation and coordination 

between the federal response community (such as the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency) and local and regional civilian response 

organizations, the report did not describe how military response 

capabilities would be integrated into such exercises, nor how lessons 

learned from national exercises would be shared with military 

organizations. 

In discussions with us, officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense, who were responsible for preparing the 

report, agreed that the report does not fully reflect the results-oriented 

management elements that we have described above. In addition, they 

agreed that the report does not clearly articulate the military response 

capabilities to be developed at the national, regional and local levels. They 

told us that, in their opinion, the department organizations’ roles and 

responsibilities were still evolving in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 

on September 11, 2001 (discussed in more detail later in this report), and 

they prepared the report with limited staff and limited guidance. As a 

result, they approached the preparation of the report by generally 

summarizing the key efforts underway in the department to improve 

installation preparedness, and by drawing on key elements of the existing 

antiterrorism program. 

Based on the concerns of Congress regarding the need for DOD to 

effectively plan for installation preparedness improvements against 

terrorist incidents, and our past work concluding that DOD did not have 

a comprehensive plan or overall framework to guide its installation 

preparedness improvement efforts, we believe that without clearly 

articulated results-oriented management elements, the report—and the 

comprehensive plan it is supposed to reflect—cannot serve as a useful tool 

13 Congress mandated the Department of State and Department of Justice to conduct a 

series of challenging, role-playing exercises involving the senior federal, state, and local 

officials who would direct crisis management and consequence management response to 

an actual WMD attack. The result was Top Officials (TOPOFF), a national-level domestic 

and international exercise series designed to produce a more effective, coordinated, global 

response to WMD terrorism. 

Page 14 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
to guide and manage installation improvement efforts and provide a 

mechanism to adequately assess progress. For example, DOD’s report is 

unclear in its discussion of how long-term goals will be measured, what 

resources will be needed to achieve the desired goals, when the goals are 

expected to be achieved, and how the results of ongoing improvement 

efforts will be evaluated. In addition, without a clear description of how 

national, regional, and local military response capabilities will be 

developed and integrated with civilian capabilities, it is unclear how 

duplication of requirements and redundant capabilities will be avoided. 

Therefore, without a comprehensive plan that more fully incorporates 

results-oriented management principles and better defines the desired 

military response capabilities, the department’s installation preparedness 

improvement initiatives may not be implemented in the most effective and 

efficient manner, the department may be limited in its ability to determine 

if improvement efforts are achieving the desired outcome, and 

opportunities to improve installation preparedness may not be fully 

realized. 

Furthermore, the act requires that DOD submit annual updates to the plan 

in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 that include a discussion of any 

revision to the plan, and an assessment of the progress made in achieving 

the goals and objectives of the strategy set forth in the plan. DOD, 

however, has not assigned responsibility for preparing the required 

updates to any organization and has not taken any specific steps to 

evaluate the overall progress in implementing this plan. In fact, the first 

annual update, which was due March 2004 with the materials that the 

Secretary of Defense submits to Congress in support of the budget 

submission, has not yet been submitted. According to the officials we 

spoke with, until specific responsibility for updating the plan is assigned, it 

is unclear who will prepare the updates or when they will be prepared. 

Two obstacles have impeded DOD’s ability to effectively develop a 

comprehensive approach to implement installation preparedness efforts. 

First, although numerous organizations currently engaged in installation 

preparedness improvement efforts have clear roles and responsibilities, 

two key organizations—the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and the U.S. Northern Command—have only been recently 

established, and their installation preparedness responsibilities are still 

evolving. On May 7, 2004, the Northern Command was assigned specific 

antiterrorism and force protection responsibilities for domestic 

installations, which was a significant step toward clarifying its installation 

preparedness role, but those of Homeland Defense are still undefined. 

Two Obstacles Hinder 

DOD’s Ability to 

Improve Installation 

Preparedness 

Page 15 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Second, no organization has been given the authority and responsibility 

to integrate and coordinate installation preparedness policies and 

improvement efforts and monitor progress in achieving the plan’s 

objectives. Until these issues are resolved, DOD will be unable to 

pursue installation preparedness improvements in a comprehensive 

and integrated manner, and the significant resources being applied to 

accomplish improvement goals may not be spent in the most efficient and 

effective manner. 

Numerous Organizations 


Involved in Installation 


Preparedness and 


Two Have Evolving Roles 


and Responsibilities 


Many organizations at various levels within DOD are engaged in activities 

to improve installation preparedness. The military services and their 

installation commanders play a key role in safeguarding their individual 

bases, while combatant commanders are responsible for protecting forces 

within their geographic areas of responsibility. In addition, there are 

several department and Joint-Staff-level organizations that have key roles 

and responsibilities for installation preparedness policies and procedures. 

The roles of most of these organizations are clearly defined but those of 

two recently established department organizations—the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U. S. Northern 

Command—are still evolving. Table 2 lists the key organizations involved 

in installation preparedness at the department and Joint Staff levels, and 

briefly describes their roles and responsibilities. 

Table 2: Key DOD and Joint Staff Organizations Involved in Installation 

Preparedness 

Installation preparedness 

Organization related responsibilities 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 

Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 

Develops worldwide antiterrorism policy and 

guidance for the DOD components. Such 

guidance currently includes DOD Directive 

2000.12, “DOD Antiterrorism Program”; 

DOD Instruction 2000.16, “DOD 

Antiterrorism Standards”; and DOD 

O-2000.12-H, “DOD Antiterrorism 

Handbook.” 

Page 16 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Organization 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense 

Installation preparedness 

related responsibilities 

Provides overall supervision of homeland 

defense activities of the department under 

the authority, direction, and control of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. As 

such, will oversee homeland defense 

activities, develop policies, conduct 

analyses, provide advice, and make 

recommendations on homeland defense, 

support to civil authorities, emergency 

preparedness and domestic crisis 

management matters with the department. 

DOD defines homeland defense as the 

military protection of United States territory, 

domestic population, and critical defense 

infrastructure against external threats and 

aggression. 

Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs 

Oversees the Chemical Biological Defense 

Program, including programs such as 

Project Guardian, run by the Joint Program 

Executive Office for Chemical- Biological 

Defense. 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Prepares and defends the Military 

Installations and Environment Construction Bill, which funds installation 

construction projects that include 

antiterrorism measures; monitors and 

reports on installations’ readiness; and is 

responsible for the development of DOD’s 

minimum antiterrorism standards for 

buildings. 

a

Defense Threat Reduction Agency The Director of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency reports directly to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics. 

Safeguards America’s interests from 

weapons of mass destruction by controlling 

and reducing the threat and providing tools 

and services for the warfighter. 

Provides direction and oversight of the Joint 

Services Installation Pilot Project to upgrade 

nine military installations to be model sites 

for biological and chemical safety. 

Manages the Unconventional Nuclear 

Weapons Defense program, in conjunction 

with the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Page 17 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Installation preparedness 

Organization related responsibilities 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

Defense 

Develops departmentwide concepts of 

operations and comprehensive CBRNE 

standards for the preparedness of military 

installations, as directed by the Joint Staff. 

Serves as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff’s focal point for all chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear defense 

issues in passive defense, force protection, 

consequence management, and homeland 

security, including installation protection 

responsibilities. 

Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical-Biological Defense 

Implements the Guardian Program to 

improve CBRN capabilities on 200 

installations under the purview of the 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 

Defense programs. 

Developed equipment standards for 

selecting equipment for its installations, and 

will update that equipment list on an annual 

basis throughout different phases of the 

Guardian program. 

Combatant Commands 

Geographic Combatant Commanders 	 Responsible for implementing antiterrorism 

policies and programs for the protection of 

all department elements and personnel in 

their area of responsibility. 

U. S. Northern Command Responsible for conducting operations to 

deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 

aggression aimed at the continental United 

States and other nearby areas within its 

area of responsibility. 

Effective not later than October 1, 2004, will 

exercise tactical control for department force 

protection and assume overall department 

antiterrorism program and force protection 

responsibility in the continental United 

States. 

Military Services 

Military departments 	 Each of the military services has issued 

regulations, orders, or instructions to 

implement the DOD guidance and establish 

its own specific policies and standards. The 

services assign responsibility for protecting 

installations from terrorist attacks to 

installation commanders. 

Page 18 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Installation preparedness 

Organization related responsibilities 

Installation commanders 	 Responsible for protecting installations from 

terrorist attacks, including identifying and 

prioritizing requirements using annual 

assessments of threat, vulnerability, and the 

criticality of assets. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

a

Combat Support Agency. 

Three organizations have responsibilities for recent departmentwide 

improvement initiatives. First, the Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical-Biological Defense, under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, is in charge of implementing the Guardian program to safeguard 

200 military installations within the next 5 years, at an estimated cost of 

$1.6 billion. Oversight of this project is assigned to the Office of the 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and 

Biological Defense Programs. Second, the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, a combat support agency that reports to the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is responsible for 

managing the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project—an initiative to 

enhance chemical/biological detection and emergency response 

capabilities at nine installations. Figure 2 shows a first responder in 

protective gear assisting a person exposed to a chemical/biological agent 

during a Pilot Project exercise. Third, the Joint Requirements Office for 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense, under the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible for developing CBRNE 

concepts of operations and standards for installation preparedness. 

Page 19 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Figure 2: Emergency Personnel Assist Individual in Chemical/Biological Exercise 

Source: Navy Region Southwest. 

Page 20 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Two recently established organizations have key roles in homeland 

defense, but their roles and responsibilities for improving the 

preparedness of military installations for preventing and responding to 

terrorist attacks are still evolving. The Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense, which was established as part of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,14 has 

responsibility for the overall supervision of homeland defense (including 

land, maritime, and aerospace) activities. More specifically, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is to lead and focus the 

department’s activities in homeland defense and homeland security; 

ensure internal coordination of DOD policy direction; provide guidance to 

the U.S. Northern Command for its homeland defense mission and its 

military activities in support of homeland security, support to civil 

authorities; and coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security 

and other government agencies. However, as of May 2004, DOD had not 

yet published or promulgated a charter for this organization that would 

clearly define its roles and responsibilities for installation preparedness. 

Although this organization prepared DOD’s September 2003 report to 

Congress, it does not have the authority or responsibility to integrate and 

coordinate the various aspects of installation preparedness, which are 

currently scattered throughout the department. 

Similarly, an April 2002 revision to DOD’s Unified Command Plan,15 

approved by the President, created the new U.S. Northern Command, a 

geographic combatant command with the responsibility to militarily 

defend the continental United States and other nearby areas. More 

specifically, the command is responsible for conducting operations to 

deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United 

States and its territories and interests within its area of responsibility; 

moreover, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, it provides 

military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management 

operations in response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

high-yield explosive events. 

Until recently, Northern Command’s specific role in supporting the 

department’s efforts to improve installation preparedness was not clearly 

14 Pub. L. 107-314, § 902 (2002). 

15 Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and establish 

their missions, responsibilities, force structure, geographic area of responsibility, and 

other attributes. 

Page 21 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
defined. On May 7, 2004, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff assigned U.S. Northern Command the responsibilities for force 

protection and the department’s antiterrorism program in the continental 

United States, effective no later than October 1, 2004.16 This step 

significantly clarified the command’s role, but the specific details of how 

those responsibilities will be carried out are still being developed. In 

addition, because the Northern Command’s area of responsibility covers 

domestic installations, its efforts to support installation preparedness may 

be much more complex than in overseas locations, due to the additional 

responsibilities to provide military assistance to civil authorities, including 

consequence management operations. 

The Department Lacks a 

Focal Point for Installation 

Preparedness Efforts 

DOD has not designated a single focal point with the authority and 

responsibility to integrate and coordinate all aspects of installation 

preparedness, thereby hindering its ability to develop a comprehensive 

approach to installation preparedness. This has been evident in a number 

of areas, for example: 

• 	 Although the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense does not have overall authority to integrate installation 

preparedness activities for the department, its staff was tasked with 

preparing DOD’s report on installation preparedness. Homeland 

Defense officials told us that developing the report and obtaining 

agreement on its content from the many organizations involved in 

preparedness activities was hampered because they did not have 

overall authority and responsibility for planning the department’s 

approach to installation preparedness. For example, they said they had 

limited ability to resolve disagreements among various organizations 

over many issues, such as the definition of installation preparedness or 

the specific language used in the report, and thus faced delays in 

moving the report forward. 

• 	 DOD has not assigned responsibility to any organization for updating 

the 2003 report or monitoring progress in achieving its goals. Although 

the 2003 report discussed some oversight and coordination 

mechanisms, these were primarily related to the department’s existing 

antiterrorism program. Because of the lack of an assignment, the 2004 

16 In a message from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated May 7, 2004, with subject: 

Executive Order for standup of U.S. Northern Command’s antiterrorism and force 

protection responsibilities for the continental United States. 

Page 22 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
update was not submitted to Congress, and the department has not 

taken any specific steps to evaluate the overall progress in 

implementing this plan. 

• 	 Responsibilities for developing DOD policy, standards and other 

guidance related to installation preparedness are fragmented. On 

one hand, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Low-Intensity Conflict is responsible for preparing worldwide 

antiterrorism policies,

17 standards,18 implementation guidance,19 and an 

antiterrorism strategic plan.

20 The mission of the DOD antiterrorism 

program, according to officials drafting the new antiterrorism strategic 

plan, is to provide worldwide protection of DOD personnel and their 

families; selected DOD contractors; and installations, infrastructure, 

and key assets/information essential to mission accomplishment from 

acts of terrorism, including CBRNE hazards. Over the past 10 months, 

this office has updated the antiterrorism policy and implementation 

guidance, drafted the antiterrorism strategic plan, and is currently 

revising the antiterrorism standards. The Assistant Secretary was also 

tasked by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his September 5, 2002, 

memo to ensure that CBRNE standards were developed in 

coordination with the Joint Staff; the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program, with a target issue date of May 2003. However, as of 

May 2004, the Joint Requirements Office, tasked by the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff with preparing these standards, together with the 

concepts of operations, had not been able to obtain final approval for 

either of these documents. Furthermore, according to agency officials, 

future updates to the CBRNE emergency response guidelines will be 

prepared under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense.21 

• 	 Military installations are facing challenges in prioritizing requirements 

for funding and personnel resources because DOD has been unable to 

develop departmentwide CBRNE concepts of operations and 

17 DOD Directive 2000.12: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, August 18, 2003. 

18 DOD Instruction 2000.16, “DOD Antiterrorism Standards,” June 14, 2001. 

19 DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H: DOD Antiterrorism Handbook, February 9, 2004. 

20 DOD O-20012-P Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, June 15, 2004. 

21 DOD Instruction 2000.18, “DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines,” December 4, 2002. 

Page 23 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
standards, which provide the basis for calculating requirements. Until 

they receive this guidance, the military services and installations will 

not be able to develop rational funding and personnel requirements; in 

addition, they may encounter difficulties in operating and maintaining 

new detection and protection equipment that they receive as a result of 

departmentwide initiatives such as the Joint Services Installation Pilot 

Project or the Guardian program. For example, at three installations 

participating in the Joint Services Installation Pilot Project, officials 

noted the need for additional resources to support the new equipment, 

which created unfunded requirements in fiscal year 2004 ranging from 

$2.1 to $6.5 million at each installation. 

In our discussions with officials at the department, Joint Staff, service, and 

installation levels, there was general agreement that the lack of a single 

focal point with the appropriate authority and responsibility to integrate 

departmentwide installation preparedness improvement efforts among 

the many organizations involved has adversely affected their ability to 

effectively plan for and manage these efforts. More specifically, the 

officials said that this lack of a focal point has hindered their ability to 

develop needed overarching guidance, such as the comprehensive plan, 

concepts of operations, and CBRNE standards. 

The evolving roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense and the Northern Command as the Combatant Command 

responsible for domestic military installations and facilities, combined 

with the lack of an integrating authority to oversee the efforts of various 

department organizations and improvement efforts, has limited the 

department’s ability to develop a comprehensive improvement plan, 

integrated concepts of operations, and specific installation preparedness 

standards. The recent decision to assign antiterrorism and force protection 

responsibilities for domestic installations to Northern Command has been 

a significant step in clarifying its overall responsibilities, but the role of 

Homeland Defense remains unclear because its charter has not been 

approved. Until Homeland Defense roles and responsibilities are clarified 

as to how it will support the department’s plan to improve installation 

preparedness, and an integrating authority is established, the department 

may continue to struggle with these issues, and the improvement efforts at 

all levels within the department may not be fully coordinated or efficiently 

executed. 

Page 24 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Conclusions Improving the preparedness of military installations worldwide for attacks 

using weapons of mass destruction is a challenging and complex task that 

will require a significant allocation of resources; involve numerous 

organizations within the department; and necessitate the coordination 

with other federal agencies and civilian organizations within the United 

States, and host nation organizations in overseas locations. Although the 

department has taken several steps and committed significant resources 

to immediately begin installation preparedness improvements, it lacks a 

comprehensive approach required by Congress that incorporates 

results-oriented management principles to guide improvement initiatives 

in the most efficient and effective manner. Congress has also required the 

department to prepare annual updates to the plan, which presents an 

opportunity to address the plan’s weaknesses, but several obstacles exist 

that have stymied the department’s ability to develop a comprehensive, 

results-oriented plan. The major obstacle we identified is the lack of a 

single organization or entity with the responsibility and authority to 

oversee and integrate the installation preparedness improvement efforts of 

various DOD organizations. This is a complex issue, because it involves 

those installations located within the continental United States, and 

those located in foreign countries. Other obstacles we noted include 

evolving or unclear responsibilities of key organizations, and an 

unassigned responsibility to update the plan. Without a revised plan that 

fully incorporates results-oriented management principles and clearly 

articulates the military response capabilities to be developed and 

integrated with the civilian community, the significant resources being 

applied to improve preparedness may not be spent in the most efficient 

and effective manner, and more importantly, opportunities to improve 

preparedness and protect military personnel, facilities, and capabilities 

from attacks using weapons of mass destruction may be lost. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To develop a more useful plan to guide installation preparedness 

improvement efforts, and to address barriers that inhibit DOD’s ability 

to develop a comprehensive approach to improve installation 

preparedness, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the 

following five actions: 

• 	 Designate a single integrating authority with the responsibility to 

coordinate and integrate worldwide installation preparedness 

improvement efforts at the department, service and installation levels. 

• 	 Assign that organization with responsibility for preparing the 2004, 

2005, and 2006 updates to the plan, which are required by section 1402 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. 

Page 25 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
• 	 Clarify the installation preparedness responsibilities of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. 

• 	 Require the next update to the plan to fully incorporate results-oriented 

management principles in the legislatively required elements. 

Specifically, the plan should contain: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Long-term goals that explain what results are expected, are 


results-oriented, and are expressed in a way that allows them to be 


assessed in terms of achievement. 


Strategies that articulate the processes necessary to achieve the 


organization’s goals and describe how managers are to be held 


accountable for achieving such goals. 


Annual performance goals that include a schedule with milestones 


to measure progress toward the long-term goals, and are tangible 


and measurable. 


A description of external impediments to achieving the goals and


the actions needed to mitigate these impediments;


Identification of resources, including funding, personnel, and 


equipment, needed to accomplish the expected level of


performance. 


Performance criteria or indicators used to measure progress in


achieving goals and objectives; these criteria should be objective 


and outcome-oriented with specific target levels to meet


performance goals. 


Evaluation plans that are objective and formal assessments of the 


results, impact, or effects of installation preparedness improvement 


efforts. 


Agency Comments 


and Our Evaluation 


• 	 Require the next update to the plan to clearly describe the military 

response capabilities that will be developed at the national, regional, 

and local levels; and how those capabilities will be developed in 

conjunction with civilian capabilities. 

In comments on a draft of this report provided by the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense, the department agreed with our 

recommendations recognizing the need for centralized management and 

operational oversight of a comprehensive preparedness program. The 

Assistant Secretary’s comments also stated that oversight and policy 

development for worldwide installation preparedness will be assigned to 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

and the charter directive for that organization will promulgate 

responsibility and required authority for worldwide installation 

preparedness. The Assistant Secretary will also be responsible for 

preparing the 2004, 2005, and 2006 updates to the comprehensive plan 

required by section 1402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Page 26 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Fiscal Year 2003. DOD agreed that these future updates would fully 

incorporate results-oriented management principles in the legislatively 

required elements, clearly describe the military response capabilities that 

will be developed at the national, regional, and local levels, and address 

how those capabilities will be developed in conjunction with civilian 

capabilities. In regard to the military response capabilities, DOD stated it 

was of paramount importance that the department work with other local, 

state, and federal entities to ensure redundant capabilities are avoided. 

We believe the actions DOD has outlined, when implemented, will be 

responsive to our recommendations, and they represent positive steps 

toward integrating installation preparedness improvement efforts and 

establishing a more results-oriented management framework to guide 

these efforts. The future updates to the comprehensive plan will also serve 

as a mechanism to provide Congress, DOD managers, and other 

organizations with an annual assessment of the progress achieved in 

improving installation preparedness. 

DOD’s comments are included in their entirety in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 


committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the 


Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force; the Commandant of


the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of the Management and Budget.


We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 


the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at


http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding


this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4402, or my Assistant Director, 


Robert L. Repasky, at (202) 512-9868. Key contributors to this report are 


listed in appendix IV. 


Janet St. Laurent, Director


Defense Capabilities and Management


Page 27 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2003 

SEC. 1402. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR IMPROVING THE 

PREPAREDNESS OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FOR 

TERRORIST INCIDENTS 

(a) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN—The Secretary of Defense shall develop a 

comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military 

installations for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks, including 

attacks involving the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction. 

(b) PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY—The plan under subsection (a) shall 

include a preparedness strategy that includes each of the following: 

(1) Identification of long-term goals and objectives for improving 

the preparedness of military installations for preventing and 

responding to terrorist attacks. 

(2) Identification of budget and other resource requirements 

necessary to achieve those goals and objectives. 

(3) Identification of factors beyond the control of the Secretary 

that could impede the achievement of these goals and objectives. 

(4) A discussion of the extent to which local, regional, or national 

military response capabilities are to be developed, integrated, and 

used. 

(5) A discussion of how the Secretary will coordinate the 

capabilities referred to in paragraph (4) with local, regional, or 

national civilian and other military capabilities. 

(c) PERFORMANCE PLAN.—The plan under subsection (a) shall 

include a performance plan that includes each of the following: 

(1) A reasonable schedule, with milestones, for achieving the goals 

and objectives of the strategy under subsection (b). 

(2) Performance criteria for measuring progress in achieving those 

goals and objectives. 

(3) A description of the process, together with a discussion of the 

resources, necessary to achieve those goals and objectives 

Page 28 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix I: Section 1402 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2003 

(4) A description of the process for evaluating results in achieving 

those goals and objectives. 

(d) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary shall submit the 

comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a) to the Committee on 

Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the 

House of Representatives not later than 180 days after the date of the 

enactment of this Act. 

(e) COMPTROLLER GENERAL REVIEW AND REPORT.—Not later 

than 60 days after the date on which the Secretary submits the 

comprehensive plan under subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall 

review the plan and submit to the committees referred to in subsection 

(d) the Comptroller General’s assessment of the plan. 

(f) ANNUAL REPORT.—(1) In each of 2004, 2005, and 2006, the 

Secretary of Defense shall include a report on the comprehensive plan 

developed under subsection (a) with the materials that the Secretary 

submits to Congress in support of the budget submitted by the President 

that year pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code. 

(2) Each such report shall include­

(A) a discussion of any revision that the Secretary has made 

in the comprehensive plan developed under subsection (a) 

since the last report under this subsection or, in the case of 

the first such report, since the plan was submitted under 

subsection (d); and 

(B) an assessment of the progress made in achieving the 

goals and objectives of the strategy set forth in the plan. 

(3) If the Secretary includes in the report for 2004 or 2005 under 

this subsection a declaration that the goals and objectives of the 

preparedness strategy set forth in the comprehensive plan have 

been achieved, no further report is required under this subsection. 

Page 29 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 


To determine if the Department of Defense’s (DOD) September 2003 

report to Congress represents a comprehensive plan that can guide 

installation preparedness efforts, we based our analysis on our past 

work that addressed the need for DOD to develop comprehensive 

strategies and implementation plans with results-oriented elements that 

focused on program outcomes or results, rather than program activities 

and processes. We discussed the concerns of Congress with committee 

staffs who were involved in developing section 1402 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 to better understand the 

requirements of the Act. We also discussed the report content with 

department officials who prepared it to ensure we had an agreed upon 

interpretation of the elements presented in the report. We then compared 

the nine elements discussed in the report with those specifically required 

by the legislation. We also compared the report’s seven managementrelated elements with those developed from sound management principles 

as embodied in the Government Results and Performance Act (GPRA) of 

1993 and further refined in GPRA user guides and prior GAO reports. To 

assess the two discussion elements related to military response 

capabilities required by the legislation, we reviewed information presented 

in the report to determine if it presented a clear discussion of the national, 

regional, local response capabilities, and how they would be developed in 

conjunction with civilian capabilities. We also discussed the content of the 

report in these two areas with officials at the department, Service, and 

installation levels to obtain their views on the report content and the 

usefulness of that information. 

To identify obstacles that may hinder the department’s ability to develop 

and implement an integrated and comprehensive installation preparedness 

approach, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military services who are 

responsible for policies, programs, and key initiatives related to various 

aspects of installation preparedness against chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive incidents. We also gathered 

and reviewed relevant policy guidance, instructions, and implementation 

documents for current improvement initiatives, including the Joint 

Services Installation Pilot Project and project Guardian, and discussed 

these initiatives with department and service headquarters and installation 

officials. 

We discussed and observed installation preparedness capabilities at 

13 military installations. We selected east and west coast military 

installations, representing each of the military services, including locations 

in close proximity to large civilian communities, some that were more 

Page 30 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

isolated, and some that were participating in the Joint Services Installation 

Pilot Project. Specific discussions with military installation officials 

included installation preparedness criteria, roles and responsibilities, 

major efforts to improve installation preparedness as well as the financial 

impact to the installations with regard to current improvement initiatives, 

efforts to ensure effective coordination among and between military and 

civilian organizations, particularly first responders and those involved in 

consequence management, and what they believe should be included in 

the comprehensive plan to make it a useful management tool. In addition, 

we observed installation preparedness exercises in the Norfolk and San 

Diego areas. Although the information obtained at these locations cannot 

be generalized to describe DOD’s worldwide installation preparedness 

improvement efforts, it provided us with insights on preparedness 

challenges at the installation level. Table 3 lists the military organizations 

and installations we visited or contacted to obtain our data. 

Table 3: Headquarters Organizations and Military Installations Visited or Contacted 

for this Assignment 

Department headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area 

• Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

• Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 

• 	 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and Defense 

Programs 

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

• National Guard Bureau, Homeland Defense 

Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area 

• Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Operations J-3 

• Joint Program Executive Office, Chemical Biological Program 

• Joint Requirements Office 

Military service headquarters organizations, Washington metropolitan area 

• 	 Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans (G-3) and Army 

Installation Management Agency 

• Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics (N4)) and Chief of Navy Installations 

• Commandant of the Marine Corps 

• Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations & Logistics 

Military Installations 

• Army—Fort Lewis, Wash. 

• Marine Corps—Camp Lejeune, N.C. 

• Army—Fort Eustis, Newport News, Va. 

• Navy Region Mid-Atlantic 

• Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Va. 

Page 31 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

• Naval Station Norfolk, Va. 

• Oceana Master Jet Base, Va. 

• Navy Region Northwest, Wash. 

• Sub Base Bangor, Wash. 

• Naval Station Everett, Everett, Wash. 

• Navy Region Southwest, San Diego, Calif. 

• Navy Base Point Loma, San Diego, Calif. 

• Navy Station San Diego, Calif. 

• Navy Base, Coronado, Calif. 

• Langley Air Force Base, Va. 

• McChord Air Force Base, Wash. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

To estimate fiscal year 2004 unfunded requirements for installation 

preparedness at three installations, we requested and obtained budget 

estimates from installation officials. We also obtained fiscal year 2005 

unfunded requirements as prioritized by the services and analyzed them to 

determine that installation preparedness activities were included in their 

estimates. Based on our discussions with department officials and the 

budget documentation provided, we determined that the data we used 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted our review from April 2003 through May 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 32 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Robert L. Repasky (202) 512-9868 

Acknowledgments 	 In addition to those named above, Hugh Brady, Nancy Benco, Pat Seaton, 

Elisabeth Ryan, and Corinna Wengryn made key contributions to this 

report. 

Page 36 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Related GAO Products 


Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid 


Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38. Washington, D.C.: 


March 10, 2004. 


Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services’ Antiterrorism


Efforts at Installations. GAO-03-14. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 2002. 


Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in 


Force Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. 


GAO-02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002. 


Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 


Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: 


March 25, 2002. 


Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to 


Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: 


March 1, 2002. 


Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short­


and Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: 


November 7, 2001. 


Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide 


Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001. 


Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in


Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: 


October 17, 2001. 


Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. 


GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.


Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues. 


GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 


Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related


Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 


Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s


Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. 


Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2001. 


Page 37 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
Related GAO Products 

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for 

Forces Overseas. GAO/NSIAD-00-181. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation 

Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-180. 

Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2000. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken 

to Protect Military Forces. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. 

Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness 

Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: 

November 12, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help 

Prioritize and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. 

Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces 

Overseas. GAO/NSIAD-97-207. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 1997. 

(350465) Page 38 GAO-04-855 Combating Terrorism 
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