SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

We conclude that the district court did not err in granting 

summary judgment in favor of Hometown Health on both causes of action. 

See Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 

First, Dr. Windisch's wrongful termination claim, which was 

premised upon a theory of tortious discharge, fails as a matter of law. Per 

the Agreement, Dr. Windisch did not have an employer-employee 

relationship with Hometown Health. See, e.g., Wayment v. Holmes, 112 

Nev. 232, 236, 912 P.2d 816, 818 (1996) (stating that tortious discharge 

occurs in the context of an employer-employee relationship). Further, the 

nature of Dr. Windisch's relationship with Hometown Health does not 

warrant upending the Agreement's provision which specifically states that 

they do not have an employment relationship. See Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. 

Exch., 117 Nev. 273, 278, 21 P.3d 16, 20 (2001) ("It has long been the 

policy in Nevada that absent some countervailing reason, contracts will be 

construed from the written language and enforced as written." (internal 

quotations omitted)). 

Second, Dr. Windisch's breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing claim fails as a matter of law. Dr. Windisch 

attempts to replace the Agreement's existing express no-cause termination 

provision with an implied for-cause provision, which is prohibited. See 

Griffin v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 122 Nev. 479, 483, 133 P.3d 251, 254 

(2006) ("[W]e [will not] attempt to increase the legal obligations of the 

parties where the parties intentionally limited such obligations." (internal 

quotations omitted)); Kaldi, 117 Nev. at 281, 21 P.3d at 21 ("We are not 

free to modify or vary the terms of an unambiguous agreement"); see also 

Kucharczyk v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 946 F. Supp. 1419, 1432 (N.D. Cal. 

1996) (explaining that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 

may not be used to imply a term that is contradicted by an express term of 

the contract); Grossman v. Columbine Med. Grp., Inc., 12 P.3d 269, 271 

2 

(0) 1947A 
(Colo. App. 1999) (holding that in a contract between a doctor and a health 

maintenance organization, where the "termination clause expressly set[] 

forth the right of both parties to terminate the contract for any 

reason[,] . . . the physician cannot rely on the implied duty of good faith 

and fair dealing to circumvent terms for which he expressly bargained"). 

Although the district court erred by applying the wrong law, its error is 

inconsequential.' See Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 

Nev. 592, 599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2010) ("This court will affirm a 

district court's order if the district court reached the correct result, even if 

for the wrong reason."). 

Finally, Dr. Windisch requests that this court "carv[e] out a 

narrow exception to Nevada's wrongful termination doctrine as it relates 

to without cause terminating [sic] clauses in healthcare provider 

agreements" because of the unique relationship between a healthcare 

provider and a managed care organization, similar to the courts in Harper 

v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996) and Potvin v. Metro. 

Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 2000). We decline to provide any special 

exception to the relationship between a healthcare provider and a 

managed care organization, because such a policy decision is more 

'The district court relied upon the proposition from Dillard Dep't 

Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 376, 989 P.2d 882, 885 (1999), that 

"[t]he at-will rule gives the employer the right to discharge an employee 

for any reason, so long as the reason does not violate public policy." 

However, Dillard does not mention the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing, and the law the district court applied refers only to the 

requirements of tortious discharge. Public policy need not be breached for 

a viable good faith and fair dealing claim to exist. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A 
Hardesty 

, C.J. 

appropriately considered by the Legislature. 2We instead opt to exercise 

judicial restraint, like the court in Pannozzo v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue 

Shield, 787 N.E.2d 91 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). See Hamm v. Carson City 

Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 101, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969) ("Judicial restraint 

is a worthwhile practice when the proposed new doctrine may have 

implications far beyond the perception of the court asked to declare it"); 

Sw. Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 601, 668 P.2d 261, 265 (1983) ("The 

legislature is best equipped to discern the public pulse through extensive 

hearings, analyses and debate involving multi-faceted groups having 

specific interests in the subject."). 3Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 4 

C 

Cherry 

Gibbons 

2We reject the suggestion that NRS 695G.410 provides a basis for 

relief because Windisch did not state a cause of action under the statute. 

3We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude 

that they are without merit. 

4The Honorable Kristina Pickering, Justice, voluntarily recused 

herself from participation in the decision of this matter. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

(0) 1947A e 
cc: Hon. Janet J. Berry, District Judge 

Margaret M. Crowley, Settlement Judge 

Whatley Kallas, LLP/Georgia 

Whatley Kallas, LLP/Alabama 

Bradley Drendel & Jeanney 

Littler Mendelson/Las Vegas 

Littler Mendelson/Reno 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 5 

(0) 1947A eir 
WINDISCH VS. HOMETOWN HEALTH PLAN NO. 64020 

DOUGLAS, J., concurring: 

I concur as to result only. 

Douglas 

J. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A e