IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-865

Filed 6 August 2024

Columbus County, Nos. 20 CRS 50435, 404

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

DAQUON ROLLO CORROTHERS

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 10 October 2022 by Judge 

Tiffany Peguise-Powers in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of 

Appeals 5 March 2024.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Marc X. 

Sneed, for the State.

Drew Nelson for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, Judge.

Defendant appeals from the judgments entered upon a jury’s verdicts finding 

him guilty of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, 

Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error in admitting certain 

evidence at trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of 

his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress that evidence. Defendant also 

contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motions to dismiss and motion to 

set aside the jury’s verdict. After careful review, we dismiss Defendant’s appeal in 

part, and conclude that he received a fair trial, free from error.
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BACKGROUND

At a social gathering on the evening of 27 January 2020 at Derby’s, a hangout 

in Columbus County, the victim Alex Moore asked Regina Spaulding, a family friend

of Moore’s, to lend him $400.00 in cash to help him “get his four-wheeler fixed and 

whatnot[.]” Spaulding understood this “to mean a drug deal, to be honest[,]” and lent

Moore the money. Moore told her that he was going to Defendant’s home, less than 

five minutes away, and then would return. Moore also texted Spaulding a screenshot 

of Defendant’s phone number.

Spaulding became concerned when Moore failed to return after a couple of 

hours. She called Moore, who told her that he “was coming home.” But Moore “never 

showed back up[,]” so Spaulding continued to call him. However, her calls went 

straight to voicemail, then automated text messages were sent to her cellular phone 

from Moore’s cellular phone saying, “I’ll call you back.”

After several hours, Spaulding called Marcus Solomon, another friend, told 

him what happened, and asked him to call Moore. When Moore did not answer

Solomon’s calls, Spaulding went to Moore’s residence; however, neither Moore nor his 

truck were there. Spaulding told Moore’s father that they were looking for Moore.

Early the next morning, on 28 January 2020, Spaulding discovered Moore’s

empty truck parked at a cemetery. Moore’s father reported him to authorities as 

missing that day.

On 4 February 2020, Columbus County Sheriff’s Detective Paul D. Rockenbach 
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“initiated the assistance of Special Agent J. Bain with the North Carolina State 

Bureau of Investigation[,] who was able to pin-point a more accurate last known 

location of the cellular phone belonging to [Moore].” Agent Bain identified

Defendant’s Clarkton residence (“the Property”) as the last location of Moore’s 

cellular phone and determined that Moore’s cellular phone “was at this location for 

approximately thirty minutes prior to going offline” on the evening of 27 January 

2020.

Detective Rockenbach traveled to the Property that same day, 4 February 

2020. He knocked on the door, but no one answered. Detective Rockenbach observed

that there were four vehicles parked outside the house and a wheelchair on the front 

porch. Solomon had opined to Detective Rockenbach that Defendant should not have 

been “physically able to hurt” Moore. From this, Detective Rockenbach concluded that 

the wheelchair may have belonged to “the individual . . . Moore was going to see to 

complete [the] drug transaction[,]” i.e., Defendant. While at the Property, Detective 

Rockenbach walked about the front and rear of the house, “look[ing] around the 

curtilage[.]” Around the rear of the house, Detective Rockenbach noticed a hole in the 

ground.

On 5 February 2020, Detective Rockenbach secured a search warrant for the 

Property. Officers executed the search warrant that day and located Moore’s body 

inside a “hole approximately six feet in length, maybe three to four feet in width, and 

. . . filled with water[.]” The hole “[a]ppeared to be manmade [and] dug by hand[.]”
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Officers extracted Moore’s body after pumping the water out of the hole. They also 

located “two burn piles in the back part of the residence.”

An autopsy revealed that Moore suffered gunshot wounds to several areas of 

the body, including his head, abdomen, ribs, and forearm, as well as blunt-force 

injuries. The associate chief medical examiner testified that the cause of Moore’s

death was multiple gunshot wounds, most of which likely would have been fatal in 

isolation.

On 6 February 2020, Detective Rockenbach obtained a search warrant for

Defendant’s cellular phone records.

On 3 June 2020, a grand jury returned a true bill of indictment charging 

Defendant with murder. On 9 December 2020, a grand jury returned a second true 

bill of indictment charging Defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon based 

on the allegation that Defendant stole “$400.00 from the person . . . of Alex Moore.”

On 9 September 2022, FBI Special Agent Harrison Putnam obtained the 

cellular phone records in this case, including for Defendant’s AT&T cellular phone 

and Moore’s Verizon cellular phone. The records showed that Moore’s Verizon cellular 

phone entered the coverage area of the Property and vehicle-recovery location at 

approximately 6:11 p.m. on the evening of 27 January 2020. From approximately 6:12 

to 6:34 p.m., Moore’s cellular phone remained “right in the area of [the Property],” 

and was “definitely there or near that location” during this period.
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Records from Defendant’s AT&T cellular phone likewise revealed that 

“sometime between 6:23 and 6:38 [p.m.], [Defendant’s] AT&T phone traveled . . . to 

the coverage area of the Emerson tower[,]” which Special Agent Putnam described as

“the cell site [he] would most expect to provide coverage to the vehicle recovery 

location and the [Property].” Special Agent Putnam testified that Defendant’s AT&T 

cellular phone remained in the coverage area of the Emerson tower until 

approximately 6:47 p.m. on the evening of 27 January 2020.

This matter came on for a jury trial on 29 September 2022. On 10 October 2022, 

the jury returned verdicts finding Defendant guilty of first-degree murder and 

robbery with a dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life 

imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, and a 

concurrent, active term of 64 to 89 months for the robbery with a dangerous weapon

conviction.

Defendant gave oral and written notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that “the trial court committed plain error by failing to 

suppress the evidence collected pursuant to the search warrant issued for . . . [the 

Property], the search warrant related to [Defendant’s] phone, and the follow-on 

warrants[,]” in that the search warrants were tainted by Detective Rockenbach’s

alleged unlawful 4 February search of the curtilage of Defendant’s residence.

However, Defendant neglected to file a motion to suppress this evidence. Accordingly,
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on 19 October 2023, Defendant filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari 

requesting that we invoke Rule 2 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure to allow review 

of his unpreserved constitutional arguments.

Defendant further argues that “[s]hould this Court decline to exercise its 

authority under Rule 2 or determine that the trial court did not commit plain error, 

this Court should hold that [Defendant] received ineffective assistance of counsel” 

due to trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant 

to the search warrants.

Lastly, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions 

to dismiss the first-degree murder charge and his motion to set aside the jury’s verdict

finding him guilty of first-degree murder.

I. Plain Error Review

Defendant first argues that “the trial court committed plain error by failing to 

suppress the evidence collected pursuant to the search warrant issued” for the 

Property, as well as “the search warrant related to [Defendant’s] phone, and the 

follow-on warrants.”

During Defendant’s trial, Detective Rockenbach testified that, on 4 February 

2020, he traveled to the Property and attempted to conduct a “knock and talk.” He 

explained: “I knocked on the door. There were several cars there, and nobody came to 

the door, so I went back out, and . . . I noticed a hole.” As Detective Rockenbach 

recalled, “we got to go out [to the Property] on the 4th, check it out, and nobody comes 
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to the place. I see an area of interest as I’m walking around the curtilage, and I go 

and apply for a search warrant.”

In light of this admission by Detective Rockenbach that he observed a hole on 

the Property prior to applying for the search warrants, Defendant contends that all 

subsequent evidence required suppression by the trial court, and that the trial court 

committed plain error in not suppressing the evidence.

In State v. Miller, our Supreme Court “h[e]ld that [the] defendant’s Fourth 

Amendment claims [were] not reviewable on direct appeal, even for plain error, 

because he completely waived them by not moving to suppress [the] evidence . . . 

before or at trial.” 371 N.C. 266, 267, 814 S.E.2d 81, 82 (2018). “Fact-intensive Fourth 

Amendment claims like these require an evidentiary record developed at a 

suppression hearing. Without a fully developed record, an appellate court simply 

lacks the information necessary to assess the merits of a defendant’s plain error 

arguments.” Id. at 270, 814 S.E.2d at 83–84.

As the Miller Court explained:

When a defendant does not move to suppress . . . the State 

does not get the opportunity to develop a record pertaining 

to the defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims. Developing 

a record is one of the main purposes of a suppression 

hearing. At a suppression hearing, both the defendant and 

the State can proffer testimony and any other admissible 

evidence that they deem relevant to the trial court’s 

suppression determination.

Id. at 270, 814 S.E.2d at 84.
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In light of the holding in Miller, we cannot review for plain error the merits of 

Defendant’s arguments concerning the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence. See 

id. at 273, 814 S.E.2d at 85–86 (remanding to this Court “for consideration of [the] 

defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim” where “the Court of Appeals 

should not have conducted plain error review in the first place”).

Accordingly, we deny Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari and his request 

that we invoke Rule 2 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure to review for plain error

Defendant’s unpreserved constitutional challenge, and we dismiss this portion of his

appeal.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Next, Defendant argues that his trial counsel “provided ineffective assistance 

by failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence” obtained pursuant to the search 

warrants issued after Detective Rockenbach’s observation of the hole behind the 

Property.

“In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy 

the two-prong test announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, [. . .] 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)[,]” which was

adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 324 S.E.2d 241 

(1985). State v. Harris, 255 N.C. App. 653, 657, 805 S.E.2d 729, 733 (2017). “First, the 

defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. (citation 

omitted). “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
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prejudiced the defense.” Id. (citation omitted). “Unless a defendant makes both 

showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the 

adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Id. at 658, 805 S.E.2d at 733 

(cleaned up).

“[A]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought on direct review will be 

decided on the merits when the cold record reveals that no further investigation is 

required.” Id. (cleaned up); e.g., State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166, 557 S.E.2d 500, 524 

(2001) (providing, for example, that the cold appellate record may be sufficient to 

decide a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that “may be developed and argued 

without such ancillary procedures as the appointment of investigators or an 

evidentiary hearing”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1114, 153 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2002).

To demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant must 

show that his attorney committed such serious errors during trial that the attorney 

“was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment,” Harris, 255 N.C. App. at 657, 805 S.E.2d at 733 (citation omitted), in 

other words, that “counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness[,]” Braswell, 312 N.C. at 561–62, 324 S.E.2d at 248. Trial counsel’s

decision not to file a motion to suppress evidence does not fall below “an objective 

standard of reasonableness[,]” State v. Canty, 224 N.C. App. 514, 517, 736 S.E.2d 532, 

535 (2012) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 578, 739 S.E.2d 850 (2013), 

and therefore, does not evince that the attorney’s performance was deficient “where 
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the search . . . that led to the discovery of the evidence was lawful[,]” id.

In this case, Defendant asserts that “the central question raised in [his] brief” 

is “whether the warrant application was ‘prompted by’ the illegal search” of the 

curtilage when Detective Rockenbach first visited the Property. By contrast, the State 

contends that “[g]iven that Moore’s last known location was Defendant’s residence 

and he had been missing for approximately one week, there was probable cause to 

search Defendant’s residence.”

We conclude that the cold record establishes that Detective Rockenbach’s 

observation of the hole during his walk about the Property after his unsuccessful 

“knock and talk” on 4 February 2020 did not prompt the warrant applications when 

viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, which supported the trial court’s 

determinations of probable cause. Accordingly, we agree with the State on this issue.

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the people 

from unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Allman, 369 N.C. 292, 293, 794 

S.E.2d 301, 302 (2016) (citation omitted). Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina 

Constitution “likewise prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires 

that warrants be issued only on probable cause.” Id. at 293, 794 S.E.2d at 302–03.

“At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat 

into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 100 (2001) (cleaned up). This 

heightened expectation of privacy extends not only to the home itself, but also to the 
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home’s curtilage. See State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 759–60, 767 S.E.2d 312, 317–18, 

cert. denied, 576 U.S. 1025, 192 L. Ed. 2d 882 (2015). As our Supreme Court has 

explained, “the curtilage of the home will ordinarily be construed to include at least 

the yard around the dwelling house as well as the area occupied by barns, cribs, and 

other outbuildings.” Id. at 759, 767 S.E.2d at 317 (citation omitted).

A “knock and talk” investigation does not implicate the Fourth Amendment:

“no search of the curtilage occurs when an officer is in a place where the public is 

allowed to be, such as the front door of a house.” State v. Lupek, 214 N.C. App. 146, 

151, 712 S.E.2d 915, 919 (2011). Nonetheless, the “curtilage . . . protects the privacies 

of life inside the home[,]” Grice, 367 N.C. at 760, 767 S.E.2d at 318 (cleaned up), and 

the Fourth Amendment therefore protects the curtilage of one’s home, absent the 

existence of circumstances permitting an exception to the warrant requirement. See, 

e.g., id. (“On one end of the [Fourth Amendment] spectrum, we have the home, which 

is protected by the highest constitutional threshold and thus may only be breached 

in specific, narrow circumstances. On the other end, we have open fields, which even 

though they may be private property may be reasonably traversed by law 

enforcement under the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. Marrero, 248 N.C. App. 787, 

794, 789 S.E.2d 560, 566 (2016) (explaining that “[a]n exigent circumstance is found 

to exist in the presence of an emergency or dangerous situation” (cleaned up)).

“[A] warrant may be issued only on a showing of probable cause.” Allman, 369 

N.C. at 293, 794 S.E.2d at 302 (cleaned up). “[A]n application for a search warrant 
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must be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting forth the facts and 

circumstances establishing probable cause to believe that the items . . . are in the 

place to be searched.” Id. at 294, 794 S.E.2d at 303 (cleaned up).

Probable cause exists when the supporting affidavit “gives the magistrate 

reasonable cause to believe that the search will reveal the presence of the items 

sought on the premises described in the warrant application, and that those items 

will aid in the apprehension or conviction of the offender.” Id. (cleaned up). The 

magistrate is permitted to “draw reasonable inferences from the available 

observations” in the affidavits. Id. (cleaned up). As long as the totality of the 

circumstances “yield[s] a fair probability that a police officer executing the warrant 

will find contraband or evidence of a crime at the place to be searched, a magistrate 

has probable cause to issue [the] warrant.” Id.

Moreover, a search warrant is valid despite a prior unlawful entry “where the 

information used to obtain the search warrant was not derived from an initial 

unlawful entry, but rather came from sources wholly unconnected with the unlawful 

entry and was known to the agents well before the initial unlawful entry.” State v. 

Robinson, 148 N.C. App. 422, 430, 560 S.E.2d 154, 160 (2002). Accordingly, “the 

dispositive question is whether the search warrant . . . was based on, or prompted by, 

information obtained from the officers’ warrantless entry,” or whether it was “based 

on information acquired independently of the warrantless entry so as to purge the 

search warrant of the primary taint.” Id.
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Here, we need not consider whether Detective Rockenbach unlawfully entered 

the rear curtilage of the home. It is plain that the affidavit attached to the initial 

search warrant application provides abundant support for the issuance of a search 

warrant, even absent an allegation regarding Detective Rockenbach’s observation of 

the hole. The initial warrant application established that Moore had been missing for

approximately one week; that he was last known to be headed to the Property to 

conduct a drug deal; that Moore’s cellular phone was pinpointed at the Property, 

where it went offline after 30 minutes; and that individuals at the Property were not 

answering the door. For the subsequent search warrants, Detective Rockenbach

additionally averred that “Moore’s remains were found on the property in which 

[Defendant] lives.” Detective Rockenbach’s affidavit supporting the application to 

search the Property makes no reference to the hole, and the facts alleged in the 

application reveal that the allegations “came from sources wholly unconnected with 

the [alleged] unlawful entry and w[ere] known to [Detective Rockenbach] before the 

initial [alleged] unlawful” walk about the curtilage of the Property. Id.

The search warrants were supported by probable cause—they were not “based 

on, or prompted by, information obtained from” Detective Rockenbach’s alleged 

unlawful entry, but rather “on information acquired independently of the warrantless 

entry so as to purge the search warrant of [any] primary taint.” Id.

“[F]ailure to file a motion to suppress is not ineffective assistance of counsel 

where the search . . . that led to the discovery of the evidence was lawful.” Canty, 224 
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N.C. App. at 517, 736 S.E.2d at 535. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to demonstrate 

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and we dismiss this claim.

III. Motions to Dismiss and Motion to Set Aside Verdict

Lastly, Defendant contends that the “trial court erred by failing to grant the 

motions to dismiss made during the trial and the motion to set aside the verdict” for

the charge of murder because, even “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the [S]tate, there was not substantial evidence that [he] murdered Alex Moore.”

A. Standard of Review

“We review the denial of a motion to dismiss based on an insufficiency of 

evidence de novo.” State v. Steele, 281 N.C. App. 472, 476, 868 S.E.2d 876, 880, disc. 

review denied, 382 N.C. 719, 878 S.E.2d 809 (2022).

“In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need determine only whether 

there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and that the 

defendant is the perpetrator.” State v. Osborne, 372 N.C. 619, 626, 831 S.E.2d 328, 

333 (2019) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence” is simply that amount of

evidence “necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion.” Id. (citation 

omitted). The evidence is “considered in the light most favorable to the State[,]” and

“the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference 

to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (cleaned up). Evidence unfavorable to the State “is not to 

be taken into consideration.” State v. Israel, 353 N.C. 211, 216, 539 S.E.2d 633, 637 

(2000).
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“[I]f the record developed before the trial court contains substantial evidence, 

whether direct or circumstantial, or a combination, to support a finding that the 

offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is 

for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.” Osborne, 372 N.C. at 626, 

831 S.E.2d at 333 (cleaned up).

“The standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a verdict 

for lack of substantial evidence is the same as reviewing its denial of a motion to 

dismiss, i.e., whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the 

crime.” State v. Duncan, 136 N.C. App. 515, 520, 524 S.E.2d 808, 811 (2000).

B. Analysis

In the present case, the State charged Defendant with murder pursuant to 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17. Section 14-17 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] murder 

which shall be perpetrated by means of a . . . willful, deliberate, and premeditated 

killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of 

any . . . robbery . . . shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree[.]” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-17(a) (2023). The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the 

basis of both “malice, premeditation and deliberation” as well as “[u]nder the first[-

]degree felony murder rule[.]”

“When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence 

supported the inference that Defendant” committed the first-degree murder of Moore. 

State v. Rogers, 255 N.C. App. 413, 416, 805 S.E.2d 172, 174 (2017). Spaulding 
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testified that Moore left on the evening that he went missing to conduct “a drug deal” 

with Defendant at Defendant’s home. Before he left, Moore sent Spaulding a 

screenshot of Defendant’s contact information.

The State introduced into evidence a long exchange of text messages between 

Defendant and Moore, including texts from the day that Moore went missing. In these 

texts, the two men arranged the details of Moore’s pending drug purchase from 

Defendant. Detective Rockenbach testified that the “last exchange to” Defendant was 

Moore saying that he was “outside” at 6:14 p.m., and that “[t]he rest of the messages 

are just from [Defendant] to [Moore]’s phone.” Special Agent Putnam also analyzed 

Moore’s Verizon cellular phone records, which showed that Moore’s cellular phone 

entered the coverage area of the Property and vehicle-recovery location at 

approximately 6:11 p.m. on the evening of 27 January 2020. From approximately 6:12 

to 6:34 p.m., Moore’s cellular phone remained “right in the area of the [Property]” and 

was “definitely there or near that location” during this period.

Special Agent Putnam also provided evidence regarding Defendant’s AT&T 

cellular phone data, which showed that “sometime between 6:23 and 6:38 [p.m.], 

[Defendant’s] AT&T phone traveled . . . to the coverage area of the Emerson tower[,]” 

which Special Agent Putnam described as “the cell site [that he] would most expect 

to provide coverage to the vehicle recovery location and the [Property].” Special Agent 

Putnam also testified that Defendant’s AT&T cellular phone remained within the 
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coverage area of the Emerson tower until approximately 6:47 p.m. on the evening of 

27 January 2020.

Additionally, the State presented evidence that upon searching Defendant’s 

home, officers discovered one shotgun shell casing under the couch and another on a 

space heater, as well as a long gun. In Defendant’s bedroom, officers discovered

additional 9-millimeter ammunition. Forensic firearms examiner Kelby Glass of the 

Cumberland County Sheriff’s Office testified “that the projectiles that were removed 

from the body of” Moore were “consistent with the ammo that was found in 

[Defendant’s] room[.]”

We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this 

constitutes substantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer Defendant’s

guilt of murder. See Rogers, 255 N.C. App. at 416, 805 S.E.2d at 174–75. Accordingly, 

the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motions to dismiss or motion to 

set aside the jury’s verdict. See Osborne, 372 N.C. at 626, 831 S.E.2d at 333; Duncan, 

136 N.C. App. at 520, 524 S.E.2d at 811.

CONCLUSION

Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his constitutional challenge 

to the search warrants in this case. We deny his petition for writ of certiorari and

dismiss that portion of Defendant’s appeal. In addition, Defendant has not shown

that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and we dismiss Defendant’s claim of 
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ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the trial court did not err in denying 

Defendant’s motions to dismiss or motion to set aside the jury’s verdict.

DISMISSED IN PART; NO ERROR IN PART.

Judges WOOD and THOMPSON concur.