COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Lemons and Frank 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

RAMONDO D. FOGG 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0382-99-1 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 MARCH 7, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

Christopher W. Hutton, Judge 

 Robert E. Long (Robert E. Long & Associates, 

Ltd., on briefs), for appellant. 

 Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 On appeal from his convictions of possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, and 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-248.1, Ramondo D. Fogg contends that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the 

search of the vehicle he was driving, because (1) as bailee of 

the vehicle, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and 

therefore had standing to object to the search, (2) the police 

lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity justifying the stop, and (3) the investigative stop 

should have been abandoned when the officers realized that the 

passenger in the vehicle was not the juvenile for whom they were 
searching. Because we find that the stop was valid, that 

further investigation was justified, and that the police had 

proper consent to search the vehicle, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

I. Background

 "Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause . . . involve questions of both law and fact and are 

reviewed de novo on appeal. . . . [We are, however,] bound by 

the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 'plainly 

wrong' or without evidence to support them . . . ." McGee v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 

(1997) (en banc). 

 On August 5, 1998, Fogg was driving an Acura with Tamara 

Hogge as a passenger. Hogge's grandmother owned the vehicle and 

had given Hogge permission to use it. Earlier that morning, 

Hampton police had received a report that a seventeen-year-old 

runaway, C.C., had been spotted in the Buckroe area of Hampton. 

Hampton Police Officers Schaeffer and Butler, searching for 

C.C., stopped the Acura when Officer Schaeffer observed that 

Hogge fit C.C.'s description. 

 Officer Schaeffer asked Hogge to exit the vehicle, so that 

the two officers could conduct the investigation separately. 

When Hogge exited the vehicle, Officer Schaeffer noticed that 

she was nervous and attempted to conceal a large sum of cash 

from his view. He asked her name, and when she responded, he 

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recognized her from a previous arrest. When asked about the 

cash, Hogge replied that the money belonged to Fogg and that he 

had given it to her because a warrant for his arrest was 

outstanding. Officer Schaeffer learned that Hogge's grandmother 

owned the vehicle and that she had given Hogge permission to use 

it. Hogge gave the officers permission to search the vehicle 

and signed a consent form to that effect. 

 While Officer Schaeffer spoke with Hogge, Officer Butler 

questioned Fogg about his identity. Fogg told Officer Butler 

that he did not have a driver's license, but that he was on his 

way to the DMV to get a new one. He initially gave the officer 

a false name and a false social security number. A computer 

check immediately disclosed this falsehood. Fogg later 

admitted, after the search, that there might be a warrant 

outstanding for his arrest.1

 Searching the vehicle pursuant to Hogge's consent, Officer 

Schaeffer found a green book bag containing marijuana, a roll of 

plastic bags, an electronic scale, and crack cocaine. When 

questioned about the drugs and paraphernalia, Fogg admitted 

giving the police a false identification. He also admitted that 

the book bag was his and stated that Hogge had no knowledge of 

its contents. 

 1

 There was, in fact, an outstanding warrant for Fogg's 

arrest, for his failure to appear on a prior matter. 

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 At the suppression hearing, Officer Schaeffer recalled no 

objection by Fogg to the search of the Acura. Officer Butler 

was not asked whether Fogg consented. Fogg testified that he 

objected to both officers. He testified that Hogge's 

grandmother had given him permission to use the vehicle. The 

trial court denied the motion to suppress, ruling that the 

officers had proper consent to search the vehicle, that Fogg 

lacked standing to object to the search, and that Hogge's 

statement to Officer Schaeffer that a warrant was outstanding 

for Fogg's arrest, coupled with Fogg's provision of false 

information to Officer Butler, required the officers to 

investigate further. 

II. The Investigative Stop

 Fogg concedes that the initial stop of his vehicle was 

lawful. The officers were investigating a report of a missing 

juvenile who fit Hogge's description. He contends, however, 

that the only reasonable and articulable suspicion possessed by 

the officers was based upon the search for C.C. and that as soon 

as Officer Schaeffer realized that Hogge was not C.C., the 

officers should have abandoned the stop. 

 "A consensual encounter can follow a legitimate detention." 

Rettinger v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 724, 730, 514 S.E.2d 775, 

778 (1999) (en banc). Officer Schaeffer testified that Hogge 

was free to go after he determined that she was not C.C. 

However, while determining that Hogge was not C.C., the officers 

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became properly suspicious of criminal activity by Fogg. A new 

detention may follow a completed detention when the police have 

acquired additional information. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 

22 Va. App. 347, 353, 470 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1996). 

 When Officer Schaeffer inquired about the large sum of 

money Hogge was carrying, she stated that it belonged to Fogg 

and that he had given it to her because of an outstanding 

warrant for his arrest. While Officer Schaeffer was questioning 

Hogge, Fogg gave false information to Officer Butler. Thus, 

information acquired by the officers during the valid initial 

detention gave them a further "reasonable and articulable 

suspicion" of criminal activity on Fogg's part, justifying 

further detention and investigation. 

III. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy by Fogg

Fogg next contends that he possessed a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the Acura and that the search of the 

Acura was invalid because it was conducted without his consent. 

He testified at trial that Hogge's grandmother gave him 

permission to drive the Acura and that the officers sought 

Hogge's consent to search the vehicle only after he denied 

consent to each officer. 

Fogg argues on brief that the trial court erred in 

admitting Officer Schaeffer's testimony that Hogge consented to 

the search. Although he objected to that testimony at trial, he 

did not assign it as error on appeal. Thus, he is precluded 

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from arguing now that the testimony should not have been 

admitted. See Rule 5A:12. 

Fogg argues further that the Commonwealth did not call 

Hogge or her grandmother as witnesses. He made no attempt to 

proffer testimony by either woman to corroborate his testimony. 

He cannot argue now that they could have settled the issue of 

who had permission to drive the vehicle and to give consent for 

its search. See Rule 5A:18; Zelenak v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. 

App. 295, 302, 487 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1997). 

Fogg testified that he had sole permission to drive the 

vehicle and that he refused consent to its search. The police 

officers testified that Hogge told them she had permission to 

use the car and consented to the search. Officer Schaeffer did 

not recall asking for or being refused consent to search by 

Fogg. Officer Butler was not questioned about whether Fogg 

consented. "The credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who 

has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is 

presented." Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 

S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). The trial court determined that Hogge 

had permission to use the car and that her consent legitimized 

the search, regardless of whether Fogg objected. The record 

supports this determination. 

Fogg's standing to object to the search was based not upon 

his physical relationship to the vehicle, but upon whether he 

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had "lawful and exclusive possession and control thereof 

. . . ." Delong v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 357, 363, 362 S.E.2d 

669, 672 (1987). At best, he shared possession and control of 

the vehicle with Hogge. See Hardy v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 

677, 681, 440 S.E.2d 431, 437 (1994). 

 Hogge gave the officers permission to search the vehicle. 

The vehicle was her grandmother's, and she had permission to use 

and control it. Thus, "the facts available to the officer at 

[the time of the search] . . . 'warrant[ed] a man of reasonable 

caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority 

over the premises.'" Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 

(1990) (citation omitted). At no time during the stop did Fogg 

assert that he had a right to the car superior to Hogge's. 

"Even [if Fogg] had standing as a bailee to object to the 

officer's searching the vehicle[], the search was nevertheless 

valid because the []bailor['s immediate bailee] . . . consented 

to the search." Hardy, 17 Va. App. at 681, 440 S.E.2d at 437. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed. 

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