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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 14a0328n.06

No. 13-4043

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. After revoking the supervised release of defendant Christopher 

Anderson, the district court sentenced him to an additional 18 months in prison, a term of 

incarceration that was to run consecutively to a recently imposed state prison sentence. 

Anderson now appeals, arguing: (1) that he should have been allowed to surrender himself into 

federal custody prior to the imposition of the state-court prison sentence; (2) that the district 

court erred in failing to articulate reasons for imposing consecutive sentencing; and (3) that the 

district court also erred in failing to explain its reasons for imposition of the 18-month sentence, 

even though that sentence constituted a period of incarceration at the lowest end of the applicable 

Guidelines range. Although we find no merit to Anderson’s first allegation of error, the district 

court’s failure to explain its rationale for ordering that the 18-month prison term run 

consecutively to the state term of imprisonment requires us to vacate the defendant’s federal 
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sentence and remand this matter to the district court. In light of that remand, we pretermit any 

discussion at this time of the reasonableness of Anderson’s 18-month prison sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2007, Anderson pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, the defendant’s second federal conviction for a 

controlled-substance offense. After completing the incarceration portion of his sentence for the 

conspiracy, Anderson began serving a four-year term of supervised release. However, less than 

five months after the commencement of the supervision period, he was arrested again, this time 

by Ohio authorities for tampering with evidence and for possession with intent to distribute 

heroin. As a result of that arrest, as well as because Anderson failed to notify his probation 

officer of a change in residence, the United States Probation Office petitioned the district court 

for issuance of an order directing the defendant to show cause why his supervised release should 

not be revoked. Pending the resolution of that revocation proceeding, a magistrate judge 

released Anderson on his own recognizance.

Approximately a year later, Anderson pleaded guilty in the Hamilton County (Ohio) 

Court of Common Pleas to the state charges of tampering with evidence and possession of 

heroin. Prior to being sentenced for those state convictions, however, Anderson returned to 

federal court, agreed to consent to revocation of his own-recognizance bond, and sought to be 

taken into federal custody immediately in order to begin serving whatever federal sentence 

would be imposed later for the supervised-release violation. According to Anderson’s logic, if 

he were in federal custody at the time of his state-court sentencing, he would be subject to 

concurrent sentencing. The federal district court denied Anderson’s request, however.
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Subsequently, the state court completed its sentencing obligations by ordering Anderson 

to serve three years in state prison for the tampering and heroin-possession convictions. Shortly 

thereafter, Anderson appeared again in federal court and admitted the alleged violations of his 

supervised release. Recognizing that the United States Sentencing Guidelines provided for an 

advisory sentencing range of 18 to 24 months in such a situation, the district court ruled 

succinctly:

The term of supervised release which had been granted by this court is 

hereby revoked, and the defendant, Christopher Anderson, is hereby sentenced to 

the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons for a period of 18 months, which 

sentence shall be served consecutive to the sentence imposed by the Hamilton 

County Court of Common Pleas.

DISCUSSION

Anderson first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to be taken into 

federal custody prior to being sentenced in state court for the state-law violations. Citing 18 

U.S.C. § 3149, Anderson contends that he served as his own surety on the own-recognizance 

bond allowed by the federal magistrate judge. Thus, according to Anderson, once he sought to 

present himself to a United States marshal, the statute required that he “be held in official 

detention.” Anderson’s argument betrays a misunderstanding of the relevant statutory provision.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3149:

A person charged with an offense, who is released upon the execution of 

an appearance bond with a surety, may be arrested by the surety, and if so 

arrested, shall be delivered promptly to a United States marshal and brought 

before a judicial officer. The judicial officer shall determine in accordance with 

the provisions of section 3148(b) whether to revoke the release of the person, and 

may absolve the surety of responsibility to pay all or part of the bond in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. The person so committed shall be held in official detention until 

released pursuant to this chapter or another provision of law.
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Thus, according to its plain language, this statutory provision applies in situations involving “a 

person charged with an offense” who previously had been “released upon the execution of an 

appearance bond with a surety” and who then had been “arrested by the surety.” But, Anderson 

was released in this matter on a “no amount,” personal-recognizance bond, and no surety was 

involved in the transaction. Moreover, even if we were to stretch the natural meaning of the 

statute’s language to encompass a situation in which a criminal defendant somehow could 

execute an appearance bond for himself, it is clear that such a defendant could not then “be 

arrested by the surety,” that is, by himself or herself.

Furthermore, despite Anderson’s argument to the contrary, the surrender of a defendant 

to the Marshal’s Service by a surety does not result necessarily in a defendant’s official 

detention. Instead, as the statute makes clear, “[t]he judicial officer shall determine . . . whether

to revoke the release of the person.” (Emphasis added.) Anderson had no right to be taken into 

custody. Anderson’s first allegation of error thus is without merit.

Nevertheless, both Anderson and the government agree that Anderson’s sentence must be 

vacated and this matter remanded for resentencing. As we detailed earlier, when ordering that 

Anderson’s federal prison sentence run consecutively with his state sentence, the district court 

offered no explanation for that determination. However, we have held previously that “a district 

court must indicate on the record its rationale [for imposing consecutive sentences], either 

expressly or by reference to a discussion of relevant considerations contained elsewhere. 

Otherwise, meaningful appellate review becomes impossible.” United States v. Cochrane, 

702 F.3d 334, 346 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Inman, 666 F.3d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 

2012)). Here, because “the district court abused its discretion in imposing a consecutive 
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sentence without adequate explanation,” id. at 347, we must vacate Anderson’s sentence and 

remand the matter to the district court for resentencing.

In light of this vacation and remand, we pretermit discussion of Anderson’s claim that the 

18-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of his supervised release also is procedurally

unreasonable. If, at resentencing, the district court again fails to detail its reasons for selecting 

the sentence it does, Anderson is free to appeal that new determination to this court at the 

appropriate time.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the revocation of Anderson’s supervised release. 

However, we VACATE the sentence imposed upon Anderson and REMAND this matter to the 

district court for resentencing.