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26–751 PDF 2007

S. Hrg. 109–757

HURRICANE KATRINA: URBAN SEARCH AND

RESCUE IN A CATASTROPHE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 30, 2006

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAVID T. FLANAGAN, General Counsel 

ASHA A. MATHEW, Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

ROBERT F. MUSE, Minority General Counsel 

JOSHUA A. LEVY, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 2

WITNESSES 

MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 2006

William M. Lokey, Operations Branch Chief, Response Division, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ... 6

Brigadier General Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General for Air, Louisiana 

National Guard .................................................................................................... 9

Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Assistant Chief, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries ..................................... 12

Captain Timothy P. Bayard, Commander of the Vice Crimes/Narcotics Section, New Orleans Police Department ................................................................ 14

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bayard, Captain Timothy P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63

LaCaze, Lieutenant Colonel Keith: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55

Lokey, William M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41

Veillon, Brigadier General Brod: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 51

APPENDIX

Questions and responses for the Record from Mr. Lokey ..................................... 68

Exhibit 1 ................................................................................................................... 73

Exhibit 6 ................................................................................................................... 79

Exhibit 12 ................................................................................................................. 80

(1)

HURRICANE KATRINA: URBAN SEARCH AND 

RESCUE IN A CATASTROPHE 

MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 2006

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Warner, Lieberman, and Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. Good afternoon. The Committee will come to 

order. 

In the first hours and days after Hurricane Katrina struck, 

heroes emerged. Across all levels of government, search-and-rescue 

personnel took swift action, saving thousands of the storm’s victims. These men and women saved the lives of others amid great 

peril to themselves. They demonstrated outstanding courage, devotion to duty, and inspiring ingenuity. 

A great many of these rescuers carried on despite the fact that 

their own homes and communities had been destroyed. They also 

faced obstacles exacerbated by an absence of planning, a lack of direction and leadership, and a misallocation of resources. 

The purpose of today’s hearing, the 12th by the Committee on 

Hurricane Katrina, is to examine the search-and-rescue operations 

in New Orleans and its vicinity. Our witnesses today represent 

local, State, and Federal agencies that were involved in these operations. I look forward to their testimony as they recount their agencies’ efforts to locate trapped hurricane victims and to move them 

to safety. 

It is also the purpose of this hearing to dig deeper, to go behind 

the scenes. We will explore the planning that went into preparing 

for a disaster that had been predicted for years and was imminent 

for days. We will discuss how well those plans were carried out 

when disaster finally struck. We will learn of the impediments 

these agencies faced to full coordination and effective communication and the difficulties they encountered from the lack of necessary equipment to the management of volunteers and other offers 

of assistance. 

More specifically, this hearing is intended to shed light on the 

following issues: 

2

Were Federal, State, and local efforts to preposition search-andrescue assets successful? While some efforts to position critical assets in safe areas near the strike zone worked well, it is clear that 

many did not. As a result, valuable transportation assets that could 

have been used to expedite the rescue of victims were lost. In other 

cases, extraordinary measures had to be taken to save those resources before they could be used to save people. 

How effective was FEMA in supporting the search-and-rescue efforts mounted by the State of Louisiana? The record appears to be 

very mixed. 

Should FEMA play a greater role in supporting search-and-rescue operations in flood situations? This hearing will demonstrate 

that FEMA has seen its search-and-rescue role as largely confined 

to situations involving building collapses such as occur in earthquakes. Yet testimony at the hearing we held last week on Hurricane Pam exercise indicates that drowning is the principle cause of 

death in natural disasters. 

How well were search-and-rescue efforts coordinated? The individual heroism and the extraordinary efforts that occurred cannot 

mask the fact that coordination at all levels of government was 

poor, resulting in the inefficient use of resources, needless danger 

to first responders, and prolonged suffering for the victims. 

One key search-and-rescue agency that is not testifying today is 

the U.S. Coast Guard. That is because we examined the Coast 

Guard’s outstanding performance in great detail at our hearing on 

November 9. We learned that their success was largely due to three 

principles: Extensive planning and training that was actually put 

into practice when needed; the careful prepositioning of assets out 

of harm’s way but close enough to the front lines to be immediately 

available; and a command and control structure that empowered 

front-line leaders to make decisions. I will be very interested in 

hearing the views of our witnesses on how these principles can be 

adopted across the entire emergency preparation and response 

community. 

No one has ever doubted the courage and commitment of America’s emergency responders. Time and time again throughout our 

history they have performed magnificently whenever disaster 

strikes. Hurricane Katrina added a new chapter to this outstanding 

record, but it also revealed significant and troubling flaws in planning, preparation, and coordination that made their jobs more difficult, put them in needless danger, and delayed the rescue of victims. We owe it to them, as well as to future victims, to do better. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. 

Thanks to our witnesses for being here. 

As you indicated, Madam Chairman, today we begin our 12th 

hearing in this investigation, but it also begins a week of hearings 

that will examine how well the Federal, State, and local governments heeded the warnings over the years, particularly the warnings and lessons of the fictional Hurricane Pam exercise that was 

the subject of last week’s hearing. 

3

FEMA paid more than $1.5 million for the Hurricane Pam exercise and follow-up workshops which began in July 2004 and continued through August 2005, just days before Katrina made landfall. 

One hundred and forty-seven representatives of 15 Federal agencies, 20 State agencies, 13 parishes, 5 volunteer agencies, the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 

FEMA Region VI, FEMA National Headquarters, and IEM, Inc.—

the contractor that produced the exercise—all took part in the fictional Hurricane Pam exercise. 

The first draft of the dangers this exercise revealed was released 

in August 2004, more than a year before Hurricane Katrina hit 

landfall, and it was followed by several redrafts until the final 

draft was written and distributed in January 2005, about 8 months 

before Katrina. 

The Pam exercise predicted the flooding, the people left stranded, 

the need for fleets of buses to get them out. It also predicted that 

local first responders would be overwhelmed, not just figuratively, 

but literally by the flooding that occurred, and that FEMA would 

therefore need to be ready to step in quickly. 

The Pam exercise was, as we know, only the most recent and detailed set of warnings given to all levels of government over the 

years about what would happen when the so-called big one hit New 

Orleans as everyone expected it inevitably would one day. There 

was a 1993 report by the former Government Accounting Agency, 

which warned of these dangers in the Gulf Coast. Flooding in Biloxi in 1998 after Hurricane Georges, in fact, was what convinced 

Gulf State officials that they were unprepared for the big one and 

led to the appeals for the Hurricane Pam exercise. But as we pointed out last week in testimony, it took 6 years for it to get going. 

Today we are going to deal with the search-and-rescue part of 

the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. Tomorrow, the 

topic is pre-disaster evacuations, and following that there will be 

panels on post-disaster evacuations, law and order, and communications in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. 

Unfortunately, these hearings will show that all of these warnings from Hurricane Pam and all that proceeded over the years 

were largely ignored, so that one of America’s great cities and its 

people were unprepared and all too unprotected when Hurricane 

Katrina finally struck. 

Today’s hearing, Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, not 

only illustrates the lack of preparedness, but I must say also honors the heroes of Hurricane Katrina. Interesting that Senator Collins and I chose the same words without previous consultation. 

These heroes stepped in, in some ways unprepared and unassisted, you might say with nothing but their courage and their wits 

about them, to save tens of thousands of lives. And we honor them 

today. More than 60,000 people rescued by a relative handful of 

these heroes. Today before the members of the panel speak and we 

ask questions, I want to say thank you to our witnesses and all of 

the heroes that you represent who are not with us today. 

Although Pam was a clear warning that the search-and-rescue 

efforts in New Orleans would require boats, helicopters, and buses, 

the record shows that these alerts did not draw an effective or adequate response. As we will hear from our witnesses today, the heVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:05 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 026751 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26751.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4

roes of Hurricane Katrina did not just fight against the predictable 

aftermath of an enormous, catastrophic storm, they also had, too 

often, to battle with bureaucracy, inadequate equipment, and poor 

planning, all of which, in hindsight, seem inexplicable and unacceptable given the years of warnings. 

For instance, in that first dark night after the storm passed, rescuers went out in a small number of available boats, searching for 

the stranded, their spotlights providing the crippled city’s only 

light. But while they had some eyes, as we know, they had no ears 

because their communication equipment either did not work or was 

not compatible with other rescue workers. New Orleans police and 

fire rescuers often had to wait 20 minutes to get their turn on the 

overloaded mutual aid frequency, and sometimes they had to resort 

to a variation of the childhood game ‘‘operator’’ to relay messages 

to different parts of the city step by step because of the limited 

range of the equipment that was still usable. 

The New Orleans Fire Department, which was the city’s designated lead agency for urban search-and-rescue, owned no boats, 

none, despite repeated requests to the city over the years to buy 

some. The Police Department had just seven. Police and fire rescue 

workers were forced to commandeer, even hot wire, boats to begin 

their life-saving critical rescue work. 

The Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries rescue workers put on what 

I would consider to be an extraordinary display of both organization and courage. On Monday morning, as Katrina was still raging, 

they transported 60 boats to New Orleans from their prestaged 

areas around the State, and by 4 p.m. the same day they began to 

rescue people stranded in the storm. They succeeded in rescuing 

more than 1,500 by the next afternoon, and more than 21,000 before it was over. But many of these boats were too small for the 

job, and Wildlife and Fisheries requests to FEMA for larger boats 

went unanswered. 

Unfortunately, it gets worse. There was no plan for the evacuation or care of those rescued once they arrived at the search-andrescue collection points. This awful gap in planning was not resolved until 2 days after Katrina passed and created the grueling 

and inhumane conditions at the Superdome and on the Interstate 

10 overpasses. 

Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze of Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries, who is here today to testify, has told us that his agency 

called for medical support at collection points after landfall, but to 

no avail. Ground transportation to evacuate was also lacking and 

fought over by competing agencies with competing evacuation missions. Obviously, when it comes to search and rescue in a case like 

this, time is of the essence. Hours or minutes wasted, certainly 

days wasted, can mean saving a life or not. 

FEMA search-and-rescue teams did not arrive in New Orleans 

until late Monday afternoon and did not begin their missions until 

Tuesday morning, well after the other Federal, State, and local rescuers—and here when I say Federal I mean particularly the Coast 

Guard—had begun their work. It appears—and we will ask Mr. 

Lokey about that—that the FEMA search-and-rescue teams were 

not specifically trained for water rescue. When they got there, the 

members, I believe, also did some heroic work. 

5

Why the delay and lack of training? Why did FEMA apparently 

have no plan for this particular kind of search-and-rescue mission? 

That is a question I think we are going to want to answer. 

After finally beginning operations with those three rescue teams 

on Tuesday, FEMA suddenly stopped those rescue missions on 

Thursday, September 1, apparently because of security concerns, 

but the record seems to show that other Federal, State, and local 

rescue missions continued without interruption. 

Today, and in other hearings to follow with other DHS and 

FEMA representatives, we are going to ask why FEMA decided to 

leave the scene of the tragedy. 

Madam Chairman, as you and I have both said, many heroes 

were born in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and thousands 

and thousands of people are alive today thanks to them. What 

those brave men and women did recalls—I cannot phrase it better 

than Churchill did—how so many owe so much to so few. 

But all we can do, and the greatest honor we can pay those who 

risked their lives in the aftermath of Katrina, is to make sure that 

the heroes of the next catastrophe, which will surely come, whether 

from a natural disaster, or God forbid, a terrorist attack, are given 

the proper equipment, a clear and comprehensive plan, and all the 

support they need to carry out their life-saving work. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I am very pleased to welcome our four witnesses today. William 

Lokey is the Operations Branch Chief in the Response Division of 

FEMA. He served as the Federal Coordinating Officer for Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina, and he has more than 25 years 

of emergency management experience. 

Brigadier General Brod Veillon is the Assistant Adjutant General 

of the Louisiana National Guard, the Commander of the State Air 

National Guard, and its Search and Rescue Coordinator. The General is an experienced fighter pilot and served for 13 years on active duty with the U.S. Air Force. 

Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze is the Assistant Law Enforcement Division Administrator for the Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, which is the lead agency for search and rescue under the State Emergency Operations Plan. Lieutenant Colonel LaCaze has served with the Department for 28 years. 

Captain Timothy Bayard is the Commander of the Vice and Narcotics Squad of the New Orleans Police Department and has been 

with the Department since 1975. In the immediate aftermath of 

Hurricane Katrina, he and three fellow officers established a command post at a New Orleans casino. 

I welcome you all to the Committee. I would ask that you all rise 

so I can administer the oath. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give to the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. LOKEY. I do. 

General VEILLON. I do. 

Colonel LACAZE. I do. 

Captain BAYARD. I do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Lokey, we will begin with 

you. 

6

1The prepared statement of Mr. Lokey appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM M. LOKEY,1 OPERATIONS BRANCH 

CHIEF, RESPONSE DIVISION, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. LOKEY. Good afternoon, Chairman Collins and Senator 

Lieberman. I am William Lokey, the Operations Branch Chief of 

the Response Division of FEMA. It’s an honor to appear before you 

today to discuss the activities of the National Urban Search and 

Rescue System in response to Hurricane Katrina. 

FEMA appreciates your interest in this particular part of our response to this unprecedented disaster. I think we all recognize that 

the hurricanes of 2005, in particular Hurricane Katrina, thoroughly 

stressed the capabilities of FEMA, as well as the Nation. 

Under very difficult circumstances, members of FEMA’s Urban 

Search and Rescue Program (US&R) rose to the occasion, working 

outside the scope of their regular mission, although well within the 

authority of the Stafford Act, and Urban Search and Rescue provided guidance and leadership to State and local personnel and volunteers who were organizing their response in this effort. These efforts resulted in saved lives, plus provided necessary assistance 

and comfort to numerous citizens in the affected disaster. 

Allow me to provide a brief overview to the National Disaster 

System. 

Experiences gained and awareness from the responses to the 

major earthquakes in Mexico City and Armenia in 1980 dramatically demonstrated the need for specialized urban search-and-rescue capability in the United States. 

In March 1989, hearings were held in the reauthorization of the 

National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act by the Subcommittee 

on Science of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Following the Loma Prieta earthquake, which occurred in 

the San Francisco area in October of that year, $800,000 was provided to FEMA for one-time grants to accredited State and local 

search-and-rescue organizations for the training and the acquisition of special equipment and to develop specialized teams. Thus, 

the National Urban Search and Rescue System was born. 

After 17 years and numerous activations to hurricanes and 

earthquakes, as well as to the Oklahoma City bombing, the World 

Trade Center, the Pentagon, and other emergencies, there are now 

28 sponsored National Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces located throughout the United States that are trained and equipped 

to handle structural collapse rescue. 

The 28 teams are comprised of State, local, nonprofit organizations, and volunteers. These teams are based in their home communities and States. Except when deployed for Federal activation, the 

team members and the teams themselves operate in their home 

States. One of the basic foundations of the system, in return for 

making these State and local resources available to the Federal 

Government, the Federal Government provides resources and 

training that allow the teams to better serve their communities. 

Any of these national task forces can be activated and deployed 

by FEMA to a disaster area to provide assistance in structural colVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:05 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 026751 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26751.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
7

lapse rescue or may be prepositioned when a major disaster threatens a community. When activated, the task force can be dispatched 

and en route to its destination in a matter of hours. 

Each task force is comprised of 70 specialists and is divided into 

six major functional elements of search, rescue, medical, hazardous 

materials, logistics, and planning. They may be divided into two 

35-person teams, which allows for rotation and relief of personnel 

for round-the-clock operations. A full team of this size is referred 

to as a Type I task force. 

The task forces also have the flexibility to reconfigure and deploy 

as one 28-person team, which we call a Type III team, in response 

to small, primarily weather-driven incidents, where the requirements would be physical, technical, and canine search, and light 

search and rescue in wood frame construction. Such events typically include hurricanes, tornadoes, ice storms, and typhoons. 

When the system responds, a management group called the Incident Support Team also responds to support the teams. The IST, 

as it’s called, provides command and control for supporting local 

and State rescue operations. 

Some of the capabilities of a US&R Task Force are: The physical 

search-and-rescue operations in damaged or collapsed structures; 

operation in known or suspected weapons of mass destruction environments; emergency medical care for entrapped victims, task force 

personnel and search canines; reconnaissance to assess damage 

and needs and provide feedback to other officials; assessment and 

shut-off of utilities to houses and buildings; hazardous material 

survey and evaluations; structural and hazard evaluations of buildings; stabilizing damaged structures, including shoring and cribbing; and they carry approximately 62,000 pounds of equipment 

with them, configured to quickly deploy with the team. 

Let me now provide a brief overview of US&R operations for 

Hurricane Katrina. I was deployed and arrived in Baton Rouge on 

Saturday evening, August 27. Also with me was Richard Deir, my 

Emergency Response Team—the National ERT–N, as it’s called—

Emergency Services Branch Chief. He was an experienced person 

with ESF–9, which is the Emergency Support Function for Urban 

Search and Rescue. He began working with personnel for Louisiana 

Wildlife and Fisheries, the National Guard, the Coast Guard, and 

others who were at the State EOC, planning for potential searchand-rescue operations. We had also embedded staff from IEM, the 

contractor who helped with the Hurricane Pam workshops, to be 

there also to provide technical assistance. 

Before landfall, three task forces, one Type I and two Type III, 

and the Blue IST were stationed at Barksdale Air Force Base in 

Shreveport, Louisiana. Two task forces, one Type I and one Type 

III, and the Red IST were staged in Meridian, Mississippi, at the 

Meridian Naval Air Station. Five additional task forces, two Type 

I and three Type III, were put on alert, and then on Sunday, five 

additional task forces were added to that. 

By the morning of August 30, eight additional task forces, three 

Type I and five Type III, and eight of the California Swift Water 

Rescue Teams were activated and en route to operations in Mississippi and Louisiana. On August 31, 10 additional task forces, all 

Type I, were activated and staged to assist. 

8

In Mississippi, the task forces responded the morning after 

Katrina. They were used in four counties. The theater of operations 

spread 85 miles along the Mississippi coastline. They worked in 

close cooperation with the Coast Guard in carrying out the 

searches and developing appropriate documentation. They located 

60 deceased victims. They also located three live victims and gave 

medical care to 35 people. A total of 15 task forces worked in Mississippi and demobilized on September 10. 

In Louisiana, the task forces departed from Barksdale Air Force 

Base when weather permitted on Monday afternoon, August 29. 

The leadership and some of the task force members came to Baton 

Rouge, where they were briefed, where they programmed their radios to work on local frequencies, and they departed for the New 

Orleans area. They were destined to go to what we called in 

Metairie the Sam’s Club parking lot. Teams started arriving there 

Monday evening. The teams met up with U.S. Coast Guard representatives and those from Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries, who 

were leading the search operations. 

They were later asked by the State to move their base of operations to Zephyr Field, which is about five miles from New Orleans. 

During this time the Louisiana State Wildlife and Fisheries Department was organizing boats for Urban Search and Rescue personnel use. When the boats were secured early Tuesday morning, 

the rescue operations were launched. 

The water rescue operations carried out in the New Orleans area 

may be one of the largest life-saving efforts in history. It was a 

local, State, and Federal team effort. Tens of thousands of people 

were saved or assisted in the flooded area, and the FEMA US&R 

personnel accounted for 6,582 people saved or assisted. Over 22,300 

structures were searched. They also helped to identify locations 

and helped recover more than 300 human remains, over 25 percent 

of the victims. They were also asked by the State to take a followup lead on 22,000 911 calls. They delivered food and water and assisted unaccounted numbers of people in distress. 

Due to our training, we were able to work together with 40 different teams from 19 States to work as interchangeable parts in 

this rescue effort, and there were no serious member injuries in 

spite of the continuous operations in the highly hazardous environment. 

Both Incident Support Teams were instrumental in working with 

State and local folks to set up a unified command that helped out 

a lot in organizing the diverse number of people that were there 

along with teams that arrived through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC, that arrived over the first 

several days. 

With the assistance from FEMA logistics, within 5 to 6 days, 

base camps were built from literally nothing to provide support to 

over 3,000 people and support helicopter rescue operations. Our 

teams also assisted in capping approximately 40 broken gas mains. 

It is especially important to note that water rescue is not part 

of the US&R mission, although they were somewhat equipped to do 

their collapse structure rescue mission in the water environment 

with personal protective equipment. 

9

1The prepared statement of General Veillon appears in the Appendix on page 51. 

We learned a tremendous amount from this event. We have had 

one meeting already with our task forces to identify lessons 

learned, and a second meeting is taking place as we speak in 

Miami, which I will be departing for tonight to take part in the 

planning effort. 

One of the most significant efforts we have going from our lessons learned and for the program is the development of a 5-year 

strategic plan. Through this process, in the partnership with members of the system, the sponsoring chiefs, and the various organizations, our goal is to actually define what the system is and what 

we should be providing. It was designed for rescue in collapsed 

structures. The ability to work in a weapons of mass destruction 

environment was added as a result of the events of September 11. 

We recently added the capability to accomplish our structural collapse mission in a water environment such as providing personal 

flotation devices for the rescuers. 

Our goal is to work with the task forces and the States to come 

up with a recommendation on what the system needs to be. An example of working in a water environment in a collapsed structure, 

down in the depths of the World Trade Center they were using 

boats several floors down due to the broken water mains, so it is 

necessary as part of that mission. 

The men and women of the urban rescue program represent the 

finest tradition of search and rescue in America. For the job they 

did, and the risks they took, and the lives they saved, they deserve 

high praise. 

Thank you very much for allowing me to be here. I stand ready 

to answer your questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Lokey. General Veillon. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL BROD VEILLON,1 ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL FOR AIR, LOUISIANA NATIONAL GUARD 

General VEILLON. Thank you, Chairman Collins and Senator 

Lieberman. I am Brigadier General Brod Veillon. I am the Assistant Adjutant General for Air of the Louisiana National Guard. 

On Sunday, August 28, at about 10 a.m., the Adjutant General 

called and asked me to coordinate the Louisiana National Guard’s 

support of the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries search-and-rescue 

efforts in response to Hurricane Katrina. I called a meeting at 2:30 

p.m. of the agencies that would participate in the search-and-rescue operations. The meeting occurred at the Louisiana Office of 

Emergency Preparedness. Representatives from the following agencies participated: The U.S. Coast Guard, Louisiana Wildlife and 

Fisheries, Louisiana State Police, FEMA and FEMA DMORT personnel, as well as the Civil Air Patrol. We discussed capabilities of 

each of our organizations and areas of responsibilities. 

I arrived at the Louisiana National Guard Headquarters, Jackson Barracks, New Orleans, on Sunday, August 28, at 5 p.m. 

The National Guard, as well as the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries, had positioned small boats and rescue equipment at Jackson 

Barracks to be used for the search-and-rescue effort. Sunday night, 

10

I was in the National Guard Joint Operations Center monitoring 

the storm’s progress. 

Monday morning, August 29, as the eye of the storm approached 

New Orleans, flood water began to quickly rise. It went from about 

one foot deep, mainly associated with the heavy rain, to 10 feet 

deep in 30 minutes. This was a dramatic surge of water. Jackson 

Barracks was quickly covered. In some places it was over 20 feet 

deep. A local AM radio station was reporting that the Industrial 

Canal Levee had broken and that the 9th Ward was flooding. 

We had prepositioned 18 boats at Jackson Barracks. The rapidly 

rising water prompted concern that we may lose the equipment 

and motors, so I directed the National Guardsmen to move all 

equipment and motors to the second floor. Wildlife and Fisheries 

had also parked their boats on trailers adjacent to our Operations 

Center and I noticed that they were all floating with their trailers 

attached. 

By mid afternoon of Monday, August 29, the wind and the rain 

had subsided enough where we could use our boats to begin the 

rescue effort. Because of the depth of the water, we used one of our 

small boats to motor over to the larger boats. I put a guardsman 

into the water with bolt cutters to cut the boats loose from their 

trailers. We bailed them of their rain water and put two National 

Guardsmen in each. At that time I was thinking we would probably 

find a few people who would need help. We moved out into the immediate neighborhood, and as I looked around, there were people 

on rooftops in every direction calling for help. 

There were many natural gas pipeline breaks, which formed 

small geysers, and several houses were on fire. I was expecting to 

find a few, but what I found were hundreds. My team and I began 

taking people into our boats. The water was deep enough to allow 

us to dock on the rooftops. The wind and the rain made it very difficult to maneuver in and around these homes. Telephone and electrical lines had to be lifted by hand to allow us to pass beneath 

them. 

At the third house I approached, the people there advised me 

that their neighbor was trapped in her attic. We docked on her roof 

and removed the roof vent. Looking down, we could see her crying 

for help. My crew and I used an axe to cut a hole in her roof, and 

several of us reached down and lifted her to safety. The rapidly rising water had forced her up into her attic, where she became 

trapped, unable to go higher, and she could no longer go down. 

This sequence of events was repeated over and over and over 

again, National Guardsmen cutting holes in rooftops to lift people 

out. Our boats would quickly fill, and we would motor toward the 

Mississippi River levee, which took them out of the immediate danger and placed them on good high ground. This action made them 

visible to follow-on forces who were tasked, during earlier coordination meetings, to evacuate them by air, land, or boats on the river. 

We continued this effort until nightfall. At that time the Joint 

Operations Center moved from Jackson Barracks to the Louisiana 

Superdome. Search and rescue operations continued through the 

night. I boarded one of the helicopters to the Superdome and continued my coordination from there. 

11

During the night, National Guard, as well as U.S. Coast Guard 

helicopters, began flying over the city and assessing the situation. 

It was clear that Hurricane Katrina had dealt a catastrophic blow 

to the city of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana. When the 

sun rose on Tuesday morning, the Superdome was an island, surrounded by 6 feet of water in every direction. I could see columns 

of smoke rising from several buildings in the city. 

The Superdome had become the center of gravity of our searchand-rescue efforts. We used the top floor of a parking lot as an additional helicopter landing zone. Helicopters began lifting people 

from rooftops throughout the city, bringing them to the Superdome. 

National Guard medics would assess the rescued for medical care. 

We would give them food and water, and direct them away from 

our helicopter landing area. Sometimes we were lifting people to 

safety via hoist, and other times these helicopters would lightly 

land on the rooftops where people would climb in. 

I direct your attention to my left and some of the photographs 

that we brought to accompany my testimony. 

We used the EMAC process to request and receive additional helicopters from other States to assist us with the search-and-rescue 

effort. In every direction I could see helicopters all over the city, 

hovering and lifting people to safety. This helicopter operation went 

on 24 hours a day. At night our crews used airborne spotlights, 

night vision goggles, as well as on-board infrared capabilities. The 

city was completely dark at night, and many who were waiting rescue would flash flashlights at us. 

The Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries used their boats to comb 

through the neighborhoods, house to house, searching and rescuing 

people from their flooded homes. All high ground, bridges and elevated highways, became drop-off points for the boats. Helicopters 

were used to pick up the people at these sites and transport them 

to the Superdome. 

In the days following the storm, the number of helicopters, as 

well as boat assets, grew rapidly, as more and more States, as well 

as the Federal Government, sent personnel and equipment in to assist us. With each passing day more and more people were lifted 

to safety. By Thursday, September 1, most of the people in need 

had been rescued. 

In many areas of the city the water was too deep for our highwater vehicles to enter. So we relied to a great extent on small 

boats and helicopters. Except for the Chinook helicopter, we were 

only able to take small groups at a time, but over time all were 

brought out to safety. 

I am very proud of all who were involved, State, Federal, military, and local volunteers. 

In the face of Hurricane Katrina, the greatest natural disaster to 

hit the United States, a disaster of biblical proportions, over 72,000 

people were safely lifted to high ground and evacuated out of the 

city. I am proud of the National Guard and proud that I had a part 

in the Hurricane Katrina effort. I look forward to answering your 

questions. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Lieutenant Colonel LaCaze. 

12

1The prepared statement of Colonel LaCaze appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEITH LACAZE,1 ASSISTANT CHIEF, LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, LOUISIANA 

DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES 

Colonel LACAZE. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Collins, 

Senator Lieberman, and Senator Pryor. Thank you for having us 

here. My name is Keith LaCaze. I am the Assistant Chief of Law 

Enforcement with the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. 

The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries enforcement agents 

were among the first search-and-rescue teams to arrive in New Orleans. We had to wait for landfall and passage of Hurricane 

Katrina. We had experience with planning and response to storm 

impacts in Louisiana dating back as far as Hurricane Andrew in 

1992. Prior to Katrina’s landfall, the Department of Wildlife and 

Fisheries had alerted its personnel and staged boats and vehicles 

at locations near Baton Rouge and the central part of the State in 

anticipation of response to the impacted areas. 

By 9 a.m. of the morning of Monday, August 29, Wildlife and 

Fisheries response teams were moving to unite in Baton Rouge. By 

1 p.m., the response teams were en route to New Orleans. The initial group was made up of 120 agents, boats, and four-wheel drive 

vehicles. 

The teams arrived in New Orleans at about 4 p.m. We had boats 

in the water and started making rescues in the New Orleans East 

area at St. Claude Avenue Bridge, Esplanade, Elysian Fields, 

Franklin Avenue, and St. Bernard Avenue by dark. Prior to that, 

we had started evacuating a nursing home in the Power Boulevard 

area of Kenner. Rescues in the neighborhoods under the nighttime 

conditions and the flooded streets were further complicated by debris, downed power lines, obstructions, and water at depths of up 

to 15 feet in some areas. 

I have to tell you that it’s just unimaginable to see the conditions, and after dark, with the obstructions and the downed trees 

and the obstructions in the neighborhoods, in the dark, no lighting, 

you could hear the cries for help, and our officers went out in the 

boats into areas that they weren’t very familiar with, and some of 

the city streets, and would go into those areas and come out with 

boat loads of people. And it was a very gratifying thing to see, and 

very remarkable. 

Despite the challenges that we faced, the people were rescued 

from rooftops, attics, and makeshift boats floating in the neighborhoods. Anything that they could grab onto or they could place 

themselves on, we found them there. Many were sick and injured 

people. The population included elderly, people with chronic medical conditions such as diabetes and those requiring dialysis, and 

many who had suffered injuries due to falls or mishaps during and 

after the storm. 

Rescue operations continued throughout the night, and by break 

of day on Tuesday, August 30, we estimated nearly 2,000 citizens 

had been moved to safety on the elevated portions of I–10 and I–

610. By midmorning Tuesday, additional Wildlife enforcement 

13

agents and Department biologists, technicians, and specialists, 

strengthened our rescue effort. We brought out even more people. 

In the following days, we were joined by Conservation officers 

from responding States, including Texas, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Minnesota, Michigan, North Carolina, and South 

Carolina. We were joined by volunteers and fire rescue and police 

and sheriff’s deputies from local agencies throughout the State. Everyone demonstrated levels of determination, dedication, and professionalism beyond my ability to adequately describe. 

In all, Wildlife and Fisheries rescued an estimated 21,000 people. 

We were joined by the Louisiana National Guard, the Coast Guard, 

State Police, and local law enforcement. In all, I am told that 

60,000 people were rescued in the New Orleans and St. Bernard 

Parish areas from houses, hospitals, nursing homes, schools, and 

churches, anywhere people had taken refuge to escape the flooding. 

LSU Hurricane Center scientist Ezra Boyd wrote in the Times 

Picayune, January 16, 2006, Your Opinions column that the 

Katrina death toll could have reached 10,000 and that search-andrescue operations of this unprecedented magnitude resulted in a 

significantly lower death toll than could have occurred. 

Hurricane Pam exercise predicted that 60,000 would die in a catastrophic storm. We saved 60,000. 

I am proud to have been part of this life-saving effort. I am 

proud of my Department. Where we met obstacles and challenges, 

we improvised. Where we found problems, we came up with solutions. Communications failures severely affected our ability to coordinate search and rescue effectively. Katrina destroyed the communications infrastructure. Without towers and antennas, the radios just don’t work, cell phones don’t work. Then came the flood, 

and this took out the land telephone lines. Louisiana had redundant communications. We had interoperability. Katrina just 

smashed it all to pieces. 

In order to build more redundancy, we must get funding from 

Congress for expanded radio systems. The Nation’s need for interoperable communications was identified after September 11. Homeland Security was created after September 11. We look to you, the 

oversight committee for Homeland Security, for this funding. We 

are already working on preplanning with other agencies, including 

Louisiana State Police, Louisiana Army National Guard, and U.S. 

Coast Guard, who are our partners in search-and-rescue operations. We want to use the lessons learned from Katrina to be 

ready for the next storm. Our biggest lesson, flexibility, was a key 

component to our success. 

I am very excited about our initiative to create a trained searchand-rescue volunteer force. We are partnering with the U.S. Coast 

Guard Auxiliary to accomplish this. We have designed the specifications for a new mobile command unit, and it is on order. We 

have already purchased 32 small boats with outboard motors to improve our response to urban flooding. We have obtained input from 

field level personnel, the guys on the ground, on ways to improve 

for future missions. More and better equipment is needed, especially in the communications area. We must develop a list of 

preapproved contractors who are authorized to perform search-andVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:05 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 026751 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26751.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
14

1The prepared statement of Captain Bayard appears in the Appendix on page 63. 

rescue missions on behalf of State or Federal agencies, with the expectation of payment for services provided. 

Written standard operating procedures describing preparedness 

levels and specific actions to be taken with approach and landfall 

of major storms or events have been developed. In the next 6 

months, our agency will provide additional search-and-rescue training for in-service personnel and future academy classes. We will 

apply for grants for money to acquire additional emergency searchand-rescue equipment needed for similar operations in the future. 

We will enhance the training of mid-level supervisory personnel in 

search-and-rescue organization and coordination. We will meet and 

train with other agencies involved in response for better joint agency performance. We will explore equipment and training levels at 

local agencies to determine resources available and their location. 

We want to build a better team with our local and Federal searchand-rescue partners. 

In closing, I must emphasize the dedication of the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries staff members who responded to 

this crisis, particularly those enforcement agents, biologists, and 

technicians who lost homes and personal property in the same 

flooded areas where they worked so diligently to help others. These 

men and women in many cases evacuated with nothing more than 

their families and the clothes they were wearing. They got their 

families to safety, then immediately returned to face this task. 

Without their knowledge of the local area and their ability to guide 

rescue forces through the confusion of flooded roads and streets, 

our mission would not have been nearly as effective and successful. 

I would like to thank the Chairman and all Committee Members 

for the opportunity to speak and to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Captain Bayard. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN TIMOTHY P. BAYARD,1 COMMANDER 

OF THE VICE CRIMES/NARCOTICS SECTION, NEW ORLEANS 

POLICE DEPARTMENT 

Captain BAYARD. Good afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to 

appear before you today. My name is Tim Bayard. I’m a Captain 

with the New Orleans Police Department, Commander of the Vice 

Crimes and Narcotics Division. I have been a member of the Department for 30 years. I coordinated and directed the water rescue 

and recovery operations throughout the city of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. I am here today to relay my experiences, which began prior to Katrina’s arrival and include the 14 

days that followed. 

Let me briefly explain the events that led to my coordination of 

the massive water-based rescue and recovery operations. 

In 1965, I experienced Hurricane Betsy. My father was a New 

Orleans fireman. Based on my conversations with him, I had a 

good recollection of the areas of the city which flooded as a result. 

I knew which areas of the city were high and the available routes 

to access bridges and overpasses suitable for boat launch locations. 

15

Forty years later, many of the same areas flooded again. The high 

ground was essentially the same. 

On Friday, August 26, at approximately 11:30 p.m., I learned 

that New Orleans was in the cross-hairs of Katrina. I spoke with 

Deputy Superintendent Warren Riley, Commander of Field Operations, and suggested items that would be immediately needed following the storm’s impact. This information was also forwarded to 

the Office of Emergency Preparedness. 

On Saturday, August 27, I instructed the supervisors under my 

command to contact each member of our division with instructions 

to evacuate their families and rally at our office at 12 noon on Sunday, August 28. Each member was instructed to bring at least 3 

days supply of food and clothing. 

On Sunday, August 28, we removed our division’s vehicles from 

the Equipment Maintenance Division, an area prone to flooding. 

All of our vehicles were fueled for deployment. With the exception 

of our high-water vehicles, all vehicles were secured in the Superdome parking lot and at the Convention Center. 

My unit patrolled the central business district, while I privately 

negotiated safe housing for my officers. The Narcotics Unit was 

housed at the Maison Dupuy Hotel, the Vice Crimes Section was 

housed at the Marriott. Once the sustained winds reached 55 miles 

an hour, my units were instructed to return to their respective hotels. 

I later met with Captain Jeff Winn, Commander of the Tac 

teams and Special Operations Command, and Captain Harry Mendoza, Commander of the Traffic Division. Together we established 

a rally point which was Harrah’s Casino, which is at the foot of 

Canal Street, one of the highest points in the city. We agreed to 

meet there following the storm. 

We, however, were not equipped with any emergency rescue 

equipment, provisions, or fuel. 

Captain Robert Norton, Commander of the Bomb Squad and the 

Dive Team, was housed in the LSU Dental School, along with the 

Third District contingent. Captain Norton had previously deployed 

our Department’s three boats. These boats were deployed in MidCity, Algiers, and New Orleans East. Captain Norton, cut off a lot 

by rising water, was able to conduct a hasty rescue operation in the 

neighborhood adjacent to the dental school, utilizing a privately 

owned boat. Captain Norton’s boat experienced motor failure, and 

he himself had to be rescued. The three departmental boats were 

also engaged in hasty rescue operations in the same areas. The 

issue here was that none of these efforts were coordinated by a central command. Additionally, due to the vehicles and the boat trailers being flooded, the mobility was limited. 

Based on contact with our Communications Division, I knew that 

the lower 9th Ward was flooding. Later in the day, we additionally 

learned that Lakeview was also taking on water. 

Immediately after the storm, Captains Winn, Mendoza, and I 

met at Harrah’s. Absent instructions from superiors, we made decisions to save lives. Routes were identified to access bridges and 

overpasses we utilized as boat launches. The problem was that we 

only had five boats at our disposal, two of which were commandeered. The Harbor Police met us on the St. Claude Bridge and 

16

worked side by side with members of the Tactical Unit and the 

Narcotics Unit in our continued efforts to save lives. Other members of the Tactical and Narcotics Units teamed up with firemen 

in conducting rescue operations in Lakeview Gentilly. The Vice 

Unit transported evacuees to the Superdome and Convention Center utilizing two 15-passenger vans and a pickup truck. 

The first night, we lost communication with three detectives 

trapped by rising water. The batteries on our radios were depleted, 

and they were unable to call for help. After spending the night attempting to locate the missing detectives, they appeared at the 

hotel the following morning. 

The following night, three Tactical Unit officers were lost. Again, 

without communication, officers set out in search of their colleagues. At 11:30 p.m., the officers returned to Harrah’s. All six officers had to walk through the water to get back to their respective 

units. 

By day three, Captain Winn was given the two-pronged task of 

rescuing trapped law enforcement officers and responding to violence. From that point forward, the Tactical Unit ceased civilian 

boat rescues and became the primary rapid response unit for the 

countless acts of violence. 

Given the change of Captain Winn’s mission and the fact that 

Captain Norton was trapped by surrounding water, I became the 

sole commander of the water rescue operations. 

Our efforts were not coordinated with other agencies. Our communication system was inoperable. We had no aerial views to ascertain water levels necessary to prioritize our rescue operations. 

Through public service announcements, we welcomed citizens from 

various areas in the State of Louisiana and other States, equipped 

with privately owned boats, who met us at Harrah’s, to assist us 

in rescue operations. In an effort to coordinate rescue efforts, several contacts were made with Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries. 

By happenstance, I met with members of the U.S. Army 20th 

Group Special Forces. This meeting propelled our rescue operation 

to another level. We immediately gained access to helicopters, Zodiac boats, and trucks. Captain Will Lynn became my counterpart. 

With the Special Forces Group, we set up a forward command post 

equipped with maps, asset boards, and deployment strategy. This 

was the first incident command center established following the 

event. From that moment forward, it became the command from 

which all water rescue operations were deployed. 

For 14 days, my division was involved in water rescue operations. At no point did we have a truly unified command. 

In week three, we finally coordinated with FEMA. That is when 

we began conducting secondary rescue operations. We worked 

along with Fire Department search-and-rescue units from other 

States through November 2005. 

Mistakes. The New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness 

failed. They did not prepare themselves, nor did they manage the 

city agencies responsible for conducting emergency response to the 

disaster. Their function was to coordinate with State, Federal, and 

other local agencies to enlist logistical assistance. We did not coordinate with any State, local, or Federal agencies. We were not 

prepared logistically. Most importantly, we relocated evacuees to 

17

two locations where there was no food, water, or portable restrooms. We did not implement the pre-existing plan. We did not utilize buses that would have allowed us to transport mass quantities 

of evacuees expeditiously. We did not have food, water, or fuel for 

the emergency workers. We did not have a back-up communication 

system. We had no portable radio towers or repeaters that would 

enable us to communicate. The other mistakes have been mentioned previously. 

The remedies. New Orleans Police Department now has a fully 

staffed Bomb Squad and Dive Team. It is equipped with four flat 

boats and one 16-foot V-hull. We have two 8-wheel all terrain vehicles for shallow water rescue. Captain Norton is currently negotiating with the State officials in an attempt to secure privately 

owned boats that were abandoned, as well as boats that are now 

owned by insurance companies, in order to increase our fleet. 

Captain Norton has met with members of the New Orleans Fire 

Department in an attempt to cross-train police officers and firemen 

in water and urban rescue procedures. This will allow the New Orleans Police Department to be the lead agency in water rescue, 

with fire personnel in support, and will allow the New Orleans Fire 

Department to take the lead in structural damage rescue, with police officers as support personnel. 

Captain Norton is also attempting to secure a facility to house 

large quantities of food and water for the 2006 hurricane season. 

Captain Jeff Strickland, Commander of Miami Dade’s Urban 

Search and Rescue Unit, has been contacted by Captain Norton to 

attempt to secure training, as well as to obtain information on how 

and what is needed to outfit a US&R team. 

He is also engaged in conversations with members of the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries in an attempt to secure boat safety 

training for each member of his unit and each member of the Vice, 

Narcotics, and Tactical Units. I would like to say that training will 

be conducted this Thursday with Louisiana State Wildlife and 

Fisheries. 

Requests. I lived this horror, and as a result, I have identified 

the following equipment needed to adequately prepare for the 2006 

hurricane season. 

We must establish a regional communications system, as per the 

USAI agreement, that’s the Urban Area Security Initiative, which 

allows us to coordinate rescue efforts with surrounding jurisdictions, St. Bernard Parish, Jefferson Parish, and Plaquemines Parish, all parishes that were affected by the storm. 

We need additional flat boats, inflatable boats, air boats. We 

need a fully-equipped US&R trailer. We need training for 100 

members of the New Orleans Police Department. 

The most important thing to me is reimbursement for the damages and repairs to police officers and firemen who used their personal boats to rescue people, to get their boats repaired. The question is, can this equipment and reimbursement be funded through 

a Community Block Development Grant? That I don’t know. 

I would like to make two suggestions if I may. I suggest or request that someone draft legislation to mandate that all health 

care facilities, hospitals, raise their emergency generators and fuel 

reservoirs to a minimum of 32 feet. Also mandate that they have 

18

1 Exhibit 6 appears in the Appendix on page 79. 

enough fuel to operate the generators for at least 3 days. How 

many individuals on life support perished due to generator failure? 

Many generators are located in basements. The basement of every 

hospital in New Orleans flooded. 

Additionally draft legislation to mandate mandatory evacuation 

of all one- and two-story elderly care centers in the event of a Category 3 or higher storm. The city and State will be responsible for 

supplying the vehicles needed to transport the elderly. These patients will be relocated to a facility that will accommodate their 

every need. 

Conclusion. My purpose before you today is to help you understand what the members of New Orleans Police Department’s Vice 

Crime/Narcotics Section experienced. I know numerous mistakes as 

it relates to planning and decisionmaking occurred. Mistakes were 

made in every level of government. I am not here to point fingers. 

I am here to relate my story and my experiences in an attempt to 

ensure that other agencies do not make the same mistakes that we 

made prior to, during, and after Katrina. 

I would also like to say that I’m very proud of the members of 

the Vice Squad, Narcotics Section, and the other members who rallied with us to do rescues in the city of New Orleans. 

Thank you. I am now prepared to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Captain. 

Mr. Lokey, when you arrived in Baton Rouge on Saturday, you 

arrived amidst predictions for a catastrophic hurricane with enormous storm surges and the overtopping of the levees as a likely 

event. I recognize that FEMA is not the lead agency for search and 

rescue, but you do have Urban Search and Rescue Teams, and you 

do have an obligation to be the coordinator and to make sure that 

your State and local partners have what they need. 

In light of these predictions for a truly horrific hurricane to 

strike the city, I would think that FEMA would have tapped every 

possible resource, would have responded very quickly to requests 

from State and local agencies for assistance, and would have eagerly taken up other offers of qualified assistance. And yet that is 

not what seems to have happened, and that perplexes me. 

I want to ask you about two particular examples. If you would 

turn to Exhibit 6 1 in your book, this is a Louisiana form for State 

agencies to use to make requests for supplies, and I know that the 

staff has discussed this form with you. It shows that on Sunday, 

before landfall, the State asked for rubber rafts. It asked that these 

rubber rafts be delivered to New Orleans the next day, the day of 

landfall, to be used in rescue missions. 

The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has told our investigators that FEMA turned down that request, and indeed, you can see 

written on that document ‘‘Request Denied.’’

It is puzzling to me, given the predictions for flooding, for the 

storm surge, for the overtopping of the levees, that FEMA wouldn’t 

have said, ‘‘Of course, we will get them to you instantly.’’

What happened in this case? 

Mr. LOKEY. In this particular case, first of all, I first became 

aware of this when your staff showed me this. Literally hundreds 

19

of requests came through, many of which the level I was working, 

I did not know about. So on this particular one, I followed up with 

my staff. 

The request for 300 did come in to the State EOC. That request 

was turned into a request for 1,000 rubber boats. That was sent 

to our regional office in Denton, Texas, where most everything—the 

actual procurement and things like that were taking place. 

I am informed that a meeting took place there with the searchand-rescue people, the DOD, the Corps of Engineers, and the Coast 

Guard, where the decision was made that these rubber boats in the 

environment we were working in would not be useful with the debris and things like that. So the request was denied. More substantial boats were ordered, and although in lesser numbers, 20 Zodiacs 

and I believe 27 flat-bottomed boats were procured and sent in to 

use. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. LaCaze, let me ask you to respond to 

that because the request was initiated by your agency. Do you 

think it would have been helpful to have those rubber rafts? 

Colonel LACAZE. I think to us in the field, in the New Orleans 

area, the situation we were in, I believe that the rafts would have 

been beneficial, especially in the early stages, because in the situation we were in, we could have used the rubber rafts in tow with 

the small motorboats that we sent into the neighborhoods, and we 

could have loaded additional evacuees into the rafts and towed 

them. 

The other benefit of the rafts would have been that in some of 

the very shallow water areas, say 2-foot to 3-foot, officers, rescuers 

could have actually taken the rafts and walked alongside and 

pulled them into shallow water areas, up onto porches, for example, or very near or up into the doorways of homes where we could 

have loaded mobility-impaired people or sick people that could have 

been placed in those rafts. So they would have had some benefit 

to us, I think, especially in the early stages of the rescue. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Lokey, I didn’t know what Mr. LaCaze 

was going to say, but he just gave a very good reason why at least 

this initial version of the request should have been granted. But 

what troubles me is, Don’t you all talk to one another? I mean, 

wouldn’t this be a case if you thought that the State didn’t really 

need this equipment, that you would have a conversation and try 

to figure out what assets are needed? 

Captain, from your testimony and other interviews, what strikes 

me is the utter lack of coordination on search-and-rescue operations. It sounds like the New Orleans Police Department, your 

staff and officers, were operating all on their own and doing a great 

job, the best job that they could with search and rescue. But did 

you see coordination with the city, the rest of the city agencies, the 

State, FEMA, and the National Guard? 

Captain BAYARD. No, ma’am, we did not actually get with FEMA 

until week four. Week three, we moved into the OEP at the Hyatt 

Hotel, but I did not actually meet with any member of FEMA until 

week four, and then we started doing secondary rescue. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Lokey, the other example that I want to 

talk to you about was an offer from the Department of the Interior. 

Now, this was after landfall. The levees had breached. The city was 

20

80 percent underwater, and the Department of the Interior says to 

FEMA, Hey, we are experts at search and rescue. We have a lot 

of experience. What is more, we can help you out on law and order, 

which was one of the reasons that FEMA pulled back its Search 

and Rescue Teams temporarily. 

The Department of the Interior offered 300 boats, 400 trained 

law enforcement officers, 11 aircraft, and, in fact, in its response 

to our inquiry, the Department wrote that these were clearly the 

assets and skills that were precisely relevant in the post-Katrina 

environment. 

I know that you told the Committee that you were not aware of 

that offer either. Doesn’t that suggest a systemic problem when you 

as the Federal coordinating official do not get word that these assets are available? 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, yes, it does. And to back up, my report about 

the change in the order to the Zodiacs and the flat-bottomed boats 

was just a report of what I was told what happened, not that I disagreed that they needed it. 

Communications and coordination was lacking. Preplanning was 

lacking. We were not prepared for this. 

Relative to the DOI request, I was not aware of that at the time. 

I have since talked with my staff, and no one was. Those resources 

certainly could have been. At minimum, that shows that we have 

a lot more work to do at the Federal level. 

I am sorry. I lost my train of thought. There was one other question you have about——

Chairman COLLINS. I was just suggesting that when you get offers of trained personnel assets——

Mr. LOKEY. Oh, yes. If we had gotten it, we certainly would have 

used it. But, again, I mainly in my operations partnered up with 

Jeff Smith, the State coordinating officer. I made every effort, anything he asked for, to try to get. And I even talked with him when 

the first issue of boats came up after my first interview with your 

staff, and he was not aware of this. I can assure you, had he approached me, things might have been different. 

But, there was so much going on. We have a tremendous amount 

of work to do on this. There is no question. 

Chairman COLLINS. I appreciate your candid answer to that. My 

point is that we have a broken system. We have a system when, 

even when desperately needed, personnel and equipment are offered, we don’t seem to be able to incorporate them into the response. And in the meantime, we have thousands of victims on the 

rooftops waiting to be rescued. We have first responders—State, 

local, and Federal—doing their best, but going through the city 

with no maps to guide them in some cases and without coordination, so that you have rescuers from all different agencies literally 

bumping into one another, not dividing up the city in a logical way, 

not coordinating their efforts. And I want to come back to this. Mr. 

Lokey. 

Mr. LOKEY. If I could add one other thing, and I could ask Wildlife and Fisheries to respond, because where we set up camp was 

at Metairie at Zephyr Field, and that is where plans were made on 

where to search for the whole area. And, that is where we partnered with them on Tuesday. Daily plans were done. Incident acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:05 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 026751 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26751.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
21

tion plans were done on who would search where. And I thought 

there was representation from the Police Department there. The 

New Orleans Police was doing their search and rescue there. But 

we were making every effort, with the number of people that came 

in at Zephyr Field, to do that coordination. It wasn’t that it wasn’t 

taking place or that people weren’t trying. But there was a lot of 

great efforts going on by a lot of people. But as an overall single 

command post controlling everything going on in Hurricane 

Katrina in Louisiana, no, ma’am, that did not exist. 

But we went to where the State asked us to go to work with 

them to do the unified command. 

Chairman COLLINS. But I think that shows some of the lack of 

coordination between the State and local agencies as well that the 

captain alluded to. I will come back to that issue. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lokey, let me continue that line of questioning. I think in 

some sense you may have, in your own quiet response to Senator 

Collins, given us the bottom line when you said we were not prepared for this. And I take that to mean that FEMA was not prepared for Hurricane Katrina. And our responsibility here is to figure out why and what we can do together to make sure that the 

next time disaster strikes, natural or otherwise, we are better prepared. 

I want to clarify that you are the Operations Branch Chief of the 

Response Division at national FEMA. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Which is to say that you are in charge of all 

operations, I suppose planning and implementation of the response 

to an emergency. 

Mr. LOKEY. My specific responsibilities are the National Urban 

Search and Rescue Program, the National Disaster Medical System, the National Response Coordination Center. I do have a planning unit that was the—where Hurricane Pam was planned. But 

like in the Response Division, all the logistics and equipment and 

support and things come out of the logistics——

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is somewhere else. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, that is someplace else 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Mr. LOKEY. I am not overall of all operations. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. But am I right that you were asked 

to go to Baton Rouge to be the No. 1 person for FEMA in regard 

to Hurricane Katrina? 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You have heard us talk about the Hurricane 

Pam fictional exercise, which FEMA sponsored and paid for. Were 

you aware of the Hurricane Pam exercise prior to the weekend before Katrina? 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir, I was. I assumed my job at headquarters in 

late April. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. April 2005? 

Mr. LOKEY. Of 2005, yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. 

22

Mr. LOKEY. And as I was coming up to speed on the various initiatives, I was briefed by my staff on the Hurricane Pam initiatives. My only direct involvement was on the July workshop in 

New Orleans, I was able to be there for the last day for the briefing 

from various working groups on, I think, specifically at that time 

on transportation and search and rescue where they were in the 

process. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. As we go along today, I think we are going 

to want to ask you why to our eyes and ears, as we go on with this 

investigation, it seems that there was so little specific and tangible 

response to the deficiencies, not just in FEMA but State and local 

as well, that the Hurricane Pam exercise showed. In other words, 

we weren’t ready for this. We weren’t ready for Katrina at all levels of government. But I want to focus on having—well, let me ask 

you just real briefly: Did you take any specific action in your work 

in response to what you saw of the Hurricane Pam report? 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir, I did, and in hindsight, it obviously was not 

the right thing. One of the things, for example, we were briefed on 

was the locals were only 10 percent done with their planning for 

the use of buses for evacuation, and they told me they would need 

a Presidential declaration of emergency 72 hours in advance to be 

able to pay for it. 

I went back to headquarters and sent a memo over to the Recovery Division where that declaration unit was housed, expressing 

this to get the discussion started. And also instead of making plans 

to do the buses myself, I went and worked on getting them more 

money so they could continue their planning. And so I worked to—

because they had asked that—they had done a lot of good things 

in the Hurrican Pam process, and my main focus was trying to get 

continued money to do that. And then Hurricanes Dennis through 

before Katrina kind of wound us up, and we didn’t do anything 

more than that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me take you to August 27, 2 days before 

landfall. FEMA officials, including yourself, were e-mailed certain 

sections of the southeast Louisiana catastrophic hurricane plan, the 

plan that came out of the Hurricane Pam exercise, by Sharon 

Blades. Could you identify Sharon Blades? 

Mr. LOKEY. Sharon Blades works for me. She is part of our planning unit in the Response Division. She had been intimately involved, one of the lead staff working on the Hurricane Pam process. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So did she circulate that at your request, or did she just find it and circulate it as a crisis reminder? 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, it was kind of as a reminder because when I 

got tagged to be the—well, when Director Brown made the decision 

to send the ERT–N, the National Response Team, which the Blue 

Team was up and I was the FCO for that, on Saturday morning, 

and one of the things—and by that time, as the hurricane moved 

west, it became New Orleans and Louisiana were coming into the 

target area, I had asked that the contractors from IEM be embedded in Louisiana and in our NRCC to give technical advice to remind people what had been done through the planning. 

I carried with me several of the documents, and I don’t want to 

take credit for good staff work. I wanted to get the word out, and 

Sharon did the appropriate thing to plan that. And on the airplane 

23

going down there, I thumbed through it and looked for things to—

you tickle me on the things we need to be talking to the State 

about. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Don’t you agree that by that time it was too 

late? In other words, the deficiencies that the Hurricane Pam exercise showed in FEMA would have required a response much earlier, training of your Search and Rescue Teams for water rescue, 

etc.? 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, for overall system things to respond with, yes, 

sir, you are exactly right. As far as the prepositioning of assets and 

things like that, that was specifically challenging in Katrina because after it hit southern Florida and came out, the track had it 

going through Tallahassee. And then the track moved very rapidly 

west, and we were staging commodities and teams to respond to 

Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. And that was why when I got 

there on Saturday night and got the briefing we activated the additional Urban Search and Rescue Teams. They would have been entirely—we never could have gotten them on time there. We put 

them on alert to move them in as quickly as possible after. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me read you from the Hurricane Pam 

plan’s section on search and rescue, ‘‘Parish resources in the most 

severely impacted areas will not be available for several weeks or 

even months, as they were not removed from the area prior to the 

storm.’’

My understanding from my staff in the pre-hearing interview 

that they had with you is that you indicated some awareness of 

that particular prediction in Pam, which is to say that the first responders locally would be overwhelmed by the flooding. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Why was that? It certainly appears in the 

explicit wording of the Pam plan that there is a prediction that this 

kind of hurricane would in some sense drown—not literally, thank 

God, but would overwhelm the local first responders. 

Looking at the plan, in hindsight, knowing that it came out in 

January 2005, you arrived at FEMA in April 2005, it cries out for 

action at the Federal, State, and local level, which, unfortunately, 

did not happen. 

In the case of FEMA, it seems to me to clearly say that if this 

big one hits, the locals are simply not going to be able to handle 

it and that FEMA has got to get ready to come in with everything 

and take over. 

Am I reading it right? And if so, why didn’t something more happen at FEMA national headquarters to get ready for it? 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, let me say what I will express will be my opinions. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Please. 

Mr. LOKEY. Not necessarily that of the Department. But before 

I came to headquarters, I was a Federal Coordinating Officer. 

What is ingrained in us is that the State is sovereign. We work for 

them. We partner up with them. And FEMA does not even have 

the authority to go in and take over. And so I did as I was trained 

and what I was used to doing, partnered up with the State, and 

made sure I met their objectives. 

24

I was able to review the Hurricane Pam things, like, for example—I am not sure exactly where it is, but there is a suggested 24 

hours out what to have available. And it was four NDMS teams 

and two DMORT teams, and it was a pretty short list. Boats were 

not on that list. 

In my discussions with the State, the Coast Guard and the Fisheries folks were moving their boats to safe areas. I don’t have 

boats. But I didn’t get a request for boats. 

In hindsight—I mean, next time, sir, I will be before this Committee wondering why I spent so much money on things that were 

not needed. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, there you go. I mean, looking at the 

Pam exercise, you are responsible for the Urban Search and Rescue 

Teams. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Don’t you agree that the Pam exercise really 

was a plea that the Urban Search and Rescue Teams have some 

water rescue capacities? 

Mr. LOKEY. No, sir. I think the Urban Rescue Teams weren’t 

even part of the Pam process. There is extremely robust water rescue capability in this country. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Within FEMA? 

Mr. LOKEY. No, sir. FEMA does not have organic water rescue 

capability. We have found from experience our urban search-andrescue people occasionally, in doing their collapsed structure mission, do need to be prepared to work in a water environment. Subsequently, they have the safety gear. But to expand that program 

into a water rescue asset, we don’t have enough funding to even 

do our structural collapse program as we would like. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So part of it was a lack of adequate funding. 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, initially. That has always been considered that 

is a local and State responsibility. And with the time we could get 

there with teams to perform water rescue, all through the EMAC 

program. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The EMAC is the State mutual aid programs. So you called in a water rescue team, as I recall you mentioning in your opening statement, from California. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But, obviously, it was not there early. 

Mr. LOKEY. No, because what happened was when early in the 

game I was talking to Jeff Smith, especially when water became an 

issue, I was giving him advice from my experience in search and 

rescue of where through EMAC they could get robust water rescue 

capability. I suggested California. I found out a few hours later 

California had not signed the EMAC agreement. Fortunately, we 

have cooperative agreements with the eight main jurisdictions that 

are sponsors of Urban Search and Rescue Teams, which I worked 

for 2 years for California OES, Office of Emergency Services. Those 

are the jurisdictions that have eight California Swift Water teams. 

So we had a legal mechanism to bring those teams on board, pay 

them through FEMA, provide them the liability, and——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. When did they get there, do you 

know? 

25

Mr. LOKEY. We have a detailed record of that. I believe they got 

there by Wednesday, but I am not sure. I provided your staff a 

timeline of when they were in. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. Do you think FEMA should have its 

own in-house water rescue capacity? 

Mr. LOKEY. I personally do not. I think that we ought to train 

our teams and better prepare them to work in a water environment 

so they can help as they did in this event. I do personally feel we 

should take the leadership, though, to help develop a national system of standards and training, and we can pay to move other 

teams around the country. That would be much more cost-effective 

than developing 28 Swift Water rescue teams within FEMA. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, may I ask your indulgence to ask one related question to Captain Bayard? And it is also 

similar to what I just asked Mr. Lokey, and we will be asking other 

city officials this. 

Why after Pam’s clear warnings, to the best of your knowledge, 

Captain, did the city barely have any watercraft to deploy for 

search-and-rescue missions? And why did neither the New Orleans 

Fire Department nor the Police Department, to the best of my 

knowledge—and you correct me if I am wrong—have any water 

rescue training before Katrina made landfall? 

Captain BAYARD. Senator Lieberman, I cannot answer that one 

way or the other. I was not involved in the exercise with Hurricane 

Pam, and I know that there are requests that went up about boats. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Prior to Katrina? 

Captain BAYARD. Prior to Katrina, yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. From the Fire Department, Police Department, or both? 

Captain BAYARD. I think from both agencies, sir. I know for sure 

from the Police Department. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Up to the city government? 

Captain BAYARD. It went up through the chain of command, yes, 

sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And, of course, it was not responded to affirmatively in a timely way. 

Captain BAYARD. Correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

We have much to learn about this tragedy. Is America, today at 

this moment this afternoon, better prepared should we have the 

misfortune of a similar incident? In other words, are we learning 

from the past? Have we implemented correct steps as best we can? 

More is to be done, but are we in a better state than we were when 

this happened? Just a simple few remarks from each of you. Mr. 

Lokey. 

Mr. LOKEY. I think we are because we learned some hard lessons 

that have already been instituted. And as I mentioned earlier, our 

Urban Rescue Teams are as we speak in Miami working on making 

things better and doing the things to implement what we learned 

so we don’t make the same mistakes twice. 

Senator WARNER. Good. 

26

General VEILLON. Senator Warner, thank you for that question. 

We are better. Throughout the Katrina rescue effort, there was 

unity of efforts by all organizations. We were all focused on the 

same thing: Rescuing people and taking them to safety. We did not 

have command and control, one command and control cell that controlled this whole effort. But there are a lot of positive lessons 

learned from the efforts of New Orleans, and I know they will all 

be instituted by the coming hurricane season. 

Senator WARNER. Good. Thank you. Colonel LaCaze. 

Colonel LACAZE. Yes, sir, I think we are. I know certainly our 

agency learned a great deal from it. We have effected some changes 

and improvements already and have lots of plans to do additional 

planning. And for the rest of the country, I will say this: If we ever 

have to respond to another State in a similar situation the way 

those States responded to us, I think we would bring a very effective and experienced and useful force to their assistance. Within 

our State and with other groups, we are already getting requests 

to come speak at conferences and at meetings and things to share 

the knowledge that we have. So in that way, I think we are going 

to go out, go forward to a lot of the rest of the country and tell our 

story and share our experience so they can benefit and make plans 

to be better prepared for these things. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. Captain Bayard. 

Captain BAYARD. Senator Warner, we definitely learned a lot. 

Right now we are going through a lot of training with the Wildlife 

and Fisheries as far as boat and rescue. We are trying to get a 

US&R team established on the Police Department because we already have on-the-job training, I guess you would say, through this 

one. Even though we had no experience, we did search and rescue. 

Then we did secondary search and rescue with breaching homes 

and all. So we got a lot of experience, and we are going to try to 

get better. 

The Department has implemented training as far as leadership 

training. We are getting incident command training. I spoke with 

the superintendent prior to coming up here, and this training is 

being slated right now. DEA and FBI are doing the leadership 

training on behalf of the New Orleans Police Department, and the 

incident command training, to my understanding, will be coming 

from the FBI as well. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you. 

Madam Chairman, and I say to the Ranking Member, it is very 

important that we have had these series of hearings, and I thank 

the Chairman. And I think they have been very productive. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

General, I want to explore with you an issue of prepositioning assets. I recognize that hindsight is always 20/20, but the fact is that 

FEMA wasn’t the only agency that turned down what at least 

today appeared to be reasonable requests. 

Our Committee is informed that the Chief of Operations, now Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, made a request of the National Guard Commander at Jackson Barracks for 

five high-water vehicles and five boats to be pre-staged at each of 

the eight police district stations around the city so that the New 

27

Orleans Police Department could deploy immediately after the 

storm. 

Are you aware that, in fact, Superintendent Riley was told that 

the National Guard felt that most of the assets should stay at 

Jackson Barracks, which subsequently flooded, and that, in fact, no 

boats were pre-staged at all and high-water vehicles, rather than 

being pre-staged at all eight stations, were placed at only three or 

four? 

General VEILLON. Madam Chairman, I am not aware of that specific request. We placed high-water vehicles as well as boats at 

Jackson Barracks in order to be close to those people that may 

need us. We did lose some high-water vehicles due to the water, 

but those vehicles were quickly put back into commission and used 

after the floodwaters began to recede. 

But specifically, ma’am, I am not aware of the request from the 

New Orleans Police Department. 

Chairman COLLINS. Well, given that Jackson Barracks was in 

the flood zone, did anyone express concern that assets might be lost 

due to flooding? And I want to follow up on your previous answer 

by pointing out that the Committee is informed that 20 high-water 

vehicles were out of commission due to flooding. Those are 20 vehicles that would have been very helpful in rescuing people and 

bringing them out of the city. 

General VEILLON. Yes, ma’am. It was a decision made that we 

should have assets at Jackson Barracks, our headquarters, in preparation for this storm. The catastrophic nature of the floods did 

have an impact on our prepositioned equipment. We have always 

positioned boats and high-water vehicles at Jackson Barracks for 

all hurricanes and have always had better luck. When the levees 

broke and Jackson Barracks flooded, we lost a lot of that equipment initially. 

So, yes, ma’am, we were aware of the relative danger and possibility of loss, but we believed it was the right place for the equipment. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. LaCaze, we have heard that you experienced difficulty in getting the National Guard to allow you to use 

buses that would have assisted in the evacuation of patients from 

Tulane Medical Center. Could you tell us about that incident? 

Colonel LACAZE. Yes, ma’am. The Wednesday following the hurricane, we were asked that morning to go to the Tulane Medical 

Center to evacuate patients from that hospital and also if we would 

have the ability to evacuate some from Charity also. So we deployed into that area and began moving people from the hospital. 

We were met on scene by some people from the Shreveport Fire 

Department and some Shreveport medical first responder units 

that explained to us that they had a triage location set up in a 

small parking lot just across the street. This is at Loyola and 

Perdido. Just across the street from the Holiday Inn Hotel was the 

first dry ground that you could get to coming from Tulane Medical 

Center. And the plan was for us to take our boats, go to the hospital, move the people from the hospital to the parking lot where 

there would be ambulances that would be arriving to take the patients from there and to evacuate them out of the city. 

28

So we started the evacuation, and in just a little while we had 

to stop with only about 20 patients because the parking lot area, 

that was about all they could hold at one time, and we were not 

getting the ambulances in as scheduled. So we held up on further 

evacuation and turned our efforts to just working in the city area 

evacuating people and assisting people who were trying to get out 

while we waited for the ambulances so we could resume the hospital evacuation. 

It came to my attention sometime that afternoon that there were 

about—I think it was five buses that were parked on up near the 

interstate, just up the street, actually, from where we were. Our 

radio systems were very poor. You would get communication to the 

Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge occasionally, about 

50 percent or less of the time, and I relayed a request and advised 

that there were buses that were on location here, they were very 

near to where we were, in the absence of the ambulances would it 

be possible to get the buses, to place the patients on board, and to 

move them out that way. 

The initial response that we got back from Baton Rouge EOC 

was that that was approved to go send someone up there and get 

the buses. We sent one of the firemen, the Shreveport firemen. 

There was a 4-wheeler that they were using to run around in the 

area. It went up, contacted, and there were some National Guardsmen who had the buses, had a security watch on the buses. And 

I assume he made contact with them. He went up and talked to 

them and told them that we had a request and they had been authorized. 

He came back to me and said that they would need to know who 

had authorized that, who was requesting it, and could I put that 

in writing. So I made a note with the authorization from the EOC, 

I think it was Colonel Smalley or Colonel Smith. I can’t recall who 

the person in the EOC that had advised, that had authorized it. 

I told them who I was and signed my name to it and sent it. 

He took the message and went up. He stayed a few minutes. He 

came back and said, ‘‘They want you to come up there.’’ So I got 

on the 4-wheeler with him, and we rode up to the Guardsmen who 

were watching the buses, and I said, ‘‘We really need the buses.’’ 

And the senior sergeant there advised that they did not have the 

authorization and they, therefore, couldn’t release the buses. And 

I said, ‘‘Well, let me try to talk to somebody. Do you have something that beats the radio that I have that is not working very 

well?’’ They provided a cell phone, and I tried to make a phone call 

on the cell phone but couldn’t get through on it either. It wasn’t 

really working any better than the radio was. And just couldn’t get 

through and couldn’t talk—at that point communications were virtually lost again. And with that, he just said, ‘‘I am sorry. I know 

you and I would love to be able to. I just can’t do it without the 

authorization.’’ And I had asked, ‘‘Well, what is the purpose of the 

buses? What are they doing here?’’ And he said, ‘‘These are for special needs people.’’

Chairman COLLINS. What are patients? 

Colonel LACAZE. And what did I have down the street? But I 

said, ‘‘Well, I understand the position you are in,’’ and I knew that 

29

it wasn’t any use to pursue it at that level with him because he 

had his orders and I had my responsibility and my request. 

So at that point we went back, and since we still were not getting ambulances and were not—and finally did, but not in any adequate numbers—I think there were five. That was when I made 

the decision to go ahead and load the patients in our pick-up trucks 

and load the equipment, the wheelchairs, and stretchers and things 

like that into the boats that we were trailering. After we got out 

of the water and got all the patients out of the hospital, we 

trailered our boats, loaded the people in the trucks, put the equipment on board the boats, and went to the causeway. 

Chairman COLLINS. That sounds like bureaucracy at its worst. 

Here you are trying to evacuate patients. There are five empty 

buses available. And instead, you are asked to fill out paperwork, 

you cannot get the authorization, so you end up loading patients 

into pick-up trucks and other vehicles, which is much slower and 

delays the evacuation. Is that a fair assessment? 

Colonel LACAZE. Yes, ma’am, that is a fair assessment. And I attribute it to the communication problem. 

Chairman COLLINS. Did you see any evidence, as you are attempting to evacuate hospitals, of any kind of coordination among 

Federal, State, and local agencies to deal with the problems of the 

need to evacuate hospitals? 

Colonel LACAZE. Helicopters were doing air evacuations very rapidly and very regularly from the hospitals, but at the ground level 

where we were, the situation that I have described to you there 

was the kind of things that we were encountering. 

Chairman COLLINS. So on the ground there was no coordination 

that you could see. 

Colonel LACAZE. Not at that point. The only coordination that I 

was able to see was at least the Shreveport Fire Department and 

medical service personnel who had been tasked to that assignment. 

They were on scene and in place, as were we. But as far as the coordination needed for the ground transportation, we ran into a 

problem there. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks again, Madam Chairman. Just let 

me continue on the question of red tape in the middle of the crisis. 

I know that our staffs have received testimony from witnesses 

that indicated—and here, again, Colonel LaCaze, I am going to ask 

you—that when the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries went to make certain EMAC requests, which I take it to be 

requests from other States who could provide assistance, you also 

met with some red tape about whether FEMA had approved a particular State agency to deploy specifically to Louisiana. Is that correct? Did you have problems with red tape in that regard? 

Colonel LACAZE. To some degree, sir. I know that Texas Parks 

and Wildlife was on scene—by Wednesday morning they had arrived. The remaining States that I mentioned showed up in the following days. But it did seem in all honesty that it was a little bit 

slow. Help was slow in coming. I think that anyone that was involved there and into the area immediately after impact will tell 

you that our feeling was that help was slow in coming at those levels. 

30

Senator LIEBERMAN. And was it your impression that was because of some red tape within the FEMA system or just that FEMA 

had not been adequately prepared as the hurricane was coming to 

get people in there quickly? 

Colonel LACAZE. The information that I was getting was coming 

from the Office of Emergency Preparedness in Baton Rouge, and 

what the Wildlife and Fisheries personnel were relaying to me 

there was that requests were bogged down in the process, in the 

pipe, so to speak. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Lokey, when you were there, were you 

aware that there was a logjam in terms of the EMAC request? 

Again, I’m talking about an EMAC request being a request from 

Louisiana for help from other States with the kinds of capacities 

that they needed. 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, EMAC is strictly a state-to-state mutual aid operation. I do not believe FEMA has any dog in that fight, if you 

will. 

I do remember delays of people not wanting to respond because 

they didn’t have the right signature to assure they were covered 

under the EMAC compact, but that is strictly state-to-state. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. In any case, just to clarify, am I right that 

wouldn’t come through your division? Or would it? 

Mr. LOKEY. No, sir, that would be strictly state-to-state. Now, we 

do have an EMAC representative at the National Response Coordination Center that helps coordinate things like that. But I do not 

believe there is any part of the FEMA approval process in an 

EMAC request. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So, therefore, your answer is, contrary to 

what the Colonel said, who felt that FEMA was part of holding up 

those——

Mr. LOKEY. I do not believe FEMA was part of holding that up. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Let me go back to a baseline question. 

General Veillon, as you testified earlier, you began doing your 

water rescue on Monday, August 29, the day of landfall. I want to 

ask you a couple of questions. At what point did you realize that 

day that a major water rescue effort would be required? And as 

part of that, when did you know that any one of the levees, the significant levees around New Orleans, had been broken? 

General VEILLON. Yes, sir, thank you. On Monday morning, midmorning, around 9:30, the water rapidly rose with a significant current at Jackson Barracks. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Which is where you were. 

General VEILLON. Yes, sir, which is where I was. From past experience with hurricanes and floods, charts, I expected some water at 

Jackson Barracks. This was different in how fast it rose and what 

a current it had. So it was significantly deep in a very short time. 

I learned shortly thereafter, maybe 30 minutes, listening to the 

AM radio station in New Orleans, WWL, which was announcing 

that the Industrial levee had broke. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. As far as you could tell, that announcement 

was made based on something the radio station had heard from a 

reporter or people in the area. 

General VEILLON. Yes, sir. I am not sure how they came to that 

information. 

31

Senator LIEBERMAN. But it turned out to be accurate. 

General VEILLON. Yes, sir, it was accurate, and about an hour 

after that, the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge advised us at Jackson Barracks that, in fact, the Industrial Canal 

had a levee breach. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So that would be what time? 

General VEILLON. That would have been in a sequence of maybe 

9:30 the water rose; 10, 10:30, the radio announces it; 11, 11:30, 

OEP advises. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Colonel LaCaze, when did you first 

learn that the levees had been broken? 

Colonel LACAZE. We had heard apparently the same radio broadcast from the public radio stations that morning around 9 o’clock, 

that they suspected that there were levee breaches. I did not get 

true confirmation of that until Tuesday morning, but we had made 

observation during the night Monday night and in the wee hours 

of Tuesday of fluctuation in the water levels that made us suspect 

that we had a levee breach. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Although, am I right, you were already out 

there on Monday afternoon? 

Colonel LACAZE. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Captain, when did you hear about any one 

of the levees breaking? 

Captain BAYARD. It was Monday morning. We were able to speak 

with Communications Section, and the Lower 9th Ward was inundated with 911 calls, so we knew we had a problem. And the levee 

actually breached in two locations—one right at Jordan Avenue, 

and the second, the major break, was at Pria. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And which levee was this, just for the 

record? 

Captain BAYARD. Industrial Canal levee, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lokey, at the State Emergency Operations Center, when did 

you first learn that the levees had broken? 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, we were getting unsubstantiated reports starting Monday about the same time because I was right next to Colonel Smith in the Emergency Operations Center. I got confirmation 

with the eyes-on conference call I had with Marty Bahamonde, who 

had flown around in a Coast Guard helicopter. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We have heard from him. Right. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And did you then communicate that information to FEMA in Washington? 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. Well, the conference call with Marty included my chain of command, and so we all got it at the same time. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And that was, as I recall, later in the day. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. More specifically, but not to the minute, it 

was more like early evening, am I right? Or later afternoon? 

Mr. LOKEY. It was later in the afternoon, and I was with Jeff 

Smith, and we were trying to get reports. The Corps of Engineers 

was going out to inspect, and we were getting all sorts of things 

and seeing things on CNN. 

32

1 Exhibit 12 appears in the Appendix on page 80. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Lokey, while I am directing a question 

to you, I want to come back to something I said in my opening 

statement, which is based on Exhibit 12.1 It is a report from the 

Homeland Security Operations Center dated Thursday, September 

1, 2005. And it states that FEMA Search and Rescue Teams 

stopped operations until the National Guard could provide adequate security for them. Explain first why that happened because 

my understanding is that the rest of the Search and Rescue Teams 

had continued in their work. 

Mr. LOKEY. I followed up on this, even the discussions today, 

with members of our Incident Support Team on the exact timing 

of this. Monday night was the time the rumors were abounding 

about the breakdown of law and order and things like that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The very first night. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. And some of our rescue teams had even 

heard gunshots, although no fire was directed at them. 

Search and rescue operations never totally stopped, and FEMA 

did not pull out. What occurred was, according to my folks who 

were on scene, that the unified command of the Coast Guard and 

the National Guard and the folks working out of Metairie pulled 

back in to make a decision on exactly what was happening and how 

to get protection for our forces in their boats. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Basically, they pulled back into temporary 

headquarters. 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, into their command posts at Zephyr Field. 

Some of the assets that were in the field were diverted to neighborhoods they knew were safe. As soon as they identified where they 

could get law enforcement officers—and this was in coordination—

I understand that Jefferson County Parish law enforcement was 

there. As soon as they got law enforcement officers to put in the 

boats to protect the people, they were back in the water again 

doing rescues. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So how long was that, would you say? 

Mr. LOKEY. I believe that they pulled back in Monday midday, 

and they launched again early Tuesday morning when they got the 

law enforcement support. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. Now, there is a confusion here because 

in Exhibit 12 there is a reference to Thursday, September 1, later 

in the week, when the Search and Rescue Teams stopped operations. 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, if I remember correctly, it was September 1. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, that is the Thursday. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, that was—well, this is probably a later report. 

But by the time it got out from us—when I had heard that they 

had ceased operations—because the decision was made in the field. 

The decision to protect your forces I leave to my people managing 

in the field. When I got the word that they had pulled back because 

of this and finally made touch with them, they had already solved 

it and were working on their plans to get back with law enforcement people as soon as they could get that in the water. 

33

So I am pretty confident that the event that spawned this was 

the rumors from August 31 in the evening, and then the morning 

of September 1 was the day they——

Senator LIEBERMAN. That would have been Tuesday and—OK, 

Wednesday and Thursday. 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, they stopped midday—I would have to check 

this. The night of August 31—September 1 was when they ceased 

until they got the law enforcement and launched again September 

2, I believe. But they did not pull out. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. They just pulled back. 

Mr. LOKEY. They redirected in other places, and they did not go 

into the hazardous area until they ascertained exactly what the 

threat was and were able to get law enforcement people to accompany them. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, to what extent did disorder inhibit 

search and rescue? 

General VEILLON. Senator, there was probably a rumor an hour 

about snipers and other things going on in the city. The National 

Guard, we did not stop our rescue efforts for any security issue. It 

is my experience of Katrina that the National Guard did not experience security concerns. There were a lot of rumors of issues, but 

we continued our operations and did not experience any problems. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. My time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Captain, it is my understanding that you have been with the 

New Orleans Police Department for some 30 years. Is that correct? 

Captain BAYARD. Yes, ma’am, it is. 

Chairman COLLINS. So during that time, you have undoubtedly 

been involved in preparations for other hurricanes. Could you give 

the Committee some comparison on the preparation for Hurricane 

Katrina versus other hurricanes during that 30 years? 

Captain BAYARD. Well, for previous hurricanes, again, we would 

call people in early, just like we did for this one. We would go over 

the plan, make sure everybody understood what the plan was. 

Then we would start having—we would disperse food, water, everybody would fill fuel tanks up in their cars, just like we pretty much 

did for this one. 

We would have some military vehicles staged at stations at the 

Mars Street compound where myself and the TAC teams were 

staged. Each district always had at least a Hummer or one truck 

at the station houses in the previous storms in my 30 years. 

Chairman COLLINS. But that did not happen in this case. 

Captain BAYARD. We didn’t have any at Mars Street, and we 

pulled out of Mars Street probably 7, 8 o’clock that night to go to 

the hotels and then go patrol until the winds got up. So we pretty 

much planned just like we do for any other storm. 

Chairman COLLINS. Were the plans more extensive for Hurricane 

Katrina? 

Captain BAYARD. No, ma’am. 

Chairman COLLINS. Were they less or just similar? 

Captain BAYARD. I would say pretty much the same. 

Chairman COLLINS. Pretty much the same. So even though this 

was a hurricane that was expected to be a far stronger hurricane, 

you did not see more robust preparations. Is that fair? 

34

1 Exhibit 1 appears in the Appendix on page 73. 

Captain BAYARD. Yes, ma’am. I did not experience that. 

Chairman COLLINS. It is my understanding that the city has a 

mobile command center. Was that brought to the casino where you 

set up operations? 

Captain BAYARD. No, ma’am, it is not. It is a tractor-trailer, and 

it was stationed at Elysian Fields or North Miro in the fire station, 

and it was moved. And I found out later on that it was moved to 

a safe haven in Algiers and that it is currently being used as a fire 

station by Holy Cross High School on Renee Street below the Industrial Canal. And our two mobile command posts were—we did 

not know where they were either. They didn’t come into play until 

after, I think, like the third week. 

Chairman COLLINS. Did that hinder your efforts? 

Captain BAYARD. We were trying to coordinate everything off two 

picnic tables and chairs, and when I ran into the special forces 

group, we went and got plywood and two-by-fours, and then they 

built a little area, and that was the Incident Commander Center 

made out of plywood and two-by-fours, and that is where we 

worked. 

Chairman COLLINS. Some have said that if the physical communications network had not been devastated, the response to Hurricane Katrina would have been far better and a lot of the problems 

that we saw would not have occurred. And there is no doubt that 

if people’s cell phones and radios are working, obviously communication is a lot easier. 

But in your report, you present a far broader indictment of what 

went wrong. I want to refer to Exhibit 1,1 which is a memo that 

you wrote to Deputy Chief Steven Nicholas. Could you read the 

first paragraph under ‘‘Summary and Recommendations’’ for us? 

Captain BAYARD. It says, ‘‘The Office of Emergency Preparedness 

needs to be revamped. If their role is to have us prepared to handle 

a disaster such as this, they failed. They lacked a plan, did not provide the necessary equipment, provided no direction or leadership, 

did not coordinate or attempt to have commanders of field operations coordinate with any State or Federal agency, etc. We really 

need to take a long, hard look at this section.’’

Chairman COLLINS. Can you tell us how this report came about? 

Was it an after-action review? 

Captain BAYARD. Yes, ma’am. It was an after-action summary. It 

was submitted on October 16, 2005, which is a little over a month 

after the storm had impacted New Orleans. 

Chairman COLLINS. So does it remain your judgment that it was 

a lack of planning, direction, and leadership that were responsible 

for the poor response? 

Captain BAYARD. Yes, ma’am. I read the mission statement. I 

gave it to the investigators, to you all, and I felt, based off of what 

that mission statement is, that they should have had us better prepared for this storm, and not only this, but any other storm that’s 

coming. They were supposed to be coordinating with State, local, 

and Federal agencies. They were supposed to have equipment 

staged for us, things along those lines, and that didn’t happen. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

35

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Mr. Lokey, I am 

going to come back to you. You happen to be the guy from FEMA 

here today, so you are naturally getting a lot of questions, and because we are focused on the Federal role, although we are interested, obviously, and concerned about State and local preparedness 

too. We had all of these warnings that built up over the years. We 

have the specific warnings contained in the Hurricane Pam report 

and plan, which showed in a test case of what turned out to be, 

thank God, worse than Katrina, that locals were overwhelmed, 

they could not handle it. 

We heard you say earlier that you wish you had done more before to respond to the PAM report. You came in April. You were 

not there for a long time, and I can only ask you this from your 

perspective; we are going to have other people testify from FEMA 

as this goes on—and a lot of this, we are finding memos, and we 

are asking you questions about memos. But let’s be honest about 

this, we were all watching television, and Max Mayfield was on TV 

Thursday and Friday, telling us this is a Category 4 or 5 storm. 

So neon lights are flashing saying, this is the big one. And I do not 

see within FEMA, even at that point, acknowledging that there 

was not enough earlier reaction to Pam, that somebody there said, 

‘‘Hey, this is it. Pam warned us the State and local people are 

going to be overwhelmed. The levees are going to break. We have 

to mobilize everything we have to get in there as quickly as possible.’’

I do not see that it happened. I see that it happened as time 

went on, but I do not see that it happened, for instance, that weekend. Am I right or wrong? 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. We certainly did not mobilize everything we 

had. We did mobilize more than we had ever mobilized before. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. In advance or afterward? 

Mr. LOKEY. In advance. We had a number of urban rescue teams, 

a number of National Disaster Medical Teams, the amount of commodities that were staged, and literally, they were spread from 

Florida through Texas to respond. But it certainly was not everything we had, but, again, our challenge was that this was a huge 

storm, and Mississippi took a terrible brunt of it also. Alabama 

took a brunt of it. And just with what we had available, in hindsight, yes, we should have put more teams in and brought them in. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How many search-and-rescue teams could 

you have brought into the Gulf Coast or New Orleans? 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, theoretically, I could have brought 28 of them 

in, but we had a bunch of them on alert. We had two teams in Mississippi and three teams in Shreveport, and then when the storm—

again, when I got there Saturday, the first thing I did was call my 

urban rescue people and put a bunch of more teams, I think five 

additional teams, on alert for quick response. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Looking back, you said you wish that over 

that weekend you had activated more of those teams to come in. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Because of the scope of it. How about Monday when you found out pretty clearly from people on the scene 

that the levees had broken? So now the nightmare, which had been 

predicted and could be reasonably foreseen over the weekend with 

36

all the weather forecasts and, incidentally, some e-mail traffic within FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, becomes real. 

The General and others can verify this. What should have happened then? For instance, looking back, do you wish that you had 

immediately notified people in Washington that the levees had broken, or do you think that they knew about it? 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, they had some of the same information I did. 

They might have even had more because communications were so 

bad that even my chain of command was constantly on me that 

they could not get me on the phone because phone lines were saturated. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. From Washington? 

Mr. LOKEY. From Washington, yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So where do you think they might have gotten the information, from public sources? 

Mr. LOKEY. Watching CNN because the media was out right 

away, showing those pictures of not only the problems that were 

developing at the Superdome and at the Convention Center, but 

the rescues, and I was scrambling from where I was to move everything under my control and to advise the State on where they could 

get additional water assets, and I had discussions with Under Secretary Brown that although it was not our policy, we were putting 

our people in the water, and we would make plans with the State, 

if they would provide the boats, we would put the people in them. 

And then we got the California teams in. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. When did you have that conversation with 

Under Secretary Brown? 

Mr. LOKEY. Monday and Tuesday. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Monday afternoon or evening? 

Mr. LOKEY. Well, Monday afternoon. Mr. Brown did not get there 

until Monday afternoon. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. This was face to face? 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. We already decided that because the teams 

were appropriately equipped and appropriately prepared, and these 

firefighters, although water rescue was not their mission, these are 

some of the best rescue people in the world, and we certainly knew 

that——

Senator LIEBERMAN. I have to tell you, I applaud that decision. 

Even though they were not specifically trained, as I said before, 

they fall under the category of heroes because they just used their 

brains and their guts and saved an awful lot of lives. 

Mr. LOKEY. Yes, sir. They improvised and made it work. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, absolutely. 

I wanted to ask just one general question, and again, this is 

about search and rescue. We are going to do a separate hearing on 

communications. But how much did the communications failure 

hurt the search-and-rescue efforts? Any of you want to reflect a little bit on what happened? Captain Bayard. 

Captain BAYARD. Well, Senator, when we didn’t have communication, it means we couldn’t get real good intelligence back from 

the fields, and without communications, we couldn’t coordinate 

with Wildlife and Fisheries, with the military, and things along 

those lines. So communication is vital in a time of crisis. If we canVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:05 Jan 18, 2007 Jkt 026751 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26751.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
37

not communicate, we can’t coordinate, and that’s exactly what happened here. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Colonel LaCaze. 

Colonel LACAZE. Yes, sir, I would concur with that. You have to 

have communication, not only among the rescuers within the teams 

that are out there affecting the rescues so they can help each other, 

but all the way up the chain of command, to be able to provide information as to how many people we have, what kind of condition 

they are in, the medical assistance and transport we need, the food, 

water supplies that we need. All of that information has to be relayed. And when you have the breakdown of communications, the 

very lifeblood of the whole search-and-rescue operation is severely 

cut back. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, let me ask the question a little bit 

differently, which is: How manageable is the task of providing a 

sustainable communications system in a Katrina-like disaster? In 

other words, obviously, the system that existed was out. Is it just 

a question of having the will and the money to buy the system, to 

get one that stays in, that continues to work? 

General VEILLON. What we had primarily was 800 megahertz 

radio. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General VEILLON. Where we communicated from the Superdome 

to Baton Rouge via radio. That radio was saturated, the frequencies, with all agencies trying to operate. We also used satellite 

phones, and they became saturated. Blackberries served a good 

purpose, where we did have e-mail capability. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Interesting. 

General VEILLON. The National Guard possesses some communications assets unique to the military, radio pallets loaded in the 

back of a Humvee. We have a forward air control unit that has 

that capability, where we forward deployed those units to give us 

feedback. 

What we need for the future is a communications package that 

has interoperability, that we can talk to everybody at this table, as 

well as a surge capability, that when everybody comes up on the 

frequency, the system can handle that. 

So we had communications, but it was saturated. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. As far as you know, does that kind of system exist? In other words, if we decided we want to buy it and give 

you the resources to buy it, I presume you could find it, it does not 

have to be developed. 

General VEILLON. Sir, in this country, I presume it does exist. I 

am not an expert in that, but that is what I would think where we 

need to go. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. One of the questions we are going to look 

at in another hearing is the sequence of events and decisions that 

were made about when to deploy the military more broadly than 

the National Guard. One of the questions I know will be whether 

the military, existing as it does and preparing as it does for combat 

situations, would have brought with it, if it had been sent in early, 

the kind of separate communications system that would have withstood the pressures of the situation on the ground? Do you know? 

38

General VEILLON. Well, sir, the Iwo Jima arrived with a vast 

amount of communications capability. It did not—by that time that 

the Iwo Jima was in place——

Senator LIEBERMAN. When did it get there? I have forgotten. 

General VEILLON. Sir, as I recall, it would have been about Saturday after the storm. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General VEILLON. By that point, most of the rescue and evacuation of the Superdome and the Convention Center had taken 

place. We were more into a hasty search mode. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right, and there was less demand on the 

system. 

General VEILLON. Yes, sir. The peak had passed. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right, thank you. 

Mr. LOKEY. If I may, just to let you know what we are doing to 

inprove that, we got caught up in the communications problems. 

But we have been working with the Northern Command, which is 

the major military group we work with for military support to civilian authorities, in looking at what we’re calling capability packages 

to predefine the capabilities they may have that are available to 

match up with what our potential needs are, so the time it takes 

for us to develop a scope of work and the exact needs can be shortened. We have been working with them on that, not only for communications packages, but also for medical capability, air capability, and ground transportation capability. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is very reassuring because the poignant moment that you describe, where your superiors in Washington 

are having trouble contacting you as the chief FEMA person on the 

scene in Louisiana, is a moment that should never come again. I 

mean, you cannot imagine, if I may use the handy example, that 

General Abizaid at CENTCOM Headquarters in Qatar would have 

trouble getting General Casey in Baghdad. It would not happen, 

and it should not have happened in your case. 

Mr. LOKEY. And one thing we have done also, that the availability to us of what we have now purchased as a result of Katrina, 

of additional satellite phones, and also for the ERT–Ns, the two 

National Response Teams, we are developing communications 

packages and caches for them. We are doing training that we were 

not able to do last year, and we are trying to make things better 

so something like this won’t happen again, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Appreciate that. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to thank each of you for testifying today and for your cooperation with the Committee. As I listened to each of you testify, 

I was reminded of a phrase from the 9/11 Commission’s report. 

When the Commission described ‘‘good people straining against bad 

structures,’’ and particularly with the Lieutenant Colonel and the 

Captain’s recitation of how they had to get around bureaucracy, or 

a lack of leadership and direction, a lack of planning, and be very 

innovative. I thank all four of you and your teams for all that you 

did to help the victims of Katrina. But good people should not have 

to strain against bad systems or inadequate structures, and that is 

one of the things that we want to help recommend remedies for. 

39

I was also struck once again, as I have been throughout this series of hearings, by the absence of effective planning and determined leadership at all levels of government, and that is an issue 

that we will continue to pursue as well. I thank you for increasing 

our understanding. 

Senator Lieberman, do you have any final comment? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I think you said it just right, and I appreciate it. These are good people who are working hard under tough 

circumstances, some of whom performed heroic service, and a lot 

of people are alive today as a result of it. But the really infuriating 

reality is the extent to which the warnings were being given and 

people at all levels of government did not respond. There was a lot 

more damage done to life and property as a result of an admittedly 

catastrophic storm than should have been the case. 

I take some heart, Mr. Lokey, from hearing about some of the 

things you said that FEMA is beginning to do internally, and we 

hope that coming out of this, by telling the story, by putting it all 

together and enabling everybody, including the public, to look back 

and see how this happened, that we will generate both the pressure and, frankly, the kind of support that you all need to do the 

jobs you do, to put the structures in place, and then to fund them. 

I am sure there was a good reason why somebody in the New Orleans Government or in the Federal Government did not give you exactly what you needed. You requested the boats, and you did not 

get them. But it was not a good enough reason, as you look back 

at it, and it sure was penny-wise and pound-foolish when you think 

about the terrible damage that resulted from it. 

So you have helped us very much today in your testimony, and 

we are going to take it and try to make something constructive out 

of it. Thank you very much for your service. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your cooperation. The hearing 

record will remain open for 15 days. This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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