NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 15-2572

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SHAMROCK CREEK LLC

v.

BOROUGH OF PARAMUS; PARAMUS ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; 

PARAMUS PLANNING BOARD; MAYOR RICHARD LABARBIERA; RALPH AMATO;

MARIA ELENA BELLINGER; JOSEPH LAGANA; THOMAS LOCICERO; 

ERIC NAZZIOLA; MICHAEL ROHDIECK; JAMES TEDESCO; LISA MESEROLE; 

BOSWELL ENGINEERING, INC.; PETER TEN KATE; MARK DISTLER; ED ONORATO; 

JOHN DOES 1-25; XYZ ENTITITES 1-25; VERILE PATRICK; DONNA WARBURTON; 

JEANNE WEBER; PATRICK O'BRIEN; STEPHEN SULLIVAN; JOSEPH GARCIA

 BOROUGH OF PARAMUS; PARAMUS ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; 

 MAYOR RICHARD LABARBIERA; RALPH AMATO; MARIA ELENA BELLINGER; 

 JOSEPH LAGANA; THOMAS LOCICERO; ERIC NAZZIOLA; MICHAEL ROHDIECK; 

 JAMES TEDESCO; LISA MESEROLE; VERILE PATRICK; DONNA WARBURTON; 

 JEANNE WEBER; PATRICK O'BRIEN; STEPHEN SULLIVAN; JOSEPH GARCIA,

 Appellants

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(District Court No. 2-12-cv-02716)

District Judge: Hon. Claire C. Cecchi 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

April 18, 2016

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge,

∗ FUENTES and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

 ∗ Judge McKee concluded his term as Chief of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on 

September 30, 2016.
2

(Opinion Filed: March 23, 2017)

___________

OPINION∗∗

___________

McKEE, Chief Judge

Appellants (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Borough”)1 appeal the 

District Court’s grant of Shamrock’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal as well as the 

District Court’s denial of the Borough’s Motion for Sanctions. We will affirm.

I.

After the Borough moved to dismiss Shamrock’s Second Amended Complaint, 

Shamrock moved to voluntarily dismiss that Amended Complaint under Rule 41 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and instead litigate its claims in state court. The 

Borough opposed the Motion and filed a Cross-Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

The District Court granted Shamrock’s Rule 41 Motion, finding that the Borough 

would not suffer any prejudice other than the prospect of continued litigation in state 

court. The District Court also denied the Borough’s Rule 11 Cross-Motion, finding that 

sanctions were inappropriate. The Borough appeals.

 ∗∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 Appellants include the Borough, the Borough Zoning Board, both the current and former 

Mayor of Paramus, numerous members of the Paramus Borough Council, the Residential and 

Zoning Signage Officer for Paramus, and a member of the Borough Zoning Board.
3

We review both of the District Court’s rulings for an abuse of discretion.2 “A 

district court abuses its discretion when ‘its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous 

finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’”3

II.

Under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, once an answer has been 

filed, a plaintiff may not voluntarily dismiss a case unless all parties approve or unless 

there is a court order “on terms that the court considers proper.”4 As a general rule, a 

district court has broad discretion to grant Rule 41 motions.5

 Such motions are generally 

granted unless a defendant will suffer legal prejudice “other than the mere prospect of a 

second lawsuit.”6

 We will generally not disturb an order of voluntary dismissal on appeal 

if the decision was not arbitrary or does not subject a defendant to prejudice beyond 

further litigation.7

With this guidance in mind, we conclude that the District Court’s decision in this 

case was a proper exercise of judicial discretion.8

 The District Court considered all 

factors necessary to determine whether voluntary dismissal would substantially prejudice 

 2 See In re Miller, 730 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2013); Ferguson v. Eakle, 492 F.2d 26, 28 (3d Cir. 

1974).

3 Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford 

Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2008)).

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).

5 See Ockert v. Union Barge Line Corp., 190 F.2d 303, 304 (3d Cir. 1951).

6 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 863 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 5 J. Moore, 

Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 41.05[1], at 41–62 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

7 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 194 F.2d 770, 771 

(3d Cir. 1952).

8 See id. at 772.
4

the Borough, and it concluded that it would not be subjected to any prejudice other than 

the prospect of continued litigation in state court.9

The District Court’s denial of the Borough’s related Cross-Motion for Sanctions 

also was appropriate. We give the District Court’s Rule 11 determination substantial 

deference, and we will override the decision only if it is “contrary to reason or without a 

reasonable basis in law and fact.”10 This record simply does not support Borough’s claim 

that the District Court should have imposed sanctions for the transfer to state court. The 

District Court also appropriately considered the attorneys’ conduct and concluded that the 

Borough failed to show that Shamrock had engaged in bad faith conduct or had filed its 

Complaint without first making a reasonable inquiry.11

III.

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in its entirety.

 9 See Paoli, 916 F.2d at 863; Westinghouse, 194 F.2d at 771.

10 Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 1994); see also CTC Imps. & Exps. v. Nigerian 

Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 578 (3d Cir. 1991).

11 See Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 62 (summarizing Rule 11’s requirements and finding that “[t]he 

standard for testing an attorney’s conduct is that of what was objectively reasonable under the

circumstances”).