TRANSFORMING 

FOR STABILIZATION 

AND RECONSTRUCTION 

OPERATIONS

Including chapters on lessons learned, force sizing, organization,

active and Reserve components, military culture, technological

support, interagency coordination, and international capabilities

The National Defense University established the Center for Technology and National Security

Policy to study the implications of technological innovation for U.S. national security policy and

military planning. The center combines scientific and technical assessments with analyses of

current strategic and defense policy issues for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff,

military services, defense laboratories, Congress, and other government agencies. Major areas 

of focus include military transformation, science and technology policy, life sciences, homeland

security, and computational social science modeling. The center staff is comprised of defense

analysts and technologists and is led by two senior analysts who hold the Roosevelt Chair of

National Security Policy and the Edison Chair of Science and Technology.
Transforming for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Operations
Transforming for

Stabilization and

Reconstruction

Operations

edited by Hans Binnendijk and

Stuart E. Johnson

PUBLISHED FOR THE CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY 

AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

BY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2004
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense

Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release;

distribution unlimited.

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided

that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy

of reprints or reviews.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Transforming for stabilization and reconstruction operations / edited by

Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1–57906–066–8

1. United States—Armed Forces—Civic action. 2. United States—Armed

Forces—Operations other than war. I. Binnendijk, Hans. II. Johnson, Stuart

E., 1944– 

UH723.T73 2004

355.4'9'0973—dc22

2004049863

First Printing, April 2004

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 512–1800 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government

Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. For GPO publications on-line access their Web site at:

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For current publications of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, consult the

Nationa Defense University Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu.
Contents

Acknowledgements ....................... xi

Executive Summary ....................... xiii

Chapter 1

Learning from History .................... 3

Chapter 2

New Strategic Concepts ................... 15

Chapter 3

Scenarios for Force Sizing .................. 35

Chapter 4

Organizing for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction ........................... 53

Chapter 5

Rebalancing the Active/Reserve Mix ......... 71

Appendix I—Inventory of Core S&R Units .............. 81

Appendix II—S&R Support and Services Units ........... 82

Appendix III—Combat Units ...................... 84

Appendix IV—Two Active Component/National Guard

Integrated Divisions ......................... 86

vii
Chapter 6

Broadening Military Culture ............... 87

Chapter 7

Supporting Technologies .................. 97

Chapter 8

Interagency Capabilities ................... 107

Chapter 9

International Capabilities .................. 115

Recommendations ........................ 129

About the Contributors ................... 131

viii
ix

Illustrations

Figures

1. Historical Pattern of Combat and S&R Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

2. New Challenges: Preemption and RDOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

3. Transformed S&R Capability: Bridge to Nation-Building . . . . . . . . xvi

4. Today’s World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5. Key Determinants of Force Requirements for S&R Missions . . . . . . 43

6. Illustrative Decision Tree for S&R Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

7. Distribution of Size and Likely Conditions for Scenarios . . . . . . . . 47

8. How Options Meet the Strategic Space of Requirements . . . . . . . . 49

9. S&R Joint Command Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

10. S&R JCOM Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

11. U.S. Army S&R Force Types in Theater at the End of

Major Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

12. A Full-Spectrum NATO Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Tables

1. Historical Case Studies Post-Conflict Assessment ............ 4

2. Key Country Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3. Dedicated S&R Force Requirements for Multiple 

Contingencies (Illustrative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4. An Illustrative S&R Joint Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5. Required and Existing S&R Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

6. Regional Distribution of Foreign Area Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

7. Reserve Component Contribution to S&R Force Types in Iraq . . . . . 79

8. American Efforts at Nation-Building, 1898–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

9. Leading Foreign Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations . . . . 121

10. Contributions to Major Multinational Peace Operations . . . . . . . . 122

11. Potential Niche Capability Contributors to Multinational 

S&R Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
xi

Acknowledgements

This volume reports conclusions and recommendations on military

requirements for the stabilization and reconstruction phase of military operations. It is based on numerous studies, internal discussions, external briefings, and scholarly research. As always with a collaborative product, so many colleagues helped in large and small ways that

acknowledging all of them by name is impractical. Suffice it to say here

that their help was unstinting and invaluable.

The bulk of the writing of this volume was done by staff of the Center

for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University. The principal contributors were: Michael Baranick (Learning From

History), Charles Barry (Organizing for Stabilization and Reconstruction

and Rebalancing the Active/Reserve Mix), Hans Binnendijk (Executive Summary), Lee Blank (Interagency Capabilities), Daniel Burghart, (International

Capabilities), Leigh Caraher (Broadening Military Culture), Joseph Eash

(Support Technologies), Stuart Johnson (Organizing for Stabilization and

Reconstruction), Erik Kjonnerod (Interagency Capabilities), Richard Kugler

(Scenarios for Force Sizing), Douglas Macgregor (New Strategic Concepts),

Larry Wentz (Learning From History), and Elihu Zimet (Supporting Technologies). In addition to contributing a chapter, Leigh Caraher provided

diligent and thoughtful research and editorial support throughout the entire

project, and William Bode assisted with the editorial development and production.

The editors especially would like to thank Vice Admiral Arthur K.

Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), Director of the Office of Force Transformation,

for his intellectual contributions to the concepts advanced here and for his

overall support for this project.
xiii

Executive Summary

Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by the rapid defeat of enemy military forces, by relatively small

deployments of American forces, and by a very limited destruction

of the critical civilian infrastructure. This success can be credited in large

part to the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military evident in its effective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver on the battlefield.

The Armed Forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond

promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and

attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi

military. This has set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the

reins to a representative Iraqi government. Moreover, the failure to establish security concurrently with the defeat of the Iraqi military may well

have emboldened those who oppose the United States, United Kingdom,

and even United Nations presence.

It is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces

to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform

how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)

operations. The very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the United

States must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and

begin the reconstruction process promptly—ideally concurrently—with

the end of major combat. This can only be done if planning for the stabilization and reconstruction operations is integrated into planning for the

conflict from the beginning and if the right skills are in theater to begin operations concurrently with the surrender or collapse of the enemy military.

The changed operational environment that U.S. forces face when

combat ceases are illustrated by figures 1–3. They indicate a need to close

the gap between the end of major combat operations and the point at

which the nation-building mission is up and running.

Traditional military operations have been characterized by planning

for combat and a relatively long buildup of forces, as illustrated in figure 1.
xiv

When the United States had assembled sizable forces in the theater, then,

and only then, would it launch offensive operations. The conflict would

typically last for months or years and end with the negotiation of enemy

surrender or an extended ceasefire. Because conflict was protracted and involved large forces, enemy resistance was pretty much eliminated, and there

were sizable U.S. and allied forces in theater at the end of the conflict. Moreover, the relatively long duration of major combat operations allowed time

to plan for stabilization and reconstruction operations and to begin them

as the conflict wound down.

In the past decade the United States has been transforming its military forces and adopting new concepts of combat operations that have led

to a pattern of conflict illustrated by figure 2. The focus has been on rapid

and decisive operations and, more recently, on preemption. The conflicts

in Afghanistan and Iraq are good examples. The United States did not

wait until it had deployed large forces to the theater before beginning

combat. The time spent planning the operation and deploying forces was

compressed. In lieu of overwhelming forces in theater, the military employed a variety of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems

and Special Forces to gain an accurate, real- or near-real time picture of

enemy force deployments. It used this information to strike high leverage

targets with precision and in a timely fashion. The result was a collapse of

the enemy military much more quickly than had been typical of combat

Figure 1. Historical Pattern of Combat and S&R Missions

Major

Combat

Mission NationBuilding

Mission Intensity

Long

Term

(Civilian Lead)

Duration Force

Available

for Occupation

Long

War

Slow

Buildup

Planning

for

Combat
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xv

operations. But the United States was caught without a mature plan for

post-conflict operations and without an adequate complement of the

skills needed to begin reconstruction promptly. The resultant gap left U.S.

forces without an adequate response to the disorder that followed the defeat of enemy forces.

Figure 3 illustrates a new concept of operations that is described in

detail in this study, which proposes a way to plan and organize for stabilization and reconstruction operations that targets the gap between the

end of major combat operations and the beginning of nation-building. It

illustrates the proposal that planning for the S&R mission begin concurrently with planning for major combat, and that S&R operations begin

concurrently with the defeat of the enemy military. With stability established and reconstruction underway, the important process of nationbuilding can proceed. It also proposes steps to enhance civilian nationbuilding capabilities, which should shorten the duration of the S&R phase

of operations. Without this process in place, the United States may win the

war, but lose the peace.

The capability to provide stabilization and reconstruction must not

be relegated only to post-conflict situations. Indeed, the nature of the

world and the tasks ahead may dictate that the United States and its allies

prevent rather than preempt whenever possible. The capabilities discussed

in this study are equally applicable to conflict prevention and resolution.

Figure 2. New Challenges: Preemption and RDOs

Major

Combat

Mission

NationBuilding

Mission

S&R

Mission

Gap

Long

Term

(Civilian Lead)

Few Forces

Available

for S&R

Short

War

Fast

Buildup

Planning

for

Combat Intensity

Duration
xvi

The following chapters examine the various elements of the stabilization and reconstruction capabilities needed by the U.S. military. They

address systematically the range of issues that must be resolved to transform S&R operations, including military strategy, organization, technology, personnel, and education. A brief précis of the findings of each chapter is presented below.

Chapter 1 reviews recent cases in which the United States has participated in S&R operations, sometimes with allies, sometimes alone. Insights

from that review include:

■ Successive post-Cold War U.S. interventions have become increasingly more ambitious.

■ Regime change and S&R missions can be successful in different cultures.

■ But the risks and costs are high.

■ Previous political and economic conditions are key uncontrollable

factors.

■ Controllable factors include level and duration of effort in terms of

troop levels and financial resources.

■ Five to seven years is the historic duration of successful nationbuilding.

■ Rapid and decisive military victory does not guarantee a peaceful

post-conflict stabilization environment.

Figure 3. Transformed S&R Capability: Bridge to Nation-Building

Major

Combat

Mission

NationBuilding

Mission

S&R

Mission

Long

Term

(Civilian Lead)

Prompt

S&R

Operations

Short

War

Fast

Concurrent

Buildup

Planning for

Combat

and

S&R Intensity

Duration
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xvii

■ A secure environment is a necessary, but not sufficient criterion for

success.

■ Multilateral involvement contributes to legitimacy and burden

sharing, but does not guarantee success.

Chapter 2 proposes strategic concepts to guide the United States in

planning S&R operations. These include an integrated war-winning and

peace-winning strategy, unity of effort, a compelling and consistent strategic message, integrated planning of combat and S&R operations, concurrent combat and S&R operations, precision targeting of rejectionist elements, good understanding of the indigenous culture, early and

demonstrable success, early introduction of local capabilities, and modular, adaptive S&R capabilities.

Chapter 3 analyzes the range of potential conflict scenarios in which

the United States might be involved that would require a competent S&R

capability. Examination of the trade space between size (and therefore

cost) of the S&R capability and risk yields the conclusion that:

■ DOD needs to establish analytical standards for determining the

size and design of S&R forces.

■ S&R forces should be sized to cope with one large S&R operation or

two medium-size operations. Preliminary analysis indicates that

DOD should aspire to field two S&R division-equivalents with joint

assets.

■ S&R forces will need substantial assets in such key categories as military police, construction engineers, and civil affairs, and in most

cases will need associated combat forces.

Chapter 4 proposes an organizational model for these two S&R Joint

Commands. One would be composed primarily of units on active duty

from both the active and reserve components. The second could consist

mostly of forces from the reserve component. Both headquarters would be

staffed by personnel on active duty either from the active component or

activated reservists. During peacetime, the headquarters would plan for

S&R operations, monitor the status of S&R forces, develop doctrine, oversee training, and conduct exercises. These would be mainline units, not

combat service support units that are embedded in division or corps combat units. The S&R Joint Commands are organized to ensure that they are

flexible, modular, and scalable force multipliers. They should be organized

to ensure that S&R forces are available to deploy concurrently with combat units. Light combat units could be attached to the S&R force to provide it the capability to operate autonomously in a hostile environment.
The S&R force, or elements of it, could also be attached to larger combat

forces if the situation demanded it.

Chapter 5 analyzes the units in the current force that are needed for

S&R operations and concludes that the problem is not a serious lack of the

required skills, but that those skills reside in units that are scattered

throughout the force. The units need to be pulled together and organized

systematically. This in turn would create synergies and training opportunities that should dramatically improve performance. In addition, rebalancing will be needed between the active and reserve components to ensure the prompt availability of S&R units to deploy concurrently with the

combat units. Some civil affairs, military police, medical, and engineering

units now in the reserve component would have to be shifted from the reserve to the active component.

Chapter 6 explores the need for a shift in military culture that may

be needed to make the proposed S&R forces successful and recommends

changes in professional military education to help bring about cultural

changes. Specifically:

■ PME institutions should incorporate more courses and lectures on

stabilization and reconstruction operations, civil-military cooperation, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations.

■ Instructors from the interagency community with a background in

sociology, law, history, and experience in S&R operations should be

added to the faculties.

■ The personnel system must reward language and negotiations skills

and interagency experience.

■ S&R groups should train as a unit. The training should include personnel from key agencies that will be in the field with it (for example, State, Justice, Treasury).

Chapter 7 identifies key technologies that could enhance the capabilities of S&R forces. The technologies cited are either mature and could be

deployed promptly or need more research but promise a high impact payoff if the research succeeds. They are grouped into three categories:

■ Security technology, including non-lethal weapons, biometrics,

communications, and body armor.

■ Infrastructure technology, including training packages and collaborative planning tools.

■ Technology for human relations, including language translators,

and record generation and storage management tools.

xviii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xix

Chapter 8 reviews interagency contributions to S&R capabilities and

concludes that a much greater level of interagency cooperation will be required both in Washington and in the field to assure policy success. It also

proposes organizational changes to enhance civilian capability in the stabilization and reconstruction mission:

■ Creating a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group

(NIACCG) as a planning component of the National Security

Council structure. Responsibilities of the NIACCG would include

planning for post-conflict operations.

■ Resourcing the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs)

to embed interagency capabilities at the combatant command and

S&R headquarters levels.

Chapter 9 discusses the pros and cons of a U.S.-supported International Peacekeeping Force and highlights the imperative to plan extensively during peacetime and then early on with coalition members as a

conflict emerges. The U.S. should look first to the well equipped and well

trained forces for the more demanding job of stabilization and reconstruction. These will mostly be forces from NATO allies. A reorganization

of NATO forces similar to that proposed for U.S. forces in chapter 4 would

be necessary to optimize NATO ability to execute S&R missions. Forces

from less advanced countries would benefit from a U.S. role in training

and equipping an International Peacekeeping Force. This effort could include the establishment of regional training centers, involving both U.S.

active duty and reserve forces.

A concluding section distills this analysis into ten recommendations

that establish a framework for reorganizing and planning for transformed

stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Transforming for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Operations
Chapter 1

Learning from History

A merican involvement in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)

operations has grown in frequency and scope. During the Cold

War, the United States averaged one major intervention about

every 10 years. In the decade following the end of the Cold War, there was

an intervention about every two years. Within the last 18 months, there

have been two—Afghanistan and Iraq. The current operation in Iraq is the

most complex and challenging stabilization and reconstruction operation

undertaken by the United States since the post-World War II occupations

of Germany and Japan. Improvements in the U.S. ability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations have not been commensurate with

this experience, however. While dramatic improvements have been made

in U.S. warfighting capabilities over the past decade, there have not been

comparable improvements in post-conflict S&R capabilities of either the

military or civilian elements.

Historical case studies ranging from the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan to the present operation in Iraq were examined to identify common factors that contribute to success in stabilization

and reconstruction operations. The studies were also helpful in understanding the implications of possible capability gaps for rapid, decisive,

and preemptive military operations in the future. The RAND publication

America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq and the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace policy brief “Lessons from the Past:

The American Record on Nation-Building”were important sources for the

lessons described in this chapter. Other studies, articles, reports, and interviews with experts were used as well.1

Background

Various terms have been used to describe post-conflict operations.

Germany and Japan were called occupations. Somalia, Haiti, and the

3
Balkans were called peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are called stabilization and reconstruction.

In each of these cases, the military instrument of national power was used

to underpin a process of building a stable peace. Using Germany, Japan,

Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq as historical case studies, this chapter examines factors that influence the relative ease or difficulty of conducting post-conflict operations and contribute to the success

or failure of an operation. The results are summarized in table 1.

The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan were

America’s first experiences with the use of military force in the aftermath

of a conflict to support rapid societal change. These efforts set the standards for successful post-conflict nation-building. During the Cold War,

U.S. military power was employed to preserve the status quo, not to alter

it, and to manage crises, not to resolve underlying problems. American interventions usually were undertaken to overthrow hostile regimes and reinstall friendly ones. Following a rash of nation-state failures after the end

Table 1. Historical Case Studies Post-Conflict Assessment

Germany Japan Somalia

Military Mission Regime Change, Partial Regime Humanitarian 

Security, Change, Aid, Regime 

HA/Refugees/DP, HA/Refugees/DP, Change

Reconstruction Reconstruction

Previous State of Society/Economy/ Developed Developed Chaotic, Violent,

Political Structure Dysfunctional

Damage Caused by Military Action Devestating Devestating Some

Continuing Hostile Activities Low Low High

Post-Conflict Duration 7 years 7 years 2 years

Troop Strength Per Capita High Modest Modest

Foreign Aid/Investment High Low Low

Multilateral Involvement Limited None Medium

Degree of Success High High None

4
of the Cold War, the United States intervened not simply to police ceasefires or restore the status quo, but to try to bring about more fundamental

transformation of war-torn or oppressed societies. In most of these cases,

the United States was able to secure broad international support.

Each successive post-Cold War intervention has generally been

more ambitious than its predecessor. Somalia started as a humanitarian

operation and expanded to an attempt to establish democracy. In Haiti,

forces restored a democratically elected president and built security institutions. The mission in Bosnia was creation of a multiethnic state. In

Kosovo the international community has worked toward the establishment of a democratic polity and market economy. In Afghanistan, the

United States and its allies focused on the removal of the Taliban and establishment of a democratic government. The operation in Iraq has taken

on a scope comparable to the transformational attempts still underway in

Bosnia and Kosovo and on a scale comparable to the occupations of Germany and Japan.

Impact

Haiti Balkans Afghanistan Iraq on Success

Regime Change, Stop Ethnic Regime Change, Regime Change, Regime Change

Stabilization, Cleansing, Stabilization, Stabilization, can be

Reconstruction Stabilization, Reconstruction Reconstruction successful

Reconstruction

Fragile Unstable to Dysfunctional Totalitarian, High

Dysfunctional Unstable

Very little Moderate, Mostly Some Limited, Most due Medium

warring factions to neglect

Low Medium High High High

2 years Bosnia: 7 + years 2 + years 6 + months Needs at least

Kosovo: 3 + years 5 years

Modest High Low Low High

Low High Low Increasing High

Medium High Medium Limited Medium

Low Medium TBD TBD

LEARNING FROM HISTORY 5
There are clear examples of successes in these case studies in different cultural environments. However, the costs and risks associated with

reconstruction and nation-building remain high, and the overall low success rate is a reminder of the difficulties of such operations. The postCold War efforts have not matched the success of the post-World War II

occupations of Germany and Japan. Efforts by the United States to win

the peace have been problematic, as evidenced by failures in Somalia and

Haiti, moderate success in the Balkans, and yet to be determined outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Discussion

The following lessons emerge from these case studies.

Lesson 1: Controllable factors for success are the level and duration of

effort of the United States and its coalition partners as measured in

terms of manpower, time, and money invested.2

A strong correlation can be seen between resources committed and

success. Considerable resources were invested in ensuring stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building in Germany and the Balkans. By contrast, a thin deployment of forces for limited time and a lack of resource

investments contributed to the failures in Somalia and Haiti. In

Afghanistan, the low investment of money and multinational forces has

resulted so far in limited improvement in overall security, slow progress in

democratization and limited economic growth. The correlation is not perfect, however. Reconstruction of Japan succeeded with a modest commitment of occupying forces and a relatively low level of foreign aid.

The RAND report on nation-building suggests that higher force levels for longer durations promote success. It notes that where large numbers of U.S. forces were deployed for long periods of time, as in Bosnia and

Kosovo, operations have been successful or are making progress. This was

not the case in the Somalia and Haiti operations, which were not successful. The report also describes a correlation between levels of casualties and

level of U.S. troops per capita. Only when the number of stabilization

troops has been low in comparison to the population, such as, in Somalia,

Afghanistan, and now Iraq, have U.S. forces suffered significant casualties.

In Somalia, increased combat deaths prompted the early withdrawal of

U.S. forces that contributed to the failure of the overall mission. By contrast, in Germany, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where troop levels were high, U.S.

forces suffered few post-conflict combat-related deaths. Supplementing

military forces with U.S. and international civilian police (CIVPOL) to

6
provide civil security, as was done in the Balkans, also contributes to success. It should be noted that it could take a year or more to build up and

deploy a CIVPOL force once combat has ended.

The remaining factor that can be controlled is the time the United

States and its partners devote to stabilization and reconstruction and then

to nation-building. The cases studied differed in duration and expectations for departure. Haiti began with clear departure deadlines that were

adhered to. Germany, Japan, Somalia, and Bosnia began with short time

lines but saw them extended. Iraq started with expectations for a short duration but is now viewed as a longer-term effort. Kosovo and Afghanistan

began without any expectations of an early exit. Staying around for a long

time does not guarantee success, but leaving early ensures failure, such as

in Somalia and Haiti.

History suggests that about five years is the minimum time needed

to cultivate an enduring transition to democracy. The transitions in Germany and Japan, for example, took seven years. Setting departure deadlines can unintentionally create expectations of imminent withdrawal or

of a shallow commitment. In Bosnia, IFOR’s one-year timetable and political discussions surrounding SFOR’s end date made stabilization and reconstruction difficult, because belligerents planned to wait out the international community’s intervention. Greater progress was made after the

United States announced that military forces would stay in Bosnia as long

as needed to ensure a successful transition.

Other important but uncontrollable factors for success are the target

nation’s internal characteristics and the convergence of the geopolitical interests of outside powers and the target nation.3 These were contributing

factors to the successes in Germany, Japan, and the Balkans.

Lesson 2: A rapid and decisive conventional military victory does not

guarantee a peaceful post-conflict stabilization environment and

indeed could make the S&R mission more challenging.

The U.S. military transformation effort, which is focused on enhanced

military capabilities to conduct rapid decisive warfighting operations with

speed, precision, and smaller force packages on the ground, could have unintended consequences for S&R operations. As combat subsided in past operations, the larger combat force transitioned to support resource-intensive

S&R operations. It was augmented with additional military police, civil affairs, PSYOP, engineers, and medical capabilities. This arrangement worked

reasonably well for slow transitions from combat to stability operations.

Under the improved force package arrangements, there are fewer forces and

LEARNING FROM HISTORY 7
capabilities available on the ground to conduct these operations. The transition is also much quicker.

The S&R operations studied in this chapter experienced varying levels of violence following the end of combat, depending on how the conflict concluded and the intervening troop strength. Germany, Japan, and

the Balkans did not experience major post-conflict hostilities. Germany

and Japan surrendered. Formal ceasefire agreements such as the Dayton

Peace Accords in Bosnia and the Military Technical Agreement in Kosovo

set the initial conditions for the cessation of hostilities. In the Balkans, the

security challenge was difficult, but it was related to ethnic revenge and not

directed at U.S. military forces, whose security effort was largely focused

on protecting ethnic minorities and enclaves. In Somalia, UN and U.S.

forces were unable to cope with urban warfare. In Afghanistan and Iraq,

the United States did achieve a rapid and decisive victory in the conventional phase of conflict, but soon those victories morphed into guerrilla

wars. In the end, the situations in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq had more

in common with each other than with the other cases—a most challenging security environment.

Lesson 3: A secure environment is a necessary precondition for

successful nation-building.

Establishing a safe and secure environment is the primary mission

of the military in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Security is

a precondition for economic development, building democratic institutions, and the rule of law. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies Post-conflict Reconstruction project, “security as a

concept addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate

and stable security institutions.”4 Civil unrest and the willingness of militants to continue fighting were concerns for intervening forces in each of

the case studies.

Military police played an important role in helping maintain law and

order and in training civilian police to assume these responsibilities, but in

many cases there were not enough to perform the mission needs. In Germany, a U.S. military-led constabulary force was created to fill the law and

order gap. In the Balkans, the United Nations provided international

police to train the local police force. A constabulary force composed of

Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie bridged the civil and military

security activities and provided crowd control capabilities.

8
Augmentation of the military force by civilian law enforcement

(including forensics) became increasingly important in addressing civil

security needs.5 In recent operations, organized crime was a major challenge that had to be addressed as part of the security operation. In the

Balkans, the United Nations provided a multinational specialized police capability to address organized crime. Terrorism has also emerged as an important area of concern. Afghanistan and Iraq have experienced more terrorist related incidents than the Balkans. Specialized civil-military

counter-terrorism Joint Task Force capabilities have been employed as part

of the global war on terrorism. These capabilities are an additional capability to force packages normally used to support combat and S&R operations.

A legitimate and functioning penal system is also an important part

of the security equation. In several case studies, judicial teams of prosecutors, lawyers, judges and corrections officers were used to establish court

and prison systems.6 In Haiti, the inability to develop sustainable security

institutions led to the eventual failure of the international operation.

Without a safe and secure environment, humanitarian relief, assistance to refugees and displaced persons, restoration of basic services, and

reconstruction of institutions and infrastructure are more difficult. It has

become increasingly important for these activities to begin concurrently

with the establishment of a safe and secure environment. In recent case

studies, the military was required to provide security and humanitarian relief, governance and other assistance until a permissive environment could

be created to allow a transition to civilians. The military, in particular MPs,

civil affairs, engineers, and medical teams, facilitated the transition to civilian authorities and became important players in these activities.

Lesson 4: Combat operations and stabilization and reconstruction

operations must be planned concurrently and as interdependent

elements within an overall strategy for winning the peace.

The ability of the U.S. military to defeat enemy forces rapidly and

decisively with a reduced combat presence on the ground has significantly reduced planning time for the post-conflict phase. Thus, planning

for stabilization and reconstruction must take place concurrently with

planning for the war. Both combat and S&R are critical for success. Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the local population and the international community at large have grown less tolerant of delays in reconstruction.

Because of the complex nature of stabilization and reconstruction,

an integrated approach to winning the peace is needed. The civil-military

LEARNING FROM HISTORY 9
planning process builds trust among key players, clarifies and establishes

roles and responsibilities, helps identify and resolve inconsistencies and

gaps, and helps to synchronize overall civil-military activities. History

suggests that a comprehensive integrated plan spanning the continuum

from war to combat termination to a transition to civilian control to a

well-defined end state seldom exists. In Afghanistan coordination between civil, economic, and military functions was fragmented, resulting

in limited economic and civil progress. In Bosnia these functions were

initially fragmented, while in Kosovo they were reasonably well coordinated. Iraq policy was heavily focused on combat operations, with S&R

operations taking a backseat. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance/Coalition Provisional Authority (ORHA/CPA) has been

slow to produce results, in large part because of the delay in planning and

execution and a lack of adequate field authority, personnel, and resources.

Strong U.S. leadership and a policy focused on managing civil, economic,

and political change and maintaining a military presence over a long period of time were fundamental to success in Germany and Japan.

Lesson 5: Multilateral operations contribute to legitimacy, burden

sharing, and staying power. They are more difficult than unilateral

operations but cheaper for any one nation and more durable.

Multilateral operations do not, however, guarantee success.

History suggests that multilateral stabilization and reconstruction

operations and nation-building are more complex and time-consuming

than unilateral efforts; however, they can be considerably less expensive

and can produce more thorough societal transformations. Multilateralism

has drawbacks, such as complexity in coordination and burdensome bureaucracy, yet history suggests that multilateralism helps manage risk

while unilateralism invites it. In spite of the limitations, international involvement is important for helping achieve success. For example, UNsanctioned operations garner more international legitimacy, help distribute the costs (manpower and money) more widely, and provide a hedge

against the huge risks of failure. They also provide a means to encourage

staying power to see operations through to a successful outcome.

International involvement has been mixed for the case studies examined and, though a useful contributor, does not guarantee success. Somalia was the first post-Cold War attempt by the United States to support a

multinational nation-building effort. The effort failed due to the inability

to establish and staff an international structure to fill the governance gap

and begin reconstruction. In Haiti, the U.S.-led multinational military 

10
effort successfully restored President Aristide to power, but U.S. and international elements departed before a competent administration could be

created, self-sustaining democratic structures could be put in place, and

lasting economic reforms could be instituted.

Other multilateral S&R operations experienced varying levels of success. Since the occupation of Germany, the largest international effort has

occurred in the Balkans. In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO led a multinational

military effort of forces from member nations and non-NATO countries.

There was also significant participation by the UN, the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union

(EU), which were responsible for such nation-building tasks as civil administration and policing, elections monitoring, and economic development. While military unity of command was achieved through NATO,

civilian unity of command was established under UN auspices in Kosovo.

In Bosnia, civilian unity of command was more difficult to achieve because international responsibilities were more fragmented. As a result,

Bosnia has made political and economic progress but is not yet a self-sustaining political and economic entity. Kosovo has been somewhat more

successful because of the high degree of collaboration and burden sharing

among the multilateral participants, though progress has been hindered

because its final status in the international community has not been resolved. With the exception of Germany, Kosovo has enjoyed the most rapid

economic recovery among the cases studied. Multilateral involvement has

been considered a major factor in the relative ongoing successes in Bosnia

and Kosovo in particular.

Involvement and support of regional players is also important because neighboring states can exert significant influence to help achieve the

desired outcome, as was the case in Germany. Neighboring states also can

work at odds, as was the case in Bosnia. Consequently, it is necessary to

both constrain and engage neighboring states. International participation

can contribute to producing greater regional reconciliation, as was the case

in Germany, Bosnia and Kosovo.

Lesson 6: Embedding civilians with reconstruction specialties into the

warfighting force can facilitate planning and coordination.

Experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq suggest that it may

be appropriate to embed civilians in the deploying force to address planning for civil security and administration, restoring essential services and

other reconstruction needs, and facilitating the transition to the civilian

authority responsible for conducting the longer-term nation-building 

LEARNING FROM HISTORY 11
effort. This was the intended role of Task Force IV and the ORHA in Iraq.

The overall effectiveness has been slow in maturing because planning for

this capability started late, and staffs were not deployed soon enough,

given proper field authority, or adequately resourced to do the jobs they

needed to do upon arrival in country.

Lesson 7: Unity of effort depends heavily on a shared vision and the

ability to shape the response of multilateral participants.

Diverse players are involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations—international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, U.S. government and other foreign government agencies, and

coalition militaries. Broad multilateral participation is compatible with

unity of effort if the major participants share a common vision and can

shape international institutions accordingly, as in Kosovo with the UN,

OSCE, EU, NATO and contributing nations. Close coordination built on

this shared vision and unity of effort is important in building a stable

peace and for preventing partners from unintentionally working at cross

purposes. In multinational operations, the U.S. military can find itself in a

lead nation role or in a support role, where U.S. military units report to a

non-U.S. commander (for example, KFOR in Kosovo) or multinational

units report to a U.S. commander (for example, the U.S. led MND–North

in Bosnia and MNB–East in Kosovo). In these circumstances unity of

command becomes critical.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO was effective in ensuring broad multinational military participation and unity of command. On the civilian side

the record was mixed. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in

Bosnia was fragmented among competing civil agencies, and there was little coordination between OHR and NATO at the beginning of the operation. In Kosovo, on the other hand, multinational unity of effort was

achieved under UN auspices, and there was good coordination between

NATO and the UN.

Lesson 8: Information operations require a comprehensive and

integrated strategy from the inception of the operation through

stabilization and reconstruction and nation-building to the desired end

state. IO needs to shape and influence the information environment.

Information operations (IO) are more than leaflet drops and Commando Solo broadcasts, especially in the new world of global information

and the 24/7 international media cycle. They can help to establish legitimacy for the operation, win the hearts and minds of the local population,

gain regional and international support, and influence an adversary’s 

12
decisions. Communication with the local population is critical for managing expectations, allaying fears and suspicions, helping establish legitimacy

and support for the operation, and minimizing public unrest and possible

interference with the operation.

The United States has not done that well in understanding its target

audience and waging the information war. For example, the IO campaign

in Iraq was inadequately integrated with the overall political-military effort. It was also slow to respond to threats and failed to utilize the most

common venue accessible to Iraqis—the printed word. In many of the case

studies, the product development, testing, and approval cycle was cumbersome and lacked timeliness. In the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it also

proved difficult to measure the effectiveness of the information campaign

and to make definitive judgments because there were no agreed measures

of performance or effectiveness to support planning and assessment.

Lesson 9: Collaborative information environments facilitate civilmilitary coordination and information sharing.

Communications and information systems supporting past S&R operations were stove-piped and had limited coverage and capacity and little

connection between military and civilian systems. This contributed to

problems in civil-military coordination and information sharing in several

cases. Tactical military systems primarily supported the warfighting military command and control needs and provided only limited service to deployed national government agency elements. Deployed government

agencies, IOs, and NGOs used indigenous commercial telecommunications systems or contractor provided capabilities that were not directly

linked with the military networks. Some progress has been made in developing collaborative information environments for military operations, but

none exist for civil-military operations in S&R environments.

Conclusions

● History teaches that regime change operations can be successful in

various cultural settings, but the record is mixed and the price high.

● There are numerous uncontrollable factors that affect the outcome, especially the nation’s political, social and economic past.

● But there are controllable factors that can help determine the outcome, such as the level of effort and time the United States will contribute.

● A stable security environment is a necessary, but not sufficient ingredient for success.

LEARNING FROM HISTORY 13
● Another necessary ingredient is broad unity of effort within the

U.S. government.

● Taken together, the case histories studied make a strong argument

for creating a standing stabilization and reconstruction force as part of the

U.S. military.

Notes 1 Sources included interviews of senior personnel such as Ambassadors Robert B. Oakley and

James Dobbins, literature searches, and review of findings from studies by the National Defense University, U.S. Army War College, U.S. Institute of Peace, ASD C3I Command and Control Research Program, Institute of Defense Analyses, RAND, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Association

of the United States Army, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Government Accounting

Office, Open Society Institute, and UN Foundation. 2 James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building From Germany to Iraq, RAND, 2003. 3 Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation-building,”

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003. 4 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” white paper

for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project prepared by the Center for Strategic and International

Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, September 22, 2002, 1, accessed at <www.csis.org/isp/

pcr/securitypaper.pdf>. 5 “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” USIP, 2003. 6 Robert Perito, “The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations,” Pearson Peacekeeping

Center, 2002.

14
Chapter 2

New Strategic Concepts

S

ecuring the peace in the aftermath of conflict depends on many factors: how much damage is inflicted on a region’s infrastructure, how

many civilians unconnected to the local regime are killed or injured,

and how much regional instability a long military campaign creates all

shape the prospects for success in the post-conflict environment. Consequently, planning for military operations must begin with a clear, attainable, political-military objective that includes an understanding of what

the postwar setting must look like when combat operations end and postconflict operations begin.

In 1956, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden concluded that

Egypt’s new president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, was a dangerous fascist riding

the wave of Arab nationalism to greater and greater heights of power.

When Egypt took over the Suez Canal from Britain, Eden saw Nasser as

another Hitler and decided that any policy but direct military action

would amount to appeasement. French Premier Guy Mollet shared this

opinion and agreed to join Britain in an attack on Egypt to remove Nasser.

For Eden, the removal of Nasser seemed to be enough to rationalize the

use of British military power, but Eden’s military commanders needed

more, as Geoffrey Regan recounts:

Field Marshal Montgomery, soon after he heard that Eden planned a

strike against Egypt, asked him what was his object. Eden apparently

replied that it was to “knock Nasser off his perch.” Montgomery says

that he told Eden this was not good enough and that his generals

would need to know what the political aim was after Nasser was toppled, in order to plan the right kind of operation.1

15

* Thanks to Dr. James Kurtz, Institute for Defense Analysis, for sharing his work on the British

Army experience and its application to the U.S. Army in the new strategic environment.
The rest of the story is too well known to repeat here. Suffice it to say

that Nasser’s influence in the Arab world was enhanced by Britain’s muddled intervention.2 In the end, it was Eden who was removed from office,

and British prestige was severely damaged.

Eden’s failure to answer the question of what came after Nasser was

partly responsible for the operation’s disastrous outcome. If the effect

Eden wanted was the removal of Nasser, what were the steps that had to be

taken, and did those steps promise to achieve the political goals without

unnecessary risk or without other, unintended consequences in the aftermath of conflict? Was the cause-effect chain clear and logical to others (for

example, Montgomery)? The answers to these questions indicate serious

flaws in Eden’s planning.

Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq once again have plunged

Western armies into the chaos and disorder of the Islamic World, a region

where the problems of maintaining order and creating prosperity seem intractable.3 In the Islamic World, as in many parts of the developing world,

long-established social structures and belief systems are crumbling under

the crushing weight of global change, and the people whose lives depended

upon the old structures are seeing their worlds disintegrate.4 The challenge

to America and her allies is gradually to bring such areas of the world that

exist beyond the pale of the globalized world into the modern, integrated

structure of planetary civilization.

Understanding this aspect of stabilization and reconstruction operations is important; some of America’s adversaries in the non-globalized

world may conclude that it is possible to sap America to the point where it

allows the world to be changed for the worse.5 That is certainly the goal of

the smartest of these adversaries. Sadly, America’s ignominious withdrawal

from Somalia confirmed them in their judgment of American weakness.

Thus, military power is crucial to the maintenance of American self-confidence in conflict and post-conflict operations. If conflict and post-conflict operations look hard, America may deter itself from taking action in

its own interest. Indeed, self-deterrence is one of the greatest dangers

America faces today. Deciding whether to take military action that includes post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations should be

based not on whether the operations look easy or hard, but on whether

they are essential to the security interests of the United States and its allies.

Keeping in mind that conflict and post-conflict periods overlap, this

chapter examines what needs to happen in the broader context of strategic planning before, during, and after the conduct of military operations

16
in conflict or crisis. The key to success in post-conflict settings is understanding two interrelated points: that no military solution is possible absent a political and economic solution, and that persistent conditions of

insecurity prevent enduring, positive, political and economic development. For the American and British Armies, addressing the range of difficulties that can obstruct post-conflict stability and grasping the strategic

imperatives of post-conflict planning are essential to the creation of conditions conducive to the emergence of a new, prosperous, and more humane society.

Background

Today, most of the tensions in the international arena stem from the

impact of globalization and the resulting forces of ethnic, tribal and religious hatred. Terrorism is the latest manifestation of the intersection of

these forces and signals that the international system is in a period of readjustment as much of the developing world copes with the forces of uneven change. American military action will occasionally be unavoidable as

states and regions of the world that fail to integrate into or fall out of the

global economy threaten American and allied access to vital resources or

create refugee flows. In some cases like, such as Afghanistan, countries can

become sanctuaries for terrorism, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking. In nearly every case, they become catalysts for regional conflict

and instability.

At the same time, most of the social, economic, and military structures in the areas where U.S. and allied forces are likely to operate are

weakened from years of economic stagnation, internal corruption, and, in

some cases, international sanctions. These fragile structures can be expected to break relatively quickly under resolute American military assault. This means that American military operations will almost certainly

result in some form of power vacuum that American forces will have to

fill. In other words, if the United States and its allies disarm a country and

remove its government from power, the United States and its allies take on

the obligation to defend it.

The effect of these events on the Armed Forces is that they confront

more complex tasks; they will be employed more often, more quickly, and

in a greater diversity of strategic settings than ever before. The leading

force in land warfare, the U.S. Army, must be ready to perform tasks from

humanitarian aid to regime removal and post-conflict reconstruction.

Fulfilling this role, however, requires a fresh analytical approach.

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 17
Discussion

With these points in mind, a more coherent framework to guide

planning and thinking must emerge. This suggests the need for some limited, but useful generalizations that can be developed to serve as the conceptual basis for thinking and planning future military operations with

post-conflict requirements in mind. The point of this approach is simple:

Once the right questions are asked, answers can be provided and action

can be taken to address the identified requirements.

Coherent War-Winning and Peace-Winning Strategy

No one doubts the importance to the success of a military campaign

of a viable political strategy with attainable political-military objectives,

but devising such a strategy is harder than is generally recognized. In conflict and post-conflict settings, strategy involves the art of controlling and

managing all the resources of a nation or a coalition of nations, including

armed forces, to the end that vital interests shall be effectively promoted

and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. This

approach is in fact the highest form of strategy, because it integrates military power with diplomacy, economic development, and political interests

and results in policies that operate for decades or even centuries. In postconflict planning, a strategy that does not spread American and allied military resources too thinly but instead links military capabilities to other

governmental and non-governmental agencies is essential.

Of course, agreement on political-military goals is always difficult to

reach, but agreement on what counts constitutes the foundation for strategy in military operations. Non-governmental actors are usually very

knowledgeable about an area and its inhabitants. They can help refine approaches that require military attention. However difficult it may be to articulate them, understanding the interests of all actors involved in the conduct of conflict and post-conflict operations is the true wellspring of valid

objectives that define what a nation or coalition of nations is trying to do.

As always, the most compelling interests relate to survival, but no interest

exists in a vacuum. Hardly anyone is neutral. Even seemingly innocuous

interests can cause conflict.

These observations suggest that regardless of how much American

military commanders know about their opponents and their military objectives, given the unstructured nature of U.S. national strategy since the

end of the Cold War, it is almost certain that military operations will develop in parallel with evolving policy goals. This means that commanders

must exercise initiative and think through the consequences of their 

18
actions, whether or not they are told specifically what to do in varying circumstances. Inevitably, this recognition imposes the minimal requirement

to plan for the use of facilities that are specifically excluded from destruction and for rules of engagement, humanitarian assistance, power generation, if needed, and local law and order in the aftermath of conflict.

As the Russians discovered in Chechnya, military occupation does

not automatically equal a political solution. Augmenting and staffing land

component command headquarters with the expertise and talent to compensate for what the commander does not know or has not studied in the

context of stabilization and reconstruction operations is crucial. Planning

ahead will never be enough. Unanticipated requirements will always develop. Military leaders charged with executing military action need to understand the limits of what they can accomplish while reacting to the

sometimes open-ended missions that they are occasionally instructed to

execute. In post-conflict settings, commanders must anticipate the need

for a different mix of capabilities and incorporate them into force planning. If disaffected enemy military formations are inclined to cooperate,

this too must be considered as a means of maximizing resources in the

conflict region to shorten warfighting operations and improve the

prospects for stability in the post-conflict environment. In sum, by asking

the right questions in the context of post-conflict needs, it is possible for

commanders to discern what is essential to link tactical actions directly to

strategic goals and to discard what is unimportant or counterproductive

before, during, and after combat operations.

Unity of Effort

Integrating the diverse military and civilian agencies operating in

the post-conflict environment is important but not easy. Without a

shared strategic vision, there is always a real danger that various actors—

civilian and military—will cling tenaciously to their own policy views and

strategic orientations, unwilling or unable to integrate their perceptions

with the perceptions of others. Unity of command and broad participation may occasionally be at odds if the lead nation adopts a policy position that other participants cannot accept. Thus, the need to balance institutional and local interests in the context of policy making and

implementation is critical.

The effective use of military capabilities in conflict and post-conflict

environments demands the reconciliation of political ends and military/

civilian means. Without this reconciliation, clear attainable objectives

based on a sound political vision will not emerge and unity of effort will

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 19
be sacrificed. Somalia demonstrated conclusively the importance of unity

of effort. At one point, there were three separate command arrangements

in Somalia. Often this resulted in at least one organization not knowing

what the others were doing. Somalia also showed the need to realistically

match the political mandate for intervention to the existing capabilities—

in Somalia the mandate actually grew as the force structure declined.

Ideally, all lines of authority would lead unambiguously and directly

to and through a single headquarters combining civilian and military expertise in a clearing-house for decisionmaking. The authority of the individual in charge, whether civilian or military, over civil and military organizations of power and influence is essential to the establishment of an

integrated, interagency response in support of a coherent strategy for stabilization and reconstruction.

Compelling and Consistent Strategic Message

Knowledge of the historical record should teach us “how to think,

not what to do.” Clearly, post-conflict planning and implementation

strategies demand an understanding of more than the right weapon for

the right target set. What general insights can we draw from experience?

When Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer arrived in Malaya6 to assume

command of all British military and civilian elements of the on-going

counter-insurgency campaign, he focused intently on the message that he

wanted insurgents, soldiers, and civilians to hear and understand. Knowing

that he was addressing a diverse audience of Chinese, Malay, Indian, and

British citizens, he was particularly interested in disarming his opposition

while reassuring Britain’s supporters. Ultimately, he composed his essential

strategic message along the following lines: First, Britain would leave

Malaya; Britain had no intention of colonizing Malaya in the postwar period or keeping forces in Malaya. Second, although there was no timetable

for British military withdrawal, the removal of British forces would depend

on specific conditions. These conditions entailed, for example, the establishment of local law and order, a functioning judiciary and penal system to

support law and order, unimpeded movement of all people and goods

across the country, and the creation of a national army that would be the

guarantor of Malaya’s independence and freedom. Faced with the constraints that a diminished British Empire imposed on his operations, Field

Marshal Templer insisted that he would make do with the 33 British infantry battalions in the brigade battlegroups he had on hand and told

British authorities, “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the

jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.”7

20
British authorities made clear their intention to depart Malaya once

conditions of political and economic stability returned to the peninsula.

Conditions was the operative term. In time, because the Malayan populace

took seriously British public statements expressing Britain’s intention to

leave Malaya once internal stability existed, the resulting misery that terrorism inflicted on the population actually undermined the communist

insurgency. Malayans, Chinese, and Indians who sympathized in any way

with the insurgency saw no reason to support it when it became clear that

the British had no intention of remaining indefinitely. Coupled with the

inability of communist insurgents to move from opportunistic terrorism

to a sustained and effective military campaign against the British, terrorist

actions built support in the population for the British-led military campaign against the communists.8

Britain’s success against the insurgency in Malaya is not a perfect

analogy for American and allied operations today in Southwest Asia, but it

does provide evidence that a uniform, consistent message that supports a

political strategy with attainable political-military objectives is vital. In addition, Field Marshal Templer’s message was no less important to the

British military authorities. Thanks to the clarity of the message, they, too,

understood as clearly as their Malayan counterparts what had to be done

to facilitate Britain’s withdrawal from the region. Today, what American

and allied soldiers and civilians say and do make a difference. The Sergeant

on patrol must understand and convey the same message that the Joint

Force Commander or his civilian counterparts disseminate.

Full Spectrum Planning 

Post-conflict planning evolves in parallel with the war plan. It

equates to planning backward from victory.9 This kind of thinking requires that the joint force keep the final objective in mind while following

promising intermediate paths to the final objective before, during, and

after the conflict ends.

Entailed in reaching this objective is the systematic calculation of the

value, as well as the risk and cost, of attacking specific enemy vulnerabilities or strengths based on the effect produced by their physical or functional destruction, neutralization, denial, exploitation, or manipulation

through all available means, direct and indirect.10 Facilities that offer capabilities in the post-conflict environment to advancing American and allied forces need to be spared. For instance, Yugoslav military barracks were

nearly all destroyed during the Kosovo air campaign, with the result that

entirely new facilities had to be built for arriving NATO troops when the

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 21
Yugoslav forces withdrew. In addition, the decision to destroy the communications infrastructure made it very tough in the first few weeks of

NATO’s occupation to disseminate critical information to all of the region’s inhabitants.

Operations necessary to sustain American influence when the fighting ends are no less important than the combat operations themselves are

to victory. Having won the war, it is vital to win the peace. In strategic

terms, this requires the coherent and continuous application of national

and alliance elements of power through effects-based processes to accomplish strategic objectives. In practice, this may involve the need to

front-load critical civil order and humanitarian assistance capabilities immediately behind advancing combat troops. This was done in Kosovo,

with the result that the civilian population suffered minimally. In some

settings, the need to incorporate disaffected enemy civil and military authorities and their supporting elements should be considered early in the

post-conflict process.11

This recognition implies early planning for the combination of

American and allied military forces with U.S., allied, and international

civilian capabilities, including governmental, international, and non-governmental organizations and private contractors. This planning process

should include identification and development of these resources and

planning for their initial combined utilization and the subsequent devolution from military to civilian operations. This is a very important consideration, whether the activity is relief, stabilization, or reconstruction. It is

essential, even in the early stages with a weak initial civilian capability. It

can be much more effective if the civilian capability to influence reconstruction is better developed early in the planning process.

Concurrency of Operations

As noted earlier, the American political goal in post-conflict settings

is to create the conditions conducive to the emergence of a more humane

government on the local and national levels that is democratic in character.

The operative word here is conditions, because the strength and presence of

U.S. and allied military power is really dependent on specific conditions,

not on timetables for withdrawal devised in isolation from developments in

the post-war region. Success in stabilization and reconstruction operations

depends on the mobilization of capabilities during and after conflict that

are essential to the maintenance of order and the restoration of normal economic activity. All of these points suggest straightforward military tasks

that ultimately drive conditions in the post-conflict environment.

22
Task 1. Suppress, defeat, or destroy those elements that resist the

emergence of a new society or simply promote anarchy. As will be seen,

these operations involve much more than conventional military power.

They require the tight integration of small, effectively led conventional

army and marine units with Army Special Forces, intelligence, counterterrorist, and local police elements.

Task 2. Establish law and order. These activities require a mix of specialized military and police units with the skills and the judicial authority

to impose a new, effective, and legitimate political order.

Task 3. On an emergency basis, repair damage to infrastructure that

is essential to the emergence of a new social and political order. Army engineer units working with civil and indigenous authorities target critical

infrastructure for power regeneration, transportation, sanitation, communication, and education.

Task 4. Rapidly establish an effective interim government constituted

from the indigenous population. U.S. and allied military and civil authority must simultaneously create the conditions for the growth of local selfrule and economic prosperity, often in the context of serious internal ethnic and sectarian tensions.

All four tasks must be tackled simultaneously because they are interdependent. U.S. Joint Forces Command argues that for any current or future joint force to discharge the tasks of stabilization and reconstruction

with success requires significant coordination across service and governmental boundaries. No doubt this is true, but the force mix that is deployed to the warfight must already contain some of the capabilities that

will be needed in those areas where fighting has ended and reconstruction

has begun.

Precision-targeting of Rejectionist Elements

As Sir Winston Churchill said of Field Marshal Montgomery’s

lethargic and ponderous advance against the out-gunned and outmanned combined German and Italian force at El Alamein: “When you

are winning a war almost everything that happens can be claimed to be

right and wise.” The opposite also holds true in post-conflict settings. If

the perception grows that security is poor, that law and order are unenforceable, then almost everything that happens is criticized. If security degrades, the pressure to withdraw U.S. and allied forces grows, as the

American experience in Somalia demonstrated. Among those who resist

American military intervention and the forces of globalization that intervention brings with it, the hope is that, like the Soviet military in

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 23
Afghanistan, the American military will respond with indiscriminate

crackdowns and violence. Terrorist or insurgent elements are always engaged in obtaining popular support on their home ground and abroad by

attacking American military targets in areas where Americans are intensely unpopular.

This was true in Somalia and it is likely to be the case wherever

American soldiers and marines serve. It is the unavoidable price of superpower status. Terrorists know that the people most likely to render aid and

assistance to them will be those who lose friends, relatives, and parents to

American military action. In Afghanistan, for instance, the code of conduct known as the Pushtunwaldi stresses, besides other things, blood

vengeance (badal).12 As a result, finding and defeating or co-opting rejectionist elements that violently oppose U.S. and allied intervention is critical to mission success. Success in this arena is critical if military problems

are to be converted to police problems—the real purpose of counter-insurgency operations.

In exclusively military terms, this means that the best way to inflict

serious losses on the terrorists is to locate them without being seen, to deploy ambush parties and launch small, but deadly assaults with standoff

attack weapons in support. With dramatic improvements in precision,

advanced command and control systems, and the growing transparency

provided by an evolving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

grid, the tactical use of small Army and Marine elements against discrete

targets is more achievable today than ever before. But to be effective the

civilian, military, and intelligence resources must be interconnected or

netted, as well as jointly commanded. Ideally, what one part of this integrated organization sees, all parts must see; what one part thinks, all parts

must think.13

The collection, processing, analysis, fusion, and dissemination of

timely information and intelligence must be addressed in an integrative

setting. Feedback to every level, civilian and military, is critical. Soldiers

who apprehend suspects who are subsequently transported to higher

headquarters for more thorough interrogation must know the results of

the interrogation to more effectively target suspects in the future.

This tactic necessitates the use of small detachments of American

and allied soldiers that are not much larger than the enemy concentration

they are attacking. For one thing, most enemies in the post-conflict 

environment will deliberately avoid direct combat with regular Army and

Marine combat forces, preferring instead to emphasize offensive action

24
against smaller, lightly protected and equipped U.S. ground elements, particularly at night. To avoid losses to superior American firepower, terrorists and insurgents must remain dispersed and strike unexpectedly. In the

post-conflict environments of today’s world, there is no distinction between front and rear, with the added disadvantage that American artillery

is of limited utility in a setting where fighting is close and sudden. As a result, accurate, devastating direct fire from close range and from standoff

distances is the key in these encounters. But the real ingredient for success

is initiative, and initiative requires freedom of action.

If American ground forces are subject to attack when and where they

are unprepared for terrorist action, they will lose the initiative. Tactical independence of small units along with the use of reaction forces that include AH64Ds on routine patrol overhead or on strip alert, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles are part of the answer, but surveillance

platforms with the capacity for sustained coverage in areas where terrorist

activity is highest are vital if American military power is to be selectively

and effectively applied against the armed enemy.

Accurate, devastating firepower is not the only variable in this complex equation. Education of officers to understand and perform these tasks

is equally, if not more critical. Military force is credible only to the extent

that the will that uses it is credible. However, military power employed in

isolation from a psychological program designed to undermine the rejectionists’ legitimacy will not work. Sporadic acts of terror or violence persist as long as there is a support base within the population that tolerates

or accepts the legitimacy of the insurgent cause.14

Improved Cultural Intelligence

What is required for the difficult and complex job of winning hearts

and minds is something General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), former

Commander, U.S. Central Command, calls cultural intelligence. Zinni has

his own short list of questions to this end: “What I need to understand is

how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their

values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?”15

Geared to fight traditional wars against conventional enemies, soldiers must now make significant and, in some cases, radical changes in

the way they think about warfare and the conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations in the post-conflict environment. The Army is

experiencing major changes in size, composition, mission, and technology. The number and variety of operations are increasing with far greater

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 25
emphasis on joint and multinational operations, while new technology is

simultaneously changing the nature of warfare.16 Box-to-box connectivity is worthless without brain-to-brain connectivity, and the required intellectual connectivity comes with education and experience.17 Brigadier

General David Grange, USA (Ret.), summed up the challenge very well:

A transformed mindset is one that can handle the chaotic and uncertain situations created by the collapse of political, economic, and security systems. Leaders must be able to operate in countries that have

no effective governments, where the enemy and front lines are not

easily identifiable, and rules of engagement are conflicting. Our forces

are expected to deal with terrorists, drug traffickers, warlords, militant

fundamentalists, and paramilitary units—and still be able to overcome large maneuver formations and formidable defense systems.18

Military educational institutions, however, lost their monopoly as

providers of knowledge and understanding long ago. A good plan for officer development that emphasizes the criticality of teaching leaders how—

as opposed to what—to think is the first step. To cope with the complex

challenge of joint expeditionary warfare and stabilization and reconstruction operations, officers will increasingly need the educational background

found only in major universities. Thus, the second step involves selecting

officers willing to participate in rigorous graduate education programs.

Assuming the background for stabilization and reconstruction exists,

the analytical framework for understanding the adversary in the field begins with the over-arching concept of foreign internal defense (FID), which

is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government

in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and

protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.19 These activities include the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its

growth and to protect itself from subversion as it develops. FID focuses

specifically on building viable institutions (political, economic, social and

military) that respond to the needs of a developing society.

The use of incentives—including actions ranging from the provision

of specific human services and the repair of damaged infrastructure by

Army engineers and technical units to the targeted delivery of hard cash

into the right hands—must animate the behavior of military leaders at

every level. This low-level excursion by U.S. and allied forces into the postconflict society is critical to the development of a sophisticated capability

to conduct military operations based on human intelligence (HUMINT).

Black and White Special Forces operatives armed with good HUMINT

26
operating from within the communities themselves can help guide and

shape the actions of conventional Army ground forces. In time, this approach will produce critical information that can be used quickly and effectively to destroy the terrorist or insurgent. In time, the insurgent’s fear

of betrayal from within his small group becomes a paranoia that dissolves

the group and leads to defeat of the larger insurgency.

Early Demonstrable Success in Key Areas

Early success in three key areas—security, power, and jobs—is essential in any post-conflict setting. Where local law and order have disintegrated, security is immediately at risk. Where water and energy services are

interrupted, daily life for the inhabitants quickly becomes intolerable.

And, where jobs have vanished with the regime that created them, thousands of disgruntled former employees provide fertile recruiting ground

for insurgency and terrorism. Presumptions of American success in conflict or post-conflict environments should not ignore these facts.

Consider the security problem first. If striking at small, local enemy

concentrations and fixed targets becomes the sole objective, future stabilization and reconstruction operations will soon falter. Appropriately organized, equipped and trained ground combat forces drawn from the local

population or the cooperative elements in the existing military establishment must be on hand to work closely with U.S and allied forces to pursue insurgents into their sanctuaries and destroy them in detail. Thus,

friendly indigenous forces must be given the opportunity to demonstrate

that they are professionally trained as police or soldiers and that they can

move quickly and decisively against any resisting enemy. This means adequately arming the local police and giving them the authority to arrest

and, if necessary, kill their opponents.

Organized crime always flourishes in post-conflict settings where

local order has collapsed. Only armed policemen who speak the local language, know the inhabitants, and are familiar with the area can cope with

the challenge of organized crime. The military can support and reinforce

their activity, but the investigative capabilities of the American and allied

military establishments to root out and destroy organized crime are limited. All too frequently, criminal elements and organized political opposition are linked. Finding ways to separate the two sides of this equation is

important, because political opposition feeds on the illicit funds provided

by organized criminality.

During the planning for the introduction of NATO forces into

Kosovo, teams of military police and engineers were assembled and

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 27
incorporated into the force packages that entered Kosovo immediately

after Yugoslav forces withdrew. This action ensured that both local security concerns and the need for the rapid regeneration of electric power

would be addressed in the first days of NATO occupation. NATO forces

were lucky insofar as power was concerned. In most cases, connectivity to

power sources in surrounding countries could be restored with relatively

little difficulty. However, in some cases, military units provided large generators with the capacity to provide power for local clinics and hospitals

until connections to better sources were restored.

Providing jobs is a much tougher challenge. For example, the United

Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have created false economies

of dependency by hiring local national labor to support a variety of UN

initiatives. But far too little attention has been focused on the introduction

of commercial firms through the loosening of restrictions in customs and

cross-border traffic. Nascent capitalism often is lumped together with organized crime, particularly in countries where there is little or no history

of a viable free market. Distinguishing one from the other is essential,

however, if a new economic structure is to emerge that does not depend

on foreign donors for survival. Developing internal markets linked to

food, shelter, and clothing are attainable near-term goals, but not enough

to sustain long-term economic growth. Because no one country can develop in isolation from its surroundings, true economic development always requires a regional strategy that links development to the larger market forces of the region.

When conditions are not secure, it is always difficult to entice capital

investment. Despite the violence in Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinian Arab private sector—spearheaded by the Palestinian diaspora and the

support of the European Union—has had some success in creating new

banking systems, venture capital funds, and a mechanism for the privatization of telecommunication and other industries. American business,

however, has been understandably reluctant to invest in the area, and the

continuous breakdown of civil order in the Palestinian areas makes it unlikely that this condition will change soon.20

Early Introduction of Indigenous Capabilities

In the complex environment of postwar stabilization and reconstruction, legitimacy, consent, and the use of force are inextricably intertwined. Without the help of the people who already live in the region

where the conflict occurred, it is simply not possible to restore normalcy

in public order or economic terms. It is important to understand that

28
there are large numbers of targets for insurgents or terrorists to choose

from and that defending them all demands infinite U.S and coalition resources that will not be provided. Nearly one-third of occupying forces are

normally engaged in protecting specific sites, lines of communication, and

strong points. These static guard missions should be the first tasks to pass

rapidly over to local citizens.

As noted earlier, the first place to start is to create local police and military establishments staffed by indigenous people. Making the training and

formation of local citizens as police is a top priority in any post-conflict environment. The faster this process occurs, the more successful the larger

stabilization and reconstruction operation is likely to be and the sooner

U.S. and allied military forces can withdraw. As the British Army discovered

the hard way in Ulster, it was a serious mistake for British troops to conduct

house-to-house searches of Irish homes. Local police drawn from the population were much better at the job and they evoked a much less hostile response from the Irish population than the British Army did.

Identifying American citizens with skills of importance to the operation and linking them through the Internet to operations on the ground

is another way to encourage greater local participation. During the early

phases of American military operations in Afghanistan, Afghans living in

the United States provided enormously important insights and support to

U.S. and allied forces trying to establish a rapport with the indigenous

population. Bringing former citizens of a country ravaged by war and

under U.S. and allied occupation to the county in question can be helpful—if they are not inserted immediately into positions of authority, but

used instead as a kind of positive fifth column to build support for the

larger reconstruction effort.

These points notwithstanding, there can be serious obstacles to cooperation with the people whom soldiers and marines are trying to help

in the post-conflict environment. In a very different strategic setting, General Sherman made similar observations in the context of southern reconstruction after America’s Civil War:

No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of

the people of the South, we cannot accomplish it by force. Nor can we

afford to maintain there an army large enough to hold them in subjugation. All we can, or should attempt is to give them rope, to 

develop in an honest way if possible, preserving in reserve enough

military power to check any excesses if they attempt any.21

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 29
Lego-like S&R Capabilities

The use of force must be agile, responsive, and suited to the specific

environment. For instance, soldiers with small arms in soft-skinned vehicles are not capable of coping with terrorists or insurgents armed with

armor-piercing weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades or commanddetonated anti-tank mines. At the same time, tanks are not well suited for

crowd control or urban policing. This means that different types and levels of force will be required within the post-conflict region depending on

local conditions. Understanding this point influences the development of

force packages that contain capabilities both for warfighting and for provision of humanitarian assistance and civil order.

What is required is the ability to organize core military capabilities

into specialized modules of mission-focused combat power for integration

as needed into post-conflict operations. Transforming ground forces into

mission-focused force packages—the military equivalent of “Legos” that

can be assembled into larger joint operational forces—is applicable to postconflict operations as well as to combat. In practice, this scheme depends

on evolving joint systems and a technical architecture (a set of building

codes) for successful aggregation. The U.S. Army already has most of the

capabilities needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations, if it is

willing to organize them appropriately.

Military organizations for stabilization and reconstruction operations should bring specific capabilities to the post-conflict environment

ranging from bridge reconstruction to water purification. However, these

modular organizations should be self-contained both tactically and in regard to command systems to ensure they can be independently deployed

for long periods. This feature of self-containment reduces the need for

communication and information processes both within the modular formations and between them and their higher joint headquarters.

It is vital to apply limited U.S. and coalition military resources when

and where they will have the greatest effect. The key step involves constituting Army formations from the capabilities that are required for the mission. One way to create the Lego-like capability is to view Army forces as capability packages organized for mission effectiveness. Regardless of the

scale of the contingency, Army forces will be required to provide some level

of support to U.S. government agencies, non-governmental organizations,

international organizations, and host-nation agencies.22 The Army should

organize to fulfill the mission.

30
As in other military operations, standards of training, readiness, and

discipline must be very high. Soldiers must understand that whatever tactic or operational technique worked 10 years ago, 2 days ago, or even 50

miles away may not work again, and they must be prepared to adopt whatever tactic does work.23 In this sense, the creation, and the regular employment, of superior joint tactical forms ought to be the Army goal.

Conclusions

● The importance of establishing attainable political-military objectives to the successful implementation of a war and peace winning strategy cannot be overstated. It is dangerous for American military or civilian

leaders to entertain dreams of social and political structures in any country that cannot be sustained because the cultural and economic conditions

will not support it.

● Grand designs for nation-building fail when they are conceived in

isolation from conditions in societies that Americans do not understand.

Whatever emerges in the post-conflict environment of American and allied military intervention must reflect the preferences and ideas of the

people that live there.

● What the Army and Marine Corps can do in the post-conflict environment is no less important than what they do in war. What soldiers

and marines say and do matters to the people under occupation. Their

message must be consistent with the guidelines established at the highest

levels. A failure of understanding makes a coherent strategic message ineffective. The British experience in Malaya is instructive.

● Advanced technologies are enablers in achieving success, but ultimately it is military organization, training, and thinking on the ground that

will make the difference. Soldiers and marines have the skills, and both

services already have a high percentage of the capabilities that are needed.

What is needed is a new philosophy of military leadership and education

designed to prepare officers and soldiers for post-conflict operations.

● One way to address the diversity of capabilities required in stabilization and reconstruction is to consider the bulk of Army forces as inherently capable of meeting some or most of the post-conflict operational requirements. In practice, Army forces should be viewed as capability

packages organized for mission effectiveness. Army forces have responded

with agility to unanticipated missions before. The use of field artillery units

from Fort Sill, Oklahoma is one example. That said, a policy of reorienting

non-infantry units to perform light and motorized infantry-type missions

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 31
entails some risk if a joint rotational readiness system is not adopted by the

U.S. Army. Without rotational readiness and unit replacement, formations become very difficult to retrain and refocus on warfighting missions after long

periods of employment in missions other than war.

● The global war on terrorism presents the Army, in particular, with

the opportunity to reevaluate its role in stabilization and reconstruction

missions in a way that will guide Army transformation along new paths to

future operational success. As Field Marshal Rommel said: “Mortal danger

is an effective antidote for fixed ideas.” This necessitates the transformation of Army thinking and culture into a force organized, trained, and postured for global joint expeditionary warfare that will include post-conflict

activities, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Notes 1 Geoffrey Regan, Great Military Disasters: A Historical Survey of Military Incompetence (New York:

Barnes and Noble Books, 1987), 279.

2 James Webb, “Heading for Trouble,” The Washington Post, September 4, 2002, D7. Webb’s comments on the nature of an Iraqi operation are insightful: “The connotations of ‘a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad’ show how inapt the comparison is. Our occupation forces never set foot inside

Japan until the emperor had formally surrendered and prepared Japanese citizens for our arrival. Nor

did MacArthur destroy the Japanese government when he took over as proconsul after World War II.

Instead, he took pains to preserve the integrity of the Japanese imperial family and to work his changes

through the government. Nor is Japanese culture in any way similar to Iraq’s. The Japanese are a homogeneous people who place a high premium on respect, and they cooperated fully with MacArthur’s

forces by order of the emperor.”

3 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 4.

4 Brink Lindsey, Against the Dead Hand: The Uncertain Struggle for Global Capitalism (New York:

John Wiley and Sons, 2002), 211.

5 Jack Shanahan, Chet Richards, and Franklin Spinney, “Bury Cold War Mindset: Fourth-Generation Warfare Rewrites Military Strategy,” Defense News, August 5–11, 2002, 11.

6 Malaya commonly is confused with Malaysia. On July 9, 1963, Malaya joined with North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore to form the Federation of Malaysia. Singapore withdrew August 9, 1965,

and the federation became simply Malaysia.

7 Margaret Shennan, Out in the Midday Sun: The British in Malaya 1880–1960 (London: John

Murray, 2000), 321.

8 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington,

DC: Brassey’s, 1990), 80–81.

9 Again, according to U.S. Joint Forces Command, effects-based planning (EBP) is an operational

planning process to conduct EBO within rapid decisive operations (RDO). EBP is results-based vice

attrition-based. EBP closely mirrors the current joint planning process yet focuses upon the linkage of

actions to effects to objectives. EBP changes the way we view the enemy, ourselves, and what is included and emphasized in the planning process. EBP uses a flexibly structured battle rhythm that

leverages a collaborative knowledge environment and capitalizes on the use of fewer formal joint

boards. It employs virtual, near-simultaneous planning at all echelons of command.

10 C.J. Heatley III, “The Rapid Dominance Concept,” unpublished paper provided to the Office of

Net Assessment by the Defense Group, Inc., Alexandria, VA, January 7, 2000.

32
11 Mark Fineman, Warren Vieth, and Robin Wright, “Dissolving Iraqi Army Was Costly Choice.

The masses of enlisted men could have been used for reconstruction and security. Now the U.S. faces

terrorism and building a new force,” The New York Times, August 24, 2003, 5. 12 Bard E. O’Neill, 81. 13 Kenneth Watman, “Global 2000,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001), 76. 14 Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York: Picador, 2001), 203. 15 Anthony C. Zinni, “Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural

Awareness and Flexible Thinking,” June 4, 1994, reproduced in Joseph Strange, Capital “W” War: A

Case for Strategic Principles of War (Quantico, VA: Defense Automated Printing Service, 1998), 267. 16 Gary Yukl, “Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army and Approaches for Developing Them,” in Out of the Box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other

Top-Performing Organizations, ed. James Hunt, George E. Dodge, and Leonard Wong (Stamford, CT:

JAI Press, 1999), 255. 17 Clayton Christensen makes this same point about businesses in The Innovator’s Dilemma: When

New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997), 209. 18 David L. Grange, “Transforming Isn’t Chanting Slogans,” Proceedings 128, no. 8 (August 2002), 2. 19 See U.S. Special Operations Command Web site, “Terms and Definitions,” for the definition of

Foreign Internal Defense from which this paragraph was extracted. 20 Allan Gerson, “Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role,” The American Journal of International

Law, 95, no. 1 (January 2001), 109.

21 General William T. Sherman, on the subject of reconstruction in the South after the American

Civil War, 1861–1865. 22 Joint Operations Concept, JROC draft, March 7, 2003, final draft, 27. 23 William Donohue Ellis and Thomas J. Cunningham, Jr., Clark of St. Vith, The Sergeants’ General

(Cleveland: Dillon/Liederbach, 1974), 56, 57, 166, 167.

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 33
Chapter 3

Scenarios for Force Sizing

How many military forces should the United States possess in

order to perform post-war S&R missions? More fundamentally,

how should it go about making calculated decisions in this

arena? What analytical standard should DOD employ to size its S&R forces

for this purpose? Likewise, what analytical standards should DOD employ

to design its S&R forces in ways that shape their internal characteristics and

performance capabilities? This paper addresses these questions in preliminary ways that can help set the stage for further research and analysis.

With S&R missions now gaining greater urgency, these thorny issues

demand careful attention. S&R forces start functioning after U.S. combat

forces have succeeded in occupying enemy territory. Their purpose is to

carry out S&R missions that arise during war-termination and in the

often-difficult stages that follow before lasting peace is established. For

the most part, forces in the form of major S&R units do not now exist as

organized entities, but many of the components for them are scattered

throughout the force. The recent Iraq experience suggests that U.S. strategy will need them in the years ahead. DOD will not be able to make sensible decisions about how to prepare S&R forces until it has analytical

standards for sizing and designing them. But what should these standards

be? Because these major S&R formations do not now exist, they will have

to be assembled.

Background

This chapter examines scenarios in which U.S. forces might have to

perform S&R missions. The analysis of scenarios and related force planning considerations is preliminary. It is intended to establish a strategic

framework that will be used to conduct further investigation and does not

pretend to report final results of thorough deliberation. Even so, it offers

suggestive insights on the force planning calculus for S&R missions and

35
how scenario analysis fits into this calculus. Basically, the scenarios considered here support the judgment that the U.S. military needs significant

S&R forces. Determining the exact size and composition of these forces is

a complex enterprise that is best approached by considering multiple options and weighing their effectiveness in the S&R mission.

As experience shows, scenarios are notoriously bad at predicting

events. Typically the events that they foresee never happen, and they fail to

forecast the surprising contingencies that actually occur. But when used as

analytical tools rather than crystal balls, scenarios can shed light on force

sizing and designing in a generic sense. This chapter takes an initial look

at twelve illustrative S&R scenarios that address the key regions of the

world and help cover the spectrum of future events in terms of size, difficulty, and unique features. The results put forth here are tentative, and will

be developed further as additional research is performed.

Discussion

Clearly the U.S. military needs forces for performing S&R duties. The

Iraq experience has cast a bright spotlight on this new reality. But how

many such forces will be enough? Will DOD need a small S&R force, a

medium-size force, or a large force? This question demands a sensible answer. Today, S&R forces are in great demand. Their responsiveness and capabilities need to be enhanced, and some argue that they need to be increased in size as well.

Determining how many S&R forces to deploy for a particular contingency is not the same as determining how many forces to deploy for the

purpose of war-termination and post-war occupation. The latter function

typically is performed by combat forces, whose missions and tasks are different from those of S&R. Thus, S&R forces are normally a subset of total

deployments, and they perform missions within their bailiwick. The size

of S&R forces, however, might be large if their missions are demanding.

Depending upon the situation, S&R forces might match or even outnumber occupation combat forces. Moreover, they remain in the occupied

country for a considerable period after most occupation forces have been

withdrawn.

Addressing the S&R force-sizing issue is anything but an exercise in

the obvious. When the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 and the Defense

Planning Guidance (DPG) were published, they created a “4–2–1” standard

for sizing the overall conventional posture. This standard implied that the

U.S. military should have enough forces to occupy an enemy country the

36
size of Iraq or North Korea after an MTW conflict. Today, however, the

United States finds itself actually occupying Iraq while also performing

two small-but-demanding S&R missions in the Balkans (Kosovo and

Bosnia) and Afghanistan. To the extent the current situation is prologue, the

implication is that DOD will need enough S&R forces to handle more than

one concurrent contingency.

Maybe the 4–2–1 standard should be applied to the S&R posture.

The 4–2–1 standard addresses concurrent requirements in flexible ways. It

says that U.S. combat forces should always be prepared for two MTWs, but

in ways that permit them to wage a single MTW while using the remainder to handle lesser conflicts and carry out smaller crisis interventions. If

this standard were applied to sizing S&R forces, DOD presumably would

create enough forces for two-MTW-size S&R missions. But it would enjoy

the flexibility to use them for a wide range of lesser contingencies, while

always holding an S&R capability for a single MTW in reserve.

Would this amount of forces be about right, or too much, or too little? Nobody knows the answer because nobody can predict the future. Ten

years ago, few people could have imagined U.S. military forces performing

S&R duties in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq at the same time. What

can be said is that no analytical standard will be able to identify a single

point of requirements above which safety and success are ensured, and

below which insecurity and failure are guaranteed. Compared to today’s

minimal posture, more S&R forces will always be better, and fewer forces,

always worse. The real issue is one of confidence levels: How much capability and insurance does the United States want to possess in an uncertain

world where S&R situations seem to be proliferating? 

In the past, DOD has normally tried to answer this question by investing in additional assets to the point where the so-called “knee of

curve” is reached on a curve of diminishing marginal returns. This is the

point where additional investments provide only small incremental returns that presumably are not worth the added expenses, and where the

marginal costs thus exceed the marginal benefits. If the knee-of-curve

standard is applied to S&R sizing, it might suffice as a general yardstick.

But finding where the knee of the curve resides in the S&R world is a

complicated matter. Will a two–MTW S&R force fall at the knee of the

curve? Will creating it be worth the possible tradeoff of having to sacrifice some combat forces? These are questions for analysts to address and

decision-makers to contemplate.

SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 37
The issue of force-design is no less important. Even if the U.S. military possess enough S&R forces in aggregate, it can fail to perform key S&R

missions if these forces do not possess the proper assets and capabilities. S&R

missions typically require that a number of different tasks be performed.

The U.S. forces deployed must have enough assets in each category to perform all of these tasks at the required level of intensity. S&R situations,

moreover, do not come in a single mode. Indeed, they can generate a wide

range of differing force requirements. Whereas one mission might place a

premium on disarming a defeated enemy military as part of war-termination, another mission may call for controlling massive immigration and

feeding a desperate population. Still another situation might call for U.S.

forces to suppress looters, rebuild bridges and buildings, restore electrical

power and plumbing, and reconstitute a local police force. The great variety of such situations suggests that S&R forces should have a wide range of

assets, and should possess the flexible capacity to be packaged and repackaged in different ways attuned to the shifting needs at hand.

This need for flexibility and diversity can have an elevating effect on

force requirements because of the requirement for multiple modular

packages, each of which itself must be sized for adequacy. For example, the

U.S. military must possess enough military police, construction engineers,

and civil affairs experts. The act of adding up potential needs in each of

these categories can elevate total force requirements above what normally

might seem adequate. In any event, a more fundamental truth applies: The

United States likely will be better off with a medium-size S&R posture that

has a sensible internal mix of assets than with a large S&R posture that

lacks the necessary array of diverse, well-prepared, and properly balanced

assets. The bottom line is that effective force sizing and force design both

matter in equally important ways that affect each other. If they are to be

performed properly, both require well-construed analytical standards of

the sort that an appraisal of potential scenarios can help bring to life.

Strategic Sources of S&R Scenarios

S&R scenarios may gain frequency owing to changes taking place in

global security and economic affairs. As many observers have noted, globalization and other information-era dynamics are altering the modern

world and creating fast-paced transformations toward unclear destinations. A decade ago, a common hope was that an era of growing prosperity

and tranquility lay ahead, but the post-Cold War world has proven to be

chaotic and dangerous in surprising ways. The result has been a growing

38
number of situations requiring the use of U.S. military forces. Today’s

world can be divided into three separate zones, as visualized in figure 4.

The first zone is the “democratic core,” which includes the wealthy

democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia plus parts of Latin

America. For the most part, this zone is not only democratic, but also

prosperous and secure. Composed of about 1.8 billion people and possessing about 70 percent of the world’s wealth, this zone is a major beneficiary of globalization, new-era regional security affairs, and other positive

trends. The second zone is the “transitional zone.” Numbering over 2 billion people, this zone includes China, India, Russia, and other key parts of

Central Asia and Asia. While this zone is not wealthy or fully democratic,

many of its countries are making steady progress toward prosperous market economies and representative governments.

SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 39

Figure 4. Today’s World

Democratic

Core

Transitional

Zone

Focus of

S&R

Missions

Outlying Endangered Zone:

Failing States and Ethnic

Rivalries,

Rogue States, Tyrants,

Terrorists, and WMD

Proliferators
The third zone is the outlying “endangered zone,” which is profiting

from neither globalization nor new-era security affairs. Straddling the

“southern strategic arc of instability” from the Balkans to the East Asia littoral, this zone includes much of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, North

Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa plus pockets of instability elsewhere. It totals about 2 billion people. While countries and regions there differ appreciably from each other, they have in common great chaos, turbulence, and

instability. Many countries there pose no military threats to their neighbors, but this zone houses most of today’s failing states, ethnic rivalries,

rogue states, tyrants, terrorists and WMD proliferators. Future S&R scenarios come from this zone.

Preliminary Insights from Twelve Illustrative Scenarios

Obviously the continuing occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan,

which could last for some time, will have implications for U.S. force needs

in the S&R arena. But other contingencies also could erupt as the future unfolds. Total requirements for S&R forces will depend upon decisions regarding whether and to what degree the United States should be prepared

for simultaneous contingencies. But in equally important ways, they also

will depend upon the requirements posed by individual contingencies. Scenario analysis can help shed insights on such demands. The twelve scenarios considered here include S&R missions in the Middle East (Iran, Syria,

and Yemen), Asia (North Korea and Indonesia), South Asia (Pakistan), the

Caucasus (Georgia), North Africa (Libya), Sub-Saharan Africa (Liberia and

Sudan), and Latin America (Colombia and Cuba). These are not the only

countries that could be considered, but they form a representative sample

of the total. Key features of these countries are noted in table 2.

By comparison, Iraq has 22 million people, a per capita income

(PCI) of about $2,500, a desert climate, and 375,000 troops under arms.

Afghanistan has 23 million people, and Bosnia about 4 million people. At

its peak, the operation in Bosnia required commitment of approximately

20,000 U.S. personnel, supplemented by 40,000 troops from our NATO allies. Over time, it settled down to become a brigade-size operation for the

United States. Iraq turned out to be a large S&R operation. But it is a country of only 22 million, and if a special S&R force had been deployed there,

it likely would be division-size. For these reasons, Iraq is best interpreted

as a medium-size S&R operation: for example, smaller than what could be

needed in Iran or other large countries.

S&R scenarios in these countries are purely hypothetical and have

been chosen to illustrate the wide range of geographic diversity and unique

40
characteristics that would be encountered. While Syria and Yemen are

smaller than Iraq, Iran is three times as populous. Its combination of a large

population and an Islamic culture could make an S&R mission there highly

demanding. An S&R mission in North Korea, after state failure, presumably

would be aided by South Korean troops, yet would be demanding for reasons of its own: a large military to be disarmed, a destitute economy, and a

stultified society. An intervention in Indonesia most likely would be conducted for humanitarian purposes at the request of the government, but

could encounter local resistance, and the large size of the population could

create sizable demands on S&R forces if large portions of the country required American assistance. An S&R mission in Pakistan presumably

would be a byproduct of chaos caused by collapse of governmental control

or an outgrowth of an Indo-Pakistani war.

An S&R mission in Georgia—a small country—is a surrogate for a

larger number of scenarios that could take place in the Caucasus or Central Asia. For Africa, Liberia serves as a surrogate for S&R scenarios in a

number of small West African countries that can be accessed by the sea. By

contrast, Sudan is an East African country that is far harder to access, and

it has more people than Iraq. In the western hemisphere, the scenarios of

SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 41

Table 2. Key Country Characteristics

Population Per Capita Military

Country (millions) Income Terrain Personnel

Colombia 48 $6,200 Jungle/Mountains 158,000

Cuba 11 2,600 Mixed 35,000

Georgia 5 5,300 Mountains/Plains 17,000

Indonesia 216 4,000 Jungle/Forests 300,000

Iran 68 7,400 Desert 325,000

Liberia 3 600 Jungle 11,000

Libya 6 6,200 Desert 76,000

North Korea 24 1,000 Mountains/Plains 1,000,000

Pakistan 162 2,400 Desert 620,000

Sudan 30 1,700 Desert 112,000

Syria 16 7,000 Desert 215,000

Yemen 19 1,500 Desert 50,000
S&R missions in Colombia and Cuba presumably would occur for different reasons. Intervention in Colombia, a large country of 48 million, presumably would be an outgrowth of drug-trafficking issues and at the request of the Colombian government. A Cuban S&R mission might take

place if the communist government collapses.

The exact degree of difficulty encountered by U.S. forces is a variable,

not a constant, and would depend upon the situation of the moment. S&R

missions in Islamic countries (that is, seven of the countries on this list)

could be quite difficult for reasons of culture and religion alone. Interventions in small countries outside the Middle East (for example, Georgia or

Colombia) could be easier because the culture is more receptive to Western values. Intervention in a chaotic Pakistan could be extremely difficult.

But even this scenario would be less demanding than two much larger scenarios not considered here because they are so implausible: a big S&R mission in South Asia after an Indo-Pakistan nuclear war, or an S&R mission

in China. In any event, none of these scenarios would be pushovers: all

would require serious force preparations.

The countries range in size: three are large, five are medium-size, and

four are small. Their economies are mostly poor, but vary from Middle

Eastern countries with PCIs of $6,000 or so to poverty-stricken countries

with PCIs of $2,000 or less. Their terrain conditions also vary greatly,

ranging from deserts to jungles, with few offering established infrastructures of roads and rail similar to Europe. Their military forces also vary

considerably in size, but North Korea aside, none are modern powerhouses. Yet most of them possess ample weapons and trained military people to carry out guerilla warfare against U.S. forces.

Thus, a key judgment advanced here is that there is no standard model

of an S&R scenario upon which to base U.S. force planning. Instead, U.S.

force plans will need to consider a wide spectrum of scenarios that vary

greatly in the environments that they create. Moreover, there is no standard model of how an S&R scenario might unfold in its operational characteristics. In each of these countries, an S&R mission could range from a

relatively short and simple enterprise to one that is long and difficult.

Much would depend upon the situation that gave rise to war and intervention and on the political-military conditions when U.S. S&R forces arrive. For example, it is possible to imagine U.S. forces intervening in Cuba

to restore order following collapse of Castro’s government, and being welcomed as liberators. It also is possible to imagine U.S. forces encountering

a hotly unstable situation and being treated as hated invaders. The same

42
applies to most of these countries. This observation reinforces the judgment that U.S. forces for S&R missions should be highly flexible and

adaptable, capable of handling a broad spectrum of challenges and operating environments. The United States should not only be prepared for

S&R missions in a wide variety of countries of differing sizes and conditions, but should also be prepared to intervene in each country in a variety of different ways, depending upon the conditions of the moment.

Together, these scenarios suggest that requirements are heavily a function of two primary variables: 1) The magnitude of the S&R operation that

must be mounted, which is largely determined by the size of the country being

occupied, and 2) The difficulties encountered in carrying out the operation.

As figure 5 shows, targeted countries come in small, medium, and large

sizes. Likewise, operations can be easy, or moderately difficult, or very difficult. Force requirements will grow as the size of the country and the difficulty of occupying it increase. Conversely, the capability of any given

posture will decline as the degree of difficulty grows. The distance between

requirements and capabilities measures a gap in U.S. preparations.

Operating conditions can vary widely not only from country to

country, but within a single country. Operating conditions among and

within many countries are products of multiple contributing variables

SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 43

Figure 5. Key Determinants of Force Requirements for S&R Missions

Force capability

Force requirements

Gap in capabilities

versus requirements Size of Country

Very

Difficult

Operating Conditions

Moderately

Difficult

Large

Medium

Small

Easy
that interact. Their effect is to reinforce the judgment that operating conditions can vary across a wide spectrum:

The characteristics of the country can matter. An occupied country

with a prosperous economy, an integrated society, and a functioning administrative structure will be easier to stabilize and reconstruct than a

country that is poverty-stricken, socially chaotic, and poorly governed.

Likewise, a country that has been only moderately damaged by the war will

be easier to handle than a country that has been badly damaged. A well-off

country will require fewer U.S. forces than a weak, destroyed country.

The degree to which peace and security already exist also matters. A

country that is already peaceful and accepting of U.S. occupation will be

easier to handle than a country in which wartime fighting is ongoing, antiAmerican violence is endemic, and the entire population faces fears about

safety and security. Ethnic strife is a key factor determining security. If ethnic groups or rival factions are waging war against each other, this will create very difficult conditions for U.S. forces. A secure setting reduces U.S.

force requirements; an insecure setting elevates them.

The ambitiousness of U.S. goals is a key consideration. An S&R operation can be relatively easy to carry out if U.S. goals are modest: for example, only to restore peace and a functioning government. But if the goal is

to reconstruct a badly damaged economy and to replace authoritarian rule

with a functioning democracy, the S&R mission can be considerably more

demanding. The more ambitious the U.S. goals, the greater will be S&R

force requirements.

The nature of the S&R tasks to be performed is important. One security

task is to disarm an enemy military and take possession of WMD; another

is to suppress local opposition and guerilla attacks; a third is to establish

policing and law-enforcement functions. Economic tasks include rebuilding damaged roads, rail lines, bridges, buildings and telecommunications;

restoring electrical power grids, health services, and sewage; and creating

the conditions under which markets can function in ways that permit a

country-wide flow of goods and services. Political tasks include dismantling authoritarian institutions, restoring normal administrative functions

(such as schools, welfare payments, and public information), writing a

new constitution, organizing elections, and creating new or reconfigured

government departments. As the number of tasks to be performed grows,

and as the demanding nature of each of them rises, U.S. force requirements also grow.

44
The nature of the terrain and communications infrastructure matter in

the force calculus. Desert climates with existing roads (for example, Iraq)

mean that U.S. military forces can travel by truck and other ground vehicles. Jungle terrain (for example, Colombia) with few roads means that

U.S. forces will need to use helicopters and boats on rivers. This has implications for the type of S&R forces deployed to a country, especially the

need for military aviation units.

The presence or absence of competent allies is a key consideration.

When competent allied military forces are deployed to perform S&R

functions, U.S. force requirements decrease. Also important is whether

the occupied country’s own military forces can be used for S&R missions.

After the United States occupied Iraq, it promptly dissolved the professional Iraqi Army. The decision was made necessary by exigent circumstances, but it meant that units of that army could not be used in the S&R

mission. The same applied to Iraqi police forces, which dissolved on their

own. The effect was to confront the United States with a lengthy process

of rebuilding.

Accompaniment by U.S. combat forces may be necessary. If sizable

combat forces are present, they can perform key security functions. If not,

S&R forces will have to perform them, thereby elevating requirements. The

duration of the intervention is a key factor in determining U.S. force requirements. A brief occupation of three to six months can be performed by the

forces sent in the initial stages. But longer durations are the rule and will

require rotation of forces by individual or unit replacement policies. A

two-year occupation, for example, could require rotating forces fully four

times. Some units might have to deploy to the country twice.

Other variables can enter the equation directly or indirectly. These factors include: the motivations of neighboring states, the presence or absence

of internal ethnic or tribal conflict, local attitudes toward the U.S. military,

and the presence or absence of strategic consent to the S&R process. These

variables can make an S&R operation either more or less difficult.

Using Decision Trees to Gauge Force Requirements

Requirements for S&R missions thus must take into account the

unique features of each individual country. Because so many variables must

be considered, moreover, the act of gauging force requirements is not an exercise in single-point calculations. For any single country, requirements

could range across a wide spectrum depending upon the situation encountered. Decision trees that employ branches and sequels can help scope the

range of potential requirements. Figure 6, for example, employs one chance

SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 45
node (the degree of difficulty facing the operation) and one decision node

(ambitiousness of U.S. goals and multiplicity of S&R tasks) to display nine

different branches, and a resulting range of requirements from 2,000 to

20,000 troops.

An analysis of potential requirements for all twelve countries could

get quite complicated. It could require filling in fully 108 cells of a matrix

(twelve countries multiplied by nine branches for each country). Once requirements for individual countries are calculated, multiple contingencies

must then be considered. For these twelve countries, two concurrent contingencies could occur in fully 132 different ways, and three contingencies

could happen in 1,320 ways.

Complex, full-spectrum calculations of this sort are best left to the

Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders. Some simplifying observations,

however, can be offered. Figure 7 provides an initial best-estimate portrayal of the size and likely conditions for each scenario. Together, these

scenarios cover the strategic space with clustering in the middle: mediumsized countries presenting moderately difficult or worse conditions.

As a general rule, concurrent S&R contingencies are likely to come in

varying doses, requiring either a brigade-size S&R team of joint forces

46

Figure 6: Illustrative Decision Tree for S&R Requirements

Chance Node Decision Node

O O

O

O

U.S. S&R Troops Needed

20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

5,000

2,000
(4,000–5,000 troops) for a small contingency in moderately difficult conditions, or a division-size team (12,000–15,000) for a medium-size contingency, or two division-equivalents (20,000–30,000) for a large contingency, or a full corps of three to four divisions (45,000–90,000) for a very

large contingency. Using these planning factors, table 3 shows how aggregate force requirements for multiple contingencies can vary greatly as a

function of the number of contingencies and the characteristics of each.

SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 47

Figure 7: Distribution of Size and Likely Conditions for Scenarios

Indonesia Pakistan

Iran

Colombia

Sudan

North Korea Yemen

Libya Cuba Georgia Liberia Size of Country

Very

Difficult

Degree of Difficulty

Moderately

Difficult

Large

Medium

Small

Easy

Table 3: Dedicated S&R Force Requirements for Multiple

Contingencies (Illustrative)

Contingency Personnel Requirements

Two small contingencies 5,000 + 5,000 = 10,000

Three small contingencies 5,000 + 5,000 + 5,000 = 15,000

One small, one medium contingency 5,000 + 15,000 = 20,000

Two medium contingencies 15,000 + 15,000 = 30,000

One small, two medium contingencies 5,000 +15,000 + 15,000 = 35,000

One medium, one large contingency 15,000 + 30,000 = 45,000

Two large contingencies 30,000 + 30,000 = 60,000

Two very large contingencies 60,000 + 60,000 = 120,000
Employing Force Structure Options to Gauge Capabilities

A simplified approach to gauging requirements and priorities is first

to identify a spectrum of options for S&R force-sizing, then to determine

what aggregate capabilities each option would provide, and then to offer

judgments about the level of confidence that each option would provide.

While all options should be posed in terms of joint forces involving some

air and naval assets, most S&R missions will be dominated by ground

forces (Army and Marine Corps). The following four options employ

ground units as the measure of merit to arrive at aggregate capabilities:

■ Brigade-size S&R Force: Can handle one small contingency.

■ Division-size Force: One medium event or three small events.

■ Two division-equivalents: One large event, or two medium events.

■ Corps of 3–4 division-equivalents: One very large event or two

large events.

Given the complexity of the subject, it is impossible to judge any of

these options adequate or inadequate. What these options provide are ascending levels of capability, and thus a growing capacity to cover the

“strategic space” of potential requirements. Figure 8 helps illuminate this

relationship by showing, illustratively, how much coverage of strategic

space is provided by each option. The force performance line measures

the capability of each option; above the line is a remaining zone of risk,

which shrinks as the postures grow larger. In essence, all options leave a

measure of risk, but progressively bigger options enlarge the coverage of

strategic requirements and reduce the remaining risk.

For example, if the U.S. military can field a single S&R divisionequivalent, as opposed to one brigade, this will enlarge its capacity to cover

the strategic space by providing a capacity to handle a single medium-size

contingency at moderate difficulty (for example, Iraq) or a number of

smaller events. By comparison, a second division-equivalent would further

enlarge the zone of coverage by providing a capacity to handle two

medium-size events at moderate difficulty (see dashed lines to this force

and associated capability). Two division-equivalents would ensure that

U.S. capabilities could not be overpowered by concurrent contingencies. A

corps-size force of three to four division-equivalents would yield greater

coverage: for example, the capacity to handle three medium-size (with

three division-equivalents) or two large events (with division-equivalents). The result is an even smaller zone of risk. The central issue is this:

how much confidence does the United States want in its S&R forces? How

much of a price in money and manpower is it willing to pay? How much

48
risk is it willing to run in order to avoid the opportunity cost of investing

in ever-larger S&R forces? 

How do these options stack up in terms of national defense priorities? The circled area on the chart helps answer this question by suggesting

a program target for DOD planning that focuses on concurrent contingencies and moderately difficult conditions. In this context, a brigade-size

force is a bare minimum but will be too small if tomorrow’s world is as

turbulent as today’s. A corps-size force is close to ideal, but may be more

than the traffic will bear. A two division-equivalent force would provide a

solid range of capabilities and a relatively high level of insurance, including a capacity for medium S&R missions following two MTWs. A force of

one division-equivalent could handle a single MTW under moderately demanding conditions and would provide moderate insurance.

The bottom line is this: if the traffic will bear two division-equivalent

S&R commands, fine. If not, one division-equivalent S&R command is a

good place to start. Major new capabilities are not created overnight, but

instead evolve in phases. DOD could start by seeking to create a brigadesize S&R force quickly in the near-term, then field a full S&R command

within the Future Years Defense Plan or sooner. In the longer term, it could

SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 49

Figure 8: How Options Meet the Strategic Space of Requirements

Force Performance Line

Zone of Risk

Program Target

4 Divisions

3 Divisions

2 Divisions

1 Division

1 Brigade Number and Size of Contingencies

Very

Difficult

Difficulty of Operations

Moderately

Difficult

2 Large and

1 Medium

2 Large

1 Large and

1 Medium

1 Large or

2 Medium

1 Medium

Easy
field a second S&R command if the initial effort proved successful, requirements remained high, and the necessary resources were available.

Designing S&R Capabilities 

Because future contingencies could impose such a diverse array of

conditions and unique requirements for capabilities, U.S. forces should

have a diverse set of assets capable of performing a wide variety of S&R

functions. They should also be modular, flexible, and adaptable so that

they can be combined and recombined to create different packages tailored to each situation. While creating such forces is a complicated task

that requires detailed planning, table 4 illustrates a notional S&R command that would provide a healthy portfolio of assets for most situations.

It contains some combat forces (a Stryker brigade augmented with an attack helicopter battalion) for demanding security tasks. The core forces for

the S&R mission are four battalions of military police, construction engineers, civil affairs, medical support, psychological operations, and other

assets that commonly are needed for S&R tasks. Total manpower for the

S&R forces of the command would be about 11,300 personnel, but combat and logistics combat service support (CSS) assets could elevate the

total deployed force to more than 18,000 personnel. This is merely one

idea to be taken as a reference point in designing future S&R structures,

but it is suggestive of the type of capabilities that often will be needed.

Such an S&R joint command might be organized into three or four

brigade-size task forces for S&R missions, a combat brigade, and divisional-level CSS assets. Its S&R brigades could be detached to assist combat divisions or be kept under the S&R command. The command and its

brigade-size sub-elements would be equipped with employment concepts

tailored to the goals and operations of the S&R mission. A main advantage

of this S&R command is that it could perform demanding S&R missions

at far less manpower than a force of combat formations that would lack

the appropriate numbers and combinations of S&R units. This S&R command is a natural complement to transformed Army forces that focus on

high-tech strike operations in expeditionary warfare and whose lean support structures may lack some traditional CSS assets.

Two S&R joint commands not only would double the total assets for

S&R missions, they would create additional flexibility and adaptability for

tailored commitments. For example, a scenario might call for commitment of only one S&R command, but with six construction engineer battalions. The relevant engineer battalion from the second command could

be cross-attached to the first S&R command. Such flexibility would apply

50
across-the-board for all specific capabilities. A second S&R command also

would provide a rotational base when one command is deployed. These

S&R commands would be manned mostly by Army troops, but, to the extent they are joint, the Marines could contribute sizable numbers, and the

Navy and Air Force could contribute in niche areas. Joint formations, of

course, would help add further flexibility and adaptability to S&R forces.

If only one command is deployed, a strong case can be made for

having it entirely or mostly composed of active-duty troops in order to

ensure prompt deployability. If a second command is deployed, consideration can be given to have it partly structured with RC forces. What

should be avoided, however, is an RC S&R command of low readiness,

similar to that of today’s National Guard combat divisions. A cadred approach to the second S&R command might provide a workable solution.

SCENARIOS FOR FORCE SIZING 51

Table 4: An Illustrative S&R Joint Command

Manpower 

Units Manpower (w/o combat, CSS)

Headquarters (all) 725 725

Notional TFC: Stryker Brigade w/Atk Helo 3,937 –

Military Police Battalions (4) 2,164 2,164

Civil Affairs Battalions (4) 584 584

Construction Engineer Battalions (4) 2,692 2,692

Area Medical Battalions (4) 1,442 1,442

PSYOP Battalions (4) 1,000 1,000

ISR Battalion 421 421

Communications Battalion 454 454

Combat Aviation Battalion 315 315

Medium Truck Battalion 517 517

EOD Battalion 100 100

Chem/Bio Company 175 175

Training and Security Assistance Battalion 500 500

Special Forces Battalion (OPCON) 225 225

Support Command (S&S/Maint/Trans/Ord) 2,959 –

Totals 18,210 11,314
For example, 33 percent of its personnel could be active-duty, the other

67 percent, reserve component, but trained at high readiness and legally

capable of being called to active duty and deployed quickly. A better

model, of course, would be 67 percent active and only 33 percent reserve.

But this may be more than the traffic will bear. Regardless of the exact

AC/RC mix chosen, the Army’s two fill-out divisions (7th and 24th) could

provide active-duty headquarters and developable foundations for one or

two S&R commands. The effect would be to elevate the Army to eleven to

twelve active division-equivalents: ten combat divisions and one to two

S&R commands.

How can such S&R assets be created? While some S&R assets that do

not now exist would have to be created, many relevant assets already exist

in the Army. Reorganization and reassignment of those assets could help

meet emerging S&R requirements. In today's active Army, many of these

units are standard issue in varying amounts to the ten active divisions and

four corps. If some assets could be transferred from their parent units,

they could be assigned to S&R commands. Whether such a transfer (up to

20 percent of existing assets) can safely take place without unduly damaging the combat readiness of the parent unit is unclear. If this step is prohibited, reserve component formations are an obvious source of assets:

Army reserve CS/CSS units and Guard divisions possess sizable numbers

of these units. But would they possess adequate readiness? If not, they

may have to receive added funds for extra training and equipment, or

even be transferred to the active structure, a step that would require funds

and manpower.

Conclusion

● DOD needs stronger S&R forces, but it also needs analytical standards for determining their size and design.

● Scenario analysis suggests that multiple, different S&R contingencies could occur in future years in all regions and can vary greatly in size

and difficulty.

● S&R forces for one medium-size contingency similar to Iraq likely

will not be enough. Bigger contingencies than Iraq could occur. Also, multiple contingencies could occur—in fact, are occurring now.

52
Chapter 4

Organizing for Stabilization

and Reconstruction

This chapter describes how DOD can organize to plan and train for

stabilization and reconstruction operations to ensure they begin

promptly as U.S. forces rout or destroy enemy military capacity.

The resultant capability will fill a gap in post-conflict operations that is

critical to the new U.S. strategy of preemption and rapid decisive operations. The following proposal builds on the preceding chapters that described past U.S. S&R operations and projected operations that U.S. forces

could face in the future.

Under its new transformed strategy, the United States will employ

smaller joint force packages equipped with advanced technology weaponry and organized for combat operations that lead to rapid defeat of

enemy forces. However, this strategy results in far fewer forces in theater

for the critical, labor-intensive business of post-conflict stabilization. To

ensure a smooth—ideally, rolling—transition to stabilization and reconstruction, the United States needs to have better capabilities to plan and

conduct comprehensive post-conflict operations concurrent with the new

style of combat operations. The two operations, combat and post-conflict,

are equally important to strategic victory and must be closely integrated,

especially in terms of planning, exercising, and adequate resource allocation. In order to execute the post-conflict plan successfully, combatant

commanders need a new capability embodied in another joint force

specifically tailored and equipped with the requisite technologies to succeed at post-conflict operations.

Background

Recent U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by rapid success in deposing the enemy’s standing military forces.

53
However, in both theaters U.S. combat forces were required to pursue substantial enemy forces that remained at large at significant cost in terms of

local and regional stability. In both cases, a relatively modest-size force,

backed by the latest military technology, gained dominant battlefield

knowledge and defeated the enemy by bringing lethal firepower to bear

promptly on high leverage targets. But when the enemy dispersed, the deployed U.S. force was not prepared to prevent widespread looting, lawlessness, and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, particularly in Iraq.

Failure to establish area security concurrent with destruction of enemy

control set back plans to restore essential services and emboldened opponents of U.S. occupation.

Current doctrine calls for combat commands to turn to S&R operations once combat operations have subsided. Even in Iraq, S&R operations

are performed by combat units augmented with additional civil affairs, military police, engineers, medical, and other critical capabilities. However,

these capabilities are brought to the fore only after combat missions are on

the ebb or over. That clear-cut operational sequence worked in conflicts

that progressed less rapidly and where a much larger force was employed

and available for stabilization as combat subsided. It does not work today,

because the S&R task has become more critical and the forces and time

available to execute it are much constrained.

The requirement to master post-conflict operations, to provide

stability, and lay the groundwork for reconstruction of a defeated country, calls for transforming how we organize, plan, and conduct S&R operations. They cannot be deferred until combat operations have been

concluded. Plans to defeat the enemy and to initiate S&R operations must

be addressed simultaneously as interdependent parts of the overall campaign. Demarcating between combat and post-conflict phases does not

reflect what takes place on the ground, where both capabilities are needed

simultaneously. The combatant commander needs a distinct post-conflict

planning and executing capability, organized to plan and conduct S&R

operations alongside combat forces. That organization should be composed of S&R capabilities and not be part of a combat corps or division.

It should be a brigade- or division-size unit capable of planning, developing doctrine, and exercising. It should have some combat power so that

it can operate autonomously in a post-conflict environment marked by

residual, low-level hostilities.

54
Discussion

The doctrine of relying on combat units for S&R operations as they

complete their combat missions served us well in the past, but for rapid

decisive operations it is an unsatisfactorily sequential and largely ad hoc

approach, too disconnected from combat operations. Combatant commands need a dedicated command, tailored specifically for post-conflict

operations, that is readily deployable and available for planning, training

and exercising. The operational concept for such a force would be to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently with combat units, moving in to establish control and security as combat units

move forward, foreclosing the emergence of lawlessness and anarchy. The

most ready forces should be in the active component to overcome the

longer lead times required to mobilize and deploy reserve component

units. Organizing such a force should not be a major end strength issue, as

almost all the capabilities required are present within the existing force

structures, either active or reserve.

The new force should be joint. All services have some of the required

capabilities in their force structure. However, most of the assets are in the

Army, and in some deployment schemes all the elements could be Army.

Still, it would be neither practical nor wise to place the entire post-conflict

stabilization and reconstruction mission on the Army. In light of the longterm rotational requirements, it will be imperative to draw on the resources of all services.

Ideally the new command would be co-located on a single base so

that it could engage in frequent integrated training and develop strong, cohesive capabilities. This may be a long-term goal given the cost of relocation. However, to the extent possible, the brigade- or division-level joint

command should be located as close as possible to its initial ready forces,

and at least one integrated subordinate command should be located close

to the joint command.

The proposal is for a flexible but standing high readiness joint force

of modular design that is scalable and addresses two key transformational

imperatives:

■ Integration from the outset of planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations into exercise plans and war plans.

■ Ensuring that the requisite forces are in place to initiate stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently with the collapse

of enemy authority in any locale, a concept we call “rolling stabilization.”

ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 55
Based on the analysis in previous chapters, two S&R Joint Command

(JCOM) forces should be organized to conduct core stabilization and reconstruction operations across a theater of operations. One would be

composed primarily of active component (AC) units. The second would

be in the Reserve componens (RC), but with an active headquarters and

active key cadre at the next lower commands (S&R Group).

The S&R JCOM would not require permanently assigned sub-units

(at least not initially), except for its immediate subordinate S&R Group

headquarters and its special staff. However, specific battalion-equivalent

units of each type would be designated as S&R units by priority mission

and in operational plans (OPLANS) and must be ready for immediate deployment. Additional units from all services would participate in subsequent rotations and be maintained at appropriate readiness levels for

S&R missions.

Two Alternative Models

The S&R JCOM could be designed in either of two ways. The first design focuses on theaters where U.S. forces are already present as a result of

U.S. combat operations. In such theaters a mature logistics support system

and a large number of U.S. combat forces would be in place as the operational-strategic context for post-conflict operations. An S&R JCOM designed for these scenarios would be tailored to current doctrinal methods of

logistics support and security protection for rear area operations. That

means that the S&R JCOM would rely primarily on external area logistics

support, as other non-combat forces do. It could also be given operational

control of a modest-size combat force provided by the combatant command, should security remain a concern. This would be typical of deployment following combat operations similar to those in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The second design relates to S&R operations in theaters where U.S.

forces are not deployed, as in the case of Haiti in 1994. The S&R JCOM

would require its own tailored logistics and combat capability, similar to a

combat division, but needing no more than a brigade-size combat force

within its organic structure. Unlike other non-combat units, this force

would not rely on area support logistics or require attachment of combat

forces from the combatant commander, in most situations.

Other factors also bear on which design is appropriate to the particular situation.

Logistical support for the S&R JCOM is a special consideration.

Should it be like a combat division with its own organic support command,

or like a non-combat unit, plugging into area support groups positioned

56
across the area of operations? Including organic logistics would make the

command less of a burden on the host combat unit. It also would allow

more freedom of action in situations where area support is sparse or unreliable. However, adding a logistics command to the S&R JCOM design significantly increases strength requirements (a typical division support command is almost 3,000), adds cost, increases lift requirements, and slows

deployment times. Moreover, with many other units still reliant on area

support, no economy of effort would be realized by investing in a support

command for the S&R JCOM.

The Army will also have to decide whether combat forces should be

organic to the S&R JCOM. A full brigade of approximately 3,500 may be

required only when deploying as a separate task force, yet having some organic force always available may be wise. Current doctrine calls for a Tactical Combat Force (TCF) to be to placed (usually under operational control or OPCON) with rear area commands only as required and sized

appropriately to the mission. In most scenarios the JCOM can expect to

have a combat force readily available from in-theater forces. Such a force

would be provided to the JCOM by the combatant commander as necessary. If the JCOM has its own TCF it need not worry about availability or

responsiveness. However, like the support command, a TCF will increase

the JCOM’s cost and deployment times. Perhaps a larger issue will be the

steady diversion of staff and commander from S&R matters as the JCOM

tends to manning, training, and equipping its TCF.

The need to establish a rotation pattern is another factor in determining whether to invest in dedicated organic combat formations that are

necessary only in limited scenarios. If an S&R mission were to last a year

or more, sub-units would be subject to unit rotation within six to twelve

months. Hence, the S&R JCOM staff must be able to maintain operational

effectiveness supported by a system of rotating sub-units, including combat and logistical forces.

The S&R JCOM also must be capable of deploying as a separate Joint

Task Force to theaters where conflict has not broken out, or where conflict

between combatants other than the United States has taken place. In these

scenarios a theater support command would not be in place, and U.S. combat forces would not be present. Therefore, the S&R JCOM commander

and staff must be capable of command and control of combat operations

as well as logistics operations. When deployed as a separate task force, the

S&R JCOM would need to be augmented with a combat force as well as a

tailored Area Support Group. The responsible combatant commander

ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 57
would provide both these assets under current Joint doctrine. The Tactical

Combat Force (TCF) included in the task force could be a Marine or Army

ground force, or a joint-combined force, supported by Navy and Air Force

firepower and all-service special operations forces.

In a combat theater where American forces are present, they would

still engage in S&R operations as they do now. Combat forces would provide security and continue combat operations while coordinating S&R operations with S&R JCOM operations within their areas of operation. This

could be through direct interface as well as by coordination at the combatant command or Combined Force Land Component Command

(CFLCC) level. Although combat forces focus first on combat operations

and the S&R JCOM on stabilization and reconstruction operations, they

would work in tandem, especially as combat operations begin to subside

and stabilization and reconstruction becomes the primary goal. Ultimately, S&R JCOM operations should emerge as the main effort, allowing

for earlier redeployment of combat forces.

A notional organization of an S&R JCOM is at figure 10. As the diagram illustrates, the command could deploy with up to four multi-capable S&R Groups and other specialized units. Although scalable, the notional size of the S&R JCOMs would be approximately 11,300 personnel,

not including combat forces or support units that would be attached for

independent operations as a separately deployed S&R Joint Task Force. In

such scenarios the overall S&R force could be as high as 18,200.

S&R JCOM Characteristics

The main characteristics that the proposed S&R JCOM organization

adds to U.S. capabilities are:

■ Modular in design; scalable in size

■ Tailorable to mission requirements

■ Digital in C4ISR

■ Capable of controlling limited combat operations

■ Joint and potentially multinational

■ Trained in regional and linguistic expertise

■ Embedded with interagency, civil-military, and contractor capabilities

■ Responsible to combatant commands for peacetime planning and

exercises

■ Organized for functionally integrated S&R operations

■ Capable of C2 over independent theater operations

58
The active component S&R JCOM must achieve and sustain a readiness posture equivalent to early-deploying combat forces. The RC S&R

JCOM should be deployable within three months of mobilization. The RC

command could relieve the AC command on a planned rotation cycle or

be employed in a second contingency operation. These requirements justify an AC headquarters for the RC S&R JCOM as well as an active cadre

in S&R Group command and staff positions.

Most subordinate S&R units exist in the active and reserve components of the services but must be mission designated and ready to deploy.

These units will have other missions as well (most units do); however, when

required for training, exercises, or operations, the S&R mission must have

priority. As sub-units rotate, the S&R Group headquarters provides for

continuity of operations and the integration of efforts across all S&R functions—MPs, CA, medical, engineers, information operations, and other

areas. All services, especially the Army, must review mission requirements

of existing units and determine if additional units are required in the active

structure to meet the S&R requirement. In most cases, current forces

should be adequate; these same units are performing the S&R mission in

Iraq today, albeit under an ad hoc concept of operations belatedly executed.

However, some rebalancing to the AC–RC mix would be necessary.

ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 59

Figure 9: S&R Joint Command Organization

XX

(OPCON)

SUPPORT

COMMAND

TRANS

Mortuary

Chem/Bio

SF

AREA

SUPP BN

TCF

RECON

ARTY

ATK HELO

DS BN

MANEUVER

TRNG &

SEC ASST

CS AVN

COMM

(Digital Bridge)

ISR

MEDIUM

TRUCK

EOD

CA

ENG

MED

PSYOP

CA

ENG

MED

PSYOP

CA

ENG

MED

PSYOP

CA

ENG

MED

PSYOP

Joint

S&R GRP

MP MP MP MP

Joint

S&R GRP

Joint

S&R GRP

Joint

S&R GRP

SSE TM S&R JCOM Civil-Military Action Cell (C HQ Special Staff –MAC)
The S&R JCOM is responsible for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations in coordination with the regional combatant commands, CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM.

One S&R JCOM has a representative team embedded at each combatant

commander’s headquarters. This team participates in contingency planning

and provides the combatant commander’s staff with information on the capabilities and availability of forces for S&R operations. The team feeds back

information on requirements to its home headquarters. Subordinate Joint

S&R Groups specialize in a particular region and sustain skills in a secondary region to give the JCOM added employment flexibility.

During exercises or preparation for operations, the S&R JCOM commander supports the combatant commander and staff in the development

of war plans. He augments his planning team at the combatant command

headquarters and participates fully in OPLAN development. He consults

the combatant commander on tailoring the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) or other deployment plans so that S&R forces arrive in

theater as needed to fit the combatant commander’s overall plan.

The S&R JCOM commander deploys with the combatant commander

to the theater of operations with appropriate staff. He is responsible to the

combatant commander for employment of Joint S&R Groups or allocation

of Groups to subordinate combat commands of the CFLCC, usually at the

Army division or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level. He also ensures

continuous S&R planning, civil-military interface, force debarkation, acclimatization, operational readiness, coordination with support and security

forces, and ultimate employment of S&R Groups. In short, the S&R JCOM

commander wears a second hat as the principal advisor on stabilization and

reconstruction to the combatant commander, as well as his primary responsibilities as overall commander of S&R forces in theater and source of theater-wide S&R plans. The responsibilities that fall to this joint headquarters

require that the commander be a general/flag officer, depending on the force

composition and theater, of one to three-star rank.

The S&R JCOM headquarters develops joint and combined doctrine and training standards and is responsible for the training, manning,

and readiness of the force. On a regular basis, the headquarters brings 

together forces from all services, both active and Reserve components, including the forces needed for initial S&R operations. In addition to interagency partners and representatives from allied militaries, and international and nongovernmental organizations, exercises should include a

mix of force capabilities:

60
■ Military Police (Combat Support, Internment/Relocation Units

and Criminal Investigators)

■ Civil Affairs

■ Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 

■ Medical

■ Engineer (Combat Support and Construction)

■ Training and Security Assistance

■ Intelligence and Surveillance

■ Transport and Support units

■ Combat forces of all services and selected Allies

■ Interagency Representatives

■ EOD and De-mining Units

■ WMD detection teams

■ Sensitive Site Exploitation teams

■ Mortuary Affairs

■ Logisticians

Stabilization and reconstruction exercises should be conducted

within the context of broader combat exercises to accustom staffs at the

theater, joint, service, and interagency levels to devoting resources to postconflict operations concurrent with the conduct of combat operations.

Regular exercises ensure that a basic S&R force capability package always

is ready to deploy as part of a contingency operation. Just as important,

they ensure that commanders and staffs at all echelons of participation

plan for and critically examine post-conflict requirements alongside combat planning.

Adjustments by Combatant Command and Joint Staffs

This concept will require some realignment of the combatant command staff. The S&R joint commander would appoint a staff representative to each of the combatant command’s principal staff to plan and coordinate S&R operational requirements. This would be particularly

important in the J-2, where the S&R command would have essential elements of information (EEI) in, for example, the area of cultural intelligence. The J-3 would be the logical staff to include the S&R commander’s

personal representative as the combatant commander’s principal advisor

for S&R operations. The broader J-5 policy focus is another area where

the S&R staff would have to invest in personnel capable of planning and

coordinating joint staff actions. Other adjustments should be considered.

ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 61
Combatant commanders and subordinate combat commanders will

also have to think differently about war planning and the integration of

S&R planners into their headquarters teams. In particular, planners will

have to accommodate the flow of troops for S&R operations within a deployment plan that typically is focused on combat forces in the opening

weeks of a deployment.

S&R JCOM Headquarters Staffs 

As depicted in figure 10, the S&R JCOM headquarters is similar to an

Army divisional echelon. Creating them, however, would not require additional divisions. As noted above, most of the required units already exist

in either the AC or the RC. Two active S&R JCOM headquarters could be

created by reconfiguring existing headquarters or activating new headquarters. One option would be to create the JCOMs by reorganizing the

Army’s two active component/Reserve integrated divisions, the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) as

S&R JCOMs; one would be a rapidly deployable active force and the other

a fully active headquarters with cadred subordinate commands.

Principal Staff. The principal staff sections of the S&R JCOM would

be doctrinal joint staff elements, J-1 through J-6 and J-SOF. The responsibilities for each section would relate to new doctrine for joint S&R operations. A crucial feature of the principal staff is that it must have the normal skills to plan and conduct multifaceted operations, including combat

operations of limited size. This means that the J-3 (Operations) staff must

include a fire support section. Moreover, all principal staffs should have officers experienced in combat operations, as well as sufficient officers specialized in all stabilization and reconstruction areas of expertise. The J-2

will have not only typical intelligence expertise but unique capabilities to

gather and analyze intelligence peculiar to S& R operations: political, ethnic, cultural, religious, social, and economic. Due to this requirement, the

J-2 staff should be larger than that of a combat command, and the intelligence battalion will have added capabilities.

Civil-Military Action Cell. The Civil-Military Actions Cell

(C–MAC) is envisioned to be especially robust. It will coordinate for the

JCOM commander with personnel from international organizations,

nongovernmental organizations, and local and national civilian governments as necessary. Even when the JCOM is not the senior U.S. military

command in theater, or when the S&R JCOM is subordinate to a U.S.

government civilian representative (for example, a U.S. ambassador), the

C–MAC responsibilities for coordinating U.S. military stabilization and

62
reconstruction support will be far-reaching, multifunctional, and continuous. The C–MAC will also coordinate with other U.S. government

agencies operating in theater, serving as the S&R link to interagency support and requirements. Interagency liaisons will be a part of the C–MAC,

except for intelligence agency liaisons, which will coordinate directly

with the J-2.

Special Staff Sections. The special staff section may be as large as

the C–MAC. Special staff representatives must include a legal counsel

staff, including international law and war crimes counselors. Another

special staff will be a Political Advisor (POLAD) section capable of advising the commander on religious and cultural issues as well as political factors. The command will also have appropriate translation technologies

and capabilities (oral and written)—not only at the JCOM level but all

the way down to front line elements. Other special staffs are those typical

of civil affairs operations, such as experts in power plant operations,

postal systems, local government administration, judicial affairs, water/

waste management, and nuclear energy, among other specialties.

A contracting office and a budgeting section will be particularly

critical to S&R JCOM mission duration. These staff sections must have

ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 63

Figure 10: S&R JCOM Headquarters

SSE

POLAD

Legal

Int l Law

Contracting

Func./Regional

Experts

Econ Advisor

Cultural Intel

Economic Intel

Social Intel

Religious Intel

CA

MP

ENG

MED

Info Ops

CBT Ops

Fire Support

COCOM Liaison

Multinational

Forces Liaisons

Local groups

Key security

Train Military

Stratigic S&R

U.S.–Local Policy

Policy

Implementation

NGO/PVO

UN/IOs

State/AID

Interagencies

Local Civil

Contractors

J-1 J-2 J-3 J-4 J-5 J-6 J-SOC

Spec. Staff S&R JCOM

XX

C-MAC
personnel, funding, and authorization to get permanent reconstruction

underway rapidly and decisively. The JCOM can reestablish only immediate and temporary services and infrastructure. Commercial contractors

accomplish permanent reconstruction of power grids, road networks,

telecommunications, and other infrastructure. For that reason the linkages and staff coordination with civilian contractors is especially crucial.

The S&R JCOM must optimize as well as expedite the employment of

civilian contractors for reconstruction. Post-conflict S&R operations

should be planned and conducted so as to initiate a handoff to civilian

agencies in charge of nation-building, commercial reconstruction operations, and local government administration (especially police and judicial

functions) as soon as possible. This handoff should mirror the handoff

that occurs between combat and S&R forces and should lead to the drawdown of the S&R force as expeditiously as possible.

Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) Team. S&R missions might involve

the search for weapons of mass destruction or the investigation of war

crimes. The SSE team will have to work closely with the command’s intelligence and security forces to locate, secure, and investigate suspect and

sensitive sites. The team includes weapons, scientific, or criminal investigators and works closely with other special units, such as Chem/Bio detection teams and military police.

S&R JCOM Sub-Units

The Four S&R Groups. The core capability of the S&R JCOM resides

in four multi-functional S&R Groups composed of: military police, civil

affairs, engineers, medical services, and information operations elements.

Commanded at the colonel or brigadier level, S&R Groups will conduct

operations in sector so as to effect stabilization and reconstruction over an

assigned area of responsibility. If that area coincides with the combat AOR

of a larger unit (for example, an Army division or Marine Corps MEF), the

S&R Group would probably be in direct support of that command. S&R

Groups are scaleable and can command all or part of any type unit, depending on the situation. For small-scale operations, an S&R Group can

be task organized to deploy by itself as an S&R Task Force.

Regional and linguistic expertise. Regional and linguistic skills are

most important for the S&R Group headquarters staffs. In addition,

translation technologies will be critical to training, and equipment investment, and readiness criterion. Each of the four subordinate S&R

Group headquarters of a JCOM will specialize in a geographical region,

similar to the practice of U.S. Army Special Forces Groups, with each S&R

64
Group being designated as having one primary and one back-up region

of expertise. Regional expertise must also be closely integrated with cultural intelligence gathering so that regional knowledge grows over time to

form a sound basis for informed planning and operations.

Group Headquarters. The Joint S&R Group HQ is organized

around the basic structure of a brigade-level headquarters staff, with primary staff sections capable of planning and executing operations for all

types of subordinate units, including logistics support, force protection,

intelligence, and personnel management. One option for organizing four

Joint S&R Group HQs from existing resources is to select an MP, Engineer, Medical and CA brigade headquarters to transform into a Joint S&R

Group HQs. This would afford the JCOM commander a senior officer in

each functional area who can advise the JCOM on matters such as training, personnel readiness, logistics, and equipment that are particular to

each function. Each Group must have integrated capabilities across all

S&R missions and functions.

Composite MP Battalion. The MP battalion is a composite battalion

consisting primarily of combat support MPs, plus some internment and

resettlement MPs. In addition, each battalion includes criminal investigation teams to deal with the potential for criminalized power structures and

organized crime.

CA Battalion. The CA battalion provides general CA expertise at the

local level, such as government administration and services plus basic infrastructure operations expertise. Although these missions are analogous

to current CA missions the battalion’s future operations will be more

closely integrated with other units and new operational concepts for CA

will be needed.

Construction Engineer Battalion. The Engineer battalion’s primary

mission is reconstruction of basic infrastructure. These missions call for

construction engineers. Combat engineers also have capabilities that could

be utilized. Engineer battalions could be composites of existing units.

Area Medical Battalion. The medical battalion is similar to a U.S.

Army Area Support Medical Battalion. Its primary missions are humanitarian assistance, indigenous emergency/first responder medical training,

food and water decontamination, and other health services.

Training and Security Assistance (TSA) Battalion. This is a new unit

concept with a unique and crucial mission: to work with local security 

authorities to rebuild the national and local police forces and to train and

operationalize a reconstituted national military. In these missions the

ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 65
TSA battalion will work closely with the SF battalion, but its tasks would

last longer. Ideally, the TSA battalion will contain a large cohort of senior

noncommissioned officers (NCOs), junior officers, and qualified police

instructors.

Combat Support Aviation and Medium Truck Battalions. These

units will afford the JCOM with the means to transport needed supplies

and equipment quickly throughout the operational area without vying for

assets needed by combat units. In theaters where U.S. forces are already deployed, resources from combat units might augment these assets. In environments where roads are poor or insecure, helicopter transportation may

have to be increased or augmented by larger medium helicopters.

Signal Communications Battalion. The model for these units is the

4th Infantry Division (Mech), the Army’s first digitized division. Its digital

communications are highly capable internally but have to communicate

with many external analog systems. The solution is to employ a “digital

bridge” automation suite to link digital and analog systems. Given the importance of the S&R mission to overall success, it is imperative that it be

built from the beginning with the most modern communications capabilities. To realize this objective the S&R JCOM will also require a digital

bridge element.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Battalion. The

ISR battalion is another unit with unique S&R missions. It should include a

counter-intelligence company and robust human intelligence (HUMINT)

resources that focus on detection and identification of resistance groups,

guerilla operations, and organized criminal elements. It will also need a

significant ground, airborne, and communications surveillance capability.

Because the operating concept for the S&R JCOM is to employ its relatively small force to maximum effectiveness, knowing where enemy elements and potential risks are emerging is crucial. Technology will offer

force multipliers in UAVs, communications intercept, and advanced unattended sensors. These systems will afford early detection of threats to

pipelines or power stations, for example, without the need for a large security force. Sophisticated all-weather cameras should also be in the battalion equipment list.

The most unique capability of the ISR battalion will be its focus on

“cultural intelligence” issues—religious, political, ethnic—as much as

overt security risks. The ISR battalion will also work closely with the MP

battalion’s criminal investigators as well as Group and JCOM staffs to analyze information in the area of criminal intelligence.

66
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Battalion. A battalion-size

EOD unit is recommended for the S&R JCOM because it may be responsible for overseeing rapid and multifaceted EOD operations. EOD teams

will work closely with other JCOM forces, especially the MPs and engineer

elements, to advise and conduct EOD operations. These will include bomb

disposal, unexploded ordnance removal, weapons collection and disposal,

and mine clearing (roads, ports, etc.) and minefield removal. In some geographical areas, such as where opening harbors is critical to reconstruction, the EOD battalion may need augmentation by Navy underwater

EOD teams.

Special Forces Battalion. An Army Special Forces battalion or comparable Marine unit should be under the operational control of the S&R

JCOM in order to develop the local situation and begin to rebuild selected

indigenous security capabilities. The SF battalion will have special cultural

and language skills that will help them embed their teams in the local population, determine their security force potential, and take steps to reestablish order. In longer-term S&R operations, the continuous inclusion of an

SF battalion in the JCOM may not be necessary.

Tactical Combat Force (TCF). When deployed as a separate joint

task force, the S&R JCOM will include a TCF to provide military security

beyond the capabilities of the assigned MP battalions. The TCF would be

tailored to the operational environment. It could be a Stryker brigade or a

light or heavy infantry brigade task force. The size of the TCF will depend

on the enemy situation. In some situations the TCF could be a division or

larger size force. In those cases, a higher JTF headquarters could be deployed, with the S&R JCOM as one subordinate command and the TCF as

a separate command.

Area Support Group (ASG). The ASG’s tailorable organization and

support concept is consistent with prevailing Army doctrine. It includes

an Area Support Battalion (ASB) for each S&R Group capable of providing supplies and services. The medical battalion (including an air ambulance detachment) mission is to support the medical needs of the

command while the medical battalions of the S&R Groups provide civilian medical support. The transport battalion mission is to provide all

transport needs of the JCOM, including fuel, water, and bulk cargo.

Other units are tailored under the ASG as required.

S&R Stockage Requirements. The S&R JCOM logistics concept

should encompass the establishment of pre-packed and/or pre-positioned

stocks of emergency equipment, in particular, a requisite fleet of power

ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 67
generators, water purifiers, pipeline, fuel storage, bridging, shelters, and

other stocks that will be in urgent demand as conflict abates. These stocks

must be readily transportable and either pre-positioned or sent forward

early to be available to lead S&R forces.

S&R JCOM Concepts of Employment

The S&R JCOM employment context and concepts are summarized

below.

Strategic Employment Context. The United States deploys highly

flexible, maneuverable JTFs composed of smaller, lighter but, more lethal

high-tech combat forces to conduct counterforce operations rapidly. The

JTF’s area occupation capabilities are limited. Therefore, an S&R JCOM

deploys with the combat forces and operates in close coordination to take

over rapidly from advancing combat forces as the battle progresses.

S&R JCOM Ops Employment Concept. U.S. combatant commands

integrate S&R JCOM elements in the combat force deployment flow so they

are in position to take immediate control of liberated areas. S&R JCOM establishes stability and begins initial infrastructure reconstruction under the

JTF or its land component command. An S&R JCOM is supported and sustained by the JTF Theater Support Command. S&R JCOM security needs

are met by main JTF combat forces. S&R JCOM can also deploy as a separate JTF, with its own security and support force augmentation.

S&R JCOM Tactical Employment Concept. An S&R JCOM is organized with four subordinate JTF commands—combined capabilities teams

capable of area/sector stabilization and reconstruction—supported by

S&R JCOM and JTF assets. Subordinate Joint S&R Groups are normally

OPCON to combat commands in assigned sectors, but may operate under

overall S&R JCOM control, depending on the combatant commander’s

scheme of maneuver.

Conclusions

● There is a pressing need for transforming the way the U.S. military

organizes for stabilization and reconstruction operations from a secondary, separate, and ad hoc operation into a co-equal operation in tandem

with combat.

● The concept described above provides the outline of an urgently

needed capability. It ensures that there is a capable staff that can integrate

into the combatant commander’s headquarters to plan stabilization and

reconstruction operations and to manage the training and readiness of the

forces. It also ensures that a significant pool of forces needed for S&R

68
operations is well-trained, appropriately organized, and ready to deploy

on timelines similar to combat forces.

● The modular nature of the proposed joint organization provides

the flexibility to generate virtually any S&R force package with the scale,

configuration, and readiness posture appropriate to any contingency.

ORGANIZING FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 69
Chapter 5

Rebalancing the

Active/Reserve Mix

Post-conflict operations require specialized forces that are just as

ready to deploy as combat forces. If the United States has been engaged in combat, the security and support required for S&R operations will already be in theater as components of the fighting forces. These

forces would shift to providing security and support to post-conflict missions and work with other forces (for example, civil affairs units) specialized in post-conflict operations. If U.S. forces are not present, a post-conflict joint task force must be constituted and must include its own

sustainment and security forces.

Although S&R operations will include forces from all services in operational, critical support, or security enforcement roles, the predominant force requirements are for land component forces and fall on the

Army. Based on recent experience and the expected duration of future

missions, several critical Army capabilities are insufficient in the active

component. The most salient active force shortfall has been in civil affairs, followed by military police, engineers, medical, and psychological

operations units. In rebalancing the force, more of these capabilities

should be in the active force, and should be organized in a structure specially designed for S&R operations.

This chapter identifies current units of the four services that constitute specific capabilities for S&R operations. Almost all of the core S&R

forces are in the Army. However, all services are examined to address the

full support capability of the U.S. military for these operations. Typically,

S&R operations last months or even years longer than combat operations.

That fact increases the demand for these units in terms of rotation policies

commensurate with an all-volunteer force, as well as the reality that these

71
units are not solely for S&R operations but have essential combat support

and combat service support roles as well.

Background

Immediate post-conflict requirements in any scenario include both

stabilization operations and reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure.

Stabilization involves the immediate establishment of positive control over

activities in areas occupied by U.S. forces. Law and order is the most important requirement, including the prevention of looting and other crimes

against population and property.

Without reconstruction there will be no enduring stability. Military

units must be able to engage simultaneously in restoration of order and

limited immediate reconstruction of essential infrastructure. For example,

military resources can rapidly restore power generation to key facilities,

such as hospitals, using military generators. Military engineers can rebuild

selected roads and maintain them for basic use for a limited time. However,

it is important to emphasize that these measures are only expedient fixes

both in quantity and quality. Permanent reconstruction of roads, pipelines,

power grids, and other infrastructure requires expert contractors. Construction contractors should come in on the heels of the S&R force and

begin work in a coordinated fashion towards permanent reconstruction.

Stabilization and reconstruction tasks have historically been performed by combat forces in theater when major combat operations ended.

But combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were carried out with

smaller, high-tech forces in rapid counterforce operations against an

enemy that was modest in size but difficult to fix and destroy. Smaller U.S.

combat forces have fewer troops to divert from combat to immediate S&R

operations. Without that capability, unrest and disorder are inevitable.

The United States needs to consider reorganizing military forces to address

the gap in capabilities that has opened with the move toward expeditionary warfare. One analytical step is to identify what types of units are

needed to perform S&R missions and determine where these units are in

the AC/RC structure.

Discussion

Two Types of Stabilization and Reconstruction Scenarios 

There are two broad classes of scenarios under which the United

States might deploy S&R forces.

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One scenario occurs when the United States has been engaged in

combat operations and needs S&R forces to flow in immediately, even before combat operations completely subside.

In this environment the S&R force would be slimmed down, comprising only those assets needed to conduct stabilization operations. The

reason for this is that the military theater logistics and security infrastructure will already be in place. The Theater Support Command can readily

include support for stabilization forces alongside combat forces in its theater concept of area support logistics operations. As operations transition

from combat to post-conflict, theater support and services are maintained

and tailored to the requirements of the post-conflict forces, increasingly

stabilization forces but with requisite combat forces. Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of this scenario.

The second scenario occurs when the United States deploys for S&R

operations to a theater where either hostilities have not broken out or an

earlier conflict did not involve U.S. combat forces and no U.S. logistics

support forces or combat forces are on the ground.

In this scenario the deploying S&R force must be further task organized to include requisite support elements to provide all classes of

supply, service and transport. It will also require an appropriate security

force composed of at least light combat forces beyond its organic military

police units. Depending on the situation, either the S&R force commander or the combat force commander would be designated the overall

task force commander.

These two basic scenarios drive the following inventory groups and

methodology.

Inventory of U.S. Forces Available for S&R Operations 

The inventory below is broken into three force groups indicated by

unit type. The first group lists core S&R units. The second identifies service/support units required for S&R operations. The third shows combat

forces that might be needed to ensure security for an S&R operation when

U.S. combat forces are not already in theater. Each group is divided into

active and Reserve component assets.

Assets that are organic to a larger committed unit (truck companies,

lift helicopters, etc.) are not listed separately from the parent organization.

These assets are not really available for external missions but are essential

to the unit’s ability to perform its own mission. Hence, there will be a lot

of equipment in theater dedicated to support of U.S. (and sometimes allied) forces that is suited to S&R operations.

REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 73
Unit Types

Core Stabilization and Reconstruction Force Units 

Civil Affairs Battalions PSYOP Groups

Engineer Battalions Medical Battalions

Military Police Battalions

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Support and Services Units 

Joint/Combined Command and Explosive Ordnance Groups

Control HQs Aviation Brigades (Lift)

Theater Support Commands Sealift

Corps Support Groups/Commands Airlift

Transportation Groups/Commands Airborne ISR (including UAVs)

Quartermaster Groups Security Force Units

Signal Brigades/Commands

Combat Units 

Combat Divisions Attack Aviation Brigades

Infantry Stryker Brigades Air Defense Brigades

Separate Combat Brigades Military Intelligence Brigades

Heavy/Light Armored Cavalry Air Force Close Air Support

Regiments Naval Air/Surface Fire Support

Artillery Brigades

Core Units Required for S&R JCOM

The left-hand column of table 4 shows the numbers and types of

units required to constitute the two S&R JCOM sub-units, one composed

of active and one of RC units, as proposed in chapter 4. The right-hand

column shows the number of units in the Army AC/RC structure above division level. Similar units in the other services should also be considered,

especially for multiple rotations.

The comparison between units in the structure and what is required

to organize the proposed structure is important for several reasons. First,

numbers alone do not tell us if there are ample units available to populate

the proposed commands.

All units, active and reserve, have specific missions within approved

national security OPLANS. The services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress have reviewed these requirements. Whether current

assets are adequate to create S&R JCOM capabilities can only be determined by an analysis of the impact on existing missions, some of which are

exactly the S&R missions being proposed for the new commands. More

forces of some types may be needed, even though adding force structure

and increasing end strength is recognized as costly and must be closely examined. Although current forces are stretched thin now, bringing more

74
units into the active structure has to be justified based on future requirements. Prominent among them will be long running S&R operations,

from small scale contingencies, such as Panama, to large operations, such

as Iraq. In short, the S&R mission may warrant more active S&R forces of

some types than are now available.

Finally, most relevant units from both the active and Reserve components have performed S&R operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as one

of their current missions. Therefore, reorganizing them under an S&R

JCOM is both a force management issue and an end strength and force

structure issue of rebalancing the active and reserve forces. The Army and

the other services need to examine whether, if this concept is adopted, the

units to be mission-tasked to the S&R Command constitute a realignment of existing resources, additional resource requirements, or some of

both. Some metrics for examining the adequacy of the on-hand unit

types listed above are:

Military Police. The requirement is shown for four active and four

reserve composite combat support/internment and resettlement battalions augmented with criminal investigation teams (a different organization than exists now—see chapter 4). Far more MP resources than these

eight battalions are already in Iraq and Afghanistan, which speaks to the

scalability required for planning and conducting large operations. Although the Army has many non-divisional MP battalions in the force

(12/14), many deployments other than S&R operations (homeland security, etc.) have increased the demands on these units. MPs from the reserve

components are not the most frequently activated units but in recent years

REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 75

Table 5: Required and Existing S&R Units

Actual

Proposed (above division level)

AC/RC Bns AC/RC Bns

Military Police 4/.4 12/.14

Civil Affairs 4/.4 1/.28

Construction Engineers 4/.4 7/.33

Area Medical 4/.4 4/.6

Psychological Operations 4/.4 5/.8

Training and Security Assistance 1/.1 0/.0
they have been consistently among those in high demand, indicating more

are needed in the active force.

Does the United States need a new type of military police capability?

The question is outside the scope of this study but deserves serious consideration. Other countries field national police forces (French Gendarmerie,

Spanish Guardia Civil, Italian Carabinieri, Dutch Royal Marechaussee) that

bridge a gap between their civilian police and their military forces. The

United States fills that gap with military police that are organized, trained,

and equipped to accompany military units to establish security in environments that range from quiet to hostile. However, they do not focus mainly

on civil law enforcement missions, as do the Gendarmerie.

Civil Affairs Battalions. The one area where the Army clearly has

significant AC limitations is civil affairs. Moreover, experience going back

to the Gulf War indicates that civil affairs are an enduring high demand requirement. Moreover, surge requirements are getting longer while periods

of low utilizations are shrinking. There is little doubt the trend will continue. Not only does the Army need more active CA units for operations,

they also need to be integrated fully with other S&R forces and combat

forces during training, exercises, and operations.

Construction Engineers. Another group subject to high RC activation rates in recent operations is construction engineers. The Army has a

significant number of these units in the RC. However, unless rotation

management is a problem, there may be no need to increase the AC contingent of engineers. This is an area where both the Navy and Air Force

have units that should be considered as part of the rotation mix for longerterm operations.

Area Medical Battalion. As with construction engineers, RC medical

units are more in demand than military police in terms of activation for

deployment. The numbers above (4/6) indicate that this will be an area of

concern for which rotation planning has to be considered. The first recourse should be to draw on other service assets. Another place to look for

these types of units is in allied forces, especially those with extensive humanitarian operations experience. Ultimately, the United States may find

the best strategy is to employ U.S. medical units early in the post-conflict

phase and move quickly to allied or even contractor units.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion. Indications are these

units have the highest recent deployment tempo of all Army units. This is

a likely unit type to consider for rebalancing by moving some additional

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capability into the active force. A broader issue for analysis is whether

DOD needs more of these units overall.

Training and Security Assistance Battalion. The mission of this new

unit, to train a new indigenous military and police force, is essential to the

eventual draw down of U.S. security forces and should begin immediately

as combat operations subside. In the past this has been a typical Army Special Forces mission. However, the high demand on SOF units and the

greatly increased need for police and military training both argue for creation of a distinctly different capability, one that can gather the remnants

of indigenous capabilities and achieve momentum quickly toward a new

force. As noted elsewhere, this mission may ultimately be a candidate for

contractual solutions. However, that cannot be assumed as either the immediate or the long-term answer without more rigorous analysis of the alternatives. This should be a military unit in the S&R JCOM and a new

force structure requirement.

Foreign Area Officer Expertise Among the Services. Each of the four

services maintains a cohort of officer personnel trained as regional and

linguistic experts. The Air Force and Navy programs are developmental

and focus on identifying officers who already possess some level of foreign

area expertise. The Army program is the oldest and most advanced. The

Army program, begun in the 1940s, has been overhauled several times.

Since 1996, officers have been able to specialize as Foreign Area Officers

(FAO) as a single career track. At present, four years are needed to complete the three-phase FAO qualification regime, which includes language

training, an advanced degree in regional studies, and a regional tour. The

Marine Corps program is a smaller version of the Army program, as Marine FAO requirements are far fewer.

Army FAOs are organized into nine regions. The regional distribution of FAOs (see table 6) does not reflect a changed security environment. A rebalancing is needed to develop more FAOs with North

Africa/Middle East expertise. As with other capabilities, regional expertise should be pursued in all services and not limited to the Army alone.

At present there is a serious shortfall across all services, although the

Army program provides a good model for the other services to follow.

Stabilization and Reconstruction Forces in Iraq. Early data from

Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates the availability of S&R force types

within current force inventories. U.S. Army data regarding forces in theater on May 1, 2003, the date generally regarded as the transition from

major combat operations to post-conflict operations, reveals the Army

REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 77
forces available for stabilization and reconstruction operations shown in

figure 12.

Stabilization and reconstruction forces from the U.S. Army alone

were nearly 25 percent of the overall U.S. strength of 150,000, and deployments continued through late June/early July. Other American services

and the British contingent also included S&R forces. Planners had seen to

it that these forces were in theater or on their way early on. What was lacking was dedicated command and control for the post-conflict mission and

plans for the rapid, integrated employment of such forces at likely points

of instability. A rolling application of stabilization forces needed to unfold

as combat forces removed the control of the Iraqi regime. The immediacy

of the stabilization mission meant it could not be handed to combat commanders still engaged in major operations, as had been done in traditional

large force operations.

Another important feature of the Army’s S&R in-theater force profile in May 2004 was the large RC contingent, as shown in table 7.

The active component of these resources, in particular engineers,

medical, and military police, were organic to combat formations, such as

divisions. Following doctrine, they were assigned stabilization missions as

secondary to their primary combat support role. Therefore, the major

tasks of stabilization and reconstruction were carried primarily by the Reserve component.

This does not necessarily suggest the need for greater troop

strength to add S&R forces to the inventory, though force planners may

78

Table 6: Regional Distribution of Foreign Area Officers

Country/Region Number

China 41

Eurasia 184

Europe 195

Latin America 189

North Africa/Middle East 140

Northeast Asia 71

South Asia 35

Southeast Asia 64

Sub-Saharan Africa 83
conclude that some adjustment is warranted. Rather, early indications

from Operation Iraqi Freedom experience buttress the two main arguments of this paper. First, that dedicated command and control of S&R

forces and missions has emerged as an imperative of rapid decisive operations called for by U.S. military strategy. Second, that there is a need

to reexamine the balance of active and reserve S&R forces for the future.

These are twin arguments to better organize available resources to serve

REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 79

Figure 11: U.S. Army S&R Force Types In Theater at the End of Major

Combat Operations (May 1, 2003) Total: 37,350

Source: Information derived from the Army Mobilization Deployment Information System.

Civil Affairs (1,800)

Military Police 

(10,400)

Medical (7,280)

PSYOP (640)

Engineers (17,230)

Table 7: Reserve Component Contribution to S&R Force Types in Iraq

(May 1, 2003)

Type Percent RC

Military Police 59

Civil Affairs 98

Engineers 46

Medical 35

PSYOP 98
the combatant commander at the point where major combat operations

transition into post conflict operations, when instability threatens success even while commanders continue their focus on combat mission.

Organizing, planning, and conducting integrated post-conflict operations for the future require a different approach to the employment of

S&R forces already being deployed.

Conclusions 

This preliminary analysis suggests several conclusions:

● Substantial S&R forces exist in the active and reserve forces, but

there are too few active CA and PSYOP units based on the high demand

the United States experienced in the 1990s.

● The demand for additional active component medical, intelligence, engineer, mortuary affairs, air traffic control, and military police

forces became clear in recent operations. Sustained future demands in all

these areas should be examined.

● Rebalancing AC/RC forces is primarily but not exclusively an Army

issue. In particular, the Marine Corps which relies on Army CA assets in

Iraq has identified the need for more CA and MP units. Making S&R

forces truly joint and addressing the issue of long-term operations also requires the Navy and Air Force to examine their assets, particularly in force

protection (Shore Police and Air Police), construction engineers, and

medical specialties.

● The Army conducted a service-wide trimming of its administrative

(non-operational organizations) structure in 1999 and moved many

spaces into operational units to bring them up to full strength. Another

review may be warranted.

● Some Army support functions or even whole units could be considered for transfer to RC status, conversion to DOD civilian manning, or

contracting out to minimize growth in active strength.

● The Army FAO program is well established but needs to be

realigned. The other services have not invested adequately in regional

expertise.

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Appendix I: Inventory of Core S&R Units

Army

Civil Affairs Battalions/Groups

Active Component—1 CA Battalion

Reserve—6 CA Brigades

Engineer Groups/Brigades

Active Component—5 Combat Engineer Groups/Brigades

Reserve—3 Engineer Brigades/Commands

National Guard—5 Engineer Brigades/Groups 

Military Police Brigades

Active Component—5 MP Brigades (CBT SUPT)

Reserve—2 MP Brigades (I&R), 1 MP Brigade (CBT SUPT)

National Guard—3 MP Brigades (CBT SUPT) 

Psychological Operation Groups

Active Component—1 PSYOP Group

Reserve—2 PSYOP Groups

Medical Brigades

Active Component—4 Medical Brigades/Commands

Reserve—7 Medical Brigades/Commands

Marine Corps

Two Reserve Civil Affairs Groups; four Reserve Military Police Companies

Navy

Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB) 

Active Component—8

Reserve—12

Naval Construction Regiments (NCR)

Active Component—2

Reserve—4

Air Force

Air Force Security Forces

Many units beyond those organic to active Wings exist in the Air Force Reserve and 

Air National Guard

Air Force Engineer Units

Active Component Red Horse Squadrons

Reserve Component Red Horse Squadrons

REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 81
Appendix II: S&R Support and Services Units

Army

Theater Support Commands 

Active Component—3 TSC (all at reduced manning)

Reserve—1 TSC, 3 TSC Augmentations (for Active TSCs)

Corps Support Group/Command 

Active Component—3 

Reserve—1

Transportation Groups/Commands 

Active Component—2 Commands

Reserve—1 Command/3 Groups

National Guard—1 Brigade 

Quartermaster Groups 

Active Component—1

Reserve—1

National Guard—1

Signal Brigades/Commands 

Active Component—11 

Reserve—3

National Guard—3

Explosive Ordnance Groups 

Active Component—1

National Guard—1

Aviation Brigades (Lift) 

Active Component—3 

Reserve—1

National Guard—3 

Navy

Sealift

Active Component—8 Fast Sealift ships and 3 Cargo ships

Naval Reserve Fleet

Afloat Force Cargo/Prepositioning Ships

Active Component—39 (supporting all services)

Reserve—Ready Reserve Force transport ships

Marine Corps

Force Service Support Groups

Active Component—3 FSSG

Reserve—1FSSG

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Air Force

Support forces include mission support for airlift and airborne platforms for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (including UAVs). The Air Force also must provide Tactical Air Control

Party (TACP) personnel to ground units and Airlift Control Element (ALCE) personnel for terminal

airport control. Airfield operations, including air traffic and instrumented airspace control, also are required. Finally, the service will have to provide Medical Evacuation aircraft to the operation. Through

the Air Force Component of U.S. Transportation Command, Military Airlift Command, the Air Force

also is responsible for commercial contract air support.

REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 83
Appendix III: Combat Units

Army

Combat Divisions

Active Component—10 

National Guard—8 [Note: under reorganization—new mix of 5 divisions by 2010]

Infantry Stryker Brigades

Active Component—1 operational ready, 4 others proposed

National Guard—1 proposed

Separate Combat Brigades

Active Component—2 INF

National Guard—1 ARM, 1 INF, 1 Scout Brigade

Enhanced Readiness NG Brigades—7 LGT INF, 5 MECH INF, 1 ARM, 1 CAV 

Heavy/Light Armored Cavalry Regiments

Component—1 ACR, 1 ACR (LGT)

National Guard—1 Enhanced Readiness ACR

Artillery Brigades (155mm, MLRS)

Active Component—6

National Guard—17

Attack Aviation 

Active Component—3 Brigades (2 battalions each) 

National Guard—2 (3 battalions total)

Air Defense Brigades

Active Component—5

National Guard—1

Military Intelligence Brigades

Component—3 

Reserve—1

National Guard—1 (linguist)

Navy

Aircraft Carriers (CAS)

Active Component—13

Reserve—none

Surface Combatants: cruisers/frigates/destroyers (Naval Gunfire ashore)

Active Component—27/35/59 

Reserve—none

Patrol Craft (Coastal Security Operations)

Active Component—13

Reserve—none [Note: the Navy also operates numerous harbor security boats]

84
Marine Corps

Marine Divisions 

Active Component—3 (operationally organized into 3 MEFs and 2 MEBs)

Reserve—1

Marine Special Operations Forces

Active Component—4 MEB (Anti-Terrorism); 2 Force Reconnaissance Companies; Marine

Contingent U.S. Special Operations Command

Reserve—2 Force Reconnaissance Companies

Air Force

Combat units provide close air support to ground security forces and to the stabilization force

as required, including suppression of enemy air defense. Platforms that may be called upon include all

fighter/attack aircraft, fighter/bomber aircraft, and bombers with PGM capability.

REBALANCING THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX 85
Appendix IV: Two Active Component/National Guard

Integrated Divisions

(Activated in June 1999)

7th Infantry Division (Light)

Fort Carson, CO (Forward Element at Fort Polk, LA)

Active Component. Division Headquarters Company (-), about 150 personnel. These personnel are responsible for planning and for coordination of training for subordinate units. Most are also

dual slotted in garrison support positions at Fort Carson. For example, the Division Commander is

also the installation commander of Fort Carson, and the Division Operations Officer (G-3) is also the

post Director of Plans and Training (responsible for range/training area management, budgeting etc.).

Supported Fort Carson AC units include the 3rd ACR, 3rd Brigade, 4th ID, and a battalion of the 10th SF

Group.

The AC 7th ID HQ (-) is regarded by subordinate National Guard brigades as a major source of

assistance in planning and executing their Enhanced Light Infantry Brigade training.

National Guard. All other division units, including three Enhanced Light Infantry Brigades.

[Note: two of these brigades—the 30th and 39th—will deploy to Iraq in 2004 for a year.] 

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Fort Riley, KS (Forward Element at Fort Jackson, SC)

Active Component. Division Headquarters Company (-), about 150 personnel. These personnel are responsible for planning and for coordination of training for subordinate units. Most are also

dual slotted in garrison support positions at Fort Riley. For example, the Division Commander is also

the installation commander of Fort Riley, and the Division Operations Officer (G-3) is also the post

Director of Plans and Training (responsible for range/training area management, budgeting, etc.).

Supported Fort Riley active units include the 3rd Brigades of both the 1st Armored Division and the 1st

ID in Germany.

The AC 24th ID HQ (-) is regarded by subordinate NG brigades as a major source of assistance

in planning and executing their Enhanced Mechanized Infantry Brigade training.

National Guard. All other division units, including three Enhanced Mechanized Infantry

Brigades.

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Chapter 6

Broadening Military Culture

Despite a long history of involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations, the U.S. military has more recently viewed

these activities as separate and detracting from its primary

warfighting mission. When it has engaged in stabilization and reconstruction operations, the U.S. military often has raised concerns about a prolonged engagement and focused on an exit strategy and on working in

parallel with civilian organizations. The result has been an inability to

train, equip, and plan for these operations properly. This cultural mindset

could reduce the military’s effectiveness in addressing complexity on the

battlefield and in adapting to changing situations. Recognizing that any

cultural change requires training, education, and clear intent from the

leadership, this chapter will focus on the role professional military education can play in adapting military culture and how training can better prepare military personnel for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Background

Since the early 1990s, the U.S. military has resisted prolonged involvement in S&R operations for reasons ranging from concern for the

degradation of combat readiness and diversion of limited resources to a

belief that these operations are not the role of the military. Military leaders feared that training, equipping, and planning for S&R operations

would detract from warfighting capabilities. These concerns stem from

Vietnam and were reinforced by problems with peace operations in the

1990s, especially Somalia.

Failure in Somalia had a profound impact on the American military

and political psyche: no longer would the United States use the military to

do nation-building. In the future, the United States would require clearly

stated, achievable objectives before conducting any peace or humanitarian

operation, and its role would only be to provide security. Another side 

87
effect of the U.S. experience in Somalia was the growing notion that the

military’s primary mission should always be to fight and win the Nation’s

wars, rather than become embroiled in difficult, prolonged peace and stability operations. Despite a cultural reluctance to participate in peace and

stability operations, the U.S. military found itself doing just that throughout the 1990s, which reinforced antipathy to such operations.

An example of this cultural resistance is the Army’s 2003 decision to

close the U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, the only DOD organization dedicated to the study of these types of operations, as part of a

money-saving initiative. In the wake of the Iraqi operation the decision

drew criticism and the institute was reconstituted.

The U.S. military focuses financial and human resources on training

and equipping for the warfighting mission. Participation in S&R operations often is seen as diverting limited resources and degrading combat

readiness. A unit is required to train to mission essential task lists

(METLs).1 Because no METL exists for peace operations, units are prevented from training for these missions until three to four months before

deployment. Training, therefore, focuses on core competencies, such as patrolling and crowd control, leaving little time to acquire negotiating skills

or learn the cultural or historical context of a missions. For crises that arise

rapidly, even less time is available to train troops in the skills needed for

stabilization and reconstruction.

In 1999, the Army reported that two of its ten divisions were no

longer combat ready to fight in a major theater war because of deployments to peace operations. Unit readiness is in part measured by the number of training hours flown, miles driven, or hours steamed. When a unit

is deployed or is training in preparation for deployment to a peace operation, it is unable to hone its combat skills. These measures of readiness do

not take into account enhancement of other important skills—small unit

action, working with local populations, increased unit cohesion—many of

which are important for future S&R and/or major combat operations.

The United States has a long history of conducting stabilization and

reconstruction operations, from the Indian Wars in the 19th century to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 21st, and the new strategic environment ensures more such commitments. Military personnel must be

properly trained and equipped to engage effectively in these operations.

This will require cultural change to overcome resistance to S&R operations. It also will require increased understanding of and ability to adapt

88
to a highly complex and constantly changing strategic environment. Professional military education can play a central role in both.

Discussion 

Not only did Iraq demonstrate the capabilities of a transforming U.S.

military, it revealed the need for a new cognitive paradigm for engaging in

S&R operations. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have driven home the

national security and international political imperatives that became evident after September 11 to build a stable peace in countries torn by conflict and have underscored the importance of establishing security as a

prerequisite for political and economic development. More important, it

has heralded a new strategic era in which the lines between conflict and

peace are blurred and complexity rules the battlefield. Across the board integration of these concepts into professional military education will help

prepare military personnel for the new strategic environment while at the

same time adapting its military culture for stabilization and reconstruction operations.

New strategic environment

The new strategic environment in which the U.S. military finds itself

is simultaneously complex and highly constrained. Any future use of military force will likely occur within a limited war or a military operation

other than war, and winning the peace will be as important as winning the

war.2 Because S&R operations will likely take place in a politically charged

environment, victory on the battlefield could end in strategic failure if political objectives are not achieved. Building a stable peace means addressing the underlying sources of a conflict, not just its symptoms. Complexity will increase with the presence of an array of partners including

coalition forces, interagency players, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and local officials. Operations probably will

occur in populated urban areas, resulting in greater interaction with local

populations and increased demand for interpreters. For local populations

and the media, U.S. servicemen will be the face of U.S. policy, so tactical

decisions and individual actions can have strategic implications. Current

efforts in transforming the U.S. military will further shape this strategic

environment. With more agile and dispersed forces, small, independent

operations will become the rule rather than the exception.

BROADENING MILITARY CULTURE 89
Concepts of conflict and post-conflict

Traditionally, the United States has considered combat and post-conflict operations as two distinct phases, conceptualized as a linear progression from conflict to post-conflict to peace. As the U.S. experience in Iraq

illustrates, however, stabilization and reconstruction operations will likely

occur in environments where the mix between conflict and peace shifts

back and forth. As one U.S. officer with experience in stabilization and reconstruction operations put it, “it’s not post-conflict when you’re getting

shot at.” A more fluid, non-linear concept of conflict must be articulated

and incorporated into professional military education.

Interdependence of reconstruction tasks

A stable peace is built on four pillars: security, social and economic

well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation.

Although success in each area depends on the effective integration and interaction across them, security (encompassing both collective and individual security) is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the

other pillars.3 A country plagued by internally or externally imposed conflict often lacks the mechanisms or institutions to provide for its own security, uphold the rule of law, or address human rights abuses; its government may be nonexistent or too weak to provide services to its citizenry or

improve their socio-economic livelihoods. The U.S. leadership must approach stabilization and reconstruction as a national, governmental mission, rather than as solely military or civilian, to enable the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power to be

harnessed and integrated effectively.

Critical skills set for stabilization and reconstruction

Stabilization and reconstruction operations typically take place in

complex, fluid environments that require not only physical stamina, but

also mental agility, intellectual capability, and a skill set different from that

of conventional warfighting. The following list of skills needed to be effective in these environments was derived from a United States Institute of

Peace report based on interviews from senior leaders in Bosnia.4 Professional military education should develop each of these skills, with greater

emphasis on the last six.

■ Warfighting skills in the event conflict escalates and to avert potential conflict

■ Courage to take risks

■ Confidence to delegate authority and the need for trust 

90
■ Confidence in crisis decisionmaking and in doing things that have

never been done before 

■ Increased decisionmaking skills

■ Ability to adapt or adjust to a new environment 

■ Adherence to principle and the ability to maintain fairness and

evenhandedness for all parties 

■ Vision of the politico-military environment

■ Ability to interact with those outside the military and build consensus

■ A broad intellectual background

■ Interpersonal skills

■ Understanding historical and cultural contexts

Probably the two most critical skills needed in S&R operations are

knowledge and understanding of historical and cultural contexts and the

interpersonal skills to exploit that understanding. Insensitivity to cultural

differences can contribute to tensions between locals and military forces

and reduce the effectiveness of the operation.5 Moreover, understanding

the cultural context of a country aids in formulating effective strategies for

addressing the underlying sources of a conflict. Interpersonal skills are essential for building cooperation among disparate partners and trust

among the local population. They can make the difference between

progress and stalemate or, worse, regression.

Negotiating skills have been cited as critical in recent U.S. military interventions, and for the future. General Anthony Zinni once said, “always

consider negotiations as a great alternative to violence.”6 Down to the platoon level, officers and troops will engage in direct negotiations to quell

angry crowds, determine how to distribute relief supplies, or settle quarrels between warring factions with local leaders, belligerent parties, and

the general population.7

The employment of smaller, more dispersed units calls for improved

decisionmaking skills. “Junior leaders must be confident and competent to

make quick, hard decisions . . . [The] decisions had to be made while operating relatively independently and out of communication range with

their superiors.”8 Based on their own experiences in peace operations,

commanders recognize that the success of an S&R operation depends on

the vigilance, mental alertness, and responses of the most junior soldier

and his noncommissioned officer.

Mission requirements and political objectives for S&R operations are

tough to define and may change often. This puts military commanders in

BROADENING MILITARY CULTURE 91
a difficult position as they try to translate strategic objectives into operational and tactical tasks.9 An understanding of the larger strategic environment and an ability to adapt as it changes are keys to success in any

military operation; they are particularly important in the complex environments in which S&R operations take place. As an operation matures

and the security situation on the ground stabilizes, an ability to adjust to

the new environment is critical to success.

Role of Professional Military Education

Professional military education can play a central role in changing

the military’s cultural mindset and in developing the broad intellectual

framework necessary for these demanding, complex, and multidisciplinary situations. The first step in achieving a change in culture is to demonstrate the importance of S&R operations in American national security

strategy through courses or lectures and by emphasizing these themes

throughout the curricula. While the content of courses certainly contributes to a student’s knowledge base, the structure and the composition

of the faculties and student bodies also shape the intellectual development

of the military professional.

Because stabilization and reconstruction operations have often been

viewed as separate and detracting from the military’s primary warfighting

mission, PME curricula have dedicated limited time to its study, even

though peace operations have been identified as a “special area of emphasis.”10 An independent study conducted in 2001 at the National Defense

University found that many core courses included peace operations as one

two-hour lecture that focused on service or joint doctrine. Elective courses,

on the other hand, spent 24 to more than 30 hours on peace operations, but

these had limited participation due to class size constraints. At the U.S.

Army War College, for example, only 14 percent of the Class of 2001 was

enrolled in the elective “Peace Operations Issues: Policy and Practice.” For

the most part, electives focused on the role and policy of the United States,

the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations. They had less instruction on sources of conflict or post-conflict reconstruction.

Since September 11 and the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, instruction on nation-building and the new strategic environment has been

added to the PME curriculum. For example, the National War College now

offers a core course lecture titled “Peacekeeping and Nation-building.” The

Marine Corps has done an excellent job in providing the cultural capacity

to adapt to a complex and changing environment. The Expeditionary

Warfare School (formerly the Amphibious Warfare School) offers a 10-day

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course on military operations other than war (MOOTW). In 2001 approximately 90 percent of all captains received instruction in MOOTW.

These are important first steps, in recognizing the importance of

these operations, but more courses and lectures are needed to effect real

change. Further instruction is also needed in civil-military cooperation,

interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations. Additional classes

are not enough, however, if few students are enrolled in them. Instruction

related to stabilization and reconstruction operations should be incorporated at all levels of PME, from officer basic courses through senior-level

war colleges, as well as noncommissioned officer education, service academies, and ROTC programs. Students need to be exposed to these topics

from the beginning of their careers to build the appropriate mindset and

necessary skills.

The structure of a course or academic program can impact the

preparation of military personnel as much as content. As described above,

interpersonal skills to work with those outside the military, the broad intellectual background to understand cultural and strategic contexts, and

the mental agility to adapt to a constantly changing environment are critical skills for effective engagement in S&R operations. Working with coalition forces, interagency partners, and international and nongovernmental

organizations requires an ability to understand perspectives different from

the military’s. One easy step to bring different perspectives into the classroom is to invite guest speakers to describe their roles and unique cultures.

Interacting with students from other countries or other federal agencies in

class discussions, assignments, and exercises also helps build interpersonal

skills. Students reported that the participation of international students

and guest speakers were critical to their better understanding and appreciating civilian and international partners.

Tabletop exercises and computer simulations are excellent tools in

sharpening decisionmaking skills and illustrating complex situations or

concepts. Students in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces stated

that one of the most valuable aspects of their elective was the final exercise, which illustrated the complexities of a peace operation. Most, if not

all, PME schools include small- and large-scale exercises in the curricula;

using scenarios that reflect an S&R environment can further illustrate and

integrate complex concepts. Computer simulations can also enhance decisionmaking skills by demonstrating to students how certain decisions

may impact a situation or produce unintended consequences. Also, exercises and simulations provide indirect experience in stabilization and 

BROADENING MILITARY CULTURE 93
reconstruction operations and are essential to sound analysis, planning,

and action in the future.11

To operate effectively in the new strategic environment, the United

States needs military and civilian professionals who understand the historical and strategic contexts of areas throughout the world, the cultural

and religious influences that guide popular thinking, and the nature of

human conflict, past and present. The U.S. military will continue to be

called on to engage in combat, so honing warfighting skills and other core

competencies must not be neglected. The model of an applied liberal arts

education would supplement instruction in doctrine and core competencies with culture, sociology, psychology, history, language, international

and domestic law, ethics, and media and negotiations skills—all important

subjects for developing the intellectual skills and capability to deal with a

complex and changing strategic environment.

Professional military education, however, is often considered a zero

sum game. Per the law of diminishing returns, there is a point beyond

which there will be only incremental improvements in core competencies

for the amount of training invested, but investment in cultural understanding, however modest, will yield significant returns. A debate on the

level of proficiency required for this strategic environment should take

place, and an appropriate investment in other “liberal arts” made. Ideally,

this would include all subject areas listed above, but sociology, law, and negotiations should be emphasized.

Training S&R Forces

Training also has an important role to play in adapting military culture and in preparing military personnel for operations. Current peace operations training can provide some insight into the military’s approach to

training. Cultural reluctance to peace operations has created a “just-intime” philosophy for training for these missions. A unit switches from

training for war to training for peace operations only three to four months

before deployment. Training occurs at the individual, unit, and leader levels. Unit training culminates in a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk or the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. MREs are scenario-driven,

replicating a spectrum of contingencies a unit might encounter, including

situations involving civilians, hostile crowds, and adversarial forces.

Several studies and after action reviews have concluded that just-intime training provides inadequate preparation for the political-military

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and civil-military aspects of peace operations. Although no units failed to

carry out their mission in the Balkans, units and staffs needed several

weeks to achieve a level of proficiency once deployed in theater. PKI’s

after-action review on Kosovo acknowledged that more peacetime training in peace operations requirements was necessary.12 Peacetime training

can develop a baseline understanding of missions, tasks, and the complex

operating environment so that units can become more proficient faster.

Future requirements for rapid deployment and the synergies required for stabilization and reconstruction necessitates regular peacetime

training for the S&R forces described in chapter 4. All elements of an S&R

unit must train and exercise together periodically to build important linkages and relationships. Individual, unit, and leader training should highlight critical stabilization and reconstruction skills, such as negotiations,

small unit decisionmaking, and interaction with U.S. interagency players,

NGOs, foreign militaries, and the local population. It is therefore important that representatives from these communities participate in training

exercises. Facilities should be made available in the near term for training

for S&R Groups, building toward the capability to host an exercise involving a full S&R JCOM exercise in the future. Training technologies like

those described in chapter 7 could also be utilized.

Conclusion

● Because of its cultural ethos, the U.S. military believed throughout

the 1990s that it should not engage in prolonged S&R activities because

they degraded its ability to fight and win the Nation’s wars.

● Given our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq and the new strategic environment, operations have become a national security and international political imperative for the U.S. military.

● Professional military education and training must now adapt military culture and prepare military personnel to engage in S&R operations

effectively.

● S&R operations will require greater understanding of local historical and cultural contexts, interpersonal skills to work with partners and

local populations, and an ability to adapt to rapidly changing and complex

environments.

● All elements of S&R forces, including representatives from the interagency community, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition militaries, should train and exercise together periodically.

BROADENING MILITARY CULTURE 95
Notes 1 Mission essential tasks are those tasks that must be performed with the utmost effectiveness to

succeed on the battlefield. 2 John R. Boulé, II, “Operational Planning and Conflict Termination,” Joint Force Quarterly, 29

(Autumn/Winter 2001–02), 102. 3 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” white paper

for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project prepared by the Center for Strategic and International

Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army, September 22, 2002, 1, accessed at <www.csis.org/isp/

pcr/securitypaper.pdf>. 4 Howard Olsen and John Davis, “Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from

Bosnia,” U.S. Institute of Peace Press, October 1999, 5–7. 5 Michael J. Hardesty and Jason D. Ellis, “Training for Peace Operations: The U.S. Army Adapts to

the Post-Cold War World,” U.S. Institute of Peace Press, February 1997, 9. 6 Anthony C. Zinni, as quoted in Kenneth C. Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 71. 7 Hardesty and Ellis, 15.

8 Ibid, 12.

9 Ibid, 9.

10 Special Areas of Emphasis highlight the concerns of OSD, the services, combatant commands,

defense agencies, and Joint Staff regarding coverage of specific joint subject matters in the PME colleges. Colleges will evaluate each SAE for inclusion in their curricula; however, inclusion is not required. 11 Robert H. Dorff, “Professional Military Security Education: The View from a Senior Service College,” Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century

International Security Environment, ed. James A. Smith et al. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College,

2001), 30. 12 Brent C. Bankus, “Training the Military for Peace Operations: A Past, Present, and Future View,”

paper delivered to U.S. Institute of Peace Symposium on best practices for peace and humanitarian operations, June 26, 2001, 27–29.

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Chapter 7

Supporting Technologies

The abrupt transition from active combat to post-combat stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq has resulted in a problem filled

transition period for U.S. and coalition forces. The military has

been thrust into non-traditional roles for which it has been neither trained

nor equipped. In addition, it appears that the military will continue to be

called upon to deal with an environment in which the transition between

war, stabilization and reconstruction, peacekeeping, and renewed conflict

will be fast, localized, and unpredictable. Thus, the military, particularly

the Army, will of necessity be engaged in S&R until an orderly transition

to civilian leadership is achieved. In addition, globalization has opened

world markets for a wide variety of lethal weapons and information technology that are available to insurgent, guerrilla, terrorist, and criminal

forces. American forces will continue to confront rocket propelled

grenades (RPG), mines, mortars, and even artillery and anti-tank

weapons, as well as small arms wielded by assailants connected by the Internet. New technologies and equipment are needed for military operations in the post-conflict state.

Background

During the interval between stabilization and reconstruction and 

nation-building, the military could be required to perform the roles of civil

government. The primary S&R role is security, which includes the protection not only of our own troops but of the civilian population, along with

other law enforcement responsibilities. A second military S&R role is the

maintenance of the civilian infrastructure both for subsistence and basic

services. Finally, the military must maintain positive human relations with

the indigenous population and our own troops in an environment of danger, economic dislocation, cultural differences and mistrust. Perhaps most

importantly, the military force—as the surrogate for civilian authority—

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must demonstrate concern for the indigenous population while still facing

personal dangers. As in diplomacy, the primary agent of positive change is

built upon a foundation of trust.

While the issues clearly transcend technological solution, we must

adapt current military technology and develop new technologies to promote successful civil-military operations during the post-direct-combat

phase of the joint campaign. This chapter will describe some of the technology solutions that could augment military capability for expanded responsibilities during stabilization and reconstruction. The technologies

are discussed in the framework of post-conflict military roles and needs.

Four overarching areas where technology can play an important role in

military S&R are training (including pre-packaged expert tool sets), communications, specialized offensive and defensive weapons systems, and

modeling and analysis. For the military, deployed, focused mission-training packages are required for personnel to acquire the required skill sets

they need for security, infrastructure maintenance, and human relations

they have not received before being deployed. While the military is developing networked communications for intra-military operations, the ability to couple the military network with the civilian communications system is essential for S&R operations. Weapons systems, such as non-lethal

weapons for crowd control, are needed to augment combat systems. Finally, the military needs specialized software tool kits to prioritize work in

reestablishing civilian infrastructure functionality. While opposition and

criminal threats remain, vital infrastructure must be protected.

Discussion

Security

During the period of post-conflict stabilization, the military provides

for its own security and is responsible for civilian security and for reconstituting a civilian police force and national military. The most challenging

and resource intensive security environment is within population centers.

Security needs

Counter-guerrilla/sniper. A sniper attack in an urban environment is

nearly impossible to prevent, as evidenced by the sniper killings in Washington, D.C. during the fall of 2002 and the current attacks in Iraq. As also

witnessed in Iraq, the attacker has the advantage of initiative, unpredictably

choosing the time and place of an attack. It is impossible for U.S. troops to

be on full alert always and everywhere. Technology is needed to correlate

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intelligence information and rapidly identify and neutralize threats; technologies are also needed to harden vehicles, buildings, and individuals

against attack. The population will lose confidence in the authority of the

military force if this force appears vulnerable.

Ordnance/mine detection and neutralization. Mines or bombs can

be triggered autonomously with sensors or by remote control. For combat operations, military organizations use very heavy equipment such as

flails to clear safe paths in minefields. Individual mine detection is a very

slow step-by-step procedure with short-range detectors. These approaches have limited utility in an urban environment where freedom of

movement is paramount.

Crowd control. Military weaponry is optimized for maximum lethality and, therefore, is inappropriate for crowd control. Leading combat organizations, the first into population centers, are not equipped or trained

sufficiently in crowd control. These operations are made much more difficult when language and cultural barriers exist. Crowd control requires

specialized communications, defensive equipment, and non-lethal

weapons. A new area for work is intelligence for “preventive crowd control.” This is similar to civilian police intelligence to identify leadership in

agitation groups.

Border/perimeter security. Local civil security demands security from

external threats to both the civilian population and military formations. Secure international borders must be established and maintained to prevent

entry of foreign insurgents and the flow of weapons. To reduce military logistics burdens, border security requires surveillance and intelligence.

Survivable transport vehicles. A large number of combat casualties

in Iraq have been in Humvees. The proliferation of such weapons as RPGs

makes these vehicles vulnerable. They are also vulnerable to the mine

threat. Transport vehicles need to be made more survivable with enhanced

armor and improved sensors with embedded networked intelligence.

Intelligence. Local intelligence, from multiple sources, is the key

enabler to security. In particular, intelligence is required to detect and

track hostile individuals and organizations, find arms caches, and track

down criminals. Tools are required to speed processing and assessment

of field HUMINT. Included is the need to predict actions, conduct profiles, and identify key leaders or influence agents. Efficient and relevant

intelligence requires distributed and networked surveillance sensors to

augment HUMINT.

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Technology for Security

Distributed mission training for security. Conventional classroom

and facility training is giving way to distributed training utilizing interactive software packages and virtual training facilities with model-based

simulations. Group training is also possible by networked systems. Networking permits the linking of multiple distributed training sites in the

United States to distributed sites in an occupied country. As the skill demands for the military shifts from combat to providing security, the training packages must be provided immediately after hostilities subside. Technologies include public security mission training packages, portable

simulation centers, and equipment.

Civil-military communications interoperability. While still incomplete, military communications technology has provided considerable

capability for joint service interoperability. However, little if any priority

has been given to the need for connectivity to and within civilian communications networks. To operate effectively with an indigenous communications infrastructure, bridges such as analog to digital converters will

need to be developed as deployable sets. In some cases the military may

even need to have analog radio stocks if the military-civilian interfaces

cannot be handled by software. Technologies include wireless and wired

networks, software protocols for network management, and civil-military

interfaces. Antennas, both mobile and quick-erecting, are needed as replacements for losses and breakdowns.

Distributed and networked surveillance sensors. Security is heavily

dependent on knowledge of the location and movement of individuals and

vehicles of interest. The urban environment is a particular challenge due to

the concealment provided by buildings, underground utility tunnels, and

other infrastructure “terrain features.” Sensors can be mounted on buildings, fly in UAVs, be in unattended ground systems, or be carried by people.

Some level of sensor coverage already exists, such as security cameras in

banks. Technology is needed to network dissimilar sensors to provide a

broad area of coverage and to provide an integrated picture. In some cases,

tasking tools are required to direct overhead sensors to fill in holes in coverage. A particular need is for sensors to detect mines and remotely fired

explosives while on the move. Technologies include cameras, infrared detectors, acoustic detectors, radars, metal detectors, and chemical detectors.

Network counter-terrorist analysis tools. Networks are used by terrorist and insurgent groups to establish organizational cohesion while remaining physically dispersed until a decisive point in time and action.

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Technologies including network monitoring, intercept and analysis software tools, and intelligent agents are needed to probe networks and databases to permit decisionmaking relative to insurgent planning and location.

Counter-sniper system. Counter-sniper systems fall into two categories. Detection of the sniper prior to firing and response systems that immediately return fire guided by the sniper weapon signature. Optical detectors are needed that can distinguish between sniper sighting technologies

and media or private camera lenses. Other technologies include optical

augmentation from the sniper weapon, electromagnetic detection, flash detectors, acoustic arrays, and automated cueing of a response weapon.

Lightweight and flexible body armor. More improvements are

needed to provide greater body area coverage while retaining freedom of

movement for the wearer. Body armors are needed that provide protection

and can be concealed to promote confidence of security in the protected

populations. Technologies include lighter weight, flexible ballistic clothing

ensembles. Future developments will incorporate embedded sensors, antennas and “Combat ID” and will reduce signatures.

Vehicle tagging and tracking. Approximately 2,500 U.S. vehicles in

Iraq were provided with the Cobra Blue Force Tracking system, which

transmits ID and position information at less than a watt of transmitted

power. Comprehensive tracking of civilian as well as military vehicles

would require many more systems that are easy to install. Information

from the tags transmitted to the intelligence network would provide a

comprehensive tactical picture.

Biometrics. Biometrics is an emerging technology that uses unique

human characteristics, such as retinal patterns, facial recognition, and

even characteristic walking patterns to identify wanted individuals in

groups or as individuals passing through a checkpoint. In order to be operationally effective, biometric identification must be done remotely and

rapidly in a cluttered background and against camouflage and disguise.

The technology requires specialized sensors and processing algorithms.

Biometrics can be used to confirm individual identity as well as be a reliable independent source of identification, such as when fingerprints at a

crime scene identify the criminals. In this later case the FBI fingerprint file

is also a good example of how biometric databases can be used globally

through networking databases.

Penetrating radar. Military and civil law enforcers need to “see

through walls” when searching a building. Instead of x-rays, the most

promising technology is low frequency radar. Current systems have limited

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES 101
range and resolution but still provide useful capability at close range.

Higher power transmitters and advanced signal processing technologies

will improve these systems.

Non-lethal weapons. While the military has maintained a joint office

with the Marine Corps as executive agent, little priority has been given to

non-lethal weapons within service development programs because of limited utility in major combat operations. Law enforcement authorities as

well have not developed a cohesive program to develop these weapons.

However, for S&R operations, non-lethal weapons have significant potential utility for riot and crowd control and in situations where combatants

and civilians are intermingled. Directed energy systems such as lasers and

millimeter radio frequency weapons could play a significant non-lethal

role in crowd dispersal. Two systems under investigation are the Airborne

Tactical Laser ACTD and the Air Force developed millimeter wave Active

Denial System.

Unmanned vehicles for surveillance and threat neutralization. In

Iraq two levels of UAV systems were used to advantage, the high altitude

Global Hawk and the medium-altitude Predator. Further deployment of

distributed low-level UAVs is required for detailed local surveillance. This

class of unmanned systems includes small UAVs, such as Dragon Eye, and

unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) yet to be developed. Forces need to go

into buildings and caves using on-board sensors for immediate intelligence

as well as employment of leave behind unattended sensors. Wide area coverage is also needed that can reduce manpower requirements. The systems

can be armed to defeat threats while reducing risks to friendly personnel.

Technologies include electro-optic and infrared cameras and acoustic detectors, networked into the intelligence grid. Long dwell medium- and

high-altitude UAVs and airships will add to an integrated sensor grid.

Defensive information operations. A major insurgent tool is the

spreading of misinformation to damage the credibility of the stabilization and reconstruction or enforcement powers. An additional threat is

the corruption of our friendly information systems and the possible

clandestine introduction of false information into our own networks.

Technologies include network intrusion detection, mitigation and damage assessment software, user authentication techniques, and encryption

technologies and methodologies.

Infrastructure

In the period following conflict and occupation the military has the

immediate responsibility for providing the basic services necessary to

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start the process of reconstruction. The military needs the tools to assess

which elements of the infrastructure are most essential for reconstruction

and protection based upon the politico-military situation. User friendly,

portable planning tools are needed to enable soldiers with limited civil

engineering background knowledge such as restoring power plants to

some limited capability before permanent repairs can be made. Professional Army Civil Engineering training needs to include skills in large city

utility operations.

Infrastructure needs

Collaborative planning tools. Netcentric warfare planning tools for

distributed decisionmaking have been under development for military

planning and operations. In stabilization and reconstruction, collaborative

planning tools are needed by the military to collaborate with civilian organizations, including U.S., international/foreign, and indigenous.

Civil Engineering. The S&R force must have the tailored equipment

sets with technology to manage civil functions with the fewest number of

people to reduce our logistics and political footprint. However, there is a

non-synergistic issue created by inserting modern technology in countries

that have relied upon low cost manpower—the most efficient solutions

can create high unemployment and contribute to instability.

Food and Health Services. Military field hospitals and medical

support should augment and support local medical facilities until they

can be supported with indigenous capabilities. Bare-bones, in-theater

medical support requires information and physical “reach-back” capability to U.S. facilities for corrective care and databases for diagnostic

and treatment support.

Civil government. Civil functions, such as fire fighting, law enforcement, and social services, need to be reestablished and in some cases created. These essential functions will have to be protected to promote trust

and confidence in U.S. goals for post-combat operations.

Infrastructure technologies

Civil infrastructure simulations. The military employs simulations

and decisionmaking tools for combat in mission planning and target selection. In rebuilding infrastructure it is necessary to do mission planning

and select which parts of the infrastructure or which facilities need to be

addressed first for reconstitution and protection. This is somewhat the inverse of target planning, in which the target is now the element of critical

infrastructure. Simulation tools for this prioritization planning need to be

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES 103
developed or modified from existing planning tools such that targeting assets could be transformed from “find it and destroy it” to “find it and understand it.”

Education and training packages. Software training packages and

mobile or virtual training centers are required for tailored training in engineering, services, and civil administration. Training must be sensitive to

the significant religious, cultural, historical, and environmental factors

that define a country.

Infrastructure equipment. Construction, water purification, and

sanitation equipment is required to repair and maintain systems that may

be archaic or incompatible with existing repair parts. Deployable equipment is required to provide water and sanitation while the permanent infrastructure is being renewed. High-density, lightweight electric power

supplies such as fuel cells and compact fuel oil generators can supply

emergency power during power interruptions. Emergency medical treatment equipment and transportable field hospitals may be required to support both the military and civilian populations.

Human Relations

Human relations are key to winning the peace. To be successful the

United States must gain trust and create a state in which the citizens of an

occupied nation feel that their condition is improved and that they have

hope for the future. Rebuilding the infrastructure is a large part of this objective but other human relations aspects, such as communications and

job creation also build morale. Technology can also contribute to the well

being of our own troops, mostly through connectivity to the continental

United States.

Human relations needs

Civilian communications. Communications between coalition

forces and the local population are required to bridge cultural differences,

establish trust, deliver our message, and counter disinformation about

our intent.

Civilian job creation and training. Long-term self-viability for an

occupied country is the ability to take over and manage their own affairs.

The United States needs to further this with job creation and training at

both the blue-collar and white-collar levels.

Record generation, storage, and management. It is significant that

insurgent efforts to destabilize Iraq have focused on the destruction of

records that are essential for stabilization, which requires accurate records

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of property, contracts and general information. Records are also needed to

track the demobilized military and refugees.

Troop morale and welfare for extended tours. Extended tours appear to be inevitable in such operations as Iraq. U.S. troops are currently

operating in a harsh and threatening environment with few of the amenities associated with deployments at home or in Europe.

Technology for human relations

Public information sources. Public information, including television,

radio and newspapers, needs to be utilized to advantage U.S. goals. The

United States should develop tailored messages for the local population on

such topics as “this week’s progress in providing reliable electrical power,”

or “the interim government’s weekly message on free vaccinations,” which

would provide a continuous flow of public service announcements.

Training tools for culture, linguistics. Skills in culture and language

are not quickly acquired. However, software, pamphlets, and videos can be

tailored to specific topics such as cultural dos and don’ts in everyday life or

roles of religious leaders in secular life.

Mobile, real-time language translators. The long-term goal of a machine translator is to match the capability of a human translator. This requires not only vocabulary and syntax but also sensitivity to inflection,

idiom, and nuance for oral translation. Machine translation has progressed significantly in translating text but is in its infancy in rapid accurate oral translation.

Elite modeling. The United States needs to develop the set of characteristics of indigenous potential leaders to determine whom it can work

with and who are the leadership’s friends and enemies. Modeling based

on human factors and required skills needs to be developed to augment

this profiling.

Conclusions

● While a high level of technology characterizes the U.S. military,

gaps exist in its capabilities and equipment to perform stabilization and

reconstruction in a post-conflict environment such as in Iraq.

● Most of this technology and equipment was optimized for professional military formations. However, since nations are controlled from

cities, our military technology for S&R operations needs to be optimized

for urban terrain.

● In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the lack of a functioning civil infrastructure frustrates our ability to achieve a satisfactory S&R end state.

SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGIES 105
● As in combat operations, success depends on knowledge of the

enemy. Technology to identify, track, and eliminate threats to civil authority is fundamental to S&R success. At the same time, conventional military

power must be visible enough to deter organized military resistance.

● Such military systems as communications devices, vehicles,

weapons, surveillance systems, and planning tools should be enhanced to

operate in a civilian environment.

● In addition, the military should directly use or modify equipment,

such as body armor and non-lethal weapons, originally developed for police, SWAT teams, and riot control.

● Finally, there are areas where new technologies such as robotics,

non-lethal weapons, and language translators can provide high-payoff results to both the military and to civilian police forces.

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Chapter 8

Interagency Capabilities

The evolving nature of conflict is such that no one department or

agency has sufficient resources, expertise, or authority to respond

unilaterally to all of the requirements for a return to stability when

the fighting stops. The reconstitution of the infrastructure of a society following extensive military conflict requires the involvement of multiple actors due to the confluence of a variety of considerations—including governance, economic growth, essential services, and security. During

conflict, the Department of Defense is responsible for the establishment of

a secure environment to facilitate the restoration of civil order. However,

there are many tasks required to rebuild the national infrastructure and

society for which executive departments other than DOD have the necessary expertise. The deeper the interagency cooperation during planning

and execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations, the sooner

the military will be able to pass responsibility to civilian agencies to begin

the nation-building mission.

Many non-DOD departments and agencies possess the knowledge

and skill sets, if not resources, necessary to supplant or augment military

capabilities in situations where DOD resources are already sufficiently engaged or security related concerns are of a higher priority. These situations

include humanitarian and refugee assistance, establishment of new political institutions, reconstitution of a national financial system, reformation

of the judicial process and component elements, and introduction of economic recovery initiatives, including significant rebuilding of national

commercial, transportation, and sanitation/health infrastructures. The involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international

organizations (IOs) is also necessary to ensure that the full spectrum of requirements for post-conflict reconstruction efforts is addressed. More

than ever, interagency cooperation, within the USG as well as between the

USG and other actors, is critical for effective post-conflict reconstruction.

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Two different initiatives are needed to accomplish this task. First, significant improvements must be made to the interagency decisionmaking

process. Second, civilian agencies need new structures and programs to

harness and deliver their capabilities better.

Background

The tragic deaths of U.S. military personnel in Somalia was a watershed event in uncovering the failure of the interagency community to plan

effectively and share information. These lapses in marshalling the power of

the Executive Branch were recognized at the highest levels, and the National Security Council (NSC) staff initiated steps toward corrective action. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD–56) attempted to institutionalize a procedure for interagency planning and management of

complex contingency operations. The intent was to achieve unity of effort

within departments and agencies and to develop realistic missions and

tasks. Under PDD–56, the Deputies Committee (DC) would establish an

Executive Committee (ExComm), to oversee the efforts of an Interagency

Working Group (IWG) in developing a political-military plan, supervising

its rehearsal, and completing an after-action review to institutionalize the

lessons learned for future planning.

While PDD–56 increased awareness of the need for interagency coordination, it fell short of its original intent and was rarely invoked other

than as an internal tool by the NSC staff. There was no enforcement mechanism to ensure that departments and agencies adopted a planning

process for complex crisis operations or institutionalized lessons learned.

Regrettably, PDD–56 did not have the powerful impact on the interagency

planning process that it might have due to the absence of assertive NSC

staff oversight and resistance from various federal departments. Nevertheless, the desire to achieve a more comprehensive level of integration in the

planning for complex crises was shared by the majority of those Federal

officials who underwent the training and education programs developed

and executed by the National Defense University, the U.S. Foreign Service

Institute, and the U.S. Army War College. This troika of academic institutions established a program of Interagency Transformation, Education

and After Action Review (ITEA) which conducted six large-scale educational events for Deputy Assistant and subordinate level officials over three

years and measurably enhanced the understanding of the planning process

required to integrate interagency operations at strategic levels.

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A complicating factor in this equation is that the number of players

has multiplied substantially since the end of the Cold War. What had been

a fairly simple organizational structure to manage before (Defense, State

and NSC) became a far more difficult maze of competing and conflicting

entities, each with its own culture, organization, orientation and desire to

shepherd their resources in fulfillment of their parochial needs. As the

number of players has grown, so has the complexity of coordinating and

managing their capabilities. The absence of efficient and integrated planning only compounds this situation.

The Bush Administration revisited the issue of interagency coordination in its first National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD).

NSPD–1 revised the structure of the National Security Council System.

While it does not apply directly to crisis situations, NSPD–1 is intended to

improve the interagency structure, thereby addressing some of the shortcomings of previous attempts to institutionalize interagency coordination.

Regrettably, the structural aspects of interagency coordination were not

matched by a procedural directive resulting in a situation where there was

form but little management application within which the elements of execution could effect realistic planning. An attempt was made to correct

this oversight by the drafting of what became known as “NSPD XX,” but

this directive was shelved.

The inclusion of a dedicated unit in S&R JCOM headquarters to

develop strong liaison with civilian agencies can provide an important

complement to military capabilities, which are more focused on combat

operations and post-conflict security. This is an important issue to resolve. Civilian agencies bring critical skill to the field that the military

cannot duplicate. Hence, the need for a well-staffed C-MAC within the

S&R JCOM to develop and maintain strong liaison with civilian agencies

as they arrive in theater. Many civilian departments have the functional

expertise necessary for a comprehensive USG response in a post-conflict

environment. Inclusion of these agencies helps to ensure that military accomplishments are not jeopardized by the lack of an integrated plan that

addresses the difficulties of post-conflict reconstruction, such as the collapse of the political system, the loss of law enforcement capabilities, the

breakdown of basic infrastructure, and the emergence of a humanitarian

crisis. While the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is

the most prominent partner in stabilization and reconstruction, other

agencies with critical expertise include:

INTERAGENCY CAPABILITIES 109
■ Forward deployed elements of the Department of State, which can

provide timely assistance to local leadership on the reestablishment

of a basic political framework for a stable government and also

work with their military counterparts as counsel on various political-military issues that must be immediately addressed.

■ The Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), which has unique capabilities for international training and criminal justice development.

■ The Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative

Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) can provide much valued

assistance based upon its extensive experience in supporting foreign governments in the establishment of civilian law enforcement

capabilities.

■ The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the Department of Agriculture, which is equipped to increase income and food availability

by mobilizing expertise for agriculturally led economic growth.

■ The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) field office team

should also be part of the proposed S&R JCOMs, because of the urgency for making funds available to operational elements.

Discussion

Improving Interagency Coorination

While both PDD–56 and NSPD–1 address the issue of interagency

coordination at the strategic level, more needs to be done. The creation of

a National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group (NIACCG) has

been suggested to fill the need for a national level group to plan and coordinate post-conflict operations. The group would be chaired by the

NSC and consist of representatives from the departments that are critical

to the mission, including Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and

Agriculture. The body would meet on a regular basis to review lessons

learned from past operations and develop strategic guidance for agencies

that have a role in post-conflict operations. When planning begins for

major combat, this group would be responsible for providing strategic

guidance and coordinating planning among the departments involved in

post-conflict operations.

The guidance from the NIACCG would be implemented at the operational level by chiefs of mission and by combatant commanders. To

establish the same unity of effort at this level, a vehicle for coordinating

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and managing interagency planning is required. The linkage between these

two levels of engagement has been bridged by the development and deployment of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to each of

the regional commands, and funding initiatives are currently under consideration to institutionalize this experiment as a permanent component

on command staffs. These coordinating mechanisms, once formally established and manned, will provide combatant commands in-house counsel

and expertise of civilian agencies. The concept for this novel organization

provides for a broader advisory capacity to enable a threefold mission: to

reach forward to other departments and agencies that are represented on

country teams, to reach back to parent agencies to facilitate coordination

and provide additional explanation of national policy guidance to the

commands, and to reach horizontally across the combatant command

staffs to educate these military elements on the capabilities, resources, and

limitations of the civil departments and agencies. JIACGs, however, are not

policymaking bodies and do not have the direct authority to commit their

agencies to forward deployed operations.

Due to the complexity of tasks in a post-conflict environment, a

greater depth of planning and coordination is needed, even below the

combatant command level. Personnel from key civilian agencies need to

be forward deployed with stabilization and reconstruction units so that

operations are enhanced by the full range of capabilities resident in the

USG. While there are inherent dangers and incurred risks associated with

any deployed force, whether civilian or military, capabilities for operations within major deployed forces should be linked to capabilities that

exist within the strategic and theater strategic levels. In order to accomplish this objective, civilian agency representation should be a part of the

select S&R units.

Strengthening Civilian S&R Capabilities

The key goal of stabilization and reconstruction operations is to

establish stable conditions in theater so that civilian agencies of the U.S.

government or a multinational organization can take control and begin

the process of nation-building.

This is illustrated by figure 3 of the Executive Summary. As major

combat operations end, control could pass to the commander of the S&R

forces. The combat forces would swing into a supporting role in the S&R

operations. As stability takes root, combat forces could begin to be withdrawn. When the theater is stable enough, control could pass from the military S&R commander to civilian authorities from the State Department

INTERAGENCY CAPABILITIES 111
or to a UN representative responsible for the nation-building mission. The

sooner this handoff takes place, the sooner the military can begin to draw

down its forces in theater, and civilian personnel with skills appropriate to

nation-building tasks can take over the evolving mission.

With this in mind, the United States should focus on ways to ensure

that the handoff of control takes place as soon as feasible and therefore

that the expertise for the nation-building mission is in place as promptly

as possible. A two-step process to achieve this is described below.

● Create a standing interagency S&R team that could deploy to the theater promptly with the skills needed to prepare for nation-building.

This would be a standing team of several hundred people at most.

They would be deployed to the theater as soon as major combat operations

had ended and stabilization and reconstruction operations had begun.

They would lay the groundwork for the nation-building mission, including preparing for the arrival of additional personnel from federal government agencies, contractors, and others involved in nation-building. When

in theater, they could deploy with the C–MAC.

The interagency team would include, at a minimum, personnel from

the State Department, the Agency for International Development, Justice,

Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture. A commitment to be “on call” to

deploy to the theater on relatively short notice would be part of their job

responsibilities. During peacetime they would meet periodically with

planners from the S&R JCOM to review and update plans for the integration of the S&R mission with the initiation of the nation-building mission.

When deployed to theater, they would typically work with the J-10 in the

combatant commander’s headquarters to plan for the transfer of authority from the military to the State Department.

● Develop an on-call civilian crisis management corps that has a reservoir of expertise for the nation-building mission.

The key cause of delay in transferring control from the military to

civilian authorities is likely to be the time it takes to get personnel with the

skills needed for the nation-building mission into theater. It would be prohibitively expensive to have an organization staffed with skilled personnel

full-time during peace, but this is not necessary. Considerable untapped

skills needed for nation-building exist in the private sector, particularly in

the medical, legal, language, and law enforcement fields. The U.S. government, with State Department in the lead, could establish a civilian crisis

management corps. The corps would contract with personnel or organizations to commit to deploying to a theater promptly upon being notified.

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This cadre could be drawn from state and local governments as well as the

private sector. They, along with additional personnel from the federal government and from contractors, could join the early deploying interagency

team to begin the nation-building mission promptly.

Conclusions

● During post-conflict S&R operations, when chaos, ambiguity, and

uncertainty dominate the environment, the failure to appreciate the need

for interagency cooperation can lead to duplication of effort, gaps in the

provision of goods and services, and added tension among stakeholders.

● Even while DOD works to accomplish its primary goal of establishing basic security, there are a number of issues that must be addressed

simultaneously for successful post-conflict reconstruction. These issues

include the alleviation of suffering through humanitarian assistance, the

establishment of a stable political system, the maintenance of law and

order, including the training of law enforcement personnel, the promotion of economic growth, and the reestablishment of basic infrastructure

and services.

● While DOD may still have a role in these issues, the bulk of these

tasks will fall upon their civilian counterparts, such as the Departments of

State, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, and Energy and USAID. Although

these agencies do not have the resources and personnel that are found

within Defense, they possess a refined knowledge of specific functions that

fall outside the scope of security operations.

● In order to achieve objectives in post-conflict reconstruction, departments and agencies need to work in conjunction with one another, including the ambassador/country team, and with NGOs and IOs.

● Achieving this degree of coordination requires a planning capability that is initiated early, developed in a coordinated manner, and continued throughout the multiple phases of the operation. This multi-agency

engagement is important at the strategic and operational levels, but is even

more vital in its implementation, where minor setbacks can have an immediate and lasting impact on the entire operation.

● If specially equipped and trained S&R units are tasked with key responsibilities for post-conflict reconstruction, civilian departments and

agencies should be represented in these organizations to bring about more

effective planning and implementation. New governmental structures will

be needed to accomplish this.

INTERAGENCY CAPABILITIES 113
Chapter 9

International Capabilities

Recent events in Iraq have highlighted the need for stabilization and

reconstruction operations to solidify the military gains U.S. forces

have achieved. While much discussed, achieving a stable environment has proved difficult, not only because of the conditions encountered,

but because combat operations and S&R operations are different, requiring different types of forces, with different training and equipment, and

even different mindsets. American combat forces have proven to be very

good at combat, but have come up short in S&R operations. Though U.S.

forces have been gaining experience in peace operations and missions

other than war, these types of operations traditionally have been shunned

and seen as detracting from combat readiness. Major General William

Nash, USA (Ret.), former commander of U.S. forces in Bosnia, once said

that the U.S. military, in their heart of hearts, feels very strongly that they

do not want to be peacekeepers, and who can blame them, because fighting is what they do.

Still, because failure to secure the peace negates gains made through

combat, new attention is being paid to S&R operations. Senior defense officials are considering the creation of some type of international peacekeeping force that the United States would train and equip. This force

would be a mix of American troops and foreign/regional forces. Though

originally conceived for peace operations, this force should also contain

personnel appropriately trained for S&R operations. American personnel

committed to this force might be assigned on a long-term basis, thus allowing them to develop institutional expertise in the unique nature of these

types of missions, and in working with the associated foreign members.

Training and equipping such a force in advance of deployment would reduce problems with coordination and interoperability that have plagued

other multinational peacekeeping efforts. With proper preparation and advanced planning, such a force would be able to react quickly to situations,

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such as the recent crisis in Liberia, by minimizing the problems that have

slowed other such deployments.

The viability of this concept depends on several factors, a critical one

being the willingness of foreign nations to contribute to such a force. Even

if donors can be found, could such a force truly be effective? What steps

would have to be taken to create it? What would be its status under international law? The underlying question is, is it realistic for the United States

to rely on the international community to provide forces in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations?

Background

Recent Nation-building Efforts

The history of American involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations, followed by nation-building, is one of mixed success as illustrated by table 8. An examination of these efforts indicates the value of

involving the international community. In a recent study, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that multinational participation leads to a higher probability that democracy will take root.1 Whether

the presence of multinational forces is a key determinant for success may be

debated, but there can be little question that the involvement of foreign

peacekeeping/stability forces decreases the burden on American forces.

Afghanistan offers an example of how a multinational effort can be

used to bolster S&R operations following a conflict. The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) is composed of 33 countries operating

pursuant to a UN mandate. NATO assumed control of the force in August

2003. In what must still be considered a hostile environment, security has

been established in and around Kabul. Since that time, the UN has expanded the ISAF mandate to provide security to areas outside Kabul and

its environs. Though reports from the field have cited difficulties in coordinating what, in many ways, had initially been an ad hoc force, they also

have emphasized the contributions that coalition forces continue to make

toward improving the situation in the country.

Operations in Iraq have cast into sharp relief some of the problems of

putting together a multinational S&R force after the fact. Without a firm

commitment based on a broad consensus of an alliance or the UN, the

United States has encountered difficulties lining up foreign forces to take

over some of the burdens in post-conflict Iraq. Aside from Britain, foreign

contributions have been minimal, with only three nations contributing

over 1,000 troops. (As of summer 2003, Poland had committed 2,300,

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Ukraine 1,800 and Spain 1,300, with Bulgaria, The Philippines, Romania,

Latvia, Nicaragua, Slovakia, and Lithuania all contributing substantially

less.) Many nations have been unwilling to participate without a UN mandate in what is viewed as a conflict initiated by America. Other nations have

indicated a willingness to participate, but have attached unacceptable conditions; as an example, Fiji has said it would send 700 troops, but refuses to

have them serve under the Polish general who commands the foreign contingent in Iraq.

The Need for an Organizing Principle

Though it is apparent that multinational peacekeeping/stability operations have certain advantages, involving many nations in these efforts is

no guarantee of success. While the United Nations has conducted 56

peacekeeping missions since its inception (13 of which are currently active), its record is mixed. The reasons for failure are many and varied.

However, commonly cited difficulties include disagreements among the

participating members as to the mission and how it is to be accomplished

and difficulties in integrating diverse units with varying capabilities. The

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Table 8: American Efforts at Nation-Building, 1898–2003

Type Successes Failures Ongoing

Unilateral Panama (1989) Cambodia (1970–73)

Grenada (1983) Vietnam (1964–73)

Dominican Republic

(1964–65)

Japan (1945–52) Cuba (1917–22)

Dominican Republic

(1916–24)

Haiti (1915–34)

Nicaragua (1909–33)

Cuba (1906–09)

Panama (1903–36)

Cuba (1898–1902)

Multilateral Germany (1945–49) Haiti (1994–96) Afghanistan

(2001–Present)

Kosovo* (1999–Present)

Bosnia-Herzegovina*

(1995–Present)

* Though not examined in the Carnegie Study, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are both multilateral efforts that are ongoing.
UN has achieved greater success in places where it has partnered with regional organizations, such as with NATO in Kosovo. In such cases, the UN

has focused its efforts on political or reconstruction tasks while a regional

organization or lead nation has provided security.

NATO has fared better, primarily because participation was viewed

as being in the best interest of the alliance and its members. Member nations are accustomed to working together and already share common doctrine, procedures, and equipment. In Afghanistan, NATO assumption of

ISAF responsibilities has been hailed as an example of how an alliance can

be used in this type of role. Still, it cannot be assumed that an alliance with

the competence of NATO will exist in all cases or, if one did exist, that the

member states would be willing to support a specific mission.

What is apparent is that there must be a reason, or an organizing

principle, for the participating nations to band together in these efforts.

The legitimacy given by a UN mandate is critical to gaining support

from most nations, but even that may not suffice to convince members

of the international community to participate. National interest is a

strong motivating factor, but care must be taken in offering this incentive, lest such interests override the nature of the mission. Thomas

Barrett argues that, because of the benefits to be had from stability in a

region, all of the developed and many of the developing nations of the

world should be willing to participate in these types of operations.2 In a

globalized world, it is in the interests of both developed and developing

states to bring about conditions that will encourage further development

and a stable security environment. Failure has too many consequences,

from the dangers posed by rogue states with access to weapons of mass

destruction, to the adverse consequences of migration and refugee flows,

to the creation of fertile ground for terrorist activities. Thus, nations that

do not believe so already must be convinced that the benefits of a safe

and secure global environment far outweigh the costs involved in achieving it.

This is not to say that every nation will be willing to participate in

every case. It may be far easier to recruit countries to participate where

they see a direct impact on their own region, or where they have cultural

or economic ties. The EU assumption of duties from NATO in Macedonia

is a case in point. There, the desire for regional security caused the EU to

take on its first such mission. A feeling of involvement or ownership is essential if these types of missions are to succeed, and this can only be

achieved where the member nations feel that they are an integral part of

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the process. According to James Dobbins, former U.S. envoy to Somalia,

Bosnia, and Afghanistan, it is necessary that member states feel they have

a stake in the management, as well as the risks and the costs.

Discussion

The Nature of an International Peacekeeping Force

The problem in Iraq, and to varying degrees elsewhere, is that multinational S&R operations have been more or less an afterthought and not

organized or coordinated in advance. As described by one senior government official just returned from Iraq, the United States failed to line up

potential coalition members for post-conflict S&R operations, failed to determine the size or makeup of such a force, and failed even to specify how

long the donor nations might expect their forces to serve. Many countries

were unwilling to sign up for an open-ended commitment. With the lack

of a UN mandate, still others were concerned with the domestic backlash

they might face for supporting what was perceived by many as an unjustified exercise in American adventurism.

To address these types of concerns, an International Peacekeeping

Force is envisioned that would call on nations to commit to providing

forces, when needed, for future stability operations. Troops so designated

would receive special training in these types of operations. Training

prior to deployment would be tailored to specific conditions, while

maintaining a pool of units to choose from would allow organizers to

customize the force to meet the nature of the mission. Deployment of

this force ideally would have a UN mandate, though, depending on the

situation, this might not be a necessary precondition. In return for committing to support such efforts, the donor nations could receive equipment and training for the designated units, logistics support, and financial assistance.

While the exact U.S. role in this effort is currently under discussion,

indications are that DOD would be willing to establish and support several training centers for these forces in the United States or elsewhere.

Standardizing training and equipment would reduce problems with command, control, and interoperability that have plagued previous multinational operations. American involvement would insure that certain standards of training would be met, especially in such areas as civil-military

affairs and human rights. The United States also could provide logistics

support to deploy this force and maintain it in the field. Finally, the United

States probably would be a major contributor to such a force, because, as

INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES 119
noted by one senior DOD official, the United States can only expect to

maintain its credibility as leader in such situations if it demonstrates the

willingness to commit its own forces. This does not exclude the possibility

of other nations taking the lead role in a specific situation, as Australia did

in East Timor. However, even when the United States plays the leading

role, as in Iraq, the existence of a viable international peacekeeping force

would do much to reduce the burden on American resources.

Donor Populations

For an international peacekeeping force to be viable, there must be

enough other countries willing to contribute to it. Historically, countries

have contributed forces to international peacekeeping efforts for reasons

ranging from altruism to regional self-interest and expectation of material

gain. In August 2003, 89 UN members contributed over 36,000 military

and civilian police to ongoing UN peacekeeping operations (See table 9 for

major contributors).3 Whether countries would be willing to commit to a

pool that would support future peacekeeping or stabilization and reconstruction operations as part of an international force, and under what circumstances, would have to be determined. However, based on experience,

some projections can be made.

European militaries, especially NATO members, often make significant contributions to multinational peacekeeping operations (see table 10).

These troops pay their own way, tend to be well trained and well equipped,

and maintain a degree of autonomy. Though these countries sometimes

have interests that preclude contributing, they can still be counted on where

they have regional concerns, or where their interests and those of the

United States coincide.

A second group of poorer and less developed nations has traditionally provided willing contributors to S&R operations. These nations see

participation in these operations as a means of financing and obtaining

equipment and training for their militaries. Their forces typically require

training, transportation to the theater, and substantial logistical and technical support, once deployed. Still, once trained and deployed, these forces

have performed acceptably.

A third group, falling somewhere between the first two, has taken

on new significance in the post-Cold War world. These are nations, primarily from the old Eastern Bloc, that have small yet capable militaries

and do not really require extensive training and equipment. However,

they lack the logistics and technical means required to support longterm or distant deployments. Examples of this group are the Czech

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Republic, Poland, and Romania, all of which have deployed forces to

Afghanistan and Iraq. Countries such as Argentina and Brazil might also

be considered to be in this category. These countries are sufficiently large

and technologically advanced to provide substantial contingents of relatively skilled forces, with U.S. or other assistance, for participation in

out-of-sector deployments. At least in the immediate future, these countries are less likely to have policy interests that would conflict with U.S.

goals or adversely affect their ability to participate.

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Table 9: Leading Foreign Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations

Civilian Military

Number Country Police Observers Troops Total

1 Pakistan 200 75 3,905 4,180

2 Bangladesh 91 63 3,771 3,926

3 India 360 39 2,534 2,933

4 Ghana 74 45 1,908 2,027

5 Uruguay — 62 1,740 1,802

6 Kenya 55 62 1,674 1,791

7 Nigeria 60 54 1,630 1,744

8 Jordan 434 57 1,088 1,579

9 South Africa — 7 1,409 1,416

10 Ukraine 195 31 832 1,058

11 Nepal 72 39 811 922

12 Zambia 18 38 832 888

13 Australia 59 18 794 871

14 Poland 124 16 597 737

15 Portugal 42 1 656 699

16 Morocco — 1 657 658

17 Slovakia — 4 603 607

18 United Kingdon 148 25 430 603

19 Argentina 149 7 401 557

20 Thailand 18 11 508 537

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, August 31, 2003.
Niche Capabilities

As noted earlier, in addition to manpower, foreign militaries can

provide unique capabilities that enhance the likelihood of success of

S&R operations. Multinational units, like the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), have been created specifically for peacekeeping operations and have been equipped and trained in the skills needed for these

types of missions. Other skills important for success in these operations

can be found in national forces and represent capabilities U.S. forces

lack. This is especially the case in constabulary and domestic police

forces, such as the French Gendarmerie and Italian Carabinieri. Other

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Table 10: Contributions to Major Multinational Peace Operations*

Country Personnel

Germany 6,841

France 6,624

Italy 6,295

United Kingdom 3,554

Turkey 2,731

Spain 2,180

Poland 1,575

Canada 1,457

Greece 1,382

Netherlands 1,348

Portugal 1,048

Norway 994

Australia 950

Denmark 869

Belgium 682

Japan 680

Hungary 668

Czech Republic 604

Source: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense 2002.

* Data includes forces committed to United Nations and other multilateral peace operations.
skills or niche capabilities could include linguist support, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) detection and decontamination

units, civil and public affairs detachments, engineer support, medical,

and intelligence and informational assets.

A partial list of potential contributors, based on current deployments or offers of support, indicates that there is a wide range of countries and skills that can be drawn upon (see table 11). Difficulties that

arise in bringing together and integrating forces from various nations can

be alleviated to a large degree through careful planning, coordination,

and training. The key to success, as seen in Kosovo, is to anticipate the use

of these forces far enough in advance of deployment that the difficulties

inherent in such multinational operations do not detract from the mission itself. As seen in the example of NATO, multinational training and

operational experience can overcome differences in language and national orientation. In sum, the advantages to having a wide range of

forces, with unique skills and capabilities, far outweighs the difficulties

involved in managing such a force.

A NATO S&R Capability

As NATO allies transform their combat forces and focus increasingly

on operations beyond Europe, they too will need to transform their force

structures to achieve strengthened, deployable S&R forces. The reorganization will have to be done in concert with two other major force development projects underway in Europe: the NATO Response Force (NRF)

and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). These forces and the S&R

contingents could relate to one another as illustrated in figure 13.

NATO is in the process of standing up the NATO Response Force,

about 21,000 troops, which will focus on demanding expeditionary operations. Concurrently, the European Union is developing a European Rapid

Reaction Force that, when fully assembled, could number up to 100,000

troops to address peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, primarily in and on the periphery of Europe.

In addition to the NRF and ERRF, NATO should create a new S&R

capability that mirrors the American S&R force proposed in chapters 4

and 5. This would build upon NATO’s already significant peace operations

experience. As with the NRF, the NATO S&R Force would gain from reorganization and focused training and equipment. The proposed NATO

S&R Force could deploy behind the NRF and pick up the stabilization and

reconstruction missions in the wake of successful NRF action. The NATO

S&R Force would draw from the same pool of European forces to be used

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Table 11: Potential Niche Capability Contributors to Multinational S&R Operation

Military Civil

Police/ Civilian Affairs/ 

Constabulary Police Engineer CIMIC Medical EOD Transport 

Argentina X X Armenia X X Australia Austria XAzerbaijan Belgium X X XBulgaria XCanada X X Czech Republic X X X Denmark X X X X Estonia XFinland France X X X X Georgia Germany X X X X X Ghana XHungary X India XItaly X X X X X X Jordan XLithuania X
Kazakhstan X Kenya XKyrgyzstan Morocco XNepal XNetherlands X XNigeria XNorway X X X Pakistan XPhilippines XPoland X Portugal X X XRomania X X XSlovakia X X X Slovenia XSpain XSweden X Switzerland X X XTajikistan Turkey X X XUkraine X X X X X United Kingdom X X X Uzbekistan 

Source: Compiled from the KFOR website and interviews with senior defense analysts.
for the ERRF, but its missions would not necessarily be the same. The NRF

and S&R Force would give Europe the full spectrum of capabilities to wage

modern war and win modern peace. It would also give Europe a stronger

and more versatile ERRF over time, plus the choice to use NATO or the EU

as a policy instrument.

Many will question whether NATO can create a new S&R Force so

soon after the birth of the NRF. Two arguments favor the proposition.

First, NATO now has considerable peace operations experience on which

to base this reorganization. Second, NATO officials estimate that existing

European force structure can be cut by thirty to forty percent because of

its Cold War orientation. Savings from these reductions could be spent to

improve the NRF and create a new NATO S&R Force.

Pros, Cons, and a Caveat

Aside from the obvious benefit of sharing the burden of such deployments with members of the international community, there are other

advantages to an international peacekeeping force. Based on the niche

capabilities of national forces, organizers could customize an S&R operations package. The use of international forces would lessen the U.S. footprint in deployments and give them greater legitimacy. Training and

deploying such forces would build cooperation and understanding between U.S. and participating forces, as well as develop an experience

factor that might be of use in the future. Finally, use of international

forces would help ameliorate the lack of U.S. sensitivity to foreign cultures and religions, and could even be of benefit when the countries

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Figure 12: A Full-Spectrum NATO Force

NATO European Union

NATO Response

Force

European Rapid

Reaction Forces

NATO S&R Forces

(proposed)
participating share a common language, background, or heritage with the

area to which they are deployed.

At the same time, some of these perceived advantages could become

disadvantages, depending on the situation and circumstances. The participation of certain members of a peacekeeping force in a region where

there are existing national or cultural animosities could increase regional

tensions. Sunni Muslims being deployed into a predominantly Shi’a area

is one example. Even though trained and equipped by the United States,

national forces can be expected to remain loyal to their country, which

might have interests that conflict with those of the United States. In such

cases, the United States may find itself at odds with the nations themselves, creating frictions that otherwise might not exist. Just as the United

States disagreed with other members of NATO over Iraq, membership in

an international peacekeeping force is no guarantee that there will not be

disagreements between the United States and other members.

Finally, there are legal issues that must be addressed. Deployment of

a peacekeeping force under UN auspices carries the weight of the backing

of a majority of the international community, but will deployment of a

multinational peacekeeping force without UN sanction carry the same

weight? If major powers are at odds over the use of the force, will there be

an arbitration mechanism, or do members of the force, and by extension

their nations, put themselves at risk of being caught in a great power dispute? Who bears responsibility for damages or injuries suffered during

such deployments? How does the use of such a force coincide with international law? Such questions must be addressed if such a force is to

become a reality.

Conclusions

● The past has proven the value of coalition warfare, and a strong argument can be made for the value of coalitions in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

● The United States stands to gain through international burden

sharing, in terms of the costs involved and the commitment needed, both

of which would be greater if the United States chose to go it alone.

● However, there are other, less tangible benefits to be had, not the

least of which might be the lessening of the negative perception of the

United States as a unitary actor that tends to go its own way without taking into consideration the concerns of other nations.

INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES 127
● The United States has repeatedly demonstrated its military

prowess in war but has yet to establish a winning record in maintaining the

peace. Enlisting the aid and experience of other nations may be a way of

improving that record. As one commentator has noted, “Winning the

peace is as important as winning the war, only harder.”

● Much work will have to go into the development of an international peacekeeping force or a new NATO S&R force. The costs involved

may be high, but far less than the cost of failing to establish a lasting peace

in places such as Iraq.

Notes 1 “From Victory to Success: Afterwar Policy in Iraq,” a special report by The Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace with Foreign Policy (2003). 2 Tom Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney, Jr. “Global Transaction Strategy,” Military Officer, May 2003,

68–77.

3 “Monthly Summary of Contributors,” UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, August

2003.

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Recommendations

This report lays out a framework for reorganizing and planning for

transformed stabilization and reconstruction operations. Under this

framework, we recommend that the Administration:

● Create two joint military headquarters to organize units critical to

the S&R mission (S&R JCOMs). The headquarters would be responsible

for monitoring the status of the units, overseeing training and exercising,

developing doctrine, and planning for S&R operations.

● Field two S&R division-equivalents with joint assets. The first division-equivalent should be mostly active personnel; the second divisionequivalent can include a large component of reserve personnel.

● Organize each division-equivalent to be flexible, modular, scalable,

and rapidly deployable with four brigade-size S&R Groups that include

Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Medical, and PSYOP supported by

a tactical combat capability.

● Develop new strategic concepts for future S&R missions. Key examples are concurrent planning for major combat and S&R missions and

concurrent deployment of combat and S&R forces.

● Designate an adequate number of ready units for S&R missions by

rebalancing the AC/RC mix. Enough units are needed in the overall S&R

force to sustain a rotation basis.

● Revise PME curricula to include more instruction in stabilization

and reconstruction operations, civil-military cooperation, interagency

planning, media relations, and negotiations. Add instructors with a background in sociology, law, and psychology; and especially with experience

in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

● Develop systems and technologies to support S&R operations.

High-priority examples are wireless and land-based communications for

civilian/military interoperability, expert S&R-tailored mission-training

packages for security and infrastructure, unmanned systems, non-lethal

weapons, detection devices for urban operations, and course-of-action

analysis and planning tools.

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● Establish a process for more efficient multi-agency planning, coordination and engagement for S&R operations. Create a National Interagency Contingency Coordination Group (NIACCG) under the National

Security Council with responsibility for planning. Create Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), counterpart organizations in the

combatant commands and the S&R JCOMs, with representatives from

other federal agencies embedded in a J-10 directorate and C–MAC.

● Establish a multi-agency civilian rapid response capability to deploy with S&R forces and prepare for the transition from S&R operations

(military control) to the nation-building mission (civilian control).

● Strengthen international stabilization and reconstruction efforts

by identifying countries with niche capabilities, training and equipping an

international peacekeeping force, and encouraging NATO to develop an

independent S&R force that mirrors the proposed U.S. force.

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About the Contributors

Michael J. Baranick (chapter 1) is Executive Director of CTNSP and

a senior research scientist for modeling and simulation technology. Previously, he was chief of the Modeling and Simulation Branch at the NDU

War Gaming and Simulation Center (now the National Strategic Gaming

Center [NSGC]) and held policy and technical advisory appointments in

the Army. He earned a doctorate in systems planning and development

from The Pennsylvania State University.

Charles L. Barry (chapters 4 and 5) is a Washington-area consultant specializing in information technologies, strategic management,

transatlantic relations, and defense transformation. He has lectured and

published extensively on these topics since 1984 as an editor, contributing author, and author of numerous books, articles, and monographs.

Hans Binnendijk (executive summary) holds the Roosevelt Chair of

National Security Policy at NDU and is Director of CTNSP. He has served

on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and

Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control (1999–2001), and as

Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National

Defense University (1994–1999) and Principal Deputy Director of the

State Department Policy Planning Staff (1993–1994). Dr. Binnendijk is a

graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and received a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,

Tufts University (1972). He is author or co-author of about 100 publications and reports.

Jonas L. Blank (chapter 8) is a senior analyst in the National Strategic Gaming Center. Before joining the NSGC, Mr. Blank, he was the

chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the

National War College. Previously, he was assigned to the Joint Staff as

Chief of the Strategy Division (J–5) where he was involved with national

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security strategy formulation and other interagency working group issues, particularly those related to operations other than war. His combat

experience includes special operations flying units in Vietnam and

F–111F operations in Desert Storm.

Daniel L. Burghart (chapter 9) is a specialist in Russian and Central

European affairs who joined CTNSP as a senior research fellow upon retirement from the United States Army. He has extensive experience in the

former Soviet Union, especially in Central Asia. He holds a B.A. in political

science from Illinois, a dual Masters degree in political science and Russian

area studies from University of Wisconsin, and a Ph.D. in Russian and international studies from the University of Surrey. His publications include

Red Microchip: Technology Transfer, Export Control and Economic Restructuring in the Soviet Union (Dartmouth, 1992).

Leigh C. Caraher (chapter 6) worked at the Atlantic Council of the

United States, a foreign policy research institute in Washington, D.C., before

joining CTNSP as a research associate. Her research areas include peace

operations, professional military education, and military transformation.

Ms. Caraher is a graduate of the University of Virginia.

Joseph J. Eash, III (chapter 7) is a CTNSP distinguished fellow on an

Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) detail from Georgia Tech Research

Institute. He is the program manager for the Pre-Conflict Management

Tools project. Before joining CTNSP, he was Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts, in which capacity he was responsible for oversight of advanced concept technology demonstrations.

He has 45 years of experience in managing high technology programs in

the military and industry.

Dr. Stuart E. Johnson (chapter 4) is a CTNSP distinguished research

professor. He has extensive experience in DOD and at NATO Headquarters as a defense planner and policy analyst. He earned a B.S. degree in

chemistry from Amherst College (1966) and a Ph.D. in physics from the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1971) and did post-doctoral work

in physics at the University of Leiden, Netherlands, 1971–72. His most recent book is New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking

(RAND 2003).

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L. Erik Kjonnerod (chapter 8) is a senior fellow and supervisory chief

of the NSGC Security Strategy and Policy Division and Director of the

NDU Interagency Transformation, Education, and After Action Review

Program. An adjunct professor at George Washington University and the

Foreign Service Institute, he lectures frequently on politico-military affairs

and crisis decision-making processes. He is a noted Latin American civilmilitary specialist who has served in military and diplomatic postings

throughout the Americas. He earned a B.A. degree from Rutgers (1967), an

M.A. from the University of Illinois (1974), and will receive a doctorate in

education from George Mason University at the end of his current

academic program.

Richard L. Kugler (chapter 3) is a distinguished research professor

in CTNSP. A former senior executive in OSD and director of the DOD

Strategic Concepts and Development Center in the 1980s, he is a defense

planner and strategic analyst with over 30 years of experience in DOD

and RAND. His specialties are U.S. defense strategy, global security affairs, and NATO. An operations research analyst and political scientist, he

holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the

author of many studies and journal articles and 15 books on defense and

security issues, including The Global Century: Globalization and National

Security, Vol. 1 and 2 (National Defense University Press, 2001), co-edited

with Ellen Frost.

Douglas A. Macgregor (chapter 2) is a colonel in the U.S. Army and

a senior research fellow in CTNSP. He has served in a variety of command

and staff assignments, including command of a division cavalry squadron

in the 1st Infantry Division (Mech). During Desert Storm, Colonel Macgregor was awarded the bronze star with "V" device for valor while leading

combat troops of the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in

the battle of the 73 Easting. He was commissioned in the U.S. Army in

1976 upon graduation from West Point and holds an M.A. in comparative

politics and a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Virginia. His publications include The Soviet-East German Military Alliance

(Cambridge University Press, 1989), Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design

for Landpower in the 21st Century (Praeger, 1997), and Transformation

Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Praeger, 2003).

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 133
Larry K. Wentz (chapter 1) is a research scientist at the George

Mason University (GMU) Center of Excellence in C3I and an independent consultant. Before joining GMU, he was the director of the lessons

from Kosovo study sponsored by the ASD (C3I) Command and Control

Research Program (CCRP). Mr. Wentz has extensive experience in civilmilitary support to peace operations and U.S., Coalition JTF, and NATO

C2 and C4ISR research, architectures, systems, operations and exercises,

and training. Mr. Wentz has a B.S.E.E from Monmouth College (1965)

and an M.S. in systems engineering and operations research from the

University of Pennsylvania Moore School of Engineering (1968). His

publications include Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (CCRP,

1997) and Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience (CCRP, 2002).

Elihu Zimet (chapter 7) is a CTNSP distinguished research professor on an IPA detail from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. He has

directed basic research, applied research, and advanced development programs in missile, gun, and directed energy weapons, aircraft avionics and

propulsion, and low observable and counter low observable technologies.

He holds a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering from the Polytechnic

Institute of Brooklyn (1962) and a Ph.D. from Yale University (1969).

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military services, defense laboratories, Congress, and other government agencies. Major areas 

of focus include military transformation, science and technology policy, life sciences, homeland

security, and computational social science modeling. The center staff is comprised of defense

analysts and technologists and is led by two senior analysts who hold the Roosevelt Chair of

National Security Policy and the Edison Chair of Science and Technology.

Cover 4—Bleeds 3 sides, butts to Cover 1