J-S54031-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ADAM STIDFOLE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 449 MDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 4, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-44-CR-0000677-2016

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2021

Adam Stidfole (“Stidfole”) appeals from the Order denying his first 

Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

In or about September 2016, Mifflin County Children and Youth 

(“CYS”) received two reports regarding the care of a 10-year-old girl (“the 

victim”). The first report indicated that the victim was being left alone with 

Stidfole, who was not the victim’s father or an appropriate caretaker. The 

second report indicated that the victim was overheard talking about having 

sex with Stidfole and watching pornography. CYS caseworker Hannah Wert 

(“Wert”) investigated the allegations, and reported the matter to the 

Pennsylvania State Police. 

State Trooper Shane Varner (“Trooper Varner”) was assigned to 

investigate the case. As a part of his investigation, Trooper Varner 
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interviewed Stidfole, and arranged for the victim to be interviewed by a 

specialist with the Children’s Advocacy Center. After the interviews, Trooper 

Varner filed a Criminal Complaint, accusing Stidfole of various sexual 

offenses relating to the unlawful touching of the victim’s vagina.

On September 18, 2017, following a trial, a jury found Stidfole guilty 

of one count each of aggravated indecent assault and corruption of minors, 

and three counts each of unlawful contact with a minor and indecent 

assault.1 On December 15, 2017, the trial court sentenced Stidfole to an 

aggregate term of 25 to 50 years in prison.2 Stidfole did not file any postsentence motions or a direct appeal.

On May 7, 2018, Stidfole, pro se, filed the instant PCRA Petition. The 

PCRA court appointed Justin P. Miller, Esquire (“Attorney Miller”), as counsel 

for Stidfole. On August 5, 2019, Attorney Miller filed an Amended PCRA 

Petition. Following a hearing, on February 4, 2020, the PCRA Court entered 

an Order denying Stidfole’s Amended PCRA Petition.

On March 5, 2020, Stidfole filed an Application for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal (“Application for IFP Status”). On March 

10, 2020, the PCRA court granted Stidfole’s Application for IFP Status, and 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(a)(7), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 6318(a)(1), 3126(a)(7).

2 On March 6, 2018, the trial court entered an “Amended Sentence” to 

correct the numbering of the counts on the December 15, 2017, sentencing 

Order. Stidfole’s sentence remained the same.
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Stidfole filed a counseled Notice of Appeal from the February 4, 2020, Order 

denying his Amended PCRA Petition. Stidfole subsequently filed a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on 

appeal.

On April 23, 2020, this Court entered an Order stating that Stidfole’s 

March 10, 2020, Notice of Appeal was filed outside of the 30-day appeal

period,3 and directing Stidfole to show cause why his appeal should not be 

quashed as untimely. On May 18, 2020, Attorney Miller filed a Response 

with this Court. 

In his Response, Attorney Miller claims that he had mailed Stidfole’s

Notice of Appeal with the Application for IFP Status; both documents were 

delivered to the Mifflin County Clerk of Courts on March 5, 2020; the Mifflin 

County Clerk of Courts time-stamped his Application for IFP Status on March 

5, 2020; and a breakdown in court operations caused the Notice of Appeal 

not to be time-stamped on March 5, 2020, and to be untimely filed on March 

10, 2020. Attorney Miller attached to his Response a letter from the Mifflin 

County Clerk of Courts, indicating that the Clerk of Courts had received 

Stidfole’s Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2020, but waited to time-stamp and 

file it until March 10, 2020, after the PCRA court had granted his Application 

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3 See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (stating that a notice of appeal “shall be filed within 

30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”).
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for IFP Status. This Court subsequently discharged the Rule to show cause, 

and referred the timeliness issue to the merits panel.

This Court has held that “[a]bsent a breakdown in the operations of 

the court, time limitations on the taking of appeals are strictly construed and 

cannot be extended as a matter of grace.” Commonwealth v. Valentine, 

928 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa. Super. 2007) (brackets, quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 905 provides 

that “[u]pon receipt of the notice of appeal, the clerk [of courts] shall 

immediately stamp it with the date of receipt, and that date shall constitute 

the date when the appeal was taken, which date shall be shown on the 

docket.” Pa.R.A.P. 905. 

Here, the Mifflin County Clerk of Courts received Stidfole’s Notice of 

Appeal on March 5, 2020, and failed to stamp it with the date of receipt. 

Had the Clerk of Courts stamped Stidfole’s Notice of Appeal when it was 

received, in accordance with Rule 905, Stidfole’s Notice would have been 

timely filed. Thus, we conclude that a breakdown in court operations caused 

Stidfole’s Notice of Appeal to be untimely filed. See id.; see also Nagy v. 

Best Home Servs., Inc., 829 A.2d 1166, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2003) (finding a 

breakdown in court operations where the appellant deposited his notice of 

appeal with the trial court’s Prothonotary within the 30-day period, and the 

Prothonotary failed to time-stamp and docket the notice of appeal when it 

was received); accord Commonwealth v. Alaouie, 837 A.2d 1190, 1192 
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(Pa. Super. 2003). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider Stidfole’s 

claims on appeal.

On appeal, Stidfole raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the [PCRA] court committed an abuse of discretion 

and/or error of law in not finding [Stidfole’s] trial counsel 

ineffective for the following reasons:

a. Failing to challenge the qualifications of the [victim’s] 

therapist;

b. Failing to raise a taint objection;

c. Failing to obtain complete discovery;

d. Failing to cross-examine witness [] Wert; and

e. Failing to call defense witnesses.

Brief for Appellant at 4.

“The standard of review of an order [denying] a PCRA petition is 

whether that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is 

free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Weimer, 167 A.3d 78, 81 (Pa. 

Super. 2017). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there 

is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Id. (citation omitted).

In each of Stidfole’s claims, he argues the ineffectiveness of his trial 

counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the 

PCRA, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that counsel’s ineffectiveness “so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could 

have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Specifically, a petitioner 
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must establish, first, that “the underlying claim has arguable merit; second, 

that counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and third, 

that [the a]ppellant was prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 

A.3d 1012, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2014). “A PCRA petitioner must address each 

of these prongs on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 

144 (Pa. 2018). Counsel is presumed to be effective and the burden is on 

the appellant to prove otherwise. Commonwealth v. Hannible, 30 A.3d 

426, 439 (Pa. 2011). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for 

ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. Commonwealth v. 

Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010).

In his first claim, Stidfole argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 

in presenting his objection to the Commonwealth’s request to present the 

victim’s testimony by way of contemporaneous alternative testimony. Brief 

for Appellant at 10-11. According to Stidfole, his trial counsel “made no 

effort to challenge the contemporaneous alternative testimony,” and 

ineffectively questioned the victim’s therapist, Dionne Sterner (“Sterner”), 

who testified in favor of the contemporaneous alternative testimony, 

regarding her qualifications. Id. at 10-11.

Our review of the record discloses that Stidfole’s trial counsel objected 

to the contemporaneous alternative testimony, and objected to Sterner’s 

ability to testify regarding the necessity of the victim testifying via 

contemporaneous alternative testimony. See N.T., 9/12/17, at 3-4, 11-12; 
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N.T., 1/27/20, at 6-7. The trial court overruled both objections. N.T., 

9/12/17, at 13; Order, 9/15/17. Moreover, Stidfole’s trial counsel explained 

at the PCRA hearing that Sterner testified regarding her qualifications, and 

that he did not see any reason to challenge her qualifications. N.T., 

1/27/20, at 7, 27-28. Indeed, in its Opinion, the PCRA court states that it

“found [Sterner] to be qualified to discuss the victim’s [mental health]

treatment.” PCRA Court Opinion, 2/4/20, at 3. Thus, we agree that 

Stidfole’s underlying claim lacks arguable merit, and that his trial counsel 

had a reasonable basis for his actions. See Charleston, supra. 

Accordingly, this claim fails.

In his second claim, Stidfole argues that his trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to object to the victim’s testimony at trial on the 

grounds that her testimony was tainted. Brief for Appellant at 11-12. 

Stidfole states that there was “possible taint based on the witness’s age and 

suggestive interviews,” and that his trial counsel should have obtained the 

transcripts from the interviews of the victim, and certain CYS records, which 

may have shown that the victim’s testimony was tainted. Id. at 12 

(emphasis added). 

Here, Stidfole has not presented any evidence supporting his claim 

that the interviews of the victim were “suggestive,” that the victim was 

susceptible to suggestion, or that the victim testified falsely. Indeed,

Stidfole failed to produce any records from CYS, or any transcripts from 
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interviews of the victim, in support of his claim. Lacking any evidence that 

the victim’s testimony was tainted, Stidfole’s claim that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise an objection regarding tainted testimony fails. 

See Commonwealth v. Brown, 872 A.2d 1139, 1150 (Pa. 2005) (stating 

that “trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present [certain 

evidence at trial,] when there was no such evidence of record.”). Further, 

Stidfole’s trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he had obtained 

records from CYS, and there was nothing in the records that indicated the 

victim’s testimony may have been tainted. N.T., 1/27/20, at 9-10, 29-31. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Stidfole’s underlying claim lacks merit, and 

Stidfole failed to establish the lack of a reasonable basis for his trial 

counsel’s actions. See Charleston, supra. Accordingly, this claim fails. 

In his third claim, Stidfole argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to obtain CYS records regarding the victim. Brief for Appellant at 

12-13. According to Stidfole, CYS possesses records showing that the victim

has made similar accusations against other individuals, all of 

which were determined to be unfounded or otherwise dismissed 

by the relative agencies; [t]hat [the victim] was coerced to 

name [Stidfole] as a perpetrator by investigators, counselors, 

therapists, and others charged with her well-being; and that the 

[victim] made statements to relevant caseworkers tending to 

cast doubt on the truth of her testimony at trial.

Id. at 12.

Again, Stidfole failed to present any evidence in support of his third 

claim. Stidfole has not presented any records from CYS, or testimony from 
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any “investigators, counselors, therapists, or others charged with [the 

victim’s] well-being,” that would support his allegation. Lacking any

evidence that CYS possessed these records, Stidfole’s claim that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to obtain them lacks merit. See Brown, supra. 

Because Stidfole’s underlying claim lacks merit, his third ineffectiveness 

claim fails. See Charleston, supra. 

In his fourth claim, Stidfole argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to cross-examine Wert at trial. Brief for Appellant at 13-14. 

Stidfole claims that “[h]ad trial counsel obtained copies of the CYS records 

and properly evaluated them, he could have developed a line of questioning 

designed to undermine the witness’s credibility and elicited facts that would 

have bolstered the credibility of [Stidfole’s] denial of wrongdoing or 

criminality.” Id. at 14.

Here, Stidfole again failed to present any evidence to support his claim 

that CYS had documents in its possession that could have impeached Wert’s 

credibility or bolstered Stidfole’s credibility. See Brown, supra. 

Additionally, Stidfole’s trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he 

believed there would be no benefit to cross-examining Wert because “she 

didn’t testify to anything on direct that was harmful or incriminating to [] 

Stidfole.” N.T., 1/27/20, at 32; accord id. at 13. We conclude that 

Stidfole’s underlying claim lacks arguable merit. Further, Stidfole failed to 
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establish that his trial counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his actions. See 

Charleston, supra. Accordingly, this claim fails.

In his fifth claim, Stidfole argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to call character witnesses at trial to testify on his behalf. Brief for 

Appellant at 14-15. Stidfole argues that he provided his trial counsel with a 

list of witnesses who would have testified regarding his good character, and 

that trial counsel failed to interview any of the witnesses, or present their 

testimony at trial. Id.

The failure to call character witnesses does not constitute 

per se ineffectiveness. In establishing whether defense counsel 

was ineffective for failing to call witnesses, appellant must 

prove: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to 

testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have 

known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was 

willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the 

testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the 

defendant a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 463-64 (Pa. 2015) (citation and 

paragraph break omitted). 

Here, Stidfole has not asserted that any of the alleged witnesses were 

available to testify at trial, or explained how the absence of this testimony 

caused him prejudice. See id. Moreover, Stidfole’s trial counsel testified at 

the PCRA hearing that “[p]resenting character testimony would have 

potentially opened the door for the Commonwealth to bring in things that we 

didn’t want brought in....” N.T., 1/27/20, at 22. Trial counsel explained that

Stidfole had a prior criminal record for offenses similar to the ones for which 
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he was on trial, and counsel was concerned that the Commonwealth would 

have cross-examined Stidfole regarding these convictions if he presented 

good-character evidence. Id. at 34. We conclude that Stidfole’s underlying 

claim lacks arguable merit. Further, Stidfole failed to demonstrate that his 

trial counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his actions. See Charleston, 

supra; Treiber, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Hull, 982 A.2d 1020, 

1023 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that “[c]ounsel has a reasonable, strategic 

basis for not calling character witnesses if he has a legitimate reason to 

believe that the Commonwealth would cross-examine the witnesses 

concerning bad-character evidence.”). Accordingly, this claim fails.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s Order.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/25/2021