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PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: 

The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

Stephan A. Loyka, Donald A. Faggiani, and Clifford Karchmer 

with 

Maureen Baginski 

Daniel Bibel 

Melvin Carraway 

Stuart Kirby 

Ritchie A. Martinez 

Steve Sellers 

John Sullivan 
This project, conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), was supported by Cooperative 

Agreement No.2002-HS-WX-K001 with the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services. Points of views or opinions contained in this document are those of the authors and do 

not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the members of PERF. 

The opinions expressed reflect the general consensus of executive session attendees. However, not every 

view or statement presented in this report can necessarily be attributed to each participant. 

The websites and sources that are cited provide useful information at the time of this writing, but the 

authors do not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other information on the websites. 

© Police Executive Research Forum, 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

Police Executive Research Forum 

Washington, DC 20036 

United States of America 

February 2005 

ISBN 1-878734-87-3 

Library of Congress Number 2005901063 

Photos courtesy of (from top to bottom): Arlington County Police Department (1-3) 

Federal Emergency Management Association (4) 

PERF (5) 

Cover Design by David Edelson, PERF 

Interior Design based on a layout by Elliot Thomas Grant, etg Design 

II 
CONTENTS 

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 

Chapters 

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

2. What Is Intelligence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

A Model of Federal, State, and Local Information Sharing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 

Data Quality and Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

3. Intelligence-Led Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 

Defining What Works: A Case Study from the United Kingdom in Intelligence-Led Policing. 20 

The Need for Trained and Accredited Analysts of Criminal Intelligence... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 

4. Developing a Successful Intelligence Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 

Moving Intelligence-Sharing Forward. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 

The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group: Multilateral Intelligence Fusion and 41 

Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

5. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 

Appendices 

A. Participants and Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 

PERF and COPS Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 

B. A Guide to Incorporating the Intelligence Function into Community Policing . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 

C. Intelligence Training and Counterterrorism Funding Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 

About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 

About the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), 

U.S. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 

About the Police Executive Research Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

III 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR GRATITUDE TO THE MANY INDIVIDUALS 

who contributed to this white paper. Any value it has is largely a 

result of their vision and commitment to improving how law 

enforcement entities gather and share information while continuing to support 

the tenets of community policing. 

This white paper is the result of the guidance and 

support of the paticipants at the fourth executive 

session (in a series of five) made possible by the 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS). We are grateful 

to Director Carl R. Peed for his continued recognition of the importance of these sessions and for his 

leadership. The successes of the sessions and the 

resulting white papers related to community policing in a security-conscious world are due in large 

part to the hard work, determination, and patience 

of Project Monitor Amy Schapiro. 

We also are grateful to the following contributors: Executive Assistant Director, Maureen 

Baginski, Office of Intelligence, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation; Daniel Bibel, Program Director, 

Crime Reporting Unit, Massachusetts State 

Police; Melvin Carraway, Superintendent, Indiana State Police and Chairman of the Global 

Advisory Committee; Ritchie Martinez, Criminal 

Intelligence Analyst Supervisor, Arizona Department of Public Safety and former President of the 

International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts; Major Steve Sellers, Commander, Criminal Investigations Bureau, Fairfax 

County (VA) Police Department; and John Sullivan, Sergeant, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department. 

Representatives from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies participated in the 

session, and we thank them for their thoughtful 

and candid discussions about intelligence-led 

policing and the need for greater sharing of information in the face of the terrorist threat. A special 

thanks is due to Maureen Baginski, not only for 

her written contribution mentioned earlier, but 

also for her thorough and well-received presentation at the session. We also thank Deputy Attorney General of the United States James Comey for 

taking the time out of his busy schedule to discuss 

the pressing legal issues facing law enforcement 

agencies since September 11, 2001. 

Several members of the PERF staff 

deserve our recognition. Executive Director 

Chuck Wexler was instrumental in getting the 

representatives from the various agencies to the 

same table as well as in facilitating the session. 

We thank Project Director Heather Davies for 

planning the session, taking notes, and providing 

critical feedback on this white paper. Research 

Assistant/Event Planner Anna Berke managed the 

complicated logistics of the two-day event. Lorie 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

V 
Fridell, Director of Research provided significant 

comments on the development of this paper. 

David Edelson, working under a demanding 

schedule, did an outstanding job completing the 

layout and design of this white paper. Special 

thanks go to Barbara de Boinville and Martha 

Plotkin for their editing skills. 

We gratefully acknowledge those of you in 

law enforcement—at every level of government— 

who work to keep us safe from terrorism. We hope 

this paper provides useful resources to assist you in 

your efforts. 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

VI 
FOREWORD 

MORE THAN 30 YEARS AGO, CRIME-FIGHTING TECHNIQUES SHIFTED FROM 

the traditional model of policing in the 1960s to the community 

policing principles of the 1970s. At that time the law enforcement 

profession witnessed a major change in how it combated crime. Police departments across the country began to work more closely with the communities they 

served in an effort to open lines of communication and generate information that 

could address the root causes of crime. These same community policing principles 

greatly contribute to law enforcement’s counterterrorism efforts today. Facing a 

global threat of terrorism and another possible attack on U.S. soil, law enforcement agencies again are witnessing a major modification in how they deploy and 

utilize resources to fight both crime and terrorism. Local and state police, as first 

responders and as investigators, are working with their federal counterparts to create information-sharing initiatives that will enable all law enforcement agencies to 

help detect, prevent, and respond to a terrorist threat or attack. 

There are about 18,500 federal, state, local, and intelligence and need to work together to share that 

tribal law enforcement agencies in the United intelligence to achieve common goals. But budget 

States, and each one has different operating proce- constraints, technology deficiencies, inadequate 

dures, service demands, and communities and training, and differing expectations can hinder a 

infrastructures to protect. In the face of an ever- department’s ability to meet the security needs of 

growing terrorist threat with potential ties to tradi- the community. That is why the federal branches of 

tional crimes, such as drug trafficking and forgery, law enforcement and their local and state counterlaw enforcement agencies across the country are parts are working with new resolve to create 

advancing intelligence-led policing as a principal resourceful and effective partnerships based on prophilosophy. This intricate and analytical form of ducing and sharing information and intelligence. 

law enforcement is increasingly becoming viewed A crucial first step in this process is identias necessary in the aftermath of the September 11, fying and understanding the terrorist threat. When 

2001 terrorist attacks. Agencies are recognizing a threat is defined, an agency can better detail its 

that they need to be involved in developing reliable needs and expectations, allowing for a structure 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

VII 
conducive to the exchange of information. Police 

chief executives in this country—now engaged in 

community policing—should understand the 

importance of working with their communities to 

produce information that can lead to solid intelligence. These local law enforcement officials, 

schooled in the fundamentals of community problem solving, are vital assets to the federal agencies 

tasked with the lead role in investigating terrorism. 

But the long-standing “wall” that has divided and 

hindered relationships between agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, particularly when it 

comes to intelligence, must be dismantled. 

The Police Executive Research Forum 

(PERF), with funding from the U.S. Department of 

Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services (COPS), is making progress toward bridging these divisions. PERF has convened a series of 

forums for law enforcement leaders, antiterrorism 

experts, and policymakers to examine and discuss 

the best ways to share information and intelligence 

in a security-conscious world. This white paper is 

the result of the fourth executive session, which 

brought together counterterrorism experts from 

the Department of Homeland Security; the U.S. 

Secret Service; the Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives; the National Security 

Agency; the Drug Enforcement Administration; 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association 

and state, county and local law enforcement officials. The white paper examines the challenges 

and concerns of the respective agencies as well as 

the progress they have made toward creating an 

integrated intelligence-sharing system. Conducted 

as an open forum for participants to share their 

ideas, the session provided insight on their 

approaches to such issues as how law enforcement 

executives develop intelligence functions within 

their departments, the difference between “information” and “intelligence,” the move toward intelligence-led policing, and successful models that 

can be replicated across the country. 

The COPS Office and PERF are pleased to 

facilitate these forums and to present concrete 

strategies that can help law enforcement agencies 

share information and integrate community policing and intelligence-led policing principles into 

their day-to-day operations. 

Carl R. Peed Chuck Wexler 

Director, COPS Executive Director, PERF 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

VIII 
C H A P TER O N E 

INTRODUCTION 

S

INCE THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE 

significant strides toward strengthening homeland defense, improving 

emergency response, and reducing community fear. Agencies at the federal, state, and local levels are beginning to create positive working relationships 

with each other, and to integrate their strategies for responding to the threat of 

terrorism. They are recognizing not only the importance, but also the need for 

enhanced vertical and horizontal communications. 

Law enforcement agencies have historically been 

charged with preserving the safety and security of 

the public. Regrettably, this mission is no longer 

limited to traditional crime—the prevention and 

deterrence of another terrorist attack on American 

soil have become a crucial part of this mission, 

leaving law enforcement agencies at every level of 

government responsible for restoring and maintaining a public sense of security. 

How can law enforcement fulfill this new 

obligation successfully? What is the key to maximizing the probability of success in thwarting the 

next terrorist attack? The answer lies in the ability to know as much as possible about the threat in 

order to respond accordingly and efficiently. The 

answer is the use of reliable intelligence. 

Identifying when, where, and how a terrorist attack will happen is tremendously difficult at 

best, yet this knowledge could save hundreds or 

maybe thousands of American lives. The most 

effective weapon in the war on terrorism is intelligence—the detailed analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of information. And the nucleus of this 

weapon is information collected and shared by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

Intelligence begins as bits of raw information or 

data. Information becomes intelligence when it is 

organized, analyzed, and interpreted with a specific focus. Without intelligence, agencies may be less 

than prepared to make the strategic and tactical 

decisions necessary to prevent and respond to critical incidents. This concept applies to both criminal and terrorist investigations. 

The primary challenge for local law 

enforcement is understanding and then utilizing 

intelligence in a community policing context. 

Before information becomes intelligence, numerous questions must be answered. What information should be collected? How will it be analyzed 

and by whom? What information must be shared 

and what information must be kept confidential? 

How can information on individuals be collected 

without jeopardizing their rights as American citizens? These are just some of the issues that must 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

1 
be addressed before good information can become 

useful intelligence. Yet the preceding questions cannot be answered apart from an examination of 

intelligence analysis itself. It is only with a clear 

comprehension of the analytic process that one can 

fully explore the subsequent collection and sharing 

aspects of the intelligence function. Identifying the 

central elements of a successful intelligence function will enable law enforcement agencies to generate practical solutions to the aforementioned challenges, establish rewarding intelligence functions 

specific to their needs, develop protocols for working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

other federal agencies and eliminate barriers to 

sharing intelligence. 

The Project: Community Policing 

in a Security-Conscious World 

Since 2002, the Police Executive Research Forum 

(PERF),1 with support from the U.S. Department 

of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services (COPS), has conducted a project entitled 

“Community Policing in a Security-Conscious 

World.” Together PERF and the COPS Office have 

convened a series of executive sessions for law 

enforcement chief executives, other policing professionals, government policymakers, and other 

stakeholders to explore, debate, and exchange 

information. These sessions provide law enforcement practitioners with opportunities to share 

and develop effective strategies for addressing terrorism while continuing to advance community 

policing. After the sessions, white papers on the 

findings are widely disseminated to law enforcement personnel and decision makers at all levels 

of government. 

The first executive session was held on 

November 7–8, 2002, in Washington, D.C., and 

resulted in a white paper entitled Protecting Your 

Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local 

Law Enforcement, Volume 1: Local-Federal Partnerships. The second volume, entitled Working 

with Diverse Communities, was the result of the 

second executive session held on June 5–6, 2003, 

in Chicago, IL. The third volume, Preparing for 

and Responding to Bioterrorism, was the result of 

the third executive session held in Los Angeles, 

CA, on July 24–25, 2003. (These documents are 

available for free download at www.policeforum.org 

or www.cops.usdoj.gov.) Following this white 

paper, the fifth volume will focus on law enforcement’s partnership with the DHS. A sixth white 

paper, funded by the National Institute of Justice, 

is also planned on partnering to prepare for and 

respond to critical incidents. 

The Executive Session 

on Intelligence and 

Information Sharing 

On December 16–17, 2003, in Washington, D.C., 

PERF convened the fourth executive session of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, 

intelligence experts, and academics from the intelligence and criminal justice fields. (See Appendix A 

for a list of participants and observers.) Moderated 

by Chuck Wexler, PERF’s executive director, the 

session fostered a lively examination of strategies 

1 PERF, a nonprofit membership organization of progressive policing professionals, is dedicated to advancing law enforcement services to all communities through innovation and national leadership. Its members represent jurisdictions serving 

more than half of the nation’s population, and the organization provides training, technical assistance, research, publications, and other services to its members and the profession. More information about PERF can be found at its website, 

www.policeforum.org. 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

2 
for effectively integrating intelligence and information sharing with community policing. The discussion was particularly fruitful because participants had been asked, before the session, to find 

out what their intelligence officers and analysts 

considered to be the most pressing concerns related to information sharing. The primary discussion 

focused on the myriad challenges to effective intelligence collection and information sharing that 

plague local-federal partnerships, yet the session 

affirmed how important it is for law enforcement 

agencies to have an intelligence function for both 

criminal and terrorist investigations. 

In addition to the difficulty of meeting 

local intelligence demands, participants discussed 

elements of effective intelligence units in jurisdictions such as Los Angeles and New York. Emphasis was placed on the factors that constitute productive intelligence and the manner in which 

multi-agency, multijurisdictional partnerships are 

cultivated. The session also included a critical 

assessment of available information-sharing 

resources. 

The White Paper 

This white paper, the fourth in the series, summarizes the comments of participants at the executive 

session on intelligence and information sharing. 

Volume One in the series, Local-Federal Partnerships, briefly explored the need for greater sharing 

of intelligence by agencies, organizational impediments to effective intelligence sharing, and local 

agencies’ concerns about turf battles and security 

clearances. This paper builds upon that early discussion, stresses the importance of the intelligence 

function, and provides recommendations to law 

enforcement agencies for establishing a successful 

intelligence function. The goal of this white paper 

is to help local law enforcement agencies and others in the field identify the means and merits of 

producing and sharing solid intelligence and to provide recommendations for preventing future terrorist attacks through progressive, analytic policing 

techniques. After all, prevention starts first and 

foremost at the local level. This document is not 

meant to recommend a plan for the transformation 

of the federal intelligence community, nor does it 

outline a long-range plan the likes of those being 

formulated by other federal agencies. Rather it is a 

framework in which to consider more immediate 

actions that can be taken by state and local agencies 

and to focus on remaining challenges. 

This volume is divided into four substantive chapters: What is Intelligence?, IntelligenceLed Policing, Developing a Successful Intelligence 

Function, and Recommendations. The chapters 

include several sidebar pieces written by executive 

session participants or law enforcement practitioners that provide more detailed accounts of selected 

programs or points of view. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

3 
PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

4 
C H A P TER T W O 

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 

I

ntelligence and information are not the same—a distinction explored later in 

the chapter. First, one must understand the common illusions surrounding 

intelligence. These misconceptions are a proper starting point because they 

were discussed and, it is hoped, dispelled during the course of the executive session. 

Illusions and Intelligence 

It has become widely accepted that information 

sharing among government agencies and between 

levels of government is essential to preventing 

another catastrophic attack like that of September 

11, 2001. Yet, a misconception persists on the part 

of the public, lawmakers, and even some in the law 

enforcement and intelligence communities that 

information sharing alone will be the miracle 

counterterrorism solution. Information sharing is 

critical for homeland security. It makes prevention 

possible by enabling a better national and local 

understanding of threats. Indeed, information 

sharing moves usable information gathered by federal, state, and local agencies to the national level 

and back down again. But the key to successful 

information sharing is that the information is 

usable. In order to enable this exchange, it is 

important that all the parties collaborating in the 

production and sharing processes be on the same 

page, conceptually as well as technologically. 

Maureen Baginski, executive assistant 

director for the Office of Intelligence at the FBI, 

opened the executive session stressing many of 

these issues. Baginski oversees the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence throughout 

the FBI and is responsible for integrating the intelligence function into all FBI investigative operations. 

She also serves as the primary FBI contact for the 

dissemination of information to (and receipt of 

information from) the intelligence community, state 

and local law enforcement agencies, and other government agencies, both national and international. 

The intelligence community is defined as “a federation of fifteen executive branch agencies and organizations that conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and 

protection of national security.”2 Those agencies 

include the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Air Force; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the 

Department of Homeland Security; the Department 

of Energy; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly 

the National Imagery and Mapping Agency); the 

National Reconnaissance Office; the National Secu2 See the Intelligence Community website at www.intelligence.gov. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

5 
rity Agency; the Department of the Treasury; the 

Department of State; and the Coast Guard. 

The lead intelligence officer for the FBI, 

Baginski set the tone for the session in her discourse. Her remarks highlighted the urgent need to 

dispel the myths surrounding intelligence. For too 

long, the intelligence and law enforcement communities have had an uneven and at times antagonistic relationship fostered in part by such misconceptions. This was evident in the candid 

confessions of Baginski and several other law 

enforcement professionals in attendance. Commenting on her more than 25 years of experience 

working for the National Security Agency, Baginski 

acknowledged the intelligence community’s view 

of law enforcement as an unknown, and those at 

the session who had made a career in law enforcement cited similar skepticism with respect to the 

intelligence community. 

The reasons for any doubts or misinterpretations are understandable. The two communities 

differ in their core responsibilities and objectives, 

not to mention in their expectations regarding 

information acquisition and management. Moreover, the contemporary cultures of the two communities were shaped by very different experiences. 

The intelligence community evolved from a Cold 

War mentality—an approach rooted in rigid command and control and orchestrated behind a veil of 

secrecy. As participants at the executive session 

pointed out, the law enforcement community has 

unfortunately been beset by scandals as a result of 

improper and overreaching domestic intelligence 

activities. As a result, the distance between the law 

enforcement and intelligence communities 

widened further. But this relationship is necessarily 

changed by the nature of the threat we now face. 

The responsibilities and expectations placed on the 

“The important question 

is why agencies need to 

generate an intelligence 

function. The answer is 

to enable better, more 

informed decision making.” 

—Melvin Carraway, 

Superintendent, 

Indiana State Police 

law enforcement and intelligence communities 

correspond and even intersect today. 

Toward the end of her address, Baginski 

posed the question to law enforcement officials in 

attendance, “What worries you most?” She immediately followed that inquiry with two more questions. “What do you know about that threat? And, 

more importantly, what don’t you know about that 

threat?” The simple questions she raised highlight 

the need for and value of intelligence as a tool for 

making sound decisions. 

Intelligence as a Tool 

for Making Decisions 

Intelligence is not something that is only collected 

by covert agents attempting to subvert another government or organization, or even prevent attacks 

on our own government. This view is antiquated 

and no longer valid. The truth is, the collection and 

analysis of intelligence is no longer limited to government agencies. Today intelligence functions are 

widespread. The desire to execute insightful, calculated decisions transcends mission, sector, or 

industry. Most large organizations need a formal 

capacity to determine whether threats in their 

respective environments should become the subjects of executive policy consideration. CorporaPROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

6 
tions seeking to maintain or increase their market 

share collect information on market fluctuations, 

consumer trends, and their competitors. They do 

so to achieve their desired goal through informed 

decision making. Herbert Meyer, a former administrator in U.S. intelligence, concisely delineates 

what executive session participants were trying to 

convey about the meaning of intelligence today: 

Intelligence has broadened to become 

organized information. More precisely, 

intelligence has come to mean information that has not only been selected and 

collected, but also analyzed, evaluated 

and distributed to meet the unique policymaking needs of one particular enterprise. It is this transformation of what 

has been collected into finished, 

polished, forward-looking analytic products designed to meet the unique 

policymaking needs of one enterprise— 

and the organizational effort required to 

do it—that marks the difference 

between what intelligence used to be 

and what it has become (Meyer 1987). 

Physicians are trained to diagnose a 

patient before initiating a medical intervention. 

They gather information in order to improve their 

chances of properly diagnosing and curing a problem. So should law enforcement design and conduct their operations blindly? The answer is plainly, no. Executive session participants—federal, 

state, and local officials alike—agreed that the 

indispensable reward of intelligence analysis is an 

improved, informed decision-making process. Like 

other professionals, law enforcement executives 

need information that will not only facilitate the 

development of effective responses, but also enable 

their proper execution and provide a measurement 

of success. Law enforcement intelligence ultimately supports three specific types of decision making—strategic, operational, and tactical.3 Tactical 

decisions—like those made regarding specific 

crime-fighting measures—are critically important. 

Intelligence as a Tool 

for Fighting Crime 

During the two-day session, some questioned 

whether attention was being disproportionately 

directed at Islamic extremism, neglecting traditional crime responsibilities—and homegrown terrorist threats. Other participants drew the discussion back to the nexus that exists between 

traditional crime and terrorism. They cited fraudulent identifications, trafficking in illegal merchandise, and drug sales as means to terrorists’ 

ends. The “ends” or goals are simple—kill, destroy, 

and disrupt. But the complexities of the new threat 

necessitate a fundamental change in law enforcement priorities—not simply toward terrorism but 

toward an intelligence-based approach. 

For law enforcement, intelligence constitutes an actionable inference or a set of related 

inferences derived from some form of inductive or 

deductive logic. By combining information, analysis, and interpretation, intelligence helps to document a threat, ascertain its probability of occurring, and define a responsive course of action, all in 

a timely manner. Good information, analyzed and 

evaluated in a timely manner, can provide the 

details necessary for developing the most efficient 

and productive strategies for disrupting a drug or 

crime syndicate, preventing a terrorist attack, or 

addressing any number of evolving crime prob3 See Carter 2002 for a discussion of the types of decision making supported by intelligence. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

7 
lems. In a country fighting terrorism, intelligence 

provides a means to unravel and intercept terrorist plots or to define countermoves. In the world 

of law enforcement today, intelligence is good 

crime analysis applied in a new context. 

Executive session participants mentioned 

COMPSTAT4 as a good example of how law 

enforcement can turn information into one form 

of intelligence for fighting crime. The COMPSTAT 

process, developed and first implemented in the 

New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 

1994, collects and analyzes crime data.5 This 

“intelligence-led” strategy enabled the policymak-

“Terrorism can and does 

manifest itself in traditional 

criminal activity.” 

—Melvin Carraway, 

Superintendent, 

Indiana State Police 

ers in New York City to position key resources 

where they would have the greatest impact. The 

result was a relatively quick and dramatic reduction in violent and drug-related crimes. 

4 For more information on the COMPSTAT process at the NYPD and crime mapping as a law enforcement tool, see the 

NYPD website at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/chfdept/chief-of-department.html and the National Institute of 

Justice website at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/pubs.html. For additional information on regional crime mapping and 

case studies on how mapping has been successfully applied, see LaVigne and Wartell (1998, 2000, 2001). 5 See Steinert-Threlkeld (2002). 

A MODEL OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL INFORMATION SHARING 

by Major Steve Sellers, Commander, 

Criminal Investigations Bureau, 

Fairfax County (VA) Police Department 

Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Fairfax County Police Department realized the importance of 

establishing a Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU) to address not only traditional criminal intelligence, but also the real possibility of domestic and international terrorists in our midst. Fairfax 

County, a diverse jurisdiction of over one million residents, lies just west of Washington, D.C., and 

is home to the Central Intelligence Agency, near the Pentagon, and close to many other sensitive 

agencies seen as potential targets. Immediately upon establishment of the CIU, the department 

strengthened relationships with its federal partners in the intelligence field. Fortunately, many of 

these relationships were already solid because of previous joint criminal investigations and the close 

proximity of the department to the nation’s capital. However, the international or foreign intelligence arena was relatively new to the agency, and required additional collaborative efforts. All perPROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

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sonnel selected for the CIU were handpicked for their experience, interpersonal skills, and ability 

to establish and maintain effective working relationships. 

One of the first steps taken by the department was to shift the administrative control of 

detectives assigned to the Joint Terrorism Taskforce (JTTF) from the Major Crimes Division to the 

CIU. This change established the first link to federal intelligence resources and eventually led to new 

ties to experts in the field. Second, the department broadened its relationships with other federal 

agencies like the U.S. Attorneys Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the Department 

of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Social Security 

Administration, and various military intelligence installations. Eventually, these collaborations 

yielded joint investigative work. Through their work together on criminal cases of common interest, 

detectives, federal agents, and analysts developed trust. Strong working relationships between federal, state, and local authorities in the world of intelligence are paramount to effective information 

sharing. The walls of mistrust must be systematically broken down. In the end, effective communication depends on the people who are selected to participate and lead our intelligence efforts. 

Once the issue of trust was addressed, the CIU members applied for federal top-secret clearances. Although not necessarily required for police intelligence functions, top-secret clearances 

reduce the complexities inherent in sharing classified information. Clearances generally took anywhere from 12–16 months to obtain. 

The same commitment to relationship-building also applies to community involvement. 

Many years ago the Fairfax County Police Department established the Auxiliary Police Officer Program and later the Volunteer in Police Services (VIPS) program. Both programs draw upon Fairfax 

County citizens interested in giving back to the community by volunteering their time with the 

department. Some members of the Auxiliary Police and VIPS programs were already actively 

engaged in full-time intelligence jobs with a variety of federal agencies. Shortly after September 11, 

2001, the CIU drew upon this pool of experienced intelligence professionals and reassigned them 

to the CIU. In addition, the VIPS coordinator conducted an active recruitment effort to seek more 

experts in the field. Today, the CIU has 19 active VIPS officers and 14 auxiliary police officers. Most 

of them have extensive intelligence experience and appropriate security clearances. The use of experienced police volunteers not only extended the department’s capabilities and staffing, it also 

opened doors to multiple federal agencies and fostered communication. 

The next step toward improved information sharing was the integration of operational 

functions. Federal partners from the Secret Service and FBI were invited to move into the department’s intelligence office. Integration of daily activities (working in the same office) resulted in 

mutual trust and an environment open to sharing information. Later, a more developed plan of 

integration emerged with the newly established National Capital Regional Intelligence Center 

(NCRIC). The NCRIC, managed by the Fairfax County Police Department and funded by the FBI, 

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9 
draws upon multiple federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence organizations to 

work under one roof. The NCRIC outlined plans to incorporate a Watch Desk, an operational component, and an analysis component staffed by multiple agencies. This system of integration ensures 

adequate information sharing within the entire Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. 

Effective and timely information sharing is the responsibility of law enforcement leaders. 

They must be judicious in determining who will operate the intelligence function within their agencies. Information sharing occurs faster and more efficiently at the supervisory and line levels. Some 

police leaders are quick to blame federal administrators for failing to share important information. 

In many cases, however, the fault may lie within the department and its own selection of personnel to perform the intelligence function. Trust is forged at the supervisory and line levels when law 

enforcement and federal agencies integrate operations and work together on a daily basis. These 

steps have helped to ensure an effective and efficient information-sharing model for the Fairfax 

County Police Department. 

The Difference between 

“Information” and “Intelligence” 

David Carter, a professor of criminal justice at 

Michigan State University and an observer at the 

executive session, has written extensively with colleagues on the merits of law enforcement intelligence, defining it as “...the product of an analytic 

process that provides an integrated perspective 

[about] disparate information about crime, crime 

trends, crime and security threats, and conditions 

associated with criminality” (Carter and Holden 

2002). He makes an important distinction 

between information and intelligence: “In the 

purest sense, [the term] intelligence information is 

an inaccuracy since information is raw data and 

intelligence is the output of the analytic process” 

(Carter 2002).6 

Throughout the executive session, some 

participants used the terms “information” and 

“intelligence” interchangeably. It is a misconception to view intelligence as simply pieces of information about people, places, or events that may or 

may not hold some significance in determining 

criminality. One of the objectives of the executive 

session was to ensure these terms were used properly so all participants would have a common 

understanding. By insisting on this distinction 

early on, the moderator succeeded in promoting a 

more focused and accurate dialogue. 

Meyer’s (1987) intelligence model outlines 

four stages of the intelligence process: determining 

requirements based on a comprehensive threat 

assessment, collecting relevant and usable information, analyzing the data and developing an 

appropriate response, and finally, assessing the 

6 Carter and Holden (2002) and Carter (2004) are also sources for more information on how local law enforcement can apply 

intelligence and community policing principles in furtherance of homeland security goals. 

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effectiveness of the intelligence and decision-making processes. Some analysts believe that this 

process can best be understood as a linear progression. The first two stages are processes concerned 

with information, while the last two stages are 

processes based on intelligence and rooted in 

analysis. In the middle of this continuum, would 

be a brick wall with a window for passing the end 

product of the information processes to the beginning of the intelligence process. This would be the 

only point where the two processes meet, according to this theory. Ideally this process should be 

cyclical though, with the end intelligence product 

in turn influencing what is being collected next. 

Information is essentially raw data, either 

qualitative or quantitative. There may be some 

analysis involved, but it is generally of a descriptive 

nature. In law enforcement, the information is what 

a crime analyst might use to identify, for example, 

a drug hot spot. Reports of drug use or sales in a 

specific area would be the information gathered, but 

when scrutinized and examined against the spatial 

analysis of multiple reports, the information 

becomes more revealing. The investigator may then 

take the analysis from the crime analyst and use it 

in conjunction with other information—witness 

statements, personal experience, or knowledge 

from those dealing with other drug markets—and 

apply it to a case or another specific threat. Competent analysis organizes and interprets the data in 

a framework determined by intelligence requirements or specific gaps in knowledge. Only after 

bringing all the information and analysis available 

together does the investigator have the “intelligence” to make an interpretive decision about a 

strategic, tactical, or operational plan of action. 

Executive session participants agreed that 

intelligence is key to discovering what is unknown 

“Requirement-driven 

collection is the key 

to success.” 

—Barbara Cart, 

Executive Assistant, 

Homeland Security Office, 

National Security Agency 

about an identified threat. But in order to generate 

reliable intelligence and produce results that are 

applicable to that specific problem, the information feeding the analytic process must be collected 

in a manner consistent with an individual’s or 

agency’s needs. In other words, beginning with 

quality information is paramount to achieving a 

successful end product. As will be explained later, 

executive session participants emphasized that 

departments cannot establish a successful intelligence function without promoting quality collection, and quality collection is driven by an agency’s 

particular needs or requirements for information. 

Each stage of this process may require separate technology, personnel, training, and educational commitments. Assessing what needs to be 

known and defining the techniques for collecting 

these data can rely on a process that is very different from that used for transforming the information into a finished product and providing policymakers with the findings. On the surface, the 

technology used to archive, transfer, and process 

the information and intelligence may seem similar 

and banal—a simple computer terminal, for 

instance. However, below the surface, different 

software, manuals, and paperwork can be driving 

the effort. More importantly, in front of that terminal there may be analysts with different training 

and skill sets than the information collectors. 

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Executive session participants noted that 

the awareness of the distinction between “information” and “intelligence” shed light on the misconception that information sharing will enable an 

immediate resolution to problems of crime and 

security. Participants also agreed that whether the 

information is efficacious in resolving the problems of crime and security depends on its quality. 

Types of Intelligence7 

Much of the confusion about the meaning of 

the term “intelligence” can be attributed in part to 

the absence of a clear delineation between national security intelligence and law enforcement 

intelligence. 

Participants agreed that national security 

intelligence is what typically comes to mind when 

a person hears the term “intelligence.” This type of 

intelligence is focused on identifying and neutralizing external threats posed by foreign powers, 

organizations, or now transnational actors like terrorists. They seek to undermine or disrupt the 

social, political, and economic relationship 

between the United States and the rest of the 

world. Historically, utilizing and producing this 

intelligence have been the responsibility of organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency, the 

National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The FBI has important national 

security intelligence responsibilities stemming 

from jurisdiction over espionage and counterintelligence and, more recently, terrorism. 

Strategic intelligence provides detailed 

information on the overview of criminal activity, 

groups, and threats, enabling broader departmental 

policy planning and resource allocation. Ongoing 

strategic intelligence keeps officials alert to threats 

and potential crimes. The information gathered, 

analyzed, and disseminated helps police understand the structure, characteristics, motivations, 

and philosophy related to specific intelligence targets. Strategic intelligence is what most agencies 

lack. Participants noted, however, that operational 

and tactical intelligence, without strategic intelligence to put it in an overarching plan or context, 

is not as productive as it could be. 

Operational intelligence is the type used 

most often by law enforcement agencies. It guides 

operational decisions about how to maintain public 

safety. Operational intelligence can justify monitoring individuals who may pose a threat to public 

safety, but care should be exercised to avoid overstepping domestic surveillance restrictions and 

other intelligence-gathering limitations. Executive 

session participants suggested that this can be 

accomplished through clearly defined policies and 

procedures set forth by agency executives. (The 

Department of Justice guidelines established by the 

Code of Federal Regulations [specifically, 28 CFR 

23 et seq.] were drafted to accomplish just that. 

They carefully proscribe what information cannot 

be collected.)8 Policymakers need to become familiar with the laws governing domestic surveillance 

and intelligence gathering—most notably the USA 

PATRIOT Act and a presidential directive, Executive Order 123333. These authorities expand the 

role and capacity of law enforcement to gather 

information and intelligence. The potential con7 Definitions of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence are based largely on the work of David Carter (2002; 2004) 

and Carter and Holden (2002). 8 For more information on 28 CFR, see the General Printing Office website, www.gpoaccess.gov, or the FBI website, 

www.fbi.gov. 

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cerns about privacy and individual rights surrounding domestic surveillance and other intelligence 

gathering, as well as the bad taste left by several law 

enforcement agencies’ misjudgments in the past 

few decades, have made some departments wary. 

Executive session participants, however, warned 

their colleagues against discounting the value of 

operational intelligence and choosing not to actively pursue their other inteligence functions because 

of the potential legal ramifications, and because it 

is still an essential tool for maintaining community security. 

Tactical intelligence is used in either the 

formulation of an ongoing criminal investigation 

or in threat mitigation during a crisis situation. 

This is the type of intelligence involved in what 

police commonly refer to as “raid planning.” Tactical intelligence is most often gathered as a casebuilding instrument, yet in a crisis situation it can 

offer insight concerning the nature of both the 

threat and the target. Tactical intelligence also 

helps police effectively manage a response. In the 

case of a precise terrorist threat to an identifiable 

target it can help police move decisively to prevent 

the attack. 

While the distinction between national 

security intelligence and law enforcement intelligence was discussed among participants at the 

executive session, they recognized the increasing 

overlap in the new dynamic that our nation faces 

following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The 

proliferation of threats that transcend national 

borders and conventional tactics (for example, suicide bombers and chemical attacks) understandably muddy the terminology. There is a clear 

nexus between the two forms of intelligence in 

dealing with terrorists living and breaking the law 

in our own cities, towns, and counties. It is perhaps most evident now that traditional criminal 

enterprises that engage in such activities as drug 

trafficking and money laundering in the United 

States are funding international crimes committed by multinational organizations. Recently, individuals engaged in cigarette smuggling on a massive scale to raise funds for a terrorist organization 

were prosecuted. As this example shows, intelligence that improves national security is intelligence that improves law enforcement efforts, and 

vice versa. 

DATA QUALITY AND USABILITY 

by Daniel Bibel, Program Director, 

Crime Reporting Unit, Massachusetts State Police 

The following quote from the website of the West Midlands Police Department in the United 

Kingdom provides a good introduction to the topic of data quality and usability: 

Management of data requires time, authority, resources and expertise to complete the 

tasks necessary to help ensure that...data (and the information extracted from it) is of 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

13 
such quality as to make it reliable, trusted by those who use it, effective in...policing... 

and looked upon as a priceless asset rather than an administrative burden.9 

Police administrators are data consumers, just like the administrators and managers in any 

organization. In order to make rational decisions, plan strategies, and assess outcomes, they need 

to have timely, accurate, reliable, and valid data. Whether crime is up or down, and no matter how 

many calls for service come in, decisions need to be made concerning all the elements that make 

up an executive’s business practice. These decisions relate to employee scheduling, routine maintenance of vehicles, and budgeting, in addition to things commonly understood to be police matters. Whether these decisions are effective will be determined in large part by the data used to make 

them. 

Data are part of the basic building blocks of an information system, but data alone (“raw 

data”) are not enough for the police executive. To enable effective decision-making, data must be 

combined with value and meaning in order to transform it into actionable knowledge. The quality 

of our results (output) depends in great measure on the quality of our data (input). “The integrity 

and reliability of data-based analysis and reporting depend, in large part, on the quality of the underlying data.” (Whitaker n.d.) 

There are a number of internal checks on the quality of data. These checks are generated, 

maintained, and used within an agency. On a very basic level, the data must “fit” the requirements 

of the data systems in use. Standard codes or abbreviations are used for certain data elements. Most 

computer systems have built-in checks to eliminate the entry of totally incorrect data. For example, a number cannot be entered in a computer field that requires a letter, and a street address that 

does not exist within a jurisdiction cannot be entered into a computer-aided dispatch system. 

In the best situation, the data within the agency will be used creatively and productively for 

administrative, operational, or tactical purposes. The more the data are used, the better the quality of the data should become, as errors in coding or content are detected and corrected. This feedback loop is a necessary component of any system for collecting quality data. Although software can 

perform some level of error checking, the knowledge of an experienced individual is essential in 

quality control. The process of case review is therefore critically important in a quality data system. 

Data may still be “wrong” (that is, it may be incomplete or missing), but the data can nonetheless 

be useful within a department. Officers in an agency may understand where to go when dispatched 

to “Red’s Garage,” even without a specific street address given. The age, race, or sex of a particular 

person may be missing in a report, but the person could be well known to the department. Variations in spelling may be acceptable, since everyone “knows” what is being referenced. As long as 

the mistakes or errors are consistent, the data may be meaningful and useful. 

9 See www.west-midlands.police.uk/ 

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The use of data for intelligence and information sharing creates a new set of issues and concerns. An agency may have reasonable data quality standards (and have a good understanding of the 

limitations of its own data), but when the agency’s data must be shared with a group of agencies, 

questions about the reliability and accuracy of the shared data elements often arise. So-called “cooperative information systems” demand greater scrutiny from all the agencies involved. 

Eck (2002) describes five potential sources of error in crime data: citizen reporting differences, agency recording variations, event classification, inconsistent descriptive information, and 

geocoding accuracy. Citizen reporting differences may be outside the control of agency management, but each of the other factors should be managed by the agency.

10 Donald Faggiani, Dan Bibel, 

and Diana Brensilber (2001) mention a sixth source of error, the department’s lack of appreciation 

for the utility of their data. Without this understanding of and appreciation for the value of data, it 

is unclear whether the resources needed to provide quality data will be made available. 

Each of these factors will have an impact on the reliability and validity of an individual 

police department’s data. When several police agencies attempt to merge their data, the cumulative 

error rate will be much greater. It may be assumed that all agencies use the same coding system for 

data elements, or that a standardized look-up table exists to map the different values. Similar data 

elements, however, may not have the same meaning or significance. Different agencies may have 

different standards for reporting or processing events. One department may enter only the most 

serious offense in an incident, while an adjoining department enters all offenses. The case review 

process may be expedited in Department A while Department B delays 24 hours before sign-off. In 

another set of agencies, citizens come forward to report a high percentage of all offenses, whereas a 

neighboring department with poor community relations receives a much smaller proportion of 

offense reports. In any one of these examples, the potential for cooperative information sharing will 

be greatly reduced. Agencies must be aware of this, and continue to move the intelligence function 

along accordingly. 

10 Even citizen reporting behavior may well be within the control of police if efforts are made to improve policecommunity relations and to encourage crime reporting. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

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C H A P TER T HRE E 

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 

I

t was commonly accepted among the executive session participants that local 

law enforcement agencies need help in reengineering their intelligence function. Discussions focused on what was lacking at various agencies, whether it 

was resources, technology, or qualified personnel. Some participants contended that 

these were secondary issues. The more central issue was the need to foster a more 

analytic approach to policing—an approach driven by intelligence. 

National Criminal Intelligence 

Sharing Plan 

In March 2002, law enforcement executives and 

intelligence experts attending the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Criminal 

Intelligence Sharing Summit, funded by the 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

(COPS), called for the creation of a coordinated 

criminal intelligence council to develop a national criminal intelligence sharing plan. In response 

to this need, the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global),11 a federal advisory committee of the U.S. Department of Justice, formed 

the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) 

funded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to 

act as an interim council to coordinate intelligence and information sharing recommendations. The GIWG, the IACP and OJP incorporated best practices and recommendations from 

across the country into the National Criminal 

Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). The NCISP is 

the result of participation and feedback from 

local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement. 

The plan contains model policies and standards 

for leveraging existing infrastructures for sharing 

criminal intelligence across all levels of government. It provides a cohesive vision and practical 

solutions to improve law enforcement’s ability to 

detect threats and protect communities. The 

chairman of the Global Advisory Committee at 

this writing is Superintendent Melvin Carraway 

of the Indiana State Police. At the executive session, he played an instrumental role by informing 

the group about the NCISP, which has been 

endorsed by the U.S. Department of Justice, the 

Department of Homeland Security, and myriad 

law enforcement groups. A core recommendation 

of the Plan is the promotion of intelligence-led 

policing. 

11 For more information on the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and the 2002 International Association of 

Chiefs of Police Summit that initiated the effort, see http://it.ojp.gov//topic.jsp?topic_id=8 or the IACP website at 

www.theiacp.org. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

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GLOBAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVE 

by Melvin Carraway, 

Superintendent, Indiana State Police 

Local law enforcement is still defining its role in addressing the ongoing terrorist threat. While 

some new approaches, technologies, and skills are needed, police professionals have a solid foundation in community policing, problem solving, and innovative crime control. The focus of law 

enforcement is and always will be crime-based. Law enforcement in America is adept at preventing 

crime and disorder, addressing citizens’ fears and needs, uncovering leads, interviewing suspects 

and witnesses, reviewing evidence, gathering statements, and finding patterns. Police will draw on 

these skills to collect and analyze new or different types of intelligence in light of the terrorist 

threat. Managers and policy makers must reinforce the premise that good police work can uncover 

all types of crime patterns—including terrorism. The key to their success will be providing them 

with the information and intelligence—as well as the means to share what they observe with others engaged in counterterrorism—they need to detect terrorist activity. 

Community policing has promoted interagency trust, partnerships, and the value of information. Daily newspaper headlines attest to the effectiveness of local law enforcement community 

policing efforts in both mitigating and providing solutions to problems, preventing crime and violent acts, and helping to instill a sense of security within communities. The necessary evolution of 

community policing following the attacks of September 11, 2001 inevitably leads to preventing and 

responding to the effects of terrorism. Strengthening citizen partnerships with patrol officers and 

using their information to detect and arrest those who would harm our communities is a natural 

outgrowth of community policing. We must utilize the combined efforts of all public safety agencies’ resources and build on their community policing successes to prevent another terrorist act 

from taking place. Agencies must assess their deficiencies in information sharing, the incompatibilities of information sharing technologies, and the inconsistencies of procedures and policies that 

prevent the effective sharing of information and intelligence. 

With these tenets as a framework, a new initiative has been underway to improve information and intelligence sharing between federal, state, local, and tribal agencies engaged in counterterrorism. GLOBAL, the “group of groups,” represents more than 30 justice-related organizations. We have been laying the foundation for an environment where trust is cultivated and 

technology is enhanced to aid all members of the justice community. The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) highlights actions and recommendations that federal, local, state, and 

tribal law enforcement agencies can follow to implement successful information and intelligence 

sharing approaches. A community of law enforcement experts from operations, training, analysis, 

policy, and security participated in the development of its recommendations. 

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Law enforcement agencies, regardless of size, should adopt the minimum standards of 

intelligence-led policing outlined in the NCISP. The standards focus on the intelligence process and 

include elements such as the mission of the function, management and supervision, personnel 

selection, training, security, privacy rights, development and dissemination of intelligence products, 

and accountability measures. 

GLOBAL has published several products recently that advance and reinforce the need for 

information sharing standards. These publications include security practices, justice information 

privacy guidelines, and the Global Justice Extensible Markup Language (XML) Data Model (Global 

JXDM). 

The Global JXDM is an XML standard designed specifically for criminal justice information exchanges, providing law enforcement, other public safety agencies, prosecutors, public defenders, and other judicial entities with a common language to effectively share data and information 

in a timely manner. The Global JXDM is designed to increase the ability of justice and public safety communities to share information at all levels, laying the foundation for local, state, and national justice interoperability. The Global JXDM is a comprehensive product that includes a data 

model, a data dictionary, and an XML schema. Through the use of a shared vocabulary that is 

understood system-to-system, Global JXDM enables access from multiple sources and reuse in 

multiple applications. As of October 2004, more than 50 law enforcement and justice-related projects have been implemented using the Global JXDM, demonstrating its flexibility and stability. 

The justice community is moving toward interoperability and enhanced intelligence production and information sharing, and Global continues to do its part. For more information regarding the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, please visit the U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs website at www.it.ojp.gov/index.jsp. 

The Philosophy of 

Intelligence-Led Policing 

Intelligence-led policing is based on a common 

understanding of intelligence and its usefulness. At 

the executive session, Superintendent Carraway 

noted the NCISP recommends a standardized definition of intelligence-led policing. The Plan defines 

it as “the collection and analysis of information to 

produce an intelligence end-product designed to 

inform police decision making at both the tactical 

and strategic levels.” The NCISP adds that for intelligence-led policing to be effective, it must become 

an “integral part of an agency’s philosophy.” Intelligence-led policing is a management orientation in 

which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, 

rather than the reverse. Managers must be prepared 

to deviate from traditional policing philosophies—a 

move to action rather than reaction. They must 

understand and trust that operations can and 

should be driven by intelligence. Intelligence-led 

policing is innovative and, by some standards, even 

radical. Above all, it requires commitment. 

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DEFINING WHAT WORKS: A CASE STUDY FROM THE 

UNITED KINGDOM IN INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 

by Stuart Kirby, Detective Chief Superintendent, 

HQ Crime and Operations Division, Lancashire Constabulary 

Situated in the Northwest of England, the Lancashire Constabulary, an agency of 5,600 staff (3,600 

sworn), initiated intelligence-led policing in the early 1990s when examination revealed indiscriminate use of resources did little to improve public confidence or to reduce and detect crime and disorder. The Constabulary seized the opportunity to be one of the lead forces in the countrywide 

implementation of the UK National Intelligence Model (NIM). It predicted that the uniform implementation of an evaluated intelligence process would be significant, not only across its own operational areas but also when dealing with other police forces. 

Initially the Constabulary had to ensure they complied with the NIM requirement to put 

critical personnel in place, such as analysts, researchers, and intelligence officers. Similarly, systems 

and technical capacity were enhanced to collate intelligence from a variety of sources. Here the 

Constabulary developed “Sleuth,” a data warehousing system, which presents such timely information as known individuals (arrests and intelligence), recorded crime, recorded incidents, forensic information, domestic violence data and statistics, missing individuals, and other high-interest 

people—tailored to individual area or officer needs. 

Although the NIM process works at level 3 (national issues), the Constabulary employs the 

model predominantly at level 2 (cross-border issues within the Constabulary or between neighboring forces); and level 1 (local neighborhood level). At each level a strategic assessment is completed, which sets out current and emerging crime and disorder issues. These assessments are presented and discussed at a Strategic Tasking and Co-ordinating Group (STCG) meeting. At the 

Constabulary level (level 2) STCG, Chief Constable Paul Stephenson meets with other Chief Officers, Divisional (local) Commanders, and heads of administrative departments to agree on a control strategy, which in effect are the priorities for the force. Similarly Divisional Commanders, influenced by these priorities, meet with their own senior management team and set the local (level 1) 

priorities. While these meetings set, monitor, and review the strategic agenda, they are supported 

by a Tactical Tasking and Co-ordinating meeting group who decide the best methods for implementing the STCG’s wishes. At all of these meetings actions are carefully recorded and allocated 

to specific individuals who are required to return and report on them. 

An illustration is perhaps the best way to show how the process works. During 2001, while 

reviewing operational performance at the force monthly STCG, a Divisional Commander explained 

that a number of persistent offenders were driven to steal by their cocaine addiction, creating a new 

hot spot. As there appeared some consensus on the increased availability of the drug, Chief ConPROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

20 
stable Paul Stephenson commissioned a problem profile on the issue. The problem profile,12 together with target profile,13 tactical assessment,14 and strategic assessment15 (mentioned earlier) are the 

four most relied upon of the analytical products described by the NIM. Once the problem profile 

was commissioned, HQ Intelligence staff set the data collection plan requiring local intelligence 

units to supply information on such issues as amount and type of drug seizures, locations, offenders and victims. The collection plan also requested that personnel interview persistent offenders to 

understand their lifestyle, and contact other partners (i.e., health and drug professionals) for their 

perspective. 

The completed “problem profile” was presented at a later STCG meeting and as a result 

class A drugs and drug-related criminality were made a priority of the control strategy. Prompted by 

the NIM, the Lancashire Constabulary then devised its strategic response in three areas: further 

intelligence gathering, enforcement, and prevention. 

In relation to enforcement, Operation Nimrod, a systematic and targeted test purchase 

operation was formed to focus on open drug markets. From 2002–2004, this has resulted in the 

execution of 4,000 warrants, the seizure of £500,000 worth of drugs and 400+ offenders sentenced 

collectively to more than 1,000 years in prison. The consistency of the model also allowed 

improved regional and national collaboration, which resulted in interagency enforcement activity 

on trafficking routes. Other tactical activity also supported these strategic responses. Target profiles 

were commissioned at levels 1 and 2, to deal with problem individuals, while daily Tasking and Coordinating meetings focused patrol and specialist staff at a local level on priority areas. 

Meanwhile the preventive effort concentrated on Operation Tower, an assertive program 

targeting persistent offenders. Such offenders are approached and offered support in terms of drug 

treatment, accommodation, and employment. However, should they slip back into the drug abuse 

that generates their offending, they are targeted for enforcement. The project, at this writing, 

involves 271 persistent offenders of which 175 are currently in treatment. A results analysis conducted by academics has shown it having a significant impact on reducing crime. 

12 Problem profiles are assessments that focus on specific crime trends or incident hotspots. A problem profile generally includes a detailed analysis of the problem or threat, and recommendations for intelligence, prevention, 

enforcement, or partnership activity. 13 Much like problem profiles, target profiles are made to gain a greater understanding of specific threats. In this case 

the threat is a specific person(s) or criminal network. 

14 Tactical assessments involve the collection of diverse data in order to monitor and identify crime trends. The product is forward-looking, but provides an analysis of current operational threats, assessed against the anticipated priorities set out in the strategic assessment and control strategy. 15 Strategic assessments take into account the agency’s needs related to enforcement and prevention activity, and 

assist in defining a control strategy. The assessment uses crime data, as well as public perception and satisfaction 

surveys, and health, welfare, and education data to determine both agency and community priorities along with intelligence, prevention, and enforcement needs. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

21 
The Constabulary is committed to a problem-oriented approach in order to deliver sustainable solutions to crime and disorder issues. The NIM provides a clear process to highlight priorities, understand problems, set cohesive strategies, and monitor both implementation as well as 

the results delivered. It also provides the framework to involve partner agencies in understanding 

and responding to these issues. 

A number of executive session participants 

made strong arguments that many law enforcement 

agencies have been practicing intelligence-led policing in their jurisdictions for some time. The growth 

of technology in the 1980s and 1990s moved many 

departments from pin maps and paper files to GIS 

and crime analysis. In addition, some participants 

stated that just because a local law enforcement 

agency does not refer to an intelligence function 

does not mean that it is not engaged in collection 

and analysis efforts.16 Indeed, local law enforcement 

uses intelligence in order to cultivate leads, build 

investigations, and implement strategies for dealing 

with specific problems. Although, efforts to extend 

their analysis beyond their border or regions has 

been more of a challenge. 

The well-known COMPSTAT program, 

begun by the NYPD, has used statistical analysis 

in the development of effective tactical decisions 

and resource allocations. The COMPSTAT program has also relied on follow-up and accountability assessments to steer policy decisions. COMPSTAT is only one example of a tool that facilitates 

intelligence-led policing. Another approach is a 

program for High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 

(HIDTAs).17 The Office of National Drug Control 

Policy guidelines that mandate regional drug threat 

assessments, and stipulate that strategies for combating those threats be implemented based on the 

assessment, follow a similar targeting strategy for 

addressing crime threats and security problems. In 

addition to these and other mechanisms for 

advancing intelligence-led policing, there are other 

successful approaches to addressing crime, citizen 

fear, and the terrorist threat—most notably, community policing. 

Community Policing and 

Intelligence-Led Policing 

The community policing philosophy promotes 

and supports organizational strategies to address 

the causes and reduce the fear of crime and social 

disorder through problem-solving tactics and 

police-community partnerships. The community 

policing model balances reactive responses to calls 

for service with proactive problem-solving centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Developing police-community partnerships, improving 

communications with the public, reducing fears, 

and taking a scientific approach to problem solving are actions that directly support intelligenceled policing. Proactive, problem-oriented policing 

also requires an analytic capacity necessary for 

both information collection and intelligence 

16 Maureen Baginski reminded participants of this truth in her address to the executive session. 17 More information on the HIDTA program can be found on page 38 of this document and at http://www.whitehouse 

drugpolicy.gov/hidta/index.html and at www.nhac.org. 

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22 
analysis. The ultimate objective of problem-ori- Appendix B for a summary table from the facilitaented policing is the development of a more tor’s blueprint entitled, A Guide to Incorporating 

detailed understanding of and effective response to 

specifically identified problems. 

Specifically, problem-oriented policing is 

based on the SARA model—scanning for, analyzing, responding to, and assessing problems.18 Officers are encouraged to scan for and then prioritize 

problems based on community and other stakeholder information and data on a set of incidents. 

Officers then attempt to define the source of a 

problem. The problem, rather than the incident, 

becomes the primary focus of police work. Systematic collection and analysis of information about 

the specific problem or threat follow. These first 

two steps in the SARA model exemplify the proactive approach of intelligence-led policing. The third 

and fourth steps in the SARA model—response 

and assessment—are also an integral part of intelligence-led policing, especially with regard to the 

use of tactical intelligence. Officers tailor their 

approach to the situation based on analysis and 

circumstance. They then evaluate their efforts to 

determine whether they have been effective, efficient, or to map further analysis or action. 

The Community Policing Consortium has 

created a technical assistance program designed to 

support law enforcement executives with organizational change.19 Specifically, the program is intended to help police leaders think strategically about 

innovative approaches to criminal intelligence 

within the framework of community policing. (See 

the Intelligence Function into Community Policing.) Executive session participants familiar with 

the initiative recognized it as an important means 

to reconcile or integrate intelligence work and 

community policing. The program also stresses 

the importance of safeguards to protect constitutional rights and the role of front-line police officers as well as managers in applying community 

policing principles to their critical responsibilities. 

“Community policing 

officers are close to and 

know their communities, 

and not through clandestine 

operations, but through 

trust and relationships that 

have been cultivated over 

time.” 

—Peter Modaferri, Chief of 

Detectives, Rockland 

County, NY, District 

Attorney’s Office 

The core of the program is a symposium 

for chief executives of law enforcement agencies 

where they have an opportunity to engage in the 

free exchange of ideas about community policing 

principles and criminal intelligence in an interactive format that targets specific, relevant issues 

and moves the profession forward. 

18 For more information on the SARA model, see http://www.lancashire.police.uk/problemsolving.html or Problem-Solving 

Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships available through the U.S. Department 

of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 19 The program was designed by PERF Deputy Director Drew Diamond in coordination with the Community Policing Consortium. The Consortium is funded by the COPS Office and composed of the following five policing organizations: Police 

Executive Research Forum, International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement 

Executives, National Sheriffs’ Association, and Police Foundation. For more information on the Consortium, this program, 

and the training blueprint see www.communitypolicing.org, or contact the Consortium office at (800) 833-3085. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

23 
Throughout the two-day executive 

session, the one theme that underscored most of 

the discussions was the uncertainty over how to 

sustain a community policing philosophy in 

this new paradigm. For well over a decade, 

community oriented policing has helped to 

guide and change the role of American law 

enforcement within the communities they serve. 

Local law enforcement participants at the 

executive session expressed their commitment to 

community-oriented policing and to problem 

solving. The relationship between local law 

enforcement agencies and the communities they 

serve is a valuable tool in fighting crime and 

addressing the terrorist threat. The information 

flow between the cop on the street and the 

members of the community is a vital resource for 

identifying neighborhood problems, reporting 

suspicious activity, and providing a context for 

intelligence analysis. The level of trust that 

exists between local police and residents will 

influence the value of the information police 

receive about all potential threats to community safety, and illustrates the important contribution of community policing to the intelligence process. 

Starting at the Street Level 

The adage that the analyst is only as good as the 

data he or she receives was frequently repeated 

during the session. Community policing can be an 

important mechanism for strengthening communications and investigations that yield quality 

data. Executive session participants maintained 

that if intelligence-led policing was going to take 

hold, it would need to build on the successes of 

community oriented policing and start with the 

conversion of the individual officers at the street 

level. While executive session discussion topics 

covered everything from improving intelligence 

resources to technology, the need to begin by training the line officer in awareness and collection was 

continually emphasized. 

With the real-life demands on police 

resources, it is largely up to line officers to do the 

information collecting. If line officers were provided better training in collection—as well as the 

basic principles of analysis—an agency could 

enhance quality collection. After all, intelligence 

work begins at the street level. 

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CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE 

THE NEED FOR TRAINED AND ACCREDITED ANALYSTS OF 

by Ritchie A. Martinez, Certified Criminal Analyst; 

Arizona Department of Public Safety Criminal Intelligence 

Analyst Supervisor; Former President, International Association 

o f Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts2 0 

The role of the law enforcement criminal intelligence analyst evolved during the 1970s. At first only 

a few agencies had full-time intelligence analysts, and most of them were used to support organized 

crime (OC) investigations. Agencies with OC or general criminal intelligence units predominately 

used sworn police officers to perform analytical duties. Police civilian personnel (that is, 

nonsworn/commissioned personnel) were rarely hired for those trusted positions or given opportunities to attend the very limited training available. Since then the challenge of multijurisdictional 

and global crimes has produced changes in the thinking of police executives. Today they recognize 

the value of managing and analyzing information, and intelligence analysts are used at all levels in 

criminal justice agencies. 

Properly used and trained intelligence analysts are a valuable expert resource for agency 

executives. This is especially important today when information must be routinely and urgently 

analyzed to prevent local crime and maintain our nation’s security. Well-trained intelligence analysts contribute by 

• Reducing the civil rights and privacy pitfalls that intelligence units can encounter as a result 

of collecting, storing, and sharing criminal information/intelligence; 

• Implementing knowledge-based networks and computerized systems; 

• Applying analytic methods for complex operational, tactical, and strategic criminal investigations; and 

• Managing, assessing, and analyzing information through special computerized analytic tools 

and the application of critical thinking skills. 

The increased utilization of intelligence analysts has generated the need for training and 

accreditation. Whether performed by sworn or civilian personnel, criminal intelligence analysis is 

now widely accepted as a specialized function requiring professional skills. Our national counterdrug efforts and the current counterterrorism crisis have heightened this awareness. Like many 

responses to a crisis, the rapid acquisition of analysts has created gaps in the development of analytic training standards (the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan did approve intelligence 

20 Ritchie A. Martinez was serving as President of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence 

Analysts (IALEIA) at the time of the executive session. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

25 
training standards in June 2004) and proper roles for the analyst. Police executives must plan how 

to meet the needs of working analysts, and intelligence analysts must examine their competencies 

to ensure they meet the expectations of their professional body. The training and eventual certification of intelligence analysts must be a mutually shared goal for agency executives and analysts. 

No standardized intelligence training for basic academy police recruits exists at the state 

and local level yet. Federal agencies (the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement 

Administration) have limited programs. Most providers of training represent the commercial, governmental, and professional associations. While all training providers deliver excellent products, 

the providers do not coordinate their efforts, and they do not provide a logical progression to learning core analytical competencies. Consequently, the current training creates gaps in knowledge for 

some existing analysts and prevents some new career analysts from learning the fundamentals of 

criminal intelligence analysis. The training shortcomings are as short-sighted as having academies 

omit how to write reports on criminal charges from police officers’ training information. Core principles are essential for developing a sound foundation for analytical thinking. Like police officers, 

analysts need to achieve competency through the practice of efforts that meet common standards. 

The law enforcement intelligence community has begun to develop those standards. Two programs—former President Clinton’s Executive Mandate 2000, General Counterdrug Intelligence 

Plan (GCIP), and the U.S. Department of Justice Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative: 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP)—have identified intelligence analyst issues 

that must be addressed and have made specific recommendations. 

The NCSIP tasked the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 

(IALEIA) with developing analytic standards. These standards are pending approval. In addition to 

IALEIA, which has been advancing the science and art of intelligence since 1981, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) and the Society of Certified Criminal Analysts (SCCA) have developed standards for intelligence unit personnel. All of these groups are responding to national initiatives and working to develop and implement programs. SCCA has been certifying professional 

law enforcement, military, and corporate/industry security analysts since 1990. 

The training of intelligence analysts has made progress. Training is better today, and it is 

positioned to improve. The challenge will be to orchestrate the efforts of these and other groups, 

and work closely with professional organizations that have been vested in the law enforcement 

criminal intelligence field for years. 

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26 
Core Minimum Criminal 

Intelligence Training Standards 

Part of the key to developing standards for intelligence-led policing is ensuring that all levels of law 

enforcement are provided with the appropriate 

training on what criminal intelligence is and how 

it should be collected, analyzed, and shared. The 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 

(NCISP) recommended the development of minimum training standards for all affected levels of 

law enforcement personnel. The Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) has collaborated 

with a subgroup of DOJ’s Counter-Terrorism 

Training Working Group (CTTWG) to develop 

minimum training standards for the six training 

classifications outlined in the NCISP. Currently a 

national Criminal Intelligence Training Coordination Strategy (CITCS) is being implemented by 

the GIWG that will develop minimum training 

standards for the following five training classifications (Intellicenge Analyst and Inelligence Collectors are treated as one classifcation by GIWG 

despite being separate in NCISP): 

• Intelligence Analyst 

• Intelligence Manager 

• Law Enforcement Executive 

• General Law Enforcement Officer (Basic Recruit 

and In-Service) 

• Train-the-Trainer 

The CITCS recommendations include 

minimum standards for training, time allotments 

for each element, as well as suggested curricula, 

training delivery methods, and materials. The 

purpose of these standards is to provide a blueprint for training facilities, law enforcement agencies, and personnel. These are not mandated 

standards, but rather a guide for agencies and 

organizations to develop and/or enhance their 

intelligence function through consistent, quality 

training. 

The GIWG and the Criminal Intelligence 

Coordinating Council (CICC), a Council established by the U.S. Attorney General to implement 

the NCISP, has also been working with the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) to develop Law Enforcement Analytical Standards. Input for the 

standards was obtained through a number of 

meetings, IALEIA’s web site, and the GIWG and 

CICC membership, as well as many other agencies and individuals. IALEIA and Global are cosponsoring the production of booklets on Law 

Enforcement Analytical Standards for future distribution and use by the law enforcement and 

intelligence communities. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

27 
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28 
C H A P TER F OUR 

DEVELOPING A SUCCESSFUL 

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION 

E

xecutive session participants emphasized that before information and 

intelligence sharing systems can be established, important decisions—and 

changes—must be made by each agency regarding personnel, technology, 

organizational structures, and strategies, policies, and procedures for handling the 

collection, storage, and sharing of quality data. Change management is an important concept. Properly managed change involves an organization-wide commitment to reform, a clear communication of that vision, and the identification of 

concrete steps to effect positive change. 

Meeting the Commitment 

Participants at the session noted that in order to 

advance intelligence-led policing, ensure solid 

intelligence production, and facilitate the exchange 

of valuable, focused, and actionable intelligence, 

law enforcement agencies will need to change the 

manner in which they regularly function. This 

transition goes beyond deciding to openly share 

routinely collected information with other law 

enforcement agencies, and includes sharing the 

burden of information analysis, and in turn the 

manufacture of effective intelligence. This responsibility requires devoting personnel and resources 

to both collection and analysis. 

Working together, state and local law 

enforcement agencies need to develop, where possible, cadres of intelligence and analytic experts 

who are professionally trained and educated. The 

few national-level analytic training programs— 

public and private—should be complemented by 

specialized in-service programs offered by state and 

regional law enforcement academies. In this way, 

the need for multitudes of trained analysts will be 

met more readily. State and regional academies are 

closer than national groups or third party contractors to the range of specific threats faced by local 

communities, yet they still can be grounded in a 

national framework. 

Participants noted that even agencies that 

employ analysts or that operate an intelligence 

unit, may not always benefit from their existence. 

Too often intelligence units are plagued by passivity. Too many intelligence units simply respond 

to information requests and do not have a prescribed responsibility to perform some type of 

analysis. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

29 
Achieving a Shared View 

of the Threat 

In her opening address to session participants, 

Maureen Baginski stressed how crucial it is for the 

law enforcement community—from federal to 

local agencies—to develop a “shared view of the 

threat.” Before attempting to determine where, 

when, or how the next threat will present itself, 

law enforcement agencies need to understand the 

nature of the possible threats and the requisite features of the collection process that are likely to 

ensure that the right information is collected. 

Executive Assistant Director Baginski believes federal authorities should meet periodically with 

police to exchange views on perceived threats and 

collectively work on identifying priorities. The lack 

of a common understanding of the threats facing 

the United States is at odds with the urgent need 

to get decision-makers the information they 

require. The threats facing U.S. communities 

today are not limited, of course, to international 

terrorism but include criminal networks as well as 

local, “home grown” hate groups. If officers gained 

a shared understanding of the various threats and 

related concerns then they may be able to produce 

new insights of value in this newly expanded area 

of responsibility—intelligence production. These 

principles are consistent with the goals of targeted, 

problem-oriented policing encouraged by the community policing model. 

Identifying intelligence collection requirements is critical to effective threat mitigation. 

These requirements help police collect what they 

need and avoid unnecessary commitments of time 

and resources to collecting information that may 

never prove to be useful. An up-front, and sustained effort to collect more targeted information 

can help avoid problems endemic to other intelli-

“Intelligence analysts are 

only as good as the 

information they receive 

from the collector. We must 

build the intelligence 

function from the ground 

up, beginning with the 

rank-and-file officer.” 

—Maureen Baginski, 

Executive Assistant 

Director, Office of 

Intelligence, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation 

gence efforts where the separation of useful information from useless information occurs late in the 

process—leading to inefficiency or even legal difficulties. In fact, one of the goals of the Office of 

Intelligence at the FBI is the development of a 

framework for ordering intelligence priorities. 

Identifying knowledge gaps in federal and 

local law enforcement agencies in particular, and 

establishing the intelligence needs of both would 

enable a more efficient exchange of data and/or 

intelligence. Threat-based collection would help 

avoid the problems that information and intelligence gathering created in the 1970s. During that 

time, some law enforcement agencies collected an 

overabundance of information on individuals 

without a clear goal of an end product in mind— 

and even without an explicit connection to criminal activity. So more than 30 years later, collecting, archiving, and sharing information can 

recreate that controversy unless law enforcement 

agencies can find a better way to identify the critical threat basis of the information to be collected and determine how long it should be kept 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

30 
before it is purged. Whether or not an agency has 

the resources to establish its own intelligence 

function, it must issue guidelines for officers on 

collection techniques and targets. Each piece of 

information needs to be assessed for its validity 

and reliability in understanding threats, identifying suspects, and developing cases that can be 

prosecuted. 

Helping Officers Identify, Collect, 

and Use Information 

The advancement of intelligence-led policing 

begins with a full understanding of the legitimacy 

of the intelligence function. Executive session participants agreed that the underlying goal of intelligence-led policing is to increase the quantity and 

quality of usable information. Better information 

“We need a generation of 

police officers who know 

how to identify, collect, and 

use information before we 

can ensure legitimately 

productive information 

sharing.” 

—Peter Modaferri, Chief of 

Detectives, Rockland 

County, NY, District 

Attorney,s Office 

will certainly improve the intelligence being developed by local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies. But the ability to produce and share 

intelligence is dependent on the standards set forth 

for collection, analysis, and dissemination of the 

information or intelligence. Intelligence-led policing is going to be successful only if the information 

the police get is credible and interpreted correctly. 

Therefore, developing standard, integrated data 

systems, documenting the standardization, as well 

as implementing and evaluating these standards in 

more than 18,000 state, local, and tribal law 

enforcement agencies are essential tasks. 

Fostering the Analytic Process 

Executive session participants conceded that not 

all agencies are able to allocate the same resources 

to developing an independent intelligence function. In agencies without the capacity or staffing 

levels to support a corps of analysts, personnel in 

intelligence and specialized enforcement units 

need to develop skills in organizing and analyzing 

their own information—in effect becoming their 

own analysts. An impressive array of intelligence 

exploitation and data mining tools is available in 

software platforms and can be maintained on desktop and other portable computers. (Many agencies 

are acquiring these systems now with terrorism 

prevention grants from the Office of Domestic Preparedness and other grant programs.)21 Fortunately, these products are becoming more affordable as 

agencies are becoming increasingly concerned with 

tightening budgets and overextended resources. 

Federal agencies, such as DHS, can provide valuable assistance to local and state enforcement 

agencies by offering evaluative assessments of 

these programs in order to support a more knowledgeable procurement process. 

Federal agencies are providing assistance 

with regards to training as well. Technology is really 

secondary to the cultivated abilities of a fully 

21 For more information regarding grant opportunities, see the ODP website at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0356.xml. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

31 
“Not everyone will be 

able to deploy the same 

resources, but there are 

some fundamental training 

techniques that an agency 

can strive towards 

implementing; domestic 

and international best 

practices they can learn 

from; and analytical 

standards they can identify 

that will enable the agency 

as a whole to be more 

prepared.” 

—Ritchie A. Martinez, 

Criminal Intelligence 

Analyst Supervisor, 

Arizona Department of 

Public Safety 

trained and experienced analyst. The intelligence 

analytic training program now being piloted at the 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) 

on behalf of state and local enforcement agencies is 

a positive beginning.22 Executive session participants agreed that analysts and officers alike must 

be well versed in the analytic process that supports 

intelligence production. Still, understanding analysis is not a trivial matter. Analysis is a practice 

rooted in cognitive mental processes—not exclusively dictated by specific methods or techniques. 

Once apprised of a subject or threat, the analyst, or 

the officer in many cases, must know what to look 

for next and infer a reasoned conclusion. 

This is a difficult practice to cultivate 

through training. Particular variables—unrelated 

to the actual focus of the analysis—affect the analytic process. This is important for managers 

developing an intelligence function, or improving 

the intelligence process within their department, 

to understand. By distilling a list of the variables 

that affect analytic reasoning, it may be possible to 

move the tradecraft of intelligence analysis closer 

to a science.23 

Systemic Variables 

Systemic variables are those that affect both the 

intelligence organization and the analytic environment. The managerial structure, management 

practice, working culture, taboos, and organizational demographics are all variables that affect 

organizational behavior, as well as individual work 

habits or practices. Systemic variables also incorporate outside influences, such as consumers’ 

needs, time and political constraints, as well as 

security issues. 

“We need to train law 

enforcement in analytic 

tradecraft.” 

—Maureen Baginski, 

Executive Assistant 

Director, Office of 

Intelligence, FBI 

22 For more information on funding and training programs see the FLETC website at www.fletc.gov, the training section of 

the IALEIA website at www.ialeia.org/training, or the Office of Justice Program Information Technology Initiatives website 

at http://it.ojp.gov/index.jsp. 

23 Rob Johnston has explored these variables for the CIA in his work, Developing a Taxonomy of Intelligence Analysis Variables.For a more detailed discussion of theories on refining intelligence analysis to a science, as well as more on the following variables, see a CIA document written by Johnston (2003) or http://cia.gov/csi/studies/vol47no3/article05.html. 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

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Systematic Variables 

Systematic variables are those that affect the 

process of analysis itself. They include specific 

requirements of users; how the information is 

acquired, stored, and reported; the reliability or 

validity of the data; and most importantly any 

organizationally prescribed methods for processing 

the information and making decisions based upon 

the analysis. 

Idiosyncratic Variables 

Variables that affect the individual and his or her 

analytic performance are considered to be idiosyncratic variables. They influence the mindset and 

personal approach of the analyst or officer. This 

mental paradigm reflects the cultural, linguistic, 

and socioeconomic background of the individual, 

including any biases, decision-making styles, or 

reactions to different stressors. These variables 

also encompass education, training, and the willingness and ability to apply experience or skill sets 

to the task at hand. 

Communication Variables 

Finally, the variables that affect interaction within 

and between groups are vital to understanding the 

intelligence function. Communication variables 

include formal and informal exchanges within and 

among organizations, and between individuals and 

networks that are a part of the intelligence cycle. 

The analytic process, rather than an exact 

science, is a tradecraft. It mirrors the practice of 

medicine in that tools and techniques support a 

diagnosis, yet in the end it is the personal judgment of the practitioner that integrates the art and 

the science to produce an informed and effective 

course of action. 

Some executive session participants discussed an ideal paradigm in which every agency 

would be able to fully staff its own intelligence 

unit. A manager could then deploy analysts to the 

field to assist in quality data collection. Other 

participants warned against this type of thinking. 

“Developing an intelligence 

function is about 

experimentation, 

prioritization, and 

responsiveness.” 

—John P. Sullivan, 

Sergeant, Los Angeles 

County Sheriff’s 

Department 

In fact, a very vocal group of local law enforcement executives expressed concern about individual agencies—particularly small and mediumsized agencies—developing their own intelligence 

units, for fear they would create a greater abundance of counterproductive stovepipes of unexploited information. It was suggested by these 

same participants that networks, such as the 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), the FBI Law 

Enforcement Online (LEO), and Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISSnet), simply be utilized more effectively rather than create new production and sharing mechanisms. Several 

participants called for more regional coordination, and proposed that larger agencies with the 

capacity and established infrastructure to assist 

smaller agencies or partners do so through joint 

intelligence partnerships. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

33 
Tools for Intelligence Sharing 

As participants discussed, not every agency is capable of developing a full-fledged intelligence unit. 

These agencies need to find a way to share information and obtain intelligence through other 

channels. And those that are capable of employing 

intelligence analysts or officers still need to be 

able to interface with other groups in order to 

ascertain outside intelligence, as well as communicate their own intelligence products. Session participants made the recommendation that state and 

local agencies should use the LEO and RISSnet 

networks—discussed in more detail below—to their 

fullest potential. These forums facilitate the critical 

exchange of information while national standards 

for collecting, archiving, and sharing data are 

developed. Several executive session participants 

suggested that state and local representatives also 

contact their regional FBI Field Intelligence Groups 

(FIGs) as a means to develop relationships that 

would facilitate the effective exchange of critical 

information. 

MOVING INTELLIGENCE SHARING FORWARD 

by Maureen Baginski, Executive Assistant Director (EAD), 

Office of Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

The Threat 

Today, our adversaries are nation states, militaries, and shadowy criminal and criminal-like 

organizations that would do us harm. These adversaries represent complex challenges; they are 

networked together by information technology systems that allow them to have a shared view of 

their objectives, a clear understanding of their roles in carrying out those objectives, and very 

tight decision loops in taking action. To defeat these adversaries and prevent the harm they 

would do, we must get inside and ahead of their decision loops. Intelligence information and 

information technology systems that allow maximum sharing of intelligence information are 

core weapons in our battle with this new adversary. It takes a network to defeat a networked 

adversary. 

Intelligence is best defined as vital information about those who would do us harm. The 

only measure of the value of intelligence is whether or not it helps a decision maker make a better 

decision. The decision makers are those charged with protecting our nation, and there are many, 

ranging from the President to the patrolman. For that reason, intelligence producers must not base 

their intelligence products on what they know or what they think is interesting, but rather on what 

their decision makers must know to make better decisions. The goal of intelligence cannot be to 

get the decision makers’ attention; it must be to inform their decisions. This means first and forePROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

34 
most that intelligence producers must invest more time and energy in understanding the needs of 

intelligence users. Only then will we create a network capable of defeating our adversaries. 

The Intelligence Cycle 

The Intelligence Cycle (below) is key to creating that network: 

In a threat driven environment, Intelligence 

Requirements drive investigations. Requirements are 

identified information needs - what we must know to 

safeguard the nation. Intelligence requirements are 

established by the Director of Central Intelligence 

according to guidance received from the President 

and the National and Homeland Security Advisors. Requirements are developed based on critical information required to protect the United 

States from national security and criminal threats. 

The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI 

participate in the formulation of national intelligence 

requirements. 

Planning and Direction is the second step of the intelligence cycle. It is the management of the entire effort, to respond to intelligence needs up to and 

including delivering an intelligence product to the decision maker. It also drives new requirements 

based on feedback from decision-makers. As the EAD for Intelligence, I lead the intelligence planning and direction function for the FBI. 

Collection is the gathering of raw information based on requirements. Activities such as 

interviews, technical and physical surveillances, human source operation, searches, and liaison 

relationships result in the collection of intelligence. The FBI has a very robust collection capability 

because of our investigative mission. We must now share the vast amount of intelligence that we 

collect on a daily basis with our partners who need it to make decisions. 

Another part of the intelligence cycle is Processing and Exploitation. This involves converting the vast amount of information collected to a form usable for analysis. This is done in a variety of methods including decryption, language translations, and data reduction. Processing includes 

the entering of raw data into databases where it can be exploited for use in the analysis process. 

Analysis and Production is the conversion of raw information into intelligence. It includes 

integrating, evaluating, and analyzing available data and preparing intelligence products. This is a 

vital piece of the cycle as it is the “value added” portion of the process. Talented and knowledgeable 

FBI personnel integrate, evaluate, and put into context raw information and draw conclusions about 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

35 
its implications. This is a vital part of transforming “information” into “intelligence” which then 

can be used to make decisions. 

Dissemination, the last step, which directly responds to the first, is the distribution of raw 

or finished intelligence to the decision makers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements. 

The FBI disseminates information in three standard formats: Intelligence Information Reports, FBI 

Intelligence Bulletins, and FBI Intelligence Assessments. 

As you can see, the Intelligence Cycle is just that, a continuing cycle, which overlaps and 

drives each of its functions and in turn, drives the investigative mission. This cycle or process is 

used across all programs—Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber, and Criminal—to counter all threats. 

Field Intelligence Groups 

The FBI’s intelligence capabilities are dispersed across the country and overseas. It is in the field that 

the majority of our intelligence information is collected and produced. For that reason, a vital part of 

the FBI’s enhanced intelligence capability is the creation of the Field Intelligence Groups or FIGs. 

The FIGs are comprised of agents and analysts who are charged with directing intelligence production operations in the field and ensuring that the sum total of FBI investigative product is reviewed 

for intelligence value and shared according to processes established by the Office of Intelligence. 

The FIGs provide an independent intelligence requirements and collection function; supervise and oversee effective standards for the intelligence analyst and agent workforce; and provide 

planning and direction to all other parts of the intelligence cycle. The FIGs contribute to the FBI’s 

overall intelligence cycle, which is focused on answering the questions and getting the answers to 

the right people. The FIGs serve as the Bureau’s primary interface for receiving and disseminating 

information, including threat and violent act warning information, with the Intelligence Community; federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement; and other government agencies. The FIGs 

oversee the transformation of the collected information into intelligence that we can share with 

ourselves and our partners, in a timely and consistent manner. 

The Intelligence Cadre 

The heart and soul of any intelligence program is its people. It is important to note that the intelligence cadre is not limited to intelligence analysts, but also includes agents, language analysts, surveillance specialists, and others. It takes all of these specialists to perform quality intelligence production at the FBI. 

To that end, we now have standardized the Intelligence Analyst position descriptions, created one skill community for Intelligence Analysts (whether in the field or FBI headquarters), and 

standardized the Intelligence Analyst promotion procedures and criteria. There are three distinct 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

36 
work roles for Intelligence Analysts at the FBI—operations specialists, reports officers, and allsource analysts. All FBI Intelligence Analysts will be certified in each work role to ensure maximum 

flexibility in deploying our analytic workforce. The Training Division and the Office of Intelligence 

are currently developing courses for agents, analysts, and law enforcement officers, to better prepare 

and educate our personnel regarding the integration of intelligence and law enforcement operations, 

and information sharing initiatives. We are in the process of hiring Intelligence Analysts, developing a certification process for our intelligence professionals, and standardizing our dissemination of 

intelligence to our partners. 

The Intelligence Program and Information Sharing 

At the FBI we will share information as the rule and withhold only by exception, both within the 

FBI and with our outside partners. The first question we ask ourselves is “who else needs to have 

this information?” We have worked with the GLOBAL Intelligence Working Group on the 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and are committed to its model for intelligence and 

information sharing. The FBI is also committed to providing those information technology systems that assist law enforcement—from the National Crime Information Center, the Integrated 

Automated Fingerprint Identification System, and the Interstate Identification Index, to Law 

Enforcement Online. 

Because defending the nation is a team effort, we will always “write to share.” We recognize 

and take seriously our responsibility to the nation, the Intelligence Community, and our federal, 

state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners to disseminate information, and we do it as an 

inherent part of our mission. The time when any one of us can act on our own to defeat our adversaries is gone. We must rely on each other for what each brings to the table, whether it is manpower, 

technology, or expertise. We must work together in seamless coordination and create the networks 

that together will defeat our adversaries. 

Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) 

The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), 

which was created by Congress in 1974, links law 

enforcement agencies throughout the nation by 

providing secure communications, information 

sharing resources, and investigative support to 

combat multijurisdictional crime and terrorist 

threats. RISS is a national program supported by 

six centers that operate in specific geographic 

regions, serving the unique needs of law enforcement in each of those regions while fostering 

information sharing among all levels of law 

enforcement across the country. 

The Regional Information Sharing System secure intranet, or RISSnet, is the intranetbased means for participating law enforcement 

agencies to share criminal intelligence information. Funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

37 
and membership dues, RISSnet provides detailed 

information on an offender’s criminal activity 

(addresses, phone numbers, weapons used, and 

other information useful to law enforcement). 

RISSnet began with only the six regional projects—each with a separate data system that could 

be accessed by all members. Revised in the mid1990s, RISSnet is now a secure, firewall-protected 

wide-area network (WAN). This new system 

enables better access to the information across all 

participating agencies. RISS now serves more 

than 7,000 local, state, federal, and tribal law 

enforcement member agencies in all 50 states, the 

District of Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, 

Canada, and England. 

Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 

Introduced by the FBI in 1995, the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system is a communications 

and information service for law enforcement agencies. At this writing, approximately 40,000 users 

have access to the LEO system through the Internet. Those who have an established account with 

the FBI can access the system from any Internet 

connection in the world. According to the FBI, 

LEO is intended to provide a state-of-the-art communication mechanism to link all levels of law 

enforcement throughout the United States. Both 

the LEO and RISS programs urge state and local 

agencies to post important information which 

could be useful in identifying multijurisdictional 

criminals and help to further these investigations. 

The systems also provide secure e-mail as a common tool for communications between agencies 

regardless of geographic location or level of government. And LEO is also used as a vehicle to 

educate officers on the best technologies and practices in all areas of law enforcement. 

The FBI has also developed a 24-hour 

Counterterrorism Watch Center, to serve as the 

FBI’s focal point for all incoming terrorist 

threats. 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) 

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 

(HIDTA) program focuses resources and personnel in the areas of the country most vulnerable to 

drug trafficking, and helps federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies solve problems through 

teamwork and information sharing. Authorized 

by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the HIDTA 

program is administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The HIDTA program 

began with five areas in 1990 and has since 

grown to 31 areas across the United States. The 

areas selected for the program are major centers 

of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution. These areas are also major 

distribution points for narcotics trafficking. They 

are particularly dangerous because of their potential to expand the illegal drug markets to other 

areas. 

Intelligence Fusion Centers 

Executive session participants discussed the 

recent surge of interest in regional and multiagency intelligence fusion centers. One example is 

the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The JTTFs 

are designed to involve local agencies in the work 

being conducted by federal agencies like the FBI, 

through information sharing and collaboration in 

counterterrorism efforts. Participants recommended they be expanded to have a greater role and 

capacity for intelligence gathering and analysis 

beyond case-specific investigations. Other intelligence fusion centers are compacts of local and 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

38 
state enforcement agencies specializing in such 

efforts as antiterrorism or narcotics enforcement.24 Agencies that participate in intelligence 

fusion centers need evaluative tools to determine 

whether the centers are operating as efficiently as 

they might be, and whether certain fusion 

arrangements as federal-local collaborations are 

“We should be wary about 

each agency creating its 

own intelligence unit. It 

could result in simply 

creating more silos of 

information that are 

unconnected to a 

meaningful network.” 

—Charles Ramsey, Chief of 

Police, Metropolitan (DC) 

Police Department 

more cost-effective in certain situations than 

other arrangements, such as local-county networks. At the time of this writing, there is no 

widespread acceptance of a prescribed framework 

to determine how either a local intelligence or 

regional fusion center should be established, and 

correspondingly, there is no evaluative scheme to 

compare the structure and organizational components of different kinds of fusion centers to assess 

efficiency.

25 The possibility that even a minority 

of such centers may be operating at sub-optimal 

levels, in contrast to their potential, is reason 

enough to begin to develop guidelines for steering 

a definitive movement towards collaboration. 

Safeguards for Balancing 

Empowerments with Restraints 

Any initiative to upgrade the local intelligence 

function must be advanced by the executive. Questions of beginning or expanding an intelligence collection effort, setting up or enhancing a dedicated 

unit, training and equipping personnel, and 

bounding the initiative with legal safeguards all 

require attention at the highest command level. 

The Global Intelligence Working Group 

realized the need for police chiefs and sheriffs to 

assume an active leadership role. The Criminal 

Intelligence Training Coordination Strategy Working Group, coordinated by the U.S. Department of 

Justice Office of Justice Programs, raised the issue as 

a priority in its [draft] document, “Core Criminal 

Intelligence Training Standards.” Specifically, the 

group recommends a four-hour block of training to 

raise the awareness of law enforcement executives to 

new requirements and opportunities in intelligence 

administration. The purpose is to educate executives 

on the basic purpose and role of the intelligence 

process in law enforcement, and to appreciate their 

expanded range of responsibilities as leaders under 

the U.S. Department of Justice adoption of the 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. 

Vehicles for delivering the executive-level 

orientation await finalization, but recommendations 

include the U.S. Attorneys’ Law Enforcement Coordination Committees (LECCs), state Peace Officers 

Standards and Training (POST) programs, and the 

24 The Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) in Fairfax County, Virginia is an example of such a fusion center. The TEW 

group is highlighted in the sidebar discussion that follows this section. 25 Carter (2004) discusses creating and managing an intelligence function, as well as collaborating with federal and regional 

agencies to facilitate intelligence production and sharing. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

39 
FBI National Academy. Depending on the receptivity of police executives to the program and the 

prospect that a four-hour session may leave unanswered questions, session participants recommend 

establishing a police chiefs and sheriffs advisory 

group to explore ongoing educational requirements 

for agency executives. Among other challenges, the 

executive advisory group could address the continuing need to find resources to sustain the upgraded 

intelligence effort, approaches for enhancing automated analysis of information, assessment of compliance with 28 CFR Part 23 and other legal controls 

on information dissemination and use, and other 

questions that will surely arise as intelligence 

becomes a more active and central process within 

law enforcement. The 28 CFR Part 23 provisions 

regulate the collections and storage of intelligence 

information on various individuals when agencies 

are using federal funds to operate intelligence systems. Whether units are utilizing open sources or 

confidential sources, a criminal predicate must exist 

if an agency is going to collect information on an 

individual or group of individuals. 

Executive session participants stressed 

that law enforcement managers should implement 

specific guidelines to ensure a successful intelligence function. Concerns about data integrity and 

civil liberties must be addressed. Executive session 

observer David Carter (2002) has suggested that 

agencies adopt the following: 

• A fair use policy to articulate the types of 

crimes to be included in the system, who has 

access to the system, and who “owns” the 

data in the system 

• A quality assurance policy to document the 

validity, reliability, and materiality of the 

data, as well as who has the authority to 

enter data and alter the information 

• A recision of any “Third Party Rules” to forbid 

the recipient of intelligence products from disseminating it to a third party 

• Accountability controls to govern all information security and provide audit trails for all 

information 

• An inspectorate to monitor processes and 

controls and to handle allegations or concerns 

about security breeches and inappropriate 

dissemination 

• A compliance mechanism to ensure that all 

federal and state laws are abided by with 

respect to the submission and distribution 

of information and to manage Freedom of 

Information Act or Open Records inquiries. 

Many of these guidelines are also covered in 

the U.S. Department of Justice guidelines on interjurisdictional information-sharing systems and can 

be found in 28 CFR 23 et seq.26 IALEIA’s Law 

Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) has developed 

information-sharing guidelines that can provide 

assistance in establishing an intelligence capacity, 

and the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, a steering council working in association with 

the Global group, is also developing standards for 

regional intelligence centers—including guidance on 

the development of memoranda of understanding 

between crossjurisdictional entities.27 

26 Presently they apply to systems funded by the U.S. Department of Justice and to networks funded under the Crime Control Act. HIDTA has voluntarily adopted them as a positive standard, but various systems funded by the Department of 

Homeland Security and by the Office of Domestic Preparedness mandated to conform to the 28 CFR provisions covering 

accountability and requiring that information systems be tied to explicit criminal activity. 27 For more guidance on developing and implementing standards for an information-sharing capacity, see the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit website at www.leiu-homepage.org/main.cgi. 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

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THE TERRORISM EARLY WARNING (TEW) GROUP: MULTILATERAL 

INTELLIGENCE FUSION AND INFORMATION SHARING 

by Sergeant John P. Sullivan, 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group in Los Angeles was established in 1996 as an interagency information sharing and analysis function designed to serve the information needs of local, 

state, and federal agencies involved in all phases of homeland security operations. 

The TEW Model 

The TEW is a multilateral, multijurisdictional, and multidisciplinary effort. It integrates law 

enforcement, fire, health, and emergency management agencies to address the intelligence needs 

for combating terrorism and protecting critical infrastructure. The TEW goes beyond criminal intelligence fusion and analysis. It results in “all source/all phase” fusion. In other words, it integrates 

all the information necessary for achieving a situational understanding at all phases of operations 

(before, during, and after an incident). 

The TEW in Los Angeles includes a multidisciplinary fusion center staffed by “core agencies” including the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Los 

Angeles Division of the FBI, Los Angeles Fire Department, Los Angeles County Fire Department, 

and Los Angeles County Health Department. The TEW also receives support from state agencies 

and independent police, fire, and health agencies in Los Angeles County. The core agencies contribute permanent and surge staff, forward all potential terrorist criminal leads and pre-incident 

indicators to the TEW for assessment, and participate in joint training and exercises to facilitate 

TEW operations. In addition, each agency (and stations or units at larger agencies) have established 

Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) to enhance two-way information exchange between the TEW 

and cooperating agencies. The TEW works in cooperation with Joint Terrorism Task Forces and 

other investigative agencies to improve prevention and response and to ensure an appropriate 

exchange of information between investigative and response entities. 

TEW Organization 

As depicted in Figure 1, the TEW is organized into six mutually supportive cells. The responsibilities of each cell are described below: 

• The Unified Command cell provides direction, sets intelligence requirements, and interacts 

with the incident command entities. 

• The Analysis/Synthesis cell coordinates net assessment activities and develops the collection 

plan. (It requests information be sought by the various net assessment elements and develops 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

41 
the results of all the cells’ analysis into actionable intelligence products, including advisories, 

alerts, warnings, and mission folders to assist response.) 

• The Consequence Management cell assesses the law enforcement, fire, and health consequences of the event. 

• The Investigative Liaison cell coordinates with criminal investigative entities and the traditional intelligence community. 

• The Epidemiological Intelligence (Epi-Intel) cell is responsible for real-time disease surveillance and coordination with the disease investigation. 

• The Forensic Intelligence Support cell exploits a range of technical means to support the 

TEW fusion process. These include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear explosives 

(CBRNE) reconnaissance, the use of sensors and detectors, and geospatial tools (such as 

mapping, imagery, and GIS products). 

Fig. 1. TEW Net Assessment Organization 

The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group model is designed for both “first responder” 

agencies and “follow-on” response agencies, as a cooperative vehicle for obtaining and assessing the 

information and intelligence needed for an effective homeland security response. It establishes a 

high degree of interoperability among levels of responders (local, state, federal), disciplines (law 

enforcement, fire service, public health and medical), and civil and military agencies. This model 

demonstrates that intelligence is an important element in forging an interagency response. 

Unified 

Command Cell 

Investigative 

Liaison 

Analysis/ 

Synthesis 

Consequence 

Management 

Epidemiological 

Intelligence 

(Epi-Intel) 

Forensic 

Intelligence 

Support 

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C H A P TER F I V E 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

S

ince September 11, 2001, the challenge of reshaping the law enforcement 

intelligence function in the United States, and more specifically of advancing intelligence-led policing, has been much more daunting than it might 

appear. As noted by participants at the executive session on Intelligence and Information Sharing, this endeavor extends far beyond creating interoperable technologies for sharing data. In the fight against terrorism, as in the fight against 

crime in our communities, success depends on building a foundation of shared 

understandings, shared expectations, and shared goals. This challenge of 

intragovernmental intelligence cooperation is certainly formidable, but it is a 

challenge that must be met collectively because, as Americans and as law enforcement practitioners, we face together the consequences of this threat. Therefore, 

we must find ways of developing a common perception of the threats to our communities and our country so that we can act in concert. Establishing these commonalities will then enable governmental and law enforcement agencies at every 

level to develop the mechanisms needed to meet the threats successfully. 

The executive session provided a forum for federal, the swift implementation of collection, analysis, 

state, and local law enforcement practitioners and dissemination, and technology standards for the 

members of the intelligence community to discuss law enforcement and intelligence communities. 

their concerns and hopes with regard to the future The recommendations below reflect the themes 

of intelligence and information sharing. The open and suggestions presented and discussed throughand spirited dialogue proved informative. Partici- out the executive session. The list is not exhauspants discussed not only the need for a shift in pol- tive, but hopefully provides a firm foundation for 

icy toward intelligence-led policing but also threat- successful intelligence and information sharing. 

specific policing practices. Once established, the The recommendations are grouped by theme. 

shift in philosophy should provide a framework for 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

43 
Defining the Terms 

➔ Law enforcement managers must understand 

the term “intelligence.” Its meaning is not limited 

to clandestine operations in the national security 

context. Intelligence helps organizations develop 

an accurate picture of their respective environments and make informed decisions. 

➔ Analysts and officers alike must emphasize the 

distinction between “information” and “intelligence.” Intelligence combines information, analysis, and interpretation to produce inferences about 

a specific problem or threat. 

Moving Toward Intelligence-Led 

Policing 

➔ Law enforcement executives must assess how 

they currently use intelligence, and whether they 

need to reengineer their structure, personnel, and 

resources to support an intelligence-led policing 

philosophy. 

➔ The law enforcement profession should recognize the need for better analytic capabilities in the 

policing profession. To help guide the movement 

toward intelligence-led policing, leaders of state 

and local agencies in the United States should 

examine models from other countries as well as 

identify best practices nationwide. 

➔ State and local law enforcement agencies 

should recognize the value of the concepts outlined 

in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 

(NCISP) and begin to work at following the guidelines set forth by the Plan.28 

➔ Following the recommendations in the NCISP, 

law enforcement agencies must work together to 

develop a common understanding of criminal intelligence and its usefulness in combating both traditional crime and terrorism-related offenses. 

➔ In their efforts to improve intelligence and 

information sharing, state and local police executives should examine the FBI and other federal 

efforts to reorganize the nation’s intelligence 

mechanisms and functions. Some suggested they 

should stress state and local participation in formulizing counterterrorism efforts and implement 

the relevant findings of the National Commission 

on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 

Commission).29 

➔ Issues related to standardizing data systems, 

documenting criteria, and implementing and evaluating the standards must be resolved. There are 

more than 18,000 state, local, and tribal law 

enforcement agencies in the United States, and in 

order to guarantee the success of intelligence-led 

policing initiatives, greater agreement on these 

issues must be reached. 

➔ Federal entities are encouraged to continue 

their efforts to translate threats they are aware of 

into what it means for particular jurisdictions. At 

the same time, local law enforcement needs to 

enhance how it relays operative information up to 

the federal levels (i.e., evidence from identity theft 

cases, fraudulent documents, and more). 

28 For more information on NCISP and to obtain a digital copy, see http://it.ojp.gov/documents/ncisp/. 29 For more information see www.fbi.gov/publications.htm and www.9-11commission.gov/. 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

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Understanding Community 

Policing and Intelligence-Led 

Policing 

➔ In the past 30 years law enforcement executives have increasingly embraced the philosophy of 

community policing. Today they must work to 

redefine the role of community policing within an 

intelligence-led policing environment. Federal agencies should consider developing both overview and 

prescriptive materials on intelligence-led policing. 

Meeting the Need for Analysts 

➔ To implement intelligence-led policing, state, 

local, and tribal law enforcement agencies need 

intelligence analytic experts who are professionally 

trained and educated. The few national-level analytic training programs—whether federal or private—should be complemented by specialized inservice programs at state and regional law 

enforcement academies. 

➔ For agencies without the capacity or staffing 

levels to support a corps of analysts, their personnel in intelligence and specialized enforcement 

units need to access appropriate resources or develop skills to organize and analyze their own information. Intelligence exploitation and data mining 

tools are available in software platforms, and they 

can be maintained on desktop and other portable 

computers. New grants from the Department of 

Homeland Security are available to make many of 

these programs more affordable for state and local 

enforcement agencies. 

➔ Just as the Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services put more officers on the streets in 

the 1990s, we need resources that will enable the 

addition of qualified analysts to the ranks of federal, state, local, and tribal entities. This includes the 

development and training of a new generation of 

analysts, so that agencies are not vying for the services of a limited pool of career intelligence analysts. 

Assessing Intelligence Fusion 

Centers 

➔ There has been a recent surge of interest in 

intelligence fusion centers. These are regional, 

multi-agency centers that promote information 

sharing. Some centers involve federal-local partnerships and others are based on compacts 

between local and state enforcement agencies specializing in antiterrorism or narcotics enforcement. Evaluative tools are needed to determine 

whether participation in these centers is efficient 

and cost-effective in certain situations for law 

enforcement agencies. For example, agencies need 

to assess the efficacy of federal-local versus localcounty fusion arrangements with respect to specific needs and capabilities. 

➔ More efforts should be focused on regional 

intelligence planning, whether for collection, 

analysis, needs assessments, or grant applications. 

➔ State and local agencies are encouraged to contact the local field office of the FBI and to develop 

working relationships with the Field Intelligence 

Groups within those offices. 

➔ At the present time, there are no nationally 

accepted evaluative schemes for prescribing how 

either a local intelligence or regional fusion center should be established. Therefore, we have no 

corresponding ability to compare the structure 

and organization of different kinds of fusion centers. The possibility that even a few centers may 

be operating below their potential is reason 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

45 
enough to begin to search for evaluative programs 

that can guide the future of a national movement 

in this direction. 

Making the Most of Existing 

Resources 

➔ Local law enforcement agencies, whether or 

not they participate in regional fusion centers or 

maintain an established intelligence function, are 

encouraged to seek out and fully utilize established mechanisms for sharing information such 

as LEO, RISS, as well as other regional task 

forces. FBI field offices and state homeland security offices continue to be important points of 

contact for local officials. 

➔ Smaller agencies without the capacity to create 

or maintain an effective intelligence function are 

encouraged to partner with larger agencies in their 

region with an established intelligence mechanism 

or that possess the necessary resources to create a 

productive intelligence unit. 

➔ More attention must be paid to identifying and 

disseminating best practices. These should include 

how best to include private sector and university 

security entities. 

➔ There is a need to standardize the classification systems of the various intelligence agencies. 

Currently, what may be classified at one level may 

not be classified at another in a different government agency. 

Balancing Empowerments 

with Restraints 

➔ Law enforcement must be fully aware of federal constraints and safeguards—specifically, 28 CFR 

23 et seq.— and understand when they should be 

applied. 

➔ A curriculum stressing the new requirements 

and opportunities for law enforcement executives 

in the field of intelligence administration should 

be implemented through a variety of vehicles to 

ensure nationwide consistency in understanding. 

➔ Law enforcement executives and public information officers (PIOs) should be provided background and talking points on the merits of local 

intelligence units, as well as information to help dispel or refute misconceptions on the part of the public and media, for use in interviews or public discussion forums. This background should include 

details of how the agency plans to protect the civil 

liberties and privacy of the community it serves. 

The highlighted recommendations from 

this white paper cover a wide range of issues for 

law enforcement and other government agencies 

as they begin to formulate and advance their intelligence functions. The text offers more detailed 

suggestions that can be tailored to the unique 

needs of a department. In all, and the issues discussed within are meant as a starting point for further discussions on the future of producing and 

sharing intelligence. 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

46 
A PPENDIX A 

PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS 

Participants30 

Maureen Baginski 

Executive Assistant Director 

Office of Intelligence 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 

Jack Barrett 

Commander 

Superintendent of Detectives 

Metropolitan Police Department 

Washington, D.C. 

Daniel Bibel 

Program Manager 

Crime Reporting Unit 

Massachusetts State Police 

Framingham, Massachusetts 

Victor Brito 

Captain 

Special Investigations Division 

Metropolitan Police Department 

Washington, D.C. 

Charles Brueggemann 

Deputy Director 

Illinois State Police 

Springfield, Illinois 

Melvin Carraway 

Superintendent 

Indiana State Police 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Chairman 

Global Advisory Committee 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 

Office of Justice Programs 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Barbara Cart 

Executive Assistant 

Homeland Security Support Office 

National Security Agency 

Fort Meade, Maryland 

David Cohen 

Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence 

New York City Police Department 

New York, New York 

James Comey 

Deputy Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

Hank Crumpton 

Chief of Natural Resources Division 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Washington, D.C. 

Deborah Daniels 

Assistant Attorney General 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

Washington, D.C. 

Edward Flynn 

Secretary of Public Safety 

Massachusetts Executive Office for Public Safety 

Boston, Massachusetts 

30 Participants ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

47 
Joshua Filler 

Director 

Office of State and Local Government 

Coordination 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, D.C. 

Polly Hanson 

Chief of Police 

Metro Transit Police Department 

Washington, D.C. 

Willie Hulon 

Special Agent in Charge 

Detroit Field Office 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Detroit, Michigan 

Ron Iden 

Assistant Director in Charge 

Los Angeles Field Office 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Los Angeles, California 

Robert Jordan 

Special Agent in Charge 

Portland Field Office 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Portland, Oregon 

Kathleen Keirnan 

Assistant Director 

Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives 

Washington, D.C. 

Ronald Louie 

Chief of Police 

Hillsboro Police Department 

Hillsboro, Oregon 

Thomas Manger 

Chief of Police 

Fairfax County Police Department 

Fairfax, Virginia 

Ritchie A. Martinez 

Criminal Intelligence Analyst Supervisor 

Arizona Department of Public Safety 

Tucson, Arizona 

President 

International Association of 

Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 

Michael Mason 

Assistant Director in Charge 

Washington Headquarters 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 

Peter Modafferi 

Chief of Detectives 

Rockland County District Attorney’s Office 

New City, New York 

Daniel Oates 

Chief of Police 

Ann Arbor Police Department 

Ann Arbor, Michigan 

Robert K. Olson 

Former Chief of Police 

Minneapolis Police Department 

Minneapolis, Minnesota 

Carl Peed 

Director 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

D. Strebel Pierce 

Special Agent in Charge 

Minneapolis Field Office 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Minneapolis, Minnesota 

Charles Prouty 

Executive Assistant Director 

Washington Headquarters 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 

PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

48 
Louis Quijas 

Director 

Office of Law Enforcement Coordination 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 

Charles Ramsey 

Chief of Police 

Metropolitan Police Department 

Washington, D.C. 

Mike Rolince 

Acting Assistant Director 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 

M. Douglas Scott 

Chief of Police 

Arlington County Police Department 

Arlington, Virginia 

Mark Spurrier 

Deputy Chief 

Office of Enforcement 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

Silver Spring, Maryland 

Michael Stenger 

Special Agent in Charge 

U.S. Secret Service 

Washington, D.C. 

John P. Sullivan 

Sergeant 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

Monterey Park, California 

Karen Tandy 

Administrator 

U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 

Arlington, Virginia 

Bill Young 

Sheriff 

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Deptartment 

Las Vegas, Nevada 

Observers31 

Jim Burch 

Associate Deputy Director of Policy 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

David L. Carter 

Professor 

School of Criminal Justice 

Michigan State University 

East Lansing, Michigan 

Robert Casey, Jr. 

Deputy Director 

Office of Intelligence 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 

G. David Curry 

Professor 

Criminology and Criminal Justice 

University of Missouri - St. Louis 

St. Louis, Missouri 

Mike Duffy 

Deputy Chief Information Officer 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

Steven M. Edwards 

Senior Policy Advisor for Law Enforcement 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

31 Observers’ ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

49 
Robert Fox 

Lieutenant 

Intelligence Investigations Section 

Analysis Unit 

Major Crimes Division 

Los Angeles Police Department 

Los Angeles, California 

Steven H. Gurley 

Special Agent in Charge 

Los Angeles Field Office 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Los Angeles, California 

Greg Harris 

Principal Deputy Director 

Office of Intergovernmental and Public Liaison 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

Dennis Kenney 

Professor 

John Jay College 

City University of New York 

Policy Lab 

Washington, D.C. 

David Klinger 

Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice 

University of Missouri - St. Louis 

St. Louis, Missouri 

Steve Mastrofski 

Director 

Department of Justice 

George Mason University 

Manassas, Virginia 

Pat McCreary 

Senior Policy Advisor 

Bureau of Justice Assistance 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

Lois Felson Mock 

Senior Social Science Analyst 

National Institute of Justice 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 

Ronald Parthemore 

Law Enforcement Liaison 

Office of State and Local Government 

Coordination 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, D.C. 

Steven Pomerantz 

Executive Director 

Center for Criminal Justice Technology 

Mitretek Systems 

Falls Church, Virginia 

Sue Reingold 

Infrastructure Protection & Information Analyst 

Office of State and Local Government 

Coordination 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, D.C. 

Diego Rodriguez 

Special Agent/Unit Chief 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 

Raul Roldan 

Section Chief 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Quantico, Virginia 

Ellen Scrivner 

Law Enforcement Consultant 

Washington, D.C. 

Kathleen Timmons 

Special Assistant to the Assistant Director 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 

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Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services Staff 

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

Phone: 1-800-421-6770 

Fax: 202-616-2914 

Website: www.cops.usdoj.gov 

Beverly Alford 

Assistant Director 

Pam Cammarata 

Deputy Director 

Robert Chapman 

Senior Social Science Analyst 

Mary Hyland 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Frank Mathers 

Grant Monitoring Specialist 

Laurel Matthews 

Special Assistant 

Gilbert Moore 

Public Affairs Specialist 

Timothy Quinn 

Chief of Staff 

Amy Schapiro 

Senior Social Science Analyst 

Michael Seelman 

Senior Social Science Analyst 

Police Executive Research Forum Staff 

1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930 

Washington, DC 20036 

Phone: 202-466-7820 

Fax: 202-466-7826 

Website: www.policeforum.org 

Anna Berke 

Conference Coordinator 

Corina Solé Brito 

Research Associate 

Terry Chowanec 

Senior Associate 

Heather Davies 

Research Associate 

Don Faggiani 

Senior Research Associate 

Lorie Fridell 

Director of Research 

Alex Hayes 

Research Assistant 

Clifford Karchmer 

Director of Program Development 

Bruce Kubu 

Research Associate 

Steve Loyka 

Legislative Research Assistant 

Stacy Osnick Milligan 

Research Associate 

Rebecca Neuburger 

Membership/Marketing Coordinator 

Martha Plotkin 

Communications Director 

Chuck Wexler 

Executive Director 

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51 
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52 
A PPENDIX B 

A GUIDE TO INCORPORATING THE 

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION INTO COMMUNITY 

POLICING 

A Guide to Incorporating the Intelligence Function into Community Policing32 

Planning and 

Implementation Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 

1-1. Assessment: 

Perform workforce and 

community analysis 

Analyze current 

intelligence efforts 

Conduct internal 

(agency) environmental scan of current use of community in intelligence 

function 

Conduct external 

(community) 

environmental scan 

of current use of 

community in intelligence function 

1-2. Political Support: 

Develop internal agency support 

and community support 

Determine the 

political (both internal and external) 

stakeholders 

Develop support 

from internal and 

external stakeholders 

Promote community 

involvement in intelligence function 

1-3. Community Outreach: 

Educate the public about the 

plan—solicit input and feedback 

Educate community Develop material Organize focus 

groups 

Develop strategies to 

include stakeholders 

in the outreach effort 

1-4. Agency Directives: Look for 

needed changes or additions 

Encourage stakeholders to recommend or 

implement any 

changes in policies 

Review policies and 

procedures for consistency with community policing 

principles 

1-5. Resource Considerations: 

Evaluate resources needed 

Identify potential 

costs of implementing changes as recommended by the 

community with 

regard to the intelligence function 

Review current technology related to the 

intelligence function 

and determine future 

needs 

Identify funding 

sources 

Prioritize and allocate resources; 

develop a budget 

1-6. Training Needs: 

Assess the need for new skills 

/additional training 

Identify training 

priorities 

Develop a training 

strategy that involves 

the community in 

the intelligence 

function 

Deliver the training 

1-7. Employee-Labor Relations 

Build support in the workforce 

Engage the union 

(stakeholders) at the 

onset of the process 

Develop consensus 

among formal and 

informal leadership 

in organization 

Develop communication strategies to 

promote “buy in” 

Establish a credible 

program that ensures 

open and honest 

(“above-board”) 

communication 

32 Taken from the Community Policing Consortium’s Executive Training Curriculum. (Minor editorial changes were made 

to this table by the authors.) 

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A PPENDIX C 

INTELLIGENCE TRAINING AND 

COUNTERTERRORISM FUNDING RESOURCES33 

Intelligence Training Resources 

Bureau of Justice Assistance Law Enforcement 

Training Database 

http://bjatraining.aspensys.com/ 

Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law 

Enforcement 

http://www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/tta/index. 

html 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) 

http://www.fletc.gov/trng.htm 

Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) 

http://www.iir.com/ 

28 CFR Part 23 Training 

http://www.iir.com/28cfr/Training.htm 

State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) 

http://www.iir.com/slatt/ 

National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) 

http://www.nw3c.org/training_courses.html 

Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) 

Services and Training 

http://www.iir.com/RISS/RISS_services.htm 

Funding Resources 

The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 

(CFDA) 

U.S. General Services Administration 

1800 F Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20405 

http://www.cfda.gov 

Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law 

Enforcement 

http://www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/fund/ 

index.html 

Federal Grant Opportunities 

Phone: (301) 589-1017 

http://www.fedgrants.gov/ 

FirstGov 

U.S. General Services Administration 

1800 F Street, NW, Washington, DC 20405 

Phone: (800) FED-INFO 

http://www.firstgov.gov/Government/State_Local/ 

Grants.shtml 

Grants.Gov 

HHH Building, Room 739F 

200 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20201 

Phone (800) 518-4726 

http://www.grants.gov/ 

33 This list of resources was compiled by the Criminal Intelligence Training Coordination Strategy (CITCS) Working Group, 

working in association with the Global Initiative and the Bureau of Justice Assistance. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

55 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Washington, DC 20528 

http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=38&c 

ontent=3419 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Domestic Preparedness (ODP) 

810 Seventh Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20531 

Phone: (800) 368-6498 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/grants_goals.htm 

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 

Assistance (BJA) 

810 Seventh Street NW, Fourth Floor 

Washington, DC 20531 

Phone: (202) 616-6500 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/ 

U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 

Justice (NIJ) 

810 Seventh Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20531 

Phone: (202) 307-2942 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/funding.htm 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530 

Phone: (800) 421-6770 or (202) 307-1480 

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/ 

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 

Programs 

810 Seventh Street, NW, Room 5400 

Washington, DC 20531 

Phone: (202) 307-0790 

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/fundopps.htm 

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REFERENCES 

Carter, David L. 2004. Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 

Enforcement Agencies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 

Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

———. Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Primer. 

East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 

School of Criminal Justice. 

Carter, David L. and Richard Holden. 2002. 

“Homeland Security and Local Law Enforcement: 

Practical Applications of Intelligence and Community Policing.” Local Government Police Management (4th ed.) Washington, D.C.: International 

City Management. 

Criminal Intelligence Training Coordination Strategy Working Group (DRAFT). 2004. Core Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for United 

States Law Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies: Findings and Recommendations. 

Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Assistance. 

Eck, John. 2002. Overcoming the Barriers: Crime 

Mapping in the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: 

Police Foundation. 

Faggiani, Donald, Daniel Bibel, and Diana Brensilber. 2001. “Regional Problem Solving Using the 

National Incident Based Reporting System.” In 

Reuland, Melissa, Corina Brito and Lisa Carroll, 

eds., Solving Crime and Disorder Problems. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum. 

Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG). 2004. 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. 

Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Justice, 

Office of Justice Programs. Available online at 

http://it.ojp.gov/topic.jsp?topic_id=103. 

Johnston, Rob. 2003. “Developing a Taxonomy of 

Intelligence Analysis Variables.” Journal of Intelligence, Vol. 47, No. 3. 

LaVigne, Nancy and Julie Wartell. 1998. Crime 

Mapping Case Studies: Successes in the Field. 

Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research 

Forum. 

———. 2000. Crime Mapping Case Studies: Successes in the Field, Volume 2. Washington, D.C.: 

Police Executive Research Forum. 

———. 2001. Mapping Across Boundaries: Regional Crime Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum. 

Meyer, H.E. 1987. Real World Intelligence. New 

York: Grove Weidenfeld. 

Steinert-Threlkeld, Tom. 2002. “CompStat: From 

Humble Beginnings.” Baseline Magazine: The Project Management Center. 9 September. (www.baselinemag.com). 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

2002. Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 

Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving Partnerships. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 

Justice. 

Whitaker, Janet. n.d. “Understanding NIBRS Data 

Quality.” Justice Research and Statistics Association Resource Center. Washington, D.C. 

(www.jrsa.org). 

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57 
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58 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 

Stephan A. Loyka, 

Research Assistant/Legislative Specialist, 

Police Executive Research Forum 

Steve Loyka joined the PERF legislative affairs staff 

in 2003 after spending a year with the U.S. Senate 

Small Business Committee. Loyka has since taken 

on collaborative roles in the research and management services departments at PERF, contributing 

to several projects including this white paper 

series. He has represented PERF at forums dealing 

with homeland security and information-sharing 

issues. Recently, he participated in a working group 

on the need to create a training curriculum on 

criminal intelligence sharing for law enforcement 

executives. Loyka holds a bachelor of arts degree in 

political science from the Johns Hopkins University, and he will receive his master’s degree in government and homeland security studies also from 

the Johns Hopkins University in early 2005. 

Donald Faggiani, Senior Research Associate, 

Police Executive Research Forum 

Donald Faggiani, before returning to PERF, served 

as the executive director of the Wyoming Statistical Analysis Center for Rural Policy Studies at the 

University of Wyoming. He was also the director of 

the Virginia Statistical Analysis Center. He holds a 

doctoral degree in public policy analysis from the 

University of Illinois at Chicago and has been an 

adjunct faculty member of the University of 

Wyoming Criminal Justice Department. 

Faggiani has worked extensively with the 

FBI’s National Incident-Based Reporting System 

(NIBRS) and is recognized as one of the leaders in 

research using incident-based police data systems. 

He is one of the few researchers in the country to 

incorporate NIBRS with GIS and mapping for 

research purposes. Faggiani has been appointed to 

the FBI’s Policy Advisory Council overseeing the 

development of a National Data Exchange Program for aiding law enforcement in their fight 

against terrorism. 

He is also the project director for PERF’s 

project on Protecting America’s Ports: Assessing 

Coordination between Law Enforcement and 

Industrial Security, funded by the National Institute of Justice. 

Clifford Karchmer, 

Director of Program Development, 

Police Executive Research Forum 

Clifford Karchmer is responsible for expanding program opportunities at PERF in the areas of criminal 

justice and homeland security. He also has day-today management responsibilities for PERF programs with the Office of Justice Programs and 

Office of Domestic Preparedness. Examples include 

the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) PoliceMedical Collaboration Project, the BJA Homicide 

Investigative and Model Witness Security projects, 

the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) National Underage Drinking Program technical assistance, and the National Institute of Justice study of model police executive 

strategies to facilitate large budgetary acquisitions. 

He directs an ODP initiative to develop executiveVOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

59 
oriented guides on preparedness topics ranging 

from bioterrorism to unified incident management 

Karchmer has been involved in a variety of 

research, strategy development, technical assistance, and training projects concerned with 

domestic and international dimensions of narcotics trafficking activity, money laundering and 

white-collar crime, asset forfeiture, homicide, and 

witness intimidation, and counterterrorism. He 

was honored with a Public Service Innovators’ 

award by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University for his work in developing a collaborative initiative between law 

enforcement and emergency health care personnel. 

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60 
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 

Maureen Baginski 

Executive Assistant Director 

Office of Intelligence, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

In April 2003, Maureen Baginski was appointed by 

FBI Director Robert Mueller to lead the FBI’s new 

Office of Intelligence. She oversees the collection, 

analysis, and dissemination of intelligence throughout the Bureau and is responsible for integrating the 

intelligence function into all FBI investigative operations. Baginski is developing a strategic analytic 

capacity at the Bureau and expanding its ability to 

convert investigative information into strategic 

intelligence. Under her direction, the Bureau has 

begun prioritizing national collection requirements 

and evaluating the performance of FBI field offices 

nationwide in meeting these requirements. 

Baginski also serves as the Bureau’s primary contact with the intelligence community, 

state and local law enforcement agencies, and 

national and international government agencies 

for disseminating and receiving information. She is 

active in efforts to establish, administer, and evaluate standards for intelligence sharing. 

Prior to joining the FBI, Baginski spent 25 

years with the National Security Agency (NSA). As 

the head of the NSA Signals Intelligence Directorate, the nation’s high-technology cryptology 

organization, she managed a complex and geographically dispersed enterprise engaged in distributed information production. She began her NSA 

career in 1979 as a Russian language instructor. At 

NSA she held a variety of positions, including lead 

analyst for the former Soviet Union; executive 

assistant to the director of NSA; chief of operations 

policy; assistant deputy director for technology and 

systems; and chief in the Office of the Director. 

Baginski holds a master of arts degree in slavic languages and a bachelor of arts degree in Russian and 

Spanish from the State University of New York 

(SUNY), Albany, NY. 

Daniel Bibel, Program Director 

Crime Reporting Unit, 

Massachusetts State Police 

Daniel Bibel has extensive experience in collecting 

and analyzing summary and incident crime data 

for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He has 

been in charge of the Crime Reporting Unit of the 

Massachusetts State Police since 1988. Before 

then, he directed the Commonwealth’s Statistical 

Analysis Center. He received his M.S. degree from 

Northeastern University and has done postgraduate work at Rutgers University. 

For the past 15 years, Bibel has been actively involved in the development and implementation of the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). He has organized several panels on 

NIBRS for the American Society of Criminology 

and given numerous talks on crime mapping and 

analysis using incident-specific crime data. 

Melvin Carraway, Superintendent 

Indiana State Police Service 

Indiana Governor Frank O’Bannon appointed 

Melvin Carraway Superintendent of the Indiana 

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61 
State Police on January 13, 1997. Superintendent 

Carraway also serves as the current chairman of 

the Global Advisory Committee of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, in association 

with the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 

Plan and the U.S. Department of Justice Office of 

Justice Programs. The Global Advisory Committee 

(GAC) is composed of key personnel from local, 

state, tribal, federal, and international justice and 

public safety entities and includes agency executives and policy makers, automation planners and 

managers, information practitioners, and, most 

importantly, end users. This last group distinguishes the GAC as a committee whose members 

remain actively dedicated to information sharing, 

because they continue to be producers, consumers, 

and administrators of crucial justice-related data. 

Fellow committee members elect leaders of the 

Global Advisory Committee (GAC) every two 

years. 

Prior to his appointment as superintendent, Carraway served as the executive director for 

the Indiana State Emergency Management Agency, 

Department of Fire and Building Services. Carraway coordinated disaster relief for flood and tornado victims, and facilitated state activities during 

the investigation of and recovery from major incidents, including plane crashes and industrial accidents. He was also instrumental in reconfiguring 

the State Emergency Operations Center, and reorganizing the Public Safety Institute that trains volunteer and professional firefighters and emergency 

medical personnel for efficiency and accountability. 

Carraway became a state trooper in 1979 

and was assigned to the Indianapolis District. In 

his 22 years with the Indiana State Police, his 

assignments have included Commander of Training, Aviation Commander, and Enforcement Division Commander. He participates and provides 

leadership to various national and local boards and 

commissions, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives. Carraway earned a bachelor of music degree from 

Heidelberg College and is also a graduate of the FBI 

National Academy. 

Stuart Kirby, PhD, 

Detective Chief Superintendent 

and Divisional Commander, 

Lancashire Constabulary, United Kingdom 

Stuart Kirby is a Detective Chief Superintendent 

with the Lancashire Constabulary and commands 

the HQ Specialist Operations and Crime Division, 

which is responsible for the departments of intelligence, major crimes unit, scientific support, homicide investigation, air support, mounted police, 

motorway policing, community safety, and operational planning. Kirby has 27 years service experience and has performed in numerous supervisory 

capacities including head of intelligence, head of 

uniform and detective training, and divisional 

commander. 

Kirby is a registered psychologist, and has 

a Ph.D. in investigative psychology. His area of 

expertise is in crimes against children. Since 1993, 

he has assisted police forces nationally in ongoing 

investigations concerning the sexual exploitation 

of children, and has published numerous articles 

on the subject. Kirby is also an honorary senior fellow at Lancaster and Liverpool Universities. He 

has won two national awards on behalf of his 

organization in the area of problem-oriented policing, and recently published an article on the intePROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: THE STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SERIES 

62 
gration of the UK National Intelligence Model with 

a problem-oriented approach. 

Ritchie A. Martinez, 

Criminal Intelligence Analyst Supervisor 

Arizona Department of Public Safety 

Ritchie A. Martinez has worked in the field of law 

enforcement for 32 years developing and instructing classes in law enforcement intelligence and 

management of major case investigations. He 

began his career as a deputy sheriff in 1972 when 

he was assigned to Arizona’s first multi-agency 

narcotics investigative task force around the United States–Mexico border areas. He created the 

unit’s first intelligence system, supported narcotics 

enforcement officers’ intelligence requirements, 

and analyzed specific case/investigative targets. In 

1976, Martinez became a special agent/intelligence 

analyst assigned to the Arizona Narcotics Strike 

Force. He also assisted in developing a regional 

statewide intelligence program and building an 

analytical section to support a multi-state intelligence system (Narcotics Information Network of 

Arizona, NINA & Quad State). During this time, 

he also worked with his agency’s staff to establish 

and create the program known as RISSnet (Regional Information Sharing System), and the Rocky 

Mountain Information Network’s (RMIN) intelligence and analytical systems. In 1981, he was 

appointed Manager of Criminal Intelligence Analysis Section, for the Arizona Criminal Intelligence 

System Agency (ACISA), and in 1984 he was 

transferred to the Arizona Department of Public 

Safety (DPS), Criminal Investigation Bureau’s 

intelligence division. Upon retiring in 1994, he 

returned to DPS and began his civilian criminal 

intelligence analytical career. He was appointed to 

supervise criminal intelligence analysts assigned to 

the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA), 

and Post Seizure Analysis Team (PSAT). Currently 

he coordinates four multi-agency intelligence analysts’ teams in the Arizona HIDTA Center, Investigative Support Center. 

Martinez is the former president of the 

International Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA 2000-2004), and a 

former member of the Board of Governors for the 

Society of Certified Crime Analysts (SCCA) for 10 

years. He holds college degrees in both criminal 

justice and business administration. He has 

received numerous awards and citations for his 

work. Among those awards, was the Executive 

Office of the President of the United States, Office 

of National Drug Control Policy-High Intensity 

Drug Trafficking Area, “Outstanding Intelligence 

Analyst” December 2000. 

Steve Sellers, Major 

Fairfax County (VA) Police Department 

Steve Sellers is a 22-year veteran of the Fairfax 

County Police Department. He oversees the Criminal Investigations Bureau, which is responsible for 

the department’s Organized Crime & Narcotics 

Division, Major Crimes Division, Investigative 

Support Division, Crime Scene Section, Victim 

Services Section, and the Criminal Intelligence 

Division. As head of the Washington-Area Sniper 

Prosecution Taskforce, he was instrumental in the 

prosecution of Lee Malvo and John Mohammad. 

He coordinated the many agencies and individuals 

involved in the prosecution efforts (for example, 

Fairfax County Police, police from other local jurisdictions, prosecutors, officials in the FBI and ATF, 

and members of the Secret Service). 

He has a bachelor of arts degree in 

business from National-Louis University and a 

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63 
masters degree in public administration from Virginia Tech. Sellers is also a graduate of the FBI 

National Academy, and he holds a Graduate 

Certificate in criminal justice from the University of Virginia. 

Sellers is a member of the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police, National Academy 

Associates, Leadership Fairfax, Major Cities Chiefs 

Association, National Association of Public 

Administrators, and other national and international police organizations. 

John P. Sullivan, Sergeant 

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

John Sullivan has been a member of the Los 

Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department since 

1988. Assigned to the Emergency Operations 

Bureau, he serves as officer-in-charge of the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group. He is a 

member of the InterAgency Board on Equipment 

Standardization and Interoperability for Terrorism Response (an independent group of federal, 

state, and local first responders) and the Board of 

Advisors for the Terrorism Research Center, an 

independent institute in northern Virginia, dedicated to research on terrorism, information warfare and security, critical infrastructure protection, and other issues. 

Sullivan is the author of more than 50 articles on terrorism, policing, and emergency 

response topics. He is also coauthor of Policing 

Transportation Facilities, Jane’s Unconventional 

Weapons Response Handbook, Jane’s Facility Security Handbook, and Emergency Preparedness for 

Transit Terrorism. He holds a bachelor of arts 

degree in government from the College of William 

and Mary and a master of arts degree in urban 

affairs and policy analysis from the New School for 

Social Research. 

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ABOUT THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY 

ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services (COPS) was created in 1994 and has the unique mission to 

directly serve the needs of state and local law enforcement. The COPS 

Office has been the driving force in advancing the concept of community policing, and is responsible for one of the greatest infusions of resources into state, 

local, and tribal law enforcement in our nation’s history. 

Since 1994, COPS has invested over $10 billion to 

add community policing officers to the nation’s 

streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support 

crime prevention initiatives, and provide training 

and technical assistance to help advance community policing. COPS funding has furthered the 

advancement of community policing through community policing innovation conferences, the development of best practices, pilot community policing 

programs, and applied research and evaluation initiatives. COPS has also positioned itself to respond 

directly to emerging law enforcement needs. Examples include working in partnership with departments to enhance police integrity, promoting safe 

schools, combating the methamphetamine drug 

problem, and supporting homeland security efforts. 

Through its grant programs, COPS is 

assisting and encouraging local, state, and tribal 

law enforcement agencies to enhance their homeland security efforts using proven community 

policing strategies. Traditional COPS programs 

such as the Universal Hiring Program (UHP) gives 

priority consideration to those applicants that 

demonstrate a use of funds related to terrorism 

preparedness or response through community 

policing. The COPS in Schools (CIS) program has 

a mandatory training component that includes 

topics on terrorism prevention, emergency 

response, and the critical role schools can play in 

community response. Finally, COPS is implementing grant programs intended to develop interoperable voice and data communications networks 

among emergency response agencies that will 

assist in addressing local homeland security 

demands. 

The COPS Office has made substantial 

investments in law enforcement training. COPS 

created a national network of Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs) to offer state and 

local law enforcement, elected officials, and comVOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

65 
munity leaders training opportunities on a wide 

range of community policing topics. Most recently 

the RCPIs have been focusing their efforts on 

developing and delivering homeland security training. COPS also supports the advancement of community policing strategies through the Community Policing Consortium. Additionally, COPS has 

made a major investment in applied research, 

which makes possible the growing body of substantive knowledge covering all aspects of community policing. 

These substantial investments have produced a significant community policing infrastructure across the country as evidenced by the fact 

that at the present time, approximately 86 percent 

of the nation’s population is served by law enforcement agencies practicing community policing. The 

COPS Office continues to respond proactively by 

providing critical resources, training, and technical 

assistance to help state, local, and tribal law 

enforcement implement innovative and effective 

community policing strategies. 

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ABOUT PERF 

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is a national professional 

association of chief executives of large city, county, and state law 

enforcement agencies. PERF’s objective is to improve the delivery of 

police services and the effectiveness of crime control through several means: 

• the exercise of strong national leadership, 

• the public debate of police and criminal justice issues, 

• the development of research and policy, and 

• the provision of vital management and leadership services to law enforcement agencies. 

PERF members are selected on the basis of their commitment to the organization’s objectives 

and principles. PERF operates under the following tenets: 

• Research, experimentation, and the exchange of ideas through public discussion and debate are 

paths for the development of a comprehensive body of knowledge about policing. 

• Substantial and purposeful academic study is a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding, and 

adding to that body of knowledge. 

• Maintenance of the highest standards of ethics and integrity is imperative in the improvement of 

policing. 

• The police must, within the limits of the law, be responsible and accountable to the public as the 

ultimate source of law enforcement authority. 

• The principles embodied in the Constitution are the foundation of policing. 

Categories of membership also allow the organization to benefit from the diverse views of criminal justice researchers, law enforcement of all ranks, and other professionals committed to advancing 

law enforcement services to all communities. 

VOL. 4: THE PRODUCTION AND SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 

67 
NOTES 

Additional copies of this report can be downloaded free of charge at 

www.policeforum.org and www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

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68