Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Alexander W. Robbins

Bedford, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of 

A.D. (Minor Child) and

J.H. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 9, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JT-1378

Appeal from the Morgan Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Matthew G. 

Hanson, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

55C01-2001-JT-32

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 2 of 10

[1] J.H. (“Mother”) appeals the Morgan Circuit Court’s order involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her minor child, A.D. Mother argues that 

termination of her parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing

evidence. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] A.D. was born on April 24, 2019, and at birth, he tested positive for marijuana, 

methamphetamine, and amphetamine. Therefore, when A.D. was five days 

old, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed A.D. from Mother’s 

care. A.D. was placed with his paternal grandmother. 

[4] A petition alleging that A.D. was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) was 

filed on April 30, 2019.1 Mother failed to appear for the initial hearing, which 

was also held on April 30. A.D. was adjudicated a CHINS pursuant to Indiana 

Code sections 31-34-1-1 and -10.

[5] Mother appeared at the dispositional hearing held on May 23, 2019. The trial 

court ordered Mother to participate in services including a substance-abuse 

1 During these proceedings, A.D.’s biological father had an active warrant for his arrest and was hiding from 

law enforcement. He did not appear for any hearings in this case and was served by publication because he 

could not be located. His parental rights to A.D. were terminated by default, and he does not participate in 

this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 3 of 10

assessment, comply with all treatment recommendations, submit to random 

drug screens, and maintain stable and adequate housing.

[6] Mother completed a substance-abuse evaluation through Centerstone. She also 

began working with a family support specialist and a recovery coach. Mother 

failed to make significant progress, did not attend all required group sessions, 

and missed meetings with her recovery coach. She was therefore discharged 

from Centerstone in August 2019.

[7] Next, DCS referred Mother to Life Recovery Center. Mother’s participation in 

treatment through that referral was “hit or miss.” Tr. p. 77. Mother was 

discharged unsuccessfully after she tested positive for methamphetamine and 

THC. Her treatment providers recommended inpatient treatment. Mother 

denied using methamphetamine and refused to seek inpatient treatment.

[8] In November and December of 2019, Mother failed to maintain 

communication with her DCS service providers. And Mother failed to appear 

at the November 21, 2019 permanency hearing. Because Mother was not in 

compliance with the case plan, had not made progress in her treatment goals, 

and was not participating in visitation with the child, on January 27, 2020, DCS 

filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother did not appear for 

the February 3, 2020 initial hearing on the termination petition.

[9] In January 2020, a family case manager was able to speak to Mother, and she 

was re-referred to Centerstone. On April 27, 2020, Mother finally completed a 

substance abuse evaluation at Centerstone. Mother was “guarded” during her 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 4 of 10

assessment and minimized her substance-abuse issues. Tr. p. 44. The therapist 

at Centerstone recommended intensive outpatient therapy and individual 

therapy. 

[10] In May 2020, Mother resumed therapy and began to participate in intensive 

outpatient therapy three days per week. Mother missed five scheduled group 

sessions. She met with her therapist regularly until June 4, 2020. Mother 

admitted that she used methamphetamine in mid-May 2020 and continues to 

smoke marijuana. She tested positive for THC numerous times throughout 

these proceedings. 

[11] Mother initially participated in supervised visitation with A.D. However, she 

failed to participate in visitation with the child from November 2019 to May 

2020. Mother also has not made any progress towards obtaining stable 

employment or income and transportation. 

[12] On May 28, 2020 and June 12, 2020, the trial court held hearings on DCS’s 

petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother did not appear at the 

June 12 hearing, but her counsel represented her. Mother failed to respond to 

counsel’s attempts to communicate with her between the two hearing dates. 

Mother also did not respond to counsel’s text message on the morning of the 

June 12 hearing. 

[13] Both the family case manager and the Court Appointed Special Advocate 

testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best 

interests. Tr. pp. 62–63, 91. DCS maintained A.D.’s placement with paternal 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 5 of 10

grandmother throughout these proceedings, and grandmother is willing to 

adopt the child. 

[14] On June 23, 2020, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother’s parental

rights to A.D. The trial court concluded that Mother refuses to acknowledge her 

substance-abuse issues and has not taken significant steps towards addressing 

those issues during these proceedings. Appellant’s App. p. 28. The court noted 

that Mother has a “lengthy and continuing drug abuse history” and has two 

prior “DCS cases where her children have been taken from her by both consent 

and termination.” Id. Those prior cases arose due to Mother’s drug and stability 

issues providing “further evidence that [M]other essentially has no 

understanding of how her drug use has destroyed her life and the lives of her 

children.” Id. For these reasons, the trial court concluded that DCS proved both 

that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or reasons for continued 

placement outside Mother’s home will not be remedied and that continuation 

of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to A.D.’s well-being.

[15] Mother now appeals the termination of her parental rights to A.D.

Standard of Review

[16] Indiana appellate courts have long had a highly deferential standard of review 

in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 

871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness 

credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 6 of 10

unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating 

a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Clear error is that 

which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made. J.M. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 802 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004), trans. denied.

[17] Here, the trial court’s judgment contains special findings and conclusions; 

therefore, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of 

Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether 

the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the 

findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when 

the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” 

Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences 

support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 

208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Moreover, we accept unchallenged 

findings as true and determine only whether the unchallenged findings are 

sufficient to support the judgment. In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2019), trans. denied; see also T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 

104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that when the trial court’s unchallenged 

findings support termination, there is no error), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 7 of 10

Discussion and Decision

[18] Mother claims that the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her parental 

rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indiana Code section 

31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate parental rights must allege:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being 

of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

[19] DCS must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 

31-37-14-2; In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). Because Indiana 

Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the trial court is 

required to find that only one prong of subsection 2(B) has been established by 

clear and convincing evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010).

[20] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of 

the parent is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 8 of 10

at 148. It is instead sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 

child’s emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent’s 

custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court 

shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[21] The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents but instead 

to protect children. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 

Although parental rights have a constitutional dimension, the law allows for 

their termination when the parties are unable or unwilling to meet their 

responsibilities as parents. Id. Indeed, parental interests must be subordinated to 

the child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to

terminate parental rights. G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259.

[22] Mother argues that “the root of [her] problems with participating in services 

was a lack of transportation.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. She claims that she engaged 

in services “when transportation was no longer an issue due to services being 

provided virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic[.]” Id.

[23] Mother may have had difficulty participating in some services due to her lack of 

transportation. However, Mother’s continued drug use, refusal to acknowledge 

her significant substance-abuse issues, and failure to maintain communication 

with her DCS service providers had nothing to do with her alleged lack of 

transportation. Her failure to appear for the fact-finding hearing on June 12, 

2020, via a Zoom call or to communicate with her counsel was not caused by 

her lack of transportation, either.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 9 of 10

[24] At birth, A.D. tested positive for marijuana, methamphetamine, and 

amphetamine. Mother engaged in behavior that endangered A.D.’s life well 

before he was born. Yet, as the trial court found, Mother “essentially has no 

understanding of how her drug use has destroyed her life and the lives of her 

children.” Appellant’s App. p. 28. Mother continues to deny methamphetamine 

use, despite the fact that A.D. tested positive for that substance at birth and she 

tested positive in May 2020. And Mother refused to participate in inpatient 

treatment as recommended by service providers.

[25] A.D. was removed from Mother at birth and has never been placed in her care. 

The trial court’s finding that the “[p]rior history of this mother with her other 

children suggests an instability and an inability to ever wish to properly provide 

any sort of safe or sober homelife for this child” is unchallenged and supported 

by the evidence. Id. at 29. Also, Mother “has shown no intent of ever getting 

clean in order to do what she needs to do for the best interests of” A.D. Id. 

Mother’s failure to appear for the fact-finding hearing in this case further 

demonstrates her lack of commitment to A.D. and that she is unwilling to take 

the steps necessary to provide a stable life for the child.

[26] In sum, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings that 

DCS proved the factors enumerated in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2). 

Mother’s argument to the contrary is merely a request to reweigh the evidence 

and credibility of the witnesses, which our court will not do.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1378 | December 9, 2020 Page 10 of 10

Conclusion

[27] DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that resulted 

in A.D.’s removal or reasons for continued placement outside Mother’s home 

will not be remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to A.D.’s well-being. And Mother does not appeal the trial 

court’s finding that termination of her parent rights is in A.D.’s best interests. 

For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights.

[28] Affirmed.

Altice, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.