VIETNAM STUDIES 

RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

1966-1969 

by 

M ajo,- Geneml William B. Fulton 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. , 1985 
Library of Congress Cam log Card Number: 72-600370 

First I)rillled 1973-CMH Pub 90-18 

For salt by lhe SUpcrill[tlldtll[ o f Docum('IIU. U.S. Go' crnmenl Printing omct' 

WaJhmgto n. D.C. 20402 
Foreword 

The United States Army has met an unusually complex chal· 

lenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the Olher services. 

the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting 

an emerging nation to develop govcrnmcnla l processes of its own 

choosing. free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging armed conniet, the assignment in Southeast Asia 

has required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of 

a modern almy upon an underdeveloped environment and adapt· 

ing them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved 

helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing 

with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting 

conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular units. 

As this assignment nears an end, the U.S. Army must prepare 

for other challenges tholl may I ie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats itself exactly and (hat no army c"er profited 

from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the 

Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its 

experience, its shortcomings no less th,ln its achievements. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histOries 

will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in 

Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more 

salient aspects of that experience C;lIl be made available now. At 

the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior 

officers who served in important IlOSlS in Vietnam and who sti ll 

carry a heavy burden of day-to.day responsib ilities has prepared a 

series of monographs. These studies should be of great value in 

helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at 

the same time contributing to the historical record and providing 

the American public with an interim report on the performance 

of men and officers who have responded, as others have through 

our history, to exacting and trying demands. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on omeial 

records, with additional material from published and unpublished 

HI 
secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To 

facilitate security clearance. annotation and detailed bibliography 

have been omitted from the publilhed venion: a full y documented 

account with bibliography is filed with the Office of the Chief of 

Military History. 

The author of thi. monograph, Major Ceneral Willilm B. 

Fulton, was intimately involved in the early development of the 

riverine warfare concept al commHnder of the 2d Brigade. 9th 

Infantry Division, which arrived in Vietnam in January 1967 and 

immediately began combat operatioOi in the Mekong Delta. In 

March the brigade moved into Dong Tam, the base created by 

dredging sand from the bottom of an arm of the Mekong River. 

In early June the brigade teamed with Navy T ask Force 11 7 to 

form the Mobile Riverine Force. During World War II General 

Fulton fought in Italy and during the Korean War served on the 

staff of Army Forces Far East Advance. He is presently the Director 

of Doctrine Evaluation and Command Systems in the Office of the 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development and is also Systems 

Manager for Surveillance. Target Acquisition, and Night Obser· 

vation Systems. 

Washington. D.C. 

15 August 1972 

IV 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General. USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

This monograph describes U.S. Army Riverine planning and 

operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the years 1966 

through 1969. Since the personal experience of the author was 

with preparations fOT riverine operations and the initial operations 

themselves, emphasis has been placed on these activities through 

carl)' 1968. In sllmmaril.ing operations conducted in the balance 

of the three-year period. particular attention has been called to 

significant trends or changes in ri,'crine operations in Vietnam. 

a co-operative enterprise of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. 

Looking back from the valH:lgc point of early 1972. this study 

attempts to reconstruct the evcnts and describe the silliation as it 

was from 1966 through 1969, using official records. repoTls, and 

personal interviews. 

The author is indebted especially to the officers of the 9th 

Infantry Division who helped in lhe research and ,,,riting of this 

monograph. Major j ohnnie II. Corns was initially the il1lelligence 

officer and later the operations ofhcer of th e 2d Brigade during 

1966 and 1967. His research. writi ng, and continuous editing have 

been indispensable in preparation of this study. Colonel Lucien E. 

Bolduc, jr., commanded the 3d Battalion. 47th Infantry. and was 

later operations officer of the 9th In£al1lry Division during preparations for and initial conduct of ri,erine operations. His contributions in preparing the 2d 13rig<,de of the Old Rcliables for these 

operations and in preparing this manuscript are fully appreciated. 

Colonel Thomas C. Loper, 9th Infantry Division Engineer in 1967 

and 1968, contributed both in the enactment and the recording of 

the ri verine story. The author also wishes to acknowledge the typo 

ing assistance or Miss Ann i\1, Faheny and Miss judith A. Secondo, 

who patiently saw the manuscript through several drafts. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 August 1972 

v 

WILLIAM B. fULTON 

Major Gelleral, U.S. Army 

Contents 

Chap'er Page 

1. BACKGROUND 3 

3 

8 

17 

21 

23 

24 

21 

Previous American Experience. . . . . . . . 

French River War/are i71 Indochina, 1945-1954. 

The Mekong Delta . .... 

Enemy Forces. 

Republic of Vietnam Faras. 

U.S. Forces .. 

The Situation in 1966. . . 

I I. THE CONCEI)T OF A RIVERINE FORCE. 

III. RIVERINE PREPARATIONS IN THE UN ITED 

26 

STATES AND I N VIETNAM. . . . . . . . 42 

Review of the Mobile Afloat Force Concept. 45 

9th lllJarllry Divisio" Studies the Mobile 

Afloat Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 

The Coronado Conference (md Doctrin e. 52 

Fhwl Decisions 011 Deplo'yment. . . . . 56 

2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Arrives 

ill Vie/nnm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 

Rung Sat Special Zone Operational Training. 59 

IV. INITIAL DELTA O PERATIONS ...... . 

Movt:me,1l to Dorlg Tam . ....... . 

Final Mobile R iverine Force Preparations. 

2d Brigade Operations.. .... 

Mobile Riverine Force Campaign Plan . .. 

V. PL<\NS AND O PERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR 

68 

68 

70 

76 

85 

TI-IEl\'IOUILE RIVERINE FORCE. 89 

bltcfligence . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Planning . . . . . . . . . 

Operational Concept and Procedures. 

VIl 

89 

90 

93 
Pagfl 

VI. IIJ CORPS OPERATIONS AND TI-IE THREAT TO 

DONG TAM. . . . . . . 103 

Can Giuoc Operation. 104 

Co Cong Operation. . 110 

Further Can GilloC OpaatioTlL 112 

Dinh TllorJg Operation. . . . . 120 

The Mobile Riverine Force Retllnl$ to III Corps 125 

Ben Lllc OperatioTl. . . 125 

VII. CAM SON TO THE RACH RUQNG CANAL. 128 

Dinh Tuong Province alld Coronado V. 128 

Coronado IX. .... ISS 

Six Months in Retrospect. . I4.!I 

VlIl. TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968 AND U.S. REACTION 148 

IX. PACIFICATION AND KIEN HOA PROVINCE . 167 

The Third Battaliorl. . . 

Operation SEA LORDS. 

X. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY. 

GLOSSARY 

INDEX .. 

Charts 

I. River Assault Squadron Organization. 

2. Mobile Riverine Force Command Structure. 

Diagrams 

I. A Typical French River Convoy in North Vietnam. 

2. French Assault Landing. ..... 

S. Riverine Operation and Base Ddensc. 

4. Foot Disease Incident Rate ... 

VII. 

167 

179 

185 

195 

201 

61 

88 

12 

13 

38 

66 
No. 

5. Artillery Barge Towing Ilosition . ... 

6. Typical Company Landing Formation. 

Tables 

75 

100 

I. Viet Minh River Ambushes. 5 january-16 February 1954 15 

2. SEA LORDS Operations. November 1968-January 1969.. 172 

!S. U.S. River Cr:lft Transferred to Vietnam Navy in June 1969 178 

Maps 

I. The Rivers of French Indochina. 

2. The Mekong Delta ... . . 

!S. Delta Situation: july 1966 . 

4. Ap Rae 2 Operation: 2 May 1967. 

5. Cam Son Operation: 15 !\'lay 1967 . 

6. Can Giuoc Operation: 19 June 1967 . 

7. Go Cong Operation: 4-6 July 1967 . 

8. 

9. 

10. 

Northern Can Giuoc. . . ... . 

Dinh Tuong Operation: july- August 1967. 

Ben Luc Operation: 20 August 1967 . 

II. Ban Long and Cam Son Operations: September 

12. Kien Ho."t . . .. . . . . . . ... . . . 

19G7. 

13. Rach Ruong Canal Operation: 'I DecemlJcr 1967. 

14. Vinh Long ........ . 

15. Can Tho ... .. . 

16. Areas of Riverine Operations: 1%7-1969. 

Illustrations 

Soldier Struggles Through Delta Mud ... . 

LST With Armored Troop Carriers OInd Monitors. 

Self-Propelled Barracks Ship With Anllni Barge .• 

Armored Troop Carrier. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 

Command and Communications Boat. 

Assault SuppOrt Patrol Boat. 

Monitor . ... . .... . 

Landing Craft Repair Ship . 

IX 

9 

17 

22 

77 

80 

105 

109 

IIG 

IIH 

126 

130 

134 

140 

152 

157 

192 

18 

28 

30 

52 

33 

3G 

37 

48 
Poge 

A Wet But Peaceful Landing. 65 

Non·Self-Propelled Barracks Ship. 71 

Anillery Barge .... _ . . . . 72 

Anillery Fires From Barges An chored on River Bank. 7'l 

Helicopter Barge. . . . . . . . . . . 75 

Annorcd Troop Carriers in Convoy Battle Line. . 81 

J\-(obile Riverine Force Briefing Aboard USS Bel/elIJah. 93 

Troops Prepare to Embark From Ammi Barges. 9.? 

Ionitors and Assau lt Support Palrol Boats Head in to Shore. 96 

Assau lt Craft Going in To Land Troops. . . . 97 

Troops Go Ashore From }\rmorcd Troop Carricr 99 

Armored Troop Carrier With l-Ie1ip .. d . . . . . 113 

Portable Firing Platform. . . . . . . . . . . . 137 

Armored Troop Carriers Move Up the "Iy Tho River. 184 

All illustrations arc from Depanment of Defense files. 

x 
RIVERINE OPERATIONS, 1966-1969 

CHAPTER I 

Background 

During 1965 and 1966 when ~he possibility of creating a U.S. 

riverine force for operations in the Mekong Della was being discussed, there weTe three h:lsic considerations that weiJ,\:hed heavily 

in fa"or of the force: a lr.1dition of past American success in riverine operations, p-1rticul:1rly Union operations in the Mississippi 

basin during lhe Civil W:lr: the success more recently achiev~ by 

the French in riverine operations during the Indochina War nncler 

conditions that appe:lred to have chan~C(1 little dming the years 

that had intervened; and, moSt important, a situation in the Mekong Delta that scemcrl ripe faT exploitation hy a riverine force. 

Previolls American Experie"ce 

American forces conducted riverine operations as early as the 

Revolutionary War and made use of them freql1ently dl1ring the 

century that followed. In each case, the operations were p.."1ft of 

a larger land campaign. While they were not always tactically 

successful, they usually made a substantial contribution to the suc· 

cess of the campaign. 

]n 1775, on the heels of the battles of Lexington and Concord, 

both the Americ..1ns and British sought to gain control of the 

nrategic Hudson River-Lake Champlain-St. L1\HenCe River 

waterway system conne(·ting New York and the British centers in 

Canada. Forces under Colonels Benedict Arnolc! and F.than Allan 

seized the British forts at Ticonderoga and Crown Point: Arnold 

then armed a captured schooner anc! pressed nonh along L.1ke 

Champlain to attack the British base at Sl. Johns on the Richelieu 

River above the lake. In a daring surprise attack, he captured or 

destroyed a large numher of boats and considerable amounts of 

supplies and equipment before returning to L.1ke Champlain. By 

means of this lake and river operation, Arnold effcctually blunted 

the British ability to counterattack. 

Pressing their advantage. the Americans then undertook an 

invasion of Canada, with onc line of advance up the lake and river 
RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

chain. Their attack on Quebec was repulsed, and by the spring of 

1776 the British. heavily reinforced from the home country. regained the offensive. The British began to assemble a Oeet at St. 

Johns. Some of the larg,.r vessels were actually built in England. 

knocked down for shipment across the ocean, and reassembled at 

St. Johns. Spurred on by Benedict Arnold, Lhe Americans sought 

to keep pace with the British .1.1 their own Skencsborough shipyard. 

near the southern end of Lake Champlain, On II October 1776 

lhe Americans, with a Aeel of fifteen boats hastily constructed of 

green timber and manned by a scratch force of backwoodsmen and 

recruits from the seacoast-"the ROlSam of the waterfront and the 

jelSam from the taverns"- engaged the formidable British force 

of twenty·nine vessels at Valcour Island. JUSt north or Ticonderoga. 

The poorly organized and ill.equipped American force lost its ships 

one by one, and the Americans were forced to retire to Crown 

Point. The British tenaciously pursued and drove Arnold's force 

out of Crown Point into Ticonderoga at the southern tip of the 

lake. Although Arnold had lost the engagement, his small Ootilla 

delayed the British advance until tile following year, when Major 

General John Burgoyne allempted a thrust southward to cut the 

colonies in two and was defeated at Saratoga. 

Some thirty·five years later in the War of 1812, U.S. forces again 

fought the British on American waterways. In 1813 Commodore 

Oliver H. Perry assembled a Reet on Lake Erie to counter the 

British threat from C."mada. and by defeating the British Aeet in a 

series of engagements gained control of the Great L"Ikes, permitting 

a subsequent American advance into Canada. Dnring the next 

year the British made three major attempts to exploit inland water· 

ways: one from Chesapeake Bay against Washington. a second 

overland from Canada toward New York. and a third from the 

Gui£ of Mexico against New Orleans. Each British effort was met 

by an opposing American riverine force. In August 1'814 British 

forces pushing up the Chesapeake were met by a force under 

Commodore Joshua Barney. After several engagements in which 

Barney's initiative and dogged persistence frustrated the British 

advance, the British disembarked at Benedict, Maryland. and then 

marched the thirty-one miles to 'Vashington. where they burned 

the public buildings. The British drive down Lake Champlain 

was blocked in September 1814 by American Commodore Thomas 

Macdonough in the ri\'er banle of Plattsburg. 

A few months later. in December 1814, the British moved 

against New Orleans, connected to the Gulf of Mexico by the lakes 
RACKGROU l'"O 

and bayons of the Mississippi Del ta . While the Briti .. h asscmhled 

forces off the coast. American lA)1ll1ll1)(lure Daniel T . I);tltersull 

prep.,red his river forces lei oppose the awu"k. lie pJol( ecJ ohstrL~t. · 

tions in the waterways 1c;lciing directly to the ci lY. anel \\'ilh fi ve 

gunboats and two lenders met the advancin~ British foncs on I.ake 

norgne. Outgunned and OUlll1atH.'uvcred, P;ltlerSon wa~ Ih{)rou~hl y 

beaten. Despite his dcfe:'ll he cOlllinued with tI'e rCllltl alHS of his 

shallow-water navy to oppose the British advance with sk ill and 

energy, thlls gaining eno ll ~h lime 10 permit General Andrew .I alk· 

son to ready the derenscs of the city. Then Patterson, with th e 

Carolil/a and the LOIIIJuwn, his two Iarp,cst ships, deployed ( 1Il the 

river, joined forces with J ad,son in a defense that resu lted in ulti· 

mate derea t of the British. 

From 1835 to IR42 Army ane! Navy forces fought in the Florida 

Everglades against the Creeks and the Seminoles in a paniclII;lrly 

frustrating and indec isive camp:lign . To navigate the inl ets alan!.!, 

the coast as well as the waterway males of the swamps, a mosquito 

fleet of some 150 craft-schooners. fl at-bottomed boats, hateaux. and 

canocs-was assembled and manned hy soldiers, s.,iloTS, anel mari nes. 

Operating in conjllnClion with Army Colonel William .I. Worth , 

Navy LieUlenalll John T . ~ft:L,u~hlin transported men, equipment, and supplies. patrolled \\'aterways, and conducted raids. Uecause of its mobility and striki ll ~ power, the riverine force. well 

adapted to conditions in the E" cs, was able to red uce;; the 

Indian threat. 

A few yea rs later durin].!; the War with Mexico, 1846- 1848. the 

Ameri can Navy conduCled two river raids which, althou g:h nOt 

particularly decisive in [helll!iehes. made a 5lro ~ impression o n 

one of the younger panicipanl.~, Li eutenant Da vi d Dixon Porter. 

who was to lise the experience in another war. The raids were conducted some sevemy-6\'e miles lip [he Tabasco River against San 

Juan Bautista, an enemy nossi ~ point and operati ng hase. Commodore Matthew C. Perry utilii'ed steamers to tow twO sai ling schoo· 

ners and smaller craft lip the wi nd ing ri ver against a strong ClIlTent. 

On his first raid he homharc1ed the l ily wit hout deharking any 

troops. On his second, he I;mdecl a force of 2,:)00 sa ilors and ma -

rines, which had been formed into infantry and artillery c1i"isiom, 

and assaulted the city from the shore. SUPI)(lrted by fire from the 

force anOat that inc\lHkd four steam warships. six schooners, some 

"bomh ri3s" that mounted UlOrlars. and a numher of shIpS' hu.,ts. 

While Perry was ashore leading his men. the sh ips and hO;I15 were 

left under the command of Lielltenant Porter. 
6 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Extensive riverine operations were conducted during the Civil 

WaT. Along the (oasU of lhe Confederacy, the Union launched 

joint Anny-Navy expeditions that gradually gained footholds in 

the vicinity of Mobile. Alabama; Savannah, Ceorgia; Charleston. 

South Carolina; and Wilmington, North Carolina. At the same 

time there was a concerted Army-Navy effort to control the inland 

waterways of the Mississippi basin and thus cut the Confederacy 

in two. At the outset, Union Commodore John D. Rodgers assem· 

bled a fleet of steam-powered. shallow-drah vessels at Cairo, Illinois. 

where the Ohio River flows into the Mississippi. The gunboats 

were well armed and well annored, could carry a dOlen large guns8-inch, 32- and 42-pounders- and ranged up to a 50-foot beam and 

a length of 175 feet, with ironclad, sloping superstructures. Rodgers 

used his craft to patrol and gather intelligence of the Confederate 

forces that lay within striking distance. Relying in part on the intelligence Rodgers obtained, Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant decided to move against Confederate forces at Belmont, Missouri. 

Rodgers transported 3,000 of Grant's men and provided fire support for the operation. When substantial Confederate reinforcements arrived unexpectedly to bolster the garrison at Belmont, 

Grant prudently re~mbarked and withdrew, demonstrating that 

river craft may be as useful in a withdrawal as they are in an 

advance. 

Soon aflenvard. Commodore Andrew H. Foote. who succeeded 

Rodgers, and General Grant requested permission to undertake 

offensive river operations. In January 1862 their plan for a joint 

Army-Navy operation was approved. In February the combined 

forces moved up the Ohio River and then the Tennessee River to 

attack Confederate Fort Henry. The force used regular civilian 

transports as well as the specialized shallow-water gunboats. Grant 

landed his men five miles above the fort and advanced overland. 

The gunboats began the attack alone. firing as they approached 

the fort. They closed to point-blank range, silenced the Confederate shore batteries. and unexpectedly forced the surrender of the 

garrison. II was a riverine victory for Union forces, and the news 

was welcome in \Vashington. where it contrasted dramatically 

with disappointing reports from other areas. 

The victory at Fort Henry was followed by Navy gunboat raids 

up the Tennessee Ri"er. The raids ranged across the entire state 

of Tennessee. probed into Mississippi . and even pushed into Alabama as far as Muscle Shoals. At the same time. General Grant and 

Commooore Foote moved 4gainst nearby Confederate Fort Donel-
BACKGROUND 7 

son, which lay on the Cumberland River and covered the land 

routes to Nashville. Grant moved mOst of his troops directly overland, while FOOle descended the Cumberland to the Ohio. then 

sailed up the Tennessee. The baule began when Foote moved his 

gunboats against the Confederate shore balleries. I-I cavy fire from 

the shore soon forced the gunboats to withdraw; each of the six 

ships look twenty or more hits and tWO ships werc put out of action. 

Casualties were high and included Commodore Foote, who was 

seriously wounded. L.'ltcr, under renewed Union attack from river 

and shore, the Confederate garrison surrendered. While Fort Henry 

was essentially a Navy victory. it was a combination of Anny and 

Navy forces t.hat proved decisive at Fort Donelson. 

Shortly thereafter the Union Navy in the Gulf of Mexico 

moved inland againSl New Orleans. Forces under Admiral David 

Glasgow Farragut first crossed the sandbar at the mouth of the 

Mississippi. then rerigged ships for river operations. Farragut directed a five-day bombardment by a specially prepared mortar 

flotilla to soften up the Confederate defenses along the river. He 

assembled his force and in a daring night maneuver ran the gaunt· 

let of forts and Confederate warships that blocked the way. Once 

he had penetrated the Confederate defenses. he moved on unopposed to his objective. With a force of less than 3,500 men. he succeeded in capturing the South's largest city. 

Although he had achieved success, Farragut was nonetheless 

impressed by some of the difficulties which his deepwater force had 

encountered on the river. He wrote. "Fighting is nothing to the 

evils of the river-getting on shore, running afoul of one another, 

losing anchors, etc." 

A few weeks later, in June 1862. Farragut moved up the Mil'-

sissippi and tried to seize Vicksburg blll was repulsed. He succeeded, however, in running by the Confedera te fortifications to 

link up with Navy forces under C1.ptain Charles Henry Davis. who 

had relieved Commodore Foote. The combined flotillas then operated in support of Cram. Confederate resistance at Vicksburg prevented further passage along the river <lnd delayed Union attempts 

to split the Confederacy. It ""<IS nearly a year before Grant could 

force the surrender of the city. During Farragut's June operations. 

Union Navy forces in the vicinity of Vicksburg werc under the 

command of Rear Admiral David Dixon Poner, who had ea rlier 

taken part in river warf<lre in Mexico. Throughout the campaign 

of the lower Mississippi, the Confederates skillfu ll y used water 

mines-torpedoes, as they were called-to counter the riverine 
8 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

threat. Some forty Union craft fell victim to these torpedoes. 

Confederate snipers and shore batteries as well as such navigational 

difficulties as shallow water and tree slUmps also helped 10 frustrate Union attem pts on Vicksburg. 

In the end, Navy forces from the north succeeded in running 

the gauntlet at Vicksburg. Crant's brilliant maneuvering first to 

the south and then to the east of the fortress defeated the Confed erate forces that might have come to the rel ief of Vicksburg, 

permitting Grant to bring about its surrender. The fall of Vicksburg split the Confederacy ill two: Union control of the Mississippi, 

the Ohio. the Cumberland, and the Tennessee proved decisive in 

lhe final Union victory. 

For man y years after the Civil War r,he United States had 

little occasion to engage in riverine warfare. Perhaps the most 

notable U.S. river operation in the early twentieth century was the 

American Navy's patrol of the Yangtlc Ri ver aftcr the Boxer Rebellion in China. During the twenties and thirties a flotilla of U.S. 

Navy gunboats known as the Yangtze Patrol maneuvered along 

some 1,500 miles of meandering ri ver, fa ced with occasionall y 

swift currents. and with water leve ls that were subject to sudden 

and violent change-up to twenty-four feet in twenty-four hours. 

In addition to the difficulties of na vigating the Yangt1.e, the patrol 

had to cope with snipers, ambushes rigged by warlords, and the 

necessity to conduct rescue missions that sometimes required tile 

use of landing parties. During ,.vorld War II Ameri can forces were 

used in some operations that might be termed riverine warfare, but 

it was not until the Vietnam War that the Uni ted States organi1.ed 

a complicated riv<:r notilla to fight on inland waterways. 

French River War/are jn Indochina, 1945-1954 

During the nineteenth century the French had used the waterways of the Mekong and the Red Ri ver Deltas in their conquest of 

Indochina. When French forces returned to Vietnam in 1945 after 

World War 1l in an allempt to regai n control of the country, they 

used conventional military tacti cs at first and such riverine operations as were launched were characterized by improv isati-on, but 

in the next nine years the French developed a remarkable riverine 

force. 

In the north , in Tonkin, where most of the fighting occurred, 

the delta formed by the com bined Red, Ulack, and Clear Rivers, 

and in the south, in Cochinchina. the de lta fanned by the Mekong, 

the Bassac, the Dong Nai, the Saigon, and the Yam Co rivers 
THE RIVERS OF 

FRENCH INDOCHINA 

MAP 1 

L""" •• n .... h _.a,1om 

l$ch' mGl<e1 
10 RrV~ RI :'\'E OI' t:R \Tro1'\~ 

offered mazes of mcanderillJ.: streams nmllc{'lcd here ;Jnd th ere by 

stra igh t ca nals. (/11(/11 I) E\l'll in pl';l(clil11l' 1110.-.. uf rile traffic in 

the l10fl h of Vie tn am 11';15 by 1I';lI(';III':' Y. In wartime. with roads 

and railroads frcqllcllIl y Cllt hy ('11(.'II1Y anion. the French estimated 

Ihat 90 peru'lil of Ir:dlic was h)' inla nd wa terway. It was not su rprisi ng:. therefore, th at th e Fr('tH I! ... 11011111 tllrn to th ese walenv .. ys 

lor m ilil<lT)' opcrali om. 

The French sta rLC(\ Ollt with CI":1ft th.n were :lV:lilahl e local1 yn:Hi,'C or left by thc Japancsc- lI' hit'h they Illodified with armor 

and <t rmalll cnt. In addition, they rC('civcd from the Brilish some 

LeI's (landi ng craft. infantry) :I nd a fell' LeA's (l anding naft, 

assault) and l.e T 's (la nd ing: na ft . lank). Thc Fre nch Army 

ere,lI ed a numher of ril'er flotillas that \\'ere used for transport and 

river p;llrols. By J!)1(j the French Nav)· had nrgani~cC\ ri ver notill as 

and in 1947 these werc dcsi~lIatl'd rlill;Jioll.s "aVf/It·.f (/"IJ5f111l (naval 

assault divisions), ahhrel'iatl'd tn Din;uS;lII1 S. The divisions were 

orp,<lni7.ed initi all y to provide transport wit h lire support escort. 

In time th eir composition {liang·ed. and onc flotilla differed from 

another accordinp; to the <In:a in which it operated. Each flotill a 

had from twel ve to ei~h een crod't, ran:.:in~ from l.CVP·s (landing 

cr:.ft. veh ide or personnel) to I.SSL·s (Iandin p; ships, support, 

large), and contained al Iea:.t these dements: 

Comliland :me! lire: ~UI'Jl(lr l 

T mllsporl. . . ... 

Llnding amI <UppOrl 

1' ~lrol nnd t.iai<nl1 . 

t t.CJ or t -"SI. 

1 1.<':'1' 

:1 1.(:\1', ,,,,.I 4 I.C\ 'I'·5 

I harhor Jl:ltrol 110:11 

The Aotilla could tra nsport and land a force of approx imately bat· 

talion size and its cCJui plllen l. h ('Oulr! also support the landing 

force by fire and control the waterways in the vici nity of the land· 

ing area. The ri ver Ilotill:t could do somc patrolling, and even 

somc raiding in snpport of the main operat ing force ashore. Toward 

the end of the ca mp:ti~n as the Viel Minh massed their forces. the 

si ngle river noti lla proved inadefpl<tle and the French organized 

ri\'cr task forces consisti ng of sc\'cnd floti ll as. reinforced by addi· 

ti onaltroop lr.msports, In addilinn to these naval units, the French 

had other ec li ~ecl units, ol ~"ni~cd and manned hy the Army 

for river opcrations: SOTl1C were huill arou nd vehicl es of the Crah 

and Alligator type and some supply units were eq uipped willI 

LC M·s (landing craft. rn echan iJ:ecl). 

Command relations hetween Frenrh Army and Navy clements 

varied, bill the Navy generally operatcd the vessds and provided 

support to Amly operations. Tn Tonkin the Commander, River 
IlACKCROU:'\'1) II 

Forces, maintained close liaisoll lI'i th eadqllarter ~. (~rnllnd F<Jr("( . 

North Vietnam, and LO all int cnt~ and purpo~t.·s Ihe rour lIotilla~ in 

the arca operated in support of the Army. In COdlim.:hina the 

River Forces Command jll'O\"ided support to the Commanding Ceneral. Ground Forces, South Vietnam, as agreed wilh th e Commander, French N;lval FOlces, Indochina. 

These arrangements appeared to the French commanders, even 

in retrospect, to have heen satisfactory. alLhough there seems to 

have been some Army complaint that there were not enough landing craft, and some Navy complaint that the local Navy command· 

ers had no organic infantry capable of defending Navy bases, either 

fixed or anoat. The naval ("()ll1mand was responsible for all river 

forces regardles.~ of their parent se rvice. Thus, French Army troops 

transported by a ninassaul wcre under oper:nional ("()!l trol of the 

French Navy. Co-ordination with the Army was achieved through 

river posts, whi eh maintained din:Cl liaison with ground force 

commanders in their :Ireas. A continuing difficulty \\'as the problem 

of Dinass.-'lUl base defense. Gene,"ally, each Dinassaut had a small 

Na,'y C.ommando delachmelll or an Army light support company 

:mached to it. But the Dinassalll did nOl have regular battalionstrength landing forces permanently ;ls.~iA ned: these would have 

permilled greater autonomy and heLler COlllrol of an area bctwecn 

major operations. The infalHry landing forces, when Ill;lde available by the Army for a particuli'lr oper;ltion, usually lacked training or experience in river wadare. 

A river assault notilla generall y deployed in column. Leadin::; 

the column was an opening group of minesweepers and a guide 

for navigation, followed by a fire suppOrt ship. Next came the troop 

transports and, bringing np lhe re:tl'. th e command and support 

vessels. (Djfl ~ram 1) When a notilla was attacked it usually attempted to force passage, using what the French called "the hall 

of fire," or heaviest possible volume of imlllediate fire directed at 

enemy positions on shore. One theory held that when there was 

reason to suspect an amhush. a direct assault against the enemy was 

most effective; such improvised ass..1.ults, ho\\'ever, \\'ere rare. In an 

assault the opening group consisted of a guide ship and minesweepers. Close behind was the shock group, consisti ng of a command vessel, one or more fire support ships, and se"eral landing 

craft carrying the assault troops. The remainder of the force trailed 

at a distance of I ,000 to 1.500 rnClers. Upon arriva l at the assault 

site. the shock group would fire a prep.1.T:llion bombardm,ellt and 

the assault troops would then land. Once the landing site was se-
12 

Opening 

group 

Supportl 

Transport 

,hip' and 

crdt2 

Co-and and 

support1 

1 

RIVERINE OI'ERATIONS 

l LCH .onlt o r (guide) 

, .ection. of alne ~eeper. 

(6 boau) 

l • 1ne sweeper (repl$eeaent) 

1 LSIL 

2 !.Clot o r LCT 

l U" 

1 support ahip 1n the 

center of the convoy 1 

1 LSIL or LSS!. 

«(orce ea-ander) 

0 

a a 

a a 

o . 0 

When there was but one support ship, it took the lead and v.. the 

eo.and ship. When there were two support ship., the co~nd ahip was 

1n the rear; when there were three, the c~nd ahip was in tha tenter. 

The lead support ship aight alao be an LSSL , an an-ed LCT, or I aeetion of LCH .anitor. (2 boata). 

2 

Sometimes the transport craft were 1n CWo columns, l •• hed in 

pairs. 

Diagram 1. A Iypical French river convoy in North Vietnam. 

ctlred, the remainder of the landing force would beach and un load. 

During the landing and nOlil the river craft were withdrawn , the 

£orce afloat provided fire support, protccted the flanks of the land-
Steaaing fonaation 

6 LSSL 

., 

LSIL 

O LSSL 

., 

LSIL 

8ACKGROUNI) 

o 

Diagram 2. French assault landing. 

13 

ing site, and patrolled in the vicinity to provide additional security. 

Some crart were used ror logistic support. and the larger ships served 

temporarily as command posts ror the ground unit commanders. 

(Diagram 2) 

French reports show that during the entire campaign rrom 

1945 through 1954 losses rrom attack while vessels were at anchor 

exceeded those suffered while a convoy was under way. Most Viet 

Minh attacks against French river forces were carerully planned 
14 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

and made lise of some comhin;uion of swimmers. drifting mines, 

artillery and monar fire, and occasionally overland assaults. French 

countermeasures had SpOlty SllCCCS.~. Nets were used with ebb and 

flow of the tide to tr:.p mines; security watches were set up; all floating objects \vcrc syslcm:niG\l1y fired upon; palrol craft were sent 

out: grenade atl;lcks were m;ldc at irregular intervals and on 

unidentified objects: and lights were installed at entrances to 

anchorages. 

Harassing enemy mortar and anillery fire proved particularly 

effective, causing the rcnch to withdraw some forces that olherwise WQuld have remained on stalion. Frcm;h commanders discovered they cou ld not rely all p.'lssivc measures alone. They were 

sometimes obliged to shift anchorages during darkness LO avoid 

planned Viet Minh fire. When boats were beached it proved necessary to cover the beach from with a ground unit. 

The rivet assault flotillas wcre rarely employed in coastal operations, since craft modified for river lise \\'erc less seaworthy. had less 

cargo capacity. and had armored superstructures that hindered 

troop transfers. Troops experienced in riverine assaults required 

extensive additional training for collstal opcrations before they 

were able to maSfer going down cargo nets with their equipment, 

even when the sea was calm. 

The tempo of French riverine operations increased steadily 

from 1916 until the end of the war in 1951. The Dinassauts played 

a key role in the hattles for the Red River Delta from the summer 

of 1951 throll~h early 1952. During the battle of Ninh Binh, 29 

May- IS June ifJ51. 100 kilomelers south of Hanoi on the Day 

River. a Oinassaut reinforced the French g<lITison. provided fire 

support. Cllt enemy communications. ane! helped to force the Viet 

Minh to withdraw. 

During the baltIc of Hoa Binh. 11 November 1951 -24 February 

1952, sixty kilometers west of I-lanai on the Black River. two Oinassauts escorted convoys through a sector in which one bank of the 

river was mnlrolled hy the enemy fur a distance of about fifty kilometers. As the Viet Minh increased pressure on the lines of com· 

munication connening the garrison at Hoa Binh with the main 

French forces 10 the C;J!>l. ,he overland roLltes were severed. The 

Dinassauts, howC'\'er, continued to run the gauntlet until 12 January 1952, when an entirc rivcr convoy was ambushed and look 

hea\'y losses. Finally. ,,·hen the decision was made to evacuate Hoa 

Binh-Operation Annaranth- thc Oinassauts supported the operation by reopening the l31ack River corridor, ferrying retreatin2" 
BACKGROUj\:1) 15 

troops and refugees. then fighting their \\'a) out along the river 

toward Hanoi. Later, lWO OinassauLS pla)ed a key role in the 

offensive phase of Operation Lorraine. 29 OCLOher8 NO\'cmber 

1952, nonhwest of I lanni on the Clear ami Red Rivers. 

By the end of the W:U', French riverine forces were IlIlI y committed ane! were t:lking he:I\,)' casualties. In o\er a dOlen :Imbushes 

fourteen n<1\'al craft were sunk or damaged. with nearl y 100 men 

killed or wounded. Crable J) 

TABLE I-VIET MINII RIVtR AMlltlSIIF S, .I) JANUARY-16 FrllRUARY 1954 

Gronl' "r Tn'" Enf"mJ' "' .. W.ln".:r or enrl "'"'1>0111 C(lmmf"nu< 

5 jan uaf) ... Song Th~i Uinh OjU/lUQIlI ~ \Iinc I \ IL ,unl.; ,"all, 10 

l.ilIed or missing. 

indlitlinK 2 olli· 

ferO; ,\mll. 10 

"'Olln(lcd 

t!l j3nU31")' Roo Rher (Jin/ljJ4I.t 12 AutOmalic .............. weapon! 

H jantJ3r)" . D;lInbooCom;!;1 DjutuSllll14. ,\line .. ........... . Ja..,:Ii IH~ 

15 jantJat) . Nam Diuh Giang LCI· 9.063. 113/00ka, r hargc <link; :"\a\"\, 

h~rge oon· aUlolll:tlic I \\otmc!cd; 

I·oy.and ,,"e~pon5 /\rl11). I l.iJJed 

LCM 

20 january .. Song Thai Binh !'latoon ri ... ·r IblOOka. I launch ~lInk; 2 

11;\1 rol IJO,lI alllOllIalic 1.i1J~d.' \tlm 

I,apons "otuulC'(1 

22 januaT) Song Thai Oinh fJimuslll" I lIalOoka. 1)cll'Ct~'(1 III :'Iorane 

~utOllIalic oll5Crl al ion 

weapons pl:lI1c. neutrali,C'(! 

h) rlil:el"~ lire 

I Februar)' Roo Rh'cr LCI wilh I.C'! MinC'< I CI dalll~gcd 

I h :hruan \alll'tunal I'laloon rher \Iine ............. p~lrolllO;ll 

2 Febru3n Oa) Rh'er Pntllillwr. lI:IIool.a. Ril er p:llrol boat 

I.C\!. ri'cf .tlIIOlll~li( hun1(:d. LSSL 

I)alm! l)O;It "cal'>ons "I'rllli,an" dam· 

:t;:Ctt; 4 :"\~\\ 

~illt'(l or ml~ing . 

2110\mded 

4 Februan L' ppcr Red Rill:r LC\13nll 1\..1/00I.a. I ,II\'J/,o '"111.. I 

IlJlho 0,· ilIllUmali{ 'all hOllm!c:d 

"/WilllI12 IH~'dllOns 

5 Februarv .. !>ong Thai l.Iinh IJinflU41l1 I Mine. 1>.1/001.:1. .. ............ :lUlomali( 

"1'31'0115 
16 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

TABLE I-VU:T Mum R1Vt' R AMB USH F.S. 5 jANUARV16 Ft:BRUA RY 1951-Continucd 

OrouI'orTy"" Enem7 

0.1. W.'.r .... , or Cnoft \\'MlMln. Comm.nt~ 

9 Februar) .. Sam Dinh CianI' DinluSdl1l , Ib.rook.a. LSSL Ifrqrll'b~ 

automatic and 2 LC~I 's 

wcapons damaged: , Na\)' 

killed. including 

2offKen: IS N:I.\·Y 

\.Olmc\cd 

14 fl'bruat) .. Middle Red RiI'(T f);n(lJJiud 12 Ba1.Ooh, LCT90H damaged : 

(Hung Yen) :l.utom:l.tic Arm)'. I k.illed. I 

weapons wounded: Na \·}·.-4 

killed 

16 fcbruar)" .. ",alii Dinh Giang tJin(lSJaul IS Ilalooh, LCT 90SS damaged. 

automat ic I boat sunk.. I 

weapons t C.\{ damaged: 1 

kilted. 7 ~riouslr 

wounded 

After Ih e war the French analyzed their experience wjlh river 

warfare in Vietnam. French mau':riel, they concluded. was generallv 

adequatc. although increased armament might have improved 

performan(,e. Operational techniques Ivere genera ll y adequa te. but 

French ri\'erine forces proved highly vulnerabl e in base defense 

and susceptible to water mines. Command relationships were sat· 

isfactory but effecti veness of the forces would have been greatly 

improved by permancntl y marrying Army assa ult forces to Navy 

lift capaCity. In short. therc was a need to organi ze a!1 amphibious 

force made up of permanently assigned Army and Navy elements. 

It was the observ,uion of the French that the enemy. the Viet 

Minh . were remarkable infantrymen. but they made no attempt to 

launch armed wa ter craft aga inst French river forces. Rather, Viet 

Minh action was in the main restricted to the banks of the wa ter· 

\\'ays, from which the enemy tried to intercept French movemenlS 

by means of ambush. fixed obstacles, or use of remotely controlled 

floa ting mines. f.njoying excellent intelligence and the support 

of the population. the Viet Minh proved meticulous in their 

planning and masterful in the usc of terrain and camounage. 

Bec,luse of their excellent fire d isci pline. they usuall y enjoyed the 

adva ntage of surprise. The French thought that the Viet Minh 

tended to disperse th eir weapons too much along the banks rather 
BACKGROUND 17 

than mass them, thus rcducing thc effectiveness of the surprise and 

firepower they could bring to bear against individual elements of 

the French nOtHing force. 

The French operated in both the Red River and Mekong 

Deltas, and their experience was to prove applicable in some part 

for U.S. river forces operating more than a decade later in the 

Mekong Delta. 

The Mdo'ig Delta 

The Mekong Delta extends from Saigon south and west to the 

Gulf of Thailand and the border with Cambodia. With an area 

of about 40,000 square kilometers and an estimated eight million 

inhabitants, it constitutes about one·fourth of the lotal land area 

of South Vietnam, and cont:t.ins about one-half of the country's 

population. (Map 2) The delta is generally a flat alluvial plain 

created by the Mekong River and its distributaries. Much or the 

land surface is covered by rice paddies, making the area one of the 

world's most productive in rice growing. It is by far the most im· 

portant region in South Vietnam. 

, ! T 01 , .:. 

MAP2 
18 RIVfRl:'o1E Ol'ERATIQ1'OS 

SOl.O]U STRUGCI.E.~ TIlROUCII Of,LTA i\ [ UD 

The della had poor overland communications. Crisscrossed by 

a complex network of rivers. canals, streams. and ditches. the low, 

poorly drained surface was subjcct to eXlcnsi\c and prolonged inundation. There \\'as only one major hard surface road, Route 4, 

which extended from S.'li~on sollth to Ca 1\Iall , traversing the delta 

and linking many of Ihe larger towns. Secondary roads were poorly 

surfaced, and by the mid· 1960's had deteriorated because of lack 
BACKGROUNn 19 

of maintenance anci enemy anion, The waterway system made frequent bridging net:essary: hridge ('apa citics were mainly in the 

]0- to 20-ton range, In shan, the roadnct was of limited usc for 

military operations. 

Any mo\'cl1It'nt off the roaels was limited, It was best during the 

dry scason-N(l\'t'mllt'r tn MardI-when paddies were dry and 

would suppun li!ol:ht tral'ked ,'('hides and ani\lery pieces: it was 

poorest during the wet st'ilson-May to (ktoher-\\'hen paddies were 

inundatrd, It was t'~tril'l('(1 il1l ),('ar round hy the network of rivers. 

I':lOals, streams and dildu'5. Th('r(' were many swamps, marshes. and 

forcsts. gCIH,'ra lly hun:lcring the sc.\('uast. 

In compilrison with mml of thc other ilreas of Vietnam, the 

Mekong: Delta was ~ooel ror ail' npcr:llions, since landing w il es were 

ahundant and wcathl'r seldom prc\'clH('d helicopter operations. 

Onre troops debarked from Ilt'limptcn. howe\'er, their movement 

\\'It~ Hhnrply restricted by ditches and watcrwa)'s. 

In lihllrp contraSt to the limitl'd overland transportation, the 

ddm Imll II highly developed inland waterway system, There is 

evidt'lIffl Ihill the inhabitanu began tn improve natural ciraina!2,e 

as eal'h' ali ROO A,n" and succeeding generations have continued 

the wtll'k, Ali iI result. the 2.400 kilometers of navigable natural 

watel'\\ (1) ~ \\'f'r~ supplementcd II)' ahollt 4.000 kilometers of landcut l'MMI§ fir varying width and depth, and in good to poor 

conditltUl, 

Tht' Wtol ,eason, the dme of the southwest monsoon, permits 

delih\'l',Ht' nO()(ling of rice paddies. hilt also causes some unavoidabl(' 1I00001lnjlllli rivcrs m'crO(lw [Ileir I)anks, \Vaterways grow wider, 

ShAfI)ly funaillng cross-country traffic and limiting the amount of 

firttl Ml'iIIllHI litdtalilc for placing artillery. Off-ro.lcl movement of 

trni.ll~ !'Ilul vchides (an cause d:IIH<lAe 10 crops ,me! drainage systtlllll, 1111(1 was therefore unpopular with the farmers. Further. the 

hi""h humlclity and extensive flooding al-,"gra,'atecl the foot problems 

uf tht' snlfller, who AOl his feet \\'Ct from frequent water crossings. 

()n('·thil'd of the delta is marslt, fure.it, or swamp forest. In the 

north lies the Plain of Reeds, :t flat. grassy basin with almost no 

trees, DlII'ing the \\'et season it i.~ generally inundated to a depth of 

two to three meters: during the dry season. much of the plain dries 

out to the extent lhat large p,rass fires are freC)uent. There are relativel y few points in lhe della that lie more than a few hundrerl 

meters from a navigahle \\'a lC1'w:ly: el'cn the marshes. swamps. and 

forests can be reached by water. In short. the delta is well suiled 

to riverine operations, 
20 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Military operations on the waterways o[ the Mekong Delta 

had to be governed by the life of the delta. By any standard, the 

delta is densel y populated: it has an average of about 200 inhabitants pcr square kilometer, abOlillhe s.1me density as Massachusetu. 

The people arc concentrated along the waterways that constilUte 

their princip.11 transponation rOlltes. Transportation, essential to 

the people and to the national economy, felt the impact of military 

operations. and the U.S. commander was obliged to maneuver his 

forces 50 as to interfere as littl e as possible with the norma l now 

of civi lian transport. 

\Vhere people lived there werc trees and bushes cultivated for 

their fruit, shade. or decoration. Since these offered protection to 

an enemy seeking concealment, military cngagcmcnts often tOok 

place in populated areas. Thus a commander was faced with the 

task of inAicting damage on an armed enemy. and at the same time 

trying to avoid damage to the IInarmed loca l inhabitants. High 

population density makes it dimcult to conceal military activity 

from observation; weaknesses ma y be noted and word passed to the 

enemy. moves may be telegraphed before they can achieve their 

purpose. 

Seacoasts of the delta have extensive mangrove swamps. includ· 

ing the Rung Sal southeast of Saigon, and lhe U Minh Forest along 

the west coast: vegetation on the tidal mudflats is dense. root struc· 

ture is high and tangled. and covering is thick, making access diffl· 

cult and cross-country movement arduous. The paddy land is 

interspersed with thickets of trees and bushes in patterns that vary: 

in one area vegetation is clustered polka-dOL style about scattered 

dwellings; a few kilometers away. it is in continuous strips along 

waterways. There arc large cultivated plantations-rows of palm 

trees grown on embankments which alternate with wide drainage 

ditches. In the wide.ranging operations characteristic of riverine 

warfare, it was necessary to adapt tactics to the lay of the land. 

Riverine operations in the delta also had to deal \",ith the 

strong influence of sea tides along the inland waterways through· 

out the region. Tidal fluctuations range up to about four meters. 

The twice daily tidal flow influcnces thc velocity of currents, and 

has an important bearing on the feasibility of navigation in many 

,,'a tenvays. Variations in sea tides, together "'ilh the complex nature 

o~ the interconnccting waterways. make tidal effects exceptionally 

difficu lt to predict with confidence. As a consequence, planning for 

water operations involves a good deal of guesswork, for the time 

required to lravel rrom one point to another cannot be predicted. 
BACKGROUND 21 

The condition of the inland watenvays added obstacles to military movement. By 1960 many canals had deteriorated from neglect; 

of some 1,500 surveyed that year, nearl y half required "restoration," and could carry traffic only at full tide. Some waterways had 

been deliberatel y obstnlcted by the enemy. In the smaller streams 

there were many fish traps that restricted 1J<lssage. Bridges are always 

to be dealt with in waterborne movement, since frequently there 

is not enough clearance to permit passage of vessels. This problem 

is further complicated by variation in water levels due to tidal 

fluctuations, which may permit passage for short periods twice a day 

only. 

Finally, it was difficult to base troops in the Mekong Delta 

since firm ground was limited. Military needs for land bases tended 

to conflict with the needs of the population, so that a floating base 

offered a clear advantage. 

Enemy Forces 

As elsewhere in Vietnam, the enemy had in 1966 and early 

1967 both a political and a military organization in the della. In 

mid-1966 estimated strength of the Viet Cong in t11e IV Corps 

Tactical Zone, whi ch corresponds roughly to the delta, was 82,545 

men. Of these, 19,270 were combat troops; 1,290 were support 

troops; 50,765 were local part-t ime guerrillas; and 11 ,220 were 

working as political cadre. At the time. no North Vietnam Army 

forces were reported in the IV Corps Tacti cal Zone. In t11e summer 

of 1966 the office of the assistant chief of staff for intelligence estimated that organized military forces in the IV Corps Tactical Zone 

consisted of three regimental headquarters. 28 battalions (8 of 

which we:-e in the regiments), 69 separate companies. and II sepa· 

rate platoons-an estimate that agreed closely with that of U.S. Military Assistance Command. Vietnam. (Map J) 

It was believed that Viet Cong logistiCS depended on support 

from the population, on ca ptures from Republic or Vietnam units, 

and on supplies furnished by the Democratic Republi c of Vietnam 

-primari ly weapons and ammunition-infiltrated by sea, or by 

land From Cambodia. The base area was believed to be funda· 

mental to the Viet Cong logisti cal system. Base areas such as the 

Plain of Reeds. the U Minh Forest. and the Cam Son Secret Zone 

west of My Tho served as sites for political, military. logistical , and 

training installations. and were supplemented by "combat villages" 

on South Vietnamese territory. organized and controlled by the 

Viet Cong. Cambodia provided a rear service area for 10,000 or 
22 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

DELTA SLTUATION 

<:) ... "" ...... 0 

,-

MAP 3 

more main and loc.11 Viet Cong forces in Vietnamese provinces 

that offered free access to Camhodian territory. 

Viet Cong forces in the della were as well armed as those 

elsewhere in Vietnam. The new family of 7.62-mm. weapons manufactured by the Chincse Comlllunists were first captured in the 

delta on 11 December 1964 hy Republic of Vietnam armed forces. 

The capture included copies of the AK47, the SKS carbine, the 

RPD light machine gun. and a quamity of M43 intermediate 7.62-

mm. caTlridges of SO\ iet design. During the same month, the Vietnam Army also captured the first RPC2 antitank grenade launcher, 

capable of penetrating six to seven inches of annor at ranges of 

100 lO 200 metcrs-a potent weapon for lise against riverine craft. 

Viet Cong communications equipment. \\'IJile not abundant, 

appeared ade<lualC. The enemy was able to interfere with and 

intrude on voice circuits of U.S. and South Vietnam forces, blanking Ollt tmnsmissions and employing metical d<!ccption. 

Viet Cong methods of operation in the delta were not sub-
BACKGROUND 23 

stantially different from those employed by thc enemy in othcr 

regions. In 1966 it was reponed that Viet Cong activities had been 

primarily small unit operations- harassment, terrorism, and sabotage, with the delta accouming for approximately one-third of 

all Viet Cong initiated incidents in South Vietnam. The enemy, 

however, was also able to mount baltalion-size attacks. Several 

times the Viet Cong demonstrated a willingness and an ability to 

slug it out with government forces. In January 1963 at Ap Bac 

a Viet Cong force engaged a superior Army of Vietnam (orce that 

was attempting to surround the Viet Cong by using heliborne assault in conjunction with conventional ground movement. Five 

helicopters were destroyed and nine damaged as the Viet Cong 

inflicted heavy casuallies and withdrew. In December 1964 the Viet 

Cong 9th Division with two regiments seized the Catholic village 

of Binh Gia. During the next four days the enemy ambushed and 

virtually destroyed the Vietnamese 33d Ranger Battalion and 4th 

Marine Battalion and inflicted heavy casualties on armored and 

mechanized relief (orces. 

Republic of Vielnam Forces 

In 1966 most of the Mekong Della was included in the IV 

Corps Tactical Zone, although Cia Dinh Province. Long An 

Province, and the Rung Sat Special Zone in the north were part 

o( the 111 Corps Tactical Zone. The IV Corps Tactical Zone was 

in turn subdivided into three division tactical areas. In the north 

the 7th Division had its headquarters at My Tho: in the center 

was the 9th Division with headquarters at Sa Dec: and in the south 

was the 21st Di"ision with headquarters at Bac Lieu. In 1966 Army 

o[ Vietnam assigned strength in IV Corps Zone averaged 40.000. 

]n addition to the three divisions, there were five Ranger battalions 

and three armored cavalry squadrons. 

South Vietnam paramilitary forces included Regional Forces, 

Popular Forces, Civilian Irregular Defense Group (ClOG) troops. 

and National Police. In 1966 Regional and Popular Forces manned 

outposts and watchtowers scattercd throughout the delta. Poorly 

supported and highly vulnerable to Viet Cong attack, both these 

forces had high desertion rates. The Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group troops were employed generally along the Cambodian border as part of an effort to seal the frontier against Viet Cong and 

North Vietnamese movements of men. equipment, and supplies. 

The National Police were organizcd after the manner of the French 

gendarmerie, and exercised similar functions. 
24 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Vietnam naval forces attached to the Vietnamese 4th Naval 

Zone in the delta included six river assault groups, which had 

evolved direcliy from the French Dinassauts, and eleven coastal 

groups known collectively as the Junk Fleet. The assault groups 

were under the operational control of the IV Corps commander 

with the primary mission of supporting Vietnam Army riverine 

operations. Each group could lift a Vietnamese infantry battalion. 

giving the IV Corps Zone the capability of a six-battalion lift. The 

river assault groups were in 1966 being used in their primary role 

only 10 percent of the lime. Vietnam Army division commanders 

apparently preferred airmobile operations to riverine operations, 

hence the river assault groups were employed in support of small 

unit operations by Regional or Popular Forces under the control 

of province chiefs. Often they were used simply as escort for com· 

mercial craft. 

U.s. Forces 

The American military first entered the Mekong Delta in 1957 

when U.s. Navy ad"isers replaced French advisers. By eady 1966 

the American advisory effort had permeated the Republic of Viet· 

nam military structure. Advisers included nearly 700 officers and 

over 2,000 enlisted men from the U.S. Army, Navy. and Air Force. 

American Army advisers were present at corps, division, and sector 

(province) level. and with the IV Corps Tactical Zone Area Logistics Command. The U.S. Navy Advisory Croup. Vietnam, provided 

advisers to the Vietnamese Navy's six river assault groups and 

eleven coastal groups. 

In 1965 the U.S. Army 13th Combat Aviation Battalion had 

been sent to the delta to support Republic of Vietnam opera tions, 

and by August of that year the battalion had four assault helicopter 

companies and one reconnaissance airplane company. By mid· 

1966. U.S. naval forces included Task Force 11 5. with the code 

name MAkKET TIME. and Task Force 11 6, known as CAME 

WARDEN. MARKET TIME had the mission of patrolling coastal areas 

to prevent resupply of Viet Cong and North Vietnam forces by 

sea. GAME WARDEN had the mission of interdicting enemy lines 

of communications and assiSting government forces in repelling 

enemy attacks on river outposts of the Regional and Popular 

Forces. 

The Situation in 1966 

In April 1964 the American Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, 

Jr., had remarked: ..... I would not be surprised to see the 
BACKGROUND 25 

Mekong Delta totally cleared of Communist forces by the end of 

1965." In the summer of 1966, however, the Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, reported that about one-third of all Viet 

Cong actions against the government in South Vietnam occurred 

in the IV Corps Tactical Zone, and estimated that the Viet Cong 

controlled 24.6 percent of the population of IV Corps. 

Government influence varied wide ly from province to province. 

An Giang Province was considered "pacified," while in An Xuyen 

Province it was estimated that government forces controlled as 

littl e as 4 percent of the land. In many areas government forces 

claimed control by day, but acknowledged that the " night belongs 

to the Viet Cong.'· \Vitll few exceptions, the large towns served as 

either province or district capitals and in 1966 were largely under 

government control. All, however, were occasionally subject to 

terrorist incidents, mortar or rocket attacks, or assaults upon out· 

lying guard posts. The Viet Cong was, furthermore, choking off 

the flow or rice to market: in 1963 rice arriving at the market in 

Saigon reached a high of about four million metric tons; in 1966 

amounts declined to about three million tons, making importation 

of rice necessary. Far from being "totally cleared of Communist 

forces,·· in 1966 the delta was more than ever under Viet Cong 

control and something different was goi ng to have to be done to 

change the situation. The introduction of additional forces might 

help, but such forces would require bases, which were difficult to 

provide. It was against this background that the basic decisions for 

the creation of an American riverine force were made in late 1965 

and early 1966. 
CHAPTER II 

The Concept of a Riverine Force 

In July 1965 the staff of the United Slales Military Assistance 

Command. Vietnam (l\IACV). was drafting the campaign plan 

for 1966. the purpose of which was to help the government of South 

Vietnam establish control over the people. The sl:lff concluded 

that it was possible to secure government control over the 1. II. and 

111 Corps Tactical Zones. a conclusion largely based on the presence 

of American and other free '''orld Military Assistance Forces in 

these corps areas. In the IV Corps Tactical Zone. ho\\'e"er, where 

there wcre no U.S. ground fOTces to bolster the effons of the Viet· 

nam armed forces. lhe Slaff questioned whether the objective of the 

campaign plan could be attained. The armed forces of Vietnam 

were considered capable of maintaining; their position in the IV 

Corps, but not of reducing Communist control over significant 

portions of the population and terrain in the Mekong Delta. 

Whil e additional American and other Free World Military Assistance Forces were planned for the other corps areas. none were 

planned for the IV Corps area. In the opinio n of the staff, there 

could be no substamial progress in the IV Corps Tactical Zone 

unless U.S. ground forces were introduced. 

As a preliminary step in slllc\ying the possibility of sending 

U.S. forces into the delta. Brigadier General William E. DePuy, 

J-3 (assistant chief of staff for military operations) of the MACV 

staff, directed his planners to survey the delta for land suitable for 

basing grou nd troops. A team dispatched 10 examine My Tho, 

Vinh Long, Sa Dec, and Can Tho concluded that all land suitable 

for large tactical units was either heavily populated or occupied 

by Republi c of Vietnam armed forces. I£ U.S. units were based in 

the delta, they would have to sharc already crowded arcas or displace a portion of the population_ Si nce neither of these courses 

was acceptable, the planning staff then se:1rched for other means 

of basing troops. Obt:1ining river sand as fill material and building up an area to accommodate a division base was considered. 

U_S. Military Assistance Command engineers estimated that with 

the dredge equipment at hand se\'eOleen and a half dredge-years 
COl"CEPT OF A RIVERIKE FORCE 27 

would be necessary to fill an area large enough to hase a division. 

Since adequate dredge equipment was not available in Sou th ea~t 

Asia, immediate steps were taken to procure additional dredges 

from the Un ited States, but these were not expected to arrive until 

late 1966. Although not entirely sa tisfi ed wi th this solution. Jhe 

planning staff believed the building of a base area by dredging 

operations to be a sollnd choice. 

In addition to a land base, other means of operating in the 

delta were needed, and the planning staff turned to the experience 

of the French in Indochina for answers. The French had used 

sma ll landing craft extensively to exploit the net of \\'aterways 

from land bases. The American staff planned to lise not only small 

craft but also a group of larger landing craft that would hOllse and 

suppOrt a riverine force. These sh ips, the planners believed. might 

also be able to move along the coastline and major ril'ers and 

serve as mobile bases. It was known that during ' Vorld 'Var II the 

Navy had converted LST's (landing ships, tank) into barracks 

sh ips, and the planners believed that sllch ships could provide a 

base for a brigade force anoat. As the concept of an American river 

Aotilla took form. the planners concluded that the LST barracks 

ships could be altered to furnish a helicopter flight deck and that 

barges could be pro\·ided on \\'hich helicopters would be able to 

land for maintainance. The ships could also be equipped \\'ith 

weapons for defense. 

In their initial survcy to find anchorage sites in the delta, the 

planners of the Military Assistancc Comma nd sll~p;ested seven that 

might ser\'e. An LST could resupply the ri ver force by traveling 

from Vung Tall across a stretch of the South China Sea into the 

selected anchorage sit es on the Mekong and Bassac Ri\·ers. 

Captain David F. Welch of the U.S. Navy. who headed the Pl ans 

and Requirements Division of .1 -3. the Operations Directorate, 

U.S. Military Assistance Command. Vietnam, believed that the 

afloat force concept merited full swdy and suggested that a task 

force be set up under a U.S. Navy commander. He discussed the 

matter with Rear Admiral Norvell G. \Vard, Commander. U.S. 

Naval Forces. Vietnam, who agreed that the idea had possibilities 

and that some naval ships could be made available. 

In early December of 1965. eluring the monthly Commander's 

Meeting of the Military Assistalll.:e Command. Vietnam. General 

DePuy briefed General William C. Westmoreland and his commanders on the concept of a Mekong Delta riverine force that 

would employ an 'Army bl'igade \\·jth a comparable :"Ja"y organi za-
28 RIVERI NE OPERATIO NS 

LST WITH ARMORED TROOP CARRIERS AND M ONITORS 

tion, and that would operate from ,'ariOliS anchorages within the 

delta. The plan called for the development of tWO land bases, one 

for an infa mry division headquarters and one brigade, and an· 

other for one brigade 10 be located in the northern pan of th e 

delta, probably in Long An Provi nce. A third brigade would be 

based on th e water. \Vith the lise of a mobile floating base, the 

mingling of U.S. troops with the Vietnamese population could be 

reduced-a prime consideration in view of the rel uctance of th e 

Vietnamese to accept U.S. ground fOTces within the delta. General 

Westmoreland declared th e idea of a floating base "most imagi native," and directed that a learn be sent to brief Headquarters, 

Pacific Command. and solicit its suppOrt. 

''''hen General 'Vest moreland had accepted the idea, reconnaissance was conducted to find a land base for a division headquarters and one brigade. General DePuy and Colonel Sidney B. 

Berry, Jr., Senior Advisor. 7th Division, Army of Vietnam, selected 

a base site approximalely eight kilometers west of the town of 

My Tho, where the Kinh Xang Canal enters th e My Tho branch 

of the Mekong River. Accordi ng to French hydrographic maps, 

adequate sand deposits for fill material existed nearby. A request 

was then sem to the Joim Ch iefs of Staff in ' ·Vashinglon (or an 
CONCEPT OF A RIVERINE FORCE 29 

additional infantry division to employ in the IV Corps area. For 

planning purposes the unit was designated Z Division. 

During the latter part of December a MACV team headed by 

General DePuy met with the Pacific Command staff and outlined 

a general plan for the riverine force. After a period of discussion, 

the Pacific Command staff accepted the feasibility of the proposal. 

In the discussion the concept that the river force operating within 

the Mekong Delta would be a joint Army-Navy task force was emphasized. It was felt that barracks ships, then in storage, could be 

utilized to house part of the force, and that these barracks ships 

could be supported by small landing craft, patrol boats, and helicopters. Such support would enable the river force to conduct 

opera ti ons within a defined radius of the floating base. In addition, 

the mobility of the small craft would help to protect the floating 

base. 

Upon acceptance by the Commander in Chief, Pacific. of the 

feasibility of a riverine force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively 

approved the employment of an Army division in the Mekong 

Delta to put the plan in operation. The force was to be provided 

barracks ships and LCM-S's. The maller of land bases was left 

unanswered in the joint staff action of the Commander in Chief, 

Pacific. 

In Washington the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral 

Horacia Rivero, Jr .. supported the concept of a riverine force 

and approved a proposa l to send a planning group to Saigon 

to work with the MACV staff. The group was asked to develop 

a complete plan and to specify the means to support it. Headed 

by Captain Da\'id Bill, U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations, and consisting of representatives of the Bureau 

of Ships, the Marine Corps. and the Amphibious Command, 

Pacific, the planning group arrived in Vietnam in January of 1966. 

Together the MACV staff and the Navy group studied in detail the 

experience of the French and Vietnamese with river aS$.1ult forces 

in order to establish a similar American force, but one wilh greater 

capabilities. Under the leadership of Captain Welsh and Captain 

Bill, requirements were drawn up for self.propelled barracks ships 

(APB's) , LSTs. large covered lighters (YFNB's), large harbor 

tugs (YTB's) , landing craft rep.-tir ships (ARL's) , and a mine 

countermeasures support ship (MCS) ; all were to carry appropriate 

amlament for the area of operations. The LCM-6 would be used 

instead of the LCM-S, which \vas in limited supply. 

In a message of 19 February, the Commander in Chief, Pacific. 
30 RIVERINE OPERATIO,,"S 

SELF-PROPELLED BARRACKS 5U1P WITH A~IMI BARGE MOORED ALONCSIDE 

requested that the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, develop and submit a detailed plan of opera ti ons 

and logistical support for the employment of a Mekong Delta 

Mobile Anoat Force. The plan was to cover force composition and 

phasing. tasks to be executed, methods of execution, navigable 

areas. operating areas. afloat force locations ... Ooal force base, provisions for U.S. Air Force. Navy gu nfire, and helicopter support, 

and command relationships. The Commander in Chief, Pacific. 

Admiral Ulysses S. Cram Sharp. Jr., also asked for amplifica tion 

of the logistics involved: depots and ports from which support 

would be provided. additional facilities required at the logistic 

support base, requiremenls for additional lighterage, and specification of other resources needed to support operations. Representatives of Admiral Sharp would meet with the MACV staff to "assist 

in the development of the foregoing and to facilitate subsequent 

evalua tion and review." The MACV-Navy group continued to plan, 

following the guidance of the Commander in Chief. Pacific. 

The planning culminated in a MACV study. Mekong Delta 

Mobile Afloat Force Concept and Requirements, dated 7 March 

1966, which was forwarded on 15 March 1966 to the Commander 

in Chief, Pacific, for approval. The study articulated fully for the 
CO,,",CEPT OF A RIVERI:"E FORCE 31 

first time the concept for the Army-Navy force afloal. It later 

proved to be a far-sighted and comprehensive blueprint for the 

preparation of both Army and Navy components and the conduct 

of o~rations_ Most of the planned features of the force as stated 

in this document later materialized in the operational force. 

The study recommended that the force contain a U.S. Anny 

reinforced brigade consisting of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and other combat and comba t service support. The 

force would be based aboard U.S. Navy ships that would include 5 

self-propelled barracks ships, 2 LST's, 2 large harbor LUgS, and 2 

landing craft repair ships. In addition, twO U,S. Navy river assault 

groups \\'ould prO\'ide tactical water mobility, Each assault grOllp 

would be capable of lifting the combat elements of one reinforced 

infantry battalion. A small sa lvage craft would be necessary to 

recover damaged ships or craft. The reinforced brigade would be 

organized under the current standard ROAD (Reorga nization 

Objective Army Divisions) tables of orga nization and equipment, 

with limited augmentation. Cen .. "lin equipment specified in the 

tables, such as tenLS, mess facilities. 106-mm. recoilless rifles, antitank wire.guided missiles. and all wheeled vehicles except artillery 

prime movers were to be deleled from the force requirements. The 

number of gO-mm. recoillcss rifles in e:.ch rifle company was to be 

reduced from six to thrce to improve the mobility of the weapons 

squads. The 4.2-inch monars would accompany the force and be 

moved by water or air to field positions as necessary_ Radios would 

be either ship·mounted or man·portable. CoxS\\'ains of plastic asSo:1.u ll boats were to '>e designated in the proposed tables and trained 

upon arrival in Vietnam. Enough troops from each of the units 

afloat would be left at a land base 1,0 maintain equipment left in 

storage. The plan provided for an augmentation of three countermortar radar sections. each manned by nine men. to operate and 

maintain ship-mounted counlennorlar raetars. A mobile Ann)' Sllrgical hospital team . U.S. Air Force t:lctical air control parties which 

included forward air controllers. Viclllam Arm)' liaison troops, and 

additional ANPRC-25 radios were to be furnished from sources 

outSide the parent division of the brigadc. 

Each river assault group, later designatcd river ass."lult squadron. 

was to consist of the following: :)2 LCM-6's to serve as armored 

troop carriers, 5 LCM-6's to serve as command anet communica tion 

boats. 10 LCM-6's to serve as monitors. 32 assault support palrol 

boats. and 2 LCM-6's to serve as refuc1crs. A salvage force woulet 

includc: 2 2,000-ton heavy li ft craft , 2 YTB's for salvage, 2 LeU's 
32 RIVERINE OI>ERATIONS 

ARMORED TROOP CARRIER 

(la nding craft, utility). and 3 toO-ton floating dry docks. The 

Mobile Afloat Force concept Slated the specific tasks the force was 

to accomplish: seCUfe U.S. base areas and lines of communication 

required for U.S. operations: conduct offensive opera ti ons against 

Viet Cong forces and base areas that posed a threat both to the 

national and to the IV Corps Tactical Zone priority areas for rural 

construCtion in co-ordination with Republic of Vietnam armed 

forces (Inc! other U.S. forces: isolate th e most heavily popllla~ed and 

key food-producing areas from Viet Cong base areas: interdict Viet 

Cong supply routes: and in co-ordination with the Vietnam armed 

forces provide reserve ane! reaction forces in the IV Corps Tactical 

Zone. 

Because the Viet Cong forces were dispersed throughout the 

Mekong Delta, the ri\'er force would be required to operate in 

many locations, Initial operations would be conducted in the pro\'· 

inces (0 the nonh of the Mekong River- Co Cong, Dinh Tllong, 

Kien Phong, Kien Tuolll-{. and as far north as the Plain of Reeds. 

(See Mal) ..5 .) Once the Viet Cong main force units were neutralized in these areas, with the U,S. Navy GAME WARDE=-< forces con-
CONCEPT OF A RIVERINE FORCE 

COMMAND AND CoMMUNICATIONS BoAT 

trolling Viet Cong cross-river movements, the center of gravity of 

U.S. operations would shift sOllth into the provinces between the 

11ekong and the Bassac and e"entually south of the Bassac River. 

It was decided to lise a brigade for initial operations because 

the experience of U.S. forces in Vietnam indicated that the brigade 

was the smallest U.S. unit that could he safely and economically kept 

in the delta. It was large enough to defend its base against he,n'y 

enemy attack and at the same time to have forces available for 

offensive operations. 

The formal plan of the Military Assistance Command required 

the construction of a land base by dredging. Since land reclamation would be expensive and time-consuming. however. the plan 

also recommended the creation of a water base as well in order to 

use American forces most effectively. The plan indicated that the 

land base neal' My Tho could he marie available at the end of 

1966 or in early 1967. 

Criteria for the selection of anchorages for the noating base 

were established. The base was to be reasonably near an airfield: 
34 R1VERI:">E OPERATIONS 

be withi n or cOllliguous to it relatively secure area; have access to a 

land line of communications; ha"c enough room to anchor the 

entire force; and have a river bank that would permit debarking 

of anillery to provide fire support to the force. Siles that mel 

most of the abo"c criteria were found in the vicinity of My Tho, 

Vio h Long. Cao Lanh, Tra Vinh, Can Tho, Long Xuyen, and Dai 

Ngai, which was in the vicinity of Soc Trang. 

Recognizing that the l\Iy Tho land base would not be large 

enough to accommodate a division headquarters until earl y in 

1968. the plan ca lled for the Z Division to go initially to Ba Ria, 

which lies north of Vung Tau. The division base was to include a 

division headquarters. a su pport command, one brigade, and a storage area for the heavy equipment and rolling stock of the two brigades sent into the delta-one to be land-based near My Tho rather 

tha n in Long An Province. and a second to be the Anny component 

of the Mobile Afloat Force. Vung Tau was to be the port for staging and resupplying the Mobile Afloat Force. Minimum security 

measures would be needed for the force when it was at Vung Tau 

and when it \l,1as traveling from there to the Mekong River. During 

navigation of the major rivers. however, continuous security meas· 

ures would be necessary. Such movements were to be considered 

ventures through hostile territory and were to be handled much 

the same way as runni ng a tactical land convoy. 

The plan provided for continuous air cover. both by fixed-w ing 

tactical aircraft and armed helicopters. Advance. flank , and rear 

security on the rivers was to be provided by U.S. Navy river assault 

groups. CAME WARDEN forces would provide intelligence to assist 

in reconnoitering the route. The mine countermeasures were to be 

chain drags pulled along either side of the channel to cut command 

detonation wires of ri\'er mines. and mine-hunting sonar. Cana ls 

lenninating in the main river might harbor hostile boats and were 

therefore to be reconnoitered by both boat and air. Armed helicopters. in conjunction Idth the Navy assault groups. were to cover 

the banks of the rivers and search out possible ambush sites. The 

major ships were to be at a condition of highest watertight integrity during transit. and fixed weapons were to be manned to counter 

enemy attack. Major ships of the force were to be moved in daylight 

hours. 

At the anchorage of Ibe anoat base, an area security plan would 

be in effect. with Arm)' security forces on shore and reinforced by 

artillery. Outposts including foot and boat patrols would be used. 

The barracks ships would be moored near the center of lhe river 
CQNCEI>T OF A RIVERI)Io;E "ORO: 3.; 

and their COllntermortar radars could provide coverage of Ihe sur· 

rounding area. All \\'capons would be manned, willi an Army N~l\ \' 

reaction force standing by while Ihe ships were at anchor. 

Thc plan recognized threc principal encmy thrcats. The first 

was infiltration by small mortar or recoilless rifle teams which would 

attempt to penctrate the infalllry perimeter ashore. These leams 

would probably fire several rounds quickly and then \\'ithdraw 

rapidly. The second threat was that of a large·scale. oven attack. 

The third and possibly the most critic."11 threat to the floa ting base 

would come from the water-floaling mines, swimmer saboteurs. 

and suicide boats. Measures to counter the threats were left to the 

commanders immediately concerned. 

The Mobile Afloat Force concept provided for a variety of taco 

tical operations. The force would remain in an cnemy base area as 

long as operations could be profitably conducted-about four to six 

weeks. Ground operations would Ian four to fi\'e days, arter which 

troops would be allowed a rest of two or three days to dry alit and to 

repair equipment. It was helieved that the force could conduct four 

operations a month. A brigade would he deployed in Ihe delta for 

as long as six months. lI'ith the possihility of rot:nion with either 

the brigade at My Tho or that at Ba Ria . The force would obtain 

intelligence and de\'e lop plans prior to its arri\al in a base area, and 

operations would commcnce as soon as the floal in~ base arrived at 

its anchorage. The brigadc would rely he,l\ily on local Vietnamese 

intelligence organil.ations. 

To acquire knowledge of the area in which the force was oper· 

ating, clements of the brigade. embarked in Navy assault group 

boats. helicopters. and plastic assault hoals, would he employed 10 

...... ther data on stream and canal depths. height of hanks. areas for 

beaching, possihle anillery positions, helicopter landing zones, 

the local population, and the enemy. 

Full·scale operations would he conduCled by deploying the force 

into the combat area by water. land. and air. Security for the float· 

ing base would require from a comp:lIl)' to as mllch as a baualion 

in the immediate base arca. Operations could range lip to lifty 

kilometers from the floating base and. in exceptional cases. beyond. 

Security measures similar 10 those for relocation of the major ships 

\\'ould be (alen for the TllO\'emelll of the aSSo"1tlit naft formations 

during operations. Tactical :Iir ancl armed helicopters were to Oy 

COler, ancl anillery \\'otlld displace hy echelon as required to pro· 

vide continuolls fire support. The ass,"1tdt suPPOrt patrol boats were 

to furnish forward , flank . and rear security. and to sll'eep for shore· 
36 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

ASSAULT $UPI'ORT PATROL BOAT. A higll-speed armored boat used {or 

waterway interdictioll, sllrveillance, escort, rnilU~·swecpillg, and [ire 

su.pport. 

commanded mines. Preparatory fire could be delivered by the 

armament o f tbe Navy aSS<1.ult &"TOUpS, by artillery, and by air. 

Landing of the force would be in accordance with the tactical plan 

and the armored troop carriers would then withdraw to rendezvous 

points or rCllIrn to the afloat base for resupply. At least onc armored 

troop carrier would be designated as a floating aid station located 

at a pre.arranged poi nt in the operational area of the battalion that 

it was supporti ng. Some clements of the force could depl oy by 

waler or air beyond the immediate landing areas to cut off with· 

drawing enemy troops and some could be held anoat as a reserve. 

The river rorce would prevent the enemy from withdrawing across 

the major rivers. Assault support patrol boats and monitors not required to protect the troop carriers would be used to provide nank. 

and rear security. close-in fire suppon, and forward command post 

protection. 

Command and control would be exercised through the use of 

command and communications boats. which were to provide space 

and communica ti ons for battalion and brigade command groups. 

Command helicopters could also be used to control operations. 
CONCEPT OF A RIVERINE FORO: 37 

l\.'fONITOR 

Helicopters would be used to deploy a portion of the ground force. 

to position artillery, and 1.0 deliver reserves for the purpose of blocking the enemy or exploiting success. Armed helicopters would be 

employed for escort and fire support. Large Viet Cong forces encountered in these operations were to be neluralized or destroyro 

by fire and land maneuver. Should no large enemy force be encountered, lhe Mobile Anoat Force would be redeployed to another 

area of operations or the area would be systematically searched and 

enemy resources captured or destroyed. It was estimated that a 

battalion cou ld conduct an operation throughout an area of forty 

square kilometers in four 10 six days. After troops had closed in on 

the final objective they would be mel and withdrawn by the Navy 

assault group boats or possibly by helicopters. The withdrawal phase 

was considered critical because of the possibility of ambush and 

mines. Alternate roules and decoys would be used, but the basic 

concept for withdrawal would be the same as that of the movement 

to contact. Mine-clearing devices and air cover would be used. 

(Diagram J) 

All available means of fire support would be employed by the 

force, using the air and ground operations system common throughalit Vietnam. Sorties would be allocated 1.IJxm p\:anned requests; 

emergency ref]uests would be honored in accordance with priorities. 

The Direct Air Support Center at IV Corps Tactical Zone headquarters in Can Tho would be responsible for the allocation of 
38 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

~KRII Seeurlty 

.. <--::.-~=j;:.::::"==- , . ~- .' 

" 

Cr" 

d .9 

" 0: 0\ (KRIll Cl 6 ,! ... , . <:) "---"', 'I ,---. ---...J' 0 '-' , '" I '"-0) .... '· .. 0 ~u"Y Reactl"" 

Porce 

::::::::> IkI~-..t to Objactlyc 

~ Artlll".., ,.<,0 

o "'...a.ed Troop C..rior (ATC) 

C> _!ton ..,d ...sPI ' S 

c::> h rnd .. and Supply S~lp. (An ' S and UT' S) 

8<> .. Patrol. 

""""""" Ilockln, Line 

Diagram 3. Riverine operation and base defense. 

tactical air support with airborne fonvard air controllers utilized to 

the maximum. Artillery SUppOTt wou ld be furnished in the traditional manner, providing fire support to all echelons of the 

forcc. Gunfire support would also be supplied by assault support 

palrol boats and monitors. Army helicopter gunships would be rcquested and allocated by the division in the same manner as (or 

other divisional brigades. 

The Vung T au Area Support Command wou ld provide common 

items of suppl y and logistic support peculiar to the Anny; the 

Navy would furnish ilems peculiar to the Navy. A small Navy 
CONCEPT OF A RIVERINE FORCE 39 

support facility at Vung Tau would probably be ncc<:SS."Iry. Two 

LST's from Vung Tau would L."Ike care of all resupply except Class 

Ill. Each would be capable of carrying ten days' dry cargo for all 

elements of the force. One LST would remain on station with the 

force for seven days as a no.uing supply point. At the end of the 

seven days, the LST on station would be relieved by the second 

ship carrying ten days of supply, and would return to Vung Tau 

for replenishment. 

Self-propelled barracks ships would be stocked with thirty days 

of frozen and chilled components of Class I and thirty days of dry 

components prior to deployment. Resupply o~ Class I would be 

scheduled to draw on the initial provisioning to a fifteen-day level 

by the lime an APB returned to Vung Tau. The Navy would be 

responsible for operating all messes aboard ships, utilizing both 

Army and Navy mess personnel. 

Resupply of petroleum products would be accomplished by 

having the craft of the Navy ass.1.ull groups refuel from the APB's 

and the supply LST. The supply LST would refuel the APB's and 

other ships of the Hotilla as required. Gasoline for the assault boats 

and vehicles would be supplied from tWo LCM-6 tankers. each with 

a capacity of 10,000 gallons. The LST would be refilled by commercial barge at ten-day intervals. Fuel for helicopter companies 

would be provided to the base by commercial contractor. U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, would supply what the commercial contraCtors 

could not. 

The LST supply ships would carry that portion of the Class V 

basic load not carried on the APU's and ATC's. Army Class V 

carried aboard an APB would be limited to that portion of the 

basic load carried by the individual soldier and ten days' supply 

for Army weapons mounted on the ship. A normal allowance would 

be carried for the Navy weapons. The Army element of the force 

would prepare loading plans for that portion of the basic load to 

be carried on the ATC·s. An operating allowance of Class V would 

be carried on the Navy assault group craft for all mounted weapons. 

with a ten-day resupply for these weapons on the supply ship. 

Resupply of forces operating away from the Mobile AnOal 

Force anchorage would be tailored to the specific operation and 

would vary with the size of the force, duration of the operation. 

and distance from the anchorage. Resupply would be accomplished 

primarily by ATC and helicopter. Airlift and other means of transportation could be called upon to augment the capacity of the 

organic force for resupply as warranted by the area and nature of 
40 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

operations. Mat~ricl (0 be evacuated to Vung Tau or to the division 

base at Ba Ria would be carried by the resupply ships on their 

return to Vung Tau. Aircraft would be used for evacuation and 

for the replacement of urgently needed materiel between supply 

ship turnarounds. The Army and Navy components would retain 

maintenance responsibility for organic mau riel. including parts 

supply for service-peculiar items. Each component would provide 

repair storcs and lo.1.d lists accordingly. 

Army responsibility for maintenance would be limited to organizational maintenance of all materiel and direct support maintenance of weapons, "ehicles. signal equipment, and assault boats and 

motors. Shops on the APR's would be used by unit armorers and 

maintenance men to perform organi7.ational maintenance. Billeting 

~pace for a maintenance detachment of one officer. three warrant 

officers. and twenty-seven enlisted men. and shop sp.'l.ce of approximately 1.500 square feet would be required on the ARL's to meet 

the Army dirc<:t support requirements. 

All Navy ships and smaller craft were to arrive in Vietnam in 

operational condition. Maximum operational time would be avail· 

able prior to regular overhaul. Two ARL's constituted the major 

repair and maintenance assets for the force and would nonnally 

remain with the force to function as advanced tenders. ARL shop 

spaces and equipment would be designed for a broad range of 

repair and maintenance of all craft and ships of the force and for 

overhaul of all assault craft. In addition. shop spaces were to he 

manned by the Army to provide for repair and maintenance of 

Army equipment. 

Medical care would remain a service responsibility aboard ship. 

The Army would provide medical service for all clements of the 

force when they were away from lhe Hotilla on an operation. Two 

medical evacuation helicopters would be stationed at the airfield 

closest to the area of operations to evacuate patients from battalion 

aid stations located on ATes or from the battlefield to a mobile 

Army surgical hospital or an APR. Further evacuation to hospitals 

in the Saigon or Vung Tau area would he by helicopter or fixedwing aircraft. Hospitalization would be in the Saigon, Bien I-loa, 

and Vung Tau areas. A mobile Army surgical hospital located at 

the land base near My Tho, in conjunction with the brigade to be 

based there. and a surgical team located on an APB. would provide 

surgery and medical treatment Ilc<:essary to prepare critically in· 

jured or ill patients for evacuation to hospitals. A helicopter pad. 

sixteen-bed dispensary. and surgical suites with equipment neccs-
CQ1"CEPT OF A RIVERI1"E FORCt: 'II 

sary for one surgical team would he provided on each APB. 

Communications would be provided hy the pcnllallcntly installed Army and Navy radio equipment aboard each ship and 

assault craft. This equipment would provide LOlllmand, tactical. 

and logistical communication links 10 higher and subordinate headquarters. Tactical communicalions ashore would be by man-packed 

radios and by airborne relay when required. 

General command arrangements had been set forth previously 

by General Westmoreland. The plan indicated that they would be 

funher developed by study. The command relationships of the 

force were to be a major topic of discussion for many months after 

the publication of the Mobile Afloat Force concept. 
CHAPTER III 

Riverine Preparations in the United States 

and in Vietnam 

During the final preparation of the Mobile Afloat Force plan 

in South ViclIlam, the 9th Infantry Division was activated at Fort 

Riley, Kansas. on I February 1966 under the command of Major 

General George S. Eckhardt. This was the onc infantry division 

to be organized in the United SWtcs during the fighting in Vietnam 

- lhe so-called Z Division that had been scheduled for operations 

in the ~lckong Delta. It was probably no coincidence that the 

division had been designated the 9th U.S. Infantry; General Westmoreland had seen extensive service with the 9th in \Vorlel War II. 

having commanded the 60th Infantry and having served as chief 

of staff of lhe division during operations in both France and 

Germany. 

Because of a shortage of men and equipment the activation 

order provided for incremental formation of the division. Division 

base elements such as the headquarters and headquarters company. 

division support command, and brigade headquarters and headquarters companies ,,'ere activated first. Activation of the battalions 

of each brigade was phased. commencing in April for the 1st Bri· 

gade. May for the 2d Brigade. and June for the 3d Brigade. The 

artillery and Sepa(alC units were scheduled for activation during 

April and May. Some of the division's officers who had been previously assigned to the Department of the Army staff had learned that 

the 9th Infantry Division \\'as scheduled to operate in the sOllthern 

portion of the III Corps Tactical Zone and the northern portion of 

the IV Corps Tactical Zone and that it was to provide a floating 

brigade. This information was not discussed officially but was 

known to the brigade commanders and the division artillery 

commander. 

The division was organized as a standard infantry division composed of nine infantry battalions of which one was initially mechanized. It had a cavalry squadron and the normal artillery and 

supporting units. The division training program was limited to 
RIVERINE PREPARATIOi\'S 43 

eight weeks for basic combat traini ng, eight weeks for advanced 

individual training, and eight weeks for hath hasic and advanced 

unit training-a total of twenty-four weeks. This compression of 

training time elimi nated fOllr weeks from each of the unit traini ng 

periods and the four weeks usuall y allowed for field training excrci~es and division maneuvers-a tota l of twelve weeks from the 

normal Army tra ining time for a di\'ision. Althollgh it was not 

genera ll y known in the division, the division training period as 

established in Army training programs had been reduced in order 

to conclude at lhe lime of the beginning of the Vietnam dry season 

in December 1966 when the MACV plan call ed for the introduction of U.S. ground forces into the Mekong Delta. 

The normal Army training programs wcre foll owed for the 

basic combat and ad vanced individllal training. General Eckhardt. 

percei\,jng that the ex isting training programs had limitations for 

combat in Vietnam. by means of a personal leller gave his brigade 

commanders lhe latitude to make innovations and to modify tra ining in order to prepare their men for the physi ca l conditions and 

the tactics of the enemy in Vietnam. The training given by the 

brigade commanders was based on lessons le:lrned and standi ng 

opera ting procedures of United States units then figh ting in Vielnam. Allhough aware of possible employment of his unit in the 

Mekong Delta, each of the brigade commanders required the training he deemed ad vis.'lble to prepare his unit for opera lions in 

any part of Vietnam. Although the brigade anOat had not been 

designa ted. Colonel William B. Fulton , Commanding Officer, 2d 

Brigade, felt that the mission could ult imately be assigned to his 

brigade. Because the training period was short, however, he elected 

to adhere to normal basic trai ning in counterinsur,qency for hi~ 

units. 

Colonel Fulton established a training course for the brigade 

and battalion commanders and their staffs that was designed to 

develop proficiency in comm:lnd and staff actions for land operations in Vietnam. The class was held every ten days in a map exercise room with a sand table and map boards depicting selected 

areas of Vietnam. The sessions lasted approximatel y five hours. 

Three days before the class a brigade operations order was issued 

to the battalion commanders. reCJ uesting each battalion to prepare 

plans and orders in accordance with the brigade tactical concept. 

At the start of the session the brigade staff outl ined the situation. 

Each battalion commander was then required to furnish a copy of 

his orders and to explai n \\'by he deployed his units as he did: 

There was a general critiq ue, after which a new situatio n was 
44 RIVERINE OPERATI01"'i 

assigned for study. Each commander and his sl3.ff, which included 

representatives of artillery. engineer. aviation, and other supporting 

elements, then prepared the next set of orders. These in turn were 

presented to the group for analysis and critique. 

The commanders and staff slUdied various forms of land movement by wheeled and tracked vehicles on roads and cross-country. 

Next, air movement was considered. including troop lift and 

logistics computations. various formations, and the selection of 

landing and pickup zones. This in turn was followed by a study of 

water movement by small cTart. 

In conjunction with command and staff training. the brigade 

was developing a standing operating procedure. which was reviewed 

at sessions of the command and staff course. The course began in 

May when the brigade was activated and was separate from the 

Army training programs being undertaken by the units. Officer 

and noncommissioned officer classes in the subject matter covered 

in the Army training programs were conducted at the battalion 

level. 

Following the map exerci~ on movement. a series of exercises 

was conducted involving the organi7.ation and security of the base 

area and patrollingoulside of the base in the brigade tactical area of 

responsibility. Subsequently, exercises were conducted combining 

both air and ground movement in search and destroy operations. 

The brigade patterned its standing operating procedure and its 

methods of tactical operations primarily aher those of the 1st Infantry Division. At the time that the command and staff training 

course was in full swing. several unit commanders from the 1st 

Infantry Division were returning from Vietnam to Fort Riley and 

Junction City. Kansas. where they had left their families when they 

departed with the 1st Division in 1965. Extensive interviews were 

conducted by the brigade commander and staff. who incorporated 

the information obtained into the standing operating procedures 

and the command and staff course. 

The command and staff course did not specifically deal with 

riverine operations. Some of the map exercises were plotted in the 

northern delta immediately adjacent to the Saigon area and Di An 

where the 1st Division was operating. and one problem explored 

water movement. Too little was known about riverine operations 

to incorpornte them fully into training. Furthermore. Colonel 

Fulton felt that the basic operational essentials should be mastered 

first; riverine operations could be studied after unit training was 

completed. 
RJVERINE PREPARATIONS 45 

Review of the Mobile Afloat Force CotJcep' 

On receipt o( the MACV Mobile AAoat Force concept in midMarch 1966. the Commander in Chief. Pacific, Admiral Sharp, 

requested that it be reviewed by the Commander in Chief. Pacific 

Fleet, Admiral Roy L. Johnson. The latter generally concurred in 

the plan but pointed alit that while the Mobile Afloat Force concept provided for maintaining a brigade in the delta for up to six 

months. it might be necessary to rotate the APB's for maintenance 

and upkeep every two to three months. 

Admiral Sharp had questioned the command arrangements. 

Under the Mobile Afloot Force plan it had been recommended that 

the Navy commander be charged with the security of the mobile 

base. while the Anny brigade commander would provide support. 

Admiral Johnson, on the other hand. believed that the Army commander should be responsib le ror base security with the Navy 

commander providing supporting fire and protection against water· 

borne threat. Ht: also questioned whether the Mobile Afloat Force 

could search junks effectively and protect naval crart against water 

mines and ambushes. He expressed concern that hydrographic 

charts of the delta watern'ays were incomplete. and that river assault 

craft were not properly designed and were, furthermore. tOO noisy. 

Except for operational control. the Navy units were under the 

control of the Commander in Chief, Pacitic Fleet. The Commander, Amphibious Force. Pacific. and Commander, Service 

Force, Pacific, had specific responsibilities and part of the subsequent success of the rorce stemmed rrom the professional manner 

in which the Navy fulfilled its obligations. In the case of logistics, 

support was given not only by units in Vietnam such as the harbor 

clearance units of Service Force. Pacific. but also by other units of 

the logistic support system, "Ao,1t and ashore, as set forth in the 

support plan of the Service Force. Each of the commanders concerned felt personal responsibility for the perfonnance of those of 

his units that would be operating under Milit."lry Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

As staffing of the Mobile Afloat Force proceeded. Ccneral Westmoreland continued to ca ll attention to the necd for beginning 

immediately U.S. operations in the Mekong Delta. In " message 

to Admiral Sharp on II May. with respect to intensification of the 

efforts of Vietnam amled forces and early initiation of U.s. operations in the Mekong Delta, he stated that "enemy access to Delta 

resources must be terminated without delay." 
16 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

The planned deployment into the delta had appeared in MACV 

Planning Directive 3-66 published 21 April 1966. The directive 

had emphasized widening the range of operations in the northern 

coastal areas of South Vietnam and close-in clearing and securing 

operations around Saigon. It did not provide for any major American effon in the delta during the rainy season of May-November 

1966, but the possibility of short operations by units such as the 

Special Landing Force was cited. These operations were to have as 

their target the mangrove swamps along the coastal areas in the 

southern III Corps and northern IV Corps Tactical Zones. Plans 

for lhe operations were based on Lhe success of operation jACKSTAY 

in the Rung Sat Special Zone in 1966. 

General Westmoreland expected to send forces in late 1966 and 

early 1967 from the III Corps Tactical Zone to the Plain of Reeds 

and other northern delta areas. The planning provided for the 

Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, Lielltenant Gen· 

eral jonathan O. Seaman, to assume command of U.S. tactical 

operations in the IV Corps Tactica l Zone, co-ordinating operations 

with the Commanding General. IV Corps. through the American 

senior adviser who was to be a brigadier general. (Colonel William 

D. Desobry. Senior Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone. was promoted 

to brigadier general in August of 1966.) 

On 29 May 1966 General Westmoreland was briefed on the 

deployment of the 9th Infantry Division to the IV Corps Tactical 

Zone. He approved the plan and ordered his staff to discuss with 

General Seaman an alternate location for the 9th Division base. 

General Westmoreland directed that the Mobile Anoat Force 

plan to IOC<.He a division headquarters and onc brigade at Ba 

Ria be reconsidered. He called anention to his previous decision 

thal the 9th Division would be placed under General Seaman 

to facilitate tactical operations along the 111 and IV Corps 

border and that the Commanding General, 9th Division, would 

not become the senior adviser to the IV Corps TaClical Zone. Gen· 

eral \Vestmoreland pointed out further that the introduction o( a 

division force into IV Corps would require discussion with General 

Cao Van Vien. chainnan of the joint General Staff of the Republic 

of Vietnam. 

On 9 june General Westmoreland suggested that the delta 

might well be a source of stabili7.ation of the Vietnamese economy. 

The delta could produce enough rice for the entire country if it 

were kept under go\·ernment control: other areas of the country 

would then be free to industrialize. The delta was also the source 
RIVERINE PREPARATIONS 47 

of nearly 50 percent of the country's manpower. It therefore followed that development (.~ the region had to be accelera ted; sending in a U.S. division would aid in this acceleraLion. 

On 10 June Ceneral Westmoreland discussed with General 

Vi en and Lieutenant Ceneral Dang Van Quang, Commanding 

Ceneral, IV Corps Tactical Zone, the possible introduction of U.S. 

forces into the IV Corps Tactical Zone. On 13 June the maller 

came lip for discussion in the Mission Council meeting. General 

Quang, who had made a statement to the press some weeks earlier 

against the stationing of U.S. troops in IV Corps, but in the meantime had apparently had a change of heart, now expressed in the 

meeting a desire that a U.S. brigade be stationed in IV Corps. General Westmoreland told the council that a final decision on the 

maller of basing American troops in IV Corps would be made 

in October. Dredges had already been ordered. and the proposed 

site would be ready by December. He further stated that the trOOps 

would be located about eight kilometers from My Tho, which 

would be off limits to U.S. troops, and that travel through My 

Tho would be sharply restricted. Since the base would be completely seH-sufficient. it would be no drain on local resources. ,Vhen 

Ambassador Henry C1bot Lodge, Jr .. and the political counselor 

expressed reservat ions. General \Vestmorcland agreed wit h them 

that it would be preferable to lise Vietnamese troops, but pointed 

out that up to this time Vietnamese troops had not been completely 

successful in the delta, and imlX>rta nt Viet Cong units were still 

operating there. 

The land base had been selected by General Westmoreland 

himself from four sites submitted by the engi neers as suitable for 

building by dredging. The sites were designated W, X. Y. and Z, 

and the one ncar My Tho chosen by Genera l \Veslilloreland was 

w. The general's staff immediately rcrcrred phonetica ll y to Site ,V 

as Base \Vhisky. the word used in the military phonetic alphabet 

ror the letter \ V. General Westmoreland felt that the site should 

be given a significant name in keeping with its role as the first 

Ameri can base camp in the f\'l ekong Delta. li e asked the official 

MACV translator to give him several possible Vietnamese names for 

the base, such as the translalion of "friendship" or "co·operat ion." 

The translator's list included the Vietnamese terlll n OPlg Tam, 

literally meaning "un ited hearts and minds." General Westmoreland selected this name for three reasons: first. it signified the 1X>!l{1 

between the American and Vietn:lI11csC peoples with respect to the 

objccti\'es to be achie\'ed in the delta. Second, it connoted an appro-
48 RIVERINE OI'ERATIONS 

LANOINC CRAfT REPAIR 5111P WITH ARMORED TROOP CARRIERS 

priatc objcctive compatible with the introduction of U.S. forces 

into the populolls della where their prospective presence had 

evoked some official concern. Third, Dong Tam was a name which 

Americans wouJcl find easy to pronounce and remember. Having 

chosen the name of Dong Tam. General Westmoreland asked 

Ceneral Vicn, the chairman of the Joint General Staff, his English 

translation of the name. Ceneral Vicn confirmed that "united 

hearts and minds" was the literal translation. Thus the name Base 

Whisky was changed to Dong Tam. which became a well-known 

landmark during the subsequent co-operative efforts of American 

and Vietnamese troops in Lhe delta. 

Later in the month, at the Honolulu Requiremenu Planning 

Con ference. the Mobile Afloat Force was included in requirements 

for the calendar years 1967 and 1968. 

The Mekong Della Mobile Afloat Force will provide a means to 

introduce, employ and sustain substantial U.S. combat po ..... er in that 

vila l area. In troduction of the MDMAF [Mekong Delta Mobile ARoat 

Force] at Ihe earliest practicable d:lIe, ..... hether it be an increment of 

that force or all of it, will provide a capability for more rapid achievement of U.S. objectives in that area. 
RIVERINE l'REl'ARATIONS 49 

These requirements as set fOTlh in Ihe conference provided for the 

arrival of the first component of thaI force by April 1967 and the 

second, final component by March 196M. 

On 5 July Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense. approved 

activation and deployment of a Mobile Anoal Force consisting of 

t\\lO river assault ~oups. At the time of the approval, he reduced 

the number of self.propelled barracks ships from five to two and 

eliminated one landing craft repair ship from the force. lie \\las not 

willing to provide for the total 1>'1.ckage requested for the Mobile 

Anoat Force because he fell that the force could be fully tested 

\\lith the equipment he had approved. Included in the cut was the 

5.1.lvage force. \\Ihich required two heavy lift craft of 2.000 tons, two 

YTB's altered for sah':lge. two LCU's. and three 100·lon floating 

dry docks. Only one YTU \\'as aUlhorized. Secretary McNamara's 

decision was to have an appreciable impact on the preparation for 

and the operations of the Mobile Riverine Force as it was constituted in June of the following year, Subsequently General Westmoreland, through Admiral Sharp. requested reconsider:ttion of 

the decision to field only two self-propelled barracks ships .mel two 

river ass,1.ult groups: again four river assault groups and at least 

four barracks ships were re<luested. 

In view of the request. the J oim Chiefs of Staff asked for an 

evaluation of the planned employment and of the additional effec· 

tiveness which lhese ships and craft would contribute to the force. 

Such an evaluation already had been completed by the MACV 

staff in May. The evaluation pointed out the lack or firm ground 

for stationing major troop clements and noted that "the time· 

consuming process of dredging" required to base additional units 

on land justified the additional two \)arTacks ships. Admiral Johnson called attention to the fact lhalthc Mobile Anoat Force concept 

also provided for a mobile brigade independent or a land base, 

One brigade of the 9th Division was to be stationed at Dong Tam 

in early 1967. When barracks ships became available, a reinforced 

battalion from a brigade in III Corps Tactical Zone would be put 

anoal. 

The two river assault groups approved by SecreL.1.rY McNamara 

for fiscal year 1967 would be stationed at Dong Tam. Omission of 

the repair boat to provide mobile maintenance would preclude the 

pcnnanent basing o£ assault groups with the two barracks ships in 

the first increment or the Mubile Afloat Force. Either assault group 

would be available on ca ll from a land base to provide lift £or a 
50 RIVERINt: OPERATIONS 

batta lion afloat. Some of the boats of an assault group would remain 

to protect the barracks ships. 

Units of the 9th Division not stationed at Dong Tam or aboard 

APB's would be based in I II Corps Tactical Zone nonh and east 

of the Rung Sat Special Zone, permitting cxlcnsi,"c operations into 

the special 70ne and IV Corps hy assault group craft. \Vilh lhe 

arrival of a third assault group. which would include an ARL. one 

group could be permanently assigned to the forces afloaL This 

would leave two river assault groups assigned to Dong Tam for 

lifting battalions of that brigade or the other brigade from the 

Vung Tau arca fOI" operations in the upper d!lila. \Vhen the second 

increment arrived. at least two ri,cr assault groups would be needed 

for thc noating basc and onc each to support the other twO brigadcs of the 9th Division. 

General Westmoreland strongly recommended to Admiral 

Sharp that the two additional APJrs and assault groups be included 

in the calendar year 1967 force requirements and that they be 

activated and deploycd at the earlicst practicable d'lle. Admiral 

Sharp supported Gcneral \ Vcstmoreland's position and forwarded 

it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 July, with a further justification 

of thc IwO river assault grOllps on thc grounds that "projection of 

U.S. combat operations into the Delta is an objective of major 

importance:' Admiral Sharp slated Ihat with thrcc thousand kilometers of navigable watcm'a),s. an absence of adequate roads. and 

a lack of helicopters. the 9th Division. which "will be the princip.ll 

rivcrine ground combat force." would requirc ri\'cr assault grollp 

support. Four groups (two organic to the Mobile Anoat Force and 

two additional) could lift about half of the riverine ground force 

at anyone time. In addition. river assault group craft would be used 

in re<;onnaissance and p.1trotting missions and resupply operations. 

would reinforcc GA \I t: WAlI.ln: N and MAII.KFT TIME operations when 

ncceSs,lry, and would support operations to open and secure impartalH walcr rOIlICs. 

In August while the question of whether to incrc;'1sc the number of Navy boats was heing dccided at highcr hcadfJuartcrs, in 

Vietnam Mobile Afloat Force preparations were nearing COIll -

pletion. On I August. MACV puhlished Planning Directive 4-66-

Operations in the Delta. The directive r;dlcd for cmployment of 

riverine forces " regardless of whether based on land (Dong Tam or 

elsewhere) or on ~1I11\1AF rMekong Delta Mobilc AnOal Force)." 

Composition of a ri,icr assault group was established as 26 armored 

troop carriers, 16 assault suppon patrol boats, 5 monitors, 2 com· 
RIVERI"E I'Rt:I'ARATIO'''' .:;1 

mand communications IImlls, and 2 LCM fi rcfuclen. Thi~ composilion was to vary little throuAhout the entin' pni,)(l of ri\er alosault 

group operations. 

The MACV plan would operate in three phase~. During the 

first, the Construction Phase. I 1111)' 19fifi-:H January 1!1fi7. all 

actions required to prepare the ground and fadlities for ()(clipation 

of the base would be completed. In the second, the Preparation and 

Occupation Phase. also to TIIIl from 1 July I!)ijfi throll~h :jl Janu· 

ary 1967, all actions required to prepare the Arm)' and Na\)' units 

to occupy bases, and rile aelual ou-upalion \\'ould he completed. 

Preparation of the forces would proceed concurrently with ha~e 

construction. The Improvement and Operations Phase would hegin 

when the Army and Navy units had occupied the hases and were 

ready to begin combat operations. All anions necessary to concluCl 

and sllstain combat operations from the Dong Tarn base would be 

undertaken during this phase and base facilities would be improved 

and expanded as necessary. 

9th I nfantry DiTlj ~ion St,ulil'.( '"l' Mol,i/f' Afloal Force 

In July 1966 the 9th Di\·ision at Fort Riley had heen furnished 

copies of the plan and requirements of the Mohile Anoat Force. 

Thcse werc studied by the division staff and, :'lftcr approximately 

two weeks, the chief of staff, Colonel Crosby P. MilicI', assembled 

the brigade comm:mdcrs. In vel)' broad terms, Colonel Miller outlined the intended area of operations for thc division and rerelTed 

to the provision for a brigade anoat. This briefing arouscd the 

curiosity of Colonel Fulton. COlllmander of the 2d Brigade. l ie 

recilleslcd copies of rhe complcte plan for study h)' himself and his 

staff. and the division commander approved. An intensive analysis 

was then made by the appropriate staff officers and the study was 

returned to di\·ision headquarters. 

Exhibiting the foresight that had characterized its planning 

effon, l\fACV sent one of the principal planners for the Mobile 

Anoat Force to the United States on normal rotation and placed 

him on temporary dUly with the 9th Division for a week. This 

officer. Lieutenant Colone l John E. MUlTay, Field Artillery. was 

extremely enthusiastic about the project anc! was familiar \",ith all 

aspects of the plan and with the area of illlcnded operations in the 

delta. Colonel Fullon arranl?;ccI for Colonel Murray to spend some 

lime with his brigade staff and hattalion commanders to discuss 

all facelS of the project. Through questions and answers, a clear 
52 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

understanding of what was intended was conveyed to the brigade 

officers. 

Later in the week. Colonel Murray addressed the division staff 

and subordi nate commanders. I-Ie outlined the Mobile Afloat 

Force plan. discllssed the environment, and sketched the nature 

of intended activity. He also explained that the Marine Corps had 

deve loped a basic riverine manual entitled Small Unit Operations 

in the Riverine Environment. This document was obtained by the 

2d Brigade for study from the division G-3 (assistant chief of staff 

for operations). Lieutenant Colonel Ridlard E. Zastrow. 

In early May the Department of the Anny had infonned the 

9th Division that it would be sent to the Republic of Vietnam, 

beginning in December. The assistant division commander, Brig. 

adier General Morgan E. Roseborough. headed an advance element 

thal le£t for South Vietnam in late August to plan deployment of 

the division. 

The COTonado ConfeTence and Doctrine 

On the 12th of September. Colonel Fulton was informed by 

General Eckhardt that a confcrencc would be held on the 17th of 

September at Coronado Naval Uase, California. and was designated 

the division represcOlativc: at the conference. The conference had 

been co-ordina lcd by Headq uarters. U.S. Continental Army Com· 

mand. to examine the joint training implications \vhich would be 

imposed on the 9th Division and the Army U.S. training base by 

participation in the Mobile Afloat Force. General Eckhardt directed 

Colonel Fulton to prepare a brier of the Army views on the Mobile 

Afloat Force that would include a plan for logistic support. Gen· 

eral Eckhardt further asked thal he reteive a briefing on the pres· 

entation :0 be made at the conference. It W:IS also de<:ided that 

the division support commander. Colonel J ohn H. Barner, should 

accompany Colonel Fulton to Coronado to handle the logistical 

aspects. 

On 19 September. accompanied by Captain J ohnnie H. Corns 

of his staff, Colonel Barner. division G- 2 and G-3 representatives, 

and a represemati,'e of the division signal office. Colone l Fulton 

proceeded to Coronado. The conference was held under the 

auspices of the Commander, Amphibious Command. Pacific, Vice 

Admiral Francis.l. Blouin. Navy attendees included representatives 

from the Chief of Naval Operations. Commander in Chie£, Pacific 

Fleet. the Amphibious Training Center, the U.S. Marine Corps, 

and Commander, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Army dele· 
RIVERINE PREPARATIONS 53 

gation also included representatives from Continental Army Command headquarters, U.S. Anny Combat Developments Command, 

Fifth Army headquarters. and Sixth Army headquarters. The com· 

mander of River Assault Flotilla One, Captain Wade C. Wells, 

who was to be the U.S. Navy component commander of the Mobile 

AOoat Force, his chief of staff, C"lptain Paul B. Smith, and the rest 

of his staff attended. The conference was chaired by Rear Admiral 

Julian T . Burke, who had the additional responsibility of preparing a U.S. Navy doctrinal manual for riverine operations. Presental ions were made of the organi7.ation and operations of the two 

components as well as the broad problem of command relation· 

ships of the joint force. AfLerward several working gt"oups were 

established to deal with command and control, jOint staff arrange· 

ments, training, logistics, communica tions, and medica l support. 

During the conference Captain Wells infonned Colonel Fulton 

that the River Assault Flotilla One cil ief of staff and representatives 

of N- I, N-2, N-3, and N-4 staff sections. as well as a communica· 

tions officer, were going to Vietnam as an advance parly in early 

October. Upon learning that the 9th Division had an advanced 

planning element at Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam, Captain 

\-Vells agt"eed that the two ad,'ancc elements should be the basis 

for co-ordination in Vietnam. Captain Wells and Colonel Fulton 

also made infornlal arrangements to C(K)rdinate mutual problems 

that might arise between the time of the conference and the de· 

p..1.rture of the 2d Brigade for Vietnam, which was tentatively 

scheduled for early January 1967 . While there were no official 

provisions for direct communications and co-ordination between 

the two component commanders of the Mobile AOoat Force, this 

early meeting proved extremely beneficial in resolving mallers that 

could have impaired the entire undertaking. 

Returning to Fort Riley, Kansas, Colonel Fulton and Captain 

Corns briefed General Eckhardt and his staff on the results o{ the 

Coronado conference. General Eckhardt then designated Colonel 

Fulton as the executive agem for the division on riverine mailers, 

and specified that this responsibility carried with it the designation 

o{ commander or the Ooating brigade and the U.S. Army component for the Mobile Afloat Force. Colonel Fulton still chose not 

to incorporate riverine operations in his trair.ing program because 

of the grea t amount of normal training to be accomplished. It was 

implied. however, at the conference that there would he a training 

period in Vietnam or approximately two to three momhs during 

which the Anny and Navy components would be able to train 
54 RIVERINE OPERATlO:'llS 

their forces fOT the JOint rj,'crinc operations. Nevertheless when 

Colonel Fulton infonncd Lieutenant Colonel William B. Cronin, 

Commanding Officer. 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry, and Lieutenant 

Colonel Guy I. Tutwiler. Commanding Officer. 4th Battalion, 47th 

Infantry, of the riverine mission, they decided as part of their 

!lonnal training prOArams to incorporate techniques and equip. 

ment fOT crossing small rivers. 

While at Coronado. Colonel Fulton explored with the commander of the Amphihious Training School the possibility of 

conducting a riverine (ourse for his brigade staff, the battalion 

commanders and their staffs. and the brigade supporting unit 

commanders. This school was a repository of amphibious doctrine 

and conceplS as well as lessons learned in the MAkKET TIME and 

GAME \VARDEN operations, which were, respcctively, the U.S. Navy 

offshore and ri,'er operations in South Vietnam. All the U.S. Navy 

advisers for the Vietnamese river assault groups were trained under 

Amphibious Training School allspices. The Navy SEAL (sea-air. 

land) learns, which were rotated in and out of South Vietnam, were 

also trained there. Many of the school faculty had already completed tours of duty in both the U,S. and Vietnamese navies. The 

idea of conducting a riverine course was acceptable to the com· 

mander of the Amphibious Training School. and plans for instruction were developed throliAh subsequent correspondence between 

the brigade and the Amphibious School during the period October 

through December. Also it was agreed that the Amphibious Training School would provide a team al Fort Riley during December 

1966 for the purpose of tra in ing selected men from brigade and 

battalion in techniques of waterproofing, small boat loading and 

handling. and combat offloading from transports. Also included 

was instruction in water S<lfety techniques that was to prove immensely valuable once operations commenced. 

In early October Colonel Fulton was informed that he would 

accompany the division commander to Vietnam on an orientation 

visit to reconnoiter the riverine environment and get a preview of 

the requirements for riveri ne operat ions, The division commander 

and a small staff left on {) October for a three-week visit to Vietnam, 

Colonel Fulton·s arrival coincided with that of the advance party 

of the River ASS-'lUlt Flotilla One staff. Colonel Fulton and Captain 

Smith. chief of staff of the nOlilla. were able to visit and analyze 

the proposed training sit e in the vicinity of Ap Go Dau, adjacent 

to the Rung Sal Spec-ial Zone. approximately fifteen kilometers 

south of Bearcal. Bearcat, ten miles south of Long Binh, was to be 
RIVERINE PREPARATIQ:-';S 55 

the 9th Division base instead of Ba Ria , which had been specified 

in the original Mobile Afloat Force plan, nearcat was to be expanded into a base capable of accommodating the entire division 

until the 2d Brigade base at Ap Co ])au could be buill. Colonel 

Fulton and Captain Smith agreed all the sile ncar Ap Co Dati, and 

plans were developed by Company B, 15th Engineer Batlalion, 10 

construct the joitn training base, A phased training schedule based 

on actual combat operations from the !lew location was also tentatiyelyagreed upon. The shifl of Ihe division basc from Ga Ria to 

Beareat was to have no significant effect on the ~Iobile Anaal 

Force plan. 

Colonel Fulton also visited the nang Tam construction si te. 

the 7th Division headquarters of Ihe Army of '/ietnam, and General Dcsobry. sen ior adviser of IV Corps Tactic;1I Zone;:1l Can Tho. 

Discussions cemered on projected opera lions of U.S. forces in the 

Mekong Delta. It was especially fortuitous that Colonel FultOn. 

General Desobry. and the Senior Advisor. 7th Division, Colonel 

John E. Lance, ./1' .. had been on the faculty of the Army War 

College during the period 1962 to 1965. This professional association proved to be very vaillable during the ensuing months as 

the 2d Brigade planned for and conducted operations in the 

Mekong Delta. 

While at Headquaners. U.S. Army. Vietnam, Colonel Fulton 

learned that the Army had not completed the preparation of the 

riverine doctrine. a task assigned 10 it by MACV Directive 3-66. 

In discllssing the task, Colonel Fulton found that Major J ohn R. 

Witherell. the U.S. Arm)' Combat Developments Command li aison 

onicer, had developed an aClive interest in the Mobile Anoat Force 

plan and had started preparation of a ralher detailed manuscript 

which dealt with organization and taclics of units as envisaged by 

the Mobile Anoat Force planners. At Colonel FuILon 's suggestion 

Major Witherell agreed LO propose to Headquarters, Combat Developments Command, that it undertake the drafting of a test field 

manual on riverine opera tions. In m:lking tltis recommendation, 

Major Witherell planned to furnish his drafL manuscript. The 

meeting proved to he beneficial since during the Coronado conference the doctrine matter had be(:n explored with both Navy 

representatives and Major Donald R. Morelli, the Combat Developments Command represcntative ;ll the conference. It was agreed 

that if the manual was undertaken. the writing should be done at 

the Amphibious Training School at Coronado. the best source of 

inronnation on riverine warfare. 
56 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Upon his return to Fort Riley, Colonel Fullon was visited by 

a representative £rom Combat Developments Command who had 

outlined a manual based on Major Witherell's manuscript. Colonel 

Fulton suggested that this be accepted as the basis fOT the manual 

which was to be prepared at Coronado with representatives from 

the various Army service schools and Combat Developmcllu 

agencies under the leadership of lhe InSlilute of Combined Arms 

Croup. Fort Leavenworth. Colonel Fulton stressed that the manual should be available when the brigade and baualion staffs departed for South Vietnam on 11 January 1967. The need for the 

manual was quite appnrcnL since the U.S. Marine Corps Fleet 

Marine Force Manual 8-4, the only doctrinal manual on riverine 

operations, dea lt with only small boat tactics and did not cover 

joint riverine operations. 

Final Deci.sio1U 071 Deployme'll 

Secretary of Defense McNamara during his October visit to 

South Viemam was briefed on lhe Mobile AnOal Force, and the 

need for two additional river assau lt squadrons was stressed at that 

time. The designation river assault group had been changed to 

ri,'er assault squadron in order to avoid confusion with the Vietnamese river assault groups. During this briefing it was emphasized 

to Mr. McNamara that if the Objectives of the MACV campaign 

plan were to be achie'·oo, U.S. ground operations in the IV Corps 

area were needed to assist the Republic of Vietnam armed forces. 

It was further poimed Ollt to Mr. McNamara that roughly 50 percelll of the population and 68 percent of the rice·producing area in 

the Republic of Vietnam were in the Mekong Delta. In this briefing it was explained that the 9th Division, due in Vietnam in Dccember 1966 and January 1967. was to be the principal river 

ground force, and that the ri,"cr assault boats nceded to provide 

tactical mobility would conform to standard U.S. Navy organization structure, with tWO assault squadrons of about fifty boats each 

under command of River Assault Flotilla One. The Mobile Afloat 

Force with thc two approved river aS5<"lUII squadrons would provide 

a good start, but there was a need for at least twO additional assault 

squadrons by the end of calendar year 1967 in order to sustain the 

momentum of the riverine operations. The 9th Division. now 

planned with seven infantry battalions and two. rather than one, 

mechanized battalions. would require the support of two river 

assault squadrons. Two additional baualions from the U.S. 25th 

Division and the Australian Task Force would bring the total to 
RIVERINE PREPARATIOl'OS 57 

eleven infantry battalions for riverine operations. No decision was 

made by Mr. McNamara on the two river ass.-wlt squadrons during 

his visit. 

On 21 November General \Vestmorcland suggested to the Mission Council that it was feasible to deploy a battalion to Dong Tam 

in January 1967, and requested the council's endorsement of this 

action. Anticipating the council's concurrence, General \Vestmoreland directed the planning and preparation for deployment of a 

brigade in February 1967 if it was deemed feasible by II Field 

Force, Vietnam. By 29 November, AmbasS<ldor Lodge had approved 

this deployment. 

On 1 December. Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, 

Vietnam. published a plan for logistical support for the Mobile 

Afloat Force. This plan provided for t\\'o kinds of support-one for 

the units based at Dong Tam and one for the units afloat. The land 

base commander was assigned responsibility for the logistical support for Dong Tam. and the mobile riverine base commander 

would have responsibility for tile mobile riverine base. while 

service-peculiar supply would he the responsibility of the component commander concerned. Sai~on was designated as the primary 

supply source for the Dong Tam base, with Vung Tau as the 

alternate. and land lines of communication were to be usc<l wherever possible. The mobile riverine base would be supported by 

Vung Tau. with Saigon as the alternate. 

After evaluating the progress of the base construction at Dong 

Tam, II Field Force reponed on 4 December that it was feasible 

to support a battalion at Dong Tam in late February 1967. The 

planning and liaison machinery went into high gear early in December. Elements of tht::: 9th Division would be available for training at the Vung Tau base in early January. The commander of 

Naval Forces. Vietnam, had shifted :111 efforts to prepare the base 

for riverine training when the proposed training site at Ap Go Dau 

was abandoned in favor of Vung Tau. He recommended liaison 

between 9th Division and Vietnamese and U.S. agencies. He also 

asked Admiral Johnson to provide a suitable support ship at Vung 

Tau about 7 January and at the S<lme time 10 place aboard it one 

river assault squadron staff and one ri,rer division st.1ff. The commander of River Assault Flotilla One and his staff. less lhe advance 

element, were to leave Coronado in mid-February and a second 

river division was to leave in late February. 

General Westmoreland directed the commander of II Field 

Force to prepare to send an infantry battalion task force from the 
RIVERtNE OPERATIONS 

9th Dh ision to Dong Tam, to acid forces I,Hc r to increase it to a 

brigade, and to ad \ is<' him of thc arrival dates, The Commanding 

General , U,S. Army, Vietnam, was 10 MlppOrl the task forccs and 

Senior A(h isol', IV Corps Tactical Zone, was directed to plan for 

the provision of \'ietnam Army security forces, co·ordinate Vietnamese ami U.S. sccurity arrangements, ,md prepare the Vietnamese people for the presen(;e of U.S. troops at nang Tam. 

The first eleme llls of the 9th Di\ isioll landed at Vung Tau (In 

19 December. and on 20 Dcccmber Ceneral Westmoreland estimated that th e ballalion task force " 'auld mo\'e to Dong Tam on 

25 J anuary following tWO engineer compan ies th at were to arrivc 

th ere on 7 January. lie calcu latcd that strength would increase to 

brigade Inc! in late February or early March. 

The Mobile Anaat For(c, concei\cd and approvecl during 1966, 

was one of the most irnporlant MACV accomplishments of the year. 

This force was expecled to playa major role in th e control of th e 

delta, not on ly in :I military sense, but also cconomic:ll1y and 

politically. Further, the entire della campaign could \\'ell be a key 

to the success of th e combincd opcra tions of th e Unitcd States and 

the Republic of Vietnam. 

2d Br;gade, 9th /11/(111111 Division, Arrives ;11 Vietnam 

Upon complction of training at Fort Riley at the end of 

November 1966, the 2<1 brigade hegan preparation for overseas 

movcment. During this time, se lectcd men from the brigadc and 

baualions were ~i"e n training by the Marine Training T eam from 

the Na\'a l Amphibious School. On 3 January, the brigade commander and staff, th e commander and staff of tbe 2d Battalion, 

4th artill ery, th e commanders and staffs of the 3d and 4th Battalions, 47th Infantry, and the 52. 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry, weill 

to Coronado to attend tb e tell·cIay riverine course that had been 

established at the rcqucst of the brigade commander. The course 

prodded a great deal of useful information on operations of the 

Viemamese river :lSSault groups. U.S. Navy SEAL teams, Viet Cong 

illlelligence opcra tions in th e delta. anel the riverine environment. 

The ten da)s gave the ('olllll1:1nrlers and staffs of lhe brigade's 

attached and support ing units thc opponu nit y to conccntrate on 

purely rivcrine problems for the first lime. 

When the course ended on 12 J anuary. the Combat Developments Command writi ng ~roup had completed the first draft of 

Training Text 31-75, Rivcrinc Operations. Colonel Fulton now 

learned th at a lthough the Navy had prO\.ided advice and consulta-
R1VF.Rl~t: I'R~.I'''RAT10'\<; 

tion. it woulel not forlllall)' an'cpt the IlMllual. nor would the: (ml1-

mander of River Ass:lult Flotilla One ;u kn()\\'lcd~(' tll(' te" a'\ 

a SOIlfl'e of e1cKlrine to \\'hich he would suhscrihe. \Vllt'n agreel1lt~nt 

had heen re:u-hed in September that :I mallual \\'ould he writtcn, 

N;HY :l<Teptance was t:ullly understood, hut since 1l was nOl forth -

C'Olllmg: the (IUeSlion of ;ll,{rC('mclll on joint proceclur('s n:maincd 

The brigade commander and his ofhcer'\, howe\er, considered tllc 

training le" a sound new source of Il\erinc doctrine and nm(cpt'\ 

on which subsequent trainin!-!; ill Vietnam multi be hd'scd. Impnncmem could hc made in the Ie" after the experienLe of a( llIal 

opcr:ltions. 

The 2d Urigaclc officcr'\ who had auendeclthe Coronado riverine 

("Qurse arrived at Bien HO:l on 15 January and proceeded to lkar· 

cat. Shonl)' afterward Ihe rcmaiudcr of the advance p.:\rly arriHxl 

by :tir from Fort Rile)': indudcd were all the squaclleadcls from the 

Ihree infantry baHaliolls, two platoon selJ:~eants and tll'O platoon 

leaders rrom each of the c()Jnp:lIlie~. and all tom pan) cOlllm:lIldcr<;. 

The main bocly was ell rOIl[(' hy \\";tll'r rrom San Fr.lll(isco under 

the slipenision of l.ielllen:1Il1 ('".olond Thumas F. O'c.onnor. the 

brigade execlltive officer. The other officer c.,clre comistecl of the 

comp."1oy e:\C(;lIti,c OnlCerS. two platoon leaders from earh company, and Ihe bauillion e"ecllli\·e urhccrs with sm:lIl staffs. The 

purpose of the larAe hrigade acl\":I1Ke pany was to gin' most of Ihe 

tactical unit combat leaders hattie cxperience before Ihe main 

body arri,'cd at the enel of January. To this end the lin It ad,anc(' 

p."1rties wcre scnt to operatc \vilh Ihe U.S. 1st and 25th Oivisions 

for approximately two :lIld one·h:llf \\"ecls. 

Thc main hody deharked at Vung Tau on :\1 January and 

1 February 1967 and reached Be;mat on I Febmary. On 7 Febru· 

ary the 2d Brigade, with the 2d. 3d, and 41h Hattalions. 47th Infanll·y, and :~d Squadron. fllh C:l\alry, cOlllmen("('d a one-week 

operation in the Nhon Trach Distrin or Bien Iina Prm inec JUSt 

nonl! of the Rung Sat Special Zone. The 2d Urigacle had an excellent opportunity to sh;!ke itself down opera tionally in a tombat 

environment and to c'mnpCIl.'k"1te for the la<.:.k of a brigade field 

training exercise which il hac! heen unable to con<1u(( at Fan 

Riley because of the shan training: period. 

Rung Snt Spn:ini Zone Operflliollof Training 

During the latter I>.,,\rt of January the :Jd Battalion. 60th Infantry, an element of the ~d Brigade, !'lth 1l.S. Division. had, hegun 

riverine training with the advance River Assault Flotilla One el('· 
GO RIVERINE OPERATIOro;' .. 

menu that were aboard USS Whitfield County (LST 1169), anchored in Vung Tau harbor. The 3d Battalion. 60th Infantry. was to 

be the first infantry unit sent to Dong Tam and was to arrive there 

by the end of January. It would be followed in training by the 3d 

Battalion, 47th Infantry. which was then participating in the 2d 

Brigade operation in Nhan Trach. 

On 10 February. two companies and the st.1ff of the 3d Bat· 

talion. 47th Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Lucien E. Bolduc. 

Jr., le£t for riverine training in the Rung Sal Special Zone. The 

Navy crews with which the battalion would work had received 

on-the-job training with the Vicmamese Navy river assault groups 

in the delta. 

On 15 February. as the brigade was returning from the Nhan 

Tnch operation to its base camp at Bearcat. an order was received 

from II Field Force directing that an entire battalion conduct 

operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone beginning 16 February. 

The order was prompted by a Viet Cong auack. on a freighter 

navigating the Long Tau, the main shipping channel connecting 

Saigon and Vung Tall, on 15 February. It brought to an abrupt 

halt the organized training for Colonel Bolduc's baltalion, which 

had accomplished only three of the scheduled ten days of training; 

full-scale combat operations would have to begin. The battalion 

commander was aboard USS Whil{it:ld County with two companies 

when Colonel Fulton talked to him. Colonel Fulton had already 

ordered the remaining companies of the 3d Raltalion, 47th Infantry. 

as well as a direct support battery of the 2d Battalion, 4th Artillery, 

into the northern portion of Ihe Rung Sat Special Zone. Colonel 

Bolduc's mission was to disrupt enemy activities in the major base 

areas of the Viet Cong. 

The resulting operation initiated on 16 February 1967 and 

tenninated on 20 March was designated RIvER RAIDE.R J. It was 

the first joint operation by U.S. Army and U.s. Navy units that 

were later to constitute the Mobile Riverine Force. The 3d Battalion, 47th lnfamry, was supported by River Assault Division 91 

of River Assault Squadron 9. (Chart I) 

Joint operations centers were maintained twenty-foul' hours a 

day both at land bases and aboard the APA Henrico, and joint 

plans were made for each project. River Assault Flotilla One provided rear area support and planning assistance for river squadron 

o~rations. Squadron g's assault division was commanded by Lieutenant Charles H. Sibley, who operated LCM-6's and a command 

vessel borrowed from the Vietnam Navy since the squadron's boau 
RIVERINE J>Rt.I'ARATIONS 61 

CHART I- Rlvl!Jl ASSAULT SQUAI>RON ORGANIZATION 

Commander, 

River Assault 

Squadron 

(Task Unit) 

I 

Chief 

Staff 

Officer 

I Communications Operations 

River Division River Division 

Commander Underwater Commander 

(Task Element) Demolition (Task Element) 

Team, Explosive 

I Ordnance Detachment, I and Riverine Survey 

Chief of S ... Chief of Staff Team close 

Officer·Operations support elements Officer·Operations 

I embarked on River 

Assault Squadron I 

2 CCB's boats perform ins 1 CCB 

3 Monitors Mobile Riverine 2 Monitors 

13 ATC's Force missions 1 Refueler 

8 ASPB's 13 ATC's 

8 ASPS's 

had not yet been delivered. Vietnam River Ass:ndt Group 26 provided mine.sweeping support and escorts for movement on narrow 

and dangerous n'alerwa.ys. 

Particularly important was the SIIpport provided by the Infantry 

Advisor. Rung Sat Special Zone, Major McLendon G. Morris. 

USMC, who joined the battalion command group at thc outsct of 

the operation and remained till Ihe hallalion's operations were 

completed. Major Morris furnished liaison to the Senior Advisor. 

Rung Sat Special Zone. at Nh .. He and invaluable advice and 

assislallce. His extensive knowledge of and experience in the lone. 

his familiarity wilh complex rire suppOrt procedures, and his ability 

10 gCI support on short notice made a signiric.;ml contribution to 

R,Vt:R RAIDER I's success. 

During the operation boats of River Assaull Division !:II moved 
G2 RIVERINE OI'ERATlOr.; ~ 

troops to and from the barracks ship by ATe at :lIt hours of Ihe day 

and· night. delivering them primarily 10 friendly ambush sitcs. 

sometimes to the ballalion land base. They remained in ambush 

sites at night. and one boat was normally kept within a fifteenminute standby range of the land base as transportation for the 

platoon-size ground force. Division 91 \\'as called on a number of 

limes and was twice instrumental in the capture of sampans and 

documents. Its bO.1.LS patrolled the waterways and g-d.\'C great nell:-

ibility to the river force. 

Usc of deception in the conduct of night oper:ltions was found 

very effecti,'c in the Rung Sal Special Zone. Usually a rine company 

would be positioned around the battalion command post during 

daylight homs. Under cover of d;u'kness t.his company would be 

withdrawn and transported 10 a new area where it would establish 

a perimeter, then move out to place ambushes. It would then be in 

a position to begin search and destroy or Slrike operations at first 

light. On one occasion a complete riverine assault, with artillery 

fire and radio transmissions. was staged as a feint while troops 

remained quietly aboard landing craft that resumed their p-,trol 

stations from which small landings were subseqllemly made. 

For operations on small waterways plastic assault boatS and 

wa ter safety de\·ices were useful. The i.>analion used one 27·foot 

engineer boat and scvcral 13·man innatable rubber rafts to ad· 

"amage. bill they. like the plastic assault boatS, offered no protec· 

tion from slllall arms firc and their slow speed and the inevitable 

bunching of troo(>s made them highly ,rlllnerable. Water movement 

was essential, however. since the Viet Cong moved primarily by 

samp,'lIl; no amount of trudging through mangrove swamps would 

outmaneuver an enemy who sought to avoid contact. 

While '!alt Wliler damaged clothing, the need for exchange was 

not much higher than in normal field usc. The jungle boot stood 

up well under protracted use: jllngle fatigues were washed over· 

night aboard the support ship, and a small direct exchange stock 

was maintained. The principal damage was to weapons and am· 

munilion. which sal t water corroded. It was necessary to break 

down weapons and scrub them with a mixture of cleaning solvent 

and oil on each return to the ship. The 7.62 metal link belt am· 

munition was freflllclllly !iO hadly corroded thal it had to be 

discarded. 

Only essential equipment was carried. Ihe normal load consist· 

ing of seven maga7i ncs fur thc MI6 rifle, 200 rounds for the 

machine gun, and twch'c rounds of 40·mOl. grenades. Each squad 
RIVERINE PREPARATIONS 63 

carried 100 feet of nylon rope, a la-foot rope with snap link per 

man , and a grappling hook with 50 fect of line-items that were 

invaluable in water crossing operations as well as in detonating 

booby traps. 

Ambushes werc found to be most successful on well-traveled 

waterways. \Vhile airborne infrared devices for detecting people or 

things by their difference in temperature from the surrounding area 

proved valU<tble in the sparsely populated Rung Sat Special Zone, 

they were later less successful in th e he<tvily populated delta. 

The common mle that an ambush should be moved aftcr being 

tripped did not always apply to water ambush in the Rung Sal 

Special Zone. On one occasion. an ambush was tripped three limes 

in one night, with the resnit th,lt seven of the enemy were killed 

and three 5.1mpans and I \\"0 weapons captured. 

Lack of positions suitahle for placing art illery and the great 

distances involved pl"Odm:ed a large 70ne in which Ihe enemy was 

not subject to friendly fires. The lOne was sparsely populated. Wilh 

friendly civilians concelllrated in a few widely dispersed villages 

separated by areas which Ihe governmelll warned citizens not to 

enler. Here the U.S. effon was 10 keep thc cnemy out of arc<ts 

wherc troops had already discovered and denroyed largc Vict Cong 

base camps. factorics, munitions. stocks of rice, and other materie\. 

As a result of the experiences in Rlvnl. RAIDER I, Coloncl Bolduc 

submiued scvera l suggcstions that assisted !:tter operations of the 

Mobile Ri veri ne Force. lie adviscd that <tlly unit opcrating in thc 

Rung Sat Special Zonc for othcr than a limited objective should 

either be a rhrerine unit or receive riverine training at the OUlsel 

of the operation. Techniques wcre relativcly simple ;'lI1d easily 

learned: troops that were wel1 conditioned anrl adcquatcly commanded could operate in the 10nc for a long time without suffcring 

ad"erse effeclS. The longer the oper.ltion, Ihe longer the troops 

needed to rcst and dry Ottt. 

Since the enemy scl"Upulously "voided contact, currcnt tactical 

illlel1igence was of paramount importance. Un its operating in th e 

Rung Sal therefore had to seek imeJligence aggressively from all 

sources and agencies. QuiCk translation of encmy documents was also 

important. In one case th e battalion captured at night from a group 

of fi"e sampans d~lIm('nts and maps showing the 10('<\llon of a Viet 

Cong regional headquarters and various stops made by the sampan 

owners along the rome they had Iraveled. One document sho\\'cd 

delivery of arms to specified Viet Cong units and compromised an 

entire Viet Cong signal system. Although the general nature or 
G4 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

the contents and their imporlance was immediately apparent to 

the baltalion commander. he was obliged 10 send all the documents 

to the senior adviser of the Rung Sat Special Zone. Although he 

disP.1tchcd them immediately. no translation \\';15 received (OT morc 

than a week-too long a delay to permit timely exploitation. During 

the last stages of the operation, all documents were quickly trans· 

lated by the $-2 and an interpreter before being scnt to higher 

headquarters so that infonnation could be acted upon at once. 

Airmobility was essenlial to effcctive riverine operations; it 

was necess.uy to have a command helicopter capable or carrying a 

commander. a fire support co-ordinator, an 5-2 intelligence officer, 

an 5-3, and necess.ary r:tdio communi cations. \Vhen naval helicopters were lISed a Navy representative had to be aboard. \Vhen not 

required for dircct control of operations, thc helicopter was fully 

utilized for reconnaissancc and liaison. 

One UH-ID helicopter was placed in direct support of the battalion to pennit resupply and emergency lift of widely scattered 

troops. The battalion could fully utili7c five transport helicopters 

and two armed helicopters on a daily basis for about ten hours. 

They were needed for airmobile assaults, positioning of ambushes, 

troop ('xtractions and tr.msfers, ground reconnaissance of beaches 

and helicopter landing zoncs, checking samp.llTls. and return to 

ar('as previollsly worked in order to keep the enemy off-balance. 

In addition, there was a ncc..'<1 for night missions lIsing onc helicopter with two starlight scopes and two armed helicopters in order 

to interrupt Viet Cong s.'1mpan trnffic along the myriad waterways. Finally, airlift \\las necessary to make usc of any substantial 

finds in the area of operations. Without helicopter transpon, it 

was freqllelllly necessary to destroy captured materiel-munitions, 

cement, large rice stores-because it could not be moved. 

Fire support was diverse and highly effective. Artillery fire 

support bases were established with as many as three separate 

artillery hatteries (I05-mm .. to\\led) employed at the samc lime 

from different locations. Naval gunfire was uscd continuously 

throughout the operation. including indir«t fire of several destroyers and the dir«t and indirect firc of weapons organic to hoa ts of 

Division 91, U.S. Navy. and Rivcr Assault Croup 26. Vietnam 

Navy. Other fire suppOrt was provided by tactical air. and by U.S. 

Air Force, Anny, and Navy fixed-wing and helicopter gunships. 

Fire support presentcd a number of co·ordination and c1earan{'e 

problems. The main shipping channel was patrolled constantly by 

U.S. Navy river patrol boats and aircraft which, because or daylight 
RIVERINE I'Rt:I'ARATIO~S 

A WET BUT PEACEFUL LANDING 

traffic in shipping, required close control to prevent damage to U,S. 

or South Vietnamese forces and equipment. An additional prohlem 

was that in some lIreas cleanmce from the government of Vietnam 

was required for each mission. U.S. ground clearance for indirect 

fire was co-ordinated by the artillery liaison onlcer. Getting governmem clearance at first proved to be time-consuming. Requests had 

to be submitted to the senior adviser of the ;tOne at Nlla ne. Any 

aircraft in the area of operation would calise a cease fire in Ihe 

entire Rung SaL A zonal clear.lI1ce system was worked Ollt by all 

parties concerned and proved highly succes.."rui. It consisted of a 

circle with a radius of 11.5 kilometers drawn on the fire support 

map lIsing the fire support base (battery center) as the center. The 

circle was then subdivided like a pic into eight equal pans or zones 

and each was numbert"!l from one to eight. Thcreafler, to obtain 

clearance all that was required was to ask permission to fire into 

the zone in question. Artillery and mortar lire could thus be 

applied to the zone or zones where it was needed and withheld 

from the rest of the area. 

Troops on combat operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone 
fi6 

Percentage 

40 

35 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

35% 

15% 

/11% 

". 3% 

1 2 3 4 5 

Days 

Diagram 4. Foot disease incident rate. 

were continually in mud and the salty, dirty water could not be 

used for bathing. Certain measures were therefore taken to 5.:1.fe· 

gnard the heailh of the troops. Men stayed on combat operations 

for forty·eight hOUTS at a time and were then scm to the troopship 

in the Vung Tau area where adequate shower facilities were available and every man had a bunk for the night. All companies reo 

ceived instructions on care of the feet, which included thorough 

washing. drying, and daily inspection of the feet by medics. The 

battalion surgeons carried out frequent inspections and all cases 

of dermatophytosis werc treated with fungic idal ointments and 

powders. (Diagram 4) 

An experiment to determine the efficiency of a silicone ointment 

was carried out with seventy-six soldiers who used the ointment 

daily. During some twenty days, six cases of immersion fOOL occurred, four of them on men who used the silicone. It was found 

that the system of rotating troops for a fony-eight·hour drying out 

period and conducting inspcctions of feet to insure necessary nealmcnt of conditions as soon as they arose was of far greater benefit 

than use of the preventive ointment. 

Positioning mortars ashore in the Rung Sal was difficult and 

lim~<onsuming because of lack of finn ground, and was done only 
RIVF.RINE PREPARATIO-"S 67 

in the area of the battalion forward command post. whic:h was 

seldom moved. For support of wide-ranging operations more mobil. 

ity than this semipermanent location of the mortars was required. 

Durine; RIVER RAIDER I. two 81 ·mm. mortars were installed in the 

forw:lTC\ portion of an LCM. The mOrtar hoat was nosed into the 

bank, engines kept running to advance or back in accordance with 

the tide, and steadied against the current by quartering lines run· 

ning from the stem forward and outward at an angle of about 30 

degrees to the bank on either side of the bow ramp. Most of the 

mortar crews were used to establish local security on the bank. This 

arrangemeOl pennitted a high degree of mobility, rapid position· 

ing for firing, minimum wasted effort by the gun crews, and an 

ample supply of ammunition close at ham!. The monar boat wa" 

lIsed both day and night throughout the operation, anrl provided 

flexible. mobile fire support for all types of maneuver. 

The major operational sliccess of RIVFR RAinER I was the caplUre of substantial stores of water mines and the destruction of 

facilities for constructing water mines. It is highly probable thai 

these losses suffered by the Viet Cong account in p.1.rt for the very 

limited use of water mines against rivcrine forces during later 

operations in the northern ~fekong Delta as well as in the Rung 

Sat Special Zone. 

After RIVER RAmER I. the 4th Baltalion. 47th Infantry. took 

up operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone. making use during 

April and early May of the experiences of thc Sd Uattalion. 47th 

Infantry. and impro\"ising other techniqnes. During this lime so· 

called Ammi barges \I'el"e obtained from the Navy for use alongside 

the LST of River Flotilla One. With this type of pOlllon, rope 

l:!dders were not needed and the training time for riverine troops 

was drastically reduced. The Ammi harg~ provided as well some 

much needed space for cleaning and SlOrage of ammunition. crew· 

served weapons, and indi\ idual equipment. 
CHAPTER IV 

Initial Delta Operations 

Movement to Dong Tam 

When the 3d Battalion. 60th Infantry, was sem to Dong Tam 

in January 1967, the Headquarters, 3d Brigade, U.S. 9th Infantry 

Division, also went to Dong Tam to direct construction of the base 

and to conduct operations in Dinh Tuong Province. The 5th Battalion , 60th Infantry (Mechanized), was stationed at Tan Hiep. 

an airstrip about eight kilometers northeast o[ My Tho along 

Highway 4. The 3d Brigade cond\lcted the first of a series of opera· 

tions in late February 1967; these operations were usually limited 

to one battalion and onc or two companies of another battalion 

because 50 many troops were needed to protect the construction 

work at Dong Tam Base. 

Implementing earlier planning, General Westmoreland decided to move Headquarters, 2d Urigade, to Dong Tam so that it 

would become operational at that location on 10 March. The 3d 

Brigade was moved north to Tan An, the capital of Long An 

Province, with the mission of cond ucting a consolidation operation 

to assist the pacification program in the southern portion of the 

III Corps Tactical Zone. With the arrival of Headquarters. 2d 

Brigade, at Dong Tam. the brigade began a demanding 9O-day 

period of perfonning four separate but related tasks: the defense 

and construction of the Dong Tam Base; limited offensive operations in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces; operations in the 

Rung Sat Special Zone to protect the shipping channel; and planning with Task Force 117 to move aboard the Navy ships. 

Conducting operations in Dinh Tuong Province was to prove 

as important in the seasoning of the battalions of 2d Brigade as 

was the riverine training in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The threat 

posed to Dong Tam by the Viet Cong 5141h Provincial Battalion, 

the 26M Main Force Battalion, and local force sapper and infantry 

companies and guerrillas demanded a varied offensive campaign 

to protect the base as well as to reduce the Viet Cong innucnce. 

Although Dinh Tuong Province was bordered on the SO<.lth by 
INITIAL DELTA OPERATIONS 69 

the My Tho River, thc limitcd navigability of smaller streams 

greatly limited boat movement within the provilKe. Most canals 

were blocked by the debris of destroyed bridges or by eanhen dams 

erected by the Viet Cong to prevent their usc by civilians or milit4lry forces. Thererore. although the brigade was scheduled for a 

riverine role, it was to c.1.rry on between MaTCh and June a variety 

of operations common to all U.S. infantry units i'1 Vietnam. These 

included throwing a cordon around hamlets and searching them 

in the hope of captming members of the local Viet Cong political 

organization and guerrilla squads and platoons; brigade and battalion reconnaissance in force operations; and extcnsivc J><1.lrolling. 

Troops moved by helicopter. bo.1.l, wheeled and tracked "ehicles. 

or on foot. During the wet season the brigade operated in the Dong 

Tam area by bo.1.t and helicopter chieny. When aircraft were nOl 

available, wheeled vehicles ('ould carry troops on Highway 4 to find 

the enemy ncar suspected Viet Cong bases. The troops then moved 

on foot into the operational areas 10 the north and south of the 

road. 

During March and April the brigade commander and staff. 

assisted by the senior U.S. adviser of the 7th Vietnam Army Division, Colonel Lance, assembled good illlelligence covering Dinh 

Tuong and Kien 110;1 Provinces. In addition, through the U.S. 

senior adviser to IV Corps. General Desobry. arrangements were 

made for periodic briefings of the brigade staff by the G--2, IV 

Corps advisory staff. This infomlation was used in a series of cooperative operations undertaken by the 2d Brigade with the 7th 

Vietnam Army Division. These were to provide beneficial combat 

experience for the brigade before it embarked as the Army component of the Mobile Riverine Force. 

The diverse tasks of the brigade seldom permitted more than 

two infantry battalions to be used in offensive operations. Thus in 

covering large base areas without exact intelligence of enemy locations, participation of additional forces was co-ordinated with the 

7th Vietnam Army Division to search thoroughly and to block 

escape routes. The Commanding General, 7th Vietnam Anny 

Division, approved of sueh operalions because they permitted him 

to deploy small forces into Viet Cong base areas. for which he 

would otherwise have been obliged to usc more Vietnamese troops 

than he could spare from their security missions. Throu~hoUl the 

experience of the Mobile Riverine Force. it was to prove necessary 

to obtain additional troops. whether they were other U.S. units. 

Vietnam Army units, or Vietnamese marines, to augment the two 
70 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

battalions routinely operating within the Mobile Riverine Force. 

During the period 15 February- IO May, the 2d Brigade, although physically based at Dong Tam, conducted infantry operations with the 3d and 4th Battalions, 47th Infantry, in the Rung 

Sat Special Zone and southern Bien Haa Province. While the 3d 

Battalion, 47th Infantry. was located in the Rung Sat during February and March. the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry, was used in 

the southern portion of Bien '-loa Province, south o( Bearcal and 

bordering the Rung Sat. The boats of the Navy's River Assault 

Squadron 9 supJXlrted Anny operations in the Rung Sat during 

this period. 

Final Mobile Riverine Force Preparations 

At the same lime aClivc co-ordination and planning fOT the 

Mobile Anoat Force was begun by the 2d Brigade Slaff with the 

advance staff of River Assault Flotilla One. General Eckhardt as· 

signed LieUlenant Colonel John R. Witherell, who had been the 

Combat Developments Command liaison officer to the G-3 Section, 

U.S. Army, Vietnam , to 2d Brigade. As a major, Colonel Witherell 

had initiated the first outline draft of the riverine doctrine manual. 

He was made the deputy for riverine plann ing for the 2d Brigade. 

augmenting the brigade staff. At this time. Lieutenant Colonel 

James S. G. Turner. U.S. Marine Corps. was placed on duty with 

Headquarters. 9th Division. by the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps as an observer and liaison officer for riverine operations. At 

the request of the brigade commander, Colonel Turner was placed 

on spec ial dUly with the brigade staff. Colonels 'Vitherell and 

Turner proved to be valuable additions because the brigade staff 

was involved in planning for and conducting dail y operations of 

the two maneuver battalions, including Dong Tam Base defense 

operations, as well as in fOlnlulaling plans to establish the brigade 

at Dong Tam. In the early draft plans prepared by Colonel 

Witherell, the teon Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force was 

dropped and the title Mobile Riverine Force was fonnally adopted. 

As of mid-January. tWO APB's, Colleton and Benewal!, wcre 

scheduled to arrive in Victnam during Mayor June 1967. The t\\'o 

ships would provide only 1,600 berthing spaces for Army troops. 

When troop space for art il1ery support, base security forces, and 

the brigade staff was subtracted. there would remain spaces for a 

combat force of approximately one reinforced battalion. It was 

considered essential to increase the combat strength of the brigade 

to at leaSl two battalions. Since only tWO APB's were available, it 
INITIAL nELTA OPERA·IIO;,\.!) 71 

NON-StU"·PRorFI I FD BARRACKS 5 1111' 

was recommended by the 2d Brigade that a 10\\'<."<1 barracks ship. 

:m APL, with a berthing raJ><ici t)· for 660 troops he made ;nailabl e .. 

This recommendation was forwarder! through di\'ision to the com· 

mander of II Field Force. who. in tIIm. requesled the commander 

of the naval force in Vietnam to make the API. available. lie proposed that i£ the API, was diverted. Na,'y men he provided 10 

operate and maintain onl y the equi pment peculiar to the Na\'v 

and that Army troops be requircd to perfonn all other suppon 

functions such as cleaning. pre\ clllivl' maimenanl C. mcssinR. laundry service. and security .. This pn)posal was satisfactory to the 

Anny and APL-26 was diverted to Dong Tam in May. along with 

two sea-going tugs to mon~ the harrad..s ship .. An additional 17:1 

berths were prov ided by huilding hunks on the LOp side of Ihe 

APL under a ca ll\'as canopy. 

Frequent co-ordinalion meetings were held ",i lh Captain \"ells 

aboard his nagship at Vung Tau. nurin ~ the last two weeks of 

March Colonels \Vitherell anrl Turner 1ll00ed ahoard Ihe na~ship 

to particip<ite with the N;I\'y sta ff in the clC\e1opmclll of a Mohik 

Riverine Force standing order. The hrigade oper<ttiolls oAicef. 

Major Clyde J. Tatc. continued LO conCt'l1l1<H C on the curt'CIll 
72 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

ARTILLERY BARCE 

brigade operations. Colonel Fulton felt that the Mobile Anoat 

Force plan had not pro,.jded effective artillery support for the 

Mobile Riverine Force operations. The armored tTOOP carriers 

were to lift the 105-0101. howitzers and their prime rno\'crs. The 

artillery battalion, after being moved by water, would debark at 

a suitable place along the river and establish firing positions. Terrain reconnaissance conducted during his October 1966 visit had 

convinced Colonel Fulton that the off-loading of (h'e prime movers 

from an ATe as provided for in the plan would grcaLly restrict 

operations because of the varying lides of four to thirteen feet and 

the steepness of the ri ver banks. Consequently, the Commanding 

Officer. 3d Banalion, 34th Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Carroll S. 

Meek. began to experiment with barge-mounted artillery. He 

placed a IOS-mm. howitzer on an Ammi barge. using cleats and seg· 

mellts of telephone poles agai nst which the trails of the howitzer 

rested. Successful firing demonstrated the feasibility of this method. 

By use of aiming stakes placed ashore routine fire support could 

be provid(.-d from the barges anchored securely against the river 

bank. 

During these cxpcrimellls. the Deputy Commanding General, 
73 

ARTILLERY BARCE 

~ f02 0 

A Howlue.r Ii \\ A 

H Gun H / 0 0 

~, H • 0 Section H 

° Quarters ° ~ ... I- 0 '-

.. 50 

C •• • ~, 

Boat 1 Battery Command Poat ~ ... Crew 1 

b 

• 

, 

.. 

LCH8 -

Diagram 5. Artillery barge lowing position. 

U.S. Army, Vietnam, LielLtenant Gener:!! .lean E. Engler. placep 

a liaison officer from the G-4 Section all temporary duty with the 

brigade. This officer's sole mission was to procure special equip. 

mCIll reCJlIested hy the hrigade, thlls eliminating the procedure of 

requesting items through normal channels and greally f:.ciiitaling 

the acquisition of equipmenl. Aflcr Colonel Meek's initial firing 

experience with Ihe barge-mounted artillery. the liaison oniccr was 

asked to arrange fabrication of an experimental artillery barge. 

The work was clone in a few weeks at Cam Ranh Bay. where Slllall 

pomons were welded together illlo an artillery harge. The barge 

was then lowed down the coast :lIld hrought up Ihe Mekong Ril'cr 

to Dong Tam by a commercial ocean-going IIIg. Further firing 

experiments proved the harge uns:uisfaclOr), in that the high bow 

of the ponton was nearl), perpendicular to the surface of the water, 

making it hard to maneuver and w\\·. especially ag:linst the C!llTem, 

tide, or pre,-ailing wind. The barge was redesigned so that it floated 

lower in the water and had a sloped bow, and the design was for· 

warded by Ihe C-4 liaison officer to Cam Ranh Bay. As a result of 

successful experiments with the new design, six barges were fabricated, each barge to accommodate twO LUhcs of I05·mm, howitzer, 

MI02. (DIagram ') Each barge was to be (o\\'c<l by an I.CM-R 

throughout the areas in which the Navy assault craft supported 

Army forces. The decision to cie,·eJop the artillery barges was the 

most important equipment decision made by the Anny for the 
74 RIVERI="E OPERATIONS 

ARTILLERY FIRES FROM BARCES ANCIIORED ON RIVER BANK 

Mobile Riverine Force because the harges provided effective artillery support at all times. I-lad General Engler not had the foresight 

10 furnish liaison and to make special arrangements to obtain 

unique equipment. the initial effectiveness of the Mobile Riverine 

Force would have been great ly impaired. 

Also during the March-April period. Colonel Fulton decided 

that there was not enough helicopter landing space aboard the 

ships of the river force. Each APB had one helicopter landing pad, 

and the LST could accommodate the landing of onc helicopter. 

Throll~h the same expedited dcvelopmclll process used for the 

artillery barges, a helicopter landing barge was provided that could 

accommodate three UH- I helicopters and would have a refueling 

capacity for the helicopters of 1,500 gallons of JP-4. This barge 

would be LOwed by an LCI\I-8 of the Army transportation boat 

company. 

As more U.S. Navy craft arrived in Vietnam and the initial 

training was completed. River Assault Flotilla One elements were 

sent from the Vung Tau- Rung Sat Special Zone training area into 

Dinh Tuong P rovim;c. On 10 April the first river assault division 
INITIAL DELTA OJ>ERATIOr-;S 75 

, 

, 

HEI.lCOf'TfR BARGE 

moved to Dong Tam with 18 ATC's. I CCB. and 2 monitors and 

immediately began waterborne operations with the 5d Battalion. 

47th Infantry, which had also lert Rung Sal Spedal Zone for Dong 

Tam. Allhough these operations on the Mekong River were small 

in scale duri ng the m011lh of April. the men soon learned that 

unlike the rivers of the Rung Sat Special Zone. where obstacles 

were few, the delta waten ... ays hac! many man·made obstructions 

such as low bridges. rish traps. ;mc! earthen blocks all ca nals. 

During April a small staff group of River Ass;UIlt Flotilla One 

went to Dong Tam to work closely with the 2<1 Brigade staff in 

developing the final plans for Mobile Riverine Force operations. 

which were to begin on 2 June. The first embarkation was to 

include the brigade headquarters and staff; 3d Battalion. 34th 

Artillery; Company C. 15th Engineers; and the division support 

clemenLS. In the final pl;lIlning rh;lse for this embarkation it was 

d«ided that a larger supply LST would be needed to pro\'ide an 

additional 575 U.S. Army berthing sl>.1ces. Originally two class 

542 LST's were scheduled as the logistics support ships to rotate 

between Vung Tau :lIld the ri veri ne base. Since the 542 class is 
76 RIVERINE OPERATIOI\:S 

much smaller and provides less billeting space, a request was made 

to River Ass.1UII Flotilla One for onc of the larger 1152 class LST's. 

Again. the Navy accommodated the Anny request. Acquisition of 

the larger LST was to prove very advantageous in that the emire 

brigade aviation section, which included four 01-1-23 helicopters. 

and the maintenance section weTe placed aboard the LST and were 

operated from the night deck. Limited air resources were now 

available for combat operations regardless of the remoteness of the 

location of the mobile riverine base from 9th Division support. 

BOlh the brigade headquaners and lhe infantry banal ions were 

internally reorganized so that all equipment not necessary for 

riverine operations could be left at the Dong Tam base under the 

control of unit rear detachments. Spaces for jobs not needed by the 

Riverine Force. such as for drivers and mechanics, were converted 

to spaces wilh sh ipboard and combat duties. The combat support 

company of each battalion was reconstituted into a reconnaissance 

and surveillance company. Men assigned to spaces whose function 

was not required in the Mobile Riverine Force were placed in 

these two companies and thus two additional rifle platoons were 

created in each of the t\VO battalions. \Vhen these two platoons were 

added to the reconnaiss.1nce platoon normally found in the combat 

support company, a fOllrlh rine company for each balta li on was 

organized. This arrangement was to prove most satisfactory b('· 

cause it provided for base defense and other security missions and 

at the samc lime Jeri three companies for battalion tactical 

operations. 

2d Brigade Operations 

While planning of the riveri ne organization of the infantry 

battalions was taking place, in April and Ma y the battalions were 

actually conducting land operations. The 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, and 3d nauaJion, 60th Infantry. wcre increasing their 

proficiency in airmobile operations and learning to work with the 

officials of Dinh Tuong Province and Anny of Vietnam division 

forces. 

On 1 April 2d Brig:lde forces made a raid into northern Kien 

Hoa PrO\ ince on the r..ry Tho Ri,'er south of Dong Tam, using 

barge-mounted rtrlillery. During darkness, one baucry was mo\'cd 

west on the river from the land base, followed closely by infantry 

mounted in ATC's. Once opposite a manned station of a Viet Cong 

communications liaison roule. the anillery poured surprise, direct 

fire iOlo the target area . To protect a '-Imn Long District company, 

which had occupied a blocking position south of the target, time 
11)-50 

MAP" 

I/I;ITIAL DELTA O I'Jo:RATIQ:\'S 

AP BAC 2 OPERATION 

2 "'''11961 

..::::!> .... _., ....... OK • 

.... f' •• , .... ~" 

77 

'L11~1 I~·. ~, :-~"'o--....::·"'S to'" Ii' _ ;...:00 ~Ifl" 

fuzes were used. Immediately arter the artillery fire. infantry troops 

landed and swept through the sl;lIion. The :ulillery then anchored 

against the north bank of the ri\'er and prepared to provide indirect 

fire support. The raiders captured enemy ammunition and a portion of the labor force of the enemy mm11lunication-liaison plaLOon . 

On 2 May the 3d Uallalion, 47th Infantry. and 3d Battalion. 

60th Infantry. participated in the 2d Brigade's heaviest fighting 

to date. The target of the brigade assault was the 5 14th Local Force 

Battalion in the Ap Bac 2 area. which had been identified hy the 

commanding general of the 7th Vietnam Army Division as a nOl'mal 

operating area for the Viet Cong. (Mnl' 4) The ground over which 

Ihe battle would take place was alternately rice paddy and thick 

patches of vegetation with heavy foliage along the streams and 

canals. The brigade plan was to conduct an airmobile operation in 
i8 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

co-operation with the 7th Vietnam Army Division. On Ihe morning 

of the operalion. ho\\'c\'cr, shanly .. fter the scheduled lime for the 

airlifl of tbe fint colllp .. 1. ny, Ihe brigade was notified that no airmobile comp.'lly was available. The brigade commander decided 

to send the unit by truc\.... a move requiring approximately t\\lO 

hOlils. At the same lime the brigacle forward command POSt elements mo\'cd norlh hy ATe's on lhe Kinh Xang Canal 10 SCt up a 

post at Long Binh. The 3d Iklualion, GOth Infantry. truck convoy 

\\',,5 followed by the 3d U:Hwlion, 471h Infantry, on the same route. 

The companies of both haualions were off· loaded fa ci ng north from 

Highway 4. 

By 0830 both haltalions wcre moving north to their Ilrst objectives. Elements of th e jd Haltalion, 60th Infantry, on the west 

met no resistance. Units of the 3d Ballalion, 47th Infantry, moved 

forward ca utiously eluring the morning, covering about 1.500 

meters :lIld receiving light sniper fire. At approximately 1250 both 

Companies A and n, 3d Battalion. 47th Infalllry. encollntered the 

enemy. Comp.111)' A came under heavy automatic weapons fire 

immediately after emerging fmm a wOlXI line; it deployed in an 

allempt to mo\e against the enemy position. hilt was hampered by 

heavy undergrowth thaI made it difficult to see the enemy firing 

posilions. The compa ny sought to improve ilS position. and called 

in fire support. including artillery fire, gunsh ips, and eventually 

three air strikes 011 the enemy position_ 

About 1300, Company n. 3d Battalion. 60th Infantry, was 

placed under operaliona l conl.l'ol of the commander of 3d Battalion. 

47th Infantry, and directed to esta hlish a blocking position north 

of the enemy location. At the s,1me time Company A. 3d Battalion. 

60th Infantry. and C'.ompany r.. 5th Battalion, 60,h Infantry, were 

ordered to close enelll)' escape routes on the west. Companies Band 

C. 3d Battalion, 47th Infamry. were ordered to block northeast of 

the position of Company A, 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. 

Company C. 51h llanalion. 60th Infantry. a mechanized company, using full-nacked :trmored personnel carriers, moved through 

inundated areas which had heell thought impassable to occupy a 

position west of the enemy. Company C. !ith Battalion. 60th Infantry, and C'.ompany A, 3d Battalion. GOth Infantry, th en made 

the final assault fmm the west into Ihe enemy position. Company 

C. 5th fialtalion. ClOth Infantry. grea tly enhanced the firepower of 

the assaull by employing th e .!iO-ca liber fire of its full-tracked 

armored carriers in the ;lssauh line. The orga n ic infantry attacked 

on fOOL alongside Ihe carriers. The enemy resisted Wilh heavy rifle 
INITIAL DELTA OPERATIONS 79 

and automatic weapons fire. Company A. Jld Battalion, 60th Infantry, on the right flank of the assault. charged imo the sOllthern 

line of bunkers. and finally overran il. Seeing that their line was 

broken, many Viet Cong tried to escape to the east but were killed 

or wounded as both attaCking companies made their final assault 

into the bunker line. By 1820 enemy resistance was overcome. 

Although not a riverine operation. the action ;H Ap Rae contributed to the brigade tactical e'"'perience which was later carried 

into riverine operations. In developing operational plans. the brigade staff recognized that tactical control measures have to pro"ide 

for maximum nexibility in controlli ng the maneuver of units. If 

the original plan cannot be execlIled. there mllst be sufficient lati· 

tude to redirect the effort of the participating units according to 

the control measures previollsly issned. Check points. a series of 

intermediate objectives, and an arc;1 grid system provide flexibility 

for redirection of units ancl sh iftin ~ of boundaries and fire co· 

ordination lines. 

The Ap Bac operation included in the words of an infantryman 

" finding, fixing, fighti ng, and finishing" the enemy. Through the 

use of simple control measures. units of the tWO hattalions were 

moved into blocking positions to rut off enemy routes of withdrawal, and other units wcre In<mell\'ercd into assault posilions. 

,"Vilen this maneuver was com bined with use of both ail' and artil· 

lery supporting force, the enemy had to remain in his position or 

t:xpose himself in an aHempt to withdraw. 

The operation made it cl ear that units must be prepared to 

bring in anillery and air support as close as possible to the front 

lines. Each battalion commander IIsed an ohserva ti on helicopter 

to co·ordinate fire in closc suppOrt of his unit. The infantry IIOiIS. 

once having found the cncmy. had 10 he prepared through fire and 

maneuver to conduct a co·ordinated assault against the enemy 

positions. In this engagement. by the lise of close su pporting artillery fire. the infantry units were ahle to launch a co·ordinalcd 

attack which overcame the enemy. 

Mechanized infantry was used most successfull y at AI' naco The 

unit commander had to search for routes through very swampy 

and marshy areas. Once his :ull1ored personnel carriers (APC's) 

were deployed, he dismounted his infantry ;md moved APe's and 

infantry in a forward rapid assault on the enemy. The volume of 

fire delivered by the APC's into the bunker line. along wilh high 

explosive and white phosphorous rounds of artillery. enahled the 

infantry to overcome the enemy in bunkers and foxholes. Once 
80 

J. 

J. 

MAP S 

RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

CAM SON OPERATION 

15 Mo, 1967 

too..., c ...... , I~OO .... 

• 1,_10001 • • 1 "" .. ,.,. 

I ' 0 

fire superiority had been estab lished, th e assault was executed with 

few American casua lties. 

General Thanh, commanding the 7th Vietnam Anny Division, 

monitored the course of the 2 May baltle with imerest. By midnight 

th e intelligence staffs of the brigade and 7th Vietnam Division had 

estimated that the enemy consisted of th e 514lh Loca l Force Battalion with two companies and its heavy weapons. An enemy anack 

launched at dusk of 2 May on the l'Ommand POSt of the 3d Batlaiion. 

60th Infantry, just south of Il ighway 4, appeared to be the rest of 

the 5 14(h Loca l Force Battalion trying to relieve pressure 0 11 its 

units north of Highway 4. O n the strength of this estimate. General 

Thanh sent a J.tangec battalion on 3 May into the area which he 
INITIAL DELTA OPERATIOl"S 81 

ARMORED TROOP CARRIERS IN CoNVOY BATTI.£ LINE 

considered the most probable location to which the enemy would 

flee. His Rangers encountered and allackcd an estimated company 

of the 514th Local Force Battalion during the afternoon. The 

casualties inflicted upon the 5l4th by the U.S. 2d Brigade and the 

7th Vietnam Anny Division severely reduced its combat effectiveness. Reports received later suggested that the 2611d Main Force 

Battalion was forced to undertake training of new recruits and 

operational tasks of the 5l4th Battalion because of the losses in 

men and weapons. 

On 111 May the 4th Battalion. 47th Infantry, completed operations in the Rung Sal Special Zone and joined the brigade at Dong 

Tam. Colonel Tutwiler's battalion participated in its first major 

riverine operation in the Dong Tam area on 15 Mayas lhe 2d 

Brigade conducted the first of several operations in the Cam Son 

Secret Zone. (Map ') The Cam Son area was considered one of 

four major Viet Cong bases in Dinh Tuong Province by the intelligence staffs of both the province and 7th Vietnam Army Division. The operation of 15 May relied entirely on intelligence 

provided by these Vietnamese organizations. 
82 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

The brigade plan was to search the southern aTea of Cam Son 

along U1C Rach Ba Rai and Rach Tra Tan streams and to capture 

or destroy the Viet Congo their supplies. and their equipment. A 

fon .... ard brigade command post was established approximately two 

kilometers nOrlh of Cai Be. and a barge-mounted artillery base was 

established 011 the southern bank of the f..'fy Tho Rh'er, five kil· 

ometers southeast of the mouth of the Rach Ba Rai. The twO 

infantry banalions were supponed by 22 ATC's, 2 monitors, and 

2 cell's of River Ass.1ult Flotilla One. Commander Charles H. 

Black. the operations officer of River Assault Flotilla One, joined 

the brigade command group and co-ordinated the support of the 

Navy assault cTart. 

The operation began at 0815 when the 3d Battalion. 47th In· 

fantry. landed from assault craft at the mouth of the Rach Sa Rai 

and began to search northeast along the stream. At 0830 the 4th 

Battalion. 47th InfalHry. landed two companies from assau lt craft 

on the north bank of the My Tho River approximately halfway 

between the mouths of the Rach Ba Rai and the Rach Tra Tan. 

At 1200 Company A, 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry, was airlifted 

from Dong Tam, where it had bcen in readiness as a reserve, and 

was landed three kilometers north of fhe river on the west side of 

the Rach Tra Tan to act as a blocking force against any enemy 

encoutHcred. After landing the Army troops, thc boats of the Navy 

task force proceedcd to blocking stations along the watcnvays. 

At 1400 Companics Band C of the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry. 

met a Viet Cong force equipped with small arms, light mach inc 

guns. and rocket launchers. Company A maneuvered south and 

met the enemy within two kilometers of the My Tho river. Although Companies Band C made little progress in moving against 

the enemy fire, ilrtillel'y and close air support maintained pressure 

on the Viet Congo 

In an effort to move marc troops to the northeast and rear of 

the Viet Cong force, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Ranalion, 

47th Infantry, was mo\ee! by ATC into the Rach Trn Tan. When 

the low ticle and enemy antitank rockets prevented the assault craft 

from penetrating upriver beyond enemy positions on the banks, 

the platoon was withdrawn. 

By 1630 it became apparent thal some enemy forces were escaping by moving to the northeast. away from both Companies Band 

C. which were moving from the south. and from Comp.,my A. \\lhich 

was moving from the northwest. At this point Colonel Fulton 

directed Colonel Bolduc to move one of his companies by helicopter 
INITIAL DELTA OPERATIONS 83 

to cstablish a blocking position northeast of Ihe baltic. This was 

accomplished by 1700, but the company failed to find the enemy. 

and by 2000 all contact with the Viet Cong was IOSl. 

This fight called attention to tlte limitations imposed upon 

maneuver or assault craft dllring low tide and the imporlance of 

artillery and close air support against an enemy in well-prepared 

bunkers and firing positions. Althollgh most American C:lsualtics 

did not rcquire evacuation because thcir wounds were superficial, 

both Anny and Navy were concemccl ·by the vulnerability of men 

aboard the assault craft to rocket frdgments. The Mobile Riverine 

Force was to find vulnerability of troops aboard assault craft one 

of its continuing problems. 

On 18 and 19 May the 2d Brigade moved a forward command 

post by motor convoy north of C. ... i Bc in westem Dinh Tuong 

Province to comrol the opcr;llions of ~d Battalion, 47th Inrantry, 

and 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry. To reduce thc distance the Sllpponing helicopters would have to fly. River Ass. ... uh Flotilla One 

assault craft moved both battalions by water thirty·six kilometers 

west of Dong Tam to landing sites on the nonh bank of the My 

Tho River. With the infantry batL1.lions positioned within seven 

kilometen of the center of the larget area. one airmobile company 

was able to insert each battalion rapidly into the area. In the event 

of substantial fighting the helicopters could tum around quiCkly 

in building up forces. 

During this operation the b:lllalions or the 2d Brig<lde met few 

of the Viet Cong, but the brigade command post was auacked by 

mortar, recoilless riOe, and machine ~un fire during the early hours 

of 19 May. A ground attack was lhwaTtt:d when the Reconnaissance 

Platoon, 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. led by Second Lieutenant 

Howard C. Kirk HI' intercepted enemy movement to\\'ard the 

westem perimeter of the position: assisted by artillery. gunships. 

and an anned illumination aircraft, the reconnaiss.1ncc platoon 

broke up the attack. 

Throughout the month of May. a maximum effort was made 

to establish procedures for dose co-operalion between Army and 

Navy clements. Colonel Fulton and Commander Black aAreed that 

the helicoptCT was invaluable ror command and control of riverine 

opemlions. Finding important terrain features is a very difficult 

task for the commander on the surface. but a simplcr task for the 

airborne commander. Foot troop and assault cmfl maneuver were 

facilitated by infonnation fumished by the airborne command 

group. During darkness and in marginal flying wcather, the COIll-
84 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

maod and communications boats were valuable to brigade and 

battalion commanders in their forward positions. The combined 

usc of command helicopters and command boats by brigade and 

battalion commanders permitted close supervision and control of 

the Mobile Riverine Force in combat. 

The operations of the 2d Brigade in Dinh Tuong Province 

from March through May had already provided invaluable operaliona l experience. All of the brigade's units had mel and withstood 

the enemy; thus a feeling of confidence had been engendered in 

commanders and men. or even greater importance, however, was 

the displacement of Viet Cong units from the Dong Tam area to 

the western portion of Dinh Tuong Province. from which the 

enemy could not readily launch a large ground attack on the base. 

The 2d Brigade had become operational at Dong Tam on 10 March, 

only seventy-two hours after an engagement involving a platoon 

of the !Jd Brigade and a larger Viet Cong unit less than eight kilometers (rom the base, and (orty·eight hours after the enemy 

launched an auack on Dong Tam with recoilless riAes and mortars. 

In the next ninety days the enemy made one successful sapper 

attack that damaged a construction vehicle outside the camp and 

an American patrol ambushed an enemy force of platoon size three 

kilometers west of the base. To prevent enemy fire and ground 

attack on the base, a }'<1trolling system was executed by the base 

defense battalion, using division anillery radar. Patrols were made 

on foot, by tracked and wheeled vehicles. by boat, and by helicopter, and were sent out by day and by night. 

Offensive operations came to be guided by knowledge of the 

habits of the Viet Congo who made use of certain areas and routes 

for bases and for communication, liaison, and supply. Although 

information provided by the Vietnam Army division and province 

intelligence agencies seldom arrived in time to serve as the basis 

for an attack. it was useful in tracking the enemy's rOutes, bases, 

and length of stay in bases. It permitted a rough guess as to when 

a Viet Cong battalion would be in anyone of the four major Dinh 

Tuong base areas at a given time. Operations could be conducted 

against one or more bases on a priority basis, By co-operation with 

the Vietnam Anny and using economy of force, the brigade could 

enter the first priority base area with most of two battalions, the 

Vietnamese forces cou ld enler the second priority area, and the 

brigade would use a small force to reconnoiter a third base area. 

Helicopter transport was essentia l and air cava lry suppon highly 

desirable, It was not, however, until May that a ponion of Troop 
INITIAL DELTA OPERATIONS 85 

D, 3d SquadroD, 5th Cavalry, wrus used by the 2d Brigade. 

By the end of :May, the brigade had found the enemy in three 

of the fOUT Dinh Tuong base areas on many occasions and had 

comributed to a period of relative security for the men attempting 

to complete construction of the Dong Tam Base as well as for the 

province itsel£. 

Mobile Riverine Force Campaign Plan 

During early April it had become apparent that the Navy's 

concept of the employment of the Mobile Riverine Force differed 

slightly from the original Mobile Aftoat Force concept. Captain 

'Veils contended that the force should act as a separate force, 

divorced from 9th U.S. Division operations and comrol, with de· 

ployments deep into the delta. A period of intensive discussions 

between the component commanders ensued. Differences were not 

resolved until the preparation of a wet and dry season campaign 

plan for the Mobile River Force as well as a draft letter of instruction from the 9t.h U.S. Division commander to the brigade commander. This letter was prepared by the brigade staff and carried 

to the commander of the 9th Infantry Division. General Eckhardt, 

with the recommendation that it be issued by Headquarters. 9th 

U.S. Division, to the Mobile Riverine Force Anny component 

commander. 

General Eckhardt accepted the draft letter and draft campaign 

plan and personally look them to Captain Wells, who. as the commander of River Assault Flotilla One and Task Force 117, the 

operational designation of the Navy component of the riverine 

force, accepted both. These two documents adhered LO the original 

Mobile ARoat Force plan for operation of the river force in conjunction with the other 9th U.S. Division clements in the southern 

III Corps Tactical Zone and in thc northern ponion of the IV 

Corps Tactical Zone north of the Mekong River. 

The opinion of the Navy component commander that operations should be conducted exclusively in IV Corps was not sup' 

ported by Headquarters, MACV, Planning Directive Number 

12-66. dated 10 December 1966. entitled Command Relations for 

Riverine Operations in South Vietnam. Essentially, this document 

placed Army forces conducting riverine operations in III and IV 

Corps Tactical Zones under the operational control of the Commanding General, II Field Force, with a stipulation that he might 

exercise operational control through designated subordinate U.S. 

Army headquartcrs. The commander of U.S. Army, Vietnam, 
86 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

would exercise command. less operational control. o[ all U.S. Army 

units eng-dged in riverine operations. Similarly. Navy riveri ne forces 

were placed under the operational control of the commander of 

Naval Forces, Vietnam, and under lhe command. less operationa l 

contTol, of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. 

The planning directive recognized the unique command arrangements peculiar to the Mobile Afloat Force concept. This was 

not to be a joint task force and the specific command relationships 

had not been planned under the original concept. The planning 

directive look note of the faCl that "the conduct of riverine operations by Army and Navy forces is a new concept which will require 

the utmost coordination and cooperation by all concerned. As 

operations arc conducted and lessons learned, command relations 

will be revised as necessary to insure effective and workahle ar· 

rangements." There was LO be no single commander of the Mobile 

Riverine Force. 

The MACV document stipulated that the base commander for 

all b."l5eS, whether ashore or anoat, would be the senior Anny com· 

mander assigned. It further stipulated that the relation betwecn 

the Army and Navy units stationed on both Army and Navy bases 

would be one of co-ordination and mULUal support, with the Navy 

providing its :lppropriatc share of forces for local base defense, 

including naval gun fire support and protection against waterborne 

threats. Operational control of Navy units in these circumstances 

was to be exercised by the base commander through the Navy chain 

of command. 

Command relationships for riverine operations were further 

defined as commencing when troops began embarking on assault 

craft to leave the base and ending when troops had debarked from 

the boats upon return to the base. DLlring riverine operations, the 

Amly commander would control all particip .. 1ting Army forces and 

the Navy commander would control all panicip .. uing Navy forces. 

The Navy would provide close support to the Anny during these 

operations according to the definition by the J oint Chiefs of Staff: 

When, either by direction of higher authority or by agreement 

between the commanders concerned, a force is assigned the primary 

mission of close suppon of :t designated force, the commander of the 

supported force will exercise gcnerdJ direction of the supporting effort 

within the limits permitted by accepted tactical practices of the service 

of the supporting force. Such lfin:ction includes designation of targets 

or objectives, timing, duration of the supporting action, and other 

instructions necessary for coordination and for efficiency. 

Comm:tnd relationships between the Army and Navy elements 
INITIAL DFI.TA OPERATIONS R7 

or components during the operational planning phase would be 

one of co·ordination. This p<lrtiudar aspect of the planning directive posed a basic dilemma in Ihat co-ordinal ion meant agreement 

at the lowcst possible level as to where the force would deploy and 

how it would fighl. If Ihe agreement could not be obtained during 

the planning phase, the planllin~ directive made provision for the 

following: 

It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels through liaison. 

cooperation, coordination, and good judgemelll to make every effort 

possible to solve all command rcbtionship problems in the most expeditious and workable manner consiSlCnt with the problem. Problems 

which cannot be solved sati~faclOrily will not be forwarded to the next 

higher headquarters until the commanders concerned have made every 

effon to reach ab'Teemelll, 

In the evelll that agreement could not be reached, the division 

of component authority mcalll that each of the component commanders would pl'oceed tip his respective chain of operational control to obtai n a solution, A solution would require co-ordination 

between the headquarters of the parallel Army and Navy echelons. 

For example. in the event that there was a disagreement between 

the N<lvy component conllnmHicr and the Army comlX)nent commander of the Mobile Ri\el inc Force, the Anny commander would 

have to pass the problem to the commander of the 9th U.S. Division. It is notable thaL there was no Navy echelon equivalent to 

the 9th Infantry Division under the Navy chain of operational 

control. The commander of Ihe !lth Infantry Division would then 

have to pass the matter 10 the commander of II Field Force. 

who, in turn, would co·nrdi niuc with the par.lllel Navy commander, 

(Ch"' 2) 

The command relationships had complicated planning of the 

location of initial opcr.lliuIlS. and prompted Captain Wells to 

challenge the role of the 2d Brigade as <In integra l part of the 9th 

U.S. Division's O\'cr-al1 operations. This initial disagreement was 

resolved by G'ptain Wells' aueptililce of the 9th Division leHer of 

instruction, DCLcnninalion of the mission and ilfea of operation 

of the Mobile River Force in relation to the 9th Infantry Division, 

however, was a c.:ontin\lOll~ wurtc of fri ction between the brigade 

and Hotilla commanders. Gcner;dly the commander of River Assault 

Flotilla One agreed 10 lhe Joint Chiefs of SLaff provision that 

the supported force would dil('ct operations: "Such direction 

includes designation of t.lrgcts or objectives. timing. duration of 

the supporting action. and other instructions nCCf!SS.1ry [or the 

co·ordi nation and for efficiency." 
CHAPTER V 

Plans and Operational Procedures 

for the Mobile Riverine Force 

While the Army elements were being moved aboard the ships of 

River Assault Flotilla One. the staffs of the Amilia and brigade completed the planning for initial tactical operations. L'lcking the unity 

of organization for planning that is present in a JOint staff, the 

brigade and flotilla commanders informally agreed upon the planning roles of each staff. 

Int ellige1lce 

Colonel Fulton and Captain Wells decided that Mobile Riverine Force operations would be planned and conducted on the basis 

or intelligence collected from areas in which major enemy forces 

were mOst likely to be met and in which the abilities of a river 

force could be best used. Once an enemy force and area had been 

agreed upon as a target by the two component commanders, the 

brigade 5-2 and Hotilla N- 2. working: together closely, would collect intelligence to suppOrt further planning. The N-2 would concentrate on the nav igabi lity of waterways and threats to the Navy 

ships and assault craft. The S-2 would gather intelligence information necessary to conduct land operations. Both the 5-2 and 

the N-2 would be highly dependent upon the intelligence disseminated by other U.S. and Vietnamese headquarters because the Mobile Riverine Force had a large area of interest and wou ld need to 

move considerable distances from one location to another. 

Since the 5-2 and N- 2 cou ld nOt supply all the information 

needed by the riverine force, intelligence was obtained from several agencies. A seven-man Mobile Imelligence Civil Affairs Team 

was formed by the brigade to co-ordinate with these agencies. This 

team was formed from the brigade 5 -2 and 5-5 sections. the prisonel" of war interrogation team , the psychological opel"ations team, 

and military police platoons. It mm'ed into the operational areas 

of the force to collect imelligence from Vietnamese political officials and from intelligence officers of military units. Working close 
88 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

CHART 2 - MOllTl.E RIVERINE FORCE CoMMAND STRUCTURt. 

Commander, U.S. 

Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam 

Commanding General, Commander, Naval " FIeld Force, ------- -T----- forces, Vietnam VIetnam , 

, 

, 

, 

I 

Commanding General, Senior Advisor 

9th Infantry - IV Corps 

Division Tactical Zone 

, , , 

, , 

Commanding Officer, , , , Commander, Task I 2. Brigade, 9th ___ 'lIo... ____ l _____ Force 117, and 

Infantry Division, .n' Commander, Riverine 

Ground Commander Assault Force 

BASE DEFENSE LEGEND 

Base commander at Joint 

Army/Navy land or afloat 

Operating COntrol _______ _ 

base is senior Ann)' commander 

assigned. Army Commander is 

responsible for local base 

defense. 

Co-ordination ________ _ 

Urigadier General George C. O'Connor, Assistant Commander. 

9th U.S. Infantry Division, was responsible to the division commander ror the division operations in IV Corps. lie provided 

broad guidance and considerable latilUde to the brigade commander in dealing with the command relationships and operational 

procedures or the Mobile Riverine Force. Without this degree or 

Rexibility. it is unlikely that the brigade and "alilla commanders 

could have resolved as Lhey did Jllany fundamental issues without 

recourse to their respective superiors. 

Based on the rundamental issues agreed upon and the campaign plan oulline of where and how tile river force was going to 

fight. planning continued as the 2d Brigade and its subordinate 

units began to board the Navy ships of the Mobile Riverine Force 

at Dong Tam on 31 May. 
90 RIVERINE OPER/\TIO ...... 

to the intelligence ccolers of Vietnamese nrganilations, the team 

aided in the exchange of tactical illlclligcnrc as well as in the coordination of a limited numher of ci\ it affairs :lC(lvities. The 

Mobile In telligence Ci\ il Affairs Team \\'as nm IIslIal1), moved into 

an area during the planning phase of an operalion for fear of 

detection by enemy cOlllHcrinlclligcncc, but was moved in at the 

beginning of an operation. 

Another means of intelligence collection for Ihe riverine force 

was the riverine SUn'ey team. C.ol1lTolied by Task Force 117, the 

learn accompanied the task force on missions and recorded depth 

soundings and clearance measurements, thus providing reliable 

navigation data (or subsequcm operations. Under the direction 

or the 9th Inrantry Division engineer, Vietnamese Regional and 

Popular Forces also collecl(!d information on bridges 50 that the 

riverine force could be sure of vertica l and horizontal bridge clearance on a waterway. 

While they were collecting infonn;uion, the S-2 and N-2 

briefed the brigade and notilla commanders and th e planners on 

the area or the impending operation. and this intelligence along 

with other infonnation was incorporated in planning guidance provided by lhe commanders. It was at the point of th e ronnulation 

of planning guidance that the command relationships of the 

Mobile Riverine Force received one of its greatest tests. By close 

co-operation, Colonel Fulton and Captain Wells decided upon the 

gu idance to be issued to their staffs for each operation, and these 

agreements in time came to be accepted as an informal set of 

standing operating procedures. They were, however. subject to 

change at any time by either commander and werc not reduced to a 

written. fonnally approved document. Task Force 117 published 

a standing order that contained the resulLS of considerable Army 

and Navy planning but was not jointly approved. 

Plmmillg 

The brigade commander or a higher echelon Army commander usually selected the enemy target ;111(1 area of operations. 

The two commandcrs thcn agreed upon the general task organization, the tentative duration and timing of the operation. and the 

location or the mobilc riverine base to Sllpport the operation. The 

planning of len included great detail in orelcr to insllre that major 

issues were resolved early. permitting the two staffs to plan 

efficiently. 

From the outset, Colonel Fulton and C'lptain Wells recognized 
PLANS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 91 

the need to plan for future efforts while operations were in prog· 

ress. Colonel Turner. who had heen designated riverine adviser. 

acted as the planning co·ordinator. with the assistant N-3 (plans). 

the assistant $-3 (plans). the N-2, and the $-2 fonning the planning staff. The planning for operations to take place ten days 

hence. the planning for the next operation, three to five days 

hence, and the execution of the current operation were accom· 

plished at the same time, with the $-3 and N-3 dealing with the 

current operation. 

The planning staff. using the commanders' guidance, began by 

outlining the scheme of maneuver in the objective area. From there 

the planners worked backwards, covering in turn the landing or 

assaull, water movement, and lo:,ding phases. In preparing operations orders they took into consideration factors peculiar to riverine 

operations stich as tides. water depth, watcr obstructions, bridge 

clearance. distance of the mobile riverine base from beaches. avail. 

ability of waterway roules il1lo the area of operations, suitability of 

river banks for landing siles. and mooring for barge.mounted 

artillery, Operalion orders followed the format of the standard, 

five-paragraph field order. and were authenticated by the 5-3 ami 

the N-3. The bulk of Ihe information peculiar to riverine opera:-

tions was in the annexes, which included intelligence, operations 

overlay. fire support plan, naval support plan, signal arrangements, 

logistics, civil affairs. and psychologic.'I 1 operations infonnation. The 

intelligence annex supplied information on terrain, weather. and 

the enemy situation. Waterway intelligence was usually provided 

in an appendix that covered hydrography and the enemy threat to 

assault craft. A map of the n'a terways to be used was furnished. 

showing tides, widths :mcl depths of streams. obstacles of various 

types. bridges, shoals. mud banks, and other navigation data. The 

enemy threat to assault craft was covered in descriptions of recent 

enemy action along the waterw:lys.location or enemy bunkers, kinds 

of enemy weapons likely to he used in harassing action and ambushes, and water mine ,md swimmer danger to the small boats. 

The operations o\'erlay annex showed schematically the area of 

operations, plan of 1ll,lIleU\'er, and control measures such as check· 

points. The naval SUppOT'l plan annex contained the naval task 

organi7<Hion ami referred to the operations order for information 

concerning the situa tion. mission. and concept of operations. It 

assigned specific suppon tasks to subordinate naval elements together with the necessary co-ordinating instructions. An appendix 

to the naval support plan provided watenvay data. 
92 RIVERINE O"ERATIO ~ 

Battalion orders for operations in a riverine area followed 

the (annat used in the brigade orders and were authenticated by 

the battalion 5-3. The supporting river assault squadron water 

movement plan was prepared by the river assault squadron operations officer in co-ordination with the battalion 5-3. It was, in effect. 

the river assault squadron operations order. This plan did not 

become a (onnal part of the battalion operations order but was 

attached to it. The water movement plan contained the task. organization, mission, schedule of events, boat Ulili7.ation plan. command 

and communications instruction, and co-ordinating instructions. 

The schedule of events paragraph listed events critical to the operation and the time they were to take place. for example. where and 

when each unit was to load, and its scheduled time of arrival at 

critical water checkpoints. The boat utilization paragraph included 

numerical designations of boats and the companies to embark on 

these boats. The co.ordinating instructions paragraph included 

infonnation on submission of reports, radio silence. recognition 

lights, reconnaissance by fire. and the use of protective masks. 

Once approved, both the brigade and battalion operations 

orders became the authority for fulfilling the intent of the scheme 

of maneuver and for prO\,jding combat and combat service support. Prior to each operation, a briefing was conducted on the flagship of the Mobile Riverine Force; it included presentation of the 

plan of each battalion and squadron, as well as the latest 5-2 and 

N-2 intelligence. Briefings seldom required decisions by the flo· 

tilla or brigade commander because problems had been resolved 

between the Army and Navy elements at each subordinate echelon and between echelons during planning. Beginning in June of 

1967, plans and orders were in far greater detail than the Army 

brigade and battalion commanders believed was needed or even 

optimum for routine land warfare. The detailed nature of the 

plan, however, included agreements at the Mobile Riverine Force 

command level ; the Navy commander desired to define clearly the 

tasks to be perfonned by each service. For tJ1e Navy commanders 

and staffs, the detailed plan was less objectionable, being similar 

to the planning associated with amphibious, ship-to·shore operations. After June of 1967 as time passed both Army and Navy 

commanders realized that matters such as the loading of a battalion 

[Tom a barracks ship Onto the assault craft of a river assault squadron and the configuration of a battalion river assault squadron convoy were standing operating procedure. The Mobile Riverine' 

Force was nevertheless to rely heavil y on detailed operations orders 
I'LANS ANI) OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 93 

MOBIU RIVERINE FORCf. BRIEFING ABOARD USS BENEWAH 

rather than a fonnal. wriuen standing operating procedure for many 

months of its opera tions. 

Operational Concept and Procedures 

The initial operations of the Mobile Riverine Force during the 

period J June to 26 July 1967 were designated Operation CoRO' 

NADO 1. From 3 June through 10 June operations were conducted 

in the vicinity of Dong Tam, and were designed to make the land 

base more secure and to test the operational procedures of the 

force. A tactical operations center manned joinLly by the Anny 

and Navy provided a focal point for communications and for monitoring operations and could fulfill the needs of the riverine brio 

gade and "otilla commanders separately. 

At the levels of maneuver battalion and river assault squadron, 

the staffs operated independcntly but ma intai ned close, harmonious 

relationships. The mancuver battalion sL,ff outranked and outnumbered the river assault squadron staff. Because of a limited 

staff, the naval river assault squadron was unable to perform staff 

functions which correspond ed to those of the infantry battalion it 
91 RIV£Rlt-oE OI'ERATION" 

supported. This limitation contributed to the centralization of 

planning at the Aotilla level. The IWO boat divisions organic to 

the river assault squadrons also were limited in thcir planning. The 

rifle company commanders transacted their business \.,.itl1 naval enlisted men, who did not have the authority to make decisions. 

Time could be lost at the comp<my and boat division level in situations requiring quick decision. 

Operations consisted of co-ordinatcd airmobile, ground, and 

waterborne attacks, supported by air and nava l forces. The ground 

and naval combat elements lr.t\'c1ed to the area of operations by 

river assault squadron crdft, helicopter. or a combination of these 

means. While the boats would seTve as a block and could transport troops in the early stages of an operation. once the tToopS had 

engaged the enemy more speed was necessary and air transporta· 

tion of (orces was generally more &1.tisfaclory. 

The basic offensive maneuvers used by the Mobile Riverine 

Force were to drive the enemy against a blocking force. with the 

open nanks covered by Anny helicopter gunships. or to encircle 

him. These maneuvers were based on the estimate that the enemy 

would choose 'to fight only when he thought he could inflict 

heavy casualties or when he was surprised and forced to fight. 

H he chose not to fight, he might allempt to take advantage of the 

concealment afforded by the numerOliS lree-lined waterways by dispersing into small groups and leaving the area of operations under 

the protection of small delaying and harassing fire tcams. It was 

necessary for U.S. forces to establish blocking positions quickly and 

to be able to deploy troops rapidly. Several maneuver battalions 

were needed, but the Mobile Riverine Force had lIslially only 

two battalions. a situation tJlal provided further incentive for 

co-ordinating operations with Viemamesc or other U.S. units. 

Control of tJle riverine forces was aided by reliable and versa· 

tile parallel Anny and Navy communications systems, by operations conducted over nat terrain hy units within mutually supporting distances. and by command helicopters usee! at the brigade and 

battalion levels. Troop movements were controll ed and co-ordinated 

from the Aagship. The focal pain! for mntrol was the joint tactical 

operations center, the Army clement of which was under the super· 

vision of the brigade executive officer. Staff representation came 

from the 5-3. 5-2. N-3, air liaison. Army 3\ialion, and artillery fire 

support sections. and the center was operational at all times. 

During operations the brigade employed a forward command 

group, usually located at the fire support base. and composed of the 
"UNS AND OPERATIONAl. PROCEDURES 95 

brigade commander. the brigade 5-3, the brigade assistant fire support co-ordinator, and the air liaison officer. The brig-d.de command 

h'TOUP was generally aloft in a command helicopter in daylight 

hours. The battalion command post was fragmented into a forward 

and a rear taclical operations center. The forward post was located 

in a command boat that accompa nied the troops during their water· 

borne movement and normally consisted of the battalion com· 

mander, 5-3, assistant 5-3, art ill ery liaison officer, an operations 

sergeant, an inte lligence sergeant, and two radio telephone operators. 

The river assault squadron commander and his operations officer 

were aboard the 5<1.me command boal. The rear command post was 

located aboard ship at the mobile riverine base and lIsually consiSled of the batlalion exccutive oflicer, $- 1, 5-2. $-3, S-4, an 

operations sergeant, and two radio telephone operators. When a 

command and contrul helicopter. usua ll y an observa tion type, was 

available. the ballalion commander and his anillery liaison officer 

controll ed the opel':Hion from the air. 

After the briefing that look place before each operation, bat· 

lalion commanders and $lIpponing river a$S3.u lt squadron tom-
96 RIVERINE OJ'ERATIO~S 

MONITOR.S AND ASSAULT PATROL BOATS HEAD IN TO SHORE 

mandel'S issued final instructions to their staffs and subordinate 

commanders. These con finned or modified previously issued orders. 

Each riAe company was alloc.'ucd three annorcd troop c.1rricrs. 

and arrangements were made to load bulk cargo and ammunition 

prior to troop embarkation. At the designated loading lime for a 

particular company, three armored (roop carriers were tied alongside the Ammi barges moored to the ship and three platoons of a 

company embarked simultaneously. In most instances. the loading 

of a complete company was restricted to twenty minutes. The Navy 

stationed expert swimmers on the barges prepared to rescue men 

who might fall overboard. Once a company was loaded. the ATe's 

proceeded to a rendezvous where they wailed for the remainder of 

the battalion to load. Upon completion of the battalion loading. 

the ATC's moved at a specified time across a starting point and 

thence to the area of operation. Anny elements observed radio 

silence; the naval radio was used only for essential traffic control. 

The boats moved across the starting point in column formation. 

the leading assault support boats providing mines\\'eeping and fire 

support. Each minesweeper was equipped wilh a drag hook that 
PLANS AND OI>ERATIONAL PROCEDURES 97 

ASSAULT CRAFT GoINC IN To LAND TROOPS 

was tethered with a steel cable to a high-speed winch_ Two of the 

leading minesweepers preceding on the flanks of the column 

dragged these hooks along the boltom of the waterway in an effort 

to cut electrical wires rigged to underwater mines. The river assault 

squadron commander traveled aboard the leading command and 

control boal. The battalion commander was either in the control 

boat or in a helicopter aloft. Each supporting river division was 
98 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

divided into three sections. each section consisting of a monitor 

and three ATe's supporting the ooc rifle company. These S«lions 

we!"e in such order in the column 3S to maintain inrantry company 

integrity and to place units on the beach in the order specified by 

the baua1ion commander. While underway. the river assault squadron commander exercised command and control of the boau. The 

riAe company commanders monitored the Navy command and COIl-

(rei and the battalion command net in order to stay abreast of 

developing situations. Radar was the principal navigational aid 

during the hours of darkness. 

Water checkpoints weTe designated along the routes as a means 

of control, and as march units passed these a Tepon was made to 

the joint tactical operations center. Whether on large rivers or 

small streams, river assault units were faced with the threat of 

hostile auack. However, when the boats left the large rivers for the 

smaller waterways the danger from recoilless rifles, rocket fire, and 

mines increased. The waterways negotiated by the boats varied from 

a width of 100 meters where the smaller waterways joined the river 

to widths of 15 to 25 meten. The formation that the boats assumed 

was similar to that used on the main river except that the leading 

mineswee~rs moved to positions nearer the column. While the 

column proceeded along the small waterways, suspected areas of 

ambush (if in an area cleared by the Vietnamese government) 

were often reconnoitered by fire from the small boats and by 

artillery. 

When the lead boats of the formation were approximately 500 

meters from the beach landing sites, artillery beach preparations 

were li£ted or shifted. The leading minesweepers and moniton 

then moved into position to fire on the beaches on both sides of the 

waterway. This fire continued until masked by the beaching ATe. 

If no preparatory fire was employed, the boats landed at assigned 

beaches in sections of three, thus maintaining rifle company integ. 

rity. Boats within a .section were about 5 to 10 meters apart. and 

a distance of 150 to 300 mcters (depending on the beach landing 

sites selected for each company) separated e:lch boat section or 

aS5ault rifle company. After the units had disembarked, the boats 

remained at the beaching site umil released by the battalion commander. Upon release. the river assault squadron craft either moved 

to provide fire support to the infantry platoons or moved (0 interdiction stations and rendclvous points. Subsequent missions for 

the boats included independent interdiction, resupply, and extraction of troops. 
I'LANS I\NO OI'ERATIONAL PROCEDURES 99 

TROOPS Co AsHORE FRO\{ ARMORED TROOP CARRIER 

After landing the troops secured initial platoon and company 

objectives and moved fon\'ard in whatever formation the terrain and mission required. (DIagram 6) When contact with 

the enemy was made, commanders imm<:diateiy acted to cut off 

possible enemy escape .routes. The mon frequently used tactic was 

to move units to blocking positions to lhe Hanks and rear of the 

enemy and direct extensive artillery fire, helicopter gunship fire, 

and air strikes into the enemy positions. After this softening up 

process, troops swept the area. 

The Mobile Riverine Force had liule troubl e finding suitable 

helicopter landing and pickup zones. Pickup zones used to mount 

ainnobile operations were nOnllally loc,lted in the vicinity of thc 

firc Sllpport base or on terrain adjacent to the wa terways. When 

there were not enough aircraft to move an entire company at one 

time, platoons were shuulcd into the area of operations. The 

brigade standing opera ting procedure called for helicopter gunsh ips to escort each serial, and for an airborne forward air controller to operate along lhe route of aerial movement. 
100 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

08JECTlVE tiD 

UoNDLNG AR£A ALPIlA 

rn Monitor rx; ATC f\ ASPS 

U D c:arryingl.) 

• platoon 

OSupply 

~ ATe 

~Company 

Dcollllllander'. 

boat 

Diagram 6. Typical company landing £onnalion. 

During each day plans werc made to arrive at a night defensive 

position before dark unless troops \\'crc engaged with or pursuing 

the enemy. After resupply, the night defensive position was organized against possible enemy attack. 

The fourth TiAe company of each battalion was usually employed at the fire support base under operational control of the 

base commander; for mobile riverine base security it was under 

direct control of the Mobile Riverine Base commander. 

When the river.assault craft remained overnight on the small 

watcnvays in the operational area, the brigade and battalion com· 

manders planned for security of the boats, which were usually kept 

near infantry elements ashore. The boat fire was integrated with 

the fire of other units. 

Withdrawal of riverine forces from the area of operations was 

accomplished chiefly by boat. When units operated far inland from 

navigable waterways, however, they were extracted by helicopter 

and taken to a landing zone near a navigable waterway. They were 

then transported by boat to the Mobile Riverine Base or to 3.nother area of operations. Sites designated for picking up troops 

were often on streams lined with dense banana groves, coconut 

groves, or nipa palm that made it difficult for both the ground unit 
PLANS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 101 

commander and the river assault squadron commander to spot. 

Ground and water movement to the site was therefore controlled 

and co-ordinated from the battalion commander's helicopter. The 

commander marked specific beach and unit locations with colored 

smoke and directed the Army and Navy elements to them by radio. 

The same boat that was used to put an Anny element ashore 

was also used to bring it out. Each boat carried an identifying 

number and new a distinctive colored pennant from the mast that 

could be recognized by troops who were behind dikes and vegetation. Each boat also carried three running lights tiered near the 

top of the mast. Through the usc of varying color combinations in 

the top, center, and botlom running lights, the boat designated for 

each boarding element could be readily identified. 

Tides, draft, and maneU\'er room were primary considerations 

when boats were scheduled to rendezvous with Army forces for 

pickup because tides not only affected the water depth in canals, 

but caused significant changes in current velocity and diret:tion. 

Traveling a distance of thirty kilometers upstream could take up 

to six hOUTS against an ebbing tide. whereas the same route might 

be covered in four and a haIr hours on an incoming tide. 

The threat of ambush during troop removal was considered as 

great as during movement to landings. \Vhen possible, an alternate 

to the route used for entering an area was selected for picking up 

troops. Beaching of the boats \\'as usually accomplished with little 

difficulty because the infantrymen on shore had reconnoitered the 

banks for obstacles. Army security elements were placed 100 to 150 

meters inland from the extraction site. After the troops were aboard, 

the hoau resumed tactical formation and moved along the canal or 

stream and into the major watem'ay where the Mobile Riverine 

Base was anchored. 

During offensive operations. the commander of the Army element of the flifobile Ri\'erine Force in his position as base commander for all joint Army and Navy bases was also responsible for 

the defense of thc Mobile Ri\'crine Base. The Navy provided its 

appropriate share of (orces, which included those for gunftre support and protection against waterborne threats. Defense of the base 

also involved arrangements fOT curfew and other restrictions for 

water craft with appropriate Vietnamese civilian and military 

officials in the immediate vicinity. 

River assault divisions were assigned the responsibility for 

waterborne defense on a rotating basis. They conducted patrols to 

control river traffic, enforce curfews, and deter attack by water; 
102 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

swC!pt the vicinity of the Mobile Riverine Base for water mines; 

sent demolition teams to inspect underwater anchor chains, hulls 

of ships, and pontons for limpet mines; and dropped random 

explosive charges in the anchorage area to deter enemy swimmers. 

One rifle company under the base commander was responsible 

for shore defense of the Mobile Riverine Base. NormaJly the company employed one platoon on each bank of the river and held the 

remainder of the company in reserve. Since anchorage space was 

2,000 to 2,500 meters in length. it was impossible to conduct a 

closely knit defense with the relatively sma ll number of troops 

committed. Platoon ambush sites were csmblishcd on the banks 

opposite the flotilla flagship and during dayliglll hours securiTY 

patrols were dispatched to provide early warning of enemy auack. 

The security troops were reinforced as needed by clements of the 

company defending the fire support base. Artillery and 4.2-inch 

and BI-mm. mortar fire as well as fire from the boats was planned 

in support of the defense of the base. The n,lt trajectory of naval 

weapons fire required careful planning ror Ixnh shore and waterborne defense. 

The planning and operational procedures initially used by the 

Mobile Riverine Force were refined as the sL.. ff and the rorce 

gained experience. The first significalll test of these procedures 

came during operations in Long An Province in the III Corps 

Tactical Zone. 
Jl 

MAP6 

III CORPS OPERATIONS AND THREAT TO DONG TAM 105 

CAN GlUOC OPERATION 

19 Jun. 1967 

"". -"'--- ... <> ,- --+ _ .... n' 10 .on .... ~ _ ..... ,.... ""'."ono .... 

.. 110 .... '.. -"'I' 10<.'0'1 

c 

o , : ...... 

I 1,,1 I' " I ' o I : .. ,OIOtU.' 1.,"· ...... '.1 

kilometers of a location that had been a remote Viet Cong base 

area enjoying considerable sccurity. To altack this area, Colonel 

Fulton and Captain Wells had agreed to anchor the riverine ships 

as close as practicable to the area of operations, The time needed 

by assault craft to enter the area and the turnaround time of both 

helicopters and waler crart conducting resupply and medical evacuation would thus be reduced. The base was mo\'ed into its anchorage on the evening before operations, The risk of disclosing the 

intended area of operations by this mO\'e was accepted because the 
104 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Before entering Long An Province. the brigade commander 

briefed the baualion and company commanders on their new area 

of operations. The batlalions of the 2d Brigade had fought in Dinh 

Tuong and nonhero Kien Hoa Provinces where trees lined the 

banks of mOStslreams and major canals. Allhough the soldiers were 

familiar with moving in the rice paddies near Dong Tam, they had 

seldom encountered such wide expanses of open paddy as existed in 

eastern Long An Province. Th~sc open areas provided observation 

and fields of fire that dictated greater dispersion of men and greater 

reliance on the "scouts ouC technique. A long proven infantry 

tactic in open tcrrain , scouts Out provided for poim and flank 

security men to move out on foot as much as 500 meters from the 

remainder of their squad to provide early warning. 

In further preparation for entering eastern Long An Province 

the brigade commander, 5-2. and 5-3 visited the 3d Brigade. 9th 

lnfantry Division, and the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) . Both of these unitS had operated in 

Long An and furnished helpful infonnation. The group also visited 

the headquarters of the 46th Regiment, 25th Division, Amly of 

Vietnam, and the Can Ciuoc District headquarters. Although such 

visits risked exposing planned operations to compromise, the risk 

was accepted in order to exploit local intelligence and take advantage of operating in conjunction with other U.S. and Vietnamese 

units. For the Can Giuoc activities, the Mobile Intelligence Civil 

Affairs Team set up operations with the 2d Battalion. 46th Regiment, Army of Vietnam, and Can Giuoc District headquarters on 

19 June, the rlrst day of Mobile Riverine Force operations in 

Long An. 

Can Giuoc Operation 

Can Giuoc DiSlrict contained a good network of navigable 

waterw'ays, permiuing the assault craft to enter an area that intelli· 

gence reports indicated was used extensively by Viet Cong regional 

forces for rest and training. Civilian travel in the locality was chieny 

by water, since most bridges and the one ferry were no longer 

serviceable. Previous military actions here had depended for movement on boats and aircraft. The U.s. 9th Infantry Division's 3d 

Brigade was disposed in Long An Province west of Can Giuoc 

District to lend security by its operations to Highway 4; however. 

Can Gilloc District was outside the brigade's routine area of 

operations, 

The fact that the Mobile Riverine Force could move its afloat 

base permitted the establishment of a brigade base within three 
CHAPTER VI 

III Corps Operations and the 

Threat to Dong Tam 

On I t and 12 June 1967 the fully constituted Mobile Riverine 

Force made its first major movc. Leaving Dong Tam, it sailed down 

the Mekong River and across a streich of the South China Sea to 

a temporary anchorage at Vung Tau. and thence to an anchorage 

southeast of Saigon at Nha Be-a total distance of sixty miles. At 

Vung Tau it received additional Navy ass,1ldl craft that had arrived 

(rom the United States. Since the assallh support patrol boats that 

had been scheduled to join the force at this lime were delayed, 

armored troop carriers continued to perform mincsweeping and 

security operations until arrival of the assault support patrol boats 

in September and October. Upon reaching the Nha Be anchorage. 

the force returned to the Vietnamese N;ny the borrowed craft it 

had used since February. With the new assault craft. the flotilla 

had 52 armored troop carriers, 10 monitors, 4 command boats, 

and 2 refue1ers. 

From the Nha Be anchorage operations were conducted from 

13 through 17 June in the Rung 5.1.t Special Zone as part of 

the U.S. 9th Division operation, GREAT BEND, which brought 

greater security to the Long Tau sh ipping channel. AlLilOUgh the 

force found a base camp believed to ha\c been the recent sitt: of 

the headquarters controlling Viet Cong actions in the Rung Sat 

Special Zone, no contact was established with the enemy. 

On 18 June the Mobile Riverine Force moved eight miles to a 

mobile riverine base anchorage at the junction of the Soi Rap and 

Vam Co Rivers in preparation for operations in the Can Ciuoc 

District of eastern Long An Province. One ballery of supporting 

155-mm. self-propelled artillery was moved by LCU to the west 

bank of the Soi Rap River adjacent to the mobile riverine base at 

the confluence of the Soi Rap and Yam Co Rivers. Ammunition 

supply for the battery was transported from \lung Tau by Army 

LCM-S's while the barge-mounted artillery cominuccl to receive 

ammunition support from the LST supply ship in the base. 
106 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

force had not heen in the area hefore and the Viet Gong were not 

thought to be familiar with the capabilities of the ships and assault 

craft. The brigade and nOlilla commanders a~reed that assault craft 

would go up only those streams wide cnough to permit them to 

make ISO-dcgrce turns. Colonel FulLOn and Captain \Vells also 

agreed to use a portion of the assault craft as a blocking force once 

Army troops had landed. The hoaLS werc to enter the waterways 

as the tide was rising. permiuing greater speed and a long period 

of high tide level immediately following entry. 

The Mobile Riverine Force sent five companies of the two 

U.S. infantry ballalions into the operations aTea by assault craft. 

(Map 6) The sixth company, Company C, 3d Battalion, 47th 

Infantry. moved by waler to an air pickup zone to stand by as 

reserve. The troops entered rhe area and searched south. using 

assault craJt to cross water barriers and to provide communications 

and fire support. The 2d Battalion, 46th Infantry, Army of Viet· 

nam. moved during darkness and eSl.1.blished a blocking position 

near the town of Ap Bac. oriented to the easl. 

At approximately 1000 Colonel Fulton was notified through 

the Mobile Intelligence Civil Affairs Team, located near Can 

Giuoc District headquarters. that the district chief had information 

of a Viet Cong battalion-si7e force due cast of the blocking position 

of the 2d Battalion. 46th Infantry. The brigade commander issued 

a fragmentary order al 1010 infonning the commanders of the 

3d and 4th Bau ... lions. 47th Infantry, and the U.S, adviser to the 

Vietnam Army battalion of the reported enemy strength and location. The order directed the two U.S. battalions to continue 

their maneuver south toward the newly designated objective-the 

reponed location of the enemy battalion. Colonel Fulton also 

directed Colonel Tutwi ler, commanding the 4th Battalion, 47th 

Infantry, to prepare to assume control of Company C. 3d Battalion. 

47th Infantry, and to deploy the company by helicopter south of 

the reported enemy location. 

Colonel Tutwiler moved Company C at 1105 by air south of 

the reported enemy location with the mission of moving northeast 

to reconnoiter the enemy position. He sent Company C of his 

battalion by assault craft south on the stream and landed the com· 

panyat 11 35 northeast of the reported enemy position. 

By 11 50 Company C of the 3d Battalion had swept the reported 

enemy location wi lhout findi ng the Viet Cong. Company C of the 

4th Battalion was moving west from its landing area when it was 

fired upon from the nonh. At the same time Company A of the 4th 
III CORI'S OI'ERATIOI"OS ANI)TIlR[AT TO OO:-;C TAl\! 107 

Battalion. modng south hut at a diSL1.nce of some 800 meters 

north of Company C. 4th B;'tttalion. cnCO\llllered heavy automatic 

weapons and small anns fire from its front and right nank. The 

enemy position had turned out La be north of the reported location. 

Comp.1.ny A. lacking cover. stlffert.'d hca\y casualties. The Viet Cong 

had occupied well·fortified firing positions in an l·shape along the 

north bank of the stream that separated Comp.1.ny A from both 

Company C of the 3d Battalion and Company C of the 4th Bat· 

talion.17th Infalllry. 

Colonel Tutwiler shifted Company B of his battalion. which 

had been moving on the battalion right nank. into the area behind 

Comp.1.ny A to assist by fire and with medical e\·acuation. lie held 

his Company C on the south side of the stream to maintain contact and maneuvered Company C. 3d Battalion. north across the 

stream. Once on the north bank, Comp<1.I1Y C. 3d Banalion. fought 

slowly to the east, with its right nank on the stream. Major H. 

Glenn Penny. eXe£utive officer and acting commander of the 3d 

Battalion. 47th lnfalllry. meanwhile moved his Companies A and 

B southeast to link lip with Company C of the 3d Battalion on that 

company's north flank. At 1545 Major Penny resumed operational 

control of his Company C. C.ompany B attacked cast on line with 

Company C while Company A moved into a blocking position 600 

meters north of the left flank of Company B. By 2000 darkness and 

enemy fire prompted a halt to manellvers and placed Companies 

Band C, 3d Battalion, some 600 meters west of Company C of the 

4th Battalion where the units remained throughout the night of 

19-20 June. 

In the mO\'emelll of the two U.S. battalions toward the first 

reported enemy location, the naval ass..1.\lIt craft were limited to 

movement on the stream paralleling the 4th Battalion's left nank. 

When Company C of the 4th Battalion was fired upon at 1150. the 

naval assault craft that had brought in the company provided fire 

support for it and, later, for Company C of the 3d Battalion as it 

crossed the stream west of the actual enemy positions. 

Although the rine companies and the naval assault craft quickly 

returned the enemy fire. anillery and helicopter gunship fire could 

not be immediately hrought to bear hecallse the heavy casuahies 

initially suffered by Comp,my A of the 4th Battalion prevented the 

company t:Ommander from determininp; the dispositions of his 

platoons. Artillery fire began at approximately 1200; it was de· 

livered at the request of the forward observers and cooOrdinated by 

both ground and airborne artillery obsen'ers. Support was provided 
lOR RIVFRI'IF OI'F:RATIOV. 

during the daylight hours and well inln (he night hy helicopter 

I4l1nships. medi(',,1 c'<Hllation helicopters. and assault (Tart. 

The l1Iov('mcnt of C(Jl11p;tIli('~ A, H, and C, 3d Battalion, 171h 

Infantry. required the clHire afternoon. hut nOi all companies were 

able to link up hefore clarl... The 2d Hatlalion. 40lh Vietnam Army 

Infantry. remained in its original position during the engagement 

bcc<tusc Colonel Fuhon decided ,hal maneuver of the hattalion to 

the cast would he ('omplicatcd hy the presence of U.S. companies 

between the Vietnam hallation :l11d the enemy. 

Viet Cong :Inc! U.S. (mops c'\chanj.!,ccI rire throughout the day. 

light hours and into the nigh!. U.S. troops found that the enemy's 

reinforced hunkers could he clcslroyccl only hy 90-mlll. recoilless 

rifle fire and heliwptcr rOt "-('Is and 1.01llhs; the 20·mm. and SO·mm. 

rounds fired hy the assault craft I>cnetrated a hllnker only after 

Illultiplc hits. 

C;lsllaltics of C.ompany C of thc !lei Battalion wcre evacuated 

during the :,ftcrnooll and evcning of lhe hallic by plasti c 

,lSSault hO;lt and helicopter. Company C of the 41h Ballalion \\'as 

unahle 10 lise the assault uaft for medical e\acllalion and relied 

on helicopters. Whether I aSII:lIt ics were ta"-en dirC'Clly by helicopter 

from a ~rolll1d pickup lone 01' frolll an armored troop ca rrier aid 

station after treatment. they wcrc sent either to thc harracks lp 

llSS Coile/Oil or to a fidd hospit.al. 

During the afternoon and t.'\ cning of 19 .J une most of thc enemy 

losses came from U.S. supponing firc conccntr"tcci on a small area. 

A portion of thc cnt.'lII)' h:utalion eluded the U.S. blocking posi· 

tions dllring lhe Ili~ht. pmhahly hy crossing the stream to thc west 

of Company C, 4th Battalion, 47th Inf"ntry. and then moving 

sollth. On 20 Jllne the 4th Battalion , 47th Infantry, searched south 

to rc~ '1 (llltaCl with the enemy. Moving hy helicopter and on 

foot thl. .Iallalion founel the enemy north of Ihc Rach Cion Ong 

stream al Ap Naill and. aided by a company of the 2d Battalion. 

GOlh Infantry, encircled ;mci eliminated an enemy platoon. The 

cnmpan)' from the 2<1 B:maliOll, (jOth Infalluy. was provided from 

the :lcl Brigade by the Curlllllanding (;eneral, 9th Infantry ~ivision. 

Folluwing the haltlc ... of 1!1-20 .I unc, the Mohile Riverinc Force 

remained in the Can Ciuoc :Irea. capitali/ing on the knowlcd~e 

ohtaincd of the area and "":Irking- small c1ClIlcnts of the Viet Cong 

fllh Nh;1 Bc Battalion :md Ic)("al guerrillas with whom battle had 

hcen joined on 19 .IUllc. On 2:1 June Company A, 4th Hanalion. 

171h Infantry. which had taken hea"y losses. was moved by air 10 

Dong T;lIn 10 hCAin a tlvo-week period of refilli ng and retraining. 

Operations werc ('onclucled in the Rung Sal Specia l Zone, the Can 
III CORPS OPERATIONS AND THREAT TO DONG TAM 

GO CONG OPERATION 

4 -6 July 1961 

c:::::J ~.II<OF'" .'IG .. _,.,_ 

--.. ~ """"'- ... __ tt ... , _ .... 

... _ ...... 10<, V €"...., ... · .., 

o 

MAP 7 

109 

J.! 

Duo<: District of Long An Province, and Go Cong Province of IV 

Corps. Companies on independent missions entered the smaller 

waterways by ATe at night to establish widely dispersed ambushes. 

Infantry platoons set up ambushes ashore in co-ordination with 

ATC's and monitors lO interdict land and water routes. Cooperating with the 199th Infantry Brigade (Se parate) and the 2d 
110 RIV"~RINE OPERATIONS 

and 3d Battalions of Ihe 16th ViclIl;l.m Army InLIIHf)' Reg iment. 

the force ranged in \\'ieldy dispcr .. cd fnnn(llimu to linc! the enemy. 

An assa ult hc1i1.:optcr (111111),,'11), provided by II Field Forrc was usee! 

extensively to mOH' lroop.~ when the ri\crinc assaliit craft weTC 

limited by thc ia<.k of na\'i~hlc streams or hy th eir relatively slow 

movement. 

(;0 COllg OlJernlio1l 

On 4 July the 1\lohilc Riverine Force "gain co-operated with 

Vietnamese fon'CS 10 :111:1< l an enemy hase arca in Go Cong Province. The base, rcportt.'clly used for training recruits for thc Viet 

Cong My Tho I}m\ jl1ce IInits. lay in all arca nearly surrounded by 

waterways. (Mf/I' i) The S(-licl11c of manCII\cr for the operation 

required a Poplliar For(("~ pro\isional h:lIlalion of Go Cong Province to move o\'erland dllrin~ darkness 10 bl()('k the I,mel escape 

route th at th e Viet Con!-\, l11i~hl use- if <tuackcd-on the soutlm'est 

hound:lrY of Ihe report cd hase are:!. To :!ssist the Popular Forces 

hattalion in blcx'king: on till' \I'es(' helicopter gunships watched over 

an area into whid! ~TOImd troops were not allowl"!l to 1110\'e. The 

Mobile Rivcrinc Force deplo)'l'tl iIHo the area and moved into 

positions a long the 511(':1111 Il(~ilrly encircling the ellt'my hase area. 

Entering the \lam CII Ri\er hefore cla ylip,-Ill. fnt' companie .. 

under the COlllm:md of t\\'o hattalion he:,clquarter" moved off Ih(' 

Vam Co and intn tlle lolf('am" that fomlecl a three-quaner cirrlc 

arou nd the enelTly ,s{~ . Oncc the companies had landed. the ATe's, 

augmented by all other assault craft availahle, movcd to stations 

to prevent enemy lIl(l\'ClIIl'llI ".-ross the sma ll strea ll1 S. An assault 

helicopter COlllp:mv stood f('ady :11 firSl light 10 movc IInc infantry 

company as a re~('1 \e ullder hrig:acle contml. This C(JIlipany wa .. 

SCl down before (\;t)li~ht hy ATC's at a pickup mne adjacent 10 

the barg:e-IllUllnlt(1 :lllilll'ry lire Sl lplxlrt I)ase. 

Early on <1 Jul y Irllllp~ \It're I:mded withl1l11 encountering the 

ellemy. By IROO the !iwl'cpin~ oper.uinll had produccd only three 

minor skirmishes: IhaT uf Ih e ellcmy were killed. ninety-one dc· 

tained. and two lI'e:lp()n~ WCH.' (·"plilred. Therc hacl heen no U.S. 

01' Popular Funes (a\u:dtics. The U.S. h:ltt:lliom estah li ~hccl dis· 

persed :nnllUsh sitl's and ,horlly after clark "('~:111 10 ellcountcr 

slll:dl p,mll]ls of \lkl C:on)..\ in a numher of plan·s. These CIlCflunterS 

continucd ~IXll-:Hli(";lIl) throll~hout the e:,r1)' c\l'ninA: sever:,1 of the 

cnclll)' \\'el'{' killed and Illore were detaincd. 

On!) .lilly. rli'i(m('I in~ t it-\'edy (1i~~lIised hunkers :mcl so-c:l1lcd 

spidl'r holes in whi( h tl1(: ('I1CIllY had cscapcd delC(lion the pre\'ious day. U.S. trou ps made a Illure mClhodit-al search of the area. 
III CORPS Ol'ERAT10NS AND TUREAT TO nor.:C TAM 111 

On the same day the Viet Gong who had been detained were sent 

to a combined interrogation center established by the Mobile 

Intelligence Civil Affairs 'Team and Vietnamese provincial offi· 

cials at the province capital. Later, the interrog<ltion repons provided informa tion that the enemy clements encountered had been 

a platoon-size cadre and a newly recruited Viet Cong company. 

The cadre was reportedly equipped onl y with small arms, and the 

company had few weapons. The search for the Viet Cong continued through 5 July and ambushes were again established during 

the night. 

The Go Cong operation ended on 6 Jul y without casualties 

to U.s. or Popul ar Forces troops. Th rougholl t the opera tion, the 

assa ult craft guarded the watenvays, stopping over seven hundred 

native watercra ft and screening the people, some of whom were 

held for furth er interrogation . On 4 Jul y the reserve compan y had 

been inserted by the assault hel icopter company imo the area near. 

the COSRA 7.one. This company, operating under control of its 

parent baualion. had subsequentl y searched and maimaiued patrols and ambushes in the area. The impact of the operation on the 

enemy was not fully known until se\'eral days later when the 

iOlerroga lion ccmer had completed its work and a Popular Forces 

company had re-entered lhe arca to check inrormation provided 

by the prisoners. Enemy losses included sixty-six killed, sixty-two 

prisoners of war, and fi ve weilpons. Under the Vietnamese governmeOl program or granting amnesty to Viet Cong who returned to 

the government, seven returnees, or Hoi Chanhs, were received. 

The operation emphasized the imparlance of using a combination of land, air, and water transportation to take advantage of terrain, and the necessity for close co-operati on with South Vietnamese 

officials and intelligence units. The combined transportation means 

enabled the Mobile Ri ve.ine Force to ga in control over an area 

quickly. By seizing sampans along the watenvays the Mobile Riverine Force prevented the enemy from using- them to escape. 

During this operation the Anny initiated air resupply directly 

from the support LST. Previously supplies were moved from the 

LST by boat to a landing zone ashore. whence they were carried 

by helicopter to the field , an operation that requ ired four separate 

transfers and considerable time. With the new method, loads were 

broken to unit size on the LST, each heli copter was loaded directly 

from the LST cl eck. and the material was deli vered to the troop 

landing zone. To res~lppl y two battalions usi ng 10 UB- tO's (one 

assault helicopter compan y) required one hom and ten minutes. 
112 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

This lime was bCllered as the crew te:lI11work and the landing 

cycle on the LST's were smoothed Ollt. 

During the period of the (;0 Gong operation. another innovation was fielded hy the Mohile Riverine FOT(;C that si~nificantl)' 

increased ncxibility. The first of sc\cra] armoreci noop <:arricrs 

was modified by addjn~ OJ hl'licoplcr landing pad shaccll feCI 

square ovcr the (roop t:Ol11palllllcllt. An 11 -23 SlIC(;CSSflllly operated 

from the new pad 011 4 lilly ;111<1 a 1I1 Hn on !'i Jul y. 

On 15 Jul y Captain Wl'lls reCJuested that the Commander, 

Naval Forces. Vicm:ull, ohtain twch'c Vietnamese n:uionai policemen of the river po\i((, hrandl for assignment to Ta~l.. Force 117. 

The c'"pcricncc of sC:lrthing o\er sc\cn hundred nathe boats dUT' 

ing the Go Cong operati('" hiAhlighted the need for morc men to 

screen walerway traffic. /.! tlll)ll~h no Victnamese ri\cr polic:clllcn 

were subsequently assiAned. the £01(;C hac! the (o·operation of the 

ri\'er police on most opcratinm. 

Fu rther elm (;;rloc O/JCrnt;mH 

On 21 Jul y 1967 th e ~r ohilc Riverine Force condllclecl a two· 

clay operation employing: IWO tl.S. infantry hallalions in the 

so uth ern part of C'm r.iuOC" ni~trict. During: the prerroing thiny 

days, the force had conducted three operations in Can Giuo<: Dis· 

trict. killing 316 Viet Congo taking 15 priwners. rapturing Ml 

weapons. and detaining 1~7 pcople. This fourlh opt'rat ion was 

part of a program to strike at dirferent section~ of Can C.iuoc !lntil 

the whole district had heen fully fflvercd. R('port~ that compan'" 

Si7C groups of Vict Con.e; wefe ill th c :11"ea II:HI heen rccein'cI hy 

the comhined intelligcncc ('cnter, thc 4fith Vielllalll Anu\' Regi. 

mcnt. and Com GillO(" Distyin he:ldqllaners at Can r.iuo(". 

At 0545 on 20 Jul y the ~c\ Battaliun. 471h Infantry. and the 41h 

Battalion, 17th Infant ry. hoarded .\Tl.'s that jnined in column 

with Ihe heavY'~lrllnerl rnnnilOr~ ane! stc:lInecl \\"est from the ~Inhilc 

Riverine Hase ;lionl-: Ihe Vam Co Ri\'e r, From Ihe fire support 

patrol hase adj:uclH to Ille mnhile rilcrine hase the :trtillery ~IIP' 

paned tile oper:ll.iOII \\'il ll 1\\'0 1);lrge'IllOllnlc(\ h.ltlelics llf 10:1-111111. 

howitzers and one land-based battery of 155-mm. self-propelled 

howitlers from lll(' 2d Hauafinll. :\;"'"h AllillcrY. At dawn Company 

C of the 4th Ibttalinn , '17th luf.lIltn. landed ;\1 Ihe hrc h:rs(' as 

:m airmobile or \\'a tcrhorne rescr I C fnnc. Ihrce ,\ TC's slood h\' 

as water transport until a ("()mparl) of lIl l II) hc1i('()plcYS an'j\ed 

to snplX1n the operalioll ami to prmide 1r.IIl'ptln:niun tlf Ihe re· 

sclves to any I'>'"lrt of the 1I.lIllc arca, Wherl Ihe ("()m'o), left the hase 
III CORPS OPERATIONS AND THREAT TO DONG TAM 113 

ARMORED TROOP CARRIER Wlni H£LlI'AD 

it had a unique combat element. Both reconnaissance platoons o{ 

the two battalions had been designated Team Recon and were 

under the control of the 4th Battalion. 

At 0700 the ATC's landed along a four.kilometer stretch of 

the east bank of the Song Rach Cat River, and 800 troops moved 

ashore under the watchful support of the moniwTS. The 3d Bat· 

tall ion, 47th Infantry, landed on the north beaches: the 4th Battalion on the south beaches. with Team Recon going in on the 

right flank. The landing was unopposed and all units quickly 

secured initial objectives beyond the beach, moving steadily to 

the east. 

The operational area was bounded by the Song Rach Cat on 

the south and west and by the Song Nha Be on the cast. On the 

north, a company of the 3d Battalion guided its lefL flank along 

Highway 229 running generally west to cast. From the Song Rach 

Cu units moved slowly across the rice paddies, picking lip all male 

Vietnamese, who were then evacuated and checked for identification at the combined intelligence center at Can Giuoc. 
114 RIVUI.I:-"F OI'f.RATIOro; .. 

Overhcacllhc hrigade ,1I1e1 hattaliun CUIlUlI:lndcrs rlircrtcd 1110\('-

men( from helicopters. Artillery OhSCT\'crs ane! Air Fm-cc forw:nrl 

air controlll'Ts sun'cycc! th e h:mlcficlcl, \l'aiting In bring in supporting fire. By 1000 the compan ies h:lci moved C:\Sl approxima tely 

2,000 meters without mccling the enemy while the Na\y support 

craft moved up close behind them on the narrow streams wilh 

guns ready. At 1030, C()l1Ip.1.ny A in the cenler of the 3r1 R:llIalion 

formation rCplTled fire from well-fortified bunkers. 1t was reponecl 

that 10 to 15 Viet ('.onA' were sighted. Inll later a prisoner ~a\'c the 

number as 50 to GO. A point ~'Olll from Company A. operalinA we\l 

forward, W:15 the on ly friendly ComOaL"l nt killed by enemy fire in 

the operation. As troops m;mctI\'cred to bring Slnall amlS fire upon 

the enemy, close supponing fire by 105·mm. and 155·mm. artil1<.'rv 

was adjusted fom'ard of the :Idvance. Shonly after 11 00 the first 

air strike b(.'gan to lay 750 pound homhs and napalm on the Viet 

Cong bunkers. or th e fiv(~ stri kes ca ll ed in on the targct, three werc 

directed while the :utill cry (()llIinucci to auack. 

Units began moving rapid ly to block encmy cscape routcs. 

Companies n ancl C of the ~cI Uaualion to the north and sollth of 

the enemy deployed 011 a line facing th c enemy. Colllp<'my B. 4th 

Battalion. 47th lnfamry. lIlancuvered northeast across the rlee 

paddy to block to th e east. Company A of the 4th Haualinn 1110H'<i 

to join the hlock of th e :\1\ Itltta lion's Company C on the south. 

During Ihe whole man('II \'cr. the N;wy ATe's and monilOr~ 

were used to help find the cl1t"my. Moving forward, the as~allil 

craft took lip position~ alon~side the ground troops to add their 

fires to the battle and :lssist Ihe infanrry to ('ross the Rach Ong 

Hieu, a small stream. When COI1lP.lIlY A. 4th Bau:tlion. 47th In· 

fantry, arrivcd from the sOllth at the Radl Ong Ilieu the N:ny 

ATC's provided lift across the stream. accomplishing in minutes 

what might have taken hOllTs, and furnishing file support a~ 

needed. By I~OO all blexl..s ,,'ere in position v"ith the exception of 

Comp.1ny C of the 4th Ball.dion. At 141 5 this IInit was liflcd h) 

helicopters from the anil1clY fire suppOrt 1l.1trol base IH.'ar thl' 

Mobile Riverine Base ~lIld 1:tnded to wllIpicle lhe hl()( k un the 

east next to Company B or the 4th lklltalion. The encirdt'lIIl:1H of 

the Viet Cong was fOl1Iplcle hy 1515. 

This encirclement W:-IS an'f)11lplished with a sllloolhly op{"ralin~ 

team of infantry, artillery, Na,.y ancl Air Force (-OmpOIll'lIIs. The 

tricky tides wefe knowli. :mci the boat commanders knt'w whcn 

and how far up a strcam they could go to provide support. The 

infan try comm:mders lll.tneu\'('Tl'(! their troops across the rice pac!· 
III CORI'S OPERATIONS AND TIIREAT TO DO/'I:G TAM 115 

dies carefully. alert for booby traps and ambushes. Just in advance 

of lead elements. artillery delivered white phosphorus rounds which 

exploded 200 feet above the ground. Constantly re.adj usted, this 

marking fire insured that rapid and accurate artillery fire could 

be placed on tlle ground in front of the U.S. troops when tlley were 

engaged with the enemy. The Navy moved up dose to the infantry 

positions to add the fire of the monitor's 40-mm. guns and al·mm. 

mortars to reduce Viet Cong bunkers and machine gun emplacements. The Air Force and the artillery worked in close co· 

ordination. simultanoously laying on air strikes anrl artillery fire. 

while the Navy monitors maintaim.-d direct fire. When the heli· 

copter company arrived in the battle area with Company C. 4th 

Battalion. 47th Infantry. it was able to land in a lone already 

secured by a U.S. ground unit. thus speeding lhe encirclement. 

Action continued during the afternoon of 20 July, with units 

tightening tlleir ring on the enemy as helicopters shutded back and 

forth bringing a resupply of munitions and food. Seventeen Viet 

Cong dead had been accounted for by nightfall of the 20th. The 

pressure of artillery and small amlS fire was mailllained. The infantry positioned 9O-mm. recoilless rines and began to punch holes 

in the enemy bunkers. With darkness the Viet Cong fire became 

sporadic. U.S. troops maintained vigilance over the area during 11,e 

night. using artillery illumination and allowing the Viet Cong no 

rest. 

On 21 July a methodical sweep of the battle area revealed 

fifteen enemy bodies. one pistol, and seven rifles. More than eighteen bunkers had been reduced to rubble. Ten prisoners of war 

were taken, one of whom stated that on meeting U.S. troops the 

Viet Cong compaQY had split into small groups and attempted to 

get out. 

On 22 July the first helicopter barge was delivered to the 

Mobile Riverine Base. It was prepared for movement with the 

3d Baualion. 31th Artillery. (0 the brigade ronvard command post 

at the barge·mounted artillery fire support base on 21 July. 

On 24 July. in co-operation with the 3d Baualion. Vietnam 

Marine Corps, the 3d Battalion, 46th Vietnam Inrantry Regiment. 

and GAME 'VARDEN patrol boalS. the Mobile Riverine Force began 

operating in the northern part of Can Giuoc District in an effort to 

reduce the enemy threat to the district capital. (Map 8) At 0320 

elements of the 3d Battalion. 34th Artillery. left the Mobile Riverine Base and went into position to support the operation at Fire 

Support Base TANGO. Elements of the 3d Battalion, 46th Vietnam 
116 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

SPECIAL 

NORTHERN CAN GtUOC 

l""I""i j-..u o· "i" 1 J ... _" .. 

MAP8 

lnfantry, moved from their cantonment area at C'ln Giuoc: directly 

cast across the Song Rach Olt to land unopposed. They moved 

northeast through selccted control poin15 to the Raeh Dua River 

without meeting the enemy. 

The 2d Brig-ddc troops appro.'lched the area (rom the south, 

moving up the waterways in ATe's prolC.."Ctcd by monitors. The 

3d ilaltaiion, 47th Infantry • .reinforced by the reconnaissance 

platoon of the 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry. went ashore on the 
III CORPS OPERATIONS AND TIlREAT TO DONG TAM 117 

north bank or the Rach Vang River, moved north, and secured its 

first objectives wjthout opposition. The 4th Ballalion remained 

aOoat near the mouth of the Rach Vang as the hrig-dde reserve. 

Company C of the 4th Baualion was landed at Fire Support Base 

X-RAY, fTom which it would later be deployed as needed by helicopter. The waterborne units of the 3d Battalion patrolled the 

waters of the Kinh Lo, Rach Giang, Rach Ba Dang, and Rach Vang 

to delectlhe enemy. The 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, 199th Infantry 

Brigade, also participated in the operation, landing two companies 

by air south of the Dong Dien stream. The Vietnamese Marine 

battalion was next to enter the operation, having been lifted by 

ATC's from loading poinlS at Nha Be to beaches along the north 

bank of a stream called Muong Lon. The landings were unopposed, 

and all units quickly secured their initial objectives. 

At 0915 one company of the 4th Ballalion, 47th Infantry, was 

inserted by ATC's at a beach on the east bank of the Rach Ba Dang 

and at 1110, the battalion's remaining two companies were brought 

into the operation, one landing by helicopter and the other by 

assault craft west of the Rach Ba Dang. A few bunkers and booby 

traps were found and destroyed. Team Recon discoven_-d freshly 

broken ground guarded by booby traps; funJler search disclosed 

an arms cache containing two 57-mm. recoilless rifles, one 75·mm. 

recoilless rifle, and one 81·mm. mort..-tr with bipod. Other elements 

of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infanlry, also discovered arms. The cadles 

contained a total of sixteen individual and four crew-served 

weapons. 

Throughout the day of 24 July no enemy was sighted. On the 

morning of 25 July the Vietnam Marine Corps battalion and the 

3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, cleared the remainder of the assigned 

areas of operation. The marines consolidated in place along the 

banks of Muong Lon facing north, while the 4th Battalion, 47th 

Infantry, was taken aboard ATe's from beaches on the south bank 

of the Rach Dua and Rach Ciong Rivers to begin movement south. 

In the northern operational area the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry. had 

moved to the east, while the Vietnam marines held their position. 

The 3d Battalion, 46th Victnam Infantry, had swung about to 

search again to Ule southwest, arriving at the original beaches about 

1540. By 1715 all units werc on their way to Ulcir home stations 

by water or air. 

A Hoi Chanh who had rallied to the republic during the operation said that his unit had been directed to hide its weapons and 

equipment, break up into small groups, and temporarily cease 

operations in the Can Giuoc area. He said lhat his unit had opcr· 
MAP 9 

Bose oreo 

470 
dfjJ"J 

~ 

{) 

1 0~"' 11 

r:;,1f'J v"..;.. ~""'" [.: 1"{jI 

DINH TUONG 

JlIly _AU,." OP E RATION ___ 1967 

~ ... MO)1Iemen l to contact 

(I PoI'oI oreas 01 00 

I 

' "I' a l S 

(I iliij '\ '\ "',! I ~""lES 

(oppro .. mo~e~LOM{f(R$ 
120 

ated in c',n CiLl(x' and Can Du{)(' Disll'itts of I.ong An PrminlC 

prior (0 hallles with the i\lohik Ri\C1illc FOliC, 

Al th e end of Opcr:ltinn (;OIWNADO I 011 2!i .lilly the Mohile 

Riverine Furce. opcr:lling in ca!)lcrn l.ung ,'11 1)\'0\ inn.'. the Rung 

Sat Spl'Cial Zone. ;lIld C" COllI-{ Prm i m,e, had killed 478 of I he 

enemy sinfC 17 JUlle. The furee had heen opcl;lIing in arca:; seldom 

frcquclHcd b) the Sotllh Vicln;ml ;\nllY ancl mhel U.S. ullits. 

Dirtlt TIIOlIg O/wmlioll 

The Mohile Ri\erine Forte l'ndcd opcr:ltiollS in the l.ong An 

area because uf rdiahl(' illll'lliv,CIKC inclk:lling an cnCIll) huildl1p 

wCSt of My Tho in Dillh TUelng PI()\ inc'c. The force rcu:iwcl 

word on 25 July Chat the 1o.10hil{' RiH'rinc Itlsc wuuld mme on 

27 July from the nmiluclUC of the Soi Rap anel Vam Co R,\crs to 

the "lci11ity of Dong: T:IIII. nurinA the ahClIloon of 25 .lilly ~rollnrl 

forces were pid:.ed lip by the a.llsauh naft al1(l returned to the 

Mobile Riverine ilase. At OZOO un 27 luly ri"erinc ass:ndt ("faft 

began leavinA the base for mim.-sweeping and patrol sl:ltions :l1oug 

the route to D()n~ Tam. AI 05!",O the last ship of Ihe fOTl"(' wa~ plO' 

cceding south on the Soi Rap Ri,·cr. Ik(au\c of Ihe sloll .. peed of 

the LO\\'cci APL moving ag;lillst thc lide the jomne) took ciCH'n 

and a half hours. This did 1I0t, 110\\'('vcr. dclay thl' (OmIlH..'mClIlem 

of the operation in Dinh Ttul1ll-\ PlOvil1((, nn 2H July. In just mer 

forty·eigln hours the i\lohile Riv('I"ilic F()r("(~ was ahle to rclo(';\tc 

a hase supporting is,nOO men m('1 a dist:lIl(c of si\.t)' miles anc! 10 

shift its area of opcrations a toLd "f ci~ht)' fi\'e miles to the area 

w(,st of Dong Tam. 

The ~Iohile Riverine Fone was ahout to join thc lar~est fone 

wilh which it would (U-OPCLlt(' ill a 'Iin~lc operation in its Vi(:tllal11 

cxperience, Imellig:encc indk;lll'd that :t Vi(,t Con}: fOl"("(' of scn'ral 

battalions threatened M)' Tho ;llIcI non~ Tam: Ihe plan \\';1'1 to 

:tttad. sillluh:meuusl), three of the fUIII "icl C()n~ h;lse arr:t .. in 

Dinh TII()n~ PrO\incc from h'hidl an allad. hy lile ellelll) IIIIAht 

be staged. (AI "I) 9) 

On 27 .lilly the 7th AIIII)' of Vil,tnam Divi.llion illiti,lIed opera· 

lions desigll('d to se;tnh for tlu' "kl COilA from e:\st 10 Wl'st, 1l00th 

of Ilighway 'I. The sc:tnh \\IHlld «I\('r the ler .. itOlY arollnd til(' 

Ap nac Viet c.(JI1~ ha.llc and ('lid in the l';"lelll IXlrtion 0" enemy 

hase :lrea 470. On 2~ .lilly the I\ lollilc RiH'lill<.' Fllne wuuld 1110\'(' 

into lhe C"III Son h;ISl' art'a: 1111 2!1 July OtiC Clr 1II01"C hatt;tiiolls of 

the Vietn.11II M,lrillc (:f)rp~ \\'"lld 11I0\t' into till' Ibn I.flll~ Ihl"C 

arca. The U.S. !.lth Di\ i,illil \\,I~ to pl'He the rlth Batt;tlioll, (iOth 
III CORI'S OPERATIO NS AND T I1REAT TO DONG TAM 121 

Infantry (Mechanized), under the operational comrol of the 2d 

Brigade for the Cam Son operation, and was to hold the 3d Bat. 

talion,39th Infantry, on ca ll at that battalion's Long An base camp. 

The 1st Brigade, U.S. 25th Division . was to arrive at Dong Tam 

011 28 Jul y for commitment under the operational control of the 

9th U.S. Division. The 7th Army of Vietnam Division was given 

the 44th Ranger Battalion by the commander of IV Corps for in· 

sen ion by helicopter into the northwestern portion of Cam Son 

on 28 July. The U.S. Navy Task Force 116 (GAME WARDEN) was 

to patrol the My Tho Ri ver from My Tho to Sa Dec with thirty 

river patrol l)Q.lLS. To fac ilitate command and comrol, the U.S. 9th 

Division moved a forward command post to Dong Tam for the 

operation. 

The Mobi le Riverine Force operation in C,m Son began duro 

ing the night of 28 .July with the movement of the 5th Battalion , 

60lh Infanlry (Mechani7cd). from its Long An base camp along 

Highway 4 lO the town of C,i Lay. A battalion command post was 

established there as the maneuver companies continued south into 

the Cam Son area . As the mechanized battalion moved into the 

area of opera tions from the northeast, the 3d and 4th Battalions of 

the 47th Infantry moved by assault craft into the waterways in the 

southern portion of Cam Son. 

Troop D, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, minus the aerial rifle 

pl atoon, was operating with the Mobile Riverine Force for the 

first time. The troop had a recon naissance mission covering the 

eastern Cmu Son and western Ban Long areas on the brigade's 

n:mk. One rine company of the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, was 

on call to the 2d Brigade for airmobile employment from Dong 

Tam. 

Two assault helicopter companies were available to the 2d 

Brigade from II Field Force. At 0800 on 28 Jul y they conducted 

feint landings at twO land ing zones just north of known enemy 

fortifications in nonhern Cam Son for the purpose of delaying 

enemy movement north until both the 5th Battalion,60th Infantry, 

and the 44th Ranger Baualion could move into blocking positions 

ncar the feint landing zones. 

On 28 July troops of the 7th Army of Vietnam Division nonh 

of Il ighwa y 4 received a little enemy fire and the Mobil e Riverine 

Force encountered a few snipers in Cam Son. Troop D detected a 

squad of the enemy in the Ban Long area and killed five men 

wi th gunship fire. 
122 RIVERINE OI'ERATI01\'S 

Throughout the laic morning on 29 July bOlh Ihe 3d and 4th 

Battalions. 47th Infantry, discovered widely dispersed small enemy 

groups. From their Illovements il was deduccd 11m! Ihcsc groups 

werc trying to fall back to the north into a fortified area. As the 

3d Galla lion moved compa nies illlo this area from th e north and 

south on the east bank of the Rach Ba Rai, the enemy rcsisled. 

Between the hours of 1700 and 1900. Company C of the 3d Battalion pressed norll1: sillall enemy groups moving nonhcast delayed 

th e compa ny's advance. Sometime dllring th ese 1\\'0 hOIlTS an ATe 

was hit by 6-40 rockets and 57-mill. recoilless dOc fire: t",cntv-five 

men-Army and Navy-were wounded hy fragment .. , The 5th 

Battalion, GOth Infantry. fired upon individuals and small groups 

of the enemy during the late afternoun and c\'eninA. None of the 

Mobile Ri verine Force units were able to fis the enemy position 

and by 1930 COlHaCl with the enemy was IOSlo Most of the Viel Cong 

dead were fOllnd whcn thc infantry moved into arcas which had 

been attacked by artillery anrl helicopter gu nships. 

By the night of 29 Jul y, the fact that the 7th Vietnam Army 

Division north of Highway" had found few Viet Cong and t1l<tl 

the Viet Cong in central Cam Son had evaded major battle 

prompted General O·Connor. 9th Division, and Colonel Lan. commanding the Vietnam marines. to n)llsider the prohability that the 

encmy was in the Ban Long area. Although what the Mobile 

Riverine Force had learned abom the enemy in centra l Cam Son 

was far from conclusive, the highly c\'asive tactics of the enemy 

encountered by the force was considered an indication that the 

Viet Cong units that the force had met might be prou.'"Cti ng the 

movement of larger units intu the Ban Long area. This was in 

keeping with the paltern of 1lI0\'Clllem in southern Dinh Tuong 

Province. and while no enemy I\'as detected in Ban Long by 0 

Troop on 29 .July. an enemy sCJuad had been altacked there by 

gunships on 28 July. 

At approximately 2000 on 29 July Colonel Lan selected a landing zone for his 3d Baualion of Vietnam marines w begin landing 

hy helicopter in Ban Long Oil :10 July. The area selet:ted by C.olonel 

Lan as a likely enemy IXlsilinn 1\':lS ne;II' the place where D Troop 

had discovered the enemy on 28July. 

When it landed on :W July the :ld Vietnam fI,'larine c.orps nat· 

lalion met heavy rcsist:lllce. The troops immcrliately OIllackecl the 

enemy. who were in a wooded area nonh of the lanciinf{ 7one. More 

marines were airlifted into the landin~ lone. still under enemy 

fire. For live hours the marines allad;.ed prepared Viet Cong de· 
III CORPS OPERATIOi\S A'n TIIREAT TO OOI\G TAM ]23 

fensive positions. The enemy arlllament consisted of light and 

hea"y ma(hine glillS :lIlel monar~. The marines relied on helicopter 

gunships anel artillery. The :!d ~bnnc Battalion fought the enemy 

IhrouRhout the ,afternoon. laking ,I feh' casualties and reporting 

more and more of the enemy lilled and more equipment captured. 

General O·Connor. noting the long cast-west bell of trees that 

could pro\ide concealmelH for Ihe enemy. employed the 1st Brigade. 25th U.S. Division. cast of the marines' location to block 

movement of Ihe enemy 10 the east. In midaflernoon General 

O'Connor directed ("..olonel Fulton, commanding onicer of the 2d 

Brigade. to assist the 3d Marine Battalion in evacu:uing casualties 

and in preparing for :111 alt:lck against the Viet Cong. Colonel 

Fulton direnccl l.iCLHenant Colonel Bruce E. \Vallace. commander 

of the:old Battalion. 47th Infantry. 10 establish a blocking position 

west of the haule area. fae-ing C:!la. a mancliver accomplished by 

2000. The 4th Halllliion. 47th inf;'lmry. in the field for three days. 

was reltLrnee! to the Mohile Ri\erinc Hasc with instructions to be 

prepared to deploy carlyon :11 .Jul\". The 5th Battalion. GOth In· 

fantfY. was dct;'lched to 9th Dilision at 1230. 

nurin~ the action on ~!l July seve",] assault l}().1LS were hit 

with small arms. rocket, ;'lnd recoilless rine fire. The monitor most 

~eriously hit suffered no major Stfuctur:1i damaAe. HilS and minor 

damage were reccivcd hy fi\c other ('f;'lft. hilt the boau were able 

to absorb punisilmclH and rem:lin in operation. 

Al approximately 2030 on 30 .July. Colonel Lan requested 

illumination for ;'l ni~ht ;'lltack against the enemy positions. The 

suhsccluem attack by the 3d Vietnam Marine Corps Battalion 

silenced sever.II 12.7·nHu. machine guns <lncl inAicterl losses on the 

enemy. The ;'ltwck \\';'lS stopped by the 3d Marine B;'lualion commander hecause his own losses were hea\'y. lIIuminaiion was main-

(;'lined during the niAill: ;'It appro...:im:uely 04~0. 31 .July. the enemy 

coul1ternuackeri to the cast. Ilith hea\y losses to both sides. 

I.:ller in the morning of 31 luly, the 5th Battalion. 60th In· 

famry. was ag;'lin placed under Ihe operation'll comrol of Colonel 

Fulton. At os~r,. the Imwl\ion w('nl to the assistance of the 1st 

Squadron, (itll Victn;'llllese Army C;'l\';'llry. ane! the 44th Ranger 

H;'lualion. \\'hich had lIlel the cn('IIlY \\'hile moving to assist the 3d 

Marine B;'llwlion. Hy OR25 the .lith 11:.1I;'llion. 60th Infantry, occupied a bl<xl..ing position nonheasl of the 3d 1\311;'lliol1, 47th Infamry, where it remained during the day. During the morning of 

31 ./111)'. the 3d Battalion. 39th Inf;'lntr),. also was placed under the 

opcr;'ltion;'ll comrol of Colonel Fulton, bringing the Mobile Riv-
124 

erine Force to four hallalions <Ind Troop n, :!d Squadron, 5th 

Cavalry. The 3rl [lallation, :S!hh In(;mlry. landed sollth of Vinh 

Kim and searched west. 

Reports from the 44th Ranger llallation and ~d l\hrine Battalion indica ted that the Viet C.ong. tentativel y identified as the 

26lSd Main Force H:lllaIiOIl. had dispersed during the predawn 

countera llack ancl wcrc making th eir way south. Airborne recon· 

naiss.1ncc by the 3d [lallation, 39th Infantry. revealed movemenf 

sou th in the direction of the villa~c of Ap Binh Thoi. 

Colonel Fulton directed the 3d llallation. 39th Infantry. to 

conduct reconnaissance using helicopters southeast of the battle 

area and working west to Ap Uinh Thoi. He directed Colonel 

\Vallace to move his battalion solilheaSI and to search the area as he 

closed on Ap Sinh Thoi. This movement was initiated in midmorning and by 1700 bOlh baualions were on the oUl.5kirts of Ap 

Binh Thoi. During that time Viet Cong were observed moving into 

Ap Binh Thoi in groups of twenty·five to thirty. 

The 4th Battalion. 47th Infantry. augmented by elements of a 

Vietnamese field police force company. landed by ATC and entered 

Ap Binh Thoi. One company moved Ollt to search nortll\",est of the 

town while the rest of the baltalion assisted the Vietnamese police 

in rounding up and illlerrogating people suspected of being Viet 

Cong. Several of the prisoners reported that the Viet Cong units 

encountered by the Vietnamese marines were the 263d Main Force 

Battalion and elements of the 514th Local Force Battalion. The 

prisoners were classified as Viet Cong when they confessed to having hidden their arms as they lerl the baule area during the early 

morning darkness. Company C, 4th Battalion. 47th Infantry, cap. 

hIred four men northwest of Ap Binh Thai, all of them members 

of the 263d Main Force Baualion and one of them the battalion 

deputy commander. Of the more than 400 suspeCts detained by the 

National Police. 83 were from the 263d Main Force Battalion. 

The cordon around Ap ninh Thoi \\'as completed by dark on 3 1 

July. and no morc of the Viet Cong were sighted. 

The four-day operation, pdmarily because of the outstanding 

performance of the 3d Victnam Marine Battalion. ca used severe 

losses to the Viet Cong 263d Main Force Battalion, destroyed major 

fortifications in the Calli Son base area, probably tilw;lrted planned 

enemy operations against Dong Tam, and eased the pressure on 

Highway 4. It also demonstrated the ability of U.S. and Vietnamese 

forces to work together. After the operation intelligence sources 

reported t.hat the enemy had attempted to organilc boaLS for a 

crossing of the My Tho River into Kien Hoa Province but \\Jere 
III COR P!' OPERATIOr->S ANn TltR .. : AT TO nOr->(; TAM 125 

stopped by the cord on a t Ap Binh Thai a nd the river patrols. 

During the five-day operation on th e !\Iy Tho River more than 

fifty patrol cra ft were emplo)'cc\: 2R:! Vietnamese wa tercraft were 

stopped and sea rched hv na\'al (Taft from GAME WARDEN and the 

Mobile Ri\erin e Force in the most ambitious a ttempt lO control 

river tranLc during the force's opaatiol1S in 1967. 

During operations frolll 28 lilly to I August, a large number 

o f soldiers in lhe ~d Ballalion, 17th Infantry, develo ped foot trou -

ble as a resu lt o f spending n\'e successi\'c da ys on flooded land. The 

4th Battalion, \\,hi('h had had one n ight of rcst aboard ships o f the 

Mobi le Ri veri ne Base, experienced a similar but lower rate of 

fungus infection and immersion fool. 

The iHobile R iverille Forer Returns to III Cor/)s 

CORONADO III was cond ucted in the Rung Sat Special Zone 

from 5 through 17 August a fter the Mobile Ri veri n e Base had 

moved from Dong Tam to an anchorage at the junction of the 

Soi Rap and Vam Co Rivers, The purpose of the operation was 

to disrupt IXJssibte Viet Cong attacks o n shipping in the Long Tau 

cha nnel. AlthouAh no attacks were made on shippi ng during the 

operation, the ~fobi1e Ri\'crine Force fought slXJradically with the 

Viet Cong- and ca ptu red some munitions. 

The Commande r of Nava l Forces. Vietnam, provided th e 

followi ng c\'alualion o f the Mobi le Riverine Force through 

CORONADO III: 

Perhaps the best evaluation of l\IRF achievements can be allained 

by exami ning the results of frC(luclll ri verin e operations in Ca n Ciouc 

District of eastern Long All Provin("e, In its first operation in this area 

on 19 and 20 June, the i\IRF became engaged in the toughest fight it 

has experi-.:nced to date. Over 250 of the enemy were killed at a cost 

of 46 US KIA :\Ild 140 wounded. As the i\IRF returned to Can Ciouc 

for funher operations in 1;lIe June. during Jul y and again in late 

August, it never fai led to make contact with th e enemy. The si7e of 

the enemy units encountered has grown smaller ami the percentage 

of prisoners taken versus enemy killed has risen steadily_ Increasingly 

large caches of wea pons have lJeen uncovered. River Assau h craft now 

move freely through areas \\'h('l'c two months __ go ;nn bush with RPC-2's 

or recoilless rifl es cou ld be anticipated at an y moment. In summary. it 

appears that a VC haven ami ~tro ol d. rarely ventured into hy 

:\RVN or FWi\IAF in the pasl, has been reduced to an area containing 

on ly scattered and poorl y Mg'L ni7eti VC Guerillas, 

/Jell Lllc Operatioll 

CORONADO IV was conducted from 19 August through 9 September, Idtll operations in Long An. Co Congo and Kicn H oa 
126 IUVERINE OI'ERATIO'\ " 

LONG 

PROVINCE 

BEN LUC OPERATION 

20 A~9U" 1961 

--+ 

-- w •• ,... _0_1 to ._ot' 

.-tt," 'K_oI1U ... 

.. 

- FIr .... _ ..... 

I-l ~"'i' _,_',., ~-Jr .... " o s • ..-,ua 

MAP 10 

• 

, ... 

Provinces. On 20 August lhc assault crah left the Soi Rap and 

Yam Co Ri,cr anchorage of the Mobile Ri\('rinc Base just ahcr 

midnight and landed troops OIl 0901 in the target area nonh of 

Ben Luc on the Vam Co Dong Ri,cr. a clist<HllC or o,'cr 11ft) kil· 

ometers. (Map /0) nCGIUSC waterways off lhe Vam Co Dong in the 

target area werc nOI na\igablc . • he lwa infantl-y battalions were 
III CORPS OPERATIONS AND THREAT TO DONG TAM 127 

landed to move west and search the area on foot. Company C of 

the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, remained at a pickup zone near 

the fire support base at Ben Luc as an ainnobile reserve. To intercept enemy forces, the 334th Aviation Company's supponing gunships maintained surveillance of the areas forward of the infantry 

battalions. 

At 1400 the movement of the 3d Battalion. 47th ]nfantry, 

forced an enemy platoon From a lightly fortified area. The gunships 

were placed under control of the battalion commander, and were 

directed against the enemy. who was attempting to evade contact 

with the ground troops. The gunships sighted the enemy troops and 

took them under fire. after which the reconnaissance platoon of 

the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. was brought in by helicopter to 

mop up. The platoon encountered some fire from snipers and 

co-ordinated fire of the supporting gunships on the enemy. A search 

of the area revealed that thirty.four of the enemy had been killed. 

From documenu found in the area the enemy was identified as an 

element of the 506th Local Force Battalion. 

The success of this operation was attributed to the surprise 

achieved by the ground troops landing from the river; the Viet 

Cong were forced into the open where gunships could take them 

under fire. During the operation, which ended on 22 August. the 

Mobile Riverine Force suffered six wounded and the enemy lost 

fifty-nine killed. 

For the remainder of August and the first week of September, 

the Mobile Riverine Force operated in Can Giuoc District, en· 

countering minor enemy resistance. On 7 and B September the 

force operated in conjunction with the 1st Brigade. 9th Division. 

in the southeastern part of Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa 

Province and the northeastern part of the Rung Sat Special Zone. 

Few Viet Cong were encountered but a cache containing medical 

supplies, eight crew-served weapons, and ninety·seven small anns 

was discovered. This operation was one of thc first in which Colonel 

Bert A. David commanded the 2d Brigade. Colonel David assumed 

command as Colonel Fulton. promoted to brigadier general, became assistant division commander of the 9th Infantry Division. 

General Fulton was rcsponsiblc to Gcneral O·Connor. now com· 

mander of the 9th Divisinn, for operations in the Mekong Delta. 

At this point in early September the Mobile Riverine Force had 

operated extensively in the III Corps provinces north of the Mekong River. As the second week of September began, the force 

preparcd to return to Dinh Tuong, an area of gTcat intcrcst to the 

senior adviser of the IV Corps Tactical Zone. 
CHAPTER VII 

Cam Son to the Rach Ruong Canal 

On 11 September 1967 the Mobile Riverine Force returned to 

Dong Tam to prepare for an operation that would start in the Ban 

Long area on 12 September. the first operation of CoRONAOO v. 

Brigadier General Nguyen Manh Thanh, commander of the Anny 

of Vietnam 7th Division, furnished information thallhc Viet Cong 

263d Main Force Ranallon h .. d been in the Cam Son and Ban 

Long area during the preceding ten to fourleen days. Although the 

7th Division inlcJligence was known to depend largely on reports 

of agcnts and informers, tJ1C Mobile Riverine Force had found it 

highly reliable in identifying enemy base areas. In Dinh Tuong 

Province particularly the force repeatedly had found the Viet 

Cong in regions reported to be base areas. 

Dinh Tuong Province and Coronado V 

On 12 September the Mobile Riverine Force entered the Ban 

Long area with three battalions. The 3d ancl 5th Battalions of the 

60th Infantry-the 5th again released from operational control of 

the 3d Brigade to operate under the 2d Brigade- relied on helicopter and overland movement to get into the major east-west 

forested portion of the Ban Long area. The aSS<l.lllt craft of the force 

were unable to navigate the waterways of the arca. 

As the 3d Battalion. 60th Infantry, moved into the forest it 

found an enemy force in well-prepared positions. Assisted by 

artillery and close air support, the b:ntalion advanced to the cast. 

The Viet Cong, under the prcssure of the in("ntry advance and 

supporting fire, atlcmpted to evade to the north and northwest. 

exposing themselvcs along thinly vegetated rice paddy dikes. The 

5th Battalion. 60th Infantry. northwcst of the 3d Battalion, engaged a platoon of the enemy; fire from MJIJ\ armored personnel 

carriers and the battalion's mortar platoon killed or dispersed the 

enemy. 

At approximately 1430 a provisional battalion of Dinh Tuong 

Province Regional Forces was sent In by helicopter northeast of 
CAM SON TO THE RACH RUONG CANAL 129 

the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry. Tht: provisional battalion engaged 

widely dispersed enemy elemenls that had been forced from hiding 

by the 3d and 5th Battalions, 60th Infantry, attacks. Mobile Riverine Forces losses were nine soldiers killed and twenty-three wounded 

-all from the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry. The three battalions accounted for 134 Viet Cong killed and 39 captured. Although the 

main forces of the enemy had escaped on 12 September, the Mobile 

Riverine Force continued to search the Ban Long are.a until it 

rewrned to the Mobile Riverine Base on 14 September. (Map 11) 

Colonel David, after consulting with Ceneral Fulton, con· 

c1uded that if an operation was lau nched in the Cam Son area on 

15 September the enemy force, tentatively identified as the 5 14th 

Local Force Battalion, might be found . The plan was to strike the 

area in centra l Cam Son where the enemy's heaviest fortifications 

had been identified on previous operations. To reach lhis area 

before the major enemy force could escape, Colonel David decided 

to withhold preparatory and reconnaissance fire until the assault 

craft of the Mobile Riverine Force passed a wide curve in the Rach 

Ba Rai referred to as "Snoopy's Nose." I-Ielicopter flights over the 

area were to be limited until the assault crah cleared Snoopy's 

Nose. The movement of the 5th Battalion. 60th Infantry, by ground 

vehides into the area from Cai Lay was to be delayed until the 

3d &ttaJion, 60th Infantry, and 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, entered the Rach Ba Rai aboard ATC's. Finally, to provide a higher 

degree of flexibility if the enemy was found, the 2d Battalion, 60th 

Infantry, 3d Brigade, was designated a reserve force by the 9th 

Division. If required, the battalion would be employed by helicopter, staging from Dong Tarn after movement from tJ1e battalion's Long An Province base. 

Key elements of tJ1e maneuver were the landing of the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, north of an eastward bend in the Rach Ba 

Rai and the movement of the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, from 

the northeast. Both battalions would attack into a series of tree 

lines which the brigade planners believed had been used by enemy 

troops in the past to escape fighting. 

As the 3d Baltalion, 60th Infantry, moved up the Rach Ba Rai 

at approximately 0715 on 15 September, fire was withheld. and 

the assault craft moved steadily around Snoopy's Nose. By 0730 

lead boals were nearing Beach White Two where a company of 

Lieutenant Colonel Mercer M. Doty's 3d Battalion, 60tJI Infantry, 

was to land when the boat fonnalion came under heavy rocket, 

automatic, and small anns fire from both sides of the stream. 
MAP II 
Jl BAN LONG AND CAM SON OPERATIONS 

Siptember 1967 

o I l MU1 

bl ."",+1 "', ,,,;'T' .,1 'lr'I ~'~~'~L-, __ :::----'1 o I I Q.QCf£lllS 
132 RIVERI NE OPERATIO NS 

Enemy fire was heavier from the cast bank , and the organ ic 

firepower of the riverine assa ult craft was unleashed primaril y to 

the right flank of the force. In the smoke and confusion the assault 

craft maneuvered to fire \."eapons or to avoid other craft temporarily out of control. One ATe proceeded north of the lead minesweepers and landed on Beach White Two with the company 

commander and onc platoon of Compan y B of Colonel Daly's 

baualion. 

During the critical fifteen to twenty minutes following initi al 

enemy fire, the flow of information through the command and 

control communications nct did littl e to reflect the situation. 

Colonel Daty, fl ying over the boat fonnation and observing the 

apparent mobility of all assa ult cra ft and the success of one ATC 

in arriving at Beach White Two, was convinced that his unit could 

continue and land at the assigned beaches. Lieutenant Commander 

Francis E. (" Dusty") Rhodes, Jr., commanding the ass.aull cra ft 

supporting Colonel Doty, issued an order at 0758 for all hoats to 

LOrn back and assemble in the vicinity of Beaches Red One and 

Two. Commander Rhodes' decision that the convoy should turn 

back was based on casualties to boat crews and damage to minesweepers. The standing orders of Task Force 117 required thal 

minesweepers precede ATC's carrying troops. but he could not 

continue minesweeping to Beach White One. To act contrary to 

this procedure would constitute an action outside the " limits permitted by accepted tactical practices" of the Navy task force. 

The boat captain who passed the minesweepers and landed 

his ATC at White Beach One was probably influenced to press on 

by the fact that the infantry company commander was on board. 

The successful movement of lhis onc assault craft was not known 

to Lieutenant Commander Rhodes at the time o[ his decision. 

Colonel DOlY did not waiver from his convi ction tha t the convoy 

could and should continue. His 5-3, Major Richard H. Sharp. 

abo.'!rd the command boat relayed Colonel Doty's decision to "send 

in the troops" to Commander Rhodes. 

While tile 3d Uau .• 1Iion. 60th Infantry. and River Ass.ault Squadron 11 evacuated casua lties, resupplied. and reorganized at the Reel 

Beaches. the 5th Battalion, 60th Infan try, moved overland toward 

Beach White One from the northeast. The 3d Battalion. 47th Infantry. was commanded by Colonel Tutwiler. who had previously 

commanded the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry. He held his baa:tlion 

south of the congesled area of Beach Red. prepared to resume movement on order. 
CAM SON TO TIlE RACH RUONG CANAL 133 

At approximately 1000 Colonel Doty's baualion began to move 

upstream, sUPIXlrtoo by artillery gunships and helicopters. The 

volume of fire was as great as before but the convoy landed at 

Beaches White One and Two. Companies Band C had few men 

wounded in this second mn. while Company A had eighteen men 

wounded in onc phtoon. I30lh the assault craft and the infantry. 

who had joined freely in returning the enemy fire, required re· 

supply of ammunition. Once ashore. the 3d Battalion. 60th Infan· 

try, attacked south against stubborn enemy resislance. The 3d 

Battalion. 47th Infantry. landed at Beaches Red One and Two and 

pushed north. The 5th Uatlalion, 60th Infantry. moved close 

enough to sec the 3d Ballalion. 60th Infantry, by early afternoon. 

To encircle the enemy south of Colonel Doty's battalion, the 

2d Battalion. 60th Infantry. was placed under the operational 

control of the 2<1 Brigade and landed by helicopter south of the 

5th Battalion. 60th Infantry. By dark the 3d Battalion. 60th Infantry, unable to overcome the enemy resistance, was ordered back 

to improve its defensive position. One Vietnam Army battalion 

was landed by helicopter at approximately 1600, northwest of the 

3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, and moved to set up a position along 

the west bank of the Rach Ba Rai. The four U.S. battalions were 

in an irregular arc on the east side of the Rach Ba Rai. The stream 

was a possible enemy escape route west, although the 3d Battalion, 

47th Infantry. had seized a number of sampans jusl north of route 

212 during the late afternoon. Assault crah supporting the 3d Bat· 

talion, 47th Infantry, and 3d Baltalion, 60th Infamry, were posi. 

tioned to observe and place lire along the stream; however, no U.S. 

hoalS were deployed into the stream unless there were American 

or Vietnamese troops ashore. 

During darkness air and artillery illumination was maintained 

over the area and artillery fire was placed wi'thin the partially 

encircled area on likely enemy locations. Between 0200 and 0430. 

slllall groups of enemy soldiers were observed and fired upon for. 

ward of the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, and later the 3d Battalion, 

47th Infantry. After 0130 on 16 September no Viet Cong were 

sighted. On 16 September the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, led 

the sweep into the area. followcd by sweeps by the twO southern 

battalions forward of their positions. Resistance was light; most of 

the enemy force encountered on 15 September had been killed or 

had slipped away during the night. 

The N'lvy assault craft expended. during the period 0730-1600 

on 15 September, 10.273 rounds of 40·mm. ammunition, sixteen 
134 RIVERINE Ol'i':RATIONS 

KEEN HOA 

MAP 12 

rounds of SI-mm., 7,445 rou nds of 20·mm., 20,934 rounds of .50-

caliber, and 40,2 16 rounds of .30-caliber. The operation ended on 

16 September, after four days of heavy fighting in which tllC 

Americans and Vietnamese Ion J 6 kill ed and 146 wounded and 

the Viet Cong lost 213. 

Following the Cam Son operation. the Mobile Riverine Force 

moved into Kien HO<I Province. (Map 12) Although operati ons 

during the remainder of September were widely sell.unled in Ham 

Long, Giang Trom, and I-Iuong My Districts. illlcrrogation of local 

civilians revea led that they had prior kn owledge of the operations. 

In Giang Tram District local inhabitants sa id that a Viet Gong 

unit. believed to be pan of the 5 16lh Local Force RanaHan, had 

been in the area, but had left the night before the Riverine Force 

arrived. This experience became chanlcteristic of Mobile Riverine 

Force operations conducted in Kien Hoa Prov ince in late 1967. 

Operations usually involved brushes with enemy rocket launcher 

and recoi ll ess rifl e teams which delayed operations but inflicted 

few losses. Helicopters became invaluable during movement to 

detect and engage small enemy teams armed wilh antitank weapons. 

These operations in Kien Hoa Province saw the first use or the long· 

awaited assa ult suppOrt patrol boats. 
CA:l.1 SO;.: TO TilE RACH RUO"\G CA '\AL 

During the period :,-7 Onoher, th e Mohile Ri\('rine forn.' 

terminated major operations of COII.ONAIIO V wi th an nperation in 

the Ban Long :lre;'1. It was cundu(tcd in dose cO'f)perOl ti on wi th the 

7th Army of Vietn:nn ni\'ision and rC<iuhed in a hattie wi llI the 

Viet Gong 263d Main Fane Hattalion. The Mohile Ri\Crinc force 

had I killed and 26 wOllnded, while the Vietnam Arm)' flh Divi· 

sion suffered 6 killed and 36 wounded. The Vict Con~ losses 

tOl...11ed 163 killed, 

The Mobile Ri\'eri ne Force moved to Vung Tau on 10 OClOher 

and CORO:"'AOO VI commenced on II Octoher in the Rung Sat 

Special Zone. Minor CIl}\agemenlS took pI:.cc and small lots of 

weapons and supplies were discovered. On the night of IIi October 

the Mobile Riverine Force sent out forty.eight ambush patrols and 

twenty·two 001t patrols in order to insure the security of th e Long 

Tau shipping channel. No ships h'ere attacked during the Mobile 

Riverine Force oper:nions. 

On 20 October the Mohile Riverine Force moved to the june· 

ture of the Soi Rap and Vam ('..0 Rivers. From this base CORO:-.-.... OO 

VII was initiated. with operations in the northern part of Can 

Ciuoc District to sccure the \\'ater",a)"5 \I'hile elections were bein)!; 

held in the Repuhlic of Vietnam. Both infantry and assault craft 

were widely dispersed to get as many American soldiers into the 

area ao; possible. The usual search of water craft was discontinued. 

After the elections the commander of the 46th Vietnam Army 

Regiment lold Colonel David that the wrnout for the election 

had been 83 percent of the registered votcrs. 

CORON .... OO VIII was conducted in co·ordination witll the Royal 

Thai Regimcnt and clements of (he 3d Baltalion, 5th Cavalry. on 

27.28. and 29 OClOber in tile soHtilern Nhon Trach and the northern Rung Sat Special Zone. There were fe\\' encounters with the 

enemy. 

Coronado IX 

CORONADO IX hegan willI th e movement of the Mobile Riverine 

Base from its late Octoher anchorage off Vllng Tall to an anchorage 

in the ~Iy Tho River ncar Dong Tam. The series of operations 

thaI constituted CORm,AI)() IX was conducted primarily north of 

the My Tho Ri\er and directed against the enemy hases of Oinh 

Tuong Province. 

The i\·lobile Riverine Force arrived off Dong Tam I November 

1967 and duri ng the first days of the month conccntr:ued all equip· 

ment maintenance anrl preparations for coming operations. The 

3d Battalion. 60th Infantry. ciehark<,·cI .mel assllmed the defense 
136 RIVERI"E Ol'ERATI01'\S 

miSSion for Dong Tam Hase. The baualion's waterborne replacemCIH was the 3d Battalion, <tith Infantry, which began tactical 

operations in lhe southeastern pan of the Ciao Duc District in 

western Dinh Tuong Pro\ incc at 1500 on 2 November. During the 

nine.hour operation, the battalion destroyed H I enemy bunkers 

and c\-acwHed 1.100 pounds of rice and an assortment of enemy 

engineering and medical materials from a t:achc. The evacuated 

materials weTe dcli\Crcd w the Dinh Tllong Province Headquarters for distribution within go\crnmcllI programs. 

On 5 and 6 Novemher. a tWQ-b:lllalion operation was conducted 

in the Cam Son ScerC'l lone. l3arg;c-lIloulllcc! artillery gave support 

from a position on the north shore of the My Tho Ri\er. In this 

operation lhe Mobile Ri\erine Force deslro}'ed 34 bunkers, cap' 

tured 800 pounds of ricc and 125 pounds of 5.'lh, and killed fi,'c of 

the enemy. 

'Vilh the arriv:1l of the rllh Baltalion of the Viel1lamese Marine 

Corps at a shore camp ncar y Tho on 6 November, lhe Mobile 

Riverinc Force had a new and valuable asset. The 5th became the 

third maneuver ballalion. Possessing four rine companies and a 

heavy weapons company. it had a strength equal to that of the twO 

embarked Army ballalions. The Vietnamese marines brought a 

special esprit to the Mobile RiH'rine Force and rought extremely 

well throughout the COItO'lAt>O IX operation. 

The baltalion commander, Major Naill. participated fully with 

the advisers in the planning of l\lobile Rivcrinc Force operations. 

l\lajor Naill, Colonel Davic!, Captain Wells. and Captain Salzer. 

who succeeded Captain " 'ells 011 2 Decemher, agreed on plans and 

each commander approved and signed the original operation order 

prior 10 each operation. The N:ny ass.mlt craft. Army artillery. 

and Air Force aircraft supported the Marine battalion as they did 

the Army battalions. 

After a shoTt time spent on tr.lining and maintenance, the 

Mobile Ri"erine Force resulTled CORONADO IX 011 9 November. 

Again the targets were the 263d anc! =d4th Viet Cong Ballalions in 

the Cam Son Base area, While the 3d Batlalion. 47th Infantry. and 

Ihe 5th Marine Battalion made beach assaults early on 9 November, 

the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantr),. moved by ATe to lhe Dong Tam 

airstrip. and then in a scriL'S of helicopter lihs entered the area of 

operations. All landings were unopposed and few of the enemy 

were sighted. 

On the second day the search for the enemy shihed to the east; 

troops were mo\cd by boat and by helicopter illlo lhe Ban Long 
CAM SON TO TUE RACII RUONG CANAL 137 

PORTABLE FIRING PI.J\TFORM WITII IOS·MM. HOWITZER 

and the Ap llac base areas. Only the Marine battalion, which reo 

maincd in iu original area of operation, saw action, killing seven of 

the Viet Cong. 

On 14 November, to incrcase sCClll"ity for Highway 4 and the 

Dong Tam Uase area, a new operation began, with support from 

the artillery at Dong Tam. Whilc the 3d Baualion, 47th Infantry. 

remained at the Mobile Riverine Base for maintenance. the other 

battalions wcre transported by ro'll and helicopter to the north 

along the Kinh Xang Canal and caSt of Dong Tam Base. Thc 5th 

Marine Ballalion and thc 4th Battalion. 47th Infantry. destroyed 

63 bunkers and sei7.oo 2.000 pounds of rice and 200 pounds of salt. 

This operation cominued throuAh the night. Ambush p .. urols of 

platoon sile were sent out along I-I ighway 4 nonh of Dong Tam 

but $.1W few of the enemy. 

On 16 November the Mobile Rivcrine Force began an operation with the 3d Brigade. 9th U.S. Division. and with elements of 

both the 7th and 9th Anny of Vietnam Divisions along the border 

of Kicn Phong and Oinh Tuong Provinces. The targct was the 
138 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

502d Local Force Battalion and 267th Main Force Battalion, which 

IV Corps and II FicId Force intelligence estimated were in Base 

Area 470. Troops of the 3d Hrigade were landed by helicopter in 

the northern p.lft of the area along with the 3d Battalion, 47th 

Infantry, which was initially under the operational control of 3d 

Brigade. Since Base Area 470 lacked finn ground for artillery fire 

support bases, and artillery positioned along Highway <1 could not 

cover Ihe area, experimental artillery firi ng platforms were used. 

One platform accommodated an MI02, I05-mm. artillery piece, 

ammunition, and enough space for the crews to operate. The legs 

of the platfonn were adjustable to various heights and a large metal 

"foo(," mounted on the bottom of each leg, provided support in 

lhe mud of rice paddies. A CH-17 helicopter carried the platform, 

artillery piece, ammunition, and crew in fOUT lifts. One battery 

of lOS·mm. artillery was used throughout the operation. The 

second night of the 3d Brigade's operations, on 17 November, the 

Viet Cong attacked one of the brigade's fire support bases. The 

attack was repulsed se\eral hours before the Mobile Riverine Force 

entered the operational area off the My Tho River on the Rach 

Ruong Canal. In order for the Riverine Force to enter the opera.· 

tional area, IV Corps Vietnamese engineers, who were accompanying the assault forces early on the morning of 18 No\'ember, had 

to remove the center sp..1.n of the bridge on the Rach Ruong Canal. 

Before the bridge span was removed, a barge·moulHed artillery 

fire support base was set up so that the artillery could fire on any 

enemy troops encountered by the engineers. A 15S-mm. fire support 

base was also established all Ilighway 4, six kilometers east of the 

bridge. For better control, the Mobile Riverine Base was moved 

upriver from Dong Tam to an anchorage ncar Sa Dec. \Vhile the 

5th Marine Battalion conducted riverine ass.1.uits in the southern 

portions of the target area, the 4th Battalion, 47th Infantry. landed 

troops by helicopter in the north. 

Early on 18 November hath battalions discovered the enemy. 

In the Mobile Riverine Force fighting alone. fony.fi\pe of the enemy 

were killed. nearly half of them by helicopter gunships, and a large 

medical cache was uncovered. The Mobile Riverine Force had four 

wounded. Total losses for all American and Vietnamese units were 

26 killed and 155 wounded. h·hile the Viet Cong suffered 178 

killed and 33 taken prisoner. 

Following a period at the Dong Tam anchorage for rest and 

maintenance. the force returned to the Cam Son Hase area on 23 

November. After the first air auack- a B-S2 strike in the heavily 
CA:\I "'0:-': TO TilE RACII RUOl"G CANAL 139 

populated Oinh Tuong Prm,ince-tlm:e battal ions ,entered the area 

by riverine assault n·aft. Only a fcw of the en('my were found and 

eight of these Werc killed. Several cadles were diSt:overed. 

From 27 to :iO Nov('mher opcrations were conducted to dear 

the Kinh Xang c.,nal, whidl runs nonlmcst by Dong Tam. Com· 

pany n. 15th Engineer Batlalilln, fellW\ed all water blocks along 

the (anal while the m;lI\ell\,cr hallalions sc:tn:hecl the Ap Bac Base 

area. Five of the cnelllY were killed ;mel twO taken prisoner. Four 

major blocks wefC rCllloved fmm the Kinh Xang C1nal and sixty· 

two bunkers wele deslroy('d. The openi ng of the upper reaches of 

this canal perlllilleci the Mohile Ri,erine Force to tlSC the assault 

craft of the Navy to all:ld. the encmy's Ap Hac Base. 

On 4 Decemhcr the Mohile Ri,·crine Base moved to Sa Dec 

and the 3d and 4th B:lllalions, 47th Infantry, Wilh the 5th Marine 

Uattalion. hegan operaliolls to find :1Jlcl destroy c lements of the 

2fi71h Main Force and 502d L{)(al Force Baualions in western 

ninh Tuoll).\" and eastern Kien Phollg Provinces. The baule that 

ensued on 4-5 Decem her proved to he olle of the most severe the 

Mobile Ri\·crine Force had yet e:o..periencecl. 

Early on 4 Dcn:mhcr the force encountered major elements of 

the 502cl Local Force Battalion in a forrified hase on the west bank 

of Lh e R:lt..h Ruong Can:lI . (Mtll) I J) The enemy attacked the 

boats with rockets and ;ILHomalic wc:qxJIls and a decision was made 

to land the Marine battalion to the lIorth of lhe enemy position. 

Shonlv afterwarclthe:id Ualtalion. 47th Infantry, was landed south 

of the enemy pnsilinn. Fiv,htinJ.t was intense and Colonel David 

dirC('ted the 4th Ballalion, 47th Infantry. which was standing by at 

a pickup lone, to lanel west of the en("IllY I<)("alion. In miclafternoon 

of 4 Oecember, the Vietnamese Marinc Bana l ion made a frontal 

assauh that o,'erran the enemy's major hunker complex. Supporting fire from armed helicopters and assault <.:raft ("onnibutoo 

lar).\"cly (0 the SI1(tCSS of the assalllt. Tn the south the .3<1 Ranalion. 

47th Infantry. encoulltered stuhbom resistance from scattered 

enel!'y hunkers thaI prevented it from linking \"ilh the Vietnamese 

mannes, 

This action delllOllStralt'd the importance of a quick decision 

by a waterhorne fortt, fllmmander when the force was under fire. 

"rajor Nam decided to l;tnd immediately on what he judged to be 

the enemy flank. The t·olllmancler (If the supporting river dh·ision 

immediately ga,·e the order 10 his hoal captains, and the landings 

were made. TOlal enemy casualti(.'s for 4 and 5 December I"ere 266 

Viet Cong killed, with the Vietnamese marines accQullling for the 
110 RIVERINE OI'ERATIOr-;S 

CANAL OPERATION 

4 D.~ .. nto.' 19&1 

MAP 13 

hc;\vieSl enemy losses. The ViclIlamc5C marines had 40 killed and 

107 wounded. Nine American soldiers were killed and 89 wounded. 

The assault craft were able to land the marines with light 

casualties on 4 October chiefly because of a name (hro\"cr aboard 

one of the armored troop carriers. A vehicle with a Hame thrower 

had been driven 3ho..'1r(l. and tile ATe placed in the cOllvoy to fire on 

targets as required. The flame Il1rower had nOt only a physical but 

also a psychological cffc(( on the enemy manning bunkers south 

of the Marine landing sileo The first sliccessful lest of a name 

thrower aboard an ATe had been made on 4 October 1967. 
CA,\! SON TO 111"~ RA CU ROONe CANAL 141 

On fi De(cmher the Mo hil e Riverine Rase moved 10 an anchor· 

age on the il- Iclwng Rivcl' 1l0l'lh of Vinh I.o ng, After three cla)'s of 

loca l operalions a nd maillt('llallce h'orl- cllIrin ~ wl1i(h new lire 

suppOrt hases werl' ('sl,lllli,lu.'d ill sllppo n of () rth nll nin ~ opera· 

lions, the Mo hile Ri\'cri nc Force lIndertook np('r:llions in the 

sollthern p"n o f Cai Be Di~tril l and in the we~l('rn p:'II'1 o f Dinh 

Tuong Prminl e aJ,{:lillSt loc ll g lll'rrill:ts and Iheir insl:lllation~, 

Initial lauclinJ,{s were !IIade frolll ATe's hUl later in the first clay 

of opera tions troops were landed h)' helicopter, Vl:ry fe\\' of th e 

enemy were found , 

On 14 Dc(em hcr the Muhilc RiH'I'inc FOI'(,c :1$f.lin searcheci for 

the Vi et ('.ollg in Cam Son, The font' made as.~aults hy hO:'l1 in the 

southern ponion of the has(', followecl hy helicopter bnc1inAs hy 

the d Ballalion, 471h 1 111:111 t 1')', " was nOI until thc last cb y of thc 

operation that the enell1 y \\"I~ cliS(O\('reci :mcl in a IircliAht nine of 

the Viet Cong WC1'e killed , 

On 17 Dcccmher the Mohil e Ri\('rine Basc mo\'ed to Dong 

Tam to permit thc Mnhilt, RiH,: rin(' FOIce to lane! t!'Oo ps frolll th e 

two harral'ks .'ihi ,~, By the :Irternooll of IS l)cc.:emhc.:l' the hriAad e 

and nne hattalion h:1I1 IIlm ec1 ashore to Dong Tam, The lISS 

Col/rIo" left thc :1I ('a of operations to n 'li t at Sullic Bay in th e 

Philippine Isl:mtls :1I1c! thc llSS /J(,1II'f!'IIII mo\'ed tl) VunA T aIL in 

Vietnam to rdit, At tlli~ lillI{', till' :1c1 Ba n :dion, GOth Inrantry, 1'(" 

pla("ecl the 4th Iblt:dioll , 47th Inr.1IItry, as p:m or the Mohile 

Ri' cri n e ForC'e. and the <fth Battalion aSS limed th e Do ng Tam 

defen~e mission, 

On l!l 1)c!cl11hcr :1 t\\'ohattalion o perati on \\'a~ initiated in 

northern \.:'li I,ay Diqrin while a third hatwl ion op('ratcci nl'a r 

DQng Talll. On Ihe n ight of l!l Dctcmhcr, two mmpa n ics o f Ih e 

Jd IblLdiun, 4ith 1111';11111')', Wt'T'(' l.uHlcd .!llmg th(, Kinh Xang 

Canal to Sl'I III' ;nl1 hu hl~S, Tilt' uth('r I\\'o hallaliOl~s of the !\lohi le 

Ri\ cri ne Force w('rc.: I,meled "> a~~lLdl (raft ill th e northcrn Ap 

1~ c :11'('a , Fffe(li\'C ;I"til lcr), It"cr;lgt' \\'a~ pnl\icil'(1 II}' 111 (' IlargemOllnt('cI ani llt'l) and h)' nallt'n C, 2d B:'lllal ion, :I:I,h Artill er), 

(1;;:'-111111, sl'lf propdkcl), Tlli, Opl'l ,II ion ("()\l'I'l'fIIJl()S( (If the north 

tClitral p:1I1 of Din" TtJOIIJ-: Pmdtll(' and t1SCc] hOlh heli('opler:o; 

and hn,!lS W I,mel !lOOP" r\llholl~h few of tilt' ('IWII1) WCI'(, fount!, 

the In,II\('\I\(', h,llIalrtlm J...illl'eI (,11'\('11 Viet Cong, N;lvigability of 

th c Kinh Xall~ Cilia 1 \\':1\ ('''I'IHh'c! wll('n t'n"ineers 1'l'll1O\ccl :'I 

maior ti\l1al 1I1hrnll ilon, TIt(, opt'ra tion \\as ;ondmled I:ne on 

22 De(('mhl'! anc! ria' ~Iohil (' Ri w rir1(' Fone l'('tlln1('d 10 Ih t' ano:lt 

haS<' to rond u( 1 1II,Iililename ;lnd prepare for Christmas tru ce 

operat ions, 
142 RIVERINE OP}o RATIO;-;~ 

The Mobile Riverine Force was inSITUClecl ,h;1I operations 

should be defensive during the truce period: troops ('ollie! fire on 

groups of enemy soldiers who "seemed to be If)'ing to breed can· 

lact," or who were more than "platoonsilc" in number. The truce 

ran from 1800 on 24 DCLcmbcr through 1800 on 25 December. 

Prior to 1800 on the 211h. one Mobile Ril'crine Force baualion 

moved to each of the I wo areas in which saturation patrols were to 

be conducted. The 3d Battalion, 171h Infantry, moved to Long 

Dinh District, while to the southeast the 3d Baualion. 60th Infantry, moved into northern Kicn Hoa Province. During the truce 

there was occasional enemy sniper and harassing fire. 

The forcc's next operation \\'35 in Cai l..'ty District of Dinh 

Tuong Pro\·ince. On 28 December the 3d Uaualion. 60th Infantry. 

was landed by aircraft and w:lterborne craft in an area appro~d. 

mately eleven kilometers west of Dong Tam. It conducted opera. 

tions directed westward toward Ca i Be. with supponing fire from 

barge artillery batteries located to its sOLlth along the north 

shore of the My Tho River. Few of the enemy wcre seen during 

the operation; monitOrs and assault support patrol hoats provided 

sur\'eillance of inland waterways. On 29 December the 3d Battalion. 

60th Infantry. continued operations to the \\'CSt toward Cai Be. 

while the 4th Battalion. 47th Infantry. remained in thc 5<'lme :n ea 

and destroyed eighty.five bunkers and captured tWO prisoners. Our· 

ing the day the 3d Battalion. 60th Infantry. fouud on ly a few of 

the enemy and concluded its operations in Cai Lay District. 

On 30 December the 4th Ballalion. 47th Infantry. was moved 

from Kien Hoa north and across the My Tho River to assist the 

3d Battalion, 60th Inf:lIHry. in continuing operations in C.1i Be 

and Cai Lay Districts. Although troops were shihed by boat from 

one place to another. the battalions could find no large gr':)lIPS of 

Viet Cong. On lhe following day both battalions went into posi· 

tions where they stayed lIntil thc end of the New Year's truce at 

0600 on 1 January 1968. In groups of platoon lind company size. 

the battalions wcrc dispersed to prevent the enemy from lIsing im· 

portant lines of communication during the Irllce period. Following 

the truce period the units arrived in Dong Tam on the ;Ifternoon 

of 2 January. 

The next major mission or the Mobile Riverine FOl'ce was 

an operation in the eastern p,'lrt of Vinh Long Pro\·ince. On 7 Jan· 

uary the battalions were landed by air and water but found no 

enemy until midafternoon. when a company of the 3d Battalion, 

60th Infantry. came under hea"y automatic weapons and small 
CAM SON TO T H E RACH R UONG CANAL 14 3 

arms fire from an est imaled two pla toons. Artillery fire and air 

strikes were calkd in on the enemy, who were firing from wel lprepared. com:cak'd positions. By th e end of th e fiAil!, ];Ite on 7 

January. two more companies of the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, 

were engaged. Twellty-eip;lll of th e enemy were killed and three 

weapons were capturec!. The Mc}bile Riverine Force concluded 

the operation the following day, killing two Illore of th e enemy. 

ancl reached th e ri\'crinc base late Ihat :lfternoon. 

The next ta rget was the 2GIst Maill Force Battalion in the C""ti 

Be District. westl'rn Dinh Tuollj.{ Pl'Ov ince. On 10 J anuary assa ult 

craft and he1 implers land ed the 1th Ballalion. 17th In fantry. and 

3c1 Battalion, 60th Inf,mlry. :lIld by midafternoon Company A, 3d 

Battalion , 60th Infantry. was in heavy com hat and had susta ined 

moderate casualties. T he battalion had heen SCI down on a "hot" 

landing zone. ('.omp;my E was flown in to support Company A. 

For both companies th e fiAh ling: was heavy II Illi I ah er clark on 10 

J anuary. T he following clay fighting: was spor:ldie. Over the twO 

clays. forty·seven of th e enemy were killed. American forces suf· 

fered eighteen killed and fifty wOllndcd; most of thc C;lsualtics 

occurrcd at th c landin g WIlC whc rc thc cncmy was in wcll-prepmed. 

cxcellcntly (:amoullag<"d positions \",it h good fields of fire. 

On 12 January ;m oper:llioll was conducted in conjunction with 

the 3d Brigade in Binh Phouc Dislrin of Long An Prov ince. The 

3d Baualion, GOth Infantry, and 4th Batta li on , 47th Infantry, 

moved by hoat along the Cho Cao Canal to assigned beaches. tn 

landing. troops mct heavy enemy nx-ket and automatic weapons 

fire but kill ed seven of the enemy. The rest quickly escaped and 

there was no further fig:hti ng el uring the two-day opera ti on. 

On 14 ,January th e 2<1 Brigade em harked on th e USS Benew(I", 

and was followcd ahoard 0 11 21- 22 .I :lIlu:lI'Y by the rest of th e Mobile 

Riverine Forre. A ('onioll was thrown around the village of An 

Quoi, near nong Tam, hy the 3e1 Battalion. 17th Infantry, which 

had th e da y before relieved the 41h Battalion , 47th Infantry. as a 

Mohile Riveri ne Force hatt:dion. Thc ohjCt"'( of the cordon opera· 

tion was 10 Cit pl Ure or kill Auerri ll as, hill it was unsuccessful : the 

opera ti on brought CORONAUO IX to .. close. 

Six M ont/I.( ill Rrlros/wcl 

As the Mohile Ri verine Force prepar<.'(1 for the T el tru ce, it 

could look ha('k over six 1ll(Jllt hs of unusual ex pe ri ences. Thc 

force had entered th e Mekong Delt;1 in June as th e fi rst U.S. force 

free to conduct susta ined opera tions against Vict Cong main force 
144 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

units whose ahility was respected. Republic of Vietnam armed 

forces were widely dispersed, with balta lions of infantry and hal· 

tcries of artillery fragmented to spread a degree of security through· 

out populated areas along the major land and waterway lines of 

communication. South Vietnamese offensive operations were limited in number and duration duri ng the hOUTS of darkness by the 

need to maintain security posts 'It political, military. and commeTcial centers and all highway bridges. 

The 2<1 Brigade did not escape the duty of maintaining security 

at fixed installations; one of its batwlions was required at Dong 

Tam. The Mobile Riverine Force as a whole- a force of nearly 

4,000 men- was notlicd to a static security mission , but was available for wide-ranging movement. 

\Vhether opera ting in southern III Corps Tactical Zone or 

northern IV Corps Tactical Zone, the Mobile Riverine Force added 

to the capahi lities of the corps commanders. It provided more 

troops with which to expand Vietnam armed forces <Ind Free \Vodd 

Military Assistance Force innuence. Also it possessed significant 

water mobility to complement ail' and ground movement. The 

contribution of the Mobile Riverine Force on the waterways is 

difficult to separate from its contribution as an additional combat 

force even if it had not relied cxtensively on waler mobility. The 

Mekong Delta in June 1967 was a place where the operations of 

an airmobile brigade could also have had sign ificant impact. The 

Mobile Riverine Force WilS. however, aille to attack areas such as 

Cam Son, the Rung Sat Special Zone, eastern Long An Province, 

Co Cong. and wcstern Dinh Tuong Pro,·ince where the enemy 

relied heavily on waterways in basc..'S seldom violated by operations 

of the South Vietnamese arlllcd forces. 

These areas were lucrative targcts for a force frce to operate 

within them. They were generally remOte in tcrms of being outside 

the range of established artillery positions, accessiblc only Wilh 

great difliculty by tracked vehicles, and requiring substa ntial use 

of air or water craft for troop IlIm'Cl11ent. The mohility of the 

bargc-mounted artillery :lIlcl the Mohile Riverinc Uasc enabled 

the Mobile Riverinc Force to givc effective artillcry coverage to 

troops and to bring othcr sl.lbstatHial com hat and combat service 

support to operations immediately adj;u:clll to the base arca . Further, the Navy assault craft. more heavily armed anrl armof(.-d than 

the craft of the Vietnamcse river ass;wlt groups and enjoying Tar 

more artillery support, were able to enter base areas into which 

the craft of the river assault group darcd not venturc. Finally. the 
CAM SON TO THE RACH RUaNe CANAL 145 

Mobil(: Riverine FOTc(: was an unknown and, therefore. intimidating force to the Viet Cong. Intelligence estimates of June 1967 

were that it would take the Viet Cong six months to obtain adequate knowledge of Mobile Riverine Force equipment, tactics. 

and techniques and to react with a program of mining and rC(:oilless rille and rocket auacks. Wide-ranging operations across the 

boundaries of responsibility of the major enemy organil.ations 

would gain more time before highly effective countermeasures were 

fielded by the enemy. 

Operations were planned, therefore, so that the Mobile Riverine FoTC(: would move freely among the provinces north of the 

My Tho River; subsequently move south of the My Tho; eventually move into the southern Mekong Delta. In each area the force 

was to attack enemy main forces and local forces. By inflicting 

major losses on these units, the Mobile Riverine Force would take 

away the security provided to loca l guerrillas and the secret political 

organization by the presence of the Viet Cong main forces. 

It was in the pursuance of th is major mission that operations 

were conducted from June through December 1967. Within the 

widely sep.'Irated base areas, the Mobile Riverine Force infliCled 

losses on the 5th Nha Be Battalion and 506th Local Force Battalion of the Long An and Gia Dinh areas, on the 514th Local 

Force Battalion, 263d Main Force B.utalion, and the Viet Cong: 

district comp.'Inies of Dinh Tuong Province, on the 502d Local 

Force Battalion of Kien Phong Province, and on training: cadres 

and companies of Long An anrl Go Cong Provinces. These units 

were most frequently met in areas where water mobility permitted 

U.S. forces to reach fortificalions and c:aches at the heart of the 

enemy base. Most enemy bunkers were chosen for defense against 

likely helicopter landings. and covered trails entering the base from 

the limited land rolltes; few were designed to cover an approach 

by WOller. 

The Mobile Riverine Force routinely requested and planned 

for the usc of aircraft in the conduct of operalions during the last 

half of 1967. Often an assault helicopter comp.'Iny was shared 

during lhe day with lhe 3d Hrig<ade. 9th Infantry Division. This 

arrangement. while not ideal. provided aircraft which the com· 

manders considered an inhcrent parl of riverine opcrations. 

During lhe six-month period. Mobile Riverine Force operations 

departed from the original planning in respect to duration of 

operations and the authority for and frequency of major relocations 

of the Mobile Riverine Hase. Plans had ca lled for a four- to fi ve-day 
146 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

operation, to be followed by a two- or three-day period for rest, 

skin care, and equipment maintenance. Beginning with Operation 

RIVER RAIDER I in lhe Rung Sat Special Zone. however, it was 

learned that fOOL problems caused by wetness and fungi increased 

rapidly after a few hours of exposure, and operations generally 

were limited to forty-eight hours, with a rcst period of twenty-four 

to thirty-six hours. Wben it was necessary to keep troops on land 

for longer periods, a high percentage of foot problems occurred 

and rcst periods of three to fOUT days weTC required. Since the 

operations were shorter, eight instead of fOllT operations took place 

each month. 

A June 1967 planning directive of the Military Assistance Command. Vietnam, stated that the Mobile Riverine Base could be 

relocated within the assigned tactical area of responsibility by the 

base commander in co-ordinaLion Wilh the senior Navy commander 

embarked. For relocation to a new area of responsibility, the com· 

manding general of II Field Force would co-ordinate the move 

with the commander of Naval Forces, Vietnam, and the senior 

adviser of IV Corps, as appropriate, keeping Headquarters, Mili. 

tary Assistance Command, Vietnam, infonned. This procedure was 

followed; however, the base commander was able to initiate coordination for a move to a new area of operations and inform the 

commanding general of Il Field Force, through the Commanding 

General, 9th Infantry Division. This practice was often followed; 

but the requirements of the planning directive issued by Head· 

quarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, were met on 

movements across the boundary between 111 and IV Corps. 

The original plan (0 keep the Mobile Riverine Base in the same 

anchorage (or four to six weeks was not adhered to; more than 

twenty major relocations of the anchorage were made during the 

six months of operations- an average time at one anchorage of less 

than two weeks. 

During the months of October and November, the Mobile 

Riverine Force operations in Dinh Tuong and Long An Province, 

where substantial numbers of the enemy had been found during 

previous months, met with limited success. The Viet Cong had 

betome familiar with riverine equipment and tactics and was using 

small teanu armed with rockets and re<.:oiJless rifles. Stationed 

along the waterways entering enemy base areas, the teams harassed 

the Mobile Riverine Force. delaying operations and inflicting 

casualties. 
CAM SON TO THE RACI-I RUONe CANAL 147 

It was clear that if the Mobile Riverine Force could find the 

large enemy unils it could destroy them. In tJ1C 4- 5 December engagement. the 502d Local Force Baualion had suffered hcavy 

losses either bcr:ausc the Americans achieved surprise or because 

the enemy. aware of a pending attack. had decided to stand and 

fight. Despite this successrul experience, both Colonel David and 

Captain Salzer noted that the enemy was bcr:oming more difficult 

to find. On the eve of the Tel truce period, the Mobile Riverine 

Force published an order that would return the force to the scene 

of its last battle-western Dinh Tuong Province. The Viet Cong 

Tel offensive was to find the Mobile Riverine Force widely dispersed in that area and well removed from the scene of the major 

battles that erupted throughout the Mekong Delta on 30 January 

1968. The Mobile Riverine Force would have to move quickly to 

the scene of lhe major actions during Tet. 
CHAPTER VIIl 

Tet Offensive of 1968 and U.S. Reaction 

Shonly before the beginning or the thrcc-day cease-fire declared 

by the government of Soulh Vietnam to celebrate Tel, the lunar 

new year, the Mobile Riverine Force was ordered to lhe western 

portion or Dinh Tuong Province and the eastern part of Kien 

Phang Province to prevent the enemy hom using communication 

routes running east and solltheast through the area. There had 

been continuolls and credible intelligence reports of enemy activity 

within the area, which was readi ly accessible to assault craft. The 

Mobile Riverine Force planned to eswblish bases along the water· 

ways to provide fire support. as it had done during operations in 

the preceding November and December. 

The operation began with the movement north by stages of 

supporting artillery batteries: as each battery moved, an infantry 

unit was sent ahead to secure the next fire support ba5e. Four ba5es 

were established, three of them north along the Rach Ruong Canal 

from the Song My Tho to an agrovil1e. one of the many agricultural 

resettlement areas established by President Diem. Three CH-47 

helicopters were lISed to set down the anil1ery on the agroville 

site and the battery was laid and re:.dy to fire by 1800 on 29 January 1968, the beginning of the Tel truce. The fOllrth base was on 

Highway 4, about .two kilometers north from the river. The Mobile 

Riverine Force clements met only sporadic sniper fire on the 29th 

although the CH-4Ts were fired upon Wilh .50-calibcr machine 

guns. 

The brigade's two battalions. in addition to defending the fire 

support bases, actively patrolled in the area of operations. Surveil· 

lance was aided by the radars mounted on the assault support patrol 

boats. At 2100 on 29 January, fifteen rounds of 82·mm. mortar fire 

were received at one fire support base without causing casl1alties 

or damage. No further enemy activity occurred during the remain· 

der of the evening of 29 January and the Mobile Riverine Force 

dispersed to ambush positions to prevent major enemy movement. 

On 25 January 1968. the senior adviser of IV Corps Tactical 

Zone had warned all subordinate elements in the IV Corps that 
TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968 

during the impending T,.t holiday cease·rire period the Viet Gong 

were expected to resupply ;mel move into position for a post.Tt"t 

offensive. The warning was based Oil l"lst experience and recent 

intelliAence reports. On 29 January the senior adviser dispatcher! 

Ihe following meSs,1ge: 

Desire immediate dissemination of following information to all 

provinces without delay. There arc a number of positive intelligence 

indicators that the enemy will deliherately violate the truce by 

approaching friendly installations dllring night of ~9 January or early 

morning or 50 January. All provinci;1I scnior advisors will take action 

to insure maximulII alert Ilmlllre through the Tel period. He panicu. 

larly alert for enemy deception involving use of friendly vehidc..'S and 

uniforms. 

Ahout 1000 on 30 January. the Mohile Riverine Forre was in· 

formed thai the Military Assislance CUlllln:mcl, Vietnam, Iwd rallceled the Tt:l tnlt:c hccalt.~e of Viet Cong aHarks nil cities in the 

Ihree corps tn the north. The fon e was clireflt'fl to resumc offt'nsive 

operations "with partindar attcntion tn the ddense of thl' Ileac!· 

cluarters complexeli, Ingistilal itutililatinns, airfields, population 

centers and hillets." The Mnhilc Riverinc Force ordercd increased 

ancl aggressive rt'f·onnais..'Iann' in fnn:e within the original arc;'! of 

opcrntiom, hut the infanlry was clirc..'f·ted 10 operate duse Ie) the 

major watenvays to make feasible a rapid move hy water craft to· 

warcl the population ('('nlen;. \Vhile IWO fOmpanicli of the 3d Rat· 

tallinn, 171h Infantry, T('lllai twcI In provide SI..'f·urity fur the fire 

support l);Ise, lhe rest of thc !lei Battalion anc! the :icl Battalion, 

GOth Infamry. on :\0 January nmclut'lecl saturation p:tlrnlling to 

the cast tnwarel C.;ti ne. At the end of the day, forty suspects had 

been cieL1ined, forty hunkers deslrnyccl. anel .several small caches 

101111(1. 

On 31 January My Tho. Hen Tre, C';li Lay, C.ai Be, ancl Vinh 

Long were attach'fl hy thc Vict C.Cln~. The Vit't Cong units in· 

vulv(.'fl inchtclctl :11 My Thn, thc 2(ilsl. 2(i!\cl. anrl ril'lth Hatlalions: 

at Vinh Long. the 30Hth. :W(jth, Hr.71h I\allalinns anel local forrt's: 

at C.ai He anc! COli Lay, the 2filst M,lin FCjfC'e Battalion, liltpporl('{l 

hy the MOth and !,!!Oth ))i ~tritt (:otllpanies amllC'X'al font'S. Tlw 

Mohile }til'crint' Fnrc'e however hac! lint fOllnci :my Viet c.ung in 

the jlnpulatl'fl aH'a alnng Ihe Rat It Rilling. Wht'll the fnrc l' mm'l'il 

from tld\ area lot'al ~tlcrrillas m;ult' an t·rrllft to delay its H'lum 

mnvement In Ihe My Thu Iti\'l'r. AlthtillAlt planning and m · 

ordinatiun Wl'le t· ... idem in tilt' t·t1t'IIIY atlcmpt Itl pn'''t'llt mcwement uf the Muhill' Rin'rine Furce to II,,' Mt'lll' uf tht' major hatlk~, 

the hoau ;1I1c1 their elllharkl'ci hatl,tlium were ahle to Tl'arh the 
150 RIVERINE OPERATION\ 

Mobile Riverine Base by 0220 on I February. After less than fOllr 

hOlll"S rest, the Army and Navy clements wcre ordered La conduct 

operations in the vicinity of ali Be. Before the landing could be 

executed, however, orders were changed by the senior adviser of 

IV Corps Tactical Zone :md the river assault divisions were diverted 

to My Tho where allied forces were still heavily engaged. Elements 

of the two battalions were landed by water craft in My Tho at 

1520, I February. The five major sh ips of the Mobile Riverine 

Base moved from Vinh Long to Dong Tam in order to be in a 

better position to support opcr.ttions. 

After landing unopposed in My Tho, Comp.:,ny B, 3d Battalion, 

47th Infantry, secuTed landing sites on th e southweslern edge of 

the city for iu parent battalion and was joined by Complmies A 

and C. As the troops began to move north illlo the city, they met 

heavy fire. With the 3d Battalion. 60th Infantry, moving on the 

west, both battalions advanced north through the western portion 

of the city, receiving sma ll arms. automatic rine, and rocket fire. 

Fighting was intense and continuous and of a kind new to the 

riverine battalions. The ci ty had to he cleared slowly and system· 

atically; pockets of enemy resistance had to be wiped out to prevent 

the Viet Cong from closing in behind allied troops. 

While advancing through the city. Company A, 3d Battalion. 

47th Infantry, met heavy fire at 1615 and Company E was ordered 

to reinforce. On the wily. the lead clements or Company E also 

met intense fire and were eventually pinned down at the western 

edge of My Tho. At this time both maneuver battalions were in· 

valved in pitched battles and were taking casualties. The 3d 8:11 · 

talion, 60th Infantry, continued its movement north. advancing 

under heavy enemy fire. and air strikes were requested at 1740 to 

assist the battalion's fonvard clements. Troops moved in and out of 

doorways, from house to house. and from street to street. Artillery 

was employed against enemy troops who were fl eeing the city. At 

1955 a group of Viet Cong who had been in it previous engagement 

with troops of the Vietnam Army 7th Division attempted to enter 

the streets where Company B. 3d Battalion, was fighting, but by 

2100 Company B had e liminated them. 

Company A. 3d Batl.llion, 47th Infantry. requested a light fire 

team to SUpJXlrt its point clement. which had mel intense resistance 

from small arnl$ and rocket fire and had suffered several casual lies. 

At 1825 lhe light fire team arrived and was used lO relieve the 

pressure on Companies A and E by firing on Viet Cong positions. 

The team made TUns dircctly over Company A and placed fire 
n :T 0 .. FENSIV,,: OF 1968 l !i I 

within IwclHy-fivc Int'lCIS of dlc compa ny's IC:ld clements. To (,V:lCUate Ihe wounded, a pblCxm leader sprinted through enemy fil'C, 

jumpe'<I intO;l Vietnam Allny jeep l)'lrkt.'d in the streel. :lnd drove 

to the 1I'0unded. Ignoring the firc directed aga inst him, he helped 

thc wou nd cd men ahoard the jeep ali(I drove back to his company 

lines. By 2100 most of the hrin", had ce:lsro and th e enemy bega n 

to withdraw under cover of darkness. Throughout the night spor.tclic sniper filc and ()(:( ;l~i{)nal grcnade attacks were dirCCled 

against the Americans and Vietnamese but no major enga~ements 

eI('\ eloped. 

On 2 Fehl'u:lry the 2d Brigade continued to attack strongholds 

within the cilY. which \\'as 1'lH"irdeci hy U.S. :lnc! Vietnamcse uniu. 

At 06:l0 hOlh lI.S. h:lItalions continllro a sweep to the north in the 

western portion uf the (ity, encountering onl y light rcsist:lllce. At 

091:1:t Viet ConA" forcc W:lS engagCfI nn the northern edge of th e 

dty. Tactic,,1 "ir strikes with napalm wt're Glll ed in "nd dislodged 

Viet ConK tI"OOP" holdinj..\ a j..\1I:ud lower ncar :l highway bridge. 

The resulting ciamage to thl' hridge W:lS rcp:lired under fire hy the 

Mohile Riverine Force's suppOlling en~ineer plalOon. Upon com· 

pletion of the sweep, the tity Il'as de;II't'd of enemy units and the 

Mohile Ri\erine Force hall,dions loaded onlo armored troop carriers at 1201 for rt'deployment to COli 1.ay District in Dinh Tuong 

Province. 

By this time, th e Viet Cong offensive had lost milch of its 

origina l intensity in Dinh Tuong Province and th e enemy arI>cared to be withdrawing lO the north and west. Base Area 170, 

where the Mobile Ri\clilH' FunT had taken lip positions beforc 

Tel, W:lS thought to he .. likely lo<.;uinn for the Viet C'.ong to re-

~roup. The Mobile Rin-rine Furn' th ereforc moved the twent y-five 

kilometers from My Tho In the Ca i 1.ay :lrea 10 Cllt off enemy 

~("ape fOUles rroll1 eaSlt'!"I1 Din h Tllong Province. There were no 

significalll eng;lgt'TIIt'IlIS c\urin~ the following two days as the Vict 

COIIg app:lrently rt'maiO('{1 duse 10 My Tho and did not immed iately withelraw to t!leil nonnal hasc areas. 

On 1 Fehruary at th e direniun of the senior adviser of IV 

Corp.~ Tactit'al Zune, Ih(' :Id Ibualiull, fiOth Inf"lllry, and 3d Batwlioll. 471h In ramry. mo\t'cI 10 VillI! 1.ong to relieve continued 

Vict Cong 1,,'cSSIII't' on Vietnamese unit~. The two battalions were 

lransported hy helirnptt'r and ho:u to positiuns south of Vinl! Long, 

anclwgethcr with allit'd eklll('IItl> tht'y I"SLlhlishcc1 a (onion around 

th e city, The Muhil e Rivc l inc Base rclot'at ecl dlll"in~ the day lO all 

anc'horage 011 the Mckclll~ Ri\'cr north of Vinh Long. The 3d Bat-
152 

DlNH 

lUONG 

VINH LONG 

T ",1, J....u o , I •• ,o.nus 

1_",,_tO\ 

MAP 14 

RIVERll'I;E OI'ERATlOl'l;, 

talion, 60th Infantry, completed Ihe first airlirt ;u 1655 wilh no 

opposition, but at 1733, on the cast hank of th e Rad. Ca Tre Company A began to rccei\c sniper firc, At the same timc Company E 

was attacked with small anns ;mel :tlltulII;uic wcapons fire, The 

company returned fire and commenfed mo\cmCIll :I!-,rainst the Viet 

Congo whilc artillery was used against the enemy's po~ilion, Company A meanwhile came under intense fire as it moved to its 

assigned sector. At 2030 Comp'"lIl)' E met a heavily armed Viet 

Cong company, and Ihe fight was still in progress at 2115, As a 

result of this engagement, the :lei Baltalion, 47th Infantry, sent 
TET OI'H: I"SIVE OF 1968 153 

Company C to rei nforce the !kl Batlalion, 60th Infantry. (Map H) 

Thus far the lmttaliun, wcre sllccessfully blocking enemy movement from Vinh Long:u seve ral points. Boats of the river assaull 

divisions conducted patrols on the Rach Long Ho and Song Co 

Chiem throul-\hout the niAht. reporting only a few incidents, Divi· 

sion boats receivcd sm:dl :11'1115 and automatic weapon! fire from 

the west and east h:lIlks of the Rach Long Ho which was suppres.sed 

with no caSllalties. During the remaining hours of darknes.s on 4 

February the 3d Ballalioll. fiOth Infantry, continued to engage the 

enemy in a fight that subsided grad ually, Companies A and C were 

low on ammunition and required resupply. At 0200 a resupply 

helicopter was (:Iken under lire and downed while attempting to 

land. but an infantry forn rcSt'lleel the crah and its crew. ThroughOut the night the enelllY pn,bed both battalion positions. but suf· 

fered a considcrable numher or casualties. At dawn both battalions 

conducted search operations within their immediate areas and 

confirmed Viet (".ong losses. 

Operations south of "inh Long continued on 5 February with 

American and Vietn:une'ie forces attempting to clear the area by 

pushing south against blocks of infantrymen inserted by helicopter. 

Intelligence indicated thcre was a Viet Cong battalion in the area. 

Company E. 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, conducted airmobile 

search operations and Company A cleared the area ncar the Vinh 

Long airfield. The 3e1 Hatt:tlion, 47th Infantry, operated east of 

the Rach Cai Cam Ri ver. Clwoulliering several small enemy forces 

during the afternoon . Upon wmplelion of the sweep, the infantry 

was loaded ahoard ATC's and by 1725 had returned t.o the Mobile 

Riverine Base. after eigh t clay.." and nights of continuous movement 

and comhat. Cmupany A, :\<1 Uaualion, provided security for Vinh 

I.ong airfield ;lIld Comp:lIly C. 3d nattalion, 60th Infantry. pro-

'ided security for the Mohile Ri verine nOIse and for the 3d nattalion. 34th Artillcry, 

On 6 February, in rc"pnnsc to intelligence reports that the Viet 

Cong had sllc("ec.'c1ccl in !lim ing large forces southwest through the 

cordon around Vinh I.l)n ~. Company B. 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, depaned the ~'"h ilt, Riverine Base by boat in the early 

Illorning in an attl'mpt III mcl'ta"c the Viet Cong. The area to be 

sea rched was west of lht' Vinh Long airfi eld and south of National 

Highway 4. Company B made its first landing j ust south of the 

Highwa y 4 hridge o,·c.' the Kalil Cai Cam at 0810. Conversation 

with Popular Fon es troops ;11 a nearhy outpost revealed that a 

lalge Viet ('.ong unit \\;1.." in thc.' woods and along the stream approximately 500 meten, south of the hridge. Re-embarking, Com-
154 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

pany B commenced reconnaissance aiong the banks of the Rach 

Cai Cam to the south of the bridge. At lIDO the lead element of 

monitors and aSS<1.ult support patrol bo.1.lS received fire from automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, and RPC's (Russian-built antitank 

rockets) on both banks of the river. Company H, supported by 

artillery. gu nships. and fire from the river craft. assaulted the west 

bank of the Rach Cai Cam just north of the aTca of the ambush 

and swept south. No Viet Cong were found and the company reo 

embarked on the ATe's and col'Hinued along the stream, landing 

patrols at irregular interva ls. 

When the Viet Cong opened fire at 1100, Company E, 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry. was dispatched by boat from the Mobile 

Riverine Base and arrived in the area at 1430. Company B was 

agai n landed on the west bank of the Rach Cai c.'un ncar the 1100 

firefight area, and Company E was beached at that time just opposite Company B on the east bank of the Rach COli Cam. AJmost 

immediately both companies came under heavy RPG, grenade, and 

GO·mm. monar fire. Company B charged the Viet Gong positions 

in its zone, killed the enemy troops. and took four weapons, suffer· 

ing t WO soldiers wou nded. Company E had twelve wounded in the 

first clash and was held up while the wounded were evacuated. 

By 1510 the enemy had withdr:nvn to the southwest. 

Company A, M Baltalion, 60th Infantry, beached just south 

of the Regional Forces and was able to move rapidly south through 

the rice paddies and act as a hlocking force to the west of Company 

B. Men of Company A observed twenty Viet Cong in the river to 

their west, apparently trying to escape. and ca ll ed in artillery fire 

that caused several secondary explosions. Shortly thereafter, at 1700. 

all three companies received heavy alilomatic weapons and RPG 

fire from the wooded stream line in front of them and became 

heavily eng<lged. 

The battalion commander, ha\·ing commiued all of his available 

infantry, requested that the brigade reserve force be committed in 

an attempt to encircle the Viet Cong positions. Uy nightfall. ho\\,-

ever, enemy forces had broken coman lind the 3d Battalion, 60th 

lnfamry. returned to the Mobile Ri\crine Base early on 7 February. 

During the fighting from gO January to 6 February the Mobile 

Riverine Force made several rapid moves over a \\'ide area. The 

Mobile Riverine Force moved from the Rach Ruong C.,nal area 

of western Oi nh TlIong Province to My Tho: then to Cai Lly: 

and, finally. Lo Villh Long. The effectiveness of the Mobile Riv· 

erine Force al each city resulted in a reduction of the Viet Gong 
TEl' OFFENSIVE OF 1968 155 

attacks to harrassing actions and elimination of the threat to the 

city. By using in combination the Mobile Riverine Base, which 

moved large numbers of troops and support elements between the 

areas, assault water craft. and supporting helicopters the Mobile 

Riverine force not only moved quickly to each new area, but also 

arrived in strength and was able to sustain operations as needed. 

From 8 through 12 February the Mobile Riverine Force deployed to the northwest of My Tho and to Cia Dinh Province near 

Saigon. The entire CORONADO X operation, which ended on 

12 February, proved the ability of the Mobile Riverine Force to 

move rapidly over a large geographic area. The counteroffensive to 

relieve My Tho and Vinh Long highlighted the importance of 

having adequate air resources to usc in conjunction with the ships 

and small assault craft of the Navy Task Force 117. 

The back of the Viet Cong Tel offensive had been broken in 

the My Tho and Vinh Long area by the middle of February 

through the combined efforts of the Mobile Riverine Force and 

South Vietnamcse armed forces. 110wever, Viet Cong units continued to maintain pressure on Can Tho. the capital of Phong 

Dinh Province. The Senior Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone, having current operational control of the Mobile Riverine Force, 

decided to employ it to relieve this pressure on Can Tho. Thus 

CORONADO Xl, the last of the CORONADO series of Mobile Riverine 

Force operations. was initiated. The use of the Mobile Riverine 

Force in the central delta was made possible by the movement o( 

the 1st Brigade, 9Ul U.S. Infalllry Division, from the III Corps 

Tactical Zone to Dinh Tuong Province. All three brigades o( the 

9th Division were thus placed in the delta for the first time, signaling the opportunity for the Mobile Riverine Force to move 

south into the Bassac River area to carry out further the original 

Mobile Anoat Force concept. 

Before CORONADO XI, intell igence indicated that the Viet Cong. 

instead of withdrawing to base areas after being routed from the 

citi es, had remained near the heavily populated areas. Later it 

was apparelll that the enemy had left only enough men to maintain pressure on the cities so that American and Vietnamese forces 

would also remain nearby. Numerous intelligence rcports indicatc.-cl 

that the enemy had improved his strength throughout Phong Dinh 

Province. in some cases hy assigning young recruits to units and 

sending' them to battle with minimum training. This enabled the 

Viet Cong to display considerable force on the battlefield. The 

Tay Do Batlalion was believed lO have rC{;fuited substanti al num-
]56 RIVERINE OPERATIOl\~ 

bers on the strength of its good reputation as a fighting unit. 

Enemy forces within Phong Dinh Province were icicmified as the 

306th Main Force Battalion, 303d Main Force Ualtaiion, Tay Do I 

and II Battalions, U Minh 10th Battalion, and Military Region III 

headquarters, accompanied by a security clement of 200 men. The 

over-all mission for CORoNAno XI was based on the suspected location of Viet Cong uniu and the !Vlilitary Region III headquarters. 

The mission of the Mobile Riverine Force in CORONADO XI. 

as developed in co-ordination with the Senior Ad,·jser, IV Corps 

Tactical Zone, was to conduct riverine, air, and grou nd search 

operations in Cai Rang and Phung Hicp Districts of Phong Dinh 

Province, to locate and destroy Military Region III headquarters, 

and to conduct waterborne cordon and infantry search operations 

on the island of Cu Lao May in the Bass.1.c River. 

Operation CORONADO XI commenced on 12 February 1968, with 

the movement of the Mobile Ri veri ne Force from Dong Tam to 

an anchorage in the vicinity of Can Tho. The force proceeded up 

the Mekong River through the waterway which connects the My 

Tho and Bassac Rivers, and down the Bassac to Can Tho. The 

force arrived shortly after 1300 on 13 February, having completed 

a journey of 109 miles frolll Dong Tam. (Map 15) 

On 14 February the two infantry battalions landed from boats 

and conducted sweeps north along the canals immediately south 

of Can Tho. Army of Vietnam troops of the 9th and 21st Divisions conducted operations north of the ci ty, sweeping to the southwest. Company A, 3d Battalion , 47th Infalllry, found a cache which 

contained 460 B-40 rounds, 200 pounds of explosives, 89 120-mm. 

mortar rounds, and 500 pounds of medica l supplies. 

During the period 15- 19 Fehruary, the Mobile Riverine Force 

conducted river and air operations west of Can Tho without encountering significant enemy forces. \Vhen the Can Tho airfield 

suffered a heavy rocket and mortar altack on 16 February. the main 

task of the Mobile Riverine Force was to sweep the area in the 

vicinity of the airfield. 

On 19 February, at the request of the senior adviser of the IV 

Corps Tactical Zone, General Eckhardt. Task Force 117 units 

initiated joint waterborne patrols with units of the Vietnam Navy 

River AssaulL Group along a J3-mi1c stretch of the Song Can Tho 

to halt all sampan traffic. At 2217 a moni tor was struck by B-40 

rocket rounds that penetrated the 40-mm. turret. Although seven 

people, including a Vietnam Navy interpreter on board, were 

wounded, the monitor was able to suppress the enemy automatic 
CAN THO 

100, \. 

~ 

MAP 15 

'. 

, 

• • 

,,' 

,,, 

TEl' OFFENSIVE OF 1968 

", 

,. 

, .. ~-

157 

,., 

eo,,, 

weapons and small arms fire. Four of the wounded were evacuated 

after a rendelvouS with a medical aid boat. The patrols continued 

throughout the night in an effort to prevent escape of Viet Cong 

units from the area. 

On 22 February the Mohile Riverine Force and government 

of Vielnam forces initiated a riverine and air operation in Phung 

I-tiep District to locate the Military Region III headquarters. The 

3d Battalion. I}Oth Infantry. and the 3d Battalion. 17th Infantry, 

moved to the area of operations by means of the Kinh Saintenoy 

C"\nal. Fire support was provided by Batlery C, 2d Battalion, 35th 

Artillery. and 3d Battalion, 34th Artillery. 

To obtain the overhead clearance that the boats needed to 

proceed beyond the Phung Hiep Bridge. the Vietnam Army engi. 

necrs raised thc center span of the bridge with jacks. As the assault 

boalS proceeded west from Phllng I-liep, sporadic sniper fire (rom 

the north hank of the callal wounded four U.S. Navy men. The 

ril'erine movement beyond the bridge apparently caught the Viet 

Cong hy surprise. When Companies Band C, 3d Battalion, 47th 

Infantry, beached along the Kinh Lai Hicu Canal, just northeast 

of Hiep HUllg. the enemy was in bunkers whose figilling ports 

faced Ihe rice paddies in anlicipation of airmobile attacks. The 
158 RIVERI NJ' OPFRATIO'~ 

Viet Cong ran into the open fields away from the ('a nal where 

tlll!y were taken under fire by :millcry and g1l1lShips and sufkr('(1 

heavy casualti es. No additional U.S. Glstl:tities ofCurred. 

On 23 February, the Mohi le Ri veri ne Force concluded the unsuccessful :tttempl to locate Military Region III he:td<]lIancrs and 

was withdmwn from the are:t of operations. Throll~hol1t the d:ty 

there was no sigh t nf thc encmy or significHlt finding. The operation marked the deepest penetrat ion yet of the cko g Delta by 

U.S. forces. 

On 24 February the Mobile Ri\'crine Force cond ucted a waterborne cordon and search operation on the island of eu L .... o May 

during which both infantry battalions conducted medica l civil 

action and dental civil action programs at enclosures where Vietnamese were detained for qLlcstioning:. There was no contact with 

the enemy in this one-day opera tion. Nort hwest of c',n Tho on 

26 February, the Mohil e Riveri ne Force met a la rge Vi et Cong 

force. Company B, 3d Battalion. 60th Infantry. landl'd under fire 

that wounded many men and damaged twelve helicopters. Other 

elemen ts of the Mobil e Riverine Forc~ 1ll0\'ed to suppon Company 

B; Compan y E was airlifted at 11 30 and landed approx imately 800 

meters cast of Company B and Company A followed at 1405. At 

1545, more than five hours aftel'" the fi rst fire, Companies B and E 

were still heavily engaged :md hact not linked up. Linkup was 

effected at 1705. and beca use of the number of casualties sustained 

by Company B the compan y was placed under operational control 

of Company E. Companies A. B. and F, established :I night defensive position and were res upplied by 2200. The 3d Baualion, 

17th Infantry, to the northwest encoUlli eroo li ttle fire throughout 

the day, although its scheme or maneuver was modified to allo\\' 

it to provide additional support to the ~d Baualion. 60th Infantry. 

Task Force 117 meanwhile had established patrols on the Song 

Can Tho along the southern hOlllldary of operations to prevent 

escape of the enemy. About 20~0 an amlOred troop carrier received 

a hit in the port bow causing an explosion. An assault support 

pa trol boa t went to the aid of the ATC and was taken under fire 

by automatic weapons. The enemy fire was relllmed and sup· 

pressed. Ten minutes later a sccond ATe was fired upon by a 

recoilless rifle. The round passed over the ATC. which immediatel ... 

returned and suppressed the fire. There were no casualties among 

those on board in either attack. The units continued their patrols 

without incident until 0215 when a major action occurred a~ a 

large force of Viet Cong attempted to escape. An ass,,1llit support 
TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968 159 

patrol I)()."tt came under heavy fire from both banks and sustained 

several B-40 rocket hits causing major nooding and wounding two 

crewmcn. Other river ass."tldt crart moved into the area and suppressed the hostile fire. but one assault support p."tlrol boat sank 

as it was being to\,'cd by a monitor. All crew members wcre rcs· 

cued. but the monitor received several hits while moving to assist 

the dis."tbled assault support patrol hom. During the same period. 

another assault support I>."ttrol bom. operating four kilometers east 

of the first attack. was hit by heavy rocket and automatic weapons 

fire. The boat captain and radio men were killed insL"tntly and the 

three other crewmen were wounded but were able to beach the 

boat. The enemy attack lasted an hour and a half. with fOUT ass."tult 

craft involved in the battle. A light helicopter fire team helped to 

Cut down the enemy fire. 

The Viet Cong were unable to esc."tpe south across the Song C"tn 

Tho and continued to suITer casua lties as the blockade was maintained sllccessrully throughout the action. U.S. losses were moderate. During the night the Viet Cong continued harassing the 

Mobile Riverine Force battalions wilh probing attacks and sniper 

fire. On 27 Febmary the arca was swept again. confinning additional enemy losses and discovering caches, including five crew· 

served weapons. sixtccn small anns, and assorted ammunition. 

On I March, also. other clements of tlle Mobile Riverine Force 

and three Vietnam Anny Ranger battalions operated approximately five kilometers southwest of Can Tho. Heavy fighting 

developed in the afternoon and continued into the nighl. The 

enemy slipped away beforc daylight and only scattered groups were 

found the next day. 

CoRONADO XI required somc unusual supply operations be· 

cause: of the geographic location, tempo of operations. and change 

in control headquarters from the 9th Infantry Division to the 

senior adviser of IV Corps. Operations took the Mobile Riverine 

Force away from the normal lines of communication thus straining 

resupply. The severe and continuous righting caused a heavy expenditure or ammunition and Class I and Class III supplies. The 

control exercised by IV Corps created a new set of log'istics channels 

to support operations. The potentia l logistics problems were solved 

by personal liaison bel\vcen tlle Mobile Riverine Force and Army 

logistics representatives located at c."tn Tho. Items such as C rations. 

fuel, and construction materials were provided by 1st Logistics 

Command. The IV Corps provided ror evacuation or dead and 

wounded and responded to all Army and Navy logistics needs. 
160 RIVt:RI;\:E OI'l-:RATlO;-';" 

Within the Can Tho area, most Il1mcmcnts hy \\'atcT\\'ay (loci 

canal were accomplished without sign ificant oppmition bC(<lu'ic 

the enemy had no prep,'ucd fighting positions ncar the canals. The 

enemy, however, had taken cxccl1clll ddcnsi\'c mcaJ'iurcs against 

airmobile operations conducted ncaT open ricc paddies. Bunkers 

wcre well constructed, with good overhead protection against 

artillery and air strikes, and l'ommandcd adequate fields of fire. 

In one instance the Viet Cong could not engage the Mohile Riv· 

erine Force; their bunkers faced away from Ihe waterway. The 

enemy attempted to escape, making themselves \ulncrahlc to the 

fire of the advancing U.S. troops and supporting gunShips. 

The Viet Cong demonstrated their ability to employ automatic 

weapons fire in all battles. They characteristically L1sed an initial 

heavy volume of automatic weapons fire, follO\\lecl by sporadic 

sniper fire. Sniper fire was directed p<lrticularly at lInit leaders and 

radio operators; snipers were \\'ell trained anrl extremely effeClive 

in the Can Tho area. The Viet ('.ong comillucci to fight until the 

late hours of the niAht. 2200 to 2400. They then wilhdrcl\l but 

continued to harass U.S. positions with mortar and rocket fire. 

All operations conducted in the Can Tho area made maximum 

use of naval and air asscts. and demonstrated that logistic support 

planning and timely illlelli~ence were essential. The use of airmobility vastly innucnccd the cO\lrse of tactical situations. especially when rescrves were employed to reinforc.:e a unit under fire 

or to cxploit thc encmy siwation. 

Combat operations in CORONADO Xl ended on 3 March when 

the Mobile Riverinc Forcc left the Can Tho area for Dong Tam. 

From 4 to 6 March the force aSSllmed thc cli"ision reserve role 

while the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. was replaced by the 4th 

U.1ttalion, 47th Infantry, in the rotation of battalions within thc 

brigade. 

Operation TROUNC ('.oNe D'SII was initiated by the 9th Infan· 

try Division on 7 March 1968. Its purpose was 10 dc...'StTOY enemy 

forces in Dinh Tuong Provin('c and to reduce the threat west of 

My Tho to Highway 4. which was heing cunstamly menaccd by 

the Viet Congo The operation invulved thc 1st and 2d Bl'ig'ldes. 

9th U.S. Inrantry Division. the 7th Vietn:lm Army Division. and 

provincial forces. The commanding: general or the 9th U.S. InFantry Division was able to employ the 2c1 Bl'ig<'lde ror the first time 

in a continuing co-ordinated rolc with another division brigade. 

The Mobile Riverine Force conducted a series of combined riverine 

and ainnobile operations. beginning east of My Tho. Operations 
TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968 161 

were supported by the 3d Battalion. 34th Artillery. which established a fire support base on the nonh bank of the My Tho River. 

ten miles east of My Tho. 

During initial airmobile assaults on 7 March enemy fire was 

light and no major firefight resulted. During the afternoon. the twO 

battalions shifted their area of operations west-northwest of My 

Tho in response to intelligence reports. At 1920 the 4th Battalion, 

47th Infantry. came under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire just west of My Tho. Heavy fire continued until 2225. The 

following day troops met no Viet Cong in the area; at midday in 

response to intelligence the two battalions moved again into the 

area of operations of early 7 March. There were several firefighu 

during the rest of the day. The most significant occurred at 1715 

when Comp.·my B. 4th Ballalion. 47th Infantry, made an assault 

landing by helicopter and was fired upon by a Viet Cong force from 

well dug-in positions along the southern edge of the landing zone. 

Five helicopters were downed during the first landing. Throughout 

the evening and into the night. as other elements of, the two battalions maneuvered in support of Company B, there was sporadic 

but heavy fighting in the area. At 0300 the fire support base was 

attacked by mortars that sank two artillery barges carrying four 

105-mm. howitzers. The infantry continued their sweep of the 

previous day's battlefield without finding any Viet Cong and returned by ATC to the Mobile Riverine Base in the late afternoon. 

On 10 March the Mobile Riverine Force shifted operations 

near Cai Lay and Long Dinh. towns of Oinh Tuong Province. 

Troops of the 1st and 2d Brigades, 9th Infantry Division. conducted day and night patrolling and reconnaissance in force against 

suspected Viet Cong locations along Highway 4 until 16 March. 

On 16 March the 1st Brigade tenninated its participation in the 

TROUNG CoNG DINH operation. On 18 March, boats of River Division 92 received heavy automatic weapons and rocket fire while 

patrolling west of Dong Tam. The rockets damaged several assault 

support patrol boats and one monitor. The operation continued 

without opposition on 19 March, and the infantry battalions returned by ATC to the Mobile Riverine Base in the vicinity of 

Dong Tam. 

On 22 March the Mobile Riverine Base, still located in the My 

Tho River south of Dong Tam. was attacked at 0320 by enemy 

using mortars and recoilless rifles. The Benewah received two 

75·mm. recoilless rifle hits that caused minor damage, and near 
162 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

misses were registered by Viet Cong mortan on an LST. the 

Washlenaw County. 

Through the remainder of March the Mobile Riverine Force 

continued operations in Dinh Tuong Province with occasional 

light to moderate firelighlS. On I April the 3d Battalion , 60th Infantry, debarked and assumed the Dong Tam security mission and 

the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, joined the Mobile Riverine Force. 

Operation TROUNG CoNe DINIf was tcnninatcd on 2 April. after 

a one-battalion ainnobile operation in the Ham Long District in 

Kien Hoa Province. just south of Dong Tam. 

During TROUNC CoNe DINII the Mobile Riverine Force used 

extensively a riverine assault reconnaissance element. a small unit 

first employed in December 1967 that consisted of three or four 

monitors and .several aSS<lult support patrol boalS. Thc riverine 

assault reconnaissance clement led ATe convoys and employed 

reconnaissance by fire against likely Viet Cong ambush positions. 

The technique reduced casualties bec-dUse of the firepower and 

mobility of the craft in the riverine assault reconnaissance element 

and the placement of ATes carrying infantry well back in the 

column. Airmobility was used during TROUNG CoNG 011'111 to in· 

crease the Ilexibility of the Mobile Riverine Force by providing 

increased intelligence. firepower, and escort coveragc for convoys 

during troop movement. 

On 4 April a significant battlc was fought ncar the intersection 

of the Song Ba Lai and canals. c.ll1ed the Crossroads, in the Truc 

Ciang District of Kien Hoa Province. As the hoaLS of River Divi· 

sion 92 carrying the 2d Battalion. 47th Infantry. entered the Song 

Ba Lai they wen: ambushed with rockets. small anns, and automatic weapons. The battalion put into effect iLS counternmbush 

plan. Company B passed through the ambush and landed unopposed just beyond the Viet Cong positions. Company E was to land 

JUSt short of the ambush and the two comp.lllies were to pinch 

the Viet Cong between them. Instead. Company E was landed di· 

rectly into the ambush. suffered heavy casualties. and was forced 

to withdraw. Heavy lighting with the well-protected Viet Cong 

continued throughout lhe day. The 4th Battalion . 47th Infantry. 

crossed from the north to assist the ~d Battalion on the south bank. 

Casualties among the infantry were heavy as they encountered an 

extensive bunker complex containing .50-caliber and other automatic weapons. The aclion ceased during the evening as the Viet 

Cong slipped away in the darkness. The two battalions COnlinuoo 

to sweep the marshes 50Ulh of the Song Ba L.li through 7 April. 
TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968 163 

From 10 through 12 April the Mobile' Riverine Force conducted successive operations ncar the towns of Vinh Kim and Long 

Dinh. and east of My Tho without major encounten. An operation 

in the Giong Trom and Ben Tre Districts of Kien Hoa Province 

on 14-15 April failed to find the enemy. At 1400 on 15 April the 

Mobile Riverine Base was attacked by 57- and 75·mm. recoilless 

rifles while at anchor. The USS Bem:walt recej"ed three hits; the 

supply LST received eight hits-all above the water line. One 

LCM-6 re[ueler was hit and later burned and sank. There were no 

casua.lties and only minor damages to the Benewah and the LST. 

During the remainder of April, the Mobile Riverine Force 

conducted four separate opera tions in the Cai Lay area of Dinh 

Tuong Province, the western part of Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong 

Provinces, and the Cam Son Base area o{ Dinh Tuong Province. 

Significant engagements were fought in three of the four operations, 

with the Mobile Riverine Force inflicting losses on the enemy in 

each encounter. Two of the operations were conducted in coordination with the 2d Vietnamese Marine Corps Battalion. 

On 2 and .3 May, the Mobile Riverine Force again returned to 

Kien Hoa Province in response to enemy attacks on government 

outposts. On 5 Maya survey was made o[ Regional Forces and 

Popular Forces outposts in C'Ii Be District to delennine the extent 

of damage. Operations were directed [TOm 7 through II May 

against Military Region II Viet Cong headquarters in the Ciao 

Duc District of Dinh Tuong Province. The Mobile Riverine Force 

and the 2d Battalion, Vietnam Marine Corps, conducted a reconnaissance in force but encountered no large groups of enemy troops. 

From 14 through 16 May the Mobile Riverine Force was employed 

in lhe Mo C'Iy District of Kien Hoa Province and engaged lhe Viel 

Cong 516tl1 Battali-on in several firefighu. The Mobile Riverine 

Force and elements of lhe 3d Brigade, 9th InfaOlry Division, c.'lrried out operations from 16 through 18 May. in the Than Duc 

Districl of Long An Province in co-opcration wilh I n Corps Tactical Zone Vietnam Anny forces in order to reduce Viet Cong and 

North Vietnam Army infihralion of the Saigon area. The brigade 

continued operations in Long An and Oinh Tuong Province until 

26 May. At that lime a two-day operation was launched to reconnoiter and exploit lhe area of a 6-52 strike in the Giong Trom 

District of Kien Hoa Province. 

During the month of June the enemy generally avoided contact with the maneuver battalions and intensified his atL.'Icks against 

naval assault suppon craft of Task Force 117. On 5 and 6 June 
164 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

the Mobile Riverine Force conducted reconnaissance In force in 

the Sa Dec area. Effective lISC was made of the ES-a portable expendable launcher that fired riot-control canniSlcrs-and flameboats. The period 4 through 8 June saw the Mobile Riverine Force 

conducting operations in the Sa Dec area and eastern Kicn Phong 

Province. Returning to Kien Hoa Province, the force initiated 

operations on 10 June in the Ciang Trom and True Giang Districts. On 16 June it moved to Can Tho, and began operations 

again directed by the senior :tdviscr of IV Corps Tactical Zone to 

prevent a suspected Viet Cong offensive against the city. A fourday operation commenced on 17 June with a major fircfight in 

which the majority of the enemy's losses resulted from fire support 

by Company A, 7th BatL,lion, 1st Air Cavalry, in support of the 

maneu\ler battaliom. Completing operations in Phong Dinh Prov· 

ince on 19 Junc, the Mobile Riverine Force moved to Dong Tam. 

After fou r days of operations ncar Dong Tam, it proceeded on 26 

June to Long An Province where it was again employed to prevent 

Viet Cong and North Vietnam Anny forces from moving in and 

out of the vicinity of Saigon. Unlike the brigade's experience in 

early 1968 operations in Long An Province, Ihe enemy avoided 

Contact with the maneuver baualions throughout the operation. 

On 2July the 2d Brigade was directed to place the 3d Battalion. 

60th Infantry, under operational control of the 3d Brigade, 9th 

Infantry Division, which was in contact with the enemy in Dinh 

Tuong Province, The battalion rcmained under operational con· 

trol of the 3d Brigade through 5 july. During that time the Mobile 

Riverine Force continued its operations in Long An Province, 

moving to Dong Tam on 5 july. On 6 july the 3d Battalion, 47th 

Infantry, relieved the 4th Battalion. 47th Infantry, of its sccurity 

mission at Dong Tam Base. The 2d Brigade continued combat 

OperatiON on 7 July in Kien Hoa Province near the canal Cl'OS$--

roads on the Song Ba Lai, where the 2d Brigade had previously 

rought one of its heaviest engag<"ments. The 4th Battalion, 47th 

Infantry, entered its objective area and beached without incident. 

The 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, air·landed assault troops at several 

spots south of the 4th Battalion beach sites. The only incidents of 

the day occurred when Company E of the 4th Battalion. 47th 

Infantry, received sporadic small anns fire and D Troop. 3d Bat· 

talion, 5th Air C;t\'alry, was subjccted to sporadic automatic weap' 

ons fire. The limited enemy activity in the area was unlike prior 

experience of the Mobile Riverine Force along the Song Ba L,i. 

On JO July the Mobile Ri,'erine Force began operations to 
TET OFFENSIVE OF 1968 165 

locate and destroy enemy forces and equipment within the Huong 

My and Mo Cay Districts of Kien I-loa Province. Operations con· 

tinued. through 13 July. with both battalions using boats and heli· 

copters to search for the enemy. During the period 15 through 17 

July the Mobile Riverine Force conducted riverine operations in 

Vinh Binh Province in co·operation with the 9th Vietnam Army 

Division. Completing operations in Vinh Binh Province the Mobile 

Riverine Force moved to Dong Tam Base on 18 July. While an· 

chored of( Dong Tam. the 2<1 Brigade employed the 4th Battalion. 

47th Infamry. on 20 July LO conduct saturation patrolling and to 

establish night ambushes on the south bank of Ihe My Tho River 

in the Truc Giang and II .. m Long Districts of Kien Hoa Province. 

On 21 July the 3d Battalion. GOth Infantry, was employed in a 

cordon and search operation in co-operation with Regional Forces 

and Popular Forces elemems on Thoi Son Island. Operations con· 

tinued on 23 July in the Giong Trom and Truc Giang Districts 

of Kien Hoa Province in co.operation with the Vietnam Army. 

On 25 July the 2d Brigade terminated its operations in Kien Hoa 

Province; the next day the Mobile Riverine Force moved to Vinh 

Long Province. 

After completing final plans and prcp.'lrations for iu journey 

the Mobile Riverine Force left its Vinh Long anchorage on 28 July 

and arrived in Phong Dinh Province the samc day. On 30 July the 

force began offensivc operations in co-()rdination with the 5th Bat· 

talion, Vietnam Marine Corps, in the Vi Thanh area of Chuang 

Thien Province. To accomplish its mission. the 2d Brigade de· 

barked from the Mobile Riverine Base and established its head· 

quarters and tactical operations c(,nter inland in the vicinity of 

Vi Thanh. The Mobile Riverine Force moved into the U Minh 

Forest. forty--cight miles southwest of Can Tho in early AUb"-lst in 

a co-ordinated combined operation that included 'u.S. Army. Navy, 

and Air Force units and Vietnam j\'farine Corps and Amly forces. 

This was the first major Allied ground operation in that area in 

more than a decade and another amplification of the original 

Mobile Riverine Force operational concept that had envisioned 

operations no more than twenty to thirty miles from the Mobile 

Riverine Base. The ten--d.ay operation was also significant in that 

it substantially exceeded in scope the two. to three<lay operations 

of the force contemplated in original plans. The operation was the 

first penetration by an American ground force into the U Minh 

Forest region and it was the deepest penetration by the Mobile 

Riverine Force into the Mekong Delta. The 2d Brigade established 
166 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

a land base and fon\'ard logistic support area with lines of communi ca tion extending fifty miles to the riverine base anchored ncar 

Can Tho. The ope ration was also destined to be the last major 

strike operation conducted by the Mobile Riverine FOTce. 

By ea rl y AuguSl the Mobile Riverine Force had conducted 

many tactical operations in co-ordination with the oth er brigades 

of the 9th U.S. Division and with Vietnamese Army. Marine Corps, 

and paramilitary units. The tempo of strike operations had been 

maim .. 1.incd at a high level as the force moved from one province to 

another, across corps boundaries, :mel in response to missions 

origi nating with the cOlTlmanding genera l of the 9th U.S. Infantry 

Division and with II Field Forces Vietnam through the senior 

adviser of the IV Corps T;Jctical Zone. On several occasions opera· 

tions were carried on to block infiltration roules in ord er to ClIt 

down the tineat of enemy forces present in the Capital MiliL1ry 

Distri ct aro und Saigon, and near Ben Tre, Sa Dec, and Om Tho. 

The Mobile Ri verine Forte had operated in eight provinces of the 

Mekong Delta since early February 1968. In all operations its 

cfforts wcre complemented by lhe co-ordina lecl operations or other 

U.S. or Vietnamese units. 
CHAPTER IX 

Pacification and Kien Hoa Province 

The Third Bnltalion 

As the Mobile Ri\erinc Force began its second year of operati ons in 19G8. the 2d Bri ~Vldc still lacked a th ird maneuver battalion and full lise of the 3d Battalion, 31th Artillery. Successive 

commanders of the brigade had reiterated the need for a third 

battalion to increase the flc'Io:ibility of the force and to enable it to 

operate with grea ter independence. blll the brigade's overall 

strength had remained basi c<lJly unChanged. Two of itS three battalions remained afloat with thc J\-fobile Ri verine Force. while the 

third infantT) batL'liion was employed in deFense of Dong Tam 

Rase. In the ahsence of a third manclI\cr baltalion the Mobile 

Riverine Force operated extensively in conjunCtion with Vietnam 

Army units. 

During the first hair of 1968 the Navy component of the Mobile 

Riverine Force continUe<1 to grow. In June a third rh'er as.s.lult 

squadron was fomlC~d and in .July the Navy component was re· 

organi zed into two groups, Mobile Riverine Group Alpha and 

Group Bravo. By the fall of 1968, the force was scheduled 10 reach 

ils full strength of 4 river assault squadrons, 184 river assault craft. 

4 barracks ships, 3 repair sh ips, 2 barracks barges, 2 support ships. 

2 resupply ships, and various other suppon cra ft. 

At a riverine concept briefing on .') January 1968. General 

Abrams. depmy commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Com· 

mand, Viemam. had directed Ihe U.S. Army. Viemam, to re· 

examine the organi za tion for the Army riverine battalions and the 

composition of the land·based brigade. The 9th Infantry Division. 

Il eaciquaners, II Field Force, Vielllalll, and Hearlquancrs, U.S. 

Army, Vi elllam, concluded that the mission of the Mobile Riverine 

Force could bcst be accomplishcd by a rcorgalli7 .. 1tion of the scvcn 

infantry battalions of the division. deleting equipment and units 

nOt essentia l in riverine opcrations. General \Vcstmoreland ap· 

proved the rcorganiz.·'Hion on 21 February 1968. 

This new organization of the battalions ICIll itself readily to 

operations other than rivcrine. particularl)' airmobile opcrations. 
168 RIVERIj\'E OPERATI01"'i 

without the inl'cstmcnt in equipment and men required for 1011-

linuinp; land-based opera Lions. ill firepo\\'cl' the ri\crinc haHalion. 

less fOUT 8 1-mm. Tllortars, was cqui\alclH LO the slandanl infantry 

h:lltalion even without the considerable firqK)Wer suppOrt of tlte 

Navy assault crah. Uy borrowing c(pli pmcn., the hattalion was 

capable of sustained operations all dry land at a saving of some 

GOO spiKes which would be required by a standard banaliOI1 and 

its suppOrt elements. 

The "'Ilue of and con tinu ing need fo r o ne Viet nam Marine 

Corps battalion to operate with the Mohile Riverine Force was 

also recognized. The battalion was not, howe"er, permanently assigned to the force becallse Vietnam Ma rine Corps units were part 

of the Army of Vietn am general reserve and therefore subject to 

recall at ally time. Vietlllunesc marines had been operating with 

the Mobile Riverine Force on this basis since 15 November 1967 

and had comributedto successes of the force aga inst the VieL Congo 

The CORONADO series of operations conducted from June 1967 

to J uly 1968 had demonstrated the effecti veness of the i\lobile 

R ivcrine Force in the use of waterways 10 deny the enemy areas 

where he had previously operated \l'ith relati,'e freedom. This success led 10 an cxami nalion of how th e riverine effort could be 

expanded cheaply in order to step lip the tempo of operations in 

the i\lekong Delta. A stu dy conducted hy U.S. Anny, Vie tnam . 

and Commander. Nava l Forces. Vietnam. concluded that additiona l 

unilS of the 9th Infantry Di vision could be accommodated at Dong 

Tam withollt dredging. Further. with a modest addition o( naval 

craft to the already scheduled river assault squadrons, an cx· 

panded fo rce could sUpjX>rt two brigades afloat and one at Dong 

Tam. Through judicious usc of naval river craft and Army planes 

and helicopters the emire 9th Division could be effectively employed in the delta: the Vietnam Marine Corps and. eventually. 

ViclIlamese ri "er assault group uni ts could also be drawn into 

operations. An orga nization of twO Mobile Ri"erine Force brigades, 

each with three infantry battalions and support ing anillery, was 

considered the mOSt desirable. The third brigade was to opera te 

am of Dong Tam. either indepenelently or in conjunction with the 

Mobile Ril'erine Force. This al'l'angcmcm would provide nexibil· 

it)', reduce reliance on lanel bases, demand fe\\'c r aircraft, and help 

sustai n pressure on the Viet Congo It \\'()uld also eliminate regu lar 

ril'er assault squadron opera l,ions out of Dong Tam. which could 

de,elop a pattern easily detected by the enem),. The 3d Brigade 

\\'ith two maneuver battalions was to be sent from the Tan An 
PACIFICATION AND KIEN I-lOA PROVINCE 169 

area to Dong Tam Base to facilitate its transition to the second 

Mobile Riverine Force. The division headquarters was transferred 

from Camp l\hrtin Cox at Bearcat to its new base camp at Dong 

Tam on 25 July. 

As of July 1968 no definite date had been established for em· 

barking the long.awaited third infantry baltalion of the 2d Brigade 

aboard ships of the Mobile Riverine Force. The availability of the 

third infantry battalion was contingent upon readjustmentS in 9th 

Infantry Division base security missions. 

While general organization changes to the Mobile Riverine 

Force were being formulated, a major change was made in its mis· 

sion. On 16 July the 2d Brigade was assigned the province of Kien 

Hoa as a primary area of operations, with the added mission of 

conducting pacification aClivities of a more permane11l nature than 

those previously undertaken by the Mobile Riveri ne Force. The 

Accelerated Pacification Program guided from Headquarters, U.S. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, prompted this assignmenl. 

After six months of operations that concentrated on the area nonh 

o[ the My Tho River. including Long An Province and the Rung 

Sat Special Zone, and after an additional six months of operations 

ranging more widely afield and deeper into the delta, the Mobile 

Riverine Force returned to concentrate on Kien Hoa. At this time 

Major General Harris W. Hollis. commanding the 9th Division, 

decided to provide the force with itS third maneuver battalion and 

to require all three battalions 10 conduct airmobile and riverine 

operations in Kien Hoa Province. One of the battalions was based 

ashore in th e viCi nity of Ben Tre and twO battalions remained 

afloat. The concentration on Kien Hoa Province was directed 

Shortly after rorma l approva l of the riverine modified tables of 

organization and equipment ror the 2d Brigade and shortly before 

the arrival of the U.S. Navy craft required to lift the maneu\'er 

elementS of an additional brigade. 

The operational rotation of one infantry battal ion from the 

Mobi le Riverine Force to the Ben Tre base was quite different 

from the rotation of a baualion to Dong Tam. The May 1967 

preparations of the 2d Brigade for Mobile Riverine Force opera· 

tions had provided for each infantry battalion to leave at Dong 

Tam equipment not required when it \",as based afloat. Semi. 

permanent facilities at Dong Tam reduced the need or each battalion for organic equipment to operate a nearly independent 

battalion base. The first battalion sent to the Ben Tre base, there· 

fore, required equipment that Mobile Riverine Force battalions 
]70 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

had not needed since before June 1967. The addition of the third 

infantry batlalion as a land-based unit consequently brought a new 

organization and a logistics problem lhat the Mobile Riverine 

Force had not anticipated in its plan fOI" employing three infantry 

battalions in continuing strike operations from a base entirely 

aAoat. 

Concentration by the Mobile Riverine force on Kicn Han 

Province presented special considerations for operational flexibility. Previous operations in Kien Hoa had revealed the limited 

watenllay network off the major rivers. Helicopters had proved 

necessary both to deploy blocking forces inland in those areas lacking navigable waterways and to assist in \\lnterway reconnaissance. 

Previous operations had also demonstrated thal effcctive anchorages for the Mobile Riverine Base to support operations in Kien 

Hoa were limited lO four: the vicinity of Dong Tam: east of My 

Tho; east of Vinh Long: and east of Mocay District on the Co 

Chien River. Although use of each of these anchorages could facilitate operations into different districts of Kien I-loa Province, changing from one anchorage to another would nOt be likely to deceive 

the enemy. 

Tn the past bold changes in the location of the Mobile Riverine 

Base had achieved surprise against Viet Cong base areas that had 

not been recently or frequently attackcd. This major assct of the 

Mobile Riverine Force-the mobility of the entire force, including 

its logistics base-could not be fuHy used in the concentration of 

Kien Hoa Province. 

Beginning in earl)' September in Kien Boa Province under 

operation HO:'IESTEAD, the 2d Brigade conducted operations 

throughout the month to find and destroy the enemy in his home 

territory. The enem), attacked the river craft from ambush with 

rockets, recoilless 'rifles, and small arms. According to intelligence 

reports, the enemy had formed special five·man teams in Kien Hoa 

to ambush the boats of the Mobile Ri verine Force. The main 

ambush weapon of these teams was usually the RPG2 or RPG7 

rocket launcher. 

Tn September an additional river assault squadron and two 

barracks ships arrived in Vietnam to support the 3d Brigade, 9th 

Infantry Division. At the same time the 9th Infamry Division com· 

pleted reorganization of lhe headquarters of 3d Brigade and one 

battalion into the riverine modified tables of organil.ation ano 

equipment in amicipation of the establishmcm of the second 

l\lobile Riverine Force. By the end of 19G8 three additional bat· 
I'ACII'ICATION AN O KIF ~ 1I 0A PROVINCE 171 

talions we re rcorga ni/cd, ll1:!king a tot:! 1 o f t.wo brigade headquarters and seven infantry hattalions configured for riverin e operations. 

Du ri ng Octoher Mobile Ri\t:linc Group Alph a supponed 

pacificarion operarions in Kit'll Il oa Provi ncc wi th the 3d and 4th 

Baualions, 47th Infantry, tile 3d Bal.lalion, 60th InfalHry, clements 

of th e 3d Baualion, 341h Anillery, and the 3d Battalion , Vietnam 

Marine Corps. Mohile Ri vt'ri nc GlOlIp Bravo operated with OIher 

9th Infantry :lnd ViclIl;un grou nd force:; in Vi nh Binh, Vinh Lon g, 

LOllg An, Dil'lh Tuong. anrl Phong Dinh Pro\inces in ca rrying 

troops and hlod.ing Viet Cong LIse o f waterways, 

Tn order to make the greatest possihle usc of its resources during 

the ex tended pel iod of pat iliclli(lll ill Ki PIl 1-1 0:1. Dinh Tuong, and 

Lo ng An Pro\inC'es, the Mohile Ri\erin e Force was reorga ni7 cd 

0 11 I f, OCLOhel. Mohil e Ri\(:~ tine C,IOUp Alph a, su pporting th e 

Hth In fantry Didsion pac'i/ic3Iion oper:n ions, was as:;ignerl USS 

lIel/('wah, USS AS/lflyi, llSS S/)II;I/).,', USS Westchester COllnty, 

A PC26, a nd ),I.LC-4, Mo hile Ri\ erine Group Bravo, ca rq ing oul 

mOle mobile operat io ns rangi ng tlooughout tll c western delta 

I·(·gion. was assigned lISS M ('Y(.'eI, l lSS 1\'IIt'Ces, lISS Vl'll/O/l COllIlly, 

and USS Cllrolhll' COllllfy, Fi\ c ri vcr assault divisions were assi~ned 

to !\Iohilc Riveri ne Graul' Alpha, three to Mo hil e Riverin e Group 

Bravo. 

By the cnd of Octoher Task FOlce 11 7 had conduned liaison 

and training " 'i lll the 2br Vietnam Anny Dj ~jo n and had joined 

the 4th Vietn:1l11 Marine Curps nallation in Na\ y operations known 

as SEA l.ORDS (Southeast Asia Lake O cean Ri ver Delta Strategy), 

An extensive lilln ey of the western delta Canalli WliS :tlso marle in 

alltic-ipation uf future operations in that area. 

In No"el11 her the Mohile Riveri ne Force continued the pattern 

of nperaliollS wh ich had hegull afu'r the leorg'.m i7a tio n in October, 

with Mo hile Ri\erine Croup Alpha operating in th e eastern delta 

:tlld Mohi le Ri verine Croup Bravf) oper:tling 10 the west. Of the 

frve ri ver ass:tult di, isioT1S assignee! to Mohile Ri\ crine Grollp 

Alpha, Ri,er Assalllt ])i"i:;ioll 9 1 SlIppOltcd the jd Vietn .. 111 Marine 

Corps Ball alion in operatio ~ ill Kien lI oa Prudnce; Ril eI' Assa ult 

Oivision 92 \\'3S assigned base clcf't:nsl' dtlties; River Assault D i\i-

:;ion I I I :;lIpponed th e :Id Baualion. 34th Artillery: River Assault 

Division 11 2 operaleci with the!ld Billlalion , oOth Infantry, in Kien 

llna Prminte; :l lJcI Ri\l.'r Assault Di\'ision lSI worked with the 

:Id Batt alion, j9th Infantry, in I.':lst('rn Long An Prov in ce Of th e 

thrl.'e river assault divisions assigned to Mohi le R iverine Croup 

Bravo, Ri ver Assaull Division 12 1 provided for Dong Tlim base 
172 RIVERI;,\E OI'ERATIO;-'; S 

defense, River Assault Di\ision In supp0rled the SEA LORDS inter· 

diction operations, and River Assault Di\ision 152 su pported tl. e 

4th Vietnam Marine Corps Battalion. River assault craft also sup' 

ported other Iroop units in partindar operations during: the month. 

(Table 2) 

T .. uuF' 2-SEA LORDS O"tkATIO~'I, ;';OV.""ER 1968-JA"'UARV 1969 

Con· ~Iunlilonll Oth ~r IIrn, ... 1 

Op~rllllon~ Flrl'" ('nehu ('1I1'h~1I I';,wmy Enfmy 

MllhiK ""tO~fred l'n~'''''rrf't.1 huted C'nl'lurcd 

S'_\kCIi Tl k~ (lqan 2 ;-';on:m. 

, .. ' 9611) "'" .. (11 .0 , ( 1.0 219 27 

1011') 10m) 

TkIIs 111,& 0'0 (began 16 

;\'o"('mb('r 19(11) 276 , (11.1 0 4;0 

IOn.) " 

(;IA.>;T ~LlSC5ItOT (IK-gan 6 Dc· 

('tuber 1968) 1.014 21~ (ISH) 22 I'R 1.9 1,9 10 252 

~) lon~) 

n 'k .. ~ .. Rr.U· (began 2 J:mu· 

'" '96'1) 77 , (0.4 0 '" .. Ion,) 

A significalll incident occurred in November when USS B', ,f. 

eltesler County was mined as she lay at anchor with th e other ship~ 

of Mobile Riverine Group Alpha on the My Tho Ri"er. At 032:-1 

on I No\ember. two explosions ripped scp:lrate holes on the star· 

board side of the LST. Three or the aSS.1lilt crart that were tied 

III' alongside and 1'1'0 helicopters that were on hoard were damaged. 

Although Ihe LST was nOt in (1:lI1ger of sinking. se\'eral compa rtmems were flooded and internal blast damage was extensivc. There 

" 'as no damage to the ship's main engines or other machinery and 

she sailed to Dong Tam fur emergency repairs before proccedin~ 

to a repair racilit),. The mining was apparelllly the work of cnemy 

swimmers or s,1.ppers who penetrated, un<!etellcd, the base security 

forces. American casualties werc 25 killed, 27 wounded, and" 

missing. 

Encmy swimmers or sappcrs again stru ck the i\fobilc Riverine 

Force on the night of 15 No\cmber when the )' LLC-4 (sa l\age 

lift craft. light) was mined and Slink ",hile at :'\nchol' on the Ilam 

Luong Ri\er. Casualties in this instance were t,,'() killed and thir· 

teen wounded. Because damage was extensh,c and th e location 

h:l1.:lrdous, it was determined that s,1.lvage would be uneconomica l; 

and thc craft was destroyed 10 eliminate il as a navigational hillaI'd. 
173 

On J.'l NO\ emlWf I !)fiR lhe 11>1. Brig;lcI(' replaced lhe 'Jd nrigade 

:It nnn~ CUll and III(' 'JcI nril-::ulc r('turned to nperate in Long An 

)lr{)\in((', Tilis rlcll!oymclll Illmed Illl' ri\crilll'·organi/cd :\cI Brigade :J\\';,y fmm Ihe :11(":1 Ihal liu' Mohile Aflnal Force concepl had 

d('si~n,lIecl for follo\\ LIp riverine opef.1cionS- lhc are;! soulh of Ihe 

My Tho RI\cr. P:l1l of J\fllhilc RiH'rille Croup Alpha continued 

10 ~lIppnn the ~cI Brig:Jdc ill l.ollg An I)w,inr(' and olher U.S. 

fones in II I Corps Tactical ZOlle. 

Ri\clinc warf:U"c in Dc(cmhcr again ill\ol\'cd inlerrlinion. 

("scrnt. pitlHlI, hase :Irt'a search, and p;l{ific:tlioll. Small IInil Navy 

actions were (oncltHtcd o\t'!' wide an~: s in Kicil 11 0:1, Ki en Giang. 

Chuon~ Thien, and An XllyCIl PIO\ jilt l'~. ~Inhilc Rivt:l'ine Croup 

Alph:a oper:alions \\ere nlllfilH'cI for 111(' 1II0S1 p:all 10 :afli\iI Y in 

Kien 1111;1 Provillt(, and SlIppOlI of I Ill' 2d Bri)..tOlde, !lth Inf:tlllry 

Dll ision . Muhile Rin:rine (.rOIiP Br.l\o (OlltiUIIl'd In c:arr) oul :1 

1:lri clY of ~pl'(ial op('ra tion s ill ,II(' sO lllh eln clelLI in (f)·ordination 

with IInih of Ihe 2(1. ,'ld, ;md 41h I\:allaliolll> of Ih e Vi('IIl:a1ll Marine 

Corps. 

The 2d Bri~cI(', supportcd hy i\rohilc Ri\'erin(' r.roilP Alpha, 

t'Il/-\:IAt'd in :a ~('Iies ()f np(,I;lli()n~ ill Ik( (,lnllcr clesij.\llecl 10 ~eep 

WIlSI:lnt pH',sure _ on the Vi('1 Cong. Wilh frequent in,Cl'Iions of 

In)Qps in thc l!:alll I ,ong, Mo (:;I), ;IIHI rrllr (;i:lng Districts of 

Ki en )If);'! Prm inn-, ~d Hl ip,.lflt' p,Tounci font'S (ontintled 10 5t'e~ 

out (he CIlt'IIIY, cspl'(-i,llI y lllt'lllhcrs of th(' Viel COI1),( politic,,1 or~:t· 

ni/;ltiOIl, or the lIl:any IX''Ol'k dCI:lined for qllestioning. ahollt ~O 

PCI"(CnI 1\t'I(' slIlIseqllellll) d:assiflt:c1 ;IS Vit'! Cong and the rest <IS 

innoc(,nt (il ili;lIlS. 

Thl'OlI~hollt ! :a nll:II"Y of 19M the Mohile RiH:rin(' Force COI1 -

dUCI('d opt-rations in Ihe prm IIIU:S (If Diull Tuong. Vinh Long, 

Long All , ;11Ic! Kiell IlfM as tlH' i\fnllil(' Ri\nilll' Fm:ll' ;11-\, lin mO\{'c! 

I.lrther .Iflt:ld, On 7 ' ,11111011')' two 1I,ltr;liioll\ \\"l're 1,Indeci in !lIe Don 

N h,m d i,l rit 1 or lI'e~lt'rn K it' ll 11 11,1 Plo\ i lit l' , <Ill ,II t\l 1I0! pre\ iOllsl y 

pt'IWlt,lIed hy l! .S. 101( l'~, I \\'0 pl,llOtJlh or .'nelll) ~lIl-11 ill:as \\'('r(' 

t'ng,lgcd II, Arm y lroflp~ Idllk ,"'>.1II1t (I,lft ('~Lrlilishcd sc\c,>rai 

1I,IIa lJiCl(I..~ to pre\CIII IIll' n(;lpl..' or Ihl' glu'nill.Ls. This stlatt'gy 

I.-as illll'IU11.'1\ II) hle;lI.. lip Ihl' t'!It'IlI \ IlIul"1 ;4101I1ld nrg;lni/;!tioll , 

cI i~rll pt ('tWill) pbll ~, flt'IIII)I;l1 i/t· t'm'lIl \ 1,)1( n. ;lntl ,. id paf i fi( al ion. 

rlht, \lolllll..' Rill'l illt, Forte II'.'(] Ill'li(flPIt'I~ ("I{'nllin'i) in 1!1t' 

IIpl' utinn . t" pt'(i;llI y ill J,tI1l1;1l Y ;Incl Fdllll,ll) \\ht' n Ihe gr('ate~t 

II II 111 il('1 b"( ,ll11e ;lI,liJ..hle, 

I hl' ;I(llIlIil" 01 ~lullile RIIl'lille (,tflllP ,\Iplu heellll(' Ulore 

,LIlt! lJIOIe If/mille a~ Itt.rt,p.<t \\\'Il' 1I,ln'l)llll('d \\illl'll Kil'n Iloa 
I i4 RlvrRI"'~. OI''' RATIO'''''' 

Pro\i n('c in SuppOJ"l of the 2c! Brigack. (:0I1SI,1111 pn~~urt' Wi\S ap' 

plied to encmy f01CCS tltCI{' ill SUppOiI 01 lIlt· ,lllit"! pm;.:r:!111 III 

commil morc tl onp~ and lime 10 Ih t' patihCltHlII effurt. )\Io/)i[(' 

Riverine Group Bralo. op(' lI ~ II illl tltt· :Id anc! 41h Baltalion ... 

Vietnam illarine C.orps. ;tchana'" in lo CI111()n~ rIm·n. Kicn (;i,m~ . 

PI long Dinlt, a nd nonll('fIl '\,1 Xuyclt Prminl('s. 

In ('art) January 1909 Mobile R in'rine Group Alph:1 inilialed 

a cordon and seardt opel.lliol1 011 rhoi Son Isl:ind. in Ihe 1\1)' Tho 

Rh er so lllh (If (l ~ r Olm. TWCIlI).folir liH:r a.'isalilt na ft of RiH.'r 

Assault Dilisions 92 a nd 111 .1\1'0 infanlr)' h,lIl:dions. ciAIl! ri\'l'/" 

1J.1 trol bOat.'l. and Vi('l/ulII .\I:ny unilS p:mil ipa ted in Ihis operation 

whi(h was clircued againq \ 'i('t COJlg guen ill as and swimmer and 

sapper units h:lsed on the e;lstem enel of th e i<;lanci. The isla nd 

people.' wcrc mo\{·d tcmpor:n il) In thrce tolknio/l points, <;U'cenecl 

hy tllc National Pol i,e atlel i ... sLI('(1 nCII' id('nliliGttioll C:II'{I~. Ri\ C'r 

crafl assul11ed blod,ing Sla tions and Ihc isLmd was ~\\'('p l h)' inf.lIllfV 

units seeking Vi e t Cong. A wlal of 1 . .'\!:i~1 pcople loluntarily as· 

sembl ed al Ihe lhree collcttion points or 11{'rl' :tpprehendcd in tilc 

s\\Oeep. Se\cllly Viel Cong \\'(,Ie apprchcnd ed U\ lile enel of Ihe 

opcration on i Janua r) 1969. 

On 12 J anu;n')' iJoats of RiH!r Assau lt Oiv ision 9 1 wcrc \Iilil' 

drawn h om operati ons prelintimlr), 10 Ihe planned ItLlnOlCr of '}j 

!i\'er assault (l'afl 10 the Viclnalll Na\'y 011 I Fehruary. Vielll:ln\l'w 

naval ue\\'s had und ergone on.lhe·job lrai nin:.: with Ri\ cr s~lIIh 

Di vision 9 1 units since ca d y De('cmber 1968. Ril cr Ass.wlt Squad 

ron 111 joined ob il e Rilerine Group Alpha and RileI' .\ssa ull 

Division j j2 was teJic\{'c! h) RivCl' Assault Oilisi(lll 92 in Oper,,-

ti on SFA LORDS. Ri, cl Assault. Di visiun 1:12 telumed to Ih e Mo· 

bile RiH!rin c Base in Kiell Iloa ;111(1 SIlPPol'l cd [he '1th lbualioll, 

47lh Infantry. River s~a ult Di\isioll 13 1 supportcd Ihe 3d n"l( al· 

ion . 34111 Anillery: Ril er Assa ult Dilision 11 2 a~Sll lll ed surpOrt 

dlltics for the 3d 1~ Htalion, oOth Infalllry, and Ri ler Assallil ni\ i· 

sia n III assumed u..1se defcnse dUlics. 

Ri\ er Assaull Squadron 15 had begun re('onnaissa nce operalions 

in an encmy base area in s(} lIlh cl'll Ki ell Giang Pro\ ince in lale 

December 19G5 and had cmlli nlLcci lhese opcr:llions into J anuarv. 

Eighteen rher assaull craft. wOIkin1!, in co·ordin ati on with lite 2d 

and 3d Batl,liions. ViClllam Marine Corps. ("()ncimlcc\ patrols and 

I:mded lroops along lhe ('~"ln C:tO C1nal. Ground fighti ng wilh 

enCI11) fortcs was sporadic IhrouAholil the campaiAIl , which l:t.'iled 

IInlil 7 J:mll ar)'. Despitc il1ldj ig-encc rcports o f sig nificalH enemy 

fo rces in the area . U.S. a nd ViClnamesc lroops enw untercd only· 
I'ACIFICATION ANI) KIE N 1I 0A PROVINCE 175 

small groups of the enemy that employed hit·and-run taclics. 

This same river assault squadron, with th e 2d Vietnam Marine 

Corps Baltalion, began operations along the Song Cai Tn and Song 

Cai Lon Rivers in Kien Giong Provi nce on II January to round 

lip enemy forces suspected of being in the region. The enemy had 

used the lerriLOry hefore for Slora)..\e and for oITensive operations in 

Chuang Tien, Kien Giang, and Phong Dinh Provinces. U.S. and 

Vietnamese tTOOps were landed at a number of beaches but found 

only enemy ground forces of squad size or smaller. Aher troop 

landings, river assault craft estahlished blocking sta lions and 

checked a total of 189 sampans throuRhout the opera tion, whkh 

lasted until 18 January. The enemy attacked assault craft of the 

riverine force eight times. Of the total of twenty-six U.S. sailors 

wounded, five were injured when an ATe was sunk by a watcr 

mine on the Song Cai Tu. Two sailors and one Vietnam marine 

died when the mined craft sank almost immediately. 

On I February the twenty·five river assaull craft of Division 91 

were transferred by the U.S. Navy to the Vietnam Na,'y. Combining 

these craft with eight aSs.1111t support patrol hoats received directl), 

under the military assist.1nce program, the Vielnam Navy fonned 

two river assault and interdiction divisions, which conducted opera· 

lions in conjunction with the U.S. Navy. C..oincident with the Hlmover, River Assault Division 91 was dissolved. 

Standard infalllry operations hy water and air continued in 

February as the Mobile Riverine Force operated in several districts of Kien Hoa PrO\'ince in support of th e 2c1 RriAade. On two 

occasions river assmilt craft came under p:micularly heavy and 

well-aimed enemy fire from the river banks. On 21 February, IInils 

of River Assault Division 131 received combined rocket and alltomatic weapons fire from both hanks of the Song Ba Lai at a position three miles northeast of Bcn Tre. Six crafl were hit and 

slightly damagerl: el even U.S. sailors were 1I'0unded. Again, on 

27 February, units of River Ass:mlt Di"ision 11 2 (amc under heavy 

rocket, recoilless riflc, and :Iulomati( weapons fire from hoth hanks 

of the Song HOI Lai at a position four miles norchcast of Hen Trc. 

In this attack there were t\\'el\'c U.S. Navy sailors wounded and 

five of the river aSs.1ttlt (Taft rece ived hiLS ca using minor daTlla~e. 

Enemy swimmers with SelinA gear were si~hted in dose to 

the USS VeniOti COlwly (I.ST- Il li l) at Mohile Riverine I\asc 

Alpha at Dong Tam on two successive da)'s-25 and 26 February. 

In bOlh cases concussion grenades wcre dropped into thc water, and 

subsequent hull inspections turned up no damage . 
176 RIVERI1'\'F. OPF.RATI01\ .... 

During the same period Mohile Riverine Force clements ;'lIHbushed a Viet Cong: water CO I1\ ()~'. Elements uf the :~d Battalion, 

GOth Infantry, in night posili ons alon~ the R:lch An I~inh , three 

miles soltlheast of Mo Cay. detected three large mowri/ccI sa ll1pan'> 

movi ng northward :doll)..\" th e waterway. firing illlo the hanks. The 

soldiers quickly set lip an amhush and [OO\... the S<llllpallS under fire. 

Twenty-one of the enemy were killed and the three sampans were 

captured with no American casualti es. 

Water blockades along the Song Can Tho and Kinh Xa i\fo in 

Phong Dinh Province. hegun on 30 January by f\.lobile Ri\'crinc 

Group Bravo, comillucci inlo Fcbrnary. The 2181 Vietnam Army 

lnfantry Division had been conducting reconnaissance in force to 

prevclll massing of Viet Cong in the area. The river assault cr:lfl , 

working in conjunction with clements of th e 21st Vietnam Army 

Division, established a walcr blockade along the Song Can Tho from 

the Cai Range Bridge in Phong Dinh I)ro"ince 10 a point ci~hl 

miles west of Can Tho, and along the Kinh Xa Mo fl\Hl1 Thuan 

Mon to the junction of Ihe Kinh Xa 1\10 and Son~ Can Th/). One 

company ea<.:h of the 2c1 Vietnam f\larine C.orps Battalion ;mel the 

2951h Pbong Dinh Regional Force wcre embarked as rese l"" es. DUI"' 

ing the operation, which lasted LIIHil 3 FehrU:II'Y, over 7,000 salll ' 

pans were inspected. Ground forc'es repo n ed only light ;mel sporadi c 

fire. Enemy swimmers were seen hy Mobil e Ri" eri ne Croup Bra" o 

on 5, 7. and 9 February. Inl1 in each case no swimmers wel"e captured and there was no hull damage to hoats. 

Operating with IGO rivcr assault (Tarl in l\-1arch hecatlsc of the 

transfer of the twenty·five boa ts to Ihe Vi etn;lLll Na,'y in Fehruary, 

the Navy elements of the Mo hile Ri verine Force aga in rimged the 

delta in ri,'er assault oper:tl iollS in co·ordination with the U.S. 

Army and ViClnam armed forccs. Croup Alpha cominueci opera -

tions in Kien Hoa Province with Ihe 2d Bri ~ac1c. Attacks against 

river assa ult craft continued into i\larch :mel gro und units cngaged 

in heavy fil'efights on severa l ()\(·;lliiom. Grou p Br;wo and the Victnam marines cond ucted a successful strike into Chuong Thien 

Province. 

A plan for ahrain comhining' I1mh task groups of Ihe i\lohile 

Riverine Force took effect on -1 March as Ihe units of Task CrollI' 

Alpha pUI in at the i\l y Tho :uH'lLm:lgl'. The si ngle mohil e riverine 

base allowed for a more dlic icllt ILli li /ation of resourcc'i and reo 

duced the numher of troops needed for hase defense from 111'0 ri\Cl" 

assaull divisions to one, there by allowing the e'>:tra division 10 he 

employed in offensive opera lions. Taclical flexibility was al'iO maintained shou ld the need arise for t\\'o LLSk groups. 
I'ACIFICATION AND KIEN tlOA PROVINCE 177 

During April naval units of the Mobile Riverine Force par· 

ticipated in diversified operations with different missions and in 

various areas. Reconnaissance in force. patrolling, ambushes. troop 

transport. inspection. fire support, blocking. escort duties. and 

psychological warfare were carried out by river assault craft. often 

in conjunction with U.S. Army or Vietnam armed forces. as they 

o~n.ted from northern Long An Province to the southernmost 

reaches of the Ca Mau peninsula. The long·tenn riverine assault 

operations in Kien Hoa Province continued as the combined Anny 

and Navy un ita continued to inflict losses on the enemy. 

On 22 Aprll River Auault Division 132 was on the eai Tu 

River eight and onf"-half miles southwest of Vi Thanh . During the 

firefijil;ht. a Wlter mine e'(pluded sixty feet off the starboard bow of 

a command Inti funtrol bcl:.lt and caused minor flooding that was 

brought under mntrul. Potential loues were averted on 24 April 

when a Viet ConK t'Ol1l1tuuul-c letunated mine was discovered at· 

tached to the Illtlawlllllner net uf an APL between the how and 

ponton, The homemade mine. whkh was estimated to weight from 

150 to 17 ~ pound •• w ... tUk'm'eml wht"n an antiswimmer net was 

being raiKd u the Ihip l)fellll-ed tn ~et under way; inspection by 

mine dispoal ~)(I)trt. ft"vt'"llled tilt mine with its detonator lead 

severtd. The detonltor wlrt Will l}ful~hly ut during a minesweep 

patrol by a base eldenit' bUlt, On :tn April an assault support patrol 

boat was sunk on the r.-I Til Rh'"r a. an enemy mine was deto· 

nated beneath it. Itern tllIrlt'M 1m opt-rillon in Chuong Thien 

Province, 

The need for further 1)l1t" and helat tldensl\'e measures was 

apparent in the num~r of thwart~ll\ntl Klu'\'t'gful enemy swimmer 

attacks against the Mobile Rh'eriut' Ul't't', lnrrea.ed emphasis was 

placed on USe of neU, ('\lOt'uNinn ~f"f'mule., !tnd hull inspections by 

underwater demolition te-llnll, 

The main thrust of Mobile Rh'erine Fnrt't'- n~rations in May 

continued again" the enemy in Kien lhla PI't)\'int:t', However, three 

excursions lasting up to a wC't'k ead, wert nuute by detachments of 

six to eight river assault naft into the elm (;iUUl' District of Long 

An Province in support of the- 5th Uau:lliun, 60th Infllntry, of the 

3d Brigade. 

During .June the U.S. Navy turned o\'er to the Vietnam Navy 

sixty·four additional river assault craft \'alue-II at $18.5 million. 

(Table J) Sailon of the Vietnam Navy had already trained on the 

job with U.S. Navy river assault craft crews with whom they had 

been integrated during the pr«eding months. River Assault 
178 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Squadrons 9 and II were decommissioned on 10 and 27 June. 

respectively. 

TABU:: 3-U.5. RIVER CRAFT TRANSFERRED TO VIETNAM NAVY IN 

JUNE 1969 

en" IOJuoII l~ JUDe 21 June Total 

ATe .................. , .... 12 12 

ASP8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8 " " 

Monilor ..................... 2 , , " 8 

CCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 • 

RcfueJer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 

T«.J ................... 25 " " 54 

Mobile Riverine Force activities were cancclllrated in Kicn 

Hoa Province during June and consisted primarily of assault landings. troop sweeps and ambushes. and blocking, escorting, and 

defoliation missions. although some psychological warfare and 

medical civic action programs were conducted as well. Operations 

of limited. duration also look the force into Go Cong, Long An. 

and Vinh Binh Provinces. The total of 554 of the enemy killed 

by the Mobile Riverine Force in june, although substantial, was 

the lowest figure since january 1969, indicating a reduced tempo 

of operations. 

Mobile Riverine Force operations were even more limited in 

july. On 12june 1969 the 9th Infantry Division had been notified 

of its impending departure from Vietnam. The 2d Rrigade was the 

first to be inactivated, probably because the lst and 3d Brigades had 

had more experience in the area just south of Saigon where there 

was still a need for at leaSl one brigade. The division was inactivated in phases. The 3d Ballalion. 60th Infantry, lert the country 

in early July. The river force divisions supporting the 9th Division 

were used chieRy in defense of Dong Tam n .. se, but they also supported Vietnam Army, Regional Forces. and Popular ForCe! units. 

River Assault Flotilla One at the end of July consisted of 113 craft 

in five divisions, two divisions assigned to River Assault Squadron 

13 and three to Squadron 15. Sixty-three of the enemy were killed 

in July operations. 

When the departure of the 9111 Infantry Division was announced. there appeared in the press considerable conjct:tlIre on 

the fate of the Mekong Della. Most articles were openly pessimistiC 

about the ability of Republic of Vietnam forces to hold onto the 

gains made in the Mekong Delta after twO and a half years of U.S. 
PACIFICATION AND KIEN HOA PROVINCE 179 

operations there. A feature article of 28 July 1969, "Where the 

Reds Are Stopped in Vietnam" in U.S. News tr World Reporl, was 

guardedly optimistic. and summed up the results of riverine warfare 

in the: delta. Viet Cong deFections, it declared, had increased to 300 

per month from a pre- 1969 rate of 50. and the enemy was no 

longer able to mass forces as he had in the past. Roads and canals 

that had been closed for yean; were now open to public use. The 

Vietnam government appeared to be ruling more effectively in the 

rural areas and reFugees were moving back to their land in larger 

numbers. 

When asked "What happens once the 9th Division leaves?" 

Major General Harris W. Hollis, the division commander, was 

quoted in a New York Times article as saying: "The mission for 

which this division was sent to the Mekong Delta has been largely 

discharged- that of dealing with the Viet Cong and the North 

Vietnamese until such time as Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

can take over this function. These forces. whom we have assisted, 

arc now ready to do this." 

The Navy meanwhile was well on its way toward creating a 

U.s. and Vietnamese force to keep the Viet Cong from using the 

vital rivers and canals. With the realization that no additional U.S. 

Army forces would be placed afloat the Navy had begun in late 

1968 to search for other ways to lise its great number of river craft. 

OPeration SEA LORDS 

As early as December 1968 the U.S. Navy, in co-ordination with 

the Vietnam Army and province forces, had begun a limited program to keep the enemy away from the rivers and canals in western 

Long An and Kien Tuong Provinces. In July and August 1969 as 

more river craft became availahle, the Navy initiated Operation 

SEA LORDS under the control of the newly formed Task Force 

194 located at Can Tho. With the formal disestablishment of River 

Assault Flotilla One on 25 August 1969 all but one or the barracks 

ships were returned to the continental United States and decornmissioned. The repair ships were taken over by the Naval Support 

Activity and dispersed throughout the delta to support SEA 

LORDS. The boats of two river assault squadrons were turned 

over to the Vietnam Navy and the remainder were absorbed by 

SEA LORDS. 

A study conducted in preparation for SEA LORDS determined 

that the principal water route to exploit for the purpose of stopping 
180 RIVERINt: OPERATIONS 

the Communist flow of supplies cnlcring the IV Corps Tactical 

Area from C-.mlxxlia was the cana l route linking Iia Tien on the 

Gu lf of Thailand with Chal! Doc on the upper Mekong River. This 

route, however, closely parallels the border and lhe risk of real or 

contrived border incidents dictatL't1 against placing a SEA LORDS 

barrier there until the plan had been tested in a less sensitive area. 

IL was decided. therefore. thaI two parallcl c.mals some thirty-live 

and (orty mih.'S southeast of the border would be used to form a 

double barrier and 10 inaugurate the SEA LORDS campaign. 

" Imerdiction in depth had its :lllactiveness from an operations 

analysis point of view. and. at the s.-.rnc time. two watenvays would 

be opened (or friendly trame. In conjunClion with this barrier. 

river patrols would be strcngthencd from Long Xuyen through 

thc Vam Nao Crossovcr to the Mekong." 

The second objt.'Ctivc of SEA LORDS-control of vital trans· 

delta inland waterways- would hc accomplished by the removal of 

obstructions to navigation in the ello Gao Canal linking the Vam 

Co and My Tho Rivers; by strike opcratiOlu a long the Mang Thit· 

Nicolai C.1na\' which joins the Co Chicn and Bassac Rivers; and 

by rcopening of the Hassac--Hac Liell rice route in the lower della. 

Penetration of rivers in the C111 Mau peninsula. the third objcctive. 

actuall y began berore formal proposals were madc to the sen ior 

adviser of IV Corps TaCliC;l1 Zone. Major Gencr.tl George S. Ed.· 

hardt. A patrol hoat incursion of the Cua Long River on IR 

October 1968 is usually considert.-d the rirst of tile SEA LORDS 

operations. although a few earlier stich opcrations wcre conducted 

by MARta •• TIME. 

Ceneral Eckhardt endorsed the Navy's propos.1is. and organization for SEA LORDS proceeded rapidly. C:lptain Robert S. 

Salzer. U.S. Navy, previollsly commander of the Navy component 

of the Mobile Riverine Force. was dcsignatcd First Sea Lord and 

assigncd a sl:lff of nine officers anri six enlisted mcn at General 

Eckhardt's headquarters in Can Tim. The C.ommander of Naval 

Forces. Vietnam. was given the task force number 194. Captain 

Salzer bec.1lne commander of Task Group 194 .0 and exercised 

operational control commencing 15 Octohcr I!Hi8 of three other 

task gTOUpS: 191 .5, Coastal Raidin~ anc! l\1ocking Group; 194.6. 

Riverine Raiding and IJlocking emup: and 191.7. Ri\'erinc Strike 

Group. He was directed to <ksignate one of the three task force: 

commanders to command each specific SEA LOROS operation, 

with the commander of Task Force: 11 5 usually expcc::ted to direct 

SEA LORDS invasions from the sea and tile commander of Task 
PACIFICATION AND KIEN IIOA PROVINCE 181 

Force 116 the riverine sirikes involving large commitments or 

ground rorces. 

On 2 November the first or the barrier campaigns, later given 

the name SF..ARCII T URN, was launched. Ileavy crart or the Mobile 

Riverine Forcc and supporting ground troops succeeded in securing the waterways in a fivc-day opera lion that resulted in twelllyone Viet Cong killed and the c.'lplUrc or si7.able quamilies or anns 

and ammunition. A pcnnanenl naval patrol was then cstablishccl. 

iu main purpose to keep scc-ure the western ends or the barrier ,md 

the network or perpendicular canals running north rrom Rach 

Gia to 1-)01 Tiell. According to intelligence reports, Ih e prindpal 

Communist messengers passed through this territory. 

While the operation was in progn .. 'SS other SEA LORDS rorces 

were employed in clearing the Clio Cao ('..10011, which was open to 

navigation on 6 Novemher. l.ater in the monlh Tan Dinh and 

Dung Island in the Bas.~lc River were sca led off hy a naval blcx:kade while ground rmn's roncluclcd sweep operations. MARKET 

TIME boats moved into areas in the c."1 Mati peninsula that had 

long been cOflsiclcrt.'d exclusively the domain or the Viet Cong. The 

second or the imerdiClion h,lITiers was eSlahlislu . .'d on 16 November 

1968. and a third on 6 Oc..'celllhcr 1!)(i8. Given the c()(le name GIANT 

SI.INGSIlOT, this last campaign achieved the most dramatic and 

telling effects on enemy infiltration of all the interdiction harriers. 

Thirty miles west nr Saigon a IX'Cliliarly drawn harrier thrusts 

the Cambodian "Parrot's Beak" deep into ViClnam's 111 Corps 

area. The Parrot's Beak had lung heen known as a C..ommunist base 

rrom which supplies mo\'(.'(1 across the border. and wcll·dOClilnenlOO 

infiltration routcs had 1x."Cn trAced. These elllercci South Vietnam 

between the Vam ('.0 Tay and Vam ('.0 nang: Rivcrs: one turned 

sollth into the delL"I, Ihe mhcr cast In supply the Viet Cong in Ihe 

countryside sllrl'fJlIlI(linJ,t the capital. The IWO ri\'ers flow on eilher 

side or the I)arrot"s Beak nil nllH"erging COllrscs to the southeast. 

They appear tn form :1 slingshol intI) which the Parrot's Heak 

neatly fits, hence the l'(Klc name C.IANT SIING$1I0T. For ground Slip" 

port in the GIANI" SUNGSIIOT operation, Rear Admiral William II. 

IlollSc.', who had assulIH.'(1 the post of Firsl Sea Lord lipan C .. aptain 

S."Il7er's dep,1rture. calleel 011 the cUllImanding general or I I Ficici 

Force, Viell1am, l.iell(cII:lnt Cel1cral Ff('Clerick C. Weyand, and 

gOl his endoTSCment and promisc ur help. 

Because or the distann:s imul\"ccl and hl'("allsc it was impossible 

to bring large ships up ri\"er he)'t>lui the In\\' hricij.\cs at Tan An and 

Ben Luc, a new basing ;mel support scheme was devisc.!d ror GIANT 
182 RIVERI!'\t: OI'ERATlO~!'o 

Sl.lI"GSIIOT. An 3chran('c laninll support hase was d(:si~ncd, consisting of three or more :m,OO·fool Alum! Imrg('s un whi. Ii berthing and 

messing facilities. SlOrCfI)oms. and a lactic;1I upcralinlls center could 

be constructed and whidl would contain waler purifiC:lIion (,f(Llipmelll, generators, and 01 her assOrlcrll1l,u:hincry. 

Ad\'ance tactic; .. ll support I .. ,S(.'S werc cstahlishcd at Tuyen Nhon 

and Moc 110.1 on the Valli Co T:I)' :mel at Tra ell and II iep 110:1 on 

the Vam Co Dong. The sile at Il iep I loa \\';15 later ab;mdOlH.'d in 

favor of one at (;0 nau I III and in Ju:y HUi9 nn additional hase:: was 

pl.lced al Ben Ken ncar Ihe important city of Tay Ninh. The USS 

Ashari and the henhing and messing barge for undcrw:lIcr rep;liT 

I'I'C\\'5 were :11 Tan An, l\\\':liting the arrival of Mobile Base II. a 

sophisticat(.'d four-Ammi complex. sp(.'Cially constructed in the 

United St:IlCS with improved henhing and messing facilitic..'s and 

C<Juippctlto make extensive boat repairs. The USS lIar",:lI COlully 

provid(.'d support ill Bell Lut: for the patrol hoats uillil the completion of a shore support hase there. 

From its very inception, \.IA":'- SI.l":C.~IIOT was ch:lr3clerizcd by 

frcquclll, heavy clashes helween p:urol boats and enemy forces 

illlenl on mailllaining the lines of c.:ollllllilniciltion to their Camhodian storehousc. Extremely larv,e quantities of arms. Illlmilions, 

and supplies were uncovered in carhes buric<1 along the river banks. 

proving beyond doubt that vital enemy ildihration linc...'S had been 

eUl. 

The fourth and last of the interdiction barriers in the Mekong 

DelL."l was established on 2 January 1969 when naval p."ltrols began 

operations on the La Grangc-Ong Lon ClOal from Tuyen Nhon 

on the Valll Co Tay River to An l.ong on the Mekong. C"llled 

HAItRIER REEI'-. this operation joined G,ANT SI.IJ"OCSItOT in the cast 

with the two interdiction barriers in the west, SEARCII TURN and 

TitAN HUNC OAO. The northern ring was then complete; the enemy 

\vas no lOIlAer free to move men and supplies willi impunity from 

C."lmbodia into III and IV Corps areas. A naval "L"lriff" had been 

imposed on those shipments. measurable in tcrms of men and sup· 

plics captured or destroy(.'d, but the supplies and men that were 

prevented frorn gelling through cannot be calculated. 

Once the harriers were in place, the boms were uS(.'d to counter 

enemy pressures and probes. With rclalively lillie disruption to 

existing oTb.rani7 .. ation and logistics, boats were shifted rapidly from 

one area of operations to another. For example in Operation 

OOU8LF. Sill...,. in July 1969. 105 U.S. Navy and Vietnamese Nilvy 

boats were quickly concentrated on the waters of the Vam Co 

Dong north of Co Dall lla in response to serious enemy threats 
I'ACIHC .. \TION A Nil I\lEN 1I0A PROVINCE 183 

to the (ity 01' Tav inh. Thi'i suddcn and impressive display of 

na\al pmn'r, dirccte<1 hy the (ommandcr on Ihe scenc. Lieutenant 

Comm:lllder Tholllas K. Andelsun, U.S. Na\·y. was credited hy Ihe 

WlIIlIlan<ier of " Field Force, Lielltenant General Julian J. Ewell. 

\\·ith h:l\·ing prevented the enemy aHack on Tay Ninh from the 

sotlthwcsl. 

On two scparate occasions Ihe mohility of the hoats was increased when ~iant Army sk),cmne helicopleT"!'i were uscd to lift 

some of IIIelll il1(o new areas uf operations. In May 1969 six rivcr 

patml boats were skyhookexl 10 the upper S.'tigon Ri\'er, and in 

Jllne six more were lirtecl to the othcrwise inaccessible Cai Cai 

c.'tnal. Both operations acllie\'oo tactical surprise. 

As each operation progressed, concerted efforts were made to 

integr:ttc uniu of the ~rowing Vietnamese Navy. The military desil'al1ililY ancl political ne<·cssily to "Vietnami7.c" thc naval war 

were evident !vng in advance of SEA LORDS planning. It seemed 

olwiom that the Vietnamese Navy's hope of relieving the U.S. Navy 

of its operational responsibilities in the war as soon as possible would 

he comidcrahly enhanced hy success of SEA LORDS. SEA LORDS 

was a remarkable or~ani7.ation ",hieh came to mean unity of comlTIand anel rapid response to Changing tactical situations. Relatively 

junior oOicers and men werc ortcn placed in positions or extraordinary responsibility. Tactics and tcchniques wcre dcveloped and 

tcsled in the heat of cumhat. and .n times even borrowed from the 

enemy. impm\'ccl llpon, and usecl to ddeal him. The waterborne 

gUilrelposl. for instance, was a I'efinement of Ihe favorite enemy 

1:l(:ti(- of amhllsh. Using silent hoats and nig'ht observation devices. 

Ihc U.S, and Vietnamese IK>:llS stalked the would· be Viet Cong am· 

husher and trapped him. Im:lgination and leadership provided the 

plan and a dedicated cllllc..'Ctinn of sailors. soldiers. and airmen 

lIlade it work. 

In addition 10 use ill SEA I.ORnS, the United Stales rivcrcrart 

turned over tn thc ViclI1:1lll Na\y:1l C.an Tho were useello support 

Vietnam Marine CMPS :1I1c1 Vietnam Army uniLS in the ccntml 

clelta. Operalion>; wcre (OIHl1lll('<I ill the style of the Mobile RivCline Fon (', Il\It grcaler l'lIIpha~i~ lI'ilS placed nn Ica\ in~ sClurity 

fUTees in are:l~ that had h('('11 (It'an·t! '10 Ihal Ihc Vietnam gO\ern1II('l1t coule! cOlllinu(' 10 (111111"01 th clll. Thc' A!"tuyNavy Mohile 

Rin·rine FCII'u', wlli, II had opc'l:tteci in Ihe Mekong nelta since 

Fehruary 1967, was di~c'Slahli>;llt cI 011 2r, AU):!:IISI 19fi9 anrl Ri ver 

Flolilb One alld 2d Btig:lck, !hh Inr:lIltry Ili\ision. \\'('re inacti· 

\atcr!. The c\,p('!"iel\cc 01 liIesc' IIl1its \\;lS inhcrited hy SEA LORDS 

allel dlitll :lIely hy the \ 'ieIHall1 Anll)" :md Navy. 
, 

• 

" • u 

o 

• • o 

" • -< 
CHAPTER X 

Conclusions and Summary 

The joint river operations conducted by the U.S. Army and 

Navy in SOllth Vietnam contrihuted 10 the success of the military 

campaign in the Mekong Delta and added substantially to U.S. 

knowledge of riverine operations. 

The strategic concept embodied in the plan for the Mekong 

Delta Mobil e Ana:!1 Force and approved by General Westmoreland 

in 1966 proved SOllnd and provided a workable blucprilll for a 

variety of projects carried out hy th e Mobile Riverine Force in the 

two years it operateci. The concept rcmgnizcd the importance of 

the Mekong Delta and its resources to the whole (onnicl. Although 

th e operations planned for the river force ranged from the vicinity 

of Saigon 50mh through the della to Mui Hai Bung (Pointe de Ca 

Mall or Camall Point) ,\I the southern tip of Vietnam, early priority was gi\'en to areas in sollthern 111 Corps and northern IV 

Corl», In executing the plan, the Mobile Riverine Force was faithfullo the priority assigned to the northern delta . but never carried 

Ollt fully the int ent of the plan Olpproved by General Westmoreland 

to extend and sustain river operations south of the Oass.'lc River. 

The operations remained primarily north of the llas$.'lc River in 

keeping with the area of rcsponsihility assigned to the 9th Infantry 

Division in that area; th e incre:tsill~ role of the 2d Brigade in the 

division's plans: and the decrease in operational control of the force 

by the senior adviser of the IV Corps Tactical Zone. 

Perhaps the most significant organizational aspect of the Mobile 

Aflo.'lt Force concept was Ihe int c~ration of Amly and Navy unit5 

to pro\tidc a force uniqnely tailored to the naLUre of the area of 

operations. Spccific:tlly. the c:tp:lbilities of the twO services were 

used to the fullest by combining laClical movement of maneuver 

and fire support units hy land, air. and water. To this combination 

was added the close support of the U.S. Air Force. The Mobile 

Afloat Force plan stipulated that tlll'SC mobile resources were not 

to be dissipated on independent F.S. operations btll were 10 be 

used in dose CO-Qrdi nalion with other U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces. 
186 RIVERINE OPERATION" 

The Mobile Riverine Force, which was the organi/:ltional implementation of the Mobile AnOal Force concept. was a fonuilotls 

union of the Navy's Riv(!T Assault Flotilla One and the Army's 

2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Somewhtll controlled by circumstances, events,. and time, the alliance depended upon a spirit of 

c()-Operation and the initiative of the twO component commanders 

in the Mobile Riverine Force. Guidance for the commanders was 

largely contained in the Mobile AnOal Force plan iLSClf, and from 

the outset it was up to the commanders to make the plan work. 

Although many innovations were made lO improve equipment and 

procedures. they caused little deviation from the basic Mobile 

Afloat Force plan. The most important innovation W:IS the mounting of artillery on barges to provide the force with the direct support of an artillery battalion that was so urgemly needed. Another 

innovation was the building of helicopter landing platforms on 

armored troop carriers and the use of a helicopter landing barge 

as an integral part of the forward brigade tactical command post. 

The adaptation by the naval commander of placing the Ammi 

pontons alongside the Mobile Riverine Base ships eliminated the 

need (or cargo nets and en .. bled an entire company 10 transfer (rom 

a barracks ship to ass.~lIlt craft safe ly in les.'i than twenty milllHes. 

The decision of Secretary of Defense McNamara in late 1966 

to cul the requ ested number of self.propell ed barracks ships by 

three eliminated berthing space for tWO of three infantry battalions. 

The Navy, however, resourcefully provided space for one of the 

two battalions by giving the force an APL-a barracks barge- and 

a larger LST of tJ'e I J 52 class. The Secretary of Defensc's decision 

could have been disastrous to thc execut ion of the Mobile ARoal 

Force plan had these innovations by the Navy not becn made. Even 

so, the brigade was forced to operate without the thin) maneuver 

battalion; the Army commander was obliged to douhle his efforts 

to securc tJ,C co-operation of Vietnam Army and olher U.S. units 

in order to make the tactical operations of tJle Mobile Riverine 

Force successful. It can be postulated that this effort by the brigade 

commander to assemble a sufficieIH force consumed much attention 

and energy that could have been applied to other problems. It can 

also be argued tJlat the shortage of men and the necessity to operate in con junction with the Vietnam Army gencrated sllccesses 

that might not othem'isc have been achieved if the full maneuver 

force had been provided and if the force had opera ted less frequently in co-ordinalion with Vietnam Army units. Although the 

original Mobile Afloat Force concept provided for co.operative 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 187 

and co-ord inated efforUi with the Vietnam Army, the shortage of 

tTOOps increased the need for provincial and divisional units of the 

Vietnam AmlY throughout the various areas in which the Mobile 

Riverine Force operated. 

It should be noted that the mobile riverine base provided fOT 

in the original plan made the force unique. When one considers 

that this Army and Navy force of approximately 5,000 men, capable 

of combat and containing within itself combat service support, 

could be moved from 100 to 200 kilometers in a 24-hour period 

and could !.hen launch a day or night operation within 30 minutes 

after anchoring, its true potential is apparent. With such capabilities 

the force was able to carry out wide-ranging operations into previously inaccessible or remote Viet Cong territory. 

The original Mobile Afloat Force concept had drawn heavily 

on the successful features of French riverine operations and the 

subsequent experience of the Vietnamese river assault groups. The 

Mobile Riverine Force was ahle also to capitalize on the knowledge 

of shortcomings of these earlier experiences. Both the French and 

the Vietnamese had used a fixed operational base on land. French 

units were small. rarely consisting of more than a comp.-my and 

five or six combat assault craft. Vietnam Army ground commanders 

merely used the river assault groups to transport their forces. 

Neither the French nor the Vietnamese had joint ground and naval 

forces. Both lacked the helicopter for command and control, logistic resupply, medical evacuation, and. most important, reconnaissance and troop movement. The river bases of French and Vietnam 

armed forces proved more vulnerable, especially during darkness, 

than did the afloat base of the Mobile Riverine Force. Finally, the 

Mobile Riverine Force, because of its mobility, strength of numbers, 

and Army-Navy co-operation. was capable of sustained operations 

along a water line of communications that permitted a concentration of force against widely separated enemy base areas. This was 

not true of the French or Vietnam Army riverine operations because of the small size of the forces and their dependence on a fixed 

base. 

While the problem of command relationships did not inhibit 

the operations of the Mobile Riverine Force, it was a tender point 

in the conduct of all activities. Considering that the Army effort 

to develop riverinc doctrine was not accepted by the Navy component commander at the outset, the Mobile Riverine Force might 

havc been faced with insurmountable co-ordination problems, but 

such was not the case. Relying on the Mobile Afloat Force plan, 
188 RIVF.RINt: OPERATION" 

each component commander had it guide to follow as to common 

objt'ClivC5 and procedures ullIil cloclrinc " 'as rdined by combat 

experience. 

No joint training for ri,'crinc operations was given in the 

United States because of lack of lime ;lIld the wide geographic 

separation of Mobile Riverine Force units. bUl carly joint training 

in Vietnam was planned. FortuiLOusly. this trai ning commenced at 

the river assau lt squadron-battalion level uncler the supervision of 

the advance staff of River ASS<1lI11 Flotilla One at Vung Tau. Although the training in Ihe Rllng Sal Spcl'ia l Zone was under com· 

bat conditions, tactics ane! techniques were developed at the boat 

and platoon, company and rivl'r division. hallalion and river assault 

squadron levels, During the period February- May 1967 the flotilla 

and brigade sta ffs \!Jcre ahle 10 arri"c at a ('ommon understanding 

as to orga nizational procedures :md operational concepl.S, By start· 

ing at the boat and plalOon Icvd, the Mobile Riverine Force procedures were buill on the lH!cds of the lowest level units, and 

brigade and flotilla COllllllillHI and staff proccc!Llf('S were dcveloped 

to meet these needs, With the 2d Brigade conrlucting tactical opera. 

tions in tile delta durin~ the (Iry season of early 19G7 and the notilla 

staff ctHJrdinating the Rung Sat operations ill\'olving 2d Bribrade 

battalions, both :staffs gained vailiahle riverine experience inde· 

pcndemly, Later, as pan of th e tr:a llsition illlo the Mobile Riverine 

Force, the advance sta lf of the flOlilla joined the bl'i!-,radc staff in 

April a t Dong Tam. This also provided a nc('essary step from the 

sinKlc battalion ancl river as~alllL SfJlladron level of uperations lO 

muhibaualion. brigade ancl floti lla operations in latc April and 

May of 1967. 

The Mobile Riverin e For('e nmulland re lationships as published in a planning dire('tive from llcadqllal'l('I's, Military Assist· 

ance Command, Vietmllll, were a compromise tn obtain Navy 

participation in the Mohile Ri vcrinc Force. Recogni7ing an am· 

biguous, undefined division (If nllllilland responsihili ties between 

the Army and Navy ('OllHnantit'rs, the directive ('olllpells;lled for 

this in part by instrllcting the chain of nllllllland of bOlh the Army 

and the Navy at each Icvel within the theater to insure co.operative 

errort. It also instructed the commanders at tilt' lowest le"el. pref. 

erably at the Army and Navv ('()Inponellt level uf the Mobi le Riv· 

erine Force. to resolve any pmblellls that Illi~ht arise. This planning 

directive. which incorporated the doctrine of close support and 

mlltual ('''Q-Opcration and co·ordination. sIICC"CSSfll ll y estahlished the 

tenor of what was to follow. Tht' Navy W;IS placed in a close support 
CO;';CLUSIONS A:-.ID SUMMARY 189 

role that adhered closely to the Army principle or direct support. 

The Navy's decision in mid-1966 to make command and security 

or the Mobile Ri\'erine Base an Army responsibility resolved a 

problem that could have become very difficult. Actually the Navy 

commander assumed tactical con trol only wh il e the Mobile Riverine Base was being relocated. In all other instances he \\las cast 

in the role of supporting commander as long as Navy doctri ne was 

not violated. The Army commander, acting in response to directives, operational plans, and orders from his higher headquarters. 

detennined the plan of opera tions, which required the naval comma'ld.er to support his objective. The major factor influencing the 

relationShip between the Army :111<1 Navy commanders was the 

Navy commander's wish to operate independently of the 9th U.S. 

Division. This insistence provided the one elemem of disharmony 

in planning and conducting operations as an integral p.'lTt of the 

land campaign for the delta. While it was never stated, it c.1 n be 

assumed th,ll the Navy commander's position reflected the wishes 

of his Navy chain of command 10 ha"e separate operations. In defense of the Navy's total effort. howe"er, it can be s.1id that the 

Navy commander was quick 10 accede to the basic concept of employing the Mobile Riverine Force in co-ordination with land 

operations. The activities of the Mobile Riverine Force. in fact, 

were directly rei<l.ted to the IOtal land campaign being conducted 

in both III and IV Corps T actical Zones. Joint operational orders 

were published and the re lationship of the Army and Navy stafF~ 

in all planning and operational functions, including the establ ish· 

ment and manning of a joint oper:llions cemer, was very close. 

Perhaps the only area where a clear delineation of responsibility 

was not possihlp was at the I)()"t and river division, river assault 

squadron. and battalion levels. The Navy river assault squadron 

organi7ation did not parallel that of the Anny battalion. Both the 

platoon leader and the comp.1.lly commander were dealing with Navy 

enlisted men, while the hattalion commander was dealing with a 

lieutenant se nior ~rade or a lieillenant commander without a comp<l.rahle support ing staff equivalent to the SL1.ff of the baua lion he 

was supporting. The Navy was thus placed in an awkward position, 

partkularlv in the event of enemy attack against an ass.lult craft 

convoy. During the first si\. months to a year of operations, and 

prior to rotatiun of the initi;11 Na\v and Army commanders, it was 

normal prece/illre for the Na\y element to answer dircctly to the 

Army offitcr in command during assault craft movements. The 

Navy C"lft did not use direct fire unless explicitly authorized by 
190 RIVt-RINJo: OJ't:RATlO '''' 

the hri~:ldc COlTlInanckr. As liml' pas. .... ·d ;1IIe1 ('f1I11I11,uuit-rs rotateel. 

how~\cl" the pn'((.·c!tlH'S cSl ahlishl"f1 in !I u' Rung S:II :lIlcl in ,hI' 

lirsl si" months of Mohik RiH'rill(' Force opcr:llion .. IIC(',II1I(' \'a).;lIc 

and amhiguIIlIs sin( C I hl'y wei C 110t nmlln i tl('l lin IITllll' 11 jlli lit standing ope rating pn~l'(ltln· .... Thl' !'Iilft-rence in !>I;dfs hdow the h. ihr.lck 

and river notill" Ic\·(·1 fll"I('I"('( 1 .. 1('lllf;,li/ation :11. Ih(' thllilla :,ntl 

hri~arlc le"eI in planning. (OIllIn!, :1Ilt! ("{'lIlIinn . \Vlii", the l\'lohil,' 

Rin'rille Force oper-uillns gr;Hlua ll y ;UIiH'fl'd mnn' til Ih,' print iplc 

or clcn.:ntraliJ('c1 pbllllillj.,\ :HIII (''''ntlioll. fUlLIrc Mnbile RiH'rim ' 

I'orcc ol'g.'lni"':I,inns sllm,hl (ITn'l l Ihl' (lj ~llali y in thl' (0111111;11111 

and control orhr:lI1ilaliolls heIW('(' 1I (.'dl('lolI'l uf Iht, IWo 5l'lvi<"e5, 

The firsl year of operaliolls of the i\fnh i1c Ri\'('rinc Fore'(: lI'as 

high Iy slI('ces.~f ul hec ul'\(.: 1 Ill' III i14i l1 ,d i\101li 1(: Allnal Fort (' (OIl( epl 

was ('alTied oul faithfully, The oper-:lliflm of the 1\I01lile Rivl'rint, 

Fol'l'(; wel'e widc-r;lIl/-:inl-{- lhe forl'e was ill ('Olllh;1I in 11 111(' pnwim cs 

ami the Rung Sal Spedal 7.011(', TII('sc \\'ne ('sst'ntiall y slril-e 

fllX'ra li ons 14"in~1 l'elllOl(' ellt'll ly 11a"e alTas tll;ll in ,'iflllll' inSlann'$ 

h;ld 11m heen IWl1elrat('d in flllT(' fill' two 01' Iltn't' yt'a rs. Frnlll tll ese 

haS(! ;1I('as ,hl' main furn: Vit,t ConI-{ IIllits ami th(' polili<'al lind eI" 

J,.:l'Oulld had inlllll'l1l'('II tht: 10lal populatiun wl""'e support wali 

vital 10 Ihe slratel-\y (If Iht, Vit,t COliI-{, ('~: au~' (If Iht, hnld ;mel fn'· 

quelll movcmCl1l of thl' brJ.\'I' !\fohilt, Ri\'crill(' 1\;1'\(' fmlll w hich 

sll ike opcralions (ould he 1;111111 heel with eas(', Ihl' c1t'll1cllt of sllrprisc so importanl In 111I11h,11 Sill ('t'SS lI'a,~ ;\1 hie vt.'d , In IIlflst ('ascs 

,'ncmy (Icfenscs anti 1:1l'1il's WClt' fiirct'l ctl low;tnl 'v ~i llll 01' n' ~is

:t1lC(' 10 ;lir and land ali5< n"ts, Earl), riv('tint, fllll'r:l1iuns nftcn 

capilali/cd n n tht'St' t:IIt'llIy di:,p(l ilioll , ltl'l', wht'll tilt' ('Ill'IlIV 

Icarm.'tI to orient his dcfl'IHes IOWaI'd thc lI'a tl'rw:tys, Ih (' 9th ni\'i· 

ion romm;lIlcl(~r pnwillt-d lite 11I'!i,'nph'r lIpp(lrt IH'{'l'SS,'UY 10 

cllahle lroops to m,m('II\'cr r.'pidly fmlll I Ill' land ~iclt, ag:tilll<it the 

CI1CIllY. As Iltc lirst U.S, lII;1n(' \I\'('r unit ttl (,{IIHlllel sllslained o perations in the IV Cnrpli Ta('lil'al 7.tIIH', Ihe !\fuhilt: Ri v('rill{' Force 

tievdupeci good n.:l:ttinnships ",ilh lite (Ollllllaml('1 of Ihe 71h Vi('In :1I11 Army Ili vj"ion :mel d t:IlIt'rlI S of Ihe ~rllh Vi"lllam AnllY 

Division, ( :o-c/l'{lin:II('11 lal'j.\'t'-Sl.:t le 111ll-ralilllls "'cn' I'mltllll'lt'" in a 

Ilumher or rClllt'ltt: <lre<lS, ( t1ll1rihlllinj,\ to Ihl' l,l'tJsifll1 or Viel (:Oll~ 

slren~lh , whidl l)t,rol'C th(' :HI \,CIII (Ir Ihe l l,S, I( ntt'~ in th e an'a 

lwei heen CCJII:t1 10 thai or Ihe \'it'I\1:1I1l Army, Whih, tht, drml$ of 

lhc Mohile Riv('rinc Fui't c W\'I'C prilll;II'il), t't1I1(('l1tralt.'d agai nst 

Long An ;mel Ilillh Tilting l'nl\'ill("l'5, h'y t.'C\)lltIlHi, prnvilHcs fur 

(ol1tml of thc delta, lilt: fon e ;tISII was ahle In -'lril-,' in Co Cong 

;1Ilt! Kicl1 110.1 Provin«'s, AlthOIl};I . o nl y im iirctll y rcialetllu pad li-
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 1~1 

Cittion, the limit..1.tions imposed on Viet Cong movement and the 

losses inflicted on Vict Cong units resulted in a reduction in the 

inHuencc of the Viet C...ong on the people in the area. 

During the Tel offensivc of January- February 1968, the Mobile 

Riverine Force was used in succession against Viet Cong forces in 

the populous cities of My Tho, Vinh Long. and Can Tho, which 

were seriously threatened. Aftcr the battles for these cities, the 

Mobile Riverine Force was credited with having "saved the delt..'· 

by its direct action against the enemy in these important centers 

before the Vietnam Arm)' was able to raJly its forces. Here again 

the fact that this large, concentraled force with its own base could 

be moved so rapidly over such great distances was the key to the 

Mobile Riverine Force's success against the Vi et Cong in th e IV 

Corps Tactical Zone. 

During the spring of 1968 when the Mobile Riverine Force 

was placed under lhe operational control of the senior adviser of 

IV Corps, it again succes.<;fully penetrated remote areas. The IV 

Corps. however, had not the aircraft or supplies to sustain Mobile 

Riverine Fon:e operations, and the force was therefore available 

only intermittently to th e senior adviser of the IV Corps Tactical 

Zone. 

When 9th Division headquarters moved from Bearcat to Dong 

Tam in August 1968, it.<; mission was concentrated in Long An, 

Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa Provinces. (Map 16) With this focus· 

ing of the area of responsibility on the Mekong Delta, it can be 

assumed that the division commander strongly wished to integrdte 

the Mobile Riverine Force into the divisional effon. Further, a 

renewed emphasis on p,'!cificalion shifled the strategy away from 

strike opcrdtions, and as a consequence the Mobile Riverine Force 

largely concentrated on Kien I-loa Province. During the late summer of 1968 helicopters for troop lift were almost eliminated from 

the support of the force. The 9th U.S. Division decided to provide 

airlift chiefly for the other Iwo operating brigades ;lnd to plac<.' 

almost total reliance on water movement for the 2d Brigade. This 

d<.-cision was a deviation from the initial operational plan of employin~ the Mobile Riverine Force for strikes utilizing boats and 

helicopters, a plan tllat had proved successful in the previolls year's 

operations. Not umil OCLOber of 1968 was the Mobile Riverine 

Force aga in provided with helicopters in keeping with the initial 

concept. 

Restriction to one geographical area had limited the force in 

mid.I968, especially in respect to auempt.ing surprise, and it was 
192 

MAP 16 

RIVElllNE OI'ERATIONS 

CAM8001A 

AREAS 

SINH 

1961-1969 

_ Opw.lion a ...... 

D 2S iIO-.u ! "J. '.:OOUUOC,!:,.S 

1_ ..... 1. ' 

PHUOC 

1.0NG 

obliged to resort to other means of deception, The Viet Cong were 

abl e, however, to ana ly7c and anticipate movements on the water· 

ways, reportedly by usi ng a warning system established along the 

banks, Because of limited and pn..'tlicLable wa ter routes and a grow. 

ing enemy knowledge of tile Mobile Riverine Force. river am· 

bushes became more common. \Vhcn aircraft were lacking, the 

force was ullable to retaliate except hom the waLer. Nor was it any 

longer pcnnillcrl to make the loug moves to new areas as set forth 

in the Mobile Anoat Force concept. With the full usc of helicopters 

beginning in October, the force produced rc.."Suits comparable with 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 193 

or superior to those of other 9th Division brigades and with the 

results obtained by the Mobile Riverine Force during its first year 

in South Vietnam. 

The Mobile Riverine Force made significant contributions to 

{he war in Vietnam. Its presence in 1967 and 1968 tipped the balance of power in the northern portion of the Mekong Delta in 

favor of the U.S. and Soulh Vietnam forces. Dong Tam was developed as a division base without reducing the firm ground available to Vietnamese units in the delta and activities of the base 

increased the security of the imponam nearby city of My Tho. The 

Dong Tam area at one time had been under strong Viet Cong 

influence. and main force and local enemy units moved virtually 

at will until U.S. occupation of Dong Tam began in January 1967. 

As operations by baltalions slated to join the Mobile Riverine 

Force continued, both the 514th and the 263d Viet Cong Battalions 

were brushed back from the populated area into the more remote 

Plain of Reeds. Even though the Viet Gong 261st Main Force 

Battalion was brought as a reinforcement from Rien Hoa into 

Dinh Tuong Province in June of 1967. the combined operations 

of the Mobile Riverine Force and 7th Vietnam Army Division kept 

the Viet Cong from moving freely around Dong Tam. Riverine 

operations inflicted significant casualties on Viet Cong units and 

made them less effective. Highway 4, the main ground artery of 

the delta, which was often closed to tralTtc in the period. 1965 

through early 1967, was opened and the farm produce of the delta. 

both for domestic and export purposes. could reach the markets. 

With the completion of Dong Tam I\ase. the 9th Division head· 

quarters and three brigades were finally able to move into Dinh 

Tuong Province and the security of the northern portion of the 

delta was vastly improved. When the Navy extended its efforts to 

the Plain of Reeds and far to the west toward the Cambodian 

border in late 1968 and 1969. its operations were made easier by 

the earlier operations of the Mobile Riverine Force during 1967 

and 1968. The Navy SEA LORDS operations evolved from the 

concept that fielded the Mobile Riverine Force and GAME WARDEN 

operations. 

The Mobile Riverine Force wrote a distinct chapler in U.S. 

military history. The joint contributions made by the Army and 

Navy resulted in the accumulation of a body of knowledge that has 

been translated into service publications setting forth joint doctrine 

on riverine operations. In tlle event o( (uture riverine operations, 

the service doctrine recognizes the need for a joint task force com-
194 RIVERINE OI'ERATIONS 

maode!'" to provide unity of command. Those involved in the early 

operations of the Mobile Riverine Force ,lOSSC5SCd no prior riverine 

experience and were forced to rely on historic examples, their own 

judgment, and related Army and Navy doctrine to build a new 

American forcc. While basic service differences did arise from lime 

to time. those immcdialcly responsible at all echelons from the 

soldier and sailor on up found rC<lsonablc solutions and carried 

them out effectively :md hannoniously to the credit of both services. 
AK47 

APA 

APB 

APe 

APL 

ARL 

ASPB 

ATC 

11-40 

BA.RRI£R REEF 

CCB 

ClDe 

CoRONADO I 

CoRONADO JII 

CoRONADO V 

CoRONADO VI 

CoRONADO VIII 

CoRONADO IX 

Glossary 

Chinese-made TiRe 

Auack transport 

SeJ£-propelled barracks ship 

Annored ~rsonnel carrier 

Barracks ship, non-self-propelled 

Landing craft repair ship 

Assault support patrol boat 

Annored troop carrier 

Chinese-made rocket 

The fourth and last of the SEA LORDS interdiction barrier operations in the western della, 

commencing 2 January 1969 

Command and communications boat 

Civilian Irregular De£ense Group 

A Mobile Riverine Force operation designed to 

destroy Cho Cao District Company and enhance the security of Clto Cao Canal in Dinh 

Tuoog Province, I June-26 July 1967 

A Mobile Riverine Force operation in the Rung 

Sat Special Zone designed to disrupt possible 

Viet Cong attaclu on shipping in the Long 

Tau channel, 5-17 August 1967 

A oombincd airmobile, mechanized, and riverine 

operation in Cam Son Secret Zone, Dinh 

Tuong Provintt, and Ham Long District, 

Kien Hoa Provintt, 12 September-8 October 

1967 

An operation in the lower Rung Sal Special 

Zone, 11 - 18 October 1967 

A !I.'lobile Riverine Force operation in Nhon 

Trad} and the Rung Sat Special Zone, 27-

29 October 1967 

A Mobile Riverine Force operation involving 

d~p riverine penetrations into enemy re-
196 

CoRONADO X 

CoRONADO XI 

Dinassauts 

Duong eua Dan 

(People's Road) 

E8 

G-2 

G-3 

GAME WARDEN 

GIANT SLiNCSHOT 

RIVERINE OI'ERATIONS 

doubts and sanctuaries to achieve decisive 

action in Dinh Tllong Province, I Novcmlxr 

1967- 21 Janu;II'Y 1%8 

An opcraliol1 in which Lhe Mobile Riverine 

Force responded to Viet Cong :luacks on My 

Tho ami Villh Long. drove the enemy rrom 

those provincial capilills, thell operated ncar 

Ca i Lay on Highw:ly 4, 18 January-13 February 1968 

A combined riverine and airmobile operation to 

relieve prcssure on Can Tho and locale and 

destroy Vict Colig unils in Phong Dinh and 

lla Xuycn provinces. 13 Fcbruary-6 March 

1968 

Divisions IIIl1lf1ies d'fl5.JflUl (French naval :us..1ult 

divisions) 

An opcr.llion by the lSI and la lcr 3d Brigade, 

9th Infantry Division, to protect and upgrade 

IIi~hw ;.y 'I northwest of My Tho and to conduct reconnaissance ill force operations on 

both sides of Highway 1 in Dinh Tuong 

Province, 16 March- 30 July 1968 

Expendable laullcher. Lightweight and portable, 

it lires IG riot-control canislers in each of four 

vollcys, prodLlcin~ a rapid buildup of a large 

chemical cloud. 

Assislanl chief of staff for mili tary intclligence 

at an army. corps (fie ld force in Vietnam). or 

division headquarters 

Assistant chief of staff for operations al an anuy. 

corps (lield force in Vietnam). or division 

headquarters 

AssistallL ch ief of staff for supply at an army. 

corps (lield forcc in Vietnam). or division 

head<luartcl"S 

U.S. Navy (rask FOiTe 116) operation design:tted to thwan Viet Cong use of waterways 

;.s supply ami infiltration routes 

The third SEA LORDS oper;uion. commencing 

G Decemocr 1968, in lhe Parrot's Beak 
CREAT BEND 

HOMESTf.AO 

IPW 

J-5 

JP-4 

LCA 

LCI 

LCM 

LCT 

LCU 

LCVP 

LSIL 

LSM 

LSSL 

1ST 

LZ 

MI. 

M43 

MI02 

MACV 

MARKl.. TIME 

MCS 

MOMAF 

Monitor 

MRB 

N-I 

GLOSSARY 197 

A Mobile Riverine Force operation in the west· 

ern Rung Sal Special Zone. 13 June-26 July 

1967 

A Mobile Riverine Force operation in Kien Hoa 

~rovi ce. September 1968 

I)risoner of war interrogation 

Assistant chid of staff for military operations. 

MACV 

A U.S. Marine Corps operation in the Rung 

Sat Special Zone in late 1966 

A kerosene·based fucl for turbine engines 

L:lllding craft. assaull 

Landing craft. infantry 

Landing craft. lllC(.hanized 

Landing craft. tank. 

Landing craft. utility, a light lift craft 

L11lding craft. vehicle or personnel 

LamJing ship. infantry. large 

Landing ship. medium 

wmding ship, support. Jarge 

Landing ship. tank 

Landing lone 

Current standard American rifle 

Soviet·made rifle firing intennediate 7.62- mm. 

cartridges 

American·made IOS-mm. howitler 

U.S. Military Assistant Command. Vietnam 

U.S. Navy (fask Force 115) operation designed 

to seal the coast of South Vietnam ag-dinst 

infiltration of enemy troops and supplies 

Mine countermeasures support ship 

Mekong Delta Mobile Anoat Force 

An armored gunboat armed with 2()' and 40·mm. 

guns and 81·mlll. direct fire mortars 

Mobile Riverine Base 

Navy notilla officer in charge of administration 
198 

N-2 

N-3 

N-4 

POL 

RIVER RAWER I 

ROAD 

RPD 

RPG2 

RSSZ 

5-1 

5-2 

5-3 

S-4 

5-5 

SEAL 

SEA LORDS 

SEARC.H TURN 

SKS 

TRAN 1-l uNC DAO 

TRUONC CoNe O INIl 

WATER TRA.I' 

RIVt:RINf. OPERATION.' 

N:lvy flotilla ofhrcr ill ch:uW" of illlclligcncc' 

N:lvy 1I00i1la oilu:cr in dl;' ~c (II operations 

Navy 1I00il!:. "niter ill ("harge of supply 

I'ctrolcum, oils, and iubriC3l.b 

An Ilperalioll in the upper Long Til" shippillK 

challnel :lIId ill Ihe wUlhwCSlcrn Rung Sal 

Spcci:tI Zone. Ifi Fchru:lly- :W (l, larch 19(i7, Ihe 

firsl joint IIpcralioll of Army alld Navy fore(.'S 

which WCIC In conslil u lc the obilc Riverine 

Force 

Ih-organil3tioll Ohjective Anny Divisiom 

Chillcsc-madc light machine gUll 

Sovkl-madc ;lIItilank rocket 

RUlIg Sal Special Zone 

Adjutant or 3 brigade or smaller unil 

Ofliccr ill dl:lrgc of lhc military intelligence scction of a brig:.de or smaller unit 

Officer in charge of the operations and training 

St.'(:tiu!! of a hrigade or :.l1Ialier IInil 

Officer in ch;uXe of the suppl y alld evacua tion 

M'cl ion of a brig:lde or Slllaller unit 

Civil .. flair:. officer of a brigade or smaller unit 

Navy sea-air-land teams 

The U_S. Navy's SomheilSl Asia Lake, Ocean, 

River, Delta Stratll,')' Operations 

The first of the SEA LORDS barrier operations 

in the western delt:., conllllellcing 2 November 1!)68 

Chinese·made Glrbinc 

The !oCcoml or the SEA LORDS barrier opera· 

tions in the western delta, commencing 16 November 1968 

A rivcri ne operation initially dc.~ignccJ to drive 

enemy forces aw:.y frum My Tho ami 

dimillate enemy interdiction of lIighw:ly 'I, 

7 March-2 April 1968 

A major cordoll and sc:.rrh operation of Thoi 

Son Island in the My Tho River south of 
YFNH 

"LtC 

\,T11 

(, I.O",","RY I!J!) 

Dong T:lm during the first week. or Janu-

:U"Y I !1(i9 

1 .. lr~c ((were,1 liJ.;htl'r 

S.d\'a~c lirt a:l ft, l iglll 

L lrJ.;c h.1l bor wg 

Index 

Abr;ams, Genenlll Crc:ighton W.: 167 

Ac(den ted Padlicalioo J'rognm: 169 

Advisen, U.s.: 24. See auo individual 

nama. 

Agriculture: 20 

Agrovilles: H8 

Air oper;ations. See Hel icoplen, ope-nil' 

lions: Taclical air suppon. 

Airlifll, troops and supplies: 24, 59-40, 

77- 78. 82, M, 94, 99-100, 106. 108, 

110-12,114- 15,117.121, 127- 28,153. 

156-38, 141- 45, 148, 151- 55, ISH, 

160-62. I(H, 170, 185, 19CHI1 

Allen, Ethan: 3 

Amaranth, Ope-Mil ion: 14 

Ambushes, enemy: U-16, 25, 101. 125, 

162, 170, 192 

Ambmhes, U.S.: 65, 1M, 102, 109-11. 155, 

137, 141, 148, 162, 165, 176-78, 185 

Ammi barges: 67, 72, 96, 182. 186 

Ammunition: 62-65, 105. 133-34 

Ammunition, enemy: 22 

Amndty grantJ. See Hoi Chanh. 

Amphibious Command and Force:, Pa· 

cific, USN: 29, 45, 52 

Amphibious Training Center and 

School: 52, 54-55, 58 

An Ciang ProvhlCC: 2.5 

An Long: 182 

An Quoi: 1'15 

An "u)"en Province: 25, 173 

Anchorago: 53-54, lSI, 170 

Andenon. Lieutenant 

Thomas K.: 185 

Comnander 

Antital'lk weapol'ls, enemy: 134 

Ap 8ac: 25,79,106,120,157,159,141 

Ap Bil'lh Thoi: 124-2.5 

Ap Co Dau: 5-4-55,57 

Ap Nam: 108 

APB. ~e Barnick. ships. 

APC. Su Armored pcnol'lnd carrien. 

APL. See Barracks shipl. 

ARL. Su Landing craft rc:pair Ihipl. 

Armifl$, Firth and Sixth: 55 

Armored personnel carrien: 78-80, 128 

Armored troop carrien: 59-40, 62, 72, 

7S-76, 18, 82, 96, 98, 105, 109-10. 

112- 17, 122, 129-52, 156, 140-4\. 

lSI. 155-54, 158. 162, 175, 178, 186 

Arnold, Colonel Benedict: 5 ...... 

Artillery Uau alions: 

2d, 4th Regimen!: 58,60 

2d.35th Regiment: 112, HI. 157 

~. 5~lh Regiment : 72. 75, 115, 155, 

157. 161. 167. 171. 174 

AlIi1lery lire support : 14, 54-36. 58, 65 -

65, 72- 74. 76-79, 82- 85. 99. 102- 105. 

107.112, 115. 125, 128, 155. 136, 138, 

142, 141, ISO, 152. 154, 157-58, 161 , 

'86 

AJlllri, USS: IiI , 182 

ASI'!l. See I'alrol boals. 

ATC. Set: Armored trOOp carrien. 

Australian T3~k Force: 5& 

A"i;ation B3ttalion, !lth: 24 

Avialion Company, 5$4th : 127 

Ra R ia: $4- 15. 40, 46, 55 

Ra Xu)en >ro~incc: 174 

!lac Lieu : 25, 180 

Bamboo unal: 15 

Han Lon,;: 120-22. 128- 29. 135-36 

Harner. Colonel John H.: 52 

Rarney, Commodore JO'lhua: 4 

lIarn(ks bargfl$: 167, 186 

B;arTacks $hips: 27,29, ' I , 54- 55, 59, 45, 

49-50, 70-71, 74- 76, 120. 167, l io71,177, 179,186 

BAttttlta REEl': 172, 182 

Rase: Area 4iO, Viet Cong: 120, lla, 151 

!lase: camps: 16, 26-28, '5, 101-102, ](H- ,., 

!lase camps. enemy: 2 1- 22 

Hast Whi~k )'. Su Dong Tam. 

Il 3ilAC River: 8. 27, 53, ISS-56, 180, 185 

Ikarcat: 5-4 - 55, S!HiO, 169. 19 1 

lIe1mont, Missouri : 6 

Ben Keo: 182 
202 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Ben I.ue: 125 27, 181- 82 

nen Tn:: H9, Ui6, 169, I7S 

lien TTl: Districl: 16' 

l\flledict, Maryland; 4 

RCIln»lIir, USS: 70, ~I. 10, 161.163, 171 

lI erry. Colonel Sidney n., Jr.: 28 

Ilien HO,lI: 40,59 

lIien 1-1 00 Pro,'ince: 70. 127 

Bin Phuoc mMriel: 145 

lIinh Gia: 23 

Bill. Captain David, USN: 29 

lIlack. Comm:lIlder Charlo 1-1 .: 82. as 

lIIack Rh'cr: 8, 14 

nlouin, Vice Admiral Francis J.: 52 

Ilolduc. Licutcllant Colonel Lucien E .. 

Jr.: 00,6'.82 

Bridge conSlrllClion ;IlId demolition: HI, 

21, 138 

Bunkers, enemy: lOB, 110. !l4- Hi, 117. 

IW-'7, 139, 142. 145, 1<18, 157, 100, 

162 

Bureau of Shil". N~vy OCIl:lrtmcnt: 29 

lIurgo)ne, Major General John: 4 

l\urkC', Reu Atlmir.d Julian T.: 53 

C3 ~Iau Peninsula: 177. 180-81, 185 

C.1cho, em·my. Sec t'ood ios5e'J, (ncln): 

Mall-riel losses, cneilly. 

Cai Be: 82- 83. 142, 1-19-50 

Cai lie DbIT;eI: 141-43, 163 

Cal Cai C:II13I: 183 

Cai L,y: 121,129, 149, 151. 154, 161. 163 

Cal Lay Dimict: 111 - 42,15 1 

Cai Rang Uridge: 176 

Cai R:Ulg District: 156 

Cal T" Rh'er: 177 

C.,iro, illinois: 6 

Cam R::mh 8a)': 73 

Cam Son Secret Zone (n"M') : 21, 81-82, 

120-25, 128- 29, 136, 1311, HI, 144, 

Cambodia: '" 21, 23,180-82,195 

CamoUn)gc:: 16 

CamJl Martin FOll : 169 

('.an C:lo Canal: 174 

Can Duac District: 108- 109, 120 

Can Giuoc: 112- 15, 116-17 

Can Giuoc Oi,mi(l: 103- 10, 112-20, 125, 

127,135,177 

Can Tho: 26, 34, n, 15!HiO, 1M, 166, 

hH,19 1 

Canada ' 3-4 

Canal" S~e Waten,'a)'s, 

{~IO l..anh: 34 

Capital Military District: 166 

Carbinc, enemy SKS: 22 

Carolinll, USS: 5 

Ca$ualties: 107, 122, 125, 127, 129, 133-

55, ISS, 110, H~, I!H, 156- 57, 159, 

172 

enemy: 81, JlG-12, 11 5, 12G-21, 125, 

127, 129, 134-41. 143, 115, 172, 176, 

178, 181 

C'o'acuation, Su Medical troops a nd 

!.en'ice. 

I-"reneh roTCI~s: 15 

Repuulic of Vietnam forces: "'"- 35. 

138, 140 

C;n'alry 8auaJions 

3d, 51h Regiment: 59, 81- 85, 121, 121, 

135. 16-1 

7th, hi Regiment : 16-1 

C,,'airy unilS, RepulJlie of Vietnam: 123 

ccn, Sr~ Command and oomlllunica· 

1 ions boats, 

Charl..,Ion, South Drolina: 6 

Chau Doc: ISO 

Chemical" riot ·control: 164 

Chl'S-llpcake Bay: 4 

Chid of Naval Opc:rations: 52 

China. riverin" expc:rience in : 8 

Cho Cao Canal: 143, lBO-81 

Chuong Thien I'TO"jnCe: 165, 173- 77 

Civic aClions: 158, 178 

Civil a(fa il"$: 89-90 

CiI'il War ul~rien(e: 5,6-8 

Ci"ilian Irregula r Defen$e C roup: 25 

Clear Rh'er: 8, 15 

CIOlhing, dUr.lhili~y: 62 

Co Chicn River: 170, ISO 

Co Cong I'rovince: 125-27 

('.ollilA Zone: II I 

Cochinchina: 8, 11 

CoU"lOn, USS: 70, 108, 111 

Combal Dc,'elol'rncnts Cllmmand: 5~, 

55 56, 58 

Cllmmand ~nd communications boats: 

75.82.84, 103, 178 

Cllmma",1 and (ontrol: 36-~7.11. H-45, 

79, 83. 8587, 90-96, 100- 101. 111, 

121. 1-16, 159, 180-11 1. 183, 187- 90 

('.o"'nI;lIId"r [n Chi cf, l'adr,c, SCI' Sharp. 

Ad'niral UI}S$I..~ S, Crant. 
INDEX 203 

Commander in Ch id, Pacific Fleet. See 

John~n, Admiral Roy L. 

CommuniCillions equipment and opera· 

tions: 51, ~, 41. 9$-94 

Communinlions equ ipment lind oPCI"iI' 

lions. cnc:my: 22 

Cont inental Army Command: 52-53 

Corns, Captain Johnnie H.: 52-5' 

CoRONADO I : 93- 120 

c.o..OSADO III: 125 

CORONADO IV: 125-27 

CoRONADO V: 128- 3.5 

CoRONADO VI: 13S 

CottONADO VII: US 

CoRONAOO VI II: US 

c..c.ON"DO IX: 155-0 

co.ONADO X : 155 

CoRONADO X I : 155-60 

Coronado Conference: 52-56 

Corps Tactical Zones 

I: 26 

II: 26 

III : 23, ,26, 42, 46, 49-50, 68, 85, 102-

27. 144, 155, 163. 173. 181-82, 185. I'" IV: 21,23- 26,29,32,37, 42, 46-17,50. 

56,69, 85,88, 1091 ~21J 127, 138, 1 .... , 146, 148, 150--.:16, 159, 1M, 166, 180, 182, 185, 189-91 

Creek Indi3 ns: 5 

Cronin, Lieutenant Colonel William 5.: 

54 

Cr0s:5r~ds, the (canal): 162, 164 

Crow" Point: H 

eu Lao May: 156. 158 

Cua Long River: 180 

Cumberland River: 7-8 

Dai Ngai: 34 

David, Colonel Bert A.: 12'1, 129, 135- 36, 

139, 147 

Davis, Captain Charles H., USN: 7 

Day Ri\'er: 14- 15 

Defoliation missions: 178 

Oemolition teams: 102 

Der uy, Brigadier Genen.1 William E,: 

26-27, 29 

Oesobry, Brigadier General William c.: 

46, 55, 58, 69 

Oetcxtioo deviea: 6! 

Oi All : 44 

Diem, Ngo Oinh: 148 

Dinh T uong Provinee : 32, 68-69, 7!i-76, 

&HI5, 101, 120-25. 127-48, 151, 155, 

100--64, 171. m. 190-91. 19~ 

Oinn:u.auts: HH I, 14- 16,24 

Oircxt Air Support Genter: 37 

Don Nhan District: 173 

Dong o ien River: 117 

l}ong Nai River: 8 

Dong Tam: 47-49, 51. 57- 58, 68-71. 73, 

75,81- 82,84-85, 88, 9~, 10~ 29, 135-

42, 14-1, 150, 156, 160-62, 164-65, 

167- 7[, 173,175, 178. 191, 193 

Dot)', Lieutenant Co[onel Mercer M.: 

129-~3 

DoUIiLE SItlFT: 182 

Dredging operations: 26-27. ~3. 49 

Dry docks: ~2, 49 

Dung l$land : 181 

t:ckhardl, Major Genc:n.1 George S.: 42-

U, 52-5!, 70, 85, 156, ISO 

Elo::<:llon5: 135 

Engineer Batla[ion, 15th: 55, 75, 139 

Engineer operal ions: 26-27, 139, 14 1, 

151 

Enginei:'( operations, Vietnam Army: 

138. 157 

Engl('r. Lieutenant General Jeln E.: 

73-74 

Equipment. squad : 62-63 

t:verglades. riverine e~periencc: in: 5 

E .... ell, Lieutenant General Julian J.: 8~ 

t'arragut, Rear Admiral David G.: 7 

Feet, care of: 66, 125, 146 

Fie[d forc(', I I : 46,57,60.71. 85, 87, 110, 

121, 138, 1<1 6, 166-67, 181, 183 

Fir(' 5uppon ba~: 148, 161. See (Ilso 

Artillery fire support. 

TANCO: 115 

X·II.AY: 11 7 

Flame throwers and flame boats: 140, 

Food "" 105Ses. enemy: 1S6-!7 

Food sllPI,ly, control of: 25, 46--47 

Foote, Commodol'(' Andrew H.: 6-7 

t'OT! Donelson: 6-7 

Fort Henry: 6-7 

Fori Ticonderoga : 3 

France. ri\'('rine ('Kpttiencc: in Vietnam 

command and {(mlrol struclUre: lOl l, 16 

ri\'erine operations: 3, 8- 17 
204 RIVERI NE OP ERATIONS 

Free World Mililuy Aui,lJ.llce FOTUS. 

26, IH, 185 

"uhon, IIrigadicr Gruera l William n .: 

43-'14, 51- 56. 58, 60, 72. N. 82-1". 

89 90, 105- 100, 108, 12'- 21, 127. 

"" 

CAM' ", .. "DF"': ; N. 32, 34. 50, !>4. 115. 

12 1, 125, 193 

Gb Oinh PrO\' jnce: 23. 145, 155 

GI"'T SUSCSIIOT; 172, 181-82 

Ciao Due District: 136, 163 

Ciang T rom Dist ri ct: IS", 163-65 

Co Cong I'ro,ince: 32, 109- 12, 120, 

IH-15. li8. 190 

Co nan ~: 182 

(';"'111, Major General U1I'!Sa S.: 6- 8 

C.tA.f 8.1:1'>0: 103 

Greal Lakn: .. 

rcn~dc a'\l;anl! ~, enemy: 15 1, 154 

Grenade anauhs. French: 11 

Grenade launcher. en cl1l) RI'C2: 2'l 

Guerrilla 1,,110115, enemy: H I, 1'15. 145, 

119, 173 7-1 

Gulf of 1\1(')(;(0: 4.7 

Ha TiclI : 180 81 

lI am Long l>imicl ' 76. 134. 162, 165. 

m 

Ham Luong R iVer: 172 

lIanoi: 15 

lI,.rnrll Co/Wi)', USS: 182 

I-Ieal lh meUllres: 66 

Ii dicoplel'$ 

CII-47: 138, 148 

0 11- 23: 76, 112 

IJII-I : &I, 74, 111 - 12 

h~rges ror: l J!i, 186 

(tamage.:! and lose 23, 153, 158, 161. 

>7, 

lire ,upport by, See Tacl iclIl air SLI P' 

pori. 

oper.llion.: 19, 23. 50. 34- 39. 61. H, 

7R-79. 82 114, ] 10, 112, 165, 173. 186 

skjcr.III(""<;· 1113 

1r.U1sporl b). Su Airlirls, troops lind 

suppli"; MC"tliral trool" ami ~cn ice. 

H ntrirtl, USS 60 

Il ler Ho.a: 182 

High"'ay 4: III, 68 69. SO. 104. 120-22. 

12" . ]37 3t!, H8. 153, 160---61. ]93 

lIigh",a)" 2 12: 133 

Highway 229: 113 

lIoa Binh: 14 

lIoi Chanh: 11] ,117-18 

Hollb, Major Ceneral U;uris W.: 169, 

179 

IloMF..nUD: 170 

lIonolulu RequiremenlS Planning Conrerence: 48 

"Iouse, Rear Admiral William H.: 181 

H udson Rh'er: 3 

lI uong My Dimicl: 1.54, 165 

l1iumin;u ion, bauldield: 83, l iS, 123, 

m 

Indochina War: 3,8-17 

Inrlllliry Halla lions 

2<1. ~ Regimenl: 104, 11 7 

2<1.4110 Regiment: 54, Ml- 59, 162 

2d, 60th Regirn(,lIl: 108, ]29-35 

3d. 39110 Regiment : ]21 - 25, 171- 79 

~. 47th Regiment: 58-50, 67. 70, 

75-85, 106- 10, 11 2- 27, 129, 132-43. 

149-60, 162 00, 171 - 79 

3d, 60th Regiment, 5!r60. 68, 76-85, 

121- 25, 128-43, 149-fi6, 17 1- 79 

4th. 471h Regi ment : 54, 58- 59, 67, 70. 

8 1- 85. 106- 10, 112- 2 1, ]24- 25, I~

n, 160, 162-M, 111-79 

51h. 60Ih Regiment: 68, 78, 120-25, 

]28- 35, 177-79 

Ilirallll)' B:1II3lio,"" \'iel Cong 

hi lind 2d T ay Do: 156 

51h Nha Be: lOS. 145 

10l h U Minh: 156 

26lst : In. 149. 193 

263d : 68,81. 124, 128. 135- 36. 145, 149, 

267th

'" : 138-39 

!03d: 156 

306th : 149. 156 

3081 h: 149 

md: 138- 39, 145. 14 7 

506l h : 127, 145 

SHi h: 68. 77, 80-81, ]24. 129, 136, 

10-49, 193 

516110: 1.34, 163 

857 1" : 1-1 9 

Iol(antry Brigades 

h i. 9110 Dhision: 42. 127, ISS, 160-6 1, 

173- 79 

151, 25th Dhision: 121. 123 
INDEX 205 

Infantry Brigades-Continued 

2d. 9th Di"ision: 42, :;2-53, 55, 58-60, 

68-71, 75-88, 104--47, 151-66, 167, 

169-70, 173. 178-79, 186, 188, 191 

3d, 9th Dh'ision: ~2, 68, 8~, ICM, 108, 

137-13, 145, 163-66, 168, 17()-73, 

17S-79 

199th: 109 

Infantry Companies, Vitt Cong 530th 

and 5~Oth: 149 

Infantry Divi$ions: 

Z: 29, 54. 42 

lsI: 44, 59 

9th: 116, 159. 167, See (l/SO Mobile 

Rh'erine .·on;e. 

aCli,'ation, organizalion. sirenglh: 

42-43,56-57,7()-71 

arrival: 5S-59 

departure and inaC'livalion : 178-

79, 183 

deployment to combat: 46-49, 53, 

55-58 

role in Mobile Anoat Force: 

51-56 

training programs: 31, 12-'14. 53-

56,58-67 

25th: 56, 59 

Infanlry Divisions, Republic of Vietnam 

7th: 25,55,69, 77-S I, 12()-25, 15:;-43, 

150, 160-66, 190, 193 

9th: 2.5, 157,"",.5, 156, 165 

21st: 2.5, 156. 171. 176 

25th: 104-10, 112- 20, 1.5~, 190 

In(antry Division, Viet Cong 91h: 2.5 

Institute of Combined Arms Group: 56 

Intelligence opentions and reports: 21, 

34-.55, 63-64, 69. S()-SI. 84. S9-90. 

IIH. 106. 112, 120, 124-25, 12S, US, 

145, I4S-49, 153, 155, 160-62. 170, 

174, lSI 

Intc:lligencc opentions and reporu, 

enemy: 16, 192 

Jackson, Major General Andrew: 5 

J.4.CKSf.4.Y: 46 

Johnson. ,\dmiral Roy L.: 45,49, 52, 57, 

.. Joint ChieFs of Staff: 28-29, 49-50, 86-87 

Joint General Staff, Republic of Viet· 

nam: 46 

Joint operations. See Mobile Riverine 

Force. 

Junk .'«1, Republic of Vietnam: 24 

Kien Giang Province: 17.5- 75 

Kien Uoa: 142 

Kien !-loa Province: 68-69, 76, 10·t 

124- 27. 134- 35, 112, 163- 64, 169-71. 

173-78, 190-91.193 

Kien Phong I'rovince: 32. 137-45, 145, 

148, 1&1 

Kien Tltong Pro\'ince: 32, 179 

Kiull Lai llieu Canal: 157 

Kinh Lo R;"er: 117 

Kinh S:uiII':noy Canal: 157 

Kinh Xa ~Io: 176 

Kinh Xang Canal: 2S. 7S. 137. 139, 141 

Kirk.2d Lieutenant Howard C., III: S.5 

La Grange-Ong Lon C1nal: IS2 

1ke norgne: 5 

Lake Champlain: 3,"", 

Lake I:::rie: 4 

Lan, Colonel, Repuhlic of Vietnam Marine Corps: 122-23 

Lance. Colonel John E .. Jr.: 55,69 

Landing enft, as.o;au1t : 10 

Landing craft. infantry: 10 

Landing erafl, mec::haniled: 10, 15, 29. 

31. 39, i4, 103, 163 

I.an(iing craft repair ships: 29,40, 49-50 

Landing crafl, lank: 10, 15 

Landing craft. utility: 31,49, 105 

Landing craft, "ehicle or personnel: 10 

J..anding oper:uions procedure: 98-99, 

105- 106 

1n(iing ship, support, large: 10 

Lantling ship, lank: 27, 29, 31, 39, 74- 76, 

103, II H2. 163, 186 

LeA. Sec: Landing craft, assault. 

LCI. See L.lnding craft, infantry. 

LCM . Set: Landing craft, mcchaniled. 

LCT. Set: Landing cmft, lank, 

l.CU. Ste Landing emf!. utility. 

LeVI', See Landing craft. vehicle or 

personnel. 

Liaison officers: 70, 73 

Ligluer. large co\'erc:<l: 29 

Lodge, Henr)' Cabo!, Jr.: 24-25. H, 57 

LogistiC'.l1 Command. 1st: 159 

!'oglslic.ll i)'Stem and oper."io",: 27, 30, 

!lS-39, 45. 57, 111- 12, lI5, 1:;3, 

159-60. liO 

Logistical 5~'s em and operations, enem,' 

21 - 22, ISO-SI 
206 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Lon!! An "rovine.::: 23, 28, '4. 102- 104. 

109, 120-21, 125-27. 129, IH-46. 

16'-&1. 169. 171, 173. 1i7-19, 190-91 

Long nioh: 18 

Long Dinh: 161. 16' 

Long ninh District: 142 

Long TaLI: 60. 103, 125 

Long XU)!:": 34, 180 

LorDinc, Operation: 15 

LouiJillflll, t:SS: 5 

LSSt. Sec l...;lI'lding ship. ~upport. large. 

LST. Su Landing ~ip. lank. 

Macdonough, Commodore Thom:n: ~ 

Machine gun lire, cnt'nl) . 22, 83 

Md~ughlin. John T.: 5 

Mc:"\amara, Robert S.: 49, 56-57. 186 

Maintenance and fCj»ir: 40.45 

Mang Thil-l'\icolai Canal: 180 

Map cxcrci~: 13-+1 

Marine Corps units, Republic of Viclnam' 23, 115. 117, 120-5. 136 .... '. 

163-00. 168. 171- 76, 183 

M \~II.£T TI~[ ; 24. 50. 54. 180-81 

MASH. Su Mobile Army surgiQI hospital. 

Matfriel 10S5e'I, cnml)': ]11- 12. li S, 117. 

127, 136. 139, 143, 149, 154, 156. 

159, 172.181-82 

MCS. Sec Mine CQuntcrmCa5ur~ sup· 

pon ship, 

Meetlcal supply I~, cncmy; !G, 158, 

156 

Mtdic:al troops and J('"'iC('; 31. !G, 

4~1. lOS, 123, lSI, 154, JS7-,Sg 

Mrek , Ucutcn:mt Colond Carroll S.: 72 

Mtkong Rivcr and Dcllil: 3, 8, 27-28, 

33- 34, 73, 103, 141, 14S, 1·17, lS I. 

IS6, IS!1. 166, 168, 178-79 

optralions, French : 8, 11 -1 3, 16 

open.tlon~, U.s, Su Mobitc Ri\'crinc 

rOTC(', 

operation" \licl Cong: 22-23 

operations, \I;CI Minh : 13 14, 16- 17 

tcrrain fcalur~: 17- 23,104, II I 

U.s, cntn': 21,26-31,45,45-17.1-43 

Mafer, VSS: 17 1 

MN optralion~: 39 

Mexian War txperkna:: S 

Mitituy Region" VicI Cong 

II: 165 

II I: I!16-S8 

Miller, Coloncl Cl"05by p,: 5 1 

Mine ilclion~ and countermeasures: 7··8, 

14- 16, 3~ 3S, 37, 61, 67, 96-98, 102-

103,132, 14S, 172- 7S, 177 

Mine counttrmc.uurCi ,upport ship: 29 

MiMion Council: S7 

Miui5S ippi Rh'cr and Delta : 3,5-8 

Mo Cay District: 163, l(iS, 173 

Mobile, AliI~rna: 6 

Mobile Allall Force: 32, 54-37, 42. 45-

52, 56--S7. ;0, 72, 8S-86, ISS, 185-

87, 190-92. Su (JiJO Mobilc Ri'"c rine 

Force, 

Mobile Army surgical hospital : 40 

Mobile HilS(' II: 182 

Mobilc Intelligence Civil Affairs Tam' 

89-90, 104, 106, II I 

Mobile RI'erinc Force. Sec aba Infantry 

Division, 9th; Mobile Afloat ForC('. 

accomplishml'nts: 166, 178-79, 185, 

190-91, 193-9-1 

aClh';ation, organ;,alion, equipment: 3, 

26-3J. ,.., 4S-51. 76, 167- 71, 176-77. 

185 86, 189 

anchonge relocations: 1-16, lS I, 156, 

165, 170 

force strength and shorlage" 144, HI6-

87 

inactivation; 183-st 

mobility: 1-14, 170, 183. 187-91 

plan~, operations, Imining: 32- 37,5G60, 63, fi!)-70, 72- 127. 14'-47, 148-

56, 169, 185, I~ 

Mobite Ri"erine Croup Alpha: 167, 171-

76 

Mobile Rh'crine Group nra\'o: 167, 171. 

173- 14, 1;6 

Moe H();I : 182 

Moc:ay Di$trict : 170 

MonilOrs: !G, sa, 75, 82, 98, 103, 109, 

11 2- 16, 142, ~, 156, 162, 178 

Morelli. Major Donald R.: SS 

Morri$, ~hior McL.cndon C:., US:\IC: 61 

Mortar firt: 3J, 65, 67, 102, l iS, 128 

Morlar fire, enemy: H, "5, 8'-84, 11K, 

~, 156, 160-61 

Mui nai Bung: 185 

Muong Lon Rh'('T: 117 

Murray, Lieutenant Colonel J ohn E.: 

5 1- S2 

MU5Clc Shoals, Alabama: 6 
INDEX 207 

My Tho: 23, 26, 28, 33-35, 40, 47, 120-

21, 136, 149-51, 15-4- 55, 163, liO, 

19\. 193 

My Tho I'rovince: 110 

My Tho Rh"u: 69, 82-83, 121. 124-25, 

135- 36, 138, 142, 145, 141H9, 161, 

165, 169,172-74, 180 

Nam, Major, Republic or Vie1nam MOl' 

rim: Corps: 136, 139 

Nam Dinh Giang: 15-16 

Napalm, t:u:tical use: 114, 151 

Nashville, Tennessc:c:: 7 

1'\'ational Police: 23, 11 2, 124, 174 

NaYliI gunfire 5Upport: 30, 36, 38, Got, 86. 

100, 102, 107, 11 4-15, 133, ISS, 159 

1"01\";11 units, Republic; or Vietnam: 24, 

50, 156, 174-79, 182-8' 

Neu, ~mimine: 14 

New Orleans, Louisiana: 4,7 

New rorA; Ti".u: 179 

Nha 8c:: 65, 103,117 

Nhon Trac;h Distria: 59-«1,127, 135 

Night operations: 62, 100, 109-10, 121, 

138,1«, 161 , 18S 

~i nh Dinh: 14 

NU~UI, USS: 171 

O'Connor, Brigadier Ge:nc:r.1l George G.: 

88, 22-~ , 127 

O'Connor, Lieutenant Colonel Thomu 

Y.: 59 

Ohio River: 6-8 

I'acific Command. Stt: Sharp, Admiral 

UJ)'UCII S. Gra..at. 

I'acific fleet. ~e J ohruon. Admiral 

Roy L 

··Parrot'. 8c::;ak": 181 

Patrol aClions: 84, 101- 102, Ill , 148-49, 

153. 156-57, 161. 165, 173- 74, 177. 

180-81. See olso Reconnai$$:lncc op. 

erations; Search and clear open. 

dons.. 

Patrol !)oats: IS, 51. 35. 121 . 134-55. 142, 

148, 154. 158-59, 162, 174-?S, 178, 

182 

' 'aUenon, Commodore Daniel T .: 5 

I'enny, o\hjor II. Glenn: 107 

I'crry. Commodore: Matthew c.: 5 

"CITy, Commodore Oliver H.: <I 

I'hong Dinh Pnn'in(e: 1.iG, 161-6.5, 171. 

174- 75 

" hosphorus OOlllbs: 115 

" hung lIicp »ridge: 157 

"h ung Iliep OiSlri(l: 156-57 

" lain or Reeds: 19.21. '2. 46, 193 

l'l .. tuburgh, New York: 4 

J'01"11ar Forces, ReJlublic; o( Vietnam: 

2S-24, 90, II G-Il , I:;'. 16'. 165, 178, 

187 

Population dcnlity: 20 

I'ort opr:r.llions: 34 

I'orler, Rear Admiral David D.: 5, 7 

l'rO!!1 rcporu: 178-79 

Pri'l!mcrs of war, enemy: 11()-12, 115, 

124. 138- 39,142,172,174 

Ps)chologial warfare: 177-78 

Quang. Gellenl Dang Van, Republic; or 

Vietnam: 47 

Qucbec:, attack on: <I 

Ram An Binh: 176 

Rac;h ~ Dang: 11 7 

Ra(h 801 Rai: 82, 122. 129. 133 

Rac;h c.. Tre: 152 

Rach Cai Cam: 153- 51 

Rach Dua : 116- 17 

Rac;h Gia: 181 

Rac;h Cion Ong: 108 

Kaeh Ciong: 117 

Raeh Long 1-10: 155 

Raeh Ollg I-lieu: 114 

Raeh Ruo ng Canal : 138- '9. HH9, 154 

Rac;h Tra Tan: 82 

Rach Vang: 11 7 

Radar operalion): 51,35, 84,98. 1<18 

R:adio IICts: ' I 

Ranger units, Republic of Vietnam: 23, 

80-8 1, 121. 123-24, 159 

R~illess riRe lire: ' I. l OB, 115 

Rcooillt:$S riRe lire, enemy: 55,83-84,98, 

122- 23, 1501, 14H6, 151. 158, 161. 

165, 170, 175 

Rr:c:onnai$sanoc: oper-lIion,: 34, '12, 113, 

117, 121, 124,127,134. 142, 149, 15-4, 

161-64, 170, IH, 17677, See /llso 

Palrol ac;(ions; Sc:arc;h and c;lcar op· 

eruions. 

Red River and Delta: 8, 14- 17 

Refueler (ship): 103. 178 
208 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Region:!1 Forta. Republic of Vietnam: 

2,-24, 90, 128, 15'1, 163. 165, 17G, 

178, 187 

Rcp<lir racilili~ Su fohinu:n3nce and 

repair. 

Repair ships: 167, 179 

Resupply ships: Hi7 

Re-.vlutionary War experience: 3"'" 

Rhoda, Lieutenant O:Immander francis 

E., Jr.: ' 32 

RicheJicu R;"er: , 

Rifle, enemy AK47: 22 

Rh'cr Assaull Divj,ions 

91n: 60-62. 64, 11 7. 174- 75 

92d: 162, 171, 174 

!11th: 171, 174 

112th: 171 , 174- 75 

1215t: 171 

1S1s1: 174- 75 

' S2d: 172. 174, 177 

ISht: 171 

152d: 172 

Ri\cr A~utl Flotilla One: 5'-54.56-57. 

5!HiO, 67. 70, 74- 76, 82- 8'. 85, 87, 

89, 178- 79,18'. 186,188 

Ri~cr Awull Croup, Republic of Vicl ' 

nam 26th: 61, &1 

River ASSluh Squadrons: ' 1- '2. ' '', S9, 

49-50,56, Hi', 170, 179 

91h: 60,70, 177- 78 

11 th: 152.177- 78 

13th: 174. 178 

15th: 174, 178 

Rlvl!'R RAID ..... I: 00-6'. 67. 146 

Ri\er;'lC operations 

"-rcnch experience: 8-17,27,29.187 

U.s. experience: !-8, 19!-94 

Vietnamese experience: 187 

Ri~ero, Admir.!.I lIoracio, Jr.: 29 

Rh·en. Su indiyidual names. See IJbo 

Walaways. 

ROiId S)"Slenu: 18- 19 

Rockel fire. enemy: 8!. 93, 122- 2!. 129. 

15<1. U9. ~!. 145-<16. 150, 154, 156. 

159-62.170.175 

Roogen. Commodore John 0.: 6 

Roseborough. IIripdifi C-:neral Mor· 

gan E.: 52 

Rung Sal Spedal 7,one: 20. 2!. 46, SO. 

59--68, 70. 74- 75, 81. 10!. 108. 120. 

125, 127. 135, 144, 146, 169, 188, 190 

Sa Dcc:: 2!, 26. 121. 1!8-!9, 164, 166 

s",bo!age: 15 

Saigon : 40,44,16.57, 1:;5. J6.J-M. 166 

Saigon Ri'er: 8. 18! 

Saint Johns: !-4 

53inl LawrenCe Riyer: ! 

Sail "aler. dama~ hom: G2 

Salvage craft: !I 

Sah'age lift craft: 171 - 72 

Saller. c;'Jllain Robert S.: 1!6. 147. 180-

81 

53n Juan Bautista: 5 

Saratog:J. b;aulc of: 4 

Savannah. Georgia: 6 

S!;outJi. opcratioru by: !()I. 114 

SEA l..ORI>S: 171- 74, 179-81 

St:;a·air.land (SEAL) teams. USN: 54, 58 

~aman. Lieutenant C-:neral Jonathan 

0.: 46 

S/:uch and clear oper.u io",: 69, 156. 158, 

16H.2. 165. 17!- 74. 178, 181. Su 

IJ/so I'atml actioll5: Reconnaimnce 

opcratiOfUSOIARCII TURN: 172. 181- 82 

Sec:urily measures anti operations: 14 .52. 

}I !5. 45. 58. 100-)(14, 155, 1l7, 1<11. 

149. IS!. 169. 183 

Seminole Indians: 5 

Service Force. Pacific, USN: 45, 52 

ShuI'. Mlljor Richard I-I.: U2 

ShuI'. Admiral UI)sscs S. Grant : 28-!O, 

45.49-50 

Ships 

.llImaged and lost, French: I!. 15-16 

d:lln3gc:d and lasl. U.s.: 172.175.177 

transfer 10 Republic 0( "i~nam : 177-

78, 183 

Sibley. Lielllenant Charles n .. USN: 60 

SkenCllborough, New York: 4 

Smith. c;'Jltain r aul B., USN: 5J-55 

Smoke, tactical use: 101 

Sniper fire. ~cmy: 78. 121. 127. 142. 148, 

151- 52.157. 159-60 

"Snoop y's Nose": 129 

'ioc Trang ~ }I 

Soi Rap RiI'fi: 10!. 120. 125-2'1. ISS 

Sollg Sa l.ai: 162. 1601, 175 

Song ("'.ai I.on: 175 

Song c.,j Tu: 175 

Song Can Tho: 156. laB- 59. 176 

Song Co Chiem: IS! 

Sollg Nha Be: II! 
INDEX 209 

Song Rach Cat: 1 U, 116 

Song Thai Binh: 15 

SOng Thai Oinh: 15 

South China Scit: 27, 103 

Special ynding Force: 46 

Sphin:rc, USS: 171 

Staffs and staff (unctions: 8!HM, 188-90 

Standing oper.Hing proceduro: 4.4 

Street fighting: 150 

Subic Bay: HI 

Supply sy.uem and opcr.nions. Set Logistical system and operations. 

Suppon Ihips: 167 

Surpri5c, application of: 127, 157, 170, 

183, 190-91 

SurpriM:, application by Viet Minh: 16-

17 

Sweeps. See Sc:lreh and dear operations. 

Tabasoo River: 5 

Tactical air 5Upport: 19, 31. 34- 38, 64-

65, 78- 79, 82- 83. 9-1, 99, 108, 114-

IS, 122-23, 127- 28, 132, 136, 138-

39, 145, 145, 150-51, 15( 158- 59, 

]63-&1, 185 

Tactical operation, center: 93-91, 98 

Tan An: 68, 168, 181-82 

Tan Dinh: 181 

Tan Hic:p: 68 

Task Forces. USN 

115th: 24, 180 

116th: 24, 121, 180-81 

1171h: 68, 85,90, 112, 132, 155-56, 158, 

Hi3, 111 

l!Mth: 179-80 

Task Groups, USN 

Alpha: 176 

194: 180 

Tale, Major Cll'de J,: 71 

Tay Ninh: 183 

Tennessee River: 6-8 

Ternin fcalure$: 17-23, 104, ] II 

Tel offelUive: 148-66, 191 

Tel truce period: 141-43, 147 

Thailand forces: 155 

Than Due District: 163 

Thanh, Brigadier General Ngul"etl 

Manh, Republic of Vielnam: 50, 128 

Thoi Son bland: 165, 174 

Timan Mon: 176 

Tides, effect on operations: 20-21, 83, 

101. 114 

Tonkin: 8-10 

Tra eu: 182 

Tn Vinh: 34 

TUN HUNG 0,\0: 172,]82 

Troop' uniu 

enemy: 2 1, 25 

Republic of Vielnam: 23 

TIIOUNC GoNG DINII: ] 60-62 

Truc Giang District: 162, ]64-65, 173 

Tugs, I3rgc harbor: 29, 5],49 

Turner, Lieutenant Colonel James S. G., 

USMC: 70-71,9 1 

Tutwiler, Lieutenant Colonel Guy I.: 54, 

106-]07 

Tu)"etl Nhon: 182 

U Minh Forest: 20-21,165 

Unitt"C1 Statl'$ Air .'orce: 50-31, 11 4-15, 

]56, 165, 185, Set also Tactical air 

support. 

Unilct.! StatCS Anny, Vietnam: 39, 58, 

73,85- 86, 167--68 

United StatCli Marine Corps: 29, 52, 56, 

United " Stau:!! Military A$Sistance Com· 

mand. Vietnam: 2 1- 30, 53, 4'. 45-

16, <19-5], 55-57, 85-86. 116, 149, 

169, 188. Stlt a!Jo Wcstmoreland, 

General William C. 

United States Naval Forces, Vietnam: 27, 

57, 86, 112. 125, 146, 165, 167-68, 

171-9-1 

United States Navy Advisory Group. 

Vielnam: 24 

U.s. Nnns v World Rtlporl: 179 

Valcour hland: 4 

Vam Co Dong River: 126, 181-82 

Vam Co River: 8, 105, 110, 112, 120, 

125-27, 135, 180 

Vam Co Tay Rh·er: 181 

V~m Nao CrO$SO\'er: 180 

Van Uc Canal: 15 

Vegtution, effect on operations: 20.78 

"tlmon COlin/y. US5: 171,175 

Vi Thanh: 165 

ViCksburg, Mi i5Sippi: 7-8 

Vieu , General Cao Van, Republic of 

Vietnam: 46-48 

Viet Minh: 8-17 

Vinh lIinh Province: 165, 171, 178 

Vinh Kim: 124, 163 
210 RIVERINE OPERATIONS 

Vinh Long: 26. 3~, ]41, H9-5I, 153-55, 

170, 191 

Vinh Long Pro\ince: 142, 165, 171, 175 

VUlig Tau: 21,~, 39-40, 50, 57, 59-60, 

66,71,74,75, 10', ISS, HI, 188 

Vung Tau Am Support Command: 38 

Wal1ac;t:, LiC;Ultnant Colonel Bruce E.: 

123-24 

War of 1812 expc.ric:n~: 4-5 

Ward, Rear Admiral Norvell C.: 21 

Washington. D.C.: .. 

it'llIhlt'tulw Count)', 1.ST: 162 

Waterway. 

in communications 'Y'tem: 18-19 

mov~ncnt on: 10, 21, 98, IOS-I06. 

120, 168, 17~80 

Weapon" enemy: 22 

Wqpon. losses, enemy. Su Maltrid 

losses, enemy. 

Weather, effect on operations: 19 

Wdch, Captain David P., USN: 27 

Well" Captain Wade: c., USN: 5', 71. 

85,87,89-90, 105- 106, J 12. 136 

Westchester Counly. USS: 111-72 

Westmorclant.l, General William C.: 27-

28, 41-42, 45-50, 57, 68, 167. 185. 

See /100 Unitm Stale. Military ..ulisIanoe Command, Vietnam. 

WC)'and, Lieutenant Cenenl F~CTick 

c.: 181 

Whitfield Counly, LST: 60 

Wilmington, North Carolina: 6 

Withdl'1llwal opn:ations: S7, 100-101 

Wilhrn:II, lJeute=nt Colonel John R.: 

SS-S6,70-71 

World War II experience: 8, '1:1 

Worth, Colonel William j.: S 

Yangue Rh·tt htrol: 8 

YFNB. ~~ lJghler, large covered. 

YLCC. See Sal ... ~ge lirt cnft. 

YTB. Su Tug. large harbor. 

7..astrow, LicutCTl:lnt Colonel Richard E.: 

" 

..:r U, S. OOVERNKmT PlUlfl'lNC O"'lCE 19850- 410-397