alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(May 23, 2006)

#### Hector Ramos, Respondent, v HSBC Bank et al., Appellants.

[815 NYS2d 504]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Douglas McKeon, J.), entered on or about June 16, 2005, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendants Trammell’s and HSBC/Mt. Kisco’s motions for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motions granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants dismissing the complaint and all cross claims.

Plaintiff, a technician employed by nonparty Falk Technical Services, responded to a complaint regarding an air conditioning system at premises owned and operated by defendants. At the premises, plaintiff used a ladder to gain access to the roof. After working on the ladder for a while, plaintiff started to climb down, but the ladder shifted and he fell. Plaintiff sued the owners and managing agent.

After joinder of issue, defendants separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the Labor Law and that plaintiff failed to demonstrate any common-law negligence. As relevant to this appeal, the motion court found that plaintiff had failed to establish by admissible evidence the *436ownership of the ladder. Further, the court found that there “appears to be no testimony, or other evidence, that plaintiff ever complained about the condition or length of the ladder he used to anyone prior to the accident.” Yet, the court did not dismiss the common-law negligence claim.

We reverse. Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide construction workers with a safe place to work. “An implicit precondition to this duty ... is that the party charged with that responsibility have the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury” *(Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son,*54 NY2d 311, 317 [1981]; *see also Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp.,*82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]) and have actual or constructive notice of the alleged unsafe condition *(see Singh v Black Diamonds LLC,*24 AD3d 138, 139-140 [2005]). Although the motion court properly found that there is no evidence in the record that defendants exercised any control over plaintiff, plaintiff argues that defendants are nevertheless liable under a theory of common-law negligence, irrespective of the issue of control. However, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding actual or constructive notice of any defective condition *(see Gordon v American Museum of Natural History,*67 NY2d 836 [1986]). Accordingly, the motion court should have dismissed the common-law negligence claim. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Marlow, Sullivan, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 4 A0 81 4 . STANLEY KENNETH J OHNSON v . J OHN T. CLOUGH, I I I

.
This c ase began as a d isp o ssesso ry p ro c eed ing in magistrate c o u r t. A f ter the magistrate c o u r t entered final j u d gment in f av or o f the p laintif

f , D ef end ant Stanley J o hnso n ap p e aled to the state c o u rt, w hic h also ru led in f av o r o f the p laintif

f

. J o hnso n f iled a mo tio n to v ac ate the s tate c o u rt’ s d ec isio n. The state c o urt d enied the mo tio n and aw ard ed atto rney fees to t he p laintif f u nd er OCGA § 9 -1 5- 1 4. J o hnso n then f iled
this ap p eal. The A p p ellee has f i l ed a mo tio n to d ismiss, argu ing that w e lac k j u risd ic tio n. W e agree.
A s the A p p ellee c o ntend s in his mo tio n to d ismiss, the trial c o u rt’ s o rd er w as

no t su bj ec t to d irec t a pp eal. A n ap peal f ro m a state c ou rt o r d er d isp o sing o f a d e no v o
ap p eal f r o m a magistrate c o u r t d ec isio n mu st be initiated by filing an ap plic atio n f o r d isc r etio nary ap p eal. OCGA § 5- 6

- 35 (a) (1 1 ); Stra cha n v

. Meri to r Mtg. C o rp. E a s t , 21 6
Ga. A p p

. 82, 82 (453 SE2d 1 1 9 ) (1 99 5). “ Co m p lianc e w ith t he disc retio nary ap p eals

p ro c ed ure is j u r isd ic tio nal. ” Ha i r Res to ra ti o n S peci a l i s ts v

. S ta te o

f Ga

. , 36 0 Ga. A p p

. 9 01 , 9 03 (86 2 SE2d 56 4) (2021 ) (p u nc tu atio n o mit t ed )

. J o hnso n’ s failu re to fo llo w the

p ro p e r p ro ced u re d ep riv es u s o f j u risd ic tio n o v er this ap p eal.

M o reo v er, the ap p eal is u ntimely. Und er OCGA § 44- 7

- 56 ( b) (1 ), ap p eals in
d isp o ssesso ry ac tio ns m u st be filed w ithin sev e n d ays o f t h e d ate the j u d gment w as entered

. See Ra

y M. W ri ght, In c. v

. Jo n es , 239 Ga. Ap p

. 521 , 522- 523 (521 SE2d 456 ) February 08, 2024(1 9 9 9 ). H ere, the state c ou rt entered its ord e r d e nying J ohnso n’ s mo tio n o n

Sep tember 20, 2023, and J o hnso n f iled his no tic e o f ap p eal o n Oc to ber 1 7 , whic h w as
27 d ays later.

Fo r bo th o f these reaso ns, w e lac k j u risd ic tio n o v er this ap p e a l

. A cco r d i n g l y, the

mo tio n to d ismiss is hereby GRA N TED and this ap p eal is hereby D I SM I SSED

.

C o u r t o f A p p e a ls o f t h e S t a t e o f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O ffic e , A t la n t a ,

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r t ify t h a t t h e a b o v e is a t

r u e e x t r a c t fr o m
t h e m in u t e s o f t h e C o u r t o f A pp e a ls o f G e o r g ia

. W it n e s s m y s ig n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o f s a id c o u r t h e r e t o a ffix e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r la s t a b o v e w r

it t e n

.

, C le r

k

. 02/08/2024
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<ARTICLE>                                                           5 

        
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                         SEP-30-1997 
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<PERIOD-END>                                              JUN-30-1997 
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<PP&E>                                                      1,549,876 
<DEPRECIATION>                                                242,756 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                              1,418,860
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                         249,406 
<BONDS>                                                             0 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                               0 
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<COMMON>                                                       23,650
<OTHER-SE>                                                    858,732 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                1,418,860 
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</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF SITI-SITES.COM, INC. AND ITS
SUBSIDIARY AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
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<PERIOD-END>                              DEC-31-1999
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    2,305
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    0
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<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  0
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (991)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     66
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (925)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.112)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.112)



</TABLE>
#### § 52.61 Duration of renewal.

Each renewal of certification for a standard design will be for not less than 10, nor more than 15 years.
**Exhibit
32.1**
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Patient Safety Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Milton “Todd” Ault, III, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
 
 
 May 16,
2005
 
  Milton
      “Todd” Ault, III
      Chief
      Executive Officer
      and
      Principal Financial Officer
Editorial Note on Part 63
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 63 appear at 81 FR 86909, Dec. 2, 2016.

§ 63.75 Inspections. ( a ) DOE shall allow the Commission to inspect the premises of the geologic repository operations area at the Yucca Mountain site and adjacent areas to which DOE has rights of access.
( b ) DOE shall make available to the Commission for inspection, on reasonable notice, records kept by DOE pertaining to activities under this part.
( c ) ( 1 ) DOE shall, on requests by the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provide rent-free office space for the exclusive use of the Commission inspection personnel. Heat, air-conditioning, light, electrical outlets, and janitorial services must be furnished by DOE. The office must be convenient to and have full access to the facility and must provide the inspector both visual and acoustic privacy.
( 2 ) The space provided must be adequate to accommodate two full-time inspectors, and other transient NRC personnel and will be generally commensurate with other office facilities at the Yucca Mountain site geologic repository operations area. A space of 250 square feet either within the geologic repository operations area's office complex or in an office trailer or other onsite space at the geologic repository operations area is suggested as a guide. For locations at which activities are carried out under licenses issued under other parts of this chapter, additional space may be requested to accommodate additional full-time inspectors. The office space provided is subject to the approval of the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. All furniture, supplies, and communication equipment will be furnished by the Commission.
( 3 ) DOE shall afford any NRC resident inspector assigned to the Yucca Mountain site or other NRC inspectors identified by the Regional Administrator as likely to inspect the Yucca Mountain facility, immediate unfettered access, equivalent to access provided regular employees, after proper identification and compliance with applicable access control measures for security, radiological protection, and personal safety.
#### § 1108.125 Cost sharing or matching.

*Cost sharing or matching* means the portion of project costs not borne by the Federal Government, unless a Federal statute authorizes use of any Federal funds for cost sharing or matching.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-41269 Summary Calendar

OSIEL VALDEZ ORTIZ, Petitioner-Appellant,

versus GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. B-96-CV-235

-------------------- December 10, 1999 Before REAVLEY, SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Osiel Valdez Ortiz, Texas prisoner # 524306, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The district court granted Ortiz a certificate of appealability. Ortiz argues that his conviction following his nolo contendere plea for aggravated robbery violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial court had previously accepted Ortiz’s guilty plea to the lesser-included offense of robbery.No. 98-41269 -2- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court had conditionally accepted the first plea until the court had approved the presentence report and the plea agreement, and that “[b]ecause we have found that the trial court did not accept the plea bargain, jeopardy did not attach in the first plea proceeding.” Ortiz v. State , 933 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). An application for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted unless the decision of the state court “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “[W]e can grant habeas corpus relief only if a state court decision is so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Mata v. Johnson , 99 F.3d 1261, 1267 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson , 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. 320 (1997)), vacated in part on other grounds on rehearing , 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 1997). Ortiz has not made such a showing. See Ohio v. Johnson , 467 U.S. 493 (1984); United States v. Foy , 28 F.3d 464, 471 n.13 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Santiago Soto , 825 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1987).
AFFIRMED.
#### People ex rel. Hazel Stanley, Appellee, v. Ray Hunsaker, Appellant.

*477opinion filed July 2, 1940.

H. E. Skinner, for appellant; Walter J. Schuwerk, for appellee.

Opinion by

Justice Dady.

“Not to be published in full.”
#### § 205.82 Where to file.

A request for interpretation shall be filed with the General Counsel or his delegate or with the appropriate Regional Counsel at the address provided in § 205.12.

(Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-159, as amended, Pub. L. 93-511, Pub. L. 94-99, Pub. L. 94-133, Pub. L. 94-163, and Pub. L. 94-385; Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-275, as amended, Pub. L. 94-385; Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. 94-163, as amended, Pub. L. 94-385; E.O. 11790, 39 FR 23185; Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. 95-91; E.O. 12009, 42 FR 46267)

[39 FR 35489, Oct. 1, 1974, as amended at 43 FR 14437, Apr. 6, 1978; 43 FR 17803, Apr. 26, 1978]
COURTROOM DEPUTY MINUTES DATE : NOVEMBER 13, 2006

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA DIGITAL RECORDED: 1:06 p.m. to 1:08 p.m.

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 

PRESIDING MAG. JUDGE: CHARLES S. COODY DEPUTY CLERK: WANDA STINSON 

CASE NUMBER: 1:06CR201-WHA-CSC DEFENDANT NAME: OSCAR MARTINRAMIREZ

 

APPEARANCES

GOVERNMENT DEFENDANT

ATTY. A. CLARK MORRIS ATTY. JAMES COOPER, JR.

/ DISCOVERY STATUS: Complete.

_________________________________________________________________________________________

 _________________________________________________________________________________________

/ PENDING MOTION STATUS: None.

/ PLEA STATUS: Possible plea. 

__________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________

/ TRIAL STATUS: Will take 2 1⁄2 days to try case if goes to trial.

_________________________________________________________________________________________

 REMARKS:

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

Case 1:06-cr-00201-WHA-CSC Document 26 Filed 11/13/2006 Page 1 of 1
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

September 4, 2012

p0827

Order 

September 4, 2012

144969

ANDRE L. CAMMON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 144969

COA: 304282

Jackson CC: 10-003652-AH

G. ROBERT COTTON CORRECTIONAL

FACILITY WARDEN,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 26, 2012 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Exhibit 32



                        President's Written Certification
                             Of Financial Statements
                       Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Statute 1350



     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Statute 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned hereby certifies in his capacity
as president of Ridgefield Acquisition Corp. (the "Company") that

     (a)  the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-QSB for the period
          ended September 30, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of
          Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

     (b)  the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition of the Company at the end
          of such period and the results of operations of the Company for such
          period.


Dated: November 12, 2004


                                            /s/ Steven N. Bronson
                                            ----------------------------------
                                            Steven N. Bronson, President
#### In the Matter of Fawn Mishook, Also Known as Fawn Floud, Respondent, v James Mishook, Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Saratoga County, entered April 27, 1979, which increased the amount of a prior child support order of that court from $25 per week to $30 per week. The appellant husband contends on this appeal that the testimony of the petitioner wife at the hearing in support of the application *571was a nullity since it was unsworn and, therefore, legally insufficient to support the court’s determination. The failure of the appellant to object to the unsworn testimony, however, waives any argument that the testimony was not properly admitted *(Matter of Brown v Ristich,*36 NY2d 183, 189; 2A Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac, par 2309.05) and fails to preserve the issue for argument on this appeal (CPLR 5501, subd [a], par 3). The evidence revealed that the appellant husband’s salary had increased from the date of the original order on March 22, 1976 and that the needs of the child of the parties had likewise increased for clothing and lunches as a result of his enrollment in school. The increase in the child’s needs and the appellant’s means demonstrated the change of circumstances necessary for the upward modification of the court’s prior order (see *Matter of Fensterheim v Fensterheim,*55 AD2d 516; *Commissioner of Welfare v Belgrave,*16 AD2d 771), and provided an adequate basis therefor (cf. *Matter of Fisher v Dukelow,*56 AD2d 739). Under the cited authorities, the appellant’s further contention that a substantial change of circumstances must be shown before an upward modification can be allowed lacks merit. Accordingly, the order appealed from should be affirmed. Order affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Sweeney, Kane, Staley, Jr., and Casey, JJ., concur.
Editorial Note on Part 72
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 72 appear at 80 FR 74981, Dec. 1, 2015, and at 81 FR 86910, Dec. 2, 2016.

§ 72.94 Design basis external man-induced events. ( a ) The region must be examined for both past and present man-made facilities and activities that might endanger the proposed ISFSI or MRS. The important potential man-induced events that affect the ISFSI or MRS design must be identified.
( b ) Information concerning the potential occurrence and severity of such events must be collected and evaluated for reliability, accuracy, and completeness.
( c ) Appropriate methods must be adopted for evaluating the design basis external man-induced events, based on the current state of knowledge about such events.