Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, 

Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

March 2004 COAST GUARD 

Relationship between 

Resources Used and 

Results Achieved 

Needs to Be Clearer 

GAO-04-432 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-432.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Margaret 

Wrightson at (415) 904-2200 or 

wrightsonm@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-432, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, and 

Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 

March 2004

COAST GUARD

Relationship between Resources Used 

and Results Achieved Needs to Be 

Clearer 

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard has experienced a 

32 percent increase in its budget, a 9 percent increase in personnel, and 

major shifts in the hours in which its ships, boats, and aircraft are used in the

agency’s various programs. Hours these resources are used for most 

homeland security programs greatly exceed their pre-September 11 levels, in 

part because of an infusion of new boats, with the number of hours for the 

ports, waterways, and coastal security program up more than twelve-fold. 

(See fig. below.) Conversely, with the exception of hours for ice operations, 

hours dedicated to each non–homeland security program remained below 

their pre-September 11 levels. 

Percentage Change in Boat, Ship, and Aircraft Resource Hours, by Program, Pre-September 

11 Baseline through Fiscal Year 2003 

Programs with increasing

resource hours 

Homeland security programs Non–homeland security programs

Ports, waterways, and 

coastal security

1,200

Up 518

Up 81

Up 44

Down -2

Down -16

Down -22

Down -26

Down -44

-200 0 200 400 600

Programs with decreasing

resource hours

Defense readiness

Undocumented migrant 

interdiction

Ice operations

Aids to navigation

Foreign fish 

enforcement

Search and rescue

Living marine resources

Illegal drug interdiction

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard resource hour data.

Up 1,220

-100 100 300 500 700 1,100 1,300

Percent change

The Coast Guard’s performance results—measures used to track each 

program’s annual progress—generally did not mirror the trends in resource 

use. Instead, results for programs GAO reviewed were generally stable or 

improved regardless of the resources applied, and nearly all of the programs 

that GAO reviewed met their performance targets—the goals they set out to 

achieve—in fiscal year 2003. Coast Guard officials said that various factors 

besides resources, such as increased operating efficiencies or unexpected 

events, also affected performance results, but they have limited information 

for assessing the impact of these factors. Initial steps have been taken to 

better develop this capability, but many are in early stages, and the Coast 

Guard does not have a time frame for completing the work or assurance that 

they will result in a systematic approach for assessing the results. 

The Coast Guard has responsibility 

for protecting America’s ports, 

waterways, and waterside facilities 

from terrorist attacks. At the same 

time, the Coast Guard remains 

responsible for many other 

missions important to the nation’s 

interests, such as conducting 

search and rescue and protecting 

important fishing grounds. 

GAO’s past work found that despite 

substantial budget increases, the 

Coast Guard’s extensive homeland 

security responsibilities resulted in 

a reduction in the levels at which 

the agency’s ship, boat, and aircraft 

resources were applied to non–

homeland security programs. GAO 

was asked to update and expand 

this work by analyzing: the trends 

in resource usage, the trends in 

performance results, and the 

implications of these trends. 

GAO recommends that the Coast 

Guard develop a time frame for 

proceeding with plans to more 

accurately account for resources 

expended, and ensure that it 

develops a strategy for identifying 

the intervening factors affecting 

performance results, and

systematically assesses the 

relationship between these factors, 

resources used, and results 

achieved. The Coast Guard 

reviewed a draft of this report and 

generally agreed with the facts and 

recommendations presented, but 

did not take a formal position on 

the recommendations. 
Page i GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Generally, Resource Hours Devoted to Homeland Security 

Programs Have Increased Substantially, while Hours for Other 

Programs Have Decreased 9

Performance Results Remained Largely Unchanged or Improved 

for the Eight Programs We Assessed 13

More Systematic Understanding of Resource Usage and 

Performance Results Is Important for Management and 

Accountability 19

Conclusions 27

Recommendations 28

Agency Comments 28

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30 

Appendix II Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard Resource 

Hours 32 

Programs with Increasing Resource Hours 32

Programs with Declining Resource Hours 36

Programs with Stable Resource Hours 40

Appendix III Program-by-Program Trends in Coast Guard 

Performance Measures 42 

Programs with Generally Stable Performance Results 44

Programs with Improved Performance Results 49

Appendix IV Examples of Coast Guard Approaches to Enhance 

Operational Efficiency 54 

Intelligence 54

Technology 55

Tactics 55

Partnerships 56

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 58 

GAO Contacts 58

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Staff Acknowledgments 58

Related GAO Products 59 

Tables 

Table 1: Homeland Security and Non–Homeland Security Programs 

by Mission Area (as of March 2004) 7

Table 2: Performance Results by Program from Fiscal Year 2001 

through Fiscal Year 2003 14

Table 3: Performance Targets by Program for Fiscal Year 2003 16

Table 4: Selected Examples of Operational Efficiencies Cited by 

Coast Guard Officials 21

Table 5: Selected Examples of Actions Under Way to Improve 

Linkages between Resources and Performance Results 27

Table 6: Coast Guard Performance Measures by Program 43

Table 7: Selected Examples of Intelligence Efforts 54

Table 8: Selected Examples of Technology Efforts 55

Table 9: Selected Examples of New Tactics 56

Table 10: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Partnership Efforts 57

Figures 

Figure 1: Total Resource Hours for All Coast Guard Programs 10

Figure 2: Percentage Change in Resource Hours, by Program, PreSeptember 11 Baseline to Fiscal Year 2003 11

Figure 3: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Resource Hours 33

Figure 4: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Resource Hours 34

Figure 5: Defense Readiness Resource Hours 35

Figure 6: Ice Operations Resource Hours 36

Figure 7: Foreign Fish Enforcement Resource Hours 37

Figure 8: Living Marine Resources Resource Hours 38

Figure 9: Illegal Drug Interdiction Resource Hours 39

Figure 10: Search and Rescue Resource Hours 40

Figure 11: Aids to Navigation Resource Hours 40

Figure 12: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Performance 

Results and Target by Fiscal Year 45

Figure 13: Illegal Drug Interdiction Performance Results and 

Targets by Fiscal Year 46
Page iii GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 14: Ice Operations Performance Results and Targets by 

Fiscal Year 47

Figure 15: Living Marine Resources Performance Results and 

Target by Fiscal Year 48

Figure 16: Search and Rescue Performance Results and Target by 

Fiscal Year 49

Figure 17: Foreign Fish Enforcement Performance Results and 

Target by Fiscal Year 51

Figure 18: Aids to Navigation Performance Results and Targets by 

Fiscal Year 52

Figure 19: Defense Readiness Performance Results and Target by 

Fiscal Year 53

Abbreviations 

CAG collisions, allisions, and groundings 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act 

HITRON Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron 

HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System 

IACM Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement 

LED light-emitting diode 

MARSEC Maritime Security Condition System 

NYPD New York Police Department 

PWCS ports, waterways, and coastal security 

VMS Vessel Monitoring System 

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Page 1 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

March 22, 2004 

The Honorable Olympia J. Snowe 

Chairman 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oceans, Fisheries, and Coast Guard 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

United States Senate 

These are challenging times for the Coast Guard. As the lead federal 

agency for maritime homeland security within the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Coast Guard is facing extraordinary, heightened 

responsibilities to protect America’s ports, waterways, and waterside 

facilities from terrorist attacks and from becoming an avenue for terrorists 

to bring weapons of mass destruction into the country. The Coast Guard 

also remains responsible for many other missions important to the nation’s 

interests, such as helping stem the flow of illegal drugs and illegal 

migration, protecting important fishing grounds, and responding to marine 

pollution. These expanded responsibilities come at a time when budget 

resources are increasingly constrained, making prioritization among 

competing agencies and programs an even more critical factor in 

congressional decision making. Our past work has shown that 

notwithstanding substantial increases in the Coast Guard’s budget to 

accommodate its increased responsibilities, the Coast Guard’s emphasis 

on homeland security has resulted in a reduction in the level of resources 

devoted to non–homeland security missions. 

This report updates our earlier work on Coast Guard efforts to balance its 

homeland security and non–homeland security missions.1

 At the 

committee’s request, we have expanded the scope of the prior work to 

examine both the trends in resource usage and corresponding 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the 

Department of Homeland Security (GAO-03-594T, April 2003); U.S. General Accounting 

Office, Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource 

Use and Measure Performance for All Missions (GAO-03-544T, March 2003); U.S. General 

Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of 

Effort for All Missions (GAO-03-155, November 2002). 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

performance results between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. Specifically, as 

agreed with your offices, this report addresses the following questions: 

• What are the trends in resource usage for each Coast Guard program 

within its homeland security and non–homeland security mission areas? 

• What are the trends in performance results for each Coast Guard program? 

• What are the implications of these trends for Coast Guard management 

and accountability? 

To answer these questions, we analyzed Coast Guard data, reviewed 

documents and records, and visited Coast Guard installations to determine 

how operations were being affected. Because the Coast Guard does not 

have a system that tracks how its personnel spend their time by program, 

our work on resource usage focused on resource hour data showing the 

number of hours that Coast Guard ships, boats and aircraft were used in 

conducting each Coast Guard program. This approach, while covering a 

considerable amount of the Coast Guard’s activities, could not completely 

account for all of the resources used to achieve program results. Most 

notably, two of the Coast Guard’s 11 programs—marine safety and marine 

environmental protection—are largely carried out without using ships, 

boats, and aircraft, and thus much of the effort dedicated toward these 

programs is not captured in the resource hour data.2

 Our work on 

performance results focused on data that the Coast Guard collects and 

analyzes under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to 

determine how well the agency is achieving its goals.3

 For this part of our 

work, sufficient data were available to fully analyze 7 of the Coast Guard’s 

 2

Although resource hour data is captured for all of the Coast Guard’s programs, to a much 

greater extent than other programs, the marine safety and marine environmental protection 

programs are carried out in ways other than using Coast Guard assets—ships, boats, and 

aircraft. Instead, marine safety office personnel are extensively involved in such things as 

conducting ship inspections in port, examining shore-side facilities, and carrying out port 

security activities. The Coast Guard’s current information systems do not capture the 

majority of the time devoted to these activities, which appear to be increasing in 

importance as a result of the Coast Guard’s new port security responsibilities. 

3

These performance measures were developed following the implementation of the 

Government Performance and Results Act in 1993. Many agencies, including the Coast 

Guard, began developing performance measures to strengthen government performance 

and accountability by focusing on the results of activities and spending. The act required 

agencies to establish missions, goals, and performance measures as well as clearer linkages 

between resources and results. 
Page 3 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

11 programs.4 For those programs that we could not fully analyze, because 

they had only resource hour information or performance data but not 

both, we provided limited information in relevant portions of this report. 

We conducted our work at Coast Guard headquarters and at five of the 

Coast Guard’s nine districts that span three coasts—East, West, and Gulf. 

Our work, which was conducted from June 2003 through March 2004, was 

done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology appears in 

appendix I. 

Total Coast Guard resource hours increased 39 percent over their preSeptember 11 levels in fiscal year 2003, and there have been major shifts in 

the distribution of these resource hours among the various Coast Guard 

programs as well. Not unexpectedly, homeland security programs were 

the greatest beneficiaries of the increased hours, as more vessels devoted 

to homeland security have been added to the fleet. Conversely, the 

resource hours for most non–homeland security programs have decreased 

as many more resources are now generally devoted to protecting the 

nation’s ports and waterways. For example, resource hours for several 

programs that the Coast Guard has traditionally conducted, such as living 

marine resources, and search and rescue, declined by 26 percent and 22 

percent, respectively. 

The performance results—or indicators—that track a program’s progress 

from year to year—remained stable or improved for seven of the eight 

programs we reviewed, when comparing fiscal year 2001 and 2003 results. 

Although there was some fluctuation in fiscal year 2002, four programs 

had stable performance results, three were improved and one had pending 

results for fiscal year 2003. For example, the living marine resources 

program—whose performance is assessed by measuring the percentage of 

fishermen that the Coast Guard found in compliance with certain fishing 

regulations—had stable results with a consistent compliance rate of about 

99 to 97 percent between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. Results for the aids to 

 4

We excluded the marine safety and marine environmental protection programs because 

they did not have complete resource-hour data that would allow us to compare resourcehour trends with performance results. We provided only resource hour information for the 

Coast Guard’s newest program—called ports, waterways, and coastal security, or PWCS—

because the Coast Guard has not yet established performance measures for it. Finally, we 

provided limited performance results information for the illegal drug interdiction program 

because performance results for this program for fiscal year 2003 were not yet available. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

navigation program—which helps to ensure the safe passage of vessels—

fluctuated in fiscal year 2002, but showed improvement when comparing 

fiscal years 2001 and 2003, as the number of vessel incidents (such as 

collisions and groundings) decreased. In addition to demonstrating stable 

or improved results in fiscal year 2003, five of the eight programs we 

reviewed also met their pre-established performance targets—the goals 

they aim to achieve each year. For example, the search and rescue 

program’s target for fiscal year 2003 was to save 85 percent of mariners in 

distress and the program achieved this goal by saving over 87 percent of 

them. Two programs, defense readiness and undocumented migrant 

interdiction, missed their performance targets in fiscal year 2003—defense 

readiness achieved a 78 percent readiness status result with a 100 percent 

target, and illegal migrant interdiction missed its target of interdicting 87 

percent of illegal migrants by less than two percentage points. Results for 

the drug interdiction program were not yet available for fiscal year 2003. 

When comparing the trends in the Coast Guard’s use of resources and its 

performance results, the relationship between resources used and results 

was not always what might be expected—that is, the resources expended 

and performance results achieved did not have consistent direction of 

movement and sometimes bore an opposite relationship. For example, 

performance remained stable for four programs, even though resources 

dedicated to them increased or decreased; and three programs 

demonstrated improved results despite decreases in resource hours for 

two of them. These results have important implications for resource 

management and accountability especially given the Coast Guard’s limited 

ability to explain them. In particular, the results prompt a logical question 

as to why, despite substantial changes in the resource hours of a number 

of programs over the period we examined, the corresponding performance 

results for these programs were not necessarily affected in the same 

way—that is, they did not rise or fall in keeping with changes in resources. 

The Coast Guard cannot say with any assurance why this occurred. For 

example, the resource hours invested in the migrant interdiction program 

increased by 81 percent and its performance results—which measure the 

program’s success in interdicting illegal migrants entering the United 

States by sea—remained stable when comparing fiscal year 2001with fiscal 

year 2003. Likewise, search and rescue resource hours dropped by 22 

percent, but the measurement of the Coast Guard’s ability to save mariners 

in distress remained stable for the same period. These results suggest that 

performance was likely affected by factors other than resources. One set 

of factors, cited by the Coast Guard as helping to keep performance steady 

despite resource decreases, involved strategies such as using new 

technology, better operational tactics, improved intelligence, and stronger 
Page 5 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

partnering efforts. For example, the Coast Guard identified improved 

intelligence and technology, along with efforts to partner more closely 

with other federal agencies, as contributors to its stable performance 

results in protecting living marine resources despite a decrease in hours 

dedicated to the program. Coast Guard officials also pointed to another set 

of factors, which are largely beyond its control (such as severe weather 

conditions), to explain performance results that did not improve despite 

resource increases. However the supporting data the Coast Guard was 

able to provide to account for the effects of these two sets of factors was 

limited. The Coast Guard has initiatives under way to better measure its 

resource usage and manage program results, but many of these initiatives 

are still in early stages of development and some do not have a time frame 

for their completion. In addition, the Coast Guard does not have a 

systematic approach for ensuring that these efforts will allow the agency 

to link its resources and performance results. As we have reported in 

previous studies on performance management, agencies that understand 

the linkage between resources expended and performance results 

achieved are better positioned to allocate and manage their resources 

effectively. And by building this type of environmental assessment into its 

strategic planning process, organizations can stay focused on their longterm goals even as they make changes in the way they intend to achieve 

them. An ability to understand these types of effects is important to the 

Coast Guard and the Congress to make informed decisions about resource 

needs. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to (1) develop a time 

frame for expeditiously proceeding with initiatives to account more 

completely for resources expended and (2) ensure that through its 

planning process the agency develops a strategy for identifying the 

intervening factors that affect performance results, and systematically 

assesses the relationship between these factors, resources used, and 

results achieved. 

Now a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast 

Guard has grown considerably in the aftermath of the September 11 

terrorist attacks. The agency’s operating budget in fiscal year 2003 was 

$4.9 billion—an increase of 32 percent in real terms over its fiscal year 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

2001 operating budget.5 Corresponding to this funding increase, the 

agency’s personnel numbers have also grown significantly, and at the end 

of fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard had almost 44,500 full time positions 

about 9 percent more than it had in fiscal year 2001.6

The Coast Guard has responsibilities that fall under 11 programs within 

two broad missions—homeland security and non–homeland security.7 (See 

table 1.) While maritime homeland security duties are not necessarily new 

to the Coast Guard, the agency’s resources used for this mission area prior 

to September 11, 2001, had been minimal when compared with most of its 

other programs.8

 After September 11, the Coast Guard focused much more 

of its efforts on homeland security and established a new program area—

the ports, waterways, and coastal security program (PWCS). 

 5

The fiscal year 2003 operating budget included $628 million in supplemental funding for 

Iraqi Freedom and Liberty Shield (P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003). It also included a .65 percent 

rescission (P.L. 108-7, Feb. 20, 2003). 

6

In fiscal year 2003, there were about 38,300 military and 6,200 civilian personnel. In 

addition, the agency had about 7,900 reservists who support the national military strategy 

and provide additional operational support and surge capacity during emergencies, such as 

natural disasters. Furthermore, about 36,000 volunteer auxiliary personnel helped with a 

wide array of activities, ranging from search and rescue to boating safety education. 

7

The Coast Guard’s homeland security and non–homeland security missions are delineated 

in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002). 

8

Prior to the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Coast Guard included maritime security 

activities under its marine safety program area. 
Page 7 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Table 1: Homeland Security and Non–Homeland Security Programs by Mission Area (as of March 2004) 

Mission and program Activities and functions of each program 

Homeland security mission 

Ports, waterways, and coastal security Conducting harbor patrols, vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and 

analysis, and other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the 

damage from attacks that occur 

Illegal drug interdictiona Deploying cutters and aircraft in high drug trafficking areas and gathering 

intelligence to reduce the flow of illegal drugs through maritime transit routes 

Undocumented migrant interdictiona Deploying cutters and aircraft to reduce the flow of undocumented migrants 

entering the United States by maritime routes 

Defense readiness Participating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in global military 

operations, deploying cutters and other boats in and around harbors to protect 

DOD force mobilization operations 

Other law enforcement (foreign fish enforcement)b Protecting United States fishing grounds by ensuring that foreign fishermen do 

not illegally harvest United States fish stocks 

Non–homeland security mission 

Search and rescue Operating multi-mission stations, and a national distress and response 

communication system, conducting search and rescue operations for mariners 

in distress 

Living marine resources Enforcing domestic fishing laws and regulations through inspections and fishery 

patrols 

Aids to navigation Managing United States waterways and providing a safe, efficient and navigable 

marine transportation system; maintaining the extensive system of navigation 

aids; monitoring marine traffic through vessel traffic service centers 

Ice operations Conducting polar operations to facilitate the movement of critical goods and 

personnel in support of scientific and national security activity; conducting 

domestic icebreaking operations to facilitate year-round commerce; conducting 

international ice operations to track icebergs below the 48th north latitude 

Marine environmental protection Preventing and responding to marine oil and chemical spills; preventing the 

illegal dumping of plastics and garbage in United States waters; preventing 

biological invasions by aquatic nuisance species 

Marine safety Setting standards and conducting vessel inspections to better ensure the safety 

of passengers and crew aboard commercial vessels, cruise ships, ferries, and 

other passenger vessels; partnering with states and boating safety organizations 

to reduce recreational boating deaths 

Source: Coast Guard. 

a

In previous GAO work, these programs were identified as non–homeland security missions. 

However, with the implementation of the Homeland Security Act, the Coast Guard considers these 

programs to be under its homeland security mission. Prior to the passage of the act, the Coast Guard 

did not categorize its programs into non–homeland security and homeland security missions. 

b

Foreign fish enforcement is a key subset of the Coast Guard’s other law enforcement program. For 

the purposes of this report, we consider only the resource hours and performance results associated 

with the foreign fish aspect of the other law enforcement program. We subsequently refer to this 

program as foreign fish enforcement. 
Page 8 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

To achieve its wide range of responsibilities, the Coast Guard is organized 

into two major commands that are responsible for its overall mission 

performance—one in the Pacific Ocean area and the other in the Atlantic 

area, including the Gulf of Mexico region. These commands are divided 

into nine districts, which in turn are organized into a number of groups, 

marine safety offices, and air stations.9 Groups provide more localized 

command and control of field units and resources, such as multi mission 

stations, and patrol boats. Marine safety offices are located at coastal 

ports and on inland waterways, and are responsible for the overall safety 

and security of maritime activities and for environmental protection in 

their geographic areas. Air stations conduct search and rescue, law 

enforcement, environmental response, ice, and defense operations.10

The Coast Guard has systems in place to track its resource hours and 

performance results for each of its program areas. Resource hours,11 which 

are accumulated and reported by quarter, represent the time spent by the 

Coast Guard’s major assets—ships, boats, and aircraft (helicopters and 

 9

In total, the Coast Guard has 32 group commands, 75 marine safety offices or related units, 

and 31 air stations located throughout the United States and its territories. 

10The Coast Guard recently announced an organizational restructuring that would combine 

marine safety offices and groups into single command structures to be known as sectors. 

The Coast Guard stated that the purpose of this new organizational structure is to 

strengthen unity of command in port, waterway, and coastal areas of operation by specific 

geographic areas of responsibility. According to the Coast Guard, sweeping changes to the 

agency’s operational environment brought about since September 11 reinforce the need for 

these combined commands that will provide an interdependent approach to mission 

accomplishment, a common operating picture, and a focal point for intra-departmental, 

interagency, and other maritime stakeholders. 

11The Coast Guard maintains information, on a program-by-program basis, about how 

resources (assets such as ships, boats, or aircraft) are used to conduct its program 

missions including search and rescue; aids to navigation; defense readiness; other law 

enforcement (foreign fish enforcement); ice operations; marine environmental protection; 

illegal drug interdiction; living marine resources; undocumented migrant interdiction; 

ports, waterways, and coastal security; and marine safety. Each hour that these resources 

are used is called a resource hour. However, resource hours do not include such things as 

the time that the resource stands idle or the time that is spent in maintaining it. Resource 

hours associated with Coast Guard training for personnel and asset maintenance are 

captured in the miscellaneous support category of resource hours. Resource hours also do 

not represent the vast majority of marine safety and marine environmental protection 

efforts carried out by marine safety office personnel as these programs are largely carried 

out without using Coast Guard assets, and there are no similar data for making 

comparisons in the levels of effort. As a result, resource levels and performance results for 

the marine safety and the marine environmental protection programs were not analyzed for 

this report. In addition, the hours reported in the miscellaneous support category are not 

included in the total resource hours analyzed in this report. 
Page 9 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

fixed-wing aircraft)—conducting its programs. The Coast Guard measures 

its performance, that is, what these resource hours and its personnel hours 

accomplish, using a set of performance measures developed in accordance 

with the Government Performance and Results Act. The Coast Guard uses 

these performance measures and their corresponding goals to annually 

track the agency’s progress in attaining its strategic goals. 

Total Coast Guard resource hours devoted to its various programs have 

substantially increased since the terrorist attacks, and a major 

redistribution of these hours has also occurred, as many hours shifted 

from non–homeland security programs to homeland security programs. 

Total Coast Guard resource hours (for boats, ships, and aircraft devoted to 

all programs) increased by 39 percent from a level of about 534,000 

resource hours prior to the terrorist attacks to about 741,000 hours by the 

end of fiscal year 2003.12 Coast Guard officials told us that the addition of 

more ships, boats, and personnel contributed to the overall increase in 

resource hours. In particular, one official noted the acquisition of smaller 

boats as being a contributor to the increase in ports, waterways, and 

coastal security hours in fiscal year 2003. 

As figure 1 shows, homeland security resource hours accounted for all of 

the increase, while total hours for non–homeland security programs 

decreased. 

 12The Coast Guard calculated a resource hour baseline from which the change in resource 

hours since the September 11 attacks can be estimated. This baseline is an average of the 

eight fiscal year quarters preceding September 11, 2001 multiplied by four to put it in terms 

of a full fiscal year. For the purposes of this report, we refer to this calculation as the pre 

September 11 baseline or as pre-September 11 levels. According to Coast Guard officials, 

there is no special significance to this baseline period, other than it represents the 

historical mission activity of the Coast Guard at that period in time. 

Generally, Resource 

Hours Devoted to 

Homeland Security 

Programs Have 

Increased 

Substantially, while 

Hours for Other 

Programs Have 

Decreased 
Page 10 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 1: Total Resource Hours for All Coast Guard Programs 

On a program-by-program basis, there is a marked difference in the degree 

to which resource levels rose or declined. (See fig. 2.) Of the various 

programs, the ports, waterways, and coastal security program saw by far 

the largest increase, over 1,200 percent. Before the September 11 attacks, 

this program was a small component of the Coast Guard, with a baseline 

level of slightly more than 19,000 hours—less than 4 percent of the Coast 

Guard’s overall resource hours.13 By the end of fiscal year 2003, the Coast 

Guard had expended nearly 255,000 resource hours on this mission, 

representing about 34 percent of total resource hours. By contrast, 

 13According to a Coast Guard official, while the ports, waterways, and coastal security 

program did not exist as a separate program prior to September 11, 2001, resource hours 

related to this program’s activities were collected under four categories: port safety, port 

security-military, port security-other, and military operations-peace. The hours from these 

categories were combined after September 11 to make up the pre-September 11 baseline of 

resource hours for what the Coast Guard now defines as the ports, waterways, and coastal 

security program. After September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard began identifying resource 

hours under a ports, waterways, and coastal security program category. 
Page 11 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

resource hours spent during the same period on the illegal drug 

interdiction program declined from slightly less than 123,000 hours to just 

under 70,000 hours, a decrease of 44 percent. (See appendix II for the 

program-by-program trends by year.) 

Figure 2: Percentage Change in Resource Hours, by Program, Pre-September 11 Baseline to Fiscal Year 2003 

Coast Guard officials cited a number of factors that contributed to the 

actual resource hours expended for its programs each year. One key 

factor, noted by several officials, is the impact of unplanned events on 

planned resource hours. For instance, although the agency may have 

planned to spend resource hours in a certain way at the beginning of a 

fiscal year, the actual resource hours expended often reflected the 

unexpected circumstances or events to which the Coast Guard had to 

react in that year. For example, when the nation shifts to an orange, or 

Programs with increasing

resource hours

Non–homeland security programs

Homeland security programs

Ports, waterways, and coastal security

(19,291 to 254,640 hours)

1,200

Up 518

Up 81

Up 44

Down -2

Down -16

Down -22

Down -26

Down -44

-200 0 200 400 600

Programs with decreasing

resource hours

Defense readiness

(6,446 to 39,853 hours)

Undocumented migrant interdiction

(29,642 to 53,559 hours)

Ice operations

(11,935 to 17,217 hours)

Aids to navigation

(112,148 to 110,456 hours)

Foreign fish enforcement

(7,953 to 6,712 hours)

Search and rescue

(82,689 to 64,383 hours)

Living marine resources

(91,255 to 67,576 hours)

Illegal drug interdiction

(122,694 to 69,268 hours)

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard resource hour data.

Up 1,220

-100 100 300 500 700 1,100 1,300

Percent change
Page 12 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

high-alert, status,14 the Coast Guard concentrates more of its resources on 

security-related activities than initially planned. Severe weather, such as 

hurricanes, can also cause shifts away from planned resource use to 

spending time repositioning navigation markers that shift from their 

proper locations as a result of storms. The war in Iraq is another example 

of where resource hours shifted from planned usage when the Coast 

Guard deployed assets—11 ships, 24 boats, 2 aircraft, and 1,195 personnel 

in all—to the Persian Gulf; yet when the fiscal year 2003 budget was 

developed, the Coast Guard had anticipated using these assets for other 

programs. 

The Coast Guard’s Commandant noted that reductions in resource hours 

did not necessarily reflect changes in the agency’s program emphasis. For 

example, while resource hours devoted to the search and rescue program 

declined, this program remained a top agency priority. Coast Guard 

officials suggested that the decline in resource hours for this program was 

due to three key factors. First, search and rescue is largely demand driven, 

and as a result, its hours largely reflect the number of incidents referred to 

the Coast Guard for action. The Coast Guard received fewer distress calls; 

therefore, resource hours decreased. Second, Successful preventive efforts 

such as fishing vessel safety examinations and boating safety classes may 

have prevented mariners from getting into distress—again, resulting in 

fewer distress calls to the Coast Guard. Third, Coast Guard boats were 

more frequently on security patrols, and as a result, these boats were 

sometimes closer to the search and rescue incident and thus could 

respond more quickly. 

 14According to a Coast Guard official, the Maritime Security Condition System (MARSEC) 

alerts all Coast Guard components of any perceived threats or risk to various Coast Guard 

ports or a particular industry. MARSEC 1 is equivalent to the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Advisory System’s (HSAS) threat level green (low risk of terrorist attack), blue 

(guarded or general risk of terrorist attack), and yellow (elevated or significant risk of 

terrorist attack). MARSEC 2 is equivalent to HSAS orange (high risk of terrorist attack) and 

MARSEC 3 is equivalent to HSAS red (severe risk of terrorist attack). In fiscal years 2001, 

2002 and 2003, higher security levels existed for 19 days, 73 days, and 90 days, respectively. 
Page 13 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

For the period we examined, the Coast Guard’s performance results for 

the eight programs we reviewed remained either largely unchanged or 

improved. In addition, in fiscal year 2003, most of the programs also met 

their pre-established performance targets.15 Still, some caution is needed in 

interpreting the Coast Guard’s performance results because of limitations 

in some of the performance measures. 

Of the eight programs we reviewed for performance,16 four showed 

relatively stable performance results, although some minor fluctuations 

existed. For example, one of the stable programs, search and rescue, 

which measures its results as the percentage of lives saved each year, 

varied only a few percentage points from a low of 84.2 percent in fiscal 

year 2001 to a high of 87.7 percent in fiscal year 2003. Three programs 

(foreign fish enforcement, aids to navigation, and defense readiness), 

demonstrated improved results when comparing fiscal year 2001 and fiscal 

year 2003, although their results fluctuated a little within this period.17 We 

were unable to assess the results of the remaining program—illegal drug 

interdiction—because its performance results for fiscal year 2003 were not 

yet available at the time we did our analysis. (See table 2.) Appendix III 

provides a detailed summary of the performance results for all programs. 

 15According to GPRA, performance results are defined as the outcome of direct products 

and services delivered by a program. Performance targets or goals are defined as a set of 

annual goals that establish the agency’s intended performance, stating a particular level of 

performance in either an absolute value or as a targeted level of improvement. 

16We did not analyze detailed performance results for the marine safety and marine 

environmental protection programs because we were unable to obtain complete 

information on the resource hours for these programs; therefore, we had no basis for 

comparing resource levels with performance results. However, the performance results for 

the marine safety program for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 showed that there were 1,651 and 

1,459 maritime injuries and fatalities in those years, respectively. Marine safety program 

performance results for fiscal year 2003 were not available at the time we completed our 

work. The marine environmental protection program had not yet developed a performance 

measure in fiscal year 2001, but its results for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 respectively 

showed that there were 43.3 and 29.4 spills (oil spills over 100 gallons and chemical spills) 

per 100 million tons of oil and chemicals shipped. 

17For the purposes of this report, we were most interested in comparing performance 

results for our baseline year—fiscal year 2001—with the most currently available results—

fiscal year 2003. As a result, we defined programs as “stable” or “improved” based on the 

known results for these two years. All programs defined as “stable” showed a differential of 

less than 4 percentage points when comparing fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2003 results. 

Performance Results 

Remained Largely 

Unchanged or 

Improved for the 

Eight Programs We 

Assessed 

All Assessed Programs 

Had Stable or Improved 

Performance Results 
Page 14 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Table 2: Performance Results by Program from Fiscal Year 2001 through Fiscal Year 2003 

 Performance results by fiscal year

Program Performance measure 2001 2002 2003

Stable results 

Undocumented migrant interdiction Percentage of interdicted illegal migrants entering the 

United States through maritime means 

82.5% 88.3% 85.3%

Ice operations Number of waterway closure days 7 7 7

Living marine resources Percentage of fishermen found in compliance with 

regulations 

98.6% 97.3% 97.1%

Search and rescue Percentage of distressed mariners’ lives saved 84.2% 84.4% 87.7%

Improving results 

Foreign fish enforcement Number of detected Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)a

incursions by foreign fishing vessels 

219 250 153

Aids to navigation Number of collisions, allisions,b and groundings 1,677 1,936 1,523

Defense readiness Percentage of time units meet combat readiness status at 

C-2 levelc 

67% 70% 78%

Pending results 

Illegal drug interdiction Percentage of cocaine seized out of total estimated 

cocaine entering the United States through maritime 

meansd

11.7% 10.6% NAe

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard performance data. 

a

The EEZ is defined by the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act as 

an area within 200 miles of U.S. shores in which U.S. citizens have primary harvesting rights to fish 

stocks. 

b

The Coast Guard defines an “allision” as a vessel collision with a fixed object. 

c

According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as the level at which each unit 

possesses the resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is 

organized or designed. 

d

The illegal drug interdiction performance measure only includes cocaine as cocaine has an analyzed 

flow rate, and it constitutes the preponderance of illegal drugs entering the United States through 

maritime means (that is, cocaine shipments are measured in tons while heroin, marijuana, and other 

illegal drugs are measured in pounds). 

e

The illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year 2003 will not be calculated until the 

Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM) publishes its flow rate in spring of 2004. 

Another way that the Coast Guard assesses its performance is by 

determining whether programs have achieved their performance targets 

each year. These targets—which represent the goals that the programs aim 

to achieve each year—were met in fiscal year 2003 by five of the eight 

Most Assessed Programs 

Also Met Their 

Performance Targets 
Page 15 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

programs we reviewed.18 (See table 3.) Two of the programs that did not 

meet their performance targets were defense readiness and undocumented 

migrant interdiction. Coast Guard officials reported that the defense 

readiness program did not meet its target, in part, because of equipment 

problems associated with operating aging ships, and unit training 

deficiencies, such as cutters not having sufficient training time to perform 

gunnery exercises.19 As for the undocumented migrant interdiction 

program, Coast Guard officials reported that they consider their results to 

be a minimal decline in light of the substantial increase in the number of 

migrants they successfully interdicted during the year.20 For example, of 

the key migrant populations tracked by the Coast Guard, about 5,300 

illegal migrants were interdicted in fiscal year 2003 compared with about 

2,400 in fiscal year 2002, an increase of 120 percent.21 We could not 

determine whether the remaining program, illegal drug interdiction, met 

its performance target because the performance results for fiscal year 2003 

were not yet available at the time we conducted our work. (See app. III for 

a detailed summary of the performance targets and results for all 

programs.) 

 18The marine environmental protection program also met its performance target in fiscal 

year 2003 but was not included in our analysis. Also, since the marine safety program does 

not yet have performance results for fiscal year 2003, discussing its target is not relevant 

here. 

19According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as the level at which each 

unit possesses the resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime missions for 

which it is organized or designed. 

20The undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure indicates the percentage of 

migrants interdicted or deterred from entering the United States via maritime routes. More 

specifically, it is the number of interdicted migrants divided by the estimated flow of 

undocumented migrants (which includes the number of law enforcement interdictions, 

known successful migrant arrivals, and the estimated number of migrants deterred from 

leaving their countries of origin). This estimate is prepared annually by the Coast Guard’s 

Intelligence Coordination Center. 

21According to the Coast Guard, the 2002 and 2003 illegal migrant numbers stated here 

include only those counted in the undocumented migrant performance measure, which 

uses the following four migrant populations, Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the 

People’s Republic of China. The total number of all migrants interdicted in fiscal years 2002 

and 2003 were 4,104 and 6,054 respectively. 
Page 16 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Table 3: Performance Targets by Program for Fiscal Year 2003 

Program Fiscal year 2003 performance targets 

Fiscal year 2003 

result 

Target met in fiscal year 

2003?

Undocumented migrant 

interdiction 

Interdict or deter at least 87 percent of 

illegal migrants entering the United States 

through maritime means 85.3% No 

Illegal drug interdiction Seize 20.7 percent or more of cocaine 

entering the United States through maritime 

means To be determineda

 To be determineda

Ice operations Limit waterway closures to 8 days during 

severe winters 7 days Yes 

Living marine resources Raise percentage of fishermen found in 

compliance with regulations to 97 percent 

or above 97.1% Yes 

Search and rescue Save at least 85 percent of all mariners in 

distress 87.7% Yes 

Foreign fish enforcement Reduce number of detected EEZ incursions 

by foreign fishing vessels to 202 or less 153 incursions Yes 

Aids to navigation Reduce five-year average of collisions, 

allisions, and groundings (CAGs) to 2,010 

or less 1,523 CAGs Yes 

Defense readiness Maintain an overall combat readiness status 

at C-2 level or better for 100 percent of 

assets 78% No 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard performance data. 

a

The illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year 2003 will not be available until spring of 

2004. 

While the Coast Guard has been recognized in the past for its performance 

measurement efforts,22 Coast Guard officials also recognize that, as is true 

for all organizations, continual improvements are needed in their 

measures, and they are working toward these enhancements. And while 

the Coast Guard’s performance for the majority of its programs was 

 22In recent years, the Coast Guard has been publicly recognized in several forums for its 

performance efforts including receiving one of the highest grades of 20 agencies identified 

by the Clinton administration as having a high impact on the American public. The Coast 

Guard was one of two agencies that received an agency grade of A in the Government 

Performance Project grading system—compiled by journalists from Government Executive 

and academics from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse 

University—and it was one of two agencies that received an A for managing for results. The 

criteria for managing for results included engaging in results-oriented strategic planning; 

measuring progress toward results and accomplishments; using results for policymaking, 

management, and evaluation of progress; and communicating results to stakeholders. 

Continuing Efforts Are 

Under Way to Strengthen 

Performance Measures 
Page 17 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

favorable in fiscal year 2003, there are reasons to be cautious in 

interpreting these results. That is, Coast Guard officials acknowledged that 

limitations exist in the measures and efforts are under way to improve 

their clarity and objectivity.23 Coast Guard officials provided the following 

illustrative examples: 

• Some measures do not currently distinguish among critical factors—such 

as how certain items are weighted—within the measure. For example, 

Coast Guard officials stated that the foreign fish enforcement performance 

measure—which counts the number of times foreign fishing vessels are 

identified as illegally entering into the United States Exclusive Economic 

Zone (EEZ)—does not distinguish the severity of each entry. As a result, a 

single fisherman in a small boat catching a few fish in the Western Pacific 

is weighted equally with a large foreign trawler in Alaskan waters that is 

harvesting fish by the tons. Each of these events would be counted as one 

incursion even though their impact could be significantly different. The 

Coast Guard is currently reevaluating the Fisheries Enforcement Strategic 

Plan to address this issue. 

• Some measures are affected by fluctuations in demand; thus, the results 

may not directly reflect agency efforts. For example, the foreign fish 

enforcement performance measure—which counts the number of EEZ 

incursions by foreign fishing vessels—can be affected by oceanic and 

climatic shifts that can cause significant fluctuations in the migratory 

patterns of fish. As a result, EEZ encroachments could increase (or 

decrease) as fishermen follow their intended catch across EEZ boundaries 

(or stay within their own territories), depending on where the fish are 

located. According to Coast Guard officials, this type of migratory factor 

can influence the number of encroachments in a given year, and they are 

reviewing issues such as these to refine the measure. They plan to have a 

revised target in early 2004. 

• Coast Guard officials reported that some measures might have inaccurate 

estimates that affect the quality of the measure. For example, the 

undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure contains 

estimated information, such as the number of illegal migrants entering the 

 23Clarity issues relate to whether data in the measure could be confusing or misleading to 

users; objectivity issues relate to whether the performance assessment may be 

systematically over- or understated. 
Page 18 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

United States.24 As a result, the Coast Guard reported that the estimated 

number of potential migrants, which is a key part of this performance 

measure, might contain significant error. Coast Guard officials explained 

that they are working to strengthen this measure, in part through an 

external program evaluation that will be completed by the summer of 

2004. At this time, however, they believe their current measure is the best 

available. 

• Some performance measures rely on the Coast Guard’s presence or direct 

observation of events. A change in Coast Guard presence could skew 

results for these indicators. For example, an increased Coast Guard 

presence in a fishing area could result in more incursions being observed, 

and a decreased presence could result in fewer observations. To the 

extent such factors come into play, the results may be inaccurate. For 

example, the number of incursions might not have increased or decreased, 

but instead the Coast Guard simply had greater or lesser ability to identify 

them. The Coast Guard has acknowledged that some of its measures are 

subject to these weaknesses and directed its field personnel to be mindful 

of these issues in its planning guidance. 

One measure—for illegal drug interdiction—was recently refined and 

illustrates how the Coast Guard can improve upon and incorporate better 

performance measures into this refinement process. The illegal drug 

interdiction performance measure was recently reevaluated because the 

former measure—cocaine seizure rates—did not adequately account for 

cocaine thrown overboard or destroyed by smugglers. Consequently, the 

Coast Guard changed its illegal drug interdiction performance measure for 

fiscal year 2004 to measure the cocaine removal rate—a measure that 

includes not only the cocaine seized but also cocaine that was jettisoned 

or lost. Coast Guard officials stated that the new measure, which 

encompasses both the cocaine lost to the smuggler (through seizures, 

jettison, burning, and other non-recoverable events) as well as the cocaine 

seized, will more accurately reflect the Coast Guard’s counterdrug efforts 

and results. 

 24The Coast Guard reported that the number of illegal migrants entering the United States is 

an estimated flow number generated by the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center 

and Immigration and Naturalization Services. And, according to the Coast Guard, because 

of the speculative nature of the information used, and the secretive nature of illegal 

migration, particularly where professional smuggling organizations are involved, the 

estimated potential flow of migrants may contain significant error. 
Page 19 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

While resource hours changed substantially for some programs between 

fiscal years 2001 and 2003, their corresponding performance results did 

not necessarily reflect the direction of these changes. In particular, 

performance remained stable for four programs even though resources 

increased for two and decreased for the other two. This suggests that 

performance results were likely affected by factors other than usage of 

these resources. One set of factors, cited by the Coast Guard as helping to 

keep performance steady in some programs despite decreases in 

resources, involves strategies such as using new technology, better tactics 

and operations, and stronger partnering with other agencies. Coast Guard 

officials also pointed to a set of other factors, often called externalities, 

which are largely beyond its control but have the ability to negatively 

affect performance results despite resource increases. For the Coast 

Guard, such externalities include such developments as an increase in the 

number of immigrants seeking to enter the country by sea and 

unpredictable or severe weather conditions. The Coast Guard has a variety 

of initiatives under way to better measure resource usage and manage 

program results. However, many of these initiatives are still in early stages 

of development and some do not have a time frame for their completion. 

In addition, the Coast Guard does not have a systematic framework that 

would allow it to better understand how the various factors are affecting 

the link between resources and performance. As we have reported in the 

past, agencies that understand the linkage between expended resources 

and performance results are better able to allocate and manage their 

resources effectively. 

For most of the Coast Guard programs we reviewed, there was no clear 

relationship between the change in resource hours from pre-September 11 

levels to fiscal year 2003 levels and the performance results reported for 

the program between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. One might expect that a 

significant change in resource hours over time would result in a 

corresponding change in performance results. However, for most of the 

seven programs we reviewed with complete performance results in fiscal 

year 2003, this was not the case.25 For example, the four programs with 

stable performance results were evenly divided—two (undocumented 

migrant interdiction and ice operations) had increased resource hours of 

 25The ports, waterways, and coastal security program does not yet have a performance 

measure, the illegal drug interdiction and marine safety programs’ performance results 

have not yet been calculated for fiscal year 2003, and we did not analyze performance 

results for the marine environmental protection program. 

More Systematic 

Understanding of 

Resource Usage and 

Performance Results 

Is Important for 

Management and 

Accountability 

Coast Guard Officials Cite 

Various Factors Affecting 

Consistency between 

Expended Resources and 

Results Achieved 
Page 20 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

at least 44 percent, and two (living marine resources and search and 

rescue) had decreased resource hours of at least 22 percent. Similarly, of 

the remaining three programs, two (foreign fish enforcement and aids to 

navigation) had improved results despite decreases in their resource 

hours. The only program with consistent direction of movement between 

its resource hours and performance results was the defense readiness 

program, which had improved results and a 518 percent resource hour 

increase. 

Coast Guard officials acknowledged the apparent disconnect between 

resource hours expended and performance results achieved and offered 

two types of explanations for it. The first involved operational 

efficiencies—strategies that essentially allowed the Coast Guard to 

accomplish the same or greater results with fewer resources. These 

efficiencies were of four main types—improved technology, improved 

tactics, stronger partnerships, and improved intelligence. A limited sample 

of these efficiencies, described by Coast Guard officials during our visits 

to Coast Guard districts, is highlighted in table 4, and additional 

efficiencies are discussed in more detail in appendix IV. Many of these 

efficiencies stemmed from internal changes within the Coast Guard, such 

as using new equipment, a different procedure, or a new organizational 

alignment to do a task more quickly. However, some of the efficiencies, 

particularly those related to partnerships, involved the use of non-Coast 

Guard resources as well. 
Page 21 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Table 4: Selected Examples of Operational Efficiencies Cited by Coast Guard Officials 

Improved technology New ships. The recapitalization of the buoy tender fleet offers a number of improvements, including greater 

transit speed, reducing travel time and allowing more work to be done in a day; a larger buoy deck, allowing 

the completion of more work during a single deployment and fewer trips back to base; and improved 

navigation systems, enabling safer navigation with fewer people. 

Different lighting for navigation aids. In its aids to navigation program and in other aspects of its operations, 

the Coast Guard now uses lanterns with light emitting diodes (LEDs). Using LEDs results in fewer and 

quicker service visits, freeing time for other work. 

Improved data-monitoring system. Coast Guard officials stated that the National Marine Fisheries Service’s 

Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) helped to improve their operational efficiency in protecting United States 

fisheries. The Coast Guard leveraged this technology—which monitors fishing vessel information such as 

the vessel’s name, catch data, and location—and used it in conjunction with industry intelligence and efforts 

to work more closely with federal and state enforcement partners. Although not yet fully operational, 

according to the Coast Guard, the system was responsible for 7 of the 97 significant violations detected in 

fiscal year 2003. 

Improved tactics Use of armed helicopters. The Coast Guard reported that the Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron 

(HITRON) provides personnel, training, and resources necessary to employ armed helicopters in support of 

counter drug operations. Prior to November 2002, the Coast Guard used two armed helicopters 

simultaneously with two cutters when responding to drug interdiction operations. The Coast Guard has 

since changed its tactics to use one HITRON with one cutter per operation and has seen no degradation in 

the effectiveness of this drug interdiction tactic. 

Use of helicopters for at-sea boardings. One Coast Guard district identified a procedure whereby it uses 

helicopters rather than ships to conduct at-sea boardings of vessels of interest bound for United States 

ports. Doing so allows Coast Guard boarding personnel to reach their destination more quickly—for 

example, in 30 minutes rather than 2 or 3 hours. The time that the helicopters are in use is incorporated into 

the mandatory training schedule, resulting in no additional usage of air resources and a decrease in ship 

hours for this purpose. 

Stronger partnerships Interagency flight schedules. In Miami, the Coast Guard and another Department of Homeland Security 

agency, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement office have developed a combined flight schedule to 

integrate patrol schedules and assets, which has led to less overlap in response efforts, saving time and 

resources for both agencies. 

Coast Guard/police department partnership. The Coast Guard and the New York Police Department 

(NYPD) have a formalized partnership, and officials of the two organizations communicate several times 

daily on a variety of topics. They also often participate in joint training and first responder exercises. This 

partnership with NYPD adds significant communication and intelligence networks as well as a large number 

of additional assets to the Coast Guard’s capabilities in New York. 

Improved intelligence Intelligence-sharing arrangements. In 2001, the Coast Guard joined the United States Intelligence 

Community, a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together 

in intelligence-gathering activities. According to Coast Guard officials, this step greatly enhances the 

agency’s access to information. 

New intelligence centers. Created in 2003, one Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center is located on each 

coast. These centers increase collection and analytical capabilities, enhancing the Coast Guard’s ability to 

fuse intelligence from various sources and improving the timeliness and quality of theater-level intelligence 

support to Coast Guard operational forces. 

Source: Coast Guard. 

The second type of explanation provided by Coast Guard officials involved 

externalities—events or developments that were largely beyond the Coast 

Guard’s control but had an influence on the amount of work the Coast 
Page 22 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Guard had to confront. In fiscal year 2003, these factors included such 

things as “surge” demands, related to the Iraq War; a large increase in the 

number of undocumented migrants attempting to enter the United States 

by maritime routes, and poor weather conditions that increased 

icebreaking needs. According to Coast Guard officials, these externalities 

had a negative effect on performance results—that is, they made it more 

difficult for the Coast Guard to meet its goals, even when more resources 

were added. In the case of ice operations, because the Great Lakes region 

had one of the most “severe” winters it has experienced in the past 50 

years and unpredicted amounts of ice formed ahead of forecasted dates, 

icebreaking needs in this region were higher than normal in fiscal year 

2003. Despite this, the Coast Guard was still able to meet its performance 

goal in fiscal year 2003. However, according to Coast Guard officials, 

externalities were a factor in not meeting its goal for undocumented 

migrant interdiction because of the very large increase in illegal 

immigrants seeking to enter the United States by sea during fiscal year 

2003. 

While the factors cited by the Coast Guard likely have an effect on mission 

performance, the extent of that effect is largely unknown. Our site visits 

suggested that the efficiency factors cited by Coast Guard officials likely 

had positive effects on the agency’s performance by improving its 

effectiveness and productivity. For example, Coast Guard officials 

acknowledge that local authorities such as police and fire departments 

have assumed some of the Coast Guard’s search and rescue workload. 

Likewise, our site visits suggested that the various externalities cited by 

Coast Guard officials could have negatively affected the performance of 

some missions as well. For example, as noted, the Coast Guard did not 

meet its undocumented migrant interdiction program’s fiscal year 2003 

performance target of interdicting or deterring 87 percent of the illegal 

migrants entering the United States by sea. Coast Guard officials identified 

the significant increase in migrants attempting to enter the United States 

in fiscal year 2003 (an externality that the Coast Guard has no control 

over) as one factor that contributed to the program missing its goal. 

However, the Coast Guard does not have a mechanism in place to 

systematically determine the extent to which either of these factors affects 

performance. For instance, it does not have data on the search and rescue 

cases handled by local responders and, therefore, is unable to determine 

the extent to which this assistance has reduced the workloads of small 

boat stations. 

Coast Guard Lacks Clear 

Understanding of Extent to 

Which These Factors 

Affect Results 
Page 23 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Accounting for the effects of such factors can be a difficult task. In past 

work, we have examined the efforts of a number of agencies to understand 

and assess the many factors that influence their performance results as a 

basis for better allocating and managing their resources.26 Like the Coast 

Guard, other federal agencies face the challenge of having limited control 

over the achievement of their intended objectives. In past work, we have 

found that when various federal agencies attempted to assess 

performance, their greatest challenge in the analysis and reporting stage of 

the performance review process was separating a program’s impact on its 

objectives from the impact of external factors, primarily because the 

program’s objectives were the result of complex systems or phenomena 

outside the program’s control. Thus, it is not surprising that the Coast 

Guard would have difficulty in attempting to account more precisely for 

the effects of these various factors, both internal and external. 

Our reviews of various efforts to address these analytic challenges showed 

that agencies employed a wide range of strategies to respond to them. For 

example, some broke out data on subgroups or made statistical 

adjustments to attempt to reduce the influence of external factors on their 

measures. While there is no simple or standard approach, best practices 

suggest that managers should stay alert to the many factors—both inside 

and outside their organizations—that can influence their ability to achieve 

their goals. The successful organizations we studied tracked and 

monitored their internal and external environments continuously and 

systematically. By building environmental assessment into the strategic 

planning process, organizations can stay focused on their long-term goals 

even as they make changes in the way they intend to achieve them. An 

ability to understand the effects of these various factors is also important 

in helping Coast Guard managers and the Congress make informed 

decisions about resource needs. 

The Coast Guard’s ability to evaluate its resource needs is also affected by 

the lack of data about resource usage in two of its programs—marine 

safety and marine environmental protection. While the Coast Guard 

collects some resource hour data for these programs, the vast majority of 

 26U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 

Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996); U.S. General 

Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance 

(GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 1997); and U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for 

Results: Measuring Program Results That Are under Limited Federal Control 

(GAO/GGD-99-16). 
Page 24 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

time dedicated to these two programs is not captured because these are 

people-intensive rather than asset-intensive programs, and the Coast 

Guard lacks a data collection mechanism for capturing these hours. More 

specifically, these programs may involve Coast Guard personnel 

conducting a facility inspection or responding to an oil spill in a marina—

activities that often do not involve using Coast Guard ships, boats or 

aircraft. This “information deficit” became particularly significant after 

September 11 when the Coast Guard undertook significant additional port 

security responsibilities under the ports, waterways, and coastal security 

program. Coast Guard officials have acknowledged that resource hour 

shifts occurred from the marine safety and marine environmental 

programs to the ports, waterways, and coastal security program. However, 

they are generally unable to estimate the total effort dedicated to these 

programs or determine the level of resources the agency is likely to need 

to maintain program performance levels. In addition, to help meet its new 

responsibilities in the ports, waterways, and coastal security program, the 

Coast Guard issued guidance to its field units authorizing the suspension 

of certain marine safety and marine environmental protection program 

requirements. For example, Coast Guard units were given the flexibility to 

not perform lower-priority vessel boardings and to reduce the frequency of 

certain vessel inspections. They were also directed to leverage state and 

local agencies to respond to small spills to the maximum extent possible. 

While the guidance indicates that the marine safety office personnel 

should use risk-based decision making in implementing these types of 

measures, and negative impacts from these actions have not yet become 

evident, the potential effects of such reductions on future program 

performance could become a concern. 

Coast Guard officials agreed there is value in taking a more systematic 

approach to assessing performance, including better understanding of the 

effects of internal and external factors that affect their performance. As a 

result, the agency has begun a number of steps directed at improving 

various aspects of performance assessment. Many of these steps are still in 

their early stages, and while they represent a good beginning, it is not yet 

clear when they will be completed and whether they will tie together to 

address the weaknesses we have identified. 

One step the Coast Guard has begun involves addressing the information 

gaps that currently exist regarding resource usage in the marine safety 

office programs, but the time frame for completing these projects is 

unknown. Specific actions under way that are expected to improve 

information about the level of Coast Guard personnel hours dedicated to 

Coast Guard Has Started 

Efforts to Better 

Understand Effects of 

Internal and External 

Factors, but Impact Is 

Uncertain 
Page 25 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

various programs include measuring the personnel overtime hours for 

certain programs, and a survey of Coast Guard units to assess how 

personnel hours were reallocated within the programs after September 11. 

In addition to making these efforts, the Coast Guard also recently 

estimated the marine safety office personnel hours it believes will be 

necessary to implement its new port security responsibilities—a positive 

step toward determining what its resource needs are likely to be in order 

to successfully implement these requirements.27 The Coast Guard has also 

begun a broader effort to develop a system for tracking personnel hours at 

marine safety offices and related units. Development of this system is 

currently in a pilot stage, and Coast Guard officials did not know when it 

might be implemented Coast Guard–wide. As a result, the Coast Guard 

currently remains unable to account for the vast majority of the hours 

dedicated to two programs—marine safety and marine environmental 

protection, and this is a concern considering that together these programs 

account for 11 percent of the fiscal year 2004 enacted operating budget. 

In addition to obtaining a better understanding of how resources are used 

to produce results, the Coast Guard has also made some program-specific 

efforts to better manage and allocate resources. In the illegal drug 

interdiction program, the Coast Guard has taken steps to better quantify 

the effect of specific operational strategies on performance results. By 

examining successful drug seizures, the Coast Guard has been able to 

determine how it is getting the most results. For example: 

• Stationing Coast Guard personnel aboard Navy ships. According to 

Coast Guard officials, certain Coast Guard law enforcement units 

operating aboard navy ships (including those from the United States, the 

United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium) were responsible for 

58 percent of the Coast Guard’s cocaine seizures in fiscal year 2003. 

• Using armed instead of unarmed helicopters. Use of armed helicopters 

was deemed an effective approach for the drug interdiction program, as 

Coast Guard officials determined that these helicopters could more 

effectively deter drug smugglers from escaping. According to the Coast 

 27Responsibilities that are required under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 

(P. L. 107-295, November 25, 2002). 
Page 26 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Guard, this strategy accounted for 34 percent of cocaine seizures in fiscal 

year 2003.28

These specific efforts are noteworthy, but there is no indication that 

efforts such as these are occurring across the broad range of Coast Guard 

missions. Coast Guard officials were unable to identify similar actions 

across all programs to quantify operational strategies and establish more 

systematic linkages between resources expended and performance 

achieved. 

Separate from these program-specific efforts, the Coast Guard is beginning 

an agency-wide strategic planning effort to better assess linkages between 

the agency’s strategic goals and mission programs and the agency’s overall 

strategic intent. Specific actions involve data collection and development 

of analytical models and decision support systems. Table 5 shows some of 

the specific actions. If properly designed and implemented, such actions 

should help the Coast Guard with its long-term strategic planning and its 

ability to make connections between the agency’s resources and 

performance. Again, however, whether these efforts will address the 

weaknesses we identified or result in reliable means to link resources 

expended with performance achieved is unknown, since most of the 

efforts have just begun or are in progress. 

 28According to a Coast Guard official, the results obtained from these two strategies (law 

enforcement units on navy ships and armed helicopters) are not mutually exclusive. In 

some cases, these two strategies worked in tandem, so there is some overlap in the seizure 

results. 
Page 27 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Table 5: Selected Examples of Actions Under Way to Improve Linkages between Resources and Performance Results 

Mission cost model Designed to capture mission operating costs on a program-by-program basis, this model 

allows the Coast Guard to calculate the operating expenses (including the direct costs, 

support costs, and overhead costs) associated with each program. 

Readiness management system This Coast Guard–wide system, currently under development, is designed to assess the 

agency’s ability to respond to mission requirements in accordance with standards. This 

system will assess six facets of readiness: people, training, equipment, supplies, 

infrastructure, and information. 

Analysis of long-term strategic planning 

needs 

The Coast Guard is using a “scenario planning” approach to analyze its future long-term 

strategic planning needs. Called Project Evergreen, it involves developing “alternative 

future world scenarios,” developing strategies for addressing these future scenarios, and 

determining potential resource needs. 

Model for examining maritime 

operations 

This computer model was designed to help the Coast Guard address the complexities of 

the deepwater maritime environment as the agency assessed its core needs for the 

Integrated Deepwater System, a 30-year, $17 billion acquisition program. It simulates the 

core functions of the Coast Guard’s maritime operations, analyzes alternative 

approaches, and projects performance results derived from adding and subtracting 

different asset combinations from its vessel and aircraft fleets. 

Source: Coast Guard. 

In discussions with us, the Coast Guard has not clearly articulated a 

strategy for how these various efforts will weave together. However, Coast 

Guard officials told us that more information regarding these efforts will 

be included in the agency’s strategic blueprint. 

The Coast Guard, like other federal agencies, needs to continue 

transforming itself into a more efficient, results-oriented organization if it 

is to meet the many fiscal, management, and policy challenges it is likely 

to face. At present, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic approach for 

explaining the relationship between its expenditure of resources and its 

performance results, limiting its ability to critically examine its resource 

needs and prioritize program efforts. Its new steps to improve the tracking 

of resource usage and assessment of external factors that may also have a 

bearing on its ability to meet performance goals are laudable, though it is 

still too early to determine the effect they will have. However, there is 

currently no assurance that such efforts will give the Coast Guard a 

systematic means to effectively understand and link resources expended 

with performance achieved. Without a clear understanding of this linkage 

or a time frame to ensure that it gets completed, the agency is at risk of 

misdirecting resources and missing further opportunities to increase 

productivity and efficiency to ensure the best use of its funds. 

In our view, the Coast Guard needs to be clearer about two matters: how 

soon it will be able to have comprehensive program-by-program data 

Conclusions 
Page 28 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

about how its personnel spend their time, and how the many actions under 

way in its agency-wide strategic planning effort can collectively be used to 

establish clearer links between resources and performance. With regard to 

the first point, the Coast Guard’s project for tracking personnel time is 

currently in the pilot stage and has no time frame for completion. With 

regard to the second point, the agency’s strategic blueprint, which is a 

likely place for explaining how the Coast Guard will go about analyzing 

the relationship between resources and results, is still in development. 

Action on both fronts is necessary to provide information that allows the 

Coast Guard to manage more effectively and the Congress to balance the 

Coast Guard’s resource needs against those of other agencies and 

programs at a time when our nation’s financial condition and fiscal 

outlook are sobering. 

To provide the Coast Guard and the Congress with critical information 

necessary for an efficient and effective allocation of resources, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 

Commandant of the Coast Guard to: 

• develop a time frame for expeditiously proceeding with plans for 

implementing a system that will accurately account for resources 

expended in each of its program areas, and 

• ensure that the Coast Guard’s strategic planning process and its associated 

documents include a strategy for (1) identifying intervening factors that 

may affect program performance and (2) systematically assessing the 

relationship between these factors, resources used, and results achieved. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security 

and the Coast Guard for their review and comment. The Coast Guard 

generally agreed with the facts and recommendations presented in the 

report. Coast Guard officials provided a number of technical clarifications, 

which we incorporated to ensure the accuracy of our report. Neither the 

Department of Homeland Security nor the Coast Guard took a formal 

position on GAO’s recommendations. In its response, the Coast Guard 

raised two points that merit specific responses. The Coast Guard believes 

that early in the report, GAO does not fully consider the changing 

environment in which the Coast Guard operates, and how this affects the 

resources used and results achieved. We believe that we addressed this 

issue fully later on in the report where we outline a number of intervening 

factors and externalities that could have affected the agency’s 

performance results. In addition, although the Coast Guard generally 

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 
Page 29 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

agreed with our recommendations, the agency believes that its 

multimission nature poses a higher degree of difficulty for the agency to 

implement these recommendations. We recognize this added challenge, 

but we do not believe that it mitigates the Coast Guard’s responsibility to 

take these steps. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security and the Commandant of the 

Coast Guard. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (415) 904-2200. Other contacts and acknowledgments are listed in 

appendix V. 

Margaret T. Wrightson 

Director, Homeland Security 

 and Justice Issues 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 30 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

To determine the trends in resource hours for each Coast Guard program 

following the September 11 terrorist attacks, we reviewed our previous 

report and resource hour data from the Coast Guard’s Abstract of 

Operations (AOPS), and the Coast Guard’s Aviation Logistics and 

Maintenance Information System (ALMIS). The resource hour data, 

reported by crews of cutters, boats, and aircraft, represents the hours that 

these assets spent in each of the Coast Guard’s program areas. We 

analyzed resource hour data from fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. We 

then compared the fiscal year 2003 data with a pre-September 11 resource 

hour baseline level developed by the Coast Guard. This baseline is 

calculated by determining the average of the eight quarters of resource 

hour data from fiscal year 1999 quarter 4 through fiscal year 2001 

quarter 3 and then multiplying this quarterly average by four to obtain a 

full year’s average. We recognize that there is an overlap between the preSeptember 11 baseline data and some of the fiscal year 2001 data. 

However, because the comparisons we made were between the baseline 

and fiscal year 2003 data we were not concerned that this overlap would 

affect our results or our ability to meet our objectives. To determine the 

reliability of the data, we (1) reviewed existing documentation about the 

data and the systems that produced them, and (2) interviewed 

knowledgeable agency officials. We determined that the data was 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. However, we did not 

analyze resource hour data for the marine environmental protection, 

marine safety, or the other law enforcement programs. We did not analyze 

the resource hour data for marine safety and marine environmental 

protection programs because these programs are largely carried out 

without using Coast Guard assets, and thus the vast majority of effort 

related to these programs is not captured in AOPS or ALMIS. And 

furthermore, there are no data available that would allow us to make 

similar comparisons in the levels of effort for these programs. In addition, 

the Coast Guard reported that a surge in resource hours for the other law 

enforcement program (hours that were not related to foreign fish 

enforcement), was the result of a misinterpretation of port security 

activities, and as a result, we did not analyze changes in hours specifically 

related to the other law enforcement program. 

We reviewed the resource hour data for the remaining programs—search 

and rescue; aids to navigation; defense readiness; foreign fish 

enforcement; ice operations; illegal drug interdiction; living marine 

resources; undocumented migrant interdiction; and ports, waterways, and 

coastal security—to identify how resources were utilized across programs 

both before and after September 11. In addition, we also spoke with 

officials at Coast Guard headquarters and at the Atlantic Area Command in 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Portsmouth, Virginia, and in various Coast Guard district offices and 

operational units in Boston, Portsmouth, Miami, New Orleans, and Seattle, 

as well as personnel at operational units under these district commands. 

To identify changes in performance results compared with increases or 

decreases in resource hours, we analyzed the Coast Guard’s Periodic 

Table of Program Performance as well as its 2003 Performance Report. We 

assessed the reliability of the performance data by reviewing existing 

documentation about the data and the systems that produced them, and 

we interviewed knowledgeable officials. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We reviewed the performance data to determine how performance 

changed between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. We also interviewed Coast 

Guard officials within the Coast Guard’s Office of Plans, Policy, and 

Evaluation and program officials in all 11 of the Coast Guard’s programs. 

We also reviewed incomplete drafts of the Coast Guard’s Strategic 

Blueprint. 

To identify the Coast Guard’s efforts to utilize intelligence, technology, 

tactics, and partnerships to enhance mission effectiveness, we reviewed 

our previous reports, and Congressional Research Service reports. In 

addition, we discussed efforts in utilizing intelligence and technology, 

developing partnerships, and employing new tactics at Coast Guard 

headquarters and district offices that we visited, as well as at local Coast 

Guard units under these districts’ commands. We also reviewed Coast 

Guard mission planning guidance and the Coast Guard’s Maritime Strategy 

for Homeland Security. 

We conducted our work between June 2003 and March 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 32 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

This appendix shows, for the nine Coast Guard programs with measurable 

resource hours, the trend in these hours from the Coast Guard’s preSeptember 11 baseline through fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. In all, 

four of the nine programs saw resource hours increase, four saw declines, 

and one remained essentially the same. 

Homeland security programs such as ports, waterways, and coastal 

security; undocumented migrant interdiction; and defense readiness1

 were 

the primary beneficiaries of the growing Coast Guard resource hours. One 

non–homeland security program, ice operations, also experienced an 

increase in resource hours. However, compared with the other programs, 

this program accounted for relatively few hours. 

Prior to the events of September 11, the ports, waterways, and coastal 

security program was relatively small, with few resource hours. However, 

the program grew significantly after fiscal year 2001. (See fig. 3.) The 

program surged from a pre-September 11 baseline of 19,291 resource 

hours to 254,640 resource hours in fiscal year 2003. A Coast Guard official 

in Group Seattle attributed this substantial increase in resource hours to 

the many additional homeland security activities it was performing, 

including conducting port security patrols. 

 1

One additional program, other law enforcement (Other LE) also experienced an increase 

in resource hours. However, according to Coast Guard officials, it is likely that the surge in 

hours in fiscal year 2002 was the result of a misinterpretation of port security activities. 

Some Coast Guard crew entered what should have been PWCS hours under Other LE 

because of their interpretation of this data category. Coast Guard officials took action in 

fiscal year 2003 to clarify the appropriate categorization of port security activities and the 

hours have subsequently declined. 

Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Programs with 

Increasing Resource 

Hours 

Ports, Waterways, and 

Coastal Security 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 33 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 3: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Resource Hours 

The undocumented migrant interdiction program’s resource hours surged 

significantly in fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 4.) From its pre-September 11 

baseline of 29,642 hours, undocumented migrant interdiction resource 

hours declined to 21,836 hours in fiscal year 2001 and then grew to 53,559 

hours in fiscal year 2003. A District 7 Coast Guard official indicated that 

the additional hours resulted, in part, from increased priority for this 

program because of a growing recognition that illegal migrants 

successfully entering the United States were the equivalent of a security 

breach. In addition, another District 7 Coast Guard official also attributed 

the increase to the growing political instability in the Caribbean, which 

increased the flow of migrants from that region. 

Undocumented Migrant 

Interdiction 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 34 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 4: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Resource Hours 

Defense readiness resource hours grew incrementally until fiscal year 2003 

and then surged upward. The pre-September 11 baseline level of about 

6,000 hours accounted for 1 percent of total Coast Guard hours; by fiscal 

year 2003, the number of hours had grown to nearly 40,000 hours, or about 

5 percent of total hours. (See fig. 5.) The increased hours were generally a 

result of 11 cutters and 24 boats being deployed to Iraq, where they 

provided security for United States assets. 

Defense Readiness 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 35 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 5: Defense Readiness Resource Hours 

Ice operations is the one non–homeland security program with resource 

hours that increased from its pre-September 11 baseline levels. Ice 

operations resource hours increased from a pre-September 11 baseline of 

11,935 hours to 17,217 hours by fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 6.) Coast Guard 

officials told us that the icebreaker Healy became fully operational in 2001 

and that the addition of this asset contributed to the increased icebreaking 

hours as well. Furthermore, according to the Coast Guard, the weather 

conditions in fiscal year 2003 contributed to the increased hours as 

icebreaking assets needed additional time to address the more severe ice 

conditions. However, the increase in hours was smaller, on both a 

percentage and an actual basis than the increases for homeland security 

programs, and this program has considerably fewer resource hours than 

most of the other Coast Guard programs. In fiscal year 2003, the program 

accounted for about 2 percent of total Coast Guard resource hours. 

Ice Operations 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 36 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 6: Ice Operations Resource Hours 

Resource hours for foreign fish enforcement, living marine resources, 

illegal drug interdiction, and search and rescue have declined from their 

pre-September 11 levels. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that the 

continued emphasis on ports, waterways, and coastal security has made it 

difficult for some programs to rebound to their pre-September 11 resource 

hour levels. 

Resource hours for the foreign fish enforcement program remained below 

their pre-September 11 baseline. From the baseline of about 8,000 hours, 

foreign fish enforcement hours declined to about 5,100 hours in fiscal year 

2001. By fiscal year 2003, the number of hours had increased to 

approximately 6,700 hours, but this was still 16 percent below the preSeptember 11 baseline level. (See fig. 7.) Coast Guard officials explained 

that the program is largely demand-driven, in that the incentive for foreign 

fishermen to violate regulations is based on such factors as weather, 

currents, market rates for fish, and where the fish are located. 

Programs with 

Declining Resource 

Hours 

Foreign Fish Enforcement 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 37 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 7: Foreign Fish Enforcement Resource Hours 

Living marine resources showed a similar decline in resource hours 

between its pre-September 11 level and fiscal year 2003. Resource hours 

declined from the pre-September 11 baseline of 91,255 to 67,576 in fiscal 

year 2003—a 26 percent decline. (See fig. 8.) Coast Guard officials said the 

early part of fiscal year 2003 was an unusually low year for domestic fish; 

because of the harsh winter weather fishermen did not venture out to fish. 

Coast Guard officials also said resource hours in the program tended to 

decline when the security threat level was raised, because boats, ships, 

and aircraft were reassigned to high security risk areas. 

Living Marine Resources 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 38 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 8: Living Marine Resources Resource Hours 

The pre-September 11 baseline for illegal drug interdiction resource hours 

totaled 122,694 but declined in fiscal year 2002 to 78,002 hours and then to 

69,268 hours in fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 9.) Overall, illegal drug 

interdiction resource hours declined 44 percent between the baseline and 

fiscal year 2003. According to Coast Guard officials, the illegal drug 

interdiction program continued to successfully seize illegal drugs, despite 

the decrease in resource hours, in part because improved intelligence 

allowed them to better target their drug interdiction operations. Another 

factor that the Coast Guard believes has contributed to their drug 

interdiction efforts is a 1997 bilateral agreement with the government of 

Colombia that has improved cooperation and resulted in additional 

seizures and information. 

Illegal Drug Interdiction 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 39 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 9: Illegal Drug Interdiction Resource Hours 

The search and rescue program’s resource hours also remain below preSeptember 11 levels. From its pre-September 11 baseline of 82,689 hours, 

search and rescue declined to 64,383 resource hours in fiscal year 2003. 

(See fig. 10.) Coast Guard headquarters officials stated that the drop in 

search and rescue hours after September 11 probably resulted from 

increased security concerns that discouraged people from boating and 

fewer boaters could have resulted in fewer distress calls—a reduced 

caseload for the Coast Guard. In addition, a Group Seattle official believed 

that the group’s prevention efforts and more frequent security patrols may 

have contributed to a reduction in hours as well. 

Search and Rescue 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 40 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 10: Search and Rescue Resource Hours 

Only one Coast Guard program, aids to navigation, which is a nonhomeland security program, had stable resource hours between the preSeptember 11 baseline and fiscal year 2003. 

From their pre-September 11 baseline of 112,148 hours, aids to navigation 

resource hours rose to 127,827 hours in fiscal year 2001, (an increase of 14 

percent), and then declined to 110,456 hours in fiscal year 2003, which was 

2 percent below the pre-September 11 level. (See fig. 11.) A Coast Guard 

official said the slight decline resulted from the addition of more 

technologically advanced assets, which allow the Coast Guard to achieve 

the same results in less time. 

Programs with Stable 

Resource Hours 

Aids to Navigation 
Appendix II: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Resource Hours 

Page 41 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 11: Aids to Navigation Resource Hours 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard resource hour data. 

Resource hours

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

100,000

110,000

120,000

130,000

Pre-9/11

baseline

2001 2002 2003

Fiscal year

112,148

127,827

111,729 110,456
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 42 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

To measure its accomplishments, the Coast Guard uses a set of 

performance measures developed in accordance with the Government 

Performance and Results Act (GPRA). GPRA is a key component of a 

statutory framework that the Congress put in place during the 1990s to 

promote a new focus on results.1

 Finding that waste and inefficiency in 

federal programs were undermining confidence in government, the 

Congress sought to hold federal agencies accountable for the results of 

federal spending through regular and systematic performance planning, 

measurement, and reporting. With the implementation of GPRA, federal 

agencies, including the Coast Guard, are required to set goals, measure 

performance, and report on their accomplishments. The act requires that 

federal agencies establish long-term strategic goals, as well as annual 

goals. Agencies must then measure their performance against the goals 

they set and report publicly on how well they are doing. 

Coast Guard officials said their performance measures help focus efforts 

and link performance to a strategic outcome, manage programs at the 

headquarters level, and identify performance gaps. 

The Coast Guard currently has performance measures for 10 of its 11 

programs.2

 While some programs have historically contained multiple 

measures, they have been adjusted to one measure per program since the 

Coast Guard’s transition to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

as shown in table 6 below. The performance measures consist of 

performance results, which track the annual progress of each program, 

and performance targets, which are the goals their results aim to meet 

each year. 

 1

For a fuller discussion of the framework, see Managing for Results: The Statutory 

Framework for Performance-Based Management and Accountability 

(GAO/AIMD/GGD-98-52, January 28, 1998). 

2

According to Coast Guard officials, performance measures for the ports, waterways, and 

coastal security program are under development. 

Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 43 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Table 6: Coast Guard Performance Measures by Program 

Mission and program Performance measure 

Homeland security mission

Defense readiness Percentage of time units meet combat readiness status at C-2 levela 

Foreign fish enforcement Number of detected Exclusive Economic Zone incursions by foreign fishing vessels 

Illegal drug interdiction Percentage of cocaine seizures entering the United States through maritime means 

Ports, waterways, and coastal security Not yet determined 

Undocumented migrant interdiction Percentage of interdicted illegal migrants entering the United States through maritime 

means 

Non–homeland security mission

Aids to navigation Number of collisions, allisions, and groundings 

Ice operations Number of waterway closure days 

Living marine resources Percentage of fishermen found in compliance with regulations 

Marine environmental protection Number of chemical and oil spills greater than 100 gallons per 100 million short tons 

shipped 

Marine safety Number of passenger vessel, maritime worker, and recreational boating fatalities and 

injuries 

Search and rescue Percentage of distressed mariners’ lives saved 

Source: Coast Guard performance data. 

a

According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as the level at which each unit 

possesses the resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime missions for which it is 

organized or designed. 

For the purposes of this report, we studied performance for 8 of the 10 

programs with performance measures. We did not analyze the marine 

safety and marine environmental protection programs’ performance 

results because we were unable to obtain any reasonable measurement of 

the levels of effort being directed into these programs, and therefore had 

no basis for comparing their resource levels with their performance 

results. 

Overall, for the eight programs we studied, performance results remained 

stable or improved between fiscal years 2001 and 2003.3

 Of these 

programs, all but defense readiness and undocumented migrant 

interdiction met their performance targets for fiscal year 2003. 

 3

Illegal drug interdiction was the only exception. Because its fiscal year 2003 performance 

results will not be calculated until the spring of 2004, we were unable to assess its results 

between fiscal years 2001 and 2003. 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 44 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

The undocumented migrant interdiction performance measure, which 

measures the percentage of migrants interdicted or deterred on maritime 

routes, had a result that remained relatively stable, between 82.5 percent 

to 88.3 percent. (See fig. 12.) Although the Coast Guard did not reach the 

program’s target level of 87 percent in fiscal year 2003, the result has 

remained in this range, plus or minus about six percentage points, since 

fiscal year 2001.4

 Coast Guard officials said they could not explain the 

decline but consider it to be minimal. According to the Coast Guard, in 

fiscal year 2003 there were 3,793 successful arrivals and an estimated 

threat—the estimated flow of migrants into the United States—of 25,750 

migrants, yielding the 85.3 percent result. Although the interdiction rate 

decreased slightly, the activity level was up, reflecting the increase in 

resource hours dedicated to this mission. (The 2003 Mission Planning 

Guidance stipulated that 28,000 hours of cutter and aircraft time be used 

for undocumented migrant interdiction, whereas the 2004 guidance 

stipulated 47,000 hours of cutter and aircraft time be used.) 

In fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard reported 5,331 migrant interdictions 

compared with 2,409 in fiscal year 2002, an increase of over 120 percent.5

By comparison, the estimated threat rose by about 18 percent. 

 4

According to Coast Guard officials, the undocumented migrant interdiction performance 

measure target was set at 87 percent based on a study done to incorporate deterrence as a 

measure of Coast Guard performance. 

5

The 2002 and 2003 illegal migrant numbers include only those counted in the 

undocumented migrant performance measure, which uses the following four migrant 

populations, Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the People’s Republic of China. 

Programs with 

Generally Stable 

Performance Results 

Undocumented Migrant 

Interdiction 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 45 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 12: Undocumented Migrant Interdiction Performance Results and Target by 

Fiscal Year 

The illegal drug interdiction performance measure—the rate at which the 

Coast Guard seizes cocaine—remained relatively steady between fiscal 

years 2001 and 2002, ranging from 10.6 percent to 11.7 percent.6

 (See fig. 

13.) The seizure rate is defined as the metric tons of cocaine seized by the 

Coast Guard each fiscal year, divided by the estimated maritime flow of 

cocaine for the same year.7

 The goal is based on a 1997 Department of 

Transportation requirement setting the target baseline at 8.7 percent and 

raising it 10 percent every 5 years. The Coast Guard did not meet its 

performance target for the drug program in fiscal years 2001 and 2002. 

Starting in fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard is changing its illegal drug 

 6

The illegal drug interdiction performance result for fiscal year 2003 will not be calculated 

until the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement publishes its flow rate in spring 

2004. 

7

The illegal drug interdiction performance measure includes only cocaine, because cocaine 

has an analyzed flow rate and is the preponderant illegal drug. 

Illegal Drug Interdiction 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 46 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

interdiction performance measure to a removal rather than a seizure rate. 

This new measure includes cocaine that is jettisoned or lost as well as 

cocaine that is seized. Coast Guard officials believe this new measure 

more accurately reflects the total impact of the program on disrupting the 

flow of illegal drugs into the United States.8

Figure 13: Illegal Drug Interdiction Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal Year 

Ice operations showed both stable performance results that met 

performance targets in fiscal years 2001 and 2003. (See fig. 14.) To meet 

the target, the ice operations program must keep winter waterway 

closures under 8 days per year for severe winters and under 2 days per 

year for average winters. The Coast Guard met this target in fiscal year 

2003, with only 7 days of closures during the severe winter season. Ice 

 8

The target for the new illegal drug interdiction measure was set at 15 percent, determined 

by looking at the trend of seizures across agencies and forecasting out 1 year. Coast Guard 

officials said they will not be confident in the target for at least 3 years, when they are able 

to look at trends in the removal rate and adjust the target to reflect a more realistic goal. 

Ice Operations 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 47 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

operations program managers attribute their success to good planning. 

Each year officials from the Canadian Coast Guard, the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration, and the United States Coast Guard hold 

a planning conference to develop a winter severity assessment. If the 

assessment determines the weather will be severe, they develop a strategy 

to dedicate more assets to ice operations in order to meet the target. 

Figure 14: Ice Operations Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal Year 

The performance measure for living marine resources—defined as the 

percentage of fishermen complying with federal regulations—remained 

stable between 97.1 and 98.6 percent over the past 3 years. The program 

also met its target of 97 percent, which was first established in fiscal year 

2003. (See fig. 15.) Coast Guard officials attribute these results to 

concerted efforts to improve operational efficiency particularly through a 

vessel monitoring system and better intelligence sharing while working 

more closely with federal and state enforcement partners. Coast Guard 

officials said 16 of the 97 significant violations detected in fiscal year 2003, 

such as damage to the fish stock, were accomplished through these new 

efforts. 

Living Marine Resources 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 48 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 15: Living Marine Resources Performance Results and Target by Fiscal Year 

Between fiscal years 2001 and 2003, the search and rescue program’s 

performance results were steady. The performance measure for this 

program is the percentage of mariners’ lives saved from imminent danger. 

The range over the 3 years was 84.2 percent to 87.7 percent, and the result 

in fiscal year 2003 was above the target of 85 percent. (See fig. 16.) Coast 

Guard officials attributed the improvement to continued focus on the 

search and rescue program. The Coast Guard has also added 950 new 

positions to the program since 2001. The Coast Guard indicated that this 

personnel increase is reportedly helping manage surge requirements as 

they occur. 

Search and Rescue 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 49 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 16: Search and Rescue Performance Results and Target by Fiscal Year 

The performance results for foreign fish enforcement, which indicate the 

number of foreign vessel incursions into the United States Exclusive 

Economic Zone (EEZ),9

 dropped from 250 incursions in fiscal year 2002 to 

153 incursions in fiscal year 2003. (See fig. 17.) Because of this 

 9

The EEZ, established by the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 

Management Act, is the United States’ maximum exclusive economic zone, which extends 

200 miles from U.S. shores. Within the EEZ, U.S. citizens have primary harvesting rights to 

fish stocks. 

Programs with 

Improved 

Performance Results 

Foreign Fish Enforcement 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 50 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

improvement, foreign fish enforcement met its target for fiscal year 2003. 

(In this case, since the goal is to minimize incursions, a decline is a 

positive result.) The decrease was greatest along the United States/Russian 

maritime boundary line (6 incursions versus 22 incursions in fiscal year 

2002) and in the Central and Western Pacific region (15 incursions versus 

89 in fiscal year 2002). The Coast Guard reported that the drop along the 

United States/Russian boundary line was due to a near-constant 

enforcement presence, increased presence of Russian patrol vessels in the 

vicinity, and a stronger enforcement posture on the Coast Guard’s part, 

including the option of employing warning shots and disabling fire against 

violators. The decrease in observed incursions in the Central and Western 

Pacific was more difficult for the Coast Guard to explain. One potential 

explanation the Coast Guard gave was reduced cutter and aircraft 

coverage, brought on by the need to shift resources to thwart known 

ongoing illegal high seas drift net fishing in the North Pacific. According to 

the Coast Guard, this lack of enforcement could have reduced detections, 

but since most detected incursions in recent years have come from third 

party reports and intelligence sources rather than directly from Coast 

Guard enforcement assets, they do not believe lack of enforcement to be 

the cause of this shift. 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 51 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 17: Foreign Fish Enforcement Performance Results and Target by Fiscal 

Year 

The aids to navigation program performance measure—which assesses the 

total number of collisions, allisions10, and groundings—also demonstrated 

improved results between fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The number of 

incidents declined from 1,936 in fiscal year 2002 to 1,523 in fiscal year 

2003, a decrease of 21 percent in the last year. (See fig. 18.) Furthermore, 

the program met its target level in each of the three years. Coast Guard 

officials attribute their performance success to two reasons—an improved 

navigational infrastructure, and use of activities such as vessel inspection 

and mariner licensing and examination to reduce causal factors in 

collisions, allisions, and groundings. 

 10The Coast Guard defines allisions as vessel collisions with fixed objects versus collisions, 

which are vessel collisions with moveable objects. 

Aids to Navigation 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 52 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 18: Aids to Navigation Performance Results and Targets by Fiscal Year 

Defense readiness, as measured by the percentage of time units meet 

combat readiness status at a C-2 level,11 improved during fiscal years 2001 

to 2003. The percentage of time that defense readiness was at a C-2 level 

rose from 67 percent fiscal year 2001 to 78 percent in fiscal year 2003. 

However, defense readiness did not meet its target of 100 percent 

readiness. (See fig. 19.) The Coast Guard reported that this was due to 

equipment problems associated with operating aging ships and unit 

training deficiencies such as cutters not having sufficient training time to 

perform gunnery exercises. 

 11According to Coast Guard information, the C-2 level is defined as the level at which each 

unit possesses the resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime missions for 

which it is organized or designed. 

Defense Readiness 
Appendix III: Program-by-Program Trends in 

Coast Guard Performance Measures 

Page 53 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Figure 19: Defense Readiness Performance Results and Target by Fiscal Year 

Percent

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2001 2002 2003

Fiscal year

Performance actuals

Performance target

67

70

78

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard performance data.

Target floor set at 100%. (The Coast 

Guard must meet or exceed the target 

to achieve the goal.)
Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard 

Approaches to Enhance Operational 

Efficiency 

Page 54 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

One of the issues that we discussed with agency officials at Coast Guard 

headquarters and all five districts we visited was their efforts to utilize 

intelligence, technology, tactics, and partnerships to leverage existing 

resources. Coast Guard officials provided examples of new efforts that 

ranged in scope from agency-wide to location-specific. Greater access to 

intelligence information, new technologies and tactics, and a number of 

new or improved partnerships have likely increased efficiency to a degree, 

but in most cases the Coast Guard is unable to measure the impacts. 

The following tables show selected examples of these efforts. The 

examples provided in the tables are not a comprehensive list of all Coast 

Guard efforts in these four areas, but they serve to illustrate the variety of 

efforts under way. 

Intelligence efforts are primarily aimed at increasing the Coast Guard’s 

collection and analytical capabilities to enhance the usage of intelligence 

information. Greater coordination with external entities is another 

emphasis, adding to the amount of intelligence that the Coast Guard 

receives and is able to act upon. Table 7 shows examples of efforts at 

various Coast Guard levels. 

Table 7: Selected Examples of Intelligence Efforts 

Coast Guard location Intelligence effort 

Coast Guard–wide Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC). This strategic intelligence center serves as the focal point 

for interaction with the intelligence components of the Department of Defense, other law 

enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community. The ICC supports all Coast Guard missions 

and is the center for Coast Guard intelligence collection and management. 

Atlantic area Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC). The Hampton Roads JHOC is a collaborative effort of the 

Navy and Coast Guard that provides an effective command, control, communications, and 

computer system and information, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability. The JHOC 

is to be assigned 9 Navy and 22 Coast Guard positions and is currently staffed with Coast Guard 

and Navy reservists. 

Districts Field intelligence support teams. These consist of Coast Guard intelligence analysts and Coast 

Guard special agents. They provide tactical intelligence support to Coast Guard captains of the port 

by collecting information and reporting suspicious or criminal activity in the port areas, sharing 

information with other agencies at the local level, and rapidly disseminating intelligence to the 

captain of the port and other local commanders. 

Sector New Orleans Combined Operations and Intelligence Node (COIN). This effort includes a shared operations 

center staffed by personnel from the four Coast Guard commands located in or around New 

Orleans. The chief goal of COIN is to improve mission performance and tactical awareness through 

the efficient use of limited resources. 

Source: Coast Guard. 

Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard 

Approaches to Enhance Operational 

Efficiency 

Intelligence 
Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard 

Approaches to Enhance Operational 

Efficiency 

Page 55 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Most technology acquisitions are done Coast Guard–wide, and the 

examples in table 8 reflect this focus. However, some districts and units 

have purchased or developed unique technologies to operate in their 

environment. The table shows several examples, including one unique to 

the fifth district (Portsmouth, VA), where a database has been designed to 

provide the real-time status of assets and personnel. 

Table 8: Selected Examples of Technology Efforts 

Coast Guard location New technology 

Coast Guard–wide Night vision goggles. Used by cutter, aircraft, and maritime safety and security team 

personnel during periods of darkness, these goggles allow for safer operations and 

enhanced ability to detect intrusions. 

 Self-locating datum marker buoys. For the search and rescue program, these new buoys 

provide more up-to-date data that can be used to better determine where to begin a 

search. The Coast Guard intends for this technology to improve both search effectiveness 

and efficiency. 

Pilot program in various Coast Guard 

locations 

Personal data assistant (PDA). In several locations, PDAs are being used by boarding 

officers and marine inspectors to conduct their work. The Coast Guard expects that using 

PDAs will reduce redundant paperwork and facilitate electronic database entries. 

District 5 

Portsmouth, Va. 

SMARTS. This is a database created by personnel in District 5 to provide information 

about assets and personnel. This database is updated throughout the day by groups 

within the district and can also be used to analyze trend data. Officials in the fifth district 

told us that this data system saves both time and resources, because the information it 

provides would typically require numerous phone calls throughout the day. 

Source: Coast Guard. 

Modifying standard operating procedures and improving the way that 

routine activities are carried out can lead to greater efficiencies, enhancing 

mission effectiveness. Coast Guard officials cited various examples of how 

they had done so—often with the help of the other types of efforts 

(intelligence, technology, and partnerships). Table 9 outlines examples of 

new Coast Guard tactics that officials described to us as improving 

efficiency. 

Technology 

Tactics 
Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard 

Approaches to Enhance Operational 

Efficiency 

Page 56 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Table 9: Selected Examples of New Tactics 

Coast Guard location New tactic 

Coast Guard–wide Advanced notice of arrival (NOA). The former 24-hour NOA prior to entering a United States 

port has been extended to 96 hours. The information provided with the NOA includes details 

on the crew, passengers, cargo, and the vessel itself. This increase in notice has enabled the 

Coast Guard to screen more vessels in advance of arrival and allows additional time to prepare 

for boardings. 

Pacific and Atlantic area commands Maritime safety and security teams (MSSTs). These 100-person units, established after the 

September 11 attacks, provide a fast-deployment capability for homeland security, search and 

rescue, and law enforcement programs. MSSTs will deploy in support of national security 

special events such as Super Bowls and Olympics, as well as for severe weather recovery 

operations, protection of military load-outs, enforcement of security zones, defense of critical 

waterside facilities in strategic ports, and interdiction of illegal activities. 

District 8 

New Orleans, La. 

Inland River Vessel Movement Center. Starting in March 2003, vessels with certain dangerous 

cargos must report their crew and cargo as they move on the Mississippi River. The integration 

software the Coast Guard utilizes for this tracking is new, but there is no new technology 

required for the industry participants. This tactic allows for easier and more consistent tracking 

of these cargos during transits through densely populated areas. 

Source: Coast Guard. 

In a past examination of Coast Guard activities, we commented that 

leveraging resources through partnerships provides mission efficiency to 

the Coast Guard.1

 The Coast Guard has attempted to develop ways to 

partner more effectively with local, state, and federal agencies, as well as 

with public and private entities, and we found a number of examples in the 

locations that we visited, especially for homeland security. Coast Guard 

officials told us that these relationships were not necessarily new but had 

certainly improved since September 11. Table 10 highlights some of these 

examples. They include new efforts in collaborating with other DHS 

entities. Coast Guard officials told us that while in some instances these 

relationships existed prior to the formation of DHS, they have grown 

stronger with the creation of the new department. 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring 

Levels of Effort for All Missions (GAO-03-155, November 2002). 

Partnerships 
Appendix IV: Examples of Coast Guard 

Approaches to Enhance Operational 

Efficiency 

Page 57 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Table 10: Selected Examples of Coast Guard Partnership Efforts 

Coast Guard location Partnership 

District 7 

Miami 

DHS Partners Forum Southeast Florida Region. This group was formed to promote closer cooperation in 

southeast Florida among agencies moving to DHS. The objectives include sharing information and 

developing and implementing new coordinated initiatives. There are four interagency working groups that 

include operations/communications, intelligence, information management and public affairs, and mass 

migration planning. 

District 8 

Sector New Orleans 

Field Targeting Center (FTC). Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Field Operations brings 

together members of CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard to 

screen and target vessels. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans placed a watch stander at FTC to establish a 

cooperative screening of all incoming vessels. As a result of the partnership, the Coast Guard was also 

able to get access to two systems that greatly improved information about incoming vessels and their 

crewmembers and passengers. 

District 5 

Group Hampton Roads 

Navy. In addition to collaborating with the Navy on the Joint Harbor Operations Center (highlighted in table 

7), the Coast Guard partners with the Navy on a number of different initiatives in the fifth district to 

combine resources and avoid overlap. Since 2001, the Navy has provided vessels to the Coast Guard for 

naval escorts, and now some of these vessels are staffed with law enforcement detachments and MSSTs. 

Group Hampton Roads also maintains an active working group with Navy officials, and the group meets 

often to discuss overlapping issues including enforcement of the local security zone and joint law 

enforcement boardings. 

District 13 

Marine Safety Office 

Puget Sound 

Washington State Ferries (WSF). WSF is the largest ferry system in the United States and one of the 

Coast Guard’s greatest security concerns in the Northwest. WSF, the Washington State Patrol, and local 

Coast Guard officials have established a committee to identify goals and recommendations concerning 

ferry security, including the refinement of a rapid response information network to be used when specific 

threats are detected. 

Source: Coast Guard. 
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 58 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Margaret Wrightson (415) 904-2200 

Randall B. Williamson (206) 287-4860 

In addition to those named above, William Bates, Elizabeth Curda, Michele 

Fejfar, Dawn Hoff, David Hooper, Dawn Locke, Allen Lomax, Heather 

MacLeod, Eileen Peguero, and Stan Stenersen made key contributions to 

this report. 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 59 GAO-04-432 Coast Guard Mission 

Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of 

Homeland Security (GAO-03-594T, April 1, 2003). 

Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor 

Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions (GAO-03-544T, 

March 12, 2003). 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It 

Transitions to the New Department (GAO-03-467T, February 12, 2003). 

Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of 

Effort for All Missions (GAO-03-155, November 12, 2002). 

Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans 

with Budgets and Financial Statements (GAO-02-236, January 4, 2002). 

Performance Budgeting: Initial Experiences under the Results Act in 

Linking Plans with Budgets (GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67, April 12, 1999). 

Managing for Results: Measuring Program Results That Are under 

Limited Federal Control (GAO/GGD-99-16, December 11, 1998). 

The Results Act: An Evaluator’s Guide to Assessing Agency Annual 

Performance Plans (GAO/GGD-10.1.20, April 1998). 

Managing for Results: The Statutory Framework for Performance-Based 

Management and Accountability (GAO/AIMD/GGD-98-52, January 28, 

1998). 

Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance

(GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 1997). 

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance 

and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996). 

Related GAO Products 

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