J-S41001-15; J-S41002-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: T.B. & E.A., MINORS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: T.B., SR., FATHER No. 146 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Decrees entered December 23, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 2056 2013, 2057 2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: T.B., SR., FATHER No. 209 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered January 6, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Juvenile Division, at No(s): CP-36-DP-0000081-2011

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: T.B., SR., FATHER No. 210 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered January 6, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Juvenile 

Division, at No(s): CP-36-DP-0000007-2010

BEFORE: ALLEN, LAZARUS, and PLATT*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2015

Appellant, T.B., Sr. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees entered on 

December 23, 2014, terminating Father’s parental rights to T.M.B. (born in 

June of 2009) and E.R.A. (born in April of 2011) (collectively “the 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Children”).1 Father also appeals from the orders entered on January 6, 

2015, changing the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. We affirm. 

When T.M.B. was born in June of 2009, Lancaster County Children, 

Youth and Social Services (“CYS”) became involved due to the placement of 

T.M.B.’s older half-siblings, S.G.A. and D.J.A., in the legal and physical 

custody of CYS. On June 26, 2009, Mother agreed to a voluntary Family 

Service Plan (“FSP”) for T.M.B., and T.M.B. remained in Mother’s custody. 

On August 28, 2009, a revised FSP was made for Mother and Father. The 

FSP stated that Father was not allowed to have unsupervised contact with 

T.M.B. because of his past criminal record and a Protection from Abuse Act 

(“PFA”) order that was in effect involving Mother.

On January 15, 2010, CYS filed separate petitions for temporary 

custody of T.M.B., S.G.A., and D.J.A., alleging that Mother was not 

complying with the FSP goals and she was facing eviction. T.M.B., S.G.A. 

and D.J.A. were placed in the temporary physical custody of CYS. A shelter 

care hearing was held on January 19, 2010, keeping all of the children in the 

temporary custody of CYS. Father was present at the hearing.

On March 2, 2010, an adjudication hearing was held. On March 3, 

2010, the trial court adjudicated T.M.B. dependent, and T.M.B. was placed in 

 

1

J.A.-S., ("Mother"), signed consents to adoption of the Children on 

September 24, 2013. Mother also signed consents to adoption for S.G.A. 

and D.J.A., who are the Children’s older half-siblings. The trial court 

confirmed Mother’s consents to adoption on November 7, 2013. 
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the legal custody of CYS. She was returned to the physical custody of 

Mother. A second revised FSP was approved. Father’s revised FSP goals 

included: (1) cooperating with CYS’ assessment of his situation; (2) 

remaining free from drugs and alcohol; (3) completing parenting classes; (4) 

completing domestic violence classes; (5) staying crime free; (6) 

maintaining income; and (7) obtaining safe and stable housing. The order 

also directed Mother not to allow Father any other contact with T.M.B, and 

directed Father to have supervised one hour per week visits with T.M.B. at 

CYS. 

On July 23, 2010, a permanency review order stated that Father did 

not comply with his permanency plan, and that he had contacted CYS stating 

that he did not want to work with CYS. Father last contacted CYS on March 

22, 2010. Father was incarcerated at the Lancaster County Prison sometime 

in 2010, and he was released in June of 2011. On January 11, 2011, the 

trial court released legal custody of T.M.B. and her older siblings to Mother. 

On April 2, 2011, Mother gave birth to her fourth child, E.R.A. Mother 

refused to identify a father. On June 2, 2011, CYS became aware that 

Father was released from the Lancaster County Prison, and received reports 

that Father planned to move into the family’s residence despite Father’s nocontact order with T.M.B. On June 6, 2011, CYS filed a petition for 

temporary custody of T.M.B., E.R.A., S.G.A., and D.J.A, following police 
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reports alleging that Mother was drunk and left the Children unsupervised, 

and that Father was attempting to break into Mother’s house. 

A shelter hearing convened on June 7, 2011. At the hearing, Mother 

testified that the day Father was released from prison, he broke into her 

house despite Mother having an active PFA order against Father. A warrant 

for Father’s arrest was issued for charges of aggravated assault, indirect 

criminal contempt and stalking. Father was incarcerated a month later. 

Following the shelter care hearing, the trial court ordered T.M.B., E.R.A., 

S.G.A., and D.J.A. to remain in the temporary custody of CYS. Since June 6, 

2011, all four children have remained in CYS’s legal and physical custody. 

On September 26, 2011, following another hearing, the trial court 

adjudicated T.M.B. and E.R.A. dependent. The trial court ordered a Child 

Permanency Plan (“CPP”) goal for reunification with the Children. Father’s 

CPP goals included: (1) completing a mental health program; (2) 

completing a drug and alcohol program; (3) remaining crime-free; (4) 

completing domestic violence classes; (5) completing parenting classes; (6) 

maintaining stable income; (7) obtaining stable housing; and (8) 

maintaining a commitment to the Children. The trial court also ordered 

genetic testing to determine if Father was the father of E.R.A. On October 

31, 2011, genetic tests revealed that Father was E.R.A.’s father. 

Following the permanency review hearings on November 16, 2011, 

April 26, 2012, and July 23, 2012, the trial court found that Father was not 
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compliant with his CPP. On July 10, 2012, Father was released from jail. 

The criminal charges against Father were dismissed and reduced to a 

summary offense of harassment. The trial court found Father to be 

minimally compliant with his CPP following his permanency review hearings 

on September 11, 2012 and April 12, 2013. Father was deemed moderately 

compliant with his CPP following the permanency review hearings on June 

11, 2013 and November 12, 2013. 

On September 17, 2013, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights to the Children and a motion to change the goal to 

adoption. On August 12, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the goal 

change and termination petition, where Father was present and represented 

by counsel. At the hearing, J.J., Father’s mother (“Paternal Grandmother”); 

T.B., Father’s daughter and the Children’s half-sibling; Bethany Jenks, 

Father’s probation officer; Dr. Suzanne Ail, a licensed psychologist; Jessica 

Landman, a CYS caseworker; and Father testified. 

On December 23, 2014, the trial court entered its decrees terminating 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) 

and (b). On January 6, 2015, the trial court entered its orders changing the 

Children’s permanency goals to adoption. On January 6, 2015, a 

permanency review hearing was held. At the permanency review hearing, 

Ms. Landman and Father testified. Following the hearing, the permanency 

review order changed the Children’s goal to adoption. 
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On January 16, 2015 and January 28, 2015, Father timely filed notices 

of appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On February 12, 2015, this 

Court, sua sponte, consolidated the appeals. Father raises the following 

issues:

I. May termination of parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

sections 2511(a)(5) and (8) be granted against a parent even 

though the child was not removed from that parent’s custody?

II. Where, during the six months preceding the filing of the 

petition, the parent has consistently visited with his children, 

been cooperative with [CYS], and[,] if not completed, started 

work on, all areas of the permanency plan, may a termination 

still be granted based on the fact that the parent was initially 

uncooperative?

III. Where at the time of the termination hearing, a parent has 

successfully completed all the goals of the permanency plan save 

parenting, which was suspended by the [trial] court because the

petition had been filed, and where there is no evidence of 

current parental incapacity, is termination under 23 Pa.C.S. 

section 2511(a)(2) proper based on the parent’s earlier delay in 

addressing the goals? 

IV. Is it appropriate to change the permanency goal to adoption 

where Father has made progress and completed most of his 

plan, remains cooperative, and where there is no evidence that 

[the] Children’s best interests necessitate adoption? 

Father’s Brief at 15. 

Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is 

as follows:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental 

rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the 

trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an 
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abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary 

support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. 

Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a 

jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review 

of the record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). In termination cases, the 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. 

Id. at 806. We have stated:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we 

will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). Additionally, 

this Court “need only agree with [the trial court’s] decision as to any one 

subsection in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 581 

Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004). Here, the trial court terminated Father’s 
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parental rights based on sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). 

Accordingly, we will focus on section 2511(a)(1) in our review.

In terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court relied upon 

section 2511(a)(1) and (b) which provide:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

We have explained this Court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights 

pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) as follows:
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To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence of 

conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing 

of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be 

terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) if the parent 

either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental 

duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of 

inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of 

termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

[s]ection 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted).

Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A 

child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this 

Court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty 

which requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.
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Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional 

needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 

Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).

On appeal, Father contends that during the six months preceding the 

filing of the termination petition, Father has consistently visited with the 

Children, been cooperative with CYS, and if not completed, started work on, 

all areas of the permanency plan. Id. at 28-31. 

In terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 

2511(a)(1), the trial court reviewed the record and the evidence presented, 

and concluded that it is clear from the record that, for a period of six months 

preceding the filing of the petition for involuntary termination, Father failed 

to perform any parental duties for the Children. The Children were in the 

physical custody of CYS since June 6, 2011, and the legal custody of CYS 

since September 15, 2011. 
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The trial court found that Father did not begin working on his CPP until 

the Children had already been in CYS’s custody for fifteen months. 

His progress was slow. As of the June 4, 2013 

[p]ermanency [r]eview hearing, Father had still not completed 

his mental health evaluation, domestic violence treatment, and 

parenting. He was consistently attending his bi-weekly visits 

and it was acknowledged by the caseworker that visits went well. 

His progress was noted by the court to be moderate. It should 

be noted that he had signed a release for Nuestra Clinica, 

pertaining to a mental health evaluation and that [CYS] made 

the referral for an evaluation. However, he could not schedule 

an appointment because he did not have a social security card 

and he needed a new medical insurance card.

At the time the [t]ermination [p]etition was filed, on 

September 17, 2014 and subsequently served upon Father on 

September 24, 2014, he had still not made any further progress 

on his plan. He was still working on his insurance issues 

regarding his mental health evaluation, but it had still not been 

scheduled and he had not even scheduled a domestic violence 

evaluation or started parenting.

By the time of the thirty-month permanency review 

hearing on November 5, 2014, Father had finally completed a 

mental health evaluation and was placed on a list for a 

Personalized Parent Trainer [(“PPT”)], was attending parenting 

classes, and was waiting for his domestic violence evaluation. 

The delay in the PPT referral was the direct result of Father’s 

failure to complete his mental health evaluation since September 

16, 2011, when the [CPP] was approved. The domestic violence 

component of his plan was also pending since then.

The thirty-six month [p]ermanency [r]eview hearing was 

held on May 20, 2014. Father had finally completed his 

domestic violence evaluation in December [of] 2013, and it was 

recommended he undergo treatment. He was also working with 

a PPT, but concern was expressed about what could be 

accomplished with the termination proceeding pending and 

without services being provided directly in the home. The 

[b]onding [a]ssessment evaluations had been completed, but 

the report was pending.
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At the time of the [t]ermination [h]earing, on August 12, 

2014, it was reported that Father had finally started his domestic 

violence treatment with Child First Family Service in late July of 

2014. PPT services were suspended in late May, 2014 because 

of the pending termination proceeding and the need to increase 

visits and provide services in the home, if PPT services were to 

continue. Father had been compliant with PPT services up to 

that point in time. Father had continued to visit as scheduled.

The record supports the [trial c]ourt’s conclusion that 

Father had not completed his plan as of September 24, 2014. 

Father alleges that he was actively working his plan and that he 

had initiated efforts on all parts of his plan prior to that date, or 

that any delay in starting was not his fault, so that his Court 

must consider everything he did up to the time of the 

[t]ermination [h]earing on August 12, 2014. He claims that his 

plan was completed as of August 11, 2014, when he received his 

domestic violence certificate of completion.

The record does not support Father’s position that he had 

initiated services on all elements of his plan by September 24 

2014. [CYS] actually, and consistently, worked with Father over 

the years. While the record reflects some obstacles in getting 

some services in place, it was ultimately the responsibility of 

Father to secure the services and complete his goals. It is 

unfortunate that he wasted the ten months when T.M.B. was in 

the legal custody of [CYS] in 2010-2011 and failed to work on 

any of the components on the FSP. It is unfortunate that he 

waited to do anything on the current [CPP] approved by the 

[trial c]ourt until almost [fifteen] months had lapsed. It is 

unfortunate that he could not schedule a mental health 

evaluation because he did not have his social security card or a 

recent insurance card. These types of delays in receiving 

services were the responsibility of Father. By the time Father 

slowly started to actively work on his goals [CYS] was, as 

required by law, seeking permanency. The record is clear that 

the majority of the delay was the result of Father’s initial 

resistance to services, and subsequent conduct and behaviors. 

While Father did little, Mother, through the years, always 

seemed to do just enough to keep the goal as reunification. 

When Mother signed consents to adoption on September 24, 

2013, the posture of this case suddenly changed. Father found 
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himself two years into placement, having not completed his 

goals for reunification with [the C]hildren.

The problem is that Father’s progress started too late. He 

waited more than two years before appearing to get serious 

about completing his goals. He seemed content to allow others 

to raise [the] Children and parent them. The record is clear that 

he had not completed his plan as of September 24, 2013, and 

that while he was starting to make more progress, he had not 

started to actively work on the remainder of his goals under the 

plan. 

Trial Court Opinion, 2/13/15, at 9-12 (footnote omitted). 

The trial court found that Father failed to fulfill his parental duties and 

responsibilities for more than two years. Id. at 8. This Court has stated 

that a parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably 

prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 

326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long 

period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. at 340. 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1). We will not disturb the trial 

court’s determinations. In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 68, 73-74. 

The trial court must also consider how terminating Father’s parental 

rights would affect the needs and welfare of the Children relative to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Pursuant to section 2511(b), the trial court’s inquiry is 

specifically directed to a consideration of whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs of 
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the child. See In Re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005), 

appeal denied, 587 Pa. 705, 897 A.2d 1183 (2006). “Intangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the 

needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We have 

instructed that the court must also discern the nature and status of the 

parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing that bond. See id.

Instantly, the trial court found that termination of Father’s parental 

rights would serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the Children. Trial Court Opinion, 2/13/15, at 13. The trial court 

credited Dr. Ail’s testimony that the Children and Father do not have a 

meaningful bond or attachment. Id. Moreover, the trial court found, “if the 

bond could be repaired, any further delay in securing permanency for the 

Children would be unreasonable.” Id. 

With regard to E.R.A.’s relationship with Father, Dr. Ail testified that

E.R.A. would not be harmed if Father’s rights to E.R.A. were terminated, and 

that it would be in his best interest to terminate Father’s rights. Id. at 45, 

47. Dr. Ail testified that E.R.A. does not have a “solid attachment to 

[Father].” Id. at 86. 

With regard to T.M.B.’s relationship with Father, Dr. Ail testified:

[T.M.B.’s] attachment to [Father] is limited. And I note in my 

report that she did accept his hugs. She did let him place her in 

his lap. She let him participate in some activities with her. She 
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never, however, initiated or reciprocated those gestures or 

comments. When he would talk about loving her and each of the 

physical interactions that he had around an activity, she would 

follow by getting up and moving away from him and seek a 

different activity. That would create a break between them. 

[T.M.B.] clearly did not acknowledge his questions about 

returning to visit him at his home or what she would like to have 

in the future. And so I would describe her attachment to

[Father] as really ambivalent. She did identify him as [d]addy. 

She did include him in her play, but I didn’t see any sense of 

security in that attachment. 

N.T., 8/12/14, at 44-45. Moreover, Dr. Ail testified that T.M.B. would not be 

harmed if Father’s rights were terminated. Id. at 45. Ms. Landman testified 

that Father is “actively engaged” in visits with the Children and “pays 

attention to both of them.” Id. at 111. Nonetheless, Ms. Landman opined 

that termination of Father’s parental rights would be in the best interest of 

the Children. Id. at 112-113. 

With respect to the Children’s relationship with their foster parents, Dr. 

Ail testified that there is a “very strong attachment between the Children 

and foster parents”. Id. at 40. Dr. Ail testified that E.R.A. has separation 

anxiety due to his desire to not be separated from his foster mother. Id. at 

41. Dr. Ail explained that E.R.A. was placed with foster parents soon after 

birth and that E.R.A. has remained with them consistently. Id. Dr. Ail 

testified that T.M.B. “clearly has had a very stable placement there, and the 

family they have been placed with has been very warm, and loving towards 

them.” Id. at 41. Dr. Ail testified that E.R.A. and T.M.B.’s “successes are 

fragile and incomplete, and removing them from the current foster parents 
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would be disastrous.” Id. at 85. Ms. Landman testified that the Children 

are “doing really well” in their foster home, and “seem very comfortable 

there, very happy.” Id. at 112. 

While Father professed that he loves the Children, this Court has held 

that a parent’s love of his child, alone, does not preclude a termination. See 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). In addition, our Supreme 

Court explained that, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child 

to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.” 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

Upon careful review of the record, we find that competent evidence of 

record supports the trial court’s determination that there was no bond 

between Father and the Children which, if severed, would be detrimental to 

the Children, and that the termination of Father’s parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the Children. Thus, we will not disturb the 

trial court’s determinations. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74. We affirm 

the decrees terminating Father’s parental rights on the basis of section 

2511(a)(1) and (b).

Next, we address Father’s challenge to the change of the permanency 

goals for the Children to adoption. This Court has stated:

When reviewing an order regarding the change of a placement 

goal of a dependent child pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. 

C.S.A. § 6301, et seq., our standard of review is abuse of 

discretion. When reviewing such a decision, we are bound by 
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the facts as found by the trial court unless they are not 

supported in the record. 

In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we 

must determine that the court’s judgment was manifestly 

unreasonable, that the court did not apply the law, or that the 

court’s action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, 

as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial court’s 

findings of fact that have support in the record. The trial court, 

not the appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of 

evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts 

in the testimony. In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial 

court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. When 

the trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of 

record, we will affirm even if the record could also support an 

opposite result.

In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act sets forth the following pertinent 

inquiries for the reviewing court: 

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the 

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child.
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(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the 

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize 

the permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

. . .

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of 

the last 22 months or the court has determined that 

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable 

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the 

child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family need not be made or 

continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed 

or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a

qualified family to adopt the child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best suited to 

the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling 

reason for determining that filing a petition to terminate 

parental rights would not serve the needs and welfare of 

the child; or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with 

necessary services to achieve the safe return to the child’s 

parent, guardian or custodian within the time frames set 

forth in the permanency plan.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9). 

In addition:

The trial court must focus on the child and determine the goal 

with reference to the child’s best interests, not those of the 

parents. “Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must 

take precedence over all other considerations.” Further, at the 
J-S41001-15; J-S41002-15

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review hearing for a dependent child who has been removed 

from the parental home, the court must consider the statutorily 

mandated factors. “These statutory mandates clearly place the 

trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.”

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis in original) 

(citations and quotations omitted).

Here, the record reflects that the trial court appropriately considered 

the Children’s best interests in deciding whether to change the permanency 

goal to adoption. The competent evidence in the record supports the trial 

court’s determinations, as Father will not be able to provide proper parental 

care and control for the Children. Thus, we will not disturb them. See In re 

M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74.

After careful review, we affirm the decrees terminating Father’s 

parental rights on the basis of section 2511(a)(1) and (b), and the orders 

changing the permanency goals for the Children to adoption. 

Decrees and orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2015