NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0626n.06 No. 08-5247 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. L UCAS L . BROWN, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T FO R TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: NO RRIS, M OORE and M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Lucas Br own pleade d g uilty to thr ee counts of being
a f e l o n i n p o s s e s s i o n o f a f

i r e ar m i n v i o l a t i o n o f 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 9 2 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) ; p o s s e s s i o n w i t h int e nt t o distribute more than five gra m s o f cr ack c ocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) a nd (b )( 1) (B ); a nd

of kn ow ing ly

po sse ssi nga

fi re arm in f ur the ra nc e of a dr ugtr a ff ic kin g of fe ns e in vio lati o no f

1 8 U
. S. C. § 9 2 4 ( c ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( i)
. T h e p r e s e n te n c e in v e s ti g a ti o nr e p o rt ( “ PS R”)
rec omm en d ed that Br own be se ntence d as a c are er of fende r under

§ 4B1.1 of

the United States SentencingGuidelines bec ause he had two prior convictions for felony drug offe nses. B rown moved for a down w a r d d e parture from the c are er of fende r g uideline ra

ng e, ar g uing that the prior convic tions
o v er s t at edh i s p as tcr i m i n al co n d u ct b ec au s e t h o s e o ff

en s es i n v o l v ed o n l y s m al l am o u n t s o f d ru gs and re sulted in probation.- 2 -

After hear ing B rown’s ar gu ments in support of his positi on that his prior convictions overstate d his criminal history , the di strict court determined that the PSRproper ly classified B rown
as a ca re er offe nder. The district court ac knowledg ed that it had discre tion to im pose a se ntence outside the ca

ree r off ender g uideline ra

ng e but dec lined to do so in this case beca use it found that Br own had not demonstrated that he c ould lead a “ law-a biding life .” As grounds for de ny ing B ro wn ’s mot ion , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ob se rv e d that the c are e r of fe nd e r pr ov isi on wa s pr omu lg a te d in pa rt to p re dic t the lik e lih oo d of re c idi vis m, a nd –s ta tin g that su c h li ke lih oo d “ is n ot a ll that g re a t” in
case s where a def

endant ha s not violate d the law for a leng thy period–found that Br own had not g one for a ny substantial period of his adult life wit h o u t b re ak i ng the law. The district court fur ther observe d that many

of B rown’s infr actions involved drug s or g uns, or both. Noting that it had considere d the statutory sentenc ing f

actor s require d by

18 U.S.C. § 3 553(a) , the district court sente nced Brow n to 322 months of imprisonm ent, the lowest e nd of the guidelines
ra ng e . I n de te rm ini ng B ro wn ’s se nte nc e , the dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d that the P S R cor re c tly calc ulated the a

pplicable guideline ra

n ge as 3 2 2 to 387 months of imprisonm ent base d upon an
a d j u s t e d o f f e n s e l e v e l o f

2 7 an d a c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y c a t e g o r y o f V I. On appe al, B rown c h al l en ges the re asonable ness his sentence . We reviewa sente nce f or
rea sonablene ss under an abuse- of-discr etion standard. Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Reasonable ness re view has bo t h a p ro cedur al and substantive c omponent. Id. Her e, B rown challeng es only

the substantive re asonable ness of his sentenc e. I n revie wing a sen t en ce for substantive reasona bleness, we normally

must consider “the totality of circ umstances,” and ac cord ‘d u e defe renc e’ to the district c ourt’s conc lusion that the sentenc e imposed is w arr anted by the § 3553(a ) fa ctors.” United St ates v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 581- 3 -

(6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Ga ll). Mo reov er, a di str ic t c ourt se nte nc e that f

a lls wi thi n a

pr op e rl y calc ulated g uideline’s ra

ng e may be af forde d a pre sumption of reasona bleness. Ga ll , 522 U.S. at 51. H o w e v e r, th e s tatute g o v e r n in g c r im in a l a

p p e a ls , 1 8 U
. S. C. § 3 7 4 2 ( a ) , d o e s n o t r e c o g n iz e as a g round for

appea l a claim that the district c ourt abused its discr etion in r efusingto depar t from the a pp lic a ble g uid e lin e ra

ng e un le ss t

he se nte nc ing de te rm inatio n “ re ste d on [the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ] mistaken belief that it lacked the leg al power to gr ant a de parture .” Un ite d S tat es v . R uiz , 5 36 U. S. 62 2, 62 7 ( 20 02 ); se e als o Uni te d Stat es v. P uc k e tt , 422 F.3d 340, 344- 46 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that denial of dow nwar d depar ture is not revie wable on a ppeal unless dist ri ct cour t was unaw are of or did no t un de rs tand

its dis c re tio n to make su c h d e pa rt ur e ); United States v. Mapp , 311 F. App’ x 738, 74 0 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 8) (n oti ngsame , p os t- Ga ll). I n Br o wn ’s view, the c are er of fende r g uideline ra

ng e should not apply

beca use the two predic ate f

elony convictions over- repr esent the se riousness of his cr iminal histo r y in that both crimes inv olv e d o nly

sma ll amo un ts of dr

ug s and re su lte d in pro batio n. He po int s o ut t hat th e fi rs t pr e dic a te offe nse wa s a drugtraff

icking conviction involving less than one -half of a g ram of c rac k coca ine. Although he was sente nced to six y ear s of imprisonment, the sentence was suspende d and he w as p l a c e d o np r o b a t i o n . T h e s e c o n d p r e d i c a t e o f

f e n s e w a s a

dr u g t r a f f i c k i n g c o n v i c t i o ni n v o l v i n g f o rt ytw o g ra ms o f m ari

jua na . T hat c on victio n res ul ted in a on e -y e ar p ri so n s e nte nc e , w hic h w a s a lso suspended to probation. Although B rown attempts t o ch ar ac t er ize the issue on appea l as whethe r the district cour t
acc orded too much w eig ht to a single § 3553(a) fac tor in selectinga sente nce that was sufficie nt but
no t g re a te r t

ha n ne c e ssa ry to co mpl y wi th the purp os e s of the se nte nc ing statut e , the su bs tanc e of his challeng e i s appropr iately char acte rized as whethe r the district cour t erre d in declining to depar t from- 4 -

the ca ree r off ender g uidelines. Thus, under Ru iz , we must deter mine wheth er we have statutory jurisdiction to consider his appea l. We conclude that we do not. The district cour

t corre ctly

deter mined that Br own was subjec t to t h e ca re er of fende r g uid e lin e ra

ng e . Th e re c or d cle arl y de mon str a te s tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt re c og nize d it s a

uth or ity to imp os e a se nte nc e be low

the a pp lic a ble g uid e lin e ra

ng e bu t e le c te d n ot t o e xer c ise that a uth or ity based upon its findi ng that the circumstances of the ca se did not warr ant doing so. We theref ore la ck jurisdiction to review the district c ourt’s denia l of such depa rture. Th e jud g me nt i s aff

irm ed
.- 5 -

KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circuit Judge, di ssenting. The de fenda nt-appe llant’s brief pr e se nts the iss ue on a

pp e a l wh e the r the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc e wa s su bs tanti ve ly

un re a so na

ble in its le ng th i n li g ht o f t

he rel e va nt f a c ts a nd 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ). Th is i s a ty pic a l po st- Booke r substantive-re asonable ness question over w hich we have jurisdiction, completely distinct from the depar ture iss ue addressed by

the majority
. See , e.g. , United States v. Mc Bride , 434 F.3d 470, 474–77 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) . T he re fo re , I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.