Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1509-DR-1332 | February 4, 2016 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Andrea L. Ciobanu

Alex Beeman

Ciobanu Law, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael C. Feldhake,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Meryle Lowe (Feldhake),

Appellee-Petitioner

February 4, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1509-DR-1332

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Michael Keele, 

Judge

The Honorable Victoria M. 

Ransberger, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D07-1304-DR-15091

Baker, Judge.
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[1] Michael Feldhake appeals the judgment of the trial court (1) finding that Meryle 

Lowe complied with the trial court’s previous order to pay Feldhake $1,200 and

(2) ordering Feldhake to pay $750 in attorney fees. Acknowledging that the 

evidence presented by Lowe regarding her payment appears to be quite 

dubious, we are nevertheless compelled to affirm the trial court’s decision given 

our standard of review. 

Facts

[2] This is the second case before us arising from the dissolution of Feldhake and 

Lowe’s marriage. The facts relating to the dissolution are laid out in our 

previous memorandum decision and we will not recount them here. Feldhake v. 

Feldhake, No. 49A04-1405-DR-250 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2015). Our previous 

decision involved Feldhake’s challenge to various aspects of the trial court’s 

division of property. We largely affirmed the trial court, but remanded for the 

limited purpose of determining whether Lowe had complied with a provisional 

order, which required her to pay Feldhake $600 a month to cover mortgage 

payments for the months of December 2013 and January 2014. Id. at 6. 

[3] On March 6, 2015, the trial court issued an order on the remanded issues, 

ordering Lowe to either prove that she had already made the payments or pay 

Feldhake the $1,200 owed. The trial court gave Lowe forty-five days to comply 

with this order. On April 17, 2015, Lowe attempted to prove that she had made 

the payments by submitting a “Verified Notice of Partial Compliance with 

Order of Remanded Issues” to the trial court. Appellant’s App. p. 21-22. 
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Attached to the notice were copies of checks for $600 each, which purported to 

cover amounts due in November and December 2013. However, the 

November 2013 payment had never been at issue and the notice, quite 

inexplicably, contained no documentation of, or even reference to, the January 

2014 payment that was at issue. Feldhake was suspicious that the copies of the 

checks may have been forgeries, as he believed, mistakenly, that one of the 

checks had been cashed before it had been signed. He filed a response to 

Lowe’s notice on April 22, 2015, arguing that Lowe had not complied with the 

trial court’s order “and maybe committed fraud on the court.” Id. at 30. On 

May 11, 2015, he filed a motion for Lowe to show cause as to why she should 

not be held in contempt. 

[4] On July 23, 2015, the trial court held a summary hearing on all pending issues. 

As to whether Lowe had made the January payment, Lowe’s counsel presented 

the only evidence on the issue, stating that Lowe’s “testimony would be she 

made a cash payment around that time to [Feldhake’s] friend Ricky to provide 

to [Feldhake].” Tr. p. 8. On July 30, 2015, the trial court denied Feldhake’s 

contempt petition. The trial court held that Lowe had “demonstrated she 

satisfied her obligation to pay the mortgage payments” and that “the checks 

were not in fact fraudulent.” Appellant’s App. p. 56. It further found that 

Lowe “incurred attorney’s fees to address this wrongful allegation” and ordered 

Feldhake to pay Lowe $750. Id. at 57. Feldhake now appeals. 
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Discussion and Decision

[5] Although neither party to this case requested that the trial court make findings 

of fact before rendering its judgment, the trial court did so sua sponte. When a 

trial court makes findings on its own motion, the general judgment will control 

as to the issues upon which the court has not found and the specific findings 

will control as to the issues they cover. In re Marriage of Snemis, 575 N.E.2d 650, 

653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). We will reverse the trial court’s findings only if they 

are clearly erroneous and the general judgment will be affirmed if it can be 

sustained upon any legal theory supported by the evidence produced at trial. Id. 

[6] The proceedings at issue here were conducted in summary fashion. Our 

Supreme Court has observed that 

[s]ummary proceedings function to efficiently resolve disputes by 

allowing parties and the court to forego the use of formal rules of 

procedure and evidence and instead allow the court to base its 

findings and conclusions upon the arguments of counsel and 

limited evidence. Summary proceedings commonly take place when 

parties are not disputing essential facts, but rather the legal outcome 

compelled by those facts. 

Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 739 (Ind. 2015) (emphasis added). 

[7] In this case, the hearing was held to determine essentially one disputed fact—

whether Lowe had made the January payment. As such, summary proceedings 

were plainly not ideal. However, it appears from the record that both parties 

agreed to summary proceedings and raised no objection. See tr. p. 5, 11-12. As

both parties chose to forego the possible advantages of an evidentiary hearing,
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any challenge to the nature of these proceedings has been waived. Bogner, 29 

N.E.3d at 740. 

[8] Feldhake first argues that the trial court erred in finding that Lowe made the 

January payment. He argues that the November and December checks cannot 

possibly support an inference that a January payment was made. He further 

argues that counsel’s statement that Lowe’s “testimony would be she made a 

cash payment around that time to [Feldhake’s] friend Ricky to provide to 

[Feldhake],” was “dismissed” by the trial court. Tr. p. 8; Appellant’s Br. p. 15. 

[9] While we agree with Feldhake that the November and December checks cannot 

possibly be construed as evidence of a January payment, we cannot agree that 

Lowe’s testimony regarding payment she made to Ricky was dismissed by the 

trial court. See tr. p. 8. Our own skepticism aside, this statement, if believed, 

would have provided the trial court a basis for finding that the January payment 

had been made. Though the veracity of this statement could have been, and 

certainly should have been, challenged in an evidentiary hearing, Feldhake 

chose to forego this opportunity. This Court cannot entertain requests to 

reweigh evidence from a paper record. 

[10] Feldhake next argues that the trial court erred in awarding Lowe $750 in 

attorney fees. Indiana Code section 31-15-10-1(a) grants the trial court 

authority to order a party to pay another party’s reasonable attorney fees in a 

dissolution of marriage proceeding. The trial court has broad discretion in 

awarding attorney fees and we will reverse the award only upon an abuse of 
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discretion. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 501-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “In 

assessing such fees, any misconduct on the part of one of the parties that 

directly results in the other party incurring additional fees may be taken into 

consideration.” Id. at 502. 

[11] Here, the trial court found that

[Feldhake] has indicated to the court that [Lowe] “perpetrated a 

fraud upon the court” by submitting fraudulent copies of checks 

to the court. As [Lowe] demonstrated, the checks were not in 

fact fraudulent.

[Lowe] incurred attorney’s fees to address this wrongful 

allegation by [Feldhake], in addition to defending [Feldhake’s] 

unsuccessful contempt petition.

Appellant’s App. p. 56-57. 

[12] Feldhake argues that the trial court misconstrued the nature of his contempt 

petition. He maintains that Lowe was in contempt for failing to comply with 

the trial court’s order to prove that she had paid Feldhake within forty-five days 

of the trial court’s order on remand. Feldhake acknowledges that he alleged 

that Lowe “maybe committed fraud on the court” by submitting fraudulent 

checks. Id. at 30. He contends, however, that the gravamen of his complaint 

was that Lowe had simply not abided by the court’s order by failing to even 

attempt to prove that the January payment had been made. Feldhake believes

that his speculation as to possible fraudulent checks was not central to his 

claim.
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[13] However, the trial court acknowledged that Feldhake’s allegation of check 

forgery was not central to his claim, but nevertheless noted that Lowe had 

incurred fees to address “this wrongful allegation” in addition to defending the 

contempt petition generally. Id. at 57. This is true, as Lowe had to take 

additional steps to prove that these checks were authentic. Consequently, the 

trial court was within its discretion to award Lowe attorney fees insofar as they 

related to defending this allegation. And Feldhake does not dispute the amount 

awarded. 

[14] We close by noting that we are sympathetic to Feldhake’s argument. Assuming 

Lowe was not intentionally trying to mislead the trial court, her attempt to 

prove compliance with its order by sending copies of checks for the incorrect 

months was still unacceptable by any measure. However, Feldhake’s decision 

to agree to summary proceedings invited the trial court to accept unchallenged 

evidence. While this evidence may appear slim to us, it is nevertheless 

sufficient if it is to be believed. As we have not had the benefit of observing the 

parties, we can form no opinion as to their credibility, and cannot conclude that 

the judgment was error. 

[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.