IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 22, 2018

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ASHLEY JUVINALL

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sevier County

Nos. 22059 & 22079-III Rex Henry Ogle, Judge

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No. E2017-01906-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Ashley Juvinall, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000, 

theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, theft of property valued under 

$500, and fraudulent use of a credit card in exchange for an effective sentence of four 

years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. A

probation violation warrant was issued alleging multiple violations and, after a hearing, 

the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation sentence, ordering that she serve her

sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it revoked her probation sentence. After review, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., joined.

Susan H. Harmon, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ashley Juvinall.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Counsel;

James B. Dunn, District Attorney General; and R. Patrick Harrell, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

On December 6, 2016, the Defendant entered guilty pleas to theft of property 

valued over $1,000, theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000, theft of 

property valued under $500, and fraudulent use of a credit card. Pursuant to the 

agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve four years, eleven months, 

and twenty-nine days on supervised probation. In July 2017, the Defendant’s probation 

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officer filed a probation violation report, alleging that the Defendant had violated the 

terms of her probation sentence by failing to report, failing to complete Relapse 

Prevention, and failing to submit to an ordered drug screen on May 1, 2017. The report 

also alleged that the Defendant tested positive for morphine and oxycodone on April 20, 

2017, morphine on May 2, 2017, and cocaine and morphine on May 15, 2017. The trial 

court issued a probation violation warrant, and a hearing was held on the allegations.

At the probation violation hearing, the Defendant pleaded guilty to violating the 

terms of her probation. Keith Vincent, the Defendant’s probation officer, testified that 

the Defendant failed to report after being discharged unsuccessfully from Crossville 

Mission Bible Center on June 6, 2017. The Defendant also failed to complete “Relapse 

Prevention,” tested presumptively positive for morphine and oxycodone on April 20, 

2017, and signed an “admission of use.” He stated that the Defendant failed to submit to 

a drug screen on May 1, 2017, and tested presumptively positive on May 2, 2017, for 

morphine. Mr. Vincent noted that the May 2, 2017 sample was “not large enough to send 

for confirmation.” The Defendant also tested positive on May 15, 2017, for cocaine and 

morphine. 

Mr. Vincent testified that, initially, it was “recommended” that the Defendant 

participate in “Relapse Prevention.” Thereafter, the Defendant entered inpatient 

treatment following hospitalization for an “almost overdose.” The Defendant remained 

in “detox” for approximately seven days before transferring to Crossville Mission Bible 

School for treatment. Mr. Vincent stated that the Defendant was admitted on June 14, 

2017, and discharged on June 25, 2017, before successful completion. 

On cross-examination, Mr. Vincent testified that only one of the drug screens was 

sent for lab confirmation. He explained that the other samples were not sent due to 

insufficient amounts for testing. When asked about the Defendant’s compliance with 

probation before her hospitalization, Mr. Vincent said that the Defendant had failed to 

report on one occasion and failed to complete “Prosocial Life Skills,” as she had been 

ordered to do. 

The Defendant testified that she did not complete the treatment at Crossville 

Mission Bible School because “[i]t was just not for [her]. . . . [I]t was a little more 

intensive. . . . [And she] was very uncomfortable there.” The Defendant said that the 

environment was “[l]ike a cult.” The Defendant explained her relapse, saying that she 

began dating a man that she “shouldn’t have.” She said that he provided her with drugs,

and she felt coerced to use them. She said that this man, at the time of the probation 

violation hearing, was in jail for aggravated assault against her. The Defendant stated 

that she had been “clean” for thirty-five days, the duration of her incarceration. The 

Defendant confirmed that she had one child of whom she had joint custody. The 
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Defendant confirmed that she wanted to undergo intensive outpatient treatment in an 

effort to better herself. 

After hearing the evidence, the trial court, made the following findings:

Based on the evidence the court has heard, her admission of guilt, 

the circumstances surrounding her discharge from treatment, the fact that 

she cannot seem to stay clean outside of jail, in fact she has stayed clean in 

jail, that she is living proof that she needs to be incarcerated until she learns 

to stay clean. The court is going to revoke her probation and order her to 

execute her sentence. 

It is from this judgment the Defendant now appeals. 

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

revoked her probation. She also alleges that the trial court predetermined her sentence on 

the day of the probation violation hearing. The State responds that the trial court acted 

within its discretion when, after determining that the Defendant had violated the terms of 

her probation, it revoked the probation sentence. We agree with the State.

A trial court’s authority to revoke a suspended sentence is derived from Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 40-35-310 (2014), which provides that the trial court possesses 

the power “at any time within the maximum time which was directed and ordered by the 

court for such suspension, . . . to revoke . . . such suspension” and cause the original 

judgment to be put into effect. A trial court may revoke probation upon its finding by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a violation of the conditions of probation has 

occurred. T.C.A. § 40-35-311(e) (2014). “In probation revocation hearings, the 

credibility of witnesses is to be determined by the trial judge.” State v. Mitchell, 810 

S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). If a trial court revokes a defendant’s 

probation, options include ordering confinement, ordering the sentence into execution as 

originally entered, returning the defendant to probation on modified conditions as 

appropriate, or extending the defendant’s period of probation by up to two years. T.C.A. 

§§ 40-35-308(a), (c), -310 (2014); see State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1999).

The judgment of the trial court in a revocation proceeding will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. See State v. Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d 553, 

554 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Smith, 909 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In 

order for this Court to find an abuse of discretion, “there must be no substantial evidence 

to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation 
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has occurred.” Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d at 554. Further, a finding of abuse of discretion 

“‘reflects that the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed in light of 

the factual circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular case.’” Id.

at 555 (quoting State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn. 1999)).

The record in this case provided substantial evidence to support the trial court’s 

revocation of probation. First, the Defendant pleaded guilty to the violations. The 

Defendant’s admission of a violation has itself been held to be “substantial evidence” that 

the violation took place. State v. Glendall D. Verner, No. M2014-02339-CCA-R3-CD, 

2016 WL 3192819, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 31, 2016), perm. app. 

denied (Tenn. Sept. 30, 2016) (citing State v. Yvonne Burnette, No. 03C01-9608-CR00314, 1997 WL 414979, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 25, 1997); see State 

v. Zantuan A. Horton, No. M2014-02541-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 4536265, at *3 (Tenn.

Crim. App., at Nashville, July 28, 2015) (stating that a defendant who admitted violating 

the terms of his probation conceded an adequate basis for finding of a violation); State v. 

Gordon Herman Braden, III, No. M2014-01402-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2445994, at *2 

(Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 22, 2015); State v. Neal Levone Armour, No. 

E2003-02907-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2008168, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville,

Sept. 9, 2004) (“Essentially, then, the defendant conceded an adequate basis for a finding 

that he had violated the terms of probation.”)).

In addition to the Defendant’s admission, we conclude that the State presented 

adequate proof that she did, in fact, violate her probation. A requirement of the 

Defendant’s probation was that she would not use intoxicants of any kind or possess 

narcotic drugs. Further, she agreed to submit to drug screens as directed. The Defendant 

was also required to report to her Probation Officer as instructed and complete all referral 

programs. By the time of the hearing, the Defendant had tested presumptively positive 

on three drug screens, admitted to drug use, failed to report to Mr. Vincent after 

unsuccessful discharge from the Crossville Mission Bible Center, failed to complete 

Relapse Prevention, and failed to submit to an ordered drug screen; thus, the evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding of a violation. 

After the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the terms of her

probation, it retained discretionary authority, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 40-35-310(b), to order the Defendant to serve her sentence in incarceration. The 

determination of the proper consequence of a probation violation embodies a separate 

exercise of discretion. State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 647 (Tenn. 1999). Case law 

establishes that “an accused, already on probation, is not entitled to a second grant of 

probation or another form of alternative sentencing.” State v. Jeffrey A. Warfield, No. 

01C01-9711-CC-00504, 1999 WL 61065, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 10, 

1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 28, 1999).
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the 

Defendant to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. The Defendant 

repeatedly tested positive for drugs and admitted to drug use. The Defendant provided no 

explanation as to why she failed to report after unsuccessful discharge from a treatment 

program but said the discharge was because she wasn’t “comfortable” with the available 

treatment. The Defendant testified that she had been “clean” for thirty-five days, the 

duration of her incarceration, and admitted that she was not “clean” prior to incarceration. 

The record supports the trial court’s order requiring the Defendant to serve the remainder 

of the original sentence incarcerated. 

The Defendant asserts that the trial court should have reinstated her probation 

sentence because this was her first violation; however, as stated above, a defendant is 

“not entitled to a second grant of probation.” Id. The trial court correctly found that the 

Defendant had violated her probation and then, in its discretion, properly determined the 

consequence of the violation.

The Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly predetermined her 

sentence on the day of the probation violation hearing. The Defendant asserts that, on the 

day of the hearing, the trial court stated in open court that “defendants who opted to do 

open pleas that day would be executing on their sentences.” In her brief, the Defendant 

states that neither she nor her attorney was present at the time of this statement but 

learned of the statement through conversations with others present in court at the time. 

She argues that, after the trial court made the alleged statement, the trial court “could not 

be perceived as impartial.” 

Initially, we agree with the State that the Defendant neither cited to the record on 

appeal in support of her argument nor did she present this issue for trial court review as

required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a) to preserve the issue for appeal. 

Beyond the bare assertion in the Defendant’s brief, the Defendant cites no testimony or 

other evidence in the record, to support this allegation. The record simply does not 

support the allegation of the Defendant that the trial court was not impartial. See Tenn. 

Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). Therefore, the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE