Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

February 2004 MISSILE DEFENSE 

Actions Being Taken 

to Address Testing 

Recommendations, 

but Updated 

Assessment Needed 

GAO-04-254 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-254.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Bob Levin at 

(202) 512-4841 or levinr@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-254, a report to 

Congressional Requesters 

February 2004

MISSILE DEFENSE:

Actions Being Taken to Address Testing 

Recommendations, but Updated 

Assessment Needed 

MDA is addressing most of DOT&E’s recommendations on flight testing but 

will not complete many actions before September 2004. For example, 

DOT&E recommended removing flight test range limitations by adding more 

intercept regions and launch locations to add greater realism to its tests. 

MDA is expanding the test range infrastructure to add five intercept regions 

and target and interceptor launches out of new locations. By September 

2004, one of the regions will be tested. 

MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E's proposals on ground testing. For 

example, although MDA had begun upgrading a ground facility to provide a 

realistic testing environment for the interceptor, MDA deferred testing at 

the facility to fund other priorities. Finally, MDA is addressing DOT&E's 

recommendations on discrimination--the system's ability to find an enemy 

warhead among decoys--by funding analysis programs. 

Predictions of how well the system will defeat long-range ballistic missiles 

are based on limited data. No component of the system to be fielded by 

September 2004 has been flight-tested in its deployed configuration. 

Significant uncertainties surround the capability to be fielded by September: 

MDA will not demonstrate in flight tests a critical radar called Cobra Dane 

before that date or conduct a system-level demonstration, and has yet to test 

its three-stage boosters as part of a planned intercept. 

GMD Interceptor 

In August 2000, the Defense 

Department ‘s (DOD) Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation 

(DOT&E), made 50 

recommendations on a test 

program for a system to defeat 

long-range ballistic missile threats 

against the United States. DOD’s 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 

plans to begin fielding the system 

by September 2004. 

GAO examined (1) how 

MDA addressed DOT&E’s 

recommendations and (2) what is 

known about the effectiveness of 

the system to be fielded by 

September 2004. GAO issued a 

classified report on this subject in 

June 2003. This unclassified, 

updated version reflects changes in 

MDA’s test schedule. 

GAO recommends DOT&E report 

on the status of MDA’s responses 

to its recommendations and advise 

MDA how to modify the test 

program to address long-standing 

concerns. DOD agreed with these 

recommendations, while noting 

there have been many changes in 

its test program and its acquisition 

strategy and structure since 

DOT&E’s August 2000 report. GAO 

revised the report to reflect the 

latest, approved test program but 

believes most DOT&E 

recommendations remain relevant 

given the significant technical 

challenges and uncertainties facing 

MDA. 
Page i GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Missile Defense Agency Actions Taken or Planned to Address 

DOT&E Recommendations 5

Characterization of Initial Defensive Capability 14

Conclusions 18

Recommendations for Executive Action 18

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 21 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 22 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

Abbreviations 

BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 

BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System 

CHOP Countermeasures Hands-On Program 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

DRR Deployment Readiness Review 

EKV Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle 

FY fiscal year 

GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HWIL Hardware in the Loop 

IFICS In-Flight Interceptor Communications System 

IFT Integrated Flight Test 

IOC Initial Operational Capability 

LFT&E Live Fire Test and Evaluation 

LIDS Lead System Integrator (LSI) Integrated Distributed Simulation 

MDA Missile Defense Agency 

NMD National Missile Defense 

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 

OPINE Operations in the Nuclear Environment 

ORD Operational Requirements Document 

UEWR Upgraded Early Warning Radar 

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Page 1 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

February 26, 2004 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John F. Tierney 

House of Representatives 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) within the Department of Defense 

(DOD) is developing and testing components of the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) element, which is intended to defeat long-range 

ballistic missile threats in the midcourse phase of flight.1

 When deployed, 

GMD will include (1) space- and ground-based sensors to provide early 

warning and tracking of missile launches; (2) ground- and sea-based radars 

to identify and refine the tracks of threatening missiles (called reentry 

vehicles) and associated objects; (3) ground-based interceptors, each 

consisting of a three-stage booster and kill vehicle, to destroy enemy 

missiles through “hit-to-kill” impacts outside the atmosphere; and (4) fire 

control nodes for battle management and execution of the GMD mission. 

In August 2000, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), 

submitted a report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics for consideration at DOD’s deployment 

readiness review for the National Missile Defense system.2

 The purpose of 

the report was to provide an independent assessment of the system’s 

potential operational effectiveness and suitability. Based on its assessment 

of the system at that time and the adequacy of testing in the context of 

 1

 The midcourse phase of flight refers to that portion of a ballistic missile’s trajectory 

between the boost phase and reentry phase when the warheads and decoys travel on 

ballistic trajectories above the atmosphere. 

2

 DOT&E is responsible for providing independent oversight of testing of major DOD 

acquisition programs to ensure that operational test and evaluation of major defense 

programs is adequate for verifying operational effectiveness and suitability for combat use. 

The Director is the principal operational test and evaluation official within DOD and 

advises the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics on operational test and evaluation. The Director also provides 

advice to responsible officials on developmental testing. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

deployment, it stated that test results supported a decision to continue 

development but not deployment. In the report, DOT&E stated that the 

current test program required augmentation and probably significant 

funding increases to demonstrate an operationally effective system for 

deployment. The report included a list of 50 detailed recommendations 

regarding the test program. In September 2000, the President decided to 

defer the deployment decision to the next administration, and MDA (then 

named the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization) continued with 

development of the system. 

In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense refocused the ballistic missile 

defense program into a broad-based research and development effort 

managed by MDA. The new program follows a “capability-based approach” 

and aims at developing layered defenses to intercept missiles in all phases 

of flight. According to MDA, such an approach adds flexibility to the 

acquisition process by permitting the development and testing of mature 

technologies for the quick delivery of some capability. The new approach 

also allows DOD to evolve and demonstrate additional improvements in 

missile defense systems before committing to procurement and 

operations. To this end, MDA is following a “block” approach, which 

defines, develops, produces or acquires, and fields operational capability 

in incremental blocks. Each block is designed to build capability into the 

system by introducing new or improved technology. The first block—

Block 2004—in this approach to offer a defensive capability builds upon 

MDA’s Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Test Bed for conducting 

more realistic testing of ballistic missile defense elements, of which GMD 

is the centerpiece. 

In December 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding 

components of the ballistic missile defense system for operational use by 

2004. That is, in addition to focusing resources on the development of the 

BMDS Test Bed for developmental testing of missile defense elements, he 

instructed MDA to build in an initial defensive capability that would 

protect the United States against long-range missile attacks. The Secretary 

of Defense stated that “...it would be a very preliminary, modest 

capability.” DOD decided to begin fielding an initial capability by 

September 2004. 

Because of the significance of recommendations made by DOT&E during 

DOD’s deployment readiness review and the decision by the President to 

deploy an initial defensive capability, you asked us to examine (1) the 

actions taken or planned by MDA that address the recommendations made 

by DOT&E, and (2) what is known about the effectiveness and limitations 
Page 3 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

of the initial defensive capability to defeat long-range ballistic missiles in 

the September 2004 time frame. The scope and methodology for our 

review is included in appendix I. 

We provided you with a classified report on this subject in June 2003. This 

is an unclassified version of that report, which has also been updated as of 

December 2003 to reflect changes in the GMD test program. In preparing 

this unclassified version, we removed details on some of our findings after 

an extensive declassification process. These details can be found in the 

classified version of the report. The current version has been reviewed by 

the DOD and approved for public release. 

Of the recommendations listed in the August 2000 DOT&E report—which 

we grouped under flight testing, ground testing, target discrimination, and 

programmatics categories—MDA is taking actions that, over time, address 

most of the flight testing recommendations but, by contrast, substantially 

fewer of the remaining recommendations. Specifically, 

• MDA is addressing most of the DOT&E’s recommendations on flight 

testing but will not complete many actions before September 2004. For 

example, DOT&E recommended the removal of flight test range 

limitations by adding more intercept regions and launch locations to 

achieve new intercept geometries, higher closing velocities, and longer 

ranges flown by the interceptor. MDA is expanding the test range 

infrastructure through the development of the Test Bed to add five 

intercept regions and target and interceptor launches out of new locations. 

By September 2004, MDA will have tested in one of the five new intercept 

regions. Other DOT&E recommendations on enhanced realism and the 

elimination of artificialities in flight tests are being acted upon by MDA, 

but full realization will take time to complete. 

• MDA is generally not addressing DOT&E’s recommendations on ground 

testing. For example, although MDA had taken steps to proceed with the 

design and construction of a hardware-in-the-loop laboratory at the Arnold 

Engineering Development Center in Tennessee, comprehensive testing of 

the kill vehicle in this facility has been deferred beyond Block 2004 

because of funding constraints. However, lethality testing for GMD 

engagements on the ground has been enhanced with investments in the 

Hypersonic Upgrade Program facility at Holloman Air Force Base. 

• MDA is generally addressing DOT&E’s recommendations on 

discrimination—the system’s ability to identify the true reentry vehicle 

from among decoys and associated objects. MDA has substantially 

increased the scope of work being done in discrimination, but MDA’s flight 

tests planned through September 2007 are not designed to address the 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

challenge posed by the certain countermeasures that DOT&E identified as 

simple for an enemy to implement. MDA maintains that the complexity 

and challenge of target suites used in integrated flight tests will increase as 

the discrimination capability is incrementally proven. 

The predicted effectiveness of the initial defensive capability to defeat 

long-range ballistic missiles is currently based on a limited set of flight-test 

data. For example, none of the components of the initial defensive 

capability to be fielded in September 2004—interceptors, fire control 

nodes for battle management and execution, upgraded radars, and 

forward-deployed Aegis radars on Navy cruisers and destroyers—has been 

flight-tested in its deployed configuration. As such, current predictions of 

effectiveness are based on analysis and simulations of expected 

performance of constituent components. The most significant 

uncertainties surrounding the capability to be fielded in September 2004 

are (1) MDA does not plan to demonstrate capabilities of a critical radar 

for use with the GMD element, called Cobra Dane, in flight tests before 

that date; (2) MDA has yet to test both three-stage boosters as part of an 

attempted intercept; and (3) MDA does not plan to conduct a system-level 

demonstration of the initial defensive capability in flight testing before 

September 2004. Furthermore, a notable limitation of system effectiveness 

is the inability of system radars to perform rigorous target discrimination. 

The Cobra Dane radar and the upgraded early warning radar in California 

can perform rudimentary target discrimination, but the kill vehicle itself 

must perform final target selection during the endgame. 

The recommendations in this report also appeared in our classified 

June 2003 report. We have made these recommendations to provide 

decision makers DOT&E’s assessment of MDA’s actions related to 

concerns raised by DOT&E’s August 2000 report. In commenting on a 

draft of our June 2003 report, DOD agreed with our recommendations. 

The department raised concerns, however, that the GMD test program as 

described in this report is no longer current and the program strategy and 

structure have changed since DOT&E submitted its report. While the 

GMD test program has, indeed, been in a constant state of flux, thus 

complicating our analysis, our report presents the latest, approved test 

program information provided to us by MDA. Also, despite alterations to 

the acquisition strategy and structure of the ballistic missile defense 

system, we believe most of the DOT&E recommendations are still relevant 

because the technical challenges and uncertainty with developing, testing, 

and fielding effective defensive capabilities, as identified in the August 

2000 DOT&E report, remain significant. 
Page 5 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

The August 2000 DOT&E report summarized the progress, up to that date, 

of the National Missile Defense program and the adequacy of testing in the 

context of a deployment decision.3

 At the time, the development program 

revolved around a series of ground and flight tests and was to have 

culminated in an initial operational capability by the end of fiscal year 

2005. Formal test documentation called for a total of 16 integrated flight 

tests (system-level intercept attempts) through 2004 with three additional 

flight tests during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation during the 2005 

fiscal year. DOT&E’s principal finding was that ground and flight tests 

completed up to that time did not provide results of sufficient fidelity to 

support a deployment decision. Indeed, when the deployment readiness 

review was held, there had been two failed intercepts out of three 

attempts. Furthermore, as stated in the DOT&E report, ground testing was 

not adequate to yield credible estimates of GMD system performance. 

DOT&E indicated that the current test program required augmentation and 

probably significant funding increases to demonstrate an operationally 

effective system for deployment. Accordingly, the report included a list of 

detailed recommendations for enhancing the test program. 

DOT&E made 50 specific, interrelated recommendations, which we 

organized into the following four overarching categories: Flight Testing, 

Ground Testing, Target Discrimination,4 and Programmatics. Although 

DOT&E categorized discrimination-related recommendations under the 

flight-testing and ground-testing categories, we created a separate 

category because discrimination was of principal concern to DOT&E at 

the time. DOD classified the full text of the recommendations. A detailed 

assessment indicating whether actions have been initiated by MDA and 

what their timing is relative to the September 2004 initial defensive 

capability date can be found in our June 2003 classified report on this 

subject. A summary of MDA actions to address the DOT&E 

recommendations is provided below. 

Integrated flight tests of the GMD element are demonstrations of system 

performance during which an interceptor is launched to engage and 

intercept a target reentry vehicle (mock warhead) above the atmosphere. 

 3

 The National Missile Defense program is now referred to as the Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense (GMD) program, terminology we use from this point on. 

4

 Target discrimination is the identification of the true reentry vehicle from among decoys 

and associated objects. 

Missile Defense 

Agency Actions Taken 

or Planned to Address 

DOT&E 

Recommendations 

DOT&E Recommendations 

on Flight Testing 
Page 6 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

Many recommendations (20 of 50) in the DOT&E report pertain to aspects 

of integrated flight testing, such as deficiencies in flight-test complexity, 

operational realism, and artificialities. DOT&E’s concerns with the 

composition of target suites in flight tests for testing discrimination are 

discussed separately in the discrimination section of this report. DOT&E 

reported that increasing the scope of flight testing was essential to stress 

the limits of system design and to keep pace with system development. 

MDA is taking actions that address many of the shortcomings in flight 

testing DOT&E identified in its August 2000 report. Indeed, the 

development of the BMDS Test Bed—the agency’s key instrument for 

enhancing the existing test infrastructure to provide more realistic 

testing—should go far in addressing these DOT&E recommendations over 

the long term. Currently, flight tests are limited to target launches out of 

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and interceptor launches out of 

Kwajalein Missile Range in the western Pacific.5

 For enhancing the 

capabilities of integrated flight testing, the test bed adds an interceptor 

launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base; target launch facilities at 

Kodiak Launch Complex, Alaska; a GMD fire control node at Fort Greely, 

Alaska; an upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air Force Base, 

California; upgraded communication links among test bed components; 

and test infrastructure to support five additional intercept regions. The 

ship-based Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar is also available as a forward-deployed 

asset for early target tracking. In addition, the design and construction of a 

sea-based X-band radar, which would be positioned on a mobile platform 

in the Pacific, has been funded by MDA and is scheduled to be available 

for test bed utilization in late 2005. Other components of the BMDS Test 

Bed such as the Cobra Dane radar in Shemya, Alaska, and interceptors at 

Fort Greely will not actively participate in integrated flight tests at least 

through September 2007. 

Several August 2000 DOT&E recommendations call for integrated flight 

testing with Category B engagements6

 and scenarios with multiple 

threatening reentry vehicles, both of which are expected to be common 

 5

 Kwajalein Missile Range is now referred to as Reagan Test Site, terminology we use from 

this point on. 

6

 The GMD system is designed to launch interceptors under one of three “categories” of 

operation: (A) when a threat reentry vehicle has been tracked and discriminated by groundbased radars; (B) when ground-based radars have a track of the threat complex but 

discrimination is either incomplete or unavailable; or (C) when space-based sensors 

provide an early track of the boosting missile. 

Flight Test Complexity
Page 7 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

during operational missions. In addition, the recommendations call for 

integrated flight testing to be performed under increasingly difficult 

conditions and to be made more challenging through, for example, testing 

under various solar and weather conditions. Our analysis of the GMD test 

program as it pertains to flight test complexity, based on the March 2003 

Developmental Master Test Plan for the GMD element and related 

program documentation, is summarized below. 

• Flight Test Complexity—Actions Taken or Planned. The GMD test 

plan calls for Category B engagements beginning with Integrated Flight 

Test 15 (IFT-15), scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004. 

Furthermore, it indicates that Category B engagements would be a 

common occurrence of flight testing, because the weapon task plan7

would be generated from Beale or Aegis radar data. According to MDA 

officials, however, the decision to conduct future flight tests under 

Category B engagements is currently under review; the resolution will 

depend on the individual flight test scenario and the maturity of battle 

management assets. The GMD Developmental Master Test Plan also shows 

that an integrated flight test (designated IFT-22/23) in which two 

interceptors are launched against two attacking reentry vehicles (multiple 

simultaneous engagements) will be carried out in fiscal year 2007. 

• Flight Test Complexity—Actions Not Taken or Planned. Although 

previous flight tests have been conducted under limited adverse 

conditions (light rain), flight tests to assess the actual effects of severe 

weather on system performance are not currently planned. According to 

the program office, the verification of system performance in adverse 

weather will be achieved through modeling and simulation grounded in 

technical measurements and flight test data. Furthermore, a nighttime 

engagement was attempted during IFT-10 (December 2002), but the failure 

of the kill vehicle to separate from the surrogate booster precluded 

collection of any applicable data. 

The recommendations on operational realism reflect limitations of the 

current test range. Currently, intercept tests are constrained to a single 

corridor and intercept region—target launches out of Vandenberg Air 

Force Base and interceptor launches out of the Reagan Test Site. As a 

result, flight-test engagement conditions are limited to those with low 

closing velocities and short interceptor fly-out ranges. DOT&E called for 

 7

 A weapon task plan consists of pre-launch instructions for generating an interceptor 

flyout solution that places it on an intercept path with the target. Such a plan is required 

before an interceptor is launched. 

Operational Realism 
Page 8 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

an expansion of engagement conditions and suggested adding more 

intercept regions and launch locations to achieve new intercept 

geometries, higher closing velocities, and longer ranges flown by the 

interceptor during flight testing. 

• Operational Realism—Actions Taken or Planned. The expansion of 

the test range in the Pacific with the development of the BMDS Test Bed 

will have a significant impact on achieving operational realism in 

integrated flight tests. The Block 2004 Test Bed adds five intercept regions, 

target launches out of Kodiak Launch Complex, and interceptor launches 

out of Vandenberg Air Force Base. The combination allows for flight tests 

with new intercept geometries, additional crossing angles, higher closing 

velocities, and longer ranges flown by the interceptor. For example, IFT-15 

(fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004) will be conducted with a target launch 

out of Kodiak, and IFT-17 (fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005) will be the 

first test with an interceptor launched from Vandenberg. 

• Operational Realism—Caveats. The principal caveat to the associated 

MDA actions addressing operational realism is timing. By September 2004, 

one of the five new intercept regions, north of Reagan Test Site, will have 

been exercised. The remaining new intercept regions will not be exercised 

until after September 2004. For example, the two intercept regions off the 

west coast of the United States will be used in IFT-17 (fourth quarter of 

fiscal year 2005) and IFT-18 (fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005), 

respectively. A fourth intercept point will be exercised in IFT-21 (third 

quarter of fiscal year 2006). Finally, the fifth intercept point will be 

exercised as part of the multiple simultaneous engagement to be 

conducted in fiscal year 2007. 

The DOT&E recommendations on flight test artificialities—such as the 

removal of surrogates (test range assets emulating operational assets)—

also reflect limitations of the current test range. The most artificial 

surrogate noted in the August 2000 DOT&E Report was the placement of a 

C-band transponder8

 on the target reentry vehicle. The transponder was 

essential for the execution of flight tests, because in conjunction with the 

test range radar (designated FPQ-149

), there were no other non-artificial 

options available to track the reentry vehicle with sufficient accuracy for 

 8

 MDA defines a transponder as a “receiver-transmitter that will generate a reply signal 

under proper interrogation.” The missile defense community also refers to the transponder 

as the “C-band beacon.” 

9

 FPQ-14 is a C-band test-range radar located in Oahu, Hawaii. 

Artificialities 
Page 9 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

executing the mission. DOT&E argued that this artificiality be phased out 

and, in general, recommended the system utilized in integrated flight tests 

be as functional and representative as possible. 

• Artificialities—Actions Taken or Planned. Use of the 

transponder/FPQ-14 radar combination as a surrogate radar for midcourse 

tracking is planned to be phased out. Indeed, IFT-15 (fourth quarter of 

fiscal year 2004) would be the first test that does not use this surrogate for 

mission execution. Rather, in integrated flight tests IFT-15 and beyond, 

midcourse tracking of the target suite would be achieved through the use 

of the Beale upgraded early warning radar or, pending ongoing analysis by 

GMD, the Aegis SPY-1 radar. The eventual use of the sea-based X-band 

radar beginning in late 2005 can also be used for midcourse tracking. The 

removal of other surrogates is under way. For example, the short-range 

surrogate interceptor booster, which has been used in all flight tests to 

date, is scheduled to be replaced with two more operationally 

representative boosters beginning with IFT-14 (third quarter of fiscal year 

2004). 

• Artificialities—Actions Not Taken or Planned. The MDA is not 

currently considering conducting flight tests under unrehearsed and 

unscripted conditions. 

Overall, the current DOT&E has looked favorably on MDA’s actions that 

address its recommendations, because the GMD test infrastructure is 

being significantly enhanced to allow for more flight test complexity, 

operational realism, and artificialities. We noted, however, that since 

DOT&E’s August 2000 assessment, MDA has reduced the extent of the 

flight test program, as follows: 

• Integrated Flight Tests—Number of Cancellations. During the initial 

planning phases of the revised test program, MDA considered conducting 

four intercept attempts per year. But after considerable planning and 

contract evaluations, MDA limited the flight test program to no more than 

three intercept attempts per year because of overlapping test objectives 

and funding constraints. Significantly, the previous GMD test program at 

the time of the deployment readiness review called for a total of 19 

integrated flight tests to be carried out through fiscal year 2005. The 

current test program, however, now has a total of 12 integrated flight tests 

through fiscal year 2005—because of the cancellation of IFT-11, 12, and 16, 

and the conversion of IFT-13 to booster tests (IFT-13A and 13B). To date, 8 

of the 12 have been completed under largely the same test conditions that 

were critically assessed by DOT&E. In short, only two flight tests under 

improved test conditions with more representative hardware are planned 

Elimination of Flight Tests 
Page 10 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

to be conducted before September 2004, the time at which the initial 

defensive capability is scheduled to become available. 

• Operational Testing—No Longer Required. The previous GMD test 

program also called for operational testing—Initial Operational Test and 

Evaluation—by the military services. Operational testing is a statutory 

requirement for DOT&E to independently determine operational 

effectiveness and suitability of a deployed system for use by the 

warfighter. MDA does not plan to operationally test the Block 2004 GMD 

element before it is available for initial defensive operations. The 

September 2004 fielding is not connected with a full-rate production 

decision that would clearly trigger statutory operational testing 

requirements. Nonetheless, the Combined Test Force, a group of users and 

developers, plans tests to incorporate both developmental and operational 

test requirements in the test program. 

The 13 ground testing recommendations formulated by DOT&E in its 

August 2000 report are focused concerns encompassing four areas: 

(1) realistic testing of kill vehicle functions in a Hardware-in-the-Loop 

(HWIL) facility,10 (2) ground-based lethality testing, (3) development of the 

system-level simulation known as the Lead System Integrator Integration 

Distributed Simulation (LIDS), and (4) Operations in a Nuclear 

Environment (OPINE) testing of kill vehicle components. In general, 

DOT&E’s recommendations on ground testing are not being addressed. 

A number of the August 2000 DOT&E ground testing recommendations 

pertain to the hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle built by 

Raytheon. For example, a test article is placed in an evacuated chamber to 

simulate an exoatmospheric environment, and infrared radiation of a 

simulated target scene is projected onto the kill vehicle’s sensors. DOT&E 

recommended “that an innovative new approach needs to be taken 

towards hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, so that potential 

design problems or discrimination challenges can be wrung out on the 

ground in lieu of expensive flight tests.” DOT&E stated that, in order to 

verify kill vehicle performance, kill vehicle testing should be executed 

using actual unit hardware in a hardware-in-the-loop facility capable 

of providing a realistic space environment and threat scene. MDA 

had taken steps to proceed with the design and construction of a 

hardware-in-the-loop laboratory at the Arnold Engineering Development 

Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee. Although an initial test capability had been 

 10 Hardware-in-the-loop testing is the high fidelity ground testing of a test article in a 

realistic yet simulated environment. 

DOT&E’S 

Recommendations on 

Ground Testing 

Hardware-in-the-Loop Testing 
Page 11 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

planned for the 2004 time frame, testing at the Arnold Engineering facility 

has been deferred beyond Block 2004 based on Test Bed funding 

constraints. In response to a draft of this report, MDA stated that future 

investments and test events at this facility are subject to MDA internal 

management trade-offs among the numerous priorities associated with the 

whole missile defense program portfolio. 

DOT&E made recommendations in its August 2000 report for improving 

GMD lethality testing—testing aimed at assessing a kill vehicle’s 

effectiveness in destroying a reentry vehicle. Current test plans call for an 

approach whereby ground-based experiments are conducted to collect 

data to anchor simulations, which in turn are used to assess lethality 

performance. Indeed, GMD expects to anchor such simulations from data 

derived from improved “sled testing,” which uses full-scale targets in the 

newly developed Holloman Air Force Base Hypersonic Upgrade Program 

facility. However, there are no plans to conduct intercept flight tests of the 

interceptor’s ability to destroy threat representative targets that fulfill the 

Live Fire Test and Evaluation requirements. Rather, hit point information 

is collected from actual intercept tests, which, in turn, is used as input to 

simulations to determine whether the impact was lethal. 

Another area of ground testing recommendations identified in the August 

2000 DOT&E report concerned the development and use of system-level 

digital simulations. During the time of the deployment readiness review, 

the prime contractor’s principal tool for assessing system performance 

over a broad range of scenarios was the end-to-end digital simulation 

known as LIDS. Because the development of the simulation was behind 

schedule and unavailable to support analyses of overall system 

performance, DOT&E reported that results obtained from it should not be 

used in making a deployment decision. DOT&E recommended that LIDS 

capability be “evolved to a fully validated, high-fidelity simulation.” In 

addition, DOT&E recommended that LIDS be made flexible enough to 

permit independent use by test agencies. MDA disagrees with the 

recommendations pertaining to LIDS. MDA views LIDS as one of many 

tools to analyze performance aspects of the GMD element and does not 

believe that LIDS needs to be developed to the level expected by DOT&E. 

According to the agency, a baseline of models and simulations are 

available that are intended to collectively support the entire range of 

analysis required to verify the capabilities of the GMD elements. 

Furthermore, MDA asserts the evolution of LIDS from Software Build 4 to 

its current Software Build 6.1.0 has improved the flexibility of the system 

to allow for sensitivity analyses by government users. According to MDA, 

Lethality Testing 

LIDS 
Page 12 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

extensive analysis using LIDS has been conducted at the Joint National 

Integration Center at Shriever Air Force Base, Colorado. 

Finally, the remaining ground testing recommendations identified in the 

August 2000 DOT&E report focus on OPINE testing, which refers to the 

operation of individual GMD components in environments induced by 

nuclear explosions. Details can be found in the classified version of this 

report. 

Target discrimination is a critical function of a missile defense engagement 

that requires the successful execution of a sequence of functions, 

including target detection, target tracking, estimations of physical 

characteristics of tracked objects, and data fusion. DOT&E had two 

overarching concerns with the operational testing of the discrimination 

function: 

• Capability against diverse threats. Fundamentally, successful target 

discrimination requires that the defense be able to anticipate many 

characteristics of the threat. DOT&E, therefore, was concerned that 

discrimination algorithms may not be sufficiently robust to handle 

unanticipated threat scenes. 

• The quality and quantity of information known prior to testing.

DOT&E was concerned that every physical property of target objects is 

known with unrealistic accuracy in advance of flight tests. 

Twelve of 50 recommendations in the August 2000 DOT&E report pertain 

to the testing of the discrimination function. Specifically, DOT&E 

recommended adding challenging yet unsophisticated countermeasures to 

the target suites of integrated flight tests. DOT&E also recommended 

integrating countermeasures developed by the Countermeasures HandsOn Program11 (CHOP) into target suites of integrated flight tests. Finally, 

DOT&E recommended executing flight test events—either intercept 

attempts or risk reduction flights—that have a “pop quiz” component with 

respect to radar discrimination. Operationally, this type of flight test is 

 11 The CHOP program, based at the U.S. Air Force Phillips Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force 

Base in New Mexico, is an MDA-funded program chartered to develop, build, and test 

countermeasures using only technology available to emerging missile states. The program 

involves young scientists, engineers, and military officers who are not specifically trained 

in missile defense or countermeasures and are given access only to the open literature and 

commercial off-the-shelf technology. 

OPINE Testing 

DOT&E Recommendations 

on Target Discrimination 
Page 13 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

more representative of a true tactical engagement, because the exact 

composition and type of countermeasures flown in an actual engagement 

are generally unknown. Details can be found in the classified version of 

this report. 

Relative to the previous test program, MDA has substantially increased the 

scope of work being done in discrimination. MDA is pursuing a block 

approach that incrementally builds to a system-level discrimination 

architecture that incorporates a network of sensors. The idea is to observe 

the target suite throughout its trajectory using an array of ground- and 

space-based sensors and to combine individual observations to formulate 

a “discrimination solution.” MDA is also investing resources to study the 

discrimination problem and, for example, is moving forward with flight 

test events focused on radar discrimination and large analysis programs. 

MDA has plans to conduct four Radar Certification Flights through fiscal 

year 2006. These are non-intercept flight tests for comprehensively 

characterizing the discrimination capability of the X-band radar and to 

support the development of upgraded early warning radars. Furthermore, 

these tests are expected to have a “pop quiz” component to examine radar 

discrimination. MDA has not yet scheduled “pop quiz” testing in relation to 

kill vehicle’s capability to perform target discrimination. 

MDA initiated and continues to fund analysis programs for investigating 

promising technical concepts to improve its capabilities against enemy 

countermeasures. For example, one such program, Project Hercules, is 

focused on the development and testing of discrimination algorithms and 

draws on academic, government, and industry expertise. Details can be 

found in the classified version of this report. 

Despite MDA’s increased scope of work in the discrimination area, 

as described above, the agency’s specific actions pertaining to 

integrated flight testing only partially address the August 2000 DOT&E 

recommendations. No intercept flight tests of the current test plan, 

which goes through IFT-26 (fiscal year 2007), are planned to address 

the challenge posed by an enemy’s use of unsophisticated but more 

challenging countermeasures. Rather, agency officials told us that the 

technical challenges posed by such countermeasures are being analyzed 

and may be inserted into the flight test program at a later time. 
Page 14 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

The remaining five recommendations from the August 2000 DOT&E report 

pertain to concerns on programmatic issues, namely, adequacy of spares 

in flight testing, and performance requirements. MDA has not provided for 

adequate target or interceptor backups (hot spares) during flight tests. 

MDA officials stated that additional target and interceptor spares can be 

costly, but they are considering the issue. Even if implemented, MDA’s 

actions that address the recommendations on spares would not have a 

significant impact on the actual conduct of flight tests but would reduce 

schedule risk. 

When DOT&E made its recommendations in August 2000, the GMD 

element was being developed according to operational requirements. 

However, MDA is now following a fundamentally new acquisition 

strategy—one that is capability-based with no formal operational 

requirements developed by the services. Hence, MDA has no plans to 

reexamine the reliability requirements. Nonetheless, the current test 

program is addressing certain performance issues raised by DOT&E. 

For example, the GMD program office is tracking the prime contractor’s 

progress in meeting target discrimination goals. 

Under the new acquisition strategy outlined by the Secretary of Defense in 

his January 2002 memorandum, the ballistic missile defense program has 

been refocused into a broad-based research and development effort 

managed by MDA. The new program aims at developing layered defenses 

to intercept missiles in all phases of flight and, if directed, to use 

developmental prototypes and test assets to provide an early operational 

capability. And, as stated above, system development is not subject to the 

formal operational requirements developed by the Services. 

On December 16, 2002, the President directed DOD to begin fielding the 

first increment of the multi-element ballistic missile defense system in 

2004. The Secretary of Defense stated the next day that “...it would be a 

very preliminary, modest capability.” The initial defensive capability for 

defending the United States against long-range missiles would be based on 

the GMD element of the Test Bed and augmented with more interceptors 

and external sensors, as follows: 

• GMD Element as part of the BMDS. The principal components 

of the GMD element for defensive operations include a total of up to 

10 interceptors sited at Fort Greely (6) and Vandenberg Air Force Base (4); 

GMD fire control nodes at Fort Greely and Schriever Air Force Base for 

battle management and execution; an upgraded Cobra Dane radar at 

DOT&E Recommendations 

on Programmatics 

Characterization 

of Initial Defensive 

Capability 
Page 15 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

Eareckson Air Station; and an upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air 

Force Base. 

• External Sensors. Existing sensors external to the GMD element would 

also be available for defensive operations, including Defense Support 

Program satellites for early warning of missile launches, and three 

forward-deployed Aegis AN/SPY-1 radars on existing Navy destroyers for 

early midcourse tracking. 

The above assets comprise the initial configuration, which is scheduled 

for fielding by the end of September 2004. The agency’s near-term 

intention is to grow this capability by adding 10 interceptors at Fort 

Greely, a sea-based X-band radar, and an upgraded early warning radar at 

Fylingdales, England,12 by the end of 2005. 

MDA is moving forward, as directed by the President, with the fielding of 

an initial defensive capability by the end of the 2004 fiscal year to protect 

the United States from long-range missiles. MDA cannot at this time 

formulate a credible assessment of system-level effectiveness, because 

critical components like the Cobra Dane radar and interceptor boosters 

have yet to be developed and tested in a flight test environment, and no 

initial defensive capability is available for a system-level demonstration 

and evaluation. 

• Cobra Dane Radar. The capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar will not be 

demonstrated in flight testing before September 2004. It is an L-band 

phased array radar located at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya, Alaska, at 

the western end of the Aleutian chain. Its close proximity to Russia allows 

it to perform its primary mission of collecting data on intercontinental 

ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic missile test launches to 

the Kamchatka impact area. Since the Cobra Dane radar is currently being 

used in a surveillance mode, it does not require real time communications 

and data processing capabilities. After planned software and hardware 

upgrades to be completed in fiscal year 2004, it will have the additional 

mission to perform real-time acquisition and tracking, functions critical for 

ballistic missile defense. 

• Interceptor Boosters. In July 1998, the GMD prime contractor (Boeing) 

began developing a new three-stage booster for its ground-based 

interceptor from commercial off-the-shelf components. The contractor 

 12 The upgrading of the Thule early warning radar located in Greenland will not be part of 

the Block 2004 Test Bed; it has been deferred to Block 2006. 

Uncertainties of the Initial 

Defensive Capability 
Page 16 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

encountered difficulty, and by the time the booster was flight tested in 

August 2001, it was already about 18 months behind schedule. 

Subsequently, to reduce risk, MDA altered its strategy for acquiring a new 

booster for the GMD interceptor. Development of the original booster was 

transferred to Lockheed Martin, and MDA authorized the GMD prime 

contractor to develop a second source for the booster by awarding a 

subcontract to Orbital Sciences Corporation. Both contractors are 

developing boosters for use in the September 2004 initial defensive 

capability. The first demonstration of an operational booster in an 

attempted intercept is scheduled for the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. 

• System-Level Testing. A system-level demonstration of the initial 

defensive capability will not be conducted prior to September 2004. To 

date, integrated flight tests have demonstrated basic functionality of a 

representative ballistic missile defense system using surrogate and 

prototype components, and have shown success in intercepting a mock 

reentry vehicle in a developmental test environment. The first flight test 

consisting of components closest to the configuration of the September 

2004 initial defensive capability is IFT-14, which is currently scheduled for 

the third quarter of fiscal year 2004. The test will incorporate Block 2004 

prototypes of the interceptor booster and kill vehicle of the configuration 

intended for operational use beginning in September 2004. In addition, the 

first tactical build of the battle management software will be utilized in 

IFT-14. However, interceptors will not be launched out of Fort Greeley in 

IFT-14 and IFT-15 (the remaining integrated flight tests to be conducted 

before September 2004). 

In commenting on a draft of this report, MDA stated that while it cannot 

address all technical concerns for the initial fielding, it has added the 

following activities: 

• Enhanced producibility, quality, and reliability efforts. 

• Increased operational focus in the developmental program, e.g., military 

utility and effectiveness assessments. 

• Expanded command and control, battle management, and operator 

integration in BMDS testing to support fielding of initial defensive 

capabilities in 2004. 

MDA also stated that the results of these program decisions are intended 

to provide a comprehensive program that demonstrates operational 

effectiveness and military utility against credible threats in an operational 

environment. 
Page 17 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

System effectiveness is characterized in terms of the following four 

performance metrics: (1) defended area, (2) launch area denied, 

(3) probability of engagement success, and (4) raid size breakpoint. 

Defended area is the portion of the United States protected against 

long-range missile attacks and, as a metric, is usually reported relative to 

a single threat country or region; launch area denied simply refers to the 

collection of threat countries from which the United States is protected. 

The probability of engagement success is the probability that all attacking 

warheads are destroyed, derived from the probabilities associated with 

missile defense functions like detection, discrimination, and hit-to-kill. 

Finally, raid size breakpoint is the maximum number of warheads the 

system can realistically defeat in a single engagement. This metric is highly 

dependent on interceptor inventory. 

A detailed discussion of GMD’s expected effectiveness is presented in the 

classified June 2003 version of this report. 

A notable limitation of the effectiveness of the September 2004 initial 

defensive capability—and possibly the December 2005 capability—

pertains to the inability of system radars to perform target discrimination. 

Neither the Cobra Dane radar nor the upgraded early warning radar at 

Beale is capable of performing rigorous discrimination, a function 

achievable only by the X-band radar. Rather, both radars will utilize 

common “target classification” software that enables them to classify 

objects as threatening or non-threatening. For example, debris would be 

classified as non-threatening, but objects like deployment buses and decoy 

replicas would be classified as threatening. Accordingly, the system would 

have to rely solely on the kill vehicle for a final target selection. 

The assessment of kill vehicle discrimination is, therefore, critical for 

understanding the capability of the deployed system, a point made in the 

DOT&E report. Appropriately, the GMD prime contractor tracks the 

discrimination capability of the kill vehicle as a technical performance 

measure. The prime contractor’s December 2002 assessment rated the kill 

vehicle discrimination performance as meeting expectations based on 

analysis and simulation. 

Lastly, measures of system suitability like availability and vulnerability—

which complement system effectiveness—are important for characterizing 

the initial defensive capability as a whole. MDA is aiming for full-time 

operations but faces risks in achieving this goal. Details on system 

Effectiveness of 

September 2004 and 

December 2005 Initial 

Defensive Capability 

Other Factors Affecting 

System Performance 
Page 18 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

availability and vulnerability are provided in our June 2003 

classified report. 

Since DOT&E issued its August 2000 report, DOD has altered its approach 

to the acquisition of missile defense systems to one that follows a 

“capability-based” strategy. The new approach allows MDA to evolve and 

demonstrate additional improvements in missile defense systems before 

committing to procurement and operations. MDA’s test program for all 

missile defense elements, such as GMD, was also reoriented to focus on 

the development and use of the BMDS Test Bed. Over time, the Test Bed 

should facilitate testing that address many of DOT&E’s recommendations, 

especially those pertaining to flight test realism, complexity, and 

artificialities. However, most of the agency’s actions with respect to 

DOT&E’s ground testing recommendations, namely, those pertaining to 

comprehensive hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle have been 

deferred. In addition, MDA is proceeding slowly with the flight testing 

against certain countermeasures, which DOT&E noted are simple for an 

enemy to implement. These unresolved concerns in the test program 

warrant attention by DOT&E and the test community in general. Given the 

importance of ground testing and discrimination testing for understanding 

system effectiveness, decision makers in the Congress and Office of the 

Secretary of Defense would benefit from having information on the 

agency’s progress in these matters as they consider investments in 

developing the ballistic missile defense system. As an independent office 

that reviews DOD’s weapon system testing and the office that made the 

recommendations discussed in this report, DOT&E would be in a good 

position to provide such information to decision makers. 

As a means of providing decision makers with critical information when 

investments in missile defense are considered, we recommend that 

DOT&E report periodically, as it deems appropriate, on the status of 

MDA’s actions taken or planned in response to the August 2000 

recommendations. In its review, DOT&E should include information and 

recommendations, as warranted, on MDA’s progress and planning (1) to 

improve hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, (2) to test kill 

vehicle components in nuclear environments, and (3) to test the GMD 

element’s capability to defeat likely and simple near-term 

countermeasures during integrated flight tests. In the report, DOT&E can 

advise the Director, MDA, on how the test program could be modified to 

accommodate DOT&E’s long-standing concerns. 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 19 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

In commenting on a classified draft version of this report, DOD agreed 

with our recommendations. (See app. II for a reprinted version of DOD’s 

comments.) However, DOD conveyed the following concerns: 

• The GMD test program as described in this report is no longer current. 

• It is difficult to reconcile the dated terms of reference of the original 

DOT&E recommendations with the current program strategy and 

structure. 

• The inherent robustness of the envisioned layered BMD System relative to 

midcourse countermeasures is overlooked. 

While the GMD test program has, indeed, been in a constant state of flux, 

thus complicating our analysis, our report presents the latest, approved 

test program information provided to us by MDA. 

Despite alterations to the acquisition strategy and structure of the ballistic 

missile defense system and its constituent elements, like GMD, we believe 

most of the DOT&E recommendations are still relevant because the 

technical challenges and uncertainty with developing, testing, and fielding 

effective defensive capabilities, as identified in the August 2000 DOT&E 

report, remain significant. For example, the DOT&E report issued in 

February 2003, FY02 Assessment of the Missile Defense Agency Ballistic 

Missile Defense System, continued to highlight the need for a 

comprehensive hardware-in-the-loop capability to test the kill vehicle 

under the stress of real physical phenomena and to test the kill vehicle’s 

discrimination capability. We do recognize that a number of 

recommendations for which no actions are currently planned, such as 

those recommendations dealing with flight testing during Initial 

Operational Test and Evaluation, are a direct result of MDA’s new 

acquisition approach. 

The department is correct in stating that we did not address the capability 

of the envisioned ballistic missile defense system as a whole in defeating 

midcourse countermeasures. However, we do note that a system-level 

discrimination architecture would use a network of ground- and spacebased sensors to formulate a “discrimination solution.” Also, given the 

early stages of development of the envisioned layered system, including 

boost-phase intercept, the value of this strategy has not been 

demonstrated. 

Although the department agreed that DOT&E should report periodically 

on the status of MDA’s actions to address the August 2000 DOT&E 

recommendations, it did not believe additional reporting is required to 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 20 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

track their resolution. The department pointed out that our 

recommendation grants DOT&E discretionary reporting authority 

where mandatory reporting already exists. We believe, however, the 

recommendation is worded appropriately. Existing statutory reporting 

requirements for DOT&E on the adequacy and sufficiency of the missile 

defense test program do not require that the August 2000 DOT&E 

recommendations be specifically addressed. We worded the 

recommendation to highlight the areas we believe DOT&E should 

address—hardware-in-the-loop testing of the kill vehicle, testing of 

kill vehicle components in nuclear environments, and testing the 

GMD element’s capability to defeat likely and simple near-term 

countermeasures—and to give DOT&E the discretion to address our 

recommendation in the manner it deems appropriate. To present its 

assessment, DOT&E could use existing or new reporting vehicles. 

Finally, department comments pertaining to MDA actions on ground 

testing are addressed in the body of this report. 

As arranged with your staff, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from 

its issue date. At that time, we plan to provide copies of this report to 

interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the 

Director, Missile Defense Agency. We will make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report were 

Randy Zounes, Stan Lipscomb, Tana Davis, and Bill Graveline. 

R. E. Levin 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 21 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

In examining the actions taken or planned by the MDA in response to the 

DOT&E recommendations, we analyzed pertinent test documents, studies, 

and reports. These include the (1) GMD Element Developmental Master 

Test Plan (March 2003); (2) GMD System Element Reviews; (3) MDA 

“immersion day” briefing; (4) MDA written responses to our questions 

about MDA actions in response to the DOT&E recommendations; 

(5) Secretary of Defense January 2002 Memorandum on Missile Defense 

Program Direction; and (6) Independent Review Team (Welch panel) 

Reports. In addition, MDA officials briefed us on GMD’s program status 

and efforts to defeat enemy countermeasures. We also reviewed available 

documentation on the schedule and purpose of the Test Bed. These 

documents included studies on the enhanced test program restructure, 

fiscal year 2003 budget justifications, and the request for the contract 

proposal for the Block 2004 Test Bed. 

To assess the effectiveness and limitations of the initial defensive 

capability, we relied on the following MDA documentation: (1) GMD 

System Element Review (January 2003); (2) BMDS Block 2004 Statement 

of Goals; and (3) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-23), 

the President’s directive to begin fielding an initial capability. We also 

identified uncertainties—based on the level of testing achieved to date—of 

the potential capabilities of individual elements of the initial defensive 

capability, such as the radars and interceptor boosters, as well as radar 

capabilities to perform the discrimination function. 

We conducted our work primarily at the MDA, located in Arlington, 

Virginia, and the GMD Joint Program Office, located in Arlington, Virginia, 

and Huntsville, Alabama. 

We conducted our audit work for the June 2003 classified report, upon 

which this unclassified version is based, from October 2001 to March 2003 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

However, reported dates of GMD flight test events given in this 

unclassified version have been updated with the latest (December 2003) 

GMD test schedules. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 22 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 23 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 24 GAO-04-254 Missile Defense (120310) 
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