# FILED

April 27, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk FOR PUBLICATION 1 2 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE 3 4 AT KNOXVILLE 5 6 7 8 STATE OF TENNESSEE, EX REL. ROBERT ( 9 J. EARHART, ET AL., ( 10 ( 11 Plaintiffs-Appellants, ( 12 ( Sullivan Chancery 13 ( 14 v . ( Hon. Thomas J. Seeley, Jr., 15 ( Judge (Sitting by Interchange) 16 ( 17 ( S. Ct. No. 03S01-9709-CH-00116 18 CITY OF BRISTOL, TENNESSEE, ( 19 ( 20 Defendant-Appellee. ( 21 22 23 For Plaintiffs-Appellants : For Defendant-Appellee : 24 25 David H. Hornik Jack W. Hyder, Jr. 26 Nashville Massengill, Caldwell, and 27 Hyder, P.C. 28 David L. Buuck Bristol 29 Knoxville 30 Amicus Curiae : 31 32 Tennessee Municipal 33 Attorneys’ Association 34 Debra C. Poplin 35 Knoxville 36 37 38 39 O P I N I O N 40 41 42 43
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS 44 AFFIRMED IN PART AND 45 REVERSED IN PART; 46 CASE REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT. REID, J. 47 48

I 49-2- The issues presented had their origin in two annexation 1 ordinances adopted by the City of Bristol in 1989. The ordinances 2 undertook to annex the right-of-way of Highway 11E extending 3 approximately four miles south from the city limits of Bristol into 4 the Piney Flats area. The area included no property other than the 5 highway right-of-way. 6 7 In 1991, Bluff City adopted an ordinance annexing the 8 Piney Flats area, including a portion of Highway 11E included in the 9 1989 Bristol ordinances. Bristol filed suit against Bluff City 10 contesting the latter’s action. In that suit, Bristol relied upon 11 Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-110(b), which gives a larger municipality 12 priority with respect to competing claims to annex the same area. 13 Bluff City counterclaimed on the grounds that Bristol’s 1989 14 ordinances were void. The trial court, under the Declaratory 15 Judgment Act, held that Bristol’s annexation was illegal and void. 16 The Court of Appeals decided the issue on a third legal basis, Bluff 17 City’s claim was not filed within 30 days of the date Bristol’s 18 ordinance was adopted. The application for permission to appeal was 19 denied. 20 21 On January 11, 1995, Bristol adopted 24 annexation 22 ordinances, pursuant to which it undertook to annex 24 separate 23 parcels of property adjacent to that portion of Highway 11E included 24 in Bristol’s 1989 ordinances. The right-of-way of portions of Egypt 25 Road and Highway 390 which intersect with Highway 11E were included 26 also. Within 30 days, the plaintiffs, owners of 15 of the 24 parcels 27-3-

filed a quo warrantoand declaratory judgment suit contesting the 1 annexations. Owners of one of the parcels voluntarily dismissed 2 their claims, leaving 14 parcels at issue. The complaint, which 3 originally charged that the ordinances were unreasonable within the 4 meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103(a)(1)(A) (1992) was amended to 5 charge that 16 of the ordinances, the 14 ordinances previously named 6 as well as two additional ordinances, were illegal on the grounds 7 that they constituted prohibited corridor annexations and that the 8 1989 highway right-of-way annexation was “null and void” under Tenn. 9 Code Ann. § 6-51-102 (1992) because it did not annex people, private 10 property or commercial activities. The amended complaint also 11 alleged that the illegality of the 1989 ordinances rendered all of 12 the 1995 ordinances illegal because the tracts were not contiguous t 13 the municipal boundary. In a separate case, which was consolidated 14 with the case before the Court for trial, Bluff City attacked the 15 validity of five of the ordinances, including three which were not 16 challenged by the plaintiffs, bringing the total of the challenged 17 1995 ordinances to 19. 18 19 The jury considered the ordinances separately and found 20 that 14 of the 19 annexations were reasonable. However, the trial 21 judge found that nine of those 14 were void as a matter of law. Two 22 of the ordinances found to be void were those undertaking to annex 23 the rights-of-way of Egypt Road and Highway 390, and the other seven 24 affected parcels did not adjoin the City of Bristol “except by 25 benefit of the right-of-way of U.S. Highway 11E.” The court held 26 that an annexation ordinance which does not include people or private 27-4-

property and, therefore, cannot be challenged because no one has 1 standing to sue, “has no force” and is “void.” That court further 2 held that the validity of such ordinances “can be attacked any time,” 3 and that the 1989 right-of-way by the City of Bristol was void. The 4 court stated: “Using a road right-of-way to boot strap the city into 5 a position of saying that the newly annexed area adjoins the old area 6 is a mere subterfuge.” Despite these findings, the trial court 7 granted Bristol’s motion for a new trial and a different judge as to 8 the 14 ordinances found to be invalid, stating as authority State ex 9 rel. Sullivan County v. City of Bristol(Tenn. App. August 30, 1995). 10 The five ordinances challenged by Bluff City were disposed of by 11 settlement. At a new trial held in January 1996, the jury found all 12 9 remaining ordinances to be reasonable. The trial court approved 13 the jury’s findings, found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to 14 declaratory relief, and declined to issue a declaratory judgment 15 regarding the validity of the 1989 ordinances. 16 17 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict 18 as to each ordinance and held that the trial court did not abuse its 19 discretion in declining to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the 20 validity of the 1989 ordinances. The court stated, however, that the 21 validity of the 1989 ordinances could be challenged as a void act of 22 a municipality. 23 24

I I 25 26 The order granting the application for permission to 27-5-

appeal limited the appeal to two issues: 1 2 Whether the Court of Appeals correctly permitted 3 the appellant to collaterally challenge the 1989 4 annexation ordinance outside of the quo warranto 5 procedures as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 6- 6 51-103, and whether the Court of Appeals 7 correctly ruled that the trial court did not 8 abuse its discretion in declining to issue a 9 declaratory judgment concerning the 1989 10 annexation. 11 12 13 In finding that the validity of the 1989 ordinances, as 14 opposed to their reasonableness, could be attacked at any time, the 15 Court of Appeals rejected Bristol’s argument that an annexation 16 ordinance may be challenged only by quo warrantopursuant to Tenn. 17 Code Ann. § 6-51-103. That court reasoned that “the statute 18 presupposes a valid ordinance, which, if void, can be challenged as 19 any other void act of the municipality.” 20 21 In response, Bristol contends that an annexation ordinance 22 becomes immune to direct or collateral attack upon the expiration of 23 30 days after its adoption if no contest is filed within that time by 24 an “affected landowner.” Its rationale is that the validity of the 25 ordinance is “subsumed” in the question of its reasonableness. 26 27 This case demonstrates that, if Bristol’s rationale is 28 accepted, there can be no effective judicial review of annexation 29 ordinances that utilize the highway right-of-way approach. Since the 30 1989 ordinances did not include any “people, private property, or 311 See State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge , 599 S.W.2d 545, 547

(Tenn. 1980).

2 See City of Gallatin v. City of Hendersonville , 510 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tenn. 1974).

3 SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103 (a)(1)(A).

-6- commercial activities,” 1no one had standing to contest the 1 ordinances; 2consequently, they became inviolate even if done by 2 “exercise of power not conferred by law.” 3Subsequently, separate 3 ordinances annexing separate parcels of property could be adopted so 4 long as each parcel adjoins the highway right-of-way included in the 5 prior ordinances. In this case, additional rights-of-way along Egypt 6 Road and Highway 390 were annexed, allowing parcels adjoining those 7 roads to be annexed by subsequent ordinances. Then the only basis 8 for attack is whether the annexation of a particular parcel is 9 “reasonable.” Under this annexation scenario, there could be no 10 attack on the overall plan because the original right-of-way 11 annexation ordinance cannot be questioned as to validity or 12 reasonableness. Even a flagrant usurpation of power by the city 13 under the guise of adopting an annexation ordinance could stand 14 unchallenged, according to Bristol’s rationale. 15 16 Nevertheless, Bristol insists that the legal propositions 17 it espouses represent the intent of the legislature and have been 18 validated by this Court. 19 20

III 21 22 The first issue for review is whether the Court of Appeals 23-7-

correctly permitted the plaintiffs to collaterally challenge the 1989 1 annexation ordinance outside of the quo warrantoprocedures set out 2 in Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103. 3 4 The legislature has the authority to “extend or contract 5 municipal boundaries” and that power has not been delegated to the 6

courts. Witt v. McCanless , 200 Tenn. 360, 292 S.W.2d 392, 396 7 (1956). Article XI, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution specifically 8 granted this authority to the legislature: “The General Assembly 9 shall by general law provide the exclusive methods by which 10 municipalities may be created, merged, consolidated and dissolved and 11 by which municipal boundaries may be altered.” However, under the 12 statutes, the Court is “given the power to determine whether the 13 ordinance is reasonable or unreasonable,” and whether the statutory 14 requirements have been complied with. Witt v. McCanless , 292 S.W.2d 15 at 396. In construing the applicable provisions to ascertain whether 16 the actions of the municipality are in compliance with the statute, 17 this Court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent 18 and the ordinary meaning of the language of the statutes. Carson 19 Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue , 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 20 (Tenn. 1993). Unambiguous statutes must be construed to mean what 21 they say. Montgomery v. Hoskins , 222 Tenn. 45, 47, 432 S.W.2d 654, 22 655 (1968). The “legislative intent or purpose is to be ascertained 23 primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used 24 . . . without any forced or subtle construction to limit or extend 25 the import of the language.” Worrall v. Kroger Co. , 545 S.W.2d 736, 26 738 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Sliger , 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1993). 27-8-

But, statutes “are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the 1 obvious intention of the legislature.” State v. Netto , 486 S.W.2d 2 725, 728 (Tenn. 1972) (citing Southern Ry. v. Sutton , 179 F. 471 3 (1910)). 4 5 The original statutes authorizing a municipality’s 6 annexation of property by ordinance were enacted in 1955. “Before 7 their passage, annexation of property by municipality could be 8 accomplished only under Private Act of the Legislature.” Joe M. 9 Looney, Municipalities - Judicial review of Annexation , 36 Tenn. L. 10 Rev. 825 (1969). The statutes extended a limited authority to annex 11 territory to municipalities, providing that a municipality “by 12 ordinance, may extend its corporate limits by annexation of such 13 territory adjoining its existing boundaries as may be deemed 14 necessary for the welfare of the residents and property owners of the 15 affected territory as well as the municipality as a whole . . . .” 16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-102(a)(1) (1992). This may be done “when 17 petitioned by a majority of the residents and property owners of the 18 affected territory, or upon its own initiative . . . .” I d. If 19 annexation is the result of the municipality’s own initiative, it can 20 be justified only if “it appears that the prosperity of such 21 municipality and territory will be materially retarded and the safety 22 and welfare of the inhabitants and property endangered . . .” unless 23 the area is annexed. I d . This section also provides “that the 24 ordinance shall not become operative until thirty (30) days after 25 final passage thereof.” I d

. 26 274See Hart v. City of Johnson City , 801 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tenn. 1990).

-9- At the same time the authority to annex territory was 1 delegated to municipalities, the provision allowing owners of 2 property in the annexed area to challenge the reasonableness of the 3 annexation was enacted. That provision, currently found at section 6- 4 51-103, (after deleting the language of the 1984 amendment which has 5 been held to be unconstitutional 4 ) provides: 6 7 (a)(1)(A) Any aggrieved owner of property lying 8 within territory which is the subject of an 9 annexation ordinance prior to the operative date 10 thereof, may file a suit in the nature of a quo 11 warrantoproceeding in accordance with this part 12 . . . to contest the validity thereof on the 13 ground that it reasonably may not be deemed 14 necessary for the welfare of the residents and 15 property owners of the affected territory and 16 the municipality as a whole and so constitutes 17 an exercise of power not conferred by law. . . . 18 19 20 21 Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103 (1980). 22 23 24 25 Under the clear language of the statute, suits for quo 26

warrantoon the grounds that the annexation is not reasonably 27 necessary to the safety and welfare of the inhabitants and property 28 involved, are limited to persons owning property within the 29 territory; and, once a quo warrantosuit is appealed and found valid, 30 the judgment of the appellate court is final and “not . . . subject 31 to contest . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 103(d) (1992). Generally, 32 “[a] judgment in quo warranto , like other judgments, is conclusive 33 upon the parties and their privies.” 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quo Warranto§ 34 121 (1972). “By requiring that the State bring such a proceeding, we 35-10-

avoid the specter of numerous successive suits by private parties 1 attacking the validity of annexations. . . . These problems are 2 avoided by requiring quo warrantoproceedings because the judgment 3 settles the validity of the annexation on behalf of all property 4 holders in the affected area.” Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin , 5 825 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex. 1991). 6 7 But, where the quo warrantoproceeding is not available, 8 alternative equitable remedies are not barred. “[W]here the remedy 9 by quo warrantois available, it is usually held that there is no 10 concurrent remedy in equity, unless by virtue of statutory provision. 11 But if quo warrantois not an adequate remedy, it will not be a bar 12 to alternative remedies.” 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quo Warranto§ 7 (1972). 13 The availability of other remedies is specifically acknowledged in 14 section 6-51-113 (1992), which provides, “Except as specifically 15 provided in this part, the powers conferred by this part shall be in 16 addition and supplemental to, and the limitations imposed by this 17 part shall not affect the powers conferred by any other general, 18 special or local law.” The Tennessee Declaratory Judgment Act is 19 just such another general law conferring the power to challenge the 20 validity and construction of statutes and municipal ordinances. 21 Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 22 23 Any person . . . whose rights, status, or other 24 legal relations are affected by a statute, [or] 25 municipal ordinance, . . . may have determined 26 any question of construction or validity arising 27 under the . . . statute, [or] ordinance, . . . 28 and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 29 other legal relations thereunder. 30 31-11- 1 Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-103 (1980). 2 3 4 5 Bristol presents no authority for the proposition that 6 persons who did not own property within the territory annexed are 7 bound by the 30 day rule of Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103(c). The cases 8 they present concerning the 30 day requirement involve plaintiffs who 9 had standing to sue under the statutes because they owned property 10 within the territory being annexed, but neglected to file suit within 11 the time allowed. See e.g ., City of Oak Ridge v. Roane County, 563 12 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1978); Brent v. Town of Greeneville , 203 Tenn. 60, 13 309 S.W.2d 121 (1957). Bristol relies on City of Gallatin v. City of 14 Hendersonville , 510 S.W.2d 507 (Tenn. 1974) and State ex rel. Kessel 15 v. Ashe , 888 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1994), for the proposition that a 16 person or entity who does not own property being annexed has no 17 standing to challenge the annexation. The holdings in these cases 18 affirm the clear meaning of the statute, and it is that law which 19 prevented the plaintiffs from challenging Bristol’s 1989 ordinance by 20

quo warranto . However, that law does not deny standing to the 21 present plaintiffs to contest the 1989 ordinances or the 1995 22 ordinance. The distinguishing fact is that the plaintiffs before 23 this Court, do own property in territory presently being annexed as 24 an offshoot of the 1989 ordinance which could not be challenged. 25 26 This Court has stated that the statute “authorizes a court 27 contest on only one ground - whether the annexation is reasonably 28 necessary for the welfare of the residents and property owners of the 29 affected territory and the municipality as a whole.” City of Oak 30-12-

Ridge v. Roane County, 563 S.W.2d at 897. However, in that case, the 1 Court did not discuss the remedies available under “other general, 2 special or local law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-113. It merely 3 considered the right to file a quo warrantosuit established under 4 the statute: 5 6 We hold that the right to bring a suit 7 pursuant to the authority of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8 [6-51-103]to review any issue arising out of 9 the adoption of an annexation ordinance 10 authorized in Tenn. Code Ann. § [6-51-102] 11 expires thirty days after the operative date of 12 the ordinance, the courts have no jurisdiction 13 of such suits thereafter. 14 15 16 17 I d . at 898 (emphasis added). 18 19 20 21 Other states have allowed challenges to municipal 22 annexation ordinances outside of a quo warrantoaction. In the case 23 of Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin , 825 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. 24 1991), the court stated “The only proper method for attacking the 25 validity of a city’s annexation of territory is by quo warranto 26 proceeding, unless the annexation is wholly void.” The Texas court 27 found the ordinance valid, but recognized several instances in which 28 annexation ordinances were held void through a private challenge, 29 stating, “The common trait in these cases is whether the municipality 30 exceeded the annexation authority delegated to it by the 31 Legislature.” I d. at 438. 32 33 A similar situation was presented in the case of People ex 34 rel. Coojar Realty Corp. v. Village of Burr Ridge , 225 N.E.2d 39 35-13-

(Ill. App. Ct. 1967), in which a quo warrantoproceeding was filed 1 challenging not only the annexation of the relator’s property, but 2 also a prior annexation of a highway which was used as the 3 “contiguous” property for the subsequent annexation. The court held, 4 “The annexation of relator Coojar’s property here is dependent on the 5 validity of the prior annexation of the portion of Route 66 . . . . 6 We hold that such roadway annexation as here attempted is invalid.” 7 I d . at 41. 8 9 The majority of courts have interpreted the requirement 10 that the annexed land be “contiguous,” to not allow the annexation of 11 thin strips of land to connect a larger parcel of land to a 12 municipality. State ex Rel. Dept. of Transp. v. City of Milford , 576 13 A.2d 618, 622 (Del. Ch. 1989) (see cases cited therein). These 14 decisions articulate the principle implicit in the Tennessee statute. 15 The validity of an annexation ordinance alleged to exceed the 16 authority delegated by the legislature is subject to challenge under 17 the Declaratory Judgment Act. And whereas Bristol is correct in 18 contending that objections to reasonableness under section 6-51-102 19 must be filed within 30 days, that limitation does not apply to suits 20 contesting the validity of an ordinance which purports to annex an 21 area that does not include people, private property, or commercial 22 activity. See State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge , 599 23 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980). 24 25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly permitted the 26 plaintiffs to challenge the 1989 annexation ordinance outside of the 27-14-

quo warrantoprocedures of Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103. 1 2

I V 3 4 The second issue is whether the trial court abused its 5 discretion in declining to issue a declaratory judgment concerning 6 the 1989 annexation. Under the statute, the trial judge does have 7 discretion as to a declaratory judgment ruling: 8 9 The court may refuse to render or enter a 10 declaratory judgement or decree where such 11 judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, 12 would not terminate the uncertainty or 13 controversy giving rise to the proceedings. 14 15 16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-109 (1980). This Court has stated that 17 whether to entertain a declaratory judgment action is, in certain 18 situations, largely discretionary with the trial judge. In a case 19 where there was “very voluminous testimony,” the court held that the 20 “judge had discretion not to undertake a detailed delineation of 21 priorities between liens asserted.” East Sevier County Utility 22 District v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co ., 570 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tenn. 23 1978). In that case, however, the Court held that after refusing to 24 determine the priority of the liens, the suit should have been 25 dismissed without prejudice so that the petitioner could have 26 asserted its liens in a proper hearing. The trial court’s discretion 27 in refusing a declaration is “very wide,” Standard Accident Insur. 28 Co. v. Carvin , 217 Tenn. 662, 400 S.W.2d 235, 236 (1966), and will 29 not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial judge has acted 30-15-

arbitrarily. Southern Fire and Cas. Co. v. Cooper , 200 Tenn. 283, 1 292 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tenn. 1956). In Carvin , the action was brought 2 to determine who was driving a car at the time of the accident. The 3 Court found that a declaration of rights “may properly be refused if 4 it can be made only after a judicial investigation of disputed 5 facts,” and that it is “contrary to the spirit and purpose of the 6 Declaratory Judgments Law that a party should be delayed in the 7 prosecution of an accrued cause of action until the termination of a 8 proceeding brought for a declaratory judgment.” I d . at 236-37 9 (quotations omitted). And in Cooper , where again a tort action was 10 pending, the Court was asked whether the trial court’s refusal to 11 declare whether an insurance company was required to defend an action 12 where the insured had delayed giving the insurance company notice of 13 the accident, was an abuse of discretion. The Court found that “the 14 refusal of the Court to declare the insurer’s obligations within the 15 premises need not prejudice whatever right, if any, it has by reason 16 of the alleged delay of insured in giving notice of the accident.” 17 Southern Fire and Casualty Co. v. Cooper, 292 S.W.2d at 178. The 18 Court held that because the equitable remedy was not necessary to 19 prevent irreparable loss, and because such an action would delay the 20 prosecution of the underlying cause of action, the trial court had 21 not acted arbitrarily in its refusal. I d . at 178-79. 22 23 At issue here, is whether Bristol’s somewhat ingenious 24 annexation scheme is consistent with the purpose sought to be 25 accomplished by the statutes authorizing municipalities to determine 26 their own boundaries. That purpose was discussed by the Court in 27-16-

State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge , 599 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1 l980): 2 3 The whole theory of annexation is that 4 it is a device by which a municipal 5 corporation may plan for its orderly 6 growth and development .Heavily 7 involved in this is control of fringe 8 area developments and zoning measures 9 to the end that areas of unsafe, 10 unsanitary and substandard housing may 11 not “ring” the City to the detriment of 12 the City as a whole. In a word, 13 annexation gives a city some control 14 over its own destiny. The preservation 15 of property values, the prevention of 16 the development of incipient slum 17 areas, adequate police protection 18 within a metropolitan area, and the 19 extension of city services to those who 20 are already a part of the city as a 21 practical proposition, are the 22 legitimate concern of any progressive 23 city. (Emphasis supplied). 24 25 26 27 Id.at 547 (quoting City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown 28 Enterprises, Inc. , 562 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tenn. 1978)). The focus of 29 the Court’s statements was the validity of an annexation of a strip 30 of land along a highway: 31 32 We should emphasize that this is 33 not, as appellants insist, merely a 34 “strip” or “shoestring” or “corridor” 35 annexation, although it is long and 36 lean. Such annexations, so long as 37 they take in people, private property, 38 or commercial activities, and rest on 39 some reasonable and rational basis, are 40 not per s eto be condemned. We do not 41 deal with an annexation wherein a city 42 attempts to run its corporate limits 43 down the right-of-way of an established 44 road without taking in a single citizen 45 or a single piece of private property. 46-17- Such an annexation is perhaps 1 questionable and is not here involved. 2 As in any annexation, and more 3 particularly one wherein a 4 geometrically irregular parcel of land 5 is annexed, the Court must scrutinize 6 the stated and ostensible purpose of 7 the annexation. 8 9 10 Id.at 546-47. The purpose of the statute and the procedure 11 available for implementing that purpose also were discussed in Hart 12 v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1990). There, the 13 plaintiffs challenged an amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103, 14 which was adopted by the legislature in 1984, and provided standing 15 to file quo warrantoactions to residents and owners of property 16 adjoininga proposed annexation in certain counties based on a 17 population classification. That act was declared unconstitutional 18 because the Court found there was no rational basis for the 19 population classifications. The Court stated: “The legislative 20 debate indicates that the announced purpose [of the amendment] was to 21 prevent strip annexation.” Hart v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W.2d 22 at 517. The purpose of the original statute would not have been 23 affected by the amendment, which only expanded the class of affected 24 persons authorized to file quo warrantoproceedings. Consequently, 25 even though the statute was found to be unconstitutional, the 26 determination by the Court that the purpose of the statute was to 27 prevent “strip annexation” is relevant to the inquiry before the 28 trial court of whether the 1989 annexation was void because it 29 exceeded the authority of the municipality. 30 31 This question does not concern disputed facts or the delay 32-18-

of another cause of action. Therefore, the cases relied upon by 1 Bristol do not support the trial court’s decision to refuse to issue 2 a declaratory judgment. In the case before the court, a declaratory 3 judgment would “terminate” the controversy. Where there is presented 4 a significant issue that needs resolving, as in this case, refusing 5 to issue a declaratory judgment cannot be excused on the basis of 6 discretion. This case involves an important issue of law affecting 7 the growth of cities throughout the state which needs to be resolved. 8 The same considerations which prompted this Court to grant permission 9 to appeal require that the issue be addressed at the trial level. 10 Consequently, the trial court erred in declining to consider the 11 issue. 12 13 The case is remanded to the trial court for further 14 proceedings. 15 16 Costs are taxed to the City of Bristol. 17 18

_________________________ 19 Reid, J. 20 21 22 Concur: 23 24 Anderson, C.J., Birch and Holder, JJ. 25 26 Drowota, J. - Not participating. 27