GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

February 26, 2004 

The Honorable Christopher Cox 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jim Turner 

Ranking Minority Member 

House Select Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Homeland Security Advisory System: Preliminary Observations 

Regarding Threat Level Increases from Yellow to Orange 

Established in March 2002, the Homeland Security Advisory System was designed to 

disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state, and local 

government agencies and the public. However, this system generated concern among 

federal, state, and local government agencies regarding whether they are receiving 

the necessary information to respond appropriately to heightened alerts and about 

the amount of additional costs protective measures entail. 

 

You requested that we review (1) the operations of the Homeland Security Advisory 

System, including the decision making process for changing the national threat level, 

notifications to federal, state, and local government agencies of changes in the threat 

level, and ongoing revisions to the system; (2) guidance and information that federal, 

state, and local government agencies reportedly used to determine any protective 

measures to implement when the threat level is raised to high—or code-orange—

alert; (3) any protective measures these agencies implemented during code-orange 

alert periods; (4) any additional costs these agencies reported incurring to implement 

such measures; and (5) any threat advisory systems that federal, state, or local 

government agencies had in place before the creation of the Homeland Security 

Advisory System. 

This report summarizes our preliminary observations on each of these objectives. 

The code-orange alert periods covered in this preliminary report and our ongoing 

work are March 17 to April 16, 2003; May 20 to 30, 2003; and December 21, 2003, to 

January 9, 2004. 

The preliminary observations in this report are based on information obtained as of 

February 9, 2004. This includes responses from 15 of the 28 federal agencies to which 

we sent a questionnaire regarding the Homeland Security Advisory System and codeorange alert periods, and information from 8 federal agencies, four states, the District 
2 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

of Columbia,1 and nine local governments that we contacted during the design of our 

methodology. We selected the 8 federal agencies using agencies’ reports to the Office 

of Management and Budget on the amount of homeland security funding they 

received for fiscal year 2003.2

 Five of the 8 selected agencies reported receiving the 

most homeland security funding. We selected the four states, the District of 

Columbia, and nine local governments on the basis of their critical infrastructure 

assets, such as national landmarks, ports, and oil pipelines. The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) generally has not documented the policies and procedures 

it has used for assessing intelligence information, determining whether to raise or 

lower the threat level, and notifying federal, state, and local government agencies 

about changes in threat levels. Thus, our findings about the operations of the 

Homeland Security Advisory System are principally based on interviews with DHS 

officials. We will continue to assess the Homeland Security Advisory System and 

related guidance, measures implemented during code-orange periods, and the costs 

incurred during code-orange alerts. We expect to issue a final report later this year. 

On February 23 and 24, 2004, officials representing the Department of Homeland 

Security provided oral technical comments on this report, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. We conducted our work from July 2003 to February 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. For more detailed 

information on our scope and methodology, see enclosure I. 

Results in Brief 

Based on analyses of intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 

consultation with members of the Homeland Security Council,3

 determines whether 

the national threat level should be elevated or lowered. Once the Secretary makes 

this decision, DHS and others begin the process of notifying federal, state and local 

government agencies, through various means, such as conference calls. The 

department has not yet documented its protocols for executing notification. DHS 

officials told us they are working to develop such documentation. However, they 

could not provide us with a specific time frame as to when they expect to complete 

this effort. Federal, state, and local government agencies we met with expressed 

concern about hearing of threat level changes from media and other sources prior to 

receiving notification from DHS. DHS officials maintain that the Homeland Security 

Advisory System is evolving and that they are continually adjusting it to provide 

additional information regarding specific threats. 

 

1

For this review, we analyzed information from the District of Columbia with information from states. 2

Office of Management and Budget, 2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism (Washington, 

D.C.: September 2003). 

3

Members of the Homeland Security Council include the President; the Vice President; the Secretaries 

of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury; the 

Attorney General; the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Director of the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Assistant to the President 

for Homeland Security. 
3 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Various sources, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),4

provided guidance and information to federal, state, and local government agencies 

to assist them in developing plans for responding to each of the advisory system’s five 

threat levels following establishment of the system in March 2002. Additionally, DHS 

and others provided federal, state, and local government agencies with guidance and 

information to assist them in determining actions to take in response to each codeorange alert occurrence. For the most part, the 15 federal agencies responding to our 

questionnaire noted that the guidance and information they received was useful and 

timely. However, 14 of these 15 federal agencies, along with officials from three 

states and six local governments we met with, noted that they would have benefited 

by receiving additional information on region-, sector-, site-, and event-specific 

threats when deciding additional actions to take for the three most recent codeorange alerts. We will continue to assess this guidance and information to determine 

its consistency and the extent to which the entities that provided the guidance and 

information coordinated with other agencies providing similar information. 

Federal agencies responding to our questionnaire indicated that they maintain a high 

security posture and, as a result, did not need to implement a substantial number of 

additional protective measures to respond to code-orange alerts. For the most part, 

these 15 federal agencies reported enhancing protective measures they already had in 

place to respond to the code-orange alerts, such as increasing the frequency of 

facility security patrols. To a lesser degree, these federal agencies indicated that they 

continued existing protective measures at their pre-code-orange alert levels, such as 

the use of intrusion detection systems. To ensure that protective measures operate 

as intended, federal agencies for which we received questionnaire responses reported 

conducting tests on the functionality and reliability of protective measures. They also 

reported receiving confirmation of the enhancement or implementation of measures 

from component entities, offices, or personnel. Protective measures benefited 

federal agencies in various ways, but also affected agency operations, according to 

the agencies responding to our questionnaire. For example, while actions taken 

during code-orange alerts promoted employees’ sense of security, they also resulted 

in delays for employees entering facilities. State and local government officials we 

met with noted that their agencies implemented various protective measures for 

code-orange alerts, including additional law enforcement patrols. 

Thirteen federal agencies, one state, and six localities provided information on the 

additional costs incurred during at least two of the three orange alert periods in our 

review. The cost information the federal agencies provided was generally estimates. 

Nine agencies reported incurring additional costs while 4 stated that they did not 

incur any additional costs. Eight of the 9 agencies provided cost estimates, whereas 

the ninth provided actual costs extracted from its financial accounting system. For 

the 9 agencies that reported incurring additional costs, we calculated the additional 

average daily costs incurred during each of the three orange alert periods. The 

additional average daily costs varied by alert period and ranged from as little as about 

$160 dollars for a small independent agency to more than $165,000 for a cabinet 

department. For 8 of the 9 agencies, the additional average daily costs were lower for 

 

4

The Federal Emergency Management Agency was incorporated into the Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security upon the department’s creation in 

March 2003. 
4 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

the third alert period than the first alert period. Cost information for the one state 

and six localities was limited, and we have little or no information on how those costs 

were determined. Thus, we cannot assess the reliability and comparability of these 

costs. 

Some federal, state, and local government agencies we contacted reported that they 

have threat advisory systems in place to ensure government agencies are notified of 

impending emergencies such as natural disasters or terrorist threats, allowing them 

to prepare a response. These systems, which were generally in place before the 

creation of the Homeland Security Advisory System, are similar to the Homeland 

Security Advisory System or have been revised to conform to it and include threat 

levels with associated protective measures. For example, one federal agency told us 

that it had developed its own five-level alert system 8 years ago to ensure protection 

of critical national security assets. While federal, state, and local government 

agencies said they raise or lower their systems’ threat levels to correspond to changes 

in the national threat level, they also independently change threat levels to respond to 

specific threats or for large public events. 

Background 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3) established the Homeland 

Security Advisory System in March 2002. Through the creation of the Homeland 

Security Advisory System, HSPD-3 sought to produce a common vocabulary, context, 

and structure for an ongoing discussion about the nature of threats that confront the 

nation and the appropriate measures that should be taken in response to those 

threats. Additionally, HSPD-3 established the Homeland Security Advisory System as 

a mechanism to inform and facilitate decisions related to securing the homeland 

among various levels of government, the private sector, and American citizens. 

 

The Homeland Security Advisory System, as shown in figure 1, is comprised of five 

color-coded threat conditions, which represent levels of risk related to potential 

terror attack. As defined in HSPD-3, risk includes both the probability of an attack 

occurring and its potential gravity. 
5 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Figure 1: Homeland Security Advisory System 

Since its establishment in March 2002, the Homeland Security Advisory System 

national threat level has remained at elevated alert—code-yellow—except for five 

periods during which the administration raised it to high alert—code-orange. The 

periods of code-orange alert follow: 

• September 10 to 24, 2002; 

• February 7 to 27, 2003; 

• March 17 to April 16, 2003; 

• May 20 to 30, 2003; and 

• December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004. 

The Homeland Security Advisory System is binding on the executive branch. HSPD-3 

directs all federal departments, agencies, and offices, other than military facilities,5

 to 

conform their existing threat advisory systems to the Homeland Security Advisory 

System. These agencies are responsible for ensuring their systems are consistently 

implemented in accordance with national threat levels as defined by the Homeland 

Security Advisory System. Additionally, federal departments and agency heads are 

responsible for developing protective measures and other antiterrorism or selfprotection and continuity plans in response to the various threat levels and operating 

and maintaining these plans. While HSPD-3 encourages other levels of government 

and the private sector to conform to the system, their compliance is voluntary. 

When HSPD-3 first established the Homeland Security Advisory System, it provided 

the Attorney General with responsibility for administering the Homeland Security 

Advisory System, including assigning threat conditions in consultation with members 

of the Homeland Security Council, except in exigent circumstances. As such, the 

Attorney General could assign threat levels for the entire nation, for particular 

 

5

The Homeland Security Advisory System does not directly apply to the armed forces, including their 

military facilities. Rather, the Department of Defense’s Force Protection Condition system rates 

threats and sets specific measures for military facilities. 
6 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

geographic areas, or for specific industrial sectors. Upon its issuance, HSPD-3 also 

assigned responsibility to the Attorney General for establishing a process and a 

system for conveying relevant threat information expeditiously to federal, state, and 

local government officials, law enforcement authorities, and the private sector. 

In November 2002, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-

296, which established the Department of Homeland Security. Under the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002, the DHS Under Secretary for Information Analysis and 

Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)is responsible for administering the Homeland 

Security Advisory System. As such, IAIP is primarily responsible for issuing public 

threat advisories and providing specific warning information to state and local 

governments and to the private sector. The act also charges IAIP with providing 

advice about appropriate protective actions and countermeasures.6

In February 2003, in accordance with the Homeland Security Act, the administration 

issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which amended HSPD-3 

by transferring authority for assigning threat conditions and conveying relevant 

information from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

HSPD-5 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to consult with the Attorney 

General and other federal agency heads the Secretary deems appropriate, including 

other members of the Homeland Security Council, when determining the threat level, 

except in exigent circumstances. 

The Advisory System Includes Threat Analysis, Notifications, and Ongoing 

Revisions, but Protocols for Notification Have Not Been Documented 

According to DHS officials, the intelligence community continuously gathers and 

analyzes information regarding potential terrorist activity. This includes information 

from such agencies as DHS,7 the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.8 Analyses from these 

and other agencies are shared with DHS’s IAIP, which is engaged in constant 

communication with intelligence agencies to assess potential homeland security 

threats. 

DHS officials told us that when intelligence information provides sufficient indication 

of a planned terrorist attack, and is determined to be credible, IAIP recommends to 

the Secretary of Homeland Security that the national threat level should be raised. To 

decide whether to lower the national threat level, DHS officials told us that the 

department reviews threat information to determine whether time frames for threats 

have passed and whether protective measures in place for the code-orange alerts 

 

6

P.L. 107-296, Sec. 201(d)(7). 

7

DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and its IAIP Directorate monitor threats and 

conduct information assessments on a daily basis. The HSOC is comprised of representatives from 

DHS component entities, other federal agencies, and local law enforcement agencies. 

8

The Terrorist Threat Integration Center is responsible for analyzing and sharing terrorist-related 

information that is collected domestically and abroad. It is an interagency joint venture that is 

comprised of elements of DHS, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, the Director of Central 

Intelligence Counterterrorist Center, the Department of Defense, and other agencies. 
7 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

have been effective in mitigating the threats. DHS officials further told us that 

analysis of the threat information and determination of threat level changes are 

specific for each time period and situation and include a certain amount of 

subjectivity. They said no explicit criteria or other quantifiable factors are used to 

decide whether to raise or lower the national threat level. 

Based on a review of the threat information and analyses, DHS officials said that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security consults with the other members of the Homeland 

Security Council on whether the national threat level should be changed.9

 DHS 

officials told us that if the Homeland Security Council members could not agree on 

whether to change the national threat level, the president would make the decision. 

After the determination has been made to raise or lower the national threat level, 

DHS begins its notification process. 

DHS used the following methods, among others, to notify entities of changes in the 

national threat level, according to responses from our federal agency questionnaire 

and discussions with DHS and other government officials: 

• Conference calls between the Secretary of Homeland Security and state 

governors and/or state homeland security officials; 

• Telephone calls from Federal Protective Service (FPS, a component of DHS) 

officials to federal agencies; 

• E-mail or telephone communications from Homeland Security Operations 

Center (HSOC) representatives to the federal, state, or local agencies they 

represent; 

• HSOC electronic systems such as the Joint Regional Information Exchange 

System; 

• FBI electronic systems such as the National Law Enforcement 

Telecommunications System;10 and 

• E-mail and/or telephone communications with federal agencies’ chief of staff 

and public affairs offices. 

Of the 13 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire that received notification 

from DHS for the code-orange alert period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, 9 

reported being notified by more than one method. These agencies most often 

reported receiving notification of threat level increases via electronic 

communications systems, such as the Washington Area Warning Alert System. 

Preliminary questionnaire responses and discussions with federal, state, and local 

government officials indicate that DHS also used multiple methods to notify federal, 

state, and local agencies of threat level changes for the other two code-orange alert 

periods in our review. 

 

9

Under HSPD-5, the Secretary can change the national threat level without consulting other Homeland 

Security Council members in exigent circumstances. However, DHS officials told us that this did not 

occur for any of the three most recent code-orange alerts. 

10We will continue to assess the various communication systems DHS utilizes to notify entities of threat 

level changes, including their relationship with one another. We expect to report the results of this 

work to you later this year. 
8 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

DHS officials stated in recent congressional testimony that the department’s 

communications of national threat level changes also provide specific information 

regarding the intelligence supporting the change in the threat condition, and that 

protective measures are developed and communicated, along with the threat 

information, prior to a public announcement of the decision. Some federal, state, and 

local officials indicated in meetings and questionnaire responses that they have not 

received information on region-, sector-, site-, or event-specific threats in DHS 

notifications of threat level changes. Some of these officials commented that they 

would like specific information on threats to determine the most appropriate 

protective measures for their agencies or localities. Thirteen of the 15 federal 

agencies responding to our questionnaire reported receiving notification of the threat 

level change from DHS during the most recent elevation to code-orange. Six of the 13 

agencies reported receiving region- or sector-specific threat information; 5 reported 

receiving information on threat time frames; and 5 reported receiving site- or eventspecific information. Two of the 15 federal agencies responding to the questionnaire 

reported that they did not receive notification from DHS. In addition, for each codeorange alert period, 12 of the 15 federal agencies identified insufficient information 

on the threat as an impediment to responding to the heightened alert. DHS officials 

maintain that they provide federal, state, and local officials with specific threat 

information whenever it is available. We will continue to review DHS’s notification 

methods, including the content of such notifications. We expect to report the results 

of this work later this year. 

Some federal agencies, as well as state and local officials we interviewed, reported 

hearing about notification of national threat level changes from other entities, such as 

the FBI and media sources, before being notified by DHS. For example, 3 federal 

agencies and five state and local entities noted learning about national threat level 

changes via media sources prior to being notified by DHS. This raises questions 

about whether DHS is always conveying information regarding threat level changes to 

government entities expeditiously, as required by HSPD-3. 

Officials from one federal agency, one state, and two localities would prefer to 

receive notification of threat level changes from DHS prior to hearing about the 

changes from media sources. These officials told us that after the change is reported 

via media sources, their agencies receive requests for detailed information on the 

change from the public and other entities. They noted that their agencies appear 

ineffective to the public and other entities because, without notification of the 

national threat level change before it is reported by media sources, they do not have 

time to prepare informed responses. DHS officials indicated they were aware that 

the media sometimes reported threat level changes before DHS notified federal, state, 

and local officials and in the case of the second alert period in our review, before the 

decision to raise the threat level was even made. In addition, DHS officials told us 

that they send notifications/advisories to the media to inform them of impending 

press conferences, and that the media may speculate about announcements of threat 

level changes that may be made at the press conferences. 

DHS officials told us that they have not yet formally documented protocols for 

notifying federal, state, and local government agencies of national threat level 
9 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

changes. They told us that they are working to document their protocols. However, 

they could not provide us with a specific time frame as to when DHS expects to 

complete this effort. For an entity to control its operations, it must have relevant, 

reliable, and timely communications relating to internal as well as external events.11 

As we have previously reported, to establish channels that facilitate open and 

effective communication, agencies should clearly set out procedures, such as 

communication protocols, that they will consistently follow when doing their work.12 

Communications protocols would, among other things, help foster clear 

understanding and transparency regarding federal agencies’ priorities and operations. 

Moreover, protocols can help ensure that agencies interact with federal, state, local, 

and other entities using clearly defined and consistently applied policies and 

procedures. 

DHS officials told us that the Homeland Security Advisory System is constantly 

evolving based on their ongoing review of the system. To provide more specific 

threat information and respond to sector- and location-specific security needs, DHS 

officials told us they adjust the system based on feedback from federal, state, local 

and private sector officials; tests of the system; and experience with previous periods 

of code-orange alert. For example, during the most recent code-orange alert, there 

was heightened concern about the use of aircraft for potential terrorist attacks and 

several geographic locations were also reported to be at particularly high risk. In a 

recent testimony, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security noted that DHS 

provided specific recommendations for protective measures to industry sectors and 

for geographic areas in response to specific threat information. When the national 

threat level was lowered to yellow on January 9, 2004, DHS recommended that some 

sectors, such as the aviation industry, and certain geographic locations continue on a 

heightened alert status. According to the Deputy Secretary, this was the first time 

since the creation of the Homeland Security Advisory System that DHS lowered the 

national threat level but recommended maintaining targeted protections for a 

particular industry sector or geographic location. 

DHS officials also told us that the department issues threat advisories and 

information bulletins for specific threats that do not require changes in the national 

threat level. Threat advisories contain information about incidents or threats 

targeting critical national infrastructures or key assets, such as pipelines. 

Information bulletins communicate information of a less urgent nature to 

nongovernmental entities and those responsible for the nation’s critical 

infrastructures. The threat advisories and bulletins we reviewed also include advice 

on protective measures for law enforcement agencies. 

Federal, State, and Local Agencies Reported Receiving Useful Information 

and Guidance, but Would Prefer More Specific Information 

Federal agencies responding to our questionnaire reported receiving and using 

guidance and information from various sources to develop plans for responding to 

 

11U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00.21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 12U.S. General Accounting Office, Office of Compliance: Status of Management Control Efforts to 

Improve Effectiveness, GAO-04-400 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 
10 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

each of the five national threat levels. In particular, these federal agencies indicated 

that they received and used guidance from FEMA, FPS, the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), and the White House. For example, 6 federal agencies reported using DOJ’s 

Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities.

13 This guidance established security 

levels for different types of federal facilities and minimum-security standards for each 

level. In addition, 5 federal agencies reported using HSPD-3, which established the 

Homeland Security Advisory System and suggested general protective measures for 

each threat level. Twelve federal agencies also reported using their agencies’ 

vulnerability assessments to help them develop appropriate measures to take in 

responding to national threat levels. 

In addition to developing response plans for each threat level, federal agencies 

responding to our questionnaire reported receiving and using both guidance and 

information and intelligence from various sources to determine additional protective 

measures to implement in response to the code-orange alerts included in our review. 

They indicated that the guidance and information was generally useful and timely. 

For example, as shown in table 1, the 15 federal agencies responding to our 

questionnaire reported using guidance from a variety of sources to determine actions 

to take for the most recent code-orange alert period from December 21, 2003, to 

January 9, 2004. Most federal agencies that reported using guidance from the 

agencies listed in table 1 noted that the guidance was useful and timely. 

Table 1: Number of Federal Agencies that Used Guidance and Found It Useful and Timely 

for the Code-Orange Alert Period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004 

Source of guidance 

Number of federal 

agencies Usefula

 Timelyb

DHS 11 10 7 

FBI 5 5 5 

White House 4 4 4 

Local law enforcement 1 1 1 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the first 15 federal agencies responding to GAO’s questionnaire. 

a

We asked federal agencies to indicate whether guidance they received was very useful, somewhat useful, 

or of little or no use. Useful reflects respondent ratings of very useful and somewhat useful. b

We also asked agencies to indicate whether the guidance they received was timely by responding yes or no. 

Likewise, as shown in table 2, the 15 respondents to the federal agency questionnaire 

indicated that they used multiple sources of information and intelligence in 

determining actions for the most recent code-orange alert period. These agencies 

also generally reported that information and intelligence from the sources listed in 

table 2 was useful and timely. 

 

13Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 

1995). 
11 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Table 2: Number of Federal Agencies that Used Information and Intelligence and Found It 

Useful and Timely for the Code-Orange Alert Period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004 

Source of 

information/intelligence 

Number of 

federal agencies Usefula Timelyb

DHS 9 8 8 

FBI 10 8 8 

White House 4 4 4 

National Joint Terrorism 

Task Force14 5 5 4 

Agency intelligence sources 3 3 2 

Local law enforcement 2 2 1 

 Source: GAO analysis of data from the first 15 federal agencies responding to GAO’s questionnaire. 

a We asked federal agencies to indicate whether the information and intelligence they received was very useful, 

somewhat useful, or of little or no use. Useful reflects respondent ratings of very useful and somewhat useful. b

We also asked agencies to indicate whether the guidance they received was timely by responding yes or no. 

Results for the other two code-orange alert periods included in our review—March 17 

to April 16, 2003, and May 20 to 30, 2003—were consistent with those reported in 

tables 1 and 2 for the code-orange alert period December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004. 

State and local government officials we met with told us that they also used guidance 

and information from several sources, including DHS, to develop actions to take for 

the code-orange alert periods. For example, they told us that their agencies used 

guidance and information from DHS on critical infrastructure assets and airport 

security. They also indicated that they used information from the FBI and local law 

enforcement agencies, such as additional intelligence information, to determine areas 

in which to strengthen protective measures.15

For the most part, federal agencies responding to our questionnaire along with 

officials we met with from 3 state and 6 local government agencies indicated that 

receiving information with greater specificity about threats would have been helpful 

in determining additional actions to take in response to code-orange alerts. For 

example, 14 of 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire indicated that 

information on region-, sector-, site-, or event-specific threats, if available, would 

have been helpful. Additionally, all 15 federal agencies reported that information on 

threat time frames, if available, would have assisted them in determining appropriate 

actions to take in responding to the code-orange alerts. Fourteen federal agencies 

also indicated that receiving information on recommended measures for preventing 

incidents would have been helpful in determining appropriate protective measures to 

implement or enhance for each code-orange alert period. 

 

14The National Joint Terrorism Task Force is comprised of numerous federal agencies co-located in the 

Strategic Information and Operations Center at FBI headquarters. This task force provides a central 

fusion point for terrorism information and intelligence to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which 

include state and local law enforcement officers, federal agents, and other federal personnel who work 

in the field to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism. 15We expect to learn more about the guidance used by states and localities as we receive responses 

from our state questionnaire and will continue to develop this information through our site visits with 

various local officials. We expect to report the results from this work to you later in this year. 
12 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

In addition, one state official noted that receiving more specific information about the 

type of threat—against bridges and dams, for example—would enable the state to 

concentrate its response in those areas, a more effective approach than simply 

blanketing the state with increased general security measures. One local official also 

noted that specific information about the location of a threat should be provided to 

law enforcement agencies throughout the nation—not just to localities that are being 

threatened—thus allowing other local governments to determine whether there 

would be an indirect impact on them and to respond accordingly. DHS officials 

indicated that the department works with state and local officials to develop specific 

protective measures. One official said that DHS communicates regularly with and 

provides technical advice to state and local officials to assist in the development of 

specialized and appropriate protective measures. 

Federal Agencies Reported Enhancing Existing Protective Measures More 

Often than Implementing New Measures, While State and Local Agencies 

Reported Implementing Additional Measures 

Federal agencies responding to our questionnaire as well as those we visited 

indicated that they substantially enhanced security following the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks. Thus, these agencies operate at high security levels regardless of 

the national threat level. In responding to our questionnaire, most federal agencies 

noted that they did not significantly increase the number of additional protective 

measures in response to the code-orange alerts. Federal agencies reported that their 

primary response for the three code-orange alerts was to enhance or more frequently 

use measures already in place, such as increasing the frequency of existing facility 

security patrols. Less often, these agencies indicated that they continued, or did not 

change, existing protective measures as a result of the code-orange alert periods, 

such as the use of intrusion detection systems. 

During the code orange alert period from December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, 

preliminary responses to the federal agency questionnaire indicate that about 49 

percent of all protective measures these agencies reported were enhanced in 

response to the threat level increase. About 37 percent of all protective measures 

reported for this period were continued at their pre-code-orange alert levels, or not 

changed, by federal agencies in response to the code-orange alert. About 13 percent 

of the protective measures federal agencies reported for the December 21, 2003, to 

January 9, 2004, code-orange alert period were implemented by these agencies solely 

in response to the code-orange alert.16 For instance, one measure implemented solely 

in response to the code orange alert period was the extension of shifts for emergency 

personnel. Preliminary analysis of responses regarding the other two periods of 

code-orange alert is consistent with those from the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 

2004, period. 

As indicated in table 3, among the most commonly reported protective measures, 

only one was implemented solely in response to the code-orange alert period 

December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, according to federal agencies’ questionnaire 

 

16Percentages do not total to 100 percent due to rounding. 
13 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

responses. Even so, only 2 of the 14 federal agencies that reported having the 

measure indicated that they implemented the measure solely in response to the codeorange alert, while the other 12 agencies indicated that the measure was already in 

place. The protective measures most commonly reported by federal agencies for the 

code-orange alert period were already in place and continued at pre-code-orange alert 

levels or were enhanced for the code-orange alert period. Preliminary results for the 

other two code-orange alert periods in our review were similar to those reported in 

table 3. 

Table 3: Protective Measures Most Commonly Reported by Federal Agencies for the December 21, 2003, 

to January 9, 2004, Code-Orange Alert Period 

Number of federal 

agencies that 

reported measure 

Number of 

agencies that 

indicated no 

change in 

measure that was 

already in placea

Number of 

agencies that 

enhanced 

measure that was 

already in placeb

Number of 

agencies that 

Implemented 

measure for 

code-orange 

onlyc

Screen mail 15 8 7 0 

Activate monitoring 

systems 15 11 4 0 

Activate intrusion 

detection systems 15 14 1 0 

Implement facility 

security patrols 15 2 13 0 

Inspect visitors 14 8 6 0 

Escort visitors 14 5 7 2 

 Source: GAO analysis of data from the first 15 federal agencies responding to GAO’s questionnaire. 

a

No change in a protective measure indicates that the measure was already in place prior to the code-orange 

alert period and continued at the same level of use or frequency during a code-orange alert. b

The enhancement of a measure that was already in place refers to the increased use of an existing protective 

measure, such as more frequent facility security patrols or increased volume of mail screened. c

The implementation of a measure for code-orange only refers to the use of an additional measure that was not 

already in place solely to respond to a code-orange alert. 

To ensure that protective measures operate as intended and are implemented as 

planned, federal agencies for which we received questionnaire responses indicated 

that they conducted tests or exercises on these measures within the past year. These 

federal agencies also reported receiving confirmation from component entities, 

offices, or personnel that protective measures were enhanced or implemented during 

the code-orange alert periods. Fifteen federal agencies responding to our 

questionnaire reported that they conducted tests or exercises on the functionality and 

reliability of intrusion detection systems, mail and delivery screening equipment and 

procedures, monitoring systems, and continuity of operations and emergency 

response measures. Fourteen of these agencies indicated that they conducted tests 

or exercises on visitor and employee screening procedures and vehicle inspection 

equipment and procedures. Furthermore, 12 of these agencies noted that they 

confirmed that protective measures were enhanced or implemented during each of 

the three code-orange alert periods. 

Federal agencies responding to our questionnaire indicated that they benefited in 

various ways from the protective measures they implemented during code-orange 

alerts, but also noted that their operations were affected. For example, these federal 

agencies reported that protective measures enhanced employees’ sense of security, 
14 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

promoted staff awareness, and provided visible deterrents to possible threats. On the 

other hand, they said that their operations were affected by delaying visitors, 

employees, and vehicles from entering facilities; limiting tours, meetings, and 

conferences; and shifting resources away from normal daily operations to ensure 

measures required for code-orange alerts were implemented. 

Additionally, these federal agencies noted that they faced a number of operational 

challenges in responding to the code-orange alerts. For example, 12 of the 15 federal 

agencies indicated that insufficient information on threats was an operational 

challenge. In particular, 6 federal agencies noted that without specific information on 

threats, they could not effectively focus resources on protective measures to respond 

to possible threats. Other operational challenges identified by some federal agencies 

responding to our questionnaire include insufficient personnel training to implement 

protective measures, insufficient equipment and materials, and insufficient facilities 

and space, particularly to screen visitors. 

Officials from two states and three local governments told us that they responded to 

code-orange alerts by implementing a variety of protective measures, such as 

enhanced entry screening, additional law enforcement patrols, and increased 

surveillance of critical infrastructure. They also told us that, in some cases, their 

agencies implemented heightened airport security measures and increased 

coordination with other agencies during the code-orange alert periods. 

Cost Data Reported by Federal, State, and Local Government Agencies Is 

Limited 

Thirteen federal agencies, one state, and six localities provided information on 

additional costs, if any, that they incurred during code-orange alert periods. The cost 

information federal agencies reported in response to our questionnaire were 

generally estimates; the methods the state and six localities used to develop their 

information are generally unknown. 

Thirteen of the 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire provided 

information on whether they incurred additional costs during each of the three codeorange alert periods in our review. Of these 13 federal agencies, 9 noted they had 

incurred additional costs and provided a dollar amount for those costs; 4 agencies 

said that they did not incur any additional costs. 

Eight of the 9 agencies that reported incurring additional costs provided cost 

estimates. In addition, most of these agencies reported using similar methods to 

develop their estimates. Based on our preliminary analysis, these methods appear to 

be reasonable. For example, 5 of these agencies reported using the additional hours 

accumulated by security personnel during code-orange alerts multiplied by the hourly 

rates of security personnel to develop estimates for additional personnel costs 

incurred during code-orange alerts. The 8 agencies’ cost estimates do not necessarily 

include all nonpersonnel costs that may have been incurred during one or more of the 

three code-orange alert periods included in our survey. 
15 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

One agency tracked additional costs incurred in response to code-orange alerts, and 

thus was able to provide actual cost information. This agency extracted cost 

information from its financial accounting system, which was subjected to auditing 

procedures. However, as reported in the fiscal year 2005 President’s Budget, this 

agency’s financial management performance had serious flaws as of December 31, 

2003. Thus, we have concerns regarding the reliability of the cost information 

provided to us. We will continue to assess this issue and expect to report the results 

of this effort to you later this year. 

For the 9 agencies that reported incurring additional costs, we calculated the 

additional average daily costs incurred during each of the three code-orange alert 

periods. The additional average daily costs for these 9 agencies ranged from $172 to 

$155,000 for the March 17 to April 16, 2003, period; from $467 to $165,660 for the May 

20 to 30, 2003, period; and from $158 to $142,725 for the December 21, 2003, to 

January 9, 2004, period. For each code-orange alert period, the lowest cost was for a 

small independent agency and the largest for a cabinet department. 

We conducted preliminary analysis on the additional average daily costs the 9 federal 

agencies incurred between the first and second alert periods, and no specific trends 

emerged. For example, of the 9 agencies that reported incurring additional costs 

during code-orange alert periods, 5 agencies had an increase in additional average 

daily costs between the first and second alert periods under review, and 3 agencies 

had a decrease. One agency’s additional costs remained the same for each of the first 

two code-orange alert periods. For these 9 agencies, the total percentage change 

between the first and second alert periods ranged from a decrease of approximately 

22 percent to an increase of about 179 percent. However, this 179 percent increase, 

reported by a small independent agency, represented only a difference of about $300. 

Based on the cost information these agencies reported, 8 of the 9 agencies incurred 

fewer additional costs during the third code-orange alert period than during the first 

code-orange alert. Percentage decreases in additional costs between these two 

periods ranged from about 8 percent to 83 percent. One agency did not experience 

any difference in additional costs incurred between the first and third code-orange 

alert periods under review. 

Even though the percentage decreases are similar for some of the 9 federal agencies, 

the actual dollar amount of the decreases could vary considerably. For example, 

while 2 federal agencies experienced an 8 percent decline in additional average daily 

costs between the first and third alert periods, 1 of these, a small independent agency, 

had a $14 decline in additional average daily costs, while the other, a larger cabinet 

level agency, had a $12,275 decline. 

Currently, we do not have sufficient information to explain the differences in 

additional costs the 9 federal agencies incurred between the first and second codeorange alert periods and the overall decline in additional costs for 8 of the 9 agencies 

between the first and third code-orange alert periods. As our analysis of the 

additional costs incurred by federal agencies continues, we will continue to examine 

differences in the additional costs individual agencies incurred in each alert period, 

and, where possible, obtain information about the reasons for these differences. We 

expect to report the results of this work to you later this year. 
16 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Two of the 15 federal agencies responding to our questionnaire said that they did not 

report cost information for any of the three orange alert periods in the survey 

because they did not track additional code-orange alert costs. These agencies 

explained that they did not have the capability to separate additional code-orange 

alert costs from their total annual security-related costs. 

To date, we have received code-orange alert cost information from one state and six 

localities. These state and local cost estimates included little or no information on 

how they were developed or on internal control procedures used to verify the 

reliability of the costs provided. Therefore, we were unable to verify the 

comprehensiveness, consistency, reliability, or comparability of the cost estimates 

they provided. Based on the cost information provided by one state, we calculated 

the additional average daily cost for 10 of the state’s agencies, which amounted to 

just under $400 for the code-orange alert period from March 17 to April 16, 2003. Five 

of its agencies collectively incurred an additional average daily cost of just over $90 

for the code-orange alert from May 20 to 30, 2003. No cost information was provided 

for the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, code-orange alert period. 

We do not yet know how the localities developed their cost information. Thus, we 

cannot assess the reliability of this information. We calculated additional average 

daily costs for the six localities based on the cost information they provided to us. 

Five localities had additional average daily costs for the March 17 to April 16, 2003, 

period, ranging from a low of about $8,000 to a high of about $68,000. Two localities 

had average daily costs of about $12,000 or less and two had costs of more than 

$60,000. For the May 20 to 30, 2003, period, three localities had additional average 

daily costs of approximately $100, $6,000, and $9,000, respectively. One of the 

localities provided cost information for all three orange alert periods included in our 

review—but its information was limited to costs for 3 agencies. That locality had 

additional average daily costs for 3 agencies of about $12,000 in the March 17 to April 

16, 2003, period; approximately $9,000 in the May 20 to 30, 2003, period; and about 

$11,000 for the December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004, period. Finally, one locality 

had about $5,000 per day in police overtime, equipment, and contractual costs for 

each day the locality was at code-orange during February through May 2003. 

We sent a questionnaire to 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 4 

territories to collect a variety of information, including additional costs they incurred 

during code-orange alerts. However, we did not receive responses from any states 

and territories in time to include the results in this report. We expect to report any 

cost information collected through this effort to you later this year. Based on our 

work to date, states and localities generally may not systematically and uniformly 

collect the additional costs associated with higher (e.g., code-orange) alert levels; 

thus, we do not expect to collect reliable, comparable, and comprehensive state and 

local government costs. For example, one locality we visited told us they had tracked 

some additional code-orange costs by using a specific job code, but the level of effort 

involved to get all agencies to comply had been considerable. To the extent that 

inconsistent methods were used in estimating costs, reasonable comparisons of cost 

information are limited. 
17 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Some Federal, State, and Local Government Agencies Have Similar Advisory 

Systems, but Can Change Threat Levels Independently 

Of those agencies and entities that we have met with or contacted, 5 federal agencies, 

4 states, and one locality have their own threat advisory systems to ensure that 

government agencies are notified of impending emergencies, such as natural 

disasters or terrorist threats, allowing them to prepare a response. These systems 

were generally in place prior to the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory 

System. One federal agency told us that it had developed its own five-level alert 

system 8 years ago to ensure the protection of critical national security assets. This 

system and those of the other 9 agencies are similar to the Homeland Security 

Advisory System or have been modified to conform to it, as required for federal 

executive agencies by HSPD-3. The systems include varying threat levels with 

protective measures specified for each. For example, all federal agencies’ threat 

advisory systems we have identified to date have five threat levels that correspond to 

the five levels of the Homeland Security Advisory System and specify a variety of 

protective measures for each level. Protective measures specified in these threat 

advisory systems include the implementation of contingency and emergency 

response plans; surveillance of critical locations; screening of mail coming into 

facilities; limitation of facility entry and exit points; and coordination with federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

Likewise, one state’s threat advisory system has five threat levels, while another 

state’s system has four. Again, these threat levels are similar to those of the 

Homeland Security Advisory System. A third state’s threat advisory system has three 

threat levels that correspond to the Homeland Security Advisory System’s yellow, 

orange, and red threat conditions. Protective measures included in these states’ 

systems include inspection of mail and packages, coordination of emergency 

response plans, establishment of command centers, and enhanced security at public 

events. The one locality threat advisory system we have identified to date is also 

similar to the Homeland Security Advisory System and has four threat levels with 

specific actions designated for each. 

Federal, state, and local government agencies we reviewed can raise or lower threat 

levels for their own advisory systems in response to threats or events that specifically 

affect their operations. They can make these adjustments regardless of whether the 

national threat level is raised or lowered at the same time. For instance, for 3 of the 

federal agencies’ threat advisory systems we identified, managers can raise the alert 

level of their specific facilities to respond to local threat conditions. However, in 

general, managers cannot lower alert levels for their facilities below the level 

specified by an agency head or designated authority. States and local governments 

can also raise or lower their own threat levels based on local threats or events. For 

example, one state raised its threat level in early February 2003 in response to the 

crash of the space shuttle Columbia, while one locality raised its threat level for July 

4, 2003, due to public events and large crowds in the city, even though the national 

threat level remained at yellow. 
18 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Agency Comments 

On February 23 and 24, 2004, officials representing the Department of Homeland 

Security provided oral technical comments on this report, which we incorporated as 

appropriate. 

We plan no further distribution of this report until 14 days after the date of this letter. 

At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Subcommittee on Technology, 

Terrorism, and Government Information, Senate Committee on the Judiciary; the 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 

House Committee on Government Reform; Senator Joseph Biden; the Secretary of 

Homeland Security; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other 

interested parties. Copies will be made available to others on request. In addition, 

this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If 

you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at jenkinswo@gao.gov. 

William O. Jenkins, Jr. 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Enclosures: 4
19 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Enclosure I

Scope and Methodology 

To address the objectives of our review, we met with and received information from 8 

federal agencies, three states, the District of Columbia, and seven local governments 

and obtained information from another state and two local governments. We met 

with and received documentation from these federal agencies, states, the District of 

Columbia, and the local governments to obtain preliminary information on the 

following: how they were notified of national threat level changes for the three most 

recent periods of code-orange alert from March 17 to April 16, 2003; May 20 to 30, 

2003; and December 21, 2003, to January 9, 2004; the guidance and information they 

reported using to assist in determining protective measures to implement during the 

three code-orange alerts; the protective measures they reported implementing during 

those periods; the additional costs they reported incurring as a result of implementing 

such measures; and any threat advisory systems they indicated were in place before 

the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System. 

We selected the 8 federal agencies to visit based on the amount of homeland security 

funding each agency reported to the Office of Management and the Budget for fiscal 

year 2003.17 We visited the 5 federal agencies that reported receiving the most 

homeland security funding in fiscal year 2003—the Departments of Energy, Health 

and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. We visited one federal 

agency that reported receiving a moderate amount of homeland security funding, the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration; one federal agency that reported 

receiving a small amount of homeland security funding, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial 

Museum; and one federal agency that did not report receiving any homeland security 

funding in fiscal year 2003, the Department of Education. 

The three states we visited were Maryland, Texas, and Virginia. We also visited the 

District of Columbia. The seven local governments we visited were Baltimore, 

Maryland; Austin, Dallas, and Travis County, Texas; and Alexandria, Arlington 

County, and Fairfax County, Virginia. We also received information from 

Montgomery County, Maryland, and Seattle, Washington. We selected Maryland and 

Virginia because they have critical infrastructure assets such as national landmarks 

and ports. Moreover, we selected the local governments in these states and the 

District of Columbia because they are part of the National Capitol Region, which has 

various important infrastructure assets, including landmarks and federal agency 

headquarters. We visited Texas, and three local governments in Texas, because it is a 

large coastal state with a variety of critical infrastructure assets, including national 

landmarks, ports, and oil pipelines. We also received information from Seattle, 

Washington, because it is a large city with critical infrastructure assets such as 

landmarks and ports. 

We examined documentation provided by the federal agencies, states, and local 

governments mentioned above to identify the guidance and information they used in 

determining protective measures for the three code-orange alert periods, the 

measures they implemented during those periods, the additional costs they incurred 

 

17Office of Management and Budget, 2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism. 
20 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

as a result of the measures implemented, and the threat advisory systems they had in 

place prior to the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System. We also 

obtained information from Georgia on its threat advisory system. 

To obtain more detailed information on federal and state agencies’ guidance, 

measures, and additional costs for the three code-orange alert periods, we developed 

and sent a questionnaire to 28 federal agencies and another to the 50 states and the 

District of Columbia, four U.S. territories18 and Puerto Rico. We received comments 

on draft versions of the federal questionnaire from the 8 federal agencies we visited, 

and we pre-tested the federal questionnaire with 4 of those agencies—the 

Departments of Energy and Homeland Security, the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration, and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. To develop a 

questionnaire to use in surveying states and territories, we adapted the final version 

of the federal questionnaire to correspond with information gathered during our 

preliminary visits to the 3 states, the District of Columbia, and the seven local 

governments and information provided to us by 1 state and two local governments. 

We then pre-tested this questionnaire with 3 states—Delaware, Pennsylvania, and 

West Virginia. 

We sent the questionnaire to the 25 federal agencies that reported homeland security 

funding for fiscal year 2003 to the Office of Management and Budget.19 In addition, 

we sent the questionnaire to 3 federal agencies that are Chief Financial Officers Act20

agencies but did not report homeland security funding for fiscal year 2003. Thus, we 

included all Chief Financial Officers Act agencies in our review, except the 

Department of Defense. Although the Department of Defense is a Chief Financial 

Officers Act agency and, along with the Army Corps of Engineers-Civil Works, 

reported homeland security funding for fiscal year 2003, we excluded these agencies 

from our review because these agencies and their component entities did not follow 

the Homeland Security Advisory System. 

We conducted preliminary analysis on the questionnaire responses received from 15 

federal agencies for this report. While we received questionnaire responses from 

additional federal agencies, we did not receive the responses in time to incorporate 

the results into this report. We did not receive responses from any states or 

territories to our questionnaire in time to include the results in this report. 

For the 15 federal agencies’ questionnaire responses, we analyzed the responses to 

determine the most commonly reported ways in which these federal agencies were 

notified of changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System national threat level, 

the types of information included in the notifications, the methods through which 

these federal agencies would like to be notified of national threat level changes, and 

the types of information they would like to have included in the notifications. 

 

18The four U.S. territories include American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. 

Virgin Islands. 

19Office of Management and Budget, 2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism. Of the 25 

federal agencies that reported homeland security funding in fiscal year 2003, 22 are Chief Financial 

Officers Act agencies. 

20P.L. 101-576 (Nov. 15, 1990). 
21 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

In addition, we analyzed the questionnaire responses to determine the most 

commonly reported types of guidance and information received by these federal 

agencies in determining protective measures for the code-orange alerts and federal 

agencies’ perspectives on the usefulness and timeliness of the guidance and 

information. We also reviewed the questionnaire responses to identify agency 

perspectives on the types of additional information that would have been helpful in 

determining protective measures. 

We evaluated the questionnaire responses to identify the most commonly reported 

types of measures that the 15 federal agencies implemented during the three codeorange alert periods, the extent to which these federal agencies conducted tests on 

protective measures and received confirmation on the implementation of measures, 

the benefits to these federal agencies from the implementation of measures, and the 

most commonly reported operational challenges faced by the 15 federal agencies in 

implementing measures. 

Furthermore, we analyzed cost data reported by these federal agencies in the 

questionnaire responses to determine the average daily additional costs incurred by 

federal agencies during the code-orange alert periods. We analyzed the federal 

agencies’ cost data to determine the percentage change in additional average daily 

costs across the three code-orange alert periods. We evaluated the questionnaire 

responses to identify methods used by these federal agencies to determine their 

actual or estimated additional costs for each of the code-orange alert periods and 

their actual or estimated total costs for each code-yellow alert that preceded the 

code-orange alert periods. We reviewed these methods to assess the level of 

consistency in the ways that these federal agencies collected actual cost data or 

developed costs estimates and also reviewed procedures reported by federal agencies 

for reviewing and certifying the reliability of cost data. 

To obtain information on these federal agencies’ threat advisory systems, we 

analyzed questionnaire responses to determine the number of federal agencies that 

had their own threat advisory systems in place prior to the establishment of the 

Homeland Security Advisory System as well as the number of agencies that follow 

their own threat advisory systems and the Homeland Security Advisory System. We 

reviewed documentation of the threat advisory systems that these federal agencies 

provided with their questionnaire responses to identify the characteristics of the 

systems, including the systems’ threat levels and protective measures and the 

systems’ conformance to the Homeland Security Advisory System. 

On the basis of our work to date, we collected detailed information on the 

experiences of Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia, during the code-orange alert 

periods through visits with local government officials. We plan to collect detailed 

information from seven additional cities and four additional counties. We selected 

locations based on the following criteria: the local governments’ receipt of urban area 

grants21 from DHS, geographic location, topography (e.g., inland or border/seaport), 

and type of locality (e.g., metropolitan or nonmetropolitan area). We selected some 

 

21The Urban Area Security Initiative grants are awarded based on a combination of current threat 

estimates, critical assets within the urban area, and population density. 
22 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

cities and counties that received grants from DHS and some that did not. We also 

selected cities and counties from different geographic regions and with different 

topographic characteristics, as well as cities and counties that are in both 

metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. 
23 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Enclosure II 

Federal Agencies Surveyed 

Department of Agriculture 

Department of Commerce 

Department of Education 

Department of Energy 

Department of Health and Human Services 

Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Housing and Urban Development 

Department of the Interior 

Department of Justice 

Department of Labor 

Department of State 

Department of Transportation 

Department of the Treasury 

Department of Veterans Affairs 

Agency for International Development 

Corporation for National and Community Service 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Federal Communications Commission 

General Services Administration 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

National Archives and Records Administration 

National Science Foundation 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Personnel Management 

Small Business Administration 

Smithsonian Institution 

Social Security Administration 

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
24 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

Enclosure III 

 
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Enclosure III Federal Questionnaire 
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Enclosure IV 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

William O. Jenkins, Jr. (202) 512-8777 

Debra B. Sebastian (202) 512-9385 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the individuals named above, David P. Alexander, Fredrick D. Berry, 

Nancy A. Briggs, Kristy N. Brown, Philip D. Caramia, Christine F. Davis, Michele 

Fejfar, Rebecca Gambler, Gladys Toro, Jonathan R. Tumin, and Kathryn G. Young 

made key contributions to this report. 

(440290) 
50 GAO-04-453R Homeland Security Advisory System 

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