1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 15a0230p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

M ARK P ARSONS ; B RANDON B RADLEY ; S COTT G ANDY ; R OBERT H ELLIN ; J OSEPH F. B RUCE ; J OSEPH W. U TSLER , Plaintiffs-Appellants , v

.

U

NITED S TATES D EPARTMENT OF J USTICE ; F EDERAL B UREAU OF I NVESTIGATION , Defendants-Appellees

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 14-1848

Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 2:14-cv-10071—Robert H. Cleland, District Judge. Argued: June 18, 2015 Decided and Filed: September 17, 2015
Before: ROGERS and McKEAGUE, Circ uit Judges; SARGUS, District Judge *

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Saura J. Sahu, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK AND STONE, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellants. Lindsey Powell, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Saura J. Sahu, Emily C. Palacios, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK AND STONE, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, Michael J. Steinberg, Daniel S. Korobkin, ACLU FUND OF MICHIGAN, De troit, Michigan, Howard Hertz, HERTZ SCHRAM PC, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellants. Lindsey Powell, Michael S. Raab, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIC E, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

* The Honorable Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., Chief United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 

### >No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 2

_________________ OPINION

_________________ SARGUS, District Judge. Plain tiffs appeal the dist rict court’s dismissal of this action for lack of standing. We REVERSE and REMAND.

OVERVIEW

This is a case about fans of the Insane Clown Posse, who call themselves “Juggalos,” and their ability to bring a lawsuit against government law enforcement agencies for alleged
violations of their constitutiona l rights. The Insane Clown Posse is a commercially successful musical art group whose fans self-identify as “J uggalos.” Juggalos are easily spotted because they frequently display, on person or property, insignia representative of the band. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center—an informati onal center operating under the Federal Bureau of Investigation—released a congressionally-ma ndated report on gang activity that included a section on Juggalos. The report identified Juggalos as a “hybrid gang” and relayed information about criminal activity committed by Juggalo subs ets. Plaintiff-Juggalos allege that they subsequently suffered violations of their First and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights at the hands of state and local law enforcement officers who were motivated to commit the injuries in question due to the identif ication of Juggalos as a criminal gang. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Department of Justice and Fede ral Bureau of Investigation unde r the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. For the
reasons that follow we REVERSE the dismissal and REMAND the case for consideration of Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) arguments.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

Because this case is before us on a motion to di smiss, we “must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe th e complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Kardules v. City of Columbus , 95 F.3d 1335, 1346 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). When considering whet her pleadings make out a justiciable case forNo. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 3

want of standing, our an alysis must be confined to the four corners of the complaint. Id . at 1347
n.4.
1. Musical Group ICP and Juggalos
The Insane Clown Posse (“ICP”) is a musical group formed in 1991 and based in Farmingham Hills, Michigan. The group is well known for elaborate live performances and has enjoyed substantial commercial success. ICP’s songs “often use harsh language and themes” that deal with social, political, religious or co unter-cultural issues. (R. 1 ¶ 22). Specifically, ICP’s music ranges from songs with “hopeful, lif e-affirming themes about the wonders of life and the support that Juggalos give to one anot her,” to “horrorcore hip hop”—music that “uses very harsh language to tell nightmare-like storie s with an underlying message that horrible things happen to people who choose evil over good.” ( Id . ¶ 3).

Members of ICP’s dedicated musical fan ba se—fans of ICP and other bands on ICP’s independent record label, Psychopathic Reco rds—are widely known as “Juggalos.” “As an expression of their identity, Juggalos often obtain and display distinctiv e tattoos of ICP and Psychopathic Record art and icons. They also w ear and otherwise display ICP art, symbols and insignia on their clothing and other personal belongings.” (Id . ¶ 24). These displays of identity include the practice of painting their faces to look like clowns and often incorporate the “hatchetman” logo—a distinctive Juggalo symbol.
Plaintiffs self-identify as Juggalos. “Jugga los gather and associate with each other to listen to ICP’s music, to share id eas surrounding the music, to expr ess their support of or interest in the ideas that ICP expresses through its music, to express their affilia tion with ICP and the artists on its record label, and to express their affiliation with one another.” ( Id . ¶ 25).
2. Defendants and the National Gang Intelligence Center
Defendant Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is a department of the United States government. Defendant Federal Bureau of Investig ation (“FBI”) is an agency housed within the DOJ. In 2005, Congress directed the U.S. Attorney General, through Public Law 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960, to “establis h a National Gang Intelligence Cent er (‘NGIC’) and gang information database to be housed at and administered by the [FBI] to collect, analyze, and disseminate gangNo. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 4

activity information from the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons, the Drug Enforcement Administration, other federal agencies, and state and local la w enforcement, prosecutors, and correctional officers.” ( Id . ¶ 100). In the same federal statute, Congress directed the NGIC to make the information available to federal, state and lo cal law enforcement agencies, among others. The
statute also directed the NGIC to annually submit a report to Congress on gang activity. “The DOJ promptly established the Center in respons e to Congress’s direction and . . . the FBI has
administered the Center since its inception.” ( Id . ¶ 101).
In 2011, the NGIC published its 2011 Nationa l Gang Threat Assessment (the “2011 NGIC Report,” or “Report”), in which the NGIC summarized and reported information it had collected and analyzed in rela tion to gangs. “According to th e [NGIC], the [2011 NGIC Report] ‘supports [DOJ] strategic objecti ves 2.2 (to reduce the threat, in cidence, and prevalence of violent crime) and 2.4 (to reduce the threat, trafficking, use a nd related violence of illegal drugs).’” ( Id . ¶ 121). The 2011 NGIC Report “is based on federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement and corrections agency intelligence . . . .” ( Id . at ¶ 122). From its publication through at least the time of the filing of the Complaint in th is case, the 2011 NGIC Report has been available to the genera l public on the NGIC website. See https://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications /2011-national-gang-threat-assessment.
In the 2011 NGIC Report, Juggalo s are classified as a “loose ly-organized hybrid gang.” ( Id . ¶ 132). The Report defines hybrid-gangs as “non-traditional gangs with multiple affiliations” that “are adopting national symbol s and gang members often crossover from gang to gang.” ( Id . ¶ 131). The Report furthe r states the following:

 “Many Juggalo subsets exhibit gang-like beha vior and engage in criminal activity
and violence.”

 “Most crimes committed by Juggalos are s poradic, disorganized, individualistic, and often involve simple assault, pers onal drug use and possession, petty theft and
vandalism.”

 “A small number of Juggalos are forming more organized subsets and engaging in more gang-like criminal activity, such as felony assaults, thefts, robberies, and drug sales.”No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 5

 “Juggalos’ disorganization and lack of st ructure within their groups, coupled with their transient nature, makes it difficult to classify them and identify their members and migration patterns.”

( Id . ¶ 140). The Report also notes that Arizona, California, Pennsylvania and Utah are the only states officially recognizing Juggalos as a gang, but that Juggalo gang-relate d criminal activity is reported in other states.
3. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries
a. Plaintiff Mark Parsons (“Parsons”)
On July 9, 2013, Parsons was riding with a driv er-trainee in a semi-tru ck on an interstate freeway outside Knoxville, Tennessee for his small trucking business, enti tled “Juggalo Express
LLC.” The side of Parsons’ truck was decorated with a large, visible ICP “hatchetman” logo. ( Id . ¶¶ 31-34). Parsons and the trainee pulled into the bypass la ne of a weigh station, where a Tennessee State Trooper ordered them to stop and park for a safety inspection. Once they parked, the State Trooper a pproached Parsons and asked if he was a Juggalo. ( Id . ¶¶ 34-37). The State Trooper indicated that he detained Parsons for an inspection due to the hatchetman logo on the truck. He then indica ted that he considered Juggalos to be a criminal gang because of the DOJ’s designation. ( Id . ¶¶ 38-39). He proceeded to detain and question Parsons about whether he had any axes, hatchets or other similar instruments in the vehicle. He searched the vehicle and continued to questi on Parsons for about anhour, during which time he did not find any weapons or contraband and did not issu e a ticket or a citation to Parsons. ( Id . ¶¶ 40-41).
b. Plaintiff Brandon Bradley (“Bradley”)
Bradley has been detained numerous times by law enforcement officer s in California due to visible Juggalo insignia on his person or clothing. In September 2012, a Citrus Heights, California Police Officer in a patrol car stopped Bradley while he was biking. Bradley’s Juggalo
tattoos were visible and he was weari ng a Juggalo merchandise T-shirt. ( Id . ¶¶ 47-48). The officer detained Bradley for fifteen minutes while questioning him about being a Juggalo. ( Id . ¶ 52). “Later, an ex-Citrus Heights Police Officer told Bradley that the ex-officer heard about the
above encounter” and also told Bradle y “the tattoos are gang-affiliated.” ( Id . ¶ 54).No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 6

In October 2012, Bradley was stopped by a de puty from the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department while walking across a street in dow ntown Sacramento. Bradley was wearing a shirt bearing ICP-related insignia and so me of his tattoos were visible. After confirming Bradley selfidentified as a Juggalo, the deputy aske d to see Bradley’s identification. ( Id . ¶¶ 55-60). The deputy took Bradley’s identifica tion and ICP-themed wallet, ra n a background check on Bradley and detained and questioned Bradley for “a substa ntial amount of time, during which the deputy accused Bradley of being in a gang because he wa s a Juggalo. The deputy stated that to be a Juggalo is to be a gang member. The deputy also asked Bradley about his ICP-related tattoos.” ( Id . ¶¶ 60-63).
In January 2013, Bradley was walking while w earing an ICP jacket with a large red “hatchetman” insignia on the b ack. Two police officers pulled up in a cruiser and stopped him. They told Bradley they noticed his jacket with the “hatchetman” insi gnia and ordered him to stand in front of a guardrail with his back to them so they could take pictures of it. They also took photographs of his face and his tattoos. ( Id . ¶¶ 64-70). The officers “interrogated Bradley about his status as a Juggalo and abou t whether he was a gang member.” ( Id . ¶ 71).
c. Plaintiff Scott Gandy (“Gandy”)
Gandy has large ICP-related tattoos on his chest. ( Id . ¶ 79). In 2012, Gandy visited an Army recruiting office where he was asked if he had any tattoos. ( Id . ¶¶ 78, 80). Upon displaying his tattoos, Gandy was told by the Army ’s recruiting Sergeant that Juggalos “were on the federal government’s gang list.” The Sergea nt said that he “cons idered Gandy’s Juggalo tattoos to be gang-related” and then “questione d Gandy about whether he was a gang member.” ( Id . ¶¶ 81-82). “The Sergeant instructed Gandy that he must remove or permanently cover his Juggalo tattoos or the Army would immediat ely deny his recruitmen t application.” ( Id . ¶ 83). As a result of this instruction, Gandy went through the painful and costly procedure of covering his Juggalo tattoos with other tattoos. He returned to the recruitment office, showed the Sergeant his new tattoos and received approval for his ap plication to be consider ed. However, Gandy was ultimately denied a position. ( Id . ¶¶ 86-88).No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 7

d. Plaintiff Robert Hellin (“Hellin”)
Hellin has visible ICP-related tattoos. ( Id . ¶ 92). He enlisted in the Army in 2008 and is currently a corporal. ( Id . ¶ 91). Hellin believes that, because of the Juggalo gang designation, his identity as a Juggalo “places him in immine nt danger of suffering discipline or an involuntary discharge from the Army.” ( Id . ¶ 93).
e. Plaintiffs Joseph Bruce (“Bruce”) and Joseph Utsler (“Utsler”)
Bruce and Utsler are members of ICP. ( Id . ¶ 94). In August 2012, they contracted with AEG Live to perform at the Royal Oak Music Th eater in Royal Oak, Michigan for their annual
musical event known as “Hallowi cked,” to be held in Octo ber 2012. On October 8, 2012, the Royal Oak Music Theater cancelled Hallo wicked without pr ior notice. ( Id . ¶¶ 96-97). “After discussions with AEG Live and Royal Oak Music Th eater, ICP’s record label discovered that the Royal Oak Police Department asked the Royal Oa k Music Theater to cancel the event. When asking the Royal Oak Music Theater to cancel th e Hallowicked event, the Royal Oak Police Department cited the federal Juggalo gang designation.” ( Id . ¶¶ 98-99).
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff-appellants Parsons, Bradley, Gandy, He llin, Bruce, and Utsl er (the “Juggalos”) filed suit against the DOJ and FBI (the “Agenc ies”) asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and vari ous constitutional provisions. 1 Specifically, the Juggalos allege that the 2011 NGIC Report violated their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Claims 1-3), was arbitrary and capricious (Cla im 4), and failed to observe procedures required by law (Cla im 5). The Juggalos also seek relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”) (Claim 6).
The Agencies moved to dismiss the co mplaint on April 9, 2014, arguing, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), that the Juggalos lacked constitutional standing and also had failed
to state a claim.

1 The Juggalos bring their first five claims under the Administrative Proced ure Act. Their first three claims specifically state First and Fifth Amendment violations.No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 8

In June 2014, the district court granted th e motion to dismiss based on the Juggalos’ failure to satisfy the requisite three-part test fo r standing: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. The district court held that Hellin had not demonstrated an injury in fact because he failed to allege any injury he had su ffered. His fears that the Army might take action against him at some point in the future did not demonstrate that injury existed or was fairly impending. As for the remaining five plaintiffs, the district court found that causation and redressability were not satisfied because their al leged injuries were inde pendent actions taken by third-parties who were not before the court. Th e district court also held that the Juggalos had forfeited an argument that they had standing to assert the DJA claim even in the absence of standing to assert their other claims. Having reach ed the dispositive standing issue, the court did not consider the Agencies’ failure to state a claim argument.

II. ARTICLE III STANDING

Motions to dismiss for lack of standing are reviewed de novo

. Miller v. Cincinnati , 622 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2010).
“The threshold question in every federal case is whether the court ha s the judicial power
to entertain the suit.” National Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Magaw , 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Article III of the United States Constitution prescribes that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction only where an actual “case or controversy” exists. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. C ourts have explained the “case or controversy” requirement through a series of “j usticiability doctrines,” including, “perhaps the most important,” that a litigant must have “standing” to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal

courts. Magaw , 132 F.3d at 279.
The Supreme Court has enumerated the follo wing elements necessary to establishing standing:
First, Plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an in vasion of a legallyprotected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti cal. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the c onduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged actio n of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must beNo. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 9

likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (int ernal citations and quotations omitted). The standing inquiry is particularly ri gorous when reaching the merits of the dispute “would force [the Court] to deci de whether an action taken by one of the other tw o branches of
the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA , 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd , 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997)).
A plaintiff must have standing for eachclaim pursued in federal court. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). However, only one plaintiff needs to have standing in
order for the suit to move forward. See Horne v. Flores , 557 U.S. 433, 446-47 (2009) (“[T]he critical question is whether at least one petitioner has allege d such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant hi s invocation of federal- court jurisdiction.”);
Massachusetts v. EPA , 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
“For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismi ss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears th e burden of establishing these elements.” Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 561; accord Kardules v. City of Columbus , 95 F.3d 1335, 1346 (6th Cir. 1996).
A. Injury in Fact
The injury prong of the standing doctrine requires that the ha rm be actual or imminent. In other words, the harm must ha ve already occurred or it must be likely to occur “imminently.” Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 560. “Immin ent” in this context is defined as “certainly impending,” in contradistinction to “alle gations of possible future injury.” Clapper , 133 S. Ct. at 1147. “At the pleading stage, genera l factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are n ecessary to support the claim.” Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation , 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). Moreover, the injury must be to a le gally cognizable right. McConnell v. FEC , 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (overruledNo. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 10

on other grounds); Citizens United v. FEC , 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Diamond v. Charles , 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986).
The Juggalos claim the following injuries re sulted from the 2011 NGIC Report: chilling effects on their freedoms of speech and associati on; stigmatic reputational injury; and various harms inflicted by third-party law enforcement agencies, such as improper stops, detentions, interrogations, searches, denial of employment, and interferen ce with contractual relations.

1. First Amendment & Due Process Claims (1-3)
The Agencies assert that the alleged First Amendment and reputational injuries are too speculative and too generalized to establish an injury in fact.
To satisfy the injury in fact requirem ent on an allegation of chilled speech, the repercussions responsible for the chilling effect mu st be imminent. “Allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.” Laird v. Tatum , 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
Generally, standing is found ba sed on First Amendment viola tions where the rule, policy or law in question has explicitly prohibited or proscribed conduct on the part of the plaintiff.
See , e.g. , Nat’l Right to Life PAC v. Connor , 323 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2003) (Missouri election provisions required out-of-state co mmittees to have an in-state treasurer and deposit account if annual spending exceeded $1500); Clapper , 133 S. Ct. at 1153 (noting that case law does not “hold[] or even suggest[] that plaintiffs can establish standi ng simply by claiming that they experienced a ‘chilling effect’ th at resulted from a governmental policy that does not regulate, constrain, or compel any action on their part”). Here, the 2011 NGTA Report does not “regulate, constrain, or compel any action” on the part of the plaintiffs. Clapper , 133 S. Ct. at 1153. The chilling effect alone, ther efore, does not constitute an injury in fact. See Morrison v. Bd. of
Educ. , 521 F.3d 602, 609-610 (6th Cir. 2008) (“First Amendment chill typically constitutes the ‘reason why the governmental imposition is invalid ra ther than the harm which entitles a party to challenge it.’”) (quoting Adult Video Assoc. v. Dep’t of Justice , 71 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 1995)).No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 11

Reputational injury, on the other hand, is suffi cient to establish an injury in fact. Meese
v. Keene , 481 U.S. 465, 473-76 (1987) (e xhibitor of foreign films ha d standing to challenge the
DOJ’s label of certain films as “political propaganda”); Turkish Coal. Of Am., Inc. v. Bruininks , 678 F.3d 617, 622-23 (8th Cir. 2012) (cognizable injury to reputation pled resulting from defendant labeling plaintiff’ s website “unreliable”); NCAA v. Governor of N.J. , 730 F.3d 208, 220-22 (3d Cir. 2013) (injury in f act requirement satisfied by ev idence that sports leagues’ reputations would be harmed by legalized gambling on games); Foretich v. U.S. , 351 F.3d 1198, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Case law is clear that wher e reputational inju ry derives directly from an unexpired and unretracted government action, that in jury satisfies the requi rements of Article III standing to challenge the action.”). Specifi cally, where claims of a chilling effect are accompanied by concrete allegations of reputational harm, the plaintiff has shown injury in fact.
Meese , 481 U.S. at 473-75. In Meese , the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff wo uld not have had standing had he merely alleged a chilling eff ect, but by introducing affidavits stating that his reputation would suffer if he showed films designated by the government as “political propaganda,” plaintiff cleared the injury in fact hurdle. Id . at 473-74. Cf. Laird , 408 U.S. at 10- 11 (rejecting argument that the plaintiffs’ Firs t Amendment rights were being “chilled by the mere existence, without more , of [the Army’s] investigativ e and data-gathering activity”) (emphasis added).
The Juggalos’ allegations that their Firs t Amendment rights are being chilled are accompanied by allegations of concrete reputati onal injuries resulting in allegedly improper stops, detentions, interrogations , searches, denial of employ ment, and interference with contractual relations. Stigmatization also constitutes an injury in fact for standing purposes.
Heckler v. Matthews , 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984). As requir ed, these reputational injuries are cognizable claims under First Amendmen t and due process causes of action. Meese , 481 U.S. at 473-74; see Paul v. Davis , 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (where reputational injury is accompanied by concrete harm, such as termination of employment, cognizable claim under Due Process Clause exists). For the reasons st ated above, the injury in fact re quirement was satisfied as to the First Amendment and due process claims.No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 12

2. Procedural Claims (4-5)
Claims for violations of procedural rights ar e treated uniquely under the standing inquiry. “The person who has been accorded a procedural ri ght to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal st andards for redressability and immediacy.” Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 572, n.7; accord Wright v. O’Day , 706 F.3d 769, 771-72 (6th Cir. 2013); Klein v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy , 753 F.3d 576, 579 (6th Cir. 2014). However, in order to sustain a claim for procedural injury for standing purposes, “the procedures in que stion [must be] designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of [plaintiff’s] that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 573, n.8. Additiona lly, the plaintiff must suffer a concrete injury as a result of the di sregarded procedural requirement. Wright , 706 F.3d at 772. Consequently, the 2011 NGIC Report—the agen cy “action, finding or conclusion”—at issue here must be designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of plaintiffs, such that the alleged arbitrary, capricious and c ontrary to law nature of the report is personally injurious to
them.
Wright is instructive on this point. We found that freedom from placement on a childabuser registry is a sufficiently concrete interest to establish standing on a procedural due process claim. 706 F.3d at 772. The Juggalos allege that they have suffered reputational injury and have been harassed, detained and otherwise mistreated by law enforcement officer s as a result of the compilation of information and analyses on Jugg alos contained within the 2011 NGIC Report. These alleged injuries are concrete and particul ar to the Appellant-Jugga los, rather than the general population of citizens suffering no adverse effects as a result of the inclusion of the Juggalo subsection. Cf. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 572 (no concrete or particular injury to plaintiffs with generalized grievance against statute); Summers v. Earth Island Inst. , 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (no standing for environmental groups to challenge U. S. Forest Service regulation in absence of dispute over a pplication of regulations). As in Wright , AppellantJuggalos are the “object of the challenged actio n”—the placement of Juggalos in the 2011 NGIC Report. Id . Thus, their freedom from placement inthe 2011 NGIC Report is a sufficiently
concrete interest to esta blish a procedural injury in fact. We find the Juggalos have established an injury in fact on thei r procedural APA claims.No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 13

B. Causation
The second prong of the Article-III standing testrequires the Juggalos to show that the injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action.” Whitmore v. Arkansas , 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc. , 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The causa tion need not be proximate. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 n.6 (2014). To that end, the fact that an injury is indirect does not destr oy standing as a matter of course. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) , 412 U.S. 669, 689 (1973) (indirect “attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury” was sufficient to satisfy standing requirements at the pleading stage) . A defendant’s actions may ha ve directly affected someone other than the plaintiff. Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997); Meese , 481 U.S. at 472-77. However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that standing, albeit not precluded, is generally more difficult to establish when the injury is indirect. Summers , 555 U.S. at 493; Allen , 468 U.S. at
751.
The district court found that the Juggalos fa iled to demonstrate causation because the third-party law enforcement officials exercise d independent judgment in committing the alleged injuries. (R. 29, at 9-12). The district court relied on Defenders of Wildlife and Clapper in drawing its conclusion. ( Id ). Both are distinguishable.

In Defenders of Wildlife , the Supreme Court did not hold that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the causation element of standing—only thatthe plaintiffs failed to satisfy injury and redressability. 504 U.S. at 562. (“Respondents had not made the requisite demonstration of (at least) injury and redressability.”). While th e Court did enumerate a he ightened standard for demonstrating causation in the case of indirect in jury caused by a third party, it makes clear that such a standard is satisfied where the plaintiff was able to “adduce facts showing that [the thirdparty’s] choices have been or will be made insuch manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Id . Here, the Juggalos alleged facts demonstrating that their injuries were caused, at least in part, by the Agenci es’ actions in publishi ng the 2011 NGTA Report:

 Parsons alleged that the Tennessee Stat e Trooper who stopped, detained and
searched Parsons indicated that he cons idered Juggalos to be a criminal gangNo. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 14

based on the DOJ’s designation and that he had stopped Parsons for an inspection because of the hatchetman logo on Parsons’ truck. (R. 1 ¶ 39).

 Gandy alleged that an Army Recruiting Se rgeant told Gandy that Juggalos were a prohibited criminal gang based on th e DOJ’s Juggalo gang designation and, therefore, the Sergeant c onsidered Gandy’s tattoos to be gang-related. ( Id . ¶ 81).

 When asking the Royal Oak Music Th eater to cancel Bruce and Utsler’s Hallowicked concert, the Royal Oak Poli ce Department cited the federal Juggalo designation. ( Id . ¶ 99).

This panel must accept as true these material allegations. The Juggalos’ allegations link the 2011 NGTA Report to their injuri es by stating that the law en forcement officials themselves acknowledged that the DOJ gang designation had cause d them to take the actions in question. At this initial stage of the case, the Juggalos’ allegations must suffice. See Lambert v. Hartman , 517 F.3d 433, 435-38 (6th Cir. 2008). Should the case proceed to discovery, the Agencies would have the opportunity to factually ch allenge the allegations.
In support of its finding that causation is broken by the independent law enforcement officers’ voluntary conduct, the di strict court noted that the Agencies did not direct the thirdparty law enforcement entities to stop, detain and question Plaintiffs, or to cancel the Hallowicked concert. (R. 29, at 10-11). See City of Detroit v. Secretary of Commerce , 4 F.3d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1993) (no causation due to “an independent act breaking the chain of causation between the challenged actions ... and the in jury to plaintiffs”). But, it is still possible to motivate harmful conduct without giving a dire ct order to engage in said conduct. The Juggalos allege that the inju rious third-party actions we re motivated by the DOJ gang designation. In the nebulous land of “fairl y traceable,” where causation means more than speculative but less than but-for , the allegation that a defe ndant’s conduct was a motivating factor in the third party’s injurious actions satisfies the requis ite standard.No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 15

The district court also noted that the 2011 NGTA Report relied in part on individual States’ designations of Juggalos as a gang, 2 “further complicating Plaintiff Bradley’s theory of causation.” (R. 29, at 10; see also 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, at 22). However,
courts have held that the fact that a defendant was one of multiple contributors to a plaintiff’s injuries does not defeat causation. Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc. , 582 F.3d 309, 345-47 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds , 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Libertarian Party of Va.
v. Judd , 718, F.3d 308, 316 (4th Cir. 2013) (causationis satisfied if witness residency requirement for gathering signatures on petitions was partially responsible for frustrating plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, even where unrelated knee injury would also have hindered assertion of rights); Barnum Timber Co. v. EPA , 633 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2011) (causation
satisfied where defendant’s listi ng of plaintiff’s property as “impaired water body” may have only been one contributing factor to decreasing property value). In American Elec. Power Co. , the Second Circuit held that injuries were fair ly traceable to the defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions, even though third parties not before the court had also emitted carbon dioxide contributing to the plaintiffs’ al leged injuries. 582 F.3d at 345- 47. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction in a divided opinion. Four Justices concluded that at least some plaintiffs had sta nding and four concluded that none had standing, with Justice Sotomayor taking no part in the decision. Id

. Resolution of this issue is not necessary in this case. The injuries alleged all occurred within law enforcement jurisdictions having re ady access to the challenged report. Several occurred in states which had not previously designated the Juggalos as a gang. In these circumstances, we need not definitive ly address the multiple causation issue.
The Agencies’ arguments on causation are also unavailing. The Agencies claim that the Juggalos fail to satisfy the pleading standards w ith respect to their allegations that the thirdparties relied on the 2011 NGIC Report in impr operly detaining, sear ching and otherwise mistreating the Juggalos. (Appellees Br. at 20-22). However, the test for standing is not whether the Juggalos met Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly ,

2 The district court noted that the 2011 NGTA Report relied on the State of California’s designation of the Juggalos as a gang. (R. 29, at 10). The 2011 NGTA Repor t states that Arizona, California, Pennsylvania and Utah designate Juggalos as gangs. (Appellees Br., at A5).No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 16

550 U.S. 540 (2007) pleading requirements, but ra ther whether they have demonstrated their injuries to be fairly traceable to the Agencies’ actions. 3 The Agencies seek to distinguish the cases relied upon by the Juggalos— Lambert and Foretich —through the level of detail provided in the plaintiffs’ allegations pertaining to causation. Of course, causation to support standing is not synonymous with causation sufficient to suppor t a claim. Nonetheless, the question of whether the causal nexus has been pled with part icularity is not the question we now address. The Juggalos’ allegations, which we must credit at the motion to di smiss stage, satisfy the fairly traceable requirement.
The Agencies also cite Clapper , in which the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries and causation theori es were too speculative to establis h an injury in fact that was fairly traceable to the defendants. 133 S. Ct. at 1150. We note that Clapper was dismissed for lack of standing at the summary judgment stage. The burden on the plaintiffs was therefore significantly higher—they c ould not rest on “mere al legations” but had to “set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts” demons trating their injuries and causation. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 561. In this case, the Juggalos need only al lege facts adducing that their injuries are fairly traceable to the Agencies’ actions. Parson s, Gandy, Bruce and Utsler have done so with their allegations that law enfor cement officers communicated the motivation behind their actions to be the DOJ’s Juggalo gang designation.
C. Redressability
The third prong of the Article III standing test is redressabilit y, i.e. the relief the plaintiff is seeking must provide redress for the injury. An injury is redressable if a court order can provide “substantial and meaningful relief.” Larson v. Valente , 456 U.S. 228, 243 (1982). “[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requi rement when he shows th at a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve
his every injury.” Id . at 244 n.15; accord

. Massachusetts v. EPA , 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007). The
relevant standard is likelihood—wheth er it is “likely, as opposed to merely specula tive, that the

3 The Agencies raised 12(b)(6) arguments in their initial Motion to Dismiss before the district court. (R. 20, at 19-30). Because the lower court dismissed the action for lack of standing, it did not proceed to consider whether the Juggalos failed to state a claim. Neither party raised th e 12(b)(6) arguments before this panel, with the exception of the Agencies’ reference to pleading standards in their argument against causation.No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 17

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC) Inc ., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). Redres sability is typically more difficult to establish where the prospective bene fit to the plaintiff de pends on the actions of independent actors. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish , 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989).
The Juggalos have requested seve ral forms of relief, including, inter alia : (1) an order declaring the 2011 NGIC Report unlawful and se tting it aside; (2) an order holding the classification of Juggalos by the DOJ , FBI or NGIC as a “criminal street gang” to be unlawful; (3) an order requiring the Agencies to expunge a ll criminal intelligence information regarding the Juggalos from NGIC’s data bases; (4) injunctive relief prohibiting the Agencies from investigating, collecting information regarding or reporting on the criminal activities of Juggalos; and (5) a declaration that th e designation of Juggalos as a “gang” or “hybrid gang” is unconstitutional, pursuant to the First and Fifth Am endments. The Agencies assert that only the
first form of relief is availa ble under the APA or the DJA, but even the broader relief sought by the Juggalos would not redress their injuries because reporting by state and local law enforcement and other entities would likely perpet uate the alleged injuries. (Appellees Br., at 14).
The Agencies argue that the alleged reputat ional harm and chilling effect would not be remedied by an order setting aside the 2011 NGIC Report because information about criminal activity performed by Juggalo subset s is available from a variety of other sources, including state
and local law enforcement in the locations wh ere the Juggalos were allegedly injured. ( Id . at 21). In Meese , the defendant, the Attorney General, espoused an analogous argument—that enjoinment of the DOJ’s label of certain films as “political propaganda” would not stem negative reaction to the plaintiff’s exhi bition of the films. 481 U.S. at 476-77. The Supreme Court disagreed, articulating that the harm to plaintiff occurred because “the Department of Justice has placed the legitimate force of its criminal en forcement powers behind the label of ‘political propaganda.’” Id . at 477. The Juggalos in this case also suffer alleged harm due to the force of a
DOJ informational label. While the 2011 NGIC Re port is not the designati on itself, it reflects the designation and includes an analytical component of the criminal activity performed by Juggalo subsets, classifying the activity as gang-like. As in Meese , “[a] judgment declaring theNo. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 18

[action in question] unconstitutional would e liminate the need to choose between [First Amendment-protected activity] and incurring the ri sk that public perception of this criminal enforcement scheme will harm appellee’s reputation.” Id

. The Agencies also assert that an orde r declaring the 2011 NGIC Report unconstitutional would not alleviate the alleged harm entirely because the information on Juggalo activity is available through the aforementioned alternate channels. But it need not be likely that the harm
will be entirely redressed, as partial redress can al so satisfy the standing requirement.
See Meese , 481 U.S. at 476 (“enjoining th e application of the words ‘p olitical propoganda’ to the films would at least partially redress the reputational injury of which appellee complains”);
Laidlaw , 528 U.S. at 185 (finding civil penalties suffici ent to satisfy redre ssability noting that they have at least “ some deterrent effect”) (emphasis added). “It can scarcely be doubted that, for a plaintiff who is injured or faces the threat of future injury due to illegal conduct ongoing at the time of a suit, a sanction th at effectively abates that c onduct and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress.” Laidlaw , 528 U.S. at 185-86. An order declaring the 2011 NGIC Report unconstitutional and setting it aside would abate the reflection of Juggalo criminal activity as gang or gang-like by the Agencies. Lambert further buttresses this conclusion.
517 F.3d at 438. The court held that Lambert had st anding if she could likely show that the relief she was requesting “would not only combat future ri sk, but would also help to redress the past . . . injury that she has suffered.” Id . The declaration the Juggalos seek would likely combat at least some future risk that theywould be subjected to reputationa l harm and chill due to the force of the DOJ’s criminal gang or gang-like designation.
The Agencies point to Raisins Landscape & Assoc., Inc. v. Michigan Department of Transportation as supportive of their argument that the Ju ggalos fail to satisfy redressability. 528 F. App’x 441 (6th Cir. 2013). In Raisins , the plaintiff-landscaping corporation filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Tr ansportation (the “Department”), alleging that prime contractors who were hired by the Departme nt and subsequently hired the plaintiff as a subcontractor failed to pay the pl aintiff for duly completed work. We held that the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue the clai ms, in part, because of a lack of redressability. The plaintiff had not shown that it was likely that “a prime cont ractor would pay its debts even if sanctioned,”No. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 19

the court explained. Id . at 445. While we cannot be certain whether and how the declaration sought by the Juggalos will affect third-party law enforcement officer s, it is reasonable to assume a likelihood that the injury would be partially redressed where, as here, the Juggalos have alleged
that the law enforcement officers violated their rights because of the 2011 NGIC Report.
See Foretich , 351 F.3d at 1215 (“[s]uch a declaration will remove the imprimatur of government authority” from the 2011 NGIC Report).
The Agencies assert that “it is entirely conjectural whether the nonagency activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected by the agency activity theyseek to achieve.” Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 571. The “action agen cies” here cannot be required to cease their behavior towards the Juggalos as they “ar e not directly bound as parties to the suit and otherwise not indirectly bound” because the 2011 NGIC Report does not prescribe regulations for conduct towards so-identified gangs. Id . at 596 (Blackmum, J., di ssenting) (summarizing majority opinion rationale for finding lack of redr essability). But the same rationale for why a non-prescriptive report can satisfy causation fo r the purposes of standing applies to redressability. The Juggalos sufficiently allege that the reputational harm and chill was caused by the 2011 NGIC Report and under Meese , where reputational harm and chill will likely be alleviated by the relief sought, redressability exis ts. We emphasize that our conclusion is based upon the allegations made in the Complaint. We express no opinion as to the 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss or the merits of the case.

III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT CLAIM
The Juggalos argue that they di d not forfeit standing to assert their DJA claim even in the absence of standing to assert th eir other claims. In their Moti on to Dismiss before the lower court, the Agencies argued that the statute does not provide a basis for ju risdiction and therefore the Juggalos’ DJA allegations coul d not survive as an independent claim. (R. 20, at 5 n.1). The Juggalos assert that the DJA solely provides a fo rm of relief, while jurisdiction comes from the underlying constitutional issues presented in the claim. The Juggalos also assert that this argument was not waived because it was both included in their opposition memorandum to the Agencies’ Motion to Dismiss and raised during oral argument. (Appellants Br., at 17). On appeal, the Agencies fail to argue that the DJA claim may not surv ive. The Juggalos asserted inNo. 14-1848 Parsons v. United Stat es Dep’t of Justice Page 20

their response to the Agencies’ Motion to Dismiss that they appropriately pled the DJA as the
basis of a claim for relief. Some of their ar guments about the appropri ateness of declaratory judgment as a remedy for constitutional violati ons could be construed as responsive to the Agencies’ cursory attack on the DJA claim. Th is was minimally sufficient to avoid forfeiting
this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s deci sion to dismiss for lack of standing and REMAND the case for consideration of Defendants’ 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim arguments.