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NBS TECHNICAL NOTE 809

Government Looks at

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u.s. PARTMENT

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National

Bureau

of

Standards

PRIVACY and

SECURITY in

COMPUTER SYSTEMS
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

The National Bureau of Standards 1 was established by an act of Congress March 3, 1901. The Bureau's overall goal is to strengthen and advance the Nation's science and technology

and facilitate their effective application for public benefit. To this end, the Bureau conducts

research and provides: (1) a basis for the Nation's physical measurement system, (2) scientific and technological services for industry and government, (3) a technical basis for equity in trade, and (4) technical services to promote public safety. The Bureau consists of the Institute for Basic Standards, the Institute for Materials Research, the Institute for Applied Technology,

the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, and the Office for Information Programs.

THE INSTITUTE FOR BASIC STANDARDS provides the central basis within the United

States of a complete and consistent system of physical measurement; coordinates that system

with measurement systems of other nations; and furnishes essential services leading to accurate and uniform physical measurements throughout the Nation's scientific community, industry, and commerce. The Institute consists of a Center for Radiation Research, an Office of Measurement Services and the following divisions: Applied Mathematics — Electricity — Mechanics — Heat — Optical Physics — Nuclear

Sciences 2 — Applied Radiation " — Quantum Electronics 3 — Electromagnetics 3 — Time

and Frequency 3 — Laboratory Astrophysics 3 — Cryogenics "'. THE INSTITUTE FOR MATERIALS RESEARCH conducts materials research leading to improved methods of measurement, standards, and data on the properties of well-characterized materials needed by industry, commerce, educational institutions, and Government; provides

advisory and research services to other Government agencies; and develops, produces, and

distributes standard reference materials. The Institute consists of the Office of Standard Reference Materials and the following divisions: Analytical Chemistry — Polymers — Metallurgy — Inorganic Materials — Reactor

Radiation — Physical Chemistry.

THE INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED TECHNOLOGY provides technical services to promote

the use of available technology and to facilitate technological innovation in industry and Government; cooperates with public and private organizations leading to the development of

technological standards (including mandatory safety standards), codes and methods of test; and provides technical advice and services to Government agencies upon request. The Institute consists of a Center for Building Technology and the following divisions and offices: Engineering and Product Standards — Weights and Measures — Invention and Innovation — Product Evaluation Technology — Electronic Technology — Technical Analysis —- Measurement Engineering — Structures, Materials, and Life Safety 4 — Building

Environment * — Technical Evaluation and Application * — Fire Technology.

THE INSTITUTE FOR COMPUTER SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY conducts research and provides technical services designed to aid Government agencies in improving cost effec- tiveness in the conduct of their programs through the selection, acquisition, and effective

utilization of automatic data processing equipment; and serves as the principal focus within

the executive branch for the development of Federal standards for automatic data processing

equipment, techniques, and computer languages. The Institute consists of the following

divisions: Computer Services — Systems and Software — Computer Systems Engineering — Information Technology.

THE OFFICE FOR INFORMATION PROGRAMS promotes optimum dissemination and

accessibility of scientific information generated within NBS and other agencies of the Federal Government; promotes the development of the National Standard Reference Data System and

a system of information analysis centers dealing with the broader aspects of the National Measurement System; provides appropriate services to ensure that the NBS staff has optimum

accessibility to the scientific information of the world. The Office consists of the following

organizational units: Office of Standard Reference Data — Office of Information Activities — Office of Technical

Publications — Library — Office of International Relations.

1 Headquarters and Laboratories at Gaithersburg, Maryland, unless otherwise noted; mailing address Washington, D.C. 20234.

2 Part of the Center for Radiation Research.

3 Located at Boulder, Colorado 80302.

« Part of the Center for Building Technology.
Government Looks at

PRIVACY and SECURITY in COMPUTER SYSTEMS

National Bureau of Standards APR 2 9 1974 A Summary of a Conference

Held at the National Bureau of Standards,

Gaithersburg, Maryland, November 19-20, 1973

Clark R. Renninger

and

Dennis K. Branstad, Editors

Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

t*1 0F c„

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Frederick B. Dent, Secretary

NATIONAt BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Richard W. Roberts, Director

Issued February 1974
National Bureau of Standards Technical Note 809

Nat. Bur. Stand. (U.S.), Tech. Note 809, 47 pages (Feb. 1974) CODEN: NBTNAE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1974

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Order by SD Catalog No. C13.46:809). Price 85 cents.
FOREWORD

Any potential confrontation between society and technology

over problems of individual privacy and data confidentiality

can be defused by understanding and action. The Conference

on Privacy and Computer Security has contributed to both by

providing an initial statement of governmental needs and

problems and suggesting a broad range of activities for

satisfying them. We hope this Conference report will serve

as the foundation for a continuing dialogue among the

government, automation industries, service industries, and

the consumer which will lead to a refinement of this statement and the assumption of relevant responsibilities for

achieving effective solutions.

Ruth M. Davis, Ph.D.

Director, Institute for

Computer Sciences and Technology

National Bureau of Standards

U.S. Department of Commerce

in
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A two-day conference on Privacy and Security in Computer Systems was sponsored by and

held at the National Bureau of Standards on November 19-20, 1973. Five hundred and ten people from government, the computer industry, and various public interest groups met to hear presentations of the needs and problems that confront governmental agencies in safeguarding individual privacy and protecting confidential data from loss or misuse.

Lawmakers at Federal, State and local levels of government are increasingly aware of

the public's concern over computer-based recordkeeping and its implications for personal

privacy. This concern has arisen partly out of fear of the impersonal super-efficient

image that computers present and partly out of a reasoned concern over the expansion of

governmental recordkeeping activities which computers make possible. Lawmakers are responding to this concern by proposing and enacting laws that are intended to specifically

safeguard the rights and interests of individuals by prescribing the circumstances and the manner in which personal data can be collected, used and disseminated.

These legislative actions, if taken unilaterally, present the prospect of potentially

conflicting requirements being imposed upon those charged with their implementation.

Further, the technological capability needed to assure compliance with these requirements

is not generally available. Compounding these problems are increased public pressures to operate governments economically. These pressures foreclose the simplistic solution of

using dedicated computers to process confidential data, yet the computer systems presently

available for resource sharing provide few techniques for controlling access to confidential data. These interrelated considerations strongly suggest that all of the legislative,

technological and managerial solutions that can be brought to bear upon the problems of

privacy and security must be effectively integrated so that a proper balance of needs and

values in relation to costs can be achieved.

The assignment and acceptance of responsibilities for accomplishing this objective

requires a recognition of the separable but interrelated components of the privacy and

computer security problems. These may be identified as:

° Protection of the privacy of the individual : a responsibility of the legislative

and judiciary branches of government.

° Providing guidelines to assure information management is in compliance with

legislative and judicial requirements for privacy : a responsibility of government,

management, and industry.

° Development and application of the needed automation and information management

technologies and products : a responsibility of industry and the government.

iv
Assessment and assignment of the costs of Security in Automation : a responsibility

of the government, industry and the public.

° Management of information in automated record-keeping systems : a responsibility of

management and information management technologists.

While the solutions for safeguarding privacy are to be found in legislative or regulatory sources, solutions for protecting confidential data are found in physical security

measures and in the technological safeguards and procedures which permit controlled accessibility to the systems and data.

The broad scope of controlled accessibility precludes simple solutions. It embraces

the use of specialized hardware and software with built-in protective features, mechanisms

for authorizing access to systems and data, techniques for uniquely identifying individuals

who are authorized to gain access, cryptographic devices and encryption algorithms to protect data during transmission among systems, and auditing or monitoring techniques for

measuring system events of security interest.

While various techniques for access control exist, there are few guidelines for the

application of these techniques. Lacking such guidelines, system users apply protection

controls that are either inadequate or excessively costly for the degree of protection they

require. The importance of considering the cost of applying security measures cannot be

over-emphasized, since security is always a cost vs. effectiveness trade-off. A highly

important extension of this managerial concern is the question of how much the public will

be willing to pay for the protection of individual privacy and how the incremental cost

for security is to be allocated among government, industry and the public.

Major needs for alleviating the problems of privacy, data confidentiality and computer

security were identified on an initial basis. A realistic approach for addressing these

needs could consist of parallel and coordinated efforts directed toward:

° Achieving a national coherence among laws defining the privacy rights of individuals

and the basic information practices to be followed in protecting these rights.

° Establishing uniform management and technical procedures for effectively applying

security measures. Important needs are techniques for assessing risks, determining

threats and threat sources, evaluating alternative security measures, auditing the

effectiveness of existing measures and physical security.

° Innovative applications of existing technology to enhance security effectiveness.

Specific needs which are susceptible to solution in this way include the retrofitting of existing systems to satisfy new security requirements and the use of
encryption techniques in civilian applications for protecting data during transmission,

° Research and development of new mechanisms and techniques where significant needs

cannot be met satisfactorily by existing technology. Among the needs requiring this

type of effort are self-protected computer systems which have the internal ability

to enforce the access controls necessary for the prescribed level of security. Other

needs include techniques for positively and uniquely identifying individuals who

have authorization for access to the system and data and the development of secure network models for evaluating alternative network designs.

° A study of the costs of data confidentiality and security to build an understanding

useful in making public choices about degrees of privacy desired by individuals and

for allocating costs among the public, industry and government.

It is hoped that the Conference will stimulate the computer industry and other

interested parties to propose specific approaches and solutions to the needs and problems

outlined and will promote new initiatives for protecting data confidentiality in computerbased records systems.

A second Conference is planned for March 4-5, 1974, which will provide an opportunity

for the presentation of proposed technological and regulatory solutions to the computer

security needs and problems identified in this Conference.

VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION TITLE PAGE

Foreword i i i Executive Summary iv

Abstract of Report 1

I. Introduction 1

II. Where the Problem Arises 2 III. The Operating Environment 10

IV. What's Needed 15

V. Costs 24

VI. Action Plans 28

Appendix A - Conference Program 33

Appendix B - Publications/References 36

Appendix C - Preview--March 4-5, 1974, Conference .. 37

vn

Government Looks At

Privacy and Security in Computer Systems

Summary of a Conference held at the

National Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, Maryland

November 19-20, 1973

Clark R. Renninger and Dennis K. Branstad, Editors

This publication summarizes the proceedings of a conference held for the

purpose of highlighting the needs and problems of Federal, State, and local

governments in safeguarding individual privacy and protecting confidential

data contained in computer systems from loss or misuse. The Conference was

held at the National Bureau of Standards on November 19-20, 1973.

The origin of governmental problems is discussed in the context of the

public's concern for privacy arising out of computer-based recordkeeping,

the diverse legislative actions now being taken to safeguard privacy, the

threats to the security of computer-based information systems and the

technological problems associated with protecting against such threats.

Useful distinctions are drawn between privacy, confidentiality and security

to clarify the issues and allocate responsiblities for solving the problem

among lawmakers, technologists and management.

Major needs are described. These include the need for cohesive Federal,

State and local legislation; technological guidelines and standards for

assuring uniform compliance with legislative requirements; management guidelines for identifying and evaluating threats to security, and improved

technological mechanisms for controlling access to computer systems and

networks. Cost implications of providing security measures are discussed.

Key words: Computer systems, privacy and security; confidentiality, privacy;

security.

I. Introduction

1.1. Purpose of the Conference

This paper is a summary of a two-day Conference on Privacy and Security in Computer

Systems, held on November 19-20, 1973, and sponsored by the Institute for Computer Sciences

and Technology of the National Bureau of Standards.

In his introductory remarks, Dr. Richard W. Roberts, Director, NBS, indicated that the

Conference was attended by 510 people: 375 of them from Federal, State and local governments, and 135 from the private sector. These attendees represented 7 Congressional offices,

46 Federal agencies, 30 States, 7 local governments, 34 computer companies and 41 professional associations, universities and public interest groups.

The stated purpose of the conference was to:

1 531-849 O - 74 - 2
"Identify initial requirements and issues that confront governmental

organizations in safeguarding individual privacy, data confidentiality

and computer security.

"Communicate this information to groups in the public and private

sector in order to mobilize and orient efforts that can respond to recognized needs.

"Establish a foundation for a second conference to be held on March 4-5,

1974, which will provide the opportunity for the presentation of proposed technological or regulatory solutions to the computer security

needs and problems identified in this Conference."

1.2. Organization of the Summary

This summary identifies the principal themes of the various presentations and organizes

them to:

A. Identify the origins of the problems encountered by Federal, State and

local governmental bodies in attempting to meet their responsibilities

in safeguarding information needed to perform governmental functions.

B. Describe the milieu in which they operate.

C. Describe the problems as seen by Federal, State and local governments.

D. Discuss the issues of costs.

E. Present suggestions for action.

The summary is an integration of the papers and presentations of the Conference. In

all cases, it is believed that the intent of the speakers has been preserved.

1.3. Appendices

A. The Conference Program

B. References to source materials cited at the Conference

C. A preview of the March 4-5, 1974, conference

II. Where the Problem Arises

2.1 . Public Interest

In the keynote address, John K. Tabor, Under Secretary of Commerce, noted a number of

factors that are creating pressure for solutions to the problems of providing protection to confidential or valuable data against misuse or loss. He cited the general expansion of

government and private information gathering and recordkeeping to support the needs of
society as a phenomenon of recent American life. The capability to manage large recordkeeping

activities and derive useful data is made possible and even accelerated through use of computers. He noted that linking computers through telecommunications multiplies the capability

to exchange and share the results of information-collecting activities while at the same time

compounding the protection problem. Under Secretary Tabor called for soundly designed safeguards to protect the confidentiality of data collected in support of expanded services and

programs at all levels of government.

Congressman Jack Brooks, Chairman of the Government Activities Subcommittee of the House

Committee on Government Operations, noted that control over dissemination of such information

involves two concepts: privacy, or who should have access to what information for what

purposes; and data security, which prevents unauthorized access to the data and also protects

its integrity.

In discussing the large number of data banks involving personal data that already exist,

Congressman Brooks indicated that 7500 data banks were counted in the Federal Government alone;

he further indicated that he believed the count was "low." The number of non-Federal data

banks involving personal information is unknown although it was indicated that the State of

California has between 8,000 - 10,000 data bases of which approximately 45% (3,600 - 4,500)

involve personal data. While these figures represent only two yery isolated data points, it

is evident that the number of Federal, State and local government data files containing personal data is very large indeed. Coupled with the large or even larger number of files

containing personal data to be found in the private sector (e.g., insurance companies, credit

card plans, mailing lists, school records, etc.), this represents a very large pool of

information that is being actively collected and maintained.

Along with the intensified recordkeeping activities of governmental units has come an increased awareness of the part of the public that such activities are going on, and with

this awareness there is an increased sensitivity about individuality and personal rights.

It would be stretching facts to suggest that the rise of awareness and feeling of potential

threat to one's individuality comes from abuses in the collection and use of data by

governmental units. Rather, it would seem that such awareness comes about from a variety

of factors present in an increasingly complex society. Regardless, the public's desire for

privacy is quite real and has created a conflict between the interests and rights of an individual and the interests and rights of government (and private) institutions. As David B. H. Martin, Special Assistant to the Secretary, HEW, pointed out, this conflict of

interests raises the public policy questions that require legislative and regulatory solutions.

Congressman Brooks pointed out that n£ legislative action can be effective without the

corresponding technological advances to support legislative efforts. He said, "The directives

of Congress and State legislatures as to constitutional and social restrictions to protect the
rights of individuals will be of little consequence if the data itself is readily available

to ill -willed persons using surreptitious or unlawful means."

It is clear that legislators are concerned about the question of rights of individual

privacy. They are willing to support legislation that defines these rights and attempts to strike a harmonious balance between the rights of individuals and the rights of society as

a whole acting through various institutions and agencies of government.

Dr. Alan Westin, Professor of Public Law and Government, Columbia University, in an interesting review of the international aspects of the privacy question, identified three

phases of awareness and action:

a) Early Warning Phase - the crying of public alarm and rising public awareness of the conflict between organizational efficiency and privacy.

b) Study Phase - commissioning of studies to identify the problem.

c) Regulatory Phase - the development of administrative, legal and regulatory safeguards for privacy.

He indicated that most of the Western industrialized nations have passed beyond the

initial phase and have moved into the Study and Regulatory Phases, while at the same time

the issue is just being recognized in nations with different cultural backgrounds, such as Japan.

In commenting on some 7-10 studies performed in a variety of countries, he noted their

remarkable similarity, taking into account the differences in terms of reference and cultures.

The more significant common findings included:

a) Computer technology increases the efficiency of recordkeeping.

b) There is significant fear (of loss of privacy) on the part of the public.

c) None of the studies could document specific episodes where automated recordkeeping created new loss of personal liberties. (Any abuses that were uncovered had existed in pre-automation manual record-keeping times.)

d) Use of computers intensifies problems (of policy, etc.) that existed in

manual systems.

e) All of the reports recommended protective measures to protect individual

rights.

Those countries having advanced to the regulatory phase appear to be evolving three

patterns of approach to regulation. These were summarized as administrative self-regulation

(the British approach), omnibus licensing and regulation (Swedish-German approach) and area- by-area provision of court enforceable citizen rights (the U.S. approach).
2.2. Separable Issues

There is a tendency to confuse the issues of privacy, confidentiality and security with

respect to recordkeeping and computers. Dr. Ruth Davis, Director, Institute for Computer

Sciences and Technology, National Bureau of Standards, outlined the essential differences

between these issues and established a framework for unambiguous discussion and solution of

these problems.

Privacy is a concept which applies to individuals . In essence, it defines the degree to which an individual wishes to interact with his social environment and manifests itself in the willingness with which an individual will share information about himself with others.

This concept conflicts with the trend toward collecting and storing personal information in

support of social programs of various importance. The government's role often makes the

supplying of this information mandatory—thus, creating a direct and acute compromise of the

individual's privacy. Under this circumstance, the burden of protecting personal data is all the more important.

Confidential ity is a concept that applies to data. It describes the status accorded to data and the degree of protection that must be provided for it. It is the protection of data

confidentiality that is one of the objects of Security . Data confidentiality applies not only

to data about individuals but to any proprietary or sensitive data that must be treated in

confidence.

Security is the realization of protection for the data, the mechanisms and resources used

in processing data, and the security mechanism(s) themselves. Data Security is the protection

of data against accidental or unauthorized destruction, modification or disclosure using both

physical security measures and controlled accessibility techniques. Physical Security is the

protection of all computer facilities against all physical threats (e.g., damage or loss from

accident, theft, malicious action, fire and other environmental hazards). Physical security

techniques involve the use of locks, badges (for personnel identification), guards, personnel

security clearances and administrative measures to control the ability and means to approach,

communicate with, or otherwise make use of, any material or component of a data processing

system. Controlled Accessibility is the term applied to the protection provided to data and

computational resources by hardware and software mechanisms of the computer itself.

From these definitions, it is possible to see that there is no direct relationship

between privacy (a desire by individuals, groups or organizations to control the collection,

use or dissemination of information about them) and security (the realization of the protection of resources), although they are interrelated. Several speakers pointed out that a perfectly secure computer could be used in such a way as to violate individual privacy.

However, this should not be construed as an excuse for not creating secure computer systems

since the thrust of earlier remarks was to the effect that legislatively defined rules for

5
assuring privacy are now levying a security-oriented environment on government (and possibly

private) data systems.

2.3. Social Implications

Dr. James Rule, Professor of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook,

presented a sociologist's view of the privacy question. He observed that the issues of

privacy are social-political-human rather than technological and that the question of how

far to go in computer-based recordkeeping on people is a political /social question in which

the rights/needs/interests of the individual must be weighted against the rights/needs/

interests of "institutions" (social, political, commercial, etc.). In his view, determining

the proper balance between individual privacy and institutional needs and interests will

involve even more agonizing choices in the future than it does now. To illustrate his point,

he described a hypothetical situation revolving around the use of computerized recordkeeping

control of crime. In the hypothetical (but potentially feasible) situation, statistical

methods of behavior analysis are used to predict individual criminality before it occurs. Assuming that such a system could be assured of evenhanded administration, would such a system be desirable and would it justify the extensive recordkeeping on all individuals

necessary to make it work?

2.4. Legislative Actions

As a result of the early warnings and studies of the privacy issue that have taken place

in this country over the past 7-8 years, a number of legislative actions have taken place

or are contemplated. For example, three Federal Acts have been passed in recent years

relating to the issue of privacy. These are the Freedom of Information Act, which provides

for making information held by Federal agencies available to the public unless it comes within a category exempted by the Act; the Federal Reports Act, which establishes procedures

for the collection of information by Federal agencies and the transfer of confidential

information from one agency to another; and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which requires consumer credit reporting agencies to adopt procedures which are fair and equitable to the consumer with regard to confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy and proper use of such

information. The Fair Credit Reporting Act also established the right of the individual to be informed of what information is maintained about him by a credit bureau or investigatory

reporting agency.

In addition to these pieces of legislation, numerous bills have been introduced in

Congress which propose to strengthen the rights of individuals with respect to confidentiality

of data, prevent invasion of privacy, establish standards for the collection, maintenance

and use of personal data, or limit the uses to which personal data can be put without written

consent of the affected individual. It was also reported at the Conference that the

Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) is implementing (internally) the

6
recommendations contained in the Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated

Personal Data Systems. (See Appendix B, Ref. 1)

The 50 State governments have pending numerous bills concerned with protection of

individual privacy and data confidentiality. Massachusetts and Iowa have already passed

significant legislation in these areas, providing higher standards of personal privacy

protection than the Federal Government. Still other States have extensive legislative

proposals that would impose extensive regulatory and technological constraints on the

operation of personal data systems.

At the local level, a number of municipalities have passed ordinances to provide

protection of computerized personal data.

While all of this legislative activity is not completed, it is indicative of the

political response to the aforementioned public awareness and concern over individual rights

and privacy.

2.5. Threats

Threats to individual privacy and technological threats to computer-based information

systems were the two themes repeatedly stressed by the various speakers. While the threat to individual privacy and liberty was predominant and seen to be mostly associated with the

unregulated collection and use of personal data, a number of the speakers cited the technological threats as being those most bothersome to the operators of information systems.

Most of the speakers agreed that the threat to privacy was one that required legal and

regulatory remedies and was not basically a technological problem. All speakers agreed,

however, that technology was required to help enforce the legal and regulatory steps.

Furthermore, a number of speakers noted that unless there were sound technological foundations

for controlled access to computer systems, the legal and regulatory actions would be largely

wasted.

In addition to the basic and somewhat diffused threat to individual privacy posed by the

collection and use of personal data, several speakers cited an additional problem of misappropriation and misuse of data by people who are authorized access in connection with their jobs.

While the problem of misuse of data would appear to be one solved by legal measures providing

stiff penalties for violators, several speakers indicated that it was in part technological

since the contemporary systems have so little in the way of controlled access mechanisms that

it is difficult to restrict access within a data base and to account for its access and usage.

The degree of difficulty and the costs associated with providing security and controlled

access to computer-based recordkeeping systems is a function of the type of access being

7
permitted, the capabilities of those performing the access, and the type of computer system

(whether dedicated, shared, local or remote access, etc.) on which the recordkeeping system

is based. In order to put some of the later discussions of approaches to solving the problem

into perspective, the classes of individuals who may access a computer system and/or its

information products could be categorized as follows:

Consumers - a term applied to the authorized recipients of information

(products) of a computer-based recordkeeping system. In many applications of computers, this group is the supplier of the raw data as well.

In organizational terms, consumers would comprise an operating agency

or department.

Producers - a term applied to the analysts and applications programmers

who design and implement specific recordkeeping systems which produce

information products for consumers. Producers may or may not be a part

of the consumer's organization. Producers require access to the computer

system to develop products; their programs require access to data in the

system.

Servicers - a term applied to the computer operations staff; includes

operators, systems programmers, data entry services, etc., responsible

for availability and maintenance of the computer system resources. The

servicers may or may not be a part of the consumer's organization.

Servicers require access to the computer system to operate and maintain

the resource. Because they have physical access, they have the capability

to access any information in or on a system.

Intruders - a term applied to individuals or organizations who have no authorized access to a computer system or its products and have a possible

malicious interest in obtaining unauthorized access to data or a system.

Intruders are generally thought of as not belonging to any of the categories

above. The primary characteristic of an intruder is his lack of authorized

access to any part of a computer system or its products. He is an outsider.

The threat to data confidentiality or system security is related to the capabilities of

each class of individuals in dealing with a system and the existence of an asset (data or system) that is supposed to be protected from some or all members of one or more classes.

As an example, any system and its data should be protected from intruders. Some (shared)

systems may contain data that is meant to be protected from different (organizational)

groups of consumers, etc. A simplified view of the degree of threat and the problems faced

in protecting data confidentiality and information processing resources is shown in the

table and the comments following. The sixteen possible entries in the table have been

grouped into ten threat classes.
^~\^ Type of

^"\^^ System

Access ^"\^^

Capability As: ""^\^

Local (off-line) Batch Remote (on-line)

Dedicated Shared Dedicated Shared

Intruder T

l T

l T2 T2

Consumer T

3 T

4 T

5 T6 Producer T

7 T8 T

7 T9 Servicer T

10 T

10 ho T

10

Intruder versus

Batch

Intruder versus

Remote

Consumer versus Dedicated Batch

Consumer versus Shared Batch

Consumer versus Dedicated Remote

Consumer versus

Shared Remote

Producers versus Dedicated Systems

Producers versus Shared Batch

Producer versus Shared Remote

Threat is a function of physical security measures and their

enforcement. High degree of risk of exposure to intruders.

Greatly expanded threat of unauthorized access due to potential

vulnerability of communications. Low risk of exposure. Potential for masquerading as any of the authorized users quite high.

Threat to data confidentiality primarily that of misusing data

otherwise authorized for access. Access control based on personal identification.

Same as T

3 plus risk of misdirecting data; control of access

to data (products) generally based on personal identification

by operations staff. Procedures to assure proper data handling must be available and strictly enforced.

Somewhat expanded threat because of substitution of automated

methods for personal identification. Also must validate

identity of terminals. Requires either physical access con- trols for terminal area or authenticated identification of

user. Increased costs of administration to control physical access to terminals and/or authenticated identification

method.

Same as T5 with increased opportunity to masquerade if

identifier/authenticator is compromised. Risk of data misroute present.

Producers constitute roughly the same threat as consumers except that they have the technical capability to siphon off

data through corrupted programs. Degree of threat is a function of where they reside organizationally. If under same management control as consumers, threat is about the same as the consumer threat.

An increased threat to data over T

7 but generally dependent

on the operating system design. Can frequently spoof the

operating system to gain unauthorized access to data.

Same as Ts (and T7) except greatly reduced risk of exposure

plus increased opportunity for anonymous bypass of access

controls. Some increased risk of masquerading depending on organization and physical set-up of remote sites.

531-849 0-74-3
T\q Servicer versus Maximum threat. Generally unrestricted access to any proAll Systems gram or data on the system. Greater opportunity and technical

capability to access data due to direct physical access to th

computer system.

III. The Operating Environment

3.1. Introduction

It would be impossible to enumerate all of the data systems involving personal or otherwise valuable data or resources. However, in order to provide an operational framework for

discussion of the privacy and security issues, the Conference did provide illustrations of

such personal recordkeeping functions in governmental units and the kinds of data confidentiality and computer resource security problems that are faced by Federal, State and local

governments. No significance should be attached to the order in which these illustrations

appear.

3.2. State of California

Mr. Kent Gould, Chief, EDP Development, Department of Finance, State of California,

described the organization of data processing in California. California expects to spend

approximately $100 million for data processing activities in 1973, a figure that is growing

at the rate of 20% per year. Eighty (80) state departments and agencies use data processing

equipment for just about e^ery application conceivable except command and control. The

Department of Finance has absolute EDP authority in California, approving individual DP budget requests for equipment and personnel. In this role, the Finance department has the

responsibility for enforcing compliance with security and privacy requirements.

California is presently attempting to consolidate data processing activities into five

(5) major centers. Gould estimated that between 8000 and 10,000 data bases are processed by

the State of California, of which approximately 45% contain personal data. He estimated that

it costs between $200,000 and $400,000 per center to provide for security and privacy requirements.

In reviewing the privacy issue as seen in California, Gould indicated that it is the

responsibility of the legislature to provide policy direction in this matter and to identify

the confidentiality requirements of various data. Where there is no legislative mandate,

the Executive branch will take action in its best view of the problem to protect data from

unauthorized dissemination and use. It will monitor the data processing practices to insure

that confidentiality requirements are met. In connection with the last point, he mentioned

that California was developing a master audit package that "correlates to security/privacy

requirements" and will be used to measure security/privacy compliance by the operating

departments and agencies.

10
Finally, he noted that the primary security/confidentiality problem in California is how to prevent unauthorized use of data by people having authorized access to it. The

essential question is the balance between management responsibility and public responsibility.

3.3. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

Mr. George Hall, Acting Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,

Department of Justice, reviewed the development of LEAA's activities in the development of

computerized criminal information files. This activity was conceived as a network of State

defined and operated systems dedicated to maintaining criminal activity information. The

project grew from a feasibility demonstration project, SEARCH, that had 20 States participating

by sharing criminal histories through a central data index. Hall noted that the development

posed a number of design and policy questions of serious import to the question of privacy

and constitutional rights of individuals. As a result of serious consideration of the

problem, it was decided that: (a) the system(s) should be decentralized to eliminate the

appearance (and reality) of Big Brother data banks; (b) only "serious" offenders should be

included in the files; (c) only criminal and public record information should be kept. He noted that the policy decision to decentralize the system(s) has added to the costs of

privacy.

In discussing the problems currently perceived with the system, a number of important

problems/questions impinging on the issues of privacy/confidentiality/security were noted.

Specifically, he cited the problem of who should be able to access criminal history data as one that needs joint Federal/State legislative action. Currently, most State statutes permit

virtually anyone to access the records. Another problem is the integrity and validity of the

data itself. Arrest records are maintained, but the disposition of the arrest is often not entered. In order to maintain properly valid and accurate data in such systems, it may be

necessary to create new information collection systems (a move that appears to complicate

the problem). Still another problem is the right of the individual to access and/or validate

his records, along with questions of how long such records should be maintained. Finally,

the question of file separation or merging for efficiency reasons looms large as a potential

future danger to civil liberties.

(NOTE: The comments and problems noted above are better understood in the perspective

of LEAA activity in this area. A review of LEAA's activity and other government

activity in developing and maintaining criminal information files can be found

in Appendix E of the HEW report.)

Finally, Hall noted a severe need for rational uniform standards regulating the

collection and use of information.

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3.4. State of Ohio

Mr. Jerry Hammett, Deputy Director, Department of Finance, State of Ohio, gave a brief

review of automated recordkeeping activities in Ohio. The Ohio Department of Administrative

Services either provides ADP services or authorizes the use of outside suppliers.

In describing data of security concern to Ohio State Government, he cited the following

files as typical

:

Personal Income Tax Records; Driver's License Records; Arrest and Conviction

Reports; VD Records (Department of Health); Patient Records (Mental Health);

Government Planning Records for Highways, Buildings, and Recreation.

Indicating that the concern over the security and confidentiality of data is not exaggerated, he cited the case where a Deputy Sheriff in an Ohio county was conducting an investigation business on the side and used his access to State criminal history records to supply

data to his clients. In another case, personnel in the Motor Vehicles Department were found

to be expunging data of serious traffic violations from offenders' records. He also posed the

hypothetical threat of having individual (and corporate) tax liability modified in an unauthorized way.

Hammett stressed his view that interactive processing threatens system security. In discussing directions for possible solutions, he indicated the need for model (and eventually

real) legislation concerning privacy and confidentiality and security standards and for the

vendors to provide hardware and software security in their products.

3.5. State of Illinois

In a talk on managing computer operations, Mr. Robert Caravella, Management Information

Division, Department of Finance, State of Illinois, presented highlights of some of the

results of the joint State of Illinois - IBM study of the applicability of IBM's Resource

Security System (RSS). He began by noting (as did other speakers) that the HEW study and

Canadian Task Force on Computer Security and Systems marked the beginning of a "new era"

in providing safeguards for privacy and data confidentiality.

In discussing the need for confidentiality/security provisions, he cited a number of

potential (and real) exposures found in contemporary systems. These include:

1. Erroneous or Misleading Data

2. Accidental Disclosure

3. Intentional Infiltration

4. Loss of Data

5. Absence of Established Standards

12
He then went on to outline an Information "Privacy" Action Plan. The plan outline consisted

of the following steps:

1. Review Information System Requirements to Determine:

what is collected

why it is collected

who needs it

when it is needed

2. Analyze the Confidentiality and Criticality of Information:

to operations

for proprietary or other reasons

3. Assess Vulnerabilities and Risks - Establish Tradeoffs between:

exposures

value of information

cost of safeguards

effectiveness of safeguards

4. Make Security Decisions

5. Investigate Technical Safeguards including:

software requirements

hardware requirements

physical access control (s)

6. Budget for Information Security

7. Organize for Security

8. Establish Individual Accountability

9. Implement Technological Safeguards

10. Create a Security Conscious Environment

11. Issue Policy Statements

12. Audit

Finally, in discussing the benefits to be expected from the joint Illinois - IBM security

study, he noted that the project was "well-balanced" in its approach—that the vital areas of

legislation, technology, administration and education were all covered in the study. In the

legislative area, model legislation has been produced covering individuals' rights to privacy

and regulating the collection and use of information in the State. The technology activity

was focusing on the areas of performance measurement and cost analysis of using RSS. In the

administrative area, the work is concentrated on monitoring the application of RSS to determine how well it meets the needs of State governments and what additional safeguards may be

needed. The educational aspect is being served by the development of 10 video tape training

programs aimed at diverse audiences from management to the technical support staff of ADP operations.

13
3.6. Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Dr. Robert Laur, Acting Director, Office of Policy Development and Planning, HEW,

outlined some of the unique privacy/confidentiality problems that arise in connection with

the operation of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). As one of the major

statistical data banks of the Federal government, the NCHS provides statistical services

for HEW.

Because of the sensitivity of medical information, NCHS has adopted the isolation of

a dedicated system as their approach to the confidentiality problem. The primary problem

is that of data confidentiality and the protection of proprietary interests of the contributors of the data. Since the medical data is identified with a Social Security or other

identification number, this number is (cryptographically) transformed to protect the identity

of the individual, and the transformation key is "carefully controlled."

In support of research, NCHS provides other workers with standardized data tapes obtainec

from its data bases. The standardized tapes are constructed to remove personal identification and to suppress statistical entries with a small number of samples (in order to eliminate

potential identification through advanced correlation techniques). In the end, Dr. Laur

noted, they rely on professional ethics for the major control over how sensitive medical

data is used.

He also observed that the present NCHS system security/confidentiality controls work

well enough for the kind of (dedicated) systems they are now using but that they will not

suffice for time-sharing systems and network connections of the future.

Presently, HEW is proposing legislation to establish a common shared information base

that would let NCHS use data located at other (medical) centers (or possibly systems supporting health care delivery). This would avoid redundant collection. As an example, he cited

the HEW's Professional Service Review Organization that requires correlating diverse medical,

hospital and physicians' records to obtain a review. He noted that a single Federal system

design for maintenance of health records raises more control problems than it solves.

3.7. Congressional Research Services

In a paper that demonstrated that requirements for data confidentiality are not unique

to the Executive Branch, Mr. Robert Chartrand, Specialist in Information Sciences, Congressional Research Services, Library of Congress, provided a review of Congressional Information

Protection needs. These needs are determined by the multiple roles played by a member of

Congress, and the historical development of how Congress operates. Among the kinds of

information cited as requiring protection were:

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a) Casework data relating to individual constituents.

b) Political data—contributors lists, key civic groups,

mailing lists, etc.

c) Committee/Subcommittee data—legislative planning data,

privileged hearings data, etc.

d) Debate Supporting data—privileged information supporting public debate.

Supporting Congress are three computer facilities, one each for the Senate and House

and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. The Senate and

House systems perform diverse administrative functions and services for the members, while

the CRS system supports a variety of information systems on pending legislation, bibliographic

information and an issue briefing system.

Typical of the Congressional security controls are those taken by the Library of

Congress. The bulk of these are physical security measures including a visual control on computer room access, use of key-cards for after-hours work, tape vaults, burn-bags and the

like. Procedural controls cited included separate handling and decentralized control of

committee information, use of passwords to protect access to Congressional files, and low

information content (generalized) software descriptions.

The future needs of Congress, seen by Mr. Chartrand, include:

strengthening security provisions of legislative branch regulations

° establishing standards for need-to-know controls for all Congressional users

description of available data and restrictions on its use

° creation of a Congressional classification system

° creation of an information service group to mediate users' information requests

and enforce need-to-know and security regulations

° prepare the most applicable service and control functions which combine protection with inquiry fulfillment.

IV. What's Needed

4.1. Legislative Policies and Regulations

Legislative activity aimed at protecting individual privacy is increasing rapidly at

all levels of government. As noted by Dr. Davis, passage of any significant number of these

legislative proposals could easily result in an unacceptable morass of conflicting requirements

being imposed on regulatory organizations, service industries and automation technology. Some

national coherence in these proposals is clearly required if there is to be any realistic or

15
practical application of the mechanisms needed to protect against intrusions on individual

privacy.

Better communication among lawmakers, government administrators, and technologists is

also essential because the effective implementation of privacy legislation depends heavily

upon the availability of technological safeguards that can assure compliance with a reasonable

degree of certainty and uniformity. As several speakers pointed out, it may not always be

possible within the current state-of-the-art to respond to legislative requirements of the

type being proposed at an acceptable cost. As Mr. Gould stated, a requirement, for example,

to record every access to a file involving personal data, if strictly enforced, could cause

the file to double in size rapidly. Such growth clearly affects the operations of the system

and inevitably leads to additional hardware and more complex software. Early coordination

among lawmakers, administrators and technologists should enable impacts of this type to be

taken into account in arriving at effective and reasonable legislative policies and the

standards and guidelines required for implementation.

This general theme was supported by spokesmen at State and local levels of government.

Mr. Andrews Atkinson, Superintendent, Cincinnati /Hamilton County Regional Computer Center,

cited the need for regulations governing information management practices as they apply to data collection, storage, application, accessibility, integrity and accuracy. Mr. Carl

Vorlander, Executive Director, National Association for State Information Systems spoke to the need for standards for defining categories of data requiring protection and the degree

of protection required by each category.

4.2. Management and Operating Guidelines

4.2.1. Determining Information Content

Underlying the process of information management is the need to determine what information is required to carry out the function being performed and to assure that only information

which is relevant and essential to that function is collected and processed. The weeding out

of nonessential confidential information through this process obviously contributes directly

to easing the problems of privacy and data security and thus represents a management activity

that should be pursued vigorously and continuously. The processes of security management, as discussed in the Conference, exclude questions of information content but recognize them as important and interrelated considerations which must be addressed.

4.2.2. Evaluating Risks, Threats and Security Techniques

Assuming that the essentiality of the data to be protected has been determined, management guidelines or operating procedures are needed for the effective employment of proper

security measures. Particularly needed at this time are guidelines for determining the level

16
of confidentiality or criticality of information (i.e., what degree of protection is required

for proprietary, personal, high value or sensitivity reasons). Of equal importance, as noted

by &tt" Walter E. Simonson, Associate Director of Electronic Data Processing, Bureau of the

Census, are guidelines for assessing the risks and threats to security, identifying the

assets to be protected and evaluating the relative effectiveness of alternative safeguard

measures in providing that protection. Dr. Simonson emphasized that employees constitute a major potential threat and suggested the use of pre-employment screening to minimize this risk.

A variety of management techniques exist for valuing assets; and if that were all of the

problem, it would be a straightforward actuarial problem to design the required level of

security. However, when data confidentiality is part of the security problem, factors other

than simple asset replacement costs have to be considered. Some of the factors involved

include the degree of threat posed by different potential accessors of a system, as was discussed in Section 2.5.

The specific techniques to be used obviously depend on the degree of threat (or on the

degree of confidentiality or importance of the data being protected). Most systems have only

the most rudimentary controlled accessibility features. While it can be argued that the cost

of providing protection techniques to a data base should be borne by the appli cation (s) requiring them, the design of contemporary systems too often permits such controls to be bypassed

completely by anyone with a programming capability. Where the systems are used with a clear

and strict distinction between consumers of information and producers of the applications,

various data base protection techniques can protect data from unauthorized access by consumers.

In many systems, consumers are often producers as well.

However, there are many questions that must be resolved even where the consumers are distinct from the producers. Whether the computer-based protection techniques should be

applied on a per-application basis or whether these techniques should be an integral part of

the operating system are questions that management of data centers need trade-off evaluations

to answer.

The relatively simple question of how to represent authorization to use a data base

becomes quite complex depending on the level of detail to which the authorization must apply--

file, record, or field within a record. Methods for representing such authorization must be

designed and evaluated in the context of the organization and intended use of data bases.

Equally important, the management and administrative procedures to update, review and otherwise control the authorizations need to be developed for the technique(s) chosen.

Currently, most of the effort to provide such controls is carried out by the users of

data processing systems. Whether they or the suppliers of data systems should develop such

protection mechanisms, the fact remains that data center managers have no guidelines as to which kind of controlled accessibility techniques to use under different circumstances and no

17
statements of the assumptions underlying assertions of protection provided by any particular

technique.

4.2.3. Physical Security

The objective of physical security is to keep intruders away from data processing and

information resources, as well as to protect the resources from natural hazards. Mr. Ike

Friedlander, Executive Director, Public Building Services, GSA, noted that physical security

is the foundation of nearly all other security solutions. If physical security measures are not taken, then external penetration of systems can easily occur, making most other measures

of doubtful value. He stated that technological detection systems are being used more frequently because of the increasing costs of using human guards. In new construction, physical

security is an important design criterion. In some cases, such as a new government building

in Seattle, the security system is controlled by a dedicated computer.

The major emphasis in physical security technology is the development of products

designed to reduce the cost of a human guard force by providing means to supplement or extend

their capabilities. Thus one finds the increased use of closed circuit TV, ultrasonic and

other alarm systems, walkie-talkies, smoke and heat detectors of various kinds and the like.

Interestingly enough, there is little in the way of new technology needed for physical

security. Mr. Nicholas A. Chronis, Chief, Data Processing Computer Center, Civil Service

Commission, pointed out that "the technology exists if the money is available." The major

need he see is for Federal guidance on how to provide day-to-day physical computer security.

The National Bureau of Standards is planning to publish such guidance early in 1974.

4.3. Controlled Accessibility

Mr. Walter W. Haase, Deputy Assistant Director, Information Systems, Office of Management

and Budget, summed up the focus of controlled accessibility in his introductory remarks at the

Panel on Controlling Access to Systems and Data when he said:

"I believe that proper application of existing computer, communication

and information processing technology can reduce the threat of improper

disclosure of private and confidential data. I also believe that further

development effort is required to close the gap between access control

needs and available technological solutions. I am not suggesting that

technology can provide a solution to the basic privacy issue but that it

could reduce the intensity of the conflict."

As described by Dr. Dennis Branstad, Computer Security Project, National Bureau of

Standards, the term "controlled accessibility" embraces the technological measures available

to control the access of people to a computer system's data and computational resources. These measures include specialized hardware and software, access procedures, authorization

18
mechanisms, identification methods, and encryption algorithms. Only computer-based mechanisms

can provide the rapid response decisions needed for effective access control.

In discussing what is needed to protect data confidentiality in computer-based recordkeeping systems, Mr. Daniel Edwards, Research Engineer, NSA, and Mr. Howard Lewis, Manager,

Data Management Programs, AEC, both noted that access to the following must be controlled:

a) Computer sites and mainframes.

b) Terminal sites and terminals.

c) Storage facilities

d) Files and records.

e) System and application programs.

f) Computer output.

g) Telecommunications.

Further, the controls must be applied to people, terminals and programs.

4.3.1. Identification of Individuals

The underlying basis of information processing resources protection is unique identification of an individual. Authorization to access data, obtain information products or use information processing resources is ultimately based on such identification. The techniques

available or being actively pursued are quite extensive. They include use of picture badges,

magnetic striped credit cards, passwords, fingerprint readers, hand geometry readers, lip

print readers, voiceprint recognition equipment, dynamic signature analysis and the like.

The identification techniques are applied to supplement or replace human recognition of an individual attempting to gain access to a building, computer room, terminal area, terminal,

computer (from a remote site), etc.

Clearly some identification techniques can serve multiple purposes (e.g., magnetic

striped cards can be used to control door locks (and as an identification to a computer),

while others are limited to a single function (e.g., passwords as a means of identifying an individual to a remote computer or as a method of authenticating access authorization to files).

It is generally true that identification techniques based on something tangible (e.g., a badge or a fingerprint) can be defeated by duplicating the identification. Thus the problem of

"breaking security" is transformed into the often simpler task of duplicating or simulating a physical entity.

19
In general, the methods of automated identification that do not require human perception

(magnetic card readers, fingerprint readers, etc.) often involve high implementation costs, so it is often economically feasible to apply them only where there are relatively few points

(rooms, terminals, etc.) where such identifications must be made.

The intangible methods of unique identification (passwords and catechetical sequences)

have the advantage of not requiring input apparatus but are not as broadly applicable as some

of the tangible methods. Primarily because of their low implementation cost and simplicity,

intangible identification methods are frequently used in time-shared systems serving a large,

frequently changing, geographically dispersed population.

The choice of which methods to use for unique personal identification involves criteria

such as user convenience, cost, precision of identification, the number of points where

identification must be made, etc. Criteria for evaluating and using such schemes are needed

because of the critical role unique identification plays in all aspects of security.

4.3.2. Authorization Mechanisms

Both Mr. Lewis and Mr. Edwards emphasized the need for authorization mechanisms to control access to systems. These mechanisms are often programs that validate a user's (and/or

program's or terminal's) right to use a given element being protected (e.g., data, program,

terminal, etc.). Mr. Lewis noted that "in practically all cases, the off-the-shelf computers

and control programs supplied by the manufacturers have inadequate protection mechanisms for

providing controlled access to a computer's assets." Mr. Edwards supported this view and added

that most computer systems are sold as complex and expensive do-it-yourself kits.

Examples given of authorization mechanisms included those to validate initial access to

a system (e.g., from a terminal), validation of data transmission to a terminal or user (i.e.,

assuring that both the user and the terminal are "cleared" to receive the data accessed), and

validation of access to files (including program files), records and fields.

While many contemporary systems have one or more specific authorization mechanisms (e.g.,

password validation of terminal users), the mechanisms are not applied uniformly in response to

a general security principle. This results in the users having the choice of building their

own control programs or modifying that supplied by the vendor in order to obtain the level of

controlled access they need. Neither of these alternatives is especially attractive.

Another consequence of the piecemeal "Band-Aid" approach to providing security "features'

on contemporary systems is the dispersal of the authorization mechanisms into a variety of

control and applications programs. Because controlled access is not a design requirement for

the operating system, it is not surprising that current systems have many "holes" caused by

incomplete application of the controlled access principle. These "holes" can be exploited by

20
virtually any programmer to circumvent the security "features" and existing authorization

mechanisms to gain unauthorized access to data, programs, or the operating system itself. Of

some six (6) to eight (8) penetration exercises run against a variety of machines, all of them

achieved undetected unauthorized access to files and programs or supervisory control of the

target system.

4.3.3. Technological Needs

Mr. Lewis and Mr. Edwards indicated that in order to meet the stringent requirements of

providing data confidentiality (especially in universal access utility systems), it is necessary to have computer systems and control programs (operating systems) built with controlled

access or security as a major design goal. In order for users to be able to evaluate the

products being offered, it would be necessary for the vendors to supply detailed security

specifications that include the (assumed) security perimeter, the external and internal protection mechanisms provided, what they protect from whom, and how the protection is achieved.

The goal is to achieve a penetration-proof system with protected authorization mechanisms

that permit precise and continuous validation of all access in the system.

It is also necessary to provide systems that can be "certified" to be secure by some independent authority. Drawing on the analogy of the rating of safes and storage containers

as being able to resist various attacks (e.g., dial manipulation--20 man-minutes, forced

entry--0 man-minutes), Mr. Edwards pointed out that proof (of security) by emphatic assertion

will not suffice. It must be possible to convincingly demonstrate that a system is secure under various kinds of attacks. There is also the need to be able to recertify a system in use because of the almost continuous stream of changes that take place in the hardware and

software of an operational system.

The primary thrust of the remarks was directed at the requirement to obtain systems that

provide protection even against the threats posed by persons with the authorization and capability to produce their own programs (producers). However, even for less demanding environments where protection is required for intruder and consumer threats, much more needs to be

done. In particular, the evaluation of already existing technological alternatives for retrofitting existing systems with controlled accessibility mechanisms that are appropriate for the

degree of protection required and the potential threat source (intruders, consumers, producers,

etc.) is needed now.

4.3.4. Network Security and Cryptography

The controlled access problem is not confined to computer systems alone, as the discussion regarding controlled access and security of the telecommunications networks linking

computers and users brought out.

21
Mr. Charles Joyce, Assistant Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy, in outlining

the problem, indicated that the basic network security question to be resolved is what proportion of protection responsibility should the communications subsystem bear.

Dr. Michael Muntner, Director, Advanced Planning and Research Division, Automated Data Management & Telecommunications Service, GSA, noted that virtually all current effort is

focused on the terminal end of networks since that is where the bulk of the experience has

been. It was his contention that access control requirements are best handled as part of an initial systems design rather than by patches and repairs to systems and networks after the

fact. He presented three types of network situations that reflect three different kinds of

management control of the resources involved. These were:

a) An integrated system—a single management responsible for both computer

systems and telecommunications control.

b) Segregated systems—one management is responsible for only the network

and a different management is responsible for the computer (based) resources.

c) Hybrid systems—where one management is responsible for some of the computer

(based) resources and the network, while other managements are responsible

for the remaining computer (based) resources.

These divided management responsibilities underscore the difficulty of assuring that the

security and controlled accessibility of a network of computer (based) resources is properly

achieved. It also underscores how the allocation of responsibility for security between the

systems and the network can result in each believing the other is (responsible for) taking

care of the problem. The basic issues involved in a particular network are:

1. How well the computer systems protect themselves.

2. How deeply can encryption be incorporated into the network.

3. Whether security-related functions can be standardized across all

system elements.

4. What records should be kept.

Of these points, 2 and 3 are the most important to networks in general, particularly

where the composition of the network is not homogenous in equipment.

Dr. Davis pointed out that cryptographic techniques can be used to protect data during

transmission among systems. Cryptographic transformations can be applied to protect data

transmitted between a computer and its terminals or other computers. The transformation can

be applied to passwords or even data in storage.

22
Details of cryptographic transformations and their applications have not received wide

circulation among civilian (nor most government) information systems developers. As a consequence, users have no basis for evaluating the efficacy of one proposed technique over

another. As an example, one manufacturer of commercial scramblers (cryptographic machines)

used a simple linear shift register as the generator of the cipher key. Current papers have

appeared recently showing how simple it is to "break" such a system with as few as 2N bits of

key (where N is the length of the shift register).

In addition to needing an evaluation of the strengths of specific cryptographic techniques, it is also necessary to evaluate whether or not they can meet other protection objectives such as preventing effective alteration or replacement of all or part of the message, or detecting attempts to retransmit previously sent legitimate messages, or denying intrusion on common carrier networks.

The controlled access problems that exist in stand-alone computer systems are quite formidable in their own right. When computers are linked to terminals and each other, there are

the considerable additional problems of determining whether attempted user accesses are legitimate and even who is attempting access. Where the interlinking communications system is a switched common carrier (e.g., the telephone network), the opportunities for remote penetration

for intercepting data is increased significantly.

The primary needs for network security are criteria that relate costs of data confidentiality to the type of network, inexpensive security techniques (e.g., cryptography) that can

be applied to networks of heterogenous equipment, methods of authenticating users and computers

which are not susceptible to masquerade, and model secure network designs that clearly identify

what protection is provided by the network against specific kinds of threats.

4.4. Computer Security Auditing and Surveillance

A number of speakers mentioned the need for security auditing of information processing

systems as a management tool for enforcing data protection policies.

In a discussion of evaluating existing systems, Mr. Robert Abbott, Manager, RISOS Project,

Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, focused on the need to audit existing protection mechanisms.

In discussing the problems this poses, he cited the lack of data on the experiences of others

using contemporary systems and the vast size of current operating systems as discouraging for

such analysis.

It was pointed out by Mr. Abbott that pre-use auditing of existing protection mechanisms

requires collaborative arrangements with manufacturers that enable the auditors to obtain

accurate information about the system under study. The main barrier to such cooperation

currently would appear to be the lack of suitable arrangements that protect the proprietary

23
and marketing interests of the manufacturers while providing system auditors with the

information needed to evaluate a system in a way that protects its integrity.

In other discussion of auditing the use of systems, several speakers noted the

importance of such audits in determining proper use of an information processing resource.

Mr. Gould stated that California was developing a master audit package that would measure

users' compliance with the security/privacy requirements established for their data.

Dr. Branstad also spoke of the use of surveillance and audits to maintain accountability

for resource usage and data access.

In the areas of monitoring usage and data access accountability and compliance with

protection standards, a major problem is that security auditing is attempted from the operating

systems instrumentation for accounting . While much of the same information is needed (e.g.,

identification of who is using the system) for both purposes, security auditing techniques may

require more detailed information on just how a system is being used (e.g., what language

processors are used, what physical devices are used, etc.) than that required for accounting

purposes alone. An existing technological problem is how to instrument both the hardware and

software of a system in such a way that very specific and detailed information on what a user

is doing can be selectively recorded without disturbing the operating environment for all

others. If this becomes feasible, an effective interface to the systems' management must

still be provided which permits specification of the activity to be monitored for a user, device, terminal, line, etc.

V. Costs

5.1 . Introduction

The importance of information in our service-oriented society leads to a consideration

of the social costs of limiting access to data in the interest of protecting individual

privacy and data confidentiality. Since data collection is often required to plan and operate

needed service programs, lack of accurate data will either inhibit the development of these

programs or raise the costs of implementing and operating them. Either way, there is a cost

associated with any "solution" that involves indiscriminate suppression of recordkeeping or makes the operating costs too high by imposing unrealistic standards of data confidentiality

and control. These factors are beyond the scope of this summary.

There is a strong indication that the public is willing to pay in some way for privacy

and security. Dr. Davis noted that approximately 15% of the telephones in the U.S. have

unlisted numbers for which the subscribers pay various rates varying from a $9.00 fixed charge

to 50i£ /month. On a less discretionary basis, passengers on national airlines have been paying

a surcharge on fares for airport security and anti-hijacking measures. Other widely used

services which have a cost component for privacy or security include: recreation, housing,

health, education and local (commuting) travel. From these broad-based examples, it is

24
possible to conclude that the costs for maintaining personal data confidentiality and security

in government-operated information systems will be readily borne by the public. As Dr. Davis

pointed out, however, the question of cost allocations among the public, industry and government has rarely been addressed. Such studies are needed to form the basis for privacy decisions and the development of appropriate cost allocation schemes.

5.2. Costs of Security

5.2.1. Physical Security

The costs of physical security are more easily identified than the costs for other areas

of computer security. Physical security costs include constructing limited access sites for

computers and terminals, vaults for tape and disc storage, additional costs for fire detection

and suppression and the like. Most of these costs should be allocated to the protection of

data processing resources rather than to the protection of data confidentiality. One would

expect these measures to be in force independent of the additional need for data confidentiality. Because computers represent an important asset of an organization, they require

protection at a level which is at least equivalent to the value of the equipment.

Carefully designed and implemented physical security will provide adequate protection of

information processing resources and data bases from intruders. The costs of physical security

are a relatively small part of preparing a site for a computer system.

As noted previously, an objective of physical security is to prevent unauthorized

individuals from physically accessing a computer system or any of the file media, terminals,

etc. As a result, the major additional costs beyond those associated with protection of assets

from natural disaster are associated with personnel identification and physical access control.

For many systems, a policy of locking the computer room and restricting access to just operations personnel, only provides a large increment of security for the system. Mr. Chronis

deplored the open showcase kind of installation that results from management being insensitive

to the needs of security.

5.2.2. Controlled Accessibility

It is in this area that discussion of costs becomes more emotional than objective. It

is sometimes stated that you can design for security and compromise performance or design for

performance and compromise security. The problem, of course, is to design for both.

A number of people claim that serious cost penalties are associated with computer security. This was implied in the remarks by Mr. Kenneth Orr who indicated that it was necessary to determine when and how to trade off performance for security. This view comes about in part

from acceptance of the fact that access control mechanisms have to be imbedded deeply in the

25
internal operating systems to provide the computer systems with a large measure of selfprotection. The current thinking of the technical community is that the primary way this can be achieved economically is to adapt, modify or change the architecture of the computer system to provide a hardware data access (reference) validation capability in the form of segment tables,

descriptors, or address mapping hardware with associated authorization controls. Any attempts

to achieve complete data access validation (including that within the operating system) in soft- ware alone would indeed raise the execution overhead to an unacceptable level and would also be

\/ery costly in terms of additional programming for the reference validation(s). A software-onlj

approach makes it imperative that the software design and implementation be done correctly.

Another aspect of the costs of security was brought out by Mr. Edwards who cited that

attempts to "fix" operating systems by patching them are fruitless exercises because the

patches are generally repairing a symptom rather than the underlying cause. Because most

present efforts at security are patches and additions to a basically unsound foundation, they

are fairly easily defeated. Based on his observations of a number of penetration exercises, he

estimates the cost of "breaking" a system at roughly 1/10 the cost of creating and installing

patched protection mechanisms.

Mr. Abbott indicated a cost of 18 man-months to do a "good integrity study" of a system

with up to 6 months of study required to become familiar with the system under investigation.

This level of effort is needed to just identify major potential problems.

Still another indication of the cost of security is found in the Air Force Security

Technology Planning Study (4) which indicates that the cost of "repairing" a single contemporary system, removing all of the known security deficiencies in the system, is on the order

of 2.5 million dollars. As a further indication of the magnitude of these costs, Mr. Gould

indicated that the costs attributable to security in the five super centers being developed in

California were from $200,000 to $400,000 per center over and above the costs attributable to physical security.

The argument that making systems secure is costly is valid if the systems' architecture

does not provide any hardware assistance to enforce the access control protection of the system

In this situation, the cost in performance and other tangible factors that would have to be

passed onto the customer is quite high.

There are, however, computer systems with the necessary architectural embellishments that

would make it possible to achieve the level of self-protection needed to support access control

and authorization mechanisms in a reliable and secure way. Even in these, because security has

not been a paramount issue in the design of the operating system, the features most often are haphazardly used. In these kinds of systems, the performance degradation attributable to security is expected to be quite low because the architectural features of utility for security

are included for other purposes—primarily for dynamic memory allocation.

26
Once cne has achieved a self-protected system, it is then possible to consider a variety

of added authorization mechanisms needed to control the employment of the resources of the

system. A self-protected system is not of itself a secure system--rather it is a reliable

foundation upon which to build a secure system for given applications.

5.2.3. Communications Safeguards

Communications can be protected either by physically protecting the transmission lines

or by using cryptographic devices. Physical protection of the lines is feasible if all remote

users are located in the same facility as the computer center. The incremental costs of

physical protection of communications lines can be quite small if the overall physical

security of a site is good.

The cost of encrypting message traffic among computers and terminals includes the costs

of the cryptographic equipment itself and the increased administrative costs of protecting the

keying information. It is necessary to physically protect the cryptographic device from

unauthorized access or tampering as well, but this cost may be minimal if the remote site

already has adequate physical protection.

Typical commercially available cryptographic devices or scramblers cost in the range of

$2000 to $5000 per unit, with discounts usually available for quantity orders. Where only a few lines are protected in this way, there is no special problem encountered. However, when

it is necessary to protect a large number of lines, then the costs of having a scrambler at both ends of eyery link become significant. None of the manufacturers of this equipment have

developed multiplexed cryptographic techniques for this kind of application. Scramblers based

on simple principles can sometimes be simulated in a computer, thus achieving the desired

multiplexing. However, this appears to be possible only for those scramblers whose principle

is also susceptible to simple analysis and exploitation.

Basically, the communications protection costs can be easily ascertained if the need is recognized.

5.2.4. Costs of Not Providing Technological Safeguards

As the need for data security is recognized and legislation is enacted to protect data

confidentiality, governmental agencies will be faced with establishing stringent data-handling

procedures to protect this data. Without technological safeguards which can provide this protection, other "stop-gap" measures must be used. The costs resulting from using these measures

on contemporary systems are:

inefficient utilization of existing hardware and personnel, or the

acquisition of extra hardware and personnel to maintain separation

of protected data

27
° loss of information accuracy, timeliness and completeness resulting

from reduced data sharing and inadequate data correlation brought

about by having to maintain separation of protected data from other

data.

Specific operational procedures being used and the cost incurred for providing security

and data confidentiality for highly sensitive or valuable data include:

° separate computers for separate applications to achieve isolation,

when combined operation on a single machine would otherwise significantly reduce costs;

° sharing of a computer by several applications sequentially instead of

concurrently, resulting in costly change-over procedures;

° scheduling applications involving protected data at times when timesharing terminals are disconnected;

° restricting capabilities of users at remote terminals.

These practices require substantially more equipment and personnel than would be required

for operation on self-protecting resource-sharing systems. Not only are the direct equipment

and people costs increased, but so are the costs resulting from reduced operational effectiveness. It is estimated that the increased costs resulting from these practices range between

10% and 100% of the costs of operating an installation, with an average cost estimate of 40%.

VI. Action Plans

6.1. Introduction

Progress toward resolving the governmental needs and problems identified during this

Conference requires the coordinated efforts of the nation's legislatures, government management, the service industries, and the automation industry. A realistic approach to providing

solutions could consist of parallel and coordinated efforts directed toward:

° Achieving a national coherence among laws defining the privacy rights of

individuals and the basic information practices to be followed in protecting these rights.

Establishing uniform management and technical procedures and guidelines

for the effective application of security measures.

Innovative applications of existing technology to enhance security

mechanisms and techniques.

° Research and development where the technology needed to eliminate

serious security deficiencies does not exist.

° Studying and allocating costs of confidentiality and security in

automated information systems.

28
6.2. Cohesive Legislation

A national legislative conference called for the purpose of considering the adoption of

uniform legislative policies, definitions, requirements and penalties would represent a significant contribution to assuring the effective implementation of laws that are enacted.

Specifically needed are definitions of the rights to be accorded to individuals in the

collection, use, and dissemination of personal data and the disclosure of information to the

individual for purposes of verification. The recommendations of the HEW Advisory Committee

could serve as a point of departure for such a conference (see Appendix A). An expected

outcome of the conference would be model Federal, State, and local legislation for addressing

the privacy problem. A number of such models are in existence. These could be considered and

either recommended or modified as required.

In formulating model legislation or specific proposals, it is essential that the legislative branch at all levels of government have the advice of the technological community to assess the technical feasibility and impact of proposals designed to protect data confidentiality. In addition to the expertise of the appropriate government technical organizations,

the computer technical societies, such as the Association for Computing Machinery and the

Computer Society of IEEE, should make their resources available to interested legislative cornmi ttees

.

6.3. Uniform Management and Operating Procedures

Cooperative efforts among government agencies, professional societies, computer industry

and private sector groups, such as the American Banking Association and the American National

Standards Institute, can result in the early agreement, documentation, and widespread distribution and implementation of useful management and operating procedures.

In particular, efforts should be directed toward determining levels of data confidentiality required for the protection of privacy rights and their impact upon technological

support requirements. Since these levels can be expected to vary among special user communities, such as health, law enforcement or credit services, initiatives can be exercised by

these communities in cooperation with the computer and information technologies.

Of broader and more common application are techniques for such activities as assessing

risks, determining threats and threat sources, evaluating alternative security measures, auditing and physical security. Some of these techniques already exist and could be readily documented for wide dissemination and use. As an example, the National Bureau of Standards is

developing physical security guidelines which will be made available through public distribution channels. Other organizations with documented techniques could offer them for use elsewhere or, working jointly, could speed up development of techniques which are not now available.

29
Models of computer system and data protection measures that could be used against various

threats would be extremely helpful in providing management with ready-made designs for the opera

tion of secure automated data systems that could be adapted to meet local needs.

6.4. Research and Development

Interaction among government agencies, other user communities, and industry groups can lead to general agreement on significant needs and problems which cannot be satisfied by existing science and technology. Research and development efforts to fill these gaps could proceed or a coordinated but independent basis.

This Conference has initially identified several such needs. Among these is a need for

self-protected computer systems. While techniques for controlled accessibility exist for systems

which are not programmed by their users, little is being done to generate self-protected systems

as a base for resource-shared systems which are secure against threats by producers (where

programming access is provided to some or all users). The focus of ongoing efforts is to develop secure advanced time-sharing systems supporting on-line programming, extensive programsharing facilities and the like (such as the Air Force project to develop a certifiably secure system and a multi-mini computer system,, such as that being developed at the University of

California, Berkeley.)

In addition to this important work, there is a need to develop self-protected systems

on other suitable equipment. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to define uniform

self-protection requirements and to develop models of controlled accessibility that are based

on other modes of computing, such as multi programmed use of systems with data file sharing in

production environments.

Secure operating systems are those with access authorization mechanisms which use the

system's self-protection mechanisms to enforce the access limitations of a programming user (producer). In such a system both the self-protection and access-authorization mechanisms

must be self-contained and certifiable. One expression of these concepts is found in the

Air Force Computer Security Technology Planning Study. It postulates systems in which all

references of any program to any other program, data, or peripheral device are validated

during execution against a list of authorized types of reference based on user and/or program

function. This idea is called a reference monitor concept and is to be realized in a combination of hardware and software called a reference validation mechanism.

It is the efficiency consequences of the requirement for validating each reference of an executing program that leads to a search for hardware techniques to perform this function. For this reason, descriptors or address mapping tables that include reference-type checking appear

attractive for developing secure systems.

30
The software components of a reference validation mechanism include the processing of

authorized references for each user/program function to set values in the tables/descriptors

used in reference checking, software that provides for the administration of the authorizations for individual users, and software that deals with attempted violations of authorized

access.

Another need for further research and development relates to network security. The out- standing needs of network security are not generally understood by either users or the technical

community at large. Not only is the security of information processing systems connected via

a network at stake-, but the network, itself, becomes an object of security interest. A coordinated research program to provide secure network models which can be used to measure and

evaluate costs, protection, and service would help designers to decide where to allocate any

security-related functions to the network and, if so, which ones (e.g., user identification,

authori zati on checks )

.

Finally, the inability to positively and uniquely identify individuals who are authorized

to gain access to computer systems and data remains a basic obstacle to computer security.

Further research and development of identification techniques, together with network security

and self-protected systems, represents an initial set of requirements around which, by common consensus, a coordinated program can be pursued.

6.5. Innovative Applications of Technology

Innovative applications of existing technology can produce improvements in the capability

of currently available systems to protect data. Cooperative efforts among users, user communities and the computer industry to develop and stimulate new ideas and to publicize successful

experiences can make a positive near-term impact upon security effectiveness.

Two such possiblities were identified at this Conference. The first relates to the

retrofitting of existing systems to satisfy new security requirements.

On most systems, for example, it would be fairly easy to validate a program's authority

for initial access (e.g., OPEN) to a given file or a user's authority to call for the execution of a given program. Because these validation functions would occur only once per job,

they are not too costly to consider using and would provide at least a first level of con- trolled accessibility for a system. It would be possible but more difficult to provide validation of authority to access specific records of a file since it would require a representation

of the access privileges accorded to the use of a file (e.g., records could be individually

tagged for reading only) or to each record by a label which shows in some meaningful way the

kinds of restrictions on its use.

31
Where the individual making the access is a consumer only, record access validation can

be still relatively simple. However, the complexity increases if record access validation is

applied to producers who can generally request any processing action on a record (e.g., read,

write, delete) and whose authority to access a record has to be determined in the specific

context of the request.

While centralized authorization mechanisms will not solve all possible controlled

accessibility problems for any particular system, they will provide greater data security on systems than is presently available and in many cases will be adequate in the short run.

A second possibility for the innovative application of existing technology involves the

use of cryptographic devices and data encryption techniques. The National Bureau of Standards

is currently engaged in making available encryption algorithms to provide a way for

civilian agencies of government to protect the contents of data during storage and transmission.

Related to the use of these techniques is the need for low-cost effective cryptographic devices

that can be used to protect data confidentiality and integrity in systems using telecommunications. With the availability of self-protected systems, programmed encryption techniques

become viable as a means of protecting data on physical storage media or between devices with

computational capability. However, such techniques impose additional burdens of key management

that need cost-effective resolution. Therefore, development of techniques for efficient key

management are also needed.

6.6. Cost Allocations

A study of the costs of data confidentiality and security in automated systems is

essential in creating an understanding for making public choices about the privacy needs of

individuals and for allocating the costs among the suppliers, the user communities, the

public and the government. Costs must be identified and acceptable concepts developed for

cost allocations schemes. Since these will undoubtedly vary among such service activities as government, banking, credit and medicine, appropriate studies might logically be organized on this basis and participated in by management, economists, and technologists.

32
Appendix A

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Monday, November 19, 1973

8:15 a.m. Conference Registration

9:30 CONFERENCE INTRODUCTION

Welcome : Dr. Richard W. Roberts, Director,

National Bureau of Standards

Keynote Remarks : Honorable John K. Tabor,

Under Secretary of Commerce

The Congressional Interest : Honorable Jack Brooks,

Chairman, Government Activities Subcommittee,

Committee on Government Operations, House of

Representatives

A Statement of the Problem : Dr. Ruth M. Davis,

Director, Institute for Computer Sciences and

Technology, National Bureau of Standards

10:30 - 10:45 Break

10:45- 1:00 SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY

Mr. David B. H. Martin, Session Chairman

Special Assistant to the Secretary

Health, Education and Welfare

Governmental Systems with a Need for

Privacy Protection

Federal: Mr. George Hall, Acting Assistant

Administrator, Law Enforcement

Assistant Administration, Department

of Justice

Municipal: Mr. Andrews Atkinson, Superintendent,

Cincinnati /Hamilton County Regional

Computer Center

Issues and Requirement for Privacy Safeguards

Professor James Rule

State University of New York

A California Solution

Mr. Kent Gould, Chief, EDP Control & Development,

Department of Finance, State of California

1:00 - 2:15 Lunch

33
2:15 - 5:15 CONTROLLING ACCESS TO SYSTEMS AND DATA

Mr. Walter W. Haase, Session Chairman

Deputy Assistant Director, Information Systems,

Office of Management and Budget

The Need and Significance of Controlled Accessibility

Dr. Dennis Branstad, Project Leader, Computer

Security, National Bureau of Standards

Governmental Systems with a Need to Control Access

Federal: Dr. Robert Laur, Acting Director, Office

of Policy Development and Planning,

Health, Education and Welfare

State: Mr. Jerry Hammett, Deputy Director,

Department of Finance, State of Ohio

Congress: Mr. Robert Chartrand, Science Policy

Research Division, Congressional

Research Service, Library of Congress

Providing for System, Program and Data Integrity

Mr. Howard E. Lewis, Jr., Manager, Data Management

Programs, Atomic Energy Commission

Managing Computer Operations

Mr. Robert Caravel la, Management Information

Division, Department of Finance, State of Illinois

Tuesday, November 20, 1973

8:15 a.m. Conference Registration

9:00 - 10:30 CONTROLLING ACCESS TO SYSTEMS AND DATA (cont'd.)

Mr. Charles Joyce, Session Chairman

Assistant Director, Office of Telecommunications

Policy

Controlling Access to Local Computer Systems

Mr. Daniel J. Edwards, Research Engineer, National

Security Agency

Controlling Access to Computer Networks

Dr. Michael Muntner, Director, Advanced Planning

and Research Division, Automated Data Management

& Telecommunications Service, General Services

Administration

10:30 - 10:45 Break

34
10:45 - 11:30 INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO PRIVACY

Dr. Alan F. Westin, Professor of Public Law and

Government, Columbia University

11:30 - 1:00 REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

Mr. Ike Friedlander, Session Chairman

Executive Director, Public Buildings Service

General Services Administration

Records and Personnel Management

Dr. Walter E. Simonson, Associate Director of

Electronic Data Processing, Bureau of the Census

Protecting Against Environmental and Other Hazards

Mr. Nicholas A. Chronis, Chief, Data Processing

Computer Center, Civil Service Commission

1:00 - 2:15 Lunch

2:15 - 3:45 ASSESSING SECURITY RISKS AND COSTS OF PROTECTION

Mr. Carl Vorlander, Session Chairman

Executive Director, National Association for State

Information Systems

Auditing Existing Protective Measures

Mr. Robert P. Abbott, Manager, RISOS Project,

Lawrence Livermore Laboratories

Management Evaluation of Needs, Benefits and Costs

of Security Protection

Mr. Ken T. Orr

Topeka, Kansas

35
Appendix B

Publications/References Cited at the Conference

1. "Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens," Report of the Secretary's

Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, U.S. Department of

Health, Education and Welfare, July 1973, U.S. Government Printing Office

(Stock No. 1700-00116), Washington, D.C. 20401, Price $2.35, postpaid.

2. Federal Fire Council Publication RP-1 , "Fire Protection for Essential Electronic

Equipment," available from: National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285

Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22151, under document number AD-692-662.

Price $6.00.

3. D0D Directive 5200.28 and appendix 5200.28 M. Office of the Secretary of Defense,

the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301.

4. "Computer Security Technology Planning Study," October 1972, Electronic Systems

Division, L.G. Hanscom Field, Bedford, Massachusetts 01730, ESD-7R-51 , Vol. I and II.

5. Report of GUIDE Subcommittee on Security Requirements.

6. Project SEARCH Security and Privacy Publications available from: Project SEARCH,

CCTRF, 1927 13th Street, Sacramento, California 95814.

7. GMIS Project 73 publication: An Administrative Guideline for Security and

Confidentiality in State and Local Government Data Centers, GMIS, 138 East Court

Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, price $25.00.

36
Appendix C

Preview of Conference on Privacy and Computer Security

National Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, Maryland

March 4-5, 1974

This Conference is planned as a sequel to the November 1973 Conference to continue the

dialog and interaction among government, industry and public interest groups that is needed

for effective resolution of the privacy and computer security issues.

More specifically, this Conference provides an opportunity for the computer industry and

other groups in the public and private sectors to present solutions, ideas, and approaches

for dealing with the governmental needs and problems outlined in this Conference Report. The

suggestions may include legislative, technological or managerial measures, and may focus on existing state-of-the-art techniques, advanced methodologies currently under development or promising research interests of a longer range nature.

Participants in the program will include persons from:

The Congress

° State legislatures

° Individual computer companies and consulting organizations

Professional organizations

° Academia

Attendance at the Conference is open to all interested persons, including management and

technical personnel from Federal, State, and local governments, the computer industry, public

interest groups, professional associations, academia and privacy and security experts.

Further information may be obtained from the Conference office:

NBS Privacy and Computer Security Conference

Administration Building, Room 209A

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

Phone: (301) 921-3195

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Government Looks at Privacy and Security in Computer Systems.

Summary of a Conference held at the National Bureau of

Standards, Gaithersburg, Maryland, November 19-20, 1973

5. Publication Date February 1974

6. Performing Organization Code

7. AUTHOR(S)

Clark R. Renninger and Dennis K. Branstad, Editors

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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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16. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a significant

bibliography or literature survey, mention it here.) This publication summarizes the proceedings of a conference held for the purpose of

highlighting the needs and problems of Federal, State and local government in safeguarding individual privacy and protecting confidential data contained in computer

systems from loss or misuse. The Conference was held at the National Bureau of

Standards on November 19-20, 1973.

The origin of governmental problems is discussed in the context of the public's concern for privacy arising out of computer-based recordkeeping, the diverse legislative actions

how being taken to safeguard privacy, the threats to the security of computer-based

information systems and the technological problems associated with protecting against

such threats. Useful distinctions are drawn between privacy, confidentiality and

security to clarify the issues and allocate responsibilities for solving the problem

among lawmakers, technologists and management.

Major needs are described. These include the need for cohesive Federal, State and

local legislation, technological guidelines and standards for assuring uniform com- pliance with legislative requirements ; management guidelines for identifying and

evaluating threats to security; and improved technological mechanisms for controlling

access to computer systems and networks . Cost implications of providing security

measures are discussed.

17. KEY WORDS (six to twelve entries; alphabetical order; capitalize only the first letter of the first key word unless a proper name; separated by semicolons)

Computer systems, privacy and security; confidentiality; privacy; security.

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