VIETNAM STUDIES 

Communications. 

Electronics 

1962 -1970 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
, 

"-

H A J. LAN D 

I 

• /. 

' . .. 

" '0,. I ,,. 

-

SOUTH , HI": A , " 

.OI.IOIOAJ'" _ ·.m .... " ...... 
VIETNAM STUDIES 

COMMUNICATIONSELECTRONICS 

1962-1970 

by 

A1ajor General Th omas Nlatthew R ienzi 

DEPARTMENT OF TilE ARMY 

WASIIINGTON. D.C. 2002 
Libra ry of Congress Ca lalog Ca rd Number: 7 1- 184863 

FIRST PRI NTED 1972-CMH PUB 90-9- 1 

For saIl' by till' Supr'';ul,'nd.'nt of J)o(-tIIU('uts, 11$ (io\'t'nUlwnt I'rilltinJ{ Off,,'" 

lnlemet: bookstore.gpo,gov Phone: toll free (866) Sl2- 1800; DC llrea 12()2) 512- 1800 

rruc: 1202 ) 512-2250 M:,iL Stop SSOP. Wru;hington. DC 2Q.I02-0001 
Foreword 

The United States Army has mct an unusually compl ex 

chall enge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction wit h th e oth er services, 

the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an 

emergi ng nation to develop governmental processes of its own 

choosing. free of olltside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging armed conflict. the assignment in Southeast Asia 

has req uired superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a 

modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting 

th em to d emands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing 

with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting 

conventiona l campaigns agai nst well-trained and determined regular units. 

As this assignment nears an end, the U.S. Army must prepare 

for other c:hallenges that ma y lie ahead, While c:ogni za nt that history ne\'er repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profiled 

from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the 

Army nevertheless stands to benellt immense ly from a sLUdy of its 

experience. its shortcomings no less than its achievements, 

Awa re that some years must elapse before the offi cial histories 

will provide a detail ed and objecti ve analysis of the experience in 

Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more 

sa li ent aspects of that experience can be made availa ble now. At 

the request of the Chief of Staff, a representa tive group o f senior 

officers who served in imponalll poStS in Vietnam and who still 

carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepared a 

series of monographs. These studies should be of great va lue in 

helping the Army deve lop future operational conce pts while at the 

same time contributing to the historical record and providing the 

American publi c with an interim report on the performance of 

men and officers who ha ve responded, as olhers have through our 

history, to exacting and trying demands. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on official records, with additiona l material from publ ished and unpu bl ished 

secondary works. from debriefi ng reports and intervi ews with key 

iii 
participalllS. and £Yom th e personal experience o f the author. To 

facil itate security clearance. annotation and detailed bibliography 

ha ve been omitted from the published version; a fully documented 

account with bibliography is filed with the Office of the Chief of 

"'ofiIitary History. 

The qualifications of Major General Thomas allhew Rienzi 

to write Com7r!1l1licalio'ls·Eleclronics are considerable. From 1962 

to 1964 he served as Signal Officer. XV III Airborne Corps: from 

1964 to 1966 as Executive Officer to the Department of the Army's 

Assisl31ll Ch ief of Staff for Communica ti ons-Elec tronics and as Program Manager for Combat Surveillance Target Acquisition and 

Night Vision Equipment; and from 1966 to 1968 as Commanding 

General and Commandant of the U.S. Army Signal Center and 

School at Fort Monmouth. New Jersey. In all these positions he 

exercised a strong influence on communica tions·e lectronics person· 

nel. organization, and equipment bound for the combat lone. In 

September 1968 he became th e Deputy Commanding General and. 

in February 1969. the Commanding General of the 1st Signal Brigade in Vietnam. a larger than division size command. For twenty· 

one months. General Ri enzi was centrally involved in the communications·electronics aspect of the U.S. effort in Southeast Asia. In 

June 1970 he assumed command of the Strategic Communications 

Command, Pacific. at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and serves concurrentl y as Deputy Chief of Staff. Communications-Electronics. 

U.S. Army Pacific. at Fort Shafter. Hawaii. 

Washi ngton. D.C. 

15 October 197 1 

,v 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General. USA 

The Adjlltam General 
Preface 

There is an old Army maxim: "The communicators are th e 

first ones in, and the last ones out." The 39th Signal Battalion was 

the first regular U.S. Army ground unit to entcr Vietnam, but 

from this modest beginning there followed a steady buildup of Signal troops to match the initially slow but later accelerated growth 

of U.S. Army forces in Vietnam. By the end of 1968, the controlling Signal headquarters in Southeast Asia, the 1st Signa l Brigade 

of the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, comprised 

six Signal groups, twenty-two Signal battalions, and a tolal strength 

of ove r 23,000 men- by far the largest Sig'na! organ iza tion ever 

deployed to a combat theater by the United States Army. This unit 

of larger than division size. when coupled with the field forces 

Signal organ izations. composed a formidable command-control 

force. 

Th is study attempts to record some of the most important experiences. problems, and achievements in the field of communications-electronics during the years 1962 to 1970. It lays no claim to 

the defi nity of history. 

I ho pe that it will show the influences that were at work and 

lessons learned. Whi le I accept full responsibil ity for the conclusions reached, it would be misleading to pretend that I have not 

been influenced by my gifted predecessors. my successor, and many 

contemporaries. along with a tremendously outstanding group of 

commanders who needed enormous electron ic poh'er to do their 

job. 

As the tempo of operations in Southeast Asia continues to di· 

minish, the Army can look back with pride- with new wisdomon the accompl ishments, under very trying conditions, of its communicators in the Republic of Vietnam and throughout all of 

Southeast Asia. And a good candidate f01" the last Army u nit to be 

extracted could well be a Signal battalion com posed of aggressively 

and dynamically great American soldiers who made it all possible. 

Washington, D.G. 

15 OctOber 1971 

v 

THOMAS MATTHEW RIENZI 

i\ lajor General. U.S. Arm}' 
Contents 

PART ONE 

The Leall Years and Early Bui ldup. 1962- 1965 

Ch(fPIe> Pllge 

I. BACKG ROUND AND BEGI NN INGS OF COM. 

MUNICATIONS. 1962- 1964 ................... 3 

The Viewam £nvironmellt ... .... .......... 3 

Communications Backgrollrld and Initial 

Buildup .... ... .............. . .. . . . ..... 6 

Long-Lints Systems: Back Porch... .. .. . .. .. . 7 

Tilt: )91h SigMI BaltaliOPI ...... . ......... . . 10 

Control and Direction Over Commrmications 12 

Improvements, Problems, (lPId Plans (0 Mid·1964 13 

II. MILITARY INTENSIFI ES COMMUN ICATIONS 

ACTIVITIES, 1964-1965 ........ ............. 17 

Satellite Communications Come 10 Viel1lam .... 18 

System Problems, Fu rther Plans, and Control 

A1atters ..... .. ......... . . .... ......... . 18 

The 2r1 Signal Grollp Arrives ........ ," "'" 22 

Command and Control Arrrmgements """" 25 

Additional Commlmicatiolls Control Elemel,ts 

bller VieUlQm , , , , , , , " ' . " , " , . , , , " , ,. , 25 

More A'lobile Radio, More Fixed Radio, and 

Cable """""" , .. ,,.,., .. ,""'.'.,' 28 

More Bllildllp and Combtlf Needs, .. ,.,"",. 31 

Im.pact 0/ Circuit Sh ortages on Telephol,e 

Systems . " . , .. , ., . ' , , ." , . , , " .' . " " . " 37 

A utomatic Telephon e alui Sum'e Voice Switch 

PlarlJ .,." .. "."""',.,, . ,"', .. ,",' 38 

Fragmented Comnllmications Control Is UI,ited 40 

SummalY, 1962-1965 " ... ,"',.,.,"",.,. 1 1 

vi 
PART TWO 

The Buildup Climaxes, 1966-1967 

Chepul Pege 

III. CREATION OF THE 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE, 

ORGAN IZATION AND OPERATION ..... ... . 47 

Crucial Decisions . ....... . 47 

Communications Support /0'1' Army alld Corps 

Areas .. .... . .. . ..... ........ ........... 48 

Regi01lal Communications Croup ............ 52 

Signal Units ill Thai/mid .. . . . .. . .. . . . .. .. . . 53 

The Signal Brigade i" 1967 ................. 53 

IV. T H E EVOLVING CONCEPT FOR CO~ IM UN . 

CATIONS ................ .............. .... . 55 

As COll ceived in 1966 ................. . 

IJel ermiliing Communications Requil'eme tlts .. 

Evo/llliOll of Three Syslems in Vi etllam 

V. COM!\'IUN ICATIONS OPERATIONS IN 

CO!\'fBAT ......... . ..... .... ............... . 

55 

56 

57 

60 

Supporting the Fidd Forces . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . 60 

Sup/JOrtillg the Divisiom .. .. . . ... . .. ... .. . . . 62 

Special Forces Communications in Vietnam .... 63 

Commlmicalio1ls /or the BailIe for DaH. T o . . . . 64 

VI. CONTROL AND DIRECTION: PROBLEMS 

AND SOLUTIONS ................ ... . . . . . . .. . 70 

Tecll1lical Mlmagemenl . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . 70 

Communications Engitleering alld Installation . 7 1 

T eleph01le Ellgineering and Mallagement .. . .. 72 

Commlmicatiolls Control Means and M ethods 74 

Vil. INTEG RATED WIDEBAND COMMUN ICATIONS SYSTE!\I ......... . ............. . 76 

Th e Three Phases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . 76 

Problems and Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 

Combat M obile Equifnnenl Used ;'1 the hllerim 84 

Slallls at the End 0/ 1967... ................. 86 

VIII. ELABORAT IONS IN THE BIG NETWO RKS. .. 87 

The Crowillg T elephone System ............ 87 

Record Traffic: M essage and Data. ... . . . . . .. . 89 

The Secure Voice IY etwork ...... .....•.. . ... 92 

vii 
Page 

SIJaee Age Commu1Iieatio1lJ .... .. .. . . .. ..... 9:\ 

T he Na tio lwl M ilitary Command and Con trol 

S),stem .. . ....... . ... .. . .... ... . .. . ..... 94 

T raining the r.ommunicato r . . .. .. . ......... 96 

SllmmaT)'. /966- / 967 .. .... .. .. .. _. ... . . . . •. 99 

PART T H REE 

Commun icatio ns Maiu re and Move T oward 

Vietn amiza tion. 1968- 1970 

IX. U.S. AR IY SICN AL T ROOPS AND TET: 1968 103 

Hanoi Changes Strafegy . . .................. 103 

The T et OUemive .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ... .. . . . 103 

Builcling Com11/lI1lia a io1lJ in the Nort hem 

Provifl ces . ....... . ..... . ... ... ...... . .. 104 

U.S. Army Signalmen and T et . ... .. . . .. . 107 

Reo rg(witalioll of Corps Area COl1l11l1l1l ieafio lls 112 

Brigade O rgalliz.a tion in 1968 for A rea Com munieatjollS . . .. .. ... .. ... . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . 113 

X. SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS 

AND I NNOVAT IONS ... . . .. . . . ... ........... 117 

M obile River;'le Force: A ll UlIIlSIwl T est ..... 117 

Battlefield Secllre Voice Equi pment. .. . ...... 120 

Airhol"11 e Radio Helay .. ... . . .. . . .. .... . ... 123 

Pi cto rial 0l)e ratiolls . .. .. .... . . . .... .. . .... . 125 

M ilil(lry A ffilia te H(l ciio System . .. ..... .. . . .. 127 

XI. SOPHIST ICATIO N OF U.S. ARMY COM MUNICATIO NS IN Vi ETNAM ... . . ...... . ... . . .... 129 

Campleliol} of the Integrated Commu nicaliollJ 

System ... . ..... . .. .. ... . . .. . . . . .. . ..... 129 

h ltegration of Defe1lse Commll nicatio1ls ...... 131 

A utomalic M essage Switching- Another First.. . 132 

T andem Switches-An Ull imale . .. . . . .. 135 

Th e Signal Soldiel' .. ... . . . .. . . . ... . . 135 

Supply alld j\/(linle n(lli ce Support . . .. . . . ..... 139 

XII. ET A~ fl ZAT N AN D RELAT ED 

ACT IVIT IES .. ... . .. .. .. . .. . . ...... . . ..... . .. 142 

Background .. .. .. ... ................. . .. . 142 

Commllllicati01lJ Vielrwmhatioll: T he Pla n . .. 142 

T l'Oi l,illg the SOll lh Vi etnamese Signal me" 14:\ 

viii 
Pllge 

Contractor Operation of Comnnmications .. ... 145 

Signal T roop Redeployments ............... 146 

R ecovery of Communications Assets ......... 147 

R eorganiUltion of the 1st Signal Brigade...... 147 

Commmlications Support in Cambodia, A prilJune 1970 .... . . . . . ... . . . ............... 148 

Stmlmmy, 1968-1970 .. . .. .. ... . .... . ...... 150 

XIII. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED ..... 153 

Control and OrgalliUltion of Commtmicatiolls.. 153 

The It,tegrated S),stem ..... . ............... 155 

Alltomation of the T eleph011e System........ 158 

Commll11icati011s Security .. . ............... 159 

Precedence arid Classijicati011 of Messages. . . . .. 160 

Ph),sical SeCllrity at the Sites................ 161 

Th e A udio·Visual M ission .. . . . .. . . . . . . .... 163 

Perso nnel (l1I d T raining .. .............. 164 

Stl pply and Ma i11tenance .. ... . ... .. ........ 168 

Aviation................... . . . ..... .. ..... 170 

Monetary Reqllireme1lis ..........•......... 171 

VietllamiwtiOll ................ .. .. •.. . .... 172 

The Great A merica11 Soldier........ . .. .. .. . 173 

INDEX 175 

Charts 

N o. Page 

I. Signal Organiza tion in Vielllam, December 1965 37 

2. 1st Signal Brigade Organization, J uly 1969 ........... 114 

Maps 

No. Page 

I. Republic of Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 

2. BACK PORCH System and "T ails," Mid· 1964 ......... . 14 

3. Multichannel Communications in Vietnam With Major 

"Tails," December 1965 .. ....... .. ..... . ........ 30 

4. Battl e for Dak To, November 1967 . . .............. . 67 

5. Major Battles and Signifi cant Local ities. 1968 T el ..... 105 

6. Res ponsibilities of In Signa l Brigade Corps Area Support Battalions, December 1968 .. . . .......... . ... 115 

7. Int egra ted Wideband Communications System, 1969 ... 131 

8. Automatic Dial T elephone Exchanges, 1969 .......... 136 

1X 
Illustrations 

Installing a Haml et Radio System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 7 

Scatter and Line-or-Sight Communications ......•....... 8 

Billboard Antennas ......... . ........ ..... . . ••.. .. ... 9 

Mobile Manual Switchboacd .......... . . . . . . . . .. . . .. 1l 

Install ing Inflatable Antenna . . . .. .. . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 12 

First Satellite T erminal in Vietnam .. .... . .. . ... . . . .. .. 19 

Man-Packed Rad io . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 

Mobile Tropospheric Sca tter Amen na ................. . 29 

Sk y troopers Prepare T o Boa rd Assault Helicopters . . . . .•. . 33 

Landing a Resuppl y Helico pter . ......... , .' . . . . . .. .. . . 36 

Bunkered Communications Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 

Operating a Posth ole Digger .. . ..... ,......... . . .. ... . 50 

General Terry Visits the 25th Division . . . . . . . . .. . • . . . .. . 54 

Hon Cong Mo untain Signal Site . . . . . . . . . . . .• . ... . . .•. . 61 

Fire Support Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 66 

Manual T elephone Switchboard . .. .. .. . •.. . .. . . .. .. . . . n 

Pr' Line Mountain Signal Facility. . .. . . . . . . . .••. . . . . •. . 77 

Antenna Frame Under Construction. .. . .•. . . .. . . . . . 82 

1st Signal Brigade Firing Mortars ........ , . . . . . . .. .. . . . 83 

Site Octopus a t Saigon ... . . ... ........ . . . , . . . .. . . . . . . 85 

Dial Telephone Exchange T est Board . . . . . . . . .. •.. . . . . . 88 

Manual Tape Relay Center ... ' .. ' .. . . . . .. . . . .•... . .. . 90 

Non·Automatic Data Relay Center ....... .. . . ... , . . . . . . 93 

Sa igon Sa tellite Terminal. " .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . . .. . . . 95 

Signalmen on Patrol . ........ . ........... . ........... 97 

General Va n Harlingen Inspects Helicopter Gear .... 100 

Cable Team at Work During T el Offensive .. . .. .. . . . . . . 110 

USS Berlewah ... .... ............................ .. .. 11 9 

Combat Photographer. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . 126 

A MARS Operator .................... . .... .. ..... 127 

" Ho ld Yer Ha ts Fellas" ....... ....... . . .. . . • , . . .. .... 130 

Automatic Message Switching Center. .... . . ............ 133 

Cable-Splicers at a Fixed Base. ........... . ......... ... 138 

Calibrating Signal Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 140 

General Foster Observes Vietnamese Signal Training Class 144 

Vietnamese Signalman on the J ob . ........... ' .. . 146 

Sky troop Communicators in Cambodia. . . . . . .. .. . .. . .. . . 149 

Convoy Across the Cambod ian Border ............... . .. 151 

Tank and Antenna Dish .. .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . ... . .. ... . 162 

General Rienzi Talks to Helico pter Crew Member ....... . 170 

x 
Illustrations are from Department o f Defense fi les exce pt for the 

Glrtoon on page 130 by Vernon E. Gra nt, wh ich appeared in Pacifi c 

SlUrs and Stripes; the photograph on page 12 of a painting by Spe. 

cialist Chesler Sa tkamp: and thc photograph on page 162 of a watcr 

color b y Specia list Eric K. Cha ndler. 

XI 

PART ONE 

THE LEAN YEARS AND EARLY 

BUILDUP, 1962 - 1965 

CHAPTER I 

Background and Beginnings of 

Communications, 1962 - 1964 

In 1962 U.S. Army Signalmen in South Vietnam began operating tropospheric sca ller radio relay sets capablc of providing numerous voice communica tions channels over extended ranges-the 

first use of that type of advanced equ ipment in a combat environment. By 1964, seven years after the Soviet Un ion had la unched 

th e world's first orbiting sa tellite, U.S. Army Signa lmen were o perating a new satellite ground station wh ich provided communications service between Saigon and Hawaii through a single commun ica ti ons satellite thousa nds of miles aloft- the first lISC of satellite 

communications in combat. And by 1968 U,S. Signalmen in South 

Vietnam had begun to operate fully automati c digital message and 

data switches, another first in a combat zone. These events give 

some indication of the growth of Army communications during 

the Vietnam conAin. Any account of communica tions in Vi etnam 

must include the increasi ng sophistica tion in equipment used to 

meet ever-growing communi ca ti ons needs in support of a multina· 

tion effon directed toward the dua l roles of nation·building and 

comba t. Such an account must also tell the story of the dedicated. 

highly ski ll ed soldiers who fOllgh! the enemy and maintained and 

operated that equipment in a hot, humid. underdeveloped land 

thousands o f miles from their homes. 

The Viel1l4m E1IvirOtl1Nellt 

The Republic of Vietnam. located on the eaStern portion of 

the Southeast Asia mainland. li es entirely within the tropics. (Mat) 

I) The terrain is varied. with the large Mekong River Delta in 

the south, and alternating mountainous and highland areas in the 

north edging a narrow coastal pla in along the South Ch ina Sea. 

Politically. the Republic of Vietnam is divided into forty-four 

provinces, which are equivalent to the fifty states of the United 

States. In turn, each province is made up of districts. comparable 

to U.S. counties. 
4 

TNAILA 

+ 

~ 

MAP 1 

COi>·IM UN ICATJONS-EI.ECTRO NICS 

D,. ,IN" .'" 1m ri--"'.. I . 00 .... '" REPUBLIC 

OF 

+ 

\.(\ , ... "" , 

·7 .... II" V IETNAM O~ NON C''\''' ______ j 

I CORPS 

, 0 S h ::':'" 

" t! . ~ '0 u, L.~" 

~ .'00". 

L 

\\\ --P~ U . .. . .. 

QIJ' HHON 

II CORPS 

• , • .J . ... - I ' .... 

,. r.r~~ ~''' + .. ,," 

l c: )-"-' III CO RPS 

~ 3 \""" ',,, .. ~ '" . ---\ '1. c .. . 'n. :;'! lONG 81HH , N .. r'" "'/' . '" U . 

"""', .. ~ , " .f< •• , .. ... 'ao 

I>'~ ... 01.0 '" 

, CAN 11.0 -I 

IV CO RP S , 

~=?: ' , • • c· ... ~ ..... .>----:' -"' .. , -

The weather has annual variations, from a wet, humid monsoon season to a dry season with practica lly no precipitation. The 

terrain and tropica l climate have had significant effect on the U.S. 

Army's comba t communications operations in Viell1am. In the Ivle-
BACKGROUND AND BEGINNINGS 5 

kong Delta, for example, it was difficult to locate terrain suitable 

fo r the placcmcru of communi cations facilities since most of the 

area is paddy land. which is partially submerged by the Mekong 

Ri ver duri ng the rainy season, and those areas that are a few feet 

above water level are densely inhabited. Because of the fiat terrain 

in the del ta, tall towers reaching lip to 200 feet or more were re· 

quired to raise anten nas to a communi cable height, The muddy, 

silty della lands provided a pOOl' base for stich constructi on. In 

the sparse ly populated high lands and mountains, sites that afforded 

both feasibl e comm unications paths and reasonable access were 

rare, Some sites that were selected required extensive preparation, 

and insta ll ati ons \\'ere dimcul t to build. supply, and defend. As 

communicaLi ons equipment became more and more sophisticated, 

the effects of humidity, dust, and Illud were harder to overcome. 

During 1959 insurgents in South Vietnam backed by the North 

Vietnamese \\'cre incrcasing their campaign of violence and subver· 

sion in an effon to obtain political control over all Vietnam. In 

1960 the Commun ist Party of North Vietmull ec id l,:~! that South 

Vietnam was 10 be "liberated" and unifi ed with the nort h. Subse· 

quently, Hanoi orga nized a Na tional Liberation Front and 

claimed that it was made up of "several political panics" in South 

Vietnam. wit h a Peopl e's Revolutionary Pany identified as the 

leader. By 196 1 the SOllth Vietnamese Communists, termed Viet 

Cong or VC. were conducting, in addition to their terrorist cam· 

paign, military operations of Illuhibaaalion size in South Viet nam. 

The South Vietnamese Government, although it had been receiv. 

ing U.S. civi l and military assistance since 1954, could not cope 

with the worseni ng si tuation. 

In late 196 1, therefore, South Vietnam urgently appealed for 

immediate and extensive help from the United Sta tes. The U.S. 

Government dec ided to expand its assistance to South Vietnam 

and increased the number of U.S. military ad visers from 700 to 

more than 3.400. Tactical aircra ft and Army helicopter units were 

sem to Vietnam to su pport and train the South Vietnamese. To 

keep pace with the growing U.S. commitment, communications in 

South Vietnam req uired tremendous expansion. 

In February 1962 the United States Military Assistance Com· 

malld. Vietnam. a U.S. joitll headquart ers, was established to con· 

trol the expanding U.S. effort and was made responsible for all 

U.S. military policy, opera tions. and assistance in South Vietnam. 

By that lime there were over 3,000 U.S. troops in the country, ad· 

visi ng and supporti ng the South Vietnamese regular military and 

paramilitary forces. 
6 COM 1\1 UN ICA TIONS·ELECTRON ICS 

Commlmications Background and Initial Buildup 

ru early as 1951, U.S. Army Signal troops were providing a 

small U.S. advisory group in Vietnam with communications that 

linked into the Army's worldwide network. By the time the U.S. 

Mil itary Assistance Com mand, Vietnam, was establ ished. high-frequency radio circuits opera ted by the Strategic Army Commun ications station in Vietnam were providing communications from Saigon to Sail Miguel in the Philippines, to Fon Buckner-a large 

Army logistics base in Okinawa-and to Bang PIa near Bangkok in 

Thailand. These radio links provided a few telephol1c and message 

circuits. In addition to its high-frequency radios, the station operated an overseas telephone switchboard and the manual message 

relay in Saigon. At this time messages were relayed manuall y at a 

teletypewriter relay station by taking an incoming message off the 

receiving equipment in the form of punched tape and inserting 

the same tape at the appropriate send positions to transmit the 

message on to its destination. 

The advisers. scattered u]> and down the more than 500·mil e· 

long country. had to rely meanwhile on the low·capacity Vi emam· 

ese military communications networks and on a high.rrequency 

radio network they operated themseh'es to pass messages and fur· 

nish telephone service. The Viemamese commercial system was of 

lillie use since it consisted primarily of a few high·frequency radio 

links using old French equipment. The U.S. Agency for Internationa l De\·elopmem. howe\'er. was planni ng the construction of a 

major long·lines microwave system to connect Saigon with com· 

mercial grade service throughout the country and to include local 

cable distribution s),stems. 

As the U.S. effon expanded in Vietnam, the very limited com· 

munications available could not support the U.S. helicopter units, 

tactic.:al aircraft. and addi tional ad\'isers being deployed throughout 

the land. During 1961 and 1962 the joint sta ff of the Commander 

in Chief. Pacific, pushed to modernize the communications facilities in the Republic of Vietnam with two objectives: first. to create 

it communications system to meet the defense needs of the South 

Viclilamesc in their counterinsurgency operations, and. second. to 

build it in such a way that it could be expanded to rurnish the 

minimum needs in support of U.S. forces. 

ode rn radio facilities were supplied through the U.S. Military Assistance Program to improve the South Vietnamese Army's 

('ommunications system. These radios provided voice and message 

(il'cuiu from Saigon to the outer-pro,·ince cities of Da Nang. Qui 

Khan. j\'ha Trang, Pleiku. Ban Me ThuDt. and Can Tho. and sup-
BACKGROU N D AN!) BEGI NN I NGS 7 

U .S. ARMY SIGNALMAN A:>IO Vn:T NAME.'iI:C I NSTALI,INC A I-I A;\I U::T RADIO 

SY3rEM 

plemented the existing Vietnamese military high-frequency voice 

and morse code systems. The Somh Vi etnamese Navy rece ived 

similar radio equipment. A limited tactical air-control system 

which employed the integrat ed communications·electronics asse ts 

of the U.S. Air Force and the Republic of Vietnam was put into 

operation. The U.S. ~Iilitary Assistance Program also supplied 

radio equipment 10 connect South Vielnamesc hamlets and vii, 

lages wit h their district headquarters, to link the district headquarters with patrols and Civil Guard posts within the district, and to 

t:onneCl the districts with their higher province headquarters. 

Province and district headquaners were also linked into the military communi cations networks by radi o. 

L ong-Lines S),sfcms: BacH Porch 

The increased tempo of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and the buildup of U.S. assista nce to the Vietnamese had created an urgelll requirement for a modern , reliable. large-capacity 

communications system that could provide high quality telephone 
8 COt\IM U N ICATIONS- EL.ECTRON l es 

TROPOSPHERIC ScATTER AND LINE-UF-SIGUT CoMMUNICATIONS 

and message c ircuits hetween key loca ti ons in Vietnam. In early 

January 1962 Secretary of Defense Robert S. ~fcNamara approved 

the cstablishmCIll of ;1 "backbone " communica tions system to S.H· 

isfy this need . The systcm, code-named B ACK POKCI/, as conce ived 

by planners in Washington a nd al th e headquallers of the Commander in Chid, Pacific, would utili ze tropospheric S('aucr radio 

trunks capabl c of providing numerOlls circuits between locations 

more than 200 mil es apart. These tropospheric scan er trunks would 

be ad\'anlageoll'i si nce. unlike conventional micro\\r;wc. wh ich needs 

a line of sight between sets. th ey would pass ovcr the vast dista nces 

of underpopulated. cnemy-infested terrain to I'()nnf'Ct the major 

opera tions and population (,llIcn in the Rcpuhlic of Vi et nam 

nonh of Saigon. Line-of-sight mi crow;'lvc rela y links arc limited 

to much shorter distances. avcragi ng about twcllt y to thiny mil es. 

From Sa igo n sou th to the delta region. long-lines service wou ld 

be provided by a cOIllmcrcial microw;l\c system. tailed SOL'TIIEkN 

TOLl.. funded by til(' U.S. AgclH y for Int erna tional Del'elo pmen t. 

The U.S. Air Force was charged with responsibility for funding 

and building the B ACK POkCH system; the Army would operate th e 

system after its completion . A U.s. Army Signal support battalion, 

suitably stru ctured for its spedal mission. \\'a5 approved for deploy-
1l,\CKGROUNJ) ANI) n EG INNINGS 9 

BlI.1.1l0AII.D ANTENN .... S 01" T i lt: BACK P ORCH SYSTEM AT PHU LAM I N 1962. 

011 10/) of the 60-foot il"Ol)Osphcric scatter (lntel'l1ws are the smaller 

{mte,IIWI for mobilt! com val efl"ilJlluml tlwt providcli fhc "fai/s," 0'-

c:clClIsiorlS. 

ment to Vietnam to opera te the B ACK P ORCH system. It woul d also 

operate shorter range "tails," or extensions, serving sca llered users, 

and provide service such as telephone and message communications for the U.S. forces supporting the Vietnamese. In addition, 

the battalion would give communications suppOrt and train ing to 

South Vielllamese armed forces. 

In J an uary 1962 the U.S. Air Force awarded a contract to furnish and install B ACK P ORCII. The system would consist of va ns 

containing tropos pheric scalle!' terminals capable of transmitting 

and rece ivi ng up to seventy-two voice channels simultaneously. 

T he links of the system would extend from the Army's Saigon stalion at Ph l! Lam to Nha Trang; from Nha Trang to Qu i Nhan ; 

from Qui Nilan to Da Nang in the nort h: from Nha Trang 10 

Pl eiku in the Central I-lighlands; and h'eSt from Pleiku to a termi· 

nal in Ubon, Thailand. (See Mal) 2.) 

Although these largc troposphcric scatter terminals, each of 

which was mounted in three large semitrailers, were designed for 

transportable operat ion. their 3D-foot mobile antennas could not 

be used because of lhe relatively grea t path lengths. More effective 
10 CO;\I;\I U N leA TIONS-ELECTRO:.lICS 

and permanent were the GO· foot antennas, set in concrete and resembling billboards, that wcrc constructed instead. The system 

began servi ce in September 1962 whe n the BACK PORCU lin k between Saigon and Nha Trang was activated. At the same time the 

U.S. Army's 39th Signal Ballalion. headquartered at T an Son 

Nhm, assumed responsibility for the o peration of the system even 

though it had not been fully tested and accepted. 

Th e )9111 Sigtlal Battalion 

The 39th Signal Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colone l 

LOLliS B. Blackwell began to Teach Vietnam in February 1962, and 

hy mid.summer the entire battalion had arrived. It had an authorized slrcnglh of O\'cr 1.000 men, consisting of a headquarters detachmelll and three numbered comp'lni es, The mission of the battalion was to operate and maintain the BACK POIlCH system; the 

extensions, or tails, to the backbone system, usi ng mobile teams 

and equipment: all telephone switchboard exchanges; and communi ca tions meSs.lge celllers in the country at that time. The 39th 

Signal Batta lio n was also responsihle for tel ephone direclOry and 

information service; photographic service, including film .. nd 

equipment exchange ; motor and air cOllrier message service; cryptographic distl'ibution service and mailllenance suppOrt for all U.S. 

Army and South Vielllamese units in Vietnam; signal maintenance 

support; and operation of the U,S, Army Signal Supply Point. The 

battalion was assigned to the U.S. Army Support Croup, Vietnam, 

which, as the Army componclll command in Vie tnam, came under 

the operational control of Li eutenant General Paul D. Harkins, 

the senior commander in Vietnam. 

As the clements of the battalion arrived, they were immediately 

cornmi lt ed, installing and operati ng communications services for 

all U,S, (l rce ~ in Vietn'ulJ. The 2~12d Signal Company was deployed 

in the Sa igon and Mekong Delta areas to provide communications 

support to all the forces located there, That su pport included operati on of manual telephone exchanges, message communica ti ons 

centers, high-frequency radio teletype and voi ce termi nals, and 

wils of the hack bone system. The l 78th Signa l Company, working 

Ollt of Da Na ng in the north, provided similar arca communications suppOrt in the I and II Corps Tactica l Zones located in the 

northern ptll't of South Vietnam. 

The :ifi2d Signal Company, whi ch was organized to operate the 

long-l ines tropos pheric scaller system, established its headqual'lcrs 

at Nha Trang in centra l Vietnam and immediately began deployment of its highly mobile tropospheric scauer terminals, or which 
BACKGROUND AND BEG INN INGS II 

,0 .. --

SICNALMEN OPERATINC MOBILE f\'[ANUAI, S WITCHBOARD IN 1962 

six were sen t to Thailand. These six terminals were put into operation in January 1963 by the 362d Signal Company to furnish 

long-l ines support to the J oint U.S. J'vtilitary Advisory Group. 

Thailand: they were transferred to the 207th Signal Company in 

Thailand duri ng December 1963. Ten of the remaining fourteen 

terminals were put into operation in Vietnam supplying tails hom 

the B ACK P ORCH system between Oa Na ng and Hue, Oa Na ng and 

Quang Ngai, Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot, Saigon and Soc Trang. 

and Saigon and Can Tho. The Can Tho terminal was moved to 

Vinh Long in mid-1963. Regarding these early efforts. a brief history of the 39th Signal Battalion states: "Hardships were shared by 

all, orlen in insecure areas with .. Viet Cong harassment. 

Speed was [the] order or the day and despite [rather poor] conditions, lhe men of the 39th. throughout the Republic of Vietnam, 

had begun the installation of the system." 

The 39th Signal Battalion, meanwhile. was assuming more 

tasks. In May 1962 the baualion was charged with operating and 

mai ntaining the U.S. advisers' voice radio net. Later in December 

1962 it assumed opera tional responsibility for the countrywide 
12 CO:\I M UN ICA TIONS-ELECTRONICS 

INSTALLING INFLATA8U:: ANTESNA FOR A MODILE RAOIO TROI'OSPHERtC 

SCATTER TERMINAL 

U.S. advisory Operations and Intelligence Radio Net down to elemenLS located at South Vietnamese division level. The battalion 

received an augmentation of over 200 soldi ers from the Military 

Assistance Advisory Grollp. Vietnam, to operate this network. In 

order to supervise the battalion's widespread opera tions, located at 

thirty·two sites throughout South Vietnam, a System Control was 

established. The System Control staff also planned and engineered 

proposed systems. 

Control and Direction Over Communications 

Early in 1962 the staff of the Commander in Chief, Pacific. believing that the buildup in Vietnam required centralized control 

and management of long-distance communications into, out of, 

and within the Republic of Vietnam, recommended to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in Washing'tOn that the responsibility for the operation of the Army's worldwide communications "gateway" station 
HACKGROUND AND BEGI NNINGS 13 

in Saigon at Phu Lam be transferred from the control of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, back to Department of 

the Army and in turn to United States Army, Pacific. As it later 

developed, th is concept required that the station continue to pro· 

vide message communications support to the advisers in Vietnam 

and that it be attached to the 39th Signal Battalion. As a result, in 

September 1962 the station, consisting of 131 officers and men. was 

assigned to U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, and in addition 

was attached to the 39th Signal Baltalion for operational cOntro!. 

The station had previously become pan of the worldwide Defense Communications System after the establishment of the De· 

fense Communications Agency on 12 :May 1960. In 1962 the mid· 

range plan of the Defense Communications Agency assigned 

responsibility for tbe Defense Communications System in Vietnam 

to the U.S. Army. Yet techn ical control and direction of this sta· 

tion became increasingly subject over the years to the Defense 

Communications Agency. 

The over-all control and direction of communications in Vietnam was vested in the U.S. joint communications·electronics staff 

in Saigon. Direction was provided to the 39th Signal Battalion 

from that staff office through the Army component Signal Officer, 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Suppon Group, Vietnam. The com· 

manding officer of the 39th Signal Battalion had dual responsibilities during th is period and was referred to as being "dual·hatted." 

He Il'as both battalion commander and the U.S. Army's Vietnam 

signal staff officer. 

improvements, Problems, and Plans to Mid·1964 

During 1963 and early 1964 U.S. Army Signalmen continued to 

operate and improve the communica tions system installed in 1962 

and early 1963. An additional mobile tropospheric sca tter link was 

installed, connecting Ban Me Tilliet in the Central Highlands to 

the small town of Gia Nghia in west central Vietnam near the famous Due Lap Special Forces Camp. By mid·1 964 a similar link 

was established between Gia Nghia and Saigon. Thus twenty·four 

channels of communications, passing over these nell' links and the 

one previously established between Ban Me Thuot and Pleiku, 

were available from Saigon to Pleiku in the Central Highlands. 

This three·link system became knoll'n as CROSSBOW. (Map 2) 

A major improvement in the ca pability to relay messages into 

and OUt of the Department of Defense's worldwide network was 

made in January 1961 upon activation of a 50·line message relay 

facility operated by Strategic Army Communications Sta tion, Viet· 
14 

.. ....... 

j 

i 

i 

\ ....... .. 

THAILAND<") 

WI!;" . 5' 

, 

CO~I M UNICA TI QNS- ELECTRONICS 

NPRTH 

VIETNAM ~ 

BACK PORCH SYSTEM AND 'TAILS" 

M 10.19(,. 

\ ... ~.~"'''' ........ .~ 

l A 

• 001 NI(IN 

C AMBODIA 

, 

. Cl C 

, 

• 

MAP. 2 

nam, personnel at Phu Lam. Message traffic handled by the station 

steadil y increased during the 1962- 1963 buildup. In J anuary 1962 

the stati on processed over 35,000 messages. The lOlal increased to 

over 117,000 in October 1963 and to mOTe than 185,000 a month 
BACKGROUND ANI) BEGINN I NGS 15 

hy mid-1964, Furthermore, the first circui t capable of passi ng lowspeed data traffic was activated over the radio links of the Strategic 

Army Communications Station, Vietnam, connecting Saigon and 

the large Army logistical base in Okinawa. 

The station also activa ted modern high·powered high-frequency 

transmitter equipment at Phu Lam and receiver equipment at Ba 

Queo, both on the outskins of Saigon, to replace o lder equipment 

which had provided radio trunks into the worldwide Defense Communications System. These improvements were not made without 

difficulty. For example. when the transmitters were installed in a 

new building at Phu Lam. their weight caused the Aoor to sink 

into the marshy earthfil1. To cope wit h wa ter seepage the building 

had to be expanded and modifi ed. The new facilities improved the 

quality of communi ca tions consisting. by early 1963, o f 16 message 

and 3 voice channels operating on the high-frequency rad io trunk 

to Okinawa. 16 message and 3 voice channels to the Philippines, 

and 12 message and 3 voice channels to Thai land. 

A new Sa igon overseas swi tchboard was install ed at Phu Lam 

to improve long-distance tel ephone service. This manual switchboard had positions fOI" four operators. However, even with this 

improvement. there were diffi culti es in placing overseas calls because or the lim ited reliability of high-frequency radio, particularly whe n operat ed in Southeast Asia. Accordi ng to a history of 

the Phu Lam Signal Battalion, "The switchboard logs consistentl y 

included entries such as 'Out,' 'out to fair,' 'poor to fair,' and 'alit 

all day.''' By the end of October 1963 the switchboard was averaging thirty-three overseas calls a day, while later, at its peak in 

1968-1970. over 1,500 ca lls were processed each day. 

Tile Commander in Chier, Pacific. recogn izing the lim itations 

of these radio systems, had pro posed as early as June 1961 a wide· 

band system to furnish high q uality communica ti ons throughout 

the Western Pacific defense line. The system would interconnect 

Korea. Ja pan. Ok inawa, T aiwa n. the Philippines, South Vietnam, 

and Thailand. 1t would alw link up with commercial undersea cables to provide circuits from Hawai i to Japan and the Phi lippines. 

T he part of the system between the Philippines and Vi etnam 

would consist of a 55·mile microwave system between Clark Air 

Force Base and San Miguel in the Ph ilippines; an 800-mil e subma· 

rine cable between San Miguel and !\I ha Trang in SOllth Vietnam ; 

and a tropospheric sca tter radio link connecting Nha Trang with 

Sa igon. The Air Force. wh ich was responsible for establ ishing the 

system, awarded the contract for construction in November 1963. 

This system, called WET \VASH, which was not completed until 
16 COM M UN l e A T IONS-ELECTRONICS 

J anuary 1965, had a capacity of sixty voice channels from Southeast Asia to the Philippines. The Air Force was then charged with 

operating the system from the Philippines to Nha Trang; the 

Army was responsib le for operation of the tropospheric sca ller link 

between Nha Trang and Saigon. 

Since communica lions with Thailand also needed improvement, a 24-ch2nl1e1 tropospheric scattef system was proposed early 

in the 19605 to be install ed between Sa igon and Bangkok. The 

Army was made resIX'nsible for this 450-mile single-hop system, 

with Phi lco-Ford Corporation as the construction contractor. 

When activated in mid-1963, the system did not perform welJ because the distance proved too grea t for operation over the p.1.th between the origi nal site locations. It was re·engineered with terminals loca ted at a site ca ll ed ve Hill , southeast of Sa igon near Vung 

Tau, in Vietnam, and a camp at Gree n Hill, north of Bangkok, in 

Thailand. This revamped system, scheduled for compl etion by 

September 1965, the world's longest single·hop tropospheric scatter 

system at the time, became operational in December 1965. 

For a while in the early 1960s optimism ran high at General 

Paul D. Hark ins' joim headquarters, in am ic ipation of an early 

end to hostilities. For example, a telecommunications plan of June 

1963 called for phasing out the Army's 39th Signal Battalion. This 

plan, which was modified by the staff of the Commander in Chief, 

Pac ific, Admiral l'larry D. Felt, and la ter approved by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, envisaged that the communications opera ted by the 

Army would be turned over to the Republic of Vietnam. By the 

end of 1963 the 39th Signal Battalion was training South Vietnamese troops to operate its mobile rad io relay equ ipment. Pl ans 

which had assumed that the Viet Cong could be eliminated by the 

end of 1964 provided the basis for communications efforts up to 

mid· 1964. But they were precluded by events which drastically 

changed the requirements for communications in Southeast Asia. 
CHAPTER II 

Military Intensifies Communications 

Activities, 1964-1965 

Before the 39th Signal Battalion could make much progress toward training Vietnamese communications personnel, optimistic 

plans looking toward an early military solution of the war werc 

h'l"ccked by current eVents. In November 1963, South Vietnam's 

first president, Ngo Dinh Diem, was assassinated and his government ovenhrown. There roll owed a series of rapidly changi ng governments, producing a Slale of disorganization that seriously weakened the South Vi et namese efforts against the Viet Congo 

Meanwhile, in early 1964, Hanoi decided to infiltrate North Vietnamese Regular Army troops into South Vietnam to defeat lhe disorganized and confused South Vietnamese. Hanoi also started to 

equip the Viet Cong with modern automatic weapons. 

The Tonkin GuJ£ incidents of early August 1964 marked the 

first direct engagements between Nonh Vietnamese and U.s. 

forces and, according to General William C. 'Vest morela nd, "rep· 

resented a cruc ial psychological turning point in the course of the 

Vietnam War." By December 1961 the Nonh Vietnamese had 

infiltrated no less than 12,000 troops, including a North Vietnamese 

Army regiment, into South Vietnam. /H the same time a Viet Cong 

division had been organ ized and was engaged in combat operations. 

In order to bolster the faltering SOllth Vietnamese forces, the 

United States deploycd additional advisers and support units. The 

Republic of South Vietnam forces were incrcased by 11 7,000 men 

dUl"ing 1961, attaining a strength of over 514,000. Their effective· 

ness, however, decreased markedly. Through the last half of that 

year U.S. troop strength increased rapidly. The number was approximately 16,000 in June of 1964 when General Westmoreland 

assumed the responsibilities of Commander, United States Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam. By the year's end, U.S. troops in 

Vietnam numbered about 23.000. 
18 CO~ ;\I U~ l eA ON~- t; LECTRQN ICS 

Satellite CommlmiCQtiorlS Come to Viettwm 

The inadeq uacy and unreliability of the meager radi o circuits 

linking Vietnam with Hawaii and Washington became painfully 

evident duri ng the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incidents. In the fi rst 

week uf August the engagement o f U.S. Navy vessels by Nort h Vietnamese IOrpcdo boats rcsull ed in a flllrr y of telephone calls and 

messages between Saigon and Washington. The long-haul high-frequcnq rad io circuits, hampered hy severe sunspot activit), and occasional tra nsmitter failure in Saigon, were simply n Ot capabl e of 

('arrying the load. The WET WASil ca hl e project, which would subsequelllly bri ng highly reliable services into Southeast Asia, was 

not yet complete. 

An cxperi mental satellite grou nd termina l. with an opera ting 

team under \Varralll Oflicer J ack i-I. inman, was rushed to Vietnam to bolster communi ca tions ca p..1.bilities. The termi nal, which 

pro\,jded one telephone and one teletype circuit to Hawa ii , be· 

came opera tional in late August 1964. Signals \Vere re layed from 

Saigon to Hawaii through a communica tions satellite launched 

into a stationary orbit some 22,000 sta tute mil es above the Pacific 

Ocean. Th is experimen tal synchronolls communica tions sa tel lite 

system, dubbed SYNCO~ t. was the first lise of satellite communications in a combat lone. The sa tel1itc grou nd terminal in Vi etnam, 

which was o perated by the U.S. Army's Stra tegic Communica tions 

Command, provided the earliest reliable communications of high 

quality into and out of Vietnam. 

The SYNCOM satell itc communica tions service was improved 

in October 1964 with a newer tcrminal that providcd one lelephone and sixtcen message circu its. Thcse "space age" communications means immedia tely proved their worth. The Command His· 

tory, 1961. of the Uni ted Statcs Milita ry Assista nce Command, 

Victnam, stales: "Sill<-c October the ... [satell it c tcrminal] has 

hand led It remarkable \olumc of opcraliona l traffic." And further: " It appears that S<1. tcllite commu nications arc here to stay and 

will increasc MACV [,\Iil itary Assistancc Command, Vietnam] 

capability in the futurc." 

System Problems, Fllrlher Pia liS, alld C011lroi Mailers 

Communica ti ons deficiencies within Vietnam became more apparent as the hard'pressed signalmen strugglcd to provide the com· 

muni cations se rvice required by the new bui ldup. As early as mid1963 it was recognizcd lha t the si nglc 72-chan nel tropospheric 

scatter link bel ween Saigon and Nha Trang did nOt have sufficient 
.\IILITARY COMMUNICATIONS INTENSIFIED 19 

FUtST SATELLITE TERMINAL, B A QUEO, NEAR SAICON. This station /inked 

Vietnam with Hawaii in first lise of satellite commlm;calioTlS in a 

combat zone. 

capacity to pass the required traffic from Nha Trang, where two 

other 72-channel systems from Pleiku and Qui Nhon converged for 

interconnections to the soutb. The BACK PORCH sites had been 

chosen as a compromise between the ease of maintaining site protection and securing tbe radio propagation characteristics required 

for operation. As a result some links performed poorly, the poorest 

link being the saturated one between Sa igon and Nba Trang. 

Another shortcoming of the long-lines systems which steadily 

became morc apparent was the lack of adequate fac ilities to control, ten, and interconnect circuits, that is, the lack of technical 

control facilities at the channel breakout or switch locations such 

as Nha Trang. Pleiku, and Qui Nhon. Colonel Thomas W. Riley. 

Jr., who was the U.S. Army, Vietnam, Signal Officer in 1965, later 

recalled: " It was ironical that such big costly refined ... links 

as ... provided at Pl ciku- in\'olving a .. [multimillion dollar] 

installation connecting Nha Trang to the east with ... [Ubon, 

Thai land] to the west-came together at Pleiku in a shed." As 
20 COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

more and more tails using mobile equipment were installed, 

branching off the BACK PORCH commercial grade system. various 

technical difficulties were encountered. Among these were differences in the voice channel electrical current levels where the cir-

('uits interconnected, and differences in the signaling Frequencies 

that are employed to ring the telephone of the distant person who 

~ being called. Without adequate technical control faci lities at the 

circuit interconnecting points it was difficult to "match" electrically 

the incompatible equipment. Also, where circuits had to be reo 

routed or activated in support of fast-moving operations. the inadequate technical control facilities could not respond rapidly. 

Furthermore, the mobile equipment was not designed to operate 

at the low noise levels associated with more sophisticated high quality "commercial" grade systems. These differences of channel levels, 

system noise levels, and ringing frequencies, and the lack of adequate technical control facilities all made for a system of degraded 

quality. Since high-speed data can pass only over high quality communications systems, it was becoming increasingly important to 

provide noiseless, error-free circuitS SO that data traffic could be 

accurately received at the distant end. 

As a result of both these technica l problems and the requirements generated by the buildup, the Commander in Chief. Pacific, 

by October 1964 had validated requirements to the J oint Chiefs of 

Staff for additional communications service. These requirements 

became known as Phase I or the Integrated Wideband Communications System. A wideband communications system as described 

in the Mil itary Assistance Command Vietnam History of 1965 is 

"a communications system which provides numerous channels of 

communication on a highly reliable basis; included are multichannel telephone cable, troposcatter, and multi-channel line of 

sight radio systems such as microwave." 

This commun ica tions project would include the establish ment 

of a BACK PORCH type of system in Thailand. The Vietnam portion as visualized by the planners would provide support for up to 

40,000 U.S. troops by upgrading the existing fixed tropospheric 

scatter communications; by improving service in the Saigon area; 

by e'itablishing an additional link north to bYP.1SS the system between Saigon and Nha Trang, extending additional channels north 

from the Saigon area and from the Da lang area still further 

north to Phu Rai; and by installing adequate technical control faci lities throughout the system. 

By December 1964 the Defense Communications Agency had 

prepared a plan and forwarded it through the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
.\IlLITARl' COMMUN ICATIONS INTENSIFI ED 21 

to the Secretary of Defense for approval. According to this plan 

the wideband sySlem would become a pan of the Defense Communications System under a Defense Communications Agency control 

center located in Saigon. The alllhority to validate CUSLOmer requirements for the use of circuits was vested with the communications-electronics staffs of the U.S. military assiSlance commands in 

Vietnam and Thailand. 

The Department of Defense. while the plan was being studied, 

decided to use permanent. fixed installations rather than large 

transportable shelters for the system. This decision would require 

wnstruction of buildings and other facilities in Southeast Asia to 

house the equipment. The decision was made on the basis that 

time was the critical factOr-the system was needed right thenand the COntractOrs were promising that the system could be operational one year after contract award if commercial equipment and 

prefabricated buildings were used. The use of "transportables," 

that is, commercial equipment installed in large vans similar to the 

equipment used on BACK PORCH. was considered; it was estimated. 

however, that transportables would require more time to manufacture and PUt into operation than a fixed system and that they 

wou ld be more cost! y. 

The plan ca lled for the system LO be operationa l by I Decem· 

bel' 1965, an early date that proved altogether lOO optimistic. For 

example, the plan was not approved (or contracting action lImil 

the Depanment of Defense approved it as a "Telecommunica tions 

Program Objective" in August 1965. The U.S. Army, which was 

designated as the contracting agency, awarded the contract for the 

Vietnam portion of the system to Page Communications Engineers, 

Inc" in September 1965. The system would be operated by the 

U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, which was originally activated on I April 1962 by combining the U.S. Army Signal Engineering Agency and the U.S. Army Communications 

Agency. This was in line with its mission as the Army's single operator of those portions of the worldwide Defense Communications 

System assigned as an Army responsibility. 

Organizational and control arrangemems changed during this 

period. The U.S. Army Support Croup. Vietnam. was redesignated 

as the U.S. Army Support Command. Vietnam, in March 1964, 

when the dual-hat sta tus of the Army component command signa l 

officer also changed. Previollsly, he had served bOlh as the Army 

Support Group Signal Officer and as the Commanding Officer, 

39th Signal Battalion. Ihll following the reorganization, the posi. 

tions were allocated se parately; according to personnel lists of 
22 COM M UN ICA TIONS- ELECTRONICS 

March 1964, Lieutenam Colonel Earl R_ Velie became Signal 

Officer of the Army Support Command and Major Leo T. White 

became Commanding Oniv'r, 39th Signal Battalion. 

Also in 1964 the command and control arrangements (or the 

big Strategic Army Commu nications Sta tion, Vietnam, were af· 

fected by the creation and expansion of the U.S. Army Strategic 

Communications Command and its Pacific subcommand headquartered in Hawaii. In November 1964 the station was redesignated 

Sirategic Communications Facility, Vietnam, and at about Ihe 

same time control of the facility passed from U.S. Army Support 

Command, Viell1am, lO U,S. Army Stra tegic Communicat ions 

Command, Pacific. These changes in 1964 marked the beginning 

of a division of control over Army communica tions in Vietnam between the Army Strategic Communications Command and the 

Army component command signal troops. 

By the spring of 1965 the combat situation had deteriorated 

further. The casualties of the South Vietnamese Army were 

mounting to the point that the equivalent of almost one infantry 

battalion a week was being lost. In :\Iarch the Unilt~d States sent 

Army airborne and l\larine combat troops to defend U.S. air bases 

in Vietnam against enelll)' altack. In order lO support these forces, 

it was necessary to deploy a logistica l command and other combat 

support troops. An addi tional signal unit, the 41st Signal Ballal· 

ion. and Headquarters. 2d Signal Group. were alerted for movemelll to Vietnam. 

By mid· 1965 it had been decided lO commi t substantial numbers of U.S. fighting troops along wit h other rom \)at support 

organizations. The emphasis was on the introduction of infantr)" 

armor, and artiller), elements. As General \Vestllloreland relates in 

his repon on the war in Vietnam: "There were inadequa te ports 

and airfields. no logistic OI'ga ni z;nion. and no su pply. tra nsportation. or mai ntena nce troops. None the less, in the face of the grave 

laclical situat ion, I decided 10 accept combat troops as rapidl), as 

they could be made available and to improvise their logistic support."' U)' the end of 1965 U.S. strength in Viemam stood at 

184,000 men. 

Till! 2d Signal Grolll) Arrives 

The first of the additional Signal Corps troops to reach Vietnam was the advance party of Headquarters, 2d Signal Group. 

wmma ndcd by Colonel James J. ~Ioran. which arrived from Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, in Ma)' 1965. Five comp,lnies of the 41st 
MtLlTARY COMMUNICATtONS t:\'TENStFtEf) 23 

Signal Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James C. Pel· 

land, arrived in late June, and the rest of the baltalion was in 

Vietnam by 14 July 1965. A se parate company, the S93d Signal 

Compan y, arrived in Saigun on ~ Jul y 1905. By mid.Jul y the 2d 

Signal Croup had reached an au thorized strength of abollt 2,900 

officers and men. 

The 2d Signal Croup. upon its arrival, ass umed command of th e 

39th Signal Battalion, taking over in fact all the missions previously assigned that baualion, such ::IS the tasks of providing signa l 

maintenance support and operation of the signal supply system in 

Vietnam. Later, th ese suppl y and maintenance missions were 

turned over to the 1st Logistica l Command. Upon acquiring its 

second signal unit, the 4 1st Signal Battalion, in mid·1965, the 2d 

Signal Gro up made it responsible for all area comm unicati ons in 

the nort he rn half of th e Republic of Vietnam in th e I and II 

Corps Tactical Zones, while assign ing responsibility to the 39th 

Signa l Ballalion for th e sou thern half of Vietnam in the II I and IV 

Corps Tac tica l Zones. The 362d Sign::ll Compan y \\'as also pl<l ced 

directl y under the 2d Signal Group to operate the tropospheric 

scatter system throughout th e country. The group \\'a5 assigned to 

U.S. Army Support Command, Vi etnam, <lnd subsequently to U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, when the latter was established on 20 July 1965, 

replacing th e SuppOrt Command. The U.S. Army. Vietnam, was 

also commanded by General \Vestmoreland , who served concurrentl y as Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

These new Regul ar Army signal IInits immediate ly went to 

work to improve the ex isting communi cations a nd establ ish communications fo r new base areas. For exampl e, by mid-Jll ly mobil e 

equipment was provided to su pport the new logistical base bei ng 

established a t Cam Ran h Ba),. A 12·\'oi<-e channel radio relil)' link 

was installed to connect Cam Ranh with Nha Trang. A one-posi-

[ion tactical swi tchboa rd was pu t into operati on , a mobile communica tions message center was installed, and high-powered radios 

linked Cam Ranh into r<ld io nets in Vietnam. In just a few weeks 

the small switchboard at Cam Ranh had to be replaced with another mobile manual board tha t was much larger- a 3.position 

switchboa..d ca pable of servi ng 200 subscribers. Microwave teallls 

with mobile eq uipment had arrived in N ha T rang to start installalion of a 45-channel mi crowave link between Cam Ranh Bay a nd 

N ha T rang. By the e nd of October 1965 arrangements had been 

made to sh ip II fixed-pl<l nt. automatic dial telephone exc hange to 

Cam Ranh Bay. The fixed a utoma tic dial telephone eq uipment 
24 CO;" I M U:o.' IC.' TIO:\'S· t:LECTR.O:"'ICS 

M AN, PACK ED RADIO OI'£RATED BY CO~II\ AT SICNALMAN I N 1965 

required a dus(·frcc, hUlllidity-controlled environmellt for operation. hence special building construction was reqllired. 

Colonel Moran 's 2d Signa l Group was also busily engaged in 

providing communications suppon to the combat tToopS, both to 

those that ,,'ere already in Vietnam and to those that were being 

sent to tb e cOllmry. The grollp was alened on 12 August 19U5 to 

provide communica tions suppon to the fam ous 173d Airborne Brigade for an important ViclIlam hi ghl'lIlds operation in the Pl c iku 

area . The next day th e necessary equipment and Signal Corps 

troops were airl ifted to Pl ciku , and by evening on 14 August comIllunica ti ons gOt imo operation, linking the 173d 's operating area 

into the large fixed backbone system a t Pl c iku. 

Equipment and pe rsonnel also had lO be redistributed to sup' 

port arriving units. During the week or 15-21 August, twemy.four 

IOns of signal equipment were moved to the I and II Corps Tactical Zones by special airlirt, wh il e an additional twem y·e ight tons 

werc awaiting movement. By earl y September 1965 U.S. Army, 

Victnam, h:ld establ ished priori ti es for providing communi ca ti ons 

support th roughout th e country. First priority would go to the 
\lILlTAR Y CO:'>I i\I U!\'ICATIO:-":S 1:-":'1 t:;..'<; IFI l-: n 25 

tombat lIn its, se~o lld to comhat support clements, and third 10 

logistic and admi nistrative clements. 

Command (md COlltrol Anmlgemc11tJ 

During this period General Westmoreland's joint headquarters 

was esta blishing and refining command c.;Olllrol anangemcnts in 

Vietnam. The final arrangemelll provided that the Commander, 

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam , exercise taClical con· 

trol over the U.S. forces through the 111 ;"'farine Amphibious 

Force in the northern I Corps Tactical Zone, through the I Field 

force in the II Corps Tactical Zone, and through the II Ficld 

Force in the III Corps Tactical Zone. BOIh fi eld force headquarters 

were modified U.S. Army Corp" headquarters. A senior U.S. 

a(h'iser was responsihle for ('olllrolling and co·ordi nating U.S. 

advisory and support troop efforts in the IV Corps Tactica l Zone. 

The Seventh Air f orce COlli roll ed all U.S. Air Force units. while 

United States Army, Vi etnam, controlled all Army support and logistical units. The I Field Force, initiall y designated Task Force 

Alpha, was activated in August 1965, II Ficld Force headquarters 

during the spring of 1966. 

When Task Force Alpha W;IS activated in August, no signal organiza tion to uppOrt it in cClllra l Vietnam W:IS available. Interim 

communica tions support was provided for Task Force Alpha, head· 

quart ered a l Nha Trang. by the 2d Signal Group. But on 15 Se ptember 1965 the organic 54 th Corps Signal Battalion of Task 

Force Alpha started (0 arrive and hy 1 October began to relieve 

the 2d Signal Group. The fi nal elements of the 54th closed into 

Vietnam in October, thus freei ng the overtaxed communicators of 

the 2d Signal Group to work in other areas in Vietnam. Initial 

communiCil ti ons support for II Fi cld Force at I,ong- Binh, fifleen 

miles northwest of Saigon, also had to be provided by the 2d Signal GrollI' during the spring of 1966 umil the 53d Signal Battal· 

ion arrived to provide the needed support. 

Addiliolwl CommUlIica/io1l5 Con/rol Elements Ellt er Vietnam 

Changes were be ing made , meanwhile, in higher level commu· 

nica tions control. direction, and operations responsi bilities. In line 

with plans for the integrated wideba nd system thaI called for 

establishment of a Defense Communications Agency center in 

Vietnam, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the ma nning 

of lhe Defense Communica tions Agency, Suppon Center. Sa igon, 

on 29 April 1965. The support centcr would provide "system con-
26 CO:'I;\1 U:'; ICA TION\-FU:CTRO:-: C.~ 

1rol and engineering support" to hOlh the military assistance command in Vietnam and that in Thailand. The center itself would 

:llsn he subj ect to the allthoril), of Defense Communications 

Agency, Southeast A~ia Region, located at Clark Air Force Base in 

the Philippines. The first SuppOrt Center elements arrived in Vietnam during May 19G5. In early JlIl1e U.S. Military Assistance 

CUlllrnand. Vietnam, assigned to th e (;cntcr additional tasks, including operational direction and restoration authority for all Dcfe nse CommunicatiOIiS tircuits in Vietnam. The Vietnam (jrcu ilS 

included Lilose 11.1.ssing over th e BACK PORCII system, which would 

be imcgralcd into th e new wideband syHcm as pan of the world· 

wide Ddense Communications Systcm. This new mission also reo 

quircd that the Defense Communications Agency clement in Viet· 

nam supervise and restore defense circuits which pa ssed over the 

llIohil e tails, down to and intluding the subscri bers' instrument, 

COlllrolled by the Army component signal troops under the 2d Signal Group. 

In September 1965 the Defense CommunicaLions Agency, Support Center. Saigon, was redesignated Defense Communications 

Agency, Southeast Asia Mainland Regioll. As a pan of the Defense 

Communications Agency organi7ational stnlctllre, the region came 

under the Pacilic area office located in Hawaii. By the end of 1965 

th e strength of the Southeast Asia i\lainland Region had grown 

from eight men to 100. 

In i\lay 19G5 Depanment of the Arm)' directed that those facilities and personnel which would become a P.'UI of the Defense 

Communications System be transferred from U.S. Am1)'. l'ar ific, to 

the Army's Strategic Communications Command. This directive 

\\'as in line \\"ith the Str:uegit- COllllllunications COlllmand's mission to operate the Army's portion of the Defense Communications 

Systelll. In July E)(iS the command established an organiza tion to 

operate the backbone system in Southeast Asia, namely, the U,S. 

Al m)' Strategil Commlll1icatinl1s Command. Pacilic Southeast ASia, 

ItX'ill('cI in Saigon. Suhordinate clements 01 this nc\\' organization 

lI'ere formed in hoth Vietnam and Thailand and were cha rged 

with th e actual operati on of th e system. Elements of the comI1wncl's 11th Signal (;roup stationed at Fon I.ewis, \\'ashington , arrived in Vietnam in June 1965 to establish th e headquart ers of the 

Strategic C()IllllllLnitatiolls COTlllllalUI ill StHllheast Asia. Colonel 

Ilenl')' Schneider \\as designated as t ummander 01 all the Strategic 

Communications Command's troops in Southeast Asia, while Lieutenant Colonel Jerry J. Enders, who arrived with the unit from 

Fort Lewis, was designated to LOOlllland the Vietnam clement. Ar-
:-'IILlTARY COMMUNICATIONS II"TE:-lSIFIEIl 27 

rangemenu were made for turning over the DeFense Communications System fa cilities of the tropospheric scatter systems operated 

by tbe 2d Signal Group for BACK POII.CI-I and WE" WASil and those 

at Green Hill in Thailand and Saigon in Vietnam, 

Not until 19 August 1965 did the 2d Signal Group turn over to 

the Strategic Communica tions Command in Vietnam the responsibility for operation of these systems, along with the transfer of 121 

officers and men. These de"elopmcllls increased the command's 

problems and widened the split in Army communications operations in Vietnam between the Army's Strategic Communications 

Command's organizations and the area support signal units of the 

2d Signal Group under the Army component headquarters, U.S, 

Army, Vietnam. 

A like transfer occurred in Thailand, The U,S. Army's 379th 

Signal Battalion, whi ch had hee n organized in Thailand in April 

1965, assigned one officer and 71 enlisted men to the Strategic 

Communications Command element in Thailand in September 

19fi5, The 379th provided mobile communications SUh"'lrt to U.S. 

forces in Thailand similar to that provided by the 39th Signal BalI;tiion in Vietnam, 

The Army's Stralegic Communications Facility, Vietnam, can· 

tinued to remain directly under the Hawaii-based Stra tegic Communications Command, Pacific, headquarters until November 

1965, when the station was assigned to the Strategic Communications Command element in Vietnam and was redesigna ted U,S. 

Army Strategic Communicatiom Command Facility, Pllu Lam, 

This vital gateway station continued to handl e most of the communi c:uions passing into and OUt of Vietnam. The preponderance 

of the traffic flowed over the high quality circuits of the WET 

W"<; 11 undersea cable to the Philippines, 

E .. ulier at the Phu Lam facility, on 23 March 1965, the first 

manual data rela y center had been activated. At that time the data 

relay had three connecled stations, Clark Air Force Base in the 

Philippines, Tan Son Nhtlt Air Base on the oUlSkins of Saigon, 

and the Army's 27th Data Processing Unit in Saigon. The station 

rela yed 11,000 ca rds on iLS first day of operation. At the end of 

1965 the station was processing approximately 400,000 cards per 

lIIomh from seven connected Stations. 

Early in 1965 the Phu Lam message re lay with its twenty-fl\'e 

active circuits also was processi ng over 250,000 messages per 

month. By September the station began to experience extreme difficuhy in handling the message tranic. The backlog of service messages became critical when at times up to 1,000 were a\\'aiting ac· 
2H CO:-' , 1\[ lI:>< ICATI O~S- EI.ECT O:" ICS 

lion . Because o f the dClCrioralin g siwation ,H Phil Lam. the o n ly 

Defense Comm unications System message relay facil ity in Vietnam, 

an interim tape rela y lac ility, using large tra nsportable vans capabl c of tcrmin;'lling cigh!ccn circuits. was d eplo ycd to Viet na m. 

These Strategi c Communica tions Comma nd m nt ingency or emergency assets, which arrived in ;'\:ha Trang on 25 OClo ber. were 

operational hy 3 NO\'cmber 1965. By the close of the yea r these 

two major message relays at Sa igon and Nha T rang were processing o\'er half a million messages per mOlHh out of and imo Vie tnam over circu its of the Defense Commun ica tions System. 

MOl"e M obile Radio, More Fixed Radio, and Cable 

As morc troops were deployed th roughout the Republic of 

Vietnam , it became appa relll that the existing B ACK P ORCH system 

and the planned illlegra tcd \ Videband Communica tions System 

coul d 11 0( support the criti cal ci rc u it needs in Vie tna m. Contingency tra nsportable ~s he ri c scatter equipment was provided 

to Vi etn am begin n ing in March 1965 \\·hen six Army mobile terminals arrived. These were used to establish additional circuits 

north from Saigon to Pleiklt th rough a singl e relay poin t situa ted 

ncar th e summit of the 7,000-foot mountain, Niu L'mg Bian, 

whi ch stood a few miles to the north of Da lal in the sout h central 

highla nds. In itia ll y insta ll ed as a 24-channel system, its ca pacity 

wa s increased in late slimmer LO fo rt y-e ight \'oice channels when 

two termi nals of another system were redeployed to provide the 

addi tional cha nnel izing eq uipment. 

Six larger troposphe ric scatter termina ls simil ar to those of the 

U II CK P ORCH system were a lso deployed and opera tiona l by th e end 

of 1965. Using theiT tra nsport abl e antennas these terminals established twellt y-four voice channel links betwee n Ple iku and Da 

;\lang, Vu ng Tall and Cilm Ra nI! Ba y, il nd between Dil Na ng and 

Ubon, T hailand. These systems, along with other ta ils prov ided by 

the 2d Signa l Croup, had added approxima tely 35,000 vo ice channel miles to the Vietnam communications system dUTing th e last 

ha lf of 1965. (tH ai) J) :\one of these statistics on facilit ies. howe"er. incl uded the numerous systems instal led by the 2d Signal 

Croup in direct suppOrt of comba t operations. 

Furthermo re. Ihe mobile systems were all stopga p measures. 

Add itional circui ts of th e fixed type \\·ere required to sup port the 

exp.1 nd ing clrort. particularly for the low priority logistica l forces 

and their complex widespread operations. By the end of 1965, the 

U.S. joint headq uarters in Sa igon had fo rwarded th ree require-
MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS INTE:\'SIFIEO 29 

MOIIH.t: TROPOSPH ERIC SCATTER ANTENNA ON NIII L A:-':C UlAN NEAR 

DALAT was installed (llId defended by U.S. Army Siglla/men in lale 1965. 

ments packages to the Commander in Chief. Pacific. which. as conce ived by the U.S. Iilit:lr y Assistan t:e Command and component 

communi ca ti ons planners, would provide the necessary long-lines 

support in Viemam. The fi rst package forwarded in OcLOber \\'as 

an addition to the programmed wideband system and was later 

called Integrated Wideband Comnlunil iuions SystCIll. Phase II: it 

was designed to support up to 200.000 troops. The second require. 

ments package, sent in November 1065, requested a coastal submarine cabl e system to supplement the int egrated wideband system. 

The third package. forwarded 10 the Commander in Chie f. Pacific, 

in December 1965, was designed to support up to 400,000 troops. 
30 CO;\1 1\1 U:-.' leA TlON <;·ELECTRONICS 

J7 

M Ul TIOIANNEl COMM UN 1CAT10N S 

IN VIETNAM WITH MAJO R 'TAliS' 

on IMIII R 1965 \ 

( 

( r 

j

' / --.:. ... ''' •• , . 

V · 

.; . -(, .-

THAILAND 

( 

J 

~'" 01 ,~~" ,," 

) 

\ 

.~ . 

0 

'-. 

" 

'"'\. ~ 

c It. MaO 0 I II 

0 •• , .. ~ ... ,., 

.. . .., .. . . -. '" 

~ ~I ;:" .: -'--'-'" .r" 

) ,,,'" 

........ . I ...... 

\l1I TNA~1 

__ ." .... ". " 0 ('''' ..... -''''''"''' " ., ." 

•• •••• 01' . ... "'". I ....... " 

---_. '''''''''14 """!I' "" __ 1"'I.>U1 "'~'''' h ,." 

MAP) 

( .... .. " 

,,"'''' . 

. ' 

This final major addition to th e int egra ted system was later called 

Integrated Wideband Communications System, Phase II I. The system wou ld provide commercial grade servi ce usi ng fixed-plant 

equipment and construction teChniques. 
M J LlTARY COM M UNl eA'llONS INTEj'.;~1 FI En 3 1 

More Buifdll/) arid Comllat Needs 

As the troop huildup cont inued, from late sum mer ullIil the 

e nd o f the year th e 2d Signal ( ;I'OIiP found it more and mure d ini· 

cult to prov ide eno ugh communica tions support. Uy Jul y there 

were three U,S, Army I'ombat brigades in Vit,tnam: th e 173d Air· 

bo rne Brigade, commanded hy Urigadier General Ellis W . W il· 

liamson, had arrived in ~Ia y 01 l!l(l:",; the ot her twu, th e lSI Bri· 

gade of Ih e IOlst Airilorne I) iv ioll ;mil til(' 2d Brigade of th t: I. I 

Infantry Division, had arrived in Jul y. U.S. and (Jl her Free World 

Military Assistance Forces began to arrive in di vision·size units 

a lo ng wi t!, all re{luired t()mn'lInicatillll~ SUPI)(II'l, The first 10m· 

plete U.S. Army di vision to rca"h Vietnam was the 1st Cavalry Di· 

vision , Airmobile, which arriv('d in Septemher 1965. The U,S, 

Army's 151 I nfalll ry Di visil m, \\'111 Ise I IJl1Imand('r .~ [1. 1;1 jllr (:('Ilcra I 

J onathan 0 , Seaman, th e Re public of Korea Capit:1I Di vision , a nd 

a Ko rean Mari ne hrigadc all arrived in October. Uy December th e 

lead e lemcllI, th e :id Hrigadc, o f th e U,S. Army's 25 th Infalllry Di· 

vision was in Vietnam, Although the planners were alloLling aU,S, 

Army comhat arca signal (OIllIl:IIl Y a nd .. sign.1I suppo rt (ompan y 

for each division,size rorce, these units \I'ere nOl in iti ally availahle, 

The signal troops already in Vietn am would ha ve to im provis(' th e 

needed support, Commun ica tions se rvice into th e sySlem or Viet· 

nam was provided by installing mobile nulifJ re la ) links (oJllH'(teo 

to th e backbone system. Only limited telephone and message ser vo 

icc (,Q uid be made avai lable. The di visions had to imlall and ope l" 

ate a good portion 01 their tOllllHunilatillll\, lI ~i ll g the url-::mi( 

capability o r the ir d ivision sig nal hattalions, until Army sig n:11 su ppan units al'l'ived. 

The or~alli(' 121 st Sign al Hatlalion (If th e U,S. lst Infantr y Di· 

vision was o ll e o f those th at ini tially had to provide all COIllIllIHli. 

(al ion servicelo tu its division witlHlIlI the ~IIPpklll(' lJt:l l 1>('nc"l 01 

Army area type signa l support. At first, the 12 1st was located in a 

stagi ng area lIe:II' !lien I loa, hili as the division spn::ld (Hit, loO did 

th e sig nal battalion. T he battalion lu.'ad1I u:lltt.'h a 11(1 two 01 it, 

th ree sil-:n;1I tllm palli es Illl l\'cd 10 til t' di vi~ ll ll h:h(' talll p in D j An , 

approximate ly fifteen mi les north\\'e,t o f Saigon. Cmlllxm y B. Ih e 

forward (Olllllluni ca lions compa n y, deployed its three platou ns 

with th e far- lIl1l1 g Big Red Om.' inlallllY hrilpd(', IHlrth of Oi All. 

From this config uratio n, the orga nic 12 ls1 Signal Batta lio n o perilted and mainl:lined all (If the «llt11I1 Uni la i'JII~ slIppcn·t for the 

divisio n. The sig n:llmen insta ll ed the myriad Wlllln:md and (on· 

trol ilS well as admin istrative telcphone and mcssage c.. in.uits Ih at 
32 CO \1 \'1 ' 'i 'C"T'();\''i '' 1.~ CTRO:-; C.'' 

tied together the five major hase cam ps of the division, They also 

operatcd Iht o\('llo;,ded SW il(hhoard .. and O\CI'\I'orJ..cd mcssaRc 

ceJUe rs at th ese base camps, And becausc the 1st Infantry Di vision 

was cngaAcd in ; 1( tive (omhat from th e first day of it~ ani "a!. the 

12151 Signal Battalion supported all combat operations b)' running 

the di"ision's (Ollllllalld and lontrol radio nets and providing es· 

sential comba t telephone and message circui ts from each infantr), 

hrig;,dc or battalion tommand post baLk to the main hase camp at 

DiAn, 

It lI'as not Hlllil Ma y 196(1, 'iomc seven months after the 121st 

Signal Battalion beGllll e operational in Vietnam, that assistance arrived in the form of the :i95th ~ignal Com pan)" This relcntl), ar· 

rived unit of the 2d Signal Group immed iatel), helped relie\'e the 

pressure on the 1st Inf;ll1Il')' Di\'isiull's comllluni(-aturs by taki ng 

o\'er tll('i!' s\\'itlhbo;u'd and I1Il1itilhanlwl radio operatiom at Di 

All. Thl' pauern of (f)Imnuni(";lIiom support, as it rapidly cvolvcd 

in th e 1st Inf;:lIltry Division area, would continue throughout L1,e 

Vietnam \\'ar: the OI"l-tanit signal unit. in this tase th e 121st Signal 

Battalion, provided th e (.ommand and control communica tions so 

esscntial to the field (ommander and supponed (ilc com hat operalitlllS, \1'llil e (he .. tIPlx u·,ing Army :Ire;'! ,iAllallll lil pl"J\ided th e ad· 

ministrative or gener:tl-Il~er cOllllllun ka ti ons, tying the hase cam ps 

together and affording cntry into the countrywide Defense ComTlIunications System, 

While th e 1st Cwalr)' Dh'ision and its organic 13th Signal Hattalion, commanded hy I.ieute nant Colonel Tom ~1. :-\icholson, 

were deploying to the An Khc area in the Vietnamese Cenu·al 

II ighlands, midll";')" hetween Pkiku and Qui :-\hOIl, the .;86th Signal Support Com p:ltl y arrived in Vietnam, The company was immediately allachcd tel the 1 1st Signal Battalion and scnt 10 An Kh e 

to suppOrt the 1st Cavalry Division, This attachment pro\'ed wise 

1}('(-au5C the ainnohil(' division, nc\\'e'it of Arm)' divisions a long 

with its com pletely equipped 11IIl lightwcight signal hattalion, was 

aho ut 10 h(' tested III1c1l'r fire in th e full), develuped airmohile conccpt. The mcn of thc 13th Signal Battalion soon had much more on 

their minds than installi ng· ha~c (·amp wirc systems and opelating 

switch boards at .-\n Khe, their basc or operations. 

In O{\ohc l 19(;:, thl' :-\orth 'i l,tnanIC~(, nlll(l'lllrall'd threc regiIIWlth of their hc,t tI"(JUlh in tilt' (:l'IlIral Il ighlalHh in all an'a he-

(l1('C1I th e C.lmhodian bord(,r and th e Special Forccs elmp at Plei 

,\I e, On 19 DuoiJer the enCnl y opc lled his campaign with an atlark 011 Ihe 1)Ici ~Ic (<I !l1 p. II'hi( h lays t\\,('nt} -fi \'e tI1ilc~ stHuhwest 

of Pl c iku. The Nonh Vil'lnamcse wmma nder allackcd with OIlC 
:'I IILiTARY CO ,\li\lUNICATIO NS INT E:\S IFlEJ) 33 

S KYllI.OQJ>ERS OF 1ST CAVALR Y DIVISION PREJ>ARJ:: To BOARD A SSAULT 

H ELICOI'TEII.S FOR l'u: 1 i\JE 

regiment, holding the bulk of his division-size force in rescrve. 

With the aid of concentrated tactical air strikes, the South Vietnamese Army in the area re pell ed the attack. On 27 October 

General \ \lestmoreland d irected the 1st Cavalry Division into com· 

bat, its mission to seek Out and destroy the enemy force in western 

Pleiku Province. Thus began the month.long campaign kn own as 

the Battl e of the Ia Drang Valley. 

Almost immediately, thanks to the helicopter, the di vision commander, 1\4ajor General Harry \V. O. Kinna rd, was abl e to send a 

div ision forward tactica l operation center to Pl eiku. And hot on its 

hee ls followed troo ps and equipment of the 13th Signal Battalion 

in heavy.lift ca rgo helicopters, The battalion rapidly installed a 

combat radio relay system from the di vision forward to each of the 

de ployed brigade headqua rters-a de finite asset throughout the 

long balti c. By mea ns of the system each brigade had direct tel e· 

phone and message COlllact with both the division forward tactical 

operations cen ter and the di vision base at An Khe. Sole·user COI.Imand and control circuits were extended from the I Field Force 

headq uarters at Nha T rang to Genera l Kinnard 's di vision forwa rd 

operations center at Pl eiku. The U.S. Air Force liaison officer at 

the forwa rd command POSt in Ple iku was also provided with sole· 

user circuits. These sole-user circuits proved invaluable during the 

l a Sl and m OSl intense phases of the la Drang battl e. 
34 COM M U N ICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

Shortly after the start of the opera ti on to relieve the besieged 

Pl ei Me Speci;)1 Forces Camp. it was found that the infantry units, 

the companies and ballations in contact with th e enemy, were having difficulty maintaining communications with their higher headquarters. It did nOt take long to pinpoilll the problem; the ShOTtrange, man-packed voice radios in use simply could not cope with 

the grea t distances and the fact that Ihe jungle undergrowth of the 

Central Highlands absorbed electrica l energy. 

Fonllnatel)' the 1st Cavalry Division's 13th Signal Battalion 

had prepared for this vcry contingency whi le nill testing lhe air. 

mobile concept at Fon Benning, Georgia. The probl em was solved 

by placing specially configured combat voice radios in the U.S. 

Army's CMiboll ain.raft and orbiti ng the crafl and their radios 

above those ground units that were using the sma ll portable sets, 

The result was an airborne relay that could automatically retrans· 

mit up to six combat rad io nets over far greater distances than the 

grou lid range of the rad ios. Thus at la Orang the unilS all the 

ground were served by the 13th Signal Battalion's airborne relay 

twent y-fo ur ho urs a day for the last th'ent}'.eight days of the campaign. The optimum ahitude turned Ollt to be nine to len thousa nd feet above grollnd, effectively extending the range of the 

small combat radios fifty to sixty miles. even when the radios were 

o perating in the mu t dense undergrowth. However. this method 

o[ communica tions, while highly successful in the l a Orang area, is 

\cry costly in manpower and eq uipment and raises man)' radio frequency interference prOblems. 

As the enem), withdreh' his assault regimelll from Plei Me. it 

suffered severe casualties from air strikes and the pursuing air cavalry. But when the 1st Cavalry Di vision put a blocking force behind the withdra\\'ing enemy. onl y a few mil es from the Cambo· 

di,lIl border. the North Vietnamese commander committed his 

remaining two regiments in an allempt to redeem his earlier failm e ;u Plei .\Ie hy destroyi ng a major .S. unit·-the 3d n rigade, 

1st Ca\'alry Division. barely thiny days in Vietnam. The 3d Bri. 

gade. howe"er. commanded by Colonel Harold C. 1\lool'e. Jr., decisively defeated each enemy regime11l in turn and the combined cr· 

fon s of the di vision literally swe pt the la Orang valley clear of 

North Vietnamese. 

~ in almost all combat action in the Vietnam 'Val', the la 

Orang campaign was not an Army effort alone. but rather a comhined air and gl'ollnd effort. t 1sually lauieal fighter aircraft of the 

Air Force and the Na vy were used in direct sllppon of combat operations. Ilere for the first time in the Vietnam conllict. the U.S. 
MILITARY COMMUN ICATIONS INTENSIFIED 35 

Air Force strategic bombers, the huge B-52s, were used in general 

support of the ground combat commander's scheme of maneuver. 

Hitherto communications had not been good enough to permit the 

close co-ordination required to employ bombing missions when 

friendly troops were going to be anY' ... here in the vicinity. But now 

direct links between the field commander and his higher headquarters and the direct lines to the U.S. Air Force's Direct Air Support 

Center, greatly reduced the reaction time. The fie ld commanders 

of the 1st Cavalry Division could now use the awesome, destructive 

power of B-52 air strikes as part of the normal planned air missions and for the first time this strategic weapon would be used 

tactically. 

The classic campaign of the Ia Drang valley during the last 

months of 1965 proved the soundness of the airmobile concept: 

ground soldiers, aviators, and communicators were successfully 

molded into a potent, fl exible, fighting force. 

As U.S. Army and other combat units continued to pour into 

the country, adding to the communica tions load of the 2d Signal 

Group, welcome assistance arrived when the 578th Signal Construction Company landed at Cam Ranh Bay and was attached to 

the 41st Signal Battalion. Help also came from the 228th Signal 

Company, attached to the 39th Signa l Battalion, which was stationed in the newly established logistical area at Long Binh near 

Bien Hoa. The 2281h provided additional multichannel radio 

relay capability in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. But there 

were still not enough communications. Brigadier General John 

Norton, General Westmoreland's deputy commander of the U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, was emphatic on that score. In the late summer of 

1965 he stated in a command report: 

Communicalions continues to be a major command problem. 1 esti· 

mate our capability by 1J 1 December will be 1.735 channels. which. con- sidering custOmer needs. will make an average deficit of 30%. On some 

major axes. the deficit will be higher, such as Saigon-Nha Trang 

(6 1%), and Nha Trang-Qui Nhon (50<70)' 

In November 1965 the 1,300-man 69th Signal Battalion 

(Army) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Meyer, 

arrived. a long with the 580th Signal Company (Construct ion). The 

69th Signal Battalion took over opera tion of all local communications support in the Saigon-Long Binh area. Besides providing 

area signal support for the numerous troop unitS, the 69th directly 

supported the headquarters of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, U.S. Army, Vietnam, and the U.S. Army's 1st Logistical Command. To assist in this massive effort, the S93d Signal 
CO.\I M U N rCA TIONS' ELECTRON rcs 

SOl-illER DIRECTS L .... "'DI1'>G OF RESU I' I'LY H ELICOPTER D U1U 1'>G IA DR .... ~C 

BATrLE 

Company, which had been providi ng communications support in 

the Saigon area. was attarhed. The 580tl1 Signal Company, which 

was capable o f installing large fixed cable systems, was also attached. 

T he last signal un it to arrive during 1965 was the 518th Signal 

Company, which reached Vietnam in late December. This company, capable of operating mobile tropospheric scatter and microwave eq ui pmem. reli e\'ed the 362d Signal Company of the responsibility for the operation of the mobile tropospheric scatter and 

mi crowa\'e systems in the III and IV Corps T actical Zones in the 

south. With these additions Colonel ;\ Ioran's 2d Signal Group had 

grown to a stl'ength of nearly 0.000 by the end of the year. (Chlll't I) 

Even so, adequa te communica tions service could not keep pace 

with the growing n umber of "customer" requirements. At the end 

of 1965 General Norton in his q uarterly repon continued to list 

inadequate communicati ons: 

The in adequacics of somc major ;IXCS of long Ji nes communica tions in 

USARV still t'em<lin alarmi ngly high: Saigon- Nha Trang 52% , and 

Nlla T rang-Qui Nhon 50o~ . Progr'llllmed in stall,llion o f mul tichannel 

equipmcl1l has proceeded as pi:lnllcd, and cver)' measure available to 

the comma nd is bcing takcn to obviatc the silU3 tion. 
.\lILITARY CO:o,I MUNICATIO NS INTENSIFIED 37 

C IIART I-SICNAL ORCANIZATION I"" VIET:>:AM, DECEM8ER 1965 

nUlIGIC 

(0.M UIII(1l10NS 

(O.MUD 

PACIfiC 

I 

nUIIGIC 

CO MMU Ill ICATIONS 

(0 •• '111 0 

VIETNAM 

I 

191M SIG 

" 

OIGi NIC 10 un 

II1I1D 'OICI 

I I 

MILITARY ASSISTANCI 

( OMMANO VIETNAM 

I 

U.S. ARMY 

VIETNAM 

I--0~I~M!I_ 

(OIllT.OI 

I 

41S1 SII'> 

" 

I 2D JIG 

" 

I I UTM SIG 

" 

OIGINIC TO Tilt 

In cn DIY 

I 

I 

I 1I1D SIG I 

" 

I 

I SII~~ SlG I 

O'G U IC 10 Til l 

1ST IN' DIY 

I mpact of Circllit Sh ortages 011 Telephone Systems 

The lack of voice channels especially affected the telephone system, partic ularl y long-distance service within Vi etnam. By July 

1965 there were approximately fifty mili tary telephone exchanges 

in opera tion and most of these were manual, usi ng a conglomeration of equipment which required operator assistance to reach any 

pany. The 2d Signal Group at that time started to rearrange the 

limited trunking under a program that required switchboard operators at the numerous switchboards located throughou t the country 

to place all long-distance ca lls through eight exchanges: at the U.S. 

:\fil itary Assistance Command, Vietnam, headquarters in Saigon, 

and at Tan Son Nhut, Can T ho, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, Qui 
38 CO;\I M U NI CATIO:\'S-ELECTRONIC!i 

Nhcn, Pl eiku, and Da Nang. This arrangement proved ineffective, 

however, because of the lack of trunk circuits and the ever-increasing number of manual switchboards that wcre being connected 

into the s)'stem. The inadequate tTllllking between switchboards 

grew worse as more and more general-uscI' circuits (trunks between telephone exchanges) came to be required as sole-uscI' on 

so-called dedicated circu its to support high-priority combat operations. Even as late as April 1968 approximately 85 percent of the 

tola] channels ava ilabl e were ti ed up on a sole-user basis. These 

dedicated circuits provided direct communication between tWO facilities, such as between the operations center at the U.S. iI.'lilitary 

Assistance Command headquarters and the operations center of a 

fi eld force headquarters. The U.S. Air Force relied heavily on dedicated circuits and systems to provide and co-ordinate air support. 

The state of general-user telephone service in Vie tnam during 

the mid-1960s is best described in a report prepared by (he Joim 

Logistic Review Board. It states in part: 

Operators were too busy to monitor effecti\'ely their circuits. Pick-up 

times of .5 to 5 minutes were (Ommon on the busy boa rds during peak 

traffic hours. Thus. not onl y were subscribers forced to route their own 

ra lls, but afte r completion of the call through the first operatOr, if the 

distant operator failed to :lIls,,'er, the ca lling party could not fla sh the 

operator back but was disconnected to join the queue again, _ . _ This 

led to the situation where, while one staff officer was t}i ng up the 

operator by demanding all explanation of slow scnice, several other 

st .. ff offi cers were cr .. nldng th eir generator ha ndles furiously tTying to 

get the attention of the same operator so that they, tOO, could discuss 

his reasons for bei ng asleep .. t his job. 

A lIiomalic T elepho"e a"d Secure Voice Switch Plans 

As early as mid-1964 (he U_S_ Military Assista nce Command 

headquarters and service component staffs had recognized the need 

for an integrated tel ephone network in Vietnam, incl uding (he 

need for direct distance dialing th rough automatic long-distance 

s\vitches to be located at DOl ;\lang, Pieiku, Nha Trang, and T an 

Son Nhul. The rapid buildup ovenook these ea rl y effon s. In September 1965, General Westmoreland 's joint headquarters in Saigon restated a requirement for a general-user automatic telephone 

system for SOUlh Vietnam. As a result, following a conference in 

Hawaii at the headquarters of the Commander in Chief. Pacific, 

Ihe Pacific area headquarlers of the Defense Commun ications 

Agency was asked to develop a plan for automatic telephone servo 

ice for Southeast Asia. The conferees had established a need for 

fihy-£our fixed automatic dial telephone exchanges. Of these the 
M ILITA I/;Y (:0\1 M UN ICA" ION.'" IN TENSIFIJ-:n 39 

Army wo uld he res po nsihl e ror Se \'eIHeen in Vielllam and nUll' in 

Tha il and. T o lie these tele pho ne exchanges togedl er th e {onrnces 

dec ided thaI nine Cl lI [alJ{ e ~w it hin g {ent ers were f(·(ltdred. 

Tentativc ly th c cente rs would he a t Oa Nang, Qui Nh o ll , Nha 

Trang, Pl ci ku , Sai gon , and Can Tho in Vie lTl,lIn , ,nul at llhon, 

Korat, and Bang kok in Thail:lIld . These wou ld he amomati c tal1-

finn switlilcs- providing dirc(t cli .... t;IIH C di;ll ing servicc 1111\(h like 

the commercial system in th e tln iled Suites- desig ned to make 

most emd ent II ~C o r the S( ;I!'(e ll di taIH e trunks, 

Earli er, in Mayor 19(j5, th e Army Signal Corps planners in 

Vi etnam and at U,S. Army, l';wifi" adquar l('r~ in Hawaii had re-

;tli7ed that automalil el ial tele pho nc CXI hall ~(,' wc rt Ill'l'cll'd illlll1(" 

di atcl y in South Vi etnam. A proposal was prompTl y made to th e 

OCpartlllel1l 01 the Alm y in \Va,hil1 glon Ih al, a, all intcrinl 

rt1 t .. un', (jltl'CII 400·lilll: trampo nah1l' d i;11 lel e phllll(: CXI hanges 

he provided . As statcd in the l!)(i!i li t01 y 1)1 {I,S. Almy Opcra· 

tiom in SOlltheast Asia: 

[the 1:. fI al Il e"tl qU:lrl ~, U.S. Arm)" p .. cilir] re:tli/ing Ih:11 

procliremeni of li xed pl;ll1t eq uipmelll and Ihe conSlruction netessary 

ttl housc stich equ ipmcnl would he una hie 10 Ke<'1' pal e with the ex· 

pOI nd ing communication requ irement, developed crileri:. for a mooel 

Il'a n\I)(lrt:. b lc dial (-ellll :1I ulhn', a fill I('( olllme ntlt'tl Ih ;lI . . ]Dc l',nt· 

menl 01 Ihc I\ n n ) ] cx ped iu: dc'ign, I'rocu rClUellt, :lIltll;lill i(;t1iul1 of the 

Ir;lIlspo n :lb lc officc\ fo r ca rl y \ h i]lIlll'III to , , , [."Wlul hc;,,1 I\, i:.]. 

As a result of these arli ~ Departmcnt of th e Arm)' in late 

I~Jli 5 ordered shipment of two fixed dial teleph one exchanges. one 

of 2,100 lines ro r Cam Ranh Bay a nd another o f 1,200 lines for 

Qu i N 1101'1 , and approved proulremel1t uf twel ve more fi xed dial 

exchan ges and six 600·line tra nsportable exchanges. In additi on six 

la rAc Arm y manual switl hlJo:l rcl ~, modified ro r 1"(' a~ manual long· 

dist:llH..e switchhoa rds, were 51 hedul ed to arri ve by January 1966, 

and wo ul d prov ide long·distance ser vil.c until th e automatic tandem switches bcc.::ame a vai lahle. 

Bell idcs th c~e large reqll ircl11 clHs for gene ral·uscr ser vice, there 

was also an urge nt need fo r oCe rtain Sllhsc.::rihers to be ahle 1O dis· 

(II ~S ( Ia ssificd l11:rlt crs over Ih e telephone system. imlalJalinn of a 

secure vo il.c switchboard was hegun in Saigon on 22 Scptemher 

1!J{i:, and th e hoard llel il me o pe ral ional 1111 IS Ol tllller when the 

firsl subscribers were tied ill. By Decemller 1965 th is system, which 

("lImisled o r Se\'enT ce n lIhsc l'ih er~ in Vie tn am, wa~ complctcd. 

VOice.scramhling to rru strate enemy interceptions h;ld hithe rto 

hc:cn limitcd to a fc:w ri xed installa tions bel <lllsc of th e compl ex 

a nd t:Osll y equipment. Blil there was a pressing need for its appli. 
40 CO~f ;\Il T :o,' ICA TIO~"-I::1.FCTRO~IC." 

((Ulan to mollil/! radio. [OQ. In th e mid-1960s, secure vo ice eqUIpment was fOT (he first l i lTle programmed for the voice radios used 

II)' L' ,S. combat troops. The 2d Signal Croup. whose many varied 

tasks included the distrihution and maintenance of U.S. Arm)' 

CTyplOgraphil material and cquipmcllt in Vietnam, began instructi on on the rep.1.il" of combat voice seclLrity eq u ipme nt in carly AuguSt 1965. 

Fragmt!l1lell ConWllmicalions Control Is United 

During the fall of 1965, as the overlaxcd U.S. Army Signalmen 

to iled to provide the best communica tions sup port possible with 

their limited resources. it hClamc more :lIld morc .. pparclll that 

the command and control arrangements over U.S. Army Signal 

IToopS and systems in Vietnam \\'ere not responsive to o perational 

requ ircmellls because tht'y were not unified or single. These ar· 

rangements, as previously disCllsscd, charged 1\\'0 separate U,S. 

Army Strategic Communications elements in Viet nam, both under 

cOIllIll:lIld of their headquarters in Hawaii and both subjcl..t to Dcfense Communications Agency direction, with responsibility for 

Inng·lines circuits in Viewam. :'\eitller of these e1cments was oper· 

ationally under General Westmorela nd. Moreover, the 2d Signal 

Group. which was responsive to the U ,S. Military Assislance Com· 

mand and which came under the command and control of Com· 

manding General. l lniterl States Army, Vietnam, had responsi bil. 

ity for the tails of the long·li nes system over which numerous 

Defense Depnnment circui ts were extended to the customers. In 

short, the circuits a nd systems were intertwined bu t their COm · 

mand and cOlltrol were di\'ided. 

l\Iajor General \Valler E. Lotl, Jr., who served as General 

,V('sunoreland's lornmunications·electronics sta ff officer from Sep· 

temher 1965 to August IOGG, described tbis fragme ntation. He 

said: 

,\ numl>CI' or ~ilc~ were onupied jointh h)' [U.S. ,.\ rmr Stra· 

tcgic Communications Comllland ;md 2d Signa l Group] uni ts. \Vhen 

failurc\ occufled in lircuit .. Ir,lII,iling thc l»l>IC lll~ of hOlh, each unil 

I>oillied its finger at the olher. Whell n facilit ), fai led , detcr· 

lninatioll of wlr:ll .il"nlil, 11;1(1 becn :!ffCltcd ,,',11> prinl:lril} dClenninecl 

b), the compl:riuts of the operator!> at the circuit ends, rather than from 

circuit rCtord~, when circuits also Iraversed cable 

systems installed by base commanders, problems were fun iter com· 

pounded. A~ :. re .. uh uf thc,c fll1,lIall0ns. I wrOle a mel>sage which 

Gcncral Westmorela nd dispatChed to the {\ rmy Chief of Statl , rccom· 

mendiu/{ com11l0 n (omllwud :lIld l'onll'ol 01 the [U.S .. \Im) 

Stratcgic COlll1nunicati01H Command :111<1 United StalCs Army. ~acific] 

theater Sign:1I c1emcnts ill ~tllh Vietnam. 
'II 

General \\'csullorc lancrs message, disp ... tchcd to Ceneral '-Iarnld K . .I 0hmoll .. \ nll) Chid of "t;tfL o n 19 October 1965, after 

out lin ing the fragmentat ion of th e orga ni za lion and <-ontrol of th e 

IT .'i. Arlll } Signal tro(jp~ in Vietnam, cit-dared: 

Consider it urgent to resolve fragmcllt:uion of comma nd and control ,jf 

nll~ '1iI-;II:l1 L'ni" in P{' cl'uhlit 01 \,iCI11:lIl1 J \0 c n'llrc COIllIllunicatioll" '}'tCIIl j, I('\pon~i\(' to o]l<'r:niol1ai rC( uirc Il1 IlI ~, h:I" unit), 

(If m ;lllagCIl1CIlI a nd ('(Hll ro] :lI1d cffi ticru ly llti li/CS margi nally adequate 

resources. I bclic\'c extraordi nary measures required. Sign:rl 

Officer. IU.S. l\rnH ViCIrl:lrll] ~hou ld esercise operat ion:r] 

control O\-er all [U.S. Army Viemam and SIr:ltcgic Communiclliom Cor1l111,llld ] clcmcllts in [the Repu blic of Vietnam]. 

A Department of the Arm)' team . headed by ivJajor Genera l 

John C. F. Tillson III. which intl uded reprcscllIatives from I-leadquarters, U.S. Arm)" I)acific, at once hurri ed to Vietnam in No-

\'('m IJcr to examine the si lUalion and discuss the matt er wi th General Westmoreland. As a result, on December 1965 the 

Dep<lI·tme-1li of the Arm)' placed the Strategic Commu nications 

ClIlIlTnand'~ deme-Ills in Vi et nam under the opcrat iona l {(lntrol nr 

the Commanding General. {1.S. Arm)'. Vietnam. The Department 

of the Army further directcd the Commander in Chi ef. U.S. Army, 

P;u ifi{. Cene ra l Joh n K. 'Valcrs, and Commanding General, U.S. 

Arm)' Strategic Comlllun ica ti ons Command, Major Genera l Ri· 

( haH\ J. i\lcyn, to pnwide a plan whereh), all Arm)' Signal eleIll CIllS down to field force level wo uld be placed under a U.S . 

. \rmy Signal Command. Vietnam. 

Srtmmmy, 1962-1965 

From the lime the 39th Signal Battalion arrived in Vielnam in 

1962 through the turbulelll year of 1965, the U.S. Arm)' Signa l 

Corp~ troo ps we re cont inuall y respond ing to changing situ<niotlS 

and req uircme llls. Even from the early days in 1962 much or the 

cnmlllunica,iOlls slIPIX>rt had to be improvised. Although pl ans. 

concepts. and programs were taki ng shape during the fi rst hig 

hu ildllp ),ear of 1965, actual resources in the the,lt er remai ned limited and the wmm uni calOrs wcre hard pressed 10 provide adequate 

se n 'i( C ( 0 the customers. There was no established commercia l sys· 

tem in Vietnam to fall back on. as there had been in Europe in 

" 'orld War II. In October 1944 . only four months after lhe Alli ed 

troops invaded Europe, the rehabil ita ted civil system )'ielded abou t 

:).000 lircllit~ . tota ling over 200.000 circuit miles, suppl emc llled by 

about 100,000 circuit miles o f ne\\' construction buil l by the signal 

fon es of the U.S. ArTll}'. 
, 

, 

1\!I:-II .. "ItE[) CO;\'MI ~IC" IO:-;S SITt; IN T ilt" A SIIAU Vl\l. U :V as 

/)orll"(l),cd by Siglw/ soldier-artist. 
:'11L1TAR,Y COMMUN ICATIONS I NTENSI FIED 43 

By the end of 1965, however, Army signalmen were being 

trained and new uni ts formed in the United States for deployment 

to Vietnam. T hese would be ava ilable in increasing numbers to 

upgrade and expand the improvised communications support then 

available in Vietnam. At the same time, as communications resources built up, the divided or fragmented control over U.S. 

Army commun ications was being corrected. The logistical and administrative troops, who were most affected by the lack of adequate communications services, would benefit. And although the 

over-a ll commun ications did not meet all theater requ irements. 

comba t operations were sufficiently suppon ed in every undertaking. Gene ral \'Vesl1norciand sta ted in a personal message to all of 

the communicators in South Vietnam during the fall of 1966: 

The communications system, despite the handicap of having to 

provide more service than in any previous war and of operating under 

severe geographical and tactical equipment limitations, has responded 

brillial1lly 10 the burgeoning requirements of a great ly expanding fighting force. No combat operation has been limited by lac:' of communications. The ingenuity, dedication, and professionalism of the communications personnel are deserving of the highest praise. 

PART TWO 

THE BUILDUP CLIMAXES, 1966 - 1967 

CHA PTER III 

Creation of the I st Signal Brigade: 

Organization a nd Operation 

General Westmoreland has referred to Hl66 as "The Year of 

Development" for the U.S. forces in the Republic of Vietnam, and 

most assuredly it W<lS for th e Army comm uni ca ti ons effort. Yet the 

techn ical developments during the expa nsion of communication 

services a t that lime, ahhough sig nificant , were overshadowed at 

firSt by the attention given at the highest levels of Army command 

to eliminating Ihe fragmented control that hampered the commun ications effort in the Republic of Vietnam. 

Cnuial Decisions 

The decision by the Depanment of the Army at the turn of 

1965- 1966 to return the Strategic Communications Command's 

Vietnam signal elements to the opera tional control of the Commanding General. U.S. Army, Vietnam, was made in direct and 

immediate response to Ge neral \,Vestl1l ore\and's "fragmentation" 

message of 19 October 1965. This arrangemelll, however, was rec· 

ognized by the Army as onl)' tempora r)" flll ther organiza tional effOri was required to auain a comple tely sa tisfactory solution. General Creighton W. Abrams, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, 

therefore asked U.s. Army. P;'lcific, in co-ordi nation wi th the Strategic Communica tions Command, to develop a phlll for the organiz,uion of a U.S. Army Signal Command, Vietnam, to include not 

only all signal units of U.S. Army, Vietnam, above the field force 

level. bllt also elements of the Strategic Commun ications Command that were in Vi etnam. General Abrams further specifi ed that 

this new coTllIl1<l nd be headed b)' a brigad ier general who would 

serve in <l dou bl e or dU<lI-hat c"pacity, bo th as commu n icationselectron ics staff officer for the U.S. Army component in Vietnam 

and as the commanding general of t he new commun ica tions com· 

mand. Colonel Roben D. Terry, who was shonly to become a 

brigadier general, was given the twO jobs. 
CO:\t :\ t lJ:"i t CATtON'-t:LECTRO:\" ICS 

1'.S. Army, Ilalific. completing the plans early in H166. recommended th e formation of a signal hrigade to be assign ed to the StaIl'~i( COllllllllnicnions Comma nd but 10 come under the operational control of U.S. Army, Vi emam. To implement this 

propos-'ll. the Dep..'l nmelH of the Army on 1 April 1966 authori7cd 

th e act ivation of the Strategic Communications Command Signal 

Brigade, Southeast Asia. Later. on 26 ay 1966, th e emhryo unit 

received its ultimate designation. 1st Signal Brigade. 

Thus a single. unified stru(lure to control ,mel direct U.S. 

Army communications effort in th e Republic of Vieinam was au· 

thuriled for the sc(ond time. Previo llsly. in 19(,2, all communila· 

tions responsibility had rested with the 39th Signal Battalion. But 

eve illS and decisions had outda ted this orga nization and restructuring was overdue. The signal command as formed in 1966 not only 

gave lommunications responsihility in Vietnam a new direction. 

but also d osed a major gap that had existed between signal un its 

and manage rs o f communi cations thro ughout Southeast Asia. 

The 1st Signa l llrigade soon grew larger than a division, bem ming the 1ar~est signa l org;mitation hy far in th e hist0T)' of the 

U.S. Army. Brigade headquarters in its first four months grew 

from an auster e Ihlee oftlcers to a strengt h of about two hundred. 

The first troo ps the brigade acquired were th ose of th e 2d Signal 

Group. On I Jul y I%(i, Brigadier Gene ra l Robert D. Terry rea rgani 7.ed the fl edgling command by limiting the 2d Sign al Crou p's 

responsihility 10 the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones onl y and by 

chargi ng the newly arrived 21 st Signal Croup with communications responsibility in (he I and II Corps Tactical Zones. 

Thereafter, as new signal units arrived in Vietnam for assignment to the hri gade or were activa ted in Vietnam. General T erry 

incorpora ted th em in either the 21st Signa! Croup in the nonh or 

(h e 2d !)ignal G rou p in the so uth. And arri ve they did. By the end 

01 1%6 (he 2d and ?lst Signal Groups each comprised six ba ttalions and each totaled well o\'('r 5,000 men. 

Comm 1I1licat;0r1s SlINJorl for Army and Corps Areas 

These uni ts of th e 1st Signal Brigade maintained the (lrea com· 

muni ca tions syst<.: ms throughout th e couIllry. The area communica tions system is a concept \\'hercb)' a sign al unit. h'ilh in its 

geographical area of reslxmsibility, provides support to all military 

units- Army. Navy, arine, Air Force. or CoaSI Guard- that reo 

quire commu n ic3lions-electron ics to supplement their organic capability. The {l.S. Army Signal Corps refers to this service as the 

Army Area Communications System; however, the U.S. Army, 
CREATIO:"-1 OF TilE 1ST SIG NAL BRI GAJ)E 49 

Vietnam . changed the designation to Corps Area Communications 

System in order to identify more closely with the geograpbi cal 

areas heing sen 'ed. that is. the four corps tactica l zones, whi ch were 

redesignated in 1970 as military regions. 

Signalmen of the 2d and 21 st Signal Groups operated message 

centers and tel ephone switchboards, maintained extensive nel\vorks 

of radio ,·ela}' systems, and constructed tel ephone cabl e and wire 

li nes between and with in the increasing number of Army bases. 

The area comlllunicat ions system in Vietnam departed from the 

Army's sig nal doctrine based on the grid concept. There were rea· 

sons for th is variation. First, the area comm uni cation 1)'1.ths either 

connected regional nodal centers or extended the tails to isolated 

el ements t ha t were not orga nically se lf·sufficienl. Second. the geo· 

graph ical distribution of base camps and other vital installations 

di ctated a linear, rather tha n a recta ngular, arrangement. The cl assic grid advantage was preserved, however, by the brigade's capacity to provide aliermHe routing between key points. 

' ,Vith the re li ef afforded by both the increase in signal troops 

and the establishment of e\'en a partial corps area communications 

system, th e vital matter of communications in support of the mil i· 

tary ad visers could fi nally be take n up: Before the end of 1966, 

General Terry had assigned a signal battalion to support the U.S. 

advisor), e1 eme llls in each of the four corps tactical zones, provid· 

ing area communications support (or the advisers and for the 

Sout h Vi etnamese Arm)' di visions. These impon am signal baltal· 

ions were the 37th Signa l Battalion in the I Corps Tactical Zone at 

Da Nang, the 43d in the II Corps Zone at Pleiku, the 44th in the 

III Corps Zone near Bien Hoa , and the 52d in the IV Corps Zone 

at the provincial capital of Can Tho in the i<.l ekong Del ta. 

Two battalions of the 2d Signal Group had missions that dif· 

fered from the rest of the units in the corps tactical lOne signal 

groups. T he 40th Signal Constructi on Battalion was unique within 

the U.S. Army: the 69th Signal Battalion (Army) . because of its 

size and responsibilities, became the nucleus of yet another signal 

battalion. 

The 40th Signal Construction Batta lion, the only heavy communicatio ns cable construction batlal ion in the active U.S. Army 

at that lime, arrived in Vietnam in the fall of 1966. The battalion 

immediately dispersed its compa nies and construction platoons the 

length and breadth or South Viet nam. By the end of 1970 this remarkabl e unit had instal1 ed over 500 miles of multi pair cabl e 

with in milit ary cantonments under the most trying conditions that 

can be imposed by bOlh enemy and friendl y forces, ha ving to cope 
SrG~AI.~ F.N D I'.-RATE A P OSTl IQIE D IGGFR ,\'r CHU L ,\I, where cable 

leiCJJhulIC JJoles (lTe beillg illstailed. 
CREATIO:"< OF TilE I 'iT S IGNAL BRIGAD E 51 

with the Viet Cong's mortars and rockets and the Army's ubiquitom bulld07c rs. Bulld07ers uscd in construction work inva riabl y 

uproot or knock down more cables and wire lines or poles than are 

destroyed by enemy action. 

The Saigon area had the largest aggregation of headquarters, 

camps. and st<lti ons in the land. The install ati on and opera tion of 

the myriad of communications in suPPOrt o f this ilTea was the taxin ~ job of the 69th Signal Battalioll aft er its arrival in latc 1965. 

" Theil the development of the huge Long Binh military complex 

in Ouober 1966 necessi tated commun ications suppOrt for Long 

Binh POSt, the 69th Signal Hatta lion was assigned the job. The battalion consisted of five signal tompanies, each organi/cd to provide 

a spec ific communications service. Because of the distance invoh-ed 

from the 69th's home station in Saigon. it was necessary to station 

at Long Binh Post detachments fwm each com pany of the hattalion. Since command and ('onllol prohlems resulted from this ar· 

rangemen t. the brigade ('olllll1all(ier dec ided 10 fo nn t\\'o h,tttalinm 

from the assets of the 2.000-l11an fi9 dl Signal fiatl alion. Reorga nizalion was comple ted on 15 August 1967. wit h lhe 44th Signal 

Battalion gaining the personnel and equi pment of the 60 th 's assets 

at l.ong Rinh. It also acquired IIle mission of providing communi· 

cations support for the Long Binh complex, includ ing the headquarters of the l '.S. Arm)'. Vietnam. and nyplologistic support for 

the entire country. The 60th Signal Battalion re tai ned the responsihility for signal suppon in the Saigon area. including the 

headq uarters of the U.S. iV'ililary As~islancc Command. Vietnam. 

Both the 69lh and tht' 44th Si~nal Batwlions were assi~ned to 

Colonel Blaine O. Vogt's 160th Signal Croup, whi ch had arrived 

in Vietnam in the spring o f 1967. Th is group headquarters. in addition to assuming the job o f are;1 and headquarters support assigned to the 441h and G9lh c;ignal Battalions in the Saigon- Long 

Binh areas, was to control and direct other important cOl11mu nicati ons activities in Vi etna m. The 40th Signal Construct ion Battalion with ilS cable comtructi on mission was assigned to the 160th 

Signal Gro up. The group l"eorgani/ed and mol ded into an effective 

o peration the U.S .• Army's countrywide communications security 

logistics sUPIXJrt activities. \!lother tradit ional Signal Corps responsibility, that of audio·visnal (photographic) support, was 

given 10 the 160th on a (OL l1l1r}'vidc basis. This task included 

backn p com hat photographic sUPlx>rt to Ihe field rorce~ and to di\-isions whi ch had their o,,'n organic aud io-visual facilities. And finally the 160th assumed the responsihility for the ope ration o f the 
.12 CO~I;\1 UN le ,\ TIO:-"'o-EL ECTRO:-lICS 

Southeast A~i(t Signal School, which had been established in June 

of 1966. 

B)' the end of 1967 Ihese th ree groups of th e 1st Signal Brigade 

controlled and directed an even dozen baltal ions. The 2d and 21st 

Signal c,rollp') provided th e <'irea cornmun icaliolH su pport in the 

four corps tactical zones: 160th Signal Grou p provided headquarters support in th e Saigon and I.ong Bioh art!:t. as well as cable 

construction, photogra phic, and communica tions security logistics 

$UPport th roughout the country. 

The circui ts and lines of the Corps Area Communications System operated hy these group~ merged a t man y points into the la rge 

backhone system, known from 1966 as the In tegra ted Wideband 

COIllTllllnicatiom System. This long-haul system was operated by 

tho us..1 nds of men from the 1st Signal Brigade who were orga n ized 

into b:llIal ions tha t constituted th e U.S. Army Regional Communica ti ons Group in Vietnam. 

Regio1lal Communicalions Group 

The U.S. Army Regional Communications Group evol\'ed ho th 

from the U.S. Army Strategic Commun ica tions Command. Vie tnam. set up in 1965 by Lieutenant Colonel J erry Enders. and from 

th e ga tch'ay fac ilit ies at »11(1 I.am and Nha T ra ng. which had remained under the comma nd of th e Strategic Commun ications 

Comma nd. Pacific. until th e 1st Signal Brigade was orga ni zed on I 

April 1966. The big communi COl tions faCi li ties and systems operated hy these organ izations \\'(,'re tagged as "fixed" and were oh en 

spoken of as " long-l ines." As earl y as February 1966, Colonel Robert D. Terry and his planners \\'ere considering a 1.ong- 1.ines 

Group to operate the gateway fa cilities a t Phu Lam and ~ha 

Trang and to provide the long-haul communica lions bet\l'een Da 

Nang, Plei ku . Qui i'hon . i\' ha Trang. Dalal. Cam Ran h Bay. I)h u 

L .. 1m. and Vung Tau. This plan was reali7ed on 4 July 1966 when 

th e U.S. Arm)' Regional Commun ications Group was activa ted. At 

tha t time, the group consisted of the Long-Lines Banalion Nonh . 

later th e 36 1st Signal Battalion . fol' cotHl'ol and managcmelll of 

the long-haul comm uni ca ti ons in the t\l'O northe rn corps zones. 

and the large communi ca tion fa cilities in N ha T rang and Phu 

l.am. l.ater. the Lo ng- Lines Battalion South, finally designated the 

369th Signal Battalion, was activated and , by December 1966, the 

Da ~allg message relay f;lC ilit y became opera tiona l under the l l.S. 

Army Regional Communica tions Group. All three message relay 

fa ci liti es wcrc operated by battalion-size units and were in fact des-
CRI':ATro:-. OF TilE 1ST S IG NAL nR AD ~ 53 

igoaled in mid-1967 as Provisional Signal Battalions Phu Lam, 

Nha Trang, and Da Nang. 

Signal Units in Thailand 

There was still another signal group under the 1st Signal Brigade- this one in Thailand. Early in 1966 Brigadier General J ohn 

E. Kelsey, Depttty Commanding General , Strat egic Communications Command, had visited with the Commanding General, U.S. 

:'-.Iilitary Assistance Command. Thailand. i\ liljor General Richard 

G. Stilwell. They agreed that all U.S. Army Signa l units in Thai· 

land should be organi zed into one signal group. This group was 

first designated Strategic Communications Command Signal 

Group, Thaibmd. under tbe command of LiClItcnalll Colonel )-)arold 1. Crochct, and was organi zed to be effective I May 1966. It acquired all U.S. Army communications fa cilities in Thailand. The 

group was redesignated in September 1966 as the 29th Signa l 

Croup, IInder the command of the 1st Signal Brigade in Sa igon, 

but remained under the operationa l control of Ceneral Stilwell, 

the tOp U.S. commander in Thailand. Later, in mid-1967, this operational control passcd to the Military Assistance Command's 

Army componelll. U.S. A 1'111 )' Support. Thailand. 

Thus a dual-hat role evolved in T hailand as well as in Vietn,lIn; the senior signal commander in each CO li n try also served as 

the pri ncipal communications-electroni cs staff officer for the Army 

fOmpo ll ent commander. The 29th Signall.l'Ollp'S organization and 

conce pt of operation \l'ilS similar to Ihat of its parent unil. the 1st 

Signal Brigade. By the end of 196i. the group consisted of the 

379th Signal SUPPOI'[ Ba tta lion and two provisional support compani es to prov ide the requ irl'd area communications support in 

Thailand ; the 442d Signill Battalion, a long-lines unit. to operate 

and ma intain the widehalld communica tion links and sites in 

Thailand ; and twO provisional battalions to man the large message 

n:l:I " fa ciliti es in Bangkok and Koral. 

By the end of 196i the troop units of the lSI Signal Brigade 

consisted o f twenty-one hattalions org;mi yed into fi ve groups and 

totaled abo ut 20,000 men. Nearl y all of these units arrived or were 

activated in Southeast Asia in the short period from April through 

December 1966. 

Th e Signal Brigade in /967 

These units of the 1st Signal Brigade, along with the combat 

signal battalions. compan ies, and platoons orga ni c to the fi ghting 
CO;\l ;\I UN 1CATION.'-ELECTRO N1CS 

forces, furnished the vi lal communi ca lions needed to support expanding oper:ltions in Southeast Asia. The hu p,c buildup of U.S. 

and olher Free \ Vorld Forces h:ld resulted in :I n unprecedented demand for comlllllllicatiom. from long-ha ll l (\:lla circlli try 10 com hat 

radio nets, laxing the resources of both lhe sign:ll battalions of the 

com hat forn's and the 1st Signal Brigade. 
CHAPTER IV 

The Evolving Concept for Communications 

As Conceived in 1966 

At the beginning of 1966, th ere were tWO Army divisions and 

three se parate infantry brigades in South Vietnam as well as a 

larger number nf comba t SIIPPOI'l a nd comba t service SlIppOrt 

units. Headquarters, I Field Force, Vietnam, under the command 

of Major Gelleral Stanley R. Larsen , controlled the U.S. Army 

combat units deployed in II Corps Tactical Zone. The 1st Infalllry 

Division cOlllrol lcd those in the III Corps Tactical Zone. At that 

lime except for signal and aviation units. there were no U.S. Army 

combat units in the I and IV Corps Tac(ical Zones. although the 

1st and 3d i\I:1rinc Amphibious Divisions were in the I Corps Tac· 

tical Zone. The major U.S. Army units in Vietnam by January 19M 

were the 1st Infantry Division with its 121st Signa l Banalion, the 

1st Cavalry Division with its 13th Signal llaualion, and the 173d 

Airborne Brigade. U.S. Army strength in ViclIlam was to morc 

than double in the course of 1966, increasi ng from approximately 

117,000 to 245,000 troops, with most of the buildup occurring in 

th e last rive mOllllis. COlllmensurate increases took place in the 

other services; total U.S. armed forces in Vietnam were to grow 

from 184 ,000 to a lmost 400,000 by the end of 1966. 

The planning that had been undertaken in late 1965 for an additional field force headquarters wlminated in the activation of 

Headquaners, II Field Force. Vietnam, in early 1966, located with 

ilS assigned corps signal hattalion, the 53d. at Long Binh. This 

new combat headquaners controlled the U.S. forcc.s in III Corps 

Tactical Zone. Joining the 1st Infantry Division in III Corps Tactica l Zone that year was the 25th Infalllry Division with its 125th 

Signal Ualtalion from Hawaii and the 19!hh Light InfalHry Brigade, which was based at Long Binh. The 4th Infalllry Division 

and its 124th Signal Battalion joined th e 1st Cavalry Division in 11 

Corps Tactical Zonc under the control of 1 Field Force. The extcnsive logistiC's h;!se th;!t was established 10 su ppOrt the continually increasing combat fOJ:ces, com bined with the military empha-
56 COM M UN IC,\ T IONS-ELECTRO NICS 

sis during 1966 on search and destroy operations, had a distinct 

in Aucnce on forecasting communications requirements and molding th e concept thai evol \fed to sa Lisfy those req uirements. 

Determ ining Communications Requirements 

Prior to th e major huildup phases in 1965, communications 

planning was based on a ralh er primitive, yet necessary. methodology. The commllll ica lOf, not be ing abl e to de term ine requ irements 

from any other sources, was literall y required to draw circles or 

"goose eggs" around a po pul a ti on center or a land area and then 

estimate the probable troop density within tha t area. \,yith th ese 

fi g ures in mind. the plan ner Ih en caiCIII;n ed th e number of tel ephones which we re needed. This logica ll y led to local switch· 

hoards needed and to long·distance circuitry, for \\'hich larger mul· 

tichannel systems would naturall y be required. This process went 

on much like the words in the old song " fOOL bone connected to 

lhe ankle bOllc. the ankle bone connected to th e knee bone, th e 

knee hone CO llnected to the th igh bone .... " Considering the cir· 

cumstances, the comm un icatio ns planners did well, for no prece· 

clel1l existed and lillI e doctrine was available to lell comma nd ers, 

a t any level. what the ir communi ca tions requirements wo uld be in 

a counterinsu rgency situation, parti cularly in suppOrt of adminis· 

mllive and logist ic opera tions. However frustrati ng this method 

was for the signa l planner. it d id furnish th e means to determine 

the needs for signal troop units that arrived in 1965 and 1966 and 

was fhe basis for th e planning of the large, fixed wideband commu· 

n ica tions s)'stem. 

Such "crystal ba ll " methods inevi tably resulted in a practice 

that un fo rt unately persisted througholl t the Vietn am yea rs-fh e 

practice whereby th e communicator was fo rced to de termine his 

own requirements and th en present them to the commander for 

approval. Since th e comnHl ll icatol', th e man who works in the com· 

nHllliC;ltions fi e ld , is responsible for serv ice, it was only logical 

that he did n OI wall( 10 fall shon of th e commander's rcq uirements, 

which werc ge nera ll y unknown ull lil his dissat isfa ction was ex· 

pressed . Th is pra ctice, th en. contribut cd directly to uncontrolled 

inflation of COllllllllllications requirements. Excessi"e requircments. 

in turn , contrib ut ed to continual requests fo r additional resources 

to sat isfy the requircments. 

In short. th e faucet had been tllmed on, and it was rather diffi· 

cult to turn off. Colonel Frank K. Gard ner, a se nior Army commll-
THE EVOLV ING CONCEPT FOR COMMUNICATIO:\,S 57 

ni cator intimately in volved with the early planning, put it this way 

in an Army War College study he wrote in 1969: 

ro t of the problcms in Southea st Asia wcre caused by the great 

q uantities of communication chan nels requcsted . . . and required 

by the USCI·S. For example, it was common pra cti ce in Southea st Asia to 

provide 32 channels of communications to a combat brigadc. During 

the Korean War, it was st andard practice 10 provide eight channels of 

comm unications from a Corps to a Division, whilc in World \¥ar II 

the objective was to attem pt to provide [our channels o f communications from a Corps to a Division. 

It was in the dual environment of relatively stable base camp 

existence on one hand, and with the ma ssi\'e search and destroy opera tions during which combat commanders often located their 

headquart ers at remote jungle si tes on the other, that the mingled 

fi xed pl ant and mobile military communications facilities, the original "make-do" arrangements, were feverishly unscrambled, improved, and integrated. The first hastily improvised terminals were 

gradually replaced by permanent fixed facilit ies of the highest 

quali ty. The entire comm unicat ions pl ant began to be upgraded 

and enl arged since much grea ter capacity was everywhere demanded. All the systems had to be interconnected and brought 

under better management and control to insure the utmost in service, even amid the hazards and destructi on of war. 

Evolution of Three Systems in Viel71am 

"Vithin Vietnam three types of communica tions systems evolved 

during 1966. All were eventually ~nterconnected and, as fa r as possible. technically integrated. Each system, however, was controlled 

and managed separately before the creation of the ) st Signat Brigade and its dual-hatted commander. The three systems we re the 

Defense Communications System, the Corps Area Communications 

System, and the Combat Communications System_ 

The Defense Communications System, which provided long-distance, joi ntl y used telephone, teletYPc\\'riter, and data fa ciliti es 

throughou t the republ ic, was controlled in Southeast Asia by the 

Defense Communications Agency. SOlllheast Asia Ma inland Region. This joint service, regional , communications operations center in Vietnam was unique in that it exercised "operational directi on and management control" over a communica ti ons system 

within a combat zone. One of the functions, oft en considered the 

primary function, of the agency was to respond to the communi cati ons requirements of the com manders of the U_S. r-.l ilitary Assistance Commands in Vietnam and Thailand_ Accordingly the De-
58 COM M UN ICATIO .... 'S-ELECTRO:'\ICS 

fense Communica tions Age ncy, through the regional opera ti ons 

center in Saigon. controlled the Defense Communications System 

in Vietnam for General ,"Vestll1orelalld and later for Ge neral 

Abrams. 

IL should be noted. however. that while this regional element 

of a joint service agency was thus responsive to the joint U.S. commander in Saigon, its commun ications management philosophy 

and command came from the top level De(ense Communica ti ons 

Agency in Washingtoll. under the Department of Defense. Further, in the exercise of its management functions, the Saigon office 

was amhorized to deal directly with the lowest communi cations op· 

eration levels of the operating command- the technical or facility 

t.:Ontroller. To compensate for this out-of-channel procedure, a coordination channel was established between the agency in Southeast Asia and the 1st Signal Brigade in order to keep each informed as to what the other was doing. 

Except for a very few facilities operated by the Air Force and 

Navy, the entire operation and maintenance of the Defense Communications System in SOUlh east Asia rested with the U.S. Army's 

1st Signal Brigade. In order to operate the system effectively, it was 

apparent that the brigade must also exerc ise the function of man· 

agement. The Department of the Army letter of 25 February 1966. 

which approved the signa l brigade concept, stated that there would 

be a single Army manager for the Integra ted ,"Videband Communi. 

cations System in Southeast Asia. 

From the outset two organizations. the Saigon offi ce of the Defense Communications Agency and the 1st Signal Brigade, were 

thus set up to manage the fixed communications in Vietnam. The 

extent and intensity of management differed between tbe two organizations and there was no gross duplication of effort, although the 

possibility was certainly present. Brigadier General Raben D. 

Terry attributed the harmony to the vigorous control exerc ised by 

the staffs of the LOp military commands in Vietnam and Thailand 

and the co-operation of the Defense Communications Agency's clements in both countries. 

The Corps Area Communica tions System supplemented combat 

communi ca tions, provided extensions for tbe fixed Defense Com· 

munications System, and interconnected geographical areas nOl 

served hy the \\'ideband system. Over·all management of the Corps 

Area System \\'as exerc ised by U.S. Army, Vietnam, through its operational control O\'e!' the 1st Signal Brigade. In December of 1965 

two signal battalions, the 39th and the 41st, had had sole area COIllmunications respo nsibility throughout Vietnam. But as U.S. com-
TilE EVOLVI:-"'G CO:-"'CEI'T FOR CO;"I:\IUNlCATIONS 59 

bat forces cont inued to build lip in the Republic of Victnam. 

additional communications were urgeml y required to suppl ement 

the organi c communi ca tions of field force. division, and sc para te 

hrigade, The natu re of the combat o perations req uired the establishmelll o f communi ca tions between division and brigade base 

camps as well as between the aClllal comba t command posts loca ted 

~t remote landi ng zones and fire bases. T he wide dispersion of 

hoth logistic and (Omilat forces increased the need for interconnecting commu nica tions fa cilities. 

One o r the most pressing tasks for the 1st Signal Brigade was to 

insure dun the rapidly growing area commu nications system was 

install ed and operating effect ively. In the spring of 1966. this lask 

was virt ually impossibl e because of the accelerated rate of the deployment of com hat forces t.O Vietnam and the delay in the deployment of separate signal su pport companies and battalions. T he 1st 

Signal Brigade \\'as at first hard pressed to provide even barely adequate base camp and area support. In many cases org:lI1ic signal 

units of the combat forces were required to pro vi~ .: base camp 

support. thereby reduci ng the ir ability to support combat operati ons. But this potel1liaJly serious problem was eased as area communica tions support continued to improve throughout the latter 

half of 1966. 

T he arriva l of signal units from the United States during this 

period increased the 1st Signa l Urigade's capability to the poi nt 

where, in late 1966, the brigade had enough battal ions to provide 

and manage adequately area communications support in Vietnam. 

The Saigon and Long Binh area of responsibility was shared by 

two battal ions and the remainder of Vi etnam was divided among 

ni ne area su pport ba ttalions of the brigade . In the course of one 

)'ear. area communi ca tions support had skyrocketed from the limited capabilities of onl y tWO battalions in 1965 to the total resources of two signal group headquarters and ele\'en bau alions in 

late 1966. 

The combat systems, ,,"hich provided communications for the 

fighting units usi ng organic commlini cHiollS equipment. were of 

course controlled by the tanical commanders. At one time there 

lI'ere ~ix ee n interconnected U.S. Army combat communica tions 

systems in Vietnam: those of the two fi eld forces. one corps head-

<ptaners. the Capita l ,\ Iilitar)' Assistance Command in the Saigon 

area. the se\'CIl divisions. and the fi,'c se parate brigades or regi. 

ments. 
CHAPTER V 

Communications Operations 111 Combat 

SU/l/Jorling Ihe Field Forces 

The 54th and 53d Signal Batlalions, supporting I Field Force 

:Il ~ha Trang and II Field Force at a base camp called Plantation 

near Long Binh, were corps signal battal ions, modified to opera te 

in Vie tnam. The main command p OSt s of both the fi eld forces, UIllike those of corps, were semi permanent and did not deploy. 

There \\'ere also other differences betl>Jec n the operat ions of a field 

force al)d a doctrinal corps, and these differences were reAected in 

the communica ti ons that were provided to field force headquarters 

and corps headquarters in Vietnam. 

The principal peculi<lrit)' of field force signal communica tions 

resulted from the need to supplant traditional wire with mobile 

multichannel radio relay systems across the miles that separated 

the base camps of the subordinate units, ~Iultichannel radio systems were extended to lo\\'er levels than ever before, In some instances. muhichannel service \\'<lS provided as 10\\' as artilleq' battery level whereas. by accepted doctrine, normal corps systems 

terminate at artillery group level. Both corps signal battalions were 

capable of operating approximately eighteen multichannel radio 

rela), links. It was normal to connect all U.S. combat troops and 

those of Free World :'>.Iilitary Assistance Forces \\'ithin the field 

forces' tactical areas of responsibility wi th the fi eld force headqua rters, In addition, it \\'35 common practice to employ circuits and 

systems of the 1st Signal Brigade's Corps Area Communications 

System to provide alternate routing. 

Each of the two field forces had a distinct and sep.1rate method 

of employing the resources of the Corps Area Communications System to supplement the organic communications; each had a specific reason. The II Field Force, opera ting in the relati"ely nat and 

populous III Corps Tactical Zone, used the corps area circuitry as 

alternate routing for its o\\'n combat system. In essence, the Corps 

Area Communications System and the II Field Force's combat 

communications system \\'('1'e interconnected throughout III Corps 
CO;\":\IUNICATIONS OPERATIONS IN COMBAT 61 

r 

HON CO:-."C MOUNTAIN SrC:-."AL SrTE, focal poinl for integration of /sl 

Cavalry Division commrmicaliolls and lsI Signa' Brigade's Corps Area 

Commrmications Syslem. 

Tactical Zone to the extent that each system could potentially pro· 

vide 100 percent backup for the other. 

On the other hand, I Field Force had (he responsibility for II 

Corps Tactical Zone, which consisted of about one·half the area of 

the Republic of Vietnam, the la rgest and most mountainous tacti· 

cal zone in the republic. ).Jeither the 54th Signal Battalion of I 

Field Force nor the lSI Signal Brigade's corps area communica ti ons 

resources in II Corps Tactical Zone could alone provide the neces· 

sary command and control comm unications from I Field Force 

headquarters in Nha Trang to the various U.S. and other Free 

"Vorld Military Forces combat headquarters in the zone. Therefore 

a concept evolved under which the 54th Signal Battalion would 

provide the multichannel communications from the forward com· 

mand post-be it a newly created ];mciing zone for a nwltibrigadc 

operation or a remote fire support base occupied by an artillery 

group--IO a communica ti on complex of a 1st Signal Brigade unit, 

From there the communica tions would traverse the Corps Area 

Communications System to Nha Trang and into the I Field Force 
62 COM:\I UN IC,\ TJO;';S-ELECTRON les 

headquarters. The alternate rOliling or backup capabili ty that prevailed in III Corps Tacti ca l Zone existed onl y within the Corps 

Area Commun ications System in the II Corps Tactical Zone. 

Supportillg the Divisions 

The combat communications systems of each division in Vietnam differed from the standard doctrine in se parate ways. These 

departures from doctrine came abollt panly as the resu lt of th e 

difference in terrain and operating conditions throughout the 

country and partl y because of the fact that each division was, in 

essence, "writing its own book" on counterinsurgency warfare. 

The order during 1966 was "search and destroy" and each combat 

division had its own way of conducting such operations. As are· 

suit, during the Vietnam War the various division signal offi cers 

continually tailored their signal battalions and adj usted their 

methods of o perating. 

During the period 1969-1970 when I enjoyed the pleasure of 

hosting a countrywide Signal Officers' Conference. I was constantly 

amazed and impressed at the divergence of opinion that appeared 

in any d isc ussion regarding the sol ution to a common problem. 

This can be attributed not only to the different circumstances in 

which each senior communicator found himself. bu t also to the 

inventiveness a nd free thinking that the signalman has always displayed. 

For the most p.1.rt. each d ivision signal baualion in action in 

Vi etnam had the same mission. All these units were responsible for 

providing the comm:md and contro l communications to the division's maneuver elements. to the direct suppon el ements, and to 

the combat elements of the Free ' Vorld r."Jilitary Assistance Force 

operatin g in the d ivision area. In addition. the signal battalions 

were required to use d ivision resources to provide comm unications 

fa ciliti es in the various base camps, compl ementing those provided 

by the Corps Area Communica ti ons Systems, which handled the 

bulk of the administrative and logisti cal traflic. 

In the Republic of Vi etnam a division usually operated in an 

area of responsibility covering 3,000 to 5,000 square miles. Such an 

operating area was enormous as compared to the 200 to 300 square 

mil es in whi ch a U.S. Army div ision would operate in cOllven· 

tional warfare. In addition, the divisions in Vietnam frequently established battalion·size and occasionai1 y company·size fire support 

bases, all of wh ich had to be lied together with reliable, responsive 

(ommUniC:lliulls to ensure quick reaction in an emergency. As 
COi\I:'I U NICt\TIO;\,S OPERATIONS I N COMBAT 63 

often as not, the division had the job of tying in Viemamese Army 

elements, Spec ial Forces camps, and U.S. "dviscrs on province and 

district headquarters, so that mutual support wa s possible, The 

need to tie in all of these, whil e deal ing with the factors of varying 

terrain and weather, made the provision of effective communications a chall enge to each di vision. Brigadi er General William M. 

Van Harlingen, Jr. , Assistant Chief of Staff for Commu nicationsElectroni cs at U.S. Army, Vietnam, from July 1967 through January 1969, stated in his debriefing report of J anuary 1969. that the 

"division signal probl ems in South Vietnam bear lillI e resemblance 

to those in a more conventional war." 

The mobile multichannel radio relay system was the backbone 

of division communi cations. Generall y )\md in a division area 

were a dozen or two multichannel rad io rela y links that connected 

the headquarters with brigade and baltalion command postS and 

fire support hases. As in the fi eld force systems, the sole-user circuit 

requirement was extensive_ On the average , approximatel y onethird of the total avail able circuits were restriCled to sole-lisers, 

and the majority of these terminated at the division tactica l operalion cent ers, For alternate emergency routi ng of circuits, the divisions utilized the corps area communications systems wherever and 

wh enC\'er possihle_ During com hat operations, \\'hen maneuver elements initiated their aClion from established base camps, the 

mobile radio rela y links were extended to the area of comba t acti on. Alternate rOllting and backup links were used extensively, 

and the field force and the corps area commun ications systems 

often provided needed assistance, espec ially for intelligence, logis· 

tic, and administrative communica tions. 

In division signal battalions, personnel and equipment au thoriza tions \\'ere modifi ed in order to meet the huge requirements 

placed on them, hut in :111 cases a great de:ll of support was necessary from the ('orps area (,Olllllllln icators. The necessity to rel y on 

the Corps Area Communi cations System for addition:!l support W:lS 

particulal'l y tTli e of the auslerc signal battalions of the airmobile 

divisions, whi ch were streamlined li ghtlveights designed for mo· 

bil e, nomadic operations. hilt were nHlght instead in the semipermanent en vironment of combat support and fire support bases. 

SPecia l Forces om mlll/ i('a ri ol/ ;lI VI'ely'am 

U.S. Army Special Forces were fi rst employed in Vietnam in 

19fi l. In the earl y stages of U.S. in volvement in Vietnam, small detachments were deployed on a six-month temporary dillY basis 
64 CO:"I:"I UN ICATIO=",'i-ELECTRO:\,ICS 

with a larger detachment based in Saigon as the control element. 

The mission of the \ 1.5. Special Forces was to recruit and train Vietn"mc~e irrcgnlar paramilitary forcc~ to defend th eir own homes 

and hamlets. In 1964 the 5th Spec ial Forces Croup was deployed 

to Vietnam. Thi~ group. headquartered at ~ha Trang wilh the 

VicmOlmcsc Army Special Forces. had detachments spread throughnIH th e cnullu-y a t the mml i~olatcd vi llages and hamlets, \\'orking 

with anc! advising th e Victll;lme~e local defense fnrcc~. A .. more and 

morc conventional {J,S. troops arrived in Vieln:lIll, the U.S. Army 

Special Forces effon cxp'lIlded. By June 1906 Ill(' Specia l Forces 

had operat ional control of over 40,000 Civi lian Irregular Defe nse 

Group troops and advised 35.000 members of the Vietnamese 

Regional Forces and Papillar Force~. 

To support the countrywide U.S. Special Forces mission, the 

signal compa ny of th e :)th Special Forces Grou p establ ished secm e 

radio tc letvpewriter links from the operational base at Nha T rang 

to th e detachment .. ;lIld teams in each cor ps tactical lone. This primary system was suppl emented by long.distance \'oice radio nets 

th;ll virtually hlanketed the (QIIlllry. 

The U.S. Special Forces com munications system was not th e 

' lIhjen of milch fanfare in Vietnam and was overshadowcd by the 

elabora te fi xed communica ti ons install ati ons that appeared 

throughout the Imlntry. It is .t{n ifi ('a nt . ho\\"ever. th at the longt:1n ce higldreqllenq ' "oice and leletYI>C\\'riter radio nets of this 

!I),stem were iiI(' onh' meam of COlllaCI with the OIl1side world for 

man y small Special Forces detachments. The communi ca ti ons oper-

=ltecl and ma intained lIy the sigll:1l men of the 5th Special Forces 

Crollp were inch.'pe ndc llt of ;111 )' ot her U.S. s),stcm in Vietnam. 

COlllnllllliCflliollS {or Ihe BailIe for Dflk T o 

What hapJ>rnec! in th e battle for Dak To. ncar the Cambodian 

harder in central Vietnam in No\'cmber 1967. illustrates not onl y 

the responsivcn ess of the U.S. comhat communicator during a nuid 

and furious cng'agclllcllt , hill a lso th e interconnection and mutua l 

support wh ich the division and field force signal battalions and th e 

l~t Signal higa(h."~ arca battalions colltinuall)' provicl ed for each 

other throughoUl the Vietnam \ Var. 

The baltle of Dak Tn \\'as nOt ;1 separate opera tion in itself hut 

OCCUlTed within the ho undari es of the U.S. Army 4th Infantry Division's Oper'llion I\l Ar.AltTIl UIC ;\!everth eless. the sile of the two 

opposing forces, the length and violence of the engagement, and 

tilt: II\"er·,,11 sig.n ifil.;]l1( c III th e hatt lc ha;'e made lilt· :vc nt ~ [hat oc· 
COM :,\ I U NICATIONS O PERATIONS IN CO:,\IBA T 65 

cUrfed in the vicinity of Oak To ITom latc October until December 1967 among the most significam that occurred in the Ceillral 

Ilighiands. 

In latc October U.S. reconnaissance revealed the presence of 

the North Vietnamese Army's 1st Division. with its four regiments 

supported by a rocket artill ery regiment, deployed hct\\'een Oak 

To and the common border area of Vietnam. Cambodia, and Laos. 

U.S. intelligence information pointed toward an imminclH North 

Vietnamese Army allack on Oak To. To meet this threat, Major 

General "Villiam R. Peers, Commanding General. 4th Infantry Division, on 1 November scnt his 1st Brigade with an attached batttllion of the 173d Airborne Brigade to positions jusl west of Oak T o. 

When immediale contact was made with Ihe enemy and heavy 

lighting ensued, the I Fie ld Force commander. Lieutenant General 

\Vil1iam B. Rosson, provided General Peers wilh more troops and 

suppOrt. The remainder of the l73d Airborne Brig:lde arrived in 

the Oak To area on 5 No\·embcr. The next day the 4111 Infantry 

Division established a tactica l command post at Oak T o to comrol 

the two subordinate headquaners. The buildup of forces. which 

included significant numbers of combat suppor! and logistic units, 

continued until the 181h , when Colonel Donald V. Rattan's 

lSI Brigade, 1st C1. \'alry Division . jo ined Ihe baul e, eSlablishing its 

battlefield command post at Polei Kleng, near Kontum. By Ihen 

the fighting was spreading to the west as the North Vietnamese 

forces were destroyed or pushed back into their sanctuaries in 

Cambodia and Laos. (MflP 4) 

The furious action around Oak T o during the month of No-

,·ember. together with the fan that a force of U.S. romh:n and Slip' 

pan troops constilliling more than a complete U.S. division had 

been committed, posed some problems 10 the 4th Infantry Division 

signalmen. For example. while the 124th Signal Baualion, com· 

manded by Lieutenant Colonel William M. Spitz, ,\'as busy establishing a complete division communi cation syslem in the Oak To 

battle area, it also had to maintain its pre"jollsl)' established network at P leiku and take care of the rest of the division area in II 

Corps Tactical Zone. The ('ltemy made sure that his presence 

would not be forgotten elsewhere by stepping lip :nwcks by fire 

and ambushes throughollt the emire Celllral Highlands. In a classic 

example of combat communica ti ons support. the 124th Sign:1I Battalion sllccessfully met the chall enge by judicious lise of its own re· 

sources, as well as those provided by I Fi eld Force's 54 th Signal 

Battalion and the 43d Signal Battalion of the 1st Signal Brigade. 

The 124th 's initial effort in support of the balile of Oak To 
06 COM t\1 UNle,\ TlONS-ELECTRONICS 

FIRE SU PPORT BA St: 0;>.' A RmCE NEAR OAK To. Tall on/Clillas were used 

to ex/end range of mobile voice radios. 

was th e installation of two 12-cha nnel links from the division roam 

command poSt a t Camp Enari ncar Plci ku [0 th e division's 1st 

Brigade forward command post at Oak To. Upon arrival of th e 

division tactical command POSt at Oak To, on 6 November, the 

battal ion was operating a mobile, one-position switch board for the 

1st Brigade of th e 4th Di"jsion. With th e increase in <lni vilY it became necessa ry to install a second switchboard for the di vision tactical command element. This second swi tchboa rd, li ke the first, \\';15 

shortl y s.'uunlled : it became appa rent that th e 1st Logistical Command's forward support act ivit)" airfi eld control personnel. and 

other support units, continuall y arriving by air and road, all had a 

need for area COlllmun iratiOIlS support. The Division Signal Oflicer 

made a rcq uest to Headquaners, I Field Force, for area service in 

order to relieve the increasing pressure un his tWO Slllall mobile 

swi tchboards and the command ;md control teletype circuits which 

his signal battalion had act ivated. As a resillt. the 1st Signal Bri· 

gade's 43d Signa l Ba ttal ion, unde r the (Ommand of Lieutenant 

Colonel Edwill B. Gentry, installed area te[epl1OI1(' and llll'sSilge 
MAP4 

COMMUNIC,\TIO:-lS OPERATIONS I N COMBAT 

BATTLE FOR DAK TO 

(NOVEMBER 1%7) 

67 

service at Dak To as \I'ell as a l2-channel general-user link from 

Oak T o to Plcikll . Thus rcliCI'cd of area service responsibility. the 

comllluni ca lions resources of the 124th Signal Bau;dion cOllld and 

did remain ori ented toward the command and control effort. 
08 CO.\1 i\I Ui\' rCAT10:"1S-ELECTRON res 

As the 173d Airborne Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Leo H. $chweiler. arrived, it was tied illlo the systcm. The 

124th installed the necessary links b('lwccn the division taclical 

command post and the 17~d's baltlefield command post at Ben 

I-I('t, west of Oak To. To provide the circuits from th e 173d for· 

ward command POSt back to its avj:u ion suppOrt. which remained 

at KUllllllll , and its h<lSC camp IOC:Hi(J1l i\l , \11 Khl'. a mix 01 12'lth. 

<l3d, and I Field Force's 54th Signal B;malioll multichannel li nks 

was employed. Lieut enant Colonel Robert j\ 1. Springer's 54th Sig· 

lIal Baual ioll prm'ided a r11tdtich:tIllid link h(:'\I\"('(" l l Oak T o airfield and KoTltum. At Kontulll this link tied into an established 

41d Signal Ba ttalion system to pick up the An Klie circuits. Two 

other 54th Signal Battalion links already in operation, one from 

Camp Enari to Pleiku and one from Pkiku to D<lk T o airfi eld, 

were Ilsed for additional special purpose circuitry. 

Some of th e largest demands for circuits over the systems provided by these three haualions were to support U.S. air operations. 

~ot only was there a need for ex tensive communications at the 

Army airfi elds but there was also a requirement for air ro ute traffic 

control and point-tn-paim dose air suppOrt cin:uits. Finally, significant numbers of channels \\'ere needed to control and guid e th e 

I;lrge bom ber effort dirc(:Icd hy Cencral \ Vestllloreland. The extensive requiremc llIs for communi ca tions in su ppon of air operations werc not confi n('d 10 this h;nde, but were typira l of most 

other opera tions in Vietnam. 

As the battl e reached a peak in mid·i\'ovember, the area system 

betwecn Dak To and Pl e iku proved insuflicient. The 1st Signal 

Brig<lde thercnpon made <l1T<tIlge1llents to inst<ll] a 24-channe l tropospheric sca tt er systcm wi th mobil e eq uiplllcllI between Dragon 

:o.rOllntaiu. aelja,·cnt In Camp En<'lri, <'Inc! the U,S. adv isers' COIllpound, which stood next to th e village of Tan Canh and had been 

consistcntly llsed as a radio relay site into the Dak To airfield. Of 

these twenty,four chan n('ls. th c 124t11 Signal l3allalion was 10 use 

I\\'el\'e in direct suppOrt of the 41h infa nlry Division, in order to 

exte nd these circuits to the division tanical command post at the 

airfiel(1. the 124tll's linelllen installed a 12-c hannel la nd line C<'lrricl' 

system usi ng spiral-fo ur cable. This four-mile link was one of th e 

relatively fe\,· ('ahle spI('Im imlalled olltside the perimeter of U.S. 

camps in Vietnam. Usually radio re lay \"Qll1d ha ve !)een lIsed. blll 

in Ihis {'ase Ihe '1lh Infantry Division signalmen had si mpl y exhausted the suppl y of radio equipment. 

In all. dnl'in~ the thirt)-Ihree days of Ihe h:Htle for Dak To. 

over fifteen multichannel links we re installed <'I nc! ope rated in cli-
COl\IMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS IN COM BAT 69 

rect support of the operation. The majorit.y·of these belonged to 

the 124th Signal Battalion. "VithOUl tile help and assistance or the 

COllullunicaLOrs from the I Field Force and the 1st Signal Brigade, 

however, [he support provided lhe combat and lhe combat service 

commanders during this signifi cam battle wo uld have been very 

lea n at best. 
CHAPTER VI 

Control and Direction: Problems and Solutions 

The size and complexity of the communications systems in 

Southeast Asia, along with the (act that the systems were fr equemly interconnected and superimposed, required the (ormation 

of special organizations, techniques, and procedures to furnish 

effectively communications engineering and technical control and 

direction for the systems. This is sometimes referred to as technical 

management. 

Technical Ma'iagement 

Technica l management of the combat systems was comparatively simple because of the generally uniform system configurations and small size of the networks. The engineering and technical control functions were built into the operating unit, and 

over-a ll direclion came hom the unit 's o perations staff. Each signal 

battalion of the field forces and divisions had a systems control sec· 

tion, popularl y referred to as SYSCON. The section was in operation twenty.four hours a day, usually with two men on each sh ift. 

The systems control section was responsible for engineering :lOd 

controlling all of the communications systems and networks operated by the un it. 

The chain of technical management of the defensc and corps 

area comnwilicatiolls s)stcms. howevcr, was long, and. like the 

Mekong River. followed myriad paths. The chain for both systems 

began outside Vietnam. That for the 1st Signal Brigade originated 

at the Army's Strategic Communica tions Command Headquarters 

at Fon Huachuca, Arizona. Techni ca l cont rol and direct ion for thc 

Defense Communications Systcm weill from the Defense Communications Agency in Washington to its Pacific Area in Hawaii , 

then to its SOlliheast Asia i\lainland Region in Saigon. The Army 

aspects of the communica tions engineering and controlling efforts, 

rather than th ose of the joint Defense Communications Agency, are 

emphasized here. 

When it was formed, the 1st Signal Brigade inherited the engi. 
CONTROL AND DIRECTION 71 

neerlng and control tasks that always accompany any large headquaners charged with communications system installation and 

operation responsibilities. These tasks had previously been performed by Colonel Moran's 2d Signal Group systems control and 

engi neeri ng staff. To this small organizat ion had fallen the chores 

of engineering and controlling all 2d Signal Group installa tions 

and operations at a time when the gro up consisted of about 3,000 

men spread th inl y throughout the republ ic. 

In the spring of 19(i6 when Colonel Robert D. Terry was organizing the 1st Signal Brigade, the growing communica tions act ivity 

in Viet nam requ ired separa te, siza ble. headquarters elements. Each 

engineering speciality would have its own headq uaners elementone for fixed-pia III projects, another for the Integrated Wideband 

Communications System under construction and still another for 

telephone management. Similarl y. centra li zed control over both 

Department of Defense and Corps Area Communica tions Systems 

required a separa te, complex structure in the hri gade headquarters. 

Elaborate equipment was needed in additi on to a large, highl y speciali zed work force of skilled communicati ons controllers. 

Communications E71gineering and Installation 

On 23 April 1966, Colonel Teny addressed a memorandum to 

his brigade deputy, Colone l Cordon B. Cauble, to Colonel Moran, 

and to Colonel Riley, Deputy U.S. Army Vi etnam Signal OlTicer, 

on the subject of plant engi neering and installation fu nctions. He 

pro JX>sed that a commllllications engineeri ng management age ncy 

be established composed of seventy-five men. A mon th later, on 23 

1\ lay, the organization was set up as the Commun ications-Electronics Engineering and Installation Agency, responsible for developing the required plans and programs and providing the managemelll of fi xed-plant proj ects, especia ll y hea vy cable construction in 

Vietnam. Lieutenant Colonel Clarence R. Driscoll came to the 1st 

Signal Brigade from the Pacific field office of the Strategic Communications Command's worJdh·ide Engi neering and InstaJ1a tion 

Agency on Okinawa. He arrived in Saigon in J une 1966 to run 

Colonel T erry's engi neering agency, bringing six engi neers with 

him. By March 1967 he had sixty-six engineers at work in the 

age ncy. Before the end of 1967 the agency was enlarged still further and was renamed the Communications Systems Engineering 

and 1\ lanagemcnt Agency. One of the most important elements of 

this agency was the project management office for the Integrated 

\Videband Communications System being install ed in Southeast 

Asia. Origi nall y headed by Lieutenant Colonel Patrick F. Kearins, 
72 COl\! 1\1 UN ICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

this office was the focus for co-ordination between the contractor 

and the military services. 

T elephone Engineering and Management 

Another managerial element, also involving engineering duties, 

was the brigade headquarters organi za tion thal supervised the installation of telephone switches in and around Sa igon. To supervise the mushrooming number of telephone switches in the metropolitan area, Colonel Terry crcated the Saigon T elephone 

Management Agency. In the summer of 1965 the U.S. military tel· 

ephone system in Saigon had consisted of two manual switchboards 

that served the two se parate joint U.S. headquarters complexes in 

the Saigon area. The tota l telephone cable fac ilities, or outside 

plant, at that time consilited of approx imately 400 circuit miles of 

combat fi eld wire, spira l four, and rubber·covered 5· and 26-pair 

cables_ In addition, three ca bles systems were leased from the Vietnamese Postes, Telegraphs et Telephones office to provide circuitrOUling between Saigon, Tan Son Nhm Air Base, and the 1st Signal Brigade's terminal at Phu Lam. 

The number of U.S. Army tel ephone switchboards in Saigon 

was increased during the fall and winter of 1965 to six local manlIal tel ephone exchanges, three other small manual exchanges 

called private branch exchanges, and one long-distance switchboard 

conneCted into the countrywide system. Two o f the manual ex· 

changes were made up of large, nine-position switchboards 

mounted in V<lns. The remaining switchboards consisted of componelllS of an o lder model, manual telephone central office. with 

four to nine operator positions, depending on the loca ti on. 

As the need for more land for U.S. acti vities increased. so did 

the telephone requests. These six loca l exchanges no longer provided "on base" comm unications; instead. a U.S. Army metropolitan tel ephone system began to take shape. This system lacked an 

over-all manager and, as a result, several serious problems arose. 

Createst of these problems were inadequa te trunking, and in some 

cases none at all, between local exchanges: lack of an outside cable 

pl ant capable of mee ting increasing subscriher demands; lack of 

unified cabl e and circuit records; and insufficient operator posi. 

tions to handle traffic d uring the busy hours. At this time the 

nine-position switchboard va ns were handling an average of 1,800 

ca lls during their busiest hour. T o further complicate the telephone communication picture, Sa igon had two civilian and four 

Vietnamese Army di al lelephone exchanges, a U.S. Air Force exchange at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. and three exchanges operated 
CONTROL ANI) I>IRECTION 

SIGSAL~ EN OPERATI"'G A LARGE :\fASllAL TELEPIIOSE SWITCIIHOARD AT 

SAIGOS 

by the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Army telephone system was superimposed on these existing facilities. With this maze confronting it 

the Saigon Telephone Management Agency was established and 

began operations in April 1966. 

The inadequate manual facilities had to be replaced. The 1st 

Signal Brigade performed this task by providing aUlomalic dial telephone switches, mOllnted in huge vans and serving up to 600 sub· 

scribers. Later, fixed automatic dial telephone exchanges were inS1alled. The laller exchanges were sophisticated modern facilities, 

serving several 1I1Ous;md subscribers. Since these modern automatic 

telephone proje/.:ls were being installed in the capi tal area they had 

to be interconnected by large, high-capacity cable links or trunks 

of high quality. 

In the spring of 1966 these projects were the responsibility of 

the telepimne lll:lll<lg'cmeIH agCllI'y and were largely confined at 

first to the metropolitan area of Saigon. Bm as 1967 progressed, 

thc need for automatic telephone service exp.-lllded far be)'ond Sa igon. Automatic dial telephone facilities were installed at man)' 
74 COM i\I UN ICA TIONS-ELECTRONICS 

outlying points, not only in Vietnam but also in Thailand. T he 

1st Signal Brigade found it necessary to se t lip a telephone managemCIll office in each numbered signal gTOUp. Since telephone service 

was required beyond the confines of the automatic dial service provided to local areas, automati c long-distance dialing facilities were 

needed also. These last military sophistications were called tandem 

switches by the Army, but were better known in the United States 

as direct distance dia ling. 

Obviously the telephone management agenc)" the over-all can-

(Tol in the brigade, had to redouble its engineering and management respo nsibilities. By the end of 1967, therefore, it was enlarged and redesignated as Southeast Asia Telephone Management 

Agency. The accomplishments of the tel ephone agency and the 

workers of the brigade were most immediately evident in the metropol itan area. During the first nine months after the agency's formation, 90 percent of the telephone system in Sa igon was trans· 

fo rmed frOI11 a manual to an automatic dial system. Although 

there had been many problems, they had been solved; and now the 

single-ma nager concept pioneered by the Saigon Telephone Management Agency was bei ng broadened to include telephone man· 

agement (or the entire country. 

Comm ImiClllions Control Means and Methods 

Within the first week after the crea tion of the 1st Signal Brigade, Colonel Terry had issued a letter of instruction, dated 7 

April 19G6, concerning com mun ications control. The Objecti ve of 

communica ti ons control as he defined it was "to provide daily operationa l direction of the communi ca tions circuits whic h collectively form the U.S. Army Communica ti ons Systems Vietnam and 

Defense Communications System (DeS Army) circui ts in South· 

east Asia." The organ ization that was created to perform this function was originally ca lled the Command Communications Control 

Center Agency. It utilized the resources and the operati ng personnel of the 2<1 Signal Groupsystems control clement. 

These men of Colonel i\'foran's 2d Signal Group had been 

perform ing communications control duti es in Vietnam since 

mid· 1965. In August 1965, when the U.S. Army Strategic 

Communications Command had become resJXlllsible for the De· 

fense Communicatiolls System in Southeast Asia, it also became responsihle for cuntro lling the circu ilS of lhe Defense Communications System. The 2d Signal Croup systems control had then 

l:olltinued 10 watch over only the combat and corps area circuits. 

This spl it responsib il ity had produced problems on procedures for 
CONTROL AND DIRECTION 75 

reporting circuit failures, activat ions, and similar routine communications actions. Combining the communica ti ons control of the 

Defense Communications System and the corps area circuits was, 

of course, one of Colonel Terry's major objectives. 

A crucial and central organization in this unifying effort was 

the new communications control agency, which was renamed in 

February 1967 the Army Communications Operations Center in 

Saigon. The center served as the primary control hub for all Army 

Southeast Asia communications. A secondary control center was established in November 1966 in Thailand at Koral. The center received up-to-the-minute information and data on all systems, their 

operation, and message traffic loads and flow . In particular, the 

center's o perators watched for any breakdowns, or "outages" in 

communicator jargon, and insured that pro per action was taken. 

This service was the Army's contri bution to the Defense Communications Agency's management over the Southeast Asia Wideband 

System. Besides this major over-a ll center in Vietnam and a secondary center in Thailand. there were similar, small er s) .. :'!m control 

elements within the 1st Signal Brigade's numbered groups, 

watching over area communica tions. Within the signal baua lions 

of these groups were still smaller watchdog el ements. This was also 

true of the combat signal battalions of the divisions and corps. 

T hese agencies of the communica tions community were all established to provide the essential engineering and control efforts 

necessary to manage the communica ti ons network as it existed in 

the spring of 1966. All the agenc ies were eagerly anticipating the 

long.awaited lnteg-ra ted Wide band Communica tions System which 

would give the country the fixed·station, high quality backbone so 

urgently needed for effective command control. 
CHAPTER VII 

Integrated Wideband Communications System 

The Integrated Wideband Communications System was a mtcrowave and tropospheric scau er communi ca tions web that eventually spanned the entire Repuhlic of Vi etnam and Thailand. The 

equipment was commercially procured. insta ll ed by a contractor, 

and the system was, therefore. of commercial fixed-station improved quality th ro ughout. It constituted the Southeast Asia portion of the g lobal Defense Commun icat ions System which had 

been delegated to the Army by the Dep.1rlmem o f Defense 

th rough its Defense Communica ti ons Agency. The compl eted system became by far the largest communications complex the Army 

had c,'er undenaken. crea ting an equivalcm of the Bell T elephone 

System for South Vietnam and Thailand. However, the integrated 

system did not come into being quickly, easily, or, for that malter, 

inexpensively. 

An urgent request for the fixed-plant system had been made in 

mid·1964, accompanied by a required implementation dale of December 1965. The implementation date. however, was not met; in 

fact, fi fteen months elapsed from the date of the contract award 

until the first link became operational in December 1966. This initial link was a small part of Phase: I of the three ultimate phases of 

the Integrated 'Videband Communications System. 

Th e Three Phases 

In Vietnam, Phase I of the Integrated Wideband Communications System, incorporating and expanding the BACK PORCH links, 

was primarily int ended to prov ide more circuits from Saigon and 

north throughout the country. A new extension was buill from the 

Monke)' :\Iountain site in Da Nang to Phu Bai, a large U.S. encampment area just south of the imperial city of Hue. In the cenleI' of a huge triangle between Saigon, Nha Trang. and Pleiku, an 

important circuit and system-switching facil it y was built on to p of 

I)r' Line i\ lolintain, a shan dista nce to the southeast from Dala l. 

High-capacity links were to be provided between I'r' Line and the 
INTEGRATED WIDEUAND CO~Il\ UN CATIONS SYSTEM 77 

PR' LINE MOUNTA IN SIC:-<AL FACILITY, a key site of the Integrated wideband Comrnlmicatiolls System. 

three corners of the triangle. Numbers of short links were built in 

and arou nd the capital city area, where the fixed systems of Phase 

I replaced earl ier tactical microwave circu its. Phase I of the integrated system was not intp.nded to support a large troop buildup 

but was to provide the communications for up to 40,000 U.S. 

IrOOPS in Vietnam, primarily advisers and helicopter units. 

As the force level in Vietnam grew, the requit'ements increased, 

and General ' '''estmoreland's communicators were forced to ask for 

the Phase II upgrade. The Depanment of Defense approved Phase 

II in January 1966 and scheduled its completion for October 1966. 

The primary purposes of Phase II were to expa:ld both the 

major north-south backbone trunk system and the Saigon microwave complex, and to extend the fix ed-plant system into new areas 

in support of combat operations. Sixteen .lew sites were to be 

added, involving Iwelll\'-five new communications links; nine 

Phase I links were to be upgraded to a higher cap.,c ilY. In all, the 

lotal num her of termi nals was doubled, and the circuit total was 

tripled. ' '''hen the Saigon- Nha Trang tropospheric scatler link was 
78 COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

upgraded to carry 240 chann t:ls, it was the world's first tro pospheric scatter link to achieve dail y operation at so large a capacity. 

In August 1966 the Secretary of Odense approved Phase III of 

the Integrated Wideb:md Communications System, which would 

provide suppon for 400,000 troo ps. The primary objective of this 

phase wa s to extcrod the wideband system into the Mekong Delta 

area in order to meet the needs of expanding combat operations 

there. No new major relay systems were included in this phase. but 

many short links were added arollnd large nodal sites in the existing wide band network. The first link of Phase III would not be 

completed until December 1967. 

Concurrent with the award of a letter contract to Page Com· 

munica tions Engineers. Inc., for the Vietnam portion of the fixedplam system. the Army awarded the comract for the Thailand por· 

lion to Philco·Ford Corporation. In Thailand progress was made 

in the same phase pattern as in Vi etnam. With the obvious excel' 

lion of combat action, the problems experienced in Thailand duro 

ing the ultimate compl etion of the wideband system paralleled 

th ose in Vi etnam. 

Problems and Delays 

The installation project moved forward relentlessly, if somewhat unevenly at times, amid diversified problems and difficulties 

of funding, managing, supplying, and manning, wh ich invariably 

accompany any large·scal e effort. This effort, however, was unique 

in Army experience for its size and complexity. Impl ememation of 

such an ambitious project could nOt be expected to come easily. 

Construction ;"Ind operation at the Tllany si tes, ultimatel y fifty·nine 

sites in Vi etnam, fell short of the expected timetable. This situation \\'<lS hardly surprising in view of such seri ous obstacles as remote sites and transportation difficulties in Southeast Asia and 

fundin g and programming delays in Washi ngton. In retrospect, it 

is to tile credit of everyone involved that the undertaking turned 

out as well as it did. 

Because of these delays, Phase I and II were not completed on 

schedule. The last link of Phase I was not accepted by the governmem umiljanuary 1968, two years and one month after the original requested opera tional date of December 1965. Not until Feb· 

ruary 1968 did the last link. of Phase II go into o peration in 

Vietnam, a year and four months after the date requested, October 

1966. The remainder of the Integra ted Wideband Communica· 

tions Syslem. Phase III along with a few additional modifica ti ons. 
INTEGRATED W IDEBAN!) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM 79 

would not be completed until much later in 1968. In the meantime, commanders al all levels urgentl y demanded that the system 

be completed as soon as possible. 

Such demands for the completion of the system, however, could 

not be easily met. The military had chosen to install a fixed, commerc ially procured system. And the commercial equipment needed 

for this system was entirely different from the communications 

hardware previously used in a war zone; it was Cllstom built and 

enormously costly. In addition. engi neering, manufacturing, test· 

ing, acceptance, and operalion presellled many difficulties at all 

levels. But it was the grea t expense of the system which surprised 

and chagrined many. 

At Army and Department of Defense levels in Wasbington, the 

major impediment was ge tting money. The lime-consuming process of fundin g had to come before anything else could be done. 

The budgetary mills of government could only grind out the 

funds slowly by increments. Yet. piecemeal funding, and the resultant bit·by-bit cOlllracting and installing, apparently cost more 

in the long run than a single lump-sum allocation at the outset. 

For example, a Strategic Communica ti ons Command report dated 7 

June 1967 Stales, in part: "This office has received a retransmission 

from Page Commun ica tions Engineers, stating that existing Phase 

III money would be exhausted by 15 July 1967 and that if additional incremental money was nOt forthcoming, the program \\'ill 

suffer in increased cost." 

In mid-1966 the Assista nt Secretary of Defense had returned a 

third addendum of the wideband communications program to the 

Defense Communicat ions Agency for additiona l justification. The 

authorities in Washington were questioning the need for all the 

money that was bei ng sought for channel expansions of trunks not 

yet in service and replacements of mobile combat systems at 

greatly increased capacity. They disbelieved the reports and re· 

quirements coming from the Southeast Asia war zone and insisted 

thal the funds be minutely justifi ed. The requirements had to be 

sta ted in detail. despite lhe fact that no one could determine the 

precise req ui reme nts far in adva nce. Frequently. changes had to be 

made in the system-in such matters as site loca ti on, equipment, 

and number of circuits-during the process of contracting and 

even of constructi on. Un foreseen demands continuall y arose requir. 

ing changes and, Ilsually, expansion, even aft er installa ti on had 

begun or had been completed. No t lInti l May 1966 were the Phase 

I and II contracts with Page Communications Engineers, Inc., fin· 

all y "definitized" for Vietnam. And four mont hs earlier, Phase 111 
80 CO"I M U NICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

had already been launched, calling for more circuits, morc terminals. and the upgrading of older terminals. This phase involved 

more equipment and larger antennas to provide morc channels, resulting naturally in a plea for more money. 

The increases and changes occurring in the midst of the funding and approval process were not the result of inefficielH planning. Rather, because of the gradua ted nature of the troop 

buildu p and the constantl y changi ng si tuation caused by combat 

activities. the volume and lype of traffic and Ihe disposition of subscribers \",ere not known early enough or in sufficient detail to enable proper engi neering of the trunking system. The logical steps 

in fixed-plant network engineering-traffic, plant, transmission, 

and equiprocllt engineering--could not be foll owed in this case. 

The difficulties enCOlintered in obtain ing adequate funds and 

establ ishi ng firm requirements were not the only faClars contributing to the delays in the fixed comm unicat ions project. 7rom the 

very beginning of the program, problems of site concurrence and 

site access were almost enc'less. For isolated sites, the problem was 

especially time-consuming, beginni ng with the in itial engineering 

surveys to find suitable locations. There were delays in gelting aircraft and ground transport to remote an'as in order to survey hillLOp si tes, and to make tests to determine the adequacy of proposed 

radio paths. Time was also consumed in obta ining pellllission from 

the local govern:nent to use these sites. Other delays ranged from 

the care required to avoid desecrating sacrcd trees in Thailand to 

the payment exacted for future harvests in Vietnam. 

Site acquisition difficulties involving the terminals on bases already established were .J[ten only a ;natter of building space. In 

llIany cases, installation commanders \\'110 had agTeed to furn ish 

space were no ~ able to do so when the lime came for construction. 

These comma nders discovered that their own unanticipated expansion had taken all of the available sp.:1.ce. in addition, the space requirements for the system increased beyond origi nal esti mates. 

Buildings had to be erec ted, and in some cases exp.:1. nded, to meet 

new requiremcnts. 

Production cap.:1.city and shor,tage of materia ls for the wideband 

systcm conSlit ulcd another signifi cant problem area. There were 

approximately 150 U.S. subcontractors providing material for the 

fixed comm unications in Vietnam and 100 subcontractors for Thailand. Page and Philco-Ford, the prime contractors, made every effort not to engage in Iircn competition for equipment by avoiding whenever possible the same vendors. in many cases, however, 

these prime contractors found 1Ilcmscives inadvenently compe ting 
INTEGRATE!) WIIlEBANO COMM UNICATIONS SYSTEM 81 

with one another because the secondo, third-, and fourth·tier vendors were furnishing components to the principal subcontractors 

for each_ ]11 addition, procurements by other government agenc ies 

with eel"al or higher priority than the Integrated Wideband Communications System as well as increased purchasing by commercial 

finns saturated the market. The industry was salllrated to such a 

point that even the offer of premium prices could not cause delivery dates to be moved lop. Business was so good that many films refused to accept a contract or subcontract with a penalty clause. In 

many cases, subcontracts were ",warded to finns that offered the 

earliest delivery dates and not necessarily to those with the lowest 

prices; however, the majority of suppliers failed to meet promised 

delivery dales. The basic causes of these failures were the delayed 

deli very of components or raw materials and the shortage of skilled 

labor. 

The tra nsportation of material, once it was finally available, 

was one of the most serious problems in the program. The accelerated buildup in Vietnam caused seaports and airports to become 

congested with cargo of every type imaginable destined for the war 

zone. Special-mission aircraft was the only means of getting the 

fixed communica tions hardware to Southeast Asia qui ckly. 

Throughout the period of installation, the U.S. Air Force Military 

Airlift Command provided spec ial Rights to bring the sorely 

needed electronic eqllipmelll illlo Vietnam. In addition, because a 

very active wa r was he ing waged and grou nd movement was constrained, the A;r Force combat ("a rgo ail'cra ft and the Army cargo 

helicopters were often the only means of gelling the hardware to 

the sites. 

Site construction was accomplisbed in a variety of geographical 

and geological areas that include the rice p:lddics of the Mekong 

Delta, the mountainous, rocky mid-country region, and the sandy 

beachcs along the coast. Each location presented a unique problem. Building and :lI1renna foundations in the delta arca had to be 

o f a spread·footing design to pre\'cnt sinking in the watcr-soaked 

day of th c rice paddies. In sandy areas, the problem of soil erosion 

was so severe that it frequentl y appeared to defy soluti on. The 

very pronounced wet and dry seasons in Southeast Asia also controlled construction schedules. II was virtually impossible to accomplish any out.3ide construction on communications sites during 

the rainy seasons. 

Other problems affecting construction of the wideband system 

were the remoteness of some sites and dIe security restrictions at 

practically all sites. Army cargo heli copters were used extensively 
82 COM;\I UN l e,\ T IONS-ELECTRON ICS 

A 120'FOOT ANTF ":-<A FRAME UNOER COSSTRUCTIOS ON VUNG CIIAU 

MOU!>.'TA IN, QUI NIION 

to transport men and material 10 mounta in sites such as Pr' Line. 

Han Cong i'olountain near An Khe. and ve Hill at Vung Tau. 

Oft en considerabl e stretches of new ro<ld had to be buill even before the actual work could begin. Use of the Vung Chua untain 

site. for example. juSt north of Qui Nhan, required the conStruction of thousands of feel of new road. In addition, an enormous 

:lIllQlIlll of rrx:k and din had to be removed from the site in order 

to provide a nat surface on which the facilities could be built. 

In the laller months of 1966 additional delays and difficulties 

in constrUClion and installation were caused by enemy action. Earlier. Ill(.' big military comm unica tions sites had rema ined rema rkably free from enemy harassment. It was almost as if the enemy fa-

\ored the new communica tions services which Southeast Asia was 

receiving for the first time in its history. 

On Th:mksgivi ng Day 190G, however, a costly amb ush of a 

commu nications eq uipmcnt convoy occurred near Dalal in the 

hills of south central Vietnam. The COIl\'oy. manned by 1st Signal 

Brigade soldiers and ContraCt civilian workcrs, was attacked while 
CO:-'IIIA ... SOL.l)IER.S OF HIE 1ST SIC:>IAt BRICADE FJRI:->C l\IOR.TARS FROM 

PR' L I:"IE 
84 CO '" MUNICATIO;-'<.'i-EI .f.CTRON les 

en route 10 th e mOtllH<'li lllOP site at PI" Line. Ei ght Page employees and one 1st Signal Brigade troo per were kill ed an d eleven men 

were wounded. Two of th e soldi ers in th e convo)', Sta ff Sergeant 

Gerald H. Bamberg and Specialist ' ·Valler S. Rogers, were ciled for 

valor in holding off the enemy and preventing th e complete ann ihilation of tbe convoy. 

Another major att ack affecting communi ca ti ons facilities occurred on th e night of 26 February 1967 at Da Nang. The enemy 

launched a large surprise rocket attack aga inst the Da Nang Air 

Base. One of the first enemy targets was the Army's signal compou nd on the base. FOrlunat c!y there were no casualties, but th e 

rockets com pl etel), destroyed four va ns in the communications 

m mpl ex which hOI!sed th e temporary mobile message rela y facility_ Replacement va ns were rushed to Vietnam hy th e Strategic 

Commu n ications Command's 11th Signal Group in th e United 

Stales, enabling reactivation o f the tape relay in ten days. Actually, 

no circuits or links were ..:omplctely out for more than a few 

hours, panly because of quick rerouting of circuits and partly because the enemy had failed to dam.lge th e big radio and technical 

control vans located adjacent to the tape relay facility. 

At last, by th e end of 1966, despite all delays am! difficulties, 

the first circu its of the \\"ideband system were tested, accepted by 

the Army. and "("ut to traffic," that is, put into service passing acwal communi ca ti ons. Brigadier General Roben D. T erry acce pted 

the first link o f th e Int egra ted Wide ba nd Comm unications System 

on 21 December 1966. This was one of two li nks wh ich carried 

tranic between Ph u 1.:1111 and the Tan Son Nhut Air Base in the 

Saigon area. These were th e first fixed site:- completed in Vietnam. 

The fi rst links in Thailand had been put into lise a lillie earlier, 

on 5 November, following the completion of tests between Karat 

and Udorn. 

After the cutover of the first li nks, the wideband communications system flo urished, fed by th e multimillion doll ar contracts to 

civilian companies and pushed by th e thousa nds of combat signal 

tmops that join ed the 1st Signal Brigade in the 1966- 1967 period. 

By mid-April 1967, hundreds of circuits in the integrated system 

had gone into service and eleven sites had been completed in Viet· 

nam. 

Combat Mobile Eqllipment Used in th e Interim 

It should be noted, however, that beca use of th e long delays invariably enco untered since the submission of th e initial require· 
INTEGRATED wlnEBA;.::n CO:\I:\IU:O<ICATIO:O<S 'i\'STDI 85 

SITE OCTOPUS, OUTSIDE SAICOX, A MAJOR CO:\IM UN ICATJO;..oS HUB IN 1967 

mcnts in August 1964, the fixed commu nications system could not 

keep pace with the huge b uildu p of U.S. and other Free World 

military forces in Vietnam. Keeping in mind tha t Phase I of the 

over-all system was designed to support 40,000 troops in Vietnam 

and that Phase II had a ceiling of 200,000, it can easily be understood that the Army communicators had many problems when the 

U.S. strength alone exceeded 350,000 men the day the widcba nd 

system's fi rst circuit was put into service. 

The solution to these problems, however temporary, was to lise 

every piece of med ium and heavy tropospheric scatter, microwave, 

and other mobile and tra nsportable multichan nel radio equi pment 

that could be deployed into Vietnam. T hroughout the long 

months of de lay in the fixed communications project, the buildup 

of troops cominued as did their appetite for long-haul circui try. 

Consequently, the mobile tropospheric scaller and microwave links 

of the Defense Communications System were rushed into service 

and abounded throughout the country, not only providing circuitry from the backbone system to locations that would one day be 

served by the fixed communications being installed. but aho sup-
86 co:.t M UN l eA TlONS-ELECTRON ICS 

plementing lhe backbon e sySlcm itself. In October 1967, eleven 

lIlolllhs after the fi rst fi xed- plant link was accepted , approximatel y 

70 percent oE the circ uits 9£ lhe De£ense Communications System 

in Vi etnam weTe in faCl prov ided by mobil e equipment inadequate 

for fixed-sta ti on tandard ~. The)' were operated hy the corps area 

signal groups of the 1st Signal Brigade. 

StatUJ at th e End 0/1967 

Regardl ess of the long, continued, and heavy dependence on 

mobile equipment for the long-haul Defense Communications System in Viell1am. cmhusiasm among lhe customers ran high in 

196; as the fixed communications system became a reality. At 

mid-year in 196;, all praised lhe progress made by Phases I and II. 

Most of the basic links were in servi ce or were being tested prior 

to aCtivation. Wind-up acti vities of Phases I and II peaked in 1967, 

and by the end of November testing had begun on the final thirteen of se \'cnty·six lin ks. The last link of Phase I in Vietnam, between Vung T au and Pl eiku, was accepted on 27 January 1968, 

and acce pta nce of the last link of Phase II, hetwee n \lung Tau and 

Long Binh, fo llowed one month later. 

The tOta l system u pon compl eti on of Phase II consisted of sev· 

enty·six communica tions links operating at fifty-eight sites in 

SOIlIheast Asia . Of the mon' than tCIl tho usa nd circuits. nearl y all 

reached their destina tion hy both tropospheric scauer and mi cro· 

wave rad io trunks. Ilowever. a few circuits passed through a recently compl e ted submarine cable system. This system, approved 

by the Dcpan mem of Defense in February 1966, comprised six 

links, capable of sixty voice channels each. connected to the major 

communi ca tions sites at Da Nan g. Qui Nhon, Nha Trang. Cam 

Ranh Bay, and \fung Tau in Vi etnam, and Sallahir. SOuth of 

Bangkok in T haila nd. The installation was compl eted in May 

1967. This dependable cabl e system, protected by its undersea 

route and interconnected wit h the fixed -station radio system at 

these six sites, constituted a va lua ble segmelll or the ever-growing 

Southeast Asia Widehand System. 

Site construction mean while was progressing on the Phase III 

effort of the integra ted system. Practicall y all of Phase III impl ementation OCC UTrcd in 1968. Whil e Ihc first Phase III link in 

Vi clnam, a 60·channel link between "ung Chua Mounta in and 

Phl! Ca l Air Base, W<lS <lccc pted hy Ihe Unit ed Stales COVCI'l1' 

mcnt during December 1967, the entirc syslem would not be com· 

piNed until 1969. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Elaborations m the Big Networks 

The big terminals of the Integrated Widehand Communications System , the huge antenna arrays, the transmitling and receiving equipment aligned row after row, lhe humidit y-free, temperalUre-contro lled buildi ngs, surro unded by stacks of sa ndbags and 

revetments, (he enormous, deafening di esel genera tors fOT electrical 

power, the hundreds of circu its constituting the Defense Communica tions System that laced Vi etnam and Thailand-all of this 

would have been useless without the facilities at every site that 

provided the switching, or "breakout," of th e indi vid ual circuits to 

fann the myriad voice, tel etype, and data networks that served the 

CUStome r. The faCl that a 240-channe[ " pipe" existed between two 

sites was meaningless to the combat commander who could not 

se nd a message or place a phone call benveen those two sites because the switches were not yet completed . The signal planners, 

therefore, had far more to do than just design the fixed wideband 

system. Concurrently with fixed·system planning and insta llation, 

efforts were being strongly directed toward improving both the tel· 

ephone and message·switching service in Vietnam, where the rapid 

bui ldup had crea ted havoc with the already overloaded military 

communications facilities. 

The Grow;"g Telephone Sy.stem 

During the 1965 buildup of U.S. troops in Vielllam, telephone 

systems sprang lip wherever headquarters, base camps. logistics cen· 

tel'S, and air bases II'ere established. Origi nally each system was operator oriented, requiring the users to work through a mantlal 

switchboard to place a call. Such a slow inefficient system was a 

nalllral conseq uence of the rapid military buildup. Natu rally when 

the 1st Signal Brigade was activated, telephone switching improve· 

ment stood high on the list o f things to be done. At the outse t the 

top requirement was meeting the needs of the Capital l\filitary 

District in the Sa igon area. As was pointed Oll t pre"iotlsly, the evo· 

lution of telephone service in this area consisted of man y manual 
88 CO" , 1\, UN rCA Tl O~S- ELECTRO NICS 

TEST B OARD I N ONE OF TUE MANY DIAL TEl.EPHONE EXCHANCES IN 

VIETNAM 

switchboards, some consolida tion, and then dial service. The telephone switch upgrade program was not confined to the Saigon 

area. The process of replacing older, manual equipment with 

newer dial eq uipment in the Ca pital j\'fi litary District set a pattern 

that was followed throughout Vietnam, and applied to military en· 

campments throughout Southeast Asia. As the big manual switchhoards were replaced in the Saigon area, they were moved to outlying camps to rcplace the smaller combat switchboards. Similarly, as 

three GOO-line, van-mounted dial exchanges were replaced by fixed, 

commercia l ones in the Capital Military District, the vans were 

sem out to fie ld camps to replace manllal switchboards. 

To solve the immediate problems of long-distance telephone 

scrvice in Vietnam, temporary arrangements wcre made in late 

1966 and early 1967, pending the eventual installation of direct 

distance dialing switches. Six long.distance manual switching 

centers, employing large, nine-positIOn manllal switchboards 

mounted in vans, were established in Vietnam. Along with Sa igon's 

long·distance switchboard the network by April 1967 was made up 
ELABORATIO NS IN T BE BIG l" ETWORKS 89 

of long-distance switchboards at Da Nang, Qui Nila n, Pleiku, Nha 

Trang, and Can Tho. This interim long-distance system remained 

the primary means of communication for general er ~ ulllil well 

into 1969, when the direct di tan c~ dialing system became operational. 

Installation of dial telephone exchanges in the north meanwhile occupied the 1st Signal Brigade's Telephone Management 

Agency, as well as civilians working for cOntractors. By the end of 

1966, fixed automatic dial exchanges were schedul ed for installation at fifteen different locations in Vietnam. The first conversion 

to a fixed-plant Army dial telephone exchange was at General 

Westmore land 's headquarters in January 1967. By the end of the 

year, eleven of the fifteen fixed-plant dial exchanges were operational. Counting all the military services, there was a total of twenty-nine fixed-plant dial central offi ces with over 34,000 lines in operation in Vietnam by tile end ()f 1967. 

Record T raffic : M essage and Dala 

Another imJX>rtant communications network that received 

much attention during this period was the record or the printed 

message and recorded data traffic network. Use of the teletypewriter was, of course, the older method and the standby £01' record or 

primed message communications. It c:ominued to serve as a back· 

bone of communica tions into and alit of the war zone, and within 

Vietnam as well, especiall y for cl assified informalion. 

Along with the message system employing manual tape relay, 

data communications were rapidl y developing in Southeast Asia, 

equaling and e\'entually exceeding the standard teletype operation. 

An Autolllatic Digital ;\I etwork which could process both message 

(teletypewriter) and data traffic was planned and approved by the 

Department of Defense in 1965. Automatic switching centers were 

to be established at Phu Lam and Nha Trang. Together, these two 

centers, each with a JOO-line termination capability, were to fulfill 

an original requirement (or 130 U.S. subscribers, with a cap.:1.city 

of 750,000 standard·length messages per da y. This capac: ity repre· 

sented a two-fold increase over the existing manual relay network's capability. 

A n umber of months elapsed and millions of messages were 

passed ove r the manual systems, however, before communicators in 

Vietnam enjoyed the benefits of the automatic network. Because of 

the growth in traffi c volume on the general·use r message network 

as troo p huildups and wartime acti vities increased, the major relay 
90 CO.\l'\l UN lCATIONS-ELEcrRON ICS 

at N ha Trang wa s upgraded to a 22-line fixed installation in April 

1966, and the ca pability of th e Plw I.am facil ity was expa nded by 

upgrading it to sevelll)'-two lines by the end of that year. To handl e the increased willic in the north, a third relay fa cility, 

moumed in vans, was activated at Da Nang in th e I Corps Tac tical 

Zone in December 19GG. It ,,'as at this facili ty that two tape relay 

vans were destroyed by enemy action in February 1967. The Da 

i'!a ng rela y st:ltion was subsequentl y upgraded to a 4S·line fixed in· 

stallation and put to lise in December 1967. The signal brigade 

coml1lander. Gellera] Terry. made tile foliol"in g comments in his 

IeUe]" of 21 Decemher lOGO to ,\Iajor General Richa rd J. i'. leyer, 

cOlllmander of the Strategic Com mtlniC;l(ions Command , rega rding 

th e first Da ;'\lang transpol"l<"lblc ]"e] ay: 

The (ll!O\Cr or Da \";IIIg: 1;ll'e reb) went extremel y well. Traffic was 

a little under 5.000 ll1c~~<lges] )'c~tCnL1y. Thc impact on lhe load at 

:\ha T rallg \\"a~ d~o .lppalCIIl ~iJ1t. e ~ha T rang droppcu tv around 
ELA80R/\TION'i IN TilE AIG :-IETWORKS 91 

12,000, No\\', if we can keep th e priorit y on the completion of the Class 

IV [fixed] Pl'Ojl.'cts, both ;11 1'\ 11:. 'I !,;'lJlg ;md 1);1 ;\'a ng, we shou ld be 

able to stay ahead of the mc~sagc busincss, 

These three fac iliti es, linked togeth er by the wideband commu· 

niC:ltions 5)Stem , were capable of a'iaying comllion·uscr meSs,lge 

traffic between each olher, as lI'e li as frOIll major relays oUl5ide 

Vietnam, 1n addit ion, th e Ihree fadlities were connected to minor 

message rela ys and to area comllHlni ca liom t ellll'r", Daily traOle 

volume handled by all three major facilities a\,l.'raged up to 70,000 

mesS<1.ges in I:l.le 1967. 

One of th e most si::;-n ifica lll prohlems encou nt ered in message 

switching in Vietnam was th e ah nOl-mal anlOUIll of traffic using 

hil!h' preced('Il(e indit:uors, The rapid growt h in tr;IfJic reStllted ill 

completely di "torl ed precedente distrihution, in whic h up to 50 

p(:nent of all tr ffic was da~<;ed a .. " Immcdi ate" or " Flash," The 

Joint Chiefs of Sta ff found it necessary to adopt ;I "Supernash " categor), in order IU make ~llle that the real " Fl ash" altion \\'as prop, 

erly disseminated. General Van Ibrlingen, 1st Si~lIal ::--igade COIllmander from lIlid· I!JGi until Fchrual-Y 1969, 1100ed in his fi nal 

t1l'1uicfini{ n'pfJlt lhat, a\ a 1(',lIlt of th e hlll"!{{'olling- oj nH.'s ~e 

11 :lfIJt, there waS:1 slo\\'do\\'n in th e delivery of II1c~sages: an d a it

uation had deve lopl'd in whidl there was constalll danger of losing 

lIles~lge". Sw h Im\es were rnmt likely t. u ocutr dllring equipnl ellt 

breakdowns in the overworked rel ay cent ers. and led to hllge hack· 

o~s (II' pileups !If ll'ssa~es. D ill iug period~ of hl'a\)' hacklog, el'CII 

meticulous attention to procedures d id not always IRe\etH errors 

resulting in lms. ,\nd a If)~t lIIe"\a~c i" (llmideted, and rightly ~O, 

one of the IIlOSt grievo us sins ill the commun ica ti ons·electroni cs 

(,ommunit y. 

The requiremc nts for daw services in Southeast Asia foll owed, 

to a brge ex\('nt, lhe gro\\'lh of ~lIppl\' activ iti es ill th;1I ;lre<l: and, 

a~ the logistics WSI('1ll began to take ~hape, so did the (~lpahilitY to 

pnnide data (outnlllrli(at iom impJ'O\c .. \[ the liqo\inning of l!lGfi, 

the onl y data reby in Vietnam \\'as at the Phl! Lam f;'lciIi ty. This 

data rel:I)' had been cSlahlished In provide limited <;('I'l'ice for IIr, 

ge ntl), needed gene ral.lIser digital data tranie. Thc majority of the 

(ircuit" in Vietnam that II ere (' utnt'( led to the Phil l.a m ~on· \u

tomatic Reb) Center could handle onl)' ten data calds pcr minute. 

a rate that \\'a~ illtnkrahl, ,lOll 10 hOlh Ih(' \1It.'llihc r ;! nd til e 

communica tor and totally incapahle of satisf)ing the .t;rowing data 

rcq II i remclI IS. 

Consequently. while th e automatic digital SwiTc hing centers 

destined fol' Vielnam wel'e bcin,g- dew'loped ;lIld ptoduced under 
92 CO:'.I"'I U NICA TlO:\'S-ELECTRON ICS 

government contract, upgrades and extensions of the existing manual data relay system were in progress_ The Phu I.am Non-A utomatic Rela y Center was upgraded by mid-1967_ Circuits with a capacity of passing 200 cards per minute were connected with 

automatic shritching centers in the continental United States, Hawai i, and the Philippines, as well as 100-cards-per-minute circuits 

to ten manual data centers in Vietnam. A second manual data 

relay, at Nha Trang, \\'as cut to traffic in August 1967. Combined, 

these two fa cilities of the 1st Signal Brigade handled an average of 

830,000 data cards per day. Although the non-automatic relay centers provided some relief for the three major tape message relays in 

handling their high volume of traffi c, the equipment was still manuall y operated, thus requirillg a large number of operatOrs, and 

;ausing excessive bandling time and a high rate of error. Unfol'lu-

!lately the me ssage and data situation would not be rectified until 

the Automa tic: Digital Ne twork was insta lled in Vietnam in mid1968. 

The SeClire Voice Network 

By mid-1967 still another communica tions improvement was 

being madc in Southeast Asia by the Army and the 1st Signal Bri-

:;adc. The rccentl y developed and highly so phisticated Automatic 

Secure Voice Communications System was being installed in the 

Defense Commun ications System to serve nOt only Vietnam and 

Thailand, but also the armed services througbout the world. This 

system, a vital military requireme nt , took a considerable amount 

of time and effort to devclop, for the feat involved more than the 

scrambling of voice impulses prior to transmission. a technique 

used to a limired degree during , Vorld War n. It was necessary to 

develop compact equipment that could be widely used, either in a 

spacious military office 01' in the dust)' hot tent of a combat commander in a war zone. 

A less sophisticated predecessor to this secure voice system, the 

"Talk Quick" system developed by the Navy, had been used in 

Vielllam since late 1965. Automatic Secure Vo ice System implementation, to replace "Talk Quick," had been planned in several 

phases. Phase I provided fof 200 secme voice subscribers in Vietnam. On 17 J lil y 1967 [he first elemcnt of the Vietnam portion of 

the Automatic Secure Voice System became operationa l- an automati c dia l exch;lI1ge serving fifty secure voice subscri bers in Saigon. 

Installation of the rcmaining ISO su bscriber lines and altendant 

small manual switching centers serving all of Vietnam was planned 

for early 1968. This sophistica tcd equipment, although it sa tisfi ed 
ELABORATIONS IN HIE BIG NETWO RKS 93 

TR .... XS~IITTI"'C D .... T .... C .... ROS AT No",-AuTO~I""TlC DATA RELAY CENTER 

operational needs, required much patience and training to use and 

maintain_ 

All of these networks, the telephone, the record message and 

data , and the secure voice networks, were built and improved during 1966 and 1967_ It was not until 1968, and in some cases 1969, 

that they were completed. 

Space Age Communications 

Communications between Southeast Asia and the rest of the 

world received another boost during the period 1966-1967. U.S. 

Army commun icatOrs, in conjunction with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, had devoted the past several years 

to improving and refining the embryonic art of satellite communications. Although limited satellite communications had existed in 

Vietnam and Thailand since 1964, a much more reliable system 

with grea ter capacity was required. In January 1966 the Defense 

Communications Agency published a plan 10 give communica ti ons 
94 COM M UNICA TIONS-E L.ECTRONICS 

satellites a larger role in s.lppon of the war effort. Thirty-two satel. 

lite communica tions paths were planned between Southeast Asia, 

Hawaii, and the continental United States. These paths were divided between two satellite communications systems, the Initial 

Defense Communications Satellite System and the commercial system of the Communications Satellite Corporation. 

The Initial Defense Communications Satellite System called [or 

developing and launching a score of sa tellites to serve fourteen 

earth terminals. The satellites were placed in random distribution, 

in near-synchronous equatorial orbits a little more than 21,000 

statute miles above the earth. Two of the fOllrteen earth terminals, 

with a total capacity of twenty-two voice channels, were installed 

in Vietnam: one at Ba Queo, near Saigon, and the other at Nha 

Trang_ These satellite communica tions terminals went into operation in Jul y 1967 with tcn of the planned twenty-two voice channels accepled for usc: five from Saigon to Hawaii and five from 

Nha Trang to Okinawa. By the end of 1967 the twO Vietnam terminals were tota lly operational, and had been upgraded to their 

maximum capacity of eleven voice channels each. 

In addition to the twemy-two military-owned and military-opera ted voice channels going into Vielllam, the Defense Commu nications Agency also leased from the commercial Communications 

Satellite Corporatic.n ten other channels to complete the thirty-two 

channels required for Southeast Asia. These channels, which terminated :n Hang 1)la. just southea st of Bangkok. Thailand . were acce pt ed for usc in Ma y H)67. Extension o f six of these ten channe ls 

from Bang Pia to Vietnam was accomplished via the submarine 

cable link from Thailand to Vung Tau, where they interconnected 

with the widcba nd comm unica ti ons system in Vietnam. 

On the last day of 1967 the ori gi nal satellite communica ti ons 

system, ca ll ed SYNCOM, whi ch was near the end of its expected 

life cycle, wellt Ollt of lise in Southeast Asia. At that time the experiment • .] satcllile o\'er the I)acific <lrea lost its usefulness and 

the old SYNCOl\f carth station at Sa Queo was closed. This forerllnner of mod ern sa tellitc communications had becn pressed into 

servi ce duri ng a crisis when no one could be Sllre that it would 

lI'ork at all. It performed admirably, however. and for three years 

the experimenl al satell itc communica tions system provided a vital 

link betwecnthe war zolle and \VashingLOIl, D.C. 

The Nfl/iollal M ilitary Command and C011trol System 

Thc ),C<lI'S 1966 and 19G7 sa\\' a dramalic incre<lse in the combat 

efforts in Vietnam by both U.S. and Free World Military Assist-
ELA80RATIONS I N TilE BIG NETWORKS 95 

Co:-:sou: OPERATOR AT SAIGO:-: SATEI.Un TERMINAL Soldil'r monitors 

.satellite traffic arid .select.s .satellite to be IIsed. 

anee Forces, whose strengt h in Vietnam jumped from just over 

200,000 in January 1966 to well over half a mil1ion by December 

1967. 

U.S. Army combat forces in Vietnam were bolstered by the ar· 

rival of the 9th Infantr y Division at the turn of 19G6- 19fi7 and the 

lOIst Airborne Division in December 1967. reuniting the lOlst 

with its 1st llrigade, wili{il had been in Vietnam since mid· It/G5. 

Another major Army combat force to appear was the 23d Infantry 

Di vision, America!' This division, activa ted in Vietnam during 

September 1967. eventually controlled the 11th , 19fi th. and 198th 

Light Infantr), Brigades. It was supported considerahl), dllring the 

organ izational phases by the resources of the 1st Signal Brigade. 

This support was in .he (orlll of a rapidl), orga ni7ed signal unit, 

which was subsequentl y designated the Americal division's orga nic 

523d Signal Battalion. At the sallie time. Army signal troops. 

which werc to provide the communica tions for this combat force, 

weill from 7,500 men to over 23,000 in the 24 'lllonth I>c ,·iod. 
96 CO:'.;\1 UN ICATIO:-.zS·ELECTRON ICS 

But numhers alone do not tell the siory. It is essential to understand the unprecedented conce pts and working agreements that 

were developed to contro l and direct the communications effort, 

and to realize the eX l CIll to wh ich the Defense Communications 

Agency, the Army's Strategic Communications Command organization, and lhe combat division and corps cOl'lmllnicalors had to 

merge their philosophies of operation and adjust their thinking to 

cope wi th the mission at hand. U.S. communications experi ence in 

the Vietnam \VaT quite effectively redefined two words in the dictionary of communications- mobile and fixed. At one lime these 

words brought to mind distinct and separate images that were the 

opposite of e,.eh olher, but now in Vi etnam fixed comnllmications 

and mobile communications merged. 

The Vietnam conflict saw the first large-scale combat employment of the centrali zed and worldwide National ~Iilitary Command and Control System of the Dep •• Tlmem of Defense. The 

rapid and la rge buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam demanded that 

this system be extended to and expanded within the Republ ic of 

Vietnam. Moreover, and perhaps paramount, the U.S. Government, because of interna l U.S. sensitivity to the conduct of the 

Vietnam War, chose to exercise close civilian comrol over military 

actions. To do this, an unprecedent ed communications network 

\vas establis hed in the field and between headquarters in Vietnam 

and higher headquarters outside the COlLntry. in lhis case, specifically, the Office of the President of the United Stales in the White 

I-louse. 

T o attain the highest degTee of command and control possible, 

a vast system of comlllun ica ti ons lines was built within Vietnam, 

stretching to Hawaii and eventu:dl y on to Wash ington, D.C. 

Ever), communica ti ons met hod was uh imate l), employed. from 

field wires and the infantryman's hand·held radio to submarine cables and orbiting sa tell ites. No single service or organization can 

take all the credit for lhis extensive communications network: 

ra ther, it is to the credit of all communicators, military and dvil· 

ian , that by the end of 1967 a system actually existed that allowed 

~o lll nu ll s, h igh quality lQmmlmi ca ti ons from the fire base to the 

White House. 

T ra;I/;'lg the Commlm;cator 

The proliferation or commerc ially procured, fixed.plant. and 

oftcn automaled systems and equipmcnt, as operated by the 

Army's 1st Signal Brigade, rcq uired naincd, experienced personnel. This requircment was not, of course, lim ited to the fi xed·sta-
ELABORATIONS IN THE BIG I"ETWORKS 97 

CO!'>1I\AT SEC:>iAUIEN , VITII TASIi. FORCE ORECO!" O!" PATROL 

lion troops of the signal brigade, The communicaLOrs of the fightIIlg forces and the signal brigade's area sUPPOl'l units also 

encountered equipmelH and procedures that were foreign to combat communica tions of onl y a few years earlier, Such equipment as 

the nel\! portable and mobile combat field radios and balllefic1d secure voice devil.:cs, together with such innovations as dynamic and 

effective airborne rela y to extend the ra nges of radio systems, and 

extensive heav)' cable ('onstrunion on combat bases all required in· 

stallers. operators. and mailHenance men. highl y proficient in their 

trades. Tn,ining soldi er-t·,:chnic ians. always an importan t task in 

Army communications. became more pressing and more complic ued in the 19(;Os than ever hcforc. This situation was ,Ill inevitable consequence of the ultrasophisticated and compl ex systems that 

were brought into the thealer of war. Although the use of auto· 

matic equipment docs. of course. reduce rhe number of operatOrs. 

it requires o f the fewer opera tors morc training and gre,uer ski ll. 

\ Vhen the first cOllllllercial qualit y backbone systems were install ed in SOlllheast Asi:l, the Army had few Regu la r Signal Corps 

troops ca pable of operating and maimaining lhe system, Short-
98 COM M UNICA TIONS-ELECTRONICS 

term soldiers did not stay long enough to be trained on the job. 

The initial backbone terminals, therefore, and later the fixed-station additions. continucd to be operated. even to the end of 1967, 

largely by civilian technicians of Page Communications and Philco-Ford. The presence of civilian communications controllers, 

maintenance technicians, and operators in a war zone, often in 

outlying and exposed locations, was something new in Army communications experience. It was another aspect of the unique war 

in Vietnam. 

Ultimately, men in uniform had to be trained to do the work, 

however complicated and exacting ancl however difficult and costly 

the training. The cost became evident before the end of 1966. The 

two fixed-station prime contractors, Page and Philco-Ford, had contracted with the U.S. Government to establ ish complete wideband 

system terminals and schools at the U.S. Army Signal School, Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey, to enable the Army to give soldiers adequate training. The COSt to the government of these two contracts 

exceeded ten million dollars. The Page school was dedicated at 

Fon Monmouth in November 1967, and the Philco school opened 

a short time later. Not until well along in 1968, however, would 

soldiers trained in these schools arrive in Vietnam and Thailand. 

Army signalmen work ing at the big communications terminals 

in the war theater were meanwhile learni ng their trade in an old 

and famili ar Army manner- they were training on the job. An 

especially ac ute need for technical controll ers on the wideband 

communications systems led the 1st Signal Brigade to establish a 

small school fo r this speciallY in June 1966 under lhe auspices of 

the Regional Communications Group o[ the 1st Signal Brigade. 

Six months arter the school o pened, it had gradua ted 25 officers 

and 173 enlisted men to help stem the ever-growing shortage of 

technical controllers in the field. 

The meager beginnings of the 1st Brigade signal school near 

Saigon, h'ith its one course, was soon expanded both in the number of courses offered and in space and fa cilities. When the huge 

Army complex at Long Binh was ready for occupancy. the school, 

then known as the Southeast Asia Signal School, graduated from 

its one-room, country sc hoolhouse atmosphere and moved into the 

expanded Long Binh facilities. This signal training center at Long 

Binh was formally organized by the 1st Signal Brigade into the 

United States Army Training Facility, 1st Signal Brigade, in Au· 

gUSt 1968. 

Although the school was a U.S. Army training fa cility, operated 

by the signal brigade, the scope of its instruction continually 
ELABORATIONS IN THE BIG NETWORKS 99 

broadened until it included courses for all communicators and 

electronics men from both United States and Free World forces, 

from the comba t surveillance radar operator and combat radio repairman to the fixed microwave ope rator. By the end of 1968, for 

example, over 3,000 students had been graduated from the school, 

which had by then expanded its curriculum to more than twenty 

different courses of instruction on mobile and fixed equipment. 

Summary, 1966-1967 

As 1967 came to an end, the large communica tions systems in 

Vietnam were near compl etion. The over-all system, lean at best 

just two years before, was now taki ng shape, and the hand-to-mouth 

days seemed to be on the way out. The combat communicatOrsthe troops of the corps, divisions, and separate brigades-had 

ga ined va luabl e experience during their service in the war zone, 

and the lessons were be ing well applied. The helicopters and the 

infantryman's radio sets, in both airborne and ground configura· 

tions, had been integrated so successfull y that new meaning was 

given to the phrase "command and control. " The combat multi· 

channel systems of the di visions and field forces were interconnected with and supplemented by the 1st Signal Brigade's Corps 

Area Communications System. Two of the three phases of the ambitious In tegTated Wideband Communications System project were 

complete and in service. The combination of the fixed-plant, high 

quality communiC;-lI ions links and the expanding dial tcJephone 

network lessened significantly the number of times the communicator had to hear that painful phrase " hoot 'n ho ll er." Ex tensive 

working arrangements were in existence between the Saigon office 

of the Ddense Communications Agency and the 1st Signal Bri· 

gade, and between the 1st Signal Brigade and the combat units. 

The control and direction concepts so painstakingly and, at times, 

painfully evolved in late 1965 and earl y 1966 were now bearing 

the fruits of success. 

On the other hand, communications service was by no means 

perfect at the end o f 1967. The long-distance general-user telephone system still relied on manllal switching techniq ues. Message 

tra illc in Viet nam still was sent via manual tape rclays and, unfortunatel y, in some remote cases a personal visit was often faster 

than send ing a message. Considcrable refi nements and improvements were now required in all areas of communications services_ 

But the foundation had been built and now was the time to get 

about the business of major leaps forward in command control 
100 COM;\I UNICA TIONS-El..ECTRONtCS 

GENERAL VAN HARI.I1':CEN (sealed) INSPECTS COMMUNICATIONS GEAl\ ON 

A COM~IANO HELlCQPTF.R 

commu nica tions-electroni cs. The enemy had been cont,inual1y met 

and defeated by Qur aggressive soldiers; relative security existed in 

all the cities and arou nd the comba t bases. It was generally be· 

lieved that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese would honor 

their sel(·declared truce during the coming February 1968 Tel hoi· 

iday. 
PART THREE 

COMMUNICATIONS MATURE AND 

MOVE TOWARD VIETNAMIZATION, 

1968-1970 

U.S. Army Signal Troops and Tel: 1968 

Han oi Changes Strategy 

During 1967 Hanoi evidently concluded that the chances fOT 

success in its campaign to comra l South Vi etnam were diminishing. The South Vietnamese Government was becoming stabilized 

as a result o f a new constitution and the nationwide free elections 

held during September and October 1967. The nation's economy 

and its armed forces were showing improvemenl. As a result of 

continual military presslire appl ied by the Free World Military Assistance Forces du ri ng 1966 and 1967, the Nonh Vietnamese and 

Viet Cong forces had been compelled to withdraw from the areas 

close lO the populati on centers of South Vietnam and move into 

their morc femote base areas or the ir secure sa nctuaries in Cam· 

bodi'l and Laos. Hanoi decided a major change of strategy was necessary. A large offensivf! would be launched in the Republic of 

Vietnam. At the same time the civilian po pulation would be incited to rise up aga inst the government and the soldiers of the 

Vietnam Army would be encouraged to desert. Exactly what 

Hanoi expected of this strategy is still uncertain. The probable intentions of the enemy were described by Ceneral Westmoreland in 

his report on the war in Vietnam: 

He probably had many things in mind- not the least of which was the 

necessity to do something dramatic to reverse his fortunes. He surely 

hoped that his dramatic change in strategy would have an impact on 

the United Sta tes similar to that which the battle of Dien Bien Phu 

had on the government and people of France. In this way he might 

hope to bring about a halt of the U.S. effort and the withdrawal of the 

U.S. Forces. 

The T el Ogeruive 

During late December 1967 and January 1968, Hanoi intiltr.ued troops and suppl ies into forward positions and into the population centers of South Vielllam. The offensive was launched 

29-30 J anuary in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones, and 30-31 

January in the remainder of the country under cover of a seven· 
104 COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

day truce declared by the Viet Cong for the celebration of Tet, the 

Vietnamese lunar New Year. The initial assaultS. employing about 

84,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong tTOOPS, were mounted 

against 42 citi es and pro\,jncial ca pitals, 64 district ca pitals. and 50 

hamlets. (Mat) 5) In most cities the attacks wcrc thrown back 

within two or three days; in Saigon ::nd Hue, however, the fighting was protracted. I-Icavy figilling a lso continued fOT sometime in 

Kontum, nan Me Thuot, Can Tho, and Ben Tre. By lhe end of 

Fehruary 1968 the enemy had lost some 45,000 men killed. 

During May and early June the enemy launched new attacks. 

primarily against the Saigon afca and in the northern P.1rt of 

South Vietnam. Before these assaults, and after them too, a series 

of rocket altacks were made against military installations and in 

some cases rockets were launched indiscriminately against the civilian population. 

By the end of June 1968 when General Abrams took command 

of the U.S. Ii litary Assistance Command. Vietnam, lIpon General 

vVestmoreland's dep.1fture for his new duty as the Army Chief of 

Staff. enemy losses were estimated at 120,000 during the first six 

months of 1968. The South Vietnamese had come through this 

major enemy offensive with more confidence. stronger armed 

forces, a strengthened governme nt, and, last, a population that had 

disregarded the call for a general uprising. 

Building Communicatio1lS in the Northern Provinces 

Before T el General Westmoreland had initiated countermea· 

sures while the enemy was movi ng into forward areas. As large 

numbers infiltrated into the Republic of Vietnam population cenlers during December 1967 and January 1968, intelligence infor· 

mation began to be rece ived at General ' Vestmoreland's joint 

headquarters that a major offensive was to take place. Conseqtlelllly. in mid·January, General Westmoreland strengthened the 

U,S. forces in the Saigon area and moved the 1st Cavalry Division 

and eJemelHs of the IOlst Airborne Division into the northernmost 

provi nces of South Vietnam. Beca use of the heavy rei nforcement 

in the northern I Corps Tartical Zone in anticipation of a major 

enemy offensive, General Westmoreland decided to open in late 

J anuary a temporary con trol headquarters in that area. This for· 

ward headquarters of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, 

under the cOlllmand of I.ieutenant General ,Villiam B. Rosson, 

was designated in March as Provisional Corps. Vietnam, and was 

ultimately redesignated the U.S. Army XXIV Corps. The corps 
"-.. 

) 

i 

\ 

C 1'1 M 

MAP S 

~ItTlI VlfTN1M 

0. . '_H'" ,_ 

H OD 1 1'1 

TET: 1968 105 

..... , " 

• 

MAJOR BATT LES 

AND 

S IGNIFI CANT LOCALITIES 

... , _0' .. 

. ''''' ' 

CORPS " 

, •• Wf l"UOI 

• 

1968 TET 

~" " 0' 

• 

REPU BLIC 

Of 

VIETNI'IM 

• 

.. u lor ""lIS 

, 

, 

" f ' $ 01 ,rOIUGU CUI~O ""G . 

was pla c~d under the opera tional conll ol of th~ III arin~ Amphibious _Force, \\'bich had responsibility for operations in the enlire I Corps Tactical Zone. 
106 COr-.fMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

By 26 January a requirement was placed on the 1st Signal Brigade to provide communications support for the U.S. Joint 

Forward Command Post to be located at Phu Bai. A tailored battalion of 608 officers and men had to be drawn from the existing 

resources of the 1st Signal Brigade. General Van Harlingen decided that the headquarters staff of the 459th Signal Battalion, 

then stationed at Nha Trang, would deploy to provide the battalion control element, while the remainder of the battalion would 

be formed from brigade resources drawn from over fony locations 

in South Vietnam. The first elements of the battalion arrived at 

Phl! Bai on 28 January 1968. By 5 February the major communications services werc operational at this new headquarters, while 

the last elements of the tailored baualion had closed by 6 February. Thus, communications support by the 459th Signal Battalion 

was hastily organized during the height of the T el offensive. 

Communications facilities for Genera l \Vestmorelancl's forward 

command poSt. including the existing Phu Bai dial telephone exchange, were bunkered in, or revetted, and cables were placed underground. ,"Vork continued at a fast pace despite an around-theclock enemy rocket attack on Phu Bai during the first three days of 

February. Though numerous rounds landed near the sites and the 

revetments were hit by many shell fragments, the equipment remai ned undamaged. 

In the midst of the battle that raged in Hue, the 459th Signal 

Battalion was ordered to provide secure teletypewriter message 

service to the fire support co·ordinator located with the Vietnamese 1st Infantry Division command post at an old fortress, the Citadel. in I-Iue. The only means of reaching the Citadel was by U.s. 

Navy landing craft, which had to traverse the Perfume River in 

order to reach the canal that circles the fortress. A four.man team 

led by I st Li eutenant john E. Hamon was organized to move and 

operate th e equipment. During the trip to the Citadel the landing 

..:raft came under heavy mortal' attack and twO of the enlisted men 

and th e lieutenant were wounded. Li eutenant Hamon, despite his 

wound, and the olle l.ninjured enlisted man put the equipment in 

operation and provided the critica l communications support for 

over twent y-four hours until help arrived. 

The 459th continued to provide support to the joint forward 

headquarters in Phu Bai until the newly arrived 63d Signal Battalion headquarters, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Elmer H. 

Graham. took over the mission of the provisional organization in 

March of 1968. 

Additional Free World Mil itary Assistance Forces were de-
TET: 1968 107 

played into the northern I Corps Tactical Zone during February 

while heavy fighting was taking pl(lce at Hue and Khe Sanh. General Van Harlingen had to further draw down from 1st Signal Bri· 

gade's resources to provide the required communications support. 

A signal suppOrt company, orga nized from his brigade's assets, had 

been airlifted illlo the area of heavy fighting in the northern provinces by the end of February. This last drai n on brigade resources 

left little in the way of contingency assets. It was in fact necessary 

to deactivate twenty·one less essential radio-relay links in order to 

provide the required resources. A few days later, however, the 

596th Signal Support Company, which had just arrived in Vietnam , was assigned to the 459th, and made a significant contribution to the battalion's communications capability. 

These "draw·downs" by bits and pieces to provide the resources 

required in the north had placed a heavy burden on the brigade. 

As General Van Harlingen ex pl ai ned in his debriefing report: 

"The 1st Signal Brigade was thrown into the midst of an administrati ve maelstrom, with personnel and equipment att<t !lmenLS and 

all the accompanying paper storm. " 

U.S. Army Signalmen and T et 

The story of the 459th Signal Battalion, as it was provisionally 

organized and deployed, is unique si nce the deployment occurred 

as the T et offen sive took place. The hastily organized battalion 

had to respond quickly and install and opera te the vital communications needed, even though it was under fire. Being under fire, 

however, was nOt ne\v to the men o f the 459tb; many of them had 

come from other locations in Vietnam that were also under attack. 

At this time all the signal troops of the di visions, field forces, and 

1st Signal Brigade deployed throughout South Vietnam were simultaneollsly installing communications in SU ppOH of the combat 

forces and defending the ir positions. They were handling increased 

commun ica ti ons traffic loads that resulted from the fighting and 

were repairing and restoring disrupted communications services. It 

was commonplace that in many places signalmen had to fight and 

at the same time provide comm unications support. One element of 

the 1st Signal Brigade, the comm unications control center with its 

communica tions status·reporting system used to control and man· 

age communica ti ons passing through more than 220 loca tions in 

Vietnam, found itself in a unique position. The reporting system 

was ca pabl e and did provide hattie information in considerable detail concerni ng enemy activity to the Military Assistance Command and U.S. Army, Vietnam, operations centers. 
108 COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

General Van Harlingen in his after action report described 

the efforts or the signalmen thus: 

Troops were ordered to be prer.ared to install and restore command 

and control commu nications wlule under 3n3ck. in all cases. I consider 

it essentia l that the Signal troop be trained and prepared to work. 

under fire. even when he mu st deliberately expose himself to do 

so. . . . Because o f the overall quality of the American soldier in 

Vietnam, and, due in part to stimul ation of the enemy's offensi ve, at 

no time did the Signal troop fail to come through when required. 

Equipment was ca nniba lized, antennas restOred, cable repaired. isolated 

sites defended and new links activated both night and day d uring periods of intense enemy rockel. mortar and small arms fire. 

Thousands of dramatic incidents. both recorded and un recorded. occurred as the signalmen fought, in one way or another, 

to keep the communications "in." A few are told here as they happened during T el 1968. 

On I February, during the height of the heavy fi gh ting in Hue, 

close to the Demilitari zed Zone in the north. the Senior U.S. Military Officer in the besieged city considered withdrawing the signal 

troops of the 1st Signal Brigade's 37th Signal Battalion from the 

Hue tropospheric sca tter site to avoid their being overrun. But 

General Van Harli ngen knew the site was critical because it provided the main commu nica tions with the beleaguered V.S. forces 

at Khe Sanh. He directed Lieutenant Colonel J erry Davis. Jr., the 

37th Battalion commander, to order the men to remain at the site 

so that the vital link with Khe Sanh could be kept operational , 

and at the same time he requested immediate assistance from the 

U.S. Marine forces fighting near lhe Hue signal site. For the next 

thirty-six hours the small installation was surrounded. The signalmen beat off repeated assaults by an estimated Viet Cong battalion attaCking with small arms, automatic weapons, and rocketS. 

Helicopters trying to reach the surrounded signalmen were turned 

back by machine gun fire; it was impossible to evacuate the 

wou nded. One soldier with a shattered arm was desperately in 

need of medical help. His fellow signalmen treated the wQund 

whil e they received instructions by telephone from Phu Ra i. Two 

companies of Marines, trying to reach the site from the U.S. Advisor's compound three blocks away, finally gained the signa l site 

after thirty-six hours or fighti ng. 

While heavy fighting was going on at the Hue tropospheric 

sca tter site, V.S. troops near the Laotian border at Khe Sanh were 

under constan t mortar and rocket atlack. A direct hit on a bunker 

by a rocket killed a lieutenant and an enlisted man of the team operating the Khe Sanh mobile tropospheric scatler terminal. Three 
TET: 1968 109 

of the remaining four team members were wounded by the rocket, 

and two of them subsequently died from their wounds. The reo 

maining signalman, Specia list William Hankinson, with the assistance of twO U.S. arines, kept the system on the air for forty 

hours until replacements arrived. 

At Dalal, in the mountains of south central Viemam. signalmen of the 362d Signal Company and Company E, 43d Signal Battalion. both attached to the 1st Signal Brigade 's 73d Signal Battal· 

ion, were in contin uous action from I through 6 February 1968. 

During the afternoon of I February members of the 218th Mili· 

tary Po lice Detachment were pinned down in their small compound by fire from an estima ted two pl atoons of Viet Congo Major 

William R. Crawford, the commander of 362d Signal Company, 

upon learning of the plight of the military policemen, immediately 

organizcd and led a 20-man rescue team. The small force of signalmen engaged the enemy with individual weapon and grenade fire, 

evacuated wou nded military policemen, and laid down a base o[ 

fire tha t enabled the uninjured soldiers to wilhdra\\'. At the same 

time, inside Dalat, Captain Donald J. Choy, the operations officer 

of the 362d, led a heavil y armed convoy to the Villa Alliance Missionary Association compound, wh ich was surrounded by Viet 

Cong. The signalmen fought their way to the compound and successfully evacuated the thirty-fou r occupants. All told, the signal 

troops of the 362d Signal Company and Company E, 43d Signal 

Battalion, rescued and provided shelter for more than si xty noncombatan ts. 

Incredibl y, there were no serious communications failures during the first weeks of the offensive. The fixed communica tions site 

at Hue, which was operating on commercial power, went off the 

air late in the evening of 31 January 1968 when the power station 

was overrun and the backup power generators located at the site 

had become inopera ti ve. Communications at the site were restored 

by the afternoon of 2 February after replacement generators had 

arrived with a convoy that had gotten through, despite two ambushes on the way. 

During a mortar attack on the Phu Lam signal site close to Saigon on 8 February, a vital 50-ton air conditioner serving the large 

tape message relay was knoc ked out. For scveral hours the station 

could process onl y " Flash" and " Immediate" precedence traffic. 

After intense efforts the air conditioner was re paired and became 

operational the following day. 

A considerable number of communica tions failures did occur 

when multipair communications cables that had been installed 
CAULE TEM.I AT 'VORK DURINC TET OFFE .... SIVE 
TET: 1968 III 

overhead on poles were cut or shredded by shrapnel and small 

arms fire. After the enemy·s initial attacks, major cable failures 

were reported in Saigon, Bien Hoa, Soc Trang, Lai Khe, Cli Chi, 

Can Tho. and Ban ~Ie Thuot. In some of these instances mobile 

radio systems were installed so that critical circuits could be restored. Signal cable repair teams worked around the clock to repair 

the damaged cabl es, even though they were o ften under enemy fire 

while working from exposed positions. In fact, on a number of occasions enemy snipers had to be knocked out so that the signalmen 

could work on the cables. One cable repairman, Specialist David ) . 

Kubik or the 36th Signal Battalion, was suspended fony feet above 

ground repairing a large cable at Lli Khe when a Illortar attack 

started. Disregarding his own sa fety he cont inued his rep..1irs. 

By 5 February most of the cahles had been restored, but in the 

arcas where heavy figh ting continued. sllch as Saigon, numerous 

cahles were still out. Essential communications traffic camillued to 

flow, nonetheless, rerouted throllgh extemporized circuits. 

During the period of the heaviest ;macks, 31 January through 

18 February 1968, only three mobile multichannel systems operated by the 1st Signal Brigade went Ollt because or combat damage, 

and then onl y for a brief time. Whereas the cables that had been 

constructed above ground were damaged considerabl y, those which 

had been buried suffered little. General Van Harlingen, com· 

Illenting o n the effects on communications during the first weeks 

of the T el offensive, declared: " Miraculously, although Signal 

troops sustained seve ral hundred casualti es. there were no disastrous interruptions of communi ca ti on at any time during the first 

few \\pccks of the offensive:' 

Later, howcver, the enemy was able to disrupt communica tions 

and innict heavy casualties at a signal site in south crn Vietnam. 

During the night of 13- 14 May 1968 the 25th Infantry Division 

signal site atop Nui Ba Den. a lone mountain about forty miles 

west or Saigon near Tay Nin h, came under a mortar, rocket, and 

to-ordinated ground attack. Some fifteen signalmen or the 1st Signa l Brigade were also at the site, operating corps area radio relay 

systcms. The enemy pcnctr:ltcd the perimeter and sevcrely damaged the equipmcnt and racilities. Twenty-three U.S. soldiers were 

kill ed. three were wounded. and one was missing as a result of the 

enemy assault. Shortly beFore 1 arrived in Vietnam in September 

1968 to serve as General Van Harlinge n's deputy brigade commander, the Nui Ba Den site was aga in attacked, early in the 

morning of 18 August. F.\( l thuugh therc were some casualties. 

damage was ligh t, and the enemy was successfull y repulsed. 
112 COM ,\IUN ICATJONS-ELECTRONICS 

Reorgatlization of Corps Area Communications 

Throughout the enemy's 1968 Tet and summer offensives the 

area support battalions of the 1st Signal Brigade COlllinued to supplement the organic communica tions of the field forces, d ivisions, 

,md separate brigades. But even before lhe T el offensive. it had become evident to Genera l Van Harlingen that excessive duplication 

existed between the long-lines area system supporting the U.S. and 

Free \.vorld Military Assistance Forces and the numerous netwqrks 

which had previously been installed to support the U,S. advisers. 

Economy and efficiency dictated their consolidation into single systems, one within each of the four corps tactical zones. This consolidation would not only promote economy in the use of equipment 

and manpower resources but would also increase the capabilities of 

the field force commander by providing communication li nks between U.S. and South Vietnamese units. It would provide each 

field force commander with a single network for control over his 

own troops and for execution of h is mission as the Senior Advisor 

within his corps tactical lOne. 

General Westmoreland approved the concept in November 

1967 and the consolidation was begun at once. Because the III 

Corps Tactical Zone appeared to be the one most cluttered wi th 

duplica ted links, General Van Harlingen began consol idation in 

that area. \·Vithin the fi rst month, his efforts netted a savings of 

twelve rad io relay links with all the ir associated equipment and 

operating personnel. These assets immediately pro,'ed valuable in 

providing badly needed communications to support the 25 th Infantry Division in \Var Zone C, northwest of Saigon, d uring Operation YELLOWSTONE in early 1968. 

The consolidation, which streamlined the communications systems in the corps tactical zones saving a considerable number of 

men and much equipment, was finished in December 1968. The 

single system concept for support of operations in each of the corps 

tactical zones became the doctrine for area signal support in Vietnam. One of the more sign ificant features of this doctrine was that 

the combat commanders could, in an emergency, obtain immediate 

communications support from the local representatives of the supporting area battalions of the 1st Signal Brigade without val idat ion 

from Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam. On many occasions the 

resulting close relationship between the brigade's area battalion 

commander and the division or field force for which he was providing signal support meant the difference between "go" or "no 

go" on short-notice combat operations. 
TET: 1968 113 

Brigade OrgaFl;zo.liml in 1968 for Area Commlmications 

The consolidation of communications systems resulted also in 

mOTC effic ient disposition of personnel and equipment. Consequently, 1968 was another year of major reorganization for the 1st 

Signa l Brigade. W ith the bu ildup of forces, communications facilities underwent further expansion, upgrading, and reorientation. 

During 1968 signal compan ies and battalions continued to deploy 

to Vietnam, joining the 1st Signal Brigade, while most of the signal organizations already in Vietnam werc busy submitting modi· 

fied tabl es of organization and equipment. All this reorganizational 

activity was a clerical nightmare, but it was unavoidable because 

the signal units were opera ting with minimal resources and, as 

their mission expanded, more resources had tc be provided. 

One of the more significant organizationa l changes made by 

the 1st Signal Brigade during th is time was the activation of still 

another signal group, which was to operate in the 1 Corps Tactical 

Zone. As o f mid-1968, the U.S. Army's XXIV Corps, commanded 

by Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell and based in Phu Bai, 

with responsibility for the I Corps Tactical Zone, had operational 

control of three U.S. divisions: the Anny's 1st Cavalry and lOIst 

Airborne Divisions and the U.S. 3d Marine Division. This corps 

also had close liaison responsibilities with the Vietnamese 1st Infantry Division. headquartered in the old imperial city of Hue. In 

July 1968 the 1st Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division 

arrived in Vietnam and was also assigned to the XXIV Corps tactical area. It was soon obvious that the 1st Signal Brigade's 63d Sig· 

nal Battalion was overburdened by having to provide communications su pport to all U.S. forces in the two northern provinces of 

Vietnam as well as the organic communications for the XXIV 

Corps. 

By September 1968 it was plain that an additional signal group 

headquarters would be required to provide command and control 

of the signal elements in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The span of 

control within the 21st Signal Group had become too great; the 

grOlIp had six battalions assigned and was deployed over two-thirds 

of South Vietnam with a strength of about 7,000 men. Conse· 

quently, a new signal group headquarters, known as the I Corps 

Tactical Zone Provisional Signal Group, was fanned on 8 September 1968. The staff for this new signal group was formed, as in 

other cases, by tightening the belt and drawing £Yom other 1st Signal Brigade units. The I Corps Tactical Zone Provisional Signal 

Group, commanded by Colonel Mitchel Goldenthal, became oper-
114 CO M M UN ICATIONS-El.,ECTRON ICS 

C HART 2-I ST SiGNAL BRiGADE ORCANIZATION, JULY 1969 

I 1ST SIG IDI I 

I 

r T 1 I I I 

tlGIO MA l 1~ SIG 12TH SIG 21ST SIG 160TH SIG 191" SIG 

(011111 r- " " " " " " IUlIANO 

HIS! SIG lUN SIG 371M m 41ST SIG 40lH SIG l010 51G 

.. .. .. .. .. .. Utili SIG 3fTH 51G noslG 410516 UTI! 51G 31STH 51G 

.. .. .. .. .. .. PHU LAII 510 51G U liANG 130 51G nTH SIG l1t1H 516 

'" '" .. .. .. .. .. .. lllIi TUNG 16TH 51G 4S9TH SIG cOlisre 4UD 516 

'" lOG 5'1 .. .. CilIIII .. .. "20 51G m 

.. "(lOIIAI 

(fMlII 

us .. IIY 

TRA'"ING 

'Ullin 

adona I in December 1968, with its headquarters in Phu Bai. The 

group had responsibility for all area communications support in 

the I Corps Tactical Zone and assumed command of the 37th and 

63d Signal Battalions. On I July 1969 this group was redesignated 

the 12th Signa l Group. commanded by Colonel Albert n . Crawford. By then the 1st Signal Brigade, with its extensive communi· 

cations responsibilities throughout Southeast Asia, comprised six 

signal groups and twenty-three batta lions. (Chart 2) 

In December 1968 there were .sca ttered throughout the Republic of Vietnam approximately 220 installations for which the Corps 

Area System provided communica tions. To mee t the requirements 
." 

! 

I 

C AMBODIA 

IV CO IIPS 

MAP 6 

TET: 1968 

RESPONSIB ILITIES OF 

1ST SIGNAL BR IGADE 

115 

CORPS AREA SUPPORT BATTALIONS 

". 

• 

(DE CEMBE R 19(8 ) 

• 

<~ 

) 

"... 41S1 

, 

REP U BLI C 

OF 

V I ETNAM 

< 

, 

NOIE JOIN SI(; 8N PROVIDEO CAllE CO~TRUC ID N C,IJ>ABlll'!' 

IHROUGI()UI SOOIH(ASI ASIA 

UIH .\NO 69TH SIC BN "S PROVIDED CO MM UNICAIiOO SUPf'OfIT 

10 IHE COMM.\N OS IN THE S~GON .\NO lONe SINH AREAS 

of these large corps area communications facilities. ten signal battalions of the 1st Signal Brigade were deployed throughout the 

country. (Nl ap 6) These ba ttal ions operated approximately 250 

area communications links, carrying over four thousand voice 
116 COl'..fM UNICATIONS-EL ECTRONICS 

channels, and an addi tional fifty interconnections, with approximately 800 voice chan nels, as part of the Defense Commun ications 

System in Vietnam. Besides multichannel rad io, the area battal ions 

operated and maintained 69 local telephone switchboards, 64 message centers, and 8 minor message relay centers to SU ppOTt all users 

within the four zones. 
CHAPTER X 

Special Communications 

Operations and Innovations 

Mobile Riverine Force: An Unusual T est 

In June 1967 Genera l Westmoreland created a new, completely 

imcgrated command composed of a U.S. Army infantry brigade and 

a U.S. Navy task force. This Mobile Riverine Force was amphibious, operating entirely afloa t; it was reminiscent of river (orces 

used by the United States in the Civil War when the Union Army 

operated on the Mississippi, Cumberland, and other rivers. The 

force was complete, independent of fixed support bases, and with 

all of its normal fire support embarked or in tow. The STeal Aexibility of the Mobile Riveri ne Force increased our ability to take 

the fight to the Viet Cong in previously inaccessible areas. The 

baltleground was the mighty Mekong River and its delta. 

The Mekong Delta is drained principally by four channels of 

the Mekong Ri ver as it fl ows so utheastward from Cambodi a to the 

sea. S(.me 1,000 mil es of primary canals crisscross the area, and in 

between the canals lie th ousa nds of square mi les of rich rice lands. 

Few roads penetrate the delta. T owns and villages sit on the mud 

banks of cana ls and ri vers, surrounded by rice paddies. Little of 

the land is more than ten feet above sea level. Although the Mekong Delta is among the world's richest lands for rice-growing, it is 

fonnidable grou nd for the infamry soldier on foot and his modern , but often heavy, supporting equipment. 

The assa ult unit of the Mobil e Riverine Force was the 2d Brigade of the U.S. Army's 9th Infantry Division, a brigtlde spec iall y 

tailored for combat on the rivers and canals. Since the riverine battalions o perated from shi ps and assault craft, the infantrymen's traditional jeeps and trucks were not used. Instead, a small Aotilla of 

boats powered by outboard mOlors was made availabl e for transportation. The supp::>rting artillery was streaml ined for operation 

aboard towed barges instead of in fixed fire supp::>rt bases. The organic com muni ati ~ resources of the riverine brigade were essen-
118 CO~IMUNICATIONS·ELECTRONICS 

tiall y the same used by other infantry except that man-packed, 

portable voice radios werc substituted for those fadios mounted on 

jeeps and tTucks. 

The U.S. Navy complement of the Mobile Riverine Force 

manned a fleet of assault troop carriers, fire support ships called 

monitors, command and communications boats, repair and supply 

ships, medical CTart. a barracks barge, and . two self-propelled barracks ships. These naval craft were specially prepared and outfined 

in the United States for deployment on the waters of the della. 

They were rigged with extra guns and cannon and wcrc heavily ar· 

mar-plated to ward off the inevitable Viet Cong rocket-propelled 

grenades and heavy-caliber machine gun rounds. 

The command and communications boat was, as the name suggeStS, a floa ting command post, providing radio communications 

for both the Army troop commander and the Navy boat commander. One of these craft was usually available for each battalion-size element in an opera tion. This communications boat itself 

took on the appearance of a floa ting antenna field, si nce nine com· 

bat vo ice radios were installed below the deck and the topside 

bristled with nine antennas. ,Vith this equipment the troop com· 

mander maintained radj o contact with his assault troops, the supporting artillery located nearby on barges. the ever·present helicop· 

ter gunships circling overhead, the monitors-fire support 

boats-the tactical fighter bombers of the Air Force, the South ViCl-

(;lamese Army counterpart commander, higher headquarters. and 

the medical evacuation helicopters. 

Much of the credit for maintaining stich extensive communications must go to the commun ica tors of th e Mobile Riverine Force. 

both Army and Navy, who el iminated the interference inherent in 

having so many radios transmitting and receiving from a floating 

metal platform. The successful operation of radio circuiu from the 

command and communications boats can be attributed to excellent 

freq uency control, many on.the.spot innovations. and a degree of 

divine providence. 

The USS Bet/ewalt, one of the self-prope lled barracks ships, was 

the command post of th e entire i\'!obile Riverine Force and was 

the rear headquarters of the 9th Infantry Division's 2d Brigade, 

the Army compl ement. It was the job of the 9th Signal Battalion, 

th e organic communica ti ons unit of th e division, to provide and 

operate telephone and message communica tions between the USS 

Bfmewah and division headquarters. ct hods wcre quiCkly dcvised 

to track, by means of radio, the USS Benewal! while it sailed on 

the delta's ca nals and streams; by use of multichannel radio relay 
SPECIAL COM M UNICATIONS OPERATIONS Ilg 

USS BENEWAH, A RIVERINE FORCE COMMAND CONTROL F I.ACSHIP 

equipment, the essential telephone and message communications 

were main.tained. \ Vhenever the ship approac hed the maximum 

range limit of the radio equipment, relay stations were activated in 

strategic loca ti ons to span the miles and mai ntain sol id communi· 

ca tions. Initially. the directional antennas both at the ground stati ons and aboard the USS Bell cwah were kept properly aimed, as 

the ship sailed or swung at anchor, by signalmen llIrning the antennas slowly by hand until the strongest signa l was indicated on 

the receivers. This effec ti ve but primitive system was soon replaced 

with special antenna-rotati ng motors rushed ITom the United 

Sta tes. The rota ting motors were similar in design and were operated on the same principle as the "rotors" which many fam il ies 

have for their home TV antennas. 

In June 1968 the 9th Signal Batta lion was faced with the problem of establish ing telephone and message communications for another floati ng command post besides that on the VSS Benewah. 

This forward command post of the Mobile Ri verine Force was operating from a medi um landing craft onl y 73 feet long and 21 feet 

wide. Since the boat was far too small to accommodate the radios 

and power generators as well as the men of the forward command 

POSt, a second landing cra ft was found on which the 9th Signal 

Haualion troopers installed multichannel radio relay equipment 

and power generators. 

T he effectiveness of this system of communications can best be 

illustrated by describing a deployment o f the Mobile Riverine 
120 COM M UN l eA TIONS-El.ECTRQNICS 

Force in December 1968. A multichannel radio link was installed 

from the 9th Infantry Division main command post at Dong Tam 

to the Mobile Riverine Force forward command post located in 

the My Tho River a few miles from Dong Tam. As this command 

post craft moved down the river in the early morning hours, deslilled for Vung Tau and its ultimate site in Long An Province. the 

USS Benewal! also weighed anchor and sailed [or Vung Tau. As 

each ship entered the South China Sea, the 9th Signal Battalion 

relay sta tion at Vung Tau picked up each radio link and relayed 

it back to Dong Tam. The signalmen at Vung Tau were COIlstantly rotating antennas for maximum signal strength, as were the 

signalmen aboard the USS Benewal! and the forward command 

poSt vessel. 

At Vung Tau the VSS Be71ewah anchored, but the landing 

craft contai ning the forward command post and the waterborne 

radio relay equipment moved up various twisting canals and waten."ays to a position forty-five miles northwest of Vung Tau. This 

movement took severa l days. Each night the two landing craft 

heached and establ ished a base from which supporting artillery fire 

was provided and controlled through the telephone circuits passing 

over the radio rclay link. While the boats were moving, the Mobile Riverine Force fonvard command post, of course, had no access to these telephone circuits. But ;'IS soon as the boats either 

beached or anchored, the 2d Brigade's commander and his staff on 

the landing craft were provided with the telephone and message 

communications via field wire strung between the two vessels. Because of this increase in communications support, the Army and 

Navy commanders of the Mobile Riverine Force now had the capability to operate at distances far from their rear or permanem 

headquarters and still inAuence and control the over-all operation 

of the force. 

The Mobile Riverine Force was a highly successful U.S. combat unit throughout its period of operation. The innova tions of 

the 9th Infantry Division signalmen ti ed this potent amphibious 

force togeth er by means of solid communica ti ons, while the force 

elements freely operated in waterways that were previously controlled, for the most part, by the Viet Cong. 

Battlefield Secure Voice Equipment 

One of the most significant and vital communications innovations during the Vietnam 'Val' was the development of equipment 

capable or providing complete security to the comba t voice radio 

nets of the fighting units. From lhe early days of the war the sen-
SPECIAL COl\IM UNICATIONS OPERATIONS 121 

ior commanders could discuss classified matters over fixed secure 

long·distance telephone systems such as "Talk Quick" and ultimately over the worldwide. so phisticated Automatic Secure Voice 

Communications System. But the division commander and his bat· 

talion commanders did not have the means of disc ussing classified 

operations with their combat units unl ess a message was written, 

encoded, and Iransmitted over either the voice radio net or the 

message circuits. The procedure was extremely slow and therefore 

suffered from the all lOa common practice of not being followed at 

all . The hope that "maybe the enemy is not listening this time" was 

much too prevalent in the U.S. forces. This false sense of security 

did not a ppear for the first time in the Vietnam War; it was 

equa lly common duri ng World W'ar 11 and the Korean War. 

The Communists in Vi etnam had always capital ized on their 

abil ity to mount a surprise attack with rockets or mortars or to 

plan an ambush with mines and machine gun fire. During 1968 

there was g rowing evidence that the enemy was placing greater em· 

phasis on explOi ting alIT communications through interception and 

commun ications deception. As far back as the 1967 battle for Oak 

To, Viet Cong radios eavesdropped on U.S. radio transmissions. 

When fighter bombers asked the U.S. infantry to place yellow 

smoke in front of the most forward friendly positions, enemy mortars dropped yellow smoke on our troops, hoping to mislead the 

Air Force into bombing friendl y forces. 

During an operation in J anua ry 1968 near the Cambodian bor· 

del', units of the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division were startled 

to hear a radio operalOr cla iming to be the leader of an Australian 

patrol JUSt ahead of them. The American commander, whose radio 

ca ll sign was MANCHU SIX, was skeptical. His pa trol started a 

search. As the U.S. troops were moving through the jungle, the un· 

known radio operator ca lled MA ~C U SIX. MANC H U SIX , 

this is ALFA BRAVO 13, over." When the infantry commander 

replied, the alleged Austral ian station transmitted, " ... the 

Viet Cong in my area are moving up on your sOlllhern Rank, repea l. southern Aank, over." When his troops deployed on the 

southern Hank began to receive small arms fire, the U.S. battalion 

commander asked for an identifica tion. The repl )' was "We are an 

Australi an 173d Airborne unit and we were dropped here this 

morning at 0600 hours, approxima tely 23 meters north. We are on 

a search and destroy mission. Over." A careful check wi th the command op"rations centers of both the 25lh Infa ntry Division and II 

Field Force revealed that the Australian forces did not have a unit 

with a " 173" designation and that, further, there were no Austra· 
122 CO;-'Il\f UNICATIONS'ELECTRONICS 

lian forces operating in th e immediate area at (hat time. The next 

radio transmission heard was " BRAVO BRAVO 15, this is ALFA 

BRAVO 13. The American unit just east of yOll , repeat, just east 

of you, thinks you're Victor Charlie [Viet Cong]. Do you read? 

Over." At (hat point the U.S. battalion commander got on his 

radio and adv ised the unknown stations that they should "stay on 

the ground and not move. If you do not move aro und, everything 

will be okay. If, in fact. you arc phony an d a VC sta tion and can· 

tinue to move to my location then I will consider you enemy 

forces and will engage. Do yOll roger? Over. " The unknown sta· 

ti on stated that it would sland off and not move until contacted by 

the U.S. infantrymen. But these allegedl y friendly troops were 

never heard from again. A search of the area by U.S. troops revealed no Australians at all ; in fact, the only signs of prior occupancy were aba ndoned ambush pOsitions of the Viet Cong that 

showed signs o f hasty departure. 

These instances emphasized the magnitude of the Viet Cong 

and North Vietnamese efforts to intercept Allied communications. 

The simplest and fa ~est method for intercept is, of course, to 

lise captured communications equipment. By mid-1968, the Viet 

Cong and North Vietnamese had in their possession man y American-made radios which they had captured, primarily the portable 

radios used by U.S. infantry soldiers. 

However, the efforts o f the Viet Cong and North Vielllamese to 

monitor U.S. radio transmissions in order to use the information 

against LI S were increasingly frustrated as secure voice equipment 

became available. The first such equipment received in Vietnam 

was developed for use wi th combat voice radios moun ted on vehicl es, and for sets placed in tactical operations centers and similar 

loca ti ons. This con fi guration, recei ved in 1966, allowed the radio 

operators who worked from essentially fixed locations, such as divi· 

sion and brigade headquaners, to discuss classified information 

freely because the enemy simply could not understand them. 

The next breakthrough was the introduction in Vi etnam during 1968 of sma ller, man-carri ed, secure voice equipment which allowed patrols and small units operating in the jungles to secure 

their radio nets. That same year a model specia ll y configured for 

installation in aircraft, both helico pters and conventional fixedwing airplanes, was sent to Vietnam. The stage was now set for 

most of the U.S. mobile combat radio stations to operate in the se· 

cure voice mode. 

Initially. however, the new eq uipment was not generally used. 

There were three reasons for this delay. First. certain spec ial cables 
SPECIAL CO:'1 1\1 UNICATIONS O P ERAT IO NS 123 

and unique items were slow in being sem from the United States. 

Second, there were misconceptions about the security require. 

ments, the integrity of til e system, and the operational value of the 

equipmenl. Third and prohably mOSt important, a secure retransmit ca J><1. bility was not available: radios using the secure equipment 

could not automatically relay transmissions. The first two problems were handled qui ckly. Emphatic messages were rushed to the 

United States and gOt the needcd auxil iary equipment moving on 

the way. (nstruCl ion from scnior officers and teams of Signal Corps 

communica tors demonstrating the equipment helped the combat 

soldiers to realize its va lue. But the third problem, the lack of retransmission ca pabilit)" had to wait lIlllil 1969 for sol ution simply 

because the eq uipment did not yet exist. Once research and devel· 

opment and the wheels of industry were runni ng at high speed, the 

secure voice repeaters were quickly obtai ned and put to efficicnt 

use in Vietnam, Thus, in the latter part of the war, these secure 

voice devices were extensive ly used-a big step toward the ulimale 

goal of completely securing the Army's combat commUl.:'"ations, 

Airborne Radio R"elay 

The success wh ich the sky troo pers of the 1st Cavalry Division 

had with airborne radio rela y in the famoliS 1a Ora ng valley campaign in 1965 paved the way for extending a commander's ability 

to comrol the a<:lion on the battlefield, As the action o f the \\'ar 

turned toward th c remote valleys and plateaus bordering Laos 

and Ca mbodia, the cost- in terms of committed troops, expec ted 

casualties, and airlifts-of se izing and holding high ground for 

radio relay insta llation appeared to be excessive, if not prohibitive. 

Recalling the previous sliccess of the 1st Cavalry Division, communications-electronics planners of the U.S. Ann y, Viet nam, opted for 

an airborne radio relay system that would connect the fi eld commander's combat voice radios with his higher hcadquarters. The 

call went out to the Departmcnt of the Army, and in early 1968 

fOllr relay aircra ft h'ere equipped and sem to Viet nam. They were 

sllccessfully tested in combat in Febmary and soon were fl ying 

relay missions throughout the country. The airborn e relays were 

particularly valuable in su ppon of the 1st Cavalry Division's rel ief 

of Khe Sanh in the northern pan of thc I Corps Tactica l Zone in 

the spri ng of 1968. 

Allhough these airhorne relays extended the fi eld commander's 

span of control and often provided the onl y means of communi cating with ground troops in contact with [he enemy, there were ma· 

jor limi tations to the systelTl. These limitations primarily inl'oh'cd 
124 CO;\1 MUNICATrO:-lS-ELECTRON rcs 

the aircraft itse lf. The twin-e ngine Caribou airplane that the 1st 

Ca\alry Division employed so sLlccessrull y in 1965 had subsequrntl y 

been taken from the Arm~ 's inventory and Illrned over to the Air 

Force. As a result, the airborn e radio relay system was installed in 

the Army's single-engi ne Ottcr airplane. These older Otters were 

difficult to maintain . The rad ios installed were not ca pable of se· 

cure voice reu'ansmission and were actually tOo heavy for the underpowered Otter. 

Once aga in, therefore. the Depa rtment of the Army was asked 

for help. U.s. Army, Vi etnam, asked that the Olter be replaced 

wit h a more powerful. all-weather aircraft and that the present radi os be replaced with newer, lighter models designed especially for 

aircra ft . The result of this request was that the 1st Signal Brigade 

received nine twin-engine U-2 1, or "U te," aircraft in the fall of 

1969. Each was equipped with a radio console capable of relaying 

threc voice radio nets, But the most significant fa ct was that all 

three nets could now operate and be relayed in the secure voice 

mode, The first missions involving this new relay system proved 

that a secure \'o iee radio link of 140 nautical miles could be readily established at an ahitude of onl y 3,500 feet . Since the Army's 

U-2l plane can sta y aloft on station for several hours at a much 

higher altitude. the occasions when a smal l unit or long-ra nge patrol was without communi ca tions were virtually nonexistent. 

Airborne mdio re lay. however, contributed to the problem of 

raclio frequency interference. The frequency spectrum for the 

combat radios was very limited and had to be allocated among the 

many U.S. Army and other combat units deployed in Vietnam. In 

order to mi nimize the interference of the radio nets with each 

other, judiciolls planning was necessary to assure that those units 

which had to share a common frequency were sufficiently separated. 

All of this careful planning was for naught, however, when an 

airborne relay station was cap.1.ble of transmitting over five or six 

times the distance of a station on the gro und. In variably, reports 

of frequency interference would start to arrive at a combat headquarters shortl y after the relay aircraft arri ved in its assigned orbit. 

The only feasib le sol ution was for the U.S. Army, Vietnam, to reservc a certai n number of frequencies for lise in airborne radio 

relay opera tions alone. This exped ient solved the interference 

problem hut (unher decreased the number of radio fTequencies 

available for general use. Therefore detailed frequency manage· 

ment was essential from the maneuver battalion to the highest levels in Vietnam. 
SPECIAL COr.1MUNICATIO;-.lS OPERATIONS 125 

Pictoria~ OI)ert}.liolls . 

The face of war is ugly, but it is a face that must be recorded. 

Recording and photographing the war was one of the missions of 

the U.S. Army Signal Corps in Viet nam. 

A young lieutenant deploys his infantrymen into an ambush 

position to the accompaniment of the soft whir of a motion picLUre camera. Farther nortb a medical evacuation mission flying 

through heavy enemy fire is recorded in a series of short cl icks 

drowned Out by the roar of the hel icopter. In the Mekong Delta, a 

U.S. Army unit helps bui ld homes in a small village as one man 

with a necklace of cameras surveys the scene through a light meter. 

Unconnected? No, not really. To the Signa l Corps comba t photographer it is j ust another day of recording both the war itself and 

the Army's reconstruction efforts throughout South Vi etnam. 

In 1962 the only operational U.S. pi ctorial unit in Vietnam 

was an element of the 39th Signal Batta lion. Late in 1965 this elemelll was transferred to the 69th Signal Battalion, where it merged 

with the 69th's orga nic Audio-Visual Platoon. The ca pabiliti es of 

the res ulting orga nization were ge nerall y limited to black and 

white still photography on a very modest sca le. The arri vi ng U.S. 

combat divisions and separate brigades had their own photographic sections, as did the signal ba ttalions of the fi eld forces, but 

their capability was also limited to a few combat photographers 

and black and whit e fil m produc tion. 

As the war increased in intensity, so did the clamor for photographic documentation. In order to place saine control over the 

countrywide pictorial effort, the 1st Signa l Brigade crea ted the 

Southeast Asia Pictorial Agency late in 1966; however, this was 

only a staff or management type of agency, consisting of one or two 

officers. Not until almost a year later was there any significant improvement in photography and processing film. 

In August 1967 the pictorial agency was redesignated the 

Southeast Asia Pictorial Center. Concurrently, men and equipment 

for photo support on a large sca le began to arrive in Vietnam. 

This orga nization soon became the most eX lensive and complex 

photo facility the U.S. Army had ever pl "ced in a combat zone. In 

addition to its centra l facilities at Long Binh, the pictorial cent er 

maintained and opera ted photo su pport units at Phu Bai, An Kh e, 

Cam Ranh nay, Can T ho, and Saigon. Each unit was capable of 

providing complete photographic service within its area of operati on. The Southeast Asia PiuOI'ial Center was the first Army photo 

facility to be capable of color processing and printing in a combat 

zone. 
126 COM;\IUN ICATIONS'ELECfRONICS 

CoMBAT PHOTOGRAi'llER OF 221ST SIGNAL COMPANY GETS A HELPING 

1-1.0. 1'10 FROM VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN 

The Southeast Asia Pictorial Center was operated by the 22lst 

Signal Photographic Company. This unit, activa ted in June 1966 

at Fon Monmouth, New Jersey, arrived in Vietnam in photographic tcam incrcmCIllS during 1967 and 1968 and has a shon but 

colorful combat history. Its combat photographers as we ll as those 

or the organ ic signal units or the field forces, divisions, and b rio 
SPECIAL COMMUN ICATIONS OPERATIONS 127 

CO~IMUN[CATOR PI..ACI'.S A MARS CALL, CIIRISTMAS 1969 

gades, captured on film the realities of the Vietnam War. Coura· 

geollsly entering the combat area, armed with a roll of film and a 

camera, photographers sometimes lost their lives as they tried to 

capture the action of the combat men they accomp."tnied. One of 

these photographers was Specialist David A. Russell of the 221st 

Signal Company, who was killed in action on 18 ~Iarch 1969 while 

on a combat photo mission in South Vietnam. The 1st Signal Brigade dedicated a new Army message relay center at Long Binh on 

25 October 1970 and named itthe Russell Army Relay. 

Militnry Affiliate Radio S)'stem 

The Military Affiliate R<ldio System, or MARS as It IS popu. 

larly known , is <l worldwide network of milit<lI'Y and designated civilian ham, or amateur, radio SL."Itions. Its mission is to provide 

emergency backup and suppl emental radio links for U.S. Department of Defense communica tions. MARS operators perform vital 
128 COM M UN ICA TIONS-ELECTRON ICS 

services fOT both the military and civil ian population. Their services range from establishing rescue communications following an 

earthquake or tornado to allowing a combat soldier to talk via 

radio telephone to his wife. 

The MARS o peration in Vietnam is definite ly small when compared with all other Army communica ti on services provided. but 

to hundreds of thousands of servicemen in Vietnam and their fa milies back home it has been the most important service provided by 

the Signal Corps. After receiving the approval of the government 

of the Republic of Vietnam. the Military Affiliate Radio System 

began operation in Vietnam in late 1965, wi th all U.S. armed services participating. The Army MARS program in Vietnam started 

with just six sta tions. A personal radio and telephone hookup, or 

"phone patch," service began in February 1966 when the Department of the Army authorized the Viet nam MARS stations to make 

contact with designated sta tions in the United Slates. A U.S. contact sta ti on \\'ould then place a collect telephone ca ll to a designated 

home, and for five minutes a soldier in Vietnam, perhaps one just 

in from a jungle patrol, could talk to his folks, who were haJf\\'ay 

around the \\'orld. True, the rece ption was not always good because of ionospheric storms and wea ther disturba nces. But who 

cared when an amateur radio operator in the United Sta tes was relaying to a soldier on a remote fi re base in Vietnam the message 

"yes, she loves you and yes, she will marry yo u, over." 

The U.S. Army, Vielllam. portion of the MARS program was 

completed in October 1969 with a total of forty-seve n MARS stations throughOll t the republic. operating in seven different nets. 

The number of contact stations in the United Sta tes had gro\\'11 

to over a hundred. In the spring of 1970 the n umber of phone 

patches, or completed con nections, from Vietnam to the United 

States reached an all-time high, averagi ng over 42,000 each month. 

At the conclusion of the MARS expansion program in Vietnam, 

soldiers in every American unit had access to a local l\'fARS station. The backbone of the MA RS sta ti ons in Vi etnam \\'as a commercially purchased. "off-the·shelf," single sideband rad io, which 

was ('apable of spanning great distances. It was not on ly the mainstay for the MARS stations, hm also for several YC;lrs was IIsed consta ntly in Vietnam to meet combat req uircments fo r a long-range 

radio. 
CHAPTER XI 

Sophistication of U.S. Army 

Communications in Vietnam 

Whereas the years from 1962 to 1967 were devoted to building 

the commun ica ti ons foundation in Vietnam, 1968 and 1969 were 

years of compl eti on and sophistication. During that period the 

huge Integra ted Widcband Communications System was finished. 

The telephone and message networks in Vietnam were furth er integrated and consol idated. For the first time. modern automa~ic 

switching equipment for both voice and message traffic was introduced into a combat zone. 

Completio'l of the In tegrated Communications System 

T he final links of Phases I and II of the Integrated Wideband 

Commun ica tions System were compl eted in the first two months of 

1968. Their compl etion marked a commun ications milestone. ex· 

tending high quality, mul tichannel communications throughout 

Vietnam: north to Hue, south to major cities in the Mekong 

Delta, and westward into T hail and. The fact that these two phases 

of the wideband system were completed and cut to traffic at this 

time had extreme combat sign ificance. Many critica l mobile assets 

could now be relieved from their interim service in the long.lines 

system and could be transferred to the north in support of the 

heavy troop buildup and unit reloca tions with in I Corps Tactical 

Zone. The T et offensive and the massing of enemy troops in the 

Demilitarized Zone and in the area of the Khe Sanh combat base 

had led to the strengthening of I Corps Tactical Zone. 

Construction and install ation at the new sites of Phase III, the 

final phase of the integrated long·lines system, were underway at 

the OUlSet of 1968 and continued through the perilous weeks of 

the Tet o ffensive. Work on the n~w Phase III links and on system 

improvements progressed steadil y, and by the end of the year all 

but one of the twenty·six links and upgrades had been completed 

and put into service. The uncompl eted link was between Qui 

Nhon and Nha Trang. 
130 COM,\l UN ICA T IONS-ELECTRONICS 

" ... HOlD YfR HA rs mus ... HERE COMES ANOTHER ONE OF THE SIGNAL BRIGADE'S 

'MODERN, SOPHIST/CATrD COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS',. " 

This last link of Phase til was accepted and put to traffic in 

January 1969. After four and a half years of effort and at a cost of 

approximately $235 million, the most massive undertaking in the 

history of the Army Signal Corps was finally finished, consliLUting 

throughout South Vietnam and Thailand the fixed-station, commercial-quality Integrated Wideband Communications System. 

(Map 7) 

One final addition to the civilian contract for the wideband system was awarded in March 1968 for the provision and installation 

of four transportable, line·oE-sight, microwave terminals. These 

transportable fa cilities had all the technica l control capabilities 

and high channel capacity of the fixed wideband stations, plus the 

ve ry distinct advamagc that they could be moved if needed elsewhere. The first of these microwave terminals to be put into full 

operation was at Dong Ha, j ust a few kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone. On 20 April 1969 this terminal linked with the 

fixed·station terminal at Quang TrL 'Work was continui ng, mean· 

while, on the three other transportable facilities be ing installed at 

Di An, a few miles north or Saigon, at Sa Dec, in the delta, and at 

Dong Sa Thin, near Cam Ranh Bay. All these fa cilities were operational by July 1969. 
......... , 

.. , 

I 

( 

\ 

\ 

SOPI1 ISTICATION OF ARi\IY COMMUNICATIONS 131 

\NO T~ INTEGRAT ED W ID EBAND 

' , YIETNAM COMMUN ICATIONS SYST EM 

'\ .......... o, ., .,,,M ,... 1')6 ') 

~_ OU C 11< 

( 

'../: 

lAO 5 \..\ ........ -:;:;::>-C\---_ , -----, 

.... ,,\ 

( 

~ .. ,,,j - \ ) 

/ 

._ ........ ') .~ >HI ~"u COl "2' ~. :;;-"'"'" 

. -""t--'''':::'_ \ 'U;"' -; ~ DI U C' 11I '. "I" U , ., 

u ___ _ 

\ 

j 

I 

\ 

CMU' ~ ____ ....... 

~"U Il' -_........, 

, \ 

\ \ 

1 1 C AM80DIA I I 

/ I 

MAP7 

/ ""..i ---_ ...... /' 

, ;:~~~---..... ,." ...... .~ .... au 

\ \ 

.". ~ ''' ~ \ \ I 1 , I 

.......... -" ...... ..... • _ • ........... ... -- ... ... ,, ,;;:::/-~--- -------

U" DIIS{ ' 0111 '0 ,." , .. 0 

R EPU8ll C 

Of 

VIETNAM 

• 

• , 

Integration of Defense Communications 

, 

In November 1968. the Department of Defense redesignated its 

telecommunica ti ons systems in Southeast Asia as the Integra ted 
132 CO;\IM UN ICA T IONS-ELECTRON ICS 

Communications System, Southeast Asia. This move involved more 

than JU St another complicated name. Now one single system incorporated previously dislinct clements: the la rge fi xed-station wideband system, the undersea cabl e system that looped around the 

coast of Vi etnam to Thailand, and a considerable number of mobile line-of-sight and tropospheric scalter radio fa cilities, supplementing and extending the terminal poims, or tails, of the Defense 

Communicatio ns Syuem in Vietnam. 

Soon after the completion of the fi xed wideha nd system and 

the establishment of the over-all illlcgrated system, numerous 

transponable combat communica tions links were released, and. 

since they were no longer needed to support the long.lines net· 

work, they were at once relocated to provide support for combat 

opera ti ons. A most critical and immediate need was the major reconfiguration of the communications in I Corps Tactica l Zone. Re· 

configuration was completed in early January 1969, thereby releasing U.S. Air Force tropos pheric sca ll er systems, which had been 

"temporarily" deployed to Vietnam in 1966 when it was apparent 

that the rapid innux of troops was surpassing the limited capability of the long-lines system. The Air Force equipment, however, 

had remained in place and in usc for three years, until the backbone system atlained full ca pacity in 1969. 

Similar " purgi ng" of the integrated long·li nes system was soon 

accomplished throughout lhe rest of Vietnam; the result was the 

rel ease of considerabl e quantities of mobile sigmd equipment that 

had been previously committed, as an interim stopgap measure, to 

the support of the Defense Communications System. The Integrated Communications System, Southeast Asia, became stable in 

mid·1969, thus yielding the fruit of much labor. 

Automatic MeJJage Switching-Another First 

The activation o f automa tic message and data switching centers 

at Phu L,m and Nha Trang in early 1968 introduced the worldwide Automatic Digital Network into Vi etnam. The Phu Lam 

switching center of this network began passing traffic in March 

1968. The now of traffic through til e PIlu Lam switching ccnter 

wrOte a new chapter in communications history: the multimillion 

dollar switch was the first of its ki nd c\'er to be install ed in a com· 

bat lone in sight or Vi et Cong patrols. A sim il ar automatic switch 

\\'as activa ted at Nha Trang on 3 June 1968. Subscriber message 

terminals to serve_ the U.S. forces were acti vated as fast as the 

equipment was available. At the end of 1968, the Phu L,m switch 

was servi ng twenty-e ight subscriber terminals with an average daily 
C II ECKII"G A Co:-':SOLE AT P nu LAM AUTOMATIC MESSAGE SWITCHING 

CENTER. White rIlbber-soled slloes were required in dust-tree, temperatlm··controlled bllilding necessary tor equipment. 
134 CO;\l ~t UNICAT ION'S- ELECTRO:-.lICS 

traffic volume of 37,000 meS5.1gcs. Nha Trang, serving nineteen 

subscribers, was handling morc than 25,000 mcsS<1.ges daily. 

The 1st Signal Brigade was charged with the responsibility of 

operating and maintaining not only the two automatic switching 

cenlers based in Vietnam, but also all Army subscriber terminals 

that were connected to the big automatic switches. The digital network provided the primary trllnking for the Defense Department's 

integrated automatic and nonautomatic message network in Vietnam. At its peak, the syslcm handled in excess of 100,000 messages 

per day, with the Army portion of the network encompassing some 

cight)'·six commun ications centers with lwemy·fi\'c automatic digital terminals. Within th is count were the automatic terminals provided to the combat divisions throughout the country. From Camp 

Eagle in the nOTlh, ncar the cit y of Hue, home of the IOlst Airhorne Division. to eu Ch i in III Corps Tactical Zone. home of the 

25th Infantry Division. communi ca tors from the 1st Signal Brigade 

operated low-s peed, 100·words· pcr·minute automatic terminals. 

Usually mounted on "ans but sometimes install ed in a fixed fa· 

cility, these terminals provided the division commander with di· 

rect worldwide access for message communications. 

In onl y two years, from the acti vat ion of the Phu Lam automatic switching center in 1968 to late 1970, the automatic message 

system in Vi etnam expanded to meet the requirements of ceillral· 

ized control and accurate, high-speed communications. The impact 

of the Automatic Digital Network on record communi ca tions in a 

war zone was immense because for the first time U.S. forces possessed a reliable and accurate hi1-\ h·speed method of ordering am· 

munition and repair parts, reporti ng casualties, and requesting replacements. 

In late 1969 some of the last necess.:"lTY refinements were made 

on the message communications system in Vietnam. The older 

manllal message relay facili ti es at Phu Lam and Da Nang were 

phased out of service. The Nha Trang relay had been relegated to 

the less important role of minor relay in December 1968. These relays had ca rried the burden of message communi cations in Vietnam and served as the gateway stations to the reSl of the world 

since lhe early 1960s. 13l1llllanual tape rclays proved to be lOO slow 

for Ollr modern army in combat. The inevitable arrival of automalic switchin g in lhe combat zone marked the end of an era in 

military communica tions. the end of the reliance on torn-tape 

rcla y as the basis for message communica tions, and another step in 

our progress to writer-lo·reader secure communications. 
SOPHISTICATION OF AR1\IY COMMUNICATIO;':S 135 

TallCiem Switches- An Ultimate 

At the end of 1968 the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone 

Service was nearing complel ion, ;lIld Ihe many years of operatorassisted long-dista nce telephone calls were coming to an end. In Novemher of that year the first automatic long-dista nce telephone 

switching center at Bang Pia , ncar Ha ngkok, Thai la nd, was com· 

pleted and cut over to' service. The remai nin g switching cen ters in 

Vietnam and Thailand were in various stages of completion. On 

22 February 1969 the Can Tho alllomatic switch was completed. 

Its cutover was followed by cutovers of centers at Korat, Thailand, 

in arch. and al Da Nang in mid-April 1969. The telephone 

switching centers at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang were completed at the end of July. Installation continucd at th e centers of 

the remaining sites at Pleiku, Vung Chua Mountain near Qui 

N hon. and Uhon , Thail:lIld. These last Ihree switches became operational by the end of 1969, thus completing the long-d istance direct dial system for Southeast Asia . 

The nine switches comprising this system were connected to 

some fifty-four automalic dial telephone exchanges of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force in Vietnam and Thailand, a ll owing selected 

subscribers and all dial telephone exchange operators to dial directly any telephone subscriber in Southeast Asia, and givi ng access 

into the worldwide AUlOmatic Voice Ne twork. The U.S. automatic 

dial telephone excha nges in Vietnam, which had access to the 

long-distance system, were hy themselves processing over 1,000,000 

telephone calls each day in 1969. (M ill) 8) 

Another critical and essen tial long·distance te lephone servi ce 

was in the area of command control. In the summer of 1967 th e 

1st Signal Brigade insta ll ed small automatic telephone excha nges. 

dubbed "emergency action consoles," at the command operat ions 

ccntcrs of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Saigon and of 

U.S. Army. Vietnam. at Long Binh. These consoles provided automalic telephone service to the essential subscribers in Saigon and 

Long Binh. In addition, the control elements of the subordinate 

commands. down to separa te hrigade levels, were connec ted to 

both emergency action consoles by se parate long-dist<1 nce telephone 

circuits. 

Th e Signal Soldier 

The growth of U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces 

III the Republic of Vietnam from 1962 to 1968 brought with it 

problems concerning the personnel needed to operate and main-
136 COM :'> I U NICAT 10 NS- EL ECTRON ICS 

........ \ 

I 

1 1 

\ .. \ . .') 

. • ~ 

-. 

C AMB OD IA 

" I" .... 1. ( •• _ .. ......... ~ . tV CMI 

'-..... .. (J 

'-> 

<' 

•• / ' SldCOfrI AREA ••,::=!,.C;>< 

M AP 8 

AUTOMATIC DIAL 

TELEPHONE EXCHANGES 

19 (, 9 

~, . 

'~ [ • "'V tll 

• O~I _.00 

""'11 " 

REP U 8ll C • 11/1" lOCI 

O F 

VI ET N AM 

• 

• 

• 

• SAIGO N ARU 

• IlOl.' '!IO" 1j(l.I ' 10llG ~~ 

• 11.' " •• g! " .. , " ... • N. ('y 

. OlD N. (>' 

• I'-'"It·] 

• 

lain the widespread communica tions facilities. The probl ems came 

from llIany sou rces, among them the lack of certain select special. 

ists and the introd ucti on of new cquipmclH into Vi etnam whcn the 

operators had no previous tra ining in the nitcd Statcs. Allhough 
SO PHISTICATION OF ARMY COMMUNICATIONS 137 

assigned strengths lagged behind authorized figures throughout the 

emire U.S. Army in Vielllam, [ will discuss here only those manpower problems that were peculiar to the U.S. Army Signal Corps 

operating in Vietnam and the actions that were taken to ease these 

problems. 

Operation and maintenance difficulties often arose when new 

equipment was introduced into Vi etnam before the Army's schools 

in the United Stales could provide trained men. This situation 

forced the operating signal units to take soldiers away from their 

primary and essential duties and either give them on-the-job training with the new equipment or send them to the 1st Signal Brigade's Army Training Facility at Long Binh for formal instruction. Typical examples of such equipment were the commercial 

dial switChing gear of the telephone network and the data transmission terminals assoc iated with the Automatic Digital Network. 

One o f the most critical ma npower shortages was in the specia lty of communications cable-splicer. Long before the communications expansion in Vietnam , the decision had been made by the 

U.S. Army to d iscontinue cabl e-s plicing as a course of instruction 

and instead to send Army students to the joint course conducted 

by the Air Force at Sheppard Air Force Base in Texas_ As heavy 

cable construction became routine in all of the large Vietnam base 

camps, it was apparent that the numbers graduating from this 

joint course could nOt meet the requirements of the U.S. Army, 

Vietnam, for tra ined splicers, The shortage was largely alleviated 

by introducing a cable-splici ng course at the 1st Signal Brigade's 

Army Traini ng Facility in Vietnam. While this method produced 

a journeyman·soldier capable o f beginning work on heavy cable 

construction projects and making rep.-tirs, the time he spent at the 

sc liool d ecreased the time left in the soldier's 12-month tour in 

which his new-found skills could be put to use. ,,,fe also had d iffi, 

culties in other fields. J\lan y mi crowave, tropospheric sca tler, radar, 

computer, and cryptographic spec ialists arriving in Vietnam needed 

additiona l training before they could perform their tasks in an acceptable manner. These men were given refTesher courses at the 

brigade's t T<lining fac ilit y. 

Another area of concern was that signal personnel arrived in 

Vietnam from two d ifferent sources. Signal officers and men for the 

1st Signal Brigade were requisitioned through channels of the Stra· 

tegic Communications Command fTom the Department of the 

Army. i\fen for the signal units of the fi eld forces, divisions, and 
138 COM M UN l eA TIQNS, ELECTRON ICS 

CARLE-SI'LICERS AT ,.yORK AT A L ARGE F IXED BASE 

separate brigades were requisitioned through U.S. Army, Vietnam, 

from the Department of the Army. Of necessity. requisitions were 

submiucd man y momhs in advance of the arrival of the replacements, and often the requirement for an individual with a panicular specialty ill a speci fi c unit had been sa tisfied by other means 

prior to his arrival in Vi etnam. In order to utili ze replacements 

most effectively and retain the Aexibility necessa ry to respond to 

the changing req uirements, a weekly meeting was established in 

1968 between the 1st Signal Brigade and the communications-elcctronics staff of the U.S. P.rmy, Vietnam, to disc llss the personnel 

silUa tion. Decisions were then made to diven incoming manpower 

resources or to reassign men already in Vietnam to meet urgent re-

<jlliremelHs. Through this procedure the possible detriment of the 

d ual replacement stream was avoided, and an effective method 

emerged for using sign:l l officers and enlisted men arriving in Vietn:lrn. 
SOPHISTICATIO N OF ARfI>tY COM~fUNICATIONS 139 

Supply and Maintenance Support 

The communications equipment used in Vi etnam ranged in 

size and compl exity from large. fixed-plant items to the squad 

radio used by the infantry soldier. All this equipment required an 

efficient repair and supply system in order to insure continuing 

communications. The procedures for providing this support differed between the mobil e and fixed communications items and 

these differences ultimately led to problems. 

An appreciation of the difficulties inherent in communications 

supply support can be gained by an examination of the sheer magnitude of the communications-e lectroni cs logistics effort at the 

height of the Vietnam War. An estimated one-third of all the 

major items of equipment in Vietnam were communications·electronics items. Over 50,000 different types of communications-electroni cs replacement and repair parts were stocked by the supply 

system in Vietnam. And there were more than 150 direct and general Sllpport supply and maintenance facilities in ',';etnam that 

dealt with communications-electron ics equipment. 

The supply and maintenance support for the communications 

equipment of the combat units and of the corps area support battalions under the 1st Sign:'!1 Brigade was standardized, following 

the guidelines of the Army's logistics doctrine. This support functioned as effectively as the over-all Army logistics system in Vietnam functioned. \Vhen the U.S. forces began to arrive in strength, 

the huge logistical buildup created unprecedented problems which 

the Army had to solve in order to fight a computerized war in the 

counterinsurgency combat environment of Vietnam. However, in 

time the dep::>t and support command system of management functioned well. and the com puter as a tool of logistic management 

came of age in Vietnam. 

The standardization that was possible for mobile communica· 

tions-electronics equipment was not feasible for the fixed-plant 

com munications equipment used in Vietnam. Our fixed signal 

equipment in Somheast Asia was mainly a combination of commercial e<Juipment provided by and partly or wholly maintained 

by two commercial COntractors. Such equipment was new to the 

Army and involved uncommon components that were not found at 

all in the field army maintenance support system. These items, 

there fore. presented unprecedented problems for the logistician in 

the matter of the availability of repair parts. the applica ti on of 

standard Army maintenance doctrine. and the training of military 

technicians to maintain the equipment. 
140 COI\II\! UN ICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

CALt8RATI .... C EQU II>.\IENT AT 1ST SIC:"'A!. llR1GAnE CAN THO S ITE 

The problems were apparent to both the logisti cian and the 

communicator alike. During tbe summer of 1968 a Department of 

lhe Army team, headed by Brigadier General Hugh F. Foster, Jr., prepared a study of communications-electronics su pport in South· 

east Asia. The study defined the logistics concepts and the support 

responsibilities for the fixed communications systems in Southeast 

Asia. Specifically, it recommended thal three area maintenance and 

supply facilities be established, two in Vietnam and onc in Thailand. These facilities, to be operated solely by and for the 1st Signal Brigade, were to furnish the maintenance and supply support 

lor the commercially procured, fixed-plant communica tions equipment in Southeast Asia_ 

In October 1968 approval of the recommendation came from 

the Department of the Army, and construction of facilities at 

Bangkok. Thailand. and at Long Binh. Vietnam, was begun 

promptly. The Thailand complex, under the 29th Signal Group, 

became operat ional in June 1969. and the Long Binh facility followed a month later. Shortly thereafter, construction was started 
SO PHI STiCt\TIO N OF t\ R~IY COM MU NICt\TIONS 141 

on the th ird fac ility at Cam Ranh Bay, which became operationa l 

in the spring of 1970. 

The activa tion of these area ma intenance ,md su pply fa cilities 

solved one of the major probl ems in the su pport of fixed communica tions systems. These systems. previollsly supported by cOlllracts 

and ill-de fi ned ma intenance and supply channels, were now supported from a single central facility in each of the three designated 

geographical areas of responsibility. 
CHAPTER XI I 

Vietnamization and Related Activities 

Background 

In th e wake of the 1968 Tet offen sive, major decisions wcrc 

made affectin g the course of the war in Vi etnam . By th e end of 

that yea r th e Paris peace talks had begu n and the United Sta tes 

had halted the bombing of North Vi etnam. Upon th e advent of 

th e Nixon administration a maj or shift occurred in U.S. fore ign 

policy. as announced by the President at Guam in July 1969. In an 

address on 3 November 1969. President Richard M. Nixon declared that the United States would provide economic and military 

assistance in accordance wit h U,S. treat y comm itmen ts. and stated: 

" \Ve shall look to the nation directly threatened to aSSllme th e primary responsibility of providing th e man power for its defe nse." 

The United States would continue to seek peace in Vietnam 

through negotiation. If that method did not succeed, th e Unit ed 

Stales would, as an alterna tive, strengthen the South Vietnamese 

armed forces so that they could take over the respo nsibilities of defending their nation. The "alternati ve," a plan ca ll ed Vi et namization, was initiated after Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's 

trip to Vietnam in March 1969. It provided for rede ployment of 

U.S. troops o n a programmed hasis, as th e South Vietnamese 

armed forces became more self-sufficient. 

T he U.S. troop withdrawals would be accompl ished in phases. 

The first phase, the withdrawal of 25,000 men, anno unced in June 

1969. included ('lel11ent~ of the L' .S. Army's 9t h Infantry Division 

and a U.S. i\ farine regiment. Over the next eighteen months withdrawal figures gre\\', so that U.S. strengtb. whic h had stood at 

abollt 535.000 at th e start of 1969 decl ined to a bout 335,000 by th e 

end of 19iO, \\·ilh major de ploymc l1ls plan ned for the near futlne. 

Communicationr VielllamiUltion: The Plan 

Implemcllling the Vietnamization program required a plan fo r 

a communications system to sa tisfy th e diminishing U.S. requirements and to Tlleet the long ran ~e needs of the Vietnamese govern· 

m Cnl and its am lcd forces. Plans were developed by the U.S. Mili-
VIETNAMIZATION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 143 

tary Assistance Command in the fall of 1969 For a time-phased 

turnover to the Republic of Vietnam of a backbone system to meet 

the needs both of the South Viet namese and of the remaining U.s. 

and other Free World Military Assistance Forces. A U.S. Army 

communi cations planning group. which was formed from U.S. 

Army, Vietnam, and 1st Signal Brigade staffs, made recommendations to the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in the 

fonn of a "strawman" plan. 

The plan required that portions of the fi xed Integrated Communications System and the Corps Area Communications System 

be turned over to the South Vietnamese. Selected terminal equipment, such as fixed automatic dial telephone exchanges and manlIal telephone switchboards with the ir associated cable systems, also 

would be turned over where required. T he considerable residue of 

U.S. communications equipment would be withdrawn from Vietnam. On a long-range basis the U.S. communica tions assets 

remaining in Vietnam would be capable of consolidation into a 

single integrated telecommunications system, to be operated by the 

government of Vietnam. To achieve the Vietnamization of the 

complex communications system, of course, skilled Vietnamese operators, maintenancemen, and managers were necessary. The training of Vietnamese communicators now became a matter of highest 

priority. 

Training the South Vietnamese Signalmen 

Since 196 1 South Vietnam had been trai ning its own signalmen 

at the Signal School of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces at 

Vung Tau. This school had primarily concerned itself with providing Vietnamese signal personnel to operate and maintain comba t 

communications systems_ In line with the Vietnamization program, 

the school had increased its student capacity unti l it reached 2,500 

by August of 1969. However, the South Vietnamese signal school 

was not capable of training its signalmen in the so-called hard, or 

higher, skills required to operate the Integr;ned Communi cations 

System, Southeast Asia, and the automatic dial telephone exchanges. As a res ult, U.S. Army. Vietnam, was asked to provide the 

necessary training. 

For this task, the 1st Signal Brigade was well suited. The bri o 

gade, with its responsibilities for the operation and maintenance of 

the extensive comm unications system which would be turned over 

to the Vietnamese, already possessed soldi er-experts. These experts 

were readily available and would work with the SOLith Vietnamese 

during the conversion period. Such co-operation, however, was 
144 COM lI,{UNICATIONS-ELECfRONICS 

GENERAL FOSTER OSS£RVINC VIETNAMESE SICNAL TRAINING CLASS 

nothing new. The signalmen of the brigade had been working for 

years with their Vietnamese counterparts through the "Buddy System," a program initiated in July 1966 by General Terry in co· 

ordination with the Vietnamese Chief Signal Officer. It had three 

major objectives: to improve the training of the South Vietnamese 

signalmen, to support civic action projects which would be beneficial to dependents of Vietnamese Signal Corps personnel, and to 

(oster a closer relationship between the signalmen of both countries. By the end of 1969 twemy-five brigade units were actively 

participating in the program. then called Buddies Together, la ter 

called in Vietnamese Clmg ThMI Thien . 

By late 1969 the brigade had also begun formal training for the 

necessary Vietnamese hard·skill signal personnel at facilities pro· 

vided by the Vietnamese signal school at Vung Tau. On I July 
VIETNAMIZATIO N AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 145 

1970, shortly after I had left Vietnam and Major General Hugh F. 

Foster, Jr., had assumed the duties of Commanding General, 1st 

Signal Brigade, and Assistant Chief of Staff for CommunicationsElectronics, U.S. Army, Vietnam, a new signal training annex was 

put into opera tion near the Vietnamese signal school at Vung Tau. 

This contractor-operated facility, at which the hard·skill personnel 

\"ould be trained, could accommodate 320 signal students. 

The program to teach hard skills was in three phases. First, the 

South Vietnamese were taught to speak and read English at the 

South Vietnamese Armed Forces Language School. An underlitanding of English was necessary since the system would be used jointly 

by the United States and South Vietnam before it was turned over 

completely to SOllth Vietnam. The language problem has been 

present throughout our experience in Vietnam and has never been 

really solved. Upon completion of th is phase, the Vietnamese un· 

denvent formal traini ng in one of the required skills of microwave 

radio repair, fixed-plant carrier repair, fixed-station technical con· 

trol, or dial telephone exchange repair. After this formal training 

the Vietnamese signalmen were assigned to communicati ons sites 

to work and learn on the job as apprentices for a little over six 

months. Once their tra ini ng was completed. these Vietnamese signalmen augmented, and will eventually replace, U.S. military or 

contractor personnel at designated communi cations facilities. In 

addition to learning hard skills at Vung Tau, Vietnamese soldiers 

were be ing trained in the relatively simple soft skills. such as cablesplicing, communications line repair, and radio repair at the 

U.S. Army Training Facility which the 1st Signal Brigade operated 

at Long Binh. 

Contractor Operation Of Communications 

In line with the Vietnamization program and the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops, the U.S. Army, Vietnam. deve loped a plan 

for contractor operation and maintenance of the Integrated Com· 

mu nica tions System, the di al telephone exchanges, and the two associated Army Signal maintenance and suppl y facilities in Vietnam. T he plan, which had been approved in early 1970 by its 

enthusiastic advocate. Stanl ey R. Resor, Secretary of the Army, was 

known as COMVETS, Contractor Operation and Maintenance, 

Vietnam, Engineering and Training Services. A similar arrangemem, COMTETS, was deve loped and ultimately approved for 

T hailand. In line with COMVETS, a contract was awarded toward 

Ihe end o f 1970 LO the Federal El ectric Corporation, a subsidiary 

of Interna tional Telephone and Telegraph, for the operation and 
146 COM MUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

V IETNAM ARMY S ICNALMAN TRAINS ON nlE JOB at the first integrated 

communications site l/lrned over 10 Vietnamese forces. 

mai ntenance of the fixed communications faci lities. The contract 

also ca ll ed for Federal Electric to provide future communications 

engineering maintenance and suppl y support in Vietnam. 

Signal T roop Redeployments 

As U.S. troops began to phase out of South Vietnam, the U.S. 

Army Signalmen who had been providing military communications support in the country, also began to redeploy. Some U.S. 

Army signa l units were inacti vated in South Vietnam itself, while 

other units were redeployed to the United States. In some cases, 

strengths and eq tl ipm~nt authoriza tions were reduced by the reorg:lI1 ization or the units themselves. For exampl e, the headquarters 

or the 972d Signal Battalion was inactiva ted in Vietnam during 

NO\·ember 1969. The battal ion's mission, that of providing contingency communi ca tions support throughout the Republic of Vietnam, was divided among the 2d. 12th, and 21st Signal Croups. Its 

comp.1nies, depending on essential needs, were either inactivated 

or assigned to other battalions. When the U.S. Army's 1st l nrantry 
VIETNAMIZATION ANO RELATEO ACTIVITIES 147 

Division redeployed to Fort Riley, Kansas, during the spring of 

1970, the division's organ ic 121 st Signal Battalion Went with the 

division. As a result of the redeployment of the 1st Infantry Division's ISl Brigade from its base camp at Lai Klle, about fony 

spaces were deleted from the 1st Signal Brigade's 587th Signal 

Company, which had provided the base camp support to this com· 

bat division. 

Recovery 0/ Communications Assets 

ru the redeployment of U.S. forces progressed, selected communications equipment, not programmed for turnover to the govern· 

ment of South Vietnam and no longer required for our troops, 

became available for use outside of Vietnam. Combat equipment 

was either deployed with its unit or was turned back into the U.S. 

Army suppl y system for redistribution. Redistrihution presented 

no major problem since mobile combat equipment is generally 

sturdy and is packaged so that it can be moved or stOred without 

damaging it when handled according to standard procedures. 

The recovery of fixed equipment, however, was another matter. 

This equipment had been shipped to Vietnam in bits and pieces, 

where it had been assembled and installed in the form of large 

communications facilities, for the most part in air-conditioned 

buildings. If the expensive fixed equipment was to be reused, 

there were problems in identifications, inventory, and packaging. 

In early 1969 we organi zed an element in the 1st Signal Bri· 

gade specifically for the purpose of the recovery and redistribution 

of fixed equipment. This small group of men was charged with the 

task of dismantling, preserving, and packaging the equipment at 

loca tions in both Victnam and Thailand. For example, during 

April 1970 two dial exchanges were recovered, one from Camp 

Enari in South Vietnam and one from Saltahip, south of Bangkok, 

in Thailand. Communications·electronics equipment from two 

other sites in Thailand were also recovercd. 

Reorgan ization o/the 1st SigTlal Brigade 

While U.S. troops were being phased out oi Vietnam, the 1st 

Signal Brigade underwent a major reorganization on 1 March 

1970. Involving some eighty.five units of the brigade, this reorganiz.a tion was based on a plan which had been approved by the Department of the Army in 1968 and which was in accord with the 

Army's evolving communications position in South Vietnam. Many 

of th.c brigade's organizations that had been structured to operate 
148 COM ~I UN l e A TIONS'ELECfRONICS 

mobile facilities were in fact o perating numerous other £aCllities, 

such as fi xed automatic dial telephone exchanges and message cen· 

ters and relays on mountaintops. In addition, man y attachments 

had been made in order to provide the specific resources required 

for a given mission. As a result, one battalion often cOIllTol\ed 

companies from several other hattalions. This sitliaLion produced 

command, administrative. and morale problems. The 1970 reorganization of the 1st Signal Brigade \\'as both an improvement and a 

reduction. Some ballalion-size units. such as the 69th Signal Battalion. operated the fixed faciliti es. These units \~ere reorganized and 

redesignated signal support agencic$, according to the U.S. Army's 

policy of not designating unin whic h operate fixed installations as 

battalions. Although not a part of the Vietnamization pro~am, 

this reorgan iza tion resulted in a reduction of the number of men 

needed in tile 1st Signa: Brigade. By the end of 1970 the 1st Bri. 

gade's slrength was approximately 14 .000 officers and men, of 

which about 12,000 were in the Republic of Vietnam and about 

2,000 with the brigade'! 29th Signal Group in Thailand. 

Communications Support in Cambodia, April-June 1970 

Even as U.S. troops were being phased out, a major test of the 

flexibility of our communications systems in South Vietnam occurred when U.S. and South Vietnam forces sought to wipe Ollt 

Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia during April-June 1970. A 

number of major operations were undertaken from Vietnam 

agamst these sanctuaries wh ich Hanoi had for years used with impunity to stage and launch attacks into South Vietnam, Laos, and 

Thailand. 

As the assault forces mo"ed IntO Cambodia, the U.S. Army 

shifted its communications forward. The 1st Cavalry Division and 

the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions established division forward 

command posts. The II Field Force set up a forward command 

POSt in Ihe III Corps Tactkal Zone ncar the Cambodian border at 

Go Dau Ha, thirty-five miles northwest of Saigon. As the combat 

situation changed. this command post was later moved to the vici nity of Tay Ninh City. 

During the initial stages of the operation, communications between the maneuver clements and their base areas were provided 

by the comba t units' organ ic man-packed and ve hicle-mounted 

voice radios. A!J the attacking forces moved furth er into Cambodia, 

airborne and ground radio relays we re used to extend the range or 

these radios. For example, the U.S. Army's 11th Armored Cavalry 
SKYTROOP COMMUNICATORS IN CA~IBODIA IN EARL\, 19;0 
150 COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS 

Regiment maintained voice radio communications over long distances through a voice retransmission station located at the isolated 

radio rclay site atop Nui Ba Den near Tay Ninh. Where\'er possi. 

ble, lightweight secure voice equipment was used wi th these rad ios 

to counter the enemy's communications intelligence. In addition, 

the combat communica tors used mobile radios of longer range to 

provide voice and secure message links from the battle area to the 

division and field force command posts within Vi etnam . 

. -'\s the sca le of the Cambodian operations broadened, the organic combat communications, including the multichannel assets 

of the attacking units, were moved forward. At the same lime, requirements fo r command and control and for intelligence, logistics, and administrative circuits reaching into the forward areas 

mushroomed. The mobile assets of the 1st Signal Brigade were 

quickly deployed to replace the combat signal unin as they moved 

their equipment into Cambodia with the attacking forces. Circui ts 

were speedil y activated over the brigade's extended Corps Area 

Communications System, providing the commanders of the top 

echelons in Vietnam with ready access LO their force commanders 

in Cambodia. The signal brigade also provided extensive communications support to U.S. advisers who accompanied the allacking 

South Vietnamese armed forces, including secure message facilities 

and manual telephone swi tching service. 

Once again U.S. Army communications, whethcr operated hy a 

signalman wit h his Slnal1 back-pack radio or a fixed communica tor 

with his troposphcric scatter equipment, met the test and justified 

the sta tement made by Ceneral Abrams in February 1969 when he 

\\las speaking of comll1un icalions in Vietnam to an assembly of key 

personnel in the III Corps Tactical Zone: 

\Vhat we have here in this country is a communications system that 

permits us 10 move our power rrom one end of the land to the other 

any lime we want to. To move our air power, to change the focus of 

the 8-52's, cha nge our troop dispositions, change the Aow of logistics 

to put it where it is the most needed . . . . The only way you 

can do all those things-and do them when you want-is with a good, 

sound communications system. 

Summary, 1968-1970 

During 1968 and 1970 our signalmen in Southeast Asia completed the U.S. Army's commun ications system. They wrapped up 

all the plans and projects, perfected the big networks together with 

their specialized voice and message switches, and provided quality 

C"ommunicat ions for all users. They made such refinemen ts as se-
VIETNAMIZATION AND RELATED ACfIVITIES 151 

ARMORED PERSO~NEL CARRIERS o~· THt: 9TH OIVISIO:-l IN CAMBODIA. Note 

vertical antennas lor mobile radios. 

cure communications. priOl'lues for key commanders, and direct 

distance dialing- all ca pable of being extended into primitive 

areas wherever sudden combat needs might arise, Our signalmen, 

wh il e installing and operating aJ1 these systems, proved themselves 

to be good combat soldiers whenever the military situation placed 

them in the midst of fire fights. 

With the over-al1 communications-electronics job accomplished, 

our signal organizations were able to improve on other missions, 

for example, the Army's cryptographic support, the Army's photogTa phic audio-visual capability, and the specialized maintenance 

and support faciliti es required daily by the equipment of the big 

backbone communica tions networks. But above all. this was a time 

of preparation for turning over the great communications systems 

that had been built up in the Republic o[ Vietllam to the Vietnamese people to operate and maintain as their own. 

As the present stud y is heing written, the South Vietnamese. 

with U.S. assistance, are prep.1I'ing ror the day when they will take 

over the operation of all communications-electronics in their 

homeland; this preparation goes on in the face o[ continued aggression d irected by Hanoi. As the South Vietnamese grow in 
152 COl\ll\1 UNICAT I01"S·E LECTRON I CS 

strength, U.S. soldiers are being withdrawn. Even as the redeployment occurs, U.S. Army Signal combat communicators are on the 

job providing coml11un i('ations for the U.S. Army's infantry, 

armor, artill ery, and aviation ; for engineers, medics, military po· 

lice, logisticians, and intell igence personnel; for the U.S. Air Force 

and Navy; for the Free World Military Assistance Forces of Aus· 

tralia , Korea, New Zealand, and Thailand, and for the governmen t 

of South Vietnam and its armed forces: for U.S. headquarters: for 

the advisers to the Vielllamese ; and for U.S. civil ian agencies in 

the DepaTlment of State and the U.S. Age ncy for Interna tional De· 

velopment. During the years 1962 through 1970, approximately 

120,000 U.S. Army Signalmen have served in South Vi elnam and 

other countries of Sotllheast Asia. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Conclusions and Lessons Learned 

The magnitude of Army communications in the war in Vietnam has exceeded the sca le of their employment in any previous 

war in history. These commun ications have increased in the same 

proportion as has the extraordinary mobility of troops and of firepower, of len delivered from aloft. whether by Army helicopter 

gunships, Air Force bombers and fighters, or Navy and Mari ne jet 

aircraft. In fac t, the mobility and firepower of our Army would 

themselves have been unmanageable without the hitherto u nheardof mobile and fixed combat communications facili ties and the 

skilled communicators that have evolved in this conflict. 

As a professional soldier and communicator, I have developed 

my own conclusions and feel we have learned certain lessons concerning the Army's communications-electron ics during the Vietnam ,,yar. The more importan t of these have been set down here, 

along with some ideas of what must be done in the futu re. 

Conlrol and Organization of Comnllwications 

The elimi nation of the fragmen ta tion of control over the 

Army's commu nications-electronics effons d uring the early stages 

of the b uild up in late 1965 and early 1966 was most important in 

the provision of an effective and effi cient communications service 

for the numerous and diverse customers in South Vietnam and 

other parts of Southeast Asia. This was accomplished by the marriage of elements of the Army's Strategic Communications Command, with its highly quali fi ed personnel, ca pable of engi neering, 

insta lling. and operating large fixed communicati ons systems, and 

the combat thea ter signa l troops, at that time consisting of the 2d 

Signal Group with its highly flex ible mobility. From this marriage 

emerged t he 1st Signal Brigade, a part of the United States Army 

Strategic Commu nica tions Command's global organiza tion, but opera tionally under control o f the United States Army, Vietnam, the 

Army component command in the Republic of Vietnam. O ur Vietnamese experience, inciden ta lly, has firml y convinced me that this 
154 COM M UN ICATIONS-ELECfRONICS 

worldwide organi zation must be more properly named the "U.S. 

Army Communi ca tions Command." 

The 1st Signal Brigade operated the relatively fixed assets of 

the Defcmc Commun ications System. At the same time it had a 

highly mobile surge carabilt)', that is, on ShOTt notice it could 

pour equipment and men into its Corps Area System in response 

to the needs o f the commanders in each of the four corps tactical 

wnes. The brigade's Corps Area signal groups also provided the 

base camp communications services in their tactical zones. 

The last and o f course a vital elemcm in over-all communications support was the Combat Systems operated by the organic 

signal companies of the separate brigades and by the organic signal 

battalions of the divisions and corps-equiva lent field forces. A basic 

decision for the control and direction of these systems was made simultaneously with the organization of the 1st Signal Brigade. This 

was the "dual-ha lling" of one individua l, a general officer, to serve 

as both the brigade commander and the U.S. Army, Vietnam, communi ca ti ons-electronics staff officer. 

Such was the situation when I arrived in Vietnam in 1968. 

Wearing the staff hat, I cou ld project Army-wide policy and guidance to both the combat signal elements with the fighting troops 

and the 1st Signal Brigade. Weari ng the 1st Signal Brigade command hat and using the brigade's diversified capabilities, I could 

weld the entire Army communications-eleCtronics effort into a harmonious whole, There is no doubt in my mind that "dual-hatti ng" 

allows for the best d irection lip and down the line through one individual, and is the way to assure effective command, control, and 

direction of the U.S. Army's communi cations·electronics. 

Qur signal organ izational structure in Vietnam is sound and 

will serve as a model for the Army's future war lOne communications structure. The major elements of the structu re are the mobil e Combat Systems, the Corps Area Commun ica tions System serving the theater of operations, and the Defense Communica tions 

System. 

The mobile Combat Systems should contin ue to be provided 

by signal units organic in a division, a corps, and a fie ld army. Qur 

div ision signal battalion organizations in Vietnam are sound, as is 

the dual-hat arrangement in the division wherei n the division's signal staff officer serves also as the divisio n's signal battalion commander. At the Army corps level the present, relatively large, 

corps·type signal battalion, which in all cases in Viet nam has 

needed significant additional resources auached, should be reorganized into at least two baualions under a group headquarters. The 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARN ED 155 

Corps Signal Group comander should wear two hats. serving concurrently as Corps Signal Officer. Communications su pport for 

field armies should also be provided by organic. high Iy mobile. 

and fl exible signal organizations_ In order to provide diversified 

mobile su pport to our field army. this organ ization must consist ol 

more than one group under a signal brigade. with the commander 

also serving on the Army staff_ 

Behind these combat communication elements there should be 

a si ngle organization to operate the Defense Communications System withi n and from the thea ter of o perations and to provide at 

the same time a flexible. mobile. surge capability in support of the 

l:ombat fo rces. Further, there should be a se parate theater area system much like the system we have logica ll y dubbed "Corps Area" 

in Vietnam. 1n a large theater this organization would be a command, consisting of sC\'e ral brigildes. The commander of sllch an 

org<mization should also wcar two hat>;. The organization mllst 

include skilled communica ti ons systems managers and be capable 

of engineering and inslalling major systems. It shoulci ~ ... the point 

of contact with Contractors and should directly manage all communica tions·electroni cs contracts. It should provide for the rehabilitation and operation of any existing commercial systems, and establish in the thealer an y required signal training facilities. tn 

summary, the organization should be the focal point in communicHiom ex pertise. providing and operating the Defense Communi· 

ca tions System. operating a flexibl e area system. and providing a 

reserve throughout the theater o f operations. Finally, I believe focalization of the diverse pieces which make lip a viable communications-electronics system is a must at lhe General Staff level of the 

Department of the Anny. 

T he lr'legral ed S),stem 

To the man of business, time is money. To the professional soldier. time is li ves. The time required to provide the high quality 

fixed communications system in Vietnam was too long. Fortunately. because we could use ava ilable mobil e equipment of lower 

capacity and lower quality that had heen employed during the 

years of read yi ng Ihe fixed system. communications·electronics did 

not fail the soldier in baltic. But I beli eve that in the future we 

can do hette r hy planning and programming for modularized high 

quality and high-ca pacity fixed and mobile long-l ines systems that 

incl ude the assoc iated voice. message. and data tralllc switches and 

terminals. 
156 COMMUN ICATIONS-ELECTRON ICS 

Completely modularized systems should be sh ipped as a package. to be assembled on the sileo t refer to a complete system with 

groupings of equipment that can go on a mountaintop. including 

the shelters OT buildings [or the equipment, the air-conditioning 

and JX>wcr units, the antennas, the compatible cryptographic 

equipment. the test equipment, the repair and maintenance gcar, 

the hOllsing for the COlllrac tors and soldiers who will install them 

and the soldiers or civilians who will operate them, and the necess..uy bun kers, sandbags. and weapons. There should be basic components, standarized in lype and in technical characteristics, and 

completely compatible with the mobile communica tions equipment of the combat and area sUpfX>rt signal unilS, capable of being 

put together in a building-block fashion. 

For example, a modulari zed site of a certain capacity, say 60 

chan nels, could be expanded to 100 or to 1,000 channels. It should 

be capable of being expanded further to include au tomated message and data traffic communica ti ons centers, local or long-distance 

automatic tel e phone exchanges-all from basic building blocks. 

All the equipment-the housi ng, the air conditioning, the power 

-must be of a fixed variety that can last in place for as long as fi ve 

years wit hout major overhaul. And everything must be so designed 

that the modules can be lifted to the sites by means of medium or 

heavy helicopters. There should be no need to build expensive access roads to mountaintops for the purpose of site construction. 

Mod ul es must be compl ete ly planned and engi neered so that, 

even if they are not in the military inventory, their production can 

sta rt as soon as approval is obtained. Production and procurement 

should be going on concurrently with the preparation of the sites 

in the area where they arc required. To my mind, we can design 

such a building-block system within the next few years. and have 

the system reasonabl y ava ilable without goi ng into production 

until it is actually needed. Basic ordering agreements could be 

made with the vendors. the radio equipment firm, the multiplex 

equipment firm, the air-conditioning firm, the tower unit finn , the 

building fi rm. and the power firm. If the modular system is tOO 

complex for the Army to install, then contracts must be let to 

firms ca pabl e of installing the complete pa ckage. On the matter of 

dcquiring modularized systems, it is im portant to deli ver equipment early to the Army service schools in the United States and to 

the war :rone so that soldiers can train on the actual equipment to 

be used. 

All the va rious transmission means, be they tropospheric scatter, microwave, smellite. cable. laser, or infra red, should be con· 
CONCLUSIONS AN I) L ESSONS LEA I) 157 

sidered by the pl anners of the future when determinations are 

being made as to what best fits the military needs in a given situation. In Southeast Asia the u ndersea ca bl e systems have provided 

some of the mOSt reliable high quality communications within and 

to that area . T he lise of undersea cable connecting points al ong 

the coast of Vietnam was a Significant innovation. and the opinion 

of some that the ca bl es were not important because of the number 

of tropospheric sca lter and microwave systems programmed at the 

same time was compl etely in error. Undersea cable has proved relatively inexpensive to mai nta in and is fairly simple to operate. even 

though it has a tremendously high initial cost. Within Vietnam, it 

provided backup to the remainder of the sys~e m and su pplied very 

important dua l routing for critica l circuits. It is beyond question 

that military communications systems require d iverse paths in 

order to provide the over·a ll reliabil ity needed on Ihe mode rn bat· 

tl efi eld. The undersea cabl e served this purpose in Vietnam . 

Requirements for the modul ar system would be based on the 

plans of t he Department of Defense, the J oint Chi efs of Staff, and 

the military de partments. And determining the needs-how much 

in the way of communica ti ons, how many circuits---can be very 

difficult. As General Abrams once sa id while tal king to our combat 

signalmen in Vi etnam: "You fellows belong to something that is 

almost a bottomless pit. No ma tter how big you make the system, 

there are more people going to want to talk over it and more people going to want to send th ings over it " 

Ge neral T erry. who conllmlllded and orga nized the 1st Signal 

Brigade during the big buildup years of 1966-1967. later had a 

study made called "Communications in Southeast Asia," for the 

purpose of find ing out how req uirements for futu re theaters might 

be determined. This va luable piece of work, in which many people 

co·operated, has fa irly we ll documented the requirements of Viet· 

nam at that time and is the fi rst serio us study of this type ever at· 

tempted during wartime. Altho ugh the study d id not come up 

with all the answers, it should serve as a va luable tool (or our 

planners, assisting them to develop requirements based on contino 

gency pl ans. However, the entire area of communications requirements forecasti ng certainly needs more study in the next decade so 

that the Army, in any futu re war, can determi ne all of its communica tions requirements rapidly in order to ass ure equitable consid· 

era tion by aHleve ls during the decision process. 

In summary, I believe Ihe "Modular System," the Basic Or· 

dering Agreement, and ea rly deta iled planning are the ingredients 
158 COM M UN ICA TlOi"S-ELf.CTRON ICS 

for lhe timely provision of a single integrated telecommunications 

system in a waT zone in lhe future. 

A ulomalio11 of the Telephone System 

The extensive lise of dial telephone exchanges, eventuall y tied 

together with automated tandem switches providing direct distance 

dialing throughout Vietnam and Thailand, has been a significant 

development during the confli ct in Vietnam. The manually operated telephone system, which we lIsed and improved over a number of years, aside (rom being costl,. in the number of operators reo 

quired. simply could not provide the needed services. One can 

imagi ne how expensive and how poor the service would be in 

the United States if our commercial telephone system was not 

highl y automated . Uecause of the origina l poor manual service in 

Vietnam, 85 percent of the total voice channels were tied up as 

sole-usc circuits, passi ng the most criti ca l traffic, but unavailable for 

general usc. 

As one means of improving the telephone servi ce when it was a 

mallual system. the U.S. Military Assistance Command. Vietnam, 

had allowed only 30 percent of the thousands of telephone subscribers in the country to have direct access to the long.distance network. With the advent of direct distance dialing and the significant increase in long-distance ca lls made. we found that in order to 

provide the needed service a further reduction to 20 percent of the 

subscribers was necessa ry- a reduction th;!t ma y seem to contradict the benefi ts of 101lA"·distance di,ding. We were never able 

to perform adequate traffic analysis when the manual telephone 

system was bei ng lIsed; however. with the :luLQmatic long-d istance 

tel ephone equ ipment, traffic loads could be accurately forecast. I 

am convinced that Ollr experience in Vietnam proves that the 

number could be reduced to 15 percent of the subscribers and still 

nOt deny long-distance calls to any important customers. I also believe that the allocation of long-distance users by a predetermined 

percentage is the onl y means of providing the needed servi ce 

throughOut a thealer at a reasonable cost in equipmem and manpower. This percelllage must be made a matter of poli cy at the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff le\'el so that the communica tions planners can 

determine the si7.e of the long-lines system in any future theater of 

opera ti ons. 

The dial tel ephone exchanges and the long-distance automatic 

switches of the future. as t indi cated before. should be modularized and install ed as a part of the over-all integrated system. And 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 159 

they must be reasonably mobile, as were the 600-line van-mounted 

dial exchanges which the Army used in Vietnam_ These mobile exchanges were employed in a number of different locations in Vietnam and were very important in crucial periods after the mid1960s in providing a Aexi ble dial telephone capability as needs 

~h ifted in Vietnam from one combat area to another. 

Besides the demonstrated need for automatic telephone switching in the large camps and base areas, where this equipment was: 

used in Vietnam, there is also a need for the combat telephone systems to be automated in the fmure. Manual telephone switchboards, now so prevalent at the division, brigade, and battalion 

command posts, cannot provide the speed of service required by 

our highly mobile fighting men. Besides providing automatic local 

telephone service, the combat communications systems, particularly 

at the corps and field army level, should be able to provide direct 

distance dialing. Automation of the mobile tel ephone switching 

systems is a must for the immediate future. 

CommunicatiOTlS Secllrity 

The vital matter of securing our communications against 

enemy interception and intelligence has been discllssed, p.:1.rticularly with reference to the technicall y difficult area of scrambling 

telephone or voice traffic. especially the voice communications of 

the combat battalions and company-size units. Studies have shown 

the absolute necessity for commun ications security, whether the information is passed by message or voice. We know that the enemy 

listens in because we have captured some of his listening devices. 

Voice security equipment has been available for some time in 

fixed communications installations at major headquarters and 

bases in the form of the Automatic Secure Voice Communi cations 

System. Secure voice gear is now available also for mobile radios. 

These first fixed systems were welcomed and used by higher headquarters. But it took a great deal of persuasion and training to gel 

mobile combat users to employ voice securi ty to the 1lllllOst with 

their field radios. We found that the most persuasive, effective way 

to insure its usc was to provide proof that a given enemy actionan ambush of one of our p.1.lrols, for example- was the result of 

the enemy's intercepting our radio talk. 

Good training in voice security- awareness of its necessity and 

a compulsion to lise it- is the key. The training of officers and soldiers in the use of voice security needs command emphasis; it 

needs the assistance and insistence of commanders and other senior 

officers. I would say the only excuse for voice communications in 
160 COM M UN ICA TIONS'£LECfRONICS 

the clear. that is. not secured or scrambled, is its lise on an occasion 

when the information being passed is extremely current, say 

within ten minutes of action as in emergency situations. Anything 

more than this is unaccepta ble if we arc to achieve success in any 

future battle. 

\Ve must be careful to develop and design security equipmen t 

that is completel y compa tible with the radios or other communications equipment and systems being used by our Army in the fie ld. 

This was not the case in all instances in Vietnam. For example. 

the man-p<lCked combat voice radios. used so extensively by almost 

all units in Vietnam, needed major modification before they could 

be used with our new man-packed voice security equipment. In 

the future we must guard aga inst this by closer co-ordination and 

d irection of Ollr developmental programs to insure that all of the 

elements that make li p a system are compmible. 

Communications security devices. along with such practices as 

r hanging radio frequencies and ca ll words. must be extensively 

employed in the fUllire. They mUSt be used for all combat orders. 

and all multichannel links must be completely secured. ' '''e could 

do a grea t deal. I am sure . to increase the security of our voice 

traffic and to improve the quality of transmission by following 

fixed-station standards. Whether in fixed or mobile applica tions. 

we must learn to use the security equ ipment we have, improving 

it technically and procedurally. improving also administrative 

mallers and regulat ions relating to its use. All this will take 

practice and time, but it can and must be done to deny the enemy 

any knowledge of our pl<l ns and ollr commands. 

Preceden ce and Classi{ictlliotl of Messages 

Two related matters in message traffic are security classifica tion 

- Confidential, Secret. and Top Secret- and precedence. sllch as 

~ta mping a mes5<'Ige " Immediate" or " Priority" if it is to be handled ahead of o thers. Such a message, if o,'er one page long and if 

it includes a long list of information addressees-those addressees 

who must know the message content but do not need to take action or respond-<auses problems and delays. In 1970 we were 

ha ndling about 100,000 messages a day. of which about 60 percent 

had both action and information addressees. These could have been 

handled much more efficiently if the " Immediate" or "Flash" precedence applied onl y to those addressees who needed to take action 

and not to th e copies which were for information onl y. T he 

information copies could have been se nt later by the communi cations center, during slack periods. Establishi ng such procedures is a 
162 COMMUNICATIONS-E L ECTRON ICS 

TAN K AND ANTENNA D lslI-Signai so/dieT-6Tt isfs conception of strong 

tie between Infantry, Armor, Artillery. and Signa lman. 

division, corps, or fi eld army, 50 that an integrated defense can be 

organized and main tained effectively. 

T he ground requirement was clearly apparent in Vietnam. 

While air defense. both active and passive. was not necessary in 

Vietnam, it probably will be required in the future. The active 

measures are obviously the ultimate res ponsibility of the U.S. 

Army's Air Defense Artill ery; yet the communications planners 

must assure that. just as the engineer is notified for power requirements, the air defense artilleryman is made aware of all existing 

and planned commu nications sites ,",'hen he is establ ishing his integrated air defense system_ Passive air defense protection is equally 

essenti al. Methods must be deve loped to conceal and even cover 

O UT fixed communications sites_ We cannot afford to take the 

chance in the future of build ing million dollar communications 

sites that can be "seen" visually and electronicall y by an attacking 

aircraft at grea t distances. The Army must investigatc thc areas of 

antenna and StruCture designs to be more in line with the principles or concealment. Thought must be given to "dummy" sites, 

aga in both visual and electronic, to protect aga inst missil es as well 

as pi loted aircraft. 

A fi nal note regard ing security of our commun ica ti ons sites of 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 161 

must if we are to be "cost effective ." These procedures could be 

furth er enhanced by both mobile and fixed automated message systems for terminal opera tion, such as the automated communications and message processing system ac tivated in the Paci fi c near 

the end of the period covered by this study. 

The same is true of much classified traffic initially stamped "Secret" and "Top Secret. " H the traffic bore a notation to declassify 

at the end of one year, or two, this would be a great help. Again, 

it is in the matter of the information addressee messages that the 

overclassifica tion becomes a problem-extremely lengthy messages 

require a teletypewriter tape to be reproduced, wh ich amounts to 

typi ng the whole message over a second time. This bappens at 

both the transmitting and the receiving end. In short it would 

be significantl y helpful to red LIce the size of messages. reduce the 

precedence. or at least reduce high precedence from information 

copies, and short en sign ificalHl y the effective periods of c1assifi ca· 

rion. 

Physical Security at the Sites 

Anot her kind of security. much more open and obvious than 

communications security, increasingly concerned the Army Signal 

Corps in Vietnam- physica l security. the defense of our many 

sites. Defense measures were essential, as on some distant mountai ntop sites. rrom the start of O lll" operarions in Vietnam in the 

I 950s. And security measures became necessary at more sites in 

1969 and 1970, when troop units formerly based in the area 

around the signal installations left as a result of the redeployment 

of U.S. forces. 

Our communications sit es in Sou theast Asia total ed from time 

to time between 250 and 300. and by no means were they all loca ted in military compo unds. Instead. these sites were often remote. 

Our combat signalmen provided for their own defense and at several sites fought off enemy auacks. 

Obviously. the average signalman can be trained to serve well 

in site defense. He can be tra ined as an infantryman, both to defe nd his site and to patrol in depth arOllnd it. To this extent he 

needs to be a soldier first, and a soldier·technician second. But 

there is need (or day-to.day use of artill ery support in defense of 

our sites, for mortar and machine gun support, and for direct air 

support. There is need as well for securit y compani es, whet her U.S. 

troops or local nationals. trained as infantry. These troops are 

needed at the isolated signal site. whether run by a signal brigade. 
CONCLUS IONS ANI) LESSONS LEARNED 163 

the fUlUre is that the precedent established in Vietnam of providing the people of the country with circllits on our communi· 

cations systems must be continued. The armed forces and government of the host country must be encouraged to use and share our 

communications systems, since the local populace has been and 

will undoubtedly continue to be a vital factor in the defense of 

our fixed communi ca ti ons fa cilities. 

The Audio-Vi.wal Mission 

Photographic responsiblity in the Army has traditionall y been 

assigned to the Signal Corps. This responsibility has expanded 

over the years to incl ude fa r more than merely providing the photographers and photographic suppOrt. Today called the audiovisual mission. the responsibility encompa sses not onl y the Army's 

pictorial se'rvices but the photogra phic history of the U.S. Army, 

and the operation and maintenance or a vast Ilumber of film 

projectors. magnetic tape recorders, a:ld other audio and visual 

aids used extensive ly in comma nd briefings and presentations. The 

Army Signal Corps today uses the most modern and advanced film 

laboratory equipment available in satisfying the Army's worldwide 

requirement for film and photographic servi ces. 

This audio-visua l responsibility has not been emphasized in the 

past with the same fervor as have the Army's other communications services. In Vie tnam it Jagged, for example. in the 1st Signal 

Brigade until more pressing communica tions prioriti es and problems could be met. It was not until mid-1967 that the photob'l'aphic effort was strengthened with the equipment and men of 

the 22lst Signal Company. 

T he 221st Signal Company was provided with "off-the-shelf," 

commercial photographic equ ipment when it went to Vietnam because the Army's standard line of photographic equipment was nOt 

ca pable of doing the job in Vietnam. This one-of-a-kind signal unit 

created probl ems for the Army school system. The U.S. Army Signal School was fully capable of providing excellent and complete 

tra ini ng in the audio-visua l skills using standard equipment, but it 

could not teach maintenance and opera tion of the commercially 

purchased cameras, autOma ted laboratory processing eq uipment. or 

projectors. These skills were taught in Vi etnam by the expedient 

or on-tile-jOb tl'aining. It was, of course. not reasible for til e Army 

to reorga nize its emire training program in order to satisfy the 

needs of o nc specialized .mit cquipped with commel'cial items, but 

attention mUSt be given to traini ng signalmen in the USe of the 
164 COM 1\1 UN ICATIONS-EL ECTRONICS 

most modern equipment in order to have them avail able for the 

Army's Audio-Visual Program in war zones. 

In dte fUlure. efforts must be made to establish earl y a compl etel y equipped and trained audio·\!isuaJ support base in the combat lone. Even the fu ll strength of the 221 s! Signal Company did 

not provide all the audio-visual support the Army needed in Vietnam. \Ve need to be able to make pictures in both color and 

black and while and we need more magnetic ta pe voice equipment 

for Our movies. \ Ve sho uld make greater lise of fi lm sn ip proj ectors 

and audio-v isual devices fOT briefings at both combat and the highest levels. \Ve should be ab le to produce a moti on pi cture within 

at least a week in Ihe thea ter of opera ti ons. Further. the over·all 

d irection of photographi c coll ection must be improved , particu· 

larly the effort to record historical events on fi lm. Our offi cers and 

managers of the Audio·Visual Program must have a sense for the 

history that is being l11:ld e. 

Personnel (wd T raining 

All of the most modern and so phistica ted equipment :tvailable 

wi ll not insur e worka ble communica tions unless the commander 

has an adequate number of trained communicators. This portion 

of my concl usio ns will deal with the soldi er·communicatOr. 

It is essential that significant efforts be made by all Signal 

Corps offi cers to acquire an intimate knowledge of the Army's per· 

sonnel acquisition system, its personnel authorization system, and 

other essential elements of personnel management. With this prep· 

aration, the career Signa l Corps offi cer at any level of command 

will be betler abl e to co pe with the intricacies of the Army's per· 

sonnel system and insure that lhe approved authorizations are in 

the hands of the signal unit in the war zone and thal the author· 

ized soldiers are in fact assigned and working. 

In rega rd to the personnel system and signal units, it is most 

important that 100 percent or the men authorized be on the job. I 

am not re ferring to a select group of signal units, but to all signal 

units at all levels. Communica tions from top to bottom is a team 

errort, and this effort can succeed only if the signal soldier is avail· 

abl e at all le\'cls to provide the req uired communications. T o at· 

tai n 100 perce nt of authorized strength on the job, J believe that 

we must staff the signalmen in the combat zoll e at 110 percent of 

the authori zed level. It has been my experi ence that in this war, as 

in 'Vorld ' Var II and Korea, an allowa ble overstrength is the onl y 

sure wa)' of attaining the 100 pcrcelll assigned strength so essential 

to complete the job. 
CONCLUSIONS A:o/O LESSO:O/S LEAR1'o:EO 165 

One of the significant personnel lessons the Army's Signal 

Corps learned in Vietnam was that it is extremely cumbersome 

and slow to attempt to transfer into a combat zone the personnel 

system used for the processing of authorization documents in a 

peacetime environment. The system I refer to is The Army Authorization Documents System, known as T AADS in Army jargon. 

From late 1968 to mid·1969 Ihe 1st Signal Brigade and divisional 

units submitted new proposed authorization documents through 

regular channels to the Department of the Army. It tOok about a 

year and:l half for these documents to he approved, and meanwhile 

Ihe war continued with great intensity. I feel we must speed up 

the process for authorization approval to less than three months. 

Immediate steps need to be taken to reduce document-processing 

time at intermediate headquarters and at the Department of the 

Army. Consideration should he given to standardized automated 

programs that can be lIsed at all command echleons for annotating 

and processing authorization document updates, The automa ted 

outputs could be accompanied by wriuen juslification for changes, 

thal is by additions or deletions to current authorizations. 

Arter spending almost twenty months to complete a major reorganization cycle necessitated hy changing operations in a war. I 

feel that dece ntra lil:Hion to the heads of major commands in the 

Army of the IXMer to approve changes within their personnel and 

equipment levels is a requiremelll, a must, if the Army's authorization s),stem is to sunive during a war. 

Whil e still on the subject of personnel, I would like to discuss 

Signal Corps offi cers as professional commun icators assigned to all 

organizations down to all types of maneuver baualions. It was 

proved to all the division commanders, corps commanders, and 

theater commanders that it was a necessity to have a professionally 

trained Signal Corps officer assigned to each baualion, group, and 

brigade of the Army's combat arms. It was necessary in order to 

create a vertical chai n of communications officers from the bottom 

to the lop---officers whose professional training and interests had 

dedicated them to the accomplishment of Ihe communications·elec· 

tronics mission. Each of these officers was able to translate his com· 

mander'S needs into :lctual working communica tions. Through 

these officers, the commander was made aware of the capabilities, 

the limitations, and the peculiarities of his own communications 

system. The Army training program, like the Communications Of· 

fic ers Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, should be used extensively to 

produce such trained Signal Corps officers for combat battalions; 

and the officers who attend the course should be assigned immedi-
166 COl'l:'1 UNICAT IONS- ELECTRONICS 

ately to combat battalions in order that the Army can take full ad· 

vantage of the ir capabilities. 

I have strong convictions on the kind of training base we 

should ha ve in the United Stales and on the matter of maintaining 

a pool of trained signalmen with the necessary skills to meet can· 

lingencics such as th e Vietnam War. Early in th e 19605, the Army 

had decided that the use of cable was dying out, if not already 

dead. Instead, radio was the word. We in the Signa l Corps 

"thought radio" from the infantry lIquad level up to the theater 

level. As a result, the specialty of cable-splicer was deleted from the 

Army's schooling program. 

The fallacy of this decision became apparent when we were installing the high quality, fixed wideband system in Southeast Asia. 

We found we did not have the trained soldi ers available to splice 

in the final few feet of cable, for example. from the electronic 

equipment building of a big fixed tropospheric sca tter terminal to 

a dial tel ephone exchange a half-mile away. A pool of cable-splicers. 

trained at our own U.S. Army schools with the same equipment the soldier will use in the fi eld rather than with makeshift 

eq uipment and materials, is necessary if the Army ever expects to 

build again as elaborate a communications system as that installed 

in Vietnam. 

I do not isolate cable-splicing as the one critical skill required. 

T consider essential the skills of the technica l controllers, microwave and tropospheric scatter operators, communications chiefs, 

radio teletypewriter operators, cryptographic and secure voice 

equipment repairmen, dial exchange and automatic switch operators and maintenance personnel, and switchboard operators. Army 

signalmen with these skills are so esse lllial that they should be part 

of a trained pool, availabl e when needed. Ideally these soldiers 

should work in their specialties throughout their careers. But if 

this is not always IX'ssible, then we should at least know where the 

trained communicators are and be able to deploy them when the 

situation dictates. And there are needs for these trained soldiers 

within the United States at the communi cations facilities the Army 

is allowed to o perate within the franchised area of U.S. common 

carriers. 

The critical skills mentioned above do not of course extend 

across the complete spectrum of skills required for Army communications. Communications is a team effort, as I said before, and 

without the trained bread-and-butter signalmen, without the combat and fixed-type communications skills, the ove r-all job cannot be 

done. 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 167 

In the matter of the Army's training centers in the United 

States, I believe these centers must receive new equipment that is 

to be introduced into the combat theater at about the same time as 

the Army's new equipment introductory teams receive it. For one 

reason or another this did not take place in the instance of Vietnam. The mistake should not be repeated. The prototype equipment must go to the signa l schools or o ther electronic training centers. Military instructors should be with the manufacturer when 

the manufacturer's plans and equipment are being developed. If 

this procedure is not followed, major problems will arise. Repeatedly during the Vietnam 'Var, new major equipment was introduced into the war zone and we had to train ourselves to operate 

and maintain it. The training base in the United States was operating months behind in new procedures and new equipment. Our 

solution. of course, was to establ ish a signal school. the 1st Signal 

Brigade's U.S. Army T rai ning Facili ty. 

This school was not unprecedented; such schools had existed 

during \Vorld War II. Training schools should be established in 

all overseas theaters to teach refresher courses for soldiers previousl y trained in the United States. The average signal soldier 

spends from tWO to nine months learning his specialty. then 

usually receives a month's leave before depa rting for his initial assignment. If he is assigned to an active war zone, the signal soldier 

needs a review of his spec ialty, just as the infantryman needs and 

gets a review o( his trade before he is subjected to combat. 

The 1st Brigade's training school in Vietnam was staffed by officers and men assigned to the bri gade. Though the quality of instruction presented was continually outstanding. the shoTt 12-

month tour of the instructors posed a problem. A far more 

appropriate arra ngement in the future would be to staff the school 

with civilian instl'llctors under contract. The contractor would be 

responsible (or school operation and instruction as long as the 

need existed and signal units would not have to draw from their 

own asset.s to man the school. Consideration should also be given 

to establishing the COntract on a contingency basis so that valuable 

time will not be wasted while the contractor trains his own staff of 

instructors. 

The preceding observations are not meant to detract from the 

tremendolls job which the Army's school system in the United 

States-the best in the world-did in preparing the soldier to be a 

commu nicator in Vietnam; I was one of its "Commanders and 

Commandants" and illlimately knew the entire training system. 
168 COM M UN leA TlONS-ELECTRONICS 

Rather, offe r my observations in the hope of easing the burden 

of future communicators. 

Supply and Maintenance 

When the Army organized the U.S. Army Materiel Command 

some years ago and, in lurn, its varied commodity-oriented subordinate commands. one of the key decisions was to place field representatives from these "commodity" commands with the Army's 

major overseas commands. I beli,eve this was a correct move for all 

the elements of the Materiel Command, but in this instance I will 

restrict myself to the communications-electronics sphere and will 

discuss only the U.S. Army Electronics Command. I consider it 

very important that the Electronics Command. dynamically commanded by Major General William B. Latta during this period, be 

represented in any future combat theater, and, further, that it be 

closely aligned in ever}' way, from the research laboratory to the 

fi eld representative, with the communications-electronics staffs at 

the various commands, to include the combat unit level. To support communi cations-electronics maintenance operations, this commodity command must, at the very minimum, be represented in 

the field maintenance facilities at the logistics and signal commands in all thea ters. These representat ives may be Department of 

the Army civilian employees. technicians from the civilian company that made the equ ipment, or men hired by contract. The essential point is that Electronics Command representatives must be 

closely aligned with the various communications·electronics staff 

d ivisions and signal commands. It is entirely possible that further 

inquiry into this matter will reveal a firm requirement for Electronics Command liaison to reach down to and include the Army's 

combat brigades_ As the communications for a division become 

more sophisticated I can foresee a real need for techni cal representation at tha t level and below_ 

It will not be enough merely to place technical representatives 

all over the world and advise the communicator in the field that 

an "area representative" is available for technical advice. The representati ves in the field must physically be with the operating 

units, and the organiza tion must be such that the field representative is in continuous communication with the laboratories and 

headquarters in the United States. Without this intimate interrelati onship, it would have been impossible for us to do our communications job in Vietnam, and such an interrelationship will be 

more and more important in the future. 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 169 

Earlier, I went to some length to present the evolution of the 

lst Signal Brigade's area maintenance and supply facilities and the 

problems of trying to maintain and stock repair parts for unique, 

commercially procured communications equipment through the 

use of the Army's common supply system. I did this because I con· 

sider the matter to be one of our most important communications 

lessons from this war. That is, the general supply system, which 

processed and delivered millions of gallons of oil and gasoline and 

millions o f tons of "beans and bullets" to Vietnam, is just not 

geared to satisfying a requeSl for one small transistorized module, 

made only hy XYZ Electronics Corporation, which is needed to 

put a key million dollar network back in operation. The Army's 

general suppl y system rightfully deals in volume and frequency of 

requests, whereas the fixed.plant communications system in Viet· 

nam did not need frequent or large quantity resupply; as a result 

the computers in the supply system did not recognize infrequent 

demands as valid. 

The instances of difficulties in obtaining unique communica· 

tions·electronics items through the general supply system were 

many. The following example illustrates the rigidity of our gen· 

eral supply system, and while the matter did not seriously deter 

our efforts, it certainly was aggravating. The lst Signal Brigade 

and the combat signal units installed hundreds of miles of multipair cable on U.S. bases during the war. They used a massive 

amount of c<l bl e·spli cing and sea ling material. As I recall, {he cable· 

splicing m<lterial. which was used by only a limited number of 

signal units in Vietnam, was categorized in the Federal Stock 

Number System as an item under "Office Stationery." If the suppliers had been familiar enough with Ollr classification system to 

look under "Office Stationery" for splicing and sea ling material, 

we could have avoided the incongruous situation that resulted. For 

it was determined that the Army in Vietnam was ordering rar too 

much office sta ti onery, and therefore it was directed that requests 

in this ca tegory would not be honored unless they were personally 

signed by an officer of sen ior rank. For some time, try as we might, 

we could not get one item of cable.splicing material unless the request forms \\'ere personally signed by sen ior personnel. The prob· 

lem was solved by setting up a special direct supply organization 

for ('ahle material in the brigade, which was the on ly major usera solution that must be cred ited to Liemenant General J oseph M. 

I-leiser, Jr.. at the time the aggressive ,md able commander of 

logistics in Vi etnam. 

Our answer to the problems of maintenance and of obtaining 
170 COM M UNICATIONS-ELECTRON ICS 

GENERAL RIENZI T At"S TO HELICOPTER CREW MEMBER IN THE MEKONG 

DELTA 

repair items for the unique, fixed-station communications equiP'" 

ment was the establishment of the Area Supply and Maintenance 

Faciliti es withi n the Army's general suppl y system, and I believe 

that without them the relatively low densi ty, yet high level, fixed 

t:ommunications installations would not have continued to operate 

in the highly effecti ve manner so necessary (or immediate command control. 

Aviation 

I am convinced that aircraft must be organic to every signal 

battalion in the Army, just as it is organic to ma ny comparable organ izations in the Army. At the height of the Vietnamese conRiel, 

the 1st Signal Brigade was 3Ulhorized 45 aircraft: 9 twin-engine, 

turbo-prop. fixed-wing aircraft; 12 light observati on helicopters; 

and 24 utility helicopters. These ain.:raft were listed as organic on 

the authoriza tion tables of each signal battalion in the brigade; 
CONCLUSIO NS AND LESSONS LEARNED 171 

howeve r, we pooled the aircraft in three provisional aviation units. 

One was based at Bearcat, near Long Sinh , to su pport the 2d Sig· 

nal Croup in III and IV Corps Tacti cal Zones; the second in Nha 

Trang supported the 21st Signal Croup in II Corps Tactical Zone; 

the third supponed the 12th Signal Croup, \\·hi ch was originally at 

Phu Bai and later at Da Nang in I Corps Tactical Zone. 'Ve 

learned that by pooli ng the aircraft we could accomplish by ourselves one-third of the maintenance tha t otherwise would have had 

to be done by aviation general support maintenance personnel. 

Without this organic airborne transportation, we could not possihly have supplied some 300 se p.1rate signa l sites twenty-four hours 

a day, on the shortest notice. 

Mon etary Reqllirements 

Establishing and operating a modern communicat ions system 

for the U.S. Army today is a massively expensive proposition. In 

order to assure that the money being spent on commu •. : ... ;nions was 

spent properly and that the civilian contracts were administered 

correctly, I feel it was important that \.;>"e had comptroller staffs at 

both U.S. AI-my. Vietnam, and the 1st Signal Brigade. as well as 

completely up the command lines to Department of the Army and 

U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command Headquarters at 

Fort Huachuca, Arizona. I would even go so far as (0 recommend 

that comptl'ol ler positions be established even at the signal group 

level so that the money required to provide communica ti ons-elec· 

tronics can he watched in some way and audited, regardless of 

whether the support is provided by the military or by civilian con· 

tract. The comptroller functi on should be paTt and paTcel of any 

command function in future communication operations since the 

commander needs the comptl'Oll er in order to manage effectively 

the asse ts of his command and provide an auditable trail in short· 

tQur war areas. 

My final point in regard to money is that 1 take issue with the 

dollar limitation on the funding of communications projects. In 

micl· 19G9 the Secretary of Defense placed a $50,000 ceili ng on communications projects that could be appro\'ed b)' the theater com· 

mander. Any pl'oject whose costs exceed that amount of money 

must receive approval from the Defense Department. That the 

process can lake a long lime is witnessed by the many months that 

passed before the imeg'Ta ted Wideband Communications System 

project was approved. I feel certa in that during war this $50,000 

thl'eshold is fa r too low. A more I'ealistic ceiling wo uld be 
172 COM 1'>1 UN ICA TJONS-ELEcrRONICS 

$1,000,000 to .$2.000,000 for the theater Army commander or any 

major U.S. Army commander to approve. This higher threshold 

would allow flexibility in the management and operation of a billion dollar communications-electronics plam such as the Army possessed in Vietnam. 

Viewami1.ation 

Finally, we come to a matter of paramount importance and a 

major objective of the United States in recent months in Vietnam 

-the Vietnamization of communications. Training the Vietnam· 

ese to take over the systems we have buih in their country has, of 

course, been a matter of deep concern to all of us. Since it began 

in the mid-1960s the "Buddies Together" progTam paired together 

officers and men of both the U.S. and South Vietnamese Armies 

- battalion commanders and executive officers, company commanders, officers and men at every level- in order to improve the 

communications knoh'·how of our Vietnamese allies. Throughout 

the last half of the 1960s this program bore good fruit, notably in 

turnover to the Vietnamese of the DOllg Tam Integrated Commu· 

nications System site when the 9th Infantry Division departed in 

ea rl y 1970. It bore fruit also in the achievements of the Vietnamese divisions that replaced U.S, divisions. 

The entire program now becomes extremely important during 

our phase·out from Vietnam, as the systems which the Vietnamese 

fan use are turned over to them. These communica tions are first 

to be operated by U.S. civilian contractors. Later, they will be 

turned over to the Vietnamese who have been trained in the Vietnam signal sc hool, or in the new U.S. contractor.operated Signal 

Training Faci lity. both at Vung Tau. The comraCl school also will 

be turned over to the Vietnamese to help them build a viable com· 

munications system for the future. 

E,·elllually. a Single Illlcgratcd Telecommunications Systemnicknamed SITS- will be welded together. serving the Republic 

of Vietnam armed forces, and serving civilians through an autonomOlls agency al the tOp level of the South Vietnamese Covern· 

ment. The foundations for all this are nOh' in being. and the work 

continues to progress under the lSI Signal Brigade commander in 

Southeast Asia. If we go on at the current pace. the Vietnamese 

should soon have a communications system adequate for the na· 

tion's needs. We must press ahead energetically in the training 

program in communications·eleclronics in order to enable the 

South Vietnamese to unite their country. 
CONCLUS IONS ANI) U ::SSONS LE,\RNED 173 

T he Creat AmeriC(l7! Soldier 

"Man is the measure of all th ings" has been a concise statement 

of a fundamental fact of life since the days of ancient Greece. And 

unquestionably the degree to which Army communications·e1ectronics in Vietnam surpassed all military signaling ever known 

until now reflects precisely the degree to which the American military signalmen of this war surpassed their predecessors. 

It has been my experience, as it was the universal experi ence of 

my predecessors in the divisional and field force signal battalions 

and in the 1st Signal Brigade, that the quality and performance of 

our enlisted men and offi cers in combat in Vietnam have notably 

excelled the levels attained in our previous conAicts. The number 

of men who fail ed to "measure lip" has been far less; the leve ls of 

bravery, morale, dedication, intelligent and aggressive appl ica tion, 

technical aptitude, and leadership have been very noticeably 

higher. 

Many a youthful second lieutenant or sergeant found himse lf 

in complete command of an isolated signal site, full y responsible 

for a sma ll self-contained ci ty of signalmen. support troops, secu· 

rity guard s, and oft en civi li an contract personnel. Almost without 

exception the young officers met the challenge. One of them, Second 

Lieutena nt Roberto Rivera. so impressed General Abrams when he 

and his party landed in their helicopter on a brigade site in Thailand near the Laotian border that General Abrams promoted the 

young Signal Corps officer to fi rst lieutenant un the spot. 

For whatever reason, whether because of the American heritage, fam ily and school background, military training, or the opportunities and chall enges encountered in Army communications 

in Vietnam, I found th e overwhelm ing majority of our soldiers to 

be dedicated, purposeful, knowledgeable, and brave. Not only is 

our combat signalman intelligent, eager, and trainable in any skill . 

but he is also a ma n of great feeli ng and empathy in his re lations 

wi th his own fellow soldie rs, wit h his counterpart in the Vietnam· 

ese Army- the Vietnamese signalman-and with the Vietnamese 

people. 

Our signalman may be little known or seldom recognized, but 

day in and day out, night in and night out, he keeps the circuits 

humming, be they mobile or fixed . He keeps communications in 

and operating around the clock, however adverse the conditions of 

weather or combat. He improvises ways and means when troubl e 

devclops. He learns qui ckl), the id iosyncrasies of the equipment. 

whether new or old, whet her relatively simple or amaz ingly com· 
174 COll.fMUN ICATlO NS-E LECTRON ICS 

plcx, often to an extent beyond the imagination of those sk ill ed in 

the an of electron ics. In Vietnam he has defe nded his sites and 

truly achieved the goal of "Keep the Shooters Talking." 

Furthermore. OUT signalma n can fight off the enemy_ He knows 

his weapons and th e security and combat skills of the infan tryman, 

for he must build bunkers afou nd his exposed equipment, layout 

and man perimeter defenses, and figh t-as he did notably in Tet , 

when the casualties of the 1st Signal Brigade mounted into the 

hund reds and the combat death loll was twenty-two. There is, for 

example, the case of Private. First Class, Thomas M . Torma, a Silver Star winner of the 86th Signal Battalion, who was badly 

wounded in an attack on the signal relay site atop Black Virgin 

Moumain- Nui Ba Dell- near Tay Ni nh, on the night of 13 May 

1968. A satchel charge blasted his weapon from his hands. but he 

met an oncoming enemy and killed him with his bare hands. 

In conclusio n. I cannot overemphasize my profound regard for 

the greatness of our officers and men as 1 saw and worked with 

them in Vietnam: the en listed men. the lieutenants and the captains, and the sen ior leaders, who learned from our military training system and who furth er trained themselves on the job for 

whatever tasks and whatever team efforts were required to build 

and operate the gigantic communications-electronics network in 

Vietnam while the U.S. Army was fighting a war. 

"May it be said well done. 

Be thou at peace." 
Index 

Abrams. General Creighton W.: 47. 5S, 

H)4, 150. 157, 173 

Advisers, U.s.: 5-6, U. 17,25.49,63-64, 

68, 76, IDS, 112, 150, 152 

Agency for International Development; 

6,8, 152 

,\ir bases. ddense of: 22 

AiT bomba rdment: 142 

Air conditioners: 109 

Air Force. Seventh : 25. Su also United 

States Air Force. 

Air support. Su Tactical air support. 

Airborne Brigade, 173d: 24,31,55,65, 

68, 121 

Ai rborne radio systems; 34. 97,99, 122-25 

Aircraft. Su also Helicopters. 

8 -52; 35 

Caribou: 34, 124 

deployed to Vietnam: 5 

future defense agai ns!: 162 

Oller: 124 

in signal units; 170-71 

Ute; 124 

Ai rlifUl: 24, 33, SI-82, 107 

Airmobile concept, t('St and application: 

34-35 

Airmobile divisions: 63 

1st Cav~lry: 31- 35.55. 1(}4, 113, 123-24, 

148 

IOlst Airborne: 95, HH. 113, 134 

Airports, operations at: 81 

Ambush('S, enemy: 82-S4, 109, 121 

Amphibious operations; 117-20 

An Khe: 32-33. 68. S2, 125 

Antenna s)'stems: 9-10, 2S. 119-2(). 162 

Aru Supply and Maintenance Facilities: 

liO 

Area systern concept; 4S-52, 59. See (llso 

,\rmy Area Communications S)"Stcm: 

Corps Area Communications System. 

Armored Cavalry Regiment. 11th: 148-

50 

Army, Dep:utmelll of the: 13,26.39, oil, 

47~S, 5S, 79. 123-24. 128. 137- 38, 

140. 147. 165. 171 

Army Area Communications System: 48 

Army Communicat ions Agency: 21 

Army Communkatiom Operations Cell' 

ter: 75 

Army CommunicatiollS Systems, Viet· 

nam: 74 

,\rmy Regional Communications Gronp: 

52-53 

Army Signal Command, Vietnam: 41, 47 

Army Signal Engineering Agency; 21 

Army Signal Supply Poin!: 10 

Mmy Training Facility: 9S, 137, 145, ]67 

Artillery units: 60.117. 120.162 

Assistant Secretary of Defense: 79 

Audio·visual support. See Photography. 

Australia; 132 

Automatic Digital Net .... ork: 89, 91-92, 

132-35. 137 

Automatic S«u re Voice Communications 

S)"Stcm: 92-93. 120-24, 130. 159-60 

Automatic tclephollc systems: 38-40, 73-

74. 88-$9, 92,99, 1-'5, loll, 145. 1<17-

4S, 158-59 

Automatic Voice Network.: ]35 

Ba Quro; 15.94 

It .. CK PORe" sptem: i-IO, 19-21,26-28. 

76 

Bamocrg, Staff Sergeant Gerald H.: 84 

Ban ~IeThuol: 6. 11.13.104, III 

BJllg Pia , T hailand: 6,9-1, 1-'5 

Bangkok. Thailand: 16.39,33,94, 140 

Ihse camps: 49, 57,59-60, 62~~. 154. 159 

IIcarC3t: 17 1 

Bell Telephone S)"Stem: 76 

Ben Het: 68 

Ben Tre: 104 

Bencwoh, USS: IIS- 2O 

Bien Hoa:31,37,49,1]1 

Black Virgin Mountain; 111. 150. IN 

Biack"'ell, Licuteuant Colonel Lotus lk 

10 

Budd)' S)"Stcm: 144. 172 

BulldolcT5. in terference by; 51 
176 INDEX 

C:lb l~ systems and install.uion : 6, 15-16, 

18,29,49. SI- 52. 73, 86, 94, 97, 1{)6, 

III. 122, 132, 137. H3 . I4S. 157. 166. 

16' 

Cam Ranh Bay: 23. 28, 35. 39, 52. 86, 

125, 130. HI 

Cambodia : 32, 34. 65, 103, 117, 121,123, 

148-50 

Camp ~glc : 134 

Dmp Enui: 66,68. 147 

Can T ho: 6, 11,37,39,49,89,10-1, Ill , 

1!?5, 135 

Dpital Military Assislance Command: 

,. 

Capital Military District: 87- 88 

Card •. datil. Su Data IU lismilSion and 

traffic. 

Casualties: IN 

Cauble, Colonel Gordon n .: ; . 

Central Highlands: 9, 13, 24, 28. 32, 34. 

Chief " or Staff, U.s. Army. See J ohnS(lll. 

Ceneral Harold K. 

Choy. Captain Don:dd J.: 109 

Citadel, Hue: 106 

Civic aClion : 144 

Ci\'il Cuard: 7 

Civilian con trol, doctrine: of: 96 

Civi l ian cmplo)'ces: 82-84,98 

Civilian Irregular DefenK Croup troops: 

.. Clark Air For« Bue: 15. 26--27 

Classific:;u io n of mcuages. Su: Prioritin 

and dassilication. 

Climate: 4-5 

Combat Commun ica tions System: 57 

Combat disruptions: 109-12 

Comllat ope-ration" $upport of: 24. 32- 34. 

43, 58-69, 7i- 78. 99. 106-13. 132. 

134-35, 137- 39, US-53. 159. 168 

Command. cOnlral. and organilation: 

12- 13. 21-22, 25-28, 4()-41. U. 47, 

51- 53.57-59,74- 75.96,112- 16.118, 

123. 148. ISO. 5~55 

Command Commun ications ContrOl Cen· 

tn Agency: 74 

Command posts: 5~, 66. 68, 120. 148 

Commander in Chief. Pacific: 6, 8, 12. 

15. 16. 20. 29. 38. See ouo Fell. 

Admiral H arry D. 

Commercial slstem. lack of: 41 

Communications. Su alJo Signal Corps. 

uc:a 1)'51<:m concept : 48- 52. 59. See 

0140 ArIll)' Area Communications 

System; Corps Area Communications 

S)·ltelll. 

com~t disruptions: 109-12 

combat ope-ratiollJ. support 0(: 2-1 , 32-

3 •. -43. 58-69. 77- 78. 99, 106-15. 132. 

134-35. 137- 39, 148-53. 159. 1GB 

command. control. and organiralioll : 

12- 13. 21- 22. 25- 28, 4()-41 , 43. 47. 

57- 59. 74-75. 112- 16. 11 8, 123. ISO. 

153- 55 

commercial s}stem lacking: .1 

eOllsolidation and reorg:ani~alio ! 112-

Ifi 

enRinl'CTing and insta llation : 71 - 72 

expansiOIl and breadth 0 ( : 3. 5- 7. 57, 

72, 76-77. 85-89. 99- 100, 11~16. 

129. 153 

funding and CO!l ts: 79-80, 150. 171-72 

grid concept, departure (rom: 49 

impro"cmenlS, problems, and plans: 

1l-16. 18-22. 4()-41. 47-18. 52-53, 

56-57, 78-84. 135-11 

integration. Sei! Integratcd Communirations System: Integrated Wideband Communications System. 

1"50111 from experience: 5~74 

priorities and classification! 24-25. 

9 1. 16().-61 

sitC$: 80. 161~3 

I)'n .. m) de"eloped: 57- 59 

technical rnan:.gemcnt: 70--7 1 

Comm un ica t ions· Elec tron i" Engineeri ng 

ami Installation Agency: 71 

Communications SateHite Corporation: 

.. Communications System} Engineering 

and Management Agcocy: 71 

CompuoJlen: 171 

Cornputers. logistical use: [~9. [69 

Cm.ITETS: [15 

CO i\lVETS: 145 

Construction projects: 21. . 51- 52. 78. 

81-82. 116, 129, ~()-41 

ContractoT5: 167-68, 172. Su also by 

nami!. 

Control. See Command, comral. and organitation. 

Co ~o) : 109 
INDEX. 177 

c,",. 

Provisional: 104 

XXIV: 1()4, 11 3 

Corp! Area Communications System: 48-

52. 57- 58,60-63,66--67,70-71,75,99, 

11 2- 16, 143, 150, 154 

Corps tattica 1 zones: 11 2 

J: 10,23-25,48-49, 55, 90, IO!-OS, 107, 

11 3-14, 123. 129, 132. 171 

II: 10, 23-25. 48--'19, 55, 6 1-62, 65. 103, 

171 

III: 23. 25. 35-36, ~9. 55. 62, 112. 

I:H. 148. 150, 17 1 

IV: 23.25. 35-36, 48--49, 55,60, 171 

Costs, Set Funding and (0515. 

Crawford , Colonel Alhtn 8 .: 114 

Crawford, Major William R.: 1()9 

Cr()(hel, Lieutenant Colonel Harold J.: 

C~05S80W " system: 13 

Crypwgraphic support and equipment : 

40. 5 1, 1!7, 15 1 

Cu Chi: III , 134 

Cung Thr.n Thien. Set Budd)' System. 

Da Nang: 6, 9-11, 20. 28, 38-39. 49, 52. 

76,8-4.86, 89-91, 134-35, 17 ' 

Da Na ng Air Ba$(': 8<1 

Oak. To. batl le of: 64-69, 121 

Oa1:l.1 : 28, 52, 76. 82. 109 

Data Processing Uni!. 27th : 27 

Data Iransmi51l ion and traffic: 3, 8. 13, 

27.57.89-93. 132- 35. 137 

Dnis. Lieutenant Colontl Jl'Try. J r.: 

108 

DtfeliK. Department of: 13. 21 . 40, 58. 

76-77. 79. 86. 89, 96, 127, 131. 157. 

17 1 

OefeliK Communica tions Agellcy: 13. 20-

21. 25- 26. 38. 40. 57- 58. 70, 75-76. 

79. 93-94. 96, 99 

Pacific: 70 

Southeut Asia Mainland Region: 26. 

57-58. 70 

Sou theast Asia Region: 26 

Su pport Center, Saigon : 25-26 

Dtfensc Conlmuniations S)'Slem: 13. 15, 

21. 26-27, 32, 57- 58, 70-7 1, 74- i6, 

85-86.92, 116, 132. 134, 1504-55 

DtfalSC measures: 161-63 

Demilitariled Zone: 108, 129-30 

Deput)· Stcretary of Dtf('TlSt': 25 

Di An : 31 - 32, 130 

Dialtelephonn. See Automatic telephone 

syU('Tl'J5. 

Diem, Ngo Dinh: 17 

Dien 8 im Phu: 103 

Digital message and data circuiU. See 

Message relay fadlities. 

Direct distance dialing. See Long-dbtance 

telepholle systeml. 

Docummts. processing: 165 

Dollg Ba Thin : 130 

Dong Ha: 130 

Dong Tam: 12Q, 172 

Dragon Mountain: 68 

Driscoll. Lieutmant Colonel Clarence 

R. : 71 

Duc: Lap Special .-orcci Camp : J3 

Electronics Command : 168 

Enders. Lieutmant Colonel JCTry J.: 26, 

52 

Engineering and installation : 71 - 72 

Equipment. communications 

future ~s: 155-60, 164 

mobile: 28. 31, 60. 63. 66, 68. 8+-86, 

III, 129, 139, 148, 159 

module concept : 155-58 

p roduction and short agC1: 80-82, 168-

70 

recovery of: 147 

transfer 10 Vietnam: 143, 172-73 

transportation of: 24. 80-82 

tyl>t'$ used: 139 

FC'dera l Electric Corporation: 145--'16 

FC'dcral Stock Number System: 169 

Fel!. Admi ral Harry D.: 16. See "iso 

Commander in Chid. Pacifi c:. 

Field Forc" 

I: 25.33.60-61, 6Hi6, 69 

II : 25. 55,60. 121. 148 

tact ical operations, su pport of: 60-62 

Fi re support bases: 59,61-62 

Firepo,,·er. con tribution to: 153 

Fort Buckner: 6 

Fort Huachuca : 70. 171 

Fort Monmouth : 98. 126 

Fori Riley: 147 

Fort Sill: 165 

FOSler. Major emeral Hugh F., J r.: 140. 

145 
178 I NDEX 

France: 103 

Free: World Milila ry is!~nce Forcfe$: 

3 1,60-62.9+-95.99, 105. 106, 1!2, 

1.55, 143, 152 

Frc'qucndes, estab lishing: 124 

funding and cosu : 79-80, 130, 171 - 72 

Cudncr, Colonel Fnnk K.: 56 

CcnCl'2lors: 119 

Gentry. Lieutenant Colonel Edwin B.: 

66 

Cia Nghia: l' 

Go Dau I-Ia : 148 

Goldcnlhal, Colonel Mitchel : 11 3 

Gnham, wCUlcn,lIl1 Colonel Elmer II.: 

106 

Green Hill : 16,27 

Grcn:ulc assaul ts: 109 

Crcllade assail]!'. enemy: 118 

Grid concept, dcparlurc from: 49 

Guam conference; 142 

Hamon, isl Lieutenant John E.: 106 

Hankinson, Sp«ialist William: 109 

~larkins. GeneTal Paul D.: 10. Su /llso 

Military AMinance Advisory Group, 

Viclnam: Miliury AloSistancc Command. Vietnam. 

Hawaii: 3. 15. 18,70. 92,9-4, 96 

Hcb,cr, Lieutenant General JOKph M., 

Jr.: 169 

Helicopter units: 71 

Ifclicoptcn .. Su Clba Aircraft; Ai rliftl, 

deploymen t 10 Vietnam: 5 

in signa l units: 170-71 

(aetia l opera tions: ", 108 

Hon Cong Mountain: 82 

lI ue: 11 , 76, 1()4, 106-09, " ' , 129, U4 

Ia Orang \'alley: '3-'5. 12S 

Infantry nrigades 

ht, h i D~alry Division : 65 

1st, 1$1 Infantry Dil'ision : 147 

ht, 4th Infantry Division : 65-66 

ht, 51h Infantry Di"bion : 113 

1st, lOin Airborne Division : SI, 9~ 

2d , 1st Infantry Division : SI 

2d , 9t h In fantr)' Division : 11 7- 20 

:kI. hI Cal'alry Division : ,H 

Sd, 25th Infantry Division : SI 

11 th Light: 95 

196th Light : 95 

Infantry BrigadC3-C0ntinued 

198th Light : 95 

199th Light: 55 

Infan try Oivisions 

area of responsibility: 62 

combat operations, ,upport of: 62~S 

ht: ' 1- '2,55, 146-47 

4th : 55, &f-69, 148 

9t h: 95, 11 7-20, 142. 172 

2Sd (Ameria l): 95 

25t h: 55, 111-12, 121. 134, 148 

Initial Defense Communications Satellite 

System: 94 

Inman. Warrant Officer jack n .: 18 

Integrated CommtJllicaiionl System, 

Southeut Asia: 1S1....!2, IoU, 145, 172 

In tegra ted Wideband Communications 

System: 20-21, 25-26, 2a-SO, 52, 56, 

58, 71, 75-86, 91. 94. 98-99, 129-30, 

171 

Intelligence reporu: 65. 104 

Interception. enemy: 121 - 22, ISO. 159-60 

Interference: -"', 11 8, 124 

Interna tional Telephone and Telegraph: 

145 

j apan: IS 

johnson, General Harold K.: 41 

j oinl Ch iefs of Staff: 12.16,20. 9 1, 157-

j oint " f orward Command Post: 106 

Joint Logistic Review Boud: '8 

Join t U.s. Military Advisory Group, 

Thailand : 11. 2 1 

Keuins, Lieu tenant Colonel Patrick F.: 

71 

Kelse)', Brigadier Gene-ral john E.: 5S 

Khe Sanh: I07-G8, 12', 129 

Kinnard, Major GenCTal Harr}' W.O.: 

KonlUm " : 65.68, 104 

Korat, Thailand: S9, 5'. 75, 84, 135 

KOTl~a , Set Republic of Koru. 

Korean War e:tperience: 121 

Kubik , Specialist David J.: 111 

Lai Khe: Ill , 147 

Lai rd , Melt'in R.: 142 

t anding craft : 106. 11 9-20 

Landing ~oncs : 59. 61 

l:Inguage balTier: 145 
INDEX 179 

u;os: 65, 103, 108, 123, 148,173 

u;nc:n , Major Genera l Stanley R.: 55 

u;na, Major Gencnl William D.: 168 

L($$OIlI p ined: 153-74 

Logistical Com ma nd, 1st: 22- 23,35,66 

Logistical managemen t: 139-10 

J.ong An Pro\';nce:: 120 

Long Sinh : 25. 35, 5 1- 52. 55. 59-00, 86, 

98. 125, 127. 135, 137, 1-10, 1-15, 17 1 

Long.distance telepho:1e s)"Jtems: 74. 88-

89,99,129,135,1511 

Lo ng·Unes n altalion, N?Tlh : 52 

Long· Lines S aualion. Sou th : 52 

Long·Unes Group: 52 

LOll, Major General Walter E,. Jr.: 40 

M.4.cAaTitu. opera tion: 64 

Machi ne: gun fi re:. See Small arms anallltJ. 

McNamara, Rohert 5.: 8, 21, 78, 171 

Maintenance and repair: 139-11, 145. 

151. 168-70 

Man.packtd radio !lCIS. 5u Radio re· 

ceivers·tra IISIIl iltcn. 

Manpowe r prohlems: 135-38. 164-68 

Manual mC'S$;!ge tela)"s: 6 

I\raleriel Command : 168 

Mekong Delta : 3-5. 10.78, 117, 129-30 

Mekong Ri"er: 5. 11 1 

Message cen lcn: 23, 49. 66-67. 116. 1-18 

Message priority indicators. S~1l Priorities 

and classifica tion . 

cuage relay fa cilities: 3. 8, 13, 52, 11 6. 

132- 35 

Message switch ing: 132-35 

Mcuage traffie, "ol ume or: 14-16, 27- 28. 

72,89-92, 134-35. 158. I(j() 

Meyer, Lietuenant Colonel Cha rles R.: 

Me)'er. " Major General Richud J.: 41. go 

Microwave systems: 6. 8, 15. 23, 76, 85-

86. 130, 137, 115 

Militu)· Mfil iate Radio System (MA RS) : 

127- 28 

Military Airlift Command : 81 

Military AMistance Advisor)· Group, 

Vietnam: 12- 13. 16. 51l1l"IJO Harkins, 

General Paul 1>.: Military AMiua nce 

Command, Vietnam. 

Military Assistance Comma nd, T hailand : 

53, 57- 58 

Milital)' .\,sistance Command . Vietnam: 

18, 20-21, 26, :?9. 35, 37- 38,51 , 57-

Military Assistance: Command, Vietnam 

-Continued 

58, 89. I<H, 107, US. 112--43, 158. 

Su also Abr.tms, Genenl Creigh ton 

W.; Harkins, Cener.t!" Paul D.: 

United States Army, Vietnam: West· 

moreland, Gener.tl William C. 

~ctivation and miuion : 5 

command and control: 25, 40 

tOial U.s. armed forces: 55 

Military Auistance Program: 6-7 

Military Police: Detachmmt, 218th: 109 

Mines: 121 

Mobi le romm un ic~ ;on$ equipment: 28, 

51 , 60,63,66,68,84-86. III, 129, 

139, 148. 159. St:e (l/lO Vans, ope ra· 

tions hom. 

Mobile Ri"erine .·orce: 11 7- 20 

Mol)ility, rontribUlion to: 153 

Module s)'Jlem, Iletd ror: 155- 58 

Monitors: 118 

Monkey Moun tain: 76 

Moore. Colonel Harold G., J r.: 34 

Moran. Colonel James J.: 22. 71 

o~ rode system: 7 

I\fortar asuults. enemy: 51. 100, 108, III , 

121 

M)' Tho R" 'er: 120 

Nat ional Aerona utics and Space Admin· 

istra tion: 93 

~ationa l Liberation front : 5 

Nationa l Military Command alld Con· 

Irol System: 94-96 

New Ze~land: 152 

:"1ha Trang: 8-10, 15- 16. 18-20, 23, 25, 

28. 33. 35-39, 52, 6<Hi1. 64, i 6, 86, 

89-92,94 .1 00. 129, 132, 135. 11 1 

Nicholson. l.ie:ulenant Colonel T om M,: 

Niu " Lang Uian : 28 

1\"ixon. Richard M.: H2 

1\"orth V,cotnam: 103. 5u nlsQ Viet Cong. 

ht Division : 65 

ait bombardmelll of: 142 

caJualties: ~ 

illsurgenC) anc! illfiltration hy: 5, 17 

1\"alional Liberation Fronl : 5 

offensives b)': 32- 33, 65, 82-84. 103- 11 

Peoplco's Re"olutional)' PaTl y: 5 

Tt:loffells;,'c: 103- 11. 129. H 2. 174 

Nonon, Brigadier Gener.tl j ohn: 35-36 

Nu; Da Ben: Ill. 150, 174 
180 INOEX 

Offensh'cs, enemy: 32-33, 51, 65, 82-84, 

O~1l 

Officers. professionalism required: 165-66 

Okinawa: 6, 15. 94 

On.the·job training: 98, 137, 145. 163 

Operations and ilHclligcnce Radio Net: 

12 

Organizat ion. Su Command, control, 

and organization. 

Pacific Command. Su Commander in 

Chief, Pacific; Fell , Admiral Harry D. 

Page Communications Enginccrs, Inc.: 

21,78-80.84,98, ].15--46 

Pari, peace talks: 142 

Patrols: 124 

Peen. Major Ceneral William R.: 65 

Pelland, LiCUlenallt Colonel James G.: 

Peopl" e's RC\'olution ary PlIrty: 5 

Perfume R iver: ]06 

Philco·Ford Corporation: 16,78,80,98, 

145-46 

Philippines: 6, 15-16.92 

Photograph y: 5 1-52,125-27,15 1. 163-64 

Phu Rai : 20. 76, 106, lOS, Il l-H, 125, 

111 

Phu Cal ,\ir Base: 86 

Phu lam: 9, 13-15, 27-28, 52, 72, 84. 

89-9 1, 132. 134 

r hu Lam Non· AIIIOmatic Relay Center: 

9 1- 92, 109 

Phu Lam Signal Jl:ana[iOll: 15 

Plalllation nase Camp: 60 

Plei Me Spe<:ia l Forces Camp: 32, 34 

Pleiku : 6, 9, 1[, 13, 19,24,28,33,38, 

49. 52. 65-67, 76. 86, 89, 13:. 

Pld ku Pro\'ince: 3l 

Polei Kleng: 6:. 

Politkal divisions: 3 

Popular Forccs: 64 

POTU. operations at: 81 

POS ies, Telegraphs eI T elephones: 72 

Pr' Line Mountain : 76.82,84 

I'riorities and elusifica tion : 24- 2:', 91, 

1",",,1 

Pri.'ate branch exchanges: 72 

Provi$iollal Signal Baltalion , Oa Nang: 

Provisional " Signa l BaualiOfl, Nha Trang: 

" 

Pro" ;siollal Signal Battalion, Phu Lam: 

" 

Quang Ngai: ] I 

Quang Tri: 130 

Qui Nhon : 6. 9, 19, 3:'-39, 52, 82, 86, 89. 

129, 135 

Radar specialiSl$: 137 

Radio nets and relay S)'stems: 6-7, 11- 12, 

15,23. 3[, 49. 60. 63-64. 66, 68, 85, 

[07, 11 2. ]1 6. 1IS-23. 149-50 

Radio recc::i\'eu·transmitters 

portable: 34.97, 1[ 8, [22, 160 

stationary: 15 

Rations, supply of: 169 

Rallan, Colonel Donald V.: 65 

Reconnais$3 llce opcratiOIl$: 65 

Record messages: 93 

Regional CommuniC:lIiOIlS Group: 98 

Regional Forces: 64 

Repair, Sec Main tenance and repair. 

Republic or Ko rea: 15.57, 152 

\$t Division: 106,113 

Capita l Division : 31 

Marine brigade: 3' 

Republic of Vietnam 

Civil Guard: 7 

Civilian Irregular Derense Group : 64 

elimate: 4-5 

commercial communications sptem; 6 

equipment. transfer to: 143. [72- 73 

expansion of forccs: [7 

military aid. requests for: 5 

political divisiolls: 3 

Popular Forces: 64 

POS ICS. Telegraphs et TeJepholles: 72 

Regional Forces: 64 

topograph)': " 5, 117 

Vietnamil.3tion program: 142--45, 151-

52, 172-73 

Republic of Vietnam Army: 118 

camalties: Z2 

communications support: 49, 63 

Special Forces: 64 

training: 9, 16-17, IU-45. 172- 73 

Republic of Vielnam Navy: 7 

RC:$Or, Stan ley R.: 145 

Riley. Colonel Thom~s W .. Jr.: 19.71 

RiHI"iI. Fiot Lieutenant Roberto: 173 

Ri\"('I"ine opetatiOfls: 117- 20 

Road3. construction and repair: 82 
INDEX 18 1 

Rocket a"3ulu. enemy: 51. 84. 104, 106, 

lOS. Ill. 121 

Rogers. Specialist Waller S.: 84 

Rosson, Lieutenant General William n.: 

65, 104 

Ru$Cs, enemy: 121- 22 

Russell, Specialist Da"id A.: 127 

Sa Dec;: 130 

Saigon: 3, 6. 8. 10--11, 13, 15-16, 18-19, 

21, 27-28, 3!)....36. 39, 51-52, 58-59, 

&1. 70. 72, 7&-77, 87--8B, 92, 94, 98-

99,104,109, Ill, 125, 130, 135 

Saigon Telephone Management Agency: 

72- 74 

San Miguel, Philippines: 6. 15 

Satellites, use in communicatioll5: 3, 18, 

9,..,94 

Sattahip, Thailand: 86, 147 

Schneider, Colonel Henry: 26 

Schools, commun ications: 98-99. 143--44, 

'67 

Schweiter, Brigadier General Leo H .: 68 

5<:rambler systerIlll: 39, 40, 92-93. 159. 

Su also Automatic Secure Voice 

Communkations Splem. 

Seaman. Maj()r General Jonathan 0.: 3] 

Search and destroy opentions: 57,62 

Secrelary of the Army. See Resor, Stan· 

ky R. 

Secretary of Defense. See Laird, Mel· 

"in R.; McNamara, Robert S. 

Secure '-oke network. See Automatic 

Secure Voice Communications Sys· 

tern. 

5«urity. safeguarding: 39-40. !iI-52. 81, 

92- 93, 97, 120-24, ISO. 159-63 

Sheppard Air Force Base: 137 

Signal Battalions 

9th: 118-20 

32d: 32-34. 55 

36th: 11 

37th: 49. lOB, 114 

39th: 10-13, 1&-17, 22- 23, 27, 41 , 48. 

58, 125 

40th: 49, 51 

41st: 22- 23. 32, 35. 58 

43d: 49.65-66,68. 109 

44th : 49, 51 

52d: 49 

53d: 25. 55, 60 

!i4th: 25.60-61.65,68 

Signal Battalions-Continucd 

63d : 106. 113- 14 

69th: 35, 49, 51, 125, 148 

73d: 109 

86th: 174 

12151: 31-32, 55, 147 

124th: 55.65. 67-& 

125th: 55 

361st: 52 

369th: 52 

379th: 27, 53 

442d: 53 

459th : 106-07 

523d : 95 

972d: 146 

Phu Lam: 15 

Signal Brigade. hI: 48, 52- 53. 57-{)1, 

64-ti6, 68-75. 82, 84, 86-87. 89, 92. 

95-96, 98-99. 106-()8, 11 1- 14. 124-

25, 127, 134-35, 137--'10, 143, 145-

48, 150, 153-54, 157, 163, 165, 167, 

169-74 

Signal Companies 

]78th: 10 

2071h: 11 

221st: 126-27, 163-64 

228th: 35 

232(]: 10 

362d: 10-11,23, 36, 109 

5181h: 36 

578th: 35 

580th: 35-36 

5861h: 32 

5871h: 147 

593d: 23. 35-36 

595th: 32 

596th: 107 

Signal Corps. See also Communications. 

accomptishmentJ: 41--'13, 86, 99-100, 

150-52, 173-74 

aircraft, organic: 170-71 

ca5uallies: 174 

command and control: 12- 13, 18- 22, 

25-2B, 40--41. 43, 47. 51 -53, 96, 148 

manpower problems: 135-38, 164-68 

missions: 10, 49 

number of troops employed: 48, 53, 

95. 114-15, 148, 152 

officers. professionalism required: 165-

reorganization: '" 147--'18 

5Oldier, tribute to: 173-74 
182 INDEX 

Signal Corps-Continued 

training: "3. 96-99, 137-38, 161-68 

troop units, arrivaLs and departures: 

8-10. 12.22. 25-26, 32. 35-36, 48--49, 

51, 107, 113. 146 

'\'cstmorcland, commendation b)': 43 

Signal Croups 

I Corps Tact ical Zone Pro\'isiona!: 

113- 14 

2d : 22-28. 31-32, 35-37, 40, 48--49. 

!i2. 71. 74, 146, 153. 171 

lith: 26, 54 

12th: 114. 146, 171 

21st: 48-49,52, liS. 146, 171 

29th: 53, 140, 1<18 

160lh: 5 1-52 

Signa l Officers' Conference: 62 

Signal Sc:hool: 98. 126, 163 

Signal T raining .'3cilil)': 172 

Single Intcgt"3ted TclC(;ommnuicalions 

System (SITS): 172 

SilC$, access, acquisi tion, numher, and 

.scenTil)·; 80. 16]-63 

Small arms assauJu: 109 

Small arms assalills, enemy: 108, 111. 

118, 121 

Smoke signals: 121 

Snipers, enemy: 111 

Soc Trang: I I, II I 

Soldier, tribute 10: 17!-74 

Sou th China Sea: 3, 120 

Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone 

Service: 135 

Southean Asia Pictorial Agcncy: 125 

Southeast Asia PiclOrial Center: 12~26 

Southeast Asia Signal School: 52, 98 

Southeast Asia Telephone Management 

Agcncy: 74 

Southeast Asia Wideband S)"stem: 75, 

86 

Sounn:as T ol.l. s),stem: 8 

Sol'iet satellite: 3 

Special Forces: 63-64 

SJX'eial Forces Group, 5th: 64 

Specialists, shortages alld trai ning: U5-

38, 144-45, 16'1-G8 

Spitl. Lieutenant Colonel William M.: 

65 

Springer. Lieutenant Colollcl Robert 

M.: 68 

State, Department of: 152 

Stil"'cl1. Lieutenant General Richard 

G.: 53. 113 

Strategic I\rm)' Communications: 6 

Strategic ;\rmy Communications Station, 

Vietnam: 6. 13- 15. 22. Su (l/so 

StrategiC Communications Facility, 

Vietnam. 

Strategic Communications Command: 

41, 47-48, 70, 74, 79. 84, 96. 137, 

153, 171 

Engineering and Installation I\ geney: 

71 

Pacilic: 18, 21-22. 26-27, 52 

Padlic. Southea.5t Asia: 26-27, 40 

Signal Brigade, Southeast Asia: 48 

Signal Croup. Thailand: 53 

Vietnam: 52 

Strategic Communications Facility. Phu 

Lam: 27, 40 

Strategic Communications Facility. Viet· 

nam: 22.27,40 

Supply systems and operations: 139-41, 

145. 168-70 

Switchboard operation and installation: 

6. 15, 2~. 37-39. 49. 66, 72, 88, 116, 

'" SYNCOM satell ite system: 18, 94 

System ('..omrol (SYSCO:" ): 12, 70-71 

Tactical air support: 7.33-35, 68 

Taiwan: 15 

"Talk Quick" system: 92, 121 

T an Canh: 68 

Tan Son Nhut Air Base: 27, 37-38, 72, 

84. 135 

T andem switches: 135, 158 

T ape systems and equipment: 6, 28. 92. 

(}!l, 134 

T ask Force Alpha: 25 

1'3)' Ninh: Ill, 148, ISO, 174 

Technical management: 70-71 

'"Telecommunications Program Objec· 

lil'e'": 21 

Telephone 1'o lanagemCllt t\gcncy: 89 

Telephone service and equipment: 6-8, 

15. 19-20. 23-24, 37-40, 57, 66, 68, 

72-74, 87-89, 93, 99, 118-20. 135, 

137,150,158-59 

T elet)'pewriter service and equipment: 

6,57, &1, 66, 89, 106. 161 
INDEX 183 

Terry, Brigadier General Robert D.: 

47-49, 52, 58, 71 -72, 74-75, 84, 90, 

144, 157 

Tel offensi\'e: 103-11, 129, 1-42, 174 

Thailand : 6, II , 1.~- 6, 19-20,26-28,39, 

53, 74-76, 78, SO. 84, 92-94. 98, 129-

30, 132, 135. 140, 145, 147-48, 152, 

158, 173 

Tillson. Ma jor General John C. F., III: 

.. Tonkin Gulf incidents: 17-18 

Topography: 3,5, 117 

Torma, Private, Fin! Clus. Thomas M.: 

17. 

Towen. erection of: 5 

Traffic. See Menage traffic. 

Training centen: 167 

Training programs: 43, 96-99. 137-38, 

161-68 

Troop uniu 

arrivals and deparlllres: 8-10, 12. 22. 

25-26,32.35-36.48-49,51,107,113. 

146 

number employed: 48. 53. 95, 11 4- 15. 

148. 152 

Tropospherk scatter systems and equip· 

ment: 3, 8-11. 13, 15-16, 18-19. 27-

28, 68. 76-78. 85-86. 132, 137 

Ubon. Thai land: 9. 19,28.39. 135 

Udorn, Thailand: 84 

United StatC5 Air Force: 7-9, 15-16. 33-

35. 38. 58, 72, 118, 124, 132. 135. 

137. 152 

United Stales Army, Pacific: 13, 26, 39-

41, 47 

United State, Army, Vietnam: 23-24. 

27.35-36,40-41. 47-49. 51, 107,1 12, 

123-24. 128, 135, 137-38, 143, 153, 

17 1. See also Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam. 

order of battle: 55. 113 

troop UnilS, periodic strength: 5, 17. 

22. 31, 55. 85. 142 

troop units, withdrawals: 142 

United States Army Support. Thailand: 

United " Stat~ Army Support Command, 

Vietnam: 21-23. See al.lo Uniled 

States Army Support Group, Viet· 

nam. 

United States Army Su pport Group, 

Viemam: 10. 13,21. See al.!o Un ited 

States Army SuppoTl Command, 

Vietnam. 

United States Embassy: 73 

United States Marine CorI": 22. lOS09, 142 

ht Marine Division: 55 

III Marine Amphibious Force: 25, 105 

3d Marine Division : 55. 113 

United States Navy: 18, 34, 58. 92. 106, 

117-20, 135. 152 

Van Harlingen. Brigadiu Ceneral Wil· 

liam M" Jr.: 63.91, 10fMlS, 111- 12 

Vans. opera tions from: 21. 28, 72. 88. 90. 

I" 

VC Hill: 16. 82 

Velie. Lieutenant Colonel Earl R.: 22 

Viet Cong: 103-04. 109. 121-22. 132. 

See also North Vietnam. 

arming by North Vietnamese Army: 

17 

assaults by: 5 1 

emergence of: 5 

Vietnam. Su North Vietnam; Republic 

of Vietnam. 

Vietnamitation program: 142-45, i51-

52. 172-73 

Villa Alliance Missionary Association: 

109 

Vin h Long: I I 

Vag!, Colonel Blaine 0.: 51 

Vung Chua Mountain : 82. 86, 135 

Vung Tau: 16. 28, 52, 82, 86. 94, 120, 

143-45 

War Zone C: 112 

Waters, General John K.: 41 

West moreland, General William C.: 17, 

22-23,33.40-4 1, 43, 47.58,68, 103-

04. 112, 117. See also Military Assist· 

ance Command. Vietnam; Un ited 

SUtes Army, Vietnam. 

WET W,!.SH s)'stem: 15-16, 18. 27 
184 INOve. 

While, Major l...«t T .: 22 

Wideband IY'lffllS: 15. See /ltso In. 

Iqrolted Communkations System, 

Southeast Alia; Integr;Ued Wideband Communications System. 

Williamson, Bripdier General Ellis W.: 

World " War U experience: .f1, 57. 121 

YI!LI.OWITON£ optt:uion: 11 2 

.'r li S ('OVI;ltNMI:NT ]'RII'TING OIl'1n. 4H4 7flO 
< 

• 

THAJLAND 

I 

(; II L' 

" THAILAND 

" TO" « ," 

r 0 U T H CHI'" A