## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Satis field , 2012 IL App (2d) 110297

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. LASHAWN SATI SFI EL D, Def endant- Appellant.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-11-0297

Filed October 1, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The demand for a speedy trial filed by defe ndan t while he was incar cer ated in a Depa

rtment of Correc tions’ fac ility was ineffe ctive due
to his failure to comply with section 3-8-10 of the Un i fi ed Code of Correc tions requiring t h at he send a copy of the demand to the chief administrative offic er of

the fa cility

wher e he w as inca

rce rate d.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit C o u rt of L ake County
, No. 09-DT- 3362; the Hon. Geor g e D. Strickland, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Thomas A. L ilien and R

. C hristopher Whit e, both of State Appellate Def ender ’s Off

ice, of Elg in, for appe llant.

Michae l J

. Waller, State’s Attorney
, of Waukeg an, (L awr ence M. Ba uer, of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor’ s Offic e, of coun s el), and David Ne al, of Coal City , for the People

.

Panel J USTI CE BI RKETT deliver ed the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustice s M c L a

r e n a n d Hutc hinson concur

red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Following a stipulated b en ch t rial, defe ndant, L ashawn Satisfield, was found guilty of driving u n der the influence of alcohol (625 I L CS 5/11-501(a) (West 2008)). On appea l, d ef en d an t contends that the trial court err ed in striking his speedy-trial demand. For t h e

rea sons that follow, we a ffirm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 Def

endant wa s char g ed with two counts of driving unde r the influenc e of a lcohol (625 I L CS 5/11-501(a) (1), (a )( 2 ) (West 2008)). On J anuar y 7, 2010, he filed a speedy-trial demand, but failed to appea r in court on Fe bruar

y 10, 2010. As a result, the trial court enter ed

a bond forf

eiture war rant for defe ndant’s arr est and order ed him to appea r in court on Marc h 17, 2010. ¶ 4 On M ar ch 2
, 2 0 1 0
, d efe ndant filed a second speedy-trial demand, this time while incar cer ated in the Depa

rtment of Correc tions’ L awr ence Correc tional Center on a separ ate offe nse. At the Marc h 17, 2010, hear ing, the State moved to strike defe nd an t ’s s ec ond demand on the basis that defe ndant failed to send a copy of the d em and to the chief administrative office r of L awr ence Correc tional Center, as require d by section 3-8-10 of the Uni fi ed Code of C orre ctions (Code) (730 I L CS 5/3-8-10 (W est 2010)). Defe ndant di d not appea r on that date

. ¶ 5 Following a subsequent hearing on the matter, the trial court g rante d the State’s motion and struck defe ndant’s second demand. The oral motion to rec onsider made by defe ndant shortly there afte r wa s denied. ¶ 6 On May

26, 2010, the trial cour

t entere d judgme nt on the bond forf eiture. ¶ 7 Def

endant filed a third speedy-trial demand on August 10, 2010, and the case proce eded
to a stipulated bench trial on November 29, 2010, afte r which the trial court found defe ndant
guilty and sentenc ed him to one y ear of court supervision. Following an unsucce ssful motion

-2-for a new tria l, defe ndant brought this t imely appea l.

¶ 8 ANALYSI S ¶ 9 On appea l, defe ndant contends that the trial court err ed in g ranting the State’s motion to strike his second speedy -trial demand. Acc ording to defe ndant, beca use the State was awa

re of his incar cer ation at L awr ence Correc tional Center, his failure to send a copy of his second speedy -trial demand to t h e chief administrative office r was not fata l to his demand. We disag ree

. ¶ 10 Section 3-8-10 of the Code provides that the speedy-trial rig hts a f f o r d e d d e f e ndants under sections 103-5(b)
, (c)
, and (e) of the Code of Criminal Procedur e of 1963 (725 I L CS 5/103- 5(b), (c)
, (e) (West 2010)) shall apply to people committed to the Depa rtment of Correc tions. 730 I L CS 5/3-8-10 (West 2010). Section 3-8-10 require s, howeve r, that a defe ndant fi le a demand that include s the following : “a statement of the place of prese nt commitment, the term, and leng th of the rema ining term, t he charg es pending ag ainst h i m o r h er to be tried and the county of t he charg es, and the demand shall be addre ssed to the state’s attorney of the county wher e he or she is char g ed with a copy to the cler k of that court and a co p y t o the chief administrative office r of the Depa

rtment of Correc tions institution or fac ility to which he or she is committed.” 730 I L CS 5/ 3-8-10 ( West 2010). ¶ 11 In People v. Staten
, 159 I ll. 2d 419, 426, 429-30 (1994), our supreme court held that the defe ndant’s failure to include in his speedy-trial demand a ref ere nce to section 3-8-10 of the Code or the details of his incar ce ra t i o n, time serve d, and time rema ining on his sentenc e rende red his demand ineffe ctive. The defe ndant arg ued, as defe ndant d o es i n the prese nt

case , that beca

use t he S tate knew wher e he was incarce rate d, his failure to strict l y co m ply with the require ments of section 3-8-10 should be excused, as the purpose of the statute was

serve d. Staten
, 159 I ll. 2d at 427-28. The supreme court reje cted that argument, noting that the require ments of section 3-8-10 are neith er t ec h n ical nor meaning less and that the leg islature chose to place the burden of makin g a n aff irmative speedy-trial demand acc ording
to section 3-8-10 on incar cer ated defe ndants. Staten
, 159 I ll. 2d at 428. In addition, the Staten

co u rt n oted that courts of this state had alre ady held that the State’s knowledg e of a defe nd ant’s wher eabouts did not relieve the defe ndant of the burden of complying with section 3-8- 10. Staten , 159 I ll. 2d at 428; se e also People v. W entlent , 109 I ll. App. 3d 291 (1982); People v . Davis , 92 I ll. App. 3d 869 (1981). ¶ 12 Def

endant attempts to distinguish Staten on t h e gro u nd that the defendant’s violations of section 3-8-10 in Staten wer e more flagrant than the violation in the prese nt case , wher e defe ndant s imply failed to deliver a copy of the demand to the chief administrative officer of L awr ence Correc tional Center. This contention is unavailing
, as the languag e used by the
supreme court in Staten indicates that the supreme court intended t o m an d at e strict compliance with the require ments of section 3-8-10. Noting sever al decisions that require d compliance with se ction 3-8-10 as a prec ondition of the running of the speedy-trial period, the supreme court stated the following : “The above authorities rec og nize that a defe ndant who claims a violation of a speedy

-

-3-trial rig ht cannot preva il if the demand for trial fails to comply with t h e t er m s o f the
g overning speedy -trial provision. To treat the informational require ments of section 3-8- 10 as surplusag e would be to infring e on the leg islative prer og ative to set rea sonable conditions on an incar cer ated defe ndant’s rig ht to rec eive a trial within 160 day s of the demand. As ref

lected by the statutes examined in the instant case , the leg islature has seen fit to provi de differ ent time periods and demand require ments for offe nders who are differ ently

situated.” Staten , 159 I ll. 2d at 429-30. Nowher e in this passag e or in th e ca s es ci t ed by Staten is there support for defe ndant’s position that whether omissions in a speedy -trial demand made pursuant to section 3-8-10

are fata l is depende nt upon the number and severity of the omissions

. Rather, Staten sug g ests that a defe ndant must fully comply with all of the require ments of section 3-8-10 in order to set the 160-day period running

. Although the defe ndant in Staten failed to comply with more require ments than defe ndant in the prese nt case , in eac h case the claimed purpose of section 3-8-10 (to make the State awa re of the defe ndant’s wher eabouts) was satisfied. Neve rtheless, the supreme court in Staten held that the defe ndant’s demand was insufficient. Acc ording ly
, we see no rea son to excuse defe ndant from full compliance with the require ments of section 3-8-10 simply

beca use he satisfied a fe w more r equire ments than the def endant in Staten

. ¶ 13 During oral arguments on this matter, counsel for defe ndant argued strenuously that the

rec ord did not contain any ev i d en ce that defe ndant, in fac t, failed to send a copy of the demand to the chief administrative office r of L awr ence Correc tional Center. He also argued
t h at any defic iency in putting the chief administrative office r on notice could have b ee n

reme died by the State’s writting defe ndan t i n t o court upon rec eiving his demand. Wit h
respe ct to defe ndant’s claim that the rec ord does not indicate whether defe ndant sent a copy to the chief administrative officer, w e note that de fenda nt had at lea st two opportunities to demonstrate to the trial court that he had complied with all of the require ments of section 3- 8-1 0 : at t h e hear ing on the State’s motion to strike his demand and at the hear ing on defe ndant’s posttrial motion. At both hear ings, defe ndant’s compliance with section 3-8-10

was square ly at issue, y et defe ndant took neither opportunity to demonstrate that he had sent

a copy of his deman d to the chief administrative office r. Moreove r, the burden to comply with the requirements of section 3-8-10 was on defe ndant. People v. Sandoval
, 23 6 I l l. 2d 57, 66 (2010) (“the leg islature intended to place the burde n of compliance [wit h the require m en t s o f section 3-8-10] on the demanding defe ndant”)

. The State was under no obligation to reme dy defe n d an t ’s failure to comply with section 3-8-10, and defe ndant’s attempt to shift that burden is unavailing

. ¶ 14 Be cause we conclude that defe ndant was require d to comply with all of the re quirements

o f s ection 3-8-10–including sending a copy of his demand to the chief administrativ e office r–and beca

use defe ndant has offe red nothing tending to show that he complied with all of those require ments, the trial court did not err in strikingdefe ndant’s second speedy-trial demand. Given our conclusion that defe ndant’s failure to demonstrate compliance with the require ments of section 3-8-10 is fata l to his demand, we need not deter mine what, if any , eff ect his failure to appea

r in the trial court on Fe bruar y 10, 2010, and Marc h 17, 2010, had
on any of his demands.

-4-¶ 15 CONCLUSI ON

¶ 16 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the circ uit court of L ake County is a ffirme d.

¶ 17 Affir

med.

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