13 April 1995

Doctrine for

Planning

Joint Operations

Joint Pub 5-0
A key ingredient in fighting and

winning wars is joint operations planning.

The joint operation planning process entails

the development of the best possible plans

for potential crises across the range of

military operations involving forces that

can reasonably be expected in a CINC’s

area of responsibility. We will continue to

develop plans using the collective wisdom

available among all military planning staffs.

It is essential that we most efficiently

plan to use the remaining resources

entrusted by American citizens as forces are

downsized. Diverse threats to our national

interests frequently require large, complex

operations. The more complex the operation, the more comprehensive the planning

must be to ensure success.

The products of our planning efforts must be able to stand up to the strongest

scrutiny, including the ultimate test: execution! It is incumbent upon you to ensure

the plans are firmly rooted in the guidance contained in this publication. This

publication guides a commander’s development of warfighting and employment

aspects of the plan. Each reader is encouraged to become an expert on this vital

subject.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
i

PREFACE

1. Scope

Joint Pub 5-0 is the keystone document

of the joint planning series. It sets forth

fundamental principles and doctrine that

guide planning by the Armed Forces of the

United States in joint or multinational

operations.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine to

govern the joint activities and performance

of the Armed Forces of the United States

in joint operations as well as the doctrinal

basis for US military involvement in

multinational and interagency operations.

It provides military guidance for the

exercise of authority by combatant

commanders and other joint force

commanders, as cited in references, and

prescribes doctrine for joint operations and

training. It provides military guidance for

use by the Armed Forces in preparing their

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of

this publication to restrict the authority of

the joint force commander (JFC) from

organizing the force and executing the

mission in a manner the JFC deems most

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the

accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in

this publication apply to the commanders

of combatant commands, subunified

commands, joint task forces, and

subordinate components of these

commands. These principles and guidance

also may apply when significant forces of

one Service are attached to forces of another

Service or when significant forces of one

Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is

authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be

followed except when, in the judgment of

the commander, exceptional circumstances

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between

the contents of this publication and the

contents of Service publications, this

publication will take precedence for the

activities of joint forces unless the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in

coordination with the other members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more

current and specific guidance.

Commanders of forces operating as part of

a multinational (alliance or coalition)

military command should follow

multinational doctrine and procedures

ratified by the United States. For doctrine

and procedures not ratified by the United

States, commanders should evaluate and

follow the multinational command’s

doctrine and procedures, where applicable.
ii

Preface

Joint Pub 5-0

Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER I

PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

 Introduction .............................................................................................................. I-1

SECTION A. JOINT PLANNING OVERVIEW ...................................................... I-1

 Military Planning ..................................................................................................... I-1

 Scope of Joint Operation Planning .......................................................................... I-3

SECTION B. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT

OF JOINT FORCES.................................................................................................... I-4

 General ..................................................................................................................... I-4

 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ...................................................................... I-5

 Joint Chiefs of Staff ................................................................................................. I-6

 Combatant Commanders.......................................................................................... I-6

SECTION C. CONCEPTS ......................................................................................... I-7

 Single Process .......................................................................................................... I-7

 Interoperable Joint Planning and Execution System ............................................... I-7

 Joint Operation Planning by the Combatant Commanders ..................................... I-8

 Joint Operation Planning and Plans Process ........................................................... I-9

 Types of Planning Processes ................................................................................... I-9

 Types of Plans and Orders ..................................................................................... I-10

 Assigned, Apportioned, and Allocated Forces ...................................................... I-13

 Adequacy, Feasibility, Acceptability, and Compliance with Joint Doctrine......... I-13

 Coordination With Other Planning ........................................................................ I-14

SECTION D. ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING............................................... I-16

 Introduction ............................................................................................................ I-16

 National Structure .................................................................................................. I-16

 Organizing for Joint Planning................................................................................ I-18

SECTION E. PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS ............. I-19

 Introduction ............................................................................................................ I-19

 JOPES Functions ................................................................................................... I-19
iv

Table of Contents

Joint Pub 5-0

CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION

 Introduction ............................................................................................................ II-1

SECTION A. NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES ................................... II-1

 Introduction ............................................................................................................ II-1

 National Security Council System......................................................................... II-1

 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System................................................... II-2

 Joint Strategic Planning System ............................................................................ II-4

SECTION B. SUPPORTING SYSTEMS ................................................................ II-7

 Introduction ............................................................................................................ II-7

 Service Planning Systems ...................................................................................... II-8

SECTION C. JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN ................................ II-10

 Introduction .......................................................................................................... II-10

 JSCP Base Document .......................................................................................... II-10

 JSCP Supplemental Instructions .......................................................................... II-12

SECTION D. JOINT MOBILIZATION PLANNING........................................... II-12

 Introduction .......................................................................................................... II-12

 Responsibilities .................................................................................................... II-12

 Integration Concepts ............................................................................................ II-13

 Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process (JIMPP) .................................... II-13

SECTION E. EMPLOYMENT PLANNING ........................................................ II-14

 Introduction .......................................................................................................... II-14

 Employment Planning ......................................................................................... II-14

 Key Planning Concepts........................................................................................ II-15

SECTION F. CAMPAIGN PLANNING ............................................................... II-18

 Introduction .......................................................................................................... II-18

 Campaign Plans ................................................................................................... II-18

 Strategic Integration............................................................................................. II-18

 Types of Campaign Plans .................................................................................... II-19

 Relationship of Campaign Planning to Joint Operation Planning ...................... II-19

 Elements of Theater Campaign Plans .................................................................. II-20

 Summary .............................................................................................................. II-21
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Table of Contents

SECTION G. MULTINATIONAL PLANNING ................................................... II-21

 Introduction .......................................................................................................... II-21

 Multinational (Alliance or Coalition) Operations ............................................... II-21

 Multinational Planning ........................................................................................ II-21

 Review of Alliance and Coalition Plans .............................................................. II-22

CHAPTER III

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

 Introduction ........................................................................................................... III-1

SECTION A. OVERVIEW ..................................................................................... III-2

 General .................................................................................................................. III-2

 JOPES Planning Processes ................................................................................... III-2

SECTION B. DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS .......................................... III-3

 Introduction ........................................................................................................... III-3

 Planning Cycles and Schedules ............................................................................ III-3

 Deliberate Planning Process ................................................................................. III-3

SECTION C. CRISIS ACTION PLANNING ........................................................ III-9

 Introduction ........................................................................................................... III-9

 Relationship to Deliberate Planning ..................................................................... III-9

 CAP Procedures .................................................................................................. III-10

 Deployment Orders, Redeployment Orders, and Deployment

 Preparation Orders .......................................................................................... III-15

SECTION D. SUMMARY .................................................................................... III-16

 Joint Planning Summary ..................................................................................... III-16

CHAPTER IV

ASSESSMENT

 Introduction ........................................................................................................... IV-1

 Responsibilities ..................................................................................................... IV-1

 Integration ............................................................................................................. IV-2

 Preparedness and Capability ................................................................................. IV-2

APPENDIX

A References ......................................................................................................... A-1

B Administrative Instructions .............................................................................. B-1
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Table of Contents

Joint Pub 5-0

GLOSSARY

Part IAbbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................. GL-1

Part IITerms and Definitions ........................................................................... GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Types of Military Planning ........................................................................... I-2

I-2 Scope of Joint Operation Planning ............................................................... I-3

I-3 The Joint Planning and Execution Community ............................................ I-8

I-4 Joint Operation Planning Processes.............................................................. I-9

I-5 Types of Joint Operation Plans ................................................................... I-11

I-6 JOPES Functions ........................................................................................ I-19

II-1 Joint Strategic Planning System ................................................................. II-4

II-2 Joint Strategic Planning System Interfaces ................................................ II-6

II-3 Developing the JSCP .................................................................................. II-11

II-4 Key Planning Concepts.............................................................................. II-15

II-5 Fundamentals of Campaign Plans ............................................................. II-20

III-1 Joint Publication 5-0 Series Hierarchy ...................................................... III-1

III-2 JOPES Deliberate Planning Process and Crisis Action Planning

 Process Functional Alignment ............................................................... III-2

III-3 The Deliberate Planning Process ............................................................... III-4

III-4 Concept Development Phase ..................................................................... III-5

III-5 Plan Development Phase ........................................................................... III-6

III-6 Time-Phased Force Deployment Data ....................................................... III-7

III-7 Comparing Crisis Action Procedures with Deliberate

 Planning Procedures ............................................................................ III-10

III-8 Summary of Crisis Action Planning Phases ............................................ III-11

III-9 Joint Planning Summary .......................................................................... III-17
vii

Executive Summary

Joint operation planning is conducted within the chain of

command that runs from the National Command Authorities

(NCA) to the combatant commanders and is primarily the

responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the combatant commanders. Joint operation

planning includes the preparation of operation plans

(OPLANs), OPLANs in concept format (CONPLANs),

functional plans, campaign plans, and operation orders by

joint force commanders, as well as those joint planning

activities that support the development of these plans and

orders. Joint operation planning is a sequential process

performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and

tactical levels of war.

Joint operation planning encompasses planning for the

full range of activities required for conducting joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment,

employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces.

Mobilization Planning. Primarily the responsibility

of the Services, mobilization planning is directed

toward assembling and organizing national resources

to support national objectives in times of war and for

military operations other than war.

Joint Planning Overview

Joint operation planning

is directed toward

employment of military

forces within the context

of a military strategy to

attain specified objectives

for possible

contingencies.

Planning for joint

operations includes:

Mobilization Planning

Scope of Joint Operation Planning

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

Covers Joint Operation Planning Processes and Concepts

Discusses Strategic Direction and Integration

Addresses both Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning

Covers the Relationship Between Joint Operation Planning

and Assessment
viii

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 5-0

Deployment Planning. Deployment planning is the

responsibility of the combatant commanders in close

coordination with US Transportation Command.

Employment Planning. Employment planning

prescribes how to apply force to attain specified

military objectives. Employment planning concepts

are developed by the combatant commanders through

their component commands.

Sustainment Planning. Sustainment planning is

directed toward providing and maintaining levels of

personnel, materiel, and consumables required to

sustain the planned type of combat activity for the

appropriate duration and at the desired level of intensity.

Redeployment Planning. Redeployment planning is

directed towards the transfer of units, individuals, or

supplies deployed in one area to another, or to another

location within the area, or to the zone of interior for

the purpose of further employment.

Joint operation planning employs an integrated process

entailing similar policies and procedures during war and

military operations other than war, providing for orderly

and coordinated problem solving and decisionmaking.

In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured

to support the thorough and fully coordinated development

of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened, as

necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing

events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate

greater decentralization of joint operation planning

activities.

Interoperable planning and execution systems are essential

to effective planning for joint operations. The activities of

the entire planning community must be integrated through

an interoperable joint system that provides for uniform

policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported

by modern communications and computer systems. The

system designed to provide interoperability is the Joint

Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

JOPES is first and foremost policies and procedures that

guide joint operation planning efforts.

Deployment Planning

Employment Planning

Sustainment Planning

Redeployment Planning

The Joint Operation

Planning and Execution

System (JOPES) provides

a single process,

interoperable planning

and execution.

Planning Concepts
ix

Executive Summary

Plans are proposed under different processes depending on

the focus of a specific plan. The processes are labeled as

campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning; however,

they are interrelated.

Campaign Planning. Combatant commanders

translate national and theater strategy into strategic and

operational concepts through the development of

theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies

the combatant commander’s strategic vision of the

arrangement of related operations necessary to attain

theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning

encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action

planning processes. If the scope of contemplated

operations requires it, campaign planning begins with

or during deliberate planning. It continues through

crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning

processes.

Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning prepares

for a possible contingency based upon the best available

information and using forces and resources apportioned

for deliberate planning by the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP). It relies heavily on

assumptions regarding the political and military

circumstances that will exist when the plan is

implemented. Deliberate planning is conducted

principally in peacetime to develop joint operation

plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning

documents.

Crisis Action Planning (CAP). CAP is based on

current events and conducted in time-sensitive

situations and emergencies using assigned, attached,

and allocated forces and resources. Crisis action

planners base their plan on the actual circumstances

that exist at the time planning occurs. They follow

prescribed CAP procedures that parallel deliberate

planning, but are more flexible and responsive to

changing events.

Joint operation planning

is categorized as:

Campaign planning

 or

Deliberate planning

 or

Crisis action planning.

Types of Planning Processes
x

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 5-0

Types of Deliberate Plans. Deliberate plans are prepared

under joint procedures and in prescribed formats as either

an OPLAN, CONPLAN with or without time-phased force

and deployment data (TPFDD), or functional plan.

OPLANs. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed

operation plan containing a full description of the

concept of operations and all required annexes with

associated appendixes. It identifies the specific forces,

functional support, deployment sequence, and resources

required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates

for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be

used as the basis of a campaign plan (if required) and then

developed into an operation order (OPORD).

CONPLAN Without TPFDD. A CONPLAN is an

operation plan in an abbreviated format that would

require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it

into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or OPORD. A CONPLAN

contains the Commander of a combatant commands

(CINC’s) Strategic Concept and those annexes and

appendixes either required by the JSCP or deemed necessary

by the combatant commander to complete planning.

CONPLAN With TPFDD. A CONPLAN with TPFDD is

the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more

detailed planning for phased deployment of forces.

Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency

of compelling interest and critical to national security but

is not likely to occur in the near term.

Functional Plans. Functional plans involve the conduct

of military operations in a peacetime or permissive

environment. These plans are traditionally developed

for specific functions or discrete tasks (e.g., nuclear

weapon recovery or evacuation, logistics, communications,

or continuity of operations) but may also be developed to

address functional peacetime operations such as disaster

relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or

counterdrug operations.

Deliberate Plans are

prepared as:

Operation Plans

(OPLANs)

OPLANs in Concept

Format Without TimePhased Force and

Deployment Data

OPLANs in Concept

Format With TimePhased Force and

Deployment Data

Functional Plans

Types of Deliberate Plans
xi

Executive Summary

Supporting Plans. Supporting plans are prepared as tasked

by the supported combatant commanders in support of their

deliberate plans. They are prepared by supporting

combatant commanders, subordinate joint force

commanders, component commanders, or other agencies.

Campaign Plans. Campaign planning can be started prior

to or during deliberate planning but is not completed until

crisis action planning. Campaign planning and principles

are the responsibility of the combatant commander.

Operation Order. OPORDs are prepared under joint

procedures in prescribed formats during crisis action

planning. They are in the form of a directive issued by a

commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of

effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

Assigned forces are those forces that have been placed

under the combatant command (command authority)

of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense in his

“Forces For Unified Commands” memo. Forces and

resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime

operations of that command.

Apportioned forces and resources are those made

available for deliberate planning as of a certain date.

They may include those assigned, those expected through

mobilization, and those programmed. They are apportioned

by the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may

be more or less than those allocated for execution planning.

Allocated forces and resources are those provided by

the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation.

The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished

through procedures established for crisis action planning.

The categories of force

and resource availability

are:

Assigned

Apportioned

Allocated

Supporting Plans

Campaign Plans and Operation Orders

Assigned, Apportioned, and Allocated Forces and Resources
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Executive Summary

Joint Pub 5-0

Adequacy determines whether the scope and the concept

of planned operations as contained in the CINC’s Strategic

Concept satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission.

Feasible plans accomplish assigned tasks with resources

that are available within the time frames contemplated by

the plan. Acceptable plans are proportional and worth

the expected cost. They provide for accomplishment of

the mission with available resources without incurring

excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time,

or position. Operation plans will be consistent with joint

doctrine as stated in approved and test publications

contained in the Joint Publication System.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organizes the

joint planning and execution community (JPEC) for joint

operation planning by establishing supported and

supporting command relationships between the

combatant commands. The supported commander is the

combatant commander having primary responsibility for

all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP or other joint

operation planning authority. Supporting commanders

provide augmentation forces or other support to a designated

supported commander or commanders or develop

supporting plans. Such support is provided in accordance

with the principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified

Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and may include the

preparation of plans that support the joint operation plan of

the supported commander.

The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to

coordinate the planning efforts of the combatant

commanders in pursuit of national strategic objectives and

to integrate their efforts with those of the remainder of the

JPEC. The JSCP is the link between strategic planning

and joint operation planning. It is the primary vehicle

through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

exercises his responsibility to provide for the preparation

of joint operation plans. The JSCP initiates deliberate joint

operation planning by assigning planning tasks to the

combatant commanders, apportioning major combat

forces and resources, and issuing planning guidance to

Joint operation plans

should be consistent with

joint doctrine and are

developed in conformance

with the criteria of

adequacy, feasibility, and

acceptability.

For every operation,

supported and supporting

command relationships

must be established

between the combatant

commands.

The Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan provides

the strategic direction

required to focus the

deliberate planning

efforts of the combatant

commanders.

Adequacy, Feasibility, Acceptability, and Consistency

with Joint Doctrine

Organizing for Joint Planning

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
xiii

Executive Summary

integrate the joint operation planning activities of the entire

JPEC within a coherent, focused framework.

Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces

or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for

war or other national emergency. Depending on the threat

to be countered, mobilization may range from manpower

augmentation of the active force to widespread involvement

of the nation’s economic, political, and industrial resources.

Planning and executing mobilization activities are

accomplished primarily by the Military Departments and

Services. However, operation planning for major

contingencies relies heavily on timely mobilization of the

necessary forces and capabilities.

Employment is the strategic, operational, or tactical use

of forces within an operational area. Employment

planning defines how existing and projected capabilities

will be used to attain objectives. It involves military actions

required to pursue warfare successfully: evaluating enemy

actions and capabilities, devising and selecting courses of

action (COAs), and positioning forces and resources; to

create advantages in combat and exploit resulting

opportunities to attain objectives despite enemy resistance.

Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when

contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a

single major operation. Campaign planning is conducted

during both deliberate and crisis action planning. A

campaign is a series of related joint major operations

that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions

to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within

a given time and space. It orients on the enemy’s centers

of gravity; achieves simultaneous and synchronized

employment of all available land, sea, air, space-based

assets, and special operations forces; clearly defines an end

state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination,

or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate

planning. Campaign plans are the operational extension

of a combatant commander’s theater strategy. They translate

strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by

specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used

Joint mobilization

planning is the planning

for moving systematically

and selectively from a

normal state of peacetime

preparedness to an

appropriate warfighting

posture.

Employment planning

defines how existing and

projected capabilities will

be used to obtain

objectives.

The campaign plan

embodies the combatant

commander’s vision of

the arrangement of

operations necessary to

attain strategic objectives.

Joint Mobilization Planning

Employment Planning

Campaign Planning
xiv

Executive Summary

Joint Pub 5-0

to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning is

a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange

for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide

the planning of joint operations within their theater. In

addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant

commanders give the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater

coordination at the national level. Theater campaigns are

conducted by joint forces. They may follow more than

one line of operation. Theater campaigns synthesize

mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and

their subordinate operations or campaigns into a coherent

whole. Subordinate campaign plans can be created by

joint task forces or subunified commands if required.

All other planning is for operations supporting the

campaign. Campaign planning has its greatest application

in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used

in situations other than war. Campaign plans guide the

development of supporting OPLANs or OPORDs and

facilitate national-level coordination of strategic priorities

and resource allocations. Tasking for strategic requirements

or major contingencies may require the preparation of

several alternative plans for the same requirement using

different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility.

For these reasons, campaign plans are based on

reasonable assumptions and are not normally completed

until after the NCA selects the COA during CAP.

Deliberate plans may include elements of campaign

planning, however these elements will have to be updated

as in any deliberate plan used at execution.

Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in

national and international channels. Collective security

goals, strategies, and combined operation plans are

developed in accordance with individual treaty or alliance

procedures. Deliberate joint operation planning for

multinational operations is performed through national

channels but in accordance with US doctrine and

procedures. Coordination of these separate planning

channels is accomplished at the national level through

established coalition bodies and at the theater and

operational levels by commanders of combatant commands

or other subordinate joint US commands who are

responsible within both channels for operation planning

matters.

Multinational planning is

accomplished in national

and international

channels.

Multinational Planning
xv

Executive Summary

The JOPES is the principal system within the Department

of Defense for translating policy decisions into operation

plans and OPORDs in support of national security

objectives. To accomplish this task, JOPES consists of a

deliberate and a crisis action planning process.

Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing

capabilities to achieve objectives defined in national military

strategy. The resultant plans are a measurement of the

nation’s ability to successfully prosecute the national

military strategy within the constraints of available forces

and resources. This measurement provides a means of

assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities,

determining risks, and focusing the acquisition of additional

resources and capabilities. Assessments derived through

joint operation planning provide insight into the strengths

and deficiencies of the Nation’s existing military

capabilities. Consequently, they can be an invaluable source

of information for force development planning and the

development of national military strategy.

This publication establishes responsibilities for planning

for joint operations. It promulgates doctrine, principles,

and concepts that govern: (1) planning for the mobilization,

deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment

of forces for joint operations; (2) development and execution

of joint operation plans, campaign plans, and operation

orders; (3) integration of the Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System with other joint systems and processes;

(4) integration of joint operation planning with the

administrative and logistic functions of the Military

Departments and Services; and (5) use of joint operation

planning to support functions of capability assessment and

force development.

JOPES consists of five

basic planning functions

and the deliberate and

crisis action planning

processes.

Joint operation planning

plays a vital role in

assessing national

warfighting capabilities

and programming

improvement.

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

Assessment

CONCLUSION
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Executive Summary

Joint Pub 5-0

Intentionally Blank
“But in truth, the larger the command, the more time must go into planning;

the longer it will take to move troops into position, to reconnoiter, to

accumulate ammunition and other supplies, and to coordinate other

participating elements on the ground and in the air. To a conscientious

commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning. By proper foresight

and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the most precious

elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks ahead as far as he

can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to eliminate as many variable

factors as he is able. He has a firsthand look at as much of the ground as

circumstances render accessible to him. He checks each task in the plan

with the man to whom he intends to assign it. Then—having secured in

almost every instance his subordinates’ wholehearted acceptance of the

contemplated mission and agreement on its feasibility—only then does he

issue an order.”

General Mathew B. Ridgway: The Korean War, (1967)

CHAPTER I

PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

I-1

1. Introduction

Planning for the employment of military

forces is an inherent responsibility of command. Planning is performed at every

echelon of command, and it is conducted

across the range of military operations.

SECTION A. JOINT

PLANNING OVERVIEW

2. Military Planning

Military planning includes two broad

categories of planning: force planning and

joint operation planning. (See Figure I-1.)

a. Force Planning. Force planning is

associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is

primarily the responsibility of the Military

Departments, Services, and US Special

Operations Command (USSOCOM) and

is conducted under administrative control

that runs from the Secretary of Defense to

the Secretaries of the Military Departments

to the Chiefs of the Services. The Services

recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide

forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these

forces. USSOCOM has similar responsibility

for special operation forces, with the

exception of organizing Service components.

Force planning is outside the scope of this

publication. However, Chapter IV, “Assessment,” discusses how joint operation

planning influences force planning.

b. Joint Operation Planning. Joint

operation planning is the focus of this

document. It is directed toward the

employment of military forces within the

context of a military strategy to attain

specified objectives for possible contingencies. Joint operation planning is

conducted within the chain of command that

runs from the National Command Authorities

(NCA) to the combatant commanders and

is primarily the responsibility of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the combatant commanders. At the

national level, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the

Chiefs of the Services, is principally
I-2

Chapter I

Joint Pub 5-0

responsible for the unified planning to

employ the Armed Forces in support of

national security objectives. Joint operation

planning includes the preparation of plans

(e.g., operation plans (OPLANs) and

campaign plans) and orders (e.g., operation

orders (OPORDs)) by the combatant

commanders as well as those joint planning

activities that support the development of

these operation plans or orders. These

activities also incorporate the functions of

the Military Departments and Services.

Joint operation planning is a sequential

process performed simultaneously at the

strategic, operational, and tactical levels of

war.

• At the strategic level, joint operation

planning involves the development of

strategic military objectives and tasks

in support of national security strategy

and the development of force and

materiel requirements necessary to

accomplish those tasks. Strategy is the

art and science of developing and

employing armed forces and other

instruments of national power in a

synchronized fashion to secure national

objectives. The NCA translates policy

into national strategic military

objectives. These military objectives

facilitate theater strategic planning. A

geographic combatant commander

usually participates in discussions with

the NCA through the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and

coalition members. The combatant

commanders plan at the strategic level

of war through participation in the

development of national military

strategy, the development of theater

estimates, and theater strategies. The

theater strategy is thus an element that

relates to both US national strategy

and operational activities within the

theater.

• Joint operation planning at the operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.

The focus at this level is on operational

art--the employment of military forces

to attain strategic and/or operational

objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of

strategies, campaigns, major operations,

and battles. Operational art determines

when, where, and for what purpose

major forces will be employed and

should influence the enemy disposition

before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment

to or withdrawal from battle, and the

arrangement of battles and major

operations to achieve operational and

strategic objectives.

Figure I-1. Types of Military Planning

TYPES OF MILITARY PLANNING

FORCE PLANNING JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

MILITARY PLANNING

Focus of this Pub
I-3

Principles and Concepts

• At the tactical level of planning, tactics

is the employment of units in combat.

It includes the ordered arrangement and

maneuver of units in relation to each

other and to the enemy in order to use

their full potential. Tactics are employed

to fight and win engagements and battles.

3. Scope of Joint Operation

Planning

As shown in Figure I-2, joint operation

planning encompasses planning for the full

range of activities required for conducting

joint operations. These activities include the

mobilization, deployment, employment,

sustainment, and redeployment of forces.

a. Mobilization Planning. Primarily the

responsibility of the Services, mobilization

planning is directed toward assembling and

organizing national resources to support

national objectives in time of war and for

military operations other than war. Mobilization planning includes bringing all or part

of the Armed Forces of the United States to

the necessary state of readiness to meet the

requirements of the specific contingency.

Mobilization planning may include planning

for the activation of all or part of the Reserve

components, as well as assembling and

organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

Joint mobilization planning is discussed in

Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and

Integration.”

b. Deployment Planning. Deployment

planning is the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders in close coordination with the United States Transportation

Command (USTRANSCOM). Deployment

planning is planning to move forces and

their sustainment resources from their

original locations to a specific operational

area to conduct joint operations outlined

in a given plan. It involves planning for

the continental United States (CONUS),

intertheater (strategic), and intratheater

movement of forces and the required

resources to sustain them. Strategic

deployment planning focuses on the intertheater movement of forces and resources

using national, allied and coalition strategic

deployment capabilities.

c. Employment Planning. Employment

planning prescribes how to apply force/

forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are

developed by the combatant commanders

through their component commands.

Employment planning provides the foundation and determines the scope of mobilization,

deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning. Employment planning is

discussed in Chapter II, “Strategic Direction

and Integration.”

d. Sustainment Planning. Sustainment

planning is directed toward providing and

maintaining levels of personnel, materiel,

and consumables required to sustain the

planned levels of combat activity for the

estimated duration and at the desired level

of intensity. Sustainment planning is the

responsibility of the combatant commanders

in close coordination with the Services and

Defense agencies.

SCOPE OFJOINT

OPERATION PLANNING

Mobilization Planning

Deployment Planning

Employment Planning

Sustainment Planning

Redeployment Planning

Figure I-2. Scope of Joint

Operation Planning
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Joint Pub 5-0

e. Redeployment Planning. Redeployment planning is directed toward the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies

deployed in one area to another area, or to

another location within the area, or to the

CONUS for the purpose of further employment. The demobilization of Reserve forces

is considered during redeployment planning.

SECTION B.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR

PLANNING FOR THE

EMPLOYMENT OF

JOINT FORCES

4. General

Joint operation planning is an inherent

command responsibility established by law

and directive. This fundamental responsibility extends from the President and

Secretary of Defense as the NCA, with the

advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, to the combatant commanders

and their subordinates in the chain of

command. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff transmits the orders of the

President and the Secretary of Defense, as

directed by the Secretary of Defense, to the

combatant commanders. The Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff also oversees the

activities of combatant commands. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff function in the planning

process in their capacities as advisers to the

President, National Security Council (NSC),

and Secretary of Defense. Although not

within this branch of the chain of command,

the Military Services and their major

logistic agencies participate in joint

operation planning through execution of

their responsibilities to: (a) organize, train,

equip, and provide forces for assignment

to the combatant commands; (b) administer

and support those forces; and (c) prepare

plans implementing joint strategic mobility,

logistic, and mobilization plans. However,

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and the combatant commanders have

primary responsibility for planning the

employment of joint forces. Their responsibilities, as defined in statute and directive,

provide the framework for joint planning

doctrine.

The lift capability required to move units from one area to another, or to another

location within the area, is of primary importance in the development of

redeployment plans.
I-5

Principles and Concepts

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff

As the principal military adviser to the

President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense,

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is

assigned specific joint operation planning

responsibilities in the areas of strategic

direction, strategic planning, and joint

operation planning. In carrying out

functions, duties, and responsibilities, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will,

as he considers appropriate, consult with

and seek the advice of the other members

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant

commanders. Subject to the direction,

authority, and control of the President and

the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible

for (per United States Code, title 10):

a. Preparing military strategy and

assessments of the associated risk. This

includes the following:

• A national military strategy to support national objectives within policy

and resource level guidance provided

by the Secretary of Defense. Such

strategy will include the preparation of

broad military options with the advice

of the other members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the combatant

commanders.

• Net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the

United States and its allies as compared

to the capabilities of potential adversaries.

b. Assisting the President and the Secretary

of Defense in providing for the strategic

direction of the Armed Forces of the United

States, including the direction of operations

conducted by the combatant commanders.

c. Preparing strategic plans, including

plans that conform with resource levels

projected by the Secretary of Defense to be

available for the period of time for which

the plans are to be effective.

d. Preparing joint logistic and mobility

plans to support strategic plans and

recommending the assignment of logistic

and mobility responsibilities to the Military

Services.

e. Advising the Secretary of Defense on

the preparation of policy guidance for the

preparation and review of joint operation

plans.

f. Providing for the preparation and

review of joint operation plans that

conform to policy guidance from the

President and the Secretary of Defense.

g. Preparing joint logistic and mobility

plans to support joint operation plans and

recommending the assignment of logistic

responsibilities to the Armed Forces in

accordance with those plans, and ascertaining

the logistic support available to execute the

joint operation plans of the combatant

commanders (CINCs). The Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff will also review

and recommend to the Secretary of Defense

appropriate logistic guidance for the

Military Services that, if implemented, will

result in logistic readiness consistent with

approved plans.

h. Advising the Secretary of Defense on

the critical deficiencies and strengths in

force capabilities (including manpower,

logistic, and mobility support) identified

during the preparation and review of joint

operation plans and assessing the effect of

such deficiencies and strengths on meeting

national security objectives and policies and

on strategic plans.
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Joint Pub 5-0

i. Preparing integrated plans for military

mobilization.

j. Reviewing the plans and programs

of the combatant commanders to determine

their adequacy, consistency, acceptability,

and feasibility for performing assigned

missions.

k. Participating, as directed, in the

preparation of multinational plans for

military action in conjunction with the

armed forces of other nations.

6. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

are military advisers to the President, the

NSC, and the Secretary of Defense as

specified in subparagraphs a and b.

a. Advice and Opinions of Members

Other Than the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

• When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff provides advice to the President,

the NSC, or the Secretary of Defense,

any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

may submit advice or an opinion in

disagreement with that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or

advice or an opinion in addition to the

advice provided by the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. If a member

submits such advice or opinion, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

will present that advice or opinion at

the same time he presents his own

advice. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff will also, as he considers

appropriate, inform the President, the

NSC, and the Secretary of Defense of

the range of military advice and

opinion with respect to any matter.

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff will establish procedures to

ensure that the presentation of his own

advice to the President, the NSC, or the

Secretary of Defense is not unduly

delayed by the submission of the

individual advice or opinion of another

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Advice on Request. The other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

individually or collectively, in their capacity

as military advisers, will provide advice

to the President, the NSC, or the Secretary

of Defense on a particular matter when the

President, the NSC, or the Secretary requests

such advice.

7. Combatant Commanders

The combatant commanders are

responsible for the development and

production of joint operation plans.

During peacetime, they act to deter war and

prepare for war by planning for the

transition to and from war and military

operations other than war. During war,

combatant commanders plan and conduct

campaigns and military operations to

accomplish assigned missions. Their joint

operation planning responsibilities are

described in the Unified Command Plan

(UCP) and Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action

Armed Forces, (UNAAF),” and include

conducting operations within assigned

geographic or functional areas.

a. Combatant command responsibilities

include planning and conducting military

operations in response to crises, to include

maintaining the security of the command

and protecting the United States and its

possessions and bases against attack or

hostile incursion. The Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasks the combatant
I-7

Principles and Concepts

commanders to prepare joint operation

plans that may be OPLANs, OPLANs in

concept format (CONPLANs) with or

without time-phased force and deployment

data (TPFDD), or functional plans.

b. The other planning activities of the

combatant commanders include:

• Conducting strategic estimates.

• Assisting the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in developing national

military strategy.

• Formulating theater or functional

strategies in conformance with national

strategic plans.

• Developing campaign plans for conducting large-scale military operations.

• Preparing and executing joint OPORDs

assigned by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

• Identifying and planning for contingencies not specifically assigned by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• Preparing plans required to discharge

responsibilities described in the UCP

and the UNAAF.

SECTION C. CONCEPTS

8. Single Process

Planning for joint operations is continuous throughout the range of military

operations. As such, joint operation

planning employs an integrated process

entailing similar policies and procedures

during war and military operations

other than war, providing for orderly

and coordinated problem solving and

decisionmaking. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to

support the thorough and fully coordinated

development of deliberate plans. In crisis,

the process is shortened, as necessary, to

support the dynamic requirements of

changing events. In wartime, the process

adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities.

In all its applications, the basic process

remains fundamentally unchanged and

provides a consistent and logical approach

for integrating the activities of the NCA,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

combatant commanders, and all other

members of the Joint Planning and Execution

Community (JPEC) (see Figure I-3) in a

coherent planning and execution process to

attain military objectives.

9. Interoperable Joint Planning

and Execution System

Interoperable planning and execution

systems are essential to effective planning

for joint operations. The activities of the

entire planning community must be integrated through an interoperable joint system

that provides for uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by modern communications and

computer systems. The system designed to

provide interoperability is the Joint

Operation Planning and Execution

System (JOPES). JOPES encompasses the

entire JPEC as shown in Figure I-3. JOPES

is, first and foremost, policies and procedures that guide joint operation planning

efforts. JOPES is the focus of the Joint Pub

5-03 series. JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) provides computer support,

primarily for transportation planning

associated with deployment operations.
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Joint Pub 5-0

NSC CIA

STATE DEPARTMENT DOD

CJCS

COMBAT SUPPORT AGENCIES

SUPPORTED

COMMAND

SUBORDINATE

COMMANDERS

SUPPORTING

COMMANDS

JOPES

SUBORDINATE

UNIFIED

COMMANDS

JTF

USTRANSCOM

MTMC

AMC

MSC

COMPONENT

COMMANDS

ARFOR

AFFOR

NAVFOR

SOF

MARFOR

FUNCTIONAL

SERVICES

USA

USAF

USN

USMC

USCG

LOGISTICS AGENCIES

THE JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION

COMMUNITY

NCA

10. Joint Operation Planning

by the Combatant

Commanders

Joint operation plans are prepared and

implemented by the combatant commanders,

subordinate joint force commanders, and

other designated component commanders

who perform such planning under the

strategic and operational direction of the

NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. In peacetime, these designated

commanders prepare plans for areas and

missions as directed in the JSCP and other

such areas as determined by the combatant

commander. Those joint operation plans

Figure I-3. The Joint Planning and Execution Community

tasked in the JSCP for CJCS approval are

reviewed by the Joint Staff, Services, and

DOD agencies. All other plans are approved

by the CINCs. When directed by the NCA

through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, deliberate plans may be converted

to campaign plans and OPORDs and implemented by the combatant commanders.

During crisis situations for which an

approved OPLAN does not exist, the

combatant commanders, in concert with

members of the JPEC as appropriate, develop

courses of action (COAs) in response to

specific situations or tasking and prepare

campaign plans and joint OPORDs to

execute COAs approved by the NCA.
I-9

Principles and Concepts

11. Joint Operation Planning

and Plans Process

Joint operation planning can occur

anywhere within the range of military

operations and may be performed deliberately

or under crisis action conditions. Joint

operation planning is coordinated at the

national level to support Secretary of

Defense Contingency Planning Guidance

(CPG), strategic requirements in the

National Military Strategy, and emerging

crises. This is achieved by assigning

planning tasks and relationships among the

combatant commanders and apportioning or

allocating them the forces and resources

available to accomplish those tasks.

12. Types of Planning Processes

“Be audacious and cunning in your

plans, firm and persevering in their

execution, determined to find a glorious

end.”

Clausewitz: Principles of War, (1812)

Plans are proposed under different

processes depending on the focus of a

specific plan. The processes are labeled

either campaign, deliberate, or crisis action

planning; however, they are interrelated.

(See Figure I-4.) As an example, campaign

and crisis action planning for Operation

DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT

STORM were based on an existing (although

not yet completed) deliberate plan.

a. Campaign Planning. Combatant

commanders translate national and theater

strategy into strategic and operational

concepts through the development of

theater campaign plans. The campaign plan

embodies the combatant commander’s

strategic vision of the arrangement of

related operations necessary to attain

theater strategic objectives. Campaign

planning encompasses both the deliberate

and crisis action planning processes. If the

scope of contemplated operations requires

it, campaign planning begins with or

during deliberate planning. It continues

through crisis action planning, thus unifying

both planning processes. As stated in Joint

Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces

of the United States,” “Campaign planning

is done in crisis or conflict (once the actual

threat, national guidance, and available

resources become evident), but the basis and

framework for successful campaigns is laid

by peacetime analysis, planning, and

exercises.” The degree to which the amount

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESSES

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

DELIBERATE PLANNING CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

*

* Based on theater-unique conditions, campaign planning principles will be used to

develop plans and orders.

Figure I-4. Joint Operation Planning Processes
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Chapter I

Joint Pub 5-0

of work accomplished in deliberate planning

may serve as the core for a campaign plan

is directly dependent on the particular

theater and objectives. Campaign planning

is discussed in Chapter II, “Strategic

Direction and Integration.”

b. Deliberate Planning. Deliberate

planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available

information and using forces and resources

apportioned for deliberate planning by the

JSCP. It relies heavily on assumptions

regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is

implemented. Deliberate planning is

conducted principally in peacetime to

develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning

documents. It is accomplished in prescribed

cycles that complement other DOD planning systems and is performed in accordance with formally established procedures.

Deliberate planning is a highly structured

process that engages the commanders and

staffs of the entire JPEC in the methodical

development of fully coordinated, complex

planning for all contingencies and the

transition to and from war. Plans developed

during deliberate planning provide a

foundation for and ease the transition to

crisis resolution. Work performed during

the deliberate planning process allows the

JPEC to develop the processes, procedures,

and planning expertise that are critically

needed during crisis action planning.

Deliberate planning is discussed in Chapter

III, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution.”

c. Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

Crisis action planning is based on current

events and conducted in time-sensitive

situations and emergencies using assigned,

attached, and allocated forces and resources.

Crisis action planners base their plan on

the actual circumstances that exist at the

time planning occurs. They follow

prescribed crisis action planning procedures

that parallel deliberate planning, but are

more flexible and responsive to changing

events. The procedures provide for the

timely flow of information and intelligence,

rapid execution planning, and the communication of the decisions of the NCA to

combatant commanders. Crisis action

planning and crisis action planning procedures are discussed in Chapter III, “Joint

Operation Planning and Execution.”

13. Types of Plans and Orders

Plans and operation orders are prepared

according to deliberate, campaign and crisis

action planning procedures. (See Figure I-5.)

a. Types of Deliberate Plans. Deliberate plans are prepared under joint

procedures and in prescribed formats as

either an OPLAN, CONPLAN with or

without TPFDD, or functional plan.

Supporting plans are also developed in

support of each of these plans to satisfy the

supported CINC’s planning requirements.

The term “operation plan” is a generic term

that includes OPLANs, CONPLANs with

or without TPFDD, and Functional Plans.

• OPLANs. An OPLAN is a complete

and detailed operation plan containing

a full description of the concept of

operations and all required annexes

with associated appendixes. It identifies

the specific forces, functional support,

deployment sequence, and resources

required to execute the plan and

provides closure estimates for their

movement into the theater. An OPLAN

can be used as the basis of a campaign

plan (if required) and then developed

into an OPORD. OPLANs are normally prepared when:
I-11

Principles and Concepts

•• The contingency has a compelling

national interest, a specific threat, is

critical to national security, and

requires detailed prior planning.

•• The nature (large scale) of the

contingency requires detailed prior

planning for complex issues.

•• Detailed planning will contribute to

deterrence by demonstrating readiness

and resolve.

•• Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning. OPLANs

facilitate the transition to war and,

through the development of supporting

plans, establish the feasibility of the

plan’s concept of operations.

•• Detailed planning is necessary to

determine force and sustainment

requirements, determine available

resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

• CONPLANs

•• CONPLANs Without TPFDD. A

CONPLAN is an operation plan in an

abbreviated format that would require

considerable expansion or alteration to

convert it into an OPLAN, campaign

plan, or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept,

Annexes A-D and K, and other annexes

and appendixes either required by the

JSCP or deemed necessary by the

CINC to complete planning. CONPLANs

are generally developed to meet

common type missions that may

develop rapidly and require implementation of like action but under markedly

different circumstances; e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations. Unless

specified in the JSCP, detailed support

requirements are not calculated and

TPFDD files are not prepared.

•• CONPLANs With TPFDD. A

CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

TYPES OF JOINT OPERATION PLANS

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING

DELIBERATE PLANNING

OPLAN

CONPLAN

with/without

TPFDD

FUNCTIONAL

PLAN

CAMPAIGN

PLAN OPORD

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

Figure I-5. Types of Joint Operation Plans
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that requires more detailed planning

for phased deployment of forces.

Detailed planning may be required to

support a contingency of compelling

interest and critical to national security

but is not likely to occur in the near

term. These conditions require planning

associated with the warfighting/

employment aspects of the plan for a

clear understanding of the CINC’s

concept of operations. Phasing, centers

of gravity, and commander’s intent

enhance a clear understanding of what

forces are required and when they have

to be deployed (e.g., TPFDD) in order

to achieve the national objective. A

CONPLAN with TPFDD may also be

required where the primary purpose is

force movement planning in support

of alliances. In this case campaign

planning principles should be considered and incorporated to the maximum extent possible. Recognizing,

however, that the level of detail

contained in these plans is dependent

upon similarly detailed alliance planning that these CONPLANs support,

a campaign orientation may not be

possible in all cases.

• Functional Plans. Functional plans

involve the conduct of military

operations in a peacetime or permissive environment. These plans are

traditionally developed for specific

functions or discrete tasks (e.g.,

nuclear weapon recovery or evacuation, logistics, communications, or

continuity of operations) but may be

developed to address functional peacetime operations such as disaster relief,

humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping,

or counterdrug operations. Functional

plans will be written using the JOPES

procedures and formats specified for a

CONPLAN (without a TPFDD).

b. Supporting plans are prepared as

tasked by the supported combatant

commandersin support of their deliberate

plans. They are prepared by supporting

combatant commanders, subordinate joint

force commanders, component commanders,

or other agencies. These commanders or

agencies may, in turn, assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional

supporting plans. Employment plans

normally are the responsibility of the

commander who will direct the forces when

the supported plan is implemented. In many

cases, however, the political or military

situation cannot be clearly forecast, so

employment planning may be delayed until

circumstances require it. In the absence of

CJCS instructions to the contrary, the

combatant commanders responsible for the

supported plans will review and approve

supporting plans.

The time-phased deployment of properly

equipped forces to locations where they can best

be used is a challenge that planning must solve

to achieve national objectives.
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Principles and Concepts

c. Campaign Plans and Operation

Orders

• Campaign Plans. Campaign planning

can begin before or during deliberate

planning but is not completed until

crisis action planning. Campaign

planning and principles are the responsibility of the combatant commander.

Campaign plan models are contained

in proposed Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Joint

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for Campaign Planning.” Campaign

plans are discussed in Chapter II,

“Strategic Direction and Integration.”

• Operation Order. OPORDs are

prepared under joint procedures in

prescribed formats during crisis action

planning. They are in the form of a

directive issued by a commander to

subordinate commanders to effect the

coordinated execution of an operation.

14. Assigned, Apportioned, and

Allocated Forces

Joint operation planning uses uniform

categories to define the availability of forces

and resources for planning and conducting

joint operations. Availability categories are

assigned, apportioned, and allocated.

a. Assigned. Assigned forces and

resources are those in being that have been

placed under the combatant command

(command authority) of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense in his

“Forces For Unified Commands” memorandum. Forces and resources so assigned are

available for normal peacetime operations

of that command.

b. Apportioned. Apportioned forces

and resources are those assumed to be

available for deliberate planning as of a

specified date. They may include those

assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. They are

apportioned by the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less

than the forces actually allocated for

execution planning.

c. Allocated. Allocated forces and

resources are those provided by the NCA

for execution planning or actual implementation. The allocation of forces and

resources is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action

planning. In actual implementation,

allocated augmenting forces become

assigned or attached forces when they are

transferred or attached to the receiving

combatant commander.

15. Adequacy, Feasibility,

Acceptability, and

Compliance with Joint

Doctrine

Joint operation plans are developed in

conformance with the criteria of adequacy,

feasibility, acceptability, and compliance

with joint doctrine.

a. Adequacy. Adequacy determines

whether the scope and concept of planned

operations satisfy the tasking and will

accomplish the mission. Planning assumptions should provide guidelines for the

development of the plan to increase the

effectiveness of the concept of operations.

These assumptions must be reasonable and

consistent with strategic guidance.

b. Feasibility. Feasible plans accomplish assigned tasks with resources that

are available within the time frames

contemplated by the plan. Measures to

enhance feasibility include ensuring

effective employment schemes, sufficiency

of resources and capabilities, and maintaining alternatives and reserves.
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c. Acceptability. Acceptable plans are

proportional and worth the anticipated

cost. They provide for accomplishment of

the mission with available resources without

incurring excessive losses in personnel,

equipment, materiel, time, or position. They

are consistent with the law of war and are

militarily and politically supportable.

d. Compliance with Joint Doctrine.

Operation plans will comply with joint

doctrine as stated in approved and test

publications contained in the Joint Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate

joint doctrine when preparing operation

plans facilitates crisis action planning and

the execution of operations.

16. Coordination With Other

Planning

The validity and utility of joint operation

planning are enhanced when planning is

coordinated with other DOD planning

activities. Deliberate planning is cyclical,

and must be integrated with other planning

cycles whose primary objectives are the

definition and assessment of national

military strategy, the development of

military capabilities, and the management

of resources. Synchronized with other

planning, joint operation planning promotes

synergy and coherence in defense planning.

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM: THE EARLY YEARS

In the National Security Act of 1947 the first listed duty of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff was “to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction

of the military forces.” During the first five years following enactment of the

basic legislation the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharged their planning

responsibility in a rather unsystematic manner. Plans were drawn to meet

particular contingencies but they were not prepared or revised on a regular

schedule. The plans were not interrelated in a comprehensive system, nor

were they scheduled to provide timely guidance for the necessary annual

decisions concerning budgets, force levels, deployments, and mobilization.

Until late in 1949 the unsystematic approach to planning resulted from the

relatively small size of the Joint Staff. The National Security Act Amendments

of that year authorized enlarging the Joint Staff to 210 officers, more than

double the number previously assigned, but not many months later the

outbreak of the conflict in Korea imposed new requirements on the JCS

supporting organization. Thus, although the Director, Joint Staff, had submitted

recommendations for placing JCS planning on a systematic basis as early as

December 1949, a formal JCS “Program for Planning” was not adopted until

mid-1952.

On 14 July 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued JCS Memorandum of Policy

(MOP) 84, which called for the preparation each year of joint strategic plans

for the long-, mid-, and short-range. The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate

(JLRSE) would treat the five-year period starting on 1 July approximately five

years after the approval of the estimate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was

designed to translate US national policy into long-range supporting military

strategy and objectives and also provide guidance for research by identifying

desirable objectives for technical development.
I-15

Principles and Concepts

The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), the mid-range plan, would apply

to the four-year period beginning 1 July three years after approval by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. In addition to providing strategic guidance for the mid-range

period, this plan would provide specific guidance for the pre-D-day development

of the forces needed to support it and for the preparation of Service budget

requests for the fiscal year beginning two years after the plan was approved.

It would also provide guidance for mobilization planning by the Services and

the Munitions Board. The plan would have three sections. The first would

provide guidance for the preparation of the part of the annual budget dealing

with the development of the US and allied military forces needed during

peacetime and in military conflict short of total war. The second would guide

preparation of the part of the annual budget devoted to supporting the US and

allied forces necessary to conduct combat operations during the initial phase

of general war. The third would guide preparation of the part of the annual

budget addressed to developing the additional forces and resources needed

prior to D-day for the mobilization base and to meeting mobilization

requirements during 48 months of general war. To assure the orderly

implementation, the JSOP was to be ready for JCS consideration by 1 May

each year, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to give their final approval by 30

June.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the short-range plan, assumed

that D-day would occur on l July following JCS approval. It would guide the

employment of available US and allied military forces under conditions of peace,

in limited military conflict, and during the initial phase of general war. It would

also guide the expansion of US and allied forces during the first 48 months of

general war. The JSCP would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 1

November each year; they would complete action on it by 31 December.

From the first, this planning system failed to operate as anticipated. Under the

schedule established by Policy Memorandum 84, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

should have completed the following plans by the end of 1954: two Joint LongRange Strategic Estimates, covering the period from 1 July 1958 through 30

June 1964; two Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, for D-days of 1 July 1956 and

1 July 1957; and three Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans for fiscal years

1954,1955, and 1956. But the planning tasks had proved more exacting and

the problems of coordination more extensive than expected, and progress

had been hindered even more by the fundamental disagreements among the

Services over strategic concepts that the effort revealed. As a result, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had completed only one plan, the JSCP for FY 1955, and this

was finished more than three months behind schedule. Two plans were in

progress at the end of 1954: the next JSCP, for FY 1956, and a Joint Mid-Range

War Plan (JMRWP) for a D-day of 1 July 1957. No JLRSE existed even in draft

form and none was in sight within the near future. To complete the two plans

under preparation became the first order of business for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff in the field of strategic planning during the period 1955-1956.

SOURCE: Condit, Kenneth W., “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National

Policy, 1955-1956,” History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol VI,

Joint Staff Historical Office, 1992.
I-16

Chapter I

Joint Pub 5-0

SECTION D. ORGANIZATION

FOR PLANNING

17. Introduction

Two factors shape the framework in

which the planning and execution of joint

operations occur. The first is a permanently established national organization.

This structure consists of a hierarchy of

individuals and organizations with continuing responsibilities and relationships. A

second factor is the process through which

the permanent organization responds to

the requirements of a specific contingency.

18. National Structure

The national structure for joint operation

planning and execution includes the NCA

and the JPEC.

a. National Command Authorities.

The ultimate authority for national defense

rests with the President. The President is

assisted by the NSC, which is the principal

forum for the development of national

security policy. The Secretary of Defense

is the principal adviser to the President for

all matters relating to the Department of

Defense and is a member of the NSC. The

President and the Secretary of Defense

(or their duly authorized alternates or

successors) are the NCA, and they alone

are vested with the lawful authority to direct

the Armed Forces of the United States in

the execution of military action, including

the movement of forces or the initiation of

operations. In peacetime, the Secretary of

Defense issues policy guidance for joint

operation planning and reviews joint

operation plans with the assistance of the

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In

crisis and war, the Secretary plays a pivotal

role in crisis action planning and execution.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

is the principal military adviser to the NCA.

b. Joint Planning and Execution

Community. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in planning

for the mobilization, training, preparation,

movement, reception, employment, support,

and sustainment of forces assigned or

committed to a theater of war or theater of

operations are collectively termed the

JPEC. The JPEC consists of the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant

commands and their component commands,

subunified commands, joint task forces

(JTFs) (if established), and Defense

agencies (See Figure I-3.)

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with

the other members of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, manages the joint operation

planning process. In peacetime, the

Chairman assigns planning tasks and

resources, establishes planning relationships, and approves joint OPLANs.

In crisis and war, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff orchestrates the

development of strategic options and

COAs, resolves conflicts in resources,

provides recommendations and risk

assessments to the NCA, conveys NCA

decisions to the combatant commanders, and monitors the deployment and

employment of forces.

• Services. The Services and

USSOCOM provide interoperable

forces for assignment to the combatant

commanders and provide for logistic

support to the combatant commanders.

USSOCOM’s responsibility to equip

special operations forces (SOF) is

limited to special operations-peculiar

equipment, materiel, supplies and

services, and Service-common equipment specified in appropriate written
I-17

Principles and Concepts

agreements. The Services also maintain

reserve forces and prepare for the

expansion of capabilities in time of

war. For joint operation planning, the

Services and USSOCOM make recommendations regarding the apportionment of forces and resources

to the Joint Staff and, upon approval,

identify the specific units and support

to be allocated to the combatant

commanders’ joint operation plans.

The Services prepare detailed mobilization, sustainment, and mobility plans

containing the identification of the

actual forces and support allocated.

• Combatant Commands. The combatant commanders are principally

responsible for the preparation and

implementation of joint operation

plans. During peacetime, they

participate in the development of

national military and theater strategies

and develop operation plans in the

deliberate planning process. This is a

continual process. During crises, they

expand and refine existing plans or

develop new plans, and recommend

courses of action. When military

operations are required in time of

conflict, combatant commanders

conduct joint operations. Campaigns

are planned and conducted when the

contemplated military operations

exceed the scope of a single major joint

operation or battle.

• Service Component Commands. The

Service component commands perform joint planning functions both

within the chain of command and under

the administrative control of the

Military Departments. Within the

chain of command, the Service

component commands recommend the

proper force composition and employment of Service forces, provide Service

forces and support information for joint

planning, and prepare component-level

operation plans or OPORDs in support

of taskings assigned to the combatant

commands. Under administrative

control, the Service component commands prepare and execute administrative and logistic plans to support

operating forces.

AEGIS cruisers represent formidable capability and are integral to both deliberate

and crisis action planning.
I-18

Chapter I

Joint Pub 5-0

• Special Operations Component

Commands. Combatant commanders

with geographic responsibilities establish theater special operations commands (SOCs) as subordinate unified

commands to serve as the joint force

special operations component commander (JFSOCC) of their unified

command. Similarly, subordinate

joint force commanders may establish

a joint special operations task force

commander to serve as the JFSOCC of

a subordinate joint force. This individual typically exercises operational

control or tactical control over assigned

and attached forces in order to enhance

unity of effort of special operations

throughout the joint force. USSOCOM

provides similar support to the theater

SOCs that the Services provide to their

respective Service component commands within the combatant commands.

The JFSOCC reports to the joint force

commander (JFC) and is the principal

adviser for special operations within

the joint force. The JFSOCC provides

recommendations on organization and

employment considerations for SOF

and, when directed, prepares component-level operation plans. Joint Pub

3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special

Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-05.3,

“Joint Special Operations Operational

Procedures,” contain additional information on special operations.

• Subordinate Joint Commands. When

established, subunified commands and

JTFs perform joint planning functions

similar to those of the combatant

commands for specified missions or

designated joint operations areas.

Such functions are accomplished

under the direction of the authority that

established the subordinate command.

19. Organizing for Joint

Planning

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

organizes the JPEC for joint operation

planning by establishing supported and

supporting command relationships

between the combatant commands.

(Refer to Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action

Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and Joint Pub

3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” for a

more complete discussion of such command

relationships between combatant commands and between subordinate commands

of joint forces.) A supported commander

is identified for each planning task, and

supporting commanders, Services,

USSOCOM, and agencies are designated as

appropriate. This process provides for unity

of command in the planning and execution

of joint operations and facilitates unity of

effort within the JPEC.

a. Supported Commander. The supported commander is the combatant commander having primary responsibility for

all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP

or other joint operation planning authority.

In the context of joint operation planning,

this term refers to the commander who

prepares operation plans, campaign

plans, or operation orders in response to

CJCS requirements.

b. Supporting Commanders. Supporting commanders provide augmentation

forces or other support to a designated

supported commander or commanders

or develop supporting plans. Such

support is provided in accordance with the

principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2,

“Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),”

and may include the preparation of plans

that support the joint operation plan of the

supported commander. Under some

circumstances, a commander may be a
I-19

Principles and Concepts

supporting commander for one contingency

while being a supported commander for

another. USTRANSCOM, US Space

Command, US Strategic Command and

USSOCOM perform unique functions in

support of the other combatant commands.

For example, USTRANSCOM and its

transportation component commands plan

and execute the transportation aspects of

worldwide strategic mobility operations,

integrate deployment-related ADP systems,

and provide centralized wartime traffic

management.

SECTION E. PROCEDURES

FOR PLANNING JOINT

OPERATIONS

20. Introduction

The joint operation planning process

is a coordinated joint staff procedure

used by commanders to determine the best

method of accomplishing assigned tasks

and to direct the actions necessary to

accomplish those tasks. JOPES is used to

conduct joint planning. JOPES facilitates

the building and maintenance of OPLANs

and CONPLANs (with or without TPFDDs).

It aids in the development of effective

options and OPORDs through adaptation

of OPLANs or plan creation in a no-plan

scenario. JOPES provides policies and

procedures to ensure effective management

of planning operations across the spectrum

of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. As

part of the Worldwide Military Command

and Control System (WWMCCS), JOPES

supports the deployment and transportation

aspects of joint operation planning and

execution. (The Global Command and

Control System is replacing the WWMCCS.

See Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and

Integration,” paragraph 6.c.) Detailed

JOPES guidance is provided in the Joint Pub

5-03 series.

21. JOPES Functions

JOPES contains five basic planning

functions--threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of

action development, detailed planning, and

implementation as shown in Figure I-6.

a. Threat Identification and Assessment. This function involves detecting

actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decisionmakers, and

then determining threat capabilities and

intentions. This function supports all

organizational levels during planning and

execution. It gives information for strategic

planning and resource allocations at the

national level, by developing courses of

action and detailed planning at the operational level, and monitoring and adjusting

operations during execution.

b. Strategy Determination. This

function furnishes direction from the

national level for developing courses of

action. It assists the NCA and the CJCS in

formulating appropriate options to counter

the threat. Strategy determination involves

formulating politico-military assessments,

clearly defining political and military

objectives or end states, developing

JOPES FUNCTIONS

Threat Identification & Assessment

Strategy Determination

Course of Action Development

Detailed Planning

Implementation

Figure I-6. JOPES Functions
I-20

Chapter I

Joint Pub 5-0

strategic concepts and options, apportioning

forces and other resources, and formulating

planning guidance.

c. Course of Action Development.

COA development support includes JOPES

functions that help the supported commander’s staff develop and test alternative

COAs based on NCA/CJCS task assignments, guidance, and force and resource

allocation. This facilitates development of

the CINC’s Strategic Concept in deliberate

planning and the commander’s estimate in

crisis action planning.

d. Detailed Planning. This function

supports preparation of the approved

concept of operations or COA for implementation. It facilitates the following:

• Development and time-phasing of

detailed force lists and required

sustainment.

• Development of directives, schedules,

and orders.

• Determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host-nation

support, and transportation needs.

• Identification and resolution of force

and resource shortfalls and constraints.

The result is development of detailed, fully

integrated mobilization, deployment,

employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities based on the approved

concept of operations or COA.

e. Implementation. This function gives

decisionmakers the tools to monitor,

analyze, and manage plan execution.

Planning is a cyclic process that continues

throughout implementation. Of particular

importance is the ability to redirect forces,

adjust priorities, or influence events as the

situation unfolds. Implementation usually

ends with some type of replanning effort,

such as redeployment or redirection of

operations.
CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION

II-1

“In total war it is quite impossible to draw any precise line between military

and non-military problems.”

Winston Churchill: Their Finest Hour, (1949)

1. Introduction

This chapter describes planning that

provides the strategic context and

framework within which joint operations

are planned. The emphasis is on those joint

processes and plans that provide direction

and integrate the JPEC in a unified effort

for joint operation planning and execution.

SECTION A. NATIONAL

SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES

2. Introduction

This section discusses national-level

systems and processes that influence

planning for joint operations. The focus

is on the interrelationships and how other

national-level systems complement and

support the operation planning responsibilities identified in Chapter I, “Principles

and Concepts.” Four interrelated defense

planning systems (the NSC System,

the Planning Programming and Budgeting

System (PPBS), the Joint Strategic Planning

System (JSPS), and JOPES) directly

impact the joint operation planning

process. This section briefly describes the

NSC System, PPBS, and JSPS. Chapter III,

“Joint Operation Planning and Execution,”

discusses JOPES.

3. National Security Council

System

The NSC system is the principal forum

for deliberation of national security policy

issues requiring Presidential decision.

The NSC system provides the framework

for establishing national strategy and policy

objectives. The NSC develops policy

options, considers implications, coordinates

operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops

recommendations for the President, and

monitors policy implementation. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

discharges a substantial part of his statutory

responsibilities as the principal military

adviser to the President, the NSC, and the

Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly attends

NSC meetings and presents his views and

those of the other members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. The NSC prepares national

security guidance that, with Presidential

approval, implements national security

policy. These policy decisions provide the

basis for military planning and programming.
II-2

Chapter II

Joint Pub 5-0

4. Planning, Programming, and

Budgeting System

The PPBS is another major nationallevel system related to the joint operation

planning and execution process. The DOD

military strategy formulation and resource

management system develops and integrates

defense policy, military strategy, Service

programs, and the DOD budget. This

system’s ultimate objective is the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet

the warfighting needs of the combatant

commanders. The PPBS applies JSPS

derived national military strategy and

recommended forces, and translates them

into budgetary requirements to be presented

to Congress. The PPBS encompasses

three phases:

a. Planning. The planning phase of the

PPBS articulates the national policy,

military strategy, and the force requirements to support the national defense. In

response to guidance from the President and

the Secretary of Defense regarding projected

budget levels and national security objectives, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, in coordination with the other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, uses

the JSPS to develop national military

objectives, strategy, recommended

forces, options, assessments, and evaluation of risk for the President’s consideration. Following review by the Secretary of

Defense, the President considers the

recommendations of the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and makes his

strategy and option decisions, which are

then incorporated in the development of the

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The

DPG is developed by the Under Secretary

of Defense for Policy in close coordination

with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the combatant commanders, the

Services, and others. The final DPG is

reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services,

the combatant commanders, and other

members of the Defense Planning Resources

Board (DPRB) before being forwarded to

the Secretary of Defense for approval and

publication. The DPG is the link between

planning and programming as it articulates

national defense strategy and appropriate

force structure requirements, together with

programming guidance sufficient to accomplish national security objectives to the

Military Departments, the Defense agencies,

and USSOCOM for the development of their

Program Objective Memorandums (POMs).

b. Programming. The programming

phase of the PPBS focuses on the development of POMs and the integration of

those POMs into a coherent defense

program to support the warfighting

requirements of the combatant commanders.

With the exception of USSOCOM’s special

operations-unique requirements, the

combatant commanders provide their

requirements to the Services through their

Service components and identify their

highest priority needs to the Secretary of

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff by means of the Integrated

Priority List (IPL). The Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM

develop their POMs based on the combatant

command requirements and strategic

concepts and guidance contained in the

DPG. The POMs express the Services’ total

requirements and include assessments of

risk, as well as descriptions of how well the

POMs support the requirements of the

combatant commanders. The Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses the overall

balance and adequacy of the composite

POM force and support levels in view of

approved strategy and the requirements of

the combatant commanders and documents

his assessment in the Chairman’s Program

Assessment (CPA). In a coordinated effort,

program issues are identified by the
II-3

Strategic Direction and Integration

combatant commanders and DPRB members

and are resolved by the DPRB. The results

are promulgated in the Secretary’s Program Decision Memorandum (PDM).

The PDM is the link between programming and budgeting.

c. Budgeting. The final phase of the

PPBS is budgeting. Once the PDMs are

received, budget estimates are prepared

by each of the Military Departments, the

Defense agencies, and USSOCOM and

submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The

Defense budget is reviewed by the Office

of the Secretary of Defense and the Office

of Management and Budget to ensure that

it is consistent with fiscal guidance.

Changes to the budget are documented

in Program Budget Decisions (PBDs).

During this final phase of budgeting, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant

commanders assess the impact of PBDs on

warfighting capabilities. Their concerns are

presented to the Secretary of Defense.

Final changes are incorporated with

previous PBDs to establish the DOD

portion of the President’s budget, which is

submitted to Congress for funding. When

the President signs the congressional

appropriations act into law, the Services,

Defense agencies, and USSOCOM execute the budget to procure forces and

capabilities.

WAR PLANNING BY THE WAR COLLEGE

Under Major General Leonard Wood’s reorganization of the War Department

General Staff in September of 1910, the War College Division (WCD) was given

responsibility for preparing plans for the national defense, operating the Army

War College (AWC), and handling military intelligence.

At this time, war plans were developed through the interaction of two groups,

the War Plans Committee in the WCD and student planning committees in the

AWC. Student committees dealt with various geographical areas and were

responsible for working out details within the existing general plans. In so

doing, they assisted the War Plans Committee, which was charged with

finalizing the contingency plans.

These plans considered various wars that might hypothetically occur.

Sometimes, however, developments in the real world added particular urgency

to such planning.

The situation in Mexico in early 1912, for example, prompted a review and

revision of the existing war plan. This plan, in brief, called for a main effort to

be made along the axis Vera Cruz-Mexico City. A secondary thrust was to be

made from the north, from Laredo to Monterrey. Finally, static defense was to

be organized along the entire 1600 mile common border. Several problem

areas surfaced during the course of this review. For instance, the plan called

for 435,000 American troops. There was much head scratching among the

planners as to where these forces would come from since only 35,000 could

be provided from the regular Mobile Army units in the continental United States.

The planners were further discommoded when the Commissary General,

Brigadier General Henry G. Sharpe, pointed out that there were no provisions

in the plan for the establishment and operation of a logistical base and line of

communications.
II-4

Chapter II

Joint Pub 5-0

Wood, as Chief of Staff of the Army, was not happy over how his own planning

system actually worked in practice. Neither the proposed plan nor the

commentary on it from the special staff sections pleased him. They showed

the General Staff in a bad light and suggested that it was an inadequate planning

agency. He, therefore, pointed out to the President of the AWC, who also

served as Chief of the WCD, that the present plan needed work and that he

would immediately give it his attention.

SOURCE: Hixson, John A., “War Planning by the War College,” published in

Vignettes of Military History, Vol. II, US Army Military History Research

Collection. Office of Military History, Army War College, 1976.

5. Joint Strategic Planning

System

The JSPS is the primary formal means

by which the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the

other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and the combatant commanders, carries out

his statutory responsibilities required by

title 10, US Code, 6 April 1991, and further

delineated in DOD 5100.1, 25 September

1987. CJCS memorandum of policy

(MOP) 7, to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01,

provides policy and procedures governing

the operation of the JSPS. The purpose and

outputs of the JSPS are summarized in

Figure II-1. The central process of the JSPS

is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The

JSR is a continuous process that assesses

the strategic environment for issues and

factors that affect the National Military

Strategy (NMS) in the near-term or the

long-range. It continuously gathers information; examines current, emerging and

future issues, threats, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures

and military missions; and reviews and

assesses current strategy, forces, and

national policy objectives. The JSR

facilitates the integration of strategy, joint

operation planning, and program assessment. When significant changes or factors

in the strategic environment are identified,

JSR issue papers are presented to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant

commanders. These papers will provide

entering arguments for proposed changes to

the NMS, Joint Planning Document (JPD),

and JSCP and solicit the Chairman’s guidJOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) discharges

strategic planning responsibilities

Series of complementary documents

CJCS military advice to National Command Authorities

CJCS formal input to Planning, Programming, and

Budgeting System

Figure II-1. Joint Strategic Planning System
II-5

Strategic Direction and Integration

ance for changing the military strategy if

required. The four products of the JSPS are:

a. National Military Strategy. The

NMS provides the advice of the Chairman, in coordination with the other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and

the Secretary of Defense on the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained

force structure required to attain national

security objectives. The NMS is designed

to assist the Secretary of Defense in the

preparation of the DPG and to guide the

development of the JSCP. Following

Secretary of Defense review, the NMS is

forwarded to the President. The NMS may

be used to determine the CJCS position on

matters of strategic importance for use in

NCA-directed actions.

b. The Joint Planning Document. The

JPD supports the NMS by providing

concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of

Defense for consideration during preparation of the DPG. Published as stand-alone

documents addressing specific functional

areas, JPD volumes are coordinated and

collaborated with the Chiefs of the Services,

combatant commanders and Defense

agencies, and serve as a conduit for input

to the DPG.

c. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

The JSCP provides guidance to the

combatant commanders and the Chiefs of

the Services to accomplish tasks and

missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant

commanders, based on military capabilities

resulting from completed program and

budget actions. The JSCP provides a

coherent framework for capabilities-based

military advice provided to the NCA. It is

reviewed at least biennially for required

changes.

d. Chairman’s Program Assessment.

The CPA assists the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling his

responsibility to provide advice to the

Secretary of Defense on how well the

POMs conform to established priorities.

It also provides assistance to the Secretary

in decisions concerning the defense

program subsequent to receipt of the POMs.

The CPA summarizes the views of the

Chairman on the balance and capabilities

of the POM force and the support levels

required to attain US national security

objectives.

e. Joint Strategic Planning System

Interactions. The JSPS is a flexible and

interactive system intended to provide

supporting military advice to the DOD

PPBS and strategic guidance for use in

JOPES. The JSPS provides the means for

the Chairman, in coordination with the other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the combatant commanders, to review the

national security environment and US

national security objectives. Additionally,

it provides the means to evaluate the threat;

assess current strategy and existing or

proposed programs and budgets; and

propose military strategy, programs, and

forces necessary to achieve those national

security objectives in a resource-limited

environment consistent with policies and

priorities established by the President and

the Secretary of Defense. The JSPS is also

a formal means by which the other members

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders carry out some of their

statutory responsibilities. Therefore, the

JSPS process must establish the opportunity

for their timely and substantive participation

in the development of every JSPS document.

As programs are developed and resources

allocated, JSPS products and JSPSrelated documents provide a means to

evaluate capabilities and to assess the

adequacy and risk associated with the

programs and budgets of the Military
II-6

Chapter II

Joint Pub 5-0

Departments and Defense agencies and,

where appropriate, propose changes to

those programs and budgets in conformity

with strategic priorities. Figure II-2

illustrates the various JSPS products and

JSPS-related document interfaces.

f. JSPS Plans and Documents. The

JSPS comprises plans and documents that

are described in CJCS MOP 7, to be revised

as CJCSI 3100.01, and will not be superseded by other documents without the

express approval of the Chairman, in

coordination with the other members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

g. JSPS-Related Assessments and

Guidance. In addition to the JSPS plans

and documents included in CJCS MOP 7,

to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01, assessments

are performed and planning guidance is

issued to support those plans and documents.

The following is a list of assessments and

guidance that contain critical JSPSrelated information and other key

documents.

Figure II-2. Joint Strategic Planning System Interfaces

CHAIRMAN'S

GUIDANCE

Top-Down guidance

JOINT PLANNING

DOCUMENT

CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM

ASSESSMENT

Adequacy/Capability

Assessment of POM Force

NCA GUIDANCE

CINC/SERVICE/

AGENCY

SECDEF,

DEFENSE

PLANNING &

RESOURCES

BOARD

SECDEF

PRESIDENT

SECDEF

POMs

OPLAN

DEVELOPMENT

PREPAREDNESS

ASSESSMENT

DEFENSE

PLANNING

GUIDANCE

(DPG)

CONTINGENCY

PLANNING

GUIDANCE (CPG)

Strategic Vision

Direction

Military Strategy

Future Environments

Security Needs

Options

Assessments

Strategic Direction

Military Strategy

Strategic Landscape

Security Needs

Programs/Budgets

Risk Evaluation

Strategic Direction

Strategic Plans

Operation Plans

Logistic Plans

Net Assessments

CINC Requirements

CINC Requirements

Net Assessments

Programs/Budgets

Risk Evaluation

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

NATIONAL MILITARY

STRATEGY

JOINT STRATEGY

REVIEW

JOINT STAFF, SERVICE,

CINC EFFORT

continuous assessment of the

Strategic EnvironmentWhat has changed?

JOINT STRATEGIC

CAPABILITIES PLAN

Guidance & Tasking for

Deliberate Planning
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Strategic Direction and Integration

• Joint Military Net Assessment

(JMNA). The JMNA is prepared by

the Chairman in coordination with the

other members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the combatant commanders.

It is submitted annually to the Secretary

of Defense for his approval and

submission to Congress in conjunction

with the submission of the defense

budget. The JMNA fulfills the

Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty

to submit to Congress an annual

comprehensive net assessment of the

defense capabilities and programs of

the Armed Forces of the United States

and its allies compared with those of

potential adversaries.

• Logistics Sustainability Analysis

(LSA). The LSA of an operation plan

will be completed during the development and maintenance of the combatant commanders' operational plan.

The LSA provides a broad assessment

of key logistic capabilities by:

documenting the results of a process

that assures an integrated evaluation of

key logistic capabilities, identifying

logistic support short-falls and assessing the risks, and providing a baseline

for the Joint Monthly Readiness

Review (JMRR) process. The LSA

builds upon assessments, which are

formed in collaboration with the

Services, supporting commanders, and

DOD Agencies. The LSA assesses the

combined support capabilities represented by the four pillars of logistics:

material, logistic support forces,

infrastructure, and lift. The LSA

integrates the assessments of the

individual pillars of logistics by

optimizing and balancing their

contributions as both enablers and

constrainers of logistic support.

Preparation of this analysis is a two step

process. It begins with the Services and

DOD Agencies assessment of their

ability to support the CINC's plan,

followed by the CINC's assessment of

the inputs along with supported commander's analysis of theater requirements and capabilities.

• Defense Planning Guidance. The

DPG furnishes the Secretary of

Defense’s programming and fiscal

guidance to the Military Departments for development of department

POMs for the defense planning

period. The DPG includes major

planning issues and decisions, strategy

and policy, strategic elements, the

Secretary’s program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate,

the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and

a series of studies. The DPG is a major

link between JSPS and the PPBS.

• Contingency Planning Guidance.

The CPG fulfills the Secretary of

Defense’s statutory duty to provide

annually to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for joint operation planning.

The Secretary provides this guidance

with the approval of the President after

coordination with the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG is the

primary source document for the JSCP.

SECTION B. SUPPORTING

SYSTEMS

6. Introduction

Systems that facilitate joint operation

planning are the WWMCCS and the

Service planning systems. These systems

and their relationship to joint planning are

described below.

a. Worldwide Military Command and

Control System. WWMCCS is the system

that provides the means for operational

direction and technical administrative
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support for command and control of US

military forces. It supports joint operation

planning and implementation. WWMCCS

furnishes the multipath channel of secure

communications that transmits tactical

warning and assessment intelligence to the

NCA and direction from the NCA to the

combatant commanders. WWMCCS

consists of the National Military Command

System (NMCS), the command, control,

communications, and computer (C4)

systems of the combatant commanders, the

WWMCCS-related management and

information systems of the Military

Departments, the C4 systems of the Service

component commands, and the C4 support

systems of DOD agencies. Information

flow is enhanced by formalized reporting

structures defined in the Joint Pub 1-03

series and by standard, compatible ADP C4

systems connected in a network of reporting

systems and data bases defined in the Joint

Pub 6-03 series. The ADP system supports

four basic functional areas: resource and

unit monitoring, conventional planning and

execution, nuclear planning and execution,

and tactical warning and attack assessment

intelligence.

b. WWMCCS Intercomputer Network

(WIN). WIN provides planners with the

means to review, update, and transfer

data rapidly between WWMCCS locations. It permits real-time secure communications. WIN enables commanders

and staffs to work critical compartmented

plans and OPORDs by innate characteristics

of user IDs and other system safeguards.

Within WIN, the telecommunications

network permits access to computer

resources at separate WWMCCS locations

and use of those resources. The WIN file

transfer service supports the exchange of

large volumes of data such as TPFDD files

between members of the JPEC. The WIN

Teleconference enables interconnected

members of the JPEC to confer and exchange

textual information simultaneously.

c. Global Command and Control

System (GCCS). The GCCS is replacing

WWMCCS. GCCS furnishes warfighters

at all levels with needed connectivity, rapid

access, flexibility, and simplicity in

operations for a comprehensive, interoperable, global command and control

capability.

d. National Military Command System. The NMCS is the priority component of WWMCCS that supports the

NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

exercising their military command

responsibilities, including planning and

executing joint operations. It includes the

National Military Command Center

(NMCC), the Alternate National Military

Command Center, the National Emergency

Airborne Command Post, and other

command centers designated by the

Secretary of Defense. It also includes the

communications connecting those command

centers with the headquarters of the

combatant commanders, Services, and other

commands and agencies that support joint

operation planning via the WWMCCS. The

NMCS also provides coordination with

activities outside the Department of

Defense (e.g., the White House Situation

Room and the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) Operations Center) that have operation planning and execution functions. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is

responsible to the Secretary of Defense for

operating the NMCS to meet the needs of

the NCA.

7. Service Planning Systems

The Secretary of each Military Department is responsible for the associated

Services’ efficiency and its preparedness for

military operations. Each has Serviceunique planning systems that support

planning for joint operations. These

systems incorporate strategic guidance from

Joint Staff documents, program guidance
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Strategic Direction and Integration

from Military Department channels, and

promulgate the guidance of the Chiefs of

the Services to the component commanders

for joint operation planning. The Service

component commanders receive guidance

through the chain of command and the

administrative control channel. The

component commanders are the common

link in these two and support the combatant

commanders. The Service planning systems are documented in the publications

described in the following subparagraphs.

a. Army Mobilization and Operations

Planning and Execution System

(AMOPES). The AMOPES is an integrated planning and execution system used

to ensure that Army capabilities are

available to support the combatant commanders during military operations. It

provides a single source document for

issuing policies, procedures, guidance, and

planning assumptions for all levels of

mobilization, as well as for military

operations without the involuntary callup

of the Reserve component forces. It

provides policy and guidance for follow-on

activities of military operations to include

redeployment and demobilization.

AMOPES provides US Army mobilization

and operations planning guidance, including the availability, apportionment, and

employment of US Army forces. Annex R

of AMOPES describes the US Army Crisis

Action System and its relationships to CJCS

crisis action planning.

b. Navy Capabilities and Mobilization

Plan (NCMP). The NCMP is the basic US

Navy document for transmitting mobilization and operations planning guidance and

for allocating forces. It provides direction

and guidance to second-echelon commands,

including the US Coast Guard, responsible

for developing logistic support and mobilization plans.

c. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan

(MCP) and Marine Corps Mobilization

Management Plan (MPLAN). The MCP

and MPLAN are the basic US Marine Corps

operations planning documents. The MCP

presents Marine Corps capabilities to joint

force commanders and staffs; provides

guidance and information to joint force

commanders and staffs on the deployment

The National Emergency Airborne Command Post provides the National Command

Authorities with back-up capability to exercise their military command

responsibilities.
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and employment of Marine Corps forces;

identifies Marine Corps forces apportioned

to the unified commanders in the JSCP; and

fuses guidance, information, planning, and

capabilities from Services' planning and

joint planning channels and imparts it to

joint force commanders and staffs. The

MPLAN provides policies, procedures, and

responsibilities for the expansion of the

Marine Corps to specific levels of mobilization. MPLAN Volume III contains a

prioritized list of Selected Marine Corps

Reserve units needed to augment and

reinforce the Marine Expeditionary Forces

for major regional contingencies. It also

contains information on base, station, and

CONUS requirements to support mobilization and Fleet Marine Force deployments.

It is intended to provide information for

deliberate planning and to provide a

predictable basis for refining requirements

during crisis action.

d. Air Force War and Mobilization

Plan (WMP). The Air Force WMP,

published in six volumes, provides major

commands and US Air Force staff agencies

with consolidated guidance concerning the

support of combatant forces and mobilization planning. The WMP provides consolidated lists of OPLANs, lists of combat and

support forces available to support

OPLANs, planned positioning and use of

aircraft forces in support of joint OPLANs,

basic planning factors, and base use.

e. Coast Guard Capabilities Manual

(CG CAPMAN) and Coast Guard Logistic Support and Mobilization Plan (CG

LSMP). The CG CAPMAN and CG LSMP

support the NCMP and contain operational

guidance and force apportionment for

contingencies and war.

SECTION C. JOINT

STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

PLAN

8. Introduction

The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the planning

efforts of the combatant commanders in

pursuit of national strategic objectives

and to integrate their efforts with those

of the remainder of the JPEC. The JSCP

is the link between strategic planning

accomplished through the JSPS and joint

operation planning conducted through

JOPES. The major factors used in developing the JSCP are shown in Figure II-3. It is

the primary vehicle through which the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

exercises his responsibility to provide for

the preparation of joint operation plans. The

JSCP and its annexes, as well as the

administrative procedures governing its

preparation, are described in detail in CJCS

MOP 7, to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01.

The JSCP initiates deliberate joint

operation planning by:

a. Assigning planning tasks to the

combatant commanders.

b. Apportioning major combat forces

and resources.

c. Issuing planning guidance to integrate

the joint operation planning activities of the

entire JPEC within a coherent, focused

framework.

9. JSCP Base Document

The JSCP base document provides:
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Strategic Direction and Integration

a. A summary of the current national

military strategy for deterrence and war

and a statement of general strategic

taskings to combatant commanders. The

JSCP provides the strategic direction

required to coordinate the efforts of the

combatant commanders in the attainment

of national military objectives.

b. Planning guidance to the combatant

commanders governing the development

of plans.

c. Planning guidance to the Services

and Combat Support Agencies for supporting the combatant commanders in the

execution of assigned objectives and tasks.

d. A list of major combat forces expected

to be available during the planning period

under various conditions of mobili-zation

and apportionment of those forces to the

combatant commanders for planning.

e. Service- and force-unique information and limitations on the use of specific forces as required to meet plan taskings.

f. An intelligence estimate for planning.

This estimate is an appraisal of available

intelligence relating to a specific situation

or condition with a view to determining the

courses of action open to the enemy or

potential enemy and the order of probability

of their adoption. It will support activities

during the JSCP planning cycle.

DEVELOPING THE JOINT STRATEGIC

CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP)

PRINCIPAL DIRECTIONS

Regional orientation

Peacetime engagement

Flexibility

Deterrence and defense

Crisis response options

Strategic agility

Decisive force

SELECTED STRATEGIC

CONCEPTS

JSCP

National Military

Strategy

Joint Planning

Document

Defense Planning

Guidance

PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

Realistic

Manageable workload

Simple and understandable

Priorities for planning

and training

Contingency Planning Guidance

Guidance

Tasks

Figure II-3. Developing the JSCP
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10. JSCP Supplemental

Instructions

The supplemental instructions to the

JSCP provide additional planning guidance, capabilities, and amplification of

taskings for planning in specified functional

areas. JSCP supplemental instructions are:

a. CJCSI 3110.02, “Intelligence.”

b. CJCSI 3110.03, “Logistics.”

c. CJCSI 3110.04, “Nuclear.”

d. CJCSI 3110.05, “Psychological.”

e. CJCSI 3110.06, “Special Operations.”

f. CJCSI 3110.07, “Nuclear, Biological,

Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents;

and Herbicides.”

g. CJCSI 3110.08, “Mapping, Charting,

and Geodesy.”

h. CJCSI 3110.09, “Command and

Control Warfare (C2W).”

i. CJCSI 3110.10, “Command, Control,

Communications, and Computer Systems.”

j. CJCSI 3110.11, “Mobility.”

k. CJCSI 3110.12, “Civil Affairs.”

l. CJCSI 3110.13, “Mobilization.”

m. CJCSI 3110.14, “Military Operations

Other Than War (MOOTW).”

n. CJCSI 3110.15, “Special Technical

Operations.”

SECTION D. JOINT

MOBILIZATION PLANNING

11. Introduction

Mobilization is the process by which

the Armed Forces or part of them are

brought to a state of readiness for war

or other national emergency. Depending

on the threat to be countered, mobilization

may range from manpower augmentation

of the active force to widespread involvement of the nation’s economic, political, and

industrial resources. Planning and executing mobilization activities are accomplished primarily by the Military Departments and Services. However, operation

planning for major contingencies relies

heavily on timely mobilization of the

necessary forces and capabilities. This

mandates that joint operation planning

and mobilization planning be closely

integrated. This section describes joint

mobilization concepts and plans through

which such integration is achieved. A

comprehensive discussion of joint

mobilization doctrine is contained in Joint

Pub 4-05, “Mobilization Planning.”

12. Responsibilities

The foundation of joint mobilization

concepts and procedures is established by

statute. The National Security Act, as

amended, delineates broad responsibilities

for mobilization.

a. Military Departments and Services.

Each of the Military Departments plans

for the expansion of its peacetime

components to meet the needs of crisis or

war and submits coordinated mobilization

information to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Each Service plans for the

expansion of its peacetime components in

accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans.
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Strategic Direction and Integration

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff performs specific mobilization

responsibilities. With the assistance of the

Joint Staff and in coordination with the

other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the Chairman prepares integrated plans

for military mobilization; provides guidance for use by the Military Departments,

the Services, and the Defense agencies in

the preparation of their respective detailed

plans; and submits general strategic

recommendations for the development of

industrial mobilization programs to the

Secretary of Defense.

13. Integration Concepts

The DOD Master Mobilization Guide

(MMG) governs coordinated planning

for mobilization within the Department

of Defense. The MMG and the DPG

provide the guidance of the Secretary of

Defense relative to mobilization planning

to support joint operations. The MMG

identifies mobilization responsibilities

and describes tasks to be performed in

peacetime and at the time of mobilization.

It also delineates functional relationships

among DOD components for mobilization

planning and execution. The Chairman and

the other members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff amplify the Secretary’s guidance by

issuing their guidance for use by the

Services and developing integrated plans

for joint mobilization. Based on the

guidance of the Secretary of Defense, the

Military Departments and the Services are

required to develop coordinated mobilization plans for assembling, preparing,

moving, and supporting mobilized forces

and capabilities. The process for integrating mobilization planning with joint

operation planning is outlined below:

a. The JSCP tasks the combatant commander to develop deliberate plans and

apportions forces and resources for planning. It contains Service-provided

availability times for major combat

forces designated to augment combatant

commands.

b. The mobilization annex of the JSCP

provides guidance to the Services for

developing supporting mobilization plans

for those contingencies that require mobilization.

c. The combatant commanders, either

directly or through their component

commands, identify requirements not

listed in the JSCP but required to support

joint operations. Identified forces are

provided by the Services.

d. The combatant commander develops OPLANs or OPORDs incorporating

Service-provided mobilization information.

e. The Services develop detailed

mobilization plans to support the OPLANs

of the combatant commanders.

f. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff reviews the OPLANs of the

combatant commanders to ascertain the

effect of mobilization capabilities on the

adequacy and feasibility of joint OPLANs.

14. Joint Industrial

Mobilization Planning

Process (JIMPP)

The goal of the Industrial Preparedness Program (IPP) is to provide an

industrial base capable of producing

critical military items essential to the

readiness and sustainment needs of the
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Armed Forces of the United States across

the range of military operations. The

JIMPP is the deliberate planning tool that

provides documented industrial mobilization plans and analytical processes to

respond to a crisis or war. The process

unifies industrial mobilization planning and

analytical efforts by focusing on warfighting requirements and capabilities.

The JIMPP is used by the Joint Staff,

Services, and Defense agencies to:

a. Estimate the capability of the industrial

base to support execution of OPLANs

developed through deliberate planning or

COAs derived through crisis action planning.

b. Establish a baseline national industrial mobilization capability assessment

based on the potential military demands

identified through the JSPS.

c. Coordinate the industrial mobilization planning of the Services.

d. Identify and provide DOD industrial

mobilization requirements to the IPP.

SECTION E. EMPLOYMENT

PLANNING

15. Introduction

This section discusses the role of employment planning in joint operation planning,

describes employment planning considerations and functions at the national, theater,

and subordinate command levels, and

introduces new employment planning

concepts for incorporation into JSCP-tasked

plans.

16. Employment Planning

Employment is the strategic, operational,

or tactical use of forces within an operational

area. Employment planning defines how

existing and projected capabilities will be

used to attain objectives. It involves

military actions required to pursue warfare

successfully: evaluating enemy actions and

capabilities, devising and selecting COAs,

and positioning forces and resources to

create advantages in combat and exploit

resulting opportunities to attain objectives

despite enemy resistance. Employment

planning influences and drives planning

in the other mission areas of joint

operation planning. Mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment

planning support the concepts and requirements developed through employment

planning. Detailed planning for the actual

use of forces and materiel within the

operational area is normally accomplished

as part of joint operation planning by

subordinate commanders, such as component and subordinate joint force

commanders. However, in the broader

context of joint operation planning, each

level of command plans for the employment

of its available forces and resources to

achieve specified objectives.

a. National Level. At the national level,

strategic plans provide for the global and

theater employment of national capabilities

to achieve national security and military

objectives. This planning considers global

requirements, national capabilities, and the

theater strategies and campaigns of the

combatant commanders. The JSCP describes

strategic concepts, defines supporting

regional objectives, and apportions forces

and resources among the combatant commanders to attain prioritized national

objectives. National strategic planning for

mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and

redeployment is based on the planned

employment of forces in the individual

theaters.

b. Theater Level. Employment planning at the theater level focuses on
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Strategic Direction and Integration

organizing and positioning assigned and

augmenting forces for the conduct of

theater campaigns or major operations

to attain strategic and/or theater objectives.

The combatant commander’s strategic

employment concept defines objectives,

organizes forces, arranges and prioritizes

operations, assigns tasks, and prioritizes the

movement of forces and support to and

within the theater. It provides strategic

direction to the employment planning of

subordinate commands and, when appropriate, supports alliance, coalition or

treaty plans for the employment of

multinational forces. Theater strategic

employment planning provides the foundation for the concept of operations for

joint OPLANs prepared by the combatant

commander and the framework for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and

redeployment planning.

c. Subordinate Level. Subordinate

commands, such as component commands

and subordinate joint force commands,

normally accomplish the detailed employment planning for the conduct of

joint operations to perform missions

tasked by the combatant commanders.

When part of an alliance or a coalition

organization, detailed employment planning

is performed within the multinational or

bilateral chain of command in support of

multinational strategies, campaigns, and

missions. Under these circumstances,

multinational employment plans become

the basis for joint OPLANs prepared

within the US chain of command that plan

for moving, preparing, and sustaining US

forces dedicated to multinational operations.

17. Key Planning Concepts

To facilitate coordination of strategic

priorities, deliberate and crisis action

plans should contain key planning

concepts that enhance understanding of

the combatant commander’s strategic

vision and the sequence of operations

needed to attain the commander’s

theater objectives. These concepts are

shown in Figure II-4.

Because of the ambiguous nature of the

threat in some plans, all of these concepts

may not be applicable. Where possible,

they should at least be considered and

identified in the plan.

KEY PLANNING CONCEPTS

Combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.

Orientation on the strategic and operational centers of gravity of the

threat.

Protection of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity.

Phasing of operations (such as prehostilities, lodgment, decisive

combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities), to

include the commander's intent for each phase.

To the extent possible, plans should incorporate the following concepts of

joint operation planning doctrine:

Figure II-4. Key Planning Concepts
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DESERT STORM CAMPAIGN PLAN

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, in his autobiography, “It Doesn’t Take a Hero,”

recounts the events of November 14, 1990, the day he briefed his senior

commanders on his campaign plan to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait during

Desert Storm. After asserting that this would be the most important meeting

of the war, General Schwarzkopf acknowledges the twenty-two generals who

were in attendance, commenting “that no other theater commander in history

had ever been blessed with such an array of talent,” and describes his battle

plan...

“The first thing that we’re going to have to do is, I don’t like to use the word

‘decapitate,’ so I think I’ll use the word ‘attack,’ leadership, and go after his

command and control. Number two, we’ve got to gain and maintain air

superiority. Number three, we need to cut totally his supply lines. We also

need to destroy his chemical, biological, and nuclear capability. And finally,

all you tankers, listen to this. We need to destroy—not attack, not damage,

not surround—I want you to destroy the Republican Guard. When you’re done

with them, I don’t want them to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don’t

want them to exist as a military organization.’ For the benefit of the Vietnam

vets—practically the whole room—I emphasized that ‘we’re not going into this

with one arm tied behind our backs. We’re not gonna say we want to be as

nice as we possibly can, and if they draw back across the border that’s fine

with us. That’s bullshit! We are going to destroy the Republican Guard.’ If we

were ordered to go on the offensive, we would be free to use our full military

strength and attack across the border into Iraq.

‘I’m now going to tell you all some stuff that not very many people know about,

in Washington particularly,’ I said, and described the four phases of attack

we’d mapped out for Desert Storm: strategic bombing first; then gaining control

of the Kuwaiti skies; then bombing Iraqi artillery positions, trench lines, and

troops. At last I turned to the plan for the ground offensive—a fully realized

version of the envelopment I’d proposed to [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, General] Powell three weeks before. Using the map, I showed the

commanders where I wanted them to maneuver their units. The plan covered

a huge area: in order to make sure we fought the campaign on our own terms,

we had extended the boundary of the battlefield westward so that it

encompassed a rectangle roughly the size of Pennsylvania. Saddam’s forces

were concentrated at the eastern end, in and around Kuwait. Desert Shield

forces would keep them from moving south; to their east was the natural barrier

of the gulf; to their north was the Euphrates, which would become a natural

barrier once [Joint Force Air Component Commander, Lieutenant General]

Chuck Horner’s air force dropped the bridges that crossed it; and to the west

were hundreds of miles of desert that would become our main avenue of attack.

‘I anticipated,’ I said, ‘a four-pronged ground assault.’ Along the Saudi-Kuwaiti

border near the gulf, I wanted two divisions of U.S. Marines and a Saudi task

force to thrust straight into Kuwait, with the objective of tying up Saddam’s

forces and eventually encircling Kuwait City. Nodding in [U.S. Marine

Commander in DESERT STORM, Lieutenant General, Walter E.] Boomer’s

direction, I said, ‘I’ll leave it to Walt Boomer to figure out how he wants to do
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Strategic Direction and Integration

that, but it also gives him the capability to come in from the sea with his

amphibious forces.’ I’d reserved a second corridor, in the western part of

Kuwait, for a parallel attack by the pan-Arab forces led by two armored divisions

from Egypt and another Saudi task force. Their objective would be the road

junction northwest of Kuwait City that controlled Iraqi supply lines. Eventually

they would enter Kuwait City and have the dirty job of fighting the Iraqis house

to house if necessary.

Meanwhile from the west would come the U.S. Army’s power punch. Looking

at [Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General] Gary Luck, I

indicated a section of Saudi-Iraqi border more than three hundred and fifty

miles inland. ‘I am probably going to send the XVIII Airborne Corps very deep,’

I said, showing how I wanted Luck’s divisions to race north from that area to

the Euphrates, blocking the Republican Guard’s last route of retreat. Once

that sector was secured I told him, he would hook his forces east, ready to

join the attack on the main body of the Iraqi army. Finally I turned to

[Commander, VII Corps, Lieutenant General] Fred Franks. ‘I think it’s pretty

obvious what your mission is going to be’, I said, moving my hand along the

desert corridor just to the west of Kuwait, ‘attack through here and destroy

the Republican Guard.’ I wanted to pin them with their backs against the sea,

and then go in and wipe them out. I couldn’t resist adding, ‘Once they’re

gone, be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad. Because there isn’t

going to be anything else out there.’ I allowed that taking Baghdad would

probably be unnecessary, because by then the war would have ended.

After a question-and-answer session I tried to set a tone for the coming months.

‘Let me leave you with one thought, guys. In order for this to succeed—because

the enemy is still going to outnumber us—it is going to take, for lack of a

better word, killer instinct on the part of all of our leaders out there.’ I pointed

again at the map. ‘What I’m saying is when the Marines hit the wire right here

and when the Army forces hit the wire over here...we need commanders in the

lead who absolutely, dearly understand that they will get through. And that

once they’re through they’re not going to stop and discuss it. They are going

to go up there and destroy the Republican Guard. I cannot afford to have

commanders who do not understand that it is attack, attack, attack, attack,

and destroy every step of the way. If you have somebody who doesn’t

understand it, I would strongly recommend that you consider removing him

from command and putting in somebody that can do the job.

‘Because, let’s face it, the prestige of the United States military is on our

shoulders. But more importantly, the prestige of the entire United States of

America rests on our shoulders. There isn’t going to be anybody else in this

thing except us. There are no more forces coming. What we got is what’s

going to do the job. And for our country we dare not fail. We cannot fail, and

we will not fail. Anybody in here who doesn’t understand that, get out of the

way. Any questions? Okay, good luck to you. You know what needs to be

done.”

SOURCE: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre: It Doesn’t

Take a Hero, Bantam Books, 1992.
II-18

Chapter II

Joint Pub 5-0

SECTION F. CAMPAIGN

PLANNING

18. Introduction

The theater campaign plan embodies

the combatant commander’s vision of the

arrangement of related major operations

necessary to attain strategic objectives.

Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major

operation. Campaign planning is appropriate

to both deliberate and crisis action planning.

19. Campaign Plans

A campaign is a series of related joint

major operations that arrange tactical,

operational, and strategic actions to

accomplish strategic and operational

objectives within a given time and space.

A campaign plan describes how a series

of joint major operations are arranged

in time, space, and purpose to achieve a

strategic objective. It orients on the

enemy’s centers of gravity; achieves

simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, spacebased assets, and special operations forces;

clearly defines an end state that constitutes

success, failure, mission termination, or exit

strategy; and serves as the basis for

subordinate planning. Two of the most

important aspects of this plan are the

synchronized employment of forces and

the concept for their sustainment.

Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater

strategy. They translate strategic concepts

into unified plans for military action by

specifying how operations, logistics, and

time will be used to attain theater strategic

objectives. Through theater campaign

plans, combatant commanders define

objectives; describe concepts of operations

and sustainment; arrange operations in time,

space, and purpose; organize forces;

establish command relationships; assign

tasks; and synchronize air, land, sea, space,

and special operations, often in coordination

with allies, interagency operations, nongovernmental operations, and even United

Nations operations. Campaign planning

is a primary means by which combatant

commanders arrange for strategic unity

of effort and through which they guide

the planning of joint operations within

their theater. It communicates the commander’s purpose, requirements, objectives,

and concept to subordinate components and

joint forces, as well as to supporting

commands and Services, so that they may

make necessary preparations. In addition,

by means of a campaign plan, combatant

commanders give the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information

needed for intertheater coordination at the

national level.

“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is

requisite to foresee everything the

enemy may do, and be prepared with

the necessary means to counteract it.

Plans of the campaign may be modified

ad infinitum according to the

circumstances, the genius of the

general, the character of the troops,

and the features of the country.”

Napoleon Il: Maxims of War, (1831)

20. Strategic Integration

Campaign plans are used by national

authorities as well as by subordinates.

Submission of a well-conceived campaign

plan to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff gives the combatant commander’s

estimated time-phased force requirements

for consolidation with other combatant

command forecasts at the national level.

The campaign plan may be used to
II-19

Strategic Direction and Integration

influence the joint strategic planning

process. As an example, during Operation

DESERT SHIELD, Commander in Chief,

US Central Command’s campaign plan

briefing to the NCA for the expulsion of

Iraqi forces from Kuwait identified the

requirement for, and resulted in, the

deployment of a second Army corps to

Southwest Asia.

21. Types of Campaign Plans

a. Theater Campaign. Campaigns are

conducted by joint forces. They may

follow more than one line of operation.

Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and

subordinate operations into a coherent

whole. Additional guidance is available

in Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint

Operations.” Procedures for campaign

planning will be published in Joint Pub

5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Campaign Planning.” This

pub is currently in development.

b. Subordinate Campaign. Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate

campaign plans or operation plans that

accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives.

Thus, subordinate unified commands

typically develop campaign plans to

accomplish assigned missions. Also, JTFs

can develop and execute campaign plans

if missions require military operations of

substantial size, complexity, and duration

and cannot be accomplished within the

framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should

be consistent with the strategy, theater

guidance, and direction developed by the

combatant commander and should contribute to achieving combatant command

objectives (see Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for

Joint Operations”).

22. Relationship of Campaign

Planning to Joint

Operation Planning

Campaign planning has its greatest

application in the conduct of combat

operations, but can also be used in situations

other than war. Campaign plans guide the

development of supporting OPLANs or

OPORDs and facilitate national-level

coordination of strategic priorities and

resource allocations. The use of campaign

planning is refocused as the scale of

contemplated operations and the imminence

of hostilities decreases. During peacetime

deliberate planning, combatant commanders

prepare joint OPLANs, including campaign

plans, in direct response to taskings in the

JSCP. Tasking for strategic requirements

or major contingencies may require the

preparation of several alternative plans for

the same requirement using different sets

of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans

are based on reasonable assumptions and

are not normally completed until after

the NCA selects the course of action

during CAP. Deliberate plans may include

elements of campaign planning, however

these elements will have to be updated as

in any deliberate plan used at execution.

Execution planning conducted is for the

actual commitment of forces when conflict

is imminent. It is based on the current

situation and includes deployment and

initial employment of forces. When a crisis

situation develops, an assessment is

conducted that may result in the issuance

of a CJCS WARNING ORDER. COAs are

developed based on an existing OPLAN or

CONPLAN, if applicable. The combatant

commander proposes COAs and makes any

recommendations when the Commander’s

Estimate is forwarded to the NCA. The

NCA select a COA and, when directed, the
II-20

Chapter II

Joint Pub 5-0

Chairman issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER.

The combatant commander now has the

essential elements necessary for finalizing

the construction of a campaign plan using

the approved COA as the centerpiece of the

plan.

23. Elements of Theater

Campaign Plans

Theater campaign plans are time

sensitive, iterative, and adaptive, depending

on the mission and forces available.

Fundamentals of campaign plans are shown

in Figure II-5.

Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment

for achieving multinational, national, and theater strategic

objectives.

Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.

Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special

operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational,

nongovernmental , private voluntary, or United Nations forces, as

required.

Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent and

operational focus.

Identify any special forces or capabilities the enemy has in the

area.

Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity

and provide guidance for defeating them.

Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity

and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.

Sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted

simultaneously in depth.

Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate

command relationships.

Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define

what constitutes success, including conflict termination

objectives and potential posthostilities activities.

Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks,

objectives, and concepts to subordinates.

Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as

required and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS

Figure II-5. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans
II-21

Strategic Direction and Integration

result of formal agreements between two

or more nations for broad, long-term

objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty

Organization is one example. These

alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage

“combined” is often used as a synonym

(though not technically defined as such) for

all multinational operations. A coalition

is an ad hoc arrangement between two

or more nations for common action, for

instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi

aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War,

1990-1991.

27. Multinational Planning

Planning for multinational operations

is accomplished in national and international channels. Collective security

goals, strategies, and combined OPLANs

are developed in accordance with individual

treaty or alliance procedures. Deliberate

joint operation planning for multinational

operations is performed through national

channels in accordance with US doctrine

and procedures. Therefore, much of the

information and guidance provided for joint

operations is conceptually applicable to

alliance and coalition multinational problems

as well; the fundamental issues are much

the same for both circumstances. Through

national planning channels, host-nation

support and contingency mutual support

agreements are developed to facilitate

joint operations. Coordination of these

separate planning channels is accomplished

at the national level through established

coalition bodies and at the theater and

operational levels by commanders of

combatant commands or other subordinate

joint US commands, respectively, who are

responsible within both channels for

operation planning matters.

a. Strategic Integration. In support of

each treaty or alliance, a hierarchical

organization of bilateral or multilateral

24. Summary

If a campaign plan is required by the size,

complexity, and anticipated duration of

military involvement, it will be all encompassing for the theater. Subordinate

campaign plans can be created by JTFs

or subunified commands if required. All

other planning is for operations supporting

the campaign. Campaign plans are

applicable to the deliberate, as well as the

crisis action planning process when the

assumptions, mission, forces, and threat

centers of gravity are reasonably well

defined (for example in Korea), and

provide the strategic and operational

framework within which more detailed

OPLANs are prepared. Procedures for

campaign planning will be provided in Joint

Pub 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning.”

SECTION G.

MULTINATIONAL PLANNING

25. Introduction

Collective security is a strategic goal of

the United States, and joint operation

planning will frequently be accomplished

within the context of treaty or alliance

operation planning for multinational

operations. There is no single doctrine for

multinational action, and each alliance or

coalition develops its own protocols and

operation plans. Consequently, US planning for joint operations must accommodate

and complement the requirements of the

Nation’s collective security arrangements.

26. Multinational (Alliance or

Coalition) Operations

Multinational operations is a collective

term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations,

typically organized within the structure of

a coalition or an alliance. An alliance is a
II-22

Chapter II

Joint Pub 5-0

bodies is established to define objectives

and strategy and to coordinate strategic

direction for planning and executing

multinational operations. Generally, this

organization parallels the US organization

for national security, and the NCA and their

senior military and civilian staffs participate

in appropriate bodies of the alliance or treaty

organization. Through dual involvement in

the national and international security

processes, US leadership provides the means

to integrate national and theater strategic

planning with that of the treaty or alliance

organizations. Within the alliance or treaty

structure, US participants ensure that objectives and strategy complement US interests and are compatible with US capabilities. Within the US national structure,

US participants ensure that alliance or treaty

commitments are reflected in national military

strategy and are adequately addressed in

strategic direction for joint operation planning.

b. Theater Integration. Joint operation

planning is integrated with alliance or coalition planning at the theater or operational level by the commander of US national forces dedicated to the alliance or

coalition military organization. Normally,

this will be the combatant commander or

the commander of the subunified command

or JTF responsible for the geographic area

within which multinational operations are

to be planned and executed. These commanders function within the US chain of

command and that of multinational organizations. Within alliance and coalition

organizations, they command or support the

designated commander of multinational

forces and plan, as appropriate, for multinational employment in accordance with

strategic direction and guidance emanating

from treaty or alliance leadership. Within

the US chain of command, they command

joint US forces and prepare joint operation

plans in response to taskings from the NCA

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. These taskings include developing

joint OPLANs to support each treaty or

alliance commitment within the geographic

area of responsibility and planning for

unilateral US contingencies within the same

area. In this dual capacity within the US

and alliance or coalition chains of command,

the US commander coordinates alliance or

coalition planning with joint operation

planning.

c. Bilateral Planning. When directed

by the NCA through the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, designated US

commanders participate directly with the

armed forces of other nations in preparing

bilateral OPLANs. Bilateral operation planning involves the preparation of combined,

mutually developed and approved plans

governing the employment of the forces of

two nations for a common contingency.

Bilateral planning may be accomplished

within the framework of a treaty or alliance

or in the absence of such arrangements.

Bilateral planning is accomplished in

accordance with specific guidance provided

by the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

28. Review of Alliance and

Coalition Plans

US joint strategic or operation plans

prepared in support of alliance and

coalition objectives and plans are developed, reviewed, and approved exclusively

within US operational channels. They

are not shared in total with alliance or

coalition partners. Selected portions and/

or applicable planning and deployment data

may be released in accordance with

applicable CJCS Instructions. Coordination

with alliance and coalition planning is
II-23

Strategic Direction and Integration

attained through US representatives and

commanders within each collective security

organization and through the formal

exchange of information in mutually

devised forums, documents, and plans. The

review and approval of alliance and

coalition plans is accomplished in accordance with unique procedures adopted

by each alliance or coalition organization

French troops prepare for a formation of the multinational coalition, which was

formed to defeat Iraqi aggression against Kuwait during Operation DESERT

SHIELD/STORM.

and may or may not include separate US

review or approval. Bilateral operation

plans routinely require national level US

approval. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System,

Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures),” describes review and approval

procedures for joint and multinational

operation plans.
II-24

Chapter II

Joint Pub 5-0

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER III

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

III-1

Figure III-1. Joint Publication 5-0 Series Hierarchy

“A good plan violently executed Now is better than a perfect plan next week.”

George S. Patton, Jr.: War As I Knew It, (1947)

1. Introduction

Joint operations are planned and implemented through prescribed processes

that integrate the NCA, the Chairman and

the other members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, and combatant commanders within

a unified planning system. This chapter

describes the formal process for planning

joint operations and the planning and

execution systems that govern such activities.

This publication is broad in scope. More

detailed guidance can be found in other

Joint Pub 5-0 series publications as shown

in Figure III-1.

DOCTRINE FOR PLANNING JOINT

OPERATIONS

KEYSTONE PUBLICATION

JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0 SERIES HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 5-0

JOINT OPERATION

PLANNING AND

EXECUTION SYSTEM

VOLUME I

PLANNING POLICIES

AND PROCEDURES

These joint pubs are being

revised. They are being

updated and republished as

CJCS instructions.

JP 5-03.1

JP 5-03.11

JP 5-03.2

JP 5-03.21

JOINT TACTICS,

TECHNIQUES, AND

PROCEDURES FOR

JOINT CAMPAIGN

PLANNING

JOINT PUB 5-00.1

JOINT TASK FORCE

PLANNING GUIDANCE

AND PROCEDURES

JOINT PUB 5-00.2

JOINT PUB 5-03.1

JOINT OPERATION

PLANNING AND

EXECUTION SYSTEM

VOLUME III

AUTOMATED DATA

PROCESSING SUPPORT

JOINT PUB 5-03.3

JOINT PUB 5-03.21

JOINT OPERATION

PLANNING AND

EXECUTION SYSTEM

VOL II, SUPPLEMENTAL

PLANNING FORMATS

AND GUIDANCE

(CLASSIFIED)

*

*

JOINT OPERATION

PLANNING AND

EXECUTION SYSTEM

EXECUTION PLANNING

JOINT PUB 5-03.11 *

*

JOINT OPERATION

PLANNING AND

EXECUTION SYSTEM

VOLUME II

PLANNING FORMATS

AND GUIDANCE

JOINT PUB 5-03.2 *

- CJCSI 3122.01

- CJCSM 3122.02

- CJCSI 3122.03

- CJCSI 3122.04
III-2

Chapter III

Joint Pub 5-0

SECTION A. OVERVIEW

2. General

The JOPES functions described in

Chapter I, “Principles and Concepts,”

emphasize joint operation planning for

deterrence and effective transition to

war. The preparation of joint operation

plans by combatant commanders in

response to strategic direction from the

NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, taken in conjunction with other

DOD planning cycles, constitute the

national strategy for military response to the

full spectrum of potential threats identified

through the national security planning

process. Therefore, JOPES provides the

means to respond to emerging crisis

situations or transition to war through

rapid, coordinated execution planning

and implementation.

3. JOPES Planning Processes

JOPES is the principal system within the

Department of Defense for translating

policy decisions into operation plans and

OPORDs in support of national security

objectives. To accomplish this task, JOPES

consists of a deliberate and a crisis

planning process as shown in Figure III-2.

The focus of this chapter is on these two

processes.

Figure III-2. JOPES Deliberate Planning Process and Crisis Action

Planning Process Functional Alignment

JOPES DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS AND CRISIS

ACTION PLANNING PROCESS FUNCTIONAL ALIGNMENT

DELIBERATE

PLANNING

PROCESS

CRISIS ACTION

PLANNING

PROCESS

APPROVED FOR

FURTHER PLANNING

PHASE I

INITIATION

PHASE II

CONCEPT

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE III

PLAN

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE IV

PLAN

REVIEW

PHASE V

SUPPORTING

PLANS

ALERT

ORDER EXECUTE

ORDER

PHASE I

SITUATION

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE III

COA

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE IV

COA

SELECTION

PHASE V

EXECUTION

PLANNING

PHASE II

CRISIS

ASSESSMENT

PHASE VI

EXECUTION

THREAT

IDENTIFICATION &

ASSESSMENT

STRATEGY

DETERMINATION

COA

DEVELOPMENT DETAILED

PLANNING

WARNING

ORDER

JSCP

IMPLEMENTATION
III-3

Joint Operation Planning and Execution

SECTION B. DELIBERATE

PLANNING PROCESS

“In times of peace the general staff

should plan for all contingencies of war.

Its archives should contain the

historical details of the past and all

statistical, geographical, topographical,

and strategic treatises and papers for

the present and future.”

Jomini: Precis de l’ Art de la

Guerre, (1838)

4. Introduction

This section describes how the joint

operation planning process is applied

during peacetime to develop joint

OPLANs, CONPLANs (with and without

TPFDD) or functional plans to support the

national military strategy. Deliberate

planning involves the participation of the

entire JPEC in a coordinated planning effort

to counter potential threats with available

resources.

5. Planning Cycles and

Schedules

The process for joint operation planning

begins when a requirement is identified and

continues until the requirement no longer

exists. Deliberate planning is performed

in a continuous cycle that complements

and supports other DOD planning cycles.

A new deliberate plan usually begins with

the publication of a change to the JSCP. The

deliberate planning cycle usually begins

with the publication of a new JSCP. In

coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff

develops and issues a planning schedule that

coordinates plan development activities and

established submission dates for joint

OPLANs.

6. Deliberate Planning Process

Deliberate planning is accomplished in

five phases: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and

supporting plans. See Figure III-3.

a. Initiation. Planning tasks are

assigned to supported commanders,

forces and resources are apportioned, and

planning guidance is issued during this

phase. The JSCP links the JSPS to joint

operation planning, identifies broad

scenarios for plan development, specifies

the type of plan required (i.e., OPLANs,

CONPLANs [with or without TPFDDs] or

functional plans) and provides additional

planning guidance as necessary. A

combatant commander may also initiate

deliberate planning by preparing plans not

specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities.

b. Concept Development. The concept

development phase of deliberate planning

is accomplished by the supported

commander responsible for developing the

plan. Concept development follows six

steps: mission analysis, planning

guidance development, staff estimates,

commander’s estimate, CINC’s Strategic

Concept, and CJCS review. See Figure

III-4. The assigned task is analyzed, a

mission statement is developed, and

planning guidance is prepared and issued

to the staff as well as subordinate and

supporting commands in step one. During

step two, alternative COAs are developed

and distributed for staff estimates of

supportability to be completed in step three.

In step four, alternative COAs are wargamed, analyzed, and compared to produce

a commander’s estimate containing the

commander’s decision on the preferred
III-4

Chapter III

Joint Pub 5-0

PHASE I, INITIATION

PHASE II, CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

PHASE III, PLAN DEVELOPMENT

PHASE IV, PLAN REVIEW

PHASE V, SUPPORTING PLANS

CINC RECEIVES PLANNING TASK FROM CJCS

MAJOR FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

MISSION STATEMENT IS DEDUCED

SUBORDINATE TASKS ARE DERIVED

CINC'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT DEVELOPED

THE PRODUCT: A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

FORCES SELECTED AND TIME-PHASED

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS COMPUTED

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENTS SIMULATED/ANALYZED

SHORTFALLS IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED

OPERATION PLAN COMPLETED

THE PRODUCT: A COMPLETE OPLAN

OPLAN/CONPLAN REVIEWED & APPROVED BY CJCS

CINC REVISES PLAN IAW REVIEW COMMENTS

THE PRODUCT: AN APPROVED PLAN

SUPPORTING PLANS PREPARED

THE DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

Figure III-3. The Deliberate Planning Process

COA. The selected COA is then expanded

into the CINC’s Strategic Concept that is

submitted to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

When approved, the CINC’s Strategic

Concept provides the basis for plan

development.

c. Plan Development

• A CJCS-approved concept of operations is expanded into a complete

OPLAN during the plan development

phase of deliberate planning. Plan

development is accomplished by a
III-5

Joint Operation Planning and Execution

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHASE

INITIATION PHASE

PURPOSE:

To analyze assigned tasks to determine mission and

to prepare guidance for subordinates.

PURPOSE:

To issue CINC's Guidance, inform all planners &

participants, and develop courses of action.

PURPOSE:

To determine supportability of courses of action by

appropriate staff directors.

PURPOSE:

To formally compare courses of action for CINC to

develop the strategic concept.

PURPOSE:

To formally develop and distribute CINC's decision

and guidance to all participants.

PURPOSE:

To determine if scope and CONOPS are sufficient to

accomplish tasks, assess validity of assumptions,

and evaluate compliance with CJCS taskings and

guidance.

PLAN DEVELOPMENT PHASE

STEP 1

MISSION

ANALYSIS

STEP 2

PLANNING

GUIDANCE

STEP 3

STAFF

ESTIMATES

STEP 4

COMMANDER'S

ESTIMATES

STEP 5

CINC'S

CONCEPT

STEP 6

CJCS CONCEPT

Figure III-4. Concept Development Phase

designated supported commander,

normally a combatant commander,

with the assistance of supporting and

subordinate commanders. The supported commander guides the plan

development process by publishing a

Letter of Instruction (LOI) to coordinate the activities of the commands

and agencies involved. Eight steps can

be identified in the plan development

phase as shown in Figure III-5. These

eight steps provide a logical planning

structure within which the forces and

resources required to execute the

concept of operations are progressively

identified, sequenced, and coupled

with transportation capabilities to

produce a feasible OPLAN. This
III-6

Chapter III

Joint Pub 5-0

phase of deliberate planning is

heavily dependent on JOPES ADP

to produce the TPFDD.

• Although the plan development phase

generally follows a prescribed sequence,

shortfall identification is performed

throughout the process. The supported commander continuously identifies limiting factors and capabilities

shortfalls as plan development progresses. Where possible, the commander resolves the shortfalls

through planning adjustments and

coordination with component and

supporting commanders. If the shortfalls cannot be reconciled and the

resources provided by the JSCP or the

Services are inadequate to perform the

assigned task, the supported commander

reports these limiting factors and his

assessment of the associated risk to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the Chiefs of the Services

consider shortfalls and limiting factors

reported by the supported commander

and coordinate resolution. HOWEVER, THE COMPLETION OF

ASSIGNED PLANS IS NOT

DELAYED PENDING THE

RESOLUTION OF SHORTFALLS.

If shortfalls cannot be resolved within

the JSCP time frame, the completed

plan will include a consolidated

summary and impact assessment of

unresolved shortfalls.

• One of the most time-consuming and

intensively managed aspects of plan

development is constructing the

OPLAN TPFDD. A TPFDD is the

computer-supported data base portion of an OPLAN, necessary to

complete Appendix 1 to Annex A of

the OPLAN. See Figure III-6. The

supported commander provides

TPFDD development guidance and Figure III-5. Plan Development Phase

PLAN DEVELOPMENT

PHASE

Steps listed above are not necessarily

sequential and may occur simultaneously *

STEP 1

FORCE PLANNING

STEP 2

SUPPORT PLANNING

STEP 3

NUCLEAR

PLANNING

STEP 7

TPFDD REFINEMENT

STEP 8

DOCUMENTATION

STEP 4

TRANSPORTATION

PLANNING

STEP 6

TRANSPORTATION

FEASIBILITY

ANALYSIS

STEP 5

SHORTFALL

IDENTIFICATION

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

PHASE

CONOPS

PLAN REVIEW PHASE

OPLAN
III-7

Joint Operation Planning and Execution

milestones to the JPEC through a

TPFDD LOI. TPFDD development

involves the sequential development

and refinement of forces, logistics, and

transportation data in a process collectively termed TPFDD refinement. A

TPFDD normally contains assigned,

augmentation, and supporting forces

with accompanying supplies. As

TPFDD refinement progresses, an

estimate of resupply and personnel

requirements to sustain the force based

on consumption factors, computer

modeling, and past experience is added.

In addition, a fully refined TPFDD

must be made transportation feasible.

Therefore, USTRANSCOM plays a

key role in the refinement process by

hosting and coordinating refinement

conferences and assessing transportation

feasibility.

•• Forces refinement is conducted in

coordination with supported and

supporting commanders, Services, the

Joint Staff and other supporting

agencies to confirm that forces are

sourced and tailored within JSCP

guidance and to assess the adequacy of

the combat support and combat service

support sourced by the Services.

USTRANSCOM provides sealift and

airlift capability estimates based on lift

apportionment throughout the process

to ensure transportation feasibility.

•• Logistic refinement is conducted

primarily by the Services, the Defense

Logistics Agency (DLA), and Service

component commanders under the

overall direction of the supported

commander. Logistic refinement

confirms the sourcing of logistic

requirements in accordance with JSCP

guidance and assesses the adequacy of

resources provided through support

planning. USTRANSCOM coordinates

on logistic planning matters and hosts

conferences dedicated to logistic

planning and refinement.

•• Transportation refinement simulates

the planned movement resources to

ensure that the plan is transportation

feasible. USTRANSCOM uses

computer simulation to determine

TIME-PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT DATA

A computer data base

Construction requires intensive planner data

manipulation using JOPES automated data

processing tools

Transportation oriented

When generated, contains resupply cargo and

personnel planning data

Priority and sequencing of deploying forces

Deployment routing of forces

Detailed cargo descriptions

Passenger data

Figure III-6. Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
III-8

Chapter III

Joint Pub 5-0

transportation feasibility. In turn, the

supported commander adjusts TPFDD

requirements as necessary to remain

within lift capability.

•• Following TPFDD refinement, the

supported commander completes the

documentation of the plan and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within

the JOPES network as appropriate.

The supported CINC then submits the

OPLAN with the TPFDD file to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

for review.

•• At the end of the OPLAN development cycle, or biennially during

periods of extended maintenance

cycles, the Joint Staff will host a

sustainability conference to review

current LSA issues. The review will

convert any operational logistic deficiencies into programming requirements.

d. Plan Review. In the plan review

phase of deliberate planning, the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a

final review of OPLANs submitted by the

supported commander. The Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination

with the other members of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Services, and Defense agencies,

assesses and validates joint OPLANs

prepared by supported commanders using

the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine.

It is a formal process that evaluates the

entire plan, including TPFDD and other

computer-supported data files, to determine

whether taskings have been met and

whether resources have been used effectively

within the constraints of JSCP apportionment

guidance. The review also identifies

unresolved shortfalls in force and resource

capabilities. Upon completion of the

review, the supported commander is

informed that the plan is approved or

disapproved for reasons stated. Plans that

contain critical shortfalls that are beyond

the supported commander’s ability to

resolve will be approved with these shortfalls identified. In such cases, the supported

commander will be provided with guidance

regarding specific actions planned or

programmed to redress the shortfalls.

Approved plans remain so until superseded

or canceled. Upon notification that a plan

has been approved, the supported commander incorporates CJCS-directed changes

and directs the completion of supporting

plans by supporting and subordinate

commanders.

e. Supporting Plans. During this final

phase of the deliberate planning process, the

supported commander directs the completion and submission of supporting

plans to the CJCS-approved OPLAN.

These plans focus on the mobilization,

deployment, employment, sustainment,

and redeployment of forces and resources

in support of the concept described in the

supported commander’s approved plan.

Supporting plans are developed concurrently

with operation plans and are required to be

submitted to the supported commander

within 60 days of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff’s plan approval. The plans

are developed by component commanders,

subordinate joint force commanders,

supporting commanders, and other agencies

as directed by the supported commander.

The review and approval of supporting

plans is the responsibility of the commander they support. However, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may

be requested to resolve critical issues that

arise during the review of supporting plans,

and the Joint Staff may coordinate the

review of any supporting plans on behalf
III-9

Joint Operation Planning and Execution

of the Chairman and the other members of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff should circumstances

so warrant. Employment planning is

normally accomplished by the subordinate

commands that will direct the forces if the

plan is executed. It may be delayed when

the politico-military situation cannot be

clearly forecast or it may be excluded from

supporting plans if employment is to be

planned and executed within an alliance or

treaty framework.

SECTION C. CRISIS ACTION

PLANNING

7. Introduction

This section describes how the basic

planning process is adapted and employed

to plan and execute joint operations in

crisis situations. A crisis is defined, within

the context of joint operation planning and

execution as an INCIDENT or SITUATION

involving a threat to the United States, its

territories, citizens, military forces, and

possessions or vital interests that develops

rapidly and creates a condition of such

diplomatic, economic, political, or military

importance that commitment of US military

forces and resources is contemplated to

achieve national objectives. An adequate

and feasible military response to a crisis

demands a flexible adaptation of the basic

planning process that emphasizes the time

available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously

accomplished joint operation planning

whenever possible. In crisis situations, the

JPEC follows formally established CAP

procedures to adjust and implement

previously prepared joint operation plans

or to develop and execute OPORDs where

no useful joint operation plan exists for the

evolving crisis. A campaign plan may also

be developed if warranted by the scope of

contemplated operations. CAP procedures

provide for the rapid and effective

exchange of information and analysis, the

timely preparation of military COAs for

consideration by the NCA, and the

prompt transmission of NCA decisions

to supported commanders.

8. Relationship to Deliberate

Planning

CAP procedures provide for the transition

from planning of military operations to their

execution. Deliberate planning supports

crisis action planning by anticipating

potential crises and developing joint

operation plans that facilitate the rapid

development and selection of a COA and

execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for hypothetical

crises based on the best available information and using forces and resources

available for the planning period. It relies

heavily on assumptions regarding the

political and military circumstances that

will exist when the plan is implemented.

These ambiguities make it unlikely that any

joint operation plan will be usable without

modification as a given crisis unfolds

because every crisis situation cannot be

anticipated. However, the detailed analysis

and coordination accomplished in the time

available for deliberate planning can

expedite effective decisionmaking and

execution planning during a crisis. As the

crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections

are replaced with facts and actual conditions. Therefore, CAP includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate

joint operation planning whenever

possible. A comparison of CAP and

deliberate planning procedures is shown in

Figure III-7.
III-10

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Joint Pub 5-0

9. CAP Procedures

Crisis action planning and execution

are accomplished within a flexible

framework of six phases as summarized

in Figure III-8. These six phases integrate

the workings of the NCA and the JPEC

into a single unified process that sequenCOMPARING CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES

WITH DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES

Hours or days

For security reasons,

possibly very limited to

close-hold procedures

6 Phases from situation

development to

execution

Warning order to CINC:

CINC assigns tasks with

evaluation request

message

Allocated in the

Warning, Planning,

Alert, or Execute order

Warning order from

CJCS; CINC's

evaluation request

Communicates

recommendations of

CINC to the CJCS-NCA

NCA decide COA

Execute order

Campaign Plan (if reqd)

with supporting

OPORDs or OPORD

with supporting

18-24 months

Participates fully

5 Phases from initiation to

supporting plans

JSCP to CINC: CINC

assigns tasks with

planning or other written

directive

Apportioned in JSCP

Planning Directive issued

by CINC after planning

guidance step of concept

development phase

Communicates the CINC's

decision to staff and

subordinate commanders

CINC decides COA with

review by CJCS

When operation plan is

implemented, it is

converted to an OPORD,

and executed with an

Execute order

OPLAN or CONPLAN with

supporting plan

CRISIS ACTION

PLANNING

DELIBERATE

PLANNING

Time available to

plan

JPEC involvement

Phases

Document

assigning task

Forces for Planning

Early planning

guidance to staff

Commander's

estimates

Decision of COA

Execution

Document

Products

Figure III-7. Comparing Crisis Action Procedures with

Deliberate Planning Procedures
III-11

ASSESS THAT EVENT MAY HAVE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS REPORT EVENT TO NCA/CJCS NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COA CINC SENDS COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA NCA SELECT COA CJCS RELEASES NCA COA SELECTION IN ALERT ORDER CIN

MONITOR WORLDSITUATIONRECOGNIZE PROBLEMSUBMIT CINC'SASSESSMENT

CINC'S REPORT/ASSESSMENTRECEIVEDINCREASEAWARENESSINCREASE REPORTINGJS ASSESS SITUATIONJS ADVISE ONPOSSIBLE MILITARYACTIONNCA-CJCS EVALUATION

CJCS SENDS WARNINGORDER

DEVELOP COA'SCINC ASSIGNS TASKS TOSUBORDINATES BYEVALUATION REQUESTMESSAGECINC REVIEWSEVALUATION RESPONSEMESSAGECREATE / MODIFY TPFDDUSTRANSCOMPREPARES DEPLOYMENTESTIMATESEVALUATE COA'S

CJCS PRESENTSREFINED ANDPRIORITIZED COA'S TONCACJCS ADVICE TO NCACJCS MAY SENDPLANNING ORDER TOBEGIN EXECUTIONPLANNING BEFORESELECTION OF COA BYNCA

CINORORCINOPOREFFOR

SUMMARY OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING 

EVENT OCCURS WITHPOSSIBLE NATIONALSECURITYIMPLICATIONS

EVENT

ACTION

OUTCOME

PHASE I

SITUATION

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE II

CRISIS

ASSESSMENT

PHASE III

COURSE OF

ACTION

DEVELOPMENT

PHASE IV

COURSE OF

ACTION

SELECTION

1. CAP phases are scenario dependent since actual planning time can vary from hours to months. Therefore, concurrently, compressed, or eliminated altogether.2. The NCA, in coordination with the CJCS, may elect to return to situation monirtoring at any point during CA

NOTES:

Figure III-8. Summary of Crisis Action Planning Phases
III-12

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Joint Pub 5-0

tially provides for the identification of a

potential requirement for military response;

the assessment of the requirement and

formulation of strategy; the development of

feasible COAs by the supported commander;

the selection of a COA by the NCA; and,

when directed by the NCA, implementation

of the approved COA by the supported

commander.

a. Situation Development. During the

initial phase of crisis action planning,

events that have potential national

security implications are detected,

reported, and assessed to determine

whether a military response may be

required. The focus of this phase of crisis

action planning is on the combatant

commander in whose area the event

occurs and who will be responsible for the

execution of any military response. The

combatant commander may be the first to

detect and report the event to the NMCC.

However, crisis action planning may be

initiated by a report to the NMCC from any

of the national means used to continuously

monitor the worldwide situation. If not

included within the initial report, the

supported commander prepares and

submits an assessment of the event to the

NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. The assessment normally includes

amplifying information regarding the

situation, actions being taken, forces

available, expected time for earliest commitment of forces, and major constraints on

the employment of forces. If the time

sensitivity of the situation is such that

normal CAP procedures cannot be

followed, the commander’s assessment may

also include a recommended COA. It then

serves as the commander’s estimate

normally prepared in a subsequent phase of

crisis action planning. The situation

development phase ends when the

supported commander’s assessment is

submitted to the NCA and the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Crisis Assessment. During the crisis

assessment phase of crisis action planning,

the NCA, the Chairman, and the other

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

analyze the situation through available

intelligence and determine whether a

military option should be prepared. This

phase is characterized by increased information and intelligence gathering, NCA

review of options, and preparatory action

by the JPEC. The phase begins with the

receipt of the supported commander’s report

and assessment of the event. The Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination

with the other members of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, assesses the situation from a

military perspective and provides advice to

the NCA on possible military options. The

NCA identify national interests and objectives and consider possible diplomatic,

informational, economic, and military alternatives to achieve objectives. The flexibility

of the CAP provides the latitude for the

NCA to remain in this phase pending

additional information, return to the precrisis situation, or progress to the next

phase of CAP. The crisis assessment phase

ends with a strategic decision by the NCA

to return to the precrisis situation, or to have

military options developed for consideration and possible use. The NCA decision

provides strategic guidance for joint

operation planning and may include specific

guidance on the COAs to be developed.

c. COA Development. The COA

development phase of crisis action

planning implements an NCA decision or

CJCS planning directive to develop

military options. In response to that

decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff issues a planning guidance directive

to the supported commander directing the
III-13

Joint Operation Planning and Execution

preparation of COAs. Normally, the

directive will be a CJCS WARNING

ORDER, but other CAP-prescribed orders

may be used if the nature and timing of the

crisis mandate acceleration of the planning.

The directive establishes command

relationships and identifies the mission

and any planning constraints. It either

identifies forces and strategic mobility

resources and establishes tentative timing

for execution, or it requests the supported

commander develop these factors. If the

NCA direct development of a specific COA,

the directive will describe the COA and

request the supported commander’s

assessment. In response to the directive,

the supported commander, with the

support of subordinate and supporting

commanders, develops and analyzes

COAs. Joint operation plans are

reviewed for applicability and used when

needed. Based on the combatant

commander’s guidance, supporting

commanders, subordinate joint force

commanders, and component commanders

begin TPFDD development. Time

permitting, a TPFDD is generated for each

COA. USTRANSCOM reviews the

proposed COAs and prepares deployment

estimates. The Services monitor the

development of COAs and begin planning

for support forces, sustainment, and

mobilization. The supported commander

analyzes the COAs and submits his

recommendations to the NCA and the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

supported commander’s estimate describes

the selected COAs, summarizes the

supported commander’s evaluation of the

COAs, and presents recommendations. The

COA development phase of crisis action

planning ends with the submission of the

supported commander’s estimate.

d. COA Selection. The focus of the

COA selection phase is on the selection of

a COA by the NCA and the initiation of

execution planning. The Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with

the other members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, reviews and evaluates the COAs

provided in the supported commander’s

estimate and prepares recommendations

and advice for consideration by the NCA.

The NCA select a COA and direct that

execution planning be accomplished.

Upon receipt of the NCA decision, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER implementing the NCA decision. A CJCS ALERT

ORDER is a formal, CAP-prescribed order

approved by the Secretary of Defense and

transmitted to the supported commander

and other members of the JPEC to announce

the COA selected by the NCA and to initiate

execution planning. The CJCS ALERT

ORDER describes the selected COA in

sufficient detail to allow the supported

commander, in coordination with other

members of the JPEC, to conduct the

detailed planning required to deploy forces.

It will contain guidance to amplify or

change earlier guidance provided in the

CJCS WARNING ORDER. In some cases,

a PLANNING ORDER is used to initiate

execution planning activities before a

course of action is formally selected by

the NCA. Used in this manner, the

PLANNING ORDER saves time and allows

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

additional flexibility in directing military

activities. The PLANNING ORDER will

not normally be used to direct the

deployment of forces or to increase force

readiness. If force deployment is directed,

the PLANNING ORDER will require the

approval of the Secretary of Defense.

Issuance of either the PLANNING

ORDER or the ALERT ORDER marks

the beginning of execution planning.
III-14

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e. Execution Planning. An NCAapproved COA is transformed into an

OPORD during the execution planning

phase of crisis action planning. In this

phase, the JPEC performs the detailed

planning necessary to execute the approved

COA when directed by the NCA. If

required by the situation, the supported

commander will initiate campaign planning

or refine a campaign plan already in

development. This should guide the

development of the OPORD. Actual

forces, sustainment, and strategic

mobility resources are identified and the

concept of operations is described in

OPORD format. Following CAP procedures

and using capabilities provided through

JOPES and WWMCCS, the supported

commander develops the OPORD and

supporting TPFDD by modifying an

existing OPLAN, expanding an existing

CONPLAN (with or without TPFDD), or

developing a new plan. Supporting

commanders providing augmenting forces

identify and task specific units and provide

movement requirements. Component

commanders identify and update sustainment requirements in coordination with the

Services. USTRANSCOM develops

transportation schedules to support the

requirements identified by the supported

commander. A transportation schedule does

not mean that the supported commander’s

TPFDD or COA is transportation feasible;

rather, the schedules developed are the most

effective and realistic given the numbers

and types of assets and their location in

relation to C-day and L-hour. The Services

determine mobilization requirements and

plan for the provision of nonunit

sustainment. Force preparation action is

accomplished throughout the JPEC in

accordance with deployment postures

directed by the Secretary of Defense, and

deployability posture reporting is initiated.

The Chairman and the other members

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitor

execution planning activities, resolve

shortfalls when required, and review the

supported commander’s OPORD for

feasibility and adequacy. The execution

planning phase terminates with an NCA

decision to implement the OPORD. In

those instances where the crisis does not

progress to implementation, the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides

The availability of strategic mobility resources to respond to deployment and

sustainment requirements is a primary consideration in establishing a course

of action and its execution planning.
III-15

Joint Operation Planning and Execution

guidance regarding continued planning

under either crisis action or deliberate

planning procedures. If the NCA decide to

execute the OPORD, planning enters its

final phase: execution.

f. Execution. The execution phase

begins when the NCA decide to execute

a military option in response to the crisis.

During this phase, a military response is

implemented and operations are conducted by the supported commander

until the crisis is resolved. When the

Secretary of Defense authorizes the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

direct the supported commander to

implement the OPORD, the Chairman

issues a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. The

CJCS EXECUTE ORDER directs the

deployment and employment of forces,

defines the timing for the initiation of

operations, and conveys guidance not

provided in earlier CAP orders and

instructions. The supported commander, in

turn, issues an EXECUTE ORDER to

subordinate and supporting commanders

that directs the execution of their OPORDs.

Subordinate and supporting commanders

execute their OPORDs and conduct

operations to accomplish objectives. The

supported commander monitors movements, assesses and reports the achievement

of objectives, and continues planning as

necessary. The Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff monitors the deployment

and employment of forces, acts to resolve

shortfalls, and directs action needed to

ensure successful termination of the crisis.

USTRANSCOM manages common-user

global air, land, and sea transportation,

reporting the progress of deployments to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

the supported commander. The execution

phase of crisis action planning continues

until the crisis is terminated or the

mission is terminated and force redeployment has been completed. If the crisis is

prolonged, the process may be repeated

continuously as circumstances change and

missions are revised. If the crisis expands

to major conflict or war, crisis action

planning will evolve into, and be absorbed

within, the larger context of implementation

planning for the conduct of the war.

10. DEPLOYMENT ORDERS,

REDEPLOYMENT

ORDERS, AND

DEPLOYMENT

PREPARATION ORDERS

The DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

or DEPLOYMENT ORDER will be

issued upon decision of the NCA to

commence preparations for the conduct

of a military operation. DEPLOYMENT

PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDERS may be incorporated within WARNING ORDERS, PLANNING ORDERS,

ALERT ORDERS, and EXECUTE

ORDERS. However, deployment or

preparation for deployment of forces is

often necessarily independent of these

orders. Therefore, DEPLOYMENT ORDERS and DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS may be issued at any point

in the CAP process. They can be issued

by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, after authorization by the

Secretary of Defense, to:

a. Increase or decrease the deployability

posture of units.

b. Deploy forces.

c. Redeploy forces.

d. In the case of a DEPLOYMENT

PREPARATION ORDER, propose C-day

and L-hour, or in the case of a DEPLOYMENT ORDER establish C-day and L-hour.
III-16

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Joint Pub 5-0

e. Direct any other action that would

signal planned US military action or its

termination in response to a particular crisis

event or incident.

SECTION D. SUMMARY

11. Joint Planning Summary

Figure III-9 shows the interrelationships

of deliberate planning and CAP. Deliberate

planning provides the foundation for

CAP through development of detailed plans

to counter likely contingencies. During

CAP, existing plans, if available, are

expanded or modified to meet the crisis

situation. Development, adjustment, and

refinement of the TPFDD is at the heart of

transportation planning and execution.

Throughout CAP, planning information is

exchanged through WWMCCS, on secure

phone, or by OPREP messages. The end

product of execution planning is the

OPORD published by the supported

commander. The NCA exercise the

ultimate authority over the selection of

the COA, deployment of forces, and

execution of an OPERATION ORDER.
III-17

Figure III-9. Joint Planning Summary

JSCP

DELIBERATE PLANNING

JOINT PLANNING SUMMARY

NOPLAN

I

SITUATION

DEVELOPMENT

II

CRISIS

ASSESSMENT

III

COURSE OF

ACTION

DEVELOPMENT

IV

COURSE OF

ACTION

SELECTION

V

EXECUTION

PLANNING

CRISIS ACTION

PLANNING

AND/OR

CJCS

WARNING

ORDER

CJCS

PLANNING

ORDER

CJCS

ALERT

ORDER

DEVELOP EXPAND MODIFY

DETERMINE FEASIBLE

COURSES OF ACTION

CONPLAN OP

ESTABLISH DATA 

TPFDD

?

DEPLO

PLANS / S

II

CONCEPT

DEVELOPMENT

I

INITIATION

III

PLAN

DEVELOPMENT

IV

PLAN

REVIEW

V

SUPPORT

PLANS

CR

I

S

I

S
III-18

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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV

ASSESSMENT

IV-1

“Again and again we have owed peace to the fact that we were prepared for

war.”

Theodore Roosevelt: Lecture at the Naval War College, (June 1897)

1. Introduction

The objective of joint operation planning

and execution is the attainment of military

objectives in support of national security

policy. Previous chapters in this publication

described the principles, concepts, and

processes that govern the preparation and

implementation of joint OPLANs and

OPORDs in support of that objective. This

chapter focuses on the secondary, but

vital, role that joint operation planning

plays in assessing national warfighting

capabilities and programming improvement. Joint operation planning prepares for

the use of existing capabilities to achieve

objectives defined in national military

strategy. The resultant plans are a

measurement of the Nation’s ability to

successfully prosecute the national

military strategy within the constraints

of available forces and resources. This

measurement provides a means of assessing

the balance between strategy and capabilities,

determining risks, and focusing the acquisition

of additional resources and capabilities.

This chapter summarizes the requirements

for assessments and the concepts and

processes through which joint operation

planning supports these requirements.

2. Responsibilities

As the principal military adviser to the

NCA, the CJCS is responsible for

recommending national military strategy

to attain national security objectives and

for assessing the national military

capability and readiness to perform the

missions identified in the strategy. The

Chairman’s specific responsibilities for

assessment of capabilities and readiness are

defined in title 10, US Code, and include

the following:

a. Advising the Secretary of Defense on

critical strengths and deficiencies in force

capabilities (including manpower, logistics,

and mobility support) identified during the

preparation and review of joint operation

plans and assessing the effect of such

deficiencies and strengths on meeting

national security objectives and policy and

on strategic plans.

b. Establishing and maintaining a

uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to

carry out missions assigned to the command.

c. Reviewing the plans and programs

of the combatant commanders to determine

their adequacy and feasibility for the

performance of assigned missions.

d. Ascertaining the logistic support

available to execute the joint operation

plans of the combatant commanders, and

reviewing and recommending to the

Secretary of Defense logistic guidance for

the Military Services that, if implemented,

will result in logistic readiness consistent

with the approved plans.

e. Periodically, not less often than every

two years, reporting to the Secretary of

Defense on the responsiveness and

readiness of designated combat support

agencies. Those include the Defense

Information Systems Agency, Defense

Intelligence Agency, DLA, Defense

Mapping Agency, National Security
IV-2

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 5-0

Agency, Central Imagery Office, and any

other Defense agency designated as a

combat support agency by the Secretary of

Defense.

f. Developing a uniform readiness

reporting system for reporting the

readiness of combat support agencies.

g. Advising the Secretary of Defense

on the extent to which the program

recommendations and budget proposals

of the Military Departments and other DOD

components conform to the priorities

established in strategic plans and with the

priorities established for the requirements

of the combatant commanders.

h. Advising the Secretary of Defense

on the priorities of requirements, especially operational requirements, identified

by the combatant commanders.

i. Submitting to the Secretary of

Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within

projected resource levels and guidance

provided by the Secretary of Defense with

the priorities established in strategic plans

and with the priorities for the requirements

of the combatant commanders.

3. Integration

Assessments derived through joint

operation planning provide insight into

the strengths and deficiencies of the

Nation’s existing military capabilities.

Consequently, they can be an invaluable

source of information for force development planning and the development of

national military strategy. The greatest

use of joint operation planning as a vehicle

for assessing capabilities and influencing

other defense planning is realized when

deliberate planning is accomplished

within a disciplined planning cycle that

complements the PPBS and the JSPS.

These three DOD planning systems must

be integrated within a mutually supporting,

complementary process. Joint operation

planning conducted in response to the

strategic direction provided by the JSPS

must produce approved plans within a time

frame that permits consideration of the

results of that planning in the next succeeding

strategy development evolution. Conversely,

the JSPS, in conjunction with the PPBS,

must provide timely strategic direction that

allows the necessary time for the detailed

development of adequate and feasible

OPLANs. A disciplined deliberate planning

process, coordinated with PPBS and JSPS

and supported by an effective JOPES, is

essential to exploiting the full potential of

joint operation planning as a way to assess

capabilities and program improvement.

4. Preparedness and Capability

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff has the responsibility to monitor

and assess the readiness of US military

forces to fight and meet the demands of

the National Military Strategy. The

Chairman's Readiness System (CRS)

supports the Chairman in meeting this

responsibility. Joint operation plans

provide the foundation for the CRS

--they are the standards against which

readiness is measured in the JMRR. This

senior forum is designed to assess both

Unit Readiness, as reported by the Services,

and Joint Readiness, as reported by the

combatant commanders. The end product

of the CRS is senior level consensus on

the readiness of the force to successfully

execute JSCP tasks. Significant shortfalls

or deficiencies are assessed in terms of risk

and may be remedied through operational

or programmatic actions. Joint operation

plans have a major role in the process to

address remedies to shortfalls and deficiencies.
IV-3

Assessment

FORCE DEVELOPMENT — THE OLD WAY

Armed Forces planners continuously grapple with the intricacies and

complexities of Force Development. Nagging questions of how the Army

should be organized and equipped run head-on into budgetary, personnel,

and international constraints. The presence of trained operations and Force

Development specialists in today’s Army attests to the growing complexities

of planning and developing a force structure. The thing to keep in mind,

however, is that wartime expedients tend to overcome the thoughtful and

careful methods used by development planners during peacetime.

The basic method of Force Development used by the Union Army in the

American Civil War was to recruit new regiments rather than to replace

individual losses within a given regiment. In a back-up system, two or more

understrength regiments were sometimes consolidated into one. Such

consolidation sounded good in theory, but in practice it created much bitterness

among outfits reluctant to lose their separate identity. The problem was bad

enough when the merged units were from the same state or region. But

problems were far worse when an understrength regiment from one state was

merged with a regiment from another state.

An extreme example of this kind of problem, with its simple solution occurred

in August, 1863, when the 2nd Rhode Island Cavalry Regiment (four companies

strong) was ordered to be absorbed into the 1st Louisiana (Union) Cavalry

Regiment. The Rhode Islanders vocally surrounded the order and refused to

leave their camp. The Louisianians then surrounded the camp and persuaded

the Rhode Island regiment to unite with them. The persuasion technique was

direct. The New Englanders were peremptorily ordered to form ranks with the

Southern regiment. Many obeyed at last but only grumblingly and half

heartedly; others remained defiant. The colonel of the 1st Louisiana then sorted

out the main dissenters, who steadfastly refused to join the consolidated

regiment. All attempts to dissuade them failed until FORCE development was

applied. The Louisianians singled out two leading dissenters and summarily

shot them in full view of the others. The remaining Rhode Islanders promptly

broke camp and merged with the 1st Louisiana. Force Development the old

way was simple, direct, extreme if necessary, and effective.

SOURCE: Shepard, James C., “FORCE Development—The Old Way,”

published in Vignettes of Military History, Vol. II, US Army Military History

Research Collection, Office of Military History, Army War College, 1972.
IV-4

Chapter IV

Joint Pub 5-0

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

A-1

Joint Pub 5-0 is based on the following primary references:

1. Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.

2. Title 10, United States Code, April 1993.

3. CJCS MOP 7, 17 March 1993 (to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01), Joint Strategic

Planning System.

4. DOD Directive 5100.1, 25 September 1987, Functions of the Department of Defense

and Its Major Components.

5. Joint Pub 0-2, 24 February 1995, Unified Actions Armed Forces.

6. Joint Pub 1-01, w/ch 1, 30 July 1992, Joint Publication System, (Joint Doctrine and

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program).

7. Joint Pub 1-02, 23 March 1994, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

8. Unified Command Plan (UCP), 6 October 1993.

9. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

10. Joint Pub 3-0, 1 February 1995, Doctrine for Joint Operations.
A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 5-0

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX B

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

B-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the

Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,

VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,

consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for

Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-CWPD/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and

Interoperability (J-7), 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an

enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested

to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in

this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

__________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________
B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 5-0

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication

centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,

Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments or

foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office)

to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C.

20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned

administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,

Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center

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Baltimore, MD 21220-2898

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Distribution Division (Code 03443)

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d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint

publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.
GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ADP automated data processing

AFFOR Air Force forces

AMOPES Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution

System

AMC Army Materiel Command, Air Mobility Command

ARFOR Army forces

C4 command, control, communications, and computers

CAP crisis action planning

CG CAPLAN Coast Guard Capabilities Plan

CG LSMP Coast Guard Logistic Support and Mobilization Plan

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINC commander of a combatant command; commander in chief

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

COA course of action

CONPLAN operation plan in concept format

CONOPS concept of operations

CONUS continental United States

CPA Chairman’s Program Assessment

CPG Contingency Planning Guidance

CRS Chairman's Readiness System

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

DPRB Defense Planning Resources Board

GCCS Global Command and Control System

IPL integrated priority list

IPP Industrial Preparedness Program

JFC joint force commander

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander

JIMPP Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Process

JMNA Joint Military Net Assessment

JMRR Joint Monthly Readiness Review

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JPD Joint Planning Document

JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System

JSR Joint Strategy Review

JTF joint task force
GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 5-0

LOI letter of instruction

LSA logistics sustainability analysis

MARFOR Marine forces

MCP Marine Corps Capabilities Plan

MOP memorandum of policy

MPLAN Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan

MSC Military Sealift Command

MTMC Military Traffic Management Command

NAVFOR Navy forces

NCA National Command Authorities

NCMP Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan

NMCC National Military Command Center

NMCS National Military Command System

NMS national military strategy

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

PBD program budget decision

PDM Program Decision Memorandum

POM Program Objective Memorandum

PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

SOC special operations command

SOF special operations forces

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

UCP Unified Command Plan

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USCG United States Coast Guard

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WIN Worldwide Military Command and Control System

(WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network

WMP Air Force War and Mobilization Plan

WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System
GL-3

Glossary

PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

acceptability. Operation plan review

criterion. The determination whether the

contemplated course of action is worth

the cost in manpower, material, and time

involved; is consistent with the law of

war; and militarily and politically

supportable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

adequacy. Operation plan review criterion.

The determination whether the scope and

concept of a planned operation are

sufficient to accomplish the task assigned.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

alert order. 1. A crisis-action planning

directive from the Secretary of Defense,

issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, that provides essential guidance

for planning and directs the initiation of

execution planning for the selected course

of action authorized by the Secretary of

Defense. 2. A planning directive that

provides essential planning guidance and

directs the initiation of execution

planning after the directing authority

approves a military course of action. An

alert order does not authorize execution

of the approved course of action. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal

agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or

more nations for broad, long-term

objectives which further the common

interests of the members. (Joint Pub 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distribution

of limited resources among competing

requirements for employment. Specific

allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear

weapons, forces, and transportation) are

described as allocation of air sorties,

nuclear weapons, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense,

distribution for planning of limited

resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air

sorties and forces for planning) are

described as apportionment of air sorties

and forces for planning, etc. (Joint Pub

1-02)

area of operations. An operational area

defined by the joint force commander for

land and naval forces. Areas of operation

do not typically encompass the entire

operational area of the joint force

commander, but should be large enough

for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their

forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

augmentation forces. Forces to be

transferred from a supporting commander

to the combatant command (command

authority) or operational control of a

supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by

the National Command Authorities.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign. A series of related military

operations aimed at accomplishing a

strategic or operational objective within

a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign planning. The process whereby

combatant commanders and subordinate

joint force commanders translate national

or theater strategy into operational

concepts through the development of

campaign plans. Campaign planning may

begin during deliberate planning when

the actual threat, national guidance, and

available resources become evident, but

is normally not completed until after the

National Command Authorities select the

course of action during crisis action

planning. Campaign planning is

conducted when contemplated military
GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 5-0

operations exceed the scope of a single

major joint operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of

related military operations aimed at

accomplishing a strategic or operational

objective within a given time and space.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,

capabilities, or localities from which a

military force derives its freedom of

action, physical strength, or will to fight.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

CINC’s Strategic Concept. Final

document produced in Step 5 of the

concept development phase of the

deliberate planning process. The CINC’s

Strategic Concept is used as the vehicle

to distribute the CINC’s decision and

planning guidance for accomplishing

joint strategic capabilities plan or other

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the

strategic concept becomes the basis of the

plan for development into an operation

plan or operation plan in concept format.

Formerly called “the concept of

operations.” Also called CSC. (Joint Pub

1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between

two or more nations for common action.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

coalition action. Multinational action

outside the bounds of established

alliances, usually for single occasions or

longer cooperation in a narrow sector of

common interest. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or

specified command with a broad

continuing mission under a single

commander established and so designated

by the President, through the Secretary

of Defense and with the advice and

assistance of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands

typically have geographic or functional

responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority

established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”),

United States Code, section 164, exercised

only by commanders of unified or

specified combatant commands unless

otherwise directed by the President or the

Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be

delegated and is the authority of a

combatant commander to perform those

functions of command over assigned

forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning

tasks, designating objectives, and giving

authoritative direction over all aspects of

military operations, joint training, and

logistics necessary to accomplish the

missions assigned to the command.

Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the

commanders of subordinate organizations.

Normally this authority is exercised

through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional

component commanders. Combatant

command (command authority) provides

full authority to organize and employ

commands and forces as the combatant

commander considers necessary to

accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant

command (command authority). Also

called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in

chief of one of the unified or specified

combatant commands established by the

President. Also called CINC. (Joint Pub

1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation.

A logical process of reasoning by which
GL-5

Glossary

a commander considers all the

circumstances affecting the military

situation and arrives at a decision as to a

course of action to be taken to accomplish

the mission. A commander’s estimate

which considers a military situation so

far in the future as to require major

assumptions is called a commander’s

long-range estimate of the situation.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic

statement, in broad outline, of a

commander’s assumptions or intent in

regard to an operation or series of

operations. The concept of operations

frequently is embodied in campaign plans

and operation plans; in the latter case,

particularly when the plans cover a series

of connected operations to be carried out

simultaneously or in succession. The

concept is designed to give an overall

picture of the operation. It is included

primarily for additional clarity of

purpose. Also called commander’s

concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involving

military forces caused by natural

disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by

required military operations. Due to the

uncertainty of the situation, contingencies

require plans, rapid response, and special

procedures to ensure the safety and

readiness of personnel, installations, and

equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action. 1. A plan that would

accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme

adopted to accomplish a task or mission.

It is a product of the Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System concept

development phase. The supported

commander will include a recommended

course of action in the commander’s

estimate. The recommended course of

action will include the concept of

operations, evaluation of supportability

estimates of supporting organizations,

and an integrated time-phased data base

of combat, combat support, and combat

service support forces and sustainment.

Refinement of this data base will be

contingent on the time available for

course of action development. When

approved, the course of action becomes

the basis for the development of an

operation plan or operation order. Also

called COA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action development. The phase

of the Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System within the crisis action

planning process that provides for the

development of military responses and

includes, within the limits of the time

allowed: establishing force and

sustainment requirements with actual

units; evaluating force, logistic, and

transportation feasibility; identifying and

resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and

producing a course of action via a

commander’s estimate that contains a

concept of operations, employment

concept, risk assessments, prioritized

courses of action, and supporting data

bases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a

threat to the United States, its territories,

citizens, military forces, possessions, or

vital interests that develops rapidly and

creates a condition of such diplomatic,

economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military

forces and resources is contemplated to

achieve national objectives. (Joint Pub

1-02)

crisis action planning. 1. The Joint

Operation Planning and Execution

System process involving the timesensitive development of joint operation

plans and orders in response to an
GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 5-0

imminent crisis. Crisis action planning

follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an

effective response within the time frame

permitted by the crisis. 2. The timesensitive planning for the deployment,

employment, and sustainment of assigned

and allocated forces and resources that

occurs in response to a situation that may

result in actual military operations. Crisis

action planners base their plan on the

circumstances that exist at the time

planning occurs. Also called CAP. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint

Operation Planning and Execution

System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic

planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is

accomplished in prescribed cycles that

complement other Department of Defense

planning cycles in accordance with the

formally established Joint Strategic

Planning System. 2. A planning process

for the deployment and employment of

apportioned forces and resources that

occurs in response to a hypothetical

situation. Deliberate planners rely

heavily on assumptions regarding the

circumstances that will exist when the

plan is executed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment order. A planning directive

from the Secretary of Defense, issued by

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

that authorizes and directs the transfer of

forces between combatant commands by

reassignment or attachment. A deployment order normally specifies the

authority that the gaining combatant

commander will exercise over the transferred forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment planning. Operational

planning directed toward the movement

of forces and sustainment resources from

their original locations to a specific

operational area for conducting the joint

operations contemplated in a given plan.

Encompasses all activities from origin or

home station through destination,

specifically including intra-continental

United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and

holding areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

employment. The strategic, operational,

or tactical use of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

employment planning. Planning that

prescribes how to apply force/forces to

attain specified military objectives.

Employment planning concepts are

developed by combatant commanders

through their component commanders.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

execute order. 1. An order issued by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by

the authority and at the direction of the

Secretary of Defense, to implement a

National Command Authorities decision

to initiate military operations. 2. An

order to initiate military operations as

directed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

execution planning. The phase of the Joint

Operation Planning and Execution

System crisis action planning process that

provides for the translation of an

approved course of action into an

executable plan of action through the

preparation of a complete operation plan

or operation order. Execution planning

is detailed planning for the commitment

of specified forces and resources. During

crisis action planning, an approved

operation plan or other National

Command Authorities-approved course

of action is adjusted, refined, and

translated into an operation order.

Execution planning can proceed on the

basis of prior deliberate planning, or it
GL-7

Glossary

can take place in the absence of prior

planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

feasibility. Operation plan review criterion.

The determination of whether the

assigned tasks could be accomplished by

using available resources. (Joint Pub

1-02)

force planning. Planning associated with

the creation and maintenance of military

capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and

Services and is conducted under the

administrative control that runs from the

Secretary of Defense to the Military

Departments and Services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

functional plans. Plans involving the

conduct of military operations in a

peacetime or permissive environment

developed by combatant commanders to

address requirements such as disaster

relief, nation assistance, logistics,

communications, surveillance, protection

of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery

and evacuation, and continuity of

operations, or similar discrete tasks. They

may be developed in response to the

requirements of the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the

CINC, or as tasked by the supported

combatant commander, Joint Staff,

Service, or Defense agency. Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of

CINC-initiated plans is not normally

required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

implementation planning. Operational

planning associated with the conduct of

a continuing operation, campaign, or war

to attain defined objectives. At the

national level, it includes the development

of strategy and the assignment of strategic

tasks to the combatant commanders. At

the theater level, it includes the development of campaign plans to attain assigned

objectives and the preparation of

operation plans and operation orders to

prosecute the campaign. At lower levels,

implementation planning prepares for the

execution of assigned tasks or logistic

missions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from

the collection, processing, integration,

analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of

available information concerning foreign

countries or areas. 2. Information and

knowledge about an adversary obtained

through observation, investigation,

analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub

1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability of systems,

units or forces to provide service to and

accept services from other systems, units,

or forces and to use the services so

exchanged to enable them to operate

effectively together. 2. The condition

achieved among communicationselectronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when

information or services can be exchanged

directly and satisfactorily between them

and/or their users. The degree of

interoperability should be defined when

referring to specific cases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term

applied to a combatant commander,

subunified commander, or joint task force

commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority)

or operational control over a joint force.

Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operations. A general term to

describe military actions conducted by

joint forces, or by Service forces in

relationships (e.g., support, coordinating

authority), which, of themselves, do not

create joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operation planning. Planning for

contingencies which can reasonably be
GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 5-0

anticipated in an area of responsibility or

joint operations area of the command.

Planning activities exclusively associated

with the preparation of operation plans,

operation plans in concept format,

campaign plans, and operation orders

(other than the single integrated operation

plan) for the conduct of military

operations by the combatant commanders

in response to requirements established

by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Joint operation planning is

coordinated at the national level to

support Secretary of Defense Contingency

Planning Guidance (CPG), strategic

requirements in the National Military

Strategy, and emerging crises. As such,

joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning,

employment planning, sustainment

planning, and redeployment planning

procedures. Joint operation planning is

performed in accordance with formally

established planning and execution

procedures. (Approved for inclusion in

the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operation planning process. A

coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by

a commander to determine the best

method of accomplishing assigned tasks

and to direct the action necessary to

accomplish the mission. (Approved for

inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub

1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution

System. A continuously evolving system

that is being developed through the

integration and enhancement of earlier

planning and execution systems: Joint

Operation Planning System and Joint

Deployment System. It provides the

foundation for conventional command

and control by national- and theater-level

commanders and their staffs. It is

designed to satisfy their information

needs in the conduct of joint planning and

operations. Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System (JOPES) includes joint

operation planning policies, procedures,

and reporting structures supported by

communications and automated data

processing systems. JOPES is used to

monitor, plan, and execute mobilization,

deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint

operations. Also called JOPES. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

joint planning and execution community.

Those headquarters, commands, and

agencies involved in the training,

preparation, movement, reception,

employment, support, and sustainment of

military forces assigned or committed to

a theater of operations or objective area.

It usually consists of the Joint Staff,

Services, Service major commands

(including the Service wholesale logistics

commands), unified commands (and their

certain Service component commands),

subunified commands, transportation

component commands, joint task forces

(as applicable), Defense Logistics

Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g.,

Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be

appropriate to a given scenario. Also

called JPEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Strategic Planning System. The

primary means by which the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the combatant

commanders, carries out his statutory

responsibilities to assist the President and

Secretary of Defense in providing

strategic direction to the Armed Forces;

prepares strategic plans; prepares and

reviews contingency plans; advises the

President and Secretary of Defense on

requirements, programs, and budgets; and

provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United

States and its allies as compared with
GL-9

Glossary

those of their potential adversaries. Also

called JSPS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

lines of operations. Lines which define

the directional orientation of the force in

time and space in relation to the enemy.

They connect the force with its base of

operations and its objectives. (Joint Pub

1-02)

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling

and organizing national resources to

support national objectives in time of war

or other emergencies. 2. The process by

which the Armed Forces or part of them

are brought to a state of readiness for war

or other national emergency. This

includes activating all or part of the

Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies,

and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed

Forces includes but is not limited to the

following categories:

a. selective mobilization. Expansion of

the active Armed Forces resulting from

action by Congress and/or the President

to mobilize Reserve component units,

individual ready reservists, and the

resources needed for their support to meet

the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy

attack.

b. partial mobilization. Expansion of the

active Armed Forces resulting from

action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than

1,000,000) to mobilize Ready Reserve

component units, individual reservists,

and the resources needed for their support

to meet the requirements of a war or other

national emergency involving an external

threat to the national security.

c. full mobilization. Expansion of the

active Armed Forces resulting from

action by Congress and the President to

mobilize all Reserve component units in

the existing approved force structure, all

individual reservists, retired military

personnel, and the resources needed for

their support to meet the requirements of

a war or other national emergency

involving an external threat to the

national security.

d. total mobilization. Expansion of the

active Armed Forces resulting from

action by Congress and the President to

organize and/or generate additional units

or personnel, beyond the existing force

structure, and the resources needed for

their support, to meet the total requirements

of a war or other national emergency

involving an external threat to the

national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

multination. Between two or more forces

or agencies of two or more nations or

coalition partners. (Joint Pub 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective

term to describe military actions conducted

by forces of two or more nations,

typically organized within the structure

of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The

President and the Secretary of Defense

or their duly deputized alternates or

successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub

1-02)

operation. A military action or the carrying

out of a strategic, tactical, service,

training, or administrative military

mission; the process of carrying on

combat, including movement, supply,

attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to

gain the objectives of any battle or

campaign. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command

authority that may be exercised by

commanders at any echelon at or below
GL-10

Glossary

Joint Pub 5-0

the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant

command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the

authority to perform those functions of

command over subordinate forces

involving organizing and employing

commands and forces, assigning tasks,

designating objectives, and giving

authoritative direction necessary to

accomplish the mission. Operational

control includes authoritative direction

over all aspects of military operations and

joint training necessary to accomplish

missions assigned to the command.

Operational control should be exercised

through the commanders of subordinate

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate

joint force commanders and Service and/

or functional component commanders.

Operational control normally provides

full authority to organize commands and

forces and to employ those forces as the

commander in operational control

considers necessary to accomplish

assigned missions. Operational control

does not, in and of itself, include

authoritative direction for logistics or

matters of administration, discipline,

internal organization, or unit training.

Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war

at which campaigns and major operations

are planned, conducted, and sustained to

accomplish strategic objectives within

theaters or areas of operations. Activities

at this level link tactics and strategy by

establishing operational objectives

needed to accomplish the strategic

objectives, sequencing events to achieve

the operational objectives, initiating

actions, and applying resources to bring

about and sustain these events. These

activities imply a broader dimension of

time or space than do tactics; they ensure

the logistic and administrative support of

tactical forces, and provide the means by

which tactical successes are exploited to

achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub

1-02)

operation order. A directive issued by a

commander to subordinate commanders

for the purpose of effecting the coordinated

execution of an operation. Also called

OPORD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the

Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the

conduct of military operations. Plans are

prepared by combatant commanders in

response to requirements established by

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and by commanders of subordinate

commands in response to requirements

tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared

in either a complete format (OPLAN) or

as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The

CONPLAN can be published with or

without a time-phased force deployment

data (TPFDD) file.

a. OPLAN. An operation plan for the

conduct of joint operations that can be

used as a basis for development of an

operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN

identifies the forces and supplies required

to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept

and a movement schedule of these

resources to the theater of operations.

The forces and supplies are identified in

TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all

phases of the tasked operation. The plan

is prepared with the appropriate annexes,

appendixes, and TPFDD files as

described in the Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System manuals

containing planning policies, procedures,

and formats. Also called OPLAN.

b. CONPLAN. An operation plan in an

abbreviated format that would require

considerable expansion or alteration to
GL-11

Glossary

convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD.

A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s

Strategic Concept and those annexes and

appendixes deemed necessary by the

combatant commander to complete

planning. Generally, detailed support

requirements are not calculated and

TPFDD files are not prepared. Also

called CONPLAN.

c. CONPLAN With TPFDD. A

CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as

a CONPLAN except that it requires more

detailed planning for phased deployment

of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

planning order. 1. An order issued by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

initiate execution planning. The planning

order will normally follow a commander’s estimate and a planning order

will normally take the place of the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert

order. National Command Authorities

approval of a selected course of action is

not required before issuing a Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order.

2. A planning directive that provides

essential planning guidance and directs

the initiation of execution planning before

the directing authority approves a military

course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment,

personnel, materiel, or capability,

reflected as the difference between the

resources identified as a plan requirement

and those apportioned to a combatant

commander for planning, that would

adversely affect the command’s ability to

accomplish its mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

specified command. A command that has

a broad, continuing mission, normally

functional, and is established and so

designated by the President through the

Secretary of Defense with the advice and

assistance of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed

of forces from only one Military Department. Also called specified combatant

command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

staff estimates. Assessments of courses of

action by the various staff elements of a

command that serve as the foundation of

the commander’s estimate. (Joint Pub

1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at

which a nation, often as a member of a

group of nations, determines national or

multinational (alliance or coalition)

security objectives and guidance, and

develops and uses national resources to

accomplish these objectives. Activities

at this level establish national and

multinational military objectives;

sequence initiatives; define limits and

assess risks for the use of military and

other instruments of power; develop

global plans or theater war plans to

achieve those objectives; and provide

military forces and other capabilities in

accordance with strategic plans. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

strategic plan. A plan for the overall

conduct of a war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

subordinate command. A command

consisting of the commander and all those

individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been

placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command.

(Joint Pub 1-02)

supported commander. The commander

having primary responsibility for all

aspects of a task assigned by the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint

operation planning authority. In the

context of joint operation planning, this

term refers to the commander who

prepares operation plans, campaign plans,
GL-12

Glossary

Joint Pub 5-0

or operation orders in response to

requirements of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. (Approved for inclusion

in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander

who provides augmentation forces or

other support to a supported commander

or who develops a supporting plan.

Includes the designated combatant

commands and Defense agencies as

appropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting plan. An operation plan

prepared by a supporting commander or

a subordinate commander to satisfy the

requests or requirements of the supported

commander’s plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel,

logistic, and other support required to

maintain and prolong operations or

combat until successful accomplishment

or revision of the mission or of the

national objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at

which battles and engagements are

planned and executed to accomplish

military objectives assigned to tactical

units or task forces. Activities at this level

focus on the ordered arrangement and

maneuver of combat elements in relation

to each other and to the enemy to achieve

combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater of operations. A subarea within a

theater of war defined by the geographic

combatant commander required to

conduct or support specific combat

operations. Different theaters of

operations within the same theater of war

will normally be geographically separate

and focused on different enemy forces.

Theaters of operations are usually of

significant size, allowing for operations

over extended periods of time. (Joint Pub

1-02)

theater of war. Defined by the National

Command Authorities or the geographic

combatant commander, the area of air,

land, and water that is, or may become,

directly involved in the conduct of the

war. A theater of war does not normally

encompass the geographic combatant

commander’s entire area of responsibility

and may contain more than one theater

of operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater strategy. The art and science of

developing integrated strategic concepts

and courses of action directed toward

securing the objectives of national and

alliance or coalition security policy and

strategy by the use of force, threatened

use of force, or operations not involving

the use of force within a theater. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data.

The Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System data base portion of an

operation plan; it contains time-phased

force data, non-unit-related cargo and

personnel data, and movement data for

the operation plan, including:

a. In-place units.

b. Units to be deployed to support the

operation plan with a priority indicating

the desired sequence for their arrival at

the port of debarkation.

c. Routing of forces to be deployed.

d. Movement data associated with

deploying forces.

e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo

and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment

of forces.

f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-
GL-13

Glossary

user lift resources, as well as those

requirements that can be fulfilled by

assigned or attached transportation

resources. Also called TPFDD. (Joint

Pub 1-02)

unified command. A command with a

broad continuing mission under a single

commander and composed of significant

assigned components of two or more

Military Departments, and which is

established and so designated by the

President, through the Secretary of

Defense with the advice and assistance

of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Also called unified combatant

command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

warning order. 1. A preliminary notice

of an order or action which is to follow.

2. A crisis action planning directive

issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff that initiates the development and

evaluation of courses of action by a

supported commander and requests that

a commander’s estimate be submitted. 3.

A planning directive that describes the

situation, allocates forces and resources,

establishes command relationships,

provides other initial planning guidance,

and initiates subordinate unit mission

planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)
GL-14

Glossary

Joint Pub 5-0

Intentionally Blank
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and CINCS

Includes scope of project,

references, milestones,

and who will develop

drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be

Service, CINC, or Joint

Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

l

l

l

The CINCS receive the pub and

begin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director J-7, will

solicit a written report from the

combatant commands and

Services on the utility and quality

of each pub and the need for any

urgent changes or earlier-thanscheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each pub is revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision

l

l

l

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff

to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

CINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

l

l

l

STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy

as shown in the chart above. is the keystone publication. The diagram below

illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 5-0 Plans

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNEL

and

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINT

WARFARE

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes

required changes and prepares pub for

coordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formal

staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

l

l

l

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority

(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,

and Joint Staff

l

l

l

STEP #3

Two Drafts

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0 JOINT PUB 5-0

PLANS