NO. 12-16-00325-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

EARL DAVIS WILLIAMS, JR., 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

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APPEAL FROM THE 349TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Earl Davis Williams, Jr. appeals his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault on a 

public servant with a deadly weapon, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 

and one count of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. In a single issue, Appellant contends 

the trial court erred by limiting his cross examination of an accomplice witness. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On or about March 6, 2016, Officers Todd Little and Alfredo Fajardo of the Crockett 

Police Department responded to a disturbance call at Snider’s Trailer Park. As the officers 

arrived at the trailer park, they observed a vehicle leave. Little stopped the vehicle, approached 

the driver, Appellant, and requested his identification. Fajardo approached the passenger side 

and observed a shotgun in the front seat between the center console and the passenger, Kayleigh 

Ann Davis. When Fajardo notified Little of the shotgun, Appellant accelerated the vehicle and 

sped away from the officers. The officers pursued Appellant’s vehicle from Crockett to 

Grapeland. During the pursuit, Appellant’s vehicle reached a speed of one hundred thirty miles 

per hour. At some point during the chase, the officers realized they were receiving shotgun fire 

from Appellant’s vehicle. Eventually, Appellant lost control of the vehicle and wrecked. 
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Appellant and Davis abandoned the vehicle and fled on foot, but were quickly apprehended by 

law enforcement.

Appellant was subsequently charged by indictment with two counts of aggravated assault 

on a public servant, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and one count of 

evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. Appellant pleaded “guilty” to evading arrest and “not 

guilty” to the other charges. At trial, Davis testified that Appellant told her to shoot at the 

officers and helped her load the shotgun. However, she admitted previously stating that 

Appellant did not tell her to shoot and had nothing to do with the shooting. On cross 

examination, Davis testified that she entered into a plea bargain with the State, which resulted in 

a term of confinement. The trial court did not permit Appellant to ask Davis the length of her 

confinement. 

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant “guilty” of all four counts and 

assessed punishment at fifty-five years imprisonment for count one, fifty-five years 

imprisonment for count two, ten years imprisonment for count three, and seven years 

imprisonment for count four. This appeal followed.

CROSS EXAMINATION OF ACCOMPLICE WITNESS

In his only issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred when it failed to permit him to 

make a full inquiry into Davis’s plea bargain agreement with the State. Specifically, Appellant 

complains that the trial court did not allow him to question Davis regarding the term of 

confinement that she received as a result of the plea bargain.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A trial court has the discretion to decide the admissibility of evidence and, absent an 

abuse of that discretion, its rulings will not be overturned. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we consider 

“whether the [trial] court acted without reference to [the pertinent] guiding rules and principles; 

that is, whether the court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Fox v. State, 115 S.W.3d 550, 558 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d).

Through the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, an accused enjoys the right 

“to be confronted with the witnesses against him” by an opportunity to cross-examine the 

witnesses. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; Del. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 
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1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986); see Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000). The right to cross-examine witnesses requires that an accused be given wide latitude to 

explore a witness’s story, test his perceptions and memory, and impeach his credibility, including 

any fact that would tend to establish his “‘ill feeling, bias, motive, and animus’” against the 

accused. Parker v. State, 657 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (quoting Simmons v. 

State, 548 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). Rule 613(b) further recognizes the right of 

litigants to cross-examine witnesses on the issues of bias and prejudice. TEX. R. EVID. 613(b).

However, a trial court retains wide discretion to impose reasonable limits on crossexamination based on concerns such as harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 

witness’s safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Van Arsdall, 475 

U.S. at 679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435; Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 222. And a defendant’s right to crossexamine witnesses must be balanced against the probative value of the evidence. Lopez, 18 

S.W.3d at 222. “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 

defense might wish.” Del. v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 

(1985); Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 844–45 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d). 

When a defendant complains about the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness 

generally about matters concerning the witness’s credibility, to preserve error, he need not show 

what his cross-examination would have revealed, but only the general subject matter about which 

he desired to examine the witness and, if challenged, show on the record why such testimony 

should be admitted into evidence. Virts v. State, 739 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 

The erroneous denial of this right of confrontation is “constitutional error of the first magnitude 

and no amount of showing of want of prejudice [will] cure it.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 

318, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 347 (1974).

Analysis

At trial, Davis testified against Appellant. She claimed that Appellant “took off” when 

officers told them to exit the vehicle with their hands in the air. While Appellant drove, Davis 

asked Appellant what he wanted her to do. Appellant told her to shoot. Davis testified that she 

attempted to shoot in the air. When she attempted to reload the shotgun, it jammed. Appellant 

reloaded the shotgun for her. Davis admitted that she previously told police that Appellant “had 

nothing to do with it” and “didn’t tell [her] to do it to begin with” because she was trying to 
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protect Appellant from going back to prison. However, Davis claimed her trial testimony was 

the truth, she had no reason to lie, and she was not promised anything to change her story. 

During cross examination, Appellant’s counsel requested permission from the trial court 

to question Davis about her plea bargain with the State. The court granted counsel’s request but 

refused to permit questioning regarding the length of Davis’s sentence. Davis testified that she 

accepted a plea bargain offer from the State, which resulted in a conviction. She further stated 

that her plea bargain was final and not made in exchange for certain testimony. 

On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court’s refusal to permit questioning regarding 

the length of Davis’s sentence improperly limited his cross examination of Davis, an accomplice 

witness. In support of his argument, Appellant relies on Spain v. State, 585 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1979). In Spain, an accomplice witness accepted a plea bargain that resulted in a 

probated sentence. Id. at 709. The trial court allowed Spain to show the jury that the witness 

had been found guilty but did not permit questioning regarding the punishment received. Id. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the trial court’s refusal to allow Spain to show 

that the witness received a probated sentence, as evidence of bias or motive, was reversible error. 

Id. at 710. 

Nevertheless, the cases on which Spain relied, as well as other cases relied upon by 

Appellant, are distinguishable from the present case. Specifically, those cases involved possible 

motives for deceit and fabrication by the witness because charges were pending or potentially 

pending against the State’s witness. See Evans v. State, 519 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1975) (witness was in vulnerable position because of indictment pending against him); Simmons 

v. State, 548 S.W.2d 386, 387-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (charges had been dismissed against 

witness but could be refiled by State); Parker v. State, 657 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1983) (charges against witness could be refiled); Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S. Ct. at 1111 

(refusal to allow defendant to show witness was on probation at time of testimony was reversible 

error). In the present case, as of the time of trial, Davis had already pleaded “guilty” and was 

awaiting transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Thus, her case was complete. 

She was not serving a probated sentence, there were no charges pending against her, and there 

were no potential charges to refile against Davis. Nor does the record demonstrate that she 

agreed to testify against Appellant in exchange for her sentence. As a result, there is no evidence 

of a “quid pro quo” between the State and Davis. See Simmons, 548 S.W.2d at 388. 
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Even without evidence of Davis’s sentence, Appellant was otherwise afforded a thorough 

and effective cross-examination because he was permitted to reveal Davis’s plea bargain with the 

State and otherwise impeach her credibility. See Carmona v. State, 698 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1985). The jury, sole judge of Davis’s credibility and the weight to be given her 

testimony, still had the opportunity to evaluate Davis’s motivation for testifying in light of her 

plea agreement with the State. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Appellant to question Davis regarding the length of her 

sentence. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s single issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered June 29, 2018.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 29, 2018

NO. 12-16-00325-CR

EARL DAVIS WILLIAMS, JR.,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 349th District Court 

of Houston County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No.16CR-077)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court 

below for observance.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.