a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

U.S. Senate

February 2004 INTERCITY 

PASSENGER RAIL

Amtrak’s Management 

of Northeast Corridor 

Improvements 

Demonstrates Need 

for Applying Best 

Practices

GAO-04-94
Amtrak has not yet met the 3-hour trip-time goal established by the 1992 

Amtrak Authorization and Development Act although electrified service 

between Boston and New York City was initiated in January 2000 and 

Amtrak began limited high-speed rail service in December 2000. Currently, 

this trip is scheduled to take 3 hours 24 minutes. Furthermore, 51 of 72 work 

elements that FRA identified in its 1994 master plan as necessary to reduce 

trip times (e.g., electrify tracks and acquire high-speed trains), enhance 

capacity (e.g., construct sidings), rebuild or extend the life of physical assets 

(e.g., replace bridges), or make other improvements are incomplete or their 

status is unknown. Fifteen of these work elements are on non-Amtrak 

owned sections of track and are important for achieving and maintaining 3-

hour service as rail traffic increases over time. Through March 2003, Amtrak 

and others had spent about $3.2 billion on the project. 

Neither Amtrak nor FRA exercised effective management or oversight of the 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Amtrak’s management was 

not comprehensive, and it was focused primarily on the short term. Amtrak 

focused on managing the electrification and acquisition of new high-speed 

trains, and did not sufficiently address major infrastructure improvements 

needed to attain the trip-time goal. In addition, Amtrak did not fully 

integrate the interests of stakeholders (commuter rail authorities and state 

governments) into the project, even though work that involved them was 

critical to achieving 3-hour service. FRA served as a conduit for federal 

appropriations to the project but did not have the resources or the authority 

to oversee Amtrak’s management of the project. 

Best practices—including comprehensive planning, risk assessment and 

mitigation, comprehensive financial management, accountability and 

oversight, and incorporation of diverse stakeholders’ interests—provide a 

framework for effectively managing future large-scale intercity passenger 

rail infrastructure projects. These best practices have proved effective in 

managing large-scale infrastructure projects and could assist in managing 

future projects like the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. 

Best Practices for Managing Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects 

In the 1990s, the National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) 

undertook the Northeast HighSpeed Rail Improvement Project to 

make infrastructure improvements 

that would enable Amtrak to meet 

a statutory goal of providing 3-hour 

intercity passenger rail service 

between Boston and New York 

City. Amtrak shared responsibility 

for implementing the project with 

commuter rail authorities and state 

governments, and the Federal 

Railroad Administration (FRA) 

developed a master plan for the 

project and provided federal funds 

to Amtrak. GAO reviewed (1) the 

status of the project, (2) Amtrak’s 

management of the project, (3) 

FRA’s oversight of the project, and 

(4) best practices for managing 

future large-scale rail infrastructure 

projects. 

GAO recommends that Amtrak 

apply best practices for managing 

large-scale infrastructure projects 

to future major intercity passenger 

rail projects and that FRA require 

these best practices and develop 

guidance for how to do this. GAO 

also recommends that FRA seek 

legislative authority to oversee 

such projects in the future. Amtrak 

did not comment directly on GAO’s 

specific recommendations but said 

it was incorporating many of the 

best practices discussed in the 

report as part of its management 

restructuring. Amtrak also raised 

some issues concerning GAO’s 

report findings. FRA agreed with 

our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-94.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact JayEtta Z. 

Hecker at (202) 512-2834 or 

heckerj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-94, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 

February 2004

INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL 

Amtrak’s Management of Northeast 

Corridor Improvements Demonstrates 

Need for Applying Best Practices 
Page i GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project Has Not Achieved 

Trip-Time Goal 11

Amtrak Did Not Exercise Effective Management of the Northeast 

High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 26

FRA’s Oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project Was Limited 31

Best Practices Framework Would Support Effective Management of 

Large-Scale Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects 37

Conclusions 47

Recommendations for Executive Action 48

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 50

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 55

Appendix II: Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 

Work Elements, by Category and Status as of March 2003 58

Appendix III: Methodology Used to Develop a Framework of Best Practices 

for Managing Intercity Passenger Rail Infrastructure 

Projects 61

Definition and Classification of Best Practices 61

Literature Reviewed and Organizations Contacted to Identify Best 

Practices 63

Limitations 64

Appendix IV: Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and Northeast 

High-Speed Rail Improvement Projects 65

Appendix V: Selected Sources of Best Practices for Managing Large-Scale 

Infrastructure Projects 70

GAO Products 70

Non-GAO Products 70

Appendix VI: Comments from the National Railroad Passenger 

Corporation 71

Tables Table 1: FRA’s Estimated Cost of the Project, by Major Category 14
Contents

Page ii GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Table 2: Amounts Spent by Amtrak on the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project, by Category of Spending, as of 

March 2003 21

Table 3: Best Practices, by Framework Category 61

Figures Figure 1: Ownership of the Northeast Corridor 8

Figure 2: Status of Work Elements Listed in FRA’s 1994 Master 

Plan, by Milestones, as of March 2003 16

Figure 3: Geographic Location of Remaining Work Elements and 

Major Beneficiaries, as of March 2003 19

Figure 4: Growth in Estimated Cost of Route Electrification, May 

1992 to March 2003 22

Figure 5: Best Practices Framework for Managing Large-Scale 

Infrastructure Projects 39

Figure 6: Critical Path Method Graphical Representation of Project 

Schedule 42

Figure 7: NECIP Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1976 to 1998 67

Abbreviations

4R Act Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act

Amtrak National Railroad Passenger Corporation

BART Bay Area Rapid Transit

CDOT Connecticut Department of Transportation

DOT Department of Transportation

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

FTA Federal Transit Administration

MBTA Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority

NECIP Northeast Corridor Improvement Project

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PMO project management oversight

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Page 1 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

February 27, 2004 Letr

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman, Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Intercity passenger rail service is a critical component of the transportation 

system in the densely populated Northeast Corridor, which is generally 

defined as the area between Boston and Washington, D.C. The Northeast 

Corridor is the busiest passenger rail line in the country—some 200 million 

intercity and commuter rail passengers use this line, or some portion of it, 

each year. Although the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) 

is the primary owner of the Northeast Corridor between Washington, D.C., 

and New York City, track ownership between Boston and New York City is 

divided among Amtrak, commuter rail agencies, and state governments. 

Amtrak acquired its portion of the Northeast Corridor in 1976. Recognizing 

the importance of the Northeast Corridor and the need to make critical 

infrastructure improvements to the rail line, Congress established the 

Northeast Corridor Improvement Project in 1976. This project, which 

consisted of infrastructure improvements designed to enable high-speed 

rail service between Boston and Washington, D.C., was one of the largest 

rail infrastructure projects undertaken in recent times and represented the 

single largest federal investment in intercity passenger rail service in the 

last century.

In the 1990s, the focus of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project was 

on infrastructure improvements between Boston and New York City. In 

particular, in 1992 the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act directed 

the Secretary of Transportation to develop a master plan for a program of 

improvements that would permit regularly scheduled, safe, and dependable 

rail passenger service between Boston and New York City in 3 hours or 

less. In 1994, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) issued such a plan. 

The plan contained three milestones—initiating electrified train service 

between Boston and New York City, initiating 3-hour train service, and 

completing infrastructure improvements designed to enhance track 

capacity and extend the useful life of existing assets (called 

“recapitalization”)—and identified 72 work elements that would be needed 

to complete the project. FRA estimated that the first milestone could be 

completed by mid-1997, the second by 1999, and the third by the end of 
Page 2 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

2009. FRA also estimated that about $3.1 billion (1993 dollars)1 would be 

needed to enable 3-hour service between Boston and New York City and 

complete capacity enhancement and recapitalization work to maintain this 

schedule. Improvements to achieve the 3-hour service included electrifying 

the route between New Haven, Connecticut, and Boston;2

 upgrading and 

improving tracks, signals, and other infrastructure; and acquiring 26 highspeed passenger trains. Amtrak was responsible for managing these efforts, 

which collectively became known as the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project, and shared responsibility for implementing the 

project with several other entities, including commuter and freight 

railroads and state governments, which we refer to in this report as 

“stakeholders.” 

This report responds to your request that we examine Amtrak’s 

management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. In 

particular, the report discusses (1) the status of the project, (2) Amtrak’s 

management of the project, (3) FRA’s oversight of the project, and (4) the 

use of best practices as a framework for managing future large-scale 

intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects. Best practices in the 

context of capital projects are defined as those “practices that have been 

successfully implemented by organizations recognized for their 

outstanding capital decision-making practices.”3

To determine the status of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project, we reviewed applicable laws related to both it and the Northeast 

Corridor Improvement Project and reviewed documents on its cost, 

schedule, and status. To address Amtrak’s management of the project, we 

reviewed documents related to the project’s organization and management 

and interviewed Amtrak, FRA, and other officials about the project’s 

management. To address FRA’s oversight of the project, we reviewed laws 

related to FRA’s legislative authorities, discussed FRA’s oversight of the 

project with FRA officials, and reviewed documents related to the Federal 

Transit Administration’s (FTA) project management oversight program. 

Finally, to address the use of best practices as a framework for managing 

1

In this report, all financial amounts are in nominal dollars unless otherwise noted.

2

In 1994, this section of the Northeast Corridor was not electrified, and Amtrak had to 

switch from electric to diesel locomotives at New Haven.

3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital DecisionMaking, GAO/AIMD-99-32 (Washington, D.C.: December 1998).
Page 3 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

future large-scale intercity passenger rail projects, we conducted a 

literature search to identify best practices related to infrastructure 

management and discussed infrastructure management best practices with 

Amtrak, FRA, and other officials. We then synthesized this information into 

the framework presented. Appendix I discusses our overall scope and 

methodology, appendix II discusses our methodology for identifying best 

practices related to infrastructure project management, and appendix V 

lists GAO and other products associated with project management best 

practices.4

Results in Brief Amtrak has not yet met the statutory goal of 3-hour rail service between 

Boston and New York City, although it has reduced the scheduled trip time 

from about 4 hours to 3 hours 24 minutes. To achieve this reduction, it 

completed the first milestone in FRA’s 1994 master plan—initiate electrified 

train service between Boston and New York City—in January 2000, and it 

acquired enough high-speed trains to begin limited high-speed rail service 

in December 2000. However, it initiated these activities about 3 years later 

than planned. In addition, according to the latest available data (March 

2003), only 5 of the 17 work elements needed to complete the second 

milestone of FRA’s 1994 master plan—initiate 3-hour service—are 

complete. Progress toward achieving the third milestone—completing 

infrastructure improvements designed to enhance track capacity and 

extend the useful life of existing assets—has also been slower than 

planned. In total, as of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter rail authorities, and 

other stakeholders had completed 21 of the project’s 72 work elements—51 

of the work elements were incomplete or their status was unknown. 

4

In November 2001, one of the contractors manufacturing the Acela Express trains 

(Bombardier) filed suit against Amtrak in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia seeking damages for, among other things, Amtrak’s alleged interference with the 

manufacture of the equipment. In November 2002, Amtrak filed a countersuit against the 

manufacturers alleging, among other things, breach of contract. As of February 2004, these 

suits were still pending. In addition, Amtrak officials indicated that the Department of 

Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office were conducting investigations related to the contract 

for electrification work done under the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. As 

of February 2004, these investigations were also still pending. Nothing in this report is 

intended to have any impact on the outcome of these suits or investigations, and this work 

was not performed in relation to either the suits or the investigations. As discussed further 

in appendix I, this report does not analyze detailed information regarding either the highspeed trains or electrification procurements. However, we do not believe that such scope 

restraints negatively affected our ability to review and evaluate information on the overall 

management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project and draw conclusions 

about how Amtrak managed the project.
Page 4 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

According to FRA and commuter rail officials, several of the work elements 

that are incomplete or for which their status is unknown (such as 

realignment of curves) are important to achieving the 3-hour goal. As of 

March 2003, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and other stakeholders had 

spent about $3.2 billion on the project. How much more work will be done 

is uncertain. Several Amtrak officials said they consider the project 

complete, even though the trip-time goal has not been met and many 

capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements are incomplete 

or their status is unknown. Work is continuing, or is planned, for some of 

the master plan’s work elements, but there does not appear to be an effort 

to complete the project or meet the trip-time goal. 

Amtrak could have exercised more effective management of the Northeast 

High-Speed Rail Improvement Project had its management of the project 

been more comprehensive and had it focused greater attention on critical 

infrastructure issues needed to attain the 3-hour trip-time goal. Although 

FRA’s 1994 master plan laid out the blueprint for the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project, Amtrak did not adopt this plan and did not 

prepare a comprehensive management plan of its own. Instead, Amtrak 

generally focused on managing individual project components, particularly 

the electrification and acquisition of high-speed trains. Although Amtrak 

senior management obtained a substantial amount of information about 

these two aspects of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, 

it did not consistently use this information effectively to minimize the 

impact of problems on the overall project. Amtrak also relied on annual 

appropriations to plan work rather than on a more comprehensive financial 

plan that considered long-term funding needs. Finally, although Amtrak 

worked closely with stakeholders—commuter railroads and state 

governments—to coordinate some project work, it did not fully integrate 

their interests into project goals. The participation of stakeholders was, 

and continues to be, essential for completing work critical for meeting the 

3-hour trip-time goal.

FRA provided little oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project. Although FRA—the primary federal agency 

supporting the project—was the conduit of millions of federal dollars to the 

project, FRA management adopted the position that it had only limited 

authority to oversee the project. FRA was legally responsible for and 

carried out other activities related to the project, such as conducting 

environmental assessments and developing safety regulations to 

accommodate high-speed rail service. FRA officials said they did not take 

an active role in overseeing the project because (1) the agency did not have 
Page 5 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

the resources or the legislative authority to change Amtrak’s project 

management, (2) Congress did not specifically authorize FRA to oversee 

the project, and (3) FRA did not have a formal mechanism to perform 

oversight. We agree with FRA’s view that it had only limited authority to 

oversee the project. For fiscal year 2003, Congress increased FRA’s 

responsibility to provide oversight of and accountability for federal funds 

used for intercity passenger rail service, but this responsibility extended 

only to fiscal year 2003 funds.

Project management best practices can provide a framework for effectively 

managing future large-scale intercity passenger rail projects. Through our 

analyses of management approaches across a broad spectrum of national 

activities, we have identified key components of a best practices 

framework for project management. These components include (1) 

conducting comprehensive project planning, (2) assessing risks and 

identifying mitigation measures, (3) comprehensively managing project 

finances, (4) establishing accountability for and oversight of projects, and 

(5) incorporating stakeholders’ interests in planning and implementing 

projects. Comprehensive planning helps manage and control projects’ 

implementation. Assessing risks and identifying mitigation measures assist 

in meeting projects’ goals by recognizing and responding to problems 

earlier. Comprehensively managing project finances is important for 

estimating and controlling projects’ costs. Establishing accountability for 

and oversight of projects better ensures the prudent use of resources, 

including federal resources. Incorporating diverse stakeholders’ interests 

helps facilitate projects’ successful implementation by ensuring there is a 

clear understanding of roles, responsibilities, and potential concerns.

We make recommendations to Amtrak to adopt elements of the best 

practices framework when planning and implementing future large-scale 

infrastructure projects, like the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project. This includes developing project management and finance plans. 

We also make recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation to 

direct FRA to require managers of federally funded large-scale intercity 

passenger rail infrastructure projects to adopt elements of the best 

practices framework, including preparing project management and finance 

plans and conducting risk assessments, as part of their receipt of federal 

funds for such projects, and that FRA provide guidance on how to do this. 

Finally, we recommend that FRA seek legislation authorizing it to establish 

a program to oversee such federally funded large-scale intercity passenger 

rail infrastructure projects in the future. 
Page 6 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

We provided a draft of this report to Amtrak and the Department of 

Transportation for their review and comment. The president of Amtrak 

observed that our report raised many of the issues that he has had to 

address since he took office and that on a regular basis he has had to deal 

with many of the consequences of decisions made during the life of the 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Although Amtrak said it 

was unable to comment because of matters under litigation, it believes our 

findings and conclusions were incomplete because we did not consider 

how the actions of contractors might have influenced Amtrak’s 

management of the project. Amtrak also believes we placed too great a 

reliance on FRA’s master plan to measure their project management. We 

recognize that contractor actions can influence project implementation and 

management. However, our findings are directed to Amtrak’s overall 

management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, 

including the preparation and use of comprehensive project management 

plans, rather than the actions of contractors or the planning and 

implementation of specific project components (e.g., high-speed train 

acquisition). Although Amtrak agreed that FRA’s statutorily required 

master plan constituted a blueprint for the project, we found that Amtrak 

did not use this plan to manage the project or create its own 

comprehensive management plan to oversee the program of improvements 

needed to bring 3-hour passenger rail service between Boston and New 

York City. Amtrak did not directly comment on our specific 

recommendations but instead said it was incorporating many of the best 

practices discussed in our report as part of its management restructuring. 

FRA responded for the Department of Transportation and agreed with our 

recommendations. FRA said that their proposed Passenger Rail Investment 

Reform Act would create an oversight program similar to what we are 

recommending. We continue to believe that the recommendations in this 

report are valid.

Background The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 created Amtrak to provide intercity 

passenger rail service because existing railroads found such service to be 

unprofitable. Amtrak operates a 22,000-mile network, primarily over freight 

railroad tracks, providing service to 46 states and the District of Columbia. 

Amtrak owns about 650 miles of track, primarily on the Northeast Corridor 

between Boston and Washington, D.C. In fiscal year 2002, Amtrak served 

23.4 million passengers, or about 64,000 passengers per day. According to 

Amtrak, about two-thirds of its ridership is wholly or partially on the 

Northeast Corridor.
Page 7 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Amtrak acquired the Northeast Corridor in 1976 from the Consolidated Rail 

Corporation as part of the disposition of the Penn Central Transportation 

Company’s assets. At the time, the Penn Central Transportation Company 

and certain other Northeastern railroads were in bankruptcy. As required 

by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, the purpose of this 

acquisition was to facilitate improved high-speed passenger rail service. 

However, Amtrak is neither the exclusive owner nor the exclusive user of 

the Northeast Corridor. Although Amtrak is the owner and operator of the 

Northeast Corridor between New York City and Washington, D.C. (called 

the “south-end”), other organizations, including the Massachusetts Bay 

Transportation Authority (MBTA), the Connecticut Department of 

Transportation (CDOT), and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of 

New York (MTA), own significant portions of the Northeast Corridor 

between Boston and New York City (called the “north-end”). (See fig. 1.) 

Both Amtrak and commuter rail trains operate on these segments of track: 

MBTA provides commuter rail service between Boston and Providence, 

Rhode Island; Shore Line East provides commuter rail service between 

New London and New Haven, Connecticut; and Metro-North Railroad 

provides commuter rail service between New Haven and New Rochelle, 

New York. In fiscal year 2002, Amtrak accounted for 10 percent of the 

number of intercity and commuter rail trains operated on the north-end of 

the Northeast Corridor, and commuter railroads accounted for 90 percent.5

Six freight railroads also operate on the Northeast Corridor and, in fiscal 

year 2001, these freight railroads operated 38 trains per day on the 

Northeast Corridor. In contrast, in the same year Amtrak and commuter 

railroads operated approximately 470 trains per day on just the north-end 

of the Northeast Corridor.

5

Number of trains is measured as the train volume at the point of maximum line utilization. 

Although Amtrak does not operate as many trains as commuter rail operators, it accounts 

for a larger percentage of train-miles. A train-mile is a train traveling 1 mile. In fiscal year 

2002, Amtrak accounted for about 60 percent of train-miles on the north-end of the 

Northeast Corridor, compared with about 40 percent for commuter rail operators. 
Page 8 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Figure 1: Ownership of the Northeast Corridor

The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act) 

formally established the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project. Among 

other things, the 4R Act authorized Amtrak to make improvements to the 

right-of-way between Boston and Washington, D.C., needed to enable highspeed rail service, and it established certain goals for the project. In 

particular, within 5 years of the 4R Act’s enactment, the project was to 

achieve regularly scheduled and dependable intercity passenger rail service 

between Boston and New York City in 3 hours 40 minutes, and between 

New York

New Rochelle

New Haven

Boston

Providence

Philadelphia

Washington, D.C.

MTA

CDOT

MBTA

Source: GAO.

Amtrak

Amtrak
Page 9 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

New York City and Washington, D.C., in 2 hours 40 minutes. The ultimate 

goal was to achieve service between Boston and New York City in 3 hours, 

and between New York City and Washington, D.C., in 2 hours 30 minutes. 

The act directed the Secretary of Transportation to determine the 

practicability of meeting these latter goals and authorized $1.75 billion to 

accomplish them as well as make certain other improvements on routes 

related to the Northeast Corridor (such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and 

Springfield, Massachusetts). The act did not specify a time by which these 

latter goals were to be met, but did require a status report within two years 

after the 4R Act was enacted. Under the act, FRA was the project manager. 

Amtrak was a subcontractor primarily responsible for track and signal 

work.

The Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-254) called for 

transferring responsibility for the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project 

from FRA to Amtrak by October 1985.6

 FRA officials told us that at the time 

of this transfer, they generally considered the project to be complete in that 

additional funding for remaining major work elements was not envisioned. 

Although the project had achieved significant improvements to the entire 

Northeast Corridor, its principal focus had been on the south-end of the 

corridor because of the significant deterioration of the infrastructure on 

this segment of the line. An Amtrak official told us that the emphasis had 

been largely on addressing infrastructure maintenance and repair issues, 

not on enhancing the Northeast Corridor to accommodate high-speed rail 

service. Consequently, although the project met the 2-hour-40-minute triptime goal on the south-end of the Northeast Corridor between New York 

City and Washington, D.C., it did not meet either the 3-hour-40-minute or 

the 3-hour trip-time goals on the north-end of the Northeast Corridor 

between Boston and New York City. FRA attributed the failure to meet the 

trip-time goals for the north-end to a lack of funding, which prevented 

electrifying the line north of New Haven and making other improvements 

to track and structures. During the 1980s, funding for the project was 

reduced several times, and these reductions limited the scope of the 

project and led to the elimination of the north-end electrification work. 

In 1992, the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act (P.L. 102-533) 

required the Secretary of Transportation to develop a master plan for a new 

project, the goal of which was to provide intercity passenger rail service 

6

In September 1985, FRA entered into a grant agreement that transferred responsibility for 

the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project to Amtrak as of October 1, 1985. 
Page 10 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

between Boston and New York City in 3 hours or less. The act authorized a 

total of $470 million for fiscal years 1993 and 1994 to plan this effort and 

make capital investments. Amtrak established the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project in response to this act. In July 1994, FRA issued a 

master plan for the project that called for a series of improvements 

designed to meet the act’s 3-hour trip-time goal and permit initiation of 3-

hour service by 1999.7

 FRA estimated a cost of about $3.1 billion (in 1993 

dollars)8 for the project, of which about $1.9 billion (1993 dollars) would be 

required to achieve 3-hour rail service. The project was to be complete by 

the end of 2009. (See app. III for more information on the history of the 

Northeast Corridor Improvement Project and the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project.)

Since its inception in 1970, Amtrak has struggled to earn revenues and 

operate efficiently. These struggles have continued in recent years, leading 

to proposals for restructuring the provision of intercity passenger rail 

service. These proposals range from keeping Amtrak intact and providing 

increased funding to improve its equipment and infrastructure, to breaking 

Amtrak up and introducing competing rail service. The creation of a 

separate infrastructure company has also been proposed as a means to 

maintain and rehabilitate the Northeast Corridor and other infrastructure 

for providing intercity passenger rail service. Finally, a proposal has been 

made to delegate much of the responsibility for intercity passenger rail 

service to states and have states (acting through interstate compacts) 

provide a larger share of the funding and make decisions about intercity 

passenger rail service. As of September 2003, these proposals were pending 

before Congress. One or more of these proposals may influence how largescale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects are managed in the 

future.

The federal government is also likely to be involved in future large-scale 

intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects as high-speed rail corridors 

are developed around the country. As of January 2002, there were 10 

federally designated high-speed rail corridors nationwide. We reported in 

March 2001 that 34 states were participating in the development of highspeed rail corridors and that those states had invested more than $1 billion 

7

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, The Northeast 

Corridor Transportation Plan, New York City to Boston (July 1994). For purposes of this 

report, this plan is referred to as the “FRA master plan.”

8

This is about $3.6 billion in 2002 dollars.
Page 11 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

to improve local rail lines for that purpose.9 Federally designated corridors 

may be eligible for federal funds. The total cost to develop high-speed rail 

corridors is unknown. However, in April 2003, we reported that preliminary 

estimates of the cost to develop these corridors could be between $50 

billion and $70 billion over the next 20 years.10

Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement 

Project Has Not 

Achieved Trip-Time 

Goal

Amtrak has not met the goal of 3-hour rail service between Boston and New 

York City, although it has reduced the scheduled trip time from about 4 

hours in 1994 to 3 hours 24 minutes in 2003. To do this, it completed the 

first milestone in FRA’s 1994 master plan—initiate electrified train service 

between Boston and New York City—in January 2000, and it acquired 

enough high-speed trains to begin limited high-speed rail service in 

December 2000. However, it initiated these activities later than planned, 

and, according to the latest available data (from March 2003), nearly threequarters of the work elements (12 of 17 work elements) needed to 

complete the second milestone—initiate 3-hour service—are incomplete or 

their status is unknown.11 Progress toward completing the third and final 

milestone—completing infrastructure improvements designed to enhance 

track capacity and extend the life of existing track assets—has also been 

slower than planned. In total, as of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter rail 

authorities, and other stakeholders had completed 21 of the project’s 72 

work elements—51 were either incomplete or their status was unknown. 

Of these 51 work elements, according to FRA and commuter rail officials, 

several (such as realignment of curves) are important to achieving the 3-

hour goal. As of March 2003, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and other 

9

U.S. General Accounting Office, Intercity Passenger Rail: Assessing the Benefits of 

Increased Federal Funding for Amtrak and High-Speed Passenger Rail Systems, GAO-01-

480T (Washington, D.C.: March 2001).

10U.S. General Accounting Office, Intercity Passenger Rail: Issues for Consideration in 

Developing an Intercity Passenger Rail Policy, GAO-03-712T (Washington, D.C.: April 

2003).

11Status unknown means that either Amtrak did not know the status of the work element or 

we were unable to obtain information about a work element’s status from Amtrak or 

commuter railroads. It should be recognized that not all work elements might be of equal 

importance, scale, or complexity. For example, completing electrification of the line 

between New Haven and Boston (which is considered 1 work element) is significantly more 

important to achieving project goals and more complex than something like eliminating a 

railroad-highway grade crossing (which is also considered to be 1 work element). Also, as 

discussed later in this report, not all of the work elements were located on Amtrak-owned 

track.
Page 12 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

stakeholders had spent about $3.2 billion on the project. How much more 

work will be done is uncertain. Several Amtrak officials said that they 

consider the project complete, even though the 3-hour trip-time goal has 

not been met and many work elements are incomplete. Work is continuing, 

or is planned, for some of the master plan’s work elements, but there does 

not appear to be an effort to complete the project or meet the trip-time 

goal. 

FRA’s Master Plan Identified 

Milestones and Work 

Elements and Estimated 

Costs for the Northeast 

High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project

FRA’s 1994 master plan for the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project divided the project into three milestones and identified dates for 

their completion. These milestones were as follows:

• Initiate electrified service. This milestone consisted of 16 work 

elements12 and required the completion of such things as the installation 

of an electrification system between Boston and New Haven—the line 

between New Haven and New York City was already electrified—and 

the realignment of curves on the Boston to New Haven segment of track. 

According to the master plan, the installation of the electrification 

system was expected to take the most time, and its completion would 

control the achievement of the first milestone. FRA estimated this 

milestone could be completed by mid-1997.

• Initiate 3-hour train service. This milestone consisted of 17 work 

elements and required the completion of such things as the partial 

delivery of high-speed trains (at least eight trains were expected to be 

delivered to meet this milestone) and the realignment of curves between 

New Haven and New Rochelle. FRA anticipated the initiation of limited 

3-hour service between Boston and New York City in 1999, followed by 

full 3-hour service using all 26 high-speed trains in 2001.

• Complete capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements 

necessary to maintain 3-hour service. This milestone consisted of 43 

work elements and included the completion of several capacity 

enhancement and recapitalization projects, such as construction of 

12The total number of work elements for all three milestones is 76, rather than 72, because 

FRA counted 4 work elements twice—curve realignments, constructing high-level 

platforms, reconfiguring existing interlockings (places where trains can be switched from 

one track to another track), and constructing passing sidings—since they could help 

achieve more than one milestone. 
Page 13 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

passing sidings and the replacement of movable bridges—that is, 

bridges that can be lifted or pivoted to accommodate maritime traffic. 

This milestone was to be completed by the end of 2009 to accommodate 

projected intercity, commuter, and freight traffic levels in 2010.

To accomplish the project’s three milestones, FRA’s 1994 master plan also 

laid out the work elements in four categories. (See app. II for a list of all the 

work elements.) The categories were 

• trip time reduction—20 work elements were designed to reduce trip 

times through such efforts as electrifying the line from Boston to New 

Haven and acquiring high-speed trains; 

• capacity enhancement—18 work elements were designed to enhance 

capacity by, for example, reconfiguring interlockings to accommodate 

traffic growth; 

• recapitalization—15 work elements were designed to rebuild or extend 

the useful life of the infrastructure by, for example, replacing bridges;13

and 

• other—19 work elements, labeled as “other,” including fiber optic 

communications lines and pedestrian bridges, were designed to provide 

more general benefits to rail passengers and others. 

Under the master plan, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and state departments 

of transportation shared responsibility for implementing the work 

elements. According to FRA’s analysis, some of these elements exclusively 

or primarily benefited Amtrak’s intercity passenger rail service, while other 

elements primarily benefited commuter and freight rail service. 

The 1994 master plan recognized that completing the work elements would 

be expensive. FRA estimated that the work elements designed to reduce 

trip times, enhance capacity, and perform recapitalization work would cost 

about $3.1 billion (in 1993 dollars). This worked out to about $1.3 billion for 

trip-time reductions, about $600 million for capacity enhancements, and 

13These items were also to restore track and other infrastructure to a “state of good repair.” 

A state of good repair is the outcome expected from the capital investment needed to 

restore Amtrak’s right-of-way (track, signals, and auxiliary structures) to a condition that 

requires only routine maintenance. 
Page 14 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

about $1.2 billion for recapitalization. FRA did not include a cost estimate 

for the 19 other work elements.14 (See table 1.) Of the $3.1 billion cost 

estimate, FRA estimated that about $1.9 billion (about 60 percent) would 

be required to enable 3-hour service between Boston and New York City. 

The 1994 master plan also did not assign funding responsibility to 

particular organizations, but it did indicate that about 40 percent of the 

project’s estimated costs would cover work that would provide significant 

benefit to commuter railroads. The plan recognized that funding would 

come from a variety of sources, including direct appropriations to FRA, 

appropriations authorized under the Intermodal Surface Transportation 

Efficiency Act of 1991, and state and local governments. The plan further 

recognized that allocating funding responsibility and identifying funding 

sources would involve negotiations between relevant parties. 

Table 1: FRA’s Estimated Cost of the Project, by Major Category 

Source: GAO analysis of FRA data.

a

In 1993 dollars. 

b

Not available.

Amtrak generally agreed with FRA’s 1994 master plan in their written 

comments provided to FRA. However, in commenting on the plan, Amtrak 

did not agree with certain cost estimates or with all of the plan’s work 

elements that FRA identified as essential to achieve the 3-hour trip-time 

goal. For example, Amtrak did not agree that FRA should have included 

some capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements (such as 

the installation of concrete ties in commuter rail territory) in its estimate of 

the cost to complete the project. However, Amtrak recognized that both the 

14FRA indicated that the cost estimates were based on information provided by government 

agencies and the railroads themselves. For those work elements for which cost estimates 

were not directly available, FRA contractors developed conceptual estimates.

Dollars in millions

Work element Number of work elements Estimated costa

Trip-time reduction 20 $1,255.1

Capacity enhancement 18 606.4

Recapitalization 15 1,230.4

Other 19 b

Total 72 $3,091.9
Page 15 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

capacity enhancement and recapitalization work elements were ultimately 

essential to reliably and cost effectively support projected increases in rail 

service over the following 20 years. Furthermore, Amtrak said that to 

achieve a reliable 3-hour schedule it was not depending on improvements 

to the non-Amtrak-owned sections of track (such as those owned by 

commuter rail authorities) that FRA had identified as essential to achieve 

the 3-hour trip-time goal. Finally, Amtrak stated its expectation that 

improvements such as capacity enhancements would be funded by the 

state or local agency or organization primarily benefiting from the 

improvement, even if that agency or organization did not own the track. 

In subsequent discussions with Amtrak officials, they said that, while 

Amtrak had commented on FRA’s master plan during its development and 

acknowledged its issuance, Amtrak did not adopt the plan or manage its 

high-speed rail projects in accordance with it. According to Amtrak, the 

master plan was never intended by Amtrak, Congress, or FRA to be used as 

a “blueprint” or planning directive for the high-speed work and that the 

document, once released, was virtually obsolete. This contradicts 

information that was provided during our work. At that time, both Amtrak 

and FRA officials agreed that the 1994 master plan was a blueprint for the 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. A former Amtrak project 

director had told us that FRA’s plan could be considered a baseline for the 

overall project. 

Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project Has 

Not Achieved 3-Hour Goal 

and Is Far from Complete

Amtrak believed it could achieve a reliable 3-hour trip time by the summer 

of 1999—about 2 years earlier than FRA had projected in the master plan. 

Despite its belief that it could meet this goal by 1999, Amtrak has not yet 

done so, and progress on the project has been slower than FRA initially 

estimated. (See fig. 2.) As of March 2003, a total of 51 of the project’s 72 

work elements were not complete or their status was unknown. Most of 

these were in the third milestone. Although 49 of the project’s 72 work 

elements were supposed to have been completed before 2003, as of March 

2003, less than 40 percent (19 of the 49 work elements) had actually been 

completed by that date. In addition, 2 other work elements that were 
Page 16 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

scheduled for completion after 2003 were actually completed by March 

2003.15

Figure 2: Status of Work Elements Listed in FRA’s 1994 Master Plan, by Milestones, 

as of March 2003

Note: The total number of completed work elements shown in figure 2 is 22, rather than 21, because 1 

of the work elements that help to achieve two milestones (curve realignments) is partially complete 

(the portion needed to initiate electrified service) and partially incomplete (the portion needed to 

initiate 3-hour service).

15Of the 21 work elements completed by March 2003, all, or part of, 5 work elements were 

completed early—that is, ahead of their scheduled completion date. This included 1 work 

element (replace/upgrade overhead bridges in Rhode Island) that was completed in 1999—

about 10 years ahead of its scheduled completion date in 2009. It also included 1 work 

element—the track program (installation of concrete ties, track resurfacing, and ballast 

cleaning)—that was completed about 3 years ahead of its scheduled completion date. An 

Amtrak official told us that much of the track and infrastructure work was accelerated once 

delays in electrification began to occur.

Number of work elements

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Initiate electrified 

service in 1997

Initiate 3-hour service 

between Boston and 

New York City in 1999

Complete 2010 

requirements 

in 2009

Milestones

4

12

38

5

12

5

Complete as of March 2003

Incomplete or status unknown

Source: GAO analysis of Amtrak and commuter railroad data.
Page 17 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

According to the master plan, Amtrak was scheduled to complete the first 

milestone—initiate electrified service—by mid-1997, but it did not initiate 

such service between Boston and New York City until January 2000, and 

the electrification was not substantially completed until July 200016—about 

3 years later than expected. The electrification was delayed, in part, 

because Amtrak changed contractors in 1995 after the first electrification 

contractor went out of business and the contract was terminated. Amtrak 

then had to hire a new contractor to complete the work and lost about 2 

years in work time. As of March 2003, 4 of the work elements for this 

milestone were still incomplete, including the line electrification work 

element, for which final acceptance is still pending.17

Amtrak has yet to attain the second milestone—initiate 3-hour service. 

Amtrak did begin limited Acela Express high-speed train service in 

December 2000, but this service is scheduled to take 3 hours 24 minutes 

from Boston to New York, not 3 hours. The 3-hour goal has not been met, in 

part, because work elements on the 56-mile segment of track between New 

Haven and New Rochelle that is operated by Metro-North Railroad have not 

been completed. Amtrak did not believe work on this line segment was 

necessary to achieve 3-hour service. However, both FRA and commuter rail 

officials told us that work on this track segment is essential for achieving 

the 3-hour goal. Among the work elements that have not been completed is 

the reconfiguration of the New Rochelle (“Shell”) interlocking. Originally 

this was to include the construction of a “flyover” (elevated track), called 

the Shell Flyover. According to Amtrak officials, at-grade improvements are 

now planned rather than a flyover because of high costs. Work at New 

Rochelle is critical because of the severe train congestion in this area—

Connecticut Department of Transportation officials said more than 200 

commuter trains a day go through the Shell interlocking. As of March 2003, 

about three-quarters of the work elements (12 of 17 work elements) needed 

to reach this milestone were incomplete or their status was unknown. 

According to Amtrak, work on some elements under this milestone is 

actively under way. For example, the Stamford center island platforms 

were completed in the summer of 2003, and final curve modifications were 

16“Substantially complete” means that most of the construction work related to electrifying 

the line, such as installing foundations, erecting poles, and constructing electric substations 

and related facilities, had been completed. However, it does not mean that all the work was 

done or that there are no unresolved disputes concerning the work.

17For purposes of this report, we consider electrification incomplete since final acceptance 

of the system was still pending as of March 2003. It was still pending as of February 2004.
Page 18 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

under design. Amtrak said that this, in conjunction with completion of the 

Connecticut Department of Transportation’s catenary18 program would, 

among other things, allow it to travel 90 miles per hour between New 

Haven and New Rochelle and generate about 7 minutes of trip-time savings.

Finally, progress toward the third milestone—complete capacity 

enhancement and recapitalization work—has been slower than planned, 

and nearly 90 percent of the work elements for this milestone (38 of 43 

work elements) were incomplete or their status was unknown as of March 

2003. Of the 38 work elements that were incomplete or their status was 

unknown, 2 were related to trip-time reduction (a noise and vibration study 

and construction of a transfer facility at Kingston, Rhode Island), 12 were 

categorized as capacity enhancement (including construction of passing 

sidings), 10 were recapitalization (including bridge replacements), and 14 

were categorized as other (including construction of layover facilities and 

commuter parking).

As of March 2003, 15 of the 51 work elements (about 30 percent) that had 

not been completed or whose status was unknown were on track not 

owned by Amtrak. (See fig. 3.) Of these 15 work elements, Amtrak was 

expected to be the major beneficiary of 9. Some of these work elements, 

including certain curve realignments and track clearances, are critical for 

achieving the 3-hour trip time. For example, Amtrak is not currently able to 

use a key feature of the new high-speed trains—a mechanism that allows 

the trains to “tilt” and, therefore, take curves at a higher speed—in part, 

because track centers are too close on the segment of track between New 

Haven and New Rochelle. The Connecticut Department of Transportation 

and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of New York own this track. 

According to an Amtrak official, the tilt mechanism on the high-speed 

trains is turned off between New Haven and New Rochelle. FRA’s 1994 

master plan identified track curvature as the most severe constraint on trip 

time, and both FRA and commuter rail officials told us that curves on the 

north-end of the Northeast Corridor are a severe constraint on the 

achievement of faster trip times. 

18The overhead wire that delivers the electricity to the locomotive for traction, or 

movement. 
Page 19 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Figure 3: Geographic Location of Remaining Work Elements and Major Beneficiaries, as of March 2003

Note: The above does not include 18 work elements that were not geographically specific—that is, 

they applied to all or a portion of the track between Boston and New York City (e.g., electrification and 

acquisition of high-speed trains), or involved studies or actions not tied to specific geographic 

locations. 

Through March 2003, a total of about $3.2 billion (2003 dollars) had been 

spent on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project—or just less 

New York

New Rochelle

New Haven

Boston

Providence

New London

MTA

CDOT

MBTA

Number of incomplete 

work elements (4)

Number of incomplete 

work elements (14)

Number of incomplete 

work elements (4)

Number of incomplete 

work elements combined (11)

Commuter or freight major beneficiary

Work element with ...

Both Amtrak and commuter, or freight major beneficiary

Amtrak major beneficiary

Source: GAO analysis of Amtrak, commuter, and freight railroad data.

Amtrak

Amtrak

- 2 - 2

CDOT & MTA

- 3 - 3 - 5

- 6 - 2 - 6

- 3 - 1
Page 20 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

than 90 percent of the $3.6 billion (2002 dollars)19 project cost estimated in 

FRA’s 1994 master plan. Amtrak has spent about $2.6 billion20 and three 

commuter railroads, two freight railroads, and two state governments have 

spent about $625 million.21 Most of Amtrak’s spending was for the 

acquisition of high-speed trains and related maintenance facilities (about 

$1.1 billion),22 electrification of the route (about $717 million), and track 

and infrastructure projects ($652 million). (See table 2). Of the amounts 

spent by commuter and freight railroads and the state governments, the 

most—about $141 million—was spent by the Connecticut Department of 

Transportation to replace a bridge. The Connecticut Department of 

Transportation also plans to spend an additional $250 million to replace 

catenary between the New York/Connecticut state line and New Haven. 

19$3.1 billion in 1993 dollars.

20This figure does not include about $100 million in disputed costs between Amtrak and the 

electrification contractor.

21This represents information from Long Island Rail Road, Metro-North Railroad, the 

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, CSX Transportation Inc., Providence and 

Worchester Railroad, Connecticut Department of Transportation, and the Rhode Island 

Department of Transportation. 

22Of the $1.1 billion total for acquisition of trains, locomotives, and maintenance facilities, 

$753 million was financed. The $1.1 billion includes amounts spent for 15 high horsepower 

locomotives for non-high-speed train operations on electrified lines, and about $5.7 million 

for the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System.
Page 21 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Table 2: Amounts Spent by Amtrak on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project, by Category of Spending, as of March 2003

Source: GAO analysis of Amtrak data.

Note: The spending in this table is shown in the categories Amtrak used to track project spending. 

Although requested, Amtrak was unable to reconcile its categories of spending to the work elements 

and three milestones contained in FRA’s master plan.

While Amtrak did not track costs of improvements relative to the original 

projections, it is clear that the cost of some work elements was higher than 

expected. For example, the estimated cost of electrification increased from 

about $300 million in 1992 to about $727 million in 2003. (See fig. 4.) As of 

March 2003, Amtrak had spent about $717 million. According to Amtrak’s 

data, much of the cost increase (more than $200 million) was attributable 

to unexpected and unplanned items. Amtrak incurred approximately $120 

million in unplanned costs because, according to an Amtrak official, the 

contractor frequently revised the geographic location of the electrification 

work, and each revision triggered the need for safety protection work, 

called “flag protection,” that was provided by workers standing along the 

track and at highway-railroad grade crossings holding flags. Under 

collective bargaining agreements, Amtrak was required to advertise this 

work for 7 to 10 days so that its unionized employees could express their 

interest in doing the work. The extra time required for Amtrak to comply 

with this requirement delayed the electrification work and increased 

Amtrak’s costs. 

Dollars in milions

Spending category Amount spent

Acquisition of trains, locomotives, and maintenance 

facilities $1,127.2

Electrification 716.7

Track and infrastructure 652.1

Environmental impact statement mitigation activities 94.7

Product development 33.8

Total $2,624.5
Page 22 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Figure 4: Growth in Estimated Cost of Route Electrification, May 1992 to March 2003

a

The original contract was terminated in late 1995. Amtrak spent $16 million on this original contract. In 

subsequent bars the $16 million is included in contract 2 amounts.

b

Contract 2 was scheduled for completion in October 1999. 

Similarly, the cost of acquiring trains, locomotives, and maintenance 

facilities also increased, from an original estimate of about $186 million for 

26 trains in FRA’s 1994 master plan to about $800 million for 20 trains plus 

three maintenance facilities in 1996.23 Through March 2003, Amtrak had 

spent about $1.1 billion for these items. Amtrak attributed much of the cost 

23In June 1992, Amtrak had estimated a cost of about $450 million for high-speed trains.

312

16

321 337 337 337 337

37

161 173

176

89

173 173

214

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

May

1992

Dec.

1995a

Nov.

1997

Oct.

1999b

Apr.

2000

Mar.

2003

Dollars in millions

Original contract

Contract 2

Contract 2 modifications

Additional Amtrak costs related to electrification

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Source: GAO analysis of Amtrak data.
Page 23 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

increase to, among other things, the addition of the three maintenance 

facilities, various modifications to the trains, and a higher-than-expected 

bid to manufacture the trains. Amtrak also said that an additional $100 

million was incurred to add a second power car to each train (an extra 20 

power cars) to comply with new FRA passenger car safety standards. An 

Amtrak official said it was difficult to estimate the cost of trains, since the 

acquisition went from a relatively simple procurement of train equipment 

to a complex high-speed rail program that included the acquisition of 

equipment capable of traveling at speeds of up to 150 miles per hour. The 

acquisition cost of both the trains and maintenance facilities was financed, 

and debt service on this financing began in fiscal year 2002 and will 

continue through fiscal year 2023 for the high-speed trains and through 

fiscal year 2042 for the maintenance facilities unless an early buyout offer 

is exercised. Amtrak expects the interest on this financing to total about 

$426 million.24

Amtrak stated that FRA’s involvement with the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project also affected project cost and schedule. (See below 

for a discussion of FRA’s role in this project.) For example, according to 

Amtrak, the environmental impact statement that FRA developed for the 

project was over a year late and imposed significant and costly mitigation 

measures. Also, FRA’s new track standards required development of the 

technologically challenging and expensive Advanced Civil Speed 

Enforcement System—a system for automatic train control on the entire 

Northeast Corridor. Because all trains that operate on the Northeast 

Corridor would be required to use this system, Amtrak agreed to fund the 

equipment upgrades for various railroads that use the Northeast Corridor, 

including commuter railroads.25 Finally, FRA’s passenger car safety 

standards required the 20 additional power cars discussed above as well as 

an expensive crash-energy absorption system on the trains. FRA officials 

told us that Amtrak was intimately involved with development of the track 

and passenger car standards and that, in some instances, the standards 

were specifically developed to accommodate the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project. In general, FRA officials said there was no extra 

cost for Amtrak to comply with FRA’s new safety regulations. However, 

24This is interest on the permanent financing only. It does not include interest paid on 

interim loans used during construction of the equipment or facilities.

25According to an Amtrak official, phase I of this system was scheduled for completion in 

summer 2003 with phase II (to permit remote enforcement of speed restrictions) scheduled 

to be completed in 2005.
Page 24 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

they acknowledged the additional cost to develop the Advanced Civil 

Speed Enforcement System but said Amtrak could not operate high-speed 

trains without this system.

Some Consider Project 

Complete Even Though 

Work Is Not Finished

Several Amtrak officials told us that they consider the Northeast HighSpeed Rail Improvement Project complete, even though Amtrak has not 

achieved the 3-hour goal and the work is not finished. As of March 2003, 41 

of the work elements identified in FRA’s master plan were incomplete, and 

on an additional 10 work elements there was no information or their status 

was unknown. It is not clear how many work elements will be completed or 

whether Amtrak is committed to achieving the 3-hour goal. A former 

director of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project told us that 

Amtrak hopes to reduce the trip time to 3 hours 10 minutes in the future if 

funding is available. But the former director doubted there was much of a 

market for 3-hour service between Boston and New York City.26 In the past, 

however, Amtrak had stated that it was relying on meeting the 3-hour goal 

to help it attract the ridership and revenue needed to attain operational 

self-sufficiency, as called for in the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act 

of 1997.

27 As recently as 2000, the Chairman of Amtrak’s Board of Directors 

testified before Congress that Amtrak would achieve the 3-hour trip-time 

goal between Boston and New York City.

Although several Amtrak officials told us they consider the project 

complete, work is continuing, or is planned, for some of the master plan’s 

work elements. For example, Amtrak’s most recent 5-year capital plan 

(covering fiscal years 2004 through 2008), issued in April 2003, includes 12

of the 51 work elements in FRA’s master plan that, as of March 2003, were 

incomplete or whose status was unknown. These work elements consist 

primarily of replacing bridges, reconfiguring interlockings, and completing 

fire and life safety improvements in and around Pennsylvania Station in 

New York. Amtrak’s 5-year capital plan also contains $52 million through 

26Amtrak officials stated to us that they believe such a trip time is “achievable” with 

completion of the Metro-North improvements and completion of the Advanced Civil Speed 

Enforcement System.

27The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 prohibited Amtrak from using federal 

funds for operating expenses after 2002. The prohibition against using federal funds for 

operating expenses does not apply when Congress specifically appropriates funds for 

Amtrak to cover operating expenses in a particular year, as Congress did for fiscal year 2003 

(see the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003) and 2004. 
Page 25 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

fiscal year 2008 for the at-grade improvements at the Shell interlocking. In 

total, Amtrak’s capital plan budgets about $380 million for the work 

elements associated with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project. However, there does not appear to be an effort to complete the 

project or meet the trip-time goal, and Amtrak did not characterize its 

recent capital plan as encompassing the completion of the Northeast HighSpeed Rail Improvement Project. Rather, the plan was characterized as 

aiming to stabilize the railroad by returning its plant and equipment to a 

state of good repair, controlling operating deficits, and restoring liquidity.

Commuter rail agencies and state governments along the north-end of the 

Northeast Corridor also plan to continue some of the work associated with 

the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Commuter rail 

agencies and state governments we contacted said they planned to 

continue work on at least 20 of the work elements contained in the 1994 

master plan. For example, one commuter rail authority (Metro-North 

Railroad) plans to finish improving stations, rehabilitating movable bridges, 

and upgrading power, communications and signal systems. Two state 

governments (Connecticut and Rhode Island) said they plan to replace 

bridges and catenary on the New Haven rail line, as well as construct 

passing sidings and improve clearances for freight railroad operations. 

Commuter rail and state officials estimated that these work elements could 

cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Officials with the Connecticut 

Department of Transportation, for example, said their state plans to spend 

more than $800 million between 2003 and 2010 on at least 9 work elements 

associated with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, 

including bridge and catenary replacements and station relocations. 

Even though Amtrak has not reached the project’s 3-hour goal and many 

important work elements remain to be completed, Amtrak officials 

maintain that they achieved noteworthy successes, particularly in light of 

the challenges they faced. Noting that Amtrak does not own major portions 

of the Northeast Corridor, that freight and commuter rail operations 

continued throughout the life of the project, and that funding was provided 

annually in varying amounts, Amtrak officials consider the electrification 

of the Northeast Corridor a significant success. According to one Amtrak 

official, the entire project represents a success, because the Northeast 

Corridor now enables freight trains to operate at 30 miles per hour while 

intercity passenger trains travel up to 150 miles per hour. The official said 

that some states outside the Northeast Corridor that are considering 

upgrading their rail lines to accommodate both freight traffic and highspeed passenger trains have sought assistance from Amtrak. 
Page 26 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Amtrak Did Not 

Exercise Effective 

Management of the 

Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement 

Project 

Amtrak could have exercised more effective management of the Northeast 

High-Speed Rail Improvement Project had its management of the project 

been more comprehensive and had it focused greater attention on critical 

infrastructure issues needed to attain the 3-hour trip-time goal. Although 

FRA’s master plan laid out the blueprint for the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project, Amtrak did not adopt this plan and did not prepare a 

comprehensive management plan of its own. Instead, Amtrak generally 

focused on managing individual project components, particularly the 

electrification and acquisition of high-speed trains. Although Amtrak senior 

management obtained a substantial amount of information about these two 

aspects of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, it did not 

consistently use this information effectively to minimize the impact of 

problems on the overall project. Amtrak also relied on annual 

appropriations to plan work rather than on a more comprehensive financial 

plan that considered long-term funding needs. Finally, although Amtrak 

worked closely with stakeholders—commuter railroads and state 

governments—to coordinate some project work, it did not fully integrate 

their interests into project goals. The participation of stakeholders was, 

and continues to be, essential for completing work critical for meeting the 

3-hour trip-time goal.

Amtrak’s Project 

Management Was Focused 

on Selected Components, 

Not Attainment of Project 

Goals

Amtrak’s management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project contributed to its inability to achieve project goals. Project 

management was not comprehensive but rather was focused on selected 

components, not project goals. As discussed earlier, FRA’s 1994 master plan 

laid out the work elements needed to complete the project, estimated their 

costs, and identified those elements that would benefit Amtrak or others. 

However, Amtrak did not adopt this plan or manage to it. Instead, Amtrak 

focused on managing selected components of the project—primarily the 

work associated with electrifying the line between Boston and New Haven 

and acquisition of the high-speed trains. This occurred even though there 

were critical infrastructure improvements that were required in order to 

achieve the 3-hour trip time between Boston and New York City. Amtrak 

did not ignore infrastructure improvements, but as the project evolved, and 

costs increased and schedules slipped, the emphasis shifted to completing 

those infrastructure improvements required to begin electrified service 

between Boston and New York City, not those needed to achieve the 3-hour 

trip-time goal. As of February 2004, some infrastructure improvements 

(such as reconfiguring the Shell interlocking) that are critical to achieving 

the 3-hour trip time had not been completed.
Page 27 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Amtrak received a substantial amount of information about selected 

components of the project. Amtrak’s senior management and the Board of 

Directors received periodic information about the project, including 

monthly progress reports about the project. Amtrak also received monthly 

progress reports from the consortium manufacturing the high-speed trains. 

Amtrak used integrated program schedules that were updated monthly to 

visually depict start and end dates for various project tasks. Such 

information allowed Amtrak management to track work status and to 

identify actual or potential problems. For example, an October 1996 

monthly progress report on the high-speed trains noted that progress in this 

component was “significantly less” than had been planned, and by 

December 1996 the progress report noted that the high-speed train 

acquisition program was no longer likely to finish on time, even with 

planned late finish dates. 

Amtrak did not use the information it received to effectively manage 

problems that arose. While Amtrak attempted to take action to address 

various problems that developed, those actions did not prevent significant 

delays in completing either the electrification or high-speed train work. For 

example, in 1997 Amtrak proposed hiring a second contractor to help 

install electric pole foundations when installation rates decreased to an 

unacceptable level, and, in 1998, Amtrak made acceleration payments to 

help finish the electrification work. Despite these efforts, the line between 

Boston and New Haven was not fully energized until July 2000—about a 

year later than planned.28 Amtrak attempted to use recovery plans—plans 

designed to identify specific actions to be taken to get a project “back on 

track”—to address problems. But Amtrak did not assemble any programlevel (projectwide) recovery plan for the project as a whole. A former 

project director said a program-level recovery plan was not used because 

the components of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 

were not mutually dependent on each other.

Not assembling comprehensive project management or program-level 

recovery plans made it difficult for Amtrak’s senior management and Board 

of Directors to effectively manage the project and assign accountability for 

project results. A comprehensive project management plan similar to FRA’s 

1994 master plan could have allowed senior management and the Board of 

Directors to clearly understand the status of the project at any given point 

28As of fall 2003, the electrification work had still not been completed and Amtrak had not 

accepted the final system.
Page 28 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

and how problems in one project component could be affecting other 

project components. Such a plan could also have facilitated understanding 

how difficulties in one or more project components could affect the 

ultimate success of the entire project and achievement of project goals. For 

example, as noted earlier, FRA’s 1994 master plan identified the planned 

improvements to Metro-North Railroad’s New Rochelle interlocking (the 

“Shell interlocking”) as critical for achieving 3-hour service. Metro-North 

officials said that Amtrak did not work collaboratively with them on 

improving the Shell interlocking but instead imposed its own solution for 

improving the interlocking. In the late 1990s, cost increases to the proposed 

flyover led Amtrak to scale back its design to an at-grade improvement. 

Based on the documents we reviewed, it was not clear that Amtrak’s Board 

of Directors had an understanding of the effect of not completing either the 

Shell interlocking or other critical infrastructure improvements. Moreover, 

the lack of program-level recovery plans made it difficult to identify 

specific actions being taken to correct problems, who was responsible for 

these actions, when they would be completed, and expected outcomes. 

Such information was critical for maintaining accountability for the project 

and the conditions affecting the project’s outcomes. Again, project 

documents we reviewed did not indicate that Amtrak’s Board of Directors 

had a comprehensive understanding of project recovery efforts and 

expected outcomes.

Financial Management of 

the Project Was Also Not 

Comprehensive and Was 

Largely Focused on the 

Short Term

Amtrak’s financial management of the project was also not comprehensive, 

and it also focused primarily on the short term. Amtrak’s plans for financial 

management were similar to its project management plans, in that they 

addressed only individual work elements. In addition, these plans, which 

Amtrak called “spend plans,” were based largely on annual appropriations 

and focused on spending for a single fiscal year. Although the spend plans 

contained many of the elements of a financial plan—such as the total cost 

of each major work element in current-year dollars, a cumulative estimate 

of expected spending on each of these elements through the end of the 

current fiscal year, and the cumulative spending on each element to date—

they were not comprehensive and only allowed Amtrak to identify shortterm funding shortfalls for individual work components and not longerterm funding needs and potential shortfalls for the entire project. The 

spend plans also did not track the three milestones and 72 work elements 

laid out in the FRA master plan or incorporate funding needs and spending 

by non-Amtrak stakeholders, both of which would have allowed a more 

comprehensive financial management of the entire project and potentially 

linked spending to a “useful segment.” OMB defines a “useful segment” as a 
Page 29 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

component that either (1) provides information allowing an organization to 

plan the capital project, develop the design, and assess benefits, costs, and 

risks before proceeding to full acquisition, or (2) results in a useful asset 

for which the benefits exceed the costs even if no further funding is 

appropriated.

Not having a stable, long-term source of funding for the project contributed 

to the effects of Amtrak’s short-term approach to financial management. To 

fund its portion of the project, Amtrak relied on annual appropriations, and 

the amount of appropriations was not certain from year to year. Although 

direct appropriations for the project from 1992 through 1998 (when direct 

appropriations ended) averaged just under $200 million per year, they 

ranged from $250 million in 1998 to $115 million in 1996. According to 

FRA’s master plan, about $265 million per year (in 1993 dollars) would be 

needed from all parties from 1995 through 2001 to achieve 3-hour service. 

Both Amtrak and FRA officials told us that dependence on annual 

appropriations hurt the project, and one Amtrak official said this type of 

funding cycle constrained capital planning and financing for the project 

and focused on the short rather than long term.

Amtrak Worked With 

Stakeholders on Numerous 

Project Work Elements, but 

Did Not Fully Integrate 

Stakeholders’ Interests into 

the Project

Amtrak worked with numerous stakeholders on certain work elements, but 

did not fully integrate their interests into the project. Not fully integrating 

stakeholders’ interests—particularly, non-Amtrak track owners and users, 

such as commuter and freight railroads—into the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project hindered Amtrak’s achievement of the project’s 

goals, particularly along sections of the north-end of the Northeast 

Corridor that Amtrak does not own. In its 1994 master plan, FRA 

emphasized that it was critical for Amtrak to involve other stakeholders in 

planning, designing, and financing the project to ensure its completion and 

to achieve the 3-hour trip time between Boston and New York City. The 

1994 master plan also emphasized the importance of completing 

stakeholder-related work, including capacity enhancement, in order to 

ensure the future reliability of high-speed service in light of expected 

intercity and commuter rail traffic growth. According to Amtrak, one 

premise of the project laid out in the FRA master plan was that 

improvements made to benefit Amtrak were not to adversely affect other 

track users—that is, other track users were to be “held harmless” for these 

improvements. Amtrak officials said this premise significantly increased 

the importance of involving stakeholders. To help ensure that federal, state, 

and local concerns would be addressed, Amtrak established a project 

office in Old Saybrook, Connecticut.
Page 30 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Amtrak communicated with other Northeast Corridor track owners and 

users, holding regularly scheduled meetings and entering into work 

agreements with them. Amtrak worked with commuter rail and state 

officials to accommodate work that was required to begin electrified 

service between Boston and New York City. For example, Amtrak worked 

closely with MBTA on several work elements, including refurbishment of 

Canton Viaduct and construction of new platforms at the Route 128 

passenger rail station, to make sure electrified service could begin. Some 

officials we spoke with complimented Amtrak’s handling of stakeholder 

involvement. 

Yet other commuter rail and state officials believed that Amtrak did not 

fully integrate their interests into the project’s goals. For example, some 

track users alleged that after Amtrak obtained their agreement to proceed 

with the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, it managed the 

project with little regard for their interests. In their view, Amtrak did the 

work required to accommodate high-speed trains and reduce trip times, but 

it did little to focus on capacity enhancement or other work needed to 

accommodate expected growth in commuter and freight rail traffic in 

future years—a key aspect of FRA’s master plan for achieving and 

maintaining faster trip times. An official with the state of Rhode Island, for 

example, told us that Amtrak’s management of corridor improvements 

“bogged down” its efforts to complete their Freight Rail Improvement 

Project—a program to facilitate and grow freight railroad traffic in Rhode 

Island. Regarding the latter, Amtrak observed that this project was 

significantly behind in its development and that it paid to do preliminary 

design work related to the project in order to facilitate placement of 

catenary poles for the electrification work. Officials from Metro-North 

Railroad also told us that Amtrak’s agenda has generally been to take care 

of its own needs and spend money on its tracks, and commuter railroads 

could take care of their own needs. In their opinion, better cooperation and 

collaboration would have made the work go faster and more smoothly.

Completing the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project—

particularly the goal of 3-hour service between Boston and New York 

City—will continue to require collaboration between Amtrak and other 

stakeholders. Most of the work elements critical for achieving the trip-time 

goal that are not yet completed are on sections of track that Amtrak does 

not own, particularly on the 56-mile section of track owned by the 

Metropolitan Transportation Authority of New York and the Connecticut 

Department of Transportation. According to Metro-North officials, 

hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funds will be needed to 
Page 31 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

address infrastructure issues between New Haven and New Rochelle to 

achieve 3-hour service between Boston and New York City. They estimated 

that at least four bridges (costing $130 million to $150 million each) would 

require replacement and most of the 60 curves between New Haven and 

New York City would require modification. This might not only be 

prohibitively expensive but also potentially require property acquisition, 

which, because the track is in an urban setting, could be difficult due to 

existing development and involve significant condemnation issues. A 

Metro-North Railroad official estimated that gaining 1 minute or so in triptime savings could cost $200 million or more.

FRA’s Oversight of the 

Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement 

Project Was Limited

Although providing millions of federal dollars to the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project, FRA—the primary federal agency involved with 

the project—provided little oversight of the project, generally because its 

management adopted the position that it lacked legislative authority to do 

so. Instead, FRA saw itself only as a conduit for funds from the federal 

government to Amtrak—a role entailing far less oversight than the Federal 

Transit Administration’s role as the manager of a project management 

oversight program for the recipients of federal grants for major mass 

transit projects. FRA was also legally responsible for preparing 

environmental assessments for the project and developing track and 

passenger railcar safety standards, and it carried out these responsibilities. 

FRA officials said the agency provided little oversight because (1) it did not 

have the resources or the authority to change Amtrak’s project 

management, (2) Congress did not grant FRA specific legislative authority 

to conduct such oversight, and (3) FRA did not have a formal mechanism 

(such as a project management oversight process) for providing oversight. 

We agree with FRA’s view that it had limited authority to oversee the 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. For fiscal year 2003, 

Congress increased FRA’s responsibility to provide oversight of and 

accountability for federal funds used for intercity passenger rail service, 

but this responsibility extends only to fiscal year 2003 funds.

FRA Adopted Position That 

It Had Limited Authority to 

Oversee the Project

In general, FRA adopted the position that it lacked specific authority to 

oversee the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. According to 

the agency, its primary responsibility is to enforce federal law as it relates 

to railroad safety. To protect railroad employees and the public, FRA 

carries out this responsibility by developing and administering safety 

statutes, regulations, and programs; conducting research on railroad safety 
Page 32 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

and national transportation policy; and inspecting railroad track, 

equipment, signals, and railroad operating practices. It also plays a role in 

enforcing regulations applicable to the transportation of hazardous 

materials by rail. According to FRA officials, the agency did not have 

specific legislative authority to oversee the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project. Consequently, it did not have any particular 

authority to direct Amtrak’s management of the project by, for example, 

requiring Amtrak to prepare project management or finance plans.

FRA officials told us they saw themselves as responsible primarily for 

making federal funding available for the project. While FRA, as grantor for 

the government, is responsible for ensuring that grant funds are used for 

their intended purposes, FRA officials said they did not believe they were 

responsible for exercising any specific management oversight of 

continuing work on the Northeast Corridor improvements or for ensuring 

the success of high-speed rail after Amtrak assumed the responsibility for 

managing the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project in 1985. In their 

view, both of these responsibilities lay with Amtrak. Accordingly, FRA 

officials provided little guidance for planning or for assessing and 

mitigating risks to major capital rail projects after 1985—a position they 

believed was consistent with congressional direction that limited FRA’s 

oversight of grants to Amtrak before fiscal year 2003.

Under the 1985 grant agreement that transferred the Northeast Corridor 

Improvement Project to Amtrak, FRA retained responsibility to formally 

accept completed work and to audit the expenditure of funds to ensure that 

monies provided by the federal government were spent for their intended 

purposes. Amtrak was required to periodically provide reports concerning 

work status, budget, and accounting matters. Between 1986 and 1998, the 

grant agreement was amended 21 times. Some of these amendments added 

work covered by the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, such 

as the electrification work. In 1992, FRA and Amtrak amended the 

agreement to allow FRA to provide support to and coordination of the 

project. According to FRA, this included getting the environmental 

assessment started, preparing the 1994 Master Plan, and helping coordinate 

project activities among Amtrak, commuter railroads, and others. However, 

under the agreement Amtrak retained full authority to decide issues 

pertaining to property it owned and operated. 

Given these circumstances, we agree with FRA’s view that it was not 

authorized to exercise direct oversight of the project. Over time, Congress 

removed responsibility for the management and execution of 
Page 33 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

improvements to the Northeast Corridor from FRA and gave it to Amtrak. 

As part of the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980, Congress 

directed the Secretary of Transportation to enter into an agreement with 

Amtrak to reallocate authority and responsibility for track improvements 

connected with the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project and to 

transfer responsibility for the project to Amtrak by October 1, 1985. This 

transfer made Amtrak responsible for implementing project goals Congress 

had previously mandated, and thus relieved FRA of its responsibilities in 

this regard. Congress later imposed additional duties on the Secretary of 

Transportation in relation to Northeast Corridor improvements. For 

example, the 1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act directed the 

Secretary of Transportation to prepare a program master plan for 

Northeast Corridor improvements in consultation with Amtrak and 

commuter and freight railroads. Congress continued to reaffirm Amtrak’s 

central role in managing these improvements and high-speed rail work. 

Prior to 2003, there was no clear indication that Congress intended for FRA 

to reassume responsibility for conduct of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project. Rather, according to FRA, Congress intended for the 

agency to principally act as a conduit of project funds appropriated for 

Amtrak’s use. Therefore, we believe there is a basis in law for FRA acting 

primarily as a conduit of project funds and not to conduct oversight.

FRA’s limited oversight role contrasts with the stronger oversight role that 

Congress assigned to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) in 1987, 

when it directed FTA to establish a project management oversight 

program29 to better safeguard the federal investment in transit projects 

funded through the agency’s fixed guideway grants program (called the 

“New Starts” program).30 Under the project management oversight 

program, contractors serve as an extension of FTA’s technical staff to 

assess the project management and technical capacity of New Starts 

grantees and their capability to successfully implement major capital 

projects. In addition, contractors monitor projects to make sure they are on 

time, within budget, and in accordance with their plans and specifications. 

In 1998, FTA expanded its oversight efforts to include an assessment of 

29The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 authorized 

FTA’s project management oversight program. This program is codified at 49 U.S.C. §5327 

and implemented through regulations codified at 49 C.F.R. part 633. 

30New Starts is an FTA program for starting fixed guideway projects to fund up to 80 percent 

of the cost of transit system projects that use separate and exclusive rights-of-way, as well 

as for extensions of existing systems.
Page 34 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

grantees’ financial capacity and the financial impact of major projects on 

existing transit systems. These reviews, conducted by independent 

accounting firms, assess a grantee’s financial health and are performed 

before FTA commits funds for construction. The program is financed by a 

set-aside of funds available under various FTA programs.31 FRA does not 

have a project management oversight program similar to FTA’s. 

FRA Focused on 

Environmental and Safety 

Activities, Not Oversight

While FRA had little clear oversight responsibility for the project, it was 

involved with other activities, such as assessing the environmental impact 

of electrifying the line between Boston and New Haven and developing 

safety regulations for the high-speed rail service planned for the Northeast 

High-Speed Rail Improvement Project.32 Federal laws and requirements 

dictated FRA’s involvement with these activities: 

• Consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the 

Council of Environmental Quality’s requirements, FRA’s Procedures for 

Considering Environmental Impacts requires that either an 

environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement be 

prepared for all major FRA actions that could have a significant effect 

on the quality of the human environment. According to an FRA official, 

FRA prepared an environmental impact statement for the Northeast 

High-Speed Rail Improvement Project’s electrification work because the 

project was considered to be a “major action” that could have significant 

impact on the environment. 

• FRA, as the federal agency responsible for railroad safety, was also 

required to develop safety standards to facilitate the high-speed rail 

service planned under the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project. The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 199233 required 

FRA to review and revise its track safety standards. As part of this 

review, in July 1997 FRA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to 

31FTA’s project management oversight program is financed from 0.75 percent of funds 

available under 49 U.S.C. §5309, and 0.5 percent of funds available under 49 U.S.C. §5307 and 

§5311. In fiscal year 2002, FTA received about $29 million to conduct its project management 

oversight program.

32According to Amtrak, FRA had some involvement with the acquisition of the high-speed 

trains. This included numerous meetings between Amtrak and FRA officials and FRA 

participation in planning, requirements testing, and design work.

33As amended by the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994.
Page 35 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

amend its track safety standards to include new standards for track to 

be used by high-speed trains. The revised standards, made final in 1998, 

included three additional classes of track that would permit passenger 

rail trains to travel up to 200 miles per hour.34 FRA officials said the 

standards for high-speed rail service were developed at Amtrak’s 

request to accommodate train speeds of up to 150 miles per hour 

envisioned under the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project.

• In addition, the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 

required FRA to develop safety standards for passenger equipment, 

including passenger rail cars. Such standards did not previously exist. 

FRA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking establishing 

safety standards for passenger rail cars in 1996, a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking in 1997, and a Final Rule in 1999. According to FRA, these 

standards reflected the agency’s desire to ensure safety in the context of 

an ever more complex passenger railroad operating environment 

(including higher train speeds). These standards accommodate highspeed rail service. 

Apart from these activities, FRA’s direct involvement with the Northeast 

High-Speed Rail Improvement Project was limited, reflecting a decrease, 

FRA officials said, in the resources that FRA devoted to the project after 

the management of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project was 

transferred from FRA to Amtrak in 1985. At that time, about 50 to 60 

individuals who had been detailed to FRA to work on the Northeast 

Corridor Improvement Project returned to the Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA),35 and FRA closed its project office and reduced 

the number of FRA full-time employees working on the project from 

between 8 and 10 to less than 1. FRA officials said the latter individual was 

primarily responsible for monitoring the completion of outstanding work 

on the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, ensuring compliance with 

the final environmental record of decision, and serving as an ombudsman 

between FRA and Amtrak. In addition, this individual helped coordinate 

34Federal regulations currently have nine classes of railroad track (Class 1 through Class 9) 

that permit passenger trains to operate at speeds of between 15 miles per hour (Class 1) and 

200 miles per hour (Class 9). Track standards were prepared for speeds up to 200 miles per 

hour to accommodate the development of high-speed rail systems around the country.

35According to an FRA official, FHWA employees were detailed to work on Northeast 

Corridor Improvement Project activities because they had both engineering and 

infrastructure management expertise and because they would be needed only temporarily 

(up to 5 years), since the project was expected to be short term.
Page 36 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

the project with local agencies as well as commuter and freight railroads. 

Although FRA tracked federal spending on the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project and checked on project progress, agency officials 

said FRA’s authority to change how Amtrak managed this project was 

limited. FRA could raise matters of concern at meetings of Amtrak’s Board 

of Directors, they said, but the agency was one of seven votes and had no 

unilateral authority to change Amtrak’s decisions. Finally, FRA officials 

said, Congress did not specify a desire for them to be proactive in 

overseeing the project. Rather, in the officials’ view, FRA was to serve 

largely as a conduit of federal funds to Amtrak and little else.

Amtrak’s management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project was also subject to limited oversight from the Inspector General for 

Amtrak and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Inspector 

Generals. Although Amtrak’s Inspector General devoted 8 to 10 staff and 

created two groups to review the project’s activities, much of this work was 

specific to contract matters rather than program management issues. 

Amtrak’s Inspector General told us that ongoing claims disputes, criminal 

investigations, and litigation over the Acela Express trains have precluded 

his office from conducting broader audits of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project’s program management. In addition, he said that 

because the project is not yet considered complete, it would not currently 

be appropriate to conduct a programmatic review of the project. Amtrak’s 

Inspector General also told us there are certain lessons learned from the 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project that he has recently 

reinforced with Amtrak’s Chief Engineer. Similarly, DOT Inspector General 

officials said they had not conducted much oversight of the project either. 

The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 required the DOT 

Inspector General to annually assess the financial requirements of Amtrak. 

As a result, the office produced several reports on this issue. However, only 

one report issued by the DOT Inspector General directly addressed the 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. This report discussed the 

progress of the electrification work.36

In Amtrak’s fiscal year 2003 appropriations legislation, Congress adopted 

measures to increase the Secretary of Transportation’s responsibility for 

providing oversight of and accountability for the federal funds used for 

intercity passenger rail service. Among other things, these measures 

36U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Amtrak’s High-Speed Rail 

Electrification Project (December 1999).
Page 37 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

require that Amtrak transmit a business plan to the Secretary of 

Transportation and Congress, supplemented by monthly reports describing 

work completed, changes to the business plan, and reasons for the 

changes. The business plan was to describe the work to be funded using 

federal funds. Furthermore, on or after March 1, 2003, Amtrak was only 

permitted to use fiscal year 2003 and 2004 federal capital expense and 

improvement grant funds for purposes included in its business plans.37

Finally, Amtrak was required to agree to certain terms and conditions that 

would, among other things, improve its financial controls and accounting 

transparency and seek operating cost reductions. Although these measures 

acted to impact DOT’s role with respect to the expenditure of federal funds 

provided to Amtrak, the measures apply only to expenditures financed with 

fiscal year 2003 and 2004 funds and are not necessarily directed to the 

oversight of any particular infrastructure project that might be financed 

with funds provided prior to fiscal year 2003. FRA officials also said that 

the appropriations act did not provide any additional resources analogous 

to that given to FTA (such as a takedown from various program funds) to 

conduct oversight.

Best Practices 

Framework Would 

Support Effective 

Management of LargeScale Intercity 

Passenger Rail 

Infrastructure Projects

Through our work on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project 

and our analyses of reports and guidance published by our office, the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), FTA, and FHWA,38 we have 

identified key components of a best practices framework for effectively 

managing large infrastructure projects, including future intercity passenger 

rail projects. These best practices offer guidance for project managers and 

decision makers and include the following:

• Conduct comprehensive planning. Effective planning can include 

developing a preconstruction planning process, using the resulting 

preconstruction plans to implement a project, and evaluating the 

project’s success by comparing the actual results with those planned.39

37Additional restrictions were placed on grants to cover operating losses.

38See app. III for a discussion of the methodology we used to compile this framework and 

app. V for a list of best practices sources.

39Planning is linked to an organization’s strategic goals, which are based on a needs 

assessment that identifies the need for a project.
Page 38 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

• Assess risks and identify mitigation measures. Early identification and 

assessment of risks to a project allow for prompt intervention.

• Comprehensively manage the project’s finances. Tools for financial 

management can include project financial plans that provide for 

accurately estimating and effectively controlling costs.

• Establish accountability and oversight for prudent use of resources. 

Assigning responsibility for a project and tying its performance to pay 

and personnel decisions can help ensure accountability for the project’s 

results. Independent assessments of the project’s plans and 

implementation can provide oversight to help protect the federal 

investment.

• Incorporate the interests of diverse stakeholders. Coordination and 

communication with stakeholders, including states, communities, and 

others are important in identifying problems, reaching agreement on 

solutions, and avoiding delays. 

This framework applies to projects across their preconstruction, 

construction, and postconstruction phases (see fig. 5).
Page 39 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Figure 5: Best Practices Framework for Managing Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects

a

Preconstruction refers to the planning, preliminary engineering, design, and other work that precedes 

construction. Construction refers to the work involved in building a project. Postconstruction refers to 

evaluation of a project’s results.

b

Not applicable—postconstruction elements of risk assessment and financial management may be 

captured under project lessons learned or other categories.

N/Ab

N/Ab

Conduct preconstruction 

planning

Use project plans for 

implementation

Update project plans

Evaluate project, comparing 

results to planned outcomes

Identify project risks and 

develop mitigation strategies

Recognize problems and 

promptly intervene

Develop recovery plans if 

necessary

Review and refine cost estimates

Develop financial plans

Account for inflation and stability of 

funding

Control project costs to stay within 

planned budgets

Assign responsibility for project 

results.

Conduct independent 

assessment of plans and other 

preconstruction documents

Track project progress and 

monitor implementation. Tie 

project performance to pay and 

personnel decisions

Conduct independent 

assessment of implementation

Tie project performance to pay 

and personnel decisions

Conduct independent 

assessment of project results

Coordinate and communicate 

with stakeholders through 

project planning

Mitigate project impacts to 

stakeholders

Coordinate and communicate 

with stakeholders through 

implementation

Coordinate and communicate 

with stakeholders through 

postconstruction

Project Phasea Preconstruction Implementation - 

Construction

Postconstruction

EFFECTIVE PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Comprehensive 

planning

Risk assessment

Comprehensive 

financial 

management

Accountability 

and oversight

Stakeholder 

involvement

Source: GAO analysis of best practices literature.
Page 40 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Conduct Comprehensive 

Project Planning

Comprehensive planning serves as a foundation for effectively managing 

large-scale infrastructure projects, both for agencies or organizations that 

manage multiple capital projects and for individual projects. Such planning 

helps manage and control one or more projects’ implementation, costs, 

schedules, scope of work, and achievement of goals. As we reported in 

1998, a long-term capital plan documents the specific projects an 

organization intends to pursue and the resources it expects to use over the 

long term and establishes priorities for implementation.40 Officials from 

four Class I railroads we contacted prepare and develop multiyear capital 

plans that establish organizational priorities and assist in developing 

current and future budgets for the successful completion of capital 

projects.41 Plans for individual projects can take years to complete. For 

instance, preconstruction planning for the Alameda Corridor Project lasted 

more than a decade.42 However, the time spent on planning can help 

organizations and agencies avoid costs and delays later. Officials from the 

Alameda Corridor Project credited that project’s comprehensive, long-term 

planning process for helping them complete the 20-mile corridor within 

budget and on schedule. 

An important tool for comprehensive planning is the project management 

plan, which typically uses performance baselines for goals, costs, 

schedules, major milestones, and risks to manage and control a project’s 

implementation. Developing a project management plan focuses 

organizations, including those managing large-scale intercity passenger rail 

projects, on implementation issues early in the life of a project. These plans 

are not intended to be rigid, but rather, flexible and dynamic. During 

implementation, the plans are updated and otherwise revised to reflect 

changes in the project, such as changes in its cost, schedule, or scope of 

work. After a project has been implemented, its success can be measured 

by comparing its actual cost, schedule, and other outcomes with those that 

40See GAO/AIMD-99-32. 

41The four Class I railroads we contacted were the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 

Railway Co., Norfolk Southern Corporation, CSX Transportation Inc., and Union Pacific 

Railroad Company. In 2001, these were the four largest Class I railroads. For 2001, Class I 

railroads were those railroads that earned at least $266.7 million per year in revenue.

42Called the Alameda Corridor because of the street it parallels, the project created a 20-

mile, $2.4 billion railroad express line connecting the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 

to the transcontinental rail network near downtown Los Angeles. The project eliminated 

approximately 200 street-level railroad crossings, thereby alleviating congestion and 

improving mobility for cargo. 
Page 41 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

were planned. The recently introduced Passenger Rail Investment Reform 

Act (S. 1501) would similarly require organizations managing and receiving 

funds for intercity passenger rail capital projects to submit a project 

management plan for the Secretary of Transportation’s approval. 

To help ensure effective uses of federal funds, FTA requires grantees 

agreeing to federal fixed guideway project funds to develop project 

management plans as a condition of receiving federal financial assistance. 

These plans typically include budgets, implementation schedules, 

procedures for controlling documents and keeping records, reporting 

requirements, and cost and schedule controls.43 When project management 

plans are not developed or used, projects can encounter problems, such as 

cost overruns and schedule delays. As we reported in March 2000, the Bay 

Area Rapid Transit (BART) expansion project to San Francisco 

International Airport experienced costs that were $300 million more than 

estimated. According to FTA, this was in part due to management not fully 

committing to the project management plan.44 More specifically, managers 

did not update the plan or submit monthly budget and schedule updates. As 

a result, FTA said, cost and schedule trends were difficult to anticipate, and 

overruns were hard to manage effectively. 

Assess Risks and Identify 

Mitigation Measures

Risk assessments allow project managers to identify and manage risks 

related to a project’s costs, schedules, and other aspects and to develop 

mitigation measures that can increase the number of projects meeting 

established goals. Best practices suggest that managing organizations 

identify the risks to a project and their potential impact and then develop 

mitigation strategies. As we reported in 1998, early recognition of problems 

allows for prompt intervention, which increases the likelihood that 

corrective action will get the project back on track before there is 

significant deviation from its goals.45 Assessing and mitigating risks reduces 

the probability of later encountering problems that can cause cost 

43U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, EG&G Dynatrend Inc.,

Project and Construction Management Guidelines, 1996 Update (Wellesley, Mass.: June 

1996).

44U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Review of the Bay Area Rapid Transit 

District’s Airport Extension Finance Plan, GAO/RCED-00-95R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 

2000). 

45See GAO/AIMD-99-32.
Page 42 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

increases and schedule delays. Potential risks to projects include cost 

increases, funding reductions, schedule delays, and environmental, 

political, and legal issues. 

There are various techniques for performing risk assessments. Some of the 

Class I freight railroads we contacted (1) include a risk management group 

in planning a project to assess its risks, (2) conduct rigorous financial 

analyses, or (3) monitor monthly status reports to identify risks. FHWA and 

FTA suggest using what is called a critical path method to boost a project’s 

efficiency and predictability, thereby potentially reducing its risks. This 

method relies on computer technology to identify the most efficient 

sequence of events to complete the project over the shortest time. The 

computer technology identifies each task to be completed and calculates a 

set schedule (see fig. 6). Managers can then visualize the impact of 

potential delays on the project’s schedules and costs. 

Figure 6: Critical Path Method Graphical Representation of Project Schedule

Strategies for mitigating risks include developing recovery plans that may 

be integrated into the project management plan. Efforts to assess and 

mitigate risks can take place from the beginning to the end of a project. 

FHWA officials stated that no matter how much analysis is done before 

construction begins, unknowns can always threaten a project’s estimated 

costs, schedules, and goals. When risks start to affect a project’s progress, 

developing a recovery plan can help the managing organization reevaluate 

the project and outline changes to its scope, cost, schedule or other 

elements that will mitigate the negative effects of the risks. In the context 

of transit projects, FTA officials said recovery plans are not developed very 

Activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Planned schedule 

Sources: GAO and Nova Development (clip art).

Number of months 

Preconstruction

activities 

Construction activities

Postconstruction

activities 

Actual schedule 

Instances of deviation from 

planned schedule: opportunities 

to update plan to avoid cost and 

schedule overruns.
Page 43 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

often because FTA’s project management oversight process acts as a first 

line of defense to identify and address potential problems. However, when 

recovery plans are developed, they are intended to demonstrate a 

managing organization’s ability to complete a project, protect federal 

funding, and still achieve the project’s goals in the form of transit benefits 

to the community. Recovery plans help get a project “back on track” by 

considering potential changes to its management, engineering, funding 

sources, and other elements.

Comprehensively Manage 

Project Finances

Comprehensive financial management through accurately estimating and 

controlling costs helps to ensure efficient uses of funds. Estimating and 

controlling costs is important because the costs of large-scale 

infrastructure projects can increase significantly. Best practices suggest 

that managing organizations review and refine cost estimates as projects 

move closer to implementation to improve accuracy. A project financial 

plan, which shows a project’s estimated funding needs, funding sources, 

and funding responsibilities, is one tool for estimating and controlling 

costs. These plans enable project managers to compare actual costs with 

planned expenditures, identify deviations, and take actions to address 

potential problems. 

Because of the large federal investment in major infrastructure projects 

and the need to ensure sufficient funding to complete them, a financial plan 

may be required for a project to receive federal financial assistance. For 

example, since 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century has 

required recipients of federal assistance under Title 23, United States Code, 

to submit annual financial plans to DOT for projects estimated to cost $1 

billion or more.46 FHWA has developed guidance that requests that state 

financial plans include a total cost estimate for each project, annual 

updates and adjustments for inflation, estimates of future cost increases, a 

schedule for completing the project, a description of construction 

financing sources and revenues, a cash flow analysis, and a discussion of 

any other factors affecting the project’s cost. According to FHWA’s 

guidance, annual updates to these financial plans can also integrate 

changes in cost estimates that may arise as a project enters construction 

and its plans and designs are more complete. In July 2003, the DOT 

46U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal-Aid Highways: Cost and Oversight of Major 

Highway and Bridge Projects—Issues and Options, GAO-03-764T (Washington, D.C.: May 

8, 2003).
Page 44 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Inspector General testified before Congress that, in his opinion, financial 

plans should be prepared for projects costing $100 million or more.47

S. 1501 would require a detailed financial analysis to accompany grant 

requests for federal funds, plus a business plan describing capital and 

operating work to be funded, cost estimates, and a schedule for 

completion. Monthly supplemental reports to the business plans would 

also be required.

Accounting for the effects of inflation in a financial plan, as FHWA’s 

guidance directs, can increase the accuracy of a multiyear project’s cost 

estimate. Best practices suggest that cost estimates for multiyear projects 

account for inflation to avoid deviations between actual and estimated 

costs as years pass and the value of currency changes. The Boston Central 

Artery/Tunnel project,48 for example, which started in 1985, was originally 

expected to cost $2.6 billion, but as of May 2003, FHWA estimated that it 

would cost $14.6 billion—about $12 billion more than originally estimated. 

According to one FHWA official, about half of this cost increase can be 

attributed to inflation. Although inflation has generally decreased since the 

1980s, it can still have a significant impact on a project’s costs, as illustrated 

by the Central Artery/Tunnel project. 

A financial plan can also help control a project’s costs after construction 

has begun by estimating the amount of funding needed to complete the 

project and the availability of that funding. This information helps an 

organization and its contractors to assess the impact of changes that can 

cause a project’s schedules to slip and costs to rise. Particularly during the 

first years of a project’s development and construction, the funding 

received can be considerably less than the funding requested, especially 

when the funding is incremental—that is, the practice of providing budget 

authority for only a portion of a capital acquisition or part of a usable asset. 

As we have reported, incremental funding without the certainty of future 

47U.S. Department of Transportation, Controlling Costs and Improving the Effectiveness of 

Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration Programs, CC2003-148 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2003).

48The Central Artery/Tunnel project, an Interstate Highway System project in Boston is 

building or reconstructing about 7.5 miles of urban highways—about half of them 

underground. The project includes (1) extending Interstate 90 east, mostly in tunnels, 

through South Boston, under Boston Harbor (through the Ted Williams Tunnel), and to East 

Boston and Logan International Airport; (2) replacing the Central Artery—an elevated 

portion of Interstate 93 through downtown Boston—with an underground roadway; and (3) 

replacing the I-93 bridge over the Charles River.
Page 45 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

funding can result in poor planning, higher costs, delays, and even a 

project’s termination.49 We have advocated full funding of capital 

projects—that is, providing budget authority for the full costs of a capital 

acquisition or project at the time decisions are made to provide financial 

resources—as a way to increase the recognition of implied commitments 

embodied in budgetary decisions. Because a financial plan can 

demonstrate the need for funding at particular times and the impact of 

funding delays on the project’s costs and schedule, it can help an 

organization and its contractors stay within cost estimates and keep their 

project on schedule as well as determine full funding needs.

While incremental funding can create uncertainty and hamper planning, 

funding a project in meaningful phases can help to control costs. As we 

reported in 1998, best practices suggest breaking up a project’s capital 

planning and budgeting cycle into phases before, during, and—in some 

cases—after construction.50 Funding is provided for one of these phases at 

a time, and future funding is generally tied to achieving milestones. Under 

this approach, the initial design work can proceed far enough for higherquality, more reliable cost estimates to be available for decision makers to 

consider before deciding whether to complete the design and construct the 

project—and before a substantial federal investment has been made. OMB 

and a 2000 DOT task force have also recommended establishing separate 

funding categories for preconstruction activities before making a 

commitment to full construction.51 Some large-scale infrastructure projects 

are already funded in phases. For example, projects funded by FTA’s fixed 

guideway program (“New Starts”) are funded through federal grant 

agreements after preconstruction work has given decision makers a sense 

of a project’s costs, benefits, and financial viability.52

49See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

50See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

51Report of the ONE DOT Task Force on Oversight of Large Transportation Infrastructure 

Projects (December 2000).

52FTA terms these agreements “full funding grant agreements,” where funding is committed 

subject to annual appropriations. 
Page 46 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Establish Accountability 

and Oversight for Prudent 

Use of Federal Resources

Best practices suggest that organizations be held accountable for adhering 

to planned budgets and schedules, achieving goals, and other project 

outcomes in order to ensure the prudent use of federal resources. By 

monitoring a project’s performance against cost, schedule, and technical 

performance goals, as well as establishing incentives to meet those goals, 

organizations can increase the likelihood of the project’s successful 

completion. Organizations can also hold project managers and other 

personnel accountable for the project’s results. Some of the Class I freight 

railroads we contacted use internal sign-offs to assign responsibility for 

decisions about a project. They also often tie pay and personnel decisions 

to results. Under these decisions, project managers are held directly 

responsible for the project’s success or failure. Large-scale infrastructure 

projects can also face external factors during implementation, such as 

reductions in funding from federal, state, or local jurisdictions, that might 

affect accountability decisions. In such circumstances, external factors can 

be recognized and accountability can be maintained by developing a 

system that only holds project managers responsible for their particular 

actions.

Independent oversight of a project is a best practice designed to promote 

the prudent use of federal resources. Independent assessments help 

protect the federal investment in a project by reviewing the implementation 

of its plans, monitoring its construction, and reporting problems. One 

method of providing independent oversight is to use an approach similar to 

FTA’s project management oversight (PMO) program. As we reported in 

September 2000, this program has yielded benefits, including improved 

project controls and cost savings.53 For example, for one project in the San 

Francisco area, a PMO contractor’s recommendation led the grantee to 

appoint a coordinator and prepare a comprehensive project management 

plan that has improved the implementation of three interrelated projects. 

We also reported that the PMO program has been instrumental in providing 

FTA with a better understanding of issues surrounding complex 

construction projects and a better awareness of potential problems that 

could lead to cost increases and schedule delays.54 For example, PMO 

contractors assigned to three projects identified significant cost increases 

and schedule delays early in construction and helped FTA and the grantees 

53U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Project Management Oversight Benefits 

and Future Funding Requirements, GAO/RCED-00-221 (Sept. 15, 2000).

54See GAO/RCED-00-221.
Page 47 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

develop strategies to address these issues. In addition, financial 

assessments, also a part of FTA’s PMO program, have helped ease FTA’s 

concerns about grantees not having the capacity to complete new projects 

without adversely affecting their existing transit systems.

Incorporate the Interests of 

Diverse Stakeholders

Incorporating the interests of diverse stakeholders (including commuter 

and freight railroads and the public) into a project can increase its chances 

of success. This is especially important during the planning stages, when 

considering stakeholders’ interests can help project managers identify 

needs and problems and develop action plans to address them. Best 

practices suggest frequent communication and involvement through such 

means as meetings and correspondence. These approaches allow 

stakeholders like local governments and others to convey their concerns 

and problems and work with project managers to address them. 

Involving stakeholders in large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the 

Alameda Corridor Project, has shown positive results. This project 

developed community-based programs that provided business outreach, 

job training and development, and a conservation corps for community 

beautification. An official with this project said that managers frequently 

involved local jurisdictions along the route, and, in her opinion, their 

involvement helped achieve local buy-in and avoided delays through 

agreements that set the parameters of state and local reviews. For some 

highway and bridge projects, FHWA has included stakeholders by using 

neighborhood liaisons, community advisory councils, and public 

workshops. 

Conclusions Although federal investments in the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project have yielded infrastructure improvements and faster 

trip times, Amtrak did not act to comprehensively plan or manage the 

project. The trip-time goal has not been achieved, and work related to 

capacity enhancement and recapitalization is yet to be completed—much 

of which is on track Amtrak does not own and is critical if Amtrak is still 

planning to achieve a 3-hour trip time. Amtrak’s management approach and 

poor integration of stakeholder interests into the project contributed to the 

project not meeting its goals. For example, Amtrak did not develop project 

management or finance plans that could have been used to better control 

costs and schedule delays. Amtrak also could have done a better job of 
Page 48 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

integrating stakeholder interests into the project, which could have 

facilitated completion of work elements on track not owned by Amtrak. 

The lack of federal oversight also hindered the project’s successful 

implementation. As experience has shown with other federally financed 

infrastructure programs, including large transit projects, increased federal 

oversight has the potential not only to facilitate a project’s management but 

also to facilitate early intervention to correct problems once they develop. 

Oversight is critical for protecting federal investments in capital projects. 

The Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project’s performance has 

demonstrated that future large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure 

projects, including any future projects to recapitalize the Northeast 

Corridor, will require better management and oversight. In our view, these 

projects would benefit from a project management framework that is 

rooted in best practices, including comprehensive planning and financial 

management, risk assessment and mitigation, clear accountability and 

oversight, and incorporation of diverse stakeholders’ interests. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To ensure that any future federally funded major intercity passenger rail 

infrastructure projects that might be undertaken by Amtrak are 

implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible, we recommend that 

the President of Amtrak work with Amtrak’s Board of Directors to do the 

following:

1. Adopt policies and procedures for managing infrastructure projects 

that are based on best practices for managing large-scale infrastructure 

projects, and require adherence to such policies and procedures before 

approving or initiating significant changes to such projects. These 

policies and procedures should address the following:

• Preparation of comprehensive project management plans that are 

updated as needed.

• Preparation of comprehensive project financial plans that are updated 

at least annually.

• Requirements for assessing a project’s risks and the methodologies for 

performing such assessments. The assessments should be 

comprehensive and include those risks that can be reasonably foreseen 

before construction begins. When warranted, a risk assessment should 

be prepared before a project is approved and updated as conditions 
Page 49 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

indicate, and it should include measures to mitigate the potential 

identified risks. The risk assessment should clearly indicate the 

potential effects of the different types of risks that could be 

encountered, and especially how those risks could affect a project’s 

costs and schedules. 

• Preparation of program-level recovery plans. The policies and 

procedures should establish the conditions under which these plans 

would be prepared and the elements they would include.

• Mechanisms to ensure accountability for a project’s success. Such 

mechanisms should clearly indicate the individuals responsible for 

implementing the project, the expectations for their performance and 

the ways their performance will be measured, and the potential 

consequences for failing to meet expectations.

2. Adopt policies and procedures to help ensure that appropriate 

stakeholders, especially those external to Amtrak, are included in 

project planning, decision making, implementation, and, where 

appropriate, mechanisms to indicate stakeholders’ agreement with or 

approval of project management and financial plans.

To better ensure the future oversight of federally financed, large-scale 

intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Transportation seek legislation authorizing it to establish a 

project management oversight-like program to oversee these types of 

projects in the future. The legislation should do the following:

1. Specify the Federal Railroad Administration’s responsibilities for the 

oversight of federal expenditures on major intercity passenger rail 

infrastructure projects and permit as necessary, to oversee such 

projects, the establishment and implementation of a project 

management oversight-like program at the Federal Railroad 

Administration similar to that authorized by the Surface Transportation 

and Uniform Relocation Act of 1987.

2. Require the Federal Railroad Administrator to develop regulations for 

administering the project management oversight-like program and to 

specify the requirements for complying with such a program. 

3. Establish a funding mechanism to finance the program established by 

the Federal Railroad Administration. Among the mechanisms available 
Page 50 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

is direct appropriation or a statutorily limited set-aside of funds 

appropriated for designated Federal Railroad Administration programs.

To ensure that federally funded major intercity passenger rail 

infrastructure projects are implemented as effectively as possible and to 

better ensure the protection of federal investments in such projects, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Transportation, subsequent to a 

clarification of the oversight authority of the Federal Railroad 

Administration, direct the Federal Railroad Administrator to do the 

following:

1. Require managers of major intercity passenger rail infrastructure 

projects to adopt elements of the best practices framework, including 

the development of project management plans and financial plans and 

the assessment of risks to such things as the projects’ costs, schedules, 

and implementation and completion. The risk assessment should 

identify measures, as appropriate, to mitigate the risks.

2. Require managers of major intercity passenger rail infrastructure 

projects to monitor the projects’ implementation and, where 

appropriate, to develop project-level recovery plans once problems 

arise that threaten the projects’ costs, schedules, or implementation or 

completion. Each plan should identify, at a minimum, the actions to be 

taken, the individuals or organizations responsible for the actions, the 

expected outcomes, and an implementation time frame.

3. Develop guidance, based on best practices, and make it available to 

states, railroads, and others to assist in managing large-scale intercity 

passenger rail infrastructure projects. The guidance could cover the 

preparation of such things as project management and finance plans, 

risk assessments, and recovery plans that address issues that threaten 

projects’ costs, schedules, or implementation or completion. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to Amtrak and the Department of 

Transportation for their review and comment. Amtrak provided its 

comments in a letter from its President and Chief Executive Officer (see 

app. VI). In general, the President of Amtrak said that our report raised 

many of the issues that he has had to address since he took office and that 

on a regular basis he has had to deal with many of the consequences of 

decisions made during the life of the project. He further said that after he 

arrived he restructured Amtrak’s management and budget processes 
Page 51 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

because he believed that Amtrak had lost focus in a number of critical 

areas, including management of capital projects. In addition, he observed 

that as part of the management restructuring, project accountability, and 

budget-based financial reporting changes he has made since arriving at 

Amtrak in May 2002, Amtrak has incorporated many of the best practices 

discussed in our report. Amtrak did not comment on our specific 

recommendations directly but instead said they had incorporated many of 

the best practices as part of their management restructuring. FRA 

responded for the Department of Transportation and agreed with our 

recommendations and said that the Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act 

(S. 1501) incorporates many of our recommendations.

Amtrak stated that it was not in a position to provide specific comments on 

our findings or conclusions because of allegations related to ongoing 

litigation associated with the electrification and high-speed train 

acquisition activities of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project. Although Amtrak said it was unable to comment on our report 

because of matters under litigation, it believes our findings and conclusions 

are incomplete because we did not consider how the actions of contractors 

might have negatively affected Amtrak’s project management. For example, 

Amtrak believes the outcome of the Justice Department investigation of the 

electrification contractor would impact an assessment of its project 

management. In addition, Amtrak believes our reliance on FRA’s master 

plan to establish the criteria for costs and schedules in measuring their 

management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project was 

misplaced. We recognize that contractor actions can influence the 

implementation and management of capital projects. However, our work 

focused on Amtrak’s overall management of the project and the extent that 

Amtrak prepared and used comprehensive project management and 

financial plans in implementing the project, not the actions of contractors 

or the planning and implementation of specific project components (e.g., 

high-speed train acquisition). As our report notes, Amtrak did not have 

comprehensive project management or financial plans for the project—

plans that could have been used to better control costs and schedule 

delays. We also disagree that our use of FRA’s master plan to evaluate 

Amtrak’s management of the project was misplaced. The Amtrak 

Authorization and Development Act of 1992 required this plan. It 

represented a comprehensive program of improvements that would permit 

regularly scheduled, safe, and dependable rail passenger service between 

Boston and New York City in 3 hours. Although Amtrak agreed that this 

plan constituted a blueprint for the project, we found that Amtrak did not 

use this plan to manage the project or create its own comprehensive 
Page 52 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

project management plan. We do not believe that Congress meant for FRA’s 

plan to be ignored and not used in scoping and managing the project, 

particularly in the absence of an Amtrak prepared plan. 

Amtrak commented that it felt our conclusion about not fully integrating 

stakeholder interests was undeserved criticism. Amtrak said that it held 

countless meetings with stakeholders with often competing interests and 

entered into numerous agreements with them that specified their 

respective obligations and rights regarding work that was and was not 

contained in FRA’s master plan. While we recognize the work that Amtrak 

did with various stakeholders, including state departments of 

transportation and commuter railroads, we continue to believe that Amtrak 

did not fully integrate stakeholder interests into project goals. The FRA 

master plan highlighted the criticality of stakeholder involvement in 

achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal. Amtrak’s not achieving that goal is due, 

in part, to its inability to fully incorporate stakeholder interests into the 

project. Doing so could have identified stakeholder responsible work, the 

priority of such work, and required stakeholder financial contributions. 

Moreover, our report also states that some of the incomplete work 

elements on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project as of 

March 2003 that were critical to achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal were on 

stakeholder owned property. This included infrastructure improvements 

such as curve realignments and at-grade improvements at the Shell 

interlocking. Preparation and use of a comprehensive project management 

plan would have not only helped identify these projects but also ensured 

they were prioritized so that project goals could be met.

Amtrak also commented that our report failed to adequately account for a 

change in the trip-time goal for the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project and the effects this change might have had on 

Amtrak’s management of the project. Amtrak said that as early as 1995 it 

was assumed that the 3-hour trip time could only be achieved using a nonstop high-speed train from Boston to New York. Regularly scheduled 

service with intermediate stops was planned for 3 hours and 10 minutes. 

Amtrak also questioned whether the cost effectiveness of making the 

infrastructure improvements necessary to achieve a 3-hour trip time would 

currently be financially justified by the net ridership increase resulting 

from such a trip-time reduction. This contradicts information we obtained 

during our review. As the report notes, following enactment of the Amtrak 

Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, which prohibited Amtrak from 

using federal funds for operating expenses after 2002, Amtrak stated that it 

was relying on meeting the 3-hour trip-time goal to help it attract the 
Page 53 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

ridership and revenue to attain this goal. As recently as 2000, the Chairman 

of Amtrak’s Board of Directors testified before Congress that Amtrak 

would achieve the 3-hour trip-time goal between Boston and New York 

City. Such statements indicate that, rather than abandoning the 3-hour triptime goal, Amtrak continued to publicly represent until at least 2000 that it 

would attain this goal—a goal established by the 1992 Amtrak 

Authorization and Development Act. Finally, our work focused on Amtrak’s 

management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project in 

achieving the 3-hour trip-time goal. It was beyond the scope of this work to 

determine whether a 3-hour trip time should or should not have been the 

project goal or if further improvements would be financially justified in 

achieving this goal.

Finally, Amtrak commented that there was a need for dependable funding 

of capital projects. Amtrak’s President observed that the Northeast HighSpeed Rail Improvement Project suffered, especially in the early years, 

from a lack of certain and dependable federal funding and that the amount 

of financial support from year-to-year was inconsistent. In his opinion, the 

success of any future projects will require stable federal financial support 

and, without this, effective project planning and financial accountability 

would be extremely difficult. We agree that dependable financial support is 

important to the success of any capital project. However, as our report 

notes, comprehensive financial management is an equally important 

component in successfully planning and implementing capital projects. In 

particular, preparation and use of financial plans are important tools for 

estimating and controlling project costs. Financial plans are also important 

in demonstrating the need for funding at particular times and the impact of 

funding delays on project costs and schedules. We found that Amtrak had 

no comprehensive financial plan for the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project, and that Amtrak focused on the short-term, not longterm, funding needs of the project. Preparation and use of a comprehensive 

financial plan would not only have facilitated the effective use of the 

financial resources provided but also have potentially demonstrated the 

need for additional resources where warranted.

The Department of Transportation’s FRA said that it was in agreement with 

our recommendations. FRA noted that the Passenger Rail Investment 

Reform Act (S. 1501) would incorporate all of our recommendations by 

creating a program based on the Federal Transit Administration model for 

oversight. According to FRA, the structure of the capital program in S. 1501 

was closely modeled after the Federal Transit Administration’s Transit New 

Starts program. It will have the same sort of eligibility criteria, require the 
Page 54 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

same planning and analysis by applicants (including the development of 

project management plans with regular updates), and will include the same 

safety, procurement, management, and compliance reviews and audits as 

the Department undertakes with recipients of Federal Transit 

Administration funding. In addition, FRA said that S. 1501 proposes the 

same mechanism to fund the oversight of capital projects as used by the 

Federal Transit Administration, specifically authorizing the Secretary of 

Transportation to retain a portion of the grant to fund the Department’s 

oversight activities.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 7 days from the date 

of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of the report to 

congressional committees with responsibilities for intercity passenger rail 

issues; the President of Amtrak; the Secretary of Transportation; the 

Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration; and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-2834 or heckerj@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report 

included Matthew Cail, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Bert Japikse, Richard 

Jorgenson, Nancy Lueke, Steve Martin, and E. Jerry Seigler.

Sincerely yours,

JayEtta Z. Hecker

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 55 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To address the status of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project, we reviewed documents related to the project’s costs and 

schedules. These documents, obtained from Amtrak, the Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), and others, included spending plans, progress 

reports, and correspondence between Amtrak and FRA on the status of the 

project and related issues. With the assistance of Amtrak, commuter rail 

agencies, the Connecticut and Rhode Island Departments of 

Transportation, CSX Transportation Inc., and the Providence and 

Worchester Railroad, we also determined the status of the Northeast HighSpeed Rail Improvement Project’s work elements as of March 2003. These 

work elements appeared in FRA’s July 1994 master plan for the project. The 

information we compiled included, for each work element, the completion 

status, the actual or expected completion date, and the location of the work 

to be completed. Additionally, with the assistance of Amtrak, commuter rail 

agencies, the Connecticut and Rhode Island Departments of 

Transportation, and the freight railroads using the Northeast Corridor 

between Boston and New York City, we determined the amount of federal, 

state, and local funds spent on the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project through March 2003. To assess the reliability of the financial 

information obtained from Amtrak, commuter railroads, and others, we 

compared the financial data with original cost estimates and, to the extent 

feasible and appropriate, with contract documents. We found no obvious 

errors of completion or accuracy. In addition, we had extensive discussions 

with Amtrak and commuter railroad officials about project finances and 

our use of the financial data. Since the information was primarily used to 

illustrate the magnitude of changes in project and project component costs, 

we believe the data were sufficiently reliable for use in this report.

To address Amtrak’s management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project, we reviewed applicable law related to this project 

and to the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, as well as the 

legislative history of certain changes to the high-speed rail project. We also 

reviewed documents showing how the project was organized and managed, 

including project management schedules, information on the electrification 

and train acquisition contracts, and quarterly status reports. We also 

reviewed memorandums, letters, and other information about cost and 

schedule issues, including an Amtrak-acquired assessment of cost and 

schedule issues related to its acquisition of the high-speed trains. Finally, 

we discussed the project’s management and implementation with Amtrak, 

FRA, commuter rail agencies, and other officials. We did not evaluate how, 

if at all, alternative structures for providing intercity passenger rail could 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 56 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

affect the potential management of future large-scale infrastructure 

projects.

To address the federal government’s oversight of the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project, we reviewed FRA’s legislative and regulatory 

authority in relation to railroads, and to Amtrak in particular. We also 

reviewed the October 1985 grant agreement between FRA and Amtrak (and 

its subsequent amendments) to identify oversight and reporting 

requirements related to the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project and 

to the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. Finally, we 

reviewed information about FTA’s project management oversight program, 

including the applicable law establishing the program and how it is funded. 

We also reviewed previous GAO reports discussing the program, its 

implementation, and the benefits attributable to it. We discussed with 

Amtrak, FRA, and Inspector General officials from the U.S. Department of 

Transportation the oversight of the Northeast High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project and how this oversight was conducted. Our 

discussions with FRA officials covered their role in the Northeast HighSpeed Rail Improvement Project, their legal authority to oversee the 

project, how they exercised the oversight of the project, how oversight of 

the project changed after Amtrak assumed responsibility for improvements 

on the Northeast Corridor in October 1985, and FRA’s current authority and 

ability to oversee major passenger rail infrastructure projects.

To address the use of best practices as a framework for the management of 

large-scale passenger rail infrastructure projects, we conducted a literature 

search to identify best practices related to infrastructure management. The 

literature included previous GAO reports and guidelines on best practices 

related to the acquisition and management of capital assets. It also 

included publications from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 

the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and the Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA) addressing best practices and infrastructure project 

management issues. From this literature search, we compiled a list of best 

practices related to the management of large-scale infrastructure projects. 

We also discussed infrastructure management best practices with Amtrak, 

FRA, FHWA, FTA, and commuter rail officials. The Amtrak officials 

included managers and others associated with the Northeast High-Speed 

Rail Improvement Project. Finally, we discussed infrastructure 

management best practices with officials from four Class I freight railroads 

and the Alameda Corridor project in Los Angeles. We then synthesized this 

information into the best practices framework presented in this report.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 57 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

We do not believe that our review of Amtrak’s overall project management 

was materially or negatively affected by ongoing investigations and 

litigation. In November 2001, one of the contractors manufacturing the 

Acela Express trains (Bombardier) filed suit against Amtrak in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking damages for, 

among other things, Amtrak’s alleged interference with the manufacture of 

the equipment. In November 2002, Amtrak filed a countersuit against the 

manufacturers alleging, among other things, breach of contract. As of 

February 2004, these suits were still pending. In addition, Amtrak officials 

indicated that the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

were conducting investigations related to the contract for electrification 

work done under the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. As 

of February 2004, these investigations were also still pending. Nothing in 

this report is intended to have any impact on the outcome of these suits or 

investigations, and this work was not performed in relation to either the 

suits or the investigations. 

Subsequent to completion of our audit work, and in response to Amtrak’s 

October 2003 comments made on a draft of our report that, because of its 

concerns about the litigation, it had withheld critical documents during our 

work, Amtrak made available to us additional material related to their 

management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project. This 

included, among other things, monthly progress reports and quality 

manuals that were used for the electrification work and high-speed train 

acquisition, selected minutes from Amtrak Board of Directors meetings, 

and project schedules that were used to track the progress of various 

project components. We reviewed this material at both Amtrak’s HighSpeed Trainset office in Philadelphia and at Amtrak’s headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. We also interviewed a former manager of the Northeast 

High-Speed Rail Improvement Project who had not previously been 

available to us. We discussed with this individual Amtrak’s management of 

the project. We used this additional information to further assess Amtrak’s 

management of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project, the 

effectiveness of this management, and the extent to which Amtrak involved 

stakeholders in project management.

We conducted our work from November 2002 through February 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 58 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Appendix II

Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project Work Elements, by 

Category and Status as of March 2003 ApendxiI

Category Work element Status

Trip-time reduction

(Work elements either 

contributing directly to 

lowering trip time or 

permitting higher speeds.)

Realign curves Incomplete

Reconfigure Shell interlocking Incomplete

Stamford, Conn. station center island platforms Incomplete

Reconfigure New Haven, Conn., terminal area Complete

Reconfigure Old Saybrook, Conn., station Incomplete

Track program (installation of concrete ties, track resurfacing/relining, ballast 

cleaning)

Complete

Replace miter rails Incomplete

Canton Viaduct clearance improvements Complete

Install 25kV 60Hz center-fed system Incomplete

Provide clearance for electrification Complete

Noise and vibration mitigation program Incomplete

Install signal system compatible with electrification Complete

Extend centralized electrification and traffic control from New Haven to Providence Complete

Install positive stop/civil speed enforcement system Incomplete

Route 128 improvements Complete

Kingston, R.I., station intermodal transportation facility Incomplete

Construct Amtrak New Haven service facility Complete

Procure Amtrak high-speed trains Incomplete

Grade crossing elimination program Incomplete

Install approach warning signs and bells Complete
Appendix II

Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project Work Elements, by 

Category and Status as of March 2003

Page 59 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Capacity enhancement

(Work elements providing 

additional capacity to 

preserve the 3-hour trip time 

while accommodating higher 

intercity, commuter, and 

freight train frequencies.)

Penn Station—extend platform 11 (tracks 20 and 21) and 5x switch connection Complete

Reconfigure Harold interlocking Incompletea

South station capacity improvements Incomplete

Reinstall Devon, Conn., to New Haven fourth track Incomplete

Construct Shore Line East passing sidings Incomplete

Construct New London, Conn., to Providence, R.I., passing sidings Incomplete

Construct Providence to Boston passing sidings Incomplete

Shore Line East both sides fully accessible stations Incomplete

Provide third track for freight service Incomplete

Reconfigure existing interlockings Incomplete

Install high-speed universal interlockings Complete

Install gauntlet tracks Incomplete

Install new interlockings Unknown

Canton Junction, Mass., to Boston signal modifications Complete

Construct high level platforms Incomplete

Construct Amtrak Boston service facility Complete

Amtrak medium and heavy overhaul facility Unknown

Modify onboard cab signal equipment Unknown

Recapitalization

(Work elements to 

reconstruct or extend the 

useful life of the railroad's 

physical assets or to comply 

with up-to-date building 

codes.)

Pelham Bay Bridge replacement Unknown

Walk Bridge/Saga Bridge replacement Incomplete

Peck Bridge replacement Complete

Niantic Bridge replacement Incomplete

Groton Bridge replacement Incomplete

Convert open deck bridges Complete

Replace deteriorated bridges and culverts Incomplete

Replace/upgrade overhead bridges in Rhode Island Complete

Hellgate Line hanging beam removal Incomplete

New Haven Line substation replacement Incomplete

New Haven Line catenary replacement Incomplete

Commuter equipment testing Unknown

Fence selected sensitive areas Complete

Penn Station fire, life safety improvements Incomplete

Step and touch traction return mitigation Complete

(Continued From Previous Page)

Category Work element Status
Appendix II

Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail 

Improvement Project Work Elements, by 

Category and Status as of March 2003

Page 60 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Source: GAO analysis of Amtrak, FRA, and commuter railroad data.

a

According to Long Island Rail Road officials, this work element has been absorbed into another 

project.

Other work elements

(Work elements planned by 

participating organizations in 

addition to those in the 

above categories.)

Reconfigure Kingston station Unknown

Construct direct connection to Middleboro, Mass., secondary Unknown

Maintenance and operating costs allocation study Incomplete

Freight clearance improvements Incomplete

New Haven Line go/no-go signal improvements Complete

Install New Haven Line fiber optics system Incomplete

Install public address system Incomplete

Construct pedestrian bridges Incomplete

Shore Line East South Side station relocations Incomplete

Provide improved intercity and commuter parking Incomplete

Provide key station Americans with Disabilities Act access Incomplete

Construct Amtrak station improvements Incomplete

Construct Davisville, R.I., layover facility Unknown

Construct Readville, Mass., layover facility Unknown

Construct New Haven Line and Shore Line East New Haven car storage yard/New 

Haven Yard modifications

Incomplete

Construct Providence layover facility Incomplete

Construct Connecticut Department of Transportation New Haven shop Complete

Extend Shore Line East from Old Saybrook to New London Complete

Add Rhode Island Department of Transportation Kingston to Providence service Unknown

(Continued From Previous Page)

Category Work element Status
Page 61 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Appendix III

Methodology Used to Develop a Framework 

of Best Practices for Managing Intercity 

Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects ApendxiI

This appendix discusses our development of a best practices framework 

for the management of large-scale infrastructure projects, including how 

we defined and classified best practices, what reports and organizations we 

consulted, and what limitations apply to our framework. 

Definition and 

Classification of Best 

Practices

We defined best practices as those “practices successfully implemented by 

organizations recognized for their outstanding capital decision-making 

practices.”1

 Best, or leading, practices can provide a beneficial model for 

other organizations to use to improve efficiency and performance. In this 

case, best practices form a framework to boost efficiency and performance 

when managing large-scale infrastructure projects.

We identified 28 best practices related to project management and grouped 

these 28 best practices into five umbrella categories to create a framework. 

(See table 2.) These umbrella categories include (1) conducting 

comprehensive project planning, (2) assessing risks and identifying 

mitigation measures, (3) comprehensively managing project financing, (4) 

establishing accountability and oversight, and (5) incorporating the diverse 

interests of stakeholders. 

Table 3: Best Practices, by Framework Category 

1

See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

Conduct comprehensive project planning

Prepare written, comprehensive, long-term plan

Good data and information systems, in addition to effective information control systems, are essential to supporting sound capital 

planning and decision making

Establish goals; goals should be written, clear, and detailed

Establish project master schedule; set milestones and implementation dates

Project plan—a flexible and dynamic document that is reviewed and updated throughout project 

Project plan is used to manage and control project implementation; plan includes performance measurement baselines for scheduling 

and cost, major milestones, target dates, and risks associated with the project
Appendix III

Methodology Used to Develop a Framework 

of Best Practices for Managing Intercity 

Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects

Page 62 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Source: GAO.

Conduct risk assessments

Conduct risk analysis and manage risks through mitigation measures

Assess risks regarding schedule, cost, feasibility, and project failure

Determine how risk affects the technical, legal, political, social, and financial aspects of the project from beginning to completion

Conduct comprehensive financial management

Cost controls—techniques to restrain actual costs within the limits of the project budgets while satisfactorily accomplishing project 

objectives (critical during construction)

Consider full life-cycle costs of projects

Develop good, firm, reasonable, realistic cost estimates; maintain cost baselines

Incremental funding may result in project cancellation, schedule slippage, and rising costs; balance budgetary control and managerial 

flexibility when funding capital projects

Allow for inflation in multiyear projects; include all costs in year of expenditures

Encourage accountability and oversight

Adhere to planned budgets

Follow planned schedules with minimal revisions

Measure actual costs and schedules against those in project plan baseline; investigate deviations

Strengthen accountability for achieving goals

Can break up and fund project in separate phases; funding not guaranteed from one phase to the next (separate funding for planning)

Key management group functions as a single point-of-contact, and is responsible for project accomplishment

Establish incentives for accountability—tie performance to pay and personnel decisions

Hold project managers accountable for meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals

Monitor project performance against goals (cost and schedule)

Conduct independent assessments and/or reviews

Require reporting to external organizations

Incorporate stakeholder interests

Involve federal, state, local, interest groups, 3rd party service providers, public, and other stakeholders in strategic planning

Conduct public and community outreach, to include community wishes; satisfy objections; account for quality of life issues

Communicate frequently with stakeholders

(Continued From Previous Page)
Appendix III

Methodology Used to Develop a Framework 

of Best Practices for Managing Intercity 

Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects

Page 63 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Literature Reviewed 

and Organizations 

Contacted to Identify 

Best Practices

To identify the 28 best practices, we reviewed literature on, and 

interviewed organizations involved in, the management of large-scale 

infrastructure projects. This literature included previous GAO reports on or 

related to best practices; documents from OMB, FTA, and FHWA. We 

primarily relied on our 1998 Executive Guide: Leading Practices in 

Capital Decision-Making as a base for the framework.2 We supplemented 

this literature with material from FTA’s Project and Construction 

Management Guidelines, OMB’s Capital Programming Guide, and other 

sources.3

We also interviewed representatives of the following organizations to 

substantiate our selection of the best practices identified in the literature: 

• Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, 

• Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company,

• Connecticut Department of Transportation,

• CSX Corporation,

• Federal Highway Administration,

• Federal Railroad Administration,

• Federal Transit Administration,

• Long Island Rail Road,

• Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,

• Norfolk Southern Corporation,

2

See GAO/AIMD-99-32.

3

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, EG&G Dynatrend Inc.

Project and Construction Management Guidelines, 1996 Update (Wellesley, Mass.: June 

1996). Office of Management and Budget, Capital Programming Guide Version 1.0, Office 

of Management and Budget (Washington, D.C.: July 1997).
Appendix III

Methodology Used to Develop a Framework 

of Best Practices for Managing Intercity 

Passenger Rail Infrastructure Projects

Page 64 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

• Providence and Worchester Railroad,

• Rhode Island Department of Transportation, and

• Union Pacific Railroad.

Limitations Our report highlights the best practices we identified through our review of 

federal agency reports and interviews. As such, it is not intended to suggest 

that the identified best practices are the only methods for managing largescale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects or that other 

management methods are flawed. In addition, our best practices 

framework is not meant to be all-inclusive. There may be other best 

practices that would also be applicable to the management of large-scale 

infrastructure projects. Finally, difficulties in managing the Northeast HighSpeed Rail Improvement Project may have arisen even when best practices 

were used. Best practices serve as a useful framework for effectively 

managing large-scale intercity passenger rail infrastructure projects, but 

they are not meant to cover every aspect of project management and may 

not address all problems or difficulties that organizations encounter during 

project management. 
Page 65 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Appendix IV

Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Projects ApendxiIV

Although interest in improving passenger rail service on the Northeast 

Corridor dates to the 1960s, it was the Railroad Revitalization and 

Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act) that formally established the 

Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP)—a program of 

infrastructure improvements designed to enable high-speed passenger rail 

service between Boston and Washington, D.C. Among other things, the 4R 

Act established certain goals for NECIP and authorized Amtrak to make 

necessary improvements in its rights-of-way between Boston and 

Washington, D.C., to enable high-speed rail service. In particular, by 1981, 

Amtrak was to have achieved regularly scheduled and dependable intercity 

passenger rail service between Boston and New York City (called the 

“north-end” of the Northeast Corridor) in 3 hours 40 minutes, and between 

New York City and Washington, D.C. (called the “south-end” of the 

Northeast Corridor), in 2 hours 40 minutes. The act further directed the 

Secretary of Transportation to determine the practicability of establishing 

regularly scheduled and dependable passenger rail service between Boston 

and New York City in 3 hours, and between New York City and Washington, 

D.C., in 2 hours 30 minutes. The 4R Act authorized $1.75 billion to 

accomplish these goals. Congress appropriated about $1.5 billion for fiscal 

years 1976 to 1980.

FRA initially managed NECIP and developed a program of improvements 

that included rehabilitating and upgrading the line between Boston and 

Washington, D.C.; electrifying the line between Boston and New Haven, 

Connecticut; and rehabilitating and upgrading the track electrification 

system between New York City and Washington, D.C. It also included 

repairing, rehabilitating, or replacing bridges; eliminating most railroadhighway grade crossings; and improving stations. Amtrak was a 

subcontractor to FRA and was primarily responsible for track and signal 

work. The project was to be substantially completed by 1981.

The project began to experience problems early. In a February 1978 report 

to Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) concluded that 

because of funding problems and a need to better coordinate elements of 

the project with various users of the Northeast Corridor (such as commuter 

and freight railroads), it was not likely that NECIP would be completed by 

1981 and that additional investment in infrastructure improvements and 

passenger rail equipment would be required to achieve a 3-hour trip 
Appendix IV

Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Projects

Page 66 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

between Boston and New York City.1 In January 1979, DOT further stated 

not only that the project had been inadequately planned, but also that 

another $750 million would be needed to complete the project (for a total 

of $2.5 billion). Completion would be delayed until at least 1983.2

 In May 

1980, the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 authorized an 

additional $750 million for NECIP. It also required FRA to transfer 

responsibility for the project to Amtrak by October 1, 1985. The project’s 

legislative history suggests that Congress was concerned about the 

project’s schedule delays and growing costs. Congress was also interested 

in seeing the project completed by the transfer date.

Funding difficulties during the 1980s led to changes in the project. (See fig. 

7 for NECIP appropriations.) By January 1982, because of federal budget 

constraints, plans for the project had largely eliminated the construction of 

many larger-cost items, such as electrifying the line between New Haven 

and Boston. According to a former NECIP project director, these changes 

also resulted from a desire by the federal government to hold the project’s 

cost escalation to predetermined levels.

1

U.S. Department of Transportation, Two-Year Report on the Northeast Corridor (February 

1978).

2

U.S. Department of Transportation, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project, Redirection 

Study (January 1979).
Appendix IV

Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Projects

Page 67 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Figure 7: NECIP Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1976 to 1998

Note: In fiscal year 1998 direct appropriations for NECIP ended. However, after fiscal year 1998 

funding for the project was obtained from other sources, including the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. 

When FRA transferred NECIP to Amtrak in October 1985, FRA officials 

generally considered the project complete in that additional funding for 

remaining major work elements was not envisioned.3

 A total of about $1.2 

billion (out of the $2.5 billion authorized) had been spent on the project at 

the time of transfer. Although NECIP achieved significant improvements to 

the Northeast Corridor’s infrastructure and met some goals of the 4R Act, 

such as reducing the travel time between New York City and Washington, 

D.C., to 2 hours 40 minutes, it failed to achieve other goals, such as 

reducing the travel time between Boston and New York City to 3 hours 40 

minutes.4

 FRA primarily attributed this shortcoming to a lack of funds for 

electrifying the line from New Haven to Boston. Both FRA and Amtrak 

officials told us that NECIP had largely focused work on the south-end of 

the Northeast Corridor, not the north-end, because of significant 

3

Although NECIP was considered generally complete at the time of transfer, there were still 

a number of items, such as signal installation and construction of service facilities, to be 

finished. These were estimated to cost about $187 million. As part of the grant agreement, 

FRA required Amtrak to complete the construction of all elements of NECIP by September 

1988.

4

In November 1986, FRA reported that the trip time between Boston and New York City was 

3 hours 57 minutes. See U.S. Department of Transportation, Northeast Corridor: 

Achievement and Potential (November 1986).

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998

Years

Source: FRA.

Dollars in millions
Appendix IV

Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Projects

Page 68 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

deterioration of the infrastructure on the south-end resulting from years of 

deferred maintenance and neglect. In November 1986, DOT reported that 

when Congress authorized and funded NECIP in 1976, the Northeast 

Corridor had literally begun to disintegrate at both its northern and 

southern ends.5

Between 1985 and 1990, funding for NECIP decreased sharply. During this 

time, appropriations for the project averaged about $21 million per year, 

compared with about $250 million annually during fiscal years 1976 

through 1984. As the result of efforts by various organizations in the midand late 1980s, including the Coalition of Northeast Governors,6

 interest 

again rose in high-speed passenger rail service between New York City and 

Boston, because of its potential to mitigate increasing highway and air 

congestion, as well as air pollution levels. These efforts culminated in the 

1992 Amtrak Authorization and Development Act. The act required the 

Secretary of Transportation to develop a master plan for a coordinated 

program of improvements that would result in regularly scheduled, safe, 

and dependable passenger rail service between Boston and New York City 

in 3 hours or less. A total of $470 million was authorized for fiscal years 

1993 and 1994 to plan this effort and make capital investments. Congress 

actually appropriated $429 million. Amtrak established the Northeast HighSpeed Rail Improvement Project to implement this act.

In July 1994, FRA issued the master plan for the high-speed rail project 

required by the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act.7

 The plan 

established three milestones for the project: (1) initiate electrified train 

service between Boston and New York City, (2) initiate 3-hour train service 

between these cities, and (3) complete the infrastructure improvements 

designed to enhance track capacity and extend the useful life of existing 

assets. FRA identified 72 work elements to achieve these milestones. These 

work elements related to three main categories—trip-time improvement, 

capacity enhancement, and recapitalization of the infrastructure. The triptime improvements, which included electrifying the line between Boston 

5

See U.S. Department of Transportation (1986).

6

The Coalition of Northeast Governors is a nonprofit organization formed to facilitate 

communication between the governors of states in the Northeast. It conducts studies of 

various issues, including transportation. The states represented are those in the Northeast, 

from New Jersey to Maine.

7

U.S. Department of Transportation (1994).
Appendix IV

Brief History of the Northeast Corridor and 

Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Projects

Page 69 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

and New Haven and acquiring high-speed trains, were intended to either 

directly lower trip times or increase trains’ operating speeds. The capacity 

enhancements, such as reconfiguring “interlockings” (where trains can 

switch from one track to another track), were intended to maintain the 3-

hour trip time while accommodating the increased train traffic planned by 

Amtrak and other users of the Northeast Corridor. The recapitalization 

improvements, such as replacing various bridges, were intended to rebuild 

or extend the useful life of the Northeast Corridor.

FRA’s plan estimated that the total cost of the trip time, capacity, and 

recapitalization improvements would be about $3.1 billion (in constant 

1993 dollars) and that the project would be completed by January 1, 2010. 

Electrification was to be completed by the fall of 1997, and there was to be 

full 3-hour service between Boston and New York City in 2001. The plan 

assumed adequate funding from the federal government and users of the 

Northeast Corridor (such as commuter railroads), as well as close 

coordination of the project’s work elements between Amtrak and various 

stakeholders, such as states, transportation agencies, and commuter 

railroads. Coordination with stakeholders was particularly important, since 

(1) Amtrak did not own various sections of the north-end of the Northeast 

Corridor, including the sections between New Haven, Connecticut, and 

New Rochelle, New York, and between Boston and the 

Massachusetts/Rhode Island state line, and (2) there was significant 

commuter railroad traffic on the north-end of the corridor.

Amtrak was the manager of the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement 

Project and began work using both contractors and its own workforce. It 

relied on contractors primarily to electrify the line and manufacture the 

high-speed trains. Amtrak used its own workforce to perform 

infrastructure work, such as track improvements and signal work. Amtrak 

initiated electrified service in January 2000, even though the electrification 

work was not substantially completed until July 2000.8

 High-speed rail 

service was initiated in December 2000. Through March 2003, a total of 

about $3.2 billion had been spent—about $2.6 billion by Amtrak and an 

additional $625 million by commuter rail agencies and state governments.

8

According to Amtrak, as of March 2003, the electrification work had not yet been fully 

completed, since the corporation had not yet accepted the work and certified it as complete. 

In addition, there were a number of contract claims that had been filed but not yet settled.
Page 70 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Appendix V

Selected Sources of Best Practices for 

Managing Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects ApendxiV

GAO Products Federal-Aid Highways: Cost and Oversight of Major Highway and Bridge 

Projects—Issues and Options. GAO-03-764T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 

2003.

Mass Transit: Many Management Successes at WMATA, but Capital 

Planning Could Be Enhanced. GAO-01-744. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2001.

Executive Guide: Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making. 

GAO/AIMD-99-32. Washington, D.C.: December 1998.

Non-GAO Products U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. 

FHWA Major Projects–Resource Manual for Oversight Managers. 

Washington, D.C.: January 2002. 

http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/mega/mega.htm (viewed 5/19/03).

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. 

FHWA Guidance–Financial Plans. Washington, D.C.: May 2000. 

http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/contracts/fpgatt.htm (viewed 

5/19/03).

Office of Management and Budget. Capital Programming Guide Version 

1.0, Supplement to Circular A-11, Part 3: Planning, Budgeting, and 

Acquisition of Capital Assets. Washington, D.C.: July 1997.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration. EG&G 

Dynatrend Inc., Project and Construction Management Guidelines, 1996 

Update. Wellesley, Mass.: June 1996. 
Page 71 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project

Appendix VI

Comments from the National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation ApendxiVI
Appendix VI

Comments from the National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation

Page 72 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project
Appendix VI

Comments from the National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation

Page 73 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project
Appendix VI

Comments from the National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation

Page 74 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project
Appendix VI

Comments from the National Railroad 

Passenger Corporation

(544059) Page 75 GAO-04-94 Northeast Corridor Project
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