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" 
VIETNAM STUDIES 

THE ROLE OF 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

1965-1967 

by 

Majo,- Geneml Joseph A. McClnistiall 

DEPARTMEN T OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.G. , 1994 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 74-600003 

FirSl Printed J971-CMH Pub 90-19 

.-or ... I~ by the StII)fnn",nd~tII or I>oo;umc"u,. u.s.. c:o.~rn",en' !'riming Office 

W;u.hing'on, O("~ w.m 
Foreword 

The United Slates Army has mel an unusuall y compl ex 

challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other serv ices, 

the Army has fought in SUppOTl of a national policy of assisting an 

emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its own 

choosing, free of olltside coercion. In addition to the usual 

problems or waging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast 

Asia has required su perimposing the immensely sophistica ted tasks 

of a modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and 

adapting them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These 

involved helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population , 

dealing with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and 

conducting conventional campaigns agai nst well-trained and determined regular units_ 

It is Slill necessary for the Army to continue to prepare 

for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizan t that 

history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited 

from trying to meet a ne\v cha ll enge in terms of the old one, the 

Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its 

experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories 

will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in 

Southeast Asia, we have sough t a forum whereby some of the more 

sa lient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At the 

requeSl of the Chief of Staff, a represen tative group of senior officers 

who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still carry a 

heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepared a series of 

monographs. T hese studies should be of great va lue in helping the 

Army deve lop future operati onal concepts while at the same time 

contributing to the historical record and providing the American 

public with an interim report on the performance of men and 

officers who have responded, as others have through our history, to 

exacting and trying demands. 

The reader should be reminded that most or the writing was 

accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the 

monographs frequently re fer to events of the past as if they were 

taki ng place in the present. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on official 

records, with additional ma terial from pu blished and unpublished 

secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

III 
participants. and from the personal ex pericnce of the author. To 

facilitate security clearance. an notation and detailed bibliograpby 

have been omitted from th e published version ; a fully documented 

account with bibliogy-aphy is fi led with the U.S. Army Center of 

Military History. 

Major General J oseph A. McChristian is particularly well 

qualified to write of the role of military intelligence in Vietnam 

from 1965 through 1967 . During that period he served on the staff 

of General William C. Westmore land as Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Intell igence. U.S. Military Assista nce Command. Vi etn am. 

GeneraJ McChristian 's background in military intelligence is 

one of long and distinguished service. After World War II he 

served as Third U.S. Army Assista nt Chie f of Staff for In telligence 

under General George S. Patlan , as Third Army Deputy C-2, and 

as Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. Forces. Austria. In 1948 he 

was assigned to the Intelligence Di\'ision of the Department of the 

Army General Staff. tn 1949, during the Greek·Communist War, 

General McChristian became a member of the first J oint U.S. 

Military Advisory Group in Athens and, later, from June 1956 

through May 1960. he sen 'ed as U.S. Army Attache to Greece. From 

J anuary 1962 through February 1963 Gencral McChristian was 

assigned to the Office of the Assistan.t Chi ef of Sta ff for Intelligence. 

Department of the Army, where he was Ch ief of the \Vestern 

Division of Foreign Intelligence. From April 1963 through June 

1965 he served as U.S. Army, Pacific. Assistant Chid of Staff for 

Intelligence at Fort Shafter. Hawaii; from th ere he went to 

Vietnam. In August 1968 he became Chief of Army Intelligence. 

General McChristian retired from acti ve dULY in 197 1. 

Washington. D.C. 

15 December 1975 

IV 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General. USA 

The Adjutant Genera l 
Preface 

As General Westmoreland's intelligence officer from 13 July 

1965 until I June 1967, I am happy to report on the role and 

development of military intelligence in the Republic of Vietnam 

duri ng that period. I do so with respect and admiration for the 

Vietnamese, Koreans, Australians. and Americans who made up 

that great intelligence learn. 

Man y members of that learn assisted me in the preparation of 

this aCCOllnt. I know they. as I, feel a warm sense of satisfactio n III 

passi ng on to you some of the knowledge we gai ned. 

The story that foll ows is mine. I am solely responsible for its 

content. It is not a complete history: slich an undertaking is beyond 

the purpose and scope of this monograph. M y purpose is to record 

the deve!opmclll and the role of intelligence in Vietnam, not only 

for students of intelligence but also for planners and decision 

makers who depend upon intelligence in order to arrive at sound 

decisions. I have limited the scope of my account to a discussion o( 

some of the major intelligence activities developed in su ppo rt of 

the mission of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vi etnam, with 

consideration of why and how we developed what we did plus 

lessons learned along the way. 

First, I will identify the challenge. Second, will address 

developing the organization. Third, I will discuss United SlatesSouth Vietnamese combined military intelligence activities. And 

then, in tum, I will cover intelligence operations, intelligence 

producti on , counterintelligence. and intelligence suppOrt activities. 

~fy last chapter will summari ze lessons we learned. 

The task of writing this monograph was greatly fa cilitated by 

the [ollowing dedicated professionals wh o served with me in 

Vietnam and who subsequentl y provided input, suggestions, and 

advice in its prepara tion. I thank them for their in valuable 

assistance and loyalty, and I remember each with admiration and 

respect: Colonel Frank L. Scofield, U.S. Air Force: Colonel William 

H. Crosson, U.S. Army; Colonel Robert E. McMahon, U.S. Army; 

Colonel Glenn E. Muggel berg, U,S. Army; Colonel John T. Little, 

U.S. Army: Colonel Robert F. Robens, U,S. Army; Colonel John J. 

Morga n, U.S. Army; Colonel Frank L. Schaf, Jr. , U.S. Army: 

Colonel Robert Churley, U.S. Marine Corps; Colonel Ralph T . 

Hunt, U.S. Army; Colonel J erry Dismuke, U.S. Air Force: Colonel 

C. M. Smith, U.S. Air Force; Colonel Donald T. Ketcham. U.S. 

Army; Colonel Stone \V. Quillian, U.S. Marine Corps; Colonel 

v 
Gains B. Hawkins. U.S. Army; Colonel Ralph H . Groover, Jr., U.S. 

Army; Colonel Walter R. Pierce. Jr., U.s. Army; Colonel Silas E. 

Chumley, U.S. Army; Colonel Coleman Noahson. U.S. Army; 

Lieutenant Colonel AUlmer Ackley, Jr., U.S. Army; Major James 

D. Strachan, U.S. Army; Major James E. Crouch, U.S. Army; 

Sergeant Major Vince LeBlanc, U.S. Army; Master Sergeant Clyde 

F. Jepson, who, serving as my enlisted aide, conscientiollsly and 

loya lly saw to it thal in all matters relating to subsistence, quarters. 

health, sanitation, uniforms, and equipment I never had a worry; 

Colonel Gains U. Hawkins and Lieutenant Colonel Lyle K. 

Alexander for their assistance in assembling information and 

drafting this report; and Mrs. Helen Worden for her cheerful help 

in editing and typing Illy final draft 

Washington, D.G. JOSEPH A. McCHR1STlAN 

15 December 197~ 'i\1ajor General, U.S. Army, Retired 

VI 
Contents 

Chapla- Page 

I. INTRODUCTION B 

The Challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

Intelligence Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 

Evolutiot! of the Military Assistance Commaml 

I ntelligence Orgatlizatio11 . ............. ' 12 

II. COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 21 

The Combined Intelligence Coticepi . ... . .. .. . .. 2 1 

The Military InteLLigence Detachment Exchange 

Program. . . . . .. .. .. . .. . . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. . . .. 24 

The Combined blterrogatioll System. . . . . . . . . . .. 26 

Combined Document Exploitation .. . . . . . . . . . . .. 32 

Combined Materiel Exploitation. . . . . ... . . . .. .. 40 

The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam. . . .. 45 

The Sector Intelligence Support Program. . . . . ... 64 

The Combined Intelligence StaD ............... 7 1 

III. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE .. . . . ...... . .... . ... . 94 

IV. 

AeTjal Recomlais,mnce ami Surveilla'ice . . . . . . . . .. 95 

Operations ................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 106 

Exploitation Division . ..... " ........ . ........ 11 3 

Operation Cedar Falls ..... . ... . ....... . . . .... 116 

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION ..... .. .. . .... ' . 126 

Developmetlt and Publication 01 the Military 

Assistance Command Order 01 B(laie Summary.. 129 

Development and Publication 01 Infiltration Sta· 

tistics ..................................... 13 1 

Publication of Enemy Tac/ics Studies ........... 132 

Aerial Rice Survey of IV Corps Tactical Zone .... 134 

The Comhi'led Iliteiligence Cetller Imagery In· 

terpretation Photo Study Program . ........... 136 

V. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE .............. . ..... 138 

Developing the COImteritilellige1lce Effort . ...... 138 

COllfllerintelligetlCe Operations . ............... 139 

Security 01 Military Itllormaliotl .......... 142 

Commutlicatio7ls Security ...........•... .. .... 146 

vii 
VI. INTELLI GENCE SUPPORT ... . .... •... .. .. •.... 148 

Management ... .. . . .......... . . .. •..... . .. . . 148 

PlatlJ (Hid T rai7l hlg ....... • , .' ....•...... • .... 155 

~Veat r . . ........... . .... . . . .•.• . . . ........ 156 

VII. SUMMARy ........................ . ...... . ..... 157 

IfPfumiix 

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

E. 

E. 

G. 

H. 

1. 

J. 

J- 2. Military Assistance Command, Staff Officers, September 1965-March 1967 160 

J- 2. Military Assistance Comma nd. St.aff. May 

1967 ......................... . ..... . ..... 161 

Military Intelligence Orga nization, 1967 . ....... 162 

Military Intelligence Unit Commanders. Mid1965-Mid·1967 163 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Military 

Intelligence Detachment Division (Airborn e -

Mari ne Brigade) .......................... 164 

Compatibility of J- 2, Joint General Staff, and 

J- 2, Military Assistance Command 165 

Summary of Briefing on Vi et Cong T axa tion .. .. 166 

I. Fi,W11U {Hid Eco"omic Secti01I . .. . .. ... 167 

2. I mpact of Vi et Cong Taxes. . . .. . . .. ... 168 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Intelligence 

Organiza ti on ....... . ..................... 169 

Intelligence Structure, 2d Air Division .. . . .. . ... 170 

Intelligence Structure. Naval Forces, Vi etnam .... 171 

GLOSSARy .......................................... 172 

INDEX 175 

No. Chans 

I. Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, Staff Organization, July 

1965 ............................. . .... .. ..... 12 

2. J-2 Staff Organization, October 1965 15 

3. Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2, Staff Organiza tion, May 

1967 ..................... . .............. . .... 17 

4. 525tl1 Milita ry Intelligence Croup . .. .. . . . . . . .. .. . .. 20 

5. Organiza tion, Combined Military Interroga ti on Cen· 

ter, May 1967 . . . ..... .. ............. . .... . ... . 27 

V11I 
No. 

6. Organization, Combined Document Exploitation Center, May 1967 ................................. 34 

7. Organization, Combined Materie l Exploitation Center _ 4 1 

8. Organization. Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam _ 48 

9. Sector Combined Intelligence Operations _ .... _ .. .... 70 

10. Flow Chart, Combined Intelligence Staff _ ... __ ..... ' 73 

11. Organization, Combined Intelligence Staff ... _ ... .. .. 74 

12. Data Base Input (eICV) ... _ . _ ........... _.. . .. .. 75 

13. Joint Air-Ground Operations System .. . . . . . . . .. 97 

Illustrations 

Major General J oseph A. McChristian .... _ ........ .. _ .. 

Returnees \\Tere Separated From Prisoners .......... . . _ .. . 

Returnees Were Normally Interrogated in an Informa l Selting ... _ .......................................... . 

A Qualified U.S. Interroga tor Who Cannot Speak Vietnamese Questions a Source With the Help of a Vietnamese 

WAC Interpreter .... . ...... . ....................... . 

Interrogators Received Training by Sitting in on Interrogations ............................................. . 

Inner Compound at CMIC ............................ . 

CDEC Translators ...................... . ............. . 

Materiel of Interest to the General Supply and Equipment 

Section of CMEC Was Screened in Detai l .............. . 

Tactica l Scale Studies Were Used in Planning Operations .. . 

American and Vietnamese Intelligence Specialists Examine a 

Captured Enemy Rocket Launcher .................. _ .. 

Imagery Interpreter Removes Photocopy Produced by the 

Itek Variable-Width Viewer With Printer ............. . 

Police Field Force Fonnation at the National Police Compound in Saigon ...................... ............. . 

U.S. Operational Unit Commander Brids Vietnamese Police 

Officer ............................................ . 

Screening Center Is Established With Photographs and 

Blacklist of Known Viet Cong ............ . ........... . 

Search T eam in Operation With Scout Dog and U.S. Security 

Element . ........................ _ ................ . 

Scout Dog With Handler Searching Exterior of Dwelling ... . 

Search Team at House With U.S. Security Element on 

Lookout .............. . . .. ......... . ... . .......... . 

Police Field Force Scout Dog Handler and Searcher 

IX 

5 

30 

31 

32 

33 

35 

37 

43 

54 

56 

59 

79 

80 

80 

81 

81 

82 

82 
Search Element With U.S. Security Guard Leaving a 

Dwelling Aber Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 83 

Police Field Force Entering House To Cond uct Search . . .. . . 83 

Screening Area Was Established at a Centra l Location 

Within the Hamlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 84 

Screening Center in Operation .......................... 84 

Vietnamese and U.S. Officers Checking Identification of a 

Detainee ........................... . ............... 85 

Police Field Force Reviewing Photograph Album. .. . . .. . .. 86 

Vietnamese Police Officer Checking Identification of a Suspect. 86 

Additional Checks of Identification Papers by Vi etnamese 

Police Officials at Screening Center. . . .. . . .. .. . . .. . . . . .. 87 

Police Field Force Checking Hamlet Inhabitants Against 

Photographs of Viet Cong Suspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 

U.S. RepTesentative From Combined Intelligence Staff Conferring With U.S. Officer in Charge of the Cordon and 

Search Operation .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 88 

Detainee Being Questioned by Police Field Force Personnel. . 88 

Vietnamese Officer in Charge Instructing New Officer on 

Procedures of the Screening Center.. . . .. . .. . ... .. .. . . .. 89 

U.S. Civic Action Officer Giving Treats to lhe Ch ildren. . . .. S9 

Viet Cong Suspect Being Questioned by Vi etnamese Police 

Officers of the Combined Intelligence Staff. .. . . . . .. . . .. 90 

Two Suspects Are Detained ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 90 

Nha Be Desk Team .. ..... " ........ . .... " . . . . . . .. 91 

Vietnamese Clerk Is Taught Proced ures for Completing 

Automatic Data Processing System Forms ........ ' .. . . .. 91 

Vi etnamese Chi ef of lhe Combined Intelligence Staff Can· 

ferring With Deputy From the Office of the Special 

Assistant, U.S. Embassy ................... ' . . . . .. . .. .. 92 

Combined Intelligence Staff Commun ica tions Section. . . . ... 93 

Oi An Desk Team ....................... . .. ' . .. . . . .. .. 93 

Task Organization for II Field Force, Vietnam, for Operation 

CEDAR FALt..(j ............................. ' ..... " ... li S 

Task Organizations for CEDAR FALLS ''''ere Deployed Within 

Striking Distance of the Iron Triangle .................. 119 

Whil e the 11th Armored Cavalry Drove West, the 1st Division 

and Inld Brigade Were Airlifted Into Landing Zones. . 119 

Anvil or Blocking Force for CEDAR FALLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 120 

Hammer or Striking Force for CEDAR FALLS ............... 120 

Prisoner of War Collection Point for the lst Infantry DiVISion ... . .. " .. . . .. .. .. . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . . • .. . . . . . . . 122 

All Civilians in the CEDAR FALLS Area of Operations Were 

Detained .... " ... ... . . . . ... ' .. . . ... .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. 122 

x 
THE ROLE OF MILIT AR Y 

INTELLIGENCE 

CHAPTER I 

Introduction 

The Challenge 

"Find the enemyl" With these words General Harold K. 

Johnson, then chief of the staff of the Anny, wished me well as 

I lert Washington to become Ceneral William C. Westmoreland's 

assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the Republic of Vietnam. 

Combat intelligence was not new to me. I knew that finding the 

enemy was only part of the challenge. Our soldiers would have 

to fix and fight him. They would need to know enemy strength, 

capabilities. and vulnerabilities as well as information on the 

weather and terrain. Such intelligence had to be timely. accurate, 

adequate, and usable. It was to be my job to build an organization 

to meet that challenge. 

After a series of briefings in Washington and goodby~ in 

Fort Shafter, Hawaii, I was on my way to serve my country in a 

third war, albeit in an advisory role. or so 1 thought. I had just 

completed two years as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 

U.S. Army, Pacific. During those two years I had traveled from 

Singapore to Korea visiting United States and allied intelligence 

activities, including those in SOllth Vietnam. On my last visit there 

I had presented a study to General Westmoreland and his intelli· 

gence staff on my concept for the Army intelligence organization. 

From Saigon I had gone to Bangkok and presented a similar 

briefing. I was familiar with the situation in Southeast Asia. I 

knew that the Viet Cong had better intelligence than we; however, 

I knew there was much more information available to us if we 

had the resources and organization to acquire it. The counter· 

insurgency in Vietnam had unusual intelligence potential in that 

many enemy military and pOlitical organizations were relatively 

stationary and had assigned areas of operations. We could focus 

our intelligence efforts on those areas if we knew their locations. 

During my Right from Honolulu to Sa igon I wrote two questions 

in my notebook: "Where can I normally expect to find the enemy?" 

and "Where can I normally not expect to find the enemy?" During 

that night I wrote scores of answers to each question-every possi. 

bility that occurred to me. Later in Saigon we were to refine and 
4 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

reduce the answers to a few elements on which timely and adequate 

information was available. This became the basis fOT the pattern 

analysis technique methodology which permitted us to identify 

and locate enemy base areas. Consequently, we could focus most of 

our colle<:tion efforts on about 20 percent of the country. This 

step was important in achieving economy of intelligence effort. 

I arrived in Saigon on 29 June 1965. My first days in South 

Vietnam were spent visiting the fi eld and allcnding briefings. 

Major General Carl Youngdale, U.S. Marine Corps, was the 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. 1- 2, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vi etnam (MACV). We were scheduled to have 

an overlap of about two weeks. On 13 July. the day that Lieutenant 

General Carroll, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

arrived in Saigon, orders were issued assigning me as )- 2. While 

J was waiting at the airport for General Carroll's plane to arrive, 

a messenger from MACV headquarters informed me that the 

Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert S. McNamara, was to arrive on 

16 July. J was scheduled to preselll the lead·off briefing on in· 

telligence. Upon returning to MACV headquarters with General 

Carroll I learned that Mr. McNamara wanted to know what reo 

sources we needed, not as advisers but to help fight the war. 1 

had been the J-2 for only a few hours as an adviser. Now we were 

at war. We had much to do in a short lime. The challenge before 

me was laking shape-to develop and supervise a U.S. Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, combat intelligence organization. 

During the period between my assignmelll as J-2 and the arriva l 

of Mr. McNamara in Saigon, my sta ff and I prepared an intelligence 

bri efing and together with the Ail Force and Navy staffs developed 

a list of illlelligence units and resources required to support the 

new combat mission of the MACV commander. Colonel William 

H . Crosson, the chief of intelligence production, told me that he 

could not write a valid estimate of enemy capabilities and vulner· 

abilities because available intelligence was neither timely nor 

adequate and we were unabl e to evaluate much of it for accuracy. 

However, he could write a situation report, and did. The contents 

of that briefing turned out to be unimportant. Mr. McNamara 

was interested in learning what we needed in order to do our new 

job. As I started the briefing he quickly interrupted and asked my 

views on what was needed to improve intelligence. As a result of 

that hour-long disClIssion he asked that a detailed plan be provided 

to him the next day on my proposals to improve interrogation 

activities. The briefing pointed up the need for eva luating in-
INTRODUCTION 

formation, for separating fact 

from fiction. It further clarified 

the challenge: we did not have 

the means. 

\Vhile pan of my staff prepared the briefing, I worked 

with others to develop for Mr. 

McNamara a "shopping list" of 

intelligence resources required. 

I learned early that we were 

starting our planning from 

scratch. No plans or planning 

guidance concerning the tran· 

sition from an advisory organi. 

zation to a combat organization 

existed within the J-2 staff. 

From the Operations Director· 

ate, J-3, staff I learned that they 

MAJOR GENERAL 

JOSEPH A. MCCHRISTIAN 

5 

had done some planning. They had a computer run of a list of 

troops under consideration. I asked that a listing of all intelli· 

gence units and intelligence.related units be extracted; however, 

the existing com pUler programming could not do so. The officer 

in charge of this activity was not knowledgeable concerning intelligence units except for detachments assigned to divisions. Tt 

was apparent that the force structure under consideration did not 

provide adequately for intelligence. This experience revealed the 

need for computer programs to be designed to extract intelligence 

and intelligence-related data and for the intelligence staff to participate in force structure planning. No plans were available to 

J-2. The challenge continued to grow. 

For the next several days we received necessary guidance. My 

staff and I developed the organization and resources that wou ld be 

required to support Ollr combat mission. That mission was clear: 

we were to help the South Vietnamese fight a war to defend them· 

selves and at the same time help them to build a nation. 

In order for the MACV commander to have adequate intelligence to conduct a defense of South Vietnam we had to consider 

a geograph ica l area of intelligence interest much larger than that 

country itself. Not only must we concern ourselves with intelligence 

on the military, paramilitary, logistical. and political organizations 

of the enemy within South Vietnam, but we also had to concern 

ourselves with the location of enemy forces, logistical supplies, 
6 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

base areas, sanctuaries, trails, Toads. and rivers located within 

Cambodia and Laos as well as t1uoughout North Vietnam. We 

had to concern ourselves with the air space extending miles beyond the borders of South Vietnam in order to prevent surprise 

air attack. We were concerned with patrolling the South China Sea 

bordering South Vietnam and the extensive waterways within the 

Mekong Delta which were aven ues of approach for logistical 

support and reinforcements fOT the enemy. Our future organization and requests for resources had to take into consideration our 

need to collect. evaluate, and produce intelligence on all of those 

areas. We needed to know the quantity and quality of war 

materials being supplied by China and the Soviet Union and 

her satellites. We needed to be kept informed of any changes of 

Chinese military forces which could influence the war in South 

Vietnam. Above all, we needed lO know the quantity and quality 

of manpower the enemy could send to South Vietnam and the 

will of North Vietnamese leaders and soldiers to persist. 

It was apparent to me that a large and sophisticated organiza· 

tion would be required. I fully expected that the United States 

would be involved in combat and later in military assistance for 

many years. I was convinced that our military assistance would be 

required until security permitted pol itical stability. I knew from 

my experiences in the Greek Communist War and my later service 

there as the military attache, as well as from our experiences in 

Korea. that many years would pass before South Vietnam could 

defend itself. It takes a long time to identify and eliminate in· 

surgents. The challenge was clear. the opportunity to demonstrate 

our professionalism at hand. Now was the time to apply the 

principles we had learned. 

Tntelligence Philosophy 

Sound decisions depend upon timely. accurate. adequate. and 

usable information. Wartime decisions carry great responsibility; 

they affect not only the lives or our fighting men but also the 

liberty of our people. Decision makers ask questions for which 

they need answers. In the military, such questions are referred to 

as essential elements of information (EEl). The number of such 

important questions should be kept to a minimum. Actually, all 

decision makers from the Commander in Chief in the White House 

to the company commander in the field constantly need extensive 

information concern ing the enemy. terrain. and weather. Their 

desire for information is illsaLiable. When American soldiers 

bivouac in a foreign jungle their battalion commanders want to 
INTRODUCTION 7 

know the strength and location of all enemy forces capable of 

attacking their men during the night, and rightfully so. Very 

rapidly the I ist of their questions fills a book, and since the situation 

is always changing, the answers to this book of questions must be 

kept up to date. Old information needs to be correc ted as addi· 

tional information on the questioned period of time becomes 

known. With modern communications a decision maker in "Vash· 

ington is, in terms of time, just as close to the source of information 

as is the MACV commander. This poses the danger that decisions 

will be made on information (unevaluated material) and not on 

intelligence. Information should be evaluated and analyzed before 

decisions are made on untimely. inaccurate, or inadequate bases. 

Intelligence must be timely. Time is precious. Decisions made 

on untimely intelligence can result in disaster if the situation has 

changed. Intelligence should get to the person who can do some· 

thing about it in time for him to do something. Timely reporting 

requires extensive. dedicated communications in suppOrt of in· 

telligence. Timeliness also is dependent upon effectively written 

messages. In war, communications are overl oaded with questions 

going back to the originator of information because his initial 

report was incomplete. Timeliness requires the ability to manipu. 

late data rapidly to assist humans to do the evaluation which only 

they can do. Computers are a great help, but only that. An auto· 

mated system of presentation of what a computer "knows" can 

only reRecl a fraction of the data base. The computer data bank 

must have tremendous storage ca pacity and programs to permit 

timely manipulations. 

Unless pressure is maintained, promptness will suffer. Each 

intelligence report should indicate not only distribution made. hu t 

when and how each consumer was informed. To insure that highl y 

perishable reports reach commanders promptly, each headquarters 

should have an individual whose task it is to review the reponing 

process throughout the intelligence cycle. He must read all reo 

ports, not for content but for timeliness. He then must insure 

that shortcomings are called to the attention of the commanders 

involved. At J-2, Military Assistance Command, Captain James D. 

Strachan was responsible for this critical function. 

Commanders and staff officers who ask for more information 

than they need not onl y delay the receipt of what they need but 

frequently cannot use what they receive. For example, while I 

was visiting a division commander he informed me that his division 

was not receiving requested aerial photography promptly. lim· 

mediately looked into his com plaint. At that very time, a trailer 

full of photographs was in his headquarters area. His staff had 
8 THE ROLE OF M ILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

asked for too much. When it arrived they were too pressed for 

lime to examine the large amount lhey had requested. 

Intelligence must be accurate. Commanders must have confidence in it. Adequate facts must be presented for them to accept 

the intelligence as valid. Sometimes unverified information leads 

to wishful thinking. The intelligence officer must be conservative 

and unshakable in Jetting the facts speak. Rationalization and 

crystal ball gazi ng invite disaster. One either knows the facts or 

one does not. If one does not, the commander must know that fact. 

Intelligence must be adequate. It is not enough to know the 

location and strength of an enemy. Given onl y that information a 

commander might avoid combat because he is outnumbered, even 

though the enemy is out of ammunition and many of his men are 

sick. 

Intelligence must be usable. First of all , it muSl be at the lowest 

classification. It should be unclassified if at all possible so that 

it can be disseminated easily to all who need it. It should be short. 

It should be easily understood. It should be limited to essentials. 

It should be easy to handle and reprod uce if required. 

It is the job of the intelligence officer at all levels to request 

or direct the acquisition of information ; to collate and evaluate 

it ra pidly; and then to disseminate timely, accurate. adequate. and 

usable military intelligence to all planners and decision makers. 

This process may take seconds or days. Such intelligence should 

permit sound decisions concerning combat operations, war plans, 

and peace plans. Combat operations should encourage, not negate, 

negotiations for peace. 

Since W orld War II the U.S. government has put aside its 

previous naive concept of intelligence and has developed our mag· 

nificen t intelligence team. This team includes the intelligence or· 

ga niza tions of most of the executive depanments of the U.S. govern· 

ment. All of these organizations have long ago come of age, They 

are operated by professionals. I knew that we cou ld depend upon 

willing support fTom all mem bers of the team. Many of these 

agencies were represented on the U.S. team in South Vietnam. 

Directives existed to ensure proper co-ordination of all functions, 

and it was my experience over many years that co·operation as well 

as co-ordination cou ld be expected , but not without strongly held 

views bein g expressed by all. Such argumen t is healthy and necessary for logical co-ordination. However, I was convinced that in 

time of war the battlefield commander must exercise unity of 

command in matters of military intelligence. I r ecommended early 

that all intelligence within Vietnam be placed under General 
INTRODUCTION 9 

Westmoreland, but this recommendation remained in Head· 

quarters, Military Assistance Command. 

Our organization had to develop officers who would keep 

intelligence "out front," on the initiative. A staff officer who pm· 

vides intelligence to support operational planning aleardy con· 

ceived is actually playing the role of a librarian or a historian. A 

staff officer who provides the intelligence that causes orders to be 

issued or plans to be made is an intelligence officer. For example, 

General Westmoreland had been anending a weekly intelligence 

briefing at which a sizable number of his sta ff was present. The 

briefing was primarily an intelligence situation report. Since we 

were now at war, such a briefing in my judgment was inadequate. 

I changed the scope of the weekly briefing to present an estimate 

of enemy capabilities and vulnerabi liti es, highlighting changes 

which had taken place during the week, and at the end of the 

briefing made my recommendations as J-2 as to actions the com· 

mander should take based upon intelligence. At the end of the 

first briefing of this type presented to General Westmoreland early 

in August, he asked that the room be cleared of all persons except 

a few senior officers. He stated that in the future he wanted the 

same type of briefing and he wanted onl y his component com· 

manders and the chiefs of his staff sections to attend- that this 

period would become his strategy session each week. 

Another example that took place in August of 1965 was the 

result of the J-2 staff's controlling a few resources that were moved 

about the country to coll ect information in support of the com· 

mander's strategy and areas of most concern. Through the use of 

this resource the loca tion of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment was 

learned. As soon as the location was known, a telephone ca ll was 

made to headquarters of the U.S. marines. They were given the 

information and without delay launched an operalion which reo 

sulted in the first major encounter between U.S. and Viet Cong 

forces in Vietnam, Operation STARLIGHT. Operation CEDAR FALLS 

is another example. 

People who have not worked in intelligence normally have no 

conception of the number of people it takes to perform necessary 

activities. Without an extensive data base that can be manipulated 

rapidly, it is very difficult to evaluate information and to identify 

and ferret out guerrillas and members of the Vietnamese Com· 

munist political·military infrastructure. Every scrap of information. 

every writlen report. is to the intelligence officer as nickels and 

dimes are to a banker. It takes a lot of them to make the business 

profitable. Every piece of information must be accounted for like 
10 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

money and confirmed or refuted as genuine or counterfeit. When 

an intelligence analyst receives an unconfirmed report, he cannot 

let it go. He mliSt confirm or refule il. From numerous reports the 

order of battle of the enemy is constructed and updated. The 

enemy order of baute includes his composition. disposition, 

strength, training SlalUS, morale, tactics. logistics, combat effectiveness, and miscellaneous information such as unit histories, per· 

sonality files, uniforms, and insignias. These factors describing 

the capabilities and vulnerabilities of an enemy military force 

can best be learned by gaining access to enemy military personnel 

who aTC knowledgeable on the subject or by gaining access to 

documents they have written. 

The most experienced and sophisticated intelligence officers 

are selected to be estimators. They use order of battle studies, capa· 

bility studies, and other information to write valid estimates of 

how the enemy can adversely affect the accomplishment of our 

mission as well as state enemy vulnerabilities we can exploit. 

Statements such as "I think," '" believe," or "I feel" must be 

avoided. The person hearing or reading an estimate should come 

to the same conclusion as the estimator because of the validity of 

the intelligence presented and not because of what the estimalOr 

thinks. 

I had occasion from time to time lO tell new estimators of a 

lesson I learned some years ago on a visit to the advance base of 

the Summer Institute of Linguistics located deep in the Amazon 

jungles of Ecuador. A Cofan Indian and his wife were preselll in 

the camp. I asked the Indian, through an interpreter. to give me 

a lesson on how to lise his blowgun. I-Ie taught me. 1 asked if he 

would not prefer to own a rine. He replied that he used his blowgun to hunt game, especially wild piglets, for his family. He stated 

that be could blow a poison dart into each of the piglets as they 

were feeding and aher a while pick all of them up, put them in 

a bag, and take them home. whereas if he used a rine the noise of 

the first shot would frighten the pigs away. Funhermore. he would 

need money to buy the rifle and ammunition, whereas he was able 

to make his blowgun and darts from the forest. I told this story 

from time to time to warn my estimators against using an American 

yardstick to measure other peoples. Even though a guerrilla may not 

carry a weapon, he cenainly knows how to sharpen and replace a 

pungi stake or to use a hand grenade made £rom a beer can. A 

good intelligence officer must avoid preconceived ideas when it 

comes to estimating the enemy. In Vietnam, it was necessary to 

discard temporarily many of the conceptions that our military 
INTRODUCTION II 

education and experiences had engendered. Our enemy's school 

was "the bush"-to quote General Giap-and his strategy. 

tactics, and organi zation fitted a revised Maoist view of protracted 

war. For this reason I realized that military intelligence in Vi etnam had to adapt if it was to be successful against this enemy. 

History records that in time of war lhe tendency of the U.S. 

government is to provide the man on the baul efi eld the resources 

he needs. The record also reveals repea tedly the sad story of too 

little too late because we were not prepared. The military also 

strives to give the commander the resources he needs and furnish 

him mission-type orders. Because resources seldom are adequate we 

must retain some under centralized control to be employed in 

support of the commander's main efforts. We strive for centralized 

guidance and decelllralized opera tions. History also records that 

after a W;lr ends resources are grea tly reduced, centralized more 

and more at higher and then higher levels, and given over to 

civilians to a greater extent. After the Korean 'Val', Army illlelligence resources were reduced drastically. In 1965 the resources we 

needed were not combat ready. Great efforts were made to provide 

them as quickl y as was feasible. but more than two years would be 

required to receive Ill ost of the resources we originally requested. 

Centralization of sca rce resources was continued longer than was 

desirable. 

Even though we were aware that the resources we needed were 

not readily available. we asked for them. It was up to higher 

authority to reduce our requests if they had to do so. At this 

writing t feel only praise for the wholehearted support we received. 

Time to organize, equip, train. and deploy the units we needed 

was the bottleneck. 

In making our plans I told my staff to think big. I knew that 

good intelligence requires a sophislica ted and la rge orga niza tion. 

·We were at war; this was no lime to grow piecemeal. \Ve needed 

our hen effort as soon as possible. 

\Ve needed all the help we could get from our Vietnamese allies. 

They also needed alit help. Experience with other allies had taught 

me that advising them on how to conduct intelligence is not so 

effective as is working together. Not only does worki ng together 

develop competence faster, it also engenders lIlutual respect and 

confidence. During my initial ca ll on Colonel Ho Van Loi. J- 2, 

Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and my 

counterpart and friend ror almost two years. I proposed to him that 

we engage in combined intelligence activities whenever practi cable; 

he agreed. 
12 THE ROLE OF M ILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Evolution of the Military Assisla'ice Command 

In telligence Organization 

Up to the lime the decisions were made to employ U.S. forces 

and Free World Military Assistance Forces in direct combat operatioos, the MACV commander's primary means of influencing the 

conduct and the outcome of the war was through the Military 

Assistance Program and the advisory effort. Because or limi ted 

U.S. participation in combat operations. the scope of Military 

Assistance Command J- 2 activities was also limited. (C harl 1 ) 

The J-2 mission at that lime was to support and improve the 

Vietnamese military inlelligence effort and to keep the Commander, 

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; the Commander in 

Chief, Pacific; and national intelligence agencies informed on the 

intelligence situation. 

CHART I-ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, 2, STAFF ORCANIZAT10N, 

JULY 1965 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

1-2 (307) 

Dej)uty 

1-2 

1 uecutive 

1 Offiu 11 

I I I I I 

Reconnaissance Counter· ~2. High and Photo Production Collection Intelligence 

Intelligem:e Division Division and Security Command 

Division Division Division 

25 50 38 31 8 

Current Tarael 

Intelliaence Research 

and Indications and Anal1sis 

Division Division 

23 121 
INTRODUCTION 13 

Intelligence reports were received from the advisory system, 

limited bilateral operations with the Vietnamese clandeStine collection organization, the 5th U.S. Special Forces Group, unilateral 

U.S. military collection resources which included special intelligence activities such as airborne radio direction finding, photo and 

visual reconna issance, and infrared and side-looking airborne radar 

reconnaissance. These resources were provided on a very austere 

basis. 

General Westmoreland now became Commanding General, 

U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), as well as MACV commander. He 

decided to exercise command from MACV headquarters. It then 

would be my responsibility to support his strategic planning as 

well as his tactical operations. I would be not only Military Assis· 

tance Command J-2 with the responsibility of exercising general 

staff supervision over all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps 

intelligence activities, but in addition I would perform those func· 

tions of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2, U,S. Army, 

Vietnam, required to support tactical operations of the Army. In 

this role I assumed operational control of Army-level resources as 

they arrived. Military Assistance Command J-2 continued to be 

responsible for advising the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

(RVNAF) . The existing organization was not designed to suppon 

our new mission and especially this type of war. (Appendix A) 

According to existing Army doctrine the intelligence force 

structure is tailored to the organization it supports and, modified 

by considera tions of the enemy, to terrain, weather, mission, and 

scheme of operations. 

The military problem of defeating the North Vietnamese Army 

and the Viet Cong main force units on the battlefield was compli. 

cated by their utilization of a highly centralized political move· 

ment. The Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) , composed of men, 

women, and children, opera ted as the enemy's supply service. 

intelligence network, and local guerrilla force as well as a shadow 

government in each village in Vietnam. If victory on the battle· 

field was to be translated into a just and lasting peace, the 

infrastructure had to be neUlralized. In order to accomplish this 

sensitive mission we needed a massive data bank and a staff of 

sophisticated area specialists. Th is effort eventually supported 

the political stabilization or the government of Vietnam and the 

military activity of Free World Military Assistance Forces. We 

would need a large countrywide counterintelligence effort involved 

in countenabotage, countersubversion, and counterespionage actio 

vities as well as providing support to all units and installations 
14 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

concerning security of information, personnel. and surreptitious 

entry. We would need a large, countrywide area intelligence collec· 

tion effort in order to provide coverage of enemy areas and organi. 

zations to collect information as well as to promote defection of 

enemy personnel. 

Our first step was lO identify those resources required to support the U.S. Army, Vietnam. Each separate brigade, each division, 

and each field force (the name given to a corps) would arrive with 

its normal military intelligence detachment. In addition, one 

aviation company (aerial surveillance) and a topographic company 

were requested to suppOrt each field force. The aviation companies 

were equipped with three models of the OV-l Mohawk aircraft. 

The number of each model for each company was determined 

according to the type of terrain and water in the particular field 

force area of operations. 

We provided for U.S. military intelligence detachments to be 

attached to each South Vietnamese division and corps. We developed the manning requirements for the four original combined 

centers fOT intelligence, document exploitation, military interrogation, and materiel exploitation. We increased OUT requirement for 

advisers in order to provide special ists down to include all district 

headquarters. For Military Assistance Command we requested a 

military intelligence gTOup headquarters (a brigade headquarters 

did not exist) to command a counterintelligence group, an intelligence group, a military intelligence battalion (a ir reconnaissance 

support), and a military intelligence battalion to administer the 

personnel working in the centers, the advisers, and various support 

activities. In addition, large numbers of combat troops would be 

arriving soon, before Military Assistance Command intelligence 

resources were available. In the interim the war was going on. 

The J-2 staff was a large joint one with many qualified people. 

I decided to reduce the span of control and at the same time increase the number of functions necessary to perform our new 

mission adequately. An Air Force weather officer was added to the 

staff. The old Production Division and the Current Intelligence 

and Indications Division were combined into the Intelligence 

Division. The Target Research and Analysis Division, as its name 

impli es, was primarily concerned with locating targets for B-52 

bombers. ] used it as a nucleus to form the Combined Intelligence 

Center, Vietnam (CICV). (Chart 2) We needed to increase our 

data base rapidly and our ability to produce capability studies as 

well as our ability to se lect targets not only for the 8-52's but for 
INTRODUCTION 15 

C HART 2- J-2 STAFF O RCANIZATION , O CTonER 1965 

Assistant Chief of StaH 

'-2 1-----------

Deputy 

I Weatlw I I u tcutive 

OHice I I I OHice 

I I I I I 

Intelligence Plans Ind Inleitilence Counter· Management Operations Inteitigence Oivision Training Division Division Oivision Oivision 

I 

I I I I Combined Intelligence II Combined Military , Il Combined Document Combined Materiel 

Center, Vietnam Interrogation Center uploitatioo Center uploitation Center 

all ty~ or u.s. and Vietnamese Army, Navy. Marine Corps, and 

Air Force operations. The organizationa l concept for the Combined Intelligence Center can best be described by lIsing this 

matrix: 

Area o( In!elligenc;e Interest 

0 

• < 

., ;; 

" t! t~ ta to Ze d ~, 

-, ::~ o. -~ ::~ ~ ,,~ ~~ Z~ "~Func!ions 

Order of Battle 

Imagery In!erprela!ion 

Area Analysis 

Targeu 

Technicat Imelligcnce 
16 THE ROLE OF MII..lTARY INTELLIGENCE 

Seven teams composed of Vietnamese and Americans were 

established, one for each of the subareas of intelligence interest. 

Each team included order of baltle, imagery interpretation, area 

analysis, largets, and technical intelligence specialists or support. 

The team was OUT primary data base and production activity. It 

was placed under the direct supervision of the chief of the Intelligence Division. A plans and training d ivision was created. It was 

responsible for the preparaLioll of directives and supervision of 

their execution to ensure proper intelligence traini ng of U.S. and 

Vietnamese personnel as well as for the preparation of plans in· 

volving two or morc d ivisions. The Reconna issance and Photo 

Intelligence Division was combined with the Coll ection Division 

into the Intelligence Operations Division with many additional 

combat intelligence functions. The J-2 of the Vietnamese Joint 

General Staff operated a very small interrogation center in Sa igon. 

I had visited it several times between 1963 and 1965. Colonel Loi 

and I joined forces and established the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CM IC). The small U.S. effort on documents translation was co-ordinated with the Vielllamese effort to form the Combined Document Ex ploitation Center (CDEC). When facilities were 

avail able these efforts were joined to form the 6nest documents 

center I have ever seen. I have always considered the greatest source 

of information a person who is knowledgeable on the subject and 

the second greatest source a document containing such informa· 

tion. I took personal iuterest in all the combined activi ties, but 

the Intelligence Center, In terrogation Center, and Document 

Center received almost daily impetus from me. For this same 

reorganization I created the Combined Materiel Exploitation 

Center (CMEC). The Vietnamese placed a few people at this 

center bu t operated a facility of their own. Technical intelligence 

production was done both at the Combined Materiel Exploitation 

Center and at the Combined Intelligence Center. The Combined 

Intelligence Center reports were broader in scope. The Military 

Interrogation, Document Exploitation, and Materiel Exploitation 

Centers were placed under the direct authority of the chief of the 

Intelligence Operati ons Division. The Counterintelligence and 

Security Division was retained and many additional functions were 

assigned to it. I created a management division to assist me and 

my staff in handling the large and sophisticated organization now 

taking shape. (Charl J) 

By May 1967 the authorized strength of my staff had grown 

from 307 to 467. (Appendix B) My request for 16G more people 

had been fonvarded to meet recogn ized requirements. As my staff 
CHART 3-A SSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J- 2, STAFF O

Assistant Chief of Staff 

)-2 

I 

Executive Officer 

36 

I 

Deputy J-2 I Oelluty J-Z 

Combat tntelligence Production 

I I I I 

I I I 

Military Attache .l-Z Element Combine

liaisoo Office Combat Opelations Center Production Cente

4 lalgets Branch . 

Division 

.l-Z Air 

and Reeonn<lissanee Branch W<lming Branch, 

Current Indications <lnd 

51 Intelligence Branch 

107 

I Intelligence Operations I 

Division 

I Exp!~t~tion I DIVISIOn 

I ,,~;~..

DIVISIO

52 26 
18 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

grew in number and functions I kept my span of control sma ll. 

insisted that staff memoranda and command directi ves be wrinen, 

thoroughly co-ordinated, and published to insure continuity in 

ou r activiti es. I approved all such memoranda and directives. Once 

they were approved, my chiefs had full a uthority to implement 

them. 

Since the waT in Vietnam was predominantly concerned with 

combined efforts to defeat th e ell emy on the ground, the major 

impact resultant therefrom was upon the U.S. Army military 

intelligence orga nization. (Apptnlliix C) 

The U.s. Army intelligence force ava il able in July 1965 included th e 701th Intelligence Corps DClachmcm, DctachmCIll I 

of the 500th Intelligence Corps Croup, and 218 imelligcnce 

advisers who were thinly spread among South Vietnamese corps, 

d ivisions, sectors, and special zones. The 704th was a sma ll coumerintelligence detachment of forty-six men . II was th e cOll merpart 

orga nization to the Republic of Vietnam Military Security Service. 

It had been under my operationa l control when I was the U.S. 

Army, Pacific, G-2. H owever. I had assigned it to Military 

Assistance Command . Vietnam. It was also engaged in limited 

counterespionage, coulllcrsabotage, and cOll1llersubversion activities. Detachment I of the 500th Intelligence Group had also been 

under my opera tional control and was assigned to Military Assistance Command at the same time as th e 704th. Detachment I had 

fifty-six officers and enlisted men. This detachment had a dual role 

of advising and assisting the South Vietnamese in intelligence 

coll ection and engaging in limi ted coll ct:tion activities. 

Those two detachmen ts were a far cry from whal the intelligence 

force structu re should be according to our established doctrine. 

I kn ew well such Army doctrine and the capabilities and limitati ons of a ll types of U.S. Army intelligence units. As (;-2 I had 

reviewed every U.S. Army, Pac ific, contingency plan and had 

recommended changes in th e force structure to support those 

plans. I had req uested a military intelligence baltalion LO be transferred from the continental United States to Hawaii. This was 

done. The baualion was reorganized to support the contingency 

plans belter. Part of it was stru ctured to support operations in 

Vietnam. That detachment was sent in response to JOY urgent 

request to assist in establishin g the order of battle files for the 

Combined Intelligence Center. I knew tha t it would take a year 

or more for th e Department of th e Army to activate, train, and 

deploy to Vietnam new intelligence battalions and groups. H owever, our orga nizations were cellular in concept; one could re-
INTRODUCTION 19 

quest various functional teams to be attached to eXlstlllg units. 

Such individual teams could be created rapidly and their arrival 

could be programmed over a period of months. I requested such 

teams. This course of action saved time and spread Ollt the buildup 

so that no one unit or activity had to turn over all its experienced 

men at one time. 

Dy June 1967 U.S. Army intelligence units under the opera· 

tional control of Military Assistance Command J- 2 had grown in 

strength from 102 to 2.466. advisers from 218 to 622. (Appendix D) 

An additional 615 personnel were on request to complete the organization considered essential. Also, the completed staff action of a 

new table of organization and equipmem for a U.S. Army intelli. 

gence brigade to be commanded by a brigadier general had been 

submitted. 

The 525th Military Intelligence Group was under the command 

of the Commanding General, U.S. Army, Vietnam (General Westmoreland), and under my operational COnlrol. The comm,lIlding 

officer of the 525th Military In ~elligence Group exercised command 

over a signal company, an aviation detachment. and the 135th 

Military Intelligence Croup (Counterintelligence). which absorbed 

the mission and assets of its predecessor, the 704th Jlllelligence 

Corps Detachment. (Chart 4) The 135th was organized into six 

regions, was dispersed throughout South Vietnam, and was located 

in most places along with the Vietnamese Military Security Service. 

The 149th Military Intelligence Group (Collection) absorbed the 

mission and assets of its predecessor. Detachment I of the 500th 

Intelligence Group; the 1st Military Intelligence Baltalion (Air 

Reconnaissance Support), which had the mission of interpreting, 

reproducing, and delivering Air Force imagery flown in support 

of ground tactical commanders: and the 5 19th Military Illtelligence 

Baualion, which provided the personnel and support for the com· 

bined centers. 

In 1965 U.S. intelligence advisory sections with South Viet· 

namese corps and dh'isions were inadequately manned and unable 

to process the increased flow of intelligence information into U.S. 

channels; they also had difliculty providing requisite support to 

Vietnamese corps and division G- 2's. To alleviate this problem 

the U.S. advisory sections with Vietnamese corps and divisions were 

reorgalllzed as military intelligence detachments with greatly in· 

creased manning. In addition, manning levels of special lone and 

seclor advisory teams were increased. The CUlTent adviser element 

reflects :In authorized manning level of 621 as compared with the 

previous level of 218. 
20 T HE RO LE OF M ILITARY INTEL LIGENCE 

CHART 4-525TH MILITARY I NTELLICENCE GROU I' 

xxxx 

COMUSMACV 

L-,o"--' .., o 

• 

• . ... ....... . • o 

o 

III •••••••• 

X6 X4 

----- Command 

X5 

........... . Command less Operational ContlOl 

••• ••• ••• 0.0 Operational Control 

93 

We have only taken a glance at the over-all MACV intelligence 

organ ization. In order to keep this monograph unclassifi ed I have 

omitted much. Such information is available in oth er records for 

th ose who are authorized to ha ve it. Bul I would be remiss if I did 

not at least memion that special intell igence played a major role. 

As Miljtary Assistance Command J- 2 I exercised operational COI1-

11'01 over much of th e effort of special intell igence personnel even 

though th ey were shown as being in direct support of the MACV 

commander. This was done with th e full approva l of the authorities 

in Was hington. 
CHAPTER II 

Combined Intelligence 

T he Combined In telligence Concept 

Americans and SOlllh Vietnamese were fighting together on 

the same battlefield against a common enemy. Both of liS needed 

the same intelligence on the enemy. the terrain, and the weather. 

Each of us had capabilities and limitations affecting our ability 

lO collect and produce the needed intel ligence. We Americans 

would add trained and ex perienced men, sophisticated equipment. 

money. professionalism, management techniques, rapid communi· 

cations, a sense of urgency, and the support of Ollr intelligence 

learn. On the other hand, we had very few linguists who could 

speak Vietnamese. lVe weTC in vited to assist the Vietnamese and, 

as guests of their country. werc subject to their sovereignty. 

The SOllth Vietnamese were sovereign. They controll ed sources 

of information, real estate, and archives. They had many yea rs of 

experience in figh ting this type of war. They had an insight into 

the thinking of enemy leaders, they had an understanding and 

appreciation of enemy tactics and modus operandi , and they knew 

what information was available in their files and arch ives and could 

make it availabl e. They would add continuity to our common 

acti viti es because Ihey remained when we Americans went home 

after servin g o ur l Olli'S of duty. They spoke the same language as 

the enemy. 

They also had some limitations. They did not have enough 

trained intell igence officers and specialists. They lacked necessary 

equipment and money. Together we could be a strong team. 

Com bined intelligence was not a new concept with me. I had 

practi ced it on much smaller sca les before. I had ex peri enced firsthand the value of international co·operation in intelligence operati ons as Genera l George S. Patton's chief of intelligence in Germany 

after ' VorJd 'Var II when thousands of refugees had to be screened, 

in Greece in 1949-1950 during the successful counterinsurgency 

there, and in variOliS other cou ntri es where U.S. intelligence 

worked in concert with local intelligence agencies. 
22 THE ROLE OF ~UL1TARY INTELLIGENCE 

During my initial call on Colonel Loi. I discussed our ca· 

pabilities and limitation and proposed that we creale a combined 

intelligence system with activities at all levels of command. He 

enthusiastically agreed. The concept envisioned the United States 

forces working not merely in an advisory role. but side by side 

with the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces as equals in a partnership. In the system we would establish centers throughout the 

country for interrogation of prisoners and Hoi Chanhs and for 

exploitation of captured documents and materiel as well as a 

center where all in(ormalioll would be sent for collation, analysis, 

evaluation, and processing into intelligence in support of U.S. 

and South Vietnam forces. Combined training would be conducted 

to familiarize U.S. and South Vietnamese personnel with each 

other's intelligence procedures and techniques; there would be 

an exchange of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (AR Vi\') and 

U.S. military intelligence detachments at all levels down to separate 

brigade. 

The combined concept was founded in mutual need, trust, and 

understanding. The Vietnamese had to know that the United States 

was working openly with them. In turn, I had to dispel the criticism 

some Americans voiced implying apathy on the pan of our counter· 

parts. Unlike the U.S. advisers who would be in the country only 

one year, the Vietnamese were permanently committed in their 

homeland. We were obligated to work a seven-day week; we had, 

essentially, nothing else to do. The Vietnamese had been under 

the pressure of fighting a war for years. They had families to rear 

and care for. They could not match our schedules or initial energy 

year after year under pressure, but they were on the job around 

the clock i£ needed. 

Attention to detail in every regard was necessary for success 

of the combined concept. The combined centers were to have 

codirectors (U.S. and Vietnamese) occupying adjoining offices. 

Daily visits and command supervision at all levels were in order. 

A positive approach was taken by all concerned. Before U.S. 

personnel were assigned to any of the combined centers. an orientation program was mandatory and we stressed continual reeducation_ Daily fifteen-m inute language classes, conducted for 

Americans with the objective of improving Ollr capability, served 

as evidence of our sincerity to assist the Republic of Vietnam. In 

addition, all briefings and charts were bilingual. As sophisticated 

equipment arrived, the Vietnamese were taught to operate and 

maintain it, and eventually the computers were programmed 

bilingually to include diacritical marks. Vielllamese and Americans 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 23 

performed the same tasks together. be it reviewing an agent report 

or a computer printout or answering a request from a combat unit. 

The combined approach offered a continuity of effort and direction 

as well as an opportun ity to learn from the Viell1amese while they 

lea rned from us. 

As the U.S. role increased, as our intelligence requirements 

grew in complexity, the need for definitive political and diplomatic 

agreements began to surface. The sovere ignty of the gO\'ernment of 

Vietnam had to be protected by the military intelligence community. We found that technically we lacked the authority to 

accomplish man y of ollr intelligence functions. How ,\'ere we to 

handle prisoners? What disposition was to be made of captured 

documents and materiel? This was nOt a declared "Jar. lYe were 

there not as a conquering army or li beration force: we were in 

South Vietnam to help the people win a war and build a nation. 

Their sovere ignty was inviolate. 

Consequently, much work had to be done to prepare necessary 

agreements, not only between l\,'lilitary Assistance Command and 

the government of Vietnam but including all the Free 'Vorld 

forces. An important lesson to be learned from our experiences in 

Vietnam is that we should have within the intelligence community 

samples of agreements that might be necessary on sllch liviti e~ 

as the handling of prisoners of war, the rel ease of classified infoI" 

mation, and combined intelligence activities. The formal agreements were made not solely to assign specific responsibilities; they 

were a means of providing continuity and increasing efficiency. 

They also con tained manning and staffing requirements and ex· 

plained command and control channels. A sepa rate agreement was 

negotiated for each of the combined activities. While all were 

similar as to administrative procedures. each had distinct aspects: 

In addition to complying with the Geneva Convention, each 

signa tory of the agreement establishing the Combined Military 

Interrogation Center agreed to turn over to the center as soon as 

possible any significant or important prisoner. As for the Combined 

Materi el Exploitation Center, priority on captured materiel was 

assigned to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Any time a 

new piece o f enemy materiel was captured, the first model was 

released to the South Vi etnamese after exploitation for display in 

theiT museum. The second model went to the United States for 

further tests and evaluation. Subsequent pi eces were returned to 

the capturing unit, or if they were of a type used by our allies they 

could be returned to supply channels. The agreement for the 

Combined Document Exploitation Center stipulated that the 
24 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

government of Vietnam retain ownership of all captured documents, currency, and publications of all lypes. 

Since the United States provided a large portion of the financial 

support of all the Free World forces, it was only to be expected 

that some formal arrangements for accountability of funds be 

established. In the intelligence field, the MACV J- 2 3gTeed to provide contingency funds but retained authority to approve all 

projects for which funds were requested and to monitor such 

projcas and receive reports that resulted ITom them. Recipients 

would be required to maintain detailed fiscal records and submit 

them for audit by a J-2 representative. 

Another important agreement concerned the employment of 

South Vietnamese Army intelligence detachments with U.S. units. 

The significant aspects were the organ ization of the detachments, 

command relationships, logistical support, and administration. 

The Military Intelligence Detachmtmt Exchange Program 

The Military Intelligence Detachment Exchange Program was 

implemented to improve combat intelligence in U.S., South 

Vietnamese, and Free World Military Assistance Forces tactical 

units. Regardless of the language barrier, tile attachment of U.S. 

detachments to South Vietnamese divisions provided the Vietnamese commanders with special skills and technical expertise not 

normally available and, as a bonus, afforded an excellent channel 

through which pertinent information could be forwarded to the 

J-2, Military Assistance Command. Of particular interest to this 

report, however, are the benefits derived from the attachment of 

South Vietnamese detachments to U.S. corps-level headquarters. 

divisions, and separate brigades. 

The program began officially in January 1966 with the signing 

of an agreement by the United States and Republic of Vietnam 

Armed Forces. (Later both the Korean and Australian forces 

negotiated similar agreements.) To facil itate implementation and 

promote compatibility. the South Vietnamese military intelligence 

detachments were to be organized in accordance with the table of 

organization and equipment of a U.S. military intelligence detach· 

ment organic to airborne and Marine brigades. (APllendix E). At 

full strength such a detachment consists of eight officers. eighteen 

noncommissioned officers, and four enlisted men comprising a head· 

quarters, prisoner of war interrogation (IPW) section, order of 

battle (OB) section. imagery interpretation (II) section, and 

document analysis section. Even though the Vietnamese intelli· 

gence school in eho Lon was operating at full capacity in order 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 25 

10 provide intelligence specialists, the Republic of Vietnam Armed 

Forces was short of trained intelligence personnel, and reduced· 

strength detachments had to be formed and deployed to avoid 

excessive delays in initiating the program. Particular emphasis was 

placed on obtaining add itional interroga tors and documents 

analysts. As detachments became operational , assignments were 

made in accordance with J- 2 priorities. 

Upon joining a U.S. unit, the South Vietnamese detachment 

normally was integrated with the organic intelligence detachment, 

complementing it with skill ed intelligence specialists who were 

proficient linguists knowledgeable in local dialects, customs, and 

habits. Their ability to analyze captured documents or interrogate 

prisoners on the spot enabled commanders immediately to exploit 

information of tactical significance. As the Vietnamese became 

more proficient, they enhanced the timeliness of loca l intelligence 

by rapidly culling the unimportant and identifying those that 

merited further processing. Indeed, units without Vietnamese 

support often contributed to the overload of the ex ploitation 

system by forwarding volumes of meaningless documents. 

Continuity proved to be an enduring benefit made possible by 

having Vietnamese elements with the U.S. units. The rapid 

turnover of U.S. soldi ers hindered the development and main· 

tenance of intimate familiarity with the enemy and the local area. 

The permanence of the Vietnamese detachment greatly alleviated 

the problem. This benefit carried over into civil affairs and relations 

with local agencies where in several instances the Vi etnamese 

personnel played a leading role ill establishing rapport with the 

Regional Forces and Popula r Forces, National Police, sector 

officials, and other government authorities. 

The exchange program was the subject of some controversy, and 

not all our intelligence officers considered it either worthwhil e or 

desirable. Difficulties arose because of language barriers, the 

difference in customs and habits, and the relatively short tenure of 

U.S. intelligence personnel. Over-all, the program justified its 

existence, though it would be inaccurate to say that every G-2 was 

satisfied with his Vietnamese detachment. Most G-2's who 

conscientiously integrated the Vietnamese unit into their intelligence apparatus enjoyed olltstanding success in accomplishing 

missions and sa tisfying requirements levied by their commanders. 

By May 1967, and with the exception of lhe II th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment, 1961h and 199th Light Infantry Brigades, 

and the Republic of Korea !\'Iarine Brigade, all U.S. and Free 

World forces had Vietnamese military intelligence units assigned. 
26 THE ROLE OF' MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Vietnamese units were being trained for the Olher orga nizations 

and were assigned later in the year. 

The Combined Interrogation System 

Establishment of an effective program for the interrogation of 

enemy prisoners and Hoi Cha.lIhs was a high priority objective. At a 

briefing for SecTelary McNamara in Jul y of 1965, I presented my 

plan calling fOT the construction of military interrogation cemers at 

each division, sector, and corps. along with a national cemcr at 

Saigon. This plan was COoord inated with embassy representatives. 

who agreed, wilh the exception of interrogation celllers at sector 

level. They considered these celllers marc closely related to the 

police effort than to the military and consequentl y thought they 

should be constructed by civil authority. I accepted this proposal 

with the understanding that faciliti es within lhe sector celllers 

would be available for use by military illlerrogalors. An embassy 

representative accompanied me to Secretary McNamara's briefing 

and ack.nowledged this commitment. The secretary approved the 

plan and directed that it be implemented. 

The agreement for a combined intelligence exploitation system 

provided for illlcrrogation of capti\'es and returnees. In consonance 

with its terms, the Combined Military Interrogation Center 

(CM IC) was established in Saigon and became the focal point of 

tactical and strategic exploitation of selected human sources. (Chari 

5) As with the other exploitation programs, America ns and 

Vietnamese working together in a spirit of co-operation and 

mutual support carried out th e camhi ned interrogation activities. 

The success we achie\'ed with this program is a tribute to the 

outstanding performance of dUly of Major Lawrence Sutton. 

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick A. Pieper. and Captain Lam Van 

Nghia, who were instrumental in making the center opera tional. 

The system promoted maximuill utilization of availabl e resources 

and facilitated the exchange of sources and interrogation reports, 

allowing cross·servicing of requirements. Perhaps the greatest 

benefits accrued to the United States si nce a persistent shortage of 

trained, Vietnamese·speaking interrogators had seriously curtailed 

American efforts to exploit human sources. As a result or the 

combined concept, the over·all imerroga ti on effort profited as th" 

native fluence of the South Vietnamese was complemented by U.S. 

techni cal expertise. Man y of our highly qualified interrogators 

learned Vietnamese at the language school in Monterey. Sergeam 

Sedgewick Tourison deserves spec ial memion. His professionalism 

and dedication to dUlY were consistentl y outstanding. He proved to 
COj\f8I NEO INTELLIGENCE 27 

CHART .J.--ORGANIZATIOS, COMBINED l\1:ILlTARY iNT ERROGAT IO S CENTER, 

~fAY 1967 

I Combined Military tnterrogation Center I 

I SoUlce Control $e(1ion I I Requiremellls Section I 

I 

H OUI·of·Country I "',," I Go Teams Team Cottection 

Teams 

H tn·Counlry 

Team I H Pollticat Order of BalHe I 

leam 

H tnrilt/llion 

learn I 

Lj Counlerintettia;ence 

leam I 

be invaluable in key interrogations on numerous occasions. an 

importam example of wh ich was his detailed imerrogation of 

nineteen Vielllamese naval personnel picked up in the Gulf of 

Tonkin after their patrol cra h was sunk. As of 15 May 1966, the 

Combined i\'iilitary Interrogation Center had a total of ten U,S. 

language-qualified interrogators. i was also fortunate to have an 

excellent linguist in my specia l assistant, Captai n James D. Strachan, 

who was the honor graduate of the 1964 Vietnamese language 

course at Ihe Defense Language Institute, 'Vest CoaSl Branch. 

The Combined Military Interrogation Center personnel com· 

plement cOllSisled of an Army of the Republic of Vietnam and a 

U.S. elemem, both headed by directors with equal authority in the 

operation of the center. Operational control of the center emanated 

from both J-2, Military Assistance Command, and J- 2, Republic 

of Vietnam Armed Forces Joint General Staff. (Appendix F) 

We organized the center along functional lines. simplifying the 
28 THE ROLE OF M ILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

defin ition of responsibil ities and expediting processing of captives 

and detainees. 

A source control section was created to fa cilitate selection 

of sources to be brought to Saigon. It reviewed preliminary 

interrogation reports submitted by lower eche lons in order to 

identify knowledgeable sources. This eva luation wenl to the 

Requireme nts Branch wh ich sel ected the intcrrogatecs to be 

evacuated to the Combined Military Interrogation Center. During 

th e first four months of 1967 the cenler distributed 675 interrogation reports and 1,068 intelligence in formation reports. Each 

interrogation report was reproduced in 350 copies and scnt to 92 

different addresses worldwide. 

The Requirements Branch was the nerve center of combined 

interrogation. Based on spec ific intelligence collection requirements 

genera ted by units throughout the country and validated by J-2, 

Military Assista nce Command, the branch matched these requirements to knowledgeable sources. They briefed th e appropriate 

requirements team on what they knew concerning the source, and 

finally they insured that all requirements had been satisfied before 

authorizing termination of an interroga tion. The Requirements 

Branch supervised five requirements teams, each specializing in 

particular intelligence requirements. They knew what we knew and 

they knew what we needed to know. One team sought information 

about the enemy order of ba ttl e outside Vietnam. Another was 

concerned with order of battle within the cou ntry. Enemy tactics, 

weapons, equipment, psychological operations, and political order 

of baule (th e enemy infrastructure) fell within the purview of a 

third team. A fourth ream focused on cou nterintelligence: sabotage, 

espionage, and subversion directed against allied facilities or men. 

The fifth team concentrated on enemy infiltration. The members o f 

the req uirements teams briefed the interrogators and furnished the 

questions to be asked. 

Interrogation reports published by the Combined Military 

Interrogation Center received wide distribution. Since sources 

interrogated in Saigon normall y already had been exploited for any 

"hot" information before reaching the center, these reports seldom 

conta ined perishable intelligence. If the need arose, however, spot 

reports of immediate interest were transmitted el ectrica ll y. A 

daily summary adv ised the intelligence community (i ncluding 

Washington) of the type of information obtained from the sources 

on hand. Kn owledgeability briefs. 100, were dispatched to interested 

parties announcing the availability of each source and his area of 

expertise. 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 29 

The Combined Military Interrogation Center stationed collection teams with each corps and throughout South Vietnam_ "Go" 

teams composed of U.S. and South Vietnamese interrogators were 

always ready to be dispatched from Saigon to support combat units 

when interrogation requirements exceeded local capabilities. These 

teams were especially valuable during sweep operations that 

resulted in multitudes of detainees who had to be given at least a 

cursory check in order to detect exploitable sources. 

Evacuation of prisoners flowed normally from the capturing 

unit to the brigade or division detention area where tactical 

interrogation could be accomplished. Subsequent transferrals to the 

local Vietnamese interrogation facility or evacuations to the U.S. 

corps combined center depended on the captive's knowledge. This 

factor also influenced further channeling to the Combined Military 

Interrogation Center or the government's national interrogation 

center (if he had nonmilitary information) for thorough interrogation. After completing the interrogation process, the captive was 

placed in a detention center. Expeditious processing was stressed at 

all levels of command, and each echelon was encouraged to limit 

interrogations to information in satisfaction of local requirements. 

Seven days was the maximum time any element below the 

Combined Military Interrogation Center was authorized to detain 

a captive. 

A preliminary interrogation report reflecting highlighu of the 

field interrogation was submitted through channels to the combined 

center via J-2, Military Assistance Command. Reports of any 

sllbseqllem imerrogations also were distributed to higher and 

adjacent commands. They included pertinem biographic data, the 

circumstances of capture, areas of special knowledge, and an 

assessment by the imerrogation team of the source's physical 

condition, intelligence, and co-operativeness. 

Returnees (ralliers or Hoi Clumhs) usually were transferred by 

the acquiring unit to the nearest Chieu Hoi center or government 

agency. If the returnee had information of intelligence value, he 

might be evacuated for interrogation through the same channels as 

captives but was afforded special treatment to demonstrate the 

benevolence of the United Stales and the governmel1l of Vietnam 

and to elicit his co-operation. Within the combined centers, ralliers 

had separate dormitories and mess halls and were placed under very 

few restrictions. As soon as his interrogation was completed, the 

returnee was housed in the Chieu Hoi cel1ler or his choice. If a 

returnee was questioned within a Chieu Hoi center, we ordinarily 

worked openly in a lounge or mess hall and we emphasized winning 
30 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

RETURNEES WERE Sf.PARATUI FROM PRISONERS and given greater /rudom 

while being interrogated. 

his co-operation. In the case of vcry important captives or returnees, 

the system was flexible enough to permit expeditious processing. 

enabling the source to reach an appropriate level, usually the 

combined center, for timely interrogation. 

One slich source, Le Xuan Chuyen, chief of operations of the 

Viet Cong 51h Division, defected as a result of one of our 

cOllnterintelligence operations and was given a private office at lhe 

Combined ~rilitary Interrogation Celller. Chuyen came under 

government control in Binh Thuall Province, and in order to gel 

him to Saigon as soon as possible. Captain Strachan co-ordinated a 

U-21 aircraft en route with an empty seal. The "red carpet" 

treatment was given to Chuyen, whose seat on the plane was 

opposite that of Lieutenant General John A. Heintges, Deputy 

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

During my tOlir as J-2, Military Assistance Command, 1 

insisted that the interrogation program comply rigidly with the 

provisions of the Geneva Convention. Abuse by individual Vietnamese, however, did occur. The French and mandarin heritage of 

brutality died hard, especially in the field. despite the efforts of 

more enlightened American and Vietnamese officers. Further, many 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 31 

RETURNEES W ERE NOR.MALi.Y I NTERROGATEO IN AN INFORMAL SETl1NC, 

in l1I is case a mess tenl. 

members of the Viet Cong infrastructure were not classifi ed as 

prisoners of war and were interroga ted by the National Police, a 

civil organization which was tasked with the neutralization o f 

antigovernment sentiment. At the Combined Military In terrogation 

Center, the req uiremen15 of the Geneva Convention were o bserved 

and prisonel's were treated humanely. Vietnamese intcrrogators 

exh ibited commendable finesse in questioning prisoners. By virtue 

of their common language and nati onal heritage, they were 

successful in establiShing rappon with prisoners who only hours 

hefore may have been enemy soldiers. 

1 designed the Combined Military Interrogation Centcr bui lding 

to include a combined classroom fa cilit y. Vietnamese and U.S. 

soldi ers from all over Vi etnam here received illlerroga ti on tra ining 

which included the provisions of the Geneva ConvClllion. Any form 

of maltreatment of sources was strictly taboo. 

The Interroga ti on Cent er maintai ned dose li aison with the 

other combined centers. The analyst in the Combined Intelligence 

Center needed to keep the appropriate req uirements teams at the 

Interrogation Center informed on his intelligence needs. He, in 

turn, needed to be kept informed on the potentia l of available 
32 THE ROLE OF MILITARV INTELLIGENCE 

A QUALIFIED U.S. INTERROGATOR WIIO CANNOT SPEAK VIETNAMESE 

questions a source with tlte help of a Vietnamese WAC interpreter. 

sources. Each member of the combined intelligence system needed 

to know how he could help other centers and how they could help 

him. 

Combhlcd Document Exploitation 

Before I October 1965, document exploitation was primarily 

a function of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Our 

participation was limited to an advisory Tole since we had only 

a small translation pool of approximately eight U.S. military 

personnel and thirty Vietnamese civilians. The main weakness in 

the effort was the absence of documents to be translated. Vietnamese 

soldiers had not been imbued with the need to locate and evacuate 

enemy documents. When they did send some to their headquarters, 

the documents were kept and nOl forwarded. Documents are an 

excellent source of intelligence. second only to a knowledgeable 

person. I had had much experience in World War II, and later, 

concerning acquisition and exploitation of documents. I had visited 

these activities throughout South Vietnam over two years and 

knew the potential. I had recommended to my predecessors the 

enlargement of this important source of information. Now we had 

to have it. 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 33 

• 

, 

INTERROGATORS RECEIVED TRAINING by sitting in on interrogations and 

by conducting interrogations under the tutelage of qualified personnel. 

I sent for Lieutenant Colonel Henry Ajima. He and I had 

worked together, and I considered him the most competent officer 

in the Army on the subject. During a period of temporary duty 

with me in Saigon we made detailed plans, including the written 

job description for every civilian employee who was to be hired. 

Colonel Ajima left with the understanding that as soon as the 

facility which he and I designed was ready he would join my staff 

to be a codirector of the new Combined Document Exploitation 

Center. 

In the meantime we started hiring people. We wrote the 

n«essary direClives. We stimulated the Aow of documents. And I 

requested the Defense Intelligence Agency to train a learn of 

specialists on lhe intelligence subject code and assign lhem to me. 

This was done. 

I also requested lhat an Fl\·fA document storage and retrieval 

package along with a civilian technician and a civi li an maintenance 

man be delivered as soon as possible. They arrived in a short time 

and set up trial operations in one of my offices. When the building 

was ready Colonel Ajima arrived and we moved in. We were in 

business. This center turned out to be of unsurpassed va lue. 

The Combined Document Exploitation Center opened at 
34 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

its location near the Tan Son Nhut air base on 24 October 

1966, implementing the agreement between the Commander, U.S. 

Military Assistance Command, Vielllam, and the chief of [he J oint 

General Staff for the conduct of combined intelligence activities. 

(Chart 6) The center was assigned the mission of supporting allied 

military operations by rece iving and exploiting captured enemy 

documents, co-ordinating the over-all joint document exploitation 

effort, and providing field support teams, translation, and document 

storage and relri eval services. The center had five major functional 

elements with an authorized strength of over three hundred U.S. 

and South Vietnamese military personnel as well as Vietnamese 

civilians. 

From July 1966 to May 1967 the center received well in excess 

of three million pages of enemy documents. Approximately one· 

th ird of th is input was the result of Operation CEI),\R FALLS in 

January 1967, followed by Operation JU1'o:CTION CITY in February. 

These LWO opera Lions accoullled for nearly one million pages of 

enemy documents processed by the celller. Of this total input, 

approximate ly 10 percelll was summarized or fully translated into 

English for distribution to interested agencies. Experience proves 

that of any batch of documents acquired on the battlefield, at least 

10 percent contain information of definite intelligence val ue. 

ellART 6-0RGANIZATION, COMBINED DOCUMf.NT EXPLOITATION CF.NTER, 

MAY 1967 

Combined Document 

uptoita!ion Center 

FMA Storage Operations and Retrieval 

Blanch Branch 

I I 

Evaluation Translation Administration 

Branch Branch Branch 
COl\IBINED INTELLIGENCE 35 

- • 7 .... , . 

I NNER COMPOUND AT Ci\H C, where prisoners were detained a11d interrogated. Each room had a. dutch door which was lefl open during interrogations to discourage mistreatment of prisoners. 

The document exploitation process began at the center immedi· 

ately upon rece ipt of documellls from capturing units. Generally, 

documents anived at the cemer neatly packaged and tagged with 

details of the capture including date, place, circumstances, and 

identilY of th e capturing unil. During major military operations, 

however, documems were delivered to the center in every conceivable type of container-bags, boxes, cans, quarter-ton trailers 

and trucks. i\ lany tactical units delivered documents within hours 

after capture. During Operations CEDAR FALLS and J UNCTION C ITY, 

documents were received from tac tical units as quickly as eight to 

ten hours aher capture, with exploitation being completed within 

twenty-four hours after capture. If tactical units were unable to 

deliver documents to the center, then fully equipped combined 

field teams from the center joined the uni ts to hel p exploit the 

documents on the spot. 

Initially, d ocuments were carefully screened by highl y qualified 

Vietnamese civili ans assigned to the Evaluation Branch. Many of 

these examiners were retired or demobili zed military personnel. 
36 THE ROLE OF Jl,f1L1TARY INTELLIGENCE 

such as Captain Sang, who served as the deputy director of the 

Vietnamese element of the center until his demobilization in 

April 1967. or Captain Loi, a former member of the G-2 Section, 

Vietnamese IV Corps. During the screening. in which the Vietnamese element also parti cipated, the documents wert: divided into 

five distinct categori es to establish priorities [or ex ploitation as 

well as disposition: 

Category Alpha, or Type A, documents required immediate 

processing. with resul ts being returned to tactical units without 

delay in the form of a spot repon. An example would be an enemy 

operation plan fOT an ambush of a friendly element. In these 

instances the urgency of the information dictated the use of the 

"hot line" telephone system availabl e to lhe center for notification 

to [he unit concern ed. 

The Type Bravo documents contained information of strategic 

intelligence value such as Viet Cong certificates of commendation , 

which contained names of Viet Cong as well as unit identifi cation, 

or a notebook conta ining information as to the composition, 

strength . or disposition of an enemy unit. Most of the documents 

processed through the center were of the B ca tegory. All such 

documents were quickly summarized into English and clearly 

identified with a permanent document log number. 

The T ype Charlie documents were those considered to be of 

marginal intelligence value. such as an enemy-prod uced sketch 

map of Africa. These documents were passed to the South Vietnamese element of the center without further processing. 

Th e Type Delta documents were generall y propaganda materials such as an English.language document encouraging U.S. 

troops to write to such organizations as the Students for a Democratic Society (SOS). This category of documents also included 

currencies of all types, such as North Vietnamese currency. The 

propaganda materials were fon,'arded to the appropriate psychological warfare agencies, wh il e the currency was fonvarded to the 

appropriate custodian. 

The Type Echo documents contained cryptographic or other 

information on the enemy communications system, sllch as the 

training manual on wire communica tions. These were passed to 

the appropriate signa l intelligence agency without further processing at the center. 

The Alpha and Bravo documents were then routed to another 

group of highly qualified document specialists who prepared the 

actual summari es of each document. Those documents which contained detailed information beyond the scope of a summary or 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 37 

.. 

II 

CDEC TRANSLATORS 

gist translation were so identified and routed to the Translation 

Branch (or full translation. All such documents had already been 

summarized. so the time element for full translation was not 

always a critical factor. 

The translators represented the largest single group of highly 

trained language specialists in Vietnam. Most of them, having 

acquired a basic knowledge of English in their normal academic 

training, underwent specialized translator training with the civilian 

personnel office. Upon employment at the Combined Document 

Exploitation Center, these translalors were placed on a six-month 

on-the-job training cycle. Such training was emphasized because 

the Viet Cong, with their propensity for cover names, codes, and 

jargon, had developed a separate language, unintelligible to the 

average Vietnamese. From necessity we developed reference books 

such as the Dictionary of Viet Cong Terminology required 

by our translators. Upon comple tion of the summary or full translation process, documents were immediately forwarded to the 

Typing Section of the Administrative Branch. Because our typists 

did not speak, read, or write English. their work had to be closely 

checked by a group of U.S. military personnel. Then, all documents were routed into the Reproduction Section. During 1966 
38 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

it was a big day when 100 pounds of reports were printed. By early 

1967 the daily volume averaged 1,400 pounds of reports. with 

every indication of greater volume in the future. 

To permit fasler response to illlelligcnce requirements the 

center had the most up-to-date equipmclll, such as the ffiultilith 

platemaster, which photographs and develops masters to be used 

on the muilililh press, which prints at the Tale of 6,000 pages per 

hour; and the collator-stitcher, which amom;uically assemblies and 

staples each report. Reports then went into the distribution poilll 

for Army Post Office or courier delivery to interested agencies. 

Average time for each report from beginning to end was roughly 

six hours. 

As soon as the master copy of a document summary or full 

translation entered the Reproduction Section, the original Viet 

Cong documents and the English translation were diverted LO the 

FMA Document Storage and Retrieval Branch. The first step 

was the detailed indexing of each report by the team of highly 

trained U.S. intelligence analysts. The indexing system used was 

the intelligence subject code. Here, every name, unit identifica· 

tion, place name, and document or repon number that appeared in 

the report was recorded for retrieval purposes. The next step was 

keypunching the index data on the nexowriters. This equipmelll 

produced an index card associated with the FMA system as well 

as an index tape. Then the index card, the English translation, 

and the origina l document were recorded on 35·mm. microfilm. 

For retrieval, the highly sensitive but dependable FMA equip. 

ment was used: A question is entered into the machine by lise of 

a request card; the card is inserted into the retrieval unit and 

when the search buLton is pressed, the machine begins an elec· 

tronic search at the rate of 6,400 pages per minute: each time a 

frame appears that answers the question, the machine projects an 

8x l0·inch image of that report on a screen. The machine can make 

hard copies in five seconds. Document reports, interrogation repons, agent reports, and Military Assistance Command intelligence 

summaries were indexed and entered into the system. To permit 

greater access to this data base, the system also provided answers 

to queries in the form of microfilm strips and 16·mm. film which 

could be used by the requesler on film reader primers which were 

made available to all headquarters. 

To provide efficient use of the data base, this system was interfaced with the IBM 1401 computer located at the Combined In· 

telligence Center. The link ""as provided by the IBM 047 con· 

vener which converted the document indexing da ta from the 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 39 

index tape into IB I ( ard formal. These I Bl\! cards, wh ich con· 

tained all indexi ng data, were then programmed into the 1401 

computer. This provided the illlellige nce producers with com plete 

data regarding the availahility of information on a spec ific unit 

or subjecl. 

At this point the original documellls, which were the legal 

property of the Republic of Vietnam, were passed to the Vietnamese documelll archives wh ich was also located in the combined 

facility. Here, files of selected Viet Cong documents dating back 

to January 1962 were ava il able for perusal by the intell igence 

community. 

To assist national intelligence agencies and staff sections, the 

center's complete 35-mm. microfilm data base was furnished Paci· 

fic Command and the Ddense Intelligence Agency and was updated continuall y. Personnel of the celller periodically visited major 

headquarters in Vi etnam to photograph their intelligence fil es and 

red uce them 1.0 16-mm. microfilm c:lflridge format for permanenl 

retention, Since captured enemy documents lega ll y remained Viet· 

namese property, the Vietnamese cOl1lplement at the Combined 

Document Exploitation Center comprised the national archives 

for such materiaL 

"Go" te:llllS from the center were av,lil ahle LO aid in screening 

large amounts of documents captured or uncovered during combat 

operations, but often there h'as just too much material for the 

teams to translatc. Befflre tcams wcre dispatched we encouraged 

sending sllch malerial5 by spec ial roILrier to the celller, where 

document exploitation was much more effi cient. ;\Iost commands 

followed this procedurc. 

In the tactical units. personnel in the interrogation secti ons 

processed captured documents in addition to conducting prisoner 

interrogations and administnuive functions. Documents obt<lined 

during combat operations usuall y wcre fOI'\I':lrrled directly to 

brigade where a small U.S. and Vietnamese team ~cree d them 

for information of immediate tactical Yaille and issued spot reports 

on critica l OT perishable items. On rome operatiom an interrogat ion 

team accompanied battalion-size units, and the initial screening 

and readollts were done at that level. The documents then were 

passed to the division or <;epa rat e brigade authoritics for more 

dctailed processing. At division lc\el. document processing was 

more thorough : howevcr, emphasis was placed on getting the 

documents b;lck to the combincd center as quickly as possi hle, 

DocumCIH evacua ti un polic ies were not IIl1ifonn: Illllnan fa ctOrs 

combined wilh physica l elcments resulted in procedural variances. 
40 THE ROLt: OF MIl..JTARY INTELLIGENCE 

Some units, such as the 25th Infantry Division in eu Chi, were 

close enough to Saigon to send daily couriers to the cClller. The 

1st Air Cavalry Division and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 

often used helicopters for quick transfer from the capturing unit 

to higher headquarters. It was prererred that the tactical units 

send documents to the celller for full translation rather than lie 

lip their organic interpreters and translators. Experience showed 

that the Combined Document Exploitation Center CQuld, by far, 

provide the most rapid readollts, summaries, and full or extract 

translations of significant documents. \Vhcn we discovered that 

some units were delaying transfer of certain documents until they 

could complete local exploitation, we procured duplicating machines so that units could copy documents they wished to retain 

and send the originals back to the center. This simple measure 

permitted significant improvements in our document exploitation 

system. 

The objective or the Combined Document Exploitation Center, 

as well as the Combined Military Interrogation Center and the 

Combined Materiel Exploitation Center, was to provide the data 

base essential to intelligence production organizations such as the 

Combined Intelligence Center. 

ComiJined Maleriel Exploitation 

1n August 1965. the Military Assistance Command technical 

intelligence capability was limited. The collection and examination of captured maleriel was dOl1e as lillIe more than additional 

duty as time and work load permitted. From this austere beginning 

a sophisticated. efficient materiel exploitation program evolved. 

\Ve designed a suitable organization. requisitioned the necessary 

specialists. and prepared lhe requisite MACV directi,'cs to estab· 

lish the materiel exploitation systcm based upon a formal agreement betweel1 Military Assistan('e Command and Republic of 

Vietnam Armed Forces. Qualified technical intelligence pcrsonnel 

were few. Again we taught special classes ana conducted on-the-job 

training for fillers while the few experienced. qualified specialists 

who had been developed in the country sought to get on with 

the war. Majors Donald D_ Rhode and John C. Baker and Vietnamese Army Major Van Lam played key roles in the development 

of the Combined Maleriel Exploitation Center. and through their 

efforts command technical intelligence grew rapidly and efficiently. 

The Comhined Materiel Exploitation Cenler was charged with 

collecting and exploiting captured materiel of all Iypes, and this 

entailed examination, identification. analysis. evaluation of the 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 41 

items, and dissemination of the intelligence obta ined. We needed 

to determine the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations o[ 

enemy materiel and equipment so that adequate coulllermeasures 

could be devised. The center tailored its organiza tion for the 

Vietnam environment in an effort to realize maximum exploitation. 

(Charl 7) T he Graphics Secti on provided illustrator and photo· 

graphic sup port; the Laboratory performed chemical analysis to 

determine the composition of unidentified substances; Receiving 

and Sh ipping received maleriel from capturing units and prepared 

se lected ilems for shipment to the United States; the Communications-Electronics Section exploi ted all signal equipment, including 

electronic and photography items; the Mobility Secti on evaluated 

and analyzed enemy mines, booby traps, engineer ilems, transportation equipment, constructi on, and barrier materials; the \Veapons 

and Munitions Section analyzed fTagments to determine the type 

of ammunition employed; the Medica l Section eva luated enemy 

medical supplies, equipment, medical capabilities, and noneffective 

rates due to medical causes among enemy units; and the General 

CHART 7-0RGANIZATION, COMIlINEO MATERIEl. EXI'I.OITATION CENTER 

Combined Materiel 

Exploitation Center 

I I I Administration Exploitation 

and Support Division Division 

I _I 

Receiving Communications 

Weapons 

Graphics and Shipping laboratory ,,' Mobility and Electronics MUnitions 

General 

Field Supplies Medical 

eo-ordination and Equipment 

Teams 

- No.1 

No. 21 

No.3 

No. 41 

No.5 
42 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Supply and Equipment Section eya luated and ana lyzed enemy 

clothing, individual equ ipment, rations, petrole um products. and 

chemical, bacteriological, and radiological eq uipment. 

Specific intelligence collection requirements listing items of 

enemy malericl for which Ihe intelligence community had a need 

were prepared by the Combined [l. laleriei Exploitation Center and 

published by J-2, Military Assistance Command, to provide 

collecti on guida nce to field commanders. \\' hen captured or otherwise obtained, items of command illlerest were reported expeditiously through intelligence channels 10 J-2, Military Assistance 

Command , while the materiel itse lf was tagged by the capturing 

unit and evacuated to the celller for full·scale exploitation. Items 

of captured materiel determined to be of immediate tactical im· 

portance: were spot reported through channels and the center dis· 

patched a "go" team to effect immediate exploitation. The lack of 

experienced technical intelligence personnel hindered exploitation 

by U.S. units below division and se parate brigade. The unit's 

primary responsibility concern ed the recovery and evacuation of 

materiel from the caplUre si te to the nearest maintenance collect· 

ing point. except for food and medical supplies which were handl ed 

separa tely and explosive items that were evacuated through ammunition suppl y channels. \Vhen evacuation was impossi ble, either 

because of the tactical situa ti on or the size of the item. all pertinent data were recorded and, along with photographs or sketches, 

forwarded to the center for anal ysis and examination. 

Exploitation of captured matcriel at division and separate 

hrigade level was limitcd to a determination of the immediate 

tactical significance. and the materiel was then evacuated to the 

combined center. The prompt evacuation of significant items of 

captured materiel was stressed. 

Captured materiel was channeled to collecting points located 

within each area support command of the corps tactical zones. 

Stich mo,'ements were performed by the maintenance support 

organizations of the capturing unit or by support organizations 

providing logistical services withi n the corps. The materiel nor· 

mally rema ined at each echelon IIlHil it was examined by technical 

intelligence personnel. Except for authori7ed war trophies. cap· 

tured materiel could not be removed from Military Assistance 

Command or otherwise disposed of until released by technical 

intelligence personnel of the Combined Materiel Exploitation 

Center. 

Screening and preliminary fi eld exploitation of ca ptured mao 

teriel was done by fi eld co·ordination teams that normally operated 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 43 

MA'nRIEL OF' INTEREST TO THE GEN£RAL SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT SECTION 

OF CMEC wa.s .screened ;,/ detail. 

in the corps and division support areas. When required, they also 

provided direct assistance to capturing units. Exploitation fune· 

tions normally were carried out b)' these teams at the corps support 

area collecting points where I.hey galhered items of intelligence 

significance needed to meet requ irements of the Combined MaLeriel 

Exploitation CeOler. hems to be exploiled were evacuated to the 

center through logistical channels using backhaul transponalion 

as much as possible. Other equipment was released to the collecti ng 

point commander for disposition in accordance \\ith service 

department regulations. Captltred enemy materiel requested for 

retention by ca pturing units could be retllrned by the collecting 

point commander after screening and release by personnel al lhe 

center. 

The captured material sent to the center was examined and 

evaluated to determine enemy materiel threats, technological capa· 

bilities, and performance limilalions: to produce information from 

which military countermeasures were developed; and to provide 

continuous input to the national integrated scientific and technical 
44 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

imelligencc program in accordance with Defense Intelligence 

Agency and Military Assistance Command policy. 

In addition to performing exploitation functions at its fixed 

facility, the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center also main. 

tained "go" teams to provide field exploitation support when 

required. These quick-reaction learns were airlifted to objective 

areas to conduct on-site exploitation of large caches of materiel or 

items of great intelligence significance. 

All materiel in the category of communications and electronic 

equipment was first screened in accordance with Military Assistance 

Command directives, then evacuated to corps support area collecting points for examination by technical intelligence personnel. 

The complete recovery and expeditious evacuation of enemy 

ammunition and ammunition components contributed essentially 

to identifying weapons systems used by the Communists and a 

thorough assessment of the threat posed by each weapons system. 

Large caches of ammunition and explosives had to be inspected 

and declared 5<1.fe for handling by explosive ordnance disposal 

(EOD) teams before evacuation. Hazardous items were segregated 

immediately and destroyed by these teams. or by unit ammunition 

personnel if they were qualified to perform destmction. Explosives 

and ammunition declared safe for handling were evacuated to the 

ammunition supply point or ammunition depot designated by the 

ammunition officer of the capturing command where screening. 

preliminary exploitation, and selection of items for further evacua· 

tion to the Combined Materiel Expoitation Center for detailed 

examination were conducted. The center co-ordinated preliminary 

exploitation with the staff explosive ordnance disposal officer at 

the Military Assistance Command Combat Operations Center to 

permit technical procf'rlures for safe handling of all first found 

or newly introduced enemy explosive ordnance to be disseminated 

promptly throughout the country. All significant items-new, reo 

cent, or modified-or enemy material received special handling and 

were evacuated without delay with captured or recovered technical 

documents such as gun books, logbooks, packing slips, firing tables, 

and manuals directly associated with an item of materiel. If the 

tactical situation did not permit the materiel to be evacuated. a 

report was forwarded to the Combined Materiel Exploitation 

Center with a description of the equipment. complete capture data. 

and other information of value for a technical evaluation of the 

end item. Photographs of the materiel were highly desirable i£ the 

situation permitted. 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 45 

The Combined lntellige"ce CenleT, Vietnam 

The Combined Intelligence Center. Vietnam (CICV). was a 

true product of the combined concept. It became the most soph isticated and capable production facility I have ever known in direct 

support of wartime operation and planning_ 

During the early days of the U.S_ buildup it was imperative that 

we be able to produce intelligence as quickly as possible_ It was 

obvious that we would not have time to bring in the necessary 

units and specialists ITom the United States; we would have to 

make do with the meager resources available in Vietnam. This job 

was assigned to Colonel Frank L. Schar, Jr .• who had previously 

served as senior adviser to Colonel Ho Van Loi and as such had 

become thoroughly familiar with the Vietnamese intelligence 

organization. This experience, coupled with Colonel $chars close 

personal relationship with our counterparts. contributed importantly to the growth of the combined effort. 

While the origin of the Combined Intelligence Center cannot 

be traced to a simple cell, the Target Research and Analysis Center 

(TRAC) was important in its evolution. The Target Research 

and Analysis Center had been created in January 1965 to develop 

targets for Strategic Air Command B-25's that were scheduled to 

Ay missions in support of Military Assistance Command and was 

housed in a warehouse located on Tan Son Nhut air base. With 

the increasing emphasis on targeting. the center grew rapidly; by 

mid-1965 it constituted a significant portion of Military Assistance 

Command intelligence. More importantly, existing when the decision was reached to develop the Combined Intelligence Center. it 

had some available space in the warehouse and served as a handy 

cadre from which to draw spec ialists to start the U.S. complement 

for the combined center. Another aspect of its role in the growth 

of the Combined Intelligence Center was the rapport that had 

been developed with the Vietnamese in targeting. The Republic 

of Vietnam Armed Forces intelligence personnel had become accustomf!d to working with their Military Assistance Command 

counterparts. and this provided us a foothold that could be f!Xpanded into broader combined intelligence production. The 

targeting function of the Target Research and Analysis Center was 

assumf!d by the Targets Branch of the Combined Intelligence 

Cf!nter under Colonel Edward Ratkovich. U.S. Air Force_ 

From the limited resources available. Colonel Schaf made remarkable progress in developing the U.S. element for the Combined 

Intelligence Center, which at this stage was a unilateral "joint" 

enterprise. Drawing heavily (rom the Target Research and Analysis 
46 THE ROLE OF" MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Center, the Targets Branch, Support Branch, and Technical Intelligence Branch were fashioned from olher elemcllls within the 

J\'lilitary Assistance Command intelligence organization. However, 

there were not enough Americans in Vietnam LO man an operation 

of the scope envisioned, and, though SlIpport from the United 

States would be forthcoming, it would not arrive until late 1965. 

In mid.August of thaI year support from the G-2 of U.S. Army, 

Pacific, \\'as requested. Augmcmalion personnel from the 3 191h 

Military Intelligence Battalion were sOllglll to bolsler our overcommitted, overworked illlclligence force IIntil the units requisitioned from the United States began arriving. During the remainder 

of August and September 1965, the 319til organized and trained 

a detachment consisting of an area analysis team, seven order of 

battle teams, and a detachment headquarters-a total of eleven 

officers and twenty enlisted men. The detachment closed in Vietnam on 15 October 1965. Colonel Schar quickly assimilated this 

welcome addition into the cadre of the expanding Combined 

Imelligence Center. Because space was at a premium, the area 

analysis learn was houscd with the Target Research and Analysis 

Center in the warehollse at Tan Son Nhut while the order of 

battle teams had to be located in a building in Cho Lon. In early 

November 1965 we were informed that the 519th ~fiJita ry Intelligence Battalion, which would provide th e personnel for the 

U.S. complement at the Combi ned Intelligence Center as well as 

the combined exploitalion centers, had been alerted in August for 

movement from Fort Bragg. North Carol ina , to South Victnam. 

Except for a sma ll advance party, the battalion would deploy by 

ship and would require some fort),-fi\'e days in transit. This delay 

necessitated a request through Pacific Command that thinY-l,\'O 

critically needed specialists from the 5 19th be sent immediately to 

Vietnam by a ir: thirty-one of these specialists arrived on 25 November and were assigned to production tasks. 

Conditions during these ea rl y days were less than ideal. Critical 

deficiencies in work space, billets. transportation, communications, 

and mess facilities, complicated hy a shortage of men and by long 

duty hours, presented classic problems in management and leadership, Efficiency suffered because some production elements were 

located at Cllo Lon and some at Tan Son Nh ut. In pursuit of more 

space, we double·decked th e warehouse at Tan Son Nllllt. but the 

inconvenience of continuing our production functions while these 

alterations were in process seri ollsly detracted from our effectiveness. Logistical problems confronted the 5 19(11 when it arrived, 

and difficulties in finding suitable billets as well as administrative 
CO;\IBI:'oIED INTELLIGENCE 47 

area hindered its integration illto the ilitary Assistance Command 

intelligence organi zation. But by early December 1965 the warehouse modifications had heen completed and the U_S. complement 

for the proposed combined center was fully opera ti onal. 

The realization of a (:ombinecl «(,Iller as emisioned in my 

earlier agreement with Colonel Ho Van Loi was Slill some time 

ah·ay. Not onl y did the Vietnamese lack the requisite qualified 

personnel. we did not have a facility suita hle for housing a COlnbined opera tion of the m'lgnitude re(luired. COII Se{IU elllly, plans 

were drawn lip for constrlL(;lion of a new building for the Com· 

bined Intellige nce Center. Sillce this was to be joilll enterprise and 

would revert to the Repuhlic of VielUam Armed Forces upon 

termina tion of the U.S. commitment in South Vietnam, the construction was funded as a ~Iilitary AssiSlancc Prugram (MAP) 

project. Com pletion of the new building hecame the largel dale 

for activatiol1 of the Vietnamese complement for the center. 

At the end of 1965 the U.S. complement at the Combined Intelligence Center numbered thirt)"-Ihree men from the ~H9 th 

Military Intelligence Battalion and 253 permanent 1l<1rty. This 

number steadil y increased as additional elements of the 519th 

Military IllIelligence Ballalion arrived; however, we discovered 

that practica ll y every member of the battalioTl required either 

specialized or area training. This added burden had to be placed 

on the already overtaxed ~fiJitary Assistance Command intelligence 

organizalion and detraCled from our ca pabilities. Despite the inconveniences and d ifficulties. Ihe 5191h soon became operational. 

and by February \966 the .~ th personnel could be released to 

return to their parent unit in Hawaii. The Combined Intelligence 

Center continued to grow and ga in in expertise and efficiency. The 

Il ew building was completed in December 1966, and ribbon.cutting 

ceremOflies marked the official opening on 17 January 1967. The 

presence of the Vietnamese complement made the occasion particularly significant. 

Major Cao Minh Tiep was selected to be the Vietnamese codirector. and this outstanding officer did mllch to enhance the 

combined mission accomplishmenl of the center. 

The new center wa'i reputedl y the la rgest fully air-conditioned 

si ngle·story structure in Southeast Asia. II eventually housed over 

five hundred U.S. intelligence personnel of all sel'\'ices and more 

than one hundred Vietnamese intelligence personnel working 

twenty-rour hours a da y to provide illlelligence support to all COIll· 

bat forces in the Repu blic of Vietnam. 

The organ izati on and functions of the center and its individual 
48 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

branches, once set up and in operation, remained quite stable. 

Intelligence production requirements were satisfied in order of 

battle. area analysis. strategic intelligence, technical intelligence, 

imagery interpretation, lTagcting, and intelligence data storage. 

(Cha,' 8) 

Again, as in other agreements concerning combined imelligenec, U.S. and ViClIlamese directors controlled their respective 

elemen lS of the center. Proximity to onc another insured that they 

could easily discuss matters of mutual concern that affected the 

operation of the ctlller. Once more, I look care to instill the 

concept of free and complete exchange of information and tOlal 

co-operation so that no wall of mistrust and slispicion would be 

generated. In this combined concept, everything had LO be open and 

sincere. 

The Support Branch of the Combined Intelligence Center, 

charged with personnel administration, su ppl y l1lanagemCIll, security, and maintenance, accomplished these tasks within its 

Administrative, Security, and Supply Sections. 

CHART 8-ORGANIZATION. COMDINF.D INTELLIGENCE. CENTER, VIF.TNAM 

I J-2. Military Assistance Command I I J-2, Joinl General Staft I 

American Director Vietnamese Director 

Deputy Director Deputy Director 

Operations Support 

liaison Oftien 

Automatic 

Collection 

Oat. Processing 

Requirements 

Office 

I I I I I I 

Order 01 Battle Ima,ery Technica' Researdland 

Area Analysis TIrgets Interpretation Intelligence Analysis 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 49 

The Operations Branch was responsible for production control, 

which included editing and dissemination of messages and documents, and was organized with Distribution, Graphics, Editing, and 

Requirements Sections. In this branch also resided the communica· 

tions facilities for the center. Eventually, through the use of the 

1-2 teletype, the center communicated with all major U.S. com· 

manders and senior advisers in Vietnam, thus permitting rapid 

dissemination of significant intelligence to the combat units in 

the field-a major goal of the center. 

The Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Section automated 

storage and retrieval of a large portion of the center's data base. 

The section capably provided analysts and field units with both a 

narrative printout and a graphic plot of intelligence they required. 

Although originally designed for support of the Combined Intelli· 

gence Center, an equal amount of its work requests were to come 

from field commanders, both U.S. and Vietnamese. Indeed , many 

programs were written in Vietnamese. Automatic data processing 

assistance was as ncar as the telephone, and, in fact, many units 

operating near Saigon sent liason officers to the combined center 

for more personalized contact. If a particular need required im· 

mediate response, the center could have information in the hands 

of a courier within two hours after receipt of a request. The 

inclusion of Vietnamese military personnel in the Automatic Data 

Processing Section, trained to operate all of the equipment and 

working side by side with U.S. specialists, greatly enhanced the 

intelligence effort. Bilingual printouts were of immediate value to 

advisers, who could easily co·ordinate and compare information 

with their counterparts. 

In addition to the administrative and management personnel, 

the headquarters clement of (he Combined Intelligence Center 

included liaison officers to communicate personally with other 

agencies of the country team and with U.S. and other major com· 

mand intelligence organizations. Also, some people hom the 

collection side were collocated with the producers in the center 

to insure accurate and timely response by collectors (0 the needs 

of the center for additional data or reconnaissance coverage. 

Colonel Glenn E. Muggelbcrg in the Intelligence Operations 

Division understood that this collocation was undertaken in an 

effort to resolve a recurring problem which cropped up elsewhere 

in the vast Military Assistance Command organization: though 

geographically separated. elements in light of their integrated 

missions must necessarily work in close co·operation with one 

another. With the problems of inadequate transportation and the 
50 TilE ROLE 01· MILITARY I N TELLIGENCE 

scarcil), of sec ure commtlll it;a liOIiS that existed in Vietnam at the 

time , these elements were effectively isola ted in the ir individual 

compounds. The sol u[iol1 was to put coll ection direcLOfs with the 

producers in the Combined Int ellige nce Ccmcr. 

The Order of Balll c Branch (OB Branch) of the Combined 

Intell igence Center was composed of a headquarters element and 

three major production elemems: Ground Order of BaltIc (Grou nd 

OB), Order of BaltI c Studi es (013 Studi es), and Political Order 

of Baule (Political 013). This branch, which some considered the 

heart of th e celller, prod uced finished int elligence on the e ight 

order of ba ttl c factors and on infiltration statistics. 

In order to keep its holdings current and complete, th e Order 

of Battle Branch maintained dose li aison with other agencies in 

Saigon (i ncluding the other combined intelligence centers), with 

tactica l units in the field. and wi th th e advisers throughout th e 

cou ntry. Frequent field trips to compare and exchange informa· 

ti on acquainted the corps analysts with th e sources of the various 

types of informati on available and at the same time familiarized 

fi eld units with th e type of support the Combined Intelligence 

Center could provide. 

The Ground Order of Battle Section had five teams, one for 

each corps and a Southeast Asia team concerned with North Viet· 

nam. Laos, and Cambodia; these teams were charged \\'ith develop. 

ing military order of balli e in fonmllion on their respective geographical areas. \Ve designed th e Order of Battle Studi es Section 

along the lines of the order of hattie factors: a stren gth. composi. 

tion . and disposition team; a tactics. training. and miscellaneous 

data team; a combat efTecti\'eness team; and a logistics team. This 

secti on produced in.depth. countrywide slUdi es on th e enemy's 

forces. 

The Political Order of Ballie Section was made lip of seven 

teams organized 011 the basis of enemy military regions and the 

Central Office of South Vi etn am. The section produced complete 

and timel y intell igellce 011 th e houndari es, locations. stru cture. 

strengths. personalities. and acti viti es of the Communist political 

orga ni za ti on. or infrastruC'lure. 

A fuller understandin g of the functi oning of the Order of 

Battle Branch can he ohtained by an examination of th e general 

methodology employed by one or th e corps teams of the Ground 

Order o f Battle Section. Informat ion entered til e section from i\ 

great variety of sources incl udin g captured documents. interrogation 

reports from ca ptives and returnees, agent reports. situation reports. 

and spot reports. Translations of captured documents and 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 51 

interrogaIion reports were appreciated, above all, by the analyst, 

who spent most of his time updating his holdings by evaluating and 

interpreting these sources. Altel1lion also was given to agent reports, 

which often provided the initial indication of a change in the 

composition or disposilion of enemy forces. Several thousand 

reports came into the Combined Intelligence Celller each week. 

\Vhen reports came inlO the Order of Baule Section, they were 

scanned for information of immediate illlelligence va lue and then 

passed for detailed examination to the analyst responsible for the 

particular unit or area concerned. In the case of a captured 

document, this procedure may have involved requesting a full 

translation from the Combined Documelll Exploitation Center. In 

the case of an interrogalion report, it may have involved levying a 

specific intelligence colleaion requirement on the Combined 

Military Interrogation Center with detailed guidance to assist 

members of the requirements team and the interrogator in fully 

exploiting the source for order of battle informa ti on. As the anal yst 

developed data, he recorded it in a workbook or on cards for future 

entry in the computer data base. 

\Vithill the analytical process, we were concerned with ascertaining not only the existence of enemy units but also the strength of 

enemy forces. The corps teams of the Ground Order of Battle 

Section were charged, therefore, with determining the strength of 

individual combat and combat support units, a factor revealed 

principally in captured documents, interrogations, and the analysis 

of enemy combat losses, The Strength Team of the Order of Battle 

Studies Section developed countrYh'ide estimates of all ca tegories of 

strength, including that of guerrillas or militia forces, The corps 

teams supported lhe Strength Team by supplying information on 

specific guerrilla units as well as on combat and combat support 

units as it became available, The analyst's product thus continually 

rev ised and modified the hranch's order or battle holdings, 

which were disseminated lO field units, to the Military Assistance 

Command community, and to \Vashington through both the 

Monthly Order 0/ Bailie Summary, updated daily by cable, and the 

MACV .1-2 Periodic Intelligence Report (pERINTREP), also 

published mOJlthly. 

The Political Order of Battle Section was concerned with the 

personnel and organization of the Viet Cong infrastructure from 

hamlet through national leveL Information was received in the 

section from numerous sources: the National Interrogation Center 

(N IC) , the combined ex ploitation centers, corps and division 

interrogation center reports, agent reports, rallier or H oi CliMlh 
52 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

debriefings, American Embassy reports, intelligence summaries. and 

special collection program reports. Whatever was extracted was 

placed in the aUlomated data base, which incorporated both the 

names of individuals within the infrastructure with their known 

aliases and, using the international telegraphic code, the diacritical 

marks that are used with the Vietnamese alphabet and are essential 

for identification purposes. The section could obtain bilingual 

printouts that cou ld be sem immediately to the field for use in 

operations directed against the infrastructure. 

The Area Ana lysis Branch had the mission of supporting 

operations through the compilation and production of intelligence 

studies on transportation, communications, and military geography. 

These included tactical scale studies, area analysis base data sfudies, 

a Viet Cong and North Vietnam Army gazetteer, and various other 

special studies concerned with lines of communication, infiltration 

rou tes, avenues of approach, and general terrain analysis. In 

addition, the branch provided input for the periodic intelligence 

report and estimates and responded to special requests concerning 

its area of interest. To accomplish these tasks, the branch functioned 

with an operations element and five subordinate sections: a lines 

of commun ication section with teams responsible for highways, 

'railways, and waterways; an entry zones section with teams 

responsible for airfi elds, helicopter landing zones, drop zones, 

beaches, and ports; a cultural features section with teams for 

telecommunications, urban areas, and man·made features; a terrain 

section with teams handling landforms, vegetation, drainage. and 

soils; a weather section; and, finally, a support element which was 

responsible for a map and photo library and a reproduction room. 

From January to October 1966 the major effort of the Area 

Analysis Branch was devoted to establishing a data base and the area 

analysis studies, which were produced at an area scale of 1:250,000 

and were referred to as encyclopediae of illleJligence because they 

provided an excellelll reference for intelligence information. Each 

study consisted of three volumes: Book I was a narrative amplifying 

the overprinted base map which comprised Book II; Book III 

supplemellled Book II with photos and diagrams. Each study 

covered friendly and enemy operational aspects-lines of communication, cultural features, and weather and climate. Such studies 

were completed on all areas of South Vietnam. and I :250,000 map 

sheets containing intelligence data were reproduced in 400 copies for 

distribution to customers. Subsequently, to satisfy requirements for 

this type of intelligence support, we procured cronaAex (a stable 

base, mylar material) copies of the joint operation graphic series 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 53 

map sheets covering 50mh Vietnam. On the reverse side of each 

sheet a base map was printed. Intelligence information was then 

placed on the front of the sheet. and when reproduced on an Ozalid 

machine, a subdued base map with intelligence superimposed was 

obtained. Minor changes could be made to the cronaAex sheet 

without disturbing the base map. Subjects available on cronaflex 

at a scale of I :250,000 included cross-country movement. soils, 

vegetation, geology, and railroads. Originally the plan called for 

maintaining the data base at this scale, but this proved inadequate 

for all the information that needed to be plotted. Therefore, the 

data base was converted to a scale of 1:50,000. 

At the same time as the change to I :50,000 maps. the major 

emphasis of the Area Analysis Branch shifted to the production of 

tactical scale studies. The studies were organized into topography, 

weather, and climate; entry zones; lines of communication; cultural 

features and telecommunications; cross-country movement; enemy 

installations; and potential avenues of movement. Except for the 

first (topography, weather, and climate), which had only a 

narrative, each study included a narrative and an overprinted 

map sheet. They were printed in 350 copies to permit wide 

dissemination. By mid- 1967 tactical scale studies had been completed 

on almost half of 50mh Vietnam, and the remainder were scheduled 

for completion by November of that year. The studies were to be 

revised and republished as required. 

The Area Analysis Branch constalllly sought to improve the 

quality and timeliness of its products. One step that facilitated 

speedy response was the acquisition of the cronaAex map sheets. 

Road, trail, airfield, and landing zone data were posted to the 

cronaflex masters each day and the branch was thereby enabled to 

provide in a matter of minutes annotated maps containing the 

latest intelligence information. This process was used in conjunction 

with the rapid retrieval possible with the alllomated system in the 

Area Analysis Branch. Within a .36-hour period an Ozalid copy of a 

tactical scale study could be furnished to a requesting unit. A 

six-map-sheet study required five days for preparation and assembly 

and fourteen days for printing by the topographic company that 

supported the Combined Intelligence Center. It was preferable, if 

time permitted, to have studies printed rather than reproduced by 

the Ozalid process. 

Approximately 60 percent of the Area Analysis Branch's effort 

was devoted to the maintenance of tactical scale studies: that 

remaining was occupied by other terrain intelligence requirements 

such as input to the periodic intelligence report and estimates, 
54 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

TACTICAL SeA I.E STUDIES PRODUCED RY THE AREA ANALYSIS BRANCH OF 

CICV were used by nil Free World forces ill planning operations. 

analysis of the effects of Ihe weat her on the terra in and enemy 

capabilities, and th e status of rou tes. Particular attention was paid 

to requirements for information concerning potential avenues of 

enemy movement. 

Another significant project of the Area Anal ysis Branch was th e 

preparation of a gazetteer cOlltaining 127 I: I 00,000 Communist map 

sheets of South Vietnam and refl ecling the Viet Cong and North 

Vietnamese names for places and fea tures. Since the enemy names 

frequentl y varied from th e South Vietnamese designa tions, th e 

gazetteer showed the ellemy terminology, symbols, and grids with 

map sheet identifica lion along with th e corresponding data that 

appeared on the U.S. map series. This program was comintiOliS wilh 

new names and loca les incorporated imo th e basic document as 

discovered. 

The Technical Intelligence Branch of the Combined Intelli· 

gence Center performed equipment analyses, determined weapons 

and equipment characteristics and specificat ions, made equipment 

assessments, and determined "ldnerabilities for operational ex· 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 55 

p10itation. In order to produce accurate intelligence on enemy 

capabilities, vulnerabilities, and order of battle in the technical 

chemical, ordnance, engineer, quartermaster, medical, signal, and 

transportation areas, the branch was organized with a headquarters 

and seven technical specialty sections. 

In November 1965 action was initiated to have the 18th 

Chemical Detachment, 571st Engineer Detachment, 52lst Medical 

Detachment, 528th Ordnance Detachment, 590th Quartermaster 

Detachment, 18th Signal Detachment, and 30th Transportation 

Detachment assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion 

to support the corresponding sections of the Technical Intelligence 

Branch. Because these were the only technical intelligence units in 

Military Assistance Command, centralized control was exercised in 

order to provide the best possible support for the entire command. 

The headquarters element handled the operations and administration of the branch as well as requests for technical intelligence 

assistance. The Chemical Section monitored the enemy chemical 

capability, with particular interest in decontamination materials, 

chemical-related documents, and Soviet-bloc chemical equipment 

and munitions. The Engineer Section accumulated data on enemy 

fortifications, structures, tunnel and cave complexes, and barriers 

about which were produced comprehensive studies of Communist 

construction, installations, and facilities. The Medical Section was 

concerned with captured medical supplies and equipment as well as 

medical examinations of prisoners. The Ordnance Section worked 

on the exploitation of all items of ordnance equipment, while the 

Quartermaster Section dealt with enemy uniforms and items of 

general supply. It also provided information for inclusion in 

various recognition manuals published by the Combined Intelli· 

gence Center. The Signal Section, primarily concerned with 

Communist communications, was especially interested in signal 

equipment not of U.S. origin. 

In addition to the individual section evaluations and reports, 

the Technical Intelligence Branch as a unit prepared numerous 

studies and pamphlets on Communist equipment, anns, and 

materiel. These studies received wide distribution throughout 

Vietnam and were valuable in training centers in the United States. 

One particularly important study receiving a high priority and wide 

distribution was on the enemy use of mines and booby traps. 

Finally, the Technical Intelligence Branch of the Combined 

Intelligence Center developed and maintained the technical in· 

telligence order of battle and provided current information on all 

of the technical service or support-type units. This information was 
A:-'fEJI.iCAN AND V IETNAMESE ) I\'TELLICENCE SPECIAT.lSTS examine a 

captured enemy rocket launcher. 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 57 

published in studies designed to give the customer as much 

information as possible about the enemy's capabilities and vulnerabilities in the technical service fields. The first such study, 

NVA / VC Sigl1al Order of Battle, was published during January 

1967. 

In the Imagery Interpretation (ll) Branch of the Combined 

Intelligence Center, readouts were made of all types of imageryphoto, infrared, and side-looking airborne radar-and furnished to 

the other branches of the center that required it. The Imagery 

Interpretation Branch had two sections. The Operations Section 

was organized along geogra phical lines with a team for each 

of the Vietnamese corps as well as ollt-of-country teams; the 

Support Section included a film library, a maintenance team, 

and a photography laboratory. The air·conditioned laboratory, 

constructed in mid·1967, provided specialized photographic processing support to all branches within the center. Naturally, we 

attempted to provide the Imagery Interpre tation Branch with the 

most advanced and best equipment available in its field. 

A survey team from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Intelligence at Department of the Army and the Automatic Data 

Field Systems Command in December 1965 came to Saigon on my 

request. They recommended that we procure certain equipment for 

the proposed combined center. Their research indicated that 

the center wou ld need equipment wh ich could accelerate the 

extraction, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence fTom aerial 

imagery. \Ve initiated Project Concrete to secure the needed 

equipment and submitted requisitions on 13 December 1965. The 

first shipment of Project Concrete imagery interpretation equipment 

arrived on 15 December 1966 and consisted of twelve simple 

roll-film light tables to be used with zoom optics, two AR 85 

Viewer-Compu ters, three ltek rear-projection viewers, and a CAF 

Model 910 Ozalid printmaster. The second shipment arrived on 14 

January 1967 and included four AR 85 Viewer-Computers. one 

Map-O-Graph, three Itek variable-width viewers. a microdensitometer with clean-room module. and one photo rectifier. The final 

shipment came late in February 1967 and included six multisensor 

take-up tables with a supply of replacement parts. 

The AR 85 Viewer-Computer was designed to perform rapid 

and accurate mensuration on all types of imagery-infrared, radar. 

and photography, including panoramic photographs. Some of the 

more important functions performed by the computer included 

determination of true ground position expressed either in geographic or universa l transverse mercator co-ordinates, determination 
58 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

of height, area measurement, and measurement of straight or 

curvilinear distances. A typical project on which these machines 

were employed was the analysis of rice production in the IV Corps 

Tactical Zone. 

The Itek variable-width viewer stood as one of the most 

important items of equipment in the inventory of the Imagery 

Interpretation Branch. The viewer was used initially to scan the 

duplicate positive OT duplicate negative imagery received at the 

Combined Intelligence Center. Through a rear-view process, the 

image was projected onto a large viewing screen. The operator, 

sealed in front of the viewer, was able to have the imagery move at 

whatever speed he desired. When he detected someth ing of 

significance, he could opt to enlarge the projected image three, 

twelve, or thirty times, a feature which in itself added a new 

dimension to the imagery interpretation process at the center. For 

example, the optimum altitude for high panoramic reconnaissance 

missions was J5,000 feet. This resulted in a photo scale of 1: 15,000, 

too sma ll for tactica l interpretation. Using the variable·width 

viewer, the scale could be increased to 1:500 at 30 times mag· 

nification without appreciable loss of resolution. One of the viewers, 

equipped with a printer attachment, produced an 18x24·inch 

photograph of the image projected on the screen within approxi. 

mately forty seconds. One such photograph of a camouAaged 

surface·to--air missile site in North Vietnam, made from film taken a 

short while earlier, was used to brief U.S. Air Force strike pilots in 

Saigon. The pilots returned and destroyed the site, which had been 

located by an imagery interpreter using the Itek viewer. 

A closer look at some of the representative projects of the 

Imagery Interpretation Branch will give a better understanding of 

its operation and the use of its equipment. One important project, 

the Photo Study Program, originated in December 1966 when the 

III Corps Tactical Zone imagery interpretation team was directed 

to make a photo study of the Lo Go area in Tay Ninh Province. 

This study was intended to furnish photo intelligence on an area in 

which elements of the Central Office of South Vietnam reportedly 

had been operating. Imagery interpreters first made a detailed 

analysis of photography of the area to identify and annotate all 

items of military significance. Then, in order to determine the 

arrangement and interrelationship of the defensive positions, trails, 

and other military activity discovered on the individual photos, 

mosaics were constructed. In the mosaics the information noted on 

the individual photos began to form a pattern, particularly 

highlighting the lines of communication and area defenses. Instead 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 59 

.. 

IMAGERY INTERPRETER remOV~$ photocopy produced by the ltd variablewidth view~T with printer. 

of a trail simply crossing one photograph, it could be followed over 

a large area to aid in the identification of entire defensive systems. 

Because this study resulted in some twenty mosaics, an indexing 

system had to be devised that would allow the user to locate a 

particular mosaic without going through the whole set. To do this, 

the traces of the mosaics were plotted on I :50,000 maps and were 

numbered. Overlays were prepared, also at a scale of 1:50,000, 

showing what intelligence items were found on each mosaic that 

indicated Jines of communication and defensive positions. Thus the 

completed photo study packet contained defense and lines of 

communications overlays, a I: 50,000 index to the mosaics, and the 

annotated mosaics. However, it was apparent that the full value of 

the studies could not be realized unless the packet could be 
60 THE ROLE OF M ILITARY INTELLICENCE 

reproduced in sufficient quantity and in a convenient formal to 

permit its use by each unit in the area covered by the study. The 

original size of the complete packet-30x40 inches-was too large 

for field use. To overcome this difficulty, arrangements were made 

with the U.s. Air Force 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron 

to have the packet reproduced at a 50 percent reduction of the 

original size and in a quantity to sa tisfy all requesters. The 

popularity and sliccess of the Photo Study Program in II I Corps led 

to its adoption as a project fOT all the corps imagery interpretation 

teams in the Combined Intelligence Center. By May 1967, sixty· 

four photo studies had been produced. 

Practical applications for these studies were almost limitless. 

Special Forces units used them in selling up security for the 

Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps and hamlets, and advisers 

used them for briefing and debriefing their counterparts and troops. 

They were utilized similarly in briefing and debriefing agents and 

were of great value in the planning and conduct of U.S. and South 

Vietnamese ground operations. In many cases individual mosaics 

were removed from the packet and distributed down to platoon 

level to supplement maps and to provide intelligence on the 

platoon tactical area of responsibility. In addition to field appli. 

cations, the photo studies were valued by the targeting and strike 

objectives teams of the Targets Branch of the Combined Intelli· 

gence Center in determining targets for B-52 strikes and tactical 

unit objectives. In many cases the studies were used for comparison 

with new photogTaphs to detect evidence or indications of recent 

enemy acti vity. 

Starting from the receipt of the photography, fourteen days were 

required to complete and reproduce a study. Because of the 

increased demand, the Imagery InterpretaLion Branch decided that 

all original mosaics and the negatives made during the reproduction 

process would be held in a repository at the Combined Intelligence 

Center, where they were indexed and filed for easy retrieval. 

Subsequent requirements for any single mosaic could be filled in a 

matter of hours. 

The Research and Analysis Branch of the Combined Intelli· 

gence Center developed intelligence and produced reports and 

studies on the economic. political, sociological, and psychological 

characteristics and vulnerabilities of the enemy's military and 

political forces. The branch was organized into a South Vietnam 

section and a Southeast Asia section that was concerned with 

enemy activities in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam as well as 

with information concerning Communist Chinese involvement in 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 61 

the war or war effort. Strategic studies produced covered such 

topics as Viet Cong laxation, soldiers' morale, the effectiveness of 

8-52 strikes and herbicide operations, and characteristics of [he 

North Viel1lamese Army soldiers fighting in South Vietnam. 

(Appetldix G) A typica l study was compiled from more than six 

hundred enemy documents, interrogation reports, and field intelligence reports. The branch also provided intelligence support for 

psychological warfare operations by passing to psychological oJ>"" 

erations personnel a summary of all information applicable to that 

field. Analyses and comments on trends noted in Communist 

psychological operations also were prepared. Receiving input from 

all other activities of the Combined Intelligence Center, the 

Targets Branch was responsible for compiling the necessary intelligence to develop targets for exploitation by combat forces 

available to General Westmoreland. Basically, the Targets Branch 

was charged with locating the enemy, an intriguing and cha llenging 

task. 

The pattern analysis technique began with the development of 

an extensive data base consisting of all available information 

regarding enemy activities in a particular area. The data base 

included every instance of enemy activity contained in intelligence 

files, for example ambush sites used by the Viet Minh during the 

war with France. Criteria for inclusion in the data base were 

continually revised, but as many as thirty-five factors were some· 

times considered. Typical of information put into the data base 

were: 

I. Reported locations and movements of Communist units 

2. All agent reports of enemy activity 

3. All contacts and incidents 

4. Known and sllspected installations 

5. ReportS of logistical opera tions or activities 

6. Infiltration routes 

7. Friendly units and operations, including Arc Light strikes, 

secondary explosions. and imagery interpretation reports 

These data were posted on transparent overlays on 1:250,000 

maps. The overlays were kept current and constituted the paltern 

analysis files. Overlays were prepared by subject; that is, a separate 

overlay was made for logistical activities, another for contacts and 

incidents. Patterns were detected or identified by a detailed 

examination of each overlay by subject. Next. overlays were 

combined, as many as five at a time, and placed simultaneously over 

the map. The objective was to determine if there were any apparent 

or possible relationship between the different subject activities. For 
62 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

example, did logistical activities posted on the logistics overlay seem 

to support the comba t operations posted on the contact and incident 

overlay? Certain standardizations of format as well as innovations 

by individual analysts contributed to the effectiveness of the 

comparisons and the determination of patterns. 

In order that the analytical process yield patterns fTom which 

the enemy and his habits could be identified and targets (ormed, 

the analysts concurrently studied subject indicators such as those in 

the following hypothetical situation: 

I. Terrain considerations (obtained from base map). For the 

enemy to operate, suitable waler, trait, and road transportation 

had to be available. These modes of travel and communication 

connected the logistical bases with infiltration embarkation points, 

other bases, and nearby unit operational areas. 

2. Reported locations arid contacts (pioUed on overlay). A 

concentration of reported and accepted enemy unit sightings, in 

areas of firm enemy control where friendly agent penetration was 

difficult, indicated the existence of a supply or retraining center, 

possibly a base area itself. 

3. Confirmed Iwit movement (plotted OFi overlay). The analysis 

of identified unit movements in conjunction with installations, 

incidents, and agent reports aided in establishing operational areas, 

command procedures, unit missions and objectives, and methods of 

operation. Comparison of unit movement with known trails 

determined from aerial photography suggested enemy lines of 

communication. 

4. Unit sightiFigs (plotted 011 overlay). Unit sightings were 

analyzed in relation to friendly and enemy installations. They 

represented densities of reponed enemy activity which, besides 

identifying specific enemy organizations, could assist in locating 

enemy operational areas. Conversely. an absence of unit sightings 

may have stemmed from insufficient friendly grollnd surveillance 

and agent nelS as well as from an absence of enemy activity. 

5. lnciderlts (plotted on overlay). Incidents could be analyzed, 

either by type or in total. to establish enemy objectives and methods 

of engagement. A relative lack of terrorism, sabotage, harassment, 

or propaganda acti vity in a populated area where government 

authority was tenuous suggested a high degree of enemy control 

over the population, an entrenchment which might have meant a 

base for his operations. On the other hand, a high level of such 

activity, nestled against the perimeter of a low incident area, may 

have indicated an effort by the enemy to expand or maintain a 

protective buffer around a base. 
COM81NED INTELLIGENCE 63 

6. Installatiom (plotted on overlay). Types of logistica l installations were examined as they related to the terrain and to each 

other. and they could be analyzed in relation to confirmed and 

reported unit movement. Generally. we attempted to prove the 

validity of the reported enemy installations, to establish characteristics in their development, and to determine their relative importance to individual or combined units. A high density of food, 

ordnance, and medical installations, storage caches, or training sites 

usually defined a base area. 

7. Friendly operations and order of baule (plotted on overlay). 

Consideration had to be extended to friendly forces, since their 

presence influenced the normal pattern of enemy activity such 

as unit movement, installations, base areas, and operational procedures. Friendly installations, often not only barriers but also 

targeu, needed to he studied to reveal enemy operational techniques and methods of movement. 

8. 8-'2 strikes (plotted 011 overlay). The B-52 program's 

effectiveness could be partially evaluated by comparison with enemy 

installations, unit movement, and sightings. The status of enemy 

installations could be examined, and enemy techniques of CQunter· 

ing air strikes might be revealed, by comparing the time re lationships between reports of installations and unit movements and the 

corresponding strike. 

9. Imagery interpretation readout (plotted on overlay). In· 

telligence gained from variOliS forms of imagery provided a means 

of checking other reports and often produced added detailed 

information on a specific area of interest. All enemy activities thus 

needed to be examined collaterally with imagery of the particular 

area. Photos provided confirmation of enemy installations, lines of 

communication, and operational zones. Side-looking airborne radar, 

for instance, usefully detected night movements of watercraft. 

In the final phase of pattern analysis, the over-a ll evaluation, 

the analysts synthesized the separate trends deve loped during the 

analysis phase. Such a process measured the relative probability of 

an existing element, activity, or characteristic, based on logical 

relationships and hypotheses developed by ana lysis. 

The pattern analysis technique could have been jllst one of 

many designed to assist in imelligence production and should be 

kept in mind as a format serving to hold and exploit a potential 

reservoir of information. The process was a continuous one in which 

all phases were developing simultaneously. By no means did we 

explore all methods of analysis, but our program assisted in 

achieving economy of force by focllsing intelligence and operational 
64 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLICENCE 

resources on areas where the enemy was mOst likely to be located 

and helped avoid wasting resources elsewhere. In this manner we 

accurately located enemy base areas. 

Finished imelligence prepared through the lise of the pattern 

analysis technique was disseminated according to existing priorities. 

Feedback from the using units. consisting of after action reports or 

other field reports, provided data necessary to confirm or refine 

methods of analysis. Along this line, field reports helped to 

determine the validity of the sources and in£onnalion used during 

analysis and aided in the continuing evaluation of the intelligence 

that was produced. 

The geographical organization of many of the subelemenLS 

within the Combined Intelligence Center permiued the pooling of 

specialisu from the various branches to provide concentration on a 

specific area of interest such 'as one of the four Vietnamese corps 

tactical zones or the enemy sanctuaries of Laos, Cambodia, and 

North Vietnam, At the center itself, the order of baltle analysts. 

imagery interpreters, targets personnel, and area analysts worked 

together on their respective corps geographic regions to detect those 

areas which would become of primary interest to the tactical 

commands. 

General Westmoreland directed that senior field commanders 

and selected members of their staffs visit the Combined Imelligence 

Center to become acquainted with its capabilities. These visits 

showed that in-depth analysis and close co-operation with the 

Vietnamese were the main strengths of the center. As in any good 

partnership, both parties benefited. The Vietnamese profited from 

American material resources, technical knowledge, and experience, 

while the United States capitalized on the knowledge which the 

Vietnamese possessed aboUl the enemy and the area of operations 

and the continuity which resulted from the long-term assignments 

of the Vietnamese specialists 10 intelligence production. 

Tht! Sutor l"tdligt!"Ct! Support Program 

One of the fundamental elements of the intelligence organiza· 

tion in Vietnam was the advisory system. Before the U.S. buildup, 

the advisers stationed throughout the country provided a large 

portion of the intelligence information received by J-2. Military 

Assistance Command. They were the most responsive of the 

resources available to the intelligence staff, even Ihough remote 

locations, primitive communications, and limited transportation 

detracted from the timeliness of their reports. \Vith the escalation 

of the U.S. role, it was evident that the advisers would continue to 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 65 

be very important to (he success of our intelligence effort. They 

were our best contact with the people of Vietnam, and in a 

counterinsurgency, access to the populace is essential. Their 

capacities could be improved particularly in the areas of collection, 

processing, and reporting at the sector and subsector level. In 

addition, the combined intelligence concept needed to be extended 

to the advisers. The identification and el imination of the Communist infrastructure would depend in large measure upon sector· 

and subsector·level intelligence. 

Capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Viet Cong infrastructure, 

or, as I ca ll ed it, the Viet Cong political order of battle, were as 

much a part o f the enemy war.making potential as was his military 

order of ballie. In July 1965 Colonel Loi and I published a 

two-inch-thick memeographed report titl ed "Viet Cong Political 

Order of Battle." This report showed us what we needed and what 

we had. We had a long way to go, but we knew what we had to do. 

A political order of ba ttl e branch was part of the original 

organization of the Combined Intelligence Center. Data to support 

this program were automated very early. A special combined 

collection plan was prepared and implemented to focus maximum 

efforts to collect information at the sector and subsector level. The 

number of advisers at sector and subsector was increased. However, 

co·opera tion a nd co-ordi nation among intelligence agencies in 

sectors left much to be desired. I embarked on a program to correct 

this deficiency. 

First, my staff wrote a sector intelligence guide. This guide was 

a comprehensive handbook that not only described, step by step, 

how the sector intelligence adviser accomplished his mission, but 

also served to expla in to all commanders and staff officers in Viet· 

nam how the sector imelligence program worked and what it could 

do. The guide was carefully prepared and fully staffed. The U.S. 

Embassy, the Military Assistance Command, and the J oint General 

Staff approved it. The guide was issued in English and Vietnamese. 

Colonel Loi and I wanted to be sure that key people not only 

received the guide bUl also understood it and implemented it, so 

we created the Combined Intelligence School. We selected the 

Vietnamese and U.S. instructors; we approved the curriculum and 

attended the dress rehearsal of all lessons. The course lasted four 

days. All Vietnamese sector &-2's and their U.S. advisers, representatives from ten sectors at a time, attended the school together. 

The students not only studied all aspects of sector intelligence but 

also received a comprehensive review of pertinent Military Assistance Command and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces intelli-
66 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELL:GENCE 

gence directives. The students visited all the combined centers 

and learned what the centers cou ld do to help them and Ihat the 

centers would accept their requests by telephone. The initial 

instruction was aimed at the sector 5-2'5 and their U.S. counterparts, but the ultimate goal was to have all major commanders, key 

advisers, and intelligence officers allend tbe school. Classroom 

presentation utilized two instructors. one an American who spoke 

English and the other a Vietnamese who taught in his native 

language. Provided earphones, students heard a simultaneous translalian of each presentation. Even the charts were bilingual. The 

inaugural class, made up of the sector 5-2'5 and U.S. advisers from 

the ten most r:ritical provinces in South Vietnam. was personally 

welcomed by Colonel Loi and myself. We each addressed the students Oil this occasion to demonstrate our concern for instruction 

of this nature. 

Upon completing the course the students were fully familiar 

with the intricacies or combined intelligence and, more importantly. were well versed in the sector intelligence program which 

included comprehensive coverage of the Communist infrastructure. 

Returning to their posts, these officers belter appreciated what their 

intelligence staffs could do. In addition to the direct benefits resulting from the instruction, the school provided an example of 

what U_S.-Vietnamese co-operation could accomplish. Frequently 

it provided the first exposure for the students to a sophisticated 

combined operation and did much to set the example for working 

together. 

I always made it a point to have the young U.S. officer advisers 

to my billet for dinner. From these evening sessions I gained a 

greater appreciation of the difficulties they faced in the field. It 

is too easy for a commander to be isolated by the bureaucracy of 

a headquarters. 

As commander of lhe sector military intelligence detachment. 

the sector intelligence adviser had the mission to provide and 

supervise U.s. intelligence personnel required to support the in· 

telligence advisory effort and operations within each sector; to 

advise and assist Vietnamese counterparts while working with 

them; and to direct the over-all U.S. military intelligence effort of 

all subsectors within the sector. He also had to collate and disseminate all collected information regarding the maintenance of 

security to subsector and adjacent sectors; monitor. co-ordinate, 

and support U.S .. South Vietnamese, and Free World Military 

Assistance Forces intelligence activities within each sector area of 

responsibility. with particular emphasis on collection of infra-
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 67 

structure and order of battle data; co-ordinate with appropriate 

U.S., South Vietnamese, and Free World Military Assistance Forces 

and agencies, as well as U.S. advisers, to facilitate timely lateral and 

vertical transmittal of information; and establish, develop, and 

participate in U.S., South Vietnamese, and Free World Military 

Assistance Forces intelligence activities as required. 

The sector intelligence adviser made recommendations on intelligence objectives of operations within his sector and advised on 

the proper utilization of the Vietnamese Regional Forces intelligence platoon attached to each sector 5-2. His efforts and accomplishments and those of his detachment were founded in the concept of combined intelligence operations with his Vietnamese counterparts. The extent that he worked in combination with his counterpart detennined the degree of success he achieved. It was, 

therefore, a prime criterion of the Sector Intelligence Support 

Program that it contribute to this working relationship. 

To support this relationship, I placed additional emphasis on 

support functions already established. Additional responsibilities 

for support to be provided by the Military Assistance Command 

]-2 to the sector intelligence adviser were levied. These fell 

within the broad areas of order of battle information, maps and 

charts, photographic coverage, studies and estimates, personnel, 

sector intelligence guide. staff visits, and training and orientation. 

A number of projects were established that supported specific 

sector requirements. Seven of these are of particular interest: 

I. Additional distribution was made of sets of bilingual vocabu. 

lary cards pertaining to seven specific areas of intelligence. These 

areas included the intelligence adviser. counterintelligence, target 

presentation, imagery interpretation, intelligence planning, order 

of battle, and intelligence collection. These cards helped to com· 

municate exact meanings of words and terms and to assure under· 

standing between the sector intelligence adviser and his counterpart. 

2. Map information brochures covering individual sectors 

were forwarded to each of the forty-four sector intelligence advisers. 

The brochures conta ined updated map indexes, notes on current 

sta tus and availability, plus single copies of all current maps of the 

sector. The objective was to provide each sector intelligence ad· 

viser an indexed map library. 

3. The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, was equipped 

with computers which stored the intelligence data base and produced printouts from automated files on enemy ground order o( 

battle. special agent reports, imagery interpretation. military biog-
68 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

raphies. enemy installations, helicopter landing zones, logistica l 

movement, railroad bridges, enemy movement, highway bridges. 

road repons, inland wa terways, airfields, Arc Light incidents. 

infiltra tion , tax collection points, letter box numbers, drop zones, 

beaches. and political biographies. Studies and reports of specific 

interest to th e sector intelligence detachment which utilized this 

retrieval system were base data studi es, photo package studies, and 

order of ballie repon s and studies. 

Thro ugh th e base data studi es program extensive information 

on area analysis subjects was provided. These studi es were made 

for th e entire Republic of Vietnam on a sca le of 1 :250,000 and 

could be obtained through normal map supply channels. Area 

anal ysis information was provided at a tactical sca le for specifi c 

areas of high interest through the war zone studies program. Sector 

imelligence advisers could nominate specific areas for incl usion in 

this program. 

A photo package studies program was initi ated th rough which 

th e sector intelligence adviser was provided with a comprehensive 

photographic package covering significant area within his seclOr. 

4. The monthl y order of ba lli e su mmary provided reca pitulation and breakdown of enemy uni ts and strengths by ca tegories 

of acceptance and corps tac tical zones, maps of corps zones with 

units indicated, organizational struCtures, loss statistics, newly reported units, and infiltration statisti cs. Order of battle reports and 

studies provided technical data on enemy orga ni za tional structure, 

rear services, combat support arms, training, and infiltration. In 

additi on , coll ected data in th e Combi ned Intell igence Center order 

of battle fil es was provided on request. 

S. In addition to routine staff visits conducted by members o f 

J-2, Military Assistance Command, the sector intelligence visitati on program was initiated with th e appoi ntment of a deputy 

for sector intelligence. This appointment focused responsibility 

for monitorin g the emire sector program and provided me wit h 

an accurate assessment of the effectiveness of sector operati ons. 

6. A sector intelligence guid e was distributed to th e field . 

This guide was a current reference to sector intelligence organiza· 

tion, functions, and relationships. Although directed specifica lly 

at the sector le,rel. it was intended to assist the intelligence effort 

at all levels. Provisions were made for the frequent update of this 

publication, and it was co·ordinated with th e U.S. Embassy, Saigon, 

and J-2, J oint General Staff. 

7. A combined intellige nce school was set up for the Republic 

of Vietnam Armed Forces sector intelligence officers and their 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 69 

advisers. The scope of the intelligence subjc<:lS covered was quite 

broad and ranged from " Handling POW's" to "VC/ NVA Base 

Area Study Tc<:hniques. " All training aids were displayed in both 

Vietnamese and English, and at til e time of the instructor's presen· 

tation a translated version was given by means of a closed communi· 

cation system. Ten Vietnamese and len U.S. officers auended each 

four-day session. The nitial class was conducted 10- 13 January 

1967. and the eighth class terminated on 28 April, resulting in a 

total of 150 Vietnamese and U.S. officers representing all forty-rour 

sectors having attended. The next class was scheduled for 16 May 

1967. 

In order to place emphasis on all of the above activities I 

created the position of Deputy for Sc<:tor Illlelligence and assigned 

Colonel Stone W. Quillian, U.S. Marine Corps, to that job. He 

reported directly to me at least once a week. The remainder of the 

time he was visiting the fOTly·folir sectors to detennine how the 

program was working. His goal also involved impro" ing the 

promptness and completeness of our reporting system. While this 

procedure seemed rather fundamental, complications surfaced. At 

sector level, intelligence operations were more a police functi on 

than a military one, and lateral exchange of infonnati on was not 

what it should have been. The emphasis on offensive operations 

overtaxed th e advisers, who were expected to provide timely, 

accurate, and complete comba t inte lligence to the local commander 

while at the same time serving as the keystone of the Military 

Assistance Command collection effort directed at the enemy political apparatus. The situa tion 11'3S ameliorated by the assignment of 

trained military intelligence officers as full·time sector intellige nce 

advisers and the deployment of three-man intelligence teams 

(later increased to seven men) to the sectors. 

Indigenolls intelligence resources of the South Vietnamese 

Anny sector S-2 vari ed greatly between provinces but normally 

included a Regional Forces and Popular forces intell igence plaLOon. "Vorking closely with their counterparts, the advisory teams 

launched elaborate programs incorporating agent nets and informant systems with combat and reconnaissance patrols. As the 

national intelligence system became more sophisticated, the quality 

of the sector· level product showed marked improvement. (Appendix H ) Source control procedures, better collection management, 

and efficient fiscal accountability contributed to better productivit y. 

Early attempts to develop a good collection program were hindered 

..::."by the shortage of men experienced in the intracacies of such 

opera tions; however, this situation was eventually corrected by the 
70 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

assignment of an intelligence specialist 10 each sector headquarters. 

The information gathered by the sector apparatus was dissemi. 

nated through U.S. and Vietnamese channels to higher, lower, 

and adjacent commands. (Chart 9) 

At this point it is prudent to explain the Tole of the Province 

Intelligence Coordination Commiuees (pICe's) , which were not 

a part of the Seclor Intelligence Program. These committees had 

been established by national decree in November 1964 to serve as 

the senior intelligence agency within each province. In consonance 

with the province chief's over-all responsibility of government, the 

committee functioned as a supervisory body to direct and monitor 

all intelligence activities within the province and was charged with 

guiding. supervising. and co-ordinating the operations or both 

military and civilian agencies; receiving. collating. and dissemi· 

nating intelligence gathered by the province units; maintaining a 

centralized provincial source registry; and advising the province 

chief on the enemy situation as well as on friendly intelligence 

activities. The committee had great potential, but as Colonel 

Quillian discovered during his visits through the country, the 

standard of performance and effectiveness varied widely. In fact, 

some of the committees ex.isted only on paper and the U.S.-South 

Vietnamese sector intelligence team assumed, in many instances. 

CHART 9-SECTOR COMBINED INTF.LLIGENCE OPERATIONS 

I ........ · .. ·· ~ MACV Advisory Telm 

'------"r' I 

PrOYlnce Chitf 

I , 

I ' 

I Other I 

I Intelligence ' 

I "'tncin I 

I I 

I : •• I 

Ann)' of the S" 

L

_··_'_"b_"_·'_' _' _,;_.,_,,_m-J ••• Stctor S-2 ...... Unit 5-2's 

" I 

Military U.S .• nd Free World 

Inlelligence Militlry Assistance Forces 

ream Unit S-Z's 

, ---- Operational Control 

Regional forces Intelligence Platoon 

• ........ Advice .nd Assistance 

.. • Combined OPtralions 

lilison .nd Co-ordination 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 71 

complete responsibility for all important functions of the commillee. The set:tor S--2 was not a member of tile committee, but 

he and his U.S. adviser often were invited to attend meetings and 

many were very active ill its affairs. 

From its inception the Sector Intelligence Program experienced 

difficulties with communication. The absence of a seclIre COllntry· 

wide intelligence transmission system hindered the submission of 

timely repons and precluded real-time responses to requirements 

from higher headquarters. There \\'el'e instances where intelligence 

reporLS sent by mail from I Corps reached Saigon faster than those 

electrically transmilled. E\entually, secure communications were 

established between Saigon and each I"Orps headquarters, hut, still. 

messages to sector and below had to be relayed. Ilard·copy reports 

were the most fommon means of ('ommunications for sector 

personnel. 

Another problem affecting set:tor intelligence concerned avail· 

ability of adequate interrogation facilities. Although local agree· 

ments enabled sector personnel to obtain the intelligence reports 

resulting from police interrogations. the failure to obtain space for 

the military in the sector polite interrogation centers, Upoll which 

we had depended. caused delay in the explOitation of prisoners and 

detainees. 

In most sectors noticeahle improvements were evident. Reporting on enemy irregular forces and infrastructure improved. but the 

Office of Special Assistalll to the Amba~sador. without co-ordina· 

tion with Military Assistante COlllllland. took over COlllrol of the 

files on the infrastructure located at the sectors. I could not believe such a report until I visited a ~ector and was refused permission to see the infrastructure file by it member of the emhassy. 

\Vilhollt unity of command such things happen. This was one of 

several indications to me that in spite of all our efforts things were 

not going so well as they 'ihould. I visited the embass)' and was 

assured that the situation would hc (orrected. Not long thereafter. 

I left Vietnam. 

The ComllHl(~d Intelligence SlaO 

The Combincd Illlelligence Slaff (CI~) came into existence on 

18 Novemher 1966. but its artllal genesis goes hack 10 the spring 

and early summer of that )ear. At that time. with the go,ernment 

of Vietnam emhroiled in an illlernal political crisis, the seclirit) 

situation in and around Saig'on had steadily deteriorated. I directed 

an intensive collection campaign against Viet Cong ~filjtary Region 

IV (which included Saigon) with the objeClive of alerting the U.S. 
72 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

as well as the South Vicmamcse authorities on this growing threat. 

Resulting intelligence proved that Saigon was a priority target of 

the enemy. After I briefed General Westmoreland and the U.S. 

;\Iission Council I was asked to meet ,oJith U.S. Deputy Ambassador 

Koren to discliss aClions that could be taken. I submitted a plan 

that was approved in principle by the MACV command and Ambassador Koren. In September 1 met with Brigadier General 

Nguyen Ngoc Loan, director general of the Vietnamese National 

Police and director of the Military Security Service (MSS) of the 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, to discuss the plan. I briefed 

General Loan on the plan and left it \\'ith him to study. A combined imclligence staff was envisioned, with mission of producing 

intelligence on the identification and location of Viet Cong operat. 

ing in Military Region IV (which corresponds to Cia Oinh and 

the sOllthern half of Oall Nghia and Binh Tong Provinces) and of 

disseminating this intelligence to user agencies for apprehension 

and exploitation of enemy personnel. 

This concept was appro\'ed in November by Prime ~finister 

Nguyen Cao Ky, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and the U.S. 

~fission Council. In addition 10 the Combined Intelligence Staff, 

Operation FAIRFAX RA'G Oo."'c, consisting of three V.S, and three 

Army of the Republic of Vielllarn ballalions, was initiated on , 

December 1966 with the mission of searching out and destroying 

the Viet Cong main force units, guerrillas, and infrastructure in 

the Military Region IV area, Operation FAIRFAX IRANG DONG and 

the Combined Intelligence Staff were to be the primary elements 

of Campaign Cong Tac <1 (Vielilamese for mission). aimed at the 

elimination of ~filitary Region IV. 

The initial actions of the Combined Intelligence 'itaff were to 

compile a blacklist of :\Iilitary Region IV infrastructure personali. 

tics in suppOrt of lhe comhined l l.S. and Vietnamese military 

actions within this area. The staff compiled mel' three thousand 

names and assorted personality data during this period and pro· 

vided them to the U.S. and Vietnamese units. These data were 

acquired by the arca ("(werage desk teams. which visited all district 

h~adquarters and ilH~lligence agencies and revie\\'ed their files. 

extracting pertinent data. The result was a central registry or data 

base of known Viet Cong in ;\filitary Region IV. This registry 

was laboriously assembled hy hand, the only method available at 

that time. After this initial phase. a more systematic and sophisti. 

cated method greatly improved and facilitated the work of the 

staff. 

The Combined Intelligence Staff was placed under the opera· 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 73 

tiona I control of General Loan. Vietnamese assigned LO the staff 

represented the Military Security Service; National Police ; Central 

Intelligence Organization (CIO). Republic of Vietnam; J-2, 

Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Anned Forces; and C-2, 

Capital Military District (C ~ID ). On the U.S. side, J - 2, Military 

Assistance Command; the Office of the Special Assistant of the U.S. 

Embassy; and the 135th and l49th Military Intelligence Groups 

provided men and suppon. The Combined Intelligence Staff can· 

sisted of fifteen U.S. and fifty Vietnamese personnel. (Cha r' 10) 

The directorate consisted of three individuals, a ~Iilitary Security 

Service major who acted as chief. and two U.S. deputies, a ~Jililary 

Assistance Command J-2 lieutenant colonel and a civilian representative from the Office of the Special Assistant. The operations 

office also consisted of three indi' ieluals who were nominally the 

three assistallls to the members of the directorate (a Vietnamese 

National Police official, a Military Assistance Command J-2 

major, and a represelllalive frulll lhe Office of lhe Spedal Assislant) and who functioncd as chiefs of lhe Administrati\'c and 

CIIART IO-FLOW CHART, COMIiINED I:':TELLlCENCt~ STAFF 

Military 

S~curity Servi(l 

N.tional Police 

135th Military 

Intellilence Group 

149th Military 

Inteliilence Group 

Office 01 

Special Assistant 

Combin~d Military 

Interrol8tlon Center 

Combined Docum~nt 

Exploit.lion Center 

Othef$ 

Combined 

Intellilence Center. 

Vietnam 

~ .' ;Ii.' • 

• • ~'" .' ~"'.* ..• ~.* .' 

b ..... • •• ' 

· 

•... .... . ... "----.......... ' ... . .. .. 

........... .......... 

.. """"----.. ... 

" ..... . '. *. '" ". 

· 

· 

· ...•. : ..... . . . .•...•. : • 

• 

199th lilht 

Infantry Bri,ade 

Tactical Units 

Natlon,l Police 

MllilalY 

Security Service 

Capital 

Mihtlry Dlstrl(t 

Republic 01 Vietnam 

Districts 

Sailon Precincts 

Others 
I 

I 

74 THE ROLE OF l\flLITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Support Area Coverage and Analysis and Dissemination Branches, 

respectively. Special representatives. Vietnamese officers, represented 

the Military Security Service; CCIllTal Illlell igencc Organ ization; 

J-2, Joint General 5la(f; and G-2, Capital Military District, and 

acted as points of COlllaCl with these agencies. The Combined 

Intelligence Staff bad operational control of a field search unit and 

a screening section (CJwTf II) . 

The systematic idclltificatioll and location of Viet Cong and 

the rapid retrieval of these data in usable form was made possible 

by the use of the autOmatic data processing system located at the 

Combined IntclligclKc Center, Vietnam. (Charl 12) Data in the 

form of intelligence information reports, interrogation repons, and 

captured documents lI'ere analyzed by the U.S. and Vielllamese 

desk officer teams. Personal it} data 011 Viet Cong were then 

extracted from these repons alld transposed on IBM worksheets 

in the following categories: 

CHART II - ORGANIZATION, COMBINED INTELLICENCE STAFF 

l Direclor General, I National Police 

l Ctlmbined Intelligence I 

Siaft Directorate Screening Sectio~ r 

Special -------1 Representatives 

L~ Field Search Unit I I Operations Office I 

I Admillistralion and Support I 

Branch I Area Coverage I Branch 

I Anal)'Sis and Dissemillation I 

Branch 

Clerical t ~ Commullication~ I 

Data 

Automatic 

Processing 

r H Research J 

File t ~ Transportation J I Pholo Identification I 

I Binh Chanh I I Cu Chi I I Di An I I Go Mon I 

I Nha Be J l Saigon-Cho Lon I I Tu Due 
C"ART 12 DATA nASI!. INPl'T (CICV' 

16 

14 

12 

10 

8 

Names on Hand-Estimated '=====' LEGEND: : Worksheet Input-Data Base _ 
76 THE ROLE OF M ILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Elemellls of Information (or Data Base 

I. Serial Number 

A. Province 

B. District 

C. Number of Input 

II. DalC of Information 

III. Universal Transverse Mercator Co-ordinates 

IV. Source 

A. Unit 

B. Tlpe 

C. :\umber 

V. Personal Data 

A. 1\'ames 

B. Date and Place of Birth 

C. Tilles 

O. Organization 

E. Operational Location 

F. Party ~felllbership 

G. North Victllamese Affiliation 

H. Residence. Past and Present 

l. Education and Occupation. Military and Civilian 

J. Ethnic Group 

K. Family Data 

L. Physical Characteristics 

M. Government of Viet nam Connections 

N. Awards and Decorations 

O. Status 

The serial number block COl1lained a number and letter designation for Ihe geographic area as well as a sequence number fOT 

the individual identified. This number was used for all subsequent 

worksheets submitlcd on thc individual. Thc date of IIlformation 

and the location by universal transvcrse mercator co·ordinates were 

also extracted, if known. The fourth category. the source of information. included the U.S. or Vietnamese agency furnishing the 

report as well as the type of report and log or file number to 

facilitate Tctrie\'al of the basic data. 

The most impon:lIlt {'alcgory of the information programmed 

into the data base was per~onal data on the individual. The true 

name was spclled out in English, followed by a phonetic spclling 

in the Vietnamese telegraphic code, which simulates, in letter 

form, the diacritical markings of the Viet Cong language. Any 
COMBINED INTELLIGE:-ICE 77 

cover names or aliases \I'ere also shown, although ill this case the 

telegraphic code was not used. The rest of the personal data 

category contained any infonnalioll available on the individual"s 

position in the Viet Cong organization. geographic. location. Com· 

munist party and North Vietnamese affiliation, educational and 

occupational skills. famil} data, and physical characteristics. The 

final item, status. indicated whether the individual had been 

captured or was still at large. 

Ali of 30 April 1967, the Combined Intelligence Staff had introduced 6,507 names imo the data base and was a"eraging Ol'er 

1,200 names per month. 

An important funnion of the Combined Intelligence Staff was 

the direct support furnished to the U.S. and South Vietllame~e 

units operating in the Military Region IV area. A field search unit. 

consisting of three 49·man Police Field Force platoons, accompanied 

the U.S. and Vietnamese units conducting cordon and search opera· 

tions in ~Iilitary Region IV. After the military unit had cordoned 

off the area, the police entered the hamlet, checking the identifi· 

cation cards of all inhabitants as well as making a complete search 

of the area for tunnels, personnel, weapons. and supplies. A representative of the Combined Intelligence Staff accompanied the unit 

on these operations and pro"ided photographs of Viet Cong as 

well as the blacklists fOl' the district concerned. These hlacklists 

were used in the search of the hamlet as an aid in apprehension. 

Suspects were taken to a screening center 'I'hich was also under the 

operational control of the Combined Illlelligence Staff. There sus· 

peets were interrogated. photographed. and fingerprilHed. Those 

found to be offenders \\'ere arrested. and the remainder were 

released. 

In addition to Operation FAIRFAX, the Combined Intelligence 

Staff in January 1967 provided support for Operation C.~!)AR FALL. ... 

the U.S. and South Vietnamese muhidivision search and clear 

operation which was highl)' successful against Military Region IV. 

Activities of the staff reached a high point in ~fay and June 

1967, when it conducted a co·ordinated operation with the Capital 

Military District. the Combined Security Committee, components 

of the National Police, and Operation FAIRFAX. A tight seemiq" 

cordon was placed around Saigon and resulted in the arrest of 

seventy-three confirmed Communist clandestine action agents and 

sappers. From the inception of the Combined Intelligence Staff 

until I December 19G7, approximately five hundred Viet Cong 

action agents were apprehended in Saigon and environs. The significance of these arrests-and the success of the staff-cannot be fully 
78 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

measured but unquestionably cOlllrihuted to the CornmllniSl fail· 

ures in Saigon during the 1968 T~l offensive. 

In May 1967. I published a report on the Combined Intelligence Staff. In the prdace to thaI report I wrote; 

The purpose of this FACT BOOK is 10 present the mission, history, 

functions. and capabilities of the Combined Intelligence Staff (CIS). 

the most recent and certainly a unique addition to the family of 

Combined CCllten established by J2, ~IACV, in coordination with the 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and the Government of Vietnam. 

This staff was (ancei\'cd and crcated as a prototype counterintelligence org.ani/alion, designed to collate. analyze, and disseminate inteJli· 

~ence on Viet Cong \lilitary Region 4-the area surrounding and 

mcluding Saigon. 

The CIS, as a pilot program, has made remarkable progress in the 

shon period of its existence. Its recent venture into the operational 

field. viewed with some misgivings at first, has paid off handsomel), 

in providing its desk officers a "reel" for the problems of the tactical 

elements who are the direct users of its products. 

11 is yet too early to make a full assessment of the value of this 

organization in terms of results versus COSI. Indications at present are, 

howe,·er. that the CIS would be well worth eSlabishing in each COI'PS 

Tactical Zone during the coming year. 

On III y lau day in Vietnam, I became aware that a new plan for 

attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure was to be implemented. It 

was to be called the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation 

for Auack Against the Infrastructure (ICEX) Program. Ambassa· 

dol' Robert \V. Komer was to bead Ihe program as a deputy to the 

MACV commander. To put it mildly. I was amazed and dismayed. 

I called on ~tr. Komer and Ceneral \\'csunorcland lhal last day 

and pointed out that I had not known abOllt the program but 

thaI T was confident that lhe combined military intelligence syslem 

was out frolH leading the wav against the infrauruCture. I sug. 

gested lhal co·ordination \\':15 in order. 
-

POLICE FIELD FORCE FORMATION .... T THE NATIONAL 

SA1CO!"l before a cordon and search operation wit

lantry Brigade. 
80 THE. ROLl-: 01- MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

U .S. OPERATIOl"AL UNIT CO:o.IMANDER IN CIIARGE OF TIlE CoROO:-' AND 

SEARCII BRIEFS VIETNAMESE POLICE OFFICERS, above. ScREENING CENTER 

Is EsTABLISIiED \Vlnl PUOTOCRAPUS AND BLACKLIST OF KNOWN VIET 

CoNG. Each S!lspect is brought to the center for preliminary interrogation, bt:loUJ. 
COll.f81NED I NTELLIGENCE 81 

SEARCH TEAM IN Of'ERAnO~ 'VITH ScOUT Doc: ... ;o.;D U.S. SECURITY 

ELEMENT. Each team is composed of six Police Field Fora members; 

the seCllrity elemcnt consists 01 men from the 199111 Light Infantry 

Brigade, above. ScOUT Doc: WITH HANDI. t:R searching exterior 01 

dweWI'g and sUHounlling area lor hidlieu PCI'SOIlS (wd supplies, below. 
82 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

SEAReli TEAM AT I-loUSE Willi U.S. SECURITY EU:MF.NTS ON LooKOUT. 

One member of the hO!lSf:JlOld is allowed /0 remain ill the hOl/se during 

the sear-ell to innm: thai nothing is umoucd illegally, above. POLICE 

Fu,:U) FORCE ScOUT Doc HANDLER AND SEARCUER. Each searcher is 

eqllipped with a sled rod I/.Sed fOT probing, below. 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 83 

SEARCH ELEMENT WITH U.S. SECURITY GUARD LEAVINC A OWELLlI'iG 

AFTER SEARCH, above. POLICE FIELD FORCE ENTUII'iC HOUSE To CONDUCT 

SEARCH. These me" were traineel to search for hiddclI documents, 

weapons, and other items whicl, were stored i11 caches by Ihe Viel C011g. 

Each member of the houschold was also searched, below. 
84 THE ROLE OF M ILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

I)CII.EENING CENTER \VAS EsTAIU. ISItED AT A CEr,."llAL LocATION \VITIIIN 

TIlE HAMI.ET, aborx:. ScREENING CENTER IN OPERATION. Suspects are 

qllC5fioned (Hid pllO/ogra/,II book is showlI to co-operative ;'Idividuals 

for aSJistanct: ;'1 identifying Iwollm Viet Cong in Ihe hamlct, beioUl. 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 85 

V IETNAMESE POLICE OFFICER 'WITH U .S. OFFICER from the 2d Battalion, 

3d Infantry, I99th Light Infantry Brigade, checking identification of 

a detainee. 
86 TI-IE ROI E OF M ILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

POLICE F IELD FORCE REVIEWING P UOTOGRAPII ALBUM IN AN ATTEMP1" 

To D~:NTlH VIET CONG I N f-IAMLFT. The album contai"s photo$ 

captured during U.S. 0fJrralio" Crdllr Falll, conducted in february 

1967, above. Vlf..TNAM£S;': POI. IC.: Ol-' FICER CIU: CK I NG IOENTIFICATION OF 

It. SUSPECT, below. 

, 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 87 

AoornONAL CHECKS OF IOENTIFICATION PAPERS BY Vn:TNAMESE POLICE 

OFFICIALS AT ScRJ::£N1NC CENTER, about:. POLICE FIELD FORCE CHECKING 

HAMLET INHAJUTANTS ACAINST PHOTOGRAPHS OF VIET CoNG SUSPECTS, 

bdow. 
88 TilE ROLE OF l\1I1..1TARY INTEl.LlGENCE 

U.S. REPIU:St:NTATIVES FkOM COM.IINED INTELLIGENCE STAFF Co~FERRING 

\V1TI~ U.S. OFFICER IN CHARGE OF Till: CORDON AND SEA-Relt OPERATION, 

above. D .. :TAINEF BFING QU.:STION£D BY POLlet: FIEU> FORCE PERSONNEL 

AT ScREENINC AREA. Suspect's name is checked against the blacklist, 

below. 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 89 

VIETNAMESE OffiCER IN CHARGE INSTRUCTING NEW OffiCER ON PROCEDURES OF THE ScREENING CENTEk. Bolh are members of Ihe Combined 

Inlelligence SlaU, above. U.S. CIVIC ACTION OffiCER FkOM THE J99T1I 

LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE GIVING TREATS TO THE CHILDkEN. /" the same 

"olue, medical facilities halle bee" sel up to treat the sick, below. 
90 THE ROLE OF M I LITARY INTELLIGENCE 

VIET CoNe SusPJ'.cT being qUCSli07U:d by Vidnamese poliet! officers 01 

the Combined Intelligen ce Staff, aboue. Two SUSI'}:CTS ARE Dt:TAIN En 

from the large nUrllbl'r screened tiuring Ihe operation , br:low. 
COMBINED INTELLIGENCE 91 

/ 

NHA BE DESK TEAM discussing automatic data processing .rystt:m input 

shut before submitli1lg completed work to the Combilled Intd lige1lce 

StaD, above. Vn:TNAMESE CURK Is TAUCHT PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEnNC 

AUTOMAnc DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM FORMS, below. 
92 THE ROLE OF M ILITARY INTE LLIGENCE 

T 

I 

VU:TNAMESE CIIIEF OF TIlE CoMBINED I NTELLIGENCE STAFF CoNF£RRII'iG 

W'TU DEPUTY FROM TIlE OFl" CE 0.- T il E SPECIAL ASSISTANT, U.S. 

EMBASSY. 
COMBINED INT.ELLIGENCE 93 

CoMBI NED INTELLIGENCE STAFF COMMUNICATlO:-':S SECTION, which maintai1led radio COlllact with (Ill Saigon police precincts and districts 01 the 

area of operations, above. DI AN DESK TEA M checking blacklist against 

a list of apprehended fliel Cong, below. 
CHAPTER III 

Combat Intelligence 

Our combat units made contact with the enemy and evacuated 

prisoners, documenlS, and material. The combined centers furnished ever increasingly timely. accurate, and adequate intelligence. 

By concentrating on the eight order of battle factors, enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities were so accurately identified that the 

incidence of successfully determining his plans was surprisingly 

high. However. this war presented some rather unusual demands. 

One concerned political order of battle intelligence-more specifically. intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure. Because North 

Vietnamese forces were involved in South Vietnam, Military Assistance Command was required to monitor and report on Communist 

infiltration through Laos and Cambodia while providing order of 

battle data reAecting enemy units as regular, main force, local 

force, or guerrilla. The intelligence officer was asked not only to 

locate and identify the enemy but also to prove how he got where 

he was and where he came from. 

During the early days (mid-1965) the few U.S. collection and 

exploitation activities were under the staff cognizance of the Intelligence Operations Division (100) headed by Colonel Glenn E. 

Muggelberg, whose vast experience in intelligence collection was 

invaluable. Faced with a growing demand for information, Colonel 

Muggelberg soon had almost everyone in his division functioning 

as an operator. Staff officers commonly went to the field to pick up 

an important captured document, to sit in on the interrogation 

of a key prisoner, or to examine an item of new equipment taken 

from the enemy. However, it was not long before individual efforts 

no longer satisfied the demand_ At first, simple procedures were 

possible. We used a general collection plan for identifying requirements and resources and for assigning responsibilities. Separate 

directives were published in support of special collection programs. 

Collection requirements normally were derived from tasks 

received from the production element. Close co-operation and 

co-ordination between the collector and the producer were essen· 

tial. The producer knew what intelligence gaps existed. He had 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 95 

the data base and knew what information we already had. Within 

Military Assistance Command J-2 the Intelligence Operations 

Division, exploitation centers, and production agencies were located in different facilities. Co-ordination was achieved by placing 

representatives of the collection element with the producers at the 

Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam. 

Immense problems resulted from the huge increase in the 

number of specific intelligence collection requirements from our 

combat forces, Military Assistance Command headquarters, and 

Washington. Administrative tasks alone rapidly reached enormous 

proportions and prompted a need for an economic, yet efficient, 

management system without adding to the authorized manning 

level. Our solution was to incorporate collection management into 

the computer facilities of J-2. Utilizing four files, the system 

contained an inventory of valid collection requirements; approved 

essential elements of information and other intelligence requirements, orders, requests, and collection tasking; evaluated input 

from specified collectors; and served as a registry of all intelligence 

report numbers issued within Military Assistance Command. 

Known as the Collection Management System, it provided syste· 

matic coverage of the intelligence cycle: a data base reRecting the 

requirements, the reports that resulted, and an evaluation of the 

information contained therein. 

My deputy for combat intelligence supervised the functions 

concerning J-2 air, reconnaissance, targets, intelligence opera· 

tions, exploitation activities, and the Military Auache Liaison 

Office. 

Aerial Reconnaissance and SUTVeillanu 

In the field of intelligence an important development has been 

the sophistication of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance. As a 

result of the remarkable advances in optics and electronic sensors, 

not to mention aircraft, we have barely begun to realize our potential. At one time we had, for example, the possibility of 112 

different combinations of aircraft, K:nsor, and service that could 

be employed. Until the introduction of U.S. ground combat units 

in Vietnam in mid-1965, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance 

activities were concerned primarily with locating suitable targets 

for air strikes. The relatively small demand for close air support, 

together with an adequate number of aircarft for the situation at 

that time, obviated the need for a sophisticated tactical air control 

system. With the escalation of the U.S. commitment, rigid control 

of air asK:ts bttame necessary. 
96 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Because of our interest in aeria l reconnaissance, there was a 

requirement fOT the Army and Air Force to negotiate and establish 

a mutually acceptable system for control of air resources available 

to Military Assistance Command. In October 1965, a policy agreement establishing the Joint Air-Ground Operations System was 

promulgated. Based on experiences from Korea, the system combined certain aspects of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Control 

System and the Army Air-Ground Operations System but distinctly 

specified that control would be exercised at the joint (Military 

Assistance Command) leve l. This arrangement proved its worth 

and functioned effective ly. Brigadier General Rock!y Triantafellu. 

U.S. Air Force, then director of intelligence of the 2d Air Division, 

and his staff showed enthusiasm, and we were able to work in close 

co-ordination to develop the required systems. His sllccessor at 

7th Air Force, Brigadier General J ammie M. Philpott, was an 

equally dynamic and outstanding intelligence officer. These two 

officers deserve major credit for successfull y developing our joint 

aerial reconnaissance and surveillance programs (Appendix 1). 

As an outgrowth of the Joint Air-Ground Operations System, 

it was necessary to crea te a joint operations center, subsequently 

designated the Combat Operations Center in deference to the 

Navy orientation of the theater commander, and to set up the 

other control mechanisms at lower echelons. Benefits accruing 

to J- 2 were control and co·ordinating authority for photography, 

visual reconnaissance, and electronic intelligence (Chart 13, Appendix I). 

The aerial reconna issance and surveillance program played a 

vital role in the Military Assistance Command coll ection effort. 

Three complementary systems-photographic, visual , and electronic 

sensors-were among the primary sources of intelligence for the 

support of ground tactical operations, B-52 strikes, and interdiction of land and sea infiltration routes. Although eminently 

successful, th is collection effort had some sign ificant shortcomings 

and limitations. First of all , aerial reconnaissance and surveill ance 

are dependent on environment. Cloud cover and jungle canopy 

reduce system effecti veness-visua l and photographic. While electronic sensors such as side-looking airborne radar and infrared are 

operable under these conditions, bad weather often prevents aircraft from reaChing the target area. During the seasonal monsoons 

that occur in Southeast Asia, there are prolonged periods when 

aerial reconnaissance or surve illance techn iques are limited against 

key targets. Secondly, limited resources initially hindered the program. Also, the Republic of Vietnam was not the only area in 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 97 

CHART I 3-JofNT AIR-CROU ND OPERATIONS SVSTUf 

I 

J Military Assist.nce Command 

I 

J-2, Reconnaissance 

7th Air Force " Branch 

" Combat I Operations 

,~ I " Center , Tactical Air if _ _ Tactiul Air 

Control Center - - - - _...l Support Element 

460th Taclical 1st Military 

Rec:onnaiss.ance Wing t- -- Intelligence Baltalion 

(Air Reconnaissance Su pport) 

I I 

Tactiu l Air Direct Air Corps Tacliul 

Support Squadron t-- Support Center r - - --- Air Support 

I 

Element 

Taclical Air t------ Division Brigade 

Control Party B.ttllion 

- - - Co·ordination 

which the United States had a requiremem for aeria l reconnais· 

sance; the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Strategic Air Com· 

mand had other priorities that precluded the allocation of all their 

resourc~ to Military Assistance Command. Consequemly, Vietnam 

was never covered to the extent desired by the intelligence staff. 

Through the assiduous use of available joint resources, however, 

we managed to provide adequate support for the tactical un its. 

Tactical aeria l reconnaissance was performed with optica l 

(photographic), infTared , and side-looking airborne radar sensors 

mOllnted in Air Force RFIOI. RF4C, RB57 , RC47, and U.s. Army 

Mohawk OV- I aircraft. Missions stemmed from the monthly 

reconnaissance plan and da ily requests. The J-2 Reconnaissa nce 

Branch monthly plan was based on requests and recommendations 

for repetitive coverage submitted by all major Army headquarters, 
98 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Ihe Military Assistance Command staff, and component commands. 

On an average, the plan included some 750 targets that were processed and assigned aircraft daily by the Tactical Air Support 

Element and Tactical Air COnlTol Center. Daily requests-some 

1,200 peT month-were subm itted by each direct air support center 

directly to lhe Tactical Air Support Element for va lidation and 

lransminai to the Tactical Air Control Center for Air Force execution. These daily requests were va lidated at each echelon in the 

Joint Air-Ground system to ascertain whether aircraft organic to 

subordi n ate units could perform the mission and thereby economize 

011 the Air Force resources. 

Photographic reconnaissance support for ~Iitilary Assistance 

Command was provided by the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance 

Wing of the 7th Air Force. This unit was committed to other pro· 

grams for the Commander in Chief. Pacific, and cou ld not devote 

all its energies to Military Assistance Command projects. This d id 

not detract from the quality of support the unit provided, but the 

quantity could have been increased with additional resources. AI· 

though many sorties were Hawn over South Vietnam daily, we were 

almost a subscriber to the photography program rather than the 

principal or executive agent. The same aircraft Hew in support of 

Military Assistance Command and the Commander in Chief, Paci· 

fic; thus, the film casette from one four·hour sonie might contain 

very little of interest to Military Assistance Command. In fact. the 

characteristics of the high.performance aircraft used on photo 

missions permitted tremendous area coverage and raised doubts 

abollt the economic feasibility of point targets nominated by 

ground units. Stategic Air Command Hew high.altitude photo 

missions in Southeast Asia and accepted Military Assistance Com· 

mand mission requests: however, the climate and jungle canopy 

reduced their value. 

The technological advances that have been made in optics 

(lenses and cameras), film, sensors, illumination, and methodology 

provided the greatest capability ever known. The biggest problem, 

mastering Ollr tet:hnology and making the system work, was even· 

wally overcome. Through the efforts of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Marine Corps, we developed a magnificent photography pro· 

gram. In spite of potentia l charges of parochialism I extend a large 

share of the credit to the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air 

Reconnaissance Support) (MIBARS), which greatly facilitated 

co-ordination of the photographic effort throughout the country. 

Doctrinally, the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Re· 

connaissance Support) would be employed as an elemeOl of a field 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 99 

army to produce and d isseminate intelligence information obta ined 

or developed by Air Force reconnaissance aircraft, and its organization permitted deplcyment of a military imelligence detachment 

with each squadron of the tactical reconnaissance wing that customarily supported a field army. This concept had been tested extensively during field exercises in the United States and had been 

implemented successfull y during the Dominican Republic crisis. 

However, the battalion, designed for conventional wars of the 

classic continental battlefield, had not been tested adequately in a 

counterinsurgency such as that in Southeast Asia, nor had it been 

in a prolonged combat thea ter. 

The concept for the employment of the MIBARS placed the 

battalion headquarters at Tan Son Nhut with a detachment in 

each of the four corps tactical zones and thereby provided a direct 

support facility that would be fam iliar with the loca l situation. We 

became particularly sa tisfied with the arrangement, even though all 

the Air Force photography missions were flown out of Tan Son 

Nhut. By virtue of their personal contact with the reconnaissance 

wing and their close relationship with ground units, the ba llalion 

personnel contributed immeasurably to developing a truly joint 

effort in photo intelligence. Elements of the batta lion and the 

460th Tacti ca l Reconnaissance Wing merged in order to provide 

the greatest capability. The rapport and mUllIal cQooperation that 

evolved resulted in the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air 

Reconnaissa nce Support) being one of the few Army units ever 

to receive a Presidential Unit Citation through Air Force channels. 

In addition, its man y accomplishments were recognized when the 

1st received two Meritorious Unit Citations. 

Although numerous problems arose in the aerial reconnaissance 

and surveill ance fi eld , the personnel of the military intelligence 

battalion were extreme ly successful in overcoming them. Some of 

the first problems to be approached concern ed educa tion; there 

were almost 110 knowledgeable reconnaissance personnel in lhe 

Army. Too few commanders and sta ff officers knew how the aerial 

reconnaissance and surveillance system worked or appreciated what 

it had to offer. The baualion attacked these problems initially by 

publishing a comprehensive handbook that explained in detail its 

mission and how tactical units could request and rece ive support. 

In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Tymchak, battalion 

commander, and his officers visited tacti cal units throughout South 

Vietnam to publicize the support their organiza ti on could provide 

to combat opera ti ons and how that su pport should be requested. 

Command-wide interest was thereby generated in the aerial recon-
100 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

naissance and surveill ance program. As the MIBARS gained experience and expertise, more ambitious measures were impl emented. 

Li eutenant Colonel Eugene Kelley. Jr., who succeeded Colonel 

Tymchak, established schools for G- 2 air officers and imagery 

interpreters. The course for air officers was designed to promote 

more efficient and effective milization of aeri al reconnaissance and 

surveillance resources by training men from the tactical units in 

the fundamentals and mechanics of the system. The imagery in ter· 

pretation course was availabl e to all imagery interpretation units in 

South east Asia , regardless of service , and was illlcnded to provide 

the environmental orienta Lion and famili arizati on thal is so 

essential to accurate photo and imagery in terpretation. 

Another accomplishment of the 1st Military Intell igence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) that was vit al to the aeri al 

reconna issance and surve ill ance program was development and 

publication of comprehensive photo interpretation keys for South· 

east Asia. These keys, acwall y a photo dictionary, were invaluable 

to the interpreters, and the over-a ll effectiveness and effi ciency of 

the entire program increased when the keys became available. 

One of the most significant missions undertaken by the 1st was 

Project WAYSIDE, a complex opera ti on to produce annotated photomaps of selected areas in South Vietnam. T he topographic map 

coverage we had in the early days was not accu rate enough. ""Vhile 

terra in features may ha ve heen correctl y depicted, survey data and 

grids \\tere onl y approximate. The ~lIBARS initiated Proj ect 

""VAYSIDE in an effort to provide photomaps of U.S. installations 

and areas in which military operations were planned. These maps 

proved to be rel iable enough to permit accurate artillery suppon to 

be fired from map data , something that had been not always possible with the topographic maps previotlsly in use. These photomaps 

became extremely popular and were in grea t demand. 

These sllccesses do not mean that the system was without fault. 

We never obtained a high enough priority to get all the equipment 

and support that the MIBARS needed and deserved. During my 

tenure as J- 2, for example, we did not receive all the communica tions equipment authori zed for the baltalion. This lack contri buted to lhe dinicilltics we experienced in attempting to provide 

more limely aerial reconnaissance support for the tactica l units. 

A four. to seven-day time lag generall y passed between request 

and rece ipt of photo. causing some criticism of Ollr program , 

though there were instant:es of rece ipt wit hin hours aft er requcst. 

An additiona l detracting fa ctor was the lack of Aoat aircraft for the 

battalion . \Vhen an aircraft was down for mai ntenance or other 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 101 

reasons, no substillile replaced it, and delivery of photos to supported units was delayed. 

We also experienced considerabl e frustration in the area of 

logistical su pport for the aeria l surveillance and reconnaissance 

program. The prime example concerns the E5-38 Mobile Photography Labora tory, a basic item of equipment that was essential to 

all photo interpre taLion units. There were no floats for the E5-38 

in South Vietnam, and we were continually short of spare and replacement parts. Through Ihe initiative of Colonel Kelley, the 1st 

Military In telligence Baltalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) became the theater-wide support facility for the E5-38's. His men 

litera ll y became the technica l ex perts on the equipment and played 

a key role in maintai ning the l\'lilitary Assistance Command 

imagery interpretation capability. 

The visual surveillance program was conducted jointly by the 

U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army aviation, and the Vietnamese Air Force. The nature of tactical operati ons demanded 

fully co-ordinated and repetitive coverage of border and coastal 

areas and other sites of high interest known to be utilized 

by the enemy in order to obtain real time reports of Viet Cong and 

North Vietnamese Army activity. The program varied from screening large areas for indications of enemy presence to concentrating 

coverage where grou nd operati ons were under way or patrolling 

over friendly troop movements. It included the capacity for directing artillery, nava l gu nfire, or air strikes on any targets, either fixed 

or Heeling, d etected in the area of search. While helicopters supponed the program at division level. the Army, Air Force, and 

Marine 0 - 1 Birddogs (si ngle·engine light observation aircraft) 

served as the backbone of airborn e visual reconnaissance. bitiall y 

hampered by a short age of aircraft, eventuall y we fully implemented the program with sufficiclll aircraft allocated to each corps 

to permit coverage of the entire country. 

The corps were di vided into vis ual surveillance areas governed 

in size by the area that one aircraft crew could cover in a syste· 

matic search during a two-hour mission. Frequency of coverage was 

influenced by the enemy situation, indications of activity repon ed 

by other sources, friendly operationa l plans, suspected enemy operations, weather, and aircra ft availability. To make the program 

more effec ti ve, a pilot and observer covered the same area each 

day, developing in this way a familiarity with the terrain that 

fa cilitated detecting evidence of enemy activity (such as a new 

tra il or road repairs). When necessary. or possible. a Vietnamese 
102 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

observer went along to pennit communications with Vietnamese 

Army units in the vicinity. 

As the prognffi progressed, service responsibilities became 

morc clearly defined. Air Force O- I's were assigned to tactical 

support squadrons. one of which was placed in support of each 

corps. These aircraft. however, were under the operational control 

of the Tactica l Air Control Center through the corps' direct air 

support centers and were intended to perform in a forward air 

control role more than in one of visual surveillance; but they were 

available to support the reconnaissance effort when operational 

requirements permitted. This arrangement worked well as a result 

of the excellent rapport that existed among the corps staffs and 

their Air Force counterparts. The Army aircraft and crews were 

placed in direct support of the corps or division at which they were 

stationed. With their primary mission of supporting combat opera· 

tions, the Army 0 - 1 's carried on visual surveillance. adjustment 

of artillery and naval gunfire, colnmn cover, and radio re lay. The 

Air Force Birddogs directed air strikes and, as a secondary mission, 

performed visua l surveillance. 

When the number of aircraft in Vietnam permitted. the sector 

was established as the basic echelon at which airborne visual sur· 

veillance was conducted. An aerial reconnaissance officer designated 

for each sector and division in each corps played a key role in the 

execution of the program. These officers supervised preparation of 

the reconnaissance plan , briefed and debriefed the surveillance 

team, and insured compliance with reponing requirements. T o be 

of value the program had to provide timely information to the 

commander. An in-Hight or spot report, used to disseminate infor· 

mation of immediate tactical value, could be sent directly to the 

support unit, division, sector, corps, or fi eld force. The second 

report-an aerial observation repon or debrief-was more deliber· 

ate. It completely detailed all sightings and observations during 

the mission and had to be forwarded to higher and adjacent head· 

quarters daily. At each sllcceeding echelon, repons were consoli· 

dated and forwarded , ultimately reaching Military Assistance 

Command. Also, a weekly statistical summary submitted by each 

corps reAected aircrafl availabili ty, number of reconnaissance 

sanies, targets struck as a result or visual sightings, and surveillance 

areas not covered. 

The employment of airborne radar and infrared sensors com· 

prised a third aspect of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance. 

While the radar produced some very impressive results, readout 

of the infrared imagery presented a significant problem that was 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 103 

never adequately resolved. Before going to Vietnam. I had seen 

a demonstration of the microdensitometer in infrared readout, and 

the results convinced me it would be useful in Military Assistance 

Command. We ordered the equipment but discovered that it could 

not be used economically in Vietnam because of the complex. 

sophisticated installation process. Despite infrared problems, the 

OV-l Mohawk (twi n-engine reconnaissance aircraft) developed 

a reputation as an outstanding intelligence collector. The sidelooking airborne radar was effective and, when used in conjunction 

with searchlight·equipped , armed helicopters, produced some remarkable results; for example, the LIGHTENING BUG operation where 

the OV-J Hew night patrols over watenvays used by the enemy 

and then relayed the location and nature of lucrative targets to 

the waiting heli copters. The Mohawks were an integra l part of 

the successful Military Assistance Command campaign to interdict 

the maritime infiltration routes used by the enemy. They provided 

infrared, radar, and visual coverage of large portions of the Vietnamese coastal regions in support of Operations MARKET TIME and 

GAME WARDEN. the patrolling and search of watercraft on inland 

waterways and the contiguous South China Sea. 

As an adjunct to visual reconnaissance, and related to aerial 

photograph y, we initiated the hand-held camera program in an 

attempt to partially alleviate the timeliness problem since a mission 

could be flown, the fi lm processed, the imagery interpreted, and 

the results d elivered to the requester in a matter of hours instead 

of days. The program was implemented by the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Military 

Assistance Command and by tactica l air support squadrons for 

the Air Force. The i\llBARS trained Army observers in the techniques of photography and also provided the cameras. Film could 

be processed at either the tactical units or the battalion. Several 

camera systems were tested. The first, employing the Questar lens 

on a camera chassis with motorized film transport. was unsuitabl e 

because of the need for a stable mount and the distortion that resulted from lens jitter when used in aircraft. The second system 

tested consisted of a catadioptic lens with 26-inch equivalent focal 

length mOllnted on the same body. Although compact and easily 

handled, the sma ll aperture, limited depth of field , and critical 

focusing made this camera unacceptable. Further testing of off-theshelf cameras resulted in selection of a Japanese model with a 

200-mm. lens. For special applica tion, we acquired a SOO-mm. and 

a I,OOO-mm. lens for use with the camera. Admittedly not the 

ultimate solution, it was adequate for our purposes. 
104 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

The magnitude of aerial reconnaissance operations required 

that a system be employed to insure that data concerning missions 

flown and results obtained were maintained and readily available 

for retrieval. It was also necessary to provide information on specific 

items regularly as an aid (or proper management of the program. 

With these broad goals in mind systems were established utilizing 

automatic data processing for storage and retrieva l of information. 

One system was used for the reconnaissance program within 

Vietnam. Experience with in-collntry operations revealed a need 

for information concerning the reconnaissance cycle, frequency and 

type coverage obtained, location of coverage, and results. Since 

intelligence resuhing from missions is a production fu nct ion, this 

infonnational need was incorporated into the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, automated intelligence file_ 

From time to time it was necessary to determine what coverage 

was performed over se lected areas in a given time frame. This could 

be done by sorting the cards by co-ordinate position and then printing out data from selected cards. The file could then be sorted by 

co-ordinates and dates to determine the results of the coverage 

obtained. This system was implemented in December 1966, and 

complete data were maintained after 1 January 1967. The results 

of missions outside Vietnam were also fed into the Combined 

Intelligence Center data base. 

Automatic data processing provided a basis [or collation of 

required data, rapid rctrieval, and more accurate and timely statistical data needed for management purposes. Plans of the J-2 

Reconnaissance Branch were formulated to improve the system. 

First of all, integrated data processing was to be initiated. This 

meant that the request for aerial reconnaissance would be in the 

format and coded so that all data were placed on the card which 

would be used for subscquent data reduction. Secondly, the Combined Intelligence Center would perform the data processing using 

the 1410 computer when the second machine became operational. 

This would allow tape storage and faster retrieval. The 27th Data 

Processing Unit maintained the in-collntry program in June 1969. 

Third, programs olltside Vietnam managed by Military Assistance 

Command would be reduced to an automatic data processing system such as that appli ed to reconnaissance within Vietnam. This 

would provide a common base for data reduction so that the same 

type of infonnation for all programs would be maintained in the 

~ame manner. 

The importance of ground reconnaissance cannot be overemphasized. Ground reconnaissance nOt only can provide timely 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE \05 

and accura te information on all aspects of the enemy and the area 

of operations but also can repon on where the enemy and his 

influences d o not exist. 

The most professional and effective reconnaissance was pcrformed by the 1st Australian Task Force. They conducted reconnaissance to collect intelligence and to avoid being discovered by 

the enemy. Their teams could remai n on patrol for two weeks at a 

time without being resupplied. They were masters at it. Long-ra nge 

reconnaissance patrols were employed at almost every echelon of 

command in Vietnam. These teams were good sources of intelli· 

gence for tactical commanders. Man patrols could direct artillery 

or air strikes on targets they discovered, but occasiona lly they called 

in such strikes at times when their continuous reporting on the 

enemy would have been more ,·aluable. 

Most patrol actions were planned, co-ordinated, and execllted 

at the sector or division level. Some long-range reconnaissance 

pt1.trols responded to Military Assistance Command and field force 

tasking. The marines could ca ll upon their force rccon naissance 

unit in I Corps and the 5th Special Forces. The patrol capability 

was increased sign ificantly by establish ing the Military Assistance 

Command Recondo School at Nha Trang under the 5th Special 

Forces Grollp. I \",as highly impressed both by the Australians and 

by the successful night operations and reconnaissance conducted by 

the twO divisions and the marine brigade from the Republic o[ 

Korea. The Vie tnamese Civilian Irregu lar Defense Group border 

camps, which were isolated strongpoints advised by U.S. Special 

Forces teams, were located astride Communist infiltration routes. 

In addition to providing information about enemy movements 

and activities, these outposts conducted valuable reconnaissance 

and were a constant thorn in the side of North Vietnamese units 

operating in South Vietnam. 

The employment of returnees (Hoi Chanh.s) as scouts for U.S. 

units in the Kit Carson program was very successful. They assisted 

our patrols in locating and identifying enemy units and caches. 

The Airborne Personnel Detector ("' People Sniffer") signaled 

human presence by electronically detecting body odors. Unfor. 

tunatel y, inability to distinguish friend from foe limited its value 

in the ground mode, and it was more effectively employed when 

mounted in a helicopter and flown over areas known to be fre· 

quellled by the enemy. Because aircraft thus equ ipped had to Ry 

relatively low, vulnerability to ground fire was high and escort 

gu nsh ips were required. 

Light in tensifiers (Starligh t Scopes) proved to be of great value 
106 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

in spotting enemy movement during darkness. Without the vul· 

nerability of detection inherent in infrared light sources, the Starlight Scope intensified available light to permit observation. 

While we have not yet realized the ultimate potential of 

unattended ground sensors, their use had considerable promise. 

Based on sonic, seismic, or pressure disturbances. sensors can detect people or vehicles and can transmit this information imme· 

diately to a monitor or store the data for subsequent readout by 

an airborne monitor. Again, these systems cannot discriminate. 

There is no substitute for properly conducted ground reconnaissance. It takes men of great courage and physical stamina. It 

requires lengthy and intensive training. It requires miniaturized 

lightweight. dependable communications and aids to the human 

senses of sound and sight. Most U.S. ground reconnaissance was 

conducted to locate and conduct air or artillery strikes on enemy 

targets. Adequate emphasis was not given to avoiding detection. to 

maintaining contact. and to keeping the commander informed. 

Operations 

In the realm of area intelligence and the utilization of sensitive 

sources, initial plans called for an elaborate collection organization 

which could conduct shallow and deep operations. The original 

expectations proved overly ambitious and the program was reduced considerably. In addition, some jurisdictional questions arose 

from interservice disputes, hindering the establishment of an 

effective control mechanism. These were referred to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. and were resolved in favor of Military 

Assistance Command, creating a precedent for future controversies 

of this nature. However. relations with the Central Intelligence 

Agency were not covered by this decision, and while co-operation 

generally was excellent, J-2, Military Assistance Command. was 

not privy to all Central Intelligence Agency operations. 

The coll ection effort concept initially call ed for a single com· 

mand to conduct both unilateral and bilateral operations_ Targets 

included enemy units and activities withi n the Military Assistance 

Command area of interest as well as special targets selected in 

response LO local commanders' immediate needs for order of battle 

information. A large percentage of the effort established area coverage to satisfy better the requirements of tactical units. Generally 

speaking, these operatiOns were moderately successful in answering 

specific requirements. Unfortunately most sta ff officers in imelli. 

gence sims lacked any spec ialized intelligence training. experience, 

or familiarity with the fundamentals of taskings for collection. The 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 107 

assignment to each sector headquarters and corps.level C- 2 section 

of an intelligence liaison officer with the needed collection expertise partially alleviated the problem. 

)- 2. Military Assistance Command. was faced with an educalion problem within the military intelligence community in Vietnam. This problem also exined throughout the Army in general. 

Too few responsible people were familiar with area intelligence 

and how to use it. Security requirements may be cited by some 

as the reason for failing to include this as an Army mission at most 

service schools; but the Army cannot afford "to classify itself Out of 

this capability. and commanders muSt be made aware of its benefits. 

Very ambitious programs targeted against the Viet Cong inFrastructure and the Viet Cong irregu lar forces were initiated under 

the auspices of Military Assistance Command )-2. The focal 

point for these operations was at sector and subsector where the 

American S--2 adviser and his counterpart worked in co-ordination 

with local U.S. and Vietnamese intell igence activities. The primary 

objectives of these programs wert~ to develop substantive data on 

the enemy political order of battle in support of the Military 

Assistance Command pacification and reVOlutionary development 

programs_ Encouraging progress provided a foundation for the 

later. more expansive. Combined Intelligence Staff. 

Some of the mon active collection efforts utilized a technique 

described as specialized patrOlling. Conducted by U.S. Army intelligence units and the U.S. Army Special Forces. these programs 

produced valuable information about enemy infiltration, troop 

movements, unit locations. and logistical facilities which he lped 

develop accurate intelligence about the Communist military clements who hid in the base areas located in remote parts of the 

Republic of Vietnam. In some instances. impressive results \!Jere 

achieved which undoubtedly caused a diversion of enemy combat 

units to security missions. To increase the psychological pressures 

on the enemy soldiers and their inFrastructure, we initiated programs to encourage defections among the Communist forces. Of 

course the government's Chieu Hoi program produced a large 

number of ralliers, who were. however, for the most part of little 

status within the Communist heirarchy. We devoted considerable 

emphasis to devising feasible means of obtaining defections among 

the top-level Viet Cong cadres and North Vietnamese military 

forces and sought to induce entire units to rally to the governmem 

of Vietnam. At best, we expected Stich programs to achieve only 

moderate success, and we would have been satisfied with merely 

reducing the morale and efficiency of a unit. Offering amnesty. for 
108 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

example. could calise the leaders to become distrustful of subordinates who did not devoutly follow the party line. We also used a 

rewards program whereby suppli ers of information lcading to the 

capture of high-ranking Communist officials were paid generously. 

These efforts did provide a commendable number of new sources 

for furth er exploitati on; and regardl ess of reasons, returnee rates 

increased after the rewards offers were made. Funds also were made 

ava ilable to all commanders to pay-rewards for enemy weapons or 

for information leading to the discovery of enemy caches. 

An important factor in the intelligence effort was the role of 

the military attaches in Vietnam. In May 1964, with the growth of 

Military Assistance Command, the offices of the U.S. military 

attache were closed. Since a number of attache functions continued 

to exist, J-2, Military Assistance Command, assumed responsibility for many of the residual requirements, and several liaison 

officers were appoillled within the Intelligence Operations Division 

to discharge the attache mission as additional duties. L'Iter these 

functions were incorporated into the Foreign Liaison Office within 

the J-2 staff. Nevertheless. the growing attache requirements soon 

necessitated the expansion of our effort, and I established the 

Military Attache Liaison Office under Colonel Robert F, Robens 

as a division-level staff agency. The office was orga nized along the 

lines of a typical Defense attache office so that it quickly could 

assume the offic ial attache functions. The Military Attache Liaison 

Office repeatedly proved its worth in co-ordinating matters per· 

taining to attaches from other countries as they affected V.S. forces 

and provided a diplomatic lever to secure information of va lue to 

the command. 

Another aspect of our intelligence collection concerned the 

role of the V.S. Special Forces in Vietnam. As the Military Assistance Command combat organization expanded, efforts were reo 

doubled to improve OllT capacity for conducting offensive intell i· 

gence missions in enemy-comrolled areas, and we sought to take 

advantage of the vast potential of the 5th Special Forces Group. 

This organization, with A detachments strategica ll y deployed 

throughout the country. had excellent communications from all 

units back to th e gro up headquarters, its own airlift capability. and 

an extremely efficient command and control system. \Vhil e the 

Special Forces was providing valuable input to our intelligence 

effon and was participating in some of our collection programs. it 

obviously could do much more. I visited the newly assigned com· 

mander of the Special Forces. Colonel Francis J. Kelly, in June 

1966 and proposed a plan for using the potential of his group to 
COMBAT INTELLIGE NCE 109 

collect intelligence of value to the entire command. Colonel Kelly 

enthusiastically received these recommendations and offered his 

full support. 

To expedite the program I made ava ilable one of my most able 

officers, Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Ruble, to be the first career 

military intelligence officer assigned as 5-2 of the 5th Special 

Forces Group. The results were gratifying. First, a number of 

regulations were written to explai n the steps necessary to improve 

the intelligence program, and mobile training teams were dis· 

patched by the group 5-2 officer to visit each A and B detachment 

to assist in their implementation. Marked improvements were observed in collection operations targeted against the enemy military 

and political order of battle. Production was advanced by the 

establishment of an intelligence analysis center in each corps 

tactical zone. 

As intelligence tasking continued to expand, it became evident 

that additional personnel, particularly those with spec ific intell igence skills, were essential. Two augmentation units were provided: 

the 403d Special Operations Detachment and an unnumbered military intelligence detachment composed of 11 0 men. The 403d was 

retained under group cOIHl"ol while the 11 0-man augmentation 

detachment was organized into five teams conta ining counter· 

intelligence, interrogation, analytical, and administrative specialists. One team was retained at group headquarters and one sent to 

each of the group's four companies. With the deployment of these 

teams, the 5th Special Forces Group intelligence organization 

provided excellent finished intelligence to its subordinate units 

as well as higher headquarters. The sophistication of the intelligence apparatus allowed for operations against the infrastructure, 

particularly through the low-level informer nets that were estab· 

lished by the A and B detachments. In addition, an elaborate collection capability soon emerged and highly productive programs 

were initiated. Detachment B57, which was a 52-man unit; a 

13-man special mission group; (he 403d Special Operations Detachment; plus some 125 intelligence personnel stationed with the C 

detachments came directly under the group S-2. The men of the 

Special FOTces were ideal intelligence collectors; they knew the 

value of intelligence. 

The objectives of one special collection program in effect were 

to develop timely illtelligence on North Vietnamese Army infiltra· 

tion through Cambodia, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 

Army bases in Cambodia, and Cambodian su ppOrt to the 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. All prisoners were 
110 THE ROLE OF tl.f I L ITARY INTELLIGENCE 

interrogated concern ing their routes of march from North to South 

Vietnam. If they were ever in Cambodia we asked for witnessed, 

handwriuen signed statements from each source. His piCture was 

attached to his sta tement. \Ve had a book full of such evidence. 

mLlch of it valuable. J- 2, Military Assistance Command, published 

a detailed report on the role of Cambodia in supporting lhe Viet 

Cong and North Vietnamese Army. This program was highly 

successful. 

Another program was designed to collect information on the 

Vict Cong infrastTlicture and to update the Viet Cong political 

order of battle handbook. This was a combined coll ection effort 

primarily at the sector and subsector level. By June 1967 about 

15,000 names were reponed as possible members of the infra· 

structure. 

Another similar plan was directed at the deve lopment of an 

accurme estimate of the Viet Cong irregular forces strength, thereby 

providi ng a measure of the Viet Cong ability to increase their 

regular forces strength and to offset their regular forces losses. 

Such infonnation also provided a better understanding of the 

problem facing the Republic of Vietnam and the U.S. and Free 

World Military Assistance Forces in their pacification and revolu· 

tionary development efforts. Again, the focal point of this effort 

was at the sector. By the end of May 1967 this program gave liS 

for the first lime a good estimate of the Viet Cong irregular forces 

strength. It had taken ;Ibout five months. Colonel Loi and I had 

decided to place the requ irement for th is plan through our separate 

channels of communica tion. He tasked the Vietnamese intelligence 

officer at each sector to submit to him a report on the organ ization 

and estimated strength of the Viet Cong irregular forces. Ire· 

quested the American intelligence officer at sector to furnish me 

the same information. Then Colonel Loi and I had our staffs com· 

pare reports. We resubmitted our requests and asked for full 

co·ordination of all agencies. Their eventual reports gave us the 

best information ava ilable to date. This was the first planned effort 

to coll ect such infonnation. 

Another J- 2, Military Assistance Command, program was 

established to intercept suspect enemy trawlers and steel·hull ships 

bringing supplies and men into South Vietnam. This was primarily 

a Navy program, but all agencies part icipated. The program was 

very successful. 

During the last sixteen months of my tour the number of active 

speci fi c intelligence coll ection requirements had increased 146 

percent and we were processing about 350 at all times. Also, the 
COMBAT INTELLICENCE III 

number of intelligence reporlS (Depanment of Defense Form 

1396) from 1964 to 1966 increased 5,000 percent. Over thirteen 

thousand reports were handled in 1966. During the first four 

months of 1967 there were almost 9,000. From this proliferation of 

reports an economical, yet efficient, method to manage this administrative requirements was needed. The system developed for this 

purpose was named the Military Assistance Command Collection 

Management System and was a subsystem of the Military Assistance 

Command Intelligence Data Handling System. 

The Collecti on Management System data base had four files. 

The first file contained all the information applicable to specific 

intelligence collection requiremenlS, such as who originated the 

requirement. who had to collect the information, what was the 

priority of the requirement, and when the requirement expired. 

These requirements were generated by the Defense Intelligence 

Agency and other intelligence consumers. Data were provided 

monthly for both staff and fi eld use in the form of a collection 

requirements registry. 

This registry provided the collection manager with an inventory 

of active specific intelligence collection requirements and arranged 

these requiremen ts in formats which enabled rapid identifica tion, 

by management-oriented groupings such as subject matter and 

geograph ic area addressed (for instance, North Vietnamese anti· 

aircraft tactics in the Central Highlands). The registry proved its 

value by accommodating the increased burden of requirements 

admin istration both at the headquarters and in the fi eld. The 

registry. updated monthly, served as the specific intelligence collection requirement in ventory and working control document 

for both. 

Also from this file, every month , a sep.1ra le report was provided 

each requiremem originator. This report listed those specific 

intelligence collection requirements for which the originator ,"'as 

responsible which were due to expire and which therefore needed 

to be reviewed. The purpose of the review was to insure on the 

one hand that coll ection assets were not dissip.1led on satisfied 

requiremen ts and on the other hand that valid requirements were 

not cancelled. 

The second file was also a requirements fil e. It contai ned the 

essential elements of informa tion and other information requests 

which the MACV commander had approved. It also included the 

indicators, specifi c orders and requests, and collection tasking for 

each essemial element of information and collection requirement. 
112 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

From this file we published the Military Assistance Command 

intelligence coll ection plan for the 1967 combined campa ign plan. 

The com pUler program ava ilable for processing this fil e permitted rapid updating of the requirements and republication of 

the document without burdening the fi eld units with administrative details such as "pen and ink" changes. Plans called for this 

file to be placed on tape for easier updating and relrieval. We also 

intended to develop a system which would provide fi eld unitS 

with a version ori ented specifically for their use. This later system 

would become feasible as the J-2 computer capability improved. 

The third fi le, the evaluation file, conta ined the opinions of a 

requirement originator as to the value of the information provided 

by a specific collector. for example whether it was timely. whether 

it answered the question, or its general value in the light of intelli. 

gence holdings. This type of evalua tion is basic to successful coll ection. It is a form of feedback from which both the collection 

manager and the coll ector can analyze. redirect. and redefin e their 

coll ection objectives. In effect the requirement originator or anal yst 

provides a scorecard which measures the success of the collection 

action. It was estimated that approximately 40 percell! of Military 

Assistance Command be eva luated and this percentage was an 

adequate sampl e for a valid evalua tion program. It was envisioned 

that this fil e would be used primarily in-house by the coll ection 

managers in eva luati ng the quality of the reporti ng system. 

The fourth fil e provided a registry of all intelligence report 

numbers issued for reporting purposes within Military Assistance 

Command. A significant portion of this file contained an expanded 

computer record which provided management data on those reports 

which had been evaluated. 

This file did nOt contain the intelligence infonnation provided 

by the report. Other files within J-2 contained the substantive 

intelligence data which had been reported. The reports which 

emanated from the file were used in mon itoring and evaluating 

reporting activities to detemine the extent of response of spec ific 

requirements (specific intelligence collection req uirements or col· 

lection plans, for example) and to determine the over·all extent 

of collector response to specifically assigned collection tasks. 

The Coll ec tion Management System, th rough these fou r fil es. 

provided the collection manager with a useful tool for controlling, 

evaluating, and redirecting. where necessary, the collection effort. 

The system served the req uirement originator. the manager. and 

the collector by providing a total system wherein the collection 

cycle could be traversed. It provided a data base from which infor-
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 113 

mation could be provided the originator, the collection manager, 

and the coll ector on all requirements levied on Military Assistance 

Command coll ection assets, selected intelligence reports submitted 

by Military Assistance Command collection assets in response to 

requirements, and evaluations of selected reports submitted by 

Military Assistance Command collecLOrs. 

Exploilatio11 Division 

The combined agreement of October 1965 between Military 

Assistance Command and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

established a combined exploitation system and provided [or the 

establ ishment of physical plants to house each activity at national 

level. A second agreement concluded in June 1966 established 

similar provisions for materiel exploitation. 

In order to implement the system, fOllT intelligence exploitation 

programs were placed into effect: These were the interrogation, 

document, materiel, and Ch ieu Hoi programs. These combined 

programs, based upon the aforementioned agreements, had several 

factors in common. They were controlled and co-ordinated by .1 -2, 

Military Assistance Command, and J-2. Joint General Staff; they 

involved combined employment of U.S. and Vietnamese resources; 

and they aimed to achieve timely intelligence. 

At Military Assistance Command level, staff supervision over 

these progra ms became the responsibility of the Exploitation 

Branch. Intelligence Operations Division. In February 1967, during 

a J- 2 orga niza tional realignment, the Exploitation Branch was 

broken away from the Intelligence Operations Division and was 

redesignated the Exploitati on Division. The Exploitation Division 

exercised direct staff supervision over the Combined Military Interrogation Center, the Combined Document Exploitation Center, 

and the Combined Materie l Exploitation Center. The fourth exploitation program was the Chieu Hoi program, the purposes of 

which were to induce defection, to collect intelligence, to weaken 

the Viet Cong cause, and to convert the returnees to useful citi7.ens. 

Only those Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldiers who defected after supporting the military or politica l activities of the 

National Libera tion Front were eligible for the Chieu H oi pro· 

gram. After being exploited for intelligence and after a period of 

reindoctrination and training, returnees were resettled as normal 

citizens of the republic. J-2 interest in the Chieu Hoi program was 

primarily in its intelligence potclllial. tn 1966 it was estimated that 

only 10 percent of all Chieu Hoi returnees were being exploited for 
114 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

intelligence or psychological purposes. In July 1966, a concerted 

effort was initiated lO improve the intelligence exploitation of 

returnees through lhe assignment of additional J- 2 personnel 

to the program, including full·time .1- 2 liaison officers at each 

of the four corps. Exploitation improved to the extent that few 

returnees were overlooked as potential sources of information on 

the Viet Congo All North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong military 

cadres and all political cadres were evacuated to the national Clliell 

Hoi center in Sa igon, where they were interrogated in depth. 

Some representative cases that have occurred since August df 

1966 illustrate the formidable intelligence potential of the program. The U.S. marines in the 1 Corps area implemented a program 

for the tactical exploitation of selected Chieu Hoi returnees. 

Identified as Kit Carson ScOutS, military returnees who had com· 

pleted the prescribed reindoctrination at a Chieu Hoi center were 

recruited from the centers and hired full lime as guides or scoutS 

for tactical units. Over tbitty of these scouts were employed by the 

marines, and plans called for a total of fifty by June 1967. These 

scouts contributed to the success of search·and·c1ear operations and 

identified and assisted in the capture of over forty-five of their 

former Viet Cong compatriots. Similar uses of returnees in support 

of tactical operations were carried out in the other corps areas. 

Since August 1966, three very important Viet Cong and North 

Vietnamese Army personnel have voluntarily returned to South 

Vietnamese control under the Chiell Hoi program. The first of 

these was Lieutenant Colonel Le Xuan Chuyen, the former chi,ef 

of staff for operations and trai ning of the 5th Viet Cong Division. 

He was highly knowledgeable throughout a broad spectrum of 

military subjects. In May 1967 Colonel Chuyen was appointed 

director of the national Chiell Hoi center in Saigon. 

In October 1966 the assistant director of the Central Office of 

South Vietnam medical school, Nguyen Huu Hung, returned to 

government control. He provided a considerable amount of detailed 

information pertaining to Central Office personalities, order of 

battle, and medical training. 

In March 1967 the former chief of the training section of 

Military Region V, Hoynh Cu, returned to government control. 

He provided valuable information on North Vietnamese Army 

strategy in the Western Highlands Military Region and on Military 

Region V organization and activities, logistics, and order of battle. 

Based upon information provided by a returnee in the IV 

Corps area, the South Vietnamese Army 21st Division reacted by 

launching an immediate operation which resulted in 309 Viet 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 115 

Cong casua lti es. 13 captured, and large equipment losses. These are 

some typical examples of the intelligence exploitation of the Chieu 

Hoi program. 

The highlight of intelligence exploitation in 1967 was the 

quality, quantity. and timeliness of information gained as the 

result of Operation CEDAR FALLS, which was directed against 

Military Region IV from 8-26 January. To improve tactical 

interrogation during the operation, len field interrogation teams 

consisting of a total of fourteen Americans and eight Vietnamese 

from the Combined Military Interrogation Center were sent to 

support the tactical units of II Field Force. Interrogations yielded 

valuable information on unit identifications and loca tions. 

The operation proved to be an intelligence windfall in terms 

of captured enemy documents. Of the 492,553 pages received during the period. 52,797, or approximately II percent, were either 

summarized or fully translated. These explOited documents provided information regarding the subordinate units and agencies of 

Military Region IV, including defense plans for War Zone C. Also 

included was an outline plan and general Objectives for the Viet 

Cong 1966-1967 campa ign. There were strong indications that 

the entire military file on Binh Duong Province unit headquarters 

was captured by friendly forces. Over 1,500 pages of signal intelligence and crypto material were processed. These pages of crypto 

material included signal directives, signed operation instructions. 

and crypto operator notebooks, most of which were originated by 

the Crypto Cell, Current Affairs Commi ttee, Military Region IV. 

The timely initial exploitation of these documents yielded tactical 

and strategic intelligence. 

Two document exploitation teams consisting of four Americans 

and two South V~eLnamese from the Combined Document Exploitation Center were in direct support of combat units. Timeliness 

of evacuation and exploitation was exce ll ent. Capturing units were 

provided on-the-spot taCtical document exploitation support, and 

the results of every document exploited at the cenler were provided 

to tactical units and to the Military Assistance Command staff 

withi n twenty·four hours. 

On 22 February HI67 Operation JUNCTION C ITY was initiated by 

units of II Field Force. Vietnam, and III Corps. Intelligence exploitation included the capture or a large quantity of film which 

provided excellent identification photos of members of the Viet 

Cong hierarchy. The take consisted of various positives. negatives, 

undeveloped exposed film, unused film. and some duplicate film. 

All of this film was processed. screened. summarized, and combined 
116 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

into a total of sixty·fi ve reels varying in length from five to thirty 

minutes. With the co-operation of the Joint U.S. Public Affa irs 

Office. five of the films were combined to make a composite 35-

minute film with a commentary soundtrack added in English. This 

composite film depicted the late General Nguyan Chi Thanh visiting a hospital in Tar Ninh Province, South Vietnam; General 

Thanh was a member of the North Vietnamese Politburo and the 

commanding general of the National Liberation Front of South 

Vietnam. (In the summer of 1967, he was mortally wounded by a 

8-52 strike in Tay Ninh Province.) In addition, the film showed 

Major General (then Brigadier General) Tran Do addressing a 

meeting of the Central Office of South Vietnam; General Do was 

the deputy political officer of the National Liberation Front and 

chief of the political section of the Central Office. Generals Thanh 

and Do were positively identified by a returnee who knew them 

personally. 

The intelligence exploitation programs provided rapid response 

in interrogation by the Combined Military Interrogation Center 

ranging from tactical through strategic areas of intelligence interest; in document exploitation ranging from summarizations to 

complete translations, as well as automated rapid retrieval of documents by subject area by the Combined Document Exploitation 

Center: and in materiel exploitation ranging from on.the·spot technical evaluation to complete analysis at the Combined Materiel 

Exploitation Center. 

Operatioll Cedar Falls 

While Vietnam provided many examples of the role of intelligence in support of operations. CEDAR FALLS is a classic. 1 conce ived this operation and recommended it to General Westmore· 

land. This was the first corps·level operation in Vietnam and 

employed a multidivision force in the notorious Iron Triangle. 

some twemy-five miles north·northwest of Saigon. Initiated on 8 

January 1967. the operation aimed at the capture or destruction of 

Headquarters. Viet Cong Military Region IV. and iLS base camps 

and supply bases as well as the 272d Viet Cong Regiment. The 

Iron Triangle had become a sa nctuary from which the Viet Cong 

operated with impunity against Cia Dinh Province and Saigon. 

Because of the importance of the security of Saigon, the capital 

city, I had ordered the initiation of Operation RENDEZVOUS, a concerted effort to gather information about enemy personalities, units. 

headquarters. and activities within Military Region IV. RENDEZVOUS 

utilized all sources of intelligence collection from short.range radio 
COl\IBAT INTELLICENCE 117 

direction-finding equipment. side-looking airborne radar. infrared, 

agent reports, photography, long-range reconnaissance patrols, and 

reports from rhe Combined Interrogation Center, Combined Documcnt Exploitation Center. and Combined Intclligence Ccnter. 

RENDEZVOUS became the example of co-operation and co-ordination 

on a large sca le by rhe Cl1lire military intelligence community_ The 

combined centers provided specialized studies on suspected and 

known members of the Viet Cong infrastructure, pattern analysis 

of likely troop and logistics concentra tions, and photo studies. Since 

Military Region IV was immediately subordinate to the Central 

Office of South Vietnam, we expected to capture the Central Office 

and Hanoi's plans affecti ng Sa igon. Any disruption of Military 

Region IV would delay Communist plans affecLing the capital. 

By late 1966, an analysis of information obtained from RENDEZvous established patterns wh ich convinced me that a quick strike 

against Military Region IV would not only prove tacticall y successful but wou ld probably seriously disrupt the region. 

One morning in mid-December 1966, fortified with overwhelming inte lligence, I recommendcd to General \Vestffioreland that 

Operation J UNCTION CITY be postponed and that II Field Force 

atlack j\·filitary Region IV. He directed that I brief Lieutenant 

General j ona than O. Seaman, commander of II Field Force, who 

was then preparing to lau nch Operation J UNCTION CITY in \Var 

Zone C. 

\Ve briefed General Seaman and his staff that afternoon on the 

intelligence that had been gathered. He studi ed the facts and was 

impressed by what he termed a "most convincing presentation." 

General Seaman agreed to postpone J UNCTION CITY and go for 

Military Region IV. He realized that contact with large uni ts 

would be unlikely but agreed that the capture of equipment, directives, and personnel of such an important headquarters subordinate to the Central Office was imponant to the security of 

Sa igon and was a potential intelligence coup. This. together with 

the disruptive effect on enemy opera tions against Saigon, was a 

great opportunit y. I reported the above to General \Vestmoreland 

in his offi ce that evening. He picked up the phone and call ed 

General Seaman. He ordered CEDAR FALLS and arranged to meet 

with General Seaman and his staff the next day. Intelligence was 

"out £ront." 

Enemy order of ba ttl e at this time included. in addition to 

Military Region IV headquarters, the 272d Regiment. the 1st and 

7th Main Force Battalions. the Phu Loi Battalion, and fOllT loca l 

forces companies, all operating within the area. The 9th Viet Cong 
liB THE ROLE OF' MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

, .. FIELD FORCE VIETNAM 

I 

I I I I 

~1 

... ~73 ~196 

TASK ORCANIZATION FOR II FI.ELD FORCE, VIETNAM, FOR OPERATION 

CEDAR FALLS 

Division minus the 272d Regiment was capable of piecemeal reinforcement within forty-eight hours from areas west of the Iron 

Triangle. The enemy, however, was not expected to reinforce but 

rather to defend supply bases and headquarters areas with avail able 

security elements. His resistance was predicted to be primarily 

delaying actions. Owing to the lack of friendly opcldlions within 

the area, extensive £orlificalions and tunnel systems also were 

expected. Estimates of the enemy's strength and probable courses 

of action proved accurate in that the 272d Regiment avoided 

major contact and left the defense of Military Region IV to local 

forces. 

Immediately pr«eding CEDAR FALLS. tactical units deployed 

under the guise of small·sca le operations to sites within striking 

dist.'Ulce of the Iron Triangle. Both the 1st Infantry Division and 

the 25th Infantry Division started deployment on 5 January. with 

elements of the 17M Airborne Brigade. under operationa l control 

of the 1st Division, initiating Operation NIAGARA FALLS in the 

Cau Dinh jungle between Highway U and the Thi Thinh River. 

The operation, when terminated on 7 January 1967. left these 

elements positioned for CEDAR FAU.5. They constituted the hammer 

of the operation. The 25th Division deployed the 196th Light 
I • , 

, ' 

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 

• 

.' - .. ~ 

.r III 

11 9 

•• 

. . 

• 

TASK ORCANIZATIOSS "·OR. CEDAR FALLS \VERE DEPLOYED ,"VITIIIN S1lt.IKING 

DISTANCE OF TIlE IRO:o1 TIUANCLE. abovt:. WHILE THE 11TH ARMORED 

CAVALRY DROV.; \'VEST, THE 1sT DIVISION AND 1750 BRIGADE \VERE AIR· 

LIFTED INTO LANDING ZOSES aroll/ltl the edge of the ThanlJ Die" Forest 

R eserve at the Tlorthern (lank of the Iron Triangle, below . 

. ' . . ~ t' 

\ - .' . 

... 1) A..". ... • .t' • 

• . .." ~ 

,Il 

CND,..t\ 
120 nlE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

-" ',. .... 

• ell C -'!~ 

• 

• 

, . 

\VITII TilE l\IO\'t:~It:NTOf Tin: I 96TH L le UT I NF"ANT!tY BRIGADE FROM TAY 

NIl'l l! TO TRUNC LAP (/lid wilh IIle /Josilioning of tile 196/11 Glul Ille 251h 

Divi.sio,. near tilt: Saigr)/! River and Ihe H o 11 0 Woods, Ihe anvil 01' 

blocking force for Cedar Falls wns realiy, above. TilE H AMMER OR 

SlltHUNC FORCE OF Of'ERATIO:>l CI::DAR FAUS , tile 1st Diu;sio,1 a"d cleo 

men/s of the J flit Annored Cavalry R egmwIII alltl 17Jd nrigade, struck 

011 9 January wilh tile armor element (/riving west, below. 

, 

• 

, 

• 

" • 

• 

., 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 121 

Infantry Brigade from Tay Ninh. The command POSt and trains 

of the 196th moved on 5 January LO Trung Lap, southwest of the 

Iron Triangle. In the next two days the brigade shifted forces out 

of Tay Ninh and deployed four battalions into the Ho Bo woods 

close to the west bank of the Sa igon R iver. and by 7 January they 

too were positioned as components of the anvil, or blocking forces, 

for CEDAR FA LLS. Elements of the South Vietnamese 5th Infantry 

Division blocked on the southeast edge of the triangle. After heavy 

8-52 strikes against targets in the area wh ich had been recommended by J-2 elemems, the hammer or striking force of the 

operation. the 1st Infantry Division and elements of II th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment and 173d Airborne Brigade, struck on 9 January 

1967 with the armor element driv ing west out of Ben Cat to the 

Saigon River at Rach Bap. At the same time elements of the 1st 

Division and the 173d Airborne Brigade were airlifted into landing 

zones around the edges of the Thanh Dien Forest Reserve at the 

northern Hank of the Iron Triangle for their mission, the destruction of the headquarters and related installations of the Viet Cong 

Mi litary Region IV. 

When the decision had been reached to attack Military Region 

IV, we were able to provide II Field Force with a wealth of inte lli· 

gence on the area. This was accomplished in a matter of hours by 

using our two automatic data processing systems. The combined 

centers also were alerted to provide augmentation personne l to the 

tactical un its on order. In the actua l operations, teams from all the 

combined centers were dispatched to both the 1st and 25th Infantry 

Divisions for use as the ir commanders saw fi t. However. in addition to the research and analysis support rendered by Military 

Assistance Command J- 2, the intelligence un its under out operational con(rol also were tasked \\'ith providing support both be fore 

and during the operation. The 525th Military Intelligence Group 

supported CEDAR FALLS through subelements, including the 135th 

Military Intell igence Group, 1491h Mili tary Intelligence Group, 

and 1st Military Intelligence Battal ion (Air Reconnaissance 

Support). 

Detachmelll A of the lst provided aerial photographic coverage 

of access routes and potenthl targets within the area. After the 

opera tion began, the detachment provided local support to the 

G- 2's and 5-2's o[ the divisions and separate brigades, work ing 

closely with the imagery interpretation sections of the military 

intelligence det.chments, including seventy-six missions in support 

of the 173d Airborne Brigade alone. 

The 149th Military Intell igence Group. which had been gather· 
122 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

PRISONEll OF WAR COLLECTION POINT FOR THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION 

during Operation Cedar Falls, above. ALL CIV ILIANS IN Tlt E CEDAR 

FALLS AREA OF OPERATIONS WEltE DETAINED. Thousands 0/ refu.gees 

were screened eacll day, below. 
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 123 

ing intelligence from Operation RENIlEZVOUS for the preceding six 

months, provided specific collection support to Operation CEDAR 

FALLS as welL Representatives located with the intelligence sections 

of the divisions and separate brigades had the mission of assuring 

timely dissemination of information reports and keeping their 

headquarters advised of new requirements. Agents within the 

target area enabled the group to furnish information on the location of a munitions storage area, routes of march, and river traffic 

within the triangle. 

Intelligence support organic to the five tactical units participating in the operation came from their military intelligence detachmentS and special operations units working with the divisions and 

separate brigades. Communications security teams also were deployed to the fOn\'ard command posts to assist the commander in 

maintaining security of friendly communications. Prisoner-of-war 

and detainee interrogation sections established refugee screening 

camps in the forward base camps. All civilians within the area of 

operations were detained, and literally thousands of refugees were 

screened each day. Before deploymel1l, the interrogation teams 

received detailed briefings from both order of battle and imagery 

imerpretation personnel who provided aerial photOgraphs with 

overlays for the interrogators to use as a base for questioning. 

Prisoner detention facilities were set up and counterintelligence 

and imerrogation personnel worked in consonance. Counterintelligence personnel checked the blacklist while the interrogations were 

going on and obtained positive leads on many individuals who 

either provided information on enemy units and installations or 

proved to be Viet Cong themselves. They also accomp.:'lnied local 

medical teams into the surrounding area and questioned the local 

populace for information on enemy intentions and dispositions. 

Imagery interpretation and order of battle personnel worked 

together to provide hard targets to the attacking units. Month·old 

photographs of the entire area of operations were received from 

the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support). Apparent targets on these photos were rechecked and rephotographed by Anny and Air Force aerial reconnaissance 

elements. New photographs were compared with order of battle 

holdings, and updated intelligence then was passed to the various 

G-2's for exploitation by infantry troops. 

As a resull of CEDAR FALLS, the Viet Cong command committee 

of the military region-consisting or the region commander and 

the chiefs of the military, political, and rear-service staffs-dis· 

persed and were not heard from for a long time. In faCl, lriendly 
124 THE ROLE OF M I LITARY INTELLIGENCE 

forces later produced the personal effects of Ibese individuals including their wallets, tOilet gear, and notebooks bearing lOp secret 

classification. The caplllTC of the classified files of both the military 

and political staffs of Military Region IV seriollsly disrupted their 

efforts, as did the uprooting of lhe logistical operations and the 

capture of food and medical supplies. 

In retrospect, CEDAR FALLS was nothing less than a significant 

victory in terms of casualties inflicted upon the enemy and maleriel 

and rice stOTCS captured or destroyed. More important was the vast 

amOllnt of intelligence raw material that it produced. The term 

raw material is ad \'anced adv isedly. since many of the inte lligence 

sources and documents turned up during the operation were usable 

on the SIX)l by document exploiters and interrogators attached to 

the task force. Much of the exploitation of military intelligence. 

however, took place outside of the immediate tactical area-for 

the most part in the combined centers in Saigon. 

General Seaman characterized this operation as the "biggest 

intelligence breakthrough in the war." During the course of the 

action in the Iron Triangle, 213 enemy were deta ined and. in 

addition, 512 suspects and 518 ra!liers were held for interrogation. 

All the intelligence these sources provided was relayed at once to 

commanders in the field and to l\Iilitary Assistance Command. 

Twelve valuable sources were sent to the Combined Military interrogation Center for further exploitation by U.S. and South 

Vietnamese intell igence. Among the CEDAR FALLS detainees interrogated at the combined center was the operations officer of Mili· 

tary Region IV. who, in addition to being captured carrying about 

two pounds of documents, proved to be a lucrative sonrce of information himself. Another important detainee, a high-level Viet 

Cong JX>litical cadre member, was initially unco-operative. He 

made the mistake of bragging about his background as a graduate 

of Moscow University, however. and the J-2 computers in Saigon 

soon produced his complete personal history statement. Many of 

the region intell igence files we captured had detailed accounts of 

its activities from 1962 to 1966; contained Viet Cong unit strength 

figures, personnel rosters, and areas of operation of specifi c units; 

and yielded valuable data on future operations. In addition. two 

thousand personal history Slatements or Communist cadre members were se ized. leading to the arrest of a number of enemy agents 

operating in Saigon and other areas. Perhaps the most significant 

find was a copy of Ihe 12th resolution of the Central Committee of 

the Communist party of North Vietnam which fi rst annou nced 

direct intervention in the Republic of Vietnam by North Viet-
CO:,\·IBAT INTELLIGE NCE 125 

namese troops. In all, over 490,000 pages of captured documents 

were sent to the Combined Document Exploitalion Cenler; more 

than 52,000 of these were found to be of significant intelligence 

value. 

Some 3,700 LOns of rice-enough LO feed five regiments for a 

year-were either destroyed or confiscated. Engineer elements, in 

addition to their massive jungle.clearing operations, destroyed 

over 1,000 bunkers, 424 separa te tunnel complexes, and 509 struc· 

tures. Seven hundred twenty enemy were killed and 555 individual 

weapons along with 23 crew·served weapons were captured between 

8 and 26 January. 

The Viet Cong themselves later admitted in highly classified 

reports that the operation conSlilUted a disaster for them. The 

over·all intelligence value of the operation was unparalleled in the 

records of U.S. military efforts in Vietnam lip to that time. Aside 

from all this, CEDAR. FALLS was important as an outstanding example 

of the manner and means of intelligence support from the inception 

to the conclusion of a combat operation. The success of such opera· 

tions in a war in which sound intelligence meant so much reflected 

the close co-operation between tactical uniu and the intelligence 

elements supporting them. All parties demonstrated a mutual 

understanding of requirements and the cap.lbil ities and limitations 

involved in the collection. processing, and usc of intelligence. 
CHAPTER IV 

Intelligence Production 

Collection efforts resull in information. Until that information 

has been processed and converted into usable intelligence. it is of 

little value to a commander. When I arrived in Vietnam the weekly 

briefing being presented each Sawrday morning to General West· 

moreland was basically a current situation repon which did not 

provide the intelligence he needed in order to employ effectively 

the combat power rapidly being developed in the Republic of 

Vietnam. The briefing was revised. We prepared an estimate emphasizing enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Ollr briefing 

normally culminated with J-2 recommendations for tactical operations to exploit enemy weaknesses or to spoil enemy plans. At 

the conclusion of the first revised briefing General Westmoreland 

gave his firm approval of this approach. He changed the purpose 

of the briefing to that of a strategy conference and limited attendance to his component commanders and key staff officers. Such 

a briefing took only fifteen to (wenty minutes to present; but it 

took an extensive data base, a combined intelligence system, and 

the full time of a tcam of highly qualified estimators to produce. 

Colonel Loi and his staff also produced a weekly estimate. and our 

staffs compared our estimates. If any major differences surfaced I 

always included Colonel Loi's conclusions and reasons for the 

consideration of General lVeslmoreland. Such differences seldom 

occurred. Those weekly intelligence estimate updates were timely, 

accurate, adequate. and usable. 

This example demonstrntes the raison d'elre of intelligenceproviding the commander with knowledge he needs. Convening 

raw information into meaningful intelligence is a complex procedure for trained analysts. Most Military Assistance Command 

intelligence analysts were young lieutenant graduates of the U.S. 

Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland. They were 

intelligent. educated, and energetic. They needed guidance but 

they learned fast. A few experienced officers at the Combined Intelligence Center gave them the guidance needed. They performed 
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 127 

the vast amount of collation, evaluation, and production of enemy 

capabilities and vulnerabilities. They produced such studies in 

response to requirements originated by my estimators. They had 

to prove to the estimator the validity of every statement they 

wrOte. \Vhenever I approvcd an estimate there was a vast amount 

of intelligence available to support every statemem. 

The Intelligence Division of J- 2, Military Assistance Command, was responsible for intelligence production. The Combined 

Imelligence Center was under the supervision of this division. Four 

importam branches within the Intelligence Division merit special 

attention. 

The Current Imelligence and Indications Branch provided the 

MACV commander and his staff with significant current intelligence from all sources through daily briefings. tn addition, the 

branch published the J- 2 Intelligence Summary and lhe Weekly 

Watch Report. By virtue of access to intelligence from all sources, 

the Current Intelligence and Indications Branch ,vas charged with 

producing studies and reports that could not be produced at the 

Combined Intelligence Center because certain sensitive information could not be released to other nationalities. 

While most order of battle production was accomplished at the 

Combined Intelligence Center, the Order of Battle Branch of the 

Intelligence Division functioned as the primary point of contact 

within Military Assistance Command headquarters on all matters 

regarding ground forces order of battle. In this capacity the Order 

of Battle Branch had primary staff responsibility for developing 

command policy and preparing guida nce concerning order or bat· 

lie. With emphasis on composition, strength, identification, and 

disposition, the branch co·ordinated order of battle reporting and 

holdings with the Military Assistance Command staff, the Combined Intelligence Center, and the Vietnamese intelligence staff. 

By refining the product from the Combined Intelligence Center 

and incorporating other data available within Military Assistance 

Command headquarters, the Order of Battle Branch synthesized 

inronnation from many sources and provided good, timely intelligence about the enemy. 

Our order of battle reponing was reviewed by all members of 

the national intelligence community. Military Assistance Command statistics and holdings concerning the enemy forces orten 

were questioned. Several factors contributed to this problem. 

Separate reporting channels existed between component commands 

and government agencies and their headquarters back in the 

Unitcd States. Everyone was forwarding order of battle information 
128 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTEL LICENCE 

to his superiors in Washington without approval from the MACV 

commander. 

A strong position concern ing order of bailIe intelligence was 

necess.uy. We developed definitive criteria that governed Milililry 

Assistance Command order of haule reporting. These criteria had 

to be Illel beraTe our holdings were allered. For example. we would 

not accept statistics concerning enemy troops killed by air strikes 

unless confirmed by ground reconnaissance, a prisoner, or a capLUred document. 

On several occasiOIlS we were called upon to defend my order of 

battle criteria. FiI'Sl. a rcpresclll<ltivc from the Office of th e Secretary of Defense came to 5.:1.igoll to examine and analyze ou r 

policies. criteria, procedures. and holdings. During his entrance 

inten,jew he informed me thaI he had authority to order cha nges 

in my criteria and hOldings. J told him that he would have full 

access to my entire organization and my filII support, but that as 

long as I was Military Assistance Command J- 2, those decisions 

would remain mine. Upon completion of his inveSligation, he 

strongly supported our methodology. No cha nges were recommended or made. Next , a team commissioned by the Joint ChiC£s 

of Staff came to Vietnam to determine the validity of Ollr statistics 

on enemy auacks contained in th e J- 2, Military Assistance Command, periodic intelligence report that did not coincide with 

statistics assembled in \Vash ington. The team reviewed Ollr order 

of battle files and traced the origin of the questioned statistics. 

Their findings support ed our repon. We repon ed finished intelligence; in WaSh ington th ey had been using dai ly and weekly operational reports. Finally, in an effort to resolve once and for all the 

order of baule COIlITO\'ersy. the Chainnan of the J oint Chiefs of 

Staff directed thai a conference be held in Hawaii to standardize 

the methods for developing and presenting statistics on order o[ 

battle and infiltration trends. JUSl before this conference I had 

published a Military Assistance Command order of battle manual 

on developing enemy strength. This manual contained all criteria, 

tenninology. and definitions we had been using in de,'eloping order of b:lllie holdings. This was the first of a seri es of order of 

battle manuals to be published. The conference convened on 6 

February 1967 with representatil'es from the Central Intelligence 

Agency. Defense Imelligence Agency, National Sccnrity Agency. 

Office of the Secrctary of Defense, Pacific Command, Military 

Assistance Command, and the component com mands. OUf order 

of baltic manual was reviewed and readily accepted by all the 

tonferees, thus vindicating OUf criteria and means of developing 
INTELLIGENCE PROOUCTION 129 

order of battle intelligence that had been in use since November 

of 1965. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, reproduced the manual 

and gave it wide distribution. 

The mOst importalll part of the Illlelligence Division was the 

Estimates Branch. This small, highly specia lized group was created 

in late 1965. I worked very closely with my enimators and helped 

prepare all estimates. The questions they were asked to answer 

equated to: " ' hat is the enemy capacity to affect adversely the 

accomplishment of our mission? \Vhat are his vulnerabilities, and 

what is his wi ll to persevere? Emphasis was placed on the qualllily 

and quality of his available manj)()\\'er. 

The Estimates Branch became the focal point within the J-2 

staff for all information regarding the enemy, and it enabled me 

to provide General \Vestmore land with a continually ulxlated esti· 

mate reflecting enemy losses, gains, trends in force buildup, combat 

effectiveness. capabiliti es, vulnerabilities, strengths, logistics, lead· 

ership, training, and morale. 

Another branch of the Intelligence Division that played a key 

role in the Military Assistance Command intelligence effort was 

the Strategic Resources Branch. FOCllsing on domestic e\'ents and 

activities in the Republic of Vietnam, the Strategic Resources 

Branch kept the ~Iilitary Assistance Command staff apprised of 

the I)()iitical situation and related developments within SOllth 

Vielllam, In the ea rl y days \oJhen go,'ernmelllal instability threat· 

ened the country, it was imperative that the MACV commanders 

and staff be kept abreast of fast·breaking developments during 

political crises, Such a situation evolved in March 1966 when the 

"Buddhist Struggle Movement" spread throughout the country 

and caused a vinual standstill in South Vietnamese military opera· 

tions. The Stralegic Resources Branch monitored the situation and 

disp;uched daily siluation reports as well as presented briefings as 

required. Also, the Strategic Resources Branch provided the point 

of contact for J-2 with the Military Assistance Command Office 

of Information, the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy, and the 

Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office. 

Deveio/nnel1l ami Puulication of lhe Military Assisiarlce Commll1ld 

Order of Bailie Slim mary 

The first issue of the Military Assistance Command J-2 Order 

of Bailie Summary was published on 21 January 1966 and en· 

compassed the period 15 December 1965-15 January 1966. Il 

conta ined thineen pages organized into a two·part format. Part I 

was a list of enemy units identified as mai n forces or local forces 
130 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

and as Viet Cong or North Vietnamese. Units were categorized 

according to the established Military Assistance Command and 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces acceptance criteria of confirmed, probable, and possible. ])art II provided a recapitulation 

of enemy forces and tOlal enemy personnel strength located in 

each corps tactical zone. In this first summary the total enemy 

strength was 79,500 in a force structure consisting o[ 29 regiments 

and 129 battalions. or the 129 baualions. 77 were regimc11lai and 

52 were subordinate to provinces and military regions. In the 

ensuing months, the size of the order of battle summary increased 

proportionately with the increase in enemy strength and OliT knowl· 

edge of the enemy. Accepted enemy units in the first order of 

ballie summary were listed on 8 pages. The list in 1967 required 

10 pages to depict 9 divisions, 36 regiments, and 196 battalions. 

After the publication of the first order of baltle summary, 

additional sections were added. The section "Enemy Organizational 

Structure" showed the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese chain of 

command as it existed in South Vietnam. The maps showed the 

enemy forces located in cach corps tactical zone as well as the 

boundaries o[ Viet Cong military and political organization. The 

set:lion "Identification of Newly Reported Units in the RVN" 

provided a listing of all newly reported units and served as a 

watch list in focusing the attcntion of collectors on suspected units. 

Data on. infiltration and retroactive strength were added to show 

the actua l growth of the enemy force in South Vietnam. These 

data provided a true measure of Ihe enemy's escalation o[ his \o,'ar 

effort agai nst South Vietnam. The section "Validity of Holdings 

for Enemy Battalions in RVN" provided a ready reference on the 

validity of each unit's acceptance in order of battle and "red 

nagged" those units which had dis.'"Ippeared from sight. Continuing 

effort was made to reconfirm the existence of units. Units which 

could not be reconfirmed were dropped if the total information 

on the unit and its area of operations left doubt of its existence. 

The section "NVA/ VC Unit AKAs and Cover Designations" was 

one of the most lIsC£ul and important sections of the summary. 

(A KA is an abbreviation for also known as.) The enemy's practice 

of redesignating units and using cover designations to deceive the 

allied forces was not successful. This listing provided users with 

reference material to relate an enemy unit's cover and alternate 

designations to accepted designations. 

Besides the addition of these sections. fonnats were changed 

and revised contjnually for improvement. As a result of recommen· 

dations from Military Assistance Command J- 2, the enemy force 
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 131 

structure was rccategorized as maneuver, combat support, administrative service, irregular, and political. 

The summary's timeliness was insured by electrical disseminalion of changes in the enemy's order of battle as soon as these 

changes were detected. A week ly summary cable, also dispatched 

electrically, recapitulated all information on current strength 

status as affected by changes which took place during lhe week. 

Distribution of the order of battle summary increased steadily 

from 72 copies among 38 addressees to 425 copies among 75 

addressees. This growth was indicative of the increased interest in 

Military Assistance Command order of battle throughout the U.S. 

intelligence community. 

Development and Publicatioll of lnfiltralio'l Statistics 

The data base (or the development of Military Assistance 

Command sta tistics on the infiltration of North Vietnamese soldiers 

into Soulh Vietnam was maintained by the Combined [ntelligence 

Center, Vietnam. 

Capwred documents, interrogation reports. agent reports. and 

tactical unit intelligence summaries were screened for information 

pertaining to infiltration into South Vietnam. This informat ion 

was evaluated and used to compile statistics in accordance with the 

criteria of accepted, confirmed. probable, possible, or reported 

infi ltration. Those Norlh Vietnamese Army personnel, groups, and 

units which had entered South Vietnam and were carried either 

in the confirmed or probable categori es were considered accepted. 

A confirmed infilLratiOIl unit or group was one which was accepted as in South Vietnam on the basis of informa tion provided 

by a minimum of two prisoners of war or returnees from the unit 

or group, by two captured documents from the unit, or by a 

combination of personnel and documents. A probable infiltration 

unit or group was one which \vas accepted as in South Vietnam on 

the basis of information provided by one prisoner of war or returnee from Ihe unit or group or by a captured document supported by information from other sOllTces which could be evaluated 

as probably true. A possible infiltration unit or grou p was one 

which might be in South Vietnam on the basis of information 

which could be evaluated as possibly tr ue even though no prisoner 

of war, returnee, or document verified the reports. Other units or 

groups which were mentioned in agent reports. captured documents, interrogation reports, or sightings by friendly forces were 

classified under reported infiltration; however, such information 
132 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

was insufficient to warrant inclusion into one of the other cate· 

gories. 

Infiltration statistics were discllssed in detail at lhe intelligence 

conference held at Commander in Chief, Pacifi c. headquarters on 

6- 12 February 1967. It was concluded that infiltration sta tistics 

as then developed were based upon va lid criteria and that Military 

Assistance Command would be Ihe single SOUTce of infiltra ti on 

data. To preclude conrusion it was agreed that infiltra tion data 

would be COl off on the last day of each month and transmitted 

throughollt the intelligence community on the first day of the 

following month . h was recommended that all agencies lise these 

infiltration data in all reports, briefings. and releases until the next 

monthl y report was received. 

The conference further recommended that the Military Assistance Command monthly infiltration average be computed on a 

base beginning with October 1965. This beginning was decided" 

upon as the most valid since it coincided with a period of sub· 

stantial increase in infiltration and provided a suffic ient data base 

on which to establish the average figure. Two averages were computed each month , olle for accepted infiltra tion which included 

confirmed and probable, and one for the accepted and possible 

ca tegories. 

Enemy infiltration was such that it was difficult to detect many 

groups until after they had been in South Vi etnam for as long as 

six months or even longer. This problem was compounded in 1967 

because the enemy was forced to infiltrate greater numbers of reo 

placements for his main force units. It was mllch more difficult to 

discover an infiltration grou p consisting only of replacements. 

which quickly blended into the existing force structure and lost 

their identity, than it was to discover a newly infiltrated battalion 

or regiment. For these rea sons infih rat ion statistics were subject 

to continuing re·eva lua tion with the receipt of updating information. 

Publication of Enemy Tactics Studies 

In ord er to provide our comba t uni ts in Vietnam with informa· 

tion abo ut enemy tactics I asked my staff to prepare a series of 

studies to assist the field commanders in developing measures to 

fix and d estroy the enemy. 

Our intelligence ana lysts reviewed and analyzed the existing 

information on Viet Cong and Nort h Vietnamese Army tactical 

doctrine a nd past performance as rcAected in captured documents. 
INTELLIGDICE PRODUCTION ISS 

prisoner illlclTogations, and after action reports. In addition, they 

interviewed unit commanders, advisers. and troops in the field who 

had recently engaged in combat to draw on their experience. Eight 

analysts traveled to the field and interviewed small unit leaders 

and unit ilHelligence officers. These imen'iews were particularly 

valuable in thal they provided us wil h recent firslhand experiences 

to include in the studies. Other significan t information was obtained from translations of captured lesson plans and notebooks of 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese cadres. These notebooks included 

information on the conduct of an ambush. the use of antiaircraft 

machine guns, and the employment of supporting arms. In addition, knowledgeable captives and returnees at the mili tary interrogation center were interrogated. The former Assistant Chief of 

Staff Plans CT 5 VC Division was p.:1rticularly informative in this 

regard. Information derived from other knowledgeable returnees, 

captives, and documentS after the studies had been published were 

llsed to update existing information. 

The product of this research was a series of hard-copy studies 

published in January 1967 to meet the immediate requirements of 

field commanders. Included were studies on the following: 

Ambush tactics 

Attack on fi xed installations 

Antiairborne and antiairmobile operations 

Antiheliborne and amiairmobile operations 

Antiaircraft defense by ground troops 

Viet Cong and Nort h Vietnamese Army night operations 

Employment of sn ipers 

Command and cotHrol of field units 

Employment of guerrillas with local forces and main forces 

units 

Night operations 

Defense against armor 

Reconnaissance tactics 

River mine warfare 

CrOSSing water obstacles 

Command and control 

Supply and resupply in combat 

Employment of supponing weapons in attack and defense 

Employment of guerrillas with local forces and main forces 

units 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army fire discipline 

Enemy antiaircraft teChniques. tactics, and employment 

Viet Cong withdrawa l tactics 
134 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Viet Cong evacuation of battlefield casualties 

Viet Cong retrieval of weapons from battlefields 

Viet Cong tactical usc of inland waten\'ays in South Vietnam 

Viet Cong structures and field fortifications 

Emphasis in the publication of these studies was placed on 

timeliness and accuracy of the material presented rather than on 

details of format and composition. Between eight and twelve 

hundred copies of each study were printed and disseminated to 

field commanders, the intelligence community, and U.S. service 

schools. Approximately ten thousand copies of tactics studies have 

been distributed since the program began. 

Aerial Rice Survey of TV Corps Tactical Zone 

An unusual project begun in December 1966 and completed in 

March 1967 was entitled "Aerial Rice Survey of IV Corps Tactical 

Zone." It was initiated and co-()rdinated by the Strategic Resources 

Branch of the Production Division and was prepared by the IV 

Corps imagery interpretation team of the Combined Intelligence 

Center. 

This study was initiated to determine the number of hectares 

of rice under cultivation within each province of IV Corps during 

the main 1966-1967 harvest period. This infonnation was then 

compared with the November 1966 pacification area within each 

province by the Revolutionary Development Support Directorate 

so that a determination could be made of the number of hectares 

in areas controlled or contested by the Viet Cong. A determination 

was also made of the total number of hectares of row crops and 

orchards under cultivation within each province. 

Because of the use of aerial photography, the results obtained 

were considered to reAecl the true situation and provide a firm 

base on wJ:tich to estimate rice production for the Mekong Delta 

region. 

High altitude photography at a scale of 1:22.500 and 1:37.000 

provided the basic coverage used in this study. Supplementary 

missions were Rown to fill gaps in the basic photo coverage. The 

photography was accurately plotted on I : 250.000-scale maps and 

the rice-cultivated areas deli neated on overlays of the same scale. 

The Itek rear viewer projectors and light tables with magnifying 

stereoscopes were used to select and define the ground areas under 

cultivation. Next the AR-85 Viewer-Computer was used to measure 

the cultivated areas on the photography. The areas under rice cultivation were delineated on the I :250.000 overlays and were then 
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION 135 

transrcrrcd, using a Map-O-Craph, to a 1 :500,OOO-scale map to present graph ica lly the rice cultivation in IV Corps_ 

T his study did not define those hectares on which two crops 

were grown annually. However, somewhat less than 5 percent of 

the total yearly production in IV Corps fell into this category. 

When using the estimate provided by this study, the double-crop 

areas had to be taken into consideration to provide a true production estimate. 

Caution had to be exercised when comparing the imagery interpretation statistics for the 1965-1966 harvest season with those for 

lhe 1966-1967 season because of the variance in coverage available. The coverage ava il able to the Combined Intelligence Center 

for the 1966-1967 harvest was 98.7 percent; that ava ilable for the 

1st Military Intelligence Battalion, which interpreted the 1965-

1966 harvest, was 97.1 percent. 

No attcmpt was madc to determine production statistics for the 

provinces. These computations were dependent upon acc urate 

yield estimates, various types of crop damage estimates, and a 

detennination of the area wh ich had been double cropped. Such 

estimates fell within the expertise of agricultural specialists and 

were not in the scope of this study. 

During 1966-1967, 1,543,007 hectares were ~nder rice cultivation. This was 40,923 hectares less than the Vietnamese Ministry 

of Agriculture had estimated for the 1965-1966 harvest period. 

Of these 1,543,007 hecta res, 579,045 fell within Viet Cong controlled areas and 415, 069 hectares were in contested areas. This 

left 548.893 hectares in areas secure to the government of South 

Vietnam. A total of 18,305 hectares was found to be under row 

crop cultivation, and 2,276 hectares were orchard areas. 

The most signifi cant difference found between the 1965-1966 

and 1966- 1967 harvest periods was the shift in rice hectares 

under cultivation from the pro"inces along the major waterways to 

provinces which have relative ly minor waterways and which were 

predominantly under Viet Cong control. This change was believed 

to be a result of increased Viet Cong effort to raise production in 

areas under their control. Provi nces predominantly under Viet 

Cong control in which production increased were An Xuyen, an 

increase of 8,935 hectares; Ba Xuyen, an increase of 23,577 hectares: 

and Bac Lieu, an increase of 44 ,630 hectares. Major decreases took 

place in lhose provinces which border the major rivers. specifically 

the Hall Giang, Co Chien, Ham Luong, My Tho, Mekong, and 

Cai Long and their tributaries. Provinces with the greatest de· 

creases were An Ciang, Chuang Thien, Dinh Tliong. Co Cong, 
136 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Kicn Hoa, and Phong Dinh. The greatest part of the decrease could 

be atlributed to the nood damage SUSlained in the fall of 1966. 

Subsequent studies, using the graphics included in this study. 

would tell whether or not there was a change in the number of 

hectares under cultivation and where lhese changes took place. 

In a telegram daled 29 Apri l 1967 from the Secretary of State 

to Ihe American Embassy, Saigon, this survey was cited by Mr. Rusk 

as being a most useful effort that provided sOllnd bench marks to 

comp..uc to future acreage estimates. 

The Combined hl/rlligellce Center 

Imagery Interpretation Photo Study Program 

In December of 1966 the III Corps Tactical Zone imagery 

interpretation lcam \\';15 tasked wilh making a photo study of the 

Lo Go area in Tay Ninh Provi nce. The purpose of the study was 

to furn ish photo int ell igence 011 areas in which elements of the 

Central Office of South Vietnam had reportedly been oper<lting. 

To accomplish this it was decided that. first. a detailed analysis of 

the photography would be m<lde and all items of military significance idem ificd and annotated on the photographs. Then. in order 

LO establish the p .. 1uern of defenses. tra il configurations. and 

proximity of collateral data LO the items of military significance 

gleaned from the photogt"<lphy, a mos<lic of the photos would be 

compiled. tn the mosaic form the information extracted from each 

individu<l1 photograph began to form a pattern, p.:1nicularly in the 

lines of communication and perimeter defenses. That is to S<lY, 

inste<ld of a trail simply spanning a single photograph, it could 

be followed from one photo to another and the emire defense 

~yste m in an area identified. 

Beca use the study consisted of twenty mOS<1ics. an indexing 

system had to be devised that would allow the IIser to locate <I 

panicular mOS<1ic without going through all of them 10 fmel the 

one of interest. T o do this the mosaics were plotted 011 a 1:50,000 

map and numbered. To show what intelligence items would be 

found on the mosaic. an overlay was prepared at a scale of 1 :50.000 

which reAected all lines of communicat ion and defenses taken 

from the photography. The complete phOto study package consisted 

of defense and lines or communication ove rlays, a I :50.000 index 

to the mosa ics. and annotated mosa ics. 

After briefing lhe field units on the photo study, it became 

apparelll thal its full value would not be rea lized unless it could 

be reproduced in sllfficielll quantity and appropri:ue format size 

to be distributed to each unit oper<lting in the area covered by the 
INTELLlCE;-';CE PRODUCTION 137 

study. The original size of a complete study was 30 by 40 inches, 

a size too large for field use. Arrangements were made at the 13th 

Reconnaissance Technical Squadron to reproduce the studies at a 

50 percent reduction of the original size and in sufficient quantity 

to satisfy all requesters. 

The reduced format was 15 by 20 inches and the mosaics were 

at a scale of I: 10,000 while the map and overlays were at I: 100,000. 

There was no appreciable loss of information in the reduction, 

and the smaller size was ideally suited fol' field use. The popularity 

and success of the Photo Study Program in II r Corps led to its 

adoption as a product for all of the corps tactical zones in the 

Combined Intelligence Center. and in 1967 sixty.four sllch sllldies 

had been produced by the Combined Intelligence Center. 

This type of study had a variety of uses. Special Forces units 

lIsed the studies for setting up the security of their camps and 

hamlets. Advisory units used them in briefing and debriefing the ir 

counterparts and troops. Counterintelligence agents used them in 

the briefing and interrogation of indigenous agents. They were of 

immeasurable value in the planning and conduct of U.S. :lIld Free 

World forces ground operations. In many cases the individual 

m05<'1ics were removed from the Sllldies and distributed do\\'n to 

platoon level for photo intelligence coverage of a platoon tactical 

area of responsibility. In addition to field uses, the photo studies 

were used by the Targeting and Strike Objectives Teams of the 

Combined Illlell igence Center in determining targets for B-52 

strikes and tactical unit objectives. In many instances the studies 

were used as a base for compar:nive cover from which grou nd 

activity was easily noted. 

Starting from the receipt of the photography it took approxi. 

mately founeen days to complete and reproduce a sllIdy. Bec<tuse 

of the gTeat demand for the photo studies, it w<ts decided that all 

origin<t' mosaics and the negatives made in the reproduclion process 

would be held in a Combined Intelligence Center repository. These 

mosaics and negatives were on file in the corps team. Both the 

mosaics and the negatives were indexed and fi led for easy retrieval. 

If a requirement existed for any single mosaic it could be: retrieved 

and reproduced in a mailer of hours. 

The combined military intelligence system provided extensive 

and responsive colleClion and production. The estimator had the 

support he needed, and his support improved every day. The 

elllire system existed to provide limely, accurate, adequate, and 

usable military intelligence to support sound decisions concerning 

conduct of the war. 
CHAPTER V 

Counterintelligence 

Developing the Counterintelligenu EDort 

In mid·J965, the Military Assistance Command counterintelligence resources were quite limited. Under the staff supervision of 

the Counterintelligence and Security Division of J-2, Military 

Assistance Command, the 704th Imelligence Corps Detachment 

provided counterintelligence support to the command and served 

in an advisory role with the South Vietnamese Military Security 

Service. Essentially. this was the extent of our counterintelligence 

capability. Colonel George McCutchen undertook the development 

of an adequate counterintelligence organ iza tion. 

With the reorganization of the J-2 staff in August 1965. the 

Counterintelligence and Security Division was redesignated the 

Counterin telligence Division with three branches: Personnel SecurilY. Counterintelligence. and Security of Military Informalion. 

Counterintelligence operations continued under the 704th Intelligence Corps Detachment. In December 1965 Company B of the 

519th Military Intelligence Battalion arrived in Vietnam and 

absorbed the mission, personnel. and equipment of the 704th. 

In September 1966 the 135th Military Intelligence Group 

arrived under the command of Colonel Paul Goodman. The 135th 

assimilated Company B of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion 

and assumed responsibility for executing the Military Assistance 

Command coun terin telligence mission. 

Continuing the example set by his predecessors, Colonel 

Goodman worked closely with the Military Security Service. and 

exce llem COlinterp,lrl relations existed. The increased COllnterintelligence capability permitted the deployment of counterintelligence teams to each province of South Vietnam. Orten collocated 

\!Jith local Military Security Service clements, these teams panici· 

pated regularly in combined operations. Close co-operation was 

essential to the success of our counterintelligence effort. The lack 

of linguists and the inability of occidentals to blend inconspicu· 

ously with the Viet namese made combined operations not only 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 139 

desirable but necessary. Since we required interpreters and trans· 

lators as quickly as possible, we had to rely on Vietnamese who 

knew English. 

In order to conduct effective counterintelligence operations 

without infringing upon the sovere ignty of the government of 

Vietnam, official agreements between Military Assistance Command 

and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces outlining the parameters of our authority to engage in counterintelligence operations 

were negotiat«l. 

Throughout 1966 the counterintelligence program gradually 

improved. The mission grew considerably in November of that 

year when the Combined Intelligence Staff became functional. 

Combined operations expanded. By mid-1967 a sophisticated 

counterintellige nce apparatus extended to all parts of South Vietnam. Counterintelligence services were available to every Military 

Assistance Command element and we were continuing to improve 

the effectiveness and efficiency of our programs. 

C oU1Iteri1ltelligence Operations 

Counterintelligence ItlStrllctions Number 1> published in 

March 1966, was the initial effort to implement a Military Assistance Command counterintelligence standing operating procedure. 

As operations expanded, problems arose concerning command and 

staff relationships within the counterintelligence apparatus, area 

responsibilities, release and exchange of counterintelligence information, funds, and source control procedures. The instructions 

were revised and reissued, and in November 1966 work was begun 

on preparing Counler;lIlellige'lce Instructjolls Number 2. However, the problems presented by the different geograph ic areas of 

Vietnam hindered the development of proc«lures that would apply 

without exception throughout the COU ll try. Consequently, the concept was changed and the Counterintelligence Division started 

preparing a command guide that would become effective in mid1967. 

Within the Vietnamese armed forces, the counterintelligence 

mission was assigned to the Military Security Service which did 

not fall under the control or staff supervision of the J-2, Joint 

General Staff, Colonel Ho Van Loi. In a Ministry of Defense 

directive issued in August 1965, the Military Security Service was 

given full responsibility for counterintelligence, whi le organic intelligence elements of other agencies were restricted to "pure" 

intelligence activities. Counterintelligence information collected 

other than by the Military Security Service was to be funneled into 
140 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

its channels. All intelligence agencies that became aware of infor· 

mation pertaining to sabotage. subversion, or proselyting were 

obligated immediately to notify the Security Service so that appropriate investigative or punitive action could be initiated. This 

policy prob.,bly was intended to achieve mOTC effective utilization 

of collection and expolilalion resources, a goal wh ich proved 

elusive well into 1967. Because of its over·all orientation on domestic affairs. however, the Military Security Service retained a great 

interest in political reporting. Yet despite its interest in activity 

against the regime, we received co-operation from the Military 

Security Service to the extent of stationing U.S. personnel in its 

offices. I enjoyed fine working re lations with Brigadier General 

Nguyen Ngoc Loan, who headed the service as well as the National 

Police. I respected him as a dedicated and professional officer. 

To fa cilitate co-ordina tion of counterintelligence activities 

among tbe U.S. component commands and to promote interservice 

co·opera ti on, the Counterintelligence Division established an orien· 

tation course for counterintelligence personnel. Navy and Air 

Force representatives taught the organization and mission of th eir 

respective units, and the curriculum included classes on the operalions of friendly law enforcement and counterintelligence agencies 

in Vietnam, hostile intelligence agencies, the infrastructure, opera· 

tional principles of counterespionage, counterintelligence targets, 

conduct of specia l operat ions, so urce COntrol, and the missing U.S. 

personnel and prisoncr program in Sou theast Asia. 

Education, as an effective measure for harmonizing joint coun· 

terilllclligcncc efforts. was equa ll y applicable to combined pro· 

grams. Thus, in August 1966. the Combined Intelligence School 

strcssed counterintelligence operations directed against the infra· 

~tructtlre. 

The effect of enemy propaganda on U.S., Vietnamese, and allied 

personne l was of particular concern. Considerable prop'lganda had 

been directed by the Communists agai nst U.S. servicemen. In 1966, 

combined operations in the III Corps area had been deluged by 

Viet Cong leaflets which, while purporting to provoke disaffection 

and defection from within the U.S. ranks, subtlely reminded the 

Vietnamese that th eir American counterparts might be vuln erable. 

since these leaflets included a Vietnamese translation. To help 

counter this activity all enemy propaganda material was collected 

and analyzed in co-opcration with the U.S. Embassy, which retained 

authority for developing cOllntenhemes to be used for counter· 

propaganda psychological exploitation of enemy weak nesses. 

Upon entry into the Republic of Vietnam, all arrivals received 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 141 

comprehensive security orientations, including descriptions of hostile intelligence methods and mili tary security_ Since U.S. armed 

forces in Vietnam were a prime target for enemy intelligence efforts, everyone was reminded, through the initial and subsequent 

orientations. of his responsibility for reporting any observed suspicious activity and was told how and to whom to report. 

Securi ty inspections. liaison visits, and counteri nte lligence 

physical security eva lU;Hions were conducted throughout the command in order to remind our personnel continually to practice 

security. 

The Military Assistance Command insta llation security program was d irected at preventing sabotage. \ Ve defined sabotage and 

forwarded the definition to Pacific Command. We developed a 

specific directive to cover coulllersabotage operations. Cont ingency 

countersabotage plans were prepared for strategically important 

areas such as Sa igon. We assessed potential vulnerabilities and 

advanced countermeasures to eliminate th em. For example, we 

prepared a detailed plan for the physical security of the fifteen 

power faci li ties in the Saigon electric loop system. This planning 

involved conducting vulnerability assessments for all Saigon power 

facilities during the period 20 March-4 April 1967. The assess· 

ment evaluated guard forces, alarm systems, perimeter lighting, 

physical barriers, and other essential clements ordinaril y part of a 

regular physical security survey. The over·all physical security of 

the facilities was judged " fairly good," though vulnerabilities such 

as poor lighting and fami lies li vi ng withi n compounds were apparent. Both the MACV commander and the Mission Council were 

briefed on the projecl. The study concluded that the Viet Cong 

did present a constant threat to the facilities, with an even more 

likely target being the power lines in Saigon's periphery. Since 

power loop security was deemed in essence a civil matter under 

the aegis of the Vietnamese alilhorilies, it was suggested that the 

U.S. Agency for Illlernational Development, which had both police 

and public works advisers counseling the Vietnamese, be designated 

the logica l agency to have primary responsibility for insuring 

adequate maintenance for the physical security of the power 

facilities. 

As an outgrowth of these ea rly efforts to protect the Sa igon 

power system, the Combined Securi ty Committee was established 

under the directorship of the Ch ief of the Saigon Municipal Police 

to safeguard U.S. and all ied personnel and insta llations against 

Viet Cong terrorism. Measures stich as the ones taken on behalf 

of insta llation security began to manifest a co-operative spirit evi-
142 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

denced not on ly on the governmenta l level but among the people 

as well. Thus. the Citizens Incentive Rewards Program was used 

successfull y in support of security functions by enlisting the cooperation of the Vietnamese public to repon Communist terror· 

iS1S, sappers, and the like. 

In April 1967 another directive established criteria for designating critical and key installations in Military Assistance Command. A critical installation by definition was one of "such vital 

importance that its loss or severe damage" would entail "unacceptable delay or reduction in U.S. ability lO wage war" or "cause 

major revision in the overall tactical planning of the war." Loss 

of a key installation wou ld. in general, hamper U.S. ability to 

continue the conflict. Appropriate commanders were assigned 

responsibility for these installations. Commanders without an organic counterintelligence capability were enjoined to request 

assistance from their nex.t higher headquarters. 

Security of Military Information 

T he disclosure program in Vietnam for releasing classified in· 

formation to our allies was a sign ificant development that had 

great bearing on U.S. policy for security of military information. 

Our policy was based on the concept that the combined intelligence program demanded a free ex.change of classified information 

among all participants-that intelligence personnel siuing side by 

side, working on the same project. and fighting the same enemy 

should have equal access to all available data. A lesser policy could 

onl y hinder our efforts to seek out the enemy, foster mistrust, and 

inhibit the maintenance of mu tual respect and confidence. As a 

first step. maintaining classified information that could not be 

released in any of the combined centers was forbidden. This step 

drew criticism from many of the Americans involved in the combined program because they insisted that such data were essential 

to their jobs. Consequently, a list was prepared of all documents 

vital to the combined intelligence mission bearing the NOFORN 

(no foreign dissemination) caveat. We sent the list to the Defense 

Intelligence Agency with the request that it be reviewed with a 

goa l of deleting the caveats. Th is procedure was time consuming, 

but eventually almost every document on the Jist was approved 

for release. For other than NOFORN information, my efforts 

secured an exception to nadonal policy that gave General 'Vestmoreland broad au thority to disclose intelligence information 

classified through top secret. both Department of Defense and non-
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 143 

Department of Defense originated, that pertained to hostile activities in Southeast Asia. Release would be based on the need to 

know as determined by the U.S. element concerned. This represented a breakthrough in the combined intelligence program and 

greatly facil itated operations. 

In implementing the disclosure authority, the Counterintelligence Division published memoranda to serve as guides for the 

J-2 staff in providing information to our allies. One officer within 

each division was designated the point of contact for releasing 

information to allies. Anyone within a division might bring to him 

the documents to be released. If uncertainties about releasing the 

materials arose, the point of contact had recourse in the Counterintelligence Division where the disclosure officer, appointed by the 

division chief, would resolve the problem. No mandatory requirements dictated that dissemination automatically be approved; in 

fact, a prerequisite was that some benefits would accrue to the 

United States as a result of the disclosure. Upon receiving a request for permission to release classified infonnation, the disclosure 

officer determined if current criteria were met. If not authorized. he 

informed the requester of the rationale for denial. The Disclosure 

Office maintained files of all disclosures, and the point of contact 

in each division kept records of any disclosures he had allowed. 

Security of military information was the focal point for a 

significant intelligence effort in the Republic of Vietnam. The 

employment of local laborers on all military bases complicated the 

secUTity program. Further, the tremendous increase in U.S. units 

and the expansion of the U.S. role brought forth an avalanche of 

classified documents and material. The need for an aCCUT3te accounting system was obvious. After a command-wide inventory of 

classified documents was initiated, the Counterintelligence Division 

instituted a program to reduce the number of secret and top secret 

items held by U.S. units in Vietnam. Command emphasis was 

applied to encourage the reduction in classified inventories. A 

monthly report was required to show the number of classified 

documents on hand at the beginning and end of the reporting 

period, the number of new documents generated, the number 

destroyed, the number dispatched, and the number downgraded. 

Within the Military Assistance Command staff, sccUTity control 

officers were required to attend a special training course before 

assuming their security duties. This training. besides making them 

knowledgeable of Military Assistance Command security policies 

and procedures, stressed supervision of security measures and practices within the staff offices and continuous security education. 
144 T flE ROLE OF MILITARY I;';TELLIGE NCE 

Execlition of the document security program was the responsibility of a field grade officer obtained specifica ll y fOT that task fTom 

the Military Assistance Command Adjutant General. With a counterilllelligence lcam of seven agents, he conducted inspecti ons, and 

security checks to ascertain and eva luate compli ance with Military 

Assistance Command securit y regulations, provided lech nic.'l l assistance. and supen·jsed the training of the securi ty comrol officers. 

If the classified documents req uired intensive protection, so too 

did the information which lhey COlllained. In October 1965, a 

counterintelligence direcli,'c focused attention on security of classified operational plans. All major Military Assistance Command 

acti"ities involved in operational planning were made responsible 

both for compartmentaliza tion of variOllS elements of the planning 

staff (minimizing compl ete familia rity with any given plan) and for 

insuring that individual elements of the over-all plan were not disclosed to persons not ha vi ng a verified need to know. Procedures 

were thus commanded for the ac tivities to effect situations to 

afford each element only that information necessary to prepare 

its component part of a plan. 

Interest in security permeated all levels of the tactical and 

adv isory chains of comm:md. The rather simpl e. unsophisticated 

character of the enemy disguised his complex. highly efficient 

intelligence system. The insurgents' use of informers and agents 

could have limited the all ied effort. Further, it is doubtful that the 

average U.S. officer or enlisted man ever appreciated the extent of 

the Communist collection effort even though the Counterintelli· 

gence Division placed maximum emphasis on educating them to 

the security hazards confronting the command daily. 

The extensive use of local Vietnamese in administrative. logistical. and custodial services made U.S. facil iti es vulnerable to penetration and presented a seriOliS challenge to the counterin telligence 

program. \ Ve alleviated the problem somewhat by requiring thai 

Vietnamese full-time employees receive a favorab le personnel security investigation from the ilitary Security Service. but hiring 

hordes of unscreened day laborers for construction and similar tasks 

constituted a continuing dan ger. Command allemion was focused 

on the threats to security. and detailed. extremely restrictive directives served to remind all personnel of their security responsi· 

bilities. \Videspread use of counterintelligence services. partiCUlarly inspections and technical surveys, improved the security posture 

of the command. An nounced and unannounced inspections revea led inattention to basic security in the early days, but improvements noted in su bsequent inspections indica ted that our security 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 145 

education progmms and increased command interest were 

achieving some success. 

Even though Military Assistance Command was a joint headquarters, Army Regulation 380-5, Safeguarding Defense Irlformalion, was used as the basis for the command information security 

program, and a directive was prepared to adapt the statutory requirements to the situation in Vietnam_ 'We had to insure that the 

information was available to those who needed it; therefore, the 

protective measures had to be realistic, yet achievable, For example, 

storage requirements were modifi ed to fit the capabili ties of tactical 

units and advisory teams, Another aspect concerned security classifications and marking, Because of combined operations with the 

Vietnamese, it was to be expected that a common need existed for 

access to sensitive da ta. A comp.. ... tible security system was essential 

in furtherance of the combined concept. \Ve agreed to honor each 

other's regulations and to afford the requ ired protection to each 

other's classified in formation, To avoid confusion and preclude the 

mistaken impression that all in formation was freely exchangeable, 

security classifications were marked only in the language of the 

originator or proponent of a document. In a similar vein, all the 

all ied forces in Vie tnam accepted each other's personnel security 

policies, The mu ltina tional complexion of the military establishment demanded unquestioning co-operation among the members. 

The Counterintelligence Division also was charged with 

developi ng the original fi les on Americans who wcre reported as 

missing in action or captured. T he val ue of such records is evident. 

Precise biographic and identification data facilitated the evaluation 

of reports of prisoner sightings and assisted in refu ti ng or confirming North Vietnamese and Viet Cong announcements abou t Americans who were being de tained. The esca lation of the U.S_ effort, 

particularly the increase in missing and captu red men as a result: 

of the air war, eventua ll y made the task unmanageable and lhe 

COLllllerintell igence Division was relieved of this responsibility, 

I be lieved that censorshi p such as General Dwight D, Eisenhower exercised in World War II should be instituted, I req uested 

that experts be placed on temporary duty with me in Saigon for 

planning. Three outstanding Reserve officers, Colone l J ames .J. 

McHale, U.S_ Air Force Reserve; Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin 

Goldberg, U.S, Army Reserve; and Commander Charles Hei nboekel, U.S, Naval Reserve, were made available to me, T hey 

prepa red draft plans for armed forces, civil, and prisoner of war 

censorship, These plans were completed in March 1966. T hey 

were furn ished to all sections of the Military Assistance Command 
146 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

staff and component commanders (or detailed planning and 

through the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Defense Intelligence Agency (or information. The decision was never made to 

impose censorship; however, we weTC ready_ 

Commun;calio"J Security 

The day I became J- 2, I requested and received general staff 

responsibility for the formulation of policy governing communications security. The signa l officer was to establish such security 

within J-2 policy. All other staffs were made responsible for 

reviewing their activities for security considerations. Security of 

communications, as a resull, proved mainly an administrative 

matler for the J-2 staff: It provided guidance and tasking to the 

communications security support elements of the Service cryptologic agencies in devising plans for supporting Military Assistance 

Command and the component commands; it validated lhirdcountry requirements for communica tions security material; and 

it promoted a staff visit progTam to check adherence to communications security policies and procedures at all echelons. In the meantime. the signa l officer's staff had many practical concerns such as 

insuring that communications systems installed and operated by 

U.S. forces met the published security standards; advising Vietnamese and other commanders on the design, installation. and 

operation of communications systems to achieve communications 

security objectives; and Connulating plans for illlrodUClion of new 

security equipment or material in Vietnam. 

Within the Vietnamese J Oint General Staff. the )- 7 had 

responsibility for communications security and the J-2 had only 

an intelligence liaison mission. 

With the increased U.S. activity. security malpractices were 

bound to multiply. The Counterintelligence Division wasted little 

time in developing standing operating procedures designed to 

enhance security. The first directive was published in October 

1965 and covered conventional telephone and voice communications. The telephone. a convenient transmission medium whose 

extensive and common usage was required by the urgency and 

number of daily actions, represented a potentially prolific and 

reliable source of intelligence for an enemy. tn addition. telephone 

conversations within Vietnam to terminals outside the Sa igon 

area were transmitted by rad io besides being routed through 

switchboards operated by or accessible to local nationals. We 

directed staff officers to become "aware of the vulnerability of the 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 147 

telephone and, within their respective sections, insure through 

supervision that personnel remained security conscious when using 

the telephone." In December another directive-incorporating the 

"out front" philosophy--enhanced communications security, com· 

pelling that communications security requiremems be considered 

during the planning phase of all types of operations, to include 

methods and procedures to protect communications from enemy 

exploitation. Component commanders were enjoined to develop 

and institute communications security programs and provide the 

Counterintelligence Division copies of implementing innructions. 

Cryptographic security was singled out for special anemion, 

since it was "one of the mon sensitive and closely held ca tegories 

of classified information." Un less specifically authorized, U.S. 

advisers employing operations codes were implored nOt to store 

such material lower than battalion level and then only under 

augmented provisions. Unauthorized access to cryptographic infor· 

mation constituted a serious haza rd bordering on compromise, 

which had to be reported as a physical security violation. Indeed, 

both allies and civilian employees were considered in a different 

light when seen through the eyes of communications security 

specialists: providing communications security aid to foreign gov· 

ernments was allowed only after approval and guidance had been 

extended by national communications security authorities. Pre· 

requisite consultation through channels to the Counterintelligence 

Division proved necessary before such assistance became avail able 

to allied forces. 

A d iffe rent appreciation for communicati on security raised 

some problems. For example, the same sensitive operational information passed by secure means in U.S. communications might 

be transmitted concurrently over the telephone by an allied element. Even within our own forces there were instances of partial 

disregard for security when commanders sometimes failed to ob· 

serve all the commun ications standards. Still, considerable progress 

was made in the fi eld of communications security and the Coulller· 

intelligence Division achieved commendable success in improvi ng 

the over-all communications security posture of the command. 
CHAPTER VI 

Intelligence Support 

Management 

As the Military Assistance Command intelligence organization 

grew, we sought managerial tools that would facilitate supervision 

of OUT many programs. On 30 August 1965 the forma lion of a 

management division was directed. 

First, we souglll to overcome the lack of continuity within the 

intelligence staff that resulted from the policy of one-year tours. 

Two courses of aclion were followed. First, we produced directives 

and memoranda to cover reclIrring functions and enjoined every 

officer to keep a functions manual that could be passed to his successor, insuring a ready reference designed to answer questions 

about his job. For those functions that crossed divisional lines. a 

directive was published. Next, we promoted continuity by encouraging key people to extend, and many at all levels did_ 

The Comprehensive Int elligence Program, developed to provide a means for keeping abreast of the status of J-2 staff actions, 

was first initiated at a time when more than 150 major projects 

were under way. and management problems were many. The 

program centered around production of a review and analysis chart 

maintained by each action officer for each of his projects. The 

chart brieRy described the project and its objectives, status, trend, 

analysis, and ac tions. From this record a graph renecting monthly 

activities plus a brief synopsis sheet was produced. Later redesignated the Review and Analysis Program, the Comprehensive Intelligence Program provided summarized data by which the progress 

of all )-2 functions could be assessed. This important manage· 

ment tool enabled LIS to foresee possible problem areas and prescribe corrective action before illlelligence capabil ities suffered. 

Repetitive measures for improv ing the effic iency of the Military 

Assistance Command intelligence organization and the )-2 staff 

\\'ere necessary. In May 1966 a management survey was initiated 

in )-2 to identify those areas in organization, functions, and 

staffi ng that required modifications to accompl ish assigned func· 
INTELLIGENCE SU P PORT 149 

lions. Through this medium the so undness of the J-2 organ izational struCt ure was insured, the delegation of responsibi lities and 

assignment of functions were fac ili tated, and the incidence of 

duplicati on of effort among the divisions and branches was red uced. 

One of the most perplexing problems faced by the military 

intelligence organ ization in Vietnam concerned the timeliness of 

reports. We sought to instill in intelligence officers at all levels an 

appreciation of the importance of gelling information to field 

commanders in sufficient time for them to act lIpon it. I required 

that every information report include a timeliness block. Each 

officer who in itiated a report had to record the time he made the 

information available to the commander who could act on it. My 

special assistant, Captain Strachan, monitored these actions and 

notified me when they were not timely-a procedure which 

precipitated an admonishment to the responsible officer. Rapid 

transmission of intelligence information proved always a malleI' 

of prime interest, and the J-2 sta ff grew very proficient in the 

expeditious dispatch of "hot" reports. 

Of all the techniques, procedures, or managerial tools employed by Military Assistance Command J-2 in the continuous 

campaign to improve efficiency, speed lip processing, and expedite 

dissem ination of intelligence, automation undoubtedly was the 

most valuable. The unlimited potential of computers presented a 

real challenge to the imaginative and innovative spirit of the intelligence staff, and maximum effort was devoted to adapting 

intelligence funct ions to these machines. 

As G-2 of U.S. Army, Pacific, I had conducted an extensive 

educational program on au tomation for my staff in Hawaii. I had 

also become familiar with the FMA storage and retrieval system. 

I wanted to establish automalion as soon as possible. My requests 

for equipment, trained personnel, space, and funds [ell on unsympathetic ears. I rece ived no help. I knew what I wamed, so I requested Pacific Command to survey my needs. They supported 

my requests, but it would take many months to fill them. 

However, I discovered within the ]- 2 staff Lieutenant Lilly. 

who was enterprising in addition to being I Bl\" trained. After a 

general discussion about the desired capability he set out to accomplish his mission. The first obstacle he encountered was the 

refusal of the Adjutant General's office to accept intelligence input 

because of classifications. However, the visit 10 the Adjutant General's office was fruitful in another way; Lieutenant Lilly sa lvaged 

a card punch mach ine that had been damaged in shipment. He 

repaired the machine himself, then trained an operator, and the 
150 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

J-2 staff at least could punch its own cards. Later he discovered a 

computer van being used in conjunction with imagery interpretation. He arranged its transfer to Tan Son Nhut where, placed in 

a shed at the Combined Intelligence Center, it became the J-2'5 

first computer facility. Little by lillie, additional equipment fell 

into our hands, much of it scrounged, enough so that in February 

1966 the automatic data processing system began operating. Some 

months later, plans were included fOT the acquisition and insta llation of a com pUler within the 1-2 area of the new Military 

Assistance Command headqu3ncrs under construction near Tan 

Son Nhut. After ascertaini ng the special construction necessary to 

install the equipment programmed for lise by the intelligence staff, 

Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Glldely was detailed to co-ordinate 

with the engineers and insure th at the computer requirements were 

incorporated into the plans for the building. The J-2 area within 

the new headquarters was built to accommodate the modern equipment on order that would contribute so importantly to the accom· 

plishment of the intelligence mission in the years to come. 

The fiscal accounting and supervision of Intelligence Cantin· 

gency Funds was another Management Division concern and one 

which I considered extremely important. Before I January 1966, 

this support for Military Assistance Command was provided by 

the U.S. Navy. These funds were identified by the Navy as Collec· 

tion and Classification of Information funds, and their usc was 

limited to the support of the Military Assistance Command intelli· 

gence adv isory activities of the Republic of Vietnam. U.S. Army 

and Air Force intelligence activities were provided funding support 

by their parent organ izations at the theater level. Control and administration of Collection and Classification of Information funds 

left Illuch to be desired from both an administrative and an operational point of view. J had no control over the Intelligence Can· 

tingency Funds support for Army and Air Force intelligence 

activities since their reporting channels were to their parent organizations located outside the Republic of Vietnam. Responsive fund 

suppOrt slumped behind in the rapid ly changing operational situa· 

tion, encumbered as it was by extreme ly long lines of communication to the suppOrt base. Centralized control over intelligence 

operations was inadequate because each operating intelligence unit 

funded its own operations. This, in many cases, contributed to the 

lack of effective co·ordination of ilHelligence operations. 

I knew that the most effective means to control intelligence 

operations was to control the purse strings. To this end I requested 

the assignment of Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Alitmer 
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT !5! 

Ackley, Jr.. to my staff to set up an Intelligence Contingency Funds 

Class B Agent account. Colonel Ackley was appointed the Class B 

Agent, and the account was activa ted on I J anuary 1966. At the 

same time a standing operating procedure was published which 

provided for the administration, supervision, utilization, and con· 

trol of Intelligence Con tingency Funds within the Republic of 

Vietnam. A similar standing operating procedure applicable to the 

Collection and Classification of Information funds was published 

at the same time, and supervision of these funds also came under 

the direct control of Colonel Ackley. The advantages of this centralized comrol were readi ly apparent: all intelligence opera tions required J-2 staff approval before funding support could be 

provided. In addition, funds were now immediately available to 

me for the fullest exploitialion of targets o( opportunity such as 

high-level defectors and the Volunteer Informant Program. 

Fund support of all intelligence activi ties in the Republic of 

Vietnam was now under my direct control with the exception of 

those activities sponsored by the Air Force, which maintained an 

independent fund support channel. A higher degree of professionalism as we ll as a more rapid response LO intelligence req uirements 

resulted from this centralized control of fund support. 

In addition to the problem of decentralized fund control. the 

acq uisition of intelligence equipment of all types, from small 

cameras to extreme ly expensive iote lligence production equipment, 

presented major obst.1c1es. In practically every case, intelligence 

units arriving in Vietnam came equ ipped with items of int elligence 

equipment completely unsuited to their missions there. It was 

necessary that the right equipment be obt.ained and issued to using 

units as rapidly as possible. I directed Colonel Ackley to establish 

an intelligence equipment control point which had as its mission 

the control over procurement and distribution of all intelligence 

equipment in the Republic of Vietnam. This activity was established on I February 1966, and through it we were able to sh ift 

equipment between units to use it to the fullest and to satisfy 

operational requ irements. 

The operational inAuence provided by the Intelligence Contino 

gency Funds and the Coll ection and Classifica tion of Information 

funds and by intelligence equ ipmelH resources being directly under 

my control allowed a more rapid and effective response to taClical 

req uirements. Specialized equipment could be- and was in some 

cases-procured in a matter of hours and placed in the hands of 

the user. The primary lesson to be learned from these operat ions 

was that provisions for Intelligence Contingency Funds and special 
152 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

equipment support should be established in rh e joint command 

headquarters as earl y as possibl e. As long as operationa l control 

is retai ned at joilll staff level, fund a nd equipment control must 

be located at thal level also. l owe much to the dedication, perse· 

verance, and expertise of Colonel Ackl ey in establishing and man· 

aging this vital program. 

Finally. a daily staff conference to fa cilitate co-ordina tion of 

efforts within the military intelligence community For "voiding 

duplication and to keep me advised of the cun-elll intelligence 

siLUal ion was necessary. The conference served as a fOTum to air 

problems and elicit the expertise of the intelligence staff in reo 

solving these problems. The Milita ry Assistance Command science 

adviser, Bill McMillian, at my invitation became an CllIhusiastic 

dail y p..1.rlicipa llt in these con ferences and attempted to have implemented many ideas for new eq uipmeJll and techniques that arose 

there. 

The J-2 concept for the organization of the Military Assistance 

Command Intelligence Data Handling Systems was based upon the 

req uirement for two separate fac iliti es because of security restrictions. These facilities would be mutually supporting. The first was 

for production processing of releasable data using automatic data 

processing equ ipment at the Combined Intelligence Center and the 

use of FMA Filesearch C<l uipmenl for the au tomated storage and 

retri eval of documen ts at the Combined Document Exploitation 

Celller. The second was for processing of sensiti ve data from all 

sources within J-2 using both automatic data processing equipment and the FMA Filesearch equ ipment. 

The development of the J-2 Intelligence Data Handling Systems began in the fall of 1965 when an FMA Filcsearch automated 

document storage and retri eva l system was requested to provide a 

rapid means to retrieve data from intcrroga tion reports and translated captured documen ts. This equipment was put illlo opera tion 

at the Combined Document Exploitation Center and by June 

1965 had the largest microfilmed data base of any FMA system in 

the intelligence community. Over 9,000 feet of microfilmed documents were included and on fil e at the Combined Document 

Exploitation Center. 

This system was highly successful. and the usage factor indicated 

that a second set of the same equipment was needed. A set was 

ordered in J anuary 1967 with de li very expected in May. This 

equipment was put in operation at the Combi ned Document 

Exploitation Center as an interim location un til it could be moved 

to the J-2 area of the new Military Assistanct: Command head-
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 153 

quarters. The two sets of equipment would make j-2 able to 

handle releasable documents at the Combined Document Exploitation Center and nonreleasable or sensitive documents within j- 2. 

To be able beller to disseminate and exploit this indexed 

microfilm, a 16-mm. reproduction camera was ordered. This would 

enable us to copy the FMA indexed microfi lm and disseminate 

16-mm. film cartridges to field units and other intelligence users. 

Thirty-five 16-mm. reader-primers were also ordered for distribution to these users. 

In February 1966 automatic data processing operations started 

with borrowed electrical accounting machines insta ll ed in expandable vans parked next to the Combined Intelligence Center. The 

first equipment used was the basic punch card accounting machines. 

Twelve files were initially selected for machine operations that 

wou ld provide the most immediate payoff, 

In August 1966 the Combined Intelligence Center received an 

IBM 1401 card computer and additional peripheral equ ipment. In 

january 1967 a second sma ll car~ computer, an IBM 11 30, and a 

1627 ploner were added to the equ ipment. Also in May 1967 the 

IBM 1401 computer was upgraded to a 16K memory with six 

magnetic tape dri ves. This morc than doubled the center's production capacity. At the same time the IBM 11 31 computer was 

upgraded to a magnetic tape system that could provide machine 

listings and plot simultaneously. 

'We chose to provide automated support to the nonsensitive data 

base at the Combined Intelligence Center first since it had the 

greatest application that cou ld be d isseminated to the most users. 

In the area of automatic data processing support for J- 2 and 

the sensit ive data, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Defense Intelligence Agency concurred in a second computer fa cility 

for j - 2 in the new Mi li tary Assistance Command headquarters 

bui lding to process nonreleasable and sensitive data. An IBM 1401 

computer was the minimum equipment that would meet J- 2's 

immediate needs. However, this would provide for only limited 

expansion. Therefore it was alllicipated that the Defense Intelligence Agency wou ld approve a larger computer, either an IBM 

1410 or an IBM 360 model. 

Within the J-2 Management Division there was an Intelligence Data Handling Systems branch with two sections, an FMA 

section for automaled document storage and retrieval and an auto· 

matic data processing section, In the Combined Intelligence Center 

there was an automatic data processing branch. The Intell igence 

Data Handling Systems Branch of the Management Division pro-
154 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

vided guidance to Combined Intelligence Center automa tic data 

processing and Combined Document Exploitation Center FMA. 

The future J- 2 Intelligence Data Handling Systems organization 

contempl ated a d ivision with an automatic data processing branch 

of two sections, one for J-2 and one for the Combined Intelligence 

Center. and an FMA branch with two sections, one for J-2 and 

one for the Combined Document Exploitation Center. 

The Management Division also was responsible for supervising 

the constfuction projects for various Military Assistance Command 

J- 2 and Joint General Staff 1- 2 activities. The construction 

program for J - 2 encompassed approximately $6.7 million. Of this 

amoun t $3.7 million was programmed for the construction of 

eighteen combined in terrogation centers. The balance of $3 million 

was programmed agai nst the Combined Intelligence Center complex. The eighteen combined interrogation centers were loca ted 

from as far nortb as Hue to Bac Li eu in the south . The program 

encompassed three different-size faciliti es. The largest, the Combined Military Interrogation Center, was funded at $450,000 and 

was located in the Saigon area. This facility, which had sixty-one 

permanent detention celis, including two temporary holding cells, 

became operational on 30 November 1966. Final cost for the structure came to $1 million. 

In addition to the Combined Military Interroga tion Center, 

three corps-size facilities were programmed for Bien Hoa, Pleiku, 

and Da Na ng. The corps center was somewha t sma ller than the 

combined center in that it had only a 26-man cell capacity. The 

COSt of these fac iliti es was programmed at $246,000 each. The 

corps center at Da Nang, near Marble Top Mountain, was to be 

compl eted by late August of 1967. 

The remaining fourteen interroga tion centers were division 

size and were referred to as combined division interrogation 

centers. The capacity of each center was to be an 18-man cell block. 

The facilities were costed at S182,000 each. The center at Ban Me 

T huot was completed and officially accepted by the Joint General 

Staff on 26 April 1967. Construction sta rted on the center at Hue 

on I April 1967. The remaining twelve centen were in various 

stages of construction-design or acq uisition of real estate, for 

instance-in June 1967. 

The Combined Intelligence Center complex construction 

started in late J anuary of 1966, and the facility was occupied on 

10 December of that year. A photo lab in the rear of the center 

was under construction. In addition we requested that the Com-
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 155 

bined Document Exploitation Center be expanded by approximately 4,500 square feet. 

Future J- 2 combined construction requirements envisioned 

the construction of a Military Security Service complex. The request along with the basic plan!' was submitted and approved. 

Plans and Training 

Two principal duties were assigned to the Plans and Training 

Division. The first was the J- 2 input to the Combined Campaign 

Plan which set forth the priorities, goals, and objectives of Mili· 

tary Assistance Command, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. 

and Free World Military Assistance Forces for the conduct of the 

war. Within J- 2 we recognized the Combined Campaign Plan as 

an excellent vehicle for promoting the combined intelligence con· 

cept, and the Intelligence Annex was prepared in a combined effort 

by Colonel Loi's and my staffs. The professionalism and excellence 

reflected by the Intelligence Annex elicited high praise. 

A second function of the Plans and Training Division con· 

cerned mapping. chaning. and geodesy. The scope of Military 

Assistance Command interest in mapping and charting extended to 

Army topographic maps. Air Force aeronautical charts, Navy hydro· 

graphic charts. and survey control data (an Army responsibility) 

as well as numerous related products necessary to support combat 

forces such as terrain studies, flight information publications, gazet. 

teers, and tide tables. In area, the primary concern was the South 

Vietnam land mass and its immediate tactical zone, although all 

of Southeast Asia was included in the program. 

With the relatively suddent increase in tactical units, the de· 

mand for maps skyrocketed. An initial stock of some three million 

maps ;:;:1d charts was obtained from the map depot in Japan and 

was combined with the maps on hand in the Military Assistance 

Command Training Aids Section. At the same time, two Engineer 

topographic units, the 569th Engineer Company (Topography) 

(Corps) and the 547th Engineer Platoon (Map Depot). were 

brought to Vietnam to develop the Military Assistance Command 

charting. mapping, and geodesy capability. In the interim, direct 

air shipments from the United States together with continued. 

support from Japan enabled map requirements to be met. 

By October 1966, map stockage met the needs of the command. 

In April 1967, the new 1:250,000 Joint Operations graphic map 

series began arriving. with coverage of North and South Vietnam, 

Laos, and mOSl of Cambodia by lhe end of May. This map was 
156 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

received in two versions, one for ground use and the other for air 

operations. In mid-I 966. the very popular piclomap started to 

arrive in Vietnam. It was a photo-based, coloT.intensified map supplement produced at a sca le of I :25,000, intended for use by the 

small unit leader. Captured maps were particularl y important since 

Viet Cong place names often varied from the South Vietnamese 

government designations. Because of their value during interrogations, Viet Cong ma ps werc reproduced in monochrome print and 

distributed to selected users in the intelligence community. 

Weather 

Meteorologica l services were provided to Military Assistance 

Command by the SOUlheast Asia J oint Operations Weather Center 

via three media: oral briefings. including a weekly briefing for 

General lYestmoreland; a daily written and pictorial weather forecast for South Vi etnam and all of Southeast Asia; and specific daily 

weather forecasts for individual ground operations in the Republic 

of Vietnam. \'Yeather support for major combat operations was 

provided by U.S. Air Force combat weather learns of the 5th 

Weather Squadron that prepared tactical forecasts. The excellence 

of the over-a ll meteorological program evoked pra ise from General 

Westmore land to the effect that "no other U.s. military commander ever had the advantage of the outstanding weather support 

which I had at my disposal. " 

In the early days we had a seriOliS problem in tryi ng to get 

sufficiem wea ther data to permit the preparation of accura te fore· 

casts and to maimai n data on current conditions th roughou t the 

country. The solution was surprisingly simple but extremely 

successrul. 'Ye again called upon the Special Forces to provide a 

service vita l to the command-weather reporting. The A detach· 

ments deployed within all corps were ideally suited for submitting 

weather data. It was a relati vely simple task to nain the Special 

Forces personnel in ga thering the inrormation, and their excell ent 

communica tions facilities permitted rapid submission of reports. 
CHAPTER VII 

Summary 

The intelligence challenge in Vietnam was morc than finding 

the enemy. The challenge was provid ing timely. accurate, adeq uate, 

and usable intelligence in SUpfX>Tt of decision makers from the 

Military Assistance Command commander and his battlefield commanders to the Commander in Chief in Washington. An organization designed to meet that chall enge was created. It established for 

the first time in history a combined military intelligence system. 

It look longer to establ ish that system than it should have because, 

once again, we were not prepared. 

A few of the ma ny lessons I learned. some for the umpteenth 

lime, follow. 

Unity of Command. One of the long-accepted principles of 

war- unity of command-was violated in Viet nam because of the 

nature of the insurgency. In this confl ict, all U.S. intelligence organizations were not centralized under the MACV commander. 

Combined In telligence. Contingency plans should include draft 

agreements: standing operating proced ures; orga nizational, (unctiona!, and mann ing concepts; and logistical support plans to establish a combined intelligence system, preferably incl uding all 

military and c ivilian agencies. 

Combat-Ready hltelligenu Force Structure. The force structure 

of th e services must include the combat-ready intelligence structure 

to support contingency plans. Such forces should be engaged in 

collection and production ac tiviti es during peacetime as well as 

wartime. They should be ca pable of deployment on very short 

notice and should arrive in the area of operations with all eq uipment and faciliti es required. Time is precious. 

Order 01 Battle. Order of battle is the foundation of combat 

intelligence. Order of battle training in the U.S. Army has been 

deplorable for many years. Military inte ll igence officers should 

have been trained on enemy units, weapons, and tactics, as well as 

on the Viet COllg infrastructure. 

Hll ma11 In telligence_ Among the best sources of combat 

intelligence are knowledgeable informa nts and captured doeu-
158 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

menu. The drastic cutback in resources and training devoted to 

human intelligence since World War II has seriously reduced our 

capacity in this fi eld. Officers slated for key command and staff 

positions should be educated on the advantages and limitations of 

Ihis aspect of military intelligence. 

Tactical Traj"ing. OUT forces must know the tactics of the 

enemy on the battlefield where he will be fought. We did not have 

that knowledge when we were committed. Our combat units WeTC 

not properly trained to maintain contact with the enemy once it 

was made. Consequently, we did not fix the enemy so that he could 

be destroyed on the ground. 

Reconnaissance. Reconna issance provides eyes and ears for the 

commander. The intelligence officer should have staff supervision 

over all reconnaissance, including ground reconnaissance. 

Communications. Intelligence requires the timely movement of 

extremely large volumes of words and pictures. Dedicated communications in support of intelligence are a necessity. Automated 

systems designed to display elements of intelligence in a format are 

good if capable or reAet:ting the human analysis essential to valid 

intelligence. The human needs a data base. The data base requires 

communications. 

Initiative. Intelligence officers should be imbued with the 

necessity to provide intelligence and appropriate recommendations 

upon which plans and actions are initiated rather than just to 

respond to requests for intelligence. 

"Scout.s Ollt." ' Vhen I enlisted in the Army I was trained as 

a scout of a riAe squad. When the command "Scouts Out" was given 

I ran forward with my riAe at port arms to an area from which J 

supposedly could observe the enemy. When I saw the enemy I faced 

my leader and signaled information on rhe enemy. I believe that 

whenever a contingency plan is approved that identifies a potential 

enemy our senior military authority should issue the order "Scouts 

Out," implying that a few military intelligence "scouts" be dispatched to or near the future potential area or opera tions to 

observe, report, and plan for our next war, hoping that such scouts 

will be listened to and actions will be taken to avoid another case 

of too little 100 late and inadequate training. I know from experience that such an effort will be opposed strongly. I also know from 

experience that such can and must be done. 

Brigadier General Philip B. Davidson, Jr., a West Point classmate and my successor as the AssiStant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Anny, Pacific, also succeeded me in Saigon. I had 
SUMMARY 159 

recommended him to General Westmorela nd as the finest officer 

available. I said my good byes and wrOte the following letter to 

each member of the team; they were the oncs who developed the 

organization and conducted th e role of intelligence in Vietnam: 

Upon my departure from this command I take pride in expressing 

my admiration for your unexcelled performance of d uty. You have 

earned for military intelligence a reputation of excellence second to 

none. You consistently have provided timely and accurate intelligence 

upon which the direction and support of this war have been based. 

You colleClively constitute the finest military intelligence team to ever 

support our armed forces in combat. Your paSt perfonnance is magnificent history. Your future holds greater challenges and opportunities. 

Your capabilities are extensive. J have full confidence that you, your 

officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel and civilians will 

continue to keep intelligence out front where it belongs. It has been a 

great honor servi ng with you as a member of the First Team. Please 

convey my appreciation to all concerned. 
ApPENDIX A - J - 2 , MILlT .... Ry A SS IST .... NCE COMM .... NI>, ST .... FF OFFICE

J-2, MililifY Assislan

Command 

Military Attache Weather Officer Maj. Gen. Joseph A. McC

UaiSO/l Office 

Col. Alexander Kouts .. ",,, 

Col. Robert F. Robens USAF 

Col. John J. Morgan Col. lewis J. Neyland Col. Frank C. Scofield, 

USAF 

I 

I I I 

Deputy Deputy Intelligence Operations Counterintelligence Intellige

Sector Intelligence Combat Intelligence Division DivIsion 

Col. Col. Col. William H

Col. 

Stone W. Quillian John T. little Glenn E. Muuelberg Georre McCutchen 

John V

USMC Col. Col. Col. 

Robert E. McMahon Robert E. McMahon John W. Downie 

Col. Col. Combined 

OeMel! E. Wa lker Junlchi Bulo Center

USAF 

Frank L

Ralph 
AJ'I' ENOIX B- J- 2, MILITARY A SSISTANCF. COMMANO, STAFF, MAY 1967 

J-2 

Military Assistance 

Spedal Assisl.ml f- Command - Enlisted Aide 

Capt. James D. Strachan Maj. Gen. S. Sgt. Clyde F. Jep$On 

Joseph A. McChristian 

Deputy for 

Exewtive Sector Intelligence 

Lt. Col. Ralph H. Groover, Jr. Col. Stone W. Quillian 

USMC 

Delluty for Deputy for Deputy for 

Intelligence Production Intelligence StJpport Combat Intelligence 

Col. John V. Lanterman Col. Thomas B. Summers Col. Robert E. McMahon USAF 

Production Division Counterintelligence Operations Division 

Col. John G. Babashanian Division Col. DeMel! E. Walker 

USMC Col. Junichi Buto USAF 

Estimates Oil/is ion Plans and Training Division Exploitation Division 

Lt. Col. Coleman Noahson Col. Cornelius M. Smith Col. Radford O. Hyde USAF 

Combined Ilntelligence Managemenl Division Air Reconnaissance 

Center, Vietnam Col. Donald T. Ketcham Diyision 

Col. Ralllh T. Hunt Col. John D. Foulk 

Military Attache Weather Officer Targets Divisions liaison Officer Col. lewis 1. Neyland 

Col. John J. Morgan USAF Col. Milton C. Stahmer 
ApPENDIX C-MILITARY INTELLICENCE ORCA

Military Auistance 

C<lmmand 

I 

1-2, Military Assistance 

C<lmmand 

-. 

509tll Radio Rerearch Unit Group 

• ._.1 .........................

• 

• 

• 

· 

............•..••••••.......•.•••••••••••................

· . . 

r-----'-----,· • 

I I I I 

C<lmbined II C<lmbined II C<lmbined I I 

Materiel Exploitation Document Exploitation Military Interrogation In

Center Center Center 

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

. . . 

. . . 

.............. _ ................ ,. ...............

· . . . . 

· . . . 

- . 

13Sth 149tll 51!lth 

Military tntelligence Military Intelligence Military Intelligence 

intellig

GilIUp Group Group 

Command ••• •• eo. eo. Command less Opera

.......... ..... Operational Control - • - • - Direct Support 
ApPENDIX D-MJLITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT COMMANDER

J-2, Mililary Assistance Command 

Maj. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian 

r 

Detacl1ment 5251h Military Inlelligence Group 

319th Military Intelligence Col. Richard E. Adams 

Battalion Col. William D. Nule III Lt. Col. William G. Benedict 

I I 

1491h Militar

519th Military Intelligence 1351h MllitalY Intelligence Gro

Battalion Groul> Col. William 

Lt. Col. louis Hillman Col. Paul Goodman Col. William 

Lt. Col. Cyril P. Metosh 
ApPENDIX E-REPUBLIC OF VIET

DIVISION INTELLICEN

( AIRBORNE- MAR

Detachment H

I Off 3 N

I I 

Prisoner·ot·War Order of Battle I

Interrogation Section Section 

-- -

• Off 9 NCO 1 Off 2 NCO 1 

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES MILITARY 

U.S. Military 

Intelligence 

Detachment 

t---- Support 

-----

Mutual 

EJploitation 
A I"'ENDIX F - COMPATlBll.rry OF J - 2 , JOINT CENERAI. STAF F, AND J-2, 

MIl.lTARY A SSISTA NCE COMMAND 

1-2, J- 2, 

Joint General St.ff Military Assist.nee 

Comm.nd 

I I 

Intelliunce Intelilunee Operations Division Division 

I I 

Intelligence Operations 

Division Division 

I I 

Plans lAd Intelligentt Training 

Division Support Division 

I I 

Adminislr.tion Man.gement Division Division 

I I 

Attache Office Military Ailiche 

Ualson Offke 

I I 

9241h Support Group 

149th Military 

Intelligence Group 

I 

Military 135th Miut.1)' 

5wJlity Service Inleiligenc. Group 
Appendix G 

SUMMARY OF BRIEFING ON VIET CONG TAXATION 

T he following is a summary of the briefing on Viet Cong taxation presented on 8 May 1967 by J- 2, Military Assistance Command, and based on a Combined Intelligence Center study 

completed on I April 1967: 

This briefing is a precis of a recently updated Combined Intelligence Center study on Viet Cong taxation which was based on an 

analysis of interrogation reports. captured documents, agent rcports, and U.S. and South Vietnamese Army files. The Viet Cong 

rely heavil y upon the food and money which they obtain from the 

economy of South Vietnam. They obtain the majority of this food 

and money by levying taxes on the populace of the country. This 

briefing summarizes the various types of taxes levied by the Viet 

Cong and the major features of their tax system. 

Several reasons apparently prompted the Viet Cong to adopt a 

formalized tax system. First, as the war expanded, food and money 

were needed in larger amounts and on a predictable basis that 

would a1l0w the Viet Cong to budget for future operations. Second, 

a compulsory lax system had the adva ntage of providing them more 

direct control over the civili an population. Third, the Viet Cong 

hoped that a tax would appear to be a more legitimate technique of 

obta ining funds than the previously used contribution schemes, 

since the levying of taxes is a governmental function. Fourth, the 

Viet Cong rea lized that they needed a way to insure that revenues 

were not diverted into the collector's pocket. Finally, they have 

for man)' years maintained detailed census statistics covering most 

of South Vietnam: these statistics would facilitate the establishment 

of a tax system. 

The tax system is directed at the national level by tra ined 

econom ic advisers, who comprise the finance and economic section 

of the Central Office of South Vietnam. At province, district, and 

village level, the actual operation of the tax system is carried Ollt 

by the taxation and collection subsection of the echelon finance 

and economic section. In addition, a typica l echelon finance and 

economic section contains several other su bsections. 

There has been a marked upward trend in Viet Cong lax rales 

as their requirements for food and revenue have grown. In addition to raising rates, the Viet Cong have attempted to increase tax 

revenues by enlargi ng the areas covered b.y taxes and by initiating 
APPENDIX G 

ApPENDIX GI- FINANCE AND ECONOMIC SECTION 

Accounting 

SUbsection 

TaxaliGn and 

ColiectiGn 

Subsection 

Purchase and 

Procurement 

Subsetlion 

Agriculture and 

Production 

Subsection 

Transportation 

Sub$e(;Uon 

167 

new taxes in areas already under taxation. Viet Cong revenues in 

1965. of which tax collections were the chief component. were 

estimated at two billion piasters. 

Various types of taxes are important to the enemy. At the 

present the Viet Cong are levying taxes on agricultural production. 

transportation. plantations. businesses, imports and exports, property. and income in descending order of importance. The majority 

of food and money derived from the tax system comes from 

agriculture, transportation. and marketing of agricultural products. 

The rice tax, the most important of the agriculture taxes, 

provides the Viet Cong with their largest amounts of food and 

money. In fact. a directive from the Central Office of South Vietnam states that 80-90 percent of the annual Viet Cong budget is 

obtained through this type of taxation. Agricultural tax ra tes vary 

in different parts of the country. but on an average the Viet Cong 

tax 25-30 percent of the farmer's crop. In some areas, however, 

they have collected all of a fanner's paddy at harvest except for the 

amount required by his fami ly for subsistence. 

The second most important lax to the Viet Cong is the transportation tax. This tax has several advantages to the insurgents. 

First, it can be collected on a hit and run basis at collection points 

which are located on major lines of communica tion in areas which 

favor control of the road or watenvay and which offer ready escape 

if the point is discovered. Also. since the taxes are levied on transients, the Viet Cong do not incur the discontent of a particular 

locale, Second, the rates ca ll be ra ised quiCkly in order to meet currem operational needs. Third. the transportation tax allows the 

Viet Cong to maintain a degree of control over many of the ICC's 

in South Vi etnam. At the present time the Viet Cong arc taxing 

literally everything that moves through their own and government· 

controlled areas. 

Until 1966, Viet Cong taxes on plantations in South Vietnam 

may have been second in importance only to agricultural taxes. 
168 T H E ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

These t.,xes have accounted for as much as half of the tolal Viet 

Cong revenues in a few provinces where there arc concentrations 

of plantations. However, operational d ifficulties and the resista nce 

of some owners to Viet Cong taxation aTC possibly reducing this 

source of funds and forcing Ihe enemy to depend less on this form 

of taxation. 

The lax system has twO Strong points. First, it is designed to 

draw revenue from every segment of Ihe South Vietnamese econ· 

omy. Second, the system allo\\'s for the pyram iding of laxes; that is, 

mu ltiple revenues call be ga ined by directly or indirectly taxing 

a single item on each of the normal stages of production, transpor· 

tation , processing. and marketing. Frequently export, import, and 

additiona l transportation taxes will be levied on an item as it 

(R1Sses through Viet Cong-conlroll ed areas in route to final can· 

sUlllption. All o( these taxes are added in arriving at the final price 

of the item. 

AI'I'ENDIX G2- hll'ACT OF VIET CONe TAXES 

final Price 

Tn on Import 

Tax on Transportation 

Tax on uport 

Tu on Transportation 

Tu on MarkelinJ 

Tax on PfOCHSinl 

Tax on Transportation 

Tax on ProducHon 

The system does contain inherent weaknesses. First, it requires 

that the collector and admi n istrator be well tra ined if it is to work 

effectively. Such persons are currently in short supply for the Viet 

Cong. Second, increasingly heavy taxes are being levied on the 

populace. Discontent on the pan of the people is only natural 

tinder such circumstances. Third , allied operations in an area ohen 

prevent the Viet Cong from collecting taxes. 

Despite these weaknesses, the Viet Cong tax system is highly 

effective and suppli es the enemy with substalllial amounts of food, 

money, and control over the population. 
AI'PENDIX H - REPUBLIC OF VIETN"M ARMEO FORCES I NT

Siraltgic 

Technical Strvitt 

J-7. Joint 

General Staff 

Vietnamese 

Special forces 

Central 

Intelligence 

Organization 

Military 

Security 

Strvice 

'\ 

.'\ 

.-

_. 

. "" 

/' 

. / 

. 

/ 

National Police (-

~--r---

Joint General Staff 

1-2 

CJ CJ CJ 

Otpuly 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I ___ J 

G : I 9241h~ .:rt C"" I Administration Intt

D

I 

Military Intelligence 

Organization 

Military Foreign liaison Intelliunct School 
r 

r-

- " • 0: 

-

.... 
• < z 

~ 

:> 

• u 

Z 

• 3 

~ z 

1 

~ z 

• • • < 

j 

'--
ACors 

AOP 

ARVN 

COEC 

COIC 

CEDAR FALLS 

CG 

crcv 

cIa 

CIS 

CMD 

Ci',rEC 

CMIC 

COMUSMACV 

CTZ 

EEl 

EOO 

FAIRFAX / RASG DONG 

G-2 

"Co" teams 

Glossary 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

Automatic data processing 

Army of the Republic of Vielnam 

Combined Document Exploitation Center 

Combined Division Jnlerrogation Center 

Joint operation carried out by the 1st and 25th 

Infantry Divisions. 17Sd Airborne Brigade, 

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. and South 

Vietnamese Army uni ts against Viet Cong 

Military Region IV headquarters in the Iron 

Triangle. 8-26 January 1967 

Commanding general 

Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam 

Central Intelligence Organization (Republi c of 

Vietnam) 

Combined Intelligence Staff 

Capital Military District 

Combined 1''fatericl Exploitalion Center 

Combined Military Interrogation Center 

Commander. U.S. )\'rilitary Assistance Command, 

Vietnam 

Project undertaken in 1965 to obtain imagery 

interpretation equipment 

Corps tactica l zone 

Essential elements of information 

Explosive ordnance disposal 

Operation initiated 1 December 1966 by three 

U.S. and three South Vietnamese battalions 

with the mission of searching out and destroying the Viet Cong main force unilS, guerrillas, 

and infrastructure in Viet Cong Military 

Region IV 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

Teams of U.S. and Vietnamese interroga tors 

who were always ready to be dispatched from 

Saigon to support combat units when inlerrogation requirements exceeded local capa· 

bilities 
IBM 

II 

100 

IPW 

J-2 

JUNCTION CITY 

MACV 

MI 

MIBARS 

MSS 

OB 

PICC 

RVN 

RVNAF 

5-2 

STARLIGHT 

TRAC 

USARV 

VCI 

WAYSIDE 

GLOSSARY 

International Business Machine 

Imagery interpretation 

Intelligence Operations Division 

Prisoner of war interrogation 

173 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 

U.S.-Vietnamese operation conducted FebruaryMay 1967 in War Zone C and bordering 

provinces 

U.S. Military Assistance Command. Vietnam 

Military intelligence 

Military intelligence battalion (air reconnais' 

sance support) 

Military Security Service (Republic of Vietnam) 

Order of battle 

Province Intelligence Coordination Committee 

Republic of Vietnam 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

In telligence officer 

Operation by U.S. marines which resuted in the 

first major encounter between U.S. and Viet 

Cong forces in Vietnam. late summer 1965 

Target Research and Analysis Center 

U.S. Army. Vietnam 

Viet Cong infrastructure 

Project undertak.en by the 1st Military Intelli· 

gence Ballalion (Air Reconnaissa nce Support) 

to produce annotated pholOmaps of U.S. in· 

stallations and areas in which military oper· 

ations were planned in South Vietnam 

Index 

AceuraCY. ltrcu on : 8. 10 

Ackley. Lieutenant Colonel Autmer. Jr.: 

150-52 

Adminis\r,uion: l<f. 2<1 

Administrati-'C Branch. CDEC: 57 

Ad,-isers: 12. l.f. 18-19, 52, 49.60. M-7 1. 

107, 151 

Afler·aclion reports: 133 

Agencies, national: 12 

Agency for International De\'elopment 

(AID): HI 

Agents Set: also Informer •. 

enemy: 77- 18. 12<1 . 14-4 

friendly: 15,51. 50, 69,117,123,13 1, 

AgrecmentJ '" , in ler-allied: 25- 2<1 , <10, 48, 

115.139 

Air ddense, enemy: 153 

Air operations: 1+-15. 58, , 63, 

95-106.12 1. 137 

Airbome Brigade. 173d: 118-25 

Aircraft See also Helicopters. 

B-52 bomber: 14, 45, 6()..61, 63. 96, 

121. 137 

0-1 Bird Dog: 101- 102 

OV- I Moha .... k: 14.97. 103 

RD, RC. RF designs: 97 

U-21 Ute: 30 

Airlifu of troop' and supplies: 44. 121 

Ajima , LieUienant Colonel Henry: 53 

Ama~on Ri\'er ex?Crientc: 10 

Ammunition, explOitation of. See 

Materiel . exploitation and Itudy of. 

An Giang Province: 155 

An Xuren Pro,"intc: 135 

Anal ysb techniques. Set: RC$ClTCh and 

anal)1is. 

Ar~ analysis: 52-6<1 , 6 1. 68 

Area intelligence: 107- 13. Set: also Sc<:tor 

intelligence. 

Armored Cal'alry Regiment. 11t h: 25. 10, 

121- 25 

Army Intelligence School: 126 

Artillery lire lupport: 101- 102, 105-106 

Auistant Chid of Staff for Intelligence. 

J)A : 57 

Alrocilies: 30-51. See a/so Terrorism. 

Australian forca: 2<1 , lOS 

Automatic Data Field Systems 

Command: 51 

Automatic data pTOCe$Sing: 49, 52, 51. 74, 

104 ,121. H9-50, 153-54 

Automatic Data Processing Seclion, 

CIC: <19 

A,-iallon unlLl: 14 

Ba Xu)"en PTO\'ince: 135 

Bac Lieu: 154 

Bac lJeu Province: 135 

B1Iker, Major J ohn C.: <10 

Ban Me Thuot; 154 

Bases. enemy: <I, 6, 62-64. 107, 109, 

1l6-25 

Ren Cu: 121 

Bien Ho.a: 154 

Binh Duong Province: lIS 

Binh Thuan Prol'ince: '30 

Binh Tong Prol'ince: 12 

Biographica l data, I"Ompillng: 72, 74-77, 

110, 115-16. 121 

Booby traps, enemy. See Materiel. 

exploitation and study of. 

Buddhist movement: 129 

Bunker systems, enemy: 125 

Cai Long RiI'CT: 135 

Cambodia: 6, 50, 61. 94 . 109-10, 155 

Cameras. ma nual: 103 

Canals. ke Waterways. 

Capital Military Di.trict: 73-74, 77 

Casualties. enemj': 125, 128 

Cal'alry Oi"ision (Airmobile), hI: <f0 

Cl:DAI!. FAI.I-S operation : 9, 34- 55, 77. l iS. 

116-25 

Censorship, uercl3e of: 145-46 

Central Committec of North Vietnam: 

124-25 

Ccntral lntelligence Agency: 106,128 
176 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

CentrallnteJligcnce Organiulion, RVN: 

7""'74 

Cerllnl Office of South Vietnam 

(COSVN) , NVA: 50. 58,114.117. 

,,. 

Chemical anal)'!;s: 41 

Chemical ·Bacu:riologica\· Radiological 

Equipment, eflem}'. Su Malcrkl. 

exploitation and sludr of. 

Chemical Detachment, 18th: 55 

Chieu Hoi progr.un : 29-30, 107.1 13-15 

China. Communist. S('c People's 

Republic or China. 

Cho LOll: 24,46 

Chuong T hien Province : 135 

Chuyen, Lieutcnant Colonel Lt XUan , 

NVA: 114 

Civil affairs: 25 

Civilian employees: 32-35, 4~~ 

Ciyi iian Ir .... -gu13r Defcnse Groups. 

RVN ; 50, 105 

Classification of documents: 8.23.36-37. 

142 ... n, 149 

Cloth'ng. enemy. $u Materiel. 

c7<:.ploilation and study of. 

Co Chien Ri-'cr: 135 

Co Cong Pn»';nce: US 

CoJl«tion Di'·bion. J- 2: 16 

CoII«I;OI1 Manag('llll!t1t S)"stem. 

USMACV: 95, 111- 12 

Collection p r0«$5 ~nd actio'ities: 13- 14. 

16, 18, 28-29. 40. 42, 49-50, 52, 65, 

71. 9~ 96, 106-1'. 126. 140, 157-58 

Comb;u inlclligcn(e: 6-7.9, I:!, 201, 

94-125, I:! I 

Comhat Operations Cerne" USMACV: 

Combined " Campaign Pla n: 155 

Combined DOCU!Tlelll E~ l' loi ~tion 

Ccnler: 16, 2:!, 82-40, 51, 11 3. 

I 1!>-125. 152-55 

Combi ned Intelligence Cmter, Vietnam 

(CtC\'): 14- 15.18.21-24,45-65. 

67-68,74.95, 104. 11 7. 126-27.131. 

U4-:!7. ISO, 152- 54 

Combined intelligena! Opcr.U1on5: 21-24, 

45-63.65-67. 142-46. 157 

Combined rntell igence School: 65, 68-69, 

,<0 

Combined Intelligence Staff: 71 - 78. 107, 

'" 

Combined ~bteriel Exploitation Center: 

16,23.40-44. 113. 116 

Combined Military Interrogation 

Center: 16. 2:!. 26-:!2. 51. 113, 

115-17.124.154 

Combined. Security Commiuce: 77. 141 

Command and control: 18-20.22-24,27, 

48. 72- i4, 96. 102. 106. II:!, 1:!9-40. 

150-51. 157 

Com mande r in Chier. Pad lie. See United 

States Pacilic Command. 

CommuniCiitions 

cnent)·: .56 

role in intelli~ncc: 7. 9. 71. 123. 158 

K(!urityof: 146-47 

Camlllu nicat ion$-C'lectroniu equipment. 

exploitation of: 44. Su ,11$0 Signal 

equipment. exploitation and study 

or. 

Communio tions-Electroniu Set:tion. 

CMEC: 41 

Camprchen,t.·e Intelligence Pmgnm: ", 

Compu ter ~ptem$: 5. 7. 22 . . '8-39. 57-58. 

95, 11 2,149-50, 153 

Cosou:n; project: 57 

Gong Tae 4 Clmpaign : 72 

Construction projecn: 46-47. 150. 54-5.~ 

C011lrol of intelligence. Stt Command 

and control. 

Co·operation Ilraces: 8, 11,21- 23,26. 

45. 49-50. &1-66. 9-4. 99. 102. 117. 

125. 138. HO 

Co·ordination process: 8. lB. 'lB. 31- 32. 

40.48.65.69.94-95, II:!. 11 7. 127, 

140. ISO, 152 

C.orps Tactical 7.ones 

I: 71. 105. 114 

III: 5B. 60. 115, 136-37. 140 

IV: 58, 114. 134-36 

Counlerespionage. Su Espionage and 

counterespionage. 

Counterimelligcncc Di\'ision, }-2: 138. 

140. H:!-47 

C.ounlcrintelligena: open tion$: 14. l G, 

2B, :!O. 138-47 

C.ountcrintclligcncc and Security 

Division. J- 2: 16, 138 

Countcnabotage. See Sabotage and 

counter5abotage. 
INDEX 177 

Counteuubversion. SUI Subversion and 

countersubversion. 

Courier service: 40. 49 

Crop sun·ey: 154-36 

Crosson. Colonel William H.: 4 

Cryptographic services: ~. 147 

Cu . Hoynh. NVA: 114 

Cu Chi: 40 

CurrenC)'. control 0 [: 36 

Current Imelligence and Indications 

Division. )- 2 : 14 

Da 1\"3ng: 154 

Data Procosing Uni!. 27th: 104 

Dau !'\ghia Pro\·ince: 72 

Davidson . Brigadier General Philip B .. 

Jr.: 158-59 

Deception practices. enemy: 130 

Decisions. process of: 6-8 

Defense. Department of: 20. 23. ~6, 128. 

142 

Defense Intelligence Agency: ~3. 39. H. 

Ill. 128. 142. 146. 153 

Defense Language Institute: 26-27 

Defoliation operations: 61 

DepUl l' for Sector Intelligence: 69 

Dictionary of Viet Cong Terminolog}·: 

Dinh " Tnong Province: US 

Distribution proteS$: 7-8.28.38-41.49. 

&1 .66-67. 123.129-154. 136-37 

00. Major General T nn. NVA: 116 

Doctrine. intelli gence: 6-11. 13 . 18 

Documents 

us f~ ing: 8. 2~. 36-37. 142--43.149 

exploitation a nd analysis: 14. 16. 

22- 23. 25. ~2--40. 51. 74. 113, 115-16. 

124- 25.1 31- 32. 156-58. SU:fllso 

Intelligence process. exploitation 

and stud)· of. 

Dominican Rep ublic experience: 99 

Duplica ting machinery. See Printing 

services. 

Economic structure. enemy: 60 

Ecuador: 10 

Eisenhower. General of the Army 

Dwight D.: 145 

Engineer equipment. enemy. See 

Materiel. exploitation and study of. 

Engineer units: 14. 125. 155 

569th Compan)": 155 

Engineer units-Continued 

547th Platoon: 155 

5715t Detachment: 55 

Equipment 

enemy. SUI Materiel. exploitation and 

stud) of. 

intclligence. acqubition of: 151-52 

Espionage and counterespionage: 13.18. 

28 

Essential elements of information: 6. 

9-10.95. III 

Estimates. pro(eM of: 4.9-11. 126. 129. 

Su alJo Reports. 

Evaluation process: 7-8. 22.35-36.39-42. 

51. 94-95.1 12, 126. 131 

Exchange programs. per~nnel: 22.2-4- 26 

Exploitation Division. ) - 2: 113 

£'xpl05i\·e ordnance disposa l teams: 14 

FAIRFAX operation : 72. 77 

Field Force. II: 11 5. 11 7-25 

Filing SY'tems. SUI Storage and reuie'·al 

ser\' ic~. 

Film sen·ice: 38 

Food losses. enemr : 124- 25 

Foreign Liaison Office, J-2: 108 

'-ortifications. enemy: 55. 125 

.·ree World Military Assistance Forces: 

12- 13.23-25.66-67. 1!l7, 155 

Funding support: 24. 150-51 

GAME WARD"N operation: 103 

Gazetteer. compilation of: 52.54 

Genera l Suppl r and Equipment Section. 

CMEC: 41--42 

Gene-.·a Con\·entions: 23. 30-31 

Gia Dinh Pro\·ince: 72. 116 

Giap. Gencral Vo Nguyen. NVA: 11 

··Go·· tellms: 29. . 42. 44 

Goldberg. Colonel Benjami n. USAR: 145 

Goodman . Colonel Paul: 138 

Gra phics Sc<:tion . CMEC: 41 

Guddy. Lieutenant Colonel Ed"·ard M.: 

ISO 

Guerri lla units and operations. enemy: 

13.51.71- 72. 107. 110 

Gulf of T onki n: 27 

Ham Luong River: 135 

Hall Giang Ri,·er: 135 

Hawaii conference: 128. 132 

Heinbockel. Commander Ch3rles. 

USNR: 145 
178 Tli E ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Heimges. LiculI:nani General John A.: ., 

Helicopters: 40, 101 . St:/I (I/w Aircraft. 

Highway 1!1: 18 

Uo So wOO(b: 121 

Hoi Chanh program: 22, 26,29-50,51, 

105 

Hue: 1,5.4 

Hung. !l;guyen HUll. NVA: l ]<t 

Imagery imerprctalion: 48.57-60,6'. 

100-101.121, 125.134-57 

Indexing -')'Stems: 38-'9.59--60, Ill. 

136-37 

Infantry 6rigade.: 

100lh Ughl: 25, 11&-21 

I~h Ught: 25 

Inranll')' Divisions 

151 : 118-25 

25th: 40, 11 8-25 

Infiltration, enemy: 28. 52. 94. 96. 10', 

105, 107. ISO. ' 31-!2 

Inronnalion , achangc and di5Closure of: 

142--46 

Informers: 69, 109, 12'. 144, 157- 58. Su 

a/so Agent,. 

Infrared devicct: 96-97. 102- 103, 11 7 

I nitiui>'c. value or: 158 

11151111111io115. crilial; 142 

Inu:lIigencc Dala Handling Sptcm. 

USMACV: III 

Intelligence Di\'ision, ) - 2: 1-1,16,127- 29 

Intelligence Opcr.ltionl Division, .1- 2: 16, 

94- 95. 108, 113 

Intelligenc~ process 

area ana lysis: 52-54, 61,68 

area operations: 107- 13 

classificalion procmures: 8, 23. S6-37, 

142-45, 149 

collection pr(l(eM: 15-14, 16, 18,28-29, 

40,42, 49-50. 52. 65,71,94-96, 

106-13, 126. 140, 157- 58 

combat operation.: 6-7.9, 13,24, 

94-125, 131 

combined operations: 21- 24, 45-63, 

65-67.142-46.157 

command and control : 18-20,22- 24. 

27.48.72- 74,96, 102, 106, 113, 

1»-40. 150-51, 157 

communications in : 7, 019,71. 123, 158 

co·open.lion and co-ordination in: 8, 

11,21-23,26,28,31-32,40.45, 

Intelligence procat- Continued 

48-50. 64-66. 69, 94-95, 99. 102, J13, 

117, 125, 127.138, 140, 150,152 

distribution PT()(es.s: 7-8,28,38-41,49, 

64,66-67. 123. 129-54,1S6-37 

doctrine and philosophy: 6-11. 13. 18 

asmtial elemenll of information : 6, 

9-10, 95,11 1 

elimales in : 4, 9-1 1, 126, 129 

evaluation prooess: 7-8,22.35-36, 

39-42. 51. 94-95. 11 2, 126, 131 

exchange and d ilC]05ure: 142-46 

exploitation and slUdy of: 4, 8, 10, 16. 

22- 23. 25-26. 28, 36-37. 39. 4()-44, 

51. 54-.0;5, 71 , 110-14, 116. 123-24, 

131, 133, 142-43. 149 

iniliative in: 158 

JiailOn in: 31-32, 48-SO. 107. 141 

management procedures: 148-55 

mission of: 5-6,21, 126, 157 

orp i~ation : 4-6, 8, II, 13-20,24, 

27- 28.41-42, 47- 57,157 

pattern anal)·.is: 61-&1, 117 

plans and tn.ining: 5. 16, 18,21- 22, 

24-26, 31. 37.40. 56-47. 65-66. 68-69, 

99-100, 103. 107. 109. 127, 140. 143, 

155-58 

reporu. prepan.tion and distribution 

of: 7. 12- 13,28-29.36.401,52.64, 

71. 74, 102, 11 0-12, 123. 133 

UKarch Ind InalYl.is: 4, 7. 22. 48, 

51-5-4. fiO.-.&t.109. 121, 126, 132- 34 

resources: 3-6. 9. II , 13.69 

$eCtor operatiool.: 1 

staff organization and operations: 

14-18.71 - 78, 148 

stonge and retrieval : 34, 38-39. 48, 60. 

67-68,74,95.104, 11 1- 12. 137. 149. 

152-53 

untegi' opentions: 6-7. 13, 36.48.61, 

129 

summaries. preparation and 

d istribution of: 28, 36, 38, 51-52, 

102,127- 31 

support of: 148-56 

technical intelligence: 16,46,48,54-57 

timeliness, value of: 7, 149. 157 

Intel1igenCl: seTVice, enemy: 3. 13, 1+1 

Intelligence unit.: 5, 18-19 

arrivals: 18, 46-47.138 
INDEX 179 

Intell igence uni IS- Continued 

strength : 22.24-27. '4, 47 

U5lh Group: 19.73.121, ISS 

149th Group: 19,7', 121 

SOOth Group: 18-19 

525th Group: 19. 121 

1st Battalion (MIBARS): 98-101. 103. 

121, 123. IS!; 

319th Battalion : 46-ot7 

519th Baltalion: 19, 46-ot7. 55. U8 

403d Special Oper:u ions Det achment: 

.09 

704th Detachment: 18-19, ISS 

International 8usinc:s.s Machin": 39.74. 

Inter'" rogat ion systems and practice: 'I, 10, 

14, 16.22- 23, U-32. 39. 51. 71. 110, 

11 3--14, 123--24.131. 133 

lliterviem. after·action : 133 

[ron Triangle: 11 6-25 

j apan: 155 

j ohnson. Gc:nernl Harold K.: 3 

j oint Air-Cround Opcntions System: 

96,98 

joint Chieb of Staff: 128 

Joint General Staff. RVN: 16,27. 34,65 , 

68. 72-7 , 113, 139, 146. 154 

joint U.s. PutJlic Alrain Office: 116, 129 

J UNCTION CITY operation : 35, 115. 11 7 

Kelley, Lieutenant Colonel Eugene, Jr.: 

100-101 

Kelly. Coloncl .·n ncil J : 108-109 

Kkn Hoa Province: 136 

Kit Car!lOn KOu ts: 105. 114 

Komer, Robert W.: 78. Set auo United 

Stata Emba.ssy. 

Korea . See Republic of Korea forces. 

Ko~an War expericnce: 6.96 

Ky, Nguyen Cao: 72 

Lam, Major Van. ARVN: 40 

Language barrier, O\'ercoming: 21- 22, 

2S-26, 67, 69, 138-39 

Laos: 6, 50, &t, 94, 155 

La.!iOns from Vietnam: 157-59 

Liai!lOn, maintaining: 31- 32, 48-50. 107. 

14. 

!.ight inten$lfie:rs: 105-106 

LlCIITl'I1NC Bue operation: 103 

Linn of rommunication, enemy: 52. 62, 

' 36 

Linguists: 21-22, 25-27.37 

Lo Co: 58. 136 

Loan, Brigadier Gc:ncnl Ngu}'en Ngoc. 

ARVN: 72- 73,140 

Logblical systems and operations: 24. 

'01 

Logistical sptems and operations, enemy : 

5-6. 107,124 

Loi, Colonel Ho Van, ARVN: 11 , 16.22, 

47.6,;-66.1 10. 126. 139, 155 

Mail service:; 71 

Management proccdura : 148-55 

Maps, compilation and distribution or: 

52- 54, 59, 6 1, 67-68. 100, 134-37. 

ISS-56 

Marble T op Mounta in: 15-4 

MAutt TtMt. operation : 103 

Materiel 

enemy lo.sses: 124-25 

ClIploitation and study of: 14, 22- 23, 

26,28,40- 44.54-55, 113. 11 6 

McCu tchen. Colonel George: US 

McHale. Colonel j ames j ., USAFR; 145 

McMillian. Bill; 152 

McNamara, Robert S.: 4-5,26 

MediC<il1 Detachment. 521st: 55 

Medical Section, CMEC: 41 

Medical supplies and sen 'icn, eu<:my. Serr 

Materiel, exploitatiou and study or. 

Mekong River and Delta: 6, 134-35 

Microfilm service: 38-39, 152 

Military usistancc: programs: 6, 12,47 

Military allachb; 95, 108 

Milit.ary Security Sc:rvice, RVN: 18-19. 

72- 74, 1§-40, 144. 155 

Mines, enemy. See Materiel, c:xploitilt ion 

aud study or. 

MiniSlr}' of Agriculture. RVN: 135 

Ministry of Oefense, RVN: 139 

Missile sites, enemy: 58 

Mission, intelligence: 5-6,21, 126, 157 

Mobi lity Section, CMEC: 41 

Monsoons. Set: Weather. efre<t on open· 

tions. 

Morale, enemy: 6, 61 

Muggelberg, Colonel Clenn E.: 49, 94 

My Tho Rh'er: 135 

National lnte:rrogation CcnlCr. RVN: 5 1 

l'\ational Libention Front ; 113. 116 

National Police: 25.31. 71- 73, 77. 140 

Nationa l Sc:curity Agency: 128 

Naval gunfire: IUpport: 101 
180 THE ROLE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

Nghia . Capta:n Lam Van, ARVN : 26 

Nha Trang: 105 

NIACARA fAI.U oper'llion: 118-25 

Night of'CTiltions: 105 

North Viemamese Arm)': 13,61,94, 101. 

107.109-10, lB. i.!Io-33 

North Vietnamese Na"y: 27 

OpcT3lion~ 8moch, CICV: 49 

Oper:uions Dir('ctorate. J-3. USMACV: 5 

Order of battle. enemy: 6. 10, 18, 28, 

48-51,55-57,67-68.94. 117- 18. 123. 

127- 31,157 

Order of Baltle Branch. CIGV: 50 

Ordn;lIlce Dctac;:hmem. 5281 h: 55 

Organilalion. intelligence: 4-6, 8. II. 

13-20. 24, 27-28. 41-42, 47-57. 157 

Orientation program: 22 

Pacification program: 107. 11 0 

Palrols 

ground : 105 

ma rine: 6, 103 

IIp<<ialitcd: 107 

Pattern analysis: 61-&1, 117 

" ]'mple Sniffer"; 105 

People's Republic of China: 6,00 

Peuonnel detector; 105 

Petroleum ptoduns, enemy. Su Materiel. 

exploitation and study or. 

Philpott , Brigadier Ceneral Jammie M., 

USAF: 96 

Phong Dinh PrOl'ince: 136 

Photographic Krvicn: 39, 41. 41. 57-00. 

63.68, 101. 115-16, 153 

Photography, aerial: 7-8,96,98, 1(1)-101. 

103-1()4, 117, 121, 123, 1~, 136-37 

Pieper. Lieutenant Colonel Frederkk A. : 

26 

I'lans. fonnuladng; 5, 155-56, 158 

Plans and Training J)il'i,ion, ./- 2: 155-56 

I'leiku : 15" 

Political crisis, RVN : 129 

l'olitical s{mcture. enemy: 13-11, 28. 

50-52. 60, 65-ti7, 71-72. 78. 94, 107. 

109-10. 1l7, HO 

Popular Forces, RVN: 25, 69 

Population control. enemr: 62 

Power plants, .security of: HI 

Printing services: 38,40,49. 152 

Prisone~ 

enemy: 23, 29-31. 124. See a/so Jnterrogation ,ystems and practice. 

Prisoners-Continued 

U.S., accounting for: 145 

Production Division. J-2: H, 1M. 136 

Production systems: 126-37.157. Su al.lo 

by fype. 

Propaganda, enemy. See Psychologica l 

operations. enemy. 

PrOl'ince Intelligence Coordinating Com· 

mittees: 70 

Ps)"Chological characteristics, enemy: 60 

I'S)'chological operations: 61, 107 

P~rchological operations, enemy: 28. 36. 

61. 140 

Quanerma5ter Detachment . 590th: 55 

Quillian, Colonel Stone W .. USMC: 69-iO 

Rach Bap: 12] 

Racial barrier: 138-39 

Radar. airborne: 13, M. 96-97. 102-103. 

R .. NG '" DosG op<!ration: 72 

Rat ions. enemy. Su Materiel , cxploita. 

tion and Study of. 

Ratkovich, Colonel Edward, USAF: 45 

Rcceil'ing and Shipping Section, CMEC: 

41 

Rewndo School: 105 

Rt"Collnai$Sance 

aeria l: 13.58,95-106. 123, 158 

ground: 13,104- 100. JJi. 158 

Reconnaissance Branch, J- 2: 97- 98. 104 

Rcc:onnaiWlllce and PholO Intclligenn, 

Dili'ion, 1- 2: 16 

Refugee:l: 123 

Regional Forces. RVN: 25.67,69 

Rr.I\·o.:lI·OU$ operation : 11 6- 17. 123 

Rcpalriation programs. S .... Chi .. " H oi 

prOj;lram: flo; Clla.,l, progr.ull. 

Repofu. prcparation and dist ribution of: 

7, 12 ~. 28-29. 36. 44, 52, 64. 71, 74. 

102, IHH2, 123. 133. S .. e also Esti· 

mates, process of. 

Republic of Korea forces: 24-25, 105 

Republie of Vietnam Air Force; 101 

Republic of Viet,lam Armed Forces: 13. 

15.25,32.40,45.47. 11 3, 130, ~9, 

155 

Republic of Vietllam Amly: 2 1-2"2. 27. 

'02 

5t h Divisioll: 121 

21sl !)ivision: 114 
INDEX 181 

R~uirementJ, intelli~nce. Su Mi5.'lion, 

intelligence. 

Rc:quirc:menu nranch, c~ : 28 

Research and analysis: 4, 7, 22, 48, 51-54, 

00-64, 109. 121. 126, U2-34 

Resources, intelligence: ~, 9, II. ~, 

69 

Retric:"\'al sen-ice!!. Su S!ora~ and rc. 

trieval.sc:rvices. 

Review and Anal) .. is Program: 148 

Revolutional)' Invc:lopment program: 

107, 11 0. 154 

Re"'ards programs: 108. 142 

Rhode, Major Donald D.: 40 

Rice production sun'ey: ~:W 

Rh'er S),5IenlJ. 5c:c: WatCf,,·ays. 

Roben,. Colonel Robert F.: 108 

Rotation program: 25. 148 

Ruble, Ueutenant Colonel Richard L.: 

109 

Rusk. Dean : 1!6 

RU5.'lia. Scc: Soviet Union. 

.l3botage and CQuntenahOlage: 13. 18. 

28. 110-41 

Saigon: 16, 26. 28-SO, 4~ -50, 57, 71- 72, 

77- 78,114, 11 6-17, 12~, 111 ,]50\ 

Saigon Ril'cr: 121 

SanclUari/!$. enem)': 6.64. 1] 6-25 

Schaf, Colonel Frank 1-. Jr.: 4 ... --16 

Scou u. Su Kit Canon scout : I'anols, 

ground. 

Sattning prOCeM. Sec: Evaluation process. 

Sc:a.man, Lieutenant Genenl johathan 

0.: 117- 25 

Sector intelligence: 6-1- 71 . Sec: also Area 

intel ligence. 

Securit)' measure: " . 60, 71 , 77. 107 . 

123,137, 14 1-47 

Sensors. use and potential: 106 

Signal Detachment. 18t h: 55 

Signal ~n pmenl , exploitation and 

stud), of: 36.41,55 

Sociological characteristics. enemy: 60 

South China Sea : 6, 103 

Southe:ut Asia j oint Operations Weather 

Center: 156 

Sovereignty, rc:!lpc:cting: 21. 2.1, 139 

~viCl Union: (i 

Spttial Forces Group, 5th : 13, 60. 105. 

107- 109, 137, 156 

Spttialisu. intelligc:nce: IS-H, 25, 33. 40, 

U. 45-46. &1. 69-70, 109 

Staff organization and function.' : )01 .... 18. 

71 .... 78. 148 

ST,\RI.IGIIT operation: 9 

Sta rlight Scope: 10S-106 

Storage and relTie"al serl'ices: 34, !8-39, 

48. 60, 67-68, 74. 95, 104 . 111 .... 12, 

137, 149,152- 53 

Strachan. Captain james D.: 7, 27, SO, 

14. 

StrategiC Air Command: 45,97-98 

Strat~ic intelligence: 6-7, 13, 36, '18, 61. 

129 

Students for a Democratic Socicty: ~ 

Suhversion and COulltersubvenion : ~. 

18. 28. 140 

Sum marie!!, prepa ration and di tribution 

of: 28, 36. 38, 51-52. 102. 127 .... 31 

Summer llluitute of L.ingui$tiQ: 10 

Supply S)'5 temS and openlions. enemy: 

13, 62.110, 11 6-25 

Support nranch, crcv: 46,48 

Support of intdligence: 148-56 

Surl"eil1:lIlce. aerial: 95- 106 

SUllon, Major Lawrence: 26 

Tactical Air Control Center: 98, 102 

Tactical air support: 95--106 

Tactical Air SUPl>Ort Element : 98 

T actics, enemy: 28, 132 ~4. 158 

Tall Son Nhut · 34. 45--46. 99. 150 

Target Research and Analysis Center: 45 

Target Research and Analysis ])ivi\;oll. 

j - 2: 14 

Targets Branch. CICV: 45, 60-61 

T axation. b>' enemy: 61 

Ta r Ninh PrO\ inee: 58, 121. 136-37 

T tthnical intelJigc:nce: 16, 46,48. 54-57 

Technical Intel1igence Branch. CICV: 46, 

5·1 .... 57 

Telephone service: 36, 146-47 

Tdet)l)C sel"\'ice: 49 

T ermin ~nal s: 6, 21. 52 

Terrorism, defcnse: ag3inJl: 141-12 

~t o"eluil"e: 78 

Than Dien or~t Reserve: 12] 

Thanh. General Nguyen Chi. NVA: 116 

Thi Tinh Ri\er: 1 HI 

Tiep, Major C~o Minh, ARVN. 47 

Timdine5.'l in tr.uumi5.'l ion: 7. 149, 157 
182 THE ROLE OF M ILITARY INTELLIGENCE 

TouriMln. Sergtam Sedgc:wiCk: 2fi 

Tnini"g aid.: 66,69 

T raining programs: 16. 111.21-22.24-26, 

51, 37, 40, ~6-I7, 6$-66, 68-69, 

99- 100, 103. 107. 109. 127. HO, 10, 

155-58 

Tnnslalion Branch. COEe: 37 

Translation servicc: 16,32,54. 56-SS. 51, 

T ransportation '" Detachment, 30th: 55 

Tri:ulIafellu , Brigad ier General RO(kly. 

USAF: 96 

Troop uniu, enemy. Su Order of inuit, 

enemy. 

Trung Lap: 121 

Tunnellyslems, enemy: 55, 125 

Tymchak, Lieutenant Colonel Michael: 

99 

United Stato Air For~: 4, ]5-14.58,60. 

96-99. 101, 103. 123. ~O. 150-51. 

155-.s6 

Sevc:nth Air Force: 96.98 

.6Oth Tactical R«onna;uance Wing: 

9&-99 

5th Weather Squadron: 156 

15th Re«InnaiMance TKhni(3\ Squad. 

ron: 00, 157 

United Slalt'S Army, Paci fic: 18, 16 

United Siales Army, Vietnam: 13-14. Su 

alJo Westmoreland, General William 

C. 

Unitt<! Stales Embnsy: 26. 52. 65. 71-73. 

129, 136. 140. See IliJO Komer. Robtrt 

W. 

Uni ted States Marine Corps: 9. U . 98. 

101. 105. 11 4 

United States Military Assistance Com· 

mand. Vietnam: 12- 14. 2'. '4. 40. 

42. 44. 46. 65. 71, 7'. 94-95. 98, 

102- 106. 112- U. 124. 127-.50, In. 

I'S-H. 148-50. 154-56. Su IdJO 

Westmoreland . Ceneral William C. 

United States Mission Council: 72. 141 

Un ited States Navy: 4. 15. 96. 98, 101. 

110. 140. 150. 155 

United States Padfic Command: 12. '9. 

46.97-98. 106. 128-29. 132. 141. 146. 

149. 15' 

Unit ), of command: 8-9, 71. 157 

Vi et Cong; U. '1. ~37. 51. 71- 72. 

74-78. 94. 101. 107. 109-10. 114-15. 

123-25.150.132-'5. 14()-o11. 156 

Mililary Region IV: 71-77. 11 5-25 

Milita ry Region V: 114 

Wcstern Highlands Military Region : 

II. 

5th Division: SO. 114. I" 

9th Dh'ision: 11 7- 18 

1st Regiment: 9 

272d Regiment: 11 6-25 

ht Battalion: 117 

7t h Battalion : 11 7 

Phu Loi Bal1alion : 11 7 

Viewel"$. imagery: 57-58. 154 

Vi~itation pr<>gTams: 68-69.99. 146 

War 7.oneC. VC: 11 5. 11 7 

Waterwa)"S: 6. lOS. ISS 

W-'YSIDf. p roj«t: 100 

Wcapon~. enemy. Sell I.lateriel. exploitation and study of. 

Weapons and Munitions Section. CMEC: 

41 

Weather 

eR"o:ct on operations: 96.98 

intelligence on : 6. 14.21. 156 

Westmoreland. Ceneral William C.: 9. 

U. 19. 64. 72. 98. 117. 126. 156. 

See also United States Army. Viet· 

nam: United States Mil itary Assi5l . 

ante Command. Vietnam. 

World War II experience: 145 

Voungdale. Major Cenenl earl. USMC; 

• 

0- U.S. GOIIEANMENT PRIHfHG OFFICE: '"", 382-281 
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