IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19

- 0281 Filed March 4, 2020

ADIL D. ADAMS , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,
vs. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA HOSPITALS & CLINICS , Defendant

- Appell ee

.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad A. Kepros , Judge.

A civil rights complainant appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to reopen a “j udicial revie w ” proceeding. AFFIRMED.

Adil D. Adams , Iowa City, self

- represented appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kayla Burkhiser Reynolds , Assistant Attorney General , for appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J. , and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.2

TABOR , Judge

. Adil Adams appeals the district court’s dismissal of his attempt to challenge a decision by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) to close its investigation of his complaint against the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC). Finding
the district court properly considered the parties’ filings, we affirm the dismissal.
I

. Prior Proceedings
Adams filed a complaint with the ICRC a fter he was disappointed with the
service he received at UIHC

. Following its investigation, t he ICRC issued a notice of administrative closure in September 2018, allo wing Adams the right to sue UI HC
within 30 days . In December 20 18, Adams filed a “ petition for j udicial r eview

. ” In
response, UIHC filed a m otion to d ismiss arguing Adams faile d to identify the “ final
agency a ction” from which he appealed and that his petition was untimely . Adams
di d not respond to the motion

. In January 2019, t he district c ourt dismissed
Adams ’s “ judicial r eview ” petition for the reasons cited in UIHC ’s motion

. Within a few weeks, A dams mo ved to reopen the c ase. In his motion, Adams expressed difficulties in setting up an electronic document management system ( E DMS ) account. Adams also claimed h e never received notification of UIHC ’s m otion to d ismiss or the o rder dismiss ing h is petition. Adams asserted UIHC used the wrong em ail

— a Hotmail address

— to send him notifications. Instead, Adams provided an alternate emai l

— a Gmail a ddress

— which was linked
to his EDMS account.
The UIHC resisted Adams’s m otion to reopen , asserting it sent a copy of
the motion to dismiss to the email account listed on Adams ’s petition and also through EDMS

. The UIHC attached copies of the emails sent to Adams notifying3

him of the motion to dismiss. After reviewing the parties’ filings, the district court
denied Adams ’s motion to reopen. The court explained it was Adams ’s

“ responsibility to be aware of the proceedings ” and his EDMS and email account s. The court also returned to the substance of the UIHC’s motion to dismiss, clarifying: [T]his is an action for judicial review. Judicial review is review by the judiciary of a final agency action. [Adams] has not submitted documentation of a final agency decision. What he has submitted is a right to sue letter. The right to sue letter provided in accordance with Iowa Co de section 216.16 allows the Plaintiff to commence a civil rights action in the District Court, not a judicial review action. No other basis for the judicial review action has been provided. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss would again be granted. Repre senting himself, Adams now app eals.
II. Standard of Review The UIHC’s mo tion to dismiss test ed the l egal sufficiency of Adams’s petition. See Reiff v. Evans , 630 N.W.2d 278, 284 (Iowa 2001). We review the court’s ruling on that motion fo r correction of legal error

. See Smith v. Smith , 513 N.W.2d 728, 73 0 (Iowa 1994)

. III. Analysis.
Ada ms claims the district court should have granted his motion to reopen the judicial review because he did not receive UIHC’ s motion to d ismiss or the
orde r dismissing the case

. In his motion to reopen, Adams claimed he did not receive “any hard copy of the motion or letter from the respondent or any hard copy from the court order.” Adams also asserted he has two email accounts and “some
documents were sen t to one account, but not the other, which caused confusion for [him] to review them and respond in a timely manner.”4 UIHC disputes Adams’s premise. It contends Adams had ten days to respond to its motion to dismiss, but he failed to do so. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.431(4) ( “ Unless otherwise ordered by the court or provided by rule or statute, each party opposing the motion shall file within ten days after a copy of the motion
has been served a written resistance to the motion. ”). UIHC asserts it properl y served its motion to dismiss through EDMS , as well as sending a copy to the email address on his petition

. 1 See Iowa R. Elec. P. 16.302(1) , 16.316. So , according to UIHC, Adams cannot rely on faulty service as justification for n ot respond ing to
its mo tion to dismiss within the time permitted in the rule. 2 Unconvinced by Adams’s conte ntions, the district court found “ no valid
basis ” to reopen the matter. We find no error in the court’s ruling. As the court emphasized, Adams bore the r esponsibility to update his email, monitor his
account s, and notify the court if he could no longer participate as a registered filer in EDMS

. See Iowa R. Elec. P. 16.304

. Adams offers nothing to contradict UIHC ’s contention that it properly served him t hrough EDMS

. The information available in
the record confirms UIHC sent its motion to dismiss to both his email accounts.

1 Contrary to Adams’s claim, UIHC was not required t o serve a paper copy of the motion. See Iowa R. Elec. P. 16.302(1), 16.316. B y registering as an EDMS user, Adams consented to service by e m ail. See Iowa R. Elec. P. 16.315(1)(a)

. 2 The UIHC notes that Iowa courts provide a mechanism for self

- represented parties to opt out of electronic filing in certain circumstances . But it does not appear Adams sought an exception

. See Comment to Iowa R. Elec. P. 16.302(2) (“When there are legitimate reasons preventing a person from electronic filing, the court should grant that person an exception.”)

.5 As an additional grounds for appeal, Adams contends the district court violated his due process rights by not setting h is motion to reopen for a hearing. 3 Adams does not state in his brief where in the record he preserved this constitutional issue for our review. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(1). The fact that Adams is handling his own appeal does not excuse substanti al departures from the rules of appellate procedure. See Polk C ty v. Davis , 525 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Iowa 1994). Because we cannot fin d a district court ruling on his due process issue, we decline to address it. For the reasons discussed above, we affirm th e court’s decision not to reopen the case.
AFFIRMED.

3 The UIHC addresses this claim under the rules of civil procedure, noting the district court had discretion whether to hold a hearing on Adams’s motion to reopen the case. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.431(9) ( “ T he court may deem a motion under these rules submit ted without hearing or may schedule a hearing, either in person or by telephone conference call, on the motion .”). We agree the court acted within its discretion in deciding the motion without a hearing.