1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE 

ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 20-cv-2295(EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff, the National Association for the Advancement of 

Colored People (“NAACP”) filed this lawsuit against Defendants 

the United States Postal Service (“USPS” or “Postal Service”) 

and Louis DeJoy (“Mr. DeJoy”), in his official capacity as 

Postmaster General of the United States, alleging the following 

claims: (1) Non-statutory review of unlawful agency action for 

failure to follow the procedures required by 39 U.S.C. § 3661; 

(2) Non-statutory review of unlawful agency action that is 

arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with 39 U.S.C. § 

101(e); (3) Mandamus to enforce 29 U.S.C. § 3991; and (4) 

Mandamus to enforce 39 U.S.C. § 101(e). Plaintiff seeks a 

preliminary injunction with regard to their first and second 

claims. Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s motion, the response, 
2 

and reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, 

the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.

II. Background 

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 

In the Postal Reorganization Act (“PRA”), Public Law 91-375, 

84 Stat. 719 (Aug. 12, 1970), Congress replaced the Post Office 

Department with the Postal Service as “an independent establishment 

of the executive branch of the Government of the United States, 

under the direction of a Board of Governors, with the Postmaster 

General as its chief executive officer.” 39 C.F.R. § 1.1. The PRA 

establishes that the policy of the USPS includes the mandate to 

“provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all 

areas and . . . render postal services to all communities.” 39 

U.S.C. § 101. The PRA also created an independent oversight body 

for the USPS, the Postal Rate Commission. 39 U.S.C. § 501. 

Congress passed the PRA to “[i]nsulate” the management of the 

USPS “from partisan politics . . . by having the Postmaster 

General responsible to the [Postal Rate] Commission, which 

represents the public interest only, for his conduct of the 

affairs of the Postal Service.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1104, 3660-61 

(1970). 

In the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (“PAEA”), 

Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198 (Dec. 20, 2006) (codified at 

39 U.S.C. § 3600 et seq.), Congress replaced the Postal Rate 
3 

Commission with the Postal Regulatory Commission (“PRC” or 

“Commission”) and “strengthened its role.” Carlson v. Postal 

Regul. Comm’n, 938 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 

The USPS is responsible for “develop[ing] and promot[ing] 

adequate and efficient postal services.” 39 U.S.C. § 3661(a). 

“When the Postal Service determines that there should be a 

change in the nature of postal services [that] will generally 

affect service on a nationwide or substantially nationwide 

basis,” it must “submit a proposal, within a reasonable time 

prior to the effective date of such proposal, to the Postal 

Regulatory Commission requesting an advisory opinion on the 

change.” Id. § 3661(b). 

Following the submission of a proposal, “[t]he Commission 

shall not issue its opinion on any proposal until an opportunity 

for hearing on the record under [the Administrative Procedure 

Act] has been accorded the Postal Service, users of the mail, 

and an officer of the Commission who shall be required to 

represent the interests of the general public. The opinion shall 

be in writing and shall include a certification by each 

Commissioner agreeing with the opinion that in his judgment the 

opinion conforms to the policies established under this title.” 

39 U.S.C. § 3661(c). 
4 

B. Factual Background 

1. The COVID-19 Pandemic and Its Impact on Voting in 

the 2020 Election.1

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) 

declared a global pandemic as a result of the spread of COVID19. See Dr. Tedros Adhanom, WHO Director-General’s Opening 

Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020), 

https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-sopening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march2020. On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared a 

national emergency as a result of the outbreak. Proclamation No. 

9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 18, 2020). 

The virus that causes COVID-19 is highly contagious, is 

believed to spread mostly from person-to-person when people are 

in within six feet of each other, and may be spread by people 

who are not showing symptoms of the virus. See Centers for 

Disease Control, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): How to 

Protect Yourself and Others (last updated Sep. 11, 2020), 

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-

 

1 The Court takes judicial notice of documents and information on 

official government websites. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see also

Western Watershed Project v. Bernhardt, 2020 WL 3402379, * 3 n.4 

(D.D.C. June 19, 2020). The Court takes judicial notice of 

certain information at the World Health Organization website, 

the Johns Hopkins University website, and the Mayo Clinic 

website which is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because 

they are “sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 
5 

sick/prevention.html. Symptoms range from mild to severe. See

Mayo Clinic, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), Symptoms and 

Causes (updated Sep. 11, 2020), 

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/coronavirus/symptoms-causes/syc-20479963. Older 

people and people with existing chronic medical conditions have 

a higher risk of serious illness from COVID-19. Id. Such chronic 

medical conditions include “serious heart disease . . . , 

cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, type 2 diabetes, 

severe obesity, chronic kidney disease, sickle cell disease, and 

weakened immune system from solid organ transplants.” Id. COVID19 can result in severe medical complications including 

“pneumonia and trouble breathing, organ failure in more than one 

organ, heart problems, acute respiratory distress syndrome, 

blood clots, acute kidney injury, and additional viral and 

bacterial infections.” Id. A disproportionate number of black 

people have been infected and killed by the disease. The COVID 

Tracking Project, The COVID Racial Data Tracker, 

https://covidtracking.com/race. 

As of October 10, 2020, just over one million people 

worldwide, and 214,004 Americans have died from COVID-19. See

Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center, 

https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html. Also as of October 6, 

2020, over 37 million people worldwide have been infected, with 
6 

the United States having more infections than any other country, 

with just over seven and a half million infections. Id. 

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has provided guidance to voters 

and election polling locations to prevent the spread of the 

disease, including recommending “a wide variety of voting 

options . . . such as alternative voting options that minimize 

contact.” See CDC, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): 

Considerations for Election Polling Locations and Voters, 

Interim Guidance to Prevent Spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 

(COVID-19) (last updated June 22, 2020), 

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/electionpolling-locations.html. Consistent with this guidance, states 

have enacted temporary changes for the 2020 election including 

expanding the ability to vote by mail. Nat’l Conference of State 

Legislatures, COVID-19 and Elections, (last updated Oct. 2, 

2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/absentee-and-mail-voting-policies-in-effect-for-the2020-election.aspx. 

2. USPS Implements Changes that Lead to Nationwide 

Mail Delays 

The key changes that Plaintiff challenges are the 

prohibition on “late trips” and “extra trips” (collectively 
7 

“Transportation Policy Changes”)2 announced on July 10, 2020.3

Reply, ECF No. 25 at 9.4 Defendants have since clarified that 

late or extra trips are not “banned”; however, they acknowledge 

that they continue “at a reduced level” that began in July 2020. 

Suppl. Cintron Decl., ECF No. 24-3 ¶ 4. By August 13, 2020, the 

USPS had reduced the number of late trips by 71 percent. Email 

from Mr. DeJoy to All Employees (“August 13, 2020 Email”), Aug. 

13, 2020, ECF No. 25-1. Mr. DeJoy acknowledged that the 

“transformative initiative has had unintended consequences that 

impacted our overall service levels.” Id. at 2. On September 21, 

2020, USPS issued “Operational Instructions” providing that 

“transportation, in the form of late or extra trips that are 

reasonably necessary to complete timely mail delivery, is not to 

be unreasonably restricted or prohibited. Managers are 

authorized to use their best business judgment to meet our 

service commitments.” Ex. 1 to Notice Suppl. Material, ECF No. 

29-1 at 4. 

 

2 “Late trips” and “extra trips” have been employed by the USPS 

to “complete timely mail delivery.” Ex. 1 to Notice Suppl. 

Material, ECF No. 29-1 at 4. 

3 Plaintiff originally challenged changes in addition to the 

Transportation Policy Changes, see Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for 

Prelim. Inj. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 8-1 at 22-23; but clarified that 

they challenge the Transportation Policy Changes, see Reply, ECF 

No. 25 at 9. 

4 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document.
8 

It is undisputed that the USPS did not seek an advisory 

opinion pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 3661(b) from the PRC prior to 

implementing these changes. 

C. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 20, 2020. On 

September 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary 

injunction, which requests that the Court enjoin Defendants from 

enforcing certain USPS policies and practices. See Mem. in Supp. 

of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 8-1. Defendants filed 

their opposition on September 11, 2020. See Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. 

Prelim. Inj. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 21. Plaintiff filed its 

reply brief on September 16, 2020. See Pls.’ Reply (“Reply”), 

ECF No. 25. The motion is ripe for the Court’s consideration.

III. Standard of Review 

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

establish [1] that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] 

that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.’” 

Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 

(D.C. Cir. 2011)). Where the federal government is the opposing 

party, the balance of equities and public interest factors 

merge. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). A 
9 

preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only 

be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 

to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is 

merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a 

trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch,

451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). In this Circuit, the four factors have 

typically been evaluated on a “sliding scale,” such that if “the 

movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, 

then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on 

another factor.” Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 

1288, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), “the D.C. 

Circuit has suggested that a positive showing on all four 

preliminary injunction factors may be required.” Holmes v. FEC,

71 F. Supp. 3d 178, 183 n.4 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sherley, 644 

F.3d at 393 (“[W]e read Winter at least to suggest if not to 

hold that a likelihood of success is an independent, freestanding requirement for a preliminary injunction.”) (quotation 

marks omitted). Nonetheless, “the Circuit has had no occasion to 

decide this question because it has not yet encountered a postWinter case where a preliminary injunction motion survived the 
10 

less rigorous sliding-scale analysis.” ConverDyn v. Moniz, 68 F. 

Supp. 3d 34, 46 n.2 (D.D.C. 2014). 

IV. Analysis 

Plaintiff argues that it is likely to succeed on the merits 

of its Section 3661(b) claim because “Congress has mandated that 

before implementing changes that have a nationwide impact on 

mail delivery, the Postal Service must provide an opportunity 

for public comment and seek an advisory opinion from the [PRC].” 

Mot., ECF No. 8-1 at 13. Plaintiff further argues that in 

rushing to make the Transportation Policy Changes, “Defendants 

failed to consider key statutory objectives about reliable mail 

service and the need to give the highest consideration to 

delivery [of] important mail, including ballots and checks . . . 

and failed to consider the adverse impact on timely delivery of 

medications” which they contend is inconsistent with the mandate 

set forth in Section 101. Id. 

Defendants respond that Plaintiff lacks Article III 

standing, that district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction 

over Section 3661 claims, that the ultra vires doctrine does not 

provide for judicial review here, and that Plaintiff’s claim 

that defendants’ failure to comply with Section 101(e) was 

arbitrary and capricious cannot be brought. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 21 at 33-38, 39-43, 43-49, 49-51. 
11 

A. Plaintiff Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits Of Its 39 

U.S.C. § 3661(b) Claim 

1. Plaintiff Likely Has Standing to Bring this 

Challenge 

To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an 

‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between 

the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a 

‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable 

decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 

2341 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560-61 (1992)). “These requirements apply whether an 

organization asserts standing to sue, either on its own behalf, 

or on behalf of its members.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. 

United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing 

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982). 

“Standing to seek . . . forward-looking injunctive relief 

requires [Plaintiff] to show [that it] is suffering an ongoing 

injury or faces immediate injury. For a future injury, that 

means submitting evidence showing that there is a substantial 

risk that the harm will recur.” Narragansett Indian Tribal 

Historic Pres. Office v. FERC, 949 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 

(internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations in 

original omitted). 

“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden 

of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 
12 

(citations omitted). “Since they are not mere pleading 

requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's 

case, each element must be supported in the same way as any 

other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, 

i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 

successive stages of the litigation.” Id. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate injury 

to its members or to itself as an organization. “First, the fact 

that one of the Plaintiff’s members [Mr. Earl Graham, a disabled 

veteran] allegedly has been harmed by delayed mail in the past 

does not entitle Plaintiff to standing now, at least when it is 

seeking forward-looking injunctive relief” because Defendants 

have provided “evidence that mail delays have been mitigated” 

and so “there is no basis to conclude that this purported injury 

is likely to recur.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 34-35 (citing 

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107-108, 1983). 

However, Mr. Graham has described persisting mail delays. Decl. 

of Earl Graham,5 ECF No. 8-3 ¶ 6 (“Before this summer, my mailorder medications would arrive generally a few days after my 

doctor approved any prescription. Since mid-July, however, my 

medications have taken much longer to arrive, including 

sometimes arriving one week or longer after my doctor has 

 

5 Earl Graham is a member of the NAACP. 
13 

approved prescriptions.”); Second Decl. of Earl Graham, ECF No. 

25-2 ¶ 2 (“The delays I discussed have continued since I 

submitted by August 28, 2020 declaration.); ¶ 3 (“A week [after 

an August 25, 2020 teleconference appointment with a Veterans 

Affairs doctor] the medicine approved by my doctor during my 

August 25, 2020, teleconference appointment still had not 

arrived. Without the medication, I began experiencing serious 

pain.”); ¶¶ 5-6 (explaining that he was eligible to be sent 

medication through express mail due to the seriousness of the 

pain he was experiencing and that he received the medication 

sent via express mail within two days); ¶ 6 (“By the time the 

delayed medication arrived, it had been almost two weeks since 

my August 25, 2020 teleconference appointment.”). As Plaintiff 

has provided evidence of continuing mail delays, Defendants’ 

reliance on City of L.A. for the proposition that the alleged 

injury is unlikely to recur is misplaced. In that case, the 

Supreme Court observed that “five months had elapsed between 

[the traffic stop resulting in a chokehold] and the filing of 

the complaint, yet there was no allegation of further 

unfortunate encounters between [Mr.] Lyons and the police.” City 

of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 108. Here, Plaintiff has provided 

evidence demonstrating that mail delays persist. 

As part of this argument, Defendants contend that the 

Complaint does not allege what exactly caused the mail delays. 
14 

Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 34-35. However, Defendants’ own 

evidence demonstrates that Mr. DeJoy has acknowledged that the 

Transportation Policy Changes caused mail delays. See Ex. 5, Tr. 

of Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Comm. Hr’g 

on USPS Operations During COVID-19 and the Elections, Aug. 21, 

2020, ECF No. 21-1 at 104 (Mr. DeJoy stating that the reduction 

in late trips resulted in mail delays); Id. at 309, (Mr. DeJoy 

stating that “[w]e are very concerned with the deterioration and 

service and are working very diligently.”); Id. at 323 (Mr. 

DeJoy stating that “[o]ur recovery process is taking too long. 

This should have been resolved in a couple of—in a few days and 

it’s-it’s not.”); Id. at 350 (Mr. DeJoy stating that “I think 

there is a lot of different issues going on within the country 

that are—impact mail delay, including the actions that we took 

with regard to transportation.”); August 13, 2020 Email, ECF No. 

25-1 at 4 (“Unfortunately, this transformative initiative has 

had unintended consequences that impacted our overall service 

levels.”) 

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s members’ concerns 

about future mail delays impacting their ability to vote fails 

to establish standing because future injury must be “certainly 

impending.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 35 (quoting Clapper v. 

Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2010)). Defendants contend 

that “the Postal Service has numerous policies and practices 
15 

designed to ensure that ballots will be timely delivered before 

the election,” that it is within Plaintiff’s members’ control to 

timely mail their ballots, and so their injury is speculative. 

Id. However, Defendants are incorrect to assert that standing to 

obtain injunctive relief requires the injury to be “certainly 

impending.” Rather, “[s]tanding to seek . . . forward-looking 

injunctive relief requires [Plaintiff] to show [that it] is 

suffering an ongoing injury or faces immediate injury. For a 

future injury, that means submitting evidence showing that there 

is a substantial risk that the harm will recur.” Narragansett 

Indian Tribal Historic Pres. Office, 949 F.3d at 13 (internal 

quotation marks, citations, and alterations in original 

omitted). Accordingly, as explained above, Plaintiff has 

demonstrated that its members face a “substantial risk that the 

harm will recur” and has demonstrated injury to its members. 

Third, Defendants contend that Plaintiff alleges issue 

advocacy harm, which is insufficient to establish organizational 

standing. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 35-37. Plaintiff responds 

that it has provided evidence demonstrating that because of the 

impact of the mail delays, it is “diverting resources away from 

its ordinary voter registration activities, voter protection 

activities, and education activities designed to promote voter 

turnout” which pursuant to League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838 
16 

F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), constitutes irreparable injury. Reply, 

ECF No. 25 at 30. 

 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 

(“D.C. Circuit”) recently articulated the test for determining 

whether an organization satisfies the “irreparable harm” prong: 

An organization is harmed if the “actions

taken by [the defendant] have ‘perceptibly 

impaired’ the [organization's] programs.” 

Fair Emp't Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. 

BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 

1994) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 

455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 71 L. Ed. 

2d 214 (1982)); see also Nat'l Treasury Emps. 

Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1430 

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining that the initial 

question is whether “a defendant's conduct has 

made the organization's activities more 

difficult”). If so, the organization must then 

also show that the defendant's actions

“directly conflict with the organization's 

mission.” Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 101 F.3d 

at 1430. The second step is required to ensure 

that organizations cannot engage in activities 

simply to create an injury. Id. 

League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 8. “Irreparable harm” is a 

higher burden than that necessary to establish Article III 

standing. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 383 F. Supp. 3d 

1, 11 (D.D.C. 2019) (“‘an identifiable trifle is enough for 

standing’”) (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Reg’y 

Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)). 

Plaintiff has provided evidence demonstrating that it “has 

established a civic engagement program, which is designed to 

encourage citizens to be fully engaged in the democratic 
17 

process, and to raise awareness for political, educational, 

social and economic equality for communities of color in the 

electoral and legislative process. . . [T]he program seeks to 

increase turnout among Black voters in federal, state, and local 

elections.” Decl. of Carmen Watkins,6 ECF No. 8-2 ¶¶ 2, 6. 

Plaintiff has also demonstrated that Defendants’ actions have 

“made the organization’s activities more difficult,” League of 

Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 8 (citation omitted); because 

Plaintiff has explained that needing to address the impact of 

the mail delays is causing it to “divert[] resources from the 

regular activities of the NAACP’s civil engagement program,” 

which includes “registering voters, contacting registered voters 

to ensure that they have accurate voting information and 

encouraging them to vote, organizing events to get out the vote, 

and conducting voter protection activities during early voting.” 

Id. ¶ 11. 

Next, Plaintiff must show that “the defendant's actions 

‘directly conflict with the organization's mission’” in order 

“to ensure that organizations cannot engage in activities simply 

to create an injury.” League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 8. 

Plaintiff’s civic engagement program is clearly part of its 

mission “to ensure the political, educational, social, and 

 

6 Carmen Watkins is the Interim Vice President of Field 

Operations for the NAACP. 
18 

economic equality of all persons and to eliminate race-based 

discrimination.” Watkins Decl., ECF No. 8-2 ¶ 2. And as stated 

above, the civic engagement program includes “registering 

voters, contacting registered voters to ensure that they have 

accurate voting information and encouraging them to vote, 

organizing events to get out the vote, and conducting voter 

protection activities during early voting.” Id. ¶ 11. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has provided evidence demonstrating that 

to Defendants’ actions “directly conflict with [its] mission” 

because it has needed to divert resources from the civic 

engagement program to instead “organize transportation for 

voters to drop off their absentee ballots” in various states. 

Id. ¶¶ 8, 9, 10, 12. 

Defendants fail to distinguish League of Women Voters in 

their opposition brief and the authorities they point to support 

Plaintiff’s ability to satisfy “irreparable harm,” a higher 

burden than that necessary to establish Article III standing. 

Plaintiff has provided evidence that due to mail delays caused 

by Defendants’ action, they have needed in the past and will 

need in the future to divert resources from their civic 

engagement program to organize transportation to ensure that 

votes are counted. This constitutes a “drain on the 

organization’s resources”; not simply a “setback to the 

organization’s abstract social interests.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
19 

Builders v. EPA, 667 F.3d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Nat’l 

Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. 

Cir. 1995)). Similarly, Plaintiff’s provision of services 

through its civic engagement program demonstrates that it does 

not engage solely in “pure issue-advocacy.” Ctr. for Law & Educ 

v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Rather, 

Plaintiff’s activities are more akin to those of Housing 

Opportunities Made Equal (“HOME”), which the Supreme Court held 

had standing in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. In so holding, 

the Supreme Court stated: 

If, as broadly alleged, petitioner’s steering 

practices have perceptibly impaired HOME’s 

ability to providing counseling and referral 

services for low-and moderate-income home

seekers, there can be no question that the 

organization has suffered injury in fact. Such 

concrete and demonstrable injury to the 

organization’s activities–with the consequent 

drain on the organization’s resources—

constitutes far more than simply a setback to 

the organization’s abstract social interests. 

455 U.S. at 379. Similarly, here Plaintiff has provided evidence 

demonstrating how mail delays are causing it to divert resources 

from its usual civic engagement activities, which is 

distinguishable from the situation in Int’l Acad. Of Oral 

Medicine & Toxicology v. FDA, 195 F. Supp. 3d 243 (D.D.C. 2016), 

where the Plaintiff failed to explain how the agency action 

“forced it to divert or modify its activities in any meaningful 

way from its standard programmatic efforts.” Id. at 259. 
20 

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has provided evidence 

“showing that there is a substantial risk that the harm will 

recur.” Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Pres. Office, 949 

F.3d at 13. 

Finally, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff cannot establish 

causation or redressability because it seeks to enjoin changes 

that have not occurred.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 38. Specifically, 

Defendants argue that “the only specific change that was 

actually implemented was additional guidance on complying with 

long-established transportation schedules by departing on time 

and thus mitigating extra trips.” Id. This, however, is 

precisely what Plaintiff challenges. Reply, ECF No. 25 at 9, 19-

21. 

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has demonstrated that 

it likely has standing to bring its claims on behalf of its 

members and itself as an organization. 

2. This Court Likely Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Over The Section 3661 Claim 

Defendants contend that this court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over “complaints regarding” Section 3661 because 

such complaints must first be made to the PRC and then to the 

D.C. Circuit. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 39. The statutory 

scheme provides as follows. 39 U.S.C. § 409(a) provides that 

“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, the United States 
21 

district courts shall have original but not exclusive 

jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against the Postal 

Service.” One of the exceptions to this original jurisdiction is 

set forth in 39 U.S.C. § 3662, which provides that “[a]ny 

interested person . . . who believe[s] the Postal Service is not 

operating in conformance with the requirements of a provision of 

. . . this chapter (or regulations promulgated under any of 

these provisions) may lodge a complaint with the [PRC] . . .” 

Section 3662(b) requires the PRC to respond to the complaint 

within 90 days and provides that if a complaint is not timely 

responded to, a petition for review may be filed with the D.C. 

Circuit, which also has jurisdiction to review final orders or 

decisions of the PRC. 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a procedural violation—that 

the USPS failed to comply with the requirement that “[w]hen the 

Postal Service determines that there should be a change in the 

nature of postal services which will generally affect service on 

a nationwide or substantially nationwide basis, it shall submit 

a proposal, within a reasonable time prior to the effective date 

of such proposal, to the Postal Regulatory commission requesting 

an advisory opinion on the change.” 39 U.S.C. § 3661. 

Defendants contend that “[c]ourts have repeatedly held that 

39 U.S.C. §§ 3662 and 3663 constitute the exclusive 

jurisdictional remedy for complaints about postal services that 
22 

fall within the statutory provisions specifically identified in 

[S]ection 3662.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 40. However, 

defendants have provided no mandatory authority to support their 

assertion that Sections 3662 and 3663 constitute the exclusive 

jurisdictional remedy for a claim that the USPS has failed to 

comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 

3661. Indeed, Plaintiff points out that none of the cases cited 

by defendants “concerns a failure to follow the procedural 

requirements of [S]ection 3661” but rather “considered a 

complaint about Postal Service prices and the manner in which 

the Postal Service provides delivery services.” Reply, ECF No. 

25 at 12. 

“Whether a statute is intended to preclude initial judicial 

review is determined by the statute’s language, structure, and 

purpose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be 

afforded meaningful review.” Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 

510 U.S. 200, 307 (1994) (internal citation omitted). The 

language of the statute is broad: “[a]ny interested person . . 

. who believe[s] the Postal Service is not operating in 

conformance with the requirements of a provision of . . . this 

chapter (or regulations promulgated under any of these 

provisions) may lodge a complaint with the Postal Regulatory 

Commission . . .” 39 U.S.C. § 3662. This could certainly be read 

to mean that the failure of the USPS to comply with the 
23 

procedural requirement set forth in Section 3661 would be 

encompassed by Section 3662. Plaintiff argues that the use of 

the permissive “may” in Section 3662 coupled with the mandatory 

phrasing “shall” in Section 3662(c) shows Congress did not 

intend to limit jurisdiction over Section 3661 claims. See

Reply, ECF No. 25 at 10. The statute consistently uses the word 

“may” when setting forth the procedure for filing complaints and 

for seeking appellate review of the PRC’s determination (or 

failure to make a determination): any interested person “may” 

lodge a complaint with the PRC, and if the interested person is 

unsatisfied with the response or does not receive a timely 

response, they “may” file a petition with the D.C. Circuit. 39 

U.S.C. §§ 3662(a), 3663. The use of the permissive “may” coupled 

with the use of the mandatory “shall” suggests that Sections 

3662(a) and 3663 were not intended to be the exclusive avenue 

for bringing a procedural challenge to the USPS’s failure to 

comply with Section 3661. See Bennett v. Panama Canal Co., 475 

F.2d 1280, 1828 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[T]he permissive 

interpretation is conclusively proven to be correct [together 

with the particular legislative history] by the fact that when 

in the same statute Congress intended a mandatory direction it 

used the auxiliary ‘shall’ not ‘may’-a contrast which is 

generally significant . . . .”). This interpretation is 

strengthened because the statute expressly provides that this 
24 

Court has original jurisdiction “over all actions brought by or 

against the Postal Service” unless “otherwise provided in [title 

39].” 39 U.S.C. § 409(a). 

The availability of judicial review for the USPS’s failure 

to comply with Section 3661 is consistent with the legislative 

history of the PRA. In the discussion of the section of the PRA 

that established the “procedures for changes in postal service,” 

the House Committee Report states that “[t]he postal service is—

first, last, and always—a public service” and that the PRA 

“require[s] [Postal Services management] to seek out the needs 

and desires of its present and potential customers—the American 

public.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1104 at 3668. The Committee Report 

describes provisions in the act that “contain[] specific 

provisions requiring justification and review of changes in 

service.” Id.; see Buchanan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 259, 

263 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he procedures mandated by 3661 are 

sufficiently elaborate to amount to a significant impediment in 

the path of the decision-making process of the Postal 

Service.”). 

The Court must also consider whether the claim may be 

reviewed because there is no other meaningful or adequate avenue 

for judicial review. See Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. at 

307. District court jurisdiction may not be implicitly precluded 

based on consideration of the following factors: (1) if “‘a 
25 

finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial 

review’”; (2) if the claim is “‘wholly collateral to a statute’s 

review provisions’”; and (3) if the claims are “‘outside the 

agency’s expertise’” to discern “whether the particular claims 

at issue fall outside an overarching congressional design.”7

Jaresky v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Free 

Enter. Fund v. Pub. Company Acct. Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 

489-90 (2010). Mindful of the fact that there is a 90-day window 

for the PRC to respond to a complaint brought pursuant to 

Section 3661, Defendants contend that it does not matter that 

the PRC cannot provide immediate relief because eventual relief 

is sufficient as a matter of law. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 43 

n.11. However, the authority upon which Defendants rely is 

inapposite. In American Federation of Government Employees, AFLCIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748 (D.D.C. 2019), the court held that 

meaningful judicial review was not foreclosed because Plaintiffs 

were unable to obtain “pre-implementation review of executive 

orders or immediate relief barring all agencies from 

implementing the executive orders,” Id. at 755 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); because there the parties agreed to 

consolidate their preliminary injunction requests with the 

 

7 Defendants’ assertion that the three factors must be met is 

incorrect. See Jaresky v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2015). 
26 

merits, see Scheduling Order, Civil Action No. 18-1261, ECF No. 

16 at 1. 

With regard to the first consideration—whether Plaintiff 

would be denied meaningful review—it is clear that it would. 

There is no dispute that the USPS did not comply with Section 

3661 in implementing the Transportation Policy Changes, and 

Plaintiff has provided evidence demonstrating that the changes 

have resulted in mail delays which cause Plaintiff’s members and 

Plaintiff as an organization harm. See supra IV.A.1. 

Accordingly, even if there was a “fairly discernible” intent in 

the statutory scheme to preclude district court jurisdiction, 

requiring Plaintiff to go through the PRC process would deny it 

meaningful review. See Berkley v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 

896 F.3d 624, 631 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “plaintiffs are 

denied meaningful review when they are subject to some 

additional and irremediable harm beyond the burdens associated 

with the dispute resolution process” (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted)); Krescholleck v. S. Stevedoring Co., 78 

F.3d 868, 875 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the plaintiff had 

“alleged a sufficiently serious irreparable injury to lead us to 

conclude that the administrative review process is insufficient 

to afford him full relief”). And persuasive authority holds that 

this factor is the “most important.” Berkley, 896 F.3d at 630. 

Accordingly, this first factor weighs in favor of finding 
27 

Congress intended district courts to have jurisdiction over 

claims such as the one brought by Plaintiff. The second 

consideration–whether the claim is wholly collateral to the 

statutory scheme—is “‘related’ to whether ‘meaningful judicial 

review’ is available, and the two considerations are analyzed 

together.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 

748, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Jarskey, 803 F.3d at 22.) The 

question to ask is “whether the plaintiffs ‘aimed to obtain the 

same relief they could seek in the agency proceeding.’” Id. at 

758-60 (quoting Jarskey, 803 F.3d at 23). Here, the relief 

Plaintiff seeks cannot be meaningfully redressed through filing 

a Section 3662 complaint. 

The third consideration is whether the claim is “beyond the 

expertise” of the PRC. Plaintiff’s claim is that the USPS failed 

to comply with the procedural requirement set forth in Section 

3661. This procedural claim does not require the “agency 

expertise” the statutory procedures contemplate. Berkley, 896 

F.3d at 630. Accordingly, precluding district court jurisdiction 

here would completely deny Plaintiff meaningful review given the 

timing of the implementation of the Transportation Policy 

Changes. 

For all these reasons, the Court likely has subject matter 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Section 3661(b) claim. See

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. DeJoy, Civil Action No. 20-4096, 
28 

2020 WL 5763553, *22 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2020) (stating that 

“Congressional intent to preclude district courts from hearing 

claims relating to [S]ection 3661(b) is not fairly discernible 

from the text, structure, and legislative history of the PRA.”). 

3. Plaintiff’s Section 3661(b) Claim Is Likely 

Reviewable Pursuant To The Ultra Vires Doctrine 

While as a general matter “the Postal Service is exempt 

from review under the Administrative Procedure Act, . . . its 

actions are reviewable to determine whether it has acted in 

excess of its statutory authority.” N. Air Cargo v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 674 F.3d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2012). “The scope of Non-APA 

review is narrow . . . [and] is available only to determine 

whether the agency has acted ultra vires—that is whether it has 

exceeded its statutory authority.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. U.S. 

Postal Serv., 844 F.3d 260, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 

Defendants contend that ultra vires review is unavailable 

because: (1) Plaintiff cannot show that USPS acted “in excess of 

its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition” 

because they cannot show that USPS violated Section 3661(b); and 

(2) Plaintiff has a “meaningful and adequate means of 

vindicating [their] statutory rights” because they can file a 

complaint with the PRC pursuant to Section 3662. Defs.’ Opp’n, 

ECF No. 21 at 44 (citing Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n 
29 

AFL-CIO v. Fed. Serv. Impasses Panel, 437 F.3d 1256, 1258 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s claim is 

reviewable: 

“Even where Congress is understood generally 

to have precluded review, the Supreme Court 

has found an implicit but narrow exception, 

closely paralleling the historic origins of 

judicial review for agency actions in excess 

of jurisdiction.” Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 

487, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing the leading 

case, Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188, 79 

S.Ct. 180, 183-84, 3 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1958) 

(finding judicial review proper despite 

statutory preclusion of judicial review, where 

the NLRB acted “in excess of its delegated 

powers and contrary to a specific prohibition” 

in the NLRA)). 

Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v. U.S. Postal Service, 321 F.3d 116, 

1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s claim here is that the 

USPS failed to comply with the requirement Congress set forth in 

Section 3661. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim “clearly admit[s] 

of judicial review.” Id. at 1173. 

4. USPS Likely Failed to Comply with Section 3661(b) 

The scope of non-APA review includes, among other things, 

“a straightforward question of statutory interpretation.” Nat’l 

Ass’n of Postal Sup’rs v. U.S. Postal Serv., 602 F.2d 420, 432 

(D.C. Cir. 1979). In conducting this review, “[t]he judicial 

role is to determine the extent of the agency’s delegated 

authority and then determine whether the agency has acted within 
30 

that authority. In this as in other settings, courts owe a 

measure of deference to the agency’s own construction of its 

organic statute, but the ultimate responsibility for determining 

the bounds of administrative discretion is judicial.” Id. at 

432-33 (internal citations omitted). 

Section 3661(b) provides that “[w]hen the Postal Service 

determines that there should be a change in the nature of postal 

services which will generally affect service on a nationwide or 

substantially nationwide basis, it shall submit a proposal, 

within a reasonable time prior to the effective date of such 

proposal, to the Postal Regulatory Commission requesting an 

advisory opinion on the change.” 

Persuasive authority has construed Section 3661(b) as 

follows: 

The language of the statute . . . indicates 

that three factors must coexist before 3661 

applies. First, there must be a ‘change.’ This 

implies that a quantitative determination is 

necessary. There must be some meaningful

impact on service. Minor alterations which 

have a minimal effect on the general class of 

postal users do not fall within 3661. Second, 

the change must be ‘in the nature of postal 

services.’ This involves a qualitative 

examination of the manner in which postal 

services available to the user will be 

altered. Third, the change must affect service

‘on a nationwide or substantially nationwide 

basis.’ A broad geographical area must be 

involved. These three factors combine to 

demonstrate that Congress intended the 

safeguards of 3661 to apply only when changes 

of significance were contemplated. 
31 

Buchanan v. U.S. Postal Service, 508 F.2d 259, 263 (5th Cir. 

1975). 

There is no dispute that the USPS did not comply with 

Section 3661(b) prior to implementing the Transportation Policy 

Changes. Defendants argue that the Transportation Policy Changes 

do not implicate Section 3661(b) because: (1) there has been no 

“meaningful impact on service;” (2) postal services available to 

the user have not been altered; and (3) the changes have not 

affected service in a broad geographical area. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 21 at 46 (quoting and citing Buchanan 508 F.2d at 263). In 

support, Defendants argue that “[t]he only notable change USPS 

has made has been to renew its emphasis on adhering to its 

published schedule, including developing written guidance 

clarifying the circumstances under which extra truck trips were 

acceptable, in order to mitigate the number of unplanned and 

unnecessary trips” which is not a “change” that is contemplated 

in Section 3661. Id. at 46-47. Defendants contend that this “is 

not a new policy but rather has a renewed focus on ensuring the 

Postal Service complies with its existing policies, and that it 

operates as efficiently as possible.” Id. Defendants conclude 

that this is “precisely the type of management direction to 

which [S]ection 3661 does not apply.” Id. at 47. 
32 

The Court is persuaded that Plaintiff is likely to succeed 

on its claim that Defendants violated Section 3661(b) by failing 

to submit the Transportation Policy Changes to the PRC. First, 

it was a “change” because it has had a “meaningful impact on 

service.” Buchanan, 508 F.2d at 263. Plaintiff points to 

evidence showing that the reduction in extra and late trips has 

resulted in changes to service standards nationwide because it 

has resulted in nationwide delays. See supra at 6-7, 13-14; see 

also August 13, 2020 Email, ECF No. 25-1 at 4 (“We have also 

reduced extra trips by 71 percent – a tremendous achievement.”) 

Furthermore, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Defendants’ 

position that the Transportation Policy Changes do not 

constitute a “change” is not supported by the USPS’s own 

statements. See id. at 3-4 (“In order to transform . . . we must 

make a significant number of changes that will not be easy . . . 

); Id. at 4 (“Unfortunately, this transformative initiative has 

had unintended consequences that impacted out overall service 

levels. However, recent changes are not the only contributing 

factors.”); Id. (“I ask that you bear with me while we work 

through these changes to transform for the better . . .”). 

Second, the changes were “in the nature of postal 

services,” 39 U.S.C. § 3661(b) because they qualitatively 

altered “the manner in which postal services [are] available to 

the user,” Buchanan, 508 F.2d at 263. As stated above, Plaintiff 
33 

points to evidence showing that the reduction in extra and late 

trips resulted in nationwide delays. 

Third, the changes affected service “on a nationwide or 

substantially nationwide basis,” 39 U.S.C. § 3661(b) because 

“[a] broad geographical area [was] involved,” Buchanan, 508 F.2d 

at 263. Defendants’ own evidence demonstrates that service was 

affected on a nation-wide basis. See Defs.’ Ex. 14, ECF No. 21-1 

at 452-53 (Mr. DeJoy stating that the reduction in late and 

extra trips occurred in “[e]very state a truck moves in”). 

Defendants contend that pursuant to past practice, the 

types of “nationwide changes that trigger 3661’s review are 

general changes to postal facility hours or service standards 

for mail delivery”; and not the type of operational change at 

issue here. Id. at 47-49. However, based on the analysis above, 

the significant reduction in late and extra trips has resulted 

in a change to service standards. 

While it is clear that Congress did not intend for the 

courts to micromanage the operations of the USPS, requiring the 

USPS to comply with the statutory requirement that it obtain an 

advisory opinion from the PRC and provide for notice and comment 

prior to implementing “a change in the nature of postal services 

which will generally affect service on a nationwide or 

substantially nationwide basis” is not micro-managing; it is 

requiring the USPS to act within its statutory authority. 
34 

Furthermore, Congress clearly intended Section 3661 to require 

an opportunity for public participation and for independent 

review before the USPS implements service changes that will have 

a broad effect. The broad scope of the Transportation Policy 

Changes demonstrates on its face that it is precisely the kind 

of change that is to be the subject of the public-participation 

and independent review safeguards provided by Section 3661. 

Finally, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has a 

“meaningful and adequate means of vindicating their statutory 

rights” by filing a complaint with the PRC and then seek 

judicial review in the D.C. Circuit if unsatisfied, they cannot 

establish ultra vires jurisdiction. Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 

44. Plaintiff responds—and the Court agrees—that the PRC 

complaint process, even if it is available for their procedural 

challenge, would not redress its injury due to the timeframes 

involved. Reply, ECF No. 25 at 18. Because the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has shown it will likely succeed on its claim that 

Defendants’ Transportation Policy Changes likely violated 39 

U.S.C. § 3661(b), the Court need not evaluate Plaintiff’s claim 

that Defendants acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to 

the mandate of Section 101(e) at this time. 
35 

C. Plaintiff Faces Irreparable Harm 

“In this Circuit, a litigant seeking a preliminary 

injunction must satisfy ‘a high standard’ for irreparable 

injury.” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (quoting Chaplaincy of 

Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297). The movant must 

demonstrate that it faces an injury that is “both certain and 

great; it must be actual and not theoretical,” and of a nature 

“of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for 

equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co. v. 

FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quotation marks and 

emphasis omitted). Furthermore, an organization faces 

irreparable harm where (1) the “actions taken by [the defendant] 

have ‘perceptibly impaired’ the [organization’s] programs,” 

League of Women Voters v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Wash., 28 F.3d at 1276), 

and (2) “the defendant’s actions ‘directly conflict with the 

organization’s mission,” id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. 

Union, 101 F.3d at 1430. 

With regard to the irreparable harm to its members, 

Plaintiff argues and submits evidence demonstrating that the 

“changes that USPS implemented without following the required 

[S]ection 3661 process have caused delays that harm, and will 

continue to harm, NAACP members.” Mot., ECF No. 8-1 at 38. 

Defendants counter first, that there is no procedural injury 
36 

because “Plaintiff cannot state a claim under [S]ection 3661 and 

thus cannot have suffered any procedural injury as a result of 

any violation of that statute.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 52. 

However, the Court has determined that Defendants likely 

violated Section 3661(b). See supra Section IV.A.4. And a 

failure to comply with Section 3661(b) is sufficient to show 

irreparable harm. See Buchanan, 375 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (N.D. 

Ga. 1974) (“The denial of . . . a [Section 3661] hearing, should 

one be required, is sufficient irreparable injury to support 

interlocutory injunctive relief, for it is clear that no hearing 

will be conducted and that the changes will continue unless 

enjoined.”) aff’d in relevant part, 508 F.2d at 266 (stating 

that the district court “was correct in its determinations that 

plaintiffs had properly established that there was a substantial 

threat of irreparable injury”). Second, Defendants counter that 

“Plaintiff has not identified that its members are likely to 

suffer any injuries in terms of the potential future delay of 

their ballots” in light of the USPS’s service improvements, 

noting that all Mr. Graham has to do is “mail[] his ballot a 

reasonable time before the election (which is approximately two 

months away).” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 21 at 52. However, Mr. 

Graham’s ability to return his ballot on time is not wholly 

within his control as the mailing of ballots is a matter of 

state law. See supra Section II.B.1 Furthermore, Plaintiff has 
37 

demonstrated that mail delays have persisted. See generally

Second Decl. of Earl Graham, ECF No. 25-2. 

With regard to irreparable harm to Plaintiff as an 

organization, Plaintiff argues and submits evidence 

demonstrating that “the delays caused by the Postal Service’s 

changes have harmed, and continue to harm, the NAACP itself by 

frustrating its mission and requiring it to divert resources to 

counteract the effect of USPS’s action.” Mot., ECF No. 8-1 at 

39-40. Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s claimed injury to its 

resources fails because “Plaintiff has not established that mail 

delays were necessarily the result of the challenged policies, 

or that future delays, if there are any, would be the result of 

these Postal Service operational changes,” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 

21; and that in view of the steps USPS has taken to improve 

service performance, Plaintiff cannot show that “future harm is 

imminent or likely to recur,” id. at 53. However, the Court has 

already determined that Plaintiff as an organization has 

demonstrated irreparable harm. See supra at 15-20. 

Accordingly, both Plaintiff’s members and Plaintiff as an 

organization face irreparable harm absent a preliminary 

injunction. 
38 

 

D. The Balance Of Equities And Public Interest Favor An 

Injunction 

The balance-of-equities factor directs the Court to 

“‘balance the competing claims of injury and . . . consider the 

effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the 

requested relief.’” ConverDyn, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (quoting 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 24). “When the issuance of a preliminary 

injunction, while preventing harm to one party, causes injury to 

the other, this factor does not weigh in favor of granting 

preliminary injunctive relief.” Id.; see also Serono Labs., Inc. 

v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1998). By contrast, 

the balance of equities may favor a preliminary injunction that 

serves only “‘to preserve the relative positions of the parties 

until a trial on the merits can be held.’” 64 F. Supp. 3d 195, 

205 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395). “The 

purpose of . . . interim relief is not to conclusively determine 

the rights of the parties, University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 

U.S. 390, 395 (1981), but to balance the equities as the 

litigation moves forward. In awarding a preliminary injunction a 

court must also ‘conside[r] . . . the overall public interest,’ 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 26.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance 

Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017). 
39 

Plaintiff argues that, as it explained in its argument that 

it has standing to bring its claims, without an injunction, “the 

NAACP and its members will suffer serious and immediate harms 

that could not be sufficiently remedied later . . . [and that] 

the Postal Service would not be harmed by an order requiring it 

to follow the law, and the public interest is served when 

administrative agencies comply with their statutory 

obligations,” noting that “[t]his point applies fully to 

procedural obligations imposed by statute.” Mot., ECF No. 8-1 at 

41-42. Plaintiff also notes that “the public would not be harmed 

(to the contrary) by the restoration of reliable postal service, 

providing the timely delivery of medicines and checks and other 

important mail.” Id. at 42. 

Defendants fail to respond to Plaintiff’s arguments, 

responding only that they are “undertaking extensive efforts to 

facilitate the timely delivery of Election Mail” and that 

“Plaintiff’s member voters have an opportunity to avoid any harm 

by mailing in their ballots without delay.” Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 21 at 54. Defendants also contend that ensuring “full 

compliance could [inappropriately] require the Court to act as 

an overseer of the agency’s day-to-day activities.” Id. 

The balance of the equities and the public interest favor an 

injunction. First, Defendants identify no harms to themselves 

whereas Plaintiff has demonstrated serious, immediate, and 
40 

recurring harms to its members and to itself as an organization. 

Defendants’ suggestion that an injunction could require the 

Court to oversee the USPS’s “day-to-day activities” is without 

merit given that the Court will issue a targeted preliminary 

injunction enjoining the USPS from implementing the 

Transportation Policy Changes. Second, “there is a substantial 

public interest ‘in having governmental agencies abide by the 

federal laws that govern their existence and operations.’” 

League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 12 (quoting Washington v. 

Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103 (6th Cir. 1994). 

V. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

motion for a preliminary injunction. Any request to stay this 

decision pending appeal will be denied for substantially the 

same reasons as those articulated in this Opinion. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 October 10, 2020