4356343306

Todd C. Emerson, #8175 SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. 444 South River Road 

### St. George, Utah, 84790 Telephone: (435) 634-3530 Facsimile: (435) 634-3505 18:08:18 02-22-2013

UNITED STATES OFAMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C.
IntheMatter of: DMS No. FAA-2011-0782 FAA Case No.: 2010NM060081 SkyWestAirlines, Inc. RESPONDENT'S POST TRIAL BRIEF Judge: Richard C. Goodwin

Introduction This case involves the inspection ofan airplane that was not broken. Indeed, the entire basis for this matter is far removed from any determination of"airworthiness"- whether the airplane metits type certificate and was in a condition for safe operation. Instead, it is focused on semantics and the unsupported opinion ofa lone FAAinspector. The factual details are not complex. The SkyWestCRJ 200 is equipped with several redundant systems, including dual air conditioning packs. OnMay 30, 2010, aircraft N948SW was legally operating on a single pack. However, the flight crew failed to account for the single packconfiguration and advanced the engine throttles too quicklywhen initiating the takeoffroll. Thatrapid throttle movement temporarily caused a "spike" in pressure which "latched" an overpressure message inthe cockpit. Although the pressure regulated a moment later, the crew decided to abort the takeoffattempt due to presence ofthe latched fault message. 2/194356343306 18:08:26 02-22-2013

The overpressure was not a surprise, considering that in the aircraft's configuration, twice the nonnal pressure was suddenly going through a single pack. In fact, it was anticipatedand SkyWestpilots have long been instructed, when operating on a single pack, to advance the engine throttle levers graduallyto avoid a spike in pressure. The approved minimum equipment list (MEL) notes that such gradual movement is required. Therefore, when the throttles are moved quickly, the overpressure is aknown condition·- and the aircraft functioned precisely as expected. Since the reason for the fault message was readily apparent, the flight crew could have simplyreset the system to clear the latched fault message, per the operating manual, and continued on their way. No maintenance was needed. Nevertheless, out ofan abundance of caution, the flight crew called maintenance control for additional advice, and the maintenance controller summoned a line mechanic to the aircraft. In short, SkyWest took extra steps after the source ofthe fault- operational error- was determined, to make certain a malfunctionhad

# not occurred. This permissive delay belies the FAA's contention that "time is money and (Sk.yWest) wanted to get thisaircraft back into the air as quickly as possible."2 Sky West finds itself·' · ironicallypenalized for its extra efforts in this instance. As lamented byElphaba, "no good deed goes unpunished."3 Afterbeing notified bymaintenance control, the Sky West mechanic met the plane at the gate and confinned the crew had not gradually advanced the throttles when the takeoffattempt was initiated, despite the single pack configuration. Afterperforming the reset procedure for the flight crew, the mechanic ran the aircraft engines and advanced the throttles fo verify the system was operating within nmmalparameters and that the fault had been cleared. He then signedthe logbook, noting the information referenced for the reset procedure and describing the standard engine run he performed to inspect the system, and returned the aircraft to service. The aircraft was subsequently operated on multiple flights without any similar fault, further evidencing that.' this particular event was an operational errorbythe flight crew and notmechanical failure ofan aircraft system. As with the maintenance controller, theprudent actions ofthemechanic, which resulted in additional aircraft delay, disprove the FAA's contention that SkyWest took a slapdash approach.
2 Complainant'sBriefatp. 7, line 30. 3 When dealing with an overzealous regulator, perhaps it is bestto remember Lazarus Long's advice, "Good intentions are no substitute for knowing how the buzzsaw works."
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The episode is unremarkable, but for three letters that have given the FAA dyspepsia: QRH. The mere presence ofthese letters in the maintenance record has driven the FAA to the untenable position that amechanic may not everutilize an operational manual as he interacts with an airplane. 5 Indeed, the FAA'srationale in this case is that, no matter how useful in operating or determining the proper operation ofan aircraft system, a mechanic is narrowly limited to referencing documents specificallydeveloped for a mechanic's eyes only. Except for thepersonal opinion ofSkeeter Ghering, this extremeposition is unsupported by any FAA authority, and is contrary to decades ofindustry practice. Even iftheFAA's stricture is applied, it still cannot escape the discretion that SkyWest has, under applicable regulations 11 and its General MaintenanceManual (GMM) 12
, for determining ordeveloping methods, techniques orpractices, so long as it returns the article to its original or properly altered condition. In addition to not having shown how a system reset procedure fits the regulatory definition ofmaintenance, 15 the FAAhas failed to show how use of the 

### QRH was unacceptable to the Administrator. As stated by the FAA Office ofChiefCounsel, "the agency would have to show how the method, technique, orpractice used was unacceptable" (emphasis in original) to prove a violation ofthe maintenance performance rule. 16
Statement ofFacts 

### 1. On May 30, 2010, SkyWest mechanic Joshua Harmon was notified that aircraft 948SW had aborted takeoff. 17 2. He spoke with SkyWest maintenance control and learned the aircraft was operating on one air conditioningpack 18 3. He also learned the pi1othad not followed the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) instruction to "advance the thrust levers slowlyto prevent an overpressure ofthe operating pack." 19

5 SkeeterGhering testimony, Transcript at 106-107. 11 See, for example, 14 CFR §§ 43.!3(c) and 121.367(a). 12 Ex. C-1. GMM page 4, section l(A)2(a). 15 See 14 CFR § 1.1. 16 See FAA legal interpretation to AlbertT. MacMillan datedApril22, 2011. 17 Joshua Harmon interview, Ex. C-5 18 Steve Smith interview, Ex. C-5 19 Id. See ExhibitR-2
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4. When he spoke to the flight crew, they "stated that they had not followed an SOP for a singlepack takeoffand advanced the throttle too rapidly."20 5. He reset the system and performed several static throttle ups without spiking the system or indicating a fault. 2l 6. He tested the pressure sensor and saw that it did not latch an overpressure fault. 22 7. He accessed the aircraft computerto evaluate any stored fault data.23 8. He then demonstrated to the flight crew that "the system would not over-pressurize as long as the throttle is advanced slowlywhich prevents a spike in pressure."24 9. The aircraft was not malfunctioning. The fault had been induced byimproperoperation. "Basedon the discussion with the flight crew Iknew theyhad advanced the throttles too fast and notused the APU on takeoff, so it was an induced failure." 25 10. After carrying the cabin pressure burden on its own for two days and eight flights, the right air conditioning pack finally failed for the first time on June 1.26
ARGUMENT A. The Aircraft Was Properly Inspected and Returned to Service. 

### 1. The Quick Reference Handbook ("QRH") Was Not Used To Perform Maintenance. Although the aircraft returned to the gate, it was actually operatingwithin expected parameters. As noted bytwo different Sky West mechanics, the flight crew induced the fault by not following the aircraft operatingprocedures when one "pack"is deferredperthe SkyWest minimum equipment list (MEL). 27 With the source ofthe.fault identified as crew operating error (after conferring with the maintenance controller), the captain could have reasonablydecided to

20 Harmon interview, Ex. C-5 zt Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Ex. R-1.
27 Ex. C-5.
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simplyreset the system as provided in the QRH for the aircraft. That is, since the flight crew did not account for the aircraft configuration with the leftpack on MEL, the right pack overpressure condition was expected, and a maintenance discrepancy did not exist. Indeed, without contacting any SkyWest maintenance personnel, the flight crew could have reviewed the MELprocedure, realized its error, reset the system, and taxied the aircraft for another takeoffattempt. Ifthey had, we would not be here. Nevertheless, the maintenance controller approached the issue cautiously and suggested to the flight crew that theyreturn to the gate for inspectionbymaintenance personnel.28 The "maintenance"performed afterthe aircraftreturned to the gate was an 

### inspection conductedby JoshuaHarmon operating the system and verifying that faults did not exist. The discrepancy in the aircraft maintenance log was cleared after that inspection was accomplished.29 The right packreset procedure in the QRH simply ensured the message was properly cleared so the inspection could take place. Mr. Harmon inspected the system byobserving for an overpressure fault during system operation. As such, the QRH was not used to correct the discrepancy. Rather, the maintenance action ofinspecting the system verified that 

## adiscrepancydid notexist. 2. , The "Discrepancy" Was Not a Malfunction. In a line maintenance environment, mechanics are often called to address purported "discrepancies" that, after inspection, do not exist. For example, apilot may describe inthe aircraft maintenance log what he perceived to be an overly aggressive connection ofthe 'jet· bridge" to the aircraft. Ofcourse, the discrepancy must be addressed, and the norn1al course of action would involve a visual inspectionbya mechanic to see ifthere was any evidence of

28 Smith interview, Ex. C-5 29 Harmon interview, Ex. C-5.
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aircraft damage. Ifno damage was observed, the mechanic couldproperly clear the discrepancy bynoting the visual inspection- since it was verified that a discrepancy did not exist. Likewise, the overpressuremessage in this case was initiallyperceived bythe flight crew
as a system fault. After realizing the fault was induced by not following the MELprocedure, the flight crew- at the behest ofmaintenance control- decided to return to the gate instead of simplyresetting the system, which the flight crew was fully capable ofdoing. Once at the gate, after resetting the system for the flight crew, the mechanic ran the aircraft engines to inspectthe system, and operations were normal; no discrepancies existed. 3. Operational Manuals Are Appropriately Utilized to Troubleshoot System · Faults. Although Mr. Ghering didn't know it, 30 the QRH is manufacturer data derived from the Aircraft Flight Manual. 31 It appears inSkyWest'sFAA approved Maintenance Control Manual (MCM) as areference document for troubleshooting the aircraft. 32 The MCM is part of SkyWest's required maintenance and inspection program,33 commonlyreferred to as a continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP) as listed on its operations ' ,· '
. <.· ' specifications.34 Itis absurd for the FAAto object to citing the QRH when the MCM instructs the maintenance controller to walk through the applicable QRH procedure with the crew as part ofinspecting and troubleshooting the aircraft. This practice ensures that an accurate assessment ofthe aircraft operation is accomplished.

30 Tr. 77:12-13 31 Tr. 139:7-11 32 Ex. R-4**3** Suchprograms are required byTitle 14 Code ofFederal Regulations (14 CFR) §§ 12 1;367 and 121.369(b). A Specifically, paragraph D072 ofSkyWest's operations specifications identifies the.SkyWest General M11intenance Manual (GMM) as the source document for the CAMP and the GMM incorporates the MCM.
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The FAA's position that amechanic is "prohibited" from referencing any document not authored exclusively for maintenancepersonnel is impractical and contrary to industrypractice. 35 That is especially true in a flight line environment, where proper aircraft operation is essential for identifying problems so that appropriate corrective actions can be accomplished. Stated differently, the procedures in an FAA-approved aircraft flight manual (AFM) or QRH aid in propertroubleshooting·· which includes determining ifa problem even exists.36 As apolicymatter, promoting sole reliance on "maintenance"manuals does not serve the safetyinterest, instead, it 

### decreases technical understanding ofmaintenance personnel. Again, this is especiallytrue in a line environment. A manufacturer's maintenance manual cannot envision everypotential malfunction or scenario that will occur to the aircraft during operation, and it takes some time before "common"problems that develop after a new aircraft operatesin service are addressedin those manuals. 37 Therefore, mechanics must use their skill, and all pertinent Hacceptable" data availableregarding aircraft operation, to understand why and how suchdefects occurred, in order to determine necessarycorrective actions. 38 The FAA's contention that the reset procedure is acceptable only ifperfmmedby the flight crew, but not when performed by a mechanic, promotes the exclusion ofskilled maintenance personnel from analyzing aircraft operational faults. That position is hardlyworthy ofa safetyregulator. Instead, as in this case, flight crews shouldbe encouraged to contact

35 Tr. 179-180. 36 Ex. R-4. 37 Tr. 186. 38 Inpa'r1 ticu1ai, aircraft "operating'' manuals are helpful when troubleshooting reported system faults. For example, flight attendant manuals often contain operating procedures for cabin systems (e.g., galley elevators, cabin callchime and button/light) that are helpful to maintenance personnel involved in verifyingproper system operation. The information for such complete system operation is seldom found in "maintenance" manuals which normally focus onpart replacement and system self-tests.
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maintenancepersonnel for advice when operational glitches are encountered so that accurate assessments are made, operational checks can be perfonned at the gate, and repairs can be made 

### ifnecessary. All pertinent data, especially aircraft operating manuals from the manufacturer, are relevant to this activity. The FAA position would have a chilling effect on pilot I mechanic communication, incentivizing them to contact maintenance only when they want a mechanic to "throwparts" at the airplane. That is the result ofa rigid beliefthat "mechanics can only look at mechanic books and onlypilots can look at pilot books" without regard for gaining system understanding necessary to effect properrepair. Itis astonishing the FAA would suggest "dumbing down" air carrieroperations in this way. 4. Even ifthe

### QRH Was Used to Perfonn "Maintenance"the FAAhas not Shown How the Method was Unacceptable to the Administrator.
a. The CFR 'sprovide for alternative methods. The maintenance regulations do not limit maintenance personnel to using only a manufacturer's maintenance manual when performing work. Instead, the rules clearly allow for the use ofother methods, techniques and practices so long as they are "acceptable to" the FAA. 39 Themaintenance performance rule in 14 CFR 

### §43.13(a)40 states that: Each person performing maintenance, alteration, orpreventive maintenance on an aircraft, engine, propeller, or appliance shall use the methods, techniques, and practices prescribed in the current manufacturer's maintenance manual or Instructions for Continued Airworthiness prepared byits manufacturer,

# m: other methods, techniques, and practices acceptable to the Administrator, except 

### as noted in §43.16. (Emphasis added.)

39Acceptable to the FAA does not infer FAA approval prior to use; FAA regulations clearly state where such ''approved" data is required. 40 All references in this section are to 14 CFR.
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The meaning of"othermethods, techniques, and practices acceptable to the administrator" was discussed at length bythe FAA Office ofthe ChiefCounse1.41 Inpertinent part, the FAA noted: Though the regulation provides that the person performing the maintenance 'shall' use the maintenance manual, an alternative is provided in the same sentence...by virtue ofthe 'or,' the person mayuse "othermethods, techniques, andpractices acceptable to the Administrator
... The keyhere is ifothermethods, techniques, and practices are used, they must be acceptable to the FAA.
.. .Ifa maintenance providerperformed maintenance on a product and deviated from the methods, techniques, and practices in the applicable maintenance manual, in order for the FAA to sustain a violation of§ 43.13 (a), the agencywould have to show how the method, technique, orpractice used was unacceptable." Similarly, that point is contained in an internal memorandUD;l from the FAA Office ofthe ChiefCounsel42 stating that under§ 43.13(a): Thus, ifa person performs aircraft maintenance and uses a method, technique, or practice that differs from those specified in the applicable manufacturer's maintenance manual orInstructions for ContinuedAirworthines.s,.the FAAwould have to show that the maintenance done, even thoughdifferent from thesteps outlined in the manual, was not acceptable in orderto prove a viqlation.ofthe regulation. Therefore, even ifit were assumed the QRH was used to inspect the s.yrstem afterthe. ' . overpressure indication, there is no evidence to suggest use ofthat information was unacceptable. Bythe FAA's own interpretations, to support a finding that the reset and operation methods in the QRH were not acceptable to the Administrator, the agency would have to show how the method, technique, orpractice used was unacceptable. Ithas not. TheFAA's opposition comes by way ofthe unsupported.beliefofa single inspector, based solelyupon the title ofthe document. This is not enough. The FAAhas failed to show how the QRH reset procedure was unacceptable.

41 FAA legal interpretation to AlbertT. MacMillan, supra note 14. 42 FAA Legal Interpretationto the Manager ofthe FAA Flight Standards Division, AEA-200, fro.m Rebecca MacPherson, FAAAssistant ChiefCounsel for Regulations, dated January 10, 2010.
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### b. SkyWest's GMMalso sanctions the use of othermethods. The performance requirement in 

### §43.13(a) is arule ofgeneral applicability, but it also appears in SkyWest's GMM: Qualified mechanics have knowledge based on training or experience and can determine or develop the method. technique or practice to return the component or aircraft to its original or properly altered condition. 43 (Emphasis added.) Much like§ 43.13(a), the SkyWest CAMP, through its GMM as cited above, clearly sanctions the use ofother methods, techniques and practices that would be acceptable to the Administrator, as determined byits qualified mechanics

- so long as the component or aircraft is returned to its original orproperly altered condition, as required by§ 43,13. Therefore, even if the QRH was used to perform maintenance in this matter, its use was not improperunder the Sky West .CAMP. Indeed, all evidence points to the fact that the aircraft was airworthy when the work was signed offon May30, as it operated for numerous flight legs without .the.same fault. As before, the FAAhas not explained how the use ofothermethods, techniques and practices was unacceptable to the Administrator. Instead, their argumentruns in a tight little circle: you didn't reference an approved maintenance manual, ergo, it is not acceptable. 5. The Aircraft Was AirworthyBetween May 30 and June 1, 2010. From the final NPCP, and Skeeter Ghering's testimony, 

### it is clearthat the "violations"
are based entirely on the presence ofa mechanic's referenceto an aircraft operating manual in his aircraft maintenance log "sign-off' coupled with the occurrence ofthe a problem eight (S) flights later. However, Mr. Ghering's assumption that the aircraft was unairworthy until June I when "[t]he right pack discrepancy was corrected byreplacing the right pack pressureregulating and shut offvalve"44 is wrong for several reasons.

43 Ex. C-1, GMM page 4. 44 As stated in item 11 ofthe final NPCP.
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First, the Aircraft Maintenance Log shows that both the overpressure switch and right pressureregulating and shut offvalve were replaced on June 1, 2010, andthe crew abortedtake· off again with the sameproblemfrom thepreviousjlight. 45 That is, replacing the right pack pressure regulating and shut offvalve did not fix the June 1problem. The aircraft was placed out-of-service while a new pack was sent from Salt Lake City in .order to fix· the left pack, and clearthe MEL deferral. The problem that developed on June 1was obviouslypersistent, because aborted take·offs occurred before andaftermaintenance action. Ifthe same problem had existed
on May 30, the subsequent eight (8) flight cycles could not have occurred. There is no proofthat the aircraft was unairworthy when operated between May30 and June 1, 2010. Second, there 

### is no evidence that the fault on May 30 is directlyrelated to thefault,:and related maintenance actions, on June 1, 2010. 

### Ina case involving initial and subsequent discrepancies with an aircraft cabin door, and an alleged violation of§ 121.605,46 theNational Transportation SafetyBoard (NTSB) stated that:

...repairs ultimately conducted on the aircraft are oflittle orno use inprovingthe door (and thus the aircraft) unairworthy, as they do not reliably confirm eitherthat there was a problem with the door at the time respondent checked it or that, ifthere was a problem, it was theproblem noted bythe January 27 crew. In this case, the repairs ultimately conducted onJune 1are oflittle orno use in proving the aircraft unairworthy for eight (8) flights between May 30 and June 1, as they do notreliably confim1 that there was a problem when the system was inspected on May30. That is especially true since 

### it was confirmed on May 30 that the fault was induced bythe flight crew's rapid advance ofthe throttle levers, despite the operating limitation stated inthe approved MEL.

45 Ex. R-1, p.2.
. 46 NTSB Order No. EA-4213.

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### B. Inspector Ghering's Testimony Was Not Credible.
The only evidence in support ofliability came byway ofSkeeter Ghering. 

### It became clearduring Mr. Ghering's examination that he believed SkyWest was wrong to release the aircraft with a deferred pack and instead should have stopped the aircraft in San Francisco to replace the right pack pressure valve. However, Mr. Ghering has no experience repairing the CRJ 20047 and demonstrated little knowledge ofhow it operates in 

### its properly altered conditions. I. The Pressure Spike was a Known Condition on the CRJ200 Operating on a Single 

### NC Pack. Despite being told by everyhighly experienced mechanic he interviewed, Mr. Ghering simplyrefuses to believe that 

### it

### is aknown condition ofthe CRJ200 to latch an overpressure fault when the throttles are advanced too rapidly in a singlepack configuration:is

### SkyWe~t's Director ofQuality, Darrel Cook, has been maintaining CRJ's for more than 20 years and testified that it has "absolutely"been a known condition to mechanics and maintenance controllers for more than 15 years.49 SkyWest mechanics know this through experience and recurrent training, as well as from the MEL.

## 5° However, none ofthis could dissuade Mr. Ghering from his opinion that it is not a commonlyknown occurrence, despite him having zero experience repairing the CRJ 200: Q. Is this a common problem with this aircraft? You made 

### it sound like in your earlier testimony it shouldn't do that, it should operatejust fine on one pack. A. It should. Q. So you disagree that it's a common problem for the airplane to do that? A. Yes. Q. Great. Keep going.
47 Tr. at 73, lines 3-5. 48 Tr. atpp. 82-85 49 Tr. at pp. 157-161 5o Id.

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A. I disagree that it's a commonproblem for the airplane to do that. 

### Q. No, I mean keep reading. A. Okay. "Bombardierhas a procedure in the MEL appendix for such an event." Q. Let's stop right there. Do you know whether ornot Bombardierhas a procedure in the MEL appendix? A. Yeah. As I previously stated, ifyou go- becausethere's an MEL onit, when the flight crewpicks up the airplane they look at the requirements ofthat MEL and it tells them to go to this appendix. And that appendix reads that they do an open bleed takeoff that they should do a normal static takeoff. They should advance the throttle slowly and then it gives them the sequence ofevents ofthings to do. Q. Why advance the throttle slowly, Mr. Gehring? It's in its normal condition. You should be able to advance that throttle as-- pernormal, shouldn't you? A. Yeah, ifthis guy did--

.Q. So whyare the instructions on the MELto advance the throttle slowly? A To not spike the system. Q. Exactly. Because it's a known condition ofthe aircraft that will happen ifyou advancethe throttle too quickly. Isn'tthat true? A. No. 51 Mr. Ghering cannot admit the known condition; else his theoryofviolation falls apart. If the over-pressurization is not a known condition, then yes, this aircraft would have needed , further inspection and repair perthe fault isolation manual (FIM). But the evidenceis overwhelmingthat everyone, except Mr. Ghering, knew that the CRJ200 operating on a single packis expected to over-pressurize when the throttles are advanced too rapidly. He also testified the aircraft didn't meet type design because it gave the pilot an indication message when he moved the throttle up.54 Again, hemustremain deliberately oblivious to the MEL, whichanticipates an overpressure on a rapid throttle up, in orderto supporthis theory ofunairworthiness. 

### But the aircraft was airworthy and conformingto its alteredtype design

-- it simplywas not operated correctly. The maintenance.controller spotted it

31 Tr. 82-83 s 4 Transcript at 66, Line 12

- 19
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immediately. So did JoshuaHannon. OnlyMr. Ghering refuses to see it. As statedby the FAA ChiefCounsel's Office: 55

...an air carrier airplane mayoperate legallywith certain instruments and equipment inoperative 

### ifthey are included on an approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL), and the air carrier operates the airplane under all applicable conditions and limitations contained in the approved MEL.
.. The approved MELis considered to be either a supplemental type certificate (STC)
... or an approved change to the type design without requiring recertification
... Accordingly, an aircraft operatingunderthe conditions and limitations ofan approved MEL would, with respect to the inoperative item, by definition, conform to its type certificate. In this case, the approved MEL for operating the aircraft in a single pack condition contains a limitation on rapid throttle movement. When the aircraft was operated within that limitation, the aircraft conformed to its type certificate. 2. JoshuaHarmon's Actions Were Appropriate. Mr. Gheringnext claimed that Mr. Harmonused an alternate method to perform maintenance on this aircraft and that method did not address the mechanical irregularitythe pilot entered in the aircraft logbook.56 He also claimed the static checkwas performed at the gate and the mechanic did not run the engine high enough to check whether the warning would latch.57 There is absolutelyno evidence to support this statement. Mr. Ghering has no ideahowhigh the mechanic ran the engine, what engine power level was required to check ifthe warning would latch, or even whetherthe test occurred at the gate ·- or out at the fence. He was not there and he did not ask the question in his interview. Further, the QRH does not contain a run·up procedure, it onlyresets the system. The enginerun·up pressurized the system to thelevel necessaryto verify ifa fault existed and the successful operation on eight (8) subsequent flights confirms that the system was operatingnormally. Clearly the discrepancynoted by the pilot was addressed.

55 FAA legal interpretation to Christopher Witkowski, dated March 26, 2008. 56 Transcript at 61 57 Transcript at 63, Line 9- 12; Complainant's briefp.3, lines 3-8
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3. The Discrepancy Was Not "Fixed"byReplacing the Right PackPressure Valve. Mr.Gehring also mistakenlyclaimed that replacing the right pack pressure valve "fixed" the aircraft.58 Although the maintenance log clearly shows the aircraft immediately failed with the same problem after this repair was made on June 1, Mr. Ghering could not bringhimselfto admit his mistake.59 The FAA argues "with a degree ofemphasis" that the correct maintenance procedure is significantlymore detailed and time consuming that the mere use ofa QRH flight operations procedure. (Complainant's Briefat 5.) But the fault isolation manual (FIM) procedure for this fault is not detailed. It is very limited and unnecessarilyreplaced an overpressure switch, as demonstrated on June 1. In sum, the FAA's "preferred"remedywas to ignore the obvious operational error and simplyreplace a part for no reason. Suchpractice ofblindlyreplacing parts without identifying true aircraft operation and operating conditions- referred to in the industry as simply ''shot-gunning"parts- is universally discouraged as it has the potential of introducing additional faults into a system already identified in a mechanical discrepancyreport. That is especially true when, as in this case, aroot cause has been identified and the system is inspected to verify operation withinparameters. Quite simply, the FAA's suggestion is not in line with good maintenancepractices and is contrary to safetyinterests. 

### C. The Case Cited by the FAA is Not Applicable to this Matter In its post-hearing brief, the FAA claims the aircraft was unairworthybecause a "required inspection" was not performed. This matter did not involve anyrequired inspection items (RII)
58 Transcript at 56, Line 3

- 16; Tr. at 108, line 22. 59 See 17 tortured pages oftestimony at Tr. 108-125.
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which are defined in FAAregulations as air carrier designated items ofmaintenance and ·alteration that must be inspected, including at least those that could result in a failure, malfunction, or defect endangering the safe operation ofthe aircraft, ifnot performed properly or 

### ifimproper materials are used.60 The SkyWest RII list for the aircraft at issue does not include airconditioning packs. Further, the case cited in support ofits position involved an inspection for physical damage which was not accomplished. That is completely unlike this case, involving the operational check ofan aircraft system which was accomplished. Although failure to perform thephysical damage inspection in the case cited by the FAA could go undetected, the continued existence ofthe overpressure message involved in this matter would have been immediately apparent to the flight crew. Stated differently, had the pack system been improperlyinspected on the aircraft at issue in this case, the message would have simply, and immediately, reappeared whenengine thrust was advanced. Inaddition, the FAAfailed to mention the following quote- which clearly supports SkyWest's position- from the case it cited: 61 Absent the performance ofothermethods, techniques, orpractices acceptable to the Administrator, USAiris required to follow the manufacturer's maintenance manual in performing maintenance. (Emphasis added) Again, even ifit were assumed the QRH was relied upon for performingmaintenance, the resetprocedure used was an acceptable method, technique, orpractice to allow inspection ofthe system byfunctional test. The FAA has notprovided any evidence ofunacceptabiljJy.

60 14 CFR § 12l.369(b)(2). 61 FAA Order No. 96-25.
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Conclusion Bythe definition ofmaintenance found in its own regulations, the reset task perfonned in this case was not maintenance, and the QRHwas onlyused for that task. As a result, the basic premise ofthe FAA'sposition in this matter is groundless. Nevertheless, evenifMr. Harmon did refer to the QRH to perform maintenance, FAAregulations and SkyWest's CAMP provide for the use ofsuch material bymaintenance personnel

-- and the FAA has not shown in any way how the use ofthe QRH was unacceptable. Finally, there is absolutelyno support for the FAA's allegation that use ofthe QRHreset procedureresulted in an unairworthy aircraft. Indeed, the reason for the May 30 fault was clearlyidentified in the approved MEL and had that fault existed (therefore makingthe aircraft unairworthy) subsequent to maintenance on May30, it would have beenreadily apparent to the flight crew. Fromthe successful completion ofeight (8) flights, the system was clearly working properly. The Administratorhas simplynot met its burden ofproving that the aircraft was unairworthy. The FAAhas not met its burden ofshowing that anyviolation has occurred. Along the way, it makes arguments, which ifaccepted, would tum every air carrier maintenance program
on its head
.. Longstanding use ofaircraft operation manuals for understanding system functionality and, ultimately, competent troubleshooting and best maintenance.practices would bereplaced bymindless adherence to flow charts and the resulting shot-gun approach to replacement ofparts. Thatrepresents a significantbackwards step for the entire industry, as it works decidedly against the safety interest. Instead ofplacing form over function bysimply relying on the title ofa document cited in a maintenance record, the FAA should have centered upon the facts.

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For these reasons, Your Honor should find that no regulatory violation occurred, and denyComplainant's request to impose a civil penalty. DATED this 22nd day ofFebruary, 2013.**~**

Todd C. Emerson Counsel for SkyWestAirlines

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