Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

January 2004 SPACE SHUTTLE 

Further Improvements 

Needed in NASA’s 

Modernization Efforts 

GAO-04-203 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-203.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li at 

(202) 512-3600 or lia@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-203, a report to 

congressional requesters 

January 2004

SPACE SHUTTLE 

Further Improvements Needed in NASA’s 

Modernization Efforts 

NASA cannot fully define shuttle upgrade requirements until it resolves 

questions over the shuttle’s operational life and determines requirements 

for elements of its Integrated Space Transportation Plan such as the 

International Space Station. Prior efforts to upgrade the shuttle have been 

stymied because NASA could not develop a strategic investment plan or 

systematically define the spacecraft’s requirements because of changes in its 

life expectancy and mission. 

NASA is trying to improve how it identifies, selects, and prioritizes shuttle 

upgrades. In March 2003, it institutionalized a Space Shuttle Service Life 

Extension Program to ensure safe and effective operations, along with a 

management plan documenting roles and responsibilities and an annual 

process for selecting upgraded projects and studies. In addition, NASA will 

try to improve shuttle safety by implementing the recommendations of the 

Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). 

 

NASA’s estimate of the total cost to upgrade the shuttle—$300 million-$500 

million a year, or a total of $5 billion-$8 billion through 2020—is reasonably 

based but could be significantly higher, as it does not include potential 

projects such as a crew escape system. It will be difficult for NASA to make 

an accurate estimate until it firmly establishes the basic requirements (such 

as life expectancy) for the shuttle and the process for selecting shuttle 

upgrades. A number of potential changes could significantly increase the 

cost of shuttle upgrades, including responses to the recommendations of 

the CAIB. 

Space Shuttle Atlantis Lift-Off 

The Columbia tragedy has 

accentuated the need to modernize 

the 20-year-old space shuttle, the 

only U.S. launch system that 

carries people to and from space. 

The shuttle will now be needed for 

another two decades. As it ages, 

the spacecraft’s components will 

also age, and it may become 

increasingly unreliable. 

GAO examined the National 

Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s (NASA) plans to 

upgrade the shuttle through 2020, 

how it will identify and select what 

upgrades are needed, how much 

the upgrades may cost, and what 

factors will influence that cost over 

the system’s lifetime. 

NASA needs to fully define shuttle 

upgrade requirements so decisions 

on upgrade projects can be 

integrated with its transportation 

plan. The agency must improve 

how it selects upgrades by 

developing an indicator that shows 

how upgrading will increase shuttle 

life or safety as well as other 

analytic tools to help its staff make 

judgments. It must develop a 

thorough estimate of the total lifecycle cost of upgrades through 

2020, to determine the funding that 

will be needed for shuttle upgrades.

NASA fully concurred with most 

GAO recommendations, and agreed 

with the intent of the 

recommendation to develop a cost 

estimate for all shuttle upgrades 

through 2020. 
Page i GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 1

Background 3

Shuttle Requirements Process Lacks Systematic Approach 4

NASA’s Process for Selecting and Prioritizing Upgrades Could Be 

Further Improved 5

Shuttle Upgrades Could Potentially Cost Billions More Than 

Currently Estimated 12

Conclusions 15

Recommendations for Executive Action 16

Agency Comments 17

Scope and Methodology 18

Appendix I Comments from the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 20 

Appendix II Recommended Upgrade Projects Resulting from 

the Service Life Extension Program Summit 22 

Appendix III Comparison of Crew Escape Concepts 

Under Consideration 24 

Appendix IV Staff Acknowledgments 26 

Table 

Table 1: Service Life Extension Program Projects by Category—

Fiscal Year 2004-2008 9

Figures 

Figure 1: Cockpit Avionics Upgrade 7

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Figure 2: Roof Deterioration on the Vehicle Assembly Building at 

Kennedy Space Center (the tape shows a 5-foot section 

for perspective) 10

Figure 3: Space Shuttle Crew Escape Design Concepts 14

Abbreviations 

AHMS Advanced Health Management System 

ATP Authority to Proceed 

C/W Caution and Warning 

CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

CAU Cockpit Avionics Upgrade 

CG Center of Gravity 

ET External Tank 

ISS International Space Station 

ISTP Integrated Space Transportation Plan 

MLG Main Landing Gear 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

OMM Orbiter Major Modification 

OSP Orbital Space Plane 

PLB Payload Bay 

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

PRSD Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (fuel cells) 

ROM Rough Order of Magnitude 

RSRM Reusable Solid Rocket Motor 

SLEP Service Life Extension Program 

SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine 

STE Special Test Equipment 

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Page 1 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

January 15, 2004 

The Honorable John Breaux 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bill Nelson 

United States Senate 

The space shuttle is the only U.S. launch system capable of carrying 

people to and from space. It has operated for over 20 years and is planned 

for use well into the second decade of this century and possibly beyond. 

As the shuttle ages, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) is faced with an increased need to modernize the shuttle due to 

component obsolescence and/or to enhance safety. The Shuttle Columbia 

tragedy has accentuated this need. At your request, we reviewed the 

shuttle modernization efforts to determine (1) NASA’s past requirements 

and plans to upgrade the shuttle through 2020, (2) how NASA will identify 

what upgrades are required in the future and how those upgrades will be 

selected and prioritized, and (3) NASA’s estimated life-cycle cost for 

shuttle upgrades through 2020 and identify the potential program 

uncertainties that may affect cost. 

Even before the Columbia tragedy, NASA faced critical decisions on how 

best to modernize the shuttle to keep it flying safely throughout its 

operational life. With NASA’s need to improve shuttle safety as the shuttle 

fleet returns to service, NASA has not yet clearly defined shuttle upgrade 

requirements, improved the process for selecting and prioritizing 

upgrades, and developed an estimate of the total life-cycle cost of 

upgrades through 2020. 

NASA cannot fully define shuttle upgrade requirements until it resolves its 

uncertainty over the shuttle’s operational life and determines the basic 

requirements for elements of its Integrated Space Transportation Plan1

 1

 NASA’s Integrated Space Transportation Plan provides a road map for continued shuttle 

operations and for key investment decisions. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 

Results in Brief 
Page 2 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

(ISTP), which includes the International Space Station (ISS). NASA has 

known that it needs to establish an upgrade program to modernize various 

components of the space shuttle to keep it flying safely throughout its life. 

However, efforts to upgrade the shuttle have been stymied by the agency’s 

inability to develop a long-term strategic investment plan to fly the shuttle 

safely and a systematic approach for defining the spacecraft’s 

requirements because its life expectancy and mission have continued to 

change from an original design of a 10-year life to the year 2020 and 

possibly beyond. 

NASA is making an effort to improve the process that identifies, selects, 

and prioritizes shuttle upgrades. In March 2003, it institutionalized a Space 

Shuttle Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) as the primary framework 

for ensuring safe and effective operations, along with a management plan 

documenting roles and responsibilities and an annual process for selecting 

and prioritizing upgraded projects and studies. Prior to the SLEP, NASA 

had no documented systematic selection process, and managers made 

decisions on upgrades using their professional insight and judgment and a 

limited number of quantitative or analytic tools rather than relying on 

extensive use of hard data or rigorous analysis. In addition, NASA is 

planning to make upgrades and other improvements to enhance shuttle 

safety as a result of implementing the recommendations of the Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). 

NASA has not yet attempted to prepare a total detailed life-cycle cost 

estimate for all upgrades through 2020. NASA did prepare a rough order of 

magnitude estimate of the total cost to upgrade the shuttle—$300 million-

$500 million a year, or a total of $5 billion-$8 billion through 2020—based 

on current project estimates. Although the estimate appears to be 

reasonably based, the total cost could be significantly higher, as the 

estimate does not include the costs of major potential projects such as a 

crew escape system. NASA will continue to have difficulty making an 

accurate and reliable estimate of the total cost until it finalizes the basic 

requirements (such as life expectancy) for the shuttle and further 

improves the process for identifying and selecting shuttle upgrades. 

Accurate and reliable cost estimates to upgrade the shuttle and enable it to 

continue operations are needed by decision makers. In addition, a number 

of potential program changes could significantly increase the estimated 

cost of shuttle upgrades, including major changes in shuttle requirements 

such as redesigned rocket boosters to provide additional lift capability. 

Other costly potential program changes include schedule slippages caused 

by delays in software and hardware integration and modifications 

responding to the recommendations of the CAIB. 
Page 3 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

We are making recommendations aimed at strengthening NASA’s efforts to 

modernize the space shuttle by fully defining basic requirements for the 

shuttle; improving its analytic tools to assess shuttle upgrades; and, once 

basic requirements are defined, developing a comprehensive estimate of 

the total cost for the shuttle through 2020. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA’s Deputy 

Administrator stated that the agency concurred with the first three 

recommendations and concurred with the intent of the fourth 

recommendation concerning development of a cost estimate for all shuttle 

upgrades through 2020. NASA’s detailed comments are included as 

appendix I. 

The space shuttle is the world’s first reusable space transportation system. 

It consists of a reusable orbiter with three main engines, two partially 

reusable solid rocket boosters, and an expendable external fuel tank. The 

space shuttle is an essential element of NASA’s transportation plan that 

includes a framework for maintaining shuttle fleet capability to fly safely 

through 2020. The space shuttle is NASA’s largest individual program 

accounting for about 25 percent of the agency’s fiscal year 2004 budget 

request. Since it is the nation’s only launch system capable of transporting 

people, the shuttle’s viability is critical to the space station. 

We have reported in the past that extensive delays in the development and 

assembly of the ISS and difficulties defining requirements and maturing 

technologies for the next generation space transportation systems have 

hindered the development and funding of a long-term space transportation 

program.2

 We have also testified that NASA faced a number of 

programmatic and technical challenges in making shuttle upgrades, 

including revitalizing its workforce and defining shuttle technical 

requirements. In another report, we reported that NASA continued to rely 

on qualitative risk assessments to supplement engineering judgments and 

had made only limited progress in the use of quantitative assessment 

 2

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Transportation: Status of the X-33 Reusable 

Launch Vehicle Program, GAO/NSIAD-99-176 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 1999), Space 

Transportation: Challenges Facing NASA’s Space Launch Initiative, GAO-02-1020

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2002), and Space Station: Impact of the Grounding of the 

Shuttle Fleet, GAO-03-1107 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2003). 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

methods.3 Recognizing such needs, NASA has taken steps to bring a more 

formal approach to identifying, prioritizing, and funding improvements. 

In February 1997, NASA established the Space Shuttle Program 

Development Office at NASA’s Johnson Space Center to sustain, improve, 

and add capability to the space shuttle through an upgrade program. In 

December 2002, a new selection and prioritization process for upgrades 

was implemented through the Service Life Extension Program. The SLEP 

provided a formal process to select, prioritize, and fund upgrades needed 

to keep the shuttle flying safely and efficiently and allow upgrades to be 

evaluated and approved on a priority basis. Shuttle upgrades are items that 

contribute toward the Space Shuttle Program goals to (1) fly safely, 

(2) meet the manifest, (3) improve mission supportability, and (4) improve 

the system in order to meet NASA’s commitments and goals for human 

operations in space. According to NASA, upgrades achieve major 

reductions in the operational risks inherent in the current systems by 

making changes that eliminate, reduce, or mitigate significant hazards and 

critical failure modes and that increase the overall reliability of the current 

system with respect to the likelihood of catastrophic failure. Examples of 

upgrade projects currently funded to improve safety include Cockpit 

Avionics, Vehicle Main Landing Gear Tire and Wheel, External Tank 

Friction Stir Weld, and Shuttle Main Engine Advanced Health Management 

System. 

To keep the shuttle flying safely, NASA needs to fully implement an 

upgrade program to modernize various shuttle components. However, 

efforts to do so have been stymied by the agency’s inability to develop a 

long-term strategic investment plan and a systematic approach for defining 

shuttle requirements, because the spacecraft’s life expectancy and mission 

have continued to change. Key decisions about the ultimate life and 

mission of the basic elements of the integrated transportation plan—the 

ISS and the Orbital Space Plane (OSP)—were not made prior to fully 

defining shuttle requirements. 

Originally, the shuttle was designed for a 10-year/100-flight service—

transporting satellites and other cargo for the Department of Defense and 

 3

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Shuttle Safety: Update on NASA’s Progress in 

Revitalizing the Shuttle Workforce and Making Safety Upgrades, GAO-01-1122T

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2001) and Space Shuttle: Need to Sustain Launch Risk 

Assessment Process Improvements, GAO/NSIAD-96-73 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26, 1996).

Shuttle Requirements 

Process Lacks 

Systematic Approach 
Page 5 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

others and placing in orbit and maintaining the Hubble Space Telescope—

after which its life was to end. During this time, NASA was reluctant to 

make long-term investments due to the shuttle’s perceived short life 

expectancy. With the advent of the ISS, the agency’s transportation plan 

indicated that the shuttle would be used to operate and support the ISS 

until 2012, when a new space launch vehicle was to take over that mission. 

Recently, use of the new launch vehicle was de-emphasized by a new 

ISTP, which in its place proposed development of an OSP (to transfer the 

crew to the ISS) and continued use of the shuttle (to transfer cargo). The 

new plan proposes upgrading the shuttle’s software and hardware to 

extend its operational life to 2020. 

NASA recognizes the need for a systematic approach for defining 

requirements to upgrade the shuttle, and it recently institutionalized a new 

process to select and prioritize shuttle upgrades. However, NASA has not 

yet fully defined the basic elements of the ISTP—which include the ISS, 

the OSP, and the Next Generation Launch Technology.4

 NASA has not 

precisely determined when the ISS will be completed; its ultimate mission, 

its useful life, and even how many astronauts will be on board, for 

example. Specifically, NASA has not made explicit decisions on shuttle 

requirements-–such as its future mission, lift capability, and life 

expectancy. According to NASA officials, these decisions will significantly 

affect shuttle upgrades. Similarly, the CAIB found that the shifting date for 

shuttle replacement has severely complicated decisions on how to invest 

in shuttle upgrades. 

NASA is making an effort to improve how it identifies, selects, and 

prioritizes shuttle upgrades. In December 2002, NASA initiated a SLEP as 

the primary framework for ensuring safe and effective operations. By 

March 2003, NASA had prepared a formal management plan documenting 

roles and responsibilities and defining an annual process for selecting and 

prioritizing upgraded projects and studies. Prior to the SLEP, NASA had no 

documented systematic selection process, and managers made decisions 

on upgrades using their professional insight and judgment and a limited 

number of quantitative or analytic tools rather than extensive use of hard 

data or rigorous analysis. As a result, projects that were identified, funded, 

and implemented flowed from an informal “bottom-up” approach that 

 4

 Next Generation Launch Technology will develop key technologies, such as propulsion 

and structures, for a future launch vehicle. 

NASA’s Process 

for Selecting and 

Prioritizing Upgrades 

Could Be Further 

Improved 
Page 6 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

relied largely on insight and judgment of selected managers and limited 

use of quantitative tools. 

According to NASA officials, prior to the new SLEP process, the 

identification, selection, and prioritization of shuttle upgrade projects 

largely involved an informal bottom-up approach. The upgrades were first 

proposed in an open and a continuous call for projects concepts and were 

drawn from shuttle element project organization, industry, or other shuttle 

program stakeholders. Upgrade projects would then go to the Space 

Shuttle Program Manager, the Shuttle Program Development Manager, and 

the directors of the affected NASA field centers, who would provide 

proposed projects to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, who 

would select and prioritize the projects. This early process was much more 

strongly driven by collective management insight or “judgment” rather 

than by hard data or rigorous analysis. During this process, there was little 

guidance from top management as to how the decisions on shuttle 

upgrades integrated with all the other elements of the ISTP. 

The identification, selection, and prioritization of the Cockpit Avionics 

Upgrade (CAU) is one example of a lack of a documented, structured, and 

systematic selection process prior to the SLEP. The CAU is estimated to 

cost $442 million and is NASA’s most costly of the currently approved 

upgrade projects. The CAU will update the cockpit’s dials and gauges with 

a modern instrument panel. By automating complex procedures in the 

shuttle cockpit, the upgrade is intended to improve the situational 

awareness of the crew and to better equip them to handle potential flight 

problems by reducing crew workload. (See fig. 1.) 

Earlier Process to Identify 

and Prioritize Upgrades 
Page 7 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Figure 1: Cockpit Avionics Upgrade 

Managers gave the CAU project the highest priority based on their 

professional insight and judgment and a limited number of quantitative or 

analytic tools rather than extensive use of hard data or rigorous analysis. 

The upgrade was ranked as the highest priority based on the perceived 

importance of crew situational awareness. NASA did not have a metric to 

show the relationship of the cost of the upgrade to an increase in shuttle 

life and/or safety. The ranking was essentially a collaborative voting 

process based on their professional knowledge that crew error accounts 

for 50 percent of all incidents. As crew awareness depends on a number of 

human factors, a quantitative metric, such as NASA’s Quantitative Risk 

Assessment System, could not be used since it did not contain key human 

attributes needed to evaluate the percentage of safety improvement of the 

upgrade project. 
Page 8 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

In December 2002, NASA initiated a SLEP as the primary framework for 

ensuring safe and effective operations, along with a management plan a 

few months later, documenting roles and responsibilities and an annual 

process for selecting and prioritizing upgraded projects and studies. The 

new process, which was first used in March 2003 at the first SLEP Summit, 

uses panels of experts from NASA, which are mostly chaired by the 

Deputy Center Directors, who meet periodically to develop and assess 

project recommendations. The SLEP is structured around eight panels of 

senior managers that make greater use of quantitative tools in areas such 

as safety and sustainability, including an outside panel of industry experts 

and an Integration Panel. The Integration Panel refines the prioritized 

recommendations of each panel into final recommendations to a group of 

top-level managers known as the Space Flight Leadership Council (the 

Council). As a result of the last Summit in March 2003, the Council 

approved all project recommendations of the Integration Panel with a 

total estimated cost of about $1.7 billion from fiscal years 2004-08. 

(See app. II.) In making its recommendations, the Council was not 

restricted by fiscal constraints. The Council endorsed 60 SLEP upgrade 

projects for fiscal year 2004 costing $416 million. By contrast, NASA’s 

fiscal year 2004 budget request, submitted in February 2003, asked for 

$379 million. The difference is being deliberated within NASA’s internal 

budget process. 

One product resulting from the SLEP 2003 Summit was NASA’s selection 

and identification of upgrade projects related to safety improvement, 

sustainability, and requirements for new capabilities as defined by 

“customers” such as the ISS. NASA then placed the projects into one of the 

following four categories: (1) “Should Start”—projects strongly 

recommended for start in fiscal year 2004 and which would create near 

term risk if they did not start, (2) “Existing Commitments”—projects 

previously authorized, (3) “Foundational Activities”—projects that add 

insight into the current condition of assets, and (4) “Projects and 

Studies”—system specific activities at various levels of maturity. 

(See table 1.) 

The SLEP Process 

Currently in Place 
Page 9 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Table 1: Service Life Extension Program Projects by Category—Fiscal Year 2004-2008 

Categories Sustainability Safety improvement Customer driven capabilities 

Should Start RSRM Case Vendor 

PRSD Tank Vendor 

SSME STE Equipment 

 

Existing Commitments RSRM Obsolescence 

Infrastructure 

Cockpit Avionics 

AHMS Phase I 

MLG Tire/Wheel 

Industrial Safety 

Foundational Activities Aging Vehicle Studies 

RSRM Ground Test 

Sustainability Health Metrics 

PRA Development Performance Trade Studies 

Projects and Studies Vehicle Health Monitoring 

STE Obsolescence 

Material Obsolescence 

Component Obsolescence 

Supply Chain Viability 

Spares Augmentation 

ET 3rd Generation Foam 

New Start: AHMS II 

Study: Hydrazine Replacement 

Study: SSME Nozzle 

Study: Orbiter Hardening 

Study: Enhanced C/W 

Study: Crew Survivability 

Source: NASA. 

Legend: 

AHMS Advanced Health Management System 

C/W Caution and Warning 

ET External Tank 

MLG Main Landing Gear 

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

PRSD Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (fuel cells) 

RSRM Reusable Solid Rocket Motor 

SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine 

STE Special Test Equipment 

NASA also considers development of the infrastructure to sustain shuttle 

operations through 2020 equally as important as upgrades to keep the 

shuttle flying safely. One example of a sustainability project for fiscal year 

2004 is the replacement of the roof of the 39-year-old Vehicle Assembly 

Building at Kennedy Space Center, which is in poor condition, as shown 

by the bubbles that have developed in its surface. (See fig. 2.) The roof 

replacement is estimated to cost $16 million and is part of NASA’s total 

spending on infrastructure of $54 million in fiscal year 2004. 
Page 10 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Figure 2: Roof Deterioration on the Vehicle Assembly Building at Kennedy Space 

Center (the tape shows a 5-foot section for perspective) 
Page 11 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

NASA needs to improve its analytic tools to help it improve the basis for 

identifying and selecting shuttle upgrades. NASA uses Probabilistic Risk 

Assessment (PRA) methodologies, specifically the Quantitative Risk 

Assessment System, to improve safety by assessing the relative risk 

reduction of potential upgrade projects to overall shuttle risk. However, 

program managers are aware that the PRA is incomplete and does not 

contain certain key attributes that would make it more accurate, reliable, 

and useful. Early next year, they plan to begin using a revised PRA more 

oriented toward the shuttle. In addition, the Manager of the Shuttle 

Program Development Office believes it is important to develop a new 

Sustainability Health Metric System in order to mitigate the risk that an 

asset required to fly may not be available. The metric would score a 

proposed sustainability project after an evaluation of a set of common 

sustainability factors for all elements of shuttle flight and ground systems 

and subsystems. Similarly, the CAIB could not find adequate application of 

a metric that took an integrated systematic view of the entire space shuttle 

system. NASA is considering development of a sustainability metric, and 

the Manager of the Shuttle Program Development Office believes that if 

approved, it could be ready for use during the SLEP Summit in February 

2004. NASA expects that the nomination of projects at that meeting will 

come from a more comprehensive evaluation through extensive use of 

hard data and rigorous analysis. 

Although creation of the SLEP may improve the identification and 

selection process, further improvements are possible. According to SLEP 

program officials responsible for identifying, selecting, and prioritizing 

shuttle upgrades, they need clear guidance from top management as to 

how those decisions integrate with the other elements of the ISTP, such 

as the ISS and the OSP. In addition, SLEP program officials said the 

identification and selection of upgrades for the shuttle program lack a 

clear measurable metric showing the relationship of an upgrade 

investment to an increase in shuttle operational life. They believe such a 

metric would be useful to decision makers in identifying, selecting, and 

prioritizing shuttle upgrades. Finally, according to NASA Headquarters 

officials, recommendations of the CAIB are under study and will likely 

change the selection and prioritization of shuttle upgrades for both the 

near term and the long term. 

Further Improvements in 

the SLEP Possible 
Page 12 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Until NASA finalizes the basic requirements for the shuttle and further 

improves its process for identifying and selecting upgrades, it will be 

difficult to accurately and reliably estimate the total cost of upgrades 

through 2020. NASA’s current estimate for the cost of upgrading the 

shuttle is itself highly uncertain. Accurate and reliable cost estimates to 

upgrade the shuttle to continue operations are needed by decision makers. 

We found that the agency has not yet attempted to prepare a detailed 

life-cycle cost5

 estimate for all upgrades through 2020. NASA did prepare a 

rough order of magnitude estimate based on an analysis of current project 

estimates through 2020. The total cost of shuttle upgrades, however, could 

potentially be significantly greater as the estimate did not include potential 

projects such as a crew escape system. In addition, a number of potential 

changes could significantly increase the estimated cost, such as changes in 

program requirements, schedule slippages caused by delays in software 

and hardware integration, and implementation of recommendations of 

the CAIB. 

A NASA official stated that it is difficult to develop accurate and reliable 

long-term estimates of shuttle upgrades through 2020, particularly in 

light of uncertainty of the shuttle’s basic requirements such as its life 

expectancy. However, developing life-cycle cost estimates for agency 

programs is not a new issue in the federal government. The Office of 

Management and Budget maintains guidelines for preparing a 

cost-effectiveness analysis, including life-cycle cost estimates applicable to 

all federal agencies within the executive branch.6

 Cost estimates should 

include all costs consistent with agency policy guidance. NASA performs a 

cost and systems analysis to produce feasible concepts and explore a wide 

range of implementation options to meet its program objectives. To do 

this, NASA must develop the life cycle of the program to include the direct, 

indirect, recurring, nonrecurring, and other related costs for the design, 

development, production, operation, maintenance, support, and retirement 

of the program.7

 Comprehensive life-cycle cost estimates include both the 

 5

 Life-cycle cost is the sum total of direct, indirect, recurring, and nonrecurring costs of a 

system over its entire life through disposal. A detailed life-cycle cost estimate would 

include a full range of all potential upgrades, as well as their full range of potential costs. 

6

 Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-94. 

7

 NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 7120.5 B. 

Shuttle Upgrades 

Could Potentially 

Cost Billions More 

Than Currently 

Estimated 

Current Estimate Is Rough 

Order of Magnitude 
Page 13 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

project cost estimate and the operations cost through the end of shuttle 

operations.8

NASA has not prepared a detailed total life-cycle cost estimate for 

upgrades through 2020 due to the uncertainty of the shuttle’s basic 

requirements, as well as the difficulty of preparing estimates of out-year 

funding to 2020. However, in June 2003, the agency estimated the shuttle 

upgrade cost through that year by using a rough order of magnitude 

estimate of $300 million-$500 million a year, or a total of $5 billion-

$8 billion. The $300 million-$500 million per year estimate projected for 

out-year funding was modeled using a simulation tool9

 and developed by 

an independent consulting firm. According to a NASA official, they will 

rerun this estimate by the next SLEP Summit in February 2004, using as a 

basis whatever the recommended upgrade projects are at the time. 

We performed an analysis of the rough order of magnitude estimate 

completed by NASA for all upgrades through 2020. Based on the data, we 

found that the $300 million-$500 million range of estimated costs per year, 

and the methodology used to estimate the costs, appears to be reasonable. 

According to a NASA official, NASA’s cost estimates are focused on the 

annual budget process, rather than long term through 2020, because any 

individual project takes a while to mature and near-year estimates, such as 

those from the current year and through 2008, would be more accurate 

than those from 2009 and beyond, which are more likely to change. 

NASA’s estimate is based on known projects for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 

whose costs taper off in later years and the assessment of an additional 20 

projects through 2020, where cost estimates and implementation plans are 

not certain. 

Although the rough order of magnitude estimate, as well as the 

methodology used to derive it, appears to be reasonable, the total cost 

could be billions more since potential upgrade projects such as a crew 

escape system are not included. Initially, Boeing released a list of safety 

and supportability options that included crew/cockpit escape concepts for 

 8

 Space Shuttle Program Upgrades Management Plan (NSTS 37400, volume I, revision A). 

9

 Performed through the use of a “Monte Carlo” spreadsheet simulation, which randomly 

generates values for uncertain variables over and over to simulate a model. Without the aid 

of simulation, a spreadsheet model will only reveal a single outcome, generally the most 

likely or average scenario, but after hundreds or thousands of trials, one can view the 

statistics of the results and the certainty of any outcome. 
Page 14 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

the shuttle. Figure 3 illustrates the primary types of crew escape presently 

under consideration. The approximate costs involved for the eight present 

concepts range between $1 billion and $3.9 billion, depending on the one 

selected.10 There are three other ejection concepts under development, 

none of which have received a full assessment. These other concepts will 

be assessed in a more in-depth manner, as well as previous metrics and 

costs, at the next SLEP Summit in February 2004. (Appendix III contains 

information on all 11 concepts.) 

Figure 3: Space Shuttle Crew Escape Design Concepts 

 10 The estimated cost for each of the eight present concepts is proprietary information. 
Page 15 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

A number of potential program changes could significantly increase the 

estimated cost of shuttle upgrades through 2020. For example, rough order 

of magnitude estimates do not account for possible slippages in the shuttle 

schedule. According to a NASA official, if NASA and/or Congress deem a 

crew escape option a major priority, more highly developed costs and 

schedules would be created. Also, slippage due to delays in hardware or 

software integration can affect projects where the final vehicle 

modifications are planned for the major maintenance periods. 

NASA has not yet made explicit decisions about the end state of the 

International Space Station.11 For example, if the useful life of the ISS 

were extended and/or an OSP were put into service to support the station 

as an alternative to the shuttle, the life-cycle costs of the shuttle may be 

affected. Until all requirements about the ISS have been fully defined, 

it will be difficult to determine a detailed cost of shuttle upgrades 

through 2020. 

Other potential program changes that would increase costs include a 

requirements change, such as additional lift capability that would require a 

new rocket booster. Any redesign option, if selected, would add billions to 

the total upgrade cost. For example, redesign and development of new 

liquid-fueled rocket boosters is estimated at a rough order of magnitude 

cost of $5 billion. Redesign and development of a five-segment solid 

booster would be a cheaper but less flexible option, at an estimated rough 

order of magnitude of $2 billion. 

Another major driver of increased costs would be implementing the 

recommendations of the CAIB. Its numerous recommendations, such as 

major changes to the shuttle’s thermal protection system, could potentially 

increase costs. NASA officials have said the agency intends to implement 

all the recommendations the CAIB issued in its report, but precise costs 

have yet to be determined. 

NASA is at a critical juncture in the life of the space shuttle. NASA had 

planned to upgrade the shuttle in the future. Now, after the Columbia 

tragedy, NASA has an increased emphasis to fly the shuttle safely through 

2020. NASA officials acknowledge that the loss of the Columbia will be a 

 11 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Space Station: Actions Under Way to Manage Cost, 

but Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-02-735 (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002). 

Potential Program 

Changes Could Increase 

Total Upgrade Cost 

Conclusions 
Page 16 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

key influence on the selection and prioritization of shuttle upgrades as 

NASA officials assess both the short-and long-term implications of the 

CAIB recommendations. Although creation of the Space Shuttle Service 

Life Extension Program institutionalizes the process for identifying, 

selecting, and prioritizing upgrades, additional changes are needed to 

further strengthen that process such as increased use of analytic tools and 

metrics to complement professional judgment. NASA management has 

also not yet made explicit decisions about the basic requirements for key 

elements in its Integrated Space Transportation Plan—the ISS, the OSP, 

and the space shuttle. The agency’s lack of a long-term plan, caused by 

frequent changes in the life of the shuttle, has made it hard to fully define, 

select, and prioritize shuttle upgrade requirements, which form a basis for 

identifying needed upgrades. Such a long-term plan needs to be developed 

now in conjunction with activities to return the shuttle to fly safely. In 

addition, accurate and reliable life-cycle cost estimates are important for 

determining resources needed for the selection and priority of upgrades 

and to determine annual budget requests. Even though an estimate of the 

total life-cycle cost has not been made, it is evident that the cost of 

upgrades through 2020 could be billions more than NASA’s current rough 

order of magnitude estimate if potential projects, such as a crew escape 

system and new projects resulting from the CAIB recommendations, are 

included. Unless improvements are made in NASA’s shuttle modernization 

efforts, NASA will not be able to ensure upgrades are being made to 

address the most necessary needs or to articulate the extent of safety that 

has been enhanced, and determine the total cost of the program. 

To strengthen the agency’s efforts to modernize the space shuttle, we 

recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following four actions: 

• Fully define the requirements for all elements of the ISTP so that those 

responsible for identifying, selecting, and prioritizing shuttle upgrades will 

have the guidance and a sound basis to ensure their decisions on upgrade 

projects are completely integrated with all other elements of the 

transportation plan. In particular, the Administrator should determine, in 

conjunction with its international partners, the ultimate life and mission of 

the ISS in order to provide a sound basis for fully defining shuttle 

requirements. 

• Develop and consistently apply a clear measurable metric to show the 

relationship of upgrade investments to an increase in shuttle operational 

life and/or safety for the entire space shuttle system. NASA’s Quantitative 

Risk Assessment System could be a basis for such a metric since it is 

intended to measure the safety improvement of a single upgrade project. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 17 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

• Continue to pursue development of analytic tools and metrics to help 

assure that SLEP program officials have accurate, reliable, and timely 

quantifiable information to complement their professional judgment. 

• Develop a total cost estimate for all upgrades through 2020 by updating 

the current rough order of magnitude estimate to include new projects 

resulting from the CAIB recommendations, estimates of project life-cycle 

costs, and estimates of major potential projects, such as a crew escape 

system, so that the resources needed to fund shuttle upgrades can 

be ascertained. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA’s Deputy 

Administrator stated that the agency concurred with the first three 

recommendations. Furthermore, NASA concurred with the intent of the 

fourth recommendation concerning development of a cost estimate for all 

shuttle upgrades through 2020. However, the Deputy Administrator 

commented that there were major uncertainties that severely limit the 

agency’s ability to foresee budget requirements beyond 3 to 5 years, such 

as unanticipated technical problems and the required time to accurately 

assess upgrade projects. Consequently, NASA believes that it is better to 

size the long-term (5 to 15 years) anticipated budget run-out based on 

broad estimates rather than on specific lists of projects. 

We recognize that there can be many uncertainties in developing long-term 

budget estimates. However, NASA’s proposal of an anticipated budget runout based on broad estimates is not a substitute for identifying the 

financial implications of identified needs. Specifically, in order for NASA 

to develop a credible Integrated Space Transportation Plan, the agency 

needs a more accurate and reliable long-term total cost estimate. As we 

stated in our recommendation, establishing such an estimate could be 

facilitated by (1) using life-cycle cost estimating techniques on its list of 

potential projects that NASA used to develop its cost estimate through 

2020, (2) updating its list of potential upgrade projects to include 

recommended projects of the CAIB, and (3) including major potential 

upgrade projects currently under consideration, such as a crew escape 

system. The comprehensive nature of this cost estimate will enable 

(1) NASA to formulate a more definitive picture of how it will ensure that 

the shuttle fleet flies safely in the future and (2) decision makers to 

understand associated costs. Therefore, our recommendation remains 

unchanged. 

Agency Comments 
Page 18 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

To assess NASA’s requirements and plans to upgrade the shuttle for 

continuous service through 2020, we obtained and reviewed internal 

documents and independent studies and discussed the requirements and 

plans with responsible NASA officials. 

To assess how NASA determined what upgrades were needed and how 

they were identified, selected, and prioritized, we obtained and analyzed 

schedules and documents from program officials and obtained an 

understanding of the process for identifying, selecting, and prioritizing 

shuttle upgrades. We also reviewed documents regarding analytic tools 

used to select and prioritize shuttle upgrades. 

To assess the estimated life-cycle cost of shuttle upgrades, we reviewed 

and discussed NASA’s guidance regarding preparation of life-cycle cost 

estimates with program officials. To assess the rough order of magnitude 

estimate for out-year funding completed by NASA for all upgrades through 

2020, we obtained data and analyzed the estimate using a Monte Carlo 

simulation tool called @Risk—an Excel-based spreadsheet. Monte Carlo 

simulation helps to assess the risks and uncertainties associated with 

Microsoft Excel spreadsheet models by randomly generating values for 

uncertain variables over and over to simulate a model. We assessed this 

technique to determine the level of confidence around the estimates and 

verified our assessment with responsible program officials. 

To accomplish our work, we interviewed officials and analyzed documents 

at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Johnson Space Center, Houston, 

Texas; and Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 

We also reviewed reports and interviewed representatives of NASA’s 

Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C., and NASA’s 

Independent Program Assessment Office, Langley Research Center, 

Hampton, Virginia. 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 19 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

We conducted our work from April to October 2003 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan 

no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. We 

will then send copies to others who are interested and make copies 

available to others who request them. In addition, the report will be 

available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staffs have any 

questions about this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV. 

Allen Li 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 20 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Appendix I: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 21 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 
Appendix II: Recommended Upgrade Projects 

Resulting from the Service Life Extension 

Program Summit 

Page 22 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Real Year Dollars in Millions—Not in Full Cost 

Subcategory FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 Total 

Should Start in FY04a (Sustainability Related) 

RSRM–Case Hardware Availability 5 5 5 5 5 25 

Orbiter–Certify PRSD Tank Supplier and 

Procure Spares 4 8 8 4 8 31 

SSME–Sustaining Test Equipment Tasks 6 3 1 0 0 10 

Existing Commitmentsb (Safety Related)c

Vehicle CAU 91 77 14 0 0 182 

Vehicle Main Landing Gear Tire and Wheel 3 0 0 0 0 3 

SSME AHMS (Phase 1) 4 3 2 1 0 10 

Industrial Engineering for Safety 15 15 15 15 15 75 

Othersd (Sustainability Related)e 51 43 27 21 10 152 

RSRM Obsolescence 18 19 20 20 21 98 

Infrastructure 92 77 78 79 80 406 

Foundational Activitiesf (Sustainability Related) 

Aging Vehicle Studiesg 10 14 0 0 0 24 

RSRM Ground Test Program 4 10 20 9 21 64 

Improved Tools/Metricsh 7 5 3 3 3 21 

(Customer Driven Capabilities Related)i 

Performance Trade Studies (Lift, Power, 

Stay Time) 2 2 0 0 0 4 

Projects and Studies (Sustainability Related)j

New Start: Vehicle Health Monitoring Study 4 4 0 0 0 8 

New Start: ET 3rd Generation Foam Study 3 7 8 0 0 18 

STE Obsolescence (14)k 16 18 11 7 7 59 

Material Obsolescence (3) 2 0 0 0 0 2 

Component Obsolescence (14) 6 23 27 16 13 85 

Supply Chain Viability (8) 4 0 1 1 0 5 

Spares Augmentation for SLE (5) 5 10 26 23 18 82 

(Safety Related Improvements) 

New Start: SSME AHMS (Phase 2b) 35 45 45 23 12 160 

Study: Hydrazine Replacement 3 3 1 0 0 7 

Study: Orbiter Hardening 2 2 0 0 0 4 

Study: SSME Channel Wall Nozzle 4 12 16 0 0 32 

Study: Crew Survivability Trades 1 0 0 0 0 1 

Appendix II: Recommended Upgrade 

Projects Resulting from the Service Life 

Extension Program Summit 
Appendix II: Recommended Upgrade Projects 

Resulting from the Service Life Extension 

Program Summit 

Page 23 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Real Year Dollars in Millions—Not in Full Cost 

Subcategory FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 Total 

Reserves 20 20 20 20 20 100 

Totall 416 426 347 246 233 1,668 

Source: NASA. 

Note: Final funding profile is dependent on the outcome of the FY 2005 President's Budget 

Submission. 

a

“Should Start” – High scoring sustainability projects that are strongly recommended by NASA for 

starts in FY04 and which would create near-term risk for the program if they did not start. 

b

“Existing Commitments”–Projects previously authorized. 

c

“Safety Improvement”–Projects and studies designed to improve loss of vehicle/loss of crew 

probabilities. 

d

”Others”–A major item in this category is the program installation costs for the Cockpit Avionics 

Upgrade, which is tracked separately, as well as the costs of other smaller projects. 

e

“Sustainability”–Assuring the assets required to fly are in place. 

f

“Foundational Activities”–Tasks that add to NASA’s general insight into the current condition of their 

assets. Non-system specific. 

g

Aging Vehicle Studies include: Mid-Life Certification Assessment & Issue Mitigation, Fleet Leader 

Program, Corrosion Control, STE Survey/Evaluation, Non-Destructive Evaluation Upgrades. 

h

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (safety related), Sustainability Health Metrics (sustainability related), 

Analytical Hierarchy Tool System (sustainability related). 

i

“Customer Driven Capabilities”—Requirements for new capabilities as defined by current or potential 

customers. Customers in this context are the entities that require the space shuttle for access to 

space. Currently, that is mainly the space station, the research community, and the space telescope 

community. 

j

“Projects and Studies”—System-specific activities at various levels of maturity within the system. 

k

This number represents the number of projects in each subcategory. 

l

Totals do not add due to rounding. 

Legend: 

AHMS Advanced Health Management System 

CAU Cockpit Avionics Upgrade 

ET External Tank 

PRSD Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (fuel cells) 

RSRM Reusable Solid Rocket Motor 

SLE Service Life Extension 

SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine 

STE Special Test Equipment 
Appendix III: Comparison of Crew Escape 

Concepts Under Consideration 

Page 24 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Concepta Crew size 

Mass 

properties 

1st kit delivery 

and OMM 

Ascent 

coverage no 

fireballb

Ascent 

coverage 

fireball 

potential 

NASA PRA % 

risk 

1. Extraction-50 5 crew 

5 flight deck 

122 lb added 

No ballast 

required 

4.5 y after ATP 

18 m OMM 

0 to 9k ft None 31% 

2. Ejection-42A 6 crew 

4 flight / 

2 mid deck 

1,788 lb added 

1,900 ballast 

4.5 y after ATP 

18 m OMM 

0 to 70k ft 10k to 70k ft 52% 

3. Ejection-43A 7 crew 

4 flight/ 

3 mid deck 

3,012 lb added 

2,700 ballast 

4.5 y after ATP 

18 m OMM 

0 to 70k ft 10k to 70k ft 52% 

4. Forebody-1-

2N 

7 crew 

4 flight / 

3 mid deck 

8,315 lb added 

2,700 ballastc

5.5 y after ATP 

18 m OMM 

3k to 210k ft 10k to 210k ft 80% 

5. Hybrid-1-H42A 6 crew 

4 flight / 

2 mid deck 

6,448 lb added 

2,700 ballastd

5.5 y after ATP 

18 m OMM 

0 to 210k ft 10k to 210k ft 87% 

6. Hybrid-1-H50 5 crew 

flight deck 

4,825 lb added 

2,700 ballastd

5.5 y after ATP 

18 m OMM 

0 to 210k ft 10k to 210k ft 87% 

7. PLB Capsule 

& Seats 

7 crew 

2 flight / 5 

capsule 

7,256 lb added 

2,700 ballastd

5 y after ATP 

16 m OMM 

Capsule 2k – 

210k 

Seat 0 – 70k 

Capsule 10k – 

210k 

Seat 10k – 70k 

52% 

8. Payload Bay 

Compartment 

and Seatse

7 crew 

2 flight / 5 PLB 

6,024 lb added 

2,700 ballastd

4 y after ATP 

12 m OMM 

No Padf 

75k/80k ft Max 

10k to 70k ft 52% 

9. Ejectiong 2 crew 

2 flight deck 

xxxx lb added 

xxxx ballast 

x.x y after ATP 

xx m OMM 

0 to 70k ft 10k to 70k ft 52% 

10. Ejectiong 3 crew 

3 flight deck 

xxxx lb added 

xxxx ballast 

x.x y after ATP 

xxx m OMM 

0 to 70k ft 10k to 70k ft 52% 

11. Ejectiong 4 crew 

4 flight deck 

xxxx lb added 

xxxx ballast 

x.x y after ATP 

xx m OMM 

0 to 70k ft 10k to 70k ft 52% 

Source: NASA. 

Appendix III: Comparison of Crew Escape 

Concepts Under Consideration 
Appendix III: Comparison of Crew Escape 

Concepts Under Consideration 

Page 25 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

a

Under the “Concept” column: The first number usually represents the number of crew on the flight 

deck and the second number usually represents the amount of crew on the mid-deck. The letter 

following these numbers represents the option. For example, for #2, “42A” represents 4 on Flight 

Deck, 2 on Mid-deck, option “A”. However, for #4, “1-2N” strictly represents the option and for #5 & 

#6, “1-H” stands for “Hybrid” option. 

b

The “fireball” is the environment following a shuttle explosion during ascent. The fireball size, 

temperature, and pressure are a function of the amount of ascent propellant remaining and the 

altitude of the vehicle. The more the propellant and the lower the altitude, the larger the fireball and 

the more difficulty for the crew to survive. The options do not adjust for a fireball ascent. 

c

Center of Gravity cannot be corrected with max ballast of 2,700 lb. 

d/ePRA and Ascent coverage based on 42A ejection seat assessment. 

f

“NO PAD” means that it does not have pad-abort capability (crew could not use option to escape 

while Shuttle is on pad). 

g

Assessment due by February 2004 for Service Life Extension Program Summit. 

Legend: 

ATP Authority to Proceed 

CG Center of Gravity 

OMM Orbiter Major Modification 

PLB Payload Bay 

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 

ROM Rough Order of Magnitude 

SLEP Service Life Extension Program 
Appendix IV: Staff Acknowledgments 

Page 26 GAO-04-203 Space Shuttle 

Individuals making key contributions to this report included Jerry Herley, 

Thomas Hopp, T. J. Thomson, and Karen Richey. 

Appendix IV: Staff Acknowledgments 

Acknowledgments 

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