NUMBER 13-22-00078-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

BRONCO ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellant,

v.

FYP, LLC D/B/A TEXAS PROPERTY

TAX LOANS, CITY OF MERCEDES,

MERCEDES INDEPENDENT

SCHOOL DISTRICT, HIDALGO COUNTY,

SOUTH TEXAS ISD, HIDALGO COUNTY

DRAINAGE DISTRICT #01, AND

SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE, Appellees.

On appeal from the 370th District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

In this suit involving delinquent tax liens, appellant Bronco Asset Management, 
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LLC (Bronco) appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of appellees FYP, 

LLC d/b/a Texas Property Tax Loans (FYP); City of Mercedes and Mercedes Independent 

School District (collectively, the City); and Hidalgo County, South Texas ISD, Hidalgo 

County Drainage District #01, and South Texas College (collectively, the County). By 

three multifarious issues, Bronco argues the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment because: (1) FYP, the City, and the County did not meet their summary 

judgment burden; (2) FYP’s summary judgment evidence was improperly considered over 

Bronco’s objection; and (3) Bronco’s summary judgment evidence raised a genuine issue 

of material fact as to the value of the property. We affirm in part and reverse and remand 

in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 4, 2019, FYP filed its original petition for the recovery of delinquent 

taxes. The County and the City subsequently intervened in the suit, alleging that Bronco 

owed additional delinquent property taxes for tax years 2018 and 2019.

A. FYP’s Motion for Summary Judgment

On October 28, 2020, FYP filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, 

seeking foreclosure on the tax liens it held. The attached summary judgment evidence 

shows that Bronco, delinquent in payment of property taxes for the years 2006–17, 

obtained a loan from FYP in the original amount of $309,965.60 and executed a 

promissory note evincing the transaction on July 31, 2018. Both parties executed a tax 

lien contract on the same date. As part of this transaction, Bronco executed sworn 
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documents authorizing FYP to pay the delinquent taxes and authorizing the Hidalgo 

County Tax Assessor-Collector to transfer the relevant tax liens on the property to FYP. 

Also attached as evidence were sworn certificates signed by the Hidalgo County tax 

assessor-collector certifying that FYP had paid the “taxes, penalties, interest, and 

collection costs” on the property for tax years 2006–2010, 2012, and 2015–2017. All of 

these documents were recorded with the Hidalgo County Clerk’s Office on August 14, 

2018.

The promissory note provided that Bronco would make monthly payments of 

$4,252.25 in satisfaction of the principal, accrued interest, and outstanding fees on the 

loan. Interest accrued in the amount of 10.9% annually. Bronco also agreed to pay late 

fees in the amount of “the lesser of (i) five cents for each $1 of the scheduled installment 

or (ii) the maximum late charge, if any under applicable law, in order to defray the expense 

of handling the delinquent payment.” Over the course of nearly a year, Bronco paid down 

the principal on this note by $11,868.55. However, according to an affidavit sworn to by 

Manuel Longoria, Chief Operations Officer and custodian of records for FYP, the last 

payment Bronco made “was June 30, 2019[,] which was applied to [the] April 1, 2019 

payment.” Thus, the total amount remaining on the principal when Bronco defaulted was 

$298,097.05.

Attached as “Exhibit A” to the motion was what appears to be a printout of 

information for the property taken from the Hidalgo County Appraisal District’s website. 

This exhibit represented that the most recent appraised value of the property was 
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$622,839.00. A “Pay-History and Pay-Off” document from October 19, 2020, which was 

also attached as evidence, itemized the amounts Bronco still owed on the loan. According 

to this document, Bronco owed a total of $357,752.70. Finally, two affidavits by FYP’s 

attorney were attached that detailed the history of FYP’s attempts to collect on the loan 

and the legal fees incurred in seeking to enforce the loan.

B. The City and the County’s Motions for Summary Judgment

On October 5 and November 9, 2020, respectively, the County and City filed their 

separate motions for summary judgment. These motions also sought foreclosure on 

delinquent tax liens, and each taxing unit attached as an exhibit a certified copy of the 

respective entity’s tax roll entry reflecting the delinquency.

C. Bronco’s Response

Bronco filed objections and special exceptions in response to the motions for 

summary judgment. Bronco specifically objected to FYP’s “Exhibit A” on the grounds that 

it was unauthenticated and contained hearsay. Attached to the response as evidence was 

an affidavit signed by Rafic de los Santos, the managing member of Bronco. The record 

does not contain a ruling on Bronco’s objections.

D. The Summary Judgment1

The trial court granted all three motions for summary judgment and its final 

summary judgment itemized the amounts awarded to FYP as follows:

1 The trial court originally granted summary judgment in favor of FYP, the City, and the County on 

June 1, 2021. However, the trial court later granted Bronco’s motion for new trial, and the parties relitigated 

their motions for summary judgment. The trial court signed its amended final summary judgment, which is 

the order on appeal, on November 17, 2021.
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Plaintiff FYP . . . shall recover judgment against Defendant Bronco . . . its 

taxes, penalties and interest, due and owing, and unpaid against the 

property . . . for the years 1998–2004, 2006–2010, 2012, [and] 2015–2017 

in the principal amount of $298,097.05 plus interest in the amount of 

$67,922.26, late fees of $5,102.64, Attorney’s Fees/[]Foreclosure fees of 

$5,186.00, Miscellaneous fees of $637.83, for a total of $376,945.78 

(through May 3, 2021[,] and accruing interest at the rate of $89.02 per diem) 

at the rate of ten and 9/10 percent (10.900%) per annum, and foreclosure 

of the constitutional and statutory liens upon real property described herein 

as to Defendant Bronco . . . .

The judgment also awarded to the City and the County a total of $40,262.05 and 

$17,285.93, respectively. Lastly, the judgment adjudicated the value of the property as 

$622,839.00. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment. Lujan v. 

Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). “Summary judgment is appropriate only 

when there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Tex. Com. Bank, N.A. v. Grizzle, 96 S.W.3d 240, 252 (Tex. 

2002); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). Traditional motions for summary judgment “must stand 

on their own merits, and the non-movant’s failure to answer or respond cannot supply by 

default the summary judgment proof necessary to establish the movant’s right.” City of 

Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). Only when the 

movant meets its burden to prove it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law does the 

burden then shift to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact that precludes 

summary judgment. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84.
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When reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment, we accept the 

nonmovant’s evidence as true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any 

doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 

(Tex. 2003). When the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds for its summary 

judgment, “we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the 

trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious.” Id. at 216.

III. ANALYSIS

A. FYP

By four sub-issues, Bronco asserts that summary judgment in FYP’s favor was 

improper because: (1) the amounts awarded to FYP in the judgment are not supported 

by the summary judgment evidence; (2) the motion for summary judgment failed to 

specifically reference the grounds for summary judgment and the evidence relied upon; 

(3) the trial court should have sustained Bronco’s objection to FYP’s “Exhibit A”; and (4) a 

genuine issue of material fact precluded the trial court from finding the market value of 

the property to be $622,839.00. We begin by discussing the relevant law governing FYP’s 

status as a transferee of a valid tax lien.

1. Property Tax Liens

Property taxes are unique because they, “by definition, are tied to land or personal 

property, unlike other types of taxes, which may be tied to a person or entity.” Willacy 

Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29, 42 (Tex. 2018). 

“On January 1 of each year, a tax lien attaches to property to secure the payment of all 
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taxes, penalties, and interest ultimately imposed for the year on the property, whether or 

not the taxes are imposed in the year the lien attaches.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.01(a). 

Property taxes are due upon receipt and become “delinquent if not paid before February 

1 of the year following the year in which [they are] imposed.” Id. § 31.02(a). “If property 

taxes are not paid by the owner or by another person . . . , the taxing unit may secure 

payment by legal action, including foreclosure on the lien, seizure and sale of personal 

property to satisfy the bill, or a suit to enforce personal liability for taxes.” Sebastian 

Cotton, 555 S.W.3d at 43.

A tax lien is a “creature of statute,” and the enforceability of transferred tax liens is 

governed by § 32.06 of the tax code. Genesis Tax Loan Servs. v. Kothmann, 339 S.W.3d 

104, 108–09 (Tex. 2011); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06. A property owner may 

authorize another to pay the taxes imposed by a taxing unit on the owner’s property. TEX.

TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06(a-1). In that situation, the tax lien on the property may be 

transferred from the taxing authority to the person who pays the taxes on behalf of the 

owner. Id. § 32.06(a-2). A property owner may also enter into a contract for the payment 

of delinquent property taxes with a licensed property tax lender. Id. § 32.065(a); TEX. FIN.

CODE ANN. § 351.002(1). Funds advanced by the transferee under such a contract “are 

limited to the taxes, penalties, interest, and collection costs paid as shown on the tax 

receipt, expenses paid to record the lien, plus reasonable closing costs.” TEX. TAX CODE 

ANN. § 32.06(e). If a transferee pays the property owner’s taxes and any penalties, 

interest, and collection costs imposed, the collector for the taxing unit must issue a receipt 
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to the transferee and must certify that the taxes have been paid by the transferee on 

behalf of the property owner and that the taxing unit’s lien has been transferred to the 

transferee. Id. § 32.06(b). The transferee must then record the tax lien with the deed 

records of each county in which the encumbered property is located. Id. § 32.06(d). The 

transferee is then “subrogated to and is entitled to exercise any right or remedy possessed 

by the transferring taxing unit, including or related to foreclosure or judicial sale.” Id. 

§ 32.065(c).

“At any time after its tax on property becomes delinquent, a taxing unit may file suit 

to foreclose the lien securing payment of the tax, to enforce personal liability for the tax, 

or both.” Id. § 33.41(a). “[T]he transferee of a tax lien is entitled to foreclose the lien in the 

manner provided by law for foreclosure of tax liens.” Id. § 32.06(c). A tax lien transferee 

“may file its claim and seek foreclosure in the suit for all amounts owed the transferee 

that are secured by the transferred tax lien, regardless of when the original transfer of tax 

lien was recorded or whether the original loan secured by the transferred tax lien is 

delinquent.” Id. § 33.445(a); see Ovation Servs., LLC v. Richard, 624 S.W.3d 610, 617 

(Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, no pet.).

2. Summary Judgment Evidence

Because it is dispositive, we next address Bronco’s contention that FYP’s 

summary judgment evidence did not establish its entitlement to summary judgment. 

According to Longoria’s affidavit:

Payment of the Note is secured by liens arising for ad valorem taxes, 

penalties, interests, and costs in accordance with Article VII, Section 15, 
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Texas Constitution. [Bronco] signed sworn document(s) authorizing the 

transfer of the tax liens as required under [§] 32.06(a-1), Texas Property 

Code. The tax liens for 1998–2004, 2006–2010, 2012, 2015–2017 were 

transferred to Transferee as evidenced by certified statement(s) by the 

applicable taxing units in accordance with [§] 32.06(b), Texas Property Tax 

Code . . . . Payment of the Note is further secured by Tax Lien Contract 

dated July 31, 2018 . . . .

However, FYP did not provide the applicable certified statements for the years 1998–

2004, nor did it provide proof that there were any delinquent taxes remaining with respect 

to those liens when the contract was made. Consistent with the sworn documents

executed by de los Santos authorizing the transfer of tax liens, the certified statements of 

transfer of tax lien executed by the tax assessor-collector for Hidalgo County established

only that tax liens for the years 2006–2010, 2012, and 2015–2017 were transferred to 

FYP. FYP’s contention that the obligation in the tax lien contract was secured, in part, by 

the tax liens for years 1998–2004, when no evidence demonstrates that an amount on 

those tax liens was delinquent at the time the contract was made, calls into question 

whether the tax lien contract is void. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06(a-7) (“A contract 

between a transferee and a property owner that purports to authorize payment of taxes 

that are not delinquent or due at the time of the authorization . . . is void.”); id. § 32.065(i) 

(“An agreement under this section that attempts to create a lien for the payment of taxes 

that are not delinquent or due at the time the property owner executes the sworn 

document under [§] 32.06(a-1) is void.”).

Further, funds advanced by the transferee under such a contract “are limited to the 

taxes, penalties, interest, and collection costs paid as shown on the tax receipt, expenses 

paid to record the lien, plus reasonable closing costs.” Id. § 32.06(e). The tax lien contract 
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reflects that the initial balance of the note—the funds advanced—was $309,965.60. The 

applicable certified statements sworn to by the Hidalgo County Tax Assessor-Collector

reflect that the total amount FYP secured through the transfers of the tax liens (including 

taxes, penalties, interest, and collection costs) was $297,816.60. See id. The total amount 

of recording costs reflected by the summary judgment evidence is $244.00. See id. This 

means the difference between the funds advanced under the contract—$309,965.60—

and the “taxes, penalties, interest, . . . collection costs . . . , [and] expenses paid to record 

the lien”—$298,060.60—is $11,905. See id.

FYP made no assertion below or on appeal that the unaccounted for $11,905 is a 

reasonable closing cost. See id. The Finance Commission of Texas is required to “adopt 

rules relating to the reasonableness of closing costs, fees, and other charges permitted” 

by § 32.06. Id. § 32.06(a-4)(2). According to the administrative code, “[t]he general 

maximum fee for closing costs is $900.” 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 89.601(c)(3). 

Assuming that FYP charged the maximum fee for closing costs, this still would not explain 

$11,005 of the principal, as no evidence demonstrated that this amount was secured by 

the transfer of a tax lien.

The summary judgment evidence shows that the amount awarded to FYP exceeds 

“all amounts owed . . . that are secured by the transferred tax lien[s].” See TEX. TAX CODE 

ANN. §§ 32.06, 32.065, 33.445(a). Because of this discrepancy, FYP has failed to 

establish it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 

84; cf. Harris v. Jackson & Walker, L.L.P., No. 05-93-01795-CV, 1995 WL 23008, at *3 
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(Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 20, 1995, no writ) (not designated for publication) (“The Firm’s 

own summary judgment evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact.”). We 

sustain Bronco’s first issue as to FYP. 

B. The City and the County

Bronco contends that the City’s and the County’s motions for summary judgment 

should have been denied because “none of the motions state the elements of the 

movants’ cause(s) of action and none of the motions have specific references to the

summary judgment evidence to support the movants’ claims.” We disagree. “While it is a 

better practice to specifically cite to the summary-judgment evidence in the motion itself, 

Rule 166a(c) does not require it.” Regional Specialty Clinic, P.A. v. S.A. Randles & 

Assocs., P.C., 625 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.); see 

also Jimmie Luecke Child. P’ship, Ltd. v. Droemer, No. 03-20-00096-CV, 2022 WL 

243162, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 27, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[W]e have 

previously noted that [Rule 166a(c)] ‘contains no requirement that the evidence be 

referenced more specifically than being incorporated into the motion,’ . . . especially 

when, as here, the summary judgment record is not voluminous . . . .”). The summary

judgment record is far from voluminous in this case. In total, the City’s and the County’s 

motions and evidence span approximately twelve pages.

Additionally, the City’s motion for summary judgment explained that its suit was 

“predicated upon the existence of a tax lien . . . on property owned by [Bronco].” The City 

referenced portions of the tax code relating to foreclosures on tax liens and requested 
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that “[j]udgment be entered in favor of [the City’s] tax liens against the property.” Likewise, 

the County sought “[j]udgment awarding taxes, penalties, interest, attorney’s fees[,] and 

court costs, as a matter of law, together with foreclosure of their tax liens against 

[Bronco].” The County cited relevant portions of the tax code and corresponding exhibits. 

Both the City and the County argued in their motions that the certified copies of the 

delinquent tax rolls attached were prima facie evidence of their claims. Bronco does not 

claim that the motions for summary judgment did not provide fair notice of the relief being 

sought. We conclude that the City and the County expressly presented the grounds for 

summary judgment in their motion. See McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 340 (“Grounds may 

be stated concisely, without detail and argument.” (quoting Roberts, 811 S.W.2d at 146)).

Next, to the extent Bronco objects to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

judgments in favor of the City and the County, we conclude these entities met their 

summary judgment burden.

In a suit to collect a delinquent tax, the taxing unit’s current tax roll and 

delinquent tax roll or certified copies of the entries showing the property and 

the amount of the tax and penalties imposed and interest accrued constitute 

prima facie evidence that each person charged with a duty relating to the 

imposition of the tax has complied with all requirements of law and that the 

amount of tax alleged to be delinquent against the property and the amount 

of penalties and interest due on that tax as listed are the correct amounts. 

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.47(a).

The City produced a certified copy of a delinquent tax statement. According to this

evidence, for tax years 2018 and 2019, Bronco owed a total of $14,430.18 to the City of 

Mercedes and owed a total of $25,831.87 to the Mercedes Independent School District.
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The County also produced a certified copy of a delinquent tax statement. This statement 

indicated that, if the taxes for tax years 2018 and 2019 were still unpaid after November 

30, 2020, Bronco would owe a total of $11,277.28 in taxes and penalties to Hidalgo 

County, a total of $1,945.48 in taxes and penalties to the Drainage District #01, a total of 

$960.41 in taxes and penalties to South Texas ISD, and a total of $3,432.76 in taxes and 

penalties to South Texas College.

“Once a taxing authority in a delinquency suit introduces the tax records described 

in [§] 33.47(a) into evidence, it establishes a prima facie case ‘as to every material fact 

necessary to establish its cause of action.’” City of Bellaire v. Sewell, 426 S.W.3d 116, 

120 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (quoting Nat’l Med. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 

Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 150 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)).2“After 

the taxing authority makes its prima facie case by introducing the required records, the 

burden of proof then shifts to the taxpayer to show, by introducing competent evidence, 

that he has paid the full amount of taxes, penalties, and interest or that there is some 

other defense that applies to his case.” Id. We conclude that the City and the County met 

their summary judgment burdens concerning their foreclosure claims. We overrule 

Bronco’s first issue as to the City and the County.

2 After the taxing authority makes its prima facie case by introducing the required records, 

the burden of proof then shifts to the taxpayer to show, by introducing competent evidence, 

that he has paid the full amount of taxes, penalties, and interest or that there is some other 

defense that applies to his case.

City of Bellaire v. Sewell, 426 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Bronco does 

not contend that it paid the full amount owed. See id.
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C. Property Valuation

Finally, Bronco asserts that its summary judgment evidence raised a fact issue as 

to the market value of the property. In a suit for foreclosure on a tax lien on property, the 

court is required to determine the market value of the property and incorporate its finding 

into the final judgment. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.50(a). “The appraised value of the 

property according to the most recent appraisal roll approved by the appraisal review 

board is presumed to be its market value on the date of trial.” See id. The City provided 

this evidence, the admissibility of which Bronco does not contest on appeal. Once the 

City produced this evidence, Bronco bore the burden “of establishing that the market 

value of the property differs from that appraised value.” Id. The affidavit signed by de los 

Santos and attached as evidence to Bronco’s summary judgment response states: 

I am familiar with fair market values and how such values are determined. I 

have education, training and experience in real estate and real estate 

values and sales. The present fair market value of the subject property is

not $622,839.00 as purported by the Plaintiff and Intervenors nor was it that 

amount when the taxes in questions were assessed. The value is 

excessive. It does not reflect the current market conditions nor the 

particularities of property values in Mercedes, nor the fact that the property 

remains unrented or unleased and that we have not been able to market it 

or lease it, despite diligent efforts.

However, a complaint that a property is overvalued “is not a proper defense in a 

suit to recover delinquent taxes.” Sewell, 426 S.W.3d at 121–22. To contest the appraised 

value of the property, the property owner must first adjudicate the issue through the 

administrative proceedings laid out in Chapters 41 and 42 of the tax code. See TEX. TAX.

CODE ANN. §§ 41.01–.71, 42.01–.43. “[F]ailure to exhaust the exclusive administrative 
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remedies precludes judicial review of the appraisal and also deprives the property owner 

of the right to raise such protest as a defense against a suit to enforce collection of 

delinquent taxes.” Nev. Gold & Silver, Inc. v. Andrews Indep. Sch. Dist., 225 S.W.3d 68, 

76 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.). Bronco presented no evidence that it exhausted 

its administrative remedies in contesting the appraised value of the property. Therefore, 

the trial court did not err in concluding that Bronco failed to raise a fact issue concerning 

the market value of the property. See id.; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.50(a).

We overrule Bronco’s third issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects as it pertains to the City and the 

County. We reverse the trial court’s judgment as it pertains to FYP and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum opinion.

GINA M. BENAVIDES

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

6th day of July, 2023.