U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

63–500 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1999

Serial No. 106–86

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

CALEB MCCARRY, Professional Staff Member and Counsel

JILL N. QUINN, Staff Associate

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C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

The Honorable Mike DeWine, a United States Senator from the State of

Ohio ....................................................................................................................... 3

The Honorable Bob Graham, a United States Senator from the State of

Florida ................................................................................................................... 6

The Honorable Porter Goss, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Florida ............................................................................................................... 10

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the

State of Michigan ................................................................................................. 13

The Honorable Peter Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State ................................................................... 27

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, International Relations Committee ................................ 38

Senator Mike DeWine ............................................................................................. 40

Senator Bob Graham ............................................................................................... 44

Representative Porter Goss, ................................................................................... 48

Representative John Conyers, Jr., ......................................................................... 55

Representative Charles B. Rangel (submitted in lieu of appearance) ................. 59

Ambassador Peter Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Department of State ................................................................... 64

Additional material submitted for the record:

Haiti Trip Report of September 10, 1999, submitted by Rep. Conyers, Jr. ........ 72

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

Tuesday, November 9, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m. in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. This

morning we will review the U.S. policy toward Haiti. We called this

hearing to examine what is happening in Haiti today and shed

some light on where we need to go from here to advance pluralism

and foster economic growth in Haiti. Of keen concern are the prospects for free and fair parliamentary and local elections that are

anticipated to be held on March 19th and concerns over efforts to

undermine and to politicize the Haitian National Police.

In January, I traveled to Haiti with several of my colleagues.

President Rene Preval had just dissolved parliament, deepening

Haiti’s protracted political crisis. We all agreed that the best way

out of that crisis was a sound and fair election. Several positive developments led us to believe that a good election would be possible.

President Preval issued a public statement that ‘‘very quick elections under good conditions are the only solution to the existing political crisis.’’

State Secretary for Public Security Robert Manuel began negotiations at Preval’s behest with the opposition parties. On March

17th, President Preval created a politically balanced provisional

electoral council. With supporting leverage from the Dole Amendment restrictions, a transparent settlement of the disputed 1997

elections was also achieved. Most importantly, we began to see

leaders from Haiti’s civil society, ranging from grass roots to religious to business organizations, working together across ideological

and class lines.

Our hopes began to fade, however, when a May 28th rally organized by a broad spectrum of civil society groups was attacked and

broken up by Lavalas Family party protesters. The Haitian National Police failed to protect the citizens who gathered that day to

exercise their rights to freedom of assembly and speech.

This year has seen a distressing escalation of common crime and

violent acts. On November 2nd, Amnesty International stated that

‘‘A series of violent events in Haiti have led to fears that the climate of respect for human rights which the country has been endeavoring to promote in recent years is progressively deteriorating.’’

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There is a long tradition of undemocratic rule in Haiti. Recent

events led us to fear that Haiti is experiencing a return to past

practices. It will only serve to create violence and misery in that

impoverished nation. The departure of Robert Manuel raises real

concerns about the future independence and professionalism of the

Haitian National Police. The October 8th murder of Colonel Jean

Lamy followed by the October 14th armed attack on a director of

the HNP’s Judicial Police, the unit responsible for investigating

Lamy’s killing, are very bad signs.

Our Ambassador to Haiti, Timothy Carney, underscored the real

issue recently, stating: ‘‘What is currently important is that no one

political party, no faction or group gain control of your police. I emphasize that the politization of the police is unacceptable.’’

We must not abandon our efforts to help the Haitian people. We

should continue to work to alleviate the underlying conditions that

plague Haiti. But Haitian leaders must meet their responsibilities

as well. In order for there to be good elections which the United

States can support in good conscience, there must be freedom of

speech and assembly, and an apolitical police force to protect those

essential rights. Moreover, the Provisional Electoral Council, which

has been trying to organize the elections, civil society, and political

parties should not be the object of crude, antidemocratic attacks.

On October 24th, protesters violently broke up an official function of Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council, the CEP. We were appalled that the Haitian National Police again failed to fulfill their

responsibility, in this case to protect the CEP. When former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government was overthrown, our Nation, with our support, spared no effort to restore elected, civil government to Haiti. This unacceptable outrage was committed in Mr.

Aristide’s name. That is disappointing to us all.

I would like to say a word about our Ambassador to Haiti, Timothy Carney. It is regrettable that the State Department declined

to allow him to be available for this hearing. Ambassador Carney

has earned our respect for his forthrightness and his professionalism. Among other accomplishments, we credit him with leading the effort to put good elections on track last Spring. We would

have welcomed his views on how to keep them on track today.

We thank Senator DeWine of Ohio, Senator Bob Graham of Florida, Representative Porter Goss of Florida, Representative Charles

Rangel of New York, and Representative John Conyers of Michigan

for accepting our invitation to testify before this Committee. While

we may disagree on some of the issues, each of these elected representatives has demonstrated a consistent interest in the welfare

of our hemisphere’s poorest country.

I would like to ask our Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Gejdenson, if he has any opening remarks, and then we will withhold

opening remarks in order to enable our Senators to get back for a

roll call that they have waiting for them.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I will hold my opening remarks until after the

Senators and our other House Members have given their testimony.

Chairman GILMAN. At this point, I would like to note that Senator Graham made a special effort to be with us today, because it

is his birthday. Congratulations, Senator Graham. You look youngVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:21 Jun 15, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 63500.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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er than ever. We welcome having you with us. I’m also pleased to

welcome Senator DeWine, from Ohio, and a former Member of this

Committee. Welcome Senator DeWine.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. MIKE DeWINE, A UNITED STATES

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Senator DEWINE. Thank you very much. It is great to be back

with the Committee on which I served for 6 years when I was in

the House. I want to thank you for convening this hearing today.

The country of Haiti and its people are really at a crossroads. I

thank you for holding this hearing because although Haiti is not

of strategically great importance to the United States, probably

never will be, it is close to us. It is in our back yard. What happens

in Haiti is very, very important to us as a country, and we need

to be interested in Haiti.

I am no expert on Haiti, but I follow the events affecting this

country closely, and have traveled there seven times in the last 5

years. I believe that there is some good news that comes out of

Haiti. I would like to talk first about the good news, and then the

bad news.

First the good news. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, the best news that

comes out of Haiti comes from the thousands of individuals from

the private, non-governmental organizations—members of churches, church congregations, religious people—who are in Haiti every

day trying to make a difference. These are Haitians, these are U.S.

citizens and others. They have helped the poor; they have helped

the orphaned, the starving, the elderly and the sick. Each time I

have visited Haiti, I have been inspired by their heroic deeds.

Second, the U.S. Government has played a major humanitarian

role in Haiti, and we continue to do so; and we must continue that.

We have been able to continue to feed thousands of orphan children

through Public Law 480. Also, our AID mission in Haiti is developing a local association to serve as advocates for Haitian children

and to create a network for orphanages to share ideas and resources, and this must continue.

Third, Mr. Chairman, we have made tremendous progress in

training the Haitian police. We literally started with nothing. Although the Haitian police have had problems, and will continue to

have problems, these problems were not unexpected. We have done

something that has probably not been done on this magnitude or

scale in the history of the world which, basically, we took 18-, 19-

, 20-year-old kids and turned them into a police force.

Fourth, Mr. Chairman, I have been encouraged by the success of

some USAID programs to promote growth in Haiti’s agricultural

sector. We haven’t done this enough, frankly. We need to do more

of it. But what we have done, we have seen some progress. We

have worked directly with farmers to improve techniques in the

fields, where they learn—from our example—how to improve their

farming practices to yield more productive crops. We have also, just

as importantly Mr. Chairman, worked to help form marketing cooperatives in Haiti to enable farmers to get their products to the

marketplace without having to go through the traditional Haitian

choke-hold that is controlled by just a few families.

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Fifth, Mr. Chairman, Haiti has taken some small steps toward

business privatization—not as much as we would like to have

seen—but we have seen some in the area of flour and cement and

enterprises, and also in the area of cellular phones.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we have really not seen the kind of massive exodus of Haitian refugees that we have witnessed earlier, and

that is good news as well.

But let me now turn to the bad news. The Haitian economy remains stagnant. Because a significant proportion of economic activity is really from the underground markets, it is very difficult to

determine exactly where the economy is in Haiti and to see exactly

how far it has fallen. Haiti remains the poorest nation in our hemisphere. We use the figure of $250 per capita per year, but no one

really knows the real figure. What growth there is, Mr. Chairman,

I believe, from my trips to Haiti, comes from two sources: one is

the underground economy, and the other is from foreign remittances, which are very significant in Haiti’s economy.

Mr. Chairman, the political situation is even worse. The phrase

‘‘Haitian government’’ is tragically today an oxymoron. The government has virtually ceased to function. The current political crisis

is rooted in the April 1997 parliamentary and municipal elections.

Since January 1999, President Preval has been ruling by decree.

Elections have been postponed three times, and now are scheduled

for March of the year 2000. With former-President Aristide running

for president, and he and his followers in the Lavalas Family Party

campaigning to hold one comprehensive presidential and legislative

election in November or December, 2000, it is unlikely, I believe,

that March elections will occur. Political intimidation is definitely

on the rise.

Mr. Chairman, absent a stable and democratic government in

place, Haiti has no hope of achieving real and lasting economic, political, and judicial reforms. Haiti is finding itself stuck in a vicious

cycle of despair. It is a cycle in which political stalemate thwarts

government and judicial reforms, which in turn discourages investment and privatization. Caught in a cycle like this, the economy

stands to shrink further and further unless changes are made.

Mr. Chairman, earlier I noted the limited progress of the Haitian

National Police. However, very real threat does exist that the police

force will become politicized as a result of the October 7, 1999,

forced resignation of Secretary of State for Public Security Bob

Manuel. Since then, supporters of former-President Aristide have

harassed the Police Director, General Pierre Denize, calling for his

dismissal. That has contributed to the erosion of public confidence

in the police force, which adds to the country’s instability. The Haitian people’s confidence in their country’s judicial system is also

fueled by their belief that the legal system is corrupt and for sale

to the highest bidder.

It is no surprise that with a law enforcement far from effective,

Haiti has become a popular transit stop for drug traffickers. This

will continue, Mr. Chairman, and frankly what we have to do is to

work outside the borders of Haiti on the high seas to make a difference there, at the same time that we work with the Haitian National Police.

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Why do we care about Haiti, Mr. Chairman? We care because

this tiny country lies roughly 550 miles from the U.S. coast of Florida. It is part of our hemisphere, and what happens in this hemisphere affects us; and we should care about it. We cannot ignore

Haiti. Let’s not forget that we already have a lot of money invested

in Haiti. The price we pay for failing to pay attention will take several forms. One may be another massive refugee crisis, and certainly we will see drug trafficking continuing through Haiti. That

is why we must care about Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, the planned withdrawal of the U.S. military

forces from Haiti should not represent an end to our involvement

in Haiti. Our Nation can still play a constructive role, in partnership with the Haitian people, to ensure that the many troubles inflicting this small island do not pass a point where they can not

be reversed.

Mr. Chairman, first we must continue efforts aimed at democracy-building in Haiti. This means we must promote free markets

and the rule of law. That also means that we must provide Haiti

with electoral assistance so that free and fair elections can take

place. However, Mr. Chairman, the United States must not support

any election, either politically or financially, if certain criteria are

not met.

We must insist that the parliamentary elections are held separately from the presidential elections this year. We must pressure

the Haitian government to allow the international community and

a delegation of world leaders to take a lead role in the upcoming

election. We must urge the Haitian government to reform the electoral and political party laws to level the playing field. We must

insist that they have voter registration lists, voter cards, access to

state media, and access to state financial resources. We must also

ensure that the police do not become politicized in favor of certain

factions or parties at the expense of others. Finally, we must provide funding to continue with the political party-building process in

Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, we must make it clear that our financial assistance for these elections is truly contingent on the above.

Second, until a functioning government is in place, any assistance we provide needs really to go through the private sector. This

is the only way that we can ensure that aid gets directly to the people. Third, we must fight drug trafficking through Haiti with a continued offshore U.S. presence as well as working with the Haitian

police. Fourth, the United States should expand agricultural assistance through nongovernment organizations.

We have seen some success with these USAID programs, and I

have personally visited a number of them myself, Mr. Chairman.

Efforts aimed at teaching the Haitian farmers about land preservation, natural resource depletion, and efforts to work directly with

the farmers have the most hope of preventing Haitians from abandoning agriculture for urban areas like Port-au-Prince.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, a U.S. role in Haiti must ensure that humanitarian and food assistance continues to reach people and especially the children. We have, I believe, a moral obligation to not let

the orphan children and other needy children in Haiti, the elderly,

and others starve.

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To conclude, Haiti cannot progress until its political leaders and

the elite class take responsibility for their situation and commit to

turning things around. I truly believe, Mr. Chairman, that we will

not see Haiti turn around until two things happen: First, the political leadership of the country decides that it is in their interest to

make things happen; and second—and maybe this is even more important—the political elite in Haiti, the 1 or 2 percent, the educated people, the people who have truly, historically been the elite,

they must decide that it is in their best interest that Haiti change.

They must decide that it is no longer in their interest to see chaos,

to see uncertainty, to see the status quo.

I truly believe that there are many people in Haiti in the elite

who believe that that is the only ocean they can swim in, and that

they will be better off if there is chaos, uncertainty, and no change.

Until this elite in Haiti changes its perception and truly understands that Haiti needs to change, it will be very difficult for

change to really take place in Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence with my time. I appreciate you giving us the opportunity to be here. Thank you for

holding this hearing on Haiti.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Senator DeWine, for your extensive and very thorough remarks.

[The prepared statement of Senator DeWine appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. We now turn to Senator Graham.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. BOB GRAHAM, A UNITED STATES

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman

Gejdenson, and Members of the Committee. Before I start, Mr.

Chairman, I would like to take the privilege of commenting on the

magnificent portrait of our friend, Congressman Dante Fascell. It

was 40 years ago this year that I was an intern for Congressman

Fascell. Most of the values and concepts of what it means to be a

legislator I gained from that great man, and his wisdom still pervades this Committee and this Congress; and it is so reassuring to

see his presence with us today.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Senator Graham. We certainly

miss our former Chairman, and he made a great contribution to

our Nation and to this Committee. Please proceed.

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to join my

colleagues in appearing before you today to testify on the current

political situation in Haiti. I appreciate the long efforts that you

and the Members of this Committee have focused on the situation

in Haiti and your efforts to bring democracy and prosperity to that

country.

Mr. Chairman, I am very troubled by recent events in Haiti, particularly the disruption of the meeting of the Provisional Electoral

Council, the CEP, on October 24th of this year. On that date, factions associated with the Fanmi Lavalas broke up a meeting by

throwing urine on members of the Provisional Electoral Council.

No democracy can function with this type of direct assault on its

fundamental institutions.

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In light of these events, some suggest that the situation in Haiti

is without hope, beyond our ability to influence. I am here to say

that turning our backs on Haiti is not an option. We have learned

this lesson repeatedly during this century. We will always be

drawn back to Haiti by a combination of historical ties, humanitarian instincts, and our own national interest. Although it is difficult to remain engaged, as the country that has the greatest influence on Haiti the United States must use that influence in a positive way.

I remember, as do you, the scenes of Haitian refugees awash in

the seas in their small boats. I remember the scenes of Haitian

ships being searched and found to be laden with illegal drugs destined for our Nation’s streets. These are the images of reality that

we will once again be forced to face if we ignore current events in

Haiti.

I am an optimist. I have known the quality of the Haitian people—their strong, strong family values, their dedication to personal, family and community improvements, the beauty and value

of their art and culture. These are the foundations for democratic

reform on which a stable society with economic opportunity and

prosperity may be built.

Mr. Chairman, as a Senator from Florida, I know first—hand the

importance of strengthening democracy and economic development

in Haiti, as well as the consequences of failure in these regards. Indeed, the United States has been committed to this objective and

has led international efforts to help Haiti. Since 20,000 U.S. troops

landed to restore democracy to Haiti in 1994, we have provided significant humanitarian, economic, and security assistance. In spite

of our efforts, Haitian democracy again finds itself at a crossroads.

Parliamentary and municipal elections that can resolve the political crisis in Haiti, originally scheduled for later this month, have

been postponed until March of 2000. I cannot overstate the importance of holding these elections in the Spring of 2000, and assuring

that they are open and credible elections.

Violence, election fraud, and low voter turnout have plagued Haitian elections in the past. In fact, there were problems with the

1997 elections—in which voter turn out was about 5 percent—that

escalated the current political crisis in Haiti. Only by holding free

and fair elections in a secure environment where all parties are

able to participate openly can Haiti move beyond its current stalemate. Ending this stalemate will also allow for additional economic

assistance from the United States and the international community. It is a prerequisite of improving the life of ordinary Haitians.

Let me suggest several steps that I believe must be taken to ensure that the upcoming elections can take place in an environment

that will engender trust in the system and allow Haiti to move forward. First, during the period leading up to the elections in Haiti,

although our permanent military force is small and will soon transition to an expeditionary presence, we should continue military efforts to help the Haitian people. This force should be engaged in

worthwhile civic projects such as construction of schools, roads, and

medical clinics throughout the country.

Second, we must do what we can to assure that there is a secure

environment in which these elections can take place. Providing a

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significant number of international observers will help accomplish

this objective. It is important that these observers be deployed

early in the electoral process, not just arrive a couple of days before

the election itself.

Third, the international community must provide support for

these elections. I know that the United States and other nations

have already provided significant funding to prepare for the elections. Additional assistance will be available only if the conditions

for a free and fair election exist. As I mentioned at the outset,

there have been several very troubling incidents over the last few

weeks and months that lead me to question whether these conditions do, in fact, exist. Some would suggest that, under current conditions, we should not be a party to an election in Haiti, but we

cannot afford to walk away. The world, in particular the United

States, stands ready to help the Haitian people build their democracy.

Fourth, the Provisional Electoral Council has done an excellent

job of resolving the disputed 1997 elections. During my recent visit

to Haiti, I met with several of the members of the CEP. They have

proven that they are willing to do what is right, what is courageous, what is best for the people of Haiti. They deserve our support and the support of the Haitian political parties. The reassuring and compelling statements of our Ambassador to Haiti, Tim

Carney, emphasized the importance of the CEP.

Political parties are taking risks to participate in this election,

and they deserve our support. Without it, they will be forced underground. We need to find ways to assure that they are able to assemble freely and have their platforms heard. The United States

and the international community must help the political parties directly. I applaud the efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, and the National

Democratic Institute as they have worked to advance democracy in

Haiti. Their efforts are good examples of how non-governmental organizations become engaged in promoting democratic reform where

direct involvement by the U.S. State Department and other agencies would be inappropriate.

Mr. Chairman, I would suggest these would be important steps

that the United States and the international community can take

to assure that credible elections will be held. But the Haitians

themselves have the greatest responsibility to assure that this occurs. All political parties should publicly commit to denouncing political violence, including allowing all parties to publicly campaign

without intimidation. This commitment must include actively restraining any elements or supporters from participating in violence

or intimidation. President Preval and former President Aristide

have a special responsibility to use their status and trust that the

Haitian people have placed in them to restrain the forces of evil.

I call on them to work with the international community to ensure

that these elections go forward in a secure environment. Mr. Chairman, in many respects their credibility depends on this, and they

will be held accountable for their success or failure.

It is essential to the Haitian democratic process that there are

indeed two separate elections in the coming 14 months. We have

already witnessed considerable delays. Any additional delay will

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put international support at great risk. Credible parliamentary and

municipal elections must occur to provide confidence in the electoral system for the presidential elections in November of 2000 to

be viewed as credible. It is also important that Haiti develop a

strong and independent legislative branch of government. This can

help it to survive through periods of instability and provide an outlet for those who may disagree with an elected executive.

Some have argued that the March election should be delayed and

folded into the presidential election. This would have ominous and

negative implications. It would mean for almost 3 years the country has been without a stable parliament. It will mean that the

economy of the country will continue to be denied international financial aid that requires legislative action by the Haitian Parliament before it can move forward.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your indulgence, the

United States has developed a very effective military, a military

that has proven its ability to intervene in conflicts and provide a

secure environment. We have done this in Haiti, Bosnia, and now

in Kosovo. Unfortunately, we have not been equally successful in

providing long-term political and economic stability following our

military interventions. The military’s success is the result of many

years of thoughtful planning, training, and resourcing. The followup economic and political activities have none of these qualities.

They are characterized by their ad hoc nature and lack of sustainable and credible initiatives, and a particular lack of emphasis on

carrying out an effective economic recovery plan.

These comments are by no means limited to Haiti. In the current

issue of Foreign Affairs, there is an article, Mr. Chairman, entitled

‘‘A European New Deal for the Balkans.’’ I would just read one sentence from the second paragraph, ‘‘The basis for long-term stability

and non-nationalistic politics in southeastern Europe lies in its

economies, and here the picture is bleak.’’ Exactly that same sentence could be written substituting Haiti for southeastern Europe.

Mr. Chairman, operations in Bosnia and Kosovo have been characterized by successful military as the first chapter, followed by

failed economic and political chapters which left us in situations no

better than those which we originally encountered. Mr. Chairman,

I would recommend to the Members of the House of Representatives as a step which might be taken to strengthen our economic

influence in Haiti and other countries in the Caribbean basin—the

Caribbean Basin Initiative legislation which was passed by a 3 to

1 vote in the Senate last week—I would hope that favorable and

expedited attention could be given to that in the House of Representatives. I believe this would be a significant step toward the

United States overcoming this history of failed economic response

after successful military intervention.

Mr. Chairman, during my last visit to Haiti in June of this year,

I flew over the north coast and observed scores of small boats

under construction. These boats could be a warning of things to

come, or simply a reminder of past problems. We already know the

price of failure in Haiti because we have paid it for most of the

20th Century. We must use this opportunity to enhance democracy

in Haiti so that our children and grandchildren will not have to

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continue paying the price of failure into the 21st Century. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Graham appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BALLENGER. [Presiding.] Senator Graham, I would like to

thank both you and Senator DeWine for being here. I don’t know

how much time you have.

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately we have already

had a bell for a vote that commenced at 10:30, and I am afraid that

I am going to have to join my colleague in absenting myself from

the balance of the hearing.

Mr. BALLENGER. We thank you kindly for being here this morning, and I am sorry for the tight schedule that you have run into.

Congressman Goss, we will turn it to you now.

Mr. GOSS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a

lengthy, closely typed, single-spaced multipage statement which I

would like to submit for the record.

Mr. GEJDENSON. We would love to hear all of it.

Mr. GOSS. I would like to summarize, and I would like to have

unanimous consent to submit the full statement.

Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. PORTER GOSS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. GOSS. Thank you. I will proceed to say that I also want to

congratulate the Committee for making this effort. Lord knows

Haiti needs all the help it can get from its friends. I think everybody here, as I look around, are people that have either traveled

there or are very familiar with it and are trying to find a solution

for a difficult problem.

I could point out, in terms of my own credibility about Haiti, I

have been involved with that country one way or another with government efforts since the 1960’s. I can point out that Port-auPrince is a lot closer to my district than Washington, D.C. I can

point out that I have a lot of Haitian Americans in my district. I

have to point out that I have a steady stream of visitors, parliamentarians, and businessmen from Haiti, and I basically seem to

spend a large part of my official life dealing with the Haitian problem.

I also, as the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, deal a lot

with facts that go on in the world, troubling facts, that affect our

national security and our well-being and our American interests,

and we also try very hard in the Intelligence Committee to distinguish between facts and wishful thinking. One of my criticisms—

and I have been harsh on the Administration about this—is that

they failed to distinguish the facts from the wishful thinking over

the past several years.

Let me start by saying where we are in Haiti today. By any

measure I would say—in fact by all the measures—I would say

that we are generally backsliding badly. The economy is in shambles. There is corruption in the business world, the official world

and every world. It is very hard to get a business loan from a bank

in Haiti. It is very hard to get any kind of security guarantees at

warehouses. Payoffs are a part of business. Things just are not

11

going forward in a way that would pass muster in this country, and

in fact it is getting worse.

Crime is rampant. I have been getting calls from people who say

that once the sun sets, the HNP in many of the cities just simply

go indoors and they don’t come out, and you are at your own risk

until the sun comes up again. Unfortunately, we are seeing a considerable increase in crime going on throughout the country.

The judiciary is, in fact, non-functional. The parliament is shattered, as we know. Power is concentrated in the executive branch,

with even the local officials in the country serving at the presidents’ pleasure. When I say ‘‘presidents’,’’ I use the word in the plural sense. I would also point out that there is, among international

observers in the community now, increasing concern about this

backward drift, or back slide.

Election security is going to be a critical issue. From the point

of view of competency, the HNP probably is not going to be able

to do the job sufficiently to give people the confidence to run, that

is, the opposition out there to run, or the people to vote, to be concerned about their safety in the voting process. We have to overcome those areas, and that means a huge effort, because as people

have testified already, the two Senators have testified and others

who know the situation there know, getting elections to happen in

Haiti is not going to be easy, and getting full, fair, free, and transparent elections is a huge task.

I think it is telling that former-President Aristide has been silent

on the disruptions we have seen so far to the initial kickoff sessions

of the CEP and the opposition politicians who have tried to gather

around. There has been calculated violence meant to disrupt the

democratic process. It is associated, or at least alleged, that formerPresident Aristide is responsible, in part, for this. I understand

that there has been no word forthcoming from him.

I think the question that is often asked about, gee it is going to

be such a huge effort in terms of educating the Haitians relative

to the security question of the atmosphere to vote, is a false issue

in some ways. The Haitians know how to vote. I have been there,

as many of us have, for elections to observe the Haitians. I was

there in 1990, and I was there again for the parliamentary elections thereafter; and the Haitians go about their business very

well. They understand how to do it, notwithstanding the high illiteracy rate. The problem is that they don’t feel motivated to do it

now because of the corruption, and ‘‘democracy’’, has brought them

nothing, has not brought food to the table. They see the

authoritarianism continuing, and the destabilization and the elitism that was spoken about earlier in the testimony rampant in the

country.

So, I think that the idea of know-how is not the issue. I think

the idea of atmosphere is rather critical. In the area of atmosphere,

one cannot overlook all of the very significant evidence in recent

days that there is increasing politization of the HNP. Not only is

it a competency question realistically asked, but the politization

question is one that needs to be resolved.

In a couple of other areas that have been spoken to briefly, I

would like to talk about immigration, the economic immigration,

looking to the megapolis of Miami as the way out of the troubles

12

in Haiti if you are in economic despair, which almost everybody in

the country is; we need to have a repatriation agreement. It is extraordinary to me that we have negotiated two repatriation agreements with Fidel Castro, and none with Haiti, which is thought to

be a more friendly country. It does give us a need to address that

issue.

Speaking of Cuba, I am concerned, and would ask the question

and try and direct to this Committee’s attention, what exactly is

the Cuban interest in Haiti these days? There seems to be a greater manifestation of Cuban presence, allegedly or assertedly under

the guise of medical help, but from observers’ testimony that I have

talked to and have called me, it is more than that. There appear

to be what I would call young thugs who are militant types out and

about doing I don’t know what, but apparently doing it without any

concern for whether the HNP cares what their activities are about.

It appears to me that is an area that needs to be pursued in addition to the question of the increasing drug trade which is obvious,

well known, understood, and is seriously a setback for us on the

war on drugs, and without again overlooking the problems of the

immigration flows that Senator Graham is so aware of and spoke

so articulately about.

I believe where we are in Haiti now is the need for a realistic

appraisal, and I stress the word realistic. I believe that we need to

identify the Haitians in Haiti who are willing to be powerful,

strong, courageous leaders, and assist them in their opportunity in

Haiti to lead Haitians.

I think the problem is that we have been calling it not as it is,

but as we wish it were in Haiti, and that is a formula for deceiving

ourselves.

I basically would associate myself with the ideas that have been

put forward by Senators DeWine and Graham. The one exception

would be that I do not believe it is useful for our combat troops to

be down there doing civilian projects when I believe there are other

NGO’s that can do that. But that is a small point. In terms of

drawing a line about will the United States lend its credibility to

these elections, I think we have to answer the question is it possible to have full, fair, free, friendly transparent elections where

there will be good opposition opportunities, where the Haitians will

willingly go forth and vote because there is opportunity for them.

I think that is going to be the test, and if Haiti fails that test, I

do not think that we should lend the aura of credibility to elections

that are not credible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Goss appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Goss. I hope you

can stay for some questions.

Mr. GOSS. I would be very happy to stay.

Chairman GILMAN. We are now pleased to have Congressman

Conyers, representing the State of Michigan, Ranking Minority

Member on the Judiciary Committee. Welcome, Mr. Conyers. We

are pleased to have been able to go to Haiti with you on several

occasions.

13

STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to my good friend,

the Ranking Member, Mr. Gejdenson Members of the Committee,

Mr. Payne and Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Delahunt, who serves with

me on the Judiciary Committee, have been very helpful in the one

area of foreign affairs that I have spent as much time on, this subject, perhaps more than any other. I am delighted to be here to

share with my colleagues some of the impressions of where we are

in the very important issue around restoring Haiti to some prominence, both economically and politically.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you, because you have been working with

me on this issue for many years. I have been to Haiti with everybody that has been at this table, and many of the Members of the

Committee. I have followed the subject closely; I travel there frequently. Today’s hearing provides an excellent opportunity for us to

openly discuss some of the challenges that are still facing Haiti,

and what we can do about them.

I may be the one that knows the first democratically elected

president as well as, or better than anybody in the Congress. I remember President Aristide before he was a president. He was here

in Washington and I got to know him. He traveled with the

Cranbook Institute in Michigan. I am deeply impressed by him as

a human being, a spiritual leader, and a person who is trying to

bring order to his country under incredible circumstances. I think

Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the man, deserves some examination of his

life and his career and his designation, based on the principles of

the religion out of which he came. I think we can easily demonstrate that the former-President, Mr. Aristide, has denounced, in

a regular way, all of the activities, the unfortunate incidents that

have happened, the public disruptions; and I can remember one of

our meetings in which we delivered the same kind of message that

we are delivering to ourselves, we delivered to him. As soon as I

finished he said what do you want me to do? I said we want you

to go on the radio and denounce these events. He said, I will do

it. He said, I am prepared to do it and I want to do it. And he did

it. He still does it. He has not been silent. He has publicly denounced and condemned these activities.

While we are thinking about that, we ought to examine the motive for him to be deliberately fostering the disruptions for a country in which he is the lead contender for election, I don’t think that

would make good sense. He would not benefit from any of this disruption.

The other matter that I think we need to get on the table right

away is his—he and the current President’s commitment to two

elections. That was a very important aspect of our visit. Now, the

elections were delayed but it wasn’t—it was through administrative

difficulty of printing ID cards for a million Haitians that, if you

know the terrain, as I know the Chairman does, it is impossible.

Nobody gets up there, period, except the people that live there. So

to imagine that we could bring in some entrepreneurs who would

quickly take a photo of everybody for the election, which was a

worthy idea, it is just simply impossible. So the election was delayed. But the first commitment we got from both President Preval

14

and former-President Aristide was that we get out, we make it

clear, we get out to the public that there would be two elections

and no further delay. That has been the commitment and still is.

Now, a word about the police. Pierre Denize, the head of the Haitian National Police, has been one of the most able, committed, and

open members of the whole government. They have abolished their

army, something that has never happened before. They are moving

ahead in a very excellent way. His credibility has never, ever been

brought under question. Every investigation that we have asked

him to look more carefully at, every issue that we have ever raised

to him, I think, has been very important.

The other matter that I think should be brought to your attention, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, is the whole

question of our expectations. We have to get a management under

these—our expectations. Haiti was in ruins after largely U.S.-supported governments for several administrations—in ruin. There

was no department of anything. I mean, we are talking about creating a nation from the ground up in a few years, and of course

we are impatient. We want more to happen. But we have got to get

some management over our own expectations. We have to be a bit

more realistic about what we expect of Haiti at this point.

The transition to democracy in 1990, and again in 1994, was difficult. Thousands of Aristide supporters were murdered. We still

have problems going on. The President’s own sister has been injured. These aren’t activities promoted by people that are supporting the present administration or the past administration.

Haiti has abolished its military and begun building a new professional police force with 5,000 members today, with our help.

I talked with former-Police Chief Kelly and his successors down

there, and they and we were pleased at the quick training, which

is not yet completed by far. We have got a lot more to do. So, I

think it would be inaccurate to suggest that President Aristide, or

his supporters, or any other political group are dominating the police when the few facts that we do have make it clear that the

sources of violence are so diverse.

We should avoid any over-simplification that any one group of

supporters carries a disproportionate responsibility for disruption.

The strength of a democracy is measured by how well it functions

under adverse circumstances, and the economic and social environment in Haiti places tremendous pressures on the political system.

Our U.S. Agency for International Development just reported that

even though we have delivered thousands of vaccinations for children, increased access to microcredit for entrepreneurs, and improved environmental conditions, only 39 percent of the population

has access to clean water, and only 26 percent have adequate sanitation. I meet with the businessmen regularly too, and am supportive of their efforts. They are great and doing a wonderful job.

I am here to urge that our investigation be tempered with caution and patience; that we don’t expect too much too quickly from

a nation that is literally rising from the ashes. It is in that spirit

that I am very pleased to join you here today and ask that my report from my latest visit to Haiti, of September 10, 1999, be put

in the record along with my colleagues that were there: RepresentVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:21 Jun 15, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 63500.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
15

atives Campbell, Payne, Hilliard, Faleomavaega, and Delegate

Donna Christian-Green.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection that will be made part of

the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conyers, for your testimony.

Regretfully, Congressman Rangel of New York is detained in a

Committee markup. He will not be able to be with us this morning.

Without objection, we will include his statement in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rangel appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Let me address a question or two to our panelists. The attack on Haiti’s electoral authorities on October 24th

was unacceptable. What should we do to oppose this kind of action

at this time? Mr. Goss, Mr. Conyers, or either one.

I am pleased Senator DeWine was able to return.

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly, I think that

this country, as I said in my prepared statement, must be very

strong in regard to the elections. I set forth criteria in my prepared

statement. I think we have to insist on this criteria. That is pretty

much it. This is an area where I think we have to draw the line.

As far as U.S. assistance—if U.S. assistance is going to be in

there, we have to have certain things required in regard to the

election. One of the things that we constantly monitor and look at,

not just in Haiti, but in many countries, is whether or not the police are becoming politicized. That is something we just constantly

have to worry about. I think we have made very, very significant

progress with the police in Haiti. It is an underreported, untold

success story that we all should be very proud of; that the Haitians

should be very proud of. But insisting that the police remain nonpolitical, I think, is one of the main keys to ensuring that democracy will continue to develop in Haiti.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Senator DeWine. Mr. Goss.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, one of the problems that we see with

that, as disgusting and disruptive as those incidents were, and

again remember that this is—we make these comments with the

backdrop of the United States being disinvited to have its troops

present anymore as a stabilizing factor, or any other factor—is the

fact that the HNP did not respond. They were not responsive to

calculated organized violence. There was a disruptive effort made.

The HNP was notified these events was going to take place. Their

protection was requested, as would be normal in a democracy, and

they failed to show up for whatever reason.

I certainly would give the United States of America, and its taxpayers and citizens, an A-plus for a good idea in trying to strengthen the HNP, but in terms of the measure of effectiveness, I would

have to call it a failure at this point. I think we saw that failure

in these demonstrations. I think this is the type of thing we will

continue to see, and in fact it is only a part of a continuum that

we are seeing in Haiti which is regrettably getting worse rather

than better.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Conyers.

Mr. CONYERS. Might I just observe that crowd control is one of

the most difficult areas of police enforcement. We have problems

16

right here in our own country in terms of that sort of thing, and

for a newly trained force to be able to sweep in very effectively in

the way that we know that police can and should operate, may be

a bit of a stretch for a police force that is still coming out of 6 to

9 months of training, and has no long record of being able to deal

with this sort of thing.

But more importantly, the next day, October 25th, Fanmi

Lavalas issued their press release, strongly condemning and denouncing the violence that occurred on Sunday, October 24th, during the opening of the civic education campaign. They were right

there because, why? We go to motivation again. There is nothing

for them to gain by encouraging lawlessness around electoral activity when they have the most to benefit from it.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. Just one last question. Of course we all recognize that freedom of assembly and freedom of speech are essential to free and fair elections. Do you recommend anything more we can be doing to assure that those kinds

of elections in the spring will be held in that manner of free and

fair election?

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, sir. I would like to recommend that we send

in not only an international delegation of observers for the election,

so that we can make sure that the elections are conducted as they

are supposed to be, and have been promised, but that we here in

the Congress send a delegation ourselves. It is my personal hope,

my duties in Congress permitting, to be there to make sure that

all the promises are fulfilled. I think that many of the parties begin

to realize that the only way that they can gain credibility is to minimize any disruption. That disruption operates not just to our

anger and disagreement and dissolution, but it also operates

against their own best interests politically. So it is my hope that

the observer system, which has been worked to a pretty fine point

these days, will be operating in full swing, so that everybody knows

that there will be independent observations coming out of any election.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add is

that, not only for these elections, but for the long-term development

of democracy in Haiti, we should do what I think many times we

do best, and that is export democracy and work through our private sector, through our private political parties in this country, to

help develop the political system in Haiti. This is something that

we can do on a people-to-people basis. I think our government

needs to be involved in that. That is something that, in the long

term, will pay dividends for the stability of Haiti.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Senator. Congressman Goss.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to take a step

back and say, who is inviting us to come to Haiti to do what. I

think we want to be a little careful we don’t fall into the trap that

Mr. Conyers alluded to in his testimony, that Haiti was in ruins

somehow because of former U.S. Government policies. It is a sovereign nation, and it is in charge of its own destiny. To the degree

we can be useful in the system, to the degree that we are accepted

and are wanted to come down and play in that playing field under

those terms, I think it is very important to draw those lines first.

17

I know there are well-meaning people in Haiti; I know there are

hard working people in Haiti trying to accomplish those goals. I

know that those people are interested in having a bona fide international observation force there.

But if that is going to be frustrated by a duplicity, or behind-thescenes disruptions by other powers that are there, then it has got

to come out yet again, as it has in the past. So my concern is, before we commit to anything, we find out what the invitation is,

what is expected, what the ground rules are going to be, who is

going to be held accountable, and identify the people who are asking us. Because as I pointed out earlier, we have been disinvited

in some ways from participating.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Goss. Any further

comments by any of our panelists? If not, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I commend you for holding this hearing—very important, I think, that

those of us who are here are certainly very concerned about Haiti.

I also look at the problems there, and with the disbanding of the

military that has probably been an institution that has been in

Haiti longer than any institution, and to attempt to create a police

department, I think that we are kind of expecting too much too

soon.

Unfortunately, you need to have an effective police department.

But when I look at the numbers of police in Haiti, less than 5,000

maybe—it is about 4,800 police for the entire country—trying to recruit new people from scratch, I compare the population of Haiti to

the population of New York City, probably the total miles of that

not too far off, when you take the five boroughs; New York has

45,000 police. You have 4,800 in Haiti. We look at it as saying, well

now, we ought to compare what is happening there with what happens in our major cities. You can’t even compare.

As a matter of fact, I take exception. I think the crime rate in

Haiti is very low. Now, there may be political violence which is

higher than what we have here, but overall crime—although people

don’t go out at night—if you take the number of actual crimes compared to the crime in the cities of this Nation, in spite of the fact

that we have 25 percent of the population of Haiti in prison in our

jails, I am just looking at 4,800 policemen as compared to the

45,000 policemen in New York, and we are looking for miracles.

Second, it is difficult, as Mr. Conyers said, if Aristide is so popular and the Lavalas Party is so strong, why would you need to disrupt election processes that are going on? The ones, it would seem

to me, that would want to be disruptive would be those who would

like to derail the popularity of the majority. It would be the ones

in the minority that would not want to see—the anti-Aristide people, it would seem, would be the ones who would have more to gain

by disrupting a process which is moving forward.

So I am a little bit confused, too, that when an Aristide confidante is killed, that is possibly drug related, but if someone opposed to Aristide is killed, it is political, without a question, because Aristide’s people will kill their opponents. But if an Aristide

person gets killed, not that the opponents might have killed him,

it is the fact that it must be some other reason.

18

So there is no question that there is a lot of prejudging or maybe

prejudice that goes on on that level with many people seeming to

have an anti-Haiti position.

Now, of course, I have 5 minutes to ask the question, but since

I wasn’t here for an opening statement, I thought I would roll that

in. Let me just ask the panelists, I believe that—and we all agree

that the election should be separate. I think Mr. Conyers indicated

that everyone agrees that that is the way it should be. I just wonder and maybe those of you, Mr. Goss, and Senator DeWine, the

process by which the elections were supposed to be held in December, with polling places having to be gotten, with candidates having

to be certified, with election workers having to be trained—and I

think the number is closer to 3 million photo ID’s that were going

to have to be taken in order to have the December election—I was

just wondering if anyone feels that that election could have been—

the election has been postponed—but does anyone believe that

could have been pulled off?

I heard our U.S. Embassy say it could have been pulled off. I totally disagreed with that when I was there in September or October, because I couldn’t see that all that would be done by December. I wonder if anybody there might have any views on the election, and whether that December 8th date was realistic, especially

in light of the new photo ID business that was brought in—whether it would have been possible to have it take place. I wonder if

Mr. Goss or the Senator, or Mr. Conyers could respond.

Mr. CONYERS. I just wanted to quickly observe that it was a

noble and appropriate attempt for the December elections, that is,

when it was scheduled. But on a CODEL—two CODEL’s—that we

were in, it became clear that there might be difficulty, and it would

require a postponement. Now we have cleared the crisis of the absence of a prime minister, we are seeing progress. One of my

CODEL’s unanimously recommended postponing the elections to

make sure that there was adequate time to have excellent preparation. Now, we are making sure that these preparations, including

the measures intended to increase voter confidence and reduce

fraud, are implemented. I think our country must show a strong

commitment for these elections, and let me just say that our Ambassador is doing an excellent job. I would like to just put in a

word for Ambassador Carney, who was able, while we were there,

to bring OPL and Fanmi Lavalas together, and even the dissidents,

for the first time. So, the U.S. was doing a great job in moving us

out of this necessity to postpone the election.

Senator DEWINE. Congressman, I don’t have the expertise to tell

you whether, if carried out, that election would work from a technical point of view. I think at this point that is water over the dam

for all of us, and certainly for Haiti. I think the important thing

is that we push forward, and they push forward, and they have the

will to have these elections. I think everybody I have heard today

agrees with that.

Mr. GOSS. My view is that, technically, it could have happened,

and I base that on the previous two elections that I was down there

for. But I don’t think there is a will to have an election in Haiti,

among the people, that is sufficient. There is lack of confidence

about their safety. There is lack of confidence among the people

19

who would run that their safety can be guaranteed to survive the

election. There is some feeling by the voters that voting doesn’t get

you anything. I have talked to voters who say, why do we vote? We

don’t understand this democracy; it doesn’t put food on the table.

I think the status that—Mr. Payne—that you alluded to about people killing each other is part of what is off-putting the will. I think

that there is motive for Aristide’s forces wanting to disrupt the

process. I think the motive of that is to delay the elections into one

election later in the year. Aristide is already the de facto power in

Haiti, as everybody knows. The question then of wrapping it up

with the formality of an ‘‘election in one election’’ sometime next

fall, when the presidential elections are called for, and the parliamentary elections, where a puppet parliament would be brought

along with them, I think, is a scenario that is much discussed by

people who know about Haiti.

Mr. PAYNE. My time has expired. First, I don’t see what difference you are going to have in having two elections in one, Mr.

Goss, if Aristide is the only name in town and whether it is eight

elections, they are going to win all eight. So, to have them in one,

I really don’t think it is a prime mover. As a matter of fact, I would

think that Aristide would want them separate, so people wouldn’t

think that he wanted to have them all at one time. But there is

no question that I would be shocked if Aristide’s party does not

overwhelmingly win.

Second, I do want to disagree with you. The difference, Mr. Goss,

between the election this time, in December, when we were there

almost in October, and what happened when we were both there

4 or 5 years ago in the previous election, is that they weren’t talking about taking 4 million pictures and having them put in nice little frames and have everybody there when they went to vote. The

other election was just a fingerprint. Now you have to have your

photo ID and the fingerprint too. That was the big difference. That

is what Mr. Conyers alluded to. They didn’t have the photo ID. I

don’t even know who came up with this great idea to go to Canada

to get people to take pictures of 4 million people so they can vote.

We don’t even have photo ID mandatory in New Jersey for drivers

licenses, as a matter of fact. But someone says, in our Embassy,

we can do these 3 or 4 million pictures and have everybody ready

in a month. It absolutely, in my opinion, would have been even difficult in New Jersey. We have 8 million people, too.

Mr. GOSS. If you want a response to that, Mr. Payne, I will tell

you we use motor voter in Florida, and we have concerns there as

well. The point, I would say, is I was there in 1990, and I have said

publicly many times that I thought that election was an absolutely

bona fide expression of the will of the people of Haiti. It was a very

well done election. Now, it wasn’t perfect in technical terms by the

way everybody registered and so forth, but it was a clear expression for President Aristide’s victory. I have said so. That was a

democratic election. I think that was really the last truly democratic election in Haiti, and it may have been the first one. They

did it without photos.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr.

Ballenger.

20

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of

questions. The first one is, Senator Graham was the only one of

you that spoke out about the need for some economic stability to

grow a real democracy there. I am specifically talking about CBI,

which is either hung up between the House and the Senate, or

somewhere, but it just appears to me that without some sort of economic stability, or the ability for the country to create jobs, the

whole thing is going to fall apart, as a personal opinion.

I would like to ask that, but I would also like to throw out something that a group of Haitians gave me last week, just this suggestion. They said that the major difficulty that they felt the police

had was that they were scared to take sides. As somebody said—

I think one of our Members here said—that their numbers are so

small that they are afraid to get involved, because they might end

up being brutalized themselves.

The suggestion was—and I didn’t even realize this existed—that

there are substantial numbers of Haitian American police in this

country today, in New York City and Chicago, in various and sundry areas like that, that they thought would be able to volunteer

to go down—maybe there would be 300, 500, whatever it is, to go

down—and the addition of trained policemen who have lived in a

democracy would put backbone into the Haitian police. First, I

would like to ask the question about CBI, and the second one, is

that second suggestion even practical?

Senator DEWINE. Let me start if I could, Congressman

Ballenger, with your second point. One of the success stories that

I have seen in Haiti is the U.N. CIVPOL that contains a number

of Haitian-born U.S. citizens, big city cops, who are working down

there on a contract basis, who care about Haiti, who have a background from Haiti, many times have relatives in Haiti. They are

down there with a very specific purpose and role of training of Haitian police, and really training the trainers. They are actually mentors. That has been, I think, very successful.

I think it is important for us to try to do what we can to see that

that program continues. I am concerned that it may not be continuing. So it goes right along with your points. We have resources

in this country—in most of our major cities we have Haitians who

are policemen who are very good and very talented, and many of

whom have been willing to go down to Haiti on a limited basis. I

think we need to keep that going.

The second point you made on the economy of Haiti, a lot of

things have to happen before we get the investment that we need

to see in Haiti. The assembly industry that we used to see in Haiti

in the time period when baseballs were assembled there—all kinds

of products came out of the assemblies—is back up, but it is certainly not near what it was before the embargo. That is something

that is—the plants are still there, the buildings are still there, the

Haitians are still there—but I think that the instability in the

country is keeping some companies from making a decision that

they want to go back and relocate back into Haiti.

The fact that the port is the most expensive port in the hemisphere is a real problem. You have experienced that yourself, and

I have, when we try to get humanitarian shipments through that

port. I had a situation just a week ago, we were working to get

21

some humanitarian things through the port and it just boggles the

mind the red tape you have to go through, and all the problems you

have to get it through the port.

Privatization needs to continue. There are eight or nine government-owned industries that, frankly, need to be privatized. They

have made some progress on that—flour, cement—but they need to

go further. There are just so many things to talk about when you

talk about the economy. But clearly what we have to have, what

Haiti has to see, is investment. Foreign money has to come in there

to invest in Haiti.

The other thing that I mentioned in my prepared statement was

agriculture. One of the biggest problems Haiti has today is how

many people are leaving the countryside and going to one of the

major cities. It is not just Port-au-Prince; it is several other major

cities. They are coming in there, they have no way of making a living, they have no way of eating. So we have to, I think, encourage

them; and we have the technical expertise at USAID and through

the American universities, we have that expertise to help them not

only develop their own agriculture, but many times the most important thing is to market their own agriculture so they don’t have

to go through the families that have control and the choke-points

that have been there in Haiti, so they have their own cooperatives,

principles we see in the United States in agriculture, and developed in the beginning of this century.

So there are a lot of things that can be done. But part of the

problem is the feeling by people that there is that political unrest,

the stability is not yet there in Haiti. I think having elections and

getting a government that really does function will go a long way

to restoring people’s confidence.

Mr. BALLENGER. Before I pass that onto Mr. Goss, let me just say

one thing. If you are a businessman and you are thinking of investing somewhere, would you put your money in any place that automatically says you are going to be less competitive than the Mexicans? That is the reason I throw the CBI out there.

Senator DEWINE. I totally agree with you, Congressman. We

need to do it. We need to pass it, we need to get it done.

Mr. BALLENGER. Porter.

Mr. GOSS. Thank you. I certainly agree with Senator DeWine on

the CBI issue. We have been working on it for a long time, and it

matters a great deal in my part of the world. But the issue you

raise about the economy is clearly true. We have to have the economy. But it is very hard to get anybody to invest because of the

unusually high risk involved, the great amount of corruption, and

the lack of guarantees.

In fact, I was told by one American businessman—and this is a

little bit anecdotal, but it nevertheless is the atmosphere—they

would like to have reopened the business that they had previously

in Haiti, before the embargo went on, and they could not get a

bank loan from the bank because the bank said that the bank examiner would not allow an unsecured loan in Haiti because it is

too risky. That is the kind of problem that small American businessmen are having there. It obviously is a huge damper on investment.

22

I agree with you on the economy. The problem with all of this—

and going to your second idea—I think it is a great idea. But it is

only a great idea if Haitians in Haiti want to have that happen,

want to invite those people in to provide the stability. Because, for

every time one group in Haiti gets a good idea, another group decides to derail it. The problem remains among Haitians in Haiti.

We haven’t learned the concept of opposition. We haven’t learned

the concept of middle class.

We have got a huge group of non-elite and a small group of elite,

and the power shifts back and forth in different areas; but the fact

of the matter is the great mass of the country at this point is in

economic depravity that probably doesn’t exist anywhere else in

this hemisphere, if in the world, it is so bad. It is an absolute outrage this can be, when there is so much opportunity. But unless

the Haitians who have the capacity to lead in Haiti are willing to

lead, and these decisions are made in Haiti, all the good will, good

intentions, and good aid we can throw at them will come to naught.

That is what we have seen, regrettably, in the past couple hundred

years.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr.

Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have enjoyed the

testimony from everybody this morning. It has been very informative. I hope Senator DeWine comes back because I think many of

the points he makes are really on the mark. I do agree that, for

many reasons, it is important for the United States to insist on two

elections. I think if that occurs, it will hopefully alleviate some of

the concerns expressed by Mr. Goss and those who share his perspective. I would also observe the comments by Mr. Conyers in

terms of his conversations with the former President making a

commitment to that particular premise, that particular reality.

Now we shall see. Now we shall see, Mr. Goss.

Earlier you mentioned the incidents, and you’ve reached a conclusion that they were at least instigated, if not encouraged, by

members of the Fanmi Lavalas. Again, Mr. Conyers submits to us

a press statement to indicate that, in fact, the Fanmi Lavalas condemned publicly this conduct of the actions of those who claim to

be followers of President Aristide. I certainly don’t know what happened. I wasn’t there. I have some reservations about the reliability of the information that we receive from Haiti.

But I would also point out, I think it was just this week, that

there was another incident where militants who claimed to be

Aristide supporters attacked a speaker at a political rally from

members of the ESPASE Coalition. We had some good news. The

Haitian National Police actually intervened and effected an arrest

of one of the militants. I would be interested if we could develop

some intelligence as to the whereabouts of that particular so-called

militant, and what his perspective and motives may be. I find it,

maybe because of my naivete, just simply hard to accept the fact

that all those claiming to be followers of Aristide are foolish enough

to be proclaiming it. As my friend from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, indicated, it really doesn’t make a lot of sense; but then again you

know Haiti. It is tough to read the tea leaves, isn’t it, Mr. Goss?

Mr. GOSS. It is very tough.

23

Mr. DELAHUNT. I just wanted to point that out. But you were

there in 1990. I think it is really important that we speak to this

issue in terms of the context of where we were in Haiti. I mean

Senator DeWine made some very good points about the good news

and the bad news. I think, realistically, he is pretty much on the

mark. But the violence that occurred during the coup years, from

1991 to 1994, clearly exceeded anything that we see today in Haiti

in terms of systematic political violence. Would you agree with me,

Mr. Goss?

Mr. GOSS. I would say that, measure for measure, the capacity

for brutality hasn’t changed, the number of incidents have changed.

The trend line is to more incidents rather than less at a time when

it should be the other way around. But in measuring the absent

quantity, there is no question that there were more knocks on the

door at night and people disappearing under the tension of the

Cedras—it was the military government, and the Aristide government at that particular moment.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is my understanding that during the coup

years there was in excess of 4,000 political assassinations that occurred. I mean, in terms of magnitude and scale, that is—that does

not exist today.

Mr. GOSS. There is no question that there was a spike period at

that time, as there had been other spike periods in the history of

Haiti. What I think we are all concerned about is that we are heading toward more authoritarianism and another spike period where

the stabilizing factors that we started out, with good intent, will be

captured by an authoritarian arm, and we will have the new

Tonton Macoute. I think that, as the people who watch the cycle

in Haiti say, here we go again.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It certainly isn’t to that degree of magnitude,

and I agree we should be vigilant on that. I think the point you

make, in terms of vigilance, is a very valid one. We agree on that.

But at the time—as you said you were in Haiti back in the 1980’s

and this goes to the credibility of the information we all receive

from Haiti—did we have intelligence at that point in time that

there was going to be a coup overthrowing the former President?

Mr. GOSS. I simply am not aware of any, but I would not have

been at that particular station of my life.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just given your own familiarity with the situation, how could our intelligence community have blown that one

back in 1990 and 1991?

Mr. GOSS. I am not sure that there was any mistake by the intelligence community. What I am not sure of is whether the policy

people in the executive branch did anything with the information

that was available. I just have no knowledge of exactly what was

available or how the policy people treated it. We often, in my experience in the intelligence community, and this goes back a lot of

years, provide information that says there is an 80 percent, or

whatever percent chance that there is going to be a coup by such

and such a time. Now that is——

Mr. DELAHUNT. So we really don’t know what happened back in

1991, as far as the intelligence community or as far as what the

then—Administration, the then—Bush Administration did to in

any way deal with the information.

24

Mr. GOSS. I personally do not know. I am happy to try and get

the information.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it is important. Because I think a lot of

what occurred back there we have to remember—I know you will

agree with this—it was during the coup years that this economy,

which was fragile to begin with, really went into the hopper. It

went down 30 percent in terms of the GDP. So we are starting in

1995, 1996, with total devastation. I mean, those generals that

were running the show back then, from 1991 to 1994, created a situation where there was a negative decline in GDP by 30 percent.

Senator DeWine talks about the economy that has stagnated,

and for all intents and purposes it has. The World Bank shows that

it has grown by 2, 3, or 4 percent; but I would suggest those numbers are significant. But really what has happened is that we have

had a real problem based upon what happened in the early part

of this decade in terms of moving Haiti forward. I yield back.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr.

Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, as you well know, on this Committee I have tried to offer creative suggestions. As I sit here and I listen to our colleagues, who

have made brilliant presentations, and I hear all of us, I think as

I look in this audience and I know several of the members in the

audience, there are about 20 people in the audience that know a

hell of a lot more about Haiti than any of us do. I know in the future, one thing that we might be able to do, while we can’t open

up our hearings to the public, so to speak, we might invite them

to submit one-page statements or something, which any of us that

were interested could look at.

That said, I regret very much that Senator DeWine had to leave.

I understand his leaving, but he made several provocative statements in my view, one being that Haiti is not a strategic interest

of the United States, now, or in the future. I would urge him to

understand that it was at one point in the past, and evidently, with

the significant number of Haitian nationals living in the United

States, it is likely to be again in the future. But I will quarrel with

him ideologically when he and I have an opportunity to get together.

Let me ask you, Mr. Delahunt, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Conyers

or Mr. Goss, tell me what is magical about two elections? I don’t

understand that. While I have agreed and I have supported the two

elections, I don’t know the magic in it. If there—and especially in

light of your statement, Mr. Goss, that Haiti, being a sovereign nation, is in control of their own destiny. If they want to have one

election, what is the problem?

Mr. GOSS. In my view, Haiti should be in control of its own destiny. What we are talking about here is what is the interest for the

U.S. taxpayer and the United States of America in this Haiti. I

think we naturally put out our hand in a gesture to a friendly,

neighborly country, trying to be of assistance, in good will, without

interfering in their sovereign decisions. They can take their own actions, and they accept the consequences of their actions.

Mr. HASTINGS. What is our leverage to accomplish that, aside

from just saying something?

25

Mr. GOSS. To accomplish what?

Mr. HASTINGS. To accomplish two elections, for example, since

that is what all of us seem to agree that they should have. Do we

have any leverage to cause that to happen?

Mr. GOSS. Yes. We have expertise, financial support, and good

will. I think we can do it in a way that would assure them that

we are not interested in interfering with their sovereignty; we are

only interested if they are interested in proceeding on the path of

democracy and helping them go down that path. That is our leverage. They know that we are here. If they want it, it is available.

If they don’t want it, we shouldn’t jam it down their throats.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Hastings, the very famous Delatore brothers,

Lionel Delatore and his brother Leslie Delatore, who regularly visit

us—probably well known here on the Hill, hardly a few months go

by with business delegations—they have urged upon me that we

support the notion of two elections. It was for that reason that I

urged it upon President Preval and former-President Aristide, and

they all agreed. So in a way, there seems to be a unanimity that

there can be no political name calling or attributing motives insincere if they were collapsed into one. But I think, and I hope and

pray, that we are past that.

Mr. HASTINGS. I, for one, just don’t see any particular magic in

it or, particularly as it pertains to the fact that they have had elections that were—even if you take Mr. Goss’ statement, at least one

that was for all intents and purposes fair and transparent, I see

no reason why they could not hold another at either March or December or whenever there may be an election.

I want to move or respond, since there is a record, to Senator

DeWine’s other view about how foreign investment has to go into

Haiti. One thing that needed to go into Haiti immediately following

the military operation that was successful there in 1994, was the

promises of donor countries who indicated that they were going to

do things, the United States included, that they did not do.

Now we come to an election, and the one organization that has

conducted itself admirably, MICIVIH, is one of the few that is now

without funds to carry on under the banner of the United Nations.

I would be curious to understand how we bring it to that. But regarding foreign investment and privatization, one of the reasons

private investors go into the areas is because of cheap labor and

industrious people. If there is any cheaper labor anywhere in the

hemisphere and any more industrious people than Haitian people,

then I would like to see them step forward. If it is because of the

unstable government, then I am curious why we take oil out of Nigeria, Iraq, Kazakhstan, do business in Indonesia and Russia, if instability is the barometer. So I am not so sure, again, I will quarrel

with Senator DeWine when I have an opportunity to get with him.

But let me ask you, Mr. Goss, what will we do if, according to

our views there should be two elections, and if there are not two

elections, what then should America do about Haiti, since Haiti

ain’t going to go away?

Mr. GOSS. The question of our foreign policy to Haiti or to any

other country is obviously for the administrative branch to deal

with. My view is that we should continuously try and recognize the

fact that we have a very good Haitian-American association. We

26

have the opportunity for business, and we should continuously try

and encourage that and make that known. But we are not going

to be able to overcome the tragic flaw that exists in Haiti, which

is that a bunch of leaders down there, for the past couple hundred

of years, have been looking out more for themselves than they are

for the people. You can’t have a democracy under those ground

rules. I hope we can identify those leaders and bring them along

and say look, it is to everybody’s advantage to go toward democracy

rather than to keep going back to this authoritarian idea where

you take revenge on the guy who was trying to take a piece out

of your hide last week. We do it pretty well in this country. Sometimes people say we squabble too much up here, but I think that

is the lesson we have to share.

Mr. HASTINGS. John.

Mr. CONYERS. I am optimistic. When you say 200 years, that was

200 years without a democratic system. That was the problem. The

problem was resolved successfully, thanks to U.S. help, by the election of the first democratic President in 200 years there, with JeanBertrand Aristide. What we are trying to do now is continue that,

and I think that it can be done. I think that we have a two-election

agreement. The economics and the—you referred to some very important parts of it. We have got 3 percent economic growth. From

a country that came from the ashes, 3 percent is maybe not much

in a Western situation, but there it is great.

We have got new agricultural projects with bananas. We now

have from zero factory employment to 40,000 factory workers. The

USAID program for microenterprize loans is being undertaken by

a major Haitian bank. They are checking out cruise lines. They are

getting ready to put $12 million into a cruise line. These don’t demand headlines, but this is the way that you slowly build up, and

I see it happening. I don’t think this is sheer optimism, both in

their politics and their economy.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would like to yield to Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I just have one question. I would ask both Mr.

Conyers and Mr. Goss their position in terms of the Administration’s refusal to release the so-called FRAPH documents. Do you

have an opinion on that, Mr. Goss?

Mr. GOSS. I will let the Administration speak for itself.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You don’t have an opinion on that.

Mr. GOSS. I have an opinion about a lot of things about this Administration. I share them publicly. But I think that the problem

I have with the Administration is they have not been realistic, and

they have tried to steer a picture of Haiti which is not an accurate

picture of Haiti as it is today.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But you don’t have a position on whether we

have an obligation to release to the Haitian government, allegedly—and you use that word ‘‘allegedly’’—160,000 pages of documents and video tapes, some allegedly involving torture, et cetera,

during the coup years?

Mr. GOSS. I would suggest, on that subject, that we have an Administration that handles those matters on a case-by-case basis.

We have several such countries around the world where there are

27

requests for documents. I think the handling of those documents

carefully and fairly should be left to the Administration. If there

is a problem in our oversight of that, then I think we should jump

in. But right now, I am not aware of a problem.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Delahunt, this has been a very sensitive point.

Our U.S. military confiscated documents when we entered into

Haiti that now have been redacted so much it is hard for me to figure out what utility they may have. But for us to say we are not

going to turn them over to the democratic government because we

are sensitive that it may involve some of our intelligence operations

with the Cedras Junta is really a rather bald violation of the respect that nations should have for one another. It is in the past,

but I think that if they were revealed it would make everyone feel

a lot better; and if it embarrasses the U.S. a little bit, I don’t see

where that is going to turn our status in the world into something

different.

If we keep saying we are trying to recognize them as a nation

like us in the Western Hemisphere, we really should turn those

over. It has now become a sore point that is not going to go away.

So I know their demonstrations, their requests, their petitions; and

yet we still have a kind of stonewalling that makes other people

tend to argue that we create world agreements that are for everybody else but not for us, when they are inconvenient or potentially

embarrassing.

Chairman GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield on that? My staff

informs me that the bulk of these documents are available to the

Haitian government at the present time. I thank the gentleman for

yielding. Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the panel. I look forward to hearing the

next panel. I yield back.

Chairman GILMAN. I want to thank our panelists and their indulgence in our time factor. We thank you for your testimony.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you for holding these hearings.

Chairman GILMAN. We now proceed to our final panelist, Ambassador Peter Romero, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Western

Hemisphere Affairs. We welcome Ambassador Romero. Ambassador

Romero, you may put your full statement in the record and summarize. Without objection, your full statement will be accepted in

the record.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PETER ROMERO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. ROMERO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had a statement the

size of a small town telephone book, but I think I will forego that,

with your indulgence please, and just make a few comments, if I

might.

Chairman GILMAN. The full statement will be made a part of the

record. Please summarize.

Mr. ROMERO. September marked the 5th-year anniversary of

U.N.-sanctioned military intervention that restored elected government to Haiti. Had we and the international community failed to

act, Haiti’s nightmarish repression would have continued, along

with flotillas of fleeing refugees. While deep-seated problems reVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:21 Jun 15, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 63500.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
28

main, and progress is less than we had hoped or Haitians had reason to expect, the reality is that Haiti has experienced the longest

period of democratic government in its history.

Human rights problems continue to be a serious concern. The

kind of political violence of the de facto military regime or the

Duvalier era has ended. The roughly 380 extra judicial and suspicious killings in the first 8 months of 1994 stand in stark contrast to 38 reported police killings in 1998. However, no police

killings are acceptable; they are diminished substantially. Haitians

today enjoy an unprecedented level of freedom of expression and

press, and a range of political parties and civil society groups operate openly.

The United States’ goals in Haiti remain unchanged: To help

Haitians reverse the conditions that for nearly two centuries have

mired the Haitian people in poverty and impeded the development

of democracy. To succeed, our policy needs bipartisan support. Only

with such a consensus can we work effectively with the Haitian authorities and people to meet the manifold and intractable challenges to reaching our common goals. We seek to modernize the

Haitian state in all its aspects, construct a nation rooted in the

rule of law, and create a foundation for sustained economic growth.

At the request of Haitian authorities, we and our international

partners have diligently worked together and bilaterally to help

build a professional and apolitical Haitian National Police.

Some of our efforts in this regard were inhibited this year by the

effective closure, due to lack of funds, of the OAS component of the

UN/OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti, or MICIVIH, that

has successfully served as the eyes and ears of the international

community in both monitoring and reporting on police abuse and

other human rights violations. We are currently working with the

U.N. and other bilateral donors to ensure the continuation of U.N.

police and human rights assistance after the November 30th termination of the current mandate for the U.N. International Civilian

Police Mission in Haiti, MIPONUH, and the December 31st termination of the MICIVIH mandate.

Continued international engagement is essential to help train

and mentor new police recruits, address continued management

problems among the middle ranks of the HNP, and promote the

strengthening of Haitian institutions in civil society to ensure improved respect for human rights.

The HNP faces a number of challenges, including a distinct rise

in attrition among the ranks, and an apparent increase in incidents

of human rights abuse and corruption. We are very concerned

about physical attacks in the past month on senior police leadership that have weakened police moral and pose a serious threat to

police neutrality. We continue to press for a full investigation of the

attacks, and have made clear to Haiti’s leaders that U.S. law enforcement assistance requires their continued deep commitment to

an apolitical security force.

The U.S. and international community are assisting Haiti in preparing for elections scheduled for March 19, 2000, to restore fully

the parliament and independent local governments that lapsed on

January 11th of this year. Despite some organizational difficulties,

the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) continues to operate in a

29

credible manner, and remains acceptable to a wide range of political parties. We are very concerned about the October 24th violent

disruption by self-professed supporters of former-President Aristide

at a CEP rally inaugurating the voter education campaign. This directed attack was against grass-roots political organizations, something very vital to the process.

The government of Haiti cannot let actions by a band of thugs

deter Haitians from advancing civil society and voter education. In

addition to possible steps in a bilateral context, we are urging the

political parties participating in elections to sign and abide by a

nonviolence pact presently being developed by the CEP. We are

also urging the CEP and HNP to improve coordination and communication to prevent a replay of the October 24th incident.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, Haiti remains by far the poorest country

in this hemisphere, and with one of the most violent and politically

repressive histories. Without U.S. and international assistance in

1994, Haiti would have remained under brutal dictatorship. Without continued international help, there is a real danger Haiti will

slip backward. We cannot retreat from our responsibility to advance prospects for democracy in Haiti. We must remain engaged

in helping Haitians achieve their goals of strengthening democratic

institutions and sustainable economic growth.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I hope that we can

continue to rely on the bipartisan support from Congress that we

continue to enjoy in this effort. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Romero appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Secretary Romero. I will try to be

brief. Ambassador Carney’s good strong statement on the police

suggests that someone, or some group, is seeking to politicize and

seize control of the leadership of the HNP against the interests of

the United States. Who exactly is involved with this? How should

we propose to counter their efforts?

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, we have heard that through the

years that various people would like to politicize the police to get

them to indulge in one particular political view or another. We

have just recently heard that the government is considering establishing an informal group to advise the President on the police. We

just heard that a couple of days ago.

Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Romero, we were informed that

President Preval told a recent visiting Canadian delegation that

the elections will not be held in March. What is your assessment?

Mr. ROMERO. Through the last several months, President Preval

has not been certain that elections can be held on time. Of course,

they have slipped from December to March 19th now, with the second round scheduled for the end of April. But let me just say there

were some issues related to why have two elections; and Congressman Conyers and Congressman Hastings and Congressman Payne

talked about that. I think it is absolutely vital, in the Haiti context,

that small, grass-roots political parties can organize themselves

around an event, field candidates, have the security of knowing

that they can engage in political activity without reprisals—the

single most important catalyst for democratic development. Certainly the small parties are no match for the Fanmi Lavalas, the

30

largest most established party, but they need to have the experience of being able to contest elections at the grass-roots level. I

think the two elections are absolutely critical to Haiti’s democratic

development.

Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Romero, the Committee received an

affidavit from a member of the Haitian National Police stating that

witnesses to the killing of Mr. Jean Eddy Lamy saw a police car

with a license plate 302 on it at the scene of the crime. According

to that affidavit, fingerprints recovered from the police car belonged to a mechanic who was hired by the police on a recommendation of Danny Toussaint. Have you received that kind of

information?

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, this is the first we are hearing of

this, but I would be happy to look into it.

Chairman GILMAN. I wish you would, and we will be pleased to

supply the affidavit to you.

The last question. At our December 1997 Haiti hearing, Mr.

Hamilton, our Ranking Democratic Member at the time, asked Ambassador David Greenlee for his frank appraisal of Mr. Aristide,

and I recall Ambassador Greenlee was reluctant to answer his

questions, permit me now to pose to you this question with the

same request for your frank assessment: From an American national-interest standpoint, is Mr. Aristide, at this point, being helpful or unhelpful?

Mr. ROMERO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for saving that question

for me. I think that——

Chairman GILMAN. You are welcome.

Mr. ROMERO. I think that we Americans are people who are concerned more with deeds than words, and I think that Mr.

Aristide—ex-President Aristide, has an opportunity to demonstrate

his democratic vocation, and that is through his signature as the

leader of the Party Fanmi Lavalas on a document that the CEP is

drafting up right now, that is, essentially the rules of the game, the

decorum, a nonviolence pact, if you will, among and between political parties in terms of these elections. Ex-President Aristide has

an opportunity to sign that. I think that one of the major issues

related to these elections is the security surrounding them, particularly for candidates, and if he signs them, that will, I think, go a

long way in convincing us that he would be a democratic president.

Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Romero, what is the most important thing that we should be doing to help in the forthcoming elections?

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, I think we need to keep the course,

or stay the course. I think that the progress is being made with

CEP preparations, and in a positive, fluid way. Certainly, members

of the CEP have had experience on previous electoral tribunals.

They remain widely acceptable to all the political parties and nongovernmental organizations and civil society. They have begun to

branch out regional and municipal offices in terms of preparations—certainly the electoral card is one of those manifestations of

their organization—and we believe strongly that they can get it

done with good leadership and the experience that they have on

that panel.

31

Chairman GILMAN. Just one last question, Mr. Secretary. The attack on the head of the Judiciary Police, Mario Andersol, reported

in the Haitian press was very disquieting. In addition, Police Director General, Pierre Denize, reportedly was forced to leave Jean

Lamy’s funeral. Are key members of the police still being harassed

and intimidated, and if so, what is the source and purpose of that

kind of harassment and intimidation?

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, I went down to Haiti back in May

specifically for the purpose of trying to talk to people about harassment and intimidation of the police. I have to tell you that I was

not able, I was not successful. But neither has the virtual parade

of Administration folks and Members of both houses of Congress on

that same issue. It is hard to figure out where this stuff is coming

from. Haiti is not easy when it comes to getting to the bottom of

things.

But there were a couple of statements made by Congressmen

Conyers and Payne earlier regarding what motive the Lavalas

Party would have to try to disrupt the elections since ex-President

Aristide basically is the strongest person, at least, going into the

elections later in the year 2000. I guess my answer to that would

be, in the hypothetical, that ex-President Aristide leads the strongest party in Haiti. That party basically enjoys, or has contested

elections with a turnout of about 5 to 10 percent.

If we are talking about the types of grass-roots efforts that happened back in May with the Chamber of Commerce, which tried to

occur at the end of October, in terms of getting out the vote and

voter education and that sort of thing, then there would be a whole

lot more voters out casting their ballots when it came to March

19th or the second round at the end of April. Perhaps there are

those in the party that don’t want that kind of uncertainty of a bigger voter turnout.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Secretary Romero. Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Once again, with the small group of U.S.

military there, talking to some Haitian business people and American business people on our last trip, there was a desire, of course,

to have this small contingent there. Of course, I think the Congress

voted that they should leave. The MICIVIH, how do you see them

being there? What sort of positiveness is done, if any? What do you

think, or won’t it make any difference whether there is only a

handful of them? When I was there, they had a big softball game

going on so I don’t guess there are necessarily very key decisions

being made there. But the fact that they are there, some people felt

there was kind of a reassuring thing. What do you think about

them coming out or staying there?

Mr. ROMERO. We lost about half of the contingent of MICIVIH

that is there to promote respect for human rights and monitor the

progress. We lost about half of them, about 40, when we lost funding several months ago. The other 40, approximately, are there. I

think that we are scheduled to lose the police monitoring entity by

the end of November, this month, approximately about 300 of

them. Hopefully, we will be able to at least keep a semblance of

a presence in Haiti. I think it is very, very important that there

be an international presence. I think that in terms of the reconstruction of police force, democratic institutions at large, we are

32

still at a very fragile period, and an international presence is indispensable for being able to enable those institutions to strike and

to move on under their own weight.

Mr. PAYNE. I have a question. I am trying to get a picture. There

are a number of people who of course have been opposed to Haiti,

opposed to the intervention of the U.S. military, have decided that

Haiti is a failure even before Aristide was restored, just some

HH’ers I call them, Haters of Haiti. Now, we look at the fact that

people say that Aristide’s people are intending to control the police.

They seem to somehow be leaning toward him. On the other hand,

38 policemen have been killed; and Aristide is supposed to be—anything that happens bad, Aristide does it. So you know, I kind of get

confused when these theories—they are all theories that come out,

the police they think are supportive of Aristide, and they should be

independent, and then if an election comes up and the police are

favorable to Aristide that is bad.

On the other hand, 38 policemen have been killed. Of course

Aristide’s people wouldn’t kill their friends. You see, there is a lot

of disconnect. You say Jean Lamy was killed. When anyone opposed to Aristide is killed—I am not defending—I have been down

there about a dozen times in the last 7 or 8 years, but it is clearly,

and this—and this is around the House of Representatives—the

HH’ers—Aristide did it. On the other hand, when an Aristide person is killed, it has got to be drug related.

It appears that there is just a continuing case built up against

Aristide that anything wrong is done by him; anything that may

be going in the right direction, he is opposed to. I just wondered,

is that the general feeling around? Because like I said, I get confused. There have been some people like the FRAPH who are not

choir boys. I am sure that some of them are still around. They were

not necessarily pro-Aristide, even the Tonton Macoutes back in the

old regime. So I guess my point is that there seems to be enough

tough people to go around for everyone, but the conclusion is always that if it is wrong or bad or conspiracy against progress, it

is Aristide, no one else. Can you—have you seen that, or maybe,

it is just I have gotten a one-sided picture, or could you kind of sort

it out for me a little bit since that is your job?

Mr. ROMERO. I wish I could sort it out better for you, Congressman Payne. I think there is just—there is probably a whole lot

more that we don’t know when you talk about violence and political

assassination in Haiti than what we know. But I think there are

a couple of givens here. One is that President Preval could exercise

a great deal of leadership in showcasing and reinforcing the public

dimension of support for the police. I think there is a lot to be done

that has not been done.

Hopefully, with Bob Manuel’s departure and the somewhat antagonistic relationship between the President and Bob Manuel, the

President can come forth, Vice President can come forth, and demonstrate their very strong support for an apolitical police force, effective police force in Haiti. I think the other part of the equation

too is certainly the Lavalas folks do not have a premium on violence in Haiti. But I do think that ex-President Aristide has an opportunity to take a big bite out of the violence by this nonaggression pact that will be on the table shortly and that I hope he signs.

33

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. Along those lines of confusion—and

I think it is really important that we are clear that the information

that we receive from Haiti is vague and nebulous at best.

Mr. ROMERO. Clear.

Mr. DELAHUNT. There are some who would suggest, as Mr. Payne

just articulated very well, that everything bad is the responsibility

of ex-President Aristide, and that anything good is clearly just

mere happenstance. Now, I don’t know, and I don’t think that you

know, Secretary Romero; but I do agree that the former-President

does have an opportunity to exercise some leadership here. He

clearly is well respected by a majority of the Haitian people. I think

it was Mr. Goss who indicated that his election in 1990 was a valid

election. He secured, I think it was 67 percent of the vote at that

point in time.

I take this opportunity to—and I mean this sincerely, through

you to the Haitian government, to whatever contacts we might

have with the former-President—I think it is important for him to

sign this particular nonaggression pact, if you will. Because I think

it is a statement, and I think, given his stature in Haitian society,

it is important. I think many friends of the former-President have

indicated some disappointment in his lack of clarity on this issue,

and I would put myself in that particular category.

The former-President had an opportunity to put himself in a position in terms of Haitian history, which has been a very sad history—over 200 years of brutality—to really accomplish what President Mandela has done in South Africa. I think we are at a very

critical juncture here in terms of where Haitian society goes or

where this country goes. I think the reality is there is an opportunity here for the former-President to achieve a role in his nation’s history that is clearly dramatic in terms of bringing it to and

nurturing a nation’s democracy that you mentioned.

I just give you that opinion to transfer it. Maybe I will have an

opportunity to convey it myself. But it is such a bad mistake to

completely reach conclusions about incidents. I am aware of two or

three different incidents.

Let’s put this in context. Would you agree the most recent incident, which was November 6th, the police did intervene and made

an arrest? There haven’t been any political assassinations that I

am aware of in the past several months that are conclusively determined to be political assassinations. We are making some progress.

It is not what I would like to see; it is not what anybody would

like to see, but we have got to understand the reality of Haiti at

this point in time.

You know that I opposed, on the Floor, the amendment that reduced the funding, or rather I have opposed the reduced funding

for MICIVIH. I would encourage the Administration, given the tenuous nature of the next 4 or 5 months, to reopen negotiations with

the appropriate Members of Congress to see whether, on an emergency basis, that we could not just simply restore that funding, but

to increase it, at least for a period of time.

Many allegations have been made about the police. What we

have done is we have reduced the funding for that agency which

34

provided a mechanism to inform the world about the conduct of the

police. It is just counterintuitive. It just doesn’t make any sense.

It is not a lot of money. If we talk about democracy and we talk

about our concern about the police, this is probably the most opportune time we will ever have. So I would make that request through

you to the appropriate officials in the Administration to reopen discussions with those to see that if, not only can we restore the

funds, but to raise them to a level so that we can hopefully assist

in assuring the integrity of the elections on March 19th.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, could

you tell us how much electoral assistance in dollars we now provide

to Haiti.

Mr. ROMERO. Congressman Ackerman, I think what we are talking about is approximately $16 million for the conduct of, to the

work up and then the actual elections, and counting two rounds,

and approximately $2 million of that would be earmarked for the

police, equipment, other kinds of things related to security, including renting two helicopters.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is that, in your judgment, sufficient so that we

could guarantee fair and free elections?

Mr. ROMERO. I think the sum is sufficient, Congressman Ackerman. I think what is deficient is the amount of policemen on the

ground in Haiti, and when you are talking about approximately

5,500 policemen, more or less, you are talking about the ability to

put probably about 4,000 cops in the various voting precincts, various voting centers, of which there will be about 13. Certainly the

cops will be sent to those places where one would expect to have

some potential for disruption. But you begin to see the magnitude

of the differences between what law enforcement has at its disposal

and the elections themselves.

Mr. ACKERMAN. So the number of police are insufficient?

Mr. ROMERO. Absolutely.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is there a way that we can help with that?

Mr. ROMERO. Yes. But over the short term there really is no easy

fix.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is that a function of dollars or policy?

Mr. ROMERO. It is a function of absorption. It is a function of the

attrition rate of the police whereby the long hours, 12 hour days,

6 days a week, the relatively low pay compared to other places in

the economy is causing an attrition rate that is equal to, and I

think may even begin surpassing, the intake rate.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If people leave the police force, where are they

going?

Mr. ROMERO. There are just all kind of jobs, as security guards

and other kinds of things in the economy.

Mr. ACKERMAN. So security guards are paying more than police?

Mr. ROMERO. Apparently.

Mr. ACKERMAN. In 1995, Aristide reneged on his commitment

that he had made to privatize many government enterprises. International assistance basically came to not a grinding stop, but it

was reduced enormously. If he were to be elected again, what do

you think his approach to economic reforms would be?

35

Mr. ROMERO. It would be hard to say, Congressman Ackerman.

I think there is at least a rhetorical commitment to economic reform, to include privatization. But ex-President Aristide has mentioned his intention to talk about the issue of reform and privatization in the context of a national dialogue, and I think it still remains to be seen whether that would mean an acceleration of the

process or a further paralysis of the privatization process.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. The Congress has basically prohibited DOD from maintaining a continued presence there beyond the

end of May of this coming year. In view of the political violence and

the impending elections, problems in the police that you have cited,

many believe that a U.S. presence should continue there. What

would your response be to that, and what do you think the effect

would be if we removed the U.S. troops?

Mr. ROMERO. Congressman, I think, without the slightest bit of

hyperbole, that the U.S. military presence there has had a very important symbolic value, and that is that we care, we are engaged

as a people, and that essentially we are behind those Haitian

democrats who want to move ahead on a democratic agenda. But

by far, the more important entity on the ground, in terms of law

and order, is obviously the Haitian police and also the international

organizations that we have established with the Haitians to advance human rights practices and monitoring the police. Those institutions will face essentially an end to funding by the end of November, and the end of December, respectively. We are hoping to

stand up another organization that will fold all of these functions

into one, and hopefully would be sufficient enough. But that is really where the support must come.

Mr. ACKERMAN. You have come back to the police on a couple of

these questions now. Do we have a specific program or a policy?

Have we engaged them in discussions on raising the salaries of police to help reverse that rate of attrition?

Mr. ROMERO. I am not so sure we have had a recent discussion

on salaries, but we have had repeated discussions on issues related

to supporting, publicly supporting, the police, enhancing their stature, enhancing their morale. I worked in El Salvador as a Chief of

Mission in 1992 and 1993. We created a 10,000 man police force

from nothing, and it was only because of the strong leadership of

then President Freddie Cristiani that that was able to be done. I

don’t see that strong leadership as it relates to the police, at least

not yet.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. One last question

before you leave, Mr. Secretary. The list of major drug producing

and major transit nations was due to be submitted on November

1st to the Congress. It is now a week late. The designation of Cuba

on the major’s list is one that many Members have been following

very closely. I hope that you aren’t waiting until Congress leaves

town before sending us a list. The head of the Spanish National Police told my staff last week that, as to the 71⁄2 tons of cocaine from

Columbia intended to transit Cuba last December, that all the

Spanish authorities know it was headed for Cuba, and not Spain.

Secretary Romero, can you tell us when we could expect to receive

the list?

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Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, as you well know, I don’t have responsibility, direct responsibility, for the list since I only deal in

the Western Hemisphere, and it is a worldwide list.

Chairman GILMAN. I recognize it is out of your——

Mr. ROMERO. But that having been said, I would hope that you

would get it in the next couple of days. I know that we are putting

our finishing touches on it, both the State Department, and White

House a few days ago.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for

being here today. We thank you for your patience.

Mr. ROMERO. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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