U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

28–259 PDF 2006

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR

MARITIME SECURITY

(109–43)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 24, 2006 (CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY)

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

TED POE, Texas

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington,ViceChair

CONNIE MACK, Florida

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(Ex Officio)

BOB FILNER, California, Ranking Democrat

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(Ex Officio)

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Boles, William, Director of Security, Port of Wilmington .................................... 24

Bone, Craig E., Director of Port Security, United States Coast Guard .............. 6

Glenn, Dr. Scott, Institute of Marine and Coastal Services, Rutgers University ......................................................................................................................... 24

Hatfield, Mark O., Jr., Deputy Security Director for Newark Liberty International Airport, Transportation Security Administration .............................. 6

Himber, Lisa, Vice President, Maritime Exchange for the Delaware River

and Bay ................................................................................................................. 24

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Bone, Craig E ........................................................................................................... 37

Boles, William .......................................................................................................... 48

Glenn, Dr. Scott ....................................................................................................... 53

Hatfield, Mark O., Jr ............................................................................................... 37

Himber, Lisa ............................................................................................................ 59

(1)

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME

SECURITY

Tuesday, January 24, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST

GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE

ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in the

Multipurpose Room of the Campus Center of Rutgers State University of New Jersey, Hon. Frank A. LoBiondo [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Coast

Guard and Maritime Transportation is meeting this morning to review the national strategy for maritime security in several federal

programs to enhance security in the maritime domain. This field

hearing is another in a series of hearings that the subcommittee

has held since the enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 to review the state of security in our Nation’s ports

and abroad. Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act, the

Coast Guard and other Federal agencies have developed and implemented critical Maritime Security Program systems and procedures

to improve our awareness of activities in the maritime domain and

our capabilities to prevent future attacks in the Maritime Transportation System. However, despite the progress, several key mandates under the Maritime Transportation Security Act have yet to

be completed.

One of these critical mandates is the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan. Despite repeated calls by this subcommittee and a deadline that was enacted as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act last year, we still do not have

this comprehensive national plan. I urge the Coast Guard and the

Department of Homeland Security to complete this plan so that it

can be implemented as soon as possible. I believe it is critical.

While we do not have the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, the administration has recently developed and released

the National Strategy for Maritime Security to further coordinate

the Federal maritime security efforts. The National Strategy is

supported by eight components which address specific threats and

challenges in the maritime environment.

These components call for increased cooperation, integration and

in some cases, expansion of existing programs to enhance maritime

security. The components do not, however, contain many details on

how Federal agencies will accomplish the strategic objectives outlined under the Strategy. I am very interested to hear our wit-
2

nesses testify this morning on how their respective agencies will

take the recommendations and put them into practice in our ports

and on the high seas.

The Strategy also calls for the Transportation Security Agency

and the Coast Guard to conclude development of the Transportation Workers Identification Credential, or TWIC, that will ensure

the identity of maritime workers that have access to sensitive areas

aboard vessels and in our ports. I hope the inclusion of this recommendation signals that the administration is intent on finally

completing this rulemaking. Congress required the implementation

of TWIC, and when we passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act four years ago, the original deadline for the pilot program

was December of 2003 and regulations to implement the program

nationwide were supposed to go into effect in 2004.

I thank our local Delaware River ports for their participation in

the pilot program, but it is time for the TSA to move forward with

this program nationwide. I look forward to hearing more about the

results of the pilot program and expect our witnesses to provide us

with an update on when we can expect this now long overdue program with its regulations.

The National Strategy for Maritime Security is an important

step in our efforts to improve our maritime security responsibilities, but there still is a lot of work that must be done and to take

these plans and to translate them into programs and systems that

provide enhanced security. I hope that the witnesses’ testimony

will address some of these challenges, that the subcommittee will

learn how the Federal government plans to implement the recommendations. I welcome the witnesses and thank them for their

testimony today and I am very pleased that we have several of our

colleagues with us and I would like to first introduce and thank

Congressman Mike Castle from Delaware for being here and Mike,

ask you if you have any opening statement you would like to make?

Mr. CASTLE. I thank you, Chairman LoBiondo, for the opportunity of being here and for holding this very important and timely

field hearing and also for allowing me to participate. I would also

like to thank today’s panel of distinguished witnesses, the first

panel and the second panel to come for their presence at this hearing and obviously, their input. Although most of us are not members of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation subcommittee, I must say though, that Rob, Allyson and you and I were at

a couple of these hearings. I sort of feel like we are part of this subcommittee at this point, but truly we are not. We have all worked

closely on issues affecting the Delaware River and Bay, sometimes

together, sometimes in opposition to each other.

In particular, since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, improving the security of the men and women who live and work in

this part of the country has been our top priority. As all of you

know, in July of 2004 the 9/11 Commission issued an extensive report detailing the challenges facing our government in the wake of

the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. The 9/11 report

contains critical recommendations and port security has emerged

as a significant part of this debate. While the report underscores

the importance of securing our Nation’s airports, the commission

also noted that the increased security efforts around air travel have
3

led to concerns that terrorists may turn their attention to softer

targets such as maritime and surface transportation.

In fact, the 9/11 Commission identified container and cargo ships

as one area of seaport security most vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. The committee’s report identified several chilling scenarios in

which terrorists could exploit holes in our commercial shipping system to smuggle nuclear, chemical or biological weapons into the

country. As many of the people in this room are well aware, more

than nine million marine containers come through U.S. ports each

year, most of which are foreign owned and operated by foreign

crews. On the Delaware River, the Port of Wilmington is among

the busiest terminals, handling hundreds of vessels and millions of

tons of cargo annually.

As of today, Customs and Border Patrol is capable of physically

inspecting only a small fraction of a ship’s cargo. As the Department of Homeland Security continues development of the National

Strategy for Maritime Security, increased focus on new technology,

such as real-time vessel tracking systems and smart box devices is

essential to expanding our national defense system. Once these

ships reach our ports it is also critical that we have effective procedures in place for the screening of personnel and ensuring the integrity of critical infrastructure.

The Transportation Worker Identification Credential program is

one such initiative which uses cutting edge biometric technology to

ensure security officials can protect against unauthorized use of

our Nation’s seaports. As a former member of the House Select

Committee on Intelligence, I am a firm believer in TWIC and other

biometric document security technologies.

In 2002 the Port of Wilmington was one of the locations selected

to participate in the TWIC pilot program and since then thousands

of Delaware workers have taken part in testing TWIC prototypes.

The technology has a myriad of uses from border security to private sector security awareness. Although there have been some setbacks in TWIC, I am hopeful that we will soon be moving into the

implementation phase of this important initiative.

Although much of the Department’s focus has thus far been directed at securing our domestic port facilities, it is also essential

that we find ways of improving security at foreign ports, especially

in underdeveloped countries where true port security is sometimes

nonexistent. The majority of cargo entering the U.S. is loaded in

foreign ports and overseen by foreign officials. This presents a serious security problem since most foreign countries are far behind

the U.S. in terms of maritime security.

The Government Accountability Office has also documented multiple vulnerabilities at international ports, underscoring the fact

that U.S. port security is largely ineffective as long as foreign security remains lax. Like many other transportation sectors, maritime

spending is designed for speed and efficiency. Container ships and

other vessels carry approximately 80 percent of world trade and it

is important that we not significantly impede the flow of commerce.

In the end, a truly successful international security strategy will effectively increase security while minimizing the impact on trade.

And just as the international community needs to step up and

participate in improving maritime security, so do Federal, State
4

and local governments here at home. One key lesson learned from

the mass confusion of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina is that

our government has a significant information sharing problem.

This is true for the intelligence community and it is true for Maritime Security. From the TSA down to State and local security personnel, timely information sharing and communication with private

industry is crucial to improving our ability to accurately identify

and respond to threats.

Today’s hearing is an important part of this process and I look

forward to hearing from each of our distinguished witnesses. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Castle. Congressman Andrews,

thank you so much for joining us and for all the help and advice

you have given this subcommittee. Recognized.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am privileged to

have this opportunity this morning. I want to begin by referring to

a meeting we had just about a year ago on a similar related topic

and that was the aftermath of the oil spill on the Delaware River.

And I do want to commend Congressman LoBiondo, for his stewardship in achieving a significant legislative victory in 2005 which

I believe lays the foundation to prevent such a spill from ever happening again, and I know that that is not the purpose, Frank, of

today’s hearing, but the commitments that you made and that we

supported you on that day about a year ago. We thank you for that

and congratulate you for that.

The enemy that we face in the global war against terrorism is

above all things adaptive. It is an enemy that studied us rather

well, that knows our weaknesses and is usually a few steps ahead

of where we are going. Justifiably, this country has been focused

intently on airplane and airline security since September 11 of

2001 and we should never rule out the possibility that the next attack will happen there. I think it is far more likely, however, that

the next major attack on this country will happen through another

means and obviously, one of the leading candidates of that means

of attack is our shipping system, the 25,000 cargo containers a day

that come into the United States.

We have given those who will testify today a huge responsibility.

It is not surprising that there are issues of implementation with respect to meeting that responsibility. I am encouraged by the fact

that what we have seen in the months that have passed since September 11 is an analytical clarity as to focusing on what the problem is. You know, there were calls after 9/11 for us to try to board

every ship, inspect every container. We could do that. Obviously,

there was an incredible early need to be analytically focused on

where the real threat is.

There was a secondary need to follow up in putting in place the

practical tools to make good use of those analytical conclusions and

focus on where the threat is coming from. That is the focus of today’s hearing, to see how we are doing in implementing the tools

and strategies that we need to focus on the areas where we are at

greatest risk. This is by no means an easy job, but it is an awfully

important one. And you know, I wake up every morning wondering

if this is going to be the day when the next assault will be

launched on the country.
5

The first thing that comes to my mind is what can we do today

to be sure that when that day comes, not if it comes, when it

comes, that we are prepared to the maximum extent. So I commend the chairman for calling the hearing. I look forward to learning about the progress the Coast Guard and the Department of

Homeland Security have made in preparing us for that day and in

my own way, if I can contribute toward that preparation, I am

eager to do so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Congressman Andrews and let me

take a moment since Rob commented on that hearing of almost a

year ago and thank my colleagues because everyone that is here

today, Congressman Castle, Congressman Andrews and Congresswoman Schwartz, along with Congressman Jim Saxton, gave some

great recommendations, and just by way of an update, we fully expect that this will be part of the Coast Guard conference report

which we hope to get concluded, maybe optimistically in February,

sometime early in the year, that will become law and I think will

go a long ways towards prevention in the future and I thank my

colleagues.

Now I would like to turn to Congresswoman Schwartz and thank

you for being with us today.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also wanted to

acknowledge the fact that I participated in that hearing that we

had about the Athos spill just about a little over a year ago. It was

my first, I guess, my first official activity as a new member of Congress. I actually had been a member of the committee probably for

about a few minutes and you were very gracious in allowing me to

participate in that hearing and I have to say it is the way it is supposed to work and I really just appreciate the fact that it was a

hearing where people took it very seriously, both those who were

testifying and those of us who were there asking the questions

about how we could clean up from the spill and how we could prevent a future spill.

And I really thank you for your leadership in the Delaware River

Protection Act and in getting that language into legislation and I

am on that conference committee with the express purpose of holding on to as much of that as we can and getting that language done

because it is important for us to move ahead and not only the clean

up, which is mostly done, as I understand it, and I thank everyone

for their updates on that, but also in making sure that we prevent

any future spills. Which, again, I look forward to this hearing in

a similar capacity and all of us, being deeply concerned about the

safety and security of our citizens and of the Nation and as has

been mentioned, the attention to our airports and air travel. Obviously, that was primary in our minds, but I have taken some time

with some of the members in the audience to spend some time

hearing more about the activities on the Delaware River, traveling

the Delaware River a bit, up and down, and to commend the Coast

Guard for the work that you do every day in securing and keeping

secure our port.

So I think what we are interested in today is to hear from you

about what works well, what doesn’t, what more we can do, and

I can tell you a specific concern that I have is the proposal for the

L and G facility, the terminal that is proposed for Port Richmond
6

and the really very serious concerns we have about whether, in

fact, we could ever provide the security that we would need to have

at the terminals. You know many of us are opposed to it for security reasons and I am interested in some comments that might be

made on both the current commerce and trade, how to protect our

citizens from anyone who might be coming on board a vessel, recreation vehicles, as well, of course. It is a very important part of my

district to keep the Delaware River a thriving commercial port and

also available for recreation, and I have all sorts of plans for ways

that we might enhance the North Delaware, as well. So as we populate it more with both business and residents, we also want to

make sure that it is as safe and secure as we need to make it for

our citizens and for our commercial enterprises, so I look forward

to the testimony and continuing under the leadership of Chairman

LoBiondo to be able to take actions that we might need to, to secure the port for the citizens of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania

and of course, Delaware, as well, so thank you.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much. Now we will turn to our

first panel, Rear Admiral Craig Bone, who is the Director of Port

Security for the United States Coast Guard, and Mark Hatfield,

who is the Deputy Federal Security Director for Newark Liberty

International Airport that is part of the Transportation Security

Administration. Admiral Bone, welcome today and await your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF CRAIG E. BONE, DIRECTOR OF PORT SECURITY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; AND MARK O. HATFIELD, JR., DEPUTY SECURITY DIRECTOR FOR NEWARK LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.

Rear Admiral BONE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Congressional members. I am Rear Admiral Craig Bone,

Director of Inspections and Compliance for the U.S. Coast Guard.

I was Director of Port Security. We have now organized ourselves

under Prevention Response and I have security responsibilities

under that Director of Inspection and Compliance. It is an honor

to be here today to discuss the Department’s role in implementing

the National Strategy for Maritime Security. The United States

has a vital interest in maritime security. The National Strategy for

Maritime Security prescribes for a holistic approach to dealing with

a broad array of threats, addressing activities that span from prevention to post-incident recovery to achieve the following four objectives: Prevent successful terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile

attacks; protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructure; minimize damage and expedite recovery; and safeguard the ocean and its resources.

The Strategy strives to achieve its objectives through enhanced

international cooperation, maximize domain awareness, embed security into commercial practices, deploy layered security to unify

public and private security measures and assure continuity of the

marine transportation system to maintain vital commerce.

The concept of layered security is complex. It involves multiple

types of activities to create a network of interdependent and overlapping checkpoints in this system which are designed to reduce
7

vulnerabilities and detect, deter, and defeat threats. It entails developing security measures that cover the various components of

the marine transportation system, including people, cargo, infrastructure, conveyances and information systems. These security

measures span distances from foreign ports of embarkation,

through transit zones, to ports of entry and beyond. They involve

the different modes of transportation that feed the global supply

chain and are implemented by various commercial, regulatory, law

enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic and military entities.

The National Strategy for Maritime Security defines Maritime

Domain Awareness, or MDA, as the effective understanding of anything associated with the global Maritime Domain that could impact the safety, the security, the economy or the environment of the

United States. MDA, or Maritime Domain Awareness, is neither a

program nor a mission, but a state of awareness necessary to

achieve maritime security. The Department of Homeland Security,

therefore, has tasked the Coast Guard to act on its behalf for implementing the system and processes necessary to achieve the level

of MDA required by the National Strategy.

The Maritime Domain Awareness Implementation Team, co-led

by the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard, oversees the

implementation of the national plan to achieve MDA. This plan is

a cornerstone for the successful execution of the National Strategy

for Maritime Security and serves to unify efforts across Federal

government and the private sector, as well as civil authorities within the U.S. and with our allies and international partners, as well.

Additionally, DHS has worked hard to align all our regulatory

and policy development efforts with Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard and the Transportation and Security Administration. We meet regularly to discuss policy, participate in interagency regulation development teams and sit on the Operation

Safe Commerce Executive Steering Committee. Between DHS,

CBP, the Coast Guard and TSA, we coordinate the work of our various Federal advisory committees so we understand all of the trade

community’s concerns and priorities. Now that the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the International Ship and Port

Facility Code have been implemented in the port and the facility

and at the vessel level, we are monitoring compliance and carefully

noting issues for further improvements to the regulatory framework.

We are working closely with TSA, the lead agency for the implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential,

TWIC, to assist in the implementation of this new credentialing

program. The credentialing program will ensure that all U.S. port

workers, including all U.S. mariners, have undergone an extensive

security background check and have been found eligible to work

within our port facilities and on U.S. ships. The Coast Guard is

fully supportive of this regulatory effort. We will do everything

within our ability to assist TSA in the development of this rulemaking and ensure that the TWIC and Merchant Mariner

Credentialing initiatives are complementary in order to minimize

the burden on mariners in the future.

Internationally we continue our efforts with the International

Maritime Organization, as well as visiting foreign countries to as-
8

sess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in foreign ports.

To date, 44 countries have been assessed, with Malaysia being the

most recent visit, and 35 have been found to be in substantial compliance with the International Ship and Port Security Code. The

Coast Guard is on track to assess approximately 45 countries a

year, and our goal remains at a 140 countries that we hope to engage by September 2008.

As stated in the National Strategy for Maritime Security, we

must pursue an integrated, unified approach with all maritime

partners, domestic, international, public and private to ensure the

security of the Maritime Domain remains safe and secure. Such

collaboration is fundamental to implementing the National Strategy and vital to protecting the interests of the United States.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to

answer any questions at the appropriate time, sir.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Admiral Bone. Mr. Hatfield, welcome

today.

Mr. HATFIELD. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. We look forward to your testimony.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the

subcommittee, I am both pleased and honored to have an opportunity to speak with you today and hopefully be responsive to your

inquiries on the Transportation Security Administration’s TWIC, or

Transportation Worker Identification Credential project, which we

are partnered with our friends from the U.S. Coast Guard in producing. The delivery of the that program, its implementation, will

fulfill requirements in the Maritime Transportation Security Act

and I am very pleased that I am alongside Admiral Bone in front

of the subcommittee today.

The TWIC program has three major goals. First, we are developing a common, secure biometric credential, the physical piece that

will represent the credential, that is interoperable across transportation modes and compatible with the existing independent access

control systems. Secondly, we are establishing processes to verify

the identity of each TWIC applicant, complete a security threat assessment on the applicant and positively link the issued credential

to the applicant.

Finally, we will quickly revoke cardholder privileges for individuals who are issued a TWIC credential but subsequently are determined to pose a threat to national security after the issuance of

that credential. TSA planned the TWIC program in four phases.

We have completed the first three, the first one being planning; the

second one, a technical evaluation; the third phase, a prototype

process; and then finally, the fourth phase, implementation, itself.

This past summer we completed the testing of the prototype

phase and the overall TWIC solution was evaluated against a full

range of business processes, policies and requirements. This included enrollment centers and enrollment, security threat assessments, verification of claimed identity, card personalization and

production, card issuance and processes for card replication.

Moving to the next phase now, implementation requires the promulgation of a rule. TSA and the Coast Guard, using the experience and the information gained in the prototype testing are currently preparing a joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The
9

NPRM will propose standards for security threat assessments of

workers with unescorted access to secure areas of maritime facilities and vessels. In addition, it will offer standards for a biometric

identification credential that reflects the results of a satisfactory

assessment and for access control procedures to prevent unauthorized entry into these secure areas, and it will provide a process for

redress for workers who are denied a TWIC card. The proposed

rule will also address the fee authority enabling the program to be

fully supported through user fees.

Before I conclude, I would like to briefly focus on three other

areas of maritime security initiatives under way. Intermodal transportation systems converging at America’s ports are highly interdependent and of great economic importance. These networks have

a highly critical—high criticality rating and demand significant security attention. TSA and the Coast Guard have jointly developed

and implemented the Port Security Training Exercises Program,

otherwise known as PortSTEP, to provide maritime transportation

security communities nationwide with training exercises, evaluations and information technology products to enhance security in

the port and maritime environment.

Eight PortSTEP exercises have been completed and a total of 17

exercises are scheduled for the year 2006, building toward an objective of conducting 40 exercises in all. PortSTEP will culminate in

a fully vetted and tested port and transportation security exercise

pilot program that can serve as a model for TSA and other government agencies. In coordination with the Coast Guard, TSA has implemented the SAIL test project to develop screening technologies

and capabilities aimed at enhancing security on ferry systems. This

multi-phased effort has tested and evaluated the use of explosive

detection systems on two major ferry systems.

The TSA developed and deployed a van portable Z backscatter Xray system on the Cape May to Lewes Ferry, for explosive detection document scanners on the passenger-only ferry in San Francisco Bay to look for individuals who may have had contact with

explosives or IUDs. Planning is underway to initiate a third phase

of this important program which will test a total screening program for both passengers and vehicles, targeting that on a large

ferry operation.

In addition, TSA is managing a $3.6 million research and development grant program to test and evaluate explosives trace detection equipment for screening passengers, baggage and vehicles in

the ferry and cruise line industries. A request for applications for

grant awards for vehicle screening equipment will be published

this spring. And grants for passenger and baggage screening equipment have already been awarded and procurement of that equipment for testing by the Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City is underway.

After completion of a 30-day test period for deployment of equipment, after that 30-day test period, the deployment equipment will

commence for field tests across the maritime passenger industry.

This concludes my prepared oral statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions of the committee.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Hatfield. We are going to

start off with Congressman Castle with questions.
10

Mr. CASTLE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am in the process

of reading a book called Memorial Day. I don’t know if you have

read it or not. I have got about 50 pages to go and basically it is

about the importation on a ship of different aspects of a nuclear

bomb and then another bomb which came in from Mexico or something of that nature and they are at this point getting ready to

blow up Washington, D.C. I have 50 pages to go, so if I am a little

jumpy today, you will understand the nature of my questions and

my concern of what possibly can happen here.

Let me start with you, Admiral Bone. First of all, let me just congratulate the Coast Guard on the tremendous work in Katrina. You

have probably heard that before, but I just think that is very admirable in terms of, you know, what our military services can do to

make a difference. My questions are, I guess, could be anything,

but I would like to know more about the whole smart container

technology. I remember the last time, perhaps, I looked at this or

perhaps at a hearing, we were inspecting something like 2 percent

of the containers and then we were having some trouble identifying

where containers were coming from and that is where the smart

container technology, trying to determine in real time where things

are, came into place. And that still does concern me.

I frankly have an abiding concern that we have spent a lot of our

TSA dollars and time on airport security and I worry about rail security and cargo security and I worry about how these things are

advancing. And don’t get me wrong. I think everybody is trying

their very hardest and it is very hard to do these things, but I want

to make sure they advance as rapidly as possible and I am convinced that we are going to need things like smart technology or

whatever it may be in order to truly get the highest degree of safety we possibly can. Can you just bring us up to date on where that

whole business of tracking cargo in real time with the smart technology stands?

Rear Admiral BONE. Sir, first off, thanks. Thank you very much

for the commendation on behalf of the members of the men and

women of the Coast Guard responding to Katrina. But in regard to

your specific question, the lead for cargo security is the Customs

and Border Protection, not the Coast Guard. We work very closely

with them. And that smart technology and the actual technology

used in scanning, screening and even targeting is the responsibility

of that agency and it is best that they actually respond to that for

the record, and I know that the department has indicated that they

would respond to specific questions like that. What I will tell you,

though, is they were working more closely than ever with CBP,

both in identification, upfront, of the cargos, through the Advanced

Notice of Arrival System, as well as working with them in the National Targeting Center where the containers and the cargos are

screened and targeted.

We have people also with Customs that work in our intelligence

center so that the Customs personnel are privy to all intelligence

and threat information in their targeting scheme and ability. Also,

the results of our International Port Security Program, where we

assess, through port visits at foreign countries, the risks and the

threats are built into their targeting system based on our reports.

So you have an integrated approach, but the lead, again, for that
11

particular system and integration and assessment of that, before it

arrives and also when it is at the port, is in Customs. We have the

water-borne leg of that, if you look at it, meaning Customs helps

us identify that threat and risk and then on the water, we work

to address that, again, in an inter-agency forum, those cargos, before they arrive, if need be or at the port, itself.

Mr. CASTLE. Let me sort of go off on a different tangent. I guess

either of you can answer this, but I worry about we are doing in

the United States, but I realize it is so, that almost virtually, a lot

of the shipping which we are going to see is going to be from outside of the United States into the United States. And you mentioned in your testimony about the different ports you look at in

foreign countries, et cetera, but I think the foreign port security

issues are really important, particularly those who have less available resources. I imagine in some countries it is almost non-existent. I don’t know what your inspections are showing, but I can’t

imagine that in some of the third world countries where we might

have some shipping there is a lot of security going on. Is there anything being done with respect to international maritime security,

for example, some sort of an international regulatory body or anything of that nature? And have we considered tying international

security into trade agreements or any other way of enforcing this

so that we can be more comfortable in terms of what is happening

in those countries as they start to load containers and bring them

into the United States?

Rear Admiral BONE. Yes. In fact, the International Maritime Organization is directly involved in this. Our international ship and

port security code mirrors the MTSA code with regard to security,

so security both for their facilities, their vessels and even the individuals moving through the system, and qualifications for security

officers are inclusive and already are in place. In fact, that is what

our international port security visits do. We look and assess whether or not they are implementing the international code that has

been put in place and if they don’t, in which case we have had a

number. As I said in my testimony, we have visited 44. We have

found 36 of them to be in compliance. The other ones actually receive a demarche from the State Department, at which point in

time it informs them that they have not met the requirements of

ISPS and as such, the U.S. will be taking actions with regard to

vessels that visit that port.

Vessels that go to those ports and continue trade have to move

themselves to a higher maritime security level that involves increased security while they are in the port, as well as there is increased targeting of their cargos automatically by Customs and

Border Protection, as well as us. Vessels that comply with that,

again, receive increased level of attention upon arrival and if we

believe there is a significant threat, they can be basically denied

entry. The vessels that don’t actually carry out those activities, we

board those offshore. Those that don’t carry out those activities are

denied entry into the United States.

Mr. CASTLE. But it is a continuing quest. You mentioned there

is 140 countries you want to do by 2008. You have done 44, so you

still obviously have a number more to go.

Rear Admiral BONE. Yes, sir.
12

Mr. CASTLE. So we won’t have a final answer for a couple more

years.

Rear Admiral BONE. Yes, sir. Mr. Congressman, but over 75 percent of the cargos, we targeted both the high risk as well as those

which—

Mr. CASTLE. The high production.

Rear Admiral BONE. —present the highest amount of cargo. And

again, that helps us, again, to target where do you put your resources? One of the comments earlier was, we know we can’t do everything, so how do you best assess that risk, look at the highest

risk regions and address those first or those highest flow areas so

that if we do, God forbid, have a security incident within, we can

identify and clear more quickly—

Mr. CASTLE. Right.

Rear Admiral BONE. —those which are legitimate and not hamper their commerce flow.

Mr. CASTLE. And my final question is to Mr. Hatfield. Bring me

up to date, if you can, on your time line for TWIC and what is happening during the sustainment phase and if you consult with the

private sector, I mean we have it in the Wilmington Port and they

seem to like it, but they seem to see some logistic problems and

that is to be expected, obviously. But I think it is very important

that TSA stay on top of that to make the corrections that I would

imagine that the usage of information technology probably changes

month by month, if I had to guess.

Mr. HATFIELD. Indeed, sir.

Mr. CASTLE. So can you bring us up to date on that whole TWIC

business?

Mr. HATFIELD. Indeed. And of course elemental to any time line

is the fact that we are looking to deliver against the requirements

of the Maritime Security Transportation Act. And that is a key

driver in all of this. The time line, as I had mentioned in my statement, we have completed three of the four phases that we have

broken this into and direct to the question, we are in the drafting

process right now for the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. That is

an effort that we are conducting jointly with the Coast Guard. We

have built upon all of our experience through the prototype,

through the technical evaluation, the early planning, to make sure

that we have industry input, that we have our stakeholders represented and of course, they will have ample opportunity once that

NPRM is released to comment on it before it goes into its final

phase.

What does all that mean to implementation? Well, we had senior

representatives testify or brief members of Congress last year and

they presented a very aggressive time line, speculating perhaps October of this year. I can say that that was a very aggressive speculation and I don’t know that that is possible under any scenario.

If you look at the NPRM process, and of course there are other elements, the fact that it is a fee-based system requires additional

work, additional time in crafting the system. The review for OMB,

itself, is two 90-day periods. That is six months of review unless

they decide to or agree or volunteer to shorten their section of it.

So we have TSA finishing up the draft, presenting it to the Department, who will then clear it for review by OMB and then we
13

have the public comment periods, too. So all of that said, your best

case scenario, if you do the math, it adds up—it heads towards 12

months and that is not a speculation on how long it will take, it

is just sort of a cataloging of the various steps in this final process.

But the good news is we are in the final process and if I could have

a moment just to mention, because you asked about specifically the

Delaware River/Bay area, the involvement of the stakeholders, the

involvement of our prototype partners and those who were involved

during the technical evaluation and the planning, I know that we

have gotten kudos and received praise for our inclusiveness during

that planning and the kind of double edge to that is, with all that

inclusiveness we get a more valid product and I think that is really

important at the end of the day, but that takes more time and so

that is just one of those contextual pieces that in each of these

steps we have sought to be extremely inclusive and not be dictatorial or take a government knows best position, but in fact, really

reach out because one of our key objectives is to facilitate commerce and if we overburden them, we won’t be facilitating them.

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Castle. Congresswoman

Schwartz.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you. As I said in my opening remarks, I

would like to just explore a little bit of the position on the proposed

L and G liquefied natural gas terminal for Port Richmond, in particular, so I just want some background. You know this as well. I

know you may want to call on someone else, so I guess it is mostly

questions for Admiral Bone. As I understand it, in November 2005

the Coast Guard did complete some preliminary review about security assessment for the proposed L and G facility in New Jersey,

in Logan Township, New Jersey, and concluded that for you to do

the appropriate security measures, you were able to conclude that

you had, I guess, enough resources to accommodate two to three L

and G carriers per week, which, I guess, is what they were proposing. Could you speak to what it would mean if, in fact, if we did—

if an L and G facility went into Port Richmond, if we saw more carriers than that, does that mean you would not be able to assess

the—be able to, I almost used the word guarantee, but I think that

that is actually too strong a word, but to be able to provide the security that is necessary. And basically, in just your preliminary

judgment about assessing, one of our deep concerns, of course, is

not only the number of carriers, but the density of population when

you go further up the Delaware.

We are looking at 1.2 million people that live in Philadelphia,

probably more than that if you are looking at the number of people

who come in during the day, during the course of the day who work

or come into Philadelphia for other reasons, you are talking about

maybe a million and a half people to protect several times, many

times a week; whether that is, in fact, at all practical; whether you

would be able to make some, any kind of assessment at this point

that you could provide some security on that. So could you speak

to how prepared we might be to handle such a facility?

Rear Admiral BONE. Well, first off, the specifics of—there is a

process, a very comprehensive process that is looked at. And each

port, if you have seen one port, you have seen one port. Each port
14

has its own unique characteristics, its own challenges regarding

safety and security and the same thing is true about facility locations, and this process, again, is a national process in which each

of the captain of ports, and I am assuming you know your local

captain of port who is here today, who would be involved in that

process, in identifying each one of those risks.

What I would say is it involves an assessment of the transit, as

well as the facility, itself. It is a very comprehensive process and

it takes into account all the other operations that take place in the

port and the risks associated with them, whether or not we collectively, and not just the Coast Guard, can meet the requirements

needed to provide for the safe and secure operations of the facility

as well as the transit, safe and secure transit of that vessel. I don’t

know the specifics of this port, so I would be presumptuous to even

make a statement on it. What I will say is that this is not unique

in the United States, to look at liquefied natural gas or individuals

intent to expand liquefied natural gas, and the Coast Guard has

looked at this very seriously and again looking at both the safety

and security.

And I can assure you that the facility and the safe operation, secure operations that won’t be approved by the Coast Guard, a plan

wouldn’t be approved by the Coast Guard and forwarded for consideration unless it, in fact, the Coast Guard was, in fact, assured we

could provide for that and that is the commitment that I can give

you with that regard. And even when we do put some forward, we

say we could do this provided these factors are all put in place.

That includes Coast Guard and other resources involved; it is not

exclusive. It is looked at as an entire system and the whole system

has to be in place to be safe and secure, for cargoes in particular,

a hazard like L and G.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Well, and again, I don’t know if this is going to

go forward. There is quite a bit of opposition for a number of reasons, but I certainly do look forward to working locally with the

Coast Guard here and doing that kind of assessment and your willingness to say it just can’t be done, you know, it can’t be secure.

That is a possibility, I assume, as well. There can always be resources, but it also may not be, but there also may be just too great

a risk, as well. That is a possibility in making that kind of assessment, I assume.

Rear Admiral BONE. That is always a possibility, yes, ma’am.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. So I look forward to your commitment to working

on that assessment and making that kind of judgment. Let me ask

generally, because of your broader responsibility, do you ever look

at—rather than just looking at each site in and of itself, consider

doing some determinations ahead of time? So basically saying these

are locations where we might be able to accommodate a facility

more safely, so we are not just looking at the oil industry or private

sector or actually in the case of Philadelphia, PGW saying, working

with the private sector, here is where we want to put it and then

we respond. Because, in fact, we do have serious energy needs in

this country and we do want to do more to end our reliance on foreign oil, so we are looking for alternatives. L and G might be a part

of that, certainly in the northeastern corridor, and yet we tend to

just respond to particular proposals and might there be another al-
15

ternative, which is basically to say here is a facility, there is a low

population, we could provide security here. Why doesn’t somebody

come into this location rather than always looking to respond to a

proposal that comes up?

Rear Admiral BONE. Right. Well, the natural response to that is

offshore and offshore facilities are inclusive in that, but those even

bring challenges, themselves, in other words to ensure the security

of that facility, as you become dependent upon it, the further offshore you have it, the more complicated the resource base is, so

that presents a level of complexity. I tell you, it is a private business and if you—what you are looking at is where to place something which is a hazardous environment, you know, that you are

looking at in particular. Well, the oil and chemical industry might

be equally interested as the L and G or a nuclear power plant or

other business entities, you know, and just start identifying for one

particular mode or industry over another is not the business of government, I don’t think.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Okay.

Rear Admiral BONE. I mean, and we haven’t really been charged.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. You may be right. These are private enterprises.

Rear Admiral BONE. At least we haven’t been charged.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. But it is interesting to think about, actually, sort

of being a little more proactive, saying here is where we know it

would be safer to do such a thing, so it is interesting to consider

as we move forward.

Rear Admiral BONE. I think your point is on track. I think what

we have tried to do in identifying the criteria, we have identified

those criteria which make it more difficult.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Yes.

Rear Admiral BONE. And then you have to overcome those obstacles. And so if somebody looks at what is being considered, they

will look at what they have to overcome and again, the more complex you make it, again, further up river, so to speak, that you

move something, then there is more challenges, more infrastructure that you are going to pass. There is going to be more population centers and I agree that in general, especially if it is places

where other activities are involved and it is not just an industrial

base or a farming area, it does create increased risk and increased

challenges for those responsible for providing security for it if it is

put in place.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. That is pretty close to saying it is a good idea,

so I will leave it at that. I kind of agree with that, so I will declare

victory and move on, exactly, which is great. So my only other

question would be just related more broadly to the security plans

that you require of every facility along the Delaware River and I

know you review those plans and assessed them. Do you feel, at

this point, that those are adequate? Do you have some concerns

about whether your own determination that it be facilities, just waterfront property is adequate? Are there other facilities you feel

that we ought to be, that use the river or nearby, that ought to also

have security plans and should we be looking more broadly at other

major, particularly oil and chemical facilities, that we would want

them to make sure that they not only have plans, but that you reviewed them, that they meet the appropriate requirements?
16

Rear Admiral BONE. Well, one, we have, in fact, examined and

found in compliance all the facilities that remain in operation that

are required under the MTSA, and the issue isn’t so much new

plans, it is like anything else. You can put a plan together but now

you have to implement it and you have to do it consistently. So it

is the lapse of security with regard to those facilities that we have

to keep from having occur. And we provide regular exercises and

spot checks and random checks of those facilities and we have

found facilities noncompliant, you know, not meeting their plan

and have taken actions, either in some cases, actually shut down

the facility because the security violation is so poor; in other cases,

maybe limit cargo transfer or operating in a particular portion of

the facility until it is overcome. But those normally, again, are implementation of the plan.

For other facilities in the port, the MTSA and the subcommittee

and Congress basically put forth the authority within the Captain

of the Port to identify other requirements as may be deemed necessary, but may not meet the threshold of those facilities’ security

plans and the training and requirements of the people at those facilities and all of those requirements that surround that, as for example, in marinas or other locations. But those are very specific,

usually security driven events, increased threat in a particular segment where these other facilities other exist and then a captain of

port can implement with, again, the State, the local government,

as well as the industry, the actions that is necessary to prevent or

provide protection for that area.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Okay. So I just—you mentioned two things and

I will just conclude on this, is that it is not just the plans, it is actually having the training, the people who are involved knowing

really what is in that plan, being prepared to implement those

plans should they need to, and communicating with others. I think

there is a group that meets on a regular basis. I actually visited

with them here on the Delaware River, who really do meet each

other, know each other and share plans and should an incident

occur, be able to communicate with each other. That is one of

things that we hear all the time, the ability to communicate across

jurisdictions, across geographic areas, I mean to be able to know

what each others’ plans are and to be trained to implement those

plans, as it is critical, the plans on the books, so I am glad that

you are paying attention to and I think it is important for you to

pay attention to those pieces, as well, not just the written plans in

a drawer somewhere.

Rear Admiral BONE. Well, I think your point on the area maritime security committees and their efforts, again, is, as I said in

my testimony, this is Federal, State, local, industry, public and private sector responsibilities and it is done not just at the local level,

but also on the national level. The National Maritime Security Advisory Committee provided input to the TWIC process and looked

at international security issues, as well, and has advised us as we

go forward and continues to do so with future regulatory efforts or

policy changes.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Congressman Andrews.
17

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Rear Admiral, in your

testimony you mentioned that there are approximately 25,000 containers a day come into the United States, or I believe it is in the

committee’s preparatory material, and there is a process by which

there is an intelligence analysis of which one of those containers

should be prescreened when they are loaded at ports outside the

United States and that is a product of the intelligence work of a

number of agencies.

On a scale of one to ten, ten being perfect and zero being terrible,

what is your degree of confidence in the quality of work of that intelligence process in determining which containers should be

prescreened before they come to the United States?

Rear Admiral BONE. Well, what I will tell you is that every bit

of information that is available to the Customs and Border Protection and to the National Targeting Center that I visited, I am convinced it is vetted, examined and that they, in fact, are doing everything in their power and using every source available to them

to target the containers that present the highest risk and to work

in an inter-agency effort in order to address that threat. So it is

overseas as well as at sea and here in the United States.

Mr. ANDREWS. So is it an eight, is it a nine? What is it?

Rear Admiral BONE. Well, I would say it is a ten for what they

know.

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay.

Rear Admiral BONE. What I would offer, is that doesn’t mean, I

don’t want to imply that it is perfect. I don’t want to imply that

our intelligence systems are perfect and I don’t want to imply that

there aren’t individuals with intent to try to find any gaps in it,

but I can tell you that the level of effort that is being given across

all agencies to work collectively to not—to thwart that and actually

identify those is—

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. I don’t doubt that the effort is there, there

is no question about that. What suggestions might you make to improve the process? And again, that is with no disrespect to those

trying to run it. Where are we deficient in terms of developing

more powerful intelligence?

Rear Admiral BONE. Well, in one of the areas that we are working, the international environment and again, also with Customs,

is with both long range identification tracking as well as notice of

arrival and departure. And in those notices of arrival and departure, the information being required for vessels before they depart

the port so that, again, it allows more time for analysis and assessment, inclusive, as well as of the crews, of where it came from,

where it is going to, the cargo, itself, who manufactures it, et

cetera, Customs looks at—again, it is better for Customs to answer,

give a specific answer to this kind of question, but I can assure you

that there is, in fact, an international effort to improve both the notification and the tracking. Again, the ability to screen when a target—you want to be able to identify those things which you have

a high level of confidence in and screen those out from those that

you have a lower level of confidence in. And the long range identification tracking system will allow us to track a vessel up to 2,000

miles offshore.
18

Mr. ANDREWS. We are very pleased with one of our local companies here in Camden that Mr. LoBiondo and I have both worked

with, led by a gentleman named Jacob Baines, has developed software that helps in that identification process. We are happy that

one of our local industries is participating in that. What percentage, obviously without compromising any intelligence information,

what percentage of the 25,000 containers that come into the country in any given day are screened and inspected before they are

loaded at a foreign port?

Rear Admiral BONE. I don’t—again, because I don’t do that, Customs and Border Protection does that, they would have to give you

that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. In your testimony you talk about radiological screening which is taking place at the Ports of New York and

New Jersey and in Long Beach in California. Are those the only

two ports where there is radiological screening today?

Rear Admiral BONE. Again, I know that there is radiological

screening in other ports. Again, specifically where that—there is

screening being done, not just in the ports, but offshore, as well,

on vessels and in foreign ports. It would be better that I provide

an answer for the record on that.

Mr. ANDREWS. What technological capability do we have to do radiological screening before a vessel gets to port? Here is the scenario I worry about. Terrorists load a dirty bomb onto a container

on a vessel and the vessel arrives at the Port of New Jersey and

New York and we are able to detect the presence of the dirty bomb

and five seconds later it detonates. How defective are we and what

technology exists to detect the presence of the dirty bomb before it

ever gets to the port?

Rear Admiral BONE. Again, there is, in fact, efforts under way,

in foreign ports, as well, that Customs has worked internationally

and again, they should talk to the specificity regarding that versus

we don’t—we again don’t have that responsibility. It is a core responsibility. We do have technology that we utilize offshore and

again, part of this is, just as you said, it is based on the targeting,

based on the—

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the technology based upon boarding the vessel

or is it based upon some aerial observation of the vessel?

Rear Admiral BONE. The technology—there is multiple levels of

technology and actually going into detail about that technology

wouldn’t be in the best interest of the government.

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay, I understand.

Rear Admiral BONE. But there is, in fact, a layered set of technologies in order to detect that type of a threat.

Mr. ANDREWS. If terrorists put a chemical weapon in a container

and sailed it into a United States port today, do we have any technology that would detect it?

Rear Admiral BONE. Yes, there is some technology that could detect it.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is it deployed?

Rear Admiral BONE. There is deployed technology that could detect it provided, again, what you have to have is identification of

it. You know, we don’t—you don’t go and try to inspect or examine

every container, but if there is intelligence provided on it, there is
19

an ability to respond to it. One of the things that has been put in

place that brings both—all agencies’ assets, it is called Maritime

Operations Threat Response—

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Rear Admiral BONE. —capability, MOTR, as it is referred to, and

its capability is when a threat is either identified or a terrorist or

some piracy event were to take place, regardless of where it is, the

capabilities within the U.S. government are brought together to respond to that, including the DoD. This isn’t limited—

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand.

Rear Admiral BONE. —to the Coast Guard.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are there technological capabilities that could, in

a non-invasive way, detect the presence of a chemical weapon?

That is to say, through a UAV or some other mechanism?

Rear Admiral BONE. I am not sure that I could give you an accurate testimony.

Mr. ANDREWS. One final question. And I don’t mean this in any

way to be critical, but I think it is an observation. From what you

just told me, it sounds like we still very much have an intelligencebased protective system here, that we have a system that is really

based upon good collection of human intelligence that gives you

good leads on which ships to interdict, board and inspect, is that

correct?

Rear Admiral BONE. Well, it is intelligence and assessments. I

mean, the assessments have been made—

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand.

Rear Admiral BONE. —of the manufacturers, assessments have

been made of ports and their systems, assessments are made of

ships and the carriers and their historical records. There are assessments made of countries and their, you know, whether the

country even has legal authority, you know, and has a mechanism

to provide security in their system.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is it fair to say that the principal line of defense

against a weapon of mass destruction being brought into an American port is the quality of our intelligence?

Rear Admiral BONE. No, again, there is counter-proliferation efforts underway every day. We have our members in our armed

services that are engaged in that overseas. It is not purely intelligence. There are actions being taken every single day to detect

and intercept and to screen, not just those, again, that are targeted, but even randomly, so I wouldn’t limit it to intelligence and

make that kind of a statement.

Mr. ANDREWS. Rather than limited, I said principal source of defense.

Rear Admiral BONE. It is the principal mechanism that we use,

it is not—it is the principal mechanism, I think it is true and we

refer to Maritime Domain Awareness, like I said, is looking at everything and it is the analysis of that to identify where is it that

you address and also, even what you are trying to protect, you

know. You look at the conveyance is one thing, like you said. The

execution is another. We understand that terrorists want to kill as

many people as possible, so we look at that entire layer of security

that needs to be in place, not just overseas, but because it isn’t necessarily foolproof in one location and we know everyone has to
20

work together and we look at that full layer and the ability to detect and intercept anywhere along, from the manufacturer to the

delivery source.

Mr. ANDREWS. I appreciate your answers very much. I would just

say to the Chairman that I listened to the Chairman’s opening

statement and I appreciate his customary courtesy in expressing

his concerns about the delay in issuing these regulations executed

in this plan. I would just echo what he said, that I am a bit concerned that the sense of urgency that we ought to have about the

gravity of this threat is not where it ought to be and I appreciate

the work of the subcommittee and shall we say, increasing that

sense of urgency and I would lend my voice in support to the

Chairman as he continues that effort. Thank you.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Congressman Andrews. Admiral

Bone, sort of following right up on that with the Maritime Transportation Security Act required the development of the National

Maritime Transportation Security Plan. When will the plan be submitted to Congress?

Rear Admiral BONE. I can tell you that the plan has completed

inter-agency review and is going through a final review at the Department of Homeland Security, so I can’t give you an exact date

or time, but I can tell you it is in its final stages. I don’t have—

I can’t—

Mr. LOBIONDO. I understand. It is a little frustrating for us just

not to have any—

Rear Admiral BONE. I think what is important is the Strategy,

you know, provides where you need to work and areas of emphasis.

The plan identifies specifically what inter-agency responsibilities

have and what you will see in the plan are many of the efforts that

you already see underway, as well as identification and maybe this

leads to Congressman Andrews’ concerns of the areas where we

know we have more work to do.

I didn’t want to imply that we solved everything and we don’t

have much more to do in the way of screening, in the way of technology, in the way of Maritime Domain Awareness and even in our

tactics, but I can assure you that that plan does identify it and that

the agencies are working collectively on those. We are not waiting

for the approval, no more than the ports didn’t wait for the National Strategy to begin their efforts working to secure the ports.

And I would say the key is the plan is out there. Now, how are we

going to go about executing that plan and those responsibilities?

And I think when you see—when the plan actually comes before

Congress, you will be familiar both with the areas that are being

worked, but also you will be able to identify those gaps and hopefully, then, the same support you have with MTSA on, as the Coast

Guard and CBP and TSA and the other agencies undertake their

efforts to close those gaps.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, as I think maybe Mr. Castle indicated in

one of his statements, we have so many areas of concern for transportation security, but this committee deals with maritime and

with 750 billion or so dollars to the Gross Domestic Product, a lot

of our economy at risk and there are a number of us who have repeatedly said that we are not satisfied with the emphasis that has

been put on maritime anti-terrorism or port security in terms of an
21

overall product delivered. Not that there aren’t many good people

that are working on this, but there is a point at which our patience

wears pretty thin. If we were to ever have an incident, we have to

be able to answer, you know, why we didn’t do something sooner

and we want to give the proper amount of time to allow for a thorough product to be delivered, but there is a limit to that.

Rear Admiral BONE. I understand.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Along a different line, the Maritime Transportation Security Act also requires the development of a long range

vessel tracking system, which many of us believe is extremely crucial. Can you comment or give us the status of negotiation with our

international partners to develop standards and criteria for these

systems?

Rear Admiral BONE. Yes. We are actually hopeful that in May

of this year that IMO will adopt the long range identification tracking system requirements and actually put them into place. And

again, the implementation will be over a period of time as with any

of our regulations, but by the adoption of that, that would allow for

the U.S. government to go forward and institute domestic regulations that match the international standard. And the U.S. is moving forward to have that adopted in May of this year.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay, thank you. Mr. Hatfield, you talked a little

bit about the TWIC card and some of the delays and you explained

some of that. In relation to the TWIC card, can you comment,

will—when this is finally developed and implemented, will a maritime worker who is issued a TWIC card be able to use that card

at all U.S. ports?

Mr. HATFIELD. Let me answer that by first describing the prototype which is really providing us that roadmap for where we go

from here, and in the prototype, interoperability is a key component of that, the ability to grant those privileges, access privileges

to a cardholder so that that individual may access various facilities

and by making sure that that privilege granting authority is defined and is vested in the appropriate hands. So yes to your question, it will be interoperable if it follows the same course as the

prototype and we expect it will, and to when it will be implemented, we are prepared to implement it following the successful

promulgation of the rule, and we are in that process right now.

I would like to say we are further along in that process than we

are, but we are in that process and we are working with due haste

to get the draft cleared out of TSA, present it to the department

so that it can then go to OMB and I think we are hopeful, as you

are, that OMB may be able to do it in less than the allotted 90

days for that first review and we will see how that proceeds. But

I cataloged those steps that are necessary, not that you need me

to explain the process, but a swift execution of each of those steps,

including public comment in our processing and integration of

those comments will get us to the point where we can forward and

implement. And that is important to be compliant with the law.

Mr. LOBIONDO. That is good news. We have had testimony at

previous hearings raising a lot of concern that there are different

requirements at different ports and that this is not necessarily the

TWIC card, but just with overall security requirements, and this

can be very confusing and challenging for folks to understand if
22

they are required to do something at one port but not required to

do it at another port and how does this all come together? We are

hopeful that this can be—we can have some basic standards that

everyone knows they have to adhere to.

Mr. HATFIELD. It will make uniform an important part of this access security. It will still, though, vest that authority and that policy making opportunity to local facility managers to tailor the policies and procedures for accessing their site, but it provides all of

the operators, in its current iteration, the opportunity to have a

common use tool so that they have that interoperability and then

can build their own site-specific plans around that.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Admiral Bone, the Department of

Homeland Security has created several university-based centers of

excellence to study security related matters. Unfortunately, no center of excellence for Maritime Domain Awareness has been put together or established or looked at. I think that is one of the really

critically important issues for the future on an overall total picture.

Would you care to comment on what sort of information and/or

analysis could such a center produce and if the center right here,

let us say at Rutgers, what that might be able to offer to the Coast

Guard?

Rear Admiral BONE. I think that first off, especially in Maritime

Domain Awareness, where we are trying to integrate all technologies, all capabilities, both those current and those future that

are yet to come about, and the integration of sensor technologies,

that an academic forum is a great place in order to provide input

into that process. And just as DHS has identified other centers of

excellence, as you have indicated, MDA would be, I agree, I generally agree that that would be a prime area to look towards, as

well.

I met earlier with a gentleman who has some technology and I

know is going to testify later, or is scheduled to testify later on

radar systems and high frequency systems, HF frequency systems

and we need to look at, again, all systems, all capabilities and that

includes information systems. That includes existing marine exchange systems, you know, why completely replace everything that

is good, that is already in place? Why not best utilize that technology, that capability which exists and I think that with our home

port product, we have an opportunity to do that. Just by example,

in the university where people have fresh minds and some of our

best ideas come out of our lieutenant commanders who come from

graduate school and the lieutenants, we implement internally and

I think it is a great idea.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Do any of my colleagues have any follow-up?

Ms. SCHWARTZ. I just had one or two questions, if I may, thank

you. Just to understand, Admiral, when you said that this card, the

TWIC will have, let me understand, it will have some basic elements that will be consistent across all facilities, all ports, but then

they could add on, each port authority could add on additional elements? Does that mean each card which, as the Chairman said,

would you just be—

Mr. HATFIELD. Let me take another run at that for—

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Yeah.
23

Mr. HATFIELD. —elimination.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Because you said both things, that it was consistent and then you also said that each port could, or each authority

could actually add some of its own elements. Is that adding on elements or is it actually changing it so they won’t be interoperable?

Mr. HATFIELD. No. The card itself is designed and as deployed

in the prototype, was spec’d to contain the complete number of

technologies, a magnetic stripe, a proximity chip, a smart card

chip, to the bar code and a linear bar code. So by having all of

those components, we address the need to be compatible with legacy systems, the existing access control systems that are in these

3200 identified facilities today, but we also provide state-of-the-art

technology going forward so that as they upgrade their systems, as

they—we have spec’d access control systems, by the way, to be

compatible with the highest technology features of that card. So it

can be used today in the most basic mag stripe, just like you run

your credit card through the reader and it can go all the way up

to the great potential offered by the smart card technology. So that

is the range of flexibility we have to be compatible with site-specific

technology and then when I talk about a facility being able to add

privileges so they can say that this truck driver who currently only

goes to Long Beach and San Diego, has got to take a long haul to

Portland, he can be identified and granted privileges to access Portland. Of course, I use the West Coast by default because I am from

Oregon, but I could come up with an analogy for the East Coast,

as well.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Okay. Just so the technology, so it can actually

be used in each of these facilities, it is not adding additional elements or criteria.

Mr. HATFIELD. No, the card architecture is fixed—

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Okay.

Mr. HATFIELD. —but it is designed in a way to provide ultimate

flexibility, again, to make sure it can be used today. We don’t want

to invent the technology of the future and then have to catch up

to it.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you for that clarification. Thank you.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Castle? Mr. Andrews? Admiral Bone, Mr.

Hatfield, I thank you very much. This will conclude the first panel.

We will take a five minute break and let the second panel set and

then we will proceed.

[Recess]

Mr. LOBIONDO. We will now reconvene the hearing and move to

our second panel. We have three panel members who are with us

today. We would like to welcome Lisa Himber, who is the Vice

President of Maritime Exchange for the Delaware River and Bay

Authority; Dr. Scott Glenn from the Institute of Maritime and

Coastal Services at Rutgers University; and William Boles, who is

the Director of Security for the Port of Wilmington. Ms. Himber,

if you would please proceed.
24

TESTIMONY OF LISA HIMBER, VICE PRESIDENT, MARITIME

EXCHANGE FOR THE DELAWARE RIVER AND BAY; DR. SCOTT

GLENN, INSTITUTE OF MARINE AND COASTAL SERVICES,

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY; AND WILLIAM BOLES, DIRECTOR OF

SECURITY, PORT OF WILMINGTON

Ms. HIMBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,

members of Congress. As the chairman said, I am Lisa Himber and

I am Vice President of the local maritime exchange, which is a nonprofit maritime related trade association. In addition, I also serve

as vice chair of the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee and I am a member of the local area maritime security committee. This morning I am going to briefly discuss the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the Transportation Worker Identification Credential and the importance of expanded information sharing between the private and public sectors to improve and enhance

Maritime Domain Awareness.

Let me start by saying that the commercial maritime industry

strongly supports the core concept behind the National Strategy for

Maritime Security, that is, to align Federal security programs into

a comprehensive national effort. Since 9/11 we have made great

strides in protecting our homeland. Certainly, individual port operators have implemented significant improvements and Congress

and DHS agencies have established myriad new programs designed

to mitigate threat. Yet, in many respects the only visible effect of

these efforts is to make it more difficult and costly to process vessels, cargos and crews arriving at U.S. ports.

It is our hope that the National Strategy will bring some focus

into the various individual initiatives. While the NMSAC, as a

committee, did not evaluate the National Strategy for Maritime Security as a whole, members are working to address some of the individual components of the strategy. Currently, for example, we are

working to develop a network of subject matter experts in the various industry sub-sectors of individuals upon whom DHS can call

for advice and guidance. This will help DHS with one of the key

results anticipated by the strategy and that is to assure continuity

of the maritime transportation system in the aftermath of an incident.

However, the primary work of the NMSAC has been undertaken

with regard to the TWIC program. Having been involved in the

program since even before the August 2002 launch of the East

Coast pilot, my organization and its membership is keenly interested in the successful deployment of the TWIC. In addition, the

NMSAC also elected to make TWIC the number one priority on its

agenda in recognition of the national importance of this program.

Last May the NMSAC presented DHS with a full set of recommendations for TWIC implementation.

In the first phase of the TWIC program, and you have heard

about the planning phase, we believe that TSA did everything

right. Yet, in the years—as the years pass, there has only been

slow progress and many participants have become disheartened.

Some have abandoned the program altogether. Though we continue

to believe in the TWIC concept, we are uncertain about its viability

as currently envisioned and as an immediate suggestion, we believe

that TSA and Coast Guard should develop a rule which reflects on-
25

going dialog with its industry partners. We believe it is imperative

that those who work in and around the Nation’s ports and who understand the environment must be involved in the decisions that

are made with respect to the program.

NMSAC has not yet received a response from TSA to the recommendations we presented last spring, however we are expecting

a briefing in the not-too-distant future. In addition to the TWIC,

the National Maritime Security Strategy, the Port Security Grant

Program, presidential directives and other communications have all

highlighted the need for enhanced information sharing as critical

to both incident prevention and response.

Maritime exchanges throughout the U.S. have been concerned

with effective information sharing for nearly 150 years and we

strongly support programs which capitalize on available information to meet a variety of missions. One example is the recent effort

between the Coast Guard and the CBP to simplify electronic crew

and passenger manifesting through a single program which meets

the requirements of both agencies. There are several other opportunities to improve awareness while at the same time reducing costs

for both the private and public sectors. For example, the Coast

Guard and industry can and should work more closely together to

implement a national real-time vessel monitoring program.

Private organizations are also well positioned to help captains of

the port or local CBP port directors add local electronic message

centers, distribution lists and other functionality to existing community information system. This would complement the work that

the Coast Guard has already undertaken on its home port program,

yet would relieve local Coast Guard personnel from administrative

tasks, thereby freeing resources for security, search and rescue, environmental protection and other critical missions.

Other examples include expanded sharing of electronic information moving between public and private sector trading partners. We

believe there are any number of additional opportunities to share

information that is necessary to meet both security and commercial

goals and we look forward to continuing to work with the Coast

Guard and other DHS agencies to explore projects designed to meet

the dual goals of facilitating commerce while at the same time improving homeland security. And I thank you for the opportunity to

speak today and would be happy to answer any questions you may

have.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much. Dr. Glenn.

Mr. GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Castle,

Congressman Andrews, Congresswoman Schwartz for giving me

this opportunity to testify in the potential for Compact High Frequency Radars to contribute to port security through improved

Maritime Domain Awareness. My name is Scott Glenn. I am a professor of Marine and Coastal Sciences at Rutgers University. I have

been involved in the transition of new research technologies to national security applications since the Cold War. Today I will report

on the rapidly expanding technology of Compact High Frequency

Radars. I will briefly summarize what they are, how they could

support Coast Guard missions at present status and what we need

to do to go from here.
26

First, what is a high frequency or HF radar, as they are known?

HF radars operate at very low power in FCC approved windows located between the AM/FM radio bands. Like all radars, when an

antenna transmits a signal, that scatters off of targets and a second antenna receives the scattered signal. By placing the radar

near the salty water’s edge, HF radars take advantage of a radio’s

wave’s ability to travel, as a ground wave, over the horizon and if

they follow the curvature of the earth over the horizon, they can

see targets that are beyond line of sight.

The two main targets for scattering at HF are surface waves and

surface vessels. The larger returns are from the surface waves; we

use those to map surface currents. The smaller returns from the

hard targets are used to map vessel locations. Traditionally, HF radars aim their receivers using long linear rays hundreds or even

thousands of meters long that must be deployed on isolated,

straight flat beaches, a difficult real estate negotiation near most

population centers. Compact HF radars overcome this limitation

using the direction finding ability of circular antenna rays that fit

on a single post.

Today, over 95 percent of the world’s HF radars are the compact

design, manufactured by a U.S. company, CODAR Ocean Sensors.

Okay, how can this technology support the Coast Guard mission?

Networks of Compact HF Radars, deployed onshore or even on

buoys, can increase Maritime Domain Awareness through improved

wide-area vessel surveillance and simultaneous environmental data

collection. Over the horizon, HF radars provide a layered surveillance capability, bridging the coverage gap between line of sight

microwave radars covering the near shore and global satellite systems that cover the open ocean.

Wide-area surveillance systems identify the location of all vessels

within an operational area. By tracking vessel behaviors and comparing this information to the voluntary AIS network, we can improve the targeting of specific vessels for intervention well before

they enter the port. Because intervention requires putting Coast

Guard personnel to sea, up-to-date knowledge of the environmental

conditions are required to minimize risks to safety. In the event of

an incident, real-time environmental data is required to queue response teams for search and rescue efforts and to minimize further

environmental impacts.

Okay, what is the present status of HF radar technology? Rutgers has maintained a continuously operating network of Compact

HF Radars for surface current mapping and wave monitoring since

1999. In test demonstration projects with Rutgers, real-time current maps were shown to improve Coast Guard search and rescue

response and NOAA’s Safe Sanctuary’s oil spill response. Recently,

the administrator of NOAA wrote a letter to the Assistant Commandant in response to the Coast Guard outlining ways in which

the two agencies collaborate in the development of a national HF

radar network. I request that this letter be included in the written

record.

Rutgers and CODAR Ocean Sensors have partnered in similar

demonstration of Compact HF Radars for vessel tracking, conducting and HF—constructing an HF radar test bed at Sandy Hook,

New Jersey. The dual use capability, combined with the lower cost
27

and risk of a distributed network of compact radars that are both

robust to counter-measures, has attracted research funding from

the Office of Naval Research, the Counter NarcoTerrorism Project

Office and the Department of Homeland Security. These projects

have demonstrated the capability and are now focused on testing

hardware enhancements to further improve performance.

Okay, what needs to be done in the next two years to pilot a vessel tracking system? We are at the point where today’s challenges

are shifting towards the integration of existing components into a

real time operational system. A collaborative government/academic/

industry partnership that contributes existing expertise and

leverages existing infrastructure is a proven transition path. These

necessary tasks are readily outlined and known academic and industry groups are available to work on them. International partners, in particular, the Norwegian military, are willing to contribute both money and expertise.

The Coast Guard has been asked by Congress to meet many

needs within two-year timeframes. The best place to address one

of these is Sandy Hook, where Rutgers maintains an active test bed

operated by a collaborative team of the top U.S. experts in this

technology. This test bed has been offering year-round real time, 24

hour-a-day service since 2001 and it is the most extensive test bed

in the world using this latest technology. The Coast Guard is in a

strong position to make this investment and we at Rutgers stand

ready to assemble the team and the technology within a center of

excellence to demonstrate this capability. Thank you.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Dr. Glenn. Mr. Boles.

Mr. BOLES. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. My name is William Boles. I am the Security Manager and

the Facility Security Officer at the Port of Wilmington, Delaware.

In March of 2002, in conjunction with the Maritime Exchange, the

Port of Wilmington volunteered to test the TWIC card. We stated

that we would give the card the full test and we use it as our primary access card, unlike a lot of other facilities. A few months

later, we had an East Coast TSA TWIC Team working with us to

identify a process to develop a secure ID card that would meet legitimate security needs and legitimate maritime needs. Within a

year, the team leader left the project and a whole new team

emerged. In fact, over the past two years it has been a revolving

door of TSA teams. The communication and cooperation that has

always been a part of this project from the first team was no longer

there. In the past two years there was little feedback on our ideas

and suggestions and Port stakeholders were basically left to respond to the decisions made by the TSA.

The second phase of the TWIC card started on July 23, 2003 at

the Port of Wilmington. We evaluated three different technologies,

the magnetic stripe, the linear barcode and a contact version of the

ICC chip. These are described in my written testimony. Over 3,800

technology evaluation TWIC cards were issued at the Port of Wilmington between July 23, 2003 and June 30, 2004.

The stakeholders were originally advised that the TWIC project

would flow from one phase to the next. It didn’t. The Tech Eval

phase officially ended on October 20 of 2003 and a prototype phase

at the Port of Wilmington started on June 1 of 2005. The Port of
28

Wilmington continued to use the Tech Eval, or the technology evaluation phase TWIC card during this 21-month period so our customers, tenants and employees would not have to get an interim

card and then switch back again to the prototype phase card when

that phase started.

The TSA gave us continuing support of the Tech Eval card until

June 30 of 2004, but it ended abruptly. At this point, we were

forced to issue a second type of ID card. We kept using the Tech

Eval phase TWIC card as a main access control card even through

the implementation of our facility’s security plan on July 1, 2004,

in addition to the interim card that we were now issuing and it

numbered about 200 at that point. As you can well imagine, this

caused administrative and access control problems for our port tenants, customers and employees.

On June 1, 2005 the prototype TWIC cards started being issued

at the Port of Wilmington. Actually, enrollment started on that

date. The first problem we had was that our security consultants

couldn’t get useful technical information from the Bearing Point

people, who were assigned to the project by the TSA, about the

TWIC card so we could correct our access control system software

and to make the TWIC card work, and to find the proper readers.

The prototype card issuance went very slowly in the beginning due

to the fact that the card would not work without the readers and

software corrections.

Once the readers were installed, interest began to grow in this

new TWIC card. As of today, well over 1,600 individuals have been

enrolled at the Port of Wilmington. There are also about 100 interoperable TWIC cards that work in our control system. These cards

were created or obtained at the Maritime Exchange or Holt Terminals in Gloucester City, New Jersey.

I would like to close by making a few points. The Port of Wilmington is completely committed to the TWIC card. Notwithstanding the up and downs with our tenants, customers and employees,

we now have a card that works, and everyone at the Port of Wilmington has noticed. We have a card that works in multiple facilities and with multiple levels of security. We can count on the fact

that any TWIC card holder who comes to our gate has been vetted

against a Terrorist Watch List. But with this reality, I would like

to point out what I believe are two missed opportunities by the

TSA in this prototype phase.

Number one is Canadian truck drivers. The Port of Wilmington

is serviced by over 700 Canadian truck drivers from some of the

largest trucking companies in Canada. I see this as a missed opportunity to have this card recognized by Customs and Border Protection at the Canadian border. The other missed opportunity is biometric readers. There is biometric information on the TWIC card

and at the Port of Wilmington they missed a chance to test the biometric features of this card in a seaport setting.

As you see in my testimony, it was a failure with the ICC chip

during the technical evaluation phase after that phase ended and

we see this as a missed opportunity to see what fingerprint readers

would have worked best in this environment.

Finally, my key request is to take this opportunity to appeal for

continued support of this prototype phase TWIC card through the
29

implementation date. This request is not only for the Port of Wilmington, but also for the Maritime Exchange Holt Terminals in

Gloucester City, New Jersey. If you look at the final paragraph of

my written testimony, you will see that the Port of Wilmington and

Holt Terminals are now working together to better utilize this ID

card. As we found out after the Tech Eval TWIC card phase ended,

there may still be lessons learned about this card.

I thank you for the opportunity to speak about the TWIC card

experience at the Port of Wilmington.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Boles. Mr. Castle.

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all for your

testimony. I want to focus on this whole TWIC business a little bit

because it is a little bit disconcerting, and I will start with you, Ms.

Himber, because just reading your testimony, and you also said

this, I think. I don’t know if you said it word for word the same

way, but we believe TSA should develop a rule that involves the

full participation of industry as partners in the process. The draft

of the rule has been completed in the form of NMSAC recommendations. Is that, I mean, that comes from the point of view

of where you come from, to a degree, obviously, but is that your

only concern about this in terms of how to improve TWIC? Are

there other things that you have observed or whatever and this is

from, I guess, your judgment that heck, there is a private sector

here that can help with this, as well, is where you are coming

from?

Ms. HIMBER. Well, the regulatory process is one of the concerns.

There are other concerns regarding the technical and implementation processes. The comment that I made in the document here was

specific to the implementation of the rulemaking. As a pilot location, we put together a working group of Delaware River Port

stakeholders and we were able to provide input and suggestions to

TSA during the course of the pilot program. Concurrent with that

or subsequent to that last year, we, as the National Security Advisory Committee, also worked very diligently to put recommendations on paper that could hopefully begin to start some dialog that

we believed just simply hadn’t happened yet. There are several concerns as far as the implementation of the program that still remain

outstanding that we have not seen answers to.

Mr. Boles mentioned some specifically about how to incorporate

foreign drivers, and I would add to that foreign seafarers, into the

program. We still don’t know whether TSA plans to issue a standard or to manage a program, although the MTSA clearly requires

that they manage a program. We don’t know what the background

check processes will be, the waivers and appeal processes, and we

don’t know whether our workers are going to have to have an employer or other sponsor in order to obtain a card. These are large

questions that we don’t believe have had any dialog. There has

been a lot of one-way communication from industry to TSA, but

these are the types of things that I am referencing.

Mr. CASTLE. You raise a lot of questions. Let me go to Mr. Boles

first and I may come back to both of you. Mr. Boles, sort of the

same question, in a way, in looking at your testimony, I mean,

some of your team leaders left the project, which I didn’t totally understand. I don’t know if it was a negative or just happened or
30

whatever it may be, and then you critique some of the programs

in terms of the bar code, the ICC chip, et cetera, which you seemed

to do fairly well. And then there are some other issues that you

raised in your oral testimony, and then some concerns, I think,

with the providers, the corporate providers and some of the information, the scanners and that kind of thing. What is your view of

where we are with the whole TWIC program at this place? I mean,

my impression is at the end that you feel a lot of these problems

have been straightened out and now we are doing better, but has

this advanced as rapidly as it should? Has everybody in the government and in the private sector been as responsive as they should?

Are we lagging behind? You know, what kind of mark would you

give this after the time that you have dealt with it, because I think

it is an important program and I am concerned that we are not

doing all that we should do, which is—the value of a hearing like

this, maybe you will give us all a list of things we should be going

back and paying attention to?

Mr. BOLES. Yes, I feel that way, exactly. This is an extremely important program; that is why we volunteered to do the work that

needed to be done to get it through. I believe we are about two

years behind with the original implementation date, when we first

got involved in this back in 2002. That had to do with the movement through the TSA and the different team leaders and breakdown in communications and right now—

Mr. CASTLE. I am sorry. You said we are lagging by about two

years at this point?

Mr. BOLES. Yes, from the original implementation date, which

was—I heard it mentioned earlier—was 2003, I believe I was. And

so now we are in 2006 and it looks like we are going to be, from

what I heard now, maybe in 2007 before the actual implementation

comes out. But through all those problems and issues that we have

dealt with, we actually do have a card that works now and we are

testing it and I guess we have different levels of security to it. At

the Port of Wilmington, the card not only works in the main gate—

we have other access points, but it works in our administration

building. We have several different levels of access in our administration building. We have tenants, Chiquita and Dole and it was

Delaware, now Magellan Terminals, who are very interested in this

card because they want to do an access card system for their own

facilities and they just happen to be in the Port of Wilmington, but

they are hesitant to take that step forward to commit to this card

with us because they just don’t know where it is going because of

the lack of the progress for a while there, although they see it moving now. As I said, everyone now sees what it is capable of doing

and they are very much behind it, but they are just waiting to see

what happens as far as our sustainment period and if implementation occurs.

Mr. CASTLE. Is any other country doing this and if they are, are

any of them further along than we are? Can we draw from other

countries or is this just something that is almost unique to the

United States at this point, or are we so far ahead that we are just

the pioneers and you can’t really draw from anybody else?

Mr. BOLES. I understand there is a program somewhat like this

in Canada I have not seen. I speak to a lot of the Canadian truck
31

drivers. I have not seen a card. The only thing I have seen is the

Fast Card and that is where I think we missed a big opportunity.

If you ever seen that Fast Card, the Fast program that Customs

and Border Protection has at the Canadian border, it is basically

a bar code and no photograph or a bunch of information on it,

whereas—

Mr. CASTLE. Do you think we could do this here? Sort of an EZ Pass?

Mr. BOLES. From what I see, this card is capable of doing most

anything.

Mr. CASTLE. Okay. Do you both feel that the whole TWIC program is ultimately worthwhile in that these problems that you

have faced already are starting to be resolved or can be resolved

even with the loss of the two years? Are we going down a blind

alley where people are just going to say this is ridiculous, you

know, why bother, you know, the thing is ineffective; it works here,

it doesn’t work there? I mean, I am a little concerned about the

whole future of it. I don’t mean to lead you to a negative answer

because I—this is a program I want to see work. I want to see it

be positive, but I worry about some of the lags and the concerns

that both of you have expressed.

Mr. BOLES. That is where I have asked the big favor that we continue with the sustainment period because our tenants and customers and the port stakeholders, themselves, if this sustainment

period ends abruptly again, and then we are talking about another

whole year before the actual implementation, it is very likely that

interest will just simply just go away in this card and I don’t know

what could possibly happen. Someone just thinking now we are just

going to go through an implementation that is going to die again,

and that is what we are trying to avoid by continuing to issue this

card and use the card and work with the card.

Gloucester City, apparently, is looking into taking this card and

using the potential of it into their hiring system. We know that

there is a possibility that we can do that with our off-site ILA

Longshoremen of Wilmington. We have our own people pretty

much included, but the ILA, who sometimes works, sometimes

don’t, there are ways that we can address that, and they are the

type of things we look forward to doing once we know for a fact

that this card is going to stay with us.

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you. Ms. Himber, do you have a response to

that?

Ms. HIMBER. Yes, I continue to believe 100 percent in the efficacy

of this program. I think it is the only right answer for the maritime

sector and other transportation modes, potentially, as well. I share

your concerns about the delays. In fact, I have been one of the most

vocal people, I think, to express those concerns at TSA leadership

levels. Having said that, do I think there are some opportunities

to move along more quickly? Yes. And I think that there may be

opportunities, again, with the TSA working with industry to move

it along faster and potentially, even more effectively than might be

the case when they do get to implementation. So yes, I think we

should continue to go down this road. I would hate to see this work

wasted. There are people who have already given up on it, as I

mentioned, the participants in California have said thank you, it
32

was very nice playing, but come back to us when you are ready.

I think that would be a mistake, to abandon it at this point.

Mr. CASTLE. Okay, and I thank the entire panel and I yield back,

Mr. Chairman. I may have to leave before it is all over, so I thank

you.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much for joining us and thank

you for your valuable input.

Mr. CASTLE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. LOBIONDO. We are going to invite you to all our subcommittee meetings.

Mr. CASTLE. I am going to become a member of the subcommittee.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Ms. Schwartz.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. I just appreciated that line of questioning, actually, because I think it is gone so far in this and I think your expression that you feel like this is an important tool for you, is there

anything else you want us to be saying to TSA or other, I mean,

you expressed some of the emotional—and some of the specifics,

but more specifically, you are saying move more quickly, talk to

you? I think that is what we were just saying. I see labor is not

at the table, but I know they had some of the same concerns that

you expressed about appeals process, about who is covered, what

information might be included, but either now or have you written

down very specifically what you might want us to advocate on your

behalf, or do you feel like TSA has not heard that they need to hear

in order for us to get them to move more quickly and be more responsive to your concerns?

Ms. HIMBER. I think, at least from the TWIC program office staff,

TSA has certainly heard our message and I think they understand

and I guess I would second Mr. Bole’s comment, part of the problem is, indeed, the rotating leadership within TSA. I believe that

that is a big, big part of what the delay has been about. There may

have been other reasons, information to which I may not be privy,

so we continue to try to relay the message and the concern and any

voice that could chime in, particularly yours, would be helpful. Yes,

we do need to answer some of these key questions. Yes, we do need

to get the program moving sooner rather than later and we do need

to discuss it with the stakeholders before implementing any regulations.

Mr. BOLES. Just to reiterate, the most important part from my

end is the continuance of the sustainment period. To give you a little idea of how frustrating it can be dealing with TSA sometimes

is we started the sustainment period at the end of September. I remember, like September 30, my TSA—my trusted agent who does

the enrollment for the TWIC card at the facility walked into my office about 4:00 p.m.; she works until 4:30. And she said I just got

told to not come to work anymore and I said this program is going

to be sustained. She goes no, I understand that it is not and if I

come in tomorrow, I won’t get paid. Well, I started making phone

calls, Mr. Schwartz, and quite honestly, when Mr. Schwartz and

other people on the TSA, there is now good contact, good communications going on and I understand the situation that they can be

in sometimes, but she left at 4:30. I was under the impression that

I might not see her again and that the program all of a sudden
33

abruptly stopped again and she called me about 4:50 and told me

that she would be in the next day, that she just got a call from

her—the company that she was working for had called her to say

that everything is okay, it is taken care of and I guess about five

minutes later I got a call from Mr. Schwartz stating that the

sustainment period, the papers had been signed, it was going to actually go on. So it is a very last minute nerve wracking and it is

where our tenants and customers have gotten a little bit frustrated.

I am one of the people that Lisa thinks I am an eternal optimist

and maybe I am. I have taken some bumps and bruises from my

boss because I have supported this program and it has caused some

issues and we would just appreciate if we could—if it was going to

be sustained—we knew pretty well in advance, not half an hour

after the program officially ended that it has been sustained. That

is the type of thing that becomes nerve wracking and I have a

tough time going upstairs and telling my boss that I am not sure

if we are going to have this card tomorrow.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Okay. Maybe that is something that the Chairman might want to consider, some conversation or something—

Mr. LOBIONDO. Would you yield for a second?

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Yes.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Based on what we have heard from the second

panel, we have already made a decision that there will be a series

of follow-up questions to be submitted to TSA in writing with written responses requested, and depending on what those responses

are will depend on the subcommittee’s next action of either quickly

pulling together a full focused hearing or—there are some pretty

disturbing things here, so yes, you are absolutely right, we will be

following up.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Well, you anticipated my request, so that is

great. I think that is a very appropriate action and I fully support

it, so thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses

for their efforts and their testimony. Ms. Himber, on page two of

your testimony, you are talking about difficulties in the practical

applications of some regulations and you say, ‘‘It is clear that many

of the Federal regulations promulgated under various laws or presidential directives are simply unenforceable. The U.S. Customs and

Border Protection requirement that information concerning all persons entering the United States be provided to the agency in an

electronic format not less than 24 hours prior to arrival is an excellent example.’’ What is wrong with that requirement? Why

shouldn’t we know at least 24 hours before someone enters one of

our ports who they are?

Ms. HIMBER. In general, there is nothing wrong with the requirement. Where it becomes problematic, and why I use the word unenforceable, is when you talk about—and then I use the example in

my document of the launch operator or the barge operator who

might be departing a U.S. port going out to a ship for one purpose

or another and then coming back into the United States. They don’t

know 24 hours prior who the crew is going to be. They may not

know until 15 minutes prior to departing the U.S. to ferries. They

won’t know who their passengers are and they may or may not
34

know who the crew members are. So that is one example of where

there needs to be a little bit of tweaking.

Mr. ANDREWS. So perhaps the way to tweak that, and you do

suggest this later in your testimony, is some sort of frequent flyer

program where someone who frequently is involved in such a trip

could be cleared in advance and that person could be on a list of

people who would not have to be given the 24 hour notice.

Ms. HIMBER. Right.

Mr. ANDREWS. That sounds pretty reasonable to me.

Ms. HIMBER. The other concern, and I am not purporting to have

the answer, but CBP is required to screen every person and how

you do that with the pleasure boats, I wouldn’t begin to presume,

but they—or fishing boats or whoever, sightseeing boats, so—

Mr. ANDREWS. That is obviously a different issue and problem,

but I did want to isolate on the shipping industry, itself, though.

So one problem we have identified and isolated is where we have

barge operators or other vessels that make frequent trips in and

out of U.S. waters or out of ports. Are there any other problems

for the shipping industry beside that one? Would this rule?

Ms. HIMBER. With this there are, let me say, ongoing questions.

Most of the problems, since the regulation was promulgated in

April of 2005, we have worked through them. It took some time

and unfortunately, because of the nature of some of the regulations

being promulgated under security, the rule is in place before you

have answered all the questions, so it was difficult, it was challenging, but we did get through it. We are working through some additional concerns, but nothing at this point that anybody would consider show stopping.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I think what we would be interested in is

if any of those questions yield other specific objections, like the one

I think you have already wisely have made about the frequent passengers or frequent flyers. We would like to hear them. And then,

Mr. Chairman, I would ask if in your list of follow-up questions if

you could include a question to the Coast Guard about the possibility of creating an exception—or excuse me, it would not be the

Coast Guard, it would be the CBP—the possibility of creating an

exception to this rule or some kind of modification of the rule, as

Ms. Himber has suggested.

Mr. LOBIONDO. We will ask.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. Dr. Glenn, in

your written testimony you stated that there are dual uses for

CODAR and can you explain what these dual uses are and how

they can be used for the Coast Guard in both the homeland security and in search and rescue?

Mr. GLENN. Dual uses that we presently use them quite extensively for current mapping around the U.S. We have a nice, extensive network off New Jersey. It has been tested by the Coast Guard

and it has been shown to improve their search and rescue capabilities. If we can keep this network operating on something other

than a scientist grant support, the Coast Guard is ready to put

that as a regular tool onto their SAROPS planning tool. That is the

first use and most well-developed use.
35

The other thing that we track with the CODAR systems are the

vessels. This is a very high concern for Counter NarcoTerrorism

and for the Department of Homeland Security and also the Office

of Naval Research. The network is probably going to be in place for

current mapping alone; saving lives, saving livelihoods and protecting the environment is a good enough reason to deploy this network. What we are trying to do at Sandy Hook is feed off of that

network and use it for vessel tracking so we don’t have to install

a second network, so one network does dual use.

Mr. LOBIONDO. What other natural resource management response can be implemented with CODAR?

Mr. GLENN. One of the best examples of that is off the California—State of California just invested $22 million in putting the

CODAR network across the whole State and the big driver for that

was beach protection. The economies of the beach depend on the

beach towns and the State, really, depend on clean beaches, and by

knowing what is in the water and where it is going or if something

washes up on the beach, where it came from, is critical information

to keep the beaches clean and those economies going. And so that

is one of the main uses of the system. The New Jersey Department

of Environmental Protection is also very interested in how this can

be used to look at low-dissolve oxygen off of our coast. It helps

them decide where to sample, when to sample and when to put

boats out. And so just as we do Maritime Domain Awareness for

the Coast Guard, for vessel interdiction, we can do Maritime Domain Awareness for our own environmental groups or scientists,

like myself, or fisheries groups that can then better respond to

what is going on with their more expensive boats.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Low-dissolve oxygen?

Mr. GLENN. If you don’t have a bubbler going in your fish tank

and there is a top on it, eventually all the oxygen goes away and

the fish die. The biggest example of that was in 1976 when there

was a massive fish kill along our entire coast. There are several regions of recurrent low-dissolve oxygen along the New Jersey shelf

and we have to worry about those because they affect mostly the

benthic organisms, the shellfish that can’t swim out of the way.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay, thank you. Ms. Himber and Mr. Boles,

what you had to say about TWIC card was, I think, very helpful

and important. Just to reiterate a little bit, I would like, since you

know we are going to be doing some follow-up, could you just, for

my sake, restate what you believe the top three challenges/problems are and/or questions that we need to focus on getting an answer? What are your top three?

Ms. HIMBER. My first one, of course, is the schedule. I would like

to know why, you know, what is causing the delay and what we

can do between now and implementation to minimize further

delays. The second big question that I would ask and really, it is

several issues lumped into one question, what is the status of the

program as far as will it be government managed? When can we

expect answers? I guess the easiest way to say it is when can we

expect answers to the questions that we have posed regarding the

critical open questions surrounding the program, such as waivers,

background checks and appeals for our nationals in the program?

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Boles?
36

Mr. BOLES. I would add again the sustainment to implementation for Wilmington and Gloucester City and the Maritime Exchange, but also definitely on the background checks. I work pretty

closely with the union leadership and that is an extreme concern

of theirs and in addition to that, as Lisa said, the appeal process

outlined that. And the waiver process, from what I heard, the waiver process in Florida was used to grandfather employees at their

seaports in good standing. I always try to figure out how they eventually came around to grandfathering in most of their employees

and that is how they ended up doing it, I understand.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay, any follow-up from my colleagues? No. One

final question for Ms. Himber. As a member of the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, do you feel the committee is

being utilized in full potential and that its recommendations are

given full consideration by the Department of Homeland Security?

Ms. HIMBER. Yes and no. We did a lot of good work and I think

particularly on the TWIC program. I am, you know, disheartened

that we haven’t gotten a response yet. There have been a couple

of issues that have surfaced on the committee agenda that we are

continuing to explore as possible agenda items. I think the committee will soon be, perhaps, more effective than it is today, but having said that, it has been in operation less than a year. It was

ramped up and we met for the first time in just March of last year,

so I think some of the members are kind of finding their way and

we will put together a list of agenda items that we believe can be

of distinct benefit to the DHS and we look forward to having that

opportunity and getting those kinds of responses to improve the environment under which we all have to operate.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. I want to thank the panel very much. This

was extremely helpful. You can expect to continue to hear from us

and we appreciate and look forward to your continued feedback.

The subcommittee is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65Æ