No. 96-245 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

STACY GENE HALL, 

Defendant and Appellant 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Silver Bow, 

The Honorable James E. Purcell, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Stacy G. Hall, pro se, Deer Lodge, Montana 

Deirdre Caughlan (stand-by counsel), Butte, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Honorable Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; 

Pamela P. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

Brad Newman, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, 

Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: October 31, 1996 

Decided : December 10, 1996 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3 (c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing and West Publishing Companies. 

A jury in the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow 

County, found Stacy Hall guilty of felony escape. He appeals. We 

affirm. Hall raises three issues on appeal. 

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

allowed the State to cross-examine Dr. Peters regarding his opinion 

on mental disease or defect and Hall's capacity to form the 

requisite mental state to commit the offense of escape? 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

rejected Hall's proposed jury instructions? 

3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

instructed the jury on the definitions of purposely and knowingly 

in accordance with § 45-2-103(3), MCA? 

BACKGROUND 

Hall was transferred from prison and placed at the Butte PreRelease Center. On May 8, 1995, while subject to official 

detention, Hall walked away from the Center without authorization. 

Three days later he was arrested and returned to Montana State 

Prison. Hall was charged with escape and pled not guilty. At 

trial, he argued that he suffered from a psychotic episode on the 

day of his alleged escape and did not act purposely or knowingly. 
Hall introduced the testimony of Dr. Bernard Peters, a 

licensed psychologist. Dr. Peters had performed court-ordered 

psychological tests on Hall. On direct examination, Hall questioned Dr. Peters about the results of the tests, which indicated 

that Hall did not suffer from any neuropsychological problems and 

that he was mentally healthy. 

On cross-examination, the State asked Dr. Peters if he had an 

opinion as to whether Hall suffered from mental disease or defect 

in May 1995. Hall objected, arguing that the opinion was for the 

jury to decide. The court overruled Hall's objection and Dr. 

Peters opined that Hall did not suffer from mental disease or 

defect, and that he had the capacity to act with knowledge or 

purpose in May 1995. Hall appeals. 

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

allowed the State to cross-examine Dr. Peters regarding his opinion 

on mental disease or defect and Hall's capacity to form the 

requisite mental state to commit the offense of escape? 

Hall contends that the court abused its discretion when it 

overruled his objection, based on § 46-14-213 (2), MCA, and allowed 

Dr. Peters to answer the question whether Hall suffered from a 

mental disease or defect in May 1995. The State argues that § 46- 

14-213(2), MCA, does not prohibit the State's question. 

The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is whether the 

district court abused its discretion. State v. Gollehon (1993), 

262 Mont. 293, 301, 864 P.2d 1257, 1263. Under § 46-14-102, MCA, 

evidence of a mental disease or defect is admissible to prove 

whether a defendant possessed a state of mind that is an element of 

a charged offense. See State v. Cowan (1993), 260 Mont. 510, 516, 

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861 P.2d 884, 888. Hall called Dr. Peters as a witness and 

introduced testimony concerning the diagnosis from a psychological 

test designed to determine mental disorders. Hall did not ask Dr. 

Peters whether Hall suffered from a mental disease or defect. 

However, Hall raised the possibility to the jury of whether he 

suffered from a mental disease or defect. 

Because Hall raised the issue of his mental state at the time 

of his alleged escape, and centered his defense on that argument, 

the State was entitled to clarify the issue by asking Dr. Peters 

about Hall's mental condition in May 1995. Section 46-14-213 (2), 

MCA, does not prohibit the questions that the State asked Dr. 

Peters. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 

allowed the State to cross-examine Dr. Peters concerning Hall's 

mental disease or defect. 

Hall also argues that the court violated § 46-14-213 (2), MCA, 

when it allowed Dr. Peters to give his opinion as to whether Hall 

possessed the mental capacity to act purposely or knowingly in May 

1995. Hall failed to object to this question. We will not 

consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 

Santos (1995), 273 Mont. 125, 133, 902 P.2d 510, 514-15. 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

rejected Hall's proposed jury instructions? 

Hall argues that the court did not adequately instruct the 

jury on his affirmative defense to escape. The State counters that 

Hall's proposed instruction is not supported by Montana law and 

that the jury was properly instructed on his defense. 
We review jury instructions in a criminal case to determine 

whether the instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly instruct the 

jury on the law applicable to the case. State v. Leyba (l996), 276 

Mont. 45, 51, 915 P.2d 794, 797. District courts have broad 

discretion in formulating jury instructions. State v. Ross (1995), 

269 Mont. 347, 358, 889 P.2d 161, 167. While a defendant is 

entitled to have instructions on his theory of the case, he is not 

entitled to an instruction concerning every nuance of his argument. 

During settlement of jury instructions, Hall submitted 

proposed instruction number 1. It stated: 

It is an affirmative defense that the defendant acted 

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress 

for which there was reasonable explanation or excuse, the 

reasonableness of which shall be determined from the 

viewpoint of a reasonable person in the actor's situation. 

If you find that the defendant acted under the influence 

of extreme mental or emotional stress, then you must find 

him not guilty. 

The State objected to this proposed instruction, arguing that 

it was an improper statement of Montana law. The court sustained 

the objection. Hall then submitted a revised proposed jury 

instruction which stated: 

You are instructed that the defendant is charged with an 

offence [sic] which requires him to have acted with the 

mental state of purposely or knowingly. 

A person is not guilty of the offence [sic] of escape if 

you find that he did not act purposely or knowingly. 

The State objected to the revised proposed instruction because it 

was repetitive. The court sustained the objection. 
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction regarding any 

recognized defense for which there exists sufficient evidence for 

a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Mathews v. United States 

(1988), 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 887, 99 L.Ed.2d 54, 61. In 

Montana, extreme emotional distress is a recognized affirmative 

defense to deliberate homicide and may reduce such a charge to 

mitigated deliberate homicide. See § 45-5-103, MCA. However, a 

defendant's extreme mental or emotional distress is not a recognized affirmative defense to escape. 

Hall argues that the court erred when it refused to give the 

jury his revised proposed jury instruction. A court can refuse 

repetitious jury instructions. State v. Larson (1978), 175 Mont. 

395, 401, 574 P.2d 266, 270. The jury received instructions that 

evidence of a defendant's mental disease or defect is admissible to 

prove that the defendant did not have the state of mind necessary 

to prove an element of the offense with which he was charged. The 

jury was also instructed that the State had to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Hall acted purposely or knowingly. The 

District Court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to 

include Hall's revised proposed jury instructions, the contents of 

which had already been included in two other instructions. 

Hall also argues that because the District Court refused his 

proposed jury instructions, he was denied the ability to present an 

adequate defense. This is inaccurate. Hall argued to the jury 

that he lacked the required mental intent on May 8, 1995, to commit 

the offense of escape due to extreme mental or emotional stress. 
Through his own testimony and that of several witnesses, Hall 

placed his mental state on May 8, 1995, into evidence. The 

District Court fully and accurately instructed the jury on the 

offense of escape and did not prohibit Hall from raising an 

adequate defense. 

3. Did the District Court properly instruct the jury on the 

definitions of purposely and knowingly in accordance with § 45-2- 

103 (3), MCA? 

Hall argues that proposed instruction number 17 was improper 

because it instructed the jury to disregard any state of mind 

requirement and made a mandatory presumption regarding the mental 

state required to prove him guilty of escape. 

The District Court offered proposed instruction number 17 

during settlement of instructions. The proposed instruction 

stated: 

Purpose or knowledge is manifested by the circumstances 

connected with the offense. 

Purpose or knowledge need not be proved by direct 

evidence, but may be inferred from acts, conduct and 

circumstances appearing in evidence. 

Hall objected, claiming that proposed instruction number 17 

requires the jury to ignore state of mind and does not advise that 

purpose or knowledge are required mental intent. The District 

Court overruled Hall's objection. 

In instruction number 14 the jury was instructed that the 

State must prove the element of purposely or knowingly beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Instruction number 7 informed the jury that they 

were to consider all of the instructions as a whole. It was 

unnecessary for the court to accept Hall's proposed instruction 

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number 17 to repeat the language of instruction number 14, which 

already informed the jury that the State must prove all elements of 

the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The jury was properly instructed in conformity with 5 45-2- 

103(3), MCA, which provides, "The existence of a mental state may 

be inferred from the acts of the accused and the facts and 

circumstances connected with the offense." Because mental state is 

rarely susceptible to direct proof, it must usually be inferred 

from the facts testified to by witnesses and the circumstances 

developed by the evidence. State v. Smith (1987), 228 Mont. 258, 

262-63, 742 P.2d 451, 453-54. The District Court did not abuse its 

discretion when it gave instruction numbers 7 and 14 and refused to 

give proposed instruction number 17. 

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm. 

We concur: