Filed 10/ 13/17 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Estate of BETTY LOU O’CONNOR , Deceased.

________________________________

KELLI ANNE PARILLE,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

THOMAS WILLIAM O’CONNOR,

Objector and Appellant. B272085

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP142284 )

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles C ounty, David J. Cowan

, Judge

. Affirmed. Sohaila Sagheb for Objector and Appellant

. Bryan Cave, Edward M. Rosenfeld, Timothy L. Hayes and Aaron B. Ginsburg for Petitioner and Respondent.2 In the last years of her mother’s life, daughter Kelli
Anne Parille visited on a near daily basis, scheduling her
mother’s caregiving and hospital transportation. She also
assis ted with various business affairs, including opening a joint bank account with her mother

. The issue on appeal is one courts have long grappled with

— when an elderly person
with a joint bank account dies, do the funds belong to the decedent’s estate or do they belong to the additional signer

as a co

- owner of the account? Under California law, “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the s urviving party

. . . as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing
evidence of a different intent.” The trial court held that
because there was no clear and conclusive evidence of a contrary intent, the accounts passed as a ma tter of law to Kelli upon her mother’s death. Because the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
BACKGROUND On June 27, 1990, William and Betty Lou O’Connor created the O’Connor Family Trust (OFT). The OFT was
amended in 1992. William and Betty had three children

— Thomas Williams ( Tom ) , Kelli Anne Parille (Kelli) and William Kevin ( Chip )

— who were equal residual beneficiaries
of the OFT if they survived the surviving spouse

. William
died in 1994. Ch ip died in 2004. 1 On August 1, 2 006, Betty

1 Although this date is not in the record on appeal, it is also not in dispute.3

created the Betty Lou O’ Connor Trust (BLOT). Tom, Kelli, and Chip’s two children are equal resi dual beneficiaries of
the BLOT. Betty died in 2012. Until her dea th, Betty remained
Trustee o f the OFT and BLOT. Upon Betty’s death, Annette
Gomez became the Successor Trustee of the OFT and John Weitkamp became the Successor Truste e of the B LOT. Weitkamp was also the Executor of Betty’s estate. Gomez signed and prepared Betty’ s federal estate tax return using
IRS f orm 706, while Weitkamp signed and filed the f orm 706. When Gomez became Successor Trustee of the OFT, she asked Kelli to disclose all the accounts belonging to Betty. According to Gomez, Kelli told her that Betty’s estate
included two W ells Fargo accou nts

— accounts that had been opened in October 2008 and contained approximately $477,21 8 at the time of Betty’s death. 2 Tom contends that the Wells Fargo accounts are BLOT

assets. According to Kelli, however, the accounts do not belong to the BLOT

. Instea d, they were Betty and Kelli’s joint accounts while Betty was alive and now belonged entirely to Kelli as the joint owner with right of survivorship.
The sole issue on appeal is whether Betty intended to create joint accounts with the right of survivorship in favor of Kelli when she opened the accounts, thus exempting the asset
from the BLOT.

2 As discussed below, Kelli denies she disavowed her ownership interest in the Wells Fargo accounts.4 Kelli saw her mother Betty five to six times a week during the last several years of Betty’s life. She organiz ed Betty’s life, scheduling Betty’ s caregiving and hospital transportation. Betty opened t he Wells Fargo accounts while Kelli was assisting Betty with various business affairs. According to Kelli, Betty asked Kelli to meet her at the bank to open the accounts and “put my name on it wi th her.” Kelli
testified she signed the signature card with Betty and Betty indicated the money in the accounts was for Kelli’s use. Kelli maintained she had “ complete access ” to the two

accounts. Although Wells Fargo could not find a signed signature car d for the accounts

, it did find an unsigned

consumer acc ount application and legal name change request for the accounts

. 3 The consumer account application expressly listed Betty the primary joint owner of the
accounts and Kelli the secondary joint owner. Kelli later
submitted a d eclaration stating that she had signed, and had witnessed Betty signing, th e consumer account application.
T he trial court ultimately declined to find that Betty and Kelli had sign ed signature cards when open ing the Wells Fargo ac counts. Nevertheless, the court did find that the accounts were joint accounts and that, upon Betty’s

3 According to Wells Fargo, the opening of the accounts indicated that Betty and Kelli’s signatures must have been collected at one point in time. The lega l name change request simply corrected the spelling of Betty’s last name from “O’Conner” to “O’Connor”5

death, the funds in the accounts were owned by Kelli. 4 In short, the court determined, “[t]here being no clear and conclusive evidence of a contrary int ent, on the death of Betty Lou O’Connor said accounts passed as a matter of la w to Kelli [O’Connor] Parille.” According to Tom, the trial court erred in granting Kelli’s petition se eking ownership of the accounts because: (1) there are no executed docume nts reflecting Betty’s intent to create joint accounts with the right of survivorship in favor of Kelli and a joint account cannot be created orally; and (2) none of the un signed documents produced by Wells Fargo indicate the creation of a joint account wi th the right of survivorship.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We r eview questions of law de novo. ( County of Yolo v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4 th 1242,
1248 .) However, “ [w] hen the trial court has resolved a

4 The trial court initially ordered that the funds be deposited in an interest

- bearing, federally insured blocked account. The order was interlineated to state: “Nothing herein is intended as a determination of the rightful ownership of the funds.” The trial court subsequently entered a stipulated order releasing the funds from the blocked account to BLOT Trustee, John Weitkamp with directions to dis tribute under the terms of the BLOT (1/3 to Kelli, 1/3 to Tom and 1/3 to Chip’s two children). The order provided that “nothing in this Order shall prevent

. . . Kelli

. . . from bringing a Petition seeking full ownership of the

. . . funds.”6

disputed factual issue, the appellate courts review the ruling according to the substantial ev idence rule. If the trial court’ s resolution of the factual issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed.” ( Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4 th 6 24, 632 .) In applying the substantial evidence standard of review, “ ‘the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the findings below. [C itation.] We must therefore review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this court.” ( Jessup
Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 .)

“ ‘ Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of
solid value. [Citati ons.] ‘Substantial evidence . . . is not

synon y mous with “any” evidence.’ . . . [Citations.] The focus is on the quality, rather than the quantity, of the evidence.” ( Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App. 4th 634,
651 .) “It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact.” ( Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App. 4th 621, 630.) Consequently , we do not evaluate the credibility of the
witness es

. ( Lenk v. Total

– Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App. 4th 959, 968 .) Rather, “we defer to the trier of fact
on issues of credibilit y.” ( I bi d .)7 “ Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence this court is without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the absence of a rule of law specifyi ng the
inference to be drawn

. ” ( Howard v. Owens Corning

, supra , 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 631 .)
The substantial evidence stan dard applies to both express and implied findings of fact made by the superior court in its statement of decision rendered after a nonjury
trial. (See Michael U. v. Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792

– 793 [implied findings].) The doctrine of implied findi ngs provides that a “party must state any objection to the statement in order to avoid an implied finding on appeal in favor of the prevailing party . . . [I]f a party does not bring
such deficiencies to the trial court’ s attention, that party
waives the r ight to claim on appeal that the statement was
deficient . . . and hence the appellate court will imply
fin dings to support the judgment.” ( In re Marriage of
Arceneaux (1 990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133

– 1134, fn. omitted.) Alternatively stated , the doctrine (1) directs the appellate court to presume that the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgme nt as long

as substantial evidence supports those findings and (2) applies unless the omissions and ambiguities in the
statement of decision are brought to the attention of the superi or court in a timely manner. ( In re Marriage of8

Arceneaux

, supra , 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133

– 1134 ; see Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The
Rutter Gr oup 20 16 ) ¶ 8: 57 , p. 8

– 2 8.)
D ISCUSSION
I. Applicable Statutes The first law in California concerning joint tenancy assets was Civil Code section 683, which was enacted in
1872 and read as foll ows: “ ‘ A joint interest is one owned by several persons in equal shares, by a title create d by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants. ’ ” ( Denigan v. San
Francisco Sav

. Union ( 189 9) 127 Cal. 142, 149.) I nitially,
Civ il Code section 683 was applied to cases concerning bank accounts, real property, and other types of personal property. ( See Denigan

, at p. 142 [ bank account ] ; Estate of Harris (1915) 169 Cal. 725 [ bank account, stock certificates, promissory note ]

, Siberell v. Siberell (1932 ) 214 Cal. 767 [ real property ] .) In 1935, secti on 683 was amended by adding the following s entence: “ A joint tenancy in personal property may be created by a written transfer, instrument or agreement. ” Before the 1935 amendment , joint tenancies in personal property could be created by both oral and written agreements. After the 1935 amendment, joint tenancies
could be created only by a writing. ( California Trust Co. v.
Bennett (1949) 33 Cal.2d 694. 696

– 697.) Up until July 1,

1 990, section 683 was the sole statutory authority governing9

the character and ownership of funds on deposit in joint tenancy bank accounts. 5
In 1990

, however, t he California Multiple

- Party Accounts Law (CAMPAL) , Probate Code section 5100 et seq.,
became the governing statute for such accounts. ( Lee v. Yang ( 2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 481, 489.) Under CAMPAL,

m ultiple party accounts include joint accounts. (Prob. Code, § 5132, subd. (a).) “ ‘Joint account’ means an account payable on request to one or more of two or more parties whether or not mention is made of any right of survivorship.” (Prob. Code, § 5130.) Checking accounts, savings accounts, and certificates of deposit all come within
the CAMPAL definition of “account.” 6 (Prob. Code, § 5122,

5 Neverthele ss, in the decades following the enactment of section 683, application of the statute to joint tenancy bank accounts had been undercut by cases holding that no writing was required, and that parol evidence was allowed to show the intent of the parties and the realities of ownership of the account. (See Estate of Brasz ( 1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 691, 697

– 698; Manti v. Gunari ( 1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 442, 453. )

6 Concomitantly, Civil Code section 68 3 was amended to provide that the statute did not apply to jo int accounts under CAMPAL. (Civ. Code, § 683, subd. (b).) In other words, application of section 683 to CAMPAL accounts was

now specifically prohibited. Subsequent cases have confirmed the application of CAMPAL to the exclusion of section 683. (See, e. g., Estate of Casti g lioni (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 367, 383

– 384.) Indeed, since 1990, no reported cases have applied section 683 to bank accounts. Thus,10

subd. (a).) “ Words in substantially the following form in a signature card, passbook, contract, or instrument evidencing an account, or words to t he same effect

, ” can create a joint

account if “ e xecuted before, on, or after July 1, 1990 ”

— “ This account or certificate is owned by the named parties. Upon the death of any of them, owner ship passes to the survivor(s) .” (Prob. Code

, § 5203, subd. (a).) However, u se of the form la nguage is not necessa ry to create a joint account under CAMPAL

. “ If the contract of deposit creates substantially the same relationship between the parties as an account created using the form language provided in this section, this part applies to the same extent
as if the f

orm language had been used. ” (Prob. Code

, § 5203, subd. (b).) Notably , “an account payable on request to one or more of two or more parties is treated as a joint account under this part even though no mention is made of any right of survivorship unless the terms of the account or deposit agreement otherwise provide. ” ( Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering ’ s Ann. Prob. Code (200 4 ed. ) foll. § 5 30 2
, p. 624
, italics added.) 7 Finally, s urvivorship inte rests in multiple

- party accounts are governed by section 5302, which reads in

Tom’s reliance on, and repeated citations to, this particular
statute is misleading and inapposite.

7 Th e California Law Revision Commission’s official
comments are entitled to substa ntial weight when interpreting a statute. ( See HLC Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 62.)11

relevant part: “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party . . . as against the estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent.” ( Prob. Code

, § 5302, subd. (a)

. ) No writing is required to create this right.

“ The right under this part of a surviving party to a joint

account . . . to the sums on deposit on the death of a party t o a multiple

- party account shall not be denied, abridged, or affected because such right has not been created by a writing
executed in accordance with the laws of this state prescribing the requirements to effect a valid testamentary disposition of propert y. ” (Prob. Code

, § 5304.) Furthermore, section 5302, subdivision (a), “ creates a right of survivorship in a joint account whether or not the account is described as a ‘joint tenancy’ or mentions any right of survivorship. ” ( Cal.
Law Revision Com. c om. , Deering’s Ann. Prob. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 5302 , p. 624
, italics added.) As noted above,

t he right of survivorship created by subdivision (a) may be
rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence of a different
intent. 8 (

I bi d .)

8 “This strengthen[ed] survivorship rights, since under prior l aw the presumption of survivorship arising from the joint tenancy form of the account could be overcome by only

a preponderance of the evidence. ” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Prob. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 5302,

p. 624, italics added.)12

II. Substantial Evidenc e Supports the Tria l Court The issue on appeal is one courts have long grappled
with

— w hen an elderly per son with a joint bank account dies, do the funds belong to the decedent’ s estate or do they belong to the additional signer as a co

- owner of the accoun t?
In hundreds of reported cases, courts have been require d to determine a bank depositor’ s intent at the time the depositor

o pened the joint account or added an additional signer to an already

- existing account. (See Ann

. , Deposit of Fund Belonging to Depositor in Bank Account in Name of Himself
and Another (1994) 149 A.L.R. 879, 880

– 8 81 .) In such cases, “ [t] he heirs or beneficiaries contend that the bank account belongs to them because the decedent only wanted someone to be available to sign in emerg encies and did not intend the additional signer to receive the account at
death. These parties urge the court to ignore the express or implied survivorship feature of the bank account and
distribute the funds according to the decedent’ s will or trust,

or according to state intestacy statutes. On the other hand, the additional signer claims ownership as surviving joint

tenant. Because the funds automatically belong to the survivor under the rules of joint tenancy, no funds from the

accoun t exist to pass t o the decedent’ s estate. ” ( Gregory Eddington, Survivorship Rights in Joint Bank Accounts: A Misbegotten Presumption of Intent , 15 Marquette Elder’ s Advisor 175 , 176 (2014) (hereinafter Surviorship Rights)

. )

“ The most common rul e is that funds remaining i n a ‘joint account’ belong to the survivor, absent clear and13

convincing evidence of the deceased depositor’ s contrary intent. ” ( Surviorship Rights, supra , 15 Marquette Elder’ s Advisor at p. 195.) As discussed above, California follows
this rule. ( Id. at p. 195, fn. 81.) However, as commentators
have noted, “ Presuming that the depositor intends survivorship rights ignores the plausible alternative r easons for opening the account.” ( Id. at p. 196.) “ This presumptio n of survivorship rights is inconsis tent with the analogy to
wills formalities because the bank account formalities are not convincing indications of intent to transmit property at
death. ” ( Id. at p p. 196

– 197.) Nevertheless, “[a] s in other types of cases requiring clear and convincing evid ence, the presumption is difficult to overcome. ” ( Id. at p. 197.) Here, the trial court found that the presumption of survivorship rights had not been overcome

. Given that there was no clear and conclusive evidence of a contrary intent,
the court held that the accounts had passed as a matter of law to Kelli upon Betty’s death. Th e trial court’s finding is

sup ported by substantial evidence. As noted above, Betty opened the Wells Fargo accounts while Kelli assisted Betty
with various busi ness affairs. Betty indicated to Kelli that the money in the two accounts was for K elli’s use and Kelli had complete access to the accounts. Wells Fargo confirmed
that both Betty and Kelli had “withdrawal rights” on the

accounts. The consumer account application listed Betty as the primary joint owner of the accounts and Kelli as the secondary joint owner. Kelli said she had signed, and had witnessed Betty signing, the consumer account application.14

A Wells Fargo officer authentic ated the unsig ned copy of the application. On appeal, Tom points to contradictory statements
made b y Kelli regarding ownership of the accounts

, specifically pointing to comments Kelli allegedly made during preparation of IRS f orm 706

. Form 706 , the “Fed eral Estate Tax Return,” specifically asks whether t he decedent owned any property as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship at the time of death

. The f orm 706 that Annette Gomez prepared afte r Betty’s death answered this question in the negative

. Later i n the f orm 706, Gomez
stated that Kelli “did not claim any share of ownership” of the two Wells Fargo accounts. Kelli disputes this portion of the chronology. According to Kelli, Gomez had a sked Kelli for permission to access the accounts for tax purposes after Betty died. Kelli told Gomez at that time : “You know, th e se accounts are mine. I’m going to give you limited access to this to do what you need to do.” Gomez said she understood. Kelli later changed the account pas swords so that Gomez could no longer access the accounts. 9

9 Be tty and Kelli also jointly held two Bank of the West accounts. According to the form 706, Kelli “did not claim any share of ownership” of these accounts either. Kelli later testified this statement was accurate, unlike her purported disclaimer of the Wel ls Fargo accounts. According to Kelli, the Bank of the West accounts consisted entirely of “business funds” and was “not [her] money.” Conversely, the Wells Fargo accounts were for Betty’s and Kelli’s use and “were never used for business purposes.” Thu s, according to Kelli,15 In short, Tom claims that Kelli had no expectation of receiving the money in the Wells Fargo accounts

— and thus disclaimed any ownership int erest in the accounts when
Gomez prepared the f

orm 706

— un til Wells Fargo told Kelli (after the form had been mailed) that the funds belonged to
her. It was then that Kelli changed the passwords on the

account s

. In other words, Betty never told Kelli that the money belonged to her

— only Wells Fargo did so after Betty’s
death

. As noted above , Kelli contends that she informed
Gomez the accounts belonged to her before the f orm 706 was prepared. Furthermore , Gomez herself later downplayed
Kelli’s alleged verbal disclaimer, stating it “was not a relinquishment of [K elli’s] rights to the account because she did not disclaim the account in writing within nine months of [Betty’s] death, or deliver a written disclaimer to the
bank.” 10 Indeed, Gomez subsequently contacted Wells Fargo

Betty did not intend that Kelli have survivorship rights in the Bank of the West accounts. Consequently, Kelli sent Weitkamp, the BLOT Trustee, the proceeds of the
accounts

— approximately $267,000.

10 Gomez cited Probate Code sections 278, 279 and 280 in support of this determination. Section 278 provides that a disclaimer must be in writing and signed by the disclaimant. It must also identify the creator of the interest, describe the interest to be disclaimed, and state the disclaim er and the extent of the disclaimer. Section 279 provides that a disclaimer must be filed “ within a reasonable time after the person able to disclaim acquires knowledge of the interest .” (Prob. Code, § 279, subd. (a).) With respect to a n interest16

and confirmed that the two accounts we re held in joint tenancy and that, upon Betty’s death, the accounts
“automatic ally belonged solely” to Kelli. Moreover, it is not our role to re weigh th e evidence proffered during th is particular factual dispute or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. T hat is the province of the
trier of fact. ( Howard v. Owens Corning , supra, 72 Cal.App. 4th at p p. 6 30

– 63 1 .) In addition, we note that even if Betty did not expressly inform Kell i that the accounts would belong to Kelli after Betty’s death, this would not change the legal analysis. Under California law, the presumption is that “[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving

create d by surviving th e death of another joint tenant, “a disclaimer is conclusively presumed to have been filed within a reasonable time if it is filed within nine months after the death of the creator of the interest or within nine months after the interest b ecomes indefeasibly vested, whichever occurs later.” (Prob. Code, § 279, subd. (b), (b)(6).) Section 280 provides that a disclaimer must be filed with any of the following: “(1) The superior court in the county where the decedent’s estate is administere d or, if there is no administration of the decedent’s estate, the superior court in any county where administration of the decedent’s estate would be proper. [¶] (2) The trustee, personal representative, other fiduciary, or person responsible for distrib uting the interest to the beneficiary. [¶] (3) Any other person having custody or possession of or legal title to the interest. [or] [¶] (4) The creator of the interest.” (Prob. Code, § 280, subd. (a)(1)

- (4).)17

party .

. . as against the estate of the decedent

. ” ( Prob. Code

, § 5302, subd. (a)

. ) In order to rebut the presumption, Tom had to present clear and convincing evidence of a different
intent. ( Ibid .) As the trial court determined, Betty’s
purport ed silence on the matter did not satisfy this exacting
standard. 11
III. Other Issues on Appeal
A. Admission of Unsigned Documents
Tom also contends the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by admitting the consumer account application and legal name change request into
evidence. Specifically, Tom claims that the unsigned
documents were no t properly authenticated, were without foundation, and were hearsay. 12 “ ‘An abuse of discretion

11 Indeed, “c lear and convincing” evidenc e requires a finding of high probability. This standard is not n ew. More than 100 years ago, we described such a test as requiring that the evidence be “ ‘so clear as to leave no substantial doubt’; ‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating

asse nt of every reasonable mind.’ ” ( Sheehan v. Sullivan (18 99) 126 Cal. 189, 193 .) Tom’s declaration that Betty commonly titled accounts in her children’s names as a matter of convenience, rather than a method of passing ownership, was either not credited by the trial court at all or was insufficient to rebut the presumption of ownersh ip. Once again, we defer to the trier of fact on iss ues of credibility. ( Lenk v. Total

– Western, Inc.

, supra , 89 Cal.App. 4th at p. 968 .)

12 Tom also contends that the documents “failed to contain any information from which it would be gleaned that18

occurs “where, considering all the relevant circumst ances, the court has exceeded the bounds of reason or it can fairly be said that no judge would reasonably make the same order
und er the same circumstances.’ ” ( In re Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893, 898

– 899.) We presume that the
trial court order is correct, and imply findings that are

nec essary to support the judgment. ( Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.)
Tom’s hearsay claim is without merit. Under the
business record exception to the hearsay rule

, “[ e ] vidence of a writing mad e as a record of an act, condition, or event is

not made inadmissible by the

. . . rule when offered to prove the act, condition, or event if : [¶] (a) T he writing was made in the regular course of a business; [¶] (b) T he writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; [¶] (c) T he custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation; [ and ] [¶] (d) the sources of information and method and time of prepara tion
were such as t o indicate its trustworthiness. ” (Evid. Code

, § 1271, subd. (a)

- (d).)

Betty in tended to create joint accounts with the right of survivorship in favor of Kelli.” However, as discussed above, the very fact that these were joint accounts created the presumption of this right under California law. ( Prob. Code, § 5302, subd. (a)

. ) Ind eed, Probate Code section 5302, subdivision (a), creates a right of survivorship in a joint
account whether or not the account mentions any right of survivorship. (Prob. Code, § 5302, Cal. Law Revision Com. com.)19 A trial court has wide discretion in determining whether a qualified witness possesses sufficient personal
kn owledge of the identity and mode of preparation of
docum ents for purposes of the business records exception. ( Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991) 234
Cal.A pp.3d 769, 797 & fn. 28 .) Indeed , “any ‘qualified
witness’ who is knowledgeable about the documents may lay
the foundation for introduction of bus iness records

— the witness need not be the custodian or the person who created
the record. ” ( Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App. 4th 301,
324 .) Thus, a qualified witness need not be the custodian, the person who created the record, or one with personal
kno wledge in order for a business record to be admissible under the hearsay exception

. (See id. at p. 322; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 243, p. 1108.) Furthermore, “bank statements prepared in the regular course of banking business and in accordance with banking regulations ar e in a different category than the ordinary business and financial records of a private enterprise .” (

People v. Dorsey (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 953, 960.) Consequently

, even if mistakes are made in the entries on bank statements, “ such matters may be developed on

cross

- examination and should not affect the admissibility of
the statement itself.” ( Id. at p. 961.) Here, Wells Fargo Assistant Branch Manager Gabriel
Vallarta testified that the bank had pulled the records on the two accounts and that although it could not locate a signed signature card, it was Wells Fargo’s practice to collect20

signatures before an account could be opened. Furthermore, Vallarta noted, “ [ t ] here are situations in which we can make an exception to open the account as long as we do collect those signatures at a future date.” In this instance, the opening of Betty and Kelli’s joint account indicated that “ the signatures had to have been collected at one point in time .” In addition, Kelli stated she and Betty both signed the consumer account application

, a document that was dated October 1, 2008

— five years before Betty’s death

. 13 Given this quantum of evidence, we cannot say that the trial court
“exceeded the bounds o f reason” in admitting the documents
into evidence or that “ no judge would reasonably make the
same order und er the same circumstances.” ( See In re Marriage of Bower

, supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p p . 898

– 899.)

13 We also note that even if the applicatio n was missing in its entirety, “[t]he content of a writing may be proved by otherwise admissible secondary evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 1521, subd. (a).) Indeed, oral testimony regarding the

c ontent of a writing is admissible “ if the proponent does not have possession or control of a copy of the writing and the original is lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent of the evidence. ” (Evid. Code, § 1523, subd. (b).) To that end, courts have admitted a standard form of the lost document. (See Kenniff v. Caulfield (1903) 140 Cal. 34 [blank form used in drafting lost deed] ; see also Rogers v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1132, 1137 [lost or destroyed document may be shown by an unsigned copy or oral evidence] .)21 B. Creation of Joint Accounts Probate Code section 5203, subdivision (a), requires an
executed writing. As noted by Tom, subdivision (b) of the

statute does not abrogate this req uirement, but rather permits a contract of deposit to be substituted for the other types of writing identif ied in subdivision (a) which can be used to create a joint account with the right of survivorship.
Given that the trial court expressly found that the accounts were joint accounts, which belonged to Kelli upon Betty’s death, the trial court must have impl iedly found that Betty and Kelli signed the consumer account application . Tom did not object to this portion of the trial court’s ruling. Thus, Tom cannot appeal these particular findings here. (See In re Marriage of Arceneaux , supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 11 38.)
Tom next contends that even if the consumer account application had been signed, Kelli would not have been
entitled to the accounts ’ funds because a joi nt account held by multiple parties is presumed to be a tenan cy in common
rather than a joint acco unt with the right of survivorship.
As discussed in detail above, this is not the law in California

. Therefore

, Betty did not need to explicitly designate the joint

account s as joint account s with the right of survivorship in order for Kelli to receive this right. (See Prob. Code

, § § 5203, subd. (b)

, 5302, subd. (a).) As noted above, the consumer account application listed Betty as the primary joint owner and Kelli as the22

secondary joint own er of the accounts. 14 Betty indicated the money in the accounts was for Kelli’s use and Kelli had “complete access” to the two accounts. Wells Fargo confirmed that both Betty and Kelli had “withdrawal rights”
on the accounts. Because the consumer account application
created substantially the same relationship between the parties as an account created using the form language

, section 5203 applies to the same extent as if the form lang uage had been used. (See Prob. Code

, § 5203, subd. (b).)
C. Betty’s Co urse of Conduct
Tom contends that had Betty wanted to make a devise to Kelli, it would not have been through “vague documents created by the bank.” Rather, Betty , as a sophisticated businessperson, wo uld have made a specific devise through the BLOT, as s he did for other beneficiaries. Furthermore, Tom claims, had Betty intended to gift the funds in the accounts to Kelli, she would have told her so, and
transferred the funds to Kelli while still alive

. As the trial court determined, “ [s] uc h a speculative possibility falls short

o f clear and convincing evidence” of a contrary intent. ( Copp
v. Paxton (1 996) 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 847.)

14 Tom claims that the consumer account application contains “[t]he mere word ‘owner’ ”

— thus creating a tenancy in common

— when the application clearly lists Betty and Kelli as joint owners.23 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

.

JOHNSON, J.

We concur:

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

LUI, J.