NIST Special Publication 1190 

Community Resilience Planning Guide 

for Buildings and Infrastructure 

Systems 

Volume I 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190v1

May 2016 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Penny Pritzker, Secretary 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology 

and Director 
Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems - Volume I

Contributors

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Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems - Volume I

Contributors

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Disclaimer No. 1

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document to describe an experimental 

procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or 

equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

Disclaimer No. 2

The policy of NIST is to use the International System of Units (SI) in all publications. In this document, however, 

units are presented in the system prevalent in the relevant discipline, although in some cases more than one system 

of units may be presented.

Copyright

This NIST publication is a work of the United States Government not subject to copyright protection within the 

United States under Title 17 United States Code § 105. This publication may include copyrighted content (such as 

photographs) used with permission of the credited copyright holder. Reproduction, redistribution or reuse of such 

copyrighted content apart from this publication may require permission, which should be sought from the credited 

copyright holder. Where no copyright holder or source is credited for a figure or table in this publication, the source 

is NIST, which would appreciate attribution.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1190-1

114 pages (May 2016)

CODEN: NSPUE2

This Publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1190v1
Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems - Volume I

Contributors

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Contributors

NIST

David Butry

Steve Cauffman

Stanley Gilbert 

Erica Kuligowski

Therese McAllister

Nancy McNabb

Doug Thomas

Applied Research Associates (ARA), Inc. – Prime Contractor

Ryan Anthony

Jessica Colopy 

Bill Judge 

Frank Lavelle

David Mizzen

Janet MacKenzie 

Sebastian Penedo 

Peter Vickery

NIST Disaster Resilience Fellows

Don Ballantyne (Ballantyne Consulting)

Erich Gunther (EnerNex)

Joe Englot (HNTB)

George Huff (The Continuity Project)

Stuart McCafferty (GridIntellect)

Kevin Morley (American Water Works 

Association)

Chris Poland (Chris D. Poland Consulting Engineer)

Steve Poupos (AT&T)

Liesel Ritchie (University of Colorado at Boulder)

Jay Wilson (Clackamas County, OR Office of 

Emergency Management)

Ted Zoli (HNTB)

Contractor Team

Erin Ashley (AECOM)

Andrew Cairns (AECOM)

Chris Chafee (AECOM)

Jay Doyle (AECOM)

Mat Heyman (Impresa Management Solutions)

Alan Klindworth (AECOM)

Jeffrey Kotcamp (TRC Solutions)

Lauren O‘Donnell (TRC Solutions)

Robert Pekelnicky (Degenkolb Engineers)

Nick Rubino (AECOM)

Kathy Schaefer (AECOM)

Larry Studdiforf (AECOM)

Adrienne Sheldon (AECOM)

Scott Tezak (TRC Solutions)

Simon Van Leeuwen (TRC Solutions)

Kent Yu (SEFT Consulting)

Voluntary Contributors

Jim Castagna (Verizon)

Robert Jakubek (US Cellular)

Rosemary Leffler (AT&T)

Alexis Kwasinski (University of Pittsburgh)

John Plodinec (CARRI)

Jim Shortal (Cox Communications)
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Revision History

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Revision History

Version Release Date Updated

SP 1190 October 2015 Initial Release

SP 1190-1 May 2016 Correction of typographic and formatting errors
Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems - Volume I

Table of Contents

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary...................................................................................................................................... 1

1. Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 9

1.1. Overview ................................................................................................................................... 9

1.2. Defining Communities............................................................................................................ 11

1.3. Community Resilience ............................................................................................................ 13

1.4. Community Resilience and the Built Environment................................................................. 13

1.5. Developing a Plan for Community Resilience ........................................................................ 15

1.6. Other Federal Guidance Supporting Community Resilience .................................................. 19

1.6.1. National Preparedness Goal ....................................................................................... 19

1.6.2. National Preparedness System ................................................................................... 21

1.6.3. National Infrastructure Protection Plan...................................................................... 21

1.6.4. Disaster Mitigation Assessment ................................................................................. 21

1.6.5. Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment............................................. 22

1.7. Other Community Resilience Guidance.................................................................................. 22

1.8. Guide Scope and Limitations.................................................................................................. 23

1.9. References............................................................................................................................... 24

2. Step 1: Form a Collaborative Planning Team................................................................................ 26

2.1. References............................................................................................................................... 31

3. Step 2: Understand the Situation.................................................................................................... 32

3.1. Identify and Characterize the Social Dimensions ................................................................... 32

3.2. Characterize the Built Environment ........................................................................................ 34

3.3. Link Social Dimensions to the Built Environment.................................................................. 36

4. Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives ....................................................................................... 37

4.1. Goals for Community Resilience ............................................................................................ 37

4.1.1. Establish Long-Term Community Goals ................................................................... 37

4.1.2. Establish Desired Performance Goals........................................................................ 38

4.1.3. Define Community Hazards and Levels..................................................................... 41

4.1.4. Determine Anticipated Performance .......................................................................... 46

4.1.5. Summarize the Results............................................................................................... 46

4.2. References............................................................................................................................... 47

5. Step 4: Plan Development.............................................................................................................. 49

5.1. Evaluate Gaps Between Desired and Anticipated Performance.............................................. 49

5.2. Identify Potential Solutions to Address Gaps.......................................................................... 49

5.2.1. Potential Administrative Solutions............................................................................. 50

5.2.2. Potential Construction Solutions................................................................................ 50

5.3. Prioritize Potential Solutions and Develop Implementation Strategy ..................................... 51
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5.4. References............................................................................................................................... 52

6. Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval........................................................................... 53

References............................................................................................................................................ 54

7. Step 6: Plan Implementation and Maintenance.............................................................................. 55

References............................................................................................................................................ 56

8. Future Directions ........................................................................................................................... 57

8.1. Feedback on the Guide ............................................................................................................ 57

8.2. Community Resilience Panel for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems................................. 57

9. Community Resilience Planning Example – Riverbend, USA...................................................... 58

9.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 58

9.2. Step 1: Form a Collaborative Planning Team (Chapter 2)...................................................... 59

9.3. Step 2: Understand the Situation (Chapter 3).......................................................................... 61

9.3.1. Identify and Characterize the Social Dimensions (Section 3.1)................................. 62

9.3.2. Characterize Built Environment (Section 3.2) ........................................................... 64

9.3.3. Link Social Dimensions and the Built Environment (Section 3.3) ............................ 66

9.4. Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives (Chapter 4).............................................................. 70

9.4.1. Establish Long-Term Community Goals (Section 4.1.1)........................................... 70

9.4.2. Establish Desired Performance Goals for the Built Environment (Section 

4.1.2)........................................................................................................................... 71

9.4.3. Define Community Hazards and Hazard Levels (Section 4.1.3) ............................... 73

9.4.4. Determine Anticipated Performance (Section 4.1.4) ................................................. 75

9.4.5. Summarize the Results (Section 4.1.5)....................................................................... 82

9.4.6. Repeat Process for Each Hazard Type and Level ...................................................... 83

9.5. Step 4: Plan Development (Chapter 5 of the Guide)............................................................... 83

9.6. Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval (Chapter 6)................................................. 86

9.7. Step 6: Plan Implementation and Maintenance (Chapter 7).................................................... 87

9.8. Looking Forward..................................................................................................................... 87

9.9. Supplemental Information: Routine Earthquake Performance Goals Tables.......................... 88

9.10. Supplemental Information: Extreme Flood Performance Goals Tables.................................. 95

Glossary .................................................................................................................................................... 102

List of Terms...................................................................................................................................... 102

List of Acronyms................................................................................................................................ 106

References.......................................................................................................................................... 114
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List of Figures

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List of Figures

Figure ES-1: Downtown Cedar Rapids, Iowa, during the 2008 floods [Source: FEMA 2009].................... 2

Figure ES-2: Cedar Rapids, Iowa Resilience Plan [adapted and redrawn, Cedar Rapids 2014] .................. 3

Figure ES-3: Six-step planning process for community resilience ............................................................... 4

Figure 1-1: Six-step planning process for community resilience................................................................ 10

Figure 1-2: The Community Capitals Framework [adapted and redrawn, Flora et al, 2008]..................... 11

Figure 1-3: The social functions of a community define the functional requirements of a 

community‘s buildings and infrastructure systems........................................................................ 12

Figure 1-4: Resilience can be expressed simply, in terms of system functionality and the time to

recover functionality following a disruptive hazard event [McAllister 2013]............................... 14

Figure 1-5: Community resilience planning initiatives............................................................................... 23

Figure 2-1: Levels of government and organization (adapted from John Plodinec [CARRI 2013])......... 26

Figure 2-2: Examples of community resilience activities with strong community engagement ................ 27

Figure 4-1: National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) recovery continuum [FEMA 2011] ........... 38

Figure 9-1: Riverbend, USA planning team and stakeholder task groups.................................................. 59
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List of Tables

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List of Tables

Table ES-1: Planning steps and key activities for community resilience ..................................................... 8

Table 1-1: System condition at the time of the hazard event affects the degree of damage and lost 

functionality................................................................................................................................... 14

Table 1-2: Planning steps for community resilience................................................................................... 17

Table 1-3: Core capabilities. The core capabilities indicated in bold/italic type below directly 

relate to the Guide content and guidance....................................................................................... 20

Table 1-4: NIPP Critical Infrastructure Sectors.......................................................................................... 21

Table 2-1: Examples of local government stakeholders who could be included in planning team ............ 29

Table 2-2: Examples of business and service professionals who could be included on planning 

team................................................................................................................................................ 30

Table 2-3: Examples of community and volunteer organizations that could be included on 

planning team................................................................................................................................. 31

Table 4-1: Performance level definitions for building clusters................................................................... 39

Table 4-2: Sample assignment of building clusters by functional category and recovery phases.............. 40

Table 4-3: Functionality levels for building clusters .................................................................................. 40

Table 4-4: Hazard levels for buildings and facilities.................................................................................. 43

Table 4-5: SPUR [2009] seismic hazard level definitions.......................................................................... 44

Table 4-6: Affected area and anticipated community disruption level ....................................................... 45

Table 4-7: Examples of hazard impacts...................................................................................................... 45

Table 9-1: Riverbend, USA government leaders and community stakeholders......................................... 60

Table 9-2: Social Dimensions Task Group by social institution................................................................. 61

Table 9-3: Employment for Riverbend, USA ............................................................................................. 62

Table 9-4: Riverbend, USA population demographics............................................................................... 63

Table 9-5: Building occupancy class and building count ........................................................................... 65

Table 9-6: Links between Riverbend‘s social institutions and transportation systems............................... 67

Table 9-7: Links between Riverbend‘s social institutions and buildings.................................................... 68

Table 9-8: Riverbend, USA building clusters grouped by functional category and recovery phases......... 70

Table 9-9: Summary of resilience tables for routine, design, and extreme events...................................... 72

Table 9-10: Hazards considered by Riverbend, USA................................................................................. 74

Table 9-11: Riverbend, USA building performance goals for design earthquake ...................................... 76

Table 9-12: Riverbend, USA transportation infrastructure performance goals for design 

earthquake...................................................................................................................................... 77

Table 9-13: Riverbend, USA energy infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake .................. 78

Table 9-14: Riverbend, USA water infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake .................... 79
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Table 9-15: Riverbend, USA wastewater infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake ........... 80

Table 9-16: Riverbend, USA communications infrastructure performance goals for design 

earthquake...................................................................................................................................... 81

Table 9-17: Riverbend, USA summary resilience table of performance goals for design 

earthquake...................................................................................................................................... 82

Table 9-18: Riverbend, USA buildings performance goals for routine earthquake.................................... 88

Table 9-19: Riverbend, USA transportation infrastructure performance goals for routine 

earthquake...................................................................................................................................... 89

Table 9-20: Riverbend, USA energy infrastructure performance goals for routine earthquake ................. 90

Table 9-21: Riverbend, USA water infrastructure performance goals for routine earthquake ................... 91

Table 9-22: Riverbend, USA wastewater infrastructure performance goals for routine earthquake .......... 92

Table 9-23: Riverbend, USA communications performance goals for routine earthquake ........................ 93

Table 9-24: Riverbend, USA summary resilience table of performance goals for routine 

earthquake...................................................................................................................................... 94

Table 9-25: Riverbend, USA building performance goals for extreme flood............................................. 95

Table 9-26: Riverbend, USA transportation infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood ............. 96

Table 9-27: Riverbend, USA energy infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood......................... 97

Table 9-28: Riverbend, USA water infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood........................... 98

Table 9-29: Riverbend, USA wastewater infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood.................. 99

Table 9-30: Riverbend, USA communications infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood ....... 100

Table 9-31: Riverbend, USA summary resilience table of performance goals for extreme flood............ 101
Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems - Volume I

Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

Community Resilience: The Big Picture. In the United States, there are always communities working to 

recover from a disaster. Although communities cannot stop natural hazards and have only limited ability 

to prevent technological and human-caused hazards, they can minimize disastrous consequences. 

The extent of recovery and the ultimate outcome depend upon the nature and severity of the event and the 

community‘s preparedness to prevent incidents, mitigate risk, protect assets, respond in a timely and 

coordinated way, and recover community functions. Together, these measures determine the community‘s 

resilience. 

This Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems (Guide) has been 

developed to help communities address these challenges through a practical approach that takes into 

account community social goals and their dependencies on the ―built environment‖ – buildings and 

infrastructure systems.

The Guide recognizes that most 

communities have limited resources to 

devote to resilience-related actions and 

that improving resilience is a process that 

likely will be achieved over many years. 

The Guide‘s six-step planning process 

provides a way to align priorities and 

resources with community goals to jumpstart or boost the community resilience 

process. The Guide can help communities 

build back better in ways that reflect their unique cultures, conditions, and capabilities.

Community Resilience Goals and this Guide. Community resilience, which spans activities ranging from 

preparing for hazard events, risk mitigation, and post-event recovery, should be proactive, continuous, 

and integrated into other community goals and plans. Traditional activities, such as disaster preparedness

will help and are part of resilience planning when they include prevention, protection, mitigation, 

response, and recovery.

Some communities are well on their way to achieving resilience. These communities incorporate

continuity planning, risk management, and long-term community resilience goals. But many others can 

do more to improve their resilience to hazards by incorporating more comprehensive and purposeful

planning that engages a broad set of stakeholders.

The National Preparedness Goal, developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 

response to a Presidential Policy Directive, envisions ―a secure and resilient nation with the capabilities 

required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from 

the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk‖ [FEMA 2015a]. The Guide supports that goal by 

addressing the role buildings and infrastructure systems play in assuring the health and vitality of the 

social and economic fabric of the community.

Resilience planning and actions do not happen overnight and should be part of a comprehensive, 

thoughtful process. The Guide offers a six-step planning process for local governments, the logical 

conveners, to bring stakeholders together and incorporate resilience into their short- and long-term 

planning. This process will enable communities to improve their resilience over time in a way that is cost

effective and consistent with their development goals.

Community resilience is the ability of a community to 

 Prepare for anticipated hazards

 Adapt to changing conditions

 Withstand and recover rapidly from 

disruptions
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Executive Summary

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Having a plan in place and undertaking steps to improve resilience before a hazard strikes increases the 

ability of communities to recover quickly in a way that better prepares them for future events. Even if an 

extreme event occurs, a resilient community likely will experience reduced disruption and recovery time.

Communities that do not prepare well are more likely to be overwhelmed when hazard events strike. 

Communities are often not prepared to recover from hazard events, as evidenced by the number of 

Presidential Disaster Declarations each year [FEMA 2011a]. Poor performance may result from aging 

infrastructure, dependencies between physical systems, poor siting, or lack of maintenance. Truly 

transformative planning for resilience is often assigned a low priority unless a recent event grabs

community interest. Even then, communities tend to focus on restoration to previous conditions and 

capacities rather than building back better.

Some communities have taken significant steps 

to develop, implement, and update their plans to 

improve resilience. Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for 

example, developed and exercised an evacuation 

plan for dealing with a potential incident at an 

upstream nuclear power plant. Cedar Rapids 

executed that plan during 2008 flooding, when 

the Cedar River crested well above its predicted 

500-year flood level (Figure ES-1). No lives 

were lost, despite the tremendous economic 

damage. 

Realizing the benefit and importance of 

resilience planning, in the following four months 

the City Council and City Manager instituted a 

community engagement process and developed a 

broader Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, being 

implemented today, that is receiving national 

recognition. Figure ES-2 shows a community 

plan with floodways, levees, floodwalls, and dams to improve the resilience of the community to flood 

events. That plan aims to improve overall quality of life within the community, including resilience to 

flooding events. Communities with a vision for growth, stability, and resilience encourage economic 

development, as Cedar Rapids has, even as they recover from a disaster. 

The Community Resilience Planning Guide: How can it help? While more and more organizations –

domestic and international, public and private – are promoting community resilience to lower disaster 

tolls, transforming this important concept to practice remains a work in progress. Working with public 

and private stakeholders, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed this 

voluntary Guide as a component of the President‘s Climate Action Plan. It offers a process for 

communities to incorporate short- and long-term measures to enhance resilience. 

This Guide helps connect good ideas and constructive actions for long-term community prosperity. In 

addressing the how of resilience, the Guide is a tool that will help communities unify disaster risk 

management, emergency response planning, and long-term community and economic development 

planning.

Figure ES-1: Downtown Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 

during the 2008 floods [Source: FEMA 2009]
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Executive Summary

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Figure ES-2: Cedar Rapids, Iowa Resilience Plan [adapted and redrawn, Cedar Rapids 2014] 

The Guide describes a six-step planning process that helps communities develop customized resilience 

plans by bringing together all relevant stakeholders, establishing community-level performance goals, and 

developing and implementing plans to become more resilient. This approach focuses on the roles 

buildings and physical infrastructure systems play in assuring social functions resume when needed after 

a hazard event. (Social functions include government, business, healthcare, education, community 

services, religion, culture, and media communications.) If a catastrophic event does occur, resilience 

planning encourages and enables the community to have plans in place to recover and rebuild in a 

thoughtful way. Such plans include coordinating with nearby communities as well as with state, regional, 

and federal agencies. 

The Guide can help a community take specific actions:

 Build on, broaden, bridge, and integrate its current plans (e.g., economic, emergency 

preparedness, land use) with community resilience plans, particularly for the built environment. 

 Identify risks, priorities, and pre- and post-event costs, including the consequences of not taking 

certain actions.

 Prioritize resilience actions for buildings and infrastructure systems, based on the specific hazards 

the community is most likely to face and the importance of these buildings and infrastructure 

systems in supporting key social functions.
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Executive Summary

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How do resilience plans fit in with other 

community plans? Many disaster plans are not 

well integrated with other community plans, 

including the community‘s comprehensive 

general plan or the emergency operations plan. 

Planning for resilience can and should build on 

other community plans that are already in place. 

A general plan addresses the long-range goals 

and objectives for the local government;

emergency operations plans prepare the 

community response to emergencies. An 

integrated community-level resilience plan 

seamlessly incorporates steps for disaster 

preparedness and recovery actions that will help 

them to be resilient. Communities should ensure 

that resilience is a common goal for all of their 

planning.

Incorporating resilience planning as a common 

goal usually will involve adding specific 

performance goals for buildings and 

infrastructure systems, and much more. It

requires detailed input and development by a 

broad cross section of leaders and stakeholders, 

both public and private. It calls for

understanding the community‘s social, political, 

and economic systems, and an understanding of 

how they are supported by the built 

environment. What are their vulnerabilities?

How will damage to buildings and infrastructure 

systems impact community recovery? For 

buildings and infrastructure systems, which may 

be either publicly or privately owned and 

operated, understanding their exposure to 

prevalent hazards, and their anticipated

performance or possible improvement, is key. 

Who should lead? Who should be involved? 

Community resilience should be championed by 

a planning team that provides leadership and 

engages public, non-profit, and private 

stakeholders, along with the broader community 

throughout the process (Figure ES-3). Much of 

the building stock and infrastructure systems, 

particularly in the energy and communication

sectors, are privately owned, so stakeholder 

collaboration is essential to successful planning. 

The local government is the logical convener for 

coordinating interests related to community 

resilience because it is responsible for 

implementing community building codes, 

Figure ES-3: Six-step planning process for 

community resilience
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Executive Summary

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statutes, and community plans, and can collaborate and coordinate with other entities. Many of the 

successful community resilience efforts to date have been led by a community official who works with a 

resilience team, established by the local government that collaborates with other public, non-profit, and 

private entities. Working groups with representative stakeholders and subject matter experts develop 

recommendations. A dedicated community resilience office, with a leading official who has supporting 

staff, can provide strong and consistent leadership. But every community has different capabilities and 

resources, and each should approach this process in a way that fits best within its style and means. In all 

cases, community leadership buy-in and community stakeholder engagement are vital.

How does this Guide link a community’s social needs to its built environment? In the context of this 

Guide, communities are places (such as towns, cities, or counties), designated by geographical 

boundaries, that function under the jurisdiction of a governance structure. It is within these places that 

most people live, work, find security, and feel a sense of belonging so they can grow and prosper. All 

communities have social institutions to support the needs of individuals and households. They include 

family, economic, government, health, education, community service, religious, cultural, and media 

organizations. 

Users of the Guide will assess their social 

institutions and built environment, focusing on 

their role and importance in community 

resilience. Understanding how a community‘s 

people, social institutions, and needs depend on 

the built environment is key. When considering a 

community‘s institutions and its reliance on the 

built environment, it is important to consider the 

vulnerabilities and needs of all segments of the 

population. Using this Guide, resilience planners 

will identify how people in their communities 

depend on buildings and infrastructure systems to 

support community recovery. They will establish 

goals to sequence the recovery of functions after 

a hazard event. 

The built environment can suffer significant 

damage during a hazard event. Depending on the 

event‘s severity, many people could be illprepared to manage on their own, especially for 

an extended period of time. To support vital social needs, such as emergency response and 

acute/emergency healthcare, communities need to determine in advance which buildings and 

infrastructure systems are most essential and must be functional during and immediately after a hazard

event. They also need to determine if and how the rest of the built environment can return to functionality 

in the subsequent days, weeks, and months of recovery. 

Determining Community Resilience Goals and Objectives. Communities should establish long-term 

resilience goals to guide resilience planning, prioritize activities, and develop implementation strategies. 

For example, a community may wish to develop improved infrastructure to attract new business. Or, it

may want to increase social well-being by redeveloping a floodplain to become a community park, while 

also providing natural protection from flooding. With long-term community resilience goals identified, 

communities can identify related performance goals for those buildings and physical infrastructure 

systems that are relied upon for important social services.

One key question that this Guide prompts and helps community leaders to answer is, ―When do the 

buildings and infrastructure systems that support each social institution need to be restored before 

Examples of how community members depend on 

the built environment:

 The need for housing and healthcare is 

universal. 

 Children need school buildings.

 Neighborhoods need retail districts. 

 Businesses need suitable facilities, 

functioning supply chains, delivery 

networks, and a workforce that is readily 

available. 

 Everyone needs a transportation network, 

electricity, fuel, water, wastewater 

systems, and communication/information 

access. 
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Executive Summary

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adversely affecting the community‘s longer-term ability to serve its members?‖ The Guide assists in 

determining the desired time and sequence for restoring community functions. 

To determine how the community‘s built environment would fare, planners need to estimate the 

anticipated performance of the community‘s existing buildings and infrastructure systems for the most 

likely hazards. Many communities may have identified prevailing hazards when developing plans for 

natural hazard mitigation, emergency operations, continuity of operations, or Threat and Hazard 

Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA).

This Guide encourages communities to use three 

hazard levels – routine, design, and extreme – to

address a range of potential damage and 

consequences. Evaluation of these three hazard 

levels help communities to develop 

comprehensive resilience plans. When codes do 

not define design hazard levels (e.g., wildfire or 

tornadoes), the community may establish a 

hazard level or scenario based on available 

guidance. A community‘s resilience plan should 

be anchored around the design event, but routine 

and extreme events also should be evaluated to 

ensure that the community is planning 

comprehensively for a range of possibilities.

The difference between the built environment‘s 

anticipated performance today and its desired performance in the future constitute the critical gaps in 

performance. Those gaps, then, guide development of solutions and strategies to meet long-term 

community goals and specific desired performance goals for the built environment. Simply identifying 

those gaps is an important outcome for users of this Guide. 

Determining feasible, effective solutions to fill those gaps is critical. This Guide encourages considering

administrative options, like incorporating resilience principles into other community plans (e.g., land use 

planning and mutual aid agreements). Such options frequently cost less and often can be put into place 

more quickly than construction options, which take longer to implement but can be equally important.

Once they identify, evaluate, and recommend potential solutions, users of this Guide will prepare a formal 

community resilience plan based on the information gathered by the planning team and present that plan 

for review and discussion by stakeholders and the community. When it is finalized and approved, the 

resilience plan should be put into action, reviewed periodically, and maintained.

Community Resilience in Six Steps: Figure ES-3 summarizes the six basic planning steps recommended 

by this Guide, with additional detail available in Table ES-1. Volume I further develops these six basic 

planning steps and other key activities. The Community Resilience Planning Example in Chapter 9

(Volume I) provides an example of community planning in Riverbend, USA, a fictional city that uses the 

Guide. That example walks through each of the six steps and illustrates how communities can effectively 

use the Guide. Volume II presents supporting information and resources regarding the social dimensions 

of resilience and dependencies between and among buildings and infrastructure systems (e.g., energy 

systems, transportation systems, communication systems, and water and wastewater systems).

Essential ingredients: time, commitment, and engagement. Improving community resilience takes time 

to plan and implement and for benefits to accrue – sometimes decades. Because priorities differ from one 

community to another, resilience should be addressed at varying levels of detail to suit the size, 

capability, and uniqueness of each community. However, resilience also is furthered when communities 

cooperate with neighboring and regional jurisdictions, especially when services are shared. 

Three hazard levels used in this Guide:

 Routine hazard events are more frequent, 

less consequential events that should not 

cause significant damage.

 Design hazard events are used to design 

structures; design loads are specified in 

building codes for many natural hazards. 

 Extreme events may also be defined in 

building codes for some hazards; they are 

the most likely to cause extensive 

damage. 
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Executive Summary

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Above all, identifying goals and objectives and achieving community resilience requires initiative and 

support from community leadership; broad community engagement that includes focus and persistence; 

and a willingness of public and private stakeholders to assess candidly the interplay of hazard events, 

social institutions, governance, economics, and the community‘s buildings and infrastructure systems. 

This Guide offers a practical way forward for community leaders. They should review this approach with 

potential stakeholders – and then take action. Simply beginning the process will advance a community‘s 

understanding of its situation, what is possible, and how its resilience can be improved.
Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems - Volume I

Executive Summary

8

Table ES-1: Planning steps and key activities for community resilience

Planning Steps Key Activities

1. Form a 

Collaborative 

Planning Team

(Chapter 2)

 Identify resilience leader for the community 

 Identify team members and their roles and responsibilities

 Identify key public and private stakeholders for all phases of planning and 

implementation 

2. Understand the 

Situation 

(Chapter 3)

 Social Dimensions –

 Identify and characterize functions and dependencies of social institutions, including 

business, industry, and financial systems, based on individual/social needs met by 

these institutions and social assets and vulnerabilities

 Identify how social functions are supported by the built environment

 Identify key contacts and representatives for evaluation, coordination, and decision 

making activities

 Built Environment –

 Identify and characterize buildings and infrastructure systems, including condition, 

location, and dependencies between and among systems 

 Identify key contacts/representatives for evaluation, coordination, and decision 

making activities

 Identify existing plans to be coordinated with the resilience plan

 Link social functions to the supporting built environment

 Define building clusters and supporting infrastructure

3. Determine 

Goals and 

Objectives 

(Chapter 4)

 Establish long-term community goals 

 Establish desired recovery performance goals for the built environment at the community 

level based on social needs, and dependencies and cascading effects between systems

 Define community hazards and levels 

 Determine anticipated performance during and after a hazard event to support social 

functions

 Summarize the results

4. Plan

Development

(Chapter 5)

 Evaluate gaps between the desired and anticipated performance of the built environment 

to improve community resilience and summarize results 

 Identify solutions to address gaps including both administrative and construction options

 Prioritize solutions and develop an implementation strategy

5. Plan 

Preparation, 

Review, and 

Approval

(Chapter 6)

 Document the community plan and implementation strategy

 Obtain feedback and approval from stakeholders and community 

 Finalize and approve the plan

6. Plan 

Implementation

and 

Maintenance

(Chapter 7)

 Execute approved administrative and construction solutions 

 Evaluate and update on a periodic basis 

 Modify short or long-term implementation strategy to achieve performance goals as

needed
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1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

All communities face hazard events. Across the nation, communities experience disruptions from 

weather, infrastructure failures, cyber-attacks, technological accidents, environmental changes, and other 

hazards. Hazard events become actual disasters when communities experience extensive disruption in 

basic functions, when lives and livelihoods are in jeopardy, and when recovery requires a long period of 

time.

Depending on the magnitude and duration of the recovery, communities may face consequences ranging 

from temporary interruptions in services to loss of jobs, and businesses. Residents may need to relocate, 

and precious assets can be lost. That is why strengthening community resilience is so important. 

Community resilience is the ability to prepare for anticipated hazards, adapt to changing conditions, and 

withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Activities, such as disaster preparedness – which includes 

prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery – are key steps to resilience. But many 

communities can do more, especially by focusing on the ingredients necessary for recovery. 

The National Preparedness Goal [FEMA 2015a] developed by Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) envisions ―a secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole 

community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that 

pose the greatest risk.‖ This Guide supports that goal by addressing the role buildings and infrastructure 

systems play in assuring the health and vitality of the social and economic fabric of the community. It 

offers a six-step planning process for local governments, who are the logical conveners, to bring 

stakeholders together and incorporate resilience into their short- and long-term planning. This will enable 

communities to improve their resilience over time in a way that is cost effective and consistent with their 

development goals. 

Having a plan in place before a potential disaster strikes increases the ability of communities to move 

quickly in a way that better prepares them for future events. Even if an extreme event occurs, a resilient 

community likely will experience reduced disruption and recovery time. There are other benefits of 

resilience planning: communities with well-developed resilience plans are more likely to be more 

attractive to employers and residents alike. These communities can increase their ability to achieve

broader goals of economic development and social advancement that improve the quality of life. And,

they are more likely to use hazard events as an opportunity to build back better.

Resilient communities demonstrate common characteristics: community leaders‘ commitment to 

resilience, continual improvements in preparedness and response to threats and disruptions, a 

collaborative approach, and appreciation of internal and external dependencies. Many of these 

communities employ risk management, business continuity methods, and other management practices that 

enable them to be adaptable and flexible when confronting changing conditions.

This Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems (Guide) helps 

communities determine customized resilience goals based on the long-term community goals and the

corresponding performance goals for buildings and infrastructure systems. Resilience plans that follow 

this Guide are based on a community-level assessment of social needs and functions supported by the 

built environment. These social functions are fundamental. They include government, economics, health, 

education, community services, religion, culture, and media. The built environment includes buildings 

and infrastructure systems, such as energy, communication, water and wastewater, and transportation 

systems. Buildings and infrastructure systems are vital to social functions and to a community‘s overall

prosperity and health. If these systems fail or are damaged, essential services can be interrupted over a 
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wide geographic area. This Guide helps 

communities plan how to rapidly prioritize and

restore civil and social functions. 

While all disaster preparedness steps (prevention, 

protection, mitigation, response, and recovery)

must be addressed to achieve community 

resilience, this Guide primarily focuses on 

planning for recovery of community functions, 

for which there is less published guidance. The 

Guide does not repeat the guidance already 

available on prevention, protection, mitigation, 

and response activities, all of which are part of 

resilience planning and activities. Instead, the 

Guide provides a step-by-step planning process

that helps communities understand issues relating 

to community-level damage and, especially, to 

prioritize recovery planning. In essence, the 

recovery process completes resilience planning, 

and informs other preparedness steps. For 

instance, when comparing alternative mitigation 

strategies, evaluating recovery plans associated 

with each mitigation strategy provides a more 

informed basis for selecting an approach.

Communities can and should integrate resilience 

into their long-term community planning process. 

A resilient community can also offer day-to-day 

community benefits by reducing daily disruptions 

through improved planning, design, and 

construction practices. Even if it is many years 

before a hazard event occurs, implementing the 

community‘s resilience plan can continue to 

improve the performance of its buildings and 

infrastructure systems and improve its 

attractiveness as a place to work and live.

The Guide helps communities prioritize 

improvements to buildings and infrastructure 

systems based on the role of these structures in 

supporting social institutions‘ functions during 

recovery. The Guide addresses infrastructure 

dependencies and the cascading effects of system 

failures. It is organized around six planning steps

(Figure 1-1) outlined in the Comprehensive 

Preparedness Guide [FEMA 2010] and associated 

key activities:

1. Form a collaborative planning team

2. Understand the situation

3. Determine goals and objectives

Figure 1-1: Six-step planning process for 

community resilience
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4. Plan development

5. Plan preparation, review, and approval

6. Plan implementation and maintenance

Community planning for resilience of the built environment needs input from all stakeholders, including 

local government offices for community development, emergency response, social services, public works, 

and buildings. Other government agencies with facilities or infrastructure, as well as public and private 

developers, owners and operators of buildings and infrastructure systems, should be involved, as should

representatives of local business and industry along with social organizations. Where communities are 

already working on aspects of planning to achieve resilience (e.g., land use planning, long-term economic 

development, mitigation, building inspections, or emergency management), these efforts should be 

understood and coordinated with the overall planning effort.

When all interests and needs are addressed in a comprehensive plan at the community level, a transparent, 

supportable path forward can emerge with consensus support. Resources can then be allocated based on

community-wide goals and priorities.

1.2. Defining Communities

The National Preparedness Goal asserts that ―Individual and community preparedness is fundamental to 

our success.‖ There are varying definitions of community. In this Guide, community refers to a place 

designated by geographical boundaries that functions under the jurisdiction of a governance structure, 

such as a town, city, or county. It is within these places that most people live, work, play, and build their

futures. Each community has its own identity based on location, history, leadership, population, and 

available resources. Successful communities provide its members with the means to meet essential needs 

and to pursue their interests and aspirations. 

Communities are highly diverse in terms of geography and populations. They range from small, rural 

communities to large, dense, urban communities. Communities have different histories, cultures, social 

make-up, businesses, and access to and availability of resources. They also are subject to varying hazards,

and have different degrees of risk tolerance. An effective community resilience plan will be customized 

and take into account each of these factors.

Communities can identify and describe their resources and assets as capital. This approach is based on

The Community Capitals Framework (Figure 1-2): financial (economic), built (physical), political, social, 

human, cultural, and natural. These forms of capital are interrelated and give each community its unique 

character. 

Figure 1-2: The Community Capitals Framework [adapted and redrawn, Flora et al, 2008]
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Community capitals can be classified into the following categories [Ritchie and Gill 2011]:

 Financial. Financial savings, income, investments, and available credit at the community-level

 Built. Buildings and infrastructure systems within a community

 Political. Access to resources and the ability/power to influence their distribution; also, the ability 

to engage external entities in efforts to achieve goals

 Social. Social networks, associations, and the trust they generate among groups and individuals 

within the community

 Human. Knowledge, skills, health, and physical ability of community members 

 Cultural. Language, symbols, mannerisms, attitudes, competencies, and orientations of local 

community members/groups

 Natural. Resources, such as air, land, water, minerals, oil, and the overall stability of ecosystems

Knowledge about each type of capital contributes to understanding the community‘s capacity for 

resilience planning and investments. All capacities can provide important inputs and resources from 

which to draw.

While all types of capital are important to each community, this Guide focuses primarily on built capital 

(i.e., buildings and infrastructure systems), with a strong emphasis on how built capital supports other 

capitals within a community, especially social capital. Social capital has the potential to contribute to 

resilience by enhancing sense of belonging and strengthening bonds between individuals and groups 

within communities. The needs of community members and social institutions – including government, 

industry, business, education, and health – help define functional requirements for a community‘s 

buildings and infrastructure systems (Figure 1-3). For instance, after a significant event, can residents 

remain in their homes? Can governments communicate with residents to inform them and support 

recovery efforts? Can businesses and factories resume operations within a reasonable period? These types 

of social needs determine the performance expected from a community‘s buildings and infrastructure 

systems. 

Figure 1-3: The social functions of a community define the functional requirements of a community’s

buildings and infrastructure systems.

For communities to function and prosper, they need buildings and infrastructure systems that are 

operational. When buildings and infrastructure systems are damaged, social services frequently are 

interrupted, economic losses soar, and resources must be re-allocated to repair and rebuild. When damage 
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is extensive, the recovery process can be a significant drain on local residents and their resources, and 

may be drawn out over years. Sometimes, full recovery is not possible.

1.3. Community Resilience

The term resilience is used in many ways by community stakeholders. Presidential Policy Directive 

(PPD)-8 [2011] defines resilience as ―the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and 

rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies.‖ PPD-21 [2013] expanded the definition to ―the 

ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and to withstand and recover rapidly from 

disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or 

naturally occurring threats or incidents.‖ Disaster refers to ―a serious disruption of the functioning of a 

community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which 

exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources‖ [National 

Science and Technology Council 2005]. Under these definitions, resilience includes activities already 

conducted by some communities as a part of disaster preparedness. 

In the context of this Guide, the phrase ―prepare for and adapt to changing conditions‖ refers to preparing

for conditions that may occur within the lifetime of a facility or infrastructure system. That could be a 

hazard event or physical conditions that change over time. Depending on location, preparation may 

include planning for sea level rise in coastal areas or for the effects of drought, or include improving

design and performance requirements for a hazard event, such as a hurricane or earthquake. Changing 

conditions also may include alterations in the use of infrastructure systems. For example, increased use of 

communication devices – like wireless systems that need an array of cell towers – may lead to new 

dependencies between infrastructure systems. Aging also affects infrastructure. If buildings and 

infrastructure systems are designed, maintained and operated properly, the likelihood of disruption to 

community functions from deterioration will be reduced.

The second part of the definition of resilience, ―withstand and recover quickly from disruptions,‖ requires 

that a range of possible hazard events be considered. In a more resilient community, a hazard event that 

occurs at the intensity that the affected structures were designed to meet under relevant codes and 

standards may cause local disruptions tolerated by the community without long-term detrimental effects 

(e.g., permanent relocation of residents or business). If an unanticipated or extreme event occurs, planning 

and preparation for planned events likely will reduce the extent of disruption and time for recovery.

Moreover, communities that have a well-developed resilience plan in place are better prepared for the

recovery process.

1.4. Community Resilience and the Built Environment

Resilience and functionality. Figure 1-4 depicts the concept of resilience for a building or infrastructure 

system, collectively referred to as the built environment in terms of functionality versus the performance 

goal of time to recovery of function. Functionality is a measure of how well a building or infrastructure 

system operates and delivers its service or meets its intended purpose. Time to recovery of function is a 

measure of how long it takes before a building or infrastructure system is functioning. Recovery time can 

also indirectly measure the pre-event condition of the system, because longer recovery times indicate a 

less resilient system. To more thoroughly characterize resilience of the built environment, the Guide uses 

the recovery phases defined by the FEMA National Disaster Recovery Framework [FEMA 2011b]: shortterm, intermediate, and long-term.
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Figure 1-4: Resilience can be expressed simply, in terms of system functionality and the time to recover 

functionality following a disruptive hazard event [McAllister 2013].

Two contrasting building conditions are considered, as described in Table 1-1. Figure 1-4 illustrates how 

each of these conditions can impact the performance of a building, and recovery of its functionality. At 

the time of the hazard event, the system condition affects the degree of damage and lost functionality. 

Recovery of function can be highly variable, as it depends on the damage incurred, dependencies on other 

systems, availability of resources, and the owner‘s ability to rapidly execute recovery plans that are  ̳ready 

to go.‘

Table 1-1: System condition at the time of the hazard event affects the degree of damage and lost 

functionality.

Condition A 

Experiences modest loss of 

functionality after the event

Condition B 

Increased vulnerability to the hazard 

relative to Condition ‘A’

 Well maintained

 Benefitted from good design and mitigation projects

 Improved level of functionality before hazard event

 Modest loss of functionality after event

 Degradation of functionality 

 Deterioration in the physical system 

 Lack of adequate maintenance

Planning for resilience and putting those plans into action can minimize or even eliminate loss of 

functionality, depending on the degree of damage, available solutions, resources, and priorities. When 

hazard events occur, loss of functionality can occur suddenly – in minutes or over days – due to physical 

damage to one or more systems. Recovering functionality may take anywhere from a few hours to years. 

In most instances, systems that experience less loss of functionality after a hazard event recover more 

rapidly.
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Why are community resilience and planning important? Hazard events can disrupt community functions 

so extensively that they become disasters and result in permanent changes. Hurricane Katrina (2005) and 

Hurricane Sandy (2012) are recent examples of hazard events that were followed by economic decline in 

localities that experienced significant damage and slow rates of recovery. The slow recovery in some 

areas affected by Hurricane Katrina also led to population relocation between communities. Even lesser 

events inflict significant damage on communities across our country each year. Between 2000 and 2014, 

there were between 84 and 242 Presidential disaster declarations each year from the combined effects of

floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, fires, and other events. Severe storms accounted for the 

majority of those declarations [FEMA 2011a]. 

Communities reduce vulnerabilities by adopting and enforcing appropriate codes, standards, and 

regulations; by good land use planning; and by disaster preparedness activities. These activities are 

necessary and prudent, but are not enough, by themselves, to make a community resilient. Across the 

nation, communities continue to experience significant damage and losses, despite robust adoption and 

enforcement of best practices, regulations, and codes and standards. There are a number of reasons for 

this apparent contradiction.

Many existing buildings and infrastructure systems were built before the modern standards, codes, and 

practices that are now in place existed. Adoption of modern standards and codes is a necessary but 

insufficient step, especially because the positive effects can be slow to accumulate. Buildings and 

infrastructure systems are replaced over decades. Also, standards and codes for buildings and each 

infrastructure system frequently are developed independently and do not address dependencies between 

systems or community-level performance goals, including recovery of function. Some states have codes 

that preclude modifications by local jurisdictions. Communities may need to coordinate with state

officials to facilitate local adoption of code criteria that are more stringent than those of the statewide 

code.

Community resilience requires that the built environment maintain acceptable levels of functionality 

during and after events. Communities need to ensure their built environment operates within a specified 

time period to support recovery of functions. Recovery times should be based on the role and importance 

of each facility or infrastructure system within the community, and the extent of disruption that can be 

tolerated. Not all facilities need to be restored within the same timeframe.

This Guide recognizes that buildings and infrastructure systems are built to different codes with varying 

degrees of enforcement over time, and that this mixture of construction will remain in place in most

communities for a long time. Nevertheless, those structures eventually will degrade and deficiencies will 

become apparent, including after a hazard strikes. That process provides an opportunity to develop and 

implement a new paradigm – community resilience – when planning for and envisioning the future of 

each community.

Developing a resilience plan offers communities a rational basis for considering alternative measures to 

meet community goals through improvements in the performance of the built environment. Not every 

aspect of resilience planning needs to happen at once. Multiple solutions or stages may be proposed, 

including temporary solutions to meet immediate needs, as well as long-term steps to upgrade or replace 

buildings or infrastructure systems.

1.5. Developing a Plan for Community Resilience 

Disruptive events are best addressed by a community resilience plan that includes performance goals for 

the built environment based on the social functions of the community, and preparedness strategies that 

incorporate activities related to prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Plans to 

improve community resilience through the built environment may include land use policy, temporary 

measures (e.g., interim requirements for repair or retrofit), and other structural and non-structural 
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approaches. Other aspects of a resilient community, such as business continuity and issues related to 

human health, safety, and general welfare, also may inform performance goals for the built environment.

To ensure understanding and support by the community and all stakeholders, an active community 

engagement process needs to be developed and continuously implemented throughout the planning 

process. 

Planning steps and key activities for community resilience. Figure 1-1 (page 10) and Table 1-2

summarize this Guide‘s six planning steps and associated key activities for achieving community 

resilience. 

1. Form a collaborative planning team. Strong but inclusive leadership is needed to promote and 

coordinate resilience. Management commitment and clear designation of roles, responsibilities 

and authorities are essential. The planning team likely will include representatives from local 

government (e.g., community development, emergency management, public works, and building

departments) and county, state, or federal government agencies responsible for facilities or 

infrastructure systems in the region. Other entities to be included are public and private owners 

and operators of buildings and infrastructure systems, as well as local businesses and industry. 

Organizations representing significant community groups and populations, including those that 

are especially vulnerable, are also important participants. Some of these stakeholders will already 

be working on aspects of planning for resilience, such as land use planning, long-term economic 

development, business continuity, hazard mitigation, building inspections, or emergency 

management. 

2. Understand the situation. Understanding the situation involves characterizing both the social 

dimensions and built environment of a community. 

Social dimensions. Identifying important social functions and services, as well as key contacts or 

representatives who can provide information about systems and decision making, is essential. 

Social dimensions encompass the needs of individuals and social institutions, including those 

representing government, business and industry, finance, health, education, community service,

and those representing particular religious and cultural beliefs, and the media. Shelter, food, and 

water during and after a hazard event are examples of the most fundamental social needs of 

individuals and families. 

Built environment. Identifying buildings and infrastructure systems that support the community‘s 

social functions, and identifying key contacts or representatives who can provide information 

about physical systems is also essential. Buildings and infrastructure systems can be grouped into 

clusters that support common functions vital to social systems. 

Link functions. Additionally, the dependencies between social services and the supporting built 

environment are identified. Linking buildings and infrastructure systems to desired social services 

is an important step in a plan to achieve community resilience.

3. Determine goals and objectives. When planning, leaders should consider the needs of the 

community and stakeholders, and identify risks and opportunities associated with desired 

outcomes, determine how to prevent or reduce undesired effects, and take steps to achieve

continual improvement. Identifying and agreeing on long-term community goals are essential in

guiding community resilience plans and carrying out strategies to achieve greater resilience. For 

example, in response to persistent flooding, a community may want to redevelop a floodplain to 

become a community park. At the same time, it should consider the impact of needing to relocate

residences and businesses. Also, establishing clear community goals is necessary to prioritize 

resilience activities. The community‘s goals and objectives set by the team should be measurable, 

take into account any requirements that apply, and be monitored and updated as appropriate.
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Table 1-2: Planning steps for community resilience

Planning Steps Key Activities

1. Form a 

Collaborative 

Planning Team

(Chapter 2)

 Identify resilience leader for the community 

 Identify team members, and their roles and responsibilities

 Identify key public and private stakeholders for all phases of planning and 

implementation 

2. Understand the 

Situation 

(Chapter 3)

 Social Dimensions –

 Identify and characterize functions and dependencies of social institutions, including 

business, industry, and financial systems, based on individual/social needs met by 

these institutions and social assets and vulnerabilities

 Identify how social functions are supported by the built environment

 Identify key contacts and representatives for evaluation, coordination, and decision 

making activities

 Built Environment –

 Identify and characterize buildings and infrastructure systems, including condition, 

location, and dependencies between and among systems 

 Identify key contacts/representatives for evaluation, coordination, and decision 

making activities

 Identify existing plans to be coordinated with the resilience plan

 Link social functions to the supporting built environment

 Define building clusters and supporting infrastructure

3. Determine 

Goals and 

Objectives 

(Chapter 4)

 Establish long-term community goals 

 Establish desired recovery performance goals for the built environment at the community 

level based on social needs, and dependencies and cascading effects between systems

 Define community hazards and levels 

 Determine anticipated performance during and after a hazard event to support social 

functions

 Summarize the results

4. Plan

Development

(Chapter 5)

 Evaluate gaps between the desired and anticipated performance of the built environment 

to improve community resilience and summarize results 

 Identify solutions to address gaps including both administrative and construction options

 Prioritize solutions and develop an implementation strategy

5. Plan 

Preparation, 

Review, and 

Approval

(Chapter 6)

 Document the community plan and implementation strategy

 Obtain feedback and approval from stakeholders and community 

 Finalize and approve the plan

6. Plan 

Implementation

and 

Maintenance

(Chapter 7)

 Execute approved administrative and construction solutions 

 Evaluate and update on a periodic basis 

 Modify short or long-term implementation strategy to achieve performance goals as 

needed
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Performance goals for the built environment are based on the role buildings and infrastructure 

systems play in the community. For a community to be resilient following a disruptive event, 

those structures need to function as required to support community recovery. In this Guide, the 

performance goals for the built environment are expressed in terms of the time needed to recover 

the function and role in the community. 

Two recovery times need to be established for the built environment: the desired long-term

performance goal and the anticipated performance for existing systems. First, goals for the 

desired performance (recovery of function) should consider the social needs of the community 

and the functions that each group, or cluster, of buildings and infrastructure systems must provide 

to meet those needs. They also should reflect dependencies between and among systems or the 

cascading effects caused by failures. Desired performance goals for resilience are set 

independently of hazards; they are driven by social needs, not by a particular hazard event. Then, 

the anticipated performance of building clusters and infrastructure systems are evaluated for 

specified hazard events to determine the expected time to recover function. Prevailing hazards 

and the effects of changing conditions, such as sea level rise or drought, are used to determine 

anticipated performance.

This Guide recommends using three hazard levels: routine, design, and extreme. These address a 

range of potential damage and consequences, and are helpful in formulating response and 

recovery scenarios. Routine hazard events can lead to the more frequent, less consequential

events but they may still be damaging for a community. Where defined by building codes, the 

design hazard event (e.g., earthquake, high winds) is the level used to design structures. Extreme

events may also be defined in codes for some hazards, such as earthquakes; they are the most 

likely to cause far-reaching damage. Where codes do not define hazard levels, the community 

may establish a hazard level or scenario based on available guidance or the predicted frequency 

of hazards. 

A community‘s resilience plan should be anchored around the design event, but a community 

should also evaluate routine and extreme events to ensure that they are planning comprehensively

for a range of possibilities. This approach helps communities understand performance, 

consequences, and recovery needs across a range of hazard levels. By understanding how the 

built environment will perform and recover over this range, communities will be better informed 

about priorities and potential implementation strategies. 

4. Develop the Plan. The team should compare the desired and anticipated performance of the built 

environment to identify gaps in performance. Then, it should prioritize gaps in achieving the 

desired performance based on community goals. Next, the team would develop possible

solutions. These should include administrative and construction options to mitigate damage and 

to improve recovery of functions across the community.

Land use planning is an example of an administrative tool. Options may include either or both of 

the following: (a) implement land use planning and redevelopment strategies before a hazard 

event occurs to reduce potential damage and disruption, and (b) develop plans for alternate land 

use and redevelopment strategies as part of the recovery process. These options often are part of 

community development processes, particularly in seismic and flood-prone hazard areas.

There may be multiple solutions or phases needed to achieve desired performance, including 

temporary or short-term solutions to meet immediate needs an addition to long-term, permanent 

solutions. These solutions can be prioritized, based on resources necessary to meet the desired 

performance goals established in the previous step. 
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5. Prepare, Review, and Approve the Plan. Once the team develops a resilience plan, it needs to 

document the elements of the process: community goals, desired performance goals for social 

functions and the built environment, prevailing hazards, anticipated performance for the existing 

building clusters and infrastructure systems, prioritized gaps, and short- and long-term 

implementation strategies and solutions. The plan should be broadly disseminated among

stakeholders and their organizations, as well as with community members. Seeking their review 

and comment is critical to gain support, as is providing feedback to them to maintain their 

support. The review process will differ from community to community. After review, the plan 

should be finalized and adopted by the community. 

6. Implement and Maintain the Plan. The community then executes the administrative and 

construction solutions in the approved plan. It is important that the community evaluate the plan

periodically, and update or adjust it as needed. Updates may include modifying the goals or shortor long-term implementation strategies. This work can be led by the designated lead official or by 

successors charged with implementing and maintaining the plan.

1.6. Other Federal Guidance Supporting Community Resilience 

The Guide complements other federal guidance that supports resilience ranging from local to national 

levels. Many federal programs and initiatives support resilience, not all of which can be addressed here. 

Key guidance programs managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – the National 

Preparedness Goal [FEMA 2015a] and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) – are outlined

briefly to provide the context for the Guide and its role in supporting resilience across the nation. Two 

assessment documents by FEMA that address community assessments are also presented.

1.6.1. National Preparedness Goal

The National Preparedness Goal developed by FEMA identifies core capabilities that the ―whole 

community‖ needs to strengthen to ensure the security and resiliency of the United States. The ―whole 

community‖ includes individuals, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based 

organizations, and federal, state, and local governments. The Goal stresses the importance of 

preparedness efforts, uses a risk-based approach to preparedness, and integrates the activities across five 

preparedness mission areas through the National Planning Frameworks [FEMA 2015b]: Prevention, 

Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. The National Preparedness Goal defines success in the 

following way: 

―A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community 

to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and 

hazards that pose the greatest risk.‖

These risks may include a number of hazards: natural hazards, such as hurricanes or floods, disease 

outbreak and other pandemics, technological or accidental hazards, such as a chemical spill or dam 

failure, and terrorist attacks. The National Preparedness Goal identifies core capabilities necessary to 

achieve a secure and resilient nation under each of the five mission areas, as shown in Table 1-3. The top 

row lists the five mission areas. Planning, public information and warning, and operational coordination 

are addressed across all five mission areas. The Guide directly supports many of the core capabilities of 

the Goal. Use of the Guide by local jurisdictions supports all mission areas and indirectly informs a 

variety of core capabilities.
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Table 1-3: Core capabilities. The core capabilities indicated in bold/italic type below directly relate to the Guide content and guidance.

Prevention Protection Mitigation Response Recovery

Planning

Public Information and Warning

Operational Coordination

 Forensics and 

attribution

 Intelligence and 

information sharing

 Interdiction and 

disruption

 Screening, search, 

and detection

 Access control and identity 

verification

 Cybersecurity

 Intelligence and information 

sharing

 Interdiction and disruption

 Physical protective measures

 Risk management for 

protection programs and 

activities

 Screening, search, and 

detection

 Supply chain integrity and 

security

 Community resilience

 Long-term 

vulnerability 

reduction

 Risk and disaster 

resilience assessment

 Threats and hazard 

identification

 Critical transportation

 Environmental response/health 

and safety

 Fatality management services

 Fire management and 

suppression

 Infrastructure systems

 Mass care services

 Mass search and rescue 

operations

 On-scene security, protection, 

and law enforcement

 Operational communications

 Logistics and supply chain 

management

 Public health, healthcare, and 

emergency medical services

 Situational assessment

 Economic recovery

 Health and social 

services

 Housing

 Infrastructure 

systems

 Natural and cultural 

resources
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1.6.2. National Preparedness System

The National Preparedness System is the instrument employed to build, sustain, and deliver core 

capabilities and achieve the goal of a secure and resilient Nation. The guidance, programs, processes, and 

systems that support each component of the National Preparedness System enable a collaborative, whole 

community approach to national preparedness that engages individuals, families, communities, private 

and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and all levels of government. The Guide is a tool that 

supports the National Preparedness System by building and sustaining capabilities through multi-year 

resilience planning.

1.6.3. National Infrastructure Protection Plan

The National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (NIPP) outlines 

how government and private 

sector owners and operators in 

the critical infrastructure 

community collaborate to manage 

risk and to advance security and 

resilience outcomes. The NIPP 

encourages partners to identify 

critical functions and resources 

that impact their businesses and 

communities to support 

preparedness planning and 

capability development. The 

NIPP addresses 16 critical 

infrastructure sectors, as 

identified in PPD-21 and 

presented in Table 1-4. The 16 

critical infrastructure sectors address both facilities and assets with specific services and resources that are 

important to national security.

The Guide highlights several key sectors in the built environment, and it is applicable across the critical 

sectors at the community scale. Volume II of the Guide outlines several specific infrastructure systems 

(e.g., energy, communications, water and wastewater, transportation), identifies applicable standards and 

codes, and lists implementation strategies for community resilience plans. Chapter 12 (Buildings), 

includes generic guidance applicable to many other building-dependent infrastructure sectors. 

1.6.4. Disaster Mitigation Assessment

Nearly 24,000 communities, representing 80 % of the people in the United States, have developed 

mitigation plans in accordance with FEMA Disaster Mitigation Assessment guidance, based on the 

Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 [DMA 2000]. Because mitigation is a component of resilience, these 

communities are also taking substantive steps toward planning for resilience. A planning process that 

includes a detailed consideration of the built environment as outlined in the Guide and incorporates 

ongoing mitigation planning demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of community resilience. 

Expanding the scope of existing community mitigation planning efforts, to resilience is the next logical 

step. Those who are already involved in mitigation activities have roles and responsibilities similar to 

Table 1-4: NIPP Critical Infrastructure Sectors

 Chemical

 Commercial facilities

 Communications

 Critical manufacturing

 Dams

 Defense industrial base

 Emergency services

 Energy

 Financial services

 Food and agriculture

 Government facilities

 Healthcare and public health

 Information technology

 Nuclear reactors, materials, 

and waste

 Transportation systems

 Water and wastewater 

systems
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those needed for resilience. For example, the mitigation planning process emphasizes public participation 

in vetting mitigation strategies with targets, actions, and priorities. 

1.6.5. Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

The Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), outlined in Comprehensive 

Preparedness Guide 201, Second Edition [FEMA 2013], is a process that helps communities to 

understand the risks and capability requirements to address anticipated and unanticipated hazards. The 

THIRA process helps communities map their risks to the core capabilities identified in the National 

Preparedness Goal. This informs a variety of emergency management efforts, including emergency 

operations planning and mutual aid agreements. Results of the THIRA process can help with many

preparedness activities, including mitigation opportunities that may reduce resources required in the 

future. Through THIRA, communities can identify opportunities to employ mitigation plans, projects, and 

insurance to reduce the loss of life and damage to property. The THIRA process can assist in carrying out 

Step 2 of the Guide, which focuses on understanding the situation.

1.7. Other Community Resilience Guidance

A number of resilience initiatives have focused on improving community resilience by developing 

guidance or assessment methodologies. In the United States, guidance documents that are often cited for 

use by communities include the SPUR Framework [2009], Baseline Resilience Indicators for 

Communities (BRIC) [Cutter et al 2014], the Community and Regional Resilience Institute‘s (CARRI) 

Community Resilience System [2013], the Oregon Resilience Plan [Oregon Seismic Safety Policy 

Advisory Commission 2013], NOAA‘s Coastal Resilience Index [Sempier et al. 2010], and the 

Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit (CART) [Pfefferbaum et al 2013]. International initiatives

include the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Resilience Scorecard [UNIDSR 

2014] and The Rockefeller Foundation‘s 100 Resilient Cities [Arup 2014]. There are additional programs 

and initiatives that support community resilience that are not addressed here. 

Both qualitative and quantitative approaches to resilience are available, many with scorecards or 

dashboards that reflect measurements of key resilience aspects. These visual representations provide a 

direct and simple way of presenting information for experts in the field or for decision makers. In general, 

most of these methodologies focus on social issues; in some cases, the focus is on one particular social 

service or system.

Each of the initiatives cited above provides a set of dimensions or categories of community disaster 

resilience and, in many cases, includes a list of indicators or variables for each dimension. In cases where 

the methodologies involve engaging community stakeholders, process-oriented guidelines for 

implementation are included. For methodologies that are heavily quantitative—typically involving readily 

available data —details are provided about strategies for data analysis and modeling.

Most of these resilience initiatives only minimally integrate infrastructure systems and how they support 

social needs. They do not address dependencies between and among the social and built environments. 

This Guide is designed to address this critical issue. So even if a community is already engaged in 

resilience planning, this Guide can enhance those efforts. 

The American Planning Association document, Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery: Next Generation

[APA 2014], discusses a recovery planning process and related issues. The APA reports that most disaster 

plans are standalone plans and are not integrated into other existing plans such as the community‘s 

Comprehensive (General) Plan. Standalone plans are easier to develop, update, and implement. But an 

integrated plan brings resources together and links community resilience to other plans, which is essential 
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for understanding performance and issues at a community level. This Guide supports development of a 

comprehensive understanding of what is needed from the built environment for community resilience. 

Like all plans, a community resilience plan provides a starting point and a path forward. The community 

resilience plan should become a working document that is referenced and revised as needed. Many 

communities are starting to develop more comprehensive resilience plans as guidance and supporting 

tools become available. Figure 1-5 describes The Rockefeller Foundation‘s 100 Resilient Cities initiative

that is supporting resilience planning in cities around the world.

100 Resilient Cities. Pioneered by The Rockefeller Foundation, 100 

Resilient Cities is dedicated to helping cities around the world 

become more resilient to physical, social and economic challenges 

caused by ―shocks and stresses‖ that range from earthquakes, fires, 

and floods to high unemployment, violence, and chronic food and 

water shortage. By addressing both shocks and stresses, a city 

becomes more able to respond to adverse events and is better able to 

function by using the following four techniques.

1. Establish a fully funded Chief Resilience Officer in city government to lead the city‘s resilience 

efforts

2. Solicit expert support for development of a robust resilience strategy.

3. Develop and implement resilience strategies with the help from public and private service providers, 

partners, and non-governmental organization (NGO) sectors.

4. Network with other member cities and learn from each other.

For more information, see www.100resilientcities.org.

Figure 1-5: Community resilience planning initiatives.

1.8. Guide Scope and Limitations

This Guide helps communities to set customized, long-term goals and develop implementation strategies

for improving the resilience of their buildings and infrastructure systems. The plans are informed by a 

community-level assessment of social needs, and the focus of this document is on buildings and 

infrastructure systems within a community. 

Risk assessment methodologies are not explicitly addressed in the document, but the six-step process for 

achieving community resilience is compatible with those approaches. Risk assessments can help to 

identify significant hazards and to understand associated vulnerabilities and consequences, which will 

support the development of a community resilience plan. There are several other important aspects of 

community resilience that fall outside the scope of this Guide:

 Roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local departments/agencies addressed through the 

National Preparedness Goal

 Social, political, and economic solutions or strategies to achieve a more resilient community

 Methods for engaging and informing stakeholders and community members

 Political processes that support development and adoption of community plans and laws, 

statutes, and ordinances
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 Methods for obtaining financial resources and evaluating investment options to support 

community resilience strategies

 Specifics on community services that are essential for community response and recovery: for 

example, banking and finance. Community services are discussed only to the extent they are 

supported by the built environment

 Specifics on vulnerable populations and the ways in which they might be affected by a disaster 

event

 Natural resources and the environment (natural capital), and the linkages to the built environment

(built and physical capital), as well as other capitals (e.g., financial or economic, human, social, 

political, and cultural)

 Cyber security and its role in the function of buildings and infrastructure systems.

 Financial aspects of community resilience, including financing, insurance, policies, allocation, or 

management of such resources.

1.9. References

American Planning Association (APA 2014) Planning for Post Disaster Recovery: Next Generation, 

American Planning Association (APA), Washington, DC.

Arup (2014) City Resilience Framework, The Rockefeller Foundation and Ove Arup & Partners 

International Limited, April, 

http://www.arup.com/~/media/Publications/Files/Publications/C/City_Resilience_Framework_pdf.ashx.

Community and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI 2013) Community Resilience System, Community 

and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI 2013) Community Resilience System, 

http://www.resilientus.org/recent-work/community-resilience-system, http://www.resilientus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/CRS-Final-Report.pdf. 

Cutter, S.L.; K.D. Ash; and C.T. Emrich (2014) The geographies of community disaster resilience, 

Global Environmental Change, 29, pp. 65-77.

DMA (2000) Disaster Mitigation Act, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC, 

https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/4596.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2009) FEMA P-765: Mitigation Assessment Team 

Report: Midwest Floods of 2008 in Iowa and Wisconsin, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), Washington, DC.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2010) Developing and Maintaining Emergency 

Operations Plans, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Version 2.0, November, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2011a) Presidential Disaster Declarations, January 

10, 2000 to January 1, 2011, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC, 

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=12383.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2011b) National Disaster Recovery Framework, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2013) Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 

Assessment Guide, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, Second Edition, August, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC.
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2015a) National Preparedness Goal, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC, February 6, https://www.fema.gov/nationalpreparedness-goal.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2015b) National Planning Frameworks, National 

Prevention Framework, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC, 

https://www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks.

Flora, C.B, M. Emery, S. Fey, C. Bregendahl (2008) ―Community Capitals: A Tool for Evaluating 

Strategic Interventions and Projects,‖ Encyclopedia of Rural America: The Land and People, Goreham 

ed., Grey House Publishing, Millerton, NY, pp. 1186-1187.

McAllister, T.P. (2013) Developing Guidelines and Standards for Disaster Resilience of the Built 

Environment: A Research Needs Assessment, NIST TN 1795, National Institute of Standards and 

Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 20899.

National Science and Technology Council (2005) Grand Challenges for Disaster Reduction – A Report of 

the Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction, National Science and Technology Council, Executive Office of 

the President, Washington, DC.

Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission (OSSPAC 2013) The Oregon Resilience Plan: 

Reducing Risk and Improving Recovery for the Next Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami, Salem, OR, 

February, http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/osspac/docs/Oregon_Resilience_Plan_Final.pdf.

Pfefferbaum, R.; B. Pfefferbaum; R.L. Van Horn; R.W. Klomp; F.H. Norris; and D.B. Reissman (2013) 

―The Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit (CART): An Intervention to Build Community 

Resilience to Disasters,‖ Journal of Public Health Management & Practice, May/June 2013, Vol. 19, 

Issue 3, p 250–258.

PPD-21 (2013) Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, The White House, February 12, 2013, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-criticalinfrastructure-security-and-resil.

PPD-8 (2011) Presidential Policy Directive, PPD-8 – National Preparedness, The White House, March 

30, 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.

Ritchie, L.A. and D.A. Gill (2011) ―Considering Community Capitals in Disaster Recovery and 

Resilience,‖ PERI Scope, Public Entity Risk Institute, 14(2), 

https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/component/option,com_deeppockets/task,catContShow/cat,86/id,1086/I

temid,84/.

San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR 2009) ―When is a Building Safe 

Enough?‖ San Francisco Urban Research Association, Issue 479, February 2009, 654 Mission Street, San 

Francisco, CA, http://www.spur.org, 

http://www.spur.org/sites/default/files/publications_pdfs/SPUR_Seismic_Mitigation_Policies.pdf.

Sempier, T.T., D.L. Swann, R. Emmer, S.H. Sempier, and M. Schneider (2010) Coastal Community 

Resilience Index: A Community Self-Assessment, MAGSP-08-014, November, 

http://www.gulfofmexicoalliance.org/projects/files/83Community_Resilience_Index.pdf.

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2014) Disaster Resilience Scorecard for 

Cities, Based on the ―Ten Essentials‖ defined by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 

Risk Reduction (UNISDR) for Making Cities Resilient, Developed for The United Nations Office for 

Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) by IBM and AECOM, Version 1.5, March 10, 

http://www.unisdr.org/2014/campaign-cities/Resilience%20Scorecard%20V1.5.pdf.
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2. Step 1: Form a Collaborative Planning Team

A robust community resilience plan represents the interest of all stakeholders in the community and 

benefits from collaboration among community leaders, public and private stakeholders, and other 

interested community members. Active engagement by community 

stakeholders is vital in formulating and carrying out a successful resilience 

plan.

The planning team may include a breadth of representatives:

 Local government, such as community development, public works, 

and building departments

 Public and private developers

 Owners and operators of buildings and infrastructure systems

 Local business and industry representatives

 Representatives of the community‘s social institutions (e.g., community organizations, nongovernmental organizations, business/industry groups, health, education)

 Other stakeholders or interested community groups

Much of the building stock and infrastructure systems, especially energy and communication systems, are 

privately owned, so collaboration among stakeholders is a necessity for success. As shown in Figure 2-1, 

while the planning team is focused at the community level, stakeholders in the planning process may 

range from individuals and families to national stakeholders, depending on the community‘s resources 

and characteristics. For instance, roads and bridges typically are addressed at the county and state level, 

energy systems may range from the community to the regional level, and mitigation support may be 

provided at the state or national level.

Figure 2-1: Levels of government and organization 

(adapted from John Plodinec [CARRI 2013]).

Successful planning efforts to date have been led by a community official working with a planning team

that develops recommendations through working groups of stakeholders and subject matter experts. 

As community resilience is an ongoing, long-term process, leadership by a dedicated community official 

is needed to provide continuity, elevate the importance of resilience, provide authority for convening 

stakeholders, and engage public support. The recent designation of a Chief Resilience Officer in many 

cities illustrates the type of leadership needed. Strong support and endorsement from elected officials 
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ensures that the planning process will have visibility, and is more likely to lead to community engagement 

through stakeholder participation.

Important contributors include local champions who are highly connected and engaged with 

neighborhood, business, or community groups, or who are actively engaged in other community-based 

activities. They can advocate for support from and participation by other community stakeholders, and 

can help reach out to and develop an understanding with groups representing diverse views and 

experiences within the community and with the public at large. They can be influential in rallying the 

community around planning for resilience. 

Community engagement is essential to the success of community resilience planning and implementation. 

The activities highlighted in Figure 2-2 illustrate active community engagement in their resilience 

planning. 

Resilient San Francisco (SF). Resilient SF was organized within the Mayor‘s 

office and solicited support from the Harvard Kennedy School. It is a citizen‘s 

advisory group formed by the Chief Building Inspector, and it accepted guidance 

from a self-appointed planning group from the San Francisco Planning and Urban 

Research Association [SPUR 2009]. SPUR contributed a Resilient City Plan to the 

advisory group that developed a Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety that 

lead to the creation of the Earthquake Safety Improvement Program and a 30-year 

program for achieving resilience within the city‘s privately owned buildings. This 

program, in conjunction with the City‘s Capital Planning Process and Lifelines 

Council, established a holistic effort toward resilience. It is now overseen by a 

Chief Resilience Officer and the Earthquake Safety Implementation Program 

Office, which is a part of the City‘s Executive Branch. 

Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The Cedar Rapids Framework Plan for Reinvestment and 

Revitalization [Cedar Rapids 2014] was initiated and led by the City Council 

following the 2008 floods, and was an expansion of their ongoing citywide planning 

efforts. Early in the process, three open houses for the River Corridor 

Redevelopment Plan were organized to receive feedback from the residents on the 

preliminary community analysis. The planning process included all the related City 

departments and received input from a Recovery and Reinvestment Coordinating 

team, various coordinating groups, committees, and organizations, representatives 

from the medical community, the railroads, and other industrial stakeholders. The 

plan is being implemented and has already generated significant improvements in 

the City.

Oregon Resilience Plan. The Oregon Plan was initiated by the Oregon State 

Legislature and led by the Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission 

[OSSPAC 2013]. The commission includes 19 appointees of the Governor who 

represent the various disciplines related to seismic safety policy including 

emergency managers, transportation, land conservation, housing and buildings, 

architects, engineers, and stakeholders from businesses, schools, the Port of 

Portland, and the construction industry. Planning work was organized around a 

number of task groups to address the seismic and tsunami hazards, business and 

workforce continuity, coastal communities, critical and essential buildings, and 

transportation, energy, water and wastewater systems. The report was accepted by 

the State legislature in 2014 as a framework for communities to implement. 

Figure 2-2: Examples of community resilience activities with strong community engagement
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The involvement of community members is a measure of a community‘s social capital. The community‘s

social assets and resources can facilitate information sharing, provide a conduit for social support, and 

enhance the capacity for collective action through social networks, associations, and the reciprocity and

trust generated by them among individuals and groups. Engagement of community members can

contribute to resilience by enhancing the sense of belonging and strengthening bonds between individuals 

and groups within communities (see Chapter 10, Volume II). Similar to cultural capital, social capital 

reflects the convergence of shared values in a community. It is especially valuable because it enhances a 

community‘s ability to work toward collective goals—many of which may increase other forms of 

capital.

Community engagement facilitates understanding by the community, raises awareness of resilience 

activities, and can foster buy-in and support for important resilience projects, bond issues, and legislation.

In the short-term, understanding of and support for resilience efforts can promote increased perceptions of 

safety and security within the community. In the long-term, these perceptions can lead to stronger 

community identity and a higher quality of life. 

The planning team and its related working groups will vary in size and breadth depending on the 

community. Team members from agencies with authority to plan, regulate development and the built 

environment, and make recommendations and decisions can provide valuable input to the planning 

process and offer knowledge about executing strategies. Stakeholders from particular interests may join 

working groups with the intent of developing specific recommendations for consideration by the planning 

team. Their input will be complemented by subject matter experts.

Table 2-1 through Table 2-3 provide examples of those that may be included on the planning team or in 

the stakeholder working groups. The importance and potential contributions of these stakeholders to the 

resilience planning are described briefly. Their roles may vary among communities, depending on each 

stakeholder‘s envisioned role and their current authorities or responsibilities. All will need to share

information and collaborate to develop a shared understanding of the community.

Guidance related to building a planning team is documented in the FEMA Local Mitigation Planning 

Handbook [FEMA 2013]. Many departments, businesses, and groups may already be working on aspects 

of planning to achieve resilience, such as land use planning, long-term economic development, 

mitigation, building inspections, or emergency management, and business continuity management [ISO 

2015].

Leadership that promotes collaboration among all stakeholders is needed to promote and embed resilience 

at all levels in the community. Public and private stakeholders need to work together to successfully plan, 

implement, and achieve community resilience and long-term goals.
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Table 2-1: Examples of local government stakeholders who could be included in planning team 

Office of the Chief 

Executive (e.g., Mayor) 

Provides leadership, encourages collaboration among departments, and serves as the 

link to the stakeholders in organizing, compiling, and vetting the plan throughout the 

community. Also serves as the point of contact for interactions with neighboring 

communities within the region and the state. A Chief Resilience Officer or other 

leader within the office should be considered for leading the effort. 

City Council or Board of 

Supervisors 

Represents the diversity of community opinion, adopts the needed plans, and enacts 

legislation for needed mandatory mitigation efforts.

Building Department 

Identifies appropriate codes and standards for adoption (where state codes are not 

mandated); reviews building plans and provides inspection services to assure proper 

construction; and provides post-event inspection services aimed at restoring 

functionality as soon as possible. The department also may develop and maintain a 

geographic information system (GIS)-based mapping database of community 

physical infrastructure, social institutions, and relationships between the two. 

Department of Public 

Works 

Responsible for publicly owned buildings, many roads, and infrastructure, and 

identifies emergency response and recovery routes. 

Fire departments/ districts 

Responsible for codes and enforcement of construction standards related to fire 

safety and brings expertise related to urban fires, wildfires, and fires following 

hazard events.

Parks and Recreation Identifies open spaces available for emergency or interim use for housing and other 

neighborhood functions.

Public Utilities 

Commission 

Responsible for overseeing private and public owned utility systems, setting rates 

and service levels, and assisting in developing recovery goals.

Planning Department 

Identifies pre-event land use and mitigation opportunities and post-event recovery 

opportunities that will improve the city‘s layout and reduce vulnerabilities through 

repair and reconstruction projects and future development. 

Emergency Management 

Agency and Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC) 

Identifies what is needed from the physical infrastructure to streamline response and 

recovery of social functions and institutions within the community.

Boards of Education, 

Trustees and Regents 

Represents all levels of education and clarifies the system‘s tolerance for disruptions 

and its ability to operate under temporary conditions. 

Human Services 

Department (or 

equivalent)

Identifies services vital to support community member needs, including senior, 

youth, people with disabilities, and family services and programs (including 

childcare). 
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Table 2-2: Examples of business and service professionals who could be included on planning team

Chambers of Commerce

and industry associations

Represents business and industry interests and includes business leaders who will 

bring a clear perspective on the economic impact of potential disasters as well as the 

impact of resilience plans. 

Community business 

districts 

Represents large and small businesses that support the neighborhoods, provide jobs,

and play a key role in community recovery. 

Building owners, and 

managers 

Provides building and housing owners‘ perspective on resilience and recovery in 

terms of their needs for labor, buildings, utilities, and other infrastructure systems, as 

well as how their needs influence the performance levels selected.

Utility providers 

Include power, communications, water, wastewater, and transportation providers. 

Key to rapid recovery of functionality, and will bring perspective on changes needed 

in current regulations and rate limitations. Collaboration among providers is 

essential to understand the community needs and priorities for recovery, as well as 

shared dependencies. Infrastructure systems may be represented by staff from 

outside the community.

Health 

Includes public health officials, providers of acute, sub-acute, rehabilitation, mental 

health, behavioral and end-of-life care. Brings clarity to healthcare services that are 

being provided before, and those that are needed immediately after, a significant 

event and throughout the recovery period. 

Architects and urban 

planners 

Bring a vision and expertise for an improved community that supports transit, 

housing, vibrant and livable neighborhoods, and improved quality of life. 

Engineers 

Determine design and performance capabilities for the built environment and assists

in developing suitable standards and guidelines. Can help establish desired 

performance goals and the likely performance anticipated from the existing built 

environment.

Developers and 

construction professionals 

Provide perspective on the feasibility and consequences of changing building and 

housing design and construction practices. Also, offer perspective from their clean

up and reconstruction activities after a disaster.

Media 

Reflect the needs of a key player in disseminating important information about 

response and recovery efforts, as well as the resilience process and progress, to the 

community.
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Table 2-3: Examples of community and volunteer organizations that could be included on planning 

team

Non-governmental 

Organizations (NGOs) 

Bring members‘ concerns to governments, advocate and monitor policies, and 

encourage participation in resilience-related efforts by providing information to 

members. May include non-profit, voluntary groups organized on a local, national,

or international level. May perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions 

that support other social institutions, especially those that provide services to 

vulnerable and at-risk populations.

National Voluntary 

Organizations Active in 

Disaster (VOADs) 

Serve as a primary forum where organizations share knowledge and resources 

throughout the disaster preparedness cycle to help survivors and their communities.

These are non-profit, non-partisan, membership-based organizations that help to 

build resiliency in communities nationwide.

Community associations Provide neighborhood and resident views, including homeowners, renters, and 

vulnerable populations

Community Service 

Organizations (CSOs) and 

religious/cultural groups 

Offer insights based on their role as volunteer, membership-based groups that 

provide services to the community‘s members and frequently play an important role 

in the post-disaster environment.

2.1. References

City of Cedar Rapids (2014) ―Flood Recovery Planning,‖ Cedar Rapids: City of Five Seasons, City of 

Cedar Rapids, Iowa, http://www.cedar-rapids.org/government/departments/communitydevelopment/floodrecoveryplanning/Pages/default.aspx.

Community and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI 2013) Community Resilience System, Community 

and Regional Resilience Institute (CARRI 2013) Community Resilience System, 

http://www.resilientus.org/recent-work/community-resilience-system, http://www.resilientus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/CRS-Final-Report.pdf.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2013) Local Mitigation Planning Handbook, March, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington DC.

International Organization for Standardization (ISO 2015) ISO/CD 22316 Societal Security -

Organizational Resilience - Principles and Guidelines, 

http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=50053.

Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission (2013) The Oregon Resilience Plan: Reducing Risk 

and Improving Recovery for the Next Cascadia Earthquake and Tsunami, Salem, OR, February, 

http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/osspac/docs/Oregon_Resilience_Plan_Final.pdf.

San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR 2009) ―When is a Building Safe 

Enough?‖ San Francisco Urban Research Association, Issue 479, February 2009, 654 Mission Street, San 

Francisco, CA, http://www.spur.org, 

http://www.spur.org/sites/default/files/publications_pdfs/SPUR_Seismic_Mitigation_Policies.pdf.
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3. Step 2: Understand the Situation

This Guide is based upon a fundamental premise: the social functions and needs of a community should

drive the requirements of the built environment for a community to be resilient.

The built environment is an essential part of a community‘s resilience. Social functions and institutions, 

including family/kinship, education, health, government, economy, media, and other community-based 

organizations rely on buildings and infrastructure systems before, during, and after a hazard event occurs. 

Key buildings and infrastructure systems must be functional to support neighborhood restoration, to care

for vulnerable populations, and to enable the community‘s economy to recover and thrive. 

Gaining a comprehensive understanding of a community is essential for effective resilience planning. 

That includes identifying and characterizing social and civil components:

 Social dimensions, including community demographics and how social institutions meet 

community members‘ needs prior to hazard events and during recovery

 Buildings and the infrastructure systems – the built environment – that supports the functions of 

these social institutions

In this second planning step, the team identifies and characterizes both components and identifies

important links and dependencies between them. 

3.1. Identify and Characterize the Social Dimensions

The social needs of a community provide the basis for establishing 

performance goals for the built environment. Understanding those

needs involves identifying and characterizing community members, 

their needs, and the social institutions that exist to meet those 

needs. This can be done in four sub-steps:

1. Characterize community members and their present and 

future needs. This includes population demographics and 

locations, economic indicators, social vulnerabilities, social 

capital, and their needs. Short- and long-term needs, 

including potential growth, should be considered.

2. Identify social institutions and systems within the community, including their functions, the 

particular needs they meet, and any gaps in institutional and organizational capacity that could be 

improved by changes to the built environment.

3. Identify dependencies among and within social institutions.

4. Identify key social and economic community metrics, including methods to track the impact of 

community planning and improvements.

Details and examples appear below.

Characterize the population. This involves taking stock of the community‘s demographics (e.g., age, 

health, education, income, employment status, home ownership/rental/temporary housing, language and 

culture) and linking these with individuals‘ geographic locations within the community, determining the 

community‘s economic profile or indicators (e.g., the industries present within the community), 

identifying social assets and capacities (e.g., health clinics and pharmacies, educational programs), and 

vulnerabilities (e.g., mobility issues, renting, lacking recovery resources, living or working in hazardprone areas), and defining the needs of different groups in the community. A generalized hierarchy of 
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human needs within a community, presented in Chapter 10 (Volume II), is based on Maslow‘s approach. 

Human needs are physiological (e.g., water, food, and shelter), safety and security, belonging, and growth 

and achievement. Although all needs are important, some are more urgent or time sensitive than others in 

the context of resilience. The resilience team should focus foremost, but not exclusively, on the more 

fundamental and time-sensitive needs.

Additionally, because resilience planning can involve long-term measures and modifications to the built 

environment, changes and trends in community demographics, geographic locations, vulnerabilities, and 

local needs over time should be considered. 

Identify social institutions. These can include family/kinship, economics, government, health, education, 

community service organizations, religious and cultural organizations (or other organizations that support 

belief systems), and the media. Institutions are organized in many different ways to serve community 

needs. It is important for the resilience planning team to identify the community‘s various social 

institutions and to understand how they work within the community (i.e., identify the services they 

provide and their dependencies). 

At this stage, the planning team can begin to identify gaps in capacity within the social institutions:

situations in which institutions and services would be unlikely or unable to meet all the needs of the 

community and to maintain services after a hazard event. The team next identifies gaps in social capacity 

that could be reduced by a change or improvement to the built environment. For example, the community 

might benefit and be able to better meet its social needs if housing is relocated outside a flood zone or 

future development is restricted within that flood zone.

Strengths and weaknesses in the ability of social institutions to provide services to the community need to 

be clearly identified. For example, critical services delivered by healthcare institutions or emergency 

responders are vital to meet urgent needs during recovery. The capacity of these institutions to function at 

all times (including recovery) needs to be examined in detail, fully understood, and any improvements

that are needed should be agreed upon. The population that commutes into the community to fulfill

critical functions and enable business to continue or to resume operations should be identified. Such an

analysis should also include consideration of their transportation modes, routes and dependencies (e.g., 

availability of fuel).

Identify dependencies. Given that social institutions are linked in many ways, a disruption in the built 

environment that affects one social institution may also affect others. Therefore, planners should identify

dependencies among and within social institutions to determine which functions are most critical during 

recovery. Each community is different. Chapter 10 (Volume II) provides examples of dependencies to 

consider.

Identify metrics. Communities should identify methods (or measures or metrics) to track the progress of 

social and economic aspects of community resilience and improvement activities. The basic questions that 

community metrics may help to answer include:

 How resilient are the community‘s social and economic institutions?

 Will the community‘s decisions and investments actually improve resilience? If so, how 

significant will the difference be?

Social and economic metrics can help community decision-makers understand the implications of 

community decisions for planning, siting, design, construction, operation, protection, maintenance, repair, 

and restoration of the built environment. Social and economic-based resilience metrics can be quantitative 

or descriptive. The result can be presented as an overall resilience-related score or as a set of separately 

reported scores across a broad spectrum of physical, economic, and social dimensions. Examples of 

resilience metrics for social and economic systems, and existing community resilience assessment 

methodologies are provided in Chapter 17 (Volume II).
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In understanding the community, the planning team also characterizes the built environment, as discussed 

in the following section. Characterizing the social dimensions and the built environment may occur in 

parallel.

3.2. Characterize the Built Environment

Characterizing the built environment includes 

identifying key attributes and dependencies for existing 

buildings and infrastructure systems within the 

community. Depending on their size, community 

building and public works departments and utilities may 

have much of the needed information available through 

their GIS (Geographic Information System) applications 

or other databases. 

Data and information that will be needed to characterize

the current condition of the built environment includes

the owner, location(s), current use, age, construction types, zoning, maintenance and upgrades, and 

applicable codes, standards, and regulations, both at the time of design and for current practice. 

Information about dependence on other systems, subsystems, or branches of systems, will contribute to an 

understanding of how the built environment is expected to perform if one of the systems, or a branch of 

the system, stops providing services.

Another important piece of information is the location of these structures throughout the community. 

GIS-based maps can help communities understand whether their buildings or infrastructure systems are 

located in higher-risk areas. For instance, many communities were established before flood zones were 

mapped, and consequently, have buildings and infrastructure systems subjected to flood damage. Other 

communities have buildings and infrastructure systems located near seismic faults, and may not perform 

well if a significant seismic event occurs. Alternatively, a period of rapid growth may have exceeded the 

infrastructure system‘s capacity or may have resulted in development that lacked adequate adoption or 

enforcement of local codes and regulations.

Buildings. Buildings can be characterized individually and as groups, or clusters. The term cluster refers 

to a set of buildings—and supporting infrastructure systems—that serve a common function such as 

housing, healthcare, retail, etc. Clusters are not necessarily geographically co-located, and may be 

distributed throughout the community. Characterizing a community‘s building stock involves identifying 

the number of buildings within the community by building type, occupancy, and use. Additional 

information important to establishing performance and recovery times may include construction types that 

might not perform well, such as unreinforced masonry or soft story construction in seismic zones, or a 

lack of positive ties (e.g., hurricane clips) to avoid wind uplift damage. See Chapter 12 in Volume II for 

additional considerations in characterizing the building stock.

Transportation. In addition to roads and bridges, community transportation systems may include rail 

systems, airports, coastal or river ports, pipelines, waterways, or trucking hubs. Many communities 

maintain their local roads and rely on various owners and operators to maintain other transportation 

systems. For instance, while counties and states own and maintain most highways, regional authorities 

may manage airports and shipping ports. Most rail lines are independently owned and operated, 

sometimes privately or by separate public authorities. Information from owners and operators on the 

transportation infrastructure is needed to address multiple performance and recovery issues. This 

information can be used to determine dependencies, meet anticipated usage (e.g., traffic loads on 

evacuation routes), and provide redundancy for meeting transport needs (e.g., temporary energy sources 

and alternate routes). Transportation systems may serve different roles in each phase of recovery. For 
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example, emergency response routes, evacuation pathways, and supply routes for restoration may be 

different. See Chapter 13 in Volume II for additional considerations in characterizing transportation 

systems.

Energy. Energy systems include electric power and fuel systems. Electric power systems range from 

municipally owned and operated systems to private regional systems. These systems include power 

generation, transmission, and distribution; distribution systems are located within the boundaries of

communities, but generation and transmission systems are typically located outside the community,

unless they are municipally owned. Coordination between owners and operators of energy systems 

regarding system performance and restoration sequencing during and immediately after an event is 

fundamental to community resilience planning. For many communities, understanding the sequence of 

power restoration is key to planning community recovery. Fuel supply mechanisms and distribution 

systems also need to be characterized. Fuel may be supplied by tankers, trucks, or pipelines. The total 

amount of fuel required by the community may change during recovery if temporary power sources, such 

as generators, are used. Recent growth of decentralized energy sources, such as microgrids and home 

solar energy systems, also should be taken into account over the long-term. See Chapter 14 in Volume II

for additional considerations in characterizing energy systems.

Communication. Communication services include internet, cellular, and wireline phone services as well 

as the cable, satellite, and broadcast modes relied upon by media operations. Communication companies 

are privately owned and many communities rely on multiple providers. Smaller, regional companies may 

share infrastructure with a larger, sometimes national, company. Communication infrastructure includes 

central offices and other equipment-based facilities to direct and process calls and data. It also includes

cables, cell towers, and other systems to transmit and distribute calls and data. As is the case with electric 

power, distribution systems are within community boundaries. Coordination with owners and operators 

about communication systems performance and recovery is essential to resilience planning. See Chapter 

15 in Volume II for additional considerations in characterizing communication systems.

Water and wastewater. Water systems are supplied by either surface or ground water. They include 

treatment plants and pipelines. Wastewater systems collect waste through a separate system of pipelines 

and pump stations connected to a wastewater treatment plant, which is located near a body of water used 

for post-treatment discharge. These systems typically are owned and operated at the local level, by either 

communities, special authorities, or associations of homeowners. Information on system age, 

maintenance, location, and service area is readily available in many communities. Many water systems 

are older and may need replacement; for aging systems with frequent failures, the risk of failure will 

increase during certain hazard events. The performance of older buried systems may well deserve 

additional planning options for community recovery. Water sources may be local, or they may be shared 

with other communities. Having shared water sources may require collaboration with nearby communities 

for daily water supplies and recovery plans. See Chapter 16 in Volume II for additional considerations in 

characterizing water and wastewater systems.

Dependencies. Effective resilience planning demands a thorough understanding of building and 

infrastructure system dependencies to minimize negative impacts while key functions are restored. There 

are multiple dimensions of dependency. Interactions between and among infrastructure systems can 

depend on a number of factors. Traditionally, dependencies consider the physical and functional 

relationship between different systems (e.g., drinking water systems require electricity to operate pumps, 

communications systems need power to operate, crews needed to repair damage to electrical distribution 

systems need access via roads that may be blocked). See Chapter 11 in Volume II for additional 

considerations in characterizing system dependencies.

Identify metrics. Communities should identify methods (ideally including meaningful metrics) to track 

the progress of buildings and infrastructure systems activities related to community resilience. Most 

service providers and communities track reliability of service (e.g., power or communication systems) 
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during normal operations or service restoration (e.g., restored transportation route of water line) following 

system damage (see Chapter 17 in Volume II). This Guide uses time to recovery of function as the 

primary metric for community resilience. 

3.3. Link Social Dimensions to the Built Environment

Once the social dimensions and built environment are characterized, communities identify links between 

the social institutions and their services and the buildings and infrastructure systems during day-to-day 

operations and during the recovery process. Some institutions rely more heavily on the built environment 

than others. For example, healthcare institutions may find it difficult to provide services outside of 

hospitals or other buildings on a longer-term basis because specialized equipment often relies on power 

and/or water, and controlled (sterile) environments frequently are needed to perform medical procedures. 

In this step, a community identifies the ways in which the built environment supports each social 

institution. This process involves understanding the purpose of the built environment for each institution, 

how that purpose is actualized, and the direct and indirect consequences for individuals, groups, and the 

community when the built environment is degraded. Chapter 10 (Volume II) contains examples of 

linkages between social institutions and the built environment, specifically buildings, transportation, 

water/wastewater, power/energy, and communication systems. These linkages may differ under normal 

circumstances and after a hazard event. 

Planning teams should identify external and internal dependencies that affect successful implementation 

of the community resilience plan and desired outcomes. These dependencies need to be taken into account 

in the next step when the team sets goals and objectives, because those dependencies contribute to the 

resilience plan‘s uncertainty and risk. 

By considering these linkages, the planning team can begin to identify building clusters, and the

infrastructure systems that support those clusters. For instance, building performance during a hazard and

during recovery can be considered for individual buildings that provide a critical service and for clusters 

of housing or commercial facilities. Additionally, the service or function served by the cluster before the 

hazard event may change during recovery. For example, school facilities often are used as emergency 

housing for several weeks after an event. Temporary alternate uses of facilities should be taken into 

consideration as because building cluster performance goals are set during the next step in the process.
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4. Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives

4.1. Goals for Community Resilience

Community resilience should be based on long-term community growth 

and development goals. Each community should define its own longterm planning horizon, depending on its existing infrastructure, 

anticipated plans for improvements, and resources. For the built 

environment, renewal or replacement of existing buildings and 

infrastructure systems often takes place over 30 to 100 years, depending 

on the building or infrastructure system‘s use and the type of 

construction. 

Having long-term community-level goals – such as minimizing 

disruptions to daily life, attracting new business, and improving recovery

from hazard events – guides a diverse set of stakeholders as they develop

resilience plans. Achieving the long-term goals of the community is made possible by developing 

performance goals for the built environment and the supported social functions, strategies for achieving 

those goals, and priorities for administrative and construction solutions. The desired, long-term

performance goals are expressed in the Guide as time to recovery of a function. Time is a metric that is 

readily and broadly understood, and that can be evaluated. 

There are two categories of performance when it comes to the built environment: 1) desired performance 

to be achieved over time through the resilience plan; and 2) anticipated performance if an event were to 

occur before the resilience plan was implemented. 

To determine where shortfalls, or gaps, exist, the anticipated performance of the existing built 

environment needs to be estimated for the prevailing community hazards. Desired performance goals, 

anticipated performance of the existing built environment, and recovery phases, times, and costs for a 

hazard event provide a more complete basis for communities to assess expected gaps in performance, to 

prioritize improvements, and to allocate resources. 

The Guide recommends that performance be evaluated at three levels – routine, design, and extreme – for 

each hazard. This approach helps communities understand performance across a reasonable range of 

hazard levels. Better understanding of how the built environment performs and recovers over a range of 

hazard levels further informs community decisions about priorities.

4.1.1. Establish Long-Term Community Goals

Long-term community goals guide the resilience planning, prioritization, resource allocations, and 

implementation process. The goals are high-level statements of outcomes that are desired to improve the 

community. Examples of these types of goal statements include the following:

 Improve resilience of an infrastructure system to improve community reliability and functions.

 Improve or add redundancy to a transportation route that is vulnerable to damage and minimize 

travel impacts on residents and supply impacts on businesses.

 Revitalize an existing area through improvements that make the community more resilient.
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4.1.2. Establish Desired Performance Goals

Setting desired performance goals depends on determining a couple of important factors: (1) an 

acceptable level of damage for a particular hazard level (performance level) and (2) a corresponding time 

to restore full functionality. Performance levels address life safety, which are the focus of building and 

fire codes, as well as post-event functionality, which generally is not covered by those codes. Determining 

desired time to recover functionality (also shortened to recovery time) helps to prioritize repair and 

reconstruction efforts. Additionally, performance goals should consider the role of a facility or system on 

local, regional, and possibly national and international needs. For instance, if a production plant in a 

community is the national supplier for a particular product, the impact of damage to that plant extends 

well beyond the community. 

The term cluster is used to denote groups of buildings or infrastructure systems serving a common 

function. However, a cluster does not necessarily mean that the buildings or infrastructure systems are 

geographically co-located. Examples are residential housing, schools, or healthcare facilities and 

supporting infrastructure. Such clusters serve community social institutions and should have similar 

performance goals. 

Setting desired performance goals for safety and functionality of the built environment informs resilience 

plans for new construction as well as for existing buildings and infrastructure systems. New construction 

that meets the desired performance goals helps to improve a community‘s resilience over time. For 

existing construction, having clear performance goals helps identify clusters that may benefit from 

retrofits, relocation, or other measures to ensure that these clusters provide the needed social service. 

Recovery phases. Recovery times for building clusters and infrastructure systems are organized around 

sequential recovery phases. The Guide uses the recovery phases as defined by the FEMA National 

Disaster Recovery Framework [FEMA 2011], as shown in Figure 4-1: short-term, intermediate, and longterm. The first phase usually focuses on rescue, stabilization, and preparing for recovery, and is expected 

to occur over a period of days. The second phase focuses on restoring the neighborhoods, workforce, and 

caring for the vulnerable populations and extends for weeks to months. The third phase relates to 

restoring the community‘s economy, social institutions and physical infrastructure, and may continue for 

years after the event. Activities during each recovery phase may overlap in planning and execution.

Figure 4-1: National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) recovery continuum [FEMA 2011]

Performance levels for buildings. To ensure compatibility with codes and standards, common definitions 

of performance levels should be used for buildings and infrastructure systems. These range from safe and 

operational to unsafe. Table 4-1 provides definitions for building cluster performance levels that are used 

in the Guide. These were designated originally by SPUR [2009] to define the seismic performance of 

buildings.
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Table 4-1: Performance level definitions for building clusters

Performance Level Definition

A. Safe and 

operational

These facilities incur minor damage and continue to function without interruption. 

Essential facilities need this level of function.

B. Safe and usable 

during repair

These facilities experience moderate damage to their finishes, contents and support 

systems. They receive green tags from qualified inspectors and are safe to occupy after a 

hazard event. This performance is suitable for shelter-in-place residential buildings, 

neighborhood businesses and services, and other businesses or services deemed 

important to community recovery.

C. Safe and not usable

These facilities meet minimum safety goals, but remain closed until they are repaired. 

These facilities receive yellow tags from qualified inspectors. This performance may be 

suitable for some of the facilities that support the community‘s economy. Demand for 

business and market factors will determine when they need to be functional.

D. Unsafe – partial or 

complete collapse

These facilities are dangerous because the extent of damage may lead to casualties. 

These buildings receive red tags from qualified inspectors.

Functional categories. Categorizing community functions based on the support they lend to recovery is 

helpful when determining desired performance goals for the built environment. Table 4-2 gives an 

example of assigning building clusters by recovery phases. Infrastructure systems that support the clusters 

are not listed, but should be considered. 

Four functional categories are suggested for inclusion in the three phases of recovery. Building clusters 

are assigned to one of those categories. The four categories include critical facilities and emergency 

housing (short-term), workforce housing and neighborhood restoration (intermediate term), and 

community restoration (long-term). Communities should consider human and social needs when 

assigning building clusters to the three recovery phases. 

While three recovery phases are designated, there will be considerable overlap in their initiation and 

completion, as indicated in Figure 4-1. It is conceivable that all three recovery phases could start shortly 

after the hazard event. 

Functionality levels for building clusters. Although individual buildings may be assigned desired

performance levels that reflect their role in the community, the overall ability of a building cluster to 

serve its social institutions can be measured by how many or what percentage of buildings in the cluster 

are functioning. For purposes of planning, it is helpful to set goals for three levels of functionality based 

on the percentage of buildings in the cluster that are functional, as defined in Table 4-3. This process 

allows a community to define the shape of the recovery curves shown in Figure 4-1 for each recovery 

phase. When building clusters only have a few buildings, it may be appropriate to measure the percentage 

of service restored directly, rather than the number of buildings with restored functionality within a 

cluster.

In the post-event environment, 90 % functional can be considered full restoration. In many communities, 

approximately 10 % of the buildings are out of service for a variety of reasons at any given time

[OSSPAC 2013]. The gradual, phased recovery levels in Figure 4-1 also show that not all buildings in a 

cluster are expected to recover at the same time. Chapter 12 in Volume II provides information on 

building cluster identification, and considerations for setting performance levels. 
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Table 4-2: Sample assignment of building clusters by functional category and recovery phases

Short-Term

Critical Facilities

 Disaster debris and recycling centers 

 Emergency operations centers

 Hospitals and essential healthcare facilities 

 Police and fire stations

Emergency Housing

 Animal shelters

 Banking facilities (location known by 

community)

 Food distribution centers

 Faith and community-based organizations

 Gas stations (location known by community)

 Nursing homes, transitional housing

 Public shelters 

 Residential shelter-in-place 

 Shelter for emergency response and recovery 

workers

Intermediate

Housing/Neighborhoods/Business

 Buildings or space for social services (e.g., 

child services) and prosecution activities

 Daycare centers 

 Essential city services facilities

 Houses of worship

 Local Businesses 

 Local grocery stores (location known by 

community)

 Medical provider offices

 Neighborhood retail stores

 Residential housing 

 Schools

Long-Term

Community Recovery

 Commercial and industrial businesses

 Non-emergency city services

 Resilient landscape repair, redesign, 

reconstruction, repairs to domestic environment

Table 4-3: Functionality levels for building clusters

Functionality Performance Level

30% functional Minimum number needed to initiate the activities assigned to the cluster

60% functional Minimum number needed to initiate usual operations

90% functional Minimum number needed to declare cluster is operating at normal capacity

Supporting infrastructure systems. Building clusters require service from supporting infrastructure 

systems to be functional. In the short-term, temporary solutions, such as emergency generators or portable 

water supplies, may be used to restore service and functionality. Communities are encouraged to set 

functionality levels (Table 4-3) for the recovery of infrastructure systems so they support the building 

cluster recovery. The focus should be on system performance in terms of the percentage of capacity 
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provided at the 30 %, 60 %, and 90 % milestones for the various building clusters. Consideration should 

be given to redundancies inherent in each infrastructure system and the consequence of the disruption. 

New construction and retrofit. The procedure for setting performance levels for buildings, building 

clusters, and supporting infrastructure systems is directly applicable to new construction and retrofit 

projects. The design criteria established for those projects should be based on the same performance goal 

for the building cluster they support. To achieve long-term community resilience, all new construction 

should be designed to the community-designated performance level.

4.1.3. Define Community Hazards and Levels

With desired performance goals established, the next step is to determine the expected response of the 

existing buildings and infrastructure systems to a community‘s prevailing hazards, which may include 

natural, human-caused, or technological hazards. The community resilience plan is anchored to the design 

event – that is, the hazard level used to design buildings and other structures – but consideration of 

routine as well as extreme events may identify additional issues to be considered. The planning team is 

encouraged to evaluate multiple hazard levels to ensure comprehensive planning for a range of possible 

hazard conditions that may occur.

Prevailing hazards. Each community has its own prevalent hazards to consider when planning for longterm community resilience. The following is a partial list of hazards that communities may face: 

 Wind – wind storms, hurricanes, tornadoes

 Earthquake – ground shaking, ground faults, landslides, liquefaction

 Inundation – river flood, flash flood, coastal flood/storm surge, tsunami

 Fire – urban/building, wildfire, and fire following another hazard event

 Snow or Rain – snow storms, ice storms, blizzards, drifts, ice dams, freezes or thaws, rain storms 

that overwhelm drainage systems

 Technological or Human-caused – blasts, vehicular (including rail) impacts, toxic environmental 

contamination as a result of industrial or other accidents as well as due to clean-up/disposal 

methods after a hazard event 

Many of these hazards, such as wind, earthquake, and snow, have specified design criteria in current 

codes and standards for the built environment. However, some hazards do not yet have specified design 

criteria, such as tornadoes.

Each community should identify and plan for prevailing hazards that may have significant negative 

impact on the built environment. Communities may have already identified their prevailing hazards when 

developing a natural hazard mitigation plan, emergency operations plan, continuity of operations plan, or 

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) Guide [CPG 201, FEMA 2013b]. 

Historical data may also be useful for understanding potential hazards and consequences, but should be 

interpreted and used carefully. Historical events are specific examples of the range of possible future 

events a community may face. Data on damage from historical events depend on a number of factors, 

including the density and condition of the built environment, the intensity of the hazard, and the 

community‘s readiness to respond and recover. Available sources of information for hazards include the 

following:

 The U.S. Geological Survey provides seismic design maps, historical data, and other related 

information and resources [USGS 2015]. 
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 FEMA [FEMA 2015a] provides flood maps and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides 

guidance for riverine and coastal flooding [USACE 2015]. 

 The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration‘s [NOAA 2015] U.S. Climate 

Resilience Toolkit provides information on many natural hazards. In addition to the listed 

hazards, communities may also need to address weather and climate effects, such as sea level rise 

and drought that also can impact community resilience. 

 The National Weather Service interactive flood map information [NWS 2015] provides historical 

data for inundation and hurricane hazards for each state. 

Hazard levels. For each hazard identified, communities are encouraged to determine three hazard levels 

for planning: 

 Routine – This hazard level is below the design level for the built environment and occurs more 

frequently. This event has a high probability of occurring (on the order of 50 % over a 50-year 

period, as indicated in Table 4-4). At this level, resilient buildings and infrastructure systems 

should remain functional and not experience any significant damage that would disrupt social 

functions in the community.

 Design – This is the hazard level used in codes and standards for buildings, bridges, and similar 

physical infrastructure systems. Design-level events tend to have a probability of occurring on the 

order of 10 % over a 50-year period for ordinary structures. The design hazard level for a specific 

building or infrastructure component may be greater than that for ordinary buildings, as required 

by its occupancy and risk category classifications in the adopted codes (see Chapter 12, Volume 

II for more information). To support community resilience, buildings and infrastructure systems 

should remain sufficiently functional to support the response and recovery of the community as 

defined by the performance levels identified in Table 4-1 and Table 4-3. Achievement of desired 

performance levels may require additional design criteria beyond those in codes and standards.

 Extreme – This hazard level exceeds the design level for the built environment. (Seismic ground 

motion hazards refer to the maximum considered event, which has a probabilistic basis that is 

supplemented with historical data). Extreme events have a small probability of occurrence, on the 

order of 2 % to 3 % over a 50-year period. The extreme hazard level should include those rare 

hazards that may plausibly impact a community, but may not be the greatest possible hazard a 

community can envision. They also may include anticipated long-term changes in hazards due to 

climate change. Critical facilities and infrastructure systems should remain partially functional at 

this level, with ability to restore functionality when needed to support the response and recovery 

of the community as defined by the performance levels. Other buildings and infrastructure 

systems should perform at a level that protects the occupants, though they may need to be 

rescued. Emergency response plans should be developed for scenarios based on this hazard level.

 Where hazard levels are not defined by code, the community may establish a scenario or hazard 

level based on available guidance or predicted frequency of occurrence. This case is indicated in 

Table 12-3 (Chapter 12, Volume II) by locally determined. 

Table 4-4 shows hazard levels for buildings and other structures based on American Society of Civil 

Engineers (ASCE) Structural Engineering Institute (SEI) Standard 7-10 [ASCE/SEI 2010]. The defined 

hazards are reported in two ways: as an average interval of occurrence over time (mean recurrence 

interval, MRI) or as the probability the event level occurring in a 50-year time period. The probability of 

occurrence description helps convey the relative likelihood of hazard event occurrence for the same time 

period.
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Table 4-4: Hazard levels for buildings and facilities

Hazard Routine Design Extreme

Ground Snow 50 year MRI or 

64% in 50 years

300 to 500 year MRI1or 

15 to 10% in 50 years

TBD4

Rain Locally determined2 Locally determined2 Locally determined2

Wind – Non-Hurricane 50 year MRI or

64% in 50 years

700 year MRI or

7% in 50 year

1,700 year MRI3or

3% in 50 years

Wind – Hurricane 50 to 100 year MRI or

64 to 39% in 50 years

700 year MRI or

7% in 50 years

1,700 year MRI3or

3% in 50 years

Wind – Tornado Locally determined3 Locally determined3 Locally determined3

Earthquake4

50 year MRI or

64% in 50 years

500 year MRI or

10% in 50 years

2,500 year MRI or

2% in 50 years

Tsunami Locally determined3 Locally determined3 Locally determined3

Flood Locally determined 100 to 500 year MRI or

39 to 10% in 50 years

Locally determined

Fire – Wildfire Locally determined4 Locally determined4 Locally determined4

Fire –Urban/Manmade Locally determined4 Locally determined4 Locally determined4

Blast / Terrorism Locally determined5 Locally determined5 Locally determined5

1

For the northeast, 1.6 (the Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) factor on snow load) times the 50-year 

ground snow load is equivalent to the 300 to 500 year snow load. 

2 Rain is designed by rainfall intensity of inches per hour or mm/h, as specified by the local code. 

3 Tornado and tsunami loads are not addressed in ASCE 7-10. Tornadoes are presently classified by the EF scale. 

See FEMA 361 [2015b] for tornado EF-scale wind speeds.

4 Hazards to be determined in conjunction with design professionals based on deterministic scenarios. 

5 Hazards to be determined based on deterministic scenarios. Reference UFC 04-020-01 [DoD 2008] for examples 

of deterministic scenarios.

Table 4-5 reports the three levels of seismic hazard defined by SPUR for use in San Francisco's resilience 

planning. When there is incomplete information about hazards, scenarios can be used for planning or 

assessment purposes. Note that the expected hazard level, as defined by SPUR, is consistent with the 

design hazard level defined in the Guide. Scenarios are often developed for specific examples of hazard 

events that do not have a probabilistic basis (see Table 4-4) and should be used for more general 

resilience plans.
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Table 4-5: SPUR [2009] seismic hazard level definitions

Routine

Earthquakes that are likely to occur routinely. Routine earthquakes are defined as having a 70% 

probability of occurring in 50 years. In general, earthquakes of this size will have magnitudes 

equal to 5.0 – 5.5, should not cause any noticeable damage, and should only serve as a reminder of 

the inevitable. San Francisco‘s Department of Building Inspection (DBI) uses this earthquake level 

in their Administrative Bulletin AB 083 [San Francisco Building Code 2014] for purposes of 

defining the service level performance of tall buildings.

Expected

An earthquake that can reasonably be expected to occur once during the useful life of a 

structure or system. It is defined as having a 10% probability of occurrence in 50 years. San 

Francisco‘s Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPSS) [ATC 2010] assumed that a 

magnitude 7.2 earthquake located on the peninsula segment of the San Andreas Fault would 

produce this level of shaking in most of the city.

Extreme 

(Maximum 

Considered 

Earthquake)

The extreme earthquake that can reasonably be expected to occur on a nearby fault. It is defined

as having a 2% probability of occurrence in 50 years. The CAPSS defined magnitude 7.9 

earthquake located on the peninsula segment of the San Andreas Fault would produce this level of 

shaking in most of the city.

Hazard Impact. The concept of hazard impact is intended to capture the consequences of an event for a 

given hazard level. The same hazard level may result in varying consequences, depending on the 

disruption and damage to the built environment. Two measures are used to address the consequences of 

the event: the size of the affected area and the level of disruption to community functions. For example, a 

wildfire in wilderness areas, where there is little population, can burn many square miles of forest with 

little disruption. On the other hand, the 1991 Oakland Hills firestorm burned 1500 acres, 25 lives were 

lost, and 150 people were injured. The fire destroyed nearly 3400 structures and caused $1.5 billion in 

damage [USFA 1991]. The affected area was relatively small compared to other wildfires; but the 

disruption to the affected population and built environment was severe. 

To assist communities in determining the anticipated performance of buildings and infrastructure systems 

(see Section 4.1.4), Table 4-6 defines categories for the size of the affected area and anticipated disruption 

level. Estimating the impact for a potential hazard event will help the community to determine anticipated 

performance levels and the extent of mutual aid that they may need. 

Table 4-7 shows examples of hazard impacts of past events. Even though the DaVinci Fire (Los Angeles, 

2014) became an uncontrolled (extreme) building fire that destroyed the apartment complex under 

construction [Rocha 2015], the impact on the community was localized. Similarly, the EF5 tornadoes 

(extreme) that struck Moore, OK [Kuligowski et al 2013] only affected a portion of the city and did not 

cause disruption to the entire community. In fact, unaffected Moore businesses were able to assist in the 

recovery. However, the same hazard event may cause varying levels of damage and disruption in 

communities. The Loma Prieta earthquake (California, 1989) caused regional damage and disruptions 

near Watsonville [Nakata et al 1999], but moderate community level damage and disruption to San 

Francisco. A hazard event may have sequential hazards, such as winds followed by storm surge during 

Hurricane Sandy in 2012 [FEMA 2013]. A number of New Jersey communities first lost power when 

winds came onshore (routine level, less than design wind speeds) and power distribution lines were 

damaged. When the storm surge subsequently came onshore (design event of 100- to 200-year flood 

elevation), a smaller set of communities were inundated, but many functions were severely disrupted in 

these areas.
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Table 4-6: Affected area and anticipated community disruption level

Category Definition

Affected 

Area

Localized

Damage and lost functionality are contained within an isolated area of the community. 

While the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) may open, it is able to organize needed 

actions within a few days and allow the community to return to normal operations and 

manages recovery. Economic impacts are localized.

Community

Significant damage and loss of functionality are contained within the community, such that 

assistance is required from neighboring areas that were not affected. The EOC opens, 

directs the response and turns recovery over to usual processes once the City governance 

structure takes over. Economic impacts extend to the region or state.

Regional

Significant damage occurs beyond community boundaries. Area needing emergency 

response and recovery assistance covers multiple communities in a region, each activating 

their respective EOCs and seeking assistance in response and recovery from outside the 

region. Economic impacts may extend national and globally.

Anticipated Disruption Level

Minor

All required response and recovery assistance is handled within the normal operating 

procedures of the affected community agencies, departments, and local businesses with 

little to no disruption to the normal flow of living. Critical facilities and emergency housing 

are functional and community infrastructure systems are functional with local minor 

damage.

Moderate

Community EOC activates and all response and recovery assistance is orchestrated locally, 

primarily using local resources. Critical facilities and emergency housing are functional and 

community infrastructure systems are partially functional.

Severe

Response and recovery efforts are beyond the authority and capability of local communities 

that are affected and outside coordination is needed to meet the needs of the multiple 

jurisdictions affected. Professional services and physical resources are needed from outside 

of the region. Critical facilities and emergency housing may have moderate damage but can 

be occupied with repairs; community infrastructure systems are not functional for most 

needs. 

Table 4-7: Examples of hazard impacts

Event Community Year Level Affected Area Disruption Level

DaVinci Apartment Fire Los Angeles 2014 Extreme Localized Minor

Moore OK Tornado Moore 2013 Extreme Localized Moderate

Loma Prieta EQ Watsonville 1989 Design Regional Severe

Loma Prieta EQ San Francisco 1989 Design Community Moderate

Hurricane Sandy (wind event) New Jersey 2012 Routine Regional Moderate

Hurricane Sandy (storm surge event) New Jersey 2012 Design Regional Severe
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4.1.4. Determine Anticipated Performance 

The anticipated or likely performance of the designated clusters of existing buildings and infrastructure 

systems also needs to be estimated. Anticipated performance depends on (1) the likely level of damage 

that occurs during the hazard event (performance level) and (2) the corresponding recovery time to restore 

full functionality. The recovery time depends on the performance: a cluster may need limited repairs or 

perhaps replacement. This information, when compared with the performance goals previously set, 

defines the gaps that need to be addressed and informs pre-event planning for post-event response. 

The majority of buildings and infrastructure systems in service today were designed to serve their 

intended functions on a daily basis under the normal environmental conditions. In addition, buildings and 

other structures are designed to provide occupant safety during a design-level hazard event, but they may 

not continue to be functional. Design and construction of buildings and physical infrastructure systems 

are performed by builders, architects, and engineers following their community codes and standards of 

practice. 

Codes and standards are continually evolving due to changing technology, changing needs, and new 

information, which sometimes comes from observed performance deficiencies during past events. Much 

of the existing built environment may not meet the long-term performance goals set by communities. 

Temporary or interim solutions can address short-term needs while long-term, permanent solutions are set 

in place. 

Assessment of the existing built environment should consider the performance expectations for adopted 

design codes. Since community resilience focuses on performance at the community level, selected 

building clusters and infrastructure systems are evaluated against the desired performance goals and 

functions based on social needs. Current engineering practice for predicting the performance of buildings 

and infrastructure systems under specific hazard events often is based on expert judgment or past 

experience of other communities. These techniques are constantly being developed and improved and

Chapters 12 through 16 (Volume II) provide available guidance on how to estimate the performance of 

existing buildings and infrastructure systems. 

Lack of personal experience with a damaging hazard event, and lack of understanding about the level of 

damage expected when a significant hazard event occurs, can lead to misconceptions about a 

community‘s vulnerability. Communities can gain better insights into their vulnerabilities based on 

national experience, not just local events, and can better address those vulnerabilities by adopting and 

enforcing land use guidelines and national model building codes. The cost of compliance for new 

construction is often minimal compared to the cost of recovery and reconstruction. 

4.1.5. Summarize the Results 

The planning team should document desired performance goals and anticipated performance for the built 

environment to improve communication among stakeholders and to support a comprehensive, high-level 

summary of the integrated performance of a community‘s buildings and infrastructure systems. To 

support the documentation, a tabular presentation of the many facets of a community resilience plan is 

provided in this Guide. It includes a detailed resilience table for each of the building clusters and 

infrastructure systems as well as summary resilience table that provides an integrated community-level 

overview. The detailed table includes a format for entering the desired performance goals for all clusters 

and subsystems defined for the community for each hazard level, as well as the anticipated performance 

levels for the hazard(s) under consideration. The summary tables combine all of this information together 

for buildings and infrastructure systems. Example tables are included in Chapters 12 to 16 (Volume II). 

The community resilience planning example (Chapter 9) for a fictitious community demonstrates how to

use the six-step process and how to complete the resilience tables.
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4.2. References

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE 2010) ASCE 7-10: Minimum Design Loads for Buildings 

and Other Structures, Second Edition, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Structural 

Engineering Institute (SEI), Reston, VA.

Applied Technology Council (ATC 2010) ATC 52-2: Here Today—Here Tomorrow: The Road to 

Earthquake Resilience in San Francisco: A Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety, ATC-52-2, 

Prepared for the San Francisco Department of Building Inspection (DBI) City and County of San 

Francisco under the Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPSS) Project, Redwood City, CA.

Department of Defense (DoD 2008) Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC): DoD Security Engineering 

Facilities Planning Manual, UFC 4-020-01, Department of Defense (DoD), Washington, DC.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2011) National Disaster Recovery Framework, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2013) FEMA P-942: Mitigation Assessment Team 

Report: Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and New York, Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), Washington, DC.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2013b) Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 

Assessment Guide, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, Second Edition, August, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2015a) Flood Map Service Center, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC. https://msc.fema.gov/portal. Viewed October 27, 2017.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2015b) FEMA P-361: Safe Rooms for Tornadoes and 

Hurricanes, Third Edition, Third Edition, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 

Washington, DC.

Kuligowski, E.D., L.T. Phan, M.L. Levitan, D.P. Jorgensen (2013) Preliminary Reconnaissance of the 

May 20, 2013, Newcastle-Moore Tornado in Oklahoma, NIST SP 1164, National Institute of Standards 

and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD, December 3.

Nakata, J.K. et al (1999) The October 17, 1989, Loma Prieta, California, Earthquake—Selected 

Photographs, Digital Data Series DDS-29, Version 1.2, U.S. Geological Survey, Denver, CO.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA 2015) US Climate Resilience Toolkit, 

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C., https://toolkit.climate.gov/.

National Weather Service (NWS 2015) Interactive Flood Information Map. National Weather Service

(NWS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Silver Spring, MD.

Rocha, V. (2015) ―Accelerant sparked Da Vinci fire, officials say, as reward hits $170,000,‖ Los Angeles 

Times, January 21, 2015, 10:57 AM, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-170000-rewardaccelerant-da-vinci-fire-20150121-story.html.

San Francisco Building Code (2014) Requirements and Guidelines for the Seismic Design of New Tall 

Buildings using Non-Prescriptive Seismic-Design Procedures, No. AB-083, Administrative Bulletins, San 

Francisco Building Code Department of Building Inspection, 1660 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA.

San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR 2009) The Resilient City: What San 

Francisco Needs from its Seismic Mitigation Policies, San Francisco Planning and Urban Research 

Association (SPUR), San Francisco, CA.
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United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE 2015) Flood Risk Management Program, United States 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Alexandria, VA, 

http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/Contact/ContactUs.aspx. Viewed October 27, 2015. 

United States Geological Survey (USGS 2015) Seismic Design Maps & Tools, United States Geological 

Survey (USGS), Washington, DC, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/designmaps/. Viewed October 27, 

2015.

United States Fire Administration (USFA 1991) The East Bay Hills Fire, Oakland-Berkeley, California, 

USFA-TR-060, United States Fire Administration (USFA), Technical Report Series, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), Washington, DC, October, http://www.berkeleyside.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/tr-060.pdf.
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5. Step 4: Plan Development

The planning team can next evaluate gaps between desired and 

anticipated performance of the built environment and identify 

solutions based on information about the community, its social 

dimensions, and the condition of the built environment.

Solutions can be based on combinations of administrative and 

construction options, and multiple solutions may be proposed. 

Based on the long-term community goals and the most 

significant or serious gaps in performance, proposed solutions 

can be prioritized and selected. Strategies are then developed to 

identify opportunities and methods to implement the solutions as 

opportunities and funding become available.

5.1. Evaluate Gaps Between Desired and Anticipated Performance

The information in the compiled tables provides a record and a visual presentation of the recovery time 

gaps between the desired performance levels of the built environment and the anticipated performance. It 

should be relatively easy to identify those gaps, and to see differences between community expectations 

and the reality of current buildings and infrastructure systems. 

5.2. Identify Potential Solutions to Address Gaps

With the gaps articulated, potential solutions for the built environment can be identified and evaluated. 

There may be multiple solutions or multiple stages to meet desired performance goals, including solutions 

to meet immediate needs as well as long-term, permanent solutions. 

Both administrative and construction solutions should be considered. Each type can improve 

performance, reduce damage during hazard events, advance efforts to restore functions within desired 

timeframes, and improve overall community resilience.

Some administrative activities have low implementation costs and can yield significant long-term benefit. 

All communities, large and small, can identify and commit to implementing these kinds of solutions to 

support their needs. 

Sometimes administrative and construction solutions can be combined. When a hazard event occurs, 

buildings and infrastructure systems are intended to provide protection to the occupants from serious 

injury or death. Communities can go a long way in achieving this goal by adopting and enforcing current 

building codes and regulations for new construction and the retrofit of existing buildings, where 

necessary, for public safety or to minimize community impacts.

Construction projects can add redundancies or robustness to buildings and infrastructure systems. For 

some hazards, such as flooding, the threat can be redirected. Mitigation projects completed prior to 

significant hazard events can support long-term resilience strategies, reduce demands during recovery, 

and speed the overall recovery process. Mitigation projects often are construction projects, but can also be 

administrative in nature. For instance, communities can adopt and enforce codes and standards with local 

amendments that strengthen resilience or develop mutual aid agreements that support streamlined 

recovery processes. 
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5.2.1. Potential Administrative Solutions

A community may begin to address performance gaps by considering administrative solutions. The 

following list of suggestions is not intended to be comprehensive, nor is it intended to be prescriptive.

Each community is unique based on the characteristics and goals described above. Communities may 

have other administrative solutions that will support their resilience goals and strategies.

1. Organize and maintain a resilience office with designated leadership. Whether full- or part-time, 

this office is responsible for leading development, implementation, and evaluation of community 

resilience strategies, including integration with other community plans, public outreach, 

collaboration with private stakeholders, and updating the plan on a regular basis. 

2. Align and integrate the resilience plan in a comprehensive approach with other community plans 

(e.g., General Plan, Emergency Operations Plan, Business Continuity Management Programs and 

Plans, Land Use Plans, Infrastructure and Transportation Plans, Housing Plans, Economic 

Development Plans, and plans related to the environment). This can be a lengthy collaborative 

process with the responsible agencies or partners, and may require community engagement – but 

this activity may be the difference between success and failure of a community resilience plan. 

3. Align the resilience planning concepts with the FEMA Mitigation Plan [FEMA 2013] and 

prioritize mitigation grant requests with the resilience plan. 

4. Utilize land use planning tools to manage the green infrastructure (natural capital) that supports 

community goals and to set design standards for construction in high hazard zones, such as flood 

plains, coastal areas, areas susceptible to liquefaction, etc. 

5. Develop processes and guidelines for post-event assessments and repairs that will accelerate the 

evaluation process and the designation of buildings that can be used during repair.

6. Collaborate with adjacent communities to promote common understanding and opportunities for 

mutual aid during response and recovery phases. Develop mutual aid agreements as directed by 

the resilience plan.

7. Inform all stakeholders by publishing the performance gaps and resilience plans in transparent 

and publicly available methods, including announcements of results and progress. 

8. Collaborate with managers of state- and federally-owned and leased properties to meet 

community resilience regulations or codes, if those community requirements are more stringent.

9. Develop and conduct education and awareness programs for all stakeholders in the community to 

enhance understanding, preparedness, and opportunities for improving community resilience. 

10. Form a service provider council of public and private infrastructure owners and provide a 

quarterly forum for them to meet and discuss current activities and issues, dependencies, and 

future plans.

5.2.2. Potential Construction Solutions

Targeted construction projects aligned with a community‘s resilience goals and plans can greatly enhance 

community resilience. The following solutions are suggested for consideration when developing 

resilience plans for significant long-term impacts. Again, each community is unique based on the 

characteristics and goals described above, and each may have its own solutions. Furthermore, each 

community will need to consider the costs and benefits to the public and private sectors as part of the 

decision process.
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Existing construction

1. Identify opportunities for natural resource protection and implementation solutions. This may 

include sediment and erosion control, stream corridor restoration, forest management, 

conservation easements, and wetland restoration and preservation. 

2. Retrofit public buildings to initiate the resilience implementation process in the community. This, 

along with relocating or reconstructing public facilities, may immediately improve the 

community‘s ability to recover from a hazard event and may provide an incentive for private 

building owners to do the same. 

3. Develop incentives and financial support to encourage critical buildings to be retrofitted or 

relocated to meet community codes and regulations, and to achieve desired performance and 

community resilience goals. 

4. Implement or augment inspection programs to identify buildings and infrastructure systems that

need improvements to adequately protect life safety for the prevalent hazards.

5. Consider the appropriateness of limited mandatory relocation or retrofitting programs for critical 

facilities through local ordinances. Identify and communicate viable funding opportunities.

New construction

1. Adopt and enforce the latest national model building codes, standards, and regulations for the 

built environment, and add requirements if needed to support specific community resilience 

goals. 

2. Assure the effectiveness of the building department in enforcing current codes and standards 

during permit evaluation and construction inspections to ensure that the latest processes are being 

followed. 

3. Enhance codes and standards with local ordinances to support resilience plans, stating

performance goals in a transparent manner. 

5.3. Prioritize Potential Solutions and Develop Implementation Strategy

Once the gaps are evaluated and prioritized relative to community goals, strategies can be developed to 

mitigate damage and improve recovery of functions across the community. Implementation strategies

with short-term and long-term solutions should align community goals, address prioritized gaps and 

needs, and be integrated into all other community plans, such as land use planning or economic 

development. This process is compatible with the FEMA Mitigation Plan [FEMA 2013], which many 

communities are using. The Guide can incorporate mitigation planning into the community resilience 

process as part of the planning needed to restore community functionality. 

Resilience strategies should identify opportunities to improve the built environment, or build-back better. 

After a disaster, there is significant pressure to restore the built environment quickly. Without preestablished strategies and solutions, communities often rebuild to pre-event conditions. With advance 

planning, reconstruction can promote community resilience. Immediately after a major hazard event, 

there is often community support for higher design standards, appropriate land use changes, requirements 

to repair and retrofit to higher resilience levels or the need to relocate facilities. 
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5.4. References

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2013) Local Mitigation Planning Handbook, March, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Washington DC.
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6. Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval

Plan Preparation. Community resilience goals, plans, and 

implementation strategies should be documented with supporting 

information from Planning Steps 1 through 4 (see Table 1-2, page 17).

Some basic guidance for plan preparation can be found in a publication 

by FEMA [2010]:

 Keep the language simple and clear by writing in plain 

English. 

 Summarize important information with checklists and visual 

aids, such as maps and flowcharts.

 Avoid using jargon and minimize the use of acronyms.

 Provide enough detail to convey an easily understood plan that is actionable. 

The planning team needs to determine an appropriate level of detail for the published plan. The adequacy, 

feasibility, and clarity of the plan should be key criteria for determining the level of detail. The team 

should include documents that help explain the proposed plan and recommended solutions, but avoid 

providing detailed documentation, such as analysis. Additional information can be made available to the 

public upon request.

Planners should estimate the resources needed to execute the plan, and should indicate its level of 

accuracy – including an explanation of the built-in assumptions. Some solutions may require further 

analysis before accurate estimates can be developed. Although it is not the team‘s responsibility to 

identify funding sources for implementation at early stages, the need for resources should be 

acknowledged. Possible funding mechanisms can be identified, including proposed redirection of funding 

from other planned projects. 

Plan Review. The planning team should develop and implement an outreach strategy to be certain that the 

community at large is aware of and understands the plan, and to increase appreciation of and support for 

the approach. Outreach should be an integral part of the team‘s operation from its initial launch, and the 

outreach strategy should include various engagement efforts as planning proceeds. 

At a minimum, when the plan nears readiness, the team leaders should consider doing the following:

 Have the draft plan reviewed by appropriate community government officials and other area 

governments, likely before it is released to the public. Involving these officials in planning and 

keeping them abreast of efforts along the way will improve the plan‘s accuracy and relevance and 

reduce the time required for final review.

 Make the draft plan available for public review in electronic and print formats in readily 

accessible locations. Posting on public websites is highly recommended. Accommodation may be 

required for special populations; for example, language issues may need to be addressed so that 

all interested members of the community are able to review the draft and participate in the public 

comment process. The plan should be available in alternate formats, upon request, to maintain 

compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.

A number of outreach options are available:

 Use various social media to announce the draft to the community.
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 Hold one or more public meetings to present and discuss the draft plan with the community; 

encourage and prepare for media attendance at all public meetings. Conducting separate events

for the news media are an additional consideration.

 Arrange one or more meetings with individual stakeholder groups whose cooperation will be vital 

for successful implementation of the plan. Some of these meetings may take place, before the 

public review process begins, to ensure the accuracy and relevance of the draft report. 

 Ensure that employees of all government agencies with responsibilities under the plan are aware 

of and informed about the draft plan.

 Collect public comments and make them available to the community.

Community meetings, forums, and other forms of outreach can promote understanding about the 

community goals, social needs, existing buildings and infrastructure systems, prevailing hazards, and 

short- and long-term benefits of the proposed solutions and actions. For short- and long-term success, 

transparent public collaboration and support processes are a necessity.

Changes should be expected during this review process as the larger community weighs in on the 

community resilience plan. It is likely that compromises will need to be made to reflect stakeholders‘ 

varying points of views. Vigorous discussion is often a prerequisite for, and a good indicator of, a plan 

that reflects a diverse community. Healthy engagement at this level and during the plan‘s review may lead 

to a plan of action that garners broad support and the level of commitment necessary for long-term 

success in improving community resilience.

Plan Approval. Once the community plan for improving resilience is finalized with stakeholder and 

community input, the plan should be adopted formally by the community‘s governing body. Formal 

adoption by the community is needed to ensure that the plan will influence local government activities, to 

encourage and lay the foundation for collaborative agreements with private owners and stakeholders, and 

to provide a basis for implementation through local statutes or ordinances. Formal adoption also 

establishes the authority required for changes and modifications to the plan, and is the basis for budgetrelated actions that may be required in order to gain access to the necessary resources. 

References

FEMA (2010) Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Comprehensive Preparedness 

Guide (CPG) 101, Version 2.0, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC.
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7. Step 6: Plan Implementation and Maintenance

Plan Implementation. Community resilience leaders and staff should 

develop and maintain a plan to track and document the implementation 

of adopted strategies and solutions. Implementation also requires 

continued active outreach and communication with the stakeholders 

involved in the plan‘s development and adoption – and with the 

broader community – through a variety of mechanisms. 

With the planning portion of the six-step process complete – for now –

the ―heavy lifting‖ shifts from the planning team to the government 

offices and private sector organizations responsible for execution that 

will turn the plan into action. 

The approved community resilience plan should be incorporated into 

these organizations‘ priorities and related policies, plans, and 

programs. To maintain momentum and continuity and to assure that the plan receives the persistent 

attention that it will need, it is critical that the governing body of the community designate a leader 

responsible for tracking, coordinating, and communicating resilience-related efforts. This can be the 

community resilience leader for the planning team, or the responsibility can shift to another office or 

official. This is an important decision, and one that should ensure that resilience does not become the 

province of an existing government function (e.g., public safety) to the exclusion of other functions. 

Nevertheless, the organizational structure selected is less important than the continuous and visible 

commitment to the community resilience plan, as demonstrated by the most senior leaders of the 

community. 

If the six-step planning process has been followed, the plan will point to prioritized actions to be taken. 

Even so, some additional work may be needed to organize implementation strategies in terms of 

responsibilities, and to coordinate the flow and timing of actions so that there is a clear road map and 

schedule for those charged with implementation. In some cases, communities may decide to tackle the 

―easier‖ or less costly recommendations first, including administrative solutions. In other communities, 

leaders may decide to undertake at least one or more major actions in the built environment to ensure 

continued broad engagement and momentum. The resources available and the timing of budgets may help 

to determine which actions are taken first and those that will be scheduled for a later date. 

The adopted community plan needs to be reviewed on a regular basis, consistent with the community‘s 

planning cycles. Progress can be tracked and publically posted. It is also important to report regularly on 

support garnered, challenges encountered, changing conditions, and benefits accrued over time.

The resilience plan, including the implementation strategy or specific solutions, may need to be modified

depending on changes in the social, physical, characteristics of the community, unexpected events, or 

improved understanding of the built environment and impact of prevailing hazards.

Plan Maintenance. Ideally, the community resilience planning team will recommend a process for 

reviewing, evaluating, and revising the plan on a recurring basis. The resilience plan, including the 

implementation strategy or specific solutions, may need to be modified depending on changes in the 

social or physical characteristics of the community, unexpected events, or improved understanding of the 

built environment and the impact of prevailing hazards. These include the availability of innovative 

technological approaches to strengthen the performance of buildings and infrastructure. They also include 

lessons learned during implementation of the plan.

The initial part of plan maintenance is monitoring progress. A high priority on communicating progress 

and challenges is needed to achieve the following goals: 
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 Help the community to keep its focus on, and support for, implementing the plan, including the 

many stakeholders who participate in or benefit from its implementation.

 Ensure that the plan is adjusted for new information, insights, and circumstances. 

The following key events are likely triggers for considering a review of the plan [FEMA 2010]:

 A major incident.

 A change in operational resources (e.g., policy, personnel, organizational structures, management 

processes, facilities, equipment).

 A formal update of planning guidance or standards.

 A change in elected officials.

 Major hazard-related exercises.

 A change in the jurisdiction‘s demographics or hazard or threat profile.

 A change in the acceptability of various risks.

 The enactment of new or amended laws or ordinances.

References

FEMA (2010) Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Comprehensive Preparedness 

Guide (CPG) 101, Version 2.0, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC.
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8. Future Directions

8.1. Feedback on the Guide

NIST teamed with a broad cross-section of public and private sector stakeholders and experts to develop 

this Guide. A broad network of stakeholders has been engaged through workshops around the country, the 

solicitation of public comments, and direct interactions with community officials and others. 

NIST encourages comments and feedback on the Guide. It will be especially valuable to have 

communities and those with responsibilities for, and expertise with, the built environment to offer 

reactions and recommendations for improvements. Based on responses to the Guide, NIST may revise it 

in the future. To facilitate this process, NIST would welcome answers to the following questions:

 Is this Guide useful in helping communities to better plan for disaster resilience? If so, in what 

ways is it useful? If not, how is it lacking?

 Is this Guide leading to improved resilience planning and execution at the community level?

 How can the Guide be better organized or presented?

Send comments to resilience@nist.gov.

8.2. Community Resilience Panel for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems 

NIST is establishing a Community Resilience Panel for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems (Panel). The 

Panel is a forum to achieve broad stakeholder collaboration and consensus around goals and actions 

needed to achieve community resilience and to derive benefits from that improved resilience. The Panel 

will carry out its mission through a number of activities:

 Engaging and connecting community and cross-sector stakeholders by creating a process to 

encourage and support community resilience that focuses on buildings and infrastructure.

 Identifying policy and standards-related gaps and impediments to community resilience planning 

and execution.

 Raising awareness of sector dependencies and cascading effects of disasters.

 Identifying or developing consistent resilience definitions and metrics for use across sectors.

 Contributing to current and future resilience guidance documents (including the Guide).

 Reducing barriers to achieving community resilience.

 Developing and maintaining a Resilience Knowledge Base (RKB), a web-based repository for 

documents, data, tools, etc.

The Panel is engaging stakeholder interests that include, but are not limited to, community planning, 

disaster recovery, emergency management, business continuity, insurance/re-insurance, state and local 

government, standards and code development, and the design, construction, and maintenance of buildings 

and infrastructure systems (water and wastewater, energy, communications, transportation). 

More information is available at www.CRPanel.org.
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9. Community Resilience Planning Example – Riverbend, USA

This example uses a fictional community, called Riverbend, USA, to walk through the six-step process

presented in the Guide. Riverbend is not intended to capture all possible aspects or complexities of 

community functions or the built environment. Rather, it is intended to help users of the Guide better 

understand aspects of the planning process, and assist them in applying the Guide in their own 

communities. The solutions used in Riverbend may or may not be appropriate for other communities. 

NIST encourages each community to determine its own path forward to improve community resilience. 

9.1. Introduction

Riverbend is a community with a population of approximately 50,000. It is situated in a valley along the 

Central River that was settled by farmers and loggers over 160 years ago because of the area‘s fertile 

farmland and abundant timber resources. The Riverbend economy is driven by agriculture, 

manufacturing, finance, and real estate development. It is a typical middle-class city with a median 

household income close to the national average. Over the past few years, the logging and mining 

industries have experienced a downturn. Nevertheless, the city has been successful in transforming its 

economy by attracting employers to its other growing economic sectors.

Ms. Smith grew up in Riverbend and returned to live there after her community of Rockyside suffered the 

devastating impact of a flood. Ms. Smith was a former city council member in Rockyside, and was 

subsequently elected to the Riverbend City Council one year later. 

Deeply affected by the flood she experienced in Rockyside, Ms. Smith advocated for development of a 

plan to make Riverbend more resilient. In making her case to the Mayor and other community leaders, 

she noted that Riverbend had hazard risks similar to Rockyside and warned a similar event could happen 

in Riverbend. Ms. Smith completed some research and believed the new NIST Guide contained a 

methodology flexible enough for her community, and that Rockyside might have fared better if it had 

developed and implemented resilience plans. After several lengthy discussions with other City Council 

members, the Mayor asked Ms. Smith to call and lead a City Hall meeting to engage the community. The 

goal of the meeting was to gauge and build support for developing a community resilience plan. 

At the City Hall meeting, a majority of those who attended supported developing a plan to make 

Riverbend‘s buildings and infrastructure systems more resilient. Several community groups were 

concerned at first that there would be many difficult challenges in developing a plan, and were 

particularly worried about the cost to support such an initiative. However, after additional discussion 

about the importance of resilience in their community, residents saw the benefits of living and working in 

a more resilient community and Riverbend moved forward with developing a resilience plan. Many 

participants at the meeting wanted to be included in the process and offered help. As a result of the 

support at the meeting, Ms. Smith was appointed by the Mayor to lead the formation of a planning team

and follow through with the methodology presented in the Guide. With approval of the City Council and 

support of the community, Ms. Smith began with Step 1.
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9.2. Step 1: Form a Collaborative Planning Team (Chapter 2)

Achieving community resilience requires a broad base of support from 

stakeholders. As Riverbend would likely need assistance from neighboring 

communities, regions, and the state, Ms. Smith recognized that she needed to 

identify and engage public and private stakeholders within the community, as 

well as from Fallsborough, the city across the river. Ms. Smith established a 

large work group representing a broad cross section of Riverbend. She made 

sure to include those who could help define social needs. Her vision for the 

organization of the planning process included a planning team overseen by the 

city council, and seven task groups, as shown in Figure 9-1.

Figure 9-1: Riverbend, USA planning team and stakeholder task groups

The planning team was responsible for leading development of the resilience plan. The team reported to 

the City Council, which oversaw the process and would approve the final resilience plan. An important 

part of the planning team‘s responsibility was coordinating the task groups. A representative from each 

task group was included on the planning team to coordinate between the groups and to address 

dependencies among buildings and infrastructure systems. The responsibilities of the task groups were

articulated as follows: 

 Hazards Task Group – Identify potential hazards and appropriate scenarios so the buildings and 

infrastructure systems task groups can determine the anticipated performance of the built 

environment.

 Social Dimensions Task Group– Determine the social needs and priorities of the community and 

determine the time after a hazard event when these needs must be met. Table 9-2 lists the 

representatives of the social dimensions task group by social institution. 

 Buildings Task Group– Identify and classify the buildings within Riverbend into one of the four 

building clusters described in the Guide (i.e., critical facilities, emergency housing, 

housing/neighborhoods, community recovery) based on how they meet the community‘s response 

and recovery needs. 

 Transportation Task Group– Identify and characterize the transportation systems within the city

boundary and the transportation network at the state and regional level, and how these systems

meet response and recovery needs. 
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Table 9-1: Riverbend, USA government leaders and community stakeholders

City Council Planning Team Hazard Task Group

 Mayor

 Four commissioners

 Auditor

 Resilience lead (Ms. Smith)

 City manager

 City engineer

 Public works representative

 City planner

 Riverbend Office of Emergency Management

 Buildings department

 Finance representative

 Community outreach/ public information

 Representative from each task group 

 State geological survey 

 Riverbend Department of Community 

Development

 University hazard specialist(s)

 Flood plain manager

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

 Department of Environmental Protection

Social Dimensions Task Group Buildings Task Group Transportation Task Group

 See Table 9-2 for representatives by social 

institution.

 Building owners 

 Critical facility managers (hospitals, schools)

 Privately owned building stock representative(s)

 Local industry facility managers

 General contractor

 Real estate representatives

 Engineers

 Developers

 Construction firms

 Fire department

 Land developers

 State and county Departments of Transportation

 Engineer from Riverbend Department of Public 

Works

 Railroad representatives

 Emergency management representatives 

 Traffic engineer

 Bridge engineer 

Energy Task Group Communications Task Group Water and Wastewater Task Group

 Regional generation representatives

 Distribution system provider (load serving 

entity)

 Electric power engineer

 Riverbend Office of Emergency Management

 Liquid fuel distributor

 State Public Utility Commission (PUC)

 State Department of Energy

 State PUC

 Telecommunication service providers

 Riverbend Office of Emergency Management 

 Riverbend Department of Public Works

 Fallsborough water engineer

 Emergency manager of regional fire and rescue

 Environmental quality agency
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Table 9-2: Social Dimensions Task Group by social institution

Family and Kinship Economic Government Health

 Neighborhood 

representatives 

 Citizens groups

 City Chamber of 

Commerce 

 Retail managers

 Gas station managers

 Banking and finance 

sector

 Local major industries

 Police and fire/EMS

 City Department of 

Parks and Recreation

 Senior living center

 Aging and people with 

disabilities services

 Courts

 Local health 

department

 Hospitals

 Urgent care/health 

offices

 Behavioral health 

care providers

Education Community Service

Organizations Religious and Cultural Media

 Public schools

 Private schools

 Community college /

higher education

 Shelter/food bank 

representatives

 American Red Cross 

 Recreational/civic 

clubs or groups

 Local religious, cultural, 

or belief groups

 Local media outlets

 Energy Task Group– Identify and characterize infrastructure systems for electric power, natural 

gas, and liquid fuel systems, and for a hydroelectric dam, and their role in supporting response 

and recovery needs.

 Communications Task Group– Identify and characterize communication systems, including 

wireline, cellular, broadcast, and cable systems, and their role in supporting response and 

recovery needs. Additional responsibilities included coordinating with emergency response 

agencies to support emergency communication needs.

 Water and Wastewater Task Group– Identify and characterize water and wastewater 

infrastructure systems, and their role supporting response and recovery needs. Additional 

responsibilities included coordinating with the public health authority, environmental quality

agency, firefighters, hospitals, and others to meet community needs.

The task groups largely worked in parallel, and at times jointly, with oversight from the planning team 

throughout the planning process. To promote team member participation, particularly for members 

outside the local community, face-to-face meetings were supplemented with virtual meeting capability 

(e.g., teleconference, webinar, and video conference).

9.3. Step 2: Understand the Situation (Chapter 3)

Once the planning team and task groups were created, the next step was to characterize both the social 

and built environments. The planning team assigned the social dimensions task group to characterize the 

social environment in a report. Similarly, the planning team asked each of the building and infrastructure 

system task groups to characterize their portion of the built environment. The hazards group was tasked to 

complete a report on the potential hazards that Riverbend might face. These reports were completed in 

parallel, using the guidance in the NIST Guide. The planning team, with representatives of each task 

group, then worked together to determine the links between the social and built environments. The 
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following sections summarize the reports of the task groups, except for the hazards task group, which is 

addressed in Step 3.

9.3.1. Identify and Characterize the Social Dimensions (Section 3.1)

Riverbend is a typical middle-class city with an economy (Table 9-3)

consisting of trade, government, manufacturing, education and health 

services, finance and business services, hospitality, and construction.

One of the largest single employers is the National Aircraft Parts 

(NAP) factory. NAP manufactures aircraft parts for the region and 

employs over 3,000 people, many of whom live in Riverbend. NAP 

is also the sole supplier of several equipment components critical to 

the U.S. military. Approximately 40 % of the community‘s 

workforce is employed by small businesses. As the mining and 

logging industries have declined, Riverbend has successfully

transformed its economy by attracting employers to its growing professional and business services, health 

services, and transportation sectors.

According to the 2010 United States Census, the 

median household income is slightly above the U.S. 

national average at $52,612 (see Table 9-4). Almost 

20 % of the population, 25 years and older, have a 

four-year degree or higher. Statistics show the 

diversity in age of the city, with 40 % of the 

population under the age of 18, and 13 % of the 

population 65 years of age or older. Additionally, 

approximately 15 % of the population in Riverbend 

has a disability (includes those needing aid for 

mobility or access), as defined by the U.S. Census 

Bureau.

The rate of emigration is low in Riverbend. A 

majority (59 %) of the housing units are owner 

occupied and the homeowner vacancy rate is low 

(2.6 %). Additionally, according to a demographic 

study conducted by the state university two years 

ago, the population of Riverbend is increasing and

is expected to grow steadily over the next three 

decades.

Riverbend is governed by its City Council, which 

includes the Mayor, four Commissioners, and an

auditor (see Table 9-1, page 60). The city's Office 

of Neighborhood Services provides a liaison

between the city government and Riverbend's 

neighborhood associations. Riverbend has an active 

parks and recreation department that maintains widely-used bike paths, local parks, and walking/hiking 

trails. Additionally, there is a popular senior center and several golf courses located in the area. 

The city is served by Central Regional Fire and Rescue, a special purpose district providing firefighting 

and emergency services. Because Riverbend is so close to the Central River, two of the four fire stations 

within Central Regional Fire and Rescue have water rescue capabilities. Additionally, there is a close 

Table 9-3: Employment for Riverbend, USA

Industry Percentage

Trade, transportation, and utilities 22

Government 18

Manufacturing 17

Education and health services 13

Professional and business services 8

Leisure and hospitality 8

Construction 5

Financial activities 4

Other services 3

Mining and logging 1

Information 1
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relationship between the Central Regional Fire and Rescue and the Riverbend Department of Public 

Works. The police department has over 80 staff members – one third of whom are civilian – to provide 

services.

Riverbend‘s health system offers a 

variety of health services, including 

mental health services. The county 

department of health is located 

within the city limits. Additionally, 

Memorial Hospital provides a 76-bed 

facility, with over 130 health care 

providers on staff. There also are two 

urgent care facilities and a local nonprofit healthcare provider in the city.

Riverbend is served by a public 

school district and a few private 

schools. There are a total of 23 K-12 

public schools within the school 

district, serving approximately 9000 

students. A two-year community 

college, which serves over 12,000 

students, is located on the north edge 

of the downtown area. 

Riverbend offers several programs to 

provide social support to those in 

need. Two food banks serve

approximately 10,000 people each 

year from around the region. The city

also has a homeless shelter that 

provides food, shelter, clothing, 

counseling and mental health 

referrals to over 100 homeless people 

each day.

Riverbend has local print and radio 

media. The city relies on nearby 

Fallsborough for local television 

news.

Overall, the residents of Riverbend

have a good quality of life. A healthy percentage of residents are employed either inside or near the 

community. There is limited public transportation available, but most households have at least one 

vehicle, with 90 % relying on personal transportation (including carpool) to commute to and from work. 

Historically, the unemployment rate has been close to the national average. Riverbend has very active 

government and community groups. Many neighborhoods have citizen watch groups, and they have 

become involved in safety-related city government decisions. 

Once the social dimensions task group characterized the social environment, they worked to identify the

dependencies among and within Riverbend‘s social institutions. Following the Guide‘s methodology, the 

task group recognized that a disruption in the built environment that affects one social institution is likely 

to affect others. Using the templates provided in Chapter 10, Volume II of the Guide (Tables 10-3 and 10-

4), the group identified ways in which the social institutions in Riverbend depend on each other, and 

Table 9-4: Riverbend, USA population demographics

Demographic Values

Household income under $35,000 32%

Household income over $100,000 13%

Median household income $52,612

Households from different state within last 5 years 11%

Population (25 +) with four year degree or higher 18.4%

Population (25+) with graduate degree 6.1%

Ratio of Transfer Payments* to Earned Income 18%

Households receiving Food Stamp/SNAP benefits 15%

Unemployment rate 5.5%

Population below 18 years 40%

Population 65 years of age or above 13%

Population with disabilities 15%

Employed population, uninsured 82%

Unemployed population uninsured 63%

Gender (female) 51%

*Social security and public assistance
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identified each institution‘s internal dependencies. For example, the residents rely on businesses including 

National Aircraft Parts for employment, and services such as daycare. 

The team also identified an important dependence for the city‘s services, particularly in the wake of a 

disaster. With severe disruption to services and damage to the built environment, there might be a 

diminished workforce available to perform those services. Immediately after the event, fire and police 

services, emergency medical services, and other emergency operations could be hindered. Longer-term, it 

could affect Riverbend‘s tax base, especially if people left the community. 

Filling out the Guide‘s tables with information specific to Riverbend helped the task group better 

understand these dependencies—information they then shared with the rest of the planning team. This 

process helped identify the functions that are most critical during various phases of a hazard event and to 

identify potential vulnerabilities that may result from cascading failures in other infrastructure systems.

9.3.2. Characterize Built Environment (Section 3.2)

The buildings and infrastructure systems within and 

surrounding Riverbend were built over a long period of 

time. Roughly one-third of the downtown area lies within 

the 100-year flood plain. Most of the buildings and 

infrastructure in the downtown area were constructed soon 

after the city was founded, and are older than the rest of 

Riverbend. Following a downturn of the logging industry in 

the 1970s, the downtown area declined, and many residents 

moved into other neighborhoods. The city limits expanded, 

and the associated infrastructure to support this geographic growth absorbed much of Riverbend‘s 

resources. Downtown became characterized by lower-income residents and smaller businesses.

In the past 10 years, an improved economy has made downtown more attractive and there is significant 

reinvestment in the downtown building stock and urban renewal.

As discussed previously, each of the building and infrastructure system task groups was asked to develop 

a brief report on the status of their portion of the built environment. The following summarizes their key 

findings.

Buildings. The building stock in Riverbend ranges from unreinforced masonry buildings constructed over 

100 years ago to mobile homes and single unit timber-framed houses built from 1950-1990. There also 

are modern steel mid-rise buildings, mainly for commercial or industrial purposes. A significant number 

of unreinforced masonry buildings remain downtown adjacent to the river. Table 9-5 summarizes 

buildings by occupancy class. The Riverbend task group also grouped buildings by age and state of 

maintenance to better understand their characteristics.

Transportation. Riverbend is bisected by an interstate freeway. It also includes state, county, and local 

roadways. Although there are other transportation systems in the region, including a regional airport and 

freight rail line, people rely on the roadway system for personal transport and goods are delivered by 

truck. The regional airport is located 48 km (30 miles) away from Riverbend, and has limited commercial 

airline service.

Only one bridge crosses the Central River. It is a 4-lane interstate bridge that is the primary crossing of 

the Central River in the region – completed in 1955 and widened in 1980. The next crossing of the 

Central River is 16 km (10 miles) north. The bridge also carries the water main from the Fallsborough 

Water Treatment Plant into Riverbend, an important dependency between the transportation and water 
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systems. Therefore, failure of this bridge would significantly disrupt water service to the residents and 

businesses of Riverbend. 

Table 9-5: Building occupancy class and building count

Occupancy Class No. Buildings Occupancy Class No. Buildings

Residential Industrial

 Single family dwelling 11,131  Heavy 65

 Mobile home 1,292  Light 45

 Multifamily dwelling 3,073  Food/drug/chemicals 13

 Temporary lodging 9  Metals/minerals processing 4

 Institutional dormitory 30  High technology -

 Nursing home 5  Construction 147

Commercial  Agriculture 38

 Retail trade 175  Religion/non-profit 77

 Wholesale trade 88  Government

 Personal and repair services 176  General Service 27

 Professional/technical services 270  Emergency response 9

 Banks 18  Education

 Hospital 3  Grade schools 30

 Medical office/clinic 62  College/university 10

 Entertainment/recreation 122

 Theaters 5

 Parking -

Within the downtown area, many people rely on transit bus service for mobility. Commuter bus service to 

Fallsborough provides transit access for workers. However, personal automobiles are the primary means 

of mobility for the majority of the population, and traffic during peak commute times is a frequent 

complaint for residents.

Energy. Riverbend Gas and Electric is an investor-owned utility that provides power and natural gas to 

Riverbend. It purchases power from a hydroelectric power plant located in Fallsborough that is 

maintained by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers. There are no petroleum refineries in the city. Liquid fuel 

is transported to Riverbend via a liquid fuel pipeline from the neighboring major industrial center.

Electric power distribution is predominantly through overhead transmission lines with a single crossing of 

the Central River.
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Communications. One national and one regional telecommunication company provide internet, cellular

and wireline phone, and cable services to residents and businesses in Riverbend. Though these companies 

operate within a competitive environment, they have managed to co-exist and work together. The smaller, 

regional company has similar technology and shares infrastructure with the national company. In fact, the 

smaller regional service provider leases space from the national company‘s regional Central Office, 

located outside of Riverbend. 

Water and wastewater. Riverbend does not have a water treatment plant. It gets its drinking water from 

Fallsborough, which is a wholesale provider selling treated water to a number of neighboring cities. 

Riverbend relies on County Environmental Services to treat sanitary sewage and storm water. The 

Riverbend Department of Public Works is responsible for designing, constructing, operating, and 

maintaining the city's water and wastewater infrastructure.

9.3.3. Link Social Dimensions and the Built Environment (Section 3.3)

Once the task groups characterized the social and built environments, representatives of the task groups 

worked with the planning team to link the social needs and institutions to the built environment. (Note:

Chapter 10 in Volume II of the Guide provides examples of how to accomplish this goal). This is a key 

step in the process of addressing community resilience because the eight social institutions identified in 

the Guide (i.e., government, education, economics, health, family, media, religious/cultural groups, and 

community service organizations) rely on the built environment to function. 

Following the approach in the Guide, the Riverbend planning team created one table for each 

infrastructure system (transportation, water and wastewater, energy, and communication) and for 

buildings. For each social institution, the table provides the following information: 

1. Purpose of the infrastructure system or buildings

2. How that purpose is actualized

3. Direct and indirect consequences for individuals, groups, and the community when hazard events 

lead to degraded functionality

The Riverbend planning team found that identifying the direct and indirect consequences of a hazard 

event was particularly useful for developing priorities and community performance goals when planning 

for resilience (the next step in the process – see Section 9.4).

Table 9-6 shows a partially completed table that links the social institutions and transportation systems. 

Although the entire table was completed by the Riverbend planning team, the table presented here 

displays only their highest priorities. Table 9-6 shows that the transportation network of roads and the one 

interstate bridge are used to distribute goods for processing, as well as final goods for sale. The 

transportation network of roads and the interstate bridge allows consumers to access goods and services

and provide a means for the workforce to go to and return from work. The regional airport (located 

outside of the community) is also included in the table, but it only provides limited commercial flights.

The table also shows how the loss of any of these systems could disrupt the supply chain (i.e., the supply, 

manufacture, and distribution of goods and services) and increase the time commuters would spend on the 

road and their commuting costs. Indirect impacts are also listed in Table 9-6 to capture the potential for 

cascading effects. The team noted that supply chain disruptions could lead to short- and long-term 

business losses, rising prices, reduced competitiveness, and dwindling market share.

Table 9-7 shows how the Riverbend planning team characterized their social institutions‘ reliance on the 

buildings within their community. Table 9-7 only shows the highest priority links identified by the 

planning team. The table emphasizes the importance of the city‘s downtown area to the city‘s economy, 

as well as the importance of the local government to the day-to-day operation and overall safety of the 

city.
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Table 9-6: Links between Riverbend’s social institutions and transportation systems

Social Institution Purpose of Transportation 

within each Social Institution

How Actualized within Built 

Environment

Possible Impacts if Transportation Systems Are Damaged

Direct Indirect

Family  Access to and from housing  1 Interstate road

 1 freight rail line

 1 bridge for vehicular 

traffic

 Regional airport

 Displaced population (lack 

of access)

 Inability to physically 

connect with others

 Demand for short-term/ 

nearby shelter

Economic  Distribute goods for 

processing

 Obtain labor and capital

 Distribute intermediate goods

 Distribute final goods for sale

 Bring sellers (providers) and 

consumers together

 Getting to and from work

 Loss of access to raw 

materials

 Loss of employment

 Increase in commuting 

time and costs

 Consumers unable to 

obtain goods and services

 Loss of taxes, market 

share

 Price increases

Government

Health

Education

Community Service 

Religious 

Media

Note: Only the highest Riverbend priorities are shown in this table. The entire table was completed by the planning team.
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Table 9-7: Links between Riverbend’s social institutions and buildings

Social Institution Purpose of Buildings within 

each Social Institution

How Actualized within Built 

Environment

Possible Impacts if Buildings are Damaged

Direct Indirect

Family

Economic  Point of sale

 Location of employment, 

gathering points

 Prepare materials for 

transport

 Store materials

 House equipment and 

machinery

 Design and develop aircraft 

parts

 City‘s downtown: 

 Stores

 Restaurants

 Bank

 Salon and barbershop

 Internet cafe

 Houses and apartments

 National Aircraft Parts plant

 Loss of revenue

 Loss of goods and 

services for sale

 Loss of ability to 

manufacture goods

 Loss of employment

 Loss of income

 Loss of housing

 Loss of materials

 Decrease in social capital

 Loss of taxes, market 

share

 Price increases

Government  Provide work and meeting 

space for leaders and staff

 House public safety and 

emergency response 

capabilities 

 Offices

 Police stations

 Fire and EMS stations

 Emergency operations center 

(EOC)

 Jail

 Courthouse

 Libraries

 Diminished emergency 

response

 Disruption to government 

continuity

 Loss of archived materials

 Increased casualties 

and economic 

damage

Health Care

Education

Community Service

Religious 

Media

Note: Only the highest Riverbend priorities are shown in this table. The entire table was completed by the planning team.
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Table 9-7 shows that the buildings within the downtown district, from an economic standpoint, primarily 

support three things: 1) goods and services for consumers; 2) housing; and 3) jobs for the community. 

The downtown district consists of small-business retail, restaurants, banks, several salons and 

barbershops, and an internet café, as well as houses and apartments. The community benefits from a 

strong economy and sales tax. The downtown buildings also provide places for people to gather and 

socialize, increasing the social capital within the community. The loss of the buildings in the downtown 

area would result in loss of employment and income for workers, access to goods and services, revenue 

for the businesses, and housing for the community. 

Table 9-7 also shows that the manufacturing plant facility, i.e., National Aircraft Parts (NAP), serves four 

functions: 1) store materials; 2) house equipment and machinery vital to manufacturing aircraft parts; 3) 

design and develop the parts; and 4) prepare materials for transport. The loss of this facility would result 

in the loss of income and employment for workers, loss of access to goods, loss of materials, and loss of 

revenue for the plant. Without the downtown area or the NAP, Riverbend also would experience 

secondary losses, such as a decrease in tax revenues.

Among other functions, Riverbend‘s government buildings provide office and meeting spaces for 

community leaders and staff and house public safety and emergency response capabilities (especially 

important during and after a hazard event). Government buildings consist of police stations, fire and 

emergency medical services (EMS) stations, an emergency operations center, mixed office spaces, a jail, 

a courthouse, and a library. The loss of any of these structures could disrupt continuity of government 

services. Damage to critical facilities could lead to diminished emergency response. 

Although the transportation system and buildings were high priority concerns for Riverbend, the planning 

team recognized that dependencies were a key consideration. Buildings would not be functional without 

services from the supporting infrastructure systems: energy, transportation, water and wastewater, and 

communications. That led Riverbend planners to think about the dependencies between buildings and 

infrastructure systems, focusing on the continued functionality of critical downtown buildings that could 

have major impacts on public safety and the economy if they were damaged badly.

As they considered dependencies and social needs, the planning team worked with the task groups to 

identify the building clusters and supporting infrastructure systems. Table 9-8 shows the building clusters 

identified by the Riverbend planning team: Critical Facilities, Emergency Housing,

Housing/Neighborhood/Business, and Community Recovery. That table also shows some specific 

buildings that were included in the building clusters. Since interruptions to the NAP factory‘s operations 

could be costly to the local and regional economies and impact the nation‘s military readiness, the 

planning team decided to categorize NAP as part of the Critical Facilities cluster. 
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Table 9-8: Riverbend, USA building clusters grouped by functional category and recovery phases

Building Clusters

Critical Facilities (Short-Term) Housing/Neighborhoods/Business (Intermediate)

1. Police and fire/EMS stations

2. Emergency operations centers

3. Memorial hospital and urgent care facilities, 

including pharmacies

4. Disaster debris and recycling centers

5. National Aircraft Parts (NAP) Factory

1. Waste management facilities

2. Schools

3. Medical provider offices

4. Downtown district

5. Local businesses outside of the downtown area

6. Daycare centers 

7. Religious/cultural centers/facilities

8. Fitness centers

9. Buildings or space for social services (e.g., child 

services) and prosecution activities

Emergency Housing (Short-Term) Community Recovery (Long-Term)

1. Residential shelter-in-place 

2. Food distribution centers

3. Animal shelters

4. Faith and community-based organizations

5. Emergency shelter for emergency response and 

recovery workers

6. Gas stations 

7. Banking facilities 

1. Residential housing 

2. Commercial and industrial businesses, except National 

Aircraft Parts Factory

3. Non-emergency city services

4. Resilient landscape repair, redesign, reconstruction, 

and repairs to domestic environment

9.4. Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives (Chapter 4)

After the planning team worked with the task groups to characterize the 

social and built environments of their community, they were ready to 

move forward in developing their community resilience plan.

9.4.1. Establish Long-Term Community Goals (Section 4.1.1)

The resilience plan is most effective if it supports long-term community 

growth and development goals. The planning team and task groups 

worked to identify long-term community goals based on existing 

community plans and input from community agencies and organizations. Three long-term goals and 

metrics were identified for Riverbend:
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1. Minimal disruptions to daily life and commerce

 Metric: Average commute time

2. Stable employment and new, diversified businesses to support economic growth

 Metrics: Jobs added; tax base value

3. Improved ability of government services and critical facilities to function after hazard events

 Metrics: Government services outages (number); disaster response drill performance; 

emergency response time

9.4.2. Establish Desired Performance Goals for the Built Environment (Section 4.1.2)

The planning team reviewed the links between the social and built environments to understand how 

building and infrastructure systems supported their social needs and institutions. Desired performance 

goals for buildings and infrastructure systems were determined independently from the type of hazard 

faced by the community. The desired performance goals were set to support community services before 

and after hazard events, including the sequence of services needed after an event. 

The following high-level performance goals were set for each hazard level (routine, design, and extreme):

1. For routine events:

 Meet community social needs within 1-3 days of the hazard event 

 Buildings and infrastructure systems should be fully functional within 3 days of the hazard 

event

2. For design events:

 Meet critical social needs within 1 week and community social needs within 1-12 weeks 

 Complete reconstruction projects within two years of the event

3. For extreme events:

 Preserve critical facilities, including key industry (e.g., NAP, see Table 9-8 for other critical 

facilities)

 Meet critical social needs within 12 weeks 

 Complete reconstruction within 3- 4 years. 

The planning team then worked with the building and infrastructure task groups to develop performance 

goals for building clusters and infrastructure systems to meet these high-level goals, using the tables in 

Chapters 12 to 16 (Volume II) of the Guide. Table 9-9 summarizes the tables presented in this example. 

However, only the design level event is discussed in detail for the sake of brevity. 

The Riverbend planning team used the functionality levels for building clusters in Table 4-3 on page 40

(30 %, 60 %, and 90 %) to indicate the recovery sequencing expected to reach their desired performance 

goals:

 30 % represents the fraction of buildings within a cluster or portion of infrastructure systems that 

need to be functional to initiate recovery activities

 60 % represents the fraction needed for usual (i.e., daily) operations to resume at a reduced scale

 90 % represents the fraction needed to declare the building cluster or infrastructure system at 

normal operating capacity.
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(Note: The performance goals are tailored for a number of buildings or infrastructure system 

components, such as bridges. In Riverbend, the simple example of a single bridge focuses more directly 

on services provided, rather than the number of bridges able to provide service.)

Table 9-9: Summary of resilience tables for routine, design, and extreme events 

Hazard Routine Hazard Design Hazard Extreme Hazard

Building Table 9-18, page 88 Table 9-11, page 76 Table 9-25, page 95

Transportation Table 9-19, page 89 Table 9-12, page 77 Table 9-26, page 96

Energy Table 9-20, page 90 Table 9-13, page 78 Table 9-27, page 97

Water Table 9-21, page 91 Table 9-14, page 79 Table 9-28, page 98

Waste Water Table 9-22, page 92 Table 9-15, page 80 Table 9-29, page 99

Communications Table 9-23, page 93 Table 9-16, page 81 Table 9-30, page 100

Summary Table 9-24, page 94 Table 9-17, page 82 Table 9-31, page 101

The following summaries briefly describe the key considerations taken into account by the planning team 

and task groups when they completed the performance goals tables for the design hazard event (Table 

9-11 to Table 9-16 document the desired performance goals and anticipated performance for the design 

hazards):

Buildings (Chapter 12, Volume II). The planning team felt that critical facilities should experience little 

interruption or damage in a design hazard event (see Table 9-11) since these facilities were needed to 

support recovery and emergency services to the rest of the community. The NAP factory was also 

considered a critical facility due to its high level of employment and importance to the nation‘s defense 

needs. Therefore, it was important that this facility experience minimal interruption in a design hazard 

event. The Emergency Housing cluster would need to perform well so it could be used in the days and 

weeks following a design hazard event. The planning team made this decision because they felt that the 

performance goals for the Housing and Community Recovery building clusters could be made less 

stringent if emergency housing was available. They also decided it was unreasonable to set high

performance goals for certain buildings (e.g., unreinforced masonry) due to inherent limitations of this 

construction type.

Transportation (Chapter 13, Volume II). The planning team found that many of the example 

transportation system components in the Guide performance goals table (see Chapter 13 in Volume II) did 

not apply to their community. Therefore, they only included the appropriate components in the 

performance goals table completed for Riverbend (see Table 9-12).

As previously discussed, the four-lane interstate bridge over the Central River is a major concern for the 

community because it is the only crossing that carries traffic and supports a water pipeline into Riverbend 

from Fallsborough. As seen in Table 9-12, after engaging with the State Department of Transportation, 

the planning team decided the bridge would be inspected for structural damage the day of the hazard 

event to ensure it was safe for emergency vehicles. If declared structurally sound, the bridge would be 

reopened with one lane in each direction (this meets the nominal 60 % functionality criterion), while the 

exterior two lanes would remain closed to permit a detailed inspection of damage to the fascia and soffit 

of the bridge. All lanes would then be open, hopefully by the day following the hazard event, making the 
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bridge fully operational (meeting the nominal 90 % functionality criterion). Although the regional airport 

was not within the community, the planning team worked with representatives from the airport to 

understand the impact a design event could have on its functionality, so Riverbend would know how 

disruptions might affect their businesses. 

Riverbend is served primarily by local roads. The team set goals for local roads to critical building 

clusters to be fully operational within 1 to 3 days, including debris removal, if necessary. 

Energy (Chapter 14, Volume II). Similar to the transportation table, the planning team used the relevant 

rows in the energy performance goals table in Chapter 14. Riverbend‘s energy is generated solely by a 

hydroelectric power plant. Interruption to this facility would shut down the power system, which could in 

turn cause critical facilities within the city to become non-functional after their standby power is 

expended. As they collaborated, Riverbend planners were told by operators that the power plant was 

designed to continue functioning in a design event, and that was a reasonable goal. 

For power infrastructure serving critical facilities, the team set a goal of being able to continue operations 

during or immediately after the hazard event and operate at full capacity the next day (see Table 9-13). In 

general, the restoration of the transmission and distribution infrastructure needed to be restored to 

building clusters within 1 to 3 days.

Communications (Chapter 15, Volume II). The planning team recognized that working with local 

service providers was essential to setting realistic performance goals for communications infrastructure. 

The regional and national telecommunications companies that served Riverbend work together in many 

ways. They share a regional Central Office and exchange nodes. The service providers told the 

community planners they thought it was reasonable to assume that these nodes would perform well in a 

design hazard event because of the recent construction and quality of the facilities. 

The communication service providers worked with the resilience team planners to understand community 

priorities and desired performance goals. In terms of the  ̳last mile‘ (i.e., distribution system), the 

performance goal of little or no disruption to critical facilities such as hospitals, fire stations, and the 

emergency operations center (EOC) was set (see Table 9-16) to facilitate emergency services and

recovery of function. The service providers understood the performance goals, but stated it would take 1 

to 4 weeks (typically 1 week) to restore full functionality to communications infrastructure serving other 

building clusters. The community agreed that this was reasonable. 

Water (Chapter 16, Volume II). With only one water main crossing the river from Fallsborough to 

Riverbend, water supply is a major concern. Critical facilities need a water supply within 1 to 3 days to 

remain fully functional. In addition to potable water, facilities also need an adequate water supply for fire

sprinklers if they are occupied. The team concluded that housing and businesses could do without potable 

water for up to one week (indicated by the 90 % in Table 9-14). Temporary water supplies brought into 

the community would serve as a stopgap measure until then.

Wastewater (Chapter 16, Volume II). It was important that the wastewater infrastructure system not

pollute the river with raw sewage, and that backups and overflows did not impact the community. The 

planning team set a goal of one week for the wastewater treatment plant to be operating with primary 

treatment and disinfection (indicated as 1 to 4 weeks in Table 9-15). However, they realized that meeting 

all regulatory requirements may take some time after a design event, and therefore set a goal of meeting 

those requirements in 6 months (shown as 4-36 months in Table 9-15). That would result in violations of 

those requirements, a consequence the team was prepared to accept.

9.4.3. Define Community Hazards and Hazard Levels (Section 4.1.3)

Identifying the community‘s prevailing hazards was the next step. Working in parallel with the other 

groups, the hazards task group reviewed existing hazard maps and historical events that had struck 
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Riverbend. Earthquakes and flooding were the main hazards that affected Riverbend (Table 9-10). 

Seismic hazards typically have a lower probability of occurrence (or longer mean recurrence interval, 

MRI) for the same 50-year period due to their sudden, unpredictable occurrence, and lack of warning 

time.

Table 9-10: Hazards considered by Riverbend, USA

Hazard Routine Design Extreme

Earthquake 50 year MRI or

64% in 50 years

500 year MRI or

10% in 50 years

2,500 year MRI or

2% in 50 years

Flooding 50-year MRI or

64% in 50 years

100-year MRI or

39% in 50 years

500-year MRI or

10% in 50 years

Three levels were identified for each hazard: a routine event, a design event, and an extreme event. 

Section 4.1.3 defines the three hazard levels as follows: 

 Routine – Hazard level is below the design level for the built environment and occurs more 

frequently. This event has a high probability of occurring (on the order of 40 % to 60 % over a 

50-year period, as indicated in Table 4-4). At this level, resilient buildings and infrastructure 

systems should remain functional and not experience any significant damage that would disrupt 

social functions in the community.

 Design – This is the hazard level used in codes and standards for buildings, bridges, and similar

physical infrastructure systems. Design-level events tend to have a probability of occurring on the 

order of 10 % over a 50-year period for ordinary structures (e.g., see risk category II, Section 

12.2, Volume II). The design hazard level for a specific building or infrastructure component may 

be greater than that for ordinary buildings, as required by its classification in the adopted codes. 

Buildings and infrastructure systems should remain functional enough to support the response and 

recovery of the community as defined by the performance levels. 

 Extreme – This exceeds the design level for the built environment. (Seismic hazards refer to the 

maximum considered event, which has a probabilistic basis that is supplemented with historical 

data.) Extreme events have a small probability of occurrence (on the order of 2 % to 3 % over a 

50-year period). They also may include anticipated long-term changes in hazards due to climate 

change. This might not be the greatest hazard level that can be envisioned; rather it is one that the 

community believes is possible. Critical facilities and infrastructure systems should remain at 

least minimally functional at this level. Other buildings and infrastructure systems should perform 

at a level that protects the occupants, though they may need to be rescued. Emergency response 

plans should be developed for scenarios based on this hazard level.

Riverbend experienced a major flood event in 1861 (known locally as the Great Flood), shortly after the 

city‘s founding. Because there were few buildings and little infrastructure at the time, this event did not 

cause significant damage. There have been a number of lesser flood events through the years, and 

protective measures such as levees were constructed. While the levees limit the effects of flooding, parts 

of the downtown area are prone to flooding and, consequently, have declined over the years. The planning 

team also identified the wastewater treatment plant, National Aircraft Parts factory, and the bridge 

crossing the Central River as potentially vulnerable to flooding. Based on their review of flood hazard 

maps and available historical data for Riverbend, the hazards task group selected the flood events shown 

in Table 9-10 for resilience.
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Since Riverbend had adopted modern codes for buildings and residential construction, the seismic hazard 

was determined from the seismic maps for the area. Therefore, the design event was based on an event 

with 10 % probability of occurrence in 50 years (the 500-year event) and the extreme event was based on 

a 2 % probability of occurrence in 50 years (the 2500-year event). The hazards group reported to the 

planning team that the 500-year event was appropriate to consider for most buildings. The task group also 

stated that buildings and infrastructure systems identified as critical to the community should be designed 

to support critical functions following an extreme event. 

9.4.4. Determine Anticipated Performance (Section 4.1.4)

With the agreed upon social needs of the community and the corresponding desired performance goals for

buildings and infrastructure systems, the task groups next completed an analysis of the anticipated 

performance of the built environment for the prevailing community hazards. This analysis answers the 

question of how the community‘s existing physical systems will perform relative to the desired 

performance goals.

The planning team had limited funds to carry out the analysis. The task groups analyzed the existing 

buildings and infrastructure systems using data from past flood and earthquake events in Riverbend,

reviewed standards and codes to which the structures were built, and used expert judgment to assess 

anticipated performance. In subsequent resilience plan reviews, the team believed that the accuracy of 

these analyses would likely improve as better tools became available.

Riverbend estimated the anticipated performance of their building clusters based on each hazard type (i.e., 

earthquake and flood) and hazard level (i.e., routine, design, and extreme). Using the same tables for the 

desired performance goals (Table 9-9), the anticipated performance was recorded, and provided a visual 

summary of the current gap between the desired and anticipated performance. An X is placed in each row 

to indicate the anticipated performance of existing buildings and infrastructure systems at the 90 %

recovery of function level, given the hazard type and level.

Based on the anticipated performance for the building clusters and infrastructure systems, the task groups 

estimated the anticipated affected area and disruption level in the community for the design earthquake 

event (see Table 4-6). The affected area is anticipated to be at the community scale, so that while the 

damage is mostly contained within Riverbend, assistance may be needed from nearby communities. The 

anticipated disruption level is moderate, meaning that critical facilities may be functional but non-critical 

systems may be only partially functional. 

The planning team then completed the other anticipated performance goals for the design earthquake, as 

shown in Table 9-11 to Table 9-16. That process is described in the following sections.
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Buildings (Chapter 12 in Volume II). Much of the building stock consists of older construction that used 

the existing design standards and building codes. The task group identified building types that would need

to be retrofit for design flood (e.g., critical buildings with first floor or equipment below flood level) and 

earthquake events (e.g., unreinforced masonry). The anticipated current performance is shown in Table 

9-11. Occupied building types would perform unsatisfactorily in earthquake events, needing to be 

reinforced or demolished. 

Table 9-11: Riverbend, USA building performance goals for design earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Design 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Community 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Moderate X Anticipated Performance

Building Clusters Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Building Performance Category

A B C D

Critical Facilities

Emergency Operation Centers R, S, MS 90% X

First Responder Facilities R, S, MS 90% X

Memorial Hospital R, S, MS 90% X

Non-ambulatory Occupants (prisons, nursing 

homes, etc.) R, S, MS 90% X

National Aircraft Parts Factory (NAP) R, S, C 90% X

Emergency Housing

Temporary Emergency Shelters R, S 30% 90% X

Single and Multi-family Housing (Shelter in 

place) R, S 60% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhood

Critical Retail R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Religious and Spiritual Centers R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Single and Multi-family Housing (Full Function) R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Schools R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Hotels & Motels R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Community Recovery

Businesses – Manufacturing (except NAP) R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Businesses - Commodity Services R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Businesses - Service Professions R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Conference & Event Venues R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Transportation (Chapter 13 in Volume II). Riverbend‘s transportation system consisted mostly of local 

roads and a bridge. The transportation task group estimated that although some of the local roads would 

be damaged by a design earthquake, resulting in significant cracks in the roads, the transportation system 

would be mostly functional within 2 weeks (indicated as 1-4 weeks in Table 9-12). There could be limited 

damage to the bridge crossing the Central River, but it was expected to be repaired and operational within 

one month. 

Table 9-12: Riverbend, USA transportation infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake 

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Design 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Community 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Moderate X Anticipated Performance

Transportation Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Ingress (goods, services, disaster relief)

Local Roads R, S 60% 90% X

State Highways and Bridge R, S 60% 90% X

Regional Airport R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Egress (emergency egress, evacuation, etc.)

Local Roads R, S 60% 90% X

State Highways and Bridge R, S 60% 90% X

Regional Airport R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Community resilience

Critical Facilities

Hospitals R, S 60% 90% X

Police and Fire Stations R, S 60% 90% X

Emergency Operational Centers R, S 60% 90% X

Emergency Housing

Residences R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Emergency Responder Housing R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Public Shelters R, S 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Essential City Service Facilities R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Schools R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Medical Provider Offices R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Retail R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Community Recovery

Residences R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Neighborhood retail R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Offices and work places R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Non-emergency City Services R, S 30% 60% 90% X

All businesses R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Energy (Chapter 14 in Volume II). The electric power system had performed well in past hazard events. 

The anticipated performance for the design earthquake event, indicated by the X‘s, are close to the desired 

performance goals. There was still room for improvement, however. Specifically, improving the 

resilience of the transmission and distribution system would help ensure the timely, sequential recovery of 

electric power service as desired in the community.

Table 9-13: Riverbend, USA energy infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake 

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Design 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Community 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Moderate X Anticipated Performance

Energy Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Power - Electric Utilities

Community Owner or Operated Bulk Generation

In Place Fueled Generation (Hydro, solar, wind, 

wave, compressed air)

R/C 90% X

Transmission and Distribution (including Substations)

Critical Response Facilities and Support Systems

Hospitals, Police and Fire Stations / Emergency 

Operations Centers R, C 60% 90% X

Disaster debris / recycling centers/ related lifeline 

systems R, C 60% 90% X

Emergency Housing and Support Systems

Public Shelters / Nursing Homes / Food 

Distribution Centers R, C 60% 90% X

Emergency shelter for response / recovery 

workforce/ Key Commercial and Finance R, C 60% 90% X

Housing and Neighborhood infrastructure

Essential city services / schools / Medical offices R, C 60% 90% X

Houses of worship/meditation/ exercise C 60% 90% X

Buildings/space for social services (e.g., child 

services) and prosecution activities C 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

Commercial and industrial businesses / Nonemergency city services C 90% X

Residential housing restoration R, S, MS, C 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Water (Chapter 16 in Volume II). The main concern of the water and wastewater task group was that the 

bridge crossing the Central River was a potential point-of-failure for the water main pipe coming into 

Riverbend from Fallsborough. Based on past earthquake events in the region, experience, and expert 

judgment, the task group estimated that there would be some damage to the water main crossing the 

bridge in a design earthquake event, even the bridge was expected to perform well. Possible solutions 

included repairing or replacing the water main supports to the bridge or replacing that section of the pipe. 

A pipe failure could take weeks to months to repair, as indicated by the X‘s shown in Phase 3 of Table 

9-14, so plans for a temporary water main that could be quickly put in place were also developed. 

Table 9-14: Riverbend, USA water infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Design 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Community 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Moderate X Anticipated Performance

Water Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24

+

Source

Raw or source water and terminal reservoirs R, S 90%

Raw water conveyance (pump stations, piping to 

WTP) R, S 90% X

Potable water at supply (WTP, wells, 

impoundment) R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Water for fire suppression at key supply points (to

promote redundancy) R, S 90% X

Transmission (including Booster Stations)

Backbone transmission facilities (pipelines, pump 

stations, and tanks) R, S 90% X

Control Systems

SCADA or other control systems R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Distribution

Critical Facilities 

Wholesale Users (other communities, rural water 

districts) R, S 60% 90% X

Hospitals, EOC, Police Station, Fire Stations R, S 60% 90% X

Emergency Housing

Emergency Shelters R, S 60% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Drinking water available at community 

distribution centers R, S 60% 90%

Water for fire suppression at fire hydrants R, S 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

All other clusters R, S 30% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Wastewater (Chapter 16 in Volume II). The water and wastewater task group estimated that a design 

earthquake would cause significant damage to the wastewater treatment plant, and it could take months to 

years for repairs to be completed, as indicated in Table 9-15. Replacement of any heavy equipment alone 

could take over a year. The task group developed plans to support basic functionality with temporary 

measures to ensure primary wastewater treatment was provided, as needed, by the intermediate recovery 

phase.

Table 9-15: Riverbend, USA wastewater infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Design 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Community 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Moderate X Anticipated Performance

Wastewater Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Treatment Plants

Treatment plants operating with primary 

treatment and disinfection R, S 60% 90% X

Treatment plants operating to meet regulatory 

requirements R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Trunk Lines

Backbone collection facilities (major trunkline, 

lift stations, siphons, relief mains, aerial 

crossings)

R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Flow equalization basins R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Control Systems

SCADA and other control systems R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Collection Lines

Critical Facilities 

Hospitals, EOC, Police Station, Fire Stations R, S 30% 90% X

Emergency Housing

Emergency Shelters R, S 30% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Threats to public health and safety controlled by 

containing & routing raw sewage away from 

public

R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

All other clusters R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Communications (Chapter 15 in Volume II). The communication task group stated that the performance 

goals in Table 9-16 were desirable, but they would need to work with local service providers to meet the 

long-term community development goals. It was noted that, based on performance for routine events, the 

communications infrastructure performed reasonably well, partly due to the redundancy in the network. 

Based on discussions with the service providers, the regional Central Office (outside of the community) 

was anticipated to be fully functional about 2 weeks after a design earthquake (indicated as 1-4 weeks in 

Table 9-16). Though it was anticipated that the  ̳last mile‘ of distribution for much of the city would not 

be fully functional until 8-12 weeks after a design earthquake, the task group also noted that the local 

service providers were already undertaking efforts that would result in performance being more in-line 

with the goals shown in the table. 

Table 9-16: Riverbend, USA communications infrastructure performance goals for design earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Design 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Community 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Moderate X Anticipated Performance

Communications Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Core Communications Buildings

Communications Hub (e.g., Central Office, IXP, 

Data Centers, etc.) R, S, C 90% X

Last Mile Distribution

Critical Facilities 

Hospitals R, S, C 90% X

Police and fire stations R, S, C 90% X

Emergency Operation Center R, S, C 90% X

Emergency Housing

Residences R, S, C 60% 90% X

Emergency responder housing R, S, C 60% 90% X

Public Shelters R, S, C 60% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Essential city service facilities R, S, C 30% 90% X

Schools R, S, C 30% 90% X

Medical provider offices R, S, C 30% 90% X

Retail R, S, C 30% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

Residences R, S, C 30% 90% X

Neighborhood retail R, S, C 30% 90% X

Offices and work places R, S, C 30% 90% X

Non-emergency city services R, S, C 30% 90% X

Businesses R, S, C 30% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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9.4.5. Summarize the Results (Section 4.1.5)

Develop Summary Resilience Tables. The planning team developed a summary resilience table (Table 

9-17) of the desired and anticipated performance goals for the building clusters and infrastructure system. 

Those tables helped the planning team identify dependencies between infrastructure systems and 

buildings for each building cluster. These dependencies, along with the resilience gaps identified within 

the individual buildings and infrastructure systems, supported decisions about sequencing recovery of 

functions, and about which investments would best address their community resilience goals.

Table 9-17: Riverbend, USA summary resilience table of performance goals for design earthquake 

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Design 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Community 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Moderate X Anticipated Performance

Summary Resilience Table

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Critical Facilities

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Emergency Housing

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Community Recovery

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix
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9.4.6. Repeat Process for Each Hazard Type and Level

The process of determining desired performance goals and anticipated performance for building clusters 

and infrastructure systems was completed for each hazard type and level. The previous text in this section 

summarized the process used for the design earthquake event. Performance goal tables for the routine 

earthquake and extreme flood events are also included in this example, with the tables listed in Table 9-9

provided at the end of the example. The performance goals and anticipated performance are summarized 

as follows.

Routine Earthquake. The performance goal for the routine earthquake event was to experience little or 

no disruption to community functions, or the supporting building clusters and infrastructure systems. As 

shown in Table 9-18 to Table 9-23, the performance goals were mostly shifted to the left (i.e., shorter 

recovery time) as a result. The anticipated performance for the routine event was also estimated to be 

much better than for the design event, with little damage to buildings expected to occur. The summary 

resilience table for the routine earthquake event is shown in Table 9-24. Only a limited amount of 

disruption was anticipated, but this performance did not quite meet the desired performance goals.

Extreme Flood. The hazards task group found that much of the community would be vulnerable to an 

extreme flood event. Unlike the routine and design earthquake events, the desired performance goals were 

established with the expectation that many of the existing buildings and infrastructure systems were not 

designed for an extreme flood event, and that the community would be facing a significant recovery 

situation. However, future improved design and mitigation strategies were identified for critical 

infrastructure to achieve the desired performance goals. Table 9-25 to Table 9-30 show the desired 

performance goals and anticipated performance of the building clusters and infrastructure systems for the 

extreme flood event. Table 9-31 shows the summary resilience table. The performance goals and

anticipated performance for the extreme flood event have longer recovery times than would be expected 

for a design event. 

9.5. Step 4: Plan Development (Chapter 5 of the Guide)

Evaluate Gaps Between Desired and Anticipated Performance.

Once the performance goal tables were filled out, the resilience 

gaps were identified (i.e., difference between the anticipated 

90 % performance, X, and the desired 90 % performance goals). 

As can be seen in Table 9-17 (as well as Table 9-24 and Table 

9-31), building clusters had some of the largest resilience gaps, 

and improving the performance of buildings in Riverbend was a 

priority. Water performance also showed a large performance 

gap in the summary table, and was also likely to be a priority.

Based on the three long-term community goals, the planning 

team worked with the task groups to identify solutions and investments would be most beneficial for

Riverbend resilience. Identifying solutions to address the resilience gaps led to a long-term strategy that 

improved community resilience and met community goals.

Identify Solutions to Address Gaps. During the planning process, the team considered many projects that 

could be funded over a 50-year period to achieve the community goals. The team also identified shortterm solutions that could be implemented because many of the larger investments required more resources 

than currently available and would be implemented over time. Administrative and construction solutions

were developed by the tasks groups for consideration by the entire planning team.
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Short-Term Administrative Solutions. 

Communications – Charging Stations. The last mile of the communications infrastructure system was

vulnerable to the earthquake and flood design event. The communications task group worked with service 

providers to develop potential solutions. Based upon their discussions, they recommended purchasing 

charging stations for cellular phones and deploying them after an event when external power is lost. 

These stations are commonly brought in by service providers after hazard events, but an adequate supply 

for businesses and residents was needed.

Long-Term Administrative Solutions.

Buildings Downtown. The part of the downtown area that is less prone to flooding has been well 

preserved and has flourished in recent years as restaurants and shops moved in. However, the portion of 

the downtown area that experiences frequent flooding has begun to languish, and small businesses in this 

part of town are struggling. The planning team determined whether the well-preserved part of downtown 

and its residents were subject to risks from more severe hazards events than recently experienced by 

Riverbend. The task groups found that the buildings in this area were vulnerable to a design flood and 

vulnerable to collapse in a design earthquake. Therefore, the task groups recommended the following 

actions:

 The city government should undertake buy-back programs for the downtown area. Houses and 

commercial properties in the 100-year flood zone and those in a state of disrepair would be 

purchased. These properties would be razed. To reduce negative impacts on residents, the city 

would financially assist residents and businesses with relocation to locations that would perform 

well during design flood and earthquake events. Hopefully, the relocated businesses would 

contribute to stabilizing employment and economic growth.

 Eventually, the land would be used to create a city-owned golf course. The golf course would 

provide jobs for management, food services, grounds keeping/maintenance. It would also provide 

a source of entertainment for residents and additional income to Riverbend, while allowing a 

spillway for floods.

Energy – Critical Facilities and Government Offices. The energy task group wanted to ensure 

government offices and critical facilities could continue operation during and immediately following a 

disruptive event or return to service quickly. They proposed that an energy assurance plan be developed 

to ensure police and fire stations, government offices, and critical facilities had sufficient power to allow 

them to operate emergency services until grid power could be restored. The energy task group would 

work with the regional electric utility to develop and implement cost-effective measures.

Short-Term Construction Solutions.

Water – Redundant Source. Pending a redundant water supply with the proposed new bridge (see longterm construction solutions), the water and wastewater task group advocated that the city restore three 

wells to provide a redundant water supply. These wells supplied Riverbend with water before the water 

main from Fallsborough was installed.

Long-Term Construction Solutions.

Buildings Downtown. The city should implement a seismic retrofit program to improve the performance 

of older, earthquake-vulnerable buildings. Some of these buildings pose a life safety risk during an 

earthquake. A plan would be developed that was affordable for building and business owners in the 
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downtown district. Funding mechanisms considered included owner tax credits and city-financed loans.

Building types that pose a life safety risk should be prioritized for improvement or moved to the buyback 

program.

Transportation – Highway Bridge. The single highway bridge over the Central River was identified as 

critical infrastructure for the community. Its failure would result in significant disruptions to commuters 

and trucks transporting goods since the nearest bridge was 10 miles away. The bridge also carried the 

water main from Fallsborough into Riverbend, so failure of the bridge would also sever the one source of 

water for Riverbend.

The bridge was vulnerable to design earthquake and extreme flood events. It had been maintained but had 

not been retrofitted to modern bridge design standard. Because the existing bridge was scheduled and 

budgeted for a deck replacement in 10 years, there was an opportunity to complete a seismic upgrade. 

However, the transportation task group completed a cost benefit analysis of completing a seismic 

upgrade, elevating the bridge deck, and mitigating against scour at the piers. The task group concluded 

that a bridge having an elevated surface was needed, and found that it was more practical and economical 

to construct a new bridge at a higher elevation. They recommended construction of a new bridge at a 

higher elevation rather than elevating the existing bridge.

The transportation task group recommended that they work with the State Department of Transportation

to seek support for construction of a second bridge crossing. A second bridge would relieve congestion 

during high traffic periods when traffic volume exceeds the capacity of the bridge, increase redundancy of 

a critical transportation route and water system, and support regional growth. 

Wastewater/Businesses – Flood Protection Levee. The wastewater treatment plant and the National 

Aircraft Parts (NAP) plant were both located in the flood plain. Because NAP was a large employer, it 

was important to the community that the factory remained in Riverbend. The planning team identified 

potential solutions to limit the vulnerability of these two facilities to flooding. 

They recommended that the city partner with the state to pursue a mitigation grant to build a flood control 

levee to protect both facilities. The levee design should consider the seismic performance of the levees 

and potential for subsequent flooding before levees could be repaired and functional again.

Prioritize Solutions and Develop Implementation Strategy. The planning team worked with the task 

groups to prioritize the proposed solutions to develop an implementation strategy over 50 years. The 

proposed strategy and schedule, which considered the relative benefits of each solution, were outlined as 

follows: 

1. Purchase charging stations that could be deployed following a hazard event and made available 

for community events. This will occur within 6 months of resilience plan approval.

2. Initiate the buy-back program within two years, and plan for it to be completed over 25-30 years. 

If additional resources become available, the program could be accelerated. 

3. Develop the golf course over the same time period. Revenues from the golf course would support 

other resilience solutions.

4. Apply for a FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program grant with the state. 

5. Restore three city wells to provide a redundant water supply. The project (inspect, test, and retain 

the appropriate permits and approvals) is anticipated to take 3-5 years.

6. Develop and implement an energy assurance plan in 5-10 years. The plan could be completed 

more quickly, but it is not the highest priority because the energy system performed well in past 

flood and earthquake events in the region.

7. Engage with the State DOT to advocate for a new bridge to be completed within 5-10 years. 
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8. Develop plans to replace the existing bridge after the second bridge is completed. 

9. Develop incentives and financial mechanisms for business owners in the downtown area to 

implement seismic retrofits, and work with them to do so. This program should be initiated in the 

next 3 years and completed within 20 years. 

9.6. Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval (Chapter 6)

The draft resilience plan was prepared and submitted to the Riverbend 

City Council. The plan contained the community resilience goals and the 

prioritized implementation strategy, as well as the following supporting 

information:

 Summary report characterizing the social dimensions of Riverbend 

 Summary report characterizing the built environment of Riverbend

 Tables and associated text that describe the linkages between the built and social environments

 A list of the long-term community goals and associated metrics

 Summary report defining Riverbend‘s hazards types and levels 

 Performance tables and associated text explaining the desired performance goals for the built 

environment and the anticipated performance of the built environment 

 Summary resilience tables and associated text, including identification of the dependencies 

among buildings and infrastructure systems and the gaps between desired and anticipated 

performance

 The administrative and construction solutions developed by Riverbend to address gaps in 

performance

 Proposed prioritization and scheduling of implementation of the resilience strategies

Once the plan was developed, the planning team publicized its release and formally opened a 60-day 

public comment period to collect input from additional stakeholders. To engage the community, the team 

organized two community City Hall meetings, two weeks apart during the first month of the plan‘s 

release. Local media were encouraged to cover the proposed plan; Ms. Smith and several members of the 

planning team met with reporters. 

Additionally, the planning team disseminated the draft plan to all task groups, encouraging them to 

distribute the plan throughout their organizations, departments, and agencies for review. After the public 

comment period, the planning team finalized Riverbend‘s resilience plan and submitted it to the City 

Council for approval. The community was widely informed of the plan‘s approval once it was signed by 

the Mayor. 
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9.7. Step 6: Plan Implementation and Maintenance (Chapter 7)

Once the plan was approved, Riverbend began the implementation 

process, starting with the short-term solutions. City staff began contacting 

vendors about bulk purchasing of charging stations for cellular phones. 

They were able to purchase these charging stations at a bulk rate within 4 

months of the resilience plan approval (2 months faster than anticipated). 

Riverbend also began engaging in some long-term solutions. For example, 

within the first 6 months, Riverbend worked with the state to apply for a 

FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program grant. The deadline for 

the first funding cycle had passed by the time Riverbend‘s plan was 

finalized. However, they were successful in attaining funding for 

construction of the flood control levee during year two of the implementation. 

Throughout the implementation of their resilience plan, the city‘s leaders tracked progress and posted it 

on the city‘s website. Riverbend decided to review their resilience plan on an annual basis and to assess 

whether the implementation strategy or any solutions required modification.

9.8. Looking Forward 

The development, approval, and implementation of the Riverbend resilience plan had several immediate 

benefits. The community became more informed and engaged in civic affairs, and they began to share the 

vision for their community, as evidenced by increased participation in organizations and meetings.

Communication between stakeholders developed into regular exchanges that provided daily benefits to 

their businesses and operations, as well as the community. All the community plans were aligned with the 

resilience goals over the next planning cycle, ensuring consistency in efforts and allocation of resources.

The value of the resilience goals and implementation of the solutions was understood by the community 

as a long-term work in progress. The resilience leadership kept the stakeholders informed of progress and 

setbacks. The transparency led to strong, continued support in the community.
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9.9. Supplemental Information: Routine Earthquake Performance Goals Tables

Table 9-18: Riverbend, USA buildings performance goals for routine earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Routine 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Localized 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Usual X Anticipated Performance

Building Clusters Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Building Performance Category

A B C D

Critical Facilities

Emergency Operation Centers R, S, MS 90% X

First Responder Facilities R, S, MS 90% X

Acute Care Hospitals R, S, MS 90% X

Non-ambulatory Occupants (prisons, nursing 

homes, etc.) R, S, MS 90% X

National Aircraft Parts Factory (NAP) R, S, C 90% X

Emergency Housing

Temporary Emergency Shelters R, S 90% X

Single / Multi-family Housing (Shelter in place) R, S 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Critical Retail R, S, C 90% X

Religious and Spiritual Centers R, S 90% X

Single and Multi-family Housing (Full Function) R, S 90% X

Schools R, S 90% X

Hotels & Motels R, S, C 90% X

Community Recovery

Businesses – Manufacturing (except NAP) R, S, C 60% 90% X

Businesses - Commodity Services R, S, C 60% 90% X

Businesses - Service Professions R, S, C 60% 90% X

Conference & Event Venues R, S, C 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-19: Riverbend, USA transportation infrastructure performance goals for routine earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Routine 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Localized 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Usual X Anticipated Performance

Transportation Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Ingress (goods, services, disaster relief)

Local Roads R, S 90% X

State Highways and Bridge R, S 90% X

Regional Airport R, S 60% 90% X

Egress (emergency egress, evacuation, etc)

Local Roads R, S 90% X

State Highways and Bridge R, S 90% X

Regional Airport R, S 60% 90% X

Community resilience

Critical Facilities

Hospitals R, S 90% X

Police and Fire Stations R, S 90% X

Emergency Operational Centers R, S 90% X

Emergency Housing

Residences R, S 90% X

Emergency Responder Housing R, S 90% X

Public Shelters R, S 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Essential City Service Facilities R, S 60% 90% X

Schools R, S 60% 90% X

Medical Provider Offices R, S 60% 90% X

Retail R, S 60% 90% X

Community Recovery

Residences R, S 60% 90% X

Neighborhood retail R, S 60% 90% X

Offices and work places R, S 60% 90% X

Non-emergency City Services R, S 60% 90% X

All businesses R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-20: Riverbend, USA energy infrastructure performance goals for routine earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Routine 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Localized 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Usual X Anticipated Performance

Energy Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Power - Electric Utilities

Community Owner or Operated Bulk Generation

In Place Fueled Generation (Hydro, solar, wind, 

wave, compressed air)

R, S, MS 90%

Transmission and Distribution (including Substations)

Critical Response Facilities and Support Systems

Hospitals, Police and Fire Stations / Emergency 

Operations Centers R, C 90% X

Disaster debris / recycling centers/ Related 

lifeline systems R, C 90% X

Emergency Housing and Support Systems

Public Shelters / Nursing Homes / Food 

Distribution Centers R, C 90% X

Emergency shelter for response / recovery 

workforce/ Key Commercial and Finance R, C 90% X

Housing and Neighborhood infrastructure

Essential city services facilities / schools / 

Medical offices R, C 90% X

Houses of worship/meditation/ exercise C 90% X

Buildings/space for social services (e.g., child 

services) and prosecution activities C 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

Commercial and industrial businesses / Nonemergency city services C 90% X

Residential housing restoration R, S, MS, C 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-21: Riverbend, USA water infrastructure performance goals for routine earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Routine 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Localized 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Usual X Anticipated Performance

Water Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Source

Raw or source water and terminal reservoirs R, S 90% X

Raw water conveyance (pump stations and piping 

to WTP) R, S 90% X

Potable water at supply (WTP, wells, 

impoundment) R, S 90% X

Water for fire suppression at key supply points (to 

promote redundancy) R, S 90% X

Transmission (including Booster Stations)

Backbone transmission facilities (pipelines, pump 

stations, and tanks) R, S 90% X

Control Systems

SCADA or other control systems R, S 90% X

Distribution

Critical Facilities

Wholesale Users (other communities, rural water 

districts) R, S 90% X

Hospitals, EOC, Police Station, Fire Stations R, S 90% X

Emergency Housing

Emergency Shelters R, S 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Drinking water available at community 

distribution centers R, S 90% X

Water for fire suppression at fire hydrants R, S 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

All other clusters R, S 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-22: Riverbend, USA wastewater infrastructure performance goals for routine earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Routine 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Localized 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Usual X Anticipated Performance

Wastewater Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Treatment Plants

Treatment plants operating with primary 

treatment and disinfection R, S 90% X

Treatment plants operating to meet regulatory 

requirements R, S 90% X

Trunk Lines

Backbone collection facilities (major trunkline, 

lift stations, siphons, relief mains, aerial 

crossings)

R, S 60% 90% X

Flow equalization basins R, S 60% 90% X

Control Systems

SCADA and other control systems R, S 90% X

Collection Lines

Critical Facilities

Hospitals, EOC, Police Station, Fire Stations R, S 90% X

Emergency Housing

Emergency Shelters R, S 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Threats to public health and safety controlled by 

containing & routing raw sewage away from 

public

R, S 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure

All other clusters R, S 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-23: Riverbend, USA communications performance goals for routine earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Routine 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Localized 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Usual X Anticipated Performance

Communications Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Core Communications Buildings

Communications Hub (e.g., Central Office, IXP, 

Data Centers)

R, S, C 90% X

Last Mile

Critical Facilities

Hospitals R, S, C 90% X

Police and fire stations R, S, C 90% X

Emergency operation center R, S, C 90% X

Emergency Housing

Residences R, S, C 90% X

Emergency responder housing R, S, C 90% X

Public shelters R, S, C 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Essential city service facilities R, S, C 60% 90% X

Schools R, S, C 60% 90% X

Medical provider offices R, S, C 60% 90% X

Retail R, S, C 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

Residences R, S, C 60% 90% X

Neighborhood retail R, S, C 60% 90% X

Offices and work places R, S, C 60% 90% X

Non-emergency city services R, S, C 60% 90% X

Businesses R, S, C 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-24: Riverbend, USA summary resilience table of performance goals for routine earthquake

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Earthquake 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Routine 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Localized 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Usual X Anticipated Performance

Summary Resilience Table

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Critical Facilities

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Emergency Housing

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Community Recovery

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix
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9.10. Supplemental Information: Extreme Flood Performance Goals Tables

Table 9-25: Riverbend, USA building performance goals for extreme flood

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Flood 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Extreme 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Regional 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Severe X Anticipated Performance

Building Clusters Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Building Performance Category

A B C D

Critical Facilities

Emergency Operation Centers R, S, MS 90% X

First Responder Facilities R, S, MS 90% X

Acute Care Hospitals R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Non-ambulatory Occupants (prisons, nursing 

homes, etc.) R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Anything Aircrafts Part Factory (NAP) R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Emergency Housing

Temporary Emergency Shelters R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Single and Multi-family Housing (Shelter in 

place) R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Critical Retail R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Religious and Spiritual Centers R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Single and Multi-family Housing (Full Function) R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Schools R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Hotels & Motels R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Community Recovery

Businesses – Manufacturing (except NAP) R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Businesses - Commodity Services R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Businesses - Service Professions R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Conference & Event Venues R, S, C 30% 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-26: Riverbend, USA transportation infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Flood 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Extreme 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Regional 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Severe X Anticipated Performance

Transportation Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Ingress (goods, services, disaster relief)

Local Roads R, S 30% 60% 90% X

State Highways and Bridge R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Regional Airport R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Egress (emergency egress, evacuation, etc)

Local Roads R, S 30% 60% 90% X

State Highways and Bridge R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Regional Airport R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Community resilience

Critical Facilities

Hospitals R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Police and Fire Stations R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Emergency Operational Centers R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Emergency Housing

Residences R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Emergency Responder Housing R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Public Shelters R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Essential City Service Facilities R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Schools R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Medical Provider Offices R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Retail R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Community Recovery

Residences R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Neighborhood retail R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Offices and work places R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Non-emergency City Services R, S 30% 60% 90% X

All businesses R, S 30% 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-27: Riverbend, USA energy infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Flood 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Extreme 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Regional 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Severe X Anticipated Performance

Energy Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Power - Electric Utilities

Community Owner or Operated Bulk Generation

In Place Fueled Generation (Hydro, solar, wind, 

wave, compressed air)

R/C 90% X

Transmission and Distribution (including Substations)

Critical Response Facilities and Support Systems

Hospitals, Police and Fire Stations / Emergency 

Operations Centers R, C 60% 90% X

Disaster debris / recycling centers/ Related 

lifeline systems R, C 60% 90% X

Emergency Housing and Support Systems

Public Shelters / Nursing Homes / Food 

Distribution Centers R, C 60% 90% X

Emergency shelter for response / recovery 

workforce/ Key Commercial and Finance R, C 60% 90% X

Housing and Neighborhood infrastructure

Essential city services facilities / schools / 

Medical offices R, C 60% 90% X

Houses of worship/meditation/ exercise C 60% 90% X

Buildings/space for social services (e.g., child 

services) and prosecution activities C 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

Commercial and industrial businesses / Nonemergency city services C 60% 90% X

Residential housing restoration R, S, MS, C 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-28: Riverbend, USA water infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Flood 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Extreme 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Regional 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Severe X Anticipated Performance

Water Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Source

Raw or source water and terminal reservoirs R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Raw water conveyance (pump stations and piping 

to WTP) R, S, MS 60% 90% X

Potable water at supply (WTP, wells, 

impoundment) R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Water for fire suppression at key supply points (to 

promote redundancy) R, S, MS 90% X

Transmission (including Booster Stations)

Backbone transmission facilities (pipelines, pump 

stations, and tanks) R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Control Systems

SCADA or other control systems R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Distribution

Critical Facilities

Wholesale Users (other communities, rural water 

districts) R, S, MS 60% 90% X

Hospitals, EOC, Police Station, Fire Stations R, S, MS 60% 90% X

Emergency Housing

Emergency Shelters R, S, MS 60% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Drinking water available at community 

distribution centers R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Water for fire suppression at fire hydrants R, S, MS 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure

All other clusters R, S, MS 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-29: Riverbend, USA wastewater infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood 

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Flood 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Extreme 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Regional 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Severe X Anticipated Performance

Wastewater Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Treatment Plants

Treatment plants operating with primary 

treatment and disinfection R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Treatment plants operating to meet regulatory 

requirements R, S, MS 90% X

Trunk Lines

Backbone collection facilities (major trunkline, 

lift stations, siphons, relief mains, aerial 

crossings)

R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Flow equalization basins R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Control Systems

SCADA and other control systems R, S, MS 60% 90% X

Collection Lines

Critical Facilities

Hospitals, EOC, Police Station, Fire Stations R, S, MS 30% 90% X

Emergency Housing

Emergency Shelters R, S, MS 30% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Threats to public health and safety controlled by 

containing & routing raw sewage away from 

public

R, S, MS 30% 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure 

All other clusters R, S, MS 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-30: Riverbend, USA communications infrastructure performance goals for extreme flood

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Flood 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Extreme 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Regional 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Severe X Anticipated Performance

Communications Infrastructure Support 

Needed4

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Core Communications Buildings

Communications Hub (e.g., Central Office, IXP, 

Data Centers) R, S, MS, C 90% X

Last Mile

Critical Facilities 

Hospitals R, S, MS, C 90% X

Police and fire stations R, S, MS, C 90% X

Emergency operation center R, S, MS, C 90% X

Emergency Housing

Residences R, S, MS, C 30% 90% X

Emergency responder housing R, S, MS, C 30% 90% X

Public shelters R, S, MS, C 30% 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Essential city service facilities R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Schools R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Medical provider offices R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Retail R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Community Recovery Infrastructure

Residences R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Neighborhood retail R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Offices and work places R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Non-emergency city services R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Businesses R, S, MS, C 30% 60% 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local)
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Table 9-31: Riverbend, USA summary resilience table of performance goals for extreme flood 

Disturbance 1 Restoration Levels 2,3

Hazard Type Flood 30% Function Restored

Hazard Level Extreme 60% Function Restored

Affected Area Regional 90% Function Restored

Disruption Level Severe X Anticipated Performance

Summary Resilience Table

Design Hazard Performance

Phase 1

Short-Term

Phase 2

Intermediate

Phase 3

Long-Term

Days Weeks Months

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+

Critical Facilities

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Emergency Housing

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Housing/Neighborhoods

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Community Recovery

Buildings 90% X

Transportation 90% X

Energy 90% X

Water 90% X

Wastewater 90% X

Communication 90% X

Footnotes:

1 Specify hazard type being considered

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe

2 30% 60% 90% Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster

3 X Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix
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102

Glossary

List of Terms

Term Definition

Buildings Individual structures, including its equipment and contents, that house people and 

support social institutions.

Built Capital Buildings and infrastructure systems, including transportation, energy, water, 

wastewater, and communication and information systems.

Built Environment All buildings and infrastructure systems. Also referred to as built capital.

Business Continuity  The capability of an organization or business to continue delivery of products or 

services at acceptable predefined levels following a disruptive incident. [ISO 

22301, 2012].

 An ongoing process to ensure that the necessary steps are taken to identify the 

impacts of potential losses and maintain viable recovery strategies, recovery 

plans, and continuity of services [NFPA 1600, 2013].

Clusters A set of buildings and supporting infrastructure systems, not necessarily 

geographically co-located, that serve a common function such as housing, healthcare, 

retail, etc.

Communication and 

Information Systems

Equipment and systems that facilitate communication services, including Internet, 

cellular and phone services.

Community  In the NPG, the term  ̳community‘ refers to groups with common goals, values, 

or purposes (e.g., local businesses, neighborhood groups). 

 In this Guide, the term  ̳community‘ refers to a place designated by geographical 

boundaries that functions under the jurisdiction of a governance structure, such 

as a town, city, or county. It is within these places that people live, work, play, 

and build their futures.

Community Resilience  ―The ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover 

from disruption due to emergencies‖ [PPD-8, 2011].

 ―The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and to withstand and 

recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and 

recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or 

incidents‖ [PPD-21, 2013].

Community Social 

Institutions

A complex, organized pattern of beliefs and behavior that meets basic individual, 

household, and community needs, including family/kinship, government, economy, 

health, education, community service organizations, religious and cultural groups 

(and other belief systems), and the media.

Critical Facilities Buildings that are intended to remain operational during hazard events and support 

functions and services needed during the short-term phase of recovery. These 

facilities are sometimes referred to as essential buildings.
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Term Definition

Critical Infrastructure ―Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 

incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact 

on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 

combination of those matters‖ [PPD-21, 2013].

Dependency The reliance of physical and/or social systems on other physical and/or social 

systems to function or provide services.

Disaster A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing 

widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the 

ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources [National 

Science and Technology Council, 2005].

Disruption The consequences of a hazard event that results in loss of services or functions in a 

community.

Emergency Responders Official and volunteer workers during the short-term phase of recovery, also referred 

to as the response phase.

Energy Systems Electric power, liquid fuel, and natural gas generation, transmission, and distribution.

Financial Capital Financial savings, income, investments, and available credit.

Function The role or purpose of a particular institution (e.g., education, finance, healthcare) 

within a community.

Functionality Capability of serving the intended function, where the built environment provides an 

operational level that allows a social institution to provide services.

General Plan A document designed to guide the future actions of a community, with long-range 

goals and objectives for the local government, including land development, 

expenditure of public funds, tax policy (tax incentives), cooperative efforts, and other 

issues of interest (such as farmland preservation, or the rehabilitation of older 

neighborhoods areas). Also referred to as a comprehensive plan, master plan, or land 

use plan [Extension, 2015]. 

Governance Structures The governing body of a community. 

Hazard A potential threat or an incident, natural or human-caused, that warrants action to 

protect life, property, the environment, and public health or safety, and to minimize 

disruptions of government, social, or economic activities [PPD-21 2013]. 

Hazard Event The occurrence of a hazard.

Hazard Impact The quantification of the community consequences of a hazard through affected area 

and level of disruption measures.

Hazard Level The quantification of the size, magnitude, or intensity of a hazard, such as wind 

speed, seismic ground acceleration, flood elevation, etc.
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104

Term Definition

Human Caused 

Disaster

A hazard event caused by human error or a deliberate action including a terrorist 

activity. 

Implementation 

Strategies

A planned set of actions that taken together will help meet a goal. To achieve 

community resilience, a set of solutions may include land use planning, codes and 

standards for new construction, and specific retrofit requirements. 

Infrastructure System Physical networks, systems, and structures that make up transportation, energy, 

communications, water and wastewater, and other systems that support the 

functionality of community social institutions. 

Life Safety Life safety in the built environment refers to buildings and other structures designed 

to protect and evacuate populations in emergencies and during hazard events.

Mitigation Activities and actions taken to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the 

impact of hazard events.

Performance Goals Metrics or specific objectives that define successful performance. For the built 

environment, performance goals include objectives related to desirable features, such 

as occupant protection or time for repairs and return to function. 

Redundancy The use of multiple critical components in a system to increase reliability of system 

performance and function, particularly when one of the multiple components is 

damaged.

Retrofitting Improving the expected performance of existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

through remedial repairs and measures that often improve system resistance or 

strength. 

Robustness The ability of a structure or system to continue operating or functioning under a 

variety of demands or conditions.

Shelter-in-place Safely remaining in a building, e.g., a residence, during or after a hazard event. 

Social Capital Broadly the term refers to ―social networks, the reciprocities that arise from them, 

and the value of these for achieving mutual goals‖ [Schuller, Baron, and Field 2000]. 

Stakeholders All parties that have an interest or concern in an operation, enterprise, or undertaking. 

Technological Hazard A human-caused event due to an accident or human error.

Transportation 

Systems

Buildings, structures, and networks that move people and goods, including roads, 

bridges, rail systems, airports, coastal or riverine ports, and trucking hubs.

Vulnerable populations Groups of individuals within a community whose needs may go unmet before or after 

a disaster event, including the elderly, people living in poverty, racial and ethnic 

minority groups, people with disabilities, and those suffering from chronic illness. 

Additional social vulnerabilities can include renters, students, single-parent families, 

small business owners, culturally diverse groups, and historic neighborhoods.
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Term Definition

Wastewater Systems Systems that collect wastewater, move it through a system of pipelines and pump 

stations to treatment plants and discharge into a receiving water.

Water Systems Systems that are supplied by either surface or ground water, treat and store the water, 

and move it to the end user through a system of pipelines.

Whole Community The National Preparedness Goal defines  ̳whole community‘ for preparedness efforts 

to strengthen the security and resiliency of the United States and includes individuals, 

communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and 

Federal, state, and local governments.

Workforce People who provide labor to one or more of the community social, business, industry, 

and economic institutions. 
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List of Acronyms

Acronym Definition

100RC 100 Resilient Cities

AAR After Action Report

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

AC Advisory Circular

ACI American Concrete Institute

AEP Airport Emergency Plan

AES Automatic Extinguishing System

AIA American Institute of Architects

AISC American Institute of Steel Construction

ALA American Lifelines Association

ANSI American National Standards Institute

APA American Planning Association

APPA American Public Power Association

AREMA American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association

ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials

ATC Applied Technology Council

AWWA American Water Works Association

BART Bay Area Rapid Transit

BPS Bulk Power System

BRIC Baseline Resilience Indicators for Communities

BSI British Standards Institute

CAIDI Customer Average Interruption Duration Index
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Acronym Definition

CAIFI Customer Average Interruption Duration Index

CaLEAP California Energy Assurance Planning

CAMV Covered Aerial Medium Voltage

CARRI Community and Regional Resilience Institute

CART Communities Advancing Resilience Toolkit

CATV Cable Television

CCSF City and County of San Francisco

CEI Critical Energy Infrastructure

CIP Capital Improvement Plan

CHP Combined Heat and Power

CSA Community Service Area

COLTs Cell on Light Trucks

CPG Comprehensive Preparedness Guide

CRF Community Resilience Framework

CRI Coastal Community Resilience Index

CRS Community Rating System

CSO Community Service Organization

CSRIC Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council

DLC RT Digital Loop Carrier Remote Terminal

DLR Dynamic Line Rating

DOB Department of Buildings

DOC Department of Commerce 

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOGAMI Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries
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Acronym Definition

DOT Department of Transportation

DR Demand Response

DSM Demand Side Management

EA Environmental Assessment

EAS Emergency Alert System

EBMUD East Bay Municipal Utility District

EE Energy Efficiency

EF Enhanced Fujita (scale)

EIA Energy Information Administration

EIM Energy Imbalance Markets

EIS Environmental Impact Statement

EMS Emergency Medical Services

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOP Executive Office of the President

EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPFAT Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

ERO Electric Reliability Organization

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FRA Federal Railroad Administration
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Acronym Definition

FTA Federal Transit Administration

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications Service

GIS Geographic Information System

GTAA Greater Toronto Airports Authority

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning

IA Iowa

IBC International Building Code

IBHS Institute for Business and Home Safety

ICC International Code Council

ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability

IEBC International Existing Building Code

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IOU Investor-Owned Utility

IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System

IPP Independent Power Producer

IRC International Residential Code

ISO International Organization for Standardization

ISP Internet Service Provider

ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems

IWUIC International Wildland-Urban Interface Code

IXP Internet Exchange Points

LADWP Los Angeles Department of Water and Power

LAWA Los Angeles World Airports
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Acronym Definition

LRFD Load Factor and Resistance Design

MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 Century Act

MARAD United States Maritime Administration

MCEER Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Reduction

MSC Mobile Switching Center

MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization

MRE Manual for Railway Engineering

NAPSR National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives

NARUC National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

NASEO National Association of State Energy Officials

NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NDRF National Disaster Recovery Framework

NEBS Network Equipment Building Standards

NEC National Electric Code

NEPA National Environmental Protection Act

NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation

NESC National Electric Safety Code

NFIP National Flood Insurance Program

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NGO Nongovernment Organization

NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center 

NIBS National Institute of Building Sciences

NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
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Acronym Definition

NPG National Preparedness Goal

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRECA National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

NWS National Weather Service

NYCC New York Panel on Climate Change

NYCDEP New York City Department of Environmental Protection

NYSERDA New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

OCDI Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan

OSSPAC Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission

PANYNJ Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

PARRE Program for Risk and Resiliency Evaluation

PDM Pre-Disaster Mitigation

PEP Private Entry Point

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials SafetyAdministration

PIANC World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure

PIEVC Public Infrastructure Engineering Vulnerability Committee

PMU Phasor Measurement Unit

POTS Plain Old Telephone Service

PPD-8 Presidential Policy Directive 8

PPD-21 Presidential Policy Directive 21

PSAP Public-Safety Answering Point

PSEG Public Service Enterprise Group

PV Photovoltaic

ROW Right of Way

RPS Renewable Portfolio Standards
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Acronym Definition

RUS Rural Utilities Service

SAFETEA-LU Safe Accountable Flexible Efficient Transportation Equity Act

SAIDI System Average Interruption Duration Index

SAIFI System Average Interruption Frequency Index

SCADA Supervisory Control Data Acquisition

SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act

SEI Structural Engineering Institute

SFPUC San Francisco Public Utilities Commission

SGIP Smart Grid Interoperability Panel

SLOSH Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes

SLR Sea Level Rise

SPUR San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association

SSO Standards Setting Organizations

THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

TIA Telecommunications Industry Association

TRB Transportation Research Board

TSP Telecommunications Service Priority

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority

UFC United Facilities Criteria

UN United Nations

UNIDSR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply

URI Utility Resilience Index

US United States

USA United States of America
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Acronym Definition

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers

USGC United States Coast Guard

VOAD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

VSAT Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool

WARN Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network

WEA Wireless Emergency Alerts

WHEAT Water Health and Economic Analysis Tool

WPS Wireless Priority Service

WWTP Wastewater Treatment Plant
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References

eXtension (2015) The Purpose of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan, eXtension Foundation, 

Centreville, AL, http://www.extension.org/pages/26677/the-purpose-of-the-comprehensive-landuse-plan#.VTAtaGXD9aQ.

International Organization for Standardization (ISO 2012) Societal security - Business continuity 

management systems – Requirements, ISO 22301:2012, International Organization for Standardization

(ISO), Geneva, Switzerland.

National Science and Technology Council (2005) Grand Challenges for Disaster Reduction – A Report of 

the Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction, National Science and Technology Council, Executive Office of 

the President, Washington, DC.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA 2013) NFPA 1600: Standard on Disaster/Emergency 

Management and Business Continuity Programs, 2013 Edition, National Fire Protection Association

(NFPA), Quincy, MA.

PPD-21 (2013) Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, The White House, February 12, 2013, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-criticalinfrastructure-security-and-resil.

PPD-8 (2011) Presidential Policy Directive, PPD-8 – National Preparedness, The White House, March 

30, 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.

Schuller, T.; S. Baron; and J. Field (2000) ―Social Capital: A Review and Critique.‖ Social Capital: 

Critical Perspectives, edited by Stephen Baron, John Field, and Tom Schuller, Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, pp. 1-38.