IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 136PA22

Filed 1 September 2023

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

WENDY DAWN LAMB HICKS

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 

of the Court of Appeals, 283 N.C. App. 74 (2022), reversing a judgment entered on 12 

December 2019 by Judge V. Bradford Long in Superior Court, Randolph County, and 

remanding for a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court on 25 April 2023.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Michael T. Henry, Assistant Attorney 

General, for the State-appellant.

Marilyn G. Ozer for defendant-appellee.

EARLS, Justice.

Defendant Wendy Dawn Lamb Hicks was convicted of second-degree murder 

after she shot and killed Caleb Adams in her home. Ms. Hicks and Mr. Adams had a 

tumultuous relationship, and on the day of the murder, Ms. Hicks had warned Mr. 

Adams by text message not to come to her residence. He ignored that warning and 

came anyway, precipitating a confrontation between them that left him dead from 

two gunshot wounds to his back. At trial, the jury was instructed on self-defense, the 

defense of habitation, and the aggressor doctrine. Ms. Hicks contends, and the Court 
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of Appeals agreed, that the evidence did not support an instruction on the aggressor 

doctrine.

In this case we are again confronted with the proper application of North 

Carolina’s “castle doctrine” statute, which establishes that a person in their home, 

motor vehicle, or workplace is presumed to have held “a reasonable fear of imminent 

death or serious bodily harm” when using deadly force to repel an unlawful intruder. 

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b) (2021); see also State v. Benner, 380 N.C. 621, 632, 2022-NCSC28, ¶ 26 (“[W]hile the enactment of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 was not ‘intended to repeal or 

limit any other defense that may exist under the common law,’ we have held that the 

enactment of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3 has supplanted the common law right to perfect selfdefense to the extent that it addresses a particular issue . . . .” (quoting N.C.G.S. § 14-

51.2(g))); State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185, 195, 2022-NCSC-12 ¶ 23 (“Commonly 

known as the ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law, the Act ‘restate[d] the law [of self-defense] 

in some respects and broaden[ed] it in others.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting John 

Rubin, The New Law of Self Defense?, North Carolina Criminal Law: A UNC School 

of Government Blog (Aug. 17, 2011), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/the-new-lawof-self-defense)); State v. Coley, 375 N.C. 156, 162 (2020) (“Viewing the evidence at 

trial in the light most favorable to defendant in order to determine whether the 

evidence was competent and sufficient to support the jury instructions on self-defense 

and the defense of habitation, we conclude that defendant was entitled to both 

instructions.”). 
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As a legal matter, the Court of Appeals held that the statutory presumption 

entitling a person within their own home to use deadly force regardless of the 

character of the assault against them remains subject to the limitation that a 

defendant is not entitled to use self-defense if they were the aggressor in the 

situation. See State v. Hicks, 283 N.C. App. 74, 81, 2022-NCCOA-263 ¶ 22. Ms. Hicks 

does not argue that this is incorrect. Instead, Ms. Hicks maintains that there was no 

evidence in the case from which a jury could find that she was the aggressor in these 

circumstances.1 Thus, our only task is to determine whether, in the light most 

favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Ms. 

Hicks was the aggressor when she shot and killed Mr. Adams. The Court of Appeals 

erroneously considered the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Hicks and 

wrongly concluded that the evidence was insufficient. We hold that the evidence was 

sufficient to give the aggressor doctrine instruction, find no error in the trial court’s 

decision to give the instruction, and therefore reverse the decision of the Court of 

Appeals. 

I. Background

A. Evidence at Trial

1 At trial, during the charge conference, defense counsel objected to the aggressor 

instruction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Ms. Hicks 

was the aggressor. In closing argument, defense counsel argued to the jury that if Ms. Hicks 

was defending her home, believing that Mr. Adams was there to harm her, then “it doesn’t 

matter who the aggressor was.” 
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Wendy Hicks and Caleb Adams first met in September 2015 through their 

employment at Dart Container. Within a few weeks, they developed an intimate 

relationship that lasted until Mr. Adams’s death on 13 June 2017. Mr. Adams was 

married to Dana Adams, and he remained so until his death. Ms. Hicks was also 

married but divorced her husband in April 2016. Both Ms. Hicks and Mr. Adams 

maintained intimate relationships with other individuals besides each other and 

their spouses. Ms. Hicks made efforts to keep her other relationships secret from Mr. 

Adams. 

Ms. Hicks and Mr. Adams’s relationship was tumultuous; they had several 

vehement arguments. They frequently referred to each other in a vulgar manner, as 

demonstrated in their text messages. Mr. Adams was never violent with his wife,

though he used coarse language, which his wife attributed to his picking up truck 

drivers’ “lingo.”

In early 2017, Mr. Adams introduced Ms. Hicks to methamphetamine. Mrs. 

Adams testified that using methamphetamine affected Mr. Adams’s emotional state. 

Specifically, she stated that methamphetamine use caused Mr. Adams to become 

angry. Mr. Adams stored the methamphetamine at Ms. Hicks’s house, and she would 

at times pick up drugs for him.

When Mr. Adams’s methamphetamine supplier was arrested, Ms. Hicks 

introduced Mr. Adams to a new supplier, a man named Doug. Ms. Hicks testified that

after a while, she began performing oral sex on Doug at Mr. Adams’s instruction to 
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pay for the methamphetamine. At some point, Ms. Hicks began a separate, intimate 

relationship with Doug, which she tried to keep secret from Mr. Adams.

The relationship between Ms. Hicks and Mr. Adams became even more 

strained around 23 May 2017, when Ms. Hicks posted a photo to Facebook of her and 

Mr. Adams kissing, which was seen by Mr. Adams’s wife. Mrs. Adams confronted Mr. 

Adams who denied that he was the man in the picture. Ms. Hicks then started placing 

anonymous calls to Mrs. Adams. On 8 June 2017, she called Mrs. Adams around 7:00

a.m., blocking the caller ID, and disclosed that Mr. Adams was having an affair and 

consuming drugs. Ms. Hicks called again later that day at about 2:00 p.m. and asked 

Mrs. Adams if she knew that Mr. Adams had been involved in a wreck. 

During the week of 12 June 2017, Ms. Hicks and Mr. Adams had several 

arguments, including one about the photo she had posted to Facebook. Ms. Hicks also 

testified that Mr. Adams was upset and angry because his supplier had raised the 

price of methamphetamine and he was concerned about owing people money.

On the morning of 12 June 2017, Mr. Adams went to Ms. Hicks’s residence, a 

trailer where she lived with her seventeen-year-old daughter, April. At trial, April 

testified that she was awakened that morning by her mother and Mr. Adams arguing.

According to April, Mr. Adams slung the door to their residence open, causing the 

door to hit a dog gate. Mr. Adams proceeded to enter the home and scream profanities 

and threats at Ms. Hicks. April testified she heard Mr. Adams say, “I’ve never hit a 

bitch but you’re pushing me to hit a bitch. You’re ruining my life. You’re ruining my 
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family.” April testified that because she was afraid, she sent messages to her 

boyfriend describing the events as they occurred. At some point that morning, Mr. 

Adams left.

That evening, Mr. Adams texted Ms. Hicks multiple times. Ms. Hicks replied 

that she would leave his drugs on the nightstand in her bedroom, and around 9:15 

p.m., Mr. Adams came and picked up his drugs. Around 11:30 p.m., Ms. Hicks texted 

Mr. Adams, threatening to send sexually explicit photographs to his wife to expose 

their affair. Approximately half an hour later, around midnight, Ms. Hicks called 

Mrs. Adams, identified herself, and told her that she and Mr. Adams were having an 

affair. She also told Mrs. Adams that Mr. Adams was using recreational drugs. 

During the conversation, Ms. Hicks told Mrs. Adams that she and Mr. Adams had 

been arguing and asked if he was ever a violent person. Ms. Hicks explained that Mr. 

Adams had threatened her and that she was concerned for her safety. Mrs. Adams 

was not aware of Mr. Adams’s behavior on the morning of 12 June 2017. Mrs. Adams 

told Ms. Hicks that Mr. Adams had never been violent with her and stressed that Mr. 

Adams needed assistance with his substance abuse problem. Ms. Hicks said she had 

a gun, at which point Mrs. Adams told Ms. Hicks to call the police if she felt 

threatened by Mr. Adams.

Later that evening, an unknown man arrived at Ms. Hicks’s residence. He 

stood in her yard and yelled, “[W]here’s Caleb[?]” Ms. Hicks informed the man that 

Mr. Adams was not at her residence, and the man instructed Ms. Hicks to tell Mr. 
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Adams to “call his people.” In response, Ms. Hicks began calling Mr. Adams 

repeatedly. Mr. Adams’s reply text stated, “You’ll be lucky if you don’t end up in a 

ditch.”

At 5:58 a.m. on 13 June 2017, Mr. Adams texted Ms. Hicks and then called her, 

telling her he was on the way to her house. At 6:13 a.m., Ms. Hicks texted Doug, “He 

[on the way] here,” and then at 6:14 a.m., she texted Mr. Adams, “No, please don’t 

come here. They looking for you.” At 6:28 a.m., she texted Doug, “He here.”

The next independently verifiable fact is that two minutes later, at 6:30 a.m., 

Ms. Hicks called 911 and told the operator that she had shot Mr. Adams. Ms. Hicks

is the only living eyewitness to what occurred in the bedroom where Mr. Adams was 

shot. The only other person in the house at the time, April, remained in her room and 

could only testify regarding what she heard. April testified that she heard Mr. Adams 

burst into the home and slam the door, as he had done the previous morning. She

also heard Mr. Adams tell her mother he was going to kill her, and she could hear 

that they were engaged in a physical struggle violent enough to move furniture.

Ms. Hicks gave four accounts of what occurred during those two minutes: two 

different statements to two deputies who had arrived at the scene; a third statement

to two detectives at the sheriff’s office; and a last version during her testimony at 

trial. While her first two accounts were virtually identical to one another, they 

differed slightly from her third statement and even more so from her trial testimony.
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All four times, Ms. Hicks asserted that Mr. Adams arrived angry, came into 

the house, and then came into her bedroom to obtain her phone. When she refused to 

give him her phone, Mr. Adams grabbed her gun from the nightstand, which was in 

its holster. From this point on, her accounts differ.

To the two deputies, Ms. Hicks stated that Mr. Adams tried to grab her in an 

attempt to get her phone, during which he dropped the gun, and she picked it up and 

shot him. Her account given to the detectives later that day was similar, except that 

she omitted that Mr. Adams dropped the gun and she picked it up. She stated to the 

detectives that after she refused to relinquish her phone, a wrestling match ensued, 

the gun and the phone switched hands, and then she shot him, but she also stated 

that she could not remember how she got the gun or how it was removed from the 

holster. 

At trial, Ms. Hicks testified that upon picking up the gun, Mr. Adams took it 

out of the holster and pointed it at her, and she then threw her phone at him. She 

said Mr. Adams went through her phone and started to leave with the gun. She 

testified that she told him to leave the gun there, at which point he came back and 

threw the gun on the nightstand. Next, she stated she picked up the gun and tried to 

walk past Mr. Adams, who grabbed her arm and started stomping on her feet. She 

stated she tried to get away, but Mr. Adams pinned her arm. She then pulled the gun 
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out of the holster and shot him.2 She stated that upon being shot, Mr. Adams walked 

past her and dropped face down at the door.

When the police arrived, Mr. Adams was lying on his back on the floor, halfway 

through the bedroom doorway. A law enforcement officer checked for a pulse and 

determined that he was dead. By Mr. Adams’s leg, the police found a key fitting Ms. 

Hicks’s front door and a “smoke vape” or “vape smoker.” Ms. Hicks told an officer at 

the scene that the key was Mr. Adams’s, and that he had used it to enter the trailer.

At trial, a forensic toxicologist testified that the level of methamphetamine in 

Mr. Adams’s blood was 1.5 milligrams per liter and the level of amphetamine was .12 

milligrams per liter. The toxicologist further testified to the effects of 

methamphetamine, including that it can cause heightened alertness, aggression, 

paranoia, violence, and sometimes psychosis.

The pathologist located two gunshot wounds. One entered the left side of Mr. 

Adams’s back and went through his heart. The second shot entered on the right side 

of Mr. Adams’s back and traveled upward. Either wound could have caused his death. 

2 Specifically, Ms. Hicks testified:

He grabs my left arm and he — he grabs my left arm. He starts 

to kick and stomp my feet to try to get my feet out from under 

me. And I’m pulling and — and tried to get away. And he comes 

around and pins my arm between us. He still has . . . his other 

elbow, his other arm, and he’s elbowing me in the side of the 

head. And he hits my — in the jaw and the side of the head, and 

he’s still pushing me. He slams my back into the mirror. . . . And 

. . . as he’s hitting me, I’m — everything just starts to — I’d say 

black out . . . . And at some point, I don’t know when, I get the 

gun out of the holster. And I did — and I shoot.
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There was an absence of stippling (when unburnt gunpowder strikes the skin and 

causes a superficial injury) or damage to Mr. Adams’s clothes, which an expert for 

the State testified indicates that the gun was shot from more than six inches away.

Nothing was broken in the house or bedroom.3 At the scene, Ms. Hicks did not appear 

to be injured, and she did not complain of any pain. At the beginning of questioning 

by the detectives, Ms. Hicks had no bruises. However, after about four hours, the 

detectives noticed what appeared to be bruises starting to develop. After questioning, 

Ms. Hicks was photographed. These photographs were presented at trial and 

displayed what may have been bruises, but they were not clear or conclusive.

B. Procedural History

On 11 July 2017, Ms. Hicks was indicted for the second-degree murder of Mr. 

Adams. The matter came on for trial by jury in November 2019. At the charge 

conference, defense counsel objected to an instruction on the aggressor doctrine, 

arguing that the evidence presented did not allow any inference that Ms. Hicks was 

the aggressor. In overruling this objection, the trial court explained its reasoning as 

follows:

The [c]ourt overrules the Defendant’s objection that the 

aggressor — that Ms. Hicks could not be the aggressor as 

a matter of law, as I think there’s some evidence from 

which the jury could find that Ms. Hicks obtained the 

weapon and that Mr. Adams was leaving or that his 

3 The front door was broken at one of its hinges. However, Ms. Hicks told the detectives 

during questioning that this had occurred before Mr. Adams’s visits to her house during the 

week of June 12. Ms. Hicks did not address this in her testimony at trial. April testified that 

she did not know when it occurred. 
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conclusions could be drawn by the jury and the [c]ourt, 

therefore, overrules the Defendant’s objection to the jury 

being allowed to consider the exception to the self-defense 

as to whether or not she, Ms. Hicks, was the aggressor.

The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of second-degree murder, the 

elements of voluntary manslaughter, the defense of habitation, self-defense, and no 

duty to retreat. 

Regarding whether Ms. Hicks was the aggressor, the court instructed that she 

would be considered the aggressor if she “voluntarily and without provocation entered 

the fight, . . . unless Ms. Hicks, thereafter, attempted to abandon the fight and gave 

notice to the deceased that Ms. Hicks was doing so” or if Ms. Hicks “reasonably 

believe[d] that she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, . . . had 

no reasonable means to retreat, and the use of force likely to cause death or serious 

bodily harm was the only way to escape the danger.” If the jury found Ms. Hicks was 

the aggressor, the court instructed that “Ms. Hicks is not entitled to the benefit of 

self-defense.” 

The jury found Ms. Hicks guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court 

sentenced her in the mitigated range for a Class B1 offense, prior record level 1, to a 

minimum of 180 months and a maximum of 228 months in custody. Ms. Hicks timely 

gave notice of appeal in open court. On appeal, Ms. Hicks argued the trial court erred 

in instructing the jury on the aggressor doctrine, and the Court of Appeals agreed, 

holding that Ms. Hicks is entitled to a new trial. See Hicks, 283 N.C. App. at 84. By 
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order dated 15 June 2022, this Court allowed the State’s petition for discretionary 

review. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Self-Defense and the Aggressor Doctrine

Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3, “a person is justified in the use of deadly force 

and does not have a duty to retreat” if he or she is in a lawful place and “reasonably 

believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm 

to himself or herself or another” or “[u]nder the circumstances permitted pursuant to 

[N.C.G.S. §] 14-51.2.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3(a) (2021). Under section 14-51.2, there is a 

presumption that a home’s “lawful occupant . . . held a reasonable fear of imminent 

death or serious bodily harm to himself or herself or another” in the use of deadly 

force if the victim “was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had 

unlawfully and forcibly entered, a home” which the lawful occupant “knew or had 

reason to believe . . . was occurring or had occurred.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b) (2021).4

As well, someone “who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s 

home . . . is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act 

involving force or violence.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(d) (2021). 

4 Justice Morgan’s dissent reads this provision to create a “compulsory” or 

“mandatory” presumption that “cannot be disregarded by the jury.” The text of the statute, 

however, makes clear that this presumption is “rebuttable” and “does not apply” in specified 

cases. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c).
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However, the defenses pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 14-51.2 and 14-51.3 “[are] not 

available to” someone who “[i]nitially provokes the use of force against himself or 

herself.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 (2021). This is what is commonly known as the “aggressor 

doctrine.” Someone may be considered the aggressor if they “aggressively and 

willingly enter[ ] into a fight without legal excuse or provocation.” State v. Wynn, 278 

N.C. 513, 519 (1971). Additionally, someone who did not instigate a fight may still be 

the aggressor if they continue to pursue a fight that the other person is trying to 

leave. See State v. Cannon, 341 N.C. 79, 82 (1995) (stating that evidence that 

defendant shot the apparently unarmed victim as she was leaving in a car supported 

a finding that defendant was the aggressor even where the victim initially went to 

defendant’s home and threatened to kill him).

Justifications pursuant to sections 14-51.2 and 14-51.3 may still be available 

to the initial aggressor if the victim employed force “so serious that the person using 

defensive force reasonably believes that he or she was in imminent danger of death 

or serious bodily harm, [they] had no reasonable means to retreat, and the use of force

. . . was the only way to escape the danger,” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)(a), or if the initial 

aggressor “withdraws, in good faith, from physical contact with the person who was 

provoked, and indicates clearly that he or she desires to withdraw and terminate the 

use of force, but the person who was provoked continues or resumes the use of force[,]” 

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2)(b). We have also held that a victim being shot in the back may

support an inference that the victim was trying to leave. See Cannon, 341 N.C. at 83. 
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For that reason, a victim being shot in the back is a factor that may be considered in 

evaluating a defendant’s self-defense claim. See State v. Rush, 340 N.C. 174, 186

(1995).

“A trial court must give the substance of a requested jury instruction if it is 

‘correct in itself and supported by the evidence.’” State v. Mercer, 373 N.C. 459, 462 

(2020) (quoting State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 464 (2009)). When the evidence is 

conflicting, it is for the jury to determine whether the defendant was the aggressor. 

State v. Terry, 329 N.C. 191, 199 (1991); State v. Benton, 299 N.C. 16, 19 (1980). 

When deciding whether to include the aggressor doctrine in jury instructions, 

“the relevant issue is simply whether the record contains evidence from which the 

jury could infer that the defendant was acting as an ‘aggressor’ at the time that he or 

she allegedly acted in self-defense.” State v. Mumma, 372 N.C. 226, 239 n.2 (2019) 

(citing Cannon, 341 N.C. at 82–83 (stating that “the evidence in this case permits the 

inference that defendant was the aggressor at the time he shot the victim”)). While 

all evidence is to be considered, “the evidence must be considered in the light most 

favorable to the State. The State must be given the benefit of every reasonable 

inference to be drawn from the evidence and any contradictions in the evidence are 

to be resolved in favor of the State.” State v. Bell, 338 N.C. 363, 388 (1994) (citing 

State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102, 107–08 (1986)); cf. Mumma, 372 N.C. at 239 n.2 

(rejecting the defendant’s assertion that the evidence is to be viewed in the light most 

favorable to him). “Contradictions in the evidence are resolved favorably to the 
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[S]tate.” Sumpter, 318 N.C. at 107 (1986) (citing State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563 (1984); 

State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. 236 (1978)).

When the trial court delivers an aggressor instruction “without supporting 

evidence, a new trial is required.” State v. Vaughn, 227 N.C. App. 198, 202 (2013) 

(cleaned up); see also State v. Porter, 340 N.C. 320, 331 (1995) (“Where jury 

instructions are given without supporting evidence, a new trial is required.”).

B. Application to this Case

The trial court properly held that the evidence presented at trial supported an 

aggressor instruction. In reversing that decision, the Court of Appeals made two legal 

errors. First, the court treated Ms. Hicks’s trial testimony as fact without addressing 

its inconsistencies with her prior accounts. See Hicks, 283 N.C. App. at 81–82. Second, 

the Court of Appeals ignored other evidence contradicting the version of events Ms. 

Hicks presented at trial. See id. On each score, the Court of Appeals mistook how trial 

courts should examine the record. 

When asked to give an aggressor instruction, a trial court must consider 

whether a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendant acted as 

an aggressor. See Mumma, 372 N.C. at 239 n.2; see also Cannon, 341 N.C. at 82–83. 

In answering that question, the court must view the record in the light most favorable 

to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. Bell, 338 N.C. at 388. 

Where, as here, there is conflicting evidence on whether the defendant acted as an 

aggressor and the jury could reasonably draw the inference either way, the State gets 
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the benefit of the doubt. See id.; see also Sumpter, 318 N.C. at 107. Properly viewed, 

the record contained significant evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer 

that Ms. Hicks acted as the aggressor. For that reason, the trial court correctly 

instructed the jury,5 and the Court of Appeals erred by holding that Ms. Hicks is 

entitled a new trial.

In reaching the conclusion that the aggressor doctrine instruction was not 

warranted, the Court of Appeals closely tracked Ms. Hicks’s testimony at trial, not 

mentioning her differing previous accounts. See Hicks, 283 N.C. App. at 81–82. The 

opinion recites as facts certain key details that are contradicted by Ms. Hicks’s

previous statements. See id. at 82 (stating that Mr. Adams “threw the Defendant’s 

phone back at her . . . [and] continued to have possession of the firearm” and that he 

“placed the firearm in his pocket and moved towards the bedroom door” but 

relinquished it when Ms. Hicks demanded); id. at 84 (stating that Mr. Adams 

“extorted her cell phone from her”). 

The opinion also rests on factual details that were asserted only in Ms. Hicks’s

account at trial and were absent from her prior accounts. See id. at 82 (stating that 

Mr. Adams “took [the gun] out of its holster, and pointed it at the Defendant,” that 

“he placed the firearm in his pocket” while he was leaving, and that “[w]hen 

Defendant attempted to leave the bedroom and flee from the altercation, Caleb 

5 The trial court’s jury instructions explained the law as set out above; Ms. Hicks does 

not dispute that the jury instructions were a correct statement of the law.
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lunged towards the Defendant and proceeded to kick, push, punch, and shove her”);

id. at 84 (stating that Mr. Adams “point[ed] a firearm at her[ ] [and] assaulted 

Defendant without provocation by punching, pushing, kicking, and shoving when she 

attempted to escape from her bedroom with the firearm”). 

However, the jury, as instructed, was entitled to disbelieve some or all of Ms. 

Hicks’s testimony at trial. See, e.g., Ward v. Carmona, 368 N.C. 35, 37–38 (2015)

(explaining that as sole judges of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of 

witnesses, jurors can believe all, part, or none of the testimony). They could have

concluded that her statements made to law enforcement officers immediately after 

the incident were more likely to be true. They could have given greater weight to the 

physical evidence. Most importantly, contradictions in the evidence are to be resolved 

in the State’s favor. See Bell, 338 N.C. at 388.

Beyond the inconsistencies between Ms. Hicks’s trial testimony and her prior 

accounts, other evidence presented at trial challenges her version of events. By 

crediting Ms. Hicks’s account over substantial physical evidence to the contrary, the 

Court of Appeals failed to view the record in the light most favorable to the State. 

That was error. Drawing all inferences in the State’s favor, a jury examining the 

evidence could reasonably infer that Ms. Hicks acted as the aggressor in her 

confrontation with Mr. Adams. For example, the jury could have noticed that, 

although Ms. Hicks testified to a violent attack, she did not exhibit obvious injuries. 

Likewise, though Ms. Hicks recounted a ferocious struggle, nothing in the bedroom 
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appeared broken, despite the room’s small size. And although Ms. Hicks testified that 

she shot Mr. Adams while trying to escape his blows, the State offered evidence that 

he was shot in the back from at least six inches away. Each of those contradictions in 

the evidence could have given a jury pause, prompting them to doubt Ms. Hicks’s

account and credit the State’s. And in deciding to give an aggressor instruction, the 

trial court properly resolved those contradictions in the State’s favor, affording it the 

benefit of the doubt as our cases prescribe. See, e.g., Sumpter, 318 N.C. at 107; Brown,

310 N.C. 563; Thomas, 296 N.C. 236. 

In arguing to the jury, the State emphasized four facts that supported the 

aggressor instruction: (1) that Mr. Adams was shot in the back; (2) that Mr. Adams 

had never been physically violent with Ms. Hicks or his wife before this incident, see 

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(2) (2021); State v. Bass, 371 N.C. 535, 544 (2018) (stating

that character evidence is admissible to support or rebut an inference that the victim 

was the aggressor); (3) that the vape found near his body shows Mr. Hicks had likely 

turned around to leave, getting it out of his pocket because he was going outside; the 

State argued that “[h]e wanted to start smoking again because he was heading out of 

the house”; and (4) that he had no intention of harming her because he had “saved 

her life [just] 48 hours before.” 

Other evidence in the case further supports the instruction. The jury heard 

approximately two and a half days of testimony from a witness reading aloud 

hundreds of pages of text messages between Mr. Adams and Ms. Hicks. This included 
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messages and photographs exchanged in the weeks leading up to the murder. The 

jury could draw inferences from this couple’s interactions that Ms. Hicks sought to 

provoke Mr. Adams and that she was angry when he seemed to indicate that he 

wanted to end their relationship.6

Furthermore, the jury could have inferred that Ms. Hicks’s fear of Mr. Adams 

was not genuine from the fact that Ms. Hicks did not call 911 at 5:58 a.m. on the 

morning of 13 June 2017 when Mr. Adams texted her, and then called her, saying 

that he was coming to her house. Her subsequent text messages to Mr. Adams telling 

him not to come to her home that morning, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

State, arguably were not motivated by her fear of Mr. Adams harming her but rather 

6 In the Analysis section of her dissent, Justice Barringer correctly observes that 

“[t]his Court has long held that speculative evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” 

But there is a difference between “speculative” evidence and circumstantial evidence. We 

have defined the latter as “proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the guilt or 

innocence of a defendant.” State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 36 (1984). Under our cases, the State 

may offer circumstantial evidence at trial so long as “a reasonable inference of [the] 

defendant’s guilt may be drawn from” it. State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 379 (2000). If the 

State’s circumstantial evidence clears that bar, it is “for the jury to decide whether the facts, 

taken singly or in combination, satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 

actually guilty.” Id. (quoting State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. at 244) (cleaned up); see also State v. 

Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452 (1988) (“Circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss 

and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of 

innocence.”). Here, the State offered jurors “proof of a chain of facts and circumstances” 

suggesting that Ms. Hicks was the initial aggressor in her confrontation with Mr. Adams. See 

Adcock, 310 N.C. at 36. Because that circumstantial evidence permits a “reasonable 

inference” of Ms. Hicks’ guilt, it was for the jury to consider and weigh it in deciding whether 

the State met its burden of proof. See Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 379.
STATE V. HICKS

Opinion of the Court

-20-

demonstrated her concern that other individuals may harm him if he showed up 

there.7

In their two-minute interaction in her bedroom, by Ms. Hicks’s own account, 

she was the only one armed at the time the confrontation escalated to physical force. 

While according to her account Mr. Adams did pick up the gun, resolving conflicts in 

the light most favorable to the State, the evidence from her initial statements 

supports the conclusion that he never pulled the gun out of the holster. The jury could, 

on this evidence, conclude that she was the first one to employ deadly force, and that 

when she did, she was the only one in possession of a deadly weapon. Finally, by Ms. 

Hicks’s own account, she stopped Mr. Adams from leaving the bedroom, and the 

physical evidence discloses that Mr. Adams was shot twice in the back from at least 

six inches away, if not further. Cumulatively, this evidence was sufficient to support 

an instruction to the jury that Ms. Hicks could not claim self-defense or defense of 

habitation if she was the aggressor. See Terry, 329 N.C. at 199. As the statutory 

language and our precedents make clear, defense of habitation is not available to an 

aggressor. See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4(2).8

7 Ms. Hicks’s 6:14 a.m. text to Mr. Adams was, “No, please don’t come here. They 

looking for you.” 

8 Justice Morgan’s dissent contends that Ms. Hicks could invoke “the affirmative 

defense of defense of another” in addition to her personal self-defense claim. Ms. Hicks did 

not invoke that defense at trial, and we cannot retroactively raise it for her. At any rate, the 

text of the statutory “aggressor” doctrine applies wholesale to the “justification described in 

[N.C.]G.S. § 14-51.2” without distinguishing between personal self-defense or defense of 

others. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4.
STATE V. HICKS

Opinion of the Court

-21-

III. Conclusion

It was for the jury to decide which version of the facts was proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt in this case. Where, as here, there was significant evidence from 

which a jury reasonably could conclude that Ms. Hicks was the aggressor in the twominute confrontation with Mr. Adams and that she intentionally shot him in the back 

as he was leaving her bedroom, not because she was in fear of her life or because she 

reasonably believed he would harm her or her daughter but out of malice, the trial 

court properly instructed the jury that if it found that she was the aggressor, the 

presumption in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 is no longer available to her. The Court of Appeals 

failed to consider the facts in the light most favorable to the State in making this 

assessment. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, hold that the 

trial court properly instructed the jury on the aggressor doctrine, and remand to the 

Court of Appeals for consideration of Defendant’s argument that the trial court 

committed plain error in admitting Exhibits 174 and 175 into evidence.

REVERSED.
STATE V. HICKS

Dietz, J., concurring

-22-

Justice DIETZ concurring.

The majority effectively holds that the language in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 

incorporates the common law aggressor doctrine. That section provides, with limited 

exceptions, that the castle doctrine and the stand your ground law do not apply to one 

who “[i]nitially provokes the use of force against himself or herself.” N.C.G.S. § 14-

51.4 (2021). While the common law aggressor doctrine may be consistent with the 

statutory “initially provokes” language in some situations, I do not believe the two 

are coextensive.

For example, in this case the trial court instructed the jury that an “aggressor” 

includes a person who “uses towards one’s opponent abusive language which,

considering all of the circumstances, is calculated and intended to provoke a fight.” 

This portion of the instruction, taken from the common law, cannot be squared with 

the statutory castle doctrine, which creates a presumption that deadly force is 

reasonable whenever the defendant knows or has reason to know that the victim has 

unlawfully or forcibly entered the defendant’s home. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b) (2021). 

When this provision of the castle doctrine applies, the disqualifying language 

in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 does not examine what the defendant did in response to that 

unlawful or forcible entry but instead what the defendant did to provoke that 

unlawful or forcible entry in the first place.

In State v. McLymore, 380 N.C. 185 (2022), this Court addressed the question 
STATE V. HICKS

Dietz, J., concurring

-23-

of “whether the General Assembly intended to add to the common law right to perfect 

self-defense or abrogate it in its entirety” in enacting N.C.G.S. §§ 14-51.2–.4. 

McLymore, 380 N.C. at 190. In holding that the statutory scheme supplanted the 

common law, we stated that “when a defendant in a criminal case claims perfect selfdefense, the applicable provisions of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3—and, by extension, the 

disqualifications provided under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4—govern.” Id. at 191. The same 

reasoning applies equally to the castle doctrine in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2. In other words, 

McLymore made clear that these statutes entirely supplanted the common law. When 

addressing self-defense under these statutes, there is no common law, there is only 

the language of the statute.

Nevertheless, at trial, Hicks did not argue that the common law aggressor 

instruction was inapplicable to the statutory castle doctrine defense found in 

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2. Likewise, she did not request an instruction on the “initially 

provokes” provision in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4—the only “aggressor” provision that applies 

to the statutory castle doctrine under McLymore, and one that arguably is narrower 

than the common law doctrine.

Moreover, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, Hicks argued only that the trial 

court erred under the common law “by instructing on the aggressor doctrine when all 

of the evidence showed an enraged Caleb Adams burst into the bedroom of Wendy 

Hicks and assaulted her.” In the Court of Appeals briefing, defendant did not raise 

the castle doctrine issue, or even cite N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2, much less argue that a
STATE V. HICKS

Dietz, J., concurring

-24-

separate, statutory aggressor instruction (one based on the interplay between 

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 and N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4) was the only suitable instruction on 

provocation with respect to a castle doctrine claim. The decision not to raise these 

issues is understandable because, as noted above, Hicks never raised these issues at 

trial, so they are waived on appeal.

As the multiple separate opinions in this case illustrate, even this Court is 

struggling to understand how the “aggressor” language from our existing case law 

(and the pattern jury instructions) can be squared with the various statutory selfdefense provisions that now govern. These are complicated and thorny legal issues 

that call out for clarity. But we are constrained to address only those arguments that 

were adequately raised and preserved in the case. These complicated legal issues 

were not and therefore must wait for another day. As a result, not only does the law 

suffer, but so does Hicks.

Justice BERGER joins in this concurring opinion.
STATE V. HICKS

Morgan, J., dissenting

-25-

Justice MORGAN dissenting.

In respectfully dissenting from the opinion of a majority of my learned 

colleagues, I join the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague Justice Barringer 

as I write separately to register my own dissenting view, while adopting by reference 

the “Background” segment of her dissenting opinion.

The series of statutory enactments and appellate case decisions which are 

invoked here collectively illustrates the fallacy in the majority’s reasoning. Firstly, 

the majority faultily conflates the legal concept of a presumption with the legal 

concept of an inference in construing N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 in light of the facts in the 

present case and erroneously relying on this Court’s decisions in State v. Cannon, 

341 N.C. 79 (1995), and State v. Rush, 340 N.C. 174 (1995), as governing authorities 

here. As noted earlier, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2, defendant was presumed, as 

the lawful occupant of her home, “to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death 

or serious bodily harm to . . . herself or another when using defensive force that is 

intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm” to Mr. Adams if (1) he was 

“in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly 

entered,” defendant’s home; and (2) defendant “knew or had reason to believe that an 

unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had 

occurred.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b) (2021) (emphasis added). The majority cites Cannon

for this Court’s recognition that where there was evidence “that the victim was shot 
STATE V. HICKS

Morgan, J., dissenting

-26-

from the side and from behind, [it] further support[ed] the inference that defendant 

shot at the victim only after the victim had quit the argument and was trying to leave 

[to go out the driveway].” 341 N.C. at 83. “An inference is nothing more than a 

permissible deduction from the evidence, while a presumption is compulsory and 

cannot be disregarded by the jury.” Henderson County v. Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 117 

(1979) (quoting Cogdell v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co., 132 N.C. 852, 854 (1903)). 

“It must be borne in mind that presumptions and inferences differ.” State v. Williams, 

288 N.C. 680, 687 (1975). Unfortunately, the majority fails to recognize the distinction 

between the two related, yet disproportionate, evidentiary components. A 

presumption must be recognized by a jury to establish a component of the case and 

cannot be disregarded; on the other hand, an inference may be recognized by a jury 

to establish a component of the case but can be disregarded. Here, defendant held the 

statutory presumption accorded to her by N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2, as the lawful occupant 

of her home, that she was entitled to employ deadly force against Mr. Adams due to 

a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm to herself or her daughter 

as a result of the decedent’s unlawful and forcible entry into defendant’s home, of 

which defendant was aware, after defendant instructed Mr. Adams to stay away from 

her residence, after he burst into defendant’s home and ultimately her bedroom, after 

he took defendant’s firearm from her bedroom nightstand, after Mr. Adams 

threatened to kill defendant, and after the two physically tussled with one another. 

In my view, in the face of a mandatory presumption which operated in favor of 
STATE V. HICKS

Morgan, J., dissenting

-27-

defendant, the State’s evidence constituted a mere permissible deduction by the jury 

which was insufficient to warrant a jury instruction on the aggressor doctrine.

Secondly, the majority conveniently couches the facts and outcomes of Cannon

and Rush in a manner intended to stretch the applicability of these cases to the 

present case, but it instead merely serves to stretch credulity. In Cannon, the 

defendant unsuccessfully argued to this Court that “the trial court, over objection, 

erred by instructing the jury that self-defense was unavailable to defendant if 

defendant was the aggressor” where the evidence showed that the case “permit[ted] 

the inference that defendant was the aggressor at the time he shot the victim” 

because “the evidence also show[ed] that immediately before the victim was shot, she 

had ‘straightened her car up to go out the driveway’ and she was about to leave,” with 

“[t]he evidence also reflect[ing] that the victim was shot from the side and from 

behind, further supporting the inference that defendant shot at the victim only after 

the victim had quit the argument and was trying to leave.” 341 N.C. at 82–83. While 

the majority strives to utilize Cannon to narrow the present case’s affirmative defense 

focus to self-defense—just as it seeks to do in its employment of our decision in Rush, 

where the defendant argued that he acted in self-defense and where “the victim had 

been shot in the back of the head,” 340 N.C. at 186—nonetheless defendant in the 

present case was entitled to invoke not only the affirmative defense of self-defense 

but also the affirmative defense of defense of another; namely, her daughter and her 

daughter’s friend, who the trial record shows were in an adjoining room to defendant’s 
STATE V. HICKS

Morgan, J., dissenting

-28-

bedroom and in whose direction Mr. Adams was moving when defendant shot him in 

the back. Indeed, in Cannon and Rush, only two persons were involved in each case—

the defendant and the defendant’s victim—and in each case only the affirmative 

defense of self-defense was available to the defendant as juxtaposed to the aggressor 

doctrine. In the instant case, however, four persons were involved—defendant, Mr. 

Adams, defendant’s daughter, and the daughter’s friend—and the affirmative defense 

of self-defense plus the affirmative defense of defense of another were available to 

defendant. Further, while the majority emphasizes the fact that Mr. Adams was shot 

in the back like the decedent in Cannon and the decedent in Rush, such that there is 

an inference that the individual who was shot was trying to leave, nonetheless the 

victims in Cannon and Rush had clearly withdrawn from any further interactions 

with the respective defendants, whereby in the present case, it was not clear that Mr. 

Adams had withdrawn from any further perpetuation of violence as he headed in the 

direction of the room which was occupied by defendant’s daughter and the daughter’s 

friend.

Based on these observations and for these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Justice BARRINGER joins in this dissenting opinion.
STATE V. HICKS

Barringer, J., dissenting

-29-

Justice BARRINGER dissenting.

I. Background

Wendy Hicks met Caleb Adams while they were both working at Dart 

Container in Randleman, North Carolina in September 2015. Mr. Adams maintained 

relationships with several women, despite being married to his wife, Dana Adams. 

Ms. Hicks and Mr. Adams began a sexual relationship together shortly after meeting. 

While in the relationship, Mr. Adams introduced Ms. Hicks to methamphetamine. 

Mr. Adams and Ms. Hicks had several vehement arguments and referred to each 

other in vulgar terms. These arguments frequently regarded methamphetamine use 

or money.

After one such argument, Ms. Hicks called Mr. Adams’s wife on 8 June 2017 

and exposed her relationship with Mr. Adams. On 12 June 2017 and 13 June 2017, 

Ms. Hicks told Mr. Adams’s wife that Mr. Adams had threatened to hurt Ms. Hicks 

and her children. At approximately 5:58 a.m. on 13 June 2017, Mr. Adams texted Ms. 

Hicks saying, “You’ll be lucky if you don’t end up in a ditch” and that he was coming 

to her house. Ms. Hicks responded by telling Mr. Adams both on the phone and via 

text not to come to her house. Despite this explicit instruction, Mr. Adams arrived at 

Ms. Hicks house at approximately 6:28 a.m. on 13 June 2017. Ms. Hicks, Ms. Hicks’s 

daughter, and her daughter’s friend were at the house when Mr. Adams arrived.

Mr. Adams entered the house and went into Ms. Hicks’s bedroom. Ms. Hicks 
STATE V. HICKS

Barringer, J., dissenting

-30-

testified that Mr. Adams took her gun from the nightstand and pointed it at her, 

demanding her phone. After going through her phone, Mr. Adams threw the gun and 

phone onto the bed. Ms. Hicks took the gun and phone. Ms. Hicks testified that when 

she tried to leave the bedroom, Mr. Adams blocked her way and physically attacked 

her.

Ms. Hicks testified that she “black[ed] out” and shot Mr. Adams twice in the 

back. Shortly after the shooting, Ms. Hicks called 911, and her daughter began 

performing CPR on Mr. Adams.

II. Analysis

At issue in this case is the interplay between N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2, commonly 

known as the castle doctrine, and N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4, commonly known as the 

aggressor doctrine.1 Section 14-51.2(b) states that:

(b) The lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or 

workplace is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of 

imminent death or serious bodily harm to himself or herself 

or another when using defensive force that is intended or 

likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to another if 

both of the following apply:

(1) The person against whom the defensive 

force was used was in the process of 

unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had 

unlawfully and forcibly entered, a home, 

motor vehicle, or workplace, or if that person 

1 In his concurrence, Justice Dietz argues that the statutory aggressor doctrine found 

in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 is not before the Court. I disagree. The issue for which this Court 

allowed review is “whether the Court of Appeals erred by awarding a new trial based on the 

aggressor instruction.” Further, the statutory scheme was argued to this Court without 

objection from either party.
STATE V. HICKS

Barringer, J., dissenting

-31-

had removed or was attempting to remove 

another against that person’s will from the 

home, motor vehicle, or workplace.

(2) The person who uses defensive force knew 

or had reason to believe that an unlawful and 

forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was 

occurring or had occurred.

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b) (2021).

In the present case, Ms. Hicks was in her own home. After being admonished 

twice not to enter her home, Mr. Adams did so and attacked Ms. Hicks in her 

bedroom. The evidence indicates that Mr. Adams had unlawfully and forcibly entered 

Ms. Hicks’s home. Accordingly, Ms. Hicks “is presumed to have held a reasonable fear 

of imminent death or serious bodily harm to . . . herself or another,” N.C.G.S. § 14-

51.2(b), and therefore, was “justified in [her] use of deadly force,” N.C.G.S. § 14-

51.3(a) (2021), unless an exception applies.

The General Statutes of North Carolina provide several exceptions to when 

this presumption applies. Section 14-51.2 further states that:

(c) The presumption set forth in subsection (b) of this 

section shall be rebuttable and does not apply in any of the 

following circumstances:

. . . .

(5) The person against whom the defensive force is 

used (i) has discontinued all efforts to unlawfully 

and forcefully enter the home, motor vehicle, or 

workplace and (ii) has exited the home, motor 

vehicle, or workplace.

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) (2021).
STATE V. HICKS

Barringer, J., dissenting

-32-

This Court has long held that speculative evidence is insufficient to sustain a 

criminal conviction. E.g., State v. Harrelson, 245 N.C. 604, 607 (1957); State v. White, 

271 N.C. 391, 395 (1967); see State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 526 (2008); State ex rel. 

Utils. Comm’n v. Cooper, 368 N.C. 216, 222–23 (2015). The evidence is merely 

speculative that Mr. Adams “discontinued all efforts to unlawfully and forcefully 

enter the home.” See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c)(5). Admittedly, he was shot in the back, 

implying that he was facing the door to the bedroom. However, Mr. Adams was facing 

the door to an interior room of her home, a home where Ms. Hicks’s daughter and her 

daughter’s friend were down the hall. Ms. Hicks retained the right to protect herself 

and the other people in her home, even when Mr. Adams turned to face away from 

her.2 The evidence is insufficient to support the exception found in N.C.G.S. § 14-

51.2(c)(5).

The aggressor doctrine is codified in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 which provides that:

The justification described in G.S. 14-51.2 and

G.S. 14-51.3 is not available to a person who used defensive 

force and who:

. . . .

(2) Initially provokes the use of force against himself 

or herself. However, the person who initially 

provokes the use of force against himself or herself 

2 In footnote 6, the majority correctly defines circumstantial evidence as the “proof of 

a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Under 

our cases, the State may offer circumstantial evidence at trial so long as ‘a reasonable 

inference of the defendant’s guilt may be drawn from’ it.” In the present case, Ms. Hicks shot 

Mr. Adams in the back; however, this does not “suggest[ ] that Ms. Hicks was the initial 

aggressor in her confrontation with Mr. Adams.” Supra at 19 n.6.
STATE V. HICKS

Barringer, J., dissenting

-33-

will be justified in using defensive force if either of 

the following occur:

a. The force used by the person who 

was provoked is so serious that the 

person using defensive force 

reasonably believes that he or she was 

in imminent danger of death or serious 

bodily harm, the person using 

defensive force had no reasonable 

means to retreat, and the use of force 

which is likely to cause death or serious 

bodily harm to the person who was 

provoked was the only way to escape 

the danger.

b. The person who used defensive force 

withdraws, in good faith, from physical 

contact with the person who was 

provoked, and indicates clearly that he 

or she desires to withdraw and 

terminate the use of force, but the 

person who was provoked continues or 

resumes the use of force.

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 (2021) (emphasis added). To justify the trial court providing this 

instruction to the jury, there must be evidence that Ms. Hicks was the initial 

aggressor; yet there is no such evidence. When the record “discloses no evidence 

tending to show that the defendant brought on the difficulty or was the aggressor,” 

giving an instruction on the defendant as an aggressor is reversible error because 

such instruction would be “partially inapplicable, incomplete and misleading.” State 

v. Washington, 234 N.C. 531, 535 (1951). “When there is no evidence that a defendant 

was the initial aggressor, it is reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury 

on the aggressor doctrine of self-defense.” State v. Juarez, 369 N.C. 351, 358 (2016). 
STATE V. HICKS

Barringer, J., dissenting

-34-

Accordingly, the trial court erred.

III. Conclusion

“[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to 

retreat in any place he or she has the lawful right to be” if he or she uses deadly force 

“[u]nder the circumstances permitted pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. § 14-51.2.” N.C.G.S. 

§ 14-51.3(a). Ms. Hicks used deadly force under the circumstances described in 

section 14-51.2 to defend herself, her daughter, and her daughter’s friend. Therefore, 

her conviction should be overturned. Under the castle doctrine, Ms. Hicks “is 

presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm to 

. . . herself or another.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b). There was insufficient evidence to 

support that Ms. Hicks was the initial aggressor, and therefore, the trial court should 

not have given the aggressor doctrine instruction. Moreover, there was merely 

speculative evidence introduced to rebut the presumption found in N.C.G.S. § 14-

51.2. Thus, I would reverse Ms. Hicks’s conviction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Justice MORGAN joins in this dissenting opinion.