GAO-06-999R Military Operations 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 22, 2006 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees 

Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S. Forces Take 

Steps to Mitigate the Risk Contractors May Pose. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Force protection has long been a challenge for Department of Defense (DOD) in the 

Middle East and elsewhere. Since the 1996 Khobar Tower attack in Saudi Arabia, 

which killed 19 U.S. servicemembers, DOD and the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) have issued policies and procedures to help commanders, who are 

responsible for the safety and security of their installations, reduce the risk of 

terrorist attack and mitigate those risks that cannot be eliminated. However, DOD 

recognizes that all risks cannot be eliminated and terrorist attacks will still occur. To 

help installation commanders address force protection challenges, DOD, CENTCOM, 

and others, such as the Multi-national Forces- Iraq (MNF-I), provide guidance and 

assistance to installation commanders. For example DOD and CENTCOM have 

developed force protection standards that apply to installations in CENTCOM’s area 

of responsibility, including Iraq and Afghanistan. These standards describe specific 

actions commanders should take to help prevent terrorist attacks. MNF-I has issued 

guidance to its subordinate commands directing among other things, the 

development of anti-terrorism plans, which include specific physical security 

measures. In addition, the Joint Staff periodically visits installations in Iraq and 

elsewhere to complete antiterrorism vulnerability assessments. The expert teams 

assess an installation for potential areas of attack and suggest actions the installation 

commander can take to reduce risks. Commanders are also provided with threat 

assessments which are updated as necessary, and routinely receive intelligence 

information, which could affect the security of their installations and forces. 

The U.S. military has long relied on contractors to provide a variety of goods and 

services to U.S. forces around the world, including those located in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. These services range from maintaining advanced weapon systems and 

setting up and operating communications networks to providing gate and perimeter 
security, interpreting foreign languages, preparing meals and doing laundry for the 

troops. DOD uses contractors for a variety of reasons, including a lack of skilled and 

qualified military personnel and the need to conserve scarce skills to ensure that they 

will be available for future deployments. DOD estimates that it has more than 50,000 

contractor employees in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.1

 Depending 

on the types of services being provided contractor employees may be U.S. citizens or 

third country nationals from countries such as the United Kingdom, the Philippines, 

Bangladesh, India, or Pakistan.2

 In addition, contractors are often encouraged to hire 

host country nationals from, for example, Iraq to help rebuild local economies and 

get local nationals back to work. 

While contractor employees can provide significant benefits to U.S. forces, contractor 

employees can also pose a risk to U.S. troops. For example, the terrorists who 

attacked the U.S.S. Cole were suspected to be contractor employees associated with 

its refueling operations. This attack led military officials to realize the risk that

contractors could pose to the safety and security of U.S. installations and military 

personnel. The risk is increased when U.S. forces are involved in a military operation 

against an insurgency, as they are in Iraq. Military officials we spoke with from three 

units who served in Iraq told us that they believed they observed contractor 

employees pacing off military facilities in an attempt to provide information on the 

location of critical facilities to hostile forces operating outside of installations. Force 

protection officials from another unit told us that they found a contractor employee 

with sensitive information that could aid hostile forces. Additionally, contractor 

employees have been responsible for additional illegal activities, including acts of 

theft and black market activities. 

Background screenings of contractor employees can provide some insight into the 

likelihood that the employee may cause harm to U.S. troops and may deter some 

criminals and terrorists from working at U.S. installations. Although DOD is not 

required to screen contractor employees, in some situations, such as in Iraq, DOD is 

using biometrics to screen contractor employees for past criminal activity and 

security threats.3

 Contractors that screen their employees generally do not use 

biometrics and depend on public records and commercial databases to screen 

potential employees. 

You asked that we review the process used to screen contractor employees who 

support U.S. deployed forces. Our objective was to determine the ability of DOD and 

 1

Neither DOD nor the services know the exact number of contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

We are issuing a report in fall 2006 that will discuss this and other contractor-on- the- battlefield issues

in more detail. See also GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces 

but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003). 2

A third country national is a person working for a contractor who is neither a citizen of the United 

States nor the host country. Data from our survey of contractors who provide support to deployed 

forces revealed that contractors hired employees from 18 different nations, including the United 

Kingdom, Russia, South Africa, Egypt, Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, and Nepal. 3

 A biometric measures a person’s unique physical characteristics (such as fingerprints, hand

geometry, facial patterns, or iris and retinal scans) or behavioral characteristics (voice patterns, 

written signatures, or keyboard typing techniques) and can be used to recognize the identity, or verify 

the claimed identify, of an individual See GAO, ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT: Agencies Face 

Challenges in Implementing New Federal Employee Identification Standard GAO-06-178 ( 

Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006)

Page 2 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
contractors that support deployed forces to conduct comprehensive background 

screenings of employees and the steps installation commanders have taken to protect 

their troops. In our June 13, 2006, testimony before your committee on actions 

needed to improve the use of private security contractors in Iraq;4

 we provided you 

with preliminary information about the difficulties contractors and DOD encounter 

when conducting background screenings of contractor employees. This 

correspondence updates our preliminary observations and responds to your request 

concerning the process used to screen contractor employees. 

To determine the ability of DOD and contractors that support deployed forces to 

conduct comprehensive background screenings of employees and the steps 

commanders have taken to protect their troops, we reviewed DOD, CENTCOM, 

MNF-I, and Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), polices including acquisition, force 

protection, base access, and biometric policies. We reviewed these policies to 

determine what, if any, background screening guidance and requirements were 

included in those documents as well as to determine who is responsible for 

installation safety and security. 

We traveled to Iraq to meet with officials from MNF-I and, MNC-I as well as the 

garrison commander of a large logistics base to discuss issues related to background 

screenings, DOD’s biometric screening program, and actions installation 

commanders take to reduce the risk posed by contractors. We also traveled to

various locations within the United States where we met with representatives of 11 

units most of whom had recently returned from Iraq and were available to meet with 

us. We met with them to gain an understanding of the military’s role in conducting 

background screenings, their ability to conduct screenings on third country and host 

country nationals, the challenges they faced, the limitations of background 

screenings, and steps they took to mitigate the risks contractors pose. Additionally, 

we met with representatives of CENTCOM, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence, and representatives of DOD’s acquisition community. 

We also interviewed officials from three background screening firms, one of whom 

served in an official capacity at a national background screening association, to 

obtain an understanding of the methods used by screeners and the challenges 

background screeners encounter when trying to screen foreign nationals. Our work 

focused on contractors who provide support to deployed forces in CENTCOM’s area 

of operation and on those contractor employees who did not require security 

clearances.5 6

 Enclosure I contains more detail on our scope and methodology. We 

 4

 GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Provides, GAO06-865T, (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006). 5

 DOD grants a security clearance to individuals needing access to classified information after 

conducting a personnel security investigation. DOD has established standards for these types of

investigations which include examining a person’s loyalty to the United States, financial situation, and

criminal history. We have ongoing work looking at the process used by the government to conduct and

grant security clearances for contractors, and as a result, we limited our work for this report to those 

employees not requiring a government issued clearance. 6

 Contractors who deploy with the forces are employees of system support and external support 

contractors and associated subcontractors who are specifically authorized in their contracts to deploy

and provide support to U.S. military forces in contingency operations. A contingency operation is a 

military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or 

becomes one as a matter of law. 

Page 3 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
conducted our review from August 2005 to August 2006 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief 

DOD and contractors have difficulty conducting comprehensive background 

screening for U.S. and foreign nationals because of a lack of resources and 

inaccurate, missing, or inaccessible data. Because force protection officers, 

intelligence officers, and other officers have concerns about the comprehensiveness 

of background screenings and the risks contractors pose, installation commanders 

take steps to protect their troops. The information available to contractors that 

screen employees who live in the Unites States is limited to public information from 

county, state, or federal courts; state databases; or commercial databases, such as 

those that collect information on incarcerations. None of these types of searches 

guarantees a comprehensive background screening because these sources may not 

include all criminal data, among other things. Screening host nation and third country 

national employees can be difficult because of inaccurate or unavailable records in 

some countries. Also, officials from the background screening firms we spoke with 

told us that some foreign laws can restrict access to criminal records. Moreover, 

DOD’s biometric screening programs are not as effective as they could be because 

the databases used to screen contractor employees include only limited international 

data, and some systems do not make all data accessible. Recognizing the limitations 

of data, military officials we interviewed who were responsible for security at 

installations in Iraq and elsewhere told us that they take steps to mitigate the risks 

contractors, particularly non-U.S. contractors, pose. For example, officials from

most of the units we spoke with told us that contractor employees are routinely 

searched as they enter and leave the installation, while the majority of the units we 

spoke with told us that they interviewed some contractor employees before granting 

them access to the base. 

 

DOD and the Department of Justice reviewed a draft of this report and neither agency 

disagreed with the contents of the report. Both agencies provided technical 

comments which we have incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Background 

DOD guidance does not require that contracts contain clauses requiring contractors 

to conduct screenings of their employees’ backgrounds However, Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD -12), which was issued in August 2004, and its 

implementing guidance, requires that the government develop standard forms of 

identification for all persons who need regular access to a federal facility, including 

U.S. military installations located overseas. Implementing guidance requires 

employees and contractors seeking access to federal facilities to undergo a National 

Agency check with written Inquiries (NACI) type background screening. 7

 In January 

 7

A NACI consists of searches of the Office of Personnel Management Security/Suitability Investigations 

Index, the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Identification Division’s name and fingerprint files, and other files or indexes when necessary. It also

includes written inquiries and searches of records covering specific areas of an individual’s 

background during the past 5 years (inquiries sent to current and past employers, schools attended,

references, and local law enforcement authorities). 

Page 4 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
2006, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was amended to require that all 

contracts (including DOD contracts) contain a clause mandating compliance with 

HSPD-12.8

 In February 2006, we issued a report on issues related to implementing 

HSPD-12, which noted that doing a NACI on foreign nationals may be difficult 

because foreign nationals generally cannot have their identities verified through the 

standard NACI process.9

 In order to conduct a NACI, an individual must have lived in 

the United States long enough to have a traceable history which may not be the case 

for foreign nationals. 

Some DOD contracts contain employee screening requirements; however, there are 

no DOD-wide standards or procedures for conducting these screenings when a 

contract requires background screenings. Furthermore, contracts do not provide 

guidance regarding the processes to be used or the depth of the investigations to be 

conducted, leaving the contractor to determine how to conduct the background 

screening. In addition, some contractors conduct background screenings as a result 

of company policy.10 When background screenings are conducted, contractors 

generally use firms that specialize in conducting background screening. 

Background Screenings of Contractor Employees May Not Be 

Comprehensive, but Military Officials Take Steps to Reduce the Risk. 

Military commanders and other officers are aware that DOD and contractors have 

difficulties conducting comprehensive criminal background screenings and take 

steps to reduce the risk contractors may pose to U.S. forces and installations. When 

performing background screenings of contractor employees who live in the United 

States background screening firms use records, such as court records, which are 

available to the general public, or databases maintained by commercial or state 

entities. Using these resources does not ensure a comprehensive background 

screening for reasons such as incomplete data. Contractors may find it difficult to 

complete background screenings of their Iraqi and third country national employees 

because of a lack of reliable information. Another factor that can contribute to 

difficulties is foreign privacy laws that make some criminal information inaccessible, 

according to screening firm officials. Moreover, DOD’s program to biometrically 

screen all Iraqis and most third country national contractor employees who seek 

access to U.S. installations is not as effective as it could be for a number of reasons, 

including the limited number of international and foreign databases available for 

screening. However, military officials we spoke with recognize the risk contractors 

pose to U.S. forces in part because of the numerous difficulties in screening 

employees, particularly those who do not live in the United States and have taken 

steps, such as requiring escorts for some contractor employees, to reduce the risk. 

 8

Contracts awarded prior to October 27, 2005, must be amended to include the new FAR clause by

October 2007. 9

GAO-06-178 10Our survey of contractors that support deployed forces revealed that 3 firms that conducted

background screenings did so because it was required by the contract while 21 firms conducted 

background screenings on their employees to satisfy internal company policies. 

Page 5 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
The Backgrounds and Identities of Contractor Employees May Be Unknown Because 

Important Data May Be Missing

Accurate information is not always available or accessible when contractors try to 

conduct criminal background investigations of U.S. nationals; third country nationals; 

and host country nationals, such as Iraqis. When screening firms conduct background 

investigations of those living in the United States, they generally use publicly 

available court records from the county, state, or federal level or search state 

criminal information repositories or commercial databases, such as those that collect 

information on incarcerations. However, none of these actions guarantees a 

comprehensive background check. For example, screening companies may not 

review federal court records if not directed to do so by the client. Moreover, 

background screening firms generally only check the records of the court that 

maintains the preponderance of criminal data and may miss some records maintained 

by specialized courts, such as domestic or family law courts. Furthermore, state 

repositories of information may not include all criminal data. For example, one 

official from a background screening firm explained that only some of the 88 counties 

in Ohio report crimes to the state repository. Similarly, the state of Illinois reported 

that in 2003 only 59 percent of the computerized criminal history records they audited 

had complete information. In addition, commercial databases may not provide a 

complete background investigation because the databases may not contain the most 

recent criminal data; certain criminal offenses may not be reported; and commercial 

databases do not have standards on how its data should be collected and validated. 

Screening third country and host country nationals presents additional challenges 

according to background screeners to whom we have spoken. Officials from 

international background screening firms cited challenges in verifying criminal 

background information on foreign nationals for reasons such as the following. 

• Some contractors must rely on the applicant to provide all prior addresses. 

Since some countries, such as India, have no national criminal database and 

maintain criminal data at the local level, persons doing the background 

screenings may miss crimes that were committed in locations within the 

country if the applicant did not reveal all previous addresses. 

• Some countries lack criminal records. Officials from one firm we spoke with 

told us that they have encountered problems screening Iraqi nationals because 

the Iraqi police lack criminal records or criminal information. 

• Criminal records may be unreliable. Some countries experience high levels 

of corruption. According to screening firm representatives we interviewed. 

Records could be destroyed, changed, or not acknowledged. 

• Some countries lack national identification numbers. Without a national 

identification number the screener may not know if the person being screened 

was the person who committed the crimes cited in the court or police records. 

• Privacy laws limit access to data. According to officials from background 

screening firms, some countries do not permit criminal background searches 

of their citizens or limit the type of information that can be released to a third 

party. In other countries, criminal information cannot be given to third parties 

and is only released to the applicant who can then determine whether to 

Page 6 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
release the information. According to screening company officials, there are 

often issues related to the authenticity of documents provided by applicants. 

Information regarding those who pose a national security risk typically is not 

accessible to background screeners. For example, both the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

gather information on terrorists and others who pose a national security risk, but this 

information is not available to commercial background screening firms. There are 

some online resources available but they may not provide reliable information. For 

example, some of the firms we spoke with told us they check the U.S. Treasury’s 

Office of Foreign Asset Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked 

Persons list, which consists of individuals designated as terrorists, narcotics 

traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction. However, this type of search is limited because the primary 

identifier is an individual’s name and aliases, thus making it difficult to know if the 

person being screened is the same person cited on the list. 

As GAO reported in July 2005,11 screening for human rights violators is problematic, 

and others we have spoken with agree that screening individuals for human rights 

abuses or convictions is very difficult. First, there is no unclassified U.S. government 

or international database of persons accused or convicted of human rights abuses. 

Second, crimes that might be considered human rights violations, such as homicides, 

are categorized by their designated criminal offense code. Third, those accused of 

human rights violations are difficult to track because individuals accused of such 

crimes can simply change their identities and their connection to human rights 

abuses would be lost. 

The Effectiveness of DOD’s Biometric Screening in Iraq Is Limited Because of 

Missing Data

DOD conducts biometric screening of most non-U.S. contractor employees needing 

access to installations in Iraq; however, the value of the screening process is limited 

because the databases used to screen applicants have little international biometric 

data. In March 2005, shortly after a dining facility bombing at a U.S. installation in 

Iraq killed 14 U.S. soldiers and wounded at least 50, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

issued a policy requiring the biometric screening of most non -U.S. personnel seeking 

access to U.S. installations in Iraq. The goal of this policy is to improve force 

protection for U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and provide positive identification of 

local and third country nationals accessing U.S. facilities. In July 2005 the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense issued an additional policy which requires that those seeking 

access to U.S. bases and installations in Iraq be fingerprinted, photographed, have 

their irises scanned, and be enrolled in one of two biometric systems DOD uses to 

gather the required biometric data. The two systems used by DOD are the Biometric 

Identification Systems for Access (BISA), a system specifically designed to facilitate 

base access, and the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), which was originally used 

in Iraq for purposes related to counterintelligence and detainee management and was 

later adapted for use as a base access control system. 

 11 GAO, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to 

Foreign Security Forces; GAO-05-793 (Washington D.C.: July 29, 2005). 

Page 7 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
Biometric information from BISA and BAT is sent to the DOD’s Biometric Fusion 

Center in West Virginia where it is merged with other biometric data collected in Iraq 

as well as other DOD biometric data to form the Automated Biometric Identification 

System (ABIS). The Biometric Fusion Center screens the applicant’s data against the 

ABIS system as well as the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 

System (IAFIS) database. The IAFIS database includes the fingerprint records of 

more than 51 million persons who have been arrested in the United States as well as 

information submitted by other agencies such as the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Department of State, and Interpol.

12

While DOD’s biometric screening process has successfully identified several persons 

seeking access to bases in Iraq who have criminal records in the United States, the 

lack of international biometric data limits its usefulness. According to an official from 

the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division, the IAFIS database includes 

criminal fingerprint data from only a limited number of foreign countries because 

some countries are reluctant to share criminal history information and others do not 

have fingerprint repositories or do not collect fingerprints in a manner compatible 

with the FBI’s system. In addition, although the IAFIS database includes fingerprint 

records submitted by Interpol, Interpol does not maintain a repository of all criminal 

offenses committed in the member countries. Instead, Interpol’s criminal database is 

composed of wanted notices as well as some limited criminal histories. This 

information is submitted by the member countries, and is only retained for 5 years. 

System Limitations Impact the Effectiveness of DOD’s Biometric Screening

BISA and BAT both collect biometric data from a number of sources in Iraq, including 

contractor employees working at installations in Iraq; however, because of system 

shortcomings, installation commanders, who are responsible for making base access 

decisions in Iraq, may not have all the information necessary to make an informed 

decision when deciding who will have access to a U.S. installation.13 As we noted 

earlier, biometric data from both BISA and BAT is sent to the Biometric Fusion

Center where they are merged with other data to form the ABIS database. While data 

from BISA enters the ABIS database immediately, it takes, on average, 71 days for 

BAT biometric data to be merged into the ABIS database. As a result, any derogatory 

information entered into BAT in the weeks prior to a person applying for a BISA 

identification card might not be brought to the attention of the installation 

commander until after the applicant had been given access to the base. However, an 

official we spoke with in Iraq told us that eventually the installation commander 

receives this information and can revoke the employee’s base access if necessary. 

Nevertheless, the employee may have been able to collect sensitive information or 

place the installation at risk during the interim. 

 12States voluntarily provide fingerprint records to the FBI for inclusion in the IAFIS database. 

According to FBI officials, not all persons arrested and convicted of crimes in the United States are 

included in the IAFIS database. 13The MNF-I base access policy states that installation commanders have the responsibility to make all 

base access decisions and makes the commanders responsible for adjudicating derogatory information 

found on individuals seeking base access. 

Page 8 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
Another limitation of BAT is its inability to easily determine those who pose a threat 

to U.S. forces from those who do not. BAT was used in Iraq as a detainee 

management system and was later adapted as a base access control system to 

improve force protection. Iraqis and others suspected of being insurgents are 

enrolled in BAT. In addition, Iraqis and many third country national contractor 

employees have also been enrolled in BAT. To distinguish detainees from contractor 

employees, BAT contains a text field that provides a description of why an individual 

was enrolled into the system. However, an official responsible for BAT told us that 

the text field is not a required field and data may not always be entered in the field. 

Officials we spoke with who have served in Iraq explained that the inability to 

determine why an individual was enrolled in BAT was frustrating because they could 

not identify those who had been enrolled as detainees from those who had been

enrolled because they are contractor employees. Moreover, the descriptive text field 

is not included when BAT biometric data are sent to ABIS. As a result, the screening 

of persons enrolling in BISA who have previously been enrolled in BAT will result in a 

fingerprint match that must be adjudicated by the installation commander, which 

adds to the commander’s workload unnecessarily. 

Military Officials Responsible for Installation Security Recognize the Risk 

Contractors May Pose to their Installations but, Took Steps to Reduce the Risk 

Force protection officers, military police, intelligence officers, and others from 10 of 

the 11 units we spoke with who served in Iraq as well as the installation commander 

of a large logistics base we visited in Iraq recognized the risk some contractor 

employees posed and took actions at their installations to minimize the risk. 14 Army 

officials from nine units and officers from the one U.S. Marine Corps unit we spoke 

with were aware of the shortcomings of the background screenings that were done 

by contractors or DOD. For example, several officers we spoke with told us that they 

believed BAT was ineffective as a screening tool because of the length of time it took 

to receive information from the database. Also, they noted that they did not have 

access to a server that contained all data collected in BAT, and thus did not have 

access to information collected at other installations. Moreover, one commander told 

us that he had concerns about whether contractors and subcontractors were 

screening their employees. When he asked a logistical support contractor’s 

representative about the screening process and for screening documentation, the 

representative did not know if the company had conducted background screenings 

and could not produce any documentation of background screenings. 

Given the inherent risk contractors may pose to military installations and the fact that 

DOD makes commanders responsible for the security of their installations, military 

commanders take a variety of actions to reduce that risk. Force protection officers 

and other military officials we spoke with who had served in Iraq described some of 

the steps that had been taken at their installations to reduce the risk posed by 

contractors. For example, host country and third country nationals were searched, 

prior to entering bases and installations, for contraband and other items that could 

jeopardize the safety of others, such as explosive materials, mobile telephones, and 

 14 DOD’s antiterrorism standards (DOD Instruction 2000.16) require that each unit have a designated

antiterrorism officer who acts as the commander’s advisor on force protection. See DOD Instruction 

2000.16: DOD Antiterrorism Standards, June 14, 2001, standard E3.1.1.6 page 12. 

Page 9 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
cameras. Officials told us that employees were also searched when they left the base. 

If employees were found with prohibited items, they could be arrested, detained, and 

lose their jobs. In addition the military requires that many contractor employees, 

particularly host country and some third country nationals be escorted while on the 

base or installation. At other installations some contractor employees are required to 

undergo interviews with military or contractor personnel trained in human 

intelligence gathering. For example at one base we visited in Iraq, the installation

commander required that all third country nationals from selected countries in 

Southwest and Central Asia be interviewed. This was in addition to the MNF-I 

requirement that employees who come from countries on the State Department’s list 

of State Sponsors of Terrorism be interviewed. Also, contractor employees must 

display badges at all times. These badges allow or restrict an employee’s access to 

certain areas of the installation, such as the dining facility. Finally, an official noted 

that he did not let host country or third country nationals from other installations 

have access to his installation due to concerns with security and knowing how or if 

the employees had been screened. 

Agency Comments 

DOD and the Department of Justice provided technical comments on a draft of this 

report. Those comments were incorporated where appropriate. Neither agency 

disagreed with the contents of the report. 

_ _ _ _ _ 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and 

the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. 

In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 10 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
Please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov if you or your staff have any 

questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Sincerely yours, 

William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosures-II 

Page 11 GAO-06-999R Military Operations
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

GAO-06-999R Military Operations 

Scope and Methodology 

Our objective was to determine the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

contractors that support deployed forces to conduct comprehensive background 

screenings of employees and the steps commanders have taken to protect their 

troops. To meet this objective we took several steps. 

First, we met with DOD and service acquisition officials to obtain an understanding 

of both the extent to which background screening provisions are included in 

contracts as well as to learn the screening practices of their contractors. We also met 

with 12 U.S. and foreign contractors that provide support to deployed forces in 

Southwest Asia to gain an understanding of what types of background screenings are 

required in their contracts with DOD and the methods they use to screen their 

employees. We selected these contractors based upon a convenience sample, where 

the selection of contractors from the population was based on their availability. The 

contractors reflected a wide range of services provided to deployed forces. For 

example, we met with contractors who maintain weapons systems such as the Army’s 

Stryker vehicle; contractors that provide base operations support, such as food and 

housings; and contractors that provide technical services such, as linguists or 

security. The contractors represented both prime contractors and subcontractors. 

Additionally, we met with officials from three U.S. background screening firms, two 

of which had international affiliates, that conduct screenings both in the United 

States and internationally to discover what screening practices, methods, and 

standards are used in the United States and other countries as well as the challenges 

faced in performing background screenings of U.S. nationals, third country nationals, 

and host country nationals. The screening firms were selected because they 

conducted background screenings for contractors with which we met. We also met 

an official from the National Association of Professional Background Screeners to 

obtain an industrywide perspective on methods used by screeners and challenges 

background screeners encounter when trying to screen foreign nationals. 

To get a better understanding of the biometric screening programs being used in Iraq, 

we traveled to Iraq to meet with officials responsible for the biometric data systems 

to learn how the collection of biometric data is used to screen contractor employees 

and the compatibility between the systems. We also met with officials from the 

Biometrics Management Office and the Biometrics Fusion Center to obtain an 

understanding of the systems’ limitations. In addition, we reviewed several DOD and 

Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) policy documents dealing with base access and the 

biometric data systems. 

To obtain a better understanding of the military’s views and concerns regarding 

background screenings, we met with commanders from 11 units from 4 units (3 Army 

divisions and a Marine Expeditionary Force) who served in Iraq between 2003 and 

2006 to discuss their ability to conduct background screenings of contractor 

employees who performed work at and had access to installations in Iraq. 

Specifically, we met with force protection officers, military police, intelligence 

officers, and others responsible for base operations and logistical support to gain an 

understanding of the military’s role in conducting background screenings, their ability 
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

Page 13 GAO-06-999R Military Operations

to conduct screenings on third country and host country nationals, the challenges 

they faced, the limitations of background screenings, and steps they took to mitigate 

the risks contractors pose. These units were selected because, for the most part, they 

had recently returned from Iraq, and unit members had not moved to other locations. 

Additionally, we traveled to locations within Southwest Asia, including Iraq, to meet 

with commanders responsible for force protection at deployed locations to discuss 

the methods they use to conduct background screenings, actions taken to mitigate 

the risk, and their ability to protect their troops. We also reviewed DOD, U.S. Central 

Command’s (CENTCOM) and MNF-I documents related to installation security and 

force protection. 

In addition, we surveyed the contractor representatives from a random probability 

sample of 114 contracts providing combat support services with the principle place of 

performance in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility originated or ongoing from the 

beginning of FY 2004 through May of 2005. Contracts through the end of FY2005 were 

included in the universe for three large contracting offices (Kuwait, Qatar, and 

Afghanistan), however, the majority of contracts included in the universe originated 

or were ongoing though May of 2005. The contracts were randomly selected from the 

universe of 560 contracts from the DD-350 database providing combat support 

services during the time period. We understood that achieving a survey response rate 

high enough to generalize to the population of DD-350 combat support services 

contracts would be difficult but acknowledged that gathering greater breadth of 

information through a random probability sample would be worthwhile. The 

questionnaire was developed with social science survey specialists in collaboration 

with GAO subject matter experts and was pretested with contractor representatives 

from 4 firms. The web based survey was administered between the dates of May 3, 

2006 and July 14, 2006. We sent one follow-up e-mail message to all nonrespondents 

after the questionnaire had been online for 2 weeks. We then contacted remaining 

non-respondents by telephone after 5 weeks and sent a final email follow-up message 

after 9 weeks. We obtained responses from 35 contractor representatives for a 

response rate of 31.58 percent. The survey responses offer information from 36 

contracts with 35 contracting firms providing combat support services and are not 

representative of the universe of all contracts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 

We include information obtained from selected survey questions to supplement 

information we obtained through site visits. The information from the following 

questions was used in this report: 

[After being asked to indicate the nationalities of people hired by your firm to 

perform this contract] If you indicated “Nationals from other third countries” in the 

previous question, please describe the nationalities of these employees hired by your 

firm to perform this contract. 
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

Page 14 GAO-06-999R Military Operations

Why does your firm perform these checks for this contract? (Check all that apply.) 

Required as part of the contract 

Required as part of company standard policy 

Other reasons 

Don’t know 

Our work focused on contractors who provide support to deployed forces in 

CENTCOM area of operation and on individuals who did not require security 

clearances. We conducted our review from August 2005 to August 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: 

The Department of Defense: 

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence, the Pentagon 

• Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics, the Pentagon 

• US Central Command, Tampa, Florida 

• Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; 

Houston, Texas; Baghdad, Iraq 

• Personnel Security Research Center, Monterey, California 

• Defense Manpower Data Center, Arlington, Virginia 

• Multinational Force-Iraq, Deputy Chief of Staff Resources and Sustainment 

• Multinational Force-Iraq, Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence 

• Multinational Force-Iraq, Deputy Chief of Staff Strategic Operations/Force 

Protection 

• Multinational Corps-Iraq, Operations Directorate/ Antiterrorism/Force 

Protection Office 

Department of the Army: 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army—Policies and Procurement, 

 Arlington, Virginia 

• Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• Stryker Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington 

o Stryker Brigade: 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, 

Washington 

o Stryker Brigade: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, 

Washington 

o Task Force Olympia, Fort Lewis, Washington 

o 593rd Corps Support Group, Fort Lewis, Washington 

• Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

o Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, Illinois 
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

Page 15 GAO-06-999R Military Operations

o Army Field Support Battalion—Southwest Asia, Camp Arifjan, 

Kuwait 

• 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia 

o Division Staff, Fort Stewart, Georgia 

o 26th Field Support Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia 

o 2nd Brigade Combat Team, Fort Stewart, Georgia 

o 703rd Field Support Battalion Fort Stewart, Georgia 

o Division Support Brigade, Fort Stewart, Georgia 

o 87th Combat Support Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia 

• 3Rd Corps Support Command, Balad Iraq 

• Camp Anaconda Garrison Command, Balad Iraq 

• US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

• US Army Central Command (rear), Fort McPherson, Georgia 

• US Army Central Command (forward), Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• Army Contracting Agency, Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort McPherson, 

Georgia 

• Area Support Group-Kuwait Provost Marshall Office, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• Biometrics Management Office, Arlington, Virginia 

• Biometrics Fusion Center, Clarksburg, West Virginia 

• Biometrics Fusion Center (Forward), Camp Victory, Iraq 

Department of the Navy 

• 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California 

Other Government Agencies: 

• Department of Justice, Washington, DC 

o FBI, Washington, DC 

 Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Clarksburg, West 

Virginia 

• Department of State 

o Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Arlington, Virginia 

o US Embassy Kuwait, Kuwait City, Kuwait 

• US National Central Bureau of International Criminal Police Organization 

(INTERPOL), Washington, DC 

Background Screening Firms: 

• First Advantage, St. Petersburg, Florida 

• First Advantage International, Bangalore, India 

• Kroll Background America, Westminster, Maryland 

• Kroll Background International, Nashville, Tennessee 
Enclosure I Enclosure I 

Page 16 GAO-06-999R Military Operations

• Background Information Services, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio 

• National Association of Professional Background Screeners, Cleveland, Ohio 

Contractors: 

• Kellogg, Brown and Root, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait; Houston, Texas; Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates 

• Triple Canopy Inc., Herndon, Virginia 

• L3/Titan, Reston, Virginia 

• CACI International, Arlington, Virginia 

• Risk Management Solutions, Panama City, Florida 

• Ahmadah General Trading & Contracting Co., Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• British Link Kuwait, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• Tamimi Global Co., Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co., Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• IAP World Services, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• ITT Industries, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait 

• Prime Projects International, Dubai, United Arab Emirates 
Enclosure II Enclosure II 

GAO-06-999R Military Operations 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements

GAO contact 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

Acknowledgements 

In addition to the contact named above, major contributors to this report were David 

A. Schmitt, Assistant Director; Carole F. Coffey, Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon, 

Grace Coleman, Jennifer Cooper, Laura Czohara Wesley Johnson, Kenneth E. Patton, 

and James A. Reynolds. 

(350732) 
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