NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAUL GOMEZ-AGUILAR, AKA Saul 

Gomez Agular, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-71350 

Agency No. A098-570-798 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 14, 2023**

Before: FERNANDEZ, FRIEDLAND, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Saul Gomez-Aguilar, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for 

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal 

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 23 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-71350 

(“CAT”), and denying his motion to remand or terminate. We have jurisdiction 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual 

findings. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). We 

review for abuse of discretion the denial of motions to remand and to terminate

proceedings. See Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005); 

Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny in part and grant 

in part the petition for review, and remand.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Gomez-Aguilar established 

changed circumstances to excuse the untimely asylum application. See Singh v. 

Holder, 649 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (court retained 

jurisdiction to review legal or constitutional questions related to the one-year filing 

deadline); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4) (changed circumstances defined). Thus, 

Gomez-Aguilar’s asylum claim fails.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that GomezAguilar failed to establish he was or would be persecuted on account of a protected 

ground. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if 

membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must still show 

that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such group”);

Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be 

free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang 
3 20-71350 

members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Thus, Gomez-Aguilar’s 

withholding of removal claim fails. 

We do not consider Gomez-Aguilar’s contention as to whether the Mexican 

government is unable or unwilling to protect him because the BIA did not deny 

relief on this ground. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (review limited to the grounds relied on by the BIA). We also do not 

consider his imputed political opinion claim because the agency did not reach it, 

and Gomez-Aguilar does not contend the BIA erred in finding that this claim was 

not properly before it. See id.; see also Corro-Barragan v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1174, 

1177 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection 

because Gomez-Aguilar failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured 

by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. 

See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).

Gomez-Aguilar’s contention that the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his 

proceedings in his motion to terminate is foreclosed by United States v. BastideHernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (lack of hearing 

information in notice to appear does not deprive immigration court of subject 

matter jurisdiction, and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) is satisfied when later notice 

provides hearing information).
4 20-71350 

As to the denial of his motion to remand, the agency did not have the benefit 

of the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021),

holding that a notice of hearing does not cure a statutorily deficient notice to 

appear to trigger the cancellation of removal stop-time provision. Thus, we grant 

the petition for review for the BIA to reconsider Gomez-Aguilar’s motion to 

remand in light of Niz-Chavez. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002) (per 

curiam).

Each party must bear its own costs on appeal.

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;

REMANDED.