SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3896-19

MELODY N. VILLANUEVAARROYO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE

CITY OF PASSAIC and VICTOR

CIRILO, individually and in his

capacity as the Executive Director

of the Housing Authority of the 

City of Passaic,

Defendants-Respondents.

______________________________

Submitted May 10, 2021 – Decided June 3, 2021

Before Judges Fasciale and Rothstadt.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-0974-15.

Angelo R. Bisceglie, Jr., attorney for appellant.

Keenan & Doris, LLC, attorneys for respondents (Erdal 

Turnacioglu, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3896-19

PER CURIAM 

In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff—a former employee of 

defendant Housing Authority of the City of Passaic (Housing Authority)—

appeals from three orders entered on remand.

1

 The first order is dated August 

14, 2019 and denied plaintiff's motion to change venue or recuse a judge. The 

remaining orders, dated June 10, 2020, denied plaintiff's cross-motion for 

summary judgment and granted the Housing Authority and Victor Cirilo's

(Cirilo) motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's remaining 

Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, 

wrongful termination, and due process claims. 

We rely on the facts as set forth in our previous opinion regarding the 

circumstances surrounding the award of two general construction contracts to 

SAAR Construction, LLC (SAAR) and plaintiff's subsequent termination. 

Villanueva-Arroyo, slip op. at 3-8. 

1 Defendant successfully obtained dismissal of the remaining count in the complaint. 

See Villanueva-Arroyo v. Hous. Auth., No. A-4752-16 (App. Div. Sept. 25, 2018)

(slip op. at 3) (reversing discovery orders, reversing summary judgment on plaintiff's 

CEPA and wrongful termination claims, but upholding summary judgment 

dismissing plaintiff's allegation that defendants violated the New Jersey Family 

Medical Leave Act, N.J.S.A. 24:11B-1 to -16). 
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On appeal, plaintiff argues:

POINT I

THE [JUDGE] BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

FURTHER ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 

A. The [Judge] Erred [I]n Failing [T]o Enforce 

Defendants Compliance With Rule 4:46-2.

B. The [Judge] Erred [I]n Dismissing Plaintiff's 

CEPA Claim. 

C. The [Judge] Erred [I]n Dismissing Plaintiff's 

Wrongful Termination Claim. 

1. The [Judge] Misapplied The Law When 

[He] Failed [T]o Consider [A]n Implied 

Employment Contract. 

2. The [Judge] [M]isapplied [T]he Waiver 

Provision [O]f [T]he CEPA. 

D. The [Judge] Erred [I]n Dismissing Plaintiff's 

Violation of Due Process Claim 

POINT II 

[PLAINTIFF] REQUESTS A CHANGE OF VENUE.[2]

2 We reject plaintiff's argument that the judge abused his discretion by denying 

plaintiff a change of venue and the recusal of a judge. Plaintiff failed to establish 

that she could not obtain an impartial adjudication in Passaic County and not did 
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We conclude the judge properly entered summary judgment and dismissed 

plaintiff's claims because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie CEPA claim,

is barred from asserting a wrongful termination claim under the CEPA waiver 

provision, and does not have a property right entitling her to due process

protection. 

We therefore affirm all three orders. 

I.

We first address plaintiff's contention that the judge erred by granting 

summary judgment to the Housing Authority and Cirilo and dismissing her 

CEPA claim. Plaintiff argues the judge failed to consider her disclosures and 

objection to the contract being awarded, and to SAAR's continued performance 

of the contract, as potential whistleblowing activities. 

We review a ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo and apply

the same standard as the trial judge. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l 

Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). Thus, we consider, as the motion 

judge did, "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed 

set forth proof that the judge was biased against her or her counsel. Importantly, 

a different judge heard the summary judgment motions which form the basis of 

this appeal. 
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in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a 

rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the nonmoving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). 

If the judge finds no genuine issue of material fact, the judge must then 

"decide whether the trial [judge] correctly interpreted the law." DepoLink Court 

Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. 

Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 

(App. Div. 2007)). We review issues of law de novo, affording no deference to 

the trial judge's legal conclusions. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 

(2013). For mixed questions of law and fact, we defer to the trial judge's 

supported factual findings, but review application of legal rules to such factual 

findings de novo. State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 577 (2015). 

Under this standard, a judge must grant summary judgment "if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or 

order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). "To defeat a motion for summary 

judgment, the opponent must '"come forward with evidence" that creates a 

genuine issue of material fact.'" Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 
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(App. Div. 2014) (quoting Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J. v. State, 425 

N.J. Super. 1, 32, (App. Div. 2012)). 

CEPA seeks to "protect and encourage employees to report illegal or 

unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector 

employers from engaging in such conduct." Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 

N.J. 8, 27 (2014) (quoting Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 461 (2003)); 

accord Sauter v. Colts Neck Volunteer Fire Co. No. 2, 451 N.J. Super. 581, 588 

(App. Div. 2017). CEPA prohibits employers from retaliating against 

employees who perform a whistleblowing activity. N.J.S.A. 34:19-13; see also

Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 378 (2015). To establish a prima facie 

CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: 

(1) [H]e or she reasonably believed that his or her 

employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or 

regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear 

mandate of public policy;

(2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity 

described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3[(a) or (c)]; 

(3) an adverse employment action was taken against 

him or her; and

(4) a causal connection exists between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.

[Lippman, 222 N.J. at 380 (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. 

at 462)].
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To satisfy the first element of a CEPA claim, a plaintiff "must identify a 

statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that closely relates to the complainedof conduct." Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 463. A plaintiff "need not show that his or 

her employer or another employee actually violated the law or a clear mandate 

of public policy," id. at 462, or that the conduct is "an actual violation of a law 

or regulation," Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 613 (2000). The 

plaintiff only needs to show that he or she "'reasonably believe[d]' that to be the 

case." Ibid. However, if the judge finds no law or policy that closely relates to 

complained-of conduct, the judge "can and should enter judgment for [the] 

defendant." Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 463. 

The second element of a CEPA claim requires the plaintiff to prove he or 

she performed a whistleblowing activity. Lippman, 222 N.J. at 380. An 

employee performs a protected whistleblowing activity if he or she: 

Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to 

a public body an activity, policy or practice of the 

employer, or another employer, with whom there is a 

business relationship, that the employee reasonably 

believes:

(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or 

regulation promulgated pursuant to law 

. . . ; or
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(2) is fraudulent or criminal, including any 

activity, policy or practice of deception or 

misrepresentation[.]

[N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a).]

Or, relevant to this appeal: 

Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, 

policy or practice which the employee reasonably 

believes:

(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or 

regulation promulgated pursuant to law 

. . . ; or

(2) is fraudulent or criminal . . . ; or

(3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of 

public policy concerning the public health, 

safety or welfare or protection of the 

environment.

[N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c).]

Third, a CEPA plaintiff must demonstrate he or she suffered an adverse 

employment action. Lippman, 222 N.J. at 380. CEPA defines retaliation as "the 

discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment 

action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment." 

N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e). Finally, to satisfy the fourth element of CEPA, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate "a causal connection . . . between the whistle-blowing activity 

and the adverse employment action." Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462. To determine 
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if a plaintiff has established causation, judges should focus on the 

"circumstances surrounding the employment action," including temporal 

proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action. 

Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221, 237 (2006). A CEPA plaintiff can 

establish causation by providing "evidence of circumstances that justify an 

inference of retaliatory motive." Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 

Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App. Div. 1995); see also Estate of Roach, 164 

N.J. at 612. 

Here, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie claim under CEPA. As a 

matter of law, the record reflects that plaintiff believed that the Housing 

Authority would be violating the Local Public Contract Law (LPCL), N.J.S.A. 

40A:11-1, by awarding the contract to SAAR. On our review, plaintiff did not 

hold an objectively reasonable belief that an illegal activity occurred related to 

the SAAR contract. Plaintiff acknowledged herself that, despite verbal 

complaints before public bidding, she was required to award the contract under 

the LPCL. Specifically, plaintiff testified as to the statutorily mandated bid 

procedure as follows 

Q: To your knowledge[,] what would you have to prove 

to actually reject the lowest bid based on these verbal 

complaints of shoddy work? 
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A: I needed more than that[,] than the verbal. I would 

have to have concrete evidence that [SAAR] was not a 

good contractor to be able to reject it. 

. . . .

Q: Does the term "prior negative experience" mean 

anything to you? 

A: Yes. 

Q: What does it mean? 

A: That means if there was negative experience prior 

to the job. 

Q: Do you have an impression as to what level the prior 

negative experience has to be before it could justify 

rejecting a low bid? 

A: I would believe it would have to be something 

substantial and in writing with some type of evidence 

to show that, other than verbal. 

Plaintiff cannot establish the first prong where she is both familiar with the 

LPCL and admitted that there was, in fact, no legal basis to disqualify SAAR. 

It is worth noting that less than one year later, and even after further complaints 

about the company's workmanship, plaintiff recommended SAAR for a second 

contract. 

As to the second prong, plaintiff failed to establish that she engaged in a 

whistleblowing activity in accordance with N.J.S.A. 24:19-3(a) or (c). Plaintiff 
11 A-3896-19

contends that the judge misapplied the statute by only analyzing her refusal to 

participate and failed to consider her objections and disclosures. As to this 

point, the judge found that

Although Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 250 N.J. 

Super. 276, 288 (App. Div. 2001)[,] indicates that a 

CEPA plaintiff's involvement in the violative activity 

does not per se bar recovery, the truth here is that the 

[p]laintiff's actions in, as applied, objecting to the 

actions must rise to more than mere disagreements to 

vault the threshold at summary judgment. Young[ v. 

Schering Corp., 275 N.J. Super. 221, 236-37 (App. Div. 

1994)]. As a threshold matter, the record fails to 

establish that [plaintiff] objected to the conduct that 

[the Housing Authority] undertook in awarding the 

contract. 

Plaintiff's initial objection to the award of the contract to SAAR does not 

constitute whistleblowing. Plaintiff herself erroneously included prevailing 

wage rates in the bid application. She testified that "the bid was . . . already out, 

so [she] couldn't pull the bid back in, but there's wasn't enough time from the 

time [she] got the rates, so [she] had to move forward with it." Plaintiff cannot 

claim she blew the whistle on grounds that the Housing Authority would be 

overpaying when she knew that no policy was being violated. In fact, plaintiff

knew that the LPCL required she move forward with the contract, given its strict 

bidding procedures, notwithstanding her own error. 
12 A-3896-19

Plaintiff did in fact disclose SAAR's substandard work to Cirilo. Plaintiff 

cites to a memo from another employee advising Cirilo and Wynter of the 

substandard conditions. Plaintiff testified that she sent e-mails and pictures "to 

memorialize [what she] was doing so there was no doubt that I was following 

the contractors." She further testified 

Q: Okay, you blew the whistle on SAAR, did you not? 

A: When I told [Cirilo] that the mangers did not like 

the work and that the work wasn't good, if that's the 

term that goes with that, yes, then I did. 

Given this testimony, and from a review of the record, plaintiff's

communications were for the purpose of doing her diligence, rather in objection

to SAAR's continuation, which is insufficient under the case law. Young, 275 

N.J. Super. at 236-37. Such claims were not expressly tied to any allegation of 

illegality or any violation of public policy. Her subsequent recommendation to 

award a second contract to SAAR in July 2014 after complaints about their 

workmanship persisted belies the concerns she raised about SAAR's quality, a 

potential wasting of Federal funding, and other issues. The judge therefore 

properly dismissed plaintiff's CEPA claim. 
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II.

We next address plaintiff's contention that the judge erred in dismissing 

her wrongful termination claim. Defendant argues that plaintiff's claim is barred 

by CEPA's waiver provision. Plaintiff argues the waiver provision does not 

apply and that dismissal was improper because the Housing Authority Employee 

Handbook (the Handbook) created an implied employment contract which 

required that the Housing Authority implement progressive discipline before 

terminating her. We conclude that plaintiff's wrongful termination claim is 

barred by the CEPA waiver provision and, even if it was not, it fails on the 

merits because plaintiff is an at-will employee. 

Under CEPA's waiver provision, "the institution of an action in 

accordance with [CEPA] shall be deemed a waiver of the rights and remedies 

available . . . under the common law." N.J.S.A. 34:19-8. Thus, "[p]arallel 

claims based on those rights, privileges and remedies are waived because they 

represent multiple or duplicative claims based on retaliatory discharge." Young 

v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 29. (1995). The waiver provision does not apply 

to claims that are substantially independent of a CEPA claim. Id. at 33. A claim 

is substantially independent from a retaliatory discharge claim when, like here, 

it "require[s] different proofs than those needed to substantiate [a] CEPA claim." 
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Id. at 31 (quoting Young, 275 N.J. Super. at 238); see e.g., Royster v. NJ State 

Police, 227 N.J. 482, 498 (2017) (explaining that the Law Against 

Discrimination claim at issue was premised on the failure of New Jersey State 

Police to accommodate plaintiff's ulcerative colitis, not retaliation, thus CEPA's 

waiver provision was not at bar). 

Here, plaintiff's wrongful termination claim and CEPA claims stem from 

the same alleged retaliatory conduct. Plaintiff waived her right to seek relief for 

wrongful termination when she instituted the cause of action alleging a CEPA 

claim. Even if plaintiff's claim was not barred—which is not the case—the judge 

properly dismissed it on the merits. 

Employment is presumed to be at-will, unless specifically stated in 

explicit, contractual terms. Witkowski v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 136 N.J. 385, 

397 (1994). Employee handbooks or manuals can form implied contracts. Id.

at 392. In Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 99 N.J. 284, 285-86 (1985), which 

governs this implied contract issue, our Court held that an implied promise 

contained in an employment manual—like the Handbook here—is enforceable 

against an employer absent a clear and prominent disclaimer. Our Court directed 

that "[w]hen an employer . . . circulates a manual that, when fairly read, provides 

that certain benefits are an incident of the employment (including, especially, 
15 A-3896-19

job security provisions), [judges should enforce that handbook or manual] in 

accordance with the reasonable expectations of employees." Id. at 297-98. The 

Court further emphasized that "if the employer, for whatever reason, does not 

want the [handbook] to be capable of being construed by the [judge] as a binding 

contract, there are simple ways to attain that goal. All that need be done is the 

inclusion in a very prominent position of an appropriate statement that there is 

no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual." Id. at 309. 

We must scrutinize the Handbook to determine whether there exists a 

disclaimer that clearly states that the Handbook is neither a promise nor a 

contract and that employment is at-will. Ibid.; see Nicosia v. Wakefern Food 

Corp., 136 N.J. 401, 415 (1994) (explaining that when a disclaimer is included 

it must be set off in a manner that draws the employee's attention). 

The Handbook indeed contains a progressive discipline policy. It

provides that "[d]isciplinary action will be taken by the employee's immediate 

supervisor based upon the following factors: [s]eriousness of the offense, 

employee's past record, the employee's ability to correct his other conduct, [and] 

the likelihood of positive responses to guidance by supervisory personnel." It 

also states that "based upon the supervisor's review of the aforesaid criteria he 

or she may impose the following discipline: (a) oral warning with documentation 
16 A-3896-19

in the employee's file (b) written warning (c) suspension of more than five 

working days [or] (d) termination." (emphasis added). 

The Handbook also states that "[i]n the event that a supervisor 

recommends termination . . . an employee shall be afforded the opportunity for 

a hearing prior to imposition of the discipline." Importantly, it contains four 

disclaimers indicating that it does not create an employment contract, that no 

individual could offer a contract of employment without approval of the 

Executive Director of the Housing Authority, and, most importantly, that 

plaintiff's employment is at-will. The first disclaimer is included in the 

introduction letter to the Handbook and reads as follows 

Neither this handbook nor any other [Housing 

Authority] document, confers any contractual right, 

either express or implied, to remain in the [Housing 

Authority's] employ. Nor does it guarantee any fixed 

terms and conditions of your employment. The 

provisions of the Employee Handbook may be amended 

and supplemented from time to time without notice and 

at the sole discretion of the [Housing Authority] Board 

of Commissioners. 

The second disclaimer appears on the third page of the Handbook. It is located 

on its own page between the Table of Contents and section titled "General 

Personnel Policy." The disclaimer is capitalized, double-spaced, and in bold 

font. It states that
17 A-3896-19

THE CONTENT OF THIS HANDBOOK ARE 

GUIDELINES ONLY AND SUPER[S]EDE ANY 

PRIOR MANUAL AND/OR HANDBOOK. NEITHER 

THIS MANUAL NOR ANY OTHER GUIDELINES, 

POLICIES OR PRACTICES CREATE AN 

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. [THE HOUSING 

AUTHORITY] HAS THE RIGHT, WITH OR 

WITHOUT NOTICE, IN AN INDIVIDUAL CASE OR 

GENERALLY, TO CHANGE ANY OF ITS 

GUIDELINES, POLICIES, PRACTICES, WORKING 

CONDITIONS OR BENEFITS AT ANY TIME.

NO ONE IS AUTHORIZED TO PROVE ANY 

EMPLOYEE WITH AN EMPLOYMENT 

CONTRACT OR SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT

CONCERNING TERMS OF CONDITIONS OF 

EMPLOYMENT UNLESS THE CONTRACT OR 

ARRANGEMENT IS IN WRITING AND SIGNED BY 

THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. EMPLOYMENT 

WITH [THE HOUSING AUTHORITY] IS AT-WILL 

AND MAY BE TERMINATED AT ANY TIME 

CAUSE OR NOTICE BY THE EMPLOYEE OR [THE 

HOUSING AUTHORITY]. 

THIS NOTICE APPLIES TO ALL EMPLOYEES 

REGARDLESS OF DATE OF HIRE. 

The third disclaimer, which clearly sets forth that employment with the Housing 

Authority is "at-will," appears on the following page, under the section titled 

"General Personnel Policy." It is emphasized in its own textbox and reads 

The Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual adopted 

by the Board of Commissioners are intended to provide 

guidelines covering public service by the [Housing 

Authority] employees and is not a contract. This 
18 A-3896-19

manual contains many, but not necessarily all of the 

rules, regulations, and conditions of employment for 

[Housing Authority] personnel. The provisions of this 

manual may be amended and supplemented from time 

to time without notice and at the sole discretion of the 

[Housing Authority]. 

To the maximum extent permitted by law, the 

employment practices of [the Housing Authority] shall 

operate under the legal doctrine known[] as 

"employment at[-]will." Within Federal and State law 

. . . . [the Housing Authority] shall have the right to 

terminate an employee at any time and for any reason, 

with or without notice, except [the Housing Authority] 

shall comply with all Federal and State legal 

requirements requiring notice and an opportunity to be 

heard in the event of discipline or dismissal. 

A reading of the disciplinary process portion of the Handbook might lead 

an employee to expect that they would not immediately be fired, but the 

processes listed, which may be followed, do not speak to job security or 

employment status. Here, the clear at-will employment language and included 

disclaimers remove any implication that an expectation of plaintiff's continued 

employment existed. As such, no implied contract exists under Woolley and the 

judge properly dismissed plaintiff's wrongful termination claim. 

III.

Finally, we address plaintiff's contention that the judge erred by 

dismissing her due process claim. Plaintiff's due process arguments align with 
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those advanced in support of her wrongful termination claim and hinge on the 

same Handbook procedures, which plaintiff argues the Housing Authority 

improperly executed. 

We analyze allegations under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (CRA), 

N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, the same as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Gormley 

v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 97-98 (2014). N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) provides, in relevant 

part, that: 

[a]ny person who has been deprived of any substantive 

due process . . . rights, privileges or immunities secured 

by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or . . . 

of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those 

substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been 

interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by 

threats, intimidation, or coercion by a person acting 

under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages 

and for injunctive or other appropriate relief. 

To obtain relief under the substantive component of the due process clause 

for deprivation of property, a plaintiff must establish (1) that she has a protected 

property interest under the due process protection of the Constitution; and (2) 

that defendants' behavior in "depriving [her] of the interest in question was 'so 

egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary 

conscience.'" Desi's Pizza Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 427 (3d 

Cir. 2003) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 
20 A-3896-19

(1998)). Pertinent to this appeal, "an employee hired at will has no protected 

interest in his [or her] employment and may not prevail on a claim that his or 

her discharge constituted a violation of property rights." Morgan v. Union Cty. 

Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 268 N.J. Super. 337, 355 (App. Div. 1993) (citing 

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972)). 

Here, plaintiff is clearly an at-will employee. For the reasons stated 

above, the Handbook does not create a contract with the Housing Authority and 

explicitly disclaims any expectation of plaintiff's retained employment. She

therefore does not have a property right as required to establish a substantive 

due process violation under the CRA. At best, and in the light most favorable 

to plaintiff, her recourse would be through a procedural due process violation 

because the Housing Authority denied her an impartial hearing. This claim 

could only exist, however, if the Handbook provided for binding application of 

the procedures set forth in it, which it clearly does not. Even if the Handbook 

mandated a hearing—which is not the case—the CRA does not provide a remedy 

for procedural due process violations. See Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 

477 (2014). As such, the judge properly dismissed plaintiff's due process claim. 
21 A-3896-19

To the extent we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining arguments, we 

conclude that they are without merit to warrant discussion in a written decision. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.