2017 IL App (1st) 161957

No. 1-16-1957 

June 27, 2017 

SECOND DIVISION

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

THE VILLAGE OF ROSEMONT, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

Of Cook County. 

No. 15 CH 1061 

The Honorable 

Rita Novak, 

Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Presiding Justice Hyman and Justice Mason concurred in the judgment and 

opinion.

 OPINION

¶ 1 Better Government Association (BGA) made a request to see some contracts for use of 

entertainment venues owned by the Village of Rosemont. Rosemont produced the requested 

contracts, but it redacted from the contracts the rent and financial incentives, such as the 

distribution of revenue from food concessions. BGA filed a complaint under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2014)), seeking an order requiring 

Rosemont to disclose the redacted portions of the contracts. The circuit court granted BGA’s 
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motion for summary judgment on the complaint. Rosemont appeals from the order requiring 

disclosure of the redacted terms of the contracts.

¶ 2 We hold that FOIA does not exempt from disclosure the rent Rosemont charged and the 

negotiated financial incentives Rosemont provided to the persons who sought to use 

Rosemont’s facilities. Rosemont lacked authority to exempt from disclosure documents that 

FOIA required Rosemont to disclose. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In 2014, Garth Brooks played a concert at Allstate Arena, which Rosemont owns and 

operates. Stacy St. Clair of the Chicago Tribune sent a request to Rosemont for all contracts 

related to Brooks’s appearance at Allstate Arena. Rosemont redacted significant portions 

from the contracts it sent to St. Clair. On October 10, 2014, St. Clair filed with the Public 

Access Bureau of the Attorney General’s Office a request for review of Rosemont’s partial 

denial of her request for information. 

¶ 5 On November 12, 2014, before the Attorney General issued an opinion concerning the 

request, Rosemont adopted Ordinance No. 2014-11-12, titled “An Ordinance Providing for 

the Protection of Confidential Financial and Proprietary Information Relating to the 

Operation of Village of Rosemont Entertainment Venues.” Rosemont Ordinance No. 2014-

11-12 (approved Nov. 12, 2014). The ordinance provides, “Notwithstanding *** the Illinois 

Freedom of Information Act, no officer or employee of the Village of Rosemont shall 

knowingly disclose confidential financial or proprietary information relating to any 

Amusement Event held or to be held at an Entertainment Venue.” Rosemont Ordinance No. 

2014-11-12 (approved Nov. 12, 2014). The ordinance defined “Entertainment Venues” to 
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include Allstate Arena and the Donald E. Stephens Convention Center. Rosemont Ordinance 

No. 2014-11-12 (approved Nov. 12, 2014). The ordinance defined “Confidential Financial or 

Proprietary Information” to mean “information pertaining to the amount of money paid by a 

Producer to secure the use of an Entertainment Venue for production and presentation of an 

Amusement Event and any financial incentives, considerations or payments to be made to a 

Producer as an inducement to license or rent the Entertainment Venue for production and 

presentation of an Amusement Event.” Rosemont Ordinance No. 2014-11-12 (approved Nov. 

12, 2014). 

¶ 6 Rosemont filed with the Public Access Bureau a response to St. Clair’s request for 

review, asserting that the ordinance exempted from disclosure the redacted parts of the 

contracts with Brooks. 

¶ 7 On November 13, 2014, the day after Rosemont adopted Ordinance 2014-11-12, the 

BGA requested from Rosemont all contracts for events held at Allstate Arena and the 

Convention Center in 2014. Rosemont sent BGA copies of the contracts, but it redacted from 

the contracts “confidential financial and proprietary information of the Village of Rosemont 

consisting of amounts paid as rent for use of the relevant entertainment venue for these 

events, and rebates or financial inducements, if any, paid by the Village of Rosemont for 

production and presentation of such amusement event[s] at the Allstate Arena or the 

Convention Center.” 

¶ 8 On January 22, 2015, BGA filed a complaint charging Rosemont with violating the 

FOIA. The complaint initiated the lawsuit now before this court. Rosemont answered that 
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sections 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(g) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 104/7(1)(a), (g) (West 2014)), as well as 

Ordinance 2014-11-12, exempted the redacted portions of the contracts from disclosure. 

¶ 9 Section 7(1) of the FOIA provides: 

 “(1) When a request is made to inspect or copy a public record that contains 

information that is exempt from disclosure under this Section, but also contains 

information that is not exempt from disclosure, the public body may elect to 

redact the information that is exempt. The public body shall make the remaining 

information available for inspection and copying. Subject to this requirement, the 

following shall be exempt from inspection and copying: 

(a) Information specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or 

State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State law.

* * * 

(g) Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained 

from a person or business where the trade secrets or commercial or financial 

information are furnished under a claim that they are proprietary, privileged 

or confidential, and that disclosure of the trade secrets or commercial or 

financial information would cause competitive harm to the person or 

business, and only insofar as the claim directly applies to the records 

requested.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a), (g) (West 2014). 

¶ 10 On January 23, 2015, the Attorney General issued a binding opinion concerning St. 

Clair’s request for Rosemont’s contract with Brooks. The Attorney General said:
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“[T]he regulation of access to governmental information is an area in which ‘the 

state has a vital interest and a traditionally exclusive role.’ [City of Chicago v.] 

StubHub,[Inc.,] 2011 IL 111127, ¶ 25. Therefore, the Village of Rosemont’s 

Ordinance No. 2014-11-12 does not pertain to the Village’s government and 

affairs within the meaning of article VII, section 6(a) of the Illinois Constitution 

of 1970, and consequently is not a valid exercise of home rule power. The Village 

cannot pass an Ordinance to avoid disclosing public records to the public. Thus, 

the Ordinance has no effect upon the Village’s duty to comply with Ms. St. 

Clair’s FOIA request. *** 

* * * 

 Under the plain language of article VIII, section 1(c) of the Illinois 

Constitution and section 2.5 of FOIA, a public body cannot withhold information 

concerning funds it expends or receives from its agreements with private entities.

Moreover, section 7(1)(g) does not apply to the financial terms of these 

agreements because the financial terms were not ‘obtained from a person or 

business’ as section 7(1)(g) plainly requires, but rather were negotiated between 

the parties. *** 

* * * 

 *** The financial terms of contracts with public bodies are expressly subject 

to disclosure under *** section 2.5 of FOIA. *** 

 *** 
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 For the reasons stated above, it is the opinion of the Attorney General that the 

Village improperly denied, in part, Ms. St. Clair’s Freedom of Information Act 

request ***.” 2015 Ill. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 15-002, at 10, 12, 15, 

http://foia.ilattorneygeneral.net/pdf/opinions/2015/15-002.pdf. 

¶ 11 Rosemont decided not to appeal from the Attorney General’s opinion. It sent St. Clair the 

Brooks contracts with the terms she sought. 

¶ 12 Rosemont subsequently filed an answer to BGA’s complaint, raising again several of the 

arguments in raised in the litigation concerning Brooks’s contracts. Rosemont appended to its 

answer affidavits from the general manager of Allstate Arena and the executive director of 

the Convention Center, who said that public disclosure of the redacted information from the 

2014 contracts, including the rents and other negotiated terms of the contracts, would harm 

the competitive position of Allstate Arena, the Convention Center, and the persons who 

rented Allstate Arena and the Convention Center in 2014. 

¶ 13 BGA filed a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court heard oral arguments on the 

motion and said that section 7(1)(g) of the FOIA did not protect Rosemont’s trade secrets, 

because Rosemont did not obtain its own secrets from any other person or business. Insofar 

as Rosemont sought to protect the secrets of persons who rented Allstate Arena or the 

Convention Center, the court found no evidence those parties considered the terms of the 

contracts confidential. The court held that section 7(1)(a) also did not preclude disclosure of 

the rental terms.
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¶ 14 The circuit court found that the FOIA prevented Rosemont from adopting an ordinance 

that effectively prevented disclosure of documents that the FOIA subjected to disclosure. The 

circuit court said:

“Now, is this to say that the ordinance is unconstitutional? Maybe to some extent.

I don’t know if this ordinance would have some application other than how it 

would apply to this case. But certainly with respect to the Village’s attempt to 

control the determination of what documents are disclosable under FOIA and the 

scope of the exemptions, I think it’s preempted.” 

¶ 15 Rosemont filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the circuit court’s ruling 

included a determination that Ordinance No. 2014-11-12 violated the Illinois Constitution 

and the circuit court should not reach constitutional issues when the court could decide the 

case on nonconstitutional grounds. The circuit court granted the motion, and on 

reconsideration, entered an order holding that the Attorney General’s decision concerning the

Brooks contracts collaterally estopped Rosemont from relitigating the issue of whether the 

FOIA required disclosure of rent and other terms regarding payments for use of Rosemont’s 

entertainment venues. The court reasserted its ruling that sections 7(1)(g) and 7(1)(a) of the 

FOIA did not exempt the redacted portions of the contract from disclosure. The court vacated 

only its ruling on the validity of Rosemont’s ordinance. Rosemont now appeals. 

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 Rosemont argues that the Attorney General’s decision concerning the Brooks contracts 

should not collaterally estop Rosemont from contesting BGA’s FOIA request and sections 

7(1)(g) and 7(1)(a) of the FOIA, as well as Ordinance No. 2014-11-12, exempt from 
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disclosure the redacted portions of the contracts. We review de novo the order granting a 

motion for summary judgment. Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 

281, 309 (2010). 

¶ 18 Collateral Estoppel

¶ 19 A party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show “(1) that the issue decided in the 

prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in question; (2) that there was 

a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; and (3) that the party against whom 

estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.” Herzog v. 

Lexington Township, 167 Ill. 2d 288, 295 (1995). “Application of the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel must be narrowly tailored to fit the precise facts and issues that were clearly 

determined in the prior judgment.” Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 447, 467 (1996).

While the Attorney General stated as a general principle that the “financial terms of contracts 

with public bodies are expressly subject to disclosure under *** section 2.5 of FOIA,” the 

Attorney General needed to decide only whether the FOIA required Rosemont to disclose the 

terms of its contracts with Brooks, including the amount of rent charged and the financial 

incentives given to Brooks. 

¶ 20 We find this case similar to Lardner v. Department of Justice, 638 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.C.

Cir. 2009) (Lardner II). Lardner initially requested complete files of pardon applications 

submitted by 25 people. The Department of Justice provided the files but redacted from the 

files the names of unsuccessful applicants for pardons. Lardner challenged the redactions.

Lardner v. United States Department of Justice, No. Civ.A.03-0180, 2005 WL 758267, at 
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*1,*3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2005) (Lardner I). A court held that the department had a duty to 

disclose the redacted names. Lardner I, 2005 WL 758267, at *20. 

¶ 21 Lardner then filed a new federal FOIA request, seeking “materials listing the identities of 

all clemency applicants whose applications were denied” during a specified period. Lardner 

II, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 22. Lardner argued that the prior decision collaterally estopped the 

department from contesting his request. The Lardner II court said, 

“although both actions broadly confront the propriety of withholding the identities 

of unsuccessful clemency applicants, the circumstances in which the withholdings 

were made vary substantially between the two matters. Moreover, Plaintiff seeks 

to apply the doctrine to litigation of a legal issue, not a factual one, and in such 

circumstances, the D.C. Circuit has counseled that there is ‘more room for a 

second look when the issue is one of law than when a fact question is at stake.’ 

[National Treasury Employees Union v. Internal Revenue Service 765 F.2d 1174, 

1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985)]. In light of this observation and the differences between 

the two actions, the Court is persuaded that it is appropriate to permit [the Office 

of Pardon Attorney (OPA)] the opportunity to demonstrate why the legal issue 

should be resolved differently in this case, given the differences between the 

actions, rather than precluding OPA from litigating the merits of the new 

situation.” Lardner II, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 23. 

¶ 22 Here, both St. Clair’s litigation and BGA’s lawsuit against Rosemont concern the 

withholding of contractual terms, including negotiated incentives, for persons and businesses 

to use Rosemont’s entertainment venues. However, the kinds of incentives, as well as the 
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value of the incentives, could vary widely from contract to contract. BGA, like Lardner, 

seeks to apply collateral estoppel to a legal issue and not to a factual determination the 

Attorney General made. In accord with the reasoning of Lardner II, we find that the court 

should give Rosemont the opportunity to demonstrate that the court should treat the legal 

issue differently for some of the contracts at issue here. Accordingly, we hold that collateral 

estoppel does not apply here to bar Rosemont from arguing that the FOIA and Ordinance 

2014-11-12 exempt the redacted portions of the contracts from disclosure. 

¶ 23 Section 7(1)(g) 

¶ 24 Rosemont argues that section 7(1)(g) of FOIA exempts the redacted portions of the 

contracts from disclosure. The General Assembly enacted FOIA “to open agency action to 

the light of public scrutiny and to protect the public from government malfeasance and 

misfeasance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted) Roulette v. Department of Central 

Management Services, 141 Ill. App. 3d 394, 398 (1986). The General Assembly asserted, in 

FOIA’s public policy section, that “access [to public records] is necessary to enable the 

people to fulfill their duties of discussing public issues fully and freely, making informed 

political judgments and monitoring government to ensure that it is being conducted in the 

public interest.” 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2014). Rosemont “must comply with a valid request for 

information unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions set forth in section 7 of the FOIA 

applies.” Watkins v. McCarthy, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632, ¶ 13. “It is the public body’s 

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the requested records fall within any 

claimed exemption.” Better Government Ass’n v. Zaruba, 2014 IL App (2d) 140071, ¶ 19. 

“The legislature patterned the Illinois law after the Federal Freedom of Information Act 
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[citation] and case law construing the Federal statute should be used in Illinois to interpret 

our own FOIA.” Cooper v. Department of the Lottery, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1012 (1994). 

Cases from other states concerning freedom of information may have persuasive force.

Kenyon v. Garrels, 184 Ill. App. 3d 28, 32 (1989). 

¶ 25 Rosemont cites as persuasive authority Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Center 

Authority, 774 A.2d 40 (R.I. 2001) (Providence Journal I). Providence Journal requested 

from the Authority “ ‘documents regarding negotiations that led to the booking’ ” of two 

events, along with the contracts the Authority entered into in connection with the two events. 

Providence Journal I, 774 A.2d at 42. The Providence Journal I court looked to decisions 

interpreting the federal FOIA to help interpret Rhode Island’s law. Providence Journal I, 774 

A.2d at 46-48. The Providence Journal I court distinguished the documents produced during 

the negotiating process from the final contracts and upheld the Authority’s decision not to 

disclose the documents produced during negotiations. But the Authority could not withhold 

the contracts. The Providence Journal I court said, “ ‘[w]hile contracts may certainly contain 

information, such as the price of goods being sold, the entire contract itself cannot qualify as 

‘information’ in any ordinary sense of either word.’ ” Providence Journal I, 774 A.2d at 50 

(quoting Piper & Marbury L.L.P. v. United States Postal Service, No. CIV.A. 99-2383, 2001

WL 214217, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2001)). The Providence Journal I court reversed and 

remanded for further litigation concerning the contracts. Providence Journal I, 774 A.2d at 

50. 

¶ 26 On remand, the superior court ordered the Authority to produce the three contracts, but 

the court permitted the Authority to redact from the contracts “the prices of food and 
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beverages and related services ***; the rent charges for using the Convention Center building 

***; and the prices for rooms and any reference to complimentary rooms.” Providence 

Journal Co. v. Convention Center Authority, 824 A.2d 1246, 1247 (R.I. 2003) (Providence 

Journal II). The superior court reasoned that the final negotiated “prices were items that the 

customers would want to remain confidential and that, as with the documents reflecting the 

negotiation process that we addressed in [Providence Journal I], the negotiated price should 

remain confidential.” (Internal quotation marks omitted) Providence Journal II, 824 A.2d at 

1247-48. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed the superior court, holding that

“unlike documents reflecting the negotiation process, final agreements, the ‘fruits’ of 

negotiation, should be available to the public ***. *** Certainly, the final prices, the 

consideration offered by the purchaser of the goods and services, were part of the final 

contract and thus must be disclosed.” Providence Journal II, 824 A.2d at 1248 (citing 

Providence Journal I, 774 A.2d at 50). 

¶ 27 We agree with the Providence Journal II court that the final negotiated price of a contract 

does not qualify as “information obtained” from the purchaser, within the meaning of section 

7(1)(g). Rosemont admits that the redacted portions of the contracts include its standard 

rental rates for use of the entertainment venues. Rosemont told the purchasers Rosemont’s 

standard rates. Rosemont did not obtain information about Rosemont’s standard rates from 

the renters. See Bloomberg, L.P. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 601 

F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (amount and rates of loans do not qualify as information 

obtained from borrowers). We also agree with the Providence Journal II court and the 

Attorney General’s opinion that the public has a right to know about the sources and 
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dispositions of public funds. See 5 ILCS 140/2.5 (West 2014). Accordingly, we hold that 

section 7(1)(g) does not exempt from disclosure the redacted portions of the contracts at issue 

here.

¶ 28 Section 7(1)(a) 

¶ 29 Section 7(1)(a) exempts from disclosure only “[i]nformation specifically prohibited from 

disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations implementing federal or State 

law.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2014). Rosemont claims that the Illinois Trade Secrets Act

(Trade Secrets Act) (765 ILCS 1065/1 et seq. (West 2014)) specifically prohibits disclosure 

of the terms of its contracts. But the Trade Secrets Act provides only that “[a]ctual or 

threatened misappropriation [of trade secrets] may be enjoined.” 765 ILCS 1065/3(a) (West 

2014). The Trade Secrets Act does not specifically prohibit any disclosures. Rosemont has 

not sought an injunction under the Trade Secrets Act, but even if a court had imposed such an 

injunction, disclosure would violate the court’s injunction and not a State or federal law or 

rules or regulations implementing State or federal law. Thus, section 7(1)(a) does not exempt 

from disclosure the redacted portions of the contracts at issue. 

¶ 30 Moreover, we agree with BGA that the General Assembly adopted section 7(1)(g) as its 

prohibition on disclosure of trade secrets under the FOIA. Rosemont cites no case or 

legislative history to support its claim that the legislature intended to add a second 

prohibition on the disclosure of trade secrets in section 7(1)(a). 

¶ 31 Ordinance 2014-11-12 

¶ 32 Finally, Rosemont contends that its Ordinance 2014-11-12 exempts the redacted portions 

of the contracts from disclosure. Rosemont, a home rule unit, may exercise any power 
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pertaining to its government and affairs. Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 

(1992). The State legislature may preempt a home rule unit’s authority over a particular 

issue, but to do so, the state “legislation must contain express language that the area covered 

by the legislation is to be exclusively state controlled; it is not enough that the legislature 

comprehensively regulates an area which otherwise would fall into home rule authority.” 

Crawford v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 3d 818, 826 (1999). 

¶ 33 FOIA provides, “This Act shall be the exclusive State statute on freedom of information, 

except to the extent that other State statutes might create additional restrictions on disclosure 

of information or other laws in Illinois might create additional obligations for disclosure of 

information to the public.” 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2014). We find that in this provision, the 

legislature expressly stated its intent that only State statutes may create additional restrictions 

on disclosure of information, and other laws in Illinois, including ordinances of home rule 

units, may create additional obligations for disclosure but cannot create exemptions from 

disclosure. 

¶ 34 Rosemont claims that the FOIA does not sufficiently specify the intent to have 

restrictions on disclosure come exclusively under state control. Under Rosemont’s 

interpretation, “the public disclosure of information in the possession of a [home rule unit]

would be largely at the unfettered discretion of that body. This would derogate the purpose of 

both the State and Federal Freedom of Information Acts and the case law that has construed 

them.” Cooper, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1024. “A reliance upon self-determination by public 

officials and public employees as to what should and what should not be disclosed to the 

public would frustrate the purpose of the FOIA.” Hoffman v. Department of Corrections, 158 
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Ill. App. 3d 473, 476 (1987). Interpreting the FOIA “in its entirety, keeping in mind the 

subject it addresses and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting it” (Hall v. Henn, 208 

Ill. 2d 325, 330 (2003)), we find that the FOIA precludes Rosemont from creating additional 

restrictions on public access to information. 

¶ 35 CONCLUSION

¶ 36 An adjudication that the FOIA requires Rosemont to disclose all the terms of one contract 

does not collaterally estop Rosemont from contesting disclosure of the terms of other 

contracts. The trade secrets exemption in section 7(1)(g) of FOIA does not apply to 

information or offers, such as standard rental rates, supplied by the public body to a private 

contractor. Because no state or federal law prohibits disclosure of the redacted portions of the 

contracts at issue, section 7(1)(a) does not exempt those portions from disclosure. FOIA 

requires disclosure of all the negotiated terms of the contracts at issue, including rent and 

incentives Rosemont gave private contracting parties. Home rule units have the power to 

expand the duty to disclose, but they lack authority to exempt from disclosure documents and 

information for which FOIA mandates disclosure. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s 

judgment directing Rosemont to disclose specific rental and incentive terms of its contracts 

for use of Allstate Arena and the Convention Center. 

¶ 37 Affirmed.