U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

66–968 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

RUSSIAN THREATS TO UNITED STATES SECURITY

IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 24, 2000

Serial No. 106–158

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

LISA SMITH ARAFUNE, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on January 24, 2000 ......................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Campbell, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

California ....................................................................................................... 39

Lunev, Stanislav, former GRU Officer, author of ‘‘Through the Eyes of

the Enemy’’; ; and Peter Vincent Pry, former employee of the Central

Intelligence Agency, author of ‘‘War Scare’’ ................................................ 59

Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania .......................................................................................................... 11

Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 6

Campbell, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

California, series of letters requesting investigations ............................... 43

Green, William, California State University—San Bernadino, Naval Reserves Intelligence Officer, prepared statement of ..................................... 100

Lunev, Stanislav, former GRU Officer, author of ‘‘Through the Eyes of

the Enemy’’, prepared statement of ............................................................. 61

Pry, Peter Vincent, former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency,

author of ‘‘War Scare’’, prepared statement of ........................................... 74

Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania:

Article entitled, ‘‘The Employment of Special Task Forces Under

Contemproty Conditions’’ ...................................................................... 32

Partial transcript of October 26, 1999 hearing ....................................... 16

Partial transcript of September 14, 1999 press conference ................... 20

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RUSSIAN THREATS TO UNITED STATES

SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Los Angeles, CA.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in the Los

Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority Boardroom, 3rd

floor, One Gateway Plaza, Los Angeles, CA, Hon. Dan Burton

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Burton and Scarborough.

Staff present: Daniel R. Moll, deputy staff director; Lisa Smith

Arafune, chief clerk; Mildred Webber and Caroline Katzin, professional staff members; and Michael Yeager, minority senior oversight counsel.

Mr. BURTON. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Committee on Government Reform will come to order. I ask unanimous

consent that all Members’ and witnesses’ written opening statements be included in the record. And without objection so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits, and extraneous

or tabular material referred to be included in the record. Without

objection so ordered.

It’s been a little more than 10 years since the Berlin Wall came

tumbling down. We’ve been through eras of Glasnost and

Perestroika in Russia. We’ve seen economic reforms come and go

and we’ve watched the Russian economy come close to collapsing.

The conventional wisdom since the end of the cold war has been

that the Russian threat to our national security has evaporated.

Some people have gone so far as to say that Russia is now our ally.

The purpose of this hearing is to examine that question. Is Russia

still a threat to United States interests? Is Russia still an adversary?

I’m very glad that we’re able to hold this session here in Los Angeles today. We hold a lot of hearings in Washington, DC. Some of

them get covered by the news media; some don’t. A lot of what we

do in the Capital never gets out beyond the Washington beltway.

So when we have a recess period, I think it’s a good thing to get

out of Washington and give people and local media in other parts

of the country some exposure to the congressional process and the

issues that are important.

Two weeks ago we held a field hearing in Miami about international drug trafficking. We’ve held field hearings in my home

town of Indianapolis. One of our subcommittees held a field hearing in New York on health care not too long ago. So I think it’s

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good for the committee and good for the people we represent to do

this once in a while.

One of the problems with doing field hearings is that not many

members of the committee can attend. The 44 members of this

committee are from all over the country, and we always have a lot

of commitments. So you won’t see many members of the committee

here today. However, that doesn’t take anything away from the importance of this subject at hand. National security and our relationship with Russia are very important issues. By holding this hearing, we’re creating a permanent record that every committee member will be able to review. And I want to particularly thank Representative Scarborough who came all the way from Florida to be

with us today as well as Congressman Curt Weldon who’s from

Pennsylvania. Of course Mr. Campbell is here from California, and

we appreciate his attendance as well. This is an issue we’re going

to continue to look at down the road. So I want to thank all of today’s witnesses for being here and participating.

Now returning to the question at hand: Is Russia still a threat?

One thing we know is that Russia is still conducting espionage

against the United States. A lot of people in Washington were

shocked when they picked up their newspapers about a month ago

and discovered that a Russian spy had bugged the State Department. A spy who is stationed at the Russian Embassy had planted

a tiny listening device in a chair in the conference room. It was

right down the hall from the Secretary of State’s office. The FBI

caught him red-handed sitting in his car outside the State Department trying to listen in on a meeting. Nobody has any idea how

long that bug was there or what the Russians might have learned.

Security is so lax at the State Department that they couldn’t tell

you today if there are any other listening devices in the building.

They’re sweeping them right now.

One of our witnesses today is a former Russian intelligence

agent, Colonel Stanivlav Lunev. He is the highest ranking GRU officer ever to defect to the United States. The GRU is Russia’s premiere military intelligence agency. Colonel Lunev is in the witness

protection program and special arrangements have been made to

conceal his identity. So I apologize to the media who’s here, we’ll

have to have him come in and be covered up so that his identity

is maintained so he won’t be in any jeopardy.

Mr. Lunev worked out of the Russian Embassy in Washington

for 31⁄2 years. I had a chance to read Colonel Lunev’s testimony

when he was before Congressman Weldon’s subcommittee in 1998.

He said, ‘‘I can say to you very openly and very firmly that Russian

intelligence activity against the United States is much more active

than it was in the time of the former Soviet Union’s existence. It’s

more active today than it was then.’’ That was a year and a half

before the State Department incident. It looks to me like Colonel

Lunev knows what he’s talking about. It makes me wonder if there

are more bugs in more conference rooms waiting to be discovered.

It’s not really surprising that Russia is still actively spying on us.

But how does the Russian Government view us? Have their views

changed? Do they consider us a friend or an enemy? They just produced a new national security doctrine. It was signed by President

Putin this month. According to one scholar it, ‘‘adopts a tone far

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more aggressively anti-Western than in the 1997 version.’’ The document blames the United States and NATO for trying to dominate

the world and states that this is a grave threat to Russian security.

So it’s very clear that the Russian Government at the highest level

still sees us, the United States, as a threat and an enemy.

I recently read a quote from former CIA Director John Deutch.

He was testifying in 1998. Here’s what he said:

Russia continues to be our top security concern, even without the adversarial relationship of the cold war. Russia still possesses 20,000-plus nuclear weapons. Widespread corruption and the absence of honest and accountable internal governmental

administrative functions threatens Russia’s slow and erratic evolution toward democracy.

One of our witnesses today is Dr. Peter Pry. He was a CIA analyst for many years and he recently wrote a book, ‘‘War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink.’’ Dr. Pry states that the

Russian military and intelligence agencies still take a very hostile

view toward the United States. He states that decisionmakers in

those agencies still consider us their foremost adversary and that

this paranoia is fueled by the growing disparity between our economy and their economy and between our defense capabilities and

theirs.

That brings me to one of the issues I’d really like to focus on

today. According to Colonel Lunev, a key component of Russia’s

strategy against the West for decades has been sabotage and assassination. In his previous testimony, he stated that one of his jobs

at the Russia Embassy was to collect information about elected

leaders in this country. This information would be used to assassinate them in a time of war or crisis.

Another of Colonel Lunev’s jobs was to scout out sites where

weapons or explosives could be prepositioned. From time to time he

would travel to the Shenandoah Valley to photograph areas where

‘‘dead drops’’ would be established. Weapons would be placed in

these dead drop areas so that in times of crisis Russian agents

could come into the country to commit sabotage against power

plants, military bases, and communications facilities.

According to Colonel Lunev, part of the Soviet’s plan called for

the use of, ‘‘portable tactical nuclear devices,’’ to be used to commit

sabotage against highly protected targets. If has now been widely

reported that the Soviet Union manufactured portable briefcasesize nuclear devices that cannot all be accounted for.

Were conventional or nuclear weapons prepositioned in the

United States? Colonel Lunev doesn’t know if the sites he identified

were ever used. However, a second Russian defector says drop sites

were established all over the United States and Western Europe.

Vasili Mitrokhin was an archivist for the KGB. When he defected

to the West he brought with him pages and pages of handwritten

notes about KGB activities. He says that for decades the Soviet

Union deployed sabotage and intelligence groups whose mission it

was to commit assassinations or acts of sabotage in times of crisis

or impending war.

In his book, ‘‘The Sword and the Shield,’’ he states that drop

sites for explosives were scattered all over Western Europe and the

United States. They contained everything from communications

equipment to handguns to explosives. At one point in his book, he

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states that a standard arms package to be placed in a drop site

would include mines, explosive charges, fuses, and detonators.

Mr. Mitrokhin brought information on the exact locations of several sites in Europe, in Belgium, and Switzerland. Local police

found these sites exactly where Mitrokhin said they would be.

That’s significant because a lot of people tried to pooh-pooh what

we’re talking about here today but several sites have been located

in Europe. They were booby-trapped with explosives. The bombs

had to be set off with water cannons before the caches could be

opened. Mr. Mitrokhin states that many drop sites were established here in the United States. However, he was not able to

smuggle out the locations. He knows that one site was established

in Brainerd, MN.

In his book, he also mentions the possibility of drop sites in New

York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. However, their locations are still a

secret. Some people have asked why we’re holding this hearing

here in Los Angeles, CA. Well, I had a chance to review the hearing transcript from Congressman Weldon’s subcommittee on this

same subject. It’s my understanding that there are many potential

targets for Russian sabotage here in California. It’s my understanding that Mr. Mitrokhin mentioned California’s harbors and naval

facilities as primary targets. California is the most populous State

in the Nation. If there are hidden caches of explosives in this State,

it’s very dangerous and very important that we find out where they

are. That’s something that the people ought to be informed about.

That’s why we’re here.

The key questions before us now are where are these drop sites?

Do they still exist? What’s in them? Were any of them ever used

to store portable nuclear devices as alleged by Colonel Lunev? If

there are Russian arms caches hidden around the country with explosives and booby traps, this is a very dangerous situation. One

of the things we want to find out today is if the administration has

done anything to find out where these sites are or if they still exist.

And I want to say something that’s very important. The State

Department of the United States was asked by all of the witnesses

today, from the Congress, and myself on numerous occasions to testify, to send anybody here to testify. And Madeline Albright and

the State Department chose to ignore us. Mr. Campbell, Mr.

Weldon, myself, and many others on both the Democrat and Republican sides have written to the administration and to the State

Department on numerous occasions. They will not even respond

about this subject and I think that’s deplorable.

If there’s a threat to the United States because of hidden sites,

then by golly the State Department ought to be telling us what

they’re doing to deal with that problem and they’re not even answering Members of Congress. And I intend to force them to come

before the Congress if they don’t start responding very quickly, and

I’ll do that by subpoenaing them.

My colleagues, Congressman Weldon and Congressman Campbell, also have tried to get answers from the administration.

They’ve written to the Defense Department Secretary Cohen and to

Secretary Albright and they’ve also received no response. We’ve

asked the FBI and the CIA to testify here today so we can try to

find out what’s being done. I wish they could testify in open session

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because I know there is more and more concern here in California

and around the country about these possible sites since these books

have been published. However, their testimony is secret. It’s classified.

After our first two panels, we’ll hear from the FBI and CIA in

closed session. Right now, the security people are sweeping an adjoining room so we can go in there and make sure what is said is

kept confidential. I appreciate that our witnesses from these two

agencies are here today, and I look forward to hearing their testimony. I also want to say that I really regret that the State Department isn’t here. Once again, my staff and everybody else has tried

to get them here; and they just jump through hoops to not have

to testify.

Madeleine Albright is going to be testifying before the International Relations Committee in about 2 weeks. And she will answer questions about these issues, or she’ll have to duck them in

public. Congressman Weldon has worked harder on this issue than

anyone in Congress. Congressman Campbell has been working very

hard to get answers from the administration on behalf of California

and his constituents. And I congratulate both of you for being here

and for your hard work.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today including Mr. DeSarno from the FBI. Mr. DeSarno testified before our

committee back in 1998 when he was working on the campaign

fundraising task force. He was very forthright then. I’m sure he’ll

be forthright today. He’s a good man. We welcome him back. So

we’re glad to have him. And we’re welcoming also Dr. William

Green from Cal State University in San Bernadino who is an expert on Russia and United States policy. I look forward to hearing

from all of you.

I want to say one more thing. Congressman Waxman who represents this area couldn’t be with us today. He said he had a previous commitment. Because this issue is important, I’m disappointed that he couldn’t be here. I hope that he’ll take a hard

look at the issues that are going to be raised today because not

only do they concern all of California but in particular since Los

Angeles is such a huge population area and he represents a large

part of that, he should be very concerned about it. And I’m sure

once he hears all these issues, he will be more concerned. He does

have one of his chief staff lieutenants here, and we appreciate his

presence.

And with that, my colleague from Florida, who flew all the way

out here, I appreciate him being here.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Do you have an opening statement, Mr. Scarborough?

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. No. I’ll just be brief, Mr. Chairman. Thank

you for holding this hearing. I certainly thank Congressman Campbell for being here and the leadership he’s shown in this very important issue, not only to all Americans but again to California specifically. I think of all the people that have come before our committees and I think of all the people that have come before the

Armed Services Committee, of which I’m also a member, I think

most everybody understands that the battles of the 21st century

will not be fought on battlefields in Europe or in Asia but for Americans, we may find them being fought here at home. And certainly

if that’s the case, then California, specifically Los Angeles, CA, will

be on the front lines in battles that involve terrorism, be it nuclear,

chemical, or biological. That’s why again I thank you for your leadership.

I’ve got to echo the sentiments of our chairman that I believe unfortunately we have a President, we have a State Department, and

we have a foreign policy apparatus in Washington and on both

sides of the United States both Republicans and Democrats that do

not understand the scope of the danger facing all Americans. And

a great example is again Dr. Pry’s book, ‘‘War Scare.’’ In it he tells

a very, very interesting story.

And I think it’s very telling about how the administration right

now has been lulled to sleep by the hope that somehow the Russians have changed. It’s sort of—it’s not the new Nixon; it’s the

new Russians. And that somehow they’ve undergone this remarkable transformation. And there’s a story in here how in 1996 while

NATO was conducting military exercises in the North Sea, the

Russians were so alarmed that they got their northern fleet out. It

was a very confrontational moment in American history and in

Russian history. At the same time, Brothers to the Rescue planes

were shot down by Cuba.

And so in the middle of this great international crisis, the White

House picked up the red phone to speak to the Russians and to try

to defuse this situation. But what were they talking about? They

were talking about poultry exports. It seems that the Russians

were concerned by the fact that these maneuvers were going on

and they did a lot of different things, but the only thing that

caught the White House’s attention was that poultry exports from

Russia to America would be cut and likewise going the other way

because of Tyson Foods poultry plants in Arkansas.

So they were focusing on chickens and using the red phone for

this chicken crisis instead of understanding that the two countries

were really on the brink of some very dangerous, dangerous times.

And that continues. But, again, the State Department isn’t focused.

The White House isn’t focused on it. They’re only concerned about

economic considerations while foreign policy considerations have

been thrown out the window.

The cold war as we knew it from 1947 to 1991 may be over, but

we are now in a period that’s even more volatile and more frightening. And Curt Weldon has been a champion on this issue for some

time. I was at a meeting with him earlier this month. I’ll tell you

after about 20 minutes of talking to him, I became ever increasVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:25 Nov 01, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66968.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ingly concerned. So I look forward to his testimony. I look forward

to the testimony also of all these other witnesses.

Again, I think what’s telling is that we have interesting information from Dr. Pry’s book and others, a lot of what you’re going to

be hearing from Curt Weldon and others isn’t just from American

scholars or American researchers, it actually comes from Russians

themselves. As Curt Weldon says, from the mouths of Russians

themselves. So we are in a frightening time.

And, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for conducting this hearing. I think it’s very important. And I hope for the safety of citizens

in Los Angeles and California and across this country that our administration and that Democrats and Republicans in Washington,

DC, will start to focus on the very real threat that’s being posed

right now by mere anarchic conditions in Russia.

Thank you. Yield back my time.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Chairman Scarborough. We’ll now hear

an opening statement from Congressman Weldon of Pennsylvania.

STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for

holding this hearing, and I want to thank Mr. Scarborough for

being here and Mr. Campbell for his untiring efforts to get this administration to come clean with the American people about an

issue that I think is vitally important.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset let me state that I think I’m in an

unusual position. I am a friend of the Russian people. My undergraduate degree, as you know, is in Russian studies. I speak the

language. I’ve been there almost 20 times. For the past 6 years

since I formed the Duma-Congress relationship, I have chaired an

ongoing relationship with members of all the Russian political factions. I know over 150 Duma members personally. I have many

friends who serve in the Russian Government.

My statements today are not to try to paint Russia into a corner.

There are people there who want Russia to continue with reforms.

But we need to understand the reality of what has happened in the

former Soviet Union and what continues today. Because there are

others in that country that don’t want good relations with us and

that have other intentions.

I think secondarily I would mention that I think what we’re

going to look at today is what I would call an example of the failed

policies of this administration for 8 years. We have been so enamored with a Bill Clinton to Boris Yeltsin relationship, with an Al

Gore to Viktor Chernomyrdin relationship that whenever something would appear to surface that would appear to perhaps undermine Yeltsin or Chernomyrdin, he would pretend it didn’t happen

whether it was a theft of IMF dollars, whether it was abuse and

insider trading in Russia, whether it was arms control treaty violations that we saw time and again and never called the Russians

on, or whether it was the lasering of the eyes of one of our career

Navy intelligence officers Jack Daly. There were consistent efforts

to hide reality. The evidence of Vice President Gore being given a

brief by the CIA that linked Viktor Chernomyrdin to organized

crime within the petrol chemical industry and the Vice President

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writing the word ‘‘bullshit’’ across the front of it and sending it

back to the CIA.

The administration has had a consistent pattern of not wanting

anything to surface that might cause the perception of a problem

or a real problem in our relationship with Russia. And I’m convinced that’s what you have in the example. And I’m not going to

give you facts from some Republican radical right think tank. I’m

not going to give you comments of the far right of my party, our

party. I’m not going to give you facts from people who want to attack Russia. I’m going to give you a very logical and methodical

outline of what Russians have said on the public record. And I

want this issue to be judged on what Russians have said in the

public realm, many before our Congress, because that’s the story

today. It is what Russians have said that has occurred and what

we ought to be concerned with.

Mr. Chairman, in May 1997—and everything I’m going to say,

Mr. Chairman, has been witnessed in a bipartisan manner. Nothing that I am going to talk about was witnessed by Republicans

alone. And my entire efforts in this area have been totally bipartisan. So for those who would say this is a Republican witch-hunt,

I challenge them to come forward. I’ll debate them, and I’ll give

them the factual information that will deny that allegation.

May 30, 1997, I led a bipartisan delegation to Moscow. One of

meetings we had scheduled was with then General Alexander

Lebed, currently the Governor of Krasnoyarsk. General Lebed, as

you know, was the top defense advisor to Yeltsin. At the meeting,

Lebed for the first time revealed that one of his responsibilities

when he worked for Yeltsin was to account for 132 suitcase-size nuclear devices. He said he could not find them. He said he could locate only 48. Now, Democrats and Republicans with me said to him

in this private meeting, well, where are the rest, General? He said,

I have no idea; they could have been destroyed; they could be secure; or they could have been put on the black market for the highest bidder. Because the General is making a point to us that the

instability in the Russian military was causing military officers to

sell technology around the world.

Now, Mr. Chairman, we did not have a press conference following that event. So this was not an opportunity for Lebed to toot his

own horn. In fact, the only way the media found out about that allegation was that we filed my trip report 2 months later, and we

do as a requirement of the Congress. A producer for 20/20 picked

up on the story, Leslie Coburn. She called me; and she said, Congressman, did Lebed really say this? I said absolutely. She said do

you think he would say it on national TV? I said you will have to

ask him. She went to Moscow. 20/20 interviewed Lebed; they interviewed me and both of us with a lead story in September 1997 on

the national media where he again said in his own words, that

Russia had, in fact, produced these small atomic demolition munitions and could not account for all of them.

What was the response of the Russian Government? They denied

they ever produced them. The minister of foreign affairs for Russia

publicly said Lebed is crazy; he doesn’t know what he’s talking

about; he’s trying to gain popularity. But even worse than that, Mr.

Chairman, was that at a press conference in the Pentagon reflectVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:25 Nov 01, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66968.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing what I just talked about with this administration the question

was asked of Ken Bacon’s staff what do you make of the allegations

by Lebed. And this was the response of our government: We have

no reason to doubt what the Russian Government is saying.

So then, Mr. Chairman, on October 2, 1997, I brought over Dr.

Alexei Yablikov. Dr. Yablikov is one of the most reknown environmentalists in all of Russia. He was initially part of Yeltsin’s cabinet; was a member of the security council; and is an expert on environmental issues, ecological issues, and atomic energy issues. He

heads a think tank. He’s a member of the Academy of Sciences in

Moscow today.

I had Alexei Yablikov testify before my committee open session

in Washington. And this is what he said. He said, I know that General Lebed was correct. These devices were built. He said on the

record—and you can check the transcript—he said I know colleagues of mine who worked on these devices. And you need to understand, America, he didn’t just build these for the Ministry of Defense, they also built these for the KGB to be used for external operations.

So now I have a retired two star general given the highest award

that Russia gives, the Hero of Russia award, supported by Dr.

Alexei Yablikov saying publicly that Russia has, in fact, built these

devices and that we better work with Russia to find out where they

are and if, in fact, they’re capable of being sold abroad.

Mr. Chairman, even though our government denied that they

should pursue this issue, I traveled to Moscow that December and,

as I frequently do, met with the defense ministers of Russia, Defense Minister Sergeyev, also a retired general. For the first half

hour of my meeting, I talked about positive proactive things that

I was doing to help Russia, to help the people, to help the military

with housing, to help the problem of nuclear waste. And then I

said, but General, for you to continue to have me help you and be

Russia’s friend you have to be candid with me. What’s the story of

the small atomic demolition munitions. This is what the defense

minister from Russia said to me: ‘‘Congressman, we did build those

devices just as you built them during the cold war. We are aware

that you destroyed all of yours. And I submit to you that we will

have all of our small atomic demolition munitions destroyed by the

year 2000.’’

So here we have a Russian general saying that they were lost or

not being able to be accounted for, we have a leading environmental activist from Russia verifying his story, and we have our

government publicly going along with the Russian Government’s

total denial they had ever built them.

And finally the defense ministry of Russia admitted to me publicly, yes we built them and yes, we’ll have them all destroyed by

this year.

The following year, Mr. Chairman, March 19, 1998, I invited

General Alexander Lebed to Washington. He testified before my

committee. Again he was under terrible pressure from the Russian

Government. Again he said—he stood by his claims that these devices were unaccounted for and that we in America should be troubled because those who want to harm us are the ones that those

14

generals and admirals who are disgruntled would sell those devices

to.

In August of that same year, Mr. Chairman, August the 4th, I

invited Stanislav Lunev to come before my committee. As you

know, he’s in the witness protection program jointly administered

by, I believe, the FBI and the CIA. And he’s under an assumed

name. I had him come in behind a curtain with a ski mask on. I

had him testify. And I will not go through what he’s going to say

today but he’s going to tell you as the highest ranking GRU defector in the history of the Soviet Union or Russia, his job when he

worked under cover as a TASS correspondent at the Soviet Embassy in Washington was to locate sites where materials could be

dropped. And, in fact, that’s an issue I know this committee is

going to explore with him.

So now we have the highest ranking GRU defector reinforcing

the possibility of what both Lebed and Yablikov said and, in fact,

saying it was his understanding that these drops could include

small atomic demolition munitions as well as the possibility of

other September or August of this past year, August 1999, Dr.

Christopher Andrew published his book that you referred to called,

‘‘The KGB, the Sword and the Shield, the Mitrokhin Files.’’ This

book, as you pointed out, is based on the 8 years of collecting

Mitrokhin’s handwritten notes about secret KGB files.

I met with Dr. Christopher Andrew from Cambridge University

at a private dinner in September of last year. I asked him to testify

before my committee which he did in October. Dr. Andrew flew

over from London and he brought with him Oleg Gordievsky.

Gordievsky is the highest ranking ever KGB defector from Russia.

He was the station desk chief for the Soviet KGB in London. He

currently is in a witness protection program in Great Britain. The

two of them testified before my committee, Mr. Chairman. And

what did they say? They said in the Mitrokhin files one of the

things Mitrokhin documented was a deliberate plan by the KGB to

preposition military caches of weapons, hardware, and devices in

Europe and in North America. These devices were intended to be

used by agents who would be prepositioned in our country to blow

up dams, bridges, ports, to cause significant unrest inside of our

territory.

When I asked Dr. Andrew whether or not there were specific

sites named in the United States, he said Mitrokhin only had time

to take notes on a sampling of the kinds of cases the KGB was

working on. And he said he wasn’t interested in documenting every

single location of every single device that the KGB had put forward. Because there are literally hundreds of them all over the

world. He did document four sites so that no one could question the

authenticity of what he was saying, it just happens that one of

those sites was in Switzerland and three were in Belgium.

Last year, Mr. Chairman, the Swiss went to the exact site that

he identified, there are photographs of that site in this book and

right there at the exact spot with a booby-trapped bomb that could

kill a human being and, in fact, caused the Swiss Government to

issue a warning to all of its citizens about that type of location,

they found exactly what Mitrokhin said would be there. Devices

that the Russians had prepositioned during the Soviet era.

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In Belgium, at all three sites the Belgium intelligence service

found the exact same kinds of capability. Now, were there weapons

of mass destruction there? No. Were there military hardware and

transmission and communications equipment? Yes. Were they

booby trapped? The one in Switzerland, yes.

In the Mitrokhin files, he documents that there are States in the

United States where these devices were prepositioned. Specifically

mentioned in the files are California, Pennsylvania, New York,

Montana, Minnesota, Texas. And he further states that they are

near pipelines. They are near ports. They are near major public infrastructure locations. All of this is in the KGB files. Now, this is

not the main content of this book. Because the KGB files were expansive. Only a very small portion of this book dealt with the location of these devices. So for those who say come forward and give

us one, we can’t. But when I had Dr. Andrew who’s, by the way,

a Russian security and intelligence expert at Cambridge, one of the

leading tenured professors at Cambridge University so much so

that when Mitrokhin received his ability to live in England by the

British intelligence service and the British Government, they went

to Cambridge and they went to Dr. Andrew and they said would

you work with Mitrokhin and help to prepare these files in an organized way. That’s why the book came out.

So the British intelligence trusted Christopher Andrew to work

Mitrokhin. When Mitrokhin—or when Christopher Andrew and

Gordievsky testified before my committee, again this is in the public record, they said that there is no doubt in their mind that there

are locations today, no doubt in their minds, all over the United

States, where Soviet military equipment is stored today. No doubt.

Now, they didn’t say that there is a high degree of probability of

a nuclear device, but they left the door open. They left the door

open. In fact, I’ll submit the transcript which refers to that for the

record which people can look at in the words again of a Russian,

Mitrokhin—I mean Gordievsky and Mitrokhin and Dr. Christopher

Andrew.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman before that hearing, I went to our

own agencies. I called Louis Freeh of the FBI who I have the highest respect for. I think he has absolutely impeccable credentials. As

you know and I think as you feel, he is the one bright star in this

administration who shines above all others. I said, Director Freeh,

can you send a team over that I can talk to before I have the hearing; and he did. He sent over three people. One of whom was told— and I told him I was going to say what was discussed at that meeting so they knew that it was not being held in a classified way.

I said I want to ask you the question, one, do you consider the

Mitrokhin files to be credible. And they said, absolutely. They are

totally credible.

So anyone that would say this is some outlandish claim that’s

not been verified, I would ask them to talk to the FBI about that

and the SIS service in Great Britain.

No. 2, I said, have you attempted to find devices where the

States and sites are listed even though it’s vague and they said,

yes, but we don’t have much to go on. You know, there are thousands of miles of pipeline in Texas. There are tons of ports installations in California. We just don’t know where to look without the

specific locations.

So then I got to the third question: Has our government asked

the Russian Government for the specific locations? And the answer

was no, our government has not asked the Russian Government.

Now, Mr. Chairman, also for the record I would like to submit

a transcript of a press conference held at the Pentagon on September 15, 1999. In this transcript I’m going to quote Admiral

Quigley—Rear Admiral Quigley is being asked questions by the

media about the Mitrokhin files, about the claims in it. Admiral

Quigley is asked if he’s aware of the book and the allegations. He

says, yes, we’re aware of it. They said, do you have any interest

in actually going after some of these caches? He says not that I’m

aware of, no. Have you approached the Russians on this, about

whether or not they’ve done this? His answer, no, no we have not.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. WELDON. So in the public domain now we have two Federal

agencies, the Defense Department and the FBI stating that this administration—and I don’t think it should be the responsibility of

the FBI or the Defense Department to ask the Russians, but both

of them saying publicly, this administration hasn’t asked the question.

Mr. Chairman, on January—or on October 22, and you have this

in your files, I drafted a letter which was signed by myself and Jim

Oberstar. Jim Oberstar is not exactly considered a wacko Member

of the Congress. He is one of the most stable Democrats in the

House. He’s the ranking Democrat on the public works committee.

Jim Oberstar and I signed this letter to Madeleine Albright saying

have you asked the question of the Russians; and if you did, what

was the response; and if you haven’t asked the question, why

haven’t you. Today is January, what, the 22nd. No response from

the administration, Mr. Chairman. Nothing.

Mr. Chairman, also in October of last year, I introduced legislation. And I just didn’t go get Republican sponsors, Mr. Chairman,

my bill which is H. Res. 380 which I have before you has 16 Republican sponsors and 16 Democrat sponsors. This is a bipartisan effort. And if any Member of Congress attempts to say this is partisan, or if the media tries to spin this as partisan I will refute it

every step of the way. Sixteen Democrats and 16 Republicans cosponsored this bill, demanding that this administration come clean

with the American people.

Mr. Chairman, up until this date we have no new information.

Nothing. We have the State Department silent with their lips

closed. My own hunch is when the FBI was told by the SIS back

in 1992 and 1993 about the Mitrokhin files, Yeltsin was on the

rise. All of us wanted Yeltsin to succeed. But this administration

because of its special focus on Yeltsin and Clinton didn’t want anything to surface that would perhaps call into question Yeltsin’s

leadership or what Soviet and Russia’s intents were. So we didn’t

ask the question. And now 8 years later, they are between a rock

and a hard place. In my opinion, my best guess is they didn’t ask

the question then, they haven’t asked the question, and they’re embarrassed to come forward and admit that today.

Now one final thought, Mr. Chairman. For those who would say

that this is Russia of the past, I think by and large this kind of

activity was in the former Soviet Union. But as someone who studies Russia on a daily basis, who travels to Russia frequently, and

who knows the intricacies of the people in that country, I want to

read to you, Mr. Chairman, from an internal Russian military publication dated July, August 1995.

Now Mr. Chairman, this is 3 years after the reforms of Yeltsin.

This is after we became enamored with Russia’s success which I’m

very happy and support on a regular basis. In an article in a publication that is briefed to the highest leaders in the Russian military

today—in fact the names of the people on the editorial board are

people like Kokoshin, they’re people like Kvashnin, the highest

leaders in the Russian military. The article written by Colonel

Kadetov is entitled, ‘‘The Employment of Special Task Forces

Under Contemporary Conditions.’’ In that article, Mr. Chairman, it

says, that Russia should look—and this is 1995, mind you, Russia

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should look to have reconnaissance, commando, and other special

services equipped with compact nuclear ammunition, weapons,

mines, explosives, and other special means and equipment which

have substantially increased the capabilities of reconnaissance and

other special groups and detachments.

Further down in this article, Mr. Chairman, the bottom of the

page, 199, please bear with me on this statement.

Special task forces can be used not only in war, but also in peace time during

a period of threat. This refers to those instances when armed confrontation between

the sides has not taken on the scale of war or when the extent of military preparations by a potential enemy and a corresponding military danger have reached such

limits beyond which aggression can be curbed only by taking preventative measures.

Mr. Chairman, this article goes into detail of Russia’s current political thought of prepositioning military equipment including the

possibility of nuclear devices on our soil. So for anyone who wants

to trivialize this, I say come on. Let’s have at it. I’m willing to use

the words from Russians and from Russian materials to document

what’s taking place.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. WELDON. I have two final things. I brought with me devices

for those who say can’t happen. This is an accelerometer, and this

is a gyroscope. These have Russian markings on them. They were

clipped off of Russian SSN 19 long-range missiles that were on

Russian submarines that could hit the continental United States

because of their range. These devices are prohibited from being exported. We caught the Russians transferring these to Iraq not once,

not twice, but three times. We have more than one set. In fact, the

number is classified but it’s well over 100 sets of these devices.

These were being transferred by Russia in direct violation of an

arms control regime called the missile technology control regime.

When I was in Moscow the month after the Post reported the

story, I asked our Ambassador at the time, Tom Pickering, what

was the Russian response when you asked them about this transfer, he said, I haven’t asked them yet. I said why haven’t you asked

them? That would be a violation of the MTCR. He said that’s got

to come from Washington, from the State Department, from the

White House.

I wrote to President Clinton, Mr. Chairman. He wrote me back

in March. Dear Congressman Weldon, what you’re saying is of

great concern to us. We read the Post story. And if it’s true, you’re

right, it’s a violation of the MTCR and we will take aggressive

steps. But he went on to say we don’t have any evidence.

Mr. Chairman, I give you the evidence. I know that agencies of

this government have had the evidence since before the President

wrote that letter. That’s the problem that we’re currently confronting. We don’t have any credibility with the Russians, Mr. Chairman. They don’t respect us because of the dishrag policy of this administration which wants to pretend that things aren’t what they

are. And that doesn’t mean we have to back Russia into a corner.

It means we have to deal with them from a position of strength,

consistency and candor.

One final item if I might approach the Chair. I have a small

atomic demolition device I would like to bring up for you.

Mr. BURTON. This is a mock-up, folks. Now, I hope that Congressman Weldon will explain who made this mock-up.

Mr. WELDON. Yes, I will. This device was made by a former CIA

agent and it was made to the specifications that are in the public

record and available that the Soviet Union would use to design a

small atomic demolition munitions I have just documented General

Sergeyev has admitted that they built. So these specs are not what

our Department of Defense tried to trivialize, these are built to the

specs of the former Soviet Union.

This is a device that would be typical of a 1 to 10 kiloton device.

To give you a comparison, Hiroshima was about 15 to 16 kilotons.

This would wipe out downtown L.A., would wipe out the hotel

where I’m staying, where we’re all staying, and all the buildings

around. If you put this kind of a device in a stadium, it would kill

50,000 to 75,000 people. This device can be carried by one person.

This is the device. We’re talking about a uranium-fired and uranium-fueled device that would basically be encased inside of the

metal pipe that would have the appropriate activation devices

along with it. And the design is actually contained in the top of the

briefcase.

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Now, do we think that these devices are in fact buried in the

United States? We have no way of doing that. But this is exactly

what the Soviets had in mind. And according to the specs available

in the public domain which we can provide for the record, Dr. Pry

can assist in that effort, this is what the Soviet Union can’t locate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you for that outstanding presentation.

Now if anybody’s hair is not gray, we’ll turn to our colleague

from California, Mr. Campbell, for an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM CAMPBELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for bringing these

hearings to California. You are to be complimented for realizing the

importance of the issue and bringing it out to the people. So it’s

not just within the Washington context. My colleague from Pennsylvania, Curt Weldon, has a remarkable record of public service

and nothing more important than what he’s done in this field. It

was because of his work that I became aware of the potential difficulties with the prepositioning of communications or weapons systems, whichever, because the communications systems could be

booby trapped. And I, in my effort, have tried to bring the question

home to California: Is there a risk? That was my question, which

I hope we can get some beginnings of answers to, if not from the

administration then possibly from witnesses.

The testimony that has been given in Curt Weldon’s subcommittee on October 26 of last year builds the case. And here’s the two

large routes toward the conclusion that there are—is a high likelihood of prepositioning of communications or weapons in the State

of California for two reasons. One because the sources are likely to

be coming across the border at least in part by land, which is going

to implicate our States that are on the land border; and second,

that there are targets that were identified by these witnesses as

likely targets which were located in California. And those are the

two different streams that flow into this river of doubt as to whether there is a risk to the people of California.

Obviously, and I say this to a chairman from Indiana, all of us

are concerned. No matter where it is, that’s a given. But I wanted

at least in this opening statement to focus a bit as to why it was

so important for you to hold these hearings here and hopefully to

get some attention to this very realistic and serious risk.

The possibility, by the way, could be simply a booby-trapped communications device. Indeed in my testimony I’m just going to stick

with that example. Suppose that’s all we were talking about. Mr.

Chairman, you know we spend money because you and I serve on

the International Relations Committee together, we spend money

in Yugoslavia, we spend money in Africa, Zimbabwe where I recently visited, on demining. I’m glad that we do because some child

might come across a mine in an area where it had been planted

years before. This seems to me the minimum that we should do for

our own people, to find out if there is a booby-trapped device.

All right. I mentioned the two streams flowing into the river. On

the first Professor Hill’s testimony—excuse me, Andrews’ testimony

on October 26, one method, perhaps the main method of bringing

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arms and radio equipment into Western countries was via Soviet

diplomatic bags. In the case of the United States, however, there

are indications in KGB files that some of the equipment was smuggled across the Mexican and Canadian borders. First reason to

worry about California because of our long border with Mexico.

Second, also from Professor Andrews’ testimony, among the chief

sabotage targets across the United States-Mexican border were

military bases, missile sites, radar installations, and the oil pipeline code named Stark which ran from El Paso in Texas to Costa

Mesa in California. Three sites in the California coast were selected for DRG landings, that’s an acronym for the Russian word

for these teams, that were instructed to preposition material of this

nature. Together with large capacity caches in which to store

mines, explosives, detonators, and other sabotage material. Second

stream flowing into this river of doubt.

Third, from Mitrokhin’s testimony himself and his quotation in

the 60 Minutes presentation, so this is Mitrokhin himself speaking,

the KGB plan went from the Mexican border in the south to the

49th parallel, the Canadian border, in the north. Andrew says,

quoting Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin’s most stunning revelation is that

these targets across the United States in a KGB plan to knock out

United States power supplies in case of a war. That’s from testimony that Andrew gave quoting Mitrokhin, so it was not Mitrokhin

himself, and I can correct myself, October 26, 1999.

In Nightline’s research, as you know they did a special session

on this, they pursued the Brainerd, MN possibility and concluded

that other caches do exist. This is testimony on that program from

some source they had. And I do not know whom. But a source they

had that was able to get into the Mitrokhin files beyond what was

disclosed into the Mitrokhin files in this book. And that source,

which was revealed on Nightline identified Brainerd, MN.

My point about the danger to civilians is most clearly demonstrated by this description of what happened in Switzerland.

From the book on the Mitrokhin files, late in 1998, the Swiss authorities began removing a radio cache in woods near Bern identified by Mitrokhin. So I’ll pause just for a moment in the quote to

say it’s a radio cache. In and of itself one might not think all that

dangerous. One might think well not a weapon. However, this

radio cache which exploded when fired on by a water cannon, a

spokesman for the Federal prosecutors office issued a warning that

if any further caches were discovered they should not be touched,

‘‘anyone who tried to move the container would have been killed.’’

And the reference as well earlier is from page 365 of the ‘‘Sword

and the Shield’’ and a reference from page 16, the Mitrokhin notes

reveal similar KGB arms and radio caches, some of them booby

trapped, scattered around much of Europe and North America.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scarborough, that is the danger that I care

about, that all of us care about. And I particularly bring it home

to the situation here in California. It is likely because of its source

from across the border, and it is likely because of the targets, for

example that El Paso Costa Mesa pipeline, the military installations that were referred to in the Mitrokhin files.

Last, what have I done about it? I deserve nothing, no notice at

all except to the extent that I am taking what your work and what

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Mr. Weldon’s work has done and asking a question you would for

your own district in Indiana, you would for your district in Florida:

Is there a risk here? What can we do? Let’s find out. Accordingly,

I wrote the Secretary of State after I had convinced myself on the

basis of the evidence from the Weldon hearings, from the testimony

that I’ve just read that it was appropriate—that it was appropriate

to inquire because the risk to the people in my district or the people in California was not trivial.

I wrote on December 6, Mr. Chairman, and I asked most politely

to Secretary Albright that she pursue this vigorously. I received—

I also sent a letter to Sandy Berger and I sent a letter to Secretary

of Defense Cohen. I received a reply—this is December 6. I received

a reply only from Secretary Cohen.

Secretary Cohen said, Thank you for your letter requesting information about the location of Russian weapon caches within the

United States. I have asked the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Walt Slocum, to promptly address this request; and he will

get back to you as soon as possible. With best wishes, I am Secretary Bill Cohen.

Knowing of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize

this because fairness is a very important characteristic in anything

as important as this. One must be careful in saying this is a concern to all Democrats, Republicans alike.

I wrote again knowing of this hearing, and so I said to Sandy

Berger, Madeleine Albright, and Bill Cohen, in a letter of January

13: On January 24, 2000, the House Committee on Government Reform will be holding a field hearing in Los Angeles on exactly this

issue. I would be grateful if you would respond to my letter prior

to this hearing so that I may submit the administration’s possession in this matter to the committee for the record.

Mr. Chairman, I received no response at all.

And I’m going to conclude now with a description of an interchange for which you were present when we were both in the International Relations Committee and Madeleine Albright, Secretary

Albright testified in this particular context it was about the war in

Yugoslavia. I think you’ll remember, Mr. Chairman, that I was

very vigorous in trying to assert the role of Congress in that matter

that it was a war and that it should not have been prosecuted

without the approval of Congress as per our Constitution. I asked

Secretary Albright, Mrs. Albright, are we at war with Yugoslavia?

She said no. I said, we’re not at war? She said no. I said, what is

it then? She said it was armed conflict.

The next day she had her Assistant Secretary come up and I

asked her are we at war she said no we are in armed conflict. I

said, what’s the difference between armed conflict or not just

armed conflict and war but armed conflict and hostilities because

hostilities is in the War Power Act. And she said, wait a minute,

I’ll get the attorney for the State Department. She then turned

around and brought up the attorney for the State Department who

testified in essence that it was armed conflict if the President said

it was armed conflict; it was hostilities if the President said it was

hostilities.

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This is circumlocution. This is a disservice to the high Office of

Secretary of State. And to fail to reply at all to sincere inquiries

relative to the safety of my and your constituents is a disservice

to the American public.

I thank you for holding these hearings, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Weldon. With the

consent of my colleague, Mr. Scarborough, we’ll go with 10 minute

rounds of questions. I’ll give you 10 minutes. Let me—can you set

this for 10 minutes so that we—and we may go more than one

round depending on whether we cover everything.

I read the large part of the book, and one of the things that

struck me in addition to the nuclear devices being in briefcases

weighing about 60 pounds was that it was said that they also made

those devices in different forms. They could make them in forms

that looked like bricks or rocks or something else. Did anybody

ever express that to you that it might just be a briefcase-type

weapon?

Mr. WELDON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that was expressed. And I

think if you ask that question of Mr. Lunev, you’ll get his personal

response as to what he thought it could perhaps look like. I think

he’ll elaborate on that. But there in fact were ‘‘Spetsnaz’’ training

manuals that identify these kinds of devices in a number of forms,

not just the kind of formal briefcase that I brought today, but that

they could be placed and be hidden and not known to be in fact

what they were. So your answer is yes, that there were other types

of devices, some larger, some smaller. And you know, the other

added dimension here is we talk about reducing arms repeatedly

between us and Russia. Russia has an overwhelming advantage to

us on tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical nukes. And they admit

that. And we admit that publicly. I mean, they have a huge advantage over America on the number of tactical nukes none of which

are regulated by treaty by the way. Tactical nukes are not very far

away from what we’re talking about with small atomic demolition

munitions, which you’re saying and has been said by Russian experts could, in fact, have been camouflaged.

Mr. BURTON. I would like to followup on one thing that you said

in your opening statement you said that was it Yablikov?

Mr. WELDON. Alexei Yablikov.

Mr. BURTON. Forgive me if I don’t pronounce these names correctly. He said, as I recall, that many of these devices were for external use.

Mr. WELDON. He said that his colleagues and his peers who were

academic scientists and researchers told him they were working on

these devices in the Soviet era, that they were being built not just

for the Ministry of Defense but also for the KGB. And the design

of these devices was to be used wherever Russia needed them both

internally and externally.

Mr. BURTON. So when they built these 132 nuclear devices, the

briefcase-like device that you showed me, they intended for them

to be used for internal civil disorders, I presume, as well as external threats to the Soviet Union?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely. In fact, there was an allegation made

by Dudayev in the first Chechen conflict that he had, in fact, a

small atomic demolition device, and if you read the book One Point

Safe by Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, which I have asked the CIA

to refute and they have not done that publicly, there is a chapter

dedicated to the United States taking that charge so seriously that

we sent agents to work with the Russians to find out whether or

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not Dudayev did in fact have a small atomic demolition device.

That’s how seriously we took that allegation.

Mr. BURTON. Now, they said that they were going to destroy all

of these 132 nuclear devices by the year 2000, but only 48 can be

accounted for. That means, according to my mathematics, about 84

are still unaccounted for.

Mr. WELDON. Well, again, Lebed was the top security adviser to

Yeltsin. So he had the full weight of the Presidency to go out and

find these devices. And he said—I mean, he gave us the exact number, and he said they can only locate 48 and had no idea where the

rest were. It was the defense minister who told me in the subsequent meeting in December after his government had denied they

ever built them that, yes, they would have them all destroyed.

Mr. Chairman, I want to add one comment for the record about

Lebed’s credibility. For those who might say, well, you can’t really

trust what Lebed’s saying; for those who study Russia they know

that when Yeltsin appointed Putin, he interviewed three people for

that position. Just 2 months ago, one of the three people he interviewed was Aleksandr Lebed. So for those who are going to try to

take apart Lebed’s credibility, the Russian President just before he

appointed Putin as his successor interviewed Lebed, and I think

that was because the Chechen war went sour and Putin’s credibility went down, Lebed would be a credible alternative who had a

strong figure image in Russia.

Mr. BURTON. We don’t know how many sites there are or could

be in North America or Canada, but as the chief potential adversary of the Soviet Union time conflict, it is logical to assume that

there would be numerous sites in the United States and that

there’s a real possibility that if they were going to export these nuclear devices for external use that they would be placed here in the

United States someplace.

Mr. WELDON. I would say scores and scores, if not hundreds and

hundreds, all over this country. They named a number of States in

the files that Mitrokhin was able to get documented. Unfortunately, he didn’t take the time to get the specific locations.

You know—and I asked that question of Dr. Andrew, why didn’t

Mitrokhin get the specific locations. He said, Congressman, you

have to understand. Mitrokhin’s hatred of the KGB was primarily

because of what the KGB was doing to Russian people, and that’s

where he went to extensive documentation and the vast web of

sympathizers that the Communist party had outside of Russia, and

that’s what the bulk of this is about. The location of these devices

wasn’t one of Mitrokhin’s top priorities. That wasn’t what was of

interest to him, but he did copy down some of those files, but only

in four of them went down to the specific detail. Unfortunately, all

of those four sites were in Europe.

Mr. BURTON. It also mentioned—in the book it was mentioned

that the Spetsnaz troops which are the premier, I guess it would

be equivalent to our Delta force troops or I don’t know what would

be another analogy, but our top elite troops who are capable of

using all kinds of methods to kill people—that they were getting

dossiers on American leaders and politicians so that in time of conflict they could eradicate them more or kill them.

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Mr. WELDON. Again, Lunev will testify to that. He testified before my committee on that issue. In addition, Gordievsky, the highest ranking KGB officer whoever defected, who was the bureau

chief in London, said the same thing. I think it’s important you

keep reiterating, as you’ve been doing, as we’ve been following

through, these statements are from the mouths of Russians. These

are not—— Mr. BURTON. They’re not just low level. High level.

Mr. WELDON. These are the highest level officials in the Russian

intelligence service and the Russian military, some of whom are

still in Russia today, Mr. Chairman. Lebed is the Governor of

Krasnoyarsk, who was just interviewed for the top job in the Russian Government.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask you one final question, and that is—and

I think this is extremely important for anybody who’s paying attention to this issue, as everybody ought to be. We ought to have all

235 or 240 million Americans paying attention to this issue, and

that is, that you talked to the FBI and other agencies of the government, you talked to Louis Freeh; and they told you that nobody

has asked the former Soviet Union and the now Russian leadership

any questions about these possible sites in the United States. Nobody to your knowledge has asked any questions about if these

sites exist and where they exist.

Mr. WELDON. Two Federal agencies—it wasn’t Louis Freeh himself. The FBI said to me personally and the Defense Department

said publicly in a press conference that we have not yet asked the

Russians the questions. I don’t blame either of those agencies. I

don’t think it’s their responsibility to ask the Russians. I think it’s

the State Department’s responsibility or President Clinton in his

relationship with Boris Yeltsin, and why they haven’t done that— I’ve given you my own best estimate as to why—but I think this

country should demand and hopefully through your committee will

demand this administration come clean with the American people.

If they’re so worried about land mines, as my colleague Mr. Campbell so eloquently stated, you hear people talking about land mines.

We’ve got, according to what’s happened in Switzerland, land

mines over America.

Mr. BURTON. And possibly 84 nuclear weapons.

Mr. WELDON. And possibly.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask Mr. Campbell a few questions.

What sites in California—I don’t know if you’ve done any research on this—but what sites in California other than those that

you enumerated do you think would be of great concern if there

were devices of this type planted here in California?

Mr. CAMPBELL. My source is going to be as described in the testimony of the—from the Mitrokhin files, and that indicated strategic

targets for civil disturbance to create havoc in the event of a war,

in the event of a war, and the particular subjects were military

bases, gas and petroleum pipeline as likely, and then naturally

those closer to the border because the possibility of bringing them

across and then repositioning once they’re across was suggested. So

those would be the most likely. But I repeat that the key here is

somebody knows. This is remarkable. Somebody does know; and

therefore, why don’t we use our diplomatic efforts to find out?

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Mr. BURTON. One of the things that concerns me every time I

come to California—I love this State. It’s a beautiful State. You

have great recreational facilities. When I land at LAX, I’m always

afraid there’s going to be a terrible earthquake and the San

Andreas Fault is going to split, and we’re all going to go into the

ocean. Kidding of course, but the fact of the matter is, if a major

nuclear device of the 10 kiloton range was set off in close proximity

to one of the major fault areas, I wonder how that would affect not

only that particular area but also the entire possibility of an earthquake that would go further.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I don’t have the expertise to answer that question. I’m nowhere near a seismologist, but every Californian is an

amateur seismologist, Mr. Chairman; but I don’t have the expertise

to answer it. I’ll take your question and look at it through the microscope as opposed to the telescope end, and I would say that the

fact that we do have shifting geology means that it’s a distinct possibility that some of these locations might never be identified. That

was in the Mitrokhin—that was in the Hill book—excuse me, the

Andrew book regarding one of the European sites in Belgium, that

they were not able to find it because there had been road work and

reconstruction and change in the topography, so all the more so.

So I won’t answer your first question because I just lack the expertise, but I would say being able to identify where a place was

is not—10, 15 years ago may not get you all that you need to be

when the ground shifts.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, might I offer one last thought?

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Then I’d love to hear from my colleague from

Florida. We have in the Congress a mechanism for solving and

dealing with these problems. We do. If there are high-level, highly

confidential communications between our Government and another,

it can be shared with the Intelligence Committee, and you know

how this works. I think it’s important to emphasize that, that no

one here is saying to our administration do anything which would

jeopardize secure communications, but to give no answer at all, just

to present almost an arrogant refusal to answer the question that

a Congressman might ask on behalf of his constituents is unacceptable; and if instead the letter I’d gotten back was to say this is a

matter we need to take up with the Intelligence Committee where

it will stay in camera, where there is representation of both parties, I would have been absolutely satisfied.

Mr. WELDON. And so would I, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Thank you. But moving beyond that though,

if in fact there are possibly nuclear devices in the State of California, do not Californians also have a right to know where those devices were planted?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I do understand a public security, public safety

concern that if the matter becomes so grave as that that it be handled with delicacy, but it has to be handled by someone. It’s not

acceptable, not even to make an inquiry and then not even to give

an answer to a Congress Member who asks.

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Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And Congressman Campbell, you spoke of

the possibility of these devices being used in the event of war, but

Congressman Weldon, didn’t you talk about the possibility of these

devices even being used outside of war by again quoting that 1995

document?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely, Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And if you could again highlight that because

it sounds as if Russian military officials in 1995 were advocating

nothing less than nuclear blackmail to prevent results on the international scale that could be negative to the country.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Scarborough, you’re absolutely correct. The

document says the importance of warfare in enemy rear areas is

what it talks about; and it goes through, and it mentions compact

nuclear ammunition, weapons, mines, explosives and other special

means, and it goes down to the other paragraph, as I said before,

special task forces as stated above can be used not only in war but

also in peacetime during a period of threat. And who determines

the period of threat?

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Right. And when you talk about these special

op forces, again what are you talking about? Are you talking about

them possibly placing these nuclear devices throughout California?

Somebody said Shenandoah Valley, also.

Mr. WELDON. Weapons of mass destruction. It could be some

kind of biological agent. When we had—it was either Lunev or

Gordoyevski talk about the use of chemical and biological, because

we also had another witness come in who ran the Russian biological weapons program for about 10 years, and Peter, his name—the

book, Biohazard, I can’t think of his name.

Ms. KATZIN. It was Ken Alibeck.

Mr. WELDON. Ken Alibeck. Ken Alibeck, who was again here

under an assumed name in America, testified as the person who

ran the Soviet biological weapons program that they used these

weapons against their own people—he was part of it—and he said

it was no doubt in his mind that there were intents to use those

same materials in this country. Now, we didn’t cover that as part

of this hearing, but that’s another Russian. That’s not an American

saying that. It’s Dr. Ken Alibeck saying it, and his book basically

documents that. His book is called ‘‘Biohazard.’’

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. You all have both studied I would guess in

the intelligence arena and in the armed service arena, you’ve studied these areas also, haven’t you, as far as the impact of biological

warfare on American cities?

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Scarborough, my committee’s assignment is to

chair the Resource and Development Committee for national security which means my subcommittee oversees about $36 billion a

year of defense spending, a significant portion of which is used to

develop research programs and new capability to detect and deal

with weapons of mass destruction: biological, chemical, and nuclear.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And my responsibility is on the International Relations Committee, not the Intelligence Committee, but in the IR

Committee, we have held hearings on precisely the question you

raised.

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Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And could you simplify for somebody that’s

not looked into the biological weapons—I mean, we hear this anecdotal evidence. We hear of an airplane flying at 1,000 feet over a

city or 3,000 feet over the city dropping particles that could kill everybody in Washington, DC, or Los Angeles, CA. Is there the possibility of doing that also on the ground by these devices, and could

you briefly explain?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely. In fact, it’s happened. There was a terrorist group in Japan a few years ago that used Sarin and wiped

out the whole first responder group coming into a subway because

they didn’t know what they were facing. When Aliback testified

again before the Congress in an open hearing, he said that was his

job. As the head of the Soviet biological weapons program, his job

was to develop—and they developed over 150 strains of biological

agents that could be used against adversaries or even used against

Soviet citizens which he and Gordoyevski both have testified has

been done in the past.

So now we’re talking about probably one of the three gravest

threats we face in this century, that along with missile proliferation and cyber-terrorism and the need for us to establish information dominance. They are the three biggest threats we face because

weapons of mass destruction are here. I mean, we know that at the

World Trade Center bombing, there were actually two devices

there. The first device destroyed the garage area. Thank goodness

the second device didn’t go off because it would have penetrated

the HVAC system in that complex.

I mean, there are those who want to cause havoc in America, and

biological and chemical agents are a weapon of choice today because they’re relatively easy to make and the technology has been

worked on for years by the Russians. In fact, their stockpiles are

overwhelming. When Alexi Yablokov testified, he said for arms control purposes, we estimate the amount of chemical weapons that

Russia has to be 40,000 metric tons, and Yablokov said he’s personally aware that they produced over 100,000 metric tons. So where’s

the rest? We just don’t know.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And I would only add to that that the enclosed

space is the danger which obviously made the Japanese subway the

target that it was for that particular terrorist group. The problem

is enclosed space also describes almost every high rise built in the

last 20 years. As you go more and more to sealed windows, the possibility of a biological agent spreading through an enclosed space,

subway or high rise, makes it a very—an exceptionally dangerous

possibility for a weapon of mass destruction.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Congressman Campbell, you are without a

doubt considered one of the most thoughtful Members of Congress,

and sometimes it’s maddening to some people in leadership who

would like you to grab a torch and follow the crowd into battle, but

you’ve remained remarkably independent in Washington and you

just don’t demagogue, and so with that as a preface, I’m going to

ask you a pretty tough question that I would expect the answer a

certain way from other Members, but I know, again, you’re a

straight shooter.

Let me ask you, as somebody who represents the people of California, do you believe that Californian citizens are in danger of

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coming in contact with weapons of mass destruction because of the

information that Mr. Weldon and you and others have brought to

this committee?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I want to thank you for your kind words in the

premise of your question. I want to say that my duty is to the people I represent, and the evidence that I’ve seen is what led me to

ask for this hearing, to go to Chairman Burton, to study the material that Curt Weldon had prepared. It’s no different than you’d do

for the people of Florida or people in your district.

It is, in my judgment, distinctly possible that there are

prepositioned communications devices at a minimum. It is, in my

judgment, highly likely that those prepositioned communications

devices are booby-trapped because they were, the ones that we

checked, that were checked out were, and aging booby traps, as we

know from our knowledge of land mines, are unstable, and people

can innocently run across them. So I’m going to be cautious. I’m

going to be very cautious and say that what I have just described

is, in my view, a realistic risk. The possibility of danger to innocent

people who come across a booby-trapped communications cache or

cache of whatever or the simple aging and deterioration thereof

creates an important matter of potential risk to alleviate which the

administration ought to at least answer a polite question.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And Congressman Weldon, this will be my

last question. I’ll ask you the same question I asked Congressman

Campbell. Are the people of Los Angeles and the people of the

State of California in danger because of the information that’s been

brought before this committee?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely, and that’s according to General Alexander Lebed who told me that. It’s according to Alexi Yablokov who

told me that. It’s according to Stanislav Lunev who told me that.

It’s according to Dr. Christopher Andrew who told me that. It’s according to Oleg Gordievsky who told me that, and it’s according to

people that I worked with in Russia who say that we need to understand there are those in the past of the Soviet history who had

very unbelievable intents against America and its people. Now,

that being said, do I think all Russia’s our enemy? Absolutely not.

And do I work at developing strong relations? Absolutely.

Just in closing, I’d like to add one final thought if I might to both

Mr. Scarborough’s comment, and Mr. Chairman, your leadership.

This does not have to be a case where it’s us backing Russia into

a corner. We give Russia—the American people give Russia $1 billion a year through the cooperative threat reduction program,

through the laboratory to lab cooperation program, through programs involving agricultural assistance, through help for their nuclear waste, through programs involving economic development, all

of which, by the way, I support. I’m an active supporter of all of

them, but we give them $1 billion a year. It’s a simple thing of the

administration asking the tough questions, and I think that’s why

I said at the beginning I think this is an example of this administration’s policy failures.

They have never wanted to ask the tough questions. They’ve

never wanted to ask about the IMF funds that the oligarchs stole.

They never wondered that the Russians lost respect because we

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nies and his daughter were stealing money. It’s a question of the

arms control treaty violations, 17 of them, that we never called

Russia on. In each case it’s been the same. We don’t want to ask

the question as a Nation, and now we are paying a price for that.

And in this case I agree with Mr. Campbell’s assessment. He is

always—and I agree with you, he’s the most thoughtful Member we

have in the Congress in both parties, and I think all of our colleagues would agree with that, that Tom is taking the conservative

threat that we’re so enamored with this idea of land mines. Well,

what are we talking about? A land mine to the extent that the

Swiss Government had to put out an alert for all their people.

That’s reality. This is not some made up idea or some movie. This

is what really occurred; and therefore, this administration owes the

American people and the Congress a response. And I thank you

two for leading the effort to demand that response.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

And I certainly believe that if Californians are in danger, as well

as people in Indiana and Florida, then the administration should

step forward and ask the difficult questions. I’d like to yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Congressman Scarborough.

What I’d like to do now is take about a 5 to 10 minute break so

Mr. Lunev can be brought into the room in a secure situation. We

have to put up a panel around him. I’d like to also ask Mr. Campbell and Mr. Weldon, without objection, to join us on the dais because of their expertise, so they can help us ask questions of Mr.

Lunev. We also will have Dr. William Green and Dr. Peter Pry

come forward as well so they can be part of that panel. So we’ll

take a recess here for about 5 to 10 minutes to get the security in

place.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. Would Dr. William Green and Dr. Peter Pry also

come forward, please, and Dr. Pry, your seat is over to my left, and

Dr. Green, there you are. I won’t ask Mr. Lunev to stand up because his head is going to be above the partition. Would the other

two please rise and raise your right hands please, and would you

raise your right hand?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Thank you. You may be seated.

Let me just say before we start the statements by the witnesses

that some people of the media have indicated that we might be trying to create paranoia and a new cold war. That could not be further from the truth. Congressman Weldon stated very clearly that

it is extremely important that we try to have a good relationship

with the Russian people and the Russian Government.

At the same time that that is important, it’s also important for

us to know whether or not there’s any threat to American citizens

on American soil, and that’s why we’re holding these hearings. It’s

incumbent upon Members of Congress to try to protect—in fact, we

have a constitutional obligation to try to protect the security of

American citizens, and so it’s important that we have these hearings to try to make sure the American people know what’s going

on.

Abraham Lincoln said—and he was a pretty good President—let

the people know the facts and the country will be saved. It’s just

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as true today as it was back then. So I’m distressed that some

members of the media are thinking we’re trying to scare everybody

to death. We’re not trying to do that. We’re trying to get the facts

out so that we know that if there’s nothing to fear, there’s nothing

to fear; and if there is, that we get it cleaned up.

OK. I think we’ll start with Colonel Lunev, and I’d like to say

before Colonel Lunev starts to speak that this is not his real name.

He is in the witness protection program with the—you say the FBI

and CIA together. In fact, I’ll ask him that question in a minute

and—but he is, as I said, a very high official, the highest GRU official that’s defected to the United States. So we’ll start with you,

Mr. Lunev.

STATEMENTS OF STANISLAV LUNEV, FORMER GRU OFFICER,

AUTHOR OF ‘‘THROUGH THE EYES OF THE ENEMY;’’ WILLIAM

GREEN, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY—SAN BERNADINO,

NAVAL RESERVES INTELLIGENCE OFFICER; AND PETER

VINCENT PRY, FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AUTHOR OF ‘‘WAR SCARE’’

Mr. LUNEV. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, ladies and

gentlemen.

Mr. BURTON. Would you speak—pull the microphone as close to

you as you can.

Mr. LUNEV. First of all, thank you for inviting me for so beautiful

place like Los Angeles. Of course, weather is a little bit different

from East Coast now which is under ice and snow, you know, and,

of course, I would like to spend few of your minutes, especially to

explain you my position about all this—actually, very dangerous

stuff which unfortunately is in place now in time when former Soviet Union doesn’t exist about one decade.

For me, it was really surprise that after I wrote my book, actually after publishing of this book, that American people know so little about possible danger for the national security of this country.

Last year when I began to work for one of the Internet companies,

its name is newsmag.com, I had a chance to give a lot of radio and

TV interviews to different people, and it’s one more to underscore

my point about shortage of knowledge of American people about

national security of this country.

First of all, I need to return back to history because in time of

former Soviet Union existence, Soviet General staff designed special plan for the future war against America and American friends

and allies worldwide. According to this plan, Soviet special operation forces commanders need to come to this country and other

NATO countries in few days, maybe hours, before real war would

be in place, like students, tourists, visitors, businessmen, by regular airlines, and before real war would be in place, they need to

pick up weapons systems which are already located in this country,

including technical nuclear devices. This is—official name is technical portable atomic demolition devices, containers with chemical

and biological weapons, conventional weapons system, communication devices, actual money, credit cards, documentation, which are

already storage in this country, and in few hours or minutes before

regular nuclear missile strike will hit American soil, this special

operation forces commanders will pick up this weapons system,

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move this weapons system to their area of operational use, and we

will destroy economical and military political infrastructure of this

country; first of all, targets which could not be destroyed by regular

missile nuclear strike.

And in fulfillment of these duties they have to destroy power stations, communications system of this country, physically eliminate

American leaders who are involved in military chain of command.

It means President, Vice President, Speaker of the House, chairman of the leading committees of the U.S. Congress, joint chief of

staff members and other people, and especially not to provide them

possibility to escape from the ground in time when real war would

be in place. After this, regular missile nuclear strike and ground

operation, ground invasion in European countries against NATO

and final stage amphibious operation and invasion to the United

States.

Of course, you understand that this is history, but I need to tell

you that history is history, but unfortunately, just now a situation

is not very good, and these military plans are still existent in Russian General staff, and these military plans in time of possible war

would be fulfilled by special operation forces commanders, by strategic forces or Russian Federation exclude only one last part of this

plan, because in time after this plan was designed by Soviet General staff, nuclear weapons systems have developed so much that

actually nobody will need to invade on the territory or foreign countries because NATO countries’ territory and American territory

could be totally destroyed by nuclear weapons system, and if something could not be destroyed by nuclear weapons, you know how

many millions of looters will come to this country and they will finish actually all this destruction process.

And just now what we are talking about, location of technical nuclear devices, containers with chemical biological weapons, conventional weapons system and others, these places we have selected

extremely carefully for a long, long period of time, and to believe

that it is possible to find this places just like that without using

extremely, extremely large resources of this country, I don’t think

that it would be realistic until Russian Government, which still

have keys for these locations will not disclose this location.

And it was one of my major points when I wrote book that by

publication of my book I would keep informed Russian military

leaders that it is not secret anymore about this weapons existence

and location outside of Russian Federation, and I hope that after

this book publication, these devices could be removed from America

and other territories of American friends and allies and returned

to Russia. Unfortunately, until now, I do not have any real news

that it’s happened, and just now I can only to think about that

these weapons systems are still existent on American soil and on

the territory of American friends and allies.

Thank you for your time, ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Lunev.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lunev follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. I’d like to go to Dr. Pry next for his opening statement.

Dr. PRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me here today to

testify before your committee on Russian threats to United States

security in the post-cold war world.

The administration claims its Russia policy is a spectacular success when in fact it is a spectacular failure. We’ve been told that

capitalism and democracy are basically on track in Russia when

they’re not. We’ve been told by the administration that America’s

children are safe from Russian nuclear weapons because of the

detargeting of their missiles when, in fact, America’s children are

not safe from the Russian nuclear threat.

The administration’s Russia policy has been more of a public relations campaign to persuade the American people that all is well

rather than a hard-headed, well-attended program to really advance free enterprise and democracy in Russia and to protect

United States vital national interests. Despite administration

claims that our Russia policy is a success, many of us have

watched and worried and warned for years that our Russia policy

is careening toward failure.

Now, the media and the American people have recently been

shocked awake by a new brutal Russian leadership that has manipulated the electoral process to, in effect, thwart the free and fair

elections in Russia. We have been shocked awake by the war in

Chechnya where the Russian military is using missiles, flame

throwers, and fuel air explosives—classified in their own military

doctrine as weapons of mass destruction—to subdue their own people. We have been shocked awake by Russian military and foreign

officials who have officially blamed the United States for provoking

the Chechen crisis as part of a larger conspiracy to have NATO

penetrate the Caucasuses and gain control of the oil wealth of the

Caspian Sea.

We’ve been shocked awake by President Putin and others brazenly making nuclear threats against the United States, including

Putin on December 14 attending the launch of SS–X–27 ICBM,

where he made a direct nuclear threat against the United States

not to interfere in Russian internal affairs: And we have been

shocked awake by President Putin’s recent embrace of a new national security concept that describes the West as a threat to Russia, and relies on nuclear weapons and a nuclear first strike as the

primary cornerstone of Russia’s national security policy.

None of this comes as a surprise to those of us who have been

skeptical of the administration’s claims that its Russia policy is basically on track and successful and who have independently followed and thought about what’s been happening in Russia over the

years. Indeed, everything discussed today about Russian military

caches prepositioned on NATO territory, about nuclear suitcases,

and other aspects of the Russian threat are part of a larger pattern, manifestations of a ‘‘war scare’’ mentally among the Russian

General staff and national security elite described in my recently

published book, ‘‘War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear

Brink.’’

War scare is a term of art used in the intelligence community to

describe one-sided nuclear crises where Moscow mistakenly beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:25 Nov 01, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66968.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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lieved it faced the possibility of an imminent nuclear attack from

the West, and prepared to preempt that threat.

Beginning in the early 1980’s, Soviet elites feared that they were

losing the cold war and understood that the strains of the cold war

competition were worsening the Soviet economy and encouraging

the disintegrative internal conditions that eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. They feared that the United States,

sensing this growing weakness, might try to exploit the situation

by launching a surprise nuclear attack. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the Soviet Union itself was and is

still viewed in Moscow as not merely an internal crisis, but as a

profound international crisis that has upset global order and the

balance of power and may tempt the West to aggression against a

weakened Russia.

Fear and insecurity in Russia’s General staff and in its national

security elite has worsened as Russia’s political fortunes, economy,

and military capabilities have continued to decline over the years.

Thus, while the West has tended to think of relations with Russia

as steadily improving over the last decade, the Russian General

staff and security services have viewed those relations as in a deep

systemic crisis, akin to the protracted 20 years crisis that preceded

World War II. They live in constant fear that the United States

and NATO might at any moment move to finish Russia off and

thereby remove any possible future challenge to the West’s complete domination of the world order.

All of this may seem hard to believe given the popular tendency

to think of Russia exclusively in terms of the benign personality

that was Boris Yeltsin, and given vociferous assurances by the administration, rarely challenged by the media, that Russia is now a

strategic partner and no longer a threat to the United States. But

there are some cold, hard facts about Russia that the American

people and policymakers need to know in order to accurately appraise United States-Russian relations, in order to understand that

there is still a serious threat from that quarter.

Russian offensive strategic forces programs, for example. Despite

an economy where they can barely feed and house their own people, Russia is continuing to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles, cranking out SS–25s, deploying a new SS–27 ICBM which is

the most technologically advanced ICBM in the world, building new

ballistic missile submarines, trying to develop new sub-launched

ballistic missiles, attempting to modernize its strategic bomber

force and building two new classes of strategic cruise missiles.

Russian defensive strategic programs. They are attempting to

modernize the Moscow ABM system which is basically a de facto

national missile defense. The world’s only existing national missile

defense; but more important than this, they’re putting vast resources into constructing hundreds of deep underground facilities,

modernizing some facilities that already exist but building new

ones, too, including some like Yamantau Mountain, which is a deep

underground facility as large as Washington, DC, inside the beltway that has only one purpose: to survive a nuclear conflict. What

its purpose is beyond that we actually don’t know and have been

attempting to find out, but the Russians have gone to great lengths

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tain is another example. We know what that is. It’s a new general

staff command post vastly harder and more capable than our own

deep underground facility at NORAD headquarters. Its purpose is

to manage a thermonuclear conflict, and these facilities are undergoing construction 24 hours a day in a country where they can’t

even provide housing for their own people.

There is evidence that Congressman Weldon alluded to, actually

showed you very specifically—the gyroscopes and the

accelerometers. There’s evidence of deliberate Russian proliferation

of missiles and weapons of mass destruction technology to countries

that are hostile to the United States. This apparently fits into a

strategy that ‘‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend.’’ There is a new anti-Western strategic partnership with China

that is emerging between the two where China supports Russian

interests against NATO expansion and Russia is supporting Chinese interests via Taiwan. Russia is giving its high-tech support to

China to modernize its military, building things like SU–27 factories in China so that they can have new fighter aircraft that are

several generations more advanced than what the Chinese had before.

We have talked at length about the military caches in NATO already and the possibility of nuclear suitcases. Obviously a country

that engages in such activities does not regard us as a strategic

partner or regard the prospects for future peace as very likely.

There’s evidence that operation VRYAN continues. Operation

VRYAN was the largest cold war intelligence program ever

launched by Russia. It’s an acronym that stands for ‘‘surprise nuclear missile attack.’’ Beginning in the early 1980’s, the political

military elite told the KGB and the GRU and their other intelligence services to be on the lookout for the possibility that the

United States might imminently launch a surprise nuclear attack.

This was because of the strains and stresses that I described earlier, when they realized they were losing the cold war and they

were fearful that the West might actually be moving to finish them

off.

So they started looking for evidence that the United States was

preparing to launch a nuclear surprise attack. Every 2 weeks a

VRYAN report was sent to their top political-military leadership on

the possibility that nuclear war was right around the corner. This

program is known, begun in the early 1980’s, is known to have continued at least into the 1990’s, and there’s evidence that it continues still.

In connection with this—I will mention as an aside—that part of

it was not just intelligence collection. There was also a computer

program that was part of the VRYAN project because of the belief

that they would be able to, by calculating the correlation of forces,

the balance of military and economic and political power and looking at particular strategic warning indicators, use a very sophisticated computer program to predict when the United States might

actually launch this nuclear attack. This was to inform the General

staff so that they could beat us to the punch and strike us first.

Most disturbingly, the American people and policymakers need to

know most of all about the nuclear war scare crises of the 1980’s

and 1990’s when on several occasions the Russian General staff

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mistakenly believed that the United States might be preparing to

attack, and Russian nuclear forces were placed on alert in readiness to launch a first strike just in case. War scares occurred during ABLE ARCHER–83. This was a NATO theater nuclear exercise

in November 1983; in May 1992, during the Armenian/Azerbaijan

crisis; in October 1993 during the parliamentary crisis in Moscow

that resulted in fighting in the streets in Moscow between Yeltsin

forces and that of the national Communist parliament; during January 1995 in response to, of all things, the launch of a meteorological rocket by Norway; probably during Battle-Griffin in 1996 which

was a NATO exercise held up near Norway; possibly during Central-Asian Battalion-97, a Partnership for Peace exercise held in

the fall of 1997; and most recently, during Desert Fox in December

1999.

Some of these—the Russian nuclear alerts in response to ABLE

ARCHER 83 and the January 1995 event were more dangerous

than the Cuban missile crisis, and yet remain unknown or virtually

unknown to the American public and to policymakers. I will describe quickly just one of these events, the January 1995 event.

In this case Norway and NASA were jointly developing a meteorological rocket to study the aurora borealis. It was a missile of

unusual size. Norway had never launched a missile of this size before. It was a multistage missile, launched from Andoya Island out

in the Norwegian Sea. They sent their ballistic missile launch notification to the Russian foreign ministry just as they were supposed

to, but due to a clerical error by an inexperienced staffer in the foreign ministry, the message never got to the Russian General staff

and the Strategic Rocket Forces that the launch was going to occur.

As a consequence, when the General staff picked up this missile

being launched on their radars, initially they didn’t realize that it

was coming from Andoya Island which is located in the Norwegian

Sea. Radars can’t precisely geolocate a missile in the initial minutes it’s launched, and it could have been coming from nearby ballistic missile patrol areas that our Trident Ohio-class submarines

patrol. In their doctrine, this is one of the things they feared most

in terms of a Western surprise nuclear attack; that a single missile

would be launched from this location which has the shortest flighttime to Moscow so that an electromagnetic pulse attack could be

done. This is an exoatmospheric nuclear detonation that creates a

very powerful radio wave that would fry their electronics, their radars, their command and control so they couldn’t retaliate. And

then, just behind that, there would be this massive attack.

The General staff took so seriously this threat that it actually activated all three chegets. These are the nuclear ‘‘footballs’’ that are

carried by the Russian military-political leadership. Yeltsin, the defense minister, and the chief of the General staff. The chegets have

only one purpose when they’re activated. You’re under a surprise

nuclear attack: push the button to retaliate. That was basically the

General’s staff implicit advice when it activated the chegets. Fortunately for us, Boris Yeltsin was at the helm; and he didn’t believe

it. He couldn’t believe the West was going to attack and waited,

waited long enough to see that missile was actually going away

from Russia and not toward it. But during that moment, it only

lasted 20 minutes, but it was the single most dangerous moment

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of the nuclear missile age. And we were literally one decision away

from a global thermonuclear conflict, one decision away. Boris

Yeltsin was being asked to push the button, and that was January

1995, not that long ago.

If we look at this question quantitatively, are we safer now? Are

we safer now, now that the cold war is over? Let’s just look at some

of these numbers on these nuclear alerts. During the cold war, we

averaged about one nuclear alert by the Soviet Union per decade.

You know, the Cuban missile crisis in the sixties. There was the

Berlin crisis before that in the fifties where there was a nuclear

alert. Then the Cuban missile crisis. Then the 1973 Middle East

war. All of those had nuclear alerts, about one per decade. Then

in the 1980’s, when they saw themselves starting to lose the cold

war competition, there were two. In the 1990’s, counting these lists

that I rattled off, we have had the Russians engaging in a nuclear

alert on average about once every 2 years to 18 months. Just looking at the numbers, the frequency of war scare incidents has actually increased in the post-cold war period.

So why haven’t people heard about these events and the facts of

Russia’s ongoing preparation for war? Knowing these things is at

least as important in evaluating the true state of United StatesRussian relations, as knowing that Russia does occasionally hold

something like free elections. In fairness, some of the information

I have been describing here hasn’t been all that available to the

public and the media. My book draws on recently declassified National Intelligence Estimates and materials that are still Top Secret in Russia and that have been provided to us by various

sources, including by several heroic defectors who must now live

under witness protection programs because they are under threat

of death from their security services that they used to work for.

Also, and this is primarily the main reason people are unaware

of these things: we in the West tend to be strategic optimists, and

we don’t want to hear bad news about Russia. Some of these things

actually did make the newspapers and blurbs back on page 24, but

they didn’t fit into the overall paradigm we’ve had from the administration of improving relations with Russia. And so people don’t

know what to do with the data; it gets filed away; it gets forgotten.

The administration, for its part, has played a role in this because

it’s, of course, eager to encourage our optimism about our relations

with Russia. It doesn’t want to be blamed for losing Russia, especially in an election year.

Nonetheless, Russia’s public statements, behavior and the copious unclassified writings from the Russian General staff and security elite have provided enough evidence of their ‘‘war scare’’ mentality that we in the West shouldn’t now be surprised to discover

that Russia regards the United States as an evil empire. Indeed,

given Russia’s bloody history of victimization at the hands of numerous invaders, including as recently as World War II which

killed 30 million Russians, it is entirely logical and predictable that

Moscow would now feel threatened. If not a tendency toward paranoia, there’s also a certain logical inevitability that Moscow would

now think it entirely plausible that there could be a nuclear war

with the United States.

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Let us try to stand for a minute in the Russian General staff’s

shoes and do an experiment of the imagination. Let’s try to see

things from Moscow’s point of view. Suppose history worked out

differently and we had lost the cold war competition because capitalism turned out to be an inefficient way of organizing your economy and society and that communism was really the way to go and

that that provided for a productive economy and society. Suppose

as a consequence of the failures of capitalism our economy and the

Western economy was a disaster so that we could no longer provide

food and housing for our people and that this drew out internal

strains in our society that were so severe that our country actually

fragmented geographically, so that the southern confederate States

broke away and we lost them, and lost states in the West, as happened with the Soviet Union and is now threatening to happen

with Russia. Suppose that the economy is so bad that we couldn’t

even sustain our general purpose forces anymore. The Army and

Navy and Marines are all neglected and rusting away, and the only

thing left to us are our nuclear forces. That’s the only thing left

that works.

Suppose further that our former allies and NATO basically want

to join the winning side and the NATO alliance disintegrates, just

as the Warsaw Pact disintegrated and former NATO member

states, Britain, Italy, Germany, the Benelux countries are clamoring to join the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union, strong and robust, decides to bring them in and that next year Germany and

Britain and Italy are going to join the Warsaw Pact and so will

Canada. So we will now have the Warsaw Pact pressing against

our northern border. Suppose in preparation for joining the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union with its new allies decides to conduct

major military exercises off our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, drops

paratroopers opposite Minot Air Force Base, not a threat to us

mind you, just to demonstrate that these guys are ready to join

NATO. It’s a part of the Partnership for Peace, and to show they

are ready to join the Warsaw Pact.

Suppose they—the Soviet Union—announces that it is establishing a new world order and is leading these new allies, leads multinational coalitions to set things straight on peacekeeping operations to Nicaragua to empower the Sandinistas, and to Mexico because they disapprove of Mexican policies, and after demonstrating

high-tech conventional weapons that we are decades away from

being able to copy they approach within a few hundred kilometers

of the Texas border and then withdraw.

Even if they were giving us a billion rubles a year to help our

economy out and even if they called us strategic partners, would

we feel safe? I think not. I think that we would be terrified and

that we would be thinking—we would be very concerned about

these exercises and peacekeeping operations, and we would think

that—we would be very fearful of the possibility that the Soviet

Union might want to finally finish the cold war, bring it to a complete conclusion by eliminating the United States so that we could

never possibly threaten their attempt to completely dominate the

global order and establish a new order. I think that our fingers

would hover near the nuclear button every time there was a big exercise or big peacekeeping operation because we would be wonderVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:25 Nov 01, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66968.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing, is this it? Are they really going to come after us this time,

under the guise of peacekeeping operation or exercise?

And, indeed, we can see that in our own history there was a time

when our fingers hovered near the button. During the Eisenhower

administration, when the Red Army stood poised to roll over Western Europe and we could not match the Red Army in terms of general purpose forces, we relied very heavily on our nuclear forces

and planned, in fact, for a nuclear first strike against Russia to

cope with their conventional superiority. And this from a society

that’s a democratic society and a society of strategic optimists. How

much more worried would you be if you were the Russian General

staff, the product of a ferocious totalitarian order and of a very

bloody, unpeaceful history?

Well, I have described the problem. So what should we do? First,

we should keep our nuclear deterrent strong, nor should we hesitate to acquire defenses to protect ourselves from missiles. U.S.

military strength is probably what deterred the General staff and

prevented the war scares of the past from becoming actual nuclear

wars. But we should redouble efforts to prove that we are not a

threat through exchange programs with the Congress and Russian

Duma, as Congressman Weldon is doing, through military officers

and students. We should continue to provide economic aid. Maybe

we should increase our economic aid but change the way we’re

doing it, not the way the administration has been doing it. Try to

provide aid that directly reaches the grassroots, the Russian people

themselves, not giving billions to the Russian elite and the former

nomenklatura who then deposit it into Swiss bank accounts.

But most of all, we should be aware that Russia is a threat and

is still a nuclear super power, the only Nation on Earth that can

end Western civilization in 30 minutes. This all-important fact

should form all of our decisions on NATO expansion, on peacekeeping, on whether or not we conduct various kinds of exercises. I do

not say that we should not expand NATO or engage in peacekeeping, but let us stop pretending that these are virtually risk-free activities. A good case can be made for NATO expansion and peacekeeping, but let us do so with our eyes open to the very real risks

so that we may intelligently weigh the risks and benefits to the

American people in foreign and defense policy decisions that affect

our relations with Russia.

This concludes my substantive remarks, and gentlemen, I thank

you for allowing me here today to speak.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Dr. Pry.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pry follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Dr. Green.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I appear before you with a certain

disadvantage. As a college professor, I’m used to speaking in 90

minute blocks but in the interest—— Mr. BURTON. Ninety minutes is too long.

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir, but in the interest of leaving as much time

as possible for questions, I’ll try to be terse.

I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee on the

potential security threats presented by the Russian Federation’s

nuclear weapons policy. My generation was born and grew up

under the Soviet nuclear threat. The end of the cold war and the

emergence of a democratic system in Russia filled me, as it did

most of the world, with jubilation, and it wasn’t—and the big reason for this is because the threat of nuclear war between the super

powers seemed to have faded away, and so I’ve been watching the

slow erosion of Russia’s young democracy and the rebirth of tensions between Russia and the United States with deep concern.

Now, a number of recent developments have come together to

bring this concern into the public eye. Some Americans have taken

note that Russian words and actions are much more belligerent in

the wake of NATO’s decision last spring to conduct its first out of

area operation to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This

new concern about Russia was reinforced last month when then

President Boris Yeltsin publicly reminded President Clinton that

Russia remains a nuclear power. Most recently, just 10 days ago

and within 2 weeks of taking office, Russian Acting-President

Vladimir Putin has issued a revised national security concept that

not only identifies the United States as a serious threat to Russia’s

security but appears to lower the nuclear threshold in dealing with

threats from the United States.

This national security concept is a revised version of a previous

issue that came out in December 1997 of the national security concept. Both are policy statements or frameworks meant to integrate

the most important state initiatives of the Russian Federation.

Russia views its national security, and I put that in quotes, much

more broadly than does the United States for these two 20 page,

20 plus page reports include threats to any aspect of life and security, and I am quoting there as well, in defining the term. They

summarize not only foreign and defense issues but also matters

that we would view as pertaining to our domestic policy, including

the economic well-being of the Nation, crime and corruption, ecological hazards and even, I quote again, the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.

One question that should be dismissed immediately is whether

this changes the personal initiative of Vladimir Putin, acting Russian President and current front runner in the March Presidential

campaign. He is in many ways an unattractive character given his

KGB background and his austere, even his harsh personality. Although Putin’s tactic of tying renewed war in Chechnya to his drive

for national leadership has attracted much criticism abroad, at

home it may very well be the factor that propels him into the Presidency. So, therefore, there’s a natural tendency to see this new national security concept as Putin’s attempt to put his mark on security policy in the brief run up to the next election, plain politics.

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Indeed, I have read one analytic report that labels this flat out the

Putin doctrine.

It’s also a natural view, I’m afraid, for those who may be more

willing to blame worsening United States-Russian relations on

Russia’s adventuristic new President rather than on more longterm developments for which the United States Government is at

least partially responsible. In fact, there’s been a lengthy buildup

to this particular formulation of Russia’s interest in strategies, and

undoubtedly it will continue to be revised and modified.

The national security concept was published in draft last October; and since, they have only made minor changes in wording in

the final draft. At the same time, they published a new draft military doctrine that shares all the same assumptions about the West

and about Russia’s security position. For the past year, most of

these issues have been discussed very openly by Russian military

and political figures. Russian and international press reports indicates that the nuclear weapons provisions of the new national security concept were adopted by Russia’s security council as far back

as the end of April.

Moreover, you can draw a steady and long-standing departure

between the rhetoric of our post-communism, post-cold war American and Russian strategic partnership and the actual state of relations as defined in many key official Russian documents. This departure begins as early as 1992 when Russia came out with its foreign policy concept, and it goes to the 1993 version of its military

doctrine and so on to the 1997 National Security Council and now

the document that we’ve had placed before us.

I think that it’s particularly important to compare the 1997 and

the January 2000 drafts of Russia’s National Security Council.

They are similar in structure, but their differences are an important indicator of recent movement in the Russian consensus over

international and strategic policy. A difference that has attracted

much attention, of course, are the new version’s much looser terms

for describing the conditions under which nuclear weapons might

be used.

In 1997, the national security concept stated, and I quote, the

most important mission of Russian Federation’s Armed Forces is to

support nuclear deterrence. The version released earlier this month

states the Russian Federation should possess nuclear forces capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of damage

against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions

and circumstances. It goes on to state that the Russian Federation

will consider the use of all available forces and assets, including

nuclear, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression if all

other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proved ineffective. No indication of deterring nuclear attacks. This is they’ve tried their conventional forces; they

don’t work; so they’re using nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, I don’t believe this change of wording signals an

immediate shift in Russia to planning for preemptive or offensive

use of nuclear weapons, but I think that we should draw two

maybe less apocalyptic but still very disturbing conclusions. I

think, first of all, that Russia is warning this country that while

they may be weaker than we are, they’re willing to play by much

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rougher rules. Russia is willing to both take and inflict greater

losses should a confrontation turn into an armed conflict.

And Russia has nuclear weapons. In future disputes with Russia,

our growing awareness of this threat may very well dissuade us

from taking forceful action. And I think we do have to take it seriously.

Second, this lowering of the nuclear threshold should be viewed

in conjunction with an even more important shift in the national

security concept, one that a colleague of mine says essentially repudiates the 1997 draft. This is a dramatic shift in the focus and emphasis of the principal threats to Russia. The current version identifies the United States and NATO in strong terms as hostile to

Russia and to the international order. The term ‘‘strategic partnership’’ that the 1997 version used to characterize Russia’s relations

with us and with the other Western nations has disappeared. Instead, the new version describes, ‘‘the developed Western nations

under U.S. leadership as attempting to circumvent the fundamental rules of international law to dominate the world by unilateral

means including military force.’’

It alarms me to note that Russian military and political leaders

now use the term ‘‘strategic partnership’’ not to describe us, but to

describe their relationship with China; that Russia is selling some

of its most advanced weapons technology to China; and that the

high-level visits and exchanges between Russia and China appear

to be on the increase. Our relations with both these nations individually are at a low point. We can ill afford to have the two coordinate their efforts in an anti-U.S. coalition of sorts.

I don’t blame the current administration for the worsened state

of United States-Russian relations that I described. And in fact,

given the unrealistic expectations that we had in the early 1990’s,

I think that seeing them deteriorate was almost inevitable. Both

nations were almost certain to take actions the other would find

objectionable.

Just to begin with, Americans working in Russia, Americans

working with Russians abroad are always expressing their frustration with the degree to which Russian institutions and Russians individually have been damaged by the Communist experience. Leaders, organizations and even the national mind set often seem tainted by the distorted views and values that the Communist party

took pains to inculcate. Decades may pass before the trauma of

those years fades from the Russian consciousness.

By the same token the realities of the post cold war world are

such that no United States Government, regardless of party or administration, would have been able to avoid triggering Russian suspicions and hostilities.

I do hold the current administration responsible for what I regard as unrealistic and even reckless behavior in the face of this

worsening relationship. To begin with, the United States Government should have been able to predict worsening ties, or if not, to

track them as Russian antagonism began to grow. Instead, we have

gotten a relentless stream of optimistic pronouncements and interpretations from administration spokespersons even as the heat of

Russian anger and rhetoric aimed at us has risen.

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Closely tied to this Pollyanna-ish approach is the administration’s failure to establish significant ties with Russian political and

social leaders outside of a narrow circle of so-called reformers surrounding the Yeltsin Presidency. While the United States’ Government praised their commitment to democracy and the free market

system, these individuals led Russia through a corrupt privatization program that has impoverished many Russians and discredited the very concept of democracy. Indeed, much Russian popular

bitterness at the United States comes from its unconditional backing of a leadership associated with crime and corrupt rule.

Second, the administration has pursued a number of initiatives

that have alienated Russians regardless of their political orientation. These include the expansion of NATO, recent support for research on ballistic missile defense, its policy of double containment

against Iraq and Iran, the development of close ties with the

former Soviet oil producing nations in the Caspian region, and

most recently participation in NATO’s air war against Yugoslavia

over Kosovo.

I want to emphasize I’m not opposing these initiatives on their

own merits; in fact, many of them I support enthusiastically. But

it is unrealistic to expect Russia to remain passive in the face of

United States policies that touch its interests so closely. Russian

opposition should have been taken for granted. The possibility

should have been entertained that Russia would interpret them

taken together as evidence of a grand strategy aimed against it.

The new national security concept identifies one of the,

Fundamental threats in the international sphere as attempts by other states to

oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centers of the multipolar

world, to hinder the exercise of its national interest, and to weaken its position in

Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Asia Pacific region.

Finally, I want to express my dismay that current United States

foreign and military policies seem built on the assumption that

good relations with Russia can be taken for granted. If I’m correct

in this interpretation, it is an assumption built upon sand. We cannot get U.N. Security Council approval for the numerous overseas

interventions and peacekeeping missions current policy seems to

regard as essential if Russia vetoes them. We cannot project our

values and influence into regions they have never known, such as

the Balkans and Central Asia, if Russia stands ready to combine

with regional tyrannies to keep us out. And we cannot depend on

our shrunken peacetime military and naval forces to defend our interests abroad if, as a generation ago, a nuclear-armed Russia adversary backs radical regimes when they find themselves in confrontation with the United States.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I stand

ready to respond to any questions the committee might raise, following adjournment of this hearing to augment the issues we have

discussed here with additional materials.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Doctor. Let me say for the record that

Dr. Pry is a member of the Armed Services Committee staff and

that he represents the majority on that staff. And I want to make

sure that’s clear so that people know that he may, according to

some members and some people, have a bias toward a different position. I don’t believe that to be the case, but I wanted to make

sure that that was stated for the record.

Mr. WELDON. Represents both sides.

Mr. BURTON. Excuse me. Oh, he represents both sides on the

Armed Services Committee. So forgive me, Dr. Pry. Appreciate

that.

Let me just start the questioning. And I don’t think I’ll question

too long because I want to make sure my colleagues have plenty

of time.

Mr. Lunev, there’s a lot of people that are going to be skeptical

about what you have said. You were a member of the GRU. You

were the highest ranking official of the intelligence community in

the Soviet Union to defect. Would you elaborate briefly and tell us

why you believe that there is a continued threat and why you believe that there are weapons of one type or another and communications equipment of one type or another that are buried here in

the United States for possible use in the future and why you and

others believe that they have created dossiers on American officials, government officials, in the event that there’s some kind of

a potential conflict that they can target for assassination.

Mr. LUNEV. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Pry actually make very good account of last development connected with Russian military and

Russian military preparations. Including myself, I can spend very

short, very small time I think especially to explain that, unfortunately, in time when America and American people spent huge

amount of money trying to assist Russia in transition, transaction

to free market economy and to the real democracy, unfortunately

nothing happened in Russia. And American people, which spent so

big money, of course, have all rights to expect something in return

back from Russia. But it’s not going point of view of Russian Government. Because Russian Government which actually totally destroyed Russian economy—and you know how Russian people ordinary people just now living in Russian federation—in this situation

Russian Government using very old traditional or history methods

and trying to explain to Russian people that Russian people are living so bad not because of its own corrupted government but because of foreign enemy.

And Peter Pry and Dr. Green, they provided us real views of

Russian leaders just now who are in charge of Russia who openly

talking, speaking to Russian people that this situation with Russia

is so bad because of America, because of America which already destroyed former Soviet Union, destroy Yugoslavia, occupied Kosovo,

just now America which tried to destabilize the region in northern

Caucasus especially, to establish control over this strategically important area, this America which like to destroy mother Russia

itself.

And in this situation, they built up Russian military machine not

to nowhere but especially against the United States and American

friends and allies worldwide. You know what’s going on just now

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in Chechnya. It’s very small area. It’s actually—I don’t know how

to compare it, but maybe it’s only fifth spot of California State. But

these people, Chechnyan people who fighting for independence from

Russia more than 200 years just now fighting against the same

Russian domination which was historically in this area. And Russian Government using Chechnyan area, area of Chechnyans living

like some kind of test field for future war, for real war. Because

they using huge number of Russian military personnel for combat

training. They using new weapons system which are in stage of design only. First time, if I understand rightly, it was first time in

history when Russian military few weeks ago used bombs against

Chechnyan militants.

And in this situation when Russian Government, which actually

just now are considering only one strategic partner in the world,

it’s not America, but China, Russian Government, which continues

its military buildup and development of Russian military machine,

they do not change their mind. And they still consider United

States like main potential military adversity.

Mr. BURTON. Let me interrupt you. I guess I didn’t make my

point quite clear. Why should Americans be concerned about the

book and the statements that have been made that there are—

there’s a strong possibility that there are sites across the United

States and North America where military equipment and communications equipment, and telecommunications equipment might be

buried and also the possibility that there might be some nuclear

weapons buried? Why should Americans be concerned about that?

I mean, could you and the others that we’ve quoted here today be

incorrect?

Mr. LUNEV. American people need to be concerned about this location because this weapon system which storage in this country

could be used by Russian special operation forces commanders

against American people in time when Russian Government will

order them for action. This is very big danger.

Mr. BURTON. I don’t want to belabor the point, but there will be

people who will say this is all bologna, that it’s not factual even

though several Russian leaders have said that these things have

occurred or could occur. How would you answer them?

Mr. LUNEV. I would like to answer to people who is really concerned about national security of this country that location of this

weapon system of foreign region in the territory of independent

country like United States of America, it’s violation, violation of

American rights, traditions and sovereignty. And it’s direct danger

to the national security of this country.

Mr. BURTON. But you believe that that really occurs?

Mr. LUNEV. I believe, yes.

Dr. PRY. Could I offer a short answer to that question, sir, could

I have the temerity?

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Dr. PRY. Caches have been found in Europe. That is a fact. It is

a fact. They have been found in Belgium and Switzerland. So we

know the caches are real. It would be—we are a Nation of strategic

optimists; but it’s a real stretch, it seems to me, to think that when

their doctrine calls for putting these caches in NATO and the

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United States, and then we find caches in NATO, that we then conclude that well, they wouldn’t have done it in the United States.

I think the burden of proof at this point is on those who want

to argue that we don’t have to worry about these caches to answer

that argument. Why should they be in NATO and not the United

States?

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. I wanted to ask a question about the new administration. You know, we’ve heard often that in the post-cold war

era how nuclear weapons were not controlled, how some had been

smuggled or lost or sold to rogue states. And I want to ask you all

obviously when we had the Yeltsin administration many considered

the administration to be weak, corrupt, and had devolved power

where somebody said Russian Mafia has as much control as any

other institutions there, let me ask you about the new administration. Even though Putin is more nationalistic and more militaristic

and more hostile to the West, do you all believe that there may be

a silver lining in that he may gain more control over nuclear weapons? Because obviously if on one side we’ve been seeing military

and political and economic anarchy in Russia over the past 8 or 9

years, if he is a stronger leader, is there a chance to believe that

maybe some of the nuclear proliferation, at least on the black market, may be brought under control?

Because right now how many weapons—85 of these suitcases

can’t even be accounted for. I know that’s sort of throwing a curve

ball, but many Americans have said for some time that one of the

most dangerous things with the Russian Government is that they

don’t have control over nuclear weapons because they’re so weak.

Any taker’s on that?

Dr. PRY. I’ll—go on.

Mr. GREEN. There’s, I think, a widespread impression that authoritarian or totalitarian governments are in control from top to

bottom. But experience shows that even a government that can be

very forceful and very brutal in keeping its population down can

suffer from massive corruption and turmoil. It’s not so much that

it doesn’t exist as that the press is unable to report about it. There

is no freedom to talk about it. I don’t think that the sort of opportunities for proliferation you’ve been discussing would go away if

Russia went back under an authoritarian form of government.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. How would you compare it, though? The lack

of control over nuclear weapons under the Soviet Union, the 80—

listen, I’m not here preaching the joys of communism or totalitarianism, I’m just asking a question. How would you compare,

though, the control of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union in the

1970’s and 1980’s compared to the 1990’s?

Mr. GREEN. Well, in the Soviet period, control of nuclear weapons

was part of a very rigid control of all of society. That has broken

down. Even if it were reassembled, the horse is already out of the

door. We’ve had 10 to 15 years of a very high level of disorder in

Russia. And if there has been significant leakage of nuclear terms

or weapons out of Russia, merely re-establishing authoritarian controls isn’t going to bring them back.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Colonel.

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Mr. LUNEV. I absolutely agree with Dr. Green that in time of

former Soviet Union existence it was very strong control over nuclear materials and weapons systems, but after the USSR disintegration, control became weaker; but nonproliferation question is

not connected with this protection of nuclear materials and weapons because all proliferation and nuclear technology is delivery to

rogue countries made under direct permission from Russian government of Boris Yeltsin.

But you ask very excellent question because what could be happened in future in time when administration and Russian Government actually was changed. And Mr. Putin just now Acting President and leading candidate for Russian federation next President,

he doesn’t have nothing, absolutely in his back, exclude only war

in Chechnya. And he depends from Russian military much more

than Yeltsin depend from his military machine. At the same time,

Mr. Putin depends from Russian security services much more than

Yeltsin who in his past had a lot of problem with KGB and he

hated KGB to the last days when he was in power.

So if Mr. Putin who just now promising reforms to reformers,

pensions to pensioners, high salary to military personnel, security

services, and if this person who open, actually open and just now

carrying on war against his own people in Northern Caucasus

would become next Russian President, it would be much more

stronger person than internationally and domestically. He is young.

He’s not drunk. He is not out of his mind. And of course he would

like maybe to do something for Russian people, maybe to do something for reforms which never occur in Russia. Maybe he will do

something for Russian people. But internationally he would be

much more militant and much more aggressive than his predecessor.

And in time, of course, when he would be in charge of Russian

military machine as a commander in chief of Russian federation

military, of course he will use all his power including huge nuclear

arsenal to press foreign countries, especially for his own gains and

benefits.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. And I think, by the way, you’ve just helped

him define his campaign slogan: I’m not drunk. I’m not crazy. As

you said of his predecessor.

Dr. Pry, could you just conclude on this same question. Because,

again, it seems to me if he’s going to have an iron fist and if he’s

going to do a lot of things that Americans might be repulsed by

even if he’s more militaristic and aggressive against the West, is

there a possibility that this might bring some stability at home in

Russia over control of nuclear weapons that have not been controlled over the past 8 years?

Dr. PRY. Yeah. You see the question presumes that the reason

we have proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass

destruction technology from Russia is because of a lack of central

control, and that this is being done by the Russian Mafia criminal

elements and independent enterprisers. This is the majority view

in the West. But I submit this is a case of our strategic optimism.

If you look at many of the specific examples of proliferation that

have occurred, they are a matter of deliberate government policy.

They are not being done by the Mafia. It is not the Mafia that is

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building a nuclear reactor for Iran. It is not the Mafia that helped

them develop the——

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. If I can interrupt here. And I want you to get

into that briefly; but, again, there’s a big difference between purposely selling nuclear technology to Iran and other rogue states

and not knowing where 84 nuclear devices are. I mean, I certainly

understand he may want to sell to Syria, he may want to sell to

Iran, he may want to sell to other rogue states. That’s very different, though, than losing 84 nuclear devices, is it not?

Dr. PRY. Sure. General Lebed could not account for the 84 nuclear devices. That does not mean that the GRU does not know

where they are.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Right.

Dr. PRY. That was part of Mr. Lunev’s testimony that maybe

they’re here and part of the government doesn’t want to tell another part of the government. But I guess here you could say, well,

if he has an iron hand, is more Stalin-like, maybe he could get

these guys to tell the General Lebeds where they are. And that’s

possible. I don’t deny that there could be some—I think the benefits would be marginal in terms of the tradeoff, in terms of getting

control. Because frankly when I think—when you get down to specifics about cases of proliferation and you look at all the cases of

proliferation, one is hard pressed to actually come up with a hard

example of where the Russian Mafia really proliferated anything.

Those accelerometers and gyroscopes, over 100 of them, hard to believe that organized crime could manage that, you know. It looks

like this was in collusion.

Also, organized crime and the government are often one in the

same. Defense Minister Grachev was a major boss of an organized

crime family in Russia according to research done by many Russian

journalists. I think the bottom line is you have a more authoritarian or totalitarian government that is even more hostile to the

West than the past government was, it will provide even more of

an incentive for these guys to want to strengthen our adversaries

in the world by arming them with weapons of mass destruction and

highly effective conventional weapons to cause as much trouble for

the United States as they can. That is going to by far outweigh the

increased police actions that you might get, you know, from having

an authoritarian government. I believe it will be a net loss for us

in security.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Lunev, did you want to respond to that?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Only few years according to these devices, looks like yes. Because these devices are

designed for a special operation forces commanders and actually

time when design of this weapon system was in place, it was only

GRU which handle special operation forces commanders which

need to operate worldwide.

And, according General Lebed’s statements that some of these

devices are not located in Russia, later he made one more statement because there were a lot of questions, is it possible that these

devices could find way in the hands of international terrorists or

other countries or countries without nuclear weapons. And General

Lebed said openly that according checking process he made trying

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to find these devices he found that these nuclear weapons systems

are in right hands. So GRU——

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. In right hands.

Mr. LUNEV. In right hands, not in wrong hands.

Mr. BURTON. If the gentleman will yield. What he was saying

then is that the government did have control of those some place,

but he was not telling where they were.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Thanks.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Scarborough.

Mr. Weldon.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Lunev, I have known you for some time, but

I think for the purpose of the media here we should go through exactly who you are and what you were doing. You are currently in

a witness protection program in this country administered by two

of our intelligence agencies; is that correct? The CIA and the FBI.

Mr. LUNEV. It’s interagency.

Mr. WELDON. So Stanislav Lunev is not your correct name.

Mr. LUNEV. It’s my original name.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Lunev, when you were active in the GRU,

which is the intelligence arm of the Soviet military, you were stationed for a while in the Soviet Embassy in Washington; is that

correct?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELDON. When you were stationed at the Soviet Embassy in

Washington, was your cover that of being a TASS correspondent?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELDON. And so people who came across you in Washington

really thought you were working for the Soviet media; is that correct?

Mr. LUNEV. Of course.

Mr. WELDON. But what were your real assignments? What kinds

of things were you expected to do while you were working there

supposedly as a TASS correspondent? What kinds of things did the

GRU expect you to accomplish?

Mr. LUNEV. Let’s say that the journalist cover is very good for

intelligence officers because the same targets to penetrate through

secrets to open secrets and publish something about this. So it was

very good for my intelligence job. And in time of my operational

business in Washington, DC, area, I was assigned for special

tasking to penetrate through American national security system

and recruit people with access to the secrets of American national

security.

Mr. WELDON. Were you also asked to locate sites where caches

of weapons could be deposited in our country?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir, but it was some kind of support job I made

for my field office additionally to my major targets. And in time of

this support job, I spend many, many hours, many hundreds of

hours run around big Washington, DC, area trying to find places

for—we named them dead drops. Dead drops. Dead drops which

could be used for storage of money, documents, microfilms, weapons systems, different types of weapons systems, and report about

our dead drops proposal to Moscow.

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Mr. WELDON. How many such locations do you think that you

uncovered while you were on station in Washington approximately?

Mr. LUNEV. It’s very easy to say because I stay in Washington,

DC, about 31⁄2 years. And every 6 months I need to find one, two

places for different size dead drops. To keep in mind the GRU field

office in Washington, DC, it’s about 40 person. There’s hundreds

going every 6 months.

Mr. WELDON. So hundreds of sites were identified.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes.

Mr. WELDON. Were there other GRU agents in other offices

throughout the United States that were doing the same thing?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELDON. So how many——

Mr. LUNEV. And some of them much more were involved in this

kind of job because they didn’t have so hard targets as I had.

Mr. WELDON. So how many sites do you think were identified

overall during the course of, say, a year nationwide in America?

Mr. LUNEV. Thousands.

Mr. WELDON. Thousands.

Mr. LUNEV. Thousands. It’s only in big Washington, DC, operational area, in New York, San Francisco, where we had field offices were located, but in every trip outside of this area, you know

it was 25-mile zone.

Mr. WELDON. Right. Right.

Mr. LUNEV. Everybody was assigned especially to find some

places of dead drop and sent description of this location to Moscow

after return back to Washington.

Mr. WELDON. And what was your understanding of the kinds of

drops that would occur there? Was it just communications and telemetry equipment, money and small arms, or was there the possibility of weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, from this business nobody from intelligence offices in the field doesn’t know how this place like they found the

dead drop would be used. And all the description is going to Moscow. And Moscow headquarter deciding how to use concrete dead

drop position.

Mr. WELDON. Did you ever have any indication of the possibility

of a weapon of mass destruction being brought to the United

States?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, in time when I had my instructions before operational tour to Washington, DC, like the same that was before I fly

to China, I had very clear instruction. These dead drop positions

need to be found for all types of weapons including nuclear weapons.

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Lunev, how many sites do you think there are

today in the United States where caches of weapons and military

material are still buried? Just an approximate.

Mr. LUNEV. I think hundreds.

Mr. WELDON. Hundreds.

Mr. LUNEV. Hundreds, yes.

Mr. WELDON. Are you confident that even though Mitrokhin

didn’t copy down every exact location, that in the KGB files those

sites are in fact documented down to the exact location?

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Mr. LUNEV. I think that much more real information could be

found in the GRU headquarter, not so much KGB. Because KGB

traditionally they were active in Europe. It’s very close countries.

But GRU as a strategic intelligence agency was much more active

if the United States.

Mr. WELDON. Good point. I agree with you. I think you’re probably correct. It probably needs to be as to the GRU.

So therefore is it your assessment as someone who was a senior

expert and was involved in these kinds of activities that there are

people in America who are at risk today because of the possibility

of what happened in Switzerland happening throughout the United

States in perhaps public park lands or in open space that may have

been the site where these materials were located?

Mr. LUNEV. I hope that it’s never happened, but I cannot exclude.

Mr. WELDON. Do you think it’s true that we have sites such as

Switzerland where there are booby-trapped devices that could

harm American people, do you think that in fact is a very real possibility in America today?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir. And I need to tell a few words additionally.

Because please keep in mind that the United States intelligence

and counterintelligence services are best in the world. And the people who planned the same operation in Switzerland and the United

States, they keep in mind difference in intelligence and counterintelligence services. And, of course, everything which was done in

the United States was done many, many, many times much more

carefully and safety for its participants than it was done in European countries.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Lunev, describe please for me the kind of boobytrap that

might be connected with one of these dead drops or weapons caches

or communications caches.

Mr. LUNEV. What does this mean, ‘‘boobytrap’’?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Boobytrap is a device that would explode if somebody who happened upon this by accident or happened upon this

by counterintelligence without having information or key or a key

to defuse it.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir, I understand. I understand your question.

The devices which would explode this weapons system if somebody

from strangers will try to open it to approach, usually use in combat area in time of warfare, but connected with the same devices

like portable technical nuclear briefcase or containers with chemical and biological weapons using different types of devices, so-called

self-liquidation devices. And if somebody would like to approach

this device, it will be self-liquidation, first of all. But I cannot exclude possibility that for more than 100 percent guarantee second

level of security would be the same devices for the explosion.

Mr. CAMPBELL. In the example given in the book to which reference has been made from the Mitrokhin files, we have a

boobytrapped device in Switzerland which was used to protect communications devices apparently. My question is whether this would

be typical of the kind of protection that you would have placed

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around a communications cache, a communications dead drop in

the United States.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir, it’s typical. It’s typical and in the traditions.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And if you have an estimate, I would like to

know it whether this was true for all dead drops and locations of

this nature or some. And if only some, what was the distinction.

Mr. LUNEV. Thank you, sir. No. It’s very big difference because

for dead drops, for communication with agents, for exchange of

microfilms, information, money, to provide them communication devices, it’s—I think it’s only in few cases they could be equipped by

this special destruction devices. But in general, when you have

agent with elementary school education to explain him how to

switch off this explosion device, it’s impossible. But for dead drops

which could be used by special operation forces commanders, yes,

it is necessary.

Mr. CAMPBELL. And those would include dead drops that you are

aware of within the United States.

Mr. LUNEV. This is dead drops for the future war. It means

places where weapons system could be storage, communication devices not for peace time, not for spy games, but for war time and

all reserves which would be necessary to command this for the war

time.

Mr. CAMPBELL. You mentioned San Francisco field office of the

GRU. Are you aware of any locations of devices, communications,

or weapons that would have been the responsibility of GRU agents

working out of the San Francisco office?

Mr. LUNEV. Sure. I didn’t have time to tell you all story about

this. But it’s not only GRU operational offices who are working in

this country under civilian cover or in military uniform are involved in this business. Because they, yes, they are responsible for

finding dead drops and the operations according dead drops. But

please keep in mind that a lot of GRU offices are coming here like

businessmen, like students, teachers, most popular computer specialists, and all other cover they can use. And they will do one of

the major part of their job is to find these dead drop positions. Plus

illegals in this country, there is a lot of illegals, not only for GRU

but for KGB. And all of them are looking around especially to fulfill

their tasking.

And San Francisco is extremely important. San Francisco and

Los Angeles it’s strategically important targets for the future war

operational use. And, of course, I am sure that they are in lots of

places where these weapons systems are located of course not inside but somewhere around, especially to be delivered in very short

time to the place of the operational use. So it’s not only San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, New York City. It’s in this

country there are a lot of targets for these weapons.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I ask about San Francisco only because you

brought it up as a field office of the GRU.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes. And it’s very important strategically. You know

what Navy, Army, Air Force facilities you do have, and how San

Francisco military area is important for the future war operations.

It’s extremely important.

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Mr. CAMPBELL. I’m tempted to ask one additional question if I

might, Mr. Chairman. Silicon Valley, would that have an equal interest to your operations?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes, sir. Because to believe that in this country it’s

very difficult to find location of nuclear weapons, American nuclear

weapons or military units, no, it’s very clear from space satellites.

But the major secrets of the United States are in up-to-date technologies development, first of all connected with military. And Silicon Valley is a recognized leader in this technologies, research, development and production. And of course Silicon Valley is one of

the targets for penetration by GRU; but it’s not by nuclear briefcases, it’s by recruitment of people.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Very well.

Mr. Chairman, I have one final question and that is to ask Colonel Lunev why he defected.

Mr. BURTON. Why did you defect?

Mr. LUNEV. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Campbell, it’s very long story.

But very briefly I can tell you if you have couple minutes of course

because I cannot do it in shorter period of time.

For me, as a graduate of law school of Moscow Military Political

Academy, I had access to secret archives of Communist party in

time when I get this advanced military education. When I saw papers and documents signed by Lenin, Stalin, and other leaders of

Soviet international communists, after I saw these papers, communism ideology never play any role in my life. I keep my membership in Communist party only like some kind of ordinary or regular

staff I need to have, but I do it for my country, I believe in my

country, not communist ideology.

And all my life I believe that Soviet propaganda which tell me

and other Soviet people that way of life in Soviet Union is fair and

equal for all people, I believe in this way of life maybe because I

didn’t see any other. I believe in this when I worked in Singapore,

in China and Soviet Union, until I came to the United States.

When I came to this country, I found that it’s different story. Because, please, turn back the Soviet Union 10 years ago what was

it in America. Evil empire, leader of international imperialism,

country where only small number of people are living very good,

this is millionaires, and all other population living very bad and

working for these rich people to become more and more rich.

When I came to this country, I found that’s wrong. I found that,

yes, in this country there is limited number of very wealthy or rich

people, limited number of very poor people who are living very bad.

But between in this country there is huge, huge middle class which

lives in this country, I cannot say very good, not bad. Not bad.

And when I found that, that it’s absolutely different society, different—the polar different types of living, of course I reduce my

hostile activity against this country dramatically if not to zero and

try to do minimum what I could do against this country in my

operational stay here.

And, of course, I didn’t want to fight against America. And I

didn’t want to damage America. And it’s happen 1991, 1992, after

your society’s integration, the society’s integration, I found that unfortunately information I receive from my sources with risk of myself and people who believed me is going to wrong hands. And I

115

found that some of my information is going through the hands of

Russian, just now it’s name of criminals or people who are conducted with organized crime activity against the United States.

It was some kind of last drop in my decision to cancel my hostile

activity against the United States. But last drop, real last drop, it

was in my conversations with my friends and associates—maybe

you remember the beginning of 1992, wintertime, and American

Air Force cargo plans deliver humanitarian aid to Russian people.

In time when America tried to assist my own country and my own

people, in time when Russian Government didn’t do nothing but requested new credits and loans from the United States, I with my

friends and associates we discussed very actively problem what to

do in this country. Because America, if to believe Yeltsin, it was

not anymore enemy but became friend or partner.

And in this situation we need to cancel our hostile activity

against America. And if it’s necessary to continue our spy business,

but by other ways like friendly countries, you know what foreign

intelligence services are working in this country, but most of them

are friendly intelligence services. And when we requested Moscow

what to do in this situation, we received direct order from Russian

President Boris Yeltsin to activate our spy business against America and to make it more dangerous for the United States than before. It was last drop. After this I made my decision.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just ask two questions then I’ll yield to my

colleagues again for a second round if they choose to ask questions.

No. 1, do you know anything about these nuclear devices that we

were talking about? Do you have any knowledge of those nuclear

devices?

Mr. LUNEV. No, sir, because I was assigned to strategic intelligence.

Mr. BURTON. So you wouldn’t know if it took more than one person to detonate one of those.

Mr. LUNEV. I know only one that special operation forces commanders, they had special groups of people, specially trained how

to use these devices.

Mr. BURTON. Can one person set the devices off?

Mr. LUNEV. Maybe this is only one person in group who can handle this problem.

Mr. BURTON. So one person could detonate a device like that.

Mr. LUNEV. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. OK. That’s what I thought. The other thing is in

the event that it was boobytrapped if we had a nuclear device like

that here in the United States buried, in the event that it was

boobytrapped, do you know if the boobytrap went off if the nuclear

device also would be exploded?

Mr. LUNEV. It’s very difficult to expect that this nuclear device

would be destroyed by this explosion.

Mr. BURTON. Would it explode?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes. If it would be exploded, it would be a lot of evidences that it was nuclear device. So it’s much more easy to have

special self-liquidation device.

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Mr. BURTON. What I meant is let’s say there’s a boobytrap on a

site where they have a nuclear device. If the boobytrap went off,

would that also explode the nuclear device?

Mr. LUNEV. Very good question, but I think it’s for more specialist than me in this area.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Mr. LUNEV. But I can tell you that if somebody in his design

would like to destroy this device, he would like to make it much

more chemically than by regular explosions.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

Mr. Weldon, do you have any more questions?

Mr. WELDON. Colonel Lunev, several decades ago there was what

we call a sleeper agent of the Soviet government who turned himself into the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who was living in

Canada. And as a part of his turning himself in, he said that he

was—his job was to wait for a coded signal from the GRU which

he would then use to detonate a bomb that would eliminate a main

oil pumping station north of Edmonton and destroy it.

Now, that individual was known; and in fact I have talked to the

people who interviewed him and I’m trying to get to him now. Are

the use of these so-called sleeper agents, were they common among

the GRU to have people prepositioned; and do you still think that

that type of a person could exist today in both the United States

and perhaps Canada?

Mr. LUNEV. It sounds very familiar for me because it’s regular

practice to use as you said sleeping agent, especially for using of

these devices in time of war after receiving special authorization

from radio or by other devices. So it’s very regular practice, sounds

very typical for this. And just now—it’s just now it’s very difficult

to say how to use these people now. But we name these people

illegals or illegal intelligence agents or officers. Illegal intelligence

was not canceled, is in place, and would be in place until the time

when country could be existing. So I think that this methods of

operational use of people would be in place for unlimited time.

Mr. WELDON. One final question, Mr. Lunev. I referred today to

a document from the Russian military publication Military

Thought. I believe it’s called Voennaya. Is that correct?

Mr. LUNEV. Yes.

Mr. WELDON. It says this has been published every year since

June 1918. Are you familiar with this document?

Mr. LUNEV. No, sir.

Mr. WELDON. The internal Russian Military Thought?

Mr. LUNEV. No, sir.

Mr. WELDON. In the document in July 1995 I referred to the article that talks about the employment of special task forces. And I

referred to the one sentence that says special task forces can be

used not only in war but also in peacetime during a period of

threat.

Do you believe that there is the possibility that there are some

in Russia today that would want to use these kinds of weapons and

these kind of special forces in peacetime as well as in time of perhaps conflict if they believed that perhaps a war was about to

begin?

117

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, in military plans everything is possible. And it

could be look like that just now it’s peacetime, but for people who

are in decisionmaking process it looks like preliminary time for the

future war. So we cannot operate by the same time which these

people. And yes, it’s possible for using of this weapons system during so-called peacetime for different purposes, but decision could be

made by supreme commander in chief only.

Mr. WELDON. One final if you don’t mind, Mr. Chairman. Colonel

Lunev, the $64,000 question today and has been for the past 3

months, the major question is why wouldn’t our administration ask

the Russians to give us the exact locations of these sites? Now, I’ve

given my own speculation. What’s your speculation as a former

GRU official now living in the United States? We’ve had two agencies tell us that we haven’t asked the question. Why in the world

wouldn’t our administration ask that question of the Russians to

tell us where those sites are?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, why are you asking me about this?

Mr. WELDON. Because I had to give my own speculation and I

gave that earlier today. I think it’s a part of our policy of we didn’t

want to embarrass Yeltsin in 1992 and 1993 when we found out

about the Mitrokhin files so we didn’t want to ask the question. So

now we’re between a rock and a hard place because if we ask the

question now people are going to criticize the administration for

waiting 8 years or 7 years to ask it. I’m just asking you to speculate. What do you think would be the reason?

Mr. LUNEV. Sir, I can give you my thoughts very briefly because

you know that in this country as I already said you have very good

and professional intelligence and counterintelligence. And I am

sure that these people are—I very highly respect these people. By

the way you have some of them behind me now. I saw them in

Washington. I am sure that they inform politicians about what’s

really going on, what could be happening with these devices. But

why politicians didn’t do it, it’s not question for me. How to do it,

I think it’s very easy. You know how many billions of dollars America already sent to Russian Government and this money disappeared. Russian people didn’t get one penny from this billions

and billions of dollars.

Mr. WELDON. Exactly.

Mr. LUNEV. Why not to ask before sending this money for this

information. It’s very easy to say. Russian Government existing on

money from America. Why not to ask for favor.

Mr. WELDON. I agree with you absolutely 1,000 percent. That’s

the question for the administration. Why haven’t they asked.

Mr. BURTON. I think that’s a good question to end this part of

the hearing on. Before we dismiss our panel, I want to thank very

much the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority for allowing us to use this facility. I also want to thank all of

the MTA staff that’s worked so hard and so closely with my staff

to make sure this hearing was possible.

I also want to thank the panel. You’ve been very, very informative to us. We really appreciate it. We appreciate your coming all

the way to Los Angeles. And hopefully we’ll be able to pick your

brains in the future for more information as this process goes forward.

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And, Mr. Lunev, thank you for helping America by giving us this

information. Thank you very much.

Mr. LUNEV. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BURTON. We’re going to let you leave first. So we’ll let you

put your sack over your head.

Mr. LUNEV. May I say a few words only? Few words.

Mr. BURTON. Yeah, sure.

Mr. LUNEV. Because just now I told you that I am working for

an information company. And I found that in my conversations

with my readers, with listeners that just now America, situation is

in America is not bad, not bad. Economy is growing. People are living not bad. And I think that just now maybe it’s very good time

to think about American national security a little bit more than

usual. Because maybe later it could be too late.

And thank you for you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for you, ladies

and gentlemen, for inviting us, for listening to us. And I am really

respect what are you doing for this country.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much. We’ll meet you outside. I

would like to shake your hand.

Would you escort him out.

And the other panelists, thank you very much.

We will go into executive session, the Members of Congress with

the intelligence agencies. It’s for the classified briefing. And we’ll

do that in about 10 minutes in the adjoining room.

Thank you all very much. And thanks to the media for being

here. We appreciate your attendance.

[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the committee was recessed.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

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