GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 18, 2004 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Defense Logistics: GAO’s Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the 

Navy’s Fleet Response Plan 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom have 

prompted major changes in the employment of naval forces around the globe. These 

two events resulted in an ultimate surging to deploy seven carrier strike groups and 

the largest amphibious task force assembled in decades. According to the Navy, at 

the time of the September 11 attacks and in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

only a small number of ships at peak readiness were forward deployed. However, 

most of the Navy’s ships were not available for use because they were in early stages 

of their training cycles. This prompted the Navy, in March 2003, to develop a concept 

to enhance its deployment readiness strategy. The Navy’s Fleet Response Plan, 

implemented in May 2003, evolved from a concept to institutionalize an enhanced 

surge capability. 

The Fleet Response Plan modifies the Navy’s pre-2001 rotational deployment policy, 

replacing 6-month routine deployments with more flexible deployment options that 

provide the capability to deploy as many as eight carrier strike groups when and 

where needed. Although we focused our review of the maintenance impacts of the 

Fleet Response Plan on aircraft carriers, the plan applies to all ship classes except 

submarines.1

 The plan changes the manner in which the Navy maintains, trains, staffs, 

and deploys its ships to allow a greater availability of the fleet to meet Homeland 

Defense and Defense Guidance requirements. As it relates to maintenance, the plan 

relies on increased continuous maintenance during pier dockings. Primarily, the plan 

alters the Navy’s prior 6-month rotational deployment and presence policy to the 

 

1

 Navy officials informed us that maintenance processes do not change under the Fleet Response Plan 

for the submarine force because of the nature and criticality of submarine systems. 
Page 2 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

current policy of being forward deployed and capable of surging substantial forces—

a “6 plus 2” carrier strike force versus a “3 to 4” carrier strike force—when and where 

they are needed. The 6 plus 2 force concept signifies that six carrier strike groups are 

available to deploy within 30 days of notification, and two additional groups are 

available within 90 days of notification. The 3 to 4 force that preceded the Fleet 

Response Plan generally had only three or four carrier strike groups available for 

deployment when needed. 

The emphasis of the Fleet Response Plan is on readiness and speed of response. It 

assumes a deployment mind-set of quickly—within 3 to 4 months after completing its 

maintenance—making a carrier available to surge, if necessary. This mind-set differs 

from that of the traditional rotational deployment process where, in the case of a 

carrier, the ship would undergo maintenance, training, and staffing preparations to be 

ready for the next scheduled deployment in about 1 year after completing its 

maintenance period. The Navy attained the 6 plus 2 carrier strike force capability in 

November 2003. 

Because of potential budget implications, you asked us to review the assumption that 

the Navy’s implementation of its Fleet Response Plan would reduce the duration of 

aircraft carrier depot maintenance intervals between deployment periods from 

approximately 18 months to 9 months. Specifically, our objectives were to identify 

• the likely impacts and risks for the Navy’s logistics requirements that could 

result from shortened maintenance cycles between deployments; 

• the Navy’s plan for fulfilling major repair and maintenance requirements; 

upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering 

systems; and performing nuclear refueling in the shortened maintenance cycle; 

and 

• how the Navy’s budget supports its plan to shorten maintenance cycles. 

On April 6, 2004, we provided your office with a briefing on our observations 

regarding the maintenance impacts associated with the plan. This report summarizes 

and updates the information we provided you in that briefing. A copy of the briefing 

is included in enclosure I to this report. 

To address our objectives, we held discussions with officials from key Department of 

Defense and Navy organizations responsible for conceptualizing and implementing 

the Navy’s plan. While the scope of our work did not include an assessment of the 

impact of staff assignments or the training aspects of the Fleet Response Plan, we 

plan to initiate a separate review to assess the plan’s effect on staffing, training, and 

meeting the theater commanders’ needs. In addition, we did not independently 

assess the reliability of the workload data that we obtained for the Puget Sound and 

Norfolk Naval Shipyards. For purposes of this assignment, we considered the data 

sufficiently reliable to determine the extent to which workloads changed. 

We performed our work from November 2003 through April 2004 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 3 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

The Navy’s Fleet Response Plan 

Does Not Shorten Maintenance Intervals 

The Navy’s Fleet Response Plan does not shorten preexisting time frames for 

performing aircraft carrier maintenance. Furthermore, it does not alter existing major 

repair and maintenance requirements; methods of upgrading and modernizing 

weapons, communications, and engineering systems; or methods of performing 

nuclear refueling. At this time, the potential impact of the plan on the Navy’s budget 

is uncertain. 

Maintenance Intervals 

Remain the Same 

The Navy’s Fleet Response Plan does not reduce depot maintenance intervals 

between deployment cycles as was initially assumed. Navy officials informed us that 

the concept of reducing maintenance intervals in order to deploy ships more quickly 

if needed was considered during early discussions of what was to become the plan, 

but it was quickly dismissed as an unviable option. The Navy recognized that 

shortened maintenance cycles might adversely affect fleet readiness and would not 

meet the intent of the plan. 

Overall, the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan alters how the Navy assigns personnel, 

accomplishes training, and manages maintenance to provide a more ready force. With 

respect to maintenance intervals, we obtained data regarding changes that had 

occurred after the implementation of the plan. Prior to the plan, the Navy had a 

notional 24-month Inter-Deployment Training Cycle for its nuclear carriers—the 

majority of its carrier fleet. This cycle normally included a 6-month maintenance 

period and an 18-month operational cycle, which incorporated training and a 6-month 

deployment. However, the Navy was actually performing a 27-month cycle instead of 

the notional 24-month cycle. Under the Fleet Response Plan, in essence, the Navy 

formalized the 27-month cycle that it was already performing—revising its name to 

“Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle.” This change formally extended the operational 

interval for a nuclear carrier by about 3 months. 2 However, it did not alter the 

6-month depot-level maintenance period that existed prior to the implementation of 

the plan. 

Major Repair, Upgrading Systems, and 

Nuclear Refueling Process Remain 

Unchanged under Fleet Response Plan 

The implementation of the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan does not alter existing repair 

and maintenance requirements; methods for upgrading and modernizing weapons, 

communications, and engineering systems; or methods for performing nuclear 

refueling. These aspects of Navy ship maintenance requirements will continue to be 

 

2 The Navy is assessing its capability to achieve a 32-month Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle. This 

would extend carrier operational availability by an additional 5 months. 
Page 4 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

conducted in accordance with Chief of Naval Operations guidance for naval ships. 3

However, Chief of Naval Operations and Naval Sea Systems Command officials 

informed us that under the Fleet Response Plan, the Navy intends to provide needed 

depot maintenance—called continuous maintenance—more frequently during 

scheduled, shorter-duration pier dockings, instead of deferring this maintenance until 

the normal 6-month maintenance period arrives. Intensification of the preexisting 

continuous maintenance process constitutes the essential core of the Fleet Response 

Plan’s maintenance component. Navy officials stated that additional carrier 

operational availability is being achieved through intensified continuous depot-level 

maintenance. 

As an additional measure to obtain an indication of the Fleet Response Plan’s impact 

on depot-level maintenance, we conducted a limited review of total workload data at 

the Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards before and after the implementation of 

the plan for the period of fiscal years 2003 projected through 2009. The “snapshot” 

data we obtained indicated that although the scheduled maintenance workloads 

varied somewhat on an annual basis, the total and average maintenance workload, in 

terms of staff-days, increased only by about 1 percent and remained relatively 

constant over this period. Naval Sea Systems Command officials stated that 

workload adjustments are a routine business function among shipyards that occurred 

before the plan was implemented and will continue to occur. 

Impact of Fleet Response Plan on 

Navy’s Budget Is Unknown 

There are no present indications that the implementation of the plan will affect the 

Navy’s budget. Navy and Office of the Secretary Defense (OSD) budget officials 

stated that the plan was relatively new and they were unaware of any specific 

budgetary implications at this time. However, Program Budget Decision 709R, dated 

December 22, 2003, asserts that the plan might generate a “bow-wave” of 

maintenance requirements in future years. This assertion stems from an assumption 

that the longer the time between maintenance periods, the more repair work may be 

required. Discussion with an OSD budget official revealed that the assertion was not 

supported by analysis, but rather was based on the official’s prior experience with the 

development of new Navy programs, and on the official’s understanding that the Fleet 

Response Plan focused on streamlining ship maintenance and extending operational 

cycles. The official raised the bow-wave issue in Program Budget Decision 709R to 

provide impetus for improving the plan implementation. However, based on the 

Navy’s intensification of its continuous maintenance process, the OSD budget official 

in retrospect agreed that the Fleet Response Plan probably would not generate a 

bow-wave of maintenance requirements. Program Budget Decision 709R states that, 

prior to the Fiscal Year 2006 Program Review, the Navy should evaluate the impact of 

the plan on (1) sea-shore rotations and manning; (2) intermediate, organizational, and 

depot maintenance; and (3) readiness. OSD and Navy officials stated that such 

assessments would not require formal studies but would occur during the normal 

budget review process. The officials from the various organizations we visited stated 

 

3

 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) NOTICE 4700, Representative Intervals, Durations, 

Maintenance Cycles, and Repair Man-Days for Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy 

Ships, June 16, 2003. 
Page 5 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

that it might take several years of experience to assess the effects that result from 

implementing the plan. 

Scope and Methodology 

To address the assumption that the duration of aircraft carrier depot maintenance 

cycles between deployments would be reduced from approximately 18 months to 

9 months and the effects that such a reduction would have on the Navy’s 

maintenance operations and budget, we relied on data gathered through our visits 

and interviews with key personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Office of the Navy Comptroller; Naval Sea 

Systems Command; and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. We reviewed the 

Navy’s Fleet Response Plan, policies, procedures, and pertinent articles and obtained 

briefings to understand ship maintenance practices and intervals before and after the 

implementation of the plan. Also, because shipyards perform the bulk of depot-level 

maintenance, we completed a limited analysis of workload data for two public 

shipyards—Puget Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards—to determine potential 

workload impacts associated with the implementation of the Fleet Response Plan. 

The workload data developed by the Naval Sea Systems Command are used to make 

adjustments in workload among the shipyards. We used the data to determine if 

significant changes occurred in shipyard workloads as a result of the Navy’s 

implementation of its Fleet Response Plan. For purposes of this assignment, we 

considered the data sufficiently reliable to determine the extent to which workloads 

changed. 

To address the effects of shortened maintenance cycles on the Navy’s major repair 

and maintenance requirements; upgrading and modernizing weapons, 

communications, and engineering systems; and performing nuclear refueling, we 

relied on data gathered through our visits and interviews with key Navy personnel 

within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Naval Sea Systems Command; and 

Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command. We reviewed the Navy’s Fleet Response 

Plan, policies, procedures, and pertinent articles and briefings. Because the Fleet 

Response Plan does not shorten ship maintenance cycles, we did not perform any 

additional work regarding this objective. These types of maintenance activities 

continue to be performed in the normal scheduled maintenance intervals. 

To determine budget implications associated with the Fleet Response Plan, we 

interviewed Under Secretary of Defense and Navy Comptroller officials and reviewed 

and discussed Program Budget Decisions that approved the Navy’s implementation of 

the Fleet Response Plan. 

We performed our work from November 2003 through April 2004 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Page 6 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

Agency Comments 

In written comments on this report, the Department of Defense concurred with the 

draft report. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated 

as appropriate. The Deputy Under Secretary’s comments are included in enclosure II. 

– – – – – 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members 

of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that have jurisdiction and 

oversight responsibilities for the Department of Defense. We are also sending copies 

to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. 

Copies will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any question about this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-8365 or e-mail me at solisw@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report were David 

Schmitt, Dudley Roache, Patricia Albritton, Cheryl Weissman, and Julio Luna. 

Sincerely yours, 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosures - 2 
Enclosure I 

Page 7 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

Briefing Slides

1

GAO’s Observations on Maintenance 

Aspects of the Navy’s Fleet Response 

Plan 

Briefing to the Subcommittee on Defense

House Appropriations Committee

April 6, 2004
Enclosure I 

Page 8 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

2

Briefing Outline

• Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

• Organizations Visited

• Background

• Results of Our Work
Enclosure I 

Page 9 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

3

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

• Overall objectives: To review the assumption that the Navy’s implementation of 

its Fleet Response Plan (FRP) would reduce carrier depot maintenance 

periods between deployments from about 18 months to 9 months, and to 

assess any potential impacts such a reduction would have on the Navy’s 

maintenance budget. To investigate this, we

• met with officials from key organizations responsible for the Navy’s development and implementation of the FRP and its budgetary impacts;

• reviewed the Navy’s FRP, policies, procedures, and pertinent briefings and literature to gain an understanding of ship maintenance cycles before and 

after the implementation of the FRP. We did not review the training and 

manning changes incorporated in the FRP;

• completed a limited analysis of public shipyards’ workload data to determine indications of workload impacts associated with implementing 

the FRP.
Enclosure I 

Page 10 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

4

Organizations Visited

• Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness, Pentagon

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Pentagon

• Department of the Navy (Navy Comptroller), Pentagon

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation 

(PA&E), Pentagon

• Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Pentagon

• Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Washington, D.C., and 

• Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), Norfolk, Virginia
Enclosure I 

Page 11 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

5

Background

• CNO tasked CFFC in March 2003 to create a more employment-capable 

and responsive force after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the launching of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

• The FRP evolved from the CNO tasking and was implemented in May 2003 to meet Homeland Defense and Defense Guidance requirements by 

creating a “6 plus 2” carrier strike force ready to surge when and where 

needed.

• The FRP’s emphasis is on readiness and speed; how soon a ship can be 

surged, if necessary, upon returning from deployment.

• The FRP involves revising ship Inter-Deployment Training (now called 

Readiness—from IDTC to IDRC) Cycle processes—a paradigm change in 

the Navy’s maintenance, training, and manning processes.
Enclosure I 

Page 12 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

6

Results of Our Work: Ship Operations and Maintenance 

Cycles Before and After the FRP Implementation

• FRP does not reduce carrier depot maintenance periods between deployments.

• Before implementation of the FRP, the Navy used notional 21-month and 24- month operational and maintenance cycles for its 2 conventional and 10 

nuclear carriers, respectively. 

• FRP formalizes the 27-month operational and maintenance cycle that the Navy has actually been practicing in lieu of the notional cycles. The Navy refers to 

this 27-month cycle under FRP as the Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle. This 

cycle involves:

• Alternating operating intervals and depot-level maintenance periods.

• Short stand-down period (end of deployment period).

• Maintenance period (involves various maintenance strategies: e.g., Selected Restricted Availability, Engineered Operational Cycle, and 

Incremental Maintenance Program).

• Interdeployment training (basic, intermediate, and advanced).

• Cyclical manning before FRP (causing under-manning in early phase of IDTC). “At Sea” manning leveled out under FRP.
Enclosure I 

Page 13 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

7

Results of Our Work: Notional Ship Maintenance Cycles 

Remain the Same Before and After the FRP Implementation

There are two conventional carriers – U.S.S. Kennedy and U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. The U.S.S. Kitty Hawk is a forward deployed aircraft carrier that uses a unique 120 days (4-month) 

annual maintenance period.

a

Of the ten nuclear carriers, one carrier – the U.S.S. Enterprise – uses a different maintenance strategy, but the interval remains the same as the nine Nimitz Class Carriers. b

Operating 18 months 18 months

Maintenance 3 months 6 months

Extended maintenance 12 months 10.5 months

Total 72 months 76.5 months

Operating 18 months 18 months

Maintenance 3 months 6 months

Operating 18 months 18 months

Operating and maintenance Intervals Conventional Nuclear

(no change before and after FRP)

Alternating Operating and Depot-level Maintenance Intervals

Aircraft carrier type

a b
Enclosure I 

Page 14 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

8

Results of Our Work: Maintenance, Training, and 

Deployment Cycle before FRP – Four Carrier Battle Groups 

Available to Deploy

Carrier Battle Group a

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Deployment

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Stand-down Maintenance Inter – Deployment Training Cycle

CVBG CVBG CVBG CVBG

CVBG CVBG CVBG CVBG

24 - Month Cycle 

CVBG

CVBG CVBG

Deep Maintenance

CVBG employment a

Month of cycle

Inter – Deployment Training Cycle

Deployable

Non-deployable

Denotes cycle transition

CVBG

Forward Deployed Naval Forces

Source: GAO based on Navy data.
Enclosure I 

Page 15 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

9

Results of Our Work: Maintenance, Training, and 

Deployment Cycle after FRP – Eight Carrier Strike Groups 

Available for Employment

a

Carrier Strike Group

Source: GAO based on Navy data.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Gain Proficiency (Surge)

CSG Employment Maintenance Gain Proficiency (Peacetime)

Build Proficiency

CSG 5 CSG 4 CSG 2 CSG 1

CSG CSG 8 CSG 7

Ready for Rapid Work – Up 

(90 days) if Required

Ready for Independent 

Forward Deployment 

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Employable

CSG

CSG 6

Surge Ready: in specified time frame

based on operational requirements

27 - Month Cycle 

a

Month of Cycle

CSG CSG

Deep Maintenance

CSG

Forward Deployed Naval Forces Employable

Non-employable

Training

Employable

Non-deployable
Enclosure I 

Page 16 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

10

Results of Our Work: Scheduling to 

Achieve “6 + 2” Surge Capability

D Deploy

M Maintenance

BP Basic Training Phase

IP/S Intermediate Training Phase/Sustain

Extended Maintenance

Fleet Response Plan Cycle

SUS Sustain 

AP/S Advanced Training Phase/Sustain 

Forward Deployed Naval Forces

Aircraft Carrier

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

FDNF

10

11

12

Available for employment

Source: GAO based on Navy data.
Enclosure I 

Page 17 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

11

Results of Our Work: Impact of FRP on the 

Navy’s Maintenance Budget to Be Determined

• The impact of the FRP on the Navy’s maintenance budget is unknown at this time. 

The FRP was implemented in May 2003. The U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln was the first 

carrier to enter maintenance under the FRP. 

• The FRP does not reduce carrier maintenance durations but does require changes in the timing and methodology of providing maintenance—Continuous Maintenance. 

• Budget, PA&E, CNO, and CFFC officials all stated that there may be impacts 

associated with implementing FRP but it will likely take several years’ experience 

under FRP to assess the impacts.

• Program Budget Decision 709R, dated 12/22/03, states that the Navy, prior to the 

2006 Program Review, should evaluate the impact of FRP on (1) sea-shore rotations 

and manning, (2) intermediate/organizational/depot maintenance, and (3) readiness. 
Enclosure I 

Page 18 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

12

Results of Our Work: Impact of FRP to 

Be Determined

• “Snapshot” data (man-days) for workloads at the Puget 

Sound and Norfolk Naval Shipyards show that although 

annual workloads vary somewhat, total and average 

workloads, in terms of man-days, increased only about 1 

percent and remained relatively constant over the FY 03 – FY 

09 period.

• NAVSEA officials stated that workload adjustments among 

shipyards is a routine business function. Such adjustments 

continue under FRP. 
Enclosure I 

Page 19 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

13

Results of Our Work: Observations

• Aircraft carrier maintenance intervals are not impacted by the 

implementation of the Navy’s FRP. Maintenance intervals under 

the FRP are basically the same as the intervals before the FRP was 

implemented.

• The Navy’s FRP does alter the Navy’s prior deployment practices to 

achieve greater availability of carrier strike groups to better meet 

Homeland Defense and Defense Guidance.

• The impact of the FRP on the Navy’s maintenance budget is 

unknown at this time. This plan is relatively new; it was 

implemented in May 2003, and the 6 + 2 carrier strike force goal

was achieved in November 2003. The Navy’s FRP has not been 

implemented long enough to assess the results of maintenance 

strategies or to quantify impacts.
Enclosure II 

Page 20 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

Comments from the Department of Defense
Enclosure II 

Page 21 GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics 

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