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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 3, 2004

Serial No. 108–93

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

CHRIS BELL, Texas 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina, Chairman 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

CALEB MCCARRY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

TED BRENNAN, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 

Western Hemisphere Affairs ............................................................................... 11

The Honorable Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration ................................................................. 16

The Honorable Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator for Latin America 

and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development ..................... 18

Pierre-Marie Paquiot, President, State University of Haiti ................................. 69

Robert Maguire, Ph.D., Director of Programs in International Affairs, Trinity 

College ................................................................................................................... 72

Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, The Earth Institute at Columbia University ........... 80

The Honorable Timothy M. Carney, former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti .............. 82

The Honorable Orlando Marville, Former Head of the Election Observation 

Mission of the Organization of American States (2000) ................................... 84

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Roger F. Noriega: Prepared statement ........................................ 14

The Honorable Arthur E. Dewey: Prepared statement ........................................ 18

The Honorable Adolfo A. Franco: Prepared statement ......................................... 21

Robert Maguire, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 74

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Charles B. Rangel, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 105

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 106

The Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 107

Responses from the Honorable Roger F. Noriega to questions submitted for 

the record by the Honorable Gregory W. Meeks ............................................... 108

Responses from the Honorable Arthur E. Dewey to questions submitted for 

the record by the Honorable Gregory W. Meeks ............................................... 111

Responses from the Honorable Adolfo A. Franco to questions submitted for 

the record by the Honorable Gregory W. Meeks ............................................... 113

Report on Haiti from the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 

2003, U.S. Department of State .......................................................................... 115

Report on Haiti from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 

2003, U.S. Department of State .......................................................................... 132

Letters from Haitian-Americans in support of the U.S. Administration ............ 136

Reverend Walter Fauntroy, former Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives from the District of Columbia: Prepared statement ................................. 144

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Fact Sheet on Humanitarian Assistance to Haiti ................................................................................... 148

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, 

National Security and International Affairs Division, Government Accounting Office: Prepared statement submitted to the Committee on International Relations on September 19, 2000 ........................................................ 149

Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the International 

Civilian Support Mission in Haiti dated November 9, 2000 ............................ 164

Resolution 1529 (2004) of the United Nations Security Council adopted at 

its 4919th meeting on February 29, 2004 .......................................................... 172

Page

IV

Excerpts from ‘‘Island of Disenchantment,’’ by Charles Lane, printed in the 

September 29, 1997 issue of The New Republic ................................................ 175

(1)

THE SITUATION IN HAITI 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cass Ballenger (Chairman of the Subcommittee) Presiding. 

Mr. BALLENGER. First of all, let me apologize to the people who 

sat and waited. It really was not 45 minutes; it was only about 40 

minutes. 

Before we get started, I want to ask unanimous consent that all 

Members of Congress in attendance today be permitted to join the 

Members of the Subcommittee up here on the dais. Without objection, it is so ordered. Okay, thank you. 

I wish to announce some of the ground rules upon which both 

Ranking Member Mr. Menendez and I have agreed. First, Members 

of the Subcommittee will be allowed to offer an opening statement. 

Second, all Members of the House will be allowed to insert their 

written statements into the record. Third, all Members, time permitting, will be given 5 minutes to ask questions of the witnesses, 

and I would like to say to those of you who are here, we are going 

to be pretty strict on that 5 minutes, or we will be here all day. 

Accordingly, I ask unanimous consent to allow all nonmembers of 

the Subcommittee to speak when they are recognized by the Chair 

to question witnesses. 

Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Alternating by party, priority will be given first to the Members 

of the Subcommittee; then, as time permits, to the Members of the 

full International Relations Committee; and, finally, to Members 

who do not serve on the International Relations Committee. 

Fourth, in the interest of time, I am going to be pretty strict on 

the clock so that each Member will have the best chance of being 

able to say something. 

Before I begin with my opening statement, I wish to remind everyone that this hearing will be lively and emotional, since we all 

want a full debate, and I also ask that everyone remain cordial and 

respectful throughout, if possible, and we have an obligation to uphold the dignity of our offices and this Subcommittee. While we 

may disagree on some issues, we remain obligated to work together 

to discuss the important issues which face our Nation and those of 

Haiti. In my considered opinion, we can and must work together 

in good faith to meet the challenges that we now face. 

2

And now, my opening statement. 

This afternoon we will examine the situation in Haiti. This situation in Haiti is, as has been for some time, extremely challenging. 

The needs of the Haitian people for democracy, jobs, education, and 

health care, and for basic necessities such as food and clean water 

are as great as they have ever been. One can lay out terrible statistics, but they cannot even begin to describe the situation of Haiti’s 

impoverished citizens. 

The efforts of the some of the world’s most experienced diplomats 

to resolve the political stalemate in Haiti all ended in frustration. 

The Deputy Secretary General of the Organization of American 

States made 20 trips to Haiti to try to work out a solution. President Aristide resigned and left Haiti. Presidents in other countries, 

including our own, have resigned for the good of the people. 

Let me be clear. I fully support the steps taken by the Bush Administration to give the people of Haiti a chance to build a better 

future. Our government has acted with the backing of other governments, particularly France and Canada, and has secured the 

unanimous vote in the United Nations Council for a resolution that 

supports actions to help Haiti. 

There is something else I would like to say. There have been accusations that officials of the U.S. Government have committed a 

felony punishable by death, and that is kidnapping. The head of 

the Steele Foundation, which was responsible for President 

Aristide’s security, told me, personally, that if U.S. forces or any 

other forces had tried to kidnap or otherwise harm President 

Aristide, his men had orders to resist and were authorized to do 

so with lethal force, if necessary. The accusation that President 

Aristide was kidnapped is clearly false. 

It is my hope that the hearing can support an initiative that I 

agreed with several Members to come together on a bipartisan 

basis to see how we can help Haiti. I have personally committed 

to deliver humanitarian assistance to Haiti with private funds as 

soon as the situation there permits. 

There is a new provisional President in place in accordance with 

the Haitian Constitution. American Marines are now on the ground 

in Haiti, and it is time to move forward to help the Haitian people. 

With that, I yield to the Ranking Member. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our Members are well-informed and very passionate about the 

issue, but they have every intention of pursuing both the truth as 

well as their policy points of views, and I do not expect anything 

less. 

Today the Americas are watching. The people of our hemisphere 

watched this Administration turn its back on democracy and walk 

out on a democratically-elected President. They were watching in 

Bolivia where massive protests forced President Sanchez de Lozada 

to resign last October. They were watching in Argentina where 

riots overturned numerous Presidents in 2001. They were watching 

in Ecuador when a massive protest overturned a President in 2000. 

But let us be clear that in Haiti, President Aristide was confronting a violent, step-by-step takeover of his country by rebel 

leaders and not simply protests in the street. They watched, and 

they got the clear messages that this Administration sent: This AdVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ministration will not stand up for a democratically-elected Head of 

State they do not like, and this Administration will stand idly by 

as rebels, thugs, and prisoners topple a democratically-elected government. 

Now, we should watch out. That is an incredibly dangerous and 

irresponsible message to send reverberating throughout this hemisphere, particularly at a time when many democracies are teetering on the verge of chaos, crisis, and conflict. Let us be clear: 

We do not get to choose who gets elected in other countries. We 

may like them. We may hate them. And certainly it is our responsibility to question their policies and to shape our own policy toward 

them. But it must be clear to the world and to all the countries in 

the Americas that we respect and support democratically-elected 

Heads of State, period. In fact, I have serious concerns myself 

about President Aristide’s policies and actions, but that cannot dictate our support for democracy. 

This Administration has tried to suggest that when a gang of 

thugs was on the President’s doorstep, that his only choice was either nonintervention and subsequent death, or resignation. Imagine if millions of Americans had stormed the White House after the 

2000 elections. Would we have said that the President’s only choice 

was to leave office or face the mob? Absolutely not. We would rail 

that that action would cause the beginning of the end of our Constitution and our democracy. 

As Andreas Oppenheimer said in his column in the Miami Herald last Sunday, and I quote:

‘‘These are dark days for the cause of democracy in Latin 

America. The fact that a few rebels in Haiti could sway major 

countries to demand the resignation of an elected President 

should sound alarm bells throughout the hemisphere. It happens at a time when violent antigovernment groups are 

spreading in several Latin American countries with politically 

weak elected leaders, and where some elected governments 

seem more tolerant of dictatorship than their predecessors.’’

And we must look clearly at what this Administration’s policies 

have wrought. Yesterday Guy Philippe declared himself military 

chief, and Louis-Jodel Chamblain, a convicted killer and accused Fsquad leader, says he is now in command of operations. According 

to today’s Washington Post, rebel leader Guy Philippe declared on 

Tuesday that he was in control of Haiti’s security forces, and then 

watches as followers looted a downtown museum to the roaring approval of thousands of supporters outside the National Palace. And 

as violence escalated in Port-au-Prince, bodies laid at intersections 

and downtown warehouses, and unclaimed at the morgue. 

And so we say to the people of the Americas, at least in this 

hearing, we in Congress are watching, too, and we will not abdicate 

our responsibility to democracy in this hemisphere. That is why I 

am here today, to ask serious questions about the Administration’s 

policy in Haiti. How could this Administration allow so-called rebel 

leaders, known thugs and convicted murderers to violently take 

over Haiti, piece by piece, city by city? How could the Administration turn a deaf ear to Aristide’s call for help, while passively supVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
4

porting his resignation and strongly urging him to reconsider 

whether his Presidency should continue? 

There are, of course, the allegations of President Aristide himself. They need to be explored and responded to. We must also fully 

understand the Administration’s involvement with opposition 

groups and whether violent nondemocratic groups received funding 

or support. And the Administration must account for its decision 

not to send peacekeepers in without a political solution when it 

was obvious that there would be no political solution without those 

peacekeepers. 

Finally, as we turn to our witnesses, I remind them that the 

words, actions, and deeds of this Administration in Haiti must be 

judged not only for their impact in Haiti, but for their consequences 

throughout this hemisphere. The Americas are watching, and so 

are we, gentlemen, and we look forward to your testimony and the 

answers to the questions that we pose to you. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I thank the gentleman. 

I would like to say, I hope your telephones are ringing the way 

mine are. I have gotten 45 phone calls from Florida, and everybody 

there, every phone call I have gotten so far, is in favor of what happened. 

Next is Congressman Weller. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for conducting this important hearing today and for the opportunity to 

give my statement as a Member of this Subcommittee. 

Mr. Chairman, in recent days the Congress and the American 

people have heard plenty of rhetoric from supporters of President 

Aristide regarding the situation in Haiti. I believe it is now time 

to move away from political rhetoric and talk about the facts. I 

think it is important to remember that every American, including 

the President and every Member of Congress, sincerely wants to 

help the people of Haiti. 

We continue to hear outrage from some that Aristide is no longer 

in power, and that the United States should have stepped in to let 

him keep his or help him keep his power over the Haitian people. 

We even hear unfounded accusations that the United States kidnapped Aristide and his family and forced them out of the country. 

But what are the facts that we have known about Aristide and his 

government? 

Fact number 1: Under Aristide, Haiti blatantly became a hub of 

narcotics trafficking. Where is the outrage to the fact that Barry 

McCaffrey, President Clinton’s own drug czar, said with regard to 

Aristide and his role in narcotrafficking that:

‘‘It is hard to imagine that Aristide himself isn’t taking part in 

this enormously lucrative form of criminal activity. It makes 

one wonder why Aristide became very quickly Haiti’s wealthiest man.’’

What do we hear Aristide supporters saying about the fact that 

the United States State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2003 revealed that top officials under the 

government of Aristide were directly involved in narcotics trafficking? Where is the outrage that under Aristide’s government, 

aircraft filled with drugs have been allowed not only to land on 

5

roads in Port-au-Prince, but have received assistance from Haitian 

National Police officers in blocking traffic, offloading the drugs, and 

ground transport? 

And one of the most important assertions made by Aristide’s supporters is that this is a coup against democracy. Let us make sure 

and get the facts on the record today about what kind of democracy 

Haiti experienced under Aristide. The 2000 elections were noteworthy not for their democratic nature, but for the fraud and violence that accompanied the elections. The Organization of American States Electoral Observation Mission condemned the 2000 legislative election as rigged, and noted that 1.2 million ballots for 

senatorial candidates were discarded. 

Here are the facts on the presidential election. The November 

2000 presidential election was held with no OAS observation, an illegally constituted commission, boycotts by the observation, and no 

domestic observation. Less than 10 percent of eligible voters participated in those national elections in Haiti. The Clinton Administration refused to provide aid to support the elections, and, most 

importantly, the United Nations saw right through Aristide’s brand 

of democracy. Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended that the 

United Nations close its mission to help build democracy in Haiti, 

saying U.N. efforts were useless considering the government’s 

questionable legitimacy and increasing isolation. 

Let us be clear on the role of the Administration in trying to 

solve Haiti’s crisis. The Bush Administration was actively involved, 

both independently and through the OAS and CARICOM nations, 

in working to bring President Aristide back from the precipice he 

placed himself and his country upon. Countless delegations from 

the United States visited, counseled and urged Aristide to fix the 

flawed elections that brought him to power and to renounce corruption, but nothing could dissuade Aristide from rejecting reform and 

rejecting building public institutions. Aristide squandered the opportunity he had to lead Haiti in favor of personal gain. 

Roger J. Daley, U.S. General Consul in Haiti from 1998 to 2002, 

summed up democracy under Aristide:

‘‘To support Aristide’s continued tenure as President is to focus 

on the shadow of democracy and not on its substance.’’

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am extremely concerned about the 

harm that continued unsubstantiated allegations that Aristide was 

kidnapped and forcibly removed from the country may do to our 

armed services and diplomats currently in Haiti today. In fact, recently, a senior United States diplomat in Haiti, a Latino-American, has been specifically targeted by name, putting both he and 

his family at risk. They are already in a dangerous situation, and 

irresponsible comments may not only serve to add gasoline to the 

fire of mob violence in Haiti, but I respectfully urge everyone to 

consider the safety of our Armed Forces before making statements 

that may endanger their lives. 

Mr. Chairman, this is an important hearing for our Western 

Hemisphere, and I want to commend you for your leadership in arranging this hearing, and thank you for the opportunity to make 

a brief statement. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Now, Congressman Delahunt. 

6

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would have to respectfully disagree with the last speaker in terms of his version of 

the facts, but maybe we can illuminate that during the course of 

the questions and answers. Let me just say up front, too, I am no 

defender of President Aristide. I told him at a meeting that I considered him a profound disappointment, and I think at least two 

members of the panel have heard me say that on other occasions. 

But let us reflect where we are today. Haiti has been taken over 

by assassins, drug dealers, thugs, and terrorists. Guy Philippe is a 

former Police Chief who fled the country after allegedly planning 

a coup. He is reportedly under investigation by U.S. authorities for 

involvement in drug trafficking. His cohort, Mr. Chamblain, is a 

convicted killer, the number 2 man of the death squad commonly 

referred to as the FRAPH (Front for the Advancement and 

Progress of Haiti), which brutalized Haiti during the junta years. 

By the way, the leader and founder of FRAPH, Emmanuel Toto 

Constant, a terrorist of the worst sort who is responsible for the 

deaths of thousands, he is not part of this new junta yet because 

he is in the United States, purportedly selling real estate in New 

York City. 

So now we hear that the leaders of this so-called democratic opposition, including Evans Paul and Charles Baker, have been meeting with Philippe and Chamblain. Joining them was the notorious 

Dany Toussaint, well-known to anyone who is conversant with 

Haiti. He is suspected of drug dealing and the murder of the country’s most prominent journalist, and today our Ambassador apparently had a meeting with Philippe. 

Call it what you will, a coup, an alteration in the constitutional 

order, a resignation, the fact is that this Administration did nothing to save democracy in Haiti, and people who represent the very 

worst in that society are in the process of taking it over. It is obscene and a stain on our national honor. It goes against everything 

that we in America embrace, and it did not have to happen. Haiti 

did not have to be delivered into the hands of people who are, to 

put it in terms familiar to many of us, pure evil. 

The fact is that for the past 10 years, the Majority in this Congress and the current Administration did nothing to nurture democratic institutions in Haiti. Instead, aid was blocked or not requested for the police, for the judicial system, the human rights observers for election monitors. And remember, in September 2002, 

an independent electoral council was accepted by Aristide, but it 

could not function because the so-called Democratic Convergence 

refused to name its representative to the council. 

In late 2003, Aristide accepted a plan put forth by the Haitian 

Bishops and supported by Secretary Powell in which he would have 

shared power, but it was rejected by the opposition. And in January, the Caribbean community secured Aristide’s agreement to a 

coalition government and the disarmament of violent thugs, but the 

opposition refused to negotiate unless Aristide resigned. At any of 

these moments, the message from the Administration should have 

been sent loud and clear that it was time for the opposition to put 

the Haitian people above their petty desires and negotiate in good 

faith. I see no evidence that that occurred. 

7

Just a few days ago, Secretary Noriega said that some in Congress are disappointed because the U.S. did not send in troops, and 

I am using his quote, ‘‘to bail out Aristide.’’ I reject that premise. 

Our troops would not have been going into Haiti to bail out 

Aristide; they would have been going in to protect the Haitian people from some of the worst butchers and thugs in that nation’s history. 

Let me conclude that recent events portend a very bad sign for 

the future of democracy and human rights in this hemisphere. 

I yield back what time I may have left. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I would 

like to thank you for holding this important hearing and allowing 

all of us the opportunity to speak on an issue that is of vital importance, especially to my south Florida community, but, indeed, to 

the international community in their efforts to support true democratic and political reform in Haiti. So I commend you for having 

this hearing and for addressing your commitment to the current 

situation and improvement in Haiti. 

I would also like to welcome our witnesses today. Ambassador 

Noriega has advised the President and Secretary Powell with a 

true sense of professionalism and understanding of the region, and 

we welcome him back to our neck of the woods, here in our Subcommittee. 

To Administrator Franco, I would like to thank him for his ongoing efforts and commitment to the humanitarian situation in Haiti. 

I know that you have been following it closely, and it is important 

to note that this Administration’s contributions have even exceeded 

congressional funding. 

Adolfo, I am thrilled to see that one of my former staffers, Jose 

Fuentos, is sitting behind you and working with you and USAID 

on these important issues. In concert with Assistant Secretary 

Dewey, I am positive that your offices and the staff of all of these 

fine gentlemen are working extremely hard to make the current 

situation in Haiti less painful for the people of Haiti. 

That is why we are here, Mr. Chairman, to discuss and learn 

about the current situation in Haiti and, more importantly, about 

the future of Haiti and a future that we hope is a bright one and 

a positive one. 

The state of affairs in Haiti is changing and updated not only on 

a daily basis, on an hourly basis, but indeed every minute it seems 

to alter. Most recently the United Nations laid out its plan for 

Haiti where Resolution 1529 called for a multinational interim 

force to work with Haitian political forces and the international 

community to restore a true, a lasting, and a transparent democracy in Haiti. Additionally, CARICOM nations are working on the 

CARICOM Action Plan. Under this plan, civil society, political opposition, and the government each appoint one member to this 

council. 

Recent accounts, as we know, are troubling. Our own DEA 

agents indicate that Haiti has been a major transit point for narcotics into the United States. Statements by elusive narcotraffickers are shedding light on Haiti’s turning a blind eye to drug 

trafficking. These drugs, which infest the streets and the playVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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grounds of our neighborhoods, only bring tragedy to American families. So at all levels, the United States has taken a leadership role 

in eliminating this danger and in working in tandem with our regional and international allies to create a stable and working government for the people of Haiti, a government responsible to its 

people and to the needs of the Haitian people. 

With a population exceeding 7 million, we must come together to 

help the people of Haiti overcome the transition it is currently experiencing. The women and the children of Haiti sit in despair 

awaiting assistance, be it military or humanitarian. But let us not 

take our eyes off the target and remember that at the end of the 

day, the children of Haiti are looking for international help, and 

the United States will be there to help them. 

Secretary Powell summarized our objective while addressing EU 

ministers earlier this week, and I quote:

‘‘And now we are there to give the Haitian people another 

chance, and we will be working with Haitians to help Haitians 

put in place a political system, and we will support it to the 

best of our ability. I am pleased that the international community has responded so quickly with a unanimous U.N. resolution.’’

Those are the Secretary’s words. 

So as I sit here today with my colleagues discussing the current 

situation in Haiti, I cannot help but ponder upon the suffering of 

a people and on the current situation of an island not too far from 

Haiti, my homeland of Cuba. But I strongly encourage this Administration to work on promoting the security situation in Haiti, in 

supporting an independent government that enjoys true popular 

support and restores respect for the rule of law in Haiti. 

The United States has been and probably always will be Haiti’s 

leading provider of economic aid. I encourage our colleagues here 

today to continue their support for the international financial 

loans. Our country has been the shining beacon for freedom and 

liberty for our Western Hemisphere neighbors. Haiti is currently in 

a situation where assistance is warranted, and I call on my colleagues to make all efforts to bring stability and transparency to 

a people who for so many years have longed for it. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to hear 

from so many others. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Now Congressman Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I, too, express my appreciation for this hearing to finally be held. I know that Chairman 

Menendez as our Ranking Member has called repeatedly for a 

hearing, and our colleague Barbara Lee on the International Relations Committee, not on this Subcommittee, has also done that, 

and, of course, my voice. But I guess it took the situation that we 

currently have in Haiti to talk about now what can we do, whereas 

if we had a meeting before, perhaps some of these areas could have 

been addressed before, and we could have prevented what happened. 

It is always interesting to hear the people from the other side. 

My colleague from Illinois talked about how tremendous this drugdealing state of Haiti has been. And I, you know, get amused beVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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cause President Aristide asked the DEA to bring him more support. 

He allowed the U.S. to have overflight responsibilities where our 

aircraft could fly over and have surveillance over its country, could 

use our Coast Guard at their ports, but we did not take advantage 

of it. So the easy way to do it is to say, well, you know, he allowed 

drug-dealing to happen. So we need to take a look, I guess, at Panama, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, all 

of those places that we are spending tremendous amounts of funds 

supporting in some instances the new leadership, while we still 

have this tremendous thing. And so I really kind of question a person to say there is drug-dealing going on. It is going on even in the 

State of Illinois, and we do not, therefore, condemn the Governor 

to say that he has turned his back. 

So I would just like to say that, you know, you can have a selffulfilling prophecy. If you wait and wait and wait until the last 

minute, there is no other option but to leave. And when the thugs 

were coming down, town by town—and, as Mr. Delahunt mentioned, these are convicted killers: Chamblain, former sergeant, accused of killing businessmen and others; Philippe, who was actually convicted of killing Antoine Izmery and Guy Malary. These are 

people our government evidently feels more comfortable in sitting 

down with, negotiating with, because I guess that is what they are 

going to do because those are the new people who will be in charge 

of this government. 

It makes no sense at all to take people who have been in the DR, 

people who are in New York, the former FRAPH that stood on the 

docks and turned the country of Harlem around. Do you remember 

that? The same people now are in this new government. This is a 

disgrace. 

Then we have our great Colonel, David Berger—and I know that 

he is concerned since there are so few Marines—said that, ‘‘I am 

not a police officer, and I have no instructions to disarm.’’ So as the 

American Marines sit by, protecting U.S. properties, this band of 

thugs and gangsters and killers simply can do whatever they want 

to do. 

If, in fact, we are going to do nothing, then we ought to leave and 

just let the place go down like it is happening. How can we send 

in people and just allow the killings to go on, to look the other way? 

You would do better maybe with the Haitian Police Department. 

They might at least try to apprehend the criminal. 

So I think several weeks ago when the French made it pretty 

clear that they were willing to go in with 4,000 Marines, but I suspect that somehow they were discouraged—I was told by Secretary 

of State Powell that it was a misinterpretation. They really did not 

want to go in. However, they not only said they would go in, they 

said they didn’t necessarily need Americans to go in. They said 

they would appreciate it if we would participate in the costs. I can 

see one thing being blurred by interpretation, but not a specific 

kind of a plan like that, that all of a sudden we find that it was 

totally misinterpreted. We should allow countries that have some 

goodwill toward a situation, that when they see right over wrong, 

to do their thing and not necessarily say that is in our sphere of 

influence, which I would suppose occurred. 

10

So I am very—it is a sad day for democracy. This regime change 

is who we want to see elected and who we do not. If we do not 

agree with them, they are out. If we do, they are okay, regardless 

to—it reminds me of the Cold War, the Mobutus that we created 

for 30 years in Zaire. The people who rob and kill their own people 

are those that we would rather negotiate with. It makes no sense. 

It is a flawed policy. It is a dark day in our history. 

I think that when a President—why not take him out and then 

come up with that diplomatic solution that Secretary of State Colin 

Powell was trying to negotiate? Why do we have to resign in order 

for him to leave? He could have left the country and come back 

once order was restored. But since he resigned, I guess then we can 

deal with the country because a coup d’etat did not occur. He just 

quit, retired, had enough, decided to resign and go somewhere else. 

Therefore, legally, I guess, the international communities could 

then deal with this coup d’etat, which even in the Africa Unions 

say that if a country is taken over by military forces in Africa, 

countries do not have diplomatic relations, and that country is isolated and boycotted, and sanctions go out on that country. However, the convenient resignation of President Aristide, therefore, 

precludes even the AU’s, African Union, laws to preside. 

So as you can tell, we are very—many of us are very frustrated. 

We appreciated the President finally meeting with us last Wednesday, but we have seen nothing positive really come about. I would 

hope that we would have a plan. I would hope that we would—if 

we don’t want to intervene with disarmament, why don’t we let 

someone else go in, those who may be willing to have disarmament 

reintegration, so that the killings can stop right now? It is simply 

a lawless place, and I believe that we can do better. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Pursuant to the previous order, Members, other 

Members, may submit their written testimony for the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

Let me go to the first panel now. What I plan on doing is introducing all members of the panel first, and all will testify before any 

questions will be asked. 

First of all, Roger Noriega. Roger Noriega serves as Assistant 

Secretary of State for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. 

He is a frequent visitor of this Subcommittee, and we always enjoy 

having him here. 

Second is Arthur Gene Dewey. Gene Dewey serves our Nation as 

Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, 

and Migration. He is responsible for overseeing U.S. policies regarding the refugees and international migration. He is a graduate 

of West Point and served two combat aviation tours in Vietnam. I 

would like to thank him for coming. 

Third is Adolfo Franco. Adolfo Franco is the Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean of the U.S. Agency for 

International Development. Mr. Franco previously served as a 

counsel to the Majority on the International Relations Committee, 

and it is a pleasure to see you again, Adolfo. 

Let me please request of you if you could reduce your testimony 

to 5 minutes, and we will enter your total statement for the record, 

if that is satisfactory. And if that is okay, Secretary Noriega. 

11

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER F. NORIEGA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS 

Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear before you and to have an opportunity to speak to 

this Subcommittee today on the topic of Haiti. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, one chapter in the 

history of Haiti has just come to a close, a very sad chapter, and 

the Haitian people are preparing to write a new one. The resignation of President Aristide on February 29 marked the end of a process that in its early days held out a bright promise to free Haiti 

from the violence, authoritarianism, and confrontation that has 

plagued that country since its independence 200 years ago. Sadly, 

that hope remains unrealized today. While responsibility for this 

failure resides largely with former President Aristide himself, the 

task before the United States, working with the international community, is to help the people of Haiti break the cycle of political 

misrule that has caused so much misery. 

As we move ahead, it is important that we understand where the 

problems lie. The Haitian people are not to blame for the country’s 

poverty and lack of development. Those of us who have Haitian 

friends and colleagues know that they are an especially creative 

and particularly industrious people. Those who have made the 

United States their home are a blessing to our community and to 

our economy. Rather, the absence of good governance, even the absence of the will to govern fairly and effectively, lies at the heart 

of the problem. 

President Aristide’s legacy of frustrated hopes was caused as 

much by what he did not do as by what he did do. At the end, even 

his supporters in the international community realized that his 

rule had undermined democracy and economic development in 

Haiti, rather than strengthened it. 

Let us be very clear. United States policy in Haiti and throughout the Western Hemisphere, indeed throughout the world, is to 

support and strengthen democratic institutions. On September 11, 

2001, the United States joined the 33 other members of the Organization of American States, including Haiti, in signing the InterAmerican Democratic Charter. The creation of the Democratic 

Charter owed much to the hemispheric concern against the undermining of democratic institutions by elected governments themselves. It acknowledges that the essential elements of representative democracy go well beyond merely holding elections, and that 

governments have the obligation to promote and to defend democratic principles and institutions. 

A commitment to constitutional democracy was what led this 

government to demand that Jean-Bertrand Aristide be restored to 

power after he was deposed by a military coup in 1991. By the fall 

of 1994, the United States led a multinational force to restore 

President Aristide to power, as a matter of fact. From the outset, 

Mr. Aristide’s supporters began committing systematic acts of violence that undermined the confidence of the Haitian people in our 

international mission. Many Haitians began wondering whether we 

were in Haiti to strengthen democracy or merely keep one individual in power. 

12

Looking back, it is fair to say that had the international community been more rigorous in holding President Aristide to his commitments to respect human rights and the rule of law, his rule 

might not have ended with his resignation and his self-imposed 

exile 10 years later. 

Killings of President Aristide’s opponents began within months of 

his return to power, but no persons were ever arrested or convicted 

for these crimes. The undermining of the democratic process was 

demonstrated by the highly flawed Parliamentary elections of July 

1995, badly run local elections in April 1997, and the fraudulent 

Parliamentary elections once again in May 2000. This series of farcical electoral exercises and the Haitian Government’s unwillingness to govern justly opened the door to the many subsequent acts 

of political violence and the intimidation by President Aristide 

against his opponents. Incidentally, his election at the end of November 2000 was pronounced by the international community as 

not meeting international standards. Since 1994, the United States has provided $850 million in assistance to Haiti. However, our aid programs failed to produce sustainable growth because of the corruption and the inaction of the 

Haitian Government. An impressive investment of money and technical assistance to create a 5,000 Haitian national police force was 

squandered as President Aristide deliberately politicized and underfunded the organization. Instead, Aristide and his successors 

undermined the rule of law by relying on criminal gangs and failing to confront narcotraffickers. 

Mr. Delahunt has referred to Danny Toussaint as being one of 

the thugs that is pretending to run Haiti today. Danny Toussaint 

was an aide to President Aristide. He was a security aide to President Aristide. He was one of his principal advisers. He is a creature of President Aristide, and you are right, he is a very bad man. 

You are wrong, though. He is not running Haiti. 

Despite the justified frustration of the international community, 

we never gave up on Haiti or the Haitian people. Our approach in 

encouraging respect for constitutional processes and good governance of Haiti focused on working with our hemispheric partners 

through the OAS and with the other friends of Haiti. In June 2001, 

the OAS General Assembly approved Resolution 831 calling on the 

Government of Haiti to take steps to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections as a means of resolving the political 

crisis created by the tainted, corrupted elections of 2000. 

On December 17, 2001, only a few months later, the Government 

of Haiti instead lashed out at its opponents with a series of brutal 

attacks by pro-Aristide thugs on persons and property. This led to 

the OAS Resolution 806, which called for the creation of an OAS 

Special Mission to strengthen democracy in Haiti and for the 

Aristide regime to take vigorous steps to restore a climate of security. 

When the Government of Haiti failed to comply with the terms 

of Resolution 806, the OAS responded with another resolution, 822, 

in September 2002. In this resolution, the Government of Haiti 

again committed itself to take a series of actions to promote a climate of security and confidence leading to free and fair elections 

in 2003. I was Chairman of the OAS Permanent Council when ResVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
13

olution 822 was approved, and the U.S. delegation did the heavy 

lifting in negotiating that document. Resolution 822 is an important resolution because it took the key step of calling for the normalization of economic cooperation between the Government of 

Haiti and the international and financial institutions as a means 

of providing Haiti with further a incentive to develop its institutions and promote sustainable development. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Secretary, if you could bring it to a close; 

if I am going to be tough on everybody else, I guess I have to be 

tough on you, too. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, I guess I could stop right now if you do not 

want to hear the rest of this. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, I would love to hear it, but I just—could 

you——

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, then, I will keep going. 

In the face of the Haitian Government’s noncompliance with the 

terms of these resolutions, the Caribbean community, CARICOM, 

and the OAS sent a high-level delegation, which included President 

Bush’s Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere Affairs to Haiti in 

March 2003. In September 2003, the United States facilitated the 

OAS effort to send another special envoy to Haiti, Ambassador Terence Todman, to help broker a breakthrough in the political stalemate. While all of this was taking place, the United States donated 

another $3.5 million to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti to support 

its work. 

These determined efforts came to naught. Rather than taking 

steps to build political consensus, reign in the rampant corruption 

that robbed Haitians of their already meager resources, or promote 

an atmosphere of security, Aristide continued to recruit and arm 

gangs of thugs to be unleashed against his opponents. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Secretary, they are checking your statement 

up here, and you have a couple more pages to go. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Sure. 

Mr. BALLENGER. If you don’t mind, could you bring it to a close, 

please, sir? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, let me tell you what I need to tell you about 

the future, sir. 

I want to talk about several key points regarding United States 

policy and how we go forward with our international partners to 

help the Haitian people. 

The United States has been and will continue to be a firm supporter of democracy in Haiti. That is the cornerstone of our policy. 

President Aristide’s departure was never a demand by the United 

States. We continuously worked with our international partners to 

break through the political impasse and allow democracy to have 

a chance. The United States has been and will almost certainly remain Haiti’s leading provider of economic assistance. This aid was 

never suspended or cut off, as some have claimed. Between 1995 

and 2003, the United States provided $850 million in assistance. 

Looking forward, our goal is to further stabilize the security situation and provide emergency humanitarian assistance to Haitians, 

promote the formation of independent government that enjoys 

broad popular support, and work with the government to restore 

the rule of law and other key democratic institutions in Haiti, 

14

while encouraging steps to improve the difficult economic condition 

of the Haitian people. 

The United States is not alone in this process. Under the terms 

of the U.N. Security Council resolution, United States forces are on 

the ground in Haiti, participating in a Multilateral Interim Force 

to contribute to a secure and stable environment. And, Mr. Menendez, the countries of the Americas are doing more than watching 

what we are doing in Haiti, they are helping. And, quite frankly, 

to compare them in any way to the way President Aristide has governed Haiti is, as a matter of fact, an insult to the Latin American 

leaders. 

As the Multinational Interim Force ends its mission, we will continue to support a U.N. stabilization force, and key countries in the 

hemisphere are going to participate in that process and will build 

up a Haitian national police. These are the people who will be protecting Haitians from killers. 

President Bush has called for a break from the past in Haiti. Indeed, there must be a break from the past if Haiti is to move forward. That break will not come in the form of a new autocrat or 

demagogue, but by unleashing the incredible potential of the Haitian people in positive and productive directions. Nowhere is it 

written that the Haitian people must be ruled by tyrants. They deserve leaders worthy of their trust and respect who favor the common good over personal gain. 

Mr. Chairman, you are going to hear from Pierre-Marie Paquiot 

in a few minutes. This is the legacy of President Aristide, the Director of the University of Haiti whose legs were pulverized by 

Aristide’s gangs when he dared to wander into the middle of a 

demonstration in December 2003 and try to break up the violence, 

beaten to where his legs were pulverized, and he has to go through 

rehabilitation. This is the legacy of violence of President Aristide. 

He is also part of the future, and you will be able to hear his message, because that is the voice of the Haitian people. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER F. NORIEGA, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear and to speak before this Subcommittee 

today on the topic of Haiti. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members: 

A chapter in the history of Haiti has just come to a close and the Haitian people 

are preparing to write a new one. The resignation of President Aristide on February 

29 marked the end of a process that in its early days held out a bright promise to 

free Haiti from the violence, authoritarianism, and confrontation that has plagued 

that country since its independence two hundred years ago. Sadly, that hope remains unrealized. While responsibility for this failure resides largely with Aristide 

himself, the task before the United States, working with the international community, is to help the people of Haiti break the cycle of political misrule that has 

caused so much misery. 

As we move ahead, it is important that we understand where the problems lie. 

The Haitian people are not to blame for the country’s poverty and lack of development. Rather, the absence of good governance, even the WILL to govern fairly and 

effectively lies at the heart of the problem. Aristide’s legacy of frustrated hope was 

caused as much by what HE DID NOT DO as by the steps he took. At the end, 

even his supporters in the international community realized that his rule had undermined democracy and economic development in Haiti rather than strengthened 

it. 

15

Let’s be very clear. U.S. policy in Haiti and throughout the Western Hemisphere—indeed the world—is to support democracy and the strengthening of democratic institutions. On September 11, 2001, the United States joined the 33 other 

members of the Organization of American States—including Haiti—in signing the 

Inter-American Democratic Charter. The creation of the Democratic Charter owed 

much to the hemispheric concern against the undermining of democratic institutions 

by elected governments. It acknowledges that the essential elements of representative democracy go well beyond merely holding elections and that governments have 

the obligation to promote and defend democratic principles and institutions. 

The commitment to strengthening democracy has been the cornerstone of our policy in Haiti since the restoration of Aristide to power—by the international community led by the United States—in 1994. This process was set back by the highly 

flawed parliamentary elections of June 1995, badly run local elections in April 1997, 

and fraudulent parliamentary elections once again in May 2000. This series of bogus 

electoral exercises and the Haitian government’s unwillingness to govern fairly 

opened the door to many subsequent acts of political violence and intimidation by 

Aristide against his opponents. Our approach in encouraging respect for constitutional processes and good governance in Haiti focused on working with our hemispheric partners through the OAS and with other friends of Haiti. In June 2001, 

the OAS General Assembly approved Resolution 1831 calling on the Government of 

Haiti to take steps to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections as 

a means of resolving the political crisis created by the tainted elections of 2000. 

On December 17, 2001, the Government of Haiti lashed out at its opponents with 

a series of brutal attacks by pro-Aristide thugs on persons and property. This led 

to OAS Resolution 806, which called for the creation of an OAS Special Mission to 

Strengthen Democracy in Haiti and for the Aristide regime to take vigorous steps 

to restore a climate of security. 

When the Government of Haiti failed to comply with the terms of Resolution 806, 

the OAS responded with another resolution—822—in September 2002. In this resolution, the Government of Haiti again committed itself to take a series of actions 

to promote a climate of security and confidence leading to free and fair elections in 

2003. I was Chairman of the OAS Permanent Council when Resolution 822 was approved and the U.S. delegation did the heavy lifting in negotiating the document. 

Resolution 822 took the key step of calling for the normalization of economic cooperation between the GOH and the international financial institutions—as a 

means of providing Haiti with further incentive to develop its institutions and promote sustainable development. 

In the face of the Haitian Government’s non-compliance with the terms of these 

resolutions, the Caribbean Community—CARICOM—and the OAS sent a high-level 

delegation, which included President Bush’s Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere 

Affairs, to Haiti in March 2003. In September 2003, the United States facilitated 

the OAS effort to send another special envoy to Haiti, Ambassador Terence Todman, 

to help broker a breakthrough in the political stalemate. While all this was taking 

place, the United States donated $3.5M to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti to support its work. 

These impressive efforts came to naught. Rather than taking steps to build political consensus, reign in the rampant corruption that robbed Haitians of their already meager resources, or promote an atmosphere of security, Aristide continued 

to recruit and arm gangs of thugs to be unleashed against his opponents. In the 

process, he undermined what little legitimate law enforcement capacity remained in 

the already corrupted and weakened Haitian National Police. U.S. law enforcement 

assistance was essentially limited to support of the Haitian Coast Guard, a rare and 

largely autonomous police unit that continued to have professional and competent 

leadership. 

Further undermining the rule of law and the effectiveness of his government, 

Aristide turned a blind eye to the rampant corruption and drug trafficking of those 

within his circle of power. 

It is no wonder, therefore, that when one of the largest pro-Aristide gangs turned 

against him and rose in open rebellion in the city of Gonaı ̈ves last month, the Government of Haiti had no effective, let alone legitimate means with which to respond. 

The rapid collapse of Government authority throughout Haiti bore testimony not to 

the strength of the thugs and gangs who sought to bring him down, but to Aristide’s 

own failures. By gutting respect for the rule of law and reverting to authoritarian 

practices, he undermined his own legitimacy and demeaned the word ‘‘democracy.’’

Under these circumstances, Aristide agreed to what he had steadfastly rejected 

before, a plan that would open the door to consensus government and a way forward 

to resolve Haiti’s political crisis. This was, of course, the CARICOM Prior Action 

Plan, with its own Plan of Action and endorsement by the United States, France 

16

and Canada. For Aristide, this change of heart came too late to save his government. Nor did his eleventh-hour appeal for foreign military intervention garner support in the international community. No country, the United States included, was 

inclined to send forces to sustain the failed political status quo in Haiti. In what 

may eventually be considered his finest hour, Aristide decided to resign, initiating 

a constitutional process that transferred power to the President of the Supreme 

Court. 

There are several key points that I wish to make regarding U.S. policy toward 

Haiti—as we move forward with our international partners to help the Haitian people:

1. the United States has been and will continue to be a firm supporter of democracy in Haiti. That is a cornerstone of our policy.

2. Aristide’s departure was never a U.S. demand. We continuously worked with 

our international partners to break through the political impasse and allow 

democracy to have a chance. Even France, while calling on February 25 for 

Aristide’s ouster, remained supportive of our efforts to find a negotiated solution. While we were convinced that Aristide was a key obstacle in these efforts, we sought to work with him up until the very end. These efforts were 

conducted at the highest levels of the United States Government, with Secretary Powell in the forefront.

3. The United States has been and will almost certainly remain Haiti’s leading 

provider of economic aid. This aid was never suspended or cut off, as some 

have claimed. Between 1995 and 2003, the United States provided over $850 

million in assistance to Haiti.

4. Our leadership at the OAS in negotiating Resolution 822 in September 2002 

helped to open the door to normalized relations between Haiti and the IFIs 

and since then IDB loans have begun to flow. We will continue to support 

IFI loans to Haiti based on their technical merits.

Looking forward, our goal is first to stabilize the security situation and provide 

emergency humanitarian assistance to Haitians, promote the formation of an independent government that enjoys broad popular support, and work with that government to restore the rule of law and other key democratic institutions in Haiti, while 

encouraging steps to improve the difficult economic condition of the Haitian people. 

The United States is not alone in this process. Under the terms of a UN Resolution 

approved unanimously by the Security Council on February 29, U.S. forces are already in Haiti, participating in a Multilateral Interim Force to contribute to a secure and stable environment. The key elements of the CARICOM prior action plan 

are, as we speak, being carried out to name a new Prime Minister who will in turn 

form a consensus government to lead Haiti forward. As the Multinational Interim 

Force ends its mission, we will support the UN stabilization force called for by the 

Security Council and will work with the UN and OAS to help the Haitian people 

rebuild their institutions, starting with the Haitian National Police. 

President Bush has called for a ‘‘break from the past’’ in Haiti. Indeed there 

MUST be a break from the past if Haiti is to move forward. That break will not 

come in the form of a new autocrat or demagogue but by unleashing the incredible 

potential of the Haitian people in positive and productive directions. Nowhere is 

there written that the Haitian people must be poor or ruled by tyrants. They deserve leaders worthy of their trust and respect, who favor the common good over 

personal gain. The rule of law must be upheld. Those responsible for crimes and 

abuses must be punished. Gangs and thugs cannot be allowed to hold sway. Support 

from the United States and the international community can help—and they will 

have it—but the long-term job of building Haitian democracy is up to the Haitians 

themselves. They, above all people in our Hemisphere, deserve some success.

Mr. BALLENGER. Secretary Dewey. Witnesses are not supposed to 

be regulated by the 5-minute rule, but I made that statement to 

begin with, so I have to stick with it. Sorry about that. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ARTHUR E. DEWEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION 

Mr. DEWEY. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I, too, 

appreciate this opportunity to discuss recent developments in Haiti 

as they pertain to refugee and migration affairs. 

17

I am thankful first that the number of Haitians taking to the sea 

in overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels was not of the order of those 

who had departed during previous migrations. Had there been a 

mass migration by sea, we would almost certainly have seen people 

drowned or otherwise lost at sea. We continue to encourage Haitians not to take to sea. 

During the course of the last week, the U.S. Coast Guard rescued 

some 900 migrants at sea. Once aboard cutters, they were given 

medical attention and food and cared for while awaiting repatriation in coordination with the Haitian Coast Guard. 

If at any time during the course of interdiction and repatriation 

efforts a migrant in any way expresses or indicates a fear or concern regarding returning to Haiti, that migrant is interviewed by 

a trained Department of Homeland Security protection officer to 

determine whether the migrant requires protection against repatriation. During last week’s repatriations, migrants who expressed 

the fear of return were promptly transferred to a separate vessel 

for protection screening. 

Among those interdicted, only a handful expressed fear of returning home. They were promptly transferred to a separate vessel. 

They were not immediately returned to Haiti with the other migrants. And after a thorough screening, these migrants were found 

not to have a credible fear of persecution and were repatriated. 

The U.S. Coast Guard effected these repatriations with superb 

assistance from the Haitian Coast Guard and from U.S. Embassy 

staff in Port-au-Prince, who were on the scene for as much of the 

repatriation process as possible. My own bureau, the Bureau of 

Population, Refugees and Migration at the State Department, is 

now making emergency funds available to the Embassy to cover 

food, transportation, and similar expenses to assist repatriated migrants as they return to their homes. 

We are working closely with the Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Defense, in this endeavor, as we have worked closely together 

throughout the recent events in Haiti. 

In addition to these efforts, we contacted the Office of the United 

Nations High Commissioner For Refugees well before the onset of 

the crisis to discuss, among other issues, what could be done to assist Caribbean countries like Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and 

the Bahamas in the event of a large outflow from Haiti. 

With our full support, UNHCR dispatched a team of specialists 

to the Caribbean to draw up a comprehensive regional response to 

any crisis that might emerge. They have provided guidance to Caribbean governments throughout the crisis. Consideration of an 

international appeal for assistance is now on hold pending new developments. 

Our goal in this endeavor has been to mobilize the international 

community through the High Commissioner For Refugees to ensure 

that the United States, and the United States taxpayer, do not 

bear sole responsibility for responding to this crisis, and that we 

can count on our international partners to shoulder responsibility 

as well. Application of international burden-sharing to rebuild 

Haiti will also minimize motivations in the future for Haitians to 

attempt to flee their homeland. 

18

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Dewey. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dewey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ARTHUR E. DEWEY, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss recent developments in Haiti as they pertain to migration and refugee affairs. 

I am thankful, first, that the number of Haitians taking to the sea in overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels was not of the order of those who departed during 

previous migrations. Had there been a mass migration by sea, we would almost certainly have seen people drowned or otherwise lost at sea. We continue to encourage 

Haitians not to take to sea. 

During the course of the last week, the U. S. Coast Guard rescued some 900 migrants at sea. Once aboard cutters they were given medical attention and food, and 

cared for while awaiting repatriation in coordination with the Haitian Coast Guard. 

If at any time during the course of interdiction and repatriation efforts a migrant 

in any way expresses or indicates a fear or concern regarding return to Haiti, that 

migrant is interviewed by a trained Department of Homeland Security protection officer to determine whether the migrant requires protection against repatriation. 

During last week’s repatriations, migrants who expressed a fear of return were 

promptly transferred to a separate vessel for protection screening. 

Among those interdicted, only several expressed fear of returning home. They 

were promptly transferred to a separate vessel. They were not immediately returned 

to Haiti with the other migrants. After thorough screening, these migrants were 

found not to have a credible fear of persecution, and were repatriated. 

The U. S. Coast Guard effected these repatriations with superb assistance from 

the Haitian Coast Guard and from U.S. Embassy staff in Port-Au-Prince who were 

on scene for as much of the repatriation process as possible. My own bureau, the 

Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, is now making emergency funds 

available to the Embassy to cover food, transportation and similar expenses to assist 

repatriated migrants return to their homes. 

We are working closely with the Department of Homeland Security, including the 

U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Defense in this endeavor, as we have 

worked closely together throughout the recent events in Haiti. 

In addition to these efforts, we contacted the office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) well before the onset of the crisis to discuss, 

among other issues, what could be done to assist Caribbean countries like Jamaica, 

the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas in the event of a large outflow from Haiti. 

With our full support, UNHCR dispatched a team of specialists to the Caribbean 

to draw up a comprehensive regional response to any crisis that might emerge. They 

have provided guidance to Caribbean governments throughout the crisis. Consideration of an international appeal for assistance is now on hold pending new developments. 

Our goal in this endeavor has been to mobilize the international community 

through UNHCR to ensure that the United States—and the United States taxpayer—do not bear sole responsibility for responding to the crisis, and that we can 

count on our international partners to shoulder responsibility as well. 

Application of international burden sharing to rebuilding Haiti will also minimize 

motivations in the future for Haitians to attempt to flee their homeland.

Mr. BALLENGER. Adolfo, it is your turn. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO A. FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE 

CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. FRANCO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee. It is always a pleasure to return home to the House 

International Relations Committee, and today is a very timely 

hearing, discussing the unfolding humanitarian situation in Haiti 

and USAID’s continuing efforts to assist the Haitian people to realize their dream of peace, prosperity and democracy. I have subVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
19

mitted a complete statement for the record, and I ask that it be 

made a part of the record. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection. 

Mr. FRANCO. I used to be the guy who monitors those lights, so 

if it goes yellow, just let me know, and I will wrap it up. I appreciate it. 

Although we might have differences of opinion, I know that 

President Bush, this Congress, and the American people are all 

fully committed to the well-being and prosperity of the Haitian people. Just as Secretary Noriega has noted, the United States is and 

has been the largest bilateral donor in Haiti, and this Administration will not shirk its responsibilities to the Haitian people. 

With the situation regarding the humanitarian efforts at hand, 

Mr. Chairman, since the conflict began in early February, there 

has been some restriction of movement of commercial goods and relief supplies, including food, fuel, and medical stocks. This has hindered AID’s ability to distribute food assistance to those populations it normally serves. Access and distribution remain our 

major obstacle for both humanitarian deliveries and regular commercial activity in the country. USAID is implementing with its 

nongovernmental organizational partners, but has, however, reported that the primary concern of humanitarian assistance is lack 

of security, and this impedes the safe passage for the transportation and distribution of relief supplies, fuel, water, and food commodities. 

However, Mr. Chairman, as I stated last week, I want to make 

clear that based on the best information available to USAID, and 

we are in constant communication with Port-au-Prince, we have 

staff there and our partner organization, Haiti has enough food to 

feed its population, although insecurity and disruptions in transportation and distribution could potentially cause a deterioration in 

the availability of food, particularly in urban areas. 

Despite overall availability of food, however, it is true that certain pockets of particular need exist, and these are certain populations, particularly in the north, with the elderly and some orphanages that have reported to us difficulties in receiving food supplies. I will travel to Haiti this weekend to personally assess the 

situation on the ground with our staff and our partners in Port-auPrince. 

To meet the needs of Haiti, Mr. Chairman, we have 20,000 metric tons of food available in Louisiana for immediate transport to 

Haiti if that would become necessary, and we have stocks of 11,000 

metric tons of food. This is just USAID food in country. You may 

have read that some of this food was looted in the unrest on February 29, but I am very pleased to report to the Committee today 

that the subsequent investigation by our personnel on the ground 

reveals that most of our USAID emergency food supplies remain intact and are under secure storage in Port-au-Prince. 

I want to state, Mr. Chairman, that prior to this, we were 

preplanning, and I reported this to the committee last week, if necessary, drops throughout the country that were not using the Portau-Prince facility, use of helicopters, certainly any other means 

that we would in a complex emergency to deliver food. So we have 

been on top of this since well before February 18. 

20

The interruption of basic health services in the north is a serious 

concern, and due to hazardous and very difficult road conditions, 

this represents a point of concern for us. We have sent a large 

amount of medical supplies to Haiti in the last few days and provided a grant to the Pan American Health Organization for additional supplies. In addition, the International Committee of the 

Red Cross has increased the number of staff to meet these shortages of medical personnel in clinics and hospitals, particularly in 

Port-au-Prince. 

Currently there are no reports of an outbreak of the six major 

childhood vaccine-preventable diseases in the country. However, we 

do have reports of increased cases of diarrhea and fever in the 

towns of Gonaives, particularly due to the lack of water. According 

to the Pan American Health Organization, there is a shortage of 

tuberculosis, TB, drugs, and the disruption of TB programs in the 

north of the country. We are working with Pan American Health 

Organization currently, and we hope to bring the situation under 

control as soon as possible, and I will report to the Committee on 

the progress being made. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, USAID is responding quickly to the potential for humanitarian crisis in Haiti. When Ambassador Foley declared a disaster emergency on February 18, our Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance provided $50,000 to transport and distribute 

emergency relief supplies, including 12 medical kits and 3 surgical 

kits that serve 10,000 people each for the next 3 months. In addition, we provided $400,000 that I mentioned to the Pan American 

Health Organization to purchase additional medical supplies immediately and to conduct emergency relief activities in Haiti. They 

have an extensive and very good network in the country. 

On February 24, we deployed a three-person team to Port-auPrince, including a senior regional team adviser, a health officer, 

and an information liaison officer with our partner organizations to 

coordinate our humanitarian activities in the country. USAID has 

also contracted several small aircraft to transport staff throughout 

the country to conduct an assessment of the conditions, and I can 

report to you that airplanes took off early this afternoon to conduct 

those assessments. These planes also, in addition to the assessments, carry cargo, including relief supplies, to remote areas as 

needed. 

Our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is currently awarding 

a $400,000 grant to Catholic Relief Services for procurement of 

what we call cash grants, and these are providing small cash so 

people can buy food on the commercial markets, and this serves 

particularly the most vulnerable populations, such as orphanages 

and hospitals. We are also—our Embassy in Port-au-Prince is conducting a security plan to address the protection of our staff and 

our implementing partners as they transport goods and needed 

services to people throughout the country. We work with CSR, 

Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, CARE, and Save the Children. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we have been, for some time, engaged in Haiti, so we were well prepared for this potential emergency. We have been monitoring the situation well before the disturbances of February 18, and as Secretary Noriega has said, our 

21

commitment and our resolve is to provide the necessary assistance 

to the people of Haiti, and we will continue to do so. Thank you. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Franco. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Franco follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO A. FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINIS- TRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTER- NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before the 

House Committee on International Relations to discuss with you the unfolding humanitarian situation in Haiti and USAID’s continuing assistance with helping the 

Haitian people realize their dream of peace, prosperity and democracy. The central 

focus of my remarks will be on what USAID is doing through our humanitarian assistance programs to mitigate the effects of the social and political unrest on the 

most vulnerable segments of Haiti’s population. 

FOOD SECURITY

The ongoing political turmoil and economic deterioration in Haiti have created the 

potential for a humanitarian crisis, and have affected numerous aspects of development such as food security, health and nutrition, and water and sanitation. While 

sufficient food stocks are currently in-country and no immediate food crisis exists 

at present, this could change quickly in coming weeks, especially in the north, due 

to insecurity and disruptions in the transportation and distribution system. USAID 

currently has in storage, more than 11,000 metric tons of P. L. 480 Title II food commodities. The bulk of these commodities are monetized and the proceeds are used 

for delivering health care, education, and agricultural production services to Haiti’s 

most food-insecure population. The rest is used for direct food distribution to Haiti’s 

indigent populations and children’s orphanages throughout the country. Most of the 

food stocks are under secured storage in Port-au-Prince. The World Food Program 

and European Union also have available for distribution, stocks of at least 5,000 

metric tons, and 3,100 tons respectively. 

HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM

The U.S. Government through USAID is Haiti’s largest bilateral donor. In FY03, 

USAID contributed $71 million. Through fiscal years 1995–2003, USAID provided 

a total of $850 million in direct bilateral assistance. Prior to the outbreak of violence, USAID had planned $52 million in assistance in FY04 to programs ranging 

from health, democracy and governance, education and economic growth. We are 

currently analyzing additional assistance options. To ensure that quality service delivery continues to benefit those Haitians who are most in need, USAID assistance 

is channeled principally through NGOs. USAID is also the lead donor in addressing 

critical transnational issues such as HIV/AIDS and other debilitating infectious diseases, a seriously degraded natural resource base, respect for human rights and the 

rule of law, and trafficking in persons. 

USAID uses food aid both to supplement its humanitarian program and as a truly 

development tool. PL 480 Title II funds account for more than one-half of USAID/

Haiti’s funding. This food-assisted program promotes improvements in household 

food security, nutrition, and the welfare of women, children, and poor, marginal 

farmers in six out of the nine districts of Haiti—affecting the lives of 640,000 poor 

Haitians. Emergency response is also critical. Last year, over $3 million in emergency assistance was provided to communities affected by drought and flooding. 

CIVIL UNREST AND THE USAID PROGRAM

Civil unrest reached a peak in Port-au-Prince over the past week, and although 

not as intense, lawlessness continues and the situation remains fluid following the 

resignation of Aristide. There have been violent conflicts between opposition 

protestors and government supporters, accompanied by widespread looting, and robberies of civilians at roadblocks throughout the capital. On February 27–29, several 

warehouses in Port-au-Prince were looted. Reports indicate that 800 metric tons of 

European Union food commodities may have been taken. The manager of the food 

storage facilities in Port-au-Prince where USG-funded stocks are located reported 

that approximately five percent of the food stocks there have been looted. One of 

four USAID-supported Cooperating Food Sponsors, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 

reported on March 1 that looters stole 30 pickup trucks from the CRS garage. In 

Port-au-Prince, looters also stole medical supplies. 

22

Increasing conflict since early February has severely restricted movement of commercial goods and relief supplies, including food, fuel and medical supplies, creating 

difficult conditions in some areas, and for those normally dependent on food assistance. Access and distribution remain major obstacles for both humanitarian deliveries and regular consumption. USAID and its implementing partners continue to 

report that the primary humanitarian concerns at present stem from limited access, 

security, and unsafe passage for transporting and distributing relief supplies, fuel, 

water, and food commodities. There appears to be no massive shortages of food or 

other essential commodities at this time as Haiti benefited from good harvests over 

the last two agricultural seasons. However, an accurate assessment is difficult at 

present due to lack of secure access to vulnerable areas throughout the country. 

Food Availability: USAID’s NGO development food aid partners and the U.N. 

World Food Program (WFP) currently have approximately 15,000 metric tons (MT) 

of food stocks in country. The European Union (EU) has 2,500 MT at a warehouse 

and 600 MT at the port in Port-au-Prince. There is also an additional 2,000 MT 

available from other donors. Thus the total amount of food assistance available from 

all donors is approximately 20,000 MT. 

Due to poverty and chronic malnutrition in Haiti, some segments of the Haitian 

population are vulnerable to severe malnutrition. However, daily reports from 

USAID’s four partners in Haiti-CARE, Save the Children Foundation (SCF), World 

Vision International (WVI), and CRS-indicate that none believe the situation requires re-programming of planned food assistance. Region-specific reports from food 

aid organizations are summarized as follows:

• WVI does not anticipate a food crisis erupting in its targeted areas of Central 

Plateau and Iˆle de la Gonaˆve, even if distributions stop for a few months because of the strong coping mechanisms among the populations and the good 

December harvest. WVI is currently operating at 100 percent on Iˆle de la 

Gonaˆve.

• CRS reported that food supplies for orphanages in Haiti are limited and some 

orphanages may begin to run out of food early March. CRS is considering 

using existing funds to purchase food on the local market for vulnerable orphanages.

• On February 22, looters broke into a WFP warehouse in Cap-Haı ̈tien and 

took 800 metric tons (MT) of food stocks, mainly vegetable oil and pulses. Despite the loss of food stocks, WFP estimates that it still has sufficient stocks 

either in Haiti or en route to the country to provide assistance to 373,000 people.

• WFP reported that the shipment of 1,200 MT of rice scheduled to arrive at 

the Cap-Haı ̈tien port is on hold until the security situation improves. According to WFP, a total of 268,000 people are in need of food in the north and 

northeast, where prices have increased by 20 to 30 percent since early February. However, the prices of these commodities have decreased after the February 22 looting of the WFP warehouse in Cap-Haı ̈tien.

Fuel Availability: Fuel is vital not only for transport, but also for the continued 

operation of facilities and equipment such as hospitals, bakeries, and freight moving 

equipment at ports. Reports regarding fuel supplies in the capitol are conflicting. 

According to the fuel companies, there is currently enough fuel in storage in Portau-Prince to supply the country, but the International Federation of Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) are concerned that fuel shortages may lead to the 

shutdown of the capitol’s electrical plant and water treatment station. Further exacerbating the situation is the destruction of at least one fuel station in Port-au-Prince 

during the civil unrest. CARE reported that there is a potable water crisis in 

Gonaives due to a lack of fuel. Although CARE has food stocks in Port-au-Prince, 

the organization lacks fuel for transportation, particularly for food distributions in 

the north. 

Medical Supplies: A major humanitarian concern at present is the interruption of 

basic health services, particularly in the north. The ability to purchase and transport drugs and fuel to health facilities nationwide has been disrupted in major population centers due to the sporadic access to banks and insecure travel on the roads. 

The ICRC has been organizing regular convoys to both Gonaives and Cap-Haitien 

in cooperation with the Haitian Red Cross, and ICRC medical teams have also been 

stationed at facilities in these cities. 

It is not clear at this time how many medical facilities have been affected by the 

recent unrest. Reports from the Hospital Communaute Haitienne in the capitol indicate that there is an increase in the number of trauma patients at the hospital and 

care is hindered by fuel shortages for generator power and lack of surgical and medVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ical kits. Negotiations for a planned expansion of ICRC operations in the Canape 

Vert Hospital in Port-au-Prince ended without agreement and ICRC has reported 

that there are no doctors remaining at Canape Vert following the withdrawal of 

ICRC staff. Similar disruptions of supplies are occurring in Gonaives and other 

areas. 

Currently there are no reports of an outbreak of the six major childhood vaccinepreventable diseases. However, increased cases of diarrhea and fever have been reported in the town of Gonaives due to a lack of potable water. The Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) has sentinel sites in Haiti, of which 30 percent to 40 

percent are still functional and operating. 

A Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) epidemiologist recently arrived in 

Haiti to reactivate the health surveillance system, as Haiti lacks adequate surveillance data from health facilities throughout the country. PAHO will monitor data 

on measles outbreaks, polio, diphtheria, typhoid, and violence, as well as acute malnutrition. According to PAHO, there is a shortage of tuberculosis (TB) drugs and 

a disruption of TB programs in the north. Me ́dicins Sans Frontie`res-Belgium is requesting TB drugs from PAHO. 

Displaced Populations: USAID and its NGO partners continue to report very limited displacement and no ‘‘sites’’ with concentrations of internally displaced persons 

(IDPs). According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

(UNOCHA), numbers of IDPs cannot be accurately assessed at present. However, 

UNOCHA notes that significant numbers of residents are moving from insecure cities to other areas or returning to their places of birth in the mountains. Movements 

have also been reported from rural areas to main cities. According to a well-known 

and trusted source, he has never been aware of the existence of IDPs in Haiti. 

On February 23, the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) indicated 

that the Dominican Republic does not have structures in place to manage a migratory wave of refugees. The GODR also noted that Dominican authorities have reinforced the border with Haiti along critical points. On February 24, the GODR sent 

1,200 additional troops to patrol its border with Haiti. The GODR has declined to 

state the total number of troops along the 225-mile border. According to the U.N. 

High Commissioner for Refugees, approximately 400 Haitians have fled to the DR, 

Jamaica, and Cuba since early February 2004. 

U.S. GOVERNMENT HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO HAITI’S POLITICAL CRISIS

• On February 18, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti James B. Foley issued a disaster declaration due to the ongoing complex emergency in Haiti. As an initial response 

to the situation, OFDA has provided $50,000 through USAID/Haiti to support the 

transport and distribution of emergency relief supplies, including 12 medical kits 

and three surgical kits, valued at approximately $87,000. Each medical kit is 

equipped to serve 10,000 people for approximately three months. On February 26, 

the medical kits arrived in Port-au-Prince. In addition, OFDA approved $400,000 

in funding for PAHO to purchase additional medical supplies and to conduct 

emergency relief activities in Haiti.

• On February 24, OFDA deployed a three-person team to Port-au-Prince, including 

a Senior Regional Advisor as Team Leader, a Health Officer, and an Information 

Officer.

• OFDA has contracted with Airserve for two to three aircrafts to move relief personnel and light cargo around Haiti if required in the coming days and weeks.

• USAID/Food For Peace has significant amounts of additional food stocks which 

can be transported to Haiti by sea for food assistance within 7–14 days if needed

• OFDA is currently awarding grants in the amount of $400,000 to CRS for local 

procurement and emergency cash grants to institutions serving vulnerable populations such as orphanages and hospitals.

• The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince is currently developing a security asset plan 

that will address protection of people and USG buildings, transport of goods and 

people, and security of NGO partners, such as CRS, WVI, CARE, and Save the 

Children. A top priority of the security asset plan is to secure and protect the airport and port in the capital.

• There are approximately 15,000 MT of USG-procured food commodities immediately available for distribution in Haiti. USAID will continue to work with other 

members of the donor community to mobilize the additional resources required for 

the Haiti post-conflict effort. 

24

CONCLUSION

USAID is closely monitoring the humanitarian impact of the current political crisis in Haiti. With the presence of international forces in Haiti, we expect the security situation to improve significantly. This will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. USAID/Haiti and OFDA personnel will continue to assess the unfolding humanitarian situation, and develop appropriate responses for the Haitian 

post-conflict period. USAID is working closely with other agencies and implementing 

partners to develop a post-conflict program strategy that will ensure the continued 

provision of emergency relief and improved basic services, and generate productive 

employment over the immediate, short- and medium-term. In addition, USAID is 

working with other donors to jointly identify long-term priorities in Haiti.

Mr. BALLENGER. I yield myself 5 minutes, and yield my time to 

the gentleman from Indiana Mr. Burton, who has to leave early. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I want to thank the Chairman for yielding to 

me. I was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere in 1995 and 1996, and I had a chance to go to Haiti on a 

couple of occasions. I think Mr. Noriega was with the Foreign Affairs Committee at that time. I would like to just go through a few 

points that we found that we thought was very important. 

First of all, regarding the murders and the horrible atrocities 

that were taking place down there, in 1995, one of the leading opponents of Mr. Aristide was Mariel Burtan. She was surrounded 

and shot to death at Port-au-Prince right on the main street in 

broad daylight, and we questioned the FBI—Mr. Dobbins was before the Committee—about whether or not Aristide was involved, 

and Mr. Dobbins lied to the Committee. And we subsequently followed up, and we found out that there was no question that Mr. 

Aristide had to know and be involved in the murder of Ms. Burtan. 

In about that time period, when Mr. Aristide was coming back 

into power, we had clips of Mr. Aristide giving speeches, and they 

were translated, and in his speeches he was talking about the 

value of putting a tire around people’s necks that didn’t agree with 

him, filling them with gasoline, and burning them to death. 

There is a real democrat kind of fellow for you—democratic person. 

In 1994 Mr. Aristide, according to a drug cartel informant, received a sackful of money in order to let the drug cartel move drugs 

through Haiti. And the State Department has reported that high 

officials all the way up to the top of the government are involved 

in drug trafficking. According to the State Department’s 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, it is a major transshipment point for narcotics. 

On February 25, 2004, one of Haiti’s most flamboyant drug traffickers told a Miami Federal Court under oath that he couldn’t 

thrive in Haiti without paying millions of bribes to his close friend, 

the President, Mr. Aristide. So he was involved in drug trafficking 

according to testimony in Federal Court. 

On February 26 of 2004, Barry McCaffrey, as has been stated 

earlier, who was the drug czar under President Clinton, said it was 

hard to imagine that Aristide himself wasn’t taking part in drug 

trafficking. 

The human rights records I think are legion. After the election—

I want to talk about the election that took place. Everybody talks 

about it being so democratic. The Lavalas Party conducted the 

counting of the ballots. They said Aristide received 91 percent of 

25

the vote and there was a turnout of 611⁄2 percent. But according 

to reports from others who were there from the international community, the turnout was about 10 percent, and it was flagrant 

voter fraud. 

In fact on November 29, 2000, after Aristide was reelected, U.N. 

Secretary Kofi Annan recommended that the U.N. Close its mission 

to help build democracy in Haiti, saying U.N. Efforts were useless, 

considering the government’s questionable legitimacy and increasing isolation. 

Now, regarding human rights—and this is something that really 

bothers me. In the government—in our government’s June 1, 2003 

Trafficking in Persons Report, the Haitian Government does not 

fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of 

human trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so. 

And the reports said Haiti is a source country for trafficking of 

children for forced labor and sexual exploitation. And between 90 

and 300,000 poor rural children age 4 to 14 serve as unpaid domestic laborers in slave-like conditions. 

This is the kind of government that was going on under Aristide 

in Haiti. He was a brutal dictator who had no problem of putting 

tires around people’s necks and burning them to death. 

The gentleman who is going to testify later was beaten and had 

his legs broken down there. They were allowing children to go into 

slave labor. He was a major source point for drug trafficking and 

was taking money from drug traffickers in the millions of dollars, 

and this is the kind of person we were supposed to go in there and 

defend and protect? 

If we hadn’t gone in there, and if Aristide had stayed, I believe 

he would be dead today because I think the people there would 

have killed him. I think the rebels would have taken the capital 

and he would have been killed. So, Mr. Aristide is alive today because he chose to leave when he did. As far as this kidnapping 

charge is concerned, anybody that knows, knows that America does 

not work that way 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Menendez. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first, Mr. Noriega, tell you that I don’t appreciate your 

insolent mischaracterization of my remarks. Either you did not listen to them, or you in fact purposely mischaracterized them. Either 

way I resent it, and I don’t intend to take it. 

I have a series of questions and I would like the first two to give 

me a yes or no answer. Did the Government of the United States 

formally recognize President Aristide as the duly elected President 

of Haiti, yes or no? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I don’t think it is that simple. We treated him as 

a constitutional President. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Menendez. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

I don’t think it is that simple. We regarded Aristide as a constitutional President. 

Aristide was elected, but he did not govern democratically and the presidential election of November 2000 did not truly reflect the will of the Haitian people. Opposition parties did not participate in that election, nor was it observed or supported 

by the international community, which estimated voter turnout at 5–15 percent. 

This happened because Aristide and his ruling party refused to reconsider the reVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
26

sults of the legislative elections in May 2000, after international observers uncovered fraudulent vote tabulation.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Did our Ambassador present credentials to 

President Aristide? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Did the United States seek to invoke the Democratic charter that you talked about at the OAS as it related to 

Haiti? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We didn’t and neither did the Republic of Haiti. 

Aristide did not use the self-help mechanism——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Menendez. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We didn’t, and neither did the Republic of Haiti. Aristide did not use the self-help 

mechanisms that were available to his country under the Charter. This was Haiti’s 

decision to make, not that of the United States or other OAS member states. Haiti 

did consent to OAS action in Haiti, such as the establishment of the OAS Special 

Mission in Resolution 806, but only after the Permanent Council called upon it to 

do so.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I asked you for a yes or no, and it is no. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Sometimes these issues are a little more complicated. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. I fully understand that, but there are some questions that can be answered yes or no so you don’t eat up all of my 

time. The reality is the United States, the Democratic charter that 

you referred to inferentially in your statement to try to paint the 

brush, the United States did not pursue that Democratic charter at 

the OAS as it related to Haiti. 

Mr. NORIEGA. None of the 34 countries——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Menendez. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

None of the 34 member countries of the OAS did. Aristide’s government could 

have invoked the Charter directly in any number of ways to restore democracy, but 

it chose not to do so. The Aristide government did co-operate with OAS initiatives, 

such as creation of the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti, but 

only after the OAS Permanent Council asked it to do so. One last comment - the 

implication that the United States did not support efforts to settle Haiti’s political 

crisis democratically and peacefully is entirely false. The Administration fully supported OAS efforts, both financially and diplomatically, while at the same time pursuing vigorous diplomacy directly with Aristide and the opposition to achieve a political settlement.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I didn’t ask you about the 34 countries, I asked 

you about the United States, Mr. Secretary. And if you want to 

play games with us here——

Mr. NORIEGA. No, sir, I am telling you that none of them did. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Let me ask you this. On February 13, Secretary 

Powell said ‘‘the Administration was not seeking Mr. Aristide’s resignation.’’ On February 17, Secretary Powell went even further and 

said, ‘‘we cannot buy into a proposition that says the elected President must be forced out of office by thugs.’’

And yet that is exactly what the Administration did when, on 

February 26, 9 days later, Secretary Powell suggested Mr. Aristide 

‘‘examine the situation that he is in and make a careful consideration of how best to serve the Haitian people at this time and subsequently suggest that he leave.’’ So all of those statements, includVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
27

ing your own, Mr. Noriega, on October 21 of this past year, before 

this very Subcommittee where you said ‘‘as it relates to Haiti, violence has no place in settling political dispute in a democracy.’’

Well, if violence has no place in such a set of circumstances, if 

I tell the thugs that are at the presidential gate that we won’t go 

in until there is a political solution, and the inherent fact in that 

statement is that you can go ahead and pursue violent overthrow 

because I am not going to send anybody in until you have a political solution, that ultimately encourages that type of action. And it 

is that type of action, whether it exists in Haiti or whether it exists 

in other countries in this hemisphere, that I was referring to. 

So how is it that this Administration says that violence has no 

place in settling political disputes, that we cannot buy into a proposition that says an elected President will be forced out of office by 

thugs; that we, in fact are not seeking that resignation especially 

under those set of circumstances, and then we allow those who 

would by violent effort overthrow a government? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Menendez. 

And if I can give you more than a yes or no to that question, it 

is extraordinarily important to bear in mind that we do not have 

an obligation to put American lives at risk to save every government that may ask us for help, whether it is democratically-elected 

or not. We do not have an obligation to do that. We have to make 

decisions about where we will put American lives at risk. 

In the case of Haiti, I think it was a difficult decision, but we 

made the right one. The erratic, irresponsible behavior of President 

Aristide in the last 48 hours demonstrated that he was not a reliable person or reliable interlocutor. That does not mean by any 

means that we support the violent overthrow of that man. However, it did mean that he was not a sustainable political solution. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. In the 20 seconds that I have left, I will simply 

say that we made a very clear message. Yes, we don’t have to send 

troops each and every time, but we sent a very clear message: You 

can go ahead and pursue your violent activity because, unless there 

is a political solution, we don’t seek to intervene either ourselves 

or through any international effort. 

And that is a risk for democracy in this hemisphere. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman Weller. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary and 

Mr. Secretary and Mr. Administrator, and I thank all of you for 

participating today. 

And we have heard some terms such as thugs, killers, and narcotraffickers being used in comments before this Committee today, 

but they also describe the government of President Aristide. And 

I would note that over the last several years, the Bush Administration has bent over backwards, time after time, to help the people 

of Haiti; in particular, where President Bush waived other considerations to continue providing aid and assistance to Haiti. 

And let me give you an example of where that is. There is probably no greater threat to democracy than the corruption that comes 

from narcotrafficking as well as the threat to our own Nation’s security. According to the State Department in March 2004, serious 

allegations persisted that high-level government and police officials 

28

were involved in drug trafficking. And in 2001, 2002, and 2003, the 

Bush Administration said Haiti was not certified as having fully cooperated, or had failed demonstrably to comply with the United 

States drug control efforts. 

All 3 years, President Bush determined however that it was in 

the national interest in the United States to continue providing aid 

to Haiti despite its lack of effort and counternarcotics, but also expressed concern regarding the human rights record of the Aristide 

administration and, it appears, which human rights were of no concern to President Aristide. In fact, it appears that President 

Aristide instigated violence against his political opponents. 

In June 2001, Mr. Aristide announced a zero tolerance policy on 

crime which many Haitians interpreted as an imitation vigilante 

justice. That December, the pro-Aristide organization called Sleep 

in the Woods, took matter into its own hands and hacked to death 

radio journalist Brignol Lindnor in the town of Petit Goave. 

Lindnor had done radio broadcasts critical of Mr. Aristide. 

Little more than a month ago, Mr. Aristide pardoned 42 violent 

criminals, commuting the sentences of 66 others, provided amnesty 

to an additional 90 accused whose cases were still under investigation. So it is wondering whose side some of the thugs were on. 

We talk about the election, Mr. Secretary, and of course, you 

know, it appears in many cases that the elections of Mr. Aristide 

were very, very tainted. It is often cited, his reelection in November 

2000 is proof that he was a freely elected democratic leader. However, international observers, not just American observers, refused 

to observe this election. The head of the Provisional Electoral 

Council Leon Manus fled Haiti because he was threatened by 

Aristide for failing to endorse fraudulent election results. And after 

Manus fled, the ruling Lavalas Party installed a one-party electoral 

council and held the November 2000 presidential elections. The 

Clinton Administration even refused to provide support of any kind 

for that election process. 

Public disenchantment with the sham election process was expressed by a voter turnout estimated less than 10 percent of eligible voters by foreign diplomats and journalists. The question is: 

Can this really be termed a free and fair election? 

One of our senior United States diplomats who was in Haiti during the November 2000 presidential election stated that there was 

more enthusiasm and participation in the elections that gave 

Charles Taylor the presidency of Liberia, and who the United 

States Government told last year to step down when civil war 

reached Monrovia. And did anyone seriously advocate sending U.S. 

troops to prop up Charles Taylor’s regime? That is an ironic question here, because some of those who called for the removal of 

Charles Taylor are those who say that we should have sent troops 

in to keep President Aristide in. And when you had greater election 

participation in Liberia for Charles Taylor than you did in Haiti, 

you wonder about the legitimacy of the Haitian elections. 

So the question is: Why is Charles Taylor out, good; versus 

Aristide out, bad? What is the difference when Liberia had a greater level of participation in the election? 

I guess, Mr. Secretary, the question I have for you is did we treat 

Charles Taylor in Liberia any differently than we treated Aristide, 

29

or have we treated Aristide any differently than we did Charles 

Taylor and Liberia in similar circumstances? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Congressman. The decisions 

we made regarding President Aristide for the last several years 

have been tied to support for a diplomatic negotiated solution to 

get Haiti back on a democratic course. I explained during my testimony that we did not achieve that objective, but we tried. 

We didn’t achieve that objective because of the lack of political 

will by President Aristide, in part. The fact that other political actors in Haiti didn’t want to participate and didn’t have confidence 

in President Aristide’s ability to keep his promises was also another problem. But for example, when we asked for steps to improve the security climate, we asked that a new police chief be appointed. He was appointed and within a couple of days, showed up 

in the U.S. Embassy seeking political asylum. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I hate to cut you off. It is our mistake up here. 

Generally speaking, we don’t cut our witness’ time off, but my big 

mouth got us in trouble. So I apologize for the difficulty. If you 

need a second, 10, 15 seconds, go ahead, without objection. 

Mr. NORIEGA. In the last few weeks we saw the Haitian National 

Police without arms, but had reports that the government was distributing arms to its gangs. We saw most of the looting and violence against persons and property in Haiti and Port-au-Prince 

committed by those gangs of President Aristide. We saw these 

gangs attack their own Coast Guard installation, which was clearly 

intended to prevent the United States from being able to return 

migrants, so it would provoke perhaps a migrant crisis. 

We saw that President Aristide in those final days was not a reliable person and he would not be part of a sustainable political solution. We were prepared to send some forces in to support a sustainable process that kept Aristide in power, but we were not prepared 

to put American lives on the line merely to do that. 

MR. BALLENGER. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Why didn’t you use your influence with the opposition, Mr. 

Noriega, to get them to agree to the various accommodations that 

Aristide made? Be really brief about it; I don’t want a long answer 

now. 

Mr. NORIEGA. We made a strong effort to do that. We spent 4 

hours a couple of Saturdays ago trying to convince them to do that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But it didn’t work. 

Are you currently supporting the government, as it exists now, 

of Prime Minister Neptune. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, sir. Prime Minister Neptune is the head of the 

government until a new government is formed. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. And what plans do you have for the formation 

of a new government? 

Mr. NORIEGA. There is a Tripartite Commission which will include a representative of the Lavalas Party, a representative of the 

international community, and a representative of the Democratic 

Platform. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. That is the only answer. It is sufficient for me. 

Mr. NORIEGA. It is not the answer, sir. 

30

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Delahunt. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

It is not the answer, sir. That is, it is not the only answer. The new government 

is being formed in accordance with the CARICOM plan. Under that plan, the Tripartite Commission appoints a seven-member Council of Eminent Persons. That 

Council nominates a new Prime Minister, and Interim President Alexandre appoints 

the Prime Minister, who then chooses a cabinet. We are giving our full support to 

this transition process. A permanent government will be formed after elections are 

held.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is sufficient for me, Mr. Noriega. I am asking 

the question, so I would ask you to desist. 

What are our plans as far as Toto Constant is concerned? Are we 

going to allow him to stay in this country? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Mr. Chairman and Congressman, I don’t know 

much about his situation. I will tell you that I asked several weeks 

ago, when this recent violence happened, that U.S. law enforcement be notified because we didn’t want this individual to show up 

in Haiti. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. The answer is you don’t know much about it. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I don’t know particularly. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Your information would be the same as mine, 

that the former head of the FRAPH, who is responsible for thousands of deaths during the period from 1991 to 1994, is currently 

here in New York City and is free? Is that your information? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I think he came here about 6 years ago. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Delahunt. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

I think he came here about 10 years ago. In 1995, the Department of State revoked his visa and an Immigration judge issued a deportation order. In late 1995, 

Constant sued the U.S. Government seeking damages. In 1996, that suit was settled. In 1997, an assessment was done evaluating the threat to Constant if he were 

returned to Haiti. Based on that assessment, reviewed by various U.S. Government 

agencies, Constant was not returned to Haiti. In 1998, Constant tried to reopen his 

asylum case, but an Immigration judge denied the motion. Constant appealed, and 

the Board of Immigration appeals upheld the denial in September 2003. At the moment, I do not believe there are any pending appeals or other legal impediments 

to Constant’s removal. The Departments of State and Homeland Security are evaluating whether Constant can be deported now, in light of current country conditions.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I want to point out because you make references 

to international support and maybe this is a statement that has 

been rescinded, but CARICOM, through the Prime Minister of Jamaica, recently issued this statement: 

President Aristide has submitted his resignation as the President 

of Haiti and left the country for an undisclosed destination. We are 

bound to question whether his resignation was truly voluntary, as 

it comes after the capture of sections of Haiti by armed insurgents 

and the failure of the international community to provide the requisite support despite the appeals of CARICOM. The removal of 

President Aristide in these circumstances sets a dangerous precedent for democratically-elected governments anywhere and everywhere, as it promotes the removal of duly elected persons from office by the power of rebel forces. 

It was a statement that has been issued by CARICOM. Is that 

accurate? 

31

Mr. NORIEGA. That was a statement they issued a few days ago, 

and they are meeting today and we hope we can encourage them 

to be part of the solution. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. In terms of the fraudulent elections that we 

talked about, and you alluded to the OAS report. Let me read the 

report as I have it before me. And I happened to be a volunteer, 

an election observer, and unfortunately there was no one other 

than some Members on the Democratic side of this Committee and 

staffers and no one from our colleagues on the other side. So I was 

there, Mr. Noriega.

‘‘Election day proceedings on May 21 represented the high 

point of the electoral process. An estimated 60 percent of registered voters went to the polls. Very few incidents of violence 

were reported. Haitian National Police responded efficiently 

and professionally to situations that could have deteriorated 

into violence. While voters had to wait in long lines, especially 

at the beginning of the day, they were eventually able to cast 

their ballots free of pressure and intimidation. Most voters 

were able to find their polling with relative ease.’’

This is really about the tabulation. Let us really understand 

what the fraudulent elections are all about so the American people 

understand them. The elections themselves were relatively well 

done, given the situation in Haiti at the time. It was about whether 

a certain runoff of 7 Senate seats would occur. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, it is an accurate statement. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. You indicate in your written testimony:

‘‘Under the circumstances, Aristide agreed to what he had 

steadfastly rejected before, a plan that would open the door to 

consensus government.’’

You are referring to the CARICOM plan. 

Was I under a misunderstanding that Secretary Powell endorsed 

a plan put forth by the Catholic Bishops of Haiti that Aristide 

agreed to? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We were promoting—

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Delahunt. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We were promoting the CARICOM plan. The Secretary endorsed CARICOM’s plan 

on February 13, after his meeting with CARICOM foreign ministers, Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham, and OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria. There were 

two Bishops plans—one was withdrawn in November 2003 and the other was never 

presented because the CARICOM plan evolved at the same time. To the best of my 

knowledge, the Secretary did not endorse any plan put forward by the Bishops, although he and other Administration officials were urging the parties to settle their 

political differences throughout this period of time. Aristide agreed to the CARICOM 

plan.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Answer my question. Did Aristide agree and the 

opposition reject the plan that was put forward by the Catholic 

Bishops of Haiti where he would share power? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

32

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much and thank you, gentlemen. I wanted to ask questions related to refugees and migration 

as well as to the level of U.S. and international aid. 

When I first got elected to Congress, I had the high honor of representing the area in Miami known as little Haiti, and I was able 

to establish great communication with the leaders and the common 

folk in that community and have found them to be hardworking, 

law-abiding, a wonderful addition to the fabric that makes up our 

south Florida communities. And it breaks my heart to see our—the 

U.S. policy being one that repatriates individuals to a very difficult 

condition in their homeland, and that is why some of us have been 

advocating for TPS status for Haitian nationals living in the 

United States, Temporary Protected Status, so they are not set 

back to a country that by all accounts, wherever—whether you are 

pro-Aristide or anti-Aristide, all of us can agree it is a tumultuous 

situation of civil strife, no respect for the rule of law. We don’t 

know when true democratic elections will take place. We are not 

sure who the leader is, although we have a constitutional leader 

there and it breaks our hearts to see continued divisions of families. 

I wanted to ask you about if there would be any change in the 

United States policy toward either repatriation and/or conferring 

TPS status to Haitian nationals who are otherwise very law-abiding, wonderful citizens of our community. 

And my second question has to do with the level of U.S. and 

international aid. How much military aid do you see forthcoming 

in the coming weeks, in the coming months; how much humanitarian aid; what will be the level of the international aid with 

CARICOM or the U.N.; how will it be supervised; who will be there 

to make sure the distribution is done in the correct way and will 

not be stolen by whoever happens to consider himself or herself the 

chief of the town? 

So I am concerned about the free flow supervision of humanitarian aid so that it does get to the people themselves. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I will answer the first 

part on the security component and the current security mission, 

and I will ask Mr. Dewey and Mr. Franco to address the specific 

points you raised. 

The security presence that we have on the ground is primarily 

United States and French forces. The Chileans are arriving very 

soon, and other countries will be joining. This is part of the initial 

phase of the Multinational Interim Force to establish a certain 

amount of order so we can have a constitutional succession and 

begin to reestablish the institutions of government, starting with 

the Haitian National Police and the formulation of a civilian government. 

The initial troop presence will be on the order of 3,000 or more 

soldiers in the follow-on mission under another U.N. Mandate and 

a more traditional peacekeeping-type operation which contemplates 

the presence of several thousand. 

We have had a good number of countries in the Hemisphere indicating their willingness to participate in that follow-on mission, 

and it will carry out its work as U.N. Missions generally do for 

33

these peacekeeping missions. I will ask Mr. Dewey to address the 

migration issue. 

Mr. DEWEY. We understand your concern on that issue and it is 

fortunate also we are concerned in watching that issue of Temporary Protected Status very closely. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security makes the determination on Temporary Protected Status in consultation with the State Department. 

We are also checking people that we feel can give us good advice 

and input in terms of our advising DHS. We talked to the Office 

of the High Commissioners for Refugees, for example. And there is 

concurrence now at this point that it is not time to recommend that 

status, and the reason is because the situation is just too fluid. It 

varies day by day and I think you can appreciate that. But we are 

not relenting our vigilance in watching it. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Once again for Mr. Weller, I want to make a couple things clear, 

and he seems to be an expert on Liberia. We did not call for the 

removal of Charles Taylor, for your information. 

Secondly, when you compare President Aristide to Charles Taylor, for your information, there was a special court in Sierra Leone 

that was sponsored by the United Nations that indicted Charles 

Taylor. So I want you to get some of your information correct. 

Let me just say—let me ask you, Mr. Noriega, as you know, the 

CIA paid and protected the FRAPH-squad people in the old days. 

And I would like to know what you know about Guy Philippe. Mr. 

Philippe was trained by the United States military in Ecuador. Do 

you know anything about that? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Payne. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

No. The U.S. has never trained Philippe in Ecuador, or any other country.

Mr. PAYNE. Let me say, do you have any knowledge of why—the 

DR, the Dominican Republic, they haven’t been having any outside 

problems with foreign countries in quite awhile, right? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. They weren’t invaded by Iraq, right? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Right. 

Mr. PAYNE. Let me ask you another question. Why would, then, 

the U.S. ship 35,000 weapons, 20,000 guns that were sold to the 

DR recently? Do you have any idea why there would be so much 

weaponry—and I am asking the question because, as you know, the 

rebels have a lot of U.S.-made weapons. I think they have a lot of 

M–16s, M–60s. They have rocket-propelled launchers. And we 

know that 20,000 weapons were sent by the U.S. to the DR. I don’t 

know the date. But you don’t know anything about it. You honestly 

don’t know anything about—you are in charge of Latin America 

and you don’t know about these 35,000. 

Mr. NORIEGA. No. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Payne. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

34

No. Your information is inaccurate. The U.S. has agreed to sell reconditioned M–

16s to the Dominican Republic, but has not delivered any of them. The last U.S. 

Government arms sale to the Dominican Republic took place in 1991, when we sold 

side arms to the Dominican military.

Mr. PAYNE. And never heard of any training in Ecuador, Mr. 

Noriega? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I heard the accusation and I heard the reference, 

and I don’t know that it is true. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Payne. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

I heard the accusation and I heard the reference, and I don’t know if it is true. 

I believe Philippe attended the Ecuadoran Army Academy for about one year in the 

1990s as part of a bilateral exchange program between Haiti and Ecuador. As I understand it, the United States was not involved in any way in that exchange program, and did not at any time provide support or training for Philippe.

Mr. PAYNE. Let me ask you, when you worked as the chief aide 

to Jesse Helms, at that time there were allegations that President 

Aristide was mentally unbalanced. Do you remember your report 

on that? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I was working here for Ben Gilman at the time. 

Mr. PAYNE. Did you work for Jesse Helms? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I sure did. I am proud to have worked for Jesse 

Helms for 4 years. 

Mr. PAYNE. And you weren’t proud to work for Ben Gilman? I 

know Ben Gilman. Let me——

Mr. NORIEGA. Let the record show, I love Ben Gilman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, I am just saying that you said you were proud 

to work for Ben Gilman but evidently not so proud—I mean of 

Jesse Helms, not so proud of Ben Gilman. 

Will the Haitian military be reactivated? 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is a decision that will have to be dealt with 

by the next elected government of Haiti. 

Mr. PAYNE. And under their Constitution, I thought that the 

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court took over the government. 

Mr. NORIEGA. He is the new President now. He is the Head of 

State. 

Mr. PAYNE. He will be the Head of State until the next elections? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Until there is a new election. 

Mr. PAYNE. The question about the fact that Mr. Aristide—as 

you may recall, we asked for intervention into sending the troops 

into Haiti, the same way for Mr. Weller’s information. We asked for 

United States troops to also be sent to Liberia; same thing as we 

did for Haiti. We didn’t do either one. We sent them after the Nigerians went in Liberia, but did not send anything in until Mr. 

Aristide left. 

But could you explain the resignation as well as you know it? 

Mr. NORIEGA. President Aristide resigned. I don’t know if I have 

a copy of the letter here or—one of my people probably does have 

a copy of the letter. All I have is a translation of it. I have seen 

the actual letter. He submitted his resignation on the evening of 

the 29th, I believe. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Payne. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

35

President Aristide resigned. I don’t know if I have a copy of the letter here or—

one of my people probably does have a copy of the letter. All I have is a translation 

of it. I have seen the actual letter. He submitted his resignation on the evening of 

the 29th, I believe. The resignation letter itself is revealing. Aristide wrote that if 

his resignation could prevent a bloodbath, then he agreed to leave in the hope that 

there would be life and not death. Aristide knew full well that if he tried to remain 

as president, many people would die in the impending clash between his armed partisans and the advancing insurgents. At no time did the U.S. force this conclusion 

on Aristide or even suggest it. The evening before Aristide left, he passed a message 

to Ambassador Foley through his private security guards, asking what the U.S. 

thought would be in the best interest of the Haitian people—staying or resigning. 

After consulting with Secretary Powell, the Ambassador replied to Aristide: You 

have to decide what is best for Haiti. Hours after this, Aristide told the Embassy 

that he was ready to go that night. The U.S. helped Aristide get to the airport and 

arranged air transportation out of the country for him, his wife, and his private security detail.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Foley. 

Mr. FOLEY. Let me first extend to Mr. Noriega my personal appreciation for going down to Haiti and attempting to negotiate a 

settlement to the crisis. You went in the middle of turmoil. You did 

so at some risk and peril to your own life, and I want to applaud 

you on behalf of Congress, or at least this Member of Congress, for 

endeavoring to seek a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Congressman Wexler and I have neighboring districts and we have a newspaper, The Palm Beach Post, the most liberal probably of any newspaper in Florida. They have never printed a kind word about President Bush or his brother, Governor Bush. 

Let me read you today’s editorial:

‘‘A Delusional Aristide. Jean-Bertrand Aristide can accuse 

the United States of many things, but depriving him of an opportunity to bring democracy to Haiti isn’t one of them. The 

United States, in conjunction with France and the Organization of American States, helped Mr. Aristide to leave the country. Though his destination wasn’t clear when the plane took 

off, the action protected Mr. Aristide and his family. It might 

have prevented a blood bath. 

‘‘His departure decreased the chance that armed criminals 

masquerading as rebels will take control and increased the 

chance that an international effort can move Haiti toward 

democratic elections.’’

Now, that is by an observer, The Palm Beach Post. 

I hear a lot of things about a gentleman being kidnapped, spirited away in the middle of the night, and we will have plenty of 

time to ferret those issues out. But there is one thing for certain: 

Haiti needs our help. And this Administration has stepped up to 

the plate. 

Now I can read testimony, Randall Robinson and I were on CNN 

the other day and he is making wild accusations about this kidnapping. Mr. Robinson’s wife was paid some $300,000 by the Haiti 

Government to represent them in matters of public relations. This 

is what he said about President Clinton:

‘‘Civil rights lobbyist Randall Robinson said he opposed 

President Clinton because he had exhausted all patience with 

President Clinton’s failed, insensitive, and ultimately racist 

policy in Haiti.’’

36

And it goes on about the President’s flip-flop on Haiti, indifference, 

sending in troops; no, maybe I won’t. 

So we can continue to have this political dialogue and see who 

we can blame. I personally take the word of Secretary Colin Powell 

over this man. He has had ample opportunity to help his people 

with aid from this country and others. France, Canada, would not 

invest one nickle or one body to save this man’s failed presidency. 

The State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report of 2003, 2002, and 2001 established that senior officials 

throughout the Haitian Government, including the Haitian National Police, presidential security unit, and Aristide’s palace 

guards, were actively involved in drug trafficking. These reports established that light aircraft, landing with drug cargoes on Route 9 

in Port-au-Prince, are actively helped by Haitian National Police 

who block traffic and help with offloading the drugs and providing 

ground transportation. 

Let me read you another thing that is very important and I 

would like you to comment on:

The 2003 State Department Human Rights Report for Haiti 

confirms that there were credible reports of extrajudicial 

killings by members of the Haitian National Police, municipal 

national government officials, and civilian attaches associated 

with the Haitian National Police. In 1994, the United States 

used military force to restore Aristide to office. One of the compelling reasons for using force to restore Aristide to office was 

that the military regime was using civilian attaches to terrorize the population, particularly Aristide supporters. 

Aristide, it turns out, has been using civilian attaches to terrorize the population, particularly his political opponents.

What does this use of attaches say about the Aristide’s government’s commitment to the rule of law? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Congressman Foley, and I 

will pass on to our staff the statements of gratitude for the work 

they are doing to help Haiti. The report and the references to the 

human rights violations are written by professionals at the State 

Department, and they make a compelling point, which is, we do not 

choose who runs various countries. We don’t choose who we recognize as constitutionally-elected leaders, but we do have an obligation to choose where we put American lives at risk. And in this 

case, we made the decision based on what we know about President Aristide after years of trying, that it was not an effective, sustainable, political solution to merely prop him up. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Now for the other Members, we are going to call 

on you. Since it is all going to be Democrats, we are going to call 

on Members of the Committee by seniority and then finish up with 

whoever is left. And you have my condolences, Charlie, as you may 

be last. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Noriega, for 

joining us. 

This hearing has been intriguing, to say the least, with some of 

the charges thrown around. And it just seems—I have been involved in working on issues regarding Haiti for 3 or 4 years and 

have just been amazed at how the Bush Administration has simply 

37

set Aristide up for failure. The $154 million that Ms. Lee and many 

in the Congressional Black Caucus, Mr. Wexler and others have 

tried to spring loose the $154 million the Administration blocked 

for water, for sewer, for health, for roads, for sanitation, for all the 

things that would have made this regime a lot more successful simply wasn’t available. 

It is hard to look at this situation and think that the Bush Administration really wanted the experiment of democracy in Haiti to 

succeed. 

But let me move to a question about the Constitution. I have 

heard Mr. Noriega refer to the Constitution many times. President 

Bush, I would like to quote, said on Sunday:

‘‘The Constitution of Haiti is working. There is an interim 

President, as per the Constitution, in place.’’

The White House described Aristide’s exile as ‘‘peaceful, democratic, and constitutional.’’ I don’t think the President and, unfortunately, the President or his Administration frankly took the time 

to read the Constitution of Haiti, or they simply chose to ignore it. 

I would like to read article 149 of the 1987 Constitution of Haiti:

‘‘Should the Office of the President of the Republic become 

vacant for any reason, the President of the Supreme Court of 

the Republic or, in his absence, the Vice President of that 

Court or, in his absence, the judge with the highest seniority,’’

and so on by order of seniority,

‘‘Shall be invested temporarily with the duties of the President 

of the republic by the National Assembly, duly convened by the 

Prime Minister. The election of a new President for a new 5-

year term shall be held at least 45 and no more than 90 days 

after the vacancy occurs pursuant to the constitutional electoral law.’’

The Administration’s assertion that Haiti’s Constitution is working simply doesn’t mesh with the facts. In urging President 

Aristide’s resignation, without a legislature to ratify the interim 

President, the Bush Administration played a role in subverting and 

effectively nullifying the Constitution to which you consistently 

point. 

If the opposition had chosen to join in diplomatic solutions to the 

crisis, democracy could have been preserved. Instead, the U.S. 

stood by as a rebel minority forced him out of power. 

Now, the Haiti Constitution calls for the election of a new President at least 45 and no more than 90 days after the vacancy occurs. To the best of my knowledge, after urging President Aristide 

to resign, the Bush Administration offered no insight and no plan 

as to how this will be accomplished. 

Please explain to me how the Constitution was followed as President Bush promised, and how it is possible to move forward constitutionally without a legislature. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, there is no Parliament because the Parliament’s term expired because there were no elections held in a 

timely fashion. We have——

38

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Brown. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

Well, there is no Parliament because the Parliament’s term expired because there 

were no elections held in a timely fashion. We have had to deal with this political 

reality in offering advice on how Haiti could reconstitute its government while respecting the 1987 constitution. When President Aristide resigned, Boniface 

Alexandre, President of Haiti’s Supreme Court, became Haiti’s president under Article 149 of the constitution. Under Haiti’s Constitution, the Prime Minister is the 

head of government. Article 165 of the constitution says that if the Prime Minister 

resigns, the government remains in place until the appointment of a successor, in 

order to transact current business. Article 165 does not specify how or when a successor Prime Minister should be chosen, but a reasonable interpretation would require the President to choose a new Prime Minister from the majority party in Parliament, as stipulated in Article 137. But what does the constitution say about appointing a new Prime Minister if there is no Parliament? It is silent on this point. 

Whatever the reasons were for Parliament’s expiration, Haiti needed a government 

after Yvon Neptune, Aristide’s Prime Minister, resigned. Doing nothing, because the 

constitution is silent, was not an option. Since the legislature did not exist, Haiti 

used the provisions of the CARICOM action plan to provide a mechanism for the 

appointment of a new Prime Minister. In my view, this does not make Haiti’s transitional government unconstitutional. To the contrary, the transitional government 

was formed with full respect for the constitution under the circumstances prevailing 

at the time. And we need to recall that this is a transitional government, to be replaced when elections are held within a year or so.

Mr. BROWN. Because the opposition didn’t block any elections 

and the administration didn’t force the opposition to move forward 

and conduct those elections. 

Mr. NORIEGA. We didn’t force them to do it, but our ability to do 

that would be limited. But the reason they didn’t want to do it was 

because they didn’t trust the process. And every time they raised 

their head in the political process——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Brown. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We didn’t force them to do it, but our ability to make them do this would be very 

limited. The reason the opposition didn’t want to participate in elections was because they didn’t trust the process. Every time they raised their head in the political 

process, all they saw was President Aristide evading his commitments to the OAS 

to create a secure climate for elections. Aristide partisans, at times armed and acting with the complicity of the Haitian National Police, violently suppressed many 

of the opposition’s peaceful demonstrations. In December 2001, there was a concerted, nation-wide attack against the opposition. Many offices were torched and 

some residences of opposition leaders as well. Going back to the May 2000 elections, 

Aristide’s government refused to fix fraudulent election results for the Senate, despite an OAS finding that the vote results were tabulated in a fraudulent manner 

and despite requests from opposition leaders, the U.S., and other members of the 

international community. Little wonder, then, that opposition and civil society leaders would not engage in an electoral process without good faith action from Aristide 

to ensure their security—action that Aristide never took despite his many promises 

that he would act.

Mr. BROWN. Whenever our policy as a government—whenever 

there is an opposition that objects to an election, we say well, then, 

that is okay not to have an election? 

Mr. NORIEGA. That isn’t what I am saying, and I don’t have 

much time to give an answer. The process is going to have to be 

worked out by the new government, which will be a government 

that is formed by a consensus, by a group of wise men that is being 

formed by a Tripartite Commission that will advise on the appointment of a new Prime Minister. President Aristide’s party will be 

39

represented as well as other representatives of civil society and the 

international community. They will form this new government, appoint a new Cabinet. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Brown. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

That isn’t what I am saying and I don’t have much time to give an answer. The 

process is going to have to be worked out by the new government, which will be 

a government that is formed by a consensus, by a group of wise men that is being 

formed by a Tripartite Commission which will appoint a seven member Council of 

Eminent Persons, which will in turn advise on the appointment of a new Prime 

Minister. President Aristide’s party will be represented as well as other representatives of civil society and the international community. The Council of Eminent Persons will advise on nominations for a new Prime Minister, President Alexandre will 

appoint the new Prime Minister, who will appoint a new Cabinet. This is the process for the formation of the transitional government, a process that follows provisions of the Haitian constitution. This is the first step toward free and fair elections 

that will put a new permanent government into power. The international community, including the U.S., will be heavily involved in making sure that these elections 

are conducted in a secure environment, so that all political parties, including Mr. 

Aristide’s party, can participate without fearing for their personal safety. Before 

Aristide left, neither we nor anyone else could force the opposition to agree to elections when it was plain that Aristide would use violence and intimidation to retain 

power. That is not democracy. Such an election would not be free, fair, or democratic.

Mr. BROWN. Is this in the Constitution that President Bush has 

asserted that we are following? 

Mr. NORIEGA. This is based on an international plan that was 

posed to President Aristide, which he accepted, and we are trying 

to follow that process to the best of our ability. 

Mr. BROWN. The opposition didn’t accept it. 

Mr. NORIEGA. The opposition didn’t accept it because they didn’t 

trust President Aristide, and we have heard a few reasons why. Regarding your statements that this Administration linked the delivery of assistance—or blocked the delivery of assistance is not accurate. And your statement that we—well, I will stop. 

Mr. BROWN. If your statement is about to be that if you didn’t 

block it, you can’t count the number the phone calls that many of 

us made to try to free up that money for roads and sewers and for 

clean water, where their water is some of the worst drinking water 

in the world. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Your time is up. You are out of order, Mr. 

Brown. Mr. Wexler, please proceed. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Noriega, I found the collective response to Ms. RosLehtinen’s question with respect to the Temporary Protective Status, with respect to many Haitians that are in the south Florida 

community mostly, the response is an incredulous one. And I guess 

it is sort of a twisted sense of reality where, on the one hand, you 

take rightful point in introducing the gentleman who is sitting in 

his wheelchair in the front row—and I am very happy that he is 

here—as a personal example of the tragic circumstances that not 

only himself but thousands of other Haitian people have found 

themselves in, and understanding that Mr. Aristide no longer is 

the President. 

But on the one hand, we have sitting in the front row a gentleman, who in your own language, had his legs crushed. And now, 

40

for months, we have been deporting Haitians back to Haiti. We 

continue to deport Haitians back to Haiti today. We have asked on 

a bipartisan basis that through the turmoil, we just take a timeout. 

We are told it is not ripe yet to take a timeout deporting people. 

And apparently our boats that are circling Haiti don’t have on 

those boats people who can speak Creole, so that when we take 

these people into custody, they can’t even articulate, because nobody on our side of the equation understands them, what fears 

they may in fact have. 

Well, the gentleman in the front row seems to be the personification of the fears. So it seems to me on the one hand, you can’t parade people. And I am thrilled with an enormous amount of respect 

that this gentleman is here, but you can’t have people sitting here 

in the front row that had their lives ruined, and at the same time 

say that we are continuing the current policy of sending Haitians 

back so they too can have their lives ruined. 

Which are we supposed to believe? Either there is a crisis or 

there isn’t. But we can’t claim a crisis to justify our inaction or our 

feelings toward the previous President and then continue to send 

others back so they can get mauled like this gentleman in the first 

row. Which is it? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Now that President Aristide is no longer President 

of Haiti, perhaps it is safe for this man to go back to Haiti. 

Mr. WEXLER. Is that the policy? Is that the American policy now? 

Mr. NORIEGA. On the other hand, if there are people, for example, persons who are from the Aristide government who were to 

come to the United States and have a credible fear of persecution, 

that would be weighed today. We have to make decisions based on 

individual cases. If there is a credible fear, then we have an obligation to run that fear to ground, to give them an opportunity to substantiate a political asylum claim. So that process does exist. It has 

to be done on an individual basis. 

Mr. WEXLER. What circumstances would need to occur in Haiti 

in order for the State Department to recommend to the Department of Homeland Security that Temporary Protective Status be 

provided for Haitians? What hasn’t occurred that needs to occur? 

Mr. DEWEY. The conditions for Temporary Protective Status are 

an acute situation and widespread violence throughout the country, 

or a natural disaster, as has been the case for some of the countries 

in Central America. It doesn’t meet that test, and the Department 

of Homeland Security makes that decision. 

Mr. WEXLER. How many more Haitians will have to die in order 

for the chaos to be great enough so we can grant a Temporary Protective Status? Is there a level that needs to be established that we 

have to reach? 

Mr. DEWEY. If we have evidence that Haitians are dying. There 

have not been any that have been repatriated after the departure. 

Mr. WEXLER. Do you recognize the dichotomy? On the one hand, 

Mr. Noriega spends his entire testimony documenting all the tragedies that have occurred in Haiti. And up until 2 days ago that 

same gentleman was in charge, and now we are saying there is no 

documented problem. 

Mr. NORIEGA. May I address that point very briefly? May I note 

that in the days——

41

Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection. 

Mr. NORIEGA. In the days before President Aristide’s departure, 

we had about 900 people that had taken to the seas. Since the days 

of Aristide’s departure, we have three intercepted on the seas. So 

I think the situation may be improving and we hope it gets better 

every day. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. I find it incredible. I look at today’s news. I understand that the United States is shifting its policy, where Staff Sergeant Timothy Edwards said that at airports, the Marines’ mission 

now is aimed to protect Haitians from reprisal attacks. I mean, it 

is clear what is going on. We are shifting our policies now. This is 

just in today’s paper. I don’t know whether you read it today. But 

there are problems that we have to shift it because of the reprisals, 

and they are talking about bodies laying in the street. 

I watched CNN the other day. But they have had bodies just recently that they were putting in and taking to the morgue. So people are dying every day. I think that is well documented. 

I wonder, is Venezuela next? I wonder, because we tried that 

once and it didn’t work, and maybe we ought to go back again because we believe in democracy. I wonder if Venezuela is next. 

Let me ask you, I think that it is clear—and I wonder what is 

the most important thing here. It is clear to me, and I think it is 

clear to all, that you and the Administration for whatever the reason, you don’t like—didn’t like Aristide. Now, I wonder what becomes more important. Is it an individual or an institution of government that is important in the lives of the people, the 8 million 

people that happen to live in Haiti, the most important thing, the 

saving of lives of Haitians? 

Now if, in fact, you have a policy that is just based upon who you 

like and dislike in regards to who heads the country, and you make 

those decisions, then I wonder why we even went through the charade of saying that we agree with, first, the Bishops. When they 

came together, they had an agreement and they wanted to sit down 

and get both parties together so we can stop atrocities. Why would 

we even say we agree with that? Why would we even say that we 

agreed with the CARICOM agreement, if in fact we weren’t serious 

about trying to get two sides to the table to negotiate an agreement? 

We know an agreement cannot be had but one side. You need 

two sides at the table. And if fact—why would we say we want a 

diplomatic relationship? Based upon everything I heard here, you 

are saying that your minds were made up before CARICOM and 

you were saying you didn’t want a diplomatic conclusion to this 

problem. You just wanted to get rid of Aristide. That was the objective, not to preserve this democracy. The objective seems to me to 

get rid of a Head of State. 

You indicated in your testimony we don’t put American lives at 

risk to save a government. But by now, right now, by not trying 

to save a government, we are going to put American lives at stake, 

because we have rebels and criminals and hoods that are controlling the streets. And our own admission when we look at individuals—and I am not a conspiracy theorist at all, but when, in fact, 

you have these allegations, I think some of them have been fairly 

42

well documented, and I will ask you that when you have allegations that the CIA had been connected to the FRAPH, whose leaders went through Aristide originally, and most recently over the 

weekend, and the FRAPH death squad leader Toto Constant, who 

not only lives in Queens, lives in my district and is causing heck 

in my district as we speak, causing people—and we are separating 

Haitians in the streets of New York and Brooklyn, Queens and 

Brooklyn from each other, but Constant is there and he is going 

to come back. 

Then you have Guy Philippe, who is a leader of the current 

movement, was trained by the United States military in Ecuador. 

We have M–16s that were found and M–60s and rocket-propelled 

grenade launchers in the hands of the rebels appear to be weapons 

sent by the United States to the Dominican Republic, and now they 

end up in Haiti. You have a situation, as I said, where the U.S. 

did not really back the CARICOM peace plan at all, but they claim 

they backed it after the Congressional Black Caucus—I would 

ask—and I can go on and I could bring up allegation after allegation, but I would like to know—and then you also have all sorts 

of figures who are coming out of the woodwork to rule in Haiti—

Guy Philippe and I hear Baby Doc is coming back, Danny Toussaint. 

What is our current plan for Haiti and will these people be allowed to take office? There are criminals that have been released. 

Prisons were broken into. The people that broke laws, people that 

went to the DR, some people serving a life sentence, all is forgotten 

about and these people can now come back, and are these going to 

be the ones that are going to negotiate a peace agreement for a 

democratic government in Haiti? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you, Congressman. Congressman, the 

Bishops that you referred to, the Bishops’ plan that you referred 

to, was actually withdrawn by the Bishops. We tried to get them 

to propose another plan, and Secretary Powell encouraged them to 

propose another plan. But the Bishops’ consensus was that Aristide 

had to leave, and we were told they would not put forward a plan 

that would leave Aristide in place. 

With respect to the question of whether we like the man or not, 

that isn’t the issue. It isn’t even the issue of whether we like what 

he did when he was in office over a 10-year period. But we do have 

to make some judgments about whether we want to put American 

lives at risk merely to keep him in power for a little bit longer. 

We were not asked and are not expected to put American lives 

at risk to keep in power good men in Bolivia or in Argentina or in 

Ecuador. And it is not merely a question of whether we like a person; it is whether we think it is a sustainable, viable investment 

for American foreign policy. It is a reasonable assessment that we 

are obligated to make. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Meeks. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

Thank you, Congressman. Congressman, the Bishops that you referred to, the 

Bishops’ plan that you referred to, was actually withdrawn by the Bishops. We tried 

to get them to propose another plan, and Secretary Powell encouraged them to propose another plan. But the Bishops’ consensus was that Aristide had to leave, and 

43

we were told that they would not put forward a plan that would leave Aristide in 

place. 

With respect to the question of whether we like the man or not, that isn’t the 

issue. It isn’t even the issue of whether we like what he did when he was in office 

over a 10-year period. But we do have to make some judgments about whether we 

want to put American lives at risk merely to keep him in power a little bit longer. 

We were not asked and are not expected to put American lives at risk to keep in 

power good men in Bolivia or in Argentina or in Ecuador. And it is not merely a 

question of whether we like a person; it is whether we think it is a sustainable, viable investment for American foreign policy. It is a reasonable assessment that we 

were obligated to make. 

It is worth remembering that Haiti’s political crisis had festered for more than 

two years by the time the rebels began armed attacks in the north. Intervening with 

troops in the middle of an armed insurgency caused by the unresolved political crisis 

was not, in our judgment, a prudent policy. The armed insurgents opposing Aristide 

would have viewed the intervention as supporting Aristide, substantially increasing 

risk for American troops. When President Aristide resigned and left the country, it 

became possible for troops to conduct stability operations without being in between 

two armed factions. 

Let me address some of the other questions you raise in your statement. You said 

that we didn’t like Aristide, that our minds were made up before the CARICOM 

plan, that we did not want a diplomatic conclusion to the problem. The facts, I 

think, show something far different. We were observers at the meetings where 

CARICOM came up with its plan, and offered our advice and counsel when asked. 

We knew what the plan involved from the very beginning, and were it favor of it. 

The Secretary himself publicly endorsed the CARICOM plan on February 13. After 

Aristide accepted the plan in Kingston, we engaged in intensive diplomacy to convince opposition and civil society leaders to accept the CARICOM plan, including 

that part of the plan that called for Aristide to serve out the remainder of his term. 

So we did engage in diplomacy to achieve a political solution, and this settlement 

included President Aristide remaining in office. 

As I said earlier, the U.S. Government has delivered no M–16 rifles, or any of 

the other weapons you mention, to the Dominican Republic. The last U.S. weapons 

sale to the Dominican Republic was 1991, when we delivered side arms. I have also 

testified that Guy Philippe’s military training in Ecuador was not funded or sponsored by the U.S., but was part of a bilateral program between Haiti and Ecuador. 

On our current plans for Haiti, the U.S. intends to support efforts to rebuild Haiti’s governmental institutions, including a professional, independent police force. We 

will support free and fair elections as soon as the interim Haitian government determines it is practical to hold them. One of the guiding principles of our engagement 

in Haiti is that political power will not be turned over to persons who have participated in political violence, including irregular armed groups.

Mr. BALLENGER. Again, sorry, Mr. Secretary. Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank you and 

the Ranking Member for this hearing. It is long overdue, but now 

I understand why. 

It is very clear to me, Mr. Noriega, that, first of all, we have been 

involved in the process of destabilizing and undermining the government of Haiti over the last 3, 4 years. It is also very clear to 

me that—and it is this Administration’s policy that regime change 

is a central component of its foreign policy and it manifests itself 

in a variety of ways. It just so happens in Haiti, it was planned 

in this way, working with the murderers and the thugs and those 

paramilitary groups to achieve what you had planned from day 

one, and that is a coup and overthrow of the government of President Aristide, the duly elected President of a black nation of 8 million people, the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. I think your 

testimony confirmed that for me. 

Let me also indicate that it is very important for me to just ask 

you about the safety and security of President and Mrs. Aristide, 

because we have called the State Department just to ask them to 

put us in touch with them, and it is my understanding there is no 

44

United States Embassy in the Central African Republic. Or is there 

a way to at least know what is transpiring? I want to make sure 

from your point of view that you are ensuring their safety and their 

well-being. 

Next I would like to know just, really, Mr. Noriega, when did you 

decide that Mr. Aristide had to go? And what did you do to make 

sure that that happened? And I ask you that because I wrote to 

Secretary Powell on February 12 and said in this letter—let me 

just read one paragraph. I said—and this was February 12:

‘‘I must say, Mr. Secretary, that our failure to support the 

democratic process and help restore order looks like a covert 

effort to overthrow a government. There is a violent coup d’etat 

in the making, and it appears that the United States is aiding 

and abetting an attempt to violently topple the Aristide government. With all due respect, this looks like regime change.’’

There were a series of questions I asked the Secretary of State. 

He has not responded yet. Maybe you can. 

Does the State Department support the democratically-elected 

government of Haiti, and what tactical steps is our government 

taking to support the democratic process? 

Secondly, is our country supporting and sanctioning an overthrow of the Aristide government by giving a wink and nod to the 

opposition? And I said to the Secretary, there are reports that we 

are covertly funding the opposition. 

Thirdly, does the United States support the CARICOM proposal 

and will we work through the OAS to broker a peaceful solution 

and not an overthrow of the Aristide government? 

Finally, I asked, is it true that Haitian opposition parties and 

leaders have received USAID funding? Mr. Secretary, I think it is 

very important that these questions be answered truthfully because many would like to believe the Secretary of State. 

I know he said recently some of our statements are nonsense. 

There have been reports that we are buying into conspiracy theories. But I also think it is very important to ask these questions, 

given the facts that the Secretary of State made and the presentation he made at the United Nations with regard to the weapons 

of mass destruction, with regard to Iraq. It is important we know 

the truth. And it is important to answer some of these questions 

that we have been asking today, because certainly your testimony 

to date begs the question, just when did we plan this and how did 

we see this being executed? And I would like to hear from you on 

that. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, Congresswoman, on the safety and wellbeing of President Aristide and his party, he is not the responsibility of the United States Government. We facilitated his safe departure from the country at his request. He is free to leave the 

Central African Republic at any time. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Lee. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

Well, Congresswoman, on the safety and well-being of President Aristide and his 

party, he is not the responsibility of the United States Government. We facilitated 

his safe departure from the country at his request. He is free to leave the Central 

African Republic at any time. 

45

On your next question, we never decided that Aristide had to resign office—he decided that himself when he realized that continuing in office would mean death and 

suffering in the conflict between his armed partisans and the insurgents. And as 

I responded a moment ago to Congressman Meeks, we supported the CARICOM 

plan, which among other things called for President Aristide to remain in office for 

the balance of his term. 

While Aristide was in office, we acknowledged him as Haiti’s elected president 

and supported the democratic process by working with all parties to achieve a settlement of the political crisis. This included urging Aristide on several occasions to 

end his undemocratic suppression of legitimate political dissent and free press. We 

also asked him to do something to create a climate of security for elections, as he 

promised the OAS he would, but never did. We engaged in an intensive effort to 

obtain the opposition’s agreement to the CARICOM plan, which initially they did 

not accept because it allowed Aristide to remain in office. 

Opposition parties and leaders in Haiti have never received direct funding from 

USAID. Opposition parties and their leaders have participated in political party 

training given by USAID grantees, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Secretary, let me just say my office was in touch 

with the State Department throughout this process, and we were 

told that President Aristide and Mrs. Aristide were going to a destination of their choosing. We heard that President Aristide had no 

idea where he was going until 20 minutes before they landed. 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is accurate. He had chosen a destination 

which decided it would not be able to accept him. We then had to 

find a place that would accept him. We did, and the Central African Republic has graciously accepted to do that. 

They also now say that he is free to leave any time he wants, 

and the public statements I have seen, I think that they would welcome his leaving whenever he wants. 

Ms. LEE. And wouldn’t we get a letter in response to the questions that we asked of the——

Mr. NORIEGA. I think you certainly are owed an answer, Congresswoman. 

Ms. LEE. And this was February 12, mind you, before the coup 

took place. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Okay. Could I request, just to assist you all, we 

have quite a few more people, and let us be honest, I think they 

are more interested in making a statement than asking questions. 

But if you could record the questions that we do not have time to 

answer, it would be greatly appreciated. 

Sooner or later, the gentleman with the leg problem is supposed 

to come up and, at the rate we are going, it may be midnight. So 

let me ask the people that are going to ask questions, either make 

your statement and don’t ask questions, or ask questions and give 

them time to answer. 

So it is now. 

Ms. WATSON. I am going to read you a statement and then would 

you tell me if it is true.

‘‘The United States State Department, which never negotiates with terrorists, has sufficient cozy contact with the Haitian rebels to convince them to delay their onslaught on Portau-Prince. Even after the rebels rejected terms of settlement 

acceptable to President Aristide, in a matter of hours, the 

State Department acceded to the rebel demands, which was 

the removal of President Aristide.’’

46

Would you say that is a true statement, or would you say it is 

not? 

Mr. NORIEGA. That statement is false. 

Ms. WATSON. All right. 

Now, does the State Department deal with those who plan coup 

d’etats or overthrow of legitimately elected democratic governments? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, we do not. 

Ms. WATSON. What kind of conversation did you have with the 

leaders or leader of the rebel groups? 

Mr. NORIEGA. None. 

Ms. WATSON. All right. 

How, then, did you know they would not accept the proposal that 

was offered and agreed to by President Aristide? 

Mr. NORIEGA. The conversations we had were with the civilian 

democratic opposition, representatives of political parties and civil 

society, not with the so-called ‘‘rebel groups,’’ which I would prefer 

to refer to as ‘‘criminal gangs.’’

Ms. WATSON. Apparently, it is a criminal gang member, Philippe, 

that has threatened other duly elected officials if they do not attend a meeting. I understand less than 24 hours ago this statement 

was made, and I understand this person has been responsible for 

the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of Haitians in the past. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I did not see the statement you are referring to, 

ma’am, but we have communicated to the so-called ‘‘rebels,’’ ‘‘criminal gangs,’’ that they should lay down their arms and leave the 

city. 

Before they reached the city, we had public statements that said 

that they would be held responsible, if they came into the city, for 

the violence that ensued, and the international community would 

hold them responsible for that. They said that they saw those 

statements, among other things, on the Internet and said that they 

were not coming into the city. 

They immediately proceeded to come into the city. So they were 

not responding to these public statements. 

But as the international community is able to put more security 

forces on the ground, these folks will have no choice but to respond 

and to comply and to pull out of the city. 

Ms. WATSON. Is it true or not true that our Ambassador, Ambassador Foley, met with the rebel leader today? 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is not true. 

Ms. WATSON. He did not meet with him today? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, he did not. 

Ms. WATSON. Maybe before? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I don’t think he has ever met the man. 

Ms. WATSON. Okay. Maybe the Associated Press got it wrong. I 

know they do get some things wrong. But it is in the Associated 

Press today, and I will see that you get a copy:

‘‘A day after declaring himself Haiti’s new military chief, 

rebel leader Guy Philippe met briefly with U.S. Ambassador 

James Foley at the envoy’s residence on Wednesday. Neither 

side would comment about the content.’’

47

Mr. NORIEGA. That is false. The meeting that I know Ambassador Foley had was with Yvon Neptune, who was President 

Aristide’s Prime Minister, and with the interim President of Haiti, 

Boniface Alexandre. As far as I know, Ambassador Foley has never 

met with a guerrilla leader. 

The leader of the U.S. military contingent met with Philippe 

briefly this morning to tell him that he should lay down his arms. 

Ms. WATSON. What did you just say? Repeat what you just said, 

the last sentence. 

Mr. NORIEGA. The head of the U.S. military contingent met with 

Philippe this morning to tell him to lay down his arms and to leave 

the city. 

Ms. WATSON. Under whose authority? Was that under the Ambassador’s authority? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No. That man does not work for the Ambassador. 

Ms. WATSON. Who directed? 

Mr. NORIEGA. What he is doing, in the interest of the security 

of U.S. forces, is to tell this man to leave the city to prevent any 

sort of a confrontation. If he does not leave the city, he will have 

to respond to the force of the international community; and that 

was the simple message to him. 

Ms. WATSON. Well, I would suggest strongly that the State Department immediately contact the Associated Press to clarify this, 

that is going out over e-mail. 

Mr. BALLENGER. If I may, I have the latest quotation of 2:57 this 

afternoon from the Associated Press, so it saves you the trouble of 

finding out:

‘‘Rebel leader Guy Philippe said Wednesday his forces laid 

down their arms as United States Marines fanned out through 

the capital, rifles at ready, to help restore some order amid 

Haiti’s bloody uprising.’’

And now—I mean, it is the same Associated Press that you 

agreed was not too smart. 

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me just to finish 

my question, and it probably is more like a statement. 

I have listened for the last hour or so to an assault on a President that was duly elected in a democratic process. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I hate to be impolite, but we did not let anybody 

else have additional time. 

Ms. WATSON. Well, you kind of took some of my time, but you 

are the Chair, you can do that. But there is definitely a double 

standard. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Your time had already expired. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Rangel. 

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you so much, and thank you, Mr. Noriega, 

for sharing your views with us. 

You had indicated that you would not deal with these rogues and 

thugs that were part of the militia, and I guess the noncivilian part 

of the opposition, but there did come a time where these rogues 

and thugs were approaching the palace and that our government 

thought that President Aristide was in danger of his life and his 

family’s. 

48

Mr. NORIEGA. Pardon me, sir? I didn’t hear the last part of that. 

Mr. RANGEL. Did there come a time that the United States Government thought that these rogues, these thugs, these criminals 

were approaching the palace and that President Aristide and his 

family would be in danger? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes. 

Mr. RANGEL. And as you said, that we did not think it was appropriate to put our military in harm’s way to shore up his safety? 

Mr. NORIEGA. That was a decision we made. 

Mr. RANGEL. Right. And so therefore we communicated that to 

President Aristide that he could not depend on us to protect him 

against these thugs, these criminals, and these rogues? 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is essentially correct, yes. We told him 

through public statements that we were not going to do that. 

Mr. RANGEL. And as a result of this, President Aristide thought 

that it was in his best interests and the best interests of the Haitians for him to leave? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RANGEL. And we facilitated that leaving? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, sir, we did. 

Mr. RANGEL. And we did take him out of Haiti? 

Mr. NORIEGA. At his request. 

Mr. RANGEL. Yes. And he requested, because he was fearful for 

his life and other Haitians that would die as a result of the information we gave him, right? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I think it wasn’t necessarily just the information 

we gave him, but I think——

Mr. RANGEL. Well, it encouraged him to leave, I would think. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes. If you read his resignation letter, that is the 

reason. 

Mr. RANGEL. Well, I want to know, if someone leaves a country 

that is elected, because he is fearful for his life, is that not a coup 

d’etat? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I don’t think so, sir. 

Mr. RANGEL. Well, that is what is explained in the dictionary. 

How would you describe a coup d’etat? 

Here is a man that is informed by the United States Government 

that we cannot protect him, and the rebels and thugs and rogues 

are going to come and they are going to kill him and his family and 

Haitians would die. Do you want to leave? He says, ‘‘Yes.’’ You 

make him leave. 

Why is that not a coup d’etat? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We did not make him leave, sir. 

Mr. RANGEL. I didn’t say you made him leave. He asked to leave. 

Mr. NORIEGA. At the very end you said, and ‘‘you make him 

leave.’’

Mr. RANGEL. You helped him to leave, I meant to say. Forgive 

me. 

Mr. NORIEGA. At his request. 

Mr. RANGEL. At his request. He begged you to help him to leave 

to get out of there so he would not get killed, and his family, because he feared that these rebel forces that we informed him would 

kill him and other Haitians, and he left. Now, why is that not a 

coup d’etat? 

49

Mr. NORIEGA. It isn’t what I would regard as a traditional coup 

d’etat. 

Mr. RANGEL. Tell me the difference. When the man is running 

for his life, here comes the military, they are armed, they are going 

to kill them. We know it, we tell him that. 

He says, please get me out of here. We get him out of there. Why 

is that not a coup d’etat? 

Mr. NORIEGA. He resigned, sir. 

Mr. RANGEL. Now, did we ask him to resign? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, we didn’t. We told him that if he needed to 

leave——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Rangel. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

No, we didn’t. We told him that if he needed to leave, we could facilitate his departure.

Mr. RANGEL. Be very careful, Mr. Noriega, because it is reported. 

Did we ask him to resign? Was that a condition of helping him to 

leave the country? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We told him that for us to be able to facilitate his 

departure——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Rangel. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We told him that for us to be able to facilitate his departure that he had to decide 

what was best for Haiti. If he decided to resign, we would work with him on a destination. I do not consider that a condition for helping him to leave. Aristide and 

his security advisors made their own assessment of his position.

Mr. RANGEL. Yes, of course. That is easy. 

Mr. NORIEGA. We did not want to have a situation where we 

were going to have to——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Rangel. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We did not want a situation where we were going to have to deal with the consequences of a political vacuum. If Aristide had left Haiti with his status as president unresolved, the street violence would have continued. Aristide understood 

this—he said so in his resignation letter—I agree to leave if my resignation can prevent a bloodbath.

Mr. RANGEL. You didn’t want to have a situation, so you told him 

that unless he resigned, we would not be able to facilitate his departure. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Because we wanted to have some sort of a sustainable political——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Rangel. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

Because we wanted to have some sort of a sustainable political framework after 

Aristide’s departure if he decided to leave, it was understood that he would resign 

and show us his letter of resignation. Haiti’s constitution provides for a succession 

if the Office of the President becomes vacant for any reason. If Aristide had not resigned, the office would not be vacant even if he had left the country. His successor 

could not have taken office, and there would have been a power vacuum that armed 

insurgents could have exploited. Again, Aristide understood this—this is why he 

submitted a resignation before leaving.

50

Mr. RANGEL. I didn’t ask the reasons, Mr. Noriega. I am just asking you this. 

Mr. BALLENGER. If I may say something, Charlie, you ought to 

give him a chance to answer at least one question before you throw 

another one at him. 

Mr. RANGEL. But this is such a simple one here. 

As a condition of assisting this man, saving his life, that of his 

family, one of the conditions of helping him was that he resign; is 

that not true? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We did not want to have a situation where——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Rangel. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We did not want to have a situation where political chaos would ensue if Aristide 

left the country without resigning. Aristide had to make this decision himself—he 

could have stayed and the violence would have continued. If he decided to leave 

without tendering a resignation, political turmoil and violence would also have continued. I believed that if we helped Aristide leave the country without seeing his 

letter of resignation that we might be contributing to the uncertainty and turmoil 

in the country and, ironically, that he might accuse us of taking him against his 

will. Ambassador Foley and I have discussed this, and we agree that, in light of the 

fact that Mrs. Aristide is an American citizen, and in order to attempt to avoid a 

bloodbath, we would have been inclined to help Mr. Aristide depart Haiti even if 

he refused to show us his letter of resignation.

Mr. RANGEL. Oh, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. WATERS. Make him answer. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Well, if you listen to the answer, it might satisfy 

you. 

Mr. RANGEL. Now my time is going to expire. That is not fair. 

If he had not signed that letter of resignation, would you have 

helped him to leave the country? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Probably, yes, in the final analysis. 

Mr. RANGEL. But you told him—at that time, he was told that 

he had to resign in order to leave the country. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I think in the humanitarian interests, particularly 

since his wife is an American citizen, we would have been prepared 

to take him——

Mr. RANGEL. But you told him that he had to resign if he wanted 

to leave the country. 

Mr. NORIEGA. We told him, because we wanted to have a sustainable solution where we could avoid bloodshed, where we could 

be——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Rangel. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We told him that we wanted to have a sustainable solution where we could avoid 

bloodshed, where we could be assured that violence would not continue. We did not 

tell him he had to resign, but it was understood that he had decided to leave and 

to resign. Both decisions were his to make and he made them.

Mr. RANGEL. And twice he was asked for that resignation, and 

he would not have left unless he signed it; is that correct? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We wanted to be able to have a basis for a sustainable political solution. 

Mr. RANGEL. But you told him that unless he signed it, he could 

not leave the country. 

51

Mr. NORIEGA. We wanted to have a sustainable political solution, 

and the only way to be able to achieve that——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congressman Rangel. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We wanted to have a sustainable political solution, and the only way to be able 

to achieve that, if Aristide chose to leave the country, was that his formal resignation be part of that solution.

Mr. RANGEL. And without that resignation, it would have been 

a coup d’etat by anyone’s standard. 

Mr. BALLENGER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. NORIEGA. We have a letter of resignation, sir. 

Mr. RANGEL. You sure did, and I would have signed one too. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Waters. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you 

for allowing those of us who are not Members of the Committee to 

be here today. I want you to know that several of you, including 

you, Mr. Chairman, have said that it is a fabrication that he was 

forced out, that there was no coup d’etat, he was not kidnapped. 

I talked to President Aristide this morning. He called me, and he 

maintained that he was forced out, he was literally kidnapped, he 

did not go of his own will, so I want to put that on the record. 

Secondly, I want to put on the record that I have been to Haiti 

three times since January 1, and I have met with the opposition, 

that is, Mr. Apaid, Jr., and some of those from the committee of 

184 and talked to many people about what was going on. 

In addition to that, I was in Haiti a week ago this past Saturday 

where you came and led the delegation of the international community, where Mr. Aristide signed off on the CARICOM proposal. So 

I want to put that on the record. 

But I am very interested in some things that you have said, and 

I do want yes or no answers. Don’t take up my time. 

I want to know, you have said that you have no responsibility to 

protect a Head of State. Are you going to protect the new Chief 

Justice that was just sworn in, who is now the Head of State of 

Haiti, or not? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We believe that he is part of this——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Waters. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

We believe that he is part of the interim government that will govern Haiti during 

the political transition period, that is, before free and fair elections are held to put 

a new permanent government in place. We have to make sure that the political 

transition is effective and democratic, so yes, we will protect him. 

Aristide was protected by a private security firm, paid for by the Haitian government. He had security protection throughout all of the events preceding his resignation. His security detail went to the airport with him, and boarded the plane as 

well. 

President Alexandre does not have the advantage of a private security firm, which 

the interim government cannot afford, and the Haitian National Police are incapable at this point. As the police force and Haiti’s interim government become stronger, Haiti’s domestic security forces will become responsible for protecting high-level 

officials.

Ms. WATERS. Are you going to protect him or not, yes, or no. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, we are, because he is part of a sustainable political solution. 

52

Ms. WATERS. Did you refuse to protect Mr. Aristide, who was 

then the Head of State? So you have a different standard for these 

two; is that correct? 

That is all I want to know, yes or no. 

Mr. NORIEGA. These are very different men and very different political solutions. 

Ms. WATERS. So, yes, for the chief justice; no, for Mr. Aristide. 

So you don’t have a policy that is consistent about having no responsibility to protect Head of State. 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is not what I said the policy was, ma’am. You 

are misstating what the policy was. 

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Waters. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

That is not what I said the policy was, ma’am. You are misstating what the policy 

was. Interim President Alexandre is a vital part of the transition to a democratic 

Haiti through free and fair elections. For the transition to be successful, he has to 

be protected from harm. Issues concerning protection for Aristide before his resignation were different. He had his own private security detail, paid for by the Haitian 

government. President Alexandre does not have such protection, because the interim 

government can’t afford to pay for it and Haiti’s domestic security forces are too 

weak now. As a matter of policy, we protect President Alexandre because the future 

of democracy in Haiti depends on it, and we can arrange this protection under the 

umbrella of stability that the Multinational Interim Force provides. Before his resignation, Aristide had his own personal protection, not to mention the pro-Aristide 

armed gangs standing between him and the insurgents. We did not need to give 

Aristide protection.

Ms. WATERS. Let’s go on to the next question. 

Mr. Noriega, people are assuming that you knew——

Mr. NORIEGA. You are misstating what the policy is. 

Ms. WATERS [continuing]. That the so-called ‘‘rebels,’’ who they 

were. I just want some yes or no answers. 

Did you know about the history of Louis-Jodel Chamblain? Did 

you know that he was the right hand of Emmanuel Constant, who 

is now up in New York; and did you know that he had murdered 

Mr. Antoine Izmery, along with thousands of other Haitians? Did 

you know that before they reentered Haiti in this last coup d’etat 

that took place? Did you know about him? Had you ever heard 

about him and his history? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, I have. 

Ms. WATERS. Have you ever met him? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you know about Mr. Guy Philippe? Did you 

know that he was a convicted drug dealer and that he attempted 

a coup on President Aristide in 2002, and that he is responsible for 

killing 26 members of Lavalas. Had you heard about him before he 

entered Gonaives? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I had heard of him, but not——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Waters. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

I had heard of him, but not of any specific allegations about the activities you 

mention. We knew that Philippe was in the Dominican Republic. We also knew that 

in 2003 armed groups were attacking government facilities in the central plateau 

region, but we had no information connecting Philippe to these attacks.

53

Ms. WATERS. You knew about his history as a convicted drug 

dealer? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I did not know the details of that. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you know that he had been a killer, that he 

was accused of killing? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I do not know any details that——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Waters. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

I do not know any details that would link Philippe to accusations of involvement 

in killings. Of course, I know from the media that he was one of several leaders 

of so-called rebel gangs that were involved in political violence, including killing. I 

also am aware of accusations of his involvement in other forms of criminality.

Ms. WATERS. Did you know that he was in exile? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I do not know the details. 

Ms. WATERS. Do you know that he was in exile? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I knew that he was in exile, yes. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you know that he had returned and he was up 

in Gonaives and Cap Haitien? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I knew that he returned; I saw it on television. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you know about Mr. Jean Tatoune and did you 

know that he was a member of FRAPH, and did you know about 

him before he came back into the country? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, I have never heard of him. 

Ms. WATERS. Had you heard that he was involved in the massacre at Raboteau? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I had heard of that incident. 

Ms. WATERS. Had you met Mr. Guy Philippe before he returned 

to Haiti? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, I have never met him. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you ever met Mr. Emmanuel Constant? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, I have not. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you know that he was the head of FRAPH? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I have heard that. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you know that Mr. Chamblain was his right 

hand? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I have heard that from you folks. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you know that Mr. Constant was hired and 

worked for the CIA? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, I don’t know that. 

Ms. WATERS. It was in the public domain. It was in the papers. 

You never knew it? You never heard it? 

You are not sworn in, but you are on record. Did you know that 

Mr. Constant worked for the CIA? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Ma’am, I am telling you, we don’t generally comment on these things, but I do not know that. 

Ms. WATERS. You do not generally—you are qualifying your 

statement. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am telling you that——

Ms. WATERS. What you are telling me is, you don’t want to tell 

me that you know. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am trying to tell you, but you won’t give me an 

opportunity. 

54

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Waters. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

I am trying to tell you, but you won’t give me an opportunity. I am telling you 

that I have no knowledge that Constant in fact worked for the CIA. I believe that 

when he first came to the U.S., he claimed that he had worked for the CIA, but 

that is all I know.

Ms. WATERS. Okay. I think I know enough. 

Now, you knew that these thugs had returned and that they had 

taken over Gonaives and Cap Haitien. Did you at any time publicly 

denounce the thugs that you knew were thugs before they came in 

and invaded Haiti? Did you ever denounce them? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We said that these people should have no business 

in the political process and they should lay down their arms. 

Ms. WATERS. Did you ever attempt to make them lay down their 

arms or to tell them that they were in exile, they were crooks and 

criminals and that they should not be in that country? 

Mr. NORIEGA. They shouldn’t be in Haiti. We have told them 

they should lay down their arms and go home. These violent folks 

have no——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Waters. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

They shouldn’t be in Haiti. We have told them they should lay down their arms 

and go home. One of our guiding principles for engagement in Haiti is that power 

will not be turned over to those who have participated in political violence, including 

irregular armed groups. Another principle is that Haitian citizens will be held accountable for past crimes through the system of justice, not through revenge.

Ms. WATERS. But you did nothing to enforce it? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We are doing that now, ma’am. 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, after the fact. After the fact, the same crooks 

and criminals and thugs and killers that you knew were in the 

country, that you did nothing to intervene with, you are now, after 

the fact, saying they should leave; is that right? 

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman, regular order. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Ma’am, I said——

Mr. BALLENGER. The gentlewoman’s time has passed. 

Pardon me, Mr. Secretary, but I am relieving you of having to 

answer that question. 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is all right. No problem. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. First of all, let me thank the Chairman and 

particularly the Ranking Member for the effort they have made to 

have this hearing, which happens to be particularly timely, but all 

of the Members who worked so hard that are on this particular 

Committee that really generated this meeting, all of the standing 

Members that are there—Congressmen Payne and Meek, Barbara 

Lee and Ms. Watson and others who are on the Committee—I 

thank you very much, and I thank you for the courtesies of allowing us to be here. 

Mr. Noriega, this is not a personal inquiry, it is not personal 

against you. I can tell you that there is a great deal of emotion because many of us have taken personally the bleeding in the streets, 

the mutilating and the murdering that has been occurring. And, of 

55

course, we take personally words such as a ‘‘rule by tyranny,’’ and 

we take personally the seemingly unceasing attack on an ex-priest 

that through a great deal of his life has spent making efforts to the 

extent of possibly a loss of life to preserve democracy. 

To this very distinguished gentleman that is in the room let me, 

first of all, acknowledge you and offer to you my deepest understanding, because those of us who lived through the era here in the 

United, States as we still fight against racism and hostilities and 

discrimination, are reminded of those who marched across the Edmond Pettis Bridge and the dogs and hoses that came about, and 

the fact that some of those who were marching were unfortunately 

terribly injured. 

If you would, accept our sympathies. 

To Mr. Noriega, let me pose this series of questions to you: Have 

you ever had a sense of fear of your life or the fear of your life and 

that of your family members? Do you have any history of that or 

any way that you could understand that by personal experience? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, yes, absolutely. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you have been in fear of your life? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Might you share with us? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You have been in fear of your life when and 

where? 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is none of your business, ma’am. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me say this. Since you are going to 

be hostile, let me say this. 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, no. It is a silly question. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. My business is to find out whether the Administration lied and whether or not you kidnapped and coerced Mr. 

Aristide. So that is my business. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Please ask me those questions, and I will answer 

them. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would imagine—excuse me. I am talking, not 

you. Since you started off being rude, then let me be rude. In any 

event, let me just say this. 

My understanding of Mr. Aristide’s position on that eve where he 

was, if you will, thrown out of his own country, is that he was told 

by American officials, maybe with the involvement of the CIA, that 

his life was in jeopardy and that the security would be removed. 

My question to you is whether or not you have any firsthand 

knowledge of that activity. 

My second point is—and you don’t need to comment on this—I 

am reminded of the attack on Chairman Karzai’s, or President 

Karzai’s life in Afghanistan, reminded of the fact that we did not 

ask him to leave his country, but we provided the necessary security so that, thank God, his life was spared. He didn’t have to make 

that decision. 

Do you have any firsthand knowledge of saying to President 

Aristide that your security would be immediately removed? 

Mr. NORIEGA. It is not true. As a matter of fact, there is an organization that, as a private contractor, has provided security for——

56

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Jackson-Lee. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

It is not true. As a matter of fact, there is an organization that, as a private contractor, has provided security for Aristide, paid for by the Government of Haiti. This 

organization provided for Aristide’s security throughout all of the events that led to 

his resignation. A U.S. government security team consulted with his security detail 

on the prevailing security conditions. We approved of that contact because we were 

concerned about the security of U.S. citizens, including Mrs. Aristide and the Americans who served in his private security detail. However, I am not aware of the details of these exchanges. After those conversations, Aristide contacted the Embassy, 

through his private security firm, to ask what the U.S. Ambassador thought would 

be best for Haiti. Our answer was that he, Aristide, had to make that judgment. 

Aristide’s private security personnel stayed with him after he made the decision to 

resign, accompanied him to the airport, and boarded the aircraft with him for the 

trip to the Central African Republic.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have any knowledge of saying to him 

that his security would be removed at that time. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am trying to answer the question. It is not true. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If that is not true, then I assume that you 

would welcome, as I have asked both the leaders of this House for 

a full congressional investigation that would investigate the Administration as to whether or not that is true. Would you welcome 

that investigation? 

Mr. NORIEGA. The Congress has an obligation to oversee——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You would welcome that investigation, yes or 

no. 

Mr. NORIEGA. The Congress has an obligation to oversee the Executive Branch. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is that yes or no? Is that yes or no? Is that 

yes or no. 

Mr. NORIEGA. We would cooperate with any——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you would welcome that investigation, 

yes or no? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We will welcome—we will cooperate with any inquiry that the Congress deems appropriate. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Let me proceed with my questions on another important aspect 

that I am concerned about. 

Is the United States a member of the U.N. Security Council? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So as I understand it, by way of a report on 

February 25, 2004, the U.N. News Service, the United Nations Security Council today deplored the Haitian opposition’s rejection of 

proposals from two regional organizations that could form the basis 

for a peaceful compromise. And so you were—the United States 

was a part of that offering of a compromise——

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman, regular order. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying this. 

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman, regular order. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. CARICOM has been totally disrespected by 

this Administration. 

Mr. WELLER. Regular order, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you have violated the relationship with 

the Caribbean——

57

Mr. WELLER. Regular order, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And we will never be able to mend it, because 

there is no way of providing the support that the United States 

has. 

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman, regular order. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that we have 

failed to be the kind of friend to Haiti that we should have been. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Everybody else had to stop, so I am trying to 

be fair to everybody. 

Ms. Corrine Brown is next. 

Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. First, let me say that I hope 

you received my letter of apology at our last meeting. I did not 

mean anything personally to you, but I stand by what I said about 

this Administration’s policy, pertaining to the Haitian people, is 

racist, and there is no way around it. 

In our discussion, there was a lot of discussion about elections, 

and of course, everybody knows that I take any discussion about 

elections personally, because I experienced, I guess, the Americanstyle coup d’etat. 

I heard you say something about not a traditional coup d’etat in 

Haiti; well, we had not a traditional coup d’etat in Florida; in my 

district alone, 227,000 votes were thrown out. And I personally 

went to Haiti and monitored the election, and I can tell you it was 

just as fair as the one that we had in Florida. 

Now, my concern—and my concern was there about the Haitians 

that have been turned back, how we have dual policies, we do not 

let not one Haitian come into this country, we send them back into 

the middle of this war that is going on, and we turn on the television and we see people being slaughtered. So my concern still is 

for the Haitian people. We have our military there, and I am grateful that they are there, but they are standing by while people are 

being slaughtered in the streets. 

What are our plans for the Haitian people? In talking to other 

leaders in the Caribbean countries, they are—they indicated that 

the United States of America blocked us going in, intervening. We 

stopped the other members of the international community from 

going in and helping to stabilize this country. 

Can you tell me what you know about that to be true, and what 

are we going to do to help the hard-working Haitian people? 

Now, I know it is a difference between them and Iraq, because 

in Iraq they have oil, and in Haiti they have nothing but a history—and we just left Black History Month—they do have a history 

of helping the United States. 

Now, I want to know, what are we going to do to help those people, my brothers and sisters, those children? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, ma’am. Thank you very much. I did receive 

your letter, and I have never for a moment doubted that your concern and engagement and interest and passion about the subject 

was anything less than sincere and motivated by your interest in 

the well-being of the Haitian people. 

The United States did not block other countries from intervening. 

There was some allusion that maybe we did this vis-a-vis France. 

The suggestion was that, somehow, Secretary Powell was being deVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ceptive about that; and of course, that is not true. We did not block 

them——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Corinne Brown. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

Yes, ma’am. Thank you very much. I did receive your letter, and I have never for 

a moment doubted that your concern and engagement and interest and passion 

about the subject was anything less than sincere and motivated by your interest in 

the well-being of the Haitian people. 

The United States did not block other countries from intervening. There was some 

allusion that maybe we did this vis-a-vis France. We did not block them or any 

other country from intervening on a bilateral basis, but no country chose to intervene before Aristide’s resignation. This was for the same reasons I described for the 

U.S. decision not to intervene. No country wanted to place troops and lives at risk 

by putting them into the middle of an unresolved, armed conflict. Your question suggests that perhaps we stopped the international community from going in to stabilize Haiti. I think this may be a reference to the UN Security Council Resolution 

that some Caribbean Community member states applied for on February 26. If so, 

I would respectfully point out to you that the Security Council voted 15–0 not to 

involve the UN at that point. In deciding not to intervene, the Security Council gave 

the same reasons I have stated for not involving the U.S.—it did not want to put 

a UN stabilization force in between two warring factions. 

To answer your question about what we are doing to help the Haitian people, we 

are doing a lot and will do much more. The U.S. has provided over $3 million in 

emergency aid since mid-February, on top of the $55 million in regular assistance 

budgeted for fiscal year 2004. We supported, and of course will continue to support, 

re-engagement of the International Financial Institutions. Since last July, when the 

Haitian government cleared its arrears to the Inter-American Development Bank 

(IDB), it has approved loans totaling $398 million. The IDB has distributed $47 million of this amount, all but $30 million of the rest are project loans that will pay 

out over 5–10 years, thereby making a substantial contribution to Haiti’s long-term 

development. On a bilateral basis, the Administration expects an intensive engagement in Haiti’s reconstruction over the next several years to help restore the capacity to govern, develop a professional and independent police force, promote economic 

development, and support free and fair elections.

Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. Sir, it was not just France; we 

talked to several different countries. I fear to call their names, because, you know, if we are not in lockstep with this Administration, 

they take you out. So I am not going to call anybody’s name, any 

country’s name, not me. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I understand the discretion that you are showing 

by not naming particular countries, but I can say that any country 

that wanted to send police or troops was free to do so. Of course, 

the United States would not be in a position to prevent any one of 

the 150 countries in the world from contributing to Haiti. 

Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. My understanding, after talking to these various leaders, is that the United States of America, 

under the Bush Administration, blocked the international community from going in and stabilizing this country. I mean, they were 

in the process of trying to do something. 

My understanding on Sunday, and we went in on Saturday 

night, in the heat of the night, in the middle of the night and took 

out Aristide. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Regarding the reference to blocking assistance, I 

think I would be aware of any of that, and I do not have any—

there is no——

Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. Did we tell other countries? 

Now, be careful. Did we tell other countries that we did not want 

them to intervene? 

59

Mr. NORIEGA. No, we did not do that. We did not do that. And 

as far as—one final thing to the personal security thing that I 

think Congresswoman Jackson——

Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. You are going to have to answer her question on her time. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am sorry. I thought——

Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. I want to protect Aristide, but 

I want to know about the Haitian people. They are being shot down 

as we speak here today. What are we doing? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We will gradually build up this presence, bring in 

other countries that will provide security, get the Haitian National 

Police stood up again, let them do their work in a professional way, 

bring some resources in, some technical assistance, get them to 

start doing that. 

We will also have to look at the economic side, look at ways to 

create jobs and investment. 

Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Christensen. 

Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, thank you. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have been in and out, so I am not sure what questions have 

been asked and answered. But let me start with this. 

For at least the past couple of years, Members of the Congres- sional Black Caucus have been working to have the $145 or $150 

million in development loans released to Haiti, and at every turn, 

at every turn, it was pointed out to us that it was our country who 

was blocking the release of those funds. 

Would you not say that the inability or denying Haiti access as 

the basis of development assistance to help develop their infrastructure contributed to this? Would you not say that we were 

complicit in the downfall of that government? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Ma’am, the decision to link the delivery of that 

international financial assistance to a political settlement was 

made in late 2000. In September 2002, based on OAS Resolution 

822, that I helped shepherd through the OAS Permanent Council, 

we delinked that. So, quite frankly, this Administration undid 

something that the previous Administration did by allowing that 

aid to start to flow. The IDB lending began. 

And I will ask Adolfo Franco to address that. 

Mr. FRANCO. Yes, Congresswoman. In the first instance, loans 

from the Inter-American Development Bank had to be made consistent with the rules of that bank, and as you know, Haiti was in 

arrears with that bank, and until the arrears were cleared and 

Haiti was able to secure a bridge loan, consistent with the bank’s 

own rules, the United States could not do—it was not possible to 

move forward on those loans. 

However, I would tell you this. We are the largest bilateral donor 

in Haiti. We provided $16 million more than the Congress requested for Haiti last year. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Our contributions have been diminishing. In 

addition to that, we had many, many meetings with representatives of the IDB in Haiti and here, and we know that different approaches to dealing with that have been used in other countries, 

60

and Haiti was never afforded the opportunity that other countries 

similarly situated had. 

Mr. FRANCO. As you know, Congresswoman, Haiti was able to secure a bridge loan to clear its arrears, and I believe President 

Iglesias was in Haiti in July. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. By that time, so much time had passed. 

Ms. WATERS. Only $3 million of that money has been given to 

Haiti. They say they cannot meet the conditions, even after they 

made them do the bridge loan. 

Mr. FRANCO. These are the Inter-American Development Bank’s 

conditions. These are not the conditions of the United States Government. These are the conditions set forth by the bank’s own 

rules. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. We were pretty much assured that if we 

could get our country to agree, the IDB would be willing to restructure that loan in any possible way that had been used in other 

countries. They outlined several ways for us to do it, but we could 

not get our country to agree to it. 

Mr. FRANCO. I have been personally in contact with the bank officials, both bank officials and the U.S. executive representative of 

the bank, and that is not true. 

What was difficult for Haiti, because of its arrears and because 

of its difficult situation was to clear that issue before the loans 

could move forward. Once that was cleared, the loans did move forward. 

In terms of the disbursement mechanisms, Congresswoman Waters, those are the bank’s disbursement mechanisms. I do not believe anybody until today has suggested that we manipulated the 

bank’s rules, the first time I have heard it. I have never heard that 

from my independent official at the bank or any executive director 

at the bank. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Well, let me just ask one other question, because what we have—our discussions differ from what we are hearing here today; and forgive me if this question has been asked. 

The U.S. was part of the development of the CARICOM proposal 

and endorsed that proposal? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. What was the process whereby the U.S. Government decided to abandon that and to take unilateral action that 

resulted in President Aristide’s leaving? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Each country made a decision for itself on what to 

do after the CARICOM plan was not implemented. It was not implemented because the opposition refused to accept and participate 

in it. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Was CARICOM involved in your decision? 

Mr. NORIEGA. They were aware of our decision. They all made 

decisions for themselves not to intervene. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. But there was essentially an agreement, was 

there not, by virtue of that proposal being essentially signed off on 

by CARICOM——

Mr. NORIEGA. We did want to work together. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Did you break that agreement, and why? 

Mr. NORIEGA. You are exactly right. We did want to work together. There was a consensus to try to work together, but counVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
61

tries had to make a decision on whether they would commit their 

own troops. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Okay. 

Congressman Porter Goss. 

Mr. GOSS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for 

having to leave, so I may have some questions that are repetitive. 

But first of all, I would like to thank Mr. Noriega and the other 

gentlemen at the table. I want to thank you for the very fine work 

you have done in a very difficult situation. 

I know you are very familiar with the situation in Haiti; you 

have been working on it for years, trying to relieve the plight of 

a country that is full of people that are burdened with medical 

problems, food problems and, of course, leadership problems in 

their struggle to get to democracy. That is well-known. It is not 

just my opinion, it is certainly the opinion, apparently, of all of the 

other countries that have been involved with trying to help Haiti 

as well. 

The efforts that you have made, I think, have led to results that 

are probably the best that we can have. The amount of misinformation surrounding what is going on is extremely disturbing and, I 

am afraid, may actually be leading to inciting some further violence 

and some further bad happenings and actually, threatening the 

lives of some of our Armed Forces there. So I would hope that any 

discussion that we have, in public particularly, would be handled 

in such a thoughtful, polite way, that it would be constructive to 

a solution of the problem, rather than to inciting and emoting passions that are clearly out of place at this time. 

My question is, first of all, is there any truth in the fact that Mr. 

Aristide was kidnapped? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, sir. And you are correct to point out that the 

statements that he was and the mentioning of the names of U.S. 

Foreign Service Officers who were directly involved in helping that 

man on television, and accusing them of helping kidnap and 

strong-arm him, put the lives of those individual people on the 

ground in Haiti in jeopardy, and it is extraordinarily irresponsible. 

Mr. GOSS. Thank you. I agree with you totally. 

Secondly, with regard to the question of Mr. Aristide’s freedom 

to make his own choice, could you comment on whether the government forced him to leave or whether he was given an opportunity 

to make a decision? 

Mr. NORIEGA. He had an opportunity to make a decision, and I 

appreciate the opportunity to expand on the answer. There was 

some reference earlier that the United States said we would pull 

his security. 

As a matter of fact, when this violence was beginning in earnest, 

we got word that his private security company which was providing 

his security wanted to augment their presence by adding additional 

people. I made a point of telling people that would be involved in 

the licensing of that request, if you get that, expedite it. 

We, by all means, want to have the man’s personal security 

taken care of. We were not, however, in the final analysis, willing 

to put American servicemen on the ground to be part of a political 

process that would do no more than keep him in power in an unchecked way outside the context of a political agreement where we 

62

might actually be able to have a sustainable political process in 

place. 

Mr. GOSS. I congratulate you for arranging, under difficult circumstances, for the safe departure of Mr. Aristide. 

Was there any involvement by the CIA in his departure that you 

are aware of? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am not aware of any involvement. 

Mr. GOSS. I understand that you have not had the opportunity 

to answer fully some of the questions that have been put to you. 

Are there any of the questions that have been put to you that you 

would like to further expand on? 

Mr. NORIEGA. A couple of points. 

Mr. GOSS. Please, sir. 

Mr. NORIEGA. On the disintegration of the Haitian institutions, 

which we supposedly encouraged, we actually had $1 billion worth 

of assistance going in there over the last 10 years, and it was 

squandered because these institutions were undermined. 

Take the specific example of HNP, the Haitian National Police. 

They were undermined by underfunding by the Haitian government, by politicization almost immediately, by the use of them to 

carry out political murders. And finally Congress made the decision 

to cut off assistance to the HNP because of narcotics corruption. 

It was not a decision of the Executive Branch to do that, and I 

believe it was done during the previous Administration. But Congress decided that it could no longer invest in that institution, and 

it is very important, because the gangs that Aristide used to govern 

the situation——

Ms. WATERS. Regular order, Mr. Chairman. Regular order, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. GOSS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am sorry. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Jan Schakowsky. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 

allowing those of us who care about Haiti, but are not on this Committee, to ask some questions. 

Let me just first say it is obvious, Mr. Noriega, that you think 

that the very distinguished Congressional Black Caucus, Members 

of Congress who, in my view, have the most expertise and the most 

interest in Haiti, not only for President Aristide, but for the people 

of Haiti, who almost to a person disagree with you, are all wrong. 

And it seems to me that that would justify a full and objective investigation of exactly what happened. 

We need to understand, since there is such disagreement, every 

dollar that was spent by the United States in Haiti over the last 

while leading up to this, how the USAID dollars were spent or the 

CIA dollars were spent; and we ought to examine carefully the intelligence. 

You know, many Members in this Congress relied in the past on 

intelligence that happened to be all wrong, and we need to look at 

that carefully as well, the intelligence that you based your decisions on. 

I am very interested also in what happened that night. I was in 

conversation with Mrs. Aristide in Haiti at about 6:30 p.m., and 

there was absolutely no hint whatsoever that this was going to be 

63

the night when they were leaving. So I was wondering if there is 

a State Department memorandum or a written record or a plan 

that involved the United States that we could have a copy of now, 

if there were any communications that were written that we could 

look at that would help to explain exactly what happened. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Ma’am and Mr. Chairman, the Committee, 

through its oversight responsibilities and powers, can request information from the Administration and we will accommodate it in the 

normal way. 

Mr. BALLENGER. That is what I was hoping, that people would 

submit questions, and I am sure you will be glad to answer them. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I will submit additional questions. 

What time was the first conversation with President Aristide, is 

one question I have about this? And was the letter of resignation 

composed by, not just signed by, actually composed by President 

Aristide? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I do not know who composed the letter, but it was 

not composed by us. I assume that he wrote it. It had his flare. 

But the first conversation with him, I believe, was after 9 p.m. 

We had received word through an emissary that he wanted to pose 

some questions to us and that he——

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Are you saying, for the record here, that the 

first contact was from Mr. Aristide to the Embassy or to U.S. representatives to discuss his leaving? 

Mr. NORIEGA. To discuss his departure. We had contacts with his 

emissaries throughout all of this period of time. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. About leaving? 

Mr. NORIEGA. No, no, no. It was about staying, as a matter of 

fact. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Exactly. That was my sense at 6:30 p.m. 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is right. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Are you saying, though, that he made the first 

overture? This is important to get on the record. 

Mr. NORIEGA. The first comments that clearly suggest that he 

was considering leaving came from an emissary of his, who posed 

some questions to us, to Ambassador Foley. The questions were——

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega 

provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congresswoman Schakowsky. Mr. Noriega’s response follows:]

The first comments that clearly suggested that Aristide was considering leaving 

came from an emissary, who posed some questions to us, to Ambassador Foley. The 

questions were—did the U.S. think it was in Haiti’s best interest for Aristide to stay 

or to go; would we protect his wealth and property; what would happen to his supporters and key Cabinet ministers; and did he have a choice of destination. These 

questions came to us through Aristide’s private security personnel. So yes, Aristide 

did make the first overture.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I have heard those, but you are saying that at 

no time before that was there any suggestion from the U.S. Government in any way that he should resign and leave, and that we 

would—we would help him leave? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am not aware of every conversation that took 

place with a so-called U.S. Government official. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. When was the plane ordered? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I think it was probably after 1 a.m. It would have 

been after he indicated that he was interested. 

64

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. When he was on the plane, were they told that 

they could not even raise the window shades? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am not aware that that is the case. I have heard 

that allegation, but I have heard other allegations that are absolutely inaccurate. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Was he told on the way to the Central African 

Republic where he was going? In advance of what we heard was 

about 20 minutes before they landed, did he know? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I do not think so. I think he was told right before 

the arrival. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Why would that be? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I can answer the question if you——

Mr. BALLENGER. Go ahead. 

Mr. NORIEGA. There were members of his security detail who 

were armed. This is a very unusual ‘‘kidnapping’’ where you let the 

man’s bodyguards carry arms. Frankly, we were concerned that because they had weapons on the plane, that they might react, because he was not going to his desired location, but we were taking 

him somewhere near there, because the desired location had turned 

him down. They didn’t want to accept him. I am sorry. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman Kirk. 

Mr. KIRK. Mr. Secretary, good to see you. When did French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin withdraw support for President Aristide? 

Mr. NORIEGA. It must have been about 4 or 5 days before his departure. We did not follow suit as he clearly was out in front of us 

on that. 

Mr. KIRK. As I remember, the French Government was very public about—after having been staunch supporters of President 

Aristide, of saying that they felt that some sort of transition was 

necessary for law and order and democratic growth in Haiti? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I think they asked him to consider what was best 

for the Haitian people. 

Mr. KIRK. My understanding of the Secretary’s working relationship with the Foreign Minister of Development is—in many ways 

has been reborn after some disagreements over Iraq. 

Can you give me an assessment of how the French and United 

States Governments now see this problem? 

Mr. NORIEGA. They see it as a shared problem, that the international community shares responsibility to try to help the Haitian 

people at this point. We are working together with them, putting 

some force on the ground to help the Haitian people by tranquilizing the situation, providing a secure and stable environment so 

this political succession to a new government can continue. 

Mr. KIRK. Is there any significant difference between the French 

and United States position on Haiti? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Not really, sir. 

Mr. KIRK. Let me take you back to September 18, 1994. President Clinton had asked President Carter and then private citizen 

Colin Powell to go to Port-au-Prince and meet with General 

Cedras. It is my understanding that that was a very tense meeting. 

I was in a previous capacity; I was a lieutenant junior grade in the 

Navy Command Center at the time, and I remember full well the 

65

duty captain giving some very direct orders to private citizen Colin 

Powell. 

President Clinton had ordered the invasion of Haiti to put President Aristide back into power. The 82nd Airborne Division had 

been launched out of Camp Lejeune, and when we told Colin Powell that United States forces were en route, we ordered him to 

leave the Haitian military headquarters there. 

In a very dramatic moment, Colin Powell said he was not leaving, that he was going to stay there because he felt that he could 

negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the coup d’etat leaders and 

bring President Aristide back to power peacefully. He describes actually being in the truck with General Cedras on the way to see 

the then-nominal President with hand grenades rolling on the floor 

as he thought he could bring a deal back. 

I can tell you that it was with some personal bravery on Colin 

Powell’s part, because the order to take out the Haitian military 

command had already been given by President Clinton. And in that 

military rule that some idiot never gets the word, we were furiously calling units telling them not to fire, because Colin Powell 

was still on the premises. 

To his great credit and personal bravery, he brought about a 

peaceful settlement, and General Cedras left, and Americans entered Haiti and reinstalled President Aristide into power without 

a shot being fired, I think due to the personal bravery of Jimmy 

Carter and Colin Powell. 

Mr. NORIEGA. And Sam Nunn. 

Mr. KIRK. Sorry, and Senator Sam Nunn, correct. So I want the 

record to reflect the personal braveries. 

I think it is a bit ironic to criticize Colin Powell, when he, probably more than anyone else, stared at General Cedras face-to-face, 

backed him down; and what was an invasion ordered by President 

Clinton then became a peaceful deployment of the international 

community to restore order there. 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, Congressman, and I think that is why it is 

a source of great disappointment that 10 years later, the great investment of treasure and lives having been put on the line for 

President Aristide came to naught, and we saw a leader who was 

not able to lead effectively or honestly or justly and, unfortunately, 

sowed the seeds of his own demise in this circumstance. 

Mr. KIRK. It might be that we need to—without defending the career of any Haitian politician, we need to defend the constitution 

of Haiti. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman, we cut everybody else off. I would 

like to ask unanimous consent that Mr. Meek and Mr. Conyers be 

the last to ask questions so we can get to the next panel. 

So without further ado, Mr. Meek. 

Without objection. 

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

President Paquiot, I want to welcome you to the U.S. Congress. 

I am glad that you are here to share your testimony with me, and 

my family and I prayed for your speedy recovery, even when the 

incident took place. 

Secretary Noriega, I must say that with as many Haitians that 

are trying to receive temporary protective status or even safe refVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
66

uge in the United States, that you would bring the President here 

to speak before this Committee to drive your point home is really—

in my opinion, really sad. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I did not do that, sir. He is a witness at the next 

panel. 

Mr. MEEK. He got here somehow, okay? 

Mr. BALLENGER. He was my witness. 

Mr. MEEK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I apologize to Mr. Noriega. 

Mr. NORIEGA. That is all right. 

Mr. MEEK. But the bottom line is that we have Haitians—and 

Secretary Dewey, I want to say the reason why it is down to three 

now is because the Coast Guard—am I correct that they are in the 

bay in Port-au-Prince right now? How close is the Coast Guard as 

it relates to being off the coast of Haiti, our U.S. Coast Guard? 

Mr. DEWEY. Our Coast Guard maintains a presence off the coast. 

Mr. MEEK. So you can see it from the coast; is that correct? 

Mr. DEWEY. I am not sure you can see it from the coast. 

Mr. MEEK. Well, television accounts, large shots, you can see our 

Coast Guard cutters there. 

How many people have been repatriated? 

Mr. DEWEY. Approximately 900. 

Mr. MEEK. Approximately 900. I think when the President made 

the statement, Mr. Chairman, that Haitians should stay in Haiti, 

I think he really meant it, because if he did not put the force on 

the ground, he definitely put the force in the water. When we are 

there repatriating, Secretary Dewey, are they repatriated in port in 

Port-au-Prince? 

Mr. DEWEY. In the vicinity of Port-au-Prince, Congressman, 

Killick Coast Guard Base. 

Mr. MEEK. How does that happen? They just get off and they 

walk on to the street and go home, I guess? 

Mr. DEWEY. That is essentially correct. 

Mr. MEEK. Okay. The reason why, Mr. Chairman, that you do 

not have Haitians taking to the sea is because they actually have 

a bull’s-eye on their backs when they get off at Port-au-Prince. So 

if they are trying to escape persecution, they will definitely lose 

their lives. 

One other thing I want to add. As it relates to temporary protective status, I think it is very important that this Administration 

understands—for the bloated bodies that are in the street in Haiti, 

I do not know how many Haitians have to lose their lives. 

Let’s just talk about under normal circumstances, when Haitians 

are interdicted at sea or even when they make it to the port and 

shores of Miami. Our Homeland Security objects to their being released on probation or what have you, so I think this Administration has spoken to how it feels about Haitians. 

Mr. Noriega, let me ask you, as it relates to the future of the 

Haitian people—we have met before, in the past, not in this hearing, but in other hearings. I am a Member of the Committee on 

Armed Services and Homeland Security Committee. I will tell you 

that I take great pride in our armed services and also for their 

safety. I do not want to say that you personally want to put their 

safety in jeopardy, but I must say the moves of the, Administration 

67

setting the tone that is in Haiti right now, I think would make 

things very difficult for a safe haven for our armed services. 

Now, let me tell you this. In no way do I, nor should any other 

Member of this Congress, feel that they are putting the lives of our 

troops in jeopardy because we question the Executive Branch. I 

just want to let you know that. 

I take personal offense when I hear that if Members are saying 

things—and I do not call names, and I do not think we should call 

names of people on the ground, but I would say this. For Members 

of the Congress not to be able to speak freely about how they feel, 

about the positions that the Executive Branch is taking, let alone 

the rebel forces who went through Guy Philippe, whom you seem 

to be very vaguely familiar with—this is him on the front page of 

The New York Times, parading through the streets of Port-auPrince, thanks to the United States of America. 

Here he is here, once again, The Washington Post, right here in 

our capital city, on the front cover. Does it look like he is not in 

charge? I want to tell you right now, he is very much in charge. 

Let me ask you about the Prime Minister. Where is the Prime 

Minister now of Haiti? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am not sure. 

Mr. MEEK. Can he leave his office? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I am not sure. 

Mr. MEEK. Is he protected? 

Mr. NORIEGA. Yes. 

Mr. MEEK. Mr. Guy Philippe said he was going to arrest him? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I heard something of that nature. 

Mr. MEEK. Did he have a meeting yesterday at 4 p.m. and he 

said any police chief who didn’t show up that they would have to 

answer personally to him? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I didn’t hear that, but I don’t doubt your word on 

this. 

Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I think it is 

important not only that this Committee continues to move forth 

and get some of these questions answered, but this Committee definitely take the time out to go Haiti to find out exactly what is 

going on and also aboard our Coast Guard cutters to make sure 

there are translators that are there. Our meeting at the U.N. with 

the Secretary General, he was concerned about our refugee policy 

as it relates to giving people real interviews, not just some interviews. And that is the reason why, Mr. Secretary, you don’t see a 

mass migration away. 

And that is the reason why we still continue to see executions 

in Haiti. Mr. Noriega, I look forward to working with you to provide the very safety we need in Haiti 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really 

appreciate your courtesy. Mr. Noriega—

Mr. BALLENGER. Can I ask a question? Can I say that you are 

the last individual? 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Can we call Mr. Conyers’ name out? 

Mr. BALLENGER. Is Mr. Conyers not here? 

68

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just have a few questions. Mr. Noriega, you 

know, I had an opportunity to talk to Secretary Powell on Saturday. And during those discussions, I was of the clear impression 

that President Aristide was in good hands. Secretary Powell was 

very clear that apparently there were 400 troops surrounding him. 

And that there were—there was a private security agency and that 

there was just absolutely no question about the fact that he was 

safe. I know this question may have arisen before because I am curious since I was involved in this personally, you know, can you tell 

me what happened that suddenly Sunday morning, he apparently—things changed or did they? 

Mr. NORIEGA. It is interesting to me, too. We believe that his personal security was more or less tended to. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. What did you say? 

Mr. NORIEGA. We believe that his personal security was tended 

to. I think he was in good hands. There was perimeter security 

around the palace. And there was close-in security by a professional security firm that has been with him for many years, maybe 

5 or 6. And we were concerned in general that was there an acute 

threat to him. There was some question as to how reliable some of 

the people in the palace guard were, but we had an impression that 

the some of the people around him were able to deal with any problems of that kind. But the impression was that there was not an 

immediate, acute threat to him. That was my impression. 

And I was rather surprised that he decided to leave. And up 

until the last minute, up until the time he got on the plane, he 

could have changed his mind, and I frankly expected him to change 

his mind. That is why we didn’t ask for a plane until the very, very 

last minute—relatively in the last minute in the process, because 

we wanted to have a real sense whether he was really interested 

in leaving or not. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So I take it that you were surprised when he 

said that he was taken away pretty much against his will? 

Mr. NORIEGA. I was very surprised. Well, actually when I 

thought about it, it was not too much of a surprise that he would 

do that. I guess I was shocked at the chutzpah, because there are 

so many witnesses to all of this, including his personal guards who 

now have said publicly he wasn’t kidnapped. And I was disappointed that that allegation was repeated so widely. But as far 

as we were concerned, we were at his request, facilitating his safe 

departure from the country. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. One of the things that Secretary Powell also 

talked about was the difficulty that might come about. And by the 

way, Secretary General of the U.N. also said the same thing that 

there might be some difficulty in reestablishing a democracy here, 

you know, getting it moving again because you have got the rebel 

forces who are trying to take apart—you know, be a part of the 

process. You have Aristide supporters who want to be part of the 

process. And it seems as if things appear—you know, trying to pull 

these forces, there are other forces coming together to be part of 

the process. How do you see that working out? 

Mr. NORIEGA. It is going to be difficult and we need to let the 

Haitian people make these decisions for themselves. There is a 

process for doing that. And little by little, I think we can establish 

69

some kind of political order and strengthen the institution of the 

government. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Secretary and all you fellows, those that 

didn’t have to answer all the questions, you have done a wonderful 

job. I apologize for the length of time and without further ado, you 

are free to go and we will call the next panel. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. I assume that questions for this panel as well as 

the next, written questions are still open because we have a series 

of detailed questions that we want answers to. 

Mr. BALLENGER. We would like to be able to get the full answers 

that you never got to give. 

Mr. NORIEGA. I had my shots. 

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, is there some way that you can encourage the answers to be given in a timely fashion? Some of us 

are still waiting to have our letters responded to that we sent to 

the State Department. 

Mr. BALLENGER. He is more sympathetic to me than you, so I 

will ask him to do that. 

Ms. WATERS. I will tell him, get our answers returned that we 

give to you. 

Mr. NORIEGA. You deserve answers. 

Ms. WATERS. And we are still waiting for some. I have sent you 

some letters that have not been answered. So please get it back to 

us, okay? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t mind asking. 

Mr. BALLENGER. We have a bunch of people that have been waiting a long time. And I am scared they are going to call on a vote, 

so if we can get the tables changed. And I know we have a couple 

members on this next panel that are very short on time and I am 

surprised they are still here. You have my apologies. I tried to cut 

it short. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, could I recommend that we have 

a rolling, as we have done in the Full Committee, that some Members go vote now and others come back so we can listen to these 

witnesses in recognition of the time? 

Mr. BALLENGER. That is a great idea. Mr. Paquiot, we are going 

to keep going and we have two more people—he has to catch a 

plane. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Could I ask you what the order of the witnesses 

will be? 

Mr. BALLENGER. The way we have it figured, Mr. Paquiot, Mr. 

Maguire and then Mr. Sachs. And the names I did not call, let me 

apologize to you, but those gentlemen had warned us ahead of time 

that they had limited time. 

Mr. BALLENGER. And Mr. Sachs, good luck. Mr. Paquiot. 

STATEMENT OF PIERRE-MARIE PAQUIOT, PRESIDENT, STATE 

UNIVERSITY OF HAITI 

Mr. PAQUIOT. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this 

afternoon in order to share with you some of the bitter experiences 

of the Haitian people in general and my suffering in particular. 

Also, I appreciate the opportunity to engage with you in discussions 

on Haiti’s future. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like 

to submit the statement for the record. 

70

Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection, yes, sir. 

Mr. PAQUIOT. First of all I would like to say I am not the voice 

of any kind of political party in Haiti. I am not representing any 

kind of opposition. I am just a citizen concerned by the situation 

going on right now in Haiti and I would like to share with you 

some of my thoughts. 

Haiti entered the 21st century with a grim reality. Poverty is the 

norm. Our people have inherited a vicious cycle that they are progressively less able to escape. Violence prevailed society and economy development eludes us. Tensions between the leaders of the 

various opposition political parties in Family Lavalas are the results of the May, 2000 local and parliamentary elections. The ensuing violence escalated to a point that all the gangs have been attacking opposition leaders and others who dare challenge the system. Journalists were subject to abuse in some senses and paid the 

ultimate price of death by practicing their profession. It is from 

this that I share my story. 

The State University of Haiti is made up of 15 schools with approximately 800 faculty members and about 15,000 students. The 

Haitian Constitution of 1987 grants independent status to the 

State University of Haiti, although 100 persons come from the 

State and the autonomy of the university has been the subject of 

contention between the institutive body and the former President 

of Haiti, Mr. Aristide. And indeed, President Aristide’s attempts to 

control the university over the past few years were met with strong 

and sustained opposition from the university. When President 

Aristide took office in February, 2001, I met with him to examine 

the problems facing the university. And as a matter of fact, I have 

to tell you that I was a very strong supporter of President Aristide. 

And in fact, I was fired from the university during the coup d’etat because of President Aristide. I submitted to the President a 

document which contained a set of recommendations for addressing 

the most crucial problems facing the nation. To this day, Mr. 

Aristide neither acknowledged nor acted on any of the recommendations. Ultimately, the problems between President 

Aristide and the university peaked on May 18, 2001, which is a 

flag day in Haiti, and which is also celebrated in Haiti as university day. 

It was on this day that I, the President of the university delivered a speech to the Nation reminding the political parties, President Aristide’s political party and also the opposition, the importance of our national motto, l’Union Fait La Force, which means 

liberty, equality and brotherhood. 

Apparently, Mr. Aristide did not approve of my speech in which 

he was reminded of my offer to make the university facilities available as a neutral ground for his party and the various political 

party leaders to discuss the contested local and parliamentary election of May, 2000, the suggestion to which they had both initially 

agreed to. And soon after the speech, all breaks of conflict broke 

out in various schools inside the university. I don’t have much 

time, so I will skip some details to go forward. And I am going on 

December 5. On December 5, 2003, a small group of students who 

are demonstrating against President Aristide—as they have the 

right to do it as any citizen, inside the school of human sciences, 

71

while President Aristide’s armed thugs attempted to enter the campus to subdue the protest. 

When I heard this was taking place, I immediately ended a meeting I was having with the Minister of Education of Mr. Aristide 

and went to the School of Human Science in order to examine firsthand the extent of damages to the university property and see how 

best to facilitate the safe exit of students from the campus without 

being harmed by Aristide’s forces. 

While I was inside talking with the students, a group of thugs 

armed with guns, clubs and rocks invaded the campus shooting, 

further destroying property and physically assaulting people, forcing those they brutalized and say [speaking in native language], 

which means ‘‘long live Aristide.’’ I was beaten unmercifully and 

suffered two broken knees. I am not here to lament on my situation. The point is I want to share with you the situation that is 

going on in Haiti so that we can do something. 

I don’t have any hard feeling about President Aristide. As a matter of fact, I am very sad for President Aristide because he was 

very popular in Haiti and now he is in exile and somehow he is 

responsible for what happened to him. From there, I spent weeks 

in hiding. And given the extent of the injuries I suffered, it was 

doubtful whether I could ever walk again. 

Mr. Chairman, I constantly consider myself lucky because I can 

sit before you today to give you eye witness testimony. Many of my 

fellow citizens will never see another day, whether they were 

against Aristide or for Aristide, that is not the point. Lives have 

been prematurely destroyed and ended during the struggle for freedom and freedom from fear. I can testify today in Washington, DC, 

thanks to God and to the many friends and caring individuals who 

contributed my safe departure from Haiti to get medical care here 

in the United States. Officials of the International Foundation for 

Electoral Assistance worked very hard in collaboration with partners like the Haitian Resources Development Foundation, the Public Diplomacy Office, and the consular section of the United States 

Embassy in Port-au-Prince to ensure the timely and safe exit from 

Haiti for me and my family. 

Since my arrival to the United States of America on January 9, 

2004, I have received tremendous support from the New Orleans 

medical and legal community and from the Haiti democracy 

project. The events of December 5, 2003 triggered the ultimate 

ground swell of opposition to President Aristide. People at least at 

the university level and all people from all walks of life realized 

then that the repression sponsored by Mr. Aristide or his government had no limit and had no respect for any institution. 

It became extremely clear that Mr. Aristide was the principal 

source of problem and he did not have the legitimacy to be part of 

the long-term solution to heal Haiti. After many years of political 

turmoil due to the disputed election results, failed policies, mismanagement and human rights violations, Haiti and her friends in 

the international community currently face a very crucial challenge 

in developing an approach based on local leaders, national priorities to address the many development and political problems the 

countries has suffered. So I will——

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Paquiot, if you don’t mind. 

72

Mr. PAQUIOT. I will stop here, you know. What we need now in 

Haiti is the strong support of the international community. President Aristide belongs to the past. We must look forward so that 

nothing like that will ever again happen in Haiti. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I don’t know whether Mr. Sachs or Mr. Maguire. 

Mr. Maguire, I think you were the first one and you were recommended a long time ago. I am not going to the House Floor to 

vote so we can continue. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MAGUIRE, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF 

PROGRAMS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TRINITY COLLEGE 

Mr. MAGUIRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very grateful for 

this opportunity to share my knowledge on Haiti with you. I have 

been working on Haiti 25 years, 20 of them as a civil servant in 

the same organization as Adolfo Franco. And what I see in Haiti 

occurring now is what I would call deja vu all over again. And I 

think this implies that if we are really going to understand Haiti, 

we need to look at not what is just going on, but we have to look 

backward. Secretary Powell said last week said he was disappointed with President Aristide and I think we all have been. 

There is much to be disappointed about. 

And I would say we also need to be disappointed elsewhere. We 

need to be disappointed with the opposition to Mr. Aristide, their 

continuing intransigence, their failure to engage and even when 

they had Mr. Aristide in a corner two Saturdays ago, their refusal 

to engage with the CARICOM proposal does not merit them to be 

called a Democratic opposition. They are an opposition. They have 

still yet to earn the label ‘‘democratic.’’

They have been determined to broker their way into power. And 

what we see today in Haiti is not a struggle over issues, ideas or 

principles, it is a matter of a struggle over power. I think Secretary 

Powell’s disappointment should also be extended to those whose 

policies and practices were enacted on his watch, policies and practices toward Haiti. I have outlined those in a paper here which I 

will be glad to submit to you published in November called, 

‘‘United States Policy Toward Haiti, Engagement or Estrangement.’’

I traced in here in much greater detail than I can now how our 

policies have evolved in the last 5 years or so to be those that are 

meant to isolate the Haitian government, to withhold resources 

from it and to punish it. I would speak from experience, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know if you recall this, but at one point I brought to 

you in March, 2001, Mr. Neptune, who was, at the time, the President of the Senate, Mr. Leslie Voltaire, who was one of the ministers and Mr. Bazin, another minister. I had invited them to come 

to Trinity college for a symposium so they could have their voices 

heard in Washington. 

Initially, however, I had invited the Prime Minister and First 

Lady. I was told by intermediaries from our government, that this 

would not be possible that I was trying to embarrass the administration. And I felt this was a shame because we needed to have all 

voices on the table. We need to listen. We do not engage the government of Haiti. We talked at them and criticized them. There 

was this parallel presumptive policy I believe working over the past 

73

several years working to strengthen the opposition and embolden 

it and suggest through signals sent from Washington that that opposition zero option of not engaging with the Aristide government 

had the support from Washington. 

I don’t say this just myself. Our former Ambassador to Haiti, 

Honorable Dean Curran said it in his address to the Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce of July of last year when he was leaving. I would like to quote what Ambassador Curran said. He said:

‘‘There is incoherence in Haiti that has troubled me, the incoherence of the way Washington’s views are interpreted here. 

Those of you who know me who will realize that since I have 

arrived here as President Clinton’s Ambassador and then 

President Bush’s, I have always talked straight about U.S. policy and what might and might not be new policy directions. 

But there were many in Washington and Haiti who preferred 

not to listen to me, the President’s representative, but to their 

own friends in Washington.’’

The sirens of extremism on one hand or apologists on the other, 

they don’t hold official positions. I call them the ‘‘Chimeres’’ of 

Washington. We had our Ambassador saying that, complaining and 

being concerned that there were signals coming from Washington 

that prohibited and emboldened the opposition and prohibited them 

from being part of a political solution. I think we need to look deeply into that because we have had a policy in my view that seemingly has been driven by a deeply rooted and strongly held aversion 

to one man, Jean-Bertrand Aristide and has seemed determined to 

put Haiti at risk, either to emasculate Mr. Aristide politically or to 

force him from office. 

Mr. Aristide has many, many faults. I am not trying to defend 

him, but I think our policies pushed Mr. Aristide and his government more and more into a corner with predictable results. With 

fewer and fewer resources, the government was left managing scarcity. And in the Haitian political reality, managing scarcity means 

managing power and managing power means managing the street 

gangs. This is a long-held practice in Haiti. And I would say we are 

seeing the same practice being enacted today. 

I would characterize what happened over the past 3 years as the 

gradual strangulation of the Haitian government with, ironically, 

Mr. Aristide providing the rope. But we do really not really engage 

him. We did not try to reinforce anything that he had done positive. And something in the last panel, there was a lot of discussion 

about Mr. Aristide’s involvement in drug trafficking. I think we 

should note for the record that Mr. Aristide in 2003 turned over to 

the U.S. DEA Haiti’s two leading drug traffickers, Jacques Ketan 

and another man named Jasmay Edijuan, and a number of smaller 

drug traffickers. Would he have done that if he was as complacent 

in drug trafficking as came out and was accused in the first panel? 

I don’t think so. 

But in any case, the departure of Mr. Aristide has been achieved 

and the phrase that comes to mind is that of victory. Those who 

wanted his departure both in Haiti and beyond it has seen Haiti 

descend into lawlessness, with gunmen and revenge and the settling of scores, the kind of dechoukaj that has government officials 

74

running to the airport now under United States protection fleeing 

the country, and the destruction of Haiti’s infrastructure, the virtual vulcanization of the country by gangs. 

And I think we need to look at the issue of narco-trafficking 

which, again, Haiti is essentially right now a narco-trafficking free 

state. There is no order out there in the countryside because of 

what has been going on. What can we do? I think we need to forge 

a bipartisan approach toward Haiti. And I think what would help 

us forge that approach is to first examine the issue of the Washington ‘‘Chimires’’ who are sending mixed messages to Haiti. And 

I noticed in The Washington Post the other day that The Washington Post was suggesting in its editorial that one organization 

that needs to be examined very carefully in this equation is the 

International Republican Institute and its role with working with 

the Haitian opposition. I suggest you need to look at that very carefully. I would also suggest——

Mr. BALLENGER. Could you sum it up, please? 

Mr. MAGUIRE. We need to support in Haiti a policy of political 

inclusion. All political actors in Haiti have been working toward exclusion. It is the struggle for power. We need to get all the political 

actors under the tent so all can have responsibility in the process. 

This will not happen by having the Lavalas people chased out of 

the country now by armed thugs, and it will not happen by having 

an electoral process in Haiti where it is always winner take all. We 

need to look for a solution in Haiti that can be a proportional representation so that a small political party with 10 percent of the 

votes gets 10 percent of the seats and 10 percent of the responsibility to engage in the process. I will stop there. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maguire follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT MAGUIRE, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS IN

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TRINITY COLLEGE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to speak before you and other members 

of the subcommittee and the U.S. House of Representatives today. I am happy to 

have this opportunity to share my insights and analysis on what is going on in 

Haiti. I have followed Haiti and Haiti-US policy issues for 25 years. Over that time 

I have come to know the country both from the ‘bottom-up’ through work at the 

Inter-American Foundation, a U.S. government agency, where I held responsibility 

for its grassroots development programs in Haiti, and from the ‘top down’ through 

both work at the U.S. Department of State in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere 

Affairs and scholarly activities at Johns Hopkins, Georgetown, and Brown Universities. I continue my involvement with Haiti as the Director of the Trinity College 

Haiti Program in Washington, DC. This program has been supported by the Ford 

and the Rockefeller Foundations. 

DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN

Since this is a time of year when many of us begin to turn our attention to baseball, allow me to open my remarks by citing a phrase made famous by one of the 

sport’s most colorful characters, Yogi Berra, who coined the expression ‘‘deja vu all 

over again.’’ What we are seeing today in Haiti is something akin to that expression. 

And, as the expression implies, to understand the present we need to look backward. 

Today, in the streets of Port-au-Prince and in other cities and towns of Haiti, we 

have been seeing the kind of murder and mayhem that characterized the country 

between 1991 and 1994, following a violent coup d’etat carried out by Haiti’s army, 

leading to three years of brutal de facto military rule. Gunmen in fatigues roam the 

streets, menacing citizens and waving their automatic weapons arrogantly. Bodies 

mysteriously turn up at intersections in city streets, some of them face down with 

hands bound and bullet holes in their backs. Rampaging mobs of civilians and erstVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
75

while soldiers and members of paramilitary death squads attack public and private 

property, looting, burning and destroying in a practice that Haitians call dechoukaj, 

or uprooting. 

Elected and appointed government officials, in fear of their lives, are either going 

into hiding within Haiti or fleeing the country. In press reports released earlier 

today, it is stated that U.S. Marines have become ambulant bodyguards for Haitian 

officials rushing to the airport to save themselves. Also, we have begun to receive 

reports of meetings between the armed thugs dressed up in military fatigues and 

members of the unarmed opposition, and of tense confrontations between US military officials and the thugs. And, finally, we have begun to receive reports that 

cracks are already forming in the facade of unity among the armed and unarmed 

opponents of the recently uprooted, elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, as 

Haiti’s next struggle for power begins in earnest. 

Yes, Mr. Chairman, this is certainly a case of ‘‘deja vu all over again.’’

MULTIPLE DISAPPOINTMENTS

Last week, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated that he had been ‘‘disappointed’’ with Haiti’s now-deposed president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Secretary 

Powell is correct in this statement, as there is no doubt that Mr. Aristide provided 

much to be disappointed about. But I wonder if Mr. Powell is also disappointed in 

Haiti’s self-proclaimed democratic opposition, a group of political and economic leaders who have also given us much to criticize and regret. The single-minded intransigence of this largely ad hoc group toward achieving its one, unifying objective—

the removal of Mr. Aristide from office—has motivated it to behave rather 

undemocratically. Its leaders have failed to engage in true democratic process as 

measured by elections and by negotiated solutions to political problems. Instead, 

they have acted with a veto from an empty chair from the negotiating table, repeatedly undermining or thwarting internationally-led attempts to find a solution to 

Haiti’s political crisis. Also, and particularly over the past two months, they have 

practiced that deeply rooted Haitian political practice of giving a ‘wink and a nod’ 

to violence in the street if you believe it furthers your political objectives. 

I wonder, as well, if Mr. Powell was disappointed, or perhaps even outraged, by 

the failure of the unarmed opposition to respond to the latest international urgings, 

two weekends ago, when both he, via telephone, and his Assistant Secretary for 

Western Hemisphere, Mr. Roger Noriega, in person, pushed for this group to finally 

agree to take its seat at the negotiating table—when the odds appeared highly favorable for it to achieve an objective of political inclusion. The CARICOM plan, a 

solid recipe for achieving a negotiated, non-violent solution to Haiti’s long lasting 

and disastrous political crisis, supported not only by the United States, but by all 

the hemisphere’s democratic governments, was simply rejected out-of-hand by this 

so-called democratic group. 

This failure of US influence—perhaps we can say of US diplomacy—is doubly 

shocking since the personalities who comprise this opposition have been widely perceived as allies—even sycophants—of Washington. Among these personalities are individuals who have participated in an array of political strategy meetings organized 

by the International Republican Institute using US government funds, and who 

have repeatedly visited Washington over the past three years. And, at least one of 

the highest profile leaders of this faction, Mr. Andre Apaid, is a US citizen. 

As this veteran Haiti-watcher scans this political landscape, I get a strong sense 

of Haitian deja vu all over again, as self-styled and unelected political leaders seek 

the ways and means to broker their way into power. In their mind’s eye, again taking a page from deeply rooted Haitian political practice, their means justify their 

ends. And what are those ends? Allow me to state, Mr. Chairman, that what we 

have been seeing in Haiti is not a political struggle of competing issues, ideas, and 

principals. What we have been seeing in Haiti is nothing more than a struggle 

among the political class and its allies, and the incumbent government to seize, and/

or to hold on to, power. Let us hope that the dust of confrontation and violence settles in Haiti and that moderate, reasonable voices, with viable ideas, will emerge 

from among those struggling for power and some true democratic credentials will 

begin to be earned. Let us hope, also, that new, more democratic voices, less tainted 

by participation in the tragic political confrontations of the past three years, will 

come forth to relieve the country of its largely failed leadership on both sides of the 

current political equation. 

THE CONDUCT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

In terms of disappointment, Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committee, 

I also wonder whether this sense of Mr. Powell has extended to those who have been 

76

largely responsible for the conduct of U.S. policy toward Haiti since January 2001. 

As I have outlined in Trinity College Haiti Program Briefing Paper Number 8, US 

Policy Toward Haiti: Engagement or Estrangement, published last November, over 

the past ten years, US policy toward Haiti has evolved from one where our government was constructively engaged with the government of Haiti in an attempt to 

nurture democratic institutions and democratic practice in this country trying to 

find its way out of 200 years of bad and mostly authoritarian governance, to a policy 

that worked to isolate the Haitian government, withhold resources from it, punish 

it, and push it into a corner. 

Concurrently, as we constantly chastised that government, our efforts focused 

more and more exclusively on working with Haiti’s opposition groups. In following 

this path, we sacrificed carefully constructed leverage and influence with Haitian 

elected political actors, many of whom are already pre-disposed to be distrustful of 

the United States as a dominant force in Haitian political reality that has not always made choices that have worked toward the benefit of Haiti’s people. 

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit Briefing Paper Number 8 as a 

part of my written testimony since it elaborates this analysis in much greater detail 

than I have an opportunity to do in this testimony today. 

Not all in Washington abandoned that leverage and influence we worked to 

achieve over many years. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, that in March 2001, I escorted to your office several high Haitian government officials who had traveled to 

Washington only a month after the inauguration of Mr. Aristide to his second term 

in office to participate in a symposium on Haiti at Trinity College. Among them 

were Mr. Yvon Neptune, who at that time was the President of Haiti’s Senate, and 

Mr. Leslie Voltaire, the then—and current—Minister for Haitians Living Overseas. 

Also a part of the Haitian government delegation that visited you were two ministers who, even though members of the opposition, had accepted Mr. Aristide’s invitation to join his government’s cabinet. One of these ministers was Mr. Marc Louis 

Bazin, Mr. Aristide’s principal opponent in the 1990 election who, subsequently, 

briefly served as the Prime Minister of the 1991–1994 de facto military regime. 

What better example could we have had of the potential for political reconciliation 

in Haiti than Mr. Aristide and Mr. Bazin working together. Sadly, because Mr. 

Bazin had rejected participation in the bitterly recidivistic opposition to Mr. Aristide 

(at that time called the ‘‘Democratic Convergence’’), his credentials as a member of 

the opposition working within the Lavalas government were not accepted by 

Aristide’s opponents in Haiti and in Washington. 

Much to your credit, Mr. Chairman, you were open to meeting these Haitian government officials and engaging them in constructive conversation. And they were 

anxious to engage you. You even made an extra effort by taking time from your 

busy schedule to travel up North Capital Street to Trinity’s campus the next day 

to listen to them speak at the symposium. 

Sadly, Executive Branch officials reacted quite differently to this opportunity for 

engagement and dialogue. Not only did ranking officials in Washington choose not 

to engage these Haitian government officials, but, in the run-up to the symposium, 

they urged me not to invite them to Washington, adding that this would embarrass 

the new American administration. This, Mr. Chairman, is my own personal story 

of a golden opportunity the Bush Administration lost to engage, to maintain/

strengthen influence and leverage in Haiti, and to assist Haiti emerge from its dark 

political past. Surely, this is not the only time that administration officials refused 

an opportunity like this. 

Rather than taking advantage of this and similar opportunities, it seems to me 

that our government was not only busy isolating Haiti’s elected government, but, 

through various intermediaries and political operatives in Washington, it was allowing signals to travel to Port-au-Prince that emboldened the opposition and its ‘‘zero 

option’’ policy of intransigence by suggesting that the opposition had Washington’s 

support. 

THE CHIMERES OF WASHINGTON, D.C. 

This is not my assessment alone. This concern that presumptive policy signals 

were being sent to Port-au-Prince from Washington, and that those signals were 

highly damaging to efforts to resolve what was, back then, a relatively reparable 

political crisis, was shared by none other than the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti. In his 

farewell address in Port-au-Prince last summer to HAMCHAM, the Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce, the career diplomat who headed our embassy in Haiti, 

the Honorable Brian Dean Curran, reflected on Haiti’s long-standing political crisis 

remarking:

77

‘‘There is an incoherence (in Haiti) that has troubled me: the incoherence of 

the way Washington’s views are interpreted here. Those of you who know me 

will realize that since I arrived here as President Clinton’s Ambassador and 

then President Bush’s, I have always talked straight about US policy and what 

might and might not be new policy directions. But there were many in Haiti 

who preferred not to listen to me, the president’s representative, but to their 

own friends in Washington, sirens of extremism or revanchism on the one hand 

or apologists on the other. They don’t hold official positions. I call then the 

chimeres of Washington.’’

And who, pray tell, might these irregular actors be? I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the committee takes steps to get to the bottom of this. It might begin 

by heeding the supposition of the Washington Post that the International Republican Institute has played an important role in the ‘wink and nod’ messages from 

Washington sent to the opposition. In its February 19th edition, the Post editorialized: ‘‘In particular, it (the administration) has declined to exercise its considerable 

leverage on the civilian opposition parties, some of which have been supported by 

such U.S. groups as the International Republican Institute and which have rejected 

any political solution short of Mr. Aristide’s immediate resignation.’’

In sum, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that our policy—and practices—toward 

Haiti in recent years have been driven, unfortunately, by a deeply rooted animosity 

to one man—Jean-Bertrand Aristide—that has been held among a relatively small 

but powerful group of actors in Washington. Policies rigorously enacted under the 

auspices of this zealous group in order either to emasculate Mr. Aristide politically 

or to force him out of office, as we are seeing right now, have put the citizens and 

country of Haiti at grave risk, and have created potential spill over effects both in 

the Caribbean and on to our shores. 

To achieve the narrow political goal of getting Mr.Aristide, the chimeres of Washington have, in essence, enacted policies that have devastated Haiti. What better 

example can one identify of the irresponsibility of being willing to throw out the 

bathwater in order to get at the baby. 

ACTS OF DESPERATION

As I reflect on the result of these policies of isolation, non-engagement, constant 

criticism and punitive action I get the sense of the gradual strangulation of an elected government. As the noose around its neck tightened, it was pushed increasingly 

toward ill-advised and desperate acts. The suspension of international assistance 

was a particularly key element of strangulation. The government of Mr. Aristide, 

like all governments in this tragically poor and resource-starved country, was deeply 

dependent on external assistance in order to enact government programs. During 

his inaugural address of February 7, 2001, Mr. Aristide took a quite unusual—perhaps even unprecedented—step for a Haitian President when he outlined a series 

of social welfare, infrastructure development and investment goals of his government, suggesting that his term in office be judged according to his ability to meet 

these goals. These plans were derived from the Lavalas Family party’s ‘‘White 

Paper’’ for Haiti, an unusual attempt—for Haitian political parties—to set forth a 

platform that directed itself toward the country’s multitude of social, economic and 

environmental problems. 

Sadly, following the virtual complete suspension of bilateral and multilateral aid 

to his government as a result of the May 2000 election’s eight flawed senatorial vote 

counts and the Haitian government’s bewildering failure to address this issue, few 

resources were available to the government to work toward these goals. As Mr. 

Aristide and his government were pushed more and more into a corner, predictable 

results emerged. With fewer and fewer resources to manage, the government was 

left to manage scarcity and, became increasingly desperate and corrupt. And, in 

Haiti’s political reality, managing scarcity means managing power, with equally predictable results. Mr. Aristide, presiding over a resource starved government under 

constant assault from political opponents both in and beyond Haiti, took to the 

streets, aligning his government with impoverished urban youth—the now infamous 

chimeres of Haiti—who, by way of organized gangs, served as a means of managing 

the maintenance of power. 

Interviews with urban gang leaders over the past several months on various National Public Radio (NPR) broadcasts have been quite revealing in this regard and 

have underscored the enormous tragedy of both the government’s strangulation and 

its descent into the streets. Those interviewed have repeatedly suggested that they 

would have preferred to have a legitimate government job as opposed to becoming 

a member or leader of a street gang. Sadly, with no jobs available, the life of a 

chimere presented itself as a viable option. 

78

Mr. Chairman, when I was a boy growing up in the New Jersey suburbs in an 

area that had just recently been farmland, I occasionally encountered a rabbit that 

had found its way into my back yard that was enclosed with a chain link fence. 

Sometimes, I attempted to catch the rabbit, gradually backing it into a corner of 

the fence as what I perceived as the best strategy to capture it. I never did manage 

to catch one of those elusive critters, but I recall vividly how the rabbits that I managed to back into the corner of the fence became increasingly desperate as their maneuvering space shrank. In fact, I recall vividly on one occasion how a panicked rabbit that I had edged into the corner acted with such desperation that bashed itself 

against the fence, injuring itself in its attempts to elude my grasp. Aghast at the 

blood streaming from the animal, I quickly backed away. This was the last time I 

tried cornering a rabbit in order to capture it. It was not my goal to force self-inflicted damage. 

I relate this story, Mr. Chairman, because I think of it when I reflect on what 

has happened in Haiti over the past several years. As the government of Haiti was 

increasingly backed into that corner, it acted more and more like that panicked rabbit of my youth, injuring itself in desperation. Ultimately, as its maneuvering space 

shrank, the government, in its increasing desperation to escape the trap, inflicted 

many wounds on itself. What a tragedy of huge proportions. 

A PYRRHIC VICTORY

The departure of Mr. Aristide, at least for now, has been achieved. Those who 

have sought it for quite some time are certainly rejoicing their political victory. But 

their victory is proving to be a Pyrrhic one as Haiti descends deeper on the slippery 

slope of lawlessness. Revenge killing and settling scores—in Port-au-Prince and elsewhere in the country—have become the new ordre du jour. Prisons throughout the 

country have been emptied. Secondary cities, towns and villages across the land 

have become the domain of gang leaders establishing fiefdoms in what is now a balkanized country. And, with the descent into lawlessness comes the probable scenario 

of Haiti’s emergence as a kind of narco-trafficking free state, as the countryside’s 

runways and ports fall within the domain of the local warlords, many of whom already have a history of involvement in drug trafficking. 

The victory is Pyrrhic also, Mr. Chairman, because it was achieved through the 

slow strangulation of Haiti’s capacity to respond to the humanitarian, social and environmental challenges and crises before it. And, in recent weeks, we have seen in 

particular a rash of significant damage to the country’s already weak humanitarian 

and development infrastructure, as roads and ports have been severely damaged 

and destroyed, and public and private buildings looted and burned. 

Perhaps the most Pyrrhic element of this victory, however, has been its achievement at the expense of the Haitian population’s faith in democracy. This is illustrated most vividly by the enthusiastic welcome being given by some to the return 

of the gunmen. While there should be no doubt that this welcome has been fueled 

by a realistic sense of self-preservation by those who do not have the guns, by the 

gratitude of those released from Haiti’s jails and their families, and by former military and paramilitary figures who have been waiting patiently for such an opening 

to occur, this welcome is also fueled by another factor. Haiti’s citizens are deeply 

disappointed, indeed, disgusted, with the comportment of all of the country’s political leaders who, over the past decade, have been so intent on their own, personal 

struggles to maintain or attain power that they have sacrificed their country. To 

coin a phrase, they have been fiddling while Rome has been burning. 

This disenchantment with democracy is an enormously tragic and dangerous development. Haitians have harbored ‘dreams of democracy’ since the 1986 ouster of 

the Duvalier dictatorship. Their dreams have repeatedly been turned into nightmares. It is in everyone’s interest in this room that we work together to deflect that 

disenchantment and restore faith in the resolution of disputes through participation, 

engagement, the peaceful mediation of differences, rule of law, and the rejection of 

all forms of political intimidation, violence and recidivism. 

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DEJA VU

I will leave to others the debate and the necessary investigation over the circumstances of Mr. Aristide’s abrupt departure from Haiti last Sunday. Surely, the 

removal—regardless of how it occurred—of a democratically-elected leader prior to 

the completion of his term—is a set-back to Haiti’s democratic process and a threat 

to other nations in the hemisphere; indeed around the world. Regardless of whether 

or not Mr. Aristide is restored to the presidency to complete his term of office ending 

on February 7, 2006, however, there are several steps we can take, actions we can 

79

support, and principles that can guide us that will contribute toward a sustained 

resolution of Haiti’s seemingly unending internal and external political warfare. 

First, from a Washington and US perspective, we must forge a bi-partisan approach toward Haiti. Of course, this being Washington and ours being a democracy, 

we will agree to disagree over certain specifics. But, even amid our disagreements, 

we must be prepared to examine our role in Haiti’s affairs in a more even-handed 

manner that does not chose sides, stem from deeply rooted personal animosities, or 

seek to profit from Haiti’s misfortunes. 

In this regard, it is of great necessity that the chimeres of Washington be removed 

from any real or perceived role in the future of U.S. policy toward Haiti. We must 

put an end to ‘wink and nod’ messages coming out of Washington. These messages—

and actions that reinforced them—have caused considerable damage not only to 

Haiti, but also to the credibility of Washington’s leadership on Haiti and around the 

world. I would urge you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, to examine the roles of these chimeres, who, as the US Ambassador suggested, were aiding 

and abetting Haiti’s tragedies. Specifically, I would urge you to clarify the validity 

of various allegations that have been leveled at the International Republican Institute for its role in exacerbating and reinforcing an atmosphere of political intransigence and violence in Haiti. I would urge you, also, to explore alleged links among 

Haiti’s resurgent gunmen once based in the Dominican Republic and drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering. 

Second, I would urge us support policies and practices that will reinforce the notion of political inclusion in Haiti. Let us work—successfully this time—not to play 

favorites, but rather work to get all the legitimate political actors under the political 

tent. It is of vital importance that Haiti’s once and future political actors all participate in the governance of their country and accept the responsibilities that come 

along with it. To this end, the framework offered by the CARICOM plan is an excellent place to start. Acts of dechoukaj aimed at members of the Aristide government 

and the Lavalas party, and the urgent flight from the country of these political actors is not. 

Third, and directly related to the need to have all legitimate political actors gain 

inclusion in governance, we must support steps to put an end to Haiti’s tried and 

true political practices of ‘winner takes all’ and ‘loser undermines the winner.’ In 

this regard, Haiti’s electoral laws that prescribe a winner takes all approach toward 

each and every elective office should be re-examined. In my view, Mr. Chairman, 

this approach, particularly in a country that has had one dominant party competing 

with many smaller ones, has only exacerbated polarization and confrontation. Some 

form of proportional representation, perhaps in Haiti’s Chamber of Deputies, would 

help to ensure broader political participation. A party that captures, say, 10 percent 

of the votes nationwide, could be awarded 10 percent of the seats in that parliamentary body. This would both bring that element into the process and force upon it 

the responsibilities of governance. 

Fourth, there is an immediate need to move against the armed thugs and convicts 

who have been freed from prison, and to re-establish some semblance of rule of law. 

In this regard, Haiti’s civilian-led police need immediate strengthening and support, 

and its judicial system requires intense and long term support. The thugs must not 

find their way into the police force. Putting this genie back into the bottle will be 

a difficult, but necessary element not only to allow the country to move forward, but 

to provide a needed push toward ending impunity. The return of the army and of 

the FRAPH gunmen and criminals is in the best interests of only those particular 

individuals, not of the Haiti, its citizens, and the international community. 

Fifth, we need to be prepared to stick with Haiti over the long haul. Staying the 

course will mean that our attention to Haiti can not be merely intense and short 

term, as it was in 1994/95, and then leaving the country to its own devices, while 

enacting partisan-driven policies in Washington that harmed gains that had been 

made. If nation-building is an expression that gives some of you heartburn, think 

of perhaps another approach—call it ‘‘nation-nurturing’’—where we provide active 

and sustained support to the non-governmental—and government—bodies in Haiti 

that will develop the country and its required institutions. In other words, we do 

not have to build Haiti, but we should have a long term commitment to all Haitians 

to help them rebuild their own country. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman, the tragic developments in Haiti, that are still unfolding, are to 

some considerable extent the result of failed US policies and practices that have sacrificed the well-being of Haiti to achieve a narrow political goal—the removal of one 

man from elected office. These policies and practices have not served Secretary PowVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
80

ell; they have not served President Bush; they have not served the United States 

Congress, they have not served the American people, and they have surely not 

served the long-suffering people of Haiti. 

Again, I thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts and analysis with 

you, and I stand ready to work with all of you to help improving the way the government of the United States relates to and works with its Caribbean neighbor. 

Thank you.

Mr. BALLENGER. I recognize Congressman Rangel. You are a constituent of Congressman Rangel’s, I think, Mr. Sachs, are you not? 

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for giving me the honor 

to introduce to you a friend, a constituent, an international scholar, 

a professor at Harvard that is now at the great university of Columbia in my district, and that is Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, the Director 

of the Earth Institute of Columbia University. We are sorry for the 

delay, but I am pleased that you managed to stay. Thank you Dr. 

Sachs and Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Sachs. All yours. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY D. SACHS, DIRECTOR, THE EARTH 

INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SACHS. Thank you very much, Chairman. You asked a few 

minutes ago why we would stay through such a long hearing. 

There are two reasons: One is I would go anywhere where Congressman Rangel is and I would follow him around the world because he is the most remarkable person, and I am so honored that 

he is my representative in the Congress. But there is a second reason, which is that I think I speak for many Americans that are 

deeply frightened today. We are frightened partly for Haiti, but we 

are truly frightened for America because we don’t know what is 

happening in this country. 

What we hear doesn’t add up. It reminds me when I am asked 

to believe the Administration of Groucho Marx’s old line, ‘‘what do 

you believe me, or your own eyes.’’ Doesn’t meet the smell test 

when I hear Mr. Noriega. And what I have heard directly, and I 

am experienced probably as much as any person on this planet in 

international development and in countries like Haiti and in Haiti, 

what I hear about what is happening does not make sense, Mr. 

Chairman. And so I come here to appeal to you, to Congressman 

Menendez and to the rest of the panel to exercise Democratic oversight over the Executive Branch with urgency now. 

I heard a lot of speeches. A lot of your colleagues seem to know 

all the answers, but there are a lot of urgent questions you must 

find answers to. And I don’t believe that you are working hard 

enough in the Congress yet to find out the answers to something 

that is at a threat to American democracy. 

Now I and others have been in touch closely with the people 

around President Aristide, his wife. We have been in contact repeatedly. I have talked to his attorney. What you have been told 

and what we have been told is flatly denied by President Aristide 

and his wife. And I believe that rather than hearing congressmen 

like Congressman Weller or like others say we believe, I think it 

would be good to find out rather than just to believe. Where is Mr. 

Aristide? How safe is he right now? I know as of this morning, they 

fear for their safety. I know that as of this morning, they do not 

believe they can communicate freely with the outside world. 

81

Are you sure? I heard Mr. Noriega just say right now the U.S. 

has no responsibility. This was a most shocking answer to me as 

an American citizen after airlifting a President out of his country 

and depositing him in the Central African Republic to be told by 

the Assistant Secretary of State, it is not our responsibility is simply amazing. What is his current status? We heard so many contradictions today. Mr. Aristide’s departure was never a U.S. demand. That was in the testimony but I heard Mr. Noriega flatly 

contradicted himself. It was a demand. It had political reasons he 

said, but yes, it was a demand. And I heard it directly as well from 

Mr. Aristide’s attorney that his client was not allowed on the airplane without giving the letter of resignation to Mr. Moreno in the 

Embassy in Haiti. 

Do you just believe it or do you exercise oversight to find out, Mr. 

Chairman, because we need to know these things. Because in one 

case, it is a resignation and in another case, it is a coup. We need 

to understand these facts. What was said to Mr. Aristide about his 

security? Congressman Cummings said that Secretary Powell assured President Aristide—was assured of and assured Mr. Aristide 

of his security as of Saturday afternoon. Mr. Aristide’s attorney has 

said that his client was told that the U.S. would not protect his 

personal security or family security. 

Mr. Noriega said early in the testimony, Mr. Chairman, said 

early in the testimony that yes, we weren’t going to protect him. 

Said later in the testimony that no, he was not at any personal 

risk, he was very surprised that he decided to leave under those 

circumstances. What are you going to believe, me or your own 

eyes? What about the withdrawal of U.S. support for CARICOM. 

Curious, isn’t it? The Caribbean leaders are absolutely aghast of 

what we have done. One of them had the gumption to say so on 

the record knowing that we can turn our governments it seems and 

has a history of doing so. But he said at no time was CARICOM 

action plan predicated on the unconstitutional removal of President 

Aristide from office. 

The removal of President Aristide in these circumstances sets a 

dangerous precedent for democratically-elected governments. What 

about U.S. links to the rebels? Please don’t take these denials at 

face value, Mr. Chairman, because history constantly shows the 

CIA fingerprints after the fact. Let’s find out what Guy Philippe 

was doing when we talked to him, what Jodel Chamblain is doing 

there as the head of the rebels. Let’s ask not to hear that our Defense Department doesn’t know how M–16s from the Dominican 

Republic got in their hands. Maybe they were ‘‘sold.’’ Maybe they 

were given. Let’s find out. It is absolutely alarming. 

Then what was the support from congressionally voted funds to 

the International Republican Institute going to an opposition that 

blocked the CARICOM agreement? We are supporting the opposition. Is that right? We are giving millions of dollars to the opposition that Mr. Noriega went down to negotiate with them and got 

a negative answer? Are you curious? I am curious as an American 

and I am appealing to the Chairman of this Subcommittee to be 

curious as well. It doesn’t make sense. What do you believe, Mr. 

Noriega or your own eyes? What about all of the love and care for 

82

Haiti that we heard today? Now here’s an area of some expertise 

of mine——

Mr. BALLENGER. Could you summarize? 

Mr. SACHS. I will summarize. I will summarize of why I am 

frightened and why millions of Americans are frightened and why 

we are looking to you for leadership. Now I came back from Haiti 

in early 2001 and spoke to the leadership of the Inter-American 

Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World 

Bank, and the Organization for American States. And they all told 

me that the Bush Administration had put a complete freeze on all 

multi-lateral assistance. I know something about that business certainly as much as anyone in this room. And I know what it means 

for the United States to put a freeze on this aid. And then when 

I hear people concerned about the children of Haiti where nearly 

100 children die before their fifth birthday out of every thousand 

that are born where we froze all aid for 3 years. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Is this a summary? 

Mr. SACHS. As Dr. Maguire said, we have strangled that country. 

I would like some answers as an American citizen. I am grateful 

for the chance to tell you how frightened we are for our own democracy, Mr. Chairman. We do not know what our country is doing 

and we appeal to you and your Committee to get real answers to 

these questions. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BALLENGER. If I may interrupt for a second in the fact that 

I wondered myself about the safety of the President. And so the 

Steele Foundation is an organization that has been providing—

taken care of his safety for years that are paid for by the Haitian 

government. And I called the president of the Steele Foundation 

and last night he told me for sure that there is no doubt in my 

mind that they were completely protected by our men. And then he 

said this morning he called me back and said I just wanted to 

check it out, and I will tell you now I will swear on a stack of Bibles that we had armed guards there at his request and we did 

whatever he told us to do. 

Mr. SACHS. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion to you and 

our colleagues. Please call President Aristide in the Central African 

Republic. Please call President Aristide to find out for yourself 

whether you are correct in that assessment because they feel at 

risk of their lives. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call, since you 

have said they are willing to swear on a stack of Bibles, I wouldn’t 

mind having them before the Committee to do so. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Ambassador Tim Carney, career foreign service 

officer at the Department of State, served as Ambassador to Haiti 

during the Clinton Administration and we welcome you aboard, 

and sorry for the long wait you had to go through. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. CARNEY, 

FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO HAITI 

Mr. CARNEY. I am delighted to be here. I am delighted to see before me some Members whom I welcomed into my residence in 

Port-au-Prince and who welcomed me into their offices here in 

Washington and repeatedly, I might add. 

83

What do we have in Haiti? Well, we now have an opportunity for 

the international community to support a political process there, 

not a personality. It is essential that we provide resources for Haitians to determine their future. Our first priority, sir, must be to 

ensure security while former and still respected Haitian national 

police elements reconstitute themselves. In this context of security 

and a political process, I will associate myself with Mr. Payne in 

underscoring that the most vital mandate for the interim international force and for the follow-on security entity is disarmament. 

You put your finger on that, absolutely. In parallel with providing 

security, we all must facilitate the political process that Haitian 

parties themselves are embarked on in the framework of their Constitution. I believe that at the outset, three interrelated crises must 

receive Haitian attention and get the aid and advice of the international community. Those three crises are the rule of law, the 

economy and the environment. 

And specifically, Haiti needs institution building, especially those 

institutions that ensure law and order, police, magistrates and the 

courts. Second, Haiti has to have adequate laws and procedures for 

economic stability and to foster development. Those must be in 

place. They need, for example, to be able to have people establish 

titles to their own property so they can put them up for collateral 

for improvement. Foreign investors whose capital is important to 

create jobs, must have the security of their investments in Haiti’s 

economy. 

And third, the crumbling environment there needs urgent attention. Clean water is a particularly urgent need. That aquifer under 

Haiti is already starting to salinate and of course got to stop cutting down trees to make charcoal. Must have propane in their 

homes so Haitians can cook. The most important reality for we in 

the international community is an understanding that Haitian success in bringing their nation into this 21st century with the stake 

in the prosperity of our hemisphere is not a job for days or months, 

it is one that is going to take years of imagination, discipline and 

hard work. 

My last thought, sir, is to congratulate France, Canada and the 

United States for help bringing about the circumstances that can 

realize these goals, the U.N. and its agencies, the international financial institutions and most of all the hard work of Haitians are 

the way forward. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. Now Ambassador Marville. You 

have extensive experience in Haiti and have served as an election 

observer in 1997 and 1998. Ambassador Marville was named Secretary General of the Organization of American States to head up 

the Electoral Observation Mission for the legislative and municipal 

and local government elections held in 2000. Recently participated 

as a member of CARICOM mission to Haiti led by Prime Minister 

James Mitchell of St. Vincent, and the Grenadines to review the 

situation in Haiti. And I thank you for being here and would thank 

you for staying as long as you have, sir. 

84

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ORLANDO MARVILLE, 

FORMER HEAD OF THE ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION 

OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (2000) 

Mr. MARVILLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you, the 

rest of the Committee. I stayed actually longer than you may have 

imagined because I traveled all the way here this morning. I was 

informed that I would have to testify before you sometime late last 

night and what I have is handwritten. Interestingly, much of what 

I want to say has been covered, but I will go through some of it 

anyway. And I think the most fundamental point I want to make, 

I want to make at the beginning. 

Haiti is not only Haiti of now, it is also Haiti of the past. I think 

we have to understand some things. What I have to say is probably 

of no comfort to anyone. The truth is nonpartisan. And unlike 

Haiti, it cannot be used as a political football. When I went to 

Haiti, I went to Haiti with all the feelings of a man of the Caribbean with African ancestry who had great respect for a rag-tag 

army that back in the early 1800s defeated what was supposed to 

be the invincible army of Napoleon for its own independence. 

The U.S.A. was already independent. But the U.S. independence 

had no effect on the rest of the hemisphere. Haiti, on the other 

hand, I must assure you, the revolt of the captives in Haiti resulted 

in revolts in Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, throughout the Caribbean. Additionally, the British were then forced to manumit slaves 

by 1834. For the rest of the northern segment of the Americas, 

there was absolute silence and shunning for 100 years the slave 

holding powers of Europe and North America isolated Haiti. This 

is the international community worked up to today. And I think we 

have to understand what has been happening, what needs to happen. 

I wanted to go through the process of elections, which we consider flawed not because of the shoestring democracy process that 

occurred, but because of a tradition that had developed in Haiti 

where the winner has to have everything. As a result of that, we 

wrote a letter, a private confidence letter to the president of the 

Republic and to the president of the electoral commission indicating that, in fact, there had been a fraudulent attempt to change 

the numbers rather than going back and pleading with them to 

have the second round. Somebody within the electoral commission 

leaked the letter to the press and everything went down. I was 

called immediately before the letter was leaked by the president of 

the Republic. 

We had a lengthy conversation. I indicated that he had to bite 

the bullet and he had to tell Mr. Aristide. He said, you know, a 

man who has been robbed of 4 years of power, is difficult to talk 

to. I said if you bite the bullet, I myself will be one of the first people to go out and seek investments from the Caribbean and elsewhere, which I considered an absolute necessity. The rest is history. A lot of it is sad. It is sad what I remember for instance that 

at 6 a.m., I was in a polling booth in Petionville, Haiti. And people 

were lined up as if there were food rations or something. 

When the voting began, they pressed against the door and the 

police were not able to keep absolute control. But in the midst of 

this a very pregnant woman appeared and the crowd made way for 

85

her. And then I went through it. Anyway, getting back to the point, 

sir, we have had since then situations which have been not very 

pleasant. First of all, we had a very small electoral observation 

team. The fact that it was small was because a lot of the funding 

that could have been provided from here was blocked by a single 

Member of the Senate. 

Additionally, when we came to update the Congress, we were 

able to meet, I think two or three Members of the Democratic 

party, but only the persons who provided information to the Republicans. It seemed all the time that there was a question of who is 

in, who is out and that is the political football. I know I don’t have 

a lot of time, so I will jump to the present because there are some 

things that are absolutely necessary and a few points. The present 

offers perhaps the final window of opportunity for the international 

community and Haiti’s brothers in CARICOM. 

I notice my colleague, Ambassador Carney, permitted CARICOM 

to come good, as they say. Haiti must not be made once more a political football. There is also no quick fix. Haiti needs food, medicine, physicians, clean water and any number of efforts to bring 

what is one of the hardest working and most talented populations 

in the hemisphere to return to acceptable human levels. Thereafter, not only will there be a great need for social infrastructure 

improvement, but serious assistance must be offered in creating an 

apolitical police force and an adequate justice system as well as 

preparing for elections, which I believe may require 2 or more 

years before they can be successfully conducted. Some of the monies suspended before should be used immediately for these purposes. 

Finally, with respect to the question of proper elections, the time 

period I suggest is based first on my own experience where it is extremely important to have a proper and permanent electoral council. It is extremely important to have all parties on board on this 

issue. We cannot have the legal opposition saying no. We can’t 

have Lavalas saying no. The time taking to do a census in Haiti 

would be considerable because it is a country where parts of it are 

practically inaccessible and it takes time to get there. Additionally, 

we need to be sure of proper paraphernalia, metal ballot boxes and 

proper ballots, et cetera and also sufficient monies to support electoral observation. Even after that, Mr. Chairman, we are going to 

need a period of considerable assistance to allow the country to get 

on its feet. And this is not something that can be done. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Could you summarize? 

Mr. MARVILLE. I am at the end practically. In a year or 2, it requires the international community, by which I mean the North 

American countries, Europe, Japan, Latin America and together, 

they must work with CARICOM, which I think, in some ways, sympathizes with, understands, misunderstands maybe, but is an important aspect of this whole process. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, sir. Just a few questions. Ambassador Carney, I have been to Haiti many times and I planted with 

C.A.R.E. International—I planted 3 million trees. That was 20 

years ago and I will bet you there is not a tree left. We put a hospital in Leogane, and I understand it still exists there. A little old 

lady came to visit me and she was not only the mayor of her town 

86

in northern Haiti, but she was also a teacher. And she said could 

you get us anything to help us out with? And I said what do you 

need? And she said I need pencils and paper. It kind of shocked 

me. Well, what I did is I got 800,000 sheets of 81⁄2 by 11 paper and 

50,000 pencils because of my business connections, and we shipped 

it. 

And about a week or 10 days after I shipped it, the Salesian 

order of the Catholic church called me up to say that we are terribly sorry to tell you, sir, but they burned her school down. Would 

you mind if we gave her maybe a thousand pencils and 10,000 

sheets of paper and kept the rest of it for the church? And I said 

no, sir. That is one of the reasons that I seem very frustrated in 

trying to do something positive about Haiti. 

But one of the things that really kind of bugs me is with the 

armed guards and the arms that have been there, what would you 

recommend to control the gangs and how to disarm them? When 

we sent our 20,000 troops in there and they refused to disarm, and 

I think our troops cut loose with a couple of guns and killed maybe 

five or six of them, and all of a sudden, they gave the guns over, 

but it appears that the drug trade is reinforced, resupplied guns. 

Do you have any suggestions as to a method of somehow disarming 

the mobs that they have? 

Mr. CARNEY. Let me first accept my colleagues’ criticism and unreservedly add CARICOM to those who deserve congratulations. 

Disarming, it has got to be done by appeals. But there is no doubt 

in my mind that there is going to come a day when there is going 

to have to be action that hopefully will not involve large-scale 

shooting. But I think if we are going to do this right, we are going 

to have to be willing to lock and load if the situation requires it. 

Now in that context, I believe we should definitely have Haitian 

police with us. And my understanding is that right now as we are 

sitting here there is an effort going forward to call up those Haitian 

national policemen who were either fired from the year 2000 on or 

who quit in disgust who have a reputation that can return with respect and professionalism to their duties. 

Mr. BALLENGER. I hope—and I understand that of course some 

of the police that stayed on, I guess were corrupted by the program 

and so forth, and I don’t know how you separated the situation, but 

I understand your point. That is really the only base you have to 

work with I think as far as law enforcement and law and order for 

the country itself. 

Mr. CARNEY. I know the Haitian Coast Guard has remained of 

good reputation, but we are talking fewer than 100 men in that element. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Bob. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of the panelists for their endurance and their participation, and I particularly 

want to thank Dr. Maguire and Dr. Sachs, who we asked to be with 

us. And I just want to make a brief comment before I ask a question or two, and that is, it seems that this hearing, the whole 

course of the majority is to discredit President Aristide, and I don’t 

particularly have the greatest affinity for President Aristide, but 

that is not the issue. The issue is what is our policy as it relates 

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icy in terms of standing up, including for those who we may not 

care for because we don’t agree with their policies, but who were 

democratically-elected, who this government recognized as the duly 

democratically-elected entity. 

It goes far beyond Haiti. It goes to the message that there is unrest in significant parts of this hemisphere. And if I were in some 

countries like we have already seen, like Bolivia, Ecuador and 

other places, I would say I understand how to get to my goal. 

Let me create confrontation, maybe violent confrontation and 

then ultimately a political solution where we say to the newlydemocratic entities step aside because when we send a message 

that we don’t intend to get involved unless there is a political solution, and ultimately that says to those who do not want a political 

solution because they want a conclusion, not a political solution, 

but a conclusion that brings them to power, then I think we have 

gone down an incredibly dangerous path in this hemisphere. And 

that is what I think today’s hearing is largely about. Very important to what is happening in Haiti, but this broad ability to wipe 

it away so easily by seeking to discredit one individual is I believe 

disingenuous. 

Dr. Maguire, let me ask you, if I go ahead and I say to those who 

are seeking violent overthrow that I won’t do anything in terms of 

either of my country or those of the international community until 

there is a political solution, what do you think that that says to entities, whether it be in Haiti or other groups in this hemisphere for 

that fact or any part of the world? 

Mr. MAGUIRE. I think it tells them they can act with impunity 

and get away with it. And this is one of the tragedies of the scenario that is unfolding right now where we have personalities with 

known criminal records, known human rights violators, people who 

orchestrated coup attempts in 2001, the attack on the palace that 

was orchestrated by Mr. Guy Philippe. He tells them that rule of 

law doesn’t matter. He tells them that impunity is at large again 

in Haiti. And you know, one of the things that frightens me considerably is that we are seeing now through the press reports, through 

the newspaper that Mr. Meek held up, we are seeing Mr. Philippe 

kind of greeted as some kind of a folk hero. But let us step back 

from that, and let us say that Mr. Philippe and his comrades over 

the past 3 weeks have emptied every prison in Haiti, including the 

penitentiary and those people surrounding them and giving them 

a joyful welcome are certainly happy. They and their families are 

happy that these people are out of jail and this includes people who 

were tried and found guilty for the Raboteau massacre under a 

wonderful judicial process that showed that the Haitian government could do it. It was lauded everywhere in the hemisphere and 

these people are back on the streets. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. One final question, wouldn’t some of the statements I heard from the Assistant Secretary about all of the alleged 

narcotic trafficking that it has been pointed out that President 

Aristide did hand over to the United States major narcotic dealers, 

what do we say then about Afghanistan where we are supporting 

a government in which the there is more opium grown today in Afghanistan than when we took over and we are actually looking the 

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istan, and yet we are strongly supporting President Karzai, who I 

believe we should be supporting. But isn’t there a duality of position or a——

Mr. MAGUIRE. There is an incredible contradiction. I see the contradictions throughout. I see them today where certain people have 

indicated a concern about human rights violations that occurred in 

1995, the murder of Madam Duoshay Bertrand. I hear people talking about the concern of the murder of Lingo Bringall. But I don’t 

hear people talking about the concern of the murder of other people 

who don’t happen to be affiliated with the opposition. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Before Mr. Weller, let me first tell everybody 

Mr. Paquiot missed his plane to stay here and testify, so I would 

just like to thank you, sir, for the sacrifice you made there. 

Now, Mr. Weller. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also, as a member 

of this panel, want to thank those who are on the second panel for 

your patience and being here this evening. 

Mr. Paquiot in particular, thank you for sticking around. I recognize it is a sacrifice for you to be here as well as to miss the flight, 

stay an extra day, when I assume you want to be home with your 

family at this time. 

Mr. Paquiot, I really welcome your participation in this panel 

today. All too often in many of these hearings, we have experts 

from outside of countries such as Haiti telling us what should be 

done in your country, and you are a distinguished leader as president of a prestigious university, and your personal sacrifice as a 

victim of Aristide’s thugs is heart-breaking. My heart goes out to 

you as well as my prayers for you and your family, as well as your 

country and the people of your country, because every American 

wants things to be better in Haiti for you and your people. 

You are part of the solution, and looking to the future as one of 

the respected leaders of Haiti, what would you recommend? What 

do you foresee as the necessary steps to strengthen democracy in 

Haiti, to make democracy work for the people of Haiti? What would 

you recommend? I really appreciate your participation today. 

Mr. PAQUIOT. I thank you for the opportunity you give me to answer your question. I think we tend to focus too much on personality, like Aristide, for instance. We have a lot of people like that 

in the country. We had a lot of—the history of Haiti, we had a lot 

of people who thought they were Messiahs, they were above everybody. I heard lots of people here at the table talking about what 

should be done in Haiti. 

We have to address the very problem that we Haitians face. And 

as a matter of fact, you know, I do not think that Haiti should be 

like an issue in American policy, because I have been hearing a lot 

of things this afternoon. The problem is not that. The problem is 

the Haitian people who have been suffering for 200 years. Even 

when Haiti was independent, it was not recognized as an independent country, even by the United States. I think the United 

States recognized Haiti for an independent country maybe 60 years 

after Haiti was independent. So you have to understand a country 

that was based, you know, on slavery, and it is quite ‘‘normal’’ that 

you have those kinds of situations, because you must build things 

on the economy, reinforcing the economy. It is a long-term process. 

89

You must have institutions. That is the kind of thing that you do 

not have in Haiti. When you do not have institutions, strong institutions, in a country, you tend to believe in personalities. And since 

Duvalier left, we went through a whole process of disillusionment. 

So I think that most of the things that should be done have already been said at this table. I heard people talk about that. 

We have basic problems in Haiti like problems with electricity, 

like problems with water, problems that you would not think that 

a country in this century would have to face. So I think those are 

the kinds of things that should be addressed and not necessarily 

put the emphasis on somebody. And that is why me, and along 

with a lot of Haitians who have been very disappointed by Mr. 

Aristide, I thought it was going to do a lot of things. As a matter 

of fact, at the university we do not even discuss about the issue of 

whether it was or not, you know, being well-elected, because we 

thought that he should have been given the chance to do something, and as a matter of fact, he failed in that. 

So I think what we should do, what the international community 

should do, is to address the real problem of the Haitian people, 

that we need strong institutions, education, and things like that. 

This will be a long process. So as far as I am concerned, I think 

that is the kind of thing that we will have to do in Haiti if we want 

that something like that will never happen again in this country. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Professor. 

Quickly, using the remainder of my time, Ambassador Marville, 

thank you for the leadership that Barbados has played, particularly 

in CARICOM and in the Caribbean region. What role do you think 

that CARICOM should play in helping Haiti in the immediate future? What role do you see for CARICOM? 

Mr. MARVILLE. CARICOM has any number of skills with respect 

to elections. I come from a country which has had a tradition of 

Parliament that dates back to 1639. Back in 19—I do not know 

when, immediately after the fall of Duvalier, when Namphy became a general, our then Prime Minister offered Namphy whatever 

assistance he wanted in trying to put an elected government in 

place. Namphy listened and then went off, and nothing happened. 

CARICOM can do a lot of these things. There are several factors 

at play here. We have populations in two or three countries which 

already speak clearly, who, for instance, served as police and soldiers along with the U.S. forces in 1994, and they have been very 

effective because they could reach people at the local level. We are 

not from Haiti, but our connections with Haiti are real. 

This is one of the things. I would suggest that whatever the 

international community thinks it wants to do, CARICOM is a necessary ally in that process. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you very much. Thank you for your time. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you. 

I think your recommendations are excellent. I think now that 

this Administration has accepted the concept of nation-building, 

and I know, Ambassador, you have been involved in that process 

recently, that underscores what I think I am hearing. There has to 

be a permanent commitment, there has to be patience, and there 

has to be appropriate resources. 

90

My remarks at the beginning, and I think you corroborated an 

observation that I made, when this Congress did not provide the 

funding for those election monitors to the OAS, it was a point in 

history that will be reviewed and examined as a turning point. Because I met you, Ambassador, I was one of those Democrats that 

you referred to, large D Democrats. We were there. We observed 

the election. There was a euphoria, until, of course, the interpretation was provided that a plurality was sufficient as opposed to a 

majority to avoid a runoff. But the reality has been, consistently for 

the past 10 years, we have turned our back on Haiti, and we have 

not made that necessary commitment. 

I would like to just bring one other—I think it was you, Mr. 

Maguire, and maybe others—and let me direct this question to my 

friend Ambassador Carney. The International Republican Institute, 

I have had very serious concerns with the activities of that group 

for some time now, not just in Haiti, but elsewhere. I have witnessed their role in a variety of countries, and I think it is time 

we reexamined all of the so-called democracy-building programs. 

Are you aware, Ambassador, that—and maybe I am incorrect in 

this statement—that the IRI is operating out of the Dominican Republic? Are you familiar with that? 

Mr. CARNEY. No, sir. You will recall that I retired in early 

2000——

Mr. DELAHUNT. You were fortunate then. 

Mr. CARNEY [continuing]. And am not up to speed on that at all. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Either Mr. Sachs or Mr. Maguire or anybody 

else. 

Mr. MAGUIRE. I can tell you that I am fully aware that the IRI 

has had meetings in Miami with the democratic opposition. In fact, 

the date is etched in my mind because it was the day of the aborted coup attempt in Venezuela. I think that was April 12, 2002, if 

I am not mistaken. And at this time I just happened to be in 

Miami for a meeting that had been scheduled long before that of 

Haitian diaspora organizations by the National Coalition of Haitian 

Rights. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me interrupt you for a moment. Are you familiar with an individual by the name of Stanley Lucas? 

Mr. MAGUIRE. I know Mr. Lucas. He is the IRI point person on 

Haiti, and I was quite seized when, in Haiti in 2001 in January, 

I saw in a video run on State television, a clip of Mr. Lucas drinking champagne with Prosper Avril and the other generals after a 

coup had been thrown. And I thought, well, you know, if I were 

running the IRI, I certainly would not want a person with this kind 

of a history and background running its programs in Haiti for me. 

I also understand that Mr. Lucas has been asked by AID, as AID 

has funded the IRI for these various meetings, that he——

Mr. DELAHUNT. The funding is no longer coming from the National Endowment for Democracy; is that what you are saying? 

Mr. MAGUIRE. Well, what I understand is that AID was kind of 

directed to fund the IRI. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Was kind of directed? 

Mr. MAGUIRE. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Kind of directed. What do you mean by kind of 

directed, Mr. Maguire? 

91

Mr. MAGUIRE. Well, in my conversations in Haiti with various 

people who know this much better than I do, AID was pretty much 

mandated to support the IRI. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. By Congress? 

Mr. MAGUIRE. I do not believe so. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I think, Mr. Sachs, you make a very good 

point, and I would recommend to the Chair that we take the time 

over the course of the next 6 months or a year to really—you know, 

we create commissions around here rather frequently. I really 

think it is important for us to review the roles of the institutes, the 

NDI, the NED. 

Mr. Chairman, you know that we have had great success, at 

least in a transitory way, bringing people of different perspectives 

together to discuss democracy. I just fear that what we are doing 

here is we are creating advocacy groups that are not working in the 

best interests of the United States in nurturing democratic institutions. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I could not agree more. I 

think that the concept of NDI and IRI and the rest are good. I 

think, though, it is rare that an institution has really taken on a 

political binge like IRI. But I was there at the original election of 

President Aristide when IRI had a report that was colorful. It was 

all done; it was given on the night of the election, IRI’s report on 

the election. It had to be printed somewhere in the United States, 

and it had to be printed before the election, because that was the 

election evening. I was there, Mr. Goss was there, we were all observers. 

The IRI has taken this Haiti question and made it a political 

issue, and it is unfair, because I think that the concept of IRI and 

the DRI, National Democratic Institute are good, but I think that 

in Haiti and in Venezuela, the IRI has overstepped its boundaries. 

As a matter of fact, the National Endowment for Democracy has 

asked IRI to take a look at their new leadership who, as you know, 

many of the IRI people ended up in the Bush Administration, as 

they should. They are good card-carrying Republicans. And there is 

a new group of IRI people who I do not think understand democracy-building rather than taking part in politics. 

So there is no question that IRI has had a political—as a matter 

of fact, NDI was still working, and the IRI was asked to leave. 

Once again, the CIA who had been in Haiti, as you know, forever 

had Bazin winning the election and were embarrassed and shocked 

that this guy Aristide won 70 percent of the election. Bazin, great 

guy; beautiful French pictures in his house, very talented World 

Banker. Aristide is running around out there having the people understand that he is trying to change their way of life. And so how 

the CIA could have misread the fact that this is a popular movement and the first election, to me it just shows how flawed our intelligence agency happens to be. It made no sense at all. 

Just sort of in conclusion, the whole question of the impact that 

Haiti has had on the United States, I think the Ambassador mentioned its importance. Haiti fought in the Battle of Savannah. We 

had a celebration in the State Legislature in New Jersey because 

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pendence, the Battle of Savannah in particular. It was Haiti who, 

when we defeated the French, caused the French to sell the Louisiana Territories, which had to then open up the West so Lewis 

and Clark could move on into the West, because France was broke 

because they lost so much. And Haiti contributed as much as the 

original Thirteen Colonies to France as the whole Thirteen Colonies gave to Britain, and, therefore, France lost that and became 

in need of funds and sold the Louisiana Territory. 

Why do I say that? Because we have been involved; Haiti has 

been an advocate for the United States, and, as a matter of fact, 

the United States would not recognize Haiti because they did not 

want to have a black diplomat when we had slavery. 

We could go on and on with Haiti. Even as I conclude, the planting of trees that I really commend the Chairman for doing, the reason that the erosion has happened so much was because in World 

War II, our War Department asked Haiti to cut down its natural 

habitat and try to grow rubber trees because we were cut off from 

the Pacific region. There was a Haitian person who was—who 

knew that they would not grow, but they continued to do it. Erosion set in, it has never been turned back, and now this whole 

question of that flawed policy, of Haiti attempting to help the 

United States in World War II, somehow helped to create the problems that we are seeing there. 

So there is an involvement of Haiti. As a matter of fact, Simon 

Bolivar, who went and freed Latin America, lived in Haiti and 

studied there. 

Let me just conclude by saying it is unfortunate that we had this 

policy. It is wrong that we have not recognized this Republic. I 

hope that in the future we will have a decent policy as relates to 

this country. They deserve better. 

Since my time has not expired, Mr. Carney, let me ask you a 

quick question, since the orange light is still on. I know you work 

with the opposition, and I am glad you agree that disarmament 

and the DDRR programs should go on. But can you tell me why 

the opposition that you work with, with the business community, 

why they refused the CARICOM proposal? 

Mr. CARNEY. I can tell you what they told me. I am not sure I 

can tell you the whole story. 

The argument, and as a group of us initially put it to the opposition, was to accept the CARICOM proposal in a statement that 

made no mention of Mr. Aristide at all. They found that impossible. 

They said that in order to keep credibility with their base, and that 

organization is rooted in civil society, something new in Haiti, in 

my experience, that they simply could not refuse to mention President Aristide at all. An argument was then that they not make it 

a precondition that he leave his office; rather, it be stated as a goal. 

And the contention was even that would simply undermine them 

to the point that the only results would be Guy Philippe’s welcome 

in Port-au-Prince as the liberator, which would effectively 

marginalize them politically for Haiti’s future. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I neglected to say last 

time, thank you for conducting this hearing. 

93

Let me ask first, Mr. Paquiot, simply, do you believe that Haitians should receive asylum here in America? Do you believe that 

Haitians should receive asylum as a result of the violence, et 

cetera, that is going on in Haiti right now? 

Mr. PAQUIOT. Well, I think that the dual policy consisting of having a policy for Cubans and one for Haitians is not fair, because, 

for instance, when a Cuban leaves Cuba right now, it is not for economic reasons, it is because they have their friends, their family 

in Miami, and they are, you know, comparing the lifestyle. 

Mr. MEEKS. So you believe our policy should change? 

Mr. PAQUIOT. I believe we should have the same standard for everybody. 

Mr. MEEKS. Now, Ambassador Carney, let me ask you, in helping 

with the opposition, et cetera, I am told, and you can correct me 

if I am wrong, that your project brings some of the opposition members to the United States and works with them in that way. And 

I wanted to follow up just basically on the question that Mr. Payne 

had initiated. So how long was your involvement? Did the negotiations take place as to whether or not they should or should not accept the CARICOM agreement? Can you just tell me was there any 

true engagement, and was there anything that could have happened that we could have had really at the negotiating table, and 

whether or not, you know, the United States said anything to you 

or to anybody at the front and said, hey, get these guys at the negotiating table so that we can try to have a diplomatic solution? 

Mr. CARNEY. The event was essentially a long phone conversation that took place last Tuesday, I believe it was, Tuesday a week 

ago. It was not done at the behest of the U.S. Administration or 

of CARICOM; it was rather an initiative by three or four of us who 

either lived in Haiti or have followed Haiti continuously for the 

last, in some cases, 14 or 15 years. The interlocutors in Port-auPrince basically had already given a temporizing response to the 

Department of State. There had been more time asked for before 

a definitive response came through, and it was in those interstices 

that we put a call through and tried to make some points that this 

kind of a political process with firm international guarantees might 

be the way forward. 

Mr. MEEKS. Did they know that these expatriates and thugs and 

criminals would soon be coming back in, and there would be violence that would take place very shortly? 

Mr. CARNEY. If I recall, at the time the armed opposition led by 

the men whose identities we have had adequately described were 

quite close to Port-au-Prince; 25 miles comes to mind, subject to 

correction. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. Now, let me ask then, based upon the fact 

that I think that we all agree who these individuals are, I was 

wondering whether the Board of Haitian Democracy and whether 

the opposition would agree and would push for the United Nations 

and/or some international court to come in so that those individuals who have been released from prison or who have been involved in the prior atrocities in Haiti, that they now go back before 

this body of justice so that, one, they could be reincarcerated, and 

two, that they not be allowed to participate in any shape, form, or 

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thing, to deal with part of any negotiation in dealing with the democracy or trying to establish a democracy again in Haiti. 

Mr. CARNEY. I believe that idea has merit and ought to be put 

into the political process in Port-au-Prince. 

Mr. MEEKS. So I am just wondering, would the Board come out 

with some kind of a definitive statement in that regard that you 

would submit to our State Department as well as to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations saying that you would urge such a 

tribunal to be put in place? 

Mr. CARNEY. I will put it to the Board and argue its merits, but 

I cannot speak for what the Board might do. I am just a member 

of the Board, not the Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you again and 

our Ranking Member for these hearings, and I also thank our panelists for being here. I believe what we are hearing today and what 

many of us know to be the case in terms of United States policy 

toward Haiti, and especially in the last 3 years, does warrant a 

fuller congressional investigation by the appropriate Committees, 

perhaps this Committee, with the Intelligence Committees, with 

Judiciary and all Committees that have some jurisdiction over our 

role as it relates to Haiti. 

I wanted to ask any of the panelists to give me some feedback. 

Congressman Conyers and I are introducing a resolution to establish an independent commission to investigate these matters, and 

I would like to hear from you what you think should be part of this 

commission and the investigation, what questions should be asked 

as we pursue this. 

Let me just start by asking Dr. Sachs to respond, and then any 

of the panelists could feel free to give me your ideas on that. 

Mr. SACHS. Thank you very much. 

First, I would like to say that we are just 3 days into what looks 

like a coup, with the U.S. heavy involvement. So I think it is a 

matter of real time, not just a matter of 6 months or a year or 2 

years, but for this Committee to use its oversight powers right now 

to understand what has happened in the last 5 or 6 days, to reach 

President Aristide, to ensure his safety, to demand that the State 

Department ensure his safety and his ability to speak freely to you 

and to the whole—to Members of Congress that need to understand 

what has happened, because you will not have a political solution 

in the next few days or the next few weeks unless we understand 

what actually has happened. 

And the more I hear U.S. Government officials saying that we 

have to look forward, not back, that is a recipe for disaster when 

we are 3 days into a removal from office of a President on a U.S.-

chartered plane, taken to the Central African Republic, where the 

man is not even in contact safely with the rest of the world. 

So it is a little bit premature to start doing big theory before you 

secure his physical safety and his ability to speak with you and 

with the rest of the Congress, so that we understand, because there 

is one interpretation which has a lot of, unfortunately, evidence behind it, which was that this was a U.S.-led effort to remove him 

from office against his will, and at the threat of imminent death 

to his family. 

95

Now, if that is the case, that is a quite remarkable conclusion. 

We do not know yet whether that is the case, but the evidence 

seems to point in that direction in many different ways. And it was 

not flatly contradicted today, by the way, because what Secretary 

Noriega said was that, yes, indeed, he was told that he had to resign to get on that airplane. He said that. And that, of course, is 

what President Aristide has told those that he has reached by 

phone and told his attorney and others. 

So we are in real time right now, with an extraordinarily dangerous situation, a President carried away on a U.S.-chartered 

plane, and we do not know where and what his physical status is, 

and he does not want to be there, I know. He wants to be in a safe 

place, not in the Central African Republic. And this Committee has 

a responsibility, with all due respect, in its oversight, in my opinion, to help ensure that that is the case. 

Now, if we find the worst, and I think we may actually find the 

worst, that has lots of implications about how to restore democracy. 

And CARICOM leaders will have lots of views about that, because 

as we have talked to them in recent days, they believe that there 

is a grave threat to democracy as the way events have transpired 

against their clear needs in the region, and Prime Minister Patterson was absolutely explicit about this. 

So I want to urge that this is not a time, in my view, for theory 

quite yet. This is a time for quick action, with the Committee taking a lead responsibility to ensure that the State Department gives 

you answers about what was the U.S. role in the forcible removal 

from office of a President in our hemisphere. 

Mr. MAGUIRE. If I may add some comments, it is a trite phrase 

now, but I think we need to connect some dots here. I think we 

need to ask why was Guy Philippe not arrested in the Dominican 

Republic when the Government of Haiti asked for him to be arrested, and who was protecting him there? I think we need to ask 

what kind of links there have been of the flow of drugs from Haiti 

to the Dominican Republic, and how that has played into the financing of various activities. And I think we have to ask why the 

United States Ambassador had to intervene to keep a Haitian notorious for drug trafficking from attending an IRI fundraiser in early 

2003. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Rangel. 

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, once again, thank you and the rest of 

the Committee for calling these hearings. 

Let me take advantage of the Ambassadors that are here and ask 

them, what does coup d’etat mean as it relates to the American understanding of the—international understanding of that French 

term, coup d’etat, Ambassador Carney? I am going to ask Ambassador Marville as well, but since both of you are professional diplomats, what does it mean to you? 

Mr. CARNEY. A blow against the State, if you will, the forcible 

seizure of power, and there are any number of ways to perpetrate 

one. There was a book, in fact, done in the mid-1960s by Edward 

Luttwak. 

Mr. RANGEL. That is good for me. 

Ambassador Marville. 

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Mr. MARVILLE. I concur with that. It is a forcible takeover of 

power, but that is an old definition. I think one is moving toward 

a definition of a takeover by force, a subtle takeover, a soft coup, 

hard coup, and so on. 

Mr. RANGEL. Now, does anyone doubt that President Aristide 

was in fear for his life before he exited Haiti, and that the American Embassy and all of the good forces there facilitated his removal, and that he left because he was afraid that armed rebel 

forces might kill him? Is there any doubt about that story that we 

tell? 

Mr. CARNEY. I am sure those were elements in it, but I do not 

know the whole story. 

Mr. RANGEL. I know, but no one challenges that. Is there any 

question in your mind? 

Mr. MARVILLE. Yes, there will be a question, but I do not have 

any answers. I do not know what the details are. 

Mr. RANGEL. What question could there be? Do you doubt that 

he left because he thought he was going to be killed? 

Mr. MARVILLE. No, I do not doubt that. 

Mr. RANGEL. Do you doubt that he left because we told him that 

he should leave? You were here when Noriega testified? 

Mr. MARVILLE. That is not what I am saying. What I am saying 

is that I do not know the precise details of the whole exercise, and 

there is a lot of doubt over what happened, and that is——

Mr. RANGEL. Let’s take an academic thing. From what we know 

from what Secretary Noriega said, that he was warned that his life 

was in danger and he left, we agreed, because his life was in danger. What does not make this a coup d’etat as Ambassadors understand it? Rebels, force, fear, flee. 

Now, if it is a coup d’etat, can legitimate governments in the 

international community recognize somebody who came into power 

as a result of the seizure of a government through force? Can it be 

done in Barbados? Can it be done in the United States? Can we 

recognize the person who seized the government through arms illegally? 

Mr. MARVILLE. Unfortunately, sir, this has always been done. 

Mr. RANGEL. By whom? 

Mr. MARVILLE. By communities in general. There is a——

Mr. RANGEL. Well, name me somebody. Who took over a government by force when the President was elected, and the United 

States or the Government of Barbados said, welcome, we never did 

like the guy that was elected anyway; was that ever done by your 

government? 

Mr. MARVILLE. No. I am saying, sir——

Mr. RANGEL. No, no. Was it ever done by the United States or 

by your government, or any civilized government? 

Mr. MARVILLE. No, it has not been done by our government. It 

is not part of our tradition. 

Mr. RANGEL. Okay. That is all I am talking about, tradition. Do 

you know of any situation where this has been done, where the 

thugs, which Noriega called them thugs and crooks, and all the 

people came over, chased out the President; have they ever been 

recognized as a legitimate government that you know of, Ambassador? 

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Mr. CARNEY. I cannot think of one, but I somehow suspect there 

is. 

Mr. RANGEL. If indeed this is the circumstances we are dealing 

with, would it not be correct that our position should be the restoration of the legal government in Haiti? 

Mr. SACHS. Yes, sir, absolutely. And if we determine——

Mr. RANGEL. What choice do we have? 

Mr. SACHS. If we determine that those are the facts, as they 

seem to be, that is absolutely what the CARICOM——

Mr. RANGEL. I want to hear from the Ambassadors, the Ambassadors. What choices do we have except to say our position is the 

rule of law, not for Haiti, but for all civilized countries, especially 

in the Caribbean? 

Ms. WATERS. Especially. 

Mr. MARVILLE. Sir, you have pointed to a danger that we recognize. However, I was giving you an answer that is part of diplomacy. Unfortunately, governments in general have accepted coup 

d’etat as a de facto reality, even if they have——

Mr. RANGEL. Let me get closer to home. Who is your Prime Minister? Was he elected? 

Mr. MARVILLE. Yes, of course. 

Mr. RANGEL. Do we have opposition? 

Mr. MARVILLE. Yes. 

Mr. RANGEL. Suppose we do not like your Prime Minister, but we 

like your opposition; suppose people came from outside of Barbados, supported your opposition, and then after they got there, we 

deal with the opposition. Is that tradition? 

Mr. MARVILLE. Since you asked the question, I would suggest 

that anybody who tried that with Barbados would be dumber than 

dumb. 

Mr. RANGEL. Well, I hope that you support the CARICOM who 

believed that the restoration of the rule of law is important to 

CARICOM, just as it is important to Haiti. I want to thank the 

Ambassadors for understanding this better than I do. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Waters. 

Mr. CARNEY. Let me answer what I believe is at the heart of the 

disagreement between the two sides of this hearing, and that is 

there is a large—largely shared belief that Mr. Aristide had so attenuated his legitimacy and so compromised his own devotion to 

democracy as to render a U.S. view of his restorability dubious. 

Mr. BALLENGER. That is a good answer. 

Ms. Waters, it is your ballgame. 

Ms. WATERS. Yes. Mr. Chairman and Members, first I want to 

thank you again for allowing us to be here, but to entertain any 

conversation that talks about our respect and support for democracy around the world calls into question the fact that we give 

Egypt billions of dollars. I do not think that is a democracy. On and 

on and on. I mean, I could just call the roll on it. So there are some 

contradictions here. 

But I want to say to the panel, this business of the opposition, 

in this discussion when we talk about the opposition, we are talking about Mr. Andre Apaid, Jr., and the so-called Group of 184. 

How many people here know that Mr. Andre Apaid is an American 

citizen with an American passport? How many people know that 

98

the United States has never responded to the question: What the 

heck is an American citizen doing creating a coup d’etat in somebody else’s country? Was that ever discussed in CARICOM? 

Mr. MARVILLE. No. 

Ms. WATERS. Have you ever heard it discussed by Mr. Noriega, 

anybody? 

Well, how many people know that Mr. Apaid owns about 15 or 

16 factories in Haiti? How many people know that? Can I hear 

you? 

Mr. SACHS. Oh, yes. 

Ms. WATERS. You know that? 

How many people know that President Aristide, in the work that 

he was doing, was fighting for and insisting on an increase in 

wages for these poor workers in these factories? How many people 

know that? Can I hear you? 

Mr. MARVILLE. Yes. 

Mr. MAGUIRE. Yes. 

Mr. SACHS. Confirmed. 

Ms. WATERS. How many people know that Mr. Apaid has been 

accused of not paying his taxes, and that Mr. Aristide was insisting 

that he pay his taxes? Does anyone know that? 

Mr. SACHS. Yes. 

Ms. WATERS. You heard that before? 

Mr. SACHS. Heard that. 

Mr. MAGUIRE. Yes. 

Ms. WATERS. How many people know that Mr. Aristide was not 

only fighting for increased wages in the factories, fighting for the 

business class to pay their taxes so that they could have some 

money for infrastructure; how many people knew that he was fighting against this indentured servitude of young girls who work in 

the homes of the privileged, who work from sunup to sundown taking care of babies, scrubbing floors in exchange for food and a place 

to sleep? Anybody understand anything about that? 

Mr. CARNEY. Yes. I am familiar with that concept. 

Mr. MAGUIRE. Mr. Aristide was an advocate of doing something 

about restavek, which is what you are talking about, this practice, 

but particularly strong before he was actually elected to office. 

Ms. WATERS. Okay. So this priest from Cite Soleil, referred to as 

a priest of the slums, was fighting for increased wages, fighting to 

make the rich pay their taxes, and against these children being 

used basically as slaves and servants in these homes. 

How many people know that the figure that the Chairman and others referred to today of $850 million did not go to the Aristide 

government? 

Mr. MAGUIRE. In fact, I believe the United States cut off most bilateral aid probably by around 1998 or so; however, we continued 

to fund the Haitian Coast Guard, which is bilateral aid. 

Ms. WATERS. All right. How many people understand that there 

is a difference between bilateral aid that goes directly to the government and the funding of nongovernment organizations? How 

many people understand that? 

Mr. MAGUIRE. Understood. 

Mr. SACHS. Congresswoman. 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, please, respond quickly. 

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Mr. SACHS. Yes, very, very quickly. When I spoke with President 

Aristide in 2001, he laid out a very sensible, responsible economic 

vision and wanted to work with the Inter-American Development 

Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, and, 

thus, I was particularly shocked to come back to Washington to 

find a U.S.-imposed freeze on all of those institutions. 

Ms. WATERS. How many people know that if you do not have that 

kind of aid, you have no money for the infrastructure, you have no 

money to clean up the water, no money for the police, no money 

for the fire? And while Mr. Aristide has been blamed for not doing 

anything about poverty, do you understand how he was strangled 

by the lack of aid, bilateral or otherwise? How many people understand that? 

Mr. SACHS. Let me speak as a macroeconomist to say that it is 

even worse than that, because they drained him of foreign exchange reserves. As he continued to service the debts to the international institutions, the exchange rate collapsed, the inflation 

rose, and the economy collapsed, and that was the deliberate result 

of the strangulation of aid. 

Ms. WATERS. Well, I hope we can get rid of some of the lies and 

misconceptions about all of this money that has gone to the government, when, in fact, it has not, and I do not want to hear that said 

anymore. So I just wanted to get that on the record. 

Mr. WELLER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you so very much. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Jackson Lee is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me again express my appreciation to the 

Chairman and Ranking Member for their courtesies. 

Mr. Paquiot, again, thank you, and let me just make a statement. All of us want to have Haiti go forward. I only wish that we 

had done our job previously and provided the appropriate aid 

through our monetary organizations and USAID so we would not 

be here today. 

Let me pose a quick question to Ambassador Carney to understand the funding of your organization. Is it mostly what we would 

call the economic elite? 

Mr. CARNEY. To the extent the organization has any funding at 

all, it is donations——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Generally supported by people of better economic means. 

Let me just ask this other question. 

Mr. CARNEY. I do not know, to be specific. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, would you say that numbers of individuals involved with the organization were not happy with President 

Aristide? 

Mr. CARNEY. A large number are not happy with him, that is correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What I would say is that we have had—I 

think it is recognized that the United States has Green Party and 

Independents, Republicans and Democrats, many of whom disagree, and I might imagine that they disagree with the present Administration. I think as the longest-standing democracy, we would 

stand up in arms, and I use that figuratively, to oppose a group 

that would engage in a coup d’etat because they were opposed to 

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the leadership of our Nation. I just want to put that on the record; 

I am not posing a question to you right now. 

Let me go to Mr. Sachs and Mr. Maguire because I would like 

to—even as you are academics, you have a very strong grounding 

in Haitian politics, diplomacy, and also the needs of the Haitian 

people. I think we should put that on the record. My line of questioning to the earlier witness, the Assistant Secretary, that led him 

to, I think, offer a gaffe in telling a Member of Congress what was 

or was not the business of Congress—and I will look forward to his 

apology for that; I am sorry that we did not have a second round. 

I was not intending to intimidate him, but to ask a serious question. 

I say that because my line of questioning was, if you were in fear 

of your life, would it not be much easier to accept anything if you 

believe that someone was going to leave you abandoned with no security, no protection, and, therefore, your only option is to get up 

and get out? Mr. Sachs, does that sound reasonable? You are in 

fear for your life, you are relying upon a certain protective element, 

and that seems to be being removed from you immediately, such 

as what was happening to President Aristide on Saturday night 

and early Sunday morning. 

Mr. SACHS. The best evidence is the USDCM actually told Mr. 

Aristide and his wife that you are all going to be killed unless you 

get on the airplane. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would you translate that to a degree of coercion that you had to leave immediately and that your family was 

in jeopardy? 

Mr. SACHS. I think it was utterly coercive. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me just say that I applaud the work of 

my colleagues. I have asked both the Leader and the Speaker to 

convene immediate congressional hearings of the Intelligence Committee, other relevant Committees, this one is certainly relevant, 

for the time certain that I think you are speaking of. Do you think 

that is what we need to move on as quickly as possible, that we 

would have immediate investigatory hearings in this body right 

now, subpoena records or ask for records to determine what happened in the last 48 hours? 

Mr. SACHS. I think—I hope you go into evening session to do that 

this evening, because in real time, this country is at profound risk. 

A President’s whereabouts are not known, his physical safety is not 

known, and his story is being suppressed, I fear. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think it is appropriate because we are 

a democracy that we should determine whether the CIA was actively involved in both a coup d’etat and a deposing of a democratically-elected President? 

Mr. SACHS. I most certainly do, especially because it looks like 

the CIA had its fingerprints all over the 1991 coup, and as Santayana said, if you do not learn from the past, you are doomed to repeat it. And we may be in the middle of repeating it right now, because when the Congressional Black Caucus 13 years ago asked for 

an investigation, it was just laughed off, and we are back again, 

with all of the fingerprints once again there. So, yes, this is urgent. 

This is not just theoretical. 

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Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me get another question to you, because 

you are so knowledgeable. The good Ambassador Marville said it 

would have been dumber than dumb to go against Barbados. Unfortunately, Haiti is a victim, a small victim, a victim without a 

military that the duly-elected democratic military President yielded, if you will, and made a decision to be as peaceful as he could. 

Have we not damaged—based on Grenada and other interaction 

with CARICOM—have we not drastically damaged the relationship 

between the United States and CARICOM, which offered a peace 

settlement of which the President of Haiti agreed to and the 

United States gave no, if you will, both military support or political 

support to that, even though they were a member of the United 

Nations Security Council that voted to go with CARICOM’s offer of 

peace and resolution and diplomatic solution? Did we not or have 

we not drastically violated our relationship with CARICOM and 

that cohesion in between the Western Hemisphere? 

Mr. WELLER [presiding]. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would the gentleman be able to answer, Mr. 

Chairman? 

Mr. WELLER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman’s time having expired does not mean that we do not allow witnesses to answer. So 

I would urge the witness to be able to answer. 

Mr. WELLER. With all due respect to my good friend from New 

Jersey, this is the rule we have been following. We have cut off witnesses before, including the Assistant Secretary of State. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, we have let them make introductory answers. 

Mr. WELLER. The gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Is the gentleman not permitted to answer? At 

this stage you are going to be abrupt? I would let the gentleman 

have—I ask unanimous consent to let the gentleman have 1 minute 

to give an answer. 

Mr. WELLER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. We have cut 

off other witnesses. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask unanimous consent for 1 minute to let the 

gentleman answer. 

Mr. WELLER. The gentleman has 1 minute. 

Mr. SACHS. I will just take 15 seconds. The CARICOM leadership 

is aghast at what happened and believes that democracy in the 

whole region has been jeopardized and is continuing to be jeopardized until the situation is properly restored on a constitutional 

basis. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. WELLER. The gentlewoman from the Virgin Islands is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. I, like Congressman Meeks, was 

remiss in not thanking the Committee for allowing those of us who 

are not on the Committee to participate in what has been a very 

important hearing. 

I just want to follow up on the last question from my colleague, 

Ms. Jackson Lee, because I had asked the question of Secretary 

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Noriega regarding our country’s unilateral decision to move ahead, 

having been in agreement with CARICOM. I was just informed 

that CARICOM held a press conference not more than 2 hours ago, 

and the essence of what their statement was is that CARICOM 

does not accept the removal of Aristide; demands the immediate return of the democratic Government of Haiti; that they demand an 

impartial, transparent investigation by the U.N. into the circumstances surrounding his removal; and that they will have no 

dealings with the so-called Government of Haiti. 

So if you would like to just expand on the question about the deterioration in whatever was left of the relationship between our 

country and our closest neighbors, our third border, I will let you 

go ahead. 

Mr. SACHS. I think CARICOM leaders are very frightened about 

a President in their region being carried off by a U.S. airplane in 

the middle of the night under threat of death, being told that if he 

does not get on the plane with a handed resignation, his family will 

be killed, and then taken to the Central African Republic without 

knowing where he is going. That has made some of the leaders 

nervous. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. SACHS. It should scare the wits out of them. 

Mr. MAGUIRE. Could I just add one thing here? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Sure. 

Mr. MAGUIRE. I am not surprised that people in Jamaica would 

be nervous. If we go back just a decade or 2, we did have occasions 

in Jamaica where the opposition boycotted the elections, as the opposition in Haiti did in November 2000. So there has got to be kind 

of a reverberation of deja vu again, I will use that term, among 

Haiti’s neighbors. And I do think that we need to listen carefully 

to Haiti’s neighbors. As I have said, you know, when Haiti sneezes, 

Florida catches a cold, but the neighbors catch the flu. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Right. And we are one of those neighbors. 

I do not have any further questions. I did not make an opening 

statement, and I would just like to close by saying to Mr. Paquiot 

that, you know, I regret hearing about and seeing your grave misfortune and injuries, but especially so because our country abandoned Haiti, as you have heard so clearly, and allowed this to happen. And so you are really a victim at the very least of our omission or failure to act, but at the worst our contributing towards, as 

we are uncovering this afternoon, our support of the opposition. 

It is interesting that we in the CBC have been criticized for focusing all of our attention on President Aristide the person, and if 

caring about our brother is something to criticize, well, I surely accept it. But the panel has reminded me, and I think it has made 

it very clear, that it is not us who brought the focus of our foreign 

policy toward Haiti or the crisis that we are now in, it is not us 

that brought that focus to Aristide, it is the U.S. Government, our 

leadership, who hated this man so much that they not only allowed 

the country to be destabilized by it, but they really fueled that destabilization and allowed the 8 million or so people of Haiti, who 

really believed in us, believed that we would help bring democracy 

and trusted us to do that, to suffer unnecessarily just to get rid of 

him. So I just wanted to make that statement. 

103

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Will the gentlewoman yield? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Sure, I will yield. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. First I would like to—I do not know if it is 

appropriate; I am not a Member of the Committee. Am I allowed 

to ask unanimous consent to submit letters into the record? 

Mr. WELLER. Yes, without objection. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding, and I 

just have one brief question to——

Mr. WELLER. If the gentlewoman would yield, another Member 

of the Committee can submit it into the record for you at your request. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I just—you wanted to ask a question? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Would the gentlewoman yield to me? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Sure. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask unanimous consent to include in the record 

letters written by Ms. Jackson Lee to Leader Pelosi and Speaker 

Hastert. 

Mr. WELLER. Without objection. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Are you still yielding? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Go ahead. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I just have a quick question, Mr. Sachs, on the 

asylum question. Does it not appear to you from your study to be 

a dual standard that we have already said this is a tumultuous 

condition in Haiti, and that we are not allowing or do not seem to 

be allowing Haitians to apply for asylum here in the United States? 

Mr. SACHS. It is quite shocking and obviously very locally driven 

politically and very painful to watch. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I want to just use my last second to thank 

you all for staying, for your patience, and for your commitment to 

bringing some truth and clarity to this issue. 

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I just want to take the 

opportunity to thank Chairman Ballenger for the courtesies that he 

extended in this hearing, particularly to nonmembers of the Committee. We appreciate that. Obviously, there is a great deal of interest in this issue, and we appreciate the manner in which he conducted the hearing and the manner in which he gave opportunities 

to Members to make statements, ask questions, and we look forward to continuing opportunities to continue to pursue this issue 

in the days ahead. I just want to take this opportunity to thank 

the Chair. 

Mr. BALLENGER [presiding]. I would like to thank you guys for 

toughing it out the way you did, and, Mr. Paquiot, especially you, 

because of the physical condition that you are in and also to miss 

a plane. I am sure you all missed appointments that you had 

planned on. 

Mr. Maguire, I had notification last week that you were going to 

be on short notice and that you were going to have to leave, and 

I thank you kindly for sticking around, and I am sure Mr. Sachs 

had the same problem. 

Ms. WATERS. Would you thank Mr. Paquiot on behalf of all of us? 

Mr. BALLENGER. Yes. Mr. Paquiot, everybody thanks you for sacrificing your time and yourself for being able to participate in this. 

104

Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman and the Ranking Member, thank you 

for your comments. On behalf of those of us who have participated 

today, we particularly appreciate everyone who participated on our 

panel and for your patience. And to our two international visitors, 

thank you for the time that you have given to be here today. 

I ask unanimous consent for all Members to have 5 legislative 

days to revise and extend their remarks and submit written questions for the two panels for a response. 

Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned. 

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 7:25 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(105)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

I want to thank Chairman Ballenger and Ranking Democratic member Menendez 

for holding this hearing on Haiti. 

The crisis in Haiti is of great importance for this country and the international 

community. The situation in Haiti is of deep concern to many members of Congress, 

particularly members of the Congressional Black Caucus who worked so hard to restore Jean Bertrand Aristide to the Presidency to which he was elected by the people of Haiti. 

Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, including myself, met with Secretary 

of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, and President 

Bush at the White House last week prior to the removal of Haitian President 

Aristide from power. 

We thought we were in agreement with the Administration on the importance of 

pursuing a negotiated agreement between President Aristide and the Opposition 

that would have achieved power-sharing and the completion of Aristide’s presidential term. This weekend, upon Aristide’s removal, we met with UN Secretary 

General Kofi Annan at the United Nations to request the engagement of the UN 

in the Haitian crisis. 

Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the members of this sub-committee 

and panel directly to offer my thoughts on the situation in Haiti. 

In reading the press, it is always interesting to see how easily right wing conservatives disparage the rule of law when it suits their purpose. 

Those who question the legitimacy of my call for an investigation into the facts 

and circumstances of the role of the US Government in effecting the forcible removal from office of the constitutionally elected President of Haiti accuse me of just 

wanting to be negative and critical of the President. 

I have been accused of using improper and inflammatory language. The truth is 

that what I am doing, through the use of appropriate and accurate language, is 

seeking to hold the Government of the United Sates accountable for its actions in 

Haiti over this past weekend. 

Isn’t this exactly what President Bush and his Administration claim to be doing 

in Iraq and elsewhere, promoting democracy and the rule of law? 

Let’s examine the facts and the language I have applied to them. 

I have asserted that the Government of the United States perpetrated a coup 

d’etat in Haiti on Saturday night and Sunday morning when the Deputy Chief of 

Mission went to the home of President Aristide with security forces and informed 

him that his enemies were at the gates and the United States was not prepared 

to defend him. 

As a result, he had two choices: either sign the letter of resignation conveniently 

prepared for his signature and accept an escorted departure from Haiti or refuse 

to sign the letter of resignation and face certain death in a matter of hours. 

What is a coup d’etat? It is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘‘a violent or illegal 

seizure of power.’’

In Haiti on Saturday night/Sunday morning the United States Government used 

the threat of violence against the constitutionally elected President of Haiti and his 

family to obtain his resignation and departure from Haiti before the end of his constitutionally determined term of office. That action, I maintain, meets the definition 

of a coup d’etat. 

What is a resignation? The Oxford dictionary says it is the act of voluntarily leaving or quitting a position. 

106

Is, as in Haiti on Saturday night/Sunday morning the United States Government 

obtained a signed letter of resignation under the threat of imminent violence and 

death as a consequence if the President did not sign, that a valid resignation, or 

was it obtained involuntarily by force and thus invalid? 

I have been accused of using irresponsible and inflammatory language in describing President Aristide’s forcible removal from office a ‘‘kidnapping.’’ An examination 

of the meaning of the word again justifies its use. What is ‘‘kidnapping?’’

The Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, says that ‘‘at common law, kidnapping 

is the forcible abduction or stealing and carrying away of a person from his own 

country to another.’’ On Saturday night/Sunday morning the United States Government engineered the forcible removal of the lawfully elected President of Haiti from 

his own country and arranged that he be carried away to another. President 

Aristide was indeed kidnapped and apparently by the Government of the United 

States. 

I maintain that I have described the role of the United States in the removal of 

Jean Bertrand Aristide from the Presidency of Haiti in violation of the constitution 

of Haiti and his forced exile accurately. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Early Sunday morning, Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was found to resign his office and went into exile. Thus, a tragic page has been turned in another 

sad chapter of the painful history of the world’s first Black independent nation. 

Americans should take no joy in what has occurred. They should be very concerned 

about what lies ahead, bearing in mind that whatever happens to Haiti from this 

point indirectly happens to America. 

More than 1,000 Haitians have sought refuge in the United States, only to be returned to their deeply troubled nation. More refugees are sure to come as the widespread looting, street violence, and killings already under way during the past week 

intensifies in the wake of Aristide’s departure. 

President Bush has sent in a contingent of U.S. Marines. Other nations are contributing troops to an international peacekeeping force authorized by the United Nations Security Council. 

Hopefully, these steps will quell the violence and anarchy. Hopefully, they will expedite the restoration of order and put into place a government acceptable to all 

Haitians. President Bush is staking a lot on hope. Unfortunately, hope is a poor 

substitute for policy—especially good policy. 

Which is why Americans should not take comfort in what has transpired, nor 

pride in the role of their own government. The Bush administration is deeply complacent in the ouster of a democratically elected president of an independent country. The long term interests of the American people as opposed to the immediate 

interests of the Bush Administration demand that todays congressional hearing on 

Haiti find answers to three questions: Why did developments in Haiti take the 

course they have? What are the implications of yet another U.S.-backed coup? 

Where will things go from here? 

While it cannot be said that Aristide played no role in the demise of his presidency, it is also true that withholding badly needed U.S. and international aid made 

it doubly difficult for the Aristide government to fulfill its responsibilities to the 

Haitian people. Over the past several weeks, as gangs of armed thugs, former torturers and death squad leaders, coup plotters, drug dealers, and convicted murderers—to paraphrase Colin Powell’s words, mounted an armed rebellion against 

the duly elected government, the Administration rejected Aristide’s call for international assistance. The Administration only supported the Caribbean Community’s 

(CARICOM) plan of action for resolving the crisis in response to intense pressure 

from the Congressional Black Caucus—a plan to which Aristide agreed but the opposition rejected. 

The Administration’s posture assured the opposition that it would not have to 

reach a compromise. They could simply hold out and let the thugs do their dirty 

work. In effect, the Administration promised to send in the marines if and only if 

Aristide resigned. Lacking sufficient internal forces to restore law and order, 

Aristide—facing the specter of revenge killings, more looting, and massive waves of 

refugees fleeing to the United States was given no choice. The Administration 

claims the resignation was consistent with Haiti’s constitution. That may be formally true, but in essence we are witnessing the 33rd coup d’etat in Haiti’s history—most of them engineered by the United States. 

107

The Administration suggests that the crisis was solely Aristide’s fault. It also accuses the ousted Haitian president of electoral fraud. I have been among those who 

criticized Aristide for autocratic governance, for failure to develop democratic institutions, and for insufficient steps to improve the material conditions of the Haitian 

people. 

But, in a democracy, elections should be the principal means by which leaders are 

replaced. Instead, President Bush has strengthen undemocratic and anti-democratic 

methods, while further weakening Haiti’s already fragile democratic institutions. 

Moreover, what exactly is the agenda of the opposition and of the armed rebels that 

our government tacitly supports? What costs will the American people incur? What 

will happened when the marines leave? What message are we sending to other 

countries in the hemisphere experiencing internal political difficulties? Will these 

nations be more or less inclined to tolerate dissent? 

What Haiti needs most is the rule of law and an orderly constitutional process. 

It urgently needs large scale humanitarian assistance in the form of food, clothing, 

medical care, and shelter. It also needs stability, sustained help in creating a coherent civil society, and a long term economic development commitment from the 

United States, the UN, CARICOM, the Organization of American States, and the 

international community. CARICOM is to be commended for its balanced approach 

to resolving this crisis. Let us hope the UN maintains a peacekeeping presence and 

when the time comes contributes election monitors. 

The Administration has once again demonstrated that it is fully capable of 

ousting a head of state that it does not like. It has shown itself to be far less capable 

when it comes to reconstruction and nation-building. Yet, it is precisely on these 

questions that once again the credibility of the United States hinges. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAXINE WATERS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

I have been to Haiti three times during the last two months, most recently, about 

ten days ago. It was clear to me that a coup d’etat was in progress, and I communicated my concerns to Secretary of State Colin Powell on a regular basis. As recently as a week ago, Secretary Powell had repeatedly stated that the United States 

would not call for the resignation of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the democratically-elected President of Haiti, or support any attempts to remove him from 

office. Yet, obviously, by this past weekend, the Bush Administration abandoned 

that position, reversed course, and pressured President Aristide to leave. 

What happened? Why would we not commit U.S. forces to stabilize the democratically-elected government of Haiti when we had no reluctance to commit those same 

forces once President Aristide was removed? Were the Haitian people less worthy 

of protection from violence and unrest when President Aristide was still in power? 

Were their circumstances any less dire? It appears that our government was perfectly content to let the Haitian people suffer the burdens of this violence and civil 

unrest until President Aristide’s departure was achieved. 

Perhaps this sheds some light on why Ambassador Roger Noriega, the Assistant 

Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs and the former chief of staff for Senator 

Jesse Helms, was permitted to pursue a policy of undermining President Aristide’s 

government for so many years. Ambassador Noriega has a long history of being 

aligned with the anti-Aristide business owners in Haiti and undermining the democratically-elected governments of Haiti. Ambassador Noriega has been working 

closely with the opposition in Haiti. The Ambassador’s statements throughout the 

political crisis that led to President Aristide’s removal have been extremely onesided. 

For several years, the United States blocked $145.9 million in development loans 

to Haiti by the Inter-American Development Bank. These loans were supposed to 

fund health, basic education, rural road development, potable water and sanitation 

programs, but the United States government prevented the money from ever going 

to Haiti until the Congressional Black Caucus intervened last year. Denying Haiti 

access to basic development assistance undermined the ability of the elected government of Haiti to serve the needs of its people and further impoverished a poor population. 

The United States government also helped to organize and train the political opposition in Haiti. The International Republican Institute (IRI) has been providing 

the opposition training for political party development, communications strategies, 

public opinion polling, web site development and public outreach. IRI has a blatantly partisan approach. It trains opposition groups but flatly refuses to work with 

Lavalas party members or other supporters of President Aristide. IRI’s Haiti ProVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
108

gram is funded by American taxpayers through the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). IRI is currently operating under a two-year grant from 

USAID obtained in late 2002. 

While I was in Haiti, I met with leaders of the opposition, including Andre Apaid, 

the leader of the Group of 184. Unfortunately, Andre Apaid is not the democratic 

leader that the Administration would have us believe. Andre Apaid was a Duvaliersupporter, who allegedly holds an American passport and operates sweatshops in 

Haiti. Andre Apaid refused to accept the CARICOM proposal as the basis for negotiations to resolve the political crisis. He repeatedly rejected President Aristide’s 

offer to negotiate, and he refused to participate in any negotiations whatsoever. 

The opposition has accused President Aristide of drug trafficking and corruption. 

Yet when asked for documentation, they have not been able to produce anything 

more than rumors, innuendos and allegations. No one has ever identified any money 

allegedly stolen by President Aristide. 

President Aristide has given the United States special authority to assist with 

drug interdiction efforts by allowing the United States to interdict drugs in Haitian 

waters. The government of Haiti does not have the resources needed to wage a 

tough and consistent war against drugs, and the President of Haiti begged the 

United States for assistance to eliminate drug trafficking. 

Many of the thugs that took over Haiti in the last few weeks are former members 

of the Haitian military or members of the feared death squad known as the Front 

for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH). FRAPH members were responsible for numerous human rights violations during the three years following the 

coup d’etat in 1991. Guy Philippe, who yesterday declared himself the new chief of 

Haiti’s military, is a former police chief and military officer, who was accused of a 

previous coup attempt in 2002. Louis Jodel Chamblain, was a leader of FRAPH and 

was convicted in abstentia for his role in a 1994 massacre. He has also been accused 

of drug trafficking. 

When President Aristide disbanded the Haitian military following his return to 

Haiti in 1994, the former military officers were never disarmed. Many simply went 

over the border into the Dominican Republic, taking their M–1 and M–14 weapons 

with them. 

I am especially concerned by the possibility that the U.S. government may have 

armed and trained the former military officers and death squad leaders who carried 

out last Sunday’s coup. In 2002, the United States supplied M–16’s to the Dominican Republic, supposedly for use along the Haitian border, and stationed 900 U.S. 

troops alongside Dominican guards at the border. Many of the thugs that have 

taken over Haiti are now armed with M–16’s. The U.S. government must investigate 

how these thugs were armed and explain how the M–16’s got into their hands. 

The United States has also maintained a ban on weapons sales to Haiti. This has 

left the Haitian police force ill-equipped to maintain law and order in the face of 

groups of armed thugs, former military officers and death squad members. The people of the city of St. Marc placed boxes, rocks and cars in the roads to protect themselves from the approaching paramilitary groups. The Administration should explain why this ban on weapons sales was maintained against Haiti throughout 

President Aristide’s term in office. 

Once the thugs had completely surrounded Port-au-Prince, President Aristide was 

forced to leave Haiti. President Aristide called me on Monday morning and told me 

that Luis G. Moreno, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Port-auPrince, came to his home in the wee hours of the morning with other diplomats and 

U.S. Marines. He said he was told to leave, and leave now, or he and many Haitians 

would be killed. He said he was kidnaped. 

This certainly has the appearance of a coup. 

I demand that this Administration explain how they allowed a democraticallyelected government to be overthrown by a group of heavily-armed thugs. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE ROGER F. NORIEGA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR

THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Question: 

I agree that there were many problems with Aristide’s government but also strongly 

believe in democratic and diplomatic solutions and that the US approach was neither of these. It seems to me that nothing Aristide did would have been enough to 

bring the opposition to negotiate. In hindsight, as the world’s superpower working 

with the poorest country in the hemisphere, is there anything the US could have done 

109

to compel the opposition to come to the negotiating plan such that a peaceful and 

democratic solution involving all political leaders could have been reached? 

Response: 

The U.S. worked with the United Nations (UN), the Organization of American 

States, (OAS), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to attempt to resolve the 

political crisis in Haiti. We did everything we could to bring the two sides to the 

table, but Aristide had engendered the distrust of the opposition in the political 

process. His manipulation of violence against the opposition led them to doubt the 

viability of any power-sharing government led by Aristide. In addition, Aristide had 

previously refused to take part in any attempts to create a legitimate power sharing 

government. The opposition and civic society leaders would not engage in an electoral process without good faith actions from Aristide to guarantee their security. 

Aristide never took these steps. 

Question: 

It seems that all sorts of sordid figures are coming out of the woodwork to rule 

in Haiti. Guy Phillipe has taken over the armed forces and is insisting on a role in 

Haiti’s future, Baby Doc wants to return, and Danny Toussaint wants to run for 

President. What is our current plan for Haiti and will these people be allowed to take 

office? 

Response: 

We have been very clear with the interim Government of Haiti that there can be 

no role in government or the police for anybody who espouses political violence or 

has committed crimes or human rights abuses in the past. We also encourage the 

Government of Haiti to pursue justice for any criminal acts through the judicial system. 

We are working with the international community to assist Haiti in planning for 

its elections and in standing up its police force and justice system. The Administration expects to play a role, defined in the context of the other donors in the international community, in Haiti’s reconstruction over the next several years to help restore the capacity to govern, develop a professional and independent police force, 

promote economic development, and support free and fair elections. 

Question: 

What is the Administration’s plan for the future of Haiti? How long do we plan 

on providing peacekeepers? What actions are being taken to protect the safety and 

security of innocent citizens in Haiti, in light of the growing threats to public order? 

What plans exist to help Haiti grow its economy and lift it from the extreme poverty 

it suffers under today? 

Response: 

The U.S. military is currently functioning as the lead nation of the Multinational 

Interim Force (MIF) authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1529. We expect 

that the MIF will be replaced by a UN peacekeeping operation on or about May 29. 

We are pressing the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to submit to the 

UN Security Council its report on recommendations for a follow-on UN peacekeeping force in Haiti. That report will form the basis for deliberations on a second 

UN Security Council Resolution to authorize a UN peacekeeping force for Haiti. 

The MIF in Haiti comprises approximately 3900 personnel from Canada, Chile, 

France and the United States. Its primary mission is to restore order and to support 

the Government of Haiti’s efforts to re-establish public security and stability. It is 

supporting the Haitian National Police in the disarmament of illegally armed civilians in accordance with Haitian law. Any illegally armed civilians encountered by 

presence patrols will be immediately disarmed to ensure force protection of the MIF. 

Threats to the protection of the MIF will not be tolerated. Additionally, when MIF 

personnel encounter any acts of violence, they will intervene to protect life. With 

the presence of the MIF, threats to public order have diminished markedly, although common crime remains an endemic problem in Haiti. 

Funding of economic growth programs in recent years has been limited to microfinance and hillside agriculture programs. While these have been successful in creating sustainable economic opportunities for the Haitians they have reached, they 

are not sufficient to address Haiti’s massive unemployment and economic stagnation. 

USAID is now considering reallocating some assistance to job creation programs 

through labor intensive public works to help Haiti re-cover from damage incurred 

during the political crisis that preceded former president Aristide’s resignation. 

110

However, these are necessarily a short-term solution. Sustained economic growth 

will only be achieved through private sector trade and investment. The U.S. has provided over $3 million in emergency aid since mid-February in ad- dition to the $55 million in regular assistance budgeted for fiscal year 2004. Since 

the Haitian government cleared its arrears to the Inter-American Development 

Bank (IDB), it has approved $398 million in loans. The IDB has distributed $47 million of this amount. All but $30 million of the remainder are project loans that will 

be disbursed as the projects are implemented, often 5 years or longer. These projects 

have potential to make a substantial contribution to Haiti’s long term development. 

Question: 

The International Republican Institute is said to have worked with opposition 

groups, which have not only vetoed the government’s attempts to call elections, but 

have refused to negotiate under CARICOM proposal, or the recent U.S. proposal. Exactly how much was given to IRI since 2000 to work with opposition groups? Did 

the IRI give this money to opposition groups? What groups were the recipients? Were 

any of the groups in the Dominican Republic? Did Stanley Lucas work with these 

groups in Haiti and/or in the Dominican Republic? 

Response: 

IRI’s current grant from USAID is a two-year program, begun in 2002, with an annual project budget of $600,000 per year. From 2000 to 2002, IRI undertook U.S.-

based assessments and planning for future activities in Haiti. This involved a few 

trips to Miami to discuss prospective activities with Haitian political leaders and 

members of the Haitian diaspora. 

Under its current grant, IRI provides training and education in basic skills of democracy, citizenship, and advocacy. Specifically, IRI training focuses on democratic 

political party development, and communications strategies (public opinion polling, 

web site development, public outreach). 

IRI does not provide financial assistance or material resources to any Haitian political party or group under this grant program. Participants in IRI training sessions 

receive no fees or payments; only their direct travel, lodging, and food expenses are 

covered. Since December 2002, IRI’s Haiti program has held 26 training sessions. 

IRI held these sessions in a large public hotel in Santo Domingo, the capital of the 

Dominican Republic, with direct oversight from USAID. IRI held sessions in the Dominican Republic based on its assessment that security risks in Port-au-Prince were 

too high. 

To foster a level playing field, IRI has concentrated efforts mostly on working with 

weaker political parties and disenfranchised constituencies such as women and 

youth. Under its USAID grant, IRI political party training is open to all parties 

committed to democratic principles. Political parties, groups, and individuals that 

support violence are not invited to IRI activities. Nor are individuals associated with 

the former Haitian military. In recent years, reports of links between elements of 

Fanmi Lavalas and acts of violence discouraged IRI from providing training for 

them. IRI has not offered or provided training for any groups based in the Dominican Republic. 

Stanley Lucas participated in IRI training session noted above held in the Dominican Republic, as part of the IRI Haiti program team. 

Question: 

What is the legal status of Emmanuel Toto Constant, former FRAPH leader? How 

did he come to reside in Queens, NY? Does he have CIA connections? Why isn’t he 

considered a risk to Haitians in NY? 

Response: 

Emmanuel ‘‘Toto’’ Constant arrived in the United States on a B–2 visitor’s visa 

in December 1994, at San Juan, Puerto Rico, with authorization to remain in the 

United States until June 23, 1995. The Department of State revoked his visa on 

February 14, 1995. In September 1995, a U.S. immigration judge issued a final 

order of removal to deport Constant to Haiti. In December 1995, Constant filed a 

constitutional tort action against the Secretary of State and the Attorney General 

seeking $50 million in damages. In June 1996, Constant settled his lawsuit. In August 1997, an assessment of the threat to Constant if he were returned to Haiti was 

prepared. Based on that assessment, reviewed by various government agencies, Constant was not returned to Haiti. There were concerns about Constant’s personal 

safety in Haiti, the inability of Haiti’s weak judicial system to guarantee a fair trial, 

and potential unrest if Constant were returned. 

In February 1998, Constant attempted to reopen his case to apply for asylum, but 

an Immigration Judge denied the motion. In September 2003, the Board of ImmiVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
111

gration Appeals upheld the denial. There are at the moment no pending appeals or 

known legal impediments to Constant’s removal. The Departments of State and 

Homeland Security are evaluating, in light of current country conditions, whether 

Constant may be removed to Haiti. 

We believe that Constant ended up in Queens because of the substantial Haitian 

community living in New York. 

If Constant were considered a threat to Haitians in New York, that would be a 

law enforcement matter, to be addressed by state authorities and the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

I have no knowledge of alleged connections between Constant and the CIA. 

Question: 

Noriega suggested that US intervention after the departure of Aristide saved American lives. It seems that pressuring the opposition to accept the CARICOM plan 

would have prevented American military from having to enter Haiti at all. Why was 

not pursuing the CARICOM plan, a peaceful and democratic solution, a safer plan 

for our military than going into Haiti after Aristide’s questioned ‘‘voluntary’’ resignation? 

Response: 

We worked with the international community to pursue a peaceful and democratic 

solution under the CARICOM plan. However, the armed rebel forces were intent on 

entering Port-au-Prince and ousting Aristide. These rebels would have marched on 

Port-au-Prince whether the political opposition had agreed to the CARICOM plan 

or not. Thousands of innocent Haitian citizens may have been killed in this environment. No one knows if they would have shared power with the political opposition. 

This would have been a coup d’etat. Aristide chose to resign and leave Haiti, which 

allowed for constitutional succession and for the international community to pursue 

the CARICOM plan. 

To put U.S. troops on the ground while Aristide was in the National Palace would 

have been seen by many Haitians, including the rebels, as U.S. support for the 

Aristide regime. It would have meant putting our troops in the middle of an armed 

insurgency caused by an unresolved political crisis, largely of Aristide’s own making. 

Armed insurgents would have viewed U.S. protection for Aristide as support for him 

and would have raised the risk to U.S. troops to an unacceptable level. When 

Aristide resigned, it became possible for U.S. troops to conduct stability operations 

without being between armed factions. 

Question: 

How does US involvement in what happened in Haiti impact the rest of the western hemisphere and how the world sees us? 

Response: 

I believe it demonstrates that the U.S. acted vigorously to protect the security and 

welfare of the Haitian people and that our commitment to the democratic process 

and economic well-being of Haitians remains as strong as ever. 

As in the past, the U.S. will continue to support UN, OAS, and other efforts to 

re-establish a functioning democratic process, good governance, and economic development for the welfare of all Haitians. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE ARTHUR E. DEWEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Question: 

What is this Administration’s plan for the future of Haiti? How long do we plan 

on providing peacekeepers? What actions are being taken to protect the safety and 

security of innocent citizens in Haiti, in light of the growing threats to public order? 

What plans exist to help Haiti grow its economy and lift it from the extreme poverty 

it suffers under today? 

Answer: 

The Administration is working with the international community in the wake of 

the resignation of former President Aristide to ensure that the interim government 

proceeds in a constitutional, consensus-based manner to restore democratic governance, stability, and economic growth to Haiti. We are doing this by supporting the 

international plan of action endorsed in OAS Permanent Council Resolution 861 and 

112

by taking a leading role in the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which, pursuant 

to UN Security Council Resolution 1529, has helped the interim government to restore order and provide security. 

As of March 31, the MIF in Haiti totaled over 3,600 uniformed personnel, including over 1,900 from the U.S. UNSCR 1529 provided a 90-day mandate for the MIF 

and declared the willingness of the Security Council to establish a follow-on UN stabilization force. In addition to protection of dignitaries, static protection of key facilities, and roving patrols, the MIF has extended its operations to the north, central, 

and southern regions of Haiti as well as Port-au-Prince. It is also supporting the 

efforts of the Haitian National Police to disarm those who have illegal firearms. The United States has provided $3.3 million in emergency assistance to Haiti 

since February 18, when the U.S. Embassy issued a disaster declaration for Haiti. 

The U.S. remains the largest donor of bilateral assistance to Haiti, and plans to provide at least $55 million under ongoing assistance programs in FY 2004. The U.S. 

is examining how assistance can be re-oriented to address Haiti’s needs for security 

and economic growth. 

The U.S. is by far Haiti’s largest trading partner and foreign investor. Haiti is 

a beneficiary of the U.S. Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and Generalized 

System of Preferences. 

Question: 

Our government has been very clear in stating that it will not accept Haitian refugees and repatriated an estimated 1,000 Haitians that have recently fled. It is unconscionable that our government would force innocent people back into the midst of an 

unavoidable armed conflict when it is clear that conditions are dangerous. Because 

there clearly exists extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent 

these nationals from returning in safety. I believe it is necessary to grant Temporary 

Protected Status to Haitian refugees that reach our shores. Also, why are we not 

working with UNHCR as we have in the past to offer Haitians fleeing the conflict 

‘‘temporary protection?’’

Answer: 

First, it is important to clarify that, per standing U.S. policy, during the recent 

unrest in Haiti, all migrants who expressed concern about returning to Haiti were 

interviewed by a trained protection officer from the Department of Homeland Security. The migrants were given a full opportunity to detail their fears, and the United 

States did not repatriate any migrants who were determined to qualify as refugees. 

With respect to Temporary Protected Status (TPS), Congress has provided specific, narrow criteria for TPS designations. After consultation with the appropriate 

government agencies, the Secretary of DHS may designate a foreign state for TPS 

based upon: (1) an ongoing armed conflict that poses a serious threat to the safety 

of returning nationals; (2) an environmental disaster that results in a substantial, 

but temporary, disruption of living conditions, or (3) extraordinary and temporary 

conditions that prevent a country’s nationals from safely returning to that country, 

unless the Secretary finds that such designation is contrary to the national interest 

of the United States. 

The United States is actively engaged in efforts to rebuild Haitian democracy. In 

addition, the United States has placed troops on the ground as the leading contingent of the multinational interim force authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1529, adopted unanimously on February 29, 2004. The level of violence in Haiti has significantly declined as a result. 

Given the efforts of the U.S. Government to improve the situation within Haiti, 

the Department of State does not think it appropriate to recommend to the Department of Homeland Security that it designate TPS for Haitians in the United States 

at this time. Nevertheless, we will continue to closely monitor events as they unfold. 

We maintain a strong working relationship with UNHCR and are its largest contributor. Earlier this year, we supported UNHCR’s decision to dispatch experts to 

assist several Caribbean countries, including Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and 

the Bahamas, in their preparations for a potential outflow of migrants in the region. 

We continue to consult closely with UNHCR on our response to potential outflows 

of migrants from Haiti and other countries in the region. In addition, we are continuing our discussions with UNHCR to find the best ways to assist the countries 

of the Caribbean in their preparation for potential outflows of migrants. 

Question: 

In the past, Haitian refugees were estimated to be in the tens of thousands and 

provisions were estimated to cost $1.9 million. What provisions if any do we already 

have in place if a mass exodus takes place? What plans if any do we have for a donor 

conference, such that, as with Iraq, the American taxpayers would not have to bare 

113

this burden alone? How much do you estimate that the international community 

would be willing to donate without a conference? 

Answer: 

The basic interagency responsibilities for a mass migration emergency are outlined in Executive Order 13276. All appropriate agencies are involved in routine 

comprehensive contingency planning for a unified response to a mass migration 

event for the Caribbean. Domestic funding responsibilities are considered a part of 

this planning. 

The World Bank held an informal meeting on March 23, 2004, for donor governments, international financial institutions, and international and regional organizations to exchange views on the situation in Haiti and agree on next steps to ensure 

a coordinated response to the short and medium-term needs of the country. In this 

context, donors welcomed the launch by the UN of a Flash Appeal for Haiti to address the urgent needs of the Haitian population in a coordinated manner. 

The World Bank reports that donors agreed to propose to the interim government 

the launch of a joint government/multi-donor assessment of the economic, social, 

and institutional needs in Haiti. The proposed assessment could result in the preparation of a carefully costed and coordinated national reconstruction plan covering 

both short-term and medium-term programs. The assessment would build on the ongoing multi-disciplinary rapid assessment mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1529 to evaluate security, humanitarian, and transitional needs. 

Donors also agreed to propose to the interim government to reconvene in Portau-Prince in three to four weeks to discuss the government’s policy priorities and 

the objectives of the proposed needs assessment mission and to agree on next steps. 

One of the next steps could be a formal Donor’s conference, which could be held in 

a few months. 

The informal donor’s meeting on Haiti was attended by high-level delegations 

from Canada, the CARICOM Secretariat, Chile, the European Commission, France, 

Germany, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Organization of 

la Fracophonie, the International Organization for Migration, the International 

Monetary Fund, Japan, the Organization of American States, the Pan American 

Health Organization, Spain, the United States, UNDP, UNDPKO, UNOCHA, 

UNICEF, the World Bank, and the World Food Program. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE ADOLFO A. FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE

GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW

YORK

Question: 

What is this Administration’s plan for Haiti? How long do we plan on providing 

peacekeepers? What actions are being taken to protect the safety and security of innocent citizens in Haiti, in light of the growing threats to public order? 

Answer: 

The U.S. is providing troops to the Multinational Interim Force (scheduled to be 

in Haiti for 90 days), which will then be replaced by a United Nations Peacekeeping 

Operation. The Multinational Interim Force is working to contribute to a secure and 

stable environment in Haiti. The situation in Haiti is returning to normal, with 

many schools, banks, hospitals, and stores reopening. 

The Department of State is in a better position to provide an update on the status 

of the Multinational Interim Force and the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. 

Question: 

What plans exist to help Haiti grow its economy and lift it from the extreme poverty it suffers under today? 

Answer: 

USAID is continuing its activities in Haiti and has a substantial development and 

humanitarian network of partners already on the ground. The USG has provided 

over $3 million dollars in emergency assistance in the last few weeks. Of that 

amount more than $2 million is from USAID and the remainder from State/PRM. 

The planned FY 2004 budget available for economic growth, democracy, health, 

and food assistance activities in Haiti is now approximately $52 million. We are currently working with other donors to identify additional assistance resources. USAID/

Haiti’s Draft Emergency Response Plan, currently under development, envisions 

114

three phases: (1) Immediate Response (next 6 months), (2) Intermediate Stabilization (months 7–12), and (3) Strategic Development (months 13–24).

• Under the Immediate Response phase, chief priorities are job creation and delivery of critical health and humanitarian services. Illustrative activities 

would include: (1) jobs programs to help rebuild the nation’s badly eroded infrastructure; (2) community water and sanitation programs; (3) human rights 

monitoring; and (4) provision of humanitarian assistance, especially health 

services.

• The second phase of Intermediate Stabilization would emphasize: (1) improved health service delivery; (2) returning children to primary school; (3) 

expanding agriculture, trade, and microfinance activities; and (4) continued 

job creation, municipal development, and increased investment.

• After one year of intensive donor response, our programs should begin to 

transition from emergency post-crisis activities to the third phase of longer 

term strategic development activities. During this period the program would 

concentrate on further institutional strengthening, longer term expansion of 

export agriculture, trade, investment and education. Our health and humanitarian programs would, of course, still continue. 

Question: 

In the past, Haitian refugees were estimated to be in the tens of thousands and 

provisions were estimated to cost $1.9 million. What provisions if any do we already 

have in place if a mass exodus takes place? 

Answer: 

The Coast Guard is continuing to monitor the situation closely and is cooperating 

with the Haitian Coast Guard. There have been no new interdictions of Haitians 

by the U.S. since February 27. Out migration is not viewed as a serious problem 

at this time. 

Question: 

What plans if any do we have for a donor conference, such that, as with Iraq, the 

American taxpayers would not have to bar this burden alone? How much do you estimate that the international community would be willing to donate without a conference? 

Answer: 

Donors have scheduled a meeting with the Haitian interim government in Portau-Prince on April 22 to discuss the government’s policy priorities, the objectives of 

a proposed needs assessment mission, and to agree on next steps, which will include 

a donor meeting to pledge funds. 

Question: 

According to assessments issued by Oxfam International over 140,000 people in 

Haiti have no access to clean water, many more are short on food, and the threat 

of disease due to poor sanitation is growing. Oxfam warned that unless a secure environment is created so that humanitarian aid can be delivered, Haiti will be facing 

a humanitarian crisis. Will this Administration increase humanitarian aid to Haiti 

and how will it ensure that that aid reaches those it is intended to help? 

Answer: 

Contrary to reports, food supplies are not scarce in Haiti. However, security and 

fuel shortages in certain areas of the country remain a problem for food distribution. 

USAID continues to closely monitor food stocks in country and has been active in 

providing medicines and supplies. USAID food cooperating sponsors are all working 

at capacity to make sure that food aid supplies continue to reach those most in 

need. 

USAID is distributing emergency relief supplies, including 12 medical kits each 

of which will serve 10,000 people for approximately three months, as well as 3 surgical kits and additional medical supplies. We are planning for an additional 10 

medical kits under the Draft Haiti Emergency response Plan being prepared by the 

USAID mission. 

We are also working through our NGOs to provide emergency cash grants to support local institutions and provide services for the most vulnerable populations. 

After providing UNICEF early on with support for emergency vaccines, USAID also 

will support UNICEF’s expanded program on immunizations activities and securing 

the cold chain. USAID has emergency air transport to conduct assessments and deliver relief supplies in several regions. 

115

Under the Draft Haiti Emergency Response Plan, USAID has proposed several 

kinds of water purification methods, from the emergency tablet distribution, to more 

sustainable locally assembled water purification tanks for villages, with chlorine 

and other purification methods. 

USAID also plans to make available, under the Emergency Response Plan, 

3,000,000 packets of ORT salts, since diarrheal diseases, endemic in Haiti and a 

major threat to the lives of those under five years of age, are on the rise, and clean, 

potable water is in shorter and shorter supply. 

Question: 

Will U.S. peacekeepers be used to provide safe passage to relief workers and aid? 

Answer: 

The Multinational Force has deployed beyond the capital and our partners who 

implement our food programs in Haiti are assessing damages incurred during the 

last few weeks and are beginning to resume operations. 

Question: 

Quality of life in the hemisphere’s poorest country is abysmal. According to USAID 

estimates for FY04, approximately 80 percent of the population lives on less that $2 

per day; nearly half of Haiti’s people are illiterate; and life expectancy is 53. How 

does the Administration reconcile the vast needs of Haiti against the atrophied requests in the core development accounts for the Caribbean country? How will much 

needed development programs in Haiti be affected by these cuts? 

Answer: 

The U.S. Government through USAID is Haiti’s largest bilateral donor. From FY 

1995 to 2003, USAID provided a total of $850 million in direct bilateral assistance. 

For FY 2004, USAID has initially planned $52 million in assistance in the areas 

of health, democracy and governance, education, and economic growth. This planning level, developed as part of the budget cycle two years ago, does show a reduction in the economic growth sector in response to a lack of commitment by the Haitian government to reform. However, at that time, this was counterbalanced with 

increases in the levels dedicated to HIV/AIDS and other health programs in recognition of the needs of the Haitian people. Under the Draft Emergency Response Plan, 

efforts will be made to identify additional resources to expand health and education 

programs and increase income earning opportunities, both through short-term jobs 

programs as well as long-term sustainable income generating opportunities generated microenterprise, investment promotion, and trade. 

Question: 

Moreover, given the importance that the U.S. had place on the role of the OAS in 

Haiti, what is the reasoning behind reducing the request for the OAS Special Mission 

in Haiti from almost $5 million in FY04 to zero in FY05? 

Answer: 

The Department of State is in a better position to answer questions pertaining 

to the OAS. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2003

Haiti 

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 

FEBRUARY 25, 2004

HAITI

Haiti is a republic with an elected president and a bicameral legislature. The 1987 

Constitution remains in force, but many of its provisions were not respected in practice. The opposition parties boycotted the 2000 presidential elections, in which JeanBertrand Aristide was reelected with extremely low voter turnout. The political impasse and political violence stemming from controversial results of May 2000 legislative and local elections continued during the year. In September 2002, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted Resolution 822 as a catalyst for resolving 

the political impasse. Included in the resolution was a provision calling for a legitimate Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), which was to be charged with planning 

local, municipal, and legislative elections during the year; however, the elections 

were never held. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, 

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it is not independent in practice and remained largely weak and corrupt, as well 

as subject to interference by the executive and legislative branches. 

The Government established the Haitian National Police (HNP) in 1995 as the 

sole security force in the country after disbanding the Armed Forces of Haiti 

(FAd’H). The HNP is officially an autonomous civilian institution; however, authorities did not maintain effective control of the security forces, and HNP officials at 

all levels were implicated in corruption and narcotics trafficking. Partisan political 

leaders increasingly exercised control over elements of the police and influenced it 

for personal or political gain. President Aristide filled many key HNP positions with 

political allies lacking experience, training, and credibility. Some parliamentarians, 

mayors, and members of local government councils (CASECs) exercised arrest authority without legal sanction. The HNP has a variety of specialized units, including 

a crisis response unit (SWAT); a crowd control unit (CIMOs) serving Port-au-Prince 

and the Western department; crowd control units (UDMOs) serving each of the remaining eight departments; Special Brigades (BS) attached to certain 

commissariats; and a small Coast Guard unit. Police ‘‘attaches’’ became increasingly 

prevalent throughout the country and particularly in certain commissariats. The 

large and well-funded Presidential Security Unit, officially part of the HNP, had its 

own budget and remained administratively and functionally independent. Civilian 

deaths and serious injuries resulted from the inability of HNP units to maintain 

order. Members of the security forces committed human rights abuses during the 

year. 

The country has a market-based economy and state-controlled utilities, and its 

economic stagnation continued during the year due to the continuing political crisis 

and the petroleum price shocks experienced in the second quarter. A small elite controlled much of the country’s wealth. Two-thirds of the estimated 8 million citizens 

worked in subsistence agriculture and were extremely poor. The informal sector accounted for approximately 70 percent of all economic activity, making taxation problematic. Remittances from Haitians living overseas, estimated at $931 million in 

2002, were a growing revenue source. Textiles accounted for approximately 80 percent of recorded exports; assembled goods, leather goods, agricultural products, and 

handicrafts also provided limited export revenue. The Haitian Institute for Statistics 

calculated real GDP growth of 0.5 percent for the fiscal year, compared with negative growth of 0.9 percent for fiscal year 2002. Inflation was 42.5 percent for the 

fiscal year, compared with 10.7 percent for fiscal year 2002, largely reflecting the 

adjustment in fuel prices to world market rates and the decline in the value of the 

gourde. By year’s end, inflation had subsided to an annualized rate in the low teens. 

The Government’s human rights record remained poor, with political and civil officials implicated in serious abuses. There were credible reports of extrajudicial 

killings by members of the HNP. Police officers used excessive—and sometimes 

deadly—force in making arrests or controlling demonstrations and were rarely punished for such acts. Attacks on and threats to journalists and political dissenters by 

members of Popular Organizations (OPs) and by supporters of the President’s party, 

Fanmi Lavalas (FL), increased. Prison conditions remained poor, and prisoners with 

valid release orders continued to be held in defiance of these orders. Legal impunity 

remained a major problem, and police and judicial officials often failed to respect 

legal provisions or pursue and prosecute suspected violators. The media were largely 

free and often critical of the Government; however, most journalists practiced some 

form of self-censorship. Child abuse, violence, and societal discrimination against 

women remained problems. Internal trafficking of children and child domestic labor 

remained a problem; however, the Government increased its efforts to address the 

issue. 

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From: 

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.—There were credible reports of 

extrajudicial killings by members of the HNP, municipal government officials, and 

civilian attaches (see Section 1.d.) associated with HNP commissariats. 

Individuals involved in the State University protest movement that began in August 2002 continued to be victims of violence and human rights violations. On January 7, assailants shot and killed Eric Pierre, a 27-year-old medical student, while 

leaving the Faculty of Medicine building. The authorities did not arrest anyone in 

connection with his death, despite witnesses’ allegations that the attackers left the 

scene in two vehicles, one with official license plates and the other with the state 

telephone company logo on the side. 

On January 8, police shot and killed an anti-government demonstrator as they 

were breaking up a demonstration in Gonaives. Jean-Dady Simeon, HNP spokesVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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person, claimed that the man was already dead when police intervened (see Section 

2.b.). 

On January 27, armed men shot and killed 17-year-old John Peter Ancy Oleus 

in Carrefour under orders from the wife of the Police Commissioner of Jacmel, Mrs. 

Cadet. As John Peter and Cadet were arguing over the Oleus family’s garbage disposal near her home, Cadet summoned six armed men, one of whom shot and killed 

Oleus as he ran to lock the front door of his house to protect his sisters inside. The 

authorities arrested Cadet soon after the crime was committed, but State Prosecutor 

Josue Pierre Louis released her the following day. Louis claimed that he had to follow the ‘‘hierarchy of respect,’’ and that he was simply following orders from the 

Justice Minister. At year’s end, no one had been held responsible for Oleus’ death. 

On February 4, a group of armed men shot and killed Ronuald Cadet, another 

student involved in State University demonstrations who had been in hiding since 

November 2002. This case, remained unsolved at year’s end. 

On March 27, in Petit-Goave, a police bullet grazed 21-year-old Ginette Pierre, 

who was believed to be the daughter of a Convergence leader whom the police 

planned to arrest. After she fell to the ground, the officers put their car in reverse 

and ran over the woman’s head, killing her instantly. The Government provided 

funds for her wake and funeral, but took no action against the police officers responsible for her death. 

On May 18, a civilian attache from the Commissariat in Hinche killed Josue 

Telusme. On July 8, attaches from Delmas 33 Commissariat riding in a HNP vehicle 

killed Leon Regois and discarded his body at the State University Hospital. 

In October, Municipal Commissaire for Hinche Neguippe Simon shot and killed 

a woman who accidentally struck his vehicle with a rock during a domestic dispute. 

Following the incident, Simon disappeared, but was later arrested, then inexplicably 

released from jail while pending trial in December and was promoted into higher 

ranks of the HNP leadership. 

On October 21, police in Gonaives broke up an anti-Aristide march by the civil 

society coalition group Union Citoyenne. Police arrested several opposition members 

participating in the march. Police, in concert with pro-Lavalas ‘‘chimeres’’ (thugs) 

threw rocks and bottles, preventing the demonstration from taking place; one person 

was shot and killed and several others were injured. 

Sparked by the death of Cannibal Army head Amiot ‘‘Cubain’’ Metayer (see Sections 1.b. and 3), several weeks of intense violence between police and Cannibal 

Army members were brought to a climax in Gonaives from October 26 to 28. On 

October 26, Cannibal Army members attacked the home of the Government’s representative in Gonaives, Ketlin Telemaque, and burned one of the mayor’s vehicles 

as police responded in kind. Following an attack on the main police commissariat, 

a gun battle between the police and gang members led to the death of a 12-yearold girl and the injuring of the Departmental Police Director. 

From October 27 to 28, police and civilian chimeres mounted a major offensive 

on the gang-controlled section of Raboteau, Gonaives. While attempting to locate 

and arrest Cannibal Army members, police burned 10 homes in Raboteau, arrested 

area residents, and slaughtered livestock. Police efforts were unsuccessful, as the 

operation only netted civilians not involved with the Cannibal Army. During the 

siege, a newborn baby was burned to death, a woman was killed, and two other civilians were shot and injured. Reports estimated that there were as many as 50 

dead and 80 injured civilians in Gonaives from September through December due 

to the continued violence. 

In May, following a hearing before the Court of Appeals, Deputy Jocelyn Saint 

Louis of Saint Raphael, who was arrested for his alleged role in the January 2002 

murder of mayor Sernand Severe, was released. 

In December 2002, armed men dressed in black identified as HNP took three 

brothers, Angelot, Andy Philippe, and Vladimir Sanon, from their home in Carrefour 

in Port-au-Prince (see Section 1.c.). Later that day their bodies were found with gunshot wounds and taken to the city morgue. The boys had previously protested the 

police robbery and shooting of their friend, Marcellus Bongue. The authorities had 

not arrested anybody, and no examining judge had questioned any of the four policemen whom eyewitnesses identified as the last persons seen with the brothers. The 

police officers and the civilian attache from the Carrefour Commissariat suspected 

in the killing of the three brothers had not been brought to justice and were still 

working in that commissariat at year’s end. 

There was no progress in several other killings that occurred during 2002, including those of the three youths from Cite Soleil, a farmer in the town of Hinche, and 

four persons killed in an attack on the Las Cahobas jail. 

In September 2002, an investigating judge indicted 10 persons in connection with 

the 2001 killing of journalist Brignol Lindor; however, he did not indict Petit Goave 

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deputy mayor Duby Bony, who allegedly incited the killing when he said Lindor 

should be met with ‘‘zero tolerance’’ (a code word for officially sanctioned killings). 

Out of 27 warrants issued, the authorities arrested only 3 individuals in connection 

with Lindor’s death. Judge Fritzner Duclair determined that the mayor’s call did 

not incite the killing and failed to include the mayor or other local government officials who publicly called for retribution against Lindor (see Section 2.a.). By the end 

of January, only one person, Masee Zephir, remained in prison awaiting trial. 

On March 24, almost 3 years after the killing of popular Radio Haiti-Inter host 

and journalist Jean Leopold Dominique, Judge Bernard Sainvil issued the final report on his investigation of the journalist’s death. The report, criticized by the 

human rights community for its failure to identify the true authors of the crime, 

widely suspected to be high-ranking government officials, implicated six men: 

Dymsley Milien, alias ‘‘Tilou,’’ for the actual murder, and five others who have already been in jail for more than 2 years as accomplices. Although Senator Dany 

Toussaint implicated former deputy mayor of Port-au-Prince Harold Severe during 

Toussaint’s interrogation in January, in the final report, Severe was neither cleared 

nor implicated in Dominique’s death. In August, Judge Jean Bien-Aime released 

three of the men incarcerated for the crime: Freud Junior Desmarates, Ralph Joseph, and Ralph Leger. 

On January 27, the HNP took into custody Herbert Valmond and Carl Dorelien, 

both former FAd’H colonels returned to the country as criminal deportees. They 

were turned over to a special police unit who took them to the national penitentiary, 

where they remained at year’s end. On January 29, Justice Minister Calixte 

Delatour announced that the two would be serving life sentences. In 2000, a criminal court in Gonaives had convicted Valmond and Dorelien in absentia, along with 

35 former military leaders, for premeditated homicide in connection with the 1994 

Raboteau massacre. 

Vigilante killings are a long established practice in the country, and their incidence increased following President Aristide’s zero tolerance exhortation to police 

and citizens to bypass the judicial system if they caught criminals in the act. During 

the year, human rights organizations, journalists, and opposition groups criticized 

the Government’s support for this practice.

b. Disappearance.—There were credible reports of politically motivated disappearances; however, there were fewer such reports than in the previous year. 

Attaches from Delmas 33 police station arrested Junior Jean and Mankes Anelus 

in front of their neighbors in June. The pair has since disappeared. 

On July 15, persons believed to be attaches from the Cap-Haitien Commissariat 

kidnapped Pierre Franklin Julien, father of Citizen’s Initiative founder Denis 

Julien, and held him for ransom. 

Ordonel Paul, a presidential palace employee and widely believed to be the man 

who betrayed Cannibal Army leader Amiot Metayer, was last seen with Metayer on 

September 21 (see Section 3). 

There were no further developments in the cases of disappearances reported in 

2002.

c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.—

The 1987 Constitution prohibits the use of unnecessary force or restraint, psychological pressure, or brutality by the security forces; however, members of the security forces continued to violate these provisions. Police officers used excessive and 

sometimes deadly force in making arrests or controlling demonstrations and were 

rarely punished for such acts. Torture and other forms of abuse were reported. 

Police mistreatment of suspects at the time of arrest and during detention remained common in all parts of the country. Beating with fists, sticks, belts, and 

‘‘kalot marassa’’—a severe boxing of the ears—were the most common form of abuse. 

Persons who reported such abuse often had visible injuries consistent with the alleged mistreatment. Mistreatment also took the form of withholding medical treatment from injured jail inmates. 

A police officer from the Commissariat in Hinche shot Joseline Desroses in the 

mouth after she refused his sexual advances. 

On July 14, the Brigade for Research and Intervention (BRI) arrested opposition 

militant Judie C. Roy and brought her to the National Police Academy, where she 

and three colleagues were tortured for 4 days before being transferred to the Delmas 

33 police station. While at Delmas 33, they claimed to have been tortured using the 

kalot marassa method and brutally beaten by civilian attaches before being transferred to Fort National prison. Roy was refused medical treatment and legal counsel 

upon her initial arrival at Fort National, but eventually was allowed to see a doctor 

and obtain a lawyer after protest from the National Coalition for Haitian Rights 

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(NCHR). Roy was eventually transferred to the Petionville police station where she 

remained at year’s end. 

On October 14, homeless 16-year-old Jonathan Louima was brutally beaten and 

tortured in the Port-au-Prince Police Commissariat. After being arrested, Louima 

was brought to the police station where police beat him and summoned dogs to bite 

him all over his body. He survived the attack, and HNP Chief Inspector Sainturne 

promised an investigation. At year’s end, no police officers had been held responsible 

for the attack. 

The police were accused of using excessive force against demonstrators and failing 

to protect demonstrators from violence by pro-Lavalas chimeres (see Section 2.b.). 

Prison conditions remained poor. The Penitentiary Administration Management 

(DAP) made some progress in improving prison administration and warden training. 

Prisoners and detainees continued to suffer from a lack of basic hygiene, malnutrition, poor quality health care, and, in some facilities, 24-hour confinement. Most 

prisons periodically suffered from lack of water, especially in the provinces. The incidence of preventable diseases such as beriberi, AIDS, and tuberculosis increased. 

Some prisoners who were incarcerated for petty crimes were given amnesty and released by the Ministry of Justice during the year. The Government estimated the 

total prison population to be 3,519, including 116 female and minor (male and female) prisoners. This figure changed somewhat on December 31, when President 

Aristide issued a decree giving full amnesty to common law criminals still awaiting 

trial, and commuted the sentences of 66 other prisoners. 

Overcrowding prevented the separation of violent from nonviolent prisoners or 

convicts from those in pretrial detention. Many were incarcerated in temporary 

holding cells, particularly in the provinces. 

Prison officials confirmed reports by international human rights observers of instances of inmate abuse by prison personnel; however, no statistics were available. 

Prisoners and detainees, ignorant of legal rights or doubtful officials would respond 

positively, rarely filed official complaints. 

The Government commission to investigate the 2001 riot at the National Penitentiary, the country’s largest prison facility located in Port-au-Prince, had not yet published a report of its findings. 

The Government’s Office of Citizen Protection monitored prison conditions and offered training to prison administrators on criminal procedures, particularly the constitutional requirement limiting preventive detention (garde a` vu) to 48 hours. The 

U.N. Development Program (UNDP) continued technical assistance to the DAP, focusing on midlevel warden training and management information. The NCHR actively monitored prison conditions in cooperation with the DAP, which offered a 

prisoners’ rights awareness campaign. 

The DAP conducted objective testing of prison physicians and nurses to exclude 

those who were inadequately trained. Doctors were available in the capital but were 

less frequently available to those incarcerated in the provinces. Nurses did not conduct daily checkups on the physical condition of inmates. Dispensary supplies were 

limited, and family members often had to purchase needed medication. 

Fort National prison in Port-au-Prince was the only prison facility exclusively for 

women and juveniles. In other prison facilities, women were held in cells separate 

from men. However, in 2000, U.N. Special Rapporteur for Violence against Women 

Radhika Coomaraswamy reported, based on her 1999 visit, that most female prisoners shared living quarters with male prisoners. This subjected women to violence 

and sexual abuse. Due to overcrowding, juveniles often were held with adults. 

On February 14, 18-year-old Natacha Jean Jacques was released from Fort National, following strong protests from civil society organizations. Jacques became 

pregnant during her incarceration at Fort National while serving time after being 

arrested in 2000 for killing the man who was raping her. A warrant was issued for 

the arrest of her rapist in jail, a medical assistant working at the prison, Ilus 

Denasty. At year’s end, he remained at large. 

The authorities freely permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC), the Haitian Red Cross, and other human rights groups to enter prisons and 

police stations, monitor conditions, and assist prisoners and detainees with medical 

care, food, and legal aid. The Director General of the HNP and the DAP cooperated 

with the ICRC and the UNDP.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.—The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces continued to employ both practices. The 

Constitution stipulates that a person may be arrested only if apprehended during 

the commission of a crime, or on the basis of a written order by a legally competent 

official, such as a justice of the peace or magistrate. The authorities can only execute these orders between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. and must bring the detainee before a judge within 48 hours of arrest. In practice, officials frequently ignored these 

120

provisions. There were also instances of arrests by security forces and local officials 

lacking proper authority; mayors and members of local CASECs sometimes arrested 

persons in under-policed rural areas. Judges often issued arrest warrants with little 

or no evidence. 

The HNP is officially an autonomous civilian institution; however, despite a cadre 

of competent and committed officers trained by U.S., French, and Canadian authorities, HNP officials at all levels were implicated in corruption and narcotics trafficking (see Section 3). While some new cadets entered through a competitive selection process, the Government appointed more than half of the new recruits based 

on political and personal favoritism. In the spring, the police academy graduated 

more than 800 police officers, including a record number of female officers. The HNP 

failed to pursue criminals, promoting a growing condition of judicial impunity. The 

Special Brigades are small detachments of regular policemen attached to certain 

commissariats throughout the country. These units, which have no special tactical 

training, are equipped with assault rifles and dressed in black T-shirts that read 

‘‘BS.’’ Their job is to provide defense for the commissariats or fill in for SWAT in 

certain situations until SWAT teams can arrive. 

Killings and other abuses (see Section 1.a.) involving civilian attaches in police 

commissariats increased during the year. Attaches have their roots in the launch 

of the zero tolerance operation in June 2001. They are not members of the police 

force, nor have they received any official training at the police academy; rather they 

act as special units of armed civilian thugs and operate in police stations of large 

urban areas. They also often provide special security for key political figures. Attaches function under the direct control of the chief commissioner of a police station 

and are given special identification cards. The most notable commissariats for attache activity were Delmas 33, Carrefour, Cite Soleil, Port-au-Prince, Petionville, 

Gonaives, Cap-Haitien, and Hinche. 

Certain police jurisdictions routinely disregarded the 48-hour requirement to 

present detainees before a judge, and some detainees were held for years in pretrial 

detention. Although the 48-hour rule was violated in all parts of the country, it was 

most often and most flagrantly ignored in Jeremie, Cap-Haitien, Petionville, and the 

Delmas commissariat of Port-au-Prince. Police or other government officials often 

apprehended persons without warrants, or on warrants not issued by a duly authorized official. Moreover, arrests sometimes were made on charges such as sorcery or 

debt with no basis in law. The authorities frequently detained individuals on unspecified charges or pending investigation. The Government often resorted to arrest 

and detention on false charges or on the charge of ‘‘plotting against the security of 

the State,’’ particularly in political or personal vendettas. Detainees were generally 

allowed access to family members and a lawyer of their own choosing. Many detainees could not afford the services of an attorney, and the Government did not provide 

free counsel. Bail is available at the discretion of the investigative judge. Bail hearings are not automatic, and judges usually granted bail only for minor cases and 

based on compelling humanitarian grounds such as a need for medical attention. 

Prosper Avril, former general and head of the military government from 1988 to 

1990, remained incarcerated despite the Gonaives Court of Appeals’ ruling in October 2002 that his rearrest was illegal, and which ordered his release. However, the 

district attorney’s office in Port-au-Prince did not comply with the ruling. Avril remained incarcerated at year’s end. 

On March 9, women’s rights activist Carline Simon and her husband Serge were 

brutally arrested, beaten, and held for a week without formal charges brought 

against them. The couple was arrested after the police rescued them from a failed 

kidnapping attempt. On March 10, they were transferred from Cite Soleil to the 

Delmas police station as State Prosecutor Josue Pierre Louis issued a temporary release order for the couple. The Delmas Police Commissioner refused to free them 

and a HNP spokesperson claimed they were in possession of illegal firearms; those 

weapons were never found. Due to immense pressure from the human rights community, Simon and her husband were released on March 13. 

After spending almost 6 months in the National Penitentiary, Rosemond Jean, 

head of the movement to reclaim lost money from government-supported cooperatives, was released on March 31. Arbitrarily arrested without warrant in September 

2002, attaches beat Jean and accused her of possessing illegal firearms and munitions. Police entered his house without a warrant, claiming that he had weapons 

and he was plotting against the state. No weapons were ever found in his possession. After pressure from the international community, the authorities cleared Jean 

of all charges and released him in March. 

On February 18, former Army officers Ibert Blanc, Rosalvo Bastia, and Pastor 

Ceriphin Franck were arrested in the central department of Hinche without 

charges. On July 29, the three were transported by helicopter to Port-au-Prince. AcVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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cused of conspiring against the security of the State, they remained at the National 

Penitentiary awaiting trial at year’s end. 

Prolonged pretrial detention was a serious problem. Judicial delays left an estimated 78 percent of the country’s prison population awaiting trial. The problem was 

most extreme in Port-au-Prince, with 88 percent of National Penitentiary inmates 

in pretrial detention status. Eighty-six percent of females and 95 percent of minor 

detainees were in pretrial detention. The prolonged detention of persons with valid 

release orders continued to be a problem (see Section 1.e.). 

Since her July 14 arrest, Judie Roy remained incarcerated in a prison in the Portau-Prince suburb of Petionville, accused of conspiring against the security of the 

State (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). 

The Constitution prohibits the involuntary exile of citizens, and there were no reports of its use. Self-imposed internal and external exile were common among opponents of the regime.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.—The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary was subject to significant influence by the 

executive and legislative branches. Years of extensive corruption and governmental 

neglect left the poorly organized judicial system largely moribund. Judges assigned 

to politically sensitive cases complained about interference by the executive branch. 

At the lowest level of the justice system, justices of the peace issue warrants, adjudicate minor infractions, mediate cases, take depositions, and refer cases to prosecutors or higher judicial officials. Investigating magistrates and public prosecutors 

cooperate in the development of more serious cases, which are tried by the judges 

of the first instance courts. Thirty appeals court judges hear cases referred from the 

first instance courts, and the 11-member Court of Cassation, the country’s highest 

court, addresses questions of procedure and constitutionality. In Port-au-Prince, 

seven judges sit on a special labor court with jurisdiction over labor disputes, but 

in the provinces courts of first instance adjudicate such cases. 

The judicial apparatus follows a civil law system based on the Napoleonic Code; 

the Criminal Code dates from 1832, although it has been amended in some instances. The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial; however, this 

right was abridged widely in practice. The Constitution also expressly denies police 

and judicial authorities the right to interrogate suspects unless legal counsel or a 

representative of the suspect’s choice are present or they waive this right; this right 

was also abridged in practice. While trials are public, most accused persons cannot 

afford legal counsel for interrogation or trial, and the law does not require that the 

Government provide legal representation. Despite the efforts of local human rights 

groups and the international community to provide free legal aid, many interrogations occurred without presence of counsel. However, some defendants had access 

to counsel during trials. The Constitution provides defendants with a presumption 

of innocence and the right to be present at trial, to confront witnesses against them, 

and to present witnesses and evidence in their own behalf; however, in practice corrupt and uneducated judges frequently denied defendants these rights. 

Systemic problems including underfunding and a shortage of adequately trained 

and qualified justices of the peace, judges, and prosecutors created a huge backlog 

of criminal cases, with many detainees waiting months or even years in pretrial detention for a court date (see Section 1.d.). There was no legal redress for prolonged 

pretrial detention following acquittal or dismissal of charges. 

In most regions, judges lacked the basic resources to perform their duties. Professional competence was sometimes lacking as well. The qualifying yearlong course 

at the Magistrates’ school requires no previous legal training. Judges increasingly 

conducted legal proceedings exclusively in Creole rather than French, but language 

remained a significant barrier to full access to the judicial system (see Section 5). 

UNDP, supported by the Government, provided additional training for many segments of the judicial system, including new judges and attorneys. 

The Constitution sets varying tenure periods for judges above the level of justice 

of the peace. However, in practice the Ministry of Justice exercised appointment and 

administrative oversight over the judiciary, prosecutors, and court staff. This Ministry can remove justices of the peace and in practice has occasionally dismissed 

judges above this level. 

The Code of Criminal Procedure does not assign clear responsibility to investigate 

crimes, dividing the authority among police, justices of the peace, prosecutors, and 

investigative magistrates. Examining magistrates often received files that were 

empty or missing police reports. Autopsies were conducted only rarely, and autopsy 

reports seldom issued. The code provides for 2 criminal court sessions (‘‘assizes’’) per 

year in each of the 15 first instance jurisdictions for all major crimes requiring a 

jury trial; each session generally lasts for 2 weeks. Criminal assizes in Port-auPrince have met only once a year since 1998. 

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Citizens deported to Haiti after completing prison sentences in foreign countries 

are detained until a family member agrees to take custody of them and their prison 

release order is processed, although there is no provision for such detention in the 

law. This generally takes 1 to 2 months, but has lasted as long as 4 months in unusual instances. 

There were no reports of political prisoners.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence.—The 

Constitution prohibits such practices; however, police and other security force elements routinely conducted searches without warrants (see Section 1.c.). 

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: 

a. Freedom of Speech and Press.—The Constitution provides for freedom of speech 

and of the press; however, the Government did not respect these rights in practice. 

Several times during the year, the Government publicly expressed support for free 

expression; however, there were several documented attacks on members of the 

press. Print and electronic media freely criticized the Government and opposition. 

However, in practice most media admitted to some form of self-censorship to avoid 

offending sponsors or the politically influential. 

There were two French-language newspapers in the country, Le Nouvelliste and 

L’Union, with a combined circulation of less than 20,000 readers. L’Union is a government-run newspaper; its editor was the Secretary of State for Communication. 

Le Nouvelliste and some irregularly printed papers were frequently critical of government policies. There was virtually no Creole-language press. 

With a literacy rate of approximately 52 percent and limited access to television, 

the most important medium is radio, especially those stations broadcasting in Creole. There were 275 private radio stations, with 43 in the capital alone. Most carried 

a mix of music, news, and talk show programs that many citizens regard as their 

only opportunity to speak out on a variety of political, social, and economic issues. 

Uncensored foreign satellite and cable broadcasts were available but limited in impact: most citizens could not afford televisions. The few stations carrying news or 

opinion broadcasts freely expressed a wide range of political viewpoints. 

Although most radio stations and other forms of telecommunications were nominally independent, they are subject to a 1997 law designating the State sole owner 

and proprietor of the airwaves. The State leases broadcast rights to private enterprises, retaining preemption rights in the event of a national emergency, including 

natural disasters. The Government did not exercise this right in practice. 

There were several attacks on, or threats against, journalists during the year, and 

the legal system provided limited protection or redress. Journalists were accused of 

destabilizing the Government and often subjected to anonymous threats of violence, 

including threats of kidnapping and murder. Police and government officials often 

failed to protect journalists during civil unrest. The NGO Reporters Without Borders 

and local journalists’ associations continued to protest attacks in prior years and 

called on the Government to provide security. The Government failed to do so, despite frequent expressions of support for free expression. Pro-government OPs 

(loosely organized neighborhood-based groups that often functioned as politically-affiliated gangs) sometimes threatened journalists covering protests, civil unrest, and 

other large group events. In such cases, the Government’s inability or unwillingness 

to provide adequate security to media outlets and journalists contributed to an increased sense of vulnerability among members of the media who criticized the Government or Fanmi Lavalas. 

According to a report released on August 15 by the Committee to Protect Journalists, in less than 3 years, 2 journalists, Brignol Lindor and Jean Dominique, had 

been killed and nearly 30 others had fled into exile. At year’s end, only one person 

remained in prison awaiting trial for the December 2001 killing of Petit-Goave journalist, Brignol Lindor (see Section 1.a.). 

On February 4, assailants shot Reverend Manes Blanc, the director of Radio 

Shekina in St. Marc, twice in the stomach. His assailants said he was too vocal in 

his anti-Lavalas comments, and that they intended to kill him. The gunshots were 

not fatal, and no one was charged with the crime. 

On February 14, veteran reporter Goudou Jean Numa was warned about returning to his home as unknown persons had visited earlier in the day inquiring about 

him. Arsonists returned later and set fire to the reporter’s vehicle. Goudou left the 

country. 

On February 18, pro-Lavalas forces burned the home of Voice of America stringer 

Montigene Sincere and arrested, then released, his two sons, who were also journalists. Sincere was attacked in the past by persons believed to be acting on behalf of 

FL. 

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That same day, Radio Metropole, a pro-opposition radio station in Port-au-Prince, 

observed a 24-hour pause in news reporting to protest attacks on several of its staffers in weeks prior. Two days before, shots were allegedly fired at the home of the 

mother of Radio Metropole political columnist Nancy Roc. 

On October 28, several armed and masked individuals in a truck with government 

service license plates opened fire on Radio Caraibes in Port-au-Prince. The attack 

occurred the day before a court hearing on the case of a Radio Caraibes journalist 

who was killed in a traffic accident involving a vehicle and employees from the Interior Ministry. No one was injured in the attack. While he did not denounce the attack, government spokesperson Mario Dupuy promised an investigation of the event. 

The case remained unsolved at year’s end. 

Radio Maxima in Cap-Haitien, a prominent anti-Aristide station was attacked a 

number of times since December 2002, leaving all three of its transmitters destroyed. Staff also reported verbal threats against their lives before and after the 

anti-Lavalas demonstrations planned for October 24–25 in Cap-Haitien. 

In September 2002, Radio Kiskeya temporarily went off the air after receiving 

threats that an OP was going to attack the station. On April 30, Liliane Pierre Paul, 

the Program Director for the station, received a threatening letter with a bullet inside. The letter instructed her to broadcast a message on the radio by May 6 calling 

for French President Chirac to pay financial reparations to Haiti, threatening to kill 

French citizens in the country and Pierre Paul if she did not oblige. The letter was 

signed by members of various OP Lavalas groups, including the group believed to 

be responsible for the murder of Brignol Lindor. Nothing happened on May 6. 

On March 20, the investigative report by Judge Sainvil on the 3-year-old murder 

of radio journalist Jean Dominique was released. The report indicted six men who 

have been in prison for 2 years on unrelated charges (see Section 1.a.). In December 

2002, armed men attempting to enter the home of Michele Montas, Dominique’s 

widow, shot and killed Maxime Seide, her bodyguard. Montas left the country. On 

April 3, the third anniversary of Dominique’s death, major radio and print media 

staged a blackout refraining from all news reporting, broadcasts, and analyses to 

demonstrate what a country would become without a free press. 

Foreign journalists generally traveled without hindrance from the authorities. The 

Government did not censor books or films. 

The Government did not limit access to the Internet. 

The Government did not restrict academic freedom.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.—The Constitution provides for 

freedom of assembly; however, the Government’s increasing repression of planned 

events and periodic prohibition of demonstrations flagrantly ignored that freedom. 

Although some organizations were able to exercise this right without hindrance 

throughout the year, numerous violations of this freedom frequently occurred in the 

capital as well as in the provinces. Authorities frequently failed to provide police 

protection for opposition parties, student groups, and women’s groups conducting 

peaceful demonstrations. Authorities often transported pro-Aristide supporters, 

armed and unarmed, to announced opposition events and failed to arrest them for 

throwing rocks or bottles at the demonstrators and brutally beating them with 

clubs. 

The HNP and governmental authorities continued to suppress citizens’ fundamental rights to demonstrate, protest, and express their opinions. There were a series of general strikes in January promoting a variety of causes that often ended 

in confrontation or death (see Section 1.a.). Transportation unions and the opposition called for strikes and demonstrations throughout the month of January to protest the price increase for fuel and continued to urge President Aristide to resign. 

Activists and women’s organizations took to the streets of Port-au-Prince on 

March 10 to commemorate International Women’s Day and to call for justice in 

cases where women’s rights had been violated. The HNP attempted to break-up the 

demonstration, claiming that the women were not authorized to hold a march. Police confiscated the keys to the vehicle carrying the sound system and cut the connection from the system to the generator, yet the women were able to continue 

marching without further incident. 

For several years, the Central Plateau and the city of Hinche have been plagued 

with political violence. In March, the pro-opposition Papaye Peasants Movement 

cancelled its march, marking its 30th anniversary in Hinche, due to warnings of security problems, and read its resolutions on the radio instead. Armed Lavalas OP’s, 

unaware of the cancellation, blocked the road between Hinche and Papaye and assaulted anyone who attempted to travel that road. They injured more than 10 persons in the attacks. 

On July 12, the civil society Group 184 (G184) led a ‘‘Caravan of Hope’’ on a 

march into the pro-government stronghold of Cite Soleil. The group planned to 

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unveil a new social contract, but the event turned violent when the meeting place 

was overrun by a mob of pro-Lavalas chimeres. Police put forth little effort in stopping the chimeres and appeared to have incited hostilities. Personnel from foreign 

embassies and the OAS were on hand to observe the rally and were unharmed. 

On August 30, in the north, Cap-Haitien police, apparently responding to government instructions, violently repressed the opening event of a planned opposition/civil 

society ‘‘Weekend of Solidarity,’’ using tear gas and automatic weapons to disperse 

the peaceful open-air meeting. Pro-government popular organizations used barricades of burning tires to block access. The march scheduled for August 31 was then 

cancelled. 

On September 14, another opposition march in Cap-Haitien was broken up a half 

a kilometer from its starting point by another group of chimeres throwing rocks and 

bottles at 2–5,000 demonstrators. Police launched tear gas at both the Lavalas aggressors and then at the opposition crowd. The confrontation occurred after police 

allowed 1,000 pro-FL counter-demonstrators to breach their assigned route and confront the oncoming opposition demonstration. 

On October 25, in Cap-Haitien, pro-Lavalas chimeres constructed barriers and 

blocked road and air entry into the city in anticipation of an opposition march 

planned for October 26. Despite police efforts at dismantling the barricades, rockthrowing chimeres went on a rampage through the city effectively causing the opposition to cancel the demonstration. 

On October 29, two nonpolitical demonstrations staged by women’s groups, one to 

protest the climate of violence in the country and one to plant trees, were broken 

up by Lavalas chimeres. In both cases, police failed to prevent the disruption of the 

demonstrations, and little afterward to constrain the chimeres. 

The G184 planned November 14 rally, to discuss its social contract and to present 

its political proposal, in downtown Port-au-Prince foundered in the face of a governmental campaign of obstruction and repression. Long before the rally was to begin, 

police impeded access to the area by constructing roadblocks and searching private 

vehicles. The rally failed to commence as OP members attacked the G184’s stage 

equipment while police arrested 25 G184 members, including the brother-in-law and 

nephew of G184 leader Andy Apaid. As G184 members tried to move to the staging 

point, they were confronted by rock-throwing pro-Lavalas OP members. Crowd-control police intervened using tear gas and firing warning shots into the air. In an 

effort to avert further violence, Apaid called an end to the gathering in the early 

afternoon as OP members chased G184 partisans from the scene. Most of the G184 

members were released on November 18, but the Apaid family members remained 

in prison until December 1 on false weapons charges. 

On December 5, pro-Lavalas chimeres violently disrupted an anti-Aristide demonstration planned by State University students. An estimated 30 students were injured, at least 10 by gunfire. The University Rector suffered 2 broken kneecaps as 

a result of clubbing by the chimeres. Police on the scene were complicit with the 

chimeres throughout and did nothing to curb the violence, reacting only when the 

Rector was clubbed, and only then assisting in the evacuation of the students. 

Human rights groups and government officials widely criticized the attack, which 

led to the resignation of the Minister of Education, Marie-Carmel Paul Austin. 

On December 8, several thousand students demonstrated in Gonaives, demanding 

justice for Port-au-Prince university students attacked by pro-Lavalas chimeres on 

December 5 (termed ‘‘Black Friday’’). Police used tear gas to disband the demonstrators and indiscriminately fired into the crowd injuring several civilians and two police officers. One journalist on the scene reported that police shot and injured several journalists attempting to verify how many protesters died during the event. 

On December 12, State University student protesters in Port-au-Prince joined 

forces with Apaid’s 184 and members of the city’s business, legal, academic, and artisan community to launch a massive anti-government demonstration. Early morning police barricades and burning tires erected by chimeres, some carrying arms, attempted to thwart the crowds that had gathered in various sections of the city. Police fired into the air and used tear gas in an attempt to disperse the demonstrators, 

who regrouped later in another location; this pattern continued throughout the day. 

There were no reported fatalities. 

Following a student demonstration on December 15, HNP officers injected 21-

year-old Josue Alcenat with an unknown substance while holding him at the police 

station in Canape Vert section of Port-au-Prince. Alcenat spent 5 days in a local 

hospital undergoing tests to determine the nature of the substance. Alcenat was 

sent to a medical facility abroad to undergo further testing after the hospital was 

unable to arrive at any concrete conclusion. 

On December 17, small groups of students attempted to mobilize in Port-auPrince, but low numbers and aggressive police intervention combined to prevent a 

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major demonstration. Lavalas chimeres reportedly opened fire on several journalists 

and protesters in different parts of the city as police used large amounts of tear gas 

to disperse students assembled at various points. Simultaneously, police employed 

similar tactics to halt anti-government demonstrations in cities outside the capital, 

such as Jacmel, St. Marc, and Cap-Haitien. During one protest in Trou de Nord, 

police fired into a crowd attempting to break-up a protest and killed a young girl. 

Protesters responded by attacking several government office buildings and burning 

the house of the police officer who shot the girl. 

The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the Government generally respected this right in practice. The Penal Code requires prior government 

approval for any association of more than 20 persons that seeks tax benefits and 

official recognition from the Government.

c. Freedom of Religion.—The Constitution provides for the right to practice all religions and faiths, provided that practice does not disturb law and order, and the 

Government generally respected this right in practice. 

In many respects, Roman Catholicism retained its traditional primacy among the 

country’s religions. Precise figures were difficult to obtain, but it was estimated that 

80 percent of the population were Catholic. However, Protestant denominations (primarily Methodist and Baptist) were growing in terms of number of active members, 

in comparison to the Catholic Church membership. A large segment of the population practiced Christianity as well as Voodoo, a traditional religion derived in part 

from West African beliefs. While there were associations of Voodoo practitioners and 

priests, there was no organized hierarchy. Official recognition by the Ministry of Religious Affairs gives religious organizations legal standing and tax-exempt status, 

and extends civil recognition to church documents. In 2001, the Ministry of Religion 

officially recognized the first Voodoo church, the Eglise Vodou d’Ayiti, and in April, 

the Government officially recognized Voodoo as a religion. 

Accusations of sorcery, particularly in rural areas, led to mob violence and 

killings, and Voodoo practitioners were targeted in some cases. 

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2003 International Religious Freedom Report.

d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.—The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. 

An unknown number of undocumented migrants left the country by sea or land 

to seek better economic opportunities. The Government’s National Migration Office 

(ONM) was responsible for assisting citizens repatriated from other countries and 

frequently provided small sums of money to repatriated migrants for transportation. 

During the year, the ONM assisted 17,323 repatriated citizens. There were reliable 

reports of family separation and maltreatment of Haitians by Dominican soldiers 

during the year. There were no credible reports of government mistreatment of repatriated migrants. 

The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee status or asylum to persons who meet the definition in the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status 

of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. In practice, the Government provided protection 

against refoulement, but did not routinely grant refugee status on asylum. 

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government 

The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government 

peacefully. In practice, the political system remained in transition from a dictatorial 

system to a more open and competitive one, and the political crisis stemming from 

flawed 2000 elections continued to hinder the implementation of this right. The 

dominant Fanmi Lavalas (FL) political party, which controls all branches of government, manipulated legislative elections in May 2000 and exaggerated electoral participation in the November 2000 presidential elections. OAS efforts since then to resolve the crisis have been unsuccessful. 

In September 2002, the OAS unanimously approved Resolution 822, delinking 

international economic assistance from the signing of an FL/Convergence 

Democratique (CD) accord between FL and opposition parties. It called on the Government to implement previous OAS resolutions, expressed the expectation that the 

Government would hold legislative and local elections in 2003, and called on the 

Government to create a favorable security climate, implement a disarmament plan, 

strengthen independent police and judicial institutions to combat impunity, and participate in the formation of a credible Provisional Electoral Council by November 4, 

2002, and an Electoral Guarantees Commission by December 4, 2002. The resolution broadened the mandate of the OAS Special Mission to assist the Government 

in undertaking its obligations and to monitor and evaluate those efforts. By NovemVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
126

ber 20, 2002, seven of the entities comprising the CEP had nominated a representative, although not officially sworn them in. CD, the main opposition block, had not 

put forth a representative. 

OAS policy remained focused on implementation of Resolution 822, the main 

thrust of which was the formation of a legitimate CEP, which was to be charged 

with planning local, municipal, and legislative elections during the year. However, 

elections did not take place, largely due to the inability to form the consensus CEP. 

The Government had invited a three-member OAS special inquiry commission to 

investigate the 2001 attacks on members of opposition parties, which were triggered 

by an apparent attack on the presidential palace. Under international pressure, the 

Government agreed to pay reparations to the victims and publish a report of actions 

taken against persons implicated in the events. An agreement was reached between 

the two largest opposition political parties, the Struggling People’s Organization 

(OPL) and the New Christian Movement for a New Haiti (MOCHRENA), and the 

Government paid reparations during the year. 

Resolution 822 also called for a thorough inquiry into all politically motivated 

crimes and cited the need to strengthen independent police and judicial institutions 

to combat impunity. In particular, the OAS requested the arrest of Amiot ‘‘Cubain’’ 

Metayer, also the leader of the Cannibal Army in Gonaives, for his part in the violence of December 2001. After failing for 7 months to rearrest Metayer, and following the exile of the judge assigned to the case due to threats and pressure, the 

State Prosecutor’s office in Gonaives exonerated Metayer and declared his initial arrest illegal on May 14. On September 23, Metayer’s body was found in St. Marc. 

Although the Government promised a full investigation, many opposition groups, 

and even Metayer’s own Cannibal Army, accused authorities of ordering the murder 

to ensure Metayer’s silence about official involvement in the violence. 

On the occasion of the high-level OAS/CARICOM meeting on March 19–20, the 

OAS emphasized replacing the leadership of the HNP for the Government to further 

demonstrate its willingness to combat impunity. On March 25, Jean Claude JeanBaptiste replaced Jean Nesly Lucien as Director General (DG) and Evans Pierre 

Sainturne replaced Victor Harvel Jean-Baptiste as HNP Chief General Inspector. 

These appointments immediately sparked controversy among human rights organizations and the international community because of numerous and credible reports 

of criminal activity by both officials. There was photographic evidence of JeanBaptiste participating in the brutal beating and burning murder of Pastor Sylvio 

Claude, leader of the Parti Democrate Chretien Haitien, one of the political parties 

that ran against FL in the 1990 elections. Additionally, Jean-Baptiste was named 

as DG without consultation with the OAS, as required by Resolution 822. 

Under significant international pressure, the authorities replaced Jean-Baptiste 

with Jean-Robert Faveur, who was sworn in on June 6, as DG of the HNP. On June 

21, Faveur resigned his position, citing government intimidation and interference in 

his decision-making, and his unwillingness to execute illegal orders. Faveur fled the 

country fearing retribution for public statements he made on the radio about his experience as DG. In July, former civil court senior judge (Doyenne) Jocelyne Pierre 

replaced Faveur as DG. Sainturne was implicated in the 2001 murder attempt on 

the investigating judge of the Jean Dominique murder investigation, but remained 

the Chief General Inspector at year’s end. 

Affiliation with the FL was increasingly required for government employment, 

and political patronage was widespread. It was common for political appointees to 

use their positions for personal enrichment. Many of the 2,500 to 3,500 officers on 

the official HNP payroll were ghost officers who did not actually work (see Section 

1.d.). 

The Government continued to accuse opposition supporters of plotting against the 

State. Members of opposition parties and their supporters faced the constant threat 

of arrest (see Section 1.d.). Most remained in jail for months despite the widespread 

perception that the charges were without foundation. 

On December 14, two prominent critics of the Government, Senator Pierre Prince 

Sonson and Catholic Bishop Pierre Andre Dumas, were shot at in what appeared 

to have been murder attempts or intimidation. Another vocal critic of the Government, Evans Lescouflair, also reported a December 11 attempt on his life. An opposition politician accompanying Prince Sonson at the time of the attack identified 

Lavalas Deputy James Desrosins as driver of the vehicle used in the attempt on 

Sonson’s life. The attack on Sonson came days after a Lavalas Deputy issued an incendiary call to arms to Lavalas supporters. 

There are no legal impediments to women’s participation in politics or government. The monetary deposit required of female candidates for political office (if 

sponsored by a recognized party) is one-half that required of male candidates. At 

127

year’s end, 3 of the 81 deputies were women, and there were 6 women among the 

19 senators. Five of the 16 ministers in the Government were women. 

Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights 

A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated 

without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 

human rights cases. Government officials generally acknowledged their views but 

often failed to implement recommendations. The Government permitted special missions and the continued presence of U.N. bodies and other international organizations such as the ICRC, the U.N. Independent Expert on Human Rights, the UNDP, 

the IACHR, and the OAS Special Mission’s human rights office. However, threats 

and intimidation from unknown sources against domestic NGOs continued during 

the year. 

In a report released before the April 17 session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, independent observer Louis Joinet cited the steady decline in the human 

rights situation since his September 2002 visit and recommended establishment of 

an office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in the country. Joinet 

noted that security had deteriorated and violence against human rights defenders 

increased; arrests, illegal detentions of political activists, police brutality, and cases 

of intimidation had been widely publicized; and the judicial system continued to be 

deficient as judges had been subjected to attacks, causing some to go into exile. 

Joinet’s report also recommended a national commission on reparations for the victims of the 1991 coup d’etat and legislative reform of three bills concerning the judiciary as a means of combating impunity. At year’s end, the proposed office had not 

been established, but the U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) opened an 

office in the neighboring Dominican Republic, which began to handle cases of Haitian political asylum seekers. 

Human rights organizations increasingly turned to issues that they had not previously addressed, including prison conditions, the widespread lack of health facilities, and impunity for criminals. Local officials often attempted to control and 

sought money from domestic human rights groups, as well as other local NGOs. Especially in Gonaives, the Les Cayes region, and in the Central Plateau, local officials 

and their supporters often harassed, refused permits to assemble, and threatened 

NGOs. 

No investigations were opened in the 2002 cases of Patrick Merisier, a human 

rights field monitor who was shot, or human rights attorney Fleury Lysias who was 

illegally arrested and beaten. 

At the national and international levels, human rights organizations have been 

active and effective in monitoring human rights issues, and met frequently with 

government officials. Human rights organizations, including the Platform of Haitian 

Human Rights Organizations, the NCHR, the Lawyers’ Committee for the Respect 

of Individual Rights, the Ecumenical Center of Human Rights, and the Catholic 

Bishops’ National Commission on Justice and Peace, made frequent media appearances and published objective reports on violations. All reported receiving threats 

as a result of their work. 

In February, Marie-Yolene Gilles, coordinator of NCHR’s Human Rights Monitoring Program, was targeted by a campaign of intimidation. While working on the 

December 2002 triple murder case of the three brothers killed by police in Carrefour 

(see Section 1.a.), Gilles received phone calls with threats to kill her and her family 

and burn down her home. She was threatened again in August for her work investigating attaches in police stations. 

The Office of the Protector of Citizens (OPC), an ombudsman-like office provided 

for by the Constitution, received complaints of abuse at all levels of government. 

The Government did not directly impede OPC investigations but did not always respond to its requests for information. In the past, local human rights organizations 

did not view the office as an advocate or interlocutor with the Government and often 

did not file complaints with the OPC, reporting that OPC did not play an active role 

following up on human rights complaints. This perception changed, however, with 

the appointment of Necker Dessables, a respected human rights advocate, as the 

OPC ombudsman in 2002. Relations between the OPC and major human rights organizations such as the Platform for Human Rights and the Lawyers Committee for 

the Respect of Individual Rights improved and continued to be positive. The OPC 

had budgetary problems and employed only four investigators and was therefore unable to be very active in investigations of human rights abuses. 

The Parliament’s Justice and Human Rights Committee did not have a high profile and focused largely on judicial issues. 

128

Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or Social Status 

The Constitution does not specifically prohibit discrimination on the grounds of 

race, sex, disability, language, or social status. It does provide for equal working 

conditions regardless of sex, beliefs, or marital status. However, there was no effective governmental mechanism to administer or enforce these provisions. Societal discrimination occurred against persons with HIV/AIDS, particularly women, but educational programs and HIV/AIDS activists were fighting to change that stigma.

Women.—The law provides penalties for rape and domestic violence; however, the 

Government did not enforce these provisions adequately. According to women’s 

rights groups, rape and other abuse of women was common, both within and outside 

marriage. Women’s shelters and organizations reported that local armed thugs frequently raped and harassed girls and women in the ‘‘quartiers populaires’’ (slums) 

like Cite Soleil and Martissant. Police authorities rarely arrested the perpetrators 

or investigate the incident, and the victims sometimes suffered further harassment 

in retaliation. There were no government-sponsored programs for victims of violence. The Criminal Code excuses a husband who murders his wife or her partner 

upon catching them in the act of adultery in his home, but a wife who kills her husband under similar circumstances is not excused. 

The law does not specifically prohibit sexual harassment, although the Labor 

Code states that men and women have the same rights and obligations. Sexual harassment of female workers was a problem, especially in the assembly sector (see 

Section 6.b.). 

Women do not enjoy the same social and economic status as men. In some social 

strata, tradition limits women’s roles. A majority of peasant women remained in traditional occupations of farming, marketing, and domestic labor. Very poor female 

heads of household in urban areas also often find their employment opportunities 

limited to traditional roles in domestic labor and sales. Laws governing child support recognize the widespread practice of multiple-father families but were rarely 

enforced. Female employees in private industry or service jobs, including government jobs, were seldom promoted to supervisory positions. However, well-educated 

women have occupied prominent positions in both the private and public sector in 

the past several years. 

The Ministry of Women’s Affairs is charged with promoting and defending the 

rights of women and ensuring that they attain an equal status in society, but had 

few resources at its disposal and was able to accomplish little in this regard. 

Domestic women’s rights groups were small, localized, and received little publicity.

Children.—Government health care and education programs for children were inadequate. Malnutrition was a problem; approximately 23 percent of all children 

under 5 were chronically malnourished. The Government has a school nutrition program, administered through the Office of National Development and supported by 

foreign donors. Through this program, health clinics and dispensaries have begun 

to distribute donated food to children. 

The Constitution and the law provide for free and compulsory primary education; 

however, in practice most rural families had no access to public schools. The costs 

of school fees, books, materials, and uniforms, even in public schools, were prohibitive for most families, and an estimated 90 percent of schools were private. Schools 

were dilapidated and understaffed. According to the Government, 40 percent of children never attend school; of those who do, less than 15 percent graduate from secondary school. The Ministry of Education estimated primary school enrollment at 

65 percent. Poorer families sometimes rationed education money to pay school fees 

only for male children. 

Child abuse was a problem. Government-sponsored radio commercials urged parents not to abuse their children physically or mentally. There was some anecdotal 

evidence that in very poor families, caretakers deprive the youngest children of food 

to feed older, income-generating children. 

In early January, a 10-year-old girl was lured into an alley, raped, and became 

pregnant by a 16-year-old male. On April 16, the victim’s family filed a complaint 

against the male with the Justice of the Peace of Carrefour. On January 17, police 

arrested him and released him the following day, but then rearrested him on April 

28 after the family filed a complaint with the State Prosecutor’s office. After discussion between the assistant prosecutor and the defendant’s lawyer, the defendant 

was released, provided he would return for the hearing in May; he never appeared 

and neither did the Assistant Prosecutor. The lead State Prosecutor highlighted the 

apparent collusion between the defendant’s lawyer and the assistant prosecutor. 

Following significant press coverage and interventions by human rights and women’s organizations, the defendant was arrested for a third time on May 16. He spent 

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only a few days in prison at Fort National and was subsequently released due to 

his age. The prosecutor’s investigation of the case continued at year’s end. 

The law prohibits corporal punishment of children, and all schools must post 

clearly their disciplinary policies. It also called for the establishment of a commission to determine appropriate school disciplinary measures. In practice, corporal 

punishment was accepted as a form of discipline. 

Port-au-Prince’s large population of street children included many domestic servants, or ‘‘restaveks’’ (‘‘to stay with’’ in Creole) who were dismissed from or fled employers’ homes (see Section 6.f.). The Ministry of Social Affairs provided some assistance to street children. 

Several international and local NGOs worked on children’s issues. UNICEF and 

Save the Children Canada and UK, in conjunction with local NGOs such as the Haitian Coalition for the Defense of the Rights of the Child (COHADDE), promote children’s rights by conducting studies of children’s issues, most notably a study on 

child domestic labor (see Section 6.f.), and awareness raising activities in the country.

Persons with Disabilities.—The Constitution provides that persons with disabilities shall have the means to ensure their autonomy, education, and independence. 

However, there was no legislation to implement these constitutional provisions or 

to mandate provision of access to buildings for persons with disabilities. Given the 

severe poverty in which most citizens live, those with disabilities faced a particularly harsh existence even though they did not face overt mistreatment. Disabled 

beggars were common on the streets of Port-au-Prince and other towns.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.—Approximately 99 percent of Haitians are 

descendants, in whole or in part, of African slaves who won a war of independence 

from France in 1804. The remaining population is of European, Middle Eastern, 

North American, or Latin American origin. The law makes no distinction based on 

race. However, longstanding social and political animosities were often tied to cultural identification, skin color, and overlapping issues of class in a starkly nonegalitarian society. Some of these animosities date back to before the country’s revolutionary period. 

Racial distinctions tend to parallel social and economic strata. Mulattos generally 

belong to the wealthiest classes of society. Mulattos historically have been targets 

of sporadic attacks and kidnappings because they were perceived as wealthy. 

The Government recognizes two official languages: Creole, spoken by virtually all 

Haitians; and French, limited to approximately 20 percent of the population including the economic elite. Lack of French-language skills limited access to political and 

economic opportunities for the majority of the population. Although Creole was used 

in parliamentary debate in the Lower House of Parliament, the Government prepared most official documents only in French. Language also remained a significant 

barrier to full access to the judicial system (see Section 1.e.). Despite the Government’s literacy promotion, many Creole speakers were illiterate. 

Section 6. Worker Rights 

a. The Right of Association.—The Constitution and the Labor Code provide for the 

right of association, which was generally respected in practice; however, the Labor 

Code dates from earlier governments and is far more restrictive. For instance, there 

is no legislation protecting the right of public employees to organize. 

The law protects union activities and prohibits a closed shop. For legal recognition 

the law also requires that a union, which must have a minimum of 10 members, 

register with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs within 60 days of its formation. The Labor Code does not require prior approval before any association is established. Unions are subject to the same registration requirements as other associations (see Section 2.b.). The law prohibits employers, management, and anyone who 

represents the interests of employers from joining a union. 

In theory unions are independent of the Government and political parties. Nine 

principal labor federations represented approximately 5 percent of the total labor 

force of approximately 2.8 million persons, including the approximately 2 to 3 percent working in the industrial sector. Union membership decreased significantly, 

but unions remained active in the public sector. Some union representatives asserted that union activists not affiliated with the Government felt themselves forced 

into self-exile. 

Several unions have grievances pending against the Government over unfair labor 

practices and other worker rights violations before the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. 

Labor unions reported several cases of threats and arrests during the year. Leaders of several major labor confederations reported receiving threats and demands to 

support the FL party. On July 29, armed men visited the home of Petit-Frere JeanVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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Louis, Secretary General of the General Independent Organization of Haitian Workers. Jean-Louis had spoken out against the corruption among Lavalas officials in 

Port de Paix and in the Northwest Department. He was not home at that time but 

upon hearing of the incident, he left Port de Paix and went into hiding in Gonaives. 

On July 30, the office of Fignole St. Cyr, Secretary General of the Autonomous 

Central of Haitian Workers, was the target of similar harassment. While he was 

out, armed thugs entered St. Cyr’s office and demanded his staff divulge his arrival 

time. The truck circled the office for the remainder of the morning but eventually 

left when St. Cyr failed to appear. St. Cyr had taken part in the G184 demonstration in Cite Soleil (see Section 2.b.) and had criticized the Government on unemployment, the political crisis, and interference with the press. 

Union leaders asserted that some employers in the private industrial sector dismissed individuals for participation in union organizing activities. In 2000, the ILO 

criticized the Labor Code for its failure to include a specific provision providing protection against anti-union discrimination at the time of hiring. 

Unions may freely form or join federations or confederations and affiliate with 

international bodies. Each of the principal labor federations maintained some affiliation with various international labor organizations.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.—The Labor Code protects 

trade union organizing activities and stipulates fines for those who interfere with 

this right but does not provide for reinstatement of workers fired for trade union 

activities. No fines were issued during the year, or in previous years. Unions generally were free of government and employer interference to pursue their goals, although the Government made little effort to enforce the law. 

Organized labor activity was concentrated in the Port-au-Prince area, in state enterprises, and in the civil service. High unemployment rates and anti-union sentiment among some factory workers and most employers limited the success of union 

organizing efforts. 

Collective bargaining was nonexistent, and employers set wages unilaterally. The 

Labor Code does not distinguish between industries producing for the local market 

and those producing for export. Employees in the export-oriented assembly sector 

enjoyed better than average wages and benefits. However, frequent verbal abuse 

and intimidation of workers and organizers were problems in the assembly sector. 

Female workers in the assembly sector reported that some employers sexually harassed female workers with impunity. Women also reported that while most assembly sector workers were women, virtually all supervisors were men. Workers had 

access to labor courts (Tribunaux de Travail) set up to resolve common labor-management disputes; however, the courts’ judgments were not enforced. The courts 

function under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and adjudicate minor conflicts, but unions stated that the process was inefficient. Seven 

labor courts operate in Port-au-Prince, and in the provinces plaintiffs utilize municipal courts. 

The Labor Code provides for the right to strike, except for managers, administrators, other heads of establishments, and public utility service workers. The Labor 

Code defines public utility service employees as essential workers who ‘‘cannot suspend their activities without causing serious harm to public health and security.’’ 

There were few public sector strikes during the year. In May 2002, hospital residents went on strike to protest lack of supplies and the diversion of existing supplies to administrators. When the Government intervened and provided additional 

materials, residents resumed work. 

There are no export processing zones (EPZs) outside of the metropolitan area. 

Legislation governing free trade zones provide that the Labor Code applies in the 

EPZs, and the Government signed an agreement with Grupo M, a Dominican textile 

company, to build a production facility in a newly established free trade zone on the 

border near Ouanaminthe. On October 9, the International Finance Corporation 

(IFC) approved a loan to the company; its provisions stipulated a social compensation plan for farmers and landowners displaced by the project. The IFC called for 

independent investigations into allegations of Grupo M abuse of workers and union 

organizers. Nevertheless, Batay Ouvriye, an organization of peasant workers, 

strongly opposed the project, and progress has stalled pending legislative authorization of the land concession, which had not been granted at year’s end.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor.—The Labor Code prohibits forced or 

bonded labor for adults and minors; however, the Government failed to enforce this 

law for children, who continued to be subjected to forced domestic labor as restaveks 

in urban households, sometimes under harsh conditions (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).

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ice, for which the minimum is 12 years of age. There is also a legal provision for 

employment of children between the ages of 12 and 16 as apprentices. The Labor 

Code prohibits minors from working under dangerous conditions and prohibits night 

work in industrial enterprises for minors under 18. Fierce adult competition for jobs 

ensured child labor was not a factor in the industrial sector; however, children 

under the age of 15 commonly worked at informal sector jobs to supplement family 

income. Children also commonly worked with parents on small family farms, although the high unemployment rate among adults kept children from employment 

on commercial farms in significant numbers. Government agencies lacked the resources to enforce relevant laws and regulations effectively. According to 

COHADDE, children worked primarily as domestic servants (restaveks); however, 

some worked on the street as vendors or beggars, and some were involved in prostitution. 

The Government has not ratified and does not adhere to ILO Convention 182 on 

elimination of the worse forms of child labor. It has not defined ‘‘worst forms of child 

labor’’ or ‘‘hazardous work.’’

The Government designated the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs’ Social Welfare and Research Institute (IBESR) to implement and enforce child labor laws and 

regulations. The Government has begun to place a high priority on the eradication 

of child domestic labor (see Section 6.f.). Despite the Government’s efforts, the budget for the Ministry remained below what is needed to fund adequately programs to 

investigate exploitative child labor cases throughout the country. 

The IBESR coordinated efforts with the Ministries of Justice, Education, and Foreign Affairs, as well as local and international agencies, to formulate and enforce 

child labor policies. The Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 

ILO’s International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) in 1999. 

IPEC began a Child Labor Project in 2000, which was scheduled to end in December 

2002 but continued through the spring and developed a framework focusing on institutional capacity building, prevention through awareness-raising, and direct assistance to victims of child labor. A much-lauded government-sponsored hotline for children in crisis operated only during regular business hours and had limited resources 

and access to safe shelters. In August 2002, NCHR-New York inaugurated a program to prevent the restavek practice, improve living conditions for and rescue 

these children, and reintegrate them into society (see Section 6.f.).

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.—The legal minimum daily wage, established in 

1995 by the Tripartite Commission of Salaried Workers, whose six members were 

appointed by the President (two representatives each of labor, employers, and government), is approximately $0.96 (36 gourdes). This wage was insufficient to provide 

a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Some workers were paid on 

a piece-rate basis and may earn more than the minimum wage. The majority of citizens worked in the informal sector and subsistence agriculture, where minimum 

wage legislation does not apply and wages of $0.40 (15 gourdes) a day were common. Many women worked as domestic employees, where minimum wage legislation 

also does not apply. 

The Labor Code governs individual employment contracts. It sets the standard 

workday at 8 hours and the workweek at 48 hours, with 24 hours of rest on Sunday. 

However, HNP officers worked 12-hour shifts 6 days per week, in apparent violation 

of the Labor Code. The code also establishes minimum health and safety regulations. The industrial and assembly sectors largely observed these guidelines. However, the Ministry of Social Affairs did not enforce work hours or health and safety 

regulations. 

The assembly sector published a voluntary code of conduct in 1999, committing 

signatories to a number of measures designed to raise industry standards, including 

payment of the minimum wage and the prohibition of child labor. Employers in the 

assembly sector generally paid the minimum wage or higher. In this sector, working 

conditions were also generally better and there were no reports of child labor. 

There were no formal data, but unions alleged that job-related injuries were prevalent in the construction industry and public works sectors. With more than 50 percent of the population unemployed, workers were not able to exercise the right to 

remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued 

employment.

f. Trafficking in Persons.—The Government passed a law in June prohibiting trafficking in women and children; however, trafficking in women and children was a 

problem. Internal trafficking of children for domestic labor remained a problem in 

the country. On October 8, a new, more comprehensive law was introduced before 

Parliament that would render trafficking in all persons illegal. The Chamber of Deputies approved it and it was waiting Senate passage at year’s end. 

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Haitians trafficked overseas were sent largely to the Dominican Republic, the 

U.S., Europe (mainly France), and Canada. The results of the most recent study of 

trafficking across the border conducted by UNICEF in August 2002 reported that 

between 2,000 and 3,000 Haitian children were trafficked to the Dominican Republic 

each year. The findings were the result of a joint UNICEF/International Organization for Migration study. However, most trafficking occurs within the country’s borders and involves children. In June, the Government created a Brigade for the Protection of Minors (BPM), a special unit under the HNP charged with investigating 

cases of child trafficking and monitoring movement of children across the Haitian/

Dominican border. The BPM was functional; however, resource issues remained a 

barrier to its operational capacity. 

Rural families continued to send young children to more affluent city dwellers to 

serve as unpaid domestic labor in a practice called restavek. In May, the country’s 

first lady, Mildred Aristide, authored a book documenting the restavek phenomenon 

in Haiti, its historical background, and the steps that the Government should take 

to combat the practice. The practice of sending children, mainly girls, to work as 

domestic servants in exchange for that child’s room and board has existed in the 

country for centuries. While some restaveks received adequate care including an 

education, the Ministry of Social Affairs believed that many employers compelled 

the children to work long hours, provided them little nourishment, and frequently 

beat and abused them. The majority of restaveks worked in homes where the yearly 

income was very low, so conditions, food, and education for nonbiological children 

were not priorities. 

In May, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs held a conference to unveil the 

results of a study that the Government co-sponsored with UNICEF, ILO/IPEC, 

UNDP, and Save the Children Canada and UK to determine the fundamentals of 

child domestic labor practice. The study, which covered the fiscal years 2001–02, 

noted that 173,000 children, or 8.2 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 

17 years of age, worked as domestic household labor. Of that 8.2 percent, girls comprised the majority of child domestics at 59 percent and boys at 41 percent. Labor 

laws require anyone who has a child domestic in their employ to obtain a permit 

from IBESR and to ensure the overall welfare of the child until they reach 15 years 

of age. Additionally, the law requires that restaveks 15 years of age and older be 

paid not less than one half the amount paid to an adult servant hired to perform 

similar work, in addition to room and board. To avoid this obligation, employers dismissed many restaveks before they reached that age. 

The Government acknowledged the problem of internal trafficking and took steps 

to address it, despite severe resource constraints. The Government devoted the bulk 

of its entire social welfare budget to combating trafficking of children. Since its establishment in 2000, the hotline for child abuse victims received over 720 calls leading to action on 158 cases, either through initiation of criminal action against an 

abusive adult or removal of the child from an abusive situation. Eighty-three percent of the children involved in these cases were in domestic service, many were 

under the age of 12, and many reported abuses such as beatings, rape, and malnutrition. In August, IBESR hired four additional monitors to rescue children believed to be working in forced labor situations. Government officials placed rescued 

victims in shelters and in the care of local NGOs, such as Foyer Maurice Sixto, a 

children’s shelter located in Port-au-Prince. 

In August, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved the creation of three additional consulates along the Haitian/Dominican border, which were charged with 

monitoring the movement of Haitian children across the border. The Ministry of the 

Interior also reinforced agents at border control points at the three international 

airports to watch for children who might be traveling unaccompanied or without 

their parents. The Ministry of Justice circulated memorandums to magistrates 

around the country in an awareness-heightening campaign on the new anti-trafficking law and on child labor laws. To address some of the social aspects of the 

restavek practice, the Government provided a subsidy of 70 percent for educational 

supplies, including books and uniforms. The Government also called on employers 

of child domestics to release them from their duties in the afternoon to allow them 

the opportunity to attend school. 

There was no evidence that the authorities were complicit in trafficking of persons. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report—2003

Released by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

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MARCH 2004

HAITI

I. Summary 

Haiti’s geographical position, weak institutions, and subsistence economy have 

made it a key conduit for drug traffickers transporting cocaine from South America 

to the United States and, to a lesser degree, Canada and Europe. The Haitian National Police (HNP) lacks discipline and is riddled with corruption. The judicial system is equally weak, its prosecutors and judges susceptible to bribes and intimidation. 

The Government of Haiti (GOH) made slow progress toward implementation of 

the May 2002 counternarcotics Letter of Agreement with the United States. A new 

facility for the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) in Cap Haitien was completed and 

staffed. However, operational funding remained inadequate. The Bureau de Lutte 

contre le Trafic Illicite de Stupefiants (BLTS), the counternarcotics unit of the HNP, 

restricted to the capital by lack of transport resources, did little without DEA leadership and involvement. 

Corruption, weak law enforcement capability, and lack of GOH commitment combined to limit cooperation in general, although Haitian officials have cooperated in 

some specific cases. The GOH’s major achievement was its expulsion of four drug 

traffickers, including the notorious Jacques Beaudoin Ketant, to the U.S. for prosecution. Haiti’s ongoing political and economic crises continued to grip the country 

in 2003, eclipsing the fight against drug trafficking. Serious allegations persisted 

that high-level government and police officials are involved in drug trafficking. 

Haiti remains highly susceptible to money laundering due to its weak legal system and pervasive corruption. The money laundering law passed in 2002 has not 

been implemented. The anti-money laundering commission finally submitted candidate lists for Director General and deputy DG to the President and the Minister 

of Justice. On December 11, 2003, the GOH inaugurated the Financial Intelligence 

Unit (FIU) to serve as a clearinghouse for information relating to money laundering 

and other misuses of the financial system. The FIU will simultaneously serve as a 

conduit for the transfer of seized assets to the Ministry of Finance. Haiti is a party 

to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. 

II. Status of Country 

The political disconnect between supporters and opponents of President Aristide 

deepened in 2003 and took on violent overtones. The economy remained stalled and 

attracted little foreign investment, and trafficking in drugs and aliens remained one 

of the few reliable avenues to wealth. The currency fluctuated around 40 to one 

against the dollar. Fuel price controls were lifted just before January 2003, doubling 

prices overnight and affecting law enforcement’s ability to conduct operations. In 

December 2003, months of unrest erupted in demonstrations by the political opposition and by Lavalas supporters, the latter strengthened by roving gangs of 

‘‘chimeres’’ (thugs). 

The HNP continued to lose mid-level and senior officers but retained overall membership levels with the graduation of about 850 new agents in 2003. Under Lavalas 

pressure, unqualified Aristide loyalists were placed in key HNP positions, which relegated U.S.-trained officers to secondary positions. For instance, the 14th police 

academy class is almost entirely composed of Aristide loyalists, including many who 

are totally illiterate. The government does not provide adequate resources to the police. The GOH routinely pays HNP officials late or not at all, and new recruits are 

often assigned without uniforms, firearms, training, or supervision. Severely limited 

international assistance has damaged both the HNP and the judiciary and contributed to their erosion in numbers and effectiveness. The Organization of American 

States assigned 24 foreign police advisors mid-year, but a lack of GOH support for 

their mission limited its impact. 

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

During the year, the GOH moved cautiously toward fulfillment of its commitments made in the Letter of Agreement of May 15, 2002. A National Drug Control 

Strategy Bill, developed with OAS support, is still being debated in Congress. The 

GOH has not yet ratified the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The 

GOH occasionally permitted U.S. hot pursuit into territorial waters and assisted in 

one pursuit in January 2003. A few investigations of official drug-related corruption 

were started, but none were carried through. Seizures remained low. No major drug 

trafficker was prosecuted or extradited, but four well-known traffickers were expelled to the U.S. Haitian law enforcement remained starved for resources. The 

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GOH did increase the number of HNP agents assigned to the BLTS and the HCG, 

and the new Coast Guard station at Cap-Haitien is staffed and operating. 

DEA provided a basic drug enforcement seminar for 32 BLTS agents in March 

2003. DEA polygraphed 26 BLTS agents in August 2003, and the four who failed 

were reassigned. The Embassy proposed establishment of a special drug court to the 

Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, but GOH officials took no action. 

On February 3, leading daily Le Nouvelliste published a list of ten officials who 

allegedly had their U.S. visas canceled. On the list were two highly placed HNP officials, National Police Superior Council member Carel Alexandre and BLTS commander Evintz Brillant. Both were soon relieved of their posts. Brillant’s supervisor, 

Jeannot Jean-Francois, sought asylum in the French embassy and eventually fled 

to Miami. In March, Jean-Claude Jean Baptiste, unofficial liaison between the Palace and violent gangs, was named head of the HNP, and soon was linked to a previous political murder and criminal activity. International protests led to his replacement in June by Jean-Robert Faveur, an uncorrupted, professional officer who 

fled the country within ten days of his appointment following political pressure that 

undermined his authority. The current head of the HNP is Jocelyn Pierre, a senior 

judge with no prior law enforcement experience, known for having bowed to political 

pressure in a high profile case. 

Corruption. There was no effort to curb drug-related corruption, and no prosecutions or convictions of major traffickers took place in Haiti. Involvement of government and HNP officials in drug trafficking continued to hamper cooperation and 

erode trust between Haitian and foreign law enforcement agencies. There is strong 

evidence of interference by Haitian law enforcement officials, particularly leaking 

information on planned operations, as well as considerable involvement in trafficking. 

On October 5, 2003, a twin-engine Aztec aircraft landed near Cap-Haitien and 

offloaded 500 kilograms of cocaine. The Secretary of Public Security refused to take 

action to apprehend three traffickers lodged at the Continental Hotel until DEA 

pressure forced their arrest. Witnesses have often observed light aircraft landing 

with drug cargoes on Route 9 in Port-au-Prince. Typically, HNP officers will block 

traffic and help with off-loading and ground transport. 

Law Enforcement Efforts. On June 18, Jacques Ketant, one of Haiti’s most notorious drug traffickers, was expelled by the GOH. The GOH subsequently expelled 

three other traffickers in similar fashion. With Haitian cooperation, DEA has seized 

several large houses belonging to Ketant. Haitian citizen Salim Jean Batrony, arrested in 2002 with 58 kilograms of cocaine, was released, causing a scandal in 

which the judge was dismissed, but Mr. Batrony was not re-arrested. 

There were no joint large-scale U.S.-Haiti law enforcement counternarcotics operations in 2003 in part because of the disappointing results of Operation Hurricane 

in 2002. 

The HCG was involved in three significant law enforcement cases during the year. 

On September 18, Cap-Haitien officers seized $400,000 from the M/V NIKLAS II. 

On October 13, the Cap-Haitien detachment stopped a boatload of migrants who reportedly intended to smuggle drugs to Miami. In November, the Coast Guard intercepted a boat carrying 40 pounds of marijuana. 

During 2003, the U.S. invoked the 2002 Bilateral Agreement to Suppress Illicit 

Maritime Drug Traffic eight times, pursuing suspect vessels into territorial waters 

and sometimes boarding them. In all cases, Haitian authorities have permitted 

search of Haitian-flag vessels, sometimes without the presence of a Haitian law enforcement official. 

Haitian drug trafficking organizations continue to operate with relative impunity. 

The arrival of cocaine from South America is generally unimpeded, due to the 

HNP’s lack of human and material resources. Haiti’s roads are very poor, and the 

HNP has no air assets. The HCG has no presence on the south coast and, even with 

assistance from the U.S. Coast Guard, its ability to patrol in other areas is limited 

by frequent vessel breakdowns. The BLTS has no permanent presence outside Portau-Prince and no effective means of transport. The GOH does not provide the HCG 

or BLTS with necessary equipment, maintenance, or logistical support. 

Agreements and Treaties. Haiti is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Haiti’s law on the control and suppression of illicit drug trafficking reflects most of the 

Convention’s provisions; however, there has been no serious effort to implement it. 

Extradition is carried out under the 1905 U.S.-Haiti extradition treaty. Haitian law 

prohibits the extradition of its nationals. The GOH has cooperated with specific requests for expulsion of non-Haitians, and this year for the first time expelled Haitian drug traffickers. The GOH has not yet ratified the OAS mutual legal assistance 

treaty. Haiti has signed, but not yet ratified, the Inter-American Convention 

Against Corruption. 

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Cultivation/Production. Illicit cultivation in Haiti is limited to minor amounts of 

marijuana. There is no information on drug production or use of precursors. 

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). There are no viable demand reduction 

or rehabilitation programs. Polling data indicate that domestic marijuana and cocaine use, while low, continues to rise. 

Drug Flow/Transit. Embassy Port-au-Prince estimates that the flow of cocaine 

through Haiti has continued to increase, with some cocaine going to the U.S. 

through the Dominican Republic, whose 225-mile (360 km) border with Haiti is 

largely uncontrolled. Approximately 8 percent of the cocaine destined for the U.S. 

transited Haiti and/or the Dominican Republic. Cocaine arrives in the country by 

maritime or air conveyances. Traffickers forward these shipments onward using 

maritime vessels or over land to the Dominican Republic. During 2003, United 

States authorities seized drugs concealed on five different commercial vessels arriving in Miami from Haitian ports, totaling 1,214 pounds of cocaine. 

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 

The U.S. plan for combating illegal drug trafficking via Haiti remains one of interdiction along with police and judicial institution-building. However, several factors 

work against successful implementation of that plan-forewarned smugglers elude 

the HNP, and low or no response by the HNP to DEA intelligence allows suspected 

air and sea deliveries to be completed without challenge. The GOH’s slow implementation of the bilateral counternarcotics assistance agreement also hinders significant 

achievement, and lack of resources and lack of political will are equally to blame. 

The Road Ahead. Stemming the flow of illegal narcotics through Haiti remains 

a cornerstone of U.S. counternarcotics policy. Key preconditions to stemming the illegal flow remain improving the effectiveness of GOH law enforcement and judicial 

institutions and strengthening the GOH’s ability to fund these institutions by encouraging development of an effective system of liquidating assets seized from arrested smugglers. The new HCG base at Cap-Haitien must be supplemented with 

a small BLTS detachment and eventually replicated on the south coast. The road 

ahead is obstructed by the politicization and corruption of the police and judiciary, 

and further obscured at this time by social disorder and political violence. 

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LETTERS FROM HAITIAN-AMERICANS IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REVEREND WALTER FAUNTROY, FORMER DELEGATE TO THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


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U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT—FACT SHEET 

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO HAITI

FEBRUARY 23, 2004

On Tuesday, February 24, 2004, USAID will dispatch a three-person team to 

Haiti. The team will work closely with the Embassy, USAID Mission, and non-government organization (NGOs) partners to assess humanitarian conditions and monitor and coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance. 

The ongoing political turmoil and economic instability in Haiti have created a potential humanitarian crisis, and have affected numerous aspects of development 

such as food security, health, nutrition, water and sanitation. While sufficient food 

stocks are currently in-country and no immediate food crisis exists at present, this 

could change quickly in coming weeks, especially in the north, due to insecurity and 

disruptions of transport and distribution. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has more than 11,000 metric tons of food for direct distribution in 

country for food assistance development programs. 

The U.S. Government through USAID is Haiti’s largest bilateral donor. In 2003, 

USAID contributed $71 million. Through fiscal years 1995–2003, USAID provided 

a total of $850 million in direct bilateral assistance. For FY04, USAID has planned 

$52 million in assistance to programs ranging from health, democracy and governance, education and economic growth. To ensure that assistance goes to those Haitians most in need, USAID assistance is channeled principally through NGO’s. The 

U.S. provides food and food-related assistance directly and indirectly to 650,000 poor 

Haitians. 

USAID is the lead donor in providing assistance to combat the spread of HIV/

AIDS in Haiti by working through U.S. private health organizations and Haitian 

NGO’s. Haiti has also been singled out by President George W. Bush as a priority 

country for preventing Mother to Child Transmission of HIV/AIDS, resulting in several million dollars more each year of funding to help mothers and children. U.S. 

assistance works to alleviate poverty, illiteracy, and malnutrition and promotes respect for human rights and the rule of law. 

A major humanitarian concern at present is the breakdown in the provision of 

basic health services, particularly in the north. The two main hospitals in Port-auPrince lack supplies and drugs and are barely functioning. Similar disruptions are 

occurring in Gona?s, Haiti’s fourth largest city, and other areas. 

CARE, a USAID recipient, has distributed 520 metric tons (MT) of food commodities to the population of Gona?s. The International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC) and CARE have negotiated limited safe passage to Gona?s. World Vision 

International (WVI) reports that there is no food emergency in Hinche, due to a 

good December harvest. Scarcity of fuel is a major problem in many areas and has 

hindered humanitarian operations, mainly in the north. 

CARE reports that there is a potable water crisis in Gona?s due to the lack of 

fuel. The Haitian electrical company does not have enough fuel to continue to supply 

Gona?s with potable water. Although CARE has food stocks in the port of Port-auPrince, the organization lacks fuel for transportation, particularly for food distributions in the north. 

On February 18, 2004, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti James B. Foley issued a disaster 

declaration due to the ongoing complex humanitarian emergency in Haiti. USAID 

provided $50,000 to support the transport and distribution of emergency relief supplies, including 12 medical kits and three surgical kits, valued at approximately 

$87,000. Each medical kit is equipped to serve 10,000 people for approximately 

three months. 

In addition, USAID approved $400,000 in funding for the Pan American Health 

Organization (PAHO) to purchase additional medical supplies and to conduct emergency relief activities in Haiti. To date, a total of $537,000 has been allocated for 

transport and distribution of medical supplies, as well as the purchasing of medical 

equipment and emergency health activities. 

For more information about USAID’s ongoing efforts in Haiti, visit 

www.usaid.gov/haiti. 

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

ISLAND OF DISENCHANTMENT (EXCERPTS)

CHARLES LANE

SEPTEMBER 29, 1997

This obscure underworld episode would be of no interest outside Haiti except for 

one fact: Eddy Arbrouet is also wanted for the August 1996 murder of Antoine Leroy 

and Jacques Fleurival, two right-wing opponents of the U.S.-backed Haitian government. A pile of evidence links Arbrouet to the murders—and other evidence suggests that he was acting in collaboration with senior officers of Haiti’s Presidential 

Security Unit, the American-trained and—financed corps of official bodyguards who 

protect Haiti’s president, Rene Preval. Haitian officials deny that any such conspiracy existed. But U.S. officials and other sources familiar with the incident say 

the killing was one in a series carried out by political hit men who appear to have 

been operating from within the National Palace. 

Aristide promised the U.S. that ‘‘national reconciliation,’’ not vengeance, would 

follow his return to office. But with Arbrouet still at large, and twenty-six political 

murders since 1995 still officially unsolved, that promise—and hence the promise 

of democratic rule—seems unfulfilled. 

On August 19, the United Nations announced it would provide no further aid to 

elections in Haiti ‘‘ until the credibility and transparency of the electoral process are 

re-established.’’

And then there are the political murders, for which no one has yet been convicted, 

or even formally charged, and which remain a source of quiet tension between the 

United States and Haiti. The Clinton administration has informed Preval that the 

Leroy-Fleurival investigation is a test case of Haiti’s commitment to the rule of law; 

it has done so largely because Republicans in Congress have made clear they see 

Haiti’s response to the murders as a test of the Clinton administration’s policy 

The trail of blood that leads to Eddy Arbrouet’s hideout began at 3:45 in the afternoon of March 28, 1995, on a busy street in Port-au-Prince. Mireille Durocher Bertin 

and a client, Eugene Baillergeau Jr., were sitting in their car, stuck in a traffic jam, 

when two assailants opened fire on them with a 9 mm pistol and a 5.56 mm machine gun. Both died on the spot. 

Coming soon after Aristide’s restoration to power, the murder of Bertin and her 

associate sent a chill through Haiti: Bertin, an attorney for members of the traditional elite, was one of Aristide’s leading critics. Shortly before her death, she had 

sent a letter to U.S. military authorities, who were in control of the island at the 

time. Written on behalf of the right-wing Mobilization for National Development 

Party (MDN), the letter accused an Aristide government intelligence operative 

named Patric Moise of being involved in a plot to kill 100 members of the rightwing elite. 

nine days before the killing, a Haitian employee of the U.S. forces had made a 

startling statement to his American boss: Moise had asked him to assist in a plan 

to kill Bertin. Mondesir Beaubrun, then Aristide’s minister of interior, had purportedly offered Moise $5,000 to carry out the hit. The U.S. Army immediately arrested 

five suspects, including Moise, catching four of the alleged conspirators in an Isuzu 

Trooper owned by the Ministry of Interior, a car Moise said Minister Beaubrun had 

lent to him. 

But then U.S. officials made a strange decision. Rather than warn Bertin about 

the plots directly, they asked Aristide and his Minister of Justice, Jean-Joseph 

Exume, to warn Bertin. (Some U.S. embassy officials had argued that U.S. officials 

should warn Bertin directly, but they were overruled by the U.S. Ambassador, William Swing, according to a General Accounting Office report about the affair.) 

Whatever the case, U.S. officials were palpably alarmed when Bertin showed up 

dead despite what they thought was a good-faith understanding that Aristide and 

his justice minister would protect her. With President Clinton set to arrive for a triumphal visit to Haiti on April 1, Ambassador Swing asked Aristide to invite FBI 

agents to help crack the case. 

The FBI quickly discounted theories that the murders had been related to a robbery, drug trafficking or a family dispute. Instead, the investigators said, the most 

likely scenario was that a second group of government hit men had taken over after 

the U.S. nipped the Beaubrun-Moise plot in the bud. Among the leads were radio 

conversations intercepted by the U.S. military the day of the killing, in which two 

men appeared to be talking about following Bertin’s car. The two men were Joseph 

Medard, then the deputy chief of Aristide’s bodyguards, and Lieutenant Pierre 

Lubin of the Interim Public Security Force (ipsf), the police force that Aristide seVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:45 Jun 14, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00179 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\WH\030304\92343 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
176

lected—and financed with U.S. money—to help American troops keep order during 

the transition. The FBI began trying to question Medard, Lubin and several other 

officials of the ipsf and the National Palace. 

1. Suddenly, FBI agents found themselves in the position of having to investigate 

the very government officials who were supposed to help them solve the case. The 

Haitians were not accommodating. Haitian officials told the FBI agents they could 

not investigate the Bertin case unless they also agreed to investigate twenty killings 

by the ousted military regime. In May, FBI agents saw Haitian government vehicles 

parked menacingly near the home of a key witness. Witnesses told of threats from 

the ipsf. 

Ambassador Swing sent the State Department a cable saying that ‘‘the FBI investigation of the Bertin assassination is at a standstill due to lack of Haitian government cooperation.’’

After the FBI quit, the Bertin case was assigned to the Haitian police force’s new 

Special Investigations Unit. The unit consists of a small U.S.-funded team of Haitians working under the direction of an American adviser with forensic support from 

the FBI. At Haitian insistence, the unit is also looking into killings by the ousted 

military regime; but it has had plenty of new business. Indeed, the suspicious 

killings continued while the FBI was still in town. 

1. Michel Gonzales, a prominent Haitian airline executive, lived with his horses 

on forty acres in the Port-au-Prince exurb of Tabarre. 

Gonzales’s next-door neighbor was a powerful Haitian, too: Aristide. On two occasions around the time of Aristide’s return to Haiti, Aristide’s advisers, Jean-Marie 

Cherestal and Leslie Voltaire, asked U.S. officials to obtain the land for Aristide’s 

use, according to two U.S. sources familiar with the events. The request was refused. 

At that point, Gonzales’s friends say, visitors began arriving and telling Gonzales 

pointedly to get out. He didn’t. On May 22, 1995, two men on a motorbike shot 

Gonzales dead in front of Aristide’s place, while Gonzales’s wife and daughter—both 

American citizens—looked on in horror. 

Two days after the cops found Gonzales dead, Michel-Ange Hermann, a former 

colonel in the fadh, was gunned down. And in the run-up to the national elections, 

assassins felled two minor Senate candidates: Leslie Grimar, an auto parts dealer, 

and Max Mayard, a former general with the fadh. An FBI inspection of shell casings 

found at the Bertin, Hermann, Mayard and Grimar murder scenes has established 

that the bullets were all fired from the same gun. They also match shell casings 

found at the Leroy-Fleurival homicide scene. Which brings us back to the case 

Two days after the cops found Gonzales dead, Michel-Ange Hermann, a former 

colonel in the fadh, was gunned down. And in the run-up to the national elections, 

assassins felled two minor Senate candidates: Leslie Grimar, an auto parts dealer, 

and Max Mayard, a former general with the fadh. An FBI inspection of shell casings 

found at the Bertin, Hermann, Mayard and Grimar murder scenes has established 

that the bullets were all fired from the same gun. They also match shell casings 

found at the Leroy-Fleurival homicide scene. Which brings us back to the case 

Two days after the cops found Gonzales dead, Michel-Ange Hermann, a former 

colonel in the fadh, was gunned down. And in the run-up to the national elections, 

assassins felled two minor Senate candidates: Leslie Grimar, an auto parts dealer, 

and Max Mayard, a former general with the fadh. An FBI inspection of shell casings 

found at the Bertin, Hermann, Mayard and Grimar murder scenes has established 

that the bullets were all fired from the same gun. They also match shell casings 

found at the Leroy-Fleurival homicide scene. Which brings us back to the case 

The summer of 1996 was a politically tense period in Port-au-Prince. U.S. intelligence developed reliable information that Haitian rightists and ex-fadh officers 

were arming for a coup against President Preval. Shots were fired at the National 

Palace. On August 17, Preval’s police tackled the threat by rounding up nineteen 

former fadh members at the headquarters of the same party with which Bertin had 

been associated, the MDN. Three days after that, Leroy and Fleurival were killed. 

Within hours of the shooting, the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince had convincing 

evidence that several presidential bodyguards had been present at the crime. (The 

Los Angeles Times has reported that the evidence consisted of intercepted radio conversations among the bodyguards.) Police found a Taurus 9 mm pistol next to 

Leroy’s body. The serial number on the Taurus identified it as property of the presidential bodyguards. 

Even more damning evidence about Arbrouet’s ties to the National Palace has 

emerged since then. Arbrouet was a paid informant for the presidential bodyguards, 

working directly for the top officer, Joseph Moise. Arbrouet had both an entry pass 

to the National Palace and a government-issued gun. 

177

The Clintonites tried to handle the dilemma by dispatching forty-six American 

bodyguards to watch Preval’s back while he began the delicate process of removing 

the ten bodyguards who were suspected of having knowledge of, or a role in, the 

killings. Moise, the top officer, was one of the first to be suspended at U.S. insistence. But Preval dragged his feet about firing the men, and delays cropped up in 

the Haitian investigation.

Æ