VIETNAM STUD

AIRMOBILIT

1961-1

DEPARTMENT OF THE AR

AIRMOBILITY 

1961-1971 

by 

Lieutenant Geneml John J. Tolson 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON , D.C., 1999 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-600371 

First Printed 1973-CMH Pub 90-4 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, DC 20402 
Dedication 

This study is humbly dedicated to the memory of the follow

airmobile battalion commanders who were killed in action du

the period I commanded the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam: 

Lieutenant Colonel Bob L. Gregory 

Lieutenant Colonel Herlihy T. Long 

Lieutenant Colonel Howard P. Petty 

Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Runkle 

These gallant men-and all the honored dead of that war-wil

always in the thoughts and prayers of their comrades-in-arms. 

111 

Foreword 

The United States Army has met an unusually complex c

lenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other serv

the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assistin

emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its 

choosing, free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual probl

of waging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia 

required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks o

Inodern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adap

them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved h

ing to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing w

the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting 

ventional campaigns against well-trained and determined reg

units. 

As this assignment nears an end, the U.S. Army must pre

for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that 

tory never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever pro

from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, 

Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study o

experience, its shortcomings no less, than its achievements. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histo

will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experienc

Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the m

salient aspects of that experience can be made available now

the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of se

officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who 

carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepar

series of monographs. These studies should be of great valu

helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at 

same time contributing to the historical record and providing 

American public with an interim report on the performanc

men and officers who have responded, as others have through 

history, to exacting and trying demands. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on of

records, with additional material from published and unpubli

secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with 

participants, and from the personal experience of the author

v 
The author of this monograph, Lieutenant General John J. 

Tolson, has been involved with the airmobile concept since June 

1939, when he participated in the first tactical air movement of 

ground forces by the U.S. Army. Participating in all the combat 

jumps of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment during Work! 

\Var 11, he became an Army aviator in 1957, and later served as 

Director of Army Aviation and Commandant of the U.S. Army 

Aviation School. From April 1967 to July 1968 he served as Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Vietnam. 

General Tolson is now Deputy Commanding General, Continental 

Amly Command. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 November 1972 

VI 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General, USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

The purpose of this study is to trace the evolution of airmob

in the U.S. Army. The integration of aircraft into the org

structure of the ground forces is as radical a change as the m

from the horse to the truck, and the process is only beginning

Because this change is not the product of one man or one s

group of men but rather a fortunate confluence of techno

tactics, and imagination, proper credit to every responsible 

vidual is impossible. I have tried to identify some of those pe

who made a major contribution throughout the years. I apolo

to those people whose names have been omitted either becau

oversight or lack of space. 

Although Vietnam was the first large combat test of airmob

air assault operations in Southeast Asia would not have been 

sible without certain key decisions a decade earlier. This s

attempts to trace the most important milestones which led to 

eventual formation of airmobile divisions. 

It would be impossible in a single volume to adequately 

scribe ev'ery airmobile operation in Vietnam during the 

1961-197l. Therefore, only selected operations have been ch

as examples of different airmobile tactics. Many of these 

selected because of the author's personal knowledge. Ano

author might have selected different operations. 

I believe I'd be remiss.in this account if I were not candid 

the reader on some of the pros and cons of airmobility. T

throughout the text, I have inserted comments that are inte

to broaden the reader's view of this issue. 

This study is aimed at a broad audience, some of whom 

only have a passing familiarity with Army aircraft systems. T

systems are pictured in an appendix with appropriate data on 

Over 300 major source documents were reviewed during 

preparation of this study. For the serious student we have ident

a rich vein that, as yet, has not been deeply mined. Thousan

important stories, yet untold, lay buried in these pages. Le

has permitted us to extract only a few. 

I wish to thank the many senior officers who went out of 

way to contribute their own special comments for this monog

Vll 
of my monograph contains no documentation, the extent of my 

indebtedness to these two officers is not readily apparent. Major 

Harber's manuscript was subsequently published by the U.S. Army 

Aviation Systems Command under the title, LogisticaL Support of 

Airmobile Opemtions, RepubLic of Vietnam, 1961-1971. 

Finally, I must recognize the two officers who were primarily 

responsible for researching, drafting, and compiling this volume. 

Colonel James J. Brockmyer, who was my senior assistant, has been 

associated with airmobility for more than two decades and was the 

editor of the test report of the 11 th Air Assault Division. CW-2 

Charlie M. Montgomery, who researched and typed the multiple 

drafts, was a special assistant to General Westmoreland for four 

years in Vietnam. These two officers must share with me any credit 

(or blame) that this study might generate. 

Airmobility is no panacea; it brings with it many unique problems as well as unique capabilities. It is hoped that this study will 

give the reader some insight into both of these areas. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 ~oveOlber 1972 

VUI 

JOH~ J. TOLSO~ 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 
Contents 

Chapter 

I. THE GROWTH OF THE AIRMOBILE CONCEPT 

The First Airmobile Units in Vietnam 

The Growth of the Concept. . . . 

The Armed Helicopter . . . . . . 

Stall Plans an Army Aircraft «.Family" 

The Rogers Board . . . . 

Army-Air Force Differences . . . . 

Vietnam Fleet Expands . . . . . . 

The Events Leading to the Howze Board 

The Howze Board . . . 

The Howze Board Report. . . . 

II. THE EARLY YEARS IN VIETNAM, 1961-1965 . 

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Becomes 

Airmobile . . 

Enemy Reaction . . . . . . . . . 

Early Problems . . . . . . . . . . 

The Armed Helicopter in Vietnam . 

Techniques of Using the Armed Helicopter. 

Tactical Troop Transport. . . . . . 

Methodology of the Early Air Assaults 

The Eagle Flight . . . . . . . 

The Growing Aircraft Inventory 

The Mohawk in Vietnam . . . 

The Caribou in Vietnam . . . 

Other Army Aviation Units in Vietnam. 

Increasing Viet Cong Threat. . . . . . 

III. THE EARLY YEARS IN THE UNITED STATES, 

1963-1965 ..... . .. 

The Air Assault Tests. 

lX 
BUILDUP. 1965 ......... . 

Buildup of u.s. Ground Forces . 

A Critique of an Air Assault . 

Aviation Support . . . . . 

Growing Pains . . . . . . 

Deployment of the Cavalry . 

The An Khe Hub. 

The 1a Drang .. 

Overview of 1965 . 

V. AIRMOBILITY COMES OF AGE. 1966 . 

Airmobility in the Delta. . . . 

Airmobile Logistics . . . . . . 

The Army·s "Aircraft Carrier" .. 

The 1st Cavalry Division in Binh Dinh . 

The Role of the Chinook . 

Operation Crazy Horse ..... . 

VI. AIRMOBILE DEVELOPMENTS. 1966 . 

The Genesis of the 1st Aviation Brigade. 

The Caribou Transfer . 

Army Aviation Personnel 

"Arc Light" . . . . . . 

Techniques of the lOlst . 

Airmobility and the U.S. "Presence" . 

Fall, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Artillery in the Airmobile Concept. 

Other Operations . . . . . . . . . 

VII. THE PEAK YEAR. 1967 . . . . . 

Parachute Assault in Vietnam 

Change of Command . . . 

Operation Lejeune . . . . 

The Cavalry Spread Thin 

x 

63 

63 

64 

66 

67 

68 

72 

73 

83 

86 

86 

88 

91 

92 

94 

95 

102 

102 

104 

108 

113 

114 

115 

117 

120 

123 

126 

126 

129 

130 

136 
DECCA 

"Fire Brigades" Sent North . . 

Operation Pershing Continues 

Tam Quan ..... 

1967 Draws to a Close 

VIII. TET, 1968 .. ... . .... . 

Summary of Operation Pershing 

The Enemy Tet Offensive . .. 

The Tet Offensive at Quang Tri . 

The Move North . .... . 

The Battle of Quang Tri City 

The 1st Cavalry at Hue 

Summary of Tet .. .. 

IX. MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1968 

Khe Sanh ...... . 

Operation Pegasus . . . 

9th Division in the Delta 

The A Shau Valley . . . 

X. AIRMOBILE DEVELOPMENTS, 1968 

Change of Command at Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam . . . . . 

Enemy Helicopters1 . . . . . . . 

The Second Airmobile Division .. 

Thoughts on Leaving the Cavalry . 

Status of the 1st Aviation Br£gade . 

An Example of Cordon Operations . 

T he Cavalry Moves South . . . . . 

XI. THE CHANGING WAR AND CAMBODIA, 1969-1970 

The Changing War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Supporting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

in the Delta . . . . . . . . . . 

The Cavalry's Cambodian Campaign 

Xl 
gzg

Into Laos. . . . . . . 235 

The Battle . . . . . . 240 

Review of Airmobile Support During Lamson 719 244 

XIII. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 253 

APPENDIX. ARMY AIRCRAFT PHOTOGRAPHS. . .. 261 

GLOSSARY 

INDEX 

Charts 

No. 

I. 1st Cavalry Division Organization . 

2. 1st Aviation Brigade Organization 

Maps 

285 

291 

Page 

59 

203 

I. South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 

2. The Ia Drang Valley. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 

3. Comparative Sizes: United States and South Vietnam. 116 

4. Operation Pegasus. 1-2 April 1968 173 

5. Operation Pegasus. 3-4 April 1968 175 

6. Operation Pegasus. 5-6 April 1968 176 

7. A Shau Valley . . . 183 

tl. Vinh Loc Island. . . 205 

9. Thrust into Cambodia 219 

10. The City . . . . . . 225 

II. Tactical Concept of LAMSON 719 239 

12. LAMSON 719 ...... 243 

xii 
The Boxer, Loaded with 1st Air Cavalry Aircraft, Just Prior to 

Departure for Vietnam. . . . 

The Boxer Leaves for Vietnam . . . . . . . 

Jumping From a Huey Helicopter . . . . . . 

Troops Boarding CH-47 Chinook Helicopters. 

CH-47 Chinook Delivering IOS-mm Howitzer (Towed ) with 

Ammunition Pallet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CH-54 Skyhook Helicopter Delivering 155-mm Howitzer. .. 

Combat Assault-Troops Moving Out to Secure the Landing Zone 

Huey Cobra Firing in Support of a Combat Assault. . . . . . 

Awaiting the Second Wave of Combat Helicopters on an Isolated 

Landing Zone During Operation Pershing . _ . . . . . . . 

A Blue Team Rifle Squad From the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry 

Exiting From a Huey Helicopter. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 

Landing Zone Stallion in the A Shau Valley, Occupied by the 

1st Brigade Headquarters, 1st Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cambodians Fill Bags with Captured Rice, 18 May 1970 . . . . 

A CH-47 Chinook Helicopter Lifts Off a Slingload of Ammunition From Fire SupportBas~ Myron in Cambodia, 24 June 

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Troops Descending an Aerial Ladder Into Triple Canopied 

Jungle ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 

CH-47 Chinook Delivering Captured Rice in Republic of Vietnam Controlled Rural Area 

UH-19D Chickasaw 

CH-34C Choctaw 

CH-23 Raven . . 

OH-13S Sioux. . 

CH-37B Mohave . 

XH-40 . . . . . 

UH-IA Iroquois . 

CH-47 Chinook . 

CH-21 C Shawnee 

UH-IB Iroquois 

UH-ID Iroquois 

UH-IC Iroquois 

CH-54 Tarhe . . 

OH-6A Cayuse . 

AH-IG Huey Cobra 

OH- 58A Kiowa . . 

XUl 
OV-IMohawk . 

U-21 Ute ... 

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files. 

XIV 

283 

284 
AIRMOBILITY, 1961-1971 

---> 

CHAPTER I 

The Growth of the Ainnobile Concep

The First Airmobile Units in Vietnam 

On 11 December 1961 the United States aircraft carrier U

Card docked in downtown Saigon with 32 U. S. Army H-21 

copters and 400 men. The 57th Transportation Company (L

Helicopter) from Fort Lewis, Wash., and the 8th Transporta

Company (Light Helicopter) from Fort Bragg, N. C., had arr

in Southeast Asia. This event had a two-fold significance: it 

the first major symbol of United States combat power in Vietn

and, it was the beginning of a new era of airmobility in the Un

States Army. 

Just twelve days later these helicopters were committed into 

first airmobile combat action in Vietnam, Operation CHOP

Approximately 1,000 Vietnamese paratroopers were airlifted 

a suspected Viet Cong headquarters complex about ten miles 

of the Vietnamese capitol. The paratroopers captured an elu

underground radio transmitter after meeting only slight resist

from a surprised enemy. Major George D. Hardesty, Jr. of the 

Transportation Company and Major Robert J. Dillard of the 

could report that their units had performed outstandingly u

their first baptism of fire. 

The events of December 1961 prefaced a decade of unparall

growth of airmobility. But they also were a culmination of m

decisions during the preceding decade which allowed the Presi

of the United States to exercise this option in support of the 

ernment of Vietnam. 

The Growth of the Concept 

In its broadest sense, the airmobility concept envisages the 

of aerial vehicles organic to the Army to assure the balanc

mobility, firepower, intelligence, support-and command and 

trol. The story of airmobility in the Army is inextricably i

woven with the story of Army aviation. Airmobility could 
- j 

The airmobility concept was not a product of Vietnam expediency. It would probably not be practical to make a record of every 

decision which formed a part of the airmobile concept. It certainly 

had its roots in both the airborne techniques of World War II and 

the early doctrine for organic aviation for ground forces for that 

era. However, from a practical viewpoint, the embryonic decision 

can be said to be the Army's move to form twelve helicopter battalions on 21 August 1952. This key decision was made to commit 

the Army to airmobility even though a practical troop-carrying 

helicopter was still unproven and the helicopter tactics and techniques existed only in the minds of a handful of men. Though 

the twelve battalion goal was overly optimistic at that time, it 

dramatized how the impact of Korean experience had influenced 

Army planners. 

In Korea the Army had learned that the difficult terrain in that 

land mass and the numerical superiority of the enemy combined 

to provide the communist with an advantage that was not easily 

balanced by the qualitative superiority of the American soldier 

and his supporting firepower. Many thoughtful officers had watched 

the little observation helicopter-turned ambulance-flit up and 

down the steep hills with effortless agility. It was not hard to envision the possibilities inherent in hundreds of larger machines 

carrying combat troops up and over those deadly slopes. The 

Marines had already demonstrated the possibility of a small unit 

being carried into combat and the helicopter itself was beginning 

to mature, with more power and more dependability. 

After Korea many senior commanders restudied the lessons of 

that war and compared actual campaign operations with hypothetical airmobile operations under the same conditions. Various 

Army aviators and members of the helicopter industry were keeping a close watch on the French and British helicopter operations 

in Algeria and Malaysia. 

The mid-fifties were gestation years for new tactics and technology. Major General James M. Gavin's article in Harpers magazine (April 1954) "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses!" was 

indicative of the sort of vision some enthusiasts had for the future. 

The .article was an unofficial summation of several staff· studies 

prepared in his. office while he was G-3, Department of the Army. 

During this period I was General Gavin's Director of Doctrine and 

Combat Development, and through his Deputy, Major General 
g 

p

entirely by accident, one of the key action officers was a y

Major Edwin C. ("Spec") Powell, later to become Directo

Army Aviation. 

The growing helicopter industry was groping for direction 

the military. At the same time, its engineers were pushing d

proposals to potential military customers who weren't at all 

of their requirements. Many new approaches to vertical (or 

vertical) flight were being tested as a replacement for, or an e

sion of, the helicopter. For the first time, the Army placed m

Research and Development funds in aeronautic programs. 

There were precious few guidelines for airmobile doctrin

the early fifties and none had the formal stamp as official U

Army policy. Recognizing this deficiency, General Gavin dec

to plant the seed in the Army School System. Through the 

offices of Major General Robert M. Young, G-I of the Army, 

Major General Joseph H . Harper, Commandant of the Infa

School, I was ordered to Fort Benning with instructions to dev

tactical doctririe for the combat employment of helicopters. 

As Director of the Airborne Department, I was able to bro

its charter and change the name to the Airborne-Army Avi

Department. A new Airmobility Division was established as 

focal point for doctrinal innovation. We started gathering 

necessary people and equipment to develop procedures, orga

tional concepts, and materiel requirements for airmobility. A 

copter company, equipped with H-19's and, later, H-34's 

placed at our disposal for field experiments. The company 

mander, Major William C. Howell, Jr., was to beco:ne Presi

Eisenhower's personal helicopter pilot and, after retirement, cu

of the U. S. Army Aviation Museum at Fort Rucker. 

The results of a few months of concentrated activity 

climaxed with the publication of a new field manual, FM 57

"Army Transport Aviation-Combat Operations." The basic ta

and techniques described in this manual stood the test of time 

would be vindicated in the tests of the II th Air Assault Div

and in Vietnam. 

The first formal military requirement for an aerial weapon 

Army helicopters was initiated during this same period at 

Benning and, subsequently, approved through the chains of 

mand by Department of the Army. The requirement specifi
y 

ppg ppp

combat assault. Unfortunately, the light turret gun was never 

developed .as conceived, but the Ordnance Corps latched onto the 

requirement as the justification of expenditures in the initial development of helicopter armament. 

The Armed Helicopter 

During this same time frame, a small group of pioneers, with 

the blessing and backing of Brigadier General Carl I. Hutton, 

Commandant of the Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, 

were making the first crude experiments with armed helicopters. 

Scrounging discarded hardware from the other services' junkyards, 

they improvised various combinations of machine guns and rockets 

in the face of ridicule and outright opposition. At the same time 

they began to develop tactics and techniques which they felt would 

prove useful when the technology of helicopter armament caught 

up to the theory. 

The guiding genius for much of this development was a colorful 

officer, Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool. Colonel Vanderpool was Chief 

of the U. S. Army Aviation School's Combat Development Office, 

which was under the direct supervision of the Assistant Commandant. This arrangement was fortuitous since we could make 

all the assets of the School available to his project if required. In 

June 1956, with two officers, two enlisted men, and unbounded 

enthusiasm, Colonel Vanderpool went to work without a charter, 

without money and, by explicit direction, without publicity. 

With borrowed personnel from the Department of Tactics, 

Colonel Vanderpool formed a "Sky-Cav" platoon which became 

notorious for its hair-raising demonstrations of aerial reconnaissance by fire. By mid-1957 this provisional unit, redesignated Aerial 

Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, had somehow acquired two 

H-21's. one H-25, and one H-19 armed with a wondrous variety 

of unlikely weapons. Colonel Vanderpool and his "hoods" were to 

see their efforts officially recognized when the Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Platoon became the nucleus of the 7292d Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company (Provisional) with an approved 

Table of Distribution sanctioned by the Department of the Army 

on 25 March 1958. In subsequent work, Colonel Vanderpool and 

his group developed, on paper, organizations for an "Armair" troop, 
of Army Aviation, on the organization of an 

Armair Divisi

Staff Plans an Army Aircraft "Family" 

Near the end of the 1950's, the Army staff recognized the o

whelming need to get its "aviation house" in order. It was bec

ing big business. Too many programs were going in too m

directions. Many Army agencies had separate responsibilities 

were pursuing their own program in happy isolation of the 

The Transportation Corps and Signal Corps had relucta

brought their test activities to Fort Rucker with the Army Avia

Test Board, but there were still many fragmented efforts at m

echelons. The Army seemed uncertain of its goals; Congress 

unhappy with some of the budget justifications; and, the avia

industry was uncertain . 

. At the end of June 1959, the Army had 5,500 aircraft, mo

them substandard, with a requirement for 6,400. Taking 

account normal losses, wearout, and attrition, the aviation pic

was very poor for 1970. The greatest need was for a light obse

tion aircraft to perform the "bread and butter" mission of A

aviation. 

One of the most important milestones during this pcriod 

the decision to develop the XH-40 Bell Utility Helicopter an

power it with a turbine engine. Although designed as an a

ambulance, it was recognized even then that this machine m

turn out to be the most useful aerial platform ever pu

production. 

In October 1959 the Army Chief of Research and Developm

Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, initiated an Army 

craft Development Plan to advance firm guidance for research 

development efforts during the next decade. He felt the plan w

bridge the gap between the Army and U. S. Air Force capabil

and give the Army the initiative in the manned aircraft field. 

dustry was expected to contribute a major effort. 

To implement the Army Aircraft Development Plan, the O

of the Chief of Research and Development prepared three b

development objectives which they called Army Study Requ

ments. These study requirements forecast a need for light obse

tion, manned surveillance, and tactical transport aircraft. T

were presented to all members of industry on 1 December 195
proaches to meet the requirements. 

The Rogers Board 

On 15 January 1960 the Army Chief of Staff established the 

Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board chaired by Lieutenant 

General Gordon B. Rogers, the Deputy Commanding General of 

the Continental Army Command, to consider the Army Aircraft 

Development Plan and to review the industry proposals. Other 

members of the Board were Major Generals Robert J. Wood, 

Hamilton H. Howze, Thomas F. Van Natta, Alva R. Fitch, Richard 

D. Meyer, and Ernest F. Easterbrook; and Brigadier Generals 

Lawrence J. Lincoln, William M. Thames, Jr., and Clifton F. 

von Kann. The Board was supported by the Army general staff 

and elements of the Continental Army Command. Colonel Robert 

R. Williams, then Chief of the Airmobility Division, Office of the 

Chief of Research and Development, was the guiding genius behind 

the formation of the Rogers Board and Secretary (without vote) . 

As the Deputy Director of Army Aviation, I also served on the 

Board without vote. 

On 1 February 1960, forty-five companies submitted 119 designed concepts as their solutions to the problems posed by the 

Army Study Requirements. These concepts were evaluated in two 

phases-a technical evaluation under the direction of the Chief of 

Transportation from 1-15 February and an opera!ional evaluation 

from 16-28 February under the direction of the Office of the Chief 

of Research and Development. 

It is important to note that this was the first time that most of 

the major aircraft companies took official notice of the aviation 

potential within the Army. Before the Rogers Board, only the 

helicopter manufacturers and a few light airplane companies had 

any comprehension of the Army's requirements. 

After the evaluation period, the Rogers Board met at Fort 

Monroe from 29 February to 6 March. During that time it reviewed 

the Army Aircraft Development Plan, discussed roles and missions 

of Army aviation, projected Army funding, assessed combat surveillance requirements, and detailed procurement plans. 

The Rogers Board made recommendations regarding three 

types of aircraft-observation, surveillance and transport. In the 

observation field it advocated conducting an immediate design 
phase out the existing observation aircraft, the L-19, H-13, a

H-23. In the surveillance field, the Rogers Board believed t

more testing on sensory devices, data link, and intelligence pro

sing were necessary before military characteristics could be p

pared for a penetration surveillance aircraft. Pending these stud

the Board recommended a new aircraft be developed with 

operational target date by 1970. In the area of transport aircr

the Board determined that more specifics were needed on ex

requirements for Army airlift to support contingency plans 

a program was needed to provide a vertical or short-take-off-a

landing long-range replacement for the Chinook and Caribou 

the early 1970's. 

Two other recommendations were made by the Board wh

are not generally well-known. The Board recommended the es

lishment of a policy to replace each model of aircraft at least ev

ten years or sooner if warranted by operational requirements 

technological advances. It also recommended that Department 

the Army and Continental Army Command prepare an in de

study to determine whether the concept of air fighting units 

practical and if an experimental unit should be activated to 

its feasibility. 

On' 19 March 1960 the Army Chief of Staff approved the Rog

Board recommendations with implementation for planning p

poses and assigned various staff agencies primary responsibility 

carry out these recommendations. Regarding air fighting units, 

charged Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations with the responsi

ity for preparing recommendations in this area. 

The importance of the Rogers Board has been somewhat 

scured by the later Howze Board and tests of the 11 th Air Ass

Division. However, it was a remarkable milestone in Army 

mobility. It set forward a chain of actions which had a profo

effect on later concepts. 

With historical hindsight, it is apparent that the scope of 

1960 Rogers Board review was limited. It obviously did not c

stitute a major advance in tactical mobility for the Army. Bu

comparison with the advances made during the 1950's, the Boa

objectives, if obtained, would have represented a substantial g

in mobility through the use of aviation. The Rogers Board p

vided essential aviation guidance for development, procurem

and personnel planning. 
Russell P. Bonasso, the Aviation Officer of the 101st Airborne 

Division, made what could be called a drastic organizational proposal in 1960. After studying the fragmented aviation assets in the 

division, he briefed the Commanding General, Major General 

William C. Westmoreland, on the advantages of centralized control. At the conclusion of a lengthy discussion, General Westmore-

'land authorized the formation of the 101st Combat Aviation 

Battalion (Provisional) -the first such organization in the Army. 

Army-Air Force Differences 

The early development of the airmobile concept was not without controversy. As the direct result of the experiences in Korea 

and the disagreements over Army aviation between the Air Force 

and the Army, Secretaries Frank Pace, Jr. of the Army and Thomas 

K. Finletter of the Air Force signed a special Memorandum o

Understanding dated 2 October 1951. Under the terms of this 

document organic Army aircraft would be used by the Army "as an 

integral part of its components for the purpose of expediency and 

improving ground combat and logistics procedures within the 

combat zone," Detailed functions under the exclusive control o

the ground force commander which might be performed by Army 

organic aircraft were spelled out in this Magna Carta of Army 

aviation. Predictably this did not settle the so-called roles and 

missions issues between the Services. Other memoranda were to 

follow. 

The Air Force witnessed the rapid growth of Army aviation 

during the 1950's. From 668 light airplanes and 57 light helicopter

that comprised the Army inventory on 30 June 1950, it saw the 

Army acquire over 5,000 aircraft of fifteen different varieties by 

1960. The Air Force had watched the Army become the acknowl

edged leader in vertical flight and ground effects machines. Agains

strenuous objections, the Army had "borrowed" three Air Force

T -37 jets for testing and a number of Army aviators were being 

qualified in various transonic aircraft from other Services and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Worst ot all, ' the Air Force 

found itself with a growing number of "technologically unem

ployed" pilots and they heard themselves described in front of a 

Congressional committee as the "silent silo-sitters-of-the-seventies.
tion, it was my duty to present the fonnal portion of the bri

in the presence of General George H. Decker, the Anny Ch

Staff; and many senior officers of both Services. 

At that time the focus in the Army was on the nuclear b

field. Organic aviation was viewed by the Army as the best m

of maintaining combat operations in an area characterized by 

depth and frontage with the dispersion of many small self.-cont

units. The major threat was viewed as a sophisticated enemy a

ing with masses of annor on the plains of Europe. Counter·gue

warfare at that time was viewed as a secondary mission. N eve

less, the early planners in airmobility perceived that one o

automatic fallouts in organizing the Anny for greater ainnob

would be much greater capabilities in the lower spectrum

warfare. . 

The Anny had already made a decision to replace its 

fixed-wing observation airplane and the two light observation 

copters with a single light turbine helicopter. This had be

fundamental decision of the Rogers Board the year before and 

another example of the Anny's commitment to the turbine en

The early Bell XH-40 had been standardized as the HU-I 

was envisioned then as the replacement for the L-20 utility 

plane and the H-19 utility helicopter. Further growth versio

the Bell machine were planned to replace the bulk of the mis

then perfonned by the Sikorsky H-34 and the Vertol H-21. 

Vertol HC-IB Chinook was then on the drawing boards to re

the piston powered Sikorsky H-37. 

To provide background for understanding the question 

answer period which followed the briefing I must digress to 

ment on the Mohawk and the Caribou aircraft. 

Since its inception as a joint Army and Marine program

OV-I Mohawk had been a center of controversy. Actually the A

and Marine requirements were never compatible and comprom

were made that suited neither. From the Anny's viewpoint

original design was compromised by shipboard requirements 

other specific Marine specifications which had little applicatio

an Army observation aircraft. From the .Marine viewpoint, 

were looking for a fixed·wing replacement for the old Cessna 

observation aircraft and they did not require sophisticated s

systems which they planned to carryon other aircraft. As it tu
fenses memorandum on weight limitations for Army aircraft and 

because it had inherent capabilities for armament, the Air Force 

had opposed its development from the beginning. There is no doub

that certain Army extremists viewed the Mohawk as the "nose o

the camel within the tent of tactical air support." The Army wa

to suffer for their enthusiasm for years to come. The manufacturer

Grumman, did not help by publishing carefully placed brochure

which showed the Mohawk in a variety of attack roles. 

The Mohawk was originally designed as a visual reconnaissance 

aircraft with better survivability than the L-19 of Korean vintage

In addition, it was to have an integral camera sY-6tem for spot photo 

coverage. Above all, it was to land and take off in the same distance 

as the L-19 which it was to supplement. It was not long, however

-that "improved" versions of the Mohawk were visualized carrying 

sophisticated sensor systems developed by the Army surveillanc

agencies such as infra-red and side-looking radar. Weight, space

and power provisions had not been made for these systems in th

original design. As a result, the gross weight increased and per

formance declined. These growth versions of the Mohawk wer

coming off the drawing board before the first "A" model had even 

been tested throughout its entire flight envelope and subsequen

tests were to prove that major engineering modifications to both 

wing and power plants would be necessary in the latter versions

Furthermore, the addition of all this sophisticated sensor equip

ment not only raised die unit cost significantly but, in the view o

many, watered down the Army contention that this was truly 

front line low echelon aircraft. 

Turning to the Caribou, this aircraft came into the Army by 

the sheer persistence of a few perceptive representatives of deHavi

land Aircraft Corporation of Canada and a few equally perceptiv

Army aviation enthusiasts who recognized the natural affinity o

the deHaviland aircraft to the Army environment. Starting with 

the Beaver-which was designed as a "bush pilot's dream," and 

progressing to the reliable, but somewhat clumsy Otter-the Cari

bou seemed a natural to those Army planners who saw a significan

gap between the Army's organic capability and the C-130 Ai

Force transport. 

The Caribou was the second exception by the Secretary of De

fense to his memorandum on the weight limitations for Army 

fixed-wing aircraft. Its very size threw down a gantlet to the Ai
and was relatively easy to maintain and operate. The Air Force s

this 32 passenger aircraft as a second invasion of its domain a

the projected rise of the Army's inventory at a time that the A

Force aircraft inventory was declining was bound to cause mo

heat than light.1 

The Caribou proved to be an extremely useful addition to t

United States aircraft inventory and did yeoman service in Vietna

Later it would be transferred to the Air Force in 1966 as part 

another Army-Air Force agreement, but in the early 1960's t

Caribou and the Mohawk were the two major symbols of Arm

Air Force disagreement and more time was devoted to these syste

than to the entire airmobility concept itself. 

The question and answer period that followed the briefi

began with a discussion about the Russians' effort in the helicop

field and the Russians' method of organizing their aviation. Ge

eral White then turned to the growth of aviation in ~e Unit

States Army and got to the heart of the meeting. To the obvio

dismay of some Air Force staff officers, he said, 

I don't disagree with the Army concept. Obviously there is alw

going to be the clash of budgetary impingements. Your idea of supp

ing yourselves and thiS "Sky Cav," I can't quarrel with. But w

worries me and must worry you for other reasons is what does 

future hold? Two of these airplanes are probably as big as our bomb

were eighteen or twenty years ago. What does the future hold? H

do we get along, because the air does clash at a certain point? How 

we work this out? 

General Decker indicated that Army aviation would take 

where the Air Force left off and that he was perfectly happy 

leave it that way-provided the Air Force provisioned the necessa

airlift and tactical air support to complement the Army's nee

The conversation then shifted to the type of close air support th

the Army felt was best. General Decker espoused a single-purpo

1 The very existence of the Caribou in the Army inventory changed one Air Fo

program-the Fairchild C-12! "Provider." This latter aircraft was scheduled to 

phased out of the active Air Force inventory in 1961, with a few programmed to 

reserves and the remainder to be declared surplus. When Secretary of Defense Rob

S. Mc:-.iamara suggested that the Air Force tum over the C-12!'s to the Army 

train on this type aircraft prior to the receipt of the Caribou) , the Air Force sudde

discovered new and pressing Air Force requirements for the C-12!. Thus the Ar

Caribou protagonists not only pushed the Caribou into being, but-incidental

saved the C-12! for much·needed duty in Vietnam. 
The rest of the conversation centered about the Armys testing of 

certain jet aircraft for deep surveillance. Finally, the problems 

of command and control of two distinct systems-Air Force and 

Army-were discussed. 

General White and General Decker closed the session with a 

resolution to have Major General David A. Burchinal and Major 

General Barksdale Hamlett work on more specific agreements between the Air Force and the Army. The two Chiefs of Staff closed 

the session with the following remarks: 

General White: We waste more money; we waste time; we waste 

energy; and we waste dispositions. I doubt that we will solve all our 

problems but I am certainly for solving as many of them as. we can. 

General Decker: Well, I am, too. We will go halfway or even more. 

I will say this, that there is a group around this city not confined to 

the Army, who think the Army is nor-doing itself justice for coming 

out and making a pitch to take over some of these things such as tactical air support. I won't agree with them. I think as long as the Air 

Force has the mission and can do it they ought to do it. We don't want 

to take it over, but there is that kind of pressure as you probably know. 

I want you to know that that is not my position. 

The Air Force and the Army differences brought out in the 

briefing just described were not to be entirely solved during the 

next decade, but many problems between the services disappeared 

in the crucible of combat. Working agreements between those 

actively engaged in battle were developed and standardized. But 

the fundamental differen(:es remained between those who viewed 

aviation as an end in itself and those who saw aviation merely as 

a means to free the ground soldier from the "tyranny of terrain." 

Reviewing the Army's position in 1960, a full year before the 

first helicopter companies landed in Saigon, it should be noted 

that the Army was well along its way in airmobility. At the time 

it had the following basic objectives: each division to have the 

capability of moving at least a company of Infantry by its organic 

airlift; aerial surveillance to match the firepower of the unit a

each echelon; rapid purification of the aircraft inventory to reduce 

the types of aircraft to the minimum; acquisition of a limited 

number of flying cranes; and, increased logistical capabilities as 

represented by the Caribou and Chinook team and any possible 

successor. It is important to view these objectives in their proper 

time frame for they were not necessarily geared to the prospect o

an increased involvement in Vietnam, but rather to a new Army 
Vietnam Fleet Expands 

Early in 1961 General Maxwell D. Taylor, who was then t

Military Advisor to the President, made a situation survey visit 

Southeast Asia. During his visit he felt that the lack of adequ

roadnets, lines of communication, and means of mobility co

tributed heavily to the government's problems in South Vietna

As a result of General Taylor's recommendations, President Jo

F. Kennedy approved a more active support program to Sou

Vietnam to assist in the fight against the communist-directed V

Cong. Generally, the support included the establishment of a jo

headquarters for directing the program; increasing the numb

of U. S. advisors for the South Vietnamese armed forces; a

additional support through Army Aviation, communications un

and Navy and Air Force units. This began a chain of eve

culminating in the arrival of the helicopter units mentioned 

the beginning of this study. 

The first few helicopters to arrive "in country" were based 

Tan Son Nhut and provided support to all the Army of the R

public of Vietnam units they could reach. Naturally, this supp

was based on operational priorities-the average Army of the R

public of Vietnam infantry unit saw very few helicopters in 

day-to-day operations. This was, however, a period of innovat

and of "trial-and-error" schooling for the U. S. pilots and cre

and also for the Viet Cong. 

There is one hair-raising tale of the H-21 pilot who put do

in a landing zone only to see a squad of Viet Cong step from 

woods and open fire o~ him at point blank range. Fortunately 

the pilot and crew, the Viet Cong squad leader had firmly e

bedded in the minds of his men the necessity to "lead" the h

copter with their fire. The amazed pilot watched the squad po

their fire into the ground 20 yards in front of him. He took 

without a single hit. This kind of strange tale in a sense charact

izes the early days-you might say the bailing wire days-of 

mobility in the Vietnam War. 

Following the 57th and 8th, the 93d Transportation Compa

(Light Helicopter) arrived off the coast of Vietnam in Janu

1962. Ten miles out in the South China Sea from DaNang, 

aircraft were flown off the carrier deck of the USNS Card to 
insurmountable difficulties because. of a critical shortage of en

gines and deterioration of rotor blades and aviation equipmen

due to high humidity. Nevertheless, they continually overflew thei

programmed flying hours and exceeded aircraft availability norma

rates. 

To some extent the support gap was bridged upon arrival from 

Fort Riley, Kansas, in January 1962 of the 18th Aviation Company 

(U-IA Otter). These aircraft were spread throughout the fou

corps areas to provide a utility supply net throughout the length 

of the country. Most of their missions involved delivery of aircraf

parts and supplies to rotary wing aviation units that were widely 

separated frorr:. their support elements. 

The first Marine helicopter squadron arrived in country in 

April 1962 and was established at the old French base at Soc Trang 

in the Mekong Delta. In June and July of that year the Marine

swapped bases with the 93d Transportation Company at Da Nan

because of the greater capability of the Marine H-34 helicopter

to operate in the higher elevations of the northern region. 

To provide better command and control of the Army's growin

fleet, the 45th Transportation Battalion was deployed to Vietnam 

in early 1962 from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and assumed command o

the three Army helicopter companies and the fixed-wing Otte

company. Shortly thereafter two more light helicopter companies

the 33d and the 81st, were deployed and also came under the com

mand of the 45th Transportation Battalion. 

The first of "a long line of Hueys" arrived in Vietnam as par

of the 57th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) in earl

1962. They were shortly followed by the 23d Special Warfare Avia

tion Detachment equipped with OV-l Mohawks to provide recon

naissance and photographic coverage in support of ARVN forces

Much of this early effort was classified. As a result, many Arm

aviators felt a bit frustrated that they were being kept "unde

wraps" at the same time they read of Marine exploits around D

Nang in the daily newspapers. Nevertheless, their operations wer

receiving official attention at the highest levels. 

The Events Leading to the Howze Board 

While the first Army aviation units were deploying to Vietnam

settling in-country and making their first tentative tests in comba
gy 

g y 

reorganization of the Army divisions, an increase in the number o

divisions, the Berlin buildup and call up of reserves, insurgenc

operations in general, and additional requirements for Army-typ

aircraft in military assistance programs throughout the world. Th

Army found that the requirements for its aircraft outpaced curren

procurement and deployment of aviation units depleted the inven

tory in the Continental United States. 

In late September 1961 Secretary of Defense McNamara re

viewed the Army aviation plans and indicated tentative decision

concerning procurement of Army aircraft and the number of Arm

aviation companies. Uneasy over his tentative decision in th

matter, he sought further information. On 4 October he conferre

with General Clyde D. Eddleman, Army Vice Chief of Staf

Brigadier General von Kann, Director of Army Aviation, an

Major James J. Brockmyer, Army Aviation Action Officer. Durin

this conference he sympathetically questioned the Army program

especially the Bell utility helicopter program, stating that he fe

the procurement was strung out too many years. If the Army reall

needed these helicopters and its design offered many advantage

over the current models, he felt the early procurement of larg

numbers would best serve the national interest. 

As a result of this conference and the previous study effort o

his own staff, Mr. McNamara sent a short memorandum to th

Secretary of the Army on 5 October requesting a study of all Arm

aviation requirements. As part of this study, he desired an Arm

evaluation of his previously proposed cuts in the Army aviatio

program. He asked for a progress report by 20 October and a fina

report by mid-November. 

General von Kann, as Director of Army Aviation, began t

compile his own report of the entire Army aviation program an

a forecast for requirements for aircraft through 1970. By the tim

Mr. McNamara's memorandum reached the Army Staff, this repor

was well underway. General von Kann's report and the reclam

of the proposed reduction in Army aircraft procurement constitute

the Secretary of the Army's answer to the Secretary of Defense. 

I After living with the early problems of airmobility for six full years, it was 

disappointment to me that I would be out of the mainstream of airmobility action

for the next exciting two years. I was promoted out of my job as Deputy Director o

Army Aviation in the spring of 1961 and served as Chief, MAAG, Ethiopia unt

1963. I was then fortunate to return to the Pentagon as Director of Army Aviatio
action officers prepared a draft for Mr. McNamara which would 

have a long-range effect on the structure of the Army. 

On 19 April 1962 Mr. McNamara sent a now famous mem

orandum to the Secretary of the Army in which he stated he fel

the Army's program was dangerously conservative. He. believed th

procurement program fell short of meeting requirements and failed 

to give a rationale for an optimum mix of aircraft types. The staf

paper supporting the memorandum listed three major criticism

of the Army aviation program. First, OSD did not think the Army 

had fully explored the opportunities offered by technology to break 

their traditional ties to surface mobility. Second, they claimed tha

air vehicles operating close to the ground offered a possibl

quantum increase in effectiveness. Third, they stated that air trans

portation, all things considered, · was less costly than rail or ship 

transportation even in peacetime, and wartime urgency would mak

it even more important. Therefore, the OSD staff stated that th

Army needed a major effort to exploit the aeronautical potentia

and increase its effectiveness vis-a-vis ground transportation systems

The Secretary believed the Army needed to re-examine it

aviation requirements with a bold "new look" at land warfar

mobility. Though previous studies had produced doctrinal con

cepts, action was needed to carry the concepts into effect. Studie

of air vehicles were needed also. He directed the re-examinatio

of tactical mobility requirements divorced from traditional view

points and past policies, and free from veto or dilution by con

servative staff review. He felt the Army should be willing t

substitute airmobile systems for traditional ground systems if i

would improve capabilities and effectiveness. The final objectiv

of the re-examination was to recommend action which would giv

the Army the maximum ' attainable mobility in the combat are

within the bounds of aeronautical technology, within alternativ

funding levels. 

The Secretary of Defense directed that the results of re

examination be presented in terms of cost effectiveness and trans

port effectiveness, and that full use be made of field tests an

exercises. Mr. McNamara urged Secretary of the Army Elvis J

Stahr, Jr. to give the matter his personal attention and, in a mos

unusual departure from accepted procedure, suggested the follow

ing individuals to manage the Army's effort: Lieutenant Genera

Hamilton H. Howze, Brigadier Generals Delk M. Oden, Walte
the RAND Corporation, and Mr. Edward H. Heinemann, a w

known aviation consultant. 

Secretary McNamara summed up the emphasis he placed 

the Army reexamination of tactical mobility this way: "I shall 

disappointed if the Army's reexamination merely produces lo

tically oriented recommendations to procure more of the sa

rather than a plan for employment of fresh and perhaps unortho

concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility." 

This benchmark in airmobility history resulted from the fo

nate confluence of several trends: first, the personal dissatisfac

of the Secretary of Defense with the Army's failure to exploit 

potential capabilities of airmobility; secondly, an undeniable 

titude of many office of the Secretary of Defense civilian anal

who looked upon the service staffs and most officers as relucta

being dragged into the twentieth century; third, there wa

nucleus of Army aviation oriented officers both in the office of 

Secretary of Defense staff and Army Staff who recognized 

possibility of capitalizing on Mr. McNamara's attitude to sw

aside ultraconservative resistance within the Army itself. Fina

there was an opportunity to present to the Secretary of Defe

for his signature directives that would cause the Army to appo

an evaluation by individuals known for their farsightedness 

to submit recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defe

in order to avoid intermediate filtering. For the record, it sho

be noted that General Howze knew nothing of this backgro

maneuvering and would have sternly protested had be been aw

The Army Vice Chief of Staff immediately alerted the Gen

Staff of Secretary McNamara's requirements. The staff sugge

the appointment of a board of general officers and selected civil

with subordinate working groups similar to the organization of 

Rogers Board. Departmerit of the Army directed General Herb

B. Powell, Commanding General, Continental Army Command

establish the Board which would have three suspense dates to m

On 10 May 1962 the Board would submit an outline plan of h

it would conduct its review, including an estimate of funds 

quired. Beginning I June the Board would submit monthly pr

ress reports and by 24 August a final report incorporatin

recommended program for development and procurement of Ar

. aircraft. Department of the Army directed other agencies to p
The Howze Board 

Within a week after Secretary McNamara's memorandum of 

19 April, Continental Army Command appointed General Howze, 

Commanding General of the Strategic Army Corps and of the 

XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, as president of the ad hoc 

U. S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board to conduct a 

reexamination of the role of Army aviation and aircraft requirements. On 25 April Continental Army Command contacted General Howze to alert him of the job to be done, outlined preliminary 

instructions, and provided pertinent details. The formal directive 

dated 3 May was not issued until the Board had begun work. In 

fact, General Howze did not read it until 5 May. Continental Army 

Command warned General Howze that the deadlines were extremely demanding. On 25 April, the same day on which General 

Howze was notified that he was to form the Board, General Decker, 

Chief of Staff of the Army, informed his staff of the establishment 

of the Board and outlined the Board's purpose and function, composition, direction and control, and administrative procedures

His directive formalized the verbal instructions previously given

General Howze initial reaction was that the magnitude of the 

job and the consideration of avoiding false starts might prohibit 

the Board from accomplishing all the assigned tasks by the deadline. 

For example, he believed that exercises and troop tests should be 

continued beyond that time frame to further refine requirements 

for aircraft and of the materiel. However, he felt that within the 

time limitation the Board could arrive at most of the essential conclusions and provide a conservative estimate of the proper program 

on which the Army could embark without wasting assets. 

General Howze was free to convene portions of the Board at 

installations other than Fort Bragg if convenient. He could organize 

the Board as he saw fit. Within the first few days of May, aviation 

units and support elements awaited his bidding, funds had been 

earmarked, and instructions had been issued to insure that supply 

and maintenance priorities were clearly understood throughout 

the Army. General Howze was free to deal directly with the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the other military 

services, government agencies, and civilian industry for coordination on the technical aspects of his evaluation. Seldom has there 

ever been such a broad and open-end charter in military history. 
testing. Whole units were diverted from overseas deploymen

be included in the tests. For example, a Caribou company w

had been planned for the Pacific was delayed specifically by 

Secretary of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary of 

fense, so that it might take part in the tests. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense instructed the De

ment of the Air Force to support the Howze Board. On 8 May 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, requested 

U. S. Air Force to contribute to the efforts of the Board thro

the use of its air transport capability, especially as a mean

achieving air lines of communication within a combat theater

stated that the Army would request up to a squadron of C-1

in its exercise and tests and that this would be a good chance 

the U. S. Air Force to "sell" its services and capabilities. A

detailed requirements were formulated, Secretary Stahr conta

Air Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert to work out arrangem

between Continental Army Command and the Air Force Tac

Air Command. 

The most significant major activity of the Board throug

its deliberations was the investigation, testing and evaluatio

the organizational and operational concepts of airmobility. 

findings and evaluations of field tests, war games, operation

search, and visits to overseas combat theaters provided suppo

the final Board report. 

Much effort was devoted to field experimentation for the 

pose of comparing a conventionally equipped force with one m

airmobile by adding aircraft. The Board had for a test force 

battle group and part-time use of two others plus the artillery 

engineers of the 82d Airborne Division. In addition, the te

• General Howze was not only President of the Board, but Chairman of the 

ing and Review Committee as well. In addition to General Howze, seven 

officers and six top.level civilians originally composed the Steering and Review 

mittee. These included Major General Ben Harrell, Major General William B. R

Brigadier General John J. Lane, Brigadier General Edward L. Rowny, Bri

General Delk M. Oden, Brigadier General Robert R. \,\!illiams, Colonel Willia

Lynn, Jr., Dr. Jacob A. Stockfisch, Dr. Edwin W. Paxson, Eugene Vidal, Fred W

Frank A. Parker, and Edward H. Heinemann. Mr. Parker, General Rowny

Colonel Lynn also served as chiefs of working committees. Other senior board 

bers (eventually added to the Steering and Review Committee) were named wo

committee chiefs-Major General Clifton F. von Kann, Major General Norm

\"issering, Brigadier General Frederic W. Boye, Jr., and Brigadier General Wal

Richardson. 
tests assisted by an advisory group of civilian scientists. 

The Board conducted approximately forty tests ranging in 

magnitude from fairly elaborate live-fire exercises and three major 

week-long exercises against an assumed force of irregulars to auxiliary tests of new items of equipment. Results of the three largest 

tests indicated that Army aircraft would enhance combat effectiveness' in both conventional and counter-guerrilla actions and that 

Army tasks could be accomplished by smaller forces in shorter 

campaigns. 

The Howze Board Report 

The final report of the Howze Board was submitted on 

20 August 1962. The air assault division was the principal tactical 

innovation. As compared with about one hundred aircraft in the 

standard division, it would have 459. Airmobility would be achieved 

by extensive reduction in ground vehicles from 3,452 down to 

1,100 which would also reduce the airlift requirement for strategic 

deployment. Despite the reduction in total number of vehicles the 

cost of the new division, based upon the initial investment and a 

five-year operating cost, was about half again the cost of an infantry 

division. Artillery consisted of only 105-mm howitzers and Little 

John rockets (airtransportable in the Chinook helicopter). Augmenting this greatly reduced firepower, the division would employ 

twenty-four armed Mohawks and 36 Huey helicopters armed with 

2.75-inch rockets. 

The aircraft of the division could lift one third of its assault 

elements at one time. Three brigade headquarters provided major 

tactical sub-divisions to which the fighting battalions and support 

elements would be assigned according to the nature of the task and 

the terrain. The brigades in turn could mix units assigned to them 

as could the battalions and to a lesser extent the subordinate units 

of the battalions. All the essential elements of combat powermaneuver forces, reconnaissance, firepower, communications, and 

service support-were present. 

The Board also recommended the organization of an air cavalry 

combat brigade having 316 aircraft, 144 of which would be attack 

helicopters. Its function was the classical one for cavalry-to screen, 

reconnoiter, and wage delaying actions. Unlike the air assault 

division which was designed to join battle on the ground, all of 
the requirement for an-increased use of support aircraft to c

supplies as far forward as the tactical situation would permit. 

Board envisioned Caribous and Chinooks located in the forw

Army area to deliver men, equipment, and supplies after Air F

aircraft had deposited them as far forward as possible. 

The Board presented Mr. McNamara five alternative progr

whiCh would modernize the Army structure by replacing con

tional forces by airmobile forces. Of the five programs the B

recommended its Alternative Three as the "most responsive to 

requirement and most compatible with the Army's mission 

overall structure." This program within six years would pro

eleven Reorganization Objective Army Divisions, five air as

divisions, three air cavalry combat brigades, and five air trans

brigades. It would also increase the mobility of other combat u

and the effectiveness of their logistical support. 

The Board emphasized the quantitative and qualitative 

provements that would be necessary for Army aviation perso

programs. Its proposed alternative would require 8,900 aviato

1963, growing to 20,600 in 1968. The Board foresaw an incre

need for warrant officer pilots and recommended an office

warrant officer ratio of one to one by the end of five years. It 

recommended major changes in the' officer career program to 

hance their training, administration, and utilization. 

In a letter prefa.cing the final report, General Howze 

mented that the job was in some respects incomplete and fur

testing was recommended. He said, "The foregoing does not 

cate that I consider the Board's findings unvalidated or its j

ment faulty. The time made available although not sufficien

prove all details of the Board's recommendations as respects o

nization, personnel, equipment, maintenance and doc~rine, 

quite sufficient to enable it, with conviction, to chart a cours

action which will serve to increase markedly the combat and l

tical efficiency of the Army." The Board was aware that its prop

were not infallible and that subsequent tests and developm

could alter some elements of the proposed force structure. Th

fore, the Board recommended a continuing program of field 

using the first units becoming operational under the activa

schedule. It also recommended that progress on the Board's 

posals be reviewed annually as a safeguard against any error
and emphatic. "The Board has only a single, general conclusion," 

stated General Howze. "Adoption by the Army of the airmobile 

concept-however imperfectly it may be described and justified in 

this report-is necessary and desirable. In some respects the transition is inevitable, just as was that from animal mobility to motor." 

The Howze Board accomplished its mission in 90 days, from 

the original assignment to the finished report. In view of the 

enormous staffing task involved, and the sheer size of the analytical 

task, such alacrity has few parallels in staff work in or out of the 

military service. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, having received what it 

had asked for, now turned the report over to its systems analysts in 

the Office of the Comptroller to study in minute detail all 3,500 

pages of the main report. The review by the office of the Secretary 

of Defense Comptroller was to focus on certain procurement 

actions and to make certain recommendations of its own which 

had no relation to the Howze Board's basic recommendations. 

In mid-September 1962 the Chief of Staff directed General 

Howze, Colonel Norton, and one of the editors of the Board Report 

to work in his office in preparing rebuttals for the various attacks 

that were coming from all directions. This "ten-day" TDY mission 

was to last almost until Christmas (with General Howze being 

replaced by General Williams when the former had to return to 

his command at Fort Bragg as commander of the Strategic Army 

Corps during the Cuban missile crisis) . 

Throughout the fall of 1962 it appeared, at times, that the work 

of the Howze Board was going to be studied to death and finally 

filed away for historians. The fact that it survived attacks by members of Congress, the Air Force, and conservative elements within 

the Army was a tribute both to the soundness of its basic conclusions and to the dedicated officers within the Army who believed 

that airmobility was the wave of the future. 
CHAPTER II 

The Early Years in Vietnam, 1961-19

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Becomes Airmobil

There is no precise method to divide the Vietnam War 

convenient phases. However, from the standpoint of an airmob

study, one can consider the first phase as a learning period-a 

when U. S. Army pilots were teaching Army of the Republi

Vietnam commanders and soldiers how to effectively employ 

copter tactics, while at the same time the pilots were learnin

experience, trial and error. As more and more helicopters bec

available, we built additional aviation units to help the Vietnam

Army become as mobile as the enemy. 

This second phase of the war was characterized by batta

size air assaults of selected Vietnamese units, including the p

troopers, the rangers, and the regular infantry. It was the su

of this phase that forced the enemy to increase his effort in S

Vietnam. This proved to be something that the North Vietnam

Army was quite ready to do, and the improved capabilities of 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam were matched step-by-step 

increased resistance of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese A

as additional units and supplies poured down the Ho Chi M

Trail complex and across the border. It was during this se

phase that we made great improvements on our tactical emp

ment of helicopters. It was also during this period that we cre

our own airmobile division, tested it, and concluded that in t

of ground tactics, airmobility was here to stay. We studied 

variety of tactics used by the Vietnamese and their U. S. sup

in these airmobile operations of extended scope and we trie

apply everything we learned to the organization and trainin

our airmobile units. 

It was also during this second phase that the Huey came 

its own. The turbine engine helicopter with its great power

reliability, and its smaller requirement for maintenance, was 

technological turning point as far as airmobility is concer

Actually, the key improvement of technology was the trio of 
at this time. 

From the time of the first major commitment of helicopters to 

Vietnam on II December 1961 until the buildup of major U. S

forces in 1965, airmobility was-like diplomacy-confined to the 

art of the possible. The early helicopters were old and unsuited 

for this particular mission; the rules of engagement were set by 

the South Vietnamese Government-a Government that was continually changing in a series of coups and counter-coups; and the 

Viet Cong was undergoing a phenomenal period of growth. 

The primary mission of U. S. military forces was to advise and 

assist the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to build a viable 

military structure to meet the needs of its national security. Because of the increasing scope and intensity of Viet Cong operations

this advisory task expanded very rapidly during this period. The 

Viet Cong regular force grew steadily from two to five regimental 

headquarters, the Viet Cong battalions doubled in the same period

and the quality and quantity of their weapons and equipment 

improved considerably. This build up necessitated the deployment 

of additional U. S. Army aviation units to support Government 

of Vietnam forces. From a single transportation battalion with 

three helicopter companies in early 1962, the U. S. Army developed 

an enormous operational and logistical support complex consisting 

of many battalions of helicopter companies, fixed-wing units

maintenance units, and special purpose organizations. 

Enemy Reaction 

It is interesting to note how the enemy viewed this increasing 

airmobility potential. The following is a translation of an extrac

from a North Vietnamese instruction pamphlet captured on 

16 November 1962: 

It can be said that all the recent augmentations of forces that the 

USA has sent to the Diem government were primarily intended to 

strengthen the Diem rear area forces, increase their ability to pass infor

mation rapidly and the wide employment of helicopters in the move

ment of troops. Therefore if we can destroy or greatly reduce the 

enemy's heliborne capability we will, in essence, have destroyed the 

mobility necessary to the US raid ta<:tics. 

Although we have succeeded in inflicting some loss on the enemy 

in his heliborne operations the enemy has in some places calised us 
borne strike tactics: 

1. Careful planning and preparations are possible together 

complete mobility in an attack, support or relieving role. 

2. Secrecy can be preserved and surprise strikes can be accompli

3. Landings can be effected dee.p into our rear areas with the 

bility to attack and withdraw rapidly. 

4. An appropriate means of destroying our forces while the

still weak. 

However, these tactics suffer the following disadvantages: 

1. The population in our rear areas is on our side and will 

the enemy in every way. 

2. Small forces are usually employed by the enemy in their 

strikes and if counterattacked may find it difficult to withdraw. 

3. Heliborne operations require the latest inf~rmation (old 

may have lost its timeliness and new info must be checked for 

racy) . If the time is taken to acquire confirmatory info then the 

tion may have changed rendering the info inaccurate. 

4. The enemy's strike elements are usually unfamiliar with 

terrain and can easily be surrounded and rapidly defeated. 

5. The present available helicopters prevent the enemy from 

ploying large forces (although this is only a temporary disadvanta

will take the enemy some time before he will be able to overcom

6. The effectiveness of heliborne tactics is greatly reduce

forested and jungle covered mountain areas where a clear know

of the nature of the terrain ·cannot be discerned from the air, w

landings are difficult and ambushes easily employed against 

landings. 

7. The disadvantages inherent in helicopters are difficult to 

come. If they are flown slow or low they are vulnerable to ground 

every flying hour must be complemented by 3 hours ground ma

nance; they cannot be flown for more than 70 hours in any 2 or 3 

(TN: Obvious typographical or technical error. IO hours in 2 or 3 

seems app,ropriate) ; the helicopter consumes much fuel, carrying 

load of troops its fuel capacity is reduced and as a consequence its 

is reduced, as a result the starting point for heliborne operatio

usually near the objective and thus the enemy's element of surpris

be compromised. A landing right within our position is the most 

tive, but also subject to coming under our firepower while a lan

outside of our position, though avoiding our firepower, loses the 

ment of surprise. 

It is obvious that the Viet Cong, in spite of all their polem

had recognized that the advent of airmobility in Vietnam 

changed the name of the game. True, the a.IIies had much to 

about the employment of this new capability, but the war w

never be the same. 
y pp

repr.esented the lowest order of airmobility . . . that is, simply 

transporting people from point "A" to point "B". This is analogous 

to the requisitions of French taxis in World War I. It provided 

better and faster transportation than walking. But, it lacked the 

essentials of unified command, specially trained personnel, organic 

firepower, and responsive reconnaissance. 

The early Army aviators in 1962 spent a great deal of their 

time simply training the Vietnamese in the rudiments of getting in 

and out of a helicopter and conducting themselves properly in a 

landing zone. This was further complicated by fuzzy command 

relationships. The U. S. Army helicopter pilot belonged to Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, and was attached to the U. S. 

advisor on a one-time mission basis. The aircraft commander still 

had the authority to abort a mission that he did not feel safe; yet, 

he was not in the early planning phases and did not share the 

responsibility of the success or failure of the mission. Furthermore, 

he did not control the tactical air support or artillery fire nor the 

timing thereof. It is easy to understand the frustrations some of the 

early relationships generated. 

Little by little, sheer necessity forced those in-country to make 

workable agreements on standing operating procedures. The "whodoes-what-to-whom" on command and control, flight levels, and 

fire support were among the most important procedures agreed 

upon. The evolution of a command and control helicopter, carrying all the essential commanders and liaison officers plus the proper 

communications equipment, soon came about. Armed helicopters 

would soon be part and parcel of every transport column-and the 

polywog shape of the Huey would soon become the universally 

recognized silhouette in Southeast Asia. 1 

1 The transition to the Huey had its beginning in January 1955 when a design 

competition was held to select the new standard Arm}' utility helicopter. The first 

model. designated the XH-40. flew in 1956 and the UH-IB model did not begin its 

user evaluation testing until 28 :"ovember 1960. By June of 1963. most of the light 

helicopter companies had phased in the new lJH-I B helicopters and had transi tioned 

their aviators. maintenance personnel. and crew chiefs to the new aircraft. But. it 

would not be until 27 June 1964 that the last tired old CH-21 was formally retired 

by General Oden. Acting Commanding General. U, S. Army Support Command. Viet· 

nam. These times tend to give some appreciation of the long lead time necessary to 

develop and prove a new helicopter. 
machine gun at the door, but this fire was relatively ineffe

To better meet this requirement, the Army formed the U

Tactical Transport Helicopter Company and deployed it to 

nam in mid-1962. This company was equipped with UH-I 

copters armed with .30-caliber machine guns and 2.75-inch r

launchers and was designed to provide protective fires fo

CH-2I transport helicopters. Much of the tactical doctrin

armed helicopter employment evolved during this period incl

the techniques for protective fire preparation of landing 

prior to and during a helicopter assault. The Utility Ta

Transport Helicopter Company was redesignated the 68th Av

Company and later the 197th Airmobile Company. Its early h

was studied intensely by a special group known as the Army 

cept Team in Vietnam which was established in Saigon on 

vember 1962. 

General Rowny, after duty with the Howze Board, had 

designated to form the Army Concept Team in Vietnam b

Chief of Staff of the Army with the mission to evaluate 

methods of countering insurgency in actual combat. The 

Concept Team in Vietnam had a variety of projects to in

rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, communications, armored pers

carriers, logistics, and civic action tests. Fortunately for the 

pose of this study, they were able to document the early atte

at airmobility in a special and objective way. 

One of the most important reports made by General Ro

Army Concept Team in Vietnam evaluators was their analy

the effectiveness of the armed helicopter company during the p

16 October 1962 through 15 March 1963. This test unit h

dual mission in that it was actually fighting a real war and pr

ing armed protection for the transport helicopters, while, a

same time, it provided data to the evaluators (who sometimes 

heavily engaged in combat themselves) . 

The first element of fifteen armed Hueys was deployed to 

nam in September 1962. To assure proper employment, Ge

Rowny hammered out a modus operandi with Military Assis

Command, Vietnam, on 29 September 1962, which provid

framework for the forthcoming test. The terms of reference 

vided that the test activities must not have an unacceptable im

on military operations. Therefore, testing was undertaken on

conjunction with actual operations, and in no case was the 
U.S. Army armed helicopters, which precluded testing of any 

tactical concepts involving "offensive" employment. Under these 

rules, the armed helicopters could deliver fire only after they or 

the escorted transport helicopters had been fired upon. In late 

February 1963 the rules were modified to permit the armed 

helicopters to initiate fire against clearly identified insurgents 

who threatened their safety or the safety of escorted transport 

helicopters. 

Initially, the fifteen UH-IA helicopters were armed with locally 

fabricated weapons systems consisting of two .30 caliber machine 

guns and sixteen 2.75-inch rockets. In November 1962 the unit 

was augmented with eleven UH-I B helicopters. The "B's" were 

equipped with factory installed weapons systems of four M-60 

machine guns per aircraft and locally fabricated clusters of eight 

2.75-inch rockets. The "B" model eventually replaced most of the 

less powerful "A's." 

The provisional Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter company was based at Tan Son Nhut Airport on the outskirts of 

Saigon and was under the direct operational control of Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam. From this base, it supported transport operations of the 57th, 33d, and 93d Light Helicopter Companies, all equipped with CH-21 aircraft. In the latter part of the 

test period, one platoon of helicopters was sent to escort the Marine 

H-34 squadron operating in I Corps. 

The plan of test for this company called for the evaluation of 

the armed helicopter in the "escort" role. Although "escort" was 

not defined, actual experience determined that the escort role broke 

down into an enroute phase} that was generally flown at a relatively 

safe altitude, the approach phase} where the heliborne force usually 

descended to nap-of-the-earth heights several kilometers away from 

the landing zone, and the landing zone phase. It was in the landing 

zone phase that the armed helicopter proved most valuable. 

Prior to the advent of the escort by the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter company, transport helicopters on the "dangerous" 

combat support missions were being hit at a rate of .0 II hits per 

flying hour. For similar missions escorted by the Utility -Tactical 

Transport Helicopter company, the rate declined to .0074. During 

this same period of time, the hit rate for all other flying done by 

Army helicopters rose from .0011 to .0024. In other words, the 

Viet Cong effectiveness against un escorted aircraf~ doubled while 
ducing the amount and accuracy of enemy fires placed on tran

helicopters. The response of the transport helicopter pilots to 

added protection was clearly enthusiastic. Even the skeptical M

pilots began to rely heavily on the Army armed helicopters. 

Although the safety of the transport helicopters was the pri

consideration in escort operations, the vulnerability of the es

themselves was a matter of concern. The escorts preceded the t

ports into the landing zone and remained until all transports 

departed. When the landing zone was small and the transport 

used an extended formation, the period of exposure for ar

escorts was unnecessarily long. The escorts generally flew a

more than 100 or 200 feet above the ground and were well w

the zone of maximum vulnerability from small arms. 

The Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter company flew 

combat support hours from 16 October 1962 through 15 M

1963. Most of the operations were conducted in the III and 

Corps Tactical Zones. Suppressive fire delivered by the escort 

copters accounted for an estimated 246 Viet Cong casua

During this period, eleven armed helicopters were hit by ho

fire. While no armed helicopter was shot down, one UH-l B 

seriously damaged as a result of ground fire. It appeared tha

vulnerability of armed helicopters was well within acceptable 

limits. 

The first official Air Force recognition of the role of ar

helicopters, and their first attempt to regulate their use in Viet

appeared in a document dated 27 December 1962, entitled "H

copter Escort," and signed by Brigadier General Rollen H . An

Commander of the Second Air Division. Generally, the ar

helicopter was limited to one minute of fire before the trans

helicopters landed and one minute after the last departed . 

. . . The fighter aircraft will have primary responsibility fo

security of the entire helicopter formation during the escort p

until the formation commander makes the one minute warning 

prior to landing. At this time the responsibility will shift to the a

helicopters and they will precede the transport helicopters to the 

ing zone to draw fire or engage targets. Armed helicopters ma

designated to attack specific targets enroute when their assistan

requested by the fighter aircraft. 

This arrangement proved unworkable and the Army continu

sought more flexible guidelines. The Air Force consistently m
role of close support. For example, on 26 July 1963, the Second 

Air Division wrote a letter to General Paul D . Harkins stating that, 

in three recent incidents, Army helicopters were used "offensively." 

Further, the Air Division inferred that: " ... Employment of the 

HU-1B's in the above incidents appears to be an expansion of 

your directive for the use of armed helicopters to include interdiction and close air support missions. It also appears that air 

requests are being stopped prior to arrival at the ASOC's, with 

subsequent substitution of U. S. Army aircraft from Corps Advisor 

and Division Advisor resources." 

Major General Richard G. Weede, USMC, Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, replied: 

. . . All incidents mentioned occurred in the immediate battle areas 

of the ground units. These are not subjects for ASOC/TOC coordination but rather matters for the ground commander to handle as he 

deems appropriate. Direct support aviation is controlled by the ground 

element commander and requires no supervision or control by a tactical 

air control system far removed from the ground battle. 

U. S. Army aviation when employed in a combat support role is 

normally under the operational control of the Corps Senior Advisors. 

Therefore, incidents of the type reported are of mutual concern of the 

AR VN Corps Commander and his U. S. Advisor. Request future incidents be referred to Corps Senior Advisors by your Air Liaison Officers 

for resolution at the operating level. 

By mid-1963 the 1st Platoon of the Utility Tactical Transport 

Helicopter Company which worked with the Marine H-34's in 

the I Corps sector had become adopted by their comrades-in-arms 

as an integral part of their operations and few, if any, H-34 pilots 

elected to fly without the armed Hueys nearby. Procedures were 

developed whereby the armed Hueys picked up the fire support 

right after the fixed-wing fighter planes broke off their support for 

safety reasons, and that, in most cases, the last minute reconnaissance by the armed helicopters prevented the Marine H-34 from 

going into extremely hot ambushed landing zones. 

Ironically during this same period, I found myself as Director 

of Army Aviation testifying in front of Congressional committees 

on the role and absolute necessity of more and better armed helicopters. The Commandant of the Marine Corps and various Air 

Force officers gave negative testimony on the merits of this system. 

Fortunately, the Army viewpoint prevailed. 
Army decided to convert the helicopter companies within Vietn

to a new airmobile company Table of Organization and Equ

ment. Each of the airmobile companies was organized into 

armed platoon consisting of eight UH-IB helicopters with insta

weapons systems and two transport platoons with eight UH

helicopters each. The Utility Tactical Transport helicopter c

pany remained in-country and supported the Marines and U

Army units without organic armed helicopters. 

The early tests with the Utility Tactical Transport helico

company indicated that a platoon from five to seven armed h

copters could protect a transport helicopter force of from twe

to twenty-five aircraft. The organization of the new airmo

company was a compromise between the requirement to prov

organic arms support and the requirement to lift troops and ca

The armament system brought the armed UH-IB up to 

maximum gross weight thereby eliminating it from a troop 

cargo-carrying role. In addition to the integrated machine gun 

rocket systems, two door gunners were used on the armed h

copters. The door gunners provided additional fire when a th

was clearly identified, and they also performed the functions 

clearing and reloading weapons between engagements and clear

some stoppages during engagements. 

The UH-IB was not designed for an armed configuration 

the weight of the armament system reduced the maneuverabi

of the aircraft and induced sufficient drag to lower the maxim

speed to approximately 80 knots. As a consequence, the arm

helicopters could not overtake the airmobile force if they left 

formation to attack targets enroute. The early armed UH-IB's 

an outstanding job in proving the concept of the armed helicopt

but they also pointed out many deficiencies that the Army wo

correct in later versions. 

Techniques of Using the Armed Helicopter 

Some basic operating procedures became standard. 'Vhe

target was identified, the escort leader determined whether it co

be attacked under the rules of engagement and, if so, directed 

engagement. \Vhere possible, targets were engaged at the maxim

range of the weapon. This usually consisted of a continuous bu

of machine gun fire throughout each firing run. The flight patt
fire was used when necessary to reinforce the fires of the machine 

guns. 

The techniques of fire for all weapons systems were based on 

maneuvering the helicopter and manipulating the weapons during 

the firing run. The flexibility of the armed helicopter's weapons 

systems allowed targets to be engaged without a requirement to 

maintain the armed helicopter on an aircraft-to-target line. This 

feature was exploited whenever possible to minimize helicopter 

exposure to the target engaged. When using rockets to attack targets 

obscured by trees or overhanging foliage, it was found that best 

results were obtained with a delayed fuse. 

Fire of the armed escort helicopters during the enroute phase 

was controlled by the armed escort leader. The pre-mission briefings 

identified the probable insurgent areas and prescribed fire control 

procedures to be used by both the armed escorts and transports 

enroute and during the landing phase. In the landing zone, before 

friendly troops were on the ground, armed escort fire was controlled by the escort leader. After the ground force arrived in the 

landing zone, the ground commander often marked and identified 

insurgent targets so that suppressive fire could be quickly and 

accurately placed on them. On medical evacuation missions and 

other missions of this type, when the ground unit was in control 

of the landing zone, the fire of the helicopters was controlled by 

the ground commander. He designated targets, marked friendly 

areas, and determined if escort fire could be used without endangering friendly forces. In mountain and jungle terrain, where 

targets were obscured, the suppressive fire had to be accurately 

controlled and fire discipline maintained in order to avoid hitting 

friendly troops and to prevent needless expenditure of ammunition. 

The armed escort was under operational control of the transport commander during the enroute and landing phases of airmobile operations. If the armed escort remained in support of the 

troops in the landing zone, the ground commander assumed operational control. 

During this period of time opinion varied on the necessity for 

door gunners on transport helicopters. Generally speaking, those 

not close to the action favored elimination of the door gunner for 

the additional weight and space, while the transport helicopter 

pilots favored the retention of the door gunner without exception. 
TROOP HELICOPTERS PICK Up A RIFLE COMPANY FROM THE FIEL

In mid-1963 the question of camouflaging the helicopters ar

Both camouflaged and uncamouflaged helicopters were used 

U. S. Army units. Some pilots reported that the camouflaged h

copters were more difficult to see especially in mountainous ter

and a pilot spent an undue amount of his time keeping track of 

other ships. Other pilots and evaluators expressed the opinion 

the white Army markings and the yellow rings on the tails of 

uncamouflaged helicopters were of value to the enemy gunneTs 

the pUTpose of aiming and tracking. By and large, it was deteTm

that the advantages of camouflage outweighed the disadvanta

Tactical Troop Transport 

\Vhen the UH-lB transpoTt helicopteT was first introduced 

Vietnam, it usually carried ten combat-equipped Vietnamese 

dieTs and at times as many as eleven. An investigation deteTmi

that the aveTage helicopter was grossly overloaded with this m

soldiers. A combat-equipped Vietnamese soldieT averaged 

pounds. \Vhen ten personnel were loaded into the Huey wit
2,100 pounds over normal gross weight and 200 pounds over the 

maximum operational weight. Not only that, the center of gravity 

had shifted beyond safe limits. As a consequence, the standard 

procedure was to limit the UH-I B to eight combat troops except 

in grave emergencies. It was also directed that the armed helicopters would carry no more than the normal complement of five 

personnel and armament with the basic load. 

It was the company commander's responsibility to insure that 

the helicopters were not overloaded and that they remained within 

maximum allowable weight and center of gravity limitations. However, because of operating requirements, the pilot was delegated 

this responsibility and would estimate the load to be lifted, supervise loading and tie-down, and insure that the aircraft was safe for 

flight. To verify the estimated safety factor, the helicopter was 

brought to a hover to check available cycling range and power 

prior to departure. 

Methodology of the Em-ly Air Assaults 

During 1963 the single most important factor in the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for airmobile units in 

the Republic of Vietnam was the lack of significant· enemy air 

defense capabilities, either ground or air. The ground-based threat 

was essentially hand-held small arms and automatic weapons fire. 

On rare occasions caliber 50 or 12.7-mm machine gun fire was 

encountered. The lack of heavy enemy air defense had much to do 

with the selection of flight altitudes. During this time frame, most 

flights were made at 1500 feet or higher to reduce the chances of 

being hit by ground fire. Contour flying was rarely performed. 

The Viet Cong continued to ambush landing zones, especially in 

mountains or mangrove areas where there was a very limited number of landing sites. On occasion, they would mine the area or 

drive stakes to prohibit landing. Most of the resistance, not surprisingly, was in the critical landing phase of an air assault mission. 

The planning for an airmobile assault had evolved rather 

rapidly from the haphazard coordination witnessed in early 1962. 

Usually, this planning was initiated when the aviation battalion 

received a mission request from the Corps Tactical Operations 

Center. Missions were then assigned to the aviation companies by 

the aviation battalion commander. The companies usually received 
p, 

the airmobile company commanding officer, a representative of 

aviation battalion, and a representative from the supported 

During the reconnaissance, approach and departure routes 

selected, condition and size of the landing zone were noted, 

Right formatiqns, check points, and altitudes to be Rown w

determined. Reconnaissance air traffic over the intended lan

zone was closely controlled in order to achieve the elemen

surpnse. 

Various companies used different helicopter formations enr

to a combat assault. A major consideration in the selection 

formation was the size and shape of a landing zone and the com

commander's requirements for disembarking his troops after l

ing. A modified trail formation was sometimes used when an u

terrupted Row of troops into a small landing area was desired. 

formation most frequently used was the "V" . This forma

proved to be versatile, easy to control, and permitted landin

the Right in a minimum of time without bunching. Helicop

normally Rew about 45 degrees to the side and rear of the lead 

and high enough to be out of the rotor wash. Armed helicop

operated at the same altitude as the escorted force. A reconnaiss

element of two or four armed helicopters preceded the transp

by one to five minutes while the remaining escorts normally fla

the transports in a trail formation. If additional armed ships 

available, they were positioned in the rear of the transport

engage targets under the Right. 

The helicopter companies always attempted to plan re

routes that were different from the· approach routes. For subseq

lifts routes were varied slightly to avoid Rying over a given 

more than once. If one landing zone was used several times, 

final approach and entry for each lift was varied if at all poss

In mountainous areas and in some jungle areas, it was not pos

to vary. the route of approach. Consequently, every attempt 

made to land the troops in the shortest possible time to minim

danger. 

Any deviation from the original air movement or landing 

was co-ordinated with the commander of the air-lifted force p

to execution. If the landing zone was heavily defended the mis

commander could notify the commander of the air-lifted force 

proceed to a pre-planned alternate landing zone. 
pp

during descent, and the difficulty in finding a suitable touchdown 

spot for each ship. However, it remained a goal. The terrain in the 

landing zone sometimes slowed the disembarking of troops. In the 

Delta, water was sometimes chest deep and the ship had to be held 

with the skids just under the water level or had to maintain a low 

hover. In jungle areas, grass ten to twelve feet high was often encountered. From the moment the first helicopter touched down 

until the last ship lifted off, two minutes were considered average 

unloading time for a twelve-ship formation , This two minutes 

seems an eternity when one is expecting enemy fire any second. 

To lessen the possibility of fire being concentrated on a single 

ship, all helicopters attempted to depart at the same time. Direction 

of take off was varied for subsequent flights whenever possible. 

The armed escorts used the same tactics on the return route with 

the exception that the ships originally used for the reconnaissance 

were the last to leave the landing zone and consequently usually 

brought up the rear. If another lift was required, the formation 

returned to the loading area for troops and, if necessary, the aircraft 

were refueled and rearmed. 

Perhaps the foregoing planning considerations sound trite to 

today's informed reader. But one must bear in mind that to the 

airmobile commander of 1963 they represented the distillations of 

many hard-learned lessons and the planning procedures were quite 

sophisticated for the situation. Even then they were being refined. 

The Eagle Flight 

In an effort to reduce the planning time required for executing 

an air assault mission, some of the earlier helicopter units developed 

a task force called an "EAGLE FLIGHT" . An "EAGLE FLIGHT" was 

defined by Headquarters U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as "a tactical concept involving the employment of a small, 

self-contained, highly-trained heliborne force. Tactical planning 

emphasizes the use of this force to locate and engage the enemy or 

to pursue and attack an enemy fleeing a larger friendly force. As 

an airmobile force, 'EAGLE' is also prepared to engage an enemy 

force located or fixed by other friendly forces. The inherent flexibility of the 'EAGLE FLIGHT' as a force ready for immediate COffi-
armed Huey would serve as the command and control ship 

would have the U.S. Army aviation commander and the Arm

the Republic of Vietnam troop commander aboard; seven 

armed Hueys were used to transport the combat elements; 

armed Hueys gave the fire support and escort to the troop-carr

helicopters; and, one Huey was usually designated as a med

evacuation ship. 

The EAGLE FLIGHTS were usually on a standby basis or s

times even airborne searching for their own targets. Not only 

these EAGLE FLIGHTS immediately available for those miss

which required a minimum of planning, but they also prov

the basis for larger operations. Several EAGLE FLIGHTS were s

times used against targets that, when developed, proved too l

for a single unit. 

By November 1964, all helicopter companies in South Viet

had organized their own EAGLE FLIGHTS and each company m

tained at least one flight in an alert status on a continuing b

The Vietnamese troop commanders were particularly enthusi

about these operations for they provided a very close working 

tionship between the air and ground elements and a special e

was built from the day-ta-day operations. 

Simply stated, the EAGLE FLIGHT was a microcosm of the l

airmobile assaults that wen~ destined to take place later. It 

all the attributes of a true airmobile force with its self-conta

reconnaissance and surveillance ability, firepower, and Infan

Above all, these early EAGLE FLIGHTS were able to capitalize on 

element of surprise which so often was lost in the detailed plan

cycle with Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces. 

The Growing Aircraft Inventory 

At the beginning of 1964 the United States had 388 airc

in Vietnam including 248 helicopters, too few to accommodate 

expanding advisory effort and increasing Vietnamese Army op

tions. By the end of September 1964, there was in South Viet

a total of 406 Army aviation aircraft supporting the Army of

Republic of Vietnam as follows: 

0-1 

U--6A 

u-a 

(Birddog) 

(Beaver) 

(Seminole) 

53 

20 

9 
CH-37 (Cargo Helicopter) 9 

To support this effort, a total of 3,755 Army aviation personnel 

were provided consisting of 780 officers and 2,975 enlisted peI,"-

sonne!. This made it possible to place a U.S. Army aviation company or a U.S. Marine Corps aviation squadron in support of each 

Vietnamese Army division with additional aviation supporting 

each Corps. 

As 1964 came to a close, the U.S. Army support in Vietnam 

consisted of these'major organizations: the 13th Aviation Battalion 

at Can Tho supported the IV Corps area with three Huey companies and one Birddog platoon; the 145th Aviation Battalion at 

Saigon supported the III Corps area with two Huey companies and 

one armed helicopter company; the 52d Aviation Battalion at 

Pleiku supported I and II Corps areas with two Huey companies, 

one Birddog platoon and one Caribou platoon ; the 14th Aviation 

Battalion at Nha Trang supported all of South Vietnam and Thailand with one direct support maintenance company, one fixed-wing 

Otter company, and one Birddog platoon; the 765th Transportation 

Battalion at Vung Tau supported all four aviation battalions with 

two direct support maintenance companies, one general support 

maintenance company, one Caribou company, and one Special 

Warfare aviation detachment of .Mohawks; and, finally, the Special 

Forces Group was supported with miscellaneous Army aircraft. 

The Mohawk in Vietnam 

Since I discussed earlier the controversial aspects of the Mohawk 

in its relation to the Army-Air Force roles and missions issues, it 

is important to review its actual performance in Vietnam in 1962. 

The six armed Mohawks did a magnificent job and many Army 

advisors pleaded for more of the same. The missions performed by 

these aircraft during this period were somewhat tangential to the 

story of airmobility in the Army. However, this does not take anything away from the individual accomplishments of the Mohawk 

pilots. 

After a storm of controversy in the Pentagon, the 23d Special 

Warfare Aviation Detachment was deployed to Vietnam in Septemper 1962 for the purpose of providing air surveillance in support of Republic of Vietnam furces. In addition, they were to 
prototype armed aerial surveillance unit using the OV

l Moha

aircraft. Besides its headquarters and photo processing secti

there were three flight teams, each consisting of two armed M

hawks, four pilots, and seven enlisted maintenance and armam

specialists. 

When they were deployed to Vietnam their rules of employm

specified that: on all operational flights a Vietnamese obser

would be aboard; that the aircraft would be armed with .50 cali

weapons only; and, that this armament would be used only w

required to defend against a hostile attack. The 23d Special W

fare Aviation Detachment was assigI1ed to Support Group, Vietn

for administration and logistical support. Operational control 

mained with Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietn

who decided to place the Mohawks in support of II Army of 

Republic of Vietnam Corps. From 16 October to 22 November 

entire unit was stationed at Nha Trang supporting the 9th Divis

and the Railway Security Agency. On 23 November one flight te

was moved to Qui Nhon, 100 miles north of Nha Trang, to 

closer to the 9th Division. 

The plan of test for the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Deta

ment called for systematic surveillance of a sector that would 

sure an even distribution of effort over a selected tactical a

However, it soon became abundantly clear that the supported u

were generating so many missions for specific reconnaissance sor

within their tactical areas that no other missions could be flo

In each area, an element of the 23d Special Warfare Aviation 

tachment was employed under the direction of the Army of 

Republic of Vietnam commander, through his U. S. advisor, as 

integral part of the total available force. Because of the m

variables involved, the specific contribution of the Mohawk to 

reduction of Viet Cong incidents could not be quantified. B

there was no question that the 23d Special Warfare Aviation 

tachment inhibited and restricted Viet Cong activity. 

Visual and photographic reconnaissance by this twin-turb

airplane produced a wealth of intelligence for supported un

Hundreds of structures, most of them camouflaged, were detec

in Viet Cong base areas. Likewise, hundreds of people were sigh

in suspect areas and, because of the detailed familiarity of Moha

crews with the local situation and activity patterns, some of 

people sighted could be positively identified as insurgents. One 
MOHA WK TAKING OFF 

the unique advantages of the Mohawk in reconnaissance was its 

speed to noise relationship which allowed the aircraft to get within 

observation distance of people on the ground without alerting 

them to it,s presence. In one division, artillery fires directed from 

the air were nearly tripled by the activities of Mohawk observers, 

Supported units quickly developed air to ground procedures to 

exploit the capabilities of the immediately available Special Warfare Aviation Detachment aircraft. 

From 16 October 1962 to 15 March 1963 the 23d Special 

\Varfare Aviation Detachment flew more than 2,000 hours in the 

performance of 785 combat support missions, It had delivered 

defensive fire 27 times and had lost two aircraft. The cause of the 

loss of these two aircraft was never determined, 

Many of the U. S, Army advisors wrote glowing reports of the 

Mohawk pilots and urged Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

to relax the rules of engagement. For example, on 23 March 1963 

the Senior advisor of the II Corps Tactical Zone, Colonel Hal D. 

McCown, wrote: 

. .. Two Mohawk aircraft are constantly based at Quang Ngai airfield for close and immediate support of the 25th Infantry Division

Results of Mohawk operations there thus far include the following: 

a. Rapid production of low level aerial photographs of VC troop 
c. A bonus effect has been obtained from the defensive mach

gun fire put down by the Mohawks when fired upon. Some VC cas

ties have been observed from these fires. 

d. During the period 15 February to 8 March, artillery adjustm

by Mohawk observers on VC troops sigbted accounted for an estima

65 enemy casualties. Combining these casualties with those noted 

subparagraph c above, it is concluded that the Mohawk has ei

directly or indirectly caused more VC casualties during this period t

all other military forces in Quang Ngai, including RVNAF air stri

Furthermore, I consider that the attack by the well equipped Q 

VC Battalion in the Bato area on 3 March was relatively impot

This was most probably due to actions by Mohawk aircraft on the d

immediately preceeding the attack. These aircraft were responsible 

sighting and adjusting fire on large groups of armed VC within a 

thousand meters of the scene of the attack. 

Despite this fine performance, the full potential of the Moh

aircraft cannot be realized because of the present test restriction

refer to the limitation of armament to the .50 cal machine guns. 

The Mohawk aircraft consistently locate remunerative targets wh

are beyond the range of friendly artillery. The majority of these tar

are small bodies of troops in the open. In counter-insurgency op

tions this is the type target most likely to be encountered. These 

fleeting targets, and unless immediately engaged, will disperse and 

appear. They are long gone before a friendly air strike can be moun

On the several occasions that the Mohawk has encountered 

returned ground fire, the aircraft limitation to .50 cal machine g

has considerably curtailed the effectiveness of this defensive respo

It is apparent that the addition of rockets, napalm and small fragm

tation bombs would have greatly increased the number of VC cas

ties inflicted during the past few weeks. Further, this vastly increa

fire·power capability would have a profound impact on the VC abi

to conduct daylight troop movements. This would seriously hin

their tactical initiative, especially in Quang Ngai Province. It is 

believed that this increased defensive firepower would enhance 

surveillance capability of the aircraft by allowing greater low le

freedom 6£ movement. 

In another letter, dated 19 March 1963, the Senior Advisor 

the 25th 'Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division, Colonel P

A. Baldy, echoed many of Colonel McCown's remarks and add

his own list of impressive data. He closed his letter with 

following: 

It is my considered opinion that the Mohawks' success can be att

uted to their immediate responsiveness to the commanders. In 

counter·insurgency operation such as we have in Vietnam with 

fleeting and elusive targets, the immediate and direct control over 
Similar letters of praise came from the 9th Infantry Divisio

advisors and the senior railway security advisor. In the case of rai

way security, enemy attacks decreased by 50 percent after regula

surveillance was .begun by the 23d Special Warfare Aviation D

ta<;hment. Nevertheless, the career of a railway engineer in Vietnam 

was considered to be non-habit forming. 

There is no doubt that the Mohawks filled a real intelligenc

need for the U. S. Army advisors in the field. For the first tim

the advisors found themselves with a responsive tool in the form o

the Mohawk under their direct operational control to fill in th

many gaps in their intelligence. Their requests for aerial survei

lance and fighter strikes through the cumbersome channels to th

Vietnamese Air Force no doubt increased their desire for mor

Mohawk support. As can be seen from the above, there was th

inevitable trend to use the Mohawk in the fighter role, mainl

because it was there and it had the hard points necessary to carr

armament. 

The Caribou in Vietnam 

Having described earlier some of the controversial aspects th

surrounded the procurement of the Caribou by the U. S. Arm

I must now touch on its role in the early years in Vietnam

Unquestionably, the Caribou filled a serious gap in the Unite

States inventory. Its short field characteristics, pay load, and lig

"footprint" made it an ideal aircraft in the counter-insurgenc

environment. 

A not-well-known fact is that the Caribou airplane predate

our major helicopter commitment to Vietnam by five months. O

21 August 1961, an experimental "Y model" Caribou landed 

Saigon under the auspices of the Advanced Research Proje

Agency. The Advanced Research Project Agency had its ow

charter to test almost any device, technique, or prototype that 

felt might have application in our counter-insurgency efforts. Co

sequently, the Agency was able to cut through the red tape of Ser

ice disagreements and expedite those tests it deemed appropriat

The Advanced Research Project Agency Caribou flew up an

down the length of Vietnam going into airstrips normally limite

to much smaller aircraft such as the 0-1 or U-6 Beaver. Initial

it specialized in resupply of Special Forces outposts that were i
support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 2d Engineer B

talion which was attempting to improve the primitive airfield 

A Shau. In view of the rainy season, the Vietnamese Air Force d

not consider it suitable for either 0-1 or U-6 aircraft; and, b

cause of the constant cloud cover, air drops from C-4 Ts we

impossible. The Caribou navigated through the valleys to A Sh

and landed on the wet primitive strip for the first time. Resupp

parachutes from previous air drops and troops due for rotati

were the first load out. The troops crowded to board the aircra

since none of them believed that the Caribou would dare to com

back. However, the Caribou did return many times bringing ric

fresh food, and pierced steel planking to improve . the runway. Th

loads of succeeding trips were dictated by priority, the weath

always posing a threat. Finally, a complete road grader was mov

in, 5,500 pounds at a time. 

On December 17th, this Caribou took the President of t

Republic of Vietnam and his official retinue into A Shau. Short

thereafter, on Christmas Day, it landed President Ngo Dinh Die

and 37 additional passengers at a remote Montagnard outpost 

Mang Buk in the II Corps Tactical Zone. This strip, not qui

1,000 feet long, was at an altitude of 4,000 feet and hemmed in 

mountains. The Caribou had made an enviable reputation in Vi

nam long before the first complete ·company of aircraft arrived 

Southeast Asia. 

On 23 July 1962, the 1st Aviation Company (Fixed-wing Lig

Transport) was self-deployed from the Continental United Stat

to Thailand. In December the company was moved to Vung Ta

Republic of Vietnam. A second Caribou company, the 61st Av

tion Company, was also self-deployed from the Continental Unit

States in July 1963 and based at Vung Tau first. It was not un

early 1963 that Commander' in Ch ief Pacific approved the propos

test plan for the Caribou company, but by that time the Caribo

had been integrated into most of the daily planning at the cor

level. 

The Army Caribou pilots took justifiable pride in their pr

ficiency at bringing this big twin-engine airplane into the shorte

possible strip. Even the old Southeast Asia hands of "Air Americ

were impressed when this lumbering bird made its unbelievab

slow, steep approach into some of the primative airstrips. The tw

following examples were typical. 
Delta strips with one noteworthy exception-its runway was onl

55 feet wide. Since the Caribou had a main gear track of approxi

mately 26 feet, and since a five to ten knot cross wind usuall

prevailed at Cao Lanh, the pilots had to exercise extreme precis

directional control prior to and immediately after touchdown

While maintaining sufficient airspeed to facilitate directional con

trol, they had to constantly guard against coming in too fast on th

short 1,300 foot runway. From May to September the shoulders o

this airstrip were too wet and soft for the aircraft to leave th

runway. Consequently, the Caribou pilot had to make a half tur

at the end of the runway, then shut down the inside engine whil

the local Army of the Republic of Vietnam security force pushe

the aircraft back for another start, and then complete his turn

Nevertheless, the Caribou flights served this strip three times 

week. 

Probably the shortest strip used consistently by the Caribou wa

Tra My in I Corps. Tra My was 830 feet long and lay in a valle

floor requiring very steep descents and maximum performanc

climb-outs even for aerial delivery. At each end of the strip was a

abrupt embankment. There was no room for a short landing or a

overrun. The first landing was made by Captain Ephriam M. Gos

and CWO P. Crossan. After three attempts, Captain Goss touche

down twelve feet from the west embankment and came to a skid

ding halt eight feet from the east embankment. Needless to sa

a hasty effort was made to lengthen the strip. 

During the first six months of formal testing in early 1963, th

Caribous flew 47,563 passengers and carried over 3,800 tons o

cargo in over 9,000 sorties. Its availability rate was consistent

high. It proved a boon to Army logistical support in Vietnam

General Rowny, who was in charge of the tests being run by th

Army Concept Team in Vietnam, stated: 

The first Caribou tests there used the plane to support Green Bere

located in inaccessible places. Later, all sorts of cargoes were lifted in

all kinds of fields. Montagnards were resettled (complete with chicken

and cattle) ; fuel was delivered to stranded helicopters; casualties, whe

they occurred in large numbers, were quickly lifted to hospitals; spa

engines and parts, fresh water, food and other vital cargo were lifte

Soon there were more demands for the Caribou than we could mee

Added to its advantages of reliability and versatility was its availabilit

There were no long lead-times needed for processing requests; no tort

ous channels to go through. If a commander felt he needed logistic
Like the Mohawk, the history of the Caribou is somew

tangential to the history of airmobility in the Army. It did perfo

a logistics role in a gross weight and performance category that w

unique. The next plane in size was the C-123B which had a gr

weight of 55,700 pounds compared to the Caribou's 28,500 poun

and the single wheel load of the C-123 was almost double that 

the Caribou. Consequently, the Caribou could operate repeated

and routinely into airfields that were denied to the C-123 and la

the C-130. For example, in 1963, the Caribou could operate in

77 percent of all airstrips in Vietnam while the C-123 was limit

to just 11 percent of these airfields. The big question at thIS ti

was whether the Caribou should be employed under the co

senior advisors or whether it should be integrated into the Sou

east Asia airlift system. Strong differences of opinion existed. 

In 1964 the 61st Aviation Company introduced the low-le

extraction system to Vietnam. In this technique the Caribou fl

over a restricted drop area, at an altitude of about ten feet, and 

drag chute attached to the load which was to be deployed pul

the load out of the ship through the rear door. Faster than 

time it takes to tell, the load skidded across the ground until 

came to a safe rest. Using this system, a narrow stretch of road w

an acceptable drop zone. During my visit to Vietnam in Aug

1964, the only complaint I heard about the Caribou was that th

weren't enough of them. 

Other Army Aviation Units in Vietnam 

At that time our fixed-wing aviation assets were centralized 

Vietnam in the Aviation Support Battalion (Provisional) co

manded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Dillard. This battali

consisted of the 18th Aviation Company (U-IA Otters) for lig

transport, the 73d Aviation Company (O-IF Bird Dogs) for 

connaissance, the 61st Aviation Company (CV-2B Caribou) 

heavy transport, and the 23d ~pecial 'Warfare Aviation Deta

ment (JOV-I Mohawk) for surveillance. Three transportati

maintenance companies provided the necessary logistics suppo

The 18th Aviation Company with its Otters had been doing y

man service in Vietnam since January 1962 and its pilots genera

felt that their unique contribution to supplying infinitesimal 
credit. 

Another unit which is seldom mentioned in the Vietnam repor

(probably because it was so often taken for granted) was the 73

Aviation Company flying the two-place Bird Dog of Korean vintag

That company had arrived in Saigon on 23 May 1962 and its thirt

two aircraft were spread in fifteen separate locations all the wa

from Hue in the north to Bac Lieu in the south. These 0-1's we

primarily oriented to the reconnaissance requirement for the Vie

namese advisors but also were utilized for artillery adjustmen

target acquisition, command and control, message pickup, medic

evacuation, radio relay, and resupply. By 1964 this unit had s

up its own school to train the Vietnamese officers and aerial o

servers and they had recorded over 41,000 hours of flying time 

their first fourteen months in Vietnam. 

Increasing Viet Cong Threat 

While I was in Saigon in the summer of 1964 I spent some tim

with Major General Oden, Commanding General of the U. S. Arm

Support Command in Vietnam. General Oden, who had been m

predecessor as Director of Army Aviation, highlighted the increas

intensity of combat in Vietnam and the concurrent increased ris

being taken by our aviation units. It was apparent at this time th

the most important aspect of U. S. support to the Army of the R

public of Vietnam was the capability embodied in our U. S. Arm

aviation organizations. 

From the arrival of the first H-21 's in December 1961 up 

mid-1965, the U. S. Army had concentrated on developing a

mobile operations in support of Army of the Republic of Vietna

forces in an ever-increasing scope. As the Allied tactics and tec

niques developed, so did the Viet Cong develop counter tactics an

techniques. Consequently, there was always a need for innovatio

Experience proved that any set pattern for any length of time w

extremely dangerous since the Viet Cong were quick to capitali

on these patterns and strike at the weakest point. 

Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, o

12 June 1965, indicated his concern of the number of helicopt

assaults that had been ambushed by the Viet Cong in recent mont

and directed Brigadier General John Norton, Deputy Command

of U. S. Army Support Command, Vietnam, to study this proble
depth the enemy and the environment, airmobile operations from 

planning to execution, command and control and communication

and current and prospective material. The meeting served to sum

marize the problems of airmobility during this period and possib

solutions for the future. 

General Norton's group noted that the Viet Cong were increa

ing their efforts to counter friendly airpower with larger calibe

weapons and many reports indicated the introduction of th

l2.7-mm machine gun into South Vietnam. It was reasonable t

expect heavier antiaircraft weapons up to 37-mm in size to be intro

duced within the next six months. 

The Viet Cong had learned more than a bit about the metho

of operation of Free ''''orld Forces and could well determine prob

able landing zones and the number of troops which could b

brought in by one lift. Their antiaircraft weapons were now bein

centrally controlled and coordinated to deny the use of the mo

desirable landing zones and thereby channelize the airmobile force

into landing zones chosen and covered by the Viet Congo In th

latter zones, the Viet Cong forces tried to maintain favorable odd

of four to one to the amount of Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

forces available to react against them. Even in 1965 it was en

visioned that soon airmobile operations would be opposed b

division-size units. 

Combat intelligence for airmobile operations was woefully in

adequate due to a multitude of inadequacies in Army of th

Republic of Vietnam intelligence combined with restrictions im

posed in U.S,-Army of the Republic of Vietnam advisory relation

The increased activity of the enlarged Viet Cong forces made th

staging areas of airmobile forces increasingly vulnerable to surpris

attacks. Fuel and ammunition depots were prime targets. 

Increasing Viet Cong interdiction of main ground supply route

imd the resultant dependency on air-delivered supplies was impo

ing a severe burden on available air cargo capabilities. It becam

evident that special command control had to be vigorously applie

to insure that critical air tonnage was not diluted by non-essenti

cargo. 

General Norton's study group also highlighted one of the majo

problems of the early armed helicopters-the armed Huey becaus

of its gross weight and additional drag was slower than the troop

carrying transport helicopters that it escorted. This meant tha
escort helicopter which could maintain a speed of at least 150 knots

The urgency of this requirement was to force the Pentagon to re

examine its position on the introduction of an "interim" arme

helicopter rather than wait for a totally new weapons system. 2 

In summary, in June of 1965, the U. S. Army found itself wit

a large commitment of airmobile resources supporting Republi

of Vietnam Armed Forces' with an organization that had grow

somewhat like Topsy. Tactics and techniques had been generate

by the necessity of the moment, procedures had been hammere

out of necessity, and equipment had been borrowed and jury

rigged. Airmobility had obviously kept the South Vietnames

forces in being, but the Viet Cong had become increasingly mor

sophisticated and were reinforced with large numbers of Nort

Vietnamese regular troops. The U. S. Army aviators and cre

chiefs had done a heroic job in the face of countless difficultie

but it was obviously time to develop a new order of magnitude o

airmobility and regain the offensive. The President of the Unite

States decided to commit major numbers of U. S. ground comb

troops to the action. 

The option open to the President in 1965 to deploy a significa

U. S. airmobile force was only possible because certain events ha

occurred in the preceding years. To understand airmobility i

Vietnam we must examine the gradual development of the co

cept in the United States. Before we proceed with this examinatio

I want to interject one important reminder. The airmobile 'conce

had its roots in the necessity to counter a sophisticated enemy i

Europe. The Howze Board had only touched on the counte

guerrilla possibilities and the Air Assault tests, which we wi

discuss next, centered around two conventional opposing force

Vietnam was in the background, to be sure, but only as one of man

contingencies-not the contingency. 

• A detailed discussion of the development of a "new" armed helicopter will 

found on page 144 where we discuss the arrival of the Cobra in Vietnam. Here it 

sufficient to note that by this time in 1965, the concept definition of an Advanc

Aerial Fire Support System had evolved from a rather straight-forward compou

helicopter to an ultra-sophisticated, all-weather, computerized weapons platform w

a rigid rotor. It's my personal opinion that the original concept could have be

developed and delivered in this time frame, if the requirement had not been undu

complicated by additional requirements that strained the state of the art, increas

costs, and delayed delivery. 
CHAPTER III 

The Early Years in the United States

1963-1965 

The Air Assault Tests 

Before we examine the details of the 11 th Air Assault Divi

and the eventual deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division (

mobile) , it is important to remember that during this period 

Aviation School, Transportation School, Signal School, and A

deen Proving Ground, as well as many other Army agencies, 

voted their considerable talents and manpower to improving 

supporting the concept of airmobility. Space and time do not 

mit detailing even a portion of this effort, but I would not w

any omission here to leave the impression that the air assault 

were the sum and substance of the U. S. Army progress during 

period. 

The Howze Board had laid the foundations and suggested 

means to finish the job that it had begun so well. Now it was u

the Army as a whole to turn the major Howze Board recommen

tion into fact. 

To maintain the Howze Board momentum and to meet on

its major recommendations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operati

on 7 January 1963 issued the initial plan for the organizat

training, and testing of an air assault division and an air transp

brigade. Cadres of the test units were activated on · 15 Febru

at Fort Benning, Georgia .. The test division was named the 

Air Assault Division to revive the colors of that proud World W

II airborne division. At first it was represented by just an infa

battalion, plus a few personnel in the division headquarters 

the necessary combat support and logistical support elements. C

currently, the 10th Air Transport Brigade was activated aro

a battalion-size unit. The overall strength of these initial test u

was 191 officers, 187 warrant officers, and 2,645 enlisted men f

total of 3,023 personnel. Of the 154 aircraft provided, 125 w

helicopters and 29 were fixed-wing. It was visualized that the u
Army would be pushed into joint testing of these new organizations 

before they were sufficiently organized and trained. General Barksdale Hamlett, then Vice Chief of Staff, stated on 11 February 1963 

that his chief concern at the moment was whether the Army would 

"be permitted to pursue an orderly program without being forced 

into premature joint testing." He believed that "within our airmobile concept the principal targets for the opposition appeared 

to be the Mohawk, the Caribou, and the armed helicopter together 

with our plans for the utilization of these aircraft." Later events 

were to prove that General Hamlett's concern was well founded. 

Those who were assigned to the new test units throughout the 

year and a half of the formation and testing of the II th Air Assault 

Division and the 10th Air Transport Brigade almost universally 

regarded this period as one of the high points of their lives. It was 

one of the few times in the Army up until that point in time that 

a group of officers and men have been pul.led together with the job 

of developing and proving a concept with very little in the way of 

approved doctrine, systems, equipment, methods of operations, and 

any of the vast documentation and regulations which normally 

prescribe the formation of new military organizations. For example, 

at the time of the formation of the II th Air Assault Division, it 

was actually against Army regulations for helicopters to fly in 

formation except under the most unusual circumstances. The 

infantryman had to adjust to new methods of entering into combat and new tactics and techniques of closing with the enemy. The 

artillery man had to provide his proven support with ne'v airmobile 

artillery and aerial rocket artillery. The aviation elements had to 

broaden their training to include much work in the nap-of-theearth, formation flying, night formations, jury rigging of weapons 

on Hueys and Mohawks, and forward area refueling. It was a time 

of innovation at all levels. 

Brigadier General Harry W. O. Kinnard had been selected to 

lead the II th Air Assault Division during this critical period. He 

in turn handpicked his key personnel and gave them the widest 

latitude in accomplishing their particular portion of the mission. 

Commanders at all levels were free to pursue vigorously any advancement of the airmobile concept as they saw it. At division headquarters, General Kinnard established "an idea center" to insure 

that any suggestion however bold or radical would receive careful 

and detailed consideration. Civilian industry was briefed on the 
training and the skill of the flight crews. Particular attention w

given to night operations. 

Lieutenant Colonel John B. Stockton's 227th Assault Helic

ter Battalion-the first in the Army-spent much of its time exp

menting with methods of moving long distances through very 

weather and improving their own lighting systems for tight form

tion flying at night. The Chinook battalion under Lieuten

Colonel Benjamin S. Silver, Jr. struggled with a newly develo

machine, with the attending problems of maintenance and sp

parts, to find new methods of moving artillery and key supplies. T

10th Air Transport Brigade, under Colonel Delbert L. Bris

with a combination of Caribous and Chinooks devised the f

workable air line of communications. 

While the test units were being formed and organized, c

siderable thought was being given to the methodology that wo

have to be developed to objectively test such large organizatio

There had been no tests of this type since the years just prior 

World War II, when the Army tested its "new" triangular divis

concept. And even this test never approached the scope of the 

Assault Tests. There had been, of course, many large unit f

exercises, but these took the form of training tests rather than c

cept tests. Furthermore, the evaluation of exercises of this type 

been based solely on military judgment and opinion.1 

Lieutenant General C. W. G. Rich, who was assigned the o

all responsibility as test director on I August 1964, was given 

mission to test a concept, and base the evaluation of this conc

on scientific principles. He charged the Test Evaluation and C

trol Group, headed by General Williams, to establish a n

methodology based on evaluation of the combat systems and h

these systems interacted with each other. A scientific elem

staffed by systems analysts from the Combat Operations Resea

Group, advised and assisted the evaluation group. In the f

phases of evaluation there were 376 permanent members of 

Test and Evaluation Group as well as 1,596 temporary person

The main problem facing the Test and Evaluation Group 

the difficulty of isolating what was being tested. Test units w

developing procedures, detailed tactics, and techniques thro

1 Extensive [ests of the "Pentomic Division·· were made at Fort Benning in 

mid-1950·s, but they differed in magnitude and approach. 
concurrently with the testing, so the test findings had to be analyzed 

as to whether they were the result of unit training problems or 

actual deficiencies in the system itself. 

Throughout the early formation and training period of the 

11 th Air Assault test units, there was a continuous and intentional 

cross-feed of people, information, equipment, and ideas between 

what was going on in Vietnam and what was going on at Fort 

Benning. Members of the 11 th Air Assault paid frequent visits to 

units in Vietnam for cross-fertilization of ideas, and many of the 

members of the 11 th Air Assault in its latter stages were Vietnam 

returnees. In addition, the test division had the added mission of 

forming, training, and equipping a total of six airmobile companies 

that were sent to Vietnam during the testing period. The airmobile 

concept was not growing in isolation either in Southeast Asia or 

the United States. 

It was not until three months before the final test, labeled 

AIR ASSAULT II, that either the division or the air transport brigade 

existed as essentially anything more than a strong cadre organization. Between 1 July 1964 and 1 September 1964 both units were 

levied for complete units with aircraft and personnel for shipment 

overseas. This requirement skimmed off the cream of highly qualified individuals from all units in the division. Temporary duty 

aircraft and aviators were brought into the testing units during 

the month of September and continued to join the testing units up 

to and during the final exercise which took place from 14 October 

to 12 November 1964. 

AIR ASSAULT II involved some 35,000 personnel and covered 

over four million acres through the Carolinas. The exercise was 

a controlled field test where a test scenario listed by time certain 

actions or events that were required to occur. Maximum freedom 

of player action was permitted with sufficient control to allow 

adequate observation for those events which were necessary for 

evaluation. The 82d Airborne Division (augmented) acted as the 

aggressor force. 

As fate would have it, the weather at the beginning of AIR 

ASSAULT II was incredibly bad. Hurricane Isabell, out in the Atlantic, had low flying scud and rain blanketing out the whole of 

the eastern seaboard. Ceilings ranged from 50 to 200 feet and visibility was sometimes less than one eighth of a mile. These condi-
was not feasible. Despite this, this operation jumped off only 

hour behind schedule with the movement of one air assault in

try brigade by 120 helicopters over a distance of 100 nautical m

precisely on their objective. A year and a half of training 

paid off. 

For four weeks the test units maneuvered throughout the C

linas in offensive, defensive, and retrograde movements. T

umpires were hard-pressed to keep up with the tempo and 

collection of "hard data," by being in the right spot at the r

time, became their primary concern. So much was happen

concurrently over such a large area that control of the enthusia

units being tested was a constant problem. It was a tribute to b

the tested units and the umpire personnel that the scenario 

mained recognizable. To compound the problem, hundreds 

distinguished visitors wanted to witness this critical testing per

It is interesting to compare the comments of the two m

commanders of the units in AIR ASSAULT II, Major General Rob

H . York, who commanded the aggressor force of the 82d Airbo

Division, and General Kinnard, who commanded the lIth 

Assault Division and attached units. 

General York said: 

Air assault operations as pioneered' on Exercise AIR ASSAULT 

have a dynamic potential. Seldom do we see a new military con

which can contribute so decisively throughout the entire spectrum 

warfare. Certain air assault techniques used during Exercise A

ASSAULT II would be unacceptably hazardous in actual combat. H

ever, these deficiencies can be corrected and do not detract from 

validity of the overall concept. 

General Kinnard looked beyond the scenario of AIR ASSAUL

and said: 

Beyond what I believe to be its capabilities to perform roles nor

to other divisions, I am even more impressed by what I feel is its ab

to perform in unique ways beyond the abilities of other divisions. 

example, in a low scale war, I believe it can exert control over a m

wider area and with much more speed and flexibility and 

much less concern for the problems of interdicted ground commun

tions or of difficult terrain. In higher scales of war, I see in this divi

an unparalleled reserve or screening force capable of operating 

very large frontages. By properly picking times, places, and method

believe it can also operate with devastating effect against the rea

the enemy. Faced with threat or use of nuclear weapons, I believ
On 1 December 1964 General Rich forwarded his interim report 

of the Air Assault test to the Commanding General. Combat Developments Command. He noted that this examination of a particular division slice had not set the lower or upper limits to the 

airmobility potential but it had provided clear indications of the 

possible and practical advantages to be gained. His recommendations were as follows: 

First, I urge that the two years of effort. the experience of the people 

on hand. and the equipment on hand not be lost by the dissipation. 

fragmentation. or dispersal of the tested units. Second, I strongly recommend that the 11 th Air Assault Division or a division strength unit 

with the airmobility capability of the 11 th AAD be included in the 

Army's force structure with a full parachute capability for its nonaviation elements; and the lOth Air Transport Brigade be retained 

intact and included in the Army's force structure. The significant question is not whether we can afford such organizations. but whether this 

nation. with its rapidly expanding population and ever-increasing 

GNP can afford NOT to have . them. The tested organizations are 

prototypes, in being. of the most versatile forces that we can add to 

the United States Army. The movement capability of all divisions, 

including the II th Air Assault Division has been enhanced by Air 

Force aircraft; however. the integration of Army aircraft into these 

tested units has provided the crucial maneuver capability of light 

mobile forces to close with and destroy the enemy. In combination 

with ROAD divisions and other standard Army organizatons. airmobile 

units offer a balance of mobility and an increased Army combat readiness on a theater scale that is applicable to the ent~re spectrum of 

warfare. 

Though not part of the formal report, General Rich made one 

further observation on the fundamentai concept of airmobility. 

I wish to distinguish between three fundamental levels of airmobility. First, an aviation unit can be given to a combat force on a temporary basis for a specific operation. This is equivalent to a corps truck 

company attached to a division for a one time move. Such an operation involves two separate staffs working out detailed plans to integrate 

the SOP's and techniques of two separately trained organizations. The 

second level is represented by the organic aviation in a ROAD 

Division. This approach benefits from unity of command. day-to-day 

training and intangibles such as esprit. But it is limited to a company 

lift capability; does not permit replacement of ground vehicles by aircraft; its equipment is not tailored to aircraft capabilities; and it could 

never represent the primary thrust of the division. At the third level 

a much greater gain is possible when the organization is specifically 

trained and equipped to exploit the continuing close tactical integra-
metic scale, and only at the third level do we find a new potential 

the tempo of operations, in range overextended distances and in f

dom from heretofore formidable terrain obstacles. 

Joint Considerations 

As early as 17 January 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 

visioned testing the airmobile concept under the supervision 

U. S. Strike Command. It was originally conceived that this wo

be a complete comparative evaluation of the Army and Air Fo

airmobility concepts to include division-size joint exercises. Gene

Rosson was designated by General Paul D. Adams, Command

General U. S. Strike Command, to form a Joint Test and Eval

tion Task Force to plan and fulfill this requirement. As mention

earlier, the Army was concerned that it would be pushed into s

a test before it had fully organized and trained its own ainnob

units. The Air Force, on the other hand, had been pushing fo

joint test of its own concepts ever since the Disosway report on 

Howze Board. 

At the heart of the Air Force concept was the contention t

within a joit:tt force the Army Reorganization Objective Ar

division supported by Air Force tactical air offered a more p

tical and economical means for enhancing the mobility and com

effectiveness of Army units than did the Army air assault divisi

Selective tailoring of the Reorganization Objective Army divis

was seen as pennitting varying degrees of airtransportability 

combat capability ranging from a relatively light mobile fo

to one capable of sustained combat, all without recourse to spec

ized Army airmobile units. As visualized by the Air Force, neit

Army fixed-wing aircraft or medium helicopters were required 

tactical movement of troops or delivery of supplies. It was th

contention that the Air Force C-130 could do the majority of 

air transport mission while other Air Force aircraft provided 

connaissance and firepower. 

On 5 March 1964 a decision by the Secretary of Defense p

duced far-reaching effects on the U. S. Strike Command test 

evaluation effort. This decision allowed the Army to proceed w

its unilateral tests during the latter part of calendar year 19

Thereafter, the Army was to recommend to the Joint Chiefs 

Staff what aspect, if any, warranted validation by joint test
Meanwhile Strike Command was left with the responsibility for 

conducting joint training and testing of the Air Force concept 

through division level. The 1st Infantry Division subsequently was 

made available for this purpose. 

The Strike Command-sponsored joint test and evaluation exercise, GOLD FIRE I, was conducted in Missouri at about the same 

time that the Army was conducting its final test program with the 

air assault division. It soon became evident that the Air Force concept, rather than dealing in innovations, embraced improving 

streamlined sustained execution of a long-established concept

namely, tactical air support of ground forces. It proved that with 

overwhelming use of dedicated Air Force support, a standard Army 

division had increased potential. The joint exercise provided few 

surpnses. 

General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, United States Army

in discussing the differences between the tests of the 11 th Air 

Assault Division and the test sponsored by Strike Command of an 

Army division supported by the Air Force, remarked: "I had the 

rare privilege of seeing the II th Air Assault one week and the 

other concept at the early part of the following week, and I would 

make a comparison of perhaps a gazelle and an elephant. The two 

are not comparable. Each of them has its role to play, and it i

important that we continue to pursue in this area where we have 

made such significant strides the gains that we already have." 

At the last moment, General Rosson was told by the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 September 1964 to carry out an 

independent U. S. Strike Command evaluation of the Army's AIR 

ASSAULT II and on 6 October 1964 the gu idance was modified to 

state that a comparative evaluation of GOLD FIRE I and AIR 

ASSAULT II would not be undertaken but rather directed a separat

and independent evaluation of the Army exercise. 

The interim final report on the tests of the II th Air Assaul

which was submitted on 1 December 1964 essentially wrapped up 

twenty-one months of intensive, almost feverish, activity by thou

sands of highly specialized personnel. General Rich's final ple

had been that this organization not be dispersed to the winds. I

was now up to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determin

its future . 

The Army had convinced itself, and a large body of peopl

throughout the military establishment, that further large scal
CHART I- 1sT CAVA

@J8lSJ 

1 AlrCanlry 

Squadron 

Division Artillery 1 Signal aaHelio

~8B 3 105 Howitzer 

aattalions 

15,787 OffIcers and Men 

434 Alrcrllft 

1,600 Vehicles 

1 Aerial Artillery 

aattalion 

1 Aviation aatte

~ One arlgade Headquarters and 3 Infantry Battalions will have a

Airborne Capability 

~ Maneuver Battalllons will be assigned to Brigades as Required 
MAP 1 

I CORPS 
tional problems associated with these new units, but no fund

been programmed for major tests during calendar year 196

thousands of pilots, mechanics and technicians returned to 

home stations from temporary duty, the remainder of the tes

sonnel finished writing annexes to the final test report, comp

documentation of side tests of new equipment, and pulling 

over-due maintenance on their tired aircraft. 

On balance, it must be said that the continuation of 

service of the 11 th Air Assault hinged not only on the test r

per se, but also the events in Vietnam which made the deploy

of such a division extremely attractive. In the spring of 1965 

planners in the Pentagon were considering the deployment o

division as one of the possible options to counter a wors

situation-one in which the Viet Cong seemed likely to cut 

Vietnam in half through the II Corps Tactical Zone. 

Formation of the 1st Cavalry Division (A irmobile) 

In March 1965 the tentative decision was made to conve

lith Air Assault Division (Test) to a full-fledged member o

force structure. General Creighton W. Abrams, who was 

the Vice Chief of Staff, said after the decision briefing, "Is 

fortuitous that we happen to have this organization in exis

at this point in time?" Those who had been fighting for su

organization for over a decade could not help but sense the 

of this remark. It was decided that the new division would 

the colors of the 1st Cavalry Division which was then deploy

Korea. This decision was made for a variety of reasons, som

them emotional and some pragmatic. 

On I July 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) wa

cially activated pursuant to General Order 185, Headqu

Third U. S. Army, and was made up of the resources of the 

Air Assault Division (Test) and the 2d Infantry Division. De

a crippling loss of personnel by reassignment throughout the 

sion, its personnel were able to retrain, re-equip, and deploy 

major force to combat in ninety days. This effort is a major 

in itself. Almost 50 percent of the original personnel were ineli

for overseas deployment. Replacement pilots had to be traine

new aircraft and new standing operating procedures, and the 

inal structure itself received major modification. For example
had been deleted, and the aviation group had been drastically 

modified. A chart of the 1st Cavalry Division as deployed is shown 

on page 59. 

The division staged out of Mobile, Alabama, and Jacksonville, 

Florida, on the USS Boxer and three Military Sea Transportation 

Service ships. Approximately 80,000 man hours were required to 

process all the aircraft aboard the four vessels. The USS Boxer 

proceeded via the Suez Canal while the three smaller vessels 

traveled the Pacific. 

An advance party landed in the Republic of Vietnam on 

25 August 1965 and arrived at An Khe shortly thereafter. (Map 1) 

The men immediately began clearing the "golf course," which was 

to become the world's largest helipad. The 1st Cavalry Division 

was about to write a new chapter to its proud history. 

• The air assauit division included 24 armed Mohawks in its table of organization 

and equipment. Nothing could have raised a brighter red flag in front of those pro· 

ponents of complete Air Force control of all aspects of air support. An unbelievable 

amount of time and effort was devoted to the roles and missions aspect of the 

Mohawk during this period. General Johnson, Army Chid of Staff, remarked during 

the course of the air assault tests that he devoted more than 60 percent of his time 

in the joint arena to this one relatively small system. Indeed he felt that the whole 

future of the Army airmobile concept might be jeopardized by the Army's unwar· 

ranted concentration on hanging a few machine guns on a twin·turbine airplane. 

General Johnson described the Mohawk as the "barber pole of the air assault divi· 

sion." After being asked what he meant by this phrase, he replied that when one 

looks for a barber shop he finds it by looking for a barber pole; and one could find 

an air assault division in a theater by looking for the armed Mohawks. 
CHAPTER IV 

The First Airmobile Division and th

Buildup, 1965 

Buildup of u. S. Ground Forces 

General Westmoreland, Commander Military Assistance 

mand, Vietnam, in his report on the war in Vietnam, stated

The year 1965 was one of momentous decisions and of comm

. . . In making my recommendations in the spring and early s

of 1965, as indeed in the case of later recommendations, I was m

of the stated U. S. objective with respect to Vietnam: "To defeat 

sion so that the people of South Vietnam will be free 'to shap

own destiny." It was my judgment that this end could not be ac

without the deployment of U. S. forces. With the concurre

Ambassador Taylor, I so recommended. 

The United States had already made a large commitm

airmobility assets to Vietnam in support of Army of the Re

of Vietnam forces. Now U. S. ground forces would test th

mobility concept for the first time in combat. Propinquity di

that the first major combat unit of the U. S. Army to be dep

would be the airborne brigade stationed in Okinawa. On 

1965 the 173d Airborne Brigade, comprised of two battali

infantry and one of artillery, arrived from Okinawa to p

security for the major air base at Bien Hoa and the airfi

Vung Tau. It would not be long before this brigade wou

committed to major offensive action. 1 

Brigadier General Ellis W . Williamson, the commander 

173d, had taken immediate action to prepare his troops f

peculiar environment in Vietnam and especially highlighted 

training in counter-ambush. By 10 May 1965, he noted: 

We have started our airmobile training. At first we are jus

ticing "getting in and getting out" techniques. As far as the ind

is concerned, this is a critical operation. Get in quickly and g

1 A Marine Expeditionary Brigade had arrived in Da Nang on 8 March 

primary mission of securing the large air base in the northern province. 
,j 

Two days later in a note to the troops, General Williamson said: 

The helicopter fire support gunships often frighten new troops. 

They whip over your heads rather quickly, firing on your flank or in 

front of you. Don't be fooled by the falling expended cartridges or belt 

links. Often inexperienced troops mistakenly think that these cartridges 

and links falling among them are fire from the helicopter. They won't 

hurt you. The real bullets are on the target. These helicopter pilots 

are some ' of the most efficient; professional men that we have ever 

observed. If we can identify the target for them they can and will hit it. 

During the month of June the 173d was joined by the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment. The Australians would 

be working directly with the Brigade for some months and would 

soon be joined by a field artillery battery from New Zealand. 

On 28 June the 173d Airborne Brigade participated in the 

largest troop lift operation conducted in the Republic of South 

Vietnam up to that time. Over 144 Army aircraft, including 77 

troop transport helicopters, lifted two battalions of the Vietnamese 

2d Airborne Brigade and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 50 3d 

Infantry deep into War Zone D. In all, nine battalions were 

involved: five infantry; one artillery; one support; a composite 

battalion of cavalry, armor, and engineers; and the Australian 

battalion. This was the first time any large-size force of friendly 

troops had operated in this area for more than a year. Many caches 

of weapons and rice were destroyed. Twenty-five Viet Cong were 

killed and fifty or more wounded. On D + 2, the forces were 

extracted. 

On 6 July the 173d returned to War Zone D and conducted 

one of its most successful operations since its arrival in Vietnam. 

In conjunction with the battalion of Australians and units of 

the 43d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, multiple air 

assaults were made just north of the Song Dong Nai River. Some 

1,494 helicopter sorties were flown in support of this operation. 

Fifty-six Viet Cong were killed by actual body count. Twenty-eight 

prisoners of war were taken and one hundred tons of rice plus 

literally tons of documents were captured. 

A Critique of an Air Assault 

One of the most valuable tools of a commander is the immediate 

review of a combat operation with his subordinate commanders 
critiques were particularly important, as is shown from the fo

ing excerpts of the meeting after the assault of the 173d into 

Zone D. 

In his critique of the operation, General Williamson said

In all candor I must admit that I did not expect to find as 

enemy in that area as we did ... We did a lot of things that we 

not even have considered six weeks ago. As you recall when w

arrived in Vietnam we started off doing one thing at a time. O

operation, at the extraction time, we took 3,000 troops out of 

different landing zones in three hours and ten minutes. We wo

have moved troops that fast or afford to bring our troops that 

together at one time unless we had a lot going on at one time . 

I looked at it from above, it was a sight to see. We were withdr

from the center LZ while some friendly troops were still in the w

LZ. We had a helicopter strike going in a circle around the cent

The machine gun and rocket firing helicopters kept making their 

smaller and smaller as we withdrew our landing zone security. J

the west side we had another helicopter strike running north to 

We also had something else that was just a little hairy but it w

without any question, the artillery was firing high angle fire to 

the northern side of the landing zone. The personnel lift helic

were coming from the east, going under the artillery fire, sitting 

in the LZ to pick up troops and leaving by way of the southwe

addition to that, we had an air strike going to the northeast. 

these activities were going on at the same time. We could not 

done that a few weeks ago. 

The 173d found that they had to go to unusual lengths to 

new landing zones for medical evacuation. The commanding o

of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 50 3d Infantry, told how one 

company commanders tried to hack out an emergency la

zone in the jungle. "They used over 100 pounds of C-4 expl

that they had with them, and they had a couple of axes and h

away with their machetes. The C-4 took the bark off and m

few splinters, and that was about it. These trees were almost t

resistant to the charges." 

The S-3 of the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regi

noted one problem as he saw it in working with the helico

"I would like someone to make an assessment to what exte

we lose the initiative by the excessive use of helicopters. B

use of them, the enemy can determine where you are, and 

strength you are in." 

The Air Force liaison officer remarked: 
y y g p

py y 

troops . .. We have uncovered a number of in-house problems which 

we are busily engaged in correcting. On the strength of what we have 

learned, we can promise you far bett.er air support in the future. 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee E. Surut, Commanding Officer of the 

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, closed the critique on a wry note: 

"Gentlemen, we are rapidly approaching the time when the 

critiques will be as long as the exercises. Once again the artillery 

lent dignity to what would otherwise have been a vulgar brawl ... 

The artillery fired 4,857 rounds of 105mm ammunition during the 

four-day exercise . . . The Artillery put a lot of bullets on the 

target and accounted for significant destruction and VC casualties." 

Aviation Support 

The early experience of the 173d Airborne Brigade pointed 

out some of the advantages of attached airmobility. During its first 

three months in Vietnam the brigade was supported by the 145th 

Aviation Battalion. In September, a helicopter company was attached and collocated. Aviation support by attached aviation was 

so much better than support on a mission basis that the brigade 

staff was highly laudatory of the aviation company and the advantages of attachment. 

A study of this relationship was made by the Combat Developments Command during this period. The study concluded: 

The cohesiveness and teamwork developed between the supported 

and supporting units is extremely important. The aviation company is 

attached to the brigade, lives with the brigade, and works with the 

brigade on a daily basis. They are a part of the brigade. This unit can 

move a battalion anywhere in the TAOR within two hours. It would 

take two or three times as long if you had to go to an aviation unit 

outside the brigade. This closeness and cohesiveness between the brigade 

and the aviation company has been achieved through constant practice 

and improvement of airmobile techniques. Teamwork is the key word. 

Furthermore, effectiveness of the attached company increased appreciably. After attachment and collocation, the total sorties flown per 

month by the aviation company increased 24 percent, the number of 

combat sorties increased 165 percent, and the average tonnage carried 

per month increased 50 percent; while the average number of hours 

flown monthly per pilot decreased 24 percent and the average number 

of hours each aircraft was utilized decreased 23 percent. These data are 

based on a comparison of data developed over a six-month period, three 

months in support and three months attached. 
matter of moving troops from point A to point B if you r

wanted to exploit the potential of the helicopter. It took trai

and time to integrate tactical air, helicopter gunships, field artil

reconnaissance, and troop maneuver elements into a single 

operation. 

Growing Pains 

The early operations of the l73d would not have been pos

had not the helicopter assets been in place and trained before 

arrival. During this time we were "robbing Peter to pay P

throughout our worldwide inventory. In Vietnam as U. S. t

strength grew, we had to reduce our helicopter support to A

of the Republic of Vietnam forces to give priority to the U

Army ground units. It would not be until the arrival of th

Cavalry Division that any significant number of organic helico

would arrive with their parent unit. 

On 20 July 1965 the U. S. Army Support Command, Vie

was redesignated U. S. Army, Vietnam, and General Norton 

designated Deputy Commanding General. This change was in

tive of the growing presence of U. S. ground troops and the n

sity for better command and control procedures. On 28 

President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that our forces in 

nam would be raised from 75,000 to 125,000 and that additi

forces would be sent as requested. On 29 July, the 1st Brigad

the 10Ist Airborne Division arrived in Vietnam following a bri

of the 1st Infantry Division which had arrived a few days ea

The Marine strength continued to grow in the I Corps Tac

Zone as well as the theater logistical base to support the U

buildup. 

The problems involved in this buildup can be described 

short review of the deployment of the 1st Brigade of the 

Airborne Division. During the period 6 July to 29 July 

the Brigade moved from Fort Campbell, Kentucky to Viet

On 29 July through 21 August 1965 the Brigade manned a 

fensive perimeter in the Cam Ranh Bay area and began to esta

a base camp. From 10 to 21 August the Brigade conducted o

tions southwest of Nha Trang and on 22 August, the Brigade m

north by sea and air with a mission to sweep clear the An Khe 

of Binh Dinh Province to provide security for the arrival of 
airmobile operations. They found that many of the items that they 

had brought in country such as camouflage nets were completely 

extraneous and many things they had not brought, such as additional water trucks, were absolutely essential. 

When the Brigade was alerted at Fort Campbell, there was no 

positive assurance this would be a permanent move or a temporary 

duty move, and personal problems of families, quarters, etc., placed 

an undue administrative burden on the unit. The advance party 

moved on two old C-124 aircraft which, because of mechanical and 

administrative difficulties, required seven days to close in Nha 

Trang. The main body of over 3,600 troops was shipped aboard 

the USNS General Leroy Eltinge which had a normal troop capacity of 2,200 men. The 2 I-day voyage was a miserable period plagued 

by plumbing, lighting, and ventilation problems. 

The movement of the 1st Brigade, lOlst, to secure the An Khe 

base area for the soon-to-arrive 1st Cavalry Division was entitled 

Operation HIGHLAND and spanned the period 22 August until 

2 October. One battalion conducted an airmobile assault in conjunction with a battalion-size ground attack to open the An Khe 

Pass and to clear and secure Route 19 from Qui Nhon to An Khe. 

To secure the division base area, the Brigade conducted eight airmobile assaults and many large ground operations. A special task 

force was organized to secure convoy movement along Route 19. 

This task force established strong points along the critical terrain 

bordering the route from Qui Nhon to the An Khe Pass. Tactical 

air cover was provided for all convoys. During this period, enemy 

losses totaled 692 killed in action as opposed to the 1st Brigade 

losses of 21. 

Deployment of the Cavalry 

Meanwhile, the newly designated 1st Cavalry Division was 

feverishly preparing for deployment. The movement of over 400 

aircraft, nearly 16,000 personnel, over 1,600 vehicles, and training 

for combat in just eight weeks was a momentous task. 

The early model Chinooks needed 1,334 modifications for safety 

of flight and the Hueys nearly 2,000. New armored seats were installed in the UH-ID's and the aircraft were moved to two different staging areas at Brookley Air Force Base, Mobile, Alabama, 

and Mayport Naval Base near Jacksonville, Florida. The USS 
THE BOXER, LOADED WITH 1ST AIR CAVALRY AIRCRAFT, JUST PRIO

DEPARTURE FOR VIETNAM 
THE BOXER LEAVES FOR VIETNAM 

Boxer and three Military Sea Transportation Service ships had 

been designated to move the division. All the Hueys were cocooned 

with "spraylat" and the other aircraft had separate preservative 

techniques applied. As mentioned earlier, a "crash effort" was required to process all the aircraft aboard the four ships. Since only 

the USS Boxer had adequate fire-fighting and servicing equipment 

aboard, Army equipment had to be acquired for shipment aboard 

other vessels to insure adequate fire protection and servicing prior 

to off-loading at destination. 

One tends to forget the strategic mobility problems in moving 

such a force as the 1st Cavalry Division throughout the world and 

concentrates on the tactical mobility of the smaller units. This deployment was a non-tactical move and the Division did not land 

ready to fight. The following firsthand account by Colonel Stockton, who commanded the Air Cavalry Squadron, gives special 

insight into this problem: 

About half way across the Pacific Ocean, I received a cable from the 

commander of the divisional task force to which my squadron was 

assigned on two of the three contingency plans to become effective on 

arrival in Vietnamese waters. Following instructions he had in turn 

received from high headquarters, Colonel Ray Lynch directed me to 

be prepared to fight my way ashore! 
gy y, 

wheel vehicles, both combat and administrative, were spread am

another half dozen Liberty ships which were God knows where in 

Pacific. All I had on board the troop ship with me was the bulk of 

officers and men, together with their individual weapons-perhap

total of 600 people, or three quarters of the actual strength of 

squadron. The rest were parcelled out on the other ships with 

equipment, guarding it and preparing to offload it on arrival 

Vietnam. 

When in July I had been informed that we would be shipped 

the combat theater of operations in the most convenient manner ins

of the most tactically sound manner, I screamed loudly and vociferou

along with every other commander in the division, to anyone in auth

ity whose ear I could catch. General Kinnard was as concerned ab

this as the rest of us, but we were all defeated by the machinery 

inertia at those reaches of the Defense Department concerned with 

military shipment of people and things. 

Regardless of the fact that we had no tools with which to figh

cavalrymen, my orders from Colonel Lynch were explicit. Toge

with my valiant troop commanders, I worked out a scheme for mak

an assault landing in the Qui Nhon area with the assets we had 

hand. 

This done, I made a call on the ship's master, informing him of 

instructions I had received and requesting that he break out the dis

barkation nets we would have to use to get over the side so that 

could practice with them. Here I was stupefied for the second t

within a matter of less than 24 hours. Not only were there no ass

landing nets on board, but the master had not even been informed 

his sailing destination! He honestly thought that we might be go

to Korea or possibly to the Philippines. In either event, he was 

that he would be tied up to a dock for unloading in the usual fash

1 finally persuaded this splendid seaman that we were in fact hea

for battle-torn Vietnam. Neither he nor any of his officers had sa

in those waters for a dozen years. They were astounded at the prosp

and assumed that their destination would be some location where 

quate dock facilities existed for discharging their cargo. 1 was a

gether unable to convince the master that we were in fact headed 

Qui Nhon harbor where no unloading facilities of any kind w

available. 

Fortunately, as it turned out, our disembarkation was conduc

peacefully and without interference by the simple procedure of u

shallow draft vessels to lighter us ashore from our anchorage. Ha

been otherwise, though-had there been trouble when we arrived-

1st Cavalry Division could easily have been decimated before eve

soldier of its main fighting component set foot on dry land. Even fr

the vantage point of more than two years of hindsight. I still shud

at the recollection. 
The 1st Cavalry Division had dispatched by Air Force transport 

a 1,000 man advance party under the command of Brigadier General John M. Wright, Jr., which arrived in An Khe on 27 August. 

As mentioned earlier, security for the advance party was provided 

by the 1st Brigade, Wist Airborne Division. September was spent 

in clearing away the semi-jungle area that was to become known as 

the "Golf Course." 

When the ships with the main body arrived at Qui Nhon, the 

aircraft prepared 'for flight while on board the carriers. Only the 

Mohawks and two non-flyable Hueys were off-loaded by floating 

crane. The Chinooks quickly became the prime movers for troops 

and equipment between Qui Nhon and An Khe. 

Although the Division did not completely reach An Khe until 

3 October, it had assumed responsibility for its own security on 

28 September, and elements of the division had already seen combat 

in support of the 1st Brigade of the Wist. In the first week of October, the 1st Cavalry was assigned a tactical area of responsibility 

which was essentially a private hunting domain in which the Division could operate by simply notifying any friendly forces that were 

in that area. This area soon grew to a zone approximately 150 by 

150 miles. The 3d Brigade was given the populous coastal province 

of Binh Dinh, the 2d Brigade Kontum Province, and the 1st 

Brigade operated in the highland 'province of Pleiku which included the Chu Pong Mountains. The Cavalry Squadron was 

charged with a wide-sweeping reconnaissance mission throughout 

the entire area, but most particularly around the Special Forces 

camps at Pleime, Duc Co, Plei Djereng, Plei Murong, and Dak To 

that dotted the western highlands. 

Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard recognized the vulnerability of the base camp at An Khe and consequently made it as 

small and compact as it could be so that it could be defended with 

a minimum number of forces. A 100 meter cleared perimeter completely encircled the camp with obsta'cles and surveillance devices. 

Artillery was positioned to develop quick fire concentrations on all 

likely enemy mortar sites and infantry patrols and ambushes were 

habitually employed out to enemy mortar range. One Air Cavalry 

troop was normally retained in the base camp area and aerial rocket 

artillery aircraft were kept on night strip alert to augment the fire 

of conventional artillery. 

The establishment of the An Khe "hub of the wheel" for the 
y 

p pp

bility. As a consequence, its organizations have usually been s

of the necessary maintenance, supply, and security personnel. P

of this chronic shortage resulted from a long-standing battle 

tween the "user" and the logisticians. Understandably since 

early concept of an airmobile division, the tactical commander 

wanted organic maintenance detachments down to the batta

level. This gives him the maximum responsiveness and a great 

of flexibility. From a logistician's viewpoint, such decentraliza

is a fragmentation of scarce skills and expensive special tools. 

The tests of the 11 th Air Assault Division included an exten

evaluation of what was known as the A-B-C maintenance conc

In this concept, the A-level was organic to the battalion and 

designed to do all that repair which would return a helicopte

operable status within four hours. The B-Ievel was organic to 

division and could do all echelons of maintenance short of de

repair. The C-Ievel provided that echelon of aircraft repair bey

the capability of the direct support levels. 

While the 11th Air Assault tests conceded that the A-B-C 

tem worked, the logisticians convinced the Department of the A

that it was impractical to field the 1st Cavalry Division in the 

required using this maintenance concept. As a consequence, 

Khe became a sophisticated fixed maintenance and supply d

which would inhibit tactical planning for some time to come. 

The Ia Drang 

By mid-October 1965, the North Vietnamese Army had be

its major operation in the Central Highlands. There is every re

to believe that it planned to cut South Vietnam in two at th is t

for three North Vietnamese Army regiments had assembled 

western Pleiku Province and adjacent Cambodia. On 19 Octo

the enemy opened his campaign with an attack on the Ple

Special Forces Camp twenty-five miles southwest of Pleiku. 

27 October, General Westmoreland directed General Kinnar

move his 1st Cavalry Division and seek out and destroy this en

force consisting of the 32d, 33d, and 66th North Vietnamese A

Regiments. This became .the month-long campaign known as 

Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. 

Initially the 1st Cavalry Division reinforced the South V

namese Army in relieving the Pleime Camp, and the North V
JUMPING FROM A HUEY HELICOPTER 

namese Army regiments broke contact and disappeared into th

jungle. Little was known about the enemy's direction of movemen

except to speculate that they had gone west toward the Cambodia

horder. The I st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry was given the missio

of organizing a systematic search for the elusive enemy. 

It was apparent that the Pleime Camp had been hit-and hi

hard-by the enemy and it seemed inconceivable to the Air Cavalr

Squadron that thousands of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese sol

diers could completely disappear. On I November, Captain Wil

liam P. Gillette, the Air Cavalry Squadron intelligence officer

spotted some unusual activity just eight kilometers west of th

Pleime Camp and the Squadron was quick to capitalize on thi

information. Before the day was over, the Cavalry Squadron ha

committed most of its rifle and gunship platoons into the skirmis

that developed. They killed 78 of the enemy and captured 5

prisoners, all of whom were regular North Vietnamese soldier

carrying identity cards issued in Hanoi. During the encounter th

squadron lost five troopers killed and another seventeen wounded

It was evident that the Cavalry had uncovered a major enemy hos
instruments were mixed in with the medicine. 

In this first skirmish of the Ia Drang Valley campaign, 

Cavalry troopers were initially taken back at the almost suici

short ranges at which they came to grips with the enemy. The b

of the enemy attack force was within less than twenty meters 

their perimeter before it was discovered and the enemy's "b

hug" tactics made supporting fires extremely difficult to pl

safely. Emergency medical evacuation landing zones had to 

literally hacked out of the jungle with hand axes. Infantry re

forcements arrived at the site too late to take full advantage of 

enemy contact. 

The next day Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles, 

Assistant Division Commander, met with Colonel Stockton to p

the strategy for further exploitation of this contact. The best e

mate was that the major enemy force had moved along the Ia Dr

Valley close to the base of the Chu Pong Mountains and the 

Squadron, 9th Cavalry was given the mission of establishing 

ambush in this area. A site was chosen called landing zone MA

and the Cavalry Squadron fought its major battle in this area. 

Landing lOne MARY was unique in that it was the first t

that the 1st Cavalry Division had mounted a successful night 

bush and reinforced their attack with a night lift of an Infan

company. Also, they had developed their fire procedures to 

point that armed helicopters were able to fire within fifty me

of the friendly troops during night operations. 

By 4 November, the Cavalry Squadron had developed the ba

to a point where it could be turned over to the infantry battalio

Over 150 enemy casualties had been accounted for with a loss 

4 U. S. soldiers killed and 25 wounded. The Ia Drang VaJ1ey C

paign was now fully underway. 

On 9 November the 1st Brigade was relieved by the 3d, c

manded by Colonel Thomas W. Brown. The 3d Brigade was gi

the mission of continuing the search south and southeast of Plei

Colonel Brown continued his search in the densely wooded a

south of the Ia Drang River at the base of the Chu Pong mas

He decided that the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry was in the b

position to make the initial air assaults. 

On 14 November the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, comman

by Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore, began the pivotal op

tion of the Ia Drang Campaign. He had chosen landing z
I ......... -TI,-, r, .... , ,-, It--T---,I 5 0 LULON£T

MAP 2 

X-RAY (Map 2) out of the possible landing zones as the be

potential position for the initial air assault. The cavalry sectio

had confirmed that landing zone X-RAY could take eight to te

UH-ID's at one time. No signs of enemy activity were detecte

Two artillery batteries were in position to support the landing. 

Preparatory fire began at 1017 hours precisely where requir

and was timed with the lead elements of the . assault company. T

aerial artillery came on the heels of the tube artillery fire an

worked over the area for 30 seconds expending half their load, the

went into a orbit nearby to be on call. The lift battalion gunshi

took up the fire and were immediately ahead of the troop tran
landing zone, the trees and grass were especially thick and extend

through the jungles to the foothills of the Chu Pong Mountain

Company B made the initial assault. 

The commander of Company B, Captain John D. Herre

secured the landing zone by having his 1st platoon dispatch 

squads into different areas 50 to 100 meters off the landing zo

to reconnoiter while he retained the balance of his company co

cealed near the center as an offensive striking force. The fir

prisoner, taken at 1120, stated that there were three battalions 

the enemy on the mountain above the landing zone who were ju

waiting for an opportunity to attack. Company A, commanded 

Captain Ramon A. Nadal, II, followed Company B into the lan

ing zone unopposed and the perimeter expanded. . 

At 1330, B Company reported that it had been heavily attack

by at least two companies and its 2d platoon was in danger of bein

surrounded and cut off. Then 60-mm and B1-mm mortar fire beg

falling in the landing zone and on Company B. Company C arriv

and its commander, Captain Robert H. Edwards, was ordered 

take up blocking positions to the south and southwest of the lan

ing zone to protect it from being overrun from that direction. Th

company commanders, the forward observers, the forward air co

troller, and the artillery liaison officer were all having difficul

getting coordinated as to the location of the forward elements 

the company. There was no well-defined terrain feature to he

identify positions and the air was heavy with smoke and dust. Com

pany B seemed to be in the worst position since it had one plato

separated from the rest of the company in the jungle and could n

precisely pinpoint its location to bring in fire support. By mi

afternoon the battalion knew it was in a major battle and fightin

for its very existence. The enemy was coming from all sides. 

As the lead elements of D Company landed, the helicopte

took numerous hits, but none was shot down. One radio operat

was killed before he could dismount from the helicopter and t

door gunner and pilot were wounded. Colonel Moore stopped t

other eight UH-lD's from landing by radio. Those who had land

from D Company immediately became engaged in the fire fig

near A Company. The fighting became more intense. Colon

Moore decided to pull back A and B Companies under the cov

of heavy supporting fire and smoke to the fringe of the landin

zone and set up a tight defensive perimeter for the night. \Vhi
panies had numerous wounded and killed in action, while 

Company had taken a few casualties but was in good shape. Com

pany D had hardly been hit. During the afternoon Colonel Moor

asked for assistance. The only company immediately available wa

Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which landed in the land

ing zone by 1800. By 1900, the organization of the perimeter wa

completed. Units were tied in for the night and defensive artiller

and mortar fires were registered. 

A major problem that had developed throughout the day wa

the care and evacuation of the wounded. The battalion surgeon

medical supplies, and four aid station personnel had arrived a

1400 hours and, under heavy fire, they treated the wounded in th

command post area. Colonel Moore had decided to restrict medic

evacuation helicopters from coming in too frequently because mo

of the afternoon the landing zone was under fire. He had kept on

small area big enough to land two helicopters open as his suppl

and evacuation link to the rear and intended to defend it at a

costs. A system was arranged whereby every helicopter coming i

with troops and supplies would have a specific load of wounde

keyed to its departure. 

Concerning his helicopter support, Colonel Moore stated: 

I have the highest admiration, praise and respect for the outstan

ing professionalism and courage of the UH- ID pilots and crews wh

ran a gantlet of enemy · fire time after time to help us. They nev

refused to come in ; they followed instructions beautifully; they we

great. We in turn called them in when fire was the lightest and trie

to have everything ready for each landing to keep them on the groun

a minimum time. None were shot down and destroyed, although mo

of them took hits. Two aircraft were brought in which did not get ou

One received enemy fire in the engine and had to land in an open ar

just off the northern portion of the LZ; the other clipped a few tr

tops with the main rotor upon landing in the LZ and had to be le

Crews of both aircraft were immediately lifted out by other helicopter

Both downed helicopters were immediately secured by elements 

Company D without orders per battalion SOP-they being the neare

troops. Both were slightly damaged only and were slung out two da

later by CH-47 Chinooks. During the three day battle these were t

only two downed helicopters. 

By late afternoon it had become apparent that the battalio

would need a night landing capability and Company A of the 229

Helicopter Battalion had anticipated the requirement. A pathfind

team arrived and cleared a fairly safe zone with engineer demol
water, and medical supplies had been brought in even thou

smoke hung like a horizontal curtain over the entire area. 

Early that night the wounded had all been evacuated and t

dead had been collected in the command post area. Mortar a

artillery fires were registered close to the perimeter and the b

talion prepared for night attacks. Company B still had one plato

that was cut off and surrounded, but it was reported holding 

position with good morale. Later it was learned that this plato

began and ended the night with eight killed in action, twel

wounded in action, and only seven men not hurt. They had lo

their platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and weapons squad lead

The platoon received several attacks during the night by an es

mated 50-man enemy force. All were beaten off by small arms f

and artillery concentrations. A tactical air strike was made und

flareship illumination. This was the only illumination used all nig

since it exposed the men in the surrounding area. However, the

was a fairly bright moon from 2315 hours onwards. When daylig

broke, numerous enemy dead were seen in the surrounding ar

At brigade headquarters, Colonel Brown continued to ass

the significance of the day's activities. He was pleased that the 

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had been able to hold its own against hea

odds, and with moderate casualties, but was convinced that t

fight was not yet over. He radioed General Kinnard for anoth

battalion, and was informed that the 1st Battalion, 5th Caval

would begin arriving at brigade headquarters the followi

morning. 

In the early morning hours savage close range fighting went 

throughout the battalion perimeter. There was considerable han

to-hand fighting. For example, the 1st Platoon leader of Compa

C was found killed with five dead enemy around him in and ne

his command post fox hole. Nearby, one trooper was found kill

in action with his hands at the throat of a dead North Vietname

Army soldier. 

At approximately 0715 hours, the enemy attacked the sec

of Company D, near where the mortars were emplaced. This p

the perimeter under attack from two directions. Artillery, aer

rocket artillery, and Tactical Air were called in and deliver

accurate and extremely effective fires. The aerial rocket artille

literally rained the perimeter with its rocket concentratio

Shortly, Colonel Moore radioed brigade headquarters informi
in the landing zone. The enemy fire was so heavy that moveme

toward or within the landing zone resuJted in more friendly casu

ties. At 0755 'all platoon positions threw a colored smoke grena

on order to define visually for Tac Air, aerial rocket artillery, a

the artillery air observer the periphery of the perimeter. All f

support was brought in extremely close and a few rounds of artille

fell inside of the perimeter along with two napalm bombs. Ho

ever, only two men were wounded from friendly fires. The troope

stood their ground and many individual acts of heroism were 

corded. By 1000, the enemy attack had been defeated. 

At approximately 1330, all companies in the perimeter screen

out for 300 meters and policed the battlefield. The area was litter

with dead enemy, weapons and equipment and there was massi

evidence from the bloody trails, bandages, etc., that many oth

enemy had been dragged from the area. Some of the enemy de

were found literally stacked behind ant hills. Two prisoners we

taken and evacuated. 

Late in the afternoon of 14 November, the brigade command

had moved the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, into landing zone VICTO

At approximately 0800 hours the following morning, it headed 

foot for landing zone X-RAY. By noon, it had closed on the positio

With this added strength, the Cavalry troopers were able to atta

early in the afternoon and reached the surrounded platoon at 15

The platoon still had some ammunition left and their morale w

good. The wounded were evacuated, and all units were dispos

and dug in for the night. 

Although the enemy strongly probed their positions during 

early hours of 16 November, the Cavalry troops held their po

tions. Flares were used continuously. At first light, orders were giv

for all men on the perimeter to spray the trees, the ant hills, a

bushes forward of their positions for just over a minute to k

infiltrators and snipers. Immediately upon firing, a force of appro

mately 30 to 40 enemy exposed themselves forward of Company 

of the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and began firing their weapo

Apparently the "mad minute" of fire had prematurely triggere

planned enemy attack. The tactic of spraying had accounted 

six enemy dead. Several dropped out of the trees in the surround

a!'eas. The men liked this particular tactic not only for the eff

it had on the enemy but for the relief of tension that had be

built lip throughout the night. By 0930 hours, the first eleme
X-RAY to the new troopers. His troops were extracted by UH-ID'

early in the afternoon without enemy opposition. Discipline wa

excellent, and the helicopters were only on the ground a few sec

onds because the aircraft loads had been pre-spotted. By 1830 hour

all elements had closed into Camp Holloway, in the vicinity o

Pleiku. 

Colonel Moore, who was to receive his eagles in just seven 

days and thus be promoted away from his command, had every 

reason to be proud of the performance of his battalion. Some 634 

enemy had been killed by actual body count and six had been cap

tured. Seventy-nine troopers had been killed and 121 wounded

None were missing. The enemy had lost many small arms, heavy 

machine guns, and other equipment, and the individual U. S

soldier had acquitted himself well in the hardest kind of hand-to

hand battle. 

In his after action report, Colonel Moore noted that aeria

rocket artillery had been extremely effective. His commanders had 

confidence in bringing such fires extremely close to their own 

positions. He also had noted that tube artillery, aerial rocke

artillery, and tactical air can be used at the same time withou

seriously downgrading the effectiveness of the fire or endangerin

the aircraft. The aerial rocket artillery and Tactical Air flew per

pendicular to the artillery gun-target line in those cases when they 

were making a simultaneous attack on the same target areas. Thi

technique was possible by close teamwork between the forward ai

controller and the artillery liaison officer. 

As mentioned earlier, casualties had been a critical problem 

and attempts to help the wounded had caused additional casualtie

in attempting to get them out. Colonel Moore said, " I lost many 

leaders killed and wounded while recovering casualties. Wounded 

must be pulled back to some type of covered position and then 

treated. Troops must not get so concerned with casualties that they 

forget the enemy and their mission. Attempting to carry a man ou

requires up to four men as bearers which can hurt a unit at a critica

time." 

The 1st Cavalry troopers had found that the enemy was wel

trained, aggressive, and was equipped with a preponderance o

automatic weapons with plenty of ammunition. He was an exper

at camouflage and sought to close in strength to render U. S. fire 

support less effective and to force us to fight on his terms. He fough
fanatic in his extreme efforts to recover bodies of his dead an

wounded and their equipment. 

In the after action report, high praise was given to the pat

finders and their control of the "hot" landing zone. Until they h

arrived, every incoming aircraft had to be guided in and out 

the battalion commander on the battalion command net. The pat

finders took over this responsibility and made possible the inval

able night supply and evacuation missions. The fact that pathfinde

were available and trained as part of the 1st Cavalry Divisio

organization was testimony to the soundness of its early doctrin

The action of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was one of a ser

of major actions fought by the 1st Cavalry Division in this, its fi

major campaign in Vietnam. The 3d Brigade continued its s

tematic search and destroy pattern and defeated each of the thr

enemy regiments in turn. All together, the 1st Cavalry Divisi

and Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops killed an estimat

J 800 North Vietnamese troops. 

The battle lasted 35 days, and on 26 November 1965, the 

Cavalry Division had completed its mission of pursuit and destru

tion. The statistics of the aviation units involved, to a large exte

tell the story of how the mission was accomplished. 

During the 35 days of the campaign, the aircraft deliver

5,048 tons of cargo from the wholesale terminals to 'the hands 

the troops in the field. In addition, they transported 8,216 to

into Pleiku from various depots (primarily Qui Nhon and N

Trang). Whole infantry battalions and artillery batteries we

2 The U. S. Army almost lost its' "pathfinder" role completely after 'Vorld War 

In the reorganization of the Service roles and missions, it was determined that 

pathfinders [or the joint airborne assaults should be Air Force personnel since 

Air }'orce insisted its Combat Control Team should be inserted first and control 

subsequent drops. However, in 1955, when I had the Airborne-Army Aviat

Department at Fort Benning it became obvious that the Army should have its o

pathfinder capability [or the terminal control of the Army's organic helicopt

I received permission to reactivate Army training in these skills and Lieuten

Colonel John E. Stannard wrote the manual. Fundamental to this decision wa

determination of where Army pathfinders would be assigned. We tried to incorpor

the pathfinder skills into each infantry battalion, but Ihis solution was disappro

by Continental Army Command. The pathfinder almost became a man,withou

country until the formation of the I I th Air Assault Division, where they were m

part of the Aviation Group. As a result, only the 1st Cavalry had organic, trai

pathfinders when required. Our other units in Vietnam would find many occas

when they needed them-desperately. 
three were recovered. 

General \Vestmoreland stated, "The ability of the Ameri

to meet and defeat the best troops the enemy could put on the 

of battle was once more demonstrated beyond any possible do

as was the validity of the Army's airmobile concept. " 

Overoiew of 1965 

It has been well documented that by early 1965 the enemy 

reinforced his units in Vietnam to the point of being able to m

almost at will against major population areas. In fact, it lo

as if the North Vietnamese Army were about to cut the cou

in two, right across the middle. It is also well known that the 

mitment of U. S. Forces stemmed the tide and turned it in 

other direction. The major battles that took place were in the h

lands where the 1st Cavalry answered the challenge of a pow

North Vietnamese Army division that" was attempting to ove

the Special Forces camp at Pleime. This operation was in ess

the watershed line; from that time on, the joint U. S. and A

of the Republic of Vietnam operations throughout the cou

regained the initiative and began to drive back the major en

forces in an all-out counteroffensive. 

In 1965 there were just not enough airmobility assets t

around. Partly by design and partly by default, most of the 

mobile assets ended up in support of U. S. forces, to the detrim

of overall Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations. The A

of the Republic of Vietnam units in general reverted to a mis

of near-static ground operations close -to the populated areas. 

U. S. forces choppered into the jungles to fight the main 

North Vietnamese Army units. During this phase, the Army o

Republic of Vietnam forces -actually had less helicopters avai

to them than in the period before the buildup. 

The first operations of the 1st Cavalry Division brought 

many points which confirmed the basic conclusions of those 

had worked with the airmobile concept over the years. Airmob

put a new dimension into ground warfare, but it did not ch

the nature of warfare itself and it certainly did not negate t

basic rules of survival so important to the individual soldier. 

The airmobile trooper, like the paratrooper before him, m

be basically a professional infantryman, artilleryman, and so f
yy, y

thing, is particularly unforgiving of carelessness or sloppiness. The 

after action reports of airmobile units tend to repeat lessons learned 

in Korea and World War II on such things as ambushes, mines, 

and booby traps, rather than highlight new helicopter techniques. 

Indeed, some of the operations fought by the 1st Cavalry hardly 

make mention of their airmobility. 

These records indicate in a way that these units took airmobility 

for granted and only mentioned aircraft technology when there 

was a need for improvement-just as jeeps and ~ tons were seldom 

mentioned in dispatches of earlier battles. This is an indication 

that the helicopter was doing its job so well and so routinely that 

it was not considered worthy of mention. 

This was not unique to the 1st Cavalry operations alone, for 

in writing this study, I was struck by the similarity of other units 

who used attached airmobile assets in a matter-of-fact attitude. To 

a large degree, these units considered themselves as much airmobile 

as the 1st Cavalry Division although they w'ere not officially designated as such. This is a great credit to those separate airmobile 

companies and battalions who supported these units. Obviously 

they became so identified with the l73d, the lOlst, and so forth, 

that they functioned with almost the same continuity as those helicopter units which were organic to the 1st Cavalry Division. This 

takes away nothing from the individual helicopter crew or the unit 

that they supported; but, there is a wealth of examples which demonstrated that airmobile expertise which had been carefully developed over a period of months suddenly was downgraded by the 

shifting of attachments. Every commander instinctively knew that 

he could do certain things with "his" Hueys that he couldn't quite 

do with "somebody else's," 

By the end of 1965, it had become apparent that the "businessas-usual" approach to the aviation training base and helicopter 

production lines soon would create a major deficit in the Army's 

inventory of pilots and aircraft. Belated recognition of this fact 

produced an almost unmanageable surge in the pilot training program and a strain on every helicopter manufacturer's capacity, 

especially Bell. It would be almost two years before the aviation 

assets approached the Vietnam aviation requirements. Many Army 

aviators would find themselves faced with repetitive tours in Vietnam and many operations in Vietnam would be structured around 

the limitation of available helicopters rather than the more basic 

CHAPTER V 

Airmobility Comes of Age, 1966 

A irmobility in the Delta 

The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) launched the new year 

on 1 January 1966 with a smoothly executed move into the Mekong 

Delta. This was the first time an American ground unit had 

operated in the notorious "Plain of Reeds." 

The Brigade had moved from Hau Nghia Province into the 

Delta by land and air. The air elements, consisting of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry; the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 

50 3d Infantry; the 1 st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment; and 

"C" Battery, 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery, came into Bao Trai airstrip.1 By 1425 the 1st Battalion of the 503d had the honor of being 

the first American force to make an air assault west of the Oriental 

River. This assault, which was preceded by an effective landing 

zone preparation by Tactical Air, artillery, and armed helicopters, 

only experienced light opposition which was quickly brushed 

aside. The Australian battalion established themselves by air assault 

on the east side of the Oriental River which effectively cut this 

enemy supply route. 

As previously scheduled, the 2d Battalion of the 503d remained 

at the brigade forward base until the following morning when they 

conducted a heliborne assault into landing zone 'VINE. This landing zone was approximately five kilometers south of the Australian 

position and also on the east side of the river. Here they met very 

strong enemy resistance and the battalion fought a bitter and 

fiercely-conducted battle throughout the day against a dug-in, wellconcealed, battalion-size Viet Cong force. Intense artillery fire, 

'The 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment was the first U.S. unit to 

jump in combat eluring World War " (Operation TORCH in Africa). As executive 

officer, I helped organile the 2d Battalion and later activated, trained and led the 

3d Battalion of the 503d which made the first combat jump in the Pacific. As a 

coincidental footnote to history, when we made that jump into the Markham Valley 

of i'\ew Guinea, our total artillery support was a battery of "25- pounders" of the 

Royal Australian Artillery. 
his positions. He left III dead behind along with considera

equipment. 

The Brigade attempted to employ the armored elements, Co

pany D, 16th Armor and the Prince of Wales Light Horse (A

tralian armored personnel carriers), with the infantry battali

but found that the carriers had extreme difficulty in traversing 

marshy rice paddies. They were returned to the Brigade base a

and later were successfully employed on security missions. 

D+2, the Australian battalion conducted search patrols south 

their position and eventually linked up with the 2d Battalion 

the 503d on the east bank of the Oriental River. Operations p

ceeded through D+4 with only light contact being made and 

enemy obviously making every effort to remain hidden. 

On D + 5, the 173d Brigade demonstrated its growing sophi

cation in airmobile techniques. On this day, three Eagle Flig

one consisting of 144 men, the others 72 each, orbited the tar

area just beyond visual range. When the commander was ready 

move the force in, he announced the command of execut

"Skyhook," which was the signal for all supporting actions to 

clude firing to begin a countdown. From this prearranged sig

with minimum radio communications, all supporting actions w

time-sequenced to place the landing force on the landing z

immediately after the coordinated delivery of supporting fires a

a last minute reconnaissance. After the first flight landed, the sec

was in orbit position until it was apparent that no reinforcem

was needed in the first landing zone. The "Skyhook" proced

was then reinitiated and the second flight landed on another nea

landing zone. Following the same procedure, a Hight was put 

on yet a third landing zone. By this maneuver, three stripped do

companies had covered an area with reconnaissance by fire t

normally would have taken a battalion or more, using previ

formations. 

Operation MARAUDER was terminated on D+7, 8 January 19

after decimating the 267th Viet Cong Battalion and the headqu

ters of the Viet Cong 506th Battalion. The 173d Airborne Briga

as the first American unit to operate in the Mekong Delta, dem

strated its ability to swiftly co-ordinate the tactical air, helico

gunships, artillery, and troop maneuvers. They had ranged ove

very large area but always had their artillery in position by Chin

movement. Armor had been used successfully when it was gi
Immediately following this operation , the l7 3d Airborne began 

Operation CRI:\1P in a drive through the Ho Bo 'Woods region in 

Binh Duong Province in an attempt to destroy the politico-military 

headquarters of the Viet Cong Military Region 4. After six days 

of tedious fighting through bunkers and tunnels, the mission was 

accomplished and the headquarters was found and destroyed. An 

enormous quantity of enemy documents and weapons were captured. The brigade commander, General \Villiamson, made special 

mention after this action of the role played by his support battalion. 

"The Support Battalion makes the 173d a truly separate brigade. 

Its performance has been exceptionally fine and represents a major 

contribution to our combat power by standing behind the infantry 

and those who support the infantry with supplies, transportation, 

maintenance and medical support." The Brigade was supported 

throughout these operations by the 145th Aviation Battalion (Reo inforced) . This battalion, seldom mentioned by name, had become 

almost completely identified with the 173d Brigade total force . 

A irmobile Logistics 

Even the most enthusiastic protagonist of the airmobility concept would readily admit that the introduction of hundreds of 

complex helicopters to a combat environment brought, along with 

its advantages, many unavoidable headaches, not the least of which 

was the maintenance requirement. In 1966 the helicopter was still 

in its adolescence from a technical standpoint. The yet unreached 

goal of one hour of maintenance per hour of Right was far in the 

future. In reality, even the simplest machine required approximately ten hours of maintenance per hour of Right. The fact that 

we were willing to pay that price was mute evidence of the intrinsic 

worth of airmobility. 

The story of airmobility must include the fantastic individual 

efforts of crew chiefs and mechanics who worked practically every 

night, all night, to enable the helicopters to fight the following 

day. With the geometric increase in aircraft during the U. S. Forces 

buildup, it is important to take a brief look at the aircraft maintenance structure. 

A milestone in aviation maintenance occurred with the formal 

approval of the organization of the 34th General Support Group 

by U. S. Army, Pacific General Order Number 6, dated 17 .Tanu
ppy 

on the best alternative solution to the growing aviation mai

nance problem in Vietnam. 

In July 1965 Army aircraft maintenance in Vietnam was 

vided by three direct support companies and one general supp

company. Aviation supply was managed by a special Avia

Supply Point in Saigon. All of these units were part of the 1

Aviation Group (Provisional) which in turn reported to the U

Army Support Command. At this time in 1965, about 660 A

aircraft were in Vietnam; but, plans were already firm to exp

this aircraft population to over 2,000 by early 1966. General N 

ton, then Commanding General of U. S. Army Support Comma

formed an ad hoc committee to study possible alternatives for d

ing with this growing maintenance requirement. General Nort

objectives were to provide one-stop maintenance and supply 

port to Army aircraft (including airframe, engine, avionics 

armament); and, to provide an organization that had the abi

to grow with the requirement. 

At that time, three organizational alternatives were possi

First, the aircraft maintenance and supply units could be i

grated into the 1st Aviation Brigade structure. Second, these u

could be integrated into the 1st Logistical Command struct

Third, a special separate command organization could be form

to control all non-divisional aircraft maintenance and supply un

This group could be assigned to either the 1st Aviation Brig

the 1st Logistical Command, or directly under U. S. Army Vietn

Headquarters as a separate major command. 

Major Rudolph D. Descoteau and Major Charles L. Smith

members of the ad hoc committee, developed matrices which c

sidered all alternatives including span of control, flexibility, 

responsiveness. This committee also solicited opinion of th

potential customers to include the 1st Cavalry Division. 

27 August 1965 the ad hoc committee submitted their new plan 

the organization of aircraft maintenance and supply. This p

marked the conception of the 34th General Support Group tho

it was yet unnamed. A separate command organization to prov

the aircraft maintenance and supply support seemed to offer 

best solution. \Vith this organizational structure the requireme

to provide one-stop maintenance and supply support could be m

easily satisfied. It was realized that certain duplication in t
overall command structure. Assignment to the Aviation Brigad

would place it under the control of the operator for the highes

aircraft density. However, this would reduce the probability o

equitable support to divisional units and non-divisional-non

Aviation Brigade units such as signal and engineers. The assign

ment of the group to the 1st Logistical Command had the majo

advantage of concentrating logistical support under a single com

mander who would answer to the U. S. Army, Vietnam, G-4. Th

last alternative, having the group respond directly to U. S. Army

Vietnam, with no intervening layer, seemed in line with the critica

nature of aviation assets. 

The above alternatives were presented to General Norton an

his staff by the ad hoc committee in September 1965 with a recom

mendation to adopt the separate group structure and have it repor

directly to U. S. Army, Vietnam. General Norton accepted th

recommendation and directed implementation of the plan. 

Recommendations for a management structure to provide air

craft support from a single-point, in-theater, aircraft repair part

inventory control center evolved into the Aviation Material Man

agement Center concept. The Aviation Material Managemen

Center Tables of distributions and allowances and the Comba

Development Command Transportation Agency's proposed Tabl

of Organization and Equipment for the General Support Grou

were forwarded for approval. U. S. Army Vietnam directed forma

tion of a provisional group headquarters in November 1965. Lieu

tenant Colonel Ellis became the Group's commander and, usin

the assets of the old U. S. Army Support Command Aviation De

tachment and the Aviation Supply Point, formed a skeleton staf

Personnel and equipment resource requirements were levied o

the 14th and 765th Transportation Battalions to provide a minima

functional base. 

The formal approval authorized the proper staffing of the head

quarters but gave no relief in the critical day-to-day managemen

requirements to expand the old Army Supply Point and establis

a separate inventory control center to support the fast-growin

aircraft fleet. The Supply Division of Group Headquarters per

formed this function until more help arrived. The 24lst Trans

portation Company (Depot) arrived in February 1966, giving th

Aviation Material Management Center the capability of operatin

two depots. In April the 58th Transportation Battalion arrive
The Army's "Aircraft Carrier" 

On 12 April 1966 the most unusual Army aviation mainten

battalion of the 34th General Support Group steamed into 

Ranh Bay. The unit was the 1st Transportation Corps Batta

(Depot) (Seaborne), the only Floating Aircraft Mainten

Facility in the Army. The idea for this floating facility origin

during military operatio~s in the Pacific Theater during W

War II, when combat areas switched rapidly from island to is

and sudden changes in the combat zones made ground air

maintenance facilities almost useless. 

As early as 1962 the floating aircraft maintenance facility 

cept was being developed for use in the Vietnam combat zone

it was not until 1965 that the Navy seaplane tender USS Alberm

was actually selected for conversion to this facility. On March 

1965 it was rechristened the USNS Corpus Christi Bay. An 

getic Army aviator, Colonel John Sullivan, scurried from 

Pentagon to the shipyard to the Aviation Materiel Comman

consolidate the many facets of this unusual undertaking. The A

which had been accused by the Air Force of beginning ano

"Air Corps" now was getting strange looks from the Navy wit

attempts to get its own "aircraft carrier." 

When the red tape had been cut (lengthwise), the ship 

modified to carry approximately 370 Army maintenance perso

and supporting technicians and 130 civilian maritime crewme

operate the ship. Thirty-seven different production and sup

services were established aboard the ship enabling the facilit

perform all maintenance functions of a depot level repair fac

including overhauling and rebuilding aircraft components. On

the most remarkable innovations was a technical data librar

board which contained a complete file of 180,000 engineer d

ings on film of aircraft systems, components, and special tool

its library they had 785,000 images that could be broadcast thro

out strategic areas on a closed circuit TV. In a sense, the ship r

sented an extension of the large aircraft maintenance facilit

Corpus Christi, Texas, directly to Military Assistance Comm

Vietnam. 

When the Corpus Christi Bay first arrived at Cam Ranh 

extensive security precautions were taken to protect the ship 

enemy action. The most serious threat was envisioned to be 
Christi Bay moved out of Cam Ranh Bay and sailed to the harbor 

at Qui Nhon to be near the 1st Cavalry, the unit it primarily 

supported. 

While the Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility was a useful 

and unique addition to the U. S. Army's helicopter support capability, the more important, if less dramatic, support was performed 

in the open rice paddies and jungle clearings. There the maintenance personnel lived in constant danger, with practically none of 

the amenities, and performed daily, casual miracles on the complex 

aircraft. Never sure when the necessary bright lights would become 

an aiming point, they used the knowledge. gleaned from For

Rucker and Fort Eustis classrooms under the most primitive conditions. As one supervisor gruffly understated, "They done good!" 

The 1st Cavalry Division in Binh Dinh 

During the first half of January 1966 the 1 st Brigade of the 

1st Cavalry Division conducted Operation MATADOR to find and 

destroy the enemy in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. During this 

operation, the 1st Cavalry saw the enemy flee across the border into 

Cambodia, confirming that the enemy had well-developed sanctu

aries and base camps inside that country. 

After Operation MATADOR, the 1st Cavalry Division shifted its 

weight toward Binh Dinh Province. Some of its forces had been 

committed into this area soon after its arrival in Vietnam in the 

summer of 1965, but the major effort in the Ia Drang Valley occu

pied most of the 1st Cavalry's attention throughout 1965. 

The heavily populated rice plains in this area had a population 

of nearly half a million people of which at least 200,000 or more 

were still under the domination of the Viet Cong infrastructure

The South Vietnamese Government was attempting to extend it

control north from Qui Nhon, along National Highway One

through the rich plains area up to Tam Quan in northeastern 

Binh Dinh. In this effort, the 22d Army of the Republic of Viet

nam Division was being assisted by the Capitol Republic of Korea 

Infantry Division based near Qui Nhon. Only the southern par

of the area was truly under government Control. 

Beyond the northern border of the Phu My District, and as fa

as the edge of the abrupt mountain range which walled off the 

plains on the north and west, there were only isolated islands o
base camps hidden in the mountains. From there they sent s

forces throughout the lowlands to terrorize the farmers, manipu

the cycle of rice growing and harvesting, and generally contro

the lives of the people of Binh Dinh. 

The 1st Cavalry's initial major operation in this area was c

MASHER in its first phase, and WHITE WING in its second, t

and fourth phases. The fighting covered a full circle around B

Son. The 1st Cavalry Division, in close coordination with the 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division, began with air ass

into the Cay Giep Mountains, then moved to the Bong Son Pl

the An Lao Valley, the Kim Son Valley, and finally back to 

Cay Giep Mountains. As a result of MASHER-WHITE WING, 

airmobile division and the Army of the Republic of Viet

infantry forced the North Vietnamese Army regulars out of 

area and temporarily broke their hold on the population. A

turned out, the 1st Cavalry would find itself preoccupied in 

area on and off for a long time to come. 

In the after action report of the 3d Brigade when it concl

Operation MASHER-WHITE WING on 17 February, they were 

to report that 893 enemy had been killed by actual body co

A large quantity of equipment and small arms had been capt

along with 24,000 rounds of ammunition. Friendly losses wer

killed in action and 318 wounded. 

The Brigade had been supported throughout this operatio

the 133d Assault Support Helicopter Company with 16 Chino

The CH-47 Chinook had proved essential in moving artillery 

resupplying the Brigade with ammunition and supplies. N

resupply was often required. On 28 January seven Chinooks m

an emergency resupply mission during weather conditions 

sisting of extremely low ceilings and poor visibility, and six of 

seven committed helicopters were hit by enemy ground fire. 

company commander, Major Taylor D. Johnson, was killed w

attempting to recover a downed OH-13 scout helicopter. De

the weather and the enemy fire , the 16 Chinooks assigned to 

company during the period 1 January through 31 January 

526 hours transferring 3,212 passengers and over 1600 tons of c

Lieutenant Colonel Max A. Clark, the commanding offic

the parent organization for this company, the 228th Assault 

port Helicopter Battalion, made special note of the difficult

supporting Chinook operations so far away from the An Khe 
The Role of the Chinook 

The story of airmobility is essentially one of men and machines. 

If the Huey helicopter became the cornerstone of airmobility, then 

the Chinook must be considered one of the principal building 

blocks. 

Late in 1956 the Department of the Army announced plans to 

replace the H-37 helicopter, which was powered by piston-driven 

engines, with a new, turbine-powered aircraft. A design competition was held and, in September 1958, a joint Army-Air Force 

source selection board recommended that the Army procure the 

Boeing Vertol medium transport helicopter. However, the necessary funds to proceed with full-scale development were not available and the Army vacillated in .its design requirements. There 

were those in the Army who felt that this new helicopter should 

be a light tactical transport aimed at the mission of the old H-21's 

and H-34's and, consequently, sized for approximately fifteen 

troops. Another faction believed that the new transport should be 

much larger to serve as an artillery prime mover and have minimum interior dimensions compatible with the Pershing Missile 

system. This "sizing" problem was a critical decision. 

The first Vertol prototype, called the YHC-IA, was tested by 

the Army to derive engineering and operational data. Three aircraft were built with a maximum troop capacity of twenty. This 

model eventually became Vertol's commercial 107 and the Marine 

Sea Knight. However, the YHC-IA was considered by most of the 

Army users to be too heavy for the assault role and too light for 

the transport rolc. The decision was made to procure a heavier 

transport helicopter and at the same time upgrade the Huey as a 

tactical troop transport. This decision was to determine the pattern 

of airmobile operations for the next decade. As a consequence, the 

Army concept of air assault operations differed from the Marines 

because, among many reasons, the very nature of the equipment 

demanded different methods of employment. 

The "sizing" of the Chinook was directly related to the growth 

of the Huey and the Army's tacticians' insistance that initial air 

assaults be built around the squad. There was a critical stage in 

the Huey program when the technicians insisted that we should 

not go beyond the UH-IB model with Bell; that there should be 
When it was decided to go to the UH-ID (after an awkward p

on the original "C" design), the proper Chinook size became 

parent. By resolutely pushing for the Huey and the Chinook, 

Army accelerated its airmobility program by years. 

The Army finally settled on the larger Chinook as its stand

medi urn transport helicopter and as of February 1966, 161 airc

h(Jd been delivered to the Army. The 1st Cavalry Division 

brought their organic Chinook battalion with them when 

arrived in 1965 and a separate ~viation medium helicopter c

pany, the 147th, had arrived in Vietnam on 29 November 1

This latter company was initially placed in direct support of 

1st U. S. Infantry Division. 

The most spectacular mission in Vietnam for the Chinook 

the pl<iclng of artillery batteries in perilous mountain posit

that were inaccessible by any other means, and then keeping t

resupplied with large quantities of ammunition. The 1st Cav

Division found that its Chinooks were limited to 7,000 pounds 

load when operating in the mountains, but could carry an a

tional 1,000 pounds when operating near the coast. The e

Chinook design was limited by its rotor system which did not 

mit full use of the installed power, and the users were anxious 

an improved version which would upgrade this system. 

As with any new piece of equipment, the Chinook prese

a major problem of "customer education." Commanders, p

and crew chiefs had to be constantly alert that eager soldiers 

not overload the temptingly large cargo compartment. I feel q

confident that Hannibal had the same problem with his elepha

It would be some time before the using troops would be expert

sling loads and educated in such minor details as removing 

gunner's sight from the artillery pieces. The Chinook soon pro

to be such an invaluable aircraft for artillery movement and he

logistics that it was seldom used as an assault troop carrier. 

early decision to move to this size helicopter proved to be in

putably sound. 

Operation CRAZY HORSE 

The origins of many of the major operations in Vietnam can 

traced to some minor enemy contact which was quickly explo

by airmobile forces. Often this was the only way the elusive en
TROOPS BOARDING CH-47 CHINOOK HELICOPTERS 

could be forced to fight. Operation CRAZY HORSE is a good example 

of the aggressiveness and determination of our forces in their 

search for the enemy. And it is appropriate that we examine the 

actions of the squad and platoon to understand how it came about. 

The 1st Cavalry Division was finishing Operation DAVY 

CROCKETT on 15 May 1966 when a Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group (CIDG) patrol from the Vinh Thanh CIDG Camp, working the mountain valley immediately to the east, ambushed an 

enemy force and captured a mortar sight, 120-mm firing tables and 

a gunner's quadrant, plus some sketches of the CIDG camp and 

the hamlets in the valley. One company of the 1st Cavalry air 

assaulted into the hills east of the CIDG camp at 1000 hours on 

the 16th, to search out the area. 

At 1100 hours on the 16th, Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 8th Cavalry, commanded by Captain John D. Coleman, 

made a combat assault into what then was a one-ship landing zone 

named HEREFORD, a small patch of elephant grass about halfway 

up the side of the largest mountain east of the CIDG camp. Besides 

the usual forward observation party from the supporting artillery 

(an airmobile battery was landed adjacent to the camp) , a Special 

Forces intelligence sergeant, his CIDG counterpart, and an interpreter moved with the company. 
CH-47 CHINOOK DELIVERING l05-MM HOWITZER (TOWED) WITH 

AMMUNITION PALLET 

After a hard climb to the ridgeline of the mountain, mark

only by one pungi stake and two heat exhaustion casualties, 

company began moving eastward along the razorback. At appro

mately 1400 hours, after having just crossed a slight rise in terra

the lead platoon (the Third) spotted what appeared to be a sin

Viet Cong and opened fire. The fire was immediately returned 

volume from prepared positions to the east. The platoon lea

radioed Captain Coleman that he had encountered stiff opposit

and was ordering a squad to begin a maneuver around to his l

This flanking action by the squad met with an immediate a

violent counter-attack by an estimated enemy platoon. The squ

members fought gallantly but soon were overrun. All but one m

was killed. The sole survivor, badly wounded, wisely feigned de

and later escaped. 

The volume and din of enemy fire to the immediate front 

the Third Platoon intensified to the point that communicatio

became almost impossible. Lieutenant Heaney continued to try 

gain the initiative in his sector, but each move cost him casualt
the company command post, located immediately behind the Third 

Platoon, killing the forward observer's radio operator and wounding two others of the group before a grenade from a rifleman of the 

Second Platoon dispatched him. 

Coleman deployed the Second Platoon to both flanks of the 

company, linking with the now recoiling elements of the Third. 

One squad, moving to the right, ran into a hail of automatic 

weapons fire and took several casualties. The squad counterattacked 

twice trying to r~ach its dead, but was beaten back into a position 

that eventually became part of the company's perimeter. 

At about this time (1420), the weather closed in and a torrential downpour drenched the battlefield. The 200-foot high 

jungle canopy admitted limited light at best, and with the storm, 

only an eerie twilight penetrated to the jungle floor. The deteriorating weather also precluded the airlanding of any immediate 

reinforcements for the company. The number of casualties taken 

by the company, plus the violence of the enemy assaults, led Coleman to decide to abandon efforts to regain the offensive, and concentrate on forming a defensible position on the small patch o

high ground the company held. 

The First Platoon, next in column, was deployed to the right 

and rear, assuming control of the one squad of the Second. The 

vVeapons Platoon was assigned to fill the remaining gap. The 

\Veapons Platoon, fighting as riflemen, had barely closed into the 

perimeter and established some semblance of fighting positions 

across the trail leading into the position, when the enemy launched 

a determined attack from the west. It was beaten off, but it served 

notice to the company that it was cut off and facing an enemy 

force of much greater strength. Moreover, the enemy dead within 

the perimeter were clad in khaki uniforms and had the helme

normally associated with North Vietnamese regulars or Viet Cong 

main force units. 

By 1630 hours, Bravo had tightened its perimeter and conducted 

two probes to the east to recover wounded and dead. The wounded 

were collected at a central location in the perimeter and the uni

medics consolidated to treat them. 

The enemy forces also recognized that it had isolated the 

company and began pressing attacks at various portions of the 

perimeter, preceding each with a heavy concentration of rocket

and grenade launcher fire. Each attack was driven off, but at a cos
Because of the steep terrain tube artillery was unable to place th

volleys near enough to the perimeter to be effective in the close

defense fights. Under the severe weather conditions, the ae

rocket artillery, the usual savior of an isolated airmobile elefne

could not be expected to function. However, two birds from 

2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (the battalion commander and 

XO volunteered for the mission) felt their way up the side of 

mountain and, guided by radio, pressed home salvo after salvo 

rockets, some within a few feet of the company's perimeter. O

last volley, in conjunction with a violent exchange of small ar

and automatic weapons fire, ended the enemy threat for the nig

The attacks diminished in strength and intensity and by 2

hours, all contact was broken. 

With more than 40 wounded men, along with nearly 20 kill

Coleman had little choice but to remain in position and aw

reinforcements which had been landed at landing zone HEREFO

during a brief period when the weather broke. The men of Br

used the respite to continue digging in, and the medics, three 

them now badly wounded, worked unceasingly to give aid and co

fort to the wounded. 

Even though the company was badly hurt, and the men w

well aware of their danger the unit maintained its fighting spi

Not one trooper sugge~ted that the unit pull out. Many indica

their willingness to stand and die on that piece of ground. 

At a few minutes after 2200 hours, Bravo with less than 

effectives actually manning the perimeter was reinforced by so

130 men of Company A, 1 st Battalion (Airborne) , 12th Cava

AHa, commanded by Captain John W . ("Jackie") Cummings, h

air assaulted into landing zone HEREFORD and marched with

opposition to the perimeter. 

To facilitate relief in the pitch blackness, elements of the 

. lieving company were fed into the line and integrated into ove

defense. In many cases, members of Bravo Company gave up 

tirely or shared their hard dug holes with members of the fr

unit. 

On 17 May, at 0615 hours, Bravo pulled in its listening po

which had been stationed some 20-25 meters outside the perime

and the two companies initiated a "mad minute" of fire-a 

tematic spraying of trees and bushes in front of the positions. T

firing touched off an immediate enemy reaction, and he launc
by at least a battalion-sized unit. 

Both companies fought bravely side-by-side for nearly two 

hours. Enemy riflemen came within a few feet of foxhole position

before being killed, and the ammunition in the perimeter began 

running alarmingly low. The approach of another relief company

Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry-moving up from HERE

FORD, apparently caused the enemy to break contact. As the enemy 

riflemen faded back into the jungle, the men in the perimete

already had fixed bayonets and had loaded their last magazines in 

their rifles. 

When the smoke cleared, casualties were counted. Bravo had 

lost 25 killed, and 62 wounded. Alfa had 3 killed and 37 wounded

There were 38 enemy bodies found within or immediately ad

jacent to the friendly perimeter. Later evidence indicated that a

many as 200 additional enemy had died in the fight. (Long after

ward, in upper Binh Dinh Province, a North Vietnamese soldie

surrendered to the Division. He said that his battalion had been 

involved in the battle against B Company and testified that hi

company had been decimated.) 

For Bravo Company, the remainder of 17 May was spen

evacuating dead and wounded. For the 1st Cavalry Division

Operation CRAZY HORSE had begun. 

The rest of the action took place in the most mountainous and 

heavily forested area in the province. far from the lowlands. Be

cause of the extraordinarily difficult terrain, aircraft commander

found themselves carrying a maximum load of only two or thre

soldiers as they went into "elevator shaft" single helicopter landin

zones in the triple canopy hilltops, where the aircraft would barely 

fit in a circle of giant tree trunks. Chinooks hovered over the jungl

so that the men could climb down swaying "trooper ladders

through the triple canopy. Nevertheless, in the three weeks o

CRAZY HORSE, over 30.000 troops moved by helicopter-an exampl

of the tactical value of airmobility in mountain operations. 

The battleground was a complex morass, 3,000 feet from bottom 

to top and 20 kilometers square. In the fighting it soon becam

clear that the 2d Viet Cong Regiment was bottled up in thes

rugged hills, but the Division's companies were having trouble in 

finding and attacking this elusive enemy. In a new plan, the Divi

sion marked off the battle area into pie-shaped sectors and move

the airmobile companies to the outer edges on all sides to set up 
B52 raids almost daily. The North Vietnamese, under this pre

sure, attempted to e~cape out of the area and triggered several 

the -prepared ambushes. The enemy's powerful 2d Regiment w

disorganized by heavy losses in these ambushes; the survivo

evaded to the north into the An Lao Valley and were not in co

tact again for several months. 

During the final phase of Operation CRAZY HORSE, Republic 

Korea forces maintained contact with an enemy battalion for fo

days, inflicting heavy casualties. In this operation the Divisi

evacuated or destroyed 45 tons of rice, 10 tons of salt, a weapo

repair shop, and several large caches of ammunition and medic

supplies. Captured documents gave the first indications of the e

tent of the Viet Cong infrastructure in northeastern Binh Din

It was this intelligence that provided targets for ensuing operation

After CRAZY HORSE, there was a pause in the Battle of Bi

Dinh that lasted until early September, while the Division co

centrated on battlefields to the west and south. With overlappi

operations PAUL REVERE (Pleiku Province), HAWTHORNE (Ko

tum Province) and NATHAN HALE (Phu Yen Province) taki

place many miles apart, the Division's logistics were put to a seve

test. 

Complicating the 1st Cavalry's maintenance and supply pro

lems was the fact that the Division had far too many nonstanda

items in the inventory. This made it almost totally dependent 

an unpredictable supply system for repair parts and replacemen

There were cases in which items, such as bulldozer parts, were n

replaced for more than ten months because they were "special" a

not stocked in country. There were several unique supply system

such as those for aircraft parts and electronic components, oper

ing simultaneously in Vietnam, in addition to the military stan

ard requisitioning and issue procedures. 

As for the span of control within an airmobile division, eve

brigade could handle four maneuver battalions with ease and 

fifth battalion with minor communication augmentation at briga

headquarters. The division, in turn, could absorb two addition

brigades, for a total of five, provided each of the added brigad

hrings along its support slice. Therefore, logistics became a 

straining factor long before span of control or communication
CHAPTER VI 

Airmobile Developments, 1966 

The Genesis of the 1st Aviation Brigade 

The Army faced a dilemma at this period of time in that it ha

spread its aviation assets in Vietnam to support the Army of th

Republic of Vietnam divisions, one Republic of Korea divisio

the 1st U. S. Army Division, the 173d Brigade, and the 1st Brigad

of the lOlst Airborne with non-organic aviation units. Only th

I st Cavalry Division had sufficient organic aircraft. There was litt

experience in supporting non-airmobile divisions with separa

aviation assets and the Army was not sure of the proper mix. 

The finite limitations of available Hueys and Army aviato

forced the decision to support the average size division or Vie

namese elements with considerably less than had been devoted 

the airmobile division and eventually a ratio was determined 

one assault helicopter company per brigade in the II, III, and I

Corps Tactical Zones. At this time, the Marines had the respo

sibility for aviation support in the I Corps Tactical Zone. But, th

mere spreading of limited aviation assets did not solve the proble

of organization command and control. It was obvious from th

beginning that some sort of centralization was going to be necessar

The companies in Vietnam at that time all had developed distin

methods of operations and procedures which they had worked o

on an ad hoc basis with the supported commanders. As a resu

it was very difficult to take a company from the highlands an

switch its support operations to the Delta or vice versa for it e

tailed relearning complex command relationships, terrain, an

methods of operation. Therefore, a high degree of standardizatio

of training, procedures, and methods of operations was obvious

indicated. 

In contrast to this need, there was a strong underlying feelin

that centralization of Army aviation at a brigade level would b

a major step backwards from the fundamental principle that Arm

aviation had held since World War II, that is decentralization 

the lowest possible commander who could use and maintain 
final positive indication that Army aviation was truly headed 

a separate air arm. 

The 1st Aviation Brigade was formed provisionally on 1 Ma

1966 with Brigadier General George P. ("Phip") Seneff in co

mand. General Seneff's career had been sprinkled with key assi

ments related to airmobility and he had been a major comman

in the testing of the 11 th Air Assault Division. He was quick 

assemble many ·of his former "lIth Air Assault Team" to form 

brigade staff and to publish the first handbook and standard ope

ing procedures of the brigade. With the publication of ba

operational manuals, the 1st Brigade was able to standardize av

tion operational procedures throughout Vietnam, establish train

schools, enforce safety regulations, and in general more effectiv

manage the growing aviation assets. 

Essentially, General Seneff commanded the non-organic Ar

aviation elements in Vietnam, but operational control was ves

in the supported ground commander. It was a tribute to the p

sonalities involved that this unusual system worked; retaining 

best features of centralized command-training and standardizat

-and the best features of decentralization-operational control a

support. The onus of a large impersonal structure with its inher

unresponsiveness was avoided. Though the ghost of another 

corps would not be entirely exorcized for years to come, the 

Aviation Brigade avoided most of the pitfalls that had been grim

predicted at its onset. 

General Seneff, in coordination with Major General Willi

E. DePuy who then commanded the 1st U. S. Division, bega

test period to determine the most satisfactory means of support

a line infantry division with separate aviation elements. While c

siderable work had been done in this area during 1965, it h

grown in different directions depending on the unit sUFported a

the aviation assets available. Using the 11 th Combat Aviation B

talion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Starker, 

the test vehicle, Generals DePuy and Seneff soon ironed out m

of the serious problems in matching aviation to the ground un

Because the requirements varied in each part of Vietnam, 

brigade tried to collocate one assault helicopter company with e

U. S. brigade and in course of time each Republic of Korea briga

The companies supporting Army of the Republic of Vietnam un

were located in the most centralized positions for best support. T
how many companies might be assigned for a specific mission. 

At this time the 52d Aviation Battalion supported the 4t

Division in the highlands, the 10th Aviation Battalion supporte

the brigade of the 10ist and the Republic of Korea division, th

lIth Combat Aviation Battalion supported the Big Red One, th

214th-the 9th Division, and the 269th-the 25th Division. Th

13th Battalion, which was later to become a full group, remaine

in the Delta. Two aviation groups-the 17th and the 12th-supe

vised the aviation assets in the II and III Corps Tactical Zone

respectively. The aviation group commander was also the aviatid

officer for th~ U. S. Field Force commander. 

The Caribou Transfer 

During the spring of 1966, one of the most emotionally packe

debates was reaching its final stages. This would culminate o

6 April 1966 in a formal agreement between the Chief of Staf

U. S. Army and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force to relinquis

Army claims to the Caribou and future fixed-wing aircraft designe

for tactical airlift. Before discussing this issue, we should put a fe

basic points into focus. 

'The keystone to airmobility was-and is-the helicopter and 

is easy to forget the versatility and uniqueness of this vehicle. Man

futile discussions have been held on the cost, ton-mile capacit

complexity, and limitations of the helicopter when either compa

ing it to fixed-wing transport or other means of mobility. Th

simple fact is that no other machine could have possibly accom

plished the job of the helicopter. It alone had true ~ertical cap

bility and could perform those scores of missions ranging from a

insertion of a long range patrol to the vertical assault of an enti

division; it alone could place artillery on tht> mountain tops an

resupply these isolated bases; it alone could evacuate the wounde

out of a chimney landing zone, surrounded by 100 foot trees; 

alone could elevate the infantry support weapons and deliver th

discreet measure of fire so dear to the survival of a squad. Only th

helicopter could place a small bulldozer on a critical piece of te

Tain or extract another aircraft downed in the jungles and retur

it to fly again. 

Therefore, in discussing the inter-service differences betwee

the Army and the Air Force, one must keep in mind that the he
keenly aware of this basic fact. 

At the working level in Vietnam both Army and Air Fo

officers hammered out practical methods of solving their day-

day problems and coordinating their efforts. Ever since the co

ference I mentioned in the first chapter of this study where Gene

White expressed his concern on the size of the Army's fleet, the A

Force had opposed the Army's continued acquisition of the Ca

bou. By 1966 the Army was operating six Caribou companies 

Vietnam. The 7th Air Force in Vietnam, which had been upgrad

from the 2d Air Division on 2 April 1966, was severely critical 

the Army's method of operation of its Caribou assets. They believ

that the Caribou should be incorporated into the Air Force ma

aged Southeast Asia airlift and consequently be more producti

from a ton-mile basis. 

The Army on its side had some very strong advocates for t

Army retaining the Caribou and procuring its turbine power

successor, the Buffalo, as soon as possible. They pointed to the h

tory of the Caribou's responsiveness to the demands of far-flu

isolated units and the lack of guarantee that such support wou

be available under Air Force management. They looked upon t

Caribou as a bitterly contested victory for a legitimate Army m

sion and they were appalled at the mere possibility that the Arm

might trade this victory for an empty guarantee that they cou

remain in the helicopter business. It was truly an emotiona

charged atmosphere-one that was neither as black nor as white 

the critics on both sides appeared to believe. 

Prior to the Air Force assumption of the Caribou, most w

already under centralized management under Military Assistan

Command, Vietnam, and were participating in the Southeast A

airlift effort. However, one-fourth to one-half of their resourc

were dedicated to specific Army support. That is, one company h

the sole function of supporting the 1st Cavalry Division and oth

had full-time missions in support of small elements in the De

and Special Forces. A small portion of the Caribou fleet haul

parts and supplies to isolated Army aviation elements. No dou

some of the Caribou missions were inefficient from a standpoint 

payload, but none were considered a luxury by the users. 

With this as a background, let's turn to the actual agreeme

by the two chiefs of staff as signed on 6 April 1966. Because it 

important and relatively short, the complete text follows: 
y jy g

A. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, agrees to relinquish all claim

for CV-2 and CV-7 aircraft and for future fixed wind aircraft design

for tactical airlift. These assets now in the Army inventory will 

transferred to the Air Force. (Chief of Staff, Army, and Chief of Sta

Air Force, agree that this does not apply to administrative missi

support fixed wing aircraft.) 

B. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, agrees-

(I) To relinquish all claims for helicopters and follow-on rota

wing aircraft which are designed and operated for intra-theater mov

ment, fire support, supply, and resupply of Army forces and those A

Force control elements assigned to DASC and subordinate theret

(Chief of Staff, Army, and Chief of Staff, Air Force, agree that this do

not include rotary wing aircraft employed by Air Force SAW or SA

forces and rotary wing administrative mission support aircraft.) (Ch

of Staff, Army, and Chief of Staff, Air Force, agree that the Army a

Air Force jointly will continue to develop VTOL aircraft. Depende

upon evolution of this type aircraft, methods of employment and co

trol will be matters for continuing joint consideration by the Arm

and Air Force.) 

(2) That, in cases of operational need, the CV-2, CV-7, and C-1

type aircraft performing supply, resupply, or troop-lift functions in t

field army area, may be attached to the subordinate tactical echelo

of the field army (corps, division, or subordinate commander), 

determined by the appropriate joint/unified commander. (No

Authority for attachment is established by subsection 6, Sec. 2 of JC

Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).) 

(3) Tcj retain the CV-2 and CV-7 aircraft in the Air Force stru

ture and to consult with the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, prior 

changing the force level of, or replacing, these aircraft. 

(4) To consult with the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army in order 

arrive at takeoff, landing, and load carrying characteristics on follow-

fixed wing aircraft to meet the needs of the Army for supply, resupp

and troop movement functions. 

C. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Chief of Staff, U. S. A

Force, jointly agree-

(I) To revise all service doctrinal statements, manuals, and oth

material in variance with the substance and spirit of this agreement. 

(2) That the necessary actions resulting from this agreement 

completed by 1 January 1967. 

You will note that the agreement was far broader than t

Caribou problem alone and essentially established without dou

the Army's claim to the helicopter and especially to the arm

helicopter. Furthermore, you will note that the future develo

ments of VTOL aircraft were left for future negotiations. Som

times forgotten, this document established a precedent for attachi

Air Force units to ground commanders. 
inter-service bickering and budget limitations. There was a distinc

possibility ' that, in the absence of some such agreement, an all-ou

battle on the very right of the Army to own any aircraft might hav

occurred. Furthermore. the Army Chief of Staff was a man of un

compromising integrity who had every confidence .that both th

word and the spirit of this agreement would be carried out by bot

Services. To their credit. both Services did bend over backwards t

make sure that the transfer of the Caribou would be smoothl

effected by 1 January 1967. The Aviation School set up speci

training programs for Air Force pilots and the Army Caribou pilo

who were working themselves out of a job could not have bee

more diligent. 

General Johnson closely followed the transfer, of the Caribo

and its subsequent effectiveness under Air Force management. H

charged his staff to keep him informed of progress by frequen

analyses. One such study. made after the Air Force had been opera

ing the Caribou for a full year. showed a 12.4 percent increase i

hours flown and a 11.4 percent increase in Caribou cargo tonnag

Incidentally. this same study showed a drastic rise in the utilizatio

of the Chinook. Fundamentally, there was no real way to compar

the Air Force operations versus the Army. By Air Force standard

Army aviation organizations were woefully under-manned an

under-staffed; support and maintenance were accomplished entirel

differently by the two Services; and the Air Force had consolidate

the Caribou operations in three fixed bases. Much more basic from 

the ground commanders' viewpoint. the Air Force seemed un

wil)ing to procure more Caribou or its successor-the Buffalo. 

In this regard. Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer. Jr .• Deput

Commanding General. U. S. Army. Vietnam. on 21 April 196

wrote General Johnson. the Chief of Staff, as follows: 

... Although the Air Force has neither attached the C-7 units 

Army supported units nor given the Army operational control, th

responsiveness required has been achieved by what is termed dedicate

service. At least this is a step in the right direction. However, dedicate

service leaves the Air Force with a possible string on the aircraft an

units. It will work under conditions such as in the case of our C

support where there is strong motivation for all elements of the A

Force to make it work and where there are no competing demand

within the Air Force for use of the aircraft. In RVN only one C-7 

dedicated in support of the Air Force; this aircraft provides spare par

support for the C-7 fleet. I question that dedicated service would pr
qpy 

Air Force limitation on crew time. This limitation has in the past p

vented completion of some missions. When the extent of the compla

became known to [Brigadier General Burl W. McLaughlin, Comman

ing General 834th Air Division], he immediately stated that this wou

be corrected internally in his command. This is a further indication 

the current Air Force desire to provide highly satisfactory service. 

You will note that the study provides justification for more aircr

and defines in fairly precise terms what a follow-on aircraft should 

The Army must take a firm position on the type of aircraft to be p

vided in the future if satisfactory service is to continue. Two popu

trends in studies and statements of requirements may require consid

able Army opposition. The first concerns a VTOL development. R

quired for the mission is a simple, rugged, easily maintained, depen

able VTOL airplane which can be built within today's state-of-the-

(in fact, it exists in the de Haviland Buffalo) . Efforts to provide VTO

can only result in either an aircraft that duplicates the helicopter 

giving up speed, endurance and low cost, or an aircraft tha,t is v

expensive and complex with some severe operational limitations. T

second trend relates to size. A comparatively small aircraft is requir

The Air Force has always tended to build larger and more power

aircraft. If the ·aircraft provided for this mission becomes too large, 

will gravitate toward the Common Service Airlift System on the ba

of obtaining efficient utilization of its greater lift capacity. 

Many studies would follow by both the Air Force and the Arm

to prove the point, or disprove the point, that the Caribou we

better, or worse, under Air Force control. The same arguments 

combat effectiveness versus cost effectiveness would surface aga

but the transfer of the Caribou must always remain a footnote 

the Army's story of airmobility rather than a chapter by itself. 

Army Aviation Personnel 

During 1966, while I was Commandant of the Army Aviati

School, the shortage of Army aviators became critical. This shou

not have come as a surprise since the Army planners had forec

this shortage for more than a year, but now the buildup of U

forces in Vietnam and the concurrent requirement for more a

mobile assets made it apparent to commanders at every level. 

As early as January 1966, Department of the .Army had 

formed General Westmoreland that all aviator sources had be

exhausted and nearly 500 Republic of Vietnam returnees wo

be needed for additional tours in Vietnam. One hundred a

seventy-six of these had less than two years between tours and so
g gpp

units extremely "top heavy" in rank and consequently moral

suffered. Aviators in a sense felt they were being treated as secon

class citizens and had serious reservations about their career poten

tial. They alone seemed to be singled out for this repeated dut

in Vietnam and it was very hard to explain to their families wh

this was so. 

On 14 June 1966, Department of the Army summed up th

seriousness of the pilot shortage. Their projection showed that b

the end of Fiscal Year 1966 the Army would have a requiremen

for approximately 14,300 aviators versus a projected strength o

9,700. The requirements were forecast to grow in fiscal year 196

from a projection of 16,800 to approximately 21,500. Against thi

requirement it appeared there would only be a strength of 12,80

aviators. Obviously the real constraint to airmobility growth fo

some time to come would be the critical shortage of aviators. 

It was not until 29 March 1966 that the Army received Secre

tary of Defense approval to increase its flight training from 12

pilots a month to an active Army output of 410 aviators per month

No matter how fast this training program was accelerated, thi

training rate could not be reached until April 1967. Nevertheles

the Aviation School did reach a rate of 200 per month in May 1966

Drastic action had been taken throughout the world to reduc

manning levels for all overseas commands except Southeast Asia t

an absolute minimum. Aviator strength decreased in Europe to 

minimum of 250 and only 34 pilots were available to our forces i

Korea. Department of the Army mailed individual letters to almo

2,000 aviators in the Reserves asking for volunteers for active duty

but this effort failed to produce substantial results as only sixt

applications were received. The Army wisely decided not to dra

tically reduce its standards nor dip into the "seed com" of aviatio

instructors at the schools. Vietnam would have to live with th

shortage and use every internal management tool to make the be

use of the assets they had. 

When I made my second visit to Vietnam in 1966, I wa

anxious to glean any information which I could take back to th

Army Aviation School to better prepare the students for the

service in Vietnam. Fort Rucker at that time was almost exclusivel

geared and oriented to meet the growing needs in Vietnam and th

School made a special effort to debrief all Vietnam returnees in a

effort to glean every bit of information that would improve i
, 

the rotary-wing aviator must graduate with more than passi

knowledge of instrument flying as most of these students were goi

directly to combat-without the usual unit training transiti

which had always been the accepted practice in all Services. W

managed to squeeze sufficient hours out of the course to give ea

initial-entry student a thorough instrument course, complete 

every respect except for flight checks in two systems not being us

in Vietnam-instrument landing system and VHF omnidirection

range. Upon graduation, these students were perfectly capable 

flying instruments; but, any instrument course demands continu

practice to develop confidence and increase proficiency. Unfor

nately many graduates soon lost this capability through lack of u

and supervision. 

To partially compensate for the lack of unit training af

graduation, the course ended with an extended field maneuver

had directed that this last week before graduation incorporate 

much combat realism as possible to facilitate the essential tran

tion from "student" to "pilot." Almost every commander was e

thusiastic over the continued high quality of the new pilots bei

assigned to Vietnam. 

If there was ever a question about the wisdom of the Arm

'Varrant Officer Aviator Program, it was laid to rest at this tim

As Commandant of the Aviation School, I watched thousands 

these splendid young men mature in front of my instructors in

professionals-and that is exactly what they wanted to become-t

best Army helicopter pilots in the business. Nothing more a

nothing less. 

When the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and 

Assistant visited the Aviation School, they were concerned abo

the lack of branch career schools for the warrant aviator and 

future motivation. They could not believe that most of the

people came into the Army for the single purpose of flying; a

that, though many had been to college and were married, they d

not aspire to a career as a commissioned officer. Further, they w

not aware that those few who did want a commission could get o

under current regulations. I did my best to disabuse them of th

misconceptions. Our warrant program was attracting the very b

of American youth at the most critical time. 

To add to the problems brought about by the chronic pi

shortage, the Army in Vietnam was given the additional missio
Task Force 116 in their mission of waterway and off-shore surv

lance. Now the Navy wanted to train its own pilots and borr

some of the Army's precious armed helicopters to do a Navy miss

that no fixed-wing aircraft could do. 

On 25 July 1966 a jOint U. S. Army-U. S. Air Force-Vietnam

Air Force conference laid down the plans for the Army to tr

the first ten Vietnamese pilots in the UH-l helicopter. This was 

beginning of a long range plan to expand the capabilities 

the Vietnamese to conduct airmobile operations completely 

their own. 

Finally, the 1st Aviation Brigade was given the mission 

familiarize a limited number of Korean Army pilots and mechan

with the UH-l helicopter. When you add these requirements 

the requirement to conduct an in-country familiarization course 

all new Army aviators as well as the day-to-day commitments 

actual combat, it is easy to appreciate the dilemma of the sen

aviators in spreading their thin assets. 

In most battalions, each new aviator was given a check r

to ascertain his knowledge of the unit aircraft and, if necessa

was given additional training in this particular type. He was th

placed in the copilot seat regardless of his rank and received 

theater procedural orientation flying administrative type missi

for 25 hours. After this step, he was allowed to fly copilot dur

actual combat assaults and, when the aircraft commander felt 

had sufficiently demonstrated his proficiency, only then was 

allowed to fly as first pilot. 

Because the Army aviator was anxious to perform as ma

possible tasks as he could, it became common in the Republic 

Vietnam for aviators to fly over 100 hours a month and 120 ho

was not exceptional. This amount far exceeded the limit that h

commonly been accepted as safe over an extended period of tim

Fatigue was inevitably linked to a higher accident rate and co

manders at all echelons were alerted to detect signs of pilot fatig

within their own units. The 1st Aviation Brigade established 

policy on aviator fatigue which provided close supervision by 

flight surgeon of any aviator who exceeded 90 hours of flight ti

in a consecutive 30 day period. Naturally, flying hours alone w

an inadequate measure of this problem: one must consider 

intangibles of landing in a hot landing zone versus a "milk ru
flight, some commanders found it necessary to relax this procedu

for certain administrative flights. Consequently, many units beg

an unofficial training program whereby crew chiefs were giv

"stick" time and were coached in the rudiments of flying to 

point where they could take over in case of an emergency a

theoretically land the helicopter safely .. This training paid off 

isolated cases where the pilot and copilot were wounded and 

crew chief brought the aircraft back. This informal training h

an ancillary benefit in that it encouraged quite a few crew chi

to apply for warrant officer flight training. 

The shortage of pilots was only part of the personnel proble

Skilled mechanics, crew chiefs, avionics and armament special

were in critical demand. The twelve month rotational pol

(which General Westmoreland determined essential for the lo

range haul) generated special problems in what was known as 

"hard skills." The enlisted student might spend a full year or mo

in developing proficiency in repairing radar or turbine engin

and then serve in Vietnam for a year or less before he had to 

replaced by an equally skilled man. For the career soldier, th

was a danger that he could become over-specialized in some par

ular skill required in Southeast Asia and consequently could 

be utilized when he left. This led to morale and promotion pr

lems. Many a skilled helicopter crew chief upon being reassign

to the United States or Europe found himself "technically une

ployed" and wound up in an obscure motor pool where his spec

identity would get lost. Fortunately, many of these outstand

people were kept in the program and volunteered either to retu

to Vietnam for a successive tour or volunteered for flight traini

The performance of the crew chiefs and mechanics w

summed up by one general this way: 

The super performance did not stop with the pilots. The ma

tainers achieved the miraculous. High birds in the brigade were gett

a 140 to 150 hours a month piled on them when they were program

for only 70 and the average UH-ID was going over 100. This ov

flying was in direct contlict with the desired availability rate of 

percent, but our maintenance detachments met both goals. Crew ch

flew all day and worked on their birds all night. The sight around 

average company maintenance detachment when the birds stagge

home in the evenings was a sight to behold. The maintenance cr

rolled out, turned on the lights, worked with flashlights, worked 

feel, worked any way, in the rain, in high winds and dust storms, 
conditions, were the rule rather than the exception. 

Units in Vietnam would continue to be undermanned through

out 1966 and the ratio of aviation units to ground units would 

grow increasingly worse for the next eighteen months. Though 

every effort was being made in the United States to meet the surg

demands for pilots and aircraft, there was only so much that could 

be done to increase the output of the schools and speed up produc

tion lines. 

"Arc Light" 

The 6th of July 1966 marked the beginning of a new close sup

port capability for the ground commander. On this date, the B-52'

operated for the first time using a "combat sky spot" bombing 

system. This system enabled a ground radar control to direct th

bomber over the target and also indicate the exact moment of bomb 

release in almost any kind of weather. Now the big bombers could 

be used on targets of opportunity with a great deal of flexibility. 

The B-52's were not new to Vietnam and, in fact, had mad

their first strike in War Zone D more than a year before on 18 June

Since that time they had flown more than 3,700 sorties using th

code name "Arc Light." B-52's stationed on Guam were being use

increasingly on enemy supply routes and suspected bases that wer

located by the combined intelligence effort of the U. S. and Viet

namese forces. 

The new system employing ground radar control also incorpo

rated a quick reaction force of six B-52's which were on continu

ous alert at Guam. General Westmoreland, commenting on thei

effectiveness, said, "The B-52's were so valuable that I personall

dealt with requests from field commanders, reviewed the targets

and normally allocated the available bomber resources on a dail

basis. I also continued to urge that action be taken to substantiall

increase the B-52 sorties." 

To some the use of a heavy bomber, designed for strategi

nuclear response, in a counter insurgency environment was analo

gous to using a sledge hammer to swat flies. To the contrary, 

think the employment of this system showed the imagination an

flexibility of the U. S. Military in adapting this powerful system 

to add a new dimension of fire support for the ground trooper. In 

contrast to the snide remarks of "jungle agriculture" that som
tunnel structure, open up instant landing zones, and strike terr

into the hearts of the enemy. A single B- 52 usually carried 36,0

pounds of "iron bombs." Like any new system, it took some tim

to smoothly integrate it into the overall fire plan and devel

confidence in its control. However, many a prisoner of war su

stantiated the psychological effect of the B-52's and many enem

dead gave mute evidence of its lethality. 

The B-52's relation to the story of airmobility is in the fir

power half of the firepower-maneuver equation. The best utiliz

tion of the B-52 power included an immediate follow up of 

strike, and the air assault was the natural means of such exploit

tion. In the next few years this combination would be used mo

and more. 

Techniques of the 101st 

A civilian might be surprised to learn that the most importa

training takes place in combat. This would hardly surprise t

veterans of World War II and Korea. Every theater of war-an

each area of that "theater-presents special problems that requi

the commander on the scene to develop new tactics and techniqu

to fit the situation. The helicopter was probably the only soluti

to the dense tropical jungle, but even this versatile machine need

some place to touch down. Every unit in Vietnam had to ada

many of its airmobile procedures to fit its mission. The followi

sample, from the 1966 files of the 1st Brigade, lOlst Airbor

Division, is typical. 

Brigadier General \Villard Pearson, Commanding General, 

Brigade, lOlst Airborne Division, had established a training pr

gram for helicopter rappelling techniques since his brigade fr

quently operated in dense jungle terrain which did not ha

accessible landing zones. This training was particularly conce

trated in the reconnaissance elements and the engineer landi

zone clearing teams. These latter teams performed a most necessa

and dangerous task of going into an unknown and lightly protect

area-with equipment that had to be airdropped or sling delivere

and felling enough trees to permit several helicopters to la

simultaneously. Vietnam abounds with many large hardwood fo

ests which are extremely difficult to cut, even with the best hea

equipment. To add to the frustration of clearing operations, t
A corollary problem in the dense jungle was the evacuation 

wounded. The Huey at this time had no suitable hoist which wo

allow a stretcher to be lifted to a hovering helicopter. The hois

the Chinook was adequate, but too slow for personnel evacuati

and seldom would this helicopter be available for this missi

General Pearson recommended that improved winch systems 

both the Huey and the Chinook be provided as soon as possible

In the 101st operations in the highlands during this period, 

airmobile company was placed in direct support of each infan

battalion and the same company habitually supported a spec

battalion. The brigade found this arrangement was mutually adv

tageous; resulted in increased responsiveness; and enhanced 

effectiveness of aviation support. By now the use of a comma

and control helicopter had become routine for each infan

battalion commander and he used this helicopter for liaison, co

munications relay with subordinate units, assisting units to p

point their locations, guiding units to terrain objectives, a

locating potential landing zones. 

Seldom mentioned in dispatches, the brigade had two fixed w

Beavers which handled a multitude of minor resupply and adm

istrative missions for the brigade; and the old reliable fixed w

0-1 observation aircraft did yeoman service. These airplanes, wh

were almost taken for granted because they required so little att

tion, relieved critical helicopter assets for vital tactical missions 

which they would otherwise have not been available. 

A irmobility and the U. S. "Presence" 

With the arrival of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade 

14 August 1966, the total U. S. strength in Vietnam rose to appro

mately 300,000. More troops would soon follow. To some cas

observers throughout the world, this seemed an inordinate num

of military personnel to cope with an unsophisticated enemy i

relatively small country. Some people visualized a U. S. soldier 

every other square yard of South Vietnamese soil. This simply 

not so. 

Map 3 is an outline map of South Vietnam superimposed o

an outline map of the United States. You will note that when 

northern border along the 17th Parallel is positioned near Pi
---~-

MAP 3 

Pittsburgh \ , 

COMPARATIVE SIZES 

UNITED STATES 

AND 

SOUTH VIETNAM 
between Laos and Cambodia is largely a tortuous terrain of jung

and mountains. Even the primitive nomadic tribes, which live 

this sparsely populated area, have difficulty in traversing this a

once they have left their own little familiar area. 

The U. S. forces occupied small dots (not vast areas) on 

long expanse. They extended their power by major airmob

sweeps throughout their assigned area of operations, but in 

sense did they "hold" the terrain for long periods of time. M

operations inflicted severe damage on the Viet Cong and No

Vietnamese troops, but the tenacious infrastructure of the guerr

in many areas allowed them to rebuild their strength, sometimes 

a matter of months. It was often necessary to go back into an a

time and time again to defeat not the same enemy but perh(lps 

same numbered unit which had regrouped from local recruits 

replacements from the north. This was particularly true along 

borders of Cambodia and Laos in those provinces where a str

communist infrastructure had' existed for more than a decade. 

Without the potential for extending our power through 

helicopter, we would have been forced into small enclaves wh

in themselves would be prime targets, such as the French had fou

themselves in at an earlier time. But, air assault techniques g

the initiative to the Free World Forces along with the element

surprise and mass. No matter what the frustrations were in fight

in Vietnam, it is safe to say that without the airmobile tactics 

so-called "massive presence" in Vietnam to a great extent wo

have turned into mere pinpoints of static defense. 

Fall, 1966 

Operation THAYER I marked the beginning of the series 

battles that kept the 1st Cavalry Division in constant operation 

the plains of Binh Dinh for many months. The course of this ba

followed the enemy as he drifted across 506 Valley into the Cresc

Plains and Cay Giep Mountains. 

The Division jumped off in the attack on 15 September 19

with the simultaneous air assault of two brigades. Three battali

were lifted from An Khe and two from Hammond into the mo

tains of the Kim Son Valley. The five assaulting battalions secu

the high ground all the way around the claw-shaped valley and t

fought their way down to the valley floor against elements of 
Later in the fight, the cavalrymen were reinforced by the 3d Br

gade of the 25th Division, which increased to eleven the numbe

of battalions controlled by the 1st Cavalry Division, operating i

conjunction with nine battalions of the 22d Army of the Republi

of Vietnam Division and two to three of Government of Vietnam 

Marines and airborne troops. The division supported all of thes

units with its own organic airlift. 

On 20 September, the battle area shifted to 506 Valley as th

18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment attempted to evade to th

east and break contact. Three cavalry battalions made air assault

to the east to follow their trail. The brigade fire base at Hammon

was attacked on the night of 23. September, in what was appar

ently a move to take the pressure off the enemy in the Kim So

and 506 Valleys as they moved eastward. Also on 23 September, th

Capitol Republic of Korea Infantry Division moved into the Ph

Cat mountains in force, opening up a new phase of the Free Worl

effort in Binh Dinh Province. A few days later, the build-up o

sightings and small actions were clearly indicating that the bul

of the 18th Regiment was shifting toward the coast actually movin

into a natural pocket bounded by sea and mountains. In the fac

of the Government of Vietnam successes in reestablishing govern

mental control of the coastal area east of Phu My-Phu Cat, the 18t

Regiment was being sent in among the population in force t

bolster resistence. THAYER came to a close at the end of Septembe

with over 200 enemy killed and 100 tons of rice captured. 

By the 1st of October 1966, the 1 st Cavalry Division had bee

in Vietnam for a full year and many airmobile techniques had bee

refined and polished in the crucible of combat. Nevertheless, it 

surprising how well the basic fundamentals of the organizatio

stood the test of time. 

At the end of its first year of operations in Vietnam the 1

Cavalry Division was to face another major challenge-rotation

During the summer of 1966 approximately 9,000 officers and men o

the Division had rotated to the United States. Replacement person

nel were flown to Pleiku, South Vietnam, from Travis Air Forc

Base, California. Liaison teams were placed at both Travis an

Pleiku and the massive aerial replacement service from the Unite

States direct to the 1st Cavalry Division functioned with speed an

efficiency. Of particular value was the liaison team placed at Trav

Air Force Base. This team not only looked after the welfare o
CH-54 SKYHOOK HELICOPTER DELIVERING 155-MM HOWITZER 
g p

At the other end of the pipeline, at Pleiku, Division personne

received and coordinated the further movement of replacemen

p~rsonnel to the division base at An Khe. Some of this movemen

was accomplished by convoy over Highway 19, but a significan

part of the movement was made by air, as Air Force C-I3

aircraft and the Division's Caribou (CV-2) aircraft were available

Although Il,OOO miles long, stretching half-way around the world

the Division's replacement pipeline worked smoothly and effec

tively. Units were maintained at fighting strength, operations con

tinued, and the Division moved through its transitional "changin

of the guard." 

This changeover not only included the loss of combat seasone

leaders, fighters, fiyers, and supporters, but also witnessed the depar

ture of those personnel who had been a part of the birth of th

airmobile experience, had been with it through its early develop

ment and formative period, had tested it, and had applied th

principles of airmobility to the nature of warfare in South Vietnam

Artillery in the Airmobile Concept 

I have mentioned earlier that one, cannot view the airmobil

concept ,as a simple problem of moving men and equipment from 

point "A" to point "B." One of the fundamental reasons for th

development of airmobility was the Army's concern that the balanc

between firepower and maneuver had swung too far in the direc

tion of firepower. It was envisioned that the helicopter could righ

this balance. However, with this mobility, there was also dange

that the soldier would outrun his supporting firepower if som

means were not found to increase the mobility of the supportin

weapons to the same degree. This is particularly true of artillery

The U.S. infantryman over the years has come to expect an

get continuous artillery support on call. The artilleryman in tur

has depended on the infantry to secure his positions and keep hi

supply routes open. In Vietnam no simple solutions were availabl

to continue this long-established teamwork. The early designers o

the airmobile division had recognized that they would have t

sacrifice the heavy ISS-mm howitzers and be content with movin

the 105-mm howitzer with the Chinook helicopter. As it turned ou

a ISS-mm howitzer battalion was continuously attached to the 1

Cavalry. It was teamed with the CH-S4 Crane to become an inte
Vietnam, the Little John was deleted due to tactical and m

power considerations. To make up for this deficiency in firepow

an aerial artillery battalion was organized as the general supp

artillery. It consisted of three firing batteries, each equipped w

twelve Huey helicopters armed with 2.75-inch aerial rockets. 

The airmobile tactics of the 1st Cavalry Division, its speed 

maneuver, and the distances involved required drastic changes 

the techniques and development of fire support co-ordination. F

one thing, the air was filled with a number of new objects-hu

dreds of troop transport helicopters, armed helicopters, rec

naisance aircraft, and tactical air support. Through this sa

atmosphere thousands of shells from tube artillery had to trav

Fire support co-ordination during the critical air assault phase of 

operation was the most difficult to resolve. The tactical air suppo

tube and aerial artillery, and sometimes naval gunfire and B

bombers had to be integrated without danger to the friendly for

and without firepower gaps that would relieve the pressure on 

enemy. Only careful planning and carefully worked out stand

operating procedures could make this manageable. 

As an example, the 1st Cavalry Division had a zone syst

based on the twelve hour clock superimposed on the map locat

of each firing position. North was at 12:00 o'clock. Prior to firi

the artillery units announced over the aircraft guard frequenc

the danger areas such as "firing in zones three and four, altitu

3,000 feet." It was incumbent on the pilot to check for artill

fire prior to approaching a landing zone. As an additional prec

tion, canonneers scanned the skies in the direction of fire prior 

pulling the lanyard while observers checked the forward end 

the trajectory. 

During the first battle of the Ja Drang Valley, the 1st Cava

had covered such a wide zone that the placement of artillery 

of utmost importance. Not only was it necessary to cover the la

ing zones of the attacking forces, but it was also necessary to pl

artillery in such a position that it could cover another artill

unit for mutual support. In this "war without front lines," 

artilleryman found himself often confronting the enemy face 

face. It was not long before the artillery decided it would be g

practice to collocate itself with the infantry battalion reserve. No

theless, many an artilleryman .thought he had well deserved 

Combat Infantry Badge. 
sidered aerial rocket artillery to be a nuisance on the battlefiel

and they could not understand why its method of employme

should be any different than the armed helicopter which escorte

the tactical troop lift. Fortunately, the aggressive spirit of the aeri

rocket artillery battery demonstrated that it could and should b

used in mass. While the other armed helicopters were preoccupie

by pinpoint targets, the aerial rocket artillery could deliver ar

fire with the same responsiveness (and through the same comm

nication channels) that tube artillery had done in the past. 

These same aerial rocket artillery assets, if distributed pieceme

throughout the division, could not have functioned nearly as we

In this case, the whole was greater than the sum of all its part

Aerial rocket artillery never entirely replaced tube artillery, n

was it ever meant to. However, by careful allocation of fire an

precise timing of ships on station, the aerial rocket artillery w

able to provide a remarkable volume of fire at times when no oth

fire support was available. To their credit, the aerial rocket art

lery developed the same combined arms partnership with the infa

tryman that has always existed between the red leg and the do

soldier. 

To the infantryman who has never been in an airmobile'div

sion, it is a very difficult thing to explain the responsiveness an

effectiveness of aerial rocket arillery. Aerial rocket artillery, in co

trast to the roving gunship, generally stayed on the ground wi

one section having a two-minute alert time. They were position

so to be only a matter of minutes away from any potential targe

Two minutes after a fire mission was received they were airborn

and, in a matter of a few minutes more, on target. As soon as t

first section departed, a second section moved from a five-minu

alert to the two-minute alert status, and another standby tea

moved to the five-minute alert. By this method, continuous an

accurate firepower could be delivered. Aerial rocket artillery w

so effective in the 1st Cavalry Division that the artillery com

manders had to constantly remind the Infantry to use tube artille

when appropriate rather than call automatically for aerial rock

artillery support. 

During MASHER-WHITE WING, the 155-mm howitzer was a

lifted for the first time using the CH-54 "flying crane" helicopte

During this same campaign, it became an accepted technique 
nages of a

mmunition. Again this is symptomatic with the kin

support that the U. S. infantryman has taken for granted. H

ever, in Vietnam where practically every round had to be deliv

by air, artillery ammunition proved to be one of the biggest lo

tics problems. Commanders had to exert supervision at all le

to make sure that the right fire support means was chosen for 

target of the moment. A wise commander did not spend too m

ammunition on harassment and interdiction fires that could no

observed. 

The airmobile artilleryman had learned to fire in all direct

with a minimum of confusion. He became accustomed to rapid 

frequent moves and developed confidence in his, airmobile pr

mover, the Chinook. He even developed his own special tac

known as "the artillery raid." In this case, an artillery bat

would be moved deep into suspected enemy territory, rapidly 

prepared concentrations on targets that had been developed 

intelligence, and then pull out before the enemy could react. S

of these raids were conceived, planned, and executed in less t

three hours. 

"Y0rkable methods were found to employ aerial rocket artil

at night, but the mainstay , of fire support during the hour

darkness remained the tube artillery. Seldom was an infantry 

required to hold a position at night out of range of its frie

guns. 

Close-in fire support has always been inherently dangerous

the fluid situation of the airmobile battlefield, the ever pre

danger of the proverbial "short round" is multiplied by all 

points on the compass. An error in any direction may well re

in friendly casualties. As a result, coordination and control o

fire; the knowledge of the exact location of every friendly elem

is more important in the airmobile division than in any other c

bat force. A year's experience in Vietnam had matured the 

Cavalry Division's fire support techniques and had proven 

organization to be fundamentally sound. The artilleryman had 

been left behind in this new dimension of. combat. 

Other Operations 

The fall of 1966 saw many operations develop as the U

strength continued to grow. The newly arrived 196th Light In
Strike Force were inserted into landing zones north and east o

Sui Da, they immediately became heavily engaged. It became appar

ent that the Viet Cong 9th Division, consisting. of three regiments

together with the North Vietnamese lOlst Regiment had deployed 

into the central Tay Ninh Province with the major objective o

wiping out the Special Forces camp at Sui Da. The four Specia

Forces companies were overrun and had to withdraw in smal

groups or be extracted by helicopters. 

General Westmoreland responded to this large enemy threa

by commiting the 1st Infantry Division, contingents of the 4th and 

25th Infantry Divisions, and the 173d Airporne Brigade. Some 

22,000 U. S. and Allied troops were committed to the battle which 

became known as Operation ATTLEBORO. The battle continued 

until 24 November, d·uring which over 1,100 enemy were killed 

and huge quantities of weapons, ammunition, and supplies were 

captured. The Viet Cong 9th Division would not be seen again 

until the following year. 

The 1st Cavalry Division continued its operations in Binh Dinh 

Province with Operations THAYER II and IRVING. During the latte

operation on 15 October, they found a medical cache with severa

thousand containers of medicine and, at another location, camera 

equipment with 5,000 reels of film. Among the cameras found wa

one owned by Look Magazine senior editor, Sam Casten, who had 

been killed during Operation CRAZY HORSE in May. Over 1,170 

prisoners were captured and identified as Viet Cong infrastructure 

members or North Vietnamese regulars during Operation IRVING

This operation included the hard fought battle of Phu Huu, in 

which the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, won the Presidential Uni

Citation . 

.IRVING was a good example of cooperation between U.S., Gov

ernment of Vietnam, and Republic of Korea forces. The tactica

moves and the complicated phasing were carried out with precision

and without any major difficulties. At the same time, the operation 

showed that large scale sweeps, with two or three divisions partici

pating, should be the exception rather than the rule in this kind 

of counterinsurgency operational environment. They serve to sti

up the enemy, and they bring some of the infrastructure to the 

surface, but larger units are able to evade the sweeping and block

ing forces. In this case, the primary target was the infrastructure 

within the population, and the sweep was profitable, but, with the 
the Cambodian border in Pleiku Province. The newly arrived 

Infantry Division carried the bulk of this battle with element

the 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division. By 30 Dec

ber, 977 enemy had been killed. 

Each one of the above operations contained hundreds of ex

ples of the growing capability of U. S. forces to employ airmo

operations with effectiveness and daring. The year 1966 was 

year of accelerated buildup and the beginning of major offen

operations in Vietnam. It was also the year in which the en

.began to doubt his strategy and his tactics. 

By the end of 1966, the United States would have a tota

385,000 U. S. military personnel in South Vietnam and would 

in a position for the first time to go over to the offensive o

broad and sustained basis. General Westmoreland remarked, "D

ing 1966, airmobile operations came of age. All maneuver 

talions became skilled in the use of the helicopter for tac

transportation to achieve surprise and out-maneuver the enemy
CHAPTER VII 

The Peak Year, 1967 

Parachute Assault in Vietnam 

At 0900 hours on 22 February 1967, Brigadier General John R. 

Deane, J r., stood in the door of a C-130 aircraft. When the green 

light flashed, General Deane jumped, leading the first U. S. parachute assault in the Republic of Vietnam, and the first such assault 

since the Korean conflict fifteen years earlier. This parachute jump 

of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, signalled the beginning of Operation JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE. The original plan, as conceived 

in November 1966, called for the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne 

Division to make the parachute assault; but, much to their chagrin

they were engaged in other operations and the honor was to go to 

the 173d. 

Operation JUNCTION CITY employed the 1st and 25th Infantry 

Divisions, the II th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 196th Light 

Infantry Brigade, elements of the 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions

and South Vietnamese units, as well as the 173d Airborne Brigade

Their target was enemy bases north of Tay Ninh City, in the area 

the French had named "War Zone C." The decision to make a 

paratroop assault was based on the urgency to place a large force 

on the ground as quickly as possible and still have enough helicopter assets to make a sizeable heliborne assault as an immediate 

follow-up. 

The requirement for helicopter lift on D-day was substantial

The 1st Infantry Division had five infantry battalions to put in by 

air assault and the 173d had three infantry battalions. In addition 

to the requirement for the Huey slicks, there was a tremendous 

requirement for CH-47 lift for positioning artillery and resupply 

of ammunition. The 173d had computed that they would free 60 

Hueys and six Chinooks for support of other forces by using the 

parachute assault technique. The paratroopers were assigned landing zones farthest to the north-areas that would have cost many 

extra minutes of flying time for lift helicopters. The practical 

aspects of making more helicopters available were perhaps colored 
attack. 

The 173d was placed under the operational control of th

Infantry Division for this operation and developed an elabo

deception plan to avoid possible compromise of the drop zone

the planning phase only the commanding general, his deputy, 

two key staff officers were aware of the actual drop zone. The c

plan designated a larger alternate drop zone outside the plan

area of operation. This permitted all the necessary staging prep

tions which must precede an air drop and all necessary coordina

with the Air Force. The actual drop plan for the airborne as

phase of the operation was not distributed to the units until 

hours on 21 February, the evening before D-day. After Lieute

Colonel Robert H . Sigholtz, the Airborne Task Force Comman

briefed his troops on the operation, he sealed off his battalion 

as a security measure. Thirteen C-130's were used for the perso

drop and eight C-130's for heavy drop of equipment. Jump 

tude was 1,000 feet. 

The battalion dropped on schedule and by 0920 hours 

D-day all companies were in their locations around the drop z

Out of the 780 combat troops who made the assault, only el

sustained minor injuries. The heavy equipment drop comme

at 0925 hours and continued throughout the day. The 1st 

talion, 50 3d Infantry began landing by helicopter assault at 

hours and the entire battalion was in place shortly thereafter

direct contact with an enemy force occurred during these e

hours of D-day. Another infantry battalion, the 4th Batta

50 3d Infantry, conducted a heliborne assault into two other 

landing zones at 1420 hours and phase one of JUNCTION 

ALTERNATE was essentially complete. 

During this operation, the 173d Brigade was supported by 

lIth, the 145th, and the 1st Aviation Battalions. Over 9,700 so

were flown in support of the operation and Army aviation l

9,518 troops and a daily average of fifty tons of cargo. While 

initial parachute assault phase received most of the publicity, 

subsequent tactical moves were made by helicopter and the mom

tum of the operation depended on this support. 

As might be expected, some operational problems resulted f

this first mix of parachute and heliborne operations. One acci

and several near accidents were experienced as a result of heli

ters trying to land in an area littered with parachutes. There 
coordination required between the large number of units involved. 

While safety was of prime consideration, there were periods of time 

when no ordnance was being delivered against the enemy. In addition, General Deane had noticed that air strikes were being called 

in when troops were unable to break contact, forcing the jets to 

break away without having an alternate target. However, the control and coordination procedures began to smooth out after the 

first few hours of confusion. 

This combined operation, which the 173d Brigade had begun 

so dramatically, continued until mid-May. The enemy lost over 

2,700 dead along with vast amounts of ammunition, medical supplies, and more than 800 tons of rice. War Zone C, which had been 

an exclusive Viet Cong stronghold for many years, was now vulnerable to the allied forces at any time of their choosing. In retrospect, 

there is no question that the parachute assault which began 

JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE was effective. The troopers had been 

well trained and knew what to expect but, as General Deane stated. 

"More importantly, they did what was expected of them." 

The employment of the airborne parachute force is historically 

visualized as a theater-controlled operation aimed at achieving 

strategic surprise. Although parachute delivery of troops and equipment is a relatively inefficient means of introduction into combat. 

the very existence of this capability complicates the enemy's planning and offers the friendly commander one more option of surprise. In this instance, which involved multiple units in a major 

operation, there was a greater demand for helicopter lift than there 

were helicopter assets. As a result, the 173d pushed strongly for a 

parachute assault. The fact that airborne techniques were not used 

more often in Vietnam can be attributed to many factors. 

The most obvious restraint to an airborne operation in Vietnam 

was the time lag inherent in airborne operations in responding to 

intelligence on the elusive enemy. The relatively unsuccessful 

French parachute operations already had pointed this out to us. A 

much more important restraint was the nature of the war itself and 

the limitations imposed on U. S. forces. From a strategic point of 

view, the U. S. posture in Vietnam was defensive. U. S. tactical 

offensive operations were limited to the confines of South Vietnam. 

Had the rules been changed, the parachute potential could have 

profitably been employed by planning an airborne assault into 

enemy territory at a distance within the ferry range of the Huey. 
helicopters could have married up with this force, refueled, 

immediately given them tactical mobility out of the airhead. Th

circumstances never came about. 

Every man with jump wings was eager to prove his partic

mettle in Vietnam. However, this special talent was not o

suited for that enemy, that terrain, and that situation. Never

less, I firmly believe that there is a continuing requirement 

an airborne capability in the U. S. Army structure. 

Change of Command 

On I April 1967 I assumed command of ' the 1st Cavalry D

sion from Major General John Norton. I was fortunate in inhe

ing an outstanding team of senior commanders. My two assis

division commanders were Brigadier Generals George S. Blanch

Jr. and Edward De Saussure. My chief of staff was Colo

George W. Casey, and the three brigade commanders were Colo

James C. Smith, to be replaced in a few weeks by Colonel D

ald V. ("Snapper") Rattan, Lieutenant Colonel Fred E. Karho

and Colonel Jonathan R. Burton. My division artillery was c

manded by Colonel George W. Putnam, Jr., and Colonel Howar

Lukens had the 11th Aviation Group. Colonel Charles D. Da

had the Support Command, to be shortly replaced by Colo

Hubert S. ("Bill") Campbell. These officers, along with m

others too numerous to mention, enhanced the pleasure of c

manding the "First Team." For the next nine months my tact

command post would be in Binh Dinh Province at a location w

the unpretentious name of Landing Zone Two BITs. Division R

would remain at An Khe. 

In preparing this section of the study, there was a temptat

to view all problems from the vantage point of the division c

mander. The 1st Cavalry Division was not unique in having m

incidental day-to-day problems-problems that were typical of ev

division in Vietnam. For example, as any commander, I was c

cerned that we averaged over fifty cases of malaria per mon

Again, the 1st Cavalry is fundamentally an infantry division 

we had all the problems of booby traps, mines, ambushes, and b

security that one would find with any division, plus those ad

tional problems that go with taking care of over 400 helicopt

I have tried to focus on the airmobility aspects of my experie
Province through four successive campaigns since early 1966-

Operations THAYER I, IRVING, THAYER II, and the then current 

campaign, PERSHING. The 1st Cavalry had put intense pressure on 

the North Vietnamese Army 3d Division and its three main force 

regiments throughout these campaigns. They had suffered severe 

logistical and personnel losses. Relentlessly pursued in every portion ·of the province, the remaining North Vietnamese Army units 

were forced to find an area in which they could regain strength 

and reorganize their ranks. Consequently, the 2d Viet Cong Regiment as early as mid-October 1966 had retreated north into Quang 

Ngai Province to avoid the 1st Cavalry. The 22d North Vietnamese 

Army Regiment also withdrew into Quang Ngai during the month 

of March. These frequent enemy retreats to the north, to rest and 

regroup, contributed to the necessity for the 1st Cavalry's participation in Operation LEJEUNE which began on 7 April. The 

principal reason behind this operation was an urgent Marine 

requirement to free some of their troops in Quang Ngai for movement further north. 

OPeration Lejeune 

The boundary between the provinces of Quang N gai to the 

north and Binh Dinh to the south established the demarcation line 

between the I Corps and II Corps Tactical Zones. This same boundary line divided the U. S. military effort. with the III Marine 

Amphibious Force having the responsibility in the I Corps area. 

Throughout its previous nineteen months of operations in 

Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry had never operated outside of the II 

Corps area and, as a matter of fact. no U.S. Army combat unit 

had operated in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The enemy (with some 

reason) had assumed that they would be secure by moving into 

the "safe" area of Quang Ngai Province and thus elude the seemingly endless pursuit by the 1st Cavalry Division. This proved to 

be a mistaken assumption for on the 7th of April an Air Cavalry 

battalion task force moved into Duc Pho in the southernmost district of Quang Ngai. 

The Duc Pho area had been effectively controlled by the communists for more than ten years. Over the years the Viet Cong 

and its political arm, the National Liberation Front, had increased 

their power by political indoctrination, torture, and terrorism until 
was powerless in the area. 

On 28 January, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, part of T

Force X-RAY/ had moved from its base at Chu Lai into the D

Pho area to alleviate some of the enemy control in that distr

The Marines concentrated their operations around the city of D

Pho itself, for the Marine battalion had very little helicopter s

port and was, by and large, restricted to ground mobility. The o

Marine reinforcement in this area had been in late February 

early March when a special landing force of the 1st Battalion, 

Marines (from Okinawa) and the 2d battalion, 5th Marines (fr

Chu Lai) were engaged in a search and clear mission to the so

of Duc Pho City. In early March these reinforcements returned 

their home bases leaving the 3d battalion, 7th Marines in pl

The III Marine Amphibious Force had been receiving increas

pressure along the DMZ throughout the early months of 1967 

increased enemy infiltration had forced the Marines to commit 

majority of their forces along this line. The Marines were thin 

the DMZ and wanted to move Task Force X-RAY north from 

southern part of their area of responsibility. The Marine p

included pulling out of Duc Pho as soon as Military Assista

Command, Vietnam, could provide a replacement force. Gene

Westmoreland decided that the most responsive unit availa

would be the 1st Cavalry Division. 

The 1st Cavalry Division was given less than twelve hours 

put a battalion task force into the Duc Pho area and less t

36 hours to increase that force to brigade size. In deference to 

Marines, the operation was named after Major General Jo

Archer Lejeune, a Marine leader during the Spanish Ameri

War and World War I. Most of the landing zones also were gi

names from Marine Corps history. 

When the orders to move were received on the night of 6 Ap

the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, under the command of Lieuten

Colonel Robert D. Stevenson, was chosen to begin the action si

this battalion was in a preparatory posture at An Khe for anot

operation. At 0115 hours on the 7th, approximately three ho

after the Division had received the oral order, the 11 th Aviat

1 Task Force X·RAY was commanded by Brigadier General Foster C. ("FrO$

LaHue. He and I would be coordinating on many operations in I Corps Tac

Zone during the next few months. 
at 0930 hours on the 7th. The battalion had fully closed by 170

hours that afternoon. 

It was immediately obvious that the first requirement in thi

area would be the building of a heavy duty airstrip for support b

Air Force aircraft. The decision was made to build a C-7A Caribou 

strip immediately at landing zone MONTEZUMA which could b

expanded to accommodate C-123 aircraft. At landing zone MONTE

ZUMA there would also be space enough to build a parallel Caribou 

strip while the first airstrip was improved and surfaced to handl

the larger and heavier C-130 aircraft. 

Company 13 of the 8th Engineer Battalion had arrived at land

ing zone MONTEZUMA during the morning of the 7th and immedi

ately began a thorough reconnaissance of the airfield site. Durin

the next two days, 31 pieces of heavy engineer equipment weigh

ing over 200 tons were airlifted into Duc Pho. This move require

29 CH-54 "Flying Crane" sorties and 15 Chinook sorties. Much 

of the equipment had to be partially disassembled to reduce th

weight to a transportable helicopter load. By 1800 hours on the 7th

enough equipment was .on the ground to begin work. The earth

moving commenced and continued throughout the night by flood

lights. By midnight, six hours after construction had begun, 25 

percent of .the Caribou strip was completed. 

On 8 April the remainder of the 2d Brigade Task Force unde

Lieutenant Colonel Karhohs deployed into the LEJEUNE area o

operations and assumed operational control of the area. Th

remainder of the Marine task force was placed under operationa

control of the 2d Brigade until such time as they could be move

north. 

Landing zone MONTEZUMA was composed of light sandy soil

and the heavy rotary wing traffic soon generated monumental, semi

permanent dust clouds. ·This in turn generated a severe mainte

nance problem in the rotor heads of the helicopters. Peneprine, an 

oil-base dust palliative, was spread on the helipads and refuelin

areas as fast as it became available and helped reduce this problem

A concurrent problem was the air traffic control necessary for th

hundreds of aircraft arriving with the Air Cavalry combat and 

combat support units being lifted into MONTEZUMA throughou

the day and the Marine aircraft beginning the outward deploy

ment. Air traffic at the landing zone was at best confusing and a

worst downright hazardous. As had been experienced in ever
over the air to whom it may concern, 

1£ you blow my tent do

one more time, I'm going to shoot you down." A three-man p

finder team from the Pathfinder Platoon of the 11 th General S

port Aviation Company soon arrived to assist the Marine air tra

control personnel. The control problem improved, but it was 

from being solved. 

I had sent one of my assistant division commanders, Gen

Blanchard, to Duc Pho as my personal representative and 

remained in the LEJEUNE area of operations almost exclusively. 

several occasions, he had expressed to me his deep personal conc

over the aircraft density but, nevertheless, was amazed at the ef

tiveness of the three-man pathfinder team which controlled d

the more than 1,000 arrivals and departures of OH-13, UH-

UH-ID, CH-47, and CH-54 helicopters along with the fixed-w

aircraft. The team initially stood on the hood of a ~ -ton truck 

the dust storms churned up by rotor turbulence and wit

single radio controlled traffic with nearly the efficiency of an 

conditioned tower at a large U. S. airport. 

By 1630 on the afternoon of 8 April, the 1500-foot Cari

strip was completed. Work continued on the strip to expand i

2,300 feet for C-123 use. The first Caribou airplanes that lan

carried a mundane cargo of 30 tons of culvert, which was unloa

by the side of the runway since no parking ramp had yet been 

pared. Work continued through that night again with glar

searchlights. The Marines shuddered at the Army's intense illu

nation since they had long been accustomed to very strict light 

noise control at night. Their apprehension was fortunately 

founded and the engineer work continued without enemy in

ruption. On 13 April. the 8th Engineers began the construction 

a second Caribou airstrip parallel and west of the completed C-

strip. This was necessary to allow the C-123 field to be impro

and surfaced to meet C-130 criterion. The second strip was finis

in 25 hours after 4150 cubic yards of earth had been moved 

graded. 

One reason that landing zone MONTEZUMA did not sustain 

enemy night attack during Operation LEJEUNE was the Ni

Hunter operations that were conducted almost every even

Karhohs developed this technique to a high degree in this act

and, later, on the coastal plains of Binh Dinh. These operati

used four helicopters; one acted as a lead and flare ship, while 
and at a distance not to be revealed by the flares, observed th

ground with starlight scopes. Once the enemy was spotted, th

gunners would open up with tracers to pinpoint the target for th

last armed helicopter to make a run with 2.75-inch rockets. Thi

technique was very effective at finding and killing the enemy and 

denying him one of his most valuable assets-the night. 

Once the brigade task force had established itself at Due Pho

a sea line of communication became necessary to provide th

required daily 250 short tons of supplies necessary to support th

brigade task force. The newly constructed Caribou airstrip coul

not possibly carryall the required logistical support. A sea termina

point was selected almost directly east of landing zone MONTEZUMA 

called Razor Back Beach. During the 8-day period between 9 an

17 April, over 8,000 short tons were moved over the shore from 

LST's and LCM's. The operation was not without difficulty. San

bars prevented LST's from coming in with a full load and eigh

to twelve foot breakers made the landings of the smaller craf

extremely touchy. 

Operation LEJEUNE combined the efforts of four military serv

ices: The U. S. Army, the U. S. Marine Corps, the U. S. Air Force

and the U. S. Navy. The tactical air force support was substantial

They had only taken over operation of the Caribou since the firs

of that year and, though slightly leary of accepting the hastily con

structed airstrip, they made 159 sorties into MONTEZUMA carryin

1,081 passengers and 229 tons of cargo. During the first eigh t day

of operations, tactical air dropped 115 tons of bombs and 70 ton

of napalm. The U. S. Navy provided gun support with a total o

2,348 rounds from its two ships offshore, the USS Picking and th

USS Shelton. 

It was apparent right from the beginning that t~e enemy i

that area had never before been challenged by airmobile tactics

It was several days before they began to appreciate the versatilit

and flexibility of the 1st Cavalry operations. The enemy chose t

disperse and hide. Contact was only sporadic with the heavie

combat action on 16 April. 

At noon on 22 April, Operation LEJEUNE was terminated

Although contacts were primarily light throughout the operation

176 enemy had been killed and 127 captured by the 2d Brigade

1st Cavalry. This brigade was relieved in place by the 3d Brigad
COMBAT ASSAULT-TROOPS MOVING OUT TO SECURE THE LANDING ZO

of the 25th Division, under Colonel James G. Shanahan, wh

had been under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Divis

for some months. The 3d Brigade of the 25th would soon beco

part of Task Force OREGON, the first division-size U. S. Army fo

to be formed in the I Corps Tactical Zone. 

Operation LEJEUNE was unique in many ways. The deploym

of the 2d Brigade to the I Corps Tactical Zone was the first co

mitment of any large U. S. Army unit in that area. More imp

tantly, the engineering effort, including the lifting of 30 to

of equipment to build two tactical fixed-wing airstrips in 

matter of a few days, was unparalleled in Army engineering histo

Finally, the demonstrated "fire brigade" reaction capability 

deploying a large task force in a day and a half to an entirely n

area of operations proved again the flexibility of the airmob

division. At Duc Pho the 1st Cavalry left behind two airstrips, 

impressive sea line of communications, several critical connect

roads, and a damaged Viet Cong infrastructure. In light of 
pp

many campaigns to follow. Operation LEJEUNE, however, was a 

relatively short move outside of the Division's area of operations

Much more complex and longer moves were made shortly there

after which involved Air Force fixed-wing aircraft in addition to 

the organic lift. These moves demonstrated a technique whereby 

an Air Cavalry unit was extracted from combat, moved to a land

ing zone, and the bulk of its equipment flown by Air Force aircraf

to a new location. The organic aircraft would then be ferried to 

the area and join with the unit ready to be employed again. 

T he Cavalry Spread Thin 

On 23 June 1967, about 0900 hours in the morning, Lieutenan

General Stanley R. Larsen told me to have a battalion ready to 

move by 1300 that afternoon. They would be lifted by C-130'

from landing zone ENGLISH in the Bong Son Plain to the Dak To

Kontum area in the Central Highlands where they were desper

ately needed. It was necessary to pull the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalr

directly out of contact with the enemy and get them to landin

zone ENGLISH. Using 24 C-130 aircraft loads and two C-123's, th

battalion moved to Dak To by that evening along with an artiller

battery. They were almost immed·iately thrown into combat. Th

next day, two more battalions followed and the third day, th

remainder of the direct support artillery. By now I had my 3

Brigade (-) committed to operational control of the 4th Infantr

Division. In the next few days these units would participate in on

of the hardest fought battles of the Vietnam war. The enemy ha

shown unexpected strength and determination. During this actio

the 3d Brigade was commanded by Colonel James O. McKenna

who had just taken over the Brigade from Colonel Burton o

22 June. The 3d Brigade would not return to my control unti

25 July. 

• Operation LEJEUNE had an interesting sidelight in its unique command relation

ships. I mentioned earlier that we had crossed the invisible border into I Corp

Tactical Zone where Lieutenant General Lewis '''. Walt, as Commanding Genera

III Marine Amphibious Force, was commander of all U.S. forces in that area. On th

other hand, I worked for Lieutenant General Stanley R. Larsen, Commanding Genera

J Field Force, Vietnam, who commanded all the U.S. forces in II Corps Tactic

Zone. (Are you still with me?) Even though I commanded a major operation o

General Walt's real estate, I reported directly to General Larsel) and only co·ordinate

informally with the Marines on the spot. This is hardly standard military procedur
ability to rapidly generate a reserve force from other forces in co

tact, I had no hesitation in allowing all maneuver elements to 

committed. . 

This is not to say that any commander is happy to lose oper

tional control of any of his forces. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infant

that had been detached from the 1st Cavalry before I took co

mand had been operating in the southeast corner of the II Cor

Tactical Zone near Phan Thiet since September 1966 and circu

stances dictated that I would not have it back under my wing un

after 1 anuary 1968, when it would join me in the I Corps are

Administratively, it still belonged to the Division and we we

responsible for all normal support for this unit except operation

control, which was vested directly to General Larsen. 

Throughout the Battle of Binh Dinh, one airmobile battali

task force was detached under I Field Force control in Binh Thu

Province to support pacification activities around the city of Ph

Thiel. The task force was created and moved on 24 hours noti

Although scheduled for 60 days of operation, it stayed in being f

17 months. The task force contained a very significant part of t

division's assets. In addition to the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 

included a S,cout section from the air cavalry squadron, a plato

of engineers', a battery of 105-mm howitzers, a platoon of aer

rocket artillery, lift helicopters, a signal team, and intelligence a

civil affairs personnel, plus a forward support element for logisti

This battalion-sized operation, known as Operation BYRD, w

especially interesting as a parallel to the Division's activities duri

this period. BYRD was in effect a microcosm of the Division's ope

tions in Binh Dinh. 3 

Binh Thuan is located about 100 miles northeast of Saigon, 2

miles south of Binh Dinh and bordering the South China Sea. T

principal port city, Phan Thiet, was surrounded by a heavily pop

• Task Force BYRD was originally under the command of Lieutenant Colo

Billy M. Vaughn. It was in turn commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fred E. Karh

who made several significant changes in the Task Force's operations. Upon Gen

~orton's recommendation, Karhohs took over the 2d Brigade the same day I assum

command of the Division. Lieutenant Colonel Leo D. Turner became the new c

mander of Task Force BYRD. During the last six months of the Task Force's op

tions, it was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. Griffin, Jr., who w

a definitive thesis on Operation BYRD while attending the U. S. Army War Col

in 1970. 
areas for the Viet Congo Operation BYRD was an economy of forc

effort, using a minimum involvement of United States ground com

bat forces, aiming to upgrade capabilities of the armed forces 

South Vietnam in that area. 

In order to protect the vital port of Phan Thiet and surroun

ing areas, the Commanding General of I Field Force, Vietnam gav

the 1st Cavalry Division the mission of defeating the enemy forc

in the BYRD area, in close coordination with South Vietnam force

The battalion was to assist in opening National Highway # 1 as 

ran along the coast through this area. Of the approximately 1,60

personnel in the average daily task force strength, 650 were organ

to a battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division, 500 were from oth

1st Cavalry assets, and 450 were from I Field Force. Although th

composition of the task force varieg, the nucleus was the airmobi

battalion. The small force contained all the elements essential 

sustain independent operations and could take advantage of ava

able support. 

Initially, the task force established a fire base and comman

post on the Phan Thiet airfield from which infantry rifle comp

nies were air assaulted into landing zones within the range of th

direct' support of the artillery battery. The first operations relieve

pressure on Phan Thiet and the nearby district capitals. The ta

force began combined operations with the South Vietnames

taking advantage of U. S. Navy ships and U. S. Air Force fighte

for fire support. The area of influence of the task force was broa

ened by the establishment of fire bases at steadily increasing d

tances from Phan Thiet. 

The operation, as it continued, isolated the enemy in t

heavily-forested areas, away from the populated zones. In th

close-in areas, the task force concentrated on the Viet Cong infr

structure and took action to build confidence in the populatio

and in the friendly armed forces. Revolutionary developme

activities extended from the city toward the outlying parts of t

province. All of these phases took place simultaneously. Initiall

'the task force operated with regional and popular forces of t

South Vietnamese. Later, it conducted combined operations wi

two Vietnamese Army battalions of the 23d Army of the Republ

of Vietnam Division. 

The Task Force ended up with an amazing record. During t

17 months of Operation BYRD, the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry h
trol from the province and district capitals to virtually all 

population in the area. Agriculture production, commerce, edu

tion and medical treatment had increased manyfold .. 

The small but vitally important air assaults of Operation BY

not only reproduced the Binh Dinh battle in miniature; th

also underscored the significant advantages of envelopment o

penetration as a tactic. Penetration is costly-opening a gap, wid

ing it, and holding the shoulders in order to get into the enem

rear. The air assault concept permits a cheaper, faster, and m

decisive vertical envelopment approach, which has made the c

ventional battlefield more fluid than ever. The great variety of 

assault concepts seems to fall under two major headings-each 

which is a principle of war-surprise and security. In the Battle 

Binh Dinh as well as in Operation BYRD, extensive preparations 

detailed reconnaissance, while maximizing security, compromi

surprise and often created dry holes. Executing air assaults with

prior artillery preparation and with limited prior reconnaissa

involved considerable risk, but frequently yielded reward

results. The choice depends on the enemy situation and the abi

of the G-2 to present the proper recommendation to the divis

commander. The air assault must rely on speed, scheme of man

ver, locally available firepower (aerial rocket artillery), a

command and control from an aerial platform. Additionally

reinforcing capability to exploit success or to assault the ene

from another direction must be immediately available to 

commander. 

This period in the BYRD fighting was characterized by alm

daily contacts with squad and platoon-size Viet Cong elements 

the task force searched base areas and interdicted lines of comm

nication. Combined United States and South Vietnamese ope

tions were continuous, with both sides gaining mutual respect a

experience. 

Reconnaissance in Force 

In August 1967 the 1st Cavalry Division again moved i

Quang Ngai Province in I Corps Tactical Zone with three b

talions under the 3d Brigade, commanded by Colonel McKen

This resulted in the first major reconnaissance in force into 
well-fed livestock. Previous aerial reconnaissance had drawn heav

antiaircraft fire. Although the valley appeared prosperous, only 

few inhabitants had been observed. Intelligence experts suspect

that military age personnel were either hiding in the hills as ou

right Viet Cong soldiers or being used as laborers by the Viet Con

forces in constructing fortified positions. 

On 9 August 1967 the 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry, und

the command of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Stannard, commenc

a battalion air assault into the valley 32 miles southwest of Quan

Ngai City. The selected landing zone, named landing zone PA

was situated on a ridgeline 2,300 meters southwest of an abandon

airstrip at Ta Ma. This landing zone selected because it was th

only high ground large enough and clear enough of obstructio

to allow six lift ships to land, and because it was in an area whi

would give an assaulting company the advantage of reconnoiteri

from high ground down to the valley floor. The assault started 

0936 after a short artillery preparation. After the 1st Platoon h

landed, intense antiaircraft fire came from the surrounding hil

Two Huey's were shot down almost immediately. Company A 

the 2d Battalion was faced with a pitched battle for the next fo

hours. The enemy situation, reconstructed later from informatio

gained from prisoners of war, captured documents, and a survey 

the battle area, disclosed that the chosen landing zone was rig

in the midst of well-prepared enemy positions. Looking down on t

position were at least 80 North Vietnamese with three 12.7-mm an

aircraft weapons, 82-mm mortars, and 57-mm recoilless rifles. A V

Cong Montagnard rifle company was on the same hill mass. T

ridgeline was rimmed with fox holes and well-concealed bunke

almost flush with the ground. Company A had landed in a nest 

hornets. 

There were to be hundreds of acts of individual heroism in t

next few hours which have been duly recorded elsewhere. How

• This operation was co·ordinated with the larger operations of Task Fo

OREGON taking place in southern Quang Ngai Province under Major General W

liam B. Rosson (who in turn reported to III Marine Amphibious Force). Again 

corps boundaries had 1I0t changed but the 1st Cavalry took its orders from C

I Field Force Vietnam as it did during Operation LEJEUNE. During this time, 

1st Cavalry worked with the 1st Brigade, 101st, under Brigadier General Salve 

("Matt") Matheson. Later, when the Brigade joined its parent division, it wo

be commanded by Colonel John W. ("Rip") Collins. 
ble positions when necessary. The aerial rocket artillery had fir

576 rockets in support of this action and two armed Chinook he

copters had delivered eight tons of ordnance on possible esca

routes. Tactical Air had done a magnificent job of supporting t

ground forces with a total of 42 sorties. What could have been 

disaster turned out to be an effective assault, killing 73 enemy wh

only losing 11 friendly troops. Two major enemy units had be

flushed out of hidden positions and a major antiaircraft positi

had been destroyed. 

The skirmish at landing zone PAT was, .the major encount

with the Viet Cong during the reconnaissance in force of the So

Re Valley. This reconnaissance was a preview in miniature of maj

operations of the 1st Cavalry in subsequent years. We had learn

to establish a fixed-wing base near the assault area and save o

precious helicopter sorties for short-range missions. Song Re Vall

was an excellent rehearsal for what was to come. 

The Chinook as a "Bomber" and "Flying Tank" 

As a commander I could not help but be struck by the neve

ending inventiveness of the U. S. soldier. In my experience t

average soldier in Vietnam was as good as, and, in many wa

better than, his World War II predecessor. He came up with ne

solutions for new problems in a new environment almost dai

One example was the use of the Chinook as an "ad hoc bomber." 

The Viet Cong had developed tremendous underground for

fications and tunnel systems throughout Binh Dinh Provinc

Many of these fortifications could withstand almost any explosio

Riot agents were introduced to drive the enemy from his tunne

and force him into the open. During Operation PERSHING the 

Cavalry dropped a total of 29,600 pounds of these a.gents fro

CH-47 aircraft using a simple locally fabricated fusing system 

a standard drum. Initially the drums were merely rolled out t

back o'f the open door of the Chinook and the fusing system w

armed by a static line which permitted the drum to arm after 

was free of the aircraft. Using this method, a large concentrati

of tear gas could be placed on a suspected area with accuracy. 

Napalm was rigged and dropped in a similar manner duri

this same period. A single CH-47 could drop two and one-h

tons of napalm on an enemy installation. Naturally, this meth
q

Cavalry Division was the so-called "Go-Go Bird." The "Go-G

Bird," as it was called by the Infantry, was a heavily armed Ch

nook which the 1st Cavalry Division was asked to test in comba

Three test models were received armed with twin 20-mm Gat!lin

guns, 40-mm grenade launchers, and .50-caliber machine guns, alon

with other assorted ordnance. Though anything but graceful, it had 

tremendous morale effect on the friendly troops which constant

asked for its support. 

From the infantryman's viewpoint, when the "Go-Go Bir

came, the enemy disappeared. The pilots who flew these test a

craft performed some incredibly heroic deeds to prove the wor

of the machine. However, from the overall viewpoint of the Div

sion, these special machines required an inordinate amount 

support and, if we had kept them as part of our formal organiz

tion, we would have been required to give up three of our essenti

lift Chinooks. Army Concept Team in Vietnam monitored t

tests of the "Go-Go Birds" and flew many of the missions. Aft

two of the test vehicles were lost through attrition, the final arm

Chinook was transferred to the 1st Aviation Brigade. Much deba

would continue about the effectiveness and vulnerability of su

a large armed helicopter, but the individual trooper who enjoy

its support would never forget it. 

Armor in an Airmobile Division? 

To deal more effectively on a continuing basis with the enem

fortifications on the coastal plains of Binh Dinh, the Division h

requested and received one tank company from the 1st Battalio

69th Armor, 4th Division, at Pleiku. On the surface one of t

most unlikely additions to an airmobile division would appear 

be heavy armor. The tank with all its implications of ponderou

ness seems to be the antithesis of what one looks for in a "lean a

mean" light fighting unit. In many circumstances, tl-iis would 

true. But, I had always wanted to explore the possibility of a co

bination of the surprise of air cavalry and the shock of armo

Binh Dinh seemed the appropriate place. 

The 90-mm gun of the M-48 tank was found to be one of t

best weapons in dealing with the enemy fortifications. In 24 to 

hours, a determined enemy could prepare an elaborate perime

affording him excellent cover and concealment around an enti
destroyed to kill him. It was here that the tank came into its ow

In the Bong Son Plain, the 1st Cavalry Division usua

employed one platoon from A Company of the 1st Battalion, 6

Armor with from six to eight tanks in conjunction with an inf

try battalion when they assaulted a fortified village. Because 

employment and maneuver of the tanks were so essential in atta

ing a fortified village, a problem of too much communicati

sometimes developed. Everybody from the infantry platoon lea

and company commander on the ground to the battalion co

mander and his S-3 in the air were directing and maneuvering 

tanks. To sort out this problem, it soon became standard proced

to put the tank commander or his executive officer in a light obs

vation helicopter to control the attached tanks for the infan

battalion commander. This method worked best. 

The tank usually carried a basic load of 62 rounds of 90-m

shells and 2,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition and very oft

in the course of a four or five hour battle, a tank would use 

much as three basic loads. To prohibit a tank running out 

ammunition during a crucial time of an engagement, the 

Cavalry developed a system whereby a basic load of tank ammu

tion was pre-slung for helicopter delivery and stored at the clo

fire base to the scene of the action. Upon initial contact, an imm

diate resupply of ammunition was initiated. This same air tra

port capability was used to maintain the tanks by rapidly mov

mechanics and repair parts to disabled vehicles. 

The most critical limiting factor in the use of tanks in Vietn

was the trafficability of the soil. In the Bong Son area during 

dry season and the latter stages of the rice-growing cycle, the M

tank could move across the rice paddies with a certain amount 

ease. When the rice paddies were flooded, movement was grea

restricted and had to be carefully planned in conjunction with 

engineers. Bulldozers and engineer mine-sweeping teams had to 

attached to the moving tank elements to keep open movem

options for the armor. 

In September 1967, the I st Cavalry Division received anot

armor capability when the 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infan

was attached. The battalion was completely ground mobile in 

organic armored personnel carriers. 

When I received the 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infan

I decided not to treat this battalion as an orphan child to be h
with a fourth rifle company from headquarters and supply u

and placed their armored personnel carriers at a central posi

near landing zone UPLIFT. The companies would go out on 

mobile operations just as other companies of the Division an

a mission appeared that needed a mechanized unit, we extrac

the troops to landing zone UPLIFT and deployed them in their 

mary role. The 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infantry prove

be a very valuable asset and, when we had lost our attached tank

their parent organization, we often employed the Armored Per

nel Carriers with their .50 caliber guns in tank-like formations

using the mechanized battalion in this manner, we felt we enjo

the best of both worlds. We had the additional troops which w

completely trained in air assault tactics and we had the mechan

capability when the terrain and situation demanded. 

The "Cobra" Arrives 

On 1 September 1967, the first Huey Cobra (AH-IG) arri

in Vietnam. The initial six aircraft were assigned to their N

Equipment Training Team, under the supervision of the 1st A

tion Brigade. Cobra New Equipment Training Team train

started on 18 September with pilot transition courses and inst

tion on air frame, engine, armament and avionics maintena

The Cobra was a major step forward in the development of 

armed helicopter. For those pilots who had been flying the 

make-shift UH-IC's, it was a giant step. 

After all this time there were many people, both in and ou

the military, who didn't understand the role of the armed heli

ter. Ever since Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool had tied a machine 

on a H-13 in the mid-50's, there were those who saw the arm

helicopter as a fragile toy dreamed up by frustrated fighter pi

in the Army who were unable by regulation and budget to 

really sophisticated attack aircraft. The consensus was gener

that a semi-skilled skeet shooter or even a good slingshot a

could knock any helicopter out of the sky at short range and 

an encounter with more sophisticated antiaircraft weapons wo

be suicidal. This attitude is quite understandable in duck hun

who never had the challenge of ducks shooting back. Also, the 

nature of the helicopter, which looks very ugly and fragile c
HUEY COBRA FIRING IN SUPPORT OF A COMBAT ASSAULT 

pared to a sleek jet aircraft, adds to the conviction that flying on

in combat is non-habit forming. 

On the plus side, the helicopter is the most agile of all aircra

and has a capability of taking advantage of tover and concealmen

at extremely low altitudes that would be impossible in a fixed-win

airplane. It was soon proven that the helicopter was remarkabl

hard to sh()ot down and the most vulnerable part was the pilo

himself. Personnel armor protection and armored seats greatl

increased the pilot survivability. The experienced pilot used ever

unique aspect of the helicopter's flight envelope to his advantage

Observation from the helicopter is unequaled. The enem

learned that to fire at one was to give up his advantage of cove

and concealment and generally bring a devastating return o

machine gun fire and rockets. A corollary to the advantage o

seeing the enemy was the ability to identify our own troops wit

precision. Consequently, the armed helicopter pilot could safel

place fires within a few meters of our own troops. This becam

particularly important as the enemy developed the "hugging" tac
nation was a make-shift, albeit, quite ingenious, system that shou

be replaced by a new aircraft specifically designed for the arme

mission. In the early 1960's, industry asserted that advance w

within the state of the art. Experts in research and developme

urged the Army planners to go for a compound helicopter wi

an integrated armament system as soon as possible. They argue

that it was technically feasible and procurement of any "interim

system would mean the Army would be stuck with an inferi

capability for years to come. Moreover, it appeared that an a

vanced system could be procured almost as soon as an interi

aircraft. 

There were other pressures too. The Office of the Secretary 

Defense had been critical of all the Services in their efforts to pr

cure expensive weapon systems that appeared to offer only margin

improvements over the system they were to replace-aircraft th

flew a little higher or faster, tanks that had only slightly better pe

formance, ships that cruised but a few knots faster. Ever since th

Howze Board, the Army was sensitive to any criticism that it w

striving for less than the best in airmobility. Also, the Air For

maintained that much of Army aviation duplicated an Air For

capability rather than, as the Army claimed, complemented A

Force support. The Army decided that its best option was to ho

a design competition for a totally new system that would offer uniqu

capabilities. 

Unfortunately, what was a straight forward concept for a ne

armed helicopter soon became bogged down in a morass of perm

tations, modifications and additions to its design. The technicians ha

taken over from the tacticians. The concept grew in complexity an

cost. Worse, it was being pushed into a later time frame when 

was sorely needed in combat. Such things as a rigid rotor, groun

avoidance radar, inertial navigation and computerization were strainin

the state of the art and pricing the Army out of mass productio

A reevaluation was inevitable. 

Bell Helicopter Company had prudently carried on its own r

search and development program using proven dynamic comp

nents of the Huey. Consequently, they were able to offer, at th

appropriate moment, an "off-the-shelf" armed helicopter for ju

slightly more than the modified UH-I that the Army was the

buying to replace Vietnam attrition. The "Cobra" had enoug

speed to meet the escort mission; tandem seating; better armo
ultimate system. 

DECCA 

The history of the use, lack-of-use, and misuse of DEC

has many important lessons for future developers of airmob

equipment. 

It was recognized by the earliest planners that one of the lim

tions of the airmobility concept would be operating at night 

under periods of extreme low visibility. Research and Developm

offered many possible options to improve the helicopter's capa

ity under these conditions, but all were expensive and complex

The British had perfected a low-level radio navigational 

known as DECCA which essentially used three low frequency grou

radio stations to propagate a series of hyperbolic curves wh

could be translated by a cockpit instrument into a position 

Accuracy depended on the spread of the stations, the distance fr

the station, and the weather conditions. Because of the 

frequency, one of the attractive features was its low altitude ca

bility. This contrasted to the line-of-sight limitation of omnidir

tional radio navigation aid and Tactical Air Navigation used 

the Air Force. The Army tested several versions of the DECCA 

tem and decided it had enough advantages to warrant its insta

tion on command helicopters and lead aircraft. 

A DECCA chain had been installed in Vietnam and in the ea

1960's, the Army took over its supervision and maintenance. A 

disadvantage in the DECCA system was the requirement for spe

maps printed with the hyperbolic grid and a reluctance by 

user to take the time and effort to develop confidence in the 

tem. Its. use was further complicated by the resistance of the 

Force to accept a position report in instrument weather from 

DECCA read-out as a positive fix. Many senior officers were dissa

fied with the accuracy and reliability of the DECCA system at ni

and eventually the DECCA died from lack of use and misuse. T

requirement for a secure, accurate means of low-level navigat

remained. 

"Fire Brigades" Sent North 

On 28 September the 1st Cavalry Division was notified that 

increasing enemy buildup in the I Corps Tactical Zone mi

require that the III Marine Amphibious Force be reinforced. T
the 3d Brigade command post, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, B 

Company of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry and C Battery of the 1st 

Battalion, 77th Artillery were closed and the Brigade was under 

operational control of the Americal Division. 

By 3 October all Brigade elements were in place and Operation 

WALLOWA began the next day with a series of air assaults. This 

deployment also involved the first major move of significant maintenance elements from An Khe to Chu Lai. This experience would 

prove to be extremely valuable in later operations in the I Corps 

Tactical Zone. 

The concept of a brigade task force, in the U. S. Army's current division organization, is such that different battalions can be 

used under any brigade controlling headquarters. This allows a 

great deal of flexibility. For example, the 3d Brigade which had 

been deployed to the Dak To area and returned to the PERSHING 

area of operations had different battalions when it deployed to 

Chu Lai. During November we 'were alerted to move another brigade back to the Kontum-Dak To area. This time I elected that 

the 1st Brigade headquarters under Colonel Rattan would control 

the task force. 

The second battle of Dak To, under operational control of the 

4th Division, has been extensively documented elsewhere. For the 

purpose of this study, it is important to note that the helicopters 

of the 4th Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 52d 

Aviation Battalion, and the 1st Cavalry Division flew in excess of 

10,000 hours in support of the battle. Over 22,000 sorties were 

flown, transporting 40,000 passengers and 6,000 tons of cargo. Dak 

[0 was another example of the flexibility of an airmobile division 

which allows its assets to be parcelled out as rapid reaction forces 

and still continues on a basic mission of its own. The large 

PERSHING area of operation was left with only one thin brigade 

during this period. I was glad we had spent so much time working 

with the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division on air

mobile tactics, since the 22d, under the able leadership of Colone

Nguyen Van Hieu, would have to bear the major burden in Binh 

Dinh Province for a time. 

Operation Pershing Continues 

During the long period of the Binh Dinh operations, the 1s

Cavalry Division had developed a special rapport with the regiment
teamed with 1st Cavalry helicopters, they became well versed 

the intricacies of airmobile assaults. During Operation PERSH

over 209 joint operations were conducted with the 22d Army 

the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division. The 40th Regim

of this division played a major part in the Battle of Tam Quan

Back in May 1967, the Division's capabilities had been gre

enhanced by the attachment of three companies from the 81

National Police Field Force. Introduction of the National Po

Field Force into the PERSHING area of operations brought a n

weapon to bear on the Viet Cong infrastructure. Now, the Divis

could conduct cordon and search operations of hamlets and villa

with greatly increased effectiveness. The National Police F

Force squads were very important to 1st Cavalry operations in 

Binh Dinh Province. 

Tam Quan 

The Battle .of Tam Quan, 6 December to 20 December 19

which was one of the largest battles during Operation PERSHI

was a good example of the "piling on" tactics which had been 

successful in the early airmobile reactions to the enemy. The ba

began with the fortuitous discovery of an enemy radio antenna 

a scout team near the town of Tam Quan and a small force 

inserted at 1630 hours on 6 December. Although the origi

enemy contact had been late in the day, the 1st Brigade reacted 

"piling on" with a battalion of infantry and elements of the 

Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infantry. On the following day, 

ments of the 40th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regim

joined the fight and distinguished themselves by their aggress

manner. Throughout the battle, which was characterized by m

sive use of artillery, tactical air support, and air assaults by b

the U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops, the all

force held the initiative. There were frequent vicious hand-to-h

battles in the trenches and bunkers. The division used its mec

nized forces to fix the enemy and drive him from his fortif

positions. The airmobile units hit him when he tried to mo

The enemy lost 650 men during this fierce engagement. 

The Battle of Tam Quan had a much greater significance t

we realized at the time. In that area, it pre-empted the enem

Tel offensive even though the full impact wasn't then realized. 
AWAITING THE SECOND WAVE OF COMBAT HELICOPTERS ON AN ISOLATE

LANDING ZONE DURING OPERATION PERSHING 

a result, that part of Binh Dinh was the least effected of any pa

of South Vietnam during Tet. 

1967 Draws to a Close 

During the late fall of 1967, plans had been developed whic

would have a tremendous effect on the future of the 1st Caval

operations during the next year. U. S. Army, Vietnam, Headqua

ters, for the first time in the war, had been given the mission 

contingency planning. They began planning four contingenci

which would project the 1st Cavalry Division into the I Corp

Tactical Zone. I-the Cavalry would go north of Kontum an

Pleiku ... way north of Dak To; II-the Cavalry would go u

near Khe Sanh; III-to Ashau; and IV -the Cavalry would go in

the big supply area west of Quang Ngai. The plans themselve

known as the YORK Series, are incidental but, like many conti

gency plans, they made the U. S. forces examine potential logistic

bases, without which the plans were meaningless. The Marin
were soon to prove that the logic behind this planning effort 

U. S. Army, Vietnam, was indisputably sound. 

The year 1967 had proved many important facets of the a

mobile concept. Perhaps the most important facet that had be

demonstrated without question was the inestimable value of 

Air Cavalry squadron. This unit, especially in its operations 

the I Corps Tactical Zone, had demonstrated its unique capab

ties in uncovering the elusive Viet Congo Practically every ma

engagement was started with a contact by the 1st Squadron, 9

Cavalry Troop, and the enemy was very slow in discovering me

of coping with this reconnaissance in force. 

The Air Cavalry squadron success in the airmobile divis

convinced higher headquarters that more Air Cavalry squadro

should be assigned to the theater to work with non-airmobile di

sions. In my briefings to the many senior officers who visited 

Cavalry Division, I never missed an opportunity to state that 

matter what kind of a division I might be privileged to comma

in combat, I would fight tooth and nail for the capability of 

Air Cavalry squadron. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Tet) 1968 

Summary of OPeration Pershing 

Operation PERSHING was officially ' terminated on 21 Januar

1968, after almost a full year of fighting in, over and around Bin

Dinh Province. To most of us PERSHING had come to mean an are

of operation rather than a single campaign. During this time th

1st Cavalry Division had been continually fighting at least tw

different battles, often more. 

The primary battle was the tedious task of routing out th

Viet Cong infrastructure-that very real shadow government tha

had been strong in this area even during the French occupation

Working with the National Police Field Force, the 1st Cavalr

participated in over 970 combined operations which had resulte

in the identification and removal of over 1,600 members of th

Viet Cong political and administrative structure. About 200 Vie

Cong were identified as key leaders. Under the Cavalry umbrella

the National Police Field Force searched more than 340,000 ind

viduals and 4,300 dwellings. At the close of PERSHING we felt tha

50 percent of the Viet Cong cadre had been rendered ineffective

The pessimist would have to conclude that this left half of th

infrastructure intact, but the fact remained that the Governmen

of Vietnam had held an election in this troubled province, wherei

96.9 percent of the people eligible to vote, voted. This compare

with a nation-wide average of 80.9 percent. 

The second continuous battle in Binh Dinh was the regula

North Vietnamese Army 3rd Division units. The enemy lost 5,71

soldiers killed in action and 2,323 enemy were captured. Somehow 

this latter figure seemed to get lost in the statistics, but I alway

thought it was very important and was a key indicator of the typ

of operations being fought in this area. 

I was often asked if I thought the 1st Cavalry was "wasted o

stagnating" in Binh Dinh. In answer, I'd merely show the question

ing visitor a map depicting the air assaults of the last month an

it immediately became evident that only an airmobile unit coul
airmobile viewpoint, as it would ever be. 

Statistics on relative vulnerability show that out of 1,147 sor

one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot do

per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and 

per 21,194 sorties. Used properly the helicopter was not the fra

target some doom-forecasters had predicted. 

While the two major batties of Operation PERSHING were c

tinuing, the 1st Cavalry Division was the source of "fire brigad

for many other operations in the western and northern provin

of Vietnam. Some of these have been mentioned earlier. On 4 M

1967, the division boundary had actually been 'moved further no

to include a portion of the Nui Sang Mountain and the Nuoc D

Valley in I Corps Tactical Zone. Elements of the division 

conducted operations in that general area, particularly the An 

Valley, throughout the remainder of Operation PERSHING. 

The words of my third Chief of Staff, Colonel Conrad L. St

berry, in summing up the after action report of Operation PERSH

bear repeating: 

Operation PERSHING was the largest single operation and the m

successful in, which the 1st Air Cavalry Division has participated s

its arrival in Vietnam in August 1965. While it is difficult to mea

fully the degree of success achieved in the many facets of the wa

Binh Dinh Province, significant damage was inflicted on the enem

loss of lives and combat assets. In addition, many gaps in the VC in

structure were crea ted over a period of time which made operation

the coastal plains area more difficult for him to execute. The l

population was made aware of the Free World presence and the ab

to continuously defeat and harass the enemy. 

There are several reasons why the Division was able to accomp

this. Part of the answer lies in the ability to hop, skip, and jump o

the entire AO in short notice; part lies in the close relationship 

tween the 1st Cav Div and the 22d ARVN Div, CRID and other m

tary and paramilitary forces operating in the area; part lies in the 

that the Division operated for a long period of time in the AO 

became thoroughly familiar with the terrain and general atmosph

of the area; and part lies in the exploitation of the NPFF in separa

the VC infrastructure from the people. 

The Air Cavalrv Division also has hidden attributes which are 

apparent from organization charts, methods of operation, etc., 

contributed significantly to the succe~ of Operation PERSHING. 

quent air assaults over the battlefield maintains the "spirit of the of

sive" in 1st Cav soldiers and causes them to live with the high de

of flexibility that promotes a "can do" attitude. In addition, the 
fresh and lightly equipped and well supplied contributes significantl

to an attitude of willingness to close with and destroy the enemy. 

The 1st Air Cavalry Division enjoyed exceptionally high moral

during Operation PERSHI NG, a key factor in successful combat opera

tions. The use of organic helicopters permitted the airmobile soldie

to be abundantly supplied with everything he fired in his weapon

drank, ate, and read: even in relatively inaccessible areas on the battle

field. He lived comfortably in the field and traveled and fough

equipped with only his weapon, ammunition, and water with othe

essentials being air-lifted to him when he needed them. The possibilit

of being wounded did not discourage him because any helicopter o

the battlefield whether it be a CC ship, gunship, etc., could and fre

quently was used for medevac. In addition, the increased firepower, an

visible teamwork between organic Air Cav and ground elements neve

let the soldier feel as if he were alone on the battlefield. A combinatio

of all these factors encouraged a basically tough and well traine

soldier to be habitually willing and eager to close with the enemy i

order to enjoy the inevitable satisfaction of defeating him. 

While the performance of the individual soldier is a key factor i

success in combat, a closely related factor is the close teamwork an

unity of effort of all elements of the 1 st Cav Div. Aviation, maneuve

and fire support elements functioned in close harmony and "went th

extra mile" in individual effort to achieve success. The performance o

all personnel in the division was without exception highly admirabl

causing the Air Cavalry concept to achieve results beyond expectation

in application. 

Most of the 1st Cavalry would soon leave Binh Dinh Provinc

to counter an enemy threat to the far north. Operation PERSHIN

had not b¥ any means wiped out the Viet Cong infrastructure bu

its success can be summed up in words of an enemy prisoner o

war. This man, the Chief of Staff of a sapper battalion, stated

"I do not know whether you have known or not but I can sa

that during the period from September 1967 to January 1968 th

liberating forces were driven near to the abyss. especially in th

areas of Khanh Hoa, Phu Yen and Sinh Dinh, where ARVN an

allied forces enlarged their areas of activities to an extent that th

VC had never thought of." 

The Enemy Tet Offensive 

The time was 0315,31 January. The tower operator at Tan So

Nhut heliport, Mr. Richard O. Stark, had just received a call from 

an aircraft requesting to know if the field was secure. He replie
not duly alarmed. Minutes later, when a C-47 departed from 

Son Nhut and drew heavy ground fire, 1 realized that this was 

nervous guards, but actual enemy contact." Tan Son Nhut 

Base was under attack! 

This attack was one of many similar attacks which w

launched against military installations and population cen

throughout the Republic of Vietnam. These attacks marked 

all-out Communist offensive that continued throughout the 

holidays. 

Within three minutes after the alert at Tan Son Nhut, 

"Razorback" fire teams consisting of four armed helicopters f

the 120th Assault Helicopter Company were airborne and att

ing the enemy. Major Ronald K. Kollhoff, commander of the 

Gunship Platoon from this company, said, "The extent of 

enemy buildup was surprising. When it first started we expe

a small token diversionary force-a suicide squad-to divert at

tion from an expected mortar attack. But after a while it bec

evident that the VC wanted to actually take Tan Son Nhut 

badly." 

Major General Robert R. Williams, Commanding General

Aviation Brigade, and his house quest, Colonel E. Pearce Flem

Jr., were sleeping in the Long Binh BOQ when the alert soun

there. Within minutes they were in a command Huey chec

into the 12th Combat Aviation Group control net. There w

ground attacks taking place in several areas of the Long Binh-B

Hoa perimeter and a number of gunships were already airborne 

were being directed to targets. Colonel Fleming reported, " I 

impressed with the professionalism of all hands that 1 obse

and heard during this period of the Tel offensive. The calm

and the voices of the men on the radio made you think they w

merely calling for landing instructions at a peaceful U.S. airf

and yet they were continuously in action for hours on end. W

the sun finally came up on the morning of 31 January, 1 was 

prised to find that the VC were continuing to stay and fight." 1 

1 General Williams, the Army's first Master Aviator, 'had taken command o

1st Aviation Brigade from General Seneff on 16 September 1967. Colonel Fle

was on temporary duty in Vietnam from his position as Deputy Director of 

Aviation. 
Communist soldiers armed with weapons ranging up to machine-gu

and bazooka size. Some came openly into the open city, weapons con

cealed in luggage or under baskets of food, riding buses, taxis and moto

scooters, or walking. Others came furtively: some of the Viet Cong wh

attacked the U. S. embassy had ridden into town concealed in a truck

load of flowers. Once in town, they hid their weapons. Only after th

attack did Vietnamese intelligence realize that the unusual number o

funerals the previous week was no accident: the Viet Cong had burie

their weapons in the funeral coffins, dug them up on the night of th

assault. They even test-fired their guns during the peak of the Te

celebrations, the sound of shots mingling with that of the firecracker

going off .... An enemy force of at least 700 men tackled the city

most vital military target: Tan Son Nhut airstrip and its adjoinin

MACV compound housing Westmoreland's headquarters and the 7t

Air Force Command Center, the nerve centers of U. S. command i

the war. The Communists breached the immediate base perimete

slipping past some 150 outposts without a shot being fired, and go

within 1,000 feet of the runways before they were halted in eight hour

of bloody hand-to-hand combat. All told, the Communists attacke

from 18 different points around Tan Son Nhut, getting close enoug

to MACV to put bullets through Westy's windows. Westmoreland

staff officers were issued weapons and sent out to help sandbag th

compound, and Westmoreland moved into his windowless comman

room in the center of MACV's first floor. Other Communist units race

through the city shooting at U. S. officers' and enlisted men's bille

(BOQ's and BEQ's), Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's home, Westmore

land's home, the radio and TV stations. Wearing ARVN clothes, raider

seized part of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff Headquarters, turne

the defenders' machine guns against helicopters diving in to dislodg

them. 

There is no doubt that the quick reaction of the armed hel

copters saved Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa from serious danger o

being overrun. In the first few hours they were the only airborn

firepower since the Air Force aircraft could not get clearance t

even take off. An Air Force sergeant describing the action on 

tape recorder at Tan Son Nhut kept repeating over and over, "Oh

those beautiful Huey gunships!" One of the men in those gun

ships, Captain Chad C. Payne, a fire team leader, said, "I receive

fire everywhere I turned. My ships received seven hits, but thi

was nothing considering the amount of ground fire directed towar

us. There were hundreds of VC bodies everywhere in the vicinit

of the Tan Son Nhut perimeter. I've never seen anything like it

Another tribute to the effectiveness of the gunships came from 

a member of Advisory Team 100 at Tan Son Nhut. When h

received word that Tan Son Nhut was under attack, he assemble
ships came in and' started circling the area. I threw up a po

flare to mark the position, and the gunship radioed that we w

too close to the enemy force and to pull back some, if possible. 

pulled back and then he went in. He was right on target, pla

rockets right in the middle of Charlie's position. We killed 

200 enemy, and I'd estimate that 80-85 percent was attributabl

the helicopters. The morning of the 31 st, if I had met that p

I'd have kissed him." 

Another area of heavy activity was at the U. S. Embassy 

downtown Saigon. Chief Warrant Officer Richard Inskeep of 

19lst Assault Helicopter Company was the first to land a chop

on the embassy during the heavy fight, bringing ammunition 

evacuating ol1e wounded man. "We were receiving fire from 

sides," said Mr. Inskeep. "but we couldn't see anybody aroun

we lifted off. My gunner then spotted someone in a hole of 

roof, so we made a tight turn and came back onto the pad. 

fire was so intense that the gunner and crew chief had to pull 

ammunition out of the ship and crawl across the roof as t

pushed it in front of them. They pushed the ammunition down 

hole and helped bring the wounded man back across the roo

the ship." 

Watching from below was Mr. George Jacobson, Mission C

dinator of the U. S. Embassy. Commenting on the helicop

approach, Mr. Jacobson said, "He came in low and I thought 

a minute he was going to hit the building, but at the last min

he pulled up and made a beautiful landing on the roof. Afterw

I realized that he did it on purpose to avoid the enemy fire. It 

a tremendous piece of airmanship." Mr. Jacobson, a retired A

colonel, was to finish off the last guerrilla inside the embassy

troopers of the lOlst were landed on the Embassy's helipad, 

enemy guerrilla tried to escape the troopers, spotted Mr. Jacob

and fired three shots. He missed and Jacobson shot him with a 

that had quickly been tossed up to his second floor window 

troops below. This was the finale to the six and one-half h

battle within the embassy. 

As daylight came over the Bien Hoa Air Base, fighting was 

raging around the airfield. Small bands of Viet Cong had mana

to penetrate the southeast and southwest areas of the air base, 

reaction forces were sent out to stop them. The Air Force's 

Security Squadron found an estimated 100 Viet Cong to be in 
Armed Helicopter Company to suppress the guerrillas. Air Force 

Second Lieutenant John A. Novak, who was in command of the 

security force, said, "As the Cobras came to our support they swept 

down about two feet over our heads and fired into the enemy position, knocking out the enemy who were pinning us down. I personally witnessed time after time the Cobras sweep into the VC 

area and pin down the enemy in the face of heavy fire being 

directed at them. The Cobras were the turning point in the 

enemy's destruction." 

General Williams and Colonel Fleming had made a complete 

circuit of the III Corps Tactical Zone to determine first hand information on the situation at the various airfields. Colonel Fleming 

relates: 

In every case we found that everyone had been busy since midnight 

the night before, both on the ground repelling attacks against their 

perimeter, and mounting out their gunships, firefly missions, command 

and control ships, and in many cases conducting air assault operations

About mid-morning we landed at Bien Hoa and visited the 334th 

Gun Company and the Cobra NET Team. These guys had had everybody in action since early that morning and perhaps the most spectac

ular sight was a crippled Cobra approaching from the Saigon area and 

making a running landing between the revetments at the Bien Hoa 

heliport. 

He had lost his tail rotor drive shaft, had two rounds in the fuel 

cells, and had a full panel of warning lights, yet he brought it home 

and stepped out and said, "Put this one aside and give me another one

There are more targets down there." 

The Communists had hit in a hundred places from near the 

Demilitarized Zone in the north all the way to the tiny island o

Phu Quoc off the Delta coast some 500 miles to the south. No 

target was too big or too impossible. In peasant pajamas or openly 

insigniaed North Vietnamese Army uniforms, the raiders struck 

at nearly 40 major cities and towns. They attacked 28 of South 

Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals. 

The Tel Offensive at Quang T7"i 

At 0420 on 31 January, the 8l2th North Vietnamese Army Regi

ment and supporting elements launched a concerted attack on the 

provincial capital of Quang Tri, a key communications hub in the 

I Corps Tactical Zone. The enemy's timing had been late for 
the attack fell upon the defending Army of the Republic of V

nam forces in and around the city, the 1st Army of the Republ

Vietnam Regiment with two battalions oriented north and no

west of the city. The 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airb

Battalion was located in the suburb of Tri Buu to the east. 

battalion became the first troop decisively engaged. Pressure 

very heavy on the defending Army of the Republic of Viet

force and they were gradually forced to fall back into the 

contesting every foot of the ground as they withdrew. By noo

the 31st, the outcome of the battle remained very much in do

Shortly after noon on the 31st, the provincial advisor, 

Robert Brewer, held a conference with Colonel Rattan, comma

of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and the U. S. adviso

the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment. Mr. Br

stated that the situation in the city was desperate and that 

enemy had infiltrated at least a battalion inside the thin Arm

the Republic of Vietnam lines. It appeared the enemy was 

forcing from the east and had established fire support position

the eastern and southern fringes of the city. Recognizing the 

for immediate action, Colonel Rattan, after a hasty call to div

headquarters for authority, agreed to reorient his brigade 

attack to the east of the city. 

The Move North 

I had agreed with Colonel Rattan's assessment. of the situa

at Quang Tri and I trusted his judgment implicitly. His bri

had arrived in the Quang Tri area on 25 January having m

up from Hue-Phu Bai after initially deploying from Bong So

17 January. This move was part of the plan to orient the e

1st Cavalry Division in the I Corps area. Our initial orienta

toward the I Corps· area had started with the YORK series of p

which gave us a good head start on base areas at Red Beach 

Hue-Phu Bai. The 3d Brigade had been in the I Corps Tac

Zone for some time under the operational control of the Ame

Division taking part in Operation WALLAWA between Chu Lai 

Da Nang. The 2d Brigade .of the 1st Cavalry had remained in 

PERSHING area of operations and we were given the newly arr

2d Brigade of the lOlst Airborne Division, under Colonel Joh

Cushman. 
time establishing our maintenance and supply bases. 

I had already worked out most of the details of moving the 

Division with Colonel Putnam, my very capable Chief of Staff, in 

case the order to move was received during my absence. Colone

Stansberry was then head of the Support Command. Between the 

two of them, they cut through the red tape of inter-service bureauc

racy and solved the hour-by-hour problems that arose in moving 

the division north. 

Colonel Putnam had been practicing moving the division com

mand post long before we got the actual alert order to move. Back 

in Binh Dinh Province, he had held an actual practice move in 

which the division command post at landing zone Two BITS wa

moved to An Khe, operated out of An Khe for twenty-four hours

and then transferred back to Two BITS. At that time the heart o

the forward command post was contained in two pods carried by 

the CH-54 Crane. One pod had a G-2, G-3 Operations Cente

and the other pod contained the Fire Support Coordination Cen

ter and other control elements. The forward command post had 

a complete communications system to pick up operational contro

of the division as soon as it was in place. Incidentally, these pod

which looked very efficient on the surface were really a headach

to emplace in Vietnam and terribly immobile once emplaced

After we moved north, we discontinued their use as impractical. 

The move north was not without problems. Some of the Marin

staff officers were very reluctant to accept Colonel Putnam's esti

mate on the space required for the division headquarters. Through 

an old War College friendship with Brigadier General Earl E

Anderson, the Chief of Staff of III Marine Amphibious Force, h

was able to get in to see Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman

Jr., Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, and 

secure Landing Zone TOMBSTONE, which later became Camp Eagle

Colonel Putnam reported that there was only one bright spot in 

his entire battle with the staff. The Navy captain who commande

the Seabees came up and said, "Tell me WHAT you want don

and in what ORDER you want it done." This was just the firs

example of the magnificent support we received from the Seabees

When Colonel Rattan called me his brigade was actually ori

ented south and west of Quang Tri, with one fire base as far awa

as 20 kilometers to the west of the city. At that time, he did no

have the mission of protecting the city itself. The decision t
The Battle of Quang Tri City 

Colonel Rattan had consulted with Mr. Brewer on the m

probable location of enemy infiltration routes and then sele

landing zones adjacent to them. These assault areas were sele

for the purpose of reducing the enemy's reinforcement capab

by blocking his avenues of approach and to eliminate his fire 

port capability by landing on his support areas. At approxima

1345 hours, the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry and the 1st Battal

5th Cavalry were directed to launch their air assaults as soo

possible with priority of lift assigned to the 1st Battalion, 

Cavalry. Additional aircraft were requested from division resour

and the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry and aerial rocket artillery w

alerted. 

By 1555, B Company of the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry 

assaulted into a landing zone east of Quang Tri and a few min

later was followed by C Company. Even while they were land

C Company received intense fire from an estimated enemy c

pany. This contact lasted until 1900 at which time the en

broke contact leaving 29 bodies. The 1st Battalion, 12th Cav

air assaults had straddled the heavy weapons support of one of 

enemy battalions. As a consequence, this battalion found i

heavily engaged on the eastern edge of Quang Tri by the Arm

the Republic of Vietnam and in its rear among its support 

ments by the Air Cavalry troops. Caught between the two fo

it was quickly rendered ineffective. Shortly after the 1st Battal

12th Cavalry had launched its attack, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cav

assaulted southeast of Quang Tri with two companies. They 

landed directly on enemy positions and immediately came in h

contact with the K-6 Battalion of tile 812th North Vietnam

Army Regiment. Like its sister battalion, the K-6 found i

wedged between Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces and 

1st Cavalry and it sustained a terrific pounding from aerial ro

artillery and the air assaults. 

As darkness fell, it became evident that the battered enemy 

attempting to break contact and withdraw. Its forces rapidly br

down into small groups with some individual soldiers even attem

ing to get away among the crowds of fleeing refugees. Cont

were made throughout the night with many small enemy gro

trying to get out of the city. The enemy had suffered a terr
Division. Although well equipped, the North Vietnamese Army 

troops appeared to be inexperienced and were obviously completely 

unfamiliar with the airmobile tactics of the 1st Cavalry. The aerial 

rocket artillery 'and the helicopter gunships experienced unusual 

success against the enemy troops. Many of them attempted to play 

dead as the helicopters approached, seldom attempting to return 

fire. 

By noon on 1 February, Quang Tri City had been cleared of 

the enemy and the 1st Brigade immediately initiated pursuit. 

A Company of the 1st Battalion, 502d Airborne made a heavy contact just south of Quang Tri killing 76 of the enemy with the help 

of aerial rocket artillery. Other units of the 1 st Brigade made 

nu~erous smaller contacts throughout the day as the brigade elements moved out in ever-increasing concentric circles around the 

city. 

In this abortiye attack, the enemy lost 914 soldiers killed in 

action and 86 captured. The city of Quang Tri was without a 

doubt one of the major objectives of the Tet offensive. Its successful defense was one of the highlights of this period. The enemy's 

offensive time table in the I Corps Tactical Zone had been completely disrupted and a major communications hub remained in 

allied hands. The successful defense of Quang Tri resulted from 

the tenacious defense of the city itself by Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam forces; the accurate assessment of the tactical situation by 

Colonel Rattan and Mr. Brewer, the senior province advisor; and 

the ability of the 1st Cavalry Division to immediately react to this 

assessment by a complete change of orientation of its units and 

launching a series of air assaults on top of the enemy's supporting 

positions that very afternoon. 

The 1st Cavalry at Hue 

Volumes have been written about the battle for Hue and the 

house-to-house fighting that went on until almost the end of February. My Cavalry squadron, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, had been 

very actively engaged in the outskirts of Hue and the division was 

given the mission to interdict the routes of egress and destroy the 

enemy units west of the city. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry began 

to seal off the city from the west and the north with its right flank 

on the Perfume River on 2 February. The weather was miserable 
g

that any previous doubts that he had had about the ability of t

helicopter to fly · in marginal weather were removed. 

The 1st Cavalry was spread particularly thin at this time. T

1st Brigade with four battalions was completely occupied at Qua

Tri. The base at Camp Evans with approximately 200 helicopte

had to be secured and the main land supply line from Dong H

down to Camp Evans needed to be reinforced. 

The logisticians had more than their share of problems duri

the Battle of Hue. The road from Hue-Phu Bai to Da Nang w

cut and we actually backtracked some supplies from the north 

Cua Viet. The Air Force did a tremendous job in flying parachu

resupply missions to Camp Evans. At times they were droppi

supplies with the ceiling around 300 feet using our pathfinders a

Ground Control Approach radar. It was eerie to see the parachut

come floating out of the clouds minutes after the C-130's h

passed. During this same period, our flying cranes and Chinoo

flew out to sea and landed on the AKA's, picked up supplies, a

flew them back to Camp Evans. To the best of my knowledge, th

was the first example of .ship-to-shore resupply in combat. 

Two Cavalry battalions were initially committed to the missi

at Hue and eventually four battalions were involved in some 

the most furious combat that had taken place in Vietnam since t

beginning of the war. Air strikes were very difficult to call 

because of the bad weather and low ceilings. Most of our helicop

operations were at an altitude of about 25 feet. The Cavalry h

cut off one of the enemy's main supply lines and had taken 

heavily fortified tactical headquarters at La Chu on the outski

of the city of Hue. Our Naval gunfire support during the bat

of Hue could only be described as superb. For example, o

cruiser set a record for the number of shells fired in one day 

support of ground operations. 

I had sent one of my assistant division commanders, Brigad

General Oscar E. Davis, into the city of Hue to be my person

representative at the headquarters of Brigadier General Ngo Qua

Truong, Commanding General of the 1st Army of the Repub

of Vietnam Division. General Truong had forecast that "when t

Cav reaches the walls of Hue, the battle would be over." He w

right. Later, interrogation of prisoners indicated that three enem

regiments had begun moving from around Khe Sanh into the ar
y py p

Summary of Tel 

The Tel offensive had hurt the enemy severely. The North 

Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong had lost some 32,000 men kille

and 5,800 detained from the period between 29 January and 

11 F~bruary 1968. They had lost over 7,000 individual weapon

and almost 1,300 crew-served weapons. 

The communists had paid another kind of price. By choosin

Tel for their attack, they had alienated a major portion of th

population who considered that a sacred time of the year. They 

had also brought the battle into the very midst of the heavily popu

lated areas causing many civilian casualties who were caught in th

cross fire. Most importantly, they had totally misjudged the moo

of the South Vietnamese. Believing in their own propaganda, th

Viet Cong had called for and expected a popular uprising to wel

come the Communists as liberators. Nothing approaching tha

myth occurred anywhere in Vietnam. The Government of Vietnam 

did not collapse under the Tel offensive. On the contrary, i

rallied in the face of the threat with a unity and purpose greate

than that which had ever been displayed up to that time. 
CHAPTER IX 

Major Operations, 1968 

Khe Sanh 

Weeks before the Tel offensive, the eyes of the world had b

focused on Khe Sanh as all signs pointed to a major enemy at

on this Marine outpost. 

Located some fifteen miles south of the Demilitarized Zone 

barely seven miles from the eastern frontier of Laos, the Khe S

base functioned primarily as a support facility for surveilla

units watching the demilitarized zone and probing the outer rea

of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in nearby Laos. Khe Sanh was alm

completely surrounded by towering ridges and stood in the ce

of four valley corridors leading through the mountains to the n

and northwest of the base. To the south Khe Sanh overloo

Highway Nine, . the only east-west road in the northern prov

to join Laos and the coastal regions. The base itself was laid 

on a flat laterite plateau. It was shaped somewhat like an irreg

rectangle and covered an area approximately one mile long 

one-half mile wide. A key feature of the base was a 3,900 

aluminum mat runway which during favorable weather condit

could accommodate fixed-wing aircraft up to C-130 transports . 

. The enemy's primary objective in the Tel offensive in e

1968 was to seize power in South Vietnam and cause the defec

of major elements of its armed forces. In conjunction with 

the enemy apparently expected to seize by military action l

portions of the northern two provinces and to set up a "Libera

Government. " Khe Sanh was a part ·of this plan and was obvio

an initial objective of the North Vietnamese Army. Its sei

would have created a serious threat to our forces in the north

area and cleared the way for the enemy's advance to Quang 

City and the heavily populated region. In addition, as Gen

Westmoreland stated, "There is also little doubt that the en

hoped at Khe Sanh to obtain a climacteric victory such as he 

done in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu in the expectation that this wo

produce a psychological shock and erode American morale." 
as Operation PEGASUS. The mission was three

fold: One, to reliev

the Khe Sanh Combat Base; two, to open Highway Nine fro

Ca Lu to Khe Sanh; and, three, to destroy the enemy forces with

the area of operations. After the inevitable delays caused by th

Tel offensive, the 1st Cavalry Division began preparation for on

of its most classical engagements.l 

In the first weeks of 1968 signs of an impending enemy attac

at Khe Sanh continued to mount. As many as four North Vietnam

ese divisions were identified just north of the Demilitarized Zon

Two of these divisions, the 325th C and the 304th, were thoug

to be concentrated in the northwestern edge of Quang Tri Pro

ince with elements already in position in the hills surroundin

Khe Sanh. In addition, there were numerous indications that th

enemy was moving up many batteries of artillery in the southe

half of the Demilitarized Zone as well as in areas close to the La

border-all well within range of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. 

Convinced that a massive enemy blow would soon fall on K

Sanh, the American command moved swiftly to strengthen 

forces in the area. The 5th Marine Regiment was hastily red

ployed from the Da Nang area north to the vicinity of Hue an

the U. S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was displac

to the northern provinces along with two brigades .of the lO

Airborne Division. Beginning in mid-January, the combat base 

Khe Sanh was consecutively reinforced by the 2d Battalion of t

26th Marines, the lst Battalion of the 9th Marines, and finally t

37th South Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, bringing the troop lev

at the base to a little less than 6,000 men. 

Concurrent with the buildup of the allied forces in the vicini

of the Demilitarized Zone, B-52 bombers began to systematica

pattern bomb suspected enemy locations near Khe Sanh and tac

cal fighter bombers stepped up attacks in North Vietnam's sout

ern panhandle. East of Khe Sanh, U. S. Army heavy artillery w

assembled at the "Rock Pile" and at Camp Carroll to provide lo

range fire support to the Khe Sanh base on a quick reaction bas

In the early morning hours of 21 January the enemy had ma

his long-awaited move against Khe Sanh. The main base was h

1 The 1st Cavalry's operation in I Corps Tactical Zone-including the move nor

the Tet Offensive, securing base areas, and preparation for PEGASUs-had been gi

the name of Operation JEB STUART. 
Khe Sanh and Huong Hoa, but were beaten back by Marine a

South Vietnamese defenders. In this initial action, enemy f

destroyed virtually all of the base ammunition stock as well as 

substantial portion of the fuel supplies. In addition, the a

important air strip was severely damaged forcing a temporary s

pension of flights into the area 

From these beginnings, the battle lines at Khe Sanh were tigh

drawn around the main base and its adjacent mountain stron

holds. For the next 66 days world-wide attention would rema

riveted on Khe Sanh where the enemy seemed to be challengi

the United States to a set battle on a scale not attempted since t

great communist victory at Dien Bien Phu. 

As the siege of Khe Sanh progressed, air delivered fire supp

reached unprecedented levels. A daily average of 45 B-52 sort

and 300 tactical air sorties by Air Force and Marine aircraft w

flown against targets in the vicinity of the base. The U. S. Na

provided additional aircraft sorties from carriers. Eighteen hundr

tons of ordnance a day were dumped into the area laying waste 

huge swaths of jungle terrain and causing hundreds of second

explosions. In seventy days of air operations 96,000 tons of bom

were dropped, nearly twice as much as was delivered by the Ar

Air Force in the Pacific during 1942 and 1943. B-52 Arc Lig

strikes were particularly effective against enemy personnel and h

a great psychological impact on their troops. 

Artillery fire provided an important supplement to the 

campaign. The sixteen 175-mm guns at Camp Carroll and 

"Rock Pile" as well as the forty odd artillery pieces position

inside the Khe Sanh perimeter directed some 118,000 rounds 

enemy positions within a ten mile radius of the base. 

But even though the allies were successful in keeping Khe Sa

supplied by air and surrounding its defenders with a pulveriz

wall of firepower, a deep feeling of apprehension over the fate 

this outpost persisted in official and public circles. After all, 

base was completely encircled by an enemy with at least a th

to one numerical advantage, and that enemy unmistakably co

manded the initiative. Much of the high ground overlook

Khe Sanh was undefended and presumably under the control 

the North Vietnamese. Despite intensive counter fires the ene

managed to regularly pound the life-supporting runway and ot

critical installations with mixed barrages of artillery, rocket, a
by fog and low-hanging clouds which not only interrupted fighte

air sorties but also permitted the enemy to move men an

equipment undetected to the very edges of the Marine defens

perimeters. 

On 25 January 1968, General Westmoreland had directed tha

a Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, forward command pos

be established in the I Corps area. General Abrams would be hi

representative in this forward Command Post. Military Assistanc

Command, Vietnam, Forward was activated, staffed, and becam

operational during the period of the T et Offensive. The staff o

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Forward would soon form 

the nucleus of Provisional Corps Vietnam when General Abram

closed his forward command post. General Abrams arrived at th

command post in Phu Bai on 13 February and on that same da

the decision was made to move the lOlst Airborne Division (-) 

into Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Forward's area o

operation. The 3d Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, bein

airlifted from the United States, would come under the lOlst Air

borne Division upon its arrival in the tactical zone. 

Priority of movement for units being moved into the norther

I Corps Tactical Zone were established by Military Assistance Com

mand, Vietnam, Forward on 1 March. The 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalr

Division was to join the remainder of the division operating in th

area north of Hue and south of Quang Tri. Next, the comman

and control and support elements of the lOlst Airborne Divisio

were to move north, and finally, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborn

Division would arrive in country, through Chu Lai, and mov

north. 

The 1st Cavalry Division began repositioning its forces to allow 

for the arrival of its 2d Brigade and the lOlst Airborne Div

sion (-). The 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry was to continue security o

Quang Tri and to conduct operations south and west of the city

The 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, was to assume responsibilit

for the operational area of the 2d Brigade, lOIst Airborne Division

upon arrival in I Corps Tacticaf Zone and conduct operations t

clear the enemy elements in the Hai Lang-My Chanh area. Th

3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, was to continue to operate we

of Hue until relieved by the 2d Brigade, lOIst Airborne Division

When the 2d Brigade, lOIst began operations west and northwe

of the City of Hue, the 3d Btigade, 1st Cavalry Division woul
lished by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in a Letter 

Instruction dated 3 March 1968. Lieutenant General William 

Rosson was designated Commanding General of the Corps whi

upon its activation on 10 March, was under operational control 

III Marine Amphibious Force. The Provincial Corps, Vietna

was authorized direct coordination with Army of the Republic 

Vietnam forces within its area of responsibility. 

Operation Pegasus 

This, then, is how the situation stood ·in early 1968. Press cor

spondents began to dramatize the developments. Repeatedly 

public was told that Khe Sanh was likely to be a "very rough bu

ness with heartbreaking American casualties." The impend

battle was seen as a major test of strength between the U. S. a

North Vietnam, with heavy political and psychological overton

On 2 March, I went to Da Nang to present our plan for 

relief of Khe Sanh to General Cushman, Commanding Gene

III Marine Amphibious Force. In attendance at this briefing w

General A~rams, Deputy Commander, U. S. Military Assista

Command, Vietnam, who still had his advance headquarters 

Hue-Phu Bai. Our plan was approved in concept and provisio

troop allocations were made. 

To accomplish the mission, the 1st Cavalry Division would 

augmented by the following non-divisional units: 1st Marine Re

ment, 26th Marine Regiment, III Army of the Republic of V

nam Airborne Task Force, and the 37th Army of the Republic 

Vietnam Ranger Battalion. In all, I would have over 30,000 tro

under my direct operational control. 

Having been given the broad mission and the forces necessa

I was given complete freedom on how to do the job from 

beginning. Seldom is a commander so blessed. In the early sta

of planning, verbal orders were the modus operandi. As the c

cept took shape, I asked for representatives from all the units t

would be working with us and detailed plans were develop

under the critical supervision of Colonel Putnam. We even c

structed a sand table model of the Khe Sanh area. I made seve
be pulled together under my command on Dday. If we wante

surprise, speed and flexibility during the actual attack, everyon

had to understand their part of the plan and the control proce

dures. This was especially true of firepower. A lot of things wer

going to be moving through the same air space-bombs, rocket

artillery shells, helicopters and airplanes. We had to assure ou

selves that none got together inadvertently. 

The basic concept of Operation PEGASUS was as follows: Th

1st Marine Regiment with two battalions would launch a groun

attack west toward Khe Sanh while the 3d Brigade would lead th

1st Cavalry air assault. On D+ 1 and D + 2 all elements would con

tinue to attack west toward Khe Sanh; and, on the following da

the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry would land three battalions south

east of Khe Sanh and attack northwest. The 26th Marine Regimen

which was holding Khe Sanh, would attack south to secure Hi

471. On D+4, the 1st Brigade would air assault just south of Kh

Sanh and attack north. The following day the 3d Army of th

Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force would air assault sout

west of Khe Sanh and attack toward Lang Vei Special Forces Cam

Linkup was planned at the end of seven days. 

It became evident during the planning that the constructio

of an airstrip in the vicinity of Ca Lu would be a key factor f

the . entire operation. This airstrip, which became known as landin

zone STUD, had to be ready well before D-day (1 April 1968

Also, it was necessary to upgrade Highway Nine between th

"Rock Pile" and Ca Lu to allow prestocking of supplies at landin

zone STUD. 

I sent one of my assistant division commanders, Brigadier Ge

eral Oscar E. Davis, to personally supervise the establishing 

landing zone STUD as our advance base for PEGASUS. Callin

this a "landing zone" is a gross understatement, for landing zon

STUD would have to be a major air terminal, communications ce

ter, and ' supply depot for the future. 

The 1st Cavalry Division engineers, the Seabees USN Mobi

Construction Battalion #5, and the 11th Engineer Battalio

2 In order to correct an impression given by the newsreel coverage at this time

must point out that the only "safe" way to get into the Khe Sanh Combat Base w

by helicopter. I usually chose to land in the Special Forces area. The C-130's we

either delivering their loads by low altitude extraction or by parachute. The runw

was the most dangerous and exposed area at Khe Sanh. 
A BLUE TEAM RIFLE SQUAD FROM THE 1ST SQUADRON, 9TH CAVALR

EXITING FROM A HUEY HELICOPTER 

USMC, initiated construction of the C-7 A airfield and parkin

ramp, logistical facilities, and a bunker complex at landing zon

STUD on 14 March. By D-6 they had finished an airstrip 1500 fe

long by 600 feet wide, ammunition storage areas, aircraft an

vehicle refueling facilities, and extensive road nets into the vicini

of landing zone STUD. The Seabees, which had been augmente

with very heavy equipment, accomplished the lion's share of th

work on the airfield. 

Having established a forward base of operations, the second k

element to the success of this plan was the closely integrated reco

naissance and fire support effort of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalr

under the brilliant leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Richard W

Diller, and air, artillery, and B-52 Arc Light strikes, during th

period D-6 to D-day. 'This was almost a flawless demonstration 

properly preparing a battlefield when tactical intelligence was n

available. 

This is not to say there was not a tremendous intelligence effo

focused around Khe Sanh Combat Base itself. In addition to th
approaches around Khe Sanh. Through a complex computer s

tem, these devices could provide early warning of any intrusi

and were often used to target B-52 strikes. However, the acousti

sensor system, which was focused on the immediate area of K

Sanh, did not directly help develop the complete intelligence p

ture necessary for our proposed attack along Highway Nine. 

The actual intelligence on the enemy in the area was v

vague and expressed in generalities. The 1st Squadron, 9th Cava

operated from landing zone STUD in gradually increasing concent

circles up to the Khe Sanh area, working all the time with air co

from the 7th Air Force or the 1st Marine Air Wing. The Cava

Squadron was almost the only means available to pinpoint ene

locations, antiaircraft positions, and strong points that the divis

would try to avoid in the initial assaults. The squadron was a

responsible for the selection of critical landing zones. Their inf

mation prov.ed to be timely and accurate. 

During the initial surveillance efforts it became evident t

the enemy had established positions designed to delay or stop a

attempt to reinforce or relieve Khe Sanh. Positions were identif

on key terrain features both north and south of Highway Nine. 

part of the reconnaissance by fire, known or suspected enemy an

aircraft positions and troop concentrations were sought out a

destroyed either by organic fire or tactical air. Landing zo

were selected and preparations of the landing zones for futu

use were accomplished by tactical air using specially fused bom

and B- 52 Arc Light strikes. During this phase of the operation, 

1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry developed targets for 632 sorties of ta

cal air, 49 sorties for the specially fused bombs, and twelve B-

Arc Light strikes. The thoroughness of the battlefield preparat

was demonstrated during the initial assaults of the 1st Cavalry Di

sion, for no aircraft were lost due to antiaircraft fire or ene

artillery. 

At this point, I must mention the element of surprise. Certai

the enemy knew we were in the area. Our own reporters let 

whole world know the situation as they saw it, and the arm-ch

strategist could ponder the problem each evening in front of 

color TV. However, the inherent capabilities of the airmobile d

sion presented the enemy with a bewildering number of possi

thrusts that he would have to counter, all the way to the Laot
==t> 0+1 2Aprl968 

\ 

LAOS 

MAP 4 

Kh. Sonh 

Combot Bo .. 

CJ 

SOUTH 

VIETNAM 

border. Also, there would be a major diversionary attack in th

vicinity of the DMZ on D-l. The initiative was ours. 

At 0700 on I April 1968 the attack phase of Operation PEGASU

commenced as two battalions of the 1st Marine Regiment unde

Colonel Stanley S. Hughes attacked west from Ca Lu along High

way Nine. (Map 4) The 11th Marine Engineers followed right o

their heels. At the same time, the 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalr

under Colonel Hubert (Bill) S. Campbell was airlifted by Ch

nooks and Hueys into landing zone STUD in preparation for an a

assault into two objective areas further west. Weather delayed th

attack until 1300, when the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, commande

by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Wasiak, air assaulted into landin

zone MIKE located on prominent ground south ot Highway Nin

and well forward of the Marine attack. Lieutenant Colonel Rosco

Robinson, Jr., led the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry into the sam

landing zone to expand and develop the position. The 5th Ba

talion, 7th Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James B

Vaught, air assaulted into an area north of Highway Nine approx

mately opposite landing zone MIKE. 

These two objectives. had been chosen after careful reconnai

sance by the Cavalry Squadron indicated no major enemy defense

Though almost halfway to Khe Sanh, they were within range o
bell moved his brigade headquarters into the northern landing zon

landing zone CATES. Bad weather notwithstanding, everything was 

place prior to darkness. The major accomplishment of D-day was t

professional manner in which this tremendously complex ope

tion, with all its split-second timing and coordination, had to 

delayed several hours yet was completed as planned. 

The bad weather of D-day was to haunt the 1st Cava

throughout Operation PEGASUS. Seldom Were airmobile mov

feasible much before 1300. "Good weather" was considered to 

any condition when the ceiling was above 500 feet and slant ran

visibility was more than a mile and a half. The bad weather fu

ther proved the soundness of establishing landing zone STUD as t

springboard for the assaults. Troops, ammo and supplies could 

assembled there ready to go whenever the weather to the w

opened up. Marshalling areas further away would have drastica

deteriorated response time. 

On D + I (2 April) , the 1st Marine Regiment continued 

ground attack along the axis of Highway Nine. Two Marine co

panies made limited air assaults to support the Regiment's mome

tum. The 3d Brigade air assaulted the 2d Battalion, 7th Cava

into a new position further to the west while the other two b

talions improved their positions. The 2d Brigade under Colo

Joseph C. McDonough moved into marshalling areas in prepa

tion for air assaults the next day, if called upon. 

Lest all of this sound routine, I want to emphasize that on

the initial assaults on D-day were fixed in time or place. A

subsequent attacks were varied to meet changes in the enemy si

ation or to capitalize on unexpected progress. As an example

ordered an acceleration of the tempo when the results of D-d

attacks gave clear evidence that the enemy wa~, unprepared. 

Our initial thrusts had met less enemy resistance than expect

As a consequence, the 2d Brigade was thrown into the attack a d

earlier than the original schedule with three battalions 3 movi

into two new areas south and west of our earlier landing zon

• The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Runkle (w

was killed in action the following day and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Clarenc

Jordan), the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Le

Jr., and the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Sw
~ 0+3.4 Apr 1968 

.Hill 8815 

\ Kh.Sanh 

, 

, 

L AO"l; 

MAP 5 

26th Marines Combat Ba~. 

p:P Hill 471' 

SOUT~ 

VIETNAM 

(Map 5) They received enemy artillery during the assaults, bu

secured their objectives without serious difficulty. We now had s

air cavalry battalions and supporting artillery deep in enem

territory. 

I was anxious to get the 26th Marine Regiment out of the

static defense position as soon as feasible; so, on D + 3, I ordere

Colonel Lownds to make a battalion-size attack south from Kh

Sanh to seize Hill 471, a strategic piece of terrain affording a com

manding view of the base. Following a heavy artillery preparatio

the Marines successfully seized the hill killing thirty of the enem

On the same day, the 2d· Brigade of the Cavalry Division assaulte

one battalion into an old French fort south of Khe Sanh. Initi

contact resulted in four enemy killed. The remaining uncommitte

brigade was moved into marshalling areas. 

On D+4 (5 April) , the 2d Brigade continued its attack on th

old French fort meeting heavy enemy resistance. Enemy troop

attacked the Marines on Hill 471 but were gallantly repulsed wi

122 of the enemy left dead on the battlefield. The tempo of th

battle was one of the heaviest during the operation. The 3d Ai

borne Task Force, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, was alerte

to prepare to airlift one rifle company from Quang Tri to effe

linkup with the 37th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Rang

Battalion located at Khe Sanh. Units of the 1st Brigade und
\ 

LAOS 

\ 

\ 

MAP 6 

.Hi11881 S 

\ 

SOUTH 

VIETNAM 

¢= ~ 2 Marine battalion. 

Q-~ 

ol/7Ca. 

LZ Mike 

Colonel Stannard entered the operation with the 1st Battalion, 

Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Christian F. Dub

air assaulting into landing zone SNAPPER, due south of Khe Sa

and overlooking Highway Nine. The circle began to close arou

the enemy. (Map 6) 

On D + 5 (6 April), the 1st Marine Regiment continued 

operations on the high ground north and south of Highway Ni

moving to the west toward Khe Sanh. The heaviest contact on t

date occurred in the 3d Brigade's area of operation as the 2d B

talion, 7th Cavalry under the inspired leadership of Colo

Robinson continued its drive west on Highway Nine. Enemy blo

ing along the highway offered stubborn resistance. In a day-l

battle which ended when the enemy summarily abandoned 

position and fled, the battalion had accounted for 83 enemy kill

one prisoner of war captured, and 121 individual and ten cr

served weapons captured. The troops of the 1st Cavalry Divis

were airlifted to Hill 471 relieving the Marines at this positi

This was the first relief of the defenders of Khe Sanh. Two co

panies of troopers remained on the hill while two other compan

initiated an attack to the south toward the Khe Sanh Hamlet. 

We had plotted heavy enemy artillery that had been dug dee

into the rocks of the Co Roc Mountains in Laos just west of L

Vei. As we neared Khe Sanh I was concerned that these l52-m
out PEGASUS. 

The 1st Cavalry forces on landing zone SNAPPER were attacked 

by an enemy force utilizing mortars, hand grenades, and rocke

launchers. The attack was a disaster for the enemy and twenty wer

killed. At 1320 the 84th Company of the Vietnamese 8th Airborn

Battalion was airlifted by 1st Cavalry Division aircraft into the Kh

Sanh Combat Base and linked up with elements of the 37th Range

Battalion. The lift was conducted without incident and was marked 

as the official link-up in forces at Khe Sanh. 

On 7 April the South Vietnamese III Airborne Task Force ai

assaulted three battalions into positions north' of the road and eas

of Khe Sanh to block escape routes toward the Laotian border

Fighting throughout the area was sporadic as the enemy attempted 

to withdraw. American and South Vietnamese units began picking 

up significant quantities of abandoned weapons and equipment

The old French fort which was the last known enemy strong poin

around Khe Sanh was completely secured. 

At 0800 on 8 April the relief of Khe Sanh was effected and the 

1st Cavalry Division became the new landlord. The 3d Brigad

airlifted its command post into Khe Sanh and Colonel Campbel

assumed the mission of securing the area. This was accomplished 

after the 2d Ba~talion, 7th Cavalry successfully cleared High

way Nine to the base and effected link-up with the 26th Marine 

Regiment. The 3d Brigade elements occupied high ground to the 

east and northeast of the base with no enemy contact. At-this time 

it became increasingly evident, through lack of contact and the 

large amounts of new equipment being found indiscriminately 

abandoned on the battlefield, that the enemy had fled the area 

rather than face certain defeat. He was totally confused by the 

swift, bold, many-pronged attacks. Operations continued to the 

west. 

On 9 April all 1st Marine Regiment objectives had been secured 

and Highway Nine was repaired and secured with only scattered 

incidents of enemy sniper fires. Enemy mortar, rocket and artillery 

fire into Khe Sanh became increasingly sporadic. 

On the following day the 1st Battalion of the 12th Cavalry

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Kerner, under the 

1st Brigade seized the old Lang Vei Special Forces Camp four mile

west of Khe Sanh against light enemy resistance. This was the site 

of an enemy attack in mid-February when North Vietnamese 
The tank was destroyed along with fifteen enemy troops. 

Though this was the only recorded tank kill during Operati

PEGASUS, we had had intelligence of enemy armor throughout t

area. The enemy's offensive at Lang Vei Special Forces Camp h

given undeniable proof of this enemy capability and, since th

time, intelligence sources estimated a possibte company-size arm

unit near Khe Sanh. The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry had sigh

tank treads several times in their early reconnaissance before D-d

Before the operation I had directed the division to be prepar

to use the SS-11 missile system during PEGASUS. This system, wh

employed a wire-guided armor-piercing missile had been in 

theater since the arrival of the 1st Cavalry. However, the lack 

lucrative targets had reduced its usefulness. The system had be

standardized in the U. S. Army since 1960 when it replaced 

lighter French S8-10 missile. Since then hundreds of gunners h

been trained at Fort Rucker, Alabama, in the use of the SS-

We were never able to target this system during PEGASUS, bu

still felt it was a very valuable capability that should be maintain

in constant readiness. 

Highway Nine into the Khe Sanh Combat Base was 6fficia

opened on 11 April after the Marine engineers had worked day a

night to complete their task. In eleven days the engineers h

reconstructed over fourteen kilometers of road, repaired or replac

nine bridges, and constructed seventeen bypasses . . Numerous s

tions of the road had to be cleared of landslides and craters. 

I had scheduled more than 38 additional operations to exte

our control of the Khe Sanh area but, without warning, on 

morning of 10 April I received orders from General Rosson 

make plans to extract the Division as soon as possible to prep

for an assault into the A Shau Valley. Advance units started pu

ing out on the lIth. Limited operations continued until 15 Ap

when Operation PEGASUS was officially terminated. 

There was great potential for the continued air assault ope

tions that were abruptly brought to close. The enemy was vuln

able; he was abandoning his equipment; and, he was complet

disorganized. The decision to expedite our withdrawal imme

ately upon completing our primary mission-the relief of Khe Sa

Combat Base-was predicated on a long-range forecast which p

dicted April as the last possible time for air assault operations 

the A Shau Valley before the heavy monsoon rains. 
ically illustrated the speed and effectiveness with which a lar

force can be employed in combat using airmobile tactics and tec

niques. The enemy's repeated failure to quickly comprehend t

quick reaction time and capabilities of the 1st Cavalry Divisi

led to his defeat, forced withdrawal, and eventual rout from t

battlefield. The enemy was helpless and confused, suffered gr

losses of men and equipment, and failed in his mission to blo

and delay the relief of Khe Sanh. 

No summation of Operation PEGASUS would be complete wi

out mention of the great team effort of all the Services-Arm

Navy, Marines and Air Force. The operation was an ideal examp

of the synchronization of massive B-S2 strikes, tactical air supp

and artillery firepower with ground maneuver. The South Vietna

ese troops gave a splendid performance. The fact that we were ab

to co-ordinate all of these operations in a single headquarters w

a commander's dream. There was no question of command or w

was calling the signals. Equally important, I had the full supp

of General Rosson, who commanded the Provisional Corps Vi

nam, and of General Cushman, Commanding General, III Mari

Amphibious Force. 

The success of the PEGASUS operation can largely be attribut

to the detailed planning and preparation that occurred prior 

D-day and the effective reconnaissance and surveillance of the ar

of operations provided by the air cavalry squadron. This reco

naissance and its ability to develop hard targets for the tactical 

and B-S2 Arc Light strikes cannot be overestimated. The concept 

building landing zone STUD as a pivot point for the entire ope

tion proved sound. This base provided a continuous flow of need

supplies and equipment to forward elements of the division. T

success of the initial battalion air assaults was rapidly exploited 

aggressive company and even platoon-size air assaults, all support

by artillery and air. The enemy, although well dug in, well su

plied, and with an initial determination to deter the relief of K

Sanh, found himself surrounded with no choice but to retreat 

rout order back into Laos, leaving behind 1,304 dead and mu

valuable equipment strewn over the battlefield. 

The total success of the operation can be best measured by t

mission accomplished. For the first time, the Cavalry had made 

air assault as a division entity; every committed battalion cam

into combat by helicopter. In fifteen days, the division had enter
A Shau Valley. 

9th Division in the Delta 

While the 1st Cavalry Division was occupied in preparation fo

PEGASUS and in the actual relief of Khe Sanh, the U. S. 9th Infan

try Division was joined with the enemy in an entirely differen

type of operation in the Mekong Delta. On 1 March 1968, in con

junction with several Army of the Republic of Vietnam unit

elements of the 9th Infantry Division began Operation TRUON

CONG DINH in Dinh Tuong and Kien Tuong Provinces in the IV 

Corps Tactical Zone. By 19 April, they had accounted for 1,71

enemy killed and 999 detained, while the U. S. forces had onl

lost 57 men. The division, which was operating on water almo

as much as on land, saw airmobility in an entirely different ligh

than those troops fighting in the mountains and jungles in th

north. 

The Delta region in the IV Corps Tactical Zone stretches from 

the Cambodian border to the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula. It is "

heavily silted level plain area with elevations not in excess of 9 fee

above sea level except in the far western area. The entire area 

subject to frequent flooding. Extensive embankments had bee

built over the centuries to channel water into the fertile rice

producing fields. Mud flats and mangrove swamps encircled th

Delta regions along the ragged coastline. Road networks wer

limited but hard-surfaced major roads did exist. Most of the canal

carried a heavy burden of the traffic throughout the area. 

The 9th Division's operations in the Delta proved to be 

unique testing ground for certain of the airmobile concepts. T

begin with, the Division found itself on the low order of priorit

for airmobile assets and, consequently, could compare its opera

tions without airmobility to those with airmobility. 

Major General Julian J. Ewell was to recall later: 

To begin with, the 9th Division worked under two rather unusua

conditions which led it into a somewhat different approach to airmobil

operations than other units. The Division ended up 1968 in the north

ern Delta area, south of Saigon, where the terrain was quite low, wate

soaked and very open. As a result, ground-pounding operations wer

extremely difficult to conduct, and the open terrain gave one conside

able flexibility in conducting airmobile operations. In addition, th

enemy (although able to move freely at night) was more or less pinne
received a rather austere level of aircraft resources. These two fa

combined led to a situation where you had to squeeze maximum re

out of a relatively small number of aircraft. However, in late '68

priority of Delta operations was raised, and the Division bega

receive three lift companies and three air cav troops (includin

own). We, therefore, found that we had a reasonable number of 

craft in a highly sympathetic environment and were used to ge

the most out of our aircraft. This is all background to assure you 

we don't make claims to "inventing the wheel" but were in a situa

where we had to do what we did to stay alive. 

The 9th Infantry Division made a study of its operations f

March through August 1968 to analyze division operations 

and without airmobile assets. They attempted to quantify the 

sion's effectiveness by stripping out all the other variables with 

exception of the addition of helicopter lift and the air cav

The study considered that the simplest and most relevant statis

index of combat effectiveness was the average number of Viet C

losses inflicted daily by the unit in question. This criteria ha

be adjusted to account for the fact that units do not engag

offensive field operations every day. This was especially true 

the riverine units in the 2d Brigade, 9th Division, which ha

allow for extended periods for boat maintenance. In their st

it was assumed that the provision of all types of airmobile resou

except the assault helicopter units and air cavalry units was 

form and thus did not materially influence combat effective

from day to day. 

A total of 313 brigade-days were analyzed. With no airmob

or ai:r: cavalry support the 3d Brigade of the 9th Division avera

0.21 significant enemy contacts per day spent on field operati

However, when supported by an assault helicopter company 

an air cavalry troop, brigade performance more than doubled

other words, with no air assets a brigade made significant con

with the enemy only once every five days; with airmobile asset

developed contact every other day. 

An analysis of the Viet Cong losses per field day produced m

definitive inferences. With no air assets, the brigade performa

averaged 1.6 Viet Cong losses per field day-hardly a credit

return. However, when a brigade was supported by an air cav

troop and a helicopter company, the brigade performance ros

13.6 Viet Cong per day-an increase of 850 percent. The st

went on to refine its perimeters, but the conclusion was ines
bears repeating: 

It is possible that not all divisions in Vietnam would generate 

statistical results similar to those of the 9th Division. The inundated flatlands of the Mekong Delta have a double impact on the 

spread of effectiveness between foot and airmobile operations. Marshy 

swamps and flooded rice paddies severely penalize ground troops. Units 

frequently are able to move no more than 500 meters per hour or less

On the other hand. the broad stretches of virtually flat Delta country 

provide an ideal environment for the unrestricted employment of Army 

aviation. Presumably such would not be the ca.se in other areas of 

Vietnam. Statistics for other divisions might be expected to show improvements in combat effectiveness with air assets on the order of two 

or three to one, depending upon the circumstances. From the standpoint of II Field Force Vietnam, until analyses are made for the othe

divisions, it would appear worthwhile to allocate an additional assaul

helicopter company and an air cavalry troop to the 9th Infantry 

Division. 

T he A Shau Valley 

On 10 April 1968 at landing zone STUD, General Rosson, the 

commander of Provisional Corps Vietnam, told me to plan imme

diate movement of the 1st Cavalry into the A Shau Valley. Though 

tentative plans had been made for operations against this enemy 

redoubt sometime before, I had no warning that the 1st Cavalry 

Division would be committed so quickly on the heels of our opera

tions at Khe Sanh. The following day, we began extracting troop

from Operation PEGASUS back into our base areas at Quang Tr

City and Camp Evans. 

The A Shau Valley lies between two high mountain ranges on 

the western edge of the Republic of Vietnam. On both sides of the 

valley the mountains climb to over 1,000 meters with the angle o

slope varying from 20 to 45 degrees. The Laotian border is les

than ten kilometers away. Three abandoned airfields were spread 

along the valley floor which TUns northwest to southeast. The 

North Vietnamese forces had been in control of the valley since 

March 1966 when they overran the Special Forces camp in the 

southern end. Since that time they had built a major base for the 

infiltration of personnel and supplies from North Vietnam through 

Laos along Route 547 into Thua Thien Province and the northern 

I Corps Tactical Zone. (Map 7) 

Final preparations for Operation DELAWARE-LAM SON 216 

were conducted during the last days of Operation PEGASUS. The 1s
o 

I 

MAP 7 
targets for tactical air and B-52 strikes. During the period 14 to 

19 April, over 100 B-52 sorties, 200 Air Force and Marine fighte

sonies, and numerous aerial rocket artillery missions were flown 

against targets in the valley. The 1st Brigade of the 10 1st Airborne 

Division and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task 

Force were moved into pre-assault positions ready to make a sepa

rate attack on D-day east of the A Shau. 

The 101st Airborne Division's role in Operation DELAWARE wa

to complement the 1st Cavalry Division's assault into the valley 

itself. The 1st Brigade of the 101st, in coordination with the 3d 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force, was to 

conduct ground and airmobile assaults to interdict the enemy'

routes of withdrawal and infiltration in the area around the junc

tion of Routes 547 and 547 A. The 101st Airborne Division's Fire 

Support Base BASTOGNE, far to the east on Route 547, would jus

be able to reach the north end of the A Shau Valley with its long 

range 175-mm guns. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Air

borne Task Force was to be responsible for clearing Route 547 A

Operation DELAWARE was to be a coordinated airmobile and 

ground attack on two axes using elements of three divisions-the 

1st Cavalry, the 10 1st Airborne, and the 1st Army of the Republic 

of Vietnam Division. One prong was to be the attack along and 

astride Routes 547 and 547A, while the main attack was the assaul

into A Luoi and Ta Bat on the valley floor. 

Operation DELAWARE differed from PEGASUS in that during 

PEGASUS the Cavalry Division had control of all U. S. ground tacti

cal elements. Operation DELAWARE was under the tactical contro

of Provisional Corps, and my relationship with the 10lst Airborn

Division was one of coordination. I had also expected to have th

Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force as part o

our maneuver force, but this unit was shifted to the operationa

area of the 10 1 st during the latter planning stages. D-day had been 

tentatively set for 17 April, but I made the condition that it wa

really contingent on my having three full days of operations in 

the A Shau Valley by the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry in coordina

tion with tactical air and B-52 Arc Light strikes. The purpose o

this effort was to determine and neutralize the heavy enemy anti

aircraft concentrations. 

By the 16th of April, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry still had 

not had three full days of good weather to operate in the valley, s
Brigade would make the initial assault, the 3d Brigade having ma

the initial assaults into Operation PEGASUS. The area arou

A Luoi offered better open landing zones and it gave us immedi

control of the airstrip which we could improve for future ope

tions. However, during the final days of the reconnaissance by 

Air Cavalry Squadron, I could not get any asSurance that 

.assault into the A Luoi area would not be very costly because th

had encountered the heaviest antiaircraft fire right in that ar

Though much had been neutralized by air strikes, new positi

appeared each day and it became obvious that an ' alternate p

should be considered. The alternate I selected was an assault i

the northern part of the valley by the 3d Brigade, since the 

Brigade had been prepared to go into this area from the beginni

This alternate plan had several advantages. By going north fi

we would immediately cut off the entries into the valley from 

new highway coming in from Laos which the enemy had c

structed. But, most of ali, the threat from antiaitcraft fire was 

in this area and, after the initial assault, artillery could be pla

in the northern landing zones to further neutralize the antiaircr

fire in the center of the valley. The disadvantages of this p

included the fact that we would have to use extremely limi

landing zones and that we would delay securing the A L

airstrip. 

For Operation DELAWARE the 1st Cavalry would have its o

1st and 3d Brigades and coordinate with the 3d Army of the Rep

lic of Vietnam Regiment. The 2d Brigade of the Cavalry remain

in the Khe Sanh area to secure the base and continue limited ope

tions in that area. This left the Camp Evans area almost complet

void of combat units. Consequently, the 196th Light Infantry B

gade of the Americal Division was given the mission of defense 

the base at Camp Evans under operational control of the 1st C

alry Division. As a further mission they were also designated a

reserve unit for the Corps. 

On the morning of the 19th of April the 3d Brigade of the 

Cavalry Division under Colonel Campbell made the initial assa

into the A Shau Valley. Prior to the assault, six B-S2 strikes h

been delivered in the northern part of the valley and two stri

delivered on the main roads to the east. Tactical Air and artill

hit numerous targets just before the helicopters set down. Desp
TIGER near the winding road into Laos, and was soon followed b

its direct support artillery battery. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalr

went into landing zone VICKI on the slope northeast of TIGER

Although the initial assaults of the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry an

1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry were virtually unopposed by groun

action, subsequent assault lifts received intense antiaircraft fire. I

these later assaults, 23 helicopters were hit by ground-to-air fir

and ten aircraft were destroyed. Because of the intense antiaircra

fire, deteriorating weather conditions, and the extensive enginee

ing effort required to prepare artillery positions at landing zon

VICKI, insertion of the direct support artillery battery into landin

zone VICKI was aborted for that day. 

To the east, the 1st Brigade of the lOlst Airborne Divisio

initiated operations out of Fire Support Base BASTOGNE with on

battalion attacking to the southwest. Later in the morning of th

19th, another battalion air assaulted into the landing zone near th

junction of Routes 547 and 547-A. These battalions received lig

to moderate contact throughout the day. 

On D+ 1, the 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry continued to deplo

into the northern A Shau Valley and to spread their area o

operations. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry under Colonel Wasia

attacked to the southeast out of their original landing zone; th

2d Battalion, 7th Cav-alry under Colonel Robinson began an a

assault to establish a landing zone further south in the valley; an

the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry moved to interdict Route 548 whic

entered the A Shau Valley from Laos. 

During the first few days of Operation DELAWARE, in spite 

very low ceilings, thunder storms, and heavy enemy antiaircra

fire, the 1st Cavalry Division's helicopters and the Uo. S. Air Force

C-130 aircraft flew repeated missions into the valley to deliver th

required supplies. During the first days of the operation, navig

tion was strictly by pilotage. 

The weather during Operation DELAWARE was almost unb

lievably bad. Heavy clouds, fog, thunder storms, and low ceilin

made heroic feats of airmanship almost commonplace. Not on

were the conditions bad in the area of tactical operations, but eve

the departure area from Camp Evans had conditions which usual

forced our helicopters to climb up through an overcast on instr

ments, reassemble a formation on top of the clouds, fly to the targ

area, and then search for some sort of hole in the clouds to mak
y 

y y

limit of their capabilities. The operation was a phenomenal 

of flying, but from a commander's viewpoint it was sheer ago

see what my people had to go through to accomplish our mi

The deployed battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division 

making sporadic contact with small enemy units on 21 A

Shortly after noon, Company B of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cav

discovered an enemy maintenance area containing two trucks

bulldozers, and assorted engineering equipment. Markings o

bulldozers gave clear evidence that they had been manufac

in the USSR. 

With improvements in weather conditions on 22 April, th

Brigade, 1st Cavalry, continued to improve their bases in nor

A Shau Valley and to bring in needed supplies and equipm

The 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry had completed an ove

attack and secured a landing zone further south. This batt

was now in position to support the coming assault into the A 

Airfield and the central portions of the A Shau Valley. 

On 24 April the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, under Lieut

Colonel John V. Gibney; led the assault of Colonel Stannard

Brigade into a landing zone two kilometers south of the A 

Airfield. The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry and 1st Battalion

Cavalry completed the Brigade movement the following day 

they air assaulted the airfield itself. The 1st Brigade then b

reconnaissance in force operations moving to the south and 

Numerous caches of enemy communications equipment, . veh

ammunition, and weapons were uncovered. Operation DELAW

was spoiling the enemy's supply depots in the A Shau Valley. Th

Cavalry troopers were also finding on the ground the heavy an

craft weapons that had hit them s~ hard during the air assaults. M

antiaircraft weapons were uncovered plus thousands of roun

23-mm and 37-mm ammunition. 

The 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division continued 

buildup at the A Luoi airfield by flying in heavy engineer e

ment, sectionalized in small enough loads to be lifted by 

helicopters. The cranes were fueled with just sufficient JP

make the round trip in order to have sufficient lift capabili

sling load this heavy equipment over the ridge lines. 

On 26 April the buildup at A Luoi continued with fiftee

drops of resupply from C-130 aircraft. The 1st Cavalry Div
worked together in a joint operation continuing daily resupply by 

heavy drop. This reduced the demand on the division's aviation 

assets to complete unit distribution within the valley. However, a 

large amount of the resupply for the 3d Brigade elements continued to be lifted from Camp Evans by organic aircraft. At 1400 

on 26 April a C-130 received enemy antiaircraft fire after breaking 

out of the overcast too far to the south of the drop zone at landing 

zone STALLION. Attempting to crash land at the landing zone and 

losing altitude rapidly, the C-130 came under more small arms 

fire as it tried to turn and crashed and burned at the landing zone. 

This tragic crash points out how dedicated our Air Force pilots 

were during this operation. They were faced with the same miserable weather I have described earlier but, unlike the helicopter, 

they could not pick holes in the clouds for their descent. They 

were vectored to the A Shau Valley by the intersection of two 

radio stations on the east coast. From there, they began an instrument approach into the valley using their own on-board radar to 

avoid the mountains. No matter how reliable the guages, it takes 

a lot of guts to poke your airplane nose into clouds that are full 

of solid rock! Breaking out under a low ceiling, they made their 

parachute drop and climbed out. 

In addition to the superb support of the Hercules pilots, I 

must mention the 109th Quartermaster Company (Air Drop) at 

Cam Ranh Bay which rigged 2,212 tons of all classes of supplies 

for air drop into the A Shau Valley. They and the crews of the 

C-130's did a tremendous job under extreme pressure. 

On the morning of 29 April, elements of the 1st Battalion, 12th 

Cavalry secured a landing zone in the vicinity of Ta Bat airfield 

and the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment began its 

insertion into the valley with the airlift of its 1st Battalion landing 

at 0830. The 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment under 

the command of Colonel Hoa assumed the security mission for 

landing zone Lucy. By 1 May the 3d Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam Regiment had closed on landing zone Lucy and initiated 

attacks southeast along the Rao Lao River. At 1130 on that date

they discovered a large supply cache of ammunition, vehicle spare 

parts, and communications equipment. They continued their 

attack toward the old Special Forces camp at the south end of the 

valley. 
LANDING ZONE STALLION IN THE A SHAU VALLEY, OCCUPIED BY TH

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY 

The 8th Engineer Battalion of the 1st Cavalry had been w

ing on the airstrip at A Luoi since 29 April with the heavy e

ment that had been brought in by CH-54's. The field was act

ready to accept Caribou aircraft by noon on 1 May. Howev

was not until the following day that the first cargo aircraft, a C

Caribou, landed at landing zone STALLION at 1120. The engi

continued their work on this airstrip so that it could handle C-

and C-130's. The 8th Engineers completed the upgrading o

A Luoi Airfield to a C-130 capacity on 3 May. 

While the 1st Cavalry Division was operating in the A 

Valley, the lOlst Airborne Division had been conducting m

operations to the east. Together with the 3d Army of the Repu

of Vietnam Airborne Task Force, they had made periodic co

with the enemy and had uncovered additional major supply ca

The lOlst had built up two major fire support bases, VEG

and BASTOGNE, which would be important throughout Oper

DELAWARE. 
The Army of the Republic of Vietnam unit engaged the convoy 

with artillery fire, destroying two of the vehicles and causing one 

large secondary explosion. The rest of the vehicles escaped into 

the night. 

In the next few days, all units engaged in Operation DELAWARE 

would continue to uncover major enemy supply depots. At the 

same time, they were exposed to some of the heaviest ground fire 

received in Vietnam up to that time. Enemy 122-mm rockets were 

being employed in ever-increasing numbers while smaller caliber 

shells came in on a much too regular basis. 

During this period either I or General Davis worked out of 

our Division Forward Command Post adjacent to A Luoi Airstrip. 

This expedited our coordination with non-divisional units such 

as the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment and enabled 

us to continue our reconnaissance in force with the greatest flexibility and response. There had been no great changes in our plan 

after the first assault. Now, planning for a difficult extraction had 

to be initiated before the monsoon rains became too intense. Our 

problems now would be to backhaul any excess ammunition and 

supplies, destroy the maximum amount of enemy supplies, and 

leave behind thousands of mines and booby traps to make the 

enemy's future work more difficult. Extraction in many ways proved 

more difficult than the assault. Rain had already washed out a 

major portion of the A Luoi dirt airstrip. Consequently, all men 

and supplies would have to be lifted out by helicopter. 

During Operation DELAWARE, our intelligence effort was supplemented by a small Department of Defense team of electronic 

experts. They came all the way from Washington to emplace the 

then-new acoustic sensors in the A Shau. The team supplemented 

our other intelligence capabilities during the operation and placed 

some sensors that would remain to monitor enemy activity after 

our forces left the area. 

Extraction from the A Shall Valley began on 10 May with elements of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and the 3d Army 

of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment being air-lifted out of the 

valley. The remaining units continued offensive operations in their 

respective areas, meeting lig-ht resistance. The list of captured 

enemy supplies and equipment continued to grow. A partial list 

included: 
134,757 rounds of small arms 

ammunition 

34,140 rounds of 12.7-mm ammunition 

34',332 rounds of 23-mm ammunition 

5,850 rounds of 37-mm ammunition 

975 rounds of 57-mm ammunition 

121 rounds of 75-mm ammunition 

229 rounds of 76-mm ammunition 

806 rifle grenades 

35 mines 

36 mine detectors 

2,500 individual weapons 

93 crew-served weapons 

67 wheeled vehicles (from 

to 2Y2-ton truck) 

2,182 pounds of explosive 

5,994 blasting caps 

31 flame-throwers 

90,000 pages of documents 

71,805 pounds of food stor

Operation DELAWARE-LAM SON 216 was officially termi

on 17 May. General Rosson labeled Operation DELAWARE as 

one of the most audacious, skillfully executed and successful co

undertakings of the Vietnam War .. . It is significant that fro

inception DELAWARE was a combined effort entailing association o

1st Cavalry Division and the 3d ARVN Regiment, 1st ARVN Div

on the one hand, and the WIst Airborne Division and the 3d A

Airborne Task Force on the other. The outstanding results ach

through teamwork on the part of these combined forces reflect 

credit on their leadership, professionalism, and unsurpassed fig

zeal. 

The 1st Cavalry Division had gone into the A Shau Vall

the face of the heaviest enemy air defense ever encountere

airmobile operations up to that time. According to the mi

textbooks, this would have been called "medium intensity" 

aircraft fire. To the pilots who had to fly into this area day in 

day out, "medium" hardly seemed the appropriate descr

word. There is no doubt that the enemy had ringed this impo

base with sophisticated heavy antiaircraft defenses including 37

weapons. They had planned and interlocked their fire zones 

a period of some years. While the 1st Cavalry Division lost tw

one helicopters in this operation, the fact that they were ab

make a major move into such an area in the face of this t

and under the worst possible weather conditions is a tribu

the soundness of the airmobile concept. Some of the helico

that were lost ignored clear warnings of intense enemy conce
The enemy, of course, adjusted his fire to the obvious approaches. 

The list of ammunition, weapons, and equipment that was 

destroyed in Operation DELAWARE was most impressive in itself. 

This was, in a manner of speaking, the enemy's Cam Ranh Bay. 

However, I believe one of the greatest intangible results of this 

operation was the psychological blow to the enemy in discovering 

that there was no place in Vietnam where he could really establish 

a secure sanctuary. The enemy had always considered A Shau Valley to be his personal real estate and it was a symbol of his relative 

invulnerability. Operation DELAWARE destroyed that symbol. 

From the allied point of view, Operation DELAWARE brought 

out one important consideration. Weather had been the key planning factor on the timing of this operation from the beginning. 

The urgency to terminate Operation PEGASUS in order to go into 

the A Shau Valley was based on inches of rain to be expected after 

the month of April, not ceilings and visibilities which would prove 

so critical. In other words, the forecast monsoon rains (l"hich did 

occur) never produced the terrible flying conditions of low ceilings and scud which preceded them in April. An air cavalry division can operate in and around the scattered monsoon storms and 

cope with the occasional heavy cloudbursts far better than it can 

operate in extremely low ceilings and fog. The monsoon rains did, 

in fact, wash out the hastily constructed airfield but our capability 

for airmobile operations improved during the period. The lesson 

learned, then, was that one must be very careful to pick the proper 

weather indices in selecting an appropriate time for an airmobile 

operation. An inch of rain that falls in thirty minutes is not nearly 

as important as a tenth of an inch which falls as a light mist over 

24 hours. According to the long range forecast based on old French 

records, April was supposed to have been the best month for 

weather in the A Shau Valley. As it turned out, May would have 

been a far better month-but you don't win them all. 
CHAPTER X 

Airmobile Developments, 1968 

Change of Command at Military Assistance Command, Vie

On II June 1968, General William C. Westmoreland p

command of the U. S. forces in Vietnam to General Abrams, 

would serve as Acting Commander until General Westmor

was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the Army on 3 July. 

It would be presumptuous on my part to try to give an o

assessment of General Westmoreland's influence on the airm

concept during his four and one-half years as Commander, 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; however, there wa

doubt that General Westmoreland had set the airmobile stag

his subordinate commanders through his own strategy and e

ple. Most importantly, after giving them his broad concept 

operation, he allowed them that precious freedom which 

necessary for subordinates if they are expected to exercise 

own imagination and seize fleeting opportunity. 

For this study, it is important to again note that General 

moreland believed so much in the potential of airmobility th

was willing to commit the 1st Cavalry to a major operation 

days after its arrival-recognizing full well that a failure w

have been not only a setback for the war but a disaster fo

future of airmobility. Again, his decision to relieve Khe Sanh 

series of air assaults under the scrutiny of the entire world 

was solid affirmation of his confidence in the airmobile con

Appropriately, he would become the first Army Chief of St

wear the Army Aviator Badge. 

Enemy H elicopters.p 

On the night of 16 June 1968, an incident occurred that g

ically demonstrated the problems of command and control o

air space in the face of an enemy air threat. It also surfaced f

mental differences in the Air Force and Army concepts whi

not solved, could have a major impact on future airmobile t
py 

copters operating in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. 

Another report cited an attack on a U. S. Navy boat by an unidentified aircraft. Finally, it was reported that many of the enemy 

helicopters were destroyed by U. S. Air Force aircraft and by 

artillery. Two hours after the first report had been received, 7th 

Air Force dispatched a message stating that all aircraft, both helicopter and fixed-wing, operating in the I Corps T 'actical Zone 

would be under the positive control of Air Force ground radar 

stations. In effect, this Air Force message would have paralyzed all 

ground operations in this area. 

General Williams, Commanding General of the 1st Aviation 

Brigade, visited 7th Air Force Headquarters early on the morning 

of 17 June to inform the Chief of Staff of the 7th Air Force that 

compliance with the Air Force teletypewriter exchange was impractical since it would cut off not only tactical operations but also 

emergency resupply and medical evacuation flights in I Corps Tactical Zone. He pointed out that the 7th Air Force did not have a 

control means to handle even a fraction of the 1,000 Army aircraft 

that were in I Corps and that the 7th Air Force message itself was 

not valid since that headquarters was not in the U. S. Army, Vietnam, command channel. There is no record of III Marine Amphibious Force receiving the message or, if received, any 'objection to 

the message. At 1100 on 17 June the Chief of Staff of Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, informed the Chief of Staff of the 

7th Air Force that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, had 

not even been an information addressee on the message; that the 

message was impractical since it would stop combat operations; 

that it was not within the prerogative of the 7th Air Force to send; 

and that it would be rescinded. 

Colonel Eugene M. Lynch, Deputy Aviation Officer, U. S. 

Army, Vietnam, attended a meeting at 7th .Air Force Headquarters 

that same day to discuss this problem. The Air Force considered 

the helicopter sightings a serious threat to Da Nang Air Base and 

all other major installations in the I Corps Tactical Zone. Colonel 

Lynch emphasized the points that had been made previously ... 

that combat operations could not be stopped entirely and that the 

Army installations were quite capable of defending themselves 

against enemy helicopters. He suggested that the best anti-enemy 
18 June to discuss the Services positions and problems in this ma

ter. The Marines and the Army took similar positions, basical

that stated previously by General Williams. The Air Force cite

one of their problems was that of identifying the low slow-flyin

aircraft. 

As time passed and further investigations were conducted, 

developed that no finite evidence w.as available to confirm th

enemy helicopters had been observed in flight, on the ground, o

in a damaged state following claims of destruction by friendly ai

The previously accepted positive reports were discredited. 

My purpose in relating this incident is not to criticize an

Service or persons involved, but to highlight the lack of prior pla

ning in this most important area. The U. S. forces had enjoye

complete air superiority for so many years in Vietnam that th

mere possibility of the presence of even an enemy helicopter thre

all of their operational procedures into chaos. The Air For

reaction to a possible enemy air threat was predictable and, 

their estimation, the only realistic option at that time. The Arm

and the Marine ground elements, which depended on the unlim

ited use of the helicopters, naturally could not accept the rig

restrictions that the Air Force insisted was necessary. The incide

did not have a positive effect of clarifying the command channe

and some sober planning on means and methods to better rea

to future enemy air contingencies. It is an incident that shou

not be forgotten by the future planners of airmobility in any co

flict where absolute air superiority is not a basic assumption. 

The Second Airmobile Division 

On 28 June 1968 U. S. Army, Pacific published General Ord

325 which initiated reorganization of the 101st Airborne Divisio

into the Army's second airmobile division. This same order calle

for the Division to be redesignated the 10 1st Air Cavalry Divisio

effective I July 1968.1 

1 At this same time, the 1st Cavalry Division was redesignated the 1st Air Cava

Division. Indeed, the abbreviation "I ACD" had been in common use long befo

this official change. However, the terminology "air cavalry division" was revoked 

Department of the Army on 26 August 1968, and the designations were reestablish

as the lOlst Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobil

To avoid confusion, this monograph only refers to the two divisions' lat

designations. 
deficit in aviation assets during the buildup of forces in Vietnam 

had made such conversion impractical. The deployment of the 1

Brigade of the 10 1 st in 1965 has been covered in an earlier portio

of this study. In August 1967, two years and twenty-seven days aft

the departure of the 1st Brigade, the remainder of the 10 1st Ai

borne Division was alerted for deployment to Vietnam from Fo

Campbell, Kentucky. Originally, the Division was scheduled to b

ip country on 10 February 1968. However, this movement w

subsequently rescheduled for early December 1967. 

The culmination of the Division's preparation for deployme

was Operation EAGLE THRUST. This lift was keynoted by the depa

ture on 8 December of the Commanding General, Major Gener

Olinto M. Barsanti, in an aircraft piloted by General Howell M

Estes, Jr., Commander of the Military Airlift Command. O

18 December 1967 the last airplane touched down in Vietnam end

ing the largest and longest military airlift ever attempted into 

combat zone. The move had required 369 C-141 Starlifter aircra

missions and 22 C-133 Cargomaster aircraft missions, ultimate

airlifting 10,024 troops and over 5,300 tons of the Division's esse

tial equipment. 

During the 1968 Tet Offensive, elements of the Division move

to protect the cities of Saigon, Bien Hoa, Song Be, Phan Thie

and Hue. As mentioned earlier, elements in Saigon had helpe

secure the American Embassy during the first few hours of th

abortive enemy attack. The Division Headquarters moved to th

Hue area on 8 March 1968. The 10 1st would remain in this are

for the next few years. 

The Screaming Eagles participated in a series of combat oper

tions in the I Corps Tactical Zone to include Operation DELAWAR

near the A Shau Valley. Though the IOlst was not programme

into the A Shau Valley proper during this operation, it would b

back in force several times in the next few months. When th

order came to reorganize as an airmobile division, the 10 1st w

involved in Operation NEVADA EAGLE, a large rice-denial effort i

the plains south of Hue. 

The Division developed a three-phase plan to accomplish th

conversion from the airborne to the airmobile configuration. Th

first phase (1 July to 1 December 1968) would involve the activ

tion and organization of the 160th Aviation Group and a reorgan

zation of the division base. The second phase, which would not b
was determined that a full year would be necessary to convert 

10 1 st to an airmobile configuration. This time lag took into c

sideration the long range procurement of aviation assets and 

fact that the Division would continue to conduct combat operati

throughout the conversion period without degradation to its co

bat posture. 

The reorganization progressed in a smooth manner with a 

exceptions, one of these being in the aircraft maintenance ar

U. S. Army, Vietnam, and the 101st planners envisioned the n

airmobile division's aircraft maintenance as decentralized rat

than centralized. In this case, they hoped to profit from the exp

ence of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Aviation Briga

Higher headquarters had failed to establish this cellular conc

in its order for the conversion. Instead, it called for a large c

tralized maintenance and supply battalion. This problem 

resolved by U. S. Army Pacific General Order 607, dated 11 Oc

ber 1968, which established the desired cellular maintenance or

nization within the division. In effect, this married a maintena

cell with each company-sized aviation unit. This cell would h

the capability of providing both direct support and avion

main tenance. 

Many "chicken and the egg" arguments resulted from the fi

maintenance structure of the 101st versus the then current main

nance structure of the 1st Cavalry Division. The 1st Cavalry h

espoused decentralized maintenance ever since its deployment 

Vietnam, but there was finite limitations on the number of skil

mechanics and maintenance tool sets during the early build

phase. The arguments of the logisticians for centralized main

nance prevailed. 

When I took over the division in 1967, the division was s

tied to the maintenance "hub" at An Khe. Only the detached b

talion combat team at Ph an Thiet had its own maintenance ca

bility. Operation LEJEUNE, a week after I joined the divisi

convinced me that drastic action would have to be taken, an

ordered our logistics planners to develop maintenance kits t

could be easily moved with displaced units. In October 1967, wh

I had to send a brigade to Chu Lai, the problem became criti

Part of a maintenance battalion had gone with the brigade, 

there was still insufficient capability. 
their logistical plan. Ive already mentioned how fortunate we we

to have started our logistical bases at Red Beach and Hue-Phu B

prior to the Tet Offensive. When the 1st Brigade went to Qua

Tri, they had their maintenance with them. We had finally brok

down the "golf course" syndrome which was associated wi

An Khe. 

When the lOlst was ordered to an airmobile configuration, m

staff and I completely supported its concept of decentralized mai

tenance. The major portion of the tremendous responsibility f

converting the lOlst to its new configuration would soon be in t

very capable hands of Major General Melvin Zais. He would recei

the unqualified cooperation of every aviation commander in th

effort. 

Thoughts on Leaving the Cavalry 

On 15 July 1968 I turned over temp·orary command of the 

Cavalry Division to Brigadier General Richard L. Irby. Maj

General George J. Forsythe had already been announced as t

new Division Commanding General and would formally take co

mand on 19 August, after completing flight training. After fifte

months of combat, several points stood out in my mind as partic

larly significant to the airmobility concept. 

First, the vulnerability of the helicopter was still the mo

debatable issue in the entire military establishment. Depending 

one's preconceived notions, one could use the same statistics 

prove opposite viewpoints. For example, during calendar year 19

the 1st Cavalry had flown 977,983 sorties and had 688 aircraft h

Of these, 36 were shot down and lost. In the first six months 

1968, the Division had flown 407,806 sorties and had had 271 a

craft hit. Of these, 66 were shot down and lost. Part of this diff

ence could be attributed to the increased intensity of combat 

the northern I Corps Tactical Zone where the Division had be

fighting since January; part could be attributed to the improv

ment in the quantity and quality of the North Vietnamese Arm

antiaircraft weapons systems; but, much of this so-called "increas

vulnerability" was due to the thousands of random and sometim

uncontrolled flights by one or two aircraft performing separ

observation, administrative, and control missions. In other wor

I do not believe that we had a major increase in our losses in o
fit of detailed pre-flight intelligence briefings on especially "ho

zones and known enemy concentrations. It was particularly hazar

ous for the many transient aircraft that assumed they were in "sa

air" just because they were a few kilometers from a major U. 

installation. Before I left the Division, I initiated a formal stu

effort to quantify this observation. Unfortunately, this study w

never completed. 

The second major observation I made in my after action repo

of 15 July 1968 was the critical problem of protecting the airmob

division's helicopters on the ground. Until one has viewed at fi

hand the real estate necessary to park approximately 450 dispers

helicopters near their related aircraft maintenance facilities, it 

difficult to appreciate the magnitude of this problem. I know th

the Marines grossly underestimated our base camp requiremen

when we moved north into the I Corps Tactical Zone. They ju

could not believe that we really required the area we had ask

for-the equivalent of several major airfield complexes. 

Once established, these . areas had to be secured. This secur

was partly obtained by dispersion, construction of revetments, a

organization within the landing zone to separate the helicopte

from ammunition and fuel storage areas. Security was furth

enhanced by armed helicopter patrol~ throughout the night a

roving patrols on the ground. The ground patrols had to opera

at least to the range of enemy mortar. The security requiremen

sometimes caused a tremendous drain on combat resources if th

were not monitored closely by each tactical commander. Howev

it was my experience that an airmobile division cannot overlo

any detail in the security of its most valuable asset-its helicopte

My third comment concerned unit integrity. I've describ

earlier in this study how the 1st Cavalry Division was oft

"fragmented" to send forces of battalion size and brigade size 

other areas of operation. On the surface, it might appear like

that the division could have easily sent a proportionate share 

our aviation assets and maintenance to the same operation. As 

matter of fact, there was no proportionate share of airlift that aut

matically went with any brigade or battalion in the division. Th

division was conceived so that the division commander could va

the amounts of his assets that would be furnished to any porti

of his force during an operation. There was no set quota of airl

that was allocated on a daily basis to any unit in the division. Wh
cannot be used as the " fire brigade" for a theater commande

however, like the air cavalry squadron, its total effectiveness c

only be realized as an entity. 

My fourth observation was the constant need to be alert to t

over-utilization of rotary wing aircraft in the supply mission. Whi

I was the commander, I emphasized that our planning must alwa

include provisions for utilizing the Caribou, C-123, and C-1

aircraft wherever they could enhance our capabilities. I knew 

no instance during my tour in Vietnam when the 1st Cavalry Div

sion was denied this fixed-wing support when it was requeste

There were occasions when the division staff failed to plan f

these aircraft and took the easy way out by going ahead and usi

our organic Chinooks for long logistics hauls. Operation PEGAS

was a good example of careful planning for the maximum use 

the fixed-wing capabilities in the operational area. It would ha

been impossible to move the tonnages required in the time nec

sary without the careful preparation of landing zone STUD as 

forward fixed-wing base. 

As a fifth observation, I expressed my disappointment in o

item of equipment, the Mohawk. From the Division's point 

view, and I emphasize division) the six organic Mohawks did n

provide the expected intelligence. We made a sincere and contin

ous effort to use the Mohawk's side-looking airborne radar capab

ityand the infra-red capability, but the end product never justifi

the man-hours and assets required. I was particularly disappoint

in these results, because I had spent so much effort as Depu

Director and later as Director of Army Aviation in justifying th

system. In the early years we had made a big point of the necess

of having this capability at the division level. We had hoped th

the division commander would have a "real-time" read out of va

able information through a data link. After fifteen months, I h

to conclude that the Mohawk should be employed at corps a

theater level. 

Finally, no summary of my experience with the 1st Cava

Division would be complete without mentioning once again t

"man" part of the "man-machine" equation of airmobility. Duri

this period, I was particularly fortunate to have a series of o

standing officers and warrant officers. Space has not permitt

mentioning even a small percentage of their names. But, equa

important, the 1st Cavalry Division was blessed with a continuo
we must continuously produce here within the Division. These m

are smarter than the ones we had in World War II. They are just 

gallant and courageous also. The ones that have the talent must 

spotted early and must be promoted just as fast as it is possible to 

so. They do a tremendous job and respond to the challenge immed

ately. Continuous checks must be made to see that units are promoti

men who are doing the job just as fast as possible. I do not think the

should be any great concern of the caliber of NCOs that we have tod

in Vietnam because of their youth and brief experience. If they a

carefully selected and assisted as much as possible, they will carry t

ball. In fact the young soldier that we have in this Division today 

the greatest our Army has ever had during my service. There is 

wealth of material ready to become competent combat leaders. 

Status of the 1st Aviation Brigade 

In July of 1968 the 1st Aviation Brigade reassigned the 308

Aviation Battalion together with its support detachments to th

lOlst Airborne Division. This was part of the in-theater readjus

ment necessary for the airmobile reconfiguration of this divisio

This reassignment still left the 1st Aviation Brigade as the large

single Army aviation command in the world; indeed, larger tha

the air force of most countries. As of 31 July 1968, its strength w

25,181 men distributed as follows: 

Officers and Enlisted 

Warrant Officers Men 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 

1st Aviation Brigade 61 204 

12th Aviation Group 1644 6828 

16th Aviation Group 456 2883 

17th Aviation Group 1468 6577 

164th Aviation Group 593 3065 

58th Aviation Battalion 84 1228 

TOTAL 4306 20875 

The chronic shortage of aVlatlon personnel described in earli

chapters had finally been overcome by the expanded output of th

Army Aviation School and the leveling off of requirements 

Vietnam. Aviators, once frozen to their cockpit positions, we

again receiving normal ground assignments and schooling. Thoug

many aviators were still forced to anticipate recurring tours 
non of combat operations. No major plan was ever consider

without first determining the aviation assets available to supp

it. Nowhere was this better exemplified than in the 1st Aviati

Brigade. 

On the second anniversary of this unit back on May 25

General Abrams, Deputy Commander, U. S. Military Assistan

Command, Vietnam, summed up the feeling of the non-rated o

cers this way: "It has always been interesting for me to note th

the aviators and men of this Brigade have been taken into t

brotherhood of the combat arms. Not by regulation, not by po

tics, but they have been voted in by the infantry, who are t

chartered members of that secluded club, the combat arms." D

ing this same organizational day ceremony, noting the presence 

General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, G

eral Abrams added, "They are heroes to the district chiefs; th

are heroes to the province chiefs; and they are heroes to soldi

of every nation that fights here." 

During the same ceremony, General Vi en presented the Briga

its second Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm, an aw

earned by the men of the Brigade for their outstanding aerial s

port of such operations as JUNCTION CITY and JEB STUART, a

their opposition to the Tel offensive. General Williams, the Co

manding General of the 1 st Aviation Brigade, listed a few of 

Brigade's accomplishments during 1967 when they airlifted m

than five million troops-the equivalent of 313 infantry divisio

in more than 2.9 million sorties. In that year Brigade aircraft fl

more than 1.2 million hours-the equivalent of 137 years. T

Brigade was credited for killing 10,556 Viet Cong, sinking nea

10,000 supply sampans, and destroying more than 10,400 ene

structures and fortifications. 

It is very difficult to properly document the accomplishme

of the pilots and crews of the 1st Aviation Brigade since their de

have been interwoven in the combat operational reports of 

units which they supported. This support almost became accep

as routine. 

I have tried to spare the reader the series of inevitable "wir

diagrams" so beloved by many students of military organizatio

However, the organizational structure of the Brigade as of 31 Ju

has a special impact in the sheer number of separate aviation un

that were supporting the Free World Forces at this time. (Chart 
Key 

16CAG 

CAG: Combat Aviation Group 

CAB: Combat Aviation Battalion 

CHART 2-1sT AVIATION B

212 C

14 C

223 C

52 C

10 C

268 C

210 C

269 C

214 C

222 C

145 C

II C

13 C

307 C

AHC: Assault Helicopter Comp

UAC: Utility Airplane Compan

HHC: Heavy Helicopter Comp
Force Huey pilots, Republic of Korea and Thai aviators, as w

as U. S. and Australian personnel.2 The Brigade was also respon

ble for the supervision of the New Equipment Training Tea

which eased the introduction of complex eqJ.lipment into the op

ating units. 

These training teams performed a vital function in smooth

the way for complex equipment that was introduced rapidly in

combat. A small group of experts would arrive with every n

aircraft system and armament sub-system and work with in-coun

personnel to build up experience and iron out maintenance pr

lems that are inherent in any new system. 

For example, back in September 1967 when the first Hu

Cobra (AH-IG) arrived. in Vietnam, a New Equipment Train

Team was ready for the aircraft. This team used the first six Cob

to check out the pilots of the 334th Assault Helicopter Compa

When the design problems and maintenance problems were solv

these Cobras were then assigned to that company. The N

Equipment Training Team pilots traveled from unit to unit 

standardize procedures and to record early problems which w

immediately relayed to Continental U. S. Some of the proble

were not technical but more operational in nature, such as exp

enced in the Cobra where pilots missed the telltale noises of ene

fire, which they could hear through the open door of the ol

armed Huey, and the additional eyes and ears of the door gunne

Some modifications of tactics and techniques were necessary. 

The New Equipment Training Teams highlight another fa

of the growth of airmobility in Vietnam. Never in any previ

war had there been so much new and complex equipment int

duced into actual combat in such a short period with a minim

amount of problems. The transition from the old fleet of worn 

H-21's to a modern turbinized sophisticated fleet of thousands 

been accomplished on the battlefield. The combination of 

training base in the United States, an aerial line of communi

tions, superb logistics, and the know-how of American industry h

made this possible. 

2 One unique company of the Brigade. which supported the Australian T

Force, was composed of 50 percent Australian Navy personnel with the other 

U. S. Army. 
MAP 8 

5 

I 

, ! 

An Example of Cordon Operations 

5 MILE

I 

Airmobile forces often can be best employed with other forc

to achieve unique capabilities when a special opportunity presen

itself. I have previously described airmobile operations with arm

in Binh Dinh Province. The following operation, in which t

lOlst Airborne Division participated in a combined air-sea-Ia

maneuver, demonstrates again the imaginative use of all Fr

World capabilities. Helicopters, air-cushion vehicles, swift boa

and armored personnel vehicles were effectively employed in 

integrated force. 3 But Operation VINH Loc was not a mere demo

• The air-cushion vehicles used their unique capability of operating in swam

or very shallow water to patrol otherwise inaccessible areas. Most of these machi

saw duty in the Mekong Delta region where they had done a magnificent job. I h

not treated them extensively in this study, since they are not really an extension 

airmobile operations so much as riverine operations. During the 1950's, the Ar

experimented with a variety of so-called "ground effects machines." They- were m

noted for their instability and huge "signature," than their practicality. 
g g

Operation VINH Loc, a combined operation of elements of t

101st Airborne Division, the U. S. Navy, and Republic of Vietn

forces was conducted in Thua Thien Province during the peri

10-20 September 1968. Vinh Loc Island, fifteen miles east of Hu

is a sub-tropical island with sandy beaches, palm trees, and r

paddies. (Map 8) It is almost completely fiat with the excepti

of two small hills on the southeastern end. 

The Tet offensive had left a power vacuum on the island sin

most of the Regional and Popular Force units had been press

into service at Hue. Viet Cong forces moved into this vacuum a

established a sanctuary, prepared defensive positions, and est

lished caches. As a symbol of their power, they had staged a pub

execution of a village elder and a thirteen-year·old girl to demo

strate the consequences which local residents could expect if th

failed to support the Viet Congo 

One allied operation had been conducted on the island prior 

Operation VINH Loc. On 9 July 1968 the 2d Battalion, 7

Marines, 1st U. S. Marine Division, had begun a one-week ope

tion. The Marines did not encounter organized resistance, for m

of the enemy preferred to hide or mingle with the civilians rath

than fight. The civilians were reluctant to provide any informati

about the enemy because they felt the Viet Cong would reass

their dominance as soon as the Marines withdrew. 

When three Regional Force companies tried a sweep operati

of the area on 4 September, they were pinned down by inten

mortar, rocket, and small arms fire. Only the suppressive fire of 

armed helicopters of the 10 I st Airborne Division allowed th

units to break contact. American advisors estimated that th

were at least two Viet Cong reinforced companies and possibly 

battalion in the area . 

While these activities were occurring, plans were being ma

for a combined operation to end enemy influence on the isla

The concept of operations envisaged cordoning the island w

naval and ground forces while air assaults were planned to ov

come organized resistance and to fragment enemy units. All av

able district resources would be used in this search. 

General Zais, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Divis

(Airmobile), Major General Truong, Commanding General, 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division, and Colonel Le V

Than, Province Chief of Thua Thien, approved of the concept 
An Area Coordination Center was established under the overa

direction of the Commanding Officer, 2d Brigade, 10ist Airborn

Division_ This center was staffed by the Deputy Province Chie

the U_ S. Deputy Sector Advisor, the District Chief, and the Com

manding Officer, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 501st Infantry. Th

center also included an intelligence section comprised of repre

sentatives from the province and district intelligence staffs, th

U. S. battalion S-2 section, Special Branch Police, National Polic

and the Census Grievance Committee. The entire group would b

moved to Vinh Loc District Headquarters after the combat assaul

On 9 September one Regional Force company withdrew from 

the island as planned. The next day Company D, 1st Battalio

(Airborne), 501st Infantry moved from the northeastern end o

the island to an area just north of the Vinh Loc-Phu Yang Distri

boundary. The paratroopers had been operating in this area t

provide security for the Col Co beach naval supply facility, so th

maneuver did not arouse enemy suspicion. It was also designed t

drive enemy forces southeast along the island into Vinh Loc Di

trict. The 54th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment ha

been conducting operations in Phu Thu District. The 2d and 3

battalions of the regiment moved into blocking positions along th

northeast coast of Phu Thu District to drive the enemy across th

water into Vinh Loc. This maneuver was also an extension of no

mal operations and did not reveal to the enemy the impendin

move into Vinh Loc. The 3.d Troop, 7th Army of the Republic o

Vietnam Cavalry moved with its armored personnel carriers to th

Hue Landing Craft, Utility, ramp, then down the Perfume Rive

on medium landing craft to the Tan My LST ramp opposite Co

Co beach. They remained in the Tan My area until the night o

10 September and, under the cover of darkness, crossed over t

Vinh Loc to a position south of the Col Co beach facility. 

During the night of 10-11 September, the U. S. and Vietnames

Navy converged around the island and at first light on 11 Septem

ber the encirclement of the island was complete. At 0732 thre

companies of the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry conducted air a

saults into three landing zones on the seaward side of the islan

and started reconnaissance in force to the south. Forty-five mem

bers of the National Police Field Forces had been evenly distribute

between the three companies. The 1st Battalion of the 54th Arm

of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment conducted an air assau
All personnel encountered were detained for questioning 

the Special Branch Police. These police interrogated detain

immediately and were able to classify innocent civilians on 

spot. The latter were then escorted to safe areas. All other detain

were evacuated to the combined intelligence center. Here th

classified as Viet Cong or North Vietnamese soldiers were moved 

a Prisoner of War compound and evacuated through U. S. chann

after interrogation. Members of the Viet Cong infrastructure 

civilian dependents were evacuated through province chann

Hamlet and village chiefs were used to assist in the identificati

An interesting ruse was perpetrated on the enemy by the 

trict 5-2. As darkness approached on II September, the Army 

the Republic of Vietnam cavalry troop and infantry battalion 

231 detainees to be evacuated to the combined intelligence cen

Beginning at 2220 hours, CH-47 helicopters arrived to transp

these personnel · to the center. As the first lift landed and 

detainees began disembarking, the district 5-2 was waiting 

them. Amid the dust and confusion, he commanded in a loud vo

"K4B (battalion) over here, Cl17 (company) over there, C

(company) over there." To the surprise of everyone, except p

haps the 5-2, sixty-three of the detainees segregated themselves 

he had directed. The S-2 then took personnel from those who 

obeyed his command to those who had not responded and ask

"Is there anyone from your unit who did not fall out?" Additio

prisoners were thus identified. 

Numerous Eagle Flights were used to conduct ambushes and 

rapidly exploit intelligence as it developed. Each company c

ducted detailed searches in its zone. While ground forces w

ferreting out the enemy, the Navy and the 2d and 3d Battalio

54th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, maintained 

effective cordon of the island. The results of this relatively sm

operation, which ended on the 20th of · September, were v

impressive. One hundred and fifty-four enemy were killed, 

were captured (including 116 members of the infrastructure) , 

56 Viet Cong rallied to the government cause. Only two frien

troops were killed and nine wounded. 

Equally important, it should be noted that the destruction 

civilian property and the danger to the civilian populace were h

to an absolute minimum. Preparation fires for the combat assa

were limited to barren areas near the landing zones. Though s
civilians were wounded and three huts destroyed during the entir

operation. 

The success of Operation VINH Loc was due to its detaile

planning and coordination and the full utilization of all resource

available-airmobile, naval, and ground. The establishment of th

combined command post made possible the immediate flow o

information between intelligence, operations, and fire support ele

ments. The integration of the Popular Force platoons and th

police forces into the U. S. units overcame the language barrie

and permitted rapid distinction between civilians and enemy forces

Most importantly, the island was not left in a vacuum when th

operation was over. One U. S. rifle company and an Army of th

Republic of Vietnam battalion remained on the island to assist in 

the resettlement of the population, and to aid district forces in 

maintaining a secure atmosphere. Self-defense cadre were traine

at district level, and rural development teams were inserted t

assist in the re-establishment of local government, and to help th

people improve health and sanitation measures, as well as agricul

tural methods. Operation VINH Loc, although modest in size, had 

shown how the United States and Republic of Vietnam force

could enhance their individual capabilities through mutual plan

ning, coordination, and cooperation. 

T he Cavalry Moves South 

One of the more difficult military tasks is to move a division in 

contact with the enemy to another area of a combat theater, reposi

tion it quickly, and have it ready to fight. In Vietnam where ther

were never any front lines nor truly secure rear areas, such a mov

had special problems. Operation LIBERTY CANYON, which was th

code name given to the move of the 1st Cavalry Division from 

Corps Tactical Zone to II I Corps Tactical Zone in the fall of 1968

is one of the best examples of rapidly moving an entire division-

move that was made so professionally and smoothly that it even 

achieved strategic and tactical surprise to a knowledgeable enemy

The 1st Cavalry Division had become the world's acknowledged 

expert at pulling up stakes. 

General Forsythe received a phone call on the night of 26 Octo

ber 1968 alerting him that his division would move as quickly a

possible by air and sea to the III Corps Tactical Zone and take 
their positions to assume the large area of responsibility of the 

Cavalry Division so that no vacuum would be left into which 

enemy could infiltrate. Speed was of the essence and planning ti

would be at a minimum. 

On 27 October General Forsythe, accompanied by four 

staff members, departed Camp Evans and arrived at Headquart

II Field Force Vietnam at approximately 2230. The group w

briefed by their equivalent members of the staff of Lieuten

General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., Commanding General, II Fi

Force, Vietnam. The initial meeting determined that the m

would begin on the 28th by air and sea with one brigade clos

by 2 November. The 1st Cavalry staff members furnished II Fi

Force Vietnam planners the division's estimated daily consumpt

of supplies and fuel, and estimated exactly when and where th

supplies would be needed during and after the move. Airc

density by type and ground equipment density by type had to 

determined as of the time of move and hasty decisions made as 

what would go by air and what would go by sea. A freeze was est

lished on all major personnel changes until further notice. 

On the following day the groups met with Lieutenant Gene

Frank T. Mildren, Deputy Commanding General, U. S. Army V

nam, and members of his staff. During this meeting, import

decisions were made concerning the disposition of the aviat

units, engineer effort for revetments and storage facilities, and ti

phasing for the brigades of the Division to begin operations in th

new area. Also, it was determined that the Division base would 

located at Phuoc Vinh and the Division Support Headquart

would be located at Bien Hoa. A temporary Forward Comm

Post would be established at Long Binh for a period not to exc

two weeks. 

Many different agencies and all Services had to participate 

the planning at a very early .stage. The Air Force would have 

know the number of C-130 sorties required against the maxim

sorties per day available. The Navy needed to know the size 

quantity of equipment to be moved by sea and where it wo

embark and debark. They would then determine the shipping t

could be made available for the move. The Movement Con

Center, Saigon Support Command, the 1st Logistical Comma

and the 1st Aviation Brigade were brought into the planning d

ing the next day. 
mined that three LSTs would be available for loading at Tan M

on 28 October and two LST's available each day thereafter un

completion of the move. The aircraft carrier Princeton was ma

available to move aircraft and equipment from the Da Nang ar

Transportation was set up to haul organizational equipment fro

division unit locations at landing zone BETTy-SHARON, landing zo

NANCY, and Camp Evans to loading facilities at Tan My Ram

Quang Tri Airfield, and Phu Bai Airfield. 

All the units of the division had contingency plans for air mov

ment but these had to be modified on the spot to separate wh

was to be moved by air and what would be moved by s

At Camp Evans, General Irby, Assistant Division Command

Alpha, directed that ~-ton vehicles and smaller equipment wou

go by air with the troops, along with their individual combat ge

radios, and small arms. Selected larger pieces of equipment we

approved for air movement on an individual basis. All other equ

ment was to move by sea. The aerial ports of departure were Cam

Evans, Quang Tri, and Phu Bai. 

On 29 October the Division completed and published an 

movement plan which served as a guide as to when units wou

depart and the number of aircraft needed at origin and the des

nation of these aircraft. Due to the changes in the units stationi

plan in III Corps Tactical Zone, it was, necessary to make da

adjustments to this planned program. (The changes in the statio

ing plan were the result of later revised intelligence which caus

General Forsythe to reorient some combat maneuver and aircr

assault units.) Even with these numerous changes, there was 

case of an aircraft being on the ground available for loading wi

out a load ready to be put aboard. As it turned out, aircraft loa

were positioned well in advance of actual aircraft arrivals. 

Units of the Division did not have definitive sea moveme

plans although they had made a sea movement into I Cor

Tactical Zone just nine months earlier, utilizing eleven vesse

However, since that time, the Division had received a significa

amount of additional equipment which made the previous s

movement experience invalid. The Division was offered initia

more sea movement assets than it was capable of utilizing. Expe

ence quickly indicated that the amount of regular incoming carg

which was already back-logged on the ramps at Tan My, made 

possible to pre-position only two LST loads without choking t
J, 

i; 

. ~ 

'.~ 

keep information updated and to properly move cargo forwar

based on the actual loading situation. 

Container express containers were utilized to the utmost i

packing cargo for sea movement. Units which had insufficient con

tainer express containers were provided pallets on which to loa

cargo. Incidentally, the Division had been urged for months b

U. S. Army, Vietnam, to turn in a substantial number of on-han

container express containers. As it turned out, if these container

had been disposed of, the sea movement would not have been pos

sible within the prescribed time frame. 

Combat elements of the Division's 3d Brigade were the first t

move and upon closing in the new area were placed under th

operational control of the 1st Infantry Division, while combat ele

ments of the 1st Brigade on closing were placed under th

operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. The Divisio

Headquarters deployed to Phuoc Vinh on 7 November and opera

tional control of the 3d Brigade was returned to the 1st Cavalr

Division. On 9 November, the Division assumed operational con

trol of the 1st Brigade and combat elements of the 2d Brigad

closed in the area under Division control on 12 November. Th

last combat essential equipment of the Division closed into II

Corps Tactical Zone on 15 November 1968. Combat elements o

the Division immediately began extensive reconnaissance in forc

operations throughout Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Lon

Provinces in an effort to stem enemy infiltration along the Cam

bodian border. 

During Operation LIBERTY CANYON the 1st Cavalry Divisio

used 437 C-130 sorties to move 11,550 passengers and 3,399 sho

tons of cargo. Additionally, a total of 31 LST's, three LPD's, thre

LSD's, and one aircraft carrier were used to transport 4,097 passen

gers and 16,593 short tons of cargo. The 1st Cavalry Division ha

moved on 24 hours notice over 570 miles by land, sea, and air, an

immediately took over a large area of operations during a critic

time. With the exception of thirty aircraft which were moved o

the aircraft carrier, the remaining 415 aircraft flew all the wa

south. Many of them had been hastily repaired for a one-time fligh

However, the move was not without certain problems. Colon

William C. Dysinger, Commander of the Support Command fo

the Division, did not have enough movement control personnel t

over eight departure and arrival airfields and four seaports. How
with established special telephone circuits which became essenti

Theater support from all Services was timely and effectiv

General Irby was later to recall: 

The 1st Aviation Brigade did an outstanding job. They set 

refueling, over-night stops, and food stations enroute. Our people cou

stop and get a rest break and something to eat and spare parts if th

needed them ... The Air Force and Navy were very responsive on t

move. We coordinated on a minute-to-minute basis on the availabil

of C-130's, and the departure airfield control by the Air Force w

outstanding. 

General Forsythe summarized Operation LIBERTY CANYON 

follows: 

From northern I CTZ to the jungle frontier areas of northweste

III CTZ, the Division moved and deployed to interdict the movem

of four enemy divisions as they attempted to move souhward for 

attack on the heartland of South Vietnam. The move was comple

with great speed- (the first unit was in combat in III CTZ within 

hours after it was alerted to move, and the Division was closed in 

days) -and with strategic surprise (the enemy was confronted sudden

with a major force air assaulted astride his avenues of approach a

into his prepared base areas with no prior warning) . During the f

nine days of the twelve day move, one brigade concurrently conduc

and completed a major combat operation in northern I CTZ to pe

trate the My Chanh Valley VC base area. In III CTZ the Division w

given an immense area of operations (4,800 square miles); was ba

where existing space and facilities could be found (occupying 9 ba

for our aircraft fleet) ; was given broad mission-type orders ("constit

the II FFV covering force") ; and was given wide latitude and freed

of action to maneuver. In addition, care was taken not to fragment 

Division or its assets, to permit the full range of its power, to find 

enemy and to be shifted to fight him wherever he was found. It w

proven beyond doubt that the total power of an airmobile division 

greater than the sum of its parts. In short, we were given the oppor

nity to test the "theory of design and concept" of the airmobile divis

and we found it to be sound and practical. 
CHAPTER XI 

The Changing War and Cambodia, 

1969-1970 

The Changing War 

Emphasis on the word "Vietnamization" after 1968 has tende

to hide the fact that there was a great deal of mutual cooperation

training, and planning all along. In literally hundreds of specif

areas, we had already long ago agreed that the Vietnamese shoul

have full control of operations; and, in the Delta, which we wi

review in this chapter, it had always been the modus operand

Notwithstanding, we saw the need to do much more. The U. 

Army increased existing programs to train the South Vietnames

in all aspects of airmobility including pilot and crew instruction

joint operations, in many cases from collocated U. S. and Army o

the Republic of Vietnam division and brigade bases, and join

logistics. The operation into Cambodia in 1970 was an extremel

successful example of what we could do together. The outstandin

actions of all Army of the Republic of Vietnam units involve

showed us that we were on solid ground in phasing our respons

bilities over to the South Vietnamese. This was followed by 

successful return to the same area the following year and by a

incursion into Laos-LAMSON 719-in which Army of the Republ

of Vietnam forces took on the very best that the North Vietnames

could muster and came out on top. This phase has been marke

by the best spirit and mutual cooperation that the war has yet see

and by a dramatic tightening of the airmobile capabilities of Arm

of the Republic of Vietnam forces. 

Supporting the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in the Delta 

Earlier in this volume we touched on U.S. operations in th

Delta region, but our examination of airmobility in Vietnam woul

be incomplete without mentioning the extraordinary accomplish

ments of our Army aviation units who for many years had bee
mand of the 1st Aviation Brigade on 6 January 1970 from Ma

General Allen M. Burdett, Jr., was to remark: 

... The real story of the Aviation Brigade is in the 164th Gro

in the Delta. Elsewhere it was. 'give so many helicopters here; and 

many there.' The CG, 1st Aviation Brigade, exercised very little con

over the assets of the Brigade in the I,ll, and III Corps. But the 16

Group ·was not precisely controlled. Its commander could move ass

organize task forces ... They had an organization for combat wh

permitted a diversity of aviation assets to support three AR 

divisions. 

In December 1969 Colonel William J. Maddox, Jr.,1 w

assigned as Commanding Officer of the 164th Aviation Gro

after commanding the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Divisi

It was a fortuitous choice since Colonel Maddox had had extens

experience in the Delta-first, as Commanding Officer of the 1

Aviation Battalion, from July 1965 to August 1966; and, second

Senior Advisor to the 21st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Inf

try Division, from September 1966 to June 1967. Besides 

unique geographic features, the big difference between the ope

tions in the IV Corps Tactical Zone and the other areas of Vietn

was the lack of any long-term division-size U. S. troop commitme

This made the aviation group commander in a very large sense 

"airmobile commander" in the Delta. 

When Colonel Maddox returned to the Delta in 1969 he fou

that the allocation of the Group's 570 aircraft had not chang

materially since the time he had been the Commanding Officer 

the 13th Aviation Battalion, and he instituted major organizatio

changes to make airmobile support more responsive. The 

change was the decentralization of the aviation assets into t

forces-flexible organizations built around the assigned battal

and squadron headquarters. The 13th Aviation Battalion beca

Task Force GUARDIAN in support of the 21st Army of the Repub

of Vietnam Division. Task Force COUGAR was built around 

214th Aviation Battalion and supported both the 9th and 7th Ar

of the Republic of Vietnam Divisions. The Army of the Repub

of Vietnam forces in the border provinces, which had been de

1 Colonel Maddox, one of the most decorated officers in the United States Ar

was to be promoted to Brigadier General in July 1970 and become Directo

Army Aviation on 18 September 1970. 
ppg

307th Aviation Battalion. This latter unit was assigned the genera

support mission because it had the Chinook and Mohawk compa

nies. This task force organization had a marked impact on th

effectiveness of airmobile operations in the Delta and was warml

welcomed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam commander

and their senior advisors. Colonel Maddox insisted that the batta

ion commanders visit each division they supported on a daily bas

for personal coordination with either the division commander o

his senior advisor. 

The 13th Aviation Battalion had a long and proud history o

airmobile support in the Delta even before there was a major U. 

presence in Vietnam. During the buildup in 1965, operations i

the Delta received a lesser priority because of the overwhelmin

need to provide aviation assets to the major U. S. units arrivin

in country. Nevertheless, throughout this growth period the 13t

Aviation Battalion was supporting major Army of the Republic o

Vietnam operations against a well-organized powerful enemy. 

In 1965 the IV Corps Tactical Zone was organized into 15 sep

rate provinces. An additional province-Sa Dec-was formed i

1966. Each one of these provinces had an airfield at or near i

provincial capital. Colonel Maddox set up a system of rearm an

refuel points at each one of the 'fifteen airfields. This gave the 13

Aviation Battalion a "grid" across the Delta so that, with th

exception of the extreme southern tip of the Ca Mau Penisul

no aircraft was more than twenty minutes away from a place wher

it could be rearmed and refueled. 

Colonel Maddox would recall that when he arrived in 196

refueling was accomplished by sending fuel trucks to the neare

airfield in the proposed area of operation on D-l. This was a

obvious message to the Viet Cong that an operation was to tak

place and was a completely unreliable method of establishing 

refueling point. Colonel Maddox pressured the appropriate Vie

namese and U.S. agencies to establish a pool of a million gallon

of petroleum, oils, and lubricants which was broken out among th

15 airfields. Eventually, these same refueling points would hand

rearmament as well. 

In 1965 it was conservatively estimated that the Viet Cong ha

a strength in the Delta of 26 battalions including some very stron

provisional battalions. One of these, known as the Tay Do Batta

ion in Can Tho Province, was considered to be a far more dete
During 1965 and 1966 the three Army of the Republic of Vi

nam divisions chipped away at the Viet Cong strength until th

were able to reduce the size of their airmobile operations to co

pany size units because of the lessening threat. The 21st Divisio

in particular, commanded by Colonel (later Major Genera

Nguyen Van Minh, was aggressive and imaginative in pursui

the hard core Viet Congo Colonel Minh and Colonel Robert 

Spilman, who was the 21st Division Senior Advisor, were large

responsible for building the enviable record of the 21st Division. 

The helicopter gunship became the one weapons system th

could respond to the farflung outposts in a few moments notice d

or night. The Vietnamese depended very heavily on gunship su

port and to a lesser extent on tube artillery. Operations in t

Delta usually utilized three 5-helicopter gun platoons in the assau

One platoon would prepare a landing zone; a second platoon wou

accompany the lift ships into the landing zone; and the thi

platoon came in behind the lift ships to take over responsibil

for fire support. Two officers of the 13th Aviation Battalion-Maj

Robert F. Molinelli and Captain Robin K. Miller-were singl

out for official and unofficial recognition. Both of these individu

had made major contributions to gunship tactics in the Delta. 

Major Molinelli and Captain Miller would be honored by bei

selected at different times by the Army Aviation Association 

"Aviator of the Year." Space will not permit a full account of the

accomplishments nor even a mention of the many other splend

young men who served in the Delta-especially, those brave soldie

who manned the lonely rearm and refuel points for months on en

However, they formed the backbone of the major airmobility inn

vation in the Delta-the dedicated task force concept. 

Colonel Maddox, in explaining his rationale for forming ta

forces, remarked: 

... I have never agreed with blade time allocations at the low

levels of command; I have never believed in maintaining release tim

I have never believed that an individual who supports should be ove

concerned with the specific command relationship he has with t

supported force ... I found under the task force concept that the su

ported division actually became a proponent for his aviation suppo

Senior advisors and division commanders bragged to me that they h

released assets early so that the aircraft could go home for daylig

maintenance. I found in general that the relationships became v

close and the level of support became much higher .. . We fou
The Cavalry's Cambodian Campaign 

Probably no single operation better demonstrated the airmobi

concept than the 1st Cavalry Division's Cambodian campaig

Complete documentation of this important battle, to include th

major Army of the Republic of Vietnam operation in the "Parro

Beak," is an appropriate subject for a separate monograph. He

we will only be able to highlight this operation to bring out tho

salient points of the airmobility concept not touched upon 

earlier chapters. This was the first example of a large-scale U. 

airmobile force in operation outside the borders of South Vietnam

It was the first time our commanders were allowed to cross t

frustratingly close borders into the heart of the enemy sanctuar

Beginning in the fall of 1968 the 1st Cavalry Division h

straddled the enemy trails leading southward from the Cambodi

border toward Saigon. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Arm

made desperate attempts to reestablish their logistical net in th

area, with an obvious aim of repeating the attacks of Tet 196

Beginning early in 1969 the 1st Cavalry fought a series of hea

skirmishes along these trails as three separate North Vietname

Army divisions attempted to gain positions closer to the capit

The enemy effort was not successful. The 1st Cavalry's interdicti

of the planned enemy operations for Tet 1969 is an untold sto

that merits much further study; although the enemy force w

equally strong as it had been a year earlier during the infamo

Tet attacks, the North Vietnamese Army plans were frustrated 

the wide-ranging air cavalry surveillance and the superior mobil

of the 1st Cavalry. 

The enemy attempt during the early months of 1970 w

weaker than the previous year. Nevertheless, several battalions d

try to operate in force along the trail systems. At this time the 

Cavalry area of operation covered 14,000 square kilometers. Airm

bile troops kept a careful eye on five major north-to-south tra

stretching from Tay N inh Province across Binh Long and into t

western two-thirds of Phuoc Long. There were several instances 

which the cavalrymen uncovered base camps and fair-sized cach

however, it was evident that there was more to be found. Logisti

trails of this size had to be supplied by warehouse type cache si

far more extensive than anything yet discovered. 
CAMBODIA 

~ Areas of activit, 

.. 0 25 50 MILES 

I! liIt'd iii i .5 0 25 50 KILOMETERS 

MAP 9 

Although very little intelligence information was available c

cerning enemy operations in Cambodia, i.t was quite clear tha

major enemy logistics effort was going on there. The staff of 

1st Cavalry felt that with the trails cut off the Division was caus
This area of Cambodia that borders III Corps Tactical Zone o

the Republic of Vietnam had been used extensively by the Vie

Cong and North Vietnamese since 1961 after the organization o

Central Office South Vietnam, the headquarters commanding a

Viet Cong and North Vietnam Army forces in III and IV Corp

During this period of nine years, the enemy had developed a serie

of base camps to house the administrative units of the Centr

Office South Vietnam headquarters plus a large number of assoc

ated units and subordinate commands. This included an artiller

command, a security guard regiment, the 5th Viet Cong Division

the 7th North Vietnam Army Division, the 9th Viet Cong Div

sion, and many service regiments. Although Allied forces ha

approached the border in large operations such as JUNCTION CITY

ATTLEBORO, and more recently the operations of the 1st Cavalr

Division, the enemy had always had the advantage of being ab

to withdraw to the safety of his Cambodian sanctuaries. 

The "Fishhook" of Cambodia extended from the generally fl

plains adjacent to Mimot (Map 9) northeast through roughly rol

ing plains; and east to the roughly dissected hills and low moun

tains near O'Rang. Multi-canopied, dense undergrowth forest w

the dominant natural vegetation throughout the area. Rubb

plantations were found primarily in the western section. Ope

areas with dry crops, upland rice or marshes were scattered throug

out. This area, because of its inaccessibility and the dense veg

tation cover was extremely favorable to guerrilla warfare an

restricted heliborne and mechanized operations. Generally, co

cealment from both aerial and ground observations was excellen

The sequence of events which unfolded during the weeks whic

preceded the operation-the removal of Prince Norodom Sihanou

as Cambodian Chief of State, the closing of the port of Sihanou

ville, and limited allied operations in other portions of <;:;ambodi

had alerted the enemy to possible cross-border operations. Neve

theless, the enemy was not prepared for the massive assault 

follow, nor was he prepared for an assault in depth. It is clear no

that the North Vietnam Army felt that any crossing of the bord

would be a shallow operation of perhaps two or three kilometer

He was to discover, to his consternation, that the allied forces we

at times twenty kilometers to his rear. 

On 26 April 1970 Major General Elvy B. Roberts, th

Division Commander, received instructions from Lieutenant Ge
Cambodia. He was told that the 1st Cavalry should be prepar

to implement this operation within 72 hours of notification. 

This operation, here referred to as the "Cambodian Campaign

was officially entitled "Operation TOAN THANG 43, TOAN THAN

45, and TOAN THANG 46." It did not include the Army of the 'R

public of Vietnam operations in the area of the "Parrot's Beak" 

the south which were concurrent and continued after the ope

tions of the 1st Cavalry Division. 

During the period 26 to 28 April, the 1st Cavalry Division a

the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division conduct

joint planning for the operation. The major consideration at th

time was the allocation of sufficient forces to insure success

accomplishment of the mission while continuing to conduct tacti

operations within the III Corps Tactical Zone. The Allied for

that were to be used for the Cambodian Campaign were th

deployed against the northern tier of III Corps Tactical Zone. T

1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry was deployed in the far weste

War Zone "C"; the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airbor

Brigade was in central War Zone "C" ; and the 11th Armored C

alry Regiment and 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry, were in the east

portion. The 9th Regiment, 5th Army of the Republic of Vietn

Division was operating in Binh Long Province with the 2d Ar

of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Brigade to their east. T

2d Brigade of the Cavalry was in Phuoc Long Province. The Di

sion Artillery Commander was responsible for the defense o

large sector centering on the division headquarters at Ca

Gorvad. 

Essentially, an attack into Cambodia meant little change in 

operations of the 1st Cavalry. The Division had been moving p

gressively up to the border and expanding its interdiction ope

tions both to the east and the . west. Small hasty fire bases, e

established only for a few days, had become the method of ope

tion. Company and platoon-size airmobile units fanned out throu

wide areas of jungle and forest, travelling light, receiving resup

only once every three days. Since the division was already conc

trating on fast-moving, light operations, leap-frogging from o

small hasty fire base to the next, the order for the Cambodian ca

paign simply told it to do more of the same. 

On 28 April, the division was further directed to be prepa

to commence operations within 48 hours of notification. It h
the 1st Cavalry Division, Brigadier General Robert M. Shoemaker

A combined U~S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam staf

was assembled at this time and prepared the final plans for th

operation. 

For Bob Shoemaker, this would be the culmination of years o

dedicated effort to prove the airmobility concept. Ever since th

early days of the 11 th Air Assault Division and the movement o

the 1st Cavalry to Vietnam, he had been recognized as one of th

foremost tacticians of airmobility. 

The concept of the operation was that Task Force Shoemaker

consisting of the 3d Brigade with one mechanized infantry battal

ion and one tank battalion under operational control, the 3d Arm

of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Brigade, and the 11 t

Armored Cavalry Regiment, would conduct air assaults and groun

attacks into the "Fishhook" of Cambodia. Following an intensiv

preparation phase of B- 52 strikes, tactical air strikes, and artiller

bombardment, the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborn

Brigade would air assault into the area north of the objective t

seal off escape routes and begin operations to the south. Simultane

ously, the task force (-) would attack north across the Cambodia

Border with the 3d Brigade on the west and the 11 th Armore

Cavalry Regiment on the south and east. The 1st Squadron, 9t

Cavalry (-) would conduct screening operations in the task forc

area of operations while elements of the 9th Army of the Republi

of Vietnam Regiment and the 1st Army of the Republic of Vie

nam Armored Cavalry Regiment would screen to the east in Bin

Long Province adjacent to the objective area. All elements woul

then conduct search and interdiction oper.ations to locate an

exploit enemy lines of communication and cache sites in the objec

tive area. 

In the early hours of I May, six serials of B-52's dropped the

heavy ordnance on hard targets within the primary objective area

The last bomb went off at 0545. Fifteen minutes later an intens

artillery preparation began with the priority to the proposed land

ing zones in the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborn

Brigade's objective area. D-day had arrived. 

At 0630 the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Cavalry Reg

ment began its movement from the northwest of An Loc towar

the border. At the same time a 15,000 jJound bomb, with an ex

tended fuse designed to detonate about seven feet above the ground
directing tactical air strikes on pre

planned targets, shifting to 

3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Brigade's object

area during the period from 0700 to 0800. 

The 1st Squadron, 9th Air Cavalry began aerial reconnaissa

operations early on D-day and by 0740 had established conta

Five North Vietnam Army soldiers and their 2Y2-ton truck beca

the first recorded casualties of the operation. At 0800 hours 

1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry conducted a landing zone reconnaissa

which was followed ten minutes later by the combat assault of 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam airborne battalion into land

zone EAST. The landing zone was secured and became a fire s

port base when six l05-mm howitzers and three I55-mm howitz

were inserted shortly thereafter. During this air assault, the 1

Armored Cavalry Regiment had moved out of their staging a

and crossed the line of departure, moving north. In the 3d Brig

area, C Company, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mechanize

crossed the Cambodian border at 0945, followed by elements 

the 11 th Armored Cavalry Regiment to the east which cros

approximately fifteen minutes later. 

The 5th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Battal

in a 42-ship lift supported by 22 Cobra gunships began its com

assault into Objective "B" at 0946 and reached landing z

CENTER by 1005. The 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam A

borne Battalion completed its combat assault into Objective "

on the west. 

Contact was immediately established with a panicked No

Vietnam Army force of approximately 200 men. The Cobras s

porting the contact expended most of their rockets and mach

gun ammunition on groups of 10 to 30 North Vietnam Army m

fleeing the area in a dozen directions. It was apparent that tact

surprise had been achieved during the combat assaults as th

were no reported instances of .51-caliber ground-to-air firing. 

During the afternoon of D-day, two companies of the 2d B

talion, 7th Cavalry made a combat assault into Objective X-R

in the northern portion of the 3d Brigade area of operation. T

movement had been tentatively planned by General Shoema

and, due to the relatively light resistance throughout the area, 

ordered its execution as the final combat assault of D-day. 

The enemy reaction to the opening of the Allied Offensive t

the form of a confused, milling crowd, ill-prepared to deal with 
with heavy antiaircraft fire but rather only with small arms fir

from a few individuals. Nowhere in evidence were the heav

machineguns from the three antiaircraft battalion-size units know

to be in the area. While later evidence showed that while som

strategic preparations had been made hedging against a possibl

allied thrust, the enemy tacticians had not taken steps to counte

an air assault. Airmobility had again caught the enemy off-balance

The results were evident, as noted in the following official excerpt

of the day's activities: 

The 1/9 Cav had a field day catching small groups of NVA tryin

to evade, resulting in a record total of 157 NVA killed by helicopter. 

T AC Air in another record setting day put a total of 185 sorties o

hard targets which resulted in 109 NVA KBA in the ARVN Airborn

AO alone. 

Among the ARVN Airborne forces, the 5th Battalion was outstand

ing with 27 NV A killed and 8 prisoners taken during the day. Th

prisoners were later identified as members of the 250th Convalescenc

Battalion, the 50th Rear Service Group and the 1st Battalion, l65t

Regiment, 7th NVA Division. 

The 3d Company, 3d AR VN Airborne made the first significan

cache discovery at 1720 hours when they found a large medical cach

of up to 6,000 pounds. The cache included the finest in modern surg

cal equipment and had been imported from western Europe via A

France, possibly through Phnom Penh. 

The ground contact of Company H of the 2/11 ACR was the high

light of the lith ACR operations during the day. After passing throug

a regimental-size base camp, a large enemy force was encountered i

trenches to the north. The ensuing battle left 50 enemy dead versus 

U. S. KIA, the only U. S. combat fatalities of D-day. 

The next few days of operations were characterized by a con

tinuation of maneuvers begun on D-day. The enemy made strenu

ous efforts to avoid contact and to determine the extent and plac

ment of the Allied forces. His command and control apparatus wa

completely disrupted and he was caught off guard and ill prepared

The High Command scattered in two's and three's and a larg

exodus of trucks going in all directions was noted by the 1 st Squad

ron, 9th Cavalry. 

On 3 May Task Force Shoemaker was reinforced with elemen

of the 2d Brigade. Multiple small caches were being discovered b

the ground units while the first large weapons cache was observe

from the air by A Troop of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. Th

area was engaged with gunships and Tactical Air resulting in th
MAP 10 

I 

~ Living ~uarters A 

\..-d 10' ~ 8' 0V ~ ) A\,Sj "'OOOfO\)'V 

, 

I 

, 

destruction of 7 2 Y2-ton trucks, 13 ~ -ton trucks, and 3 je

Another truck park in the nearby area was discovered and 

Cavalry Troop destroyed nine trucks with their own "gunships. 

On 4 May 1970, B Troop of the Cavalry Squadron obser

numerous bunkers and military structures in a densely veget
CAMBODIANS FILL BAGS WITH CAPTURED RICE, 18 MAY 1970 

area northwest of the current ground operations. Additional aeria

reconnaissance teams further reported that these structures and 

bunkers were connected with bamboo matted trails. One pilot also 

reported seeing numerous antennas in the southern part of the 

complex. On 5 May, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, in 

response to the aerial reconnaissance sighting reports, displaced 

into the northern half of the complex which had been dubbed "the 

city". Immediately upon entering the suspected area, the Cavalry 

troopers reported finding numerous storage bunkers measuring 

16 feet long, 10 feet wide, and 8 feet deep. Subsequent report

indicated that most of the bunkers contained large quantities o

weapons and munitions and that the enemy had just recently 

evacuated the area. Throughout the period 5-13 May 182 storage 

bunkers, 18 mess halls, a training area and a small animal farm 

were discovered in the area. 

The logistical storage bunkers contained clothing, food stocks

medical supplies, weapons and munitions. The bulk consisted o

ammunition. Generally, all types of equipment and supplies were 
depot that was capable of rapid receipt and issue of large quan

ties of supplies. Judging from the general condition of the old

bunker and from translation of supply documents found in t

area, it was apparent that the storage depot had been in operati

for two to two and one-half years. Some bunkers had been co

structed within the last six months. 

Captured supply records ir.dicated that the supply depot p

marily supported the 7th North Vietnam Army Division. Based 

the discovery of' classroom facilities, numerous mess halls, firi

ranges, as well as large stocks of items of personal clothing a

equipment in the cache site area, it was determined that "the cit

was also used to provide refresher military and political traini

to recent replacements from North Vietnam. 

Selected items of equipment captured at this cache site compl

included: 

1,282 individual weapons 

202 crew-served weapons 

319,000 rounds of .51-caliberjI2.7-mm ammunition 

25,200 rounds of 14.5-mm antiaircraft machinegun amm

nition 

1,559,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition 

2,110 grenades 

58,000 pounds of plastic explosives 

400,000 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition 

16,920 propelling charges for 120-mm mortar 

22 cases of anti-personnel mines 

30 tons of rice 

8 tons of corn 

1,100 pounds of salt 

Throughout the Cambodian campaign, Allied forces wou

uncover other major caches of equipment which proved that th

area was truly one of the most important logistical bases of t

enemy. On 25 Maya large automotive parts cache was discover

by A Company of the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry which was the fi

of a series of caches of various supplies discovered in the area fro

25 May to 9 ] une. One of these, a communications depot, disco

ered by D Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, indicated that t

enemy did not have time to evacuate his most valuable commun

cations equipment. Considering the critical nature of enemy sign
A CH-47 CHINOOK HELICOPTER LIFTS OFF A SLING LOAD OF AMMUNITION 

FROM FIRE SUPPORT BASE MYRON IN CAMBODIA, 24 JUNE 1970 

equipment, it was felt that his equipment would have received to

priority for evacuation. Like "the city" cache site, this area als

had supplies segregated, by type, to facilitate storage and distribu

tion to receiving units. Equipment and supplies were for the mos

part new and in excellent condition. 

Unlike the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Cambodian caches wer

filled with material transported for the most part by truck. Truc

repair centers and spare parts were part of the logistics complex

The 1st Cavalry had deprived the enemy of over 305 vehicles in it

Cambodian operations. While a few of these were primarily fo

passengers, such as a captured Porche, Mercedes-Benz and jeeps

the vast majority were cargo carriers. These trucks had a tota

capacity of 442 tons. Intelligence showed that the captured vehicle

were only a small part of the North Vietnam Army truck inventor

in Cambodia. During the early days of the operation the Air Cav

alry Squadron reported that many Cambodian roads showed heav

use of trucks away from the area of operations. Obviously, the

had been among the first items to be moved out of the area. 
in Cambodia to supply depots along the South Vietnamese bor

and move these supplies quickly over the network of roads t

connected the various caches, The system was so dependent 

trucks that an extensive refueling and repair organization was ne

sary. Sophisticated and effective, the North Vietnam Army sup

system was a major weapon in the enemy's arsenal. 

By mid-May, the search had expanded eastward to the bor

area north of Phuoc Long Province where on 8 May the 2d 

gade discovered a new significant cache site. This North Vietn

Army base camp, nick-named ROCK ISLAND EAST, eventually yiel

329 tons of munitions. As the operation continued, the 1st Brig

was moved from War Zone C to the O'Rang area east of the 

Brigade. Both Brigades used the airstrip at Bu Cia Map as a 

ward logistics base. One rifle company patrolled out of the ab

doned Special Forces camp there as security for the refuel, re

point and the tons of palletized supplies which were offloaded fr

C-130's and C-123's. 

The withdrawal of the 1st Cavalry from Cambodia, altho

the most critical of all the operations, was executed in a tr

classic manner'. The withdrawal sequence was time-phased to al

for the redeployment of one fire support base each day. T

phasing would allow for even utilization of aircraft assets, part

larly the CH-54 Cranes of the 273d Aviation Company which w

required for the movement of bridges, 155-mm howitzers, 2 V2

trucks, and bulldozers. On the second day of extraction, while 

ing the 1st Battalion, 50th Cavalry from Fire Support Base DA

the aviation units ran into extremely poor weather with ceil

at zero, fog and rain. The Chinooks from the 228th Assault S

port Helicopter Battalion showed the ultimate in professiona

by flying at extremely low levels through the valleys, skirting 

fog-covered hills, and extracting the unit. On 24 June, w

extracting Fire Support Base BRONCHO, one aircraft was dow

and five others were hit. At the same time the fire support base 

taking indirect fire regularly throughout the day. Using all poss

suppressive fires from the armed helicopters, Fire Support B

BRONCHO was extracted at last light. 

Besides the Division's organic Cranes, the 273d Aviation C

pany (Heavy Helicopter) was under operational control of 

1st Cavalry during the sixty days of the Cambodian Campa

This company with its CH-54 Flying Cranes lifted essential e
TROOPS DESCENDING AN AERIAL LADDER INTO TRIPLE CANOPIED JUNG
CH-47 CHINOOK DELIVERING CAPTURED RICE IN REPUBLIC OF VIETN

CONTROLLED RURAL AREA 

neering equipment (272 bulldozers, 54 backhoes, and 41 ro

graders) as well as all 155-mm howitzers into (and out of) t

operational area. They moved bridge sections and recove

$7,315,000.00 worth of downed aircraft. During the Cambod

Campaign, this company ftew 2,486 sorties, or, as a logistician mig

put it, 177,688 ton-miles. 

On the final day of the operation, in the actual crossing of 

border by all U. S. troops, every possible precaution was taken 

insure success. Troop ladders, smoke ships, pathfinders, and rec

ery aircraft were available to cover any contingency. The cross

proved uneventful with the last CH-47 aircraft leaving Cambo

at 1523, 29 June. The honor of being the last U. S. Army aircr

out of Cambodia went to B Company of the 1st Squadron, 9

Cavalry whose screening "Pink Team" reported reentering V

nam at 1728, 29 June. 

The 1st Squadron, 9th Air Cavalry proved again during 

Cambodian Campaign how invaluable this capability is to any 

mobile operation. During the period 1 May 1970 to 30 June 19
sance, and firepower in order to determine enemy locations an

escape routes. Using "Pink Teams"-one Cobra gunship and on

OH-6A observation helicopter-the Air Cavalry troops were abl

to cover large areas effectively. When the situation warranted, th

aero-rifle platoon would be inserted to face the enemy until a large

force could be committed into the area. The intelligence provide

by the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry enabled the division to redeplo

its assets ~nd effectively destroy many of the enemy's large cach

sites. 

The 1st Cavalry Division was not sure that they would be ab

to evacuate or destroy all the large quantities of enemy supplie

that were found during this operation; but, as the engineers r

paired roads and constructed bridges to allow a convoy evacuation

these problems were solved. The enormous quantities of rice di

covered were distributed to the various agencies under the watchfu

eyes of the G-5. This captured rice was also used to feed the larg

number of refugees that came pouring into the Cavalry area o

operations. 

The operation had revealed several previously unknown fac

and confirmed several suspicions. The size and locations of th

enemy's base areas were plotted and for the first time the exten

and depth of the enemy's. logistical system was documented

Whereas the base areas had previously been thought to all be clos

to the border, it was discovered that the depth extended far int

Cambodia, often serviced by unknown roads and trails built sp

cifically for this purpose. The existence of recovery and replac

ment regiments as well as the organization and operations are

were discovered. Vast quantities of new weapons and munition

were captured, possibly preempting their intended use again

Allied forces. During the Cambodian Campaign, the 1st Cavalr

Division (including those units under its operational control

accounted for 2,574 enemy killed in action and 31 prisoners o

war. They captured 2,244 tons of rice and over ten million round

of ammunition. 

The 1st Cavalry Division operation in Cambodia far exceede

all expectations and proved to be one of the most successful oper

tions in the history of the First Team. All aspects of ground an

air combat were utilized-air cavalry, armor, infantry, and mech

nized infantry. The U.S. Air Force reconnaissance, tactical ai

and B-52's performed yeoman duty throughout the campaig
Major General George W. Casey had taken command of t

1st Cavalry on 12 May from General Roberts. General Rober

who had been scheduled to turn over command of the division o

3 May, had been extended until 12 May in order to plan, organiz

and command the initial phases of the Cambodian operation. O

6 July 1970, he wrote a letter to his troops summing up the 

Cavalry's part in the Cambodian Campaign. Excerpts from t

letter are as follows: 

... The results are impressive. You killed enough of the enemy 

man three NV A Regiments; captured or destroyed enough individu

and crew-served weapons to equip two NV A Divisions; and denied t

enemy an entire year's supply of rice for all of his maneuver battalio

in our AO. You captured more rocket, mortar, and recoilless ri

rounds than the enemy fired in all of III Corps during the twel

months preceding our move into Cambodia. And, perhaps most imp

tant, by working together in an airmobile team, you disrupted t

enemy's entire supply system, making chaos of his base areas and killi

or driving off his rear service personnel. 

Only time will tell how long it will take the NVA to recover, b

of this you can be sure-you have set the enemy back sufficiently 

permit President Nixon's redeployment plan to proceed with safe

while assuring that our Vietnamese Allies maintain their freedo

This is y'our achievement. This is yet another demonstration that y

of the 1st Cavalry Division deserve-and have earned again-the acc

lade of the FIRST TEAM. It is my honor to have served alongside y

during this crucial and historic period. 

The following day on the morning of 7 July, General Casey w

enrO\lte to Cam Ranh Bay to visit wounded Sky Troopers in t

hospital. Flying over the rugged mountains of the Central Hig

lands, General Casey's helicopter entered a thick cloudbank a

disappeared from sight. In the late afternoon of 9 July, the wrec

age of the General's helicopter was found. General Casey and 

the officers and men aboard had been killed instantly in the cras

George had served with me as my Chief of Staff during 1967. Pri

to that he commanded the 2d Brigade under General Norton. H

death was a great personal loss to me and everyone who had serv

with him. Major General George Putnam, whose 1st Aviation B

gade had been doing a fantastic job in supporting Army of t

Republic of Vietnam operations in the Parrot's Beak to the sou

was ordered to take command of the 1st Cavalry Division. 
, 

,i 

CHAPTER XII 

Organizational Changes and Laos, 

1970-1971 

Organizational Changes 

With the exception of decentralizing its maintenance, th

organization of the 1st Cavalry Division had remained essentiall

unchanged since its deployment to Vietnam. Indeed, Genera

Howze would find its organization very similar to the propose

plan his Board had prepared in 1962. However, after the Cam

bodian campaign, the ever-increasing area of operation, and th

requirement to support more Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

operations, General Putnam was prompted to examine means t

increase his air cavalry capability. 

In August 1970, General Putnam directed an analysis of th

productivity of the aircraft assets of the 1st Cavalry Division. Th

analysis disclosed that airlift escort by a section of two Cobra

from the gun company of the airlift battalions was the least pro

ductive mission being flown by the division. It was determine

that the escort at that time could be forgone since aerial rock

artillery ships were always at the critical points, the pickup zone

and landing zones. The analysis also revealed that essential gener

support missions normally flown by the OH-6A could be sup

ported by fewer aircraft if careful controls were maintained. Base

on these findings, two provisional air cavalry troops were forme

using the Assault Weapons Companies of the 227th and 229

Assault Helicopter Battalions and attaching necessary OH-6's an

personnel from other Division units. This enlarged the air caval

squadron to five troops and greatly increased the Division's cap

bility to cover its farflung operations. 

A short time later, the 1st Cavalry Division was given oper

tional control of a separate air cavalry squadron, the 3d Battalio

17th Cavalry. General Putnam commented: 

I then had two and two-thirds squadrons of air cavalry. Our AR

battalion had always been responsive to fire support requirements fro
the Howie Board. This proved to be tremendously successful in s

porting the AR VN in Cambodia. 

During this same period in late 1970 the 1st Cavalry Divisi

introduced new airmobile tactics in using the Sl-mm mortar. T

Sl-mm mortar, long a valuable weapon to the Infantry, was us

by the lst Cavalry to support strike operations outside of tu

artillery range. The mortar, which .required a smaller security e

ment than an artillery base and could be supported by the Hue

was established in a temporary mini-base located on the periphe

of regular artillery range to extend indirect fire in support 

ground troops. This became increasingly important as the numb

of squad and platoon-size operations increased. 

After the Cambodian Campaign, it became the rule rather th

the exception to conduct small unit operations down to separ

squad and platoon-size forces, rather than the multi-battalion op

ations of previous years. In this way the Cavalry could cover 

larger area more thoroughly, but this method of operation broug

with it the requirement for a high caliber of leadership at t

lowest level. The young Cavalry lieutenants and sergeants mo

than adequately proved they were up to the job. These small u

operations were enhanced by the inherent capability of the divisi

to reinforce rapidly and the great flexibility and variety of fi

power at its disposal. 

As an example of the firepower available at this time, the stan

ard armament of the Cobra now included the 2.75-inch rock

with a 17 pound warhead, the very effective 2.75-inch Fleche

rocket, and the SX-35 20-mm cannon. The firepower of the di

sion was enhanced by the intelligence gathering capability of t

Seismic Intrusion Devices which were dropped by UH-IH he

copters along known infiltration routes. Once enemy moveme

had been detected, a small unit was lifted into an area well ahe

of the enemy's determined course of movement and established 

effective ambush with artillery and gunships standing by. 

Into Laos 

The final airmobile operation to be included in this study w

given the code name of LAMSON 719. This combined operation to

place in Laos from S February to 9 April 1971. LAMSON 719 w
had fallen flat on its face-that airmobility brought unacceptab

risks when subject to any threat more than low-intensity antia

craft fire in the "permissive" environment of South Vietnam. 

is so often the case, the impact of the initial headlines remain

uncorrected by the later objective review of the facts. Ma

believed that this operation was nothing short of a disaster whe

in fact, it proved again the basic soundness of the airmobile co

cept and scored a devastating blow to the enemy's logistics sanc

ary in Laos. 

In the next few pages I've made no attempt to relate the f

story of LAMSON 719-the detailed ground battle between the co

munist forces and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. That 

properly a Vietnamese story-to be recounted elsewhere. For t

record, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam fought tenaciou

against ever-increasing odds and reached their objective. The La

operation was a tactical and strategic success, as well as a psych

logical success, for the Republic of Vietnam. 

Before one draws any comparisons between the Laos operatio

and airmobile operations conducted by the U. S. Army, it must 

realized that LAMSON 719 was a very special operation in wh

strict rules governed U. S. military- operations across the Laoti

border. While the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces could op

ate freely on the ground and in the air within Laos, U. S. For

were restricted to air operations under specific rules of engagem

and were prohibited from fighting on the ground. 

The fact that U. S. personnel were forbidden to go on t

ground in Laos required modification of normal procedures 

supporting firepower, coordination and conduct of airmobile ope

tions, and rescue and recovery of downed crews and aircraft. T

absence of U. S. advisors with the ground forces and the langua

difficulties added further complications. 

Furthermore, LAMSON 719 was a combined operation in wh

Lieutenant General Hoaug Xuan Lam, the Commanding Gener

I Corps, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, planned and conduc

the ground operations in Laos while Lieutenant General James 

Sutherland, the Commanding General, XXIV Corps, U. S. Arm

planned, co-ordinated, and conducted airmobile and aviation op

ations in support of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces grou

operations. Though these two commanders developed a high ord

of co-operation and mutual confidence, there was an absence of 
By late September and early October 1970 it had become obv

ous from various enemy actions and intelligence sources that t

North Vietnamese Army planned to strangle Phnom Penh an

overthrow the Lon Nol Government. At the same time, there w

ample evidence that the North Vietnam Army would continue 

aggression against South Vietnam and rebuild its bases along t

Cambodian border adjacent to III and IV Corps Tactical Zone

The key to these enemy operations was an intensified resupply an

reinforcement operation in southern Laos during the dry seas

which would last from mid-October to mid-April 1971. 

December 1970 and January 1971 brought a sharp increase 

the amount of supplies moved into the southern Laotian ar

known as Base Area 604, adjacent to Quang Tri Province in 

Corps Tactical Zone. The intelligence community further not

that only a small portion of these supplies had been moved furth

to the south. In previous years the enemy had reached his pe

efficiency in February and March in moving supplies down t

Ho Chi Minh Trail. Accordingly, an attack against the base are

in Laos during these months presented the highest probability 

inflicting the greatest damage to the enemy. Operation LAMSO

719 was conceived, developed, and implemented to react to th

intelligence information. 

Air interdiction of the entry points from North Vietnam in

southern Laos had intensified since October 1970 and the 7th A

Force had been very effective in destroying enemy trucks. A ne

record of kills was reached in December and January. Army of t

Republic of Vietnam operations into Cambodia were started 

November 1970 with the mission of opening land and water rout

to Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese forces had successfully expand

their area of operation and demonstrated their ability to condu

a major campaign without any advisory supervision. 

In early February 1971 the Government of Vietnam deciderl 

commit more than three Army of the Republic of Vietnam div

sions to interdict the enemy's supply and infiltration routes 

southern Laos and to destroy his logistical facilities and supplie

The broad objective was to reduce the North Vietnam Army cap

bility for waging war in the south and to advance the security 

the people of the Republic of Vietnam. 

The operational area of LAMSON 719 covered an area rough

thirty-five to sixty kilometers. The geography of this area vari
py jgg 

sheer escarpment leading to rugged mountainous terrain. Natur

clearings were rare throughout the area and landing zones usual

had to be carved out of the dense undergrowth. Intelligence ind

cated that the natural landing zones would be heavily defended. 

The airmobile operations of LAMSON 719 were spread throug

three areas: the coastal base camps where most of the helicopte

were kept at night; the forward staging area at Khe Sanh, whe

only a few helicopters remained overnight; and the operation

area over Laos. Weather conditions at anyone or all three locatio

could have a major effect on helicopter support. The right comb

nation of weather conditions had to exist before helicopters cou

take off from the coastal bases, land at Khe Sanh to refuel and 

briefed for missions, and fly into the operational area over Laos. 

Early morning fog, rain and cloud cover, sometimes delay

airmobile operations until late morning or early afternoon. ' Rare

did weather conditions preclude operations all day throughout t

operational area. On occasion, airmobile operations were conduct

under ceilings and weather conditions that precluded employme

of tactical air support. The smoke and dust raised by artille

combined with natural haze sharply reduced the visibility a

frequently caused flying safety hazards. The highest degree 

professionalism was required from all pilots. 

The terrain features in the area, especially the higher elevati

of the Annamite Mountain chain in the operational area, combin

with the marginal weather to have a decided effect on airmob

operations. The river valleys, in particular the east-west orient

Xe Pon, became natural flight routes due to navigational requir

ments in marginal weather. This in turn focused enemy antia

craft fire on obvious air routes. 

The enemy forces in southern Laos were logistics organizatio

of Base Area 604, with reinforcements from regular North Vi

namese Army units. Besides the permanent service force of en

neers, transportation, and antiaircraft troops, the North Vietna

Army forces included elements of five divisions, twelve infant

regiments, a tank regiment, an artillery regiment, and ninete

antiaircraft battalions. Each of the divisions had previously foug

in South Vietnam and most of the enemy had taken part in t

large-scale operations around Khe Sanh and Hue in 1967 and 196

In summary, the enemy consisted of large conventional forces 
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TACTICAL CONCEPT OF LA

MAP 11 

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Fire bose 

Ground odvance 

Air advance 

Subsequent atta

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(ALL POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMAT
to LAMSON 719 were the 1st Infantry Division, 1st Airborne Di

sion, the Marine Division, three battalions of Rangers, and the 

Armored Brigade with three cavalry squadrons. The U. S. eleme

operating in direct support of the Army of the Republic of Vi

nam troops inside Laos consisted of the 2d Squadron, 17th Cava

with four Air Cavalry troops, the 101st Aviation Group. with 

numper of aviation units under their operational control from 

1st Aviation Brigade, and one squadron of Marine medium tra

port helicopters. 

The tactical concept for LAMSON 719 envisioned the Airbor

Division, with the 1st Armored Brigade attached, making the m

attack by air assault and overland movement astride Highway N

to Aloui, and then proceeding in subsequent attacks to Tchepo

(Map 11) Highway Nine was to be opened as the main sup

route. The 1st Infantry Division, according to the concept, was 

attack on a parallel axis to the main attack along the high grou

south of the Xe Pon River and protect the left flank of the A

borne Division. The Ranger group would establish a fire ba

near the Laotian border north of Tabat, and protect the right fla

of the Airborne Division. A Marine brigade was to be the rese

in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. 

As early as January 1971. a planning group consisting of k

staff officers from the U.S. XXIV Corps and Army of the Repub

of Vietnam I Corps was established at Da Nang. Information 

the operation was tightly held and, in some instances, this rest

tion of information complicated the preparation for LAMSON 7

especially in those areas where a long lead time was necessa

Though control and coordination procedures were· agreed up

it would not be until three weeks after Vietnamese troops h

crossed the Laotian border that a combined tactical command p

at Khe Sanh became a reality. 

The Battle 

The attack into Laos was initiated on 8 February from ba

established on the Khe Sanh Plain. The Army of the Republic 

Vietnam 1st Armored Brigade Task Force crossed the border 

1000 and advanced nine kilometers to the west along Route N

on the first day. Three battalions of the 3d Regiment, 1st Army 

the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division, air assaulted into la
landed in both areas on D-day. 

On 9 February, all air moves were cancelled due to adverse 

weather; however, the armored task force was able to move two 

kilometers further to the west. On 10 February, the 1st Army of 

the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division air assaulted a battalion into Objective Aloui and the armored task force linked up 

with this battalion at 1555. On the same day, the 1st Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam Division landed a battalion at landing zone 

DELTA and the initial objectives of LAMSON 719 had been seized. 

After the attack on 8 February the enemy reacted violently to 

the allied offensive. He aggressively employed his weapons and 

troops already present in Southern Laos and he reinforced heavily 

his forces and committed a variety of weapons including tanks to 

the battle. Reinforcements came from North Vietnam, South Viet

nam, and other parts of Laos. 

By 19 February the Rangers in the north were receiving frequent attacks by medium artillery, sappers, and infantry and resistance was stiffening in the area of the 1st Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam Airborne Division. Resupply and medical evacuation 

became increasingly more difficult. When weather precluded the 

employment of tactical air, as it often did until noon, and emergency resupply and medical evacuation was urgently required, the 

availability of helicopter gunships became even more critical. 

By 22 February attacks against Fire Bases 30 and 31 and the 

Ranger positions were becoming more frequent and more intense

Enemy mines, ambushes, and the severe lack of maneuver room 

combined to slow the movement of the armor columns and they 

were unable to reach the Rangers to relieve the pressure. Consequently, it was decided to extract the Rangers on 25 February to 

a less hostile area near the Republic of Vietnam border. However

by this time, enemy supply bases one and two kilometers square 

had been found and a major petroleum, oils, and lubricants pipeline had been found and cut by Air Cavalry gunships. Tons of 

ammunition and food stocks had been destroyed. Six hundred and 

eighty weapons had been captured. 

On 25 February the enemy made a classic armor attack agains

Fire Base 31. They had moved their armor stealthily over con

cealed routes to final assault positions before being discovered

Then the tanks with supporting infantry launched a violent day

light attack against the fire base. The defenders, supported by U. S
This was to be the first and last success of enemy tanks duri

LAMSON 719 and the only friendly fire base to be completely ov

rUll in Laos. 

Three Army of the Republic of Vietnam armored cava

squadrons and four infantry battalions had not proved sufficient 

provide ground security for the 20 kilometers of road in La

Consequently, General Lam had reassessed his plan of attack af

the disappointing results of friendly armor in keeping open Hig

way Nine. Obviously he could no longer plan to use this as 

secure main supply route. Capitalizing on his airmobile suppo

he decided to attack the main objective of Tchepone with a ser

of rapid air assaults along the high escarpment to the south of t

river using the 1st Infantry Division. 

From 3 to 6 March, tIle 1st Army of the Republic of Vietn

Division had accomplished a series of airmobile assaults to the w

along the escarpment overlooking Route Nine. The first Army 

the Republic of Vietnam units air assaulted successfully into lan

ing zones LOLO, LIZ, and Fire Base SOPHIA WEST. After a v

effective preparation of the area by B-52's, on 6 March two inf

try battalions were lifted by 120 Hueys for 65 kilometers to 

assault into landing zone HOPE north of Tchepone. This la

combat assault was carried out in what was considered to be 

most hostile air defense environment ever encountered in the ent

war) yet only one Huey was hit and it made a safe landing in 

objective area. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam un

attacked south and west controlling the town. (Map 12) Tchepo

was the objective of th.e allied drive to the west and was the na

ral communications hub of the enemy's logistics system in La

The enemy immediately increased his pressure in the Tchepo

area and attacked the Army of the Republic of Vietnam fire ba

on the escarpment viciously. 

The I Corps Commander decided that most of the objectives 

LAMSON 719 had been accomplished and ordered a timed w

drawal from Laos before weather worsened. During the extract

to the east from the Tchepone area, new enemy forces brou

heavy pressure to bear on the Army of the Republic of Vietn

all along Route Nine. Extremely heavy antiaircraft fires w

encountered along routes to or from the Army of the Republic 

Vietnam fire bases. Enemy pressure was also felt at the prim

U. S. Forward Support Area at Khe Sanh which received he
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MAP 12 

LAMSON 719 

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Landing zone 

Fir. base 

Ground attac

Air assault 

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'ALL POSITIONS ARE APPROXIMA
on 21 March and the remaining Vietnamese forces withdrew bac

into South Vietnam over the next few days. The major airmobil

actions in Laos were terminated by 25 March even though som

Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces continued to opera

across the border. Two highly successful airmobile raids of batta

ion size were conducted between 31 March and 6 April. 

Thousands of tons of ammunition, petroleum, oils, and lubr

cants, and other supplies and equipment were destroyed by LAMSO

719 forces including U. S. air assets. In addition to the destructio

of these stockpiles, supplies from the caches of Base area 604 wer

at least partially consumed by the North Vietnam Army force

opposing LAMSON 719. Initial reports of supplies and equipmen

destroyed or captured include over 4,000 individual weapons; mor

than 1,500 crew-served weapons; 20,000 tons of ammunition; 12,00

tons of rice; 106 tanks; 76 artillery pieces; and 405 trucks. Th

effectiveness of B-52 strikes, tactical air, helicopter gunships, an

artillery is further indicated by over 9,700 secondary explosions. 

As a minimum, it can accurately be stated that the enemy lin

of communication in Base Area 604 were severed, and that su

plies and equipment ceased to move south through this area durin

the inclusive dates of the operation. This was particularly signif

cant, for in past years the enemy has reached his peak efficienc

in moving resources south during the months of February an

March. Additionally, the detailed knowledge obtained concernin

the location of depots, trail networks, truck parks, and the fu

pipeline would permit more precise targeting in the future. 

Enemy personnel losses were very heavy. While these loss

might eventually be replaced, the requirement to replace losses 

such regiments as the 1st Viet Cong, 29th, 36th, 64th, 102d, an

803d would, in all probability, draw off replacement personn

programmed for other units. Combined air-ground operations 

Base Area 604 resulted in a reported total of 13,914 enemy kille

in action. Air and ground attacks inside the five depot are

reportedly accounted for 5,357 of these casualties. An addition

69 enemy soldiers were captured. 

Review of Airmobile Support During Lamson 719 

The precise impact of LAMSON 719 on the enemy's long-ran

goals must be left for future studies. The important issue here 
ote eades tat te ecoptead poved to be aua

ceptable combat vehicle. Many reporters picked up random stori

from anyone willing to talk and the overall picture was grim. Th

following excerpt from Newsweek, 15 March 1971, was more obje

tive than most: 

To the modern American cavalryman of the air, the plunge in

Laos has been something like an old-time charge on horseback: adm

rably heroic, stunningly effective-and terribly costly. For four wee

now, American helicopter pilots have flown through some of the heav

est flak in the history of the Indochinese war. One day alone last wee

the Army admitted to losing ten aircraft to the unexpectedly hea

North Vietnamese ground fire, and there were _ reports from the fie

that the actual losses had been much worse. As a result, the customa

bravado of the American chopper pilot was beginning to wear a b

thin. "Two weeks ago," said one gunship skipper, "I couldn't have to

you how much time I had left to serve in Vietnam. Now I know th

I've got 66 days to go, and I'm counting every one:· Another flier-add

anxiously: "The roles are reversed over there. In Vietnam, you have 

hunt for the enemy. But in Laos, man, they hunt for you. 

Despite the risks, it was inevitable that U. S. helicopters should 

deeply involved in the Laotian campaign, for more than any oth

artifact of war, the chopper has become the indelible symbol of t

Indochina conflict. Helicopter pilots were among the first America

killed in the war a decade ago, and, under President Nixon's Vietnam

zation program, they will probably be among the last to leave. In t

years between, the chopper's mobility and firepower have added a rad

cally new dimension to warfare, and the daring young American pilo

have scooped up their Silver Stars, Distinguished Flying Crosses a

Air Medals by the bushel-along with Purple Hearts. In the opinion 

many military experts, the helicopter has been the difference betwe

a humiliating U. S. defeat in Vietnam and whatever chance remains 

attaining some more satisfactory outcome. 

To put the story of airmobility during LAMSON 719 into focu

it's necessary to examine the threat. With the exception of enem

air, it could be said that the environment in Laos was as host

and as sophisticated as most of the probable areas of employme

of U. S. forces throughout the world. The North Vietnamese Arm

had skillfully deployed an extensive well-integrated, highly mob

air defense system throughout the eI:J.tire operational area. Where

in Vietnam and Cambodia we had operated against 7.62-mm a

limited 12.7~mm fire, with occasional concentrations of the latte

operations in Laos had been regularly opposed by 23-mm, 37-m

and 57-mm weapons, while the 12.7-mm guns were employed 
p

The North Vietnamese Army soldier enjoyed a considerab

greater fire support in Laos than he had previously experienced 

South Vietnam and his antiaircraft weapons had been careful

positioned over a period of years. The 12.7-mm weapons were ofte

employed in triangular or rectangular formations in the vicini

of high ground approximately 1,000 meters from a potential lan

ing zone. The 23-mm guns were employed in circular or triangul

formations, though on occasion a single gun was used to prote

storage sites or vital road networks. The extensive enemy thre

was compounded by the fact that his antiaircraft weapons we

continually redeployed, usually on a day-to-day basis. 

One enemy tactic that proved most difficult to counter was t

North Vietnamese Army technique of employing 10- to 12-m

combat teams-on or near every piece of critical terrain-protect

by bunkers and trenches. These small teams, armed with one 

two machineguns and 82mm mortar and one or two rock

launchers, attacked allied aircraft and infantry on virtually eve

landing zone, pick up zone, and friendly troop position within t

range of their weapons. 

The enemy also used their "hugging" tactic which had prov

effective in earlier encounters. Using this tactic, North Vietname

Army forces sometimes moved to within 10 to 20 meters of friend

units manning perimeters and securing positions. Friendly forc

were often reluctant to bring supporting fires close enough to the

own positions to harm the enemy and, consequently, the close

enemy could direct a heavy volume of short-range small arm

antiaircraft weapons, and rocket launcher fire against helicopte

flying in and out of friendly positions. On occasion, helicopte

were fired at and hit by North Vietnamese Army riflemen lying 

and back inside of barb wire barriers surrounding a friend

position. 

Because of the ever-present enemy threat, every airmobile op

ation in LAMSON 719-even single ship resupply and medic

evacuation missions-had to be planned and conducted as a co

plete combat operation. This entailed a separate fire plan, alloc

tion of escorting armed helicopters, and contingency plans f

securing and recovering downed crews and aircraft. 

The WIst Airborne Division (Airmobile), under the comma

of Major General Thomas M. Tarpley, was given the mission 
campaign in Thua Thien Province. Furthermore, the Divisi

would take over operational and security responsibility of the are

previously covered by the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietna

Division in Quang Tri Province and along the Demilitarized Zon

They would also conduct diversionary operations from the Hu

area into the A Shau Valley along route 547. LAMSON 719 wou

receive top priority in all cases. 

The support provided to I Corps Forces in Laos as well as 

the U. S. forces operating in the northern provinces could not ha

been maintained at a high level throughout LAMSON 719 had n

U.S. Army, Vietnam, devoted a major portion of its assets in su

port. Damaged or destroyed aircraft would be quickly replaced an

maintenance support given priority to those aviation units assign

to or under the operational control of the lOlst Airborne Divisio

A special aviation task force organization was created to provi

the extensive aviation support required by LAMSON 719. This avi

tion task force was built around the structure of the lOIst Airbor

Division (Airmobile) by supplementing the division's organ

assets with aviation and air cavalry units from other divisions, t

Ist Aviation Brigade, and from units scheduled for deactivation 

redeployment. The division's 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, too

operational control of supplemental air cavalry troops. The Div

sion Support Command provided logistic and maintenance suppo

for supplemental and organic units and established forward refue

ing and rearming points to support the operation. The lOist Div

sion used its command and control structure to command t

aviation and air cavalry units and to plan and conduct the a

mobile operations in support of LAMSON 719. 

One of the key U. S. commanders during LAMSON 719 w

Brigadier General Sidney B. Berry, Jr. the Assistant Division Com

mander (Operations) of the lOIst. He had a dual role as coord

nator of U. S. aviation resources and de£acto aviation officer to t

Vietnamese I Corps Commander. These two hats made it possib

for him to carry out the key position of senior commander aloft. 

this position, he was separate from, and senior to, the ground an

air mission commanders. 

The availability of armed helicopters for the escort role w

a major limiting factor in just how many different airmobile oper

tions could be conducted simultaneously. To meet the demand f

armed helicopters, many of the older UH-IC armed Hueys we
With all its limitations, the armed helicopter proved the mo

important fire-support weapons system during LAMSON 719. Arme

heEcopters provided the capability for detecting and immediate

engaging battlefield targets of opportunity close to friendly troo

on the ground-a system unmatched by any other weapons syste

in the United States inventory. Armed helicopters, operating wi

the air cavalry, aerial rocket artillery, and escorting troop-li

heavy-lift, and support aircraft, literally covered the battle ar

with their ability to respond immediately and accurately with the

fire against known and suspected enemy weapons and position

Armed helicopters often operated under low ceilings and weath

conditions that restricted or precluded use of tactical air in clo

support of ground units or airmobile operations. Armed helico

ters, particularly those of the air cavalry, played a key role 

acquiring targets, directing artillery fire and tactical air strik

against them, and conducting battle damage assessments. 

One can not overstate the importance of the air cavalry in th

operation. They seemed to be omnipresent; they found most of t

targets; and they were generally the first on the scene ~md the la

to leave. All that I have said before about the merits of this orga

zation was exemplified in Laos. 

Air cavalry performed two principal missions during LAMSO

719-reconnaissance to the flanks and front of ground operatio

and reconnaissance and security of landing zones before and duri

combat assaults and extractions. Lieutenant Colonel Robert 

Molinelli, the Commanding Officer, 2d Squadron, 17th Cava

was the principal reconnaissance officer for the operation.1 Dire

ing his four air cavalry troops, he took his assigned tasks direc

from the Commanding General, I Corps, and delivered his repo

back through both Army of the Republic of Vietnam and U

channels. 2 This system of assigning tasks and multiplicity of repo

ing channels testifies to the critical role played by the Air Caval

As the battle progressed it became evident that, because of th

great confidence in the Air Cavalry, the Vietnamese units tend

1 To be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Archie A. Rider on 5 March. 

I Colonel Molinelli put it this way: ". took my directions directly from Gen

Lam, with General Sutherland supervising our operations on a daily basis. 

(General Sutherland) was pretty much the on-the-scene commander until the co

bined tactical command post was established at Khe Sanh." 
PT -76 tanks, a target new to the squadron.Initially, anti-tan

rockets were not availabk; engagement was made with ordnance o

hand. Upon sighting a tank the Cobras would initiate contact 

maximum range with 2.75-inch flechette rockets. This served 

wipe personnel off the vehicles and their immediate proximity

As the gun run continued, the AH-l G pilots would begin firin

a mixture of high explosive and white phosphorous rockets, break

ing off the run at approximately 500 meters and, indeed, ofte

overflying the target. 

When available, the XM-35 20-mm cannon was used. Th

weapon was extremely accurate, and afforded a theoretical stando

distance of 2,000 to 2,500 meters; however, adequate ammunitio

was not available for this weapon. When high explosive, anti-tan

rockets became available, results were mixed. This rocket w

capable of penetrating armor, but direct hits on the target we

required. Accuracy dictated that engagements be made at ranges 

500-1,000 meters from the target, thus exposing the gunship to th

tank's 12.7-mm and to supporting enemy infantry in the area. 

Upbn sighting a tank or group of tanks, the Cavalry gunship

would engage them to maintain contact, then normally turn th

target over to the Air Force and continue reconnaissance mission

If Tactical air was not available, the gunships would engage tank

until their ordnance was expended; but they rarely had enoug

ordnance to destroy every tank in a particular sighting. Betwee

8 February 1971 and 24 March 1971, the Cavalry sighted 66 tank

destroyed (burned) six, and immobilized eight.4 Three of th

destroyed tanks were hit with flechettes, High Explosive and Whi

Phosphorous; and the other three were destroyed by combination

of flechettes, High Explosive, White Phosphorous, and High Expl

sive Antitank. The majority of the other tanks not destroyed o

damaged by the Cavalry were turned over to the U. S. Air Force. 

• The PT -76 cannot be truly classified as a "tank:' It is better described as 

lightly armored gun carriage. The Cavalry troops also sighted, but did not engag

T-34 tanks. In addition, there were reports (unconfirmed) from tactical air of 

even heavier tank-the T -54. 

'The following criteria were established by the 2d Battalion, 17 Cavalry to cla

a tank destroyed or damaged. To classify a tank destroyed, the tank had to explo

or burn; whereas a damaged tank was immobilized, parts were blown 'Off and t

tank was incapable of further movement without repair. 
always maintained. One, our aircraft are not as vulnerable as ma

people think in a mid-intensity environment; two, we certain

proved that Army aircraft are capable of attacking enemy armor

Describing the limitations of current armed helicopters, Ge

eral Berry commented on 20 March 1971 as follows: 

· .. We need now tank-defeating armed helicopters. Had 

entered LAMSON 719 with a helicopter armed with an accurate, leth

relatively long-range anti-tank weapon, we would have destroyed ma

more NV A tanks and would have rendered more effective close supp

to Vietnamese ground forces. As I consider our experience against NV 

tanks in LAMSON 719 and ponder what would face us on a Europea

type battlefield, I am absolutely convinced that the US Army m

field immediately an armed helicopter with an effective tank-killi

capability. If the AH-.1 G "Cobra" mounting the TOW gives us th

required capability the soonest, fine. I hold no brief for any particu

weapons system, but I do hold the firm conviction that we need n

the armed helicopter tank-killer. 

On this same date, General Berry commented on several oth

aspects of LAMSON 719. These comments-which were made befo

the actual close of the operation and right where the action w

happening-bear repeating: 

· . . Our experience in conducting airmobile operations in supJX

of LAMSON 719 confirms the soundness of the concept and prinCip

of airmobility developed by the U.S. Army. We have, of course, mo

fied and adapted specific tactics and techniques to cope with the ope

tional environment. But airmobility principles and concepts ha

proven sound and valid. 

· .. Living and operating in the ground soldier's environment, 

armed helicopter escorts troop· lift helicopters flying the soldier to a

from his operations, escorts helicopters delivering ammunition, fo

water, 'supplies, and mail to the soldier, and escorts the medical eva

ation helicopter rescuing the wounded soldier from battle. The arm

helicopter flies underneath ceilings measured in hundreds of feet 

locate targets threatening or attacking the soldier to deliver time

responsive, accurate fire within tens of feet of the-soldier's position. 

The fighter-bomber has a unique capability to place heavy firepow

and a variety of ordnance in close support of the ground soldier. T

fighter-bomber's most distinctive characteristic is its ability to deli

heavy bombs in support of the ground soldier. The fighter-bomber f

underneath ceilings measured in thousands of feet, to deliver he

bombs within hundreds of feet of the ground soldier's position a

lighter ordnance even closer. 

The armed helicopter and fighter-bomber team works effectively 

LAMSON 719. Armed helicopters of the air cavalry reconnoiter object
for air strikes. Armed helicopters and tactical air work together 

prepare the objective area, landing and pick up zones and appro

and departure routes for safe passage and landing of the troop-

helicopters. The armed helicopters then escort troop-lift and heavy-

helicopters in and out of the landing zone while the forward air c

troller directs air strikes into adjacent target and danger areas. . . . The helicopter and its crew have proven remarkably hardy a

survivable in the mid-intensity conflict and hostile air defense envir

ment of LAMSON 719. We have lost remarkably few helicopters and cr

members in view of the heavy small arms, antiaircraft, and mortar a

artillery fires our aircraft and crews have experienced while conduct

extensive airmobile operations on NV A home ground. This is e

more remarkable in view of the numerous airmobile operations c

ducted in support of Vietnamese ground units located in small per

eters, surrounded by NV A units and weapons, and often in he

contact with the enemy. 

To assess and evaluate properly our aircraft and crew losses, o

must measure these losses against the campaign plan, mission, to

sorties, and number of exposures to enemy fire, and accomplishme

When viewed in this perspective, we have fared better than the m

optimistic prophet would have dared predict. 

One of the great stories of LAMSON 719 is the magnificent eff

to recover downed aircraft. Wherever possible, an immediate eff

was made to extract any downed aircraft and crew, even in the f

of hostile fire, and with the knowledge that the North Vietnam

often used downed aircraft as bait with which to draw more equ

ment and personnel into an ambush. In some cases, the down

aircraft had to be destroyed because the tactical situation preclud

recovery. 

Research analysts will be working with the data base fr

LAMSON 719 for a long time, particularly on the vulnerabil

aspects of the helicopter. It would take several volumes to summ

rize their parameters and permutation alone. For the purpose 

this monograph, I think it is fair to say that the loss rate .exp

enced by Army helicopters compared favorably with the loss r

of high performance aircraft in Southeast Asia for the same peri

Most importantly these loses were not considered unaccepta

in view of the mission accomplished. 

There is always the temptation to fall back on the trite sta

ment that "war has never been a particularly safe business" a

dismiss further discussioll' of loss in combat. However, no prof

sional leader ev(tr takes any of his losses lightly and the less
could pull this off under these conditions, we can do it anywher

in the world." The senior commanders on the scene seem to shar

this conclusion. 

In the context of the enemy's highly developed antiaircra

defense capability, can we make a valid judgment of the airmobil

concept from the results of LAMSON 719? Let's be candid. Our tota

helicopter losses during this operation were 107 aircraft. Take

by itself, that figure seems a de facto indictment of the concep

But the last statistic does not tell the whole story-indeed, it 

totally misleading if left unqualified. 

The basic fact is: LAMSON 719 would n,ever have been unde

taken, much less successfully completed, without the support o

thousands of helicopter sorties. A nd for every thousand sorties th

loss rate was only one quarter of one percent. Granted, every hel

copter loss was regretable; however, this ratio does show a ver

high rate of accomplishment versus attrition. Most of these losse

were troop transport Hueys-and more than half of these wer

lost just as they approached landing zones. This again points ou

in the strongest way that the helicopter is most vulnerable as 

comes to a hover over an unsecured or partially secured area. I

other words, the safety of the helicopter pilot depends very muc

on the infantryman on the ground who he supports. 

Not unexpectedly, the older Huey gunships did not fare as we

as the Cobra in this intense air defense environment. The high

attrition rate of the armed Huey's proved that the move to th

faster and better protected Cobra was timely and necessary. Man

of the Cobras were hit by 12.7-mm fire but managed to return t

base and, eventually, return to combat. 

I recognize that this account of LAMSON 719 focuses on th

airmobility aspects and does not pretend to tell the entire story 

this important battle, a battle that is perhaps too recent to put in

true historical perspective. One thing is certain. Without the a

support of the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Marines, LAMSON 71

would never have even been planned, much less would it hav

succeeded. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Conclusions 

The story of airmobility has been long-so my summary 

be short. I've tried to interject my honest opinion where it see

appropriate in the text. Only a few final observations are neces

For the reader who has borne with me through this accoun

ten years of airmobility in Vietnam and the fundamental decis

in the decade preceding that, the obvious question is, "What 

all of this mean?" The one inescapable conclusion is that the 

mobility concept is irreversible. The thousands of officers who 

learned to think and fight and live in three dimensions will n

allow themselves to be restricted to two dimensions in the fut

Airmobility will change and grow, but it is here to stay. 

In the first chapter we learned that the growth of the airmo

concept did not take place in the framework of guerrilla war

It was conceived out of the necessity to disperse on the mo

battlefield under the threat of nuclear weapons and still retain 

ability to mass quickly for decisive actions, then disperse ag

The actualities of Vietnam have since obscured these origins 

have led many people to the assumption that airmobility 

designed for and limited to counter-guerrilla contingencies. 

very nature of the terrain in Vietnam with its jungles and m

tains has led many to connect helicopter operations to this 

of terrain. Indeed, the opposite is true. Airmobility worke

Vietnam in spite of the tremendous problems of working in 

jungles and the mountains of an undeveloped country. The 

copter overcame the obstacles of limited landing zones, prim

road nets, restricted observation, and high density altitudes a

other vehicle could. But, in the open countryside of Europe 

desert in the Middle East, the airmobile force has far greater f

bility and many more options than even the armored force

Rommel in North Africa. Vietnam represented only a fractio

the possibilities for airmobile tactics. 

A casual observer of Army aviation in Vietnam could e

have arrived at the conclusion that there was no need for spe
airmobile divisions, and rightly so, were very proud of their air 

assault techniques and had developed highly refined operating procedures with their supporting aviation companies. The question 

then arises as to the need for a special organization which has over 

400 helicopters assigned to it on a full-time basis. 

However, there is much more to airmobility than just using 

helicopters. The Huey, the Cobra, the light observation helicopter

and the Chinook were the essential vehicles of airmobile comba

and combat support. But, the essence of an airmobile division is 

the ability to integrate the capabilities of these aircraft into an 

organization designed for their use by people specially trained for 

their use. This total integration is only possible in a unit which 

"owns" its helicopters. 

This is not to detract from the effectiveness of non-airmobile 

units for they possess certain characteristics which give them advantages in certain situations. A division which has tank or mechanized 

battalions or ground cavalry squadrons has certain advantages over 

the airmobile division. The same thing is true for the heavier 

weapons which are organic to the infantry division. Conversely

the lighter weapons and vehicles of the ainnobile division are 

essential for the advantages which it possesses. This study has 

detailed the . strategic moves of the 1st Cavalry Division from II 

Corps to I Corps to III Corps Tactical Zones, and touched upon 

the many brigade and battalion moves involving airlift. In all these 

moves, I was struck by the distinct advantage in moving inherently 

lean airmobile forces as compared to the airlift requirement of 

other organizations. 

The tactical advantages of the airmobile division can be 

summed up as follows: increased efficiency due to the repeated 

association of units; thorough integration of its assets because of 

close association and command relationships; and the ability to 

take a different conceptual approach because of its assured assets

The impact of organizational and command relationships has a 

direct and distinct impact on the quality of support. There is no 

denying that general support units rarely tend to identify closely 

with the supported unit, at least not as closely as organic units

This is a simple truism of human nature. 

The epitome of "superior" airmobile tactics, as contrasted with 

"good," is the capability to exploit not only an opportunity bu

the trends and changing patterns in enemy activity. This requires 
ment in Vietnam has proven the need for quick reaction to. m

the demands of the situation as seen by the commander on 

scene. Adaptation to a change in environment is more feasible 

more likely when the unit is organic. 

The airmobile division commander is able to plan a comp

campaign based on airmobility as opposed to a campaign whic

an incidental element, employs airmobile assets in some o

battle plans. As a corollary, I know of no other major organiza

besides the airmobile division where the commander is willin

consistently commit all his forces on a day-ta-day basis; tha

not keep the traditional reserve. The airmobile division c

mander knows that he can extract a reserve out of his deplo

units as needed because he has the assets and the training to d

This is a major economy of force. 

By changing our perspective from that of the division c

mander to the individual soldier, we can perceive one of the o

forgotten advantages of airmobility. It is ironic to me, after 

millions spent to reduce a few pounds from the infantryman's r

that many soldiers would end up carrying as much (or more) 

weight as the doughboy of World War I. A soldier when he ex

helicopter becomes the Army's most important extension of 

airmobile concept; and his individual load should consist of 

bare essentials needed for the next few hours-basically amm

tion and water. To avoid the classic soldier's syndrome of hol

on to everything he owns, the 1st Cavalry Division develope

technique for keeping all the personal equipment of the indivi

in squad bundles that were consistently delivered when nee

This was a tremendous boost to morale as well as a very rea

crease in effectiveness. However, this seemingly simple techn

has to be relearned several times in every campaign. 

In reviewing this volume, I sense that I could have spent m

time emphasizing the natural affinity of armor with an airmo

force. When the terrain and circumstances permit, armor and 

mobility complement each other in a natural way to form 

unbeatable team. Airmobility gives the commander unique c

bilities in reconnaissance, maneuver, and logistics while the ar

gives the shock and firepower which have characterized it in 

past. Air cavalry and airmobile infantry can find and fix the en

so that armored and mechanized forces can be brought in at 

decisive moment to finish him. There is no precise balance of t
Many new organizations will be conceived as a result of ou

Vietnam experience and that is as it should be. However, we mus

make certain we do not invent something we have already thor

oughly tested in combat. For example, there is a gTeat deal o

experience in the record of armor working with airmobile units

there was an air cavalry combat brigade, in fact if not in name

operating as part of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1970. We should 

be certain that we pick up any extrapolations for the future where 

we left off in combat. There is so much work that needs to be done 

that we can ill afford time to prove what has been proven o

preparing answers to questions that will not be asked again. 

We must use a similar approach to future Army-Air Force 

relationships. One lesson should stand out lond and clear from ou

ten years of experience in Vietnam: the command and control pro

cedures evolved in combat, often hammered out by the very men 

whose lives depended on them, proved sound and workable. Whil

this monograph has not tried to detail the Air Force story in Viet

nam, I trust it has given enough examples of the magnificent sup

port that the Air Force provided, and the trust and confidence tha

was generated in the minds of every major ground commander

As our experience grew, the close integration and timing of Ai

Force support to the organic Army support could not have been 

improved. I see no need for the Army and the Air Force to go 

through another agonizing reappraisal of their command and con

trol structures (and the haggling over hardware to do the job) 

such as was experienced after World War II and Korea. In thes

latter two periods, valuable and important lessons were forgotten 

in the peacetime budget exercises while the Services engaged in 

bitter and often emotional debates which proved unnecessary and 

detrimental. Now is the time to capitalize on the vast reservoir o

experience in both Services to put the ad hoc arrangements o

Vietnam into lasting doctrine. It is not the time to debate new 

interfaces, new organizations and new command relationships tha

are untested. 

In any activity where two Services operate the interface betwee

them will seldom be a comfortable enmeshing of capabilities

whether these capabilities are competitive, supplementary, or com

plementary. Army-Air Force aviation relationships are no excep

tion. The important thing to recognize is that there are gaps mor

often than overlaps in all areas of the interface. This has occurre
In my estimation, quantitative duplication is a myth, because 

dom will relatively scarce and expensive vehicles such as· airc

be adequate to meet all requirements. 

Another myth-one that has haunted Army aviation for th

years-is vulnerability. Throughout this volume we have touc

on various aspects of the vulnerability of Army aircraft and

particular, the helicopter. Nevertheless, the subject is still up

most in the minds of those who have honest reservations on 

soundness of future airmobile tactics. 

When I began the research for this study, I sent letters to 

senior officers requesting their personal comments and experien

on the subject of airmobility. Many of their thoughts have b

incorporated in this volume. Only one letter, from Lieuten

General Arthur S. Collins, Jr., voiced serious doubts about 

future of the airmobile concept. In his detailed analysis, whic

an important part of the bibliography, General Collins listed n

major strengths of the airmobile concept; however, he still belie

that "the fundamental weakness of the helicopter, and there

the entire airmobile concept, is its vulnerability to ground-to

fire." I disagree. But such concern cannot be lightly dismis

Those charged with the responsibility of planning our future f

structure must weigh very carefully their decisions on the type 

amount of airmobile organizations against the possible con

gencies. In the preface to this volume I stated that airmobility 

no panacea. Some of the operations in Vietnam showed that th

were higher risks involved for higher gains. I submit that the en

strategy in Southeast Asia would have had to be revised downw

if we had not had airmobile organizations, imperfect though t

were. 

The key word for airmobile operations is "survivability," 

"vulnerability." Survivability of air vehicles in the land battl

one end product of a combination of actions and reactions by 

opposing forces. The kinds of battlefield actions and reactions 

many and varied, beginning with intelligence production 

planning and ending with the last shot fired. Survivability of 

craft can be appreciated only by examining all of these influen

in their proper relationship to each other. 

The oft-studied subject of vulnerability, which is only one in

to survivability, has to be recast in proper perspective with reg

to other equally or more important contributors. The deve
by suppressive ground fire support, close air defense support, 

the proper use of intelligence for planning aviation operations, the 

effect of tactic and techniques on increased survivability, the soldier's desire to accomplish his mission, and the effect of personal 

command attention. Since Anny aircraft operate in the ground 

environment, proven techniques of ground survival are available 

to them; and, the most effective of these techniques is the 

co-ordinated use of all his capabilities by a commander on the 

scene. What is germane is the fact that the American soldier is 

more capable of carrying out his mission and more likely to survive in combat because he is airmobile. 

Throughout this study we have tried to emphasize the "man" 

portion of the man-machine equation. However, I'd like to reiterate a few of the equipment lessons that seem exceedingly important during future procurement decisions. History has proven that 

the tools of combat are seldom if ever, used in the exact manner 

which their designer had conceived. For example, the Huey began 

life as an air ambulance. Therefore, it is essential that today's 

developer, in laying the keels for the next generation, design the 

most useful tools, so that some future commander will have available a flexible arsenal that he can adapt to his war. 

The Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation 

from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key 

battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine 

that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had 

the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a "platoon 

carrier," different and less flexible tactics would have been forced 

on our commanders. As we move to replace the H uey fleet, we 

must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the 

Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so 

many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic 

problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in 

the "sizing" of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten. 

Similar principles must be kept in mind in our future helicopter gunships. There is no doubt that from a hardware standpoint. 

the anned helicopter was the single greatest innovation of Vietnam. 

I trust this volume has provided enough examples of its unique 

characteristics and methods of employment to leave no doubt about 

its place in the support of the ground soldier. The introduction of 
job that no other fire support means could do. LAMSON 719, if 

proved any point at all, proved that the Cobra could survive und

high intensity warfare while the older Huey gunship mer

showed deficiencies that we knew had always existed. 

But, there is another story in this volume that has perhaps n

been emphasized enough, and that is the test of the "Go-Go Bir

or armed Chinook. Now, I am speaking of a frame of mind th

wanted to produce a "battleship" (with all the firepower that te

implies) rather than an agile "destroyer" with the agility to go 

and get out. For the future, I think it is possible to reap the be

fits of the latest technology in weapons systems without produci

another "battleship" with its inherent disadvantages. 

The story of airmobility in Vietnam is almost certainly just t

first chapter of a new and dynamic Army. The glamour of a

mobility has long passed, but the challenges are as great as ev

Some of the technological forecast, just dimly seen by the ea

planners, is now reality. If this study has served any purpose besid

its bibliography, which I think is most important, it will fo

part of the corporate memory for those planners of the future w

would like not to pay the terrible price of relearning again in co

bat many costly lessons. As the poet-diplomat Paul Claudell on

observed, "It is not enought to know the past, it is necessary 

understand it." 

APPENDIX 

ARMY AIRCRAFT PHOTOGRAPH
UH-19D CHICKASAW 

Mission: utility, including transportation of cargo and troops, rescu

and observation operations 

First delivery: 1953 

Rotor diameter: 53' 

Length: 62'3" 

Basic weight: 5,650 lbs. 

Payload: 844 lbs. 

External cargo: 2,000 lbs. 

Crew: 2 

Passengers: 10 

Cruise airspeed: 70k 

Maximum airspeed: l15k 

None remaining in active Anny 
CH-34C CHOCTAW 

Mission: transportation of cargo and personnel 

First delivery: 1955 

Rotor diameter: 56' 

Length: 65'10" 

Basic weight: 7,800 lbs. 

Payload: 2,175 lbs. 

External cargo: 3,000 lbs. 

Crew: 2 

Passengers: 18 

Cruise airspeed: 85k 

Maximum airspeed: 133k 

230 currently in Army inventory 
CH-23 RAVEN (D&G MODELS) 

Mission: reconnaissance, medical evacuation, pilot training 

First delivery: 1955 

Rotor diameter: 35'5" 

Length: 40'8 Y2" 

Basic weight: 1,821 Ibs. 

Payload: 8511bs. (D model) ; 600 Ibs. (G. model) 

Crew: I 

Passengers: 2 

Cruise airspeed: 70k 

Maximum airspeed: 83k 

941 currently in Army inventory 
OH-13S SIOUX 

Mission: visual observation and target acquisition, pilot training 

First delivery: 1956 

Rotor diameter: 37' I Y2" 

Length: 43'3" 

Basic weight: 1,715 Ibs. 

Payload: 400 Ibs. 

Crew: I 

Passengers: 2 

Cruise airspeed: 70k 

Maximum airspeed: 87k 

575 currently in Army inventory 
CH-37B MOHAVE 

Mission: transportation of cargo, equipment, and troops 

First delivery: 1956 

Rotor diameter: 72' 

Length: 88' 

Basic weight: 21,500 Ibs. 

Payload: 5,300 lbs. 

External cargo: 10,000 lbs. 

Crew: 3 

Passengers: 23 

Cruise airspeed: 90k 

Maximum airspeed: 1l0k 

17 currently in Army inventory 
Prototype for UH-IA 

Same specifications as UH-IA 

None in Army inventory 

XH-40 
UH-IA IROQUOIS 

Nickname: Huey 

Mission: transport of personnel, equipment, supplies, training aircra

First delivery: 1959 

Rotor diameter: 43'9" 

Length: 52'10" 

Basic weight: 4,020 Ibs. 

Payload: 2,175 Ibs. 

External cargo: 3,000 Ibs. 

Crew: 2 Passengers: 6 

Cruise airspeed: 80k 

Maximum airspeed: 120k 

54 currently in Anny inventory 
CH-47 CHINOOK (A,B,&:C MODELS) 

Mission: transportation of cargo, equipment and troops 

First delivery: 1961 

'Rotor diameter: 59'1 ~" (A&:B); 60' (C) 

Length: 98' 3 ~"(A&:B); 99' (C) 

Basic weight: 18,500Ibs. (A); 19,194Ibs. (B); 19,772Ibs. (C) 

Payload: 10,1I4lbs. (A); 15,900 Ibs. (B); 19,100 Ibs. (C) 

External cargo: 16,000Ibs. (A); 20,000 Ibs. (B); 22,700 Ibs. (C) 

Crew: 3 Passengers: 33 

Cruise airspeed: 1l0k (A); I40k (B); 150k (C) 

Maximum airspeed: 130k (A) ; 165k (B&:C) 

Armament: 7.62-mm door-mounted machine gun 

482 currently in Army inventory 
CH-21C SHAWNEE 

Mission: transportation of cargo, equipment, and personnel 

First delivery: 1962 

Rotor diameter: 44' 

Length: 86'4" 

Basic weight: 8,900 lbs. 

Payload: 1,9201bs. 

External cargo: 5,000 Ibs. 

Crew: 2 

Passengers: 20 

CruiSe airspeed: 80k 

Maximum airspeed: l20k 

None remaining in active Army 
UH-IB IROQUOIS 

Nickname: Huey 

Mission: transport of personnel, equipment, supplies, and to serve 

an aerial weapons platform 

First delivery: 1961. 

Rotor diameter: 44' 

Length: 52'11" 

Basic weight: 4,600 lbs. 

Payload: 2,704 lbs. 

External cargo: 4,000 lbs. 

Crew: 2-4 Passengers: 8 

Cruise airspeed: 90k Maximum airspeed: 120k 

Armament: 40-mm grenade launcher, 7.62-mm machine gun, 2.7

rockets, M22 guided missile 

456 currently in Army inventory 
UH-ID IROQUOIS 

Nickname: Huey 

Mission: transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies, medic

evacuation, delivery of protective fire by attachment of appr

priate weapons, and instrument training 

First delivery: 1963. 

Rotor diameter: 48'3" 

Length: 57'1" 

Basic weight: 4,900 lbs. 

Payload: 3,116 lbs. 

External cargo: 4,000 lbs

Crew: 2-4 

Passengets: 11 

Cruise airspeed: lOOk 

Maximum airspeed: 120k 

Armament: 7.62-mm door-mounted machine guns 

1,010 currently in Army inventory 

UH-IH IROQUOIS 

Same as UH-ID, but with more powerful engine 

2,399 currently in Army inventory 
UH-IC IROQUOIS 

Nickname: Huey 

Mission: transporting personnel, special teams or crews, equipment, an

supplies; medical evacuation; ambulance service; reconnai

sance and security; point target and area fire by attachme

of appropriate weapons; and instrument trainer 

First delivery: 1965 

Rotor diameter: 44' 

Length: 53' 

Basic weight: 4,830 Ibs. 

Payload: 4,500 lbs. External cargo: 4,000 lbs. 

Crew: 2-4 Passengers: 6 

Cruise airspeed: lOOk Maximum airspeed: 140k 

Armament: 40-mm grenade launcher, 2.75" rockets, minigun 

290 currently in Army inventory 
CH-54 TARHE 

Nickname. Sky Crane 

Mission: movement of heavy outsized loads, recovery of downed ai

craft, and by use of detachable pods, transportation of perso

nel, vehicles, and equipment 

First delivery: 1966 

Rotor diameter: 72' 

Length: 88'5" 

Basic weight: 20,700 lbs. 

Payload: 15,400 lbs. 

External load: 20,760 lbs. 

Crew: 3 Passengers: 0 

Cruise airspeed: lOOk Maximum airspeed: l30k 

74 currently in Army inventory 
OH-6A CAYUSE 

Mission: visual observation and target acquisition, reconnaissa

command and control 

First delivery: 1966 

Rotor diameter: 26'4" 

Length: 30'3" 

Basic weight: 1,157 Ibs. 

Payload: 930 Ibs. 

Crew: 1 

Passengers: 3 

Cruise airspeed: lOOk 

Maximum airspeed: 130k 

Armament: minigun 

613 currently in Army inventory 
AH-IG HUEY COBRA 

Mission: enroute escort reconnaissance, direct fire support 

First delivery: 1967 

Rotor diameter: 44' 

Length: 52' II Y2" 

Basic weight: 5,783 lbs. 

Payload: 1,993 lbs. 

Crew: 2 

Passengers: 0 

Cruise airspeed: 130k 

Maximum airspeed: 190k 

Armament: 40·mm grenade launcher, minigun, 2.75" rockets, guided 

missiles 

568 currently in Army inventory 
OH-58A KIOWA 

Mission: visual observation and target acquisition, reconnaissa

command and control 

First delivery: 1969 

Rotor diameter: 35'4" 

Length: 32'3 Y2" 

Basic weight: 1,583 Ibs. 

Payload: 7601bs. 

Crew: 1 

Passepgers: 4 

Cruise airspeed: 102k 

Maximum airspeed: 120k 

Armament: minigun 

751 currently in Army inventory 
0-1 BIRD DOG (FORMERLY L-19) 

Mission: reconnaissance and observation 

First delivery: 1950 

Wing span: 36' 

Length: 25' 

Basic weight: 1,542 Ibs. 

Payload: 100 Ibs. 

Crew: I 

Passengers: 1 

Cruise airspeed: 86k 

Maximum airspeed: 10Ik 

552 currently in Army inventory 
U-I OllER 

Mission: utility transport, light cargo hauling, passenger service 

First delivery: 1950 

Wing span: 58' 

Length: 41'10" 

Basic weight: 4,900 Ibs. 

Payload: 1,398 lbs. 

Crew: 2 

Passengers: 10 

Cruise airspeed: 104k 

Maximum airspeed: l37k 

112 currently in Army inventory 
U-6 BEAVER 

Mission: utility transport, light cargo hauling, passenger service 

First delivery: 1951 

Wing span: 48' 

Length: 30'5" 

Basic weight: 3,100 lbs. 

Payload: 930 lbs. 

Crew: 1 

Passengers: 5 

Cruise airspeed: 105k 

Maximum airspeed: 142k 

503 currently in Army inventory 
U-8 SEMINOLE (D&F MODELS) 

Mission: transportation of personnel 

First delivery: 1956 

Wing span: 45'3" (D) ; 45'10 Y2" (F) 

Length: 3}'6" (D) ; 33'4" (F) 

Basic weight: 4,981 Ibs. (D); 5,381 1bs. (F) 

Payload: 425 Ibs. (D); 830 1bs. (F) 

Crew: 1 

Passengers: 4 

Cruise airspeed: 155k (D) ; 160k (F) 

Maximum airspeed: 200k (D&F) 

172 currently in Army inventory 
G-7 CARIBOU (FORMERLY CV2) 

Mission: cargo hauling, passenger transport 

First delivery: 1959 

Wing span: 95'8" 

Length: 74' 

Basic weight: 20,000 lbs. 

Payload: 5,000 lbs. 

Crew: 3-4 

Passengers: 32 

Cruise airspeed: 165k 

Maximum airspeed: 210k 

4 currently in Army inventory 
OV-l MOHAWK (A,B,&C MODEL<;) 

Mission: visual reconnaissance and observation, photographic r

naissance (A model), electronic surveillance using 

looking airborne radar (SLAR) (B model), Infrared 

reconnaissance (C model) 

First delivery: 1961 

Wing span: 42' (A,C) ; 48' (B) 

Length: 41'1" 

Basic weight: 9,781 lbs. 

Payload: 341 lbs. (A&B models) ; 741lbs. (C model) 

Crew: 2 

Cruise airspeed: l85k 

Maximum airspeed: 255k 

275 currently in Army inventory 
U-21 UTE 

Mission: utility services, command control, administration, liaison, 

aeromedical evacuation 

First delivery: 1967 

Wing span: 45'10 Y2" 

Length: 35'0" 

Basic weight: 5,250 Ibs. 

Payload: 1,600 Ibs. 

Crew: 2 

Passengers: 10 

Cruise airspeed: 2l0k 

Maximum airspeed: 230k 

95 currently in Army inventory 
ACR 

AIR ASSAULT II 

AKA 

AO 

ARA 

ARVN 

ASOC 

AlTLEBORO 

Bde 

BLACKHAWK 

Bn 

BYRD 

Cav 

CC 

CHOPPER 

Co 

COUGAR 

CRAZY HORSE 

CRID 

Glossary 

Air Cavalry Regiment 

The major and final Army test o

11 th Air Assault division in the 

linas. 

Attack Cargo Ship 

Area of Operations 

Aerial Rocket Art~llery 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

Air Support Operations Center 

A battle focused around the S

Forces camp at Sui Da, 19 Oct

24 November 1966. 

Brigade 

A task force made up of the 7th B

ion, lst Cavalry in support of the 

Special Tactical Zone. 

Battalion 

A battalion size microcosm of th

Cavalry Division's operations in 

Dinh province. 

Cavalry 

Command and Control 

The first airmobile combat actio

Vietnam, commencing in Dece

1961. 

Company 

A task force made up of the 214th 

tion Battalion in support of the 

and 7th Army of the Republic of 

nam Divisions. 

An operation in defense of the 

Thanh Civilian Irregular D e fe

Group Camp in Binh Dinh prov

Capitol Republic of Korea Infantry 

sion 
CTZ 

DAN CHI 157 

DASC 

DAVY CROCKETT 

DELAWARE-LAM SON 216 

DMZ 

EAGLE THRUST 

FAC 

G-l 

G-2 

G-3 

G-4 

G-5 

GOLD FIRE I 

GUARDIAN 

py p

military headquarters of the Viet Cong 

Military Region 4. 

Corps Tactical Zone 

An engagement with the Tay Do Battalion in Can Tho Province in the Delta 

during which the 13th Aviation Battalion won the Presidential Unit Citation. 

Direct Air Support Center 

A 3d Brigade operation covering the 

northeast portion of Binh Dinh Province, 4-16 May 1966. 

The 1968 operation in the A Shau Valley. 

Demilitarized Zone 

Deployment of the balance of the lO1st 

Air Cavalry Division, 8-18 December 

1967; the largest and longest military 

airlift ever attempted into a combat 

zone. 

Forward Air Controllers 

Division Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel 

Division Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence 

Division Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations 

Division Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics 

Division Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil 

Affairs 

A Strike Command sponsored joint test 

and evaluation exercise conducted in 

Missouri in 1964. 

A task force made up of the 13th Aviation Battalion in support of the 21st 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division. 
Hq 

IRVING 

JEB STUART 

JP-4 

JUNCTION CITY 

JUNCTION CITY ALTERNATE 

KBA 

KIA 

LAM SON 719 

LCM 

LEJEUNE 

LIBERTY CANYON 

LPD 

LSD 

LST 

LZ 

MACV 

MARAUDER 

MARKET TIME 

22 August2 October 1965. 

Headquarters 

A 1st Cavalry Division operation in 

Dinh province in 1966. 

1st Cavalry operation in I Corps, i

ing the move north, the Tet offe

securing base areas, and prepa

for PEGASUS. 

Kerosene-based fuel for turbine eng

A major operation north of Tay 

City in 1966. 

An operation begun on 22 February 

with the only parachute assau

Vietnam. 

Killed By Action 

Killed In Action 

A combined operation in Laos 

8 February to 6 April 1971. 

Landing Craft, Mechanized 

A 1st Cavalry Division operation 

lieve the Marines in Quang Ngai 

ince, 7-22 April 1967. 

The move of the 1st Cavalry Di

from I Corps to III Corps in th

of 1968. 

Amphibious Transport Dock 

Landing Ship, Dock 

Landing Ship, Tank 

Landing Zone 

Military Assistance Command, Vi

An operation conducted in the Pla

Reeds of the Delta by the 173d 

borne Brigade, 1-8 January 1966. 

lJ.S. Navy operations offshore of Vi

under Task Force 115. 
MATADOR 

NATHAN HALE 

NET 

NEVADA EAGLE 

NPFF 

NVA 

OPCON 

OSD 

PAUL REVERE 

PAUL REVERE IV 

PEGASUS 

PERSHING 

ROAD 

RVN 

RVNAF 

S-3 

SAR 

SAW 

SOP 

TAC 

TAOR 

An operation to find and destroy the 

enemy' in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, conducted during the first half of 

January 1966 by the 1st Brigade of the 

1st Cavalry Division. 

An operation in Phu Yen Province. 

New Equipment Training 

A lOlst Air Cavalry Division operation, 

a large rice-denial effort, in the plains 

south of Hue. 

National Police Field Force 

North Vietnam Army 

Operational Control 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

An operation in Pleiku Province. 

An operation near the Cambodian border 

in Pleiku Province. 

The operation to relieve Khe Sanh, 

1-15 April 1968. 

A 1st Cavalry Division year-long operation in Binh Dinh Province in 1967, 

terminating 21 January 1968. 

Reorganization Objectives Army Divisions' 

Republic of Vietnam 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

Officer in charge of the operations and 

training section of a brigade or smaller 

unit. 

Search and Rescue 

Special Air Warfare 

Standing Operating Procedure 

Tactical Air Command 

Tactical Area of Responsibility 
TOAN THANG 43, 45, 

and 46 

TOC 

TOW 

TRUONG CONG DINH 

VC 

VINH LOC 

VTOL 

WALLOWA 

WHITE WING 

Dinh Province in 1966. 

Operation in the "Fishhook" of 

bodia 

Tactical Operations Center 

An anti-tank wire-guided missile 

A 9th Infantry Division operatio

Dinh Tuong and Kien Tuong 

inces in the IV Corps. 

Viet Cong 

A combined operation of elements o

101st Airborne Division, the U.S. 

and Republic of Vietnam forces 

ducted in Thua Thien Province

20 September 1968. 

Vertical Take-off and Landing 

A 1st Cavalry Division operation be

Chu Lai and Da Nang in I 

beginning 4 October 1967. 

The second, third, and fourth phas

the initial major operation of th

Cavalry in Binh Dinh Province, 

cluded 17 February 1966. 

Index 

A Luoi: 184-85.187.189-90. 24HI 

A Shau: 45. 150 

A Shau Valley: 178. ISO. 182~. 196. 

199. 247 

A-B-C maintenance ooncept: 73 

Aberdeen Proving Ground: 51 

Abrams. General Creighton W.: 61. 163. 

168~. 193. 202. ~e also United 

States Military Assistance Command. Vietnam. 

Adams. Major General Paul D.: 5. 57 

Advanced Aerial Fire Support System: 

SOn 

Advanced Research Project Agency: .. 

Advisors: 15. 28. 52. 4HI .... 48. 156. 

206 

Aerial Combat Reoonnaissance Platoon: 

6 

Aerial rocket artillery. See Rocket fire 

assaults. 

"Air America": 45 

Air assault 

aitique of: M-1i6 

number mounted: 153 

tactics of: 6.26-27. !18- !19. 139 

tests of: 51-{;1 

AIIl ASSAULT II Exercise: M-55. 58 

Air Assault Division. 11th: 5. 9. 51-ti1. 

73, 8211. · ~e also Tactical Mobility 

Requirements Board. 

Air cavalry combat brigade: 22-23. 256 

Air cavalry squadron: 151 

Air defenses. enemy: !16. 48-50. 140. 145. 

184-86. 188. 191~. 198-99. 22!1-24. 

238.242. 245-46. 252 

Air liaison officers: 32. 65-{i6 

Air Support Operations Center: 32 

Air traffic control: 132- 33 

Airborne Division. 82d: 21.54 

Airborne operations: 12&-29 

Aircraft. fixed-wing. See also Helioopters. 

B-52: 101. 1I!l-l4. 121. 146. 16&-67. 

171-72. 179. 184-85. 222. 232. 242. 

244 

C-7: 107. U2. 171,189 

Aircraft. fixed-wing-Continued 

C .... 7: 13.45 

C-123: 15n, 47. 106. 132-33. 1!I6

200.229 

C- 124: 68 

C- I!IO: 12. 21 . 47. 57. 120. 127

1M. 163. 165. 170n, 18&-89. 200

212-13. 229 

C- 133: 196 

C-l4I: 196 

CV-2: 12- 14. 23. 40 ....... 7. 10

120.200 

L- 19: 9.12 

L- 20: 11 

0-1 : !19. 45. 115 

OV- I: lI- U. 22. . 62. 200. 2

T- 37: 10 

U-I: 12.40 

U-{;: 12. !19. 45 

U-8: !19 

arrival in South Vietnam: .. 

cargo-tons carried: 46. 82. 127

212 

Cessna light observation: II 

combat units formed: 10 

expansion of South Vietnamese 

15-16 

missions and sorties flown: 42. 

1M. 167. 184.212 

number in Army: 7.10 

number in South Vietnam: !l9-f0

observation types: 7-8. II 

p;usengers carried: 46. 127. 212 

plans for using: 7-8 

procurement: 17-18 

reoonnaissance and surveillance 

8-9. 12. 14 

replacement policy: 9 

supply by airdrop: 163. 18&-88. 2

in test division: 51 

transfer to Air Force: 104-108 

transport types: 8-9 

vertical-takeoff-and-landing: 9. 1

vulnerability and losses: 42. 83. 1

Aircraft carriers: 212 
use: 46-47. 152-55. 155. 171. 189 

Airlifts. of troops and supplies: 5. IS14. 22. 5S-M. sa. 46. 55. 64. 68. 82-

85. 86-87. 95. 95. 100. 106. 118-20. 

122-25. 126-29. 152. 1M. 158-H. 10. 

16S. 168. 17~74. 176-77. 1'19-80, 

187~. 196. 199--200. 202. 209--15. 

229-51. 241-42 

Airmobile Divisions: 

1st Cavalry: 61-ii2. 67-75. 84. 89. 92-

102. lOS. 117-18. 120-25. 129-44. 

147~. 166-80. 182-95. 197-201. 

209--15. 218-M 

IOIst Airborne: 84. 114-15. 157. 166. 

168. 184. 189. 191. 19!1-98. 201. 20!1-

209.246-47 

Airmobile units. See also by name. 

arrival in South Vietnam: 5. 62~. 67 

attributes of: 15S-54. 254-59 

formation and designation: 61-ii2. 

195-98 

organization proposals and adoptions: 

6-7. 10. 22-25. 55. 59. 51. 62. 68. 

8Hl. 102-104. 196-97. 254-55. 256 

tests and tactical concepts: 25. 51-iil 

Airmobility 

air cavalry. place in: 151. 254-56 

armor. place in: 142-44.255 

Army-Air Force dillerences and agree. 

ments: HH5. 51-52. 57-iil. 62n, 104-

lOS. 146. 195-95.256-57 

artillery. place in: 120-25 

concept. growth and application: H. 

24. 8S-84. 102-104. 179-80, 21S. 25SM.244-59 

ground vehicles. reduction in: 22 

objectives of: 14-15 

troop training in: 8S-84. 105. 114-15 

weather. ellect on: 192 

Aintrips. See Airfields and aintrips. 

Albemarle. USS: 91 

Algeria experience: 4 

Ambulances, helicopter. See under Heli· 

coplen. 

Ambush actions: 75. 96. 101. 208, 2M 

Ambush actions. enemy: M, 48-49. 6S, 

129. 241. 251 

lSl-S2. 148. 160. 197-98 

An Khe Pass: 68 

An Lao Valley: 95. 101. 155 

An Loc: 222 

Anderson. Brigadier General Earl E .• 

USMC: 160 

Annamite Mountains: 258 

Anthis. Brigadier General Rollen H .• 

USAF: 51 

Antiaircraft defenses. enemy. See Air de· 

fenses. enemy. 

ARC LIGHT. See Tactical air support. 

Armor units: 87. 141-44.255 

Armor units. enemy: 178.241-42.249 

Armored Cavalry Regiment. II th: 126-

29.221-24 

Armored personnel carrien: 87. 14s-44. 

207 

Armored Regiments: 

16th: 87 

69th: 142-45 

Army Aircraft Requirements Review 

Board: 8-11. 19 

Army Concept Team in Vietnam: 29. 

41. 46. 142 

Army Reserve: 109 

Army Supply Point: 90 

Artillery fire support: 42-45. 48. 6!Hi6. 

72. 76. 78-80. 86-87. 99. 101. 120-

25. ISS. 140. 149. 166-ii7. 171. 174-

75. 179, 184-86. 190. 208-209. 222. 

244. 24&. See also Rocket fire sup· 

port. 

Artillery fire support. enemy: 166-ii7. 

175-77 

"Artillery raid": 125 

Artillery regiments 

20th: 99 

77th: 148 

519th: 66.86 

Artillery un.its: 22 

Atrocities. enemy: 206 

ATTLEBORO Operation: 124.220 

Australian forces: 64-65.86-87.204 

Aviation Materiel Command: 91 

Aviation Material Management Center: 

!IO--91 
Aviation Support Battalion (Provision. 

al): 47 

Aviation Test Board: 7 

Aviation units: 40. 45-48. 66-67. 88. 102-

105. 108-15. See also Helicopter 

units. 

Battaliom 

1st: 127 

lOth: 1M 

11th: 105-104. 127 

15th: 40. 1M. 21!H8 

14th: 40 

45th: 16 

52d: 40. 1M. 148 

58th: 201 

58th Transportation: I¥.HIO 

10lst Provisional: 10 

H5th: 40. 66. 88. 127 

2Hth: 1M. 215-18 

227th: 55. 2M 

228th: 95.229 

229th: 78. 2M 

269th: 1M 

S07th: 216-18 

SOSth: 201 

765th Transportation: 40. 90 

Brigade. 1st: I¥.HIO. 102-104. 111. 142. 

144. 155. 197. 201-205. 210. 2U. 215-

18.240.247 

Companies 

lit: e 

11th: 1" 

18th: 16,47 

5Sd Light Helicopter: 16. lIO 

57th Light Helicopter: lIO 

57th Medical Detachment: 16 

57th Transportation: 5, 15 

61st: e,47 

68th: 29 

7Sd: 47-48 

81st Transportation: 16 

9Sd Light Helioopter: lIO 

9Sd Transportation: 15-16 

120th Helicopter: 155 

ISS<! Assault Support Helicopter: 

9S 

10th Medium Helicopter: 95 

191st Helicopter: 157 

27Sd: 229 

5Mth Helicopter: 158. 2M 

7292d Aerial Combat Reconn

sance Helicopter: 6 

Groups 

11th: 129. lSI-52 

12th: 89, 1M, 155, 201 

16th: 201 

17th: 1M. 201 

lOIst: 240 

l00th: 196 

IMth: 201.215-18 

Ba To: 45, 151 

Bac Lieu: 48 

Baldy. Colonel Paul A.: 4s-« 

Bao Trai: 86 

Barsanti. Major General Olinto M.: 19

Base Area 604. North Vietnamese Arm

257-M.2« 

Beachhead operations: 1M 

Bell Helicopter Company: 146-47 

Ben Hai River: 194 

Berry. Brigadier General Sidney n.: 2

250 

Bien Hoa: 65. 155-58. 196. 210 

Binh Dinh Province: 72. 92-94. 100-1

117-18, 124. 129-llIO. 155. 157

141-42. 148-50. 152-54, 160 

Binh Duong Province: 88 

Binh Long Province: 212. 218. 221-22 

Binh Thuan Province: 157 

Blanchard. Brigadier General Geo

S .• Jr.: 129. 155 

Bombs. fragmentation: 45 

Bonasao. Lieutenant Colonel Russell 

10 

Bong Son: 95, 159 

Bong Son Plain: 95. 1M. 145 

Bong Son River: 157 

Booby traps: 129. 190 

BoxeT, USS: 62.70 

Boye. Brigadier General Frederic W

21n 

Brewer, Robert: 159, 161~ 

Bridge construction and repair: 178 
Ist. IOlst Airborne Division: 67--{j8. 72. 

102. 104. 114. 126-29. 140n, 184. 18&-

92. 196. 198. 212 

2d. 1st Cavalry Division: 72. 132. 134-

35. 137n. 159. 168. 170. 17~75. 185. 

212. 221. 224-33 

2d. 9th Infantry Division: lSI 

2d. IOlst Airborne Division: 159. 168. 

207-209 

3d. 1st Cavalry Division: 75. 82. 93. 

11S. 136. 139--41. 14S. 159. i64. 168. 

170. 173--74. 17&-77. 185-92. 212. 

221-33 

3d. 9th Infantry Division: lSI 

3d. 25th Infantry Division: 118. 134-35 

3d. S2d Airborne Division: 168 

10th Air Transport: 51-53. 56 

173d Airborne: 63--67. 84. 8&-S8. 102. 

124. 126-29. 14S 

196th Light: 115. 123-24. 12&-29. 185 

Bristol. Colonel Delbert L.: 53 

British Army: 4. 147 

Brockmyer. Major James J.: 17 

Brookley Air Force Base: 68 

Brown. Colonel Thomas W.: 75. 79 

Bu Gia Map: 229 

Bunker. Ellsworth D.: 156 

··Bunker systems. 'enemy: SS. 140. 142-

43.149.202.225-27 

Burchinal. Major General David A .• 

USAF: 14 

Burdett. Major General Allen M .• Jr.: 

215 

Burton. Colonel Jonathan R.: 129. 136 

Bypass construction: 17S 

BYRD Operation: 137-39 

Ca LIM' 166. 170. 173 

Ca Mau Peninsula: 180. 216 

Cam Ranh Bay: 67.91--92. ISS 

Cambodia: 73--74. 92. 117. ISO. 212. 

214. 21S-33. 257 

Camouflage means and uses: 35. 41. 68. 

81 

Camp Carroll: 166--{j7 

Camp Eagle: 160 

Camp Evans: 163. 169. IS2. IS5-86. IS8. 

2HHI 

Can Tho: 40. 216 

Can Tho Province: 216 

Canal systems: 180 

Cao Lanh: 46 

Card, USNS: 3. 15 

Casey. Major General George W.: 129

233 

Casten. Sam: 124 

Casualties 

civilian: 164.209 

enemy: 31. 43. 64. 68. 74-75. S0--82

87. 93. 100. 118. 124-25. 12S. 134

139. 149. 152. 157. 161--{j2. 164. 175

77. 179-82. 202. 208. 223-24. 232

244 

U.S. Army: 68. 74-75. 79. SI. 93. 99

100. 139. ISO. 20S. 224, See also 

Helicopters, ambulances; Medica

evacuation and treatment. 

Cavalry Regiments 

5th: 79-S0. 131-32. 161-62. 174n, 22&

33 

7th: 75. 78-82. 137-~9. 173--74. 17&

77. IS&-92. 21&-IS. 223 

Sth: 96--100. 140. 176. 187--92. 227-35 

9th: 75. 14S. 151. 161-64. 171-72. 17S

IS2--92. 222-33 

12th: 99-100. 124. 136. 14S. 161--{j4

174n, 177. IS7--92 

17th: 234-35.240.247.249 

Cay Giep Mountains: 93. 117 

Census Grievance Committee. South 

. Vietnam: 207 

Central Highlands: 73. S3. 136 

Central Office South Vietnam: 220--21 

Chemical weapons: HI 

.Chief of Research and Development: 8 

Chief of Staff. U.S. Air Force. See White

General Thomas D. 

Chief of Staff. United States Army. See 

Decker. General George H.; Johnson. General Harold K.; Lemnitzer

General Lyman L. 

Chief of Transportation: S 

CHOPPEil Operation: 3 

Chu Lai: 131. 14S, 159. 168. 197 

Chu Pong Mountains: 72. 75. 77 

Civilian Irregular Defense Groups. 96 
pot. 

Co Roc Mountains: 176 

Col Co: 207 

Coleman. Captain John D.: 96-99 

CoIlins. Lieutenant General Arthur S .• 

Jr.: 257 

Collins. Colonel John W.: 140n 

Combat Developments Command: 56. 

66.90 

Combat Operations Research Group: 5~ 

Command and control: 10. 14. 16. 28. 

M. 41. 48. 56. 67. 101-104. 1I5. 128. 

136n, 1~9. 14~. 169-70. 179. 184. 19~-

195.222.247.256 

Command and control. enemy: 224 

Commander in Chief. Pacific. See Pacific 

Command. 

Communications equipment and operations: 160. 212-1~ 

Communications equipment and operations. enemy: 227-28 

Congress: 24 

Containers. shipment by: 212 

Continental Army Command: 8-9. 20-

21. 82n. See also Powell. General 

Herbert B. 

Cordon-and-search operations. See Searchand clear operations. 

Corps 

Provisional: 168-{)9. 179. 184 

XXIV: 240 

Corps Tactical Zones: 

I: !O. ~2. 40. 46. 67. 102. 130. 1~5. 

136n, 1~7. 1~9-4I. 147-51. 15~. 158-

59. 162. 166n, 168. 182. 194. 196. 198-

99.209-1~.215.2~7 

II: ~I. 40-42. 45. 61. 104. 130. 136n, 

137, 215 

III: 40, 102, 1M, 158, 209-1~, 215, 

220-33, 2~7 

IV: ~I, 40, 102. 180-82, 215-18, 220. 

237 

Corpus Christi Bay, USNS: 91-92 

CRAzy HORSE Operation: 95-101 

Crescent Plains: 1I7 

CluMP Operation: 88 

Crossan, Chief Warrant Officer P.: 46 

Cuban missile crisis: 24 

Cummings, Captain john W.: 99 

Da Nang: 15-16. 45. 63n, 151, 159

166. 169. 194. 211, 240 

Dak To: 72. 136. 148. 150 

DANeHI 157 Operation: 217 

Daniel. Colonel Charles D.: 129 

Davis. Brigadier General Oscar E.

170. 190 

Davison. Lieutenant General Mich

221 

DAVY CROCKEIT Operation: 96 

Deans. Brigadier General John R 

126. 128 

DECCA navigation system: 147 

Deception. application of. See Ruses

Decker, General George H.: II, 

20. 24 

De Havilland Aircraft Corporatio

lOS 

DELAWARE Operation: 182-92. 196 

Demilitarized Zone: 131, 158, 1

172-73. 194, 247 

Demolitions: 65. 78-79 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operatio

51 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personne

Deputy Secretary of Defense. See 

patrie. Roswell L. 

DePUY, Major General William E.: 

De Saussure. Brigadier General Ed

129 

Descoteau. Major Rudolpb D.: 89 

Diem. Ngo Dinh: 45 

Dien Bien Phu: 165, 167 

Dillard. Lieutenant Colonel Robe

3,47 

Diller, Lieutenant Colonel Richar

171 

Dinh Tuong Province: 180 

Disosway report: 57 

Divisions. Reorganization Objective 

Army: 23, 56-57 

Documents captured: 26-27, 64. 88. 

Dong Ha: 163 

Door gunners: ~~-M 

Dubia, Lieutenant Colonel Christi

176 

Due Co: 72 
Eagle Flights: !l8-!l9. 87. 208 

EAGLE THRUST Operation: 196 

Easterbrook. Major General Ernest F.: 

8 

Eddleman. General Clyde D.: 17. 19 

Edwards. Captain Robert H .: 77 

Eisenhower. General of the Army 

Dwight D.: 5 

Elections: 152 

Ellis. Lieutenant Colonel: 90 

Engineer Battalion. 85h: 1!l2- !l!I. 189 

Engineer troops and operations: 114- 15. 

1!l2-!l!I. 1!l5. 14!1. 170. 178. 186. 189. 

2!12 

Engines. helicopter: 7. II 

Equipment losses. See Mat~riellosses. 

Escort mission. principles of: !IO-!ll 

Estes. General Howell M.. Jr.. USAF: 

196 

Ewell. Major General Julian J.: 180 

Extraction operations: 47. 65. 81. 136. 

141. 182. 190. 229. 241-242. 255 

Field Forces. Vietnam 

I: 136n, 1!17-!l8. 140n 

II: 182.210.213 

Field manuals. See Training texts. 

Finletter. Thomas K.: 10 

Fire control and techniques: !I!I-!I4. 121. 

12!1 

Fire Support Bases 

BAS'rOCNE: 184. 186. 189 

BRONCHO: 229 

DAVID: 229 

HAMMOND: 117-18 

SoPHIA WEST: 242 

VEGHEL: 189 

"Fishhook" of Cambodia: 220-22 

Fitch. Major General Alva R.: 8 

Five Hundred and Six Valley: 1I7-18 

Fixed.wing aircraft. See Aircraft. fixedwing. 

Flares. See Illumination. battlefield. 

Fleming. Colonel E. Pearce. Jr.: 155. 158 

Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility: 

91-92 

Food losses. enemy: 64. 101. 1I8. 191. 

227. 2!12. 241. 244 

Fort Bragg: !I 

Fort Campbell: 67-68. 196 

Fort Lewis: !I 

Fort Monroe: 8 

Fort Riley: 16 

Fort Rucker: 5. 7. 178. See also Avia

tion School. 

Fort Sill: 16 

Fortifications. enemy. See Bunker sys

tems. enemy. 

Forward air controllers: 66. 81. 22!1 

French forces: 4. 128 

Gatling gun: 142 

Gavin. Major General James M.:. 4-5 

General Leroy Eltinge, USNS: 68 

General Support Group. !14th : 88- 89. 91 

Gibney. Lieutenant Colonel John V.

187 

Gillette. Captain William P.: 74 

Gilpatric. Roswell L .: 21 

"Go-Go Bird":. 142. 259 

GOLD FIRE I Exercise: 58 

"Golf Course": 72 

Goss. Captain Ephraim M.: 46 

Grenade assaults. enemy: 100. 177 

Grenade .Iaunchers: 142 

Griffin. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T .

Jr.: 1!l7n 

Ground Control Approach 'radar: 16!1 

Guam: 113 

Guerrilla operations: II: 4!1. II7 

Hai Lang: 168 

Hamlett. General Barksdale: 14. 52 

Hardesty. Major George D .• Jr.: !I 

Harkins. General Paul D.: !l2. See also 

United States Military Assistance 

Command. Vietnam. 

Harper. Major General Joseph H .: 5 

Harper'S Magazine: 4 

Harrell. Major General Ben: 21n 

Hau Nghia Province: 86 

HAWTHORNE Operation: 101 

Heaney. Lieutenant: 97 

Heinemann. Edward H .: 19.21n 

Helicopter units. See also Airmobile 

units; Aviation units. 
first organized: 4-5 

organizational structure: 202-203 

troop strength: 201 

troops. quality of: 200-201 

unit integrity. preserving: 199-200 

Utility Tactical Transportation Heli· 

copter Company: 29-33 

Helicopters: 22. See also Aircraft. fixed· 

wing. 

AH-IG Cobra: 144-47. 158. 204. 223. 

232. 234. 248-49. 252. 259 

CH-21 Shawnee: 28n, .29-30 

CH-37 Mohave: 40 

CH-47 Chinook: 93-95. 120. 126. 132-

33. 141-42. 163. 208. 216. 229-31. 259 

CH-54 Tarhe: 120. 122- 23. 132-33. 160. 

163. 189.229 

H series: 3. 5-6. 9. 11, 15-16, 28. 30. 

32.94. 144 

HC-I Chinook: 11. 14.23.25-26.68 

OH-1i Cayuse: 232. 234 

OH-13 Sioux: 133 

UH--I Iroquois: 28n, 29-30. 32-33. 35-

36. 40. 68. 76. 94-95. 111. 126. 133. 

146. 235. 242. 247-48. 252. 258-59 

XH-40 utility: 7. 11. 28n 

YHC-IA: 94 

ambulances: 4. 7. 115.258 

armed. tests and uses: 5-7. 29-35. 141-

42. 144-47. 217, 248. 258-59 

armor protection: 145 

arrival in South Vietnam: 26. 48 •. 144 

attributes of: 144-47 

cargo· tons carried: 93. 148 

combat load: 35-36 

crews and mechanics. training and 

performance: 112-13.202 

equipment. training in: 204 

flight techniques: 36 

flying cranes: 14 

ground protection: 199 

improvised uses: 141-42 

industry. proposals by: 5. 7-12. 94. 

146-47 

as key in airmobility: 104-105 

maneuverability and speed: 33 

missions and sorties flown: 31. 64. 

93, 127. 148. 153. 198. 202. 231 

performance: 84 

Sea Knight: 94 

in ship·to·shore supply: 163 

supply by. See Airlifts. of troop

supplies. 

in test division: 51 

turbulence from hovering: 132-33 

utility tactical transport: 258 

vulnerability. losses and recovery

31. 93. 140. 153. 186. 191-92. 

99. 229. 242. 250-52. 257-58 

Helicopters. enemy reports of: 193-9

Herren. Captain John D.: 77 

Hieu. Colonel Nguyen Van: 148 

HIGHLAlIOD Operation: 68 

Highway I: 92. 138 

Highway 9: 165-66. 170. 172-78

240-42 

Highway 19: 68. 120 

Highway 547: 182. 184. 186.247 

Highway 548: 186 

Hill 471: 170.175-76 

Ho Bo Woods: 88 

Ho Chi Minh Trail: 25. 165. 237 

Hoa. Colonel: 188 

Howell. Major William C .• Jr.: 5 

Howze. General Hamilton H.: 7-

24. 234. See also Tactical M

Requirements Board. 

Hue: 48. 151. 159. 162-64. 166. 169

198, 206. 238. 247 

Hughes, Colonel Stanley S., USMC: 

Huong Hoa: 167 

Hutton, Brigadier General Carl I.: 6 

Ia Orang Valley: 73-83. 92, 121 

Illumination. battlefield: 79-80 

Improvisations by soldiers: 141-42 

Infantry Divisions 

lst: 58, 67, 95, 102, 104, 124, 

29.212 

2d: 61 

4th: 104, 124-25, 136, 148 

9th: 104. 180-82 

23d (Americal): 148. 159 

25th: 42-43, 104, 124-29, 212 

Infantry Regiments 

47th Mechanized: 223 
5O!Id Airborne: 64-65.86-88. 126-29 

Infantry School: 5. See also Fort Ben· 

ning. 

Inskeep. Chief Warrant Officer Richard: 

157 

Instrument flying: 110. 186. 188 

Intelligence operations and reports: 41. 

4H4. 49. 111I. 11I9-40. 156. 171-72. 

178. 190. 200. 207-208. 211. 219-20. 

225. 2112.235. 237-1I8 

Inventory control center: 90 

Irby. Brigadier General Richard L.: 198. 

211. 2111 

IRVING Operation: 124. 130 

Isabel. Hurricane: 54 

Jacksonville. Fla.: 62 

Jacobson. Colonel George: 157 

JEB STUART Operation: lOOn, 202 

Johnson. General Harold K.: 58, 62n, 

104-107 

Johnson. Lyndon B.: 50. 67 

Johnson. Major Taylor D.: 911 

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 57-58 

Joint General Staff. RVN: 156 

Joint Test and Evaluation Task Force: 

57 

Jordan. Lieutenant Colonel Clarence E.: 

174 

JUNCfION CITY Operations: 126-29. 202. 

220 

Karhohs. Lieutenant Colonel Fred E.: 

.129. 1S2-54. 11I7n 

Kennedy.)ohn F.: 1I. 15 

Kerner. Lieutenant Colonel Robert C.: 

177 

Kerwin. Lieutenant General Walter T •• 

Jr.: 210 

Khanh Hoa Province: 154 

Khe Sanh: 150. 1611. 165-80. 1911. 238. 

240. 248n 

Khe Sanh Plain: 240.242 

Kien Tuong Province: 180 

Kim Son Valley: 911. 117-18 

Kinnard. Major General Harry W.O.: 

52.55. 71-711. 79 

Kontum Province: 72.92-94. 101 

Korea War experience: 4. 10. 84 

La Chu: 163-64 

La Hue. Brigadier General Foster C .

USMC: 1111n 

Lam. Lieutenant General Hoaug Xuan: 

236. 242. 248n 

LAM SON 207A Operation: 179-80 

LAM SoN 216 Operation: 182~ 

LAM SON 719 Operation: 214. 2115-52

259 

Landing craft. mechanized: 154 

Landing craft. utility: 207 

Landing operations. See Airlifts. of 

troops and supplies. 

Landing ship. dock: 212 

Landing ship. tank: 1M. 207. 211-12· 

Landing Zones 

BEITy-SHARON: 211 

CATES: 174 

CENTER: 2211 

DELTA: 241 

EAST: 2211 

ENGLISH: 136 

HEREFORD: 96-100 

HOPE: 242 

LIZ: 242 

LoLO: 242 

Lucy: 188. 190 

MARY: 75 

MIIlI:: 1711 

MONlYZUMA: 11I2 

NANCY: 211 

PAT: 14Cr141 

SNAPPER: 176-77 

STALLION: 188-89 

STUD: 170-74.179.182.200 

TIGER: 186 

TOMBSTONE: 160 

Two Brrs: 129. 1S2. 160 

UPLIFT: 144 

VICKI: 11!6 

VICTOR: 80 

WINE: 86 

X·RAy: 76,80-81 

Lane. Brigadier General John J.: 21n 

Lang Vei: 170,176-78 
Leary. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J.: 

174n 

LEJEUNE Operation: 150-!6. 197 

Lemnitzer. General Lyman L.: 8--9 

Liaison officers and teams: 81. 118-20 

LlIIERTY CANYON Operation: 209-15 

Lincoln. Brigadier General Lawrence 

J.: 8 

Lines of communication. air: 55 

Lines of communication. sea: 1M-55 

Little John units: 22. 62. 121 

Logistical bases and operations: 4&-48. 

67. 75. 88--91. 151. 165 

Logistical bases and operations. enemy: 

229. 252. 242 

Logistical Command. 1st: 89--90. 210 

Lon Nol: 257 

Long Binh: 155. 210 

Loo": 124 

Lownds. Colonel David E.. USMC: 170. 

175 

Lukens. Colonel Howard I.: 129 

Lynch. Colonel Eugene M.: 194 

Lynch. Colonel Ray: 7<r71 

Lynn. Colonel William M .• Jr.: 21n 

Machine guns: ~50. M. 45. 142 

Machine guns. enemy: 56. 49 

"Mad minute": SO. 99 

Maddox. Brigadier General William j.. 

Jr.: 215-16 

Maintenance and repair: 75. 88-92. 101. 

112. 197--98 

Malaria. incidence of: 129 

Malaysia: 4 

Mang Buk: 45 

MARAUDER Operation: 8&-88 

MARKET TIME Operations: III 

Markham Valley: 86n 

MASHER Operation: 95. 122 

MATADOR Operation: 92 

Materiel losses: 167 

Materiel losses. enemy: 5. M. 75. 88. 95. 

96. 101. 124. 128. 1M. 176-77. 179. 

187--90. 192. 224. 227. 229. 252. 241. 

244 

Matheson. Brigadier General Salve H.: 

HOn 

McLaughlin. Brigadier General 

W.: lOS 

McNamara. Robert S.: 12. 15n. 17-2

57. '109. 146 

Medical evacuation and treatment

48. 65. 75. 78-79. 81. 98--99. ll5

241 

Mekong River and Delta: 16. lIS. 46

88, 105. 18<>-82, 214-la 

Meyer, Major General Richard D.: 8 

Mildren. Lieutenant General Frank 

210 

Military Region 4, VC: 88 

Military Sea Transportation Service

70 

Miller. Captain Robin K.: 217 

Mimot: 220 

Mines: 190 

Mines, enemy: 56. 129, 241 

Minh. Major General Nguyen Van: 

Missile systems: 178 

Mobile, Ala.: 62 

Molinelli. Lieutenant Colonel R

F.: 217,248,250 

Moore. Colonel Harold G.: 75, 77-81 

Morale: 8<r81, 99. 109, ll2, 142, 154 

Morale, enemy: 81-82 

Mortar fire assaults: 77-79, 255 

Mortar fire assaults. enemy: 140, 

68,177,206,246 

Movement Control Center: 210 

My Chanh: 168 

My Chanh Valley: 215 

Nadal. Captain Ramon A., II: 77 

Napalm, tactical use: 45, SO, 1M. 

42 

NATHAN HALE Operation: 101 

"National Liberation Front." See 

Cong. 

Naval construction battalions: 5. 

17<r71 

Naval gunfire support: 121. 1M. 

165 

Navigation systems: 147. 186, 188 

NEVADA EACLE Operation: 196 

New Equipment Training Teams: 

204 
Nha Trang: 40-41.67-68.82 

Night operations: 79. 82. 9!!. 99. 118. 

12!!. 1!!2-M 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 10 

North Vietnamese Army: 25-27. 50. 7~ 

74. 82-8!!. 9!!. 101. 124-25. 1!!o. 140. 

158. 162. 164-67. 178-79. 182. 214. 

218-!!~. 2~7-52 

M Division: 9!!. 1!!o. 152 

7th Division: 220. 224. 227 

!!04th Division: 166 

!!25C Division: 166 

2d Regiment: 9~ 

18th Regiment: 9!!. 118 

22d Regiment: 9~. 1!!O 

!!2d Regiment: 7~ 

!!M Regiment: 7!! 

66th Regiment: 7!! 

IOIst Regiment: 124 

165th Regiment: 224 

812th Regiment: 158. 161 

250th Convalescence Battalion: 224 

50th Rear Service Group: 224 

10th Sapper Battalion: 159 

Norton. Major General John: 19. 24. 48-

49.67.89-90. 129. 1!!7" 

Novak. Second Lieutenant John A .• 

USAF: 158 

Nuclear warfare. focus on: 11 

Nui Sang Mountain: 15!! 

Nuoc Dinh Valley: 15!! 

Oden. Major General Delk M.: 18. 21". 

28".48 

Office of the Comptroller. DOD: 24 

Officers. training and use: 2!!. See aoo 

Pilots. procurement. training. and 

use. 

Okinawa: 6!! 

O'Rang: 220. 229 

Ordnance Corps: 6 

Oriental River: 86--87 

Pace. Frank. Jr.: 10 

Pacific Command: 45 

Palmer. Lieutenant General Bruce. Jr.: 

107 

Parachute assault: 126-29 

PAUL REVERE Operations: 101. 125 

Paxson. Edwin W.: 19.21" 

Payne. Captain Chad C.: 156 

Pearson. Brigadier General Willard: 11

15 

PEGASUS Operation: 166. 169-80. 18

192.200 

Pentomic division: 5~" 

Perfume River: 162. 207 

Pershing missile: 94 

PERSHING Operation: 1!!O. 1!!7. 141. 14

50. 152-54. 159 

Personal equipment. delivery of: 255 

Phan Thiet: 1!!7-!!8. 196-97 

Phnom Penh: 2!!7 

Photography. aerial: 12.41. 172 

Phu Bai: 151. 159. 16~. 161Hi9. 198.211 

Phu Cat District: 118 

Phu Huu: 124-25 

Phu My District: 92. 118 

Phu Quoc Island: 158 

Phu Thu District: 207 

Phu Yen Province: 101. 154 

Phuoc Long Province: 212. 218. 221.229 

Phuoc Vinh: 210. 212-1!! 

Piclting, USS: 1M 

pilots. procurement. training. and us

10. 15. 2!!, 25. 61. 84--85. 107-1!!. 14

201-202 

"Pink Teams": 2~1-!!2 

Plain of Reeds: 86 

PIe! Djereng: 72 

Plei Me: 72- 75. 8~ 

Plei Murong: 72 

Pleiku: 40. 82. 118-20. 142. 150 

Pleiku Province: 72-7!!. 92-94. 101. 125 

Police. national: 149, 15!!. 207-209 

POL supply. stocks and losses: 167.216 

Popular Forces. RVN: U8.206-209 

Population. control and support by

1!!(}-~1. 164. 206 

Powell. Major Edwin C.: 5 

Powell. General Herbert B.: 19. See als

Continental Army Command. 

Princeton. USS: 211 

Prisoners of war. enemy: 64. 74. S<r8

124. 1M. 1~. 152. 154. 162--M, 17

180.208. 224. 2!!2. 244 
Quang Ngai.: 42 ..... S 140. 150 

Quang ~gai Province: 4S. ISO. 1»-41 

Quang Tri: I~. 165. 168. 175. 182. 

198.211 

Quang Tri Province: 166. 2S7. 247 

Quartermaster Company. l09th: 188 

Qui Nhon: +1.68.71-72.82.92 

Radar 1)'ItaDS: 12. I1S. HiS. 188. 194. 

200 

Rankin. Colonel Alexander J.: 19 

Rao Lao River: 188 

Rattan. Colonel Donald v.: 129. 148. 

15!Hi2 

Razor Back Beach: 1M 

Reooilless rifle fire. enemy: 140 

Reoonnaiaance 

aerial: 6. 14. S7-M. 40-«. 48. 72. 87. 

1»-41. 171-7S. 178-79. 184-85. 218 • 

. 22S. 226. 2S2. 248 

ground: 1S2. 1»-41. 171-7S. 187. 190. 

207. 212. m. 248 

naval: 111 

Regional Forces. South Vietnam: 1M. 

206-207 

:Reorpnization Objective Army ·Divi· 

sions: 2S. 56-57 

Repair parts. See Maintenance and reo 

pair. 

Replacements system: 112. 120 

Republic of Korea forces: 92. 102-104. 

118. 124. 204 

Republic of Vietnam 

buildup of forces in: 65-64. 67. 115-

17 

million in: 65 

operational sites in: 116-17 

troop .trengtb. U.s.: 115. 125 

Republic of Vietnam Air Force. 4+-45 

Republic of Vietnam Army. See tWo 

Republic of Vietnam. 

I Corps: 240. 247-48 

1st Airborne Division: 221. 240-52 

1st Division: 165. 184-92. 206-209. 240-

52 

5th Division: 221 

7th Division: 215-18 

9th Division: 41.44. 215-18 

21st Division: 217 

2M Div.ision: 1M 

25th Division: 45 

2nd Airborne Brigade: 64.221 

M Airborne Brigade: 221-24 

1st Armored Brigade: 240-52 

1st Regiment: 159 

M Regiment: 185. 188. 190-91. 

52 

9th Regiment: 221-22 

40th Regiment: 149 

4M Regiment: 64 

54th Regiment: 207-208 

1st Armored Cavalry Regiment: 22

5th Airborne Battalion: 225-24 

8th Airborne Battalion: 177 

9th Airborne ~ttalion: 159. 22S 

M Airborne Task Force: 169-70

1". 184. 189-91 

7th Cavalry Regiment: 207-209 

2d Engineer Battalion: 45 

S7th Ranger Battalion: 166. 169. 

177 

aircraft supporting. number: S9-4O 

airmobility. shift to by: 25-28 

moperation by: 124-25. 2S5-52 

Ranger units: 240-52 

support of: 15. S8-40. 48. 67. 8S. 

lOS. 214-18. 240. 246-52 

mining programs: 25. 28. 48. 

204. 214. 2S5-52 

Republic of Vietnam Marine C

118. 240--52 

Republic of Vietnam Navy: 207 

Ilesearch and development: 5. 7-8. 14

Resupply . .see Supply systems and o

tionL 

Revolutionary Development prog

1M 

Rich. Lieutenant General Charles 

G.: 55. 56. 58 

Richardson. Brigadier General W

B.: 18-19. 21n 

Rider. Lieutenant Colonel Archie 

248n 

Road construction and repair: 178 

Road nets: ISO 

Roberts. Major General Elvy B.: 

21.2SS 
VietnalDCle Army: 229 

"Rock Pile": 166-67.170 

Rocket fire assaults: 22. 29-~. M. 79-

81. 99. 121-:-2~. 1M. 139. 141. 157. 

161-62. 184. 22~. 234-35. 249 

Rocket fire assaults. enemy: 100. 167. 

177. 190.206.246 

Rocket units: 43. 62 

Rogers. Lieute,nant General Gordon B.: 

8-II. 19. See also Aircraft Requirements Review Board. 

Roles and missions. armed services: II}-

15. 62n, 82. 146 

Rosson. Lieutenant General William B.: 

21n, 57-58. I4On, 169, 178-79, 182, 

185, 191 

Rotation policy: 112, 118 

Rowny, Brigadier General Edward L.: 

21n,29,46 

Runkle, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L.: 

174n 

Ruses: 127, 156, 162,208 

Sa Dec Province: 216 

Safety measures: 36 

Saigon: 3, 29, 40. 48, 89, 156, 158, 196, 

218 

Saigon Support Command: 210, 213 

Seabees. See Naval construction battalions. 

Sealifts, of troops and supplies: 209-13 

Search-and-dear operations: 82, 149, 152, 

205-209, 222 

Secretary of the Air Force. See Finletter, 

Thomas K.; Zuckert, Eugene M. 

Secretary of the Army. See Pace, Frank, 

Jr.; Stahr, Elvis J. 

Secretary of Defense. See McNamara, 

Robert S. 

Security measures: 44, 68. 72, 91-92, 129, 

163, 177, 188, 199, 209, 229, 242 

Seneff, Brigadier General George P.: 103, 

155n 

Sensor devices: Il-12, 172, 190.235 

Shanahan, Colonel James G.: 135 

Shelton, USS: 1M 

Shoemaker, Brigadier General RobO-t 

M.: 222-23 

Signal School: 51 

Sihanouk, Norodom: 220 

Silver, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin S

Jr.: 53 

Smith, Major Charles L.: 89 

Smith, Colonel James C.: 129 

Smoke, tactical use: 80 

Snipers, enemy: 177 

Soc Trang: 16 

Song Be: 196 

Song Dong Nai River: 64 

Song Re Valley: 141r41 

South China Sea: 15 

South V~etnam. See Republic of Vie

nam. 

Soviet Union: IS 

Special Forces troops: 40. 44, 46. 72- 7

83, 96. 105, 124. 170, 177-78, 18

188.229 

Special Tactical Zone. 44th: 216-18 

Special Warfare Aviation Detachmen

2!1d: 16.4Ir44.47 

Spilman. Colonel Robert B.: 217 

Stahr. Elvis J.. Jr.: 17-18. 21 

Stannard. Lieutenant Colonel John E

82n, 140. 176 

Stansberry. cOlonel Conrad L.: 153. 1

Stark. Richard 0 .: 154-55 

Starker. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B

103 

StevenilOn. Lieutenant Colonel Robe

D.: 131 

Stockfisch. Jacob A.: 21n 

Stockton, Lieutenant Colonel John B

53,70,75 

Strike Command: 57-58. 61 

Suez Canal: 62 

Sui Da: 124 

Sullivan. Colonel John: 91 

Supply systems and operations: 16. 2

44-i5, 47-48. 79, 101, 1M, 163, 17

186. 188.216,221.241 

Supply systems and operations. enemy

218-20.227,229.237 

Surprise. application of: 39. 172-73. 20

. 213. 220. 225-24 

Surut. Lieutenant Colonel Lee E.: 66 

Surveillance. See Reconnaissance_ 
Ta Bat: 184. 188. 240 

Ta Ma: 140 

Tactical Air Command: 21 

Tactical air support: 12-14. 51-52. 45. 

57-58. 68. 79-81. 86-87. 101. 115-

14. 121. 128. 154. 158. 141. 146. 149. 

162--u5. 166-67. 171-72. 177-79. 184-

86. 222·25. 252. 257. 242. 244. 249 

Tactical Mobility Requirements Board: 

16-24. 50-51. 57 

Tactical Operations Center: 52. 56 

Tam Quan: 92. 149-50 

Tan My: 207. 211-12 

Tan Son Nhut: 15. 50. 154-56 

Tanks. See Armor units. 

Tarpley. Major General Thomas M.: 

246 

Task Force 116. USN: 111 

Task Force X-RAY. USMC: 151 

Task Forces. Army 

BLACltHAWK: 216-18 

CoUG.u: 215-18 

GUARDIAN: 215-18 

formations. concept of: 158. 148. 215-

18 

Tay Ninh: 126 

Tay Ninh Province: 124.212. 218 

Taylor. General Maxwell D.: 15. 65 

Tchepone: 240. 242 

Tear gas. tactical use: 141-52 

Terrain features: 77. 114-17. 158. 140. 

145. 165. ISO. 182. 206. 220. 258. 255 

Test Evaluation and Control Group: 55 

Tet offensive: 149-50. 154-66. 168, 196. 

202.206.218 

Thailand: 40.45.204 

Thames. Brigadier General William M .• 

Jr.: 8 

Than. Colonel Le Van: 206 

THAYER Operations: 117-18. 124. 150 

Third Army: 61 

Thua Thien Province: 182. 206-209. 247 

Time: 156 

TOAN THANG Operations: 221-55 

TORCH Operation: 86n 

Tra My: 46 

Training texts: 5. 105 

Transportation COrps: 7 

Transportation School: 51 

Travis Air Force Base: 118 

Tri Buu: 159 

Troop transport. See Airlifts. of 

and supplies. 

Trudeau. Lieutenant General A

G.: 7 

Truong. Major . General Ngo Q

165.206 

TRUONG CONG DINH Operation: 18(}

Tunnel systems. enemy: 88. 114. 141 

Turner. Lieutenant Colonel Leo D.

157n 

Unger. Lieutenant Colonel Guin

215 

United States Air Force: 7-8. 

21-22. 24. 51-52. 57-61. 62n

104-108. 118-20. 154. 156. 147

58. 165. 179. 188. 195-95. 210

252.249.252.256-57 

Seventh Air Force: 105. 156. 172

257 

2d Air Division: 52. 105 

lid Security Squadron: 157-58 

United States Army. Pacific: 88

197 

United States Army Support Com

Vietnam: 48.67.89 

United States Army. Vietnam: 67

90. 150-51. 194. 197-98. 210

247 

United States Embassy: 156-57. 196 

United States Marine Corps: 4. 

16. 50-55. 67. 94. 102. 150-56

51. 160. 165-,80. 184. 194-95

240.252 

III Amphibious Force: 150-51. 

14On; 147. 160. 169. 194-95.211 

1st Air Wing: 172 

Expeditionary Brigade: 65n 

1st Regiment: 169-70. 175-74. 

77 

4th Regiment: 151 

5th Regiment: 167 

7th Regiment: 151.206 

9th Regiment: 166 
mand. Vietnam: 28- go. g2. ga. 41-

42. 48. 91. 105. m. 156. 168-69. 

194_ See also Abrams. General 

Creighton W.; Harkins. General 

Paul D.; Westmoreland. General 

William C. 

United States Navy: 8. 15. 91. Ill. 1M: 

Ig8. 160. 167. 179. 205-10 

United States Support Group. Vietnam: 

41 

Unity of command. See Command and 

control. 

Van Natta. Major General Thomas F.: 

8 

Vanderpool. Colonel Jay D.: 6-7. 144 

Vaughn. Lieutenant Colonel Billy M.: 

Ig7n 

Vaught. Lieutenant Colonel James B.: 

17g 

Vehicle losses. enemy: 190-91. 225. 225. 

228.244 

Vessels lost. enemy: 202 

Vidal. Eugene: 21n 

Vien. General Cao Van: 202 

Viet Cong: 15. 25-27. go. !16. 41-43. 48-

50. 61. 64. 74. 86-88. 92. 101. 124. 

I~g. 151- 64. 180-82. 205-209. 213. 

216-3g 

5th Division: 220 

9th Division: 124. 220 

lst Regiment: 244 

2d Regiment: 100-101. 19o 

29th Regiment: 244 

!16th Regiment: 244 

64th Regiment: 244 

100d Regiment: 244 

80lld Regiment: 244 

Q-95 Battalion: 4g 

267th Battalion: 87 

506th Battalion: 87 

Tay Do Battalion: 216-17 

Vietnamization policy: 214 

Vinh Loc Island: 206-209 

VINH Loc Operation: 205- 209 

Vinh Thanh: 96 

222-408 

Vung Tau: 40. 45. 63 

WALLOWA Operation: 148. 159 

Walt. Lieutenant General Lewis W 

USMC: l!16n 

War Zone C: 126-28.221.229 

War Zone D: 64-65. Ilg 

iWarrant officers: 23. 110 

Wasiak. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E

173. 186 

Weapons. enemy: 26 

Weather. effect on operations: 53-5

98-99. 162-63. 168. 173-74. 18

87. 190-92. 2ga. 241 

Weede. Major General Richard G 

USMC: g2 

Westmoreland. General William C.: .

6g. 73. 83. lOS. 112-13. 124-25. 1

156. 165. 168. 172. 193. See a

United States Military Assistan

Command. Vietnam. 

White. General Thomas D .• USAF: 

13-14. 104-106 

White phosphorus. tactical use: 77-78 

WHITE WING Opntion: 93. 122 

Williams. Major General Robert R.: 

19. 21n, 24. 53. 155. 158. 194-9

202 

Williamson. Brigadier General El

W.: 6Hi5. 67. 88 

Wolcott. Fred: 21n 

Wood. Major General Robert J.: 8 

World War II experience: 4. 84. 86

91.102. 167,255 

Wright. Brigadier General John M .• J

72 

Xe Pon River: 2g8. 240 

York. Major General Robert H.: 55 

Y.ORK Series plans: 150. 159 

Young, Major General Robert M.: 5 

Zais. Major General Melvin: 198. 206 

Zuckert. Eugene M.: 21 
PIN : 03965