United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

SHARON L. YOUNGMAN, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2011-7139 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in Case No. 09-2785, Chief Judge Bruce E. 

Kasold. 

___________________________ 

Decided: November 9, 2012 

___________________________ 

KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Carpenter, Chartered, of 

Topeka, Kansas, argued for claimant-appellant. 

KATY M. BARTELMA, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. 

 On the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, 

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, TODD M. HUGHES, Deputy 

Director. Of counsel on the brief were MICHAEL J.TIMINSKI, 
YOUNGMAN v. SHINSEKI 2

Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and CHRISTA A.

SHRIBER, Attorney, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

__________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, AND BRYSON, Circuit 

Judges. 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge. 

Sharon L. Youngman, as fiduciary and curator for deceased veteran Lee T. Richardson, seeks payment of accrued 

benefits of about $350,000 that had been awarded to Mr. 

Richardson before his death. Payment of this sum had been 

delayed while the Kansas state courts were accrediting Ms. 

Youngman as successor fiduciary and curator for Mr. 

Richardson, who had been adjudged incompetent several 

years earlier. Mr. Richardson died after the accreditation 

but before processing of the payment. Ms. Youngman seeks 

the payment for distribution to Mr. Richardson’s heirs. The 

Secretary refuses payment. 

This appeal reaches us as a matter of statutory interpretation. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (the Federal Circuit has 

jurisdiction to review and decide any interpretation of any 

statute or regulation under the designated sections). 

DISCUSSION

On May 3, 2005, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs 

(herein the “VA”) awarded 100% disability to Mr. Richardson, effective March 10, 1986. The award included approximately $350,000 in accrued benefits. On May 12, 2005, 

Ms. Youngman was appointed by the VA as Mr. Richardson's fiduciary, the prior fiduciary having resigned. Proceedings were commenced in the Kansas District Court in 

Wyandotte County for the appointment of Ms. Youngman as 
3 YOUNGMAN v. SHINSEKI

Mr. Richardson's “curator” under Kansas law. On July 15, 

2005, the Kansas court issued a formal “Order Appointing 

Curator.” On July 27, 2005, the VA service center manager 

in Wichita, Kansas issued to Ms. Youngman a certificate of 

legal capacity to receive and disburse benefits, the certificate stating that the VA had received a $475,000 bond from 

Ms. Youngman and that “all withheld funds can be released 

to the Curator.” 

Meanwhile, on July 7, 2005, at Ms. Youngman’s initiative Mr. Richardson through counsel filed a petition for 

mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, to 

compel the VA to pay the award of his accrued benefits. On 

July 8, 2005, the VA wrote Ms. Youngman that the payment 

was being withheld until her appointment was completed. 

On July 13, 2005, an amended petition was filed in the 

Veterans Court, identifying Ms. Youngman as Mr. Richardson's VA-appointed fiduciary. See Richardson v. Nicholson, 

476 F.3d 883, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2007). On July 28, 2005, Mr. 

Richardson died, the awarded funds still unpaid. 

On August 12, 2005, counsel filed a motion in the Court 

of Appeals for Veterans Claims to substitute Ms. Youngman 

for the deceased petitioner, for release of the awarded funds. 

 Ms. Youngman sought to distribute the funds to Mr. 

Richardson’s heirs, who are cousins of Mr. Richardson. The 

court denied the petition and the Federal Circuit affirmed, 

holding that Ms. Youngman, not being eligible for Mr. 

Richardson’s survivor benefits, lacked standing to pursue 

this claim. Id. at 886-87. 

While that appeal to the Federal Circuit was pending, in 

June 2006 Ms. Youngman filed a request for payment with 

the VA, which was denied in July 2006. Ms. Youngman 

appealed this denial to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, 

which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, based on 
YOUNGMAN v. SHINSEKI 4

Mr. Richardson’s death. In December 2010, the Court of 

Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, 

stating that even if the Board erred in holding that it lacked 

jurisdiction, “Ms. Youngman nevertheless failed to demonstrate prejudicial error.” The court cited 38 U.S.C. § 

5121(a), which provides that 

periodic monetary benefits . . . to which an individual was entitled at death under existing ratings or 

decisions or those based on evidence in the file at 

the date of death . . . and due and unpaid, shall, 

upon the death of such individual be paid as follows 

. . . (2) Upon the death of a veteran, to the living 

person first listed below: (A) The veteran's spouse. 

(B) The veteran's children (in equal shares). (C) 

The veteran's dependent parents (in equal shares). 

.... 

(6) In all other cases, only so much of the accrued 

benefits may be paid as may be necessary to reimburse the person who bore the expense of last sickness and burial. 

No other categories of payee at death are provided in the 

statute. No claim for sickness or burial expense is asserted 

here. Ms. Youngman, as fiduciary or curator, does not fit 

any of the statutory categories of persons eligible to receive 

benefits that are due and unpaid upon a veteran's death. 

Nor do Mr. Richardson’s heirs. 

Ms. Youngman argues that as fiduciary she is entitled 

to receive the funds that were owed to Mr. Richardson 

before his death for distribution to his heirs, pointing out 

that the VA explicitly stated, before the veteran’s death, 

that the veteran is entitled to these funds and that they can 

be released to the fiduciary. She states that this entitle-
5 YOUNGMAN v. SHINSEKI

ment differs from the payment of benefits to a spouse, 

children, or parents under §5121(a), acknowledging that no 

members of those classes exist. She states that this entitlement was fully vested at the time of Mr. Richardson’s 

death, that it was for retroactive accrued payments that 

would have been paid but for the change in curators and the 

delay of the state proceedings. Thus she states that as 

fiduciary and curator she has standing to receive payment 

of this vested obligation in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 

5502(a)(1), which provides for payment to the veteran’s 

fiduciary for the veteran’s benefit: 

Where it appears to the Secretary that the interest 

of the beneficiary would be served thereby, payment 

of benefits under any law administered by the Secretary may be made directly to the beneficiary or to 

a relative or some other fiduciary for the use and 

benefit of the beneficiary, regardless of any legal 

disability on the part of the beneficiary. 

Regulations to effect this statute include: 38 C.F.R. § 13.55, 

which provides that a veterans service center manager may 

“select and appoint . . . the person or legal entity best suited 

to receive Department of Veterans Affairs benefits,” 38 

C.F.R. § 13.58, which provides that the same officer may 

“make determinations as to the person or legal entity to be 

appointed legal custodian to receive Department of Veterans 

Affairs payments,” and 38 C.F.R. § 13.59(a), which provides 

that benefits may “be paid to the fiduciary appointed by a 

State court.” It is undisputed that Ms. Youngman is a duly 

appointed fiduciary. 

The VA argues that this relationship was extinguished 

with the veteran’s death. The issue is comparable to that 

addressed in Richard ex rel. Richard v. West, 161 F.3d 719 

(Fed. Cir. 1998). In that case, a deceased veteran’s brother 
YOUNGMAN v. SHINSEKI 6

sought to be substituted for the veteran, pursuant to CVA 

Rule 43(a), to obtain payment of the veteran’s serviceconnected disability benefits. This court held that “the 

intent to terminate a veteran's claim to disability compensation at death manifested by the structure and language of 

the statutes themselves” precluded recovery of such benefits 

by “a non-section 5121 claimant.” Id. at 722-23. The court 

rejected the brother’s argument “that section 5121 merely 

establishes an alternative yet nonexclusive means of recovering disability compensation due a veteran at death” and 

therefore did not apply to him, a non-section 5121 claimant. 

Id. at 722. The court held that “a veteran’s death limits the 

recipients, amounts, and processes of recovery of disability 

compensation to those provided in section 5121.” Id.

Although this case involves a fiduciary rather than a 

substitute recipient, the principle is the same. By statute, 

§5121(a) limits the payment of benefits due at the veteran’s 

death, to a surviving spouse or child or dependent parent. 

No payment can be made to the veteran’s estate, or any heir 

other than as designated in §5121(a). The Court of Appeals 

for Veterans Claims correctly held that the circumstances 

herein do not provide an exception to the statutory restriction. 

Ms. Youngman argues that §5502, authorizing payment 

to a veteran’s fiduciary, is independent of §5121’s restrictions on the distribution of accrued money owed to a veteran. However, by its terms, §5121 governs the distribution 

of accrued benefits “[i]n all . . . cases.” 38 U.S.C. § 

5121(a)(6). While §5502 allows a fiduciary to stand in the 

shoes of a veteran, the statute does not grant the fiduciary 

rights beyond those of the veteran himself. Here, because 

Mr. Richardson died without any heirs in the categories 

qualifying under §5121, his unpaid benefits died with him. 

The fact that Ms. Youngman was Mr. Richardson’s fiduciary 
7 YOUNGMAN v. SHINSEKI

at the time of his death does not remove the restriction 

explicitly provided by §5121(a). Ms. Youngman’s suggested 

interpretation of the statutory scheme would lead to the 

peculiar result whereby non-qualifying heirs of veterans 

with fiduciaries could receive the veteran’s accrued unpaid 

benefits, while non-qualifying heirs of veterans without 

fiduciaries would not be eligible to receive such benefits. 

We conclude that the Secretary correctly interpreted the 

statute, and that the veteran’s fiduciary does not have 

standing or authority to receive accrued benefits that were 

unpaid at the veteran’s death, other than in accordance with 

payments as provided in 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a), to designated 

family members or for reimbursement of the expenses of 

last sickness and burial. 

No costs. 

AFFIRMED