a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

June 2004 DEFENSE 

MANAGEMENT

Opportunities 

Exist to Improve 

Implementation of 

DOD’s Long-Term 

Corrosion Strategy

GAO-04-640
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-640.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-640, a report to 

congressional committees 

June 2004

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

Opportunities Exist to Improve 

Implementation of DOD’s Long-Term 

Corrosion Strategy 

While DOD's new long-term corrosion strategy generally addresses the 

requirements in the congressional mandate, it falls short of representing a 

comprehensive plan needed to implement successfully the strategy and 

manage DOD’s extensive corrosion problems in the future. An effective, 

results-oriented strategy identifies resources required to achieve its goals 

and outcome-based performance metrics that can measure progress toward 

achieving those goals. Without addressing certain key elements, the strategy 

is unlikely to serve as an effective tool in preventing and mitigating 

corrosion and its effects on military equipment and infrastructure. These 

shortcomings could lead to the loss of billions of dollars in avoidable 

maintenance costs and the degradation of safety and readiness. GAO’s 

review of three key elements showed the following: 

• Funding and personnel resources—The strategy does not identify the 

level of funding and personnel resources needed to implement the 

corrosion reduction plan in the near- or long-term. Officials in DOD's 

corrosion office said that resource needs are still being determined and 

firm estimates should be available in December 2004. However, 

preliminary projections made by the corrosion task force indicated that 

the DOD-wide corrosion reduction program would require about 

$1.9 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. DOD and the services, 

however, have not included any funds for fiscal year 2004 and less than 

10 percent of the task force's fiscal year 2005 estimates. While the 

strategy calls for a mechanism that ensures sustained, long-term funding, 

DOD has been using a year-by-year funding approach. 

• Performance measures and milestones—While the strategy includes 

some performance measures and milestones, they are not the resultsoriented metrics needed to successfully monitor the program's progress. 

In addition, DOD does not plan to complete a critically needed, 

corrosion cost baseline study until 2011 because of limited funding. 

Without results-oriented metrics and a baseline, DOD will not be in a 

sound position to establish cost-effective resource priorities or monitor 

progress toward corrosion reduction. 

• Policy guidance—While the strategy strengthens DOD's policy 

guidance on corrosion prevention and mitigation, improvements can 

be made. The new guidance establishes a review process for corrosion 

prevention plans for major weapon systems programs, such as the Joint 

Strike Fighter. However, the guidance does not extend the review to 

non-major weapons systems and infrastructure programs, which are 

under the purview of the military services. The guidance also does not 

require the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Focused Logistics 

Functional Capabilities Review to consider corrosion prevention 

planning when it reviews project requirements. 

Each year, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) spends an 

estimated $20 billion to repair the 

damage to military equipment and 

infrastructure caused by corrosion. 

Furthermore, corrosion profoundly 

impacts military readiness as well 

as the safety of military personnel. 

In the Bob Stump National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2003, Congress directed that DOD 

develop a long-term corrosion 

strategy, including specific 

requirements, and that GAO assess 

it. DOD submitted its strategy in 

December 2003. This report 

assesses the potential of the 

corrosion strategy (in terms of 

three elements—resources, 

performance metrics, and policy 

guidance) to effectively prevent 

and mitigate corrosion and its 

effects on military equipment and 

infrastructure. 

To provide better assurances that 

the long-term corrosion strategy is 

implemented as envisioned by 

Congress, GAO is recommending 

that the Secretary of Defense 

address certain shortcomings in 

funding, performance measures, 

and policy. 

In written comments, DOD agreed 

with all of these recommendations. 

However, GAO emphasized the 

need to complete the baseline 

study well before 2011, 

institutionalize corrosion project 

funding, and extend the review of 

corrosion prevention plans. 
Page i GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Corrosion Strategy Shortcomings May Hinder Successful 

Implementation 6

Conclusions 13

Recommendations for Executive Action 14

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 15

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 18 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 20 

Table 

Table 1: Estimated Funding Needs for Corrosion Prevention 

Projects for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009 by Military 

Services 7

Contents 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

June 23, 2004 

Congressional Committees 

Corrosion and its deteriorating impacts are so extensive that military 

equipment and military infrastructure are severely affected. The financial 

burdens are also substantial—estimates show that the Department of 

Defense (DOD) spends as much as $20 billion a year in direct costs alone 

to repair the damage caused by corrosion. Corrosion has equally profound 

impacts on the safety and readiness of the military services. For example, 

as we recently reported, the Navy suspended carrier operations in March 

2002 when one F-14 aircraft crashed because its landing gear collapsed 

because of corrosion. Our report also indicated that corrosion-related 

problems had degraded the readiness of all of the Army’s approximately 

2,450 force modernization helicopters.1

Congress, in the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization act,2

 directed the 

Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a long-term strategy to 

reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on the DOD’s military 

equipment and infrastructure.3

 The mandate required that the strategy 

include, among other things, policy guidance, performance measures and 

milestones, and an assessment of the necessary personnel and funding to 

accomplish the long-term strategy. The mandate also required that DOD 

include an assessment of these elements for four specific initiatives. The 

mandate directed us to monitor the implementation of the long-term 

strategy and submit our report to Congress no later than 18 months after 

the date of the enactment of the act. 

 1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce 

Corrosion Costs and Increase Readiness, GAO-03-753 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003). 

2

 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 107-314, 

§ 1067 (Dec. 2, 2002). 

3

 The act defines corrosion as the deterioration of a material or its properties due to a 

reaction of that material with its chemical environment; it defines military equipment as all 

weapon systems, weapon platforms, vehicles, munitions, and the components of such 

items; and it defines infrastructure as all buildings, structures, airfields, port facilities, 

surface and subterranean utility systems, heating and cooling systems, fuel tanks, 

pavements, and bridges. 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

In July 2003, following the enactment of this legislation, we issued a report 

on corrosion costs and readiness issues. In that report, we recommended, 

and DOD concurred with those recommendations, that in crafting an 

effective strategy, DOD should include a number of key elements, 

including clearly defined goals, outcome-oriented objectives, performance 

measures, and the level of resources needed to accomplish the goals and 

objectives. 

DOD submitted its long-term corrosion strategy4

 to Congress in December 

2003. As agreed with your offices, because so little time has passed since 

the strategy was submitted, our assessment focused on the potential of the 

overall corrosion strategy in terms of three elements—funding and 

personnel resources, performance measures and milestones, and policy 

guidance—to effectively prevent and mitigate corrosion and its effects on 

military equipment and infrastructure in the long term. We also assessed 

these three elements as they relate to the four initiatives specifically 

identified in the congressional mandate. 

In conducting our review, we monitored the activities of the DOD 

corrosion task force set up to develop the long-term strategy and reviewed 

briefings and studies associated with its preparation. We met with DOD 

and military service officials to obtain their views, documentation, and 

studies on the strengths and weaknesses of the new strategy. We also 

analyzed the adequacy of the strategy’s key elements by comparing them 

with criteria established in the Government Performance and Results Act 

of 19935

 and related internal controls guidance and studies. We conducted 

our review between November 2003 and April 2004 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards and determined that 

the data used in the report are sufficiently reliable for meeting our 

purposes. A detailed description of our scope and methodology is 

provided in appendix I. 

While DOD’s new long-term corrosion strategy generally addresses the 

requirements identified in the mandate (e.g., policy guidance, performance 

measures and milestones, and an assessment of the necessary funding and 

 4

 Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Department of Defense, Long-Term Strategy 

to Reduce Corrosion and the Effects of Corrosion on the Military Equipment and 

Infrastructure of the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2003). 

5

 Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

personnel), it falls short of representing the comprehensive plan that is 

necessary to implement successfully the strategy and manage DOD’s 

extensive corrosion problems in the future. As we described in our 

July 2003 report recommendation, a results-oriented comprehensive plan 

identifies the level of resources needed to achieve the strategy’s goals and 

provides outcome-based performance metrics to measure progress toward 

achieving the goals. Without fully addressing these key elements, the 

strategy is unlikely to serve as an effective management tool in preventing 

and mitigating corrosion and its effects on military equipment and 

infrastructure. In addition, without an effective strategy, DOD may lose or 

delay the opportunity to save billions of dollars in avoidable maintenance 

costs for military equipment and infrastructure by not investing in 

corrosion-reduction efforts now. Our review of three key elements showed 

the following: 

• Funding and personnel resources—While DOD’s corrosion strategy 

generally addresses the issue of funding, the strategy does not identify the 

specific level of funding and personnel resources that are needed to 

implement the long-term strategy, including the four initiatives specified in 

the mandate. In developing the strategy, DOD was to provide an 

assessment of the funding and personnel necessary to accomplish the 

long-term strategy, including the four initiatives. According to officials in 

DOD’s corrosion office, an estimate of the funding and personnel 

resources needed was not included because the requirements are still 

being determined, although they said they expect to have these estimates 

by December 2004. While DOD did not identify funding and personnel 

needs in the strategy, the corrosion task force charged with preparing the 

strategy developed a preliminary estimate of funding needs, amounting to 

a total of about $1.9 billion for fiscal years 2004 through 2009. However, 

DOD and the services have not included any funding estimates for fiscal 

year 2004 and only $27 million for fiscal year 2005 projects, about 

9 percent of the task force’s projected needs. While the strategy calls for a 

funding mechanism that will ensure sustained, long-term funding, DOD 

has thus far used, and plans to continue using, a year-by-year approach. In 

terms of personnel needs, the strategy identified the establishment of a 

DOD Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office that would be headed by a 

director and be supported by a task force of corrosion professionals from 

government and industry. 

• Performance measures and milestones—While DOD’s corrosion 

strategy identifies some performance measures and milestones for the 

four initiatives, the metrics are not the results-oriented performance 

measures needed to implement the strategy successfully. In addition, DOD 

does not plan to complete a baseline study that is of critical importance in 

measuring progress toward achieving the strategy’s goals and objectives 
Page 4 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

until 2011 because of limited funding. The strategy contains performance 

metrics that measure program activities, rather than outcome-based 

performance metrics. For example, DOD plans to measure progress by 

counting the number of major acquisition programs that have developed 

corrosion prevention plans rather than by determining the amount of 

savings realized within a specific time frame from corrosion reduction 

projects involving Navy aircraft carriers. Without a baseline and outcomebased performance metrics, DOD will be unable to establish cost-effective 

resource priorities and measure—and report on—its progress toward 

reducing corrosion and its impacts. 

• Policy guidance—DOD strengthened its policy guidance on corrosion 

prevention and mitigation in the long-term strategy, but improvements 

can be made. The new guidance, contained in a policy memorandum6

appended to the strategy, establishes a review process for corrosionrelated issues for major weapon systems programs, such as the Joint 

Strike Fighter. According to DOD corrosion officials, the guidance does 

not extend the review process to non-major weapons systems and 

infrastructure programs, which are under the responsibility of the 

individual military services, in order that the services can retain flexibility 

in managing their own programs. Furthermore, DOD’s new corrosion 

strategy does not include the need for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 

Focused Logistics Functional Capabilities Review Board to consider 

corrosion prevention planning when it reviews project requirements. One 

of the board’s responsibilities is to help ensure that an assessment of the 

sustainability of weapon systems is incorporated into Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff requirements. While the strategy provides general policy 

guidance, it does not specifically provide guidance for the four initiatives. 

To strengthen DOD’s corrosion strategy, we are recommending that DOD 

provide Congress with the long-term funding and personnel resources 

needed for corrosion prevention and mitigation projects. We are also 

recommending that DOD complete a departmentwide baseline corrosion 

study and improve the strategy’s corrosion reduction policy guidance. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with all of the 

recommendations. 

DOD acquires, operates, and maintains a vast array of physical assets, 

ranging from aircraft, ships, and land vehicles to buildings, ports, and 

 6

 Policy Memorandum dated November 12, 2003, from Acting Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to Secretary of the Military Departments. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

other facilities. Corrosion is an extensive problem that affects these assets 

and has an impact on military funding requirements, readiness, and safety. 

It is estimated that the direct costs to DOD of corrosion on military 

equipment and infrastructure is between $10 billion and $20 billion 

annually.7

In our prior work, we reported in July 2003 that, although the full impact 

of corrosion could not be quantified because of the limited amount of 

reliable data that DOD and the military services had available, corrosion 

has a substantial impact in terms of cost, readiness, and safety on military 

equipment and facilities. Moreover, we found that DOD and the military 

services did not have an effective management approach to mitigate and 

prevent corrosion. As a result, we recommended, and DOD concurred, 

that it should develop a departmentwide strategic plan with clearly 

defined goals, measurable outcome-oriented objectives, and performance 

measures. 

In recognizing the extent of DOD’s corrosion problem, Congress enacted 

legislation as part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2003 that directed the Secretary of Defense to designate an 

officer or organization to be responsible for the prevention and mitigation 

of corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure. The legislation also 

required the Secretary to develop a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion 

and the effects of corrosion on military equipment and infrastructure, and 

submit the report to Congress no later than 12 months after the date of the 

enactment of the Act. 

The mandate required that the strategy include, among other things, policy 

guidance, performance measures and milestones, and an assessment of 

the necessary personnel and funding to accomplish the long-term strategy. 

The mandate also required that DOD include an assessment of these 

elements for four specific initiatives. These initiatives are: (1) expansion of 

the emphasis on corrosion prevention and mitigation within DOD to 

include coverage of infrastructure; (2) application uniformly throughout 

DOD of requirements and criteria for the testing and certification of new 

corrosion-prevention technologies for equipment and infrastructure with 

similar characteristics, similar missions, or similar operating 

environments; (3) implementation of programs, including supporting 

databases, to ensure that a focused and coordinated approach is taken 

 7 GAO-03-753. 
Page 6 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

throughout DOD to collect, review, validate, and distribute information on 

proven methods and products that are relevant to the prevention of 

corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure; and (4) establishment 

of a coordinated research and development program for the prevention 

and mitigation of corrosion for new and existing military equipment and 

infrastructure that includes a plan to transition new corrosion prevention 

technologies into operational systems. 

To prepare a strategy, DOD established a corrosion policy and oversight 

task force. The task force is located in the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics and reports to the 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisitions, Technology, and 

Logistics. The task force consists of seven working groups responsible for 

addressing seven corrosion focus areas: (1) policy and requirements; 

(2) impact, metrics, and sustainment; (3) science and technology, 

(4) communication and outreach; (5) training and doctrine; (6) facilities; 

and (7) specifications or standards and product qualification. According to 

DOD officials, these seven areas were identified to address the 

congressional concerns that led to the mandate and the issues discussed in 

our 2003 report. These officials said that because the key elements of the 

mandate (funding and personnel, performance measures and milestones, 

and policy guidance) are comprehensive, they each apply one way or 

another to the seven focus areas in the strategy. 

While the long-term corrosion strategy generally addresses the mandate’s 

requirements, several shortcomings are likely to hamper the successful 

implementation of DOD’s long-term corrosion strategy. The strategy 

(1) does not identify the level of funding and personnel resources needed 

to tackle corrosion problems; (2) does not provide outcome-oriented 

performance measures and a baseline study to measure progress; and 

(3) strengthens existing policy guidance, but some improvements can be 

made. In addition, we recommended in our July 2003 corrosion report, and 

DOD concurred with our recommendation, that a long-term strategy 

should include elements compatible with the Government Performance 

and Results Act of 1993. Among these elements were the level of resources 

needed to accomplish the strategy’s goals and objectives and performance 

measures, such as the expected return on investment and realized net 

savings of prevention projects that show progress toward achieving the 

strategy’s objectives. 

Corrosion Strategy 

Shortcomings May 

Hinder Successful 

Implementation 
Page 7 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

While DOD’s corrosion strategy generally addresses the issue of funding, 

it does not include any estimates of the specific dollar amounts that 

are needed for its near- or long-term implementation. According to the 

strategy, the newly formed Corrosion Policy and Oversight task force will 

develop inputs to the Future Years Defense Program based on corrosion 

requirements and projects. DOD corrosion officials told us, however, that 

funding estimates were not included in the strategy because DOD and the 

military services are still in the process of determining the requirements. 

The officials said they expect to have firm estimates by December 2004. 

In a separate study during the preparation of the strategy, however, 

DOD’s corrosion task force developed a preliminary schedule of funding 

requirements for corrosion reduction efforts. These estimates projected 

that DOD and the military services would need a total of about $1.9 billion 

in departmentwide corrosion prevention and mitigation resources for 

fiscal years 2004 through 2009. DOD corrosion officials said that the task 

force’s figures represent an initial attempt to estimate DOD’s and the 

military service’s funding needs. Table 1 shows the task force’s estimated 

funding requirements for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts for 

both military equipment and infrastructure for the period from fiscal year 

2004 through fiscal year 2009. 

Table 1: Estimated Funding Needs for Corrosion Prevention Projects for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2009 by Military Services 

Dollars in millions 

 Fiscal year 

 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total by service

Equipment 

Army 10.0 81.9 82.8 83.8 112.8 155.8 527.1

Navy/Marines 30.0 58.8 47.5 46.8 43.4 39.8 266.3

Air Force 15.4 3.7 24.5 31.2 35.7 38.6 149.1

Facilities 

All services 19.0 168.0 177.0 189.0 195.0 183.0 931.0

Total 74.4 312.4 331.8 350.8 386.9 417.2 1,873.5

Source: Corrosion Policy and Oversight Task Force. 

The task force’s estimates indicated that the services would need about 

$74.4 million in fiscal year 2004 for corrosion prevention and mitigation 

projects, but this funding has not been allocated or obligated. The task 

force identified 93 projects that had high potential returns on investment 

and were ready to be undertaken immediately. These projects included, 

Strategy Does Not Identify 

Specific Funding and 

Personnel Resources 
Page 8 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

for example, the installation of sensors to monitor fuel tanks and pipes for 

corrosion and the use of corrosion-inhibiting lubricants for avionics 

equipment on military aircraft. Corrosion officials told us that the $74.4 

million was not included in DOD’s fiscal year 2004 budget request because 

the task force developed the estimate too late to be incorporated in the 

budget request. Corrosion officials said they hoped to obtain funding that 

would become available during fiscal year 2004, but, as of April 2004, DOD 

and the services had not allocated or obligated these funds. 

The task force also estimated that the services would need about 

$312 million for equipment and infrastructure corrosion projects in fiscal 

year 2005. However, DOD's Comptroller officials told us that the services 

included only $27 million, less than 10 percent of the projected amount for 

departmentwide corrosion prevention and mitigation projects in their 

fiscal year 2005 budget request. To fund these projects, DOD Comptroller 

officials approved a budget change of $27 million from a special project 

designed to counter threats to the Civil Reserve Fleet and other aircraft to 

the services’ operation and maintenance accounts ($9 million each for 

Army and Air Force, $7 million for the Navy, and $2 million for the Marine 

Corps). DOD corrosion officials told us that they are using these service 

accounts because DOD does not have an account that is dedicated to 

departmentwide corrosion reduction. These officials also said that, after 

the funds are appropriated, they plan to issue a letter of instruction to the 

services requiring them to obtain approval from DOD’s corrosion office for 

the use of these funds. Of the $27 million, DOD corrosion officials said 

they expect to use $24 million for corrosion projects (e.g., for rinse 

facilities for the services’ helicopters and other aircraft and temporary 

shelters for military equipment and vehicles), $2.5 million to begin a 

corrosion impact baseline study; and $500,000 for the corrosion task 

force’s operating expenses. DOD corrosion officials told us that, while the 

$27 million falls far short of the amount needed to fully implement the 

strategy, it represents the first time that DOD expects to use funds for 

corrosion reduction on a departmentwide basis, and it demonstrates 

DOD’s commitment to augment the funding resources that have previously 

been under the purview of the military services. 

DOD Comptroller officials told us that, in future fiscal years, corrosion 

reduction efforts would likely continue to be funded on a year-to-year 

basis by program offsets, such as those used for 2005. They said they 

eventually expect that departmentwide funding will no longer be needed 

as the military services assume a greater role in funding their own 

corrosion reduction projects. Comptroller officials said that the services 

have the knowledge and expertise to manage their own corrosion control 
Page 9 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

projects and, therefore, are in a much better position to identify and 

allocate funding for these efforts. However, DOD corrosion officials said 

that the services are not in a position of knowing which corrosion projects 

have the best potential to provide departmentwide benefits and, 

furthermore, that these projects are not well coordinated within and 

among the military services. 

DOD’s corrosion officials said that the corrosion reduction strategy may 

continue to be underfunded because of the lack of an effective long term 

funding mechanism that would better ensure that corrosion reduction 

projects have sustained funding over a period of years. At the present time, 

the corrosion prevention program is being supported piecemeal through 

budget change proposals or offsets. Corrosion officials told us that with a 

long-term funding mechanism dedicated to departmentwide corrosion 

prevention and mitigation, the program might be able to secure a 

commitment for funding these projects for future years. Such a 

mechanism could also fund projects that crosscut the services and that 

have the greatest potential for cost savings. Corrosion officials said that 

they prefer to have a long-term funding mechanism, such as a program 

element, but the DOD Comptroller does not think that this is necessary at 

this time. 

As we reported in July 2003, the corrosion mitigation program may 

continue to be underfunded because DOD and the military services 

continue to give corrosion prevention a lower priority than other 

requirements.8

 According to DOD corrosion officials, corrosion reduction 

projects must compete with other operation and maintenance programs. 

Because DOD and the military services give higher priority to projects that 

show immediate results, they have limited funding for corrosion reduction 

efforts whose benefits may not be apparent for many years. Corrosion 

officials told us that one of the biggest challenges to getting needed 

funding is to change DOD and military service personnel attitudes—from 

thinking that money spent on corrosion prevention detracts from other 

projects to realizing that it saves money in the long run. 

According to DOD corrosion officials, if DOD and the services do not 

request more funding for corrosion prevention projects, DOD may lose or 

delay the opportunity to realize savings amounting to billions of dollars in 

avoidable maintenance costs for military equipment and facilities now and 

 8 GAO-03-753. 
Page 10 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

in the future. According to corrosion officials, the average potential return 

on investment for a corrosion prevention project is about 10 to 1, with 

some projects showing a return as high as 80 to 1, and with the savings 

realized about 5 years after funding begins. DOD corrosion officials said 

that this means, for example, that if DOD invests $500 million in a 

corrosion project today, it could realize a potential savings of about 

$4.5 billion 5 years from now. 

In terms of personnel resources, the strategy generally provided an 

assessment of the personnel necessary to manage the corrosion program 

effectively in DOD and the services, but the strategy did not identify the 

level of personnel resources needed to implement the strategy. The 

strategy noted the establishment of an Office of Corrosion Policy and 

Oversight that is responsible for developing and implementing the 

corrosion strategy and specified that the office would have a director. 

DOD corrosion officials told us the office also includes a deputy director 

and engineer and that these positions are temporary. The strategy also 

indicated that a corrosion prevention and control working group, 

consisting primarily of corrosion professionals from DOD, would provide 

support for the corrosion office. DOD corrosion officials said these 

individuals are not permanently assigned to the office but serve on a parttime basis. These officials added that, because the strategy was recently 

established, DOD and the military services have had little time to 

determine the number of personnel needed to implement it. These officials 

told us that the requirements would likely be minimal and they expect to 

have a firmer estimate by December 2004. 

The strategy does not identify the specific amount of funding or personnel 

needed to move ahead with the four initiatives specified in the 

congressional mandate. While the strategy includes descriptions of 

military equipment and facilities projects that address in varying ways 

these four areas, it states that these projects require an assessment of 

funding and other resources needed to support them. DOD corrosion 

officials told us that they plan to systematically evaluate each project and 

that this assessment will include determining the resources needed to 

implement the effort. 
Page 11 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

While DOD’s corrosion strategy includes performance measures and 

milestones, they are not the outcome-oriented metrics that are needed to 

successfully monitor the department’s progress in mitigating corrosion 

and its impacts. Instead, the strategy contains output-oriented metrics that 

measure the number of program activities. For example, DOD plans to 

measure progress toward achieving the strategy’s goals by counting the 

number of major acquisition programs that have developed corrosion 

prevention plans, tracking the number of injury-related incidents related 

to corroding equipment or facilities, and recording the number of 

maintenance personnel enrolled in corrosion-mitigation training modules. 

By contrast, an outcome-oriented performance metric would allow DOD 

to determine how much corrosion-prevention projects have reduced the 

amount of maintenance costs for Navy aircraft carriers, decreased the 

failure rates for the Army’s 155 millimeter medium-towed howitzer, or 

decreased Air Force Base fuel pipeline ruptures—all within a certain 

timeframe. 

In addition, the development of meaningful performance metrics will be 

hampered until a baseline study of the costs and the extent of corrosion 

problems departmentwide is completed. In our July 2003 report, we 

indicated that the lack of reliable data made it difficult to adequately 

assess the overall impact of the corrosion problem. A baseline study 

would identify the cost of corrosion on military equipment and facilities 

across the services as well as corrosion’s impact on military personnel 

safety and operational readiness. Such a study would document where 

corrosion problems exist, identify their causes, and prioritize them 

according to their relative severity. 

However, while the long-term strategy acknowledges the critical 

importance of developing a baseline of corrosion costs, including those 

related to safety and readiness, DOD does not plan to complete such a 

baseline until 2011. DOD corrosion officials told us they plan to allocate 

$2.5 million of the $27 million provided for fiscal year 2005 corrosionrelated projects to begin such a study. DOD corrosion officials told us that 

the task force estimated that it would take an additional $1.25 million for 

each of the next 6 fiscal years (2006 through 2011) to complete the study, 

for a total cost of $10 million. They said that it would take that long 

primarily because of the limited funding available for the strategy, which 

has forced them to stretch out funding for the baseline over a period of 

several years. The officials also said that the study would take some time 

to complete because of data reliability issues, the lack of consistency in 

corrosion data within and among the military services, and the 

incompatibility of information systems that contain the data. 

Lack of Outcome-Based 

Performance Measures 

and Baseline Study 

Hamper Tracking Progress 

and Setting Priorities 
Page 12 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

Without a corrosion baseline, DOD will not be able to develop adequate 

performance metrics to measure—or report on—its initial progress toward 

reducing corrosion and its impacts. Furthermore, DOD will not have an 

overall picture of the extent of corrosion problems, making it difficult to 

effectively identify areas that are most severely impacted by corrosion and 

that require high-priority attention and resources. 

While DOD’s corrosion strategy includes some performance measures and 

milestones for the four initiatives, the metrics are not the results-oriented 

performance measures needed to successfully implement the strategy. 

As part of the long-term corrosion strategy, DOD strengthened its policy 

guidance for corrosion prevention and control activities, but there are 

opportunities to build on these improvements. The new guidance 

explicitly calls for the consideration of corrosion prevention and control 

planning during the earliest stages of the acquisition process for military 

weapon systems and military infrastructure programs; earlier guidance did 

not single out the need for such planning. DOD also included the need to 

consider corrosion prevention and control in an existing guidebook 9

 for 

weapons systems program managers. 

While the strategy contains a policy memorandum10 that sets up a review 

process for corrosion-related issues for major weapon systems programs 

(e.g., Joint Strike Fighter), it does not extend this review to non-major 

weapon systems (e.g., Torpedo Defense System Program) and 

infrastructure programs. The guidance directs the corrosion prevention 

and control working group to regularly review the adequacy of corrosion 

prevention plans of all weapon system programs subject to Defense 

Acquisition Board review. If they identify an issue, the product group will 

bring it to the attention of the board. Furthermore, the policy 

memorandum states that the Acting Undersecretary of Defense for 

Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics will personally evaluate the 

corrosion plans for programs subject to board review. According to 

DOD corrosion officials, the guidance did not extend this review to the 

 9

 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Designing and Assessing Supportability in DOD Weapons Systems Guidebook 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2003). 

10 Policy Memorandum dated November 12, 2003, from Acting Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to Secretary of the Military Departments. 

Strategy Strengthens 

DOD’s Corrosion 

Mitigation Policy Guidance 

but Could Be Improved 
Page 13 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

non-major weapons programs, which are under the responsibility of 

individual military services. The corrosion officials said this was done so 

that the services could retain flexibility in managing their own programs. 

Military service officials told us that they have not established a corrosion 

prevention plan review process for their programs because the policy 

memorandum is relatively new, and they prefer to wait to see how the 

process works before they establish a similar review process. However, 

these service officials and DOD officials said that they recognize that all 

programs, both major and non-major weapon systems and infrastructure, 

experience significant corrosion impacts and that all of their corrosion 

prevention plans would benefit from a review process. 

In addition, DOD’s new corrosion strategy does not include any corrosion 

planning or review requirements for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 

Focused Logistics Capabilities Board. However, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

officials said they will include corrosion prevention planning in the board’s 

sustainability assessments of military weapon systems. DOD corrosion 

officials told us that this effort by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would support 

the strategy and enhance DOD’s overall corrosion reduction programs. 

While the strategy provides general policy guidance, it does not 

specifically provide policy guidance for the four initiatives. 

By focusing attention on the extensive and costly problem of corrosion 

and its debilitating impact on military equipment and facilities, DOD’s new 

long-term corrosion strategy is a step in the right direction. However, 

because the strategy falls short of providing the basic elements of an 

effective management plan, DOD’s ability to implement it successfully 

remains at risk. Because of the strategy’s limited assessment of funding 

and personnel needs, lack of a baseline study, and weak performance 

measures, it is not certain that DOD’s corrosion prevention and mitigation 

efforts will be adequately funded, monitored, or thoroughly evaluated. 

Without a sufficient assessment of the funding and personnel resources 

required to reduce the effects of corrosion, Congress does not have the 

information it needs to make informed, corrosion-related funding 

decisions in the future. In addition, if DOD and the services do not 

adequately fund corrosion prevention efforts in the near term, they will 

lose or delay the opportunity to realize billions of dollars in avoidable 

maintenance costs over the long term. They will also face increasing 

degradation in the safety and readiness of military equipment and 

personnel. Furthermore, without establishing a departmentwide corrosion 

baseline, DOD cannot reliably estimate its overall resource needs, 

Conclusions 
Page 14 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

determine which ones have the highest priority, and track and measure its 

progress toward meeting these needs. Moreover, without good resultsoriented performance metrics, DOD cannot adequately measure its 

progress in reducing the impact of corrosion. Finally, without expanding 

its policy guidance to require a review of all corrosion prevention 

planning, DOD will not be able to ensure that all new programs and 

activities—including non-major weapon systems and infrastructure—are 

thoroughly evaluated. As a result, some acquisition and construction 

programs could slip by without effective planning to prevent and control 

corrosion. In addition, DOD will miss an opportunity to strengthen its 

efforts to reduce the impact of corrosion on all new acquisitions and 

facilities in the future. Without fully addressing the strategy’s weaknesses, 

the effects of corrosion will continue to exact a tremendous toll on the 

financial and operational condition of the military. 

To provide better assurances that the Department of Defense’s long-term 

corrosion strategy is successfully implemented as envisioned by Congress, 

we are making five recommendations. We are recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense instruct the Undersecretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in consultation with the DOD 

Comptroller, take the following actions: 

• Establish a date to complete the corrosion baseline study well before its 

original estimated completion date of 2011 in order that cost-effective 

resource priorities and results-oriented performance measures can be 

established to monitor progress in reducing corrosion and its impacts on 

equipment and infrastructure; 

• Establish a funding mechanism to implement the corrosion strategy that 

would be consistent with the strategy’s long-term focus; and 

• Submit to Congress, as part of the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, a 

report identifying the long-term funding and personnel resources needed 

to implement the strategy, a status report of corrosion reduction projects 

funded in fiscal year 2005, and the status of a baseline study. 

In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries of the military services 

establish policy guidance that would include the review of the corrosion 

prevention and control plans of non-major weapons systems and 

infrastructure programs. 

Finally, we recommend that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the 

Focused Logistics Capabilities Board to include corrosion prevention 

issues in its sustainability assessments of military weapon systems. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 15 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Director of Defense 

Procurement and Acquisitions Policy concurred with all five of our 

recommendations. The comments are included in appendix II of 

this report. 

In concurring with our recommendation to complete a corrosion baseline 

study as soon as possible, DOD noted that, as part of the long-term 

strategic plan, it would continue its efforts to evaluate corrosion costs. 

However, DOD did not indicate when it would complete the overall, 

departmentwide baseline study of corrosion costs that we believe is 

essential for establishing cost-effective resource priorities and tracking 

progress towards reducing corrosion and its impacts on equipment and 

infrastructure. We continue to believe that this baseline study should be 

completed as soon as possible. Therefore, we have modified our 

recommendation to be more specific and stated that DOD should establish 

a date to complete the corrosion baseline study well before its original 

estimated completion date of 2011. 

In concurring with our recommendation to establish a funding mechanism 

to implement the corrosion strategy that would be consistent with the 

strategy’s long-term focus, DOD stated that the corrosion office would 

submit funding requests through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 

and Execution process. In addition, DOD noted that funding requests for 

corrosion prevention would compete for funds with other DOD programs 

based on need priorities and fiscal constraints. Although DOD did not 

provide specific details, we would expect that funding requests for 

corrosion would be made during the budget submission process and be 

included in DOD’s submission to Congress rather than be made through 

budget change proposals or offsets after funds are obligated. We would 

also expect that corrosion prevention funding estimates would be included 

in the Future Years Defense Program. Unless DOD adopts these types of 

approaches, corrosion prevention funding will continue to receive a lower 

priority than other DOD efforts, and as a result, DOD will lose the 

opportunity to save billions of dollars in avoidable maintenance costs and 

to improve the safety and readiness of military equipment and 

infrastructure. 

In concurring with our recommendation that the Secretaries of the 

military services establish policy guidance calling for reviews of corrosion 

prevention and control plans of non-major weapons systems and 

infrastructure programs, DOD indicated that it would encourage the 

Secretaries to implement such reviews. DOD also stated that non-major 

programs are reviewed subject to the requirements of different acquisition 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 16 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

authorities within the military services. We do not believe that DOD’s 

comments are fully responsive to our recommendation. We continue to 

believe that non-major weapons systems experience corrosion problems 

similar to those experienced by major weapons systems and that they 

would benefit from the same kind of corrosion prevention plan review. 

Our recommendation also applies to infrastructure programs that are 

primarily managed by the military services. We recognize that the 

authority to manage the activities of non-major weapons systems and 

infrastructure programs lies, for the most part, with the military services 

and that is why our recommendation is directed to the Secretaries of the 

services. As a result, we would expect the Secretaries to implement the 

recommendation by establishing policy guidance appropriate to their 

respective services. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-8365 if you or your staff have any 

questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were 

Lawson Gist, Jr., Allen Westheimer, Hector Wong, Nancy Benco, and 

Katherine Lenane. 

William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Page 17 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John W. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 18 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

To assess each of the three key areas of the report, we held numerous 

discussions with officials of DOD’s Corrosion Policy and Oversight task 

force and reviewed relevant DOD documents, including the final strategy 

report to Congress. Furthermore, to determine the adequacy of each key 

area, we applied internal control tools and results-oriented performance 

standards that are necessary components for successful management 

activities in departments and, by extension, individual programs. 

To assess whether the DOD’s corrosion strategy identified and obtained 

resources to prevent and mitigate corrosion on equipment and 

infrastructure, we reviewed funding requirements and cost estimates for 

DOD and the military services and spoke to DOD officials about unfunded 

corrosion prevention project requirements, the identification of funding 

resources, and future-year funding requirements. We also reviewed the 

unfunded service requirements list and the fiscal year 2004 corrosion 

prevention projects list. We interviewed DOD Comptroller officials and 

discussed the fiscal year 2005 budget request and the prospect for future 

years funding. We also discussed our review of DOD’s Program Budget 

Directive document to understand why the task force did not have its own 

budgeted account. 

To determine whether the strategy’s performance measures and baseline 

data were adequate to prevent and mitigate corrosion DOD-wide, we 

interviewed the leader of the task force working group for Metrics, 

Impacts, and Sustainment about the development of the strategy’s 

performance measures, barriers to gathering cost data across the military 

services, and plans to develop a corrosion cost baseline. We analyzed the 

costs used to prepare existing cost impact studies, particularly studies the 

metrics working groups plan to use to help establish the baseline. We 

observed meetings and internal discussions of the working group for 

Metrics, Impacts, and Sustainment at four separate corrosion forums 

sponsored by the task force. We also reviewed corrosion prevention 

documents related to the development of performance metrics and the 

baseline study. 

To assess the adequacy of the strategy’s policy guidance for preventing 

and mitigating corrosion, we met with the Office of the Deputy 

Undersecretary of Defense for Defense Systems, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

for Logistics, and members of the task force’s working group for Policy 

and Requirements. To determine how the corrosion policy affected 

military infrastructure, we interviewed officials in the Office of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, and 

members of the task force’s working group for Facilities. We also attended 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 19 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

the TriService Corrosion Conference, the Army Corrosion Conference, and 

all four Corrosion Forums sponsored by the corrosion task force to better 

understand the role of policy and its impact on military equipment and 

infrastructure. We also reviewed relevant policy documents, memos, 

instructions, and regulations. 

To assess the reliability of the estimated funding needs for corrosion 

prevention projects for fiscal years 2004 through 2009 by the military 

services we (1) interviewed officials knowledgeable about the data and 

(2) assessed related funding requirements studies and reports. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. We conducted our review between November 2003 and April 2004 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 20 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 21 GAO-04-640 Defense Management 

Note: Page numbers in 

the draft report may differ 

from those in this report. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 22 GAO-04-640 Defense Management (350433) 
The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of 

Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities 

and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal 

government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; 

evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents 

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site 

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail 

this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to e-mail 

alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading. 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A 

check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. 

GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a 

single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Public Affairs 
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Service Requested

Presorted Standard

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00