VIETNAM STUDIES 

Tactical and 

Materiel Innovations 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

VIETNAM STUDIES 

TACTICAL AND MATERIEL 

INNOVATIONS 

by 

Lieutenant GeneralJolm H Hay, Jr. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 2002 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 72:600390 

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Foreword 

The United States Army has met an unusually complex challenge 

in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services. the Army 

has foug ht in suPPOrt of a national policy of assisting an e;merging 

nation to develop governmental processes of its own choosing, free of 

outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging armed 

conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia has required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a modem army upon an 

underdeveloped environment and adapting them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fu lfi ll the basic needs 

of an agrarian population, dea ling with the frustrations of antiguerrilla o perations, and conducting conventional campaigns against 

well-trained and determined regular units. 

It is as always necessary for the U.S. Army to con tinue to prt:",are 

for other cha llenges that lie ahead. While cognizant that history 

never repeats itself exactly and that no army every profited from 

trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the Army 

neverthe less stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience. its shortcomings no less than its achievements. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories will 

provide a detailed and objective ana lysis of the experience in Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more salient 

aspects of that experience can be made available now. At the request 

of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior officers who 

served in important posts in Vietnam and who still carry a heavy burden of day-to -day responsibilities has prepared a series of monographs. These studies should be of great va lue in helping the Army 

develop future operational concepts while at the same time contributing to the historical reco rd and providing the American public with 

an interim report on the performance of men and officers who have 

responded. as others have through our history, to exacting and trying 

demands. 

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was 

accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the 

monographs frequently re fer to events of the past as if they were 

taking place in the present. 

'" 
All monographs in the series are based primarily on offic ial records, with additional material from published and unpublished 

secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To 

facilitate sec urity clearance, annotation and deta il ed bibliography 

have been omitted from the published version; a full y documented 

account with bibliography is filed with the Office of the Chief of 

Military History_ 

The qualifications of Lieutenant Gene ral John H . Hay, Jr., to 

write Tactical and Mat eriel Innouali07lJ are considerable. After 

graduating from the Advanced Management Program at Harvard 

University, Genera l Hay se rved as the Army Member, Milit ary Stu dies 

and Li aison Division , Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Office of 

the Secret ary of Defense, from December 1962 to June 1964. General 

Hay was then assigned as the Comm a nding Genera l, Berlin Brigade, 

in West Berlin , Germany, from July 1964 until August 1966, at which 

time he became the Comm a nding General. 11th Infantry Brigade, 

U.S. Army, Pacific, September 1966-January 1967 _ In February 1967 

he became the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division in 

Vietnam and held th is position until March 1968, when he was reassigned as Deputy Commanding General, II Field Force , Vietnam, 

responsible for the defense of Saigon. He left Vietnam in August 

1968_ On 5 September 1968 he assumed the dual position of Commandant of the U.S. Army Command a nd General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth . Ka nsas, and Commanding General of the U.S. 

Army Combat Develo pme nt Command Institute of Combined Arms 

and Support. This latter position together with his combat experience 

in Vietnam a nd ea rlier assignment with the Weapons System Evalua -

tion Group make General Hay uniquely qualified to be the author of 

this study . General Hay is currently the Commanding General of the 

XVII I Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

Washington. D.C. 

1 May 1973 

iv 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major Gene ral . USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

I was the commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College when Ceneral William C. Westmoreland asked me to 

prepare this monograph. The official archives there, as well as the 

availability of the college staff, permilled a greater depth of research 

and analysis than would otherwise have been possible. We limited our 

study to innovations which influence the command of an infantry 

division. My guidance to my assistants was to write for a professional 

audience, but to make the monograph readable and interesting for 

the general public. Battle stories arc used to illustrate both tacti cal 

and materiel innovations. 

The study covers only a few of the thousa nds of innovations which 

have occ urred in Vietnam. However. I think that it serves to define 

the constant challenge to our soldiers at every level of the Army: to 

stay ahead of the many c hanges which are evolving in our profession 

at this time in our history. 

Washington. D.C. 

i May 1973 

v 

JOHN H. HAY. JR . 

Liculcnant General , U.S. Army 

( 1",/,(" 

1. INTRODUCTION .. 

II. IA ORANG ...... . 

Contents 

3 

10 

Il l. IRV ING ... ....... ...........•.... 21\ 

IV. LOCNIN H ............................ ............ 42 

V . REMACEN AND MONTANA MAULER ............. . 

VI. CORONADO X ................................ . 

VII. OAK TO .......................... . 

VIII . FIRESUP PORTBASECROOK 

FIRE SUP llQRT SURVEILLANCE BASE FLOYD 

I X. T AM KY .............................. . 

66 " 

78 

97 

107 

X . PI-IDNGCAQ .. . ...... ,................. .. . ... 11 7 

XI. 5UO I CAT ..................... . . . . . . .. . ...... . ... 127 

XII . LAM SON 11. .. . 

X I I I. 

X IV . 

xv. 

CU CIII ............................................ . 

VINI-I LOCAND PHU VANG I ....................... . 

SEARCH AND DESTROY ........ . 

XVI. SUMMA Ry ....... . 

G LOSSARY .... 

INDEX .. ". 

Charts 

I. Th ree Phases of Vietnam Strategy ............ . 

2. Vietnamese and Allied Forc~s in South Vietnam . 

3. Populalion StatuS in South Vietnam .. 

Maps 

I. Battles Illustrated . . . .. . ..•....•. ~ ...... . 2. Typl'S of Terrain in Sou th Vietnam ...... • ..... . .... . .... . .. 

\'11 

137 

148 

162 

169 

179 

185 

189 

172 

175 

181 

4 

7 
Diagrams 

.\'1) I'''~'> 

I , Rine Company Cloverleafs, Advancing Toward Contact 44 

2. Fire Suppon Sun·cilla nce Base FLOVO Layout . 29 August 1970 \02 

3. Schematic Deployment of Two Rifle Companies and Reconnaissance Pl atoon in Checkerboard Sellrch Pattern . liS 

4. LocationofFirefight , .... _. _...... 121 

Illustra tions 

Huey Cobra Firing Rockets at Enemy Target 

CH- 47 Chinook ... 

14 

15 

Fireny Illumination System . .. .. ... .......... 21 

YO-3A Quiet Aircraft ................................. , . . . 23 

CH-54 "Flying Crane'· .. , . ' , ............... , .. , . . 2S 

Members of an Engineer Tunnel Rat Team ...... . ... , ...... , 35 

Riot Hand Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37 

Dust·off Helicopter Hoists Wounded Man . , ..... ,.... . ... _ ..... , 40 

Seoul Dog Leads Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... _ . .... , 46 

ClOG Compound and Loc Ninh Airstrip .......... , .. ,. ... 47 

Sergeant and Rineman Engage Enemy Wid} MI6 Rines ............. SO 

Claymore Mine ....... , .. , .... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 

Gene ral William C, Westmoreland and Major GcncralJohn H. Hay,Jr. 55 

UH- I Helicopter Makes Delivery ........... ,......... 61 

500-Gallon Collapsible Drums Filled With Fuel . . . . . . . .. 62 

Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 

USS Ben ewah . . . . . . . . ...... , ........ , .. , . 67 

Eagle Float of Mobile Riverine Force .. , .. 

Barge ·mounted 10S-mm . HowilZer ... 

Mock ·up of XM-2 Airborne Personnel Detector ... . 

ANI ASC- 15 Communication Central . , ....... . 

. ...... , 71 

73 

81 

............... 83 

Bulldolers With Rome Plows Clear J ungle Growth, 88 

Result of Defoliation Operations .. . . . . . . . 93 

Fire SuppOrt Base CROOK .. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 

Aerial Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector ....................... 105 

Starligh t Scope . , . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... , . . 106 

Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicles With RPG Screens. ....... 109 

Armored Personnel Carriers Clear the Way ....... ............ I iO 

"General Sheridan'· ...... ,....... . .. . . ......•.. 11 3 

Combill'Engineer Vehicle ........ . 114 

Vill 
Soldiers Training on Troop Ladders . . . . . . . . . . . • . .... . 

M48 Tanks Ii alted in Herringbone Formation . . . . ... . .. . 

Engineer Mine Clearing Team . . . . . .. . . . .. ..... . .. 

ENSURE 202 Rollcron M4 8 Tank ................... . 

lst ln fantry Division Ba nd Performing at Tan Phuoc Khanh 

Woman Wins Yorkshire: Pig ........ . 

Vill agers Receive Treatment Du ri ng MEDCAP . . ............ . 

Loudspeaker Team Broadcasts Propaganda Mcssage 

Personali7.cd Propaganda Leaflet .......... . 

Scent.'$ Around Cu Chi Base Camp . . . . . .... . 

Spt.-cial Services Activitit.'$ at Cu Chi Base Camp . 

Interior of Univa c 1005 Computcr Van . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .... 

Recovery of Downcd He licopter by CH- 47 . . ... 

ARVN Soldiers and U.S. Adviser ..... . 

Prisoners of War Are Taken to Collection Point ....... . 

Infantry Troops Searching Encmy Ba ~ Are a . 

l1\ ustralions are: from Department of Defense files. 

I'flKr 

125 

129 

133 

135 

138 

139 

140 

144 

145 

152 

153 

158 

160 

165 

166 

174 

TACTICAL AND MATERIEL 

INNOVATIONS 

CIIAPTER I 

Introduction 

For the U.S. Army , the war in Vietnam presented a new type of 

battle rought with new weapons and new tactics against a vcry differen! enemy. In many respects. the area war without front lines together 

with the guerrill a tactics were OUt of ou r nation's beginnings, while 

the sophistica ted hardware presaged the future automated battlefield 

management systems. 

This monograph discusses some of the more important tactical 

and materiel innovations in Vietnam from the viewpoi nt of the in -

fantry d ivision commander. A few well -documented battles illust rate 

new concepts and hardware . most of which werc developed over an 

extended period of time in a variety of opera lions. (Map 1) However, 

the basic tactical doctrine has not changed; it has merely bee n ex · 

panded by new capabilities or altered to the Viet nam siluation . 

The tactics and methods of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 

soldiers did not fit the patterns established by enemy forces in World 

War II and the Korean Wa r. This fact was especially evident during 

the stages of the insurgency when the enemy's main fo rce units tried 

to avo id heavy contact in favor of te rrorism and ambush. Another 

difference was that all of South Vietnam was a war arena with shift · 

ing scenes of comba t in comparison to the rigidity imposed by the 

narrow front lines characte ristic of past con nicts. 

U.S. tactics, however, adjusted to the situation . In a land that 

favored the easily hidden, lightly loaded foot soldier, the helicopter 

ba la nced the odds. Airmobility was a dramatic new dimension, whi ch 

allowed the precise application of a variety of combat power. Finall y, 

pacification became a new consideration for the combat commander, 

o ne which did not concern him in the past. 

Many of the tactical and materiel innova tions developed in Viet· 

nam were in response to the enemy's methods of opera tion in South· 

east Asia . The key military strategy of the North Vietnamese Army 

(NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) was to retain the initiative through of· 

fensive action . They intended to avoid allied strongpoints and to 

attack the weak sPOtS of their c hoice, While they made many deliber· 

ate attacks aga inst allied positio ns, they tended to favor three basic 

tactica l ope rations: the raid , the ambush , and the attack by fire . The 

purpose of these attacks was to inflict casualties and to destroy equip· 

ment and installations, although at times the enemy's objectives were 
BATTLES ILLUSTRATED 

<:;) Ballies 

n a ,oo .. ,~u 

"".'.""--r",--r,'-,,-"---" t!> 0 II)O KILOMfT ER S 

CoronadO X 0 .0 

MAP J 

TomKy 

{) 

Da~ To 

FSSB FIO )'d% 

Irv,nt 

010 Orono 
INTRODUCTION 5 

purely political or psychological. After U.S. forces were introduced in 

South Vietnam in 1965, the enemy realized that to occupy. hold , or 

deny strategic positions was beyond his capability. The only ground 

that he held with any degree of pennanence was in the sanctuaries 

across the border in Cambodia , Laos, and North Vietnam . 

The North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong normally defended 

by evading. Only occ asionally would they defend a position as a feint 

or deception , trying to draw allied forces into a trap or to divert them 

from a larger unit nearby. Enemy tacticians recognized that the allied 

forces we re superior in firepower and mobility. To overcome this suo 

periority, the enemy auempted to mass, attack, and withdraw before 

allied forces could react. Each of the enemy's operations was planned 

in minute detail and often rehearsed. 

The enemy's combat forces were lightly equipped so that they 

could move more freely and quickly. They could nOt depend upon the 

type of supply lines used by most conventional forces. Instead , they 

brought supplies in before the battle and positioned them ahead of 

time . Extra weapons and ammunition were cached near the objective. 

Med ical supplies, ammunition. and food were stored along the with· 

drawal routes. Thus, an increase in the movement of supplies and in 

the discovery of caches was a fairly reliable indication of an impend· 

ing enemy offensive operation. 

The survival of the enemy forces on the battlefield depended on 

their ability to disengage from or avoid contact with allied forces. 

They considered the withdrawal phase of the operation as important 

as any other combat action. When necessary. they would counter· 

attack in an attempt to disengage . If routes leading away from the 

battlefield were blocked, the enemy troops would try to attack a weak 

spot in the allied position and escape through the breach. Delaying 

forces would ambush and harass pursuers. If an orderly withdrawa l 

was not possible , small unit commanders would disperse their troops 

in the hope of rendezvousing later at a predesignated point. 

Very early in the Vietnam War, U.S. forces realized that finding 

the elusive enemy would tax intelligence resources to the limit. Tra· 

ditional methods of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating informa· 

tion were tOO slow to provide the timely intelligence needed. U.S. 

forces expanded techniques developed in earlier conflicts, such as 

pattern analysis and long· range patrols, but these were not enough. 

Equipment such as acoustic , magnetic . and seismic sensors, platforms 

for airborne reconnaissance , and surveillance and observation devices 

was rapidly developed. Close co·ordination between intelligence ac tio 

vities and the operational forces took on new meaning as efforts were 

made to react to information while it was still useful. In past wars, 

U.S. forces pieced together the enemy picture and coupled it with 

considerations of terrain . weather, and objectives; in Vietnam, 
6 T,\CTICAL I\ NO MATERIf.L INNO\'ATIONS 

however, the enemy was pursued as soon as his position was reasonably certain. 

The area war, in contrast to the traditional division of territory 

between friendly and enemy forces. had a radical eCfect on every as· 

pect of military operations. Widely distributed. semipermanent logistic complexes and base camps were connected by aerial supply routes 

and armed convoys. These installations. defended from attack by the 

troops who lived there, provided administrative, logistic , and combat 

suppOrt to sustain the maneuver battalions. Adequate area coverage 

by artillery batterif'S required many fortified fire support bases. These 

compact defensive circles supported infantry. mechanized, cavalry, 

and tank unilS and were in turn protected by them. The infantry baltalions, companies. and platoons were usually on the offensive. digging in at night in ca refully planned night defensive positions. The 

daily operation map. instead of showing a precise line of contact. was 

sprinkled with red and blue symbols throughout the area of operation. Instead of a barren no man's land between adversaries. the 

baule was often waged in a well-populated countryside. The enemy 

hid easily among a people so intimidated as to prove all too often an 

unreliable source of information. On the allied side, specia l rules of 

engagement regulated the use of combat power in order to avoid casualties among the civilian population. 

The helicopter was extremely important. Introduced first in 

Korea, it added new dimensions to warfare. In Vietnam it extended 

the infantry unit's area of comrol at least threefold. A commander 

could react to opportunities quicker, delay his decision. or even 

change his plan en route . He could pile on, block escape routes, extract . or surprise. His entire unit could be shifted to a new area on 

short notice_ At times he was completely free from considerations of 

terrain. In the airmobile division, the helicopter was totally integrated 

imo all operations. Without the helicopter in Vietnam, limited numbers of allied forces would nOl have been able to outmaneuver the 

enemy nor to exercise their superiority of firepower. 

The terrain and weather in differem areas of Vietnam greatly innucllced the character of the war and led the tactical commander to 

dcvdop his own methods of fighting. In the Mekong Delta, extensive 

nat rice paddies and swamps. often impassable for vehicles. are laced 

with ca nals and streams. Riverine tactics. using special shallow-draft 

gunboats, noating artillery. and armored transports, assisted ground 

forces in battles against the firmly entrenched Viet Congo (Map 2) 

The piedmont area around Saigon consists of gently rolling hills 

and broad plains. It bordered well-stocked Cambodian sanctuaries 

and included the infamous jungle bases War Zones C and D. Well 

suited for tracked vehicle movement, the area was the scene of many 

main force battles. 
M

AP 2 

TYPES OF TERRAIN 

SOUTH VIETNAM 

c::::J Oelta 

~ Piedmont 

~ Hi9hlond. 

CJ Coastal Lowlondt 

D Plo leau 

o I()O MILE S 

! i' , ,' , ' 

o lOOl( llOM[ T[RS 

(Appro_, 
8 TAc n CA L AND MATERI~ L I NNOVATIONS 

The narrow coastal plains of the nonhern half of South Vietnam 

arc characterized by sandy beaches, wide nat river valleys, marshes, 

and rice fields. Mu ch of the population , commerce, and agriculture 

as well as many U.S. logistic bases and headquarters were co ncenna· 

ted in these areas. They were tempting targets for the enemy. therefore . and required special protection to avoid casualties among U.S. 

troops and their allies during com bat operations. 

The rugged mountains with dense forests are broken by a rolling 

plateau from Plciku to Ban Me Thuot. Tracked vehicle movcmenl 

and helicopter landings here we re severely limited . Poor weather and 

Ihe great distance from supply centers were important limiting fac -

cars. Enemy forces in the highlands werc mainly regular units of the 

North Vietnamese Army. 

The country is mostl y ho t. hum id , and tropical. Heavy annua l 

rainfall- 120 inches on the northern coastline. 80 inches in Saigon , 

and 40 inches at Phan Rang- comes with the monsoons to the north 

of the mountains in the winter months and to the Mekong Delta and 

piedmont area in the summer. Observation , off-road movement, 

aerial night , and communications deteriorated during the monsoon 

seasons. Maintenance, supply. and storage problems increased and 

the incidence of disease went up. Enemy activity was usually lower 

during the wet seasons. 

U.S. fire support in the form of artillery. tactical a ir. heavy bombers. and helico pter gunships was supe rior to that of the enemy. whose 

fire su pport normall y consisted of mortars. rockets. and recoilless 

rifles. The enemy often tried to "hug" allied ground forces at ranges 

too close for the use of heavy weapons. U.S. and allied tactics centered around detailed reconnaissance , airmobile maneuver, and 

overwhelming fi repower. Defensively, the meticulously planned fi re 

suppOrt bases and nig ht defensive positions of the U.S. forces became 

impregnable strongpoints. Unlike previous wars, there were very few 

bject ve~ of terrain for allied fo rces. The enemy unit , wherever it was 

located in South Vietnam , was the targeL 

Pacification as a primary mission demanded new considerations 

from a combat commander. All offensive and security operations 

were unde rtaken within the broader goal of restoring the control 

of the Republic of Vietnam government over the population. U.S . 

comba t units joined with Vietnamese fo rces and local government organizations to weed out the Viet Cong infrastructure, reopen roads. 

re -establish markets, build schools. and give medical care to the 

needy. The credit for such operations was given to local government 

leaders whenever possible. 

A Korean War veteran wou ld recognize the steel helmet . the pistol, the mortars, the towed howitzers, and the jerry can. The rest of 

today's hardware is new. The old mess kit is gone: troops are fed on 
INTRQOl:CTlON 9 

trays or paper plates. The lightweight M 16 rine has replaced (he old 

MI , and the M79 grenade launcher, the light antitank weapon, and 

the claymore mine have increased the infantryman's firepower. The 

helicopter, improved communications. and the management of 

available fire support have greatly magnified the combat power of 

U.S. units. The armored personnel carrier. the Sheridan, and the 

Huey helicopter are newly developed vehicles. The latest sensors. 

automatic data processing systems. and advanced management techniques arc steps into the future. 
CHAPTER II 

Ia Drang 

(October-November 1965) 

The battle of la Drang illustrates the influence of the helicopter 

on combat operations. IL also demonstrates the usefulness of new OTganizations such as the air cavalry, with its gTeatly increased ability to 

locate and fight the enemy. and the ainnobile division. with its great 

advance in mobility. The expanded role of Army aircraft is seen in 

such refinements as the use of the gunship and the tactica l employment of airmobile troops. The battle story introduces a series of innovations developed before and during the Vietnam War. 

There has been some speculation as to how the war would have 

been waged wilheUl the helicopter. General Westmoreland answered 

the question in this way: 

Suppose thaI we did not have helicopters and airmobile divisions today. 

How many troops would we have needed to accomplish what we have achieved 

in South Vietnam? . No finite answer is possible because our tactics in 

Vietnam were based on massive usc of helicopters .... What would we do 

without helicopters? We would be fighting a different war. for a smaller 

area. at a greater cost. with less effectiveness. We might as well have asked: 

'What would General Patton have done without his tanks?' 

The helicopter was first used in combat by U.S. armed forces for 

medical evacuation during the Korean War. Although many helicop· 

ter assault techniques were later developed by the U.S. Army and 

Marine Corps. it was the findings of the Howze Board . the formation 

of the lIth Air Assault Division. and the development of small tur· 

bine engines that first brought airmobility into its own. 

The first airmobile division was sent to Vietnam in the third quar· 

ter of 1965 as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). After establishing 

a base at An Khe in the II Corps Tactica l Zone and conducting a few 

operations against loca l Viet Cong forces. the division showed its 

strengt h in the la Orang Valley in the fa ll of 1965 . 

On 19 October the enemy attacked a Civili an Irregular Defense 

Group (ClOG) camp at Plei Me - the opening bid in an attempt to 

take over the Central Highlands. By 22 October intelligence indicated 

that there were twO North Vietnamese Army regiments in the area: 

the 33d Regiment. at Plei Me , and the 32d Regiment. which was 

waiting in ambush to destroy the expected relief column from Pleiku , 

north of Plei Me . 
IA ORANG II 

The Vietnamese II Corps commander was confronted with a diffi · 

cult choice. He could refuse to go to the relief of Plei Me and lose the 

camp, or he could commit the reserve from Pleiku, stripping the area 

of defensive troops. If he lost the reserve, Pleiku would be easy prey. 

for the Communists, who could then control the western pan of the 

Central Highlands. He decided to ask for help from the U.S. forces. 

The Commanding General. Field Forces, Vietnam. Major General 

Stanley R. Larsen , sent the following message to Major Genera l Harry 

W. O. Kinnard, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division ;' "Com' 

mencing first light 23 October First Air Cav dep loys one Bn TF mini · 

mum I lnf Bn and 1 Arty Btry to PLEIKU, mission be prepared to 

assist in defense of key US/ ARVN installations vic PLEIKU or rein· 

force II Corps operations to relieve PLEI ME ClOG CAMP." 

Task Force INGRAM was airlifted from An Khe to Pleiku early on 

23 Octobe r. The force consisted of the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 

reinforced with a battery of artillery. While the move was unde r way , 

the division commander, sensing that a decisive operation was immi· 

nent at Plei Me, obtained perm ission to deploy the 1st Brigade to 

Pleiku . The brigade headquarters with the 2d Battalion, 8th Cav<riry, 

and twO batteries of the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, a rrived by air at 

Camp Holloway by midnight on 23 Octo be r to assume opera tional 

control of Task Force INGRAM. The 1st Brigade was charged with se· 

curing Pleiku . providing anillery support fo r (he Vietnamese Anny's 

relief of Plei Me. and furnishing a reserve force. 

Meanwhile. the ARVN (Army of the Republi c of Vietnam) a r· 

mored relief column began moving down Provincial Road 6C tOward 

Plei Me. At 1730 hours the North Vietnamese Army struck the relief 

column at tWO points. but 1st Cavalry artillery was called in on the 

ambushing enemy with deadly accuracy and was a decisive factor in 

repulsing the attack. 

Before the relief column arrived at Plei Me, the camp had been 

resupplied day and night by airdrops from the Anny's CV-2 (Cari· 

bou) of the 92d Av iation Company, the CV-7 (Buffa lo) of the U.S. 

Army Aviation Test Board, and the Air Force's C-123. On the night 

of 24 October the weather was overcast and the camp could not be 

seen from the :tir. In order to identify a release point on which to drop 

the parachute loads, the camp commander fired a sta r· burst flare 

straight up through the overcast, a nd the pilots released their loads 

using the flare as a reference pOiOl. Most of the ammunition an d food 

landed within the compound . 

On the evening of 25 October the relief column arrived at the 

camp, whi ch was still under siege, and immediately rei nforced the de· 

fensive perimeter. By then, 1st Cavalry infantry and artillery had air· 

assa ulted from Pl ei ku into landing zones within close support range. 

The origina l enemy plan to destroy the ARVN relief column and then 
12 rA(:T1C,\] ANn MA ER I. NNOVt\] IONS 

fall on Plci Me had fa il ed. At 2220 hours on 25 October, the 33d 

North Vietnamese Army Regimen! at Plei Me was ordered to with -

draw to the west, leaving behind a rein forced battalion to cover the 

withdrawal. 

At this point Ge nera l William C. Westmoreland visited the 1st 

Brigade's forward command post and directed the 1st Cavalry Divi· 

sion to pursue and destroy the enemy. The division's scope of operations changed from reinforcement and reaction to unlimited offense. 

The division was to be responsible for searc hing o ut and destroying all 

enemy forces th at threatened the Central Hig hlands. The lst Brigade 

pursued the battle through 9 November. The 3d Brigade took ovcr 

until 20 November, when the 2d Brigade began the final operation. 

The battlefield covered 1.500 squ are miles of generall y flat to roll· 

ing terrain dra ined by an extensive network of rivers and small 

streams flowi ng to the west and southwest across the border into 

Cambodia. The dominating feature of the terrain was the Chu Pong 

massif in the southweste rn corner of the area. straddling the Cam· 

bodian· Vietnamese frontier. Fo r long periods this mountain mass had 

been an importa nt enemy infiltration area and one of the many 

strongholds where enemy forces could mass and construct strong 

defenses under the heavily ca nopied jungle. 

Intelligence indicat ed that a field front (divisional headquarters) 

was controlling the enemy regiments. If so, this operation marked the 

first time any V.S. unit in Vietnam had opposed a division·size unit of 

the North Vie tnamese Army unde r a sirigle commander. 

The first significant co ntact was made on I November, when a 

platoon of Troop B. 1st Squadron. 9th Ca va lry, overran a regimental 

aid station six miles southwest of Plei Me. killing fifteen enemy sol· 

diers and capturing fifteen more. This rifle platoon had been air· 

assaulted imo the area in response to reports that scattered groups of 

enemy soldiers had bee n sighted . Two more rifle platoons from A and 

B Troops were landed to sweep through the a rea. JUSt after 1400 

hours, scout hel icopters d iscovered a battalion·size enemy fo rce 

movi ng from the northeast toward the V .5. platoons. The fighting in· 

tensified at ranges tOO close for aeria l rocket artillery or tactical air 

support. The position was also beyond the range of ava il ab le tube 

artillery . Reinforcemem platoons from the 1st and 2d Battalions of 

the 12th Cava lry and the 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry landed late 

in the afternoon, foll owed by two additional platoons from the 2d 

Battalion , 12th Caval ry. Ground fire was intense o n all reinforce · 

mem , resupply. and evac ua ti on helicopters. and seven ships were hit 

byenemy fire . By 1700 hours Company B, 1st Baltalion, 8th Cavalry, 

was committed to the battle, and by 1900 hours the platoons of the 

9th Cavalry Squadron , having found and fi xed the enemy. were air· 

lifted from the area . 
13 

By the time the enemy was driven from the field the 33d North 

Vietnamese Army Regiment had lost its aid station. many paticms. 

and over 540 .000 worth of important medical supplies and had sustained 99 men killed and 183 wounded . 

The airmobile concept had proved itself. SCoul ships would rcc -

onnoiter and locate enemy groups, rifle clements would fix the enemy 

in place. and hcliborne units. supported by massed air and ground 

firepower. would attack and defeat the enemy troops. These tactics 

worked successfully again and again during the battle. 

In a well-executed ambush at 2100 hours on 3 November, the rine 

platoons of the 1st Squadron. 91h Cavalry. again drew blood. Troops 

in one of several ambush positions located JUSt north of the Chu Pong 

Mountain sighted a heavily laden North Vietnamese Army unit, esti · 

mated at company strength , moving along an cast-west trail. Deciding to take a break JUSt one hund red meters short of the ambush site, 

the enemy column loitered outside the killing zone for ninety minutes. 

while the U.S. troops waited quietly in ambush _ At2100 hours the en· 

emy unit moved noisily along the trail. The first element was allowed 

to pass. and then the trap was sprung with eight claymores along a 

100-meter zone . The attack was perfectly executed and the enemy's 

weapons platoon with machine guns. mortars. and recoi lless rifles was 

caught in a wall of lead as the cavalrymen fired continuously for two 

minutes. There was no return fire. 

The ambush patrol returned immediately to its base and weill to 

work strengthening its perimeter_By 2230 hours the base was under 

heavy attack by an estimated twO or three com panies of North Viet -

namese Army regu lars. At midnight the perimeter was in grave danger of being overrun. but reinforcements were on the way. Company 

A. 1st Battalion . 8th Cavalry. standing by at the Duc Co Special 

Forces Camp. located twelve miles of roadlcss jungle to the north. had 

been alerted. The first platoon was on the g round and in combat forty 

minutes after midnight. The entire company had arrived by 0240 

hours _ Whi le this type of relief and reinforcement is now routine. it 

was unique in November 1965. This battle marked the first time a 

perimeter under heavy fire was reinforced at night by heliborne 

troops air-assaulted into an un familiar landing zone . It was a lso the 

first time that aerial roc ket artillery was used at night and as close as 

fifty meters to U.S . troops. 

By dawn the enemy attack had lost momentum. and the fighting 

diminished to occasional sniping from surrounding trees. As a result 

of the battle. ninety.eight North Vietnamese soldiers were killed and 

len were captured. In addit ion. over 100.000 rounds of 7.62·mm. 

ammunition. two 82-mm. mortars. and three 75-mm. recoilless rifles 

were destroyed . and large quantities of mortar and recoilless rifle am · 

munition were captured. The implications of an ambush deep within 
i 'i TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

HUEY COBRA Fnm.;c ROCKETS AT ENEMY T ARCET 

what was thought to be secure territory musl have stunned the North 

Vietnamese Army's high command . 

Allhough the helicopter was n o longer strange to the enemy, he 

had failed [0 appreciate its use in tactical ro les other than as a prime 

mover o f supplies and men. For the fi rst time the enemy found his 

withdrawal routes blocked, his columns altacked, and artille ry fire 

directed on his rou tes of escape - all because of the new dimension 

added to the war by aggressive tactical use of the helicopter. During 

the pursuit of the 33d Nort h Vietnamese Army Regiment from Plei 

Me. the enemy was so baffled by the constant harassment and rapid 

compromises of "secure" way stations that the North Vietnamese 

Army command concluded that there were traitors in the regiment 

providing target information to the Americans. 

Arming Army aircraft had been tried as far back as the 1950s. but 

the war in Vietnam brought about an intensive program to develop 

Army aircraft weapons. In 1962 at Nha Trang, the 23d Special War· 

fa re Aviation Detachment (Surveill ance), whose mission was to sup· 

port provincial forces, tested six OV-IA Mohawks armed with .50· 

caliber machine guns and 2.75·inch folding· fin aerial rockets. This 

successful program was expanded until 1966, when Army fixed ·wing 

aircraft were taken out of the fighter·escort mission by the Depart· 

ment of Defense, No approved armament program was established. 

During th is same period. the use of armed helicopters inc reased 

rapidly. In October 1962 , the Util ity Tactical Transportation Com· 
IA URA:-':C 15 

CH-47 CIIINOOK 

pany (the Army's first armed helicopter unit) equipped with UI-I-I A's 

replaced B-26's and T - 28's as escorts for CH-2 1 (Shawnee) troop 

helicopters. Losses decreased significantl y, By May 1964 , B·model 

Hueys (UI-I - I B) had replaced the CH- 21 for carrying troops. and ten 

light airmobile aviation companies. with onc to three armcd platoons 

each . werc in Victnam . In 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 

brought the first air cavalry squadron and aerial artillery battalion to 

the Rcpublic of Victnam . Three armed Chinooks (CH- 47A) were 

tcsted in 1966, but the arrival of the Cobra (AH- IC) cnded t hat 

project. The Huey Cobra was introduced in 1968 with 75 percent 

more ordnance and 30 percent more speed than any of the )-I uey gunships. By April 1969 , over half of the 680 helicoptcrs in Vietnam were 

Cobras. 

There were five types of U.S. Army units operating in South Viet · 

nam which were authoril.cd to use armed helicopters: assault helicop· 

ter companies (nondivision), attack helicopter companies (airmobile 

division and nondivision), general support companies (infantry divi· 

sion), aerial rocket artillery battalions (airmobile division), and air 
16 I ACTIC,\L AND MATERIEL INNOV ATIONS 

cavalry troops (nondivision, divisional, armored cavalry regiment). 

Armed helicopter missions were primarily oriented to support ground 

maneuver forces. On such a mission. the helicopter's functions were 

to provide security and to deliver firepower. There were five categories of missions in which armed helicopters were commonly used: 

armed escort of other aircraft, surface vehicles and vessels, and 

personnel on the ground: security for an observation helicopter perfanning low-level reconnaissance; direct fire support against targets 

assigned by a commander of a ground maneuver clement: aerial 

rocket artillery functions against targets assigned by a fire support coordination cemer, forward observer, or airborne commarw:l.er; and 

hunter-killer tactics to provide security for an observation helicopter 

performing low-level reconnaissance and to deliver firepower on targets of opportunity. 

One of the most significant tactical innovations to come out of 

carly U.S. effons in Vietnam was the "eagle night." The exact origin 

of the term is obscure, but it dates from the period in late 1962 when 

the five U.S. CH-21 helicopter companies transporting ARVN forces 

were joined by the first company of armed UH- J helicopters- the 

Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company. An elite AR VN pia -

lOon was mounted in five CH -2 1 's and escorted by two to five armed 

Hueys. The gunships provided su ppressive fire in the landing zone 

and conducted aerial reconnaissance to locate the enemy. The infantry could be landed to engage a sma ll enemy force, check a hamlet , or 

pick up suspec ts for questioning, while the gunships provided support. If nothing was found, the troops would be picked up and the 

operation repeated again in another likely location. The eagle flight 

cont ributed gready to ARVN operations. As one repon stated, '"The 

enemy can fade away before the large formations, bUl he never knows 

where th e 'Eagle Flight· will land next ." The success of these early 

operations demonstrated the feasibility of airmobile tactics in aClUa l 

comba t. promoted the idea of armed helicopters. and paved the way 

for the development of much larger air assau lt forces. Such practical 

experience was infused in the testing of the airmobile concept by the 

11th Air Assault Division. 

The variety of aircraft organic to air caval ry permitted maximum 

flexibility in organizing for combat and ena bled the commander to 

StruCLUrc the assets into teams to sa tisfy mission requirements. One air 

cavalry troop was orga nic to the armored cava lry squadron of the infantry division. and three were organic to the air cavalry squadron of 

the airmobile division. Each trOOP consisted of a scout platoon 

equipped with light observation he licopters. an aerial weapons platoon with AH - I G armed helicopters. and a rifle platoon with organic 

UI-I-1 1-1 utility heli copters. In Vietnam the commander employed 

various teams in com bat ope rations. A red team consisted of two gun· 
I" DH."NG 17 

ships. AI-I - IG Cobras. with a variety of armametll. II was strictly an 

offensive weapon. readily available to the commander. A white tcam. 

consisting of twO light observation helicopters armed with 7.62 ·mm. 

miniguns. was used to reconnoite r areas where the enemy's situalion 

was unknown and significant contact was not expcClcd. One of these 

helicopters new a few feet above the g round or trees to conduct closein reconnaissance. The other new at a higher ahitude to provide 

cover and radio relay and to navigate. The higher ship also functioned 

in a command and control capacity. A pink team was a mixlUrc of 

red and white. one light observation helicopter and onc Cobra. The 

obscrvation helicopter followed trails. made low passes over the 

enemy positions. and cOOlou red the terrain in conducling its recon· 

naissance mission. The gunship new a circular pattern at a higher 

altitude in the general vicinity to provide suppressive fire and relay 

infonnation gathered by the observation helicopter. When outside of 

artillery range or in areas considered to be extremely dangerous. the 

pink learns were used in conjunction with a command and control 

helicopter. If one helicopter was downed by enemy fire. the remain· 

ing aircraft provided cover until a reaction force arrived. llink teams 

could also adjust artillery fire. although the AH-IG with its twin pods 

of 2.75-inch rockets was compara ble to a I05·mm. howitzer. Pink 

teams were the most prevalent tactical combination of aircraft in the 

air cavalry troop. 

A blue team was a structured number of UH-l l-l aircraft Ir.ms· 

porting the air cavalry troop's aeria l rine (aerorine) platoon or pan of 

a ground cava lry troop of the cava lry squadron. The blue team 

normally worked with pink teams. The aerorine platoon of the air 

cavalry troop was transported in its o rganic aircra ft in a great variety 

of roles. When the aerorine platoon was employed. a rine company 

from one of the battalions in the a rea was designa ted as the backup. 

quick reaction force. The air caval ry troops were normally assigned 

ground and aerial intelligence. security. and economy-of·force misSIOIlS. 

Intelligence missions. orie nted on the enemy. included visual reconnaissance of rOUles. areas. and specific targen. bomb damage 

assessmenl. landing zone reconnaissance and selec tion. target acquisi· 

tion. prisoner capture (body snatch). and range r and airborne personnel detcctor operations. The val ue of the air cava lry as the eyes of 

the commander was inestimable. The body snatch was a spedal operation to caplure prisoners or 10 apprehend suspected enemy personnel. In such an o peration . the heli cop ter demonstrated its nexibility. 

Using an aircraft and grou nd force " package" structured to the par· 

ticular sit uatio n . the ai r cavalry commander pinpointed the targel in· 

di vidual by employing scou t helicopters and th en landed one or more 

squads of the aerorine platoons to accomplish the snatch. Scout air· 
18 TACTICAL ANI) MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

craft screened the area while the Cobras provided cover. The snatch 

team package normally included a UH-I H command and control 

ship to direct and co-ordinate the mission. Executed as a quick reaelion technique. body snatch operations provided the commander with 

a rapid means of gaining new intelligence. 

Ranger long-range reconnaissance patrols operated in small 

teams within the division area. The learn members were qualified for 

airborne operations and trained to rappel and usc special recovery 

rigs. They were capablc of sustai ned operations in any type terrain for 

a period of five to seven days. Air cava lry supported the rangers with 

UH-I H transport. aeroweapons suppOrt, a command and control aircraft, and an immediate reaction force of an aerorine or airmobile 

platoon. Techniques to deploy the teams included false insertions, 

low-level flights, and, on occasion, landing both the aerorine platoon 

and the ranger team simultaneously. The aerorifle platoon was sub· 

sequentl y withdrawn, leaving the rangers as a stay· behind patrol. 

During operations outside the range of tube artillery. the rangers 

re lied heavily on aeroweapons gu nships (AH - IC). 

Security missions were primarily oriented LOward fricndly forces to 

provide them with early warnings and time for maneuver. Security 

missions included sc reening operations, first · and last·light reconnaissance of specified areas, and protection for convoys and downed aircraft. 

Air cavalry troops often provided surveillance of an extended area 

around a stationary or moving force. Pink teams maintained radio 

contact with the ground commander and reportcd enemy positions, 

trails, or troop sighti ngs in order that appropriate action could be 

taken. Pink or red teams were capable of engaging the enemy with 

their own organic weapons and of adjusting artillery a nd air strikes to 

reduce an enemy threat. 

When conducting first· light reconnaissa nce around a unit field 

location, the pink teams began their nights before daybreak 10 be on 

station at first light . En route the team leader contacted the gro und 

unit commander to request artillery advice and to ask whether the 

ground unit had any particular area of interest. Last -light reconnais· 

sa nce began an hour and a half before dark in order to be completed 

by nightfall. When a target was discovered , the team reported to the 

ground unit responsible for the area and requested clearance 10 fire. 

All enemy sightings were reported to the unit in whose area t he teams 

were operating. 

The composition of a convoy security fo rce varied with the size 

of the convoy. the terra in, and the enemy's situation. The scout el· 

ements, either one or two armed light observation helicopters, pro· 

vided fire support, radio relay. rapid artillery adjustment , and 

command and control. The aero weapons platoon could provide 
IA DRANG 19 

quick fire sup port if the convoy were ambushed, and the aerorifle 

platoon could be quickly brought in to assist. Other helicopters were 

then used to move th e backup reaction force quickly imo the ambush 

area. 

When an aircraft was downed within the division area of opera -

tions, a pink team was immedi ately dispatched La locate it. Then an 

aerorifle or ground cavalry platoon was brought into the area. The 

pink team screened the area surrounding the aircraft until both the 

aircraft and security platoon were evacuated. Although platoon per· 

sonnel were trained to rig aircraft for evacuation . the nonnal proce -

dure was to bring in a technica l inspector and qualified maimenance 

personnel to prepare the aircraft. 

Economy-of.force missions for airmobile cavalry included artillery 

raids. combat assaults, ambushes, delaying actions, prolonged security 

for clements constructing fire bases. and base defense reaction force 

operations. 

Artillery raids supported by air cavalry units included both the 

tube and aerial rocket artillery raids, delivered into areas where the 

enemy considered himself safe from such fire. During a tube artill ery 

raid, the air cavalry troop reconnoitered the selected landing zone 

and secured it with an aerorifle platoon before artillery was landed by 

CH-47 and CH-54 aircraft. Pink teams conducted visual reconnaissance 10 develop targets of opportunity and were capablc of adjusti ng 

fire and conducting immediate damage assessment. 

The aero rifle platoon was used to exploit significant sightings or 

to conduct ground damage assessment. In raids by the aerial rocket 

artillery battalion, the air ca valry units performed similar missions 

except that no landing lone had to be selected and developed. 

Fire base construction missions involved an aerorifle pl atoon , an 

engineer team, and a pink team. The aerorifle platoon was inserted 

(by rappel. if necessary) into the proposed landing zone to provide 

security for the engineers. After a landing zone had been cleared for 

one ship, additional engineer equipmelll was landed to enlarge the 

area to the required fire base dimensions. Pink teams condUCted 

screening operations around the troop clements; co-ordination was 

achieved through a command and control aircraft. After a one -ship 

landing zone was prepared, infantry trOOps were usually brought in , 

and the aerorifle plaLOon could then conduct reconnaissance of likely 

enemy positions in the vicinity. This platoon was a lso capable of conducting limited combat assaults and ambushes. When teamed with 

scout and aeroweapons platoon clements of the a ir cava lry troop, it 

constituted a ba lanced combined arms team. 

Although night helicopter assaults were rare in the early operations in Vietnam, the Army did work toward developing effective 

night techniques. Expe rience has shown that all missions and roles 
20 rACI tCAI AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

normally fulfilled by helicopters during daylight hours can be success· 

fully completed in darkness by aircraft equipped with navigation aids 

and night vision devices. Vietnam proved that helicopters could be 

used at night to greatly increase U.S. maneuver superiorit y over [he 

enemy. Most of the night combat assaults were made to reinforce 

units in contact with the enemy: however, they were also made to 

ga in tactical surprise, position blocking forces, and set up ambushes. 

The first night reinforcement of U.S. troops under fire occurred 

during the fircfight following the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, ambush. 

The landing zone, which could accommodate only five helicopters, 

was under continuous fire during all landings. The only light available to the pilots was that from machine gun tracer rounds. This firefight also marked the first time aerial rocket artillery was employed at 

night in close support of friendly positions. 

The first night combat assault involving airmobile IOS-mm. how· 

itzers occurred on 31 March 1966 as part of Operation LI NCOLN by the 

1st Cavalry Division (Airmo bile). When elements of the 1st Squadron, 

9th Cavalry, reinforced by a rine company. became heavily engaged 

in the early evening hours, a second rine company and Battery B, 2d 

Battalion, 19th Artillery, were brought into a previously unreconnoitered land ing zone at 0105 hours. The fire support from the battery 

contributed significantly to the total of 197 enemy soldiers killed in 

the engagement. 

The first U,S. baualion-sizc night comba t assault took place on 31 

October 1966 when the combat clements of the 2d Battalion , 327th 

Infantry (Airborne), JOist Airborne Division, were lifted into two 

landing zones near Tuy Hoa by the 48th and 129th Assault Heli copte r 

Companies and the 179th Assault SuppOrt Helicopter Company of 

the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion . Twenty-four UH-ID, six UHIB, and four CH-47 hel icop te rs were used. The night before. the 

10th Combat Aviation Battalion had conducted a deception operation involving a simulated night combat assa ult with preparatory fire 

by tactica l air, artillery, and gunships and with illumination by nares, 

The actual operation was executed without preparatory fire and 

illumina tion. Pathfinders and security clements were positioned in 

the landing zones prior to the main assaults, Helicopters new nap-ofthe·eart h night paths to gain further surprise. 

The desi re to deny the enemy freedom of movement at night led 

helicopter units to experiment with a variety of lighting systcms. The 

earliest systems were known as the Helicopter Illumination System 

(Lightning Bug-Fireny) and wcre characterized by a fixed bank of 

C-123 landing lights mounted in a g unship. The crew would find and 

hold the target with the lights whi le other gunships engaged the ene· 

my. In the Mekong Delta an OV-IC Mohawk was often used as part 

of the tcam, locating targets by an infrared device and vectOring the 
IA ORANG 21 

FIIU.FLY ILLUMINATION SYSTEM 

light ship ontO the target. A series of refinements were made which 

included developing a focusing arrangement for the illumination system, testing various searchl ights, and using the night observation 

device as a passive means of detection. 

When the Cobra was introduced into the theater, the UH-ID/ H 

Nighthawk was developed in the field. The basic components of the 

Nighthawk were an AN / VSS-S Xenon sea rchlight (component of the 

Sheridan Armored Reconnaissance Airborne Assault Vehicle). a coaxiall y mounted AN / TVS- 4 night observation device. and an 

XM-27 El 7.62-mm. minigun system. The searchlight provided both 

white light and infrared. wh ile the minigun system mounted in the 

cargo compartment allowed the Nighthawk to engage the target or 

provide suppressive fire. Norma l use involved a Nighthawk team (one 

UI-I- IO/ H wi th the light and one or twO AH-IG gunships) working 

either an area or specific targets already pinpointed through other 

methods. Ground controlled approach radar was often used to P["Qvide navigational assistance to the team. The UH-ID/ H would fly at 

fifty knots 500 feet a bove the terrain with the gunships to the rear at 

about 1,500 feet. When the light ship detected a target wit h infrared 

light. it could either turn on the white light or open fire with the minigun. with the accompanying gunships then firing into the minigun's 

tracer pattern. The Nighthawk was very effective in flat. open ter· 

rain. In mo um ainous. canopied jungle it was limited to roads. trails. 

and Rome plow cuts. Nighthawk was employed to a limited ex tent in 

base camp defense. in ch«king out radar sightings. in sensor activity. 

and in mechanical ambushes. 
22 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

In May 1966. five UH-IC gunships equipped with low-light-level 

television were deployed to Vietnam to test the use of TV as a night 

vision and target detection aid. Operating in the Mekong Delta, the 

gunships had limited success; however, the concept and the equipment needed further refinement. In November 1969, three INFANT 

(Iroquois Night Fighter and Night Tracker) systems arrived in Vietnam. Each system consisted of a UH-IH helicopter with an M21 armament subsystem (7.62-mm. miniguns and 2.75-inch rockets) and 

an image intensification system for night vision, ANI ASQ-132. This 

refined equipment was tested in night combat operations in the III 

and IV Corps Tactical Zones. INFANT increased the ability of the 

helicopter to perfonn its attack and surveillance operations at night. 

Helicopters a lso provided considerable nighttime suppon to 

ground forces by using M K24 aircraft nares, by resupplying ammunition in an emergency, and by evacuating the wounded. Base camp 

defenses were strengthened by gunships, which flew monar patrols, 

visually sighted and attacked enemy mortars. and transported ready 

reaction forces to check out radar sightings or to provide rocket and 

mortar support in standoff attacks. However, the effectiveness of surveillance by aircraft at night was limited. because the noise of the 

aircraft warned the Nonh Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong of its approach and gave them time to hide . 

The U.S. Army developed a new surveillance aircraft for use in 

Vietnam. In April 1967 , Lockheed Missiles and Space Company was 

selected to build twO experimental, low-noise aircraft. In September 

1967 , the so-ca lled quiet airplanes were deployed to the IV Corps 

Tactical Zone for sixty-day evaluation. Nothing more than a mod· 

ified glider with a wooden propeller driven by a 100-horsepower engine, the aircraft could fly slowly and quietly while the pilot conducted 

visual reconnaissance. During the test, the quiet airplanes conducted 

reconnaissance missions before and after a strike; surveillance opera · 

tions over areas, canals, rivers, roads. and along the coastline; and 

searches around the perimeter. When the test was concluded, the aircraft was judged to be valuable; however, several improvements were 

recommended. The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation then developed a 

much improved model. which was designated the YO-3A, Quiet Aircraft. The YO-3A was a more sturdy aircraft, powered by a muffled 

2 10-horsepower engine. It had a night vision aerial periscope with an 

infrared illuminator and a laser target designator. The Quiet Aircraft 

was deployed to Vietnam in the summer of 1970. 

The largest fixed-wing aircraft in the Army 's inventory was the 

CV-2 Caribou. It was the workhorse of aeria l resupply in the early 

phases of the war. The CV-7 Buffalo, a turbinized version of the 

Caribou, had a 30-percent increase in load-carrying capacity. Two 

Buffaloes were flown from Fort Rucker, Alabama, to Vietnam in the 
IA DKANG 23 

YO-3A QUIET A IRCRAFT 

fall of 1965 and evaluated during combat missions. The results were 

quite successful; however, all the Buffaloes as well as the Caribous 

..... ere transferred to the U.S. Air Force in the spring of 1967. 

The helicopter and airmobile techniques gave the commander 

ne ..... capabilities; the old time -d istance factors and terrain considera · 

tions were outmoded. In the airmobile division, the helicopter was 

not used just as a means of transporting by air - such as troop movement , reinforcement. medical evacuation. and resupply - but was 

totally integrated imo operations by commanders at all levels. The 

read il y available air assets were automatically considered in maneuver plans against the enemy. in intelligence gathering, in fire support, 

and in logistic opera Lions. 
CHAPTER III 

IRVING 

(2-24 October 1966) 

Operation IRVING illustrates a number of innovations which were 

used throughout Vietnam. These innovations represented important 

changes in the tactical, technical, and psychological sides of warfare. 

The helicopter played an enonnous part, not only in lifting troops 

into combat but also as aerial rocket artillery, in the evacuation of 

casualties, in logistical support, and in the development of new lightweight equipment. IRVING also demonstrates the U~ of civic action 

and psychological warfare in counterinsurgency operations. In addi· 

tion to being outflanked by vertical envelopment. the enemy was 

attacked by strategic bombers and by U.S. infantrymen invading his 

undergTOund hiding places. 

During October of 1966, allied military forces combined efforts in 

three closely co·ordinated operations to destroy the enemy in the cen· 

tral and eastern portions of the Republic of Vietnam's Binh Dinh 

Province and to uproot the Viet Cong's political structure along the 

province's populated coastal region , In a period of twenty· two days, 

the 22d AR VN Division, the Repub lic of Korea Capital Division , and 

the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) were to dominate the battle· 

field to such an extent that the aggressor had only one alternative to 

fighting: surrender. The enemy not only suffered heavy personnel 

losses in decisive combat , but many of his vital logistic and support 

bases were discovered and destroyed . The victory meant that the cen· 

tral coastal portion of Binh Dinh Province and hundreds of thou, 

sands of citizens were returned to the control of the South Vietnamese 

government. The people of the province were freed from Viet Cong' 

terrorism and extortion for the first time in many years, and the 

groundwork was laid for a better life. The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division's 

contribution in this campaign to pacify Binh Dinh Province was Op· 

eration IRVING. 

IRVING began on 2 October 1966 ; however. the development of 

the battlefield started many days before. The enemy had been driven 

out of his bases in the Kim Son and 506 valleys and channeled toward 

the sea. In Operation THAYER I in September, strong U.S ., South 

Vietnamese , and Korean attacks from all sides uprooted elements of 

the 610th North Vietnamese Army Division from their mountain 
IRVING 25 

sanctuaries. uncovering major medical. arms. supply. and food 

caches. a regimental hospita l. and a large antipersonnel mine and 

grenade factory. A series of fierce battles forced the enemy into a 

natural pocket bounded by the Phu Cat Mountains on the sou th. the 

coastline o n the east. the Nui Mieu Mountains on the north, and 

National Route 1 on the west. The battle lines for Operation IRVING 

had been drawn. 

The 1st Cavalry Division planned for Operation IRVING in minute 

detail. The division staff concentrated on intelligence. psychological 

operations. population control. and civic action projects as well as 

combat operations. If combat against the enemy was to be successful. 

the psychological. population control . and civic action aspects had to 

be effective. In the same pocket with the enemy were some 250,000 

civilian residents. plus important rice farming and sa lt production 

areas. To avoid noncombatant casualties. population control mea· 

sures were incorporated into the psychologi ca l operations program. 

Some twelve mill ion leaflets and 150 radio broadcast hours were used 

during Operation IRVING to help control the civilians. Curfews were 

established . and at times villagers were requested to stay where they 

were until more specific instructions were given. Psychologica l efforts 

were also geared to appeal to the enemy. For example. substantial 

rewards were offered for surrendered weapons. 

By D-day for Operation IRVtNG, the Free World Military Assis· 

tance forces were in position. Elements of the 1st and 3d Brigades of 

the 1st Cavalry Division air·assaulted into objectives well inside the 

IRVING pocket. Simultaneously. the ARVN and Korean elements coordinated attacks in the southern portion of the battle area so that all 

three schemes of maneuve r would complement one another. The 22d 

AR VN Division launched a ground attack to the northeast with two 

infantry battalions and two airborne battalions. The Republic of 

Korea Capital Division attacked northward through the Phu Cat 

Mountains. On the South China Sea. the ARVN junk fleet and the 

U.S. Navy sealed escape routes to the sea and provided fire support 

from the destroyers Hull and Folson and smaller ships. 

The 1st Cavalry Division attacked at 0700 hours on the morning of 

2 October. Colonel Archie R. Hyle . commander of the 1st Brigade. 

deployed the 1st Battalion. 8th Cavalry. to gain objective 506C; the 

2d Battalion. 8th Cavalry. to secure objective 506A; and the 1st Battalion. 12th Cavalry. to attack objective 506B. The 3d Brigade commander. Colonel Charles D. Daniel. attacked objective 507 usi ng the 

1st and 5th Battalions of the 7th Cavalry. The 1st Squadron. 9th 

Cavalry. under the control of Major General John Nonon. the divi· 

sion commander. was assigned its normal reconnaissance mission over 

the division's area of interest. Decisive combat with the enemy was to 

occur shortly after the operation began. 
26 TACTIC AL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

Early on the morning of D·day. elements of the 1st Squadron, 9th 

Cavalry, were conducting reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of 

Hoa Hoi and observed seven North Vietnamese Army soldiers in the 

village . Troop A landed its infantry elements in the village area and 

supported them with armed helicopters. They soon were engaged 

against a large enemy force that had fortified the village. When ad· 

vised of the situation at Hoa Hoi, Colonel Hyle called for the 1st Battalion , 12th Cavalry, already airborne en route to another objective. 

Lieutenant Colonel James T . Root, commander of the 1st Battalion, 

issued new orders from his command and control helicopter, and the 

battalion turned to the rescue . 

B Company was the first unit of the 1st Battalion to arrive at Hoa 

Hoi. Under the direction of Captain Frederick F. Mayer, Company B 

landed 300 meters east of the village and quickly maneuvered to 

assault the enemy's fortified positions. Although wounded, Captain 

Mayer directed the unit's drive toward the well-prepared enemy bunker system. While advancing across an open area , the unit came under extremely heavy fire and was momentarily pinned down. Members of the 2d Platoon, Company B, stood up and advanced through 

the enemy fire. One squad, spearheaded by Private, First Class, Roy 

Salagar, breached the heavily booby-trapped perimeter trench , and 

within minutes the enemy force started withdrawing into the village . 

At this time A Company air-assaulted into an area southwest of 

Hoa Hoi. As the Sd PlatOl)n came in contact with the enemy, they also 

encountered civilian noncombatants in the battle area. First Lieutenant Donald E. Grigg was deploying his platoon to return fire when 

several old men , women , and children walked between him and the 

enemy. He raced 150 meters through concentrated fire , picked up 

twO of the small children. and carried them back to his own lines. The 

other civilians followed him to safety. Lieutenant Grigg's platoon then 

closed in on the enemy and forced him to withdraw into the village. 

While othe r elements of the 1st Battalion , 12th Cavalry, were 

being air-assaulted into the battle area , the battalion held its fire on 

the village . A psychological operations helicopter circled the village 

with loudspeakers, directing the civilians to move out of the village 

and into four specific areas outside the perimeter. North Vietnamese 

Army soldiers were asked to lay down their weapons. During the moratorium, many civilians and soldiers did as they were directed . After 

one hour. when it was evident that no one else was coming out of the 

village. the 1st Battalion , 12th Cavalry, began moving in. 

Fierce fig hting lasted throughout the day as elemems of the U.S. 

battalion assaulted the fortified village . That evening, General Norton reinforced the 1st Battalion , 12th Cavalry, with Companies A and 

C of the 1st Battalion , 5th Cavalry. Under the comrol of Colonel 

Root, the companies made a night air assault on the beaches east of 
IRVING 27 

I-loa Hoi and moved into the encirclement to help contain the enemy 

during the hours of darkness. North Vietnamese soldiers tried in vain 

to shoot their way out. Effective artillery support contributed to the 

containment effort . Earlier in the day. A Battery. 2d Battalion , 19th 

I\nillcry. had bcen positioned by assau lt suppOrt hc licopters to back 

up the 1st Battalion , 12th Cavalry. During the night 883 I05-mm. 

rounds were fired in the effort to contain the enemy. The baulefield 

was illuminated by a U.S. Air Force AC-47 flareship, by anillery, 

and by naval guns from the destroyer Ullmall. Throughout the night. 

helicopters provided fire support. brought in supplies. and evacuated 

casualtics. -

At dawn. Company C, 1st Battalion , 12th Cavalry, attacked south 

through thc enemy position , while Companies A and B blocked the 

other side of the village. Thc enemy dcfended with great skill; but the 

strength of the attack. plus the well-co-ordinated combat sup pon, 

brought the battle of Hoa Hoi to a close. During this 24-hour battle. 

the lst Battalion , 12th Cavalry, and supponing units had killed or 

wounded 233 enemy soldiers, while suffering 3 killed and 29 wounded. 

In addition, 35 North Vietnamcse soldiers wcrc capturcd. and 15 sus· 

pected NVA regulars were detained . 

On D·day of the operation a B-52 strike was made on a portion of 

the Nui Mieu Mountains near objective 506A. The 1st Squadron . 9th 

Cava lry. conducted a follow-up damage assessment and discovered 

documents and seven enemy dead. which confirmed the presence of 

elcments of the 2d Viet Cong Regiment. All forces advanced on 

schedule to reduce the size of the I"'VING pocket. The sweep to the sea 

continued, using helicopter assaults and land movement to destroy 

the enemy forcC$. On 4 October a co-ordinated ground attack was 

made by the 3d Brigade using the 1st and 5th Battalions. 7th Cava lry. 

The atlack was precedcd by extensive artillery preparation. Thirty 

enemy soldiers were killed in the operation. As the sweep operations 

neared Nuoc Ngot Bay, leaflets and loudspeakers wcre used to warn 

civilians th at all boats moving on the bay would be sunk. RiOt control 

agents were also used during the operation. The battalions of the 3d 

Brigade used assault boats brought in by helicopter to sweep the 

watcrways. 

On 5 October thc 1st Battalion , 12th Cavalry. air·assaulted back 

to the west into the Soui Ca Valley to exploit a 8 -52 strike and to surprise enemy units that had escaped the IRVING pocket or had sec retly 

moved into the valley strongholds. In the IHVING battle area , the 1st 

Cavalry Di vision continued to search for North Victnamese units and 

to uproot the Viet Congo The 1st Squadron. 9th Cavalry, sighted 

many sma ll groups of enemy soldiers trying to avoid contact. The cav· 

alrymen fired at them from armed helicopters and often landed in· 

ramry elements to engage the enemy. On 9 October, while supporting 
28 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

CH-54 "FLYING CRANE" DELIVERING BULI..DOZER TO FORWARD POSITION 

a sweep along the Hung Lac peninsula , the 2d Battalion. 20th Artillery (Aerial Rocket Artillery), fired SSIl m issiles at bunkers on the 

peninsula. The missiles destroyed the bunkers, thus enabling fifty-five 

Viet Cong to be captured without a fight. 

In mid·October, enemy contacts in the coastal region diminished, 

and the emphasis of the baule shifted back to the valleys in the west. 

Capitalizing on the infonnation that elements of the 2d Viet Cong 

Regiment were regrouping in the Kim Son and Soui Ca valleys, the 

division qu ickly airlifted several battalions into the area. On 13 October. the 1st Battalion, 5th Cava lry, located the main Viet Cong province headquarters, including official stamps, radios, documents, and 

typewriters. On 14 and 15 October, in suPPOrt of the 1st Battalion, 

Company A of the 8th Engineer Battalion brought in ainnobile e ngineer construction equipment. A CH-54 "flying crane" lifted a 

grader and a pneumatic roller into the va lley. Teams of engineer 

soldiers called tunnel rats located , explored, and later destroyed extensive tunne l complexes constructed by the enemy. Sweep operations 

in the valleys turned up additional caches of equipme nt and supplies. 

During the latter part of Operation IRVING an artillery raid was 

conducted by A Battery, 2d Battalion , 19th Artill ery. Four howitzers 
IRVING 29 

with crews, 280 rounds of ammunition, and a skeleton fire direction 

center were airlifted into areas that the cnemy had thought were 

secure to fire on previously selected targets that were beyond the 

range of other tube artillery, The 280 rounds were fired in less than 

seventeen minutes, after which the artillery was airlifted back to its 

base, 

By midnight of 24 October the baltle was over. The enemy had 

been unable to cope with the airmobility and versatility of the 1st 

Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Massive firepower had decimated the 

enemy's forces. and his long-secure supply bases had been destroyed. 

While suffering 19 men killed itself, the 1st Cava lry Division had 

killed 681 enemy soldiers and caplUred 741 . The rapid reaction of 

U.S. forces allowed the division for Ihe first time to capture more 

enemy soldiers than it killed. The success of Operation IRVING had a 

lasting effect on the pacification of Binh Dinh Province. 

The major tactical innovation illustrated in Operation IRVING was 

airmobile combat. An airmobile operation is one in which combat 

forces and their equipment move about the baltlefield in aircraft to 

engage in ground combat. In such an operation, helicopters not only 

transport the torces to the battle area , but a lso enable them to develop 

the situation and to reinforce , withdraw . and displace combat power 

during the battle. The purpose of an airmobile assault is to position 

fresh combat troops on or near their tactica l objectives. The tactical 

unit can Oy over obstacles and impassable terrain to land at the stra -

tegic point in the battle area . 

The successful airmobile assaults in Operation IRVING and those 

conducted by other units in Vicmam were the rcsult of detailed planning by the participa.ting ground units, the aviation suppan elements, 

and the combat support and combat service support units. The overall commander of an airmobile task force is the commander of the 

ground unit making the assault. The aviation commander directs the 

helicopter support units and advises the task force commander on all 

aviation matters. 

Airmobile operations in Vietnam were planned in an inverse 

sequence, similar to airborne operations. First, the ground tactica l 

plan was prepared . It was the basic airmobile operation plan. In this 

plan the commander of the assault unit presented his scheme of man· 

euver and plan for fire support in the objective area. Assault objec· 

tives were chosen that insured the accomplishment of the mission. 

Landing zones were then carefully selected to support the ground taco 

tical plan . A fire support plan was developed concurrently in order to 

be closely co·ordinated and integrated with the scheme of maneuver. 

The next step in the sequence was the development of a landing 

plan. It insured the arriva l of the various elements of combat power at 
30 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

the times and locations required. The landing plan included the sequence, time , and place for landing troops, equipment, and supplies. 

An air movement plan was then prepared, which was based on the 

previous plans. Its purpose was [0 schedule the movement of troops. 

equipment, and supplies by air from pickup to landing. Details such 

as flight speeds, altitudes. formations, and routes were specified. 

Finally, a loading plan was developed. It insured the timely arrival of units at pickup zones and the loading of troops, equipment. 

and supplies on the correct aircraft at the proper lime. 

Often. because of rapidly changing tactical situations. the airmobile planning sequence was abbreviated . AU elements of the planning were considered, but in a shorter form. The actions of Colonel 

Root of the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, in Operation IRVING provide 

an excellent example. Plans were prepared for an airmobile assault 

by the 1st Battalion on objective 506B. However, when directed at the 

last minute to assault the village of Hoa Hoi, Colonel Root prepared 

and assigned new orders while en route by air to the new objective. 

Sound training and complete standing operating procedUTes for the 

ground and aviation units contributed to the quick development of 

airmobile plans and orders. 

Radio communications and prearranged visual signals, colored 

smoke, and flares were the primary means of communication during 

airmobile assaults. 

Fire support was extremely important during these operations and 

included artillery, naval gunfire, armed helicopters, tactical aircraft, 

strategic bombers, and mortars. During a specific operation the task 

force may have been supported by any or all of these means. All available fire support was controlled by the airmobile task force command 

group from its command and control helicopter. Preparatory fire on 

and around the landing zone was usually brief but intense and continuous, with no pause in the firing from the various sources. Fire was 

shifted from the landing zone only seconds before the first flight of 

helicopters touched down. The firing was diverted to selected locations to protect the assault force, and then redirected to support the 

expansion of the objective area. Smoke was often used by artillery or 

by a specifically equipped helicopter to mask the movement of the assault force. 

Division commanders in Vietnam concluded that airmobile assaults greatly increased the speed and flexibility of their operations, 

extended their area of influence, and provided them with the means 

to concentrate forces quickly and to move them after accomplishing 

the mission. 

In World War II and in the Korean War, where combat ranges 

were normally greater than in Vietnam, gunnery errors seldom resulted in friendly casualties. Any round that cleared friendly lines was 
IRVING 51 

usually safe. In Vietnam, however, about 50 percent of all arti11ery 

missions were fired very close to friendly positions or into an area vir· 

tually surrounded by converging friendly forces. An error could harm 

U.S. or allied troops or civilians living in the areas of operations. The 

senior officer in charge of each area of operation was specifically 

charged with the safety of his troops and of the local population. His 

fire support co·ordinator worked out the details required to insure 

this safety. He used such devices as no-fire lines, fire and fire support 

co-ordination lines, and clearances with the lowest level of lh~ Republic of Vietnam government (usually the district) that had U,S. advisers. Fire support co-ordinators maintained a map marked to show 

specifi ed·strike zones and no-fire lones, all based on the rules of engagement drawn up jointly by U.S. and Vietnamese high commands. 

They were applicable to all allied forces and were meant to protect 

the lives and property of friendly forces and civilians and to avoid the 

violation of operational and international boundaries. The rules were 

specific. They covered each general type of operation, such as cordon 

and search, reconnaissance in force , a waterway denial operation, 

and defense of a base camp. They also governed the establishment of 

lones. No-fire lones were those in which persons loyal to the Republic 

of Vietnam government lived. The ru les provided for the diffe rent 

curfew hours whkh each province chief specified for all Vietnamese 

civilians in urban centers, a long main supply routes, in New Life 

hamlets, and in the woods and fields, Presumably, all persons who 

were not in a no-fire lOne obeying curfew restrictions were suspect. 

Naturally, the rules did not limit the right of a unit to defend itself, and a unit attacked could take necessary aggressive ac tion 

against the enemy with any means available. As Major General Harris 

W. Holl is later stated: 

The clearest test of the hostility of a target was the receipt of fire from 

it - prima facie evidence, as it were. In such cases ou r units or aircraft could 

return fire as a matter of self-preservation, but only to the degree necessary 

to deal with the threat. No overkill airstrike could be called down on a Viet 

Cong sniper wit hout proper prior clearance. I am convinced that this 

restraint by each responsible commander played a key role in minimiling 

civilian casualties. 

The most serious problem created by clearance requirements was the 

loss of indirect fire responsiveness and surprise. As a rule, clearances 

added approximate ly three minutes' delay for each agency required 

to take action on the request. Age ncies within a unit caused the least 

delay and complications. 

To reduce the time lost in firing missions, non populated areas 

were frequently cleared in advance of operations and for night intelligence and interdiction fire. Commanders were expected to establish 

appropriate liaison with local government agefl cies and with Free 
32 TACTICAL AND MATERIEl-INNOVATIONS 

World forces to provide quick request channels and to mark specified -strike zones whenever possible. 

With the tremendous increase in the use of aircraft in the Repub· 

Iic of Vietnam came the need to assign responsibilities for their safety 

from indirect ground fire. Operational responsibility for the air advisory agencies was usually given to the major field artillery headquar. 

ters in the area . The agencies were generally located with a battalion 

operations section. Aircraft entering the area of an air advisory 

agency usually radioed in for clearance. They were given the loca -

tions of all fire or of safe routes to travd . The agency notified aircraft 

in its area about new artillery missions by calls over its network. The 

responsibility for all fire above 5,000 feet was passed by the air advisory agencies to the U_S. Air Force. 

An important innovation in the Vietnam War was the integration 

of strategic air power into the ground combat plan. Similar use of 

heavy bombers in Korea was on a much more limited scale. The Strategic Air Command, with its 8-52 bombers flying at extremely high 

altitudes, out of sight and out of hearing of the unsuspecting enemy, 

delivered devastating blows against fortified positions. Two 8 - 52 

strikes were used in Operation IRVING . 

Ground commanders used the 8 - 52's against targets of high tactical value. Enemy troop concentrations in base areas were common 

targets. When a 8-52 target was identified , a request was passed 

through command channels to a joint Army- Air Force targeting 

committee. If the request was approved , the target was included in 

the bombing schedule and the requesting unit was notified. The tactical commander could then complete his plans for using the B- 52 

strike to its best advantage on the ground. The follow-up operation 

after the bombing raid , depending on the nature of the target, ranged 

from a small patrol reconnoitering the area to a large-scale sweep operation involving a battalion·site unit or larger. Artillery was often 

u.st:d following a B- 52 strike to hit enemy personnel moving back into 

the target area . 

The tactical mobility furnished by the helicopter and the com -

munications available to the ground commander were effectively u.st:d 

to capitalize on 8-52 strikes. While the dust and smoke from the 

bombs were still in the air, the helibome assault could begin, taking 

maximum advantage of the shock and confusion among the enemy 

troops. 

One of the major artillery innovations of the Vietnam War was 

aerial rocket artillery, commonly called ARA, and later, aerial field 

artillery. The fire suPPOrt potential of the helicopter had been appre · 

ciated for some time. Gunships, in the form of UH-l helicopters 

armed wi th various combinations of machine guns, rockets, and 

grenade launchers, had been effectively used throughout the conflict. 
IRVING 33 

Theoretically, however. the gunships provided light fire support rather than the artillery type. Aerial rocket anillery, on the other hand , 

was organized and employed as artillery. In the words of Lieuten· 

alll Colonel Nelson A. Mahone, Jr .. commander of the 1st Cavalry 

Division's 2d Battalion, 20th Anillery (A RA). "We consider our· 

selves a breed apart, and our success tends to support this." Aerial 

rocket artillery fire was requested through anillery channels and was 

usually controlled by an anillery forward observer. ARA was particularly effective in support of airmobile forces beyond the range of the 

division's ground artillery. Moreover. ARA fulfiJled the need for a 

highly responsive and discriminating means of fire support for the 

infalllry during its most vulnerable phase of an air assault. namely. 

just after its arrival on the landing zone. Aerial rocket artillery heli · 

copters circling overhead watched over the landing zone and movement of the troops. If necessa ry. they immediately responded to fire 

requests by firing directly on the target. 

Although ARA was frequently used beyond the range of cannon 

artillery. it also augmented this fire. ARA was assigned the normal 

tactical missions of conventional artillery. Normally. however . it was 

used in general suPPOrt with control retained by division artillery because of ARA's range and nexibility. 

The main armamelH of the ARA consisted of the M3 2.75-inch 

folding-fin rocket system mounted on UH-l helicopters. and later on 

the Cobra version. In addition. the ARA was capable of using the 

551l antitank wire guided missiles. 551l fire was extremely valuable 

against point targets. such as bunkers located on hillsides and other 

enemy fortifications. Medium and heavy artillery in Vietnam was 

normally located in semipermanent base camps or fire bases to provide support within the tactical area of operations. Continuous fire. 

or the threat of it. from these weapons caused the enemy to move his 

base camps and supply caches out of range. The artillery raid was 

used against these outlying enemy installations by moving to a position in range of the target. firing on the enemy. and then returning to 

the artillery's base. Medium and heavy self-propelled weapons were 

particularly well suited for raids, although light and medium artillery 

lifted by helicopters could be used . In fact. the airmobile divisions 

achieved excellent results with helicopter·borne 105·mm. howitzers 

used in this fashion. and they developed expedient methods of clearing jungle artillery bases. This technique was used effectively in Operation iRVING. 

In October 1969, the IOlst Airborne Division (Airmobile) devel· 

oped the radar raid in order to extend the innuence of its anillcry. 

This type of raid was conducted by frequently moving AN/ PP5- 4 or 

AN/ PP5-5 radars with security forces to dominant terrain features 

outside fire bases. These forces co uld then provide surveillance along 
34 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

routes of infiltration previously masked by terrain. By conducti ng 

raids within existing artillery ranges, discovered targets could be 

rapidly engaged. 

During Operation IRVING, Company C, 2d Battalion . 8th Cavalry. 

discovered a tunnel complex in the NUl Mieu Mountains. T he com -

plex included five vertical shafts, thirty to fifty feet deep, with hori· 

zontal tunnels connecting them . After searching the tunnels. a squad 

of engineers from the 8th Engineer Battalion destroyed the complex 

with demolitions. 

A significa nt feature of the war in Vietnam was the widespread 

use of tunnels and other underground facili ties by the enemy. Tunnels were a major fac tor in the enemy's ab ility to survive bombing 

attacks, to appear and d isappear at will, and to operate an efficient 

logisti c system unde r primitive conditions. By the end of 1970 , 4,800 

tunnels had been discovered. Most of the discoveries were made 

during sweep operations by Free World military forces. Tunnel complexes were also located through local informers and by means of dogs 

trained to find underground fa cilities. An electronic tunnel detector 

and a seismic detector were tested with limited success. Several tec hniques have been developed to force the enemy to evacuate tunnels. 

Tunnel rat teams were formed by many infantry and engineer units to 

dear and explore tunnels. An exploration kit consisting of headlamps, communica tions eq uipment, and a pistol assisted the lea rn . A 

T unnel Explorer Loca tor System was developed to map the tunnel 

and to monitor the progress of the tunnel rat as he moved through the 

tunnel. Proven chemical techniques were the use of smoke to locate 

tunnel openings and a riot control type of tear gas, known as CS, to 

drive enemy personnel from undergTOund . 

After tunnels were cleared and searched , they were destroyed to 

prevent their furthe r use by the enemy. Methods developed to keep 

the tunnels from being used again included placing riot control 

agents in the tunnel, sealing the entrance with explosives, using dem -

olitions to destroy the tunnels, pumping acetyline into the tunnel and 

igniting the gas by explosives, and usi ng construction equipment to 

crush the tunnels. 

The first use of riot control agents in Vietnam was on 23 December 1964 when CS grenades were air-dropped as part of an attempt to 

rescue U.S. prisoners being held at a location' in An Xuycil Province. 

In this operation no contact was actuall y made with the enemy. In 

February 1965, General Westmoreland infonned the se nior advise rs 

of the four corps tactical zones that U.S. policy permitted the use of 

riot control munitions in self-defense. Kits containi ng protective 

masks and CS grenades were issued to each subsecLOr advisory team 

for self·defense. These kits were not intended for offensive use by U.S. 

troops. 
I 

MEMBERS OF AN ENGINEER T UNNEL R.n TEAM expwre Viet CQng tunneJ. 
TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

In March 1965, New York Times correspondent Peter Arnett de · 

scribed the use of riot control agents by ARVN forces. His report gen· 

erated much controversy in both the American and foreign press and 

led to an examination, by both U.S. military and political agencies, 

of the pros and cons of the use of CS in Vietnam. An independent 

action by the commander of the 2d Battalion. 7th Marine Regiment, 

on 5 September 1965 significantly influenced subsequent policy on 

the use of CS in Vietnam. The 2d Battalion encountered an enemy 

force entrenched in a series of tunnels. bunkers, and "spider" holes. 

Since there was information that women and children were also pres· 

ent. CS was used to help clear the complex. As a result. 400 persons 

were removed without serious injury to noncombatants. However. on 

7 September 1965. all senior U.S. commanders were reminded that 

"MACV policy clearly prohibits the operational use of riot control 

agents." 

Later the same month, the Military Assistance Command. 

Vietnam (MACV), decided that the military usefulness of CS warranted a request to higher authority for permission to use it in the upcoming Iron Triangle operation. The request was forwarded to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. who granted pennission for 

CS to be used in the Iron Triangle operation only. In the following 

weeks, a much-liberalized policy on the use of CS was developed. and 

on 3 November 1965 the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified General Westmoreland that he was authorized to use CS and CN (another tear gas) 

at his discretion to support military operations in South Vietnam. 

This authority was further delegated to the major commanders. 

MACV Dire<:tive 525-11. dated 24July 1967, concerned the use of 

riot control agents in tactical operations. Using these agents in situations where noncombatants were involved was deemed particularly 

appropriate. The U.S. senior advisers to the four ARVN corps were 

empowered to authorize the use ofCS by U.S. forces in suPPOrt of the 

South Vietnamese Army. U.S. advisers at all levels were to encourage 

their counterparts in the Vietnamese armed forces to use CS and CN 

whenever such use offered an over-all tactical advantage. The use of 

riot control agents in situations involving civil demonstrations. riots. 

and similar disturbances was specifically prohibited without prior approval by the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. RiOt control agents were treated as normal components of the 

combat power available to the commander. 

The early use of CS was limited by the shortage of standard munitions. The only munitions available at first in operational quantities 

were the M7 and M25 grenades. Many other ground and air muni· 

tions were being developed and later were tested and used in Vietnam. 

One of the first uses for M7 CS grenades was to flush caves. tun· 

nels, and other underground fortifications. The 1st Cavalry Division 
IRVI NC 37 

(Airmobile) effectively used 

cs grenades during Operation 

MASHER- WHITE WINe, which 

took place in a highly populated 

area. CS grenades when used on 

suspected enemy areas enabled 

1st Cavalry troops to determine 

whether the occupants were ci· 

vilians in hiding or armed Viet 

Cong. On another occasion , 

forty-three Viet Cong were pur· 

sued into a cave. All forty-three 

were driven out again , however, 

when CS hand grenades were 

thrown into the cave . The only 

casua lty occurred when one Viet 

Cong refused to surrender. 

The burning-type CS gren· 

ade , along with HC smoke gren -

RIOT HAND GRENADE, CSl , M25A2 

ades, was a lso used in conjunction with the MI06 Riot Control Agcot 

Dispenser, dubbed Mlty Mite , a portable blower. This system was 

capable of forcing the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army out of 

unsophisticated tunnel complexes. as well as helping to locate hidden 

entrances and air vems. The Mity Mite system could not drive personnel from the more complex , multilevel tunnel systems, many of which 

contained airlocks. However, bulk CS was widely u.s«=d in tunnel 

denial operations. in which bags of CS were exploded throughout the 

tunnels. The 1st Infantry Division's experience indicated that the tear 

gas remained effective for five to six months if the tunnel was sealed. 

The efficiency of powdered CS in restricting the enemy's use of fortifications and the difficulty of destroying the numerous bunkers and 

other fort:fied structures by conventiona l explosives led to the development of many techniques for dispensing CS in these enemy 

defenses. 

The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) termed their expedient 

munition the Bunker Use Restriction Bomb (BURB). The BURB 

consisted of a cardboard container for a 2.75-inch rocket warhead, 

twO noneleetric blasting caps, approximately twenty-five seconds of 

time fuze , and a fuze igniter. The device was filled with CS and taped 

shut. The blasting caps provided sufficient explosive force to rupture 

the container and to spread the CS49. Other units develope.d their 

own expcdieot CS munitions for contaminating fortifications. 

The acceptance of CS as a va luable aid in combat operations led 

to the development of severa l weapons systems. These included the E8 

not control launcher: the XM 15 and XM 165 air-delivered tactical 
38 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

cs clusters; the 40-mm. CS cartridge for the M79 grenade launcher: 

the 4.2-inch mortar CS round; the BLU52 chemical bomb (Ai r 

Force); and the XM27 grenade dispenser. The E8 chemical dispenser 

was used effectively by the 2d Battalion. 5th Marine Regiment , 

during Operation HUE CITY between 3 and 15 February 1968. The 

action during this period was characterized by close, intense house-tohouse combat. Engagements with the enemy were usually at distances 

from 20 to 150 meters, with maximum distances of 300 meters. The 

use of air and artillery forces was limited by weather conditions and 

by the closeness oCthe c llemy to friendly troops. The tactical siLUation 

required almost continual assaults on fortified buildings and some 

bunkers. The use of the £8 CS dispenser was credited with neutra lizing the enemy's firepower during the assaults. 

The greatest amount of CS employed in VieLnam was bulk CS I or 

CS2 dispensed to restrict the enemy's usc of terrain. Contamination of 

large areas or of terrain not accessible to friendly ground forces was 

normally carried out by air-delivered 55-gallon drums that contained 

eigt>ly pounds of CS. The drums were dropped from CH-47 helicopters using locally fabricated racks, which a ll owed the unloading 

of thirty drums on the target. The major targets for these drops were 

known or suspected base camps, rest areas, and infilLration routes. 

Air-delivered, burning-type munitions also produced good results 

as evidenced by the use of thirty E 158 air-delivered CS clusters in 

support of South Vietnamese Rangers on 3 February 1968_ The 

Rangers were heavily engaged by a large Viet Cong force deployed in 

a factory complex in the Cholon area of Saigon. After several attacks 

by the Rangers had been repulsed, the CS munitions were dropped 

into the area by helicopter. The Ranger assault which followed the CS 

drop was successful. 

The use of riot control agents by U.S. and a llied forces in Vietnam 

cannot be likened to the gas warfare of previous wars. Whereas mustard and chlorine gas often resulted in permanent injury and death. 

CS and CN produced only temporary irritating or disabli ng physiological effects. Their use saved the lives of many allied sold iers, civilians, and enemy soldiers. 

Because of the extensive use of helicopters in the Republic of Vietnam, landi ng zones had to be rapidly constructed in heavily forested 

areas, like those surrounding the Kim Son and Soui Ca valleys. The 

engineers in Vietnam were thus challenged to reduce the landingzone construction time, in order to meet the needs of the quickly shifting tactical situation_ Landing zone requirements ranged from the 

hasty construction of a helicopter pad, from which to provide emergency resupply or medical evacuation, to the development of large 

landing zones, able to handle sufficient aircraft to suPPOrt battalion 

or brigade operations_ 
IRVING 39 

Expenence gained by engineer units in Vietnam led to the development of landing zone construction kits that contained the necessa ry 

tools and demolitions to prepare a landing lOne for one aircraft. If 

the e ngineer team could be landed near th e new construction site. 

they would rappel from th e helicopter or climb down rope ladders. 

When suffic ient area had been cleared . air-portable construction 

equipment or additional tools and demolitions were lifted in to 

expand the new landing zone . 

The "combat trap" was developed after experimentation . In a 

joint Army and Air Force effort , an Ml21 IO.OOO-pound bomb was 

parachuted from a fixed -wing aircraft or helicopter over the desired 

landing zone site and detonated at a height that would clear away the 

dense foli age but not crea te a crater in the earth. After the combat 

trap had finished its job. a construction party and equipment were 

taken by heli copter to the new land ing zone to expand it to the 

desired size. 

The key to the success of ai rmobi le operations oft en was the ability 

of the enginee r batt alion to construct landing sites for helicopters and 

fixed -wi ng aircraft quickly. To support the airmobile division ade -

quately. air-portable construction equi pment was developed for the 

division's engineer battalion. Engineer eq uipment that could be 

moved into the forward areas by helicopter included roadgraders. 

bulldozers. scoop loaders. scrapers. and cra nes, each of which was 

secti oned and lifted into the objective area in two loads, and then assembled for operation. Ba ckhoes. small bulldozers, dump trucks. and 

compaction equipment co uld be transported in one helicopter lift. 

Tbroughout Operation IRVING the 8th Engineer Battalion used 

a irmobile construction eq ui pment to clear and expand landing zones 

and artillery positions and to construct defensive positions. On 14 Oc -

tober. a bulldozer. a grader. and a roller were sectioned and airlifted 

to the command POSt of the lst Brigade , 1st Cavalry Division. to expand the existing landing zone and to construct an aircraft refueling 

area . 

The cry of "Medici Medici" has been heard in all wars involving 

the Un ited States, and the company aidman is still the first link in the 

chain of medica l suPPOrt . In Vietnam the aidmen had a new lifesaving 1001. the medical evacua ti on helicopte r, bett er known as 

Dust·off. Because of the bravery and devolion to duty of these helicopter pi loIS and crews. many lives were saved . Often Dust-off chop· 

pers landed under heavy enemy fire to pick up wounded soldiers or 

hovered dangerously above the battlefield as an injured man was 

hoisted up to the helicopter. The seriously wounded ",'Cre taken 

directly from the field to a hospital, often bypassing the battalion aid 

sta tion and the clearing stalion. This rapid means of evacualion saved 

many lives and grea tl y improved the soldiers' morale. Each soldier 
DUsr-OFF HEUCOPTER HoISTS WOUNDED MAN FROM BA1Tl..EFIELD 
IRVING 41 

knew that ifhe were wounded he would be picked up immediately by 

Dust-off. 

Although the helicopter was a great help to the men in Vietnam 

it required considerably more engineer suPPOrt than the Army originally expected. As the commanding general of the engineers in 

Vietnam. Major General David S. Parker. noted in his debriefing 

report, "In addition to advanced landing zones. built primarily by 

division engineers through a number of ingenious technique's. there 

have been extensive requirements for revetments, parking areas. 

maintenance hangars. and paved working areas for POL. ammunition. and resupply operations. The construction has increased effectiveness through added protection and improved maintenance." 

Parked aircraft were prime targets for the enemy and. as such. 

were subjected to many damaging small anns, mortar, and rocket 

altacks. Therefore. the protection of organic aircraft was a major 

concern to all commanders. Engineers were charged with providing 

lightweight, portable, and easily erected revetments for all helicopters without decreasing the helicopter's reaction time. Construction 

materials included airfield landing mats, plywood, corrugated steel. 

and soil. 

The TI7 nylon membrane was an important development for en· 

gineer suppOrt of airmobile operations. The membrane was designed 

as a moisture barrier and dust cover for landing zones and strips. It 

was also used successfully as the surface for unloading aprons and 

parking areas, there by greatly reducing construction time . It was not 

a cure-a ll . however. since it added no bearing strength to the soil. 

The blast from he licopters often created large dust clouds. which 

increased a ircraft collisions and maintenance difficulties. The 1'17 

membrane was one way of reducing dust , but peneprime. a commer· 

cial composition of low-penetration grade asphalt and a solvent blend 

of kerosene and naphtha . was the best dust control agent tried in 

Vietnam . During Operation IRV ING. the Sth Engineer Battalion used 

some :lS,600 ga llons of peneprime on helicopter pads, refueling areas, 

and airfield turnarounds. 

Opera tion IRVING was an excellent example of recent changes in 

the tactics of war. T he a irmo bile division, with Vietnamese and 

Korean assistance, demonstrated its fl exibility and power as it pur· 

sued and destroyed a large enemy force in a populated countryside. 

The helicopter became an integral part in maneuver plans. division 

artillery. medical evacuation, and the transport of heavy equipment. 

The enemy was hit with everything from strategic bombers to tunnel 

rats, within the confines of special rules of engagement. Psychological 

opera tions and population control were also included in the tactical 

plan . 
CHAPTER IV 

Loc Ninh 

(October-November 1967) 

The 1st Infantry Division's operations around Loc Ninh in October and November 1967 illustrates many of the tactical and materiel 

innovations used by the infantry commander in Vietnam. New formatioos and techniques were employed to find the enemy. Dogs, starlight scopes, and anti-intrusion devices helped the units to avoid 

being surprised. Carefully planned defensive measures for sma ll unit 

tactical perimeters were developed by the division, and new , lighter 

weapons with increased firepower made the foot soldier more effective. Other new techniques increased the support provided by artillery, by air, and by Army aviation. 

Events leading up to the battle of Loc Ninh included the engagement of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, with elements of the 271st 

Viet Cong Regiment at Da Yeu, fifty· five ki lometers south of the Loc 

Ninh airstrip. This firefight clearly demonstrates fire suPPOrt in Vietnam. It also illustrates the use of scout dogs and the cloverleaf fonna · 

tion, a conventional reconnaissance technique adapted to the infan· 

try battalion's movement toward contac t with the enemy. 

The baltle was fought in dense scrub jungle, where observation 

was limited to ten feet. The 1st Baltalion, 18th Infantry, was com· 

manded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard E, Cavazos and had been 

operating in the vicinity of Da Yeu for seven days, searching for ele· 

ments of the 9th Viet Cong Division. On the morning of 11 October 

Companies Band C and the battalion tactical command post moved 

out of the position that the battalion had occupied without contact 

during the night. Company B, commanded by Captain Watson C. 

Caudill, led , followed by the tactica l command grou p and Company 

C, which was commanded by Major William M. Manll , Jr. The 

mortars were left in the night defensive position with Company D. 

(Company A was in Oi An on a rear area security mission.) The 

mission was to search fo r an enemy base camp believed to be two ki lo 

ometers north. 

The point squad of Company B was accompanied by a scout dog, 

which immediately gave the alert as the company cleared the perim· 

eter. In response to the dog's alert , the column proceeded in a clover-
Loe NINII 43 

leaf formation in order to prov ide maximum security. No enemy was 

sighted: however. the point squad reported hearing movement to its 

front and the dog continued to give the alert. After covering 1,800 

meters, Captain Caudill directed his front platoon leader, 1st Lieu· 

tenant George P.Johnson , to deploy his troops in line and direct sma ll 

arms fire into the forward area. The fire was immediately returned 

from a range of thirty meters. whereupon Colonel Cavazos ordered 

Capta in Ca udill to withdraw his pl atoo ns through each other and 

move into the defensive perimeter being formed by Company C. 

Meanwhile . Captain Robert Lichtenberger. Company B's forward 

observer. had called in artillery. As the 1st and 2d Platoons withdrew 

through the 3d Pl atoon , he guided the artillery fire back with them 

until it was falling only 100 meters from the 3d Platoon's positions 

and well inside the initial point of conta ct. Second Lieutenant Ralph 

D. McCall had selected an excellent position for his 3d Platoon to 

cover the withdrawal of the rema inder of the company. His squads 

were linked with Company C. Because the heavy enemy fire was ineffective . Colonel Cavazos directed the 3d Pl atoon to maintain its position rather than pull back into the perimeter. 

By l OIS, forty -five minutes after the initia l contact , the first of 

nine tactical air so rties was attacking 400 meters in front of Lieulenam McCall's 3d Platoon and just north of the east·west fire co· 

ordination line that had been established by Colonel Cavazos. Simultaneously, the artillery was striking in the area between the 3d Pla -

toon and the fire co-ordination line _ 

At Imw. a helicopter light fire team entered the battalion net for 

instructions. After noting the smoke that identified the froOl a nd 

flank elements, the fire team leader began to searc h the battalion's 

west (left) flank. He had been directed to run from south to north, to 

work his fire up to the a rtillery impact area. and to break west to 

avoid conflict with the fighters which were striking from east to west 

and breaking north. The enemy reacted immediately to the fire 

team's first run_ Seventy-five Viet Congo who had been hiding on the 

left flank , assaulted the 3d Platoon . They were cut down by the U.S. 

infantrymen firing from their positio ns behind trees and anthills. The 

charge ended as abruptly as it started. The 3d Platoon was moved 

back into the perimeter as the artillery was sh ifted even closer to the 

battalion's position. After another hour. in whi ch artillery. tactic al 

air forces. and helicopter fire teams continued to work the area, 

enemy firing ceased and the battalion (minus) moved forward . 

Twenty-one bodies were found in the enemy position. The 1st 

Battalion, 18th In fantry. had one man ki lled and four wounded (all 

from the 3d Platoon of Company B) during the Viet Cong assault. 

During the three-hour con tact , the battalion was never decisively 

engaged. The final assaulL illl o the enemy position was not started 
Clondn' Tec:hmqu. 

Poinl Squill 

Thil <quid must u. O ....... lch in clo ..... · 

'nli,,!!. II mun finish ('o ... "";"!! bllore 

(Illi,,!! 10f thl rnt 01 thl (omlllny to lei· 

.anct. 

100 to 200 

m.clrs 

---- - ( 

\ 

- 'r'-----'--;- -----...)1 SQuid ," \ Rill. 

lum·llI. J PI.toon PI,.ol 

___ L,-_--,,-J:_= ___ / 

® 

\o® 

\ 0 I 

.------ -~ ( -+ l oul Secunty 

~--- - --_/ 

00 

Loull;l(urity pro.idld 

by lif1tllm. We.pofU 

I'IIloon 

( ----

\ 

Diagram I. Rine company cloverleafs. aduancing wward contact. 
LOC NINII 45 

until enemy firing had ceased. The combined firepower of tactical 

fighters. armed helicopters, and artillery was directed simultaneously 

on the enemy position, which had been detected from an airborne 

scent picked up by a scout dog. 

The cloverleaf formation. named for the trace of the patrols that 

emana ted from the main column, was used habitually by the lst In· 

fantry Division when contact with the enemy was imminent. It 

provided for a deliberate search of the flanks of a column and for an 

"overwatcb" technique used by the point squad. (Diagram J) In the 

overwatch, one element moved while another element occupied a 

position from which it could fire immediately in support of the 

advancing point men. Using this formation, the enemy position was 

discovered before the entire unit became engaged. 

Assigning the helicopter fire team to cover the battalion's flank 

was another new technique in the Vietnam War. Although successful 

commanders in all wars have been concerned about the security of 

their units' flanks, the war in Vietnam demanded even gTeater atten· 

tion . This new emphasis resulted from the relative independence of 

small unit operations, from the nature of the terrain. and from the 

enemy's ability to hide his formations close to U.S. forces. 

Scout dogs also proved to be a valuable innovation. A scout dog 

team consisted of one dog and o ne handler. trained to work together 

and inseparable for operational purposes. Scout dogs were German 

shepherds and normally worked on a leash. They were trained to reo 

spond to airborne scents by signa ling their handlers when they picked 

up a foreign presence. Scout dogs could locate trip wires, mines, forti · 

fications. tunnels, and storage areas. Under idea l conditions, they 

could detect gToups of people several hundred meters away: however. 

fatigue, adverse weather conditions. and dense vegetation affected 

their perfonnance. In addition to the scout dog was the tracker dog. 

The tracker, a Labrador retriever, was paft of a learn consisting of 

the dog. his handler, and four men trained in visual tracking tech· 

niques. The dog, working on a 25·foot leash . followed a gTound seem 

over terrain whe re the soldier· trackers were unable to pick up visib le 

signs. The first combat tracker teams used in Vietnam were trained 

by the British in Malaya . Now the Military Police Sc hool at Fort Gor· 

don . Georgia, has the facilities for tracker training. 

The battle of Da Yeu was an unqualified defeat for the North 

Vietnamese Army: it was indicative of the outcome of subsequent 

contacts in the vicinity of Loc Ninh . Loc Ninh is a district town 13 

kilometers from the Cambodian border and 100 kilometers north 

of Saigon . The town was slated as a target by the 9th Viet Cong Divi · 

sion fo r late October. The timing coincided with the inauguration of 

President Nguyen Van Thieu: the seiture of a district capital by the 

enemy could have had substantial political impact. 
46 TAC TICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

SCOUT DOG LEADS PATROL SEARCIiING FOR VIET CONG 

During the weeks that preceded the battle, the headquarters of 

the 9th Viet Cong Division left War Zone 0 for the border area north 

of Loc Ninh. The division headquarters moved with the 275d Viet 

Cong Regiment and approached the border areas where the 272d 

Regiment had a lready assembled. The 27lst Regiment, the third of 

the division's three regiments, moved into the Long Nguyen secret 

zone, fifty kilometers south of Lac Ninh. A captured enemy document 

indicated that this move was made to facilitate the logistic suppOrt of 

the 27lst Regiment. However, after several contacts with clements of 

the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, including the battle of Da Yeu , the 

271st Regiment withdrew from the area in late October. The regiment had sustained over 400 killed in action during its brief tenure in 

the Long Nguyen secret zone , and it was probably too weak to be 

committed at Loc Ninh. The 165th Viet Cong Regiment was subse· 

quenLly directed to provide additional men to the 9th Division in 

order to fill in the ranks. 

The enemy's scheme of maneuver directed the 272d and 273d Viet 

Cong Regiments to converge on Loc Ninh. The 272d Regiment was to 

approach from the northeast and the 273d was to approach from the 

west. The operation began at 0100 hours on 29 October, when the 
LOC NINII 47 

ClOG COMPOUND AND Loc NINH AIRSTIUP with A Ballery, 6th Battalion, 

15th A rtillery, position in the foreground . 

273d Regiment attacked the district headquarters and the Civili an Irregular Defense Group (ClOG) and Special Forces camp at the Loc 

Ninh airfield . The 273d Regiment pressed the attack until 0535 when 

it was forced to withdraw. Although it had briefly penetrated the 

ClOG compound, it left 147 Viet Cong bodies on the battlefield. 

In reaction to the attack, Major Genera l John H. Hay, Jr., com· 

mander of the 1st Infantry Division, a lerted four battalions and their 

supporting artillery. Genera l Hay's plan was to deploy the battalions 

in a rough square around Loc Ninh. A study of the terrain and the 

pattern of enemy activity in the area revealed the most probable 

enemy routes of approach and withdrawal. The battalions were to set 

up night defensive positions at the corners of the square and to block 

the enemy's withdrawal. Artillery was to be placed in each of the 

night defensive positions to insure mutual support as well as suPPOrt 

for the maneuver battalions' operations. The locations of these positions- temporary fire bases- on routes essentia l to the enemy would 

cha llenge him to attack: and as he massed for the assault , fire from 

supporting artillery, tactical fighters. and helicopter fire teams would 

be directed on his exposed formations. In addition to the units a long 

the routes of withdrawa l, the plan included bolstering the defenses of 

Loc Ninh with a small force of infantry and artillery. 

At 0630 on 29 October the 1st Battalion. 18th Infantry . commanded by Colonel Cavazos. made an air assault into the south· 

western corner of the square, four kilometers west of the Loc Ninh 

airstrip. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, commanded by 

Major Louis C. Menetrey. and two batteries of artillery were moved to 
48 TACTIC AL A ND MATERIEL IN NO VATIONS 

the airstrip. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 

28th Infantry, were moved to Quan Loi, from where they could be 

committed as the situation developed. 

By 1215 the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, had made conta.ct with a 

Viet Cong company. This engagement, the first of six major firefights that comprised the battle of Loc Ninh, resulted in another 

twenty-four enemy soldiers killed. At 1215 the following day the IS[ 

Battalion, 18th Infantry, again made contact, and the 2nd Viet 

Cong Regiment lost eighty-three men. At 0055 hours on 31 October, 

the 272d Viet Cong Regiment made its bid from the northeast for the 

Lac Ninh district headquarters and the ClOG compound. now reinforced with elements of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. and Battery 

A. 6th Battalion. 15th Artillery. The 272d Regiment withdrew at 

0915. leaving llO bodies and 68 weapons around the airstrip. To 

block the withdrawal of the 272d Regiment, the 1st Battalion. 28th 

Infantry. commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James F. Cochran. Ill . 

conducted an air assault three kilometers southeast of the airstrip. 

Although the battalion made sporadic contact for several days following the assault, it was unable to re-engage the enemy significantly. 

While the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, blocked the southwest with· 

drawal route of the 272d Regiment , the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 

searched the area west of the airstrip. 

In the early morning hours of 2: November, the night defensive 

position ofthe 1st Battalion , 18th Infantry, became the battlefield for 

the fourth major engagement of the battle for Loc Ninh. The 1st 

Division's after action report described the conflict as follows: 

2 Nov - The 1/ 18th Infantry NDP [night defensive position] came under 

hea\'}' mortar attack commencing at 0030H and lasting for 20 minutes. The 

mortar positions were ~ported by ambush patrols, one being directly south 

of the NDP and one being located to the southwest. About 5 minutes later, 

Company A ambush patrol reported movement comin~ from the south. The 

VC were in the rubber guiding north along a road which led into the NDP. 

The ambush patrol blew its claymores and returned to the NDP. One VC 

was KIA (killed in action] attempting to follow the ambush patrol inside the 

NDP. 

To the east. Company D's ambush patrol reported heavy movement and 

the patrol was ordered to return to the perimeter. Company C ambush 

patrol located north of the NDP also reported movement. The patrol blew 

Its claymores and returned to the NDP. The VC attacked the NDP from 

three sides, northeast, east and south. Artillery and monar defensive can· centrations served to blunt the assault. Two VC anned with flamethrowers 

were killed before their weapons could be fired . As the artillery was brought in close to the NDP from one direction, the 

VC fire would diminish and build up from another direction. 

When LIT's rhelicopter light fire teams] arrived on station they were 

directed to eltpencl on the main attacking force to the south. The gunships as 

well as the FAC [forward air controller] and the AO [aerial observerJ reo 

ceived heavy machinegun fire from three ocations to the south. Fire from 12 
I.oe NINII 49 

heavy machineguns was identified. AirSlrikes eliminated the posilions. The 

artillery battery inside the NOP was directed to be prepared to lire ant iper· 

sonnel rounds. The guns were readied but their use was not re9uired. 

Contact was broken al 04151-1. U.S. casualties were I KHA [kIlled hostile 

action] and 8 WI-IA [wounded hostile action). There were 198 VC KIA and 

22 KBA [killed by air} by body count in the Immediate vicinity of the NOP. 

For the next five days patrols found addilional VC bodies bringing the final bod] count to 265 VC KIA (BC) [body COUnt] and 6 POW's [prisoners of 

war. There were 18 individual weapons, 10 crew served weapons, and S 

flamcthro,,"'ers captured. The flamethrowers were Soviet Model. .. . The 

unit was identified as the 27Sd VC Regiment. There were 50 sorties of 

tactical air flown in support of the contact. 

November 2d was the firth day of the battle for Loc Ninh. The 

enemy had attacked Loc Ninh twice and had been defeated both 

times. The U.S. battalions blocking his retreat were deployed on the 

southeast and southwest withdrawal routes, Intelligence indicated 

that it was now time to close the escape routes to the north. The 2d 

Battalion, 12th Infantry (a ttached to the division for this operation). 

and the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry. were assigned the mission. The 

2d Battalion, 12th Infantry. commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

Raphael D, Tice. air· assaulted seven kilometers northeast of Lac 

Ninh: the 1st Battalion. 26th Infantry . commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Arthur D. Stigall. landed six kilometers northwest. The land· 

ings were unopposed, and both battalions established night defensive 

positions in the vicinity of their landing zones. The four corners of the 

square were now occupied by U.S. battalions, each supported by carefully positioned artillery batteries. At 2340 eight Viet Cong walked 

into the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry , position. half of them carrying flashlights. Four of the enemy were killed and four were captured. 

They were members of the 272d Viet Cong Regiment. The U.S. battalion's position was attacked at 0220. When the fight was over, 

twenty·eight enemy bodies were left around the perimeter. 

The final engagement of the battle for Loc Ninh occurred on 7 

November, when two companies of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 

engaged the 3d Battalion of the 272d Viet Cong Regiment . The 1st 

Battalion, 26th Infantry, had been airlifted out of the area on 6 

November arrer having spent four days northwest of the airstrip without a significant contact. The battalion air-assaulted into an area two 

kilometers west of the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry - roughly eight kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh. The day after the air assault. Companics C and D and Colonel Stigall's command group engaged the 3d 

Battalion, 272d Regiment. Artillery, armed helicopters, and twentyseven air strikes supported the U.S. troops, Ninety-three enemy soldiers were killed, including twenty·seven by air strikes. The battle of 

Lac Ninh was over. 

Of the six major engagements that comprised the baltle of Loe 
00 rAcnCAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

SERGEANT AND Rtn.EMAN ENGAGE ENEMY W ITH M 16 RIFLES 

Ninh, twO were fought in temporary night defensive positions. The 

use of night defensive positions in Vietnam was brought about by the 

lack of conventional front lines, the inclination of the enemy to fight 

at night. and the need for the tactical units to protect themselves. The 

principles of defense were unchanged from earlier wars, but their 

application to night defensive positions included a number of new 

techniques. The most widespread of the innovations was the increased 

emphasis on defensive operations throughout the Army - an army 

that has been and will probably continue to be oriented to the attack, 

rather than to the defense. Companies and battalions in previous wars 

had been integrated into the defensive plans of larger units to a far 

greater extent than was possible on the battlefields of Vietnam. The 

independence of these units required a new emphasis on all aspects of 

defensive operations by company and battalion commanders. For example, in the past a battalion commander in a defensive position on 

the forward edge of a conventional battle area could expect the brigade headquarters to deploy a security force in front of his position. 

He could also expect additional forces in the form of a general outpost to be deployed fo rward of the brigade's outposts. The battlefield 

in Vietnam, however, was not adaptable to these traditional arrange-
LOC NIN II 51 

menls, and the extensive security echelons that characteri zed the 

night defensive positions in Vielnam were the sole responsibility of the 

battal ion or company commanders who organized the positions. 

The princi ples of defense were professionally applied to the night 

defensive positions a t Loc Ni nh . In the 2 November attack on Colonel 

Cavazos' night position, o ne American was killed and eight were 

wounded. The enemy body count was 263. Among the primary fac· 

tors that contributed to these and other similarl y impressive resu lts 

was the position that had been standa rdized in the 1st In fantry 

Di vision. 

During SHENANDOAH II the VC attacked a night defensive position on 

rive separate occasions: 6 October, II October, 31 October, 2 November 

and 3 November. The US KHA [killed hostile action} tOta led seven. The VC 

KIA was 509 by body count. One of the major reasons why the friendly 

casualties were so low was the 1st Infantry Division fightin~ j>?sition. This 

righting position has become standardized throughout the dIVIsion and pro· vides eacb soldier wi th adequate ovcrhead cover, overhcad clearance, and 

protcctive bcnn to the front with firing apertures at a 45 degree angle, a 

bcnn to the sides, adequate near protection and thorough camouflagc . Thc 

fighting position is completed durmg thc first day in a new NDP. before the 

soldier is allowed to sleep. 

A second factor that contributed significa ntly to the effectiveness of 

U.S. units in Vietnam was new weapons. The M16 . the standard rifl e. 

(ook eight years to progress from the drawing board to combat in the 

U.S. Anny. It was designed by the Armalite Division of Fairchild Air· 

craft Corporation in 1957 and sent to Vietnam with the 173d Ai r· 

borne Brigade in 1965. Initi ally the rifle was the target of some 

criticism beca use sometimes it would unexpectedly stop firing. Tec h· 

nical modifications were therefore m ade on the weapon. These im · 

provements. along with a signifi cant effort to train the troops in its 

care and cleaning, removed a ny doubts about the relia bility of the 

MI6 in combat. The MI6 muzzle velocity was higher than that of its 

predecessor, the MI4 , which significantly increased the destructive· 

ness of the bullet at close range. The relatively light weight of M I6 

ammunition (half the weight of the 7.62·mm. NATO round) allowed 

the sold ier to carry a larger basic load and reduced the frequency of 

resupply. The M 16 was dependable, easy to maintain, and capable of 

being fired as either a semiautomatic or automatic weapon. It proved 

particularly valuable in the jungle where visibility was poor, targets 

were fleeting , and contact was normally at shott range. 

The hislory of the M79 grenade launcher is longer than that of the 

MI6 , but it too first met the test of combat in Vietnam. Development 

of the 40-mm. M79 began in 1952 : however, it was nOt until 1961 

th at a substantial quantity was availab le for issue to units. With the 

M79, units in Vietnam could engage the enemy with a fragmentation 

round beyond nonnal hand grenade ra nge. High explosive was the 
rAf IlfAI Al'l> M ,\ I !- Rn L INNO\'ATlO:"lS 

CLAYMORE MINE. ARMED AND READY TO FIRE 

most commonly used round , although other types of ammunition 

were available . The M79 was useful in conducting ambushes and 

counterambushes; destroying point targets, such as machine gun 

positions; providing illumination; and marking targets for air strikes. 

The weapon was a universa l favorite with U.S. troops in a ll units from 

infantry to quartennaster. 

These small arms and support weapons were coupled with night 

surveillance devices to give U.S. units a significant advantage over the 

enemy in night operations. The night surveillance devices most com· 

manly used in Vietnam were the searchlight. sniperscope. starlight 

scope , and radar. Among these. the innovation was the starlight 

scope. This device weighs only six pounds and. when mounted on an 

M 16 rifle or M60 machine gun . can fire effectively at night out to 300 

meters. The principle of the starlight scope is amplification of 

existing light. .In situations where no natural light was available for 

the starlight scopes, artificial illumination from searchlights, flares. 

and other light sources was used. In addition to the individua l model, 

larger crew·served starlight scopes were also manufactured. 

Other new equipment related to night defensive positions was also 

introduced in Vietnam. Anti·intrusion devices, such as various types 
LOC NIN H 53 

of sensors. su pplemented the security ec helons a t night. Kits including 

fortification material and mortars tha t could not be carried cross· 

country were delivered and removed from unit night positions by heli· 

copter. The claymore mine became a part of virtually every night 

position in Vietnam. 

The claymore mine . whi ch was developed by the U.S. Army 

before the war. was introduced into combat in Vietnam . The mine 

weighs 3.5 pounds and has a casualty area the height of a man out to 

fifty meters. Most importantly. it ca n be aimed to cover a specific 

area. In fixed positions claymore mines were used in depth. with over· 

lapping kill zones. In ambush positions the ratio of one mine to twO 

men was not uncommon. The claymore mine was particularly effective 

to open an ambush because the extensive, instantaneous kill zone that 

it genera ted did not disclose the location of the ambush patrol. The 

ingenuity and speed with whi ch claymores were positioned became a 

matter of professional pride with infantrymen in Vietnam. The mine's 

effectiveness has insured its retention in the U.S. Army's arsenal. 

Many of the problems encountered were unique among the recent 

!xperiences of artillerymen , and the solutions to some of these prob· 

lems were necessarily innovative. The classic artillery roles remained 

unchanged , but how the units were used often differed from previous 

wars. Beca use of the large areas that needed prOlection and the ene· 

my's surprise tacti cs of ambush, raid, and attack by fire, artillery 

units were required to respond almost instantly to calls for defensive 

fire. Any U.S . or allied installation without this suPPOrt was inviting 

attack by the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Congo Such instant 

response required spreading the artillery thin and resulted in the in· 

ab ility to mass fire . as was done in World War II and Korea. Large 

amounts of firepower were delivered, but instead of firing a few 

rounds from many weapons- as was the case in more traditional war· 

fa re - many rounds were fired from the few tubes within range of the 

target. 

The "speed shift " of the 155·mm. howitzer was an example of the 

ingenuity of artillery innovations in Vietnam. During the first few 

months of Vietnam combat . 1st Lieutenant Nathaniel W. FOSler of 

the 8th Battalion , 6th Artillery. 1st Infantry Division , developed a 

simple. effective device to allow rapid shiflingofthe 155·mm. lowed 

howitzer. The old method involved lowering the weapon down off its 

firing jack, picking up the trails. and pointing the piece by hand in 

the new direction of fire. At best , this action was a time ·consuming 

proced ure involving conside rable effort for at least eight men. Under 

less·than·ideal conditions, particularly in mud, such a shift was ac· 

complished only with tremendo us difficulty. This problem conside r· 

ably hampered the ability of the I55·mm. towed units to meet the 

360·degree firing requirement that existed in Vietnam. 
54 T,\CTICAL ANn MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

The solution to the problem was a locally fabricated "pedestal" 

positioned under the howitzer carriage at the balance point. In use, 

the howillcr was lowered until its weight rested on the pedestal. It was 

then possible to pick up the trails and swing the howitzer in any 

direction in seconds. The average crew strength was six. Because of its 

effectiveness, the speed shift pedestal came into general use within the 

81h Battalion , 6th Artillery. in the spring of 1966. In Operation 

BUl.MINGIIAM, Battery S , with Lieutenant Foster as its execu tive officer, fired over 7,200 rounds during nincteen days and performed innumerable shifts using the pedestal. One gun was shifted thirty -three 

limes in one critical nineteen -hour period. 

A new response to the need for heavy artillery was the 175-mm. 

gun. which was used in combat for the first time in Vietnam. The gun 

was a corps-level weapon and could permane ntly cover large tactical 

areas of operations. thus freeing the smaller caliber division artillery 

units to supportlhe maneuver units. Furthermore, the 175 -mm. gun 

when teamed with the reliable eight-inch howitzer was even more 

effective. 

Central tactical control of all field artillery units was exercised in 

Vietnam to insure the most efficient use of available firepower. How· 

ever. an artillery mission was generally carried out at the lowest 

possible level, usually battery or platoon. Brigadier General Willis D. 

Crittenbergcr, Jr., Commanding General. I Field Force Artillery, 

desc ribed the situation as follows: 

This war, at least from the Force Artillery point of view. is largely a bat- tery commander's war- the junior officer must really be on his toes, thinking 

ahead, making his wams known in advance, for his battalion staff is miles 

away. In addition, the various fire support bases are established in several 

localions, so one can cover another. The battery commander then must be 

self·reliant. Vietnam is a great training ground for the leaders of the future. 

Unique problems that arose from the unconventional nature of 

the war in Vietnam were , of course , not limited to artillery. Tacti cal 

control measures were also a major difficulty . One geographical area 

in Vietnam might well contain American tactical units; third country 

forces; Vietnamese regular tactical units; American Special Forces 

detachments: and irregular un its, such as Regional Forces. PopuJar Forces. and People 's Self-Defense forces. Clear boundaries were 

needed between these units 10 avoid the tragic consequences of 

friendly fire landing on allied positions. At the same time, unity of 

command was required to insure that friendly units, regardles:: of 

make-up or nationality. were reinforced in the shortest possible time 

when necessary. 

In the spring of 1967, the II Field Force commander. Major General Frederick C. Weyand . introduced a new solution to the tactical 

control problem. In co-ordination with the Vietnamese III Corps 
LOC NIN t! 55 

GENERAL WESTMORELAi"o'l) AND GENERAL HAV 

commander, he divided the zone into "tactical areas of interest" and 

assigned them to subordinate commanders. T hese tactical areas of 

interest were normally extensions of the tactical area of responsibility. 

In the tactical areas of interest, commanders were not charged with 

primary tactical responsibility, and they were not expected to conduct 

operations on a continuing basis. The commander to whom a tactica l 

area of interest was assigned , however , had to know the location, ac· 

tivities, and operations of all forces and install ations in his area and , 

thro ug h mutua l co-opera tion and co-ordination , to ach ieve the maximum effect from the combined fri endl y forces and firepower available. This arrangement worked extreme ly well. Not only did it provide local unity of command, but it served to increase the confide nce 

and aggressiveness of the Vietnamese Army commanders who shared 

areas of operation with U.S. tactical elements. The Vietnamese com· 

manders knew that their U.S. counterparts would provide reSOUTces 

and firepower when they needed them. 
06 I ACru..; ,\I A!'on MATt: RIEL 1l\:l\:O\'ATIONS 

Brigadier General Henry J. Muller, Jr., served in Vietnam on 

both sides of this arrangement. As assistant division commander of 

the IOIst Airborne Division. he participated directly in providing 

suppOrt. primarily helicopters and firepower, to the commanders of 

the lsi ARVN Division. Later, he became the deputy se nior adviser to 

the Vietnamese I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Lam. In 

this capacity he co-ordinated support to I Corps from the IOlst Airborne Division and other U.S. units. He attributed the remarkable 

progress of the Vietnamese divisions in the I Corps area primarily to 

the close association between the Vietnamese units and the U.S. tactical elements in their common operational area. 

The key innovation of Lac Ninh was the exploitation of the tre· 

mendous tactical mobility available to the 1st Infantry Division. 

When the battle started with the attack on the airstrip. there were no 

regular U.S. Army units around Loc Ninh . Immediately the lst Battalion, 18th Infantry . most of the 2d Battalion. 28th Infantry. and 

two batteries of artillery were committed. Two more battalions were 

standing by twenty kilometers south at Quan Loi. ready to be flown in 

by helicopter on a few minutes' notice as the situation developed. On 

2 November, the fifth day of the banle. two additional battalions stationed 100 kilometers to the south were flown in and attached to the 

1st Infantry Division. This ability to react with entire battalions and 

their supporting artillery on shon notice and the concomitant ability 

to withhold the battalions until the enemy has committed himself 

were major innovations of the wa r. 

Such unprecedented mobility coupled with the lirepower available to 1st Division commanders laid the foundation for the victory at 

Loc Ninh. Time-tested principles. new weapons. starlight scopes and 

other sur\leillance del'ices. claymore mines. responsive artillery, and 

innovative tactical control measures all contributed. Finally. the individual soldier. well trained and well led. was the decisive factor. In 

the words of Ceneral Westmoreland at the conclusion of the battles 

around Loc Ninh: "This opera lion is one of the most significant and 

imponant that has been conducted in Vietnam, and 1 am delighted 

with the tremendous performance of your division. So far as I can see. 

you ha\le just made one mistake. and that is you made it look tOO 

easy. 
CHAPTER V 

REMAGEN and MONTANA MAULER 

(March-April 1969) 

Military operations in rough or mountainous terrain usually call 

(or infantry; however. the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechan itcd), conducted successful operations in the highlands of Vietnam 

with an armored-mechanized force. Several materiel innovations 

made this success possible: the exclusive use of cargo helicopters to 

establish a line of communications, new aerial resupply techniques to 

assist the helicopters in providing logistical support. and the uSt: of the 

armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) to maintain ground mobility within the task force. Finally, the organization of the brigade itself was an innovation that gave it great nexibility and power. 

The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). a unique 

and versatile organization, was the last major U.S. tactical unit to arrive in Vietnam. It included the 3d Squadron. 5th Cavalry; the 1st 

Battalion. 11th Infantry (Light); the 1st Battalion. 61st Infantry 

(Mechanized); the 1st Battalion. 77th Armor; and the 5th Battalion. 

4th Artillery (ISS-mm. Self-propelled). Shortly after arriving in Vietnam the brigade was placed under the operational control of the 3d 

Marine Division. The brigade's commander received most of his 

combat and combat service support from the division. The brigade 

of len conducted combined operations with South Vietnamese forces 

in the near-trackless terrain adjacent to the demilitarized zone and 

the Laotian border. In April of 1969, Colonel James M. Gibson conducted a dual operation by splitting his brigade: an armored infantry 

task force operated on the Khe Sanh plateau, and the rest of his force 

engaged in Operation MONTANA MAULER in the central demilitarized 

zone. 

In March 1969. intelligence reports indicated that the North Vietnameseonce again were moving across the Laotian border in the direction of the A Shau Valley. Air reconnaissance had revealed an extension of Route 926, which the Viet Cong were building from the 

old Route 92 on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, across the lower end of the 

Khe Sanh plateau in the direction of the A Shau Valley. Long-range 
TAc n C AL AND M ,\TERIEL INNOV,\TION5 

patrols had reported hearing trucks and tracked vehicles moving 

a long this new road. 

Because of these reports, the 3d Marine Division deployed one reinforced regiment to prevent the enemy from using this route and to 

search out possible North Vietnamese Army base areas in the north· 

ern extension of the A Shau Valley. At the same time , the XXIV U.S. 

Corps commander sent an armored task force to the Khe Sanh pla -

teau to open up Route 9 to Khe Sanh, cut Route 926 . and protect the 

west flank of the Marine regiment. This armored force was composed 

of clements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). 

It was given the code name of Task Force REMACEN and consisted 

of twO mechanized infantry companies; a tank company: a self· 

propelled , 105-mm . artillery battery; a reinforced armored engineer 

platoon; a platoon of 40·mm. antiaircraft "dusters"; and a battalion 

headquarters clement. Initially, command and control of the task 

fo rce was provided by the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor. Later. this unit 

was replaced by the lst Battalion , 61st Infantry (Mechanized), and 

the task force was enlarged . A troop of ARVN cavalry was among the 

units reinforcing the task force . Each battalion headquarters 

brought its organic scout and mortar platoons, its combat trains of 

tracked maintenance vehicles. and most of its su pply section . At the 

height of the operation, there were over a hundred tracked vehicles in 

the task force and no wheeled vehicles. 

In March 1969, the last secure position on Route 9 was at a bend 

in the road called Ca Lu. From this point , the road wound upward 

through a valley for about thirty miles until it reached a high plateau. 

The ruins of the ancient town of Khe Sanh sat along a stream in the 

middle of this plateau. The infamous airstrip lay about a mile north 

of the town. 

There were several narrow defiles and one unfordable mountain 

Stream along the road from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. An armored vehicle 

launched bridge was needed to span the stream. However, since there 

were no forces available to secure this span and the adjacent defiles, 

the bridge had to be retrieved after the last vehicle in the armored 

column had crossed. This meant that there would be no land line of 

communication behind Task Force REr-.IAGEN. The armored task 

force had to be supplied completely by air during the entire opera· 

lion. 

For forty-seven days. Task Force REMAGEN ranged up and down 

the Laotian border. It cut the Viet Cong Route 926, it defeated severa l attacks by elements of two North Vietnamese Army regiments, 

and il took a heavy toll of enemy casualties. It a lso captured numer· 

ous enemy weapons, documents, and equipment. During this time , 

the men of the task force consumed over 56 .000 meals, used over 

59,000 gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel. and fired over 10 ,000 
59 

rounds of artillery ammunition. The maintenance sections of the task 

force insta lled 12 engines. 18 sets of tracks. and 7 transmissions and 

performed numerous other maintenance chores under field conditions. All of this material and equipment was brought to the task 

force in the field by Army CH-47 (Chinook) or Marine CH-46 helicopters. This feat involved a considerable logistic effort, represeming 

about fifteen sorties by the supply helicopters every day for fortyseven days. In addition to the CH-4 7 and CH-46 helicopters, brigade 

UH - 1 helicopters were used to deliver mail, meals, and spare parts. 

Mechanized infantry played a key role in the success of the operation. It provided onc of the twO command and control headquarters. 

bore the brunt of the fighting, took the greatest number of casualties, 

and innicted a resounding defeat upon the enemy in every engagement. In this instance, the mechanized rifle companies selVed in their 

traditional role, reinforced with the tank company. However, these 

rifle companies operated in a wild and rugged area over thirty miles 

from the nearest friendly installation. Once again, they demonstrated 

their flexibility and proved that no terrain was inaccessible to them. 

From their sanctuaries across the Laotian border, the North Vietnamese launched a number of attacks against the night positions of 

the task force . A typical night attack occurred on 25 April. beginning 

with an extensive mortar barrage at 0330 hours. An estimated battalion from the 304th North Vietnamese Army Division was attempting 

to overrun and destroy the night defensive position of the 2d Troop, 

7th ARVN Cavalry. Team ARVN , as the unit was designated, was 

under the operational control of the 1st Battalion , 61st Infantry 

(Mechanized). The heavy mortar barrage was followed by a determined ground attack using rocket propelled grenades, small anns, 

automatic weapons, flamethrowers, and satchel charges. Unable to 

penetrate the position, the enemy quit the field at 0600 leaving 

behind 33 dead North Vietnamese soldiers, several weapons, and 300 

prepared satchel charges. 

Three days later the enemy tried again. The commander of Company A, 1st Battalion , 6lst lnfantry (Mechanized), had prepared his 

defenses well. The company was alerted by the men at a listening 

post, who sprang an ambush on the enemy soldiers as they were 

moving into position. Again , the enemy attack was supported by fire 

from rocket propelled grenades, mortars, small arms, and automatic 

weapons. Throwing satchel cha rges and using flame devices, the enemy troops charged from the southwest but were unable to penetra te 

tbe perimeter. Before dawn they again withdrew and disappeared 

into the nig ht. This time 34 of their soldiers were killed, small arms 

and automatic weapons liuered the battlefield, and 590 satc hel 

charges lay undetonated. 

At 1100 hours, Company C, 1st Ballalion , 11th Infantry, was air-
TACTICAl. ANI) 1\IATERI EL INNOVATIONS 

assaulted into the area to help re-engage the enemy. At the same time 

the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry (Light), was functioning as part of Operation MONTANA MAUl.ER, being conducted far 

to the northeast also by the 1st Infantry Brigade. Enemy contact by 

this element was recorded in the brigade's after action report. 

Two ground troops of the 3d Squadron. 5th Cavalry. were sent into an 

area in which an NVA Regiment was suspected to be located. Being small 

enough to invite an auack by an enemy regiment. yet strong enough to be 

able to defend itself until reinforcements could arrive. the cavalry was able to draw the enemy into a fight. Once contact .... 'as gained the cava lry was able 

to develop the situation so that additional forces could be intelligently committed to the battle in an attempt to close with and destroy the enemy. 

The 1st Battalion, 11th Infamry, was being used as an airmobile reo 

serve, prepared to reinforce the cavalry, When this battalion was later 

committed . a U.S. Marine Corps rifle company was attached to it. 

Thus a most unusual combination resulted : REMACEN, a U_S_-ARVN 

armored·mechanized infantry force, without a single wheeled vehicle 

and no land resupply route; and MONTANA MAUl.ER, with light infantry in airmobile reserve. Both of these forces contained Marine Corps 

units, and the brigade reponed to the 3d Marine Division. Lieutenant 

General William B. Rosson, Commanding General. 1 Field Force, 

Vietnam , sa id of such opera tions: 

I am persuaded that the mixture of Marine Corps and Anny forces 

wilhin III MAF [Marine Amphibious Force] is a desirable and productive 

arrangement. indt.'Cd, of things learned during my several assignments in 

Vietnam, I accord top billing to the realization that when Marine Corps and 

Anny uniLS arc teamed together. as in Provisional Corps Vietnam, their 

capabilities combine to produce a force possessing greater power and cffeetiveness than would be the case if the same units operated separately. 

Rich are the gains in cross infusion of ideas and experiences. Equatly rich are 

rewards achieved by shifting of asseLS belonging to one service to support 

operations by the other when such action promotes the common good, e.g_. 

helicopters. artillery, tanks. amtracks, 

Task Force REMAGEN displayed this shifting of asselS from one service 

to support another, as Marine resupply helicopters supported the task 

forc e and Marine artillery fired in su pport of it. 

Several measures were taken to accomplish the aeria l resupply. A 

forward suppl y clement was established at Vandergrift Combat Base, 

where supplies and repair parts were assembled for shipment by he licopter to Task Force REMACEN. Ail types of class-J supplies, such as 

sundry packs, B rations. and C rations, were a lso stockpiled. Petroleum , oil , and lubricant supplies were o rdered from brigad,e stocks to 

meet demands as they occurred, Over 75,000 gallons of fuel were de· 

livered to the maneuver units in 500-gallon rubber drums. The transfer of fuel from the 500-gallon rubber drums to the armored vehicles 

of the task force sometimes posed a problem. Wherever possible, the 

force of gravity was used; however. a modified M I l 3 bilge pump was 
UH-I HEUCOPTER MAKES D£UVERY 
62 T ,\CTICAL ,\NO M /\Tt:RIt:L INl"O\',\TIO:-:S 

j 

- - 500-GALLON COL.LAPSIBLE DRUMS FILLED WITH FUEL 

designed and constructed by the task force maintenance section. This 

pump 8Teatiy reduced the restrictions on the refueling of the vehicles. 

The brigade's supply officer made arrangements with the Marine 

Logistics Support Unit for the supply of munitions. As the after action 

report on Task Force R£MAG£N slated: 

Overall, Task Force-Remagen received from Vandergrift over 200 aerial 

lifts representing over 10 million pounds plus an additional 50,000 pounds of 

hOi meals, mail and spare parts flown in on brigade UH·I 's. A UH -I was a 

daily necessity for retail distribution of parts, mail and meals from the 

combat trains area to the users. 

During this period, Operation MONTANA MAULER was also being resupplied by air with an average of 12.7 short tons a day. Cenain aerial 

resupply procedures and techniques were developed due to the jungle 

environment and monsoon weather in the Republic of Vietnam. 

Natural sources of water were sparse in the area where forces were 

committed to Operation MONTANA MA ULER. As in many other opera -

tions in Vietnam, water had to be transported to the troops by heli· 

copter. There were several ways to carry the water. The water can 

usually issued by the government could be used; however, once the 

water was consumed , the troops either had to wait for the helicopter 

to return to carry away the empty cans or they had to destroy them. 

They were too bulky and heavy for the rifleman to carry over the 
63 

broken and rough terrain. Ahhough plastic water containers could be 

collapsed when empty and therefore were much easier LO carryon the 

backs of troops. they toO were a nuisance . They were frequently lost 

0 1' damaged in the jungle. 

The troops of the 1st Brigade . 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 

developed a third method to supply water to the rinc companies in 

the field. The empty shell casings provided by the 5th Battalion . 4th 

Artillery (l 55-mm. Sclf-propelled), were cleaned and filled with 

water and transported to the troops in large numbers. Once the shell 

casings were empty. 'they were either buried or otherwise discarded . 

In this way. troops were not burdened by the containers. and the), 

could not be used by the enemy. 

A lightweight collapsible container, nicknamed "Iug·a·lug." was 

Ilso used. This container. as in the case of the five .gallon metal water 

container, could not be air·dropped from any appreciable he ight 

above the jungle canopy. Therefore, the unit on the ground still had 

to clear a landing zone. A ncwer container was de\·eloped consisting 

of several plastic inserts protectcd by a crushable cardboard covcring. 

It could withstand a free fall of up to 300 feet and thus often elimi· 

nated the need to clear a landing zone. This three·gallon container 

proved to be verv useful. 

Bcfore the commitment 01 Task Force REMAGEN. other ITlnova -

lions had been developed in Vietnam to improve aerial resupply tech· 

niques. Early in 1967. the A-22 cargo sling was employed. This 

device decreased the number of man -hours spent in preparing resupply items for aerial delivery, reduced the amount of handling. and 

allowed morc sorties to bc flown in a given period of time. Also. hI" 

cause of the insulation of the cargo bag. there was less spoilagt: of 

food. In another effort to improve aerial resupply. artillery ammuni · 

tion was packed ahead of time for aeria l delivery loads during periods 

when the demand was light. in order to allow a continuous flow 

during periods of heavy demand. 

Inclement weather. a frequent deterrent to aerial operations in 

Vietnam. was combated somewhat by using ground controlled 31" 

proa ch radar in landing zones for aerial resupply under instrument 

flight conditions. The procedure was deve loped initially at Camp 

Evans, a major logistic base in South Vietnam. Resupply helicopters 

were guided by means of a rad ioed vector from Da Nang and I-IuePhu Bai airfields to areas above the overcast where visual flight was 

possible and then directed to Camp Evans. Ground controlled approach radar would then guide the helicopter as it approached touch · 

down. This method was also used successfully with helicopters carrying externa l (sling) loads. During the month of February 1968, the 

2281h Combat SuppOrt Helicopter Company flew over 700 hours in 

inst rument weather conditions. Included in that figure were over 
C)-I TACTICAl ,\:-:0 :'1 ,\ l"E.R1EL 1",1\:0\ ,\TI0:-;5 

twenty missions with sling loads. Several hundred instrument approaches were made without a single mishap. The syslem established 

during Operation DELAWARE in April 1968 to provide instrument 

approach into the A Shau Valley is a good example of this radar 

technique . Over twenty aircraft could be comrolled or monitored 

simultaneously by radar to and from the valley. 

A simple expedient was developed by the infantryman 10 provide 

visual COlli act between air and ground elements during darkness. The 

M79 grenade launcher was broken open as when loading the weapon . 

and a ligl1l source was inserted in the breech. This practice provided a 

highly reliable directional signaling and marking device. which could 

be seen clearly by the pilot or aircraft crew but not by other persons 

on Ihe ground. The operatOr merely pointed the lighl as though aim -

mg al a target. 

To reach the Laotian border area and the Khe Sanh plateau, 

Task Force REMACEN had to cross over old Route 9 from Ca Lu to the 

border. Engineer troops had been attached to assist in this job. Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion , provided a reinforced engineer pia · 

toon , and four bulldozers were made available by the 14th Engineer 

Battalion and the Marine 11th Engineer Banalion . The annored 

vehicle launched bridges in the task force served a dual purpose. The 

power and traction of the vehicle made it an excellent lank retriever, 

when not being used in its primary role. The task force had two of 

these vehicles. The AVLB can launch its eighteen-meter bridge with· 

out exposing the crew to enemy fire . The launcher can then pick up 

the bridge on the far bank and continue along in support of the assault fo rces. During the operation . thirteen bypasses were constructed 

around destroyed bridges, the AVLB's were launched six times to 

span washouts and bridge abutments, and the entire road was swept 

for mines. Several enemy antitank mines were detected and destroyed 

along the route. The engineer effort was greatly simplified by using 

only track-laying vehicles during the operation . Wheeled vehicles of 

any type were prohibited. 

Pan of the mission of Task Force RE:MACE:N required the pioneering of a new trail along the Cambodian border from Roule 9 south to 

Route 926. In heavy growth , land navigation sometimes became a 

problem due to limited visibilit y. One device used to solve this prob· 

lem was a magnetic pilot compass mounted in the armored personnel 

carrier to maintain the approximate proper magnetic azimuth for the 

force. 

The suc<.:ess of Task Force RE:>'IACE:N was described by Lieutenant 

Colonel Cannelo P. Milia, Commanding Officer, lst Battalion, 77th 

Armor, in these words: 

The mission was a natural for an armored task force . The SCOUtS recon· 

noitered : mcch infantry moved rapidly to secure the high ground: armored 
65 

.. • . .' 

, -, 

• I 

• '.' • 

• 

t 

• 

ARMORED VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGE 

engmeers pioneered a road; armored anillery and mortars provided con- tinuous fire protection. When the preliminary work was completed, the 

tanks thrust deep into the Khe Sanh plateau reaching the Laotian border 

onc day afler crossing the LD at Calu [sic]. 

The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry. presented a good example of the 

innovative nature of the war in Vietnam. The rugged, unpopulated 

territory. the enemy's nearness to its supply bases, and the large area 

of operation required fast-moving, independent task forces capable of 

aeria l resupply and reinforcement. 
CHAPTER VI 

CORONADO X 

Ganuary-February 1968) 

Just before the 1968Junar new year (Tet) truce, the 2d Brigade of 

the 9th Infantry Division launched riverine operations in the marshlands of the Mekong Delta under the code name CORONADO X . An 

Anny-Navy mobile riverine force searched out the Viet Gong's main 

force and local battalions in a combination of riverine, search and 

destroy. patrolling, and interdiction operations. When the Viet Cong 

viola ted the temporary truce by attacking eight major cities in the 

delta, the mission of the mobile riverine force was refocused toward 

crushi ng the Tet offensive. 

In Operation CORONADO X new equipment and techniques had to 

be developed for tactical mobility and fire support in the delta area, 

where conventional techniques were only marginally effective. The 

terra in was, for the most part , inundated. Swamps. rice paddies, irrigation ditches. rivers, and canals. wh ile inhibiting the mobili ty of 

regu lar U.S. forces. had been used to advantage by the enemy. The 

mobility ach ieved by the riverine and a irmobile forces changed this 

situation. 

The Mekong Delta had been a target of the Viet Cong for many 

years. This important rice· producing area covers about one·fourth of 

Vietnam but contains approximately one-half of the country's popu · 

lation . Most of the people li ve in villages built a long the banks of the 

2.500 miles of interconnecting waterways. Since the limited network 

of roads o h en becomes impassable in the rainy season. the Viet Cong 

used the waterways as their chief routes for transporting men and 

equipment. While the helicopter allowed the allied commander to 

move forces with lillie regard to terrain , the water lines of communication were important to military opera tions and to the civilian economy. The Mob il e Riverine Force was organized to prevent the enemy 

from using the waterways and to make the river system safe for the 

residents of the delta. 

A land base had to be created in the delta area to support the 

Mobile Riverine Force. because there was little land available that 

was suitable for bases. airfields, and artillery firing positions. At a 

point about fony-five miles south of Saigon the base was built . using 
CORONADO X 67 

-

USS BENl:WAH, AFLOAT BASE Fait MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE, with armored 

troop carn'ers and moniiors tied alongside. 

dredges to pump soil from the My Tho Ri ver into adjacent rice 

paddies. The camp. christened "Dong Tam." covered about 600 

acres and provided housing and logistic facilities for the 9th Infantry 

Division headquarters, division support elements. and the Mobile 

Riverine Force. The base also had a harbor large enough to handle an 

LST (landing ship. tank). 

In addiuon to the land base , mobile floating bases, consisting of 

naval barracks ships and watercraft . were used. The Navyelemems of 

the Mobile Riverine Force were organized to provide an afloat base as 

well as combat support and combat service support to the ground 

forces. A river support squadron supplied barracks, repair. sa lvage, 

and supply ships. A river assault squadron contained annored troop 

carriers. command and communication boats, monitors (the tank of 

the riverine force), and assault support patrol boats. Each river as· 

sault squadron was equipped to transport and support an infantry 

battalion conducting combat operations in the q,eha. 

During CORONAOO X, Colonel Bert A. David, commander of the 

2d Brigade , controlled the 3d Battalion , 47th Infantry; the 3d Bat · 

talion , 60th Infantry ; and 3d Battalio n . 34th Artillery. Captain 
68 rAe nc,\!. ,1.:-':0 MATERIEL INt"O V " n O NS 

Roben S. Salzer. U.S. Navy, commanded the Navy clements support· 

iog the 2d Brigade. 

The Mobile Riverine Force had been conducting searches in the 

rice paddies of western Dinh Tuong Province when the Viet Cong 

launched a devastating attack against the city of My Tho. At 1730 

hours on 31 January, the 2d Brigade was ordered to go to the relief of 

the city. When the order was received, elements of the 2d Brigade 

were located near Fire Support Bases ALABAMA, FLORIDA, and 

GEORGIA. Company S , 3d Battalion. 47th Infantry, moved to My Tho 

by helicopter, while other units of the 3d Battalions, 47th and 60th 

Infantry , boarded their armored troop carriers and moved south to 

the Mekong River. During night movement through narrow, uncharted, and shoal -ridden streams, the riverine force came under 

several attacks from small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket fire. 

The attacks were beaten off as barge -mounted artillery from the 3d 

Battalion, 34th Artillery , fired beehive rounds directly at both sides of 

the river, Accurate fire from the Navy monitors and other watercraft 

raked the banks. The twO battalions and supporting artillery reached 

the Mekong River and joined up with the afloat base at 0220 hours on 

I February. After a short period of resupply the Anny and Navy elementssteamed for My Tho. Company B, 3d Saltalion, 47th Infantry, 

which had air-assaulted into My Tho earlier. secured the beach landing siLCs for the battalion . The battalion beached at 1515 hours with 

three companies abreast and immediately began to advance nort h 

through the west side of My Tho . Automatic weapon and mortar fire 

from the Navy monitors and from assault suppOrt patrol boats and 

the barge-mounted artillery were in support . The 3d Battalion, 60th 

Infantry, beached to the west of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry , and 

also attacked to the north. The 47th Infantry's 3d Baltalion became 

involved in fierce street fighting wit h elements of the 261st, 263d, and 

514th Viet Cong Batlalions. Lieutenant Colonel Ivan C. Bland 

moved his companies slowly and effectively . house to house and street 

by street. Additional artillery, air strikes, and helicopter gunships 

were called in to suPPOrt the anacks. At the end of the day the two 

baltalions made physical contact with the enemy and prepared night 

defensive positions. The 47th's 3d Battalion had killed fifty-eight Viet 

Cong and captured four, while losing twO U.S. soldiers. The 60th's 3d 

Battalion killed twenty-six Viet Cong and suffered none killed in 

action. By 2100 hours most of the fight ing had ceased , a nd the enemy 

had begun to withdraw. The next morning, 2 February. the twO battalions encircled My Tho in a combined operation with Vietnamese 

units to sever the enemy's routes of escape_ Only light resistance was 

encountered as the battalions located several enemy soldiers killed 

in the previous day's battle. The number of Viet Cong killed by the 

2d Brigade rose to 106. For their heroic action in the battle of My 
CORONADO X 69 

Tho, ten soldiers of the 2d Brigade were awarded Silver Stars on 

the spOt by Major General George G. O·Connor. 9th Infantry Division 

commander. 

The Mobile Riverine Force was not allowed to rest on us laurels, 

however. as much work had yet to be done. The Viet Cong were retreating to the northwest. Intelligence indicated that the area around 

Cai Lay was the likely location for the Viet Cong reorganization. At 

1200 hours on 2 February. the 2d Brigade loaded back OntO its armored troop carriers. Company A, 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, was 

transported to Dong Tam and air-assaulted to Cai Lay. The riverine 

force moved west to the Ba Rai River, where it turned north toward 

Cai Lay. The 2d Brigade conducted search operations and blocked 

major rivers in order to frustrate enemy atlempts to reorganize . Large 

food caches were discovered during search operations. but contact 

with the enemy was limited. 

The next day. word was received that the Viet Cong were threat· 

ening to take over the city of Vinh Long, which had been hard hit. 

On 4 February, three Viet Cong batlalions were still located south 

and west of the city. The 60th Infantry's 3d Battalion was moved by 

rivercraft to a suitable helicopter pickup zone near Cai Lay and, from 

there . was delivered by air assault to landing zones southwest of Vinh 

long. The 3d Batlalion of the 47th Infantry boarded annored troop 

carri ers ncar Cai Lay and moved to beaches on the Long Ho River, 

southwest of Vinh Long. The battalion landed unopposed and established blocking positions oriented north laward the city. Company A 

of the 47th Infantry's 3d Ballalion and a battery of artillery from the 

3d Ballalion, 34th Artillery. were airlifted from Cai Lay to secure the 

Vinh Long airstrip. The 3d Battalion. 47th Infa ntry, moved to the 

cast of the 3d BallaHon. 60th Infantry, thus completing a blockade 

across the southern section of Vinh Long. 

In the relief of Vinh Long, the 3d Battalion, 60th Infalllry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hill, played the major role. The battalion came under small arms fire from a Vict Cong force shortly after 

landing. Companies A and E of the 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry. 

called in artillery and moved slowly toward the Viet Cong positions. 

By late afternoon. Company E had killed seven Viet Cong and captured five weapons. At 2030. however. the unit gOt into an all-night 

fight with a heavily armed Viet Cong company sout heast of the city. 

Riverboats of the Mobile Riverine Force patrolled the waterways in 

the area to contain the enemy. 

At dawn both battalions began search operations. The Set Batlalion, 60th infamry. located thirty-seven dead Viet Congo Sweep opera -

tions conti nued throughout the day wit h limited enemy contact. 

About 1745 hours the battalions boarded the annored troop carriers 

and moved by river into the Mekong Delta area and on to the afloat 
70 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL I NNOVATIONS 

basco The tired soldiers and sa ilors had had eight days and nights of 

continuous movement and combat. 

After a well-deserved night's rest, the riverine force resumed its 

pursuit of the elusive Viet Congo Intelligence sources indicated that 

the Viet Cong were now moving south and westlo the Cai Cam River. 

The 2d Brigade decided to deploy an "eagle float " down the river. 

This force was an infantry company with supporting fire mounted in 

armored troop carriers. In conjunction with aircraft overhead, the 

unil conducted a reconnaissance in force along the Cai Cam. searching for signs of the enemy. When the enemy was sighted, the eagle 

float moved ashore to sea rc h out the Viet Congo After the operation, 

the troops quickly loaded back on the boats and got under way again. 

Shortly before noon the lead minesweepers of the small riverine element received automatic weapon, recoilless rifle . and rocket fire from 

both banks of the Cai Cam. Company B. 3d Battalion . 60th Infantry , 

beached immediately on the west side of the river and swept to the 

south. Finding no enemy troops. the company returned to the river. 

At midafternoon. both Companies Band E put ashore to search 

again for the Viet Congo They came under enemy fire from rockets, 

rifle grenades, and 60-mm. mortars. Company B assaulted the Viet 

Cong position, killing five of the enemy. while anned helicopters. 

artillery. and the Navy riverboats provided fire support. As the Viet 

Cong retreated, Company A joined the action. To assist in trapping 

the enemy, the battalion commander asked Colonel David to se nd the 

2d Brigade's ready -reaction force into the battle area. Within 

minutes, the men of Company B. 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry. had 

boa rded boats and were en route to the Cai Cam River . The company 

arrived about 1900 hou rs and landed under the control of Colonel 

Hill . At dusk, night defensive positions were established by all units as 

the fighting came lO a SlOp. The eagle float , reinforced by the Mobile 

Riverine Force. had kill ed six ty-three of the enemy, while losing four 

U.S. soldiers. Twent y-seven weapons were captured along with medical supplies, ammunition , and documents. On the morning of 7 February Colonel David deployed the remainder of the 3d Battalion, 

47th Infantry. into the Cai Cam area. Both battalions searched the 

previous day's battlefield and moved southward to look for the fleeing 

enemy. During the day. seventeen retrea ting Viet Cong were killed 

and five weapons were ca ptured. BOlh battalions loaded onto armored troop ca rriers and returned to the afloat base on the Mekong 

River. 

During the period 29 January to 7 February. the Mobile Riverine 

Force had made three major relocations. The 2d Brigade was sent 

from western Dinh Tuong Province to relieve My Tho, to the north to 

secure Cai Lay, and finally to the southwest to protect the city of Vinh 

Long. After moving by boat and helicopter the soldiers of the 2d 
CORO:,\,AOO X 71 

• 

c,. 7 = .. 

EAcu: FLOAT m ' MOBILE RIVERI NE FORCE beaches to jearchfor Viet Congo 

Brigade fought through city St reets and through the muck and mire 

of the swamps to meet the enemy, The quick response of the riverine 

force and the well -co·ordinated fire from Navy rivercraft, barge, 

mounted artillery, tactical aircraft. and helicopter gunships turned 

the Viet Cong offensive into a disastrous defeal. The Mobile Riverine 

Force was again aboard the ships of their afloat base. awaiting orders 

for deployment in the Mekong Delta. 
72 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVAT IONS 

The 9th Infantry Division was highly successful in adapting unit 

o rganizations. equipment, and tactics to meet the challenge of the 

delta's terrain and of the Viet Cong's ability to blend in with the 

people of the villages. 'Jitterbug and sea l" operations were examples 

oflhe tactica l innovations aimed at reconnaissance and encirclement 

of elusive enemy elements. Planning for these specia l maneuvers started at division headquarters approximately one week before an opera -

tion. A series of targets was selected and intelligence efforts were 

focused on these areas. Commanders at all levels immersed them -

sclves in the details of the intelligence process to insure a thQrough 

understanding of enemy movements and patterns in their areas of 

operation . The day before a jitterbug and seal operation. the battalion to perform the mission was briefed on the probable targets and 

assigned air cava lry and airmobile support. The brigade commander 

would not se lect the specific targets until the evening before the operation so that the latest intelligence could be used . He would then 

choose five to seven targets for the jitterbug and seal operation . Tac· 

ti c"l air strikes were planned in advance. and artillery was moved to 

cover the new targets. Orders were issued to the mission battalion , 

which in turn prepared two companies for the assault. 

The next morning final co-ordination was completed and the 

mission was under way. At the first target . a heli copter with an 

airborne personnel deteClOr aboard swept the area at tree ·lOp level. 

Cobra gunships orbited at 500 to 700 feet . looking for fleeing Viet 

Congo Scout heli copters hovered above the area and sear ched for 

bunkers, trails, or signs of movement. if the enemy's presence was sus· 

pected, riot control agents were placed on the targets. and scout heli· 

copter pilots, wearing p ro tecti ve ma sks. hovered their aircraft near 

the ground, using the prop wash to spread the agent. If enemy bunk· 

ers were seen. the Cobras made firing passes to make the Viet Cong 

ex pose themselves. 

Meanwhile. the first lift of a rifle company was in the air ready for 

action. If enemy contact was made . the battalion commander eva luated the target information and determined what size force to send 

into the objective area. When light enemy resistance was indicated , 

only five troop helicopters would land . If a large enemy force was 

met , the entire jitterbug force would assault the target. As the jitter· 

bug force attacked, successive helicopter lifts encircled, or sealed. the 

target. All available firepower was brought to bear. As soon as the 

battalion's contact began to show promise, the brigade commander 

assumed control and alerted one of his batta lions to begin sealing in 

the Viet Congo The encircled enemy force was then pounded by artil -

lery and air strikes. Canals and rivers were sealed off with concertina 

wire stretched from one bank to the other. Hand grenades wen: 

thrown into Streams every five nr ten minutes to discourage escape. 
CORONADO X 73 

BARCE· MoUNTED I05·MM. H OWITZER 

After several hours of bombardment. all fire was halted, and the Viet 

Cong were asked to surrender. Firing was resumed after the brief 

pause if the enemy refused. 

If the enemy was located, a battalion could conduct as many as 

fivcjitterbug and seal operations a day. If no contact with the enemy 

devcloped , the battalion could search fifteen to eighteen targets a 

day. The 9th Infantry Division learned that when brigades perfonned 

the jitterbug and seal with skill. the ratio of enemy to friendly losses 

rose dramatically . 

One of the problems encountered in the marshy areas of the 

Mekong Delta was finding suitable firing positions for artillery pieces. 

The 9th Infantry Division solved the problem by mounting I05-mm. 

howitzers on landing craft and barges that could accompany the 

infantry. Both direct and indirect fire could be delivered from these 

floating platforms. For indirect fire support , the landing craft, mech· 

anized, was run up on a sloping bank and tied to stumps and trees. 

The barges mounted with artillery wcre secured against a steep bank 

in deeper water. In bOlh cases, procedures governing the accuracy 

and direction of fire were the same as on land . Direct fire was particu· 

larly valuable in providing security for riverine troop movement. It 
74 TACTlC,\L AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

was also often used to prepare intended landing sites for the floating 

infantry. These va riations provided the artillery with a significant extcnsion of its capability in the delta. 

Division commanders in Vietnam found the helicopter to be an ef· 

fective instrument for deceiving the enemy. In an airmobile operation 

the commander was able to concentrate or disperse his forces qu ickly 

for tactical advantage . The same speed and flex ibility was often applied in a feint to distrac i the enemy from the real airmobile objective 

or to lead him into a position favorable to the airmobile force. An 

enemy observer was deceived when artillery preparations and air 

strikes were directed on possible landing zones, followed by the false 

landingofa flight of helicopters, which then quickly turned and flew 

to the actual objective. Sometimes the aircraft would touch down in a 

landing zone with the soldier-passengers clearly visible. As the heli · 

copter lifted out of the landing zone, the soldiers would lie on the 

floor of the helicopter giving the impression that the ground forces 

had unloaded. 

The 9th Infantry Division used the helicopter to deceive the Viet 

Cong in many instances. When a jitterbug and sea l operation was 

completed, helicopters would pi ck up the airmobile forces to either 

return them to base or move them to a new target. During several operations a false pi cku p was staged , leaving a portion of the force in the 

area to cond uct ambushes or patrols. The division also used false helicopter landings to fix a Viet Cong force . To hold the Viet Cong in 

place , false landings were made along probable withdrawal routes to 

make the enemy feel that he was surrounded. 

At about 0800 hours onc morning, a 9th Infantry Division battalion had been conducting a reconnaissance in force when suddenl y the 

men heard the unmistakable sound of rifle fire. Instinctively the point 

man hit the ground and rolled for cover, but there was only silence. 

JUSt one shot had been fired . Somewhere out there was a Viet Cong 

sniper. The point man surveyed the area ; the only possible location 

for a sniper was in a wood line about 700 meters in front of him. He 

summoned the radio operator and reported the sniper fire to his 

platoon leader. A short time later the report reached the battalion 

commander, who immediately deployed his own sniper team to the 

point man's location. With its optical equipment the sniper team began a search of the tree line. Finally, the Viet Cong sniper was discovered in a tree 720 meters away. While one team member judged the 

wind using the M49 spouing scope, the other man fired one shot. 

killing the Viet Cong sniper. 

The use of the sniper was nOt new in Vietnam , but the systematic 

training and employment of an aggressive , offensive sniper team - a 

carefully designed "weapon system" - was. A sniper was no longer just 

the man in the rifle squad who carried the sniper rifle ; he was the 
CORONADO X 75 

product of an established school. According 10 Major General Donn 

R. Pepke. Commanding General . 4th Infantry Division: " ... a two 

week course was designed to train marksmen from each maneuver 

unit. Each student was armed with an accurized M14 rifle with a 

sniper scope mounted. This weapon was reta ined by the individu al 

when he completed the course and returned to his un it." The original 

sniper school in Vietnam was established at the 9th Infantry Division 

in June 1968. The cadre consisted of one major and eight noncommis· 

sioned officers from the Army marksmanship training unit at Fort 

Benning. Georgia. They had extensive experience in competit ive 

shooting. and one was a practiced gunsmith familiar with the tech· 

niques for tuning the accuracy of the MH. A training faci lity was 

constructed to accommodate thirty students. This facility included a 

rifle range on which targets were located up to 900 yards away. 

Students for the sniper program were selected from volunteers 

who had qualified as expert riflemen. They were well·motivated sol· 

diers and. in some cases. had competitive marksmanship experience. 

The training was so rigorous that only 50 percent of the students suc· 

cessfully completed the course . 

The initia l equipment consisted of National Match Grade M14 

rifles. These rifles were glass bedded inlO impregnated stocks that 

were impervious to water. The rifles were carefully tuned to achieve a 

high degree of accuracy . Finally. Ihe sniper used 7.62·mm. National 

Match Grade ammunition to further insure accurate firing. The 

selection of the M 14 as the sniper rifle to be used in Vietnam was not 

hastily made. In early 1967 an evaluation was conducted by the U.S. 

Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTI V) to "determine the organi· 

zational. doctrinal. and materiel requirements for sniper operations." 

This evaluation determined that the " accurized M 14 was a suitable 

sniper rifle for Vietnam ." Several telescope sights were also tested 

with various degrees of success. The best sight was an adjustable 

power telescope that incorporated a range ·finding feature . The 

magnification ranged from three to nine power as desired by the man 

firing the gun . 

The most successful use of the sniper was with ambush patrols. 

Snipers would either accompany a platoon on an ambush or. when 

provided with a security element of five to eight men . establish their 

own ambush ·sniper position . They were situated in many cases near 

known or suspected rice caches or tunnel entrances. Using such taco 

tics. thesnipcr picked the time and place to engage the enemy. there· 

by maintaining the initiative. In addition. sniper teams were some· 

times left behind to engage Viet Cong who were following a moving 

unit. The team established positions that would allow long·range ob· 

servation over the route that the unit had traveled. This technique 

was effective because the sniper could engage targets as far away as 
76 

900 meters and because the VH~t Cong tcnded to be lax about their 

cover at extreme ranges. Thus, the Viet Cong prcS(:ntcd excellent tar· 

gets. Snipers could also operate at night with the help of "pink light," 

an infrared searchlight that illuminated an area for a person looking 

through a starlight scope. This method allowed the sniper to operate 

anytime of the day or night. 

Sniper lcams were used against Viet Cong tax collectors. who 

came from Cambodia to collecllaxes from farmers. The stay-behind 

sniper teams, consisting of two snipers, a radio operator. and three 

Popular Force soldiers. were dropped off during mechanized infantry 

operations ncar the border. The learns remained in position until 

dusk. According to the villagers in the area, the amount of enemy taxation was greatly reduced. Snipers were also used to prevent the enemy from re-entering areas that he commonly mined or roadblocked. 

The effecti ... eness of the first grdduates of the 9th Di ... isioll's sniper 

school was immediately apparent. They were assigned to maneu ... er 

b"ltalionson 7 No ... ember 1968 and made their first enemy kill on 10 

No ... ember. Through 10 March 1969 the 54 snipers ofthc 9th Infantry 

Division made 135 contacts with the enemy, which resulted in 211 

confirmed enemy kills. Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell, the di ... i· 

~ion commander, commented, "The most effecti ... e single program we 

had was the sniper program." 

In 1968 the 9th Infantry Division teSled the first Army vehicle specifically designed to meet the combat needs of military units operating in the delta: the air cushion ... ehicle (ACV). The limited road 

nets, extensive waterway systems, and seasonal flooding of land areas 

of the delta made an amphibious craft ... ery desirable. 

The air cushion ... ehicle is a modified Bell Aerosystem commercial 

craft. It is thirty-nine feet long and sixteen feet high. The ... ehicle is 

supported by a cushion of high· ... olume, low-pressure compressed air 

generated by a centrifugal lift fan_ As the fan builds up air pressure in 

the cushion, the ... ehicle is lifted. It is almost frictionless when on the 

air cushion, allowing easy propulsion up to a speed of seventy-fi ... e 

knots. The same engine that powers the lift fan alsodri ... es a nine-foot, 

three-blade propeller that makes the craft speed over the delta ter· 

rain. To maintain enough air under the ACV for it to clear obstacles, 

flexible rubber can ... as skirts are hung from the edge of the "'ehicle to 

within a fraction of an inch off the ground. The ... ehicle can clear 

solid obstacles up to 3 ~ feet high and rice paddy dikes, with sloping 

sides, up to 6 feet high. The air cushion ... ehicle can force its way 

through grasses and small trees and na ... igate ditches and canals_ 

The 9th Infantry Di ... ision tested the air cushion ... ehicle in combat 

operations against the Viet Cong in the same delta region that was the 

scene for CORONADO X. In twenty offensi ... e operations, the ... ehicle 

tra ... eled o ... er land, swamps, ri ... ers, and the South China Sea at speeds 
CORONADO X 77 

up to seventy knots. The craft mounted machine guns and a highvelocity gTenade launcher and carried ten to twelve soldiel'i. During 

the lest, 43 Viet Cong were killed and 100 detained. Casualties of the' 

ACV units were two soldiers wounded. The craft also performed successfully in security missions and in transport of troops and cargo. 

The 9th Infantry Division concluded that the air cushion vehicle was 

suitable for combat operations in the delta and recommended that 

more vehicles be deployed to Vietnam. 

By the end of CORONADO X, the Mobile Riverine Force had again 

proved its value by moving rapidly and efficiently through difficult 

terrain to relieve the cities of My Tho and Vinh Long and to pursue 

the enemy forces. This operation demonstrated many tactical and 

materiel innovations that were the result of the resourcefulness and 

originality of the 9th Infantry Division and supporting Navy 

elements. Mounting the riverine artillery on barges and platforms 

substantially increased the effectiveness of the force . Such fire support 

coupled with the mobility provided by the riverine craft, air cushion 

vehicles, and helicopters made the eagle float and the jitterbug and 

seal tactics possible. In addition, the mobility. firepower, and imaginative tactical concepts of the riverine forces seized the initiative from 

the enemy and vastly improved the security of the watenYays for 

South Vietnamese citizens. 
CHAPTER VII 

DakTo 

(November-December 1967) 

T he overwhelming success of U.S. arms at Oak To may be auributed in pan to a number of innova tions that had been developed by the 

forces supporting the infa ntry. Foremost amo ng these were the new 

and vastly improved communication systems available at d ivision 

level and below. Commanders were able to achieve greater control 

and provide better and morc responsive support for maneuver units. 

Also the servicing of helicopters in fo rward areas contributed greatly 

to the effectiveness of airmobile operatio ns. Engineer effons to clear 

routes of communica tions and to deny the enemy cover and concea l· 

ment were supplemented by the usc of herbicides and a new "people 

sniffer," 

The batlle for Oak To during November a nd Decembe r 1967 was 

a disaster for the 1st North Vietnamese Army Division. Ahhough the 

enemy had expected to gain an importam psychological victory by 

swiftly striking western Kontum Province from border sanctuaries, his 

four fresh regiments were decisively defeated in what a ranking Communist officer termed a "useless and bloody battle." In a classic example of allied superiority in firepower and maneuver, fifteen U.S. 

and Vietnamese battalions beat the enemy to the punch and sent the 

survivors limping back to their sanctuaries. 

The command and control and communications effon at Oak To 

was enormous. The 4th Infantry Division headquarters controlled its 

1st and 2d Brigades, division artillery. division troops, division support command, the 173d Airborne Brigade , the 1st Brigade of the 1st 

Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and a myriad of attached and 

supporting units. The statistics in the three ·week battle were impres· 

sive: Army aviation flew more than 13 ,000 hours; eighteen U.S. and 

Vietnamese artillery batteries fired more than 170,000 rounds: and 

the Ai l' Force executed 2.100 tactical air and 300 B-52 sorties, Four 

enemy regiments lost 1,644 known dead. 

The baltic can be described best in the words of Major General 

William R. P('Crs, who was the Commanding General. 4th Infantry 

Division, during the operation: 
n,\K TO 79 

The 'battle for OAK TO' was not a designated operation in itself. but 

occurred within the bounda ries of the 4th Infantry Division's Operation 

MACARTHUR .... Nevertheless, the size of the twO opposing forces. the 

lengt h and viole nce of the engagement a nd the o\'erall significance of the 

battk have made the events that occurred in the vicinity of OAK TO from 2 

October to I December the most important that have occurred in the 

Central Highlands since the 1954 Geneva Com·ention .... 

By late OClOber intdligence sources began detecting unusual and large 

movements in the tri·borde r area - the junction of LAOT IAN-CAMBOD· 

iAN -SOUTH VIETNAMESE borders- west of the OAK TO Special Forces 

Camp in KONTUM Province. As the area was watched by the various means 

of aerial and ground intell igence gathering agencies it became apparent that 

the NVA was moving large fo rces into sout hwest KONTUM Provi nce .... 

The 1st Brigade. which had been surveilling the border area in western 

PLEIKU Province. began deploying to new [sic) OAK TO airfield on 28 

October. On 2 November an NVA reconn aissance sergeant became a 

CHI EU HOI and divulged what later proved to be the accurate positions and 

battle plans of the four NVA infantry regime nts and one a rt illery regiment 

that were preparing to lau nch the largest enemy attack to date in the Central 

High lands against the OAK TO-TAN CANI-l area. The NVA sergeant reo 

vea led that the enemy plan was to launc h the primary attack with twO 

regiments from the south and southwest of OAK TO supported by mortar 

and rocket fi re. A seeond att ack into the a rea, also supported by rockets and 

mortars, was to be lau nched from the northeast by one regiment. The fourth 

regiment was to be held in reserve. This information proved to be correct 

and was val uable in the initial deployment of our forces. The 1st Brigade 

sent one baualion on to the ridgeline that runs east to west south of OAK TO 

and an O PCON batta lion from the 173d Airborne Brigade moved west and 

established a fire support base for medium artillery at BEN '·IET. 

The initial contacts were made on the ridgeline sou th of OAK TO by the 

3d Batta lio .... 12th Infantry: followed in succession by very heavy contacts to 

the southwest by the 3d Battalion. 8th Infantry. and by the 4th Battalion. 

503<1 Airborne Infantry moving south from BEN HET. This ini tia l p hase 

took place from 1- 6 November and can be viewed as the brigade's forces 

attacking into the face of enemy units as they were moving towa rd pre. 

Sl'lected and in some areas previously prepared positions. After these imtial 

contacts the 173d Airborne Brigade With two battalions arri\'ed at OAK TO 

and moved west to BEN H ET. During this phase from 7 to 12 November. 

contact was continuous as battalions ..... ere combat assaulted behind the lead 

elements and into the baSl' areas of the 32d and 66th NVA Re~ments. 

Meanwhile. the ARVN Forces placed their units in vicimty of TAN 

CAHN to the east of OAK TO. A battalion of the 42d ARVN Regiment, 

later joined by the 2d and 3d ARVN Airborne Batta lions. oriented to the 

north and northeast to in iti ally block and then attack the 24t h NVA 

Regiment moving on to the OAK 1'0-1' Ai"Ii CANH area from the northeast 

down the TUMERONG Valley. The 2d Battalion. 8th Cavalry. moved into 

an AO southeast of TAN CANH to react against a possible attack from the 

southeast against the now large base com pIe" along Route 512 from TAN 

CANI·I to DAK TO. 'rhe 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division with the 1st 

Battalion. 12th Cavalry. arrived at KON1'UM from the coast and was im· 

mediately deployed into the OAK HODRA I Valley south of the main battle 

1\rea to intercept the withdrawing NVA . 

The NVA forces were stopped a nd forced to wit hdraw. T o the west of the 

BEN 1-1 ET the NVA committed their reserves. the 174th NVA Regiment. to 
80 TACTICAL ANO MATERIEL IN:"oIOVATIONS 

coveT the withdrawal to the southwesl of their tWO hard hit regiments. This 

resulted in the violent, four day struggle for Hill 875 which ultimately 

involved twO battalions of the 173d Airborne Brigade and Ihe lst Bal!alion, 

12th Infantry, which was airlifted into the battle area from DARLAC 

Province. The hill was taken after receiving ... TAC air and ... artillery 

bombardment. ... Meanwhile , northeasl of TAN CANH an ARVN infan - try baualion fixed a large NVA force on a hill mass while twO ARVN airborne battalions swept up the nanks in a ilerce twO day baltle, wh ich inflicted 

heavy NVA casualties. Later, the same 2d and 3d ARVN Airborne Battalio, ... sprang an attempted enemy ambush with one battalion while getting 

behind the positioned NVA forces with the othel battalion and hiuing the 

headQuaners gTOup, completelv routinl!' the baualion·site force. 

One of the means by which the division located and kept track of 

the enemy was the airborne personnel detector, commonly referred to 

as the "people sniffer." This air· transportable electrochemical instrument sensed microscopic particles suspended in the air. Mounted in 

the utility or light observation heli copters, the detector continuously 

sampled the atmosphere at the flight altitude of the aircraft for evidence of the enemy, It could also det«t the ammonia excretions of 

men . 

The improvement in communications available to the field com -

mander in Vietnam stands as a hallmark of accomplishment of Army 

communications personnel at all levels, Insight into the communications situation is given by Brigadier General William M, Van 

Harlingen , Jr. , in his debriefing report after eighteen months as 

commanding general of the 1st Signal Brigade: 

Communications has been a significan t factor in the conflict in Vietnam, Th~ enemy's limited tactical communications capability has forced him to 

adhere to preplanned offensive operations and denied to him the flexibility 

needed to react to the changing ircum tan~s of battle. On the other hand 

our wealth of tactical communications has given us great flexibility and per· mitted us to use our tactical mobility to the fullest advantage, Communica· tions organic to our divisions and field forces, along with substantial support 

by combat area si~a l units, have given U.S. field commanders a command 

and control capability which, along with their overwhelming firepower and 

tactical mobility has pennitted them a freedom of action which they have 

exploited to the fullest in the conduct of operations. 

The advances in communications since the Korean War have contributed immeasurably to the over-all effectiveness of the U.S. Army in 

combalo Through the extensive communication systems at each level, 

commanders were better able to co ntrol the personnel and weapons 

under their command . The communication improvement resulted 

from a number of factors, including the evolution in electronics tech· 

nology that ca,used the vacuum tube to give way to transistor-solid 

state circuitry. 

Because wire and cable were obviously not suitable for intercon· 

necting widely separated units across unsecured areas, VHF radio 

relay became the backbone of division communications. Responsive 
DAK TO 

MOCK-UP o~· XM-2 (MODIFIED [63) AIRBORNE PERSONNEL Df:n :croR 

mounted 011 UH·j aircraft. 

81 

telephone service was provided to all panics who genuinely needed it. 

Multichannel VHF connections extended from brigade to battalion 

level. using division resources. Howitzer batteries supporting infantry 

battalions were allocated patch-through circuits from these radio 

relays. and alternate routes and backup systems were used extensively 

during tactical operations_ 
82 TAC TI CAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

Typically, the organic division's communica tions were augmented 

by the Field Force Signal Battalion and by the area system provided 

by the 1st Signal Brigade for use by all friendly forces. These supplements were required by the great size of the division's usual area of 

operations and by the terrain that posed many challenges to the communicator. The significant innovation in the area system was the provision of multichannel VHF radio relay to small units. According to 

published doctrine, corps (field forces) systems terminated at artillery 

group level. but in Vietnam. field forces sometimes provided multichannel service as far down as the artillery battery. This extension not 

only improved communications but also supported sole-user tele -

phone service (hot lines) anywhere the commander desired. The 

actual use of the system varied greatly from division to division. The 

tactical operations center of the 1st Infantry Division was typical. It 

had thirty-five sole·user circuits that terminated in the operations 

center. In World War II four channels of communication ran from a 

corps to a division , while in the Korean War the use of eight channels 

from a corps to a division was st andard practice. In Vietnam, however, thirty-two channels to a single combat brigade were common. 

This tremendous improvement in battlefield communications had a 

proportionate effect on the commander's ability to influence the 

battle. 

Large-scale airmobile operations in Vietnam allowed, and virtually required, the commander to move his command post from the 

ground to the air. Effective command and control of widespread units 

in the jungle was not possible from the traditional command post of 

previous wars. An airborne command post was the solution. A critical 

component of this new command post was thc communications 

equipment available to the commander and his staff. Several early 

configurations had been tried; in 1965 a basic console was approved 

that included two FM radios, one VHF radio, one UHF radio , and 

one high-frequency, single side band radio. Designated the ANI ASC6. this console was designed for quick installation and removal. In 

1968 the AN/ ASC-IO console was developed. This item was sma ller 

and easier to install and provided an intercom system for the com· 

mand group on board the aircraft. Another new console. the 

ANI ASC-1 1, consisted of two vehicu lar FM radios plus the organic. 

high·frequency , single side band in the aircraft. Two ANI ASC- 11 's 

could be insta lled in one aircrafl. An alternative to the AN / ASC-IO 

was the AN/ ASC- \5. II had three UHF- FM radios with a secure 

voice device. 

These radios allowed the commander and his staff to control combat operations. The command group could use several radio nets 

simult aneously. For example, a Vietnamese commander could use 

onc FM net to control his ground units: the senior U.S. adviser could 
OAK TO 83 

AN I ASC-15 COMMUNICATION Ct;t-.'TRAI.. 

communica te with the American advisers on the other FM set; the air 

liaison officer could maintain UHF contact with the forward air controllers directing the a ir strikes; and the high-frequency, single side 

band would be available, if needed, to enter the corps' air sup port 

ope rations net. The commander of the aviation unit could usc the 

helicopter radios to control his aircraft. 

The composition of the command group varied depending on the 

desire of the commander and the nature of the mission. For Vietnamese units, the group often consisted of the Vietnamese commander, 

his senior U.S. adviser, an air liaison officer. and an artillery adviser. 

For U.S. units, the command group was made up of the airmobile 

force commander and his operations officer, air and artillery liaison 

officers, and sometimes the higher unit commander or a member of 

his staff. The commander of the U.S. Army aviation unit or his operations officer was normally the pilot or copilot of the helicopter com· 

mand post. 

The nexibility of the helicopter command pOSt enabled the commander to control ground units, to co-ordinate the helicopter force 

with prestrike forces, to co·ordinate all fire suPPOrt (attack helicep-
TACTICAl ,\:>; 1) MATERIEL I:-.':-.'OVATIO;'<S 

tcrs, ground support fire. and tactical air). and to perfonn special 

missions. In spite of these and other advantages, there were some lim· 

itations for the airborne commander. Bad weather caused the heli· 

copter to fly at lower altitudes, thereby increasing its vulnerability to 

ground fire and causing congestion over the landing zone. 'fhe weight 

of the radio equipment limited the amount of fuel that could be car· 

ried. Furthennore. the commandcr had to decide between carryi ng 

more troops and less fuel. which decreased the flying time, and more 

fuel and fewer troops. which added to the flying time. The size of Ihe 

helicopter also limited space and facilities. Especially important was 

the disadvantage of having all key personnel on one helicoptcr. While 

these limitations presented problems, the helicopter command post 

was still an effcctive command and control vehicle for the type of war· 

fare and terrain found in Vietnam. 

The a irborne radio relay was an innovation conceived to provide 

communication links between sep arated elements beyond the range 

of normal communication equipment or deployed in terrain that 

lacked adequate sites for ground relay operations. Some of the config· 

urations used were U I-A and CV -2 aircraft with four channels of 

communication, using FM radios and ARC-121 consoles; U-21 air· 

craft with six secure channels of FM communication, using an ARC149 console; 0-1 aircraft with a ground or aircraft FM radio; 

OH-13 aircraft with aircraft FM radios; and UH-ID aircraft with a 

ground FM radio. During the first three months of 1966 an airmobile 

radio relay was used in eighteen of forty-two operations reported by 

brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division and lst Infantry Division. by the 

l 73d Airborne Brigade, and by the 1st Brigade, IOlst Airborne Divi· 

sion. Specific note of this technique was made by Lieutenant Colonel 

Tom M. Nicholson. former commanding officer of the 13th Signal 

Battalion. Colonel Nicholson wrote: 

On many occasions, airborne relay was provided by CV-2 aircraft, which 

had a capability of 6 relays at once. This multiple relay was used for 

simultaneous suppon of the baHalion command, the brigade command. the 

anillery fire, the forward air control. and medical evacuation net. during 

many operations. The outstanding logistical support and medical 

evacuation, experienc~ by the battalions of the 1st Air Cay Division, would 

have been severely restricted without the airborne relay. 

In some situations the bulk and weight of standa rd equipment 

configurations proved unsatisfactory, resulting in serious problems in 

mobility and flexibility. An example of such a situation is the ANI 

MRC- 69 VHF radio relay terminal that provided connection with 

division telephone and tdety~ networks. A minimum of two CH-47 

helicopter sorties was needed to lift the AN/ MRC-69 with its com· 

ponent genera tor sel. After being landed in heavy jungle. the shelter 

was not mobile and in many cases was operating extremely close to 
DAK TO 85 

the landing zont". To solve th~ problems. some units built special re 

configurations. commonly called MRC- 34 ~ (half of 69). Typically . 

they consisted of a ~ -ton trailer with enough equipment from t he 

AN/ MRC-69 to terminate twelve channels of voice communication 

links (half of the AN / MRC-69 capacity). As one report on comma nd 

communications states: 

The trailer configuration was chosen because of its several advantages. 

Though a vehicular mounted set was self transporting, it was med tOO 

heavy for the intended purpose. Also, the rig could not be employed if the 

\'ehicle was deadlined. Finally, a trailer mounted radio tenninal was lighter 

and easier to handle. It could be backed into a Chinook and followed by the 

skid mounted 5kw generator with little or no trouble. 

Before the battle of Oak To, the 4th Infantry Division's communication unit, the 124th Signal Battalion , had had some experience 

with the MRC 34~. The first MRC-34~ constructed by the 124th 

Signal Battalion was based on pictures of radio relay units built by 

another division. Numerous improvements were made on the final 

version. What resulted was an exceptional, air-transportable communications system, which proved itself in the Oak To operation, according to the after action report of the battle. 

Due to inaccessibility of some areas by road movement and also the 

requirement for immediate communications it was necessary to airlift the 

AN/ MRC-5'H, on four different occasions. The first was when the 1st 

Brigade, Ist Air Cav located a T AC CP at Polei Kleng. From there it was air· lifted to the lst Brigade, 1st Air Cav Div, CP when they displaced to the Oak 

To area . When they were released from Div OPCON and the l!l2th Air Cay 

Squadron relocated in the vicinity of Plei Mrong it was again airlifted by 

chopper and the last time was back to Oak To Airfield when the 175d Abn 

Brigade assumed OPGON of the l!l 2th Cav. This extreme flex ibility of 

movement for 12 channel VHF communications equipment provro once 

again to be an invaluable assist to this Divisio .... . 

In 1968 the Nestor program , which included a group of speech 

security apparatus- K Y -8 and K Y -38 ground equipment and KY28 airborne equipment- for FM radios, was introduced . The use of 

this new equipment was limited at first ; however. more command 

emphasis cou pled with attempts to procure missing and desired items 

increased iLS use to approximately 85 percent as of June 1970 . The 

H YL- 3 Regenerative Repeater was introduced to meet the need for 

secure retransmission. Over-all, secure voice equipment was an in no· 

vation of major importance. 

In 1969 a durable , easy·to·use, low·level. numeral. authentication 

code, the Circe wheel code, patterned after an Air Force wheel cod e, 

was designed to replace the existing low-level codes (KAC-Q). The 

KAC-Qcodes had been bulky, easily torn, and time-consuming and , 

consequently, had promoted the use of unauthorized codes. Field 

testS of the Circe wheel code by the 23d Infantry Division (America I) 

and 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division , revealed that the new code 
86 TACTICAL AND MATERI EL I~NOVATIONS 

was easier to operate and more durable and that it discouraged the 

use of unauthorized codes. 

The baule for Dak To was a logistician's nightmare. The helicopters supporting the operation consumed 863,190 gallons of JP4 fuel 

and 32,550 gallons of aviation gasoline and used an enormous quantity of ammunition. To sustain this effort. rcarm and refuel points 

were established at Dak To. Kontum . Camp Enari, and Camp Holloway. In the early days of the war, civilian trucks traveled through 

enemy tcrriLOry to the forward area of operations where the helicopters were refueled. As the war intensified, this method proved unreliable and inadequate . Experience indicated the need for forward 

suppOrt bases for the rearming and refueling of helicopters. Operations in areas remote from the base camp stood a much better chance 

of success if the round-trip time of the helicopters could be reduced. 

Beginning in January 1966. aviation battalions made good use of 

Vietnam airfields as logistic bases of operations. This practice placed 

almost any area of operations within a 25- to 30-nautica l-mil e radius 

of an airfield. Each refuel and rearm sta tion was already stocked with 

the proper munitions, petroleum products. and equipment. Using 

these stockpiles, the un its were able to respond quickly to previously 

planned and quick-reac tion -type operations. 

Refueling was accomplished using either 500-ga llon bladders or 

55-gallon drums and portable pumping equipment . By placing the 

500-gallon bladders in line . an entire flight element could refuel in 

minutes without shutting down. From 1966 through 1968 several 

equipmem changes were prompted b y the need to increase the ability 

of aviation units supporting tactical operations to refuel rapidly. By 

spring of 1967, avia tion units could refuel at a rate of 350 gallons per 

minute. This system simultaneously refueled twelve UH- I aircraft 

within four to six minutes a nd reduced the average refueling time for 

the CH-47 by at least ten minutes. One aviation unit reported success with this system using two 10,000-ga llon bladders. one 350 -

gallons-per-minute pump. and a 4-inch manifold with twelve UH-l 

and four CH-47 refueling points. 

At Oak To there were six 10 .000-gallon bladders (two for the CH47 and four for the UH- I) set up in two JP4 refueling areas. All avia -

tion gas was d ispensed from 5 ,000 -ga llon trailers_ The neoprene bladders with 350-gallons-per-minute pumps and filter-separators were 

vital elements in the suppOrt of combat aircraft. 

The refueling and rearming time for gunships could be conside rably reduced by keeping small quantities of ammunition at refueling 

points. Therefore. ammunition was assembled and prepared at one 

location and tra nsported to the rearming area by ~ -ton trucks. 

Waste and packing materials were not b rought near the a ircraft 

because of the danger to rotor bl ades. The size of [he ~ -ton truck al-
OAK TO 87 

lowed it to move close enough so that the ammunition could be loaded 

directly onto the hel ico pter, th us elim inating one handling step . 

When properly loaded , a ~ -ton truck could ca rry enough ammunition to reann several helicopters. 

Route 14 , the main ground supply route that ran from Pleiku 

through Konturn to Oak To , passed through many miles of dense 

growth that grew to with in ten feet of the road. This grow t~ provided 

cove r and concealment from which the enemy could amb ush a supply 

column . Early in Operation MACARTHUR the engineers were ca lled on 

to clear the area on e ither side of the road. A unique aspect of land 

dearing in support of tactical opera ti ons lay in the amount - in some 

cases, thousands of acres. The problem was to find equipment that 

would be both speedy and efficient. 

During 1966 and 1967 several methods of land clearing were used. 

The King Ranch concept - developed on King Ranch property in 

Australia - consisted of dragging a he avy length of chain (at least fifty 

pounds per foot) strung between two tractors. For large trees or rocky 

soil. a steel ball fourteen feet in diameter was placed at the middle of 

the chain. The technique was found to be especially effective over 

non rocky terrain with small-to-medium-diameter trees having 

shallow roots, but not over land with grasses and light shrubs. The Ist 

Infantry Division used the King Ran ch concept to clea r 1,500 trees in 

fo ur hours. Tests eventually revealed. howeve r, that the division's 07 

tractors were too sma ll to pull the anchor chain efficienliy. Since very 

few larger tractors were used in Vietnam , the tec hnique had only 

limited use . 

Another land clearing device, the transphibian tactica l crusher. 

was tested during mid-1967. This massive 97 -ton ma chine used a 

pusher bar against large trees and cl ea ted drums to chop up felled 

trees and small vegetation. During testing. trees forty to forty-eight 

inches in diameter proved to be no obstacle to the c rusher. Two 

crushers were initially used to clear 2.083 acres in the vicinity of Long 

Sinh and then assigned to the 93d Engineer Battalion (Construction) 

for use in a tactical environment near the Binh Son Rubber Plantation , thirty-five miles sou theast of Sa igon . Approximately 1,300 acres 

were cleared in support of the 9th Infantry Division. but the crushers 

suffered an inordinate amount of lime under re pair. Therefore, after 

the testing was completed , no additiona l crushers were procured. 

The equipment that finally fi lled the need for a rapid, efficient 

land clearing device was the Rome K/ G Clearing Blade - better 

known as the Rome plow . It consisted of a tractor attachment with a 

blade that "Slung" and "sliced" large trees. A sharp projection on the 

left side of the blade split the trees, while the ctltling edge .shea red 

them off at ground level. The a ttachment came in two sizes: a 4,600-

pound blade tha t fit the Allis Chalmers HO- 16M and Caterpillar 
88 TACTI C AL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

B Uu..ooZ£RS WITH R OME P 1.qWS CLEAJlTUNCLE GROWTH whil~ m~chanitt!d 

infantry stands guard. 

D7E, and smaller 4,QOQ-pound blade used on the airmobile D6B Iractor. In la te 1966 four Rome plow bl ades were tested in the 20th Engineer Brigade. They efficiently clea red all vegetation where the soil 

could support the tractor. 

Seventy Rome plow blades were procured for combat engineer 

units. Although the original purpose of the plow was to clear jungle 

base areas, it was only a short lime before many other uses were 

found . For example. this land clea ring equipmem provided a quick 

way to clear fields of fire around base camps and fire support bases 

and to construct helicopter landing zones and night defensive posilions. The clearing of all vegetation from within 100 to 200 meters of 

roads significantly reduced the very serious p roblem of enemy 

ambush . 

Before August 1967 , Route 13 north of Lai Khe was completely 

controlled by the Viet Congo Field positions and o utposts in the no rth -

ern section of the area depended on aerial resupply, and only rarely 

did a convoy chance running the road . Occasionally, when this section of Route 13 was o pened to suppOrt an operation or to resupply 

Quan Loi or Lac Ninh , extensive engineer efforts and large security 
DAK TO 89 

forces were required. Radio Hanoi boasted that this road would neve r 

again be used for South Viewamese and American traffic. To meet 

this challenge and to deny cover and concealment to the enemy, a 

combat engineer battalion used six bulldozers equipped with land 

clearing blades and heavy steel cabs for the operators' protection. 

Working with annored securit y forces, the bulldozers peeled back the 

jungle 200 meters on both sides of Route 13. Concurrently engineer 

work parties repaired culverts, craters. and bridges in an extensive ef· 

fo n to improve this rOUle for division traffic . On I November 1967 , 

during Operation Sm:NANooAH II. Route QL 13 was opened for reo 

supply convoys. 

Initially. an enormous amount of manpower was required to 

secure the road. This need tied down many un its of an infantry division and limited the number of battalions ava ilable for conducling 

other offensive operations. Aga in the bulldozers with land clearing 

blades solved the problem by cutting ni ght defensive positions having 

wide fields of fi re at 4- to 5-kilometer interva ls along the road . These 

positions were then fortified with enough troops and equipment to 

sweep and secure the road each day. Early in 1968 the bulldozers 

pushed back the jungle an additional 200 meters on each side of 

Route QL 13, thus reduci ng night defensive positions by 50 percent. 

The first major combat support clea ri ng operation was conducted 

in lhe Iron Triangle area during Opera ti ons NIAGARA FALl.!; and 

CEDAR FALl.!;, when 3,000 acres were cleared. During Operation PAUL 

BUNYAN, the 168th Engineer Battalion cleared over 14 ,000 acres in 

suppon of the 1st Infantry Division. 

The land clearing organization grew from a few isolated tractors 

to a battalion·size operation. In mid-1967 three land clearing teams. 

composed of thirty Rome plow blades, mounted on D7E tractors, a nd 

sixty-fou r men , were aClivated and a ttached to the 27 th , 86th , a nd 

35th Engineer Battali ons. Their success led to the formation of six 

land clearing companies. Finally. the 62d Engineer Battalion (Construction) was reorgan ized and equipped as a land clearing battalion. 

By October 1969 the enginee rs had clea red 388,852 acres. 

Since the beginning of land clea ring operations, enemy sanc tu -

aries, base camps. and infiltration routes have been exposed, and the 

enemy has been separated from local suppl y sources and tax·collec· 

tion points. Land clea red by Rome plows has been immediately available fo r farming and resettling. particularly along the major lines of 

communication . Wood for cooking and heating has been easily ob· 

tainable. and a potential exists for the development of lumber 

production . 

Defoliation operations a lso deprived the enemy of his hiding 

places. Allhough they later became the cente r of much con troversy, 

herbicides were imponant tactical weapons. Defoli ation and crop de· 
90 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

strUClion we re first tested as counterinsurgency measures in 1961 as a 

part of Project ACILE, a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese develo pment 

program. Chemica l spray tests were made by the Vietnamese Air 

Force with experimental dissemination devices and off-the-shelf commercial herbicides. Despite the serious limitations of the components, 

the results demonstrated clearly th at available growth-regulator and 

desiccant chemicals were ca pable of defoliating tropical forests and 

destroying enemy food crops. The first U.S. Air Force C- 123/ MC- l 

(Hourglass) spray system , along with herbicide agents Purple and 

Blue, reached Vie tnam in 1962 , and Operation RANCH HAND was 

initiated to conduct defoliation and anticrop operations. 

By the time o f the U.S. buildup in 1965-1966, the two agents most 

commonly used in RANCH HAND were Blue and Orange, so named for 

the color markings on the containers in which the herbicides were 

shipped. Orange is a mixture of twO relatively common herbicides (2 , 

4- 0 and 2, 4 . 5-T) and is classified as a systemic herbicide. As such 

it is absorbed into the plant from the point of application . Once 

inside the plant'S system , Orange interfe res with the growth processes. 

such as photosynthesis, and eventually kills the plant if the dose is 

adequate. Blue is a desiccant . contact herbicide that damages plant 

tissue at the point where it is applied. Desiccants are drying agents 

that will cause leaves to drop off but will not necessa rily kill the pl ant 

itself. In Vietnam new foliage may grow back within thirty to ninety 

days after applying Blue. 

The rather complicated procedures and safeguards governing ap· 

proval for operational use of herbicides in South Vietnam were set 

forth in MACV Directive 525-1. The use of herbicides for defoliation 

and crop destruction was primarily an operation of the government of 

South Vietnam , supported by U.S. assets and expertise. Under policy 

guidance established by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. 

the Comma nder. U.S. Military Assista nce Command . Vietnam . and 

the U.S. Ambassado r were empowered jointly to authorize U.S. supjXlrt of the South Vietnamese government's requests for herbicide operations. General co·ordinuion of the program a nd guidance was the 

responsibility o f the Chemical Operations Division of MACV's J-3 

(Operations Directo ra te). 

All requestS for fixed .wing airc ra ft defoliation and for fixed·wing. 

helicopter. and ground spray crop destruction originated a t the dis· 

triCt o r province level. These req uests were processed through ARVN 

division and corps tactical zones to the Joint General Staff of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces. Simultaneously. U.S. commanders 

a nd advisers involved in the projec t were submitting their views 

through channels to MACV's J-3. Requests approved by the Viet· 

namese Joi nt Genera l Staff in their 203 Committee were the n passed 

to the chemical operation division of MACV'sJ- 3, where the approved 
DAK TO 91 

project was consolidated with the position of the U.S. commanders 

and adv isers before being submitted to the U.S. 203 Committee. This 

commillee consisted of rep resentatives from MACV's J-3, J-2, and 

Psychologica l O perations section and from Operation RANCH HAND, 

Civil Operations and Revolutiona ry Development Support (CORDS), 

U.S. Agency for Imemational Development (USAlD), j oint U.S. 

Public Affa irs Office OUSPAO), and the American Embassy. After 

reviewing each project. as well as necessary U.S. suppOrt, the U.S. 203 

Comminee forwarded its recommendation to the MACV command -

er and the U.S. Ambassador for consideration. If they approved t he 

project for support, the j oim Cenel al Sta ff was notifi ed. and a coordination meeting was held in the ca pita l of the province concerned. 

The province chief who sponsored the meeting was joined by the U.S. 

province and corps advisers, MACV's Chemical Operations Division 

action officer. j oi nt Gene ral Staff represematives. and RANC H HAND 

personnel. Final deta ils and changes in previous requests were made, 

and special conditions required during spray operations were estab· 

lished. T he Joint Gene ra l Staff then published an operation o rder for 

the project and established target priorities. They requested that U.S. 

support be provided on order. Details of the co-ordination of U.S. 

su ppOrt were provided by the Chemical Operations Division to t he 

commander of the Sevemh Air Force and to the 12th Special Operations Squadron. A final opportunity was given to the province chief to 

cancel the mission lwcmy·four to forty-eight hours before the individual mission was executed. 

U.S. and Vietnamese corps commanders jointly were authorized 

to carry out helicopter defoliation opera tions approved by t he 

province chief and the U.S. senior adviser. These operations were 

conducted to support local base defense , to maint ain Rome-plowed 

areas, and to clear known ambush sites a long lines of communicatio n . 

Vietnamese corps commanders and t heir U.S. senior advisers could 

approve requests for defoliation with ground-based equi pment. 

During the battle for Dak To. the 2d Battalion. 503d Infantry, of 

the 173d Airborne Brigade , established a fire suPPOrt base in an area 

of dense vegeta tion. The brigade's chemical section conducted three 

defoliation missions close to the fire suppOrt base in an attempt to 

deprive the enemy of cover for ground or standoff attacks. The 

defoliation of allied basc pe rimetcrs was usua lly carried ou t by 

ground or helicopter spray. The spraying had to be increased during 

thegTowingseason. Because of the 400'ga llon metal tank in the CH47 and the use of pressurized bottles to refill the tanks in flight, 700 to 

800 gallons of defoliant could be delivered in a single sortie. 

Defoliation along the lines of communication, with emphasis on 

ambush sites and tax· collecting points, was quite effective in opening 

these areas and improving aerial observation. On two occasions df" 
92 TACTIC AL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

foliation operations reportedly disrupted Viet Cong ambushes by 

forcing the enemy to move out of the area as soon as it had been 

sprayed. The defoliation of infiltration routes greatly inhibited the 

enemy's movement during the daylight hours, because he feared detection from the air. On several occasions defoli ation forced unplanned moves because it affecled the protective tree foliage within six 

hours. The spraying of herbicides on enemy base areas kept the Viet 

Cong and North Vietnamese Army on the move and forced them to 

avoid defoliated areas for fear of detection. 

The destruction of crops intended for the enemy was another significant accompli ~hment of the herbicide operations. This type of operation had, in some instances, forced the enemy to divert tactical 

units from combat missions to food procurement tasks. The resulting 

food shortages among enemy ranks prompted some defections. Defoliation accounted for approximate ly 90 percent of the herbicide 

effort in Vietnam. The remaining 10 percent was devoted to crop destruction. 

In J anuary 1968, a Herb icide Review Committee was established 

at the direction of U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to conduct a 

comprehensive review of each aspect of the U.S.-South Vietnamese 

herbicide program. Subcommittees were organized to study defolia -

tion and crop destruction. 

In its findings, the defoliation subcommittee "recognized the mili· 

tary worth of defoliation beyond any doubt." The progTam was im· 

portant in denying the enemy cover in heavily forested areas such as 

War Zones C and D and in Boi Loi Woods. It also increased the security of all allied forces by eliminating foliage around base camps and 

at likely ambush sites along water and land routes of communication. 

Captured Viet Cong and Ghieu o~ who were questioned about the 

effects of defoliation admitted that their units often avoided crossing 

defoliated areas and would not camp in them. One soldier indicated 

that his unit had been prevented from occupying ambush sites along a 

canal because of defoliation operations. 

The subcommittee made note of the economic and psychological 

costs of the program by calling attention to the possible loss of valuable stands of timber in War Zones C and D which would be unavoid· 

able unless salvage operations were begun within two years. It also exprcssed concern over the success of the Viet Cong in promoting 

propaganda about the program which reflected adversely on U.S. 

motives and actions. The committee called for improved operational 

and program controls to minimize the effect of herbicide drift on 

crops near target areas. 

The subcommittce on crop destruction found that sllch opera -

tions had been successful in weakening enemy strength and in deny -

ing food to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Anny military units. 
OAK TO 93 

RESULT OF DEFOUATION OPERATIONS along canal and secondary road. 

In some cases when food crops were destroyed, civilians who were sup· 

porting the communists were compelled to seek refuge in areas con· 

trolled by the government of South Vietnam, thereby depriving the 

enemy of labor as well as food. Communist military forces were then 

compell ed to raise their own crops which detracted from their opera· 

tional mission. Food·growing detachments were forced 10 work 

harder, and the results wcre poor. Frequently, su bsistence had to be 

obtained elsewhere to sustain an additional burden to the already 

strained communist transportation systcm . 

However, evidence a lso indicated that since the civilian popula· 

tion in Viet Cong-controlled areas inevitably bore the brunt of crop 

destruction operations, considerable adverse political and psychologi· 

cal COStS were incurred. The subcommillee called attention to the fact 

that the use of herbicides was only part of the total food denial 

program. Consequently, if crops were destroyed while other sources of 

food remained available. then the program was less effective. The 

commiltee found that past food control and denial activities had not 

been sufficiently co·ordinated at mission level and, therefore. had not 

realized their full potential. 

As a result of the committee's findings and conclusiON , the de· 

foliation and crop dcstruction programs were continued , but tighter 

control measures were imposed. 

By the end of 1968, the most intensive defoliation efforts had been 

made in the infamous Rung Sat Special Zone. which surrounded the 
TA CTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

shipping channel into Saigon and in War Zones C and D. A survey of 

these areas was conducted in March and April 1968 by Fred H. Tchir· 

ley, an expert in the Agricultural Research Division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He concluded at the time that the defolia -

tion program, especially in the areas of intense treatment, had caused 

ecological changes. He did not feel that such changes were irreversi ble but, as he said, ". . recovery may take a long time .... " For 

example. regeneration of the mangrove forests in the Rung Sat was 

estimated to require about twenty years. Mr. T chirley made no pre· 

diction on the semi deciduous forests, such as those found in War 

Zones C and D. He sa id: 

A single treatment on semideciduous forest would cause inconsequential 

change. Repeated treatments will result in invasion of many sites by bam- boo .... The time scale of regeneration of semideciduous forest is unknown. 

Available information is so scanty that a prediction would have no validity 

and certainly no real meaning. Most of the defoliation treatments in semideciduous forests have been made along lines of communication. The ecol- ogical effect of defoliation in those areas would not be as severe as in areas 

where large blocks have been trea ted . 

In April 1970 , the Department of Defense ordered a temporary 

ban on the usc of agent Orange . This restriction resulted in a corresponding decrease in the number of defoliation missions nown , and by 

July 1970 all defoliation missions by fixed·wing aircraft were halted. 

Crop destruction missions, although never flown in the rice· producing 

delta . were also severely curtailed and then stopped completely a 

short time later. 

There were a number of articles in scientific magazines in 1969 

and 1970 that criticized the U.S. government's herbicide program in 

Vietnam. The Herbicide Assessment Commission of the American 

Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) made a fiveweek inspection tour of Vietnam in the summer of 1970. The commission , headed by Harvard biologist Matthew S. Meselson . asserted that 

the spraying program had caused "extremely serious harm" (0 the 

land and to "some of the peoples of the war-torn country." In addition to condemning the destruction of the mangrove and hardwood 

forests, Mesclson's group charged that the crop destruction effort was 

a fai lure and that spraying may have been responsible for a high 

number of stillbirths and birth defects among the Viemamese in 1967 

and 1968. The commission did stress that "neither effect could safely 

be attributed to the impact of herbicides." It felt that further studies 

were necessary to determine the cause of medical phenomenon in 

children born of women who lived in heavily sprayed areas. Meselson 

indicated that the focus for future action "should be shifted away 

from assessing harm and toward finding ways to repair the damage 

done." 

A number of ot her articles had been written which seemed to 
I)i\K 1'0 95 

imply that Indochina had been totally destroyed by herbicides and 

that all spraying was done without plan or purpose. The AAAS com -

mission found that there was a "spectrum of opinion" on the military 

usefulness of the program but did not discuss the improved security 

for civil ians and allied forces along lines of communications after 

spraying operations. 

In October 1970 , Congress passed a bill which became Public Law 

91 -441 . One provision of this law directed the Secretary of Defense to 

" . . enter into appropriate arrangements with the National 

Academy of Sciences to conduct a comprehensive study and investiga· 

tion to determine (a) the ecological and physiological dangers inherent in the use of herbicides. and (b) the ecologica l and physiological 

effects of the defoliation program carried out by the Department of 

Defense in South Vietnam .... " The National Academy of Sciences 

(NAS) report was to be completed by 51 January 1972 and fo rwarded 

to the President and the Congress "with such comments and recom -

mendations as . .. appropriate" by 1 March 1972. Umil the findings 

of the academy are made public. and perhaps even afterward . speculation about the detrimental effects of herbicides in Viemam will 

probably continue to be debated. Vi em am has certainly not been 

destroyed, as some critics claim. and many U.S. soldiers are a live 

today because of the defoliation of ambush sites and the uncovering 

of enemy base areas. 

In addition to taking away the enemy's hiding places, U.S. forces 

developed methods to conceal their own opera tions. In ea rly 1966 a 

method was developed to dispense smoke from a low·flying helico pte r 

so that a ll or part of a landing zone could be obscured from the enemy's view to protect landing helicopters. The first system uscd a UHIC "Hog" gunship with its M3 rocket system mounted backwards. 

Smoke grenade canisters were inserted into the rocket launcher tubes 

and ejected to the rear as the aircraft flew at a slow speed and close to 

the ground . This method proved to be satisfactOry if the landing zone 

was not inundated. 

The integra l smoke generator. XM - 52, was designed to produce a 

dense cloud of smoke by injecting atOmized fog oil into the hot exhaust gases of the tu rbine engine of the UH- I . The oil was immediately vaporized. and smoke billowed to the rear. One 60-gallon tank 

or two 55·gal1on bladders were used: the bladders provided eight 

minutes of smoke. The smoke generatOr proved to be so successful 

that a contract was awarded for the manufacture of 121 systems. In 

addition to its use in landing zones during combat assaults. smoke 

could be dispensed along a flight route to screen helicopter move -

ment , in landing zones during medical evacuations, and in unused 

landing zones as a diversionary tactic . 

The battle for Oak To nas been characterized as one of the longest 
96 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

continuous bat lies fought by the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Contributing to the defeat of expert North Vietnamese Anny units were U.S. 

superiority in the command and control of units, close and timely 

logistic support , the removal of enemy hiding places, and the imaginative use of new techniques and weapons. 
CHA PTER V III 

Fire Support Base CROOK 

(June 1969) 

Fire Support Surveillance Base FLOYD 

(August 1970) 

A major innovation of the Viet nam War was the firc support base. 

Because there were no well -defined battle lines, fire support of maneuver units could not always be accomplished from secure, behind· 

the-line positions or from major base areas. Often . positions had to be 

secured in enemy-dominated territory. 

By la te 1966 the usual procedure was to establish fire support 

bases containing headquarters elements. medical facilities. a nd other 

support acti vities, as we ll as supporting light , medium, a nd som etimes heavy artillery. Setting up such bases became the routine opening phase of searc h operations. Fo r example, the beginning of OperationJUNCTION CITY, 22 February- 14 May 1967, included a drive by 

the 1st Infantry Division to open a road northward through War Zone 

C for the purpose of establishing fire support bases from which the 

maneuver battalions would operate and receive their artillery suPPOrt. 

These early bases were often attacked by North Vietnamese Army 

and Viet Cong forces. as they made idea l targets for enemy offensive 

actions. Eventually. because of the enemy's inclination to attack such 

install ations. fire support bases were established for the express pur· 

pose of decoying the enemy. In these instances, sophisticated target 

detection means including radar. sensor devices. and infr ared night 

sighting devices were used to give warning of the enemy's app roach. 

This combination proved to be eminently successful . and large num· 

bers of attacking enemy forces wen: destroyed in severa l such battles 

at little cost in friendly casualties. The decoy concept was further ex· 

panded to include the deployment of fire support bases to facilitate 

screening of suspected major enemy avenues of approat!h. This tecl)· 

nique was employed extensively by the 25th Infantry Division during 

the later stages of its tenure in Vietnam. 
98 TACTICAl. A ND MATt:RI~ L I NNOVATIONS 

F1RE SUPPORT B ASE CROOK, JUli e 1969. 

The action of 5-8 June 1969 at Fire Support Base CROOK in Tay 

Ninh Province was a classic example of "offensive fire support base" 

techniques. Approximately fourteen kilometers to the northwest of 

Tay Ninh city lay a favo rite enemy infiltration route . Close to the 

Cambodian border, the area was a majo r artery for enemy troops a nd 

supplies movi ng back and forth between War Zone C in the cast and 

Cambodia in the west. In April 1969 , Fire Support Base CROOK was 

esta blished to prevent enemy movement a long this route and to provide support for offensive operations in the vicinity. The plan 

assumed tha t the enemy would no t be able to resist an attempt to 

knock out the isolated POSl. 

Terrain surrounding the fire SU ppOTt base was flat and gene ra lly 

forested. To the east lay the triple ·ca nopy jungle of War Zone C: to 

the southwest a nd west were abando ned rice paddies. while north of 

the base was scattered double-canopy jungle . Although observation 

and fields of fire were limited to 200 meters on the east, they ranged 

out to as much as 1,000 meters over the abandoned rice paddies. 
SH (.ROOK ANI) FS~U FLOYD 99 

Positioned inside the base was a sma ll force of the 25 th Infantry 

Division, consisti ng of Company B, 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry: Bat · 

tery A. 7th Batta lion , 11th Artillery, with six 105·mm. howitzers: 

and elements of the mortar, communications, and medical pl alOo ns 

of the 3d Batt a lion, 22d Infan try. U.S. planners hoped that the e ne· 

my would see Fire SuppOrt Base CROOK as an attractive prospect for 

one of their carefull y planned night attacks. Though physica lly iso· 

lated, the base was far from alone. Supporting fire from artillery at 

other locations as we ll as from gunships and tactical ai r clements was 

arranged around the fire support base perimeter. Early warning was 

provided for by all availab le means, including the latest eq uipmelll 

such as sensors. radars, starlight scopes, and patrolling helicopters 

mounting xenon searchlights. 

Preparation of the area surro unding Fire Support Base CROOK was 

extensive. Bulldozers cleared fie lds of fire , but isolated patches of 

concea lment were deliberately left to attract North Vietnamese Anny 

reconna issance parties and observers. These patches we re placed so 

that radar was ab le to cover them exactly, and direct 105·mm. how· 

itzer fire was ready to destroy anyone using them. There were concen· 

tric circles, resembling race tracks, cut a t 100- 150 meters and 300 

meters beyond the fighting positions. These circles were to deny the 

enemy's rocket propelled grenade gun ners ideal fi ring positions a nd 

to increase the effectiveness of U.S . supporting fi re . From the air, ob· 

servers used the circles as a ra nge scale. reducing the chance of error 

and providing common frames of reference between the observers 

and the defenders. 

The sit uatio n at Fire Support Base CROOK remained relatively 

quiet until the evening of June 5, when the seismic sensors picked up 

heavy enemy activity less than one kilometer to the northwest. In ad· 

dition. radar detected small groups moving in the wood lines around 

the base. Artillery was fired at these areas and. as apprehension of an 

impending attack grew. the officer in command , Major Joseph E. 

Hacia , execu tive officer of the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, orde red 

interdicting fire from supporting artillery on trails, road junctions. 

and li kely assemb ly areas. Despite the a rtillery fire, enemy activ ity 

continued , and by midevening. Major Hacia had ordered a 100· 

percent a lert. At 0255 hours, a barrage by 107 ·mm . and 122·mm. 

rockets, 75·mm . recoilless rifles, rocket propelled grenades, and 60· 

mm . and 82 ·mm . mortar fire was direc ted at the base. Fortunately. 

most of the rocket fire went over the base , but mortar rounds hit in 

and around the perimeter, killing one U.S. soldier. Otherwise, 

damage was slight. 

Co·ordina ted with the attack by fire . the enemy launched a bat· 

ta lion·size ground attack from the south and west, which was met by a 

heavy volume of grazing fire from the defenders. The artillery battery 
100 TACTI C Al.. AND MATERIEL I NNOVATIONS 

within the base went into action with a dose fire support technique 

referred to as "killer junior." This technique provided Iigh.t artillery 

fire to a depth of 150 to 200 meters around the base , while medium 

and heavy supporting artillery hit suspected enemy positions 

throughout the area. On the perimeter, a sixteen-man enemy force 

did succeed in breaking through the wire with bangalore torpedoes, 

but it was stopped by riflemen in the bunkers. 

By 0400 hours. the full gamut of air support. including tactical air 

fighters and gunships of all kinds, went into action over the battle 

area, hitling suspected enemy rocket and mortar positions and 

covering all the open areas around the base with fire. Some fifteen 

enemy .51 -caliber antiaircraft machine guns were reported in action, 

but they were suppressed by the gunships. 

Wilting under the heavy supporting fire, the enemy withdrew into 

the jungle, and by 0530 the base was receiving onl y light , sporadic 

fire . Tactical air and artillery fire continued to pound away at the 

withdrawing enemy. in an effort to restrict his movement and inflict 

additional casualties. At first light, B Company moved out of the base 

on a sweep which uncovered seventy-six enemy bodies and fifteen 

small arms, plus a variety of ammunition, documents, and extrane· 

ous gear. 

The next evening enemy activity resumed in almost the same pattern, First, the seismic sensor equipment and radars picked up heavy 

movement, this time to the northwest and cast of the base; then 

radars began detecting three - to five -man groups moving in the wood 

lines. All return fire was made with artillery and mortars. including 

the base's artillery battery. which engaged in direct fire. Although all 

detectable movement had ceased by 0100 hours. the anillery con· 

tinued firing "killer junior. " 

At 0200 hours, a Nighthawk helicopter with a xenon searchlight 

spotted large groups of enemy troops moving toward the base along 

the road from the east. Shortly after the artillery shifted and began 

pounding these new targets, the base was hit with intense enemy preparatory fire followed by simultaneous ground attacks by battalionsize forces from the northeast and northwest. Again the base suffered 

minimal damage. and only three men were wounded. 

Army and Air Force gunships. including the Nighthawk helicop· 

ter and AC- 11 9 and AC-47 fixed -wing aircraft , engaged the attacking enemy forces under illumination to the northeast and northwest. 

Additional helicopter gunships suppressed the enemy's .51 -caliber 

antiaircraft guns firing from the west. Available artillery and mortar 

fire engaged the enemy's supporting positions to the east and south. 

All this firing . along with intense small arms, automalic weapons. 

and direct artillery fire from the base itself. wreaked havoc with the 

attacking enemy battalions. 
FSB CROOK AND FSSB FLOYD 101 

Despite the volume of defensive fire, the northwestern attacking 

battalion succeeded in breaching the ou ter wire before it was stopped . 

However, the northeastern assault was stopped short of the wire. Most 

of the attack ing fo rce we re trapped a nd cut down in the open as they 

attem pted to withdraw, and by 0530 enemy troops that were able to 

do so had retreated into the jungle. A sweep of the area on the morning of the third day, 7 June, yielded 323 enemy bodies, \0 prisoners, 

and over 40 weapons, including two machine guns and two mort ars, 

plus a large quan tity of documents, ammunition , and equipment. 

The following evening the base received li ght small anns and mortar 

fire . which caused no casualties. There was no ground attack. In 

general, this last attack seemed little mo re than a parting gesture 

from the badly beaten 272d Viet Cong Regiment. 

A total disaster for the enemy, Fire Support Base CROOK was 

another example of the ability to defeat the North Vietnamese Army 

and Viet Cong during one of their classic offensive operations. The 

battle demonstrated the rapid building ofa fire base, the use of modern detection equipment, and the integration of the full spectrum of 

modern fire support techniques to achieve a decisive victory. 

Later in the Vietnam confli ct, anot her generation of fire support 

bases was developed. Fire Su pport Surveilla nce Base FLOYD was con· 

ceived by the 173d Airborne Brigade as a total interdiction base 

covering an entire va lley floor. The base properly integrated sensors, 

radar, and other target acquisition means with the system of direct 

and indirect fire sup pOrt. Fire base facilities were o rganized to enable 

rapid reaction to confinned ta rgets and to provide adequ ate base 

defense. (Diagram 2) The nerve center of the base was the tactical 

operations center, in which radar and optical scopes and monitoring 

devices were loca ted. Insta lling the target acquisition means nearby 

insured rapid comparison of readouts and confinnation of targets. 

The mortar fire direction centers were also located in the tactica l operations ce nter in order to disseminate target information more efficiently to the indirect fire weapons. 

Successful implementation of th is fire base concept took place 

shortly before daylight on 29 August 1970. The 3d Battalion , 2d 

North Vietnamese Army Regiment , entered a valley in northern Sinh 

Dinh Province from the so uth and marched openly a long the road 

toward the area of Hoai An District, where they were to occupy 

mountain base camps and conduct operations against district for ces 

while replenishing their suppl y of rice . As the enemy column entered 

the valley, the sou thernmost sensor was activated. continuing for 

twenty minutes. A sweep by the PPS-5 radar confirmed that an 

enemy column was moving nort h in the valley. The decision was 

made to engage the rear of the column in the hope of getting a second 

try at its head. The rear was hit with mortar fire and, as hoped, the 
FSS9 FLOYD 

QUAD 50 

-t-

+ + 

X>,-

: x. [3] 

X 

X x:O =0 

X 

NAVY BINOCULARS --",,=--'X-'-' g! 

x )( 

:: D 

x 

B!MM MORTAR 

BIMM MORTAR " )( 

'f.. 

o i:: 

NOO ____ --'~,_~ D--< 

x x IT:J x 

x 

x x [}J 

x X (\ .2" MORT 

BUNKER ----..::.-~ \) X l< 

+ + n.JllL.l )( 

X )( X X 

FIGHTING POSITION ~ T + -\- X 

X" -/-" Xl( Xx 

-I- _~_ >( ).( X 

X -I- -;.. >( X 

'f.. i- ~- _ --L_ X 

X -J. --' -+ X 

CHOPPER PAO -----1-.:;- 'I- + -,- _. ~ _, " oJ "i- -+ -r ;;if!: : ~~ ri- ~ + 

+ .. -f. WIRE 

Diagram 2. Fire SuppOrt Surveillance Base FWYD layout , 29 August 1970. 
FSII CROOK AND FSSt~ FI.OYD 103 

remainder of the column marched on. The radar continued to track 

the enemy. and additional sensors became active. By this time night 

observation devices had picked up enemy activity. When the head of 

the column activated a sensor, it was hit by fi re from I 05·mm. 

howitzers. 4. 2·inch mortars, and 81·mm. mortars. After this barrage, 

the PPS-5 and night observation devices confirmed that the enemy 

was Oeeing to the west. Quad .50·caliber machine gun fire pursued 

the retreating enemy. and mortar fire blocked his escape to the west. 

Contact was not lost until the enemy left the killing zone. 

At first light, a reaction force from the 173d Airborne Brigade 

began a sweep o f the valley n oo r. Blood trails leading west into the 

high ground confirmed the accuracy of the barrages. The enemy had 

not been able to remove all of his dead and wounded. Reconnaissance 

forces found six dead enemy soldiers and one wounded, along with 

one AK-50, one 60·mm. mortar, and numerous pieces of individual 

equipment that had been discarded. On 3 September a wounded 

enemy soldier, captured in the mountains near the 506 Valley, con· 

firmed that the toll of dead and wounded had been great. 

The exact results of the action will probably never be known; 

however, because of the damage done. the 3d Battalion , 2d North 

Vietnamese Army Regiment, avoided signifi ca nt contact with allied 

forces for several months. The results were substantial conside ring 

there was no close contact between infamry units. 

Fire Support Su rveillance Base FLOYD represented an economy-of· 

force measure employing a target acquisition system and immediate 

fi re suPPOrt in an interdi ction mission. The terms "killer junior" and 

"killer senior" referred to direct fire defensive programs of the field 

arti llery. Both techniques were designed to defend fire bases against 

enemy ground attac k and used mechanical. time ·fuzed projectiles set 

to burst approximately thirty feet off the ground at ranges of 100 to 

1000 meters. The name "kille r junior" applied to lig ht and medium 

artille ry (I05·mm . and 155·mm .). while "killer sen ior" referred to the 

same system using eight ·inch howitzers. This technique proved more 

effective in many instances than direct fire with "beehive" ammuni · 

tion , because the enemy could avoid the beehive ammunition by lying 

prone or crawling. For example . in October 1967 during the battle of 

Xa Ca t , which involved an attack by several enemy battalions on the 

1st Infantry Division's Fire Base CAISSON VI , artill ery firing beehive 

ammunition had liule effect on attacking enemy troops, because they 

approached the perimeter by crawling. However. a switch to time· 

fuzed explosives stopped the advance. Another successful application 

of the "killer" technique was in clearing snipers from around base 

areas. 

In building Fire Support Base CROOK. many of the rapid construc· 

tion techniques which had been developed during the previous 
101 T,\CTlCl\1. ,\ND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

months. while positioning divisional patrol bases along the Cambodian border, were used. Construction usually started ea rly in the day 

and proceeded accord ing to the following steps. The exact position of 

lI1C fire support base was se lected and an engineer sta ke was driven at 

the center. A rope forty meters long was attached to the stake and 

stretched out from the center, forming the radius of the base and 

establishi ng the location of the bunker line . Next. an aiming circle 

was positioned at the center and a stake was driven at 0° to mark the 

location of the first bunker. Additional stakes were driven every 15 ° 

around the perimeter to mark the location of all twenty-four bunkers, 

which had been established as the ideal number for a rifle company. 

Another circle was marked seventy· five meters out from the bunker 

line , thus establishing the location of the defensive wire barrier. 

After the bunker positions had been marked, a standard package 

was dropped at each of the twenty· four stakes by a helicopter. This 

package contained one fifteen·pound, shaped demolition c harge; 

twO sheets of pierced steel planking; and a bundle of sa ndbags. The 

shaped charges were placed next to the engineer stakes. and the 

initial hole fo r the bunker was blown. A standard nine ·fool bunker 

was then built by using the pierced steel planking and sandbags and 

U} squaring up the blown crater. 

While the fighting bunkers were being constructed , bulldozers 

\\'erc busily digging holes for larger command and control bunkers 

insIde the perimeter. The berms were pushed up for artillery firing 

positiOn!> and later between the bunkers on the outer perimeter. The 

wir(, barri<"r was estaolished using one row of triple concertina wire. 

The area between the bunker line and the wire barrier was then laced 

with claymore mines. The fire support base was completed when a 

Chinook helicopter flew in with a fully assembled, twenty·foot obser· 

va tion tower. Time of co nstruction varied. but in eac h case the compan y defending the ba se was dug in with complete ove rhead cove r by 

nightfall of the first day. 

The fights at Fire Support Base CROOK and Fire Suppon Surveil · 

lance Base FLOYD demonstrated the successful integration of sensor 

devices to provide early warning and identification of enemy units. 

These devices were posit ioned either th rough the air o r by hand and 

could detect the movement of humans within a range of about 40 

meters and of vehicles within 300 meters. 

Other target acquisition devices used successfully at Fire SuppOrt 

Base CROOK and Fire Support Su rveill ance Base FLOYD were the 

ground surveillance radars and the night observation devices. The 

radar sets organic to division maneuver battalions were used primarily lO provide shon · and medium· range identification and location of 

enemy targets during periods of limited visibility. The AN / PPS-5 

radar had a maximum range of 5 kilometers and the AN/ PPS- 4 radar 
FS6 CROOK AND FSSB FLOYD 105 

AERIAL DEUVERED SEISMIC I NTRUSION DETECTOR 

had a 1.5·kilometer range for personnel detection. Both were used to 

protect the night defensive positions. Along with radar there were the 

night observation devices, either the older infrared lights or the newer 

starlight scopes. These scopes intensified the available light rather 

than emitting a light source of their own. The new sensors were of 

limited value in themselves, but when properly integrated into an 

over·a ll surveillance and target acquisition plan , as at Fire Support 

Base CROOK and Fire SuppOrt Surveillance Base FLOYD, they were 

most effective. 

A final innovation was the artillery ambush, a technique developed 

by the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, lst Cavalry Di vision Artillery. 

The ambush involved the covert planning of a homemade trip nare 

device with the trip wire running across the road. A fire unit was la id 

on this grid and fired on the flare signal. Two flares of different colors 

could be used to determine the direction of travel of the target unit. 

Later, with the arrival of the modern sensor devices, the technique 

was further refined. 

In conclusion, the unique employment of the fire support bases in 

Vietnam can be considered an innovation . The use of these bases to 
106 TAC TIC AL A N D MATERIEL INNOVATIO N S 

STARUGHT S COPE, RIFLE-Mour.'TED N IGHT OBSERVATION DEVICE 

invite enemy attacks, the pl acement at the bases, the tet:hniques of 

co-ordinating supporting fire , and the co-ordin ation of target acquisition means were prime examples of the integration of various methods and the use of ne ..... equipment to destroy the enemy. 
CHAPTER IX 

TamKy 

(March 1968) 

In early 1968, elements of the 23d Infantry Division (AmericaJ) 

fought a sharp. decisive battle near the village of Tam Ky in Quang 

Tin Province. This action demonstrates the use of armored cavalry in 

the Vietnam War. The cavalry role was expanded, particularly in 

conjunction with air scouts, and armored vehicle doctrine was modified to suit the Vietnam environment. 

A good example of the armored cava lry in Vietnam is the operation of the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. 23d Infantry Division. at Tam 

Ky. The squadron included three armored cavalry troops plus an air 

cavalry tTOOp. Troop C, 7th Squadron , 17th Cavalry. (This unit had 

just returned from an operation in the Pineapple Forest west of Tam 

Ky .) At the time. the division was using Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. 

"Mike" Cousland's cavalry squadron as a separate maneuver battalion 

under division control in his own area of operations against the 72d 

Local Force Battalion. the 70th Main Force Battalion, and the V-13 

and V - 15 Local Force Companies. On the evening of 3 March 1968, 

the squadron. Ininus two cavalry platoons. was at its base camp on 

Hawk Hill . The 1st Platoon of Troop A was on Hill 10, securing a sectOt of Route I; the 2d Platoon of Troop A was at Tam Ky. prepared 

to assist in the defense of the province headquarters. Earlier in the 

day, Captain Michael B. Prothero had assumed command of Troop 

C. Little did he reali ze that in less than twenty-four hours he would be 

commanding his troop and a rifle company against a Nonh Vietnamese Army regiment. 

Captain George R. Kaczor. the squadron's S-2 (officer in charge 

of the military intelligence section), was busily studying his intelligence reports. Major Wade E. Medbery, Jr., the S-3 (officer in 

charge of the operations and training section), had issued Colonel 

Causland's orders for the next day. In the tactical operations center, 

all was quiet with the exception of a n occasional periodic situation 

report. Suddenly the silence of the evening was broken by a loud explosion followed by a heavy bombardment offorty-five rounds of 122-
108 TAe) tCAI. AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

mm. roc kets and fifty rounds of mortar fire. Apparently the enemy 

was close by and in considerable strength. 

At first light the air cava lry discovered the rocket -firing positions 

on Hill 34 to the west of the base camp. The commanding general 

extended the cavalry's area of operations to the west and attached one 

company of infantry. The squadron was again to be committed as a 

maneuver battalion to eliminate the enemy force that had fired on it. 

Troop C was ordered to move to the west to link up with Company A, 

3d Battalion, 21st Infantry . About that time. fifteen North Vietnam· 

ese soldiers were sighted in bunkers. and the 5-3 requested an immediate air strike. At 0938 hours, Troop C started moving toward the 

area of contact as the air cavalry discovered more and more enemy 

positions. Some small arms fire was being received by the aircraft. 

and one Huey was hit but continued to ny. The forward air controller 

arrived on station and asked the air cavalry to mark the target area. 

Fighters completed the first air strike at 1100 hOUTS. 

The linkup of the infantry company and Troop C was completed 

shortly after noon. Colonel Cousland designated the cavalry troop's 

leader as the team commander and gave him o~rational control of 

the air cavalry in the area of contact. The enemy was defending from 

well -fortified positions. Throughout the afternoon the cava1ry-infantry team tested the enemy's positions, pulling back periodically to let 

the fighters strike. Finally, the North Vietnamese could take no more . 

As they began to withdraw, the last air strikes and the artillery took a 

heavy toll. 

At 1920 Troop C and Company A, 3d Battalion. 21st Infantry, 

moved to a night defensive position on Hill 34-the same hill from 

which the enemy rockets had been fired a few hours earlier. Hill 34 

was tri angular in shape. with rice paddies and streams on two of its 

three sides; it was an excellent defensive position . The field of fire 

over the rice paddies was well suited to the long-range. direct fire 

weapons on the tanks and armored cavalry assault vehicles. This 

position guarded the Phu Xuan River, a known enemy route, allowed 

observation of the enemy position, and prevented the enemy from 

using the same firing data against Hawk Hill as was used the previous 

night. 

Captain Prothero closed his units into the night location at 2012 

hours. It had been a hard day for the cavalrymen and infantrymen, 

but the task of preparing the night defense was vitally important. The 

men learned that they were dealing with the 3d Regiment of the 3d 

North Vietnamese Army Division. The enemy had originally intended 

to attack Hawk Hill , but Captain Prothero's force had thwarted his 

efforts. While Colonel Cousland and his staff planned the next day's 

operation . the troops started working on their defenses. The general 
TAM KY 109 

ARMORED CAVALRY ASSAULT VEHICLES WITH RPG SCREENS ON FRONT 

trace of the position resembled the old wagon train coils of the Indian 

wars on the American plains. 

The annored vehicl es themselves provided protection against the 

enemy's small arms and automatic weapons, but the men added a 

new device to protect the vehicles against the armor-piercing 840 

rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). It was ca lled the RPG screen. 

Nothing more than a section of "cyctone" fence. it caused a shapedcharge warhead to detonate before it hit the vehicle. Each crew set up 

a section of fence in front of its position. and the command clement in 

the center established a second screen around its vehicles. This simple 

expedient saved many veh icles and bunker positions. 

Fighting positions were built between each cava lry vehicle , and 

some of the M60 machine guns on the annored cavalry assault 

veh icles were d ismounted and positioned to provide gr a1. ing fire . Each 

vehicle carried three or four rolls of concertina barbed wire. The wire 

was strung as an outer barrier. Finally, four or five cl aymore mines 

were set up in front of each armored vehicte. Listening posts were sent 

out , and Team C waited for the enemy. 

Except for a few rounds which landed about 100 meters outside 

the perimeter at 2255 hours, the 3d North Vietnamese Army Regi -

ment let the team alone that night. During this lull . Colonel Causland 

ana lyzed his situation and prepared for the next day. He decided to 

send Troop C and Company A back into the area of contact in the 

morning and to attack the suspected enemy positions from the rear. 
110 TAC n CAL AND MATt; Rlt:L INNOVATIONS 

ARMORED P ERSONNEL CARRI ERS CLEAR T UE W AY AS I N f ANTRY FOt. LOWS wing 

vehicl~s for COueT. 

Two previously planned air strikes were made on the area sho rtly 

after first light , followed by an artillery preparation. After an aerial 

resupp ly of ammunition, the cavalry-infantry team moved out with 

air cavalry elements on either nank . At 1305 hours the team received 

small arms and automatic weapons fire at a range of fifty meters. 

This attack soon developed in to a heavy fight which lasted until 1830 

hours, when the unit wit hdrew to its nigh t defensive positions. 

On the third day Colonel Cousland committed Troop B: Troop 

C, Company A of the 3d Battalion , 21st Infantry; and the air cavalry 

troop. The battle lasted for several more days a nd resulted in 436 

North Vietnamese soldiers killed and many weapons captured . The 

3d North Viet namese Army Regiment ceased to exist as an errective 

figh til}g rorce . 

Much of the battle of Tam Ky was fought by the armored vehicles 

of the cavalry squadron. The M48 had been the standard medium 

tank since 1956, but its sister vehicle in the battle, the armored cavalry 
TAM KY 111 

assault vehicle, was modified specifically for the cavalry squadrons in 

Vietnam. The old machine gun "jeep" had lacked cross-country 

mobility and armor protection for the crew. Although the M I 14 had 

been used for a while as the scout vehicle , it was replaced with the 

much more reliable armored cavalry assault vehicle (ACAV). 

The ACA V was actually an M 113 personnel carrier modified by 

the addition of an armament subsystem. This "A" kit consisted of 

hatch armor, a shield for the commander's .50-ca liber machine gun , 

two elbow pintle mounts with gun shields for mounting M60 machine 

guns on both sides of the M 113 , and a removable pintle mount on the 

rear as an alternate mount for one of the M60's. The armored cavalry 

assault vehicle originated with the 11th Annored Cava lry, which 

equipped its M1 13's with the armament subsystems before arriving in 

Vietnam. The idea soon spread through all units in Vietnam. A "8" 

kit armament subsystem was also developed. It consisted of hatch 

armor and a shield fo r the commander's .50-caliber machine gun. 

This kit was used on the cavalry mortar carriers. 

One of the major innovations in the employment of armor in Viet· 

nam was the use of the M I 13 as a fighting veh icle. In addition to 

being used to transport troops to a baltle area, it was employed like a 

light tank, using the fire from mounted weapons to destroy the enemy 

in close combat. The infantrymen rode on or in the carrier until 

contact with the enemy was made , then they d ismounted. Carriers led 

the assaults, clearing paths through the underbrush as they went. In 

many cases, particularly in dense foliage and mine·infested terrain, 

the infantry troops did bener to remain mounted and assault the 

objective as the carriers detonated antipersonnel mines and booby 

traps. Most of the personnel carriers. which were used as assault vehicles, were modified as armored cavalry assault vehicles. This technique was discussed by Major General John J. Tolson. Ill , Commanding 

General. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). 

(The APC-s] didn't have the 90mm guns as did the tanks. but they had 

the APC's armor protection for the personnel. Their 50 cal.s. were still a 

great help in going into the fortified positions. Actually, on occasions. we 

used the APC pl atoons very similar to the tank platoons. 

The tanks which fought in the battle of Tam Ky in March 1968 

were M48A2's. Although their firepower, armor, and maneuverability endeared them to the tanker. their weight and bulk was often 

mo re than was needed. The M551 "General Sheridan" armored re -

connaissance airborne assault vehicle had been under development as 

"a lightweight armored vebicle to suPPOrt ground reconnaissance ." In 

mid-1969 it began to replace some of the tanks in the armored cavalry 

squadrons. 

The relatively large 152-mm. gun and launcher fired combusti blecase conventiona l ammunition. It could also fire the Shillelagh missile 
112 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL I NNOVATIONS 

but was not used for this purpose in Vietnam. The gun was ~uperior 

to the 90-mm. tank gun against both bunkers and personnel, and its 

canister round was excellent to open up bamboo thickets. A disadvantage of the M551 was its limited ability to "bust" through dense 

jungle. The main battle tank was greatly superior in this respect. 

In phasing in the General Sheridans. the 11 th Armored Cavalry 

was issued three Sheridans for two of the ACA V's in the reconnaissance platoon. Thus. the cavalry troop lost none of its jungle-busting 

ability and greatly increased its firepower. In the division's cavalry 

squadrons, however, tanks had been assigned to each cavalry platoon 

instead of to a separate tank troop. The Sheridan was substituted on a 

one-for-one basis for M48 tanks, resulting in a loss of jungle-busting 

ability. 

An excellent example of the Sheridan's fighting capabilities oc· 

curred on 11 March 1969, almost a year after the battle of Tam Ky, 

when Captain John W . Wells, III. moved Troop A, 3d Squadron, 4th 

Cavalry, into a night defensive position. He was located at a road 

junction west of the Ben Cui Rubber Plantation along a known enemy 

infiltration route. Judging from the results, the enemy did not realize 

the unit was there . All of the Sheridans in the perimeter were equipped 

with night observation devices. One of the crews detected a group of 

enemy troops in an open field , moving directly toward it. Captain 

Wells instructed the crew to hold its fire and load its canisters. He 

then moved to the Sheridan to observe the enemy movement person· 

ally. As the enemy came closer. the large number of radios indicated 

that this unit was the command group of a North Vietnamese battalion . 

When Captain Wells gave the order to fire , the first round eliminated the whole command group. Having lost its leadership, the 

enemy soldiers panicked and milled around in the area. In a few minutes the enemy lost forty -twO men killed in action and one prisoner of 

war as compared to twO U.S. soldiers wounded . This encounter 

demonstrated that the Sheridan was a significant combat weapon 

even during hours of darkness. 

Frequently, tanks from the division tank battalion were attached 

to the cavalry squadron when additional jungle-busting power was 

needed. Another solution to the problem was to attach one or two 

combat engineer vehicles (CEV), M728, to the squadron for certain 

operations. The need for a combat engineer vehicle first arose during 

World War Il in the hedgerows of Normandy. when bulldozer blades 

were fitted to tanks. but it was not until Vietnam that such a vehicle 

arrived on the battlefield. The M728 had been designed to support 

annor and mechanized units through fire -swept areas and to accomplish a broad range of combat engineering tasks. It was assigned to 

the division engineer battalions. The combat engineer vehicle is a 
TAM KY 113 

"CENERALSIIERIDAN" ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE AIRBORNE AssAULT 

VEHICLE 

modified M60 tank with a bulldoter blade, a turret·mounted Aframe and winch, and a I6S-mm. demolition gun. With its armor 

protection , this vehicle could move forward under enemy fire to 

destroy obstacles and fortifications with its demolition gun, clear 

obstacles with its bulldoter blade, and use the A·frame to lift equip· 

ment or place and recover bridges. 

In the 23d Infantry Division (Americal), the combat engineer 

vehicle repeatedly proved to be a va lu able asset to engineer and infantry operations. The vehicle was used in fire support, base security, 

counterambush fire , direct assault of fonified positions, and limited 

reconnaissance by fire . It even spearheaded an infantry-cavalry 

charge in the village of Tap An Bac on 19 June 1969, when division 

elements came to the defense of two bulldozers and a work party from 

the 26th Engin~r Battalion . The day·long fight was won in the final 

assault. 

The M48 tank saw combat for the first time in Viet nam. For the 

most part, tanks were part of a tank·infantry or cavalry team and 

conventional tactics were used. Commanders did, however, seek 

belter ways to use their limited armor assets. 

In December 1966, the 2d Battalion , 34th Armor, was assigned to 

secure the rome from Tay N inh to Tri Tam, where small groups of 

Viet Cong had been successfully mining the road. The battalion commander chose to use the "thunder run" technique to offset this enemy 

action. During the hours of darkness, a tank company or platoon "ran 
11 '1 rA C nC,\L AND l\'IA'n :KtEL INNOVATIONS 

COMBAT ENGINEER VEHICLE 

the road" two or three times a t irrf!gular intervals. It fired canisters 

and .50·caliber and 7 .62·mm. machine guns at likely enemy locations 

on both sides of the road . After three nights. mining incidents 

stopped . and the first Chieu Hoi rallier surrendered . He attributed 

his action to the thunder runs. This technique was used by most of the 

tank units in Vietnam. 

lieutenant General William R. Peers. Commanding General. I 

Field Force. Vietnam . made the following comment about tanks. 

In the southern coastal provinces ... the monsoon rains are sufficiently 

light that normally tanks ca n operate the yeal round. Here they proved most 

productive. For example. the provisional U.S. tank platoon in the Phan 

Thiel area has added more sta bility to the area Ihan any ol her single 

clement. Having been successful in blasting Ihe enemy OUI of their positions 

on numerous occasions, they have given a high degree of confidence to the 

ARVN, the RF/ PF. and the local population. On the other hand , they are 

greatly feared by Ihe enemy to the extent that he has tried on numerous 

occasions. but without succns. to destroy or otherwise eliminate them. 

The shock effec t of even a si ngle tank in guerrilla warfare was appar· 

em in Vietnam. lieutenant Colonel Rona ld J. Fairfi eld , Command· 

ingOfficcr. lst Battalion , 69th Armor, stated , "The NVA/ VC have 

shown a reluctance to engage tanks where they can be avoided." A 
T,\11 .. 1 KY 115 

year later. Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Williams, Jr. , while command· 

ing the same battalion, said: "Captured documents and interroga· 

tion reports disclose that the enemy is afraid of tanks. We feel what he 

really fears is the cannister round and its effect. This [feeling] has 

been justified. to a degree . by the absence of contact when tanK and 

infantry units move together." Obviously. the enemy did fight armored and cavalry units. but usually he either was put in a position 

where he had to fight or felt that he possessed' sufficient strength to 

defeat the American force. Colonel Donn A. Starry. one of the com -

manders of the) hh Annored Cavalry. stated. "A cava lry troop well 

handled was genera ll y capable of fighting anything the NVA could 

field, at least until additional cavalry and firepower could be mustered ... 

An example of the cavalry's shock action occurred when the U.S. 

1st Infantry Division staged the battle of Minh Thanh road. The divi· 

sion leaked word that it planned to move engineer eq uipment and 

supply vehicles between Minh Thanh and An Lac on 9 July 1966. 

Actually, two annored cavalry troops and one infantry company were 

sent along the route, and other combat and combat support fo rces 

were positioned to assist. When the 272d North Vietnamese Army 

Regiment spolted the cavalry force from its ambush positions. it attacked. By the time the smoke cleared the enemy regiment had lost 

239 dead on the battlefield , 89 captured, and an estimated 304 killed 

but not visible in the area. The regiment was probably reduced to less 

than 50 percent of its strength. 

Some of the findings of the official "Evaluation of Mechanized 

and Annor Combat Operations in Vietnam (MACOV)" summarize 

the effectiveness of armored cavalry units. 

Armored cavalry units ..... ere employed in roles previously assigned to lank 

and infantry maneuver battalions in addition to the traditional reconnais· 

sance, security. and economy of force roles. This change has evolved due to 

the nature of the enemy in Vietnam, the concept of area war and the 

balanced combined anns structure of the armored cavalry squadron. There 

are definiti\'e battlefields in the traditional sense, the enemy ha5 a propensity 

for avoiding contact by moving in small groups- massing only for shon term 

offensive actions. Armored cava lry squadrons have pro\'en erfcctive not only 

as a force to find and fix the enemy, but also a5 an aggressive offensi\'e force. The bala nced combined arms of structure and inherent capability for quick 

response and extended independent action have made it possible to employ 

the armored cavalry squadron as a ..... ell-balanced maneuver battalion. 

The most important materiel innovations associated wilh mechanized warfare in VielOam were the combat engineer vehicles, lhe 

M551 General Sheri dans. and the modifications of the M 11 3 personnel carrier. These vehicles were imcgrated with new techniques, such 

as airmobile tactics, secu re communications. and night vision equipmem , and proved enonnousl), effective. The rocket-propelled gren· 
116 TACTIC AL ,\ NO MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

ade screen was one of the most widely used innovations of the war. 

Cyclone fence could be found at virtually every U.S . installation in 

Vietnam. The concept of detonating enemy rocket-propelled grenades before they hit the target was sound, and the adaptation of existing materiel for this use was ingenious. 

The use of the M 113 in a tank-like role will interest the military 

theorists fOT years. The M 113 brought to the Vietnam battlefield the 

shock. firepower. and mobility that are characteristic of tank war· 

fare . The terrain was less than ideal for tanks; the enemy's forces 

included no significant armor formations. Given lh~ conditions, it is 

not surprising that the M 113 was of len used as a tank. 

The development of jungle· busting techniques and thunder runs 

was the logical outgrowth of mechanized forces in the Vietnam envir' 

onment. Every combat commander in Vietnam faced the problems of 

jungle warfare and enemy mines. Jungle·busting was the only way to 

exploit mechanized mobility in the forests, and the firepower and 

shock aClion of an M 113 or a General Sheridan was invaluable to a 

force in an occupied enemy base camp. 

U.S. armor and mechanized formations made a significant contri· 

bution to the allied effort in Vietnam. The armor soldier with mod· 

ern equipment, training. and leadership proved his effectiveness and 

gave the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army ample reason to 

avoid tanks where they could. 
CHAPTER X 

PhongCao 

(November 1966) 

The battle of Phong Cao was a classic encirclement operation that 

illustrates a succession of innovations widely used in Vietnam. Infantry tactical formations and counterguerrilla techniques aided by the 

ever-present helicopter were immensely successful. The battle began 

on 6 November 1966 when the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry. re inforced with the loca l Civili an lrregular Defense Group, airassaulted into four landing zones in the jungle fift een miles northwest 

of Tuy Hoa. The Strike Force was one of three battalions assigned to 

the lst Brigade, lOlst Airborne Division , and was commanded by 

Lieutena nt Colon el Frank L. Dietrich . Colonel Dietrich was no newcomer to combat ; he had fought in World War 11 from Africa to the 

Rhine wi th the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. 

The Strike Force was sta lking the 5th Baltalion, 95th North Viet· 

namese Regiment. The enemy was conducting training operations 

while waiting for ammunition being brought in from Binh Dinh and 

for replacements coming from North Vietnam. Only 214 of the 

enemy's 320 authorized officers and men were on duty. Their training 

area included a complex of base camps in a saddle formed by Hills 

450 in the no rth and 350 in the south . The enemy battalion was to en · 

gage any sma ll unit patrols th at entered the tra ining area, but if a 

large U.S. force moved in, it p lann ed to slip ou t and wa it for its am· 

munition and replacements at a nother site. 

Colonel Dietrich, at the time of the Strike Force's air assault, did 

not have the details of the en emy's mission or situation, but he d id 

know that a long·range patrol had spotted an unoccupied base camp 

on Hill 450 a month before. During this period in the war, long·range 

patrols were being used more frequently and were becoming a major 

source of intelligence. Intelligence indicated that an enemy d ivision 

headquarters and elements of the 95 th Regiment were in the area. 

Colonel Dietrich reasoned th at the enemy was occupying positions on 

Hill 450. He also suspected that the North Vietnamese Army forces 

would avoid combat and leave the area if they realized that the Strike 

Force's objective was the hill. To conceal his battalion's target , 
liB rAC:TI C A\. AND !\1.\ rEIUEL INNOVA nONS 

.. 12km'---------

• •• C8J 

••• ••• cgJ C8J 

12k 

••• ••• C8J C8J 

••• • •• C8JRCN C8J 

Diagram 3. Schematic deployment of two riflc companies and reconnaissance platoon in checkerboard search pattern. (Drawing is only rcprescnla -

live as no anempt is made to arrive at exact configu ration in practice .) 

therefore, he selected a deception objective west of Hill 450. He chose 

landing zones around the decoy area and instructed his company 

commanders to move initially in a direction that wou ld lead the 

North Vietnamese commander to beli eve that Hill 450 would not be 

sea rched. 

As the operation began . the helicopter assaults were unopposed, 

and the companies moved oul in modified checkerboard fannation . 

The checkerboard , a method of searching an area by covering ahernate squares with small units, was a new technique created by Lieutenanl Colonel Henry E. " I-lank" Emerson , who had preceded Co)-

onel Dietrich as the commander of 2d Battation (Airborne), 502d 

Infantry. (Diagram J) 
1'1I0:-':C CI\ O 11 9 

Company B made the first co ntact wi th fo ur Viet Cong o killing 

o nc . The Recondos. the battalio n's reconnaissa nce pl atoon reinforced 

to fifty·man strength, killed a lo ne Vie t Cong in the only o ther encounter of the day. The 7t h and 8th of November brought lig ht contact , and by ea rly afternoon of the 8th , the battalion had turned from 

the deception objective and was heading cast. At 18S0. clements of 

the Recondo Platoon reached Hill 450 and spoiled four North Viet· 

namese in a company-size base camp. In the failing light the enemy 

had not seen the Recondos. The battalion comma nder was immediately info rmed of the Reco ndos' contact a nd, during the night of 8-9 

November, his idea for surround ing the saddle was passed to the 

Strike Force commande rs. Elements of Company B would attack 

from the west , while the rest of the company established a blocking 

position in the south . Company C, commanded by Captain Stephen 

Silvasy. Jr .. would make a forced march into blocking positions in the 

southeast quadrant. Com pany A. commanded by Capta in "Mike" 

McFadden . would be lifted by helicopter to the northeast quadrant. 

The Recondos would close the circle in the no rth between Compa nies 

A a nd S. 

At 1000 the following morning, the Recondo Platoon was moving 

into position deployed as two sct:tions. The two elements were se pa -

rated by several hund red metcrs whcn Sectio n A, led by pia LOon 

sergeant Richard F, Clemons, e ngaged lim a lrailwatc her and later 

a n enemy platoon. The Recondos returned fi re and were soon rein -

forced by the 2d Pl atoon from Company B, led by 1st Lieutenant 

AldenJ. Holborn. Together the twO units moved thirty meters up the 

wooded , vine· matted slope before e nemy automatic weapons fire 

stopped their advance. As the fight was develo ping, the 3d Platoon of 

Company S , led by 1st Lieu tenant John A. Marshok , Jr., had started 

to move no rth to come in behind the enemy. Lieutenant Marshok had 

been told that the battle was on the western slope of Hill 450, but his 

platoon was still well south of the hill when he became convinced that 

the sounds of the firefight were southwest of his position . Marshok 

reported the situation to his company comma nder and began to move 

west and then south to come in behind the enemy. The echo of the 

firefight in the mount a ins, the difficulty of readi ng the map in dense 

jungle, and the stee p , slick slopes combined , however. to bring the 

platoon in on the southern flank of the Recondo-2d Platoon position . 

At noon the Strike Force command post had the following information on the locations of the rine companies. The main part of 

Company B was in a blocking position sou th of Hill S50. Company C 

was moving toward the southeast quadrant of Hill S50 but was still 

five hours away. Compan y A, several kilometers southeast of the battle , wa s a pproaching the a rea where it would be picked up for a helicopter assault to its pl ace in the encirclement. Half of the Recondo 
120 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

Platoon was in a blocking position north of Hill 450. The other half, 

Section A, was with the 2d Platoon of Company B in contact with an 

enemy platoon somewhere on the western slope of the saddle fonned 

by Hills 450 and 350. T heir location had been reported as the western 

slope of 450. The 3d Platoon of Company B had been moving north 

toward Hill 450. The platoon reported its position as a kilometer 

south of the hill, but it also stated that it could hear the Recondo fire· 

fight south of its location and that it was moving toward the sounds of 

the firing. 

The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry, was normally supported by a command and control helicopter, but Colonel Dietrich 

had not used it since the day of the assault into Phong Cao. This stra· 

tagem was pan of his deception plan to minimize the evidence that a 

U.S. battalion was in the area. Now, however, he called for the helicopter, and at 1225 it reponed to his command post. Colonel Dietrich 

immediately took to the air, and the platoons in the jungle below 

identified their locations by displaying panels and dispensing colored 

smoke grenades. In a matter of minutes he understood the confusion 

of reports he had received from the Recondo section and the two pla -

toons. The firefight was on the western slope of Hill 350. (Diagram 4) 

The three platoons were together now, and he directed them to pull 

back to allow an air strike on the enemy position. 

By 1440 the platoons had disengaged, and twO U.S. Air Force 

fighters made a pass over the enemy. Their bombs landed in the 

target area but fragments sprayed the U.S. platoons. Although 

there were no casualties, the air strike was canceled. In place of the 

fighters. a helicopter light fire team was deployed. As the gunships 

completed their strike , a battery of 155-mm. howitzers from the 1st 

Battalion, 30th Artillery, took up the fire. The anillery firing, which 

lasted over an hour, was followed by an assault of Company B's platoons. Enemy resistance to the assault was light , and as darkness fell 

on 9 November, two platoons of Company B were dug in on Hill 350. 

Company A's air assault had been unopposed, and except for the pla -

toons on Hill 350, the battalion was in a blocking position around the 

saddle . There was a gap between the Recondns and Company A and 

another between the twO Recondo sections. Claymores were positioned 

to fill the gap in the Recondo line. The battlefie ld was illuminated by 

81·mm. mortars. A U.S. Air Force C-47 was on its way to replace the 

mortar illumination with nares. The encirclement was complete. 

There was no contact during the night. but by 0715 on the morning of the 10th, the enemy had dispatched reconnaissance parties to 

determine U.S. locations. At 0840 a North Vietnamese reconnaissance patrol probed the northern flank of Company C; at OYU5 the 

Company C line was probed again; and at 1250 Company A was 

tested. At 1340 Company B was probed, and at 1345 the Recondos' 
P I'IONG CAO 

n~ -) ~ 

@ /l.. -----" LOCATIO

REPORTED 

N OF 

~ < '

,. " ' , 

, \ 

\ , 

CON TACT 

ACTUAL 

LOCATION OF 

CONTACT 

r, , ~, 

I \ 

I I 

/ / 

/ / 

./ 

Diagram 4 . Location of fircfighL 

\ \ 

\ \ 

\1 

~ 

II 

I I 

I I 

I I 

I I 

I I 

I 

I I 

I I 

/ I 

~ 

12 1 

position was reconnoitered . As a result of the enemy's reconnaissance. 

twelve North Vietnamese soldiers were killed. The North Vietnamese 

commander now knew that he was surrounded. 

While the enemy reconnaissance was in progress, the Strike Force 

started to tighten its circle of forces. Using a loudspeaker in a helicoptcr. it tried to convince the 5th Battalion of the hopelessness of its 

situation. Two hours of b roadcasting. however, brought no apparent 

results. By darkness of the 10th the entire Strike Force Battalion was 

deployed in a circle TOughly 600 meters in diameter around Hill 450. 

A prisoner captured by Company C had reported that the remainder 

or the 5th North Vietname~ Army Battalion was on the hill. 
122 TACTI C AL AND MATERI EL INNOVATIONS 

In contrast to the C-47 illumination on the night of 9-10 November, Colonel Dietrich decided that continuous illumination was not 

required the night of 10-11 November. There were no gaps now in his 

circle of forces, and the enemy would be more easily destroyed if he 

moved out of his prepared positions_ The enemy tested the ring fi ve 

times that night : twice in the Company B area in the south , twice in 

the Company A positions in the east, and finally at 0340 the Recondos 

in the west. In each case the effort failed. 

On the morning of the 11th , the 5th Batta lion was greeted by renewed psychologica l operations. This broadcast came from a speaker 

on the ground with Companies Band C, which had started moving 

north up Hill 450. This time the enemy responded. One North Vietnamese soldier surrendered to Company C and appealed to his comrades to follow him. One more soldier surrendered to Company B. 

Then Company C ca ptured seven enemy soldiers, and Company B 

captured two. Company A captured five soldiers, and the battalion 

staff with Company A captu red two more_ Companies Band C 

stopped at the top of Hill 450, and Company A swept the northern 

slope from east to west. They engaged a North Vietnamese machine 

gun and killed the crew. 

The battle was over. The total number of bodies counted and 

enemy captured was seventy-fi ve. Blood trails, parts of bodies, and 

prisoners indicated tha t many more had died. Of the thirty-six enemy 

soldiers captured , thirty-two were North Vietnamese Army troops. 

Fourteen crew-served weapons, including three of the battalion's four 

mortars; forty-four individual weapons; a nd su bsta ntial amounts of 

equipment, ammunition, and ot her supplies were a lso captured. U.S. 

casua lties during the three -day period were fi ve killed and fifteen 

wounded. 

The bat tie of Phong Cao dramatica ll y illustrates the use of the helicopter for command and control. It also demonstra tes the application 

of established principles to new situations. The helicopter was de -

scribed earlier as the most significant innovation of the war. Its va lue 

in command and control was confirmed many times in Vietnam. In 

the battle of Phong Cao, the helicopter permitted Colonel Di etrich to 

reach the point of contact in time to influence the battle. It also 

enabled him to locate the disoriented pl atoons on the ground, which 

indicated their positions with smoke and panels, and to insure their 

integration inlo his scheme of maneuver and fire suppOrt plan_ 

The unique enemy tactics in Vietnam offered the commanders of 

battalions and other small units opportunities for deception that had 

not existed in the Korean War o r World War 11. The tactics of the 

Strike Force Battalion during the battle of Phong Cao deceived the 

enemy into thinking that he was opposed by a small U.S. unit. "Even 

on 9 November when Company A conducted a heli borne assault ... a 
PI-lONG CAO 123 

POW later capLUred stated that the NVA forces o n Phong Cao Mountain thought they had the US forces surrounded umil they attempted 

to break the cont act and found it ho peless." Brigadier General Willard Pearson , who was the commanding general of the 1st Brigad e. 

lO lst Division. a t the time of the battle of Phong Cao. described the 

concept as semiguerrill a tactics. These tactics emphasized stealth and 

deception through nigh t operations. long-ra nge patrols, reduction of 

helicopter traffic and other indications of U.S. operations. and similar techniques designed to foster cont act with the enemy. Once co ntact was m ade. the un its converted to conventional methods. using all 

availab le firepower. mo bility. and reserves. 

One of the most important aspects of sem iguerri ll a warfare was 

the ambush . The amb ush had been used by the U.S. Anny as far 

back as April 1775. when Colonel Smith's redcoat column was continuously ambushed as it withdrew from Concord, Massachusetts. The 

mechanica l ambush. as it was used in Vietnam, however, was new. 

This innovation combined the ambush technique with the claymore 

mi ne and a trip wire. Later it was refined by the addition of a remote 

control firing device. In effect, this tech nique was an a ntipersonnel 

minefie ld with a fire-no fire option . Using the command·detonated 

mechanical ambush in conjunctio n with sensors increased its effec· 

tiveness. It was particularly appropria te in areas where firing devices 

that had to be triggered by the enemy were unsuit able because of 

civilian traffic. 

The long-range pa trol (LRP) was a particularly signifi cant aspect 

ofV.S. operations in Vietnam. Such patrols were not new to the U.S. 

Army. but they were used in increasing density and were now opera· 

ting at division leve l. Long-range patrols were needed in Vietnam 

because of the d ifficult terrain assigned to the divisions and the el u· 

siveness of the enemy. The helico pter and effective communicatio ns 

enabled the patrols to be more densely dispersed. 

V.S. divisions formed provisional LRP uni ts in 1965 and 1966. 

based on the success of the 5th Special Forces Group's Project Delta. 

The use of long·range patrols at division level prompted the development of a succession of minor innovations 10 support o perations. Two 

of these developments were the LRP ration, a freeze·dried meal a bout 

one·th ird the weight ofa C ration, a nd the McGuire rig. a device similar to a parachute harness, which was auached to a line suspended 

from a he li copter. The system was used to extract small patrols in 

situations where the helicopter could not land. A drawback of the 

McGuire rig was that the passenger rode to his desti nation suspended 

below the helicopter. This disadvantage was overcome in the jungle 

pcnetralor system. which was commonly used for field medical evacuation in Vietnam. The penetrator was lowered through the jungle 

canopy using a helicopter hoist , and the passenger. seated or standing 
124 rACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

on the penetrator, was lifted into the helicopter. For the seriously 

wounded . a basket litter was substituted for the jungle penetrator. In 

addition to these innovations, new tactics for depositing and picking 

up long-range patrols by helicopte r were also developed. 

The experiences of Company F (3 long-range patrol), 51st 

Infantry , between Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc , fifty kilometer-s northeast 

of Saigon. are indicative of the effectiveness of long-range patrols. In 

Operation UNIONTOWN IIl- BoXSPRINGS, in February and March 1968, 

Company F was under the operational control of the 199th Infantry 

Brigade (Light) (Separate). The plan was for both light reconnaissance learns and heavy comhat-reconnaissance teams to monitor 

trails and suspected river crossing sites in support of brigade opera -

tions. Taking prisoners of war was an additional mission of combat· 

reconnaissance teams. When the enemy's position could be fixed , 

reaction forces were committed to exploit the situation. 

During the operation , patro ls we re sent out to fight the enemy 117 

times with no U.S. losses, although there were forty emergency ex· 

tractions. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army troops were sighted 

9 1 times; contact was made SS times, and a reaction force was com· 

mitted on 10 occasions to exploit sightings o r help ex tract the long· 

range patrols. Enemy troops killed in action numbered forty.eight, 

with twenty·six mo re probable . Eighteen prisoners of war or detainees 

were taken. 

The tremendous intelligence advantage gained by the 199th 

Brigade thro ug h the use of long·ra nge patrols is not evident in these 

figures. This advantage. however, is illustrated by the following comments made by Major Generai William R. Peers, when he commanded 

the 4t h Infantry Division: 

In 1967. before we had any form of surveillance unit such as the people 

sniffer and the air cay with the scout un it, every major battle that the 4th 

Infantry Diyision gOt itself into was initiated by the action of a Long·Range 

Patrol: every single one of them. That included the battle of Oak To for the 

Long·Range Patrols completely uncovered the enemy movement. We knew 

exactly where he was coming from through our Long-Range Patrol action . 

In support of the LR P effort, General Willi am C. Westmoreland 

authorizcd the cstablishment of the MACV Recondo School in Sep· 

tember 1966. The teon "Recondo" is a combination of reconna issance and commando and had been used to describe a ranger-type 

school organized in 1959 by Ge nera l Westmoreland. when he commanded the IOlst Airborne Division at Fort Campbell , Kentucky. 

This identification of Recondo with the men of the long-range 

patrols, who were generally considered to have the most uncomfortable and dangerous job in Vietnam, led to the use of the name by 

other units. The Recondo Platoon of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 

502d Infantry, was one such unit. The platoon could act as a long-
.. IIONG CAO 125 

J 

i 

SOLDIERS TRAININC ON TROOP LADDERS SUSPENDED FROM CH- 47 . The troop 

ladder wos 5upen'or to th e rappel rope becawe il could be wed for recovery 

as well as ilUerl/on. 

range patrol since some of its members had been Recondo-trained . 

but the platoon was used as a maneuver unit in normal battalion 

operations. This innovation . the informa l organization of a fourth 

maneuver element in the infantry battalions in Vietnam , was subsequently recognized in the authorization for a fourth rifle company. 
126 TACTICAL /\ND MATERI EL INNOVATIONS 

Another technique of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), !)02d Infantry. 

that was new in some respects was the stay-behind patrol. Stay-behind 

patrols were used during World Wars I and 11 and a lso during the 

Korean War. These forces, however. were generally small in order to 

facilitate their withdrawal through enemy lina and to aid in concealment. The nuidity of the battlefield in Vietnam and the availability 

of helicopters to reinforce or extract the stay-behind force led to 

frequent use of stay-behind patrols of various sizes among U.S. forces. 

The following extract from the report of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry. gives the achievements of the Strike Force 's 

slay-behind patrol at Phong Cao. 

Three days after the conclusion of the ballle , Company A. after an overt 

resupply , moved clandestinely back into the area and stayed approximately 

4 days. During this period they uncovered one large medical cache and inter· 

cepted some enemy forces returning to the area. Some 2 days afl( r Company 

A overtly moved out of the area , Company B clandestinely moved back into 

the Phong Cao mountain area as a followup force and uncovered another 

large medical and kitchen cache plus finding one wounded NVA soldier who 

had been hiding since about 12 Novembe r. 

The use of deception was the key to the victory at Phong Cao 

mountain . The dfectivc and easily understood deception plan was an 

excellent example of the adaptation of conventional tactics to an un· 

conventional situation . The checkerboard search innovation. the 

long.range patrol, and the stay· behind force all contributed signifi· 

cantly to the success of the operations of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 

502d Infantry, at Phong Cao. 

The way in which the long· range patrols were used was one of the 

most signifi cant innovations of the war. and the use of the helicopter 

for command and contro l became a normal method of operation for 

virtually all tactical commanders in Vietnam. These innovations. ex· 

cept for the us<= of the helicopter, were adaptations of time· tested 

techniques and . in this sense, were characteristic of a large .!ihare of 

the innovations of the war. Confronted by an enemy who took advan· 

tage of any operational pattern that developed, the U.S. soldier in 

Vietnam soon learned that change was the order of the day and that 

innovation was the key to success. 
CHAPTER XI 

Suoi Cat 

(2 December 1966) 

The battle of Suoi Cat provides an excdlent example of the suc· 

cessful use of armor againsllhe am bush tactics of the Viet Cong. The 

enemy in Vietnam was not invincible, and a trained ou tfit freq uentl y 

look advantage of the mistakes and limitations of the Viet Cong or 

North Vietnamese Army. This practice applied to the mine threat as 

well, where the most successful tactic was to attack the man who 

pl aced the mine . The 11th Armo red Cavalry - the "8Iackhorse Regiment" - in th e forefront of much of the actio n in the III Corps Tac· 

tica l Zone, proved again the soundness of battle -tested doctrine and 

maneuver techniques for tan ks and armored cava lry assauJl vehicles. 

The enemy for ce in this battle was drawn from the 2751h Viet 

Cong Regiment. This regiment was assigned the task of staging an 

ambush along National Highway I in Long Khanh Province JUSt east 

of Suoi Cat. Order-of-battle expertS had put the 275 th Viet Cong 

Regiment well to the northwest, but the unit apparently made its way 

into the province sometime between late October and la te November 

1966. Fo ur or fi ve days before the 2 December battle, the 11th 

Armored Cavalry's intelligence officer received info rmation based on 

agent repons of "movements nonh and south of Highway I" ncar 

SUO! Cat and Chua Chan Mounta in . This part of Highway 1. a tra -

ditional site fo r ambushes, inevitably came to be known as Ambush 

Alley. The ambush force, which was later estimated to be a rei nforced 

battalion of the 275th Viet Cong Regimelll, spent the latter pan of 

November recon noiteri ng the ambush site and preparing positions 

complete with overhead prOlection. In typica l Viet Cong fashion, 

max imum use was made of loca l cove r, a nd withdrawal routes were 

ploued , principally to the south. 

On I December 1966, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 11th Armo red 

Cava lry, minus its 3d Platoon but re inforced by a pl atoon of tanks 

from the squadron's tank company, took over the security of t·he rock 

quarry at Cia Ray. In December. the Troop B commander sent a 

convoy lO the regimental base camp ncar Xuan Lac to obtain supplies. The two tanks. three armored cavalry assa ult vehicles, and tl\'O 
128 TACTICAL AND 1\.IATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

2 ~ -ton trucks reached the base camp without incident. The supplies 

WCTC loaded , and the grou p headed for Cia Ray at 1600 hours. The 

lank platoon leader, 1st LieUlcnant Wilbe rt Radosevich, was the can· 

vay commande r and arranged his ve hicles in the following order: 

tank , twO armored cava lry assauh vehicles (ACAV's), tWO supply 

trucks. ACA V, tank . A helicopter gunship on the convoy's radio fre -

quency and a forward air con troller were covering overhead. At Suoi 

Cat the convoy commander switched back from the squadron's radio 

net to the B Troop net as he cleared Chua Chan Mountain, which 

of len distorted communications between Cia Ray and the regimental 

base. Since the 1st Squadron maintained a re lay stalion o n top of 

Chua Chan, the convoy commande r's communications setup was 

excellent. 

As the convoy moved east out of Suoi Cat, Lieutenant Radosevich 

noticed an ominous lack of activity along the road: no men or 

women, no child ren , no dogs. About two kilometers from the hamlet, 

the lieutenant turned in the commander's hatch and accidentally 

tripped the turret override , causing the main gun to swing to the 

right . Apparently seeing this movement. an enemy soldier prematurely 

detonated a mine about ten meters ahead o r Lieutenant Radose· 

vich's tank. The fight was on . The convoy commander. wounded by 

mine fragments, dire<:ted the odd numbered vehicles to fire to the left 

of the road and the even numbered vehicles to fire to the right , 

thereby establishing the herringbone formation. He also sent word to 

B Troop that the convoy was under atlack; relief rrom several d irec· 

tions was on the way. Though hit repeatedly with recoilless rine and 

rocket rounds, the combat vehicles kept moving through the kill zone 

and escorted the two trucks to sarety in the direction or Cia Ray. 

The Troop B commander, Captain John R. Landry. led a relief 

column of twO tanks and three armored cavalry assault vehicles south 

out of Cia Ray toward the ambush . They were joined at the junction 

of Highways 1 and 333 by ACAV's from Captain Landry's 2d Platoon 

and plunged into the fray . The 2d Platoon suffered some fourteen 

nonfatal casualties from Viet Cong grenades as it neared the ambush 

site, but it herringboned its way into the battle with deadly effect. 

Elements of Company 0 LOok off from the regimental base seven 

minutes arter the first report of con ta ct, followed closely by Troop C 

and the howitzer battery. Ten minutes later, Troop A was on the way. 

Meanwhile , the helicopter gunship was making firing runs, and 

requests for artillery fire and air strikes had been sem. The tanks or 

Company 0 and the ACAV's of Troop C, in tum, raked the ambush 

site. Troop C moved east down Highway I to cover possible Viet Cong 

withdrawal roules. Troop A arrived JUSt as some of the Viet Cong 

were allempting to leave their positions. Fifteen of the enemy were cut 

down before they could gel away. The battle which began about 1640 
SUO! CAT l29 

M48 TANKS H ALTED IN HERRINCBONE FORMAnm~ 

hours was over by 1750. but sporadic fire from the Viet Cong continued until 1950. In an attempt to seal off escape routes, artillery and 

AC-47 "Spook" ships were used throughout the night. The Viet Cong 

lost at least ninety-nine men and suffered a stunning defeat. One U.S. 

soldier. a sergeant in the 27th Engineer Battalion, lost his life in the 

battle. and there were twenty-two other casualties in the Blackhorse 

Regiment. 
130 TA CTI C AL A N D MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

The Viet Cong commander had selected the small resupply convoy as a target. perhaps t.clieving that it could be easily overwhelmed. 

Normally quite skillful in the planning and execution of ambushes, 

the enemy at Suoi Cat committed a number of costly errors. The premature detonation of the mine was the first mistake. Allhough the 

killing zone was covered by light and heavy machine guns, 60-mm. 

mortars, small arms, at least one recoilless rifle. and an undetennined 

number of rocket-propelled grenade launchers, the Viet Cong were 

unable to achieve fire superiority in the first critical moments of the 

action . Having failed to stop either the lead o r the rear tank, they 

were furthermore unable to cope with the ACA V's. The most disastrous mistake made by the enemy leader was to spring the ambush 

when U.S. relief units were so dose . Within four minutes the tank 

platoon had reached the killing zone, and Troop 8 's 2d Platoon ar· 

rived in seven minutes. If the Viet Cong commander had been famil · 

iar with the potential of the ACA V in combat, very likely he would 

not have positioned his men so close to the road. Whatever the exact 

reasoning behind the location of the ambush force, it was exposed to 

the considerable and effective fire of ACA V machine gunners and 

gr-enadiers. 

The Viet Cong positions, although out of range of the eight·inch 

howitzers at Xu an Loc, were soon taken under fire by the fast moving 

artillerymen of the 1st Squadron's self· propelled 105·mm. howitzer 

battery. The ability of the artillery to move rapidly from one position 

to anothe r and to set up within range apparently was not taken into 

account by the Viet Cong ambush planner. The squadron's howitzer 

battery was joined at Suoi Cat by Battery B, 2d Battalion, 35th Ar· 

tillery, a 155·mm . self' propelled unit. Some 1,700 rounds were fired 

by these twO batteries during the fight. 

By the time the Company D and Troop C reinforcements arrived, 

the Viet Cong commander realized that he had failed in his mission 

and that he must withdraw . Enemy fire was intensified before the ap· 

pea rance of A Troop to allow the Viet Cong to disengage and move to 

withdrawa l routes. The timing of this move was poor, however. as the 

Blackho rse oo pers caught many of the Viet Cong in the act of with· 

drawing. 

Enemy mines, such as the command ·detonated device used at 

Suoi Cat, were a co nstant threat to our forces. Althoug h the U.S. 

Army did employ claymo re mines as a weapon, most of its e fforts in 

this area were concentra ted on defense. Enemy mines and booby 

tra ps caused approxima tely 70 percent of the vehicle losses a nd 20 

percent of the casualties. The enemy employed "nuisance mining," 

that is. sca ttering mines throug hout an are a rather than in 

well·defined minefields. on a sca le never before encountered by U.S. 

forces. Mines and booby traps were usuall y installed at night by 
SUOt CAT 131 

trained personnel who had detailed knowledge of the terra in . 

Through ingenious techniques in mine warfare , the Viet Cong suc· 

cessfully substituted mines and booby traps for artillery. Instead 01 

conventional minefields covered by fire , the enemy hindered or pre· 

vented the use of supply roads and inhibited off·the·road operations 

by planting explosive devices in indiscriminate patterns. While he 

benefited directly by ca using comba t casualties. vehicle losses. and 

de lays in tactical operations. equa lly important was the psychological 

effect. Just th e knowledge that a mine or booby trap could be placed 

anywhere slowed combat operations and forced aUied troops to clear 

almost the entire Vietnam road net every day. 

In response, an Army·wide concentrated effort in strategic and 

tactical planning, research and analysis, and materiel devclopm«=:nt 

was focused on countermeasures for mines and booby traps. The 

Mine Warfare Center of the Headquarters. United States Army , Viet· 

nam (USARV). conduc ted an extensive st ud y of the Viet Cong and 

North Vietnamese mining operations, techniques, and ordnance. 

Majo r Walter C. Bell . the chief of the ccnter, published a report. 

"Mine Warfare in Vietnam ," as a guide for units in the field . AI· 

though he found that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese techniques 

varied from place to place. Major Bell was able to make some gener· 

alizations. The enemy did not use the trad itiona l minefields of 

previous wars. He laid protective fields around the more permanent 

base camps but with no pattern . and the mines were certa in to be 

booby·napped. Major Bell also discovered that the enemy tended to 

mine the same sectors of roads repeatedly. 

Major Bell divided the mining problem into three major CatLgor· 

ies: road mining. off· road antivehicular mining. and antipcrsonm l 

mining. Most U.S. mine casualties occurred during road dearing op 

eratio ns. Heavy losses coupl ed with the need to clear many kilometers 

of road every day put a strain on the engineer and comba t troo p 

effort. Off·road mines caused more dama ge to armored vchiclc!) than 

road mining did. Little used trails and tracks. open fi elds, jungles, 

and even avenues that were difficult for vehicles to usc were mined . 

The antipersonnel mines or booby traps were ingeniously rigged 

devices, set in unusual locations to trap the individual soldier. Such 

devices. normall y made from materials at hand , were lIsed o n a mas· 

sive sca le . Virtually every enemy position was encircled or infested 

with them . From an extensive ana lysis of the techni ques used by the 

enemy in each of the fou r corps tactical zones. the Mine Warfare 

Center marked on a map the areas where mining activity was heavy 

and qualified each area by indicating th e most common type of mine 

there. Anned with this knowledge . the tacti ca l commanders and in· 

dividual soldie rs were able to reduce U.S. casua lties. 

In the 111 Corps Tactical Zone , the Viet Cong seemed to adjust 
132 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

their mmmg pattern according to U.S. tactical operations. rather 

than following a preconceived plan. During periods when U.S. and 

allied activity was high , there was a substantial increase in the Viet 

Cong mining efforts. Roads and off-road tracked vehicle paths wefe 

the main targets. The problem facing the 11th Armored Cavalry in 

this area became one of inhibiting the enemy's road-mining activities. 

The regiment also learned that the mining and the setting of booby 

traps was largely the work of Viet Cong local forces rather than larger 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamest: Army units. 

The Army took extensive steps to educate all subordinate 

commands concerning mines and booby traps. Information which 

defined the mine threat in various areas was passed down through 

channels. Units prepared monthly repons that outlined mine warfare 

incidents, the types of mines or booby traps encountered, and their 

locations. The Mine Warfare Center distributed notes to all major 

USARV units to inform them of various techniques that might be useful in countering the explosive devices. 

A further effort to educate troops was made by the Combined Intelligence Center. Vietnam. "Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army 

Employment of Mines and Booby Traps" described all of the mines 

and booby traps used by the enemy in Vietnam. Included were 

foreign mines and fUling devices, plus expedient mines and ingenious 

fuzing devices and trip wires used to detonate booby traps. All com -

bat units used the documents and the experiences of division personnel to conduct mine warfare training for new arrivals. 

U.S. forces unwittingly furnished many of the items from which 

the enemy fashioned mines and booby traps. Explosive material came 

from dud rounds and other ordnance lost or discarded by U.S. troop 

units. Empty C·ration cans a nd used batteries were prime components of Viet Cong mines. Field commanders conducted a constant 

antilitter campaign . Control of ammunition and policing of defensive 

positions were stressed. 

Using the Rome plow in land clearing operations helped to reduce 

command·detonated mine incidents. Removing all vegetation from 

the sides of roads and around base camps eliminated enemy cover. 

The paving of roads proved to be one of the .mOSt effective means to 

counte r enemy mines, since holes in the asphalt were difficult to dig 

and easy to identify. A good example was heavily mined Route I in 

Quang Ngai Province. Although culverts were still destroyed by the 

enemy. there were no mining incidents after the road was paved. A 

similar technique for unpaved roads was the daily use of oil or pene· 

prime over an area previously cleared of mines. Enemy attempts to 

mine the road were then readily apparent. Another effective cou ntermeasure used by many units in Vietnam was to encourage local citizens to repon the loration of mines in return for a cash reward. In 
SUO! CAT 133 

ENGINEER MINE CLEARING TEAM 

1968. through th is volunteer informant program. 103.521 pieces of 

ordnance that could have been used as mines and booby traps were 

located. Trained dogs were also effective in detecting these devices. In 

one test involving 131 road clearing missions. 157 area searches. and 2 

village searches. the dogs found 19 mines and 33 booby traps. 

Kits were developed for armored personnel carriers to provide sup· 

plemental armor for the hull bottom and to reloca te and strengthen 

the fuel line . One armored personnel carrier on which the new armor 

kit was installed hit a twenty.pound mine with no casualties among 

the men on board. 

Generally. mine detectors designed to locate metallic mines or 

minute pieces of metal were not effective. One method which com -

bated the difficulty of detecting tiny metal detonators in din roads 

sprinkled with artillery fragments was to use the same minesweep 

team every day. The men became so familiar with the road that they 

were able to SpOt minor changes in the surface or the surrounding 

area. The majority of mines found were detected visually and de -

stroyed with explosives in place. 

Still being developed are various hand· held infrared detectors and 

olhers for use in helicopters and vehicles. Experiments were conducted 
134 T /\CTI CAL AND l\I ,\TER1EL INNOVATIONS 

lO induce current in mine detonator wiring using radio frequencies. 

However. these experiments were unsuccessful and were tenninated. 

A need for better protection of troops against the enemy's mine threat 

prcmptcd the Combat Developments Command to consider mine 

prOlection in future ve hicle developments. In addition, the U.S. 

f\ rmy Materiel Command continued its effons to develop energy absorbing systems to reduce the shock of mine explosions. 

The ENSURE 202 Tank-Mounted Expendable Mine Roller was 

tried in Viclnam as a mine-detonating device . Designed to exert high 

ground pressure wilhout crushing roads and bridges. it was att ached 

to a mcdiu1l11ank. Like the man y rollers used in Vietnam a nd ea rlier. 

the problem was to su rvive the mine it detonated . 

Ta ctical operations. including ambushing and patrolling. were de · 

signed to hit at the enemy's mining efforts. Countennine activities 

were oriented toward finding mines after they had been positioned 

and toward improving the ability of personnel and vehicles to sur· 

vive an explosion. In Vietn am the U.S. forces atta cked the source of 

the problem. The mOSt useful tech nique was frequent ambush patrols 

in areas repeatedly mined. At times o bservation towers were con-

. structed o n ro utes in the vici nity. A reconnaissance in force was often 

condu cted by cava lry units ten o r fift een minutes after a mine sweep 

to surprise the enemy who would la y mines behind the team. One unit 

in the III Corps Tactical Zone made a detailed study of enemy roadmining patterns. The analysis showed that 50 percent of such activity 

in the area of oper ations was concentrated in four seCtors of road 

havi ng a tota l leng th of about 4 ~ kilometers. Once the problem 

areas were isolated . sensor fields were installed and ambush pa trol 

activity was increased. Artillery concentrations were plotted. night 

aircraft equipped wit h infrared lights were put on alert. a nd night 

observation devices were positioned so that the unit could respond to 

sensor activations a nd patrol sightings. After only one month the 

results were conclusive. The four road sectors, which had previo usly 

experienced fifty -six mining incidents per mo nth . had only fifteen incidents during the test month . One sector went from fifteen to one. 

In additio n to tactics against enemy mining. countenneasu res 

for ambushes were also developed _ The objective of the herringbone 

technique. used so successfully at the battle of Suoi Cat. was to concentrate a formation of combat vehicles "sufficiently to achieve over· 

whelming firepower to the n anks while maintaining suffi cie nt dispersion to force the enemy to em ploy aimed fire." An armored column 

could also herringbone its way down a line of march by applying the 

leapfrog technique. The first platoon halted in the herringbone 

pattern. The second platoon passed through the first and assumed the 

herringbone pattern . The third continued o n th rough, and the 

process was repeated until a suspicious or particu larly dangerous a rea 
SUOI CAT 135 

ENSURE 202 ROLLER ON M48 T ANK 

had been crossed. If contact was made , the herringbone permitted 

the commander to "fix and hold an entire ambushing force," as in the 

case of Suoi Cat. 

Natura lly, the mere execution of the herringbone formation did 

not guarantee success in a counterambush effort. The shock of the 

initial enemy volley had to be countered with a witheri ng blast of 

return fire even more shocking to the enemy soldiers. The II th Armored Cavalry's counterambush training emphasized that gu nners on 

odd numbered vehicles were to fire to the left; those on even num· 

bered vehicles were to fire to the right. If there were no visible targets 

to engage, the .50-ca li ber gunners on the armored cavalry assau lt vehicles were to begi n raki ng fire at fifty meters a nd the M60 gunners at 

twenty·five meters, and the men acti ng as grenadiers were to start 

heaving grenades over the sides of the vehicles. The ACA V'S carried 

enough ammunition for about ten minutes of a lmost continuous 

firing . The inseparable factors of command and control played an es· 

pecially vital role in counterambush tactics. The herringbone fonnation enabled a commander to move around his command. provide his 

men with more ammunitio n. and remove any wounded from the 

ambush zone. The herringbone pattern was useful as a base of fire 
136 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

while other elements maneuvered against the enemy and allowed the 

unit to communicate with the "outside world" and let those who could 

help him know that he had a problem. In the case of Suoi Cat, the 

lieutenant could contact his squadron, B Troop . the gunship, and the 

forward air controller. Either the gunship or the forward air controller 

could have acted as an airborne relay if necessary and could have provided invaluable route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy. Finally. 

the training of the entire squadron as a team and its dedication to the 

offense provided the extra drive and co-ordination needed to get the 

relief column on the way. Lieutenant Radosevich's small group gave a 

fine account of themselves; however, the timely arrival of other 

elements of the squadron carried the day. 

The success of U.S. armor formations in Vietnam was the result of 

many factors. The herringbone and the maneuver aspe<:lS of the 

counterambush drill were the most obvious. Support by artillery, tactical air fighters, and helicopter gunships was less obvious but equally 

effective. Combined, these elements often neutralized the effective· 

nCf' of the enemy ambush. 

The mining problem in Vietnam was never solved to the extent 

that operations could be conducted without provisions for mine de· 

tection. It was, however, reduced considerably by a combination of 

old and new techniques. The mine dog and new mine detectors were 

adaptations of earlier techniq ues, while the most significant innovation was the concept of engaging the minelayer before the mine was 

planted. This concept, to strike the problem at its source, was one of 

th-:: most fundamental aspects of the war. 
CHAPTER XII 

LAM SON II 

(2-5 June 1966) 

Operation LAM SON II provides a glimpse of some innovations 

which had nearly as great an impact on the struggle in Vietnam as the 

defeat of the enemy by force of anns. While the enemy must he destroyed or forced to surrender by a combination of firepower and 

maneuver, it is pacification which must end the unrest created by the 

enemy. improve the lot of the people , and build a cohesive. viable 

state. The weapons in this war may be the healing hands of a surgeon, 

a bag of rice. a loudspeaker message, or even lOyS fOT children . The 

1st Infantry Division used weapons of this unconventional nature and 

incorporated psychological warfare in combat operations. 

At 1530 on 2 June 1966, the first day of a successful hamlet festival 

in Tan Phuoc Khanh wound down with a ll the festivities of a county 

fair. The steady sound of the 1st Infantry Division Band had seemed 

oul of place as it marched through the streets of the sma ll Vietnamese 

village . It was not just a concert but a weapon in "the other war." 

The seal and search of the village had started the evening before. 

While the rest of the division was preparing night patrols, selecting 

outpoSt locations, and digging in to establish night defensive positions, Major Henry J. Wereszynski's 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry, was 

conducting an airmobile assault to set up a cordon around Tan 

Phuoc Khanh and its 9,000 inhabitants. A combined force of five 

companies had been formed to cordon the village . Major Wereszynski 

had Companies A, S, andC with Troop A. 1st Squadron , 4th Cavalry, 

attached and the 7th Company, 7th ARVN Regiment. in support. 

LAM SON l1 - a combined operation conducted by Headquarters, 

Ist Infantry Division Artillery . and Headquarters, 5th ARVN Divi· 

sion - had started with a highly successful hamlet search and "county 

fair" .operation on 26 May 1966 in Binh Chuan village . Because of the 

wide publi city. the co rdon and seal of Tan Phuoc Kh anh had to be 

completed as quickly as possible to offset the loss of surprise. The heli -

copter would be a valuable tool in providing the necessary speed. 

The mission was to pacify the village , conduct a thorough search. 

root OUt the Viet Cong infrastructure. gather intelligence. and "win 
138 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

1ST INFA~RY DIVISION BAND PE.RFORMINC AT TAN Pll lIOC KUANIl 

the hearts and minds of the people." Planning and execution involved 

close teamwork between U.S. and Vietnamese forces. There was no 

single commande r in charge , but rather a combined staff of both 

Vietnamese and U.S. personnel from the two headquarters was 

formed. 

As the airmobile force was flying toward its landing zones, Major 

Wcresl.ynski, in the command and comrol ship. was reviewing the 

plan in his mind. Company A would assault into a zone north of the 

village, Company B would be on the east, and Company C would 

land in the south. Troop A. 1st Squadron. 4th Cavalry. and 7th 

Company, 7th ARVN Regiment , were already moving overland to 

complete the cordon. As the air assault ended, the ground clements 

were mov ing into position. The village was sea led at 20 10 hours on I 

June 1966. Later that night Company A was moved by air mobile 

assault farther north to cut off possible Viet Cong escape routes. 

At 0605 hours 2d Company, 7th ARVN Regiment. moved into 

the village . Loudspeakers proved to be extremely valuable in reo 

ducing the alarm of the villagers, advising them what to do, and providing a means of control. While the externa l cordon remained in 

position , 2d Company soldiers established additional cordon lines to 

furthe r divide the hamlet into three sections. Search fo rces from Binh 
LA!'.·I SON II 139 

• -,. 

WOMAN WINS YORKStllRE PIC IN LOTTERval another hamlet jestiwl. 

Duong Province soon followed and spread throughout the vi ll age to 

begin the search. The force had been tailored to fit the needs of this 

operation and contained many different types of U.S. and Vietnamese units. 

The first step was to assemble all men between the ages of fifteen 

and forty-five_ These men were moved to the National Police headqua rters in Phu Cuong for additiona l screening. Next came the real 

heart of the cordon and sea rch operation: the hamlet festival. The 

festival was designed to display the concern of the Vietnamese govern· 

ment for the we lfare of the peoplc . The start was sounded by the Binh 

Duong Province band at 0830 hours. By 0900 hamlet residents began 

arriving in the central area and were greeted by personne l from 

province headquarters. 

Although not used at Tan Phuoc Khanh, seve ral tactical units 

conducted a lottery during count y fair operations. Instructions or infonnati on to village rs were distributed by mea ns of leaflets, which 

were stamped with lottery numbers. These leaflets helped control the 

people and, at the same lime , maintain their interest in the program. 

The winners rece ived household items as prizcs. 

The hamlet festival can best be compared to a small town's fall 

carniva l with speeches by candidates who are running for office. To 
140 TACTICAL AND II.IATERIEL I N NOVATIONS 

VIlJ.. ... CERS FROM REFUCEE CAMP IN BIEN Ho ... PROVINC E RECEIVE 

TREATMEI'o'T D URINC A MEDCAP 

the children it was all fun and games. Likewise , the adults found it 

enjoyable and were interested to hear about national programs from 

a government official. In a war or insurgency, such an operation is the 

essence of the fight. 

As the people gathered in the entertainment area , the 5th ARVN 

Division band began the Vietnamese national anthem . Coupled with 

the bright red and yellow Vietnamese banners and nags. this action 

conveyed to the people the presence of a government - one that 

cared. It was a welcome feeling in the midst of a protracted war. The 

national anthem was followed by a performance of traditional dances 

and pantomimes by the 5th ARVN Division cultural teams. Then the 

province chief. Lieutenant Colonel S a, and the district c hief, Captain Phuc, explained the government progTam to the people and 

urged them to support the government cause. Colonel Sa stayed all 

day talking to elders and heads of households. 

The hamlet festival was a collection of several functions. The 

Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) station was manned by 

medical personnel from one of the U.S. units. The staff normally included a doctor, medical specialists, Vietnamese interpreters, and 
LAM SON II 141 

sometimes a dentist. The operation was conducted like a "sick call" 

and held in conjunction with psychological activities. The medical 

treatment was mainly symptomatic - aspirin for pains. soap and medication for skin diseases, and extraction for toothaches. Seriow 

medical cases were referred to other facilities outside the military 

channels for proper treatmem or corrective surgery. The Youth Service Activity eIHertained the children so that the parents were free. 

Games were played, songs were sung, candy and toys were handed out 

to the children, and movies were shown. At one poim Colonel Ba 

joined the children for a game of ball. The Vietnamese Agricultural 

Service provided information to the elders about farming and explained to the villagers how the government was prepared to assist the 

farmer. This service was very popular with the people. 

At 1200 an American luncheon of hot dogs, potato salad, milk, 

juice, and all the extras was served. Although the people commented 

about the stra nge taste of the food , they all returned for second and 

third helpings. The meal was an interesting change from their normal 

rice-heavy diet. 

The psychological operations and civil affairs teams perfonned 

several duties. They helped direct and control the people at first and 

mingled with the crowd, talking to small groups. They were able to 

discuss government opportunities and learn what the citizens needed 

and wanted from lhe government. The real purpose of the hamlet 

festiva l was to bring the government to the people and. at the same 

time. to turn an intelligence operation into an activity that the citizens would find pleasant. A major objective was to eliminate the Viet 

Cong infrastructure. All civilians were therefore required to pass 

through identifi cation sta tions for an interview, a check of their identification cards. and the issue of special passes. This process allowed 

the detection of false identification papers and the selection of persons for further screening. Other stations were established for persons 

who wanted to volunteer information. Rice was given to all persons 

during the interviews. 

By the lime the 1st Infantry Division Band paraded through the 

streets, the results were becoming evident. Of the 740 men who had 

been sent to Phu Cuong for screening earlier in the day, 29 were 

found to be Viet Cong suspects, 9 were army deserters, 4 possessed 

false identification cards. I S were former Viet Cong who had violated 

the limits of their probation, and 62 were South Vietnamese draft 

dodgers. The search of the village had turned up 25 additional Viet 

Cong suspects, including 3 women carrying medical supplies and 10 

men hiding in haystacks and wooded areas. The scout dogs had discovered two tunnels in the village. 

During the day 325 individuals had been interrogated at the identification stations. Two of these were identified as Viet Cong, one 
142 TACTICAL AND 1\'IATt:Rlt: L INNOVATIONS 

allegedly the Viet Cong village secretary. A sketch of the U.S. Phu Loi 

Base Camp was found on the body of a Viet Cong killed during the 

assauh to establish the cordon. 

The cordon force remained in position throughout the night, and 

on 3 June the festiva l continued . Se lected areas were again searched. 

The western portion of the village yielded forty-eight more Viet Cong 

suspects. They were hiding in haystacks, tunnels. woodpiles, and 

watchtowers. By the end of the second day. the festival had succeeded 

in softening and changing the attitudes of many individuals who had 

been hostile to the government. The operation was such a success that 

it was extended for a third day. By the end of the festivities. the civilian population truly wanted to assist friendly units in securing their 

village . One woman was given 200 piasters for volunteering informa -

tion leading to the apprehension of a Viet Gong suspect hiding in a 

coffin. A confirmed Viet Gong led an intelligence platoon to a weapons cache that also conta ined Viet Gong tax collection statistics. He 

had decided to return to the government of Vietnam as a result of the 

hamlet festival. Many individuals spoke of Viet Gong harassment tac -

tics in the village and stated that if they had sufficient security many 

more ocople wou ld come there to live. 

The cordon and search coupled with a hamlet festival was tru ly an 

innovation in civil affairs and psychological operations. "The primary 

accomplishment was the demonstration of an effective technique to 

bring government . including necessary force to initiate law and 

order, to a contested hamlet. Without the cordon and search the 

operation would have been merely a festival. Without the festival the 

operation would have been another 'police action.' Together, the 

effort [was) a useful means to begin a pacification drive ." 

At 0400 hours on 5 June 1966, the task force was moved a few 

hundred meters to the north to I-loa Nhut hamlet for the next operation. A pattern had been established to hit the Viet Gong at their 

most vita l point - their infrastructure. Information acquired at a 

later date indicated that the Viet Gong had reviewed the Tan Phuoc 

K.hanh operation and had estimated that they had lost 50 percent of 

their effectiveness. They also figured that twO months would be needed 

to recoup their losses. 

In a country like Vietnam, where citizens are subjected to the 

pressures and terrorism of an insurgent force and where the power 

and aims of the legitimate government are questioned and tested each 

day. any action or incidelll that shows the individual citizen that his 

government is interested and concerned in his welfare is highly effec -

tive . The hamlet festival served this purpose well. 

In previous experience, guerrilla forces represented the government that had been displaced by the invading army. in Vietnam the 

guerrilla force represented an external power. Acts of terrorism were 
LAM SON II 143 

direCled not at the invading army but rather a t the innocent civilian. 

All actions were designed to discredit the existing government and to 

win the citizens ove r to the enemy. This situation changed the whole 

concep t of civil affairs aClivities. In the words of Major General 

Melvin Zais, fonner commanding general of the JOist Airborne Divi· 

sion, "a well organized and managed effective civic action effort is 

absolutely essentia l to the attainment of our a ims in Viet nam. " 

The civil affairs general staff officer (G-5) became increasingly 

important to the commander who was planning operations. In Major 

General Donn R. Pepke's 4th Infantry Division . "civil affairs teams 

[were] employed daily in support of tacli cal operations." While the 

operations ge neral staff offi ce r (G-3) was making pla ns for engaging 

and destroying the enemy force in an area, the G- 5 was planning 

methods a nd operations to win the loya lty and suPPOrt of the local 

civilian population . This aspect was a significant change from World 

War II . whe n civil affa irs and civic action were conducted after the 

hostilities had ended. 

A planning a nd control orga nizatio n was o bviously needed at 

brigade and battalion levels to deal with the problems involvi ng civil· 

ians. A temporary arrangement was made at first , but the experience 

ga ined and the lessons lea rned early in the 1965 buildup prompted 

the creation of the civil ·military o perations fi eld. This action led to 

lhe designation of an S- 5. civil affairs offi cer. in every separate 

brigade. 

The use of loudspeakers, the artillery of th e civil affairs officer. 

became a fine art in Viet nam. The 1st Cavalry Di vision (Airmobile) 

supported ground operations with loudspea kers borne by helicopters. 

Di visions issued I .OOO ·watt loudspeaker equipment to each brigade 

and sometimes to battalions. As a result of this practice, if prisoners 

were taken o r defectors encou ntered during tactica l operations, the 

units were able to react q uickly to the o pportunity to use these men in 

develo ping loudspeaker appea ls 10 the ir fanner comrades. In the 3d 

Brigade, 82d Airborne Di vision. such a n appeal was then transmitted 

by the defeclOr talking over a PRC-25 radio to a helicopter that re· 

broadcast the message while nying over his former unit. Thus the 

helico pter agai n demonstrated its importance in Vietnam by enhancing psychologica l o pera tio ns. Major Genera l Alben E. Milloy. 

1st Infantry Division, stated : "Aerial PSVOP proved most effective 

when employed in the quick reaction role . in support of troops in 

contact, or for immediate ex ploitation of ralliers." Psycholog ica l 

ope rati ons were a lso carried on by frontline troops using bullhorns or 

hand-held mega phones. Messages from a newly captured prisoner or 

a defector were broadcast to enemy units still fighting. In September 

1966 an enemy soldier rallied with his weapon to a 1st Infantry Division unit and was immedi ately interrogated by the G-5. A loud· 
144 TACTICAL AND MATERI EL INNOVATIONS 

MEMBER OF 8TH PSYOP BATTAUON AND illS MONTACNARD LOUDSPEAKER 

Tt;AM broadcast propaga7lda message. 

speaker tape was produced in which the rallier talked about the good 

treatment he was receiving and asked former company members, by 

name, to surrender. Within twenty-four hours, eighty-eight members of the unit defected . 

Leaflets were used separately or to complement loudspea kers. A 

multilith press was provided at the division level for quick reaction. 

On 13 May 1970 an agent reported that within Phong Dinh Province 

some 300 loca l force Viet Cong were to be recruited and sent to Cambodia as replacements for Nort h Vietnamese Army units that had suffered heavy losses. The in form ation was passed to the U.S. intel· 

ligence adviser a nd the province adviser fo r psychological opera -

tions. By 1600 on the same day, the psychologica l operations staff had 

prepared a leaflet capitalizing on the raw intelligence infonnation. 

The priority target selected for the operation was the area of Phong 

Dinh Province , which was known to harbor hard-core Viet Cong. The 

province adviser for psychological operations and the S- 5 adviser 

arranged to have the leaflets distributed throughout the appropriate 

districts during that night and the next day. Late in the evening on 14 

May. the first Hoi Chanh rallied in Phung Hiep District with a copy of 
AVDB_CG 

LI\I\I SON I I 

DEPARTMENT OF TIlE ARMY 

HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFA~TRY DIVISION 

OfFlCE OF THE COMMANDI!\G GENERAL 

22 Har ch 1967 

SUBJECT : Unsoldier l y Conduct of Officers of Cong 

Truong 9 

TO : Comm.nding Genera l 

Cong Truong 9 

HT 86500 Y1< 

Dear Gene r al : 

This is to advise you that during the battle at 

Ap Bau Bang on 20 Harch the Regimental Commander of 

Q16J and his Batcsl ion Commanders disgraced themselves 

by performing in an unsoldierly manner . 

During this battle with e~enLS of this Division 

and attached units your offiters failed to accomp l ish 

their mission and l eft the battlefie l d covered with 

dead and wounded from t heir units. 

We have buried your dead and taken care of you r 

wounded from this batt l e . 

Sincer e I),. 

J

~ . II. HAY 

HaJol' General , USA 

Corrmanding 

145 

ONE SIDE OF PERSONAl.IZED PROPAGANDA L EAFLET. Other side carried 

tra/uialio'l. 

the leaflet in his hand . By 23 May. twenty -eight Viet Cong had rallied. stating that they had done so because they were afraid of being 

sent to Cambodia . In a campa ign to attract more ra lliers th rough 
1'16 TACTICAL AND l\-I,\Tt:RIEL INNOVATIONS 

personal messages, Ihe IOlst Airborne Division gathered photographs 

of known Viet Cong opera ting in its area of operations. The families 

were asked to prepare personal messages to their relatives in the Viet 

Cong forces. T heir messages, together with the appropriat e photog raph , were made into lea fl ets and dropped in the area where the individual was tho ught to be operating_ 

The 5-5 of the 2d Brigade. 1st Infantry Division. deve loped a 

·'white envelope" concept, designed to reach soldiers in the Viet Cong 

forces and the infrastructure with personalized messages from their 

famili es_ Each family with relatives in the Viet Cong forces was given 

a white envelope containing a Chieu. Hoi (open anns) appeal, rally 

instructions, a safe co nduct pass, and a letter of amnesty from the 

loca l village o r d istrict chief. The intention was that the famil y would 

delive r the material 10 the Vie t Cong member. This techni que directed 

psychologica l pressure agai nst both the family and the individual 

ta rget. 

The success of personal messages was best described by a Victnamese who took advantage of this opportunity_ 

My family lived under communist control for more than ten years, and I 

was forced to work for the Viet Congo 1 was constantly afraid of being hit by 

American artillery. and I was seldom allowed to see my wife, even though I 

was a local guerrilla_ 

Then I found a Chieu. Hoi pass dropped by an American helicopter. My 

wife and some friends told me that it wou ld be good to be a Hoi Cha"h [a 

person who has rallied], but I hesit ated for many weeks. 

One day I came back from an operation to find that my wife had taken 

our children to Lam Son, out of VC reach. So, with the pass sewed to the 

lining of my shirt , I waited for my chance to escape NVA control, and 

turned myself over to the Gl's_ 

Si nce then I have been tra ined to do scout work. I can see my wife and 

children e\'ery week, and am happy workin~ with the 1st Division soldiers. 

Several innovations were introduced to assist the interpreter at the 

lowest level frontline unit. Bilingual questionnaires were prepared 

which enabled comma nders to gather intelligence and develo p ap· 

pea ls qu ickly for psychologica l purposes, In March 1970 another 

inrantry division initiated the idea of a bullhorn booklet to aid in 

the production or rapid·reacti on messages. The bookl et contained 

twenty· rour printed messages, varyi ng from appeals to warnings 

about restricted areas. The tactica l units could select an appropria te 

message and have a Vietnamese broadcast it immediately, Other 

units used multilingual tapes. The 1st Infantry Division obtained excellent resu lts from trilingual tapes, which were based o n the ethni c 

background of civilians in an area. 

The greatest innova tion made in the G-5 area during the course 

of the Victnam Wa r was th e incrcase in importance of psychologica l 

ope ratio ns, civil affairs, civic ac tion , and populace and rt."SOurces con-
L.AM SON II 14 7 

1rol. Whereas before, G-5 activities had been viewed as supporting an 

ope ration after the fighting had ended, they were now integra ted into 

the combat operation plan itself. Commanders and staff offi cers at 

battalion. brigade, a nd division levels learned that combat operations 

ultimately supported pacification, not vice versa. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Cu Chi 

Vietnam was a different war. It was a conni et where the front line 

was not a trace on a map but was rather wherever the opposing com· 

bat forces met and fought. The sec ure rear areas of pasl wars that 

werc so necessary for su pport were nonexistent in Vietnam. Only the 

areas th at a commander actively secured could he used for support 

activities. This situation resulted in the base camp. The same security 

problem required convoy o peratio ns in a hostile environment. and 

bener ways to conduct such operations had (0 be found . New tech· 

niques in automatic data processi ng were developed so that the 

machines could be used to suppOrt tactical activities. Finally. the 

widespread use of Army aircraft led to new and more effi cient 

methods o f maintaining the planes and helicopters. 

The quiet of the 25th Infantry Division base camp at eu Chi was 

shattered by explosions from incoming rocket rounds exactly one 

hour after midnight on 9 May 1968. Thirty ro unds of 122·mm . and 

107·mm . rockets, fired without warning from the surrounding area, 

rained down on the U.S. camp. The officer on duty at the 2d Brigade 

tactical operations center needed no confirmation from the bunker 

line as he switched on the base sirens and announced Condition RED. 

Forces on the perimeter were doubled, staffs of major units raced 

from their tactical operations centers, and troop units were readied to 

movc to secondary d efense positions. Word weill out to a nea rby fire 

suPPOrt base, the loca l ARVN hcadquarters, and II Field Force head· 

quarters that the base cam p was under attack. 

Two Cobra helicopters from Troop D , 5d Squadron, 4th Cavalry. 

in the air soon after the last rocket fell , radioed base camp defense 

and the a rtillery net. By this lime the direction of the attack had bee n 

estimatcd , and previously positioned defense artillery had bcen fired. 

The two gunships sea rched the suspected enemy launch area and ad· 

justed U.S. artillery accord ingly. 

As the battle quieted down , each sector of the bunker line called 

in to report all clear. An ARVN patrol in Vinh Cu, JUSt south of the 

base, had had no contact. Nearby fire support bases, the Cu Chi sub· 

sector headquarters, and the units at Phu Cong and Ba Bep bridges 

·reported that all was quiet. In twO hours the camp commander de· 
ell (:! II 149 

cided that no ground attack was coming, and word went out to go to 

Condition YELLOW and finally , at 0300, to return to Condidon 

WI-liTE, 

The incident was another standoff attack. 

Intelligence had forecast no high point of enemy activit y, and 

there had been no indication of such. The rockets might even have 

been fired from unattended and locall y fabricated launchers. Ac · 

cording to a captured enemy rocket company commander: 

U.S. fo rces in Vietnam are disposed in large fixed installations which 

always provide our forces with lucrative targets. Our forces are alwa~ 

certain that as long as the weapons hit the installation, the U.S. forces WIll 

lose equipment and manpower, Likewise, these lar~e POStS do not have 

sufficient forces to control the surrou nding CountrySIde. which makes our 

attacks easier. 

The G-3, ope ra tions gene ra l staff officer , ordered a reconnaissance in force in the suspected la unch area the nex.t morning; everybody not on duty at the perimeter or in the various support units and 

headquarters went back to sleep. By noon , two slightly wounded 

mechan ics were back on du ty, and a baltered five·kilowatt generator 

was hauled to the salvage yard. (The above story is a composite ac · 

count of an actual attack on Cu Chi and typ ical resul ts and reactions 

by the division.) 

These standoff attacks we re designed to destroy allied military 

assets and weaken morale at minimum risk to the enemy. Moreover, 

they demonstrated the enemy's ability to attack and inflict damage on 

major U.S. and Republic of Vietnam installations at a time and place 

of his own choosing. The propaganda val ue was hig h, :lnd at times 

the damage was Significant. A considerable part of U.S. military resources was used to protect these fi xed ipstallations. 

Cu Chi was surrounded by a large cleared area , including a m an· 

made lake backed up by Ann Margaret Dam, which was built by 

Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Gibson's 65th Engi neer Batta lion. 

The bunker line consisted of observation tOwers, firing positions with 

overhead cover, an earth berm , barbed wire ent angleme nts. spotlights, and minefields. The sup port ba ttalions camped at Cu Chi were 

assigned sectOrs of the defensive perimeter with very specifi c. re hearsed 

plans for reinforcement and counterattack. Artillery, countermortar 

fire, sensors, commu nications, reconnaissance. comba t patrols. a ir 

suppOrt. and pacification all worked together to permit a large logistic 

and command complex. to survive in no man's land. 

In Vietnam. the base camp was a place where the individual soldier could train , take care of his equipment. and get some rest and 

relaxation. It also provided a full ·time home for the larger tactical 

headquarters and the suPPOrt units. The reason for developing such a 

faci lity was given by General William C. Westmoreland: 
150 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL I NNOVATIONS 

BecallS(: of the nalUre of the war, tactical units had to ~ scattered 

throughout the nation at widespread locations. The lack of a sophisticated 

transport3lion system necessitated major units establishing their own logislic 

bascs rather than one centra l depot serving a number of units . ... 

No activity could survive unless it was protected against ground 

attack and tied into the network of combat support. Supplies, maintenance facilities, hospitals and rest centers, airfields, administrative 

offices, and artillery were all located within bases to protect them 

against the enemy's assassination squads, local forces. standoff attacks. sappers, and main force units. 

Being a semipermanent and vita l installation, Cu Chi was selected 

with an eye to water supply , drainage, vegetation , and soil composi· 

tion. Enough land was acquired to allow expansion or the camp and 

adequate fields or fire. Like many such camps, Cu Chi was situated 

close enough to a local civili an community to require constant atten· 

tion to the perimeter's derense . Finally, supply rou tes around Cu Chi 

were such that a base camp could also be developed and supported 

administratively and logistically. As one brigade commander summed 

it up, "The guiding principle is to conduct the business or the base 

camp so that it supports the maximum or the brigade's needs and 

detracts the minimum rrom the brigade's tactical operations." 

The 25th Division's planning in preparation ror the construction 

orcu Chi was unique. At their vantage point in Hawaii , division per· 

sonnel received large-scale map coverage or the ruture division area 

from the United States Army Pacifi c Mapping and Intelligence Center. These maps enabled the planners to select and analyze a base 

camp site. Arte r the division 's advance party arrived in Vietnam and 

inspected the site, the base development plans were put into final 

ronn . The assistant division commander ror suPPOrt, Brigadier General Edward H . de Saussure, headed a base camp development com· 

mittee that included in its membership the chier or starr. the G-4 

(assistant chier or starr ror logistics), the division engineer , the division 

signal orficer, and representatives rrom the major units that wou ld be 

occupying the camp. The clearing or fields or fire and the construc· 

tion of bunkers and wire barriers had first priority. The various battalion cantonment areas were selected, and the road and telephone 

line networks were designed and approved. Berore the division left 

Hawaii , it obtained precut tent and latrine kits. The kits were 

assembled by each unit in the division , packaged or banded , and 

shi pped with unit cargo to Vietnam . At the site , these tent rrames and 

latrines were easily erected in the designated unit areas and "added 

immeasurably in establishing the living areas prior to the arrival or 

the monsoon season." Within a relatively short time arter the division 

arrived at the Cu Chi base , work began on semipermanent buildings. 

T o improve base camp living conditions without waiting ror an 
CU CIII 151 

overworked supply system to function, the division had left for Vietnam with ice machine plants, 65-cubic-foot walk-in refrigerators, 10-

kilowatt generator sets. ice chests. and folding cots. Also taken along 

were filing cabinets, desks. chairs, tables, safes, tools, tentage, and 

communications equipment that came under the general heading of 

"poSt, camp , and station" property. Improvements in facilities and 

living conditions at Cu Chi progressed steadily. Maintenance shelters, 

fuel storage areas. ammunition bunkers, roads. and hardstands were 

built. Much of the construction was regulated by formal stateside 

procedures. and a great deal was done on a self· help basis because 

there were not enough engineers to go around. In the hot wet climate. 

SEA (Southeast Asia) huts were far cheaper and better than tents for 

semipermanent use . As these wooden huts were erected, Cu Chi took 

on the look of a real city. 

Post engineer functions were performed under a contract admin· 

istered by the Army headquarters at Long Binh. The contractor provided central power, certain building and ground maintenance , fire 

protection. and supervision of a variety of hired ·labor jobs. 

Although living conditions were austere. the fixed bases allowed a 

pennanence undreamt of in World War II and Korea . The costs of 

operations to enhance morale were insignificant in comparison with 

their value. A large PX served the residents of the camp and hequendy the fire bases and the troops in the field. Cu Chi had virtually 

all of the fa cilities found at permanent military installations outside 

Vietnam . The list included small clubs for officers, noncommissioned 

officers. and enlisted men; a usa club : barber shops; a MARS 

(Military Affiliate Radio System) station: a Red Cross field office and 

clubmobile unit; sports fields: miniature golf courses: swimming 

pools: and chapels. These troop suPPOrt facilities. the occasional 

respites for the fighting units at division "Holiday Inns," the outstanding medical service . the one-year tour. and lhe rest and recuperation 

program contributed to the virtual elimination of incapacitating 

combat fatigue . More than 1.000 men a month left Cu Chi for 

five ·day holidays in Hong Kong. Bangkok. Tokyo , Manila. Singapore. Penang. Taipei . Australia. or Hawaii. Additional rest and recuperation facilities were available at the beach resort in Vang Tau. 

The base camp, at times. caused considerable consternation to 

the combat commanders. It tended to devour their combat resources 

and become "the tail that wagged the dog. " At Cu Chi the 2d Brigade 

commander was usually appointed to run the camp. and he named a 

fuJI -time deputy to supervise the administrative details of camp operation . base camp defense , and personnel overhead. All commanders found that "semipermanent base camps require manpo ..... er. 

equipment, and servi ces beyond the organic capabilities of battalions. 

brigades. and divisions." By 1968 the Department of the Army had 
152 TACTICA L AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

SCENES AMOUNO Cu CIII B ASE CAMP 

approved a personnel increase for base camps. This measure was a 

great help to the commander. The camp at Cu Chi and the two other 

base camps in the di"ision at one time had an augmentation of ap· 
CUCHE 153 

SPECIAL SERVICES ACTIVITIES AT Cu CIII B ASE CA»1P 

proxima tely 500 officers and enlisted men. This number was trimmed 

to around 100 by early 1969. 

Generally. logistic su pport a t base camps came from divisional 

and nondivisional units. As a rule the 25t h Infantry Division Support 
154 TACTICAL A N I) MATERIEL I NNOVATIONS 

Command (DISCOM) provided supply and maintenance support for 

nearby tacti cal operations direct from Cu Chi and the two other division base camps, Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng. The support command 

sent along forward support elements [or operations farther away and 

also supplied all of the various landing zones, fire suPPOrt bases, and 

other tacti ca l unit loca tions. Forward suppor! activities and logistic 

support activities from the 1st Logistical Command provided addidonal support. A forward support activity was 3 provisional organiza tion SCI up in the vicinity or lhe forward operating base of a tactical 

unit . As described in onc report: " It is dep loyed 10 support a specific tactical operation when the tactica l organic suPPOrt capabi lity is 

not sufficient to provide the suppo rt required ." By contrast the logis· 

tic support activity was a "continuing activity, generally located in a 

fixed base camp to provide direct and general supply, maimenance, 

and service support to US and FWMAF (Free World Military Assistance Forces) on an area basis." By way of illustration , the 29th 

General Support Group of the Saigon Support Command was the 

major nondivisional unit charged with "across·the·board" logistic 

su pport in the 25th Infanlry Division's tactical area of responsibilit y. 

The 29th Genera l SuppOrt Group set up forward support areas for the 

25th Di vision on such o pera tions as MANHATTAN and YELLOWSTONE. 

Altho ugh the 29th did not establish a logisti c support activity as such 

at Cu Chi, subordinate units of the group were based there and furnished direct and general support supply and maintenance and certain selVices to the di vision base camp. A logistic support ac tivi ty was. 

orga nized at the Tay Ninh base camp in support of the 1st Brigade 

and other tenanl units. 

The prima ry means of resupplying Cu Chi and the other base 

camps in the area of the 25th Infanlry Division was by road. The 25 th 

Supply and Transport Battalion and the 1st Logistical Command ran 

an ave rage of four convoys, tota ling 268 vehicles, a day on the 

highway between Cu Chi and the supply complex in the Long BinhSaigon area. Division supply routes varied, from those strictly in 

enemy territory 10 those that were fairly safe for allied forces during 

daylight hours. In contested areas, major military operations were 

conducted 10 open roads to convoy traffic. Usually, effective convoy 

operations were possible only because of the mutually supporting 

artillery fire suPPOrt bases along th e route. Patrols, ambushes, and 

local search and destroy operations were co nducted near the road. 

These tech niques allowed convoys to travel wit h minimum escort. If 

the situation wa rranted, pe rmanent outposts we re provided to secure 

critical bridges and defiles. These outposts patrolled the road to 

prevent mining and am bushing. 

In August 1968 the 25th Division developed new, aggressive convoy 

procedures to reduce losses. The convoys were divided into sma ller, 
CU ClIl 155 

self·sufficient march units. Ammunition and fucl vehicles were 

pl aced at the rear to prevent an entire convoy from being blocked by 

burning veh icles, and wreckers and spare tractors we re added to keep 

traffic moving. Military police elements provided control. A major 

innovation was having the convoy commander airborne over each 

convoy, from where he directed all march units and security forces. 

Armored vehicles were Outposted a t critical points a long the route 

rather than moving with the convoy, as had been the practice. Gun· 

ship cover was arranged ahead of time over potential ambush sites. 

In areas where the road passed through jungles and plantations, 

Rome plows were used to clear potential ambush sites well back from 

both sides. 

In the fall of 1968. a convoy operating under the revised procedures began to assemble. Unknown to the men, the enemy was pre· 

paring an ambush in a rubber plan tation seventeen kilometers to the 

north. This attack was to be the first test of the new procedu res. Be· 

fore the convoy moved out, the area commanders flew over the most 

likely ambush sites. Combat elements were positioned at several pos· 

sible sites. and the rOUle was swept for mines and booby traps. 

The last stretch of road over which the convoy was to pass was 

flanked by relatively flat terra in where a rubber pla ntation had re· 

cently been cleared of vegetation. The first and half of the second 

march units had entered the plantation when mortar rounds began 

falling all around them. Recoilless rines, rockel·propelled grenades, 

and automatic weapons were fired at the convoy from both sides of 

the road. The training and orientation of convoy personnel quickly 

paid off. Vehicles short of the ambush halted and organized local 

security. Drivers moved damaged vehicles off the roadway , allowing 

other vehicles in the killing zone to continue to their destination. 

The enemy force was immediately engaged by the convoy's secur· 

ity clements. Previously positioned reaction forces moved against the 

enemy's rear while preplan ned artillery fire , gunships. and tactical air 

strikt:s look their toll . When the battle was over. the division counted 

seventy·three enemy dead and had captured large quantities of weap· 

ons and equipment . Allied losses were lighl. The enemy ambushers 

were soundly defeated. 

In the follow ing months the enemy attacked severa l more convoys. 

In every instance he failed to halt the neeting target because he was 

overwhelmed by a massive U.S. reaction . The division had turned a 

defensive situation into a highly profitable offensive maneuver. 

The use of convoy operations as a tool of pacification was a unique 

innovation. In the 25th Division the convoy was often used even when 

aerial resupply would have been easier. The rcason for this maneuver 

\'Ias to open and expand the road network to strengthen friend ly 

forces in the area . As soon as it became relatively safe for military 
156 TACTICAL ANO MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

convo)'5. civilian commercial vehicles could also use the route. This 

action had a direct and of len phenomenal influence on the South 

Vietnamese people ; they flowed back into the arca , repaired their 

homes, and began to farm the counlryside . 

The electronic com puter as an increasingly effective management 

tool was introduced into the combat headquarters in Vietnam. The 

Field Artillery Data Computer, already familiar to the artilleryman , 

the UN IVAC 1005, and the NCR (National Cash Register) 500 were 

used by the Tropic Lightning Division for routine artillery fire and 

survey programs and administrative management; and they were 

ultimately used to assist the commander in making decisions. Automatic data processors at Cu Chi became involved in providing information to many elements within th e division as well as to command 

elements in Vietnam, Hawaii , and th e United States. They used stan · 

dardized Army data systems that interfaced with command and support elemelHs ex ternal to the division and with programs developed 

by their own personnel for the suppOrt of division elements. 

The standard systems provided su pport in the areas of personnel, 

finance . and logistics. The standard Person nel Management and Accounting Card I)rocessor (PERMACA P) system linked the division 

with ASMIS (A) - Major Army Subordinate Command Management 

Informa tion System (A rmY""ide personnel reporting system) - to 

provide information on the individual 25t h Di vision soldier through 

cha nnels to the Pent agon . h also produced recu rring reports and 

rosters for personne l managemelll within the division. The programs 

a nd proced ures for the system were developed and maimained by the 

U.S. Army Computer System Command (USACSC). The UN IVAC 

1005 computer equipment was mounted in mobile ex pansibl e vans 

parked ou tside the division's tactical operations center. The PERMACA l) system provided timely and accurate data . reduced clerical effOf(, and eliminated dup lication in the personnel suppon area. 

Another sta ndard Anny system used at Cu Chi was the direct suppon uni t-gene ra l support unit (DSU-GSU) system operated by the 

7251h Maintenance Battalio n . This system provided stoc k cont rol and 

inventory accounting for re pa ir pans. The same programs a nd equip· 

ment are used by Army personnel at 150 installations in the United 

States and five foreign count ries. The DSU-GSU system uses an NCR 

500 computer and a variety of compone nts from olhe r manufacturers. On 29 October 1966 the 25t h Di vision received its system. which 

soon began to provide timely, complete. and accurate spare pans 

handling as well as increased management repon s to commanders. 

The system also fed data to higher headquarters and , in tum. to 

supply depots in the continental United States. 

The standard system used to pay the soldiers of the 25th Division 

..... asca lled Military Pay, Vielllam . Il ..... as developed by the U.S. Army 
CUCH I 157 

Finance and Comptroller Information Systems Command and used 

the UN IVAC 1005 computer. 

The 25th Division started early in the war to develop many uses 

for its automatic data processing equipment in suPPOrt of opera tional 

planning. By 1970, Major General Harris W. Hollis had concluded: 

In no other war have we been 50 deluged by so many tidbits of informa· tion for we have been accuslOmed LO an orderliness associated with estab· 

lished battle lines. Here, though, we have had to make our decisions based 

not upon enemy regimental courses of action. but rather upon the numerous 

isolated communist squad·sized clements. So with the scale down of the level 

of operations . ..... e have had to increase our reliance on objeclive analysis of 

logical courses of aClion . 

The computer reduced the time required to analyze and interpret 

infonnation. The commanders obtained a better picture of the 

enemy and were able to ex ploit valuable information quickl y. At Cu 

Chi all the input for comp uter analysis was taken from existing reo 

ports. and with the computer working o n a 24· hour schedule. no 

significant interference with other ac tivities occurred. A typical appli · 

cation was the use of the UN IVAC 1005 to analyze the threat from 

deadly mines and booby traps in the division a rea. 

The maneuver unit opera tion summary program analyzed t he 

date and limes of combat operations, size and type of operations, type 

of support provided , and , most important , results obtained in each 

casc. The program identified the most successful type of operation in 

each of the twenty·six subdivisions of the area of operations. A major 

by·product of the program was an indication of changes in enemy 

ta<"tics soon after they occurred. 

The enemy base camp denial program used dates and time. unit 

size and designation. type of terra in , co-ordinates. type of operation, 

firc support, and results of contacts. It indica ted which types of op· 

erations we re most successful in each encmy basc camp area. It provided records of these opera tions and indicated which areas would 

most likely contain significant enemy forces. As a result , scheduling 

and planning of operations in enemy base camp areas improved . 

The UNIVAC 1005 was also used as a file update and printing device, with little computing being done . Lists of known and suspected 

Viet Cong were updated and prin ted on a recurring basis to provide a 

ready source of current intelligence. This form of automation per· 

mitted simultaneous and timely use of division intelligence by several 

elements of the division in various operational areas and allowed for 

rapid updating of information to be passed to other headquarters. 

In addition to its own computer effort. the 25th Infantry Division 

took advantage of many outside com pUler operations. A typica l example was the division's use of the computer·generated MACV Ham· 

let Eva lu ation System. 
158 TACTlC,\L AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

-

I NTERIOR O F UNIVAC 1005 COMPUTER VAN 

Another major aclivilY at eu Chi was the intensive Army aircraft 

maimcnancc program. All divisions in Vietnam required this massive 

effon, and each d ivision base camp devoted a major ponion of its 

area and resources to a ircraft mai ntena nce. Lieutenant General 

J ulian J. Ewell in his debriefing report wrote: 

Aircraft maintenance is the most important single a rea ill the division, 

due to the fact that the tempo of operations is dependent to a large degree on 

a high aircraft availability rate. With a fixed base system as in Vietnam. one 

can oplimilc the aircraft maintenance system (hangars, hardstands. lights. 

etc .) and achieve peacetime availability rates under combat conditions. We 

flew the fleet 90 hours eer month pe r aircraft (and were edging up to 100 

hours) and kept the avaIlability rate over 80%. Hueys and Cobras could be 

kept up in the high 80·s. This required a virtuoso maintenance performance 

with iron control over every aspect or both aircraft operations and main- tenance. 

The aircraft maintenance program in Vietnam started at the top 

with the 34th General Support Avia tion Ma intenance and Supply 

Group, which prov ided limited depot -level mainten ance . genera l 

su ppOrt. backup direct suPPOrt mainte nance. and supp ly suppOrt fo r 

all Army aircra ft in Vietnam. Support was also given for airframe. 
CU cllr 159 

power-plant. armament , and avionics repair. From early 1965 the 

34th Genera l Support Aviation Maintenance and Supply Group grew 

to four aircraft maintenance and supply battalions with a total of ten 

direct suppOrt and five general suPPOrt companies. because the 

number of aircraft increased from 660 in 1965 to over 4,000 in late 

1968. Backup maintenance was given to both the division mainten· 

ance units and the 1st Aviation Brigade. The brigade. in tum, pro· 

vided supplemental logistic and tactical airlift throughout Vietnam. 

Concepts relative to Army aviation in land warfare had never 

been thoroughly tested in combat; therefore, Vietnam was some· 

thing of a laboratory for the discovery and development of many in· 

novations in aviation operations. As a report by the Pacific Command 

on the war in Vietnam states: 

Several actions were taken to speed maintenance and repair procedures. Dircct support maintenance detachments were provided to all separate 

helicopter companies. This additional maintenance capability was immedi· ately renected by a corresponding rise in aircraft availability rates. 

Initially, direct support aircraft maintenance detachments were 

attached to nondivisional aviation units. Next. many detachments 

were completely consolidated with the service platoon of the parent 

aviation company, allowing better use of supervisory personnel. Re· 

sponsiveness to the avia tion unit's over·a ll flying mission was STeady 

increased. Studies made in 1966 revealed that for divisional units the 

number of aircraft available had risen approxima tely 15 percent. The 

studies also showed that the maintenance system of the separate avia -

tion units was capable of more complete direct support maintenance 

than was the conventional divisional maintenance system . The nondivisional units provided, in effect . a one·step maintenance system by 

inteSTating organizational and direct support aircraft. avionics, and 

annament maintenance efforts. A study by the Anny Concept Team 

in Vietnam recommended approval of decentralized direct support 

aircraft maintenance for all standard infamry divisions in Vietnam. 

Major General George I. Forsythe in his debriefing report wrote , 

"Sufficiem advantages accrue from the decentralized maintenance 

concept to warrant implementation at the earliest practical time ." 

The recovery of disabled aircraft was another mission perfonned 

daily by aircraft maintenance unit~ in Vietnam. The 56th Aircraft 

Direct SuppOrt Maintenance Company recovered over 350 downed 

aircraft in 1968 alone . The former commander of the 56th. Lieuten· 

ani Colonel Emmett F. Knight , tells how "Goodnature Six" and many 

other direct suPPOrt units accomplished the mission of recovery. 

The aircraft recovery team is organized around the UH- IH. It is the 

rigging ship and carries the team . tools and equipment required to prepare a 

downed aircraft for airlift. The rigging ship provides weapons for fire 

suppOrt while on the ground and the necessary radios to control the 

operation. 
160 TAC TICA L AND MATERI EL INNOVATIONS 

RECOVERY O~· DOWNED HEUCQPTER BY CH- 47 CIiINOOK 

A normal mission might b~gin wilh a radio or phone ca ll to the Direct 

Support Company's operation officer. This request mcludes all necessary infonnal ion : type of aircraft, location. extent of damage . security si tuation . 

cle .... The recovery officer (airlift commander) is nolified immediately 

and begins his plan ning . . .. He makes a thorough map reconnaissance , 

d~ some rapid time·distance planning and places a call to the unit 

supplying the CH-47 (Chinook), He will pass the mission , including time on 

statIon which he has calculated . to the Chinook unit comrol station. 
CUCHI 161 

Meanwhile, the copilot of the rigging ship will have the recovery ship 

wound up. T akeoff is initiated within minutes after the mission is received . 

. . . The flight plan is opened and radar monitoring is requested. Artillery 

advice is checked periodically along the route . 

As the flight progresses into t he area where the downed aircraft is 

located, contact is made with the ground forces operating in the area. The 

troops at the site report on the exact situalion as final approach is initialed. 

On the ground the rigging crew from the UH-I H begins preparing the 

downed aircraft for the immine nt pickup by Ihe CH-47 which should arrive 

on the scene momentarily. The pilot of the Chinook receives advice and 

assistance from Ihe recovery officer while on approach, as the rigging crew 

compleles Ihe hook ·up , and during departure (rom the area. All clemenlS 

are then notified Ihat the extraction has been completed. 

Nearly every aircraft which crashes, is shot down or forced to land in 

enemy controlled or contested territory wi ll be recovered for repair or 

salvage, The effort will be coordinated by the aircraft maintenance d irect 

support unit. 

Between 1965 and 197 1, the CH-47 (Chinook) rescued downed aircraft worth approximately $2 .7 billion , 

A related innovation which helped to susta in the number of divi· 

sion a ircraft available was the development and use of a floating air· 

craft maintenance facility , This facility was a Navy seaplane tender 

converted into a floa ting depot for aircraft maintenance . The ship, 

the USNS Corpus Ch risti Bay. arrived on station in Vietnam on I 

April 1966 , By July production reached 34,000 man·hou rs per month 

of manufacturing, disassemb ling, repairing, and rebuilding opera · 

tions. During fiscal year 1969, a total of 37,887 components valued at 

S51 ,9 million was processed, Ninety-one percent were returned to ser· 

viceable condition. The 34th General Support Group reportS indicate 

that the floating aircraft maintenance facility alone was responsible 

for an additional 120 aircraft available daily in Vietnam, 

In the fina l analysis, the base camp and its many faci lities were 

many things to many people. It was a "Holiday Inn" to the soldier in 

the field and a base of operations for the logisticians. It represented a 

drain on resources of the combat commander, but it pennitted the 

aircraft mechanic to do his job, It was a phenomenon of the area war. 
CHAPTER XIV 

VINH Loc and PHU VANG I 

(September 1968) 

Two operations of the Vietnam War, V I NH Loe a nd PH U VANG. 

illustrate how the Vietnamese paramilitary fo rces we re combined 

with U.S. forces in activities aimed a t the destruction of the Viet Cong 

infrastructure. The U.S. Army has a long history of operations with 

the regular military forces of allies. However, the exte nded association of U.S. regular units with in digenous pa ramilitary organizations 

was new to the Army and requ ired a succession of innovations in 

many aspects of operations. 

The World War II association of U.S. units with the Philippine 

Constabulary (a paramilitary force) parall eled the situation with the 

Vietnamese paramilitary (orces. However, the Philippine Constabulary had been inducted into t he U.S. Army Forces, Fa r East, a few 

months before the war, and the command relationship was therefore 

re latively uncomplicated. 

As U.S. armed forces, o ther than advisory groups, joined the Vietnamese conflict. they were superimposl.d on the existing Vietnamese 

military structure. The U.S. units began operating in areas assigned 

to the Vietnamese corps tactical zone <:ommanders, who had subdi· 

vided their areas among their assigned divisions of the Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam. This arrangement, of course, created problems 

of area responsibility and co-ordination. To complicate these prob· 

lems further, the provincial (sector) and district (subsector) political 

partitions of the cou ntry had seve ral indigenous paramilitary organi· 

zations under the control of the province and district chiefs. 

In addition to the need to integrate all units into combat operations. there was a compe lling requirement to tra in the indigenous 

forces to do the jobs themselves. Major General Me lvin Zais. commander of the 1015t Airborne Di visio n (Ainnobile), in his debriefing 

report outlined the problem and its solution. 

It bee-arne appa rent from the earliest days of my command that in order 

to insu re a lasting success in our operations against the enemy forces in Thua 

Thien Province the troopers of the 10Ist Airborne Division must fight side by 

side with the GVN [Government of Vietnam] forces. To this end every 
VINI-I LOC ANI) PH U VANG I 163 

operation of any significance was a combined operation with IOIst Airborne 

units and lSI AR VN Division and / or Province unils. To insure close 

coordination US and AR VN command posts were co-located for operations, 

and liaison was established wilh Ihe 1st AR VN Division headquarters and 

regimental headquarters, Province headquarters and every district headquarters in Thua Thien. 

This collocation of units, together with the concept of "tactical areas 

of interest," insured co-ordination between forces. In the long run the 

system served to strengthen the South Vietnamese forces, including 

the paramilitary un its. It proved to be tremendously effective as American commanders worked with the Vietnamese commanders to increase the competence, confidence, and aggressiveness of indigenous 

troops. 

Vinh Loc Island is approximately twenty -five miles long and three 

miles wide at the widest point. It is situated in Thua Thien Province 

along the coast of the I Corps Tactical Zone fifteen miles east of H ue. 

Before the 1968 Communist Tet offensive , the island was relative ly 

secure under South Vie tnamese government control and the 50,000 

inhabitants were unmolested by the Viet Congo During Tet, however, 

the anemion of allied forces was divened away from areas such as 

Vinh Loc to more populated areas. This diversion allowed the enemy 

to infiltrate, ga in control of the island, and use it as a haven. As a 

result, many of the inhabitants fled. 

During the spring and summer of 1968 several one- and two-day 

operations were conducted to destroy the enemy force. Each resu lt ed 

in enemy losses but failed to uproot the Viet Cong infrastructure. An 

analysis of these effons revea led that a longer operation using available Vietnamese resources together with U.S. forces was needed to 

clear the island. A combined planning group was therefore established 

consisting of the province and district chiefs, Vietnamese Army commanders, U.S. advisers, and the commanding officers of the 2d Brigade, lOIst Airborne Division (Airmobile), and the 1st Batta lion (Air· 

mobile), 50 lst Infantry. The 2d Brigade was commanded by Colonel 

John A. Hoefling, and Lieutenam Colonel Jim I. Hum commanded 

the 50lst Battalion. The plan developed by this group ca lled for a 

combined operation to conduct a soft cordon on the island. The soft 

cordon differed from a normal cordon operation in several respects. 

Most significant were the emphasis on combined operation, the lim -

ited use of firepower in order to keep property damage and civilian 

injury at a minimum, and the slow, painstaking searches by the 

sweeping and Cdrdon forces. 

Phase I of the plan consisted of positioning the ground blocking 

forces on 0 minus I (10 September 1968) in such a way that the 

enemy would believe that all the activity was just an extension of 

normal operations. Company 0 , 1st Battalion, 50lst Infantry, 
164 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

conducted an operation in the northwestern part of the island to force 

the enemy toward the southeast. Concurrently. the 2d and 3d Baltalions of the 54th AR VN Regiment moved into blocking positions 

along the northeastern shore of Phu Yang District to add depth to the 

river patrol on the estua ry between Vinh Loc and Phu Vang. 

Phase II began on D-day (11 September) at first light when the 

naval forces surrounded the island . Immediately thereafter. the 3d 

Troop of the 7th AR VN Cavalry conducted a reconnaissance in force 

from the northwest into Vinh Loc District to prevent the enemy's 

escape and to force him into the cordon . With all blocking forces in 

position , units of Task Force 1- 501 and 1st Battalion, 54th ARVN 

Regiment . air-assaulted into six landing zones along the seaward 

shore. From these positions the twO battalions began reconnaissance 

in force operations to the southwest into the blockade established by 

the 2d and 3d Battalions. 54th ARVN Regiment. and the naval 

forces. The 922d and 955th Regiona l Force Companies. previously 

positioned in their zones between the twO battalions. conducted 

similar sweeps. These maneuvers were quickly executed and were 

completed on D-day. During the night. the operation involved maximum illumination and engagement of enemy forces attempting to 

escape the island by water. 

Phase III began on 0 plus I (12 September) and contin ued to the 

end of the operation on 20 September. This phase consisted of continuous reconnaissance in force activities. saturation patrols. "eagle 

flights." and night ambushes by all units in assigned areas of opera -

tion. The plan was to conduct methodical. detailed searches and to 

react immediately to combat intelligence ga ined . while maintaining 

the cordon around the island . 

Indigenous paramilitary forces were used extensively in order to 

take maximum advantage of their capabilities. The two Regional 

Force companies were assigned their own areas and conducted opera· 

tions alongside the ARVN and U.S. rifle companies. Popular Force 

platoons were positioned with each company-size tactical unit to take 

advantage of their knowledge of the terrain and the local population. 

Twenty.four members of the National Police Special Branch . 100 

members of the National Police Field Forces. 30 men organized into 

Armed Propaganda Teams. and a 7 -man detail for census grievances 

were spread throughout the tactical elements to question and control 

the population. This arrangement insured that South Vietnamese 

government representatives were with all units. thus minimizing mis· 

understandings with detainees and allowing a meaningful initial 

screening of the people. 

A central collection point was established where prisoners of war 

and detainees could be held . Fourteen National Policemen of the distriCt were responsible for the security and handling of suspects 
VINH LOC AND PHU VANG I 165 

AR VN SOLDIERS ANO U.S. AOVISER 

brought to the collection point. Near this facility was a Combined Intelligence Center, where representatives of all U.S. and Vietnamese 

intelligence agencies were located. Through the workings of a com -

bined staff, the initial interrogation produced infonnation that was 

used within m inutes. The Provincial Reconnaissance Un its (ten 

12-man teams) reacted immediately to exploit specific intelligence, 

and People's Self· Defense Forces were used wherever possible in 

searching the villages. In one village , twenty members of the People's 

Self-Defense Force joined ten U.S. troopers in a combined air assault 

in reaction to intelligence. 

The Vietnamese at the Combined Intelligence Center were quickwitted and capitalized on available opportunities. For example, heli· 

copters carrying 231 suspects landed at the interrogation center 

between 0100 and 0230 hours on 12 September. The landing zone was 

dusty and noisy, and the suspects were considerably confused. As the 

helicopters were un loaded the suspects were given directions such as, 

"All members of K4B Battalion over here , Cl17 Company over 

there. " Accordingly, sixty-three of the suspects lined up as directed. 

The district S- 2 then asked the suspects to identify other members of 

their units who had not followed the instructions. In this way, more 

prisoners were identified . 

The over·all operation was extremely successful. Before the operation began, two enemy companies reinforced with hamlet guerrillas 

were estimated to be in the area . At the completion of the operation, 

enemy organizations were virtually ineffective and the regu lar U.S. 

and AR VN forces were replaced by Regional and Popular Forces. 

Subsequently, two revolutionary development teams returned to the 

area and (;ontinued their work with no further interference. 
166 TACTICAL ANO MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

PRISONERS OF WAR ARE TAKEN TO COLLECTION POINT 

The VINII Loc operation was followed by Operation PHU VANG I 

in an area near the Vinh Loc district boundary. The operational area 

was approximately onc kilometer east of Hue city and included parts 

of three districts. The area wit hin the cordon , approximately twentynine square kilometers completely surrounded by navigable water· 

ways, was along the primary infiltration route into the city. 
VINH LOC AND PI-iU VANG I 167 

During the four months before the operation. numerous contacts 

were made with twO- to five-man enemy groups. The enemy was 

active. employing numerous mines and booby traps along the canal 

on the north and east of the eventual cordon. The area was known to 

have a strong and deeply rooted Viet Cong infrastructure. The civil· 

ian population feared the Viet Cong and as a result they tried to avoid 

all allied forces and seldom gave information about the enemy. Under 

these circumstances. a prolonged operation including a detailed 

search of the area was needed. Calling on the experience gained on 

Vinh Loc Island earlier in the month. planning was done by a combined staff and envisaged the use of all available U.S .. ARVN , 

province , and district resources. 

The operation included three phases. Phase I began on D-day (27 

September 1968) with all forces conducting diversionary operations to 

deceive the enemy and. if possible. to force him into the cordon a rea. 

Task Force PHU V .... NG and Task Force HUONG THUY moved into 

assigned areas just east of Hue early in the morning. Colonel Hunt's 

1st Battalion . SOlst Infantry. was placed in the area north and northeast of the cordon. while Task Force 2-17 moved into blocking positions on the southern edge of the cordon to sea l off escape to the 

south. In the meantime available naval forces screened adjacent 

waterways. and a composite baHalion of the 54th ARVN Regiment 

swept from lhe southeast toward the cordon area. 

Phase II ca lled for most of the available forces to move overl and 

and close into blocking positions around the cordon area by 0730 

hours on 0 plus I (28 September). Company A , 1st Battalion , SOlst 

Infantry. air-assaulted into its blocking position. Shortly thereafter. 

2d Battalion . 54 th ARVN Regiment. air-assaulted into two la nding 

wnes in the western portion of the co rdon. swept to the cast to engage 

any large enemy force encountered. a nd deta ined all suspicious 

persons. 

The final phase began on 0 plus 2 (29 September). All forces 

conducted detailed searches within their areas, rapidly exploiting new 

intelligence. 

In execution the operation went as planned with one exception. 

Infonnation obtained th rough interrogation of detainees early on 27 

September indicated that the enemy would attempt to withdraw hom 

the cordon to the east before blocking positions could be established 

in the area. Consequently. the cordon was closed immediately instead 

of waiting until 28 September. 

Once again maximum use was made of available indigenous 

paramilitary forces. Regional Force companies participated in the 

operation in their own assigned areas. Popular Force platoons served 

as blocking forces and contributed their knowledge of the a rea and 

local population . National Police Field Forces. Police Special 
168 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATI ONS 

Branch, Provincial Reconnaissance Units. and Census Grievance 

Teams were spread among the tactical forces to assist in the initial 

sc reening of the people and the question ing of the deta inees. They 

also worked at the Combined Intelligence Center, processing information ga ined from detainees for immediate exploitation. 

Allhough the immedi ate tactical results of these two battles were 

impressive , the long-term results of the VINH Lac and PH U VANG I operations were eve n more significa nt. Viet Cong control was repla ced 

by South Vietnamese government control and a new environment of 

stabi lity. U.S. and ARVN tactica l units were replaced by Regional 

and Popular Forces and eventua lly People's Self-Defense Forces. 

The VINH Loc and PHU VANG cordons are excellent examples of 

combined operations conducted on a basis of co-ordination and cooperation between the forces of twO countries. These soft cordon 

operations were characterized by su rprise, combined pla nning , com -

bined o perations and intelligence centers. minimum destruction, 

population control , rapid reacti on to intelligence, and detailed 

searches. The combined tactical operations ce nter. where the 

operational representatives of all elements were located. was essential 

for these oper ations. Nonnally the commanders were also at the combined cente rs. Thissyslcm enabl ed bener co-ordination . control, and 

pl anni ng and ac hieved unity of command. 

The Combined Intelligence Center also contributed significa ntl y 

to the operations. Representa tives of all intelligence agencies- U.S .. 

Vietnamese, military. paramilita ry. and civilian - partic ipated in the 

interrogation system. This practice insured that the resources of each 

agency were used to the best advantage and the unique abilities of 

each of the forces in the cordon area were exe rcised without delay to 

exploit intelligence as it became available. 

Another signifi cant aspect of the soft cordon was the limited 

supporting fire. This preca ution was necessary because of the presence of friendly units and individuals inside the cordon . Strict fire discipline had to be imposed on a ll participating units, but civili an cas· 

ua lties and property damage were ke pt at a minimum because of it. 

The success of the VIN H Loc and Pli U VANG o perations came from 

many fac tors: soft cordon tactics. combined planning. combined op· 

erations and intelligence centers, and the widespread integration of 

South Vietnamese paramilitary units and civilian agencies into U.S. 

fonnations. These combi ned ope rations, in addition to defeating the 

enemy. had a lasti ng effect on the area. They uprooted the Viet Cong 

infrastructurc in Vinh Loc and Phu Vang and contributed significantly to the confide nce and aggressivencss of the Vietnamese forces. 
CHAPTER XV 

Search and Destroy 

Among the most important differences between the war in Victnam and earlier wars was the effect of U.S. military operations on the 

people in the theater. In earlier wars, U.S. commanders were charged 

with the humane treatment of civilians and with minimizing the 

impact of their units' opera tions on the people. In Vietnam this o bligation became morc important than in any previous war. Winning 

over the hearts and minds of the people was fundamental to the U.S. 

effort; therefore . U.S. commanders were necessarily involved in 

helping the people to achieve a new life . 

The increased in volvement of military commanders with the local 

population led to many innovations in the war. The 1st Infantry 

Division's "county fair" operation was an excellent example of an effective response to a population control problem that was new to U.S. 

commanders. Another and more far-reaching innovation was the op· 

erational terminology developed to express the new rdationship be· 

tween military operations and the people. The three most basic op' 

erations or missions were search and destroy . clearing. and security. 

These tenns and the concepts they described were new. and like most 

new names and ideas. they were understood by some and misunderstood by others. Best known and most misunderstood was search and 

destroy. Some insights into the conflict about search and destroy op· 

erations can be gained by relating them to other operations and to the 

strategy as it developed during the war. 

In Vietnam. conventional operations were described in traditiona l 

military tenns. For example: the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. defended 

critical installations at Tam Ky; the llth Armored Cava lry provided 

convoy security at Suoi Cat; and the 1st Brigade. 5th Mechanized 

Division, interdicted enemy routes on the Khe Sanh plateau. 

Securing. clearing. and search and destroy operations. however. were 

unique to the war in Vietnam. 

Search and destroy operations began in 1964, before U.S. ground 

forces were committed. These operations were conduc ted to locate 

the North Vietnamese Anny and Viet Cong main force units in and 

arou nd their base areas and to attack them by fire and maneuver. 

Since enemy infiltration of the populated areas depended heavily on 
170 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIOI"S 

the availability of base areas near the population centers, destruction 

of close-in base areas received priority attention. 

The mission to search for and destroy the 5th Battalion. 95th 

NVA Regiment , carried out by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d infantry. exemplified many search and destroy operations of the war. 

The activities of the 1st Brigade . 5th Mechanized Division , on the 

Khe Sanh plateau were also search and destroy operations even 

though the brigade's mission included interdiction of a North Viet -

namese Army infiltration route. 

The second of the three basic missions was clearing. Clearing operations were conducted to drive enemy forces away from populated 

areas and to allow small units to carryon securing activities among 

the people. These opera tions upset the pattern of mutual support that 

was esseotiallO the enemy's integrated main force -local force effort. 

Operation I RVING demonstrated the clearing of the ceotral coastal 

a rea of Binh Dinh Province and the effects of the operation on the 

inhabitants. 

Securing operations, the last of the three missions. were directed 

at the enemy in the hamlets- at the infrastructure and the farmers by 

day and at the Viet Cong guerrillas by night - who operated individually as well as in squads and platoons. These enemy elements required tactics that were different from those used against the main 

forces. Saluration patrols and squad-size ambushes, which were highly 

risky in the jungle against the main forces, proved to be effective 

against the local guerrillas. During securing operations. U.S. and 

allied forces maintained a respect for private prope rty and for the 

people whose hearts and minds were the objectives of the enemy 

forces. An example of securing operations were those conducted by 

the IOlst Airborne Division (Airmobile) mentioned earlier. 

Each of the three missions supported the pacifica tion program . 

but to a different extent. Securing operations directly supported pacification and required close and continuous integration of military 

and civilian effortS. Clearing operations indirectly supported pacifica tion and required a lesser degree of co-ordination with civilian 

agencies. Search and destroy operations generally required no coordination with civ ili an agencies. They were aimed at destroying the 

enemy's main forces in uninhabited areas and in his base a reas, his 

logistic resources in particular. 

Under some circumstances in Vietnam the distinction between the 

types of operations was extremely important. For example, when 

units. especially large units. moved into new areas the definitions 

were essential. They were the basis for each element's understanding 

its own tasks and the tasks of neighboring units. They were 

particularly important to government civilians in establishing lhe 

relationships between their agenc ies and the military forces. 
SE.A RCI1 AND DESTROY 17 1 

After units had been in operational areas for a time and had established working relationships with other government agencies in the 

vicinity, the classification of day-tQ-day operations became less important. An example is the 1968 batlle of Loc Ninh near the Cambodian border, in which the 1st Infantry Division was involved. The 

mission was the defense of Loc Ninh. The enemy's attack on the 

district headquarters provided a tactical opportunity to destroy a 

major part of the 9th Viet Cong Division. The 1st Infantry Division 

responded to the need to defend Loc Ninh and se ized the opportunity 

to engage the Viet Cong division. To the extent that the battalions of 

the 1st Infantry Division denied the enemy access to the several thou· 

sand people living in and near the d istrict town, their activities were 

clearing operations. To the extent that the battalions' objective was 

the destruction of the enemy's forces, their operations were search and 

destroy. The lack of a precise distinc tion between cleari ng and search 

and destroy operations resulted in many clearing operations being reported as search and destroy and contributed to the m isunderstanding 

of the terms. Another contributing factor was the identification of all 

three missions as search and destroy in the 1968 Combined Campa ign 

Plan. The necessary distinction between the three was finally made by 

describing securing as search and destroy (local), clearing as search 

and destroy (provincial), and comba t operations against the main 

forces in the uninhabited are~s as search and destroy (regional). 

Regardless of the terms, all three missions contributed to the same 

objective, that is, a sense of security and confidence for the South 

Vietnamese people. Since these operations competed for the same 

resources, senior commanders in Vietnam were required to achieve 

and constantly adjust a ba lance between them. The principal variables that influenced the ba lance were intelligence, weather, terrain , 

and availability of trained troops and support . Some knowledge of 

the changes that affected these variables during the different phases 

of the war is essential to an understanding of the shifting ba lance. 

Four phases of the Vietnam strategy have been described by Gen· 

eral Westmoreland. All four phases emphasized strengthening [he 

Republic of Vietnam anned forces. In addition, during the fi rst 

phase. from mid-1965 to mid -1966 , the enemy offensive was blunted. 

The second phase , from mid-1966 to the end of 1967 , saw the mount · 

ing of major offensives that forced the enemy into defensive positio ns 

and drove him away from the population centers. In phase three , 

beginning in early 1968, the Vietnamese armed forces were additiona lly strengthened. and more of the war effort was turned over to 

them. (Chart 1) The final phase called lor further weakening of the 

enemy and strengtheni ng of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam as 

the U.S. role became, in the words of General Westmoreland. "progressively superfl uous. ,. 
CHART 1 - THR£E PHASES OF VIETNAM STRATEGY 

Phase [ 

Mid 65 - Mid 66 

• BuUd UI/ 10 400,000 

_ Su~ul defenoe of RVN 

_ R"'~ ioon MId upMl_ of ARVN 

• Developm .. u of ~equ;OI' Ioquac" bot. 

,ov 

PhawU 

Mid 66 - l.lI' 61 

_ Dl'0¥t! enemy ,ntO ~M"'" 

_ Imilta..d;lnd up.ond~ ARVN 

_ Encow~rombmtd ARVN USope,auonl 

• t.>ltrM bot. ~~. dmroytd JIIpl)l ..... .-....d en· 

emy Ioswl beyond till input t<lplbilniH 

• s.... free elecuon. ",lulllUon of ~IYil~n 

pemment 

-----11 ----

Phase III 

68 Continuing 

- l)ulr\ICuon of enemy fOfa'I 

_ Continued uP\ll'l<hn~ of ARVN and ,tmtorw 

foro .. 

t I'Ml/MltIOO of AltVN to ~pl ewe. ",~a",,~ 

<hare of rombit 

- Conun .... to ,lOIire 9Uffnl!. from JIO'OPIe and help 

CVN dmroy lhIdow p 't 

_ Help CVN 10tnlwnoe Law and onItr .nd to •• spond 

10 popuw "P"""O,," 

------[l! tFE> 

'"' ''/ 1 I I ___ .. M I I I .... r<:h &- dHIrOy Opn IA DRANCClImp.ll9" b8 L OECba4--

w •• Zont 0 I., c... 0.. (Ambl) TET offen"" 
SEARC H ANI) I)EST~OY 173 

The central reality of the first phase was the threat to the exi st~nce 

of South Vietnam posed by the Viet Cong main force units and the 

North Vietnamese Army. The threat was apparent in late 1964 and 

in early 1965, when Viet Cong tactics tOok a more menacing turn. 

During the battle for Binh Cia. a small vill age southeast of Saigon , the 

9th Viet Cong Division stood and fought fo r four days and inflicted 

heavy casua lties o n the Republic of Vietnam forces. This action wa s a 

significant change from the enemy's normal hit-and-run tactics. The 

battle and a series of large -sca le actions in the Mekong Delt a in early 

1965 pointed toward the enemy's esca lation to the third step of Mao 

Tse -tung's formula for insurgencies: major combat by organized mil · 

itary forces. The situa tion in 1965 was furthe r illustrated by the Communists' sta ted objecti ves: "strangulation of the Republic of Vietnam 

(RVN) at its narrow waist south of Hue; seizure of one or more provinces in the central highlands and establishment of an autonomous, 

Communist-controlled government ; ... [and isolation of] Sa igon. 

the political capital and military ne rve cente r. from the rest of the 

country. 

The commitmen t of U.S. forces in 1965 prevented the enemy 

from att aining his objectives a nd averted collapse in the south. In this 

environment of impending disaster U.S. units were first ordered to 

search for and destroy or neutralize Nort h Vietnamese Anny and Viet 

Cong forces, base areas, and suppl y points. During this phase of the 

U.S. troop commitment , th e U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 

fought the battle of the la Drang Valley. The 1st Cavalry Di vision 

decisively defeated three North Vietnamese Army regiments and 

killed over 3,500 enemy soldiers in thirty- fi ve days. In this and subsequent battles in which major U.S. form a tions were committed , the 

aim was to blunt the enemy offensive and gain time for the South 

Vietnamese to rebuild their forces. By the end of the fi rst phase , the 

enemy threat had been offset by the improvement in the South Viet -

namese armed forces and the continued buildup of U.S. forces. 

(ChaTt 2) 

The beginning of the second phase was signa led by a re-estab lishment of a military balance and a clear indication th at the initiative 

was passing to the allies. This phase was a period of developing 

strength and accelerati ng effort . The stra tegy became one of a general 

offensive and the maximum practica l support of the Revolutionary 

Development Program. Since the U.S. forces were uniquely qualified 

for area warfare. they were given the missio n of carrying the battle to 

the enemy's main forces . while ARVN concentrated its efforts on 

revolutionary development , a task for which it was far better suited 

than U.S. troops. Although over half the U.S. combat fo rce du ri ng 

1967 was em ployed in or ncar the populated areas. spoiling attacks 

and search and destroy o perations in the enemy's base areas were a 
174 TAC TICAL ANI) MATER]!':L INNOVATIONS 

I NFANTRY TROOPS SEARCHING E NEMY B ASE AREA 

fundamental part of the strategy. Search and destroy continued as a 

principal operation, and [he time spent in search was generall y in 

proportion to the va lidit y of the ever-improving intelligence concerning the enemy. 

Early in the second phase , the U.S. command was faced with the 

dua l requirements of maintaining an offensive against a substanti al 

enemy threat gathered in the base areas and in sanctuaries ac ross the 

Cambodian and Laotian borders and , at the same time. providi ng security to protect the pacifi ca tion program. Operations CEDAR FALLS. 

J UNCTION CITY, andMANHAr r AN illustrated how the ba lance between 

offensive oper ations and local secu rit y ope rations was achie ved northwest of Saigon in early 1967. 

CEDAR FALLS was a clearing operation in the Iron Triangle just 

north of Saigon. The 1st Infa ntry Division , the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 11th Armored Cava lry, elements of the 25th Infantry Division , and severa l ARVN units sealed off and sea rched the base area, 

wh ich had served as a logistic base and headquarters for the Viet 

Cong's Military Regio n I V. The o peration , which lasted for nineteen 

days d uring J anuary 1967, resulted in 720 enemy killed, 213 enemy 

ca ptured, and hundreds of tons of rice destroyed o r confisca ted. 

Equa lly important were the discovery and destruction of a vast underground headquarters and the capture of thousands of pages of enemy 

documents. The real success of the o pera tion lay, however, in the d isruption of enemy plans for the Saigon area, a disruption that permitted a signifi cant acceleration in the pacification program in areas 

close to the capita l. 
• : • 

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• 

• : 

• 

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• 

• 

JAISNIUOK ~ 

• • 

-

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! 

• 
176 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

J UNCTION CITY was a search and deslr0Y opera tion begun in February 1967 by the 1st and 25th infantry Divisions. the 11th Armored 

Cavalry, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, elements of the 4th a nd 9th Infantry Divisions, and severa l 

ARVN units. J UNCTION CITY, the largest operation of the war until 

that time, brought the battle to the e nemy in the War Zone C sanctu ary. which had been virtually unchallenged before. The opcraLion 

lasted until mid-May and resulted in over 2,700 enemy killed. In addition, to prevent tbe enemy from rebuilding his base by making U.S. 

re -entry into War Zone C relatively easy. three C-J30 airstrips were 

built and two Civili an Irregular Defense Croup camps were estab· 

lished in what had been clearly recognized as enemy· held te rritory. 

Operation MANHATTAN immediately followed JUNCTION CITY. 

Elements of the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored 

Cavalry, and AR VN forces conducted clearing operations in the 

Long Nguye n base area north of the previously cleared Iron Triangle . 

CEDAR FALJ..S, a clea ring operation, J UNCTION CITY, a search and 

destroy ope ration , and MANH ATTAN, also a clearing operation, were 

lypica l of U.S. efforts to insure a balanced strategy, striking out at the 

enemy in his border base areas periodically but returning to zones 

near the population center in order to maintain a secure environment 

for the pacifica tion program. 

Both clearing and searc h and deslr0Y opera tions were essential to 

the war effort. Pacifi ca tion could not proceed unless the enemy's 

main forces were defeated or held a t ba y in th eir sanctuari es. As Lieu· 

tenant Ceneral Ri chard C. Stilwell wrote: "Large unit operations. 

[were) the precondition for the shield behind which proceeded all 

other actions to bring securit y to the people. With the big battalio ns 

isolated , the remaining and sma ller clements of the total communist 

struct ure [could be) su bjected to widespread attack by something ap· 

proaching saturati on tactics." 

As the second phase drew to a close, less than 50 percent of all 

U.S. combat clements were deployed agai nst the enemy's main forces 

in his base a reas. Most U.S. forces were directed against the guerrillas 

and local forces. This distributi on of forces, which had been mai n· 

tained throughout 1967, ca used the enemy to revise his tactics. He 

was conv inced that keeping his ma in forces close to major population 

centers was no longer a tena bl e tactic and that he must make more 

use of the Cambodian and Laotia n sanctuaries. In fact. from base 

areas in Cambodia, the e nemy prepared for his 1968 Tet assault 

against Saigon. thi rty miles away. (11 was 1970. however. before U.S. 

entrance into these sanctu aries was authorized.) 

In September 1967 , Cener al Vo Nguyen Giap predicted heavy 

fighting as the North Vietnamese decided to change their tactics, to 

move out from the sa nctuaries, and to bring their waning military 
SEARCH AND DESTROY 177 

power to bear on the government and people of South Vietnam: to 

deal a knockout blow no matter what the cost. 

The third phase of the war began in early 1968. Although the objectives of the second phase included wearing down the enemy and 

driving him away from the populadon centers, they did not take into 

consideration that the enemy was a victim of his own propaganda, 

that he was irrational, or that he was prepared to pay an awesome 

price to enter the cides of South Vietnam. Enemy losses from the 

beginning of the Tet offensive until the end of February 1968 far exceeded the total U.S. losses in the war up to that time. In this single 

offensive , the Communists lost 45,000 men killed in action - more 

than the U.S. losses in the entire Korean War. Clearing operations in· 

creased significantl y during and after Tet. U.S. units were committed 

in the populated areas to oppose the enemy units that had penetrated 

and in the uninhabited areas to block the enemy's withdrawal and to 

prevent reinforcement of his battered forces. By June 1968 the enemy's losses resulting from these and the other allied operations were 

estimated to be 170.000 men. By the end of 1968 the level of security 

known to the South Vietnamese people before Tet had been restored. 

As the third phase progressed , more U.S. forces were committed 

to missions supporting the pacification program. Even in the north· 

ernmost corps zone , the only zone in Vietnam where enemy main 

rorce battalions outnumbered friendly battalions, the WIst Airborne 

Division (Airmobile) was able to commit two of it's nine battalions 

exclusively to the pacification effort. Other battalions, alt hough they 

continued to operate in the mountains in mobile defense of the popu· 

lated seacoast area, supported specific districts. This support took 

various forms, for example, continuous liaison, training teams, civic 

action support, and quick reaction operations of company and battalion size. 

Early in the third phase the U.S. command recognized that the 

term "search and destroy" had unfortunately become associated with 

"aimless searches in the jungle and the destruction of property." In 

April 1968 General Westmoreland therefore directed that the use of 

the term be discontinued. Operations thereafter were defined and 

discussed in basic military terms which described the type of operation, for example, reconnaissance in force. Besides avoiding the misunderstanding of search and destroy operations, the change expressed 

the difference between U.S. operations in the early stages of the war 

and those conducted during the third phase. In the early stages, the 

terms "dearing," "securing," and "search and destroy" had served as 

doctrinal teaching points to show the relationship between military 

operations and the pacification effort. They had been adopted in 

1964 for use by military and civilian agencies involved in pacification. 

By 1968. when the terms were dropped, the pacification program had 
178 TACTI C AL AND MATERIEL 1~:-<OVAT10NS 

developed to the point where civilian-military co-ordination was 

routine. Vietnamese and Free World field commanders understood 

the capabilities and limitations of the civilian agencies. and the civ il -

ians had a similar grasp of the military contribution . 

Sea rch and destroy operations, by any name, were the tactics by 

which U.S. units engaged the enemy. They were the fighl operations 

al the lime. and they COlllribulcd to th e essential funct ion of shielding 

thc pacification effort from the enemy's main [orces. Without the 

shield . the South Vietnamese would not have had the opportunity to 

rebuild their forces, and the pacification dron in Vietnam would 

have been impossible. 
CHAPTER XV I 

Summary 

This monog raph demonstra tes that Vi etnam was a war of innovations. T he contestants, the equipment , the arena. and the rules of 

engagement were different from previous wars. In the beginning, 

there was a grea t variety of recently developed ha rdware but a gene ral 

lack of doctrine concerning insurgency· type operations. Improved 

equipme nt was rushed through th e development phase , and successful ideas origi nat ed in the field. Some of the innovations described in 

the preceding chapt ers are peculiar to the Vietnam sit uation , whi le 

Olhcrs represent more significant ad vances that can be used in futur e 

conflicts. 

Man y of the major innova tions in Vietnam were time-sensiti ve. 

lhal is. they were effective onl y for a given period of time. This period 

could best be measured as the time required for the enemy to figu re 

out what the America ns were doi ng and to develop effective countermeasures. Sound in novations lasted for long periods of time , and 

some arc as va lid today as whe n th ey were conceived. Olhers were use -

ful for days or weeks o r for a few months only. The enemy soon punished the comma nder who followed set pallerns or precise procedUl·es. 

The innovative leader usually met with success. 

The widespread use of the he li co pter was the most significam ad · 

vance of the Vietnam War. Combined with a new air·assault concept. 

il led to the refi nement of the airmobile division that proved to be an 

unqu a lified success, incorporating all the advantages that the helicopter provided . II is diffic ult to exagge rate the capabilities of the 

airmobile team in Vietnam; the team rep resented the most 

revolutionary change in warfare since the blitzkrieg. However. a l T· 

mobile tactics may also be time ~e si ti ve. a nd the helicopter has 

problems with respect to futu re application. 

Improvements in communi cations para lleled o r even exceeded the 

progress made in mobility. Not since before the Civil War has a b rigade commander been able to see and ta lk to all his platoon leaders. 

The division commander had an abundance of hot lines. secure voice 

rad ios. and insta nt commun ications up the chain of command . down 

to every tactical unit. and ac ross to other services or allies. Compa red 
180 TACTICAL AND MATEIUEL INNOVATIONS 

the EE-8 and SCR- 300 of Korea, communication eq uipment in Vietnam was a technological miracle of infinite value to the commander. 

FirelJOwer progressed along with mobility and communica tions. 

The infantry soldier had a greater variety of morc powerful weapons 

than ever before. Artillery and armor pieces were morc mobile and 

morc effecti ve. Aerial fire support increased many times. and much 

of it was available from among the Army's own resources. Furthermore , the role of firepower expanded from o ne of softening the 

enemy in prepara tion for the final infantry assault to one of entirely 

eliminating enemy resistance. 

The sensors, target acquisition equipment . and night obse rvation 

devices, combined with the automatic data processing equipment, 

represent a major advance in military systems management at the 

battalion level and higher. Development of such equipment has 

progressed rapidly within the U.S. Anny. As a resu lt , there is high 

expectation for improved intelligence·gathering methods and a more 

efficien t use of combat power. The G-2 and G-3 (intelligence and op' 

erations assistant chiefs of staff) will not only be in the same tent in 

the future, they will also use the same computer. 

In the fie ld of tactics, the age -old principles did not change. U.S. 

forces conducted a huge mobile defense for over five years. They 

fought off the invader from fixed bases; however, in doing so they 

used almost purely offensive tactics. An intelligence network supe rior 

to anything known in previous wars and great tactical mobility allowed the U.S. forces to pre-empt most of the enemy's meticulo usly rehearsed plans. The riverine operatio ns, the ambushes, logistic support 

of armored fonnations by air, and the saturation patrolling demon· 

strated that the commander a t eve ry level was equal to the task of 

outthinking the enemy. 

Contact with the enemy was normally made by battalions or 

smaller units in contrast to the larger unit operations of World War II 

and Korea. In Vietnam , U.S. infa ntry o n the ground had the mission 

of finding the enemy by means of saturation patrolling and never· 

ending reconna issance in force , guided by a whole new world of intelligence -ga thering sensors a nd air cavalry. Having found the enemy , 

invariably at less than 100 yards range, the infantry commander 

called forth overwhelming rei nforcement and firepower. The main 

attack was wherever and whenever the enemy could be found . 

T he air cavalry, armored cavalry, tanks, and mechanized infantry all proved their versa tility and effectiveness in low-intensity 

warfare against an unsophistica ted enemy. The battles re po rted 

througho ut the mo nogra ph show these forces seeking out and destroying the enemy at close quarters. The U.S. armored vehicles and 

anned helico pters, ded icated to the offensive, were well suited to 

overwhelming the enemy's hidden light infantry. 
SUMMARY 161 

The adaptation of U.S. forces to the countrywide battlefield 

evolved through a process of trial and error. Not since the American 

Revol ution has a theater of operations been occupied with friendly 

and enemy military forces in the same general areas simultaneously. 

Success was not clear·cut; control of the population was often in 

doubt: victory or defeat lay at the grass· roots level after the maneuver 

battalions had done their work. Thus. there were two wars going on: 

the purely military battle against the enemy's main force and the 

pacification operation. The two were completely entwined. however, 

and the commander at every level fought in both. 

Pacification was an unprecedented addition to the commander's 

mission. Although it was basically a civilian endeavor, the military 

played a vital and continuous part because the restoration of security 

in the countryside was a prerequisite to pacification . Furthermore. 

the local Vietnamese administration was often almost wholly military 

in character and was dependent upon the Americans for necessary 

skills and equipment. Winning the war meant winning the hearts and 

minds of the people, and all friendly forces participated in this effort. 

Vietnamitation of the war, which later received a great deal of 

publicity, actually started with the first advisers and progressed 

th rough increasing U.S.-Vietnamese co-operation . It was always the 

goal of U.S. fo rces to leave behind in Vietnam an indigenous force 

able LO defend itself. Specific units from each country were paired up. 

not only LO insure co·ordination but also to provide cross·training. 

Vietnamization took its place alongside pacification and military 

operations as a primary missio n of the U.S. commander. 

There was one area, however. where American ingenuity failed : 

countermine warfare. Considering the magnitude of the enemy's 

effort in mines and booby traps, U.S. experts failed to find the answer 

to the problem of how to counter them . Another aspect of the war in 

Vietnam which many tactical commanders would revise was the large 

base camp . Because of the size to which these camps grew, they de· 

tracted far too much effort from the primary combat mission. 

Finally, the question might be asked : Has the U.S. Army been 

successful in Vietnam? Certainly the United States has not been vic· 

torious in the traditional sense. But in 1965 ARVN units were being 

beaten in every quarter of the country. The South Vietn amese government had lost control of most of the countryside. Total defeat was 

imminent . By the early 1970s most of the major U.S. Army forma · 

tions had come to Vietnam , made their co ntribution . and been with· 

drawn . As a result. the ARVN has become one of the most powerful 

military forces in th e Free World , and the Rcpublic of Vietnam now 

controls the majority of its people. (Chart J) The U.S. Army in Vict -

nam carried on its traditions of ingenuity, imagination, and nexibility. Il kept pace with the hectic technological progress of Laday's 
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SUMMARY 183 

world and demonstrated the American soldiers' ability to ouuhink the 

enemy. It showed its sophistication in materiel advances, its strength 

of will in guerrilla warfare, and its com passion in pacification. 

AAAS 

ACAV 

ACV 

ARA 

ARVN 

AVLB 

B IRM INCHAM 

CAISSON VI 

CEOAR FAlLS 

CEV 

ClOG 

CN 

CORONAOO X 

CROOK 

CS 

DELAWARE 

DSU-GSU 

FLOYD 

G-' 

Glossary 

American Association for the Advancement of Science 

Armored cavalry assault vehicle 

Air cushion vehicle 

Aerial rocket artillery 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

Armored vehicle launched bridge 

Operation conducted in April 1966 by the 1st Infantry 

Division in War Zone C near the Cambodian border in 

Tay Ninh Province 

Fire base of Ist Infantry Division near Xa Cat 

Joint clearing operation in J anuary 1967 conducted by 1st 

and 25th Infantry Divisions. 173d Airborne Brigade. 

11th Armored Cavalry, and ARVN units against VC 

Military Region IV headquarters in the Iron Triangle 

Combat engineer vehicle 

Civilian Irregu lar Defense Group 

Type of tear gas 

Operation in which the Mobile Riverine Force responded 

to Viet Cong attacks on My Tho and Vinh Long. drove 

the enemy from those provincial capitals. then oper· 

ated nea r Cai Lay on Highway 4, early in 1968 

Fire suppOrt base in Tay Ninh Province established in 

April 1969 

Riot control type of tear gas 

Operation conducted in spring of 1968 by U.S. and 

ARVN units into A Shau Valley to pre·empt enemy 

preparations for an attack on the Hue area 

Direct suppOrt unit-genera l support unit 

Fire support surveillance base constructed in 1970 

Assistant chief of staff for operations and training at an 

army. corps (field fo rce in Vietnam), or division head· 

quarters 
186 

G-' 

G-& 

HUONG Tuuv 

I NCRAM 

IRVING 

J-2 

J-3 

J UNCTION C IT Y 

LAM SON II 

LRP 

MACV 

MANUATTAN 

M ASIIERTACTICAL AND MATERIEL I NNOVATIONS 

Assistant chief of starr for supply and evacuation at an 

army . corps (fidd (orce in Viet nam), or division headquarters 

Assista nt chief of sta ff for civ il affai n; at a n army. corps 

(field force in Vietnam), or division headquarters 

Operation early in 1968 conducted by U.S. Marine Corps 

and AR VN elements to defend and drive the enemy 

from Hue city during the Tel offensi~'e 

Task force composed of U.S. and Vietnamese forces involved in Operat ion PHU VANG I 

A task force consisting of the 2d Battalion. 12th Cavalry, 

reinforced with it banery of artillery. The task force 

was charged with the security of Plciku and the support 

of AR VN ope rations at Plei Me during the early stages 

of the battle for Ia Orang in 1965. 

Operation conducted by the 22d ARVN Division, the 

Republic of Korea Capital Division. and the U.S. lst 

Cavalry Division (Ainnobile) against 610th NVA Division in 8inh Dinh Province in October 1966 

Assistant chief of starr for military intelligence, MACV 

Assistant chief of staff for military operations, MACV 

Largest operation conducted in Vietnam at the time, in· 

volving twenty·two U.S. and four ARVN battalions in 

War Zone C (Tay Ninh Province) and borderi ng provinces, 22 February- 14 May 1967 

Combined pacification operation conducted in J une 1966 

by Headquarters. lst Infantry Division Anillery . a nd 

Headqua rters. 5th ARVN Division . in T an Phuoc 

Khanh 

Long·range patrol 

Military Assistance Command. Vietnam 

Clearing ope ration conducted in 1967 by the U.S. 1st and 

25th Infan try Divisions. the 11th Annored Cavalry. 

and AR VN forces in the Long Nguyen base area just 

north of the Iron Triangle 

WHITE WINe Operation conducted early in 1966 by lst Cavalry Division (Ainnobile). ARVN. and Sout h Korean forces in 

8inh Dinh Province 

MEDCAP Medical Civic Action Program 
MONTANA 

MA ULER 

GLOSSARY 187 

Operation in Apri l 1966 in the central demilitarized zone 

involving elements of the lst Brigade, 5th Infantry 

Division (Mechani zed), as well as U.S. Marine Corps 

units 

NCR National Cash Registe r 

NIAGARA FALLS Operations condu cted early in 1968 by U.S. air and artillery to counter the enemy buildup against Khe Sanh 

NVA North Vietnamese Army 

PAUL BUNYAN Massi ve jungle-clearing project conducted by specially 

trained Army engineer units in September 1966 

PERMACAP Personnel Management and Accounting Card Processor 

PH U VANG Task force composed of U.S. and Vietnamese forces in· 

volved in Operadon PU U VANG 1 

PIW VANG I Operation conducted in Se ptember 1968 by U.S. forces 

and Vietnamese paramilitary forces in an area one 

kilometer east of Hue city that included parts of three 

districts 

PSVOP Psychological operations 

RANCH HANI) Operation to condu ct defoliation and anticrop activities 

Rt:MAC EN U.S.- AR VN armored -mechanized task force with Marine 

Corps unitS sent in March 1969 by the XXIV U.S. 

Corps commander to the Khe Sanh plateau to Open 

Route 9 to Khe Sanh, cu t Route 926, and protect the 

west flank of a 3d Marine Division rein forced regiment, 

which was tryi ng to prevent the enemy from moving 

across the lower end of the plateau toward the A Shau 

Valley 

RPG Rocket·propelled grenade 

5- 2 Officer in cha rge of the military intelligence section of a 

brigade or smaller unit 

S- 3 Officer in charge of the operadons and train ing section of 

a brigade or smaller unit 

S-5 Officer in charge of the civil a ffairs section of a brigade 

or smaller unit 

Sm NANOOA I~ II 1st Infantry Division operation in Binh Duong Province 

a nd ex te nded 10 include Loc Nin h area of Binh Lo ng 

Province after the enemy attacks on the district town, 

27 September- 19 November 1967 

TEIAYEII. I Operation in September 1966 in which U.S., ARVN , a nd 
188 TACTICAL AND MATERIEL INNOVATIONS 

UNIONTOWN 11 1-

BOXSPRINGS 

USARV 

USN$ 

VC 

V INU Loe 

YELLOWSTONE 

Korean units forced the 6lOth NVA Division into a 

natura l pocket, thus sening the stage for Operation 

I RV ING 

Operation conducted in February-Ma rch 1968 around 

Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc , northeast of Saigon 

U.S. Army , Vietnam 

United States Navy ship (civilian manned) 

Viet Cong 

Operation conducled in September 1968 by U.S. forces 

and Vietn amese paramilitary fo rces to free Vinh Loc 

Island from enemy control 

25th Infantry Division operation in War Zone C (Tay 

Ninh Province), B December 1967- 24 February 1968 
Index 

A Shau Vall .. y: S7- S8, 64 

Aerial roxkrt artill .. ry (ARA): 12 , IS, ISO. 

S"" a/.w Fir .. support . 1I .. licopt .. n ; 

Rock .. t . a.-rial . 2.75 foldin,l{ fin . M3. 

A·f.am .. : 115 

" Gu.1. )ro~ct : g.o 

Ai. AUluh Division . 11th : 10. 16 

Ai.nulry : 10. 15-17 . 108. 124 

Ai. Cavalry Squadron, It th : 85 

Air cushion ,· .. hiclc: (ACV): 76- 17 

Air Fore .. , .x~mh : 91 

Air lines of communication : S8-60, 86 

Air opc:rations. tactical : 8. 12, 30. 43. 45. 

47.49.71-72.78. 100. 110, 120. 155. 

Set auo Aircraft . 

Air supply: 6 , 11. 22 , S8- 60, 62 , ISS. &e 

al.lo Helicoptc:t5. 

Airbo.~ Brigade. 1734 : SI . 78-80, -85. 

91. 101. 10'. 174. 176 

i.bo.~ Divi,ion, 82d : 14' 

Ai.bo.ne Division (Ai'mobil .. ). 10151 : 20. 

53. S6. 84, 117 , 124.14'. 146. 162-M . 

170. 177 

Airborn .. Infantry Rc:gimcnu 

327.h : 20 

!">ohl ' 16'. 167 

!">02d ; 117-18. 120. 124. 126, 170 

!">O34 : 79. 91 

Airbo.~ ... connaiuanr .. plat forml : S 

Aircraft . S"" ouo Ai, opcntiom. taetinl; 

Bombing operniom. 

AC-47 ("Spook"): 27, 100. 129 

AC- 1I9 : 100 

airborne radio relay : 84 

annc:d. development of: 14 

B-26 ; IS 

6 -S2 : 27, '2 

C-47: 120. 122 

C _IU : II. 20, 90 

c-uo: 176 

~<I ("" nying crane" ): 28 

CV-2 (Ca ribou): II, 22 -U . 84 

CV- 7 (6 uffalo): II. 22- U 

ground prot«lion of: 41 

lM: . bicide miuioru : 90, 94 

maimenanr ... recovery. and '''pai. :J.l8, 

151. 158- 61 

A"naft Conllnuw 

OV- IA (Mohawk), 14 

IIfrty p.«autions fo. ; 32 

surveillanc .. : 22 

1'-28 : IS 

\'O- SA (Qui .. ,): 22 

Aircraft Oir« t Support ~hintenanc .. Com· 

pany . 56th : 159 

Airmobil .. opc:ntiom: 10, 29- '0, '2, 41. 

179-SO 

Ainnobility con"'pt : ' . 6. 10. 15- 16. !O6 

Ambush Alley : un 

Ambush opc:ration." . 15. :w-:n. 52 -5'. 75. 

88. 9 1-92. 95. 105. 12:3 . 127 . 130. 13'1. 

136. 155 . 180 

Amerinn ASIoOCiation for th .. Advancemem 

of Scic:ncc: (AAAS): 94 -95 

Amc:riun Embassy. Vietnam : 91 

Ammunition, 7.62·mm ; 51 . 7S , 11<1 

Ammunilion, bcchi" .. : 103 

Ammunition. ca nist ... : ]11 - IS 

AmmUIl ition supply: 86-87 

An Khe : 10 - 11 

An Loc : 11 5 

Ann Mar/pret Dam : ]19 

Amic ro]) operations: 89-94 

Anti ·intrulion devkn : <12 . 52-5' 

Anno. 

31th : 1]3 

69th : 1]1 - 15 

77th : 57 - 58 , 64 

AnnoreUlI)loymc:m : 110- 16. 127 - 28 . 1' 0 -

, .. 136 . 180 

Annorro Cavalry. ]1th 111 - 12. 115, 127 -

30. 132 . 1' 5- 36. 169. 174 . 176 

Anno,ro nvalry auault vehit '" (ACAV): 

tlO- ]2. ]27-28. 150. 135 

Annorro cavalry ~"'I )UI .. nt 

180 

107 - 16. 

AmlOred p.-uonnel ca •• ie,, : 9. III . ]15-

16. 153 

Anno.c:d R«onnaissanc .. Airborne Assault 

Vchick , M5~ I (Shc:.idan) 9. 21 . 111 -

12. 115 - 16 

Armo.c:d Vfhid.. Launc hf'd 6ridl\" 

(AVLH) ' 57- 58. 64 

Anny mM~manship train",!!: unit . 75 
190 INDt: X 

Amlyof It." Repubhc of ViCln~m (A RVN), 

171. 17), 182 

A'.b(l • ...., Baltahon. l!d 79- 80 

A"borne lIaluh"n 3d 79 -80 

Ca.-aIry. 7th : 59. 164 

~n) .... Gril'nncc Tum~ 164 , 168 

Corps. I ~6 

Coq >l, II : II 

(:Q,PI. Ill : :'4- 55 

Division, lSI' 56, 163 

Div;~lon . !:Ilh 137 , 140 

o.vi)lOn, 22d : 24 l!~ 

Nallon,,1 Police umu 16 •. 167 

paramilitary force. ; 162 -68 

P~Ol'lt $ stir Odenlot' F."cc 165, 168 

Popular Forc", troop> 76. 161 -6:' , 167 -68 

I'ro"me;al Refi)nnalssancc Unul 165, 

'68 

Ran!!". forces : 38 

RCRimcIlt . 7lh . " · 38 

Regiment , 4l!d 79 

RCI':,mcnl. 5-hh 164 . 167 

RCJ(ional Forro~ units : 164 . 167- 68 

Amell . P(tO: • . 36 

"'Iillcry 

4,h ' 57 , 63 

6th 53-!>4 

11th : 99 

l :'t h : 48 

191h , II. 20. 27 - 29 

201h , 28. " 

SO.h no 

341h 67-69 

3:'lh . 130 

77\h 10:. 

A~uh bolUI 27 

Aspuh IIdicoP1C' ComJnnies, 1$ 

481h 20 

12911'1 ; 20 

17911'1 : 20 

"luck h .. 1icoptc. companin IS 

Autom~ :d bntkfidd man~g~ffiC'm !ys. 

t~ml: S. 9. 156. 180 

Autom~ti( d~t~ prO(e»inll: !ystems: 9. 1-18. 

156- 57. 180 

Avi~lion Brigade , ht 159 

A>uuon Comp~ny . 92d II 

lb . Lie"'len~nl Colon.:1 ]40-4] 

Ba Ik'p 148 

8a Rai i~ r 69 

Ban M.: ThuOl. 8 

8 argn 7S. 77 

8 ur camp conSI'unlOn and oJl(r~tion. 21 -

22. SI. 148-61. 180. 182 

Ii ltl di rl d .IIU,,\lnation 20- 21 . 27.52.100. 

120 . 122 . 164 Su 61.10 Finn; March 

lilthu 

Bdl. MaJO' Waite. C. lSI 

Ik'il A.:rosystem air c ushion "chicle 76 

Ik'n Cui Rubbf,r I'laneation 112 

Ii.:" llet 79 

8,en H OI 124 

8 ... h Chua" IS1 

B",h Dinh P,o"",ce 24 . 29. 101 . 170 

Binh Duong Pro>-ince : IS8· S9 

Binh Gi : 173 

B",h Son Rubbf" Plam l1 : 87 

8 ntMISGItAM oprudon ~4 

Bland . L,eutenant Colonel Ivan C.' 68 

Body snarch operations : 17 - 18 

Boi Loi WQO(b : 92 

80mb. chemical . 8LUS2 : S8 

80mb. 10,000 pound. MI 21 ' S9 

Bombing operallOns 8. 24. 27 . SO. 32. 41. 

78 . Su 61,0 Ai, opeutionl. u cticaJ. 

llooby trap' : III. "0-". 157. 167 . 182 

Bulldolen ; 99. 104 . 112 - \ ' 

Bunke •. fJlswoflh ; 92 

Bunker lin" . 104 . 109. 149 

Bunke. UIoC' Restriction &mb (8 URB): " 

C~ Lu · 58. 64-65 

Cai Cam Rioe r 70 

Cal Lay: 69 -70 

Cambodian border san(luni", 6. 12. 98. 

104 . 17~ . 176 

Camp Oong Tam : 67 . 69 

Camp Enlf; 86 

Camp Ennl : 6S 

Camp Iiolloway II, 86 

Ca rgo . ling! : 6S- 64 

Ca)uahi~1: 27 . 29-SI. 4S. 49. 51. 68. 10 . 

73. 122. 128 -31. 17S. 177 

Casua ltie •. enemy : 12- lS. 20. 27 - 29, 43. 

46_49.51 .'>'1 68- 70 , 73 76- 18 101.103 . 

110.112.115.121 -22.124 . 129 . 155. 

173-14. 176 - 71 

Caudill . Captain WatSOn G -42- 13 

C~va lry 

4th ' 11 2, 137- 38. 148 

!uh , 26. 28. ~7. 60 

7th : 25 . 27 

8\h . 11 - 13. 25. 34.19 

9th : 12-IS. 20. 2~-27 

12th ' 11 - ]2. 25·27. 30,79- 80 

l7\h : 107 
IN DEX 191 

C~~~lry Di~;si(ln (Ainn(lb.I~) , IN : 10 12. IS. 

20. 2~ 2S . 27-29. '6-'7. '9. 78- 79, 

84 -8S, 10!l. Ill, 143, 169, 173 

Ca~a~os, L;o:u1f:nam Colollo:l Richud E. : 

~2 4' , 47, SI 

CU"," FAU-" 0l'('u.;on 89, IN, 116 

Ch«k~rbolrd te~rch .attia: 118-19. 126 

Cholon ; '8 

Chu Pong MoulI. ain : 12_15 

Chua Chan Moun.~;n : 127- 28 

Cire.: w~1 eotk : 8!1 

Civic ac.ion , 24-2!1. 14', 146, In 

Ciyil fairsop~utions : 141 . U. 146 

Civa Opera\lons and RO!yolution~ry [h,~d , 

opmem Suppon (CORDS) , 91 

Ci~ilian Irrqulu IkfeJ\te Group (Cl OG) 

um!" : 10- 11, 47- 48, 11 7.176 

Ci~ li ns : U2_". 1'9-4'. 169- 70. 178, 182 

ClaymorO! minCi. S££ Min~1 

C1c~ring opera.ions : 169- 71. 176-n 

Cit-mons. Sugun. Richard F.: 119 

Clovcrlnf «onnaiSl~ne~ formation : 42-

4'. ~5 

CN gal: '6. !18 

Coc r~n . Lieu.O!n anl CoIo~1 James F .. III ' 

.. Codes: 8S 

Co b~ 1 A~ ation Baltalion, 10.h : 20 

Comba. Enginrer Vehicle (CEV). M728 , 

112-U.115 

Combat Support Hdicopcu Company. 

228th : 6' 

"Comba. tr ~p" cluring opeutions: '9 

Combined 1\L~lIi enc~ Cen. e r, ViO!.nam ; 

1'2. 16S. 168 

Comm~nd and control : 17. 19.78.82_84. 

120 122. 126. 15S 

Communications sys.O!ml: 9, 78. 80- 86, 

l iS, 128. 1i9-80 

Comp~SI . m~Kn" ic pilol ' 64 

Compo."n : IS6-S;. 180 

Con'·oyopt'u.ionl ; 6. ~8 , 1!o 4-!o6. 169 

Cordon ~nd "'arch opt'utions ; 'I. '7 . 

16'- 68. 174 

CO"m;AOO X operation : 66- 71 

Corps. XXIV : S8 

CoqK Tactical 7.on"" 162 

I ; 16' 

II : 10 

III : 22. 127. 131 . U'f 

IV: 22 

CO' pllJ Citmll 8ay 161 

CowJand . I.i"utt"nam Co o~L WaJtf:r C.; 

107_10 

Criu,,"br'g,,' . Brig~dj('r General Willi. 0 .. 

Jr.' !I~ 

C, ulhrr. tramphibian . aclical ; 87 

C) mun.,ions: ' 4. '6-'8 

Cu Chi b;uc camp 148-!o8 

Cydon" f"n.,." log, 11 6 

Oa Nang airfidd 65 

Da 't'"u , ~2. <I!I-46 

Oak Hod. ai Vall")' : 79 

Oak To ; 78-96. 124 

I) ~nit'l . Cololll"l CharlCi D.: 25 

Darlac Pro"incc : 80 

Oau Ttrng : 1!o<I 

OaYid. Colond Bl'rt A.: 67. 70 

0.: SauMure. Brig~die r G<:nual Edward H . 

'" Dcccl"ion .ac.ics: 74. 9!1. 97. 99. 117-18. 

120. 1l!2-l!!!. 126 

Oefoli'llion oper~lio : '9. 89-9$ 

DaAwAu OIJeration : ~ 

!:klta project: Il!!! 

Ik' cc.on. pef'50nncl ' 72, 78. 80, lOS. 124 

Oi An ; 42 

Dirt rich. Li"u,enant Colon"l Frank l.. ' 

11 7- 18. 120. 122 

Dinh Tuong Proyince : 68. 70 

Dog5. we of: S<I. 42-0 . 4S, IS'. IS6. 141 

DSU-CSU SYSlml : 1!o6 

Oue Co Special ForcCl Camp ; I' 

OUSt control g"n.s : 4 1 

Dust ·off m~dical encualion ; '9-'f1 

EaRl" flight u ct iQ ; 16. 164 

Eaglr o~ . operations; 70. 77 

F.tMnon . Li"u.enam Colonc:1 Henry E.: 118 

EnKin~r Battalions 

7th : 64 

8th : 28. 3<1. '9. I 

I~ : 64 

26. h , II' 

27.h · 89 

28th : 129 

'!llh : 89 

62d : 89 

6S.h ; 149 

86th : 89 

9!1d : 87 

168th : 89 

Enginur Brigade. 20th : 88 
192 IND EX 

Engin~r operuions Su /lUO Tunnel during oJl("~liQns . 

ba~ ( amp coni'TUc,ion : ISO-5 1 

bridging ; I I!! 

oonsuuc.ion cquipmrm : 28.'9 

fire b:u.o (oNtlunion " 19, 10'· 04 

land dell.ing : 87 -89 , In 

landing zone construc,ion: !l8-'9, 41 

mine clearing ; 1'1 

ENSURE 202 Tank .Mounted Expendable 

Mine l~r : I." "Euh'ltion ofM«hanilnl and Armor Combal Opc:rl,ionl in Vic,nam (MACOV)" ': 

Ewell'" , Lieutenant C<i'ncra] Julian J.: 76, 1!i8 

Fairchild Aircraft Corporation ; 51 

Fairfield . Lieut.-nam Colond Ronald J.; 

II. 

Field Artillery 0 .. 1<1 Computer : LS6 

Fidd ·orcc . I: S4 . 50, 114 

Field Force. 11 : . 148 

Field FOlen. Vic\nam : ] I 

Fire support : 9. 12. 42 _45 . 47,49, S' . 78. 

lOS, 1'0. IS!>, 180. Su g/JO Cuns : 

Hclicopt<u ; ~I o"'illfn: Monars. 

cenual UIClinl (onu ol : S4 -S6 

nOalinllanilkry platforms: 6, 68-11 , 13. 

77 

hctTingbo"", fonnadon : 12.8 . 1304·'6 

int~.diC1ion fi : 99. 103 

"kilk. junio." and kill~. Jenio. M

• 100. 

,,, 

p.~pua ory fi.e : 30. 110 

" rety p.«aut;orn. : 50·31. 54. 168 

fir~ support . enemy ; 3. 8 . 99 · 100. -107-08 . 

128. 130. 148-49. 155 

Fire: support baleS : 6. 8 . 47 . 91. 97 . 106. 

148. 154 

AI ...... M .. : 68 

C"IMON VI: lOS 

C.oo~ 98- 101. 103 05 

FLO.mA ' 68 

FI.om. 101. 10S-05 

C.:oaCIA. 68 

flamClh.owen : 48 -49 

fla.n , II. 20. 22. 50. 52. 105. 120 

t10ating ai.craft maintenance facility : 161 

FO/Jon 25 

onyth~. Major Gencral Ceorge I. . 159 

Fon Benning. Georgia 75 

Fort Campbell . Kcntuo:ky : 124 

FOSl('r. ht Lieutenant Nathaniel W .: 53-54 

Fu~1 conuincf$ : 60. 86 

Cu. Src CN gil : CS munido ra. 

Cc-ncral support ompanin : 15 

General Support Group. 29th : 154 

Genera l Support Croup . 34th ; 158- 59. 161 

Cia Ray : 127.28 

Ciap. Gene ral Vo Nguy~n : 176 

Cibolon. LieUt~nlnt Colonel Edward C.; 149 

Cibolon . Colonel J ames M .: 57 

Clide,, : 22 

Cr~nade Launo:her. M79 : 9. S8. SI-S2. 6<1 

Cnu. I" Lieut~nant Donald E.: 26 

Cunboal$ : 6 

Cuns 

9O.mm . tank : Il l- 12 

152·mm.: III 

165·mm. demolition : liS 

17S·mm.: 54 

Ibda. Major Jc.ph E.: 99 

Ihmkt Evaluadon System : 157 

aml~t fesdval opcflliona : 139-42 . 169 

llawk Hill : 107-08 

lIay. Major C~ncral John II .• Jr.: 47 

Hd i~opten : 3.6. 14 . 179 

AH - IC(Cobra): 15- 18.2 1. 33. 72. 148. ,,, 

baJe camp den~ : 21·22 

body at~h operationl : 17 · 18 

CII- 21 (S haw~) : 15- 16 

CH-46 (Marine): S9 

CH- 47 (Chinook), IS. 20. 38 . 59. 84·86. 

91. ItH . ]60-6 \ 

command and (VnITO] role : 17. 19. 83-

M . 120. 122. ]26 

d~ccption taclia: H . 95 . 117·18. 120. 

123. 126 

DUJt ·off m~dinl ~vuuation : '9-4 1 

ngl~ night lactia : ]6. 164 

ngle float operaliOlu : 70. 77 

gunship fi.e support role : 8 . 10. 12- 20. 

22 -24.27.29_ 50. 32-33.43.04S.47-49. 

71 · 72. 100. 120. 128. 136 . ]48. 15S. 

IS. 

heavy equipment a nd w<:IllOns transport · 

39. 41 . SS. 84 

herbicide miDioN ' 90-9\ 

illumination syncm ( Light .. ing Bug .. 

Firefly): 20 

inldligence miuions : 17 - ]8. 2S 

jiunbug and Jeal operatiON : 72- 704 . 77 

lighl ob~.vation · 16- 18 

maim~nlncr . t<"Covery. and .rpair : 19. 78. 

86. 148. 151. ]58- 61 
INDEX 193 

Ilrlll"I"""" ('.o",,,,u<,d 

medical .. "icualion .olt' : 10.22-24.27. '8-

41. 9S. 12'-24 

monar patrol opendoTUl : 2! 

nap.uf" hf:·unh nigh!: 20 

nighloperalions: IS. 19-22. 26-27 

OV - IC (Mohawk): 20 

IICDOnnd dNtclion miS$ions : 72. 80 

p'ychological opeulion,: 26-27. 41. 145 

";OUI : 12 - 15. 16 - IB. 2'. 72 

lIC'I':urily miS$ions: 16. lB. 4S 

~k .. ,.;ref'ning mission, 9~ 

supply missions: 22-24.27. 58. ~7 60 . 62 

IUrns: 16- 19 

trOOP carrying missioJlJ: U . H. 25-!4 

tll l- I(l lu<,yJ 9.52-",!J9 62,116. 1011. ,,, 

UH- IA : IS-16 

UI-I- 18 : I~ . 20 

UH-IC: 22. 9~ 

UI I_ID : 20.84 

Ull- ID/ H (Nighthawk): 21. 100 

UH-I H (utiliIY): 16- 18. 2!. 159-61 

Herbicide A$SeSSmem CommiS$ion (AAAS) : 

94-9S 

Ic.bitidf: Revi .. w Commiu« ; 92 

Herbicide, : 78. 89-95 

Highway I: 127-28 

.Highway "5: I!B 

Hill. Liculcnam Colonel : 69- 70 

Hill 10 : 107 

Hill '4 : 108 

Hill 550; 117 , 119 ·20 

Hill 4~ : 117 -22 

Hill 675: 80 

1-10 Chi Minh Trail : ~7 

Hoa Hoi : 26-21. 50 

Hoa NhuI : 142 

Hoai An Di'lric!: 101 

Boening. Colonel John A.' 16' 

Ilolbom. hi I..ieuttnam Alden J.: 119 

HoLli •. t.bjor Gcooc ral Harris W .; 5 I. 157 

Ilowitu:n : 8. 28-29, 55 

0~ mm.: 17 . 20. 75. 99. 105. ISO 

IS~ mm.: 5'-!14, 105 . 120. ISO 

~ghl ·i nch : S4. 105. ISO 

HO"ilc Board : 10 

lIu .. : 165. 166-67, 175 

I-hll: CITY opernion ; '8 

Hut- Phu Sai airfirld : 65 

111111 : 25 

Bung Lac peninsula : 28 

Hum, Licutrnanl Colonel Jim I. : 165. 167 

I-lUaNG Tuuy In~ l"'It' 167 

Brie. Colonel Archie It.: 25-26 

Ia Orang : 10-2'. In 

Image Inlcnsificalion SYSlem. AN/ ASQ.-

1S2 ; 22 

IN FANT(lroquois Nighl Fighlf:r and Nighl 

Tracker): !2 

Infanuy baualion organization: 125 

Infamry Brigade. 1961h : 176 

Infanlry Bnllade: . 199th : l!4 

Inbnuy Oiyi.ioru 

hi: 57. 42-':". 56. 82. 84. 87 , 89. 97. 

10', II ~. 1S7 . 141 . 14'. 146. 169. 171 . 

174.176 

41h : 7S . 78-79, 8S. 124 , 10. 176 

Sih (M«haniled): 57-~8. 60, 65. 65. 85. 

169- 70 

9th : 66 -77 . 87. 176 

2Sd (Ame rical): 8S. 107. 115 

25th: 97. 99, \48 , 1:'0-S7 . 174. 176 

Infantry Rcgimtnu 

8th ; 79 

11th : 57 . 59-60 

121h : 49. 79 

181h : <It-n. 47·48. SI.!l6 

21st : 108- 10 

22d : 99-100 

261h: 48- 49. 157 

281 h : 47- 48. 56 

47,h : 67 -70 

51s1: 124 

601h : 67 - 70 

6hl! ~7-~9 

I"fnr .. d Inca,;ng devices : 20-21 . 76, 97 , 

105. 15'-54 

l", .IIAM ta~k fore .. , II 

nlclli~cncc0p" alions : 5. 17 . 25 . 117 . 124 

157 . 1:19. 1,>7 IM -68.174 lilO 

lronTria ,, ~1c a,n : 36, 89.174. 176 

Iroquois Nighl Fighler and Night Tracke. 

jINFANT).y.trm 22 

IIl\'INC operation , 24-4 1. 170 

JIII ... bull and ""II o peralions' 72- 14 . 77 

Johruon, 1st Lit:utrnam Gcoorgt P.: 4~ 

Joim Gcooc ral Slaff. R .. public of Viunam 

armro fOrCH : 90-91 

Joil1l U. S. Public Affain Offic .. OUS PAO): 

JUNa,O,. " CITY opt'ration 97 , 174 . 176 

JunK'" p"oclutor ')'l't .. m : 125- 24 
194 INDEX 

J"nll:l~ bU>ling u'chn'qun 112. 116 

J"Ilk n~tl . 2~ 

K;t .... m . Captain GrotK" R 107 

KIw Sanh platnu ~7·~8. ~-650. \69-70 

K,m Son vallC'y 24. 28. !8 

1i.;1I1I: Ranch land durinl': conc.,p', 87 

Kmnard. Major Gl'nrul Ib.rry W. 0 .: II 

Knight . Li<:o,ll"nant Colo~l Emmtu F.' 1~9 

Kontum : 79,86-87 

Komum I'ro,';nc(' : ,".19 

Korun unil$: 2·1-2;' .\1 

Ko.nn W ... 3, 8. LO . SO. n . !>!I. 80. 82. 

J:l2. ]26. 1~1. 171 , 180 

1..101 Kh .. . 88 

lam. tit'.." .. n"", Gl'nt'ral !l6 

LAM So:.' II Opc'ralion ' 15'-42 

Land dra.inll: ol"""lio"" 87 -89, 132 

l.andry. Captain John R.: 128 

l.amian !>ord ... op.,.a,;on. !l7. M . 114 . ]76 

Lanoon. Major ("-<ntral Stan I,,), R. II 

La.." 1:t'1«'1 dnl~alor 22 

l.auion. '''«UI k .. * 1;:,0 

1.C;~' (landinll craft, m.,(ham ... dj : 75 

1..(";tnrIS :to., 27 . 139. 144 - 46 

Iol("h,<,,,b<'rIC<'r . Capl~'" ko","" . 4' 

Ligll1ning IluK ~"rfh I kllmlll'!"1 Illumina 

lion System . 20 

I.ISCOI '< 0lxr3110n 20 

Lo4: Nmh : 42 .1a -!> 1 !l6. 88. 171 

Lockhn'd ~hS5il" ~nd p~u Comp~ny 22 

1..O!{I"inl Comm3nd hI I~~ 

l.on,lll Hinh : 87 . 1$1 . I~-I 

loOn,': 110 Ri,..,r . 69 

Lon,lll Kh~nh I'rovinc .. 127 

Lon,': N,IIIuyen : 46. 176 

Loudspt"akers: ~h-27 121-22.137.1'13-<\-1 

lSr (bndin,lll .h'll. lank) 67 

"Lu,lll ~ lu~( W~I .. r ("onuiner 6S 

~IA(:A.T"'-'. 0lxr3110n 79. 87 

McCall. 2d Li"uI .. n31l1 Iblph 0 43 

McFadden. Capuin Mike 119 

McGUire ",III : 123 

.\brl11nr gtm. $O~ alibrr 14 . 103. III . 

114 . 13!1 

MaehmrJo:un . M60 $2. 109. III . IS$ 

MeNamna. Robrn S. 36 

Mahon ... Colond /'I.:dson A . Jr 33 

Malnlenance 6auahon. nfllh 1!l6 

Major Army Subortlin~lr Command Ma n 

3ftem ..... Inrormallon System (,\SMJ S 

A): 1$6 

M"NII"TT"Sopt"Ullon' Ifl4 . 1701. 176 

~bnn . Major William M . JI 42 

~bo T ... ·TunK 173 

Marine Corp. unils 

Marine Amphibiou, Force. III : 60 

Martne Oivi,ion . 3d : fl7 -fl8. 60 

Marine EnRi ...... r Hillalion. Illh 6-4 

Maruloe LogiSllCI Suppon Unit : 62 

Marifloe Regime",. ~th : S8 

Marine R .. gimenl . 71h : S6 

M ..... hok . hI LicuLenanl John A . Jr. 119 

M"}"u- W,,,.rr, W,sCopcUlion : S7 

Ma~kl.. prOt"':I;'·C: .H. 72 

l'ola)·rr. Caillam FrroNick F . 26 

Mcchanil .. dinfa ... ryopr.~tio " !l9-60.ISO 

Medbrry. Ma jOr Wad .. t: J'.' 107 

Mnilul Ci.ie A("Ioon }"OlIram (MEDeA}') 

140 

Mroiul Ol"'ulion~ 

..... acualioll by heheopL"' ; If!. 22-24.27 . 

~8 41. %.123 - 2'1 

IrUtm .. "1 of ci'iliaru. "7. 1-10-41 

MekonR o.,lla 6. 8 . 66 . 6/1 17::! 

Membra.ne. nylon. n 7 -I I 

Menetrry. Major l.ou,s C .. 47 

~Inrlson . Man""" S 94 

Mlha . Lieutrnam Colond Carmelo P . 64 

Milnary p~)'. V,rtnam .• ptcm : Ifl6 

Milllary RegIOn IV IN 

Milloy. Majo. Crne ... l Albrn £. : 14' 

Mille W~rfar~ Crnttr (USARV) : 31 ~2 

Mm" 111. 128. In. 13-1 . 167 

da)'morr 9 . 13. ~8 . ~3. ~6. 10~ . 109. 

120. 123. 130 

eounle rmca~Ur" 131. 1!o7. 182 

drtf"Cuon ; ~. ,,~ . 136 

nuiunee milllnK 130 

Mmh Thanh ' 1 ~ 

M""Kun. 7.62 mm . XM 27: 17.21 - 22 

Mlly Mite (RIot Cumrol A,lllCnt Olspcrucr. 

M106) 37 

MobIle n04ltlnlC basc~ 67-71 

~lol"le Ri' er;"e 'o rce 66-7 1. 77 

MOST""" M" Lu;ll. 0pcullon: ;'7. 60. 62 

rr~ .. 8. '0. '8. tl~ 101. 10l. 120 

Muller. 6.i,':adlel Gen .. ul Henry J . J •. : 56 

My Tho 68 . 70. 77 

My Tho R"'rr 67 

Natl<mal Academy or Sciences 9;' 

"':CR (Natlonal CalIh ReR"'rr) :.00 com 

!'utcr 1;'6 

Nnlo, l"OlI'arn 85 

New Yo.k T""tJ '6 

Nha '1 ranK 14 

N,""AIl. .. F",.u 0l ... r~tlon 89 

t\'leholson. 1.'''Ulenanl Colonel Tom M 84 
INDEX 195 

NIght ob!o('",,'~uon devlcr:I : 20-22. :'2, 76. 

97 103-0:'. 112. II:". 134. 164 . 180 

NiKhtoprrations: 6. 8. 13. 19 -22 . 26-:n. 

47. !to -:' I. :"3. 89. 123 

Nonh Vir,namn<' Ind Virt ConK .HIIIS 

Ha llahon. !,,h 12 1- 22 

H~ lIalion . 261~t: 68 

Ranalion. 26:k1 68 

Hallahon. :"l4lh : 68 

Oivi~ion . ht , 78 

OiviSlon. !!d ' 108 - 10 

Oi"islon. 9th 42 . 4:" -46. 171 . 173 

o.vlSlon. 304th . :.9 

D,,'ISI01l. 610th : 24 

Local cr Ii allalion . 72d 107 

local ~orcr Company. V- 13: 107 

local Fortr Complmy. V- 15 107 

Mam FOI c" Ballahon . 70th 107 

Re,l:imclll.2d 27 - 28. 101. 103 

Rrgimelll . 24th , 79 

Rcgimt'fll . 32d 10 . 79 

Rr,l:lmt'nt . 'Sfl 10. 12-14 

Rtg"n .. nt . 66th : 79 

R<,g lmcnt . 9:'th , 117 . 170 

Rcg;mt'nt . 16!>th . 46 

Rcg"nefll , INth 79-80 

l( el/:ill\CIOI . 27hl 42 . 46 

RCJi:lmtnl. 272d 46. 48-49. 101. 113 

Reglmt'nt . 27St! 46-49 

RrJ(",!<·n, . 27:'th 127 

Nonon. ;Ioh",r CenNal lohn: 25 -26 

Nuj M,<,,,, Mounta"l) 25 . 27 . 3~ 

Nuoc NJtOl Bay 27 

Obsc-rvallon o",c~ 104 , 134 

O·Con nor. Major Ceneral Ct-oq(r G 69 

01'11(11 tc0l~ 101 

O"r''''ltrh .C"tOnfla, .. al>Ce 45 

I'aeir,ulion ' 3. 8, 137 . 142, 146. 149, I::'::'. 

170. 174 , 176-78. 182 -83 

Pa.kt'. , Majo. Ct'nrnl Da"id 5 41 

Patrols S, 18. 123-26. 180 

Pat,t'rIl anal)'Sis: 5 

P"'UL BL'NVA" operation 89 

Pearson . B.iJtadie. Ceflnal WIllard 123 

P~~, L,eutenant Cenc.al Williatn R . 78. 

114 , 124 

I'eoep.ime 41, 132 

Prople sntffe. ~' 78 , SO, 124 

I'epke. MajOr Ccfleral Donn R 7:'. 143 

I'crsonncl Managt'menl and Accounting 

Card Procnso. (I'ERMACAP) system: 

,,, 

Petroleum p,ooucu 60. 86 

Phan Ra nI{ 8 

Phan Thir, , 114 

I'hilippinr Constabulary , 162 

l'honK Cao 11 7-26 

l'hoflK Dinh Province ' 144 

I'hu Cat MountaiflS : 23 

PhuConlC : 148 

Phu CuonJt 139. 141 

I'ltu !..oi Ib~ Caml): 142 

1'",) V ",sc operation : 166-68 

Phu Xuan R''''' ' 108 

!'hue . Captain 140 

l'hunJt Il ie l' D,stricl : 144 

Pineapple Fornt : 107 

!'lciMc 10- 14 

I'lei Mroflg 8:' 

I'leik" , 8, 10 - 11 , 87 

I'ol .. i Klfnll : 8:. 

Popul~!IO" ronuol 25 . 41 , 169. 182 

l'ropaltanda 92 9~ , 149, 164 

I'roth.,.o, Captalll MIchael B,; 107 -08 

>rovi"d~1 Road 6C: II 

I>rovisional CoTP'. Vietnam . 60 

I'sychologieal opoeUIIOfU ~27. oil. 121-

22. 131. 137, 141 · 46 

I'umps : 60, 62. 86 

Quafl LOt 'i8. $6, 88 

Quang Nltal P,o"lIIee 132 

Qu~nlt Till I'fo,·inc., 107 

Radar 

AN f l' l'S· 4 : 33, 104 -0$ 

A N / !'I'S- !) : 33, 101 , 103-0!> 

1(1'0ulld COlli foiled approach : 63-64 

nillhl "'Ston role : $2,97 . 99- 101 . IM-O!> 

.adar raids 33-31 

Radio broadca~1 openllo'u ; 2::. 

Radio colllmuniutiollJ, ' 82-8:', 113 

RadOKvICh. ht L,eutenant WtlMn : 128, 

' 36 

R"''''t '' 11.0."'1) operation : 90-91 

hlio"~ 8. 123 

R«ondo 0,,0('.at;on5 119-24 

Rn;oflnalUanc., ;fl forcO(' ope.auo", : 31. 

IS., 180 

RU'''Gu< task fOfce : :'8- 60. 62 4 

Repair pans- 156 

Rt'SC and rNuperallon p.ogum. 149. 151. 

'51 

Rnupply Op<'UIIQ>U 86·87. 1!i4 -!i5 . Su 

ClU ... '\11 .upply : Helicopter •. 

Rr~olullona.y Ikvd.,pm<,nt !'rOflram 173 
196 INDEX 

Rifle. 

M I : 9 

M14 : 51 . 7$ 

M16 ' 9. -$2 

RIot comrol "1I:"nw 27 . '4. !l6 -'8, 72 

R".,rino: opeutionl 6. ,I. 66-77, 166- 67 . 

180 

Rocket. aerial . 2 75 folding 'fin . M': 14 . 17. 

22. :n. ' 7, 95 

RockC:"prOl'dlrd .l!n:n"d" (RI'C) SCTttn : 

109 . 11~ 6 

il.omc: pIOWopc:uLion. : 21, 87 -89, 9 1, 132, 

K '" ()()t. Lieut"nant Colo.,.,] Jam~ T : 26. 50 

\t(l6O,()n, Lieutenant Gc-nrnl William B.: 60 

Routes 

I 2$, 107 . 132 

9 : $8. 64 

I' : 88-89 

14 : 86 

92 57 

$ 12: 79 

926 : 51-58.64 

QL I', 89 

Run,ll; 5,,1 Sprl'"ial l..oM 9'- 9<1 

Saigon : 6, 8. 17'. 176 

SaigQIl SUpJ)Or! Command : 154 

Sab!,:u. Privale. Fim Class Roy : 26 

SalL<':r, Capeain (USN) Ro~n 5., 68 

&arch and dcwoy opcr:uionl : 169- 71. 

173-14 . 176- 78 

S<-"chlighu; : 21. $2. 76. 99- 100 

5«uringopt"ralio"' : 169- 71, 174 . 177 . 182. 

S~f a/JI) Cordon and search opcration$. 

~""",I(urrrli b w~.fa'." 12' 

.xruon: 5,9. 21. !H . 5', 97. 99-] 01 . 

10'-05. 12'. 15~ . 180 

Sh~ped. charg~ 104 . 109 

S"n.'M'OO"" II oprr~"on SI.89 

Sh",ridanfArmo rnl "ronnalss~nr" A"bom" 

iUo~uh Vehide) :9. 2 1. 111 -12, 11 5 - 16 

ShilldaRh miMil,, : III 

SiW'al Baualions 

13th : ~ 

1241 h : 8S 

.,,,Id FOl"<:f : 82 

SIgnal Brigadf. hI ' 80. 8% 

Sllvuy. Caprain Stt'phfon. Jr.' 119 

Smoke. tactinl u..., of, '0. 54 . 57 . 4'. 9S , 

120, 122 

Snillt"rs: 74- 76. 10' 

Sniprncopr; 52. 75 

Soui Ca Valky : 27 -28. '8 

5o,';c, ,,"('apons : 49 

Spuial Forces Group. 5,h : 123 

Spuial Oprrations Squadron. U,h : 91 

Spuial Wa,fa'e Aviation Ik,achm('nt (Su, ' 

...,iIIancf). Ud ' 14 

Spe«h SC'Curi, y apJulnll1l : 85 

Spf<'<! shift ho ... iucl ,c<chnique : 53- 54 

Spotling KOpr. M49 : 74 

Spray .Iys,cm. C- 123 Me I (Hourglass): 90 

SSII miuil,, : 28, S!I 

Sta rlighl .lCopn : 42. 52. !>6. 76. 99. 10!> 

S, arry. Colonel Donn A.: li S 

Sligall . Lit:utrnam Colonel Arthur D.: 49 

Slil"'cli . Lieut"narlL ~M",l Richard G .: 

17' 

Srrat"g}" and I~elia ' 3. 5. 127. 171. 17!I- 78 

Suoi Cat : 127- '6. 169 

Supply and TranlllOTI au~lion. 25,h : 1!>4 

Suppo .. Com ~n . 251h Division (O[S· 

COM): 155 !>~ 

,~ctical ~'us of IIU".,",," conc"p' : 54 -56. 

16' 

Tactical Ol)('utiolls eCI" r, ' 101. 107. 148 . 

168 

Tam li. y: 107 - 12. ]69 

~n C~"h : 79- 80 

Tan Phuoc li.ha nh 1!17- 42 

Tankt : 110- 11. 113 Su D/.w Armo. fm 

ploymCrlL 

'Iap An Bac, II' 

TarR(,1 acquisilion 5.20 -22,34 , 45 . 52.56. 

76. 97.J 101./ 103-05,1 11 2., 115 . IS!1 -34. 

164 . 180. Su o/JO Sensors. 

Tar!!e, iderlLificaLion n, 52. 72 

I"ax collc<c,ing poi",~ : 76. 89. 91. 14 2 

T~y Ninh ' 98. 11 '. 154 

Teh"ky. Fred II. !H 

Te\nco"" lighu 75 

Td"vlSion d",c<ctlo n : 22 

Truu. prccu, kill : I!>O 

Tcrrorism : , . 142 

Tt' orrellSiv,, : 66. 16'. 176- 77 

T il .. "" I opc radoll : 24 

T hi('u. NII\IYt'n Van ' 45 

Thua Thi"n P,oy;n« : 162- 6' 

- rhundcrrun" lInk,cchniqu" , 1!!I- 14. \]6 

' -I('r. Li('u,('nam Colond Ra l,had 0 . 49 

Tol .. m. ajor~ncraI hnJ .. 1]1 : I II 

Tra(ton; : 87 · 89 

Tri T am ; II~ 

Truck. ~on : 86 ·87 

Tu,""rong Valley , 79 
INln; x 197 

Tunne! dearing o~ration~: 28, 34 -37 . 41. 

.. Tunnel Explorer LocalOr SY5tem : 31 

Tunnel ral IUmS : 28 . 31. 41 

Turbine engin('5 : 10 

Tuy Hoa : 20 . 117 

Ulima,, : 27 

U .. ,o,.-rowN rll BoX5PRING Or~ra,ion : 124 

UNIVAC 1005 computer: 156 

U.S. Agency for In,eln.uiona! Develop· 

Illenl : 91 

U.S. Army A"iadon T es, Board : II 

U,S. Arllly Combat l)evelopments Com · 

mand : 134 

U.S. Army Compuler System Command : 

'56 

U.S. Army Concepl 'I-e,m in Vielnam (ACTrV): 75. 159 

U.S. Army Finane .. and Compuollu Infor· 

ma,iOl1 SYSlemS Command : 156-57 

U.S. Army Malniel Command : 134 

U.S. Army Military Police School : 45 

U.S. Army " adft., Mapping and Intelligence 

Gt-nl(r : 150 

U.S. Congr<'SS : 95 

U.S . Dc.,a"mcnl of Agriculture : 94 

U.S. Dc.,anmcnl of l">cfense : 90. 94 

U.S. Dcpartment of State : !Xl 

U.S. Joint Chiers of Starr: 36 

U.S. Marine Corps: 10. 60. Su auo Marine 

Corps unil5. 

U.S. Military AMistanc .. Comma",l . Vicl ' 

nam (MACV): 36. 90-9 1. 124 

U.S. N,,'Y : 25 . 27 . 30. 67 - 71. 161. 167 

U.S. Pacific Command : 159 

U.S. Srrat .. gic Air Command : 32 

Utili,y laniul Iransportation company ' 14 · 

16 

Valley 506 , 24. \03 

Van Harlingen. Bril(adicr Ceneral William 

M .. Jr.: 80 

Vanderl(rifl Combat Ba.., : 60. 62 

Vang Tau : 151 

Vehicles. trad ... d : 6, 8,58- 60. 64. SUI auo 

Armor employment ' Armored pe.wnnel 

carrieT$: Tanks. 

Viel Cong infrastructure : 137. H2 . 144, 

]46, ]57, 162- 68. 170 

Viel Cong units. Su North Vielnamese and 

Viet Coug uni,s. 

ViO'lnamese Agricultural Scrvic .. , 14\ 

'Viernamnc units. Su Army of Ih .. R"lmbli c 

of Vi .. lnam (ARVN). 

Vinh Cu, 148 

V,,,,, Loc operalion ' 162-68 

Vinh Long : 69- 70, 77 

Visual signals , 30.64.120.122 

War 7.one C : 6, 92. 94 , 9i-98. li6 

War 7..on .. 0 ; 6. 46. 92. 94 

Walet supply : 62- 63 

Wdls, Captain John W., Ill : 112 

Weres.zynski . Major l,",nry J.: 137 - $8 

W!.'Slmoreland. General William C. : 10. 12. 

34. $6. 56. 12-1. 149. 171. 177 

\\' .. yand . Major Ceneral Frederick C ,: 54-

Williams. " Li .. ut .. n~m Colon .. 1 Paul S., Jr.: 

Wirf '" barri .. r~ : i2, 104 . 109 

World War 11 : 3. 30.53.82, 11 2. 122 . 126. 

143. 15 1, ]62. 180 

Xa C, t : 103 

Xuan Loc , 124. 127 . 130 

YF.LLOWSTONF. operalion : 154 

7.a;l. Ma ior General Mcr-'in : 143. 162 

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