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Richard Danzi

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

1999 
well as Joint Forc Quarterly, a professional military jour

Chairman. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed 

solely those of the authors, and do not necessarily repre

National Defense University, the Department of Defen

Government agency. 

Completed under a grant from the 

Center for International Political Economy to the 

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 

at Syracuse University 

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without 

that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Pres

courtesy copy of reprints or reviews. 

NDU Press publications are sold by the U.S. Governmen

ordering information, call (202) 512-1800 or write to t

Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing

First printing, June 1999 

v/ 
3. 

4. 

5. 

About the Author 

Countering Traumatic Attacks 

Sustaining Domestic Support 

Conclusion 57 

63 

3

5
on other topics, as well as those discussed here, 

analysts concerned with national security in ot

this essay was completed, I returned to the D

Navy as its Secretary in November 1998. 

While looking forward to discussing thes

colleagues in the Pentagon and hopefully r

described in these pages, I should emphasize th

made here are personal, not official. They sho

as U.S. Government policy. 

Because my thinking on these ideas has 

number of years and benefitted from many 

impossible to identify all those who made contr

be remiss, however, if I didn't note the specia

my former assistants, Ms. Pamela Berkowsky

Cosgriff, USN, Captain Trell Parker, USN, Colo

Colonel Jay Paxton. I have for them the grea

affection. I would like especially to note 

indebtedness to a dinner meeting focused on th

by Colonel Russ Appleton, USMC, and to the 

College Current Strategy Forum, which pro

keynote address speaker, the opportunity to 

these issues. Elsewhere in the Department o

Marshall, Hans Binnendijk, and Naval Reserve 
privately employed part-time secretary while 

offer special thanks for her inexhaustible patienc

X 

a war with Iraq has been followed by years of co

sanctions and inspection; and a half-century afte

Korea, America still faces a constant and unpredi

that peninsula. In addition, state-sponsored a

terrorist groups explode bombs at American em

bases, and in American airplanes. Nuclear

biological weapons are proliferating. Ethnic and 

lock in conflict so extensive and bitter that e

interests are not directly at stake, as in Bosnia o

are imperatives for intervention. The challenges 

20th century are immensely demanding. 

But beyond the present lie other, proba

important, longer term issues. Commendably, U.

have tried to attend to the long term. After the 

Soviet Union in 1991, for example, the Depart

(DOD) emphasized the importance of "preventiv

Pentagon's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review 

to "shape" the environment as well as to re

American policy has sought to be farsighted, t

before they reach the point of crisis. There 
of attention is devoted to a decade as yet un

things, we rush to cure while underinvesting in 

interest regrettably reinforces this inclination

shape the reputations of today's decisionmakers

energy and skill with which the next decad

anticipated will be evaluated a decade from 

hundreds of other inputs. 

To these universal tendencies may be added 

particular era. We are not accustomed to think

in which tomorrow's challenges may be ve

today's. Over the last half century, American p

had little occasion to exercise the skills or disc

transcend the urgent in favor of the longer te

War II we faced an immediate, fundamental 

more than four decades after that war, Ameri

task and its most important longer term security 

same: to combat communism as incarnated i

and its allies. There was little need to think very 

the long term as compared with the present

predecessors built an intellectual framework for 

was comprehensive, consistent, and, in its cent

4 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
characteristically perceptive about much that was 

ventured that if Japan did not surpass the Unite

domestic product (GDP) by the year 2000 

surprised. ''I Or consider the conference of 35 o

Russian experts, assembled by the estimable Ce

and International Studies in 1983. The rapport

"All of us agree that there is no likelihood wha

Soviet Union will become a political democra

collapse in the foreseeable future. "2 Our head

only a short stretch of the road before us; we 

many curves that lie ahead. 

Even if we saw the future, it would be 

challenge to react to it appropriately. In s

diagnosis and prescription are not very clos

However uncommon it is to discover a reflecti

IHerman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Supersta~ (

University Press, 1983), 94,130. 

2Robert F. Byrnes, ed., After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet 

(Eng3ewood Cliffs, NJ: Prenlice-Hall, 1970), xvi-xvii. I am indeb

The Russian Tragedy: The Burden ofHistory (Armonk, NY: M. E

for calling attention to this passage. 
"fathoming the unfathomable" of the future

cash" by converting their insight into policie

present value. Put another way, it is necessa

fluently bilingual: they must translate the pres

and then interpret the future prospect back int

Either of these tasks is immensely difficult; t

daunting. 

Finally, there is a paradox. To the exten

future and effectively address it, then the futur

as we anticipated it. This is especially so because 

is a competitive business. When we respond t

would oppose us adapt to counter our res

sufficient to be farsighted; we must also const

not possible to be enduringly correct. 

Yet when all this is assimilated, and the 

challenges and the probability of failures are a

visions of the future provide the most importa

in the present. At a minimum, we place pre

perspective-we evaluate their importance an

intuitively assuming what the future will be lik

to improve that process by making possible fu

6 The B~g Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
crystal ball clouds over and we are left to g

said--what had gone wrong for America from a 

standpoint, between 1999 and 2029? Wh

Something unforeseen? 

From discussions and reflection in response 

I have distilled three risks that warrant better 

attention, and a better targeted, richer invest

energy, and treasure. 

Given the opening observation that we c

future, why is this a valuable discussion? 

independent answers, any of them valid, 

exercise. If several are persuasive, the effort i

warranted. First, whether the views here a

misguided, they will serve a good purpose 

broader debate about what others see in the cr

the resulting discussion tells us nothing about t

it can tell us a great deal about 1998. The 

investor, Warren Buffet, is credited with hav

commented that predictions about the stock 

about the stock market than they do about t

those doing the predicting. For Buffet, this imp
they are presented here, they underlie our day

security decisions and investments as the uncon

the conscious. Raising these matters to the sur

articulate what is usually inchoate can improve 

about the present. Discussions about the 

decisions are sounder if the foundations 

perspectives are better understood. 

Second, even though some fundamenta

perspective will persist after discussion, the 

sensitize policy makers to indicators that may l

views. For all their uncertainty, predictions h

aspect--they are ultimately verifiable hypothese

But time speaks initially in whispers, amplifyin

the years pass. Discussing our expectations 

better listeners. When we are sensitized to wh

anticipate, we may, more quickly than an unp

pick up clues that a scenario is unfolding o

occurring. 

Third, this approach offers us an opportun

underinvestment. These pages offer no 

comprehensiveness; this not an essay about ever

8 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
new century. 

What these pages can do is focus our attenti

problems that loom above the flatland of natio

encouraging us to look up, to focus beyond 

events that fill our calendars and our minds. If 

induce debate about the contours of our lon

about plans to minimize these risks. That deb

robust and worthwhile decisions without bein

future. We don't have to predict an airplane 

identify its site, to think it is worth mapping th

precisely because we cannot be confidently pred

well advised to hedge--to try to understand wh

wrong and to mitigate those contingencies. 

Finally, our predictive capability, tho

imperfect, can be improved through group d

people will be more insightful than others. If d

the future are like most others, an exchange of v

understanding. As a recent mantra from the c

puts it, "No one is smarter than everyone." If a 

discuss what is really important over the lon

likely to determine more correctly what matters. 

first paragraph of a review written in 2029, t

preview were critical of our national secu

investments at the end of the 20th century. P

had failed to focus adequately on what prove

important national security problems. What w

text most likely report as our failures? 

There are many candidates for answers to 

should be subject to debate. This essay outlin

describing three risks that should be of greater c

the next decades: 

• Renewed competition with a major mil

• Traumatic attacks, particularly from non

(NEW) weapons 

• Erosion of support. 

Let's review each of these risks and the imme

hold promise of reducing our vulnerability. 
can be countered by the United States if, with its 

it has the will to do so, as exemplified by Dese

Paradoxically, this American ability to proje

to any region gives us a responsibility that kee

completely at peace, as we have seen in recent 

and frustrations of our efforts to quiet regional tu

very substantial accompanying anguish shou

obscure the extraordinary circumstance in 

ourselves. We have a double privilege: we en

most fundamental sense, because there is 

credibly threatens to dominate this nation by m

we can extend this security to almost any nat

protect. In short, we have no major military co

of achieving a military victory, so long as we p

oppose it. 

This is a gift from those who preceded us 

national security. There are differences of opi

of our predecessors and which of their strategi

roles in putting us in this privileged positio

intense and appropriate debates about whe

should spend our patrimony (Kuwait, Bosn

12 The B~ ~II~ree: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
Union in arms but also to discredit its Marx

generously shared, it brought potential and for

such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, into a comm

values and has a large stake in the present int

Our economic and political ideologies and 

appeal and evident success that helped to persu

Germany, Italy, and Japan before) to adopt a 

These observations suggest a first conclusion 

The gift of advantage we have been given will n

easily endure; maintaining that advantage re

commitment, well-conceived strategies, costly 

luck, all to an extent we now only imperfectly 

our most important challenge. Just as we judge 

predominantly by the gift they have given us, o

judge us by how well we sustained it. If, in 2029, 

threatens the existence of the United State

matches our military strength, and no regional e

and sustain military force in the face of 

opposition, then we will have succeeded. On t

we do not sustain this gift, history will judge us 
An adversary could try to exceed us in 

projection, to dominate territory by the us

explosive weaponry, but it need not seek to ove

own terms. Rather, it could seek to disable u

power by undermining our will or ability to d

Attempts to do this, attempts predominantly 

anxiety, despair, disruption and confusion

"traumatic attacks." 

To the extent that our power inhibits tr

competition, we increase the likelihood of 

methods asymme~ic warfare. In warfare and 

as in physics, every action produces an opposin

strength invites exploration of a different aren

a weakness. If we are perceived as unb

conventional battlefield, our opponents wil

unconventionally and in other settings. 

Having learned the lesson of Desert 

competitors are especially likely to be draw

methods and strategies. In warfare, as in bu

tendency for a dominant power to overinve

mirror-image competitors. Smaller actors 

14 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
century. Diminishing the risk of a major milita

properly be our most important concern, but in 

as in the past, our most prevalent problems 

opponents who are not major industrial state

expected to fight as such. 

Technologies of destruction have developed 

so as to give groups, third-tier and second-tier 

major competitors the power to destroy or disru

the battlefield. Our global effort to control nucl

missiles continues to be worthwhile, but it is im

ground. Worse still, we are witnessing the 

inexpensive, accessible, and invisible technolog

weapons"--that do not require missiles for 

technologies, including biological, chemical, 

warfare" weapons, increase the capabilities 

terrorist groups, and individuals. 

Since the Chinese invention of gunpowde

warfare has focused on effecting or preventing e

To date, terrorists challenging a country's secur

have used explosive weapons. Our attention h

by the domestic bombings in Oklahoma and 
biological, and radioactive materials can be use

in conjunction with explosives. Add to this ars

warfare," which can be waged by computer to 

data and software and, in consequence, the syst

An airplane can be destroyed not only by a bo

no less effectively by misguiding its 

communications systems. These NEW wea

forms of attack can be applied simultaneousl

systems. Regardless of whether NEW weapon

role against soldiers in the century to come, t

well suited to attacking civilian populations a

Their traumatic effects can be expected to be 

unfamiliarity and invisibility. 

This proliferation of offensive power goes h

an increase in the vulnerability of what we m

interconnection and interdependence of civilian 

as we expand telecommunications, travel, u

international commerce. The increasingly c

human society, with its ever-greater densities a

virtual and real interaction, increases bot

destructiveness of attacks that will traumatize

16 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
communications have been embraced by the A

as speedier, more accessible, cheaper method

familiar tasks-but the technology transforms 

means. Though it may take some time to fully a

telecommunications can change the purpose o

Contemporary communication is immediat

and has a high amplification. It is immediate no

is quick, but also because it feels (often incorr

there is no intermediate actor to soften or distort 

What was once out of sight, and therefore large

now salient. What used to have little impact, bec

is now known while in process. Because the

channels of communication, and they are so ac

ubiquitous. Elites no longer control information

no longer control decisionmaking. Furtherm

amplifying and echoing effects, contemporary 

induces wave reactions. Pivotal incidents reporte

colored by the media and private telecommun

investor, public opinion, and decisionmaker re

disproportionately disruptive effects. The resu

NEW weapons, but also a new warfare. 
y , 

target: military forces. Wars were won on bat

Storm fit this mold. But the enemies in th

warfare may not choose to fight on battle

advantage is too large in that setting. 

The strategy of traumatic attack ignores arm

uses them as props for theatrical points. Traum

not to defeat armies, but instead to eviscera

them, making primary what was previously sec

divert or diminish the public will to utilize what 

be overwhelming force. Democracies are partic

to these attacks, as shown by the three lead

examples of this strategy in its nonviolent form: 

passive action, guerrilla warfare in Vietnam, an

in Northern Ireland. These merely foreshad

possibilities, as traumatic attack strategy ga

proportion to the immediacy and e

communication. For those who are unscrupulo

in glove, with NEW weapons. 

NEW weapons and the new warfare are lik

civilian populations, including the America peop

be tempted to blackmail us by holding civilia

18 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
national defense. The work of our security e

been directed to the use of force; other groups 

addressing public opinion. The 21st century seem

down those distinctions. Our second great ris

sufficiently preparing for and responding to t

traumatic attack both inside and outside the Un

The Risk of Erosion of Domestic Sup

While the first two risks would stem from the acti

third risk stems from our own politics and 

3Another kind of unconventional risk that erodes boun

considered. In an increasingly interdependent world, the ex

another nation's domestic conduct may physically damage ou

Saddam Hussein offered a small, wartime taste of this type of 

intimidate Saudi Arabia by dumping oil in the Persian Gulf. B

subtler. If, for example, global warming is accelerated by intens

failure to address another nation's use of these fuels thr

agreement (as with acid rain) may present a 21st-century chall

Failures of health practice, refugee control, nuclear safety, or 

drug lords and other criminals may similarly spill over borders 

otherwise be a domestic matter international. Those concerned 

in the 21st century need to think more broadly than has been 
erosion of support for security investments. Th

intensified if, simultaneously, DOD is viewed as 

compounded again if there is a gap between 

corps and American civilian society. Difficu

perceived in all three of these dimensions. A

problems would be perilous; together, they mu

and constitute the third of the great risks to A

The erosion of the rationale for security 

diplomatic or aid initiatives is, like the risk of tra

some measure a consequence of our gift. The th

Soviet Union elicited a strong response from 

now it is no more, and lesser evils abroad 

directly threatening this country. For som

probably sustain a substantial effort, like 

momentum and rhythm keep him running beyo

As we adjust to the fact that the old race 

questions will multiply as to why and how fast w

running. 

In a time of relative peace and fiscal pressur

answers to these questions become less com

defense budget of more than $280 billion pe

20 ~ Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
become increasingly controversial. 

For much of the last decade, controversy o

budget was softened by the Armed Services' ab

the stockpile of assets accumulated during the 

resources will not, however, sustain a 21st

Consequently, it is likely that either defense 

increase or defense capabilities will erode. 

The rise of a major competitor, or our f

traumatic attacks, would rekindle enthusiasm 

support for defense expenditures. But if the first a

do not materialize, there is a substantial likelihoo

one will. America has always relaxed in the ab

and present danger. Avoided competition and pr

are not like battlefield successes--they provoke n

ironically, diminish the support that made them p

an environment, inefficiencies and waste wo

penalized. When in past decades defense expen

$100 hammers and $150 wrenches were identi

and antagonism were expressed, but budgets 

The danger from the Soviet Union bought leeway 

securily budget that is unlikely in the future. 

R
population have all decreased this ratio. 

representation of women in political and prof

their acceptance as a substantial source o

changed the equation. Of the more than 3.

women who turned 18 in each recent year, fe

have served in the military, or about one in 18

of the new century, the figure will be only on

This means that fewer civilian leaders wi

understanding of the sacrifices of comfort, sa

being, and family life made by members of t

Fewer voters will understand what it means 

face danger, or what the consequences might 

inadequate training and obsolete equipment. 

have children who may be called to go in h

lawmakers will have personally experience

between preparedness and peace. 4 

4As recently as 20 years ago, more than 60 percent of th

had military experience. In the just sworn-in 106th Congres

House and 43 percent of the Senate have been in the ar

Congress to sit in the 20th century, may have the least m

Nation's history. The 21st century will likely exacerbale the 

22 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
everyday life that separate civilians and servic

students at many universities, and most no

institutions, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROT

not available, and military service is not regar

career option. As the military has contracted, r

of officers are drawn from service academies 

fraction from civilian colleges. Later in their care

will receive their advanced education in mili

civilian, graduate schools. Rarely do civilian

institutions. Further, military communities p

commissaries, and medical systems that distance 

Americans (although base realignments and closu

the number of these communities). 

This problem will intensify if the military, 

officer corps, is perceived as hostile, or at be

assimilating women and minorities. The U.S. Ar

been more successful than most other U.S. institu

opportunities to historically disenfranchised sec

society, but minorities constitute less than 1

~l'hese estimates are drawn fro,n data provided by the De

Center. 
itself as African-American, as Hispanic, or o

European; by the year 2050, this is expec

percent. Yet, 85 percent of the officers now in 

military do not describe themselves this way

than one in seven U.S. military officers is a wo

Some components of this arithmetic are n

their consequences inevitable. The compositi

could change, long-term demographic proj

materialize, or categories according to which we 

ourselves may cease to seem relevant. Differ

officer corps and American society could 

immaterial. It should be evident that ther

however. If the need for American military po

compelling, if the Pentagon is seen as wasteful

time, our military leadership is perceived as di

from much of American society, will the milita

its need for resources? In its frequently controv

In its recruilxnent? Our third great risk of failure 

States may become less than fully committed 

the military. 

24 ~ Big Three: our Greatest Security Risb~ 
R
py y 

capabilities comparable to ours. One stran

remains: we need to continue to achieve nuclear 

the absence of a peer conventional competit

refocus our main efforts. Our most difficult 

challenge will be to reduce the likelihood o

competition reemerging. The aim is not to 

competitor; it is to avoid a competition. 

If we accept this goal, we need a strategy cl

achieving it. Such a strategy operates at two leve

general, affecting our relations with all possible 

it needs to be particular, directed to reducing 

competition with specific countries. Strategies af

nations are beyond the scope of this essay, 

strategy can be described. 

A strategy designed to reduce the likeli

competition must have military, economic, 

components. These are not radically different f

in place, but their conceptual underpinning i

predominant error of our time may be mindle

goals when we are playing a new game. A m
different emphasis. 

Long-term military investments are th

dissuasion. Because military investments freq

duty as mechanisms of deterrence, it is natur

investments in old terms, but shifting the focu

to dissuasion casts some military measures in a 

compelling, strategic context. Three example

• Why our military presence abroad shoul

a means of dissuasion, even though it 

relevant as a mechanism of deterrence 

• How emphasis on near-term readiness 

of a large force structure at the expense of 

ill conceived because it excessively focuses 

• How investments in quality of life and hi

ed officers may be better justified. 

After considering these examples, this discu

diplomatic and economic tools that can be us

strategy of dissuasion. 

28 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
there were two major land wars in Asia. Today, 

Iraq, Iran, or North Korea could attack its neigh

well be questioned why American troops in Eu

Korea are required to counter these threats, give

our allies and weakness of our opponents. Su

intensify if, for example, Korea reunifies, Rus

weakness, or less-hostile regimes replace our pr

in the Middle East. 

American presence around the globe is just

it dissuades others from massive military inve

Americans in Asia, for example, it is likely that bo

and the Chinese would greatly accelerate arma

of concerns about one another. Moreover, our 

flow of commerce, in general, and oil, in particu

and other nations to integrate their economies in

without establishing large navies. In this manne

economic power from military power and ther

arguments and incentives to invest in military 

Continent in Europe, in the Mediterranean, a

East, American presence moderates the military 

military ambitions of regional powers that cou
of expenditure. It relates, above all, to the kind 

make and to our openness to innovation. Ev

the Soviet Union, the dominant emphasis in t

readiness and maintenance of large force

responsive to a model of deterrence. Large, rea

forces deter present competitors, but a strat

would increase the emphasis on de

modernization. The greatest temptations and 

compete with us will arise if another nation is 

we are at absorbing powerful and rap

innovations. 

For example, semiconductors have doubled 

18 months since coming of age in the 1960s. If 

will confront a hundred-fold increase in com

between now and 2009. These are civilian tech

opponents have access to them. Our risks 

opponents prove to be more adept than we 

them to military ends. On the eve of World W

Wehrmacht managed just such an applicati

commercial developments in the internal comb

in telecommunications to produce the milita

30 The Big ~iree: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
several established companies held the be

semiconductor industry in their hands, but--in 

year horizon posited in this article--they los

Their failure can be traced to not decisively reallo

from the product lines of the present to those o

In retrospect it should be no surprise tha

earning handsome profits from vacuum tub

embracing semiconductors. Dramatic innovati

merely reaUoca~ng resources, but also cannibaliz

bureaucratic children to feed the hungry n

problem in innovation is not securing acceptan

is establishing a willingness to surrender th

particularly difficult when the indicators of payof

Everyone is willing to flirt with the future; few w

its uncertainties at the expense of a comfortabl

Within the Department of Defense, the prese

and the past is misleading. Nothing seduces l

change when your existing method of busines

itself a winner in a prolonged contest? Unfortuna

points us in the wrong direction. The Sovi

substantial opponent, but it was not, by and larg
systems evolving elsewhere. If DOD is to 

commitment to innovation it will have to ove

habit. 

A white-hot commitment to innovation is 

achieve in our national security establishment. 

is security, it should not surprise us that its p

averse. Currently predominant theories of de

near-term risM, which reinforces existing org

In our military, rewards and incentives 

performance; tours are so short and the bud

extended and unstable that major innovat

sustain. The fear is to be unready now, not to 

the future. In Congress, the strongest incentiv

spending on products that constituents now 

infrastructure that sustains constituents in thei

a result, we remain too committed to business 

we should realize that our predominant prio

avoid the emergence of a major competitor. 

How do investments in the quality of life 

our service members relate to concerns about 

of a major competitor? This relationship is p

32 '1~e Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
equipment, training, and esprit with which t

challenges. Beyond this, however, investment 

pay and other basics that affect commitment to 

because these expenditures are not just benefit

personnel but are also contributions to our nati

Similarly, a stronger case needs to be made 

economic and diplomatic tools as key elements 

dissuasion. In the context of such a strategy, t

integration and not, as they were during th

isolation. In the midst of a military competition, 

demands dominant attention; political and econ

secondary. Absent a military competition, the 

balanced. If military competition is to be avoide

at least as important as deterrence. 

Our treatment of Germany, Japan, and Italy 

II stands as the shining example of the reward

Marshall Plan expenditures and substantial Ame

6Participants report that when Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief 

Staff, visited U.S. military units in the 1980s, his first reaction was 

our technical achievements, but he could develop no rapid plan 

of noncommissioned officers. In addition to the long lead time 

project, his difficulty derived from differences in our competing 

R
Churchill's 1946 "iron curtain" speech), all

Germany from endangering peace called for l

economic and military power. Similarly, postw

did not aim to build a strong ally; the most im

Japan's post-war recovery was the Korean W

Moreover, our deep involvement with th

nations was as an occupying victor after an extr

conflict. This gave us both the power and 

address their reconstruction. We were enga

knew the price of indifference. We also knew t

the preceding years was over. Surrender and o

the end of the old era and left no doubt that th

be different. 

These catalysts for action are no

Farsightedness and will even greater than wa

Marshall Plan are required if we are to help su

nations as Russia and China, particularly whe

to compete with another power for their lo

highly imperfect, corrupt, authoritarian, and 

nations; the natural inclination is to follow the 

to isolate them, or at least to be indifferent t

34 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
judgments about particular overtures (for exam

under what conditions to provide funding for Ru

China to the World Trade Organization). O

strategy should be rooted in the proposition tha

development of China and Russia as full partn

system will be more effective, less expensive, 

benign than another arms race. 

Imaginative and dedicated pursuit of the goal 

would also produce diplomatic initiatives as sw

undertaken by the Cold Warriors who created NA

arms control measures, like the START treatie

levels of weaponry and therefore of risk, but thei

to police the risk, rather than to eliminate it. Si

well or ill advised, NATO expansion that does no

is at best irrelevant to; at worst it retards the 

major competitor. 

Integrative efforts deserve higher billing, and t

a program are present. America pursued such a 

the face of some resistance and difficulties, 

troops a part of the Implementation Force c

Bosnia. The NATO "Partnership for Peace" pro
term, the most important question about 

opportunity will be whether we used it to avo

competition. Our aim should not be to win; it s

the competition. Only with our concerted effort, 

willingness to take risks will the 21st century lo

its predecessor, which was plagued by military 

36 ~te Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
y, g, ppp

weapons, property, and territory. Since th

gunpowder in the mid-14th century, the main 

this has been by explosive weaponry: bullets, bo

missiles. The second risk to American securit

decades is that both this aim and these means m

aim will not be to destroy American military p

difficult), but rather to sap the will to use it. Th

nonexplosive warfare, conducted with NEW 

manifestation of these changes will be "traumat

How do NEW weapons differ from their pre

special aims of traumatic attacks are amplif

weapons are used? What kinds of investments 

risks from these weapons and these types o

chapter describes three broad changes, going 

traditional reliance on deterrence, that are likely 

if we are to maintain our security in the 21st ce

In the late 20th century, traumatic attacks hav

employed explosive munitions placed in or n

airplanes, and buildings. Accordingly, we 

explosives when we attempt to protect 
the case of biological weaponry) deaths that co

the hundreds of thousands. 

An understanding of the most novel activiti

information warfare, will illuminate the ch

weapons. 7 Biological attack is the dissemin

viruses, or toxins to cause debilitating or fat

breathing, drinking, or absorption. Weapons 

7 Biological weapons are novel but not unprecedented. In t

were catapulted over the walls of castles under siege in ord

America's French and Indian Wars, Indians were given blankets 

in our Civil War, Sherman's march to the sea was impeded by 

World War II, Japanese Unit 731 experimented with biologica

many as a thousand Chinese civilians. 

This subject is, for expository purposes, given limited spac

weapons should not be overlooked. Chemical weapons, t

familiar, are somewhat more confined in their likely effects. 

easy to focus and control. Accordingly, they may be the 

Radioactive weapons (though not necessarily explosive) lie at h

large nuclear programs, whether developed for peaceful o

Russia, perhaps the greatest source of risk in this regard, th

some 2.5 million pounds of enriched uranium and plutonium

is embedded in some 24,000 nuclear weapons, 7,000 of them 

5,000 dispersed as tactical nuclear weapons, and 12,000 in 

this weapons-grade material is in more than 50 military and civ

With so little state power and economic well being in Russia, 

this radioactive material will be bought or stolen and used for 

38 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
flight, and illness can quickly overwhelm our re

care, transportation, and communication. 

It is striking how analogous information att

biological counterparts. We even use similar te

we describe a computer "virus." A single compu

biological equivalent, can have widespread a

effects. Whether embedded in software 

disseminated near the time of use, a computer v

or distort data in the information and commu

upon which military and civilian life depends. T

Year 2000 problem a "natural occurrence" tha

information attack as natural outbreaks of disease 

warfare--highlights our dependence upon

vulnerability of, information and communicatio

Biological and information attacks share mo

characteristics that can make future security 

different from today's. These attacks will not d

defeated by, mass, either of armies or of phy

8The appropriate absence of an offensive program and l

and experience make these estimates subject to debate. 
A single computer can launch an inform

ordinary crop sprayer can ge:~erate a fatal anth

miles long. A single leased airplane dispersing 

can kill more people than died in any month 

The effects of these attacks can occur for substa

delivery, and consequences must be m

uncertainty, panic, and physical effects they w

Distinguishing among crime, terrorism, na

and war become difficult when NEW we

Because large financial resources, massing po

systems are not required, it is not necessary to 

to be able to conduct this type of warfare. Tho

by a major competitor, second- or third-tier s

groups, or even individuals may present threa

and information warfare. A large industrial ba

to develop or deploy NEW weapons, b

posfindustrial weapons; in the postindustrial 

wage war is no longer monopolized by nation

Furthermore, the characteristics of low vis

natural occurrence can be exploited to leave 

whether a military attack occurred and, if it di

40 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
pace with offenses that are so easily varied and 

Taken together, more than a dozen attribu

these weapons. They cannot be countered by the 

Worse still, we are handicapped in recognizing 

to counter these weapons. The military estab

attuned to these issues. The familiar weapon

weapons. The familiar battles are the clash of arm

air forces. Familiar battlefields are the places 

grapple with their opposite numbers. The tradit

warfare is explosive weaponry, not disease (

doctors) or information (a support function). Fu

have well-developed offensive programs that m

stimulate our defensive efforts. Since 1969, we 

from any offensive program involving biologic

decision to refrain from an offensive pr

appropriate, is like the amputation of an arm

struggling to grasp a load with one hand when i

two. The offensive possibilities of information w

readily understood, but, in part because 

vulnerabilities, we are inhibited about practic

debating the offensive aspects of information "tr

R
most especially so if these weapons are us

attacks" against our civilian populations. 

NEW weapons can be employed in tradition

or to undermine reinforcement and to mass 

conventional warfare. But both biological 

warfare is more potent in less conventional cir

be used to gain bargaining leverage by th

populations and to induce a distracting and d

those populations. However vulnerable tro

information systems may be, civilians are vastl

military forces enjoy a modicum of protective c

systems, and other barriers to biological and i

civilian populations are highly vulnerable. Troop

disciplined for combat; civilians, especially Ame

not prepared. 

Warfare aimed at civilian populations woul

by body counts or territory occupied, but by 

the American public and that of allied populati

Alvin and Heidi Toffler have pointed out that w

42 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
molded without events. Traumatic attacks are th

wedge by which public opinion can be levera

which perceptions can be hung. The hallmark 

that they are valued not for their physical ef

psychological consequences. It was not the occu

or the disablement of the American milita

determined the value of the Tet Offensive 

bunker bomb in Lebanon in 1983, or the ma

before CNN cameras in Somalia in 1994. O

can have the opposite effect and instead 

determination; the Alamo, the Maine, and Pear

rallying cries precisely because of the injury t

these were not designed to be traumatic attac

we can see that the attackers were did no

psychological consequences of achieving the

These experiences warn the designers of trau

they are working with a most potent power tha

9 War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21

Brown and Company, 1993) 

1%Varfare of this kind is certainly not unprecedented. The a

of Germany and our use of atomic bombs against Japan were 

at demoralizing our opponents. 
inoculation; refinement and acquisition of s

masks to prevent infection by inhalation; impr

enhanced training; and development of doctr

preempt and, when necessary, respond to a b

Our defense against information warfare s

more innovative preparation. Our aim shou

intrusions and alterations of data that can m

airplanes, ships, and spare parts and distor

telecommunication, and other systems upon w

A deeper perception of these vulnerabilities shou

investments in intelligence and in resear

development for computer and communicati

should reflect the state of our defense

vulnerabilities in our readiness systems, includ

of officers, and exercise information protecti

other defensive skills. 

Our efforts to defend against traumatic 

demand more than the application of 

approaches to the new areas of biological 

warfare. Above all, they demand challen

conceptual framework. In addition to defense

44 '1~e Big '~ree: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
used or proliferated by second- and third-tier 

example, by a poverty-stricken Korea or an iso

is a security reason for trying to tie these 

community of nations. To counter weapons of 

it is desirable to bring countries that may be op

point where they have a stake in maintaining 

and thus in avoiding disruption. 

Working from a position of military and econ

we can afford, and in our own interests 

openhanded, cooperative strategies that avoid 

states. We are given a further opportunity to d

weapons. We can, and should, forge a worl

emphasizes the moral unacceptability, and the

public opinion, from using weapons of th

opprobrium is hardly a reliable barrier, but 

power, particularly when it must be considered b

seeking to establish the legitimacy of their caus

Where dissuasive strategies do not succe

should, rely on deterrent policies. Howev

deterrence must be extended and reworked to 

the likelihood that terrorist groups and indivi
disruption is proactive: it intrudes upon would-

preemptive strikes, inspections, arrests, or 

detection and restriction on freedom of movem

intended strikes. Our society is uncomfortable 

threatens civil liberties, risks alienating public op

mar~'s) through heavy handedness, provides 

success, and commits us to innumerable small b

likelihood of eradicating threats. It is, however

against terrorism. We need to develop strateg

that are closely controlled by civil authorities, 

to thwart traumatic attacks by the least dra

compliant with our own and international law

Beyond this, a fourth approach is needed 

deterrence, dissuasion, and disruptio

management." This approach would develop 

resources to limit the effects of attacks. 

management is required because our relianc

systems will, over the next decades, persist

abilities to protect these systems completely. Sim

chemical, or explosive attacks will be so easily 

targets so numerous and so exposed that s

46 ~ Big Three: our Greatest Security Risl~ 
successfully attacked, failure is "graceful

catastrophic. It involves the design of data 

camouflaged to confuse intruders, tagged and e

manipulation, and encrypted to minimize 

intrusion. 

In biological defense, consequence mana

investments in our public health systems. W

medical capabilities so that attacks can be prom

and therapeutic regimes initiated before sym

pernicious. In both information and bio

consequence management must include the c

and military information systems to dimin

confusion. 

Such an approach to consequence manag

carry with it a rethinking of the anachronistic dist

"here and abroad" and between military and civ

attacks that threaten our national security may 

troops and allies abroad, but they are as likel

people and activities based in the United S

cyberspace has no geography, and anyone 

biological agents can easily be imported into t
economy; therefore dollars used to protect u

yield everyday rewards. "Civil defense" exp

questioned, but by contrast, "public health" 

example, in the Centers for Disease Contro

Health Service) and information security inv

warranted for coping with natural as 

contingencies. 

When dealing with NEW weapons, a l

cannot be drawn between military and civil

ability to project military power depends, both 

on civilian utility, transport, telecommunicat

systems, which in turn depend on properly fu

information systems and civilian employe

undermined or overwhelmed by driving ma

civilian populations away from or toward cente

not likely that our response to a biological thre

would, or should, be limited to the Denver Poli

even the FBI and Federal Emergency Managem

could we ignore such threats against civilians in 

48 ~ Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
11The value we place on civilian life renders us vulnerable 

Regrettably, our opponents can use their own civilians as hostage

Desert Storm, the Iraqi Air Defense system could not stop 

Baghdad. But a complete halt was forced for 4 days when Iraq 

of its women and children in the U.S. bombing of the AI Firdo

A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Surv

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 199

demonstrations of women and children surrounded, and ther

men who threatened U.S. Marines. More recently, the Serbs us

and Muslim civilian populations as "human shields" to prevent N

development of both highly precise missiles and of nonlethal 

measure, an effort to respond to this tactic. 
DOD requirements are likely to increase as the 

planes, ships, tanks, and weapons bought in th

the end of its useful life. Costs will be fur

peacekeeping operations, with resultant wear an

and equipment, continue at their recent pace. 

At the same time, three problems may comb

support DOD needs to perform its mission: 

• Security investments will be shortchanged 

and stronger consensus is established b

rationale for their necessity. 

• It is likely that defense spending wil

scrutinized, held to standards common to th

and found to be unacceptably inefficient wh

those standards. 

• DOD may be perceived as an island a

society, an island populated by members of 

may be viewed as unrepresentative of socie

To counter the first problem, we must height

that our national security depends in the long te

other nations from competing with us militarily. 
strongly by recognizing that, in the wake of p

Soviet Union, and privatization in China, 

succeeded to the dubious honor of being one o

bailiwicks of cen~al planning. Indeed, in some re

is a Communist system. The department do

provide decisionmakers with accurate price 

incentives to minimize costs, but instead sup

directives, quotas, and punishments. It does no

but instead cuts the budgets of those who are e

funds to those who show a "requirement." Th

each manager "according to his abilities an

according to his needs." In sum, the same m

business that disabled the Soviet Union are e

Perestroika is no less warranted in the second 

first. 

Some effort has been made in that direction 

American rubric of "reengineering." The 

reengineering is sound--it is a philosophy of d

than direction--but the analogy to the Russia

suggestive. It is not enough to tear down the o

and declines in productivity will ensue unless the 

52 ~he Big ~hree: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
and then having suppliers compete to p

budgeting for the true costs of military manp

treating (as is common) it as though it were alm

legacy of conscription); and using metrics that m

and efficiency of services rather than me

bureaucrat workloads. 

All components of DOD must come to 

challenge, because restructuring is fundamen

efficiency, but also to credibility and therefore t

future, if DOD cannot extract benefit more eff

it is given, it will (unlike in the past) be given l

At its deepest level, the issue of public sup

efficiency. While maintaining a professional 

military, responsible decisionmakers also nee

need to bring the DOD and American societ

Practical steps to achieve this include stepping 

minority officers, expanding the roles of wo

opportunities to immerse officers in civilian 

officer recruitment often occurs at the beginning 

4 years before officers enter the force, and 

officers more than 25 years to become fla
representative corps of career officers. W

Jacksonian democracy, the Army and Navy h

their officer corps from being a "gentleman's serv

to all classes. All services must similarly now 

officer corps from being predominantly a white 

being truly representative of America. At 

attenlion needs to be focused on how to better 

educational institutions, at many of which RO

tradition of service have lapsed. 

For the same reason, all four services must m

faster in their assimilation of women. 

unwarranted narrowing of opportunities for 

military is morally condemnable, it erodes the r

members for one another, and it is an unconsc

talent. But, for those who think these moral a

only a penchant for political correctness and t

benefits are not worth the effort, the risk identif

another reason. As society at large accords wome

of power and professional acceptance, the mil

same. The predominantly white male leaders o

should press to recruit minorities and women 

54 The Big ~hree: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
it is targeted, but also on society at large. Portra

some recent advertisements did, as an opp

something hot ~' may draw recruits, but it mislea

thinking about the military as an institution ch

ethic of indulgence rather than responsibility. 

Although special needs warrant separate 

military education and military medicine.our 

are professionals who need to maintain un

warfighting ethic, and military doctors face 

mobilization demands often incompatibl

practice-opportunities should still be sough

military and civilian systems of education a

Similarly, present debates over housing fo

members should recognize that it would serv

bring service members into the civilian hous

than to isolate them on bases that breed a cant

Military members are most often model citi

benefit from increasing interaction of military an

Initiatives to move away from military-only 

warranted on grounds of economy; this persp

more overarching purpose. To allow the milita
56 ~ Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 
• A major competitor may deprive us 

security we now enjoy and can provide 

extraordinary pace of technological chan

availability through civilian channels enhanc

of rapid development of a highly capable c

• Attacks may be launched against us by 

competitors, including nonstate actors, 

demoralize or disrupt our ability to use 

proliferation of NEW weapons expands t

means for inflicting trauma on society and r

civilian infrastructure and population partic

to attack. 

• If we achieve our goals of avoiding a 

and of avoiding traumatic attacks, the los

potent threats will increase the risk that we 

sustain our security establishment. This ris

intensified if our officer corps is distanced fro

by recruitment that is not representative or b

civilian society in housing, educati
program built around deterrence--for exampl

priority to long-term modernization as compare

force size. It also gives greater weight to 

economic tools and uses them to integrate, ra

potential competitors. 

Because NEW weapons can be used by se

tier states, dissuasive strategies need to be app

not merely to countries that may become m

Further, because these weapons can be empl

groups and individuals, new strategies of deterr

be developed beyond those (like nuclear re

applicable to states. "Disruption" of these grou

important part of our repertoire of responses: 

heavily on arrests, preemptive strikes, sanctio

limit the free movement and economic support o

Disruption is not likely, however, to be 

effective against numerous nonstate actors a

against the Soviet Union. As a result, we w

greater emphasis on consequence manage

especially appropriate because attacks of this t

58 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risl~ 
abroad. No such distinction is viable in cybers

with weapons such as biological agents that can 

low visibility by individuals inside the United S

The risk of loss of popular support should 

make DOD more efficient. To achieve this, it 

from a system of command/control/quota m

toward more market-oriented systems that 

incentives and guide managers by app

Furthermore, the department needs to rec

manner that makes them more representativ

large. 

An array of changes is urged to give 

appropriate priority. These propositions are, of 

dispute. Are the identified risks real and pr

Should they receive the priority urged in this e

other risks should predominate in our thi

programmatic consequences sketched here 

other, less risk-focused methods of provoki
The test of this very probably controversial d

be whether others endorse the program pre

whether they generate their own programs, str

clear statement about dominant concer

particularized in the translation of these long-te

near-term priorities. By focusing on what sho

us for the long term, we can overcome th

everyday. Our goal must be to build a 

establishment that is strong in an enduring, 

transitory, way. 

Each generation of policy makers sees itse

best of times and the worst of times." For our 

worst times were when the Soviet Union posed 

security risk to the United States and its allies. 

IZBecause it is exclusively focused decades ahead, 

appropriate concerns about the nearer future. Moreover, this d

the disjunction between near- and far-term concerns. To the 

cope with present challenges we are likely to benefit in the future

raises the capabilities and morale of tomorrow's force. The 

regional war ~ may keep a near-term regional power from becom

competitor through its use of intimidation and battlefield victo

60 The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Ris~ 

71st Secretary of the Navy on November 

September 1997 to November of 1998, he 

professor at Syracuse University's Maxwell Scho

and Public Affairs, and a Traveling Fellow o

International Political Economy. Mr. Danzig a

26th Under Secretary of the Navy, from Novem

1997, at which time he was awarded the Defen

Service and the Navy Distinguished Service Aw

Mr. Danzig was a Washington partner of the 

of Latham & Watkins from 1981 to 1993. Fro

Mr. Danzig served as Principal Deputy Assis

Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and L

that, he served for a year and a half in the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary. 

Mr. Danzig has taught contract law at Stanf

Universities, lectured extensively on a variety of 

and legal issues, and published numerous articl

and a book on American and British contract l

A graduate of Reed College, Mr. Danzig 

degree from Yale Law School, as well as Bache

and Doctor of Philosophy degrees in histo

University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. Upo

from law school, Mr. Danzig served as a law 

Court Justice Byron White. 
,.%,/ 

@ 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSI