U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

64–747 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

H.R. 1838, THE TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT

ACT

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

Tuesday, October 26, 1999

Serial No. 106–111

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

HILLEL WEINBERG, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel

JILL N. QUINN, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

Markup of H.R. 1838, The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act .......................... 1

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Member of Congress from California ...... 64

H.R. 1838 .................................................................................................................. 40

Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1838, offered by Mr. Gilman

and Mr. Gejdenson ............................................................................................... 53

(1)

H.R. 1838, THE TAIWAN SECURITY

ENHANCEMENT ACT

Tuesday, October 26, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee on International Relations

will come to order. Will Members please take their seats.

The Committee on International Relations meets today in open

session, pursuant to notice, to take up H.R. 1838, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.

This bill was introduced on May 18, by the distinguished Majority Whip, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. DeLay, and a bipartisan

group of Members, including myself.

It was referred by the Speaker to the Committee on International Relations and, in addition, to the Committee on Armed

Services, for a period to be determined subsequently by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within

the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

The Chair lays the bill before the Committee.

The clerk will report the title of the bill.

Ms. BLOOMER. H.R. 1838, a bill to assist in the enhancement of

the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the first reading of the bill

is dispensed with. The clerk will read the bill for amendment.

Ms. BLOOMER. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, this Act may be cited as the——

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the bill is considered as

having been read.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. I have an amendment in the nature of a substitute at the desk. The clerk will report the amendment in the nature of a substitute.

Ms. BLOOMER. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered

by Mr. Gilman for himself and Mr. Gejdenson. Strike all after the

enacting clause and insert the following:

Chairman GILMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment in the nature of a substitute be considered as having been

read and is open to amendment at any time.

Without objection, so ordered.

2

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. I will now recognize myself to speak briefly

to the amendment in the nature of a substitute.

I am pleased to bring this measure before the Committee today

for consideration. I want to thank the Majority Whip, Mr. DeLay

of Texas, for introducing this legislation. I am also appreciative of

the cooperation between the staffs of the Majority and the Minority

and their work. We want to thank the Senate Committee staff, particularly Mr. Doran on Foreign Relations for his hard work in

crafting this bill.

Along with Members of this body, I am increasingly concerned

about China’s security policy and military modernization efforts,

including its burgeoning missile deployment opposite Taiwan, the

purchase of advanced Russian fighters and submarines, Beijing’s

outright refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, its

overwrought saber rattling, and the deleterious effect all of this has

had on regional stability.

We are also equally troubled by the Clinton Administration’s

handling of Taiwan policy in general, including the pressure it has

unwisely placed on Taipei to come to interim agreements with the

PRC regarding unification; its unwillingness to sell some defensive

weapons systems to Taiwan, irrespective of China’s military advances; its talk of a strategic partnership with Beijing, the Three

No’s; and the consequences these misguided actions have for peace

and stability in the region.

The United States should, without question, continue to steadfastly meet its security commitments to Taipei as stipulated in the

1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This means assisting Taiwan in maintaining the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait in the face

of the PRC’s unprecedented military buildup. A failure to meet Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs will make China’s military dominance of the Taiwan Strait a reality. This would not be a welcome

development in that part of the world.

A failure to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs could

lead to Beijing’s misunderstanding of American interests, foster

perceptions of Taiwanese defense vulnerability, increase the likelihood of Chinese miscalculation, and could ultimately lead to a conflict with our Nation over its adventurism.

Ensuring and enhancing Taiwan’s ability to defend itself increases the prospects for continued peace and stability in Northeast

Asia and also supports our national interests.

The Congress, in the absence of decisive Administration action,

must act to make clear to Beijing that our Nation will continue its

long-standing commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan

issue. Accordingly, I support this legislation’s efforts to enhance

Taiwan’s self-defense capability.

I am proud to be a cosponsor of the legislation. It has an impressive array of cosponsors on both sides of the aisle, and we look forward to bringing it to the Floor for consideration at an early date.

Those of you who have been following this bill know that the

sponsors have been working diligently to accommodate the various

concerns that have been expressed. Over a period of months, we

have worked with Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Cox, and other independent

Members to refine the language in the bill.

3

In addition, we have worked with Mr. Gejdenson and his staff to

come up with the amendment in the nature of a substitute that is

now before the Members of this Committee.

Mr. Gejdenson and I are pleased to offer the amendment which

we believe represents a consensus position within our Committee

regarding the future direction of U.S. security relations with Taiwan. The amendment preserves the essence of the bill as introduced. It no longer refers to sales of any specific weapons systems

to Taiwan, but in other respects it is at least as strong, or stronger,

than the bill as initially introduced.

It continues to mandate that extra positions be reserved for Taiwanese officers at U.S. military schools, that secure direct communications be established between our Nation and Taiwanese militaries for coordination in the event of a crisis, and that the Congress be kept fully and currently informed of the status of arms

sales requests from Taiwan.

Mr. Gejdenson and I believe the amendment in the nature of a

substitute will meaningfully enhance the security of both our Nation and of Taiwan. We strongly urge its adoption.

Do any Members seek recognition?

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the conclusion of

my remarks, I am going to request that Stanley Roth, the Assistant

Secretary, be given an opportunity, if it is OK with the Chairman,

to express his concerns.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I will yield.

Mr. BEREUTER. I wonder if I might be allowed, as a Subcommittee Chairman, to make my remarks before Mr. Roth comes

forward.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Without any doubt.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Obviously, any other Member I think who

would want to speak first, and then we would hear from the Administration.

I disagree with the Administration’s conclusion, but I think they

ought to have a chance to be heard. It is clear to me that, as in

many parts of the world, there is a constant tension between democratic forces and nondemocratic forces. In my time in Congress,

there was a time when Taiwan’s representatives and people concerned about Taiwan could come to me and I would feel no great

need to speak out on their behalf, because for a long time, Taiwan

did not have democratic institutions. But today, on the island of

Taiwan, we have a government that is a full-fledged democracy

with opposition, with opposition press, and it is confronted by the

largest totalitarian state in the world. I believe that Americans

ought to stand up very squarely in favor of these democratic institutions.

Now, I understand the Administration’s concerns that somehow

this is going to enrage the Mainland and they will do something

foolish. I think it would be a very foolish mistake for the Mainland

to recognize our commitment to democratic institutions and our opVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:27 Jun 15, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64747.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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position to tyranny as an excuse for some kind of military adventurism.

The Congress of the United States, I think, reflects the feeling

of the American people that Taiwan has gone from being a nondemocratic nation to a democratic nation, to a nation that has free

and open debates, and that ought to be the model for the Mainland,

and not the reverse. It ought not be Taiwan that has to mimic the

kind of tyranny that exists today, everyday, on the Mainland of

China.

I believe the work the Chairman and others on this Committee

have done on this resolution brings forward a balanced resolution

that is not provocative but clearly states America’s concern for the

democratic people and the democratic institutions on the island of

Taiwan. If the Mainland wants to have that kind of support in

Congress, it seems to me that they can begin a process of establishing at least a minimum respect for human life, to stop trafficking in organs of murdered prisoners, and to start developing the

democratic institutions that are clearly the direction for the planet.

So I support the legislation and commend the Chairman for his

efforts.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have some remarks that I hope my colleagues will follow, and

that I hope, presumptuously, might provide some enlightenment

here.

I think in my years here, except for legislation I have introduced,

I have not spent more time on any other bill than on this legislation. I think that what we are doing here today is very important.

I think it is the most significant action, in the foreign policy sense,

that this Committee will take this year.

I think that one should not underestimate the sensitivity of U.S.-

China relations when it comes to Taiwan, or the complexity and

sensitivity of the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan. Those

relationships, in combination, are very complex and problematic.

I came to Congress in 1979. A couple of months later, we passed

the Taiwan Relations Act. I was not a Member of this Committee

in my first or second term, but I do remember, of course, that there

was a Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress and that the

Carter Administration was in power. Yet Congress, on a bipartisan

basis, decided it was important to enunciate its policy with respect

to Taiwan. We had, as a result, in early 1979, the passage of the

Taiwan Relations Act over the objections of the Carter Administration.

There is an extraordinary degree of support in this country for

Taiwan. We have great respect and admiration for the advances

that they have made in democracy and, of course, for their economic development as well. But we are particularly impressed with

the changes that have taken place with regard to democracy in

that country. It is the American policy that we expect any reunification of Taiwan with the PRC only by peaceable means. That is

enunciated clearly, of course, in the Taiwan Relations Act.

There is, I would say—and we need to be candid about this—a

high degree of scepticism about the Clinton Administration and

5

their handling of Taiwanese issues. We are probably at a low point

in our relationship with the People’s Republic of China in recent

years. After spending a lot of time with Mr. Cox and Mr. DeLay,

and some time with the Chairman, certainly a lot with his staff,

I feel that the substitute offered by the Chairman and the Ranking

Member answers most of the concerns that I had enunciated—not

all of them, but most of them. I want to review some of those concerns to tell you why I think this is significant.

I thought that the original legislation was flawed in many ways.

In fact, it was factually inappropriate at times. If Members have

availed themselves of some of the most highly classified briefing

materials, they would understand that certain aspects of the previous bill were not appropriate and, in fact, would create additional

problems.

We have had a security agreement with Taiwan since 1954 that

was, in large part, mostly reversed with the passage of the Taiwan

Relations Act. There was a legitimate concern on the part of the

Administration that the Chinese would think that we were, and in

fact we were, trying to reimplement the Security Agreement of

1954. I think that we have made revisions, through the Chairman’s

substitute, which incorporate a lot of my effort, and the efforts of

other Members as well, to eliminate reasonable attitudes that we

are returning to the 1954 Securities Act. The findings sections, in

my judgment, are factual now.

I want to call Members’ attention specifically to pages 5 and 6,

where we have subsections 15, 16, and 17. I admit a heavy hand

in introducing these arrangements and these findings. They were

not a part of the original act, although inherently they were a part

of some of them.

I want to call my colleagues’ attention to something Mr. Hastings

and I witnessed when we were members of Speaker Gingrich’s visit

to the East Asia region. It was his first trip to that region and his

first trip as Speaker. It was a bipartisan group, and you could, for

example, ask Mr. Hastings, or the senior Democrat, Mr. Dingell,

about what I am going to say. But I think that, despite all of the

criticisms that some of my colleagues have had with the Speaker,

it was generally thought that his visit to Asia was quite a success,

that he said some things that needed to be said, and that they

were appropriate in clarifying American policy.

For example, when we met with President Jiang Zemin, the

Speaker said, based upon a resolution that the House had passed,

that if China attacks Taiwan, the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s defense.

Now, we have been accustomed to receiving a tirade on Taiwan

from the PRC’s highest officials for years, and we expected an hour

and a half tirade there. However, President Jiang simply said, ‘‘We

don’t intend to attack,’’ and we went on to other things.

Then when we visited Taipei a few days later, the Speaker said

to President Lee that Taiwan should understand that the U.S. expects Taiwan not to take provocative actions for Taiwan domestic

reasons. The message was very clear at that time. That was an appropriate kind of clarity, eliminating some ambiguity on where the

Congress of the United States at least, stood.

6

You will see in section 15, subsection 15 on page 5, it says, and

I am going to read this just so it is brought clearly to your attention, ‘‘It is in the national interest of the United States to eliminate

ambiguity and convey with clarity continued United States support

for Taiwan, its people, and their ability to maintain their democracy free from coercion and their society free from the use of force

against them. Lack of clarity could lead to unnecessary misunderstandings or confrontations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, with great consequences for the security of

the Western Pacific region.’’

Then, in section 16 it does go into the possible consequences of

an ambiguity and the lack of clarity and suggests that that was

one of the reasons, perhaps the primary reason, why the PRC, after

President Lee’s visit to the United States, conducted military exercises, including live fire exercises and two missile shots off the

coast of Taipei.

Section 17 suggests where the Administration had made a significant error in judging the attitude of the American people and

the Congress about our view that a person should be able to return

for honors to their alma mater. The Chinese, given the assurance

that President Lee would not be given a visa, found that the Administration changed the view and issued the visa, bringing about

a confrontation that was dangerous.

I want to call your attention also to two of the areas where originally it was said, I think with cause, that we were returning to the

1954 mutual security agreement. Changes have been made in that

area, and I think have answered those concerns wholly or largely.

Section 3, pages 6 and 7, relates to the training of Taiwanese

military officers. This is substantially different from the original

version, and I do want to call to my colleagues’ attention the fact

that Taiwan receives as large an allocation of slots in our military

schools as any of our allies. When we call for additional positions,

we say ‘‘make every effort to reserve additional positions.’’ I do not

agree with that. I thought it should have been worded slightly differently.

We can expect Israel, Greece, and other countries to come and

say that they should have their quotas enlarged. All of that will

come out of American personnel who are not receiving that training

at West Point, Annapolis, or the Air Force Academy. So I do point

that out to you. But we have changed this substantially. We do not

talk about exchanges between general officers and other similar

issues in this substitute version by the Chairman and the Ranking

Member.

The other section that was particularly problematic and suggested we might be returning to the 1954 security agreement is related to communications. In section 5(d) on page 10, this has been

modified, but it does, in fact, include, and will cause concern there

is no doubt about it, an assurance certifying to the four appropriate

committees in Congress that direct, secure communication exists

between the armed forces of the United States and armed forces of

Taiwan. That is not exactly how I would have written it, but it is

a substantial change and improvement in that respect.

Finally, I wanted to say that one of my concerns, and the reason

I have been, frankly, doing everything I could to delay this legislaVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:27 Jun 15, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64747.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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tion until we could make amendments, modifications such as this

substitute, is that I did not want to give the Chinese an excuse for

failing to reach an agreement with the United States on WTO accession. Nor, frankly, I would say to my Democratic colleagues, did

I want to give the President an excuse saying that Republicans

were responsible by pushing this legislation, and, therefore, the

President failed to get a WTO accession agreement.

The President should have agreed to Premier Zhu Rongji’s commercially viable offer in April. He ignored the advice of his substantive advisors and went with his political advisors, allegedly because of concerns that would be brought to the attention and focus

and front line again on Chinese espionage and on alleged contributions from Chinese entities to his presidential campaign. I believe

that Congress would have given permanent NTR after considerable

debate, and continue to believe that we should. But I think now it

is clear that we are not going to have a WTO accession agreement

between the United States and China, I say regretfully, before November 30, when the new multilateral trade round begins in Seattle.

Since Congress is about to adjourn, if we are going to take action

on the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, we have delayed it to

the point where the excuse by the Administration that this action

by us today, or on the House Floor later, is responsible for the failure of the Chinese and the U.S. to get together on a WTO accession

agreement won’t wash.

I thank my colleagues for listening, and I appreciate the extra

time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter, and you got a little

extra time because you did not have the opportunity to take it up

in Subcommittee.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a great deal of difficulty with this piece of legislation.

Let me stipulate at the outset that I welcome some of the

changes which the authors have incorporated, because they make

specific provisions of the proposed legislation somewhat less objectionable. But I still believe that this is a piece of legislation which

is unneeded, counterproductive, and while it does have some Democratic support, I don’t think it is quite accurate to refer to it as a

bipartisan piece of legislation. As the Ranking Democrat on the

Asia Subcommittee, I have chosen not to support the legislation,

and I would like to explain why.

The fundamental underlying assumption of this legislation is

that the Taiwan Relations Act is not working, it needs to be fixed,

and this is the way to fix it. Precisely the opposite is true. The Taiwan Relations Act has worked extremely well for 20 years, it is

working well today, and I believe that this legislation was fundamentally crafted for partisan political reasons and not because

the objective conditions surrounding our relations with Taiwan,

China, or any other area in Asia required it.

Let me be specific. Several of my colleagues have spoken with

high praise concerning the elimination of ‘‘ambiguity.’’ I trust I

need not remind anyone that the use of creative ambiguity is as old

as diplomacy itself, and to eliminate ambiguity is not a virtue. To

8

eliminate ambiguity creates rigidities which the very fluid nature

of this issue clearly does not call for.

Now, I probably have developed, over the last 2 decades, the reputation of being one of Taiwan’s strongest supporters in this body,

and I am very proud to have that reputation. I am somewhat

amused that the amended proposal and my colleague’s observations—Mr. Bereuter’s observations—refer to legislation that I introduced in this body on page 6, point 17.

This is what the improved version says: ‘‘An earlier consequence

of such ambiguity and lack of clarity was the expressed surprise by

the People’s Republic of China that Congress and the American

people fully supported President Lee Teng-hui’s private visit to his

alma mater, Cornell University, necessitating House Concurrent

Resolution 53, approved by the House of Representatives by a vote

of 390-to–0 on May 2, 1995, and by the Senate by a vote of 97–

to–1 on May 19, 1995, which stated such support explicitly.’’

Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate you turning off the light. If

the Chairman of the Asia Subcommittee could speak without time

limit, I wish to do so as well.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Lantos, we gave extra time to Mr. Bereuter because his Subcommittee——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman withhold?

The Subcommittee did not have an opportunity to take it before

the Subcommittee. We have quite a bit of discussion on this this

morning, and I will extend to you an extra minute. Please try to

be brief.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I want to remind you that the—.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would ask unanimous consent to give Mr.

Lantos an extra 2 minutes.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman has a parliamentary inquiry.

Please state it.

Mr. ACKERMAN. My parliamentary inquiry is, should not the

Ranking Member of that same Subcommittee through which this

legislation escaped without notice also be granted the same amount

of time as the Republican nonpartisan Chairman?

Chairman GILMAN. It is not a proper parliamentary inquiry. I

will be pleased to extend additional time to the gentleman from

California, Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When I read on the front page of the New York Times that the

Administration was denying the President of Taiwan a visit to his

alma mater, I went through the roof, because I do not view this

country as a place where a distinguished leader of an important

country who received his Ph.D. at Cornell and is reinvited to Cornell to receive an honorary doctorate should not be allowed to enter

the United States and visit his alma mater. I was delighted to see

that my colleagues, by a vote of 390–to–0, agreed with my position.

This was very helpful, because it pointed out to the Chinese that

the Administration has limits as to what it can agree to, and the

9

Congress has a voice in determining our policy vis-a-vis Taiwan,

China, or any other place.

Now, I have no doubt in my mind that the genesis of this legislation is politically designed to embarrass the Administration, which

I don’t think is an objective which is in the national interest. If I

felt that there would be a need for fixing the Taiwan Relations Act,

I would be happy to support provisions to strengthen it. I believe

that this legislation makes the Taiwan Relations Act less effective.

It mandates making private military discussions between Taiwan

and ourselves public. It mandates reports that are unneeded, redundant, unnecessary, and I believe it dramatically circumscribes

the flexibility needed by this, or any future Administration, in conducting our foreign policy in this unbelievably delicate arena of

U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.

My hope, Mr. Chairman—and I realize I may be on the nonprevailing side—my hope is that, both here and on the Floor, we will

have a full discussion and debate on this issue.

My commitment to Taiwan’s security is unshakeable. We have

made that clear. We mobilized the fleet to make that clear, and

that mobilization had my full support. But I believe that we are in

danger of expressing positions which undermine our ability to conduct U.S. foreign policy. This piece of legislation does not stand by

itself. We are not paying our United Nations’ dues. We are attempting to undo the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. We are now creating an unnecessary new problem with the Chinese. We have

plenty of problems with the Chinese, many of them, most of them

of their own making. But I believe that this piece of legislation is

ill-advised, unneeded, and politically motivated, and I shall vote

against it.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Salmon.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to speak.

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Chairman of the

Subcommittee for working diligently to improve the language in

this piece of legislation. But I would also like to associate myself

with the comments of the gentleman from California, Mr. Lantos.

I think that I, for one, agree with your statement that when it

comes to Taiwan’s security your credentials are impeccable and nobody would ever question your commitment to peace in that region.

I also have to wonder aloud, though, at the rationale for this

piece of legislation at this time. I think that, while it is improved,

I agree with Mr. Lantos that I believe that the upshot of passage

of this legislation would actually be counterproductive, and I have

been instructed by various Members of the Committee staff that

Taiwan’s TECRO has not asked for this legislation, so I have to

wonder what the motives behind the legislation at this particular

time are as well.

Mr. Lantos, you have your speculation, I hope that is not the

case, but I cannot understand the rationale at this given point in

time. When the relationship in that region, with the bilateral relationship with China at an all-time low, I think that we have a responsibility to do everything that we can, first, to try to bolster

that relationship, not giving away anything. I think that my supVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:27 Jun 15, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64747.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
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port of Taiwan—every time that we have had a vote supporting

Taiwan’s defense, our alliance with Taiwan, in the 5 years that I

have been here, I have been there every single time. On your measure to let Lee Teng-Hui visit his alma mater, I was there. I have

been there every single time. I was a missionary in Taiwan from

1977 to 1979. I love those people. This is not about support or no

support of Taiwan. This is about common sense, and this is the

wrong time for this piece of legislation.

I really believe that the Administration will raise some valid

points. This comes at a time when I think we could push things

over the edge. I have been in repeated conversations with TECRO,

as well as the Chinese embassy. They have all assured me that

there is no threat of China attacking Taiwan unless Taiwan out

and out votes for independence, and I do not think that is going

to happen. But I will go back and say that I think that, as Mr. Bereuter mentioned with the Speaker’s trip, we have to be frank with

both sides.

When I went to China 6 months ago to visit Tibet and to work

on issues regarding His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Jiang Zemin,

to try to get the two to talk and work toward a peaceful resolution

there, the issue came up of support for Taiwan. I told the Minister

of Foreign Affairs in China that our support of Taiwan is unequivocal. If they attack Taiwan, we would be their defender.

I think that the Taiwan Relations Act is clear. It is not necessary

to change it at this time. It has worked well for the last 20 years,

and I think that this is counterproductive. But at the same time,

while we tell our friends in China that if they attack Taiwan we

are there to defend, we also need to be plain-spoken with the President of Taiwan and tell him to not make irresponsible comments

and talk about a state-to-state relationship. That does not foster a

positive trilateral relationship, so we have to be forthright with

both sides.

I congratulate you, Mr. Lantos. I thought I was going to be a pariah here today. I appreciate the fact that I think like you, because

I have immense respect for your command of foreign policy. I intend also to vote against this bill, not because I don’t support Taiwan, but because I do.

Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

While I am pleased this Committee is considering legislation to

better enable the people of Taiwan to defend themselves from outside aggression, I think we all recognize the long-term solution to

solving this problem is not whether we give them more bombs or

more tanks or more missiles. After all, Taiwan has the best security guarantee in the world, that being the U.S. 7th fleet, our hoard

of intercontinental bombers, the 7,000 or so nuclear warheads at

our disposal, and, as the news events of the last day have shown,

the assistance of a $280 billion U.S. defense budget.

Because, regardless of how many times the White House tells

China’s dictators it respects the so-called ‘‘One China’’ policy, the

realities of the Taiwan Relations Act, the law of the land, require

us to come to Taiwan’s aid if it is attacked by China. So, no matter

how many threats the PRC makes, no matter how many missiles

11

it shoots across the Straits of Taiwan, or no matter how many

ships or planes it buys from Russia, the simple fact is that a Chinese attack against Taiwan would be, under U.S. law, the same as

attacking the United States.

But if we keep telling China’s dictators that we support their

claim to Taiwan, if we keep telling them it is OK not to renounce

using force against Taiwan, then we are creating a monster.

Mr. Chairman, I support H.R. 1838. However, while I appreciate

the effort that you, Ranking Member Gejdenson, and Mr. Bereuter

have put into this legislation, I think we know that the best way

to help Taiwan is not by reaffirming our commitment to its security

or instructing the White House to give it missiles and ships. If we

really want to guarantee the long-term health and security of Taiwan, and the thousands of our servicemen and servicewomen that

are serving in East Asia, we need, then, to recognize the obvious,

and quit alienating Taiwan from the international community simply because China says it is not a state.

Taiwan’s 22 million people have built a thriving, prosperous democracy that respects the rule of law and the human and political

freedoms of its people. Its economy, as we know, is one of the most

advanced in the world, and by every measure it should qualify that

nation for membership in the World Trade Organization, the World

Health Organization, and a variety of other international organizations.

Despite all of Taiwan’s qualifications for statehood, and despite

the reality that its people do not want to live under the autocratic

rule of China’s Communist masters, we still cannot bring ourselves

to face the obvious. Not because we do not think that Taiwan deserves to be a state, but because in this institution and in the Administration we too often cater to a regime that shows nothing but

contempt for internationally recognized human political rights and

for the rule of law. Many of the same Members of Congress, including the prime sponsor of this bill, who speak out strongly for arms

to Taiwan, turn around and lead the charge and twist the arms of

Members, then turn around and lead the charge and twist the

arms of Members to support Most Favored Nation status for China.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support H.R.

1838, but I also urge that we throw the One China policy in the

scrap heap of Cold War ideals, and quit affording China’s dictators

more rights than we do our sister democracy in Taiwan.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Brown.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I rise in strong support of the Taiwan Security Enhancement

Act. I disagree, and strongly disagree, with my good friend, Mr.

Lantos, and I find his analysis to be serious and not at all delusional.

So, with that said, Mr. Chairman, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act sends a necessary signal to Beijing, and to the Executive

Branch, that the Congress supports the Republic of China and Taiwan. Indeed, if those in the Administration responsible for implementing the original Taiwan Relations Act had performed their responsibilities in good faith, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act

would not be necessary. Unfortunately, the Executive Branch’s

12

major concern in dealing with Taiwan’s security requirements has

been, and seems to be, keeping China happy, even if that means

denying Taipei items that are deemed, even by our own military,

to be necessary for Taiwan’s security, even though, as we know, the

Taiwan Relations Act makes that perfectly acceptable, and it is

part of the agreement to provide defensive weapons systems to Taiwan.

The PRC now refuses to renounce the use of force, and in recent

years has built up its military forces, particularly its ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. It is the Communist Chinese who are

threatening military action and, thus, threatening world peace. We

need to restate and reconfirm our determination to see that Taiwan

has what it legitimately needs as an adequate defense and, thus,

an adequate deterrent.

We ask for trouble when America is ambiguous. If we are ambiguous on this point, we send a wrong message to decisionmakers of

a very powerful country who may be hostile to our own interests,

and are certainly hostile to what we view as what is necessary for

peace in the Pacific. Unless Taiwan has a credible self defense capability, as envisioned by the Taiwan Relations Act, we are promoting instability, and increasing the chances that Beijing will employ force against Taiwan which will drag in the United States to

a conflict that we do not need to have, and we do not want to have.

This is why I support the Gilman amendment to this bill. There

are several provisions in this bill that address our lack of contact

with Taiwan’s military. Although mechanisms exist for making

arms sales and providing Taiwan intelligence within the framework of our unofficial relationship, there has never been a provision for assisting Taiwan’s military on operational matters and

field training exercises. The Department of State and others in the

Administration forbid such contact. This bill seeks to remedy that

shortcoming.

The same is true for direct communication links. Direct communication between Taiwan and CINCPAC is not a political question

but a military necessity. This bill will open up those vital communications links that could save American lives in the future.

For example, this bill, on page 9, opens up contact with ‘‘senior’’

American officers with their Taiwanese counterparts. Today, our

generals and admirals cannot work together with the Taiwanese,

with their Taiwanese counterparts, to develop plans which will

serve as a deterrent to Chinese Communist military action. They

should be developing plans, because that deterrent is important to

save American lives and maintain peace.

Much the same is true in the area of missile defense. The leaders

in Beijing are particularly agitated by the idea that we might provide Taiwan’s military with information on military launches headed in their direction. Well, why shouldn’t the Taiwan military get

this data about incoming missiles? For Pete’s sake, if the Chinese

were sending missiles in that direction, they have already broken

the peace, and why can’t the United States play a role in providing

this vital information, thus ensuring that there is a deterrent to

that type of action on the part of China? The only answer that the

Administration can give us is that they are afraid that Communist

China will be upset if we make that our policy.

13

America needs to clearly state our positions and our commitments concerning the Republic of China on Taiwan, and what we

intend to do, or not to do, in the Pacific. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act does just that, and is a reminder to our own officials and to Beijing that U.S. policy, as determined by the Taiwan

Relations Act, is to be crafted by both the Administration and the

Congress. Congress needs to play a role and not just leave this up

to the Executive Branch.

I urge my colleagues to support the bill, which will push American policy toward a more realistic stance to address most of the

serious challenges we confront in the Pacific today, or the most serious challenge, I should say, that we confront in the Pacific, and

perhaps the world.

[The statement of Mr. Rohrabacher appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do want to

commend you and Mr. Gejdenson, and Mr. Bereuter, for your work

on the substitute. I think you have put together a better piece of

legislation.

But I do want to take some objection to your opening statement,

because as you lauded the bipartisan consensus that exists behind

this revised piece of legislation, you made an attack on the Administration that I don’t think was well-founded, in point of fact, and

could have been straight from Republican Congressional Campaign

Committee talking points, to essentially try and set up a political

issue for the next election campaign. That is a serious charge, but

I say it with some consideration and with the belief that it is really

true.

We can’t put together these bipartisan initiatives and then watch

people try to use those initiatives to launch into partisan-based attacks. It doesn’t augur well for the future of bipartisan work on foreign policy.

Mr. Chairman, when you say in your opening statement that the

Administration forced and pushed Taiwan to reach some specific

agreement with China, what is the specific agreement? What fundamental interest of Taiwan’s did the Administration push Taiwan

to agree to with the Chinese? If you are going to make the allegation, then justify it with some specificity. It is a very serious

charge. We are owed, the public is owed, the Administration is

owed, an explanation of what the thinking is.

Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

You will recall in my statement I said it is pressure that was unwisely placed on Taipei with regard to unification, unwillingness to

sell some defensive weapons systems to Taiwan, irrespective of

China’s military advances. It was talk of a strategic partnership

with Beijing, and the Three No’s, and the consequences.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, you have left out a part of your

statement. You said in your statement, put undue pressure on the

Taiwanese to reach agreements, to reach certain agreements with

the Chinese. I want to know what agreements we asked them

to——

14

Chairman GILMAN. If the gentleman will yield, the language that

I used was the Administration’s handling of Taiwan policy in general, including the pressure it has unwisely placed on Taipei to

come to interim agreements.

Mr. BERMAN. Yes. Which agreements?

Chairman GILMAN. Then I went on to indicate some of those

agreements.

Mr. BERMAN. No, you didn’t. You went on to indicate other issues

with Taiwan policy.

But my point is, while there is no doubt that this Administration

encouraged strong cross-straits dialogue and the effort to achieve

agreements that Taiwan would consider to be in their interest, I

am unaware of any specific agreement or concession that this Administration asked Taiwan to make in the context of negotiating

agreements with the Chinese.

In a way, the gentleman from Ohio raised the right issue. This

resolution seeks to reaffirm that which I think most people know,

and the Speaker articulated very clearly back in 1996 in Beijing,

that the United States is prepared to support Taiwan should it

come under attack.

What the gentleman from Ohio seeks to do is to fundamentally

challenge the One China policy. If that is the goal here, then why

not say that is the goal, instead of making into a contentious partisan issue that which, I think, there is a broad consensus to agree

with.

I am going to read something the Administration probably would

not like to hear, but it is from the L.A. Times, dated July 24, 1999,

and I have never heard any disassociation of it: ‘‘Over the past 3

years,’’ Jim Mann writes in this issue of the L.A. Times, ‘‘the Clinton Administration has quietly forged an extensive military relationship with Taiwan, authorizing the Pentagon to conduct the

kind of strategic dialogue with Taiwan’s armed forces that had not

been permitted by any previous Administration since 1979’’—and if

I recall, that is two Reagan Administrations and one Bush Administration—‘‘according to U.S. and Taiwanese sources.’’

The fact that some things aren’t done with all of the public fanfare that they might be done with, all U.S. policy doesn’t have to

be Rohrabacher in a China shop.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BERMAN. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that this is an excellent point. Again,

even though I disagree with it, it is not delusional. Let me just say

to my good friend, we have a difference in approach of how to

maintain the peace.

Mr. BERMAN. I know.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. In fact, what you just stated, I think, is a formula for war with Communist China. Here we are strengthening

our ties below the visual level, while giving a different impression

to the Communist Chinese decisionmakers in Beijing. There is no

excuse for that type of policy. That leaves them with the wrong impression of where we stand, and could lead to conflict, couldn’t it?

Mr. BERMAN. The fact is, though, as Chairman Bereuter mentioned, as has been clear from press statements, as is clear in our

response to the missile crisis back in 1996, to that which Mr. LanVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:27 Jun 15, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 64747.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
15

tos talked about, the U.S. interest in not letting China threaten

Taiwan’s existence, I think, has been pretty clear, and I don’t

think——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But what you just described is—.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I have a few words, but before I do—so don’t slam the gavel

down when I am done—but I have a parliamentary inquiry to know

the following: What I am tending toward is that, if I have to vote

on this, I will vote yes, but that I would rather we not bring it up.

So I am going to ask you and your counsel, what is the correct parliamentary procedure for me to make a motion, and at what time,

to what we would say is move to table or to postpone? Could I yield

to the Chairman to inform me how I would make such a motion

and at what time?

Chairman GILMAN. We will take that under advisement, and we

will discuss it with our Parliamentarian.

Mr. CAMPBELL. All right. Let me reclaim my time, and I will try

to get counsel to find out how to do that.

Here is my take. I think it is essential that we be clear that if

Mainland China attacks Taiwan, we defend Taiwan. I think there

is an element of uncertainty on that point right now in the following setting: If the attack comes following a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, it is ambiguous, by my lights,

whether the United States defends Taiwan. Incidentally, I base

that on the talks that we had, Mr. Chairman, when I was privileged to travel with you to Asia this summer, and that is the impression I got from talking with leaders of other states in the region.

I would like to make that very clear, that whatever the premise

for an attack by Mainland China on Taiwan, we defend Taiwan,

even if that is in response to unilateral declaration.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield for just a second?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I will be happy to yield, if you make it very short.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think that is a very good question, and I think

we should be very clear, because this is of such grave consequence.

The language on page 6, lines 2, 3, and 4, ‘‘should assist in defending them against invasion, missile attack, or blockade——

Mr. CAMPBELL. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. By the People’s Republic of China’’,

and that causes me concern.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman for

his helpful intervention.

I want to say this to my dear friend—San Mateo County, and

San Francisco, of course, and the City and County of San Francisco—that once in a while ambiguity is hurtful. I think of Dean

Acheson and April Glaspy, right? One from each party. I don’t

know what party they are from, but each from different Administrations. The comment that maybe Korea was outside of the protective zone of the United States may have given incentive to North

Korea, the comment that the Iraq-Kuwait issue was a border issue,

and may have given incentive to Saddam Hussein, I don’t know,

16

and there is debate over that. So if we make it clear, any attack

on Taiwan by Mainland China we will defend, that helps, that

helps. As my good friend from Massachusetts says, or blockade,

which is an act of war, a blockade is an act of war.

But I am really troubled that we bring it up right here and now.

There is no area in the world I can think of, maybe North Korea

would be the only other one, where there is a potential of a shooting war greater than this. Are we wise—are we wise to weigh in

right now?

So my feeling is no. If I must vote, I vote yes, because of the clarity that the gentleman from Massachusetts referred to, because of

my sense that if this goes down, it will send a worse message. If

this goes down, it might send a message that we are not standing

with Taiwan. But I am not yet convinced that we need to bring this

up, and so at the right time I would like to make whatever the appropriate motion is to table or to postpone.

I thank the Chairman. I invite his advising me of that right moment.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. May I inquire as to what the Parliamentarian’s decision is as to the appropriateness of Mr. Campbell’s tabling motion?

Chairman GILMAN. We are exploring that with the Parliamentarian right now, and we will make a decision on that very shortly.

The Chair would also like to inform Members of the Committee

that we intend to report this measure by roll call vote at the conclusion of our debate.

I now recognize Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Despite the way it started, this has been one of the most interesting and substantive debates and discussions that we have had.

I do wish to congratulate Mr. Bereuter for his opening statement.

I thought it was very thoughtful, and there was little, if anything,

that he said that I might disagree with.

Also, I want to agree and associate myself with the remarks of

Mr. Lantos, who, as usual, very succinctly summed up the thoughts

of a great many of us, and I include myself in that area, especially

thinking about what could the motivation of this be, and listening

to the usual, unfortunately, usual partisan attacks on the Administration when we talk about a foreign policy issue.

Like my friend Mr. Berman, I, too, wrote down, listening to the

Chairman’s opening statement, trying to figure out what the heck

was meant by undue pressure, and I wrote those words down, and

I am sure that if you search through your statement and read it

again, Mr. Chairman, you might just find it. You said undue pressure. I had no idea what you were talking about. But when charges

are made of that serious a nature, charging the Administration

with doing something provocative, I think people, especially people

in the positions of Members of Congress, should be prepared to

back up what they say.

The other thing that you said, three times during your statement, and I only wrote it down once, but you said it three times,

the failure of the Administration to meet Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs. You said that three times.

17

I am unaware, Mr. Chairman, of any request made by the Taiwanese to the Administration for their defense needs that was

turned down by the Administration. So I would be glad to yield to

you, Mr. Chairman, if you would like to be specific and explain to

me what request the Taiwanese made that was turned down?

Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would prefer the Chairman to answer, if he has

any.

Chairman GILMAN. Were you addressing your inquiry to me or

to Mr. Bereuter?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Chairman Gilman, yourself.

Chairman GILMAN. I am sorry, we have been involved in a parliamentary inquiry. Would you restate?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, if it does not take from my time to repeat

it. You criticized the Administration three times by using the

phrase, failure to meet Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs. My

question, Mr. Chairman, is what request did Taiwan ever make,

ever make, ever make to the Administration that was turned

down? I am unaware of any.

Chairman GILMAN. Let me recite to you, there was a request for

submarines by Taiwan which the Administration turned down;

there was a request for early warning radar which the Administration turned down——

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I might reclaim my time.

Chairman GILMAN [continuing]. Long-range missiles, that was

requested.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I might reclaim——

Chairman GILMAN. Air defense missiles.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I might refresh the Chairman’s recollection,

there were discussions about that, but no request for them was

ever made, and none was ever formally turned down by the Administration.

Chairman GILMAN. That is not my understanding, Mr. Ackerman. It is my understanding that there were requests, and the Administration did not act positively.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would make a unanimous consent request that

the record be kept open so that the Chairman might submit for the

record the copy of those requests.

Chairman GILMAN. We will be pleased to do that.

[Note: This information is classified.]

Mr. ACKERMAN. This Administration has been very supportive of

Taiwan, as has this Congress. We all know that. We know that

there has been no lack of—no ambiguity in the response of the Administration. After President Lee Teng-Hui’s visit to Ithaca, New

York, the Chinese did lob missiles toward Taiwan. The Administration responded by sending two aircraft career battle groups. I don’t

know what more positive indication the Chairman or anybody else

would like to see about our commitment.

On the other hand, I will vote for this. I think that inasmuch as

it has been brought up, inasmuch as the major concerns such as

the explicitness of the—.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. Of the material has been taken out

and compromised, which were the major concerns that most of us

18

have, we should be more concerned with how we treat democratic

nations than worrying about the reaction of dictatorships who

might throw a temper tantrum in order to modify our behavior.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would favor Mr. Campbell’s motion to table and,

absent that, then I am going to vote against this thing.

Just very briefly, I think one of the things that characterizes this

country always, is what works? What works? The Taiwan Relations

Act has worked.

Let me tell you about a conversation I had with Henry Kissinger

several years ago. When he was going over to China and submitting the agenda of President Nixon and then the Chinese submitted their agenda and then they, of course, compromised on this

and came up with a total one, which was ultimately the agenda for

the meeting, he was amazed, because of all of the histrionics and

all of the flamboyant statements in the paper, that the item of Taiwan was about 18th on the list of 20, and he said, why is this?

They said, the only thing we ask of you is do not embarrass us publicly on Taiwan. We do not intend to attack. That is not our intent.

We already have the concept of the One China policy. Just don’t

embarrass us.

So I really feel that this tough guy, make-it-clear, spell-it-out, letthem-have-it-straight approach, is wrong. It is wrong and it is insensitive to the conditions of the times, particularly when we are

trying to establish a greater relationship with China, understanding the Taiwanese people know exactly what we are doing.

Therefore, I would not support H.R. 1838.

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOUGHTON. Yes.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding on his time.

I just did want to make it clear that, having listened to every

classified briefing necessary to understand the weapons issue, I

think I can say with confidence that the Administration has met

all requests from the Taiwanese and, in fact, has gone beyond that

in some instances. I want to say to the gentleman from New York,

Mr. Ackerman, I think he is right in this respect.

For example, one of the things frequently mentioned was dieselpowered submarines. We haven’t produced a diesel-powered submarine in this country for over 2 decades, and the U.S. Navy will

resist any commercial entity producing them because they don’t

want to see them in their inventory at any time in the future. This

is not something that we can address directly.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense—the chief negotiator

with respect to arms issues out in the audience—Mr. Campbell,

and I have tried to arrange classified briefings for everyone who

wants to hear, but, on this issue, I think the Administration cannot

be criticized.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just to back up the Chairman’s statement, I

have been to Taiwan on numerous occasions, and I have had some

19

very serious discussions with the Executive Branch and the military in Taiwan, and I am sorry Mr. Bereuter has not had these

same discussions.

I want to make sure, Doug—I want to make sure I am commenting on what you had to say, Doug, so I want to make sure I

am not doing it without you being able to hear. I am making a

comment on what you just said, and I want to make sure you understand.

Having been to Taiwan on numerous occasions, and having been

in direct consultation with the highest levels of the Taiwanese government and the Taiwanese military, on numerous occasions they

have talked about weapons systems they would like from the

United States. This is their way of making a request. Just to be

specific with you about it, how about an upgraded missile defense

system which they have repeatedly requested in an unofficial way,

and this Administration has repeatedly turned them down in that

request?

Mr. BEREUTER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield.

Mr. BEREUTER. I cannot talk to you in this setting on that issue.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don’t think that this ought to be pictured as a Democrat versus

Republican issue. I note that in general, Congress has been more

pro-Taiwan than has any Administration. President Bush has

made some statements in favor of Beijing that I think go beyond

anything the current President has said, and it is not surprising

that in a discussion where American values and support for democracy are on one side, and the geopolitics of getting along well with

big, powerful countries might be on the other side of the argument,

in every case I can identify where there is a tension between those

two principles. Administrations and State Departments tend to be

more deferential to powerful nations and to the geopolitical interests as they see them, and the Congress has been the repository

of American support for democratic values.

I think this is good legislation. I would point out that Taiwan is

secure in its friendship with the people of the United States, and

has apparently abstained from a nuclear weapons development program. One can only imagine what a Taiwan, feeling it had been

abandoned by the United States, would feel it necessary to do.

I would disagree with my colleague from Orange County when he

argues that our military-to-military contacts are somehow secret,

and discordant, and hidden from Beijing. I am confident that they

are able to purchase copies of the Los Angeles Times, and I know

that the article that Mr. Berman referred to in the Los Angeles

Times could not have been written, except for the purpose, and

with the consent of the Administration, with the purpose of letting

the world know that we are standing by the people of Taiwan.

I think this is excellent legislation. I think we have been sidetracked a bit on issues of whether it is appropriate to criticize or

to praise the Clinton Administration. We could debate that all day.

Fortunately, the debate on this resolution will end more quickly,

and the focus of this resolution should be on what is the appropriate resolution for this Congress to pass.

20

Having passed a very solid resolution on March 19, 1996, I think

it would be a mistake to retreat from this resolution, and I would

say that if there is an increase in tension in the Taiwan Straits,

it is wrong to blame the United States or to blame Taipei. After

all, it is Beijing which shot missiles over those Straits. We, being

a large continental country, can only imagine how insecure it is to

live on a small island and to know that if ship owners feel that

their ships are in danger, then your island is effectively blockaded,

and subject to deprivation of anything that it cannot produce. I

think that if China once told America that Taiwan is 40th on their

list, or 28th on their list, and all they ask is not to be embarrassed,

it would have been less embarrassing if Beijing had abstained from

firing those missiles.

Finally, I don’t think we will ever be in a circumstance where

Taiwan does not request things that we say yes to sometimes. It

does not request things that we say no to. Perhaps we have said

no, informally, at times when we should have said yes, or the other

way around. But I think it would be a dereliction of duty of the

Taiwanese military establishment not to at least informally ask for

a little more than they think they are going to get.

I am sure that while our Chairman may not be able to put in

the record an official request denied document, that the gentleman

from Orange County is correct. There must have been informal denials. Yet, if there were no informal denials, then we would have

given Taiwan a blank check, or they would have asked for too little

from their own standpoint.

I think that this resolution, particularly as modified, is one that

we should move to the Floor.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. LANTOS. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. LANTOS. Has the decision been made with respect to Congressman Campbell’s request?

Chairman GILMAN. Yes. Counsel has been in touch with the

House Parliamentarian, and I am going to ask Mr. Weinberg to

please recite the decision.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that after

all Members who choose to express their views on this issue and

the Administration will have had a chance to express its views on

this issue, Congressman Campbell be allowed to make his motion.

Chairman GILMAN. You have asked for the Parliamentarian’s explanation. I am about to ask Mr. Weinberg to please recite the Parliamentarian’s decision.

Mr. Weinberg.

Mr. WEINBERG. Mr. Chairman, the Parliamentarian has advised

that the motion to table would be in order, and also stated that the

motion to table would kill the amendment and the bill permanently. The Parliamentarian has not, however, been able to provide

a—.

Mr. LANTOS. Did I hear you say permanently?

Mr. WEINBERG. As far as this bill, yes, sir. The bill would be put

on the table.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LANTOS. I will yield.

21

Mr. GEJDENSON. Just for my own curiosity, if the gentleman’s

motion is to table—the Chairman has already placed the substitute

in order. So the gentleman’s motion would be against the substitute, which hasn’t been voted on yet, so then, if that were to

pass, would we then vote on the underlying bill?

Mr. CAMPBELL. If the gentleman from California would yield.

Mr. LANTOS. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you.

I would be happy, of course, to follow counsel, but, as I understand it, my motion to table should come after the Committee has

adopted the substitute, and before we vote on the substitute, and

I think Congressman Lantos’s request was to make sure I didn’t

get passed over in the train that might be going at a high speed

at that point, so I sure hope he renews his unanimous consent.

Last, as I understand it, even though it is true that the motion

to table kills this, there is no parliamentary impediment to an

identical bill being introduced immediately. If I am wrong on that,

I would yield to the Chairman or to the counsel to so inform me.

In other words, let’s not put to much weight on the word ‘‘permanently.’’

Mr. ACKERMAN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Might I address it to the Parliamentarian?

Chairman GILMAN. Please.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is it not true that a motion is in order to remove

from the table, which also requires the same majority vote?

Mr. WEINBERG. I was advised by the Parliamentarian that unanimous consent would be required to take the bill from the table if

it had gone there.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If the gentleman would yield, Mr. Parliamentarian, you can ask unanimous consent to remove it from the

table—and that can be done with anything—but is it not so, that

you can make a motion to remove from the table which requires

a majority vote?

Mr. WEINBERG. I could ask the specific question, Congressman,

but the implication of the response that I received from the Parliamentarian that said it would take unanimous consent to get it off

the table, I think was meant to touch on your question as well as—

.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Would you review that with the Parliamentarian? If you review it in those terms, I think you might get a different answer from the Parliamentarian.

Mr. WEINBERG. I will do that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. If the gentleman would yield again, while this

is all very interesting, of course, the motion to table is not unlike

a motion in opposition to the bill itself, although there is a nuance

of difference that should get approximately the same results, unless there are some Members who don’t want to express themselves

in opposition of the bill, but simply want to put it over for additional time.

Mr. CAMPBELL. If the gentleman would yield, on the record I said

I would vote for this bill, but I would prefer that we not, so I am

in exactly the situation that you say has no elements, and I am one

element.

22

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. LANTOS. I am most happy to yield to all of my colleagues.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think Mr. Lantos——

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ackerman, if you will yield a moment.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Lantos has yielded to me, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Lantos has the time? Will you yield,

please?

Mr. LANTOS. I already yielded, but I will yield to you, and then

please line up so I may yield to the rest of you.

Chairman GILMAN. I am asking our counsel to clarify the request

on the parliamentary questions, and I am going to ask Mr. Rohrabacher if he would set forth his—or, Mr. Weinberg, please set

forth a clarification of the parliamentary questions.

Mr. WEINBERG. Mr. Chairman, the advice that I have received is

that the motion to table, once agreed to, is final and can be reversed only by unanimous consent.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. LANTOS. I have yielded to Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I think——

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think the import of the intention of Mr. Campbell was a mechanism, if you will, to allow for additional time to

inquire as to what is clearly a discrepancy in terms of Members’

understanding as to the facts. I think that is certainly due, and

owing those of us who are not as conversant with these issues as

Mr. Salmon, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Ackerman, and others.

I find it interesting, listening to you, Chairman Gilman, regarding three specific requests from the Taiwanese, and then listening

to Mr. Ackerman say that is absolutely not the case, and he being

supported by Mr. Bereuter, in terms of the accuracy of Mr. Ackerman’s statement. I think this is just too serious in terms of its implications, internationally, and for the United States, to move

ahead at this point in time. Maybe what we should have done here

is to have a hearing so that we could develop some evidence so that

we could make some rational, intelligent decisions.

I yield to Mr. Campbell, if I am correct in interpreting his intent.

Mr. LANTOS. To correct my friend, it is I who will yield to Mr.

Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would say, in candor, that you have a different

view, but that the two are worth consideration. My view is that it

is a dangerous time for us to be engaged in this. This is a time

where it is wiser for us to have a little more discretion. But that

if I am forced to, I would vote yes, based on what I know.

The gentleman’s point is, I think, a very helpful addition, saying

that there are more facts for you to find.

Since you have yielded to me, I do want to make clear, nothing

prevents—since Mr. Lantos yielded, nothing prevents any Member

from bringing back this identical resolution immediately. The idea

about tabling is that it is not the right time. It is not a vote on

the merits.

I yield back.

Chairman GILMAN. I am asking Mr. Weinberg once again, he has

some additional information from the Parliamentarian with regard

to the inquiry on our procedure.

23

Mr. Weinberg.

Mr. WEINBERG. Mr. Chairman, a motion to postpone to a date

certain would take the bill with it to the date certain. Such a motion would be debatable, or the debate would be proper only on the

advisability of the postponement, that a motion to table the motion

to postpone would be in order, as would an amendment to such a

motion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Lantos, on your parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LANTOS. Is it appropriate at this stage to offer a motion that

further debate on this matter be postponed until after Subcommittee hearings on this subject?

Chairman GILMAN. Are you referring to a date certain?

Mr. LANTOS. As soon as Subcommittee hearings will have concluded.

Chairman GILMAN. In order to do that, I am informed we have

to have a specific date.

Mr. LANTOS. My specific date is November 29.

Chairman GILMAN. Apparently, what you want to do is to put an

obstacle in the path of getting this legislation considered by this

Committee. Of course, your proposal would be in order if you have

a date certain.

Mr. LANTOS. November 29, Mr. Chairman. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. There is a motion before the Committee to

postpone consideration of this measure until November 29. The motion is proposed by Mr. Lantos. It is a debatable motion.

Who seeks recognition?

Mr. LANTOS. I seek recognition.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, as this wide-ranging discussion has

clearly demonstrated, many, if not all Members of the Committee

have doubts concerning certain factual representations. It is the ordinary—there is no order in the Committee, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman is correct. May we have order,

please? May we have order so that the gentleman may be heard?

May we have order—.

Mr. LANTOS. The ordinary modus operandi——

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The ordinary modus operandi of this body, particularly when it

comes to matters of such import, is to have extensive Subcommittee

hearings, that all the facts and arguments may be presented, debated, analyzed, and then come to the Full Committee with recommendation. This clearly has not been the case in this instance,

and I believe that my motion to postpone debate is in the public

interest.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Bereuter, point of inquiry. Did your Subcommittee hold any hearings on this issue?

Mr. BEREUTER. We did hold a hearing specifically on this issue

in September.

24

Chairman GILMAN. In September. At this point, since there has

been a question with regard to information that has been disclosed

to the Committee, I am going to ask Mr. Kurt Campbell, who is

here for the Administration, would you please take the witness’s

seat?

Mr. Campbell, would you recite your title?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense at

the Pentagon.

Chairman GILMAN. Are you one of our government’s chief interlocutors with Taiwan on security matters? Is that correct?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, I am.

Chairman GILMAN. In the course of your conversation with Taiwanese officials, you have become familiar with the U.S. weapons

system that they are interested in acquiring?

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is correct.

Chairman GILMAN. In your opinion, has the government of Taiwan expressed interest in acquiring from the U.S., for example, the

Aegis Air Defense System?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, if I may, please, as I have suggested to you in the past in previous hearings, the story of requests

from Taiwan, the story of the United States offering various defense articles, is a complex one. I would recommend that if we want

to proceed in this, that we do it in closed session. I think that

would—we have offered this on several occasions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Campbell, could you tell us just yes or

no, without getting into classified information? Has Taiwan made

a request for——

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I think it is inappropriate to bully

an Administration witness.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman is out of order.

Has the Taiwanese government expressed an interest in acquiring the Aegis Air Defense System, yes or no?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman said he would like

not to answer that question in open session, and I think that he

knows as much about security issues as anyone.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman is out of order. The witness

did not make that statement. The witness has been asked for a yes

or no statement.

Mr. ACKERMAN. No, the Chairman asked for a yes or no statement.

Chairman GILMAN. I said the witness is being asked to answer

with a yes or no response.

Mr. ACKERMAN. And he answered, Mr. Chairman, that it would

be inappropriate in open session.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman is out of order.

Would the witness please respond?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, as I stated, my preference would

be to review the entire range——

Chairman GILMAN. I am not asking for the entire range. Is my

request of you to classified for a yes or no response? Is that a classified matter?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me answer the question this way then, Mr.

Chairman. The Taiwanese have requested early warning capability.

25

Chairman GILMAN. How about an AMRAAM air-to-air missile request?

Mr. CAMPBELL. The U.S. Administration has agreed to provide

some form of early warning, and what we are working on now are

the technical issues associated with the provision of such a system.

Chairman GILMAN. I am referring to the Aegis system and the

AMRAAM system. Have they made a request for those systems?

Just yes or no.

Mr. CAMPBELL. As I said, Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to go

through each one of these issues in——

Chairman GILMAN. I am not asking for classified information. All

I am asking is has a request been made, Mr. Campbell, for an airto-air missile air defense system—the Aegis system and the

AMRAAM system.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes, Mr. Ackerman. State your point of order.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I believe it is not within the rules of the Committee to badger a witness.

Chairman GILMAN. I am not badgering the witness. All I am asking is—the gentleman is out of order. The witness is not being

badgered.

Mr. ACKERMAN. He has given the same answer four times; and

when he is asked the fifth time, that is a badger, by definition.

Chairman GILMAN. You are out of order, Mr. Ackerman. We are

not badgering the witness. All we are asking for is a very simple

yes or no response.

Can you respond, Mr. Campbell? Has the Taiwan government

made a request for the Aegis system or the AMRAAM system?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I have tried to respond to this. I

would prefer to——

Chairman GILMAN. I know what you said about preferring, but

can you answer with a yes or no answer?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I think it is in the interest of this

chamber, and the interest of the U.S. Government, for us to continue this discussion in private hearings. I would be happy to go

into great detail about all aspects of the security relationship with

Taiwan. If I can say, we have been standing by for 3 weeks to provide these briefings.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Campbell, the Committee has been accused of misleading our Members with regard to these requests.

Can you clarify whether such requests have been made?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I feel very confident that I can

clarify all issues associated with our security relationship with Taiwan. I believe it is in the interest of this body, and the U.S. Government, to do this in a private hearing.

Chairman GILMAN. Once again, I am asking, can you answer,

without breaching any confidential relationship, whether these requests were made?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary

inquiry.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Could the Chairman explain to us what constitutes badgering?

26

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman is out of order. He is not stating a proper parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, a point of order.

Chairman GILMAN. Please state it.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I wonder if the Chair could ask the gentleman,

rather than simply asking him for either-or, whether, in his opinion, the question that the Chair is posing is susceptible to a simple

yes or no answer, or is it necessary, in his opinion, in his role——

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s request is reasonable.

Mr. Campbell, can you respond in that manner?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I can, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say that the

arms sales process is classified. Every Administration since the introduction of the Taiwan Relations Act has treated it as such.

Second, it would be fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that there had

been a number of requests that Taiwan has made of us, both unofficially and officially, which we have discouraged. There has also

been—let me go on, Mr. Chairman. There have also been a number

of suggestions that the U.S. Government has made to Taiwan, in

terms of process or arms sales that they should consider, which

they have also refused.

Furthermore—let me just go on, if I may, please. I am trying to

answer the question. Furthermore, there have been a number of requests that Taiwan has made to the United States which we have

approved which they have sought not to pursue. The reason that

I give you this background, it is a much more complex picture than

a yes or no answer can assess at this juncture.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at the major

challenges that the Taiwanese face, anti-air, anti- submarine, amphibious, each of those areas, the U.S. Government believes that

we have taken steps, early warning, that will allow Taiwan to take

appropriate defensive steps. We believe that, frankly, we have

taken extra efforts in the last several years to fulfill our obligations

under the Taiwan Relations Act.

I am not attempting to avoid the question, Mr. Chairman. I am

simply stating that some of this information, I believe, is in the interest of the Members to know. I also believe it is not in the interest for us to be debating in public at this time.

Chairman GILMAN. Just one more question, Mr. Campbell, have

any defense systems requests that the Taiwan government has

made been turned down?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think I have already made my statement on

this issue in a more complex way, Mr. Chairman. I will just stand

by the statement I made.

Mr. BEREUTER. Will the Chairman yield?

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will just say, having looked at this in all of its classified ramifications that I can determine, I think that Deputy Assistant Secretary Campbell’s response is a responsible one. It is the only one

he can give in this situation.

But I would also say to the Chairman that your and Mr. Gejdenson’s substitute has taken care of this problem because you have

eliminated specific references to the weapons system. I think we

have taken the right course here, and I think we have gone as far

27

as we legitimately can. If we were to hold other hearings at the

Subcommittee or Committee level in order to really get to the heart

of this issue, it has to be conceptual.

Thank you.

Mr. LANTOS. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. When will you call for a vote?

Chairman GILMAN. We are about to do that. There is a motion

before us, and the debate is now only on the motion by Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Manzullo is requesting time.

Mr. MANZULLO. I just have a question on general debate before

you go to Mr. Lantos’ motion, so my remarks are not appropriate

at this time.

Chairman GILMAN. We are now, Mr. Manzullo, on the motion by

Mr. Lantos to postpone debate.

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Chairman?

I would just like to speak in support of the Lantos motion. The

reason that I do, as I think has been exemplified by the last 20

minutes, the fact is, there has not been a thorough going-over. The

Administration has volunteered to provide information to us, sensitive information that could not be provided here in an open session, in a closed session. I am on the Asia Subcommittee which

Chairman Bereuter chairs, but although we have talked many

times about the policy regarding Taiwan and China, this specific

bill has never been marked up. It has never been discussed in Subcommittee.

Let’s do it appropriately. I am not asking for us to overturn it

at the present time. I think, let’s be prudent here, let’s postpone

it. I think that the Representative from California’s suggestion is

a good one. This is so important. Let’s take the time to do it right,

and let’s get all of the information we possibly can before we move

ahead.

Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent request.

Chairman GILMAN. What is the unanimous consent request?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would ask if the gentleman from California,

Mr. Lantos, would consider, in light of the remarks by the Chair

of the Subcommittee, Mr. Bereuter, to amend his motion so that

any hearings on this particular issue would be done in closed session.

Mr. LANTOS. I hereby do so.

Chairman GILMAN. That is an inappropriate motion. That has to

be decided by the Subcommittee Chairman by a vote in the Subcommittee. House rules require that kind of vote.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would reluctantly oppose Mr.

Lantos’ motion. It seems like the only fact that is in contention is

whether the United States has denied particular weapons requests

from Taiwan. That is, at most, a sideline to the resolution. Not only

that, it is only the details of that sideline that are in question.

I think we had reached agreement that certainly we said no to

Taiwan on occasion. Perhaps we haven’t said no to a formal request, but we have said no to an informal request. We have said

yes on occasion, and as the Administration representative pointed

28

out, sometimes we say maybe, or how would you like this other

weapons system that might meet your needs and/or meet the diplomatic needs of the United States. I think that, with that background, if we were to vote on this resolution that is before us, and

that is there are times when the United States says yes and times

when we say no, it could be the subject of some other hearings in

evaluating whether the Administration has said yes or no to informal requests, but I don’t think that that needs to hold up the passage of this resolution.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. First of all, I rise in strong opposition of this

motion. I consider it to be an obstructionist motion. This is not

being done in order to find out more information. Mr. Lantos is

fully aware that there is no major issue that comes before this

Committee. When I say major issue——

Chairman GILMAN. Will you put the mike a little closer?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I rise in strong opposition to Mr. Lantos’ motion. There is no issue that comes before this Committee that is a

major issue, and an issue that is contentious, in which we are all

agreed on what the facts are. It is as simple as that. This idea that

we should postpone this decision today because we are in disagreement over the facts is a joke. The fact is, every time we come here

and disagree, we have some contention as to what the facts are.

Now, how do we determine what the facts are? We hold hearings

at the Subcommittee level. Guess what? There has been a hearing

at the Subcommittee level. I happen to be a Member of the Asia

and Pacific Subcommittee. We held that hearing on September

15th.

Let me note, in terms of what we just went through a few moments ago, that Assistant Secretary Campbell, his statement, has

backed up the Chairman’s contention. Listen very closely—if you

look very closely at his words, the Chairman’s contention that there

have been some of requests made by Taiwan that have been denied

was backed up by exactly what the Deputy Assistant Secretary

said. Of course, we have also an agreement for that. Mr. Sherman’s

statement acknowledges that that is par for the course. We agree

on some things and disagree on others where we turn down some

requests and accede to others.

Mr. Chairman, I would just say, before I yield to my good friend,

Mr. Gejdenson, I am a bit dismayed. I—having been a Member of

this Committee at a time when the Democrats controlled this Committee, I don’t remember a case where anyone on this side of the

aisle ever badgered Mr. Hamilton, as the Chairman of this Committee, as we have seen today, and it seems to be the standard operating procedure that has been coming about. I don’t like that. I

don’t think this is a gentlemanly way to handle this type of business. We should agree to disagree in a way that we respect each

other’s rights and respect each other’s opinions. But I think that

badgering the Chairman, as we have seen, really goes counter to

that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would certainly yield to my good friend, Mr.

Gejdenson.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Gejdenson.

29

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. Chairman. I want to join Mr. Rohrabacher in that China

shop for a moment, and just say that I think we ought to defeat

the motion. We ought to pass the resolution. I believe that the resolution has come to a proper balance of our concerns for gratuitously

creating tensions in the region but firmly stating our support for

a democratic government in the region.

The reality is that the language we have before us, as even Mr.

Bereuter agrees, is language that I think has struck a solid balance

in favor of democracy without being disruptive. I would hope that

Members would defeat the motion to table, and that we could then

listen to Mr. Roth or not listen to Mr. Roth, as the Committee decides at that point, and then vote on the bill in an expeditious manner.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Before yielding, I just want to associate myself with Mr. Gejdenson’s remarks. A great deal of time and effort and all of the—both

parties, Majority and Minority, have been fully consulted and have

worked on this bill. I would urge my colleagues to defeat the motion and to move forward with adoption of the measure so it can

go to the Floor.

Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to apply to get a Rohrabacher certificate as

being nondelusionary, and I am not sure how to apply. Absent that,

I just want to—an interesting point was made before when it was

said that if we do not vote until we have all of the facts before us

we may be setting a very dangerous precedent.

Some of the discussion that we have had concerning Taiwan’s defense needs over the last few minutes, I would just like to clarify.

The statement that Mr. Gilman made three times during his opening statement—one word has escaped many of us during the course

of this discussion—he said, the Administration’s failure to meet

Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs. The operative word is legitimate

defense needs. It is quite possible, Mr. Chairman, and I will concede that, that maybe Taiwan has—and it is speculation on my

part, because we have not gone into closed session—that Taiwan

made some request, as every country does of us, that we might not

have thought was a legitimate defense need, and in considering

that we have had discussions with them.

The point that I took up, Mr. Chairman, was the partisanship of

continuing to harp on the Administration in the partisan fashion

to say that they have failed to meet Taiwan’s legitimate defense

needs. Absent the witness from the Defense Department, if the

Chairman knows of any legitimate defense needs that were made

by Taiwan, as he recited three times, I think we are still open, and

I think the record is open to hear that. But what you heard from

the Administration, or from the Department of Defense, I believe,

said that there might have been requests that they made formally

or informally, that we dissuaded because of whatever reasons, and

I read that as maybe they weren’t legitimate requests, and I think

that we should hear that. But I do not think that the facts are in

dispute at all here, Mr. Chairman, and I suggest that we move forward.

30

Chairman GILMAN. The question is now on the motion to postpone the issue before the Committee to November 29, as offered by

Mr. Lantos. All those in favor, signify by saying aye. Those opposed, say no.

Chairman GILMAN. The noes have it.

Mr. LANTOS. I ask for a recorded vote.

Chairman GILMAN. A recorded vote is requested. All in favor of

a recorded vote, signify by a show of hands. A sufficient number.

A recorded vote is requested, and a recorded vote will be taken.

The clerk will call the roll.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gilman.

Chairman GILMAN. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gilman votes no.

Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Goodling votes no.

Mr. Leach.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Bereuter votes no.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Smith votes no.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Burton votes no.

Mr. Gallegly.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.

Mr. Ballenger.

Mr. BALLENGER. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ballenger votes no.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rohrabacher votes no.

Mr. Manzullo.

Mr. MANZULLO. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Manzullo votes no.

Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Royce votes no.

Mr. King.

Mr. KING. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. King votes no.

Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Chabot votes no.

Mr. Sanford.

Mr. SANFORD. Aye.

31

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sanford votes aye.

Mr. Salmon.

Mr. SALMON. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Salmon votes aye.

Mr. Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Houghton votes aye.

Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Campbell votes aye.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. McHugh votes no.

Mr. Brady.

Mr. BRADY. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brady votes no.

Mr. Burr.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gillmor.

Mr. GILLMOR. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gillmor votes no.

Mr. Radanovich.

Mr. RADANOVICH. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Radanovich votes no.

Mr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Cooksey votes no.

Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. TANCREDO. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Tancredo votes no.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gejdenson votes no.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Lantos votes aye.

Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Berman votes no.

Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ackerman votes aye.

Mr. Faleomavaega.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Martinez.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Payne.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Menendez.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brown votes no.

Ms. McKinney.

32

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Danner.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hilliard.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sherman votes no.

Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Wexler votes no.

Mr. Rothman.

Mr. ROTHMAN. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rothman votes no.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Davis votes no.

Mr. Pomeroy.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Delahunt votes aye.

Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Meeks votes aye.

Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Lee votes aye.

Mr. Crowley.

Mr. CROWLEY. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Crowley votes no.

Mr. Hoeffel.

Mr. HOEFFEL. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hoeffel votes no.

Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will call the absentees.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Leach.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gallegly.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Burr.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Faleomavaega.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Martinez.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Payne.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Menendez.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. McKinney.

33

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Danner.

Ms. DANNER. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Danner votes no.

Mr. Hilliard.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Pomeroy.

[No response.]

Chairman GILMAN. How is Mr. Burr recorded?

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Burr?

Mr. BURR. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Burr votes no.

Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will report the tally.

Just a moment. Mr. Hastings. How is Mr. Hastings recorded?

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings is recorded as not having voted.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hastings?

Mr. HASTINGS. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings votes no.

Nine ayes and 30 noes.

Chairman GILMAN. The motion is not agreed to.

If there are no further amendments, without objection, the previous question is ordered on the amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The question is now on the amendment in the nature of a substitute. All those in favor, signify by saying aye. All of those opposed, say no.

The amendment in the nature of a substitute is agreed to.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized to offer

a motion.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee report

the bill, as amended, to the House, with a recommendation that the

bill, as amended, do pass.

Chairman GILMAN. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton. Those in favor of the motion, signify by saying aye. Those opposed, say no.

The ayes have it. A quorum being present, the motion is agreed

to.

Without objection, the Chair or his designee is authorized to

make motions under rule 20 with respect to a conference on this

bill or counterpart for the Senate.

Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I request a recorded vote, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. A recorded vote is requested. All those in

favor, signify by a show of hands. A sufficient number having been

noted, a recorded vote is requested and ordered. The clerk will call

the roll.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gilman.

Chairman GILMAN. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gilman votes aye.

Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Goodling votes aye.

34

Mr. Leach.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Bereuter votes aye.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Smith votes aye.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Burton votes aye.

Mr. Gallegly.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes aye.

Mr. Ballenger.

Mr. BALLENGER. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ballenger votes aye.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rohrabacher votes aye.

Mr. Manzullo.

Mr. MANZULLO. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Manzullo votes aye.

Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Royce votes aye.

Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. King votes aye.

Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Chabot votes aye.

Mr. Sanford.

Mr. SANFORD. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sanford votes aye.

Mr. Salmon.

Mr. SALMON. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Salmon votes no.

Mr. Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Houghton votes no.

Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Campbell votes aye.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. McHugh votes aye.

Mr. Brady.

Mr. BRADY. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brady votes aye.

35

Mr. Burr.

Mr. BURR. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Burr votes aye.

Mr. Gillmor.

Mr. GILLMOR. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gillmor votes aye.

Mr. Radanovich.

Mr. RADANOVICH. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Radanovich votes aye.

Mr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Cooksey votes aye.

Mr. Tancredo.

Mr. TANCREDO. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Tancredo votes aye.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gejdenson votes aye.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Lantos votes no.

Mr. Berman.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Ackerman votes aye.

Mr. Faleomavaega.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Martinez.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Payne.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Menendez.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Brown votes aye.

Ms. McKinney.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hastings votes no.

Ms. Danner.

Ms. DANNER. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Danner votes aye.

Mr. Hilliard.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Sherman votes aye.

Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Wexler votes aye.

Mr. Rothman.

36

Mr. ROTHMAN. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Rothman votes aye.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Davis votes aye.

Mr. Pomeroy.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Delahunt votes no.

Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Meeks votes aye.

Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. No.

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. Lee votes no.

Mr. Crowley.

Mr. CROWLEY. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Crowley votes aye.

Mr. Hoeffel.

Mr. HOEFFEL. Aye.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hoeffel votes aye.

Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will report the tally.

Please call the absentees.

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Leach.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hyde.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Gallegly.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Berman.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Faleomavaega.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Martinez.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Payne.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Menendez.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Ms. McKinney.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Hilliard.

[No response.]

Ms. BLOOMER. Mr. Pomeroy.

[No response.]

Chairman GILMAN. The clerk will report the tally.

Ms. BLOOMER. On this vote, there were 32 ayes and 6 noes.

Chairman GILMAN. The motion is agreed to. The ayes have it. A

quorum being present, the motion is agreed to.

Without objection, the Chair’s designee is authorized to make a

motion under rule 20 with respect to a conference on this bill or

a counterpart from the Senate.

37

Without objection, the Chief of Staff is authorized to make technical and conforming and grammatical changes to the measure

adopted by the Committee.

The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(39)

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