IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ross C. Cioppa and Maureen Cioppa, :

Petitioners :

 :

v. : No. 1219 C.D. 2014

 : Argued: April 14, 2015

State Employees’ Retirement System, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge1

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: August 3, 2015

This matter is a petition for review filed by Ross C. Cioppa (Mr. 

Cioppa), a former Magisterial District Judge, and Maureen Cioppa (Mrs. Cioppa), 

his wife, appealing an order of the State Employees’ Retirement Board (Board) 

denying their appeals of two decisions of the State Employees’ Retirement System 

(SERS) forfeiting Mr. Cioppa’s entire accrued pension benefits and Mrs. Cioppa’s 

rights under his pension. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

Mr. Cioppa was a member of SERS from April 13, 1973 until July 31, 

1979 as an employee of the Department of Transportation and the Department of 

Revenue. Board Opinion at 8; Hearing Officer Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶¶1-3; 

Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶¶1-3, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 46a. 

 

1

This case was reassigned to the author on June 12, 2015.
2

When he left state employment in 1979, he filed for and received a refund of his 

member contributions and interest. Board Opinion at 8; Hearing Officer F.F. ¶4; 

Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶4, R.R. at 46a. On June 25, 1999, Mr. 

Cioppa resumed SERS membership as a District Justice (now Magisterial District 

Judge)2elected for a six-year term. Board Opinion at 8; Hearing Officer F.F. ¶5; 

Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶5, R.R. at 46a. In 2000, he purchased his 

previously withdrawn 6.4122 years of service credit, and in 2004 purchased .5861 

years of military service credit. Board Opinion at 8; Hearing Officer F.F. ¶¶6-7; 

Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶¶6-7, R.R. at 46a. In 2005, he was reelected to another six-year term as Magisterial District Judge. Board Opinion at 8; 

Hearing Officer F.F. ¶8; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶8, R.R. at 47a.

On October, 12, 2011, Mr. Cioppa was charged with the criminal

offenses of bribery, official oppression and indecent assault and was suspended 

with pay by the Judicial Conduct Board. Board Opinion at 8; Hearing Officer F.F. 

¶9; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶9, R.R. at 47a; Docket No. 2012-29 

Joint Ex. 1, R.R. at 50a-51a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 2 F.F. ¶¶3-5, R.R. at 

55a-56a. Mr. Cioppa resigned from office on December 9, 2011, electing to retire 

under SERS Option 2, naming Mrs. Cioppa as his survivor annuitant, with a full 

Option 4 withdrawal of his accumulated deductions. Board Opinion at 8; Hearing 

Officer F.F. ¶¶10-11; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶¶10-11, R.R. at 47a; 

Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 2 F.F. ¶6, R.R. at 56a. At the time that he resigned, 

Mr. Cioppa was 70 years old and had a total of 19.4626 years of credited service in 

 

2

The office of district justice was re-designated as magisterial district judge by the Act of 

November 30, 2004, P.L. 1618, No. 207.
3

SERS. Board Opinion at 8; Hearing Officer F.F. ¶¶1 n.1, 10; Docket No. 2012-29 

Joint Stipulation ¶10, R.R. at 47a.

On April 12, 2012, Mr. Cioppa pleaded guilty to two charges of 

official oppression and two charges of indecent assault, for which he was 

sentenced to six months house arrest and four years’ probation, and the bribery 

charges were withdrawn. Board Opinion at 8; Hearing Officer F.F. ¶12; Docket 

No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶12, R.R. at 47a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 1, 

R.R. at 50a-51a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 2 F.F. ¶¶7, 9, R.R. at 56a-57a. The 

offenses to which he pleaded guilty arose out of incidents in which he asked for 

sexual favors from two female tenants in landlord-tenant cases before him in 

exchange for favorable rulings in their cases. Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 2 F.F. 

¶8, R.R. at 56a-57a. Mrs. Cioppa has been married to Mr. Cioppa since 1964. 

Board Opinion at 5-6 F.F. ¶34; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶20, R.R. at 

48a. There is no claim or evidence that Mrs. Cioppa had any involvement in or

knowledge of her husband’s misconduct or that she benefitted from his misconduct 

in any way.

On April 20, 2012, the Judicial Conduct Board filed a formal 

complaint against Mr. Cioppa seeking disciplinary action against him for the 

conduct admitted in his guilty pleas. Board Opinion at 5-6 F.F. ¶27; Docket No. 

2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶13, R.R. at 47a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 2, R.R. 

at 53a. On July 24, 2012, the Court of Judicial Discipline ordered, pursuant to 

Article V, Section 18(d)(1) of the Constitution, that Mr. Cioppa be removed from 

the office of Magisterial District Judge and that he “shall hereafter be ineligible to 

hold any judicial office in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” Board Opinion at 

5-6 F.F. ¶¶28-29; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶¶14-15, R.R. at 47a; 
4

Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 2, R.R. at 64a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 3, R.R. 

at 65a.

In April 2012, SERS notified the Cioppas that Mr. Cioppa’s pension 

benefits and Mrs. Cioppa’s rights under his pension were being forfeited pursuant 

to the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (PEPFA)3as result of his April 12, 

2012 guilty plea to charges of official oppression. Docket No. 2012-30 Joint 

Stipulation ¶13, R.R. at 113a. In August 2012, SERS notified the Cioppas that Mr. 

Cioppa’s pension benefits and Mrs. Cioppa’s rights under his pension were being 

forfeited pursuant to Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution and 

Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 3352(a), as result of a July 24, 

2012 decision of the Court of Judicial Discipline removing him from office and 

barring him from holding judicial office in the future. Docket No. 2012-29 Joint 

Stipulation ¶16, R.R. at 47a. The Cioppas appealed the April 2012 and August 

2012 forfeitures to the Board. Docket No. 2012-30 Joint Stipulation ¶14, R.R. at 

113a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶17, R.R. at 47a; Appeal Letters, R.R. 

at 1a-5a, 10a-13a, 16a-20a, 97a-101a. Those appeals were consolidated, and the 

parties submitted the appeals to the Board’s hearing officer on stipulated facts and 

exhibits.

On March 10, 2014, the hearing officer issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law recommending denial of the appeals. The Cioppas filed 

exceptions to the hearing officer’s opinion. On June 19, 2014, the Board overruled 

the Cioppas’ exceptions and denied their requests to reinstate pension benefits. In 

that opinion, the Board adopted the hearing officer’s findings of fact and made 12 

additional findings of fact based on stipulated facts not included in the hearing 

 

3 Act of July 8, 1978, P.L. 752, No. 140, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1311-1315.
5

officer’s opinion.4 The Cioppas timely appealed the Board’s decision to this 

Court.5 

The Board correctly upheld the forfeiture of Mr. Cioppa’s pension 

rights under PEPFA, Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 

and Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code. Section 3(a) of PEPFA provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no public official 

or public employee nor any beneficiary designated by such 

public official or public employee shall be entitled to receive 

any retirement or other benefit or payment of any kind except 

a return of the contribution paid into any pension fund without 

interest, if such public official or public employee is convicted 

or pleads guilty or no defense to any crime related to public 

office or public employment.

43 P.S. § 1313(a). Official oppression, one of the crimes to which Mr. Cioppa 

pleaded guilty, is a “crime related to public office or public employment” under 

PEPFA. Section 2 of PEPFA, 43 P.S. § 1312. 

Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits 

payment of any retirement benefits to any judge, including a magisterial district 

judge, who under Article V, Section 18 “is suspended, removed or barred from 

holding judicial office for conviction of a felony or misconduct in office or conduct 

which prejudices the proper administration of justice or brings the judicial office 

 

4

The hearing officer had ruled that Mr. Cioppa was entitled to repayment of his purchase of 

.5861 years of military service credit and the Board reversed that ruling on the ground that Mr. 

Cioppa had already received a full refund of his contributions. The Cioppas do not challenge the 

Board’s ruling on the military service credit issue in this appeal. 

5

The issues here, questions of statutory and constitutional interpretation, are issues of law as 

to which our review is plenary. Heilbrunn v. State Employees’ Ret. Bd., 108 A.3d 973, 976 n.2

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
6

into disrepute.” Pa. Const. art. V, § 16(b).6 Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code

prohibits payment of any retirement benefits to any judge, including a magisterial 

district judge, who “is suspended or removed from office under section 18 of 

Article V or under Article VI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 

3352(a).7

The July 24, 2012 order of the Court of Judicial Discipline satisfies 

the forfeiture requirements of both of these provisions. It imposed discipline 

pursuant to Article V, Section 18(d) of the Constitution for conduct in office which 

is contrary to the proper administration of justice and brings the judicial office into 

disrepute and ordered that Mr. Cioppa “is hereby removed from office as

magisterial district judge.” Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 2, R.R. at 64a ; Docket 

No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 3, R.R. at 65a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶¶14-

15, R.R. at 47a. In addition, it is sufficient to support forfeiture under Article V, 

Section 16(b), independent of the removal from office, because, pursuant to Article 

 

6 Article V, Section 16(b) provides:

Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be retired on the last day of the 

calendar year in which they attain the age of 70 years. Former and retired 

justices, judges and justices of the peace shall receive such compensation as 

shall be provided by law. Except as provided by law, no salary, retirement 

benefit or other compensation, present or deferred, shall be paid to any justice, 

judge or justice of the peace who, under section 18 or under Article VI, is 

suspended, removed or barred from holding judicial office for conviction of a 

felony or misconduct in office or conduct which prejudices the proper 

administration of justice or brings the judicial office into disrepute.

Pa. Const. art. V, § 16(b).

7

Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code provides:

Former and retired judges and magisterial district judges shall receive such 

compensation as shall be provided by or pursuant to statute. No salary, 

retirement benefit or other compensation shall be paid to any judge or 

magisterial district judge who is suspended or removed from office under 

section 18 of Article V or under Article VI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.

42 Pa. C.S. § 3352(a).
7

V, Section 18(d) of the Constitution, it also barred him from holding judicial office 

as a sanction for that conduct. Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶¶14-15, R.R. 

at 47a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 2, R.R. at 64a; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 

3, R.R. at 65a.

Mr. Cioppa does not dispute that his guilty plea satisfies the 

requirements for forfeiture under PEPFA. Nor does he contest that the conduct for 

which July 24, 2012 Court of Judicial Discipline order was issued satisfies the 

requirements for forfeiture under Article V, Section 16(b) of the Constitution and 

Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code. Rather, he contends 1) that the pension 

benefits that he earned prior to the term of office in which he committed the acts 

for which he pled guilty are not forfeited under PEPFA; and 2) that his pension 

benefits could not be forfeited under Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code because he had retired and 

was over the age of 70 at the time that Court of Judicial Discipline acted against 

him. Neither of these arguments has merit. Indeed, both of these arguments have 

been clearly and expressly rejected by our Supreme Court.

Mr. Cioppa’s argument that PEPFA forfeiture is limited to the term of 

office during which he committed the crime is contrary to the language of Section 

3(a) of PEPFA that the public official or employee shall not receive “any

retirement or other benefit or payment of any kind except a return of the 

contribution paid into any pension fund without interest.” 43 P.S. § 1313(a) 

(emphasis added). The language of Section 3(c) of PEPFA relied on by Mr. 

Cioppa, that “[e]ach time a public officer or public employee is elected, appointed, 

promoted, or otherwise changes a job classification, there is a termination and 

renewal of the contract for purposes of this act,” 43 P.S. § 1313(c), does not place 
8

any limit on the forfeiture of all benefits required by Section 3(a) or suggest any 

intent to limit forfeiture. Rather, it is intended to subject public officials and 

employees who began their public employment prior the enactment of PEPFA in 

1978 to forfeiture of their entire pensions by making a post-PEPFA re-election, 

reappointment or job change a new contract to which PEPFA’s forfeiture 

provisions can validly apply. Shiomos v. State Employes’ Ret. Bd., 626 A.2d 158, 

161-62 (Pa. 1993); Apgar v. State Employes’ Ret. Sys., 655 A.2d 185, 188 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1994) (en banc).

Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has addressed this precise 

issue and held that PEPFA requires forfeiture of all retirement benefits, including 

those earned in terms of office long before the public official committed any 

criminal conduct. Shiomos, 626 A.2d at 162-63. In Shiomos, the Supreme Court 

ruled that a judge whose pension was vested prior to his re-election and second 

term of office forfeited his entire pension as a result of a conviction for extortion as 

a senior judge after his retirement. Id. at 160, 162-63. The Court concluded that 

the language of Section 3(a) of PEPFA required forfeiture of the entire pension, 

including benefits earned before the judge’s second term of office, and explained:

As a reasonable condition of public employment, the 

employee reaffirms his commitment to perform his job with 

honesty and integrity every time he or she begins a new term 

of office, receives a promotion or appointment, or experiences 

a change in job classification .... With each appointment 

there is a renewal of the agreement to perform the term of 

public service without violating [PEPFA]; an agreement 

which encompasses all that has gone before. Thus, whether or 

not a public employee’s right to receive retirement benefits 

has vested, or he or she is in actual receipt of benefits, all 

previous accumulated rights to receive such benefits are 

subject to forfeiture by and through the “renewed” agreement 
9

which is formed each time a person chooses to become a 

“public official” as defined by [Section 3(a)].

It is neither unconscionable nor unreasonable to require 

honesty and integrity during an employee’s tenure in public 

service. Nor is it violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution to 

provide that at every new term of employment a public 

official or employee renews and amends his or her pension 

contract to include the new public service and to place at risk 

that which may have already been earned. Such is the nature 

of the public employment agreement.

Id. at 162-63 (emphasis added); see also Scarantino v. Pub. Sch. Employees’ Ret.

Bd., 68 A.3d 375, 385 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

Forfeiture of all benefits, including benefits vested before the 

misconduct and the term in which the misconduct occurred, is likewise required 

under Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Section 

3352(a) of the Judicial Code. Berkhimer v. State Employees’ Ret. Bd., 60 A.3d 

873, 880 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Mr. Cioppa does not dispute this. Instead, he 

contends that neither of these forfeiture provisions can apply to him because he had 

already resigned seven months earlier and was 70 years old and therefore 

constitutionally ineligible from holding judicial office by virtue of his age. See Pa. 

Const. art. V, § 16(b). Mr. Cioppa asserts that these facts render the Court of 

Judicial Discipline order removing him from office and barring him from future 

judicial office “meaningless” and “a nullity.” Petitioners’ Br. at 12, 17, 20. This 

argument is equally invalid. 

The Court of Judicial Discipline has jurisdiction to institute 

disciplinary proceedings against former judges after they have resigned. In re 

Melograne, 812 A.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Pa. 2002); In re Ciavarella, 108 A.3d 983, 

987-88 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2014). Prior resignation and inability to hold judicial 

office in the future do not prevent the entry of a valid order removing a judge from 
10

office and barring him from holding judicial office. Melograne, 812 A.2d at 1167-

68; Ciavarella, 108 A.3d at 987-88. 

In Melograne, a former district justice, who had resigned upon his 

criminal conviction and before the Judicial Conduct Board filed a complaint 

against him, made the same argument as here that the Court of Judicial Discipline 

could not validly order that he be removed from office or ban him from holding 

judicial office in the future, asserting that

the facts of this case render each of these sanctions 

meaningless. He reasons that he cannot be removed from 

office as he has already removed himself. Furthermore, as 

Article 2, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution forbids him 

from holding office following his conviction for an “infamous 

crime,” he is effectively barred from running for office by 

virtue of his felony conviction. Thus, Appellant deduces, if his 

actions effectively impose self-punishment, there is nothing 

left for the Court of Judicial Discipline to accomplish via 

sanctions.

812 A.2d at 1167-68 (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court rejected that argument 

and upheld the order removing him from office and declaring him ineligible to 

hold future judicial office, stating: 

Appellant misapprehends the role of the Court of Judicial 

Discipline. The Court of Judicial Discipline exists not only to 

chasten the misbehaving judge; rather, it serves an equally --

if not more -- important function as protector of the integrity 

of the judiciary and the public’s confidence in that branch of 

government. In disciplining a judicial officer for his 

misconduct, that tribunal not only punishes the wrongdoer, 

but also repairs the damaged public trust and provides 

guidance to other members of the judiciary regarding their 

conduct. Appellant’s conviction and resignation do not 

accomplish these goals. Therefore, we cannot equate the 

voluntary relinquishment of office and the presumption that 

Appellant’s felony conviction would bar him from running for 
11

public office with the discipline imposed by the Court of 

Judicial Discipline. One simply is not a substitute for the 

other. We thus hold that Appellant’s resignation from judicial 

office and conviction of a felony crime did not divest the 

Court of Judicial Discipline of its authority to impose 

sanctions on Appellant.

Id. at 1168 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court’s ruling in Melograne is equally 

applicable here and requires rejection of Mr. Cioppa’s challenge to the Court of 

Judicial Discipline’s order. 

Accordingly, forfeiture of all of Mr. Cioppa’s rights to receive 

retirement benefits is required by PEPFA, Article V, Section 16(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, and Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code. 

Nonetheless, Mrs. Cioppa argues that she has two types of rights in 

Mr. Cioppa’s pension that are not subject to forfeiture, a “marital interest” in his 

pension and her rights as a survivor annuitant. We disagree. 

Mrs. Cioppa has no marital interest that gives her any enforceable 

rights under her husband’s pension. A spouse has a marital property interest in a 

pension that is recognized in equitable distribution in the event of a divorce, and 

the State Employees’ Retirement Code (Retirement Code), 71 Pa. C.S. §§ 5101-

5956, provides for alternate payees pursuant to domestic relations orders. Glancey 

v. State Employes’ Ret. Bd., 610 A.2d 15, 25 (Pa. 1992); Titler v. State Employees’

Ret. Bd., 768 A.2d 899, 901 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001); 71 Pa. C.S. § 5953(a)(3); 71 Pa. 

C.S. § 5953.1. That, however, does not give a spouse of a SERS member any 

enforceable interest in the member’s pension or right to receive benefits prior to a 

divorce. Titler, 768 A.2d at 901 (estranged spouse had no right to pension death 

benefits where no divorce was final and no domestic relations order had been 

issued and Retirement Code permitted member to freely revoke her beneficiary 

status because “[i]n order for a spouse to acquire an interest in a member’s 
12

retirement account, a Board approved [domestic relations order] must be issued 

through the divorce proceedings”); Hoffman v. State Employes’ Ret. Bd., 743 A.2d 

1014, 1017-18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (en banc) (denial of pension death benefits to 

estranged spouse who had not yet divorced did not deprive her of property right 

because equitable distribution of marital property requires a divorce).

Nor do we find merit in Mrs. Cioppa’s claim that she has independent 

pension rights as a survivor annuitant under the Retirement Code. Section 5907(j) 

of the Retirement Code provides, inter alia:

A member who is eligible and elects to receive a reduced 

annuity under Option 1, 2, 3, or 4, shall nominate a 

beneficiary or a survivor annuitant, as the case may be, by 

written designation filed with the board at the time of his 

retirement. 

71 Pa. C.S. § 5907(j). Mr. Cioppa elected Option 2 at the time of his retirement 

and named Mrs. Cioppa as his survivor annuitant. That option provides for “[a] 

joint and survivor annuity payable during the lifetime of the member with the full 

amount of such annuity payable thereafter to his survivor annuitant, if living at his 

death.” 71 Pa. C.S. § 5705(a)(2). Since nothing is payable to Cioppa during his 

lifetime, the “full amount” would similarly be zero. Simply put, the option 

provides for a reduced annuity to the member in exchange for continuation of that 

annuity to his or her designated survivor for the survivor’s life, but where the 

retired member has forfeited his right to an annuity, there is nothing to continue. 

In addition, as noted above, PEPFA unambiguously bars receipt of 

“any retirement or benefit or payment of any kind” (except return of contributions), 

not only to the member whose rights have been forfeited, but also to “any 

beneficiary designated by [him]...” 43 P.S. § 1313 (a) (emphasis added). Mrs. 

Cioppa correctly points out that under the Retirement Code, beneficiary and 
13

survivor annuitant are separately defined terms of art. However, PEPFA makes no 

such distinction, but uses only the generic term “beneficiary,” and we must 

conclude that the term is used in Section 3(a) in its ordinary sense to include any 

person designated by the member to receive benefits upon his death. PEPFA is not 

part of the Retirement Code and applies to other government entities with 

governing laws that do not use the Retirement Code’s terms and definitions. We 

believe that if the General Assembly had intended to carve out an exception to the 

harsh terms of Section 3(a) solely for “survivor annuitants” it would have said so 

explicitly.

Moreover, and perhaps most important, both “beneficiaries” and 

“survivor annuitants,” as those terms are used in the Retirement Code, are those 

who receive payments as designated survivors upon the death of the member.

Under Options 2 and 3, the survivor receives continuation of the member’s 

annuity; under other options, or upon the member’s death in state service, the 

survivor receives a lump sum payment. It would be illogical to assume that the 

legislature intended to forfeit the lump sum death benefits payable to 

“beneficiaries,” but not the continuing annuities payable to “survivor annuitants.”

Accordingly, we affirm the adjudication of the Board.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ross C. Cioppa and Maureen Cioppa, :

Petitioners :

 :

v. : No. 1219 C.D. 2014

 :

State Employees’ Retirement System, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2015, the order of the State 

Employees’ Retirement Board in the above-captioned matter is hereby 

AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ross C. Cioppa and Maureen :

Cioppa, :

:

Petitioners : 

: 

v. : No. 1219 C.D. 2014

: Argued: April 14, 2015

State Employees’ Retirement :

System, :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge 

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION

BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS FILED: August 3, 2015

I concur with the majority’s well-reasoned rulings upholding the 

forfeiture of all of Mr. Cioppa’s rights to receive retirement benefits under the 

Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (PEPFA),

1 Article V, Section 16(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, and Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code. I dissent, 

however, from the majority’s affirmance of the forfeiture of Mrs. Cioppa’s rights 

as a survivor annuitant under his pension. 

 

1 Act of July 8, 1978, P.L. 752, No. 140, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1311-1315.
JGC-2

Mrs. Cioppa has rights in Mr. Cioppa’s pension as a survivor 

annuitant under the State Employees’ Retirement Code (Retirement Code).2

Section 5907(j) of the Retirement Code provides:

A member who is eligible and elects to receive a reduced 

annuity under Option 1, 2, 3, or 4, shall nominate a 

beneficiary or a survivor annuitant, as the case may be, by 

written designation filed with the board at the time of his 

retirement. A member who has elected Option 1 may change 

his designated beneficiary at any time. A member having 

designated a survivor annuitant at the time of retirement shall 

not be permitted to nominate a new survivor annuitant unless 

such survivor annuitant predeceases him or unless the member 

is awarded a divorce or becomes married subsequent to the 

election of the option. In such cases, the annuitant shall have 

the right to reelect an option and to nominate a beneficiary or 

a new survivor annuitant and to have his annuity recomputed 

to be actuarially equivalent as of the date of recomputation to 

the annuity in effect immediately prior to the recomputation. 

In no other case shall a benefit plan be changed by an 

annuitant.

71 Pa. C.S. § 5907(j) (emphasis added). Mr. Cioppa elected Option 2 at the time 

of his retirement and named Mrs. Cioppa as his survivor annuitant in December 

2011, prior to his guilty plea and the forfeiture. (Board Opinion at 8; Hearing 

Officer F.F. ¶11; Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Stipulation ¶11, R.R. at 47a.) Mrs. 

Cioppa therefore has rights to future payment under the pension that cannot be 

revoked or altered at will by her husband. Indeed, SERS in its August 2012 letter 

to Mrs. Cioppa expressly recognized that she had an “entitlement to receive 

 

2

71 Pa. C.S. §§ 5101-5956.
JGC-3

benefits from Mr. Cioppa’s retirement account” as his designated survivor 

annuitant. (Docket No. 2012-29 Joint Ex. 4, R.R. at 69a.)3

The effect of forfeiture on a spouse’s rights in a public official’s

pension is an issue of first impression. PEPFA, Article V, Section 16(b) of the 

Constitution and Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code do not provide that all rights 

under the wrongdoer’s pension are extinguished or that the pension itself is 

forfeited or extinguished. Rather than voiding the pension itself, these forfeiture 

statutes and constitutional provision prohibit payment of pension benefits to certain 

persons. Section 3(a) of PEPFA provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no public official 

or public employee nor any beneficiary designated by such 

public official or public employee shall be entitled to receive 

any retirement or other benefit or payment of any kind except 

a return of the contribution paid into any pension fund without 

 

3 Mrs. Cioppa also argues that she has a “marital interest” in her husband’s pension. A spouse 

has a marital property interest in a pension that is recognized in equitable distribution in the 

event of a divorce, and provides for alternate payees pursuant to domestic relations orders. 

Glancey v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 610 A.2d 15, 25 (Pa. 1992); Titler v. State 

Employees’ Retirement Board, 768 A.2d 899, 901 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001); 71 Pa. C.S. § 5953(a)(3); 

71 Pa. C.S. § 5953.1. That, however, does not give a spouse of a SERS member any enforceable 

interest in the member’s pension or right to receive benefits prior to a divorce. Titler, 768 A.2d 

at 901 (estranged spouse had no right to pension death benefits where no divorce was final and 

no domestic relations order had been issued and Retirement Code permitted member to freely 

revoke her beneficiary status because “[i]n order for a spouse to acquire an interest in a 

member’s retirement account, a Board approved [domestic relations order] must be issued 

through the divorce proceedings”); Hoffman v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 743 A.2d 

1014, 1017-18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (en banc) (denial of pension death benefits to estranged 

spouse who had not yet divorced did not deprive her of property right because equitable 

distribution of marital property requires a divorce). Mrs. Cioppa’s only rights in her husband’s 

pension that can survive the forfeiture of his pension rights are therefore her rights as a survivor 

annuitant.
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interest, if such public official or public employee is convicted 

or pleads guilty or no defense to any crime related to public 

office or public employment.

43 P.S. § 1313(a) (emphasis added). Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution provides that 

no salary, retirement benefit or other compensation, 

present or deferred, shall be paid to any justice, judge or 

justice of the peace who, under section 18 or under 

Article VI, is suspended, removed or barred from holding 

judicial office for conviction of a felony or misconduct in 

office or conduct which prejudices the proper 

administration of justice or brings the judicial office into 

disrepute.

Pa. Const. art. V, § 16(b) (emphasis added). Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code

likewise provides that “[n]o salary, retirement benefit or other compensation shall 

be paid to any judge or magisterial district judge who is suspended or removed 

from office under section 18 of Article V or under Article VI of the Constitution of 

Pennsylvania.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 3352(a) (emphasis added). 

The intent to prohibit pension payments to particular individuals,

rather than extinguishing the pension itself is confirmed by another section of 

PEPFA. Section 4 of PEPFA provides that where the public official’s criminal 

conduct has caused monetary loss to the government, the government is entitled to 

a restitution order and “[t]he retirement board, administrator of the pension fund or 

employer of the defendant, upon being served with a copy of the [restitution] order, 

shall pay over all such pension benefits, contributions or other benefits to the 

extent necessary to satisfy the order of restitution.” 43 P.S. § 1314(a), (b), (d) 
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(emphasis added). If the effect of forfeiture was the extinguishment of the pension 

in its entirety, this restitution would be substantially diminished and reduced to 

payment of the public official’s unforfeited contributions, contrary to the language 

of Section 4(d) that “all such pension benefits” shall be available to provide 

restitution. The unpublished opinion in Kenney v. City of Wilkes-Barre Police 

Pension Fund, (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1334 C.D. 2009, filed February 3, 2010), 2010 

WL 9512681, relied on by SERS, does not support its contention that forfeiture 

automatically extinguishes all rights of third parties under the pension. Kenney did 

not involve forfeiture; rather, the question was whether a domestic relations order 

could alter a pension contract to require survivor rights in favor of an ex-spouse 

where the pension contract did not provide for such survivor rights. Slip op. at 3, 

2010 WL 9512681 at *1.

Nothing in the language of Article V, Section 16(b) of the 

Constitution nor Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code suggests any intent to bar a 

spouse’s or other third party’s rights to pension benefits. The language of both of

these provisions prohibits only payment of pension benefits to the individual who 

has abused a judicial office, not payment to any other persons under that 

individual’s pension. Mrs. Cioppa’s benefits as a survivor annuitant not only are 

not payments to the individual who abused his judicial office, they are not even 

payable to her until he is dead. Mrs. Cioppa’s rights as her husband’s survivor 

annuitant are therefore not forfeited under Article V, Section 16(b) of the 

Constitution and Section 3352(a) of the Judicial Code. 

The issue of whether PEPFA bars Mrs. Cioppa’s rights as a survivor 

annuitant is a closer question. PEPFA prohibits payment of pension benefits to 

both the “public official or public employee” and “any beneficiary designated by 
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such public official or public employee.” 43 P.S. § 1313(a). While a survivor 

annuitant is not a “beneficiary” under the Retirement Code, 71 Pa. C.S. § 5102, 

PEPFA is not part of the Retirement Code and applies to other government entities 

with retirement statutes that do not use the Retirement Code’s terms and 

definitions. PEPFA does not define the term “beneficiary.” A survivor annuitant 

designation under the Retirement Code, however, is also different from an ordinary 

beneficiary designation in that it is not freely revocable. As is discussed above, 

once the member has designated a survivor annuitant, he has parted with the ability 

to change his mind and designate a different person to receive those benefits. 71 

Pa. C.S. § 5907(j). An existing survivor annuitant designation cannot therefore be 

changed by the public employee after conviction of a crime or after forfeiture to 

evade the consequences of the forfeiture. Moreover, the benefits received by a 

survivor annuitant cannot be used to support the public official who breached the 

public’s trust and thereby nullify the forfeiture, as benefits are paid to the survivor 

annuitant only after the criminal public official is no longer alive. 

The critical question is whether it was the General Assembly’s intent 

by the phrase “any beneficiary designated by such public official or public 

employee” to deny payment of pension benefits to all individuals who have 

existing rights to payment of benefits under a wrongdoer’s pension, regardless of 

their lack of involvement in the wrongdoing and regardless of whether benefits 

paid to them could be used to support the wrongdoer. In construing this language, 

we must keep in mind that pension forfeiture is not favored and that pension 

forfeiture statutes are therefore strictly construed. Mazzo v. Board of Pensions and 

Retirement of the City of Philadelphia, 611 A.2d 193, 196-97 (Pa. 1992); Wiggins 
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v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pensions and Retirement, 114 A.3d 66, 72 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2015) (en banc).

The purpose of PEPFA is to deter commission of crimes by public 

officials and employees and promote accountability by preventing the public 

official or employee who committed a crime from receiving the benefit of a 

taxpayer-funded pension. Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 348-49, 351-

52 (Pa. 2012); Luzerne County Retirement Board v. Seacrist, 988 A.2d 785, 787 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In Abraham, our Supreme Court analyzed the purpose of 

PEPFA in detail in determining whether forfeiture was a direct or collateral 

consequence of a guilty plea. The Court concluded that “the discussion on PEPFA 

when it was pending as a bill demonstrates its aim of preventing those who violate 

the public’s trust from receiving the benefit of a taxpayer-funded pension,” and 

that PEPFA is aimed at ensuring and promoting accountability by “preventing 

those who violate the public’s trust from receiving a benefit funded by the public.” 

62 A.3d at 349, 352 (emphasis added). See also Seacrist, 988 A.2d at 787 (“The 

purpose of the ... Act is to deter criminal conduct in public employment by 

causing a forfeiture of pension benefits to which a public official or public 

employee would otherwise be entitled”). 

That purpose of denying taxpayer funded benefits to those who have 

committed wrongdoing in public office does not show any intent to deny payments 

to persons who neither committed nor benefitted from the wrongdoing where the 

funds they would receive cannot be used to benefit or support the wrongdoer. 

Construing the phrase “beneficiary designated by such public official or public 

employee” narrowly, as we must, I would hold that it is intended to deny the 

wrongdoer himself all benefits and rights that he had under the pension, including 
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his ability to bestow rights in his pension on others and avoid the consequences of 

forfeiture by transferring his rights to others. So construed, Section 3(a) of PEPFA 

does not include an already designated survivor annuitant over whose rights the 

wrongdoer no longer has control and who cannot receive benefits during the 

wrongdoer’s lifetime.

This construction does not permit a wrongdoer who has stolen funds

or caused monetary loss to the government to shelter pension benefits from the

government’s restitution rights. The pension rights of a survivor annuitant or 

divorced spouse remain fully subject to and subordinate to the government’s right 

to recover its losses under Section 4(d) of PEPFA. 43 P.S. § 1314(d) (requiring 

that retirement board “shall pay over all such pension benefits, contributions or 

other benefits to the extent necessary to satisfy [an] order of restitution”); see also

Marshall v. State Employees’ Retirement System, 887 A.2d 351, 357-61 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2005). There is no issue here, however, of monetary harm to the 

government or restitution that would reduce or negate Mrs. Cioppa’s survivor 

annuitant rights.

I would therefore reverse the order of the State Employees’ 

Retirement Board insofar as it directed the forfeiture of Mrs. Cioppa’s rights as 

survivor annuitant under Mr. Cioppa’s pension. 

 

____________________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge