United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

INTELLECTUAL 

PROPERTY 

Strategy for Targeting 

Organized Piracy 

(STOP) Requires 

Changes for Longterm Success 

November 2006 

 

GAO-07-74 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2006

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy 

(STOP) Requires Changes for Long-term 

Success 

Highlights of GAO-07-74, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

U.S. government efforts to protect

and enforce intellectual property

(IP) rights are crucial to preventing

billions of dollars in losses and 

mitigating health and safety risks

from trade in counterfeit and 

pirated goods. These efforts are 

coordinated through the National

Intellectual Property Law 

Enforcement Coordination Council 

(NIPLECC), created by Congress in 

1999, and the Strategy for Targeting

Organized Piracy (STOP), initiated 

by the Bush administration in 2004.

This report describes the evolution 

of NIPLECC and STOP, assesses 

the extent to which STOP 

addresses the desirable 

characteristics of an effective

national strategy, and evaluates the 

challenges to implementing a

strategy for protecting and 

enforcing IP rights. GAO examined 

relevant documents, interviewed 

agency and industry officials, and 

assessed STOP using criteria

previously developed by GAO.

What GAO Recommends

To improve strategic planning for

IP protection, GAO recommends 

that the IP Coordinator, in

consultation with the National 

Security Council and the STOP 

agencies (1) take steps to ensure

that STOP fully addresses the six

characteristics of a national

strategy and (2) clarify how

NIPLECC will carry out its 

oversight and accountability

responsibilities in implementing

STOP as its strategy. The IP

Coordinator concurred with both

recommendations. 

Although NIPLECC and STOP originated under different authorities, the 

lines between them have become increasingly blurred. NIPLECC is a 

coordinating council, while STOP is a strategy involving coordination led by 

the National Security Council. While NIPLECC has struggled to define its 

purpose, STOP generated coordination and attention to IP protection from 

the outset. Congress gave NIPLECC an oversight role, funding, and an IP 

Coordinator as its head in 2005, but STOP remains prominent. Their 

functions, however, increasingly overlap. The IP Coordinator regularly 

conducts STOP activities and speaks for STOP before Congress and private 

industry. Most significantly, NIPLECC recently adopted STOP as its 

strategy. 

STOP is a good first step toward a comprehensive integrated national 

strategy to protect and enforce IP rights and has energized protection 

efforts. GAO found, however, that STOP’s potential is limited because it 

does not fully address the characteristics of an effective national strategy, 

which GAO believes helps increase the likelihood of accountability, as well 

as effectiveness. STOP does not fully address characteristics related to 

planning and accountability. For example, its performance measures lack 

baselines and targets. STOP lacks a discussion of costs, the types and 

sources of investments needed, and processes to address risk management. 

Finally, STOP lacks a full discussion oversight responsibility. 

The current structures present several challenges to implementing a longterm strategy. First, NIPLECC retains an image of inactivity, and many 

private sector groups GAO interviewed were unclear about its role. STOP, 

despite its energy and prominence, lacks permanence beyond the current 

administration. Second, NIPLECC’s commitment to implementing an 

effective strategy is unclear. For instance, NIPLECC’s recent annual report 

does not explain how it plans to provide oversight. NIPLECC officials have 

sent mixed signals about STOP’s role, with one saying STOP should include 

metrics to measure progress, and another calling STOP an account of 

administration efforts, not a strategy. 

Extent STOP Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 

Source: GAO.

Fully addresses Partially addresses Does not address

1. Clear purpose, scope, methodology 

2. Detailed discussion of problems and assessment of risks

3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance goals

4. Description of resources, investments and risk management

5. Delineation of organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination

6. Description of strategy's integration with other agencies www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-74.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Loren Yager at 

(202) 512-4128 or yagerl@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Lines between NIPLECC and STOP Have Blurred into Overlapping 

Structures 8

STOP Is a Good Initial Effort but Does Not Yet Fully Address the 

Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 15 

Current Structures Create Challenges to an Effective Integrated

Strategy 21

Conclusions 24

Recommendations for Executive Action 24 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 25 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 27 

Appendix II GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an Effective National 

Strategy 29 

Appendix III Bush Administration: Strategy for Targeting 

Organized Piracy Accomplishments and Initiatives 39 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Commerce 50 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 51

Tables 

Table 1: Comparison of Features of NIPLECC and STOP 11 

Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for an Effective 

National Strategy 30 

Page i GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Figures 

Figure 1: Primary U.S. Government Agencies and Entities 

Supporting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights 8 

Figure 2: Key Events Relevant to NIPLECC and STOP 13 

Figure 3: Extent to Which STOP Addresses GAO’s Desirable 

Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 17 

Page ii GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Abbreviations 

APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 

CACP Coalition against Counterfeiting and Piracy 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

CAFTA-DR Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade 

Agreement 

CHIP Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property 

CRM Case Referral Mechanism 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EU European Union 

FDA Food and Drug Administration 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

GPRA Government Performance Results Act 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IP intellectual property 

IPR intellectual property rights 

NIPLECC National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement 

Coordination Council 

MOFCOM China’s Ministry of Commerce 

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 

SPP Security and Prosperity Partnership 

STOP Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy 

USPTO U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 

USTR U.S. Trade Representative

WTO World Trade Organization 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

November 8, 2006 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

U.S. government efforts to protect and enforce intellectual property (IP) 

rights overseas are crucial to preventing billions of dollars in losses to U.S. 

industry and IP rights owners and addressing health and safety risks 

resulting from the trade in counterfeit and pirated goods. IP protection 

and enforcement cut across a wide range of U.S. agencies and functions, 

as well as those of foreign governments, making coordination among all 

parties essential. 

The U.S. government has developed a complex structure to achieve 

coordination of IP enforcement efforts. In 1999, Congress created the 

interagency National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination 

Council (NIPLECC) as a mechanism to coordinate U.S. efforts to protect 

and enforce IP rights in the United States and overseas.1

 In October 2004, 

the President announced the Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy 

(STOP) to “smash the criminal networks that traffic in fakes, stop trade in 

pirated and counterfeit goods at America’s borders, block bogus goods 

around the world, and help small businesses secure and enforce their 

rights in overseas markets.” STOP also calls for collaboration among U.S. 

agencies. Then, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Congress 

created the position of Coordinator for International Intellectual Property 

Enforcement to head NIPLECC.2

 In addition, the act mandated, among 

other things, that NIPLECC promulgate a strategy for protecting American 

intellectual property abroad and oversee its implementation. Recently, 

NIPLECC adopted STOP as that strategy. 

 1

NIPLECC was established under Section 653 of the Treasury and General Government 

Appropriations Act, 2000 (Pub. L. No.106-58), 15 U.S.C. 1128.

2

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (Pub. L. No. 108-447), Division B, Title II. 

Page 1 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
In response to your request to understand more fully U.S. government 

efforts to develop a comprehensive and integrated strategy with a longterm perspective to combat IP counterfeiting and piracy, this report (1) 

describes the evolution of the relationship between NIPLECC and STOP, 

(2) assesses the extent to which STOP addresses the desirable 

characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (3) evaluates the 

challenges to ensuring the implementation of a long-term integrated 

strategy for protecting and enforcing IP rights. 

To meet these objectives, we examined NIPLECC and STOP official 

documents and reviewed the legislative history of NIPLECC. To determine 

the extent to which STOP serves as a national strategy for combating trade 

in counterfeit and pirated goods, we assessed STOP using the six desirable 

characteristics of an effective national strategy developed in previous GAO 

work.3

 GAO has used this methodology to assess and report on the 

administration’s strategies relating to combating terrorism, restructuring 

DOD’s global force posture, and rebuilding Iraq.4

 National strategies with 

these desirable characteristics offer policymakers and implementing 

agencies a management tool that can help ensure accountability and more 

effective results.5

 We also obtained and analyzed documents required 

under the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, as well

as IP-related planning documents from the government agencies involved

with STOP. We assessed the extent to which these agency documents 

support STOP goals and add information that may support elements 

necessary for an effective national strategy. In addition, we interviewed 

agency officials involved in NIPLECC and STOP, including the

Coordinator for International Intellectual Property Enforcement. We also 

interviewed members of the private sector, which we selected

 3

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

4

GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed

to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture Restructuring, GAO-06-852, 

(Washington D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006); and Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National 

Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-06-788 (Washington D.C.: June 28, 2006).

5

The six characteristics are (1) a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) a discussion 

of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address; (3) the desired goals and 

objectives, activities, and performance measures; (4) a description of the resources needed

to implement the strategy; (5) a clear delineation of the organizational roles and

responsibilities, including oversight as well as mechanisms for coordination; and (6) a

description of how the strategy relates to subordinate levels of government and their plans 

to implement the strategy. These six characteristics can be subdivided into 29 separate

elements for more detailed assessment. 

Page 2 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
judgmentally to ensure that we obtained the views of major cross-industry

associations, as well as individual associations and companies 

representing key industries that are heavily affected by IP violations such 

as the manufacturing, entertainment, and pharmaceutical industries. In all 

we spoke to 20 representatives from 16 private sector groups. We 

conducted our work from January 2006 through October 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See 

appendix I for a more detailed description of our scope and methodology. 

See appendix II for a detailed discussion of GAO’s analysis of STOP using 

the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. See 

appendix III for the STOP strategy. 

NIPLECC and STOP originated under different authorities, but the lines 

between them have become increasingly blurred, creating overlapping 

structures to protect and enforce IP rights. NIPLECC is a coordinating 

council created by Congress in 1999, while STOP is a strategy initiated by

the White House in 2004 under the auspices of the National Security 

Council, with a strong coordination component; both involve nearly the 

same agencies.6

 However, unlike NIPLECC, which has struggled to define

its purpose, STOP generated active coordination and has sponsored IP 

protection related activities from the outset. Although Congress 

augmented NIPLECC’s capabilities and clarified its purpose through 

passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005,7

 STOP remains 

more prominent. NIPLECC’s Coordinator for International Intellectual 

Property Enforcement (also known as the IP Coordinator), a position 

created by the 2005 act and filled by presidential appointment in July 2005 

to head NIPLECC, has regularly been participating in STOP activities and 

acted as a STOP spokesperson to Congress and private industry. In 

addition, NIPLECC cites STOP activities as among its accomplishments in 

Results in Brief 

 6

NIPLECC legislation includes Departments of Commerce (U.S. Patent and Trademark 

Office and International Trade Administration), Homeland Security (originally Legacy 

Customs), Justice (Criminal Division), State (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs), 

and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. STOP includes the same agencies 

with the addition of the Federal Drug Administration. 

7

In December 2004, Congress augmented NIPLECC’s capabilities in the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2005, which created the Coordinator for International Intellectual 

Property Enforcement position and provided $2 million for NIPLECC’s expenses through 

fiscal year 2006. 

Page 3 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
its September 2006 report to Congress and the President.8

 Significantly, the 

NIPLECC principals recently identified STOP as their strategy for 

protecting American IP overseas, as one of the requirements under the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act. (See app. III for the complete STOP 

strategy.) 

STOP is a good first step toward a comprehensive, integrated national 

strategy to protect and enforce U.S. intellectual property, and it has 

energized agency efforts. However, we found that STOP’s full potential as 

a strategy is limited because it does not fully address the six desirable 

characteristics of an effective national strategy. We believe these 

characteristics would improve the likelihood of STOP’s long-term 

effectivenss and ensure accountability.9

 STOP does not fully address key 

characteristics related to planning and accountability, missing key 

elements such as a discussion of performance measures, resources, risk 

management, and designation of oversight responsibility. While STOP 

generally addresses goals and subordinate objectives and activities, it only 

partially addresses performance measures; for example, it reports the 

number of calls to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) hotline, 

but it does not provide data on baselines or targets to assess how well the 

activities are being implemented. The strategy does not address resources, 

investments, and risk management; for instance, it lacks a discussion of 

current or future costs, the types or sources of investments needed to

target organized piracy, and processes to effectively balance the threats 

from counterfeit products with the resources available. In addition, STOP 

also partially addresses organizational roles and responsibilities by citing 

many examples of agency roles with respect to their STOP activities; 

however, it does not discuss a framework for accountability among the 

STOP agencies, such as designating responsibility for oversight. While 

some of these elements are addressed in individual agency documents, the 

need to consult multiple agency documents underscores the strategy’s 

lack of integration and limits its usefulness as a management tool for 

effective oversight and accountability. 

 8

Report to the President and Congress on Coordination of Intellectual Property

Enforcement and Protection, September, 2006. The National Intellectual Property Law 

Enforcement Coordination Council. 

9

While national strategies are not required by executive or legislative mandate to address a

single, consistent set of characteristics, GAO has identified six desirable characteristics of 

an effective national strategy. 

Page 4 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Several challenges to the implementation of an effective long-term strategy 

result from the current structures. First, despite NIPLECC’s key role of 

providing permanence, it continues to have leadership problems. 

NIPLECC retains an image of inactivity among the private sector despite 

its enhanced mandate and, in July 2006, Senate appropriators expressed 

concern about the lack of information provided by NIPLECC on its 

progress. Second, while agency and private sector officials praise STOP 

for energizing U.S. IP protection efforts, STOP lacks permanence. The

authority and influence STOP enjoys as a presidential initiative could

disappear after the current administration. Third, NIPLECC’s commitment 

to implementing STOP as a successful strategy remains unclear, creating a 

challenge for accountability. NIPLECC’ September 2006 report describes 

numerous STOP activities but does not articulate how NIPLECC plans to 

carry out its oversight responsibility mandated by Congress. Agency 

officials we interviewed generally considered STOP to be the U.S. 

government’s IP strategy. However, NIPLECC officials have sent mixed 

signals about the extent to which they believe STOP is meant to provide 

performance measures and information on resource levels. For instance, 

one NIPLECC representative said that STOP should include metrics to 

measure progress that should be reported on by the IP Coordinator. Yet, 

another NIPLECC representative told us that STOP was a fact sheet rather 

than a strategy. While the IP Coordinator stated in congressional 

testimony that STOP is NIPLECC’s strategy, he also told us that STOP was 

never meant to be an institutional method for reporting priorities and 

metrics to the President or Congress. Furthermore, the STOP strategy 

neither makes reference to NIPLECC’s oversight role, nor does STOP 

articulate a framework for oversight and accountability among the STOP 

agencies carrying out the strategy. 

To improve STOP’s effectiveness as a planning tool and its usefulness to 

Congress: 

We recommend that the IP Coordinator, in consultation with the National

Security Council and the six STOP agencies, including the Departments of 

Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, and State; and the Office of the

U.S. Trade Representative; and the Food and Drug Administration, take

steps to ensure that STOP fully addresses the six characteristics of a 

national strategy. 

To clarify NIPLECC’s oversight role with regard to STOP: 

We recommend that the IP Coordinator, in consultation with the National

Security Council and the six STOP agencies, including the Departments of 

Page 5 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, and State; and the Office of the

U.S. Trade Representative; and the Food and Drug Administration, clarify 

in the STOP strategy how NIPLECC will carry out its oversight and 

accountability responsibilities in implementing STOP as its strategy. 

We provided USTR, the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Homeland 

Security, and State; and USPTO, Food and Drug Administration, and the IP

Coordinator with a draft of this report for their review and comment. The 

IP Coordinator, through the Department of Commerce in consultation 

with the USPTO and the International Trade Administration, provided 

technical comments. The Department of Homeland Security, the Food and 

Drug Administration, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative also

chose to provide technical comments. We modified the report where 

appropriate. The Departments of Justice and State did not provide any 

comments. We also received written comments from the U.S. Coordinator 

for International Property Enforcement (IP Coordinator), which are 

reprinted in appendix IV. The IP Coordinator reiterated our message that 

STOP was a good first step toward a comprehensive, integrated strategy to

protect and enforce U.S. intellectual property rights and that it had 

energized U.S. efforts. He concurred with our recommendations, stating 

that his office would review them, and planned to identify opportunities 

for improvement based on those recommendations, where appropriate. 

Intellectual property is an important component of the U.S. economy, and 

the United States is an acknowledged global leader in its creation. 

However, the legal protection of intellectual property varies greatly 

around the world, and several countries are havens for the production of 

counterfeit and pirated goods. Technology has facilitated the manufacture 

and distribution of counterfeit and pirated products, resulting in a global 

illicit market that competes with genuine products that complicates 

detection and actions against violations. High profits and low risk have 

drawn in organized criminal networks, and the public is often not aware of

the issues and consequences surrounding IP theft. The Department of 

State has cited estimates that counterfeit goods represent about 7 percent 

of annual global trade, but we note that it is difficult to reliably measure 

what is fundamentally a criminal activity.10 Industry groups suggest, 

Background 

 10The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is conducting a

study on IP, examining the extent to which counterfeit goods are entering global trade and 

associated data reliability issues. 

Page 6 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
however, that counterfeiting and piracy are on the rise and that a broader 

range of products, from auto parts to razor blades, and from vital 

medicines to infant formula, are subject to counterfeit production. 

Counterfeit products raise serious public health and safety concerns, and 

the annual losses that companies face from IP violations are substantial. 

Eight federal agencies, as well as entities within those agencies including 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and USPTO, undertake the 

primary U.S. government activities in support of IP rights. These eight 

agencies are: Departments of Commerce, State, Justice, and Homeland 

Security; the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR); the Copyright Office; the 

U.S. Agency for International Development; and the U.S. International 

Trade Commission. These agencies undertake a wide range of activities 

that fall under three categories: policy initiatives, training and technical 

assistance, and law enforcement. U.S. international trade policy initiatives

to increase IP protection and enforcement are primarily led by USTR, in 

coordination with the Departments of State, Commerce, USPTO, and the 

Copyright Office, among other agencies. The policy initiatives are wide 

ranging and include reviewing IP protection abroad and negotiating 

agreements that address intellectual property. Key activities to develop

and promote enhanced IP protection through training or technical 

assistance are undertaken by the Departments of Commerce, Homeland 

Security, Justice, and State; the FBI; USPTO; and the Copyright Office. 

A smaller number of agencies and their entities are involved in

investigating IP violations and enforcing U.S. IP laws. Working in an 

environment where counterterrorism is the central priority, the 

Department of Justice, including the FBI, and the Department of 

Homeland Security take actions that include engaging in multicountry 

investigations involving intellectual property violations and seizing goods

that violate IP rights at U.S. ports of entry. The Food and Drug

Administration (FDA) also investigates intellectual property violations for 

FDA-regulated products as part of its mission to assure consumer safety. 

Finally, the U.S. International Trade Commission has an adjudicative role

in enforcement activities involving patents and trademarks. These 

agencies, and their entities, may be affiliated with NIPLECC, STOP, or 

both as indicated by figure 1. 

Page 7 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Figure 1: Primary U.S. Government Agencies and Entities Supporting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights 

Copyright

Office

Department

of

Homeland

Security

Department

of

Commerce

International

Trade

Administration

USPTO Criminal

Division FBI

Bureau of

Economics

&

Business

Affairs

United

States

Attorney’s

Office

Department 

of Health & 

Human

Services

Department

of

Justice

Office of the

U.S. Trade

Representative

Department

of State

U.S.

International

Trade

Commission

Customs

&

Border

Protection

Food & Drug

Administration

STOP agency

Entities that house NIPLECC principals

Bureau of

International

Narcotics

Law

Enforcement

Immigration

& Customs

Enforcement

Source: GAO.

Note: NIPLECC is required to consult with the Register of Copyrights on copyright law enforcement 

matters. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, while not an original member, was reported as a 

member of NIPLECC in the council’s fifth annual report issued in September 2006. 

NIPLECC and STOP originated separately under different authorities, but 

the lines between them have become increasingly blurred. They share 

similar goals, including coordination of IP protection and enforcement, 

and involve nearly the same agencies. Five of the six STOP agencies house 

NIPLECC principals. NIPLECC is a coordinating council created by 

Congress, while STOP is a strategy initiated by the White House with a 

strong coordination component. NIPLECC has struggled to define its 

purpose, while STOP has generated active coordination and sponsored IP 

protection related activities from the outset. Although Congress passed 

legislation to enhance NIPLECC’s mandate, STOP remains more 

prominent and is characterized by a high level of activity and visibility. The 

IP Coordinator, who heads NIPLECC, regularly participates directly in 

STOP-sponsored activities and represents STOP before Congress and 

Lines between 

NIPLECC and STOP 

Have Blurred into 

Overlapping 

Structures 

Page 8 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
private industry. Finally, significantly, NIPLECC adopted STOP as its 

strategy for protecting IP overseas in February 2006. 

NIPLECC and STOP 

Originated under Different 

Authorities but with 

Similar Goals 

NIPLECC and STOP were created under different authorities, NIPLECC as 

a congressional mandate and STOP as a presidential initiative. In 1999, 

Congress created NIPLECC to coordinate domestic and international 

intellectual property law enforcement among U.S. federal and foreign 

entities. The council’s membership is designated by statute and includes 

(1) Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and 

Trademarks (USPTO); (2) Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division 

(Justice); (3) Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural 

Affairs (State); (4) Ambassador, Deputy United States Trade 

Representative (USTR); (5) Commissioner of Customs (Legacy Customs);11

and (6) Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade 

(Commerce). NIPLECC is also required to consult with the Register of 

Copyrights on copyright law enforcement matters. In addition, officials 

from the USPTO and the Department of Justice are the co-chairs of 

NIPLECC. Congress required NIPLECC to report its coordination efforts 

annually to the President and to the Committees on Appropriations and 

the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives. NIPLECC’s 

authorizing legislation included no specific dollar amount for funding or 

staff. 

Although created to coordinate U.S. IP law enforcement efforts, NIPLECC 

has had difficulties. In our September 2004 report, we stated that 

NIPLECC had struggled to define its purpose. Our 2004 report noted that 

NIPLECC had little discernible impact and had not undertaken any 

independent activities, according to interviews with both industry officials 

and officials from its member agencies, and as evidenced by NIPLECC’s 

own annual reports. From 1999 through the end of 2004, NIPLECC 

produced three annual reports that did little more than provide a 

compilation of individual agency activities. Indeed, we reported that 

officials from more than half of the member agencies offered criticisms of 

 11NIPLECC’s authorizing legislation designates the Commissioner of Customs as a council 

member. This individual remained a NIPLECC member after the formation of the 

Department of Homeland Security in 2003, but under the new title of Department of

Homeland Security’s Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection. NIPLECC’s fifth 

annual report, issued in September 2006, added a second representative from the

Department of Homeland Security, the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, which includes investigative functions that had been conducted under the

former Legacy Customs. 

Page 9 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
NIPLECC, remarking that it was unfocused, ineffective, and “unwieldy.” In 

official comments to the council’s 2003 annual report, major IP industry 

associations expressed a sense that NIPLECC is not undertaking any 

independent activities or having any impact. However, some officials 

interviewed did cite positive contributions supporting IP efforts, including 

an IP training database Web site. Finally, we noted in our 2004 report that 

if Congress wished to maintain NIPLECC and take action to increase its 

effectiveness, it should consider reviewing the council’s authority, 

operating structure, membership, and mission.12

In October 2004, the President launched STOP, a separate initiative led by 

the White House under the auspices of the National Security Council, to 

target cross-border trade in tangible goods and strengthen U.S. 

government and industry IP enforcement actions. While STOP made no 

mention of NIPLECC’s role, STOP members are the same agencies that 

house NIPLECC members, except that STOP includes the FDA. According 

to a high-level official who participated in the formation of STOP, the 

initiative was intended to protect American innovation, competitiveness, 

and economic growth. It stemmed from the recognition that U.S. 

companies needed protection from increasingly complex and 

sophisticated criminal counterfeiting and piracy. As part of STOP, 

agencies began holding meetings, both at working levels and higher, to 

coordinate agency efforts to tackle the problem. 

Congress Enhanced 

NIPLECC While STOP 

Continues to Play the 

Prominent Role in 

Coordination 

Congress addressed NIPLECC’s lack of activity and unclear mission in the 

2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act in December 2004. The act called

for NIPLECC to (1) establish policies, objectives, and priorities concerning 

international IP protection and enforcement; (2) promulgate a strategy for 

protecting American IP overseas; and (3) coordinate and oversee 

implementation of the policies, objectives, and priorities and overall 

strategy for protecting American IP overseas by agencies with IP 

responsibilities. The act appropriated $2 million for NIPLECC’s expenses 

through the end of the fiscal year 2006. It also created the position of the 

Coordinator for International Intellectual Property Enforcement, also 

known as the “IP Coordinator,” to head NIPLECC. The IP Coordinator is 

appointed by the President and may not serve in any other position in the 

federal government. The co-chairs for NIPLECC are required to report to 

 12See GAO, Intellectual Property: U.S. Efforts Have Contributed to Strengthened Laws

Overseas, but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-912 (Washington D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004). 

Page 10 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
the IP Coordinator. In July 2005, the Secretary of Commerce announced 

the presidential appointment of the IP Coordinator. Table 1 compares 

NIPLECC and STOP. 

Table 1: Comparison of Features of NIPLECC and STOP 

Features NIPLECC STOP

Origin Congressional mandate White House initiative 

Leadership • Coordinator for International Intellectual Property Enforcement 

(IP Coordinator) 

• Co-Chairs from USPTO and Justice report to Coordinator 

• National Security Council 

Membership By agency and position: 

1. Department of Justice: Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division 

2. Department of Commerce: Under Secretary for IP and Director 

of USPTO; and the Under Secretary for International Trade

3. Department of Homeland Security: Commissioner of U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection; and the Assistant Secretary for 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

4. Department of State: Under Secretary for Economic, Business, 

and Agricultural Affairs 

5. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative: Deputy U.S. Trade 

Representative

By agency: 

1. Department of Justice 

2. Department of Commerce 

3. Department of Homeland Security 

4. Department of State 

5. Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative

6. Food and Drug Administration

Dedicated funding $2 million (for fiscal years 2005 and 2006) None 

Dedicated staff Seven (IP Coordinator, four staff members, and two detailees) None 

Meetings Quarterly Approximately monthly (scheduled on 

an ad hoc basis) 

Source: GAO.

Note: NIPLECC is required to consult with the Register of Copyrights. 

Since obtaining enhanced capabilities under the 2005 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, NIPLECC has made some progress, through 

NIPLECC’s administrative staff, including the IP Coordinator, an assistant, 

a policy analyst, part-time legislative and press assistants, and detailees 

from USPTO and CBP. Examples of the office’s activities include working 

with the Commercial Law Development Program13 to train foreign 

governments on IP enforcement, co-hosting an IP regulation training and 

 13The Commercial Law Development Program, a program of the U.S. Department of

Commerce Office of the General Counsel, is uniquely tasked with providing technical 

assistance in the commercial law arena to the governments and private sectors of

transitional countries in support of their economic development goals. 

Page 11 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
industry partnership conference in Chicago, working with the Department 

of State on an IP-related Web site for information sharing among U.S. 

agencies, working with USPTO to implement a workshop on border 

enforcement of IP rights in India, working with the Department of Justice 

to identify IP regulation enforcement needs in India, and producing four 

country fact sheets highlighting the status of IP protection. In addition, the 

IP Coordinator has facilitated two NIPLECC meetings, established the 

practice of holding NIPLECC meetings quarterly, and NIPLECC has issued

two annual reports since the 2005 act. The 2004 annual report was made 

available in June 2005 and is similar to earlier reports in that it is a 

compilation of individual agency activities. However, the 2005 annual 

report, which was released in September 2006, represents a departure in

substance and style. For example, it provides a broad overview of the 

problem of IP violations and how the U.S. government is supporting U.S. 

business to address it, as well as a description of the activities of the IP 

Coordinator’s office. Another new aspect of the report is that it provides 

examples of U.S. government actions to improve IP protection in China. 

(See fig. 2 for a time line of key NIPLECC and STOP events.) 

Page 12 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Figure 2: Key Events Relevant to NIPLECC and STOP

September 1999: NIPLECC 

created by Congress.

September 2004: GAO report

finds that NIPLECC struggled to

find a clear mission and had little

discernible impact.

July 2005: International 

IP Coordinator appointed 

by President.

December 2004: Congress passes Consolidated

Appropriations Act, 2005 that (1) creates IP

Coordinator position; (2) provides $2 million in funding

through fiscal year 2006; and (3) establishes mandates,

including promulgating a strategy, for NIPLECC.

September 2006: 

NIPLECC funding

from 2005 act expires.

January 2001:

NIPLECC 2000

annual report

October 2002:

NIPLECC 2001-2002

annual report

December 2003:

NIPLECC 2003

annual report

October 2004: 

STOP announced 

as a presidential 

initiative.

February 2006:

Principals agree

STOP is NIPLECC’s

strategy.

April 2006: STOP

Accomplishments

and Initiatives

strategy document.

June 2005:

NIPLECC 2004

annual report

September 2006:

NIPLECC 2005

annual report

Sources: NIPLECC annual reports, www.Stopfakes.gov, and Office of the Intellectual Property Coordinator.

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Note: STOP participants meet on an ad hoc basis approximately once or twice a month. According to

NIPLECC annual reports, NIPLECC principals met four times in 2000, once in 2001, twice in 2002, 

and once in 2003. No NIPLECC principals meetings were reported to have been held in 2004 or 

2005. NIPLECC principals held two meetings in 2006 with the IP Coordinator, and hereafter plan to 

meet on a quarterly basis. 

Unlike NIPLECC, STOP from its beginning has been characterized by a 

high level of active coordination and visibility. Agency officials with whom

we spoke said that STOP meetings occurred once or sometimes twice a 

month, and were driven by particular issues or events, and also involved 

status checks on ongoing efforts and discussing and prioritizing new ones.

For example, agency officials met to ensure that IP was given attention at 

the European Union summits and to share talking points for international 

trips. In addition, USPTO established a hotline to give businesses a point 

Page 13 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
of contact for information on IP rights enforcement and report problems 

in other countries. The hotline is fielded by attorneys with regional 

expertise. Commerce developed a Web site to provide information and 

guidance to right holders on how to register and protect their IP assets in 

markets around the world. STOP also launched multiagency delegations to 

engage foreign officials and the private sector on IP protection and 

enforcement. Officials from STOP agencies traveled to Asia during April 

2005 and 2 months later to countries in the European Union. STOP 

agencies also work with the Coalition Against Counterfeiting and Piracy 

(CACP), an association jointly led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 

National Association of Manufacturers, which U.S. private sector officials

we interviewed have stated is their primary mechanism of interfacing with

agency officials representing STOP. STOP officials work with CACP on 

their “No Trade in Fakes” program to develop voluntary guidelines 

companies can use to their supply and distribution chains are free of 

counterfeits.

NIPLECC Adopts STOP As 

Its Strategy 

The lines between NIPLECC and STOP have become increasingly blurred. 

The IP Coordinator, who heads NIPLECC, regularly participates directly in

STOP activities. For example, the IP Coordinator has effectively 

functioned as a STOP spokesperson overseas, to Congress, and to U.S. 

private industry. Significantly, NIPLECC has adopted STOP as the strategy 

it is required to promulgate under the 2005 Consolidated Appropriations 

Act. The IP Coordinator told us that STOP was not meant to cover all

aspects of IP but represented a good start toward an effective strategy. He 

believed that it made sense to use STOP as NIPLECC’s strategy rather than 

starting anew. The STOP strategy was updated since it was announced in

October 2004 and is encompassed in the June 2006 document, Bush 

Administration: Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy, 

Accomplishments and Initiative. The document consists of five general 

goals and discusses activities associated with each goal. The goals are (1)

empowering American innovators to better protect their rights at home 

and abroad, (2) increasing efforts to seize counterfeit goods at our 

borders, (3) pursuing criminal enterprises involved in piracy and 

counterfeiting, (4) working closely and creatively with U.S. industry, and

(5) aggressively engaging our trading partners to join our efforts. (See app.

III to view this latest document representing the STOP strategy, which we 

evaluate in the next section.) 

Page 14 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
STOP represents progress toward developing a comprehensive integrated

national strategy for IP protection and enforcement and has experienced

some success. However, we found that STOP does not fully address the six 

desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that we believe

would improve the likelihood of its long-term effectiveness and ensure 

accountability. Our analysis showed that STOP does not fully address key 

characteristics related to planning and accountability, missing elements 

such as a discussion of performance measures, resources, risk 

management, and designation of oversight responsibility. While we found 

that some strategy documents belonging to individual STOP agencies 

supplemented some of the characteristics not fully addressed in STOP, the 

need to consult multiple agency documents limits the usefulness of STOP 

as an integrated strategy to guide policy and decision makers in allocating 

resources and balancing priorities with other important objectives. 

While national strategies are not required by executive or legislative 

mandate to address a single, consistent set of characteristics, GAO has 

identified six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. It 

is important that a national strategy contain these characteristics, and 

their underlying elements, because they enable implementers of the 

strategy to effectively shape policies, programs, priorities, resource 

allocations, and standards so that federal departments and other 

stakeholders can achieve the desired results. National strategies provide 

policymakers and implementing agencies with a planning tool that can

help ensure accountability and effectiveness. A summary of the six 

characteristics is presented below, and appendix II provides a more 

detailed discussion of GAO’s criteria. 

STOP Is a Good Initial 

Effort but Does Not 

Yet Fully Address the 

Desirable 

Characteristics of an 

Effective National 

Strategy 

Effective National 

Strategic Planning Has Six 

Desirable Characteristics 

• Purpose, Scope, and Methodology–addresses why the strategy was 

produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process by which it was 

developed. 

• Problems, Risks, and Threats–discusses or defines problems the strategy 

intends to address, their causes, and the operating environment, and also 

provides a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threats and 

reliability of available data. 

• Goals, Objectives, Activities, and Outcome-Related Performance 

Measures–addresses what the strategy strives to achieve and the steps 

needed to reach the goals, as well as priorities, milestones, and 

performance measures to monitor and evaluate results. 

Page 15 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
• Future Costs and Resources Needed–addresses what the strategy will cost, 

the sources and types of resources and investments needed, and a risk 

management framework to guide where those resources and investments 

should be targeted. 

• U.S. Government Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination 

Mechanisms–clarifies implementing organizations’ relationships in terms 

of leading, supporting, and partnering, and designates responsibility for 

the overall framework for accountability and oversight. 

• Strategy’s Integration among and with Other Entities–addresses both 

how the strategies’ goals and objectives relate to those of government 

agencies and how the agencies plan to implement the strategy. 

We believe a national strategy should ideally contain all of these 

characteristics and present them in this order because they flow logically 

from conception to implementation. Specifically, the strategy’s purpose 

leads to the definition of the problems and risks it intends to address, 

which in turn leads to specific actions for tackling those problems and 

risks, allocating and managing the appropriate resources, identifying 

different organizations’ roles and responsibilities, and finally to integrating 

action among all relevant parties and implementing the strategy. 

We recognize that strategies themselves are not end points, but rather 

dynamic, working documents. As with any strategic planning effort, 

implementation is the key. The ultimate measure of these strategies’ value

will be the extent to which they are useful guidance for policy and 

decision makers in allocating resources and balancing priorities with other 

important objectives. It will be important over time to obtain and 

incorporate feedback from the “user” community as to how the strategies 

can better provide guidance and how Congress and the administration can 

identify and remedy impediments to implementation, such as legal, 

international, jurisdictional, or resource constraints. 

Figure 3 shows that STOP partially addresses five of the six characteristics

and their key elements, and does not address any of the elements within 

one characteristic. Our analysis noted that STOP does not address any 

elements related to resources, investment, and risk management and only

partially addresses a number of elements within the other five 

characteristics that are important for planning and accountability, 

including performance measures and designation of oversight 

STOP Is Missing Several 

Elements Important to 

Planning and 

Accountability 

Page 16 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
responsibility. A full discussion of each characteristic and our analysis can 

be found in appendix II.

Figure 3: Extent to Which STOP Addresses GAO’s Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 

1a. The impetus that led to the strategy being written, such as a statutory requirement, mandate, or key event

1b. The strategy’s purpose

1c. Key terms, major functions, mission areas, or activities the strategy covers

1d. The process that produced the strategy, (e.g., what organizations or offices drafted the document, 

whether it was the result of a working group, or which parties were consulted in its development)

2a. The problems the strategy intends to address

2b. The causes of the problems

2c. The operating environment

2d. The threats the strategy is directed toward

2e. Discusses the quality of data available, e.g., constraints, deficiencies, and “unknowns”

3a. Addresses the overall results desired, i.e., an “end-state” 

3b. Identifies strategic goals and subordinate objectives

3c. Identifies specific activities to achieve results

3d. Priorities

3e. Milestones

3f. Output-related and outcome-related performance measures

3g. The process to monitor and report on progress

3h. The limitations on progress indicators

4a. The cost of the strategy

4b. The sources (e.g., federal, state, local, and private) of resources or investments needed

4c. The types of sources or investments needed (e.g. budgetary, human capital, information technology, 

research and development, contracts) 

4d. Where resources or investments should be targeted to balance risks and costs

4e. Resource allocation mechanisms

4f. How risk management will aid implementing parties in prioritzing and allocating resources

5a. Who will be implementing the strategy

5b. Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies, departments, or 

offices (e.g., who is in charge during all phases of the strategy’s implementation)

5c. Which organizations will provide the overall framework for oversight and accountability

5d. How they will coordinate both within agencies and with other agencies

5e. The process for how conflicts will be resolved

6a. Addresses how the STOP! strategy relates to each agency’s strategies, goals, and objectives

Source: GAO.

Fully addresses Partially addresses Does not address

Purpose

Scope

Methodology

Problem 

definition

Goals and subordinate 

objectives

Activities

Performance 

measures

Resources and 

investments

Risk management

Organizational roles

and responsibilities

Coordination

Risk assessment

1. Purpose, scope, methodology 

2. Problem definition and risk assessment

3. Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures

4. Resources, investments, and risk management

5. Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination

6. Integration 

Page 17 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
STOP partially addresses the third characteristic, which is important for 

planning and accountability. Although STOP identifies five main goals, it

does not always provide subordinate objectives and is missing key 

elements related to performance measures such as priorities, milestones, 

and a process for monitoring and reporting on progress. For example, 

under its goal of pursuing criminal enterprises, STOP clearly lists 

subordinate objectives of increasing criminal prosecutions, improving 

international enforcement, and strengthening laws. But, subordinate 

objectives under its goal of working closely and creatively with U.S. 

industry can only be inferred. Also, STOP mentions implementing a new 

risk model to target high-risk cargo but does not specify time frames for its 

completion. Although STOP cites output-related performance 

measures14—such as the USPTO STOP hotline receiving over 950 calls 

during fiscal year 2005 and a 45 percent increase in the number of 

copyright and trademark cases filed from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 

2005—these figures are presented without any baselines or targets to 

facilitate the assessment of how well the program is being carried out. In 

addition, STOP cites outcome-related performance measures for a few 

activities.15 For example, STOP goal of pursuing criminal enterprises 

includes shutting down sophisticated international peer-to-peer networks 

used by over 133,000 members. Without effective performance measures, 

STOP’s goals, objectives, and activities cannot be effectively measured, 

and policymakers cannot effectively monitor STOP’s progress. 

STOP does not address any of the elements within the fourth

characteristic related to resources, investments, and risk management. As

a result, decision makers are limited in their ability to determine necessary 

resources, manage them, and shift them with changing conditions. STOP 

neither identifies current or future costs of implementing the strategy, 

such as those related to investigating and prosecuting IP-related crime or 

conducting IP training and technical assistance, nor does it identify the 

sources or types of resources required. While the strategy states that 

“American businesses lose $200 to $250 billion a year to pirated and 

counterfeit goods,” it does not provide a detailed discussion of the 

economic threat to U.S. business, discuss other risks such as the potential

 14An “output measure” records the actual level of activity or whether the effort was realized 

and can assess how well a program is being carried out. 

15An “outcome measure” assesses the actual results, effects, or impact of an activity 

compared with its intended purpose. 

Page 18 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
threats to consumer health and safety from counterfeited products, or 

discuss how resources will be allocated given these risks. 

STOP also partially addresses elements within the fifth characteristic of 

organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. STOP identifies 

lead, support, and partner roles for specific activities. For example, it 

identifies the White House as leading STOP and indicates partnering roles 

among agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Department of 

Justice’s FBI joint role of running the National Intellectual Property Rights 

(IPR) Center. However, STOP does not discuss a process or a framework 

for oversight and accountability among the agencies carrying out the 

strategy. Although STOP discusses specific instances of coordination 

among member agencies, it lacks a clear and detailed discussion of how 

overall coordination occurs. For instance, there is no mention of STOP 

meetings, their frequency, objectives, or agendas.

Some Agency Planning 

Documents Contain 

Characteristics Missing in 

STOP 

We found that some STOP agency planning documents provided additional 

detail on missing elements important to planning and accountability. For 

example, the October 2004, Report of the Department of Justice’s Task 

Force on Intellectual Property, and, June 2006, Progress Report of the 

Department of Justice’s Task Force on Intellectual Property clearly sets 

forth the Department of Justice’s strategies, objectives, activities and 

associated milestones and performance measures for improving the 

department’s overall intellectual property enforcement. The June 2006 

progress report details how the Department of Justice implemented the 31

recommendations made by the Task Force in 2004 and, where appropriate, 

how it exceeded those milestones and objectives in a number of important 

areas. For instance, the 2004 report recommended increasing the number 

of Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) units by 5; the 

progress report indicated that, by June 2006, an additional 12 units were 

added, increasing the total number of CHIP units nationally to 25. 

CBP articulates its strategies, objectives, activities, and associated 

milestones and performance measures related to STOP in its 2006 Priority 

Trade Issue: IPR Trade Strategy.

16 For example, the first objective within 

 16IPR Goal: Improve the effectiveness of IPR enforcement by actively supporting the

administration’s STOP initiative and by ensuring a single uniform approach and focusing on

known or alleged violators with high aggregate values or whose infringing products 

threaten health, safety, and economic security or have possible ties to terrorist activity. 

Page 19 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
CBP’s strategy identifies the IPR risk model as a STOP deliverable and

provides targets, measures, and milestones to track performance. 

Associated targets included a 15 percent increase in efficiency, using cargo 

selectivity criteria to develop a baseline, indicating a milestone of 

completing a pilot test by March 2005 with implementation pending. 

Another example of an agency document that addresses other 

characteristics not addressed in STOP is USPTO’s annual Performance 

and Accountability Report for 2005, which discusses the resources 

available for USPTO’s IP-related operations during that fiscal year, 

including the costs associated with patent and trademark related 

programs. 

STOP Does Not Fully 

Integrate Agencies’

Planning Documents 

We found that STOP partially addresses the sixth desirable characteristic 

regarding integration, which involves the extent to which the STOP 

strategy consistently articulates how it relates as a national strategy to 

STOP agencies’ own strategies, goals, and objectives. This characteristic 

also encompasses how STOP demonstrates the extent to which the 

agencies’ strategies have shared goals and objectives. While STOP refers 

to agency strategies for some STOP agencies, it does not do so for others. 

For example, STOP cites the Department of Justice’s October 2004 Report 

of the Department of Justice’s Task Force on Intellectual Property and 

links one of its STOP objectives, increasing criminal prosecutions, to the 

task force. However, STOP does not clearly link its objectives with those 

cited in other agencies’ planning documents relevant to IP enforcement, 

such as CBP’s most recent Priority Trade Issue: IPR Trade Strategy.

17 In 

addition, STOP does not consistently show the linkages among the 

agencies’ goals and objectives supporting STOP. For example, under its 

objective of pursuing criminal enterprises, STOP does not discuss how the 

objectives of the Department of Justice’s task force might be linked to the 

goals and objectives found in an ICE strategy. It is important that STOP 

not only reflects individual agencies’ priorities and objectives but also 

integrates them in a comprehensive manner, enhancing collaboration 

among the agencies and providing a more complete picture to policy 

makers with oversight responsibilities. The absence of clear linkages 

underscores the strategy’s lack of integration and limits the usefulness of 

STOP as a management tool for effective oversight and accountability...

 17CBP’s most recent Priority Trade Issue: IPR Trade Strategy was issued on May 16, 2006. 

The prior IPR Trade Strategy was issued on May 20, 2005.

Page 20 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Several challenges to implementation of an effective long-term integrated

strategy result from the current structures. First, NIPLECC continues to 

have leadership problems despite enhancements made by Congress. 

Second, in contrast, STOP has a positive image compared with NIPLECC 

but lacks permanence. STOP’s authority and influence, which results from 

its status as a presidential initiative, could disappear after the current 

administration. Third, NIPLECC’s commitment to implementing STOP as a 

successful strategy remains unclear, creating a challenge for 

accountability. 

Since Congress enhanced its powers, NIPLECC has been given a key 

leadership role in overseeing the development of policies, objectives, and 

priorities for IP protection and enforcement and in implementing an 

overall strategy. Yet, NIPLECC retains an image of inactivity within some

of the private sector. For example, almost half of the 16 private sector 

groups with whom we spoke expressed the opinion that NIPLECC was 

inactive or a nonplayer. In addition, representatives from 10 of these 

groups were unclear about NIPPLEC’s role, and many said that they were 

unclear about the difference between NIPLECC and STOP. Finally, in July

2006, Senate appropriators expressed concern about the lack of 

information provided by NIPLECC on its progress. 

On the other hand, both agency officials and private sector representatives 

with whom we spoke consistently praised the IP Coordinator, who heads 

NIPLECC, saying that he was effectively addressing their concerns by 

making speeches, communicating with their members, and heading U.S.

delegations overseas, although they most often associated his activities 

with STOP. In fact, most of the activities of the IP Coordinator’s office 

cited in NIPLECC’s latest annual report are part of STOP. While the IP 

Coordinator has noted in congressional testimony that NIPLECC has made 

some valuable contributions, such as updating a database for IP training 

overseas and contributing legislative suggestions to improve domestic IP 

laws, he acknowledged that there is unmet potential for NIPLECC. 

Agency officials and members of the private sector attribute STOP’s 

effectiveness to its status as a White House initiative and its resulting 

authority and influence. However, there is uncertainty whether this 

authority and influence will continue beyond the current administration

because priorities may shift after the next presidential election. In 

addition, STOP has weaknesses as a national strategy, including its failure

to fully address key characteristics related to planning and accountability 

Current Structures 

Create Challenges to 

an Effective 

Integrated Strategy 

IP Coordinator Praised, 

but NIPLECC Retains an 

Image of Weak Leadership 

Energized STOP Has 

Features That May Limit 

Its Long-term 

Effectiveness 

Page 21 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
such as performance measures, resources and investments, risk 

management, and designation of oversight responsibility. Uncertainty as to

whether STOP will have the same White House support in a new 

administration and its current shortcomings as a strategy may impact 

NIPLECC’s ability to successfully implement and monitor it. 

However, despite STOP’s lack of permanence, it is viewed as energizing 

U.S. IP protection and enforcement efforts and is generally praised by 

agency officials and industry representatives. The IP Coordinator stated in

congressional testimony that STOP has built an expansive interagency

process that provides the foundation for U.S. government efforts to fight 

global piracy. Several agency officials participating in STOP cited its 

advantages. They said that STOP gave them the opportunity to share ideas 

and support common goals. Many agency officials with whom we spoke 

said that STOP had brought increased attention to IP issues within their 

agencies and the private sector, as well as abroad, and attributed that to 

the fact that STOP came out of the White House, thereby lending it more 

authority and influence. One agency official pointed out that IP was now 

on the President’s agenda at major summits such as the G8 and the recent

European Union summits.18 Another agency official praised STOP for 

giving constituent agencies the flexibility to add to and enhance existing IP

enforcement and protection efforts. 

Private sector representatives with whom we spoke generally had positive 

views on STOP, although some thought that STOP was a compilation of 

new and ongoing U.S. agency activities that would have occurred anyway. 

One industry representative noted that STOP is a coordinated outreach to 

foreign governments that provided a collaborative alternative to the 

Special 301 process,19 whose punitive aspects countries sometimes 

resented. Another indicated that his association now coordinates training 

with CBP that is specific to his industry as a result of contacts made 

through STOP. In addition, most private sector representatives with whom

we spoke agreed that STOP was an effective communication mechanism 

between business and U.S. agencies on IP issues, particularly through 

 18The G8 is an annual summit that involves nine countries, including Canada, France, 

Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States. The European

Commission President is also a G8 member. 

19The “Special 301” provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, require USTR to 

identify foreign countries that deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual 

property rights or fair and equitable market access for U.S. persons that rely on intellectual 

property protection. 

Page 22 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
CACP, a cross-industry group created by a joint initiative between the 

Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. 

Private sector officials have stated that CACP meetings are their primary 

mechanism of interfacing with agency officials representing STOP. There 

were some industry representatives, though, who questioned whether 

STOP had added value beyond highlighting U.S. IP enforcement activities. 

Some representatives considered STOP to be mainly a compilation of 

ongoing U.S. IP activities that pre-existed STOP. For example, Operation 

Fast Link20 and a case involving counterfeit Viagra tablets manufactured in 

China, both listed as STOP accomplishments, began before STOP was 

created. 

NIPLECC’s Unclear 

Commitment Impairs 

Accountability 

Ambiguities surrounding NIPLECC’s implementation of STOP as a 

successful strategy create challenges for accountability. How NIPLECC 

will provide accountability through STOP, in practice, remains unclear. 

For instance, although NIPLECC’s most recent annual report describes 

many STOP activities and the IP Coordinator’s direct involvement in them, 

it does not explain how the NIPLECC principals and the IP Coordinator 

plan to carry out their oversight responsibilities mandated by Congress to 

help ensure a successful implementation of the strategy. In addition, the 

STOP strategy document has not been revised to mention NIPLECC’s 

oversight role or articulate a framework for oversight and accountability 

among the STOP agencies carrying out the strategy. 

Furthermore, while agency officials we interviewed generally considered

STOP to be the U.S. government’s IP strategy, NIPLECC officials have sent

mixed signals about the extent to which they believe STOP is meant to 

provide accountability in terms of performance measures and resource 

levels. One official representing NIPLECC said that the STOP strategy 

should have goals and objectives, including metrics to measure progress 

about which the IP Coordinator should report. However, a NIPLECC 

representative from another agency told us that this document was a fact

sheet rather than a strategy and that it should not be assessed as a national

strategy but as an account of administration efforts. Similarly, a NIPLECC 

representative from a third agency was skeptical whether STOP should be 

assessed as NIPLECC’s strategy. Finally, the IP Coordinator stated in 

 20Under the Department of Justice’s Operation Fast Link, on April 2004, law enforcement

authorities executed over 120 total searches during the previous 24 hours in 27 states and 

in 10 foreign countries. Four separate undercover investigations were simultaneously 

conducted, striking all facets of the illegal software, game, movie, and music trade online.

Page 23 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
congressional testimony that STOP is NIPLECC’s strategy but also told us 

that STOP was never meant to be an institutional method for reporting 

priorities and metrics to the President or Congress, or to manage 

resources. Yet, as mentioned earlier, these are key characteristics of any 

strategy. 

Combating IP counterfeiting and piracy requires the involvement of many 

U.S. agencies. The STOP strategy has brought attention and energy to IP 

efforts within the U.S. government. Agency participants and industry 

observers have generally supported the new effort. At the same time, the 

challenges of IP piracy are enormous and will require the sustained and 

coordinated efforts of U.S. agencies, their foreign counterparts, and 

industry representatives to be successful. The current structure presents 

several challenges. STOP is an important first step in the development and 

implementation of an integrated strategy, but it is not well suited to 

address the problem over the long term. As a presidential initiative, STOP

lacks permanence beyond the current administration. This poses 

challenges to its long-term effectiveness because STOP depends upon 

White House support. In addition, STOP does not fully address the six 

desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that we believe

would improve the likelihood of its long-term effectiveness and ensure 

accountability. This limits its usefulness as a tool to prioritize, guide, 

implement, and monitor the combined efforts of multiple agencies to 

protect and enforce IP rights. While NIPLECC offers STOP some 

permanence and congressional oversight, it is unclear how NIPLECC will 

carry out its responsibilities in practice, which, along with its legacy of 

inactivity, raises questions about the prospects for improving STOP and 

sustaining its positive momentum. NIPLECC’s persistent difficulties create 

doubts about its ability to carry out its mandate – that of bringing together 

multiple agencies to successfully implement an integrated strategy for IP 

protection and enforcement that represents the coordinated efforts of all 

relevant parties. 

To improve STOP’s effectiveness as a planning tool and its usefulness to 

Congress: 

We recommend that the IP Coordinator, in consultation with the National

Security Council and the six STOP agencies, including the Departments of 

Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, and State; and the Office of the

U.S. Trade Representative; and the Food and Drug Administration, take

steps to ensure that STOP fully addresses the six desirable characteristics 

of a national strategy. 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 24 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
To clarify NIPLECC’s oversight role with regard to STOP: 

We recommend that the IP Coordinator, in consultation with National 

Security Council and the six STOP agencies, including the Departments of 

Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice, and State; and the Office of the

U.S. Trade Representative; and the Food and Drug Administration, clarify 

in the STOP strategy how NIPLECC will carry out its oversight and 

accountability responsibilities in implementing STOP as its strategy. 

We provided USTR; the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Homeland 

Security, and State; USPTO; Food and Drug Administration; and the IP 

Coordinator with a draft of this report for their review and comment. The 

IP Coordinator, through the Department of Commerce in consultation 

with USPTO and the International Trade Administration, provided 

technical comments. The Department of Homeland Security, the Food and 

Drug Administration, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative also

chose to provide technical comments. We modified the report where 

appropriate. The Departments of Justice and State did not provide any 

comments. 

We also received written comments from the U.S. Coordinator for 

International Property Enforcement (IP Coordinator), which are reprinted 

in appendix IV. The IP Coordinator reiterated our message that STOP was 

a good first step toward a comprehensive, integrated strategy to protect 

and enforce U.S. intellectual property rights and that it had energized U.S.

efforts. He concurred with our recommendations, stating that his office 

would review them, and planned to identify opportunities for 

improvement based on those recommendations, where appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to appropriate 

congressional committees; the U.S. Trade Representative; the Secretaries 

of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Homeland Security, and State; 

the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office; and the 

Director of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. We also will make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 25 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4128 or at yagerl@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Loren Yager

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 26 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

As part of GAO’s review of U.S government efforts to develop a 

comprehensive and integrated strategy with a long-term perspective to 

combat intellectual property counterfeiting and piracy, we reviewed 

documents related to the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement 

Council (NIPLECC) and the Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy 

(STOP). Specifically, we reviewed legislation authorizing NIPLECC and 

augmenting its capabilities and mandate, as well as its legislative history. 

We also examined official STOP documents including the strategy 

document, Web site contents, IP fact sheets, NIPLECC meeting minutes, 

and NIPLECC’s annual reports. 

To determine the extent to which STOP serves as a national strategy for 

combating trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, we assessed STOP using 

the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy developed 

in previous GAO work.1

 The six characteristics are (1) the purpose, scope, 

and methodology; (2) the problem definition and assessment of risks the 

strategy intends to address; (3) the goals, subordinate objectives, 

activities, and performance measures; (4) resources, investments and risk 

management; (5) organizational roles, responsibilities and coordination, 

including oversight; and (6) the strategy’s integration into the goals, 

objectives and activities of its implementing agencies. (See app. II for a full 

description of the six characteristics). First, we developed a checklist 

using the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy and 

verified the relevance of the checklist to the STOP strategy. Specifically, 

three analysts from the audit team independently reviewed the April 2006 

Bush Administration: Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy, 

Accomplishments and Initiatives document by applying the checklist to

the strategy, then met to discuss the relevance of the checklist to the 

information contained in the document. The analysts concluded that the 

checklist was relevant and appropriate for assessing STOP as a strategy. 

Second, six analysts—three from the audit team and three with experience 

using the methodology for prior GAO work—independently assessed 

STOP using the checklist. The six analysts then divided into two panels, 

each with a mix of audit team and nonaudit team members and an 

adjudicator. Each panel discussed their observations and reached 

consensus on a consolidated assessment. Finally, the two panels met to 

reconcile any differences in their consolidated assessments using 

adjudicators as facilitators if needed. On the basis of these evaluations, we 

developed a consolidated summary of the extent that STOP addressed the 

 1

GAO-04-408T. 

Page 27 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

six characteristics and 29 elements of an effective national strategy. We

repeated this process when the June 2006 Bush Administration: Strategy 

for Targeting Organized Piracy, Accomplishments and Initiatives

document became available. These results are presented in figure 3 of this

report. 

We gave each of the 29 elements under the six characteristics an individual

rating of either: “fully addresses,” “partially addresses,” or “does not 

address.” According to our methodology, a strategy “fully addresses” an 

element of a characteristic when it explicitly cites all parts of the element,

and the strategy has sufficient specificity and detail. Within our 

designation of “partially addresses,” one or more of the element’s 

individual parts should be addressed. A strategy “does not address” an 

element of a characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any 

parts of the element of that characteristic, or any implicit references to the 

elements are either too vague or general to be useful. We conducted our 

review of STOP as a national strategy from April to October of 2006. 

We also obtained and analyzed documents required under the Government 

Performance Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, and IP-related planning 

documents, from the government agencies involved with STOP. The GPRA 

documents we reviewed included the “Performance Annual Report,” the 

“Annual Performance Plan,” and the “Strategic Plan.” We assessed the 

extent to which these agency documents support STOP goals and add 

information that may support characteristics and elements necessary for 

an effective national strategy. 

In addition, we interviewed agency officials involved in NIPLECC and 

STOP, including the Coordinator for International Intellectual Property 

Enforcement. We also interviewed representatives from the private sector. 

We used U.S. Customs and Border Protection data on commodities seized 

for IP violations to select the private sector groups judgmentally to ensure 

that we obtained the views of major cross-industry associations, as well as 

individual associations and companies representing key industries that are 

heavily affected by IP violations such as the manufacturing, entertainment, 

and pharmaceutical industries. In all we spoke to 20 representatives from

16 private sector groups. Interviewees included the 6 cross-industry 

associations addressing IP violations, 7 industry level associations, and 

representatives from three companies. We also reviewed their testimonies 

before Congress when available. We conducted our audit work from 

February to October of 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Page 28 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
A

Effective Natio

ppendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

nal Strategy 

Page 29 GAO-07-74

Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an 

Effective National Strategy 

In prior work, GAO identified six desirable characteristics of an effective 

national strategy that would enable its implementers to effectively shape 

policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations, and standards and that 

would enable federal departments and other stakeholders to achieve the 

identified results. GAO further determined that national strategies with the 

six characteristics can provide policymakers and implementing agencies

with a planning tool that can help ensure accountability and more effective 

results. GAO has applied this set of characteristics in our assessment of 

strategies for combating terrorism, defense management costs, and the 

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.

National strategies are not required by executive or legislative mandate to

address a single, consistent set of characteristics, and they contain varying

degrees of detail based on their different scopes. Furthermore, we found 

there was no commonly accepted set of characteristics used for an 

effective national strategy. Nonetheless, after consulting numerous 

sources, GAO identified a set of desirable characteristics that we believe

would provide additional guidance to responsible parties for developing

and implementing the strategies—and to enhance their usefulness as 

guidance for resource and policy decision makers and to better ensure 

accountability. 

Six Desirable 

Characteristics Were 

Developed from Numerous 

and Diverse Sources 

To develop these six desirable characteristics of an effective national 

strategy, GAO reviewed several sources of information. First, GAO 

gathered statutory requirements pertaining to national strategies, as well 

as legislative and executive branch guidance. GAO also consulted the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature on 

strategic planning and performance, and guidance from the Office of 

Management and Budget on the President’s Management Agenda. In 

addition, among other things, GAO studied past reports and testimonies 

for findings and recommendations pertaining to the desirable elements of

a national strategy, as well as recommendations by national commissions 

and research organizations that have commented on national strategies. 

Furthermore, we consulted widely within GAO to obtain updated 

information on strategic planning, integration across and between the 

government and its partners, implementation, and other related subjects.

GAO developed these six desirable characteristics, identified in table 2, 

based on their underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and 

the frequency with which they were cited in other sources. We believe a 

national strategy should ideally contain all of these characteristics. 

Although the authors of national strategies might organize these 

Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

characteristics in a variety of ways and/or use different terms, we present 

them in this order because they flow logically from conception to 

implementation. Specifically, the strategy’s purpose leads to the definition

of the problems and risks it intends to address, which in turn leads to 

specific actions for tackling those problems and risks, allocating and 

managing the appropriate resources, identifying different organizations’ 

roles and responsibilities, and finally to integrating action among all 

relevant parties and implementing the strategy. 

Table 2: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for an Effective National Strategy 

Desirable characteristic Description Examples of elements 

Purpose, scope, and 

methodology 

Addresses why the strategy was produced, 

the scope of its coverage, and the process 

by which it was developed. 

• Principles guiding development. 

• Impetus: e.g., legislation. 

• Definition of key terms and mission areas. 

• Process and methodology to produce strategy (via 

interagency task force, private input, etc.). 

Detailed discussion of 

problems, risks, and 

threats 

Addresses the particular national problems 

and threats at which the strategy is 

directed. 

• Discussion and definition of problems, causes, and 

operating environment. 

• Risk assessment, including analysis of threat and 

vulnerabilities.

• Quality of data: constraints, deficiencies, unknowns. 

Desired goals, objectives, 

activities, and outputrelated and outcomerelated performance 

measures 

Addresses what the strategy is trying to 

achieve, steps to achieve those results, as 

well as the priorities, milestones, and 

performance measures to gauge results. 

• Overall results desired. 

• Hierarchy of goals and subordinate objectives.

• Priorities, milestones, and performance measures to 

gauge results. 

• Specific performance or activity measures. 

• Limitations on progress indicators. 

Description of future costs 

and resources needed 

Addresses what the strategy will cost, the 

sources and types of resources and 

investments needed, and where resources 

and investments should be targeted by 

balancing risk reductions and costs. 

• Resources and investments associated with strategy. 

• Types of resources required. 

• Sources of resources. 

• Economic principles, e.g., balancing benefits and costs. 

• Resource allocation mechanisms. 

• Mandates/incentives to spur action. 

• Importance of fiscal discipline.

• Linkage to other resource documents. 

• Risk management principles. 

Delineation of U.S. 

government roles and 

responsibilities and 

coordination mechanism 

Addresses who will be implementing the 

strategy, what their roles will be compared 

to others, and mechanisms for them to 

coordinate their efforts. 

• Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities. 

• Accountability and oversight framework. 

• Potential changes to structure. 

• Specific coordination processes. 

• Conflict resolution mechanism.

Page 30 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

Desirable characteristic Description Examples of elements 

Description of strategy’s 

integration with

implementing agencies 

Addresses how a national strategy relates 

to the strategies’ goals, objectives, and 

activities of implementing agencies. 

• Integration with other national strategies (horizontal). 

• Integration with relevant documents from other 

implementing organizations (vertical). 

• Implementation guidance. 

• Details on subordinate strategies and plans for 

implementation (e.g., human capital, enterprise 

architecture). 

Source: GAO.

We recognize that strategies themselves are not end points, but rather, are 

starting points. In our view, the strengths of some strategies are useful in 

suggesting ways to enhance the value of other strategies, fill in gaps, speed 

implementation, guide resource allocations, and provide oversight 

opportunities. As with any strategic planning effort, implementation is the 

key. The ultimate measure of these strategies’ value will be the extent they 

are useful as guidance for policy and decision makers in allocating 

resources and balancing stated priorities with other important objectives. 

It will be important over time to obtain and incorporate feedback from the 

“user” community as to how the strategies can better provide guidance 

and how Congress and the administration can identify and remedy 

impediments to implementation, such as legal, international, jurisdictional, 

or resource constraints. 

STOP Partially Addresses 

Five Characteristics and 

Does Not Address One 

Our analysis showed that the strategy partially addresses five of the six 

desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy and fails to 

address one characteristic. As indicated in figure 3, shown earlier, the 

Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP) is missing key elements 

within each characteristic related to planning and accountability such as 

performance measures, resources and investments, and designation of 

oversight responsibility. The following section discusses the STOP 

strategy as it relates to each of the desirable characteristics of an effective 

national strategy. 

This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of

its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. For example, a 

strategy should discuss the specific impetus that led to its being written 

(or updated), such as statutory requirements, executive mandates, or other 

events. Furthermore, a strategy would enhance clarity by including 

definitions of key, relevant terms. In addition to describing what it is 

meant to do and the major functions, mission areas, or activities it covers,

a national strategy would ideally address its methodology. For example, a 

STOP Discusses Purpose and 

Scope but Lacks Detailed 

Discussion of Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

strategy should discuss the principles or theories that guided its 

development, the organizations or offices that drafted the document, or 

working groups that were consulted in its development. A complete 

description of purpose, scope, and methodology make the document more 

useful to organizations responsible for implementing the strategies, as well

as to oversight organizations such as Congress. 

STOP clearly identifies the purpose of the strategy as protecting and 

enforcing IP through targeting organized piracy, which encourages 

American innovation and keeps American businesses competitive 

throughout the world. However, STOP does not provide a complete 

discussion of the purpose because it does not clearly discuss the specific 

impetus that led to the creation of this particular strategy at the time it was 

written. Such an impetus might include a discussion of increasing demand

by the victims of IP violations, relevant legislation or executive mandates, 

or key events related to piracy that may have functioned as a catalyst in 

developing the strategy. STOP fully addresses the element regarding the 

scope of the strategy. The five general goals serve to clearly identify the 

major functions and mission areas the strategy covers and provides 

supporting activities for each goal. STOP, however, does not include a 

discussion of its methodology such as the process that produced the 

strategy, what organizations or offices were involved in drafting the 

document or whether it was the result of a working group. 

This characteristic addresses the particular national problems and threats 

at which the strategy is directed. Specifically, this means a detailed 

discussion or definition of the problems the strategy intends to address, 

their causes, and operating environment. In addition, this characteristic 

entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threats to and 

vulnerabilities involved with the problem and implementing the strategy. 

Specific information concerning a risk assessment helps responsible 

parties better implement the strategy by ensuring that priorities are clear 

and focused on the greatest needs. A discussion of the quality of data 

available regarding this characteristic, such as known constraints or 

deficiencies, would also be useful. 

STOP Identifies the Problem 

but Lacks Detailed Discussion 

of Risk Assessment 

Global piracy and counterfeiting are identified as the problem in the 

strategy addresses. While these terms are not defined in detail, the strategy

contains additional information on the types of piracy and counterfeiting 

that affect U.S. businesses such as references to software piracy, 

counterfeit labels, and counterfeit Viagra. 

Page 32 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

STOP only partially addresses the causes of the problem and the operating 

environment. The strategy implies, but does not clearly discuss, some 

causes of global piracy and counterfeiting when describing its activities. 

For instance, STOP discusses efforts to assist companies with supply 

chain management and U.S. government case referral mechanisms to 

address instances where foreign governments fail to provide adequate IP 

protection to U.S. businesses. In addition, STOP refers to, but does not 

clearly discuss, a variety of operating environments relevant to

counterfeiting, such as references to IP violations on the internet and 

seizures of counterfeit products at the U.S. border, as well as in 

warehouses in China. 

Further, STOP does not provide a detailed risk assessment of the threats 

involved in counterfeiting and piracy. While the strategy states that 

“American businesses lose $200 to $250 billion a year to pirated and 

counterfeit goods,” it neither provides a detailed discussion of the 

economic threat to U.S. business nor does it discuss other risks such as 

the potential threats to consumer safety from counterfeited products. 

STOP also states that profits related to piracy are “one way for criminal 

networks to support their heinous activities” but does not discuss the 

issue any further. In addition, STOP does not include any discussion 

regarding the quality of data it cites in the strategy or on counterfeiting 

and piracy in general. 

This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to achieve

and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the priorities, 

milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At the highest 

level, this could be a description of the overall results desired, followed by

a logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, and specific 

activities to achieve results. In addition, it would be helpful if the strategy 

discussed the importance of implementing parties’ efforts to establish 

priorities, milestones, and performance measures, which help ensure 

accountability. Ideally, a national strategy would set clear desired results 

and priorities, specific milestones, and outcome-related performance 

measures while giving implementing parties flexibility to pursue and 

achieve those results within a reasonable time frame. If significant 

limitations on performance measures exist, other parts of the strategy 

should address plans to obtain better data or measurements, such as 

national standards or indicators of preparedness. Identifying goals, 

objectives, and performance measures aids implementing parties in 

achieving results and enables more effective oversight and accountability.

Identifying priorities and milestones would provide decision makers with

information to better assess progress and manage time and resources. In 

STOP Addresses Goals and 

Activities but Lacks Important 

Elements for Measuring 

Performance 

Page 33 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

addition, identifying and measuring outcome-related performance, rather 

than output measures alone, would allow for more accurate measurement 

of program results and assessment of program effectiveness.1

 STOP fully 

addresses goals and activities in its strategy document, while partially 

addressing subordinate objectives and performance measures. 

STOP clearly identifies its goals and further identifies overall results 

desired with references to a level playing field for American businesses 

throughout the world. STOP goals are to 

• empower American innovators to better protect their rights at home 

and abroad,

• increase efforts to seize counterfeit goods at our borders, 

• pursue criminal enterprises involved in piracy and counterfeiting, 

• work closely and creatively with U.S. industry, and 

• aggressively engage our trading partners to join U.S. efforts. 

STOP also presents numerous activities clearly associated with each goal.

In general, STOP only partially addresses subordinate objectives because 

they are clearly stated under some goals, but implied or otherwise, unclear

in other goals. Under the third goal for example, to pursue criminal 

enterprises involved in piracy and counterfeiting, STOP clearly identifies 

increasing criminal prosecutions, improving international enforcement 

and strengthening laws as the subordinate objectives. In contrast, the 

subordinate objectives are not clearly identified under the fourth goal— to

work closely and creatively with U.S. industry— although they can be 

inferred based on the activities, such as helping businesses to ensure their 

supply and distribution chains are free of counterfeiters and correcting 

faulty business practices. 

STOP is missing a number of elements within this characteristic that are

important for effective monitoring and oversight, including a clear 

discussion of priorities, milestones, and processes for monitoring and 

reporting on progress. For example, STOP mentions implementing a new 

 1

An “output measure” records the actual level of activity or whether the effort was realized 

and can assess how well a program is being carried out. An “outcome measure” assesses

the actual results, effects, or impact of an activity compared with its intended purpose. 

Page 34 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

risk model to target high-risk cargo but does not specify time frames for its 

completion. 

STOP only partially addresses output-related and outcome-related 

performance measures, lacking information relevant to assessing how well 

programs are implemented and their impacts as compared with the 

intended purpose. For example, STOP cites output-related performance 

measures such as the number of calls received on the U.S. Patent and 

Trade Mark Office (USPTO) STOP hotline, the number of small businesses 

that attended four intellectual property Road Show events in 2005, the 

number of prosecutors in the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property 

(CHIP) units within the Department of Justice and the percentage increase 

in copyright and trademark cases filed. However, these figures are 

presented without any baselines or targets needed to assess progress. In 

addition, STOP cites outcome-related performance measures for a few 

activities, such as shutting down a sophisticated international peer-to-peer 

network used by over 133,000 members. It should be noted that 

performance measures should be carefully chosen to be meaningful for 

each goal, acknowledging limitations, and avoiding perverse incentives 

where possible. 

STOP provides no discussion of any processes for monitoring and 

reporting on progress or the limitations of its output-related and outcomerelated performance measures. Without effective performance measures in 

place, STOP’s goals, objectives and activities cannot be effectively 

measured. In the absence of these elements policymakers cannot 

effectively monitor STOP’s progress toward its stated goals.

This characteristic addresses the costs and resources involved in 

implementing the strategy and how the strategy balances those costs with 

the benefits and risks. This characteristic discusses the current and future 

costs of the strategy, the sources of resources and investments associated 

with the strategy (e.g., federal agencies, private sector), and the types of 

investment needed (e.g., human capital, information technology, research

and development, budgetary). Ideally, a strategy would also identify where 

those resources and investments should be targeted and appropriate 

mechanisms to allocate resources. A national strategy should also address 

the difficult, but critical, issues about who pays and how such efforts will 

be funded and sustained in the future. 

STOP Does Not Address 

Elements Relevant to 

Resources, Investments, or 

Risk Management 

A national strategy should also discuss linkages to other resource 

documents, such as federal agency budgets or human capital, information 

technology, research and development, and acquisition strategies. Finally, 

Page 35 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

a national strategy should also discuss in greater detail how risk 

management will aid implementing parties in prioritizing and allocating 

resources, including how this approach will create society-wide benefits 

and balance these with the cost to society. Guidance on costs and 

resources needed using a risk management approach helps implementing 

parties allocate resources according to priorities; track costs and 

performance; and shift resources, as appropriate. Such guidance also 

would assist Congress and the administration in developing a more 

effective strategy to achieve the stated goals. 

STOP does not address elements related to resources and investments or 

risk management. STOP does not identify current or future costs of 

implementing the strategy. Costs related to implementing STOP would 

include, among other things, costs related to investigating and prosecuting 

of IP related crime, conducting IP training and technical assistance, and 

developing new risk assessment technologies. STOP also does not identify 

the sources, or types, of resources required by the strategy. While the 

strategy document lists numerous activities, some involving multiple 

agencies, it neither indicates which agencies have employed what types of 

resources to carry out the activity, nor does it identify the level and type of 

resources needed in order to effectively implement the activity. 

Furthermore, with no established priorities or discussion of risk 

management, the strategy does not address how to allocate resources in 

order to best manage the threats of counterfeit products with the 

resources available to target organized piracy. As a result, the resources 

necessary to implement STOP cannot be reliably determined and 

policymakers are limited in their ability to manage resources and shift 

them as appropriate with changing conditions. 

This characteristic addresses which organizations will implement the 

strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating 

their efforts. This characteristic entails identifying the specific federal 

departments, agencies, or offices involved, as well as the roles and 

responsibilities of private and international sectors, if appropriate. A 

strategy would ideally clarify implementing organizations’ relationships in 

terms of leading, supporting, and partnering. In addition, a strategy should

describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework for 

accountability and oversight, such as the National Security Council, Office 

of Management and Budget, Congress, or other organizations. 

Furthermore, a strategy should also identify specific processes for 

coordination and collaboration between sectors and organizations—and 

address how any conflicts would be resolved. Addressing this 

STOP Partially Addresses 

Organizational Roles and 

Coordination but Lacks 

Framework for Oversight 

Page 36 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

characteristic fosters coordination and enhances both implementation and 

accountability. 

STOP provides some information on organizational roles and 

responsibilities, such as identifying lead, support, and partner roles for 

specific activities. For example, it identifies the White House as leading 

STOP and indicates partnering roles among agencies, such as between the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) and the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), which jointly run the National Intellectual Property 

(IPR) Center. However, STOP neither discusses the need, nor designates 

any agency with responsibility for providing framework for oversight and 

accountability within the strategy. 

STOP also partially addresses mechanisms for coordination. For example, 

the strategy discusses some coordination among member agencies in its 

description of STOP activities but lacks a clear and detailed discussion of 

how overall coordination occurs among agencies. For instance, there is no 

mention of STOP meetings, their frequency, objectives, or agendas. In 

addition, there is no discussion of how agencies coordinate on IP issues 

that may involve law enforcement sensitive material among agencies and 

other entities with which they collaborate. Furthermore, STOP does not 

address how conflicts among member agencies should be resolved. 

This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to other

strategies’ goals, objectives, and activities (horizontal integration)—and to 

subordinate levels of government and other organizations and their plans 

to implement the strategy (vertical integration). For example, the strategy 

could indicate how it relates to implementing agencies’ shared goals, 

subordinate objectives, and activities. Similarly, related strategies should 

highlight their common or shared goals, subordinate objectives, and 

activities. In addition, the strategy could address its relationship with 

relevant documents from implementing organizations, such as the 

strategic plans, annual performance plans, or annual performance reports 

required of federal agencies by the Government Performance and Results 

Act. A strategy should also discuss, as appropriate, various strategies and 

plans produced by the state, local, private, or international sectors. A 

strategy also should provide guidance such as the development of national 

standards to link together more effectively the roles, responsibilities, and 

capabilities of the implementing parties. A clear relationship between the 

strategy and other critical implementing documents helps agencies and

other entities understand their roles and responsibilities, foster effective 

implementation, and promote accountability. 

STOP Partially Addresses 

Integration with Member 

Agencies but Lacks Linkage to 

Individual Agency Goals and 

Objectives 

Page 37 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix II: GAO’s Analysis of STOP as an

Effective National Strategy 

STOP partially addresses this characteristic. STOP associates its goals 

with specific member agencies. For example, pursuing criminal 

enterprises is associated with the Department of Justice, and increasing 

efforts to stop counterfeits goods at the border is associated with the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection. However, STOP does not consistently 

articulate how it relates to agencies’ strategies, goals, and objectives. 

While STOP is missing many elements related to the desirable 

characteristics, we found that agency planning documents contained some 

of the missing information. For example, we identified federal agency 

planning documents that provide additional detail on missing elements 

important to planning and accountability that STOP did not adequately 

address. However, the need to consult multiple agency documents 

underscores the strategy’s lack of integration and limits the value of STOP 

as a management tool for effective oversight and accountability. Clearly 

linking STOP to the agencies’ own strategies is important to ensure that 

the strategy not only reflects individual agencies’ priorities and objectives

but also integrates them in a comprehensive manner, enhancing 

collaboration among the agencies and providing a more complete picture

to policymakers with oversight responsibilities. 

Page 38 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy Accomplishments and Initiatives 

for Targeting Organized Piracy 

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 39 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 40 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 41 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 42 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 43 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 44 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 45 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 46 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 47 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 48 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix III: Bush Administration: Strategy

for Targeting Organized Piracy

Accomplishments and Initiatives 

Page 49 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV of Commerce : Comments from the 

Department of Commerce 

Page 50 GAO-07-74 Intellectual Property
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 51 GAO-07-74 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Loren Yager, (202) 512-4128, or yagerl@gao.gov 

In addition to the individual named above, Christine Broderick, Assistant 

Director; Nina Pfeiffer; Jasminee Persaud; and Wendy Ho made significant 

contributions to this report. Martin De Alteriis, Kelly Baumgartner, Karen 

Deans, Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Patrick Hickey, and Terry 

Richardson also provided assistance.

 Intellectual Property

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320400) 
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