RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3372-18

E.S., as Guardian ad Litem

for G.S. and B.S., minors,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRUNSWICK INVESTMENT 

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, J.E.,

D.L., S.S., and A.T.,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

F.M.,

Defendant.

____________________________

Submitted November 9, 2020 – Decided August 27, 2021

Before Judges Messano, Hoffman, and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 

L-0727-17.

Keefe Law Firm, attorneys for appellant (Stephen T. 

Sullivan, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs).

Santomassimo Davis, LLP, attorneys for respondents 

(Alexander J. Anglim, of counsel and on the brief).
A-3372-18 2

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MESSANO, P.J.A.D.

Plaintiff E.S., guardian ad litem for her two minor daughters, G.S.

(Gloria) and B.S. (Barbara), appeals the Law Division's March 1, 2019 order 

granting defendants summary judgment.

1

 We review the grant of summary 

judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court, which 

mandates that summary judgment be granted "if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to 

a judgment or order as a matter of law."

[Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire 

Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) 

(quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).]

A dispute of material fact is "genuine only if, considering the burden of 

persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, 

together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving 

party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Grande v. 

Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 

N.J. 22, 38 (2014)). "'If there is no genuine issue of material fact,' then we 

must 'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" Richter v. 

1

 We use initials and pseudonyms pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(c)(9).
A-3372-18 3

Oakland Bd. of Educ., 459 N.J. Super. 400, 412 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting 

DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 

325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)). 

Additionally, "[w]e accord no deference to the trial judge's legal 

conclusions." Ibid. (citing Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013)). 

We limit our review to the record before the motion judge. See Ji v. Palmer, 

333 N.J. Super. 451, 463–64 (App. Div. 2000) (holding appellate review of the 

grant of summary judgment is limited to the record that existed before the 

motion judge (citing Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184, 188 

(1963))).

I.

From approximately March 1, 2013 until Spring 2015, plaintiff resided 

in a two-unit residential structure on Commercial Avenue in New Brunswick 

with her husband, A.S. (Andy), Gloria, Barbara, and a third child. Defendant 

Brunswick Investment Limited Partnership (Brunswick) owned the premises.

2

 

Defendant is a property management company that owns and manages 

residential rental properties and an industrial park in New Brunswick. 

2

 Brunswick's members included defendants, J.E., A.T. a/k/a A.E., D.L. and 

S.S. We use the singular, defendant, throughout the opinion, referring to the 

individual members only as necessary.
A-3372-18 4

The Commercial Avenue property consisted of two units and a detached 

garage. Apartment A was on the first floor, and Apartment B, where plaintiff 

and her family lived, was on the second. Apartment B also provided access to 

the building's attic, which contained living and storage space. Defendant F.M. 

(Fred) lived in Apartment A from approximately December 1, 2009 through 

October 22, 2013. 

The building had a common front entrance through which one could gain 

access to both apartment doors. Although there was a lock on the door of the 

entrance, defendant never provided a key to either plaintiff or her husband, and 

the door did not automatically lock when closed. Fred kept personal items in 

the garage, and he was the only person plaintiff or her husband ever saw use 

the garage. The garage door had a lock, and plaintiff saw Fred use a key on 

occasion to access the garage. Neither plaintiff nor her husband had a key for

the garage, and neither was ever in the garage. 

Andy had discovered the availability of the apartment through a friend, 

who provided a phone number to call. Fred answered Andy's call, set an 

appointment, and showed Andy the apartment. Neither plaintiff nor Andy 

knew Fred, who told Andy he was "the maintenance for the house for the 

company." Fred brought Andy to defendant's office, where he spoke with A.E. 

and signed the lease. A.E. also confirmed that Fred was "in charge of 
A-3372-18 5

maintenance." Plaintiff often paid rent at defendant's office, and Fred was 

sometimes present. 

During her tenancy, plaintiff sublet the attic space to another family. 

Whenever Andy spoke to defendant about the apartment or the attic space 

needing work, A.E. told him she would send Fred. According to plaintiff, Fred 

did numerous repairs and improvements to Apartment B and the attic, all 

approved after Andy spoke with A.E. At times, even when plaintiff or 

members of the other family were home, Fred used a key he possessed to 

access Apartment B. 

Although Fred executed a lease with Brunswick, J.E. testified at 

deposition that Fred never paid the monthly rent of $800. Instead, defendant 

forgave the rent in exchange for maintenance work Fred performed at the 

Commercial Avenue and other properties owned by defendant. Defendant kept 

no records of Fred's work or compensation, and it did not report that 

information to any government agencies. Fred continued to work for

defendant after he moved out of the Commercial Avenue property.3 

3

 At deposition, J.E. insisted Fred never returned to the Commercial Avenue 

property to do work after he moved out of Apartment A. J.E. claimed that if 

Fred went there to work after he vacated Apartment A, it was because the 

tenants called him and scheduled the work directly. However, applying 

summary judgment standards, we accord plaintiff the benefit of all favorable 

evidence and inferences, meaning that we accept she and Andy arranged for 
A-3372-18 6

Fred sometimes used defendant's company van. The keys for the van 

and the garage at the Commercial Avenue property were kept unsecured on a 

board or in an unlocked cabinet in defendant's office, and it kept no records 

regarding the use of the keys or van. 

Beginning in August 2014 and continuing through February 2015, Fred 

sexually assaulted Gloria and Barbara on four occasions. According to 

plaintiff, the first assault happened when Fred met the girls at the property 

after school and let them into Apartment B while plaintiff and Andy were at 

work. On another occasion, Fred assaulted one of the girls in the garage. The 

third assault happened after Fred arrived to do some work in the attic, and, on 

a fourth occasion, while Fred was painting the bathroom in plaintiff's 

apartment. Plaintiff first became aware of these assaults after attending a 

parent-teacher conference at school, where Gloria was experiencing problems. 

Her daughters then disclosed details of the assaults. Plaintiff and Andy 

reported these incidents to law enforcement officers who investigated, 

ultimately interviewing Fred on April 16, 2015. 

Fred acknowledged working at several of defendant's properties. He 

also corroborated some details provided by the children, but he denied 

committing any sexual assaults. It is unclear what happened thereafter, but a 

Fred to perform all work in Apartment B and the attic by contacting defendant 

for authorization. 
A-3372-18 7

document in the record indicates that as of April 22, 2015, warrants were 

issued for Fred's arrest. It is undisputed that Fred absconded and remains at 

large.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged defendant: was negligent in the "hiring, 

retention, training and supervision of [Fred]," and also its "negligence 

permitted . . . [Fred] access to" the children; negligently inflicted emotional 

distress on Gloria and Barbara; violated the New Jersey Law Against 

Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50; violated the Child Sexual 

Abuse Act (CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1; and was vicariously liable under the 

doctrine of respondeat superior or "agency principles" for various common law 

torts.4

Defendant moved for summary judgment following discovery, arguing 

that pursuant to the Court's decision in Davis v. Devereux Foundation, 209 

N.J. 269 (2012), it could not be vicariously liable as a matter of law for Fred's 

criminal acts committed outside the scope of his employment. Citing our 

decision in Davis v. Devereux Foundation, 414 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010), 

aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 209 N.J. 269 (2012), defendant also urged the judge 

to reject plaintiff's contention that the evidence permitted a finding of 

vicarious liability pursuant to § 219(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency

4

 The court dismissed the complaint as to Fred without prejudice pursuant to 

Rule 1:13-7.
A-3372-18 8

(Am. Law Inst. 1958) (hereinafter Restatement). Defendant also argued it 

could not be liable as a matter of law for the negligent hiring, training, or 

supervision of Fred, as it was undisputed it did not know of any prior criminal 

conduct by Fred and had received no complaints about him. 

After considering oral argument, the judge granted defendant's motion, 

explaining his rationale in a written opinion. Citing Restatement § 228, the 

judge first determined Fred's actions were clearly outside the scope of his 

employment. The judge then considered § 219(2), which provides:

A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his 

servants acting outside the scope of their employment, 

unless:

(a) . . . 

(b) the master was negligent or reckless, 

or

(c) . . .

(d) the servant purported to act or to speak 

on behalf of the principal and there was 

reliance upon apparent authority, or he 

was aided in accomplishing the tort by the 

existence of the agency relation.

[Restatement, § 219 (emphasis added).]5

5 This section only applies to those in a master-servant relationship. See

Restatement § 220 (defining who is a servant, as opposed to an agent). 
A-3372-18 9

Noting plaintiff's reliance in opposing summary judgment on subsections 

(2)(b) and (d), the judge correctly observed that the Court never specifically 

addressed those subsections in Davis. Relying on our decision in Davis, the 

judge concluded subsection (d) did not apply to low-level employees, like 

Fred. 414 N.J. Super. at 15–16. 

The judge then considered subsection (b), noting plaintiff's argument 

that defendant did nothing to prevent Fred's unauthorized use of keys to 

Apartment B or the garage. He concluded that plaintiff failed to "put forth any 

proof of a relevant standard of care regarding supervision of maintenance 

workers, or key sign-out or security procedures," and lacked "the benefit of 

any expert to establish . . . a standard of care, let alone a deviation." The judge 

also determined that Fred's criminal acts "were not foreseeable." He entered 

an order dismissing the complaint, and this appeal followed.

II.

Plaintiff contends no expert testimony was necessary to permit a jury to 

find defendant was directly negligent in failing to keep the common door to 

the Commercial Avenue property locked and the keys to Apartment B and the 

garage secured and their use monitored, thereby making defendants liable 

under § 219(2)(b) of the Restatement. Plaintiff also argues there was sufficient 

evidence to permit a jury to find defendant vicariously liable under § 
A-3372-18 10

219(2)(d), because a jury could find Fred acted with apparent authority and 

was aided in accomplishing the sexual assaults through his position as 

defendant's employee. She disagrees with the judge's conclusion that Fred was 

a "low-level employee," or otherwise not within the scope of § 219(2)(d) of the 

Restatement.

6

 

We digress briefly to address defendant's continued assertion that the 

Court's holding in Davis "is decisive" and readily disposes of the appeal. It 

does not.

In Davis, the plaintiff, almost nineteen years old and diagnosed with 

autism and other serious psychological and behavioral conditions, resided for 

several years in the defendant's facility. 209 N.J. at 279. One of the facility's 

resident counselors severely burned the plaintiff by throwing a scalding cup of 

water on him. Id. at 281. The counselor pled guilty and was sentenced to 

prison for her crimes. Ibid.

On appeal, we agreed with the motion judge and rejected the plaintiff's 

argument that the defendant had a non-delegable duty to the plaintiff, thereby 

6

 The judge did not address plaintiff's LAD claim or her CSAA claim. 

However, plaintiff's brief does not challenge the grant of summary judgment 

on these counts in her complaint. Any appeal from summary judgment on 

those claims is waived. See N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Alloway Twp., 438 

N.J. Super. 501, 505 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) (holding an issue not briefed is 

deemed waived on appeal). 
A-3372-18 11

making it vicariously liable under § 219(2)(c) of the Restatement. Davis, 414 

N.J. Super. at 8–10. However, we reversed the grant of summary judgment, 

concluding a jury could find the counselor's conduct was within the scope of 

her employment. Id. at 12–16.

In granting certification, the Court limited its consideration to only two 

issues: 

whether New Jersey law imposed upon [the defendant]

a "non-delegable duty" to prevent [the counselor's]

assault upon [the plaintiff] within the meaning of 

Restatement § 219(2)(c), and whether a rational 

factfinder could find that [the counselor's] violent 

conduct was within the scope of her employment 

under Restatement § 219(1).

[Davis, 209 N.J. at 288.]

 

In other words, the motion judge in this case correctly determined that the 

Davis Court never addressed the two subsections of § 219(2) at issue here.

The motion judge, however, extended our dicta in Davis beyond its 

intended bounds. Specifically, we saw "no basis for applying" § 219(2)(d) in 

Davis. 414 N.J. Super. at 15. Noting the Court's application of § 219(2)(d) in 

Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 620 (1993), we decided not to

explore other possible meanings of [§ 219(2)(d)] since 

we are satisfied that it would be inappropriate to apply 

it to the conduct of a low-level employee in the instant 

setting. We reach that conclusion because such an 

application would result in strict liability, which is 

inconsistent with the Court's implicit rejection of strict 
A-3372-18 12

liability in Hardwicke [v. American Boychoir School, 

188 N.J. 69 (2006)]. 

[Id. at 16.] 

The motion judge construed this dictum to mean criminal conduct by a lowlevel employee could never support holding his employer vicariously liable 

under § 219(2)(d) of the Restatement. We do not accept that as a rule, but, 

rather, limit our statement in Davis to the facts presented.

However, we agree that the motion judge in this case properly granted 

summary judgment, albeit in part for reasons other than those expressed in his 

written opinion. See Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018) ("[I]t is 

well-settled that appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from 

opinions, oral decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons given for the 

ultimate conclusion." (quoting Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 

191, 199 (2001))). As we explain, our courts have applied § 219(2)(b) and (d) 

of the Restatement in limited circumstances, generally serving remedial 

statutory causes of action, none of which are present here. Moreover, the 

Restatement (Third) of Agency (Am. Law Inst. 2006) (hereinafter Restatement 

Third), which the Court and our court has adopted in other settings, 

significantly altered § 219(2) of the earlier Restatement, lending further 

support to our conclusion that defendants are not liable as a matter of law 

under the facts of this case.
A-3372-18 13

III.

A.

These two subsections of the Restatement are conceptually different. In 

Aguas v. State, in the context of a sexual harassment complaint, the Court 

clarified that claims implicating § 219(2) of the Restatement "are often 

discussed in tandem, [but] are analytically distinct from and independent of 

one another." 220 N.J. 494, 512 (2015). "The first is a direct cause of action

against the employer for negligence or recklessness under Restatement § 

219(2)(b)." Ibid. (emphasis added) (citing Gaines v. Bellino, 173 N.J. 301, 

312–14 (2002)). "The second is a claim for vicarious liability under 

Restatement § 219(2)(d)." Ibid. (emphasis added) (citing Gaines, 173 N.J. at 

312–14). 

The Court has applied § 219(2)(b) and (d) of the Restatement to hold an 

employer potentially liable for the acts of its employee outside the scope of his 

employment only in limited circumstances. In each instance, the Court did so 

to serve the clear purposes of remedial legislation.

In Lehmann, the Court held that the second portion of § 219 (2)(d) of the 

Restatement — the employee "was aided in accomplishing" his tortious 

conduct "by the existence of the agency relation" — could apply to hold an 

employer vicariously liable for a supervisor's creation of a hostile work 
A-3372-18 14

environment under the LAD. 7 132 N.J. at 619–20. Critically, in order to 

impose liability under the second portion of § 219(2)(d), the factfinder must 

conclude, among other things, that "the employer delegate[d] the authority to 

the supervisor to control the situation of which the plaintiff complains." Id. at 

620. (emphasis added) (quoting Bruce Chandler Smith, When Should an 

Employer Be Held Liable For The Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Who 

Creates a Hostile Work Environment? A Proposed Theory of Liability, 19 

Ariz. St. L.J. 285, 321 (1987)). 

The Court also held an employer could be liable under § 219 (2)(b) of 

the Restatement if a plaintiff could "show that an employer was negligent by 

its failure to have in place well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment 

policies, effective formal and informal complaint structures, training, and/or

monitoring mechanisms." Id. at 621. The Court specifically declined to hold 

employers "strictly liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment by 

supervisors." Id. at 623. Instead, the Court viewed the "scope of an 

employer's liability . . . as a question of public policy" with "the crucial issue 

7

 This second portion of subsection (d) has been referred to by some courts as 

the "aided by the agency exception to employer nonliability." Zsigo v. Hurley 

Med. Ctr., 716 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Mich. 2006). Others have referred to it as 

the "aided-in-agency theory" of vicarious liability. See, e.g., Peña v. Greffet, 

110 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1116–31 (D.N.M. 2015) (tracing the history and 

development of this portion of Restatement § 219(2)(d)).
A-3372-18 15

to be which position provides the most effective intervention and prevention of 

employment discrimination." Id. at 625.

In Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Board of Education, the Court 

held "that the standards governing employer liability as determined and 

explained in [Lehmann were] fully applicable to actions brought under CEPA 

[the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14]." 138 

N.J. 405, 417 (1994). Like the LAD, CEPA "seeks to overcome the 

victimization of employees and to protect those who are especially vulnerable 

in the workplace from the improper or unlawful exercise of authority by 

employers." Id. at 418. Justice Handler noted that similar "considerations of 

public policy inform[ed the Court's] analysis of the scope of employer liability 

for retaliatory conduct under CEPA." Id. at 417.

Lastly, in Hardwicke, the Court considered whether the defendant school 

could be vicariously liable under the CSAA for sexual assaults committed 

against a former student by the school's musical director. 188 N.J. at 74. 

After concluding the school could be a "passive abuser" under the statute, id.

at 91–94, the Court considered whether the school could be vicariously liable 

for the plaintiff's common law tort claims based on the musical director's 

sexual assaults. Id. at 100–01. Once again, relying in part on the strong public 

policy undergirding the CSAA, the Court held: 
A-3372-18 16

The considerations that informed our analyses in 

Lehmann and Abbamont apply equally to claims 

predicated on facts indicating child abuse. . . . [T]he 

CSAA recognizes the vulnerability of children and 

demonstrates a legislative intent to protect them from 

victimization. In our view, common-law claims based

on child abuse are supported by the same compelling 

rationale. The CSAA imposes responsibility on those 

in the best position to know of the abuse and stop it; 

application of section 219 of the Restatement to 

plaintiff's common-law claims advances those goals.

[Id. at 102.]8

B.

Plaintiff cites no published New Jersey decision that adopted § 219(2)(b) 

of the Restatement to impose direct liability on an employer for the tortious 

conduct of an employee outside the scope of his employment other than in the 

context of claims brought pursuant to remedial legislation such as the LAD, 

CEPA or the CSAA, and our research reveals none. See Davis, 414 N.J. 

8

 As noted, the motion judge did not specifically address the CSAA count in 

the complaint, nor has plaintiff done so on appeal. Defendant and its 

individual members were not in loco parentis to Barbara and Gloria or within 

their "household," and, therefore, could not be vicariously liable as "passive 

abusers" under the CSAA. See e.g., J.P. v. Smith, 444 N.J. Super. 507, 512–13 

(App. Div. 2016) (concluding school and board of education could not be 

liable for assistant band director's sexual abuse of student at school, in her 

home, and on overnight band trips).
A-3372-18 17

Super. at 11 (noting "the legal principles set forth in the Restatement are 

intended to be summaries of the common law" and "liability under [such 

remedial legislation] is solely a matter of statutory construction"). 

Indeed, a survey of decisions from other jurisdictions reveals no 

published case, other than those brought under similar remedial statutes, that 

relied upon § 219(2)(b) to impose direct liability on an employer for the torts 

of an employee committed outside the scope of his employment. Simply put, 

it remains unclear what would make an employer negligently culpable under § 

219(2)(b) for a common law tort committed by an employee outside the scope 

of his employment. 

The question has been made clearer by the Restatement Third, which our 

Courts have recognized and adopted in several circumstances. See Kaye v.

Rosefielde, 223 N.J. 218, 229 (2015) (citing Restatement Third regarding 

fiduciary's duty of loyalty to principal); Bridgewater-Raritan Educ. Ass'n v. 

Bd. of Educ., 221 N.J. 349, 363–64 (2015) (citing Restatement Third regarding 

"apparent authority"); N.J. Laws.' Fund for Client Prot. v. Stewart Title Guar. 

Co., 203 N.J. 208, 220 (2010) (same); Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 

___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2021) (slip op. at 12–13) (same); Dunkley 

v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters, 441 N.J. Super. 322, 328 n.1 (App. 

Div. 2015) (specifically noting the "Restatement (Second) of Agency has been 
A-3372-18 18

superseded by Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006)."). The Restatement 

Third makes clear that the principal-employer is directly liable for the agentemployee's conduct "if the harm was caused by the principal's negligence in 

selecting, training, retaining, supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent." 

Id. at § 7.05(1). 

Such liability may arise "for injury caused by tortious conduct of an 

employee acting outside the scope of employment." Id. cmt. b. In other 

words, under the Restatement's latest iteration, "[t]he basis for liability under 

this rule is distinct from other bases for liability." An employer's liability for 

torts committed by its employee outside the scope of his employment "stem[s] 

from general doctrines of tort law not limited in their applicability to 

relationships of agency." Ibid.

Nonetheless, there must be a "foreseeable likelihood that harm will 

result from the conduct." Id. cmt. d. As the Restatement Third explains, 

"When a principal conducts an activity through another person, the nature of 

the task to be performed and the conduct required for performance are relevant 

to whether the principal acted negligently, either in selecting the actor or in 

instructing, supervising, or otherwise controlling the actor." Ibid.
A-3372-18 19

Plaintiff does not specifically challenge dismissal of her claims alleging 

defendant's negligent hiring, training, and supervision of Fred. Nevertheless, 

we briefly address the issue in light of the Restatement Third's commentary.

"Unlike respondeat superior, negligent hiring, supervision, and training 

are not forms of vicarious liability and are based on the direct fault of an 

employer." G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 415 (2019). Our courts have 

long recognized the elements of such a cause of action.

To be found liable for negligent supervision or 

training, the plaintiff must . . . prove that (1) an 

employer knew or had reason to know that the failure 

to supervise or train an employee in a certain way 

would create a risk of harm and (2) that risk of harm 

materializes and causes the plaintiff's damages.

[Id. at 416 (citing DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 173 

(1982)).]

The motion record is devoid of any facts demonstrating defendant knew or 

should have reasonably known that Fred posed a risk to any tenant. Plaintiff's 

negligent supervision cause of action, therefore, was properly dismissed.

Plaintiff takes a somewhat different tack by arguing defendant was 

directly negligent by failing to supply adequate security against criminal 

conduct at the Commercial Avenue property, including Fred's criminal 

conduct. She cites the failure to install a working lock on the front door of the 

property and defendant's failure to secure and monitor keys to the property as 
A-3372-18 20

independent bases for liability. See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 

222 (1980) (holding landlord could be liable for failing "to install a lock on the 

front door"). Plaintiff also argues the judge erred by concluding expert 

opinion was necessary to establish defendant's negligence. While we agree 

with plaintiff that an expert was not necessary to establish that defendant owed 

a duty to plaintiff, or that the facts in this case established a breach of the duty, 

we nevertheless conclude summary judgment was appropriate.

No evidence suggested that when defendants authorized Fred to make 

repairs and improvements as requested by plaintiff's family, it was foreseeable 

that Fred would engage in criminal conduct. This case is, therefore, unlike 

Trentacost, where the Court noted the mugging and robbery of a tenant in an 

apartment building's stairwell was reasonably foreseeable based on the high 

incidence of crime in the area and an attempted break-in to the building's 

basement two months before the attack. 82 N.J. at 223. The same 

foreseeability of harm from another's conduct was essential to holding a 

landlord potentially liable in any number of other cases. See, e.g., Scully v. 

Fitzgerald, 179 N.J. 114, 122 (2004) ("A landlord . . . has a responsibility to 

take reasonable steps to curtail the dangerous activities of tenants of which he 

should be aware and that pose a hazard to the life and property of other 

tenants." (emphasis added) (citing Williams v. Gorman, 214 N.J. Super. 517, 
A-3372-18 21

523 (App. Div. 1986))); Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 149 N.J. 496, 

504 (1997) ("[B]usiness owners and landlords have a duty to protect patrons 

and tenants from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties occurring on their 

premises." (emphasis added)).

Moreover, even if these omissions demonstrate a breach of the duty 

defendant owed to its tenant and her family, plaintiff's negligence claim still 

fails. "[A] negligence cause of action requires the establishment of four 

elements: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) actual and proximate 

causation, and (4) damages." Est. of Campagna v. Pleasant Point Props., LLC, 

464 N.J. Super. 153, 171 (App. Div. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 594 

(2013)). Defendant's failure to install a lock on the front door of the 

Commercial Avenue property or safeguard keys at its office were not 

proximate causes of the sexual assaults of plaintiff's daughters. Fred was not a 

third-party stranger to the property, nor was he simply plaintiff's fellow tenant. 

Indeed, it is part and parcel of plaintiff's argument pursuant to § 219(2)(d) of 

the Restatement, which we address below, that Fred was provided with unique 

access to the property because Brunswick authorized his presence as the 

building's superintendent. 
A-3372-18 22

In sum, plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case under § 219(2)(b) of 

the Restatement, as now superseded by Restatement Third § 7.05, that 

defendant's negligence made it directly liable for Fred's criminal conduct 

committed outside the scope of his employment.

C.

Plaintiff contends she presented a prima facie case of defendant's 

vicarious liability pursuant to § 219(2)(d) of the Restatement. This subsection 

presents two alternative methods for establishing an employer's vicarious 

liability for the tortious conduct of its employee outside the scope of his 

employment — the employee "purported to act . . . on behalf of the principal 

and there was reliance upon apparent authority"; or the tortfeasor was "aided in 

accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." Restatement, § 

219(2)(d). The limited commentary to the rule provides:

Clause (d) includes primarily situations in which the 

principal's liability is based upon conduct which is 

within the apparent authority of a servant, as where 

one purports to speak for his employer in defaming 

another or interfering with another's business. 

Apparent authority may also be the basis of an action 

of . . . physical harm. In other situations, the servant 

may be able to cause harm because of his position as 

agent . . . .

[Id. cmt. e (emphasis added) (citations omitted).]
A-3372-18 23

The Restatement specifically recognized vicarious liability for "physical harm" 

to third parties "caused . . . by their reasonable reliance upon the tortious 

representations of one acting within his apparent authority or apparent scope of 

employment." Restatement, § 266 (emphasis added). The comment and 

illustrations that follow limit the section's application to situations where 

physical harm results from an employee's misrepresentation or negligent 

representation. Id. cmt. a. 

We note once again, however, that except in the context of causes of 

action under remedial statutory schemes, plaintiff fails to cite any published 

New Jersey decision that relied on § 219(2)(d) of the Restatement as a basis 

for vicarious liability, and we have found none in our research. We also note 

our concern that an overly broad application of § 219(2)(d) in other settings 

treads perilously close to imposing strict liability on an employer. Davis, 414 

N.J. Super. at 16. 

(i)

We first deal with the "aided-by-agency" clause of § 219(2)(d) of the 

Restatement. Courts in other jurisdictions have expressed concern that a broad 

reading of its language would result in an employer's strict liability. See, e.g., 

Peña, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 ("point[ing] out the obvious defect in the aidedin-agency theory: it comes close to creating strict vicarious liability for 
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employers, and, despite purporting to be an exception, it nearly swallows the 

general rule that respondeat superior does not attach to intentional torts"); 

Zsigo, 716 N.W.2d at 224, 226 (refusing to "adopt[] the aided by the agency 

exception" in subsection 2(d) because it "would potentially be subjecting 

employers to strict liability"). See also Peña 110 F. Supp. 3d at 1119–20 

(explaining the split among courts in applying the rule in § 219(2)(d)). 

In Lehmann, the Court explained the doctrine as providing vicarious 

liability for an employer because the creation of a hostile work environment by 

a supervisor depends on whether he or she "was aided in accomplishing that 

tort by the power delegated . . . to control the day-to-day working 

environment." 132 N.J. at 620 (emphasis added). Several courts in other 

jurisdictions that have recognized the aided-by-agency doctrine for vicarious 

liability under § 219(2)(d) have limited its application to similar workplace 

torts involving sexual harassment, or to situations where the tortfeasor was a 

police officer or other law enforcement official who, through his position, was 

able to exert power and control over the victim. See Peña, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 

1125–29 (collecting cases). 

One notable exception, with facts similar to those presented here, was 

Costos v. Coconut Island Corp., 137 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998). In that case, the 

First Circuit anticipating Maine's common law, concluded that pursuant to the 
A-3372-18 25

aided-by-agency doctrine, the owners of an inn could be vicariously liable for 

its manager's surreptitious entry of a guest's room and her rape. Id. at 50. The 

court noted that "[b]y virtue of his agency relationship with the defendants, as 

manager of the inn, [the manager] was entrusted with the keys to the rooms, 

including [the victim's] room . . . . Because he was the manager of the inn, 

[he] knew exactly where to find [the victim]." Ibid.

The Supreme Court of Maine, however, has since noted the widespread 

criticism of Costos and specifically rejected its application in Mahar v. 

StoneWood Transport, 823 A.2d 540, 546 (Me. 2003). As one commentator 

aptly noted: 

Viewed in isolation, the aided-by-agency-relation 

basis for liability in section 219(2)(d) could embrace a 

wide array of cases. As courts have noted, in almost 

all vicarious liability cases the mere "existence of the 

agency relation" aids the employee in accomplishing 

the tort because the agent often would not have 

committed the tort but for the responsibilities, duties, 

and knowledge gained from the existence of the 

agency relationship. Courts, however, typically 

explain that such a reading goes too far. The agency 

relation by itself could expose the employer to nearly 

limitless liability, involving situations that fall well 

beyond a fair assessment of the employer's 

responsibility.

[Daniel M. Combs, Note, Costos v. Coconut Island 

Corp.: Creating a Vicarious Liability Catchall Under 

the Aided-by-Agency-Relation Theory, 73 U. Colo. L. 

Rev. 1099, 1105 (2002).]
A-3372-18 26

The Restatement Third entirely eliminated the "aided-by-agency" 

doctrine of vicarious liability by adopting § 7.03(2), which states:

A principal is subject to vicarious liability to a third 

party harmed by an agent's conduct when

(a) . . .

(b) as stated in § 7.08, the agent commits 

a tort when acting with apparent authority 

in dealing with a third party on or 

purportedly on behalf of the principal.

[Restatement Third, § 7.03(2).]

The accompanying comments make clear the Restatement Third's intention and 

reasoning. 

This Restatement does not include "aided in 

accomplishing" as a distinct basis for an employer's 

. . . vicarious liability. The purposes likely intended 

to be met by the "aided in accomplishing" basis are 

satisfied by a more fully elaborated treatment of 

apparent authority and by the duty of reasonable care 

that a principal owes to third parties with whom it 

interacts through employees and other agents. See § 

7.05.

[Id. § 7.08 cmt. b.] 

Courts have split on the continued vitality of the "aided-by-agency" exception 

to an employer's nonliability in light of the Restatement Third. Compare

Pearce v. Werner Enters., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 3d 948, 954–57 (D. Neb. 2015)

(discussing history of disagreements regarding the scope of the clause, its 
A-3372-18 27

elimination from the Restatement Third, and predicting that the Nebraska 

Supreme Court would not adopt the aided-by-agency rule, which "has proven 

contentious and difficult to apply, and has been disavowed by its creators "), 

with Peña, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 1130–35 (predicting New Mexico Supreme 

Court would continue to follow the aided-by-agency rule "where the 

tortfeasor's relationship with his employer gives him 'extraordinary power' 

over his victim" (quoting Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48, 61 (Vt. 2004))). 

Our Court has never applied the aided-by-agency exception to employer 

nonliability in any circumstance other than those remedial statutes designed to 

eradicate workplace discrimination and harassment, to protect conscientious 

employees, or to protect children from abuse by those in loco parentis. We 

need not anticipate whether the Court would apply the exception in other 

circumstances. Other jurisdictions that have applied the doctrine outside such 

situations have done so only if the employee-tortfeasor was in a position to 

exercise unique power over the victim. See Sherman v. State Dep't of Pub. 

Safety, 190 A.3d 148, 154–55 (Del. 2018) (holding that "if a police officer 

makes a valid arrest and then uses that leverage to obtain sex from his arrestee, 

his misconduct need not fall within the scope of his employment . . . to trigger 

his employer's liability" given "the unique, coercive authority entrusted in . . . 

police under Delaware law"); Spurlock v. Townes, 368 P.3d 1213, 1216–17 
A-3372-18 28

(N.M. 2016) (applying the theory to a corrections officer); Doe, 853 A.2d at 

60–67 (applying the theory to sexual assault by a police officer, based in part 

on the "extraordinary power that a law enforcement officer has over a 

citizen"). These limitations, together with the American Law Institute's 

repudiation of the doctrine in the Restatement Third, convinces us the aidedby-agency exception to employer nonliability does not apply to the facts of 

this case. 

(ii)

That leaves plaintiff's claim that Fred's apparent authority provides a 

basis for defendant's vicarious liability under Restatement § 219 (2)(d). We 

disagree. 

First, as the Restatement's commentary makes clear, vicarious liability 

for an employee's torts committed outside the scope of employment is limited 

to "situations in which the principal's liability is based upon conduct which is 

within the apparent authority of a servant." Restatement, § 219 cmt. e 

(emphasis added). In Jean-Charles v. Perlitz, the district court applied 

Connecticut law to consider whether the defendants were vicariously liable for 

the sexual abuse of school children by their employee, Perlitz, who was the 

school's founder. 937 F. Supp. 2d 276, 279–81 (D. Conn. 2013). In 

dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for vicarious liability, and addressing § 
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219(2)(d), the court noted "Connecticut courts have consistently declined to 

apply the doctrine of apparent authority in tort cases, notwithstanding the 

principles of agency set forth in the Restatement (Second)." Id. at 286. More 

importantly, the court held "the allegations of the complaint taken as a whole 

do not support a plausible inference that the moving defendants held out 

Perlitz as authorized to engage in sexual exploitation of the plaintiffs." Id. at 

287 (emphasis added). Here, plaintiff seeks to hold defendant vicariously 

liable for Fred's sexual assaults, committed not only outside the scope of his 

employment but outside the apparent authority conferred on Fred by defendant 

and represented as such to plaintiff to make repairs at the Commercial Avenue 

property.

As to vicarious liability for the torts of an employee based on apparent 

authority, the Restatement Third provides:

A principal is subject to vicarious liability for a 

tort committed by an agent in dealing or 

communicating with a third party on or purportedly on 

behalf of the principal when actions taken by the agent 

with apparent authority constitute the tort or enable 

the agent to conceal its commission.

[Id. at § 7.08 (emphasis added).]

Critically, in explaining the contours of apparent authority, the Restatement 

Third clarifies: "Apparent authority holds a principal accountable for the 

results of third-party beliefs about an actor's authority to act as an agent when 
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the belief is reasonable and is traceable to a manifestation of the principal." 

Restatement Third, § 2.03 cmt. c (emphasis added).

The commentary to § 7.08 explains:

The torts to which this section applies are those in 

which an agent appears to deal or communicate on 

behalf of a principal and the agent's appearance of 

authority enables the agent to commit a tort or conceal 

its commission. Such torts include fraudulent and 

negligent misrepresentations, defamation, tortious 

institution of legal proceedings, and conversion of 

property obtained by an agent purportedly at the 

principal's direction.

[Restatement Third, § 7.08 cmt. a.]

The commentary also explains the rationale behind the rule.

Apparent-authority doctrine thus focuses on the 

reasonable expectations of third parties with whom an 

agent deals. This focus is inapposite to many 

instances of tort liability. . . . [A]pparent authority . . . 

is operative in explaining a principal's vicarious 

liability when a third party's reasonable belief . . . 

stems from a manifestation made by the principal and 

it is through statements or dealings that the agent acts 

tortiously.

[Id. cmt. b (emphasis added).]

The commentary makes clear there must be some nexus between the 

principal's manifestation of authority and the agent's tortious conduct.

A principal is not subject to liability under the 

rule stated in this section unless there is a close link 

between an agent's tortious conduct and the agent's 

apparent authority. Thus, a principal is not subject to 
A-3372-18 31

liability when actions that an agent takes with 

apparent authority, although connected in some way to 

the agent's tortious conduct, do not themselves 

constitute the tort or enable the agent to make its 

commission. 

[Ibid. (emphasis added).] 

The Reporter's notes to this section of the Restatement Third explain that 

"[a]pparent authority rarely serves as a basis for liability when an 

employee . . . commits an intentional physical tort." Ibid.

The nexus between the employee's authority and the tortious conduct 

that made his employer vicariously liable was clear in Schierts v City of 

Brookfield, 868 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D. Wis. 2012). There, a police officer 

used his position to conduct a motor vehicle record search on behalf of a 

female friend, the plaintiff's ex-wife, in violation the Driver's Privacy 

Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725. Id. at 819. Citing 

Restatement Third § 7.08, the court rejected the city's argument that it could 

not be vicariously liable for its former officer's conduct, holding "there is no 

dispute that [the officer] acted with the apparent authority of the [c]ity . . . 

when he obtained [the plaintiff's] addresses from the Arizona Department of 

Transportation for an impermissible purpose." Id. at 822. 

On the other hand, in construing § 7.08 of the Restatement Third, the 

Supreme Court of Maine concluded that a camp could not be vicariously liable
A-3372-18 32

for the sexual assault of a female camper by a volunteer camp counselor 

months after camp ended. Gniadek v. Camp Sunshine at Sebago Lake, Inc., 11 

A.3d 308, 317 (Me. 2011). Citing the commentary mentioned above and its 

predecessor section, Restatement § 219(2)(d), the court noted that it did not 

"encompass assaultive and threatening conduct by an employee who did not 

purport to act on his employer's behalf." Ibid. (citing Mahar, 823 A.2d at 545–

46). See also Picher v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 974 A.2d 286, 296 

(Me. 2009) (discussing and holding on remand, that the court should consider 

§§ 7.07 and 7.08 of Restatement Third in the context of the plaintiff's limited 

claim that the defendant bishop was vicariously liable for fraudulently 

concealing knowledge of priest's "propensity . . . to commit sexual 

misconduct").

Here, the motion record demonstrated that defendant authorized Fred to 

act as its agent to make repairs and otherwise maintain the Commercial 

Avenue property. That is the only authority that plaintiff and her family could 

have reasonably relied upon in permitting him access or otherwise not 

objecting to his access. To hold defendant vicariously liable for Fred's heinous 

criminal conduct, plaintiff was required to demonstrate that defendant 

provided Fred with more than "merely the opportunity" to commit the crime. 

Peña, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. There was no such proof in this case.
A-3372-18 33

Affirmed.