DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

ROBERT L. BATTLE, JR.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D22-2763

February 23, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for 

Pinellas County; Philip J. Federico, Judge. 

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen Surber, Assistant 

Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Cline, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

Robert L. Battle, Jr., appeals a final order on his motion to correct 

illegal sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). 

We find no error in the postconviction court's conclusion that Battle's life 

sentence without the possibility of release was illegal under the Eighth 

Amendment as established in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) 
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(holding that a life sentence without possibility of parole for a juvenile 

defendant convicted of a nonhomicide offense is unconstitutional). 

However, we reverse the order and remand for the court to hold a 

sentencing hearing on count three to impose a sentence that complies 

with Graham.

Battle was a juvenile when, in 2000, he discharged a firearm and 

caused great bodily harm during an attempted robbery. At a jury trial in 

2001, he was convicted and sentenced for his crimes. Ultimately, after 

several corrections and amendments, Battle was left with a fifteen-year 

sentence with a ten-year minimum mandatory for attempted robbery 

(count two) and a mandatory life sentence for attempted felony murder 

with a firearm (count three), concurrent.

The count three sentence is at issue in this appeal. It resulted from 

application of two different sentencing statutes. First, because the State 

requested and proved that Battle qualified as a Prison Releasee 

Reoffender (PRR), the trial court was required to impose a mandatory 

minimum sentence of life on count three.1 Second, due to the facts of 

the case, the "10-20-Life" law, section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000), 

applied. Under that statute the trial court had discretion to sentence 

Battle to anything between twenty-five years and life imprisonment dayfor-day. It chose to impose life. Thus, Battle's day-for-day life sentence 

was the product of two different sentencing schemes, only one of which 

was nondiscretionary.

1 Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), mandates a life 

sentence as a PRR upon the State's request and proof that the defendant 

qualifies for the enhancement. Subsection (b) of the statute makes that 

PRR life sentence a minimum mandatory, eliminating any chance of early 

release.
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In 2017, Battle filed a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal 

sentence directed to his mandatory life sentence without the possibility 

of parole on count three. He argued that the sentence was a cruel and 

unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment, as the 

Supreme Court held in Graham, and he demanded resentencing.

The postconviction court found that the PRR minimum mandatory 

life sentence under the PRR statute was illegal under Graham. 

Nevertheless, the court ruled that Battle's life sentence must stand and 

that no resentencing was required because the court had no sentencing 

discretion under the PRR statute. Thus, it denied Battle's request to be 

resentenced. Instead, the court endeavored to "harmonize" Graham and 

the PRR statute by ordering that Battle would be entitled to a sentence 

review hearing in the future under section 921.1402(2)(d), Florida 

Statutes (2014). That statute is part of a legislative scheme enacted 

following Graham to ensure that future post-Graham sentences would 

not violate the Eighth Amendment in the manner addressed in Graham.

We fully agree with the postconviction court's conclusion that 

Battle's minimum mandatory life sentence for his nonhomicide crime 

violated the Eighth Amendment. Like the defendant in Graham, "[t]he 

State has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to 

rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed 

while he was a child in the eyes of the law."2 560 U.S. at 79.

However, we conclude that the postconviction court erred in failing 

to conduct a resentencing. In Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5, 8 (Fla. 

2016), the supreme court held that "all juveniles who have sentences 

2 Battle, the State, and the postconviction court all agree that 

Battle's sentence of life imprisonment without any possibility of release is 

illegal. The question for the courts, this one included, is what to do 

about it.
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that violate Graham are entitled to resentencing pursuant to chapter 

2014-220, Laws of Florida, codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401 and 

921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014)." See also Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d 

541, 547 (Fla. 2020) (reaffirming that this statement in Kelsey was 

intended as the court's holding while other statements from Kelsey were 

dicta). Thus, under Kelsey's plain language, Battle is entitled to 

resentencing that accords him the process and consideration of the 

factors set forth in sections 921.1401 and 921.1402. Anything less is 

insufficient.

Because we reverse for a full resentencing, we need not determine 

whether it is possible to harmonize the statutory prohibition against a 

defendant ever being released from a PRR life sentence and Graham's 

specific prohibition against imposing that very sentence for a 

nonhomicide offense committed by a juvenile. Indeed, on remand for 

resentencing, the State may well exercise its discretion to not seek PRR 

sentencing. See § 775.082(9)(a)3 (stating that "the state attorney may

seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee 

reoffender" (emphasis added)). Should the State elect not to pursue PRR 

sentencing enhancement, the sentencing court will have no need to 

determine whether or how to harmonize the PRR statute with Graham. 

Further, the court would have discretion to impose any sentence in the 

range of those authorized by the 10-20-Life statute so long as the facts 

support the application of that statute and the ultimate sentence does 

not violate Graham.

Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
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Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.