Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1707-SC-1723 | March 20, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Vassil M. Marinov

West Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Todd M. Nierman

Bonnie L. Martin

Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & 

Stewart, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Vassil Markov Marinov,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Fiat Chrysler Automotive,

Appellee-Defendant.

March 20, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A05-1707-SC-1723

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Laura Zeman, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D04-1508-SC-2922

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1707-SC-1723 | March 20, 2018 Page 2 of 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, Vassil Marinov (Marinov), appeals the trial court’s denial of 

his motion to correct error which challenged the dismissal of his small claims 

complaint against his employer, Appellee-Defendant, Fiat Chrysler Automotive 

(Fiat), in which Marinov denied the validity of an assignment of wages for 

payment of union dues. 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Marinov presents us with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether 

the small claims court properly granted Fiat’s motion to dismiss concluding that 

Marinov’s claim is preempted.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On July 8, 2013, Marinov started his employment with Fiat pursuant to the 

terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement between the United 

Automobile and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and Fiat. 

This collective bargaining agreement was valid October 2011 through October 

2015. Pursuant to its terms and as a condition of employment, all employees 

were required to be dues-paying members of the UAW. Employees could pay 

their union dues either by a check-off and automatic deduction from their

paycheck or they could elect to pay the UAW directly. Marinov signed a union 

dues check-off form, which explicitly stated the dues requirements and the 

procedure an employee must follow if the employee wants to revoke the dues 
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check-off authorization. As a result of Marinov signing the dues check-off 

form, Fiat began to deduct UAW dues from his paycheck and to forward the 

dues to UAW as required by the collective bargaining agreement. Marinov 

claims that he notified Fiat in September 2013 of his objection to having union 

dues deducted from his paycheck based on religious reasons. However, Fiat 

continued to deduct UAW dues from Marinov’s paycheck.

[5] On August 4, 2015, Marinov filed a Complaint with the small claims court, 

alleging that Fiat improperly deducted union dues from his paychecks, in 

violation of the Indiana Wage Deduction Statute, Ind. Code § 22-2-6-2. On 

December 23, 2015, Fiat filed a motion to dismiss Marinov’s Complaint,

claiming that the small claims court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 

claim as it was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 

151 et seq. and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141, 

et seq. On February 25, 2016, Marinov appeared at a non-evidentiary hearing, 

at the conclusion of which the small claims court entered an order of dismissal. 

On March 21, 2016, Marinov filed a motion to correct error, which was denied 

by the small claims court on the same day. Marinov appealed. 

[6] On June 21, 2016, while the appeal was pending, Marinov filed a Charge 

Against Employer with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). After 

investigation, the NLRB dismissed Marinov’s filing because he completed an 

Authorization for Check-Off of Dues and Initiation Fee form which he has 

never revoked. Upon receiving the decision, Marinov appealed. The NLRB 

denied the appeal, citing the same reasons given previously. 
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[7] On December 29, 2016, this court of appeals remanded the case to the small 

claims court to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to develop jurisdictional 

facts. See Marinov v. Fiat Chrysler Automotive, 2016 WL 7493516 (Ind. Ct. App. 

Dec. 29, 2016). On June 7, 2016, the small claims court conducted an 

evidentiary hearing at which it took sworn testimony to develop jurisdictional 

facts and reaffirmed its dismissal of Marinov’s claims. On June 26, 2017, 

Marinov filed a motion to correct error, which was denied on June 29, 2017.

[8] Marinov now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[9] Marinov appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct error, in which 

he asserted that Fiat improperly deducted union dues from his paycheck. 

Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error for an 

abuse of discretion. City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2010), trans. denied. However, to the extent the issues raised on appeal 

are purely questions of law, our review is de novo. Id. 

[10] Indiana is a so-called “right to work” state, meaning that employees cannot be 

required to join a union as a condition of employment.1

 See I.C. § 22-6-6-8. 

However, Indiana Code section 22-2-6-2 permits an employee to authorize a 

 

1 However, Fiat’s employees would still be required to proceed under the terms of the active collective 

bargaining agreement until it expired in October 2015. This included membership in the union and payment 

of union dues.
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wage assignment as one method of paying union dues. Yet, “[w]hen it is clear 

or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate 

are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair 

labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that the 

state jurisdiction must yield.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 

U.S. 236, 244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). 

[11] As we already acknowledged in our memorandum opinion issued after 

Marinov’s first appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Indiana recently recognized that there is a conflict of law, to some 

extent, between Indiana Code section 22-2-6-2 and federal law regarding dues 

checkoff authorizations:

[T]o the extent that an Indiana law conflicts with federal law 

regarding dues checkoff authorizations, the State law is 

preempted, and [employer] has no obligation to comply with it. 

Indiana’s wage assignment statute requires that all assignments 

of wages be revocable at any time. The assignment of wages for 

union dues, however, is an area that has long been regulated by 

federal law. So regulated, in fact, that there is no room for 

regulation by the states, and laws like Indiana’s wage assignment 

statute are preempted when it comes to dues checkoffs. As a result, 

Indiana’s wage assignment statute does not govern dues checkoff 

authorizations[.]

General Cable Indus. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local 

Union No., 135, 2016 WL 3365133, slip op. at 3, (N.D. Ind. June 17, 2016) 

(internal citations & references omitted) (emphasis added).
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[12] Accordingly, as Marinov signed a valid union dues check-off form and as there 

is no evidence of coercion or lack of consent, this court’s jurisdiction is 

preempted by federal law and, therefore, the small claims court properly 

dismissed Marinov’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2

CONCLUSION

[13] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the small claims court properly dismissed 

Marinov’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

[14] Affirmed.

[15] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur

 

2 We note that to this date Marinov has still not properly notified Fiat and the UAW Local 685 of his 

decision to withdraw from membership in the union. The instructions for the required procedures are set 

forth in the check-off form signed by Marinov in July 2013. Counsel for Fiat has repeatedly informed 

Marinov of the required procedure and the strict time frame in which to do this. During the evidentiary 

hearing before the small claims court, Fiat’s counsel again informed Marinov of the upcoming time frame in 

which he may revoke his union membership.