Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 245 / Wednesday, December 22, 2010 / Notices 80547 

2ADAMS Accession No. ML051670408. 

Authorized by Law 

This exemption would allow the use 

of Optimized ZIRLOTM fuel rod 

cladding material at SURRY. As stated 

above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to 

grant exemptions from the requirements 

of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has 

determined that granting of the 

licensee’s proposed exemption will not 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

Commission’s regulations. Therefore, 

the exemption is authorized by law. 

No Undue Risk to Public Health and 

Safety 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.46 is to establish acceptance criteria 

for adequate ECCS performance. By 

letter dated June 10, 2005, the NRC staff 

issued a safety evaluation (SE) 2

approving Addendum 1 to 

Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP– 

12610–P–A and CENPD–404–P–A, 

‘‘Optimized ZIRLOTM (these topical 

reports are non-publicly available 

because they contain proprietary 

information),’’ wherein the NRC staff 

approved the use of Optimized 

ZIRLOTM as a fuel cladding material. 

The NRC staff approved the use of 

Optimized ZIRLOTM as a fuel cladding 

material based on: (1) Similarities with 

standard ZIRLOTM, (2) demonstrated 

material performance, and (3) a 

commitment to provide irradiated data 

and validate fuel performance models 

ahead of burnups achieved in batch 

application. The NRC staff’s safety 

evaluation for Optimized ZIRLOTM

includes 10 conditions and limitations 

for its use. As previously documented in 

the NRC staff’s review of topical reports 

submitted by Westinghouse Electric 

Company, LLC (Westinghouse), and 

subject to compliance with the specific 

conditions of approval established 

therein, the NRC staff finds that the 

applicability of these ECCS acceptance 

criteria to Optimized ZIRLOTM has been 

demonstrated by Westinghouse. Ring 

compression tests performed by 

Westinghouse on Optimized ZIRLOTM

(NRC-reviewed, approved, and 

documented in Appendix B of WCAP– 

12610–P–A and CENPD–404–P–A, 

Addendum 1–A, ‘‘Optimized ZIRLOTM’’) 

demonstrate an acceptable retention of 

post-quench ductility up to 10 CFR 

50.46 limits of 2200 degrees Fahrenheit 

and 17 percent equivalent clad reacted. 

Furthermore, the NRC staff has 

concluded that oxidation measurements 

provided by the licensee illustrate that 

oxide thickness (and associated 

hydrogen pickup) for Optimized 

ZIRLOTM at any given burnup would be 

less than both zircaloy-4 and ZIRLOTM. 

Hence, the NRC staff concludes that 

Optimized ZIRLOTM would be expected 

to maintain better post-quench ductility 

than ZIRLOTM. This finding is further 

supported by an ongoing loss-of-coolant 

accident (LOCA) research program at 

Argonne National Laboratory, which has 

identified a strong correlation between 

cladding hydrogen content (due to inservice corrosion) and post-quench 

ductility. 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix K, Section I.A.5, 

‘‘Metal-Water Reaction Rate,’’ is to 

ensure that cladding oxidation and 

hydrogen generation are appropriately 

limited during a LOCA and 

conservatively accounted for in the 

ECCS evaluation model. Appendix K 

states that the rates of energy release, 

hydrogen concentration, and cladding 

oxidation from the metal-water reaction 

shall be calculated using the Baker-Just 

equation. Since the Baker-Just equation 

presumes the use of zircaloy clad fuel, 

strict application of the rule would not 

permit use of the equation for 

Optimized ZIRLOTM cladding for 

determining acceptable fuel 

performance. However, the NRC staff 

has found that metal-water reaction tests 

performed by Westinghouse on 

Optimized ZIRLOTM demonstrate 

conservative reaction rates relative to 

the Baker-Just equation and are 

bounding for those approved for 

ZIRLOTM under anticipated operational 

occurrences and postulated accidents. 

Based on the above, no new accident 

precursors are created by using 

Optimized ZIRLOTM; thus, the 

probability of postulated accidents is 

not increased. Also, based on the above, 

the consequences of postulated 

accidents are not increased. Therefore, 

there is no undue risk to public health 

and safety due to using Optimized 

ZIRLOTM. 

Consistent With Common Defense and 

Security 

The proposed exemption would allow 

the use of Optimized ZIRLOTM fuel rod 

cladding material at SURRY. This 

change to the plant configuration has no 

relation to security issues. Therefore, 

the common defense and security is not 

impacted by this exemption. 

Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present 

whenever application of the regulation 

in the particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix 

K to 10 CFR Part 50 is to establish 

acceptance criteria for ECCS 

performance. The wording of the 

regulations in 10 CFR 50.46 and 

Appendix K is not directly applicable to 

Optimized ZIRLOTM, even though the 

evaluations above show that the intent 

of the regulation is met. Therefore, since 

the underlying purposes of 10 CFR 

50.46 and Appendix K are achieved 

through the use of Optimized ZIRLOTM

fuel rod cladding material, the special 

circumstances required by 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(ii) for the granting of an 

exemption from certain requirements of 

10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K exist. 

4.0 Conclusion 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12, the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants VEPCO 

an exemption from certain requirements 

of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K to 10 

CFR Part 50, to allow the use of 

Optimized ZIRLOTM fuel rod cladding 

material, for SURRY, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the 

Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment as published in the 

Federal Register on October 5, 2010 (75 

FR 61528). 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day 

of December 2010. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Joseph G. Giitter, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2010–32144 Filed 12–21–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–400; NRC–2010–0020] 

Carolina Power & Light Company, 

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, 

Unit No. 1; Exemption 

1.0 Background 

Carolina Power & Light Company 

(CP&L, the licensee) is the holder of 

Renewed Facility Operating License No. 

NPF–63, which authorizes operation of 

the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 

(HNP), Unit 1. The license provides, 

among other things, that the facility is 


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80548 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 245 / Wednesday, December 22, 2010 / Notices 

subject to all rules, regulations, and 

orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC, the Commission) 

now or hereafter in effect. The facility 

consists of one pressurized-water 

reactor located in New Hill, North 

Carolina. 

2.0 Request/Action 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Part 73, ‘‘Physical 

protection of plants and materials,’’ 

Section 73.55, ‘‘Requirements for 

physical protection of licensed activities 

in nuclear power reactors against 

radiological sabotage,’’ published as a 

final rule in the Federal Register on 

March 27, 2009, effective May 26, 2009, 

with a full implementation date of 

March 31, 2010, requires licensees to 

protect, with high assurance, against 

radiological sabotage by designing and 

implementing comprehensive site 

security plans. The amendments to 10 

CFR 73.55 published on March 27, 2009 

(74 FR 13926), establish and update 

generically applicable security 

requirements similar to those previously 

imposed by Commission orders issued 

after the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, and implemented by licensees. 

In addition, the amendments to 10 CFR 

73.55 include additional requirements 

to further enhance site security based 

upon insights gained from 

implementation of the post-September 

11, 2001, security orders. 

By letter dated February 24, 2010 

(Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession No. ML093620908), the NRC 

granted an exemption to the licensee for 

three specific items subject to the new 

rule in 10 CFR 73.55, allowing the 

implementation of these items to be 

extended until December 15, 2010. The 

licensee has implemented all other 

physical security requirements 

established by this rulemaking prior to 

March 31, 2010, the required 

implementation date. 

By letter dated September 20, 2010, 

the licensee requested an exemption in 

accordance with 10 CFR 73.5, ‘‘Specific 

exemptions.’’ Specifically, the licensee 

requested an extension of the 

implementation date for one remaining 

item from December 15, 2010, to 

November 30, 2011. Portions of the 

licensee’s September 20, 2010, letter 

contain security-related information 

and, accordingly, a redacted version of 

this letter is available for public review 

in the ADAMS No. ML102650191. The 

licensee requested this exemption to 

allow an additional extension from the 

current implementation date granted in 

the prior exemption to implement one 

remaining item of the requirements that 

involves important physical 

modifications to the HNP, Unit 1 

security system. The licensee identified 

several issues that have delayed the 

work to this point and impacted the 

projected schedule, such as the 

existence of safety-related conduit and 

dedicated safe shut down equipment of 

HNP, Unit 1 within the area where 

important security modifications are 

planned. These issues were revealed as 

the design evolved from the conceptual 

state to a detailed design state and led 

to a significant increase in the project’s 

complexity and scope of tasks to be 

performed. The licensee stated that 

additional time, beyond that previously 

approved, is needed due the extensive 

redesign and review effort that was 

unforeseen at the conceptual design 

stage. Granting an exemption would 

allow the licensee time to complete the 

necessary security modifications to meet 

the regulatory requirements. 

3.0 Discussion of Part 73 Schedule 

Exemption From the March 31, 2010, 

Full Implementation Date 

Pursuant 10 CFR 73.55(a)(1), ‘‘By 

March 31, 2010, each nuclear power 

reactor licensee, licensed under 10 CFR 

Part 50, shall implement the 

requirements of this section through its 

Commission-approved Physical Security 

Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, 

Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Cyber 

Security Plan referred to collectively 

hereafter as ‘security plans.’’’ In 

accordance with 10 CFR 73.5, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 when 

the exemptions are authorized by law, 

and will not endanger life or property or 

the common defense and security, and 

are otherwise in the public interest. 

NRC approval of this exemption 

would allow an additional extension 

from the implementation date granted 

under a previous exemption from 

December 15, 2010, to November 30, 

2011, for one remaining item of the 

three requirements of the final rule. As 

stated above, 10 CFR 73.5 allows the 

NRC to grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR 73. The NRC 

staff has determined that granting of the 

licensee’s proposed exemption would 

not result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

Commission’s regulations. Therefore, 

the exemption is authorized by law. 

In the draft final rule provided to the 

Commission, the NRC staff proposed 

that the requirements of the new 

regulation be met within 180 days. The 

Commission directed a change from 180 

days to approximately 1 year for 

licensees to fully implement the new 

requirements. This change was 

incorporated into the final rule. 

As noted in the final rule, the 

Commission anticipated that licensees 

would have to conduct site-specific 

analyses to determine what changes 

were necessary to implement the rule’s 

requirements, and that changes could be 

accomplished through a variety of 

licensing mechanisms, including 

exemptions. Since issuance of the final 

rule, the Commission has rejected a 

request to generically extend the rule’s 

compliance date for all operating 

nuclear power plants, but noted that the 

Commission’s regulations provide 

mechanisms for individual licensees, 

with good cause, to apply for relief from 

the compliance date (Reference: June 4, 

2009, letter from R.W. Borchardt, NRC, 

to M.S. Fertel, Nuclear Energy Institute 

(ADAMS Accession No. 

ML091410309)). The licensee’s request 

for an exemption is, therefore, 

consistent with the approach set forth 

by the Commission and discussed in the 

June 4, 2009, letter. 

Shearon Harris Schedule Exemption 

Request 

The licensee provided detailed 

information in its letter dated 

September 20, 2010, describing the 

reason and justification for an 

exemption to extend the 

implementation date for the one 

remaining requirement. Additionally, 

the licensee has provided information 

regarding the revised scope for projects 

at HNP, Unit 1 and the impacts on the 

licensee’s ability to meet the current 

implementation date of December 15, 

2010. The existence of safety-related 

conduit and dedicated safe shut down 

(SSD) equipment of HNP, Unit 1 within 

the area where important security 

modifications are planned have delayed 

the work and impacted the projected 

schedule. A direct outside access route 

to the physical construction area has not 

been available due to design basis 

tornado and missile considerations for 

the safety-related conduits and SSD 

equipment. The licensee is now 

pursuing a design solution that will 

allow both temporary and ultimately 

permanent direct outside access to the 

area to ensure that the new plans will 

meet all regulatory requirements. The 

extensive redesign and review efforts 

that were unforeseen at the conceptual 

design stage need additional time 

beyond that previously approved. 

Portions of the September 20, 2010, 

letter contain security-related 

information regarding the site security 

plan, details of specific portions of the 

regulation from which the licensee 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 245 / Wednesday, December 22, 2010 / Notices 80549 

seeks exemption, justification for the 

additional extension request, a 

description of the required changes to 

the physical security systems, and a 

revised timeline with critical path 

activities that would enable the licensee 

to achieve full compliance by November 

30, 2011. The timeline provides dates 

indicating when (1) design activities 

will be completed and approved, (2) the 

exterior missile protection plate will be 

modified for entry, and (3) the new and 

relocated equipment will be installed 

and tested. 

The site-specific information 

provided within the HNP exemption 

request is relative to the requirements 

from which the licensee requested 

exemption and demonstrates the need 

for modification to meet the one specific 

remaining requirement of 10 CFR 73.55. 

The proposed implementation schedule 

depicts the critical activity milestones of 

the security system upgrades; is 

consistent with the licensee’s solution 

for meeting the requirements; is 

consistent with the scope of the 

modifications and the issues and 

challenges identified; and is consistent 

with the licensee’s requested 

compliance date. 

Notwithstanding the proposed 

schedule exemption for this one 

remaining requirement, the licensee will 

continue to be in compliance with all 

other applicable physical security 

requirement as described in 10 CFR 

73.55 and reflected in its current NRCapproved physical security program. By 

November 30, 2011, the HNP physical 

security system will be in full 

compliance with all of the regulatory 

requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, as 

published on March 27, 2009. 

4.0 Conclusion for Part 73 Schedule 

Exemption Request 

The NRC staff has reviewed the 

licensee’s submittals and concludes that 

the licensee has provided adequate 

justification for its request for an 

extension of the previously authorized 

implementation date from December 15, 

2010, with regard to one remaining 

requirement of 10 CFR 73.55, to 

November 30, 2011. This conclusion is 

based on the NRC staff’s determination 

that the licensee has made a good faith 

effort to meet the requirements in a 

timely manner, has sufficiently 

described the reason for the 

unanticipated delays, and has provided 

an updated detailed schedule with 

adequate justification to the additional 

time requested for the extension. 

The long-term benefits that will be 

realized when the security systems 

upgrade is complete justify extending 

the full compliance date with regard to 

the specific requirements of 10 CFR 

73.55 for this particular licensee. The 

security measures that HNP needs 

additional time to implement are new 

requirements imposed by amendments 

to 10 CFR 73.55, as published on March 

27, 2009, and are in addition to those 

required by the security orders issued in 

response to the events of September 11, 

2001. Accordingly, an exemption from 

the March 31, 2010, implementation 

date is authorized by law and will not 

endanger life or property or the common 

defense and security, and the 

Commission hereby grants the requested 

exemption. 

As per the licensee’s request and the 

NRC’s regulatory authority to grant an 

exemption to the March 31, 2010, 

implementation date for the one item 

specified in Attachment 1 of the CP&L 

letter dated September 20, 2010, the 

licensee is required to implement this 

one remaining item and be in full 

compliance with 10 CFR 73.55 by 

November 30, 2011. In achieving 

compliance, the licensee is reminded 

that it is responsible for determining the 

appropriate licensing mechanism (i.e., 

10 CFR 50.54(p) or 10 CFR 50.90) for 

incorporation of all necessary changes 

to its security plans. 

In accordance with 10 CFR 51.32, 

‘‘Finding of no significant impact,’’ the 

Commission has previously determined 

that the granting of this exemption will 

not have a significant effect on the 

quality of the human environment (75 

FR 77919 dated December 14, 2010). 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day 

of December 2010. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Joseph G. Giitter, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2010–32145 Filed 12–21–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–346; NRC–2010–0378] 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power 

Station; Exemption 

1.0 Background 

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 

Company (FENOC, the licensee) is the 

holder of Facility Operating License No. 

NFP–3, which authorizes operation of 

the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, 

Unit 1 (DBNPS). The license provides, 

among other things, that the facility is 

subject to all rules, regulations, and 

orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC, the Commission) 

now or hereafter in effect. 

The facility consists of one 

pressurized-water reactor located in 

Ottawa County, Ohio. 

2.0 Request/Action 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix 

G requires that fracture toughness 

requirements for ferritic materials of 

pressure-retaining components of the 

reactor coolant pressure boundary of 

light-water nuclear power reactors 

provide adequate margins of safety 

during any condition of normal 

operation, including anticipated 

operational occurrences and system 

hydrostatic tests, to which the pressure 

boundary may be subjected over its 

service lifetime; and Section 50.61 

provides fracture toughness 

requirements for protection against 

pressurized thermal shock (PTS) events. 

By letter dated April 15, 2009, 

(Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) 

Accession No. ML091130228), as 

supplemented by letters dated 

December 18, 2009, (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML093570103) and October 8, 2010 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML102861221), 

FENOC proposed exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix G and 10 CFR 50.61, to revise 

certain DBNPS reactor pressure vessel 

(RPV) initial (unirradiated) properties 

using Framatome Advanced Nuclear 

Power Topical Report (TR) BAW–2308, 

Revisions 1A and 2A, ‘‘Initial RTNDT of 

Linde 80 Weld Materials.’’ 

The licensee requested an exemption 

from Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 to 

replace the required use of the existing 

Charpy V-notch (Cv) and drop weightbased methodology and allow the use of 

an alternate methodology to incorporate 

the use of fracture toughness test data 

for evaluating the integrity of the 

DBNPS RPV circumferential beltline 

welds based on the use of the 1997 and 

2002 editions of American Society for 

Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard 

Test Method E 1921, ‘‘Standard Test 

Method for Determination of Reference 

Temperature T0, for Ferritic Steels in the 

Transition Range,’’ and American 

Society for Mechanical Engineering 

(ASME), Boiler and Pressure Vessel 

Code (Code), Code Case N–629, ‘‘Use of 

Fracture Toughness Test Data to 

establish Reference Temperature for 

Pressure Retaining materials of Section 

III, Division 1, Class 1.’’ The exemption 

is required since Appendix G to 10 CFR 

Part 50, through reference to Appendix 

G to Section XI of the ASME Code 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with NOTICES