Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3 

# United Stat es Court of Appeals

For the First C ircuit

No. 04-1382 INGRID CRUZ RAMOS, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. JO ANNE BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge ]
Before Selya, Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges .

Salvador Medina De La Cruz on brief for appellant. H.S. Garcia , United States Attorney, Lisa E. Bhatia , Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Karen B. Burzycki , Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, on brief for appellee.
January 11, 2005-2- Per Curiam . Claimant Ingrid Cruz Ramos ap peals from a decision of the district court upholding the Commissioner's denial of disability and disability insurance benefits under the Soci al Security Act. After carefully reviewing the briefs and record, we affirm the Commissioner's decision.

On appeal, appellant argues that it was error for the Administrative Law Jud ge ("ALJ") to apply the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, in light of the evidence of her nonexertional impairment. Appellant also argues that the Commissioner failed to demonstrate through particularized proof that appellant was capable of performing jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy. We conclude that there is ample support in the record for the ALJ's determination that appellant's mental impairment did not significantly affect her ability to perform the full range of jobs at the relevant exertional level. Although appellant cites treating source evaluations in support of her contention that her mental condition significantly limited her ability to function in
a work setting, the record c ontai ns substantial countervailing evidence. While the evidence shows that appellant was consistently diagnosed with severe depression, she was treated conservatively, demonstratedno s uic idal or homicidal thinking, and there is no recordof any ho spit alization for that condition. Examination-3-

notes consistently indicate that appella nt w as alert, that she demonstratedfair judg ment , and that her orientation, intellect, insight, and memory were adequate. The state agency consultative examining psychiatrist noted tha t , although appellant's flow of thought was slow, it was logical, coherent, and relevant. In addition, appellant herself reported that she got along well with co-workers and supervisors while she was working. The nonexamining state agency psychiatrist and psychologist concluded, based on their review of the medical evidence, that appellant was capable of understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple and detailedinstructions, could sustain attention and concentration for at least two-hour periods, and could complete a normal workday andwork -wee k. Accordingly, the non-examining physicians opined that appellant's mental impairment did not significantly affect her residual functional capacity ("RFC"). These assessm ents and the reports of the consultative examining physicians provide substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination. See Berrios Lopez v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 951 F.2d 427, 431-32 (1st Cir. 1991); Gray v. Heckler , 760 F.2d 369, 373 (1st Cir. 1985).

To the ext ent ap pellant contends that her treating psychiat rist' s opinion was entitled to controlling weight, her argument fails because the treating physician's opinion is inconsistent with the bulk of the medical evidence and is not-4-

supportedby anyprogress notes or clinical or laboratory findings. The AL J wa s justified in according the treating psychiatrist's report little weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). To t h e extent appellant suggests that t he ALJ should have obtained the testimonyof a medical expert to resolve any apparent con fli cts between the treating physicians' assessments a nd t he opinions of the state agency physicians, her argument is unavailing because RFC is not a medical assessment, but is ins tead an administrative finding reserved to the Commiss ion er. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). Moreover, as discussed above, it was appropriate for the ALJ to rely on the reports of the consultative and non-examining physicians in assessing appellant' s RF C. See Evangelista v. Secre tary of He alth & Human Servs. , 826 F.2d 136, 144 (1st Cir. 1987) (ALJ may piece together releva nt med ical facts from the findings and opinions of multiple physicians). Since the consultative and non-examining physicians concluded that appellant sufferedfrom mild limitations at most, the ALJ's RFC determination appears to be sufficiently supported by the record.

Having determinedthat the ALJ's finding that appellant's RFC was not significantly affected by nonexertional limitations, it is apparent that application of the Grid was appropriate and that
no 'particularized proof' of appellant's specific vocational capabilities or other vocational evidence was required. See Ortiz , 890 F.2d at 524 (reliance on Grid appropriate if nonexertional-5-

limitation reduces claimant's occupational base only marginally); Lugo , 794 F.2d at 17 (similar). Accordingly, in light of appellant's age, education, and past work experience, the ALJ properly found that Medical-Voc at ional Rule 203.19 directed a finding that appellant was not disabled. Affirmed . See 1s t Cir. R. 27(c).