82464 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices 

1Montgomery is also known as ‘‘Yuri 

Malinkovski.’’ 

2Since August 21, 2001, the Act has been in 

lapse, and the President, through Executive Order 

13,222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR 2001 Comp. 783 

(2002)), which has been extended by successive 

Presidential Notices, the most recent being that of 

August 12, 2010 (75 FR 50681 (Aug. 16, 2010)), has 

continued the Regulations in effect under the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 

U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (2000)). The unlawful conduct 

at issue here occurred in 2003. The Regulations 

governing the violations at issue are found in the 

2003 version of the Code of Federal Regulations (15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2003)). The 2010 Regulations 

govern the procedural aspects of this case. 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

[Docket No. 08–BIS–0004] 

Yuri I. Montgomery, Respondent; Final 

Decision and Order 

This matter is before me upon a 

Recommended Decision and Order 

(‘‘RDO’’) issued by the Administrative 

Law Judge (‘‘ALJ’’), and a settlement 

proposal subsequently submitted by the 

parties. 

In a charging letter filed on July 1, 

2008, the Bureau of Industry and 

Security (‘‘BIS’’) alleged that Respondent 

Yuri I. Montgomery (‘‘Respondent’’ or 

‘‘Montgomery’’) 1 had committed 

fourteen violations of the Export 

Administration Regulations (currently 

codified at 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2010) 

(‘‘Regulations’’)), issued pursuant to the 

Export Administration Act of 1979, as 

amended (50 U.S.C. app. 2401–2420) 

(the ‘‘EAA’’ or ‘‘Act’’),2 by participating 

in transactions involving the export or 

attempted export from the United States 

of items subject to the Regulations, 

while knowing that he was subject to a 

BIS order denying his export privileges. 

On January 15, 2010, BIS unilaterally 

withdrew Charge 10, leaving thirteen 

charges for consideration by the ALJ. 

Charges 1–7 of the Charging Letter 

allege that: 

As described in further detail in the 

attached schedule of violations, which is 

incorporated herein by reference, on seven 

occasions between on or about July 2, 2003, 

and on or about October 8, 2003, 

Montgomery took actions prohibited by a BIS 

order denying export privileges under 

§ 766.25 of the Regulations (Denial Order). 

Specifically, Montgomery carried on 

negotiations concerning, ordered, bought, 

sold and/or financed various items exported 

or to be exported from the United States that 

are subject to the Regulations, and/or 

benefited from transactions involving items 

exported or to be exported from the United 

States that are subject to the Regulations. At 

the time Montgomery engaged in the 

described actions, his export privileges had 

been denied under the Regulations by a 

Denial Order dated September 11, 2000, and 

published in the Federal Register on 

September 22, 2000 (65 FR 57,313). Under 

the terms of the Denial Order, Montgomery 

‘‘may not directly or indirectly, participate in 

any way in any transaction involving any 

[item] exported or to be exported from the 

United States, that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity subject 

to the Regulations, including * * * 

[c]arrying on negotiations concerning, or 

ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, 

delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or in any other 

activity subject to the Regulations; or * * * 

[b]enefiting in any way from any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or in any other 

activity subject to the Regulations.’’ That 

Denial Order is effective until January 22, 

2009, and continued in force at the time of 

the aforementioned actions taken by 

Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery 

committed seven violations of Section 

764.2(k) of the Regulations. 

Charges 8–9, and 11–14 allege that 

Montgomery acted with knowledge of 

violations of the Denial Order in 

connection with the items exported or 

to be exported from the United States to 

Macedonia, as follows: 

As described in further detail in the 

attached schedule of violations, on seven 

occasions between on or about July 2, 2003, 

and or about October 8, 2003, Montgomery 

carried on negotiations concerning, ordered, 

bought, sold and on or financed various 

items subject to the Regulations with 

knowledge that a violation of an Order issued 

under the Regulations had occurred, was 

about to occur, or was intended to occur in 

connection with the items. Specifically, 

Montgomery carried on negotiations 

concerning, ordered, bought, sold and/or 

financed various items that were exported 

from the United States to a Macedonian 

company with knowledge that he was or 

would be violating a Denial Order imposed 

against him dated September 11, 2000, and 

published in the Federal Register on 

September 22, 2000 (65 FR 57,313). 

Montgomery knew that he was the subject of 

the Denial Order because, inter alia, he had 

been provided notice of the Denial Order 

when it issued in September 2000, and he 

had on October 24, 2000, written to then-BIS 

Under Secretary for Export Enforcement 

Reinsch to request reinstatement of his 

‘‘export privileges denied on September 11, 

2000 * * *.’’ That request for reinstatement 

had been denied by the Under Secretary on 

December 21, 2000, and the Denial Order 

continued in force at the time of 

aforementioned actions taken by 

Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery 

committed seven violations of § 764.2(e) of 

the Regulations. 

The schedule of violations attached to 

the Charging Letter provided additional 

detail as to each of the seven 

transactions involved, including the 

dates of the transactions, the items 

involved and their values, and the 

consignee. 

On October 28, 2010, the ALJ issued 

an RDO in accordance with § 766.17 of 

the Regulations. The RDO provides a 

detailed summary of the procedural 

background and pre-RDO case activity, 

including the seven stays or extensions 

of time sought or stipulated to by 

Respondent during the course of the 

litigation below. Montgomery filed his 

answer to the Charging Letter on April 

2, 2009, and pursuant to part 766 of the 

Regulations was permitted to take 

discovery during the litigation and to 

present evidence and rebuttal evidence 

concerning the charges and the defenses 

he raised. Because no party had 

demanded a hearing as provided in 

§ 766.6(c) of the Regulations, the RDO 

issued on the record by the ALJ in 

accordance with § 766.6(c) and § 766.15. 

The ALJ served the RDO on the 

parties as required in § 766.17(b)(2). On 

November 10, 2010, however, the ALJ 

issued a Supplemental Certificate of 

Service, stating that the RDO initially 

served on the Respondent on October 

28, 2010, via overnight carrier, had been 

returned as undeliverable, and that he 

was attempting service of the RDO a 

second time. On November 17, 2010, I 

received a delivery confirmation from 

the ALJ showing that Respondent 

received a copy of the RDO on 

November 11, 2010. 

The delivery confirmation that I 

received on November 17, 2010, 

demonstrated that the ALJ had fulfilled 

his obligation under Section 

766.17(b)(2) of the Regulations to certify 

the full record for my review in 

accordance with Section 766.22. As 

such, and in the interest of avoiding 

confusion and ensuring that the parties 

had the full time allotted to them by the 

Regulations to make any submissions, I 

ordered that the deadlines for the 

parties’ various filings be established 

using the November 17, 2010 date as the 

date the RDO was issued. Thereafter, 

Respondent Montgomery retained new 

legal counsel and subsequently filed, 

and I granted, three unopposed motions 

seeking a stay of the proceedings to 

allow the parties to conduct settlement 

negotiations. 

As part of the settlement agreement, 

Respondent Montgomery admits to the 

violations of the Regulations alleged in 

Charges 1–9 and 11–14 of the Charging 

Letter. In addition, Montgomery has 

consented to my affirming the RDO, as 

modified with regard to the RDO’s 

Recommended Sanction in order, 

instead, to impose the sanctions agreed 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices 82465 

to by Montgomery and set forth in the 

parties’ settlement proposal. 

I have the authority, pursuant to 

§ 766.22(c) of the Regulations, to affirm, 

modify or vacate the RDO. Where a case 

is pending before me pursuant to 

§ 766.22, I also have the authority, 

under § 766.18(b)(2), to approve or reject 

a settlement proposal submitted to me 

by the parties. 

Based on my review of the record, 

including the RDO and the settlement 

proposal submitted by the parties, I 

hereby affirm the RDO, including its 

findings of fact and conclusions of law 

concerning Respondent Montgomery’s 

seven violations of Section 764.2(k) of 

the Regulations and his six violations of 

Section 764.2(e); except that I hereby 

modify the RDO’s recommended 

sanctions such that the sanctions 

imposed against Montgomery are 

consistent with the parties’ settlement 

proposal, which I hereby approve. 

Accordingly, it is therefore ordered: 

First, that a civil penalty of 

$340,000.00 is assessed against 

Montgomery. Of this civil penalty, 

$17,500 shall be paid by Montgomery to 

the U.S. Department of Commerce in 12 

installments as follows: $1,458 no later 

than January 1, 2011; $1,458 no later 

than the first day of each month from 

February, 2011 through and including 

November, 2011; and $1,462 shall be 

due no later than December 1, 2011. 

Payment of the remaining $322,500 

shall be suspended for a period of ten 

(10) years from the date of this Order, 

provided that during the period of 

suspension, Montgomery has committed 

no violation of the Act, or any 

regulation, order, or license issued 

thereunder, and has made full and 

timely payment of the $17,500 as set 

forth above. If any of the twelve 

installment payments is not fully and 

timely made, any remaining scheduled 

installment payments and the remaining 

$322,500 shall become due and owing 

immediately. 

Second, pursuant to the Debt 

Collection Act of 1982, as amended (31 

U.S.C. 3701–3720E (2000)), the civil 

penalty owed under this Order accrues 

interest as more fully described in the 

attached Notice, and, if payment is not 

made by the due dates specified herein, 

Montgomery will be assessed, in 

addition to the full amount of the civil 

penalty and interest, a penalty charge 

and administrative charge. 

Third, for a period of thirty (30) years 

from the date of this Order, Yuri I. 

Montgomery, a/k/a Yuri Malinkovski, 

with a last known address of 2912 10th 

Place West, Seattle, WA 98119, and 

when acting for or on behalf of 

Montgomery, his representatives, 

assigns, agents or employees 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as 

‘‘Denied Person’’), may not participate, 

directly or indirectly, in any way in any 

transaction involving any commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity 

subject to the Regulations, including, 

but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, License Exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or in any 

other activity subject to the Regulations; 

or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the Regulations, or in 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. 

Fourth, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf 

of the Denied Person any item subject to 

the Regulations; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

the Denied Person of the ownership, 

possession, or control of any item 

subject to the Regulations that has been 

or will be exported from the United 

States, including financing or other 

support activities related to a 

transaction whereby the Denied Person 

acquires or attempts to acquire such 

ownership, possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from the Denied Person of 

any item subject to the Regulations that 

has been exported from the United 

States; 

D. Obtain from the Denied Person in 

the United States any item subject to the 

Regulations with knowledge or reason 

to know that the item will be, or is 

intended to be, exported from the 

United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the Regulations that 

has been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by the Denied 

Person, or service any item, of whatever 

origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by the Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item 

subject to the Regulations that has been 

or will be exported from the United 

States. For purposes of this paragraph, 

servicing means installation, 

maintenance, repair, modification or 

testing. 

Fifth, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

§ 766.23 of the Regulations, any person, 

firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to the Denied 

Person by affiliation, ownership, 

control, or position of responsibility in 

the conduct of trade or related services 

may also be made subject to the 

provisions of the Order. 

Sixth, that this Order does not 

prohibit any export, reexport, or other 

transaction subject to the Regulations 

where the only items involved that are 

subject to the Regulations are the 

foreign-produced direct product of U.S.- 

origin technology. 

Seventh, that Montgomery shall have 

an opportunity to request that the Under 

Secretary reinstate his export privileges 

after a period of ten (10) years from the 

date of the Order, provided that 

Montgomery has committed no 

violation of the Act, or any regulation, 

order, or license issued thereunder prior 

to the submission of his request for 

reinstatement. BIS shall in its sole 

unreviewable discretion determine 

whether to grant, or deny, in whole or 

in part Montgomery’s request for 

reinstatement of his export privileges. 

Eighth, that the final Decision and 

Order shall be served on Montgomery 

and on BIS and shall be published in 

the Federal Register. In addition, the 

ALJ’s Recommended Decision and 

Order, except for the section related to 

the Recommended Order, shall also be 

published in the Federal Register. 

This Order, which constitutes the final 

agency action in this matter, is effective 

immediately. 

Dated: December 21, 2010. 

Eric L. Hirschhorn, 

Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry 

and Security. 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that, on this 21st day 

of December, 2010, I have served the 

foregoing DECISION AND ORDER 

signed by Eric L. Hirschhorn, Under 

Secretary of Commerce for Industry and 

Security, in the matter of Yuri I. 

Montgomery (Docket No: 08–BIS–0004) 

to be sent via United Parcel Service 

postage pre-paid to: 

Douglas N. Jacobson, Esq., Law Offices 

of Douglas N. Jacobson, PLLC, 1725 I 

Street, NW., Suite 300, Washington, 

DC 20006. Facsimile: 202–688–2782. 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2
82466 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices 

3For proceedings involving violations not 

relating to Part 760 of the Export Enforcement 

Regulations, 15 CFR 766.17(b) and (b)(2) prescribe 

that the Administrative Law Judge’s decision be a 

‘‘Recommended Decision and Order.’’ The 

violations alleged in this case are found in Part 764. 

Therefore, this is a ‘‘Recommended Decision and 

Order.’’ That section also prescribes that the 

Administrative Law Judge make recommended 

findings of fact and conclusions of law that the 

Under Secretary for Export Administration, Bureau 

of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, must affirm, modify or vacate. 15 CFR 

766.22. The Under Secretary’s action is the final 

decision for the U.S. Commerce Department. 15 

CFR 766.22(e). 

4The Regulations are currently codified in the 

Code of Federal Regulations at 15 CFR parts 730– 

774 (2008). The violations charged occurred in 

2003. The Regulations governing the violations here 

are found in the 2003 version of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (15 CFR parts 730–774 (2003)). The 

2008 Regulations govern the procedural aspects of 

this case. 

5Title 50 U.S.C. app. 2401–2420 (2000). Since 

August 21, 2001, the Act has been in lapse and the 

President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 

17, 2001 (3 CFR 2001) Comp. 783 (2002)), which 

has been extended by successive Presidential 

Notices, the most recent being that of August 15, 

2007, 72 FR 46137 (Aug. 16, 2007), has continued 

the Regulations in effect under the Emergency 

Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706 (2000)) 

(‘‘IEEPA’’). 

(By Facsimile and United Parcel 

Service.) 

Eric Clark, Joseph Jest, John Masterson, 

Attorneys for Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Office of Chief Counsel for 

Industry and Security, U.S. 

Department of Commerce, Room 

HCHB 3839, 14th Street and 

Constitution Ave., NW., Washington, 

DC 20230. Facsimile: 202–482–0085. 

(Served via hand delivery.) 

ALJ Docketing Center, Attention: 

Hearing Docket Clerk, 40 S. Gay 

Street, Room 412, Baltimore, MD 

20212–4022. (By United Parcel 

Service.) 

A copy of this Order has also been 

sent via United Parcel Service to: 

Yuri I. Montgomery, 2912 10th Place 

West, Seattle, WA 98119. (By United 

Parcel Service.) 

Andrea A. Monroe, 

Office of the Under Secretary for 

Industry and Security. 

Recommended Decision and Order 3

Issued by: Hon. Walter J. Brudzinski, 

Administrative Law Judge. 

Issued: October 28, 2010. 

On behalf of Bureau of Industry and 

Security: 

John T. Masterson, Esq., Chief Counsel 

for Industry and Security, Joseph V. 

Jest, Esq., Chief of Enforcement and 

Litigation, Parvin R. Huda, Esq., 

Senior Counsel, Eric Clark, Esq., 

Attorney Advisor, Attorneys for 

Bureau of Industry and Security, 

Office of Chief Counsel for Industry 

and Security, United States 

Department of Commerce, Room H– 

3839, 14th Street & Constitution 

Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. 

On behalf of Respondent: 

Yuri I. Montgomery, Pro se, 2912 10th 

Place West, Seattle, WA 98119. 

Table of Contents 

Preliminary Statement 

Charging Letter 

Schedule of Violations—Yuri Montgomery 

Denial Order of September 11, 2000 

Jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard 

Administrative Law Judges. 

Pre-Decisional Motion Practice 

Outstanding Motion 

Determination of Respondent’s Failure To 

Comply with Discovery 

Authority for Sanction for Failure To 

Comply With Discovery 

Sanction on Respondent’s Refusal to 

Disclose Discovery Materials 

Paragraph IV of the Denial Order 

Time for Decision 

Recommended Findings of Fact 

General Findings and Background 

Charges 1 and 8, 61 pairs of Magnum boots 

Charges 2 and 9, firing range clearing 

devices 

Charge 3 

Charges 4 and 11 

Charges 5 and 12 

Charges 6 and 13 

Charges 7 and 14 

Discussion 

Burden of Proof 

Respondent’s Prior Criminal Conviction 

Denial Order 

Law 

Applying the Denial Order and the Law to 

the Findings of Fact 

Ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 

Law 

Affirmative Defenses 

Respondent’s Two Objections 

Respondent’s Remaining Affirmative 

Defenses 

Recommended Sanction 

Recommended Order 

Attachment A—Summary of Pre-Decision 

Motion Practice 

Activity Prior To Respondent’s Answer to 

Charging Letter—Case to be Adjudicated 

on the Record 

The November 10, 2009 Memorandum and 

Order 

Attachment B—Lists of Exhibits 

Attachment C—Rulings on Proposed 

Findings of Fact 

Attachment D—Notice to the Parties 

Regarding Review by the Under 

Secretary 

Certificate of Service 

Preliminary Statement 

On July 1, 2008, the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (BIS) charged 

Respondent, Yuri Montgomery, with 14 

counts of violating two (2) separate code 

sections of the Export Administration 

Regulations (EAR).4 The EAR is issued 

under the authority of the Export 

Administration Act (EAA) of 1979.5

Charging Letter 

The fourteen (14) Count Charging 

Letter alleges seven (7) violations of 

EAR code section 764.2(k), ‘‘Acting 

Contrary to the Terms of a Denial 

Order,’’ and seven (7) violations of EAR 

code section 764.2(c), ‘‘Acting with 

Knowledge of a Violation’’ as follows: 

Charges 1–7, 15 CFR 764.2(k): Acting 

Contrary to the Terms of a Denial Order 

As described in further detail in the 

attached schedule of violations, which is 

incorporated herein by reference, on seven 

occasions between on or about July 2, 2003, 

and on or about October 8, 2003, 

Montgomery took actions prohibited by a BIS 

order denying export privileges under 

Section 766.25 of the Regulations (Denial 

Order). Specifically, Montgomery carried on 

negotiations concerning, ordered, bought, 

sold and/or financed various items exported 

or to be exported from the United States that 

are subject to the Regulations, and/or 

benefitted from transactions involving items 

exported or to be exported from the United 

States that are subject to the Regulations. At 

the time Montgomery engaged in the 

described actions, his export privileges had 

been denied under the Regulations by a 

Denial order dated September 11, 2000, and 

published in the Federal Register on 

September 22, 2000 (65 FR 57,313). Under 

the terms of the Denial Order, Montgomery: 

May not directly or indirectly, participate in 

any way in any transaction involving an 

(item) exported or to be exported from the 

United States, that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity subject 

to the Regulations, including * * * 

[c]arrying on negotiations concerning, or 

ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, 

delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations; or * * * 

[b]enefitting in any way from any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations.’’ That Denial 

Order is effective until January 22, 2009, and 

continued in force at the time of the 

aforementioned actions taken by 

Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery 

committed seven violations of Section 

764.2(k) of the Regulations. 

Charges 8–14, 15 CFR 764.2(e): Acting with 

Knowledge of a Violation 

As described in further detail in the 

attached schedule of violations, on seven 

occasions between on or about July 2, 2003, 

and [on] or about October 8, 2003, 

Montgomery carried on negations 

concerning, ordered, bought, sold and/or 

financed various items subject to the 

Regulations with knowledge that a violation 

of an Order issued under the Regulations had 

occurred, was about to occur, or was 

intended to occur in connection with the 

items. Specifically, Montgomery carried on 

negotiations concerning, ordered, bought, 

sold and/or financed various items that were 


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6BIS withdrew Charge Ten on January 15, 2010. 

7Through an internal organizational order, the 

Department of Commerce changed the name of 

Bureau of Export Administration to Bureau of 

Industry and Security. See, Industry and Security 

Programs: Change of Name, 67 FR 20,630 (Apr. 26, 

2002). Pursuant to the Savings Provision of the 

Order, ‘‘Any actions undertaken in the name of or 

on behalf of the Bureau of Export Administration, 

whether taken before, on, or after the effective date 

of this rule, shall be deemed to have been taken in 

the name of or on behalf of the Bureau of Industry 

and Security.’’ Id. at 20,631. 

exported from the United States to a 

Macedonian company with knowledge that 

he was or would be violating a Denial Order 

because, inter alia, he had been provided 

notice of the Denial Order when it issued in 

September 2000, and he had on October 24, 

2000, written to then-BIS Under Secretary for 

Export Enforcement Reinsch to request 

reinstatement of his ‘‘export privileges denied 

on September 11, 2000 * * * .’’ That request 

for reinstatement had been denied by the 

Under Secretary on December 21, 2000, and 

the Denial Order continued in force at the 

time of aforementioned actions by 

Montgomery. In so doing, Montgomery 

committed seven violations of Section 

764.2(e) of the Regulations. 

The Charging Letter further detailed 

Charges 1–7 as violations of 15 CFR 

764.2(k) and Charges 8–14 as violations 

of 15 CFR 764.2(e) asfollows: 

SCHEDULE OF VIOLATIONS—YURI MONTGOMERY

Date Charges Items Value Violation Consignee 

7/2/03 ................................. 1, 8 61 prs Magnum boots ................................................... $3,355 764.2(k); 

764.2(e) 

Micei, Int’l 

7/18/03 ............................... 2, 9 2 firing range clearing Devices ..................................... $1,136 764.2(k);

764.2(e) 

Micei, Int’l 

8/5/03 ................................. 3, 10 6 10,800 pairs of boots .................................................... RFQ 764.2(k); 

764.2(e) 

Micei, Int’l 

8/5/03 ................................. 4, 11 45 pairs Oxford shoes, 5 Remote strobe tubes ........... $2,562 764.2(k); 

764.2(e) 

Micei, Int’l 

8/13/03 ............................... 5, 12 150 shirts ...................................................................... $1,744 764.2(k); 

764.2(e) 

Micei, Int’l 

9/9/03 ................................. 6, 13 2 load binder,1 ratchet strap, 1 binder chain, 1 safety 

shackle.

$147.53 764.2(k); 

764.2(e) 

Micei, Int’l 

10/8/03 ............................... 7, 14 Items in Order #25473620/017 ..................................... $5,723.31 764.2(k); 

764.2(e) 

Micei, Int’l 

The Charging Letter advised the 

maximum civil penalty is up to the 

greater of $250,000 per violation or 

twice the transaction value that forms 

the basis of the violation, plus a denial 

of export privileges and/or exclusion 

from practice before BIS. The Charging 

Letter concluded that failure to answer 

the charges within thirty (30) days will 

be treated as a default, and, although 

Respondent is entitled to an agency 

hearing, he must file a written demand 

for one with his answer. 

Denial Order of September 11, 2000 

The pleadings, discovery, and 

affidavits in the administrative record 

reflect that on January 22, 1999, 

Respondent, Yuri I. Montgomery, also 

known as Yuri I. Malinskovski, was 

convicted in U.S. District Court for the 

District of Columbia of knowingly and 

willfully exporting and causing the 

export of prohibited items to Macedonia 

and Slovenia without applying for and 

obtaining the required export licenses in 

violation of the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act and the Export 

Administration Act of 1979. 

Pursuant to Section 11(h) of the 

Export Administration Act and 5 CFR 

766.25 (2000) the Director, Office of 

Exporter Services, Bureau of Export 

Administration, issued an order (Denial 

Order) on September 11, 2000 denying 

Respondent export privileges effective 

through January 22, 2009.7

The Denial Order states, in pertinent 

part, Respondent ‘‘may not, directly or 

indirectly, participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any * * * [item] 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States, that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity 

subject to the Regulations, or in any 

other activity subject to the 

Regulations.’’ The Denial Order detailed 

non-exclusive examples of conduct 

included in the broad prohibition 

including ‘‘[c]arrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving an item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or in any 

other activity subject to the 

Regulations.’’ (65 FR 57,313 (Sept. 22, 

2000)). Paragraph IV of the Denial Order 

states, ‘‘[t]his Order does not prohibit 

any export, reexport, or other 

transaction subject to the Regulations 

where the only items involved that are 

subject to the Regulations are the 

foreign-produced direct product of U.S.- 

origin technology.’’ (Id.). Respondent’s 

pleadings claim that the exported items 

in question fall into this exception. 

Jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard 

Administrative Law Judges 

The Charging Letter states the U.S. 

Coast Guard is providing Administrative 

Law Judge services for these 

proceedings. Accordingly, BIS 

forwarded the Charging Letter to the 

U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law 

Judge Docketing Center for adjudication. 

The ALJ Docketing Center subsequently 

issued its Notice of Docket Assignment 

to the Respondent and BIS. The 

administrative file reflects that at the 

time of the Charging Letter and 

continuing to the present, Memoranda 

of Agreement (MOA) and Office of 

Personnel Management letters issued in 

accordance with 5 U.S.C. 3344 and 5 

CFR 930.230 authorize the detail of U.S. 

Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges 

to adjudicate BIS cases involving export 

control regulations on a reimbursable 

basis. 

Pre-Decisional Motion Practice 

Throughout the course of this 

proceeding, Respondent filed dozens of 

motions, including numerous motions 

to stay. Respondent eventually filed his 

Answer ‘‘under protest, duress, and 

compulsion of the Order Denying 

Respondent’s Motion for More Definite 

Statement.’’ Respondent’s Answer 

included 19 affirmative defenses. 

Neither Respondent nor BIS demanded 

a hearing. Therefore, the undersigned 


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82468 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices 

issued an Order stating the matter will 

be adjudicated on the record in 

accordance with 15 CFR 766.6(c). A 

summary of Respondent’s motions, BIS’ 

replies, and the undersigned’s decisions 

on those motions is detailed in 

Attachment A. 

Outstanding Motion 

Respondent filed his Declaration in 

Support of Defenses on September 22, 

2010, seven (7) months after the 

February 24, 2010 deadline for filing his 

evidence in support of his defenses. The 

Declaration included 43 attachments 

and a letter dated April 29, 2010 stating 

Respondent has suffered severe mental 

stress as a result of these proceedings. 

Respondent’s Declaration explained his 

relationship with Micei International, 

summarized the events that occurred 

prior to the issuance of the Denial 

Order, and explanations of the attached 

exhibits. The majority of the evidence 

submitted supported Respondent’s 

assertion that he did not violate the EAR 

because the country of origin for some 

of the items in question was China. 

BIS filed its response on October 7, 

2010, objecting to Respondent’s 

Declaration. Specifically, the Agency 

argues that the submission of this 

Declaration along with its attachments 

are in direct violation of this court’s 

discovery orders; that all exhibits except 

Ex. 7 are dated prior to the discovery 

deadline and are thus untimely and 

should not be considered. BIS also 

argues that several of the exhibits 

submitted by Respondent raise 

authenticity and accuracy concerns, 

including the fact that two of the e-mails 

sent by separate people contained 

identical wording and grammatical 

mistakes. Furthermore, the exhibits in 

question do not provide any probative 

value because the items’ country of 

origin is not the issue because the items 

were exported from the United States. 

BIS requests the undersigned disregard 

Respondent’s Declaration and the 

attached exhibits because the filling 

further demonstrates Respondent’s 

refusal to comply with the ALJ’s orders 

and the rules that govern this 

proceeding. 

After careful review of Respondent’s 

Declaration and BIS’ response, the 

undersigned rejects Respondent’s 

Declaration as untimely because it was 

filed approximately 7 months after his 

evidence was due and violates 

discovery procedures. Respondent was 

repeatedly accorded stays and 

additional time to file evidence and 

submissions. Respondent repeatedly 

ignored these deadlines. Even if the 

undersigned accepted Respondent’s 

Declaration and exhibits, they would 

carry no probative value. As discussed 

in detail below, all items in question 

were shipped from the United States in 

violation of the EAR. Accordingly, 

Respondent’s Declaration in Support of 

Defenses and its attached exhibits is 

rejected. 

Determination on Respondent’s Failure 

To Comply With Discovery 

On June 19, 2009, BIS served all 

discovery requests on Respondent but 

Respondent replied only to BIS’s 

Requests for Admission on July 6, 2009. 

He did not respond to BIS’s 

Interrogatories and Requests for 

Production of Documents. Instead, 

Respondent asserted preliminary 

objections on June 30, 2009 and 

renewed objections on September 3, 

2009. In my Order of August 20, 2009, 

Respondent was again ordered to 

respond to the interrogatories and 

document requests. To date, he has not 

replied to BIS’s Interrogatories and 

Requests for Production of Documents, 

nor did he submit copies of his 

discovery requests as previously 

ordered to determine if enforcement is 

appropriate. 

Authority for Sanction for Failure To 

Comply With Discovery 

The Discovery Rules at 15 CFR 766.9 

(d) provide as follows: 

Enforcement. The administrative law judge 

may order a party to answer designated 

questions, to produce specified documents or 

things or to take any other action in response 

to a proper discovery request. If a party does 

not comply with such an order, the 

administrative law judge may make a 

determination or enter any order in the 

proceeding as the judge deems reasonable 

and appropriate. The judge may strike related 

charges or defenses in whole or in part or 

may take particular facts relating to the 

discovery request to which the party failed or 

refused to respond as being established for 

purposes of the proceeding in accordance 

with the contentions of the party seeking 

discovery. [Emphasis added.] In addition, 

enforcement by a district court of the United 

States may be sought under section 12(a) of 

the EAA. 

On October 26, 2009, BIS filed its 

Supplemental Submission in Response 

to the October 15, 2009 Order that the 

parties submit copies of their respective 

discovery requests to the undersigned to 

determine if enforcement pursuant to 

Section 766.9(d) of the Regulations is 

appropriate. In its Supplemental 

Submission, BIS claims, among other 

things, that Respondent’s Answer to 

BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision 

contained information and references to 

documents upon which Respondent is 

relying that should have been disclosed 

in BIS’s discovery requests but were not 

disclosed. BIS avers that Respondent 

‘‘should be barred from offering as 

evidence or otherwise seeking to make 

use of this material, as well as any other 

responsive material that he failed to 

produce, whether responsive documents 

or information that is responsive to any 

interrogatory.’’ (BIS’s October 26, 2009 

Supplemental Submission in Response 

to October 15, 2009 Order, at 3.) 

Specifically, the information in 

question is a Declaration from Sanja 

Milic of Micei and a purported e-mail 

from Range Systems. BIS argues that the 

e-mail contains information that was 

responsive to its discovery requests 

pertaining to Respondent’s Defense No. 

16 found in on page 3 of ‘‘Declaration of 

Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to 

Bureau of Industry and Security’s 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen’’ 

dated October 12, 2009. Defense No. 16 

states, ‘‘[w]hen I contacted Maintenance 

Products, Inc. to inquire of the 

availability of the products which are 

listed in the [sic] charges 6 and 13 of the 

Charging Letter herein, I was informed 

by Maintenance Products, Inc. that all of 

the products Micei was interested in 

purchasing were made in China and 

were very cheap and I did not even 

inquire of their prices.’’ BIS further 

averred that the Court should strike 

Respondent’s defense number 16 and 

any argument or purported evidence 

related to that defense. BIS ended with 

the recommendation that the Court 

postpone ruling on any discovery 

sanction until after ruling on the Motion 

for Summary Decision because that 

Motion can be resolved without 

discovery sanctions. The undersigned 

also notes that Respondent’s Affirmative 

Defense No. 16 filed on April 2, 2009 

with his Corrected Answer to Charging 

Letter avers ‘‘[t]he goods subject to the 

Charging Letter are of foreign origin and 

are therefore not subject to the 

prohibitions of the purported Denial 

Order.’’ Respondent’s affirmative 

defense no. 11, filed in his original 

Answer, reads ‘‘[t]he goods subject to the 

Charging Letter are of foreign origin and 

are therefore not subject to the Charging 

Letter.’’ 

The undersigned denied BIS’s Motion 

for Partial Summary Decision. BIS asked 

in its January 15, 2010 ‘‘Memorandum 

on Evidence Submitted in Support of 

Charges’’ that Respondent be barred 

from offering as evidence or otherwise 

seeking to make use of any responsive 

material that he failed to produce, 

whether the information is a responsive 

document or answer to an interrogatory. 

In addition, BIS asks the Court to strike 

Respondent’s Defense No. 16 and any 

argument or purported evidence related 


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to that defense pursuant to 15 CFR 

766.9(d). 

The November 10, 2009 memorandum 

and Order stated that the undersigned 

will make a determination or enter an 

Order deemed reasonable and 

appropriate in accordance with 15 CFR 

766.9(d) on the issue of Respondent’s 

continued refusal to comply with BIS’s 

Interrogatories and Requests for 

Production of Documents despite 

previous Orders to do so. That 

determination follows: 

Sanction on Respondent’s Refusal To 

Disclose Discovery Materials 

Respondent’s arguments, e-mail, and 

Declaration contain information that 

should have been disclosed during 

discovery. Respondent failed to disclose 

this information despite being ordered 

to do so and then used those 

undisclosed discovery materials in his 

defense against BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision. His arguments that 

the items in question are foreign made 

and therefore excluded from the Denial 

Order still remain in his affirmative 

defense filed with his Answer. 

Therefore, in consideration of the 

forgoing and in accordance with 15 CFR 

766.9(d), the following are stricken from 

the record: (1) Respondent’s Defense No. 

16 in his ‘‘Declaration of Yuri 

Montgomery in Opposition to Bureau of 

Industry and Security’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to Charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen’’ dated October 

12, 2009; (2) the Declaration from Sanja 

Milic of Micei; (3) the e-mail from Range 

Systems; (4) Affirmative Defense No. 16 

in Respondent’s Corrected Answer to 

Charging Letter which states ‘‘[t]he 

goods subject to the Charging Letter are 

of foreign origin and are therefore not 

subject to the prohibitions of the 

purported Denial Order;’’ (5) Affirmative 

Defense No. 11 which states, ‘‘[t]he 

goods subject to the Charging Letter are 

of foreign origin and are therefore not 

subject to the Charging Letter;’’ and (6) 

any argument related to that basic 

defense. 

Paragraph IV of the Denial Order 

Even if Respondent complied with 

discovery as previously ordered, and if 

the arguments and documents were 

found credible and give appropriate 

weight, they do not show that the items 

in question fall into the Paragraph IV 

exception to the Denial Order based 

only on their purported foreign origin. 

Paragraph IV of the Denial Order states, 

‘‘[t]his Order does not prohibit any 

export, reexport, or other transaction 

subject to the Regulations where the 

only items involved that are subject to 

the Regulations are the foreignproduced direct product of U.S.-origin 

technology.’’ This language does not 

amend the specific language in 

Paragraph I of the Denial Order which 

prohibits any participation of any kind 

in the export from the United States of 

any items subject to the Regulations. 

Paragraph I prohibits participation in 

transactions involving items exported or 

to be exported from the United States. 

Items located in the United States are 

subject to the Regulations, regardless of 

where they are produced. See, 15 CFR 

734.3(a). Since the items in this case 

were located in the United States at the 

time of Respondent’s transactions and 

were not subject to the exclusive 

jurisdiction of another agency, 

Respondent was prohibited from 

participating in those transactions. The 

items in question are subject to the EAR 

as shown below: 

Respondent claims that the Paragraph 

IV exemption applies if the items in 

question were manufactured abroad. As 

shown above, items subject to the EAR 

include items located in the United 

States regardless of where they have 

been manufactured or produced. In this 

case, jurisdiction is based on the fact 

that the items in question were located 

in the United States at the time of the 

transactions or the attempted or 

intended transactions, regardless of 

their origin. Once jurisdiction of the 

items in question is established based 

on the location of the items in the 

United States, such as in this case, it is 

not necessary to consider any other 

basis. The origin of an item must be 

determined only if the item happens to 

be located abroad at the time of the 

transaction. In this case, the items were 

located in the United States. 

In summary, Paragraph IV of the 

Denial Letter provides a narrow 

exception to transactions involving only 

items subject to the Regulations by 

reason of the foreign direct product rule 

which does not apply here because the 

items in question were not located 

abroad. In this case, jurisdiction over 

these items exists under Section 734.3. 

The items were subject to the 

Regulations and were exported or 

attempted or intended to be exported 

from the United States. Therefore, 

Respondent’s affirmative defense that 

foreign origin of the goods exempts 

them from the Regulations is rejected 

even in the absence of sanction. 

Time for Decision 

Title 15 CFR 766.17(d) provides that 

administrative enforcement proceedings 

not involving Part 760 of the EAR shall 

be concluded within one year from 

submission of the Charging Letter unless 

the Administrative Law Judge extends 

such period for good cause shown. In 

light of the attached detailed activity in 

these proceedings evidencing several 

stays, the time consumed to adjudicate 

disputed discovery issues, and the 

additional time consumed to adjudicate 

numerous motions, the undersigned 

finds that good cause exists for not 

concluding these proceedings within 

the time prescribed and that these 

proceedings are extended to October 28, 

2010. This matter is now ripe for 

decision. 

As detailed in Attachment A, the 

parties have raised many issues and the 

undersigned has ruled on most of them 

in previously issued Orders. This 

Recommended Decision and Order also 

rules on the affirmative defenses and 

any outstanding issues. As noted above, 

BIS filed its Notice of Withdrawal of 

Charge 10, concerning the 10,800 pairs 

of boots described in the charging 

Letter’s Schedule of Violations. 

Therefore, seven (7) counts of section 

764.2(k) and six (6) counts of Section 

764.2(e) of the Regulations remain for 

decision. After careful review of the 

entire record, I find that BIS has proved, 

by the preponderance of reliable, 

probative, and credible evidence, on 

seven (7) occasions, from July 2, 2003 

and October 8, 2003, that Respondent 

violated EAR code Section 764.2(k), 

‘‘Acting Contrary to the Terms of a 

Denial Order,’’ and on six (6) occasions 

that Respondent violated EAR code 

Section 764.2(e), ‘‘Acting with 

Knowledge of a Violation.’’ 

Recommended Findings of Fact 

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 

of Law are based on a thorough and 

careful analysis of the documentary 

evidence, exhibits, and the entire record 

as a whole. 

General Findings and Background 

1. Respondent Yuri I. Montgomery, 

also known as Yuri I. Malinkovski was 

convicted in the U.S. District Court for 

the District of Columbia of violating the 

International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706 (1991 

& Supp. 2000) and the Export 

Administration Act of 1979, as amended 

(currently codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 

2401–2420 (1991 & Supp. 2000)). (BIS 

Ex. B) 

2. Specifically, Respondent’s 

conviction was for knowingly and 

willingly exporting and causing the 

export of U.S.-origin stun guns to 

Macedonia and U.S. origin laser gun 

sights to Slovenia without applying for 

and obtaining the required export 

licenses from the Department of 

Commerce, and of knowingly and 

willfully exporting and causing the 


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82470 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices 

8Through an internal organizational order, the 

Department of Commerce changed the name of 

Bureau of Export Administration to Bureau of 

Industry and Security. See, Industry and Security 

Programs: Change of Name, 67 FR 20,630 (Apr. 26, 

2002). Pursuant to the Savings Provision of the 

Order, ‘‘Any actions undertaken in the name of or 

on behalf of the Bureau of Export Administration, 

whether taken before, on, or after the effective date 

of this rule, shall be deemed to have been taken in 

the name of or on behalf of the Bureau of Industry 

and Security.’’ Id. at 20,631. 

export of U.S.-origin PAGST military 

helmets to Slovenia and U.S.-origin 

handcuffs, laser gun sights, and laser 

mountings to Macedonia without 

applying for and obtaining the required 

export licenses from the Department of 

Commerce. (BIS Ex. B) 

3. Section 11(h) of the Export 

Administration Act of 1979 provides 

that, at the discretion of the Secretary of 

Commerce, no person convicted of 

violating the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act or the Export 

Administration Act, or certain other 

provisions of the U.S. Code, shall be 

eligible to apply for or use any export 

license issued pursuant to, or provided 

by, the Export Administration Act or the 

Export Administration Regulations for a 

period of up to 10 years from the date 

of the conviction. (BIS Ex. B) 

4. Pursuant to Sections 766.25 and 

750.8(a) of the Regulations and upon 

notification that a person has been 

convicted of violating the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act or the 

Export Administration Act, the Director, 

Office of Exporter Services, in 

consultation with the Director, Office of 

Export Enforcement, shall determine 

whether to deny that person’s export 

privileges for a period up to 10 years 

from the date of conviction and shall 

also determine whether to revoke any 

license previously issued to such 

person. (BIS Ex. B) 

5. Having received notice of 

Respondent’s conviction and after 

providing Respondent with notice and 

opportunity to make written submission 

before issuing an Order denying his 

export privileges, the Director, Office of 

Exporter Services, Bureau of Export 

Administration, issued an Order (Denial 

Order) on September 11, 2000 denying 

Respondent export privileges effective 

through January 22, 2009 and 

publishing it in the Federal Register.8

(65 FR 57,313 (Sept. 22, 2000) (BIS Ex. 

B)) 

6. Paragraph I of the Denial Order 

states that ‘‘Until January 22, 2009, Yuri 

I. Montgomery, also known as Yuri I. 

Malinkovski, [home address redacted] 

may not, directly or indirectly, 

participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any Commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘item’) 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States, that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity 

subject to the Regulations * * *. ’’ (BIS 

Ex. B, at paragraph I) 

7. The Denial Order specifically listed 

as non-exclusive examples of prohibited 

participation, ‘‘[c]arrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the Regulations, or in any 

other activity subject to the Regulations 

* * *.’’ (BIS Ex. B) 

8. The Denial Order also provided 

that Respondent was prohibited from 

‘‘[b]enefiting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the Regulations, or in 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. (BIS Ex. B) 

9. Respondent received actual notice 

of the Denial Order by letter on or about 

September 13, 2000 from BIS that 

included a copy of the Denial Order. 

(BIS Ex. E, page 4, Request/Response 3; 

BIS Ex. F) 

10. On October 24, 2000, Respondent 

wrote to then Under Secretary William 

Reinsch requesting reinstatement of his 

‘‘export privileges denied on September 

11, 2000.’’ (BIS Ex. E, page 4, Request/ 

Response 5; BIS Ex. G) 

11. Under Secretary Reinsch denied 

the request on Dec. 21, 2000. (BIS Ex. 

H) 

12. Respondent had notice of the 

Denial Order no later than October 24, 

2000. (BIS Ex. E, pages 4–16, Requests/ 

Responses Nos. 2, 5, 7m, 8m, 9h, 10m, 

11m, 12m, and 13m) 

13. Respondent knew that the Denial 

Order was in effect at all times from 

September 11, 2000 until January 22, 

2009. (BIS Ex. E, page 4, Request/ 

Response 2) 

14. Respondent knew that he was 

subject to the Denial Order at the time 

of each transaction at issue. (BIS Ex. E, 

pages 4–16, Requests/Responses Nos. 2, 

5, 7m, 8m, 9h, 10m, 11m, 12m, and 

13m) 

15. Respondent encouraged Micei ‘‘to 

use my credit card for Micei purchases 

as much as possible as it would allow 

me to accumulate United Airline miles 

through the use of my United Visa 

credit card * * *’’ (October 12, 2009 

Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in 

Opposition to BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to Charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen, at paragraph 

12) 

16. On several occasions, Respondent 

‘‘made inquiries for Micei of the 

availability on some of the products 

purchased for Micei.’’ (Id. at paragraph 

14) 

17. Respondent benefited from all the 

purchases by stating, ‘‘[t]he charges 

made with my credit card directly 

attribute to the ‘violations’ alleged Micei 

in the Charging Letter herein amount to 

approximately $15,000, which allowed 

me to accumulate approximately 

$15,000 [sic] miles with United 

Airlines.’’ (BIS Ex. J, page 3, paragraph 

18; BIS Ex. E, page 6, admission 7j) 

The preceding Findings of Fact are 

incorporated in the following, specific 

Findings of Fact as set for below: 

Charges 1 and 8, 61 Pairs of Magnum 

boots 

18. On or about June 9, 2003 

Respondent placed an order for 61 pairs 

of Magnum boots with the Modesto, 

California Division of Hi-Tec Retail, 

Inc., manufacturer and retailer of 

footwear. (BIS Exhibit E, page 4, 

admission 7a; BIS Exhibits L and M) 

19. The issuing bank declined 

Hi-Tec’s initial attempt to charge 

Montgomery’s credit card for the order 

which caused R. Uber at Hi-Tec to seek 

assistance from Respondent. (BIS Ex. O). 

20. Micei employee Sanja Milic 

advised Hi-Tec via e-mail that according 

to Respondent, VISA had put a security 

block on its payment which he had 

already removed so that Hi-Tec can 

charge the amount without any 

problem. (BIS EX. P) 

21. With the payment issue resolved, 

Respondent paid for the boots with his 

credit card. (BIS Ex. Q; BIS Ex. 5 at page 

4, admission 7b) 

22. Micei reimbursed Respondent for 

purchasing the boots. (BIS Ex. E, page 5, 

admission 7i(iii)) 

23. Respondent intended the boots, 

which are subject to the Regulations, to 

be exported to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E at 

page 7, admission 7e; BIS Exhibits N, R, 

and S; BIS Ex. I, 15 CFR 734.3(a)) 

24. The boots were exported from the 

United States to Macedonia on or about 

July 2, 2003. (BIS Exhibits R and S) 

25. The boots are items subject to the 

Regulations. (15 CFR 734.3(a); BIS Ex. I) 

26. At the time of the transaction, 

Respondent knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E at Request/ 

Response 7m) 

Charges 2 and 9, Firing Range Clearing 

Devices 

27. At Micei’s request, Respondent 

telephonically contacted Range 

Systems, a New Hope, Minnesota 

manufacturer of firing range equipment, 

‘‘to inquire of the availability and price 


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9Remote strobe tubes are components of the 

flashing emergency lights found on vehicles such as 

police cars. 

for their product * * *.’’ (October 12, 

2009 Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in 

Opposition to BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to Charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen, paragraph 20) 

28. In a July 8, 2003 e-mail inquiry 

sent to Range Systems describing 

himself as Micei’s regional office, 

Respondent stated that ‘‘currently we 

have one [bid] which calls for various 

products including 5–10 clearing traps 

such as your RRI Guardian (GDN) model 

* * *. Please quote the price of your 

RRR GUARDIAN (GDN) model and e/m 

me a complete price list if possible 

* * *.’’ (BIS Ex. T, page 2) 

29. Range Systems provided the 

requested price quote in a reply e-mail 

sent on July 11, 2003. (BIS Ex. T, 

page 1) 

30. Respondent placed an order for 

two of the gun clearing devices via 

e-mail sent on July 15, 2003. (BIS Ex. E, 

page 6, admission 8a; BIS Exhibits T, U, 

and V) 

31. Respondent paid Range Systems, 

Inc. for the gun clearing devices with 

his VISA credit card. (BIS Ex. T; BIS Ex. 

E, page 6, admission 8b) 

32. Respondent directed Ranges 

Systems to export the gun clearing 

devices to Micei in Macedonia via their 

freight forwarder, requesting that he be 

advised of the weight and size of the 

boxes via e-mail with a copy to Micei 

representatives. (BIS Ex. T, page 1) 

33. Micei reimbursed Respondent for 

the purchase of the gun clearing 

devices. (BIS Ex. E, page 7, admission 

8i) 

34. On or about July 18, 2003, Range 

Systems exported the gun clearing 

devices from the United States to 

Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 7, 

admission 8e; BIS Ex. T; X, and W) 

35. The gun clearing devices were 

manufactured in the United States. (BIS 

Ex. Y, Z, and AA) 

36. The gun clearing devices are items 

subject to the Regulations. (BIS Ex. I; 15 

CFR 734.3(a)) 

37. At the time of the transaction, 

Respondent knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 8, 

admission 8k and 8m) 

38. Respondent benefited from the 

purchase of the gun clearing devices. 

(BIS Ex. E, page 7, admission 8j) 

Charge 3 

39. On August 5, 2003, Respondent 

sent an e-mail to Galls, Inc., a 

Lexington, Kentucky based distributor 

of police equipment, military 

equipment, and apparel, identifying 

himself as ‘‘Micei Int’l U.S. Operations’’ 

and requesting a price quotation for 

10,800 pairs of shoes and boots. (BIS Ex. 

E, page 8, admission 9a; BIS Ex. BB, EE, 

and FF) 

40. Respondent intended to export the 

boots and shoes from the United States 

to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 8, 

admission 9d; BIS Ex. BB) 

41. Respondent carried on 

negotiations concerning the shoes and 

boots, stating in an e-mail to Galls ‘‘our 

[Micei] HQ will be putting up the 

performance bond at 20% in cash. 

Therefore, please make sure you quote 

the best possible price so you can so we 

can win this one, too.’’ (BIS Ex. BB) 

42. The boots and shoes are items 

subject to the Regulations (BIS Ex. I; 

15 CFR 734.3(a)) 

43. Respondent knew he was subject 

to the Denial Order on or about August 

5, 2003, at or about the time he 

requested a quotation. (BIS Ex. E, page 

9, admission 8f) 

Charges 4 and 11 

44. Micei’s account number at Galls is 

2547320. (BIS Ex. CC) 

45. On or about August 5, 2003, 

Respondent contacted Galls to pay for 

order # 25473620/016, previously 

placed. (BIS Ex. DD) 

46. The items in that order number 

consist of shoes and remote strobe 

tubes.9 (BIS Ex. EE and FF) 

47. In Respondent’s August 5, 2003 

e-mail to Galls, he provided his credit 

card account information to pay for the 

$2,562.44 order, stating that Micei 

advised him to pay for the items with 

his VISA card. (BIS Ex. DD and BIS Ex. 

E, page 9, admission 10b) 

48. Micei reimbursed Respondent for 

purchasing the shoes and remote strobe 

tubes. (BIS Ex. E, page 10, admission 

10i(iii)) 

49. Respondent intended to export the 

shoes and strobe tubes from the United 

States to Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 9, 

admission 10e; BIS Exhibits EE, FF, and 

GG) 

50. The shoes and remote strobe tubes 

were exported from Galls’s Inc. in 

Lexington, Kentucky, United States to 

Macedonia on or about September 5, 

2003. (BIS Exhibits EE and GG) 

51. The shoes and remote strobe tubes 

are items subject to the Regulations. 

(BIS Ex. I; 15 CFR 734.3) 

52. At the time of the transaction, 

Respondent knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 11, 

admission 10m) 

53. Respondent benefited from the 

VISA card purchase of the shoes and 

remote strobe tubes from Galls by 

earning credit towards the purchase of 

airline tickets. (BIS Ex. E, page 10, 

admission j and finding of fact 17 above) 

Charges 5 and 12 

54. On July 31, 2003, Respondent 

placed on order for 150 golf/polo shirts 

from Save On Promotional Products of 

Sandy, Oregon. (BIS Ex. HH and II) 

55. Upon receiving Respondent’s 

order, Save On ordered the shirts from 

its supplier, Tri-Mountain Gear Corp. of 

Baldwin Park, California. (BIS Ex. LL) 

56. Respondent ordered the shirts for 

or on behalf of Micei and intended them 

to be exported from the United States to 

Macedonia. (Ex. E at Request/Response 

11e); BIS Ex. HH: BIS Ex. II; BIS Ex. KK; 

BIS Ex. LL; BIS Ex. MM; BIS Ex. BIS 

NN) 

57. Respondent paid for the order 

with his credit card. (BIS Ex. JJ; BIS Ex. 

E at Request/Response 11b) 

58. Micei reimbursed Respondent for 

purchasing the shirts. (BIS Ex. E, page 

12, admission 11i(iii)) 

59. The shirts were exported from the 

United States to Macedonia on or about 

August 13, 2003. (BIS Ex. MM; BIS Ex. 

NN) 

60. The shirts are items subject to the 

Regulations. (BIS Ex. I; (15 CFR 

734.3(a)) 

61. At the time of the transaction, 

Respondent knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 12, 

admission 11m) 

62. Respondent benefited from 

purchasing the shirts from a U.S. 

supplier using his VISA card by earning 

credit towards the purchase of airline 

tickets. (BIS Ex. E, page 12, admission 

11j; Finding of Fact 17, above) 

Charges 6 and 13 

63. Respondent ordered two load 

binders, one ratchet strap, one binder 

chain, and one safety shackle from 

Maintenance Products, Inc. of Lowell, 

Indiana, on or about September 9, 2003. 

(BIS Ex. E, page 13, admission 12a; BIS 

Ex. OO and QQ) 

64. Respondent paid Maintenance 

Products, Inc. for the load binders, 

ratchet strap, binder chain, and safety 

shackle, including freight charges of 

$21.52, with his VISA credit. (BIS Ex. E, 

page 13, admission 12b; BIS Ex. PP and 

QQ) 

65. Micei reimbursed Respondent for 

purchasing the binder, ratchet strap, 

binder chain, and safety shackle. (BIS 

Ex. E, page 14, admission 12i(iii)) 

66. As Respondent intended, the load 

liners, ratchet strap, binder chain, and 

safety shackle exported from the United 

States to Macedonia on or about 

September 15, 2003. (BIS Ex. E, page 13, 

admission e; BIS Ex. RR and SS) 

67. The load binders, binder chain, 

and safety shackle were manufactured 


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in the United States. (BIS Ex. TT and 

UU) 

68. The load binders, ratchet strap, 

binder chain and safety shackle are 

items subject to the Regulations. (BIS 

Ex. I and 49 CFR 734.3(a)) 

69. At the time of the transaction, 

Respondent knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 14, 

admission 12m; BIS Ex. B, paragraph I 

and BIS Ex. F, paragraph I on page 3 of 

the Order Denying Export Privileges) 

70. By charging the purchase from the 

U.S. supplier of the load binders, ratchet 

strap, binder chain and safety shackle 

on his VISA card, Respondent 

benefitted by earning credit towards the 

purchase of airline tickets. (BIS Ex. E, 

page 14, admission 12j; see also, 

Finding of Fact 17, above) 

Charges 7 and 14 

71. In October 2003, Respondent, 

describing himself as ‘‘Micei Int’l 

(N/America Op’s), placed an order for 

uniform pants with Galls (Galls # 

5473720/017). (BIS Ex. VV) 

72. Again describing himself as 

representing Micei, Respondent paid for 

the order with his VISA credit card. (BIS 

Ex. E, page 14, admission 13b; BIS Ex. 

WW) 

73. The uniform pants were to be 

shipped from Galls’ supplier, Liberty 

Uniform of Spartanburg, South Carolina, 

to Micei in Macedonia. (BIS Ex. E, page 

15, admission 13e; BIS Ex. XX) 

74. Micei reimbursed Respondent for 

purchasing the uniform pants. (BIS Ex. 

E, pages 15 and 16, admission 13i(iii)) 

75. The uniform pants are items 

subject to the Regulations. (BIS Ex. I; 15 

CFR 734.3(a)) 

76. At the time of the transaction, 

Respondent knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. (BIS Ex. E, page 16, 

admission 13m) 

77. Respondent benefitted from his 

purchase of the uniform pants with his 

VISA credit card by earning airline 

frequent flier miles. (BIS Ex. E, page 16, 

admission 13j; see also, Finding of Fact 

17, above) 

Discussion 

Burden of Proof 

The burden in this proceeding lies 

with the Bureau of Industry and 

Security to prove the charges instituted 

against the Respondents by a 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and substantial evidence. Steadman v. 

SEC., 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981); In the 

Matter of Abdulmir Madi, et al, 68 FR 

57406 (October 3, 2003). In the simplest 

terms, the Agency must demonstrate 

that the existence of a fact is more 

probable than its nonexistence. Concrete 

Pipe & Products v. Construction 

Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 

622 (1993). 

Respondent’s Prior Criminal Conviction 

The evidence shows that on January 

22, 1999, Respondent, Yuri I. 

Montgomery, also known as Yuri I. 

Malinkovski, was convicted in the U.S. 

District Court for the District of 

Columbia of knowingly and willingly 

exporting and causing the export of U.S. 

origin stun guns to Macedonia and U.S. 

origin laser gun sights to Slovenia 

without applying for and obtaining the 

required export licenses from the 

Department of Commerce, and of 

knowingly and willfully exporting and 

causing the export of U.S. origin PAGST 

military helmets to Slovenia and U.S. 

origin handcuffs, laser gun sights, and 

laser mountings to Macedonia without 

applying for and obtaining the required 

export licenses from the Department of 

Commerce, in violation of the 

International Emergency Economic 

Powers and the Export Administration 

Act of 1979. 

Denial Order 

The Export Administration Act of 

1979 provides that no person convicted 

of violating the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act or the Export 

Administration Act, among other 

provisions of the U.S. Code, shall be 

eligible for any export license for a 

period of up to 10 years from the date 

of the conviction. Therefore, pursuant to 

the Regulations at Sections 766.25 and 

750.8(a) and upon notification to 

Respondent and an opportunity to be 

heard, the Director, Office of Exporter 

Services, Bureau of Export 

Administration, issued an Order (Denial 

Order) on September 11, 2000 denying 

Respondent export privileges effective 

through January 22, 2009. 

In pertinent part, the Denial Order 

states at paragraph I that ‘‘Until January 

22, 2009, Yuri I Montgomery, also 

known as Yuri I. Malinkovski * * * 

may not, directly or indirectly, 

participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any * * * [item] 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States, that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity 

subject to the Regulations.’’ The Denial 

Order detailed that Respondent may 

not, directly or indirectly, participate in 

any way in any transaction involving 

any * * * [item] exported or to be 

exported from the United States, that is 

subject to the Regulations, or in any 

other activity subject to the Regulations 

or * * * [b]benefitting in any way from 

any transaction involving any item 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the 

Regulations.’’ 

The Denial Order detailed nonexclusive examples of conduct included 

in the broad prohibition including 

‘‘[c]arrying on negotiations concerning, 

or ordering, buying, receiving, using, 

selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 

forwarding, transporting, financing, or 

otherwise servicing in any way, any 

transaction involving an item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the Regulations, or in 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations.’’ 

On October 24, 2000, Respondent 

requested that his exporting privileges 

be reinstated; the Under Secretary 

denied his request on December 21, 

2000. Therefore, Respondent had notice 

of the Denial Order no later than 

October 24, 2000. He also knew it was 

in effect at all times from September 11, 

2000 until January 22, 2009, which 

covers each transaction at issue. 

Law 

The Regulations define ‘‘Acting 

contrary to be terms of a denial order’’ 

at 15 CFR 764.2(k) as follows: ‘‘No 

person may take any action that is 

prohibited by a denial order. See 

§ 764.3(a)(2) of this part.’’ This is a strict 

liability offense. 

The Regulations define ‘‘Acting with 

knowledge of a violation’’ at 15 CFR 

764.2(e) as follows: ‘‘No person may 

order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, 

sell, loan, dispose of, transfer, transport, 

finance, forward, or otherwise service, 

in whole or in part, any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States, 

or that is otherwise subject to the EAR, 

with knowledge that a violation of the 

EAA, the EAR, or any order, license or 

authorization issued thereunder, has 

occurred, is about to occur, or is 

intended to occur in connection with 

the item.’’ 

The Regulations define Knowledge at 

15 CFR 772.1 under ‘‘Definitions of 

terms as used in the Export 

Administration Regulations (EAR).’’ 

* * * * * 

‘‘Knowledge. Knowledge of a 

circumstance (the term may be a variant, 

such as ‘‘know,’’ ‘‘reason to know,’’ or 

‘‘reason to believe’’) includes not only 

positive knowledge that the 

circumstance exists or is substantially 

certain to occur, but also an awareness 

of a high probability of its existence or 

future occurrence. Such awareness is 

inferred from evidence of the conscious 

disregard of facts known to a person and 

is also inferred from a person’s willful 

avoidance of facts. This definition does 

not apply to part 760 of the EAR 


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(Restrictive Trade Practices or 

Boycotts).’’ 

Applying the Denial Order and the Law 

to the Findings of Fact 

As detailed in the Findings of Fact, 

Charges 1 and 8 reflect that Respondent 

placed an order with Hi-Tec Retail, Inc. 

of Modesto, California Division, for 61 

pairs of Magnum boots. He paid for the 

boots with his VISA credit card and had 

the boots, which are subject to the 

Regulations, exported from the United 

States to Micei, Inc. in Macedonia on 

July 2, 2003. Micei, Inc. reimbursed 

Respondent for the purchase of the 

boots. Respondent’s purchase and 

reimbursement amounted to buying, 

selling or financing. Respondent 

benefited from the purchase of the boots 

by accumulating frequent flier miles 

with United Airlines. The Denial Order 

which prohibited these activities was in 

effect at the time and Respondent had 

knowledge of the Denial Order. 

These activities show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence that Respondent 

ordered the boots, carried on 

negotiations concerning the boots, 

bought, sold, and/or financed the boots, 

and benefited from the transactions for 

the boots, and that those actions 

violated the terms of his Denial Order, 

in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k). 

Therefore, Charge 1 is proved. 

These activities also show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence that Respondent 

ordered the boots, carried on 

negotiations concerning the boots, 

bought, sold, and/or financed the boots 

with knowledge that a violation of his 

Denial Order had occurred, or was about 

to occur, or was intended to occur in 

connection with the boots, in violation 

of 15 CFR 764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 8 

is proved. 

As detailed in the Findings of Fact, 

Charges 2 and 9 reflect that at Micei’s 

request, Respondent contacted Range 

Systems, a New Hope, Minnesota 

manufacturer of firing range equipment, 

to inquire of the availability and price 

for their product. In a July 8, 2003 

e-mail inquiry sent to Range Systems 

describing himself as Micei’s regional 

office, Respondent stated that ‘‘currently 

we have one [bid] which calls for 

various products including 5–10 

clearing traps such as your RRI 

Guardian (GDN) model * * *. Please 

quote the price of your RRR GUARDIAN 

(GDN) model and e/m me a complete 

price list if possible * * *.’’ Range 

Systems provided the requested price 

quote in a reply e-mail sent on July 11, 

2003. Respondent placed an order for 

two of the gun clearing devices via email sent on July 15, 2003. Respondent 

paid Range Systems, Inc. for the gun 

clearing devices with his VISA credit 

card. Respondent directed Range 

Systems to export the gun clearing 

devices to Micei in Macedonia via their 

freight forwarder and Micei reimbursed 

Respondent for the purchase of the gun 

clearing devices. Range systems 

exported the gun clearing devices from 

the United States to Macedonia on or 

about July 18, 2003. The gun clearing 

devices were also manufactured in the 

United States and subject to the 

Regulations. At the time of the 

transaction, Respondent knew he was 

subject to the Denial Order. Respondent 

also benefited from the purchase of the 

gun clearing devices. 

These activities show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, Respondent 

ordered the gun clearing devices, 

carried on negotiations concerning the 

gun clearing devices, bought, sold, and/ 

or financed the purchase of the gun 

clearing devices, and that those actions 

violated the terms of his Denial Order, 

in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k). 

Therefore, Charge 2 is proved. 

These activities also show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, Respondent 

ordered the gun clearing devices, 

carried on negotiations concerning the 

gun clearing devices, bought, sold, and/ 

or financed the purchase of the gun 

clearing devices, with knowledge that a 

violation of his Denial Order had 

occurred, was about to occur, or was 

intended to occur, in connection with 

the gun clearing devices, in violation of 

15 CFR 764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 9 is 

proved. 

As detailed in the Findings of Fact, 

Charge 3 shows that on August 5, 2003, 

Respondent sent an e-mail to Galls, Inc., 

a Lexington, Kentucky based distributor 

of police and military equipment and 

apparel identifying himself as ‘‘Micei 

Int’l (U.S. Op’s and requesting a price 

quotation for 10,800 pairs of shoes and 

boots. Respondent intended to export 

the boots and shoes from the United 

States to Macedonia. Respondent 

carried on negotiations concerning the 

shoes and boots, stating in an e-mail to 

Galls ‘‘our [Micei] HQ will be putting up 

the performance bond at 20% in cash. 

Therefore, please make sure you quote 

the best possible price so you can so we 

can win this one, too.’’ The boots and 

shoes are items subject to the 

Regulations and he knew that he was 

subject to the Denial Order at the time 

he requested the quotation on or about 

August 5, 2003. Therefore, Respondent 

violated 15 CFR 764.2(k). 

These activities show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent 

carried on negotiations concerning the 

10,800 pairs of shoes and that those 

actions violated the terms of his Denial 

Order which Respondent knew was in 

effect, in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k). 

Therefore, Charge 3 is proved. 

As detailed in the Findings of Fact, 

Charges 4 and 11 reflect that on August 

5, 2003, Respondent contacted Galls to 

pay for order # 25473620/016, 

previously placed. The first eight (8) 

digits of that number is Micei’s account 

number at Galls. The items in that order 

number consist of shoes and remote 

strobe tubes. Respondent provided his 

credit card account information to pay 

for the $2,562.44 order, stating that 

Micei advised him to pay for the items 

with his VISA card. Micei reimbursed 

Respondent for purchasing the shoes 

and remote strobe tubes. Respondent 

intended to export the shoes and strobe 

tubes from the United States to 

Macedonia and the shoes and remote 

strobe tubes were exported from Galls’ 

Inc. in Lexington, Kentucky, United 

States to Macedonia on or about 

September 5, 2003. The shoes and 

remote strobe tubes are items subject to 

the Regulations. At the time of the 

transaction, Respondent knew he was 

subject to the Denial Order. Respondent 

benefited from the VISA card purchase 

of the shoes and remote strobe tubes 

from Galls by earning credit towards the 

purchase of airline tickets. 

These activities show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent, 

bought, sold, and/or financed the 

purchase of shoes and remote strobe 

tubes, and that those actions violated 

the terms of his Denial Order, in 

violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k). Therefore, 

Charge 4 is proved. 

These activities also show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent, 

bought, sold, and/or financed the 

purchase of shoes and remote strobe 

tubes with knowledge that a violation of 

his Denial Order had occurred, was 

about to occur, or was intended to occur 

in connection with the shoes and 

remote strobe tubes, in violation of 15 

CFR 764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 11 is 

proved. 

As detailed in the Findings of Fact, 

Charges 5 and 12 reflect that on July 31, 

2003, Respondent placed an order for 

150 golf/polo shirts from Save On 

Promotional Products of Sandy, Oregon. 

Upon receiving Respondent’s order, 

Save On ordered the shirts from its 

supplier, Tri-Mountain Gear Corp. of 

Baldwin Park, California. Respondent 


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ordered the shirts for or on behalf of 

Micei to be exported from the United 

States to Macedonia. Respondent paid 

for the order with his credit card. Micei 

reimbursed Respondent for purchasing 

the shirts. The shirts were exported 

from the United States to Macedonia on 

or about August 13, 2003. The shirts are 

items subject to the Regulations. At the 

time of the transaction, Respondent 

knew he was subject to the Denial 

Order. Respondent benefited from 

purchasing the shirts from a U.S. 

supplier using his VISA card by earning 

credit towards the purchase of airline 

tickets. 

These activities show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent 

ordered the shirts, carried on 

negotiations concerning the shirts, 

bought, sold, and/or financed the shirts, 

and benefited from the transactions 

while his Denial Order was in effect, in 

violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k). Therefore, 

Charge 5 is proved. 

These activities also show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent 

ordered the shirts, carried on 

negotiations concerning the shirts, 

bought, sold, and/or financed the shirts, 

and benefited from the transactions with 

knowledge that a violation of his Denial 

Order had occurred, was about to occur, 

or was intended to occur in connection 

with the shirts, in violation of 15 CFR 

764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 12 is proved. 

As detailed in the Findings of Fact, 

Charges 6 and 13 reflect that 

Respondent ordered two load binders, 

one ratchet strap, one binder chain, and 

one safety shackle from Maintenance 

Products, Inc. of Lowell, Indiana, on or 

about September 9, 2003. Respondent 

paid Maintenance Products, Inc. for 

these items, including freight charges of 

$21.52, with his VISA credit card. Micei 

reimbursed Respondent for purchasing 

these items. As per Respondent’s intent, 

these items were exported from the 

United States to Macedonia on or about 

September 15, 2003. The load binders, 

binder chain, and safety shackle were 

manufactured in the United States. The 

load binders, ratchet strap, binder chain 

and safety shackle are items subject to 

the Regulations. At the time of the 

transaction, Respondent knew he was 

subject to the Denial Order. By charging 

the purchase from the U.S. supplier of 

the load binders, ratchet strap, binder 

chain and safety shackle on his VISA 

card, Respondent benefited by earning 

credit towards the purchase of airline 

tickets. 

These activities show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent 

ordered two load binders, one ratchet 

strap, one binder chain, and one safety 

shackle, bought, sold, and/or financed 

them, and benefited from the 

transactions while his Denial Order was 

in effect, in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(k). 

Therefore, Charge 6 is proved. 

These activities also show, by the 

preponderance or reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent 

ordered two load binders, one ratchet 

strap, one binder chain, and one safety 

shackle, bought, sold, and/or financed 

them, and benefitted from the 

transactions with knowledge that a 

violation of his Denial Order had 

occurred, was about to occur, or was 

intended to occur, in connection with 

the two load binders, one ratchet strap, 

one binder chain, and one safety 

shackle, in violation of 15 CFR 764.2(e). 

Therefore, Charge 13 is proved. 

As shown in Findings of Fact, Charges 

7 and 14 reflect that in October 2003, 

Respondent, describing himself as 

‘‘Micei Int’l (N/America Op’s), placed an 

order for uniform pants with Galls 

(Galls number 2547320/017). Again 

describing himself as representing 

Micei, Respondent paid for the order on 

October 8, 2003 with his VISA credit 

card. The uniform pants were to be 

shipped from Galls’ supplier, Liberty 

Uniform of Spartanburg, South Carolina, 

to Micei in Macedonia. Micei 

reimbursed Respondent for purchasing 

the uniform pants. The uniform pants 

are items subject to the Regulations. At 

the time of the transaction, Respondent 

knew he was subject to the Denial 

Order. Respondent benefited from his 

purchase of the uniform pants with his 

VISA credit card by earning airline 

frequent flier miles. 

These activities show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent 

ordered the uniform pants, bought, sold, 

and/or financed them, and benefited 

from the transactions while his Denial 

Order was in effect, in violation of 15 

CFR 764.2(k). Therefore, Charge 7 is 

proved. 

These activities also show, by the 

preponderance of reliable, probative, 

and credible evidence, that Respondent 

ordered the uniform pants, bought, sold, 

and/or financed them, and benefited 

from the transactions, with knowledge 

that a violation of his Denial Order had 

occurred, was about to occur, or was 

intended to occur, in connection with 

the uniform pants, in violation of 15 

CFR 764.2(e). Therefore, Charge 14 is 

proved. 

Ultimate Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law 

1. Respondent and the subject matter 

of these proceedings are properly within 

the jurisdiction vested in BIS under the 

EAA, and the EAR, as extended by 

Executive Order and Presidential 

Notices. 

2. At all times relevant in these 

proceedings, Coast Guard 

Administrative Law Judges have 

jurisdiction to adjudicate export control 

cases for the Bureau of Industry and 

Security. 

3. The exhibits that BIS submitted are 

relevant and material to the charges in 

the Charging Letter. 

4. At all times relevant, The Denial 

Order was in effect. 

5. At all times relevant, Respondent 

was subject to the terms of a Denial 

Order. 

6. At all times relevant, Respondent 

knew he was subject to the Denial 

Order. 

7. All items in question were subject 

to the Regulations at Section 734.3(a). 

8. All items in question were subject 

to the prohibitions in the Denial Order. 

9. As detailed in the Findings of Fact, 

from on or about July 2, 2003 to on or 

about October 8, 2003, on seven 

occasions as described in Charges 1 

through 7 in the Schedule of Violations, 

Respondent took actions specifically 

prohibited by the Denial Order in 

violation of 15 CFR 7343.2(k). 

10. As detailed in the Findings of 

Fact, from on or about July 2, 2003 to 

on or about October 8, 2003, on six 

occasions as described in Charges 8, 

9 and 11–14 in the Schedule of 

Violations, Respondent took actions 

prohibited by the Denial Order with 

knowledge that a violation of his Denial 

Order had occurred, were about to 

occur, or were intended to occur, in 

violation of 15 CFR 764.2(e). 

Affirmative Defenses 

In his February 24, 2010 

Memorandum in Defense to Evidence 

Submitted by BIS in Support of the 

Charges in its Charging Letter, 

Respondent offers eleven (11) 

affirmative defenses. Affirmative 

Defense number one claims ‘‘that subject 

matter jurisdiction is lacking herein 

* * * because the general Denial Order 

* * * was ‘‘null, void, and of no effect 

ab initio because BIS did not have 

statutory authority to impose such an 

order * * *.’’ 

This affirmative defense is the same 

as affirmative defenses numbered two, 

nine, and fourteen filed with his 

Answer, affirmative defenses numbered 

2, 4, 14, and 19 filed in the Corrected 


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Answer, and objection number 5 in 

Respondent’s Opposition to BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen. It 

is also essentially the same as Objection 

5 raised in his ‘‘Renewed Objections to 

BIS’s Interrogatories and Request for 

Production of Documents filed on 

September 3, 2009 and Point numbered 

1 and 10 raised in Respondent’s 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities 

in Opposition to BIS’ Motion for 

Summary Decision as to Charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen filed October 

12, 2009. 

The undersigned previously ruled 

Respondent’s claim that BIS had no 

statutory authority to issue the Denial 

Order because the EAA was in lapse is 

without merit. BIS had authority to 

issue the Denial Order and is still 

operating under that authority. See, 

November 10, 2009, Memorandum and 

Order disposing of numerous motions 

that the parties submitted on predecisional issues at 13. As noted in the 

charging Letter and subsequent filings, 

subsequent Presidential Notices have 

extended the EAA’s provisions and 

regulations up to the present. The 

Agency and the Courts have held that 

continuing the operation and 

effectiveness of the EAA and its 

regulations by issuing Executive Orders 

by the President is a valid exercise of 

authority. In the Matter of Micei 

International, 74 FR 24,788, 24,790 

(May 26, 2009); Wisconsin Project on 

Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Commerce, 317 F. 3d 275, 278–79, 282 

(DC Cir. 2003). Therefore, affirmative 

defense number one is rejected as being 

without merit. 

In affirmative defense number two, 

Respondent claims ‘‘[t]his Court lacks 

jurisdiction to adjudicate this 

proceeding because the purported 

assignment of the Administrative Law 

Judge herein has been made in violation 

of the statute and regulations regulating 

the assignment of administrative law 

judges to BIS’s civil penalty 

proceedings.’’ This defense is essentially 

the same as affirmative defense number 

one filed with his Answer and 

affirmative defenses numbers one (1) 

and three (3) in his ‘‘Corrected Answer 

to Charging Letter.’’ It is also essentially 

the same as his ‘‘Objection 6, raised in 

his ‘‘Renewed Objections to BIS’s 

Interrogatories and Request for 

Production of Documents filed on 

September 3, 2009 and essentially the 

same as Point Number 2 raised in 

Respondent’s Memorandum of Points 

and Authorities in Opposition to BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen 

filed October 12, 2009. The undersigned 

has previously ruled that at all relevant 

times in these proceedings, Memoranda 

of Agreement and an Office of Personnel 

Management authorization letters 

properly establish jurisdiction for U.S. 

Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges 

to adjudicate export control cases for 

BIS. See, November 10, 2009, 

Memorandum and Order disposing of 

numerous motions that the parties 

submitted on pre-decisional issues at 3, 

13, and 14. Therefore, affirmative 

defense number two is rejected as being 

without merit. 

In affirmative defense number three, 

Respondent claims ‘‘[t]his proceeding is 

defective and should be dismissed 

because it has been filed in violation of 

the prohibition against Double Jeopardy 

in the Constitution of the United States.’’ 

This defense is the same as 

Respondent’s affirmative defense 

number eight (8) raised in his Answer 

and affirmative defense number thirteen 

(13) raised in his Corrected Answer. It 

is also the same as Points numbered 3 

and 6 in Respondent’s Memorandum of 

Points and Authorities in Opposition to 

BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision as 

to Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen 

filed October 12, 2009. The undersigned 

has previously found that double 

jeopardy does not apply to these 

administrative proceedings in the 

November 18, 2009 Order Denying 

Respondent’s Objections to 

Qualifications of Administrative Law 

Judge at 3, 4, but further clarification is 

necessary. 

Respondent’s double jeopardy 

argument is found on pages 15–17 of his 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities 

in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to Charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen filed October 

12, 2009 and his factual basis is found 

in his October 12, 2009 ‘‘Declaration of 

Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to BIS’ 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine and Thirteen’’ at 

paragraphs 32 to 38, and 50 to 54. He 

also includes this argument in his 

‘‘Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in 

Support of Objection to Qualifications 

of ALJs and all Other Members of BIS’ 

Decision making Body’’ of October 20, 

2009 scattered throughout various 

paragraphs. 

He states that in May 2005, criminal 

charges were initiated against him in the 

U.S. District of Columbia for alleged 

violations of this Denial Order. In 2006 

that criminal action was dismissed and 

he was re-indicted on substantially 

identical charges in the U.S. District 

Court for the Western District of 

Washington at Seattle, and on April 30, 

2008. The Second Superseding 

Indictment was filed in the same court. 

Respondent claims the criminal 

prosecution was based on his alleged 

violations of this Denial Order and that 

his subsequent trial resulted in a 

mistrial because the jurors could not 

agree. Respondent further claims that 

following the mistrial, he filed a motion 

for judgment of acquittal which the 

district judge granted. Respondent’s 

statement is incorrect. Attached to his 

Declaration is the Second Superseding 

Indictment dated April 30, 2008, a 

Notice of Dismissal DATED October 10, 

2008, dismissing the Indictment with 

prejudice against this Respondent, and 

the October 20, 2008 Order of Dismissal, 

signed by U.S. District Judge Ricardo S. 

Martinez, dismissing the Indictment 

with prejudice against this Respondent. 

The Order references Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 48a which states 

‘‘The government may, with leave of 

court, dismiss an indictment, 

information, or complaint. The 

government may not dismiss the 

prosecution during trial without the 

defendant’s consent.’’ The District Judge 

did not enter an order of acquittal. 

In his Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Opposition to BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen at 

16, Respondent claims ‘‘[t]he charges 

brought forth in this proceeding are 

based on the same facts of which 

respondent has already prevailed and 

obtained dismissal with prejudice, 

which is the equivalent to acquittal, 

after undergoing a trial in the criminal 

proceeding.’’ In support of this claim, 

Respondent cites Hudson v. United 

States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) as authority. 

In Hudson, the Office of the Comptroller 

of the Currency imposed civil monetary 

penalties and debarment on the 

defendants for causing two banks in 

which they were officials to make 

certain loans in a manner that 

unlawfully allowed them to receive the 

loans’ benefits, in violation of the 

banking statutes. The government later 

indicted the defendants for essentially 

the same conduct so they moved to 

dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. 

The Supreme Court held that the double 

jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment 

is not a bar to the later criminal 

prosecution because the administrative 

proceedings were civil, not criminal. 

522 U.S. at 95, 96. The Supreme Court 

found that the double jeopardy clause 

protects only against the imposition of 

multiple criminal punishments for the 

same offense. Moreover, Respondent 

was neither acquitted nor convicted. 

Therefore, affirmative defense number 

three is rejected as being without merit. 

In affirmative defense number four, 

Respondent claims ‘‘[s]ubject matter 


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jurisdiction is lacking over [Respondent] 

because the BIS’s claims are not 

colorable, i.e., they are both, immaterial 

and made solely for the purpose of 

obtaining jurisdiction over [Respondent] 

and are wholly insubstantial and 

frivolous.’’ This affirmative defense is 

essentially the same as affirmative 

defense number 10 in his Answer, 

affirmative defense number 15 in his 

Corrected Answer, and those raised in 

argument number 4 in his Memorandum 

of Points and Authorities in Opposition 

to BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision 

as to Charges Two, Six, Nine, and 

Thirteen of October 12, 2009. The 

undersigned previously ruled that 

‘‘Respondent and the subject matter of 

these proceedings are properly within 

the jurisdiction vested in BIS under the 

EAA, and the EAR, as extended by 

Executive Order and Presidential 

Notices. See, November 10, 2009, 

Memorandum and Order disposing of 

numerous motions that the parties 

submitted on pre-decisional issues at 3. 

Therefore, Respondent’s affirmative 

defense number four is rejected as being 

without merit. 

In affirmative defense number five, 

Respondent claims ‘‘[t]he charges sought 

by BIS to be adjudicated by the instant 

Motion should be dismissed as barred 

by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’’ 

This affirmative defense is the same as 

affirmative defense number 5 in 

Respondent’s Answer, affirmative 

defense number 8 and 9 in his Corrected 

Answer, and argument number 7 in his 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities 

in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12, 

2009. Simply put, collateral estoppel 

would prevent a party from relitigating 

an issue previously decided against the 

party. Respondent claims that the 

dismissal of his criminal case is the 

same as an acquittal. According to 

Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (2004), 

an acquittal is a legal certification, 

usually by jury verdict, that an accused 

person is not guilty of the charged 

offense. According to Respondent, the 

jury could not agree on a verdict, and 

the proceedings ended in mistrial. On 

application of the government, the 

District Judge dismissed with prejudice. 

There there were no findings of ‘‘not 

guilty’’ of the counts in the Indictment 

and therefore no acquittal. Similarly, 

Black’s defines estoppel, as raised by 

Respondent in his Answer at affirmative 

defense number 5 and in his Corrected 

Answer at affirmative defense number 8, 

as a bar that prevents one from asserting 

a claim or right that contradicts what 

one has said or done before or what has 

been legally established as true. 

Respondent was not convicted in the 

criminal case. Therefore, Respondent’s 

affirmative defense number five is 

rejected as being without merit. 

In affirmative defense number six, 

Respondent claims ‘‘[t]he charges sought 

by BIS to be adjudicated by the instant 

Motion should be dismissed as barred 

by the doctrine of res judicata.’’ This is 

the same as affirmative defense number 

4 in his Answer, affirmative defense 

number 7 in his Corrected Answer, and 

Argument number 8 in his 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities 

in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12, 

2009. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. 

(2004), defines res judicata as an 

affirmative defense barring the same 

parties from litigating a second lawsuit 

on the same claim, or any other claim 

arising from the same transaction or 

series of transactions and that could 

have been—but was not—raised in the 

first suit. The three essential elements 

are (1) an earlier decision on the issue, 

(2) a final judgment on the merits, and 

(3) the involvement of the same parties, 

or parties in privity with the original 

parties. As stated in the above 

discussion on collateral estoppel, there 

was no decision in the criminal case. 

Therefore, further analysis of the 

elements is unnecessary. Respondent’s 

affirmative defense number six is 

rejected as being without merit. 

In defense number seven, Respondent 

claims ‘‘[t]he monetary penalty proposed 

by BIS should not be applied as 

violative of the Constitutional 

prohibition against cruel and unusual 

punishments.’’ This affirmative defense 

is the same as affirmative defense 

number 9 in Respondent’s October 16, 

2009 ‘‘Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Opposition to BIS’ 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen.’’ 

These proceedings are civil 

administrative proceedings and not 

criminal proceedings. Under the Eighth 

Amendment of the Constitution of the 

United States, ‘‘[e]xcessive bail shall not 

be required, nor excessive fines 

imposed, nor cruel and unusual 

punishments inflicted.’’ U.S. Const. 

amend. VIII. Assuming Respondent is 

referring to the excessive fines clause, 

Congress has set the maximum penalty 

per violation in these civil proceedings 

at $250,000. International Emergency 

Economic Powers Enhancement Act of 

2007, Public Law 110–96, 121 Stat. 1011 

(Oct. 16, 2007). The criminal penalties 

were also raised from $50,000 and ten 

years of imprisonment to $1,000,000 

and twenty years of imprisonment. 

Here, BIS proposes a civil monetary 

penalty in the amount of $340,000 for 

all thirteen violations. If the maximum 

civil penalty of $250,000 were assessed 

for each of the remaining 13 violations, 

Respondent would face civil penalties 

totaling $3,250,000. He has not offered 

any argument or case law supporting the 

notion that assessed civil penalties 

amounting to less than 10.5% of the 

congressionally established maximum 

violate the Eighth Amendment. 

Therefore, the monetary penalty BIS 

proposes does not violate the 

Constitutional prohibition against cruel 

and unusual punishments and 

affirmative defense number seven is 

rejected as being without merit. 

In affirmative defense number eight, 

Respondent claims ‘‘[n]o denial order 

may be imposed upon Respondent, as 

IEEPA provides no statutory 

authorization for such penalty.’’ This 

affirmative defense is the same as 

argument number 10 in Respondent’s 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities 

in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12, 

2009. The undersigned previously ruled 

that BIS has the statutory authority to 

issue a Denial Order. See, November 10, 

2009, Memorandum and Order 

disposing of numerous motions that the 

parties submitted on pre-decisional 

issues at 13. Therefore, affirmative 

defense number eight is rejected as 

being without merit. 

In affirmative defense number nine, 

Respondent claims ‘‘[t]he charges of 

‘acting with knowledge of violations’ 

should be dismissed because they are (a) 

duplicitous as interpreted by BIS and (b) 

unauthorized by IEEPA as amended in 

2007.’’ This is the same as argument 

number 11 in Respondent’s 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities 

in Opposition to BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12, 

2009. 

Concerning part (b) of Respondent’s 

argument, the Regulations are 

maintained in force pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act. This Court’s previous 

ruling that the Regulations are, in fact, 

maintained in force supports the 

validity of the knowledge charges. See 

Order of November 10, 2009 at 13. See 

also, In the Matter of Ihsan Medhat 

Elashi, 71 FR 38,843 (July 10, 2006) 

imposing a civil monetary penalty of 

$330,000 and a 50 year denial of export 

privileges for selling items with 

knowledge of a denial order. That case 

cites the IEEPA as statutory authority 

and 15 CFR 764.2(e) as regulatory 

authority. Therefore, Respondent’s 


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affirmative defense that the charges of 

acting with knowledge of violations 

should be dismissed because they are 

unauthorized by IEEPA as amended in 

2007, affirmative defense nine ‘‘b’’ is 

rejected as being without merit. 

Concerning Respondent’s claim that 

‘‘acting with knowledge of violations 

should be dismissed because they are (a) 

duplicitous as interpreted by BIS is also 

rejected as being without merit. Under 

the Elashi case, ‘‘if an individual has a 

denied export license, violating the 

denial order is one violation and the act 

of knowingly violating the EAR is a 

separate violation.’’ Elashi at 38,849. 

Therefore, Respondent’s affirmative 

defense nine ‘‘a’’ that ‘‘[t]he charges of 

‘acting with knowledge of violations’ 

should be dismissed because they are (a) 

duplicitous as interpreted by BIS’’ is 

rejected as being without merit. 

In defense number ten, Respondent 

claims ‘‘[t]he penalty enhancement 

under IEEPA, as retroactively amended 

in 2007, cannot be applied herein 

because it is violative of the Ex Post 

Facto clause of the Constitution of the 

United States.’’ This is the same as 

argument number 12 in Respondent’s 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities 

in Opposition to BIS’ Motion for 

Summary Decision as to charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen of October 12, 

2009. 

Congress added the enhanced civil 

penalty as part of Section 206(b) of the 

International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act of 2007, Public Law 110–96, 

121 Stat. 1011 (Oct. 16, 2007). Section 

2 of that Act reads as follows: 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 206 of the 

International Emergency Economic Powers 

Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) is amended to read as 

follows: 

‘‘SEC. 206. PENALTIES. 

‘‘(a) UNLAWFUL ACTS.—It shall be 

unlawful for a person to violate, attempt to 

violate, conspire to violate, or cause a 

violation of any license, order, regulation, or 

prohibition issued under this title. 

‘‘(b) CIVIL PENALTY.—A civil penalty may 

be imposed on any person who commits an 

unlawful act described in subsection (a) in an 

amount not to exceed the greater of— 

‘‘(1) $250,000; or 

‘‘(2) an amount that is twice the amount of 

the transaction that is the basis of the 

violation with respect to which the penalty 

is imposed. 

‘‘(c) CRIMINAL PENALTY.—A person who 

willfully commits, willfully attempts to 

commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or 

aids or abets in the commission of, an 

unlawful act described in subsection (a) 

shall, upon conviction, be fined not more 

than $1,000,000, or if a natural person, may 

be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or 

both.’’. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.— 

(1) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Section 206(b) of 

the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act, as amended by subsection (a), 

shall apply to violations described in section 

206(a) of such Act with respect to which 

enforcement action is pending or commenced 

on or after the date of the enactment of this 

Act. 

(2) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.—Section 

206(c) of the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act, as amended by 

subsection (a), shall apply to violations 

described in section 206(a) of such Act with 

respect to which enforcement action is 

commenced on or after the date of the 

enactment of this Act. 

The above language shows that 

Congress intended to establish separate 

penalties for civil and criminal 

proceedings. Once it is established that 

Congress intended to enact a civil 

enforcement scheme, only the clearest 

proof will override that intent and 

transform what is clearly a civil penalty 

into what amounts to a criminal 

penalty. See, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 

92 (2003). Respondent has not presented 

any evidence such proof. 

The enhanced civil penalties apply to 

violations with respect to which 

enforcement action is pending or 

commended on or after the date of the 

enactment of the Act. The effective date 

of the Act was October 17, 2007. Since 

this enforcement proceeding 

commenced on July 1, 2008, a civil 

penalty of up to $250,000 per violation 

applies to this case since. Therefore, 

Respondent’s affirmative defense ten 

that the penalty enhancement violates 

the Ex Post Facto clause of the United 

States Constitution is rejected as being 

without merit. 

In defense number eleven, 

Respondent claims ‘‘[a]ll of the charges 

in the Amended Charging Letter should 

be dismissed because BIS has failed to 

allege in said Charging Letter and prove 

that any of the subject products were 

not ‘the foreign-produced direct product 

of U.S.—origin technology’ which has 

been expressly exempted from the 

prohibitions of the Denial Order.’’ The 

undersigned has previously rejected this 

argument as stated in this 

Recommended Decision and Order. 

Therefore, affirmative defense number 

eleven is rejected as being without 

merit. 

Respondent’s Two Objections 

In his February 24, 2010 Objections to 

Evidence Submitted by BIS in Support 

of the Charges in its Charging Letter, 

Respondent offers two Objections: 

(1) ‘‘Respondent hereby Objects to 

unsworn, unverified, unsubstantiated, 

and unauthenticated ‘evidence’ 

supporting its charges;’’ (2) ‘‘Objection is 

hereby made to the letter submitted by 

BIS as Exhibit I, as such letter does not 

constitute evidence but is inadmissible 

self-serving legal opinion.’’ 

Concerning objection #1, Respondent 

does not address any specific exhibit or 

show why they are not admissible under 

BIS’s procedural rules at 15 CFR 

766.13(b). BIS’s exhibits are declarations 

provided under penalty of perjury; 

however, that section provides ‘‘[t]he 

rules of evidence prevailing in courts of 

law do not apply, and all evidentiary 

deemed by the administrative law judge 

to be relevant and material to the 

proceeding and not unduly repetitious 

will be received and given appropriate 

weight.’’ Having so found, Respondent’s 

objection #1 is Overruled. 

Concerning objection #2, BIS 

routinely determines what items are 

subject to its regulations. Absent a 

showing that this Exhibit is not a valid 

exercise of BIS’s authority and how it is 

not relevant or material to the Charges 

in the Charging Letter and therefore 

inadmissible under 15 CFR 766.13(b), 

this objection cannot be sustained. 

Therefore, Respondent’s objection #2 is 

Overruled. 

Respondent’s Remaining Affirmative 

Defenses 

The remaining affirmative defenses 

from Respondent’s original nineteen 

(19) not included in his February 24, 

2010 ‘‘Memorandum in Defense to 

Evidence Submitted by BIS in Support 

of the Charges in its Charging Letter’’ are 

addressed as follows: 

6. ‘‘The Charging Letter herein and 

any of its allegations fail to state facts 

constituting a valid claim against 

Respondent herein.’’ The undersigned 

previously ruled on this defense in the 

March 23, 2009 Order Denying 

Respondent’s Motion for More Definite 

Statement. After detailing the parties’ 

arguments, the undersigned held, ‘‘[t]he 

Charging Letter, together with the 

Schedule of Violations provides notice 

to Respondent sufficient to formulate 

his answer. To the extent Respondent 

requests additional information he may 

avail himself of the Discovery 

procedures under 15 CFR 766.9 after he 

files his Answer. Therefore, 

Respondent’s motion for a more definite 

statement is denied.’’ In consideration of 

the foregoing, Respondent’s defense #6 

is rejected as being without merit. 

10. ‘‘This proceeding is barred by the 

doctrine of waiver. Waiver is a 

voluntary relinquishment or 

abandonment, either express or implied, 

of a legal right or advantage. Black’s 

Law Dictionary, (8th ed. 2004). 

However, Respondent offers no 

evidence or authority on this defense. 

Therefore, this defense is rejected as 

being without merit. 


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11. ‘‘This proceeding is barred by the 

doctrine of release.’’ Release is a 

liberation from an obligation, duty, or 

demand or the act of giving up a right 

or claim to the person against whom it 

could have been enforced. Black’s law 

Dictionary, (8th ed. 2004). However, 

Respondent presents no evidence or 

authority on this defense. Therefore, 

Respondent’s defense of ‘‘release’’ is 

rejected as being without merit. 

12. ‘‘This proceeding is barred by 

settlement agreement.’’ Respondent 

offers no evidence of a previous 

settlement agreement or authority in 

support of this defense. He apparently is 

referring to the criminal charges that 

resulted in a hung jury and subsequent 

dismissal in October 2008. In paragraph 

24 of the ‘‘Declaration of Yuri 

Montgomery in Support of Objection to 

Qualifications of Administrative Law 

Judges and All Other Members of BIS 

Decisionmaking Body’’ Respondent 

states, ‘‘[s]hortly prior to July 3, 2008, 

my attorney apparently informed the 

prosecutor in said criminal action of my 

intention to file a motion to suppress 

my testimony given without the 

presence of counsel during my meetings 

and telephone interviews with BIS 

personnel and prosecutors in said 

criminal matter, as well as a motion to 

suppress some of my records obtained 

by BIS pursuant to a search warrant 

illegally obtained by BIS.’’ He mentions 

‘‘plea agreement’’ in the following 

paragraph 25 in which he states, ‘‘[o]n 

July 3, 2008, I filed a motion to suppress 

said testimony on the ground that I 

shared said information with the 

government based on my understanding 

that it was part of my obligation to 

cooperate with the government in 

exchange for immunity given to me 

pursuant to a plea agreement I entered 

into [on] or about 1999 and which 

resulted in the issuance of said Denial 

Order, as well as a motion to suppress 

evidence, including but not limited to 

copies of my e-mails, obtained under 

said search warrant, on the grounds that 

said warrant was stale and was obtained 

as a result of misleading statements 

made my BIS agents to a U.S. magistrate 

judge in eh affidavit in support of said 

search warrant.’’ This is an affirmative 

defense in which Respondent bears the 

burden of going forward with producing 

the evidence in support of it. 

Respondent has not produced any plea 

agreement. Therefore, Respondent’s 

claim is rejected as being without merit. 

15. ‘‘The Charging letter herein is 

invalid as it alleges claims which are 

frivolous and insubstantial and made for 

the sole purpose of obtaining 

jurisdiction over Respondent herein.’’ 

Defense #15 is rejected as being without 

merit for the reasons set forth in the 

ruling on defense #6, above. 

17. ‘‘This administrative proceeding is 

barred by laches due to BIS’s excessive 

delay in bringing the Charging Letter 

herein.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary 8th ed., 

2004 defines ‘‘laches’’ as ‘‘unreasonable 

delay in pursuing a right or claim— 

almost always an equitable one—in a 

way that prejudices the party against 

whom relief is sought. ‘‘Section 2462 of 

Title 28 of the United States Code 

imposes a five-year statute of limitation 

on the commencement of enforcement 

proceedings brought by BXA [now BIS] 

under the Export Administration Act.’’ 

In the Matter of MK Technology 

Associates, Inc., Decision and Order 

(Dept. of Commerce), 64 FR 69,478, 

69,481 (Dec. 13, 1999). Title 28 U.S.C. 

2462 reads as follows: 

§ 2462. Time for commencing proceedings 

Except as otherwise provided by Act of 

Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for 

the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or 

forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not 

be entertained unless commenced within five 

years from the date when the claim first 

accrued if, within the same period, the 

offender or the property is found within the 

United States in order that proper service 

may be made thereon. 

28 U.S.C. 2462 

The Charging Letter of July 1, 2008 

shows the claim first accrued on July 2, 

2003, within the five-year year Statute 

of Limitations. Further, Respondent has 

not shown how the passage of time 

within the five-year statute of 

limitations has disadvantaged or 

prejudiced him. Therefore, 

Respondent’s defense #17 is rejected as 

being without merit. 

18. ‘‘This proceeding is barred as it 

violates the Due process clause of the 

Constitution of the United States.’’ In the 

Memorandum and Order of November 

10, 2009, the undersigned Overruled 

Respondent’s objection #1 that the 

previous scheduling orders for 

discovery violated his due process 

rights. Here, Respondent makes no 

specific showing of due process 

violations but it is assumed that he 

objects to the entire proceedings. As the 

above detailed record of these 

proceedings shows, Respondent has 

been accorded reasonable notice and 

more than reasonable opportunity to be 

heard as provided for within the 

framework of BIS’s procedural rules. 

Therefore, Respondent’s defense #18 is 

rejected as being without merit. 

Recommended Sanction 

Under Section 764.3 of the 

Regulations, the applicable sanctions 

are: (1) A monetary penalty; (2) a denial 

of export privileges under the 

Regulations; and (3) exclusion from 

practice before BIS. Pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic 

Powers Enhancement Act of 2007, 

Public Law 110–96, 121 Stat. 1011 (Oct. 

16, 2007), as amended, ‘‘an amount not 

to exceed the greater of * * * $250,000; 

or * * * an amount that is twice the 

amount of the transaction that is the 

basis of the violation with respect to 

which enforcement action [was] 

pending or commenced on or after the 

date of the enactment of [the] Act.’’ 

Since BIS initiated this enforcement 

action after October 16, 2007, the 

maximum penalty in this case is 

$250,000 per violation. 

The Agency recommends a civil 

monetary penalty in the amount of 

$340,000 and a denial of export 

privileges for thirty (30) years. The 

undersigned agrees. This sanction is 

consistent with prior cases, including, 

In the Matter of: Ishan Medhat Elashi, 

71 FR 38,843 (July 10, 2006). Elashi 

violated a Denial Order against him and 

acted with knowledge of these 

violations by exporting and conspiring 

to export computer equipment to Syria. 

For Elashi’s thirty (30) violations, he 

received the maximum available civil 

monetary penalty available at the time 

($11,000 per violation for a total civil 

monetary penalty of $330,000) as well 

as a denial of his export privileges for 

fifty (50) years. 

The record is devoid of any 

acknowledgement of or acceptance of 

responsibility by Respondent for his 

actions. Respondent’s conduct reflects a 

serious disregard for export compliance 

responsibilities. 

Wherefore, 

REDACTED SECTION (PAGES 55–58) 

Accordingly, I am referring this 

Recommended Decision and Order to 

the Under Secretary for review and final 

action for the agency, without further 

notice to the Respondent, as provided in 

15 CFR 766.22. 

Done and dated October 28, 2010, in New 

York, New York. 

Walter J. Brudzinski, 

Administrative Law Judge. 

Attachment A 

Summary of Pre-Decision Motions 

Practice; Activity Prior to Respondent’s 

Answer to Charging Letter 

On July 28, 2008, Peter Offenbecher, 

Esq., of Skellenger Bender, PS, entered 

his appearance on behalf of Respondent 

and requested an extension of time to 

file Answer. On August 5, 2008, the 

Chief Administrative Law Judge granted 

Respondent’s request and extended the 

time to file Answer until August 18, 

2008. 


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10Out of the eleven Counts in the Indictment, 

four Counts concerned conduct corresponding to 

Charges in the Charging Letter. The Charging Letter 

alleged violations of 15 CFR 764.2(e) and (k). The 

Indictment alleged violations of 15 CFR 764(a) and 

(b), as well as 18 U.S.C. 2 and 50 U.S.C. 1705. 

11Respondent was neither convicted nor 

acquitted. The criminal trial ended in mistrial due 

to ‘‘hung jury’’ and the District Judge granted leave 

to dismiss the Indictment with prejudice. 

On August 14, 2008, Respondent filed 

an unopposed motion to stay the instant 

proceedings pending a parallel criminal 

trial in U.S. District Court for the 

Western District of Washington.10

On August 15, 2008, the Chief 

Administrative Law Judge assigned this 

case to the undersigned for adjudication 

and on August 18, 2008, the 

undersigned granted Respondent’s 

unopposed motion to stay. 

On October 28, 2008, BIS filed a 

Stipulated Motion to Stay Proceedings 

for 30 Days Due to Settlement 

Negotiations. The Motion advised that 

the parallel criminal action concluded 

on October 21, 2008 and that counsel for 

Respondent and counsel for BIS desire 

to engage in settlement negotiations.11

Accordingly, on October 30, 2008, the 

undersigned issued an Order Granting 

the Motion to Stay until December 1, 

2008. Counsel for Respondent filed his 

Notice of Attorney Withdrawal on 

December 2, 2008, since that time 

Respondent has been self-represented. 

On January 7, 2009, Respondent filed 

his Notice to Stay Administrative 

Proceeding advising that he and counsel 

for BIS have agreed to extend the date 

for his responsive Answer until January 

31, 2009. On January 9, 2009, the 

undersigned issued an Order Granting 

Respondent’s request staying the 

proceedings until January 31, 2009 at 

which time the Respondent shall file his 

Answer. Respondent did not file his 

Answer on January 31, 2009. Instead, on 

February 3, 2009, the undersigned 

received via facsimile Respondent’s 

Motion for More Definite Statement and 

Demand for Hearing on the Motion for 

More Definite Statement, which he 

dated January 31, 2009. BIS received 

that Motion via facsimile on February 

18, 2009. 

On March 9, 2009, BIS filed its 

opposition to Respondent’s Motion 

averring, among other things, that the 

mutually agreed upon extension of time 

to file Answer did not include any 

extension of time to file a motion for 

more definite statement. Moreover, the 

regulations do not provide for the filing 

of a more definite statement. 

On March 23, 2009, the undersigned 

denied Respondent’s Motion for More 

Definite Statement and ordered 

Respondent to Answer the Charging 

Letter and Any Demand for Hearing 

[emphasis added] by April 2, 2009. 

Respondent filed his Answer ‘‘under 

protest, duress, and compulsion of the 

Order Denying Respondent’s Motion for 

More Definite Statement.’’ He denied 

each and every allegation in the 

Charging Letter but did not demand a 

hearing. He also asserted fourteen (14) 

Affirmative Defenses: 

1. Neither this Court nor any of the 

administrative law judges herein have 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant 

administrative proceeding. 

2. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, has no jurisdiction 

over this administrative proceeding. 

3. The Charging Letter herein and any of 

its allegations fail to state facts constituting 

a valid claim against Respondent. 

4. This administrative proceeding is barred 

by the doctrine of res judicata. 

5. This administrative decision is barred by 

the doctrine of estoppel. 

6. This administrative proceeding is barred 

by the doctrine of waiver. 

7. This administrative proceeding is barred 

by the doctrine of release. 

8. This administrative proceeding is barred 

by the double jeopardy clause of the 

Constitution of the United States. 

9. This administrative proceeding is 

unauthorized in that the Export Control 

Regulations used as a basis for the Charging 

Letter herein lack proper statutory 

authorization and are thus invalid. 

10. The Charging Letter herein is invalid as 

it alleges claims which are frivolous and 

insubstantial and made for the sole purpose 

of obtaining jurisdiction over Respondent. 

11. The goods subject to the Charging 

Letter are of foreign origin and are therefore 

not subject to the Charging Letter. 

12. This administrative proceeding is 

barred by laches due to BIS’s excessive delay 

in bringing the Charging Letter. 

13. This administrative proceeding is 

violative of the Due Process clause of the 

Constitution of the United States. 

14. This administrative proceeding is 

unauthorized by law in that the statute under 

which the pertinent Export Control 

Regulations have been promulgated has 

expired. 

Respondent subsequently filed a 

‘‘Corrected Answer to Charging Letter,’’ 

again denying each allegation and also 

objecting to among other things, the 

form of the Charging Letter. He did not 

demand a hearing but included the 

following amended affirmative defenses: 

1. This Court and any and all of the 

administrative law judges herein have no 

subject matter jurisdiction over this 

proceeding. 

2. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, has no subject matter 

jurisdiction over this proceeding. 

3. This Court and any and all of the 

administrative law judges herein have no 

personal jurisdiction over Respondent 

herein. 

4. The Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, has no personal 

jurisdiction to adjudicate this proceeding. 

5. This Court and any and all of the 

administrative law judges herein lack 

statutory authorization to adjudicate this 

proceeding. 

6. The Charging Letter herein and any of 

its allegations fail to state facts constituting 

a valid claim against Respondent herein. 

7. This proceeding is barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata. 

8. This proceeding is barred by the 

doctrine of estoppel. 

9. This proceeding is barred by the 

doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

10. This proceeding is barred by the 

doctrine of waiver. 

11. This proceeding is barred by the 

doctrine of release. 

12. This proceeding is barred by settlement 

agreement. 

13. This proceeding is barred by the double 

jeopardy clause of the Constitution of the 

United States. 

14. This proceeding is unauthorized by law 

in that the Regulations used as a basis for the 

Charging Letter herein lack statutory 

authorization and are thus invalid. 

15. The Charging Letter herein is invalid as 

it alleges claims which are frivolous and 

insubstantial and made for the sole purpose 

of obtaining jurisdiction over Respondent 

herein. 

16. The goods subject to the Charging 

Letter are of foreign origin and are therefore 

not subject to the prohibitions of the 

purported Denial Order; 

17. This administrative proceeding is 

barred by laches due to BIS’s excessive delay 

in bringing the Charging Letter herein; 

18. This proceeding is barred as it violates 

the Due Process clause of the Constitution of 

the United States; 

19. This proceeding is unauthorized by law 

in that the statute under which the 

Regulations have been promulgated has 

expired. 

Activity After Respondent’s Answer to 

Charging Letter; Case To Be 

Adjudicated on the Record 

Since neither party filed a demand for 

hearing, the undersigned issued a 

Scheduling Order on June 5, 2009 

stating the matter will be adjudicated on 

the record in accordance with 15 CFR 

766.6(c). The Order set July 6, 2009 as 

the deadline to complete discovery; 

August 5, 2009 as the deadline for the 

Agency to file evidence in support of 

charges; September 2, 2009 as the 

deadline for Respondent to reply and 

file evidence in support of his defenses; 

and September 16, 2009 as the deadline 

for the Agency to file rebuttal. 

On June 19, 2009, BIS served its 

‘‘Requests for Admissions and 

Interrogatories’’ and ‘‘Requests for 

Production of Documents’’ on 

Respondent and on June 30, 2009, 

Respondent filed his ‘‘Preliminary 

Objections to BIS’s Interrogatories and 

Requests for Production of Documents’’ 


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as well as his ‘‘Objections to BIS’s 

Interrogatories and Requests for 

Production of Documents,’’ the latter of 

which contained Respondent’s Answers 

to BIS’s Requests for Admission. 

On July 6, 2010 Respondent filed his 

‘‘Requests for Admissions and Requests 

for Production of Documents.’’ These 

requests were followed by the parties’ 

‘‘Stipulation to Stay Discovery Response 

Deadlines and Extending Remaining 

Deadlines’’ and on July 30, 2010, the 

undersigned issued an Amended 

Scheduling Order extending the 

deadlines. 

That Order was followed by another 

Order on August 20, 2009 setting 

September 3, 2009 as the deadline for 

BIS to respond to Respondent’s 

‘‘Requests for Admission and Request 

for Production of Documents’’ and for 

Respondent to respond to BIS’s 

‘‘Interrogatories and Requests for 

Production of Documents.’’ 

Respondent did not file responsive 

pleadings pursuant to the August 20, 

2009 Order but instead filed ‘‘Renewed 

Objections to BIS’s Interrogatories and 

Requests for Production of Documents’’ 

on September 3, 2009. Respondent’s 

Objections are as follows: 

1. The Order Setting Deadlines and 

Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’ 

Motion to Set Deadline and Compel 

Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no 

effect because it was issued by the 

Administrative Law Judge in manifest 

violation of Respondent’s constitutional right 

to due process, as it was issued on the same 

day said motion was served on Respondent 

and even before Respondent received said 

motion which deprived Respondent of notice 

and opportunity to be heard required by the 

due process clause of the Constitution of the 

United States. 

2. The Order Setting Deadlines and 

Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s 

Motion to Set Deadline and Compel 

Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no 

effect because it was issued by the 

Administrative Law Judge in violation of the 

pertinent responses. 

3. The Order Setting Deadlines and 

Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s 

Motion to Set Deadline and Compel 

Responses is null, void, and of no effect 

because it implicitly required that responses 

be sent ‘‘via facsimile and mail’’, while 

pursuant to 15 CFR 766.5(b) service by 

facsimile is deemed acceptable but could be 

in no way required by the Regulations. 

4. The Order Setting Deadlines and 

Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s 

Motion to Set Deadline and Compel 

Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no 

effect because it implicitly required that 

responses be ‘‘produced * * * to Eric Clark’’ 

at a specified address, while 15 CFR 766.9(b) 

provides for ‘‘requests for production of 

documents for inspection and copying’’, and 

has no provision for such responses to be 

provided by other means. 

5. The Order Setting Deadlines and 

Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s 

Motion to Set Deadline and Compel 

Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no 

effect because this tribunal has no subject 

matter jurisdiction over respondent, as the 

general denial order imposed against Yuri 

Montgomery was void because BIS did not 

have statutory authority to impose such an 

order against Yuri Montgomery due to EAA 

being in lapse when said denial order was 

issued and/or when the alleged violations by 

Yuri Montgomery occurred. 

6. The Order Setting Deadlines and 

Compelling Discovery Responses on BIS’s 

Motion to Set Deadline and Compel 

Discovery Responses is null, void, and of no 

effect because this Administrative Law Judge 

had no jurisdiction to issue said Order, as his 

assignment in this matter was made in 

violation of the Administrative Procedure 

Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 3344, and the 

regulations issued under said statute, 5 CFR 

930.213. 

Therefore, on September 4, 2009, the 

undersigned issued an Order for BIS to 

file its evidence in support of charges by 

September 30, 2009 as previously 

provided. The undersigned overruled 

the above Objections in the 

Memorandum and Order of November 

10, 2009. 

On September 18, 2009, BIS requested 

a temporary stay in the Scheduling 

Order and proposed a revised 

Scheduling Order and, on the same day, 

filed a ‘‘Motion for Summary Decision 

on Charges Two, Six, Nine, and 

Thirteen.’’ 

On September 23, 2009, the 

undersigned issued an Order 

temporarily staying the July 30, 2009 

Scheduling Order pending resolution of 

the Agency’s ‘‘Motion for Summary 

Decision on Charges Two, Six, Nine, 

and Thirteen.’’ The Order also set 

October 16, 2009 for Respondent to 

Answer the Agency’s Motion for 

Summary Decision and fifteen (15) days 

thereafter as the date for the BIS to 

Reply. 

On October 13, 2009, Respondent 

filed his ‘‘Motion for an Immediate 

Temporary Stay of Further Running of 

the Court’s Scheduling Order Issued on 

September 23, 2009, Pending the 

Outcome of Respondent’s Motion that 

Requests for Admission be Deemed 

Admitted and that the Matters Therein 

Be Conclusively Established and Motion 

to Compel Production of Documents.’’ 

He also filed his ‘‘Motion That Requests 

for Admission be Deemed Admitted and 

That the Matters Therein be 

Conclusively Established,’’ and his 

‘‘Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of Respondent’s 

Motion That Requests for Admission be 

Deemed Admitted and That the Maters 

Therein be Conclusively Established.’’ 

Further, he filed ‘‘Respondent’s Motion 

to Compel Production of Documents,’’ 

and ‘‘Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of Respondent’s 

Motion to Compel Production of 

Documents.’’ 

On October 15, 2009, BIS filed its 

Opposition to Respondent’s above 

motions and on the same day the 

undersigned issued an Order Denying 

Respondent’s Motion for Immediate 

Stay and further ordered Respondent to 

Answer the Motion for Summary 

Decision on Charges Two, Six, Nine, 

and Thirteen by October 16, 2009, as 

previously ordered. The Order further 

stated that the parties are to submit 

copies of their respective discovery 

requests by October 26, 2009 so that the 

Judge can determine if enforcement 

pursuant to Section 766.9(d) of the 

regulations is appropriate. 

On October 16, 2009 the undersigned 

received the ‘‘Declaration of Yuri 

Montgomery in Opposition to BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen,’’ 

his ‘‘Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Opposition to BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen,’’ 

and ‘‘Declaration of Sanja Milic in 

Opposition to BIS’s Motion for 

Summary Decision as to Charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen,’’ all dated 

October 12, 2009. Respondent’s 

‘‘Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Opposition to BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision as to 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen’’ 

contain twelve (12) affirmative defenses, 

some of which are the same as 

Respondent’s affirmative defenses 

included with his Answer, Corrected 

Answer, and ‘‘Renewed Objections to 

BIS’s Interrogatories and Requests for 

Production of Documents’’ of September 

3, 2009. His objections and affirmative 

defenses to BIS’s Motion for Summary 

Decision as to Charges Two, Six, Nine, 

and Thirteen are as follows: 

1. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking 

herein over Yuri Montgomery because the 

general Denial Order imposed against Yuri 

Montgomery which he is alleged to have 

violated was null, void, and of no effect ab 

initio because BIS did not have statutory 

authority to impose such an order against 

Yuri Montgomery. 

2. This Court lacks jurisdiction to 

adjudicate this proceeding because the 

purported assignment of the Administrative 

Law Judge has been made in violation of the 

statute and regulations regulating assignment 

of administrative law judges to BIS’s civil 

penalty proceedings. 

3. This proceeding is defective and should 

be dismissed because it has been filed in 

violation of the prohibition against Double 

Jeopardy in the Constitution of the United 

States. 


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4. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking 

herein over Yuri Montgomery because the 

BIS’s claims are not colorable, i.e., they are 

both, immaterial and made solely for the 

purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over Yuri 

Montgomery and are wholly insubstantial 

and frivolous. 

5. Summary adjudication as to each of the 

charges should be denied because, based on 

the evidence presented by Respondent, 

disputed issues of material fact are present as 

to each of the issues presented by the Motion 

for Summary Adjudication. 

6. The charges sought by BIS to be 

adjudicated by the instant Motion should be 

dismissed as barred by the Double Jeopardy 

provision in the Constitution of the United 

States. 

7. The charges sought by BIS to be 

adjudicated by the instant Motion should be 

dismissed as barred by the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel. 

8. The charges sought by BIS to be 

adjudicated by the instant Motion should be 

dismissed as barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. 

9. The monetary penalty proposed by BIS 

should not be applied as violative of the 

Constitutional prohibition against cruel and 

unusually punishments. 

10. No denial order may be imposed upon 

Respondent, as IEEPA provides no statutory 

authorization for such penalty. 

11. The charges of ‘‘acting with knowledge 

of violation’’ should be dismissed because 

they are a) duplicitous as interpreted by BIS 

and b) unauthorized by IEEPA as amended in 

2007. 

12. The penalty enhancement under 

IEEPA, as retroactively amended in 2007, 

cannot be applied herein because it is 

violative of the Ex Post Facto clause of the 

Constitution of the United States. 

On October 20, 2009, the undersigned 

received Respondent’s ‘‘Objections to 

Qualifications of Administrative Law 

Judges and All Members of the Bureau 

of Industry and Security 

Decisionmaking Body.’’ Among other 

things, Respondent claims that he has 

filed a civil suit against various BIS 

officials and members of this Court. To 

date, the undersigned has not been 

served with the Complaint nor has any 

other Coast Guard Administrative Law 

Judge. The undersigned also received 

‘‘Respondent’s Declaration in Support of 

Objections to Qualifications of ALJs and 

all Other Members of Bureau of Industry 

and Security Decisionmaking Body.’’ 

On October 26, 2009, BIS submitted 

its response to the Order of October 15, 

2009 directing the parties to submit 

copies of their respective discovery 

requests by October 26, 2009 so that the 

Judge can determine whether 

enforcement pursuant to Section 

766.9(d), noted above, is appropriate. 

BIS claimed that Respondent did not 

answer or produce any documents in 

response to BIS’s Interrogatories and 

Requests for Production of Documents 

despite being ordered to do so. BIS also 

filed a Supplemental Submission on 

October 26, 2009 in response to the 

October 15, 2009 Order stating 

Respondent’s reply papers to BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision on 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen 

included material that ‘‘clearly is 

responsive to BIS’s discovery requests 

and thus should have been, but was not, 

provided to BIS, first in response to its 

discovery requests and then, most 

importantly, in response to the Court’s 

Order of August 20, 2009.’’ The items in 

question that Respondent did not 

disclose in response to BIS’s Request for 

Production of Documents is a 

Declaration from Sanja Milic of Micei 

and a purported e-mail from Range 

Systems. 

On November 2, 2009, BIS filed its 

Reply to Respondent’s Opposition to 

Motion for Summary Decision and on 

November 6, 2009, filed its Response to 

Respondent’s Objection to the 

Qualifications of Administrative Law 

Judges and All Other Members of 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Decisionmaking Body. 

The November 10, 2009 Memorandum 

and Order 

On November 10, 2009, the 

undersigned issued a Memorandum and 

Order disposing of numerous motions 

that the parties submitted on predecisional issues. In summary, the 

Memorandum and Order found that 

U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law 

Judges have jurisdiction to adjudicate 

cases for BIS involving export control 

regulations; that Respondent is not 

entitled to 20 days notice prior to 

service of a discovery request; that the 

deadline to complete discovery is not 

the deadline to make discovery requests; 

that documents are due on the dates 

specified, not simply mailed on the due 

dates; that Respondent’s Requests for 

Admissions to BIS which he claims 

were mailed on July 6, 2009 but not 

received until July 13, 2009, are Not 

Timely; and that BIS timely filed its 

Answers to Respondent’s Requests for 

Admission and Requests for Production 

of Documents on September 3, 2009. 

The November 10, 2009 

Memorandum and Order further 

Overruled the following numbered 

Respondent’s objections: (1) That the 

undersigned’s Order Setting Deadlines 

and Compelling Discovery Responses is 

null, void, and of no effect; (2) that the 

above-referenced Order is null, void, 

and of no effect because it was issued 

by the Administrative Law Judge in 

violation of minimum notice provisions 

required by 15 CFR 766.9(b) which is 

reasonably interpreted by Respondent to 

require at least a 20 day notice for 

service of the pertinent responses; (3) 

that the above-referenced Order is null, 

void, and of no effect because it 

implicitly requires that responses be 

sent via facsimile and mail while 

pursuant to 15 CFR 766.5(b) service by 

facsimile is deemed acceptable but 

could not be required by the 

Regulations; (4) that the abovereferenced Order is null, void, and of no 

effect because it implicitly requires that 

responses be produced to Eric Clark at 

a specified address, while 15 CFR 

766.9(b) provides for requests for 

production of documents for inspection 

and copying; (5) that the abovereferenced Order is null, void, and of no 

effect because this tribunal has no 

subject matter jurisdiction; (6) that the 

above-referenced Order is null, void, 

and of no effect because the 

Administrative Law Judge had no 

jurisdiction to issue said Order as his 

assignment in this matter was made in 

violation of the Administrative 

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 3344, 

and the regulations issued under said 

statute, 5 CFR 930.213. 

The November 10, 2009 

Memorandum and Order stayed the 

previous Order of September 4, 2009 

directing BIS to submit its evidence in 

support of its charges by September 30, 

2009 pending adjudication of BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision on 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen. 

The November 10, 2009 Memorandum 

and Order Denied Respondent’s October 

13, 2009 Motion that Requests for 

Admission be Deemed Admitted and 

That Matters Therein be Conclusively 

Established. The November 10, 2009 

Memorandum and Order also Granted 

Respondent’s request for production of 

certain Memoranda of Agreement and 

Office of Personnel Management letters 

of authorization establishing the 

jurisdiction of U.S. Coast Guard 

Administrative Law Judges. It further 

stated that the undersigned will make a 

determination or enter an Order deemed 

reasonable and appropriate in 

accordance with 15 CFR 766.9(d) on the 

issue of Respondent’s continued refusal 

to comply with BIS’s Interrogatories and 

Requests for Production of Documents 

despite previous Orders to do so. 

The November 10, 2009 

Memorandum and Order referenced 

BIS’s October 26, 2009 Response to the 

October 15, 2009 Order wherein it 

claimed Respondent’s Answer to BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision on 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen 

contained information and references to 

documents that Respondent is relying 

on which should have been disclosed in 

BIS’s discovery requests but were not 

disclosed. BIS’s Response requested 


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12Respondent’s defense number 16 in his 

‘‘Declaration of Yuri Montgomery in Opposition to 

BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision as to Charges 

Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen’’ states, ‘‘[w]hen I 

contacted Maintenance Products, Inc. to inquire of 

the availability of the products which are listed in 

the [sic] charges 6 and 13 of the Charging Letter 

herein, I was informed by Maintenance Products, 

Inc. that all of the products Micei was interested in 

purchasing were made in China and were very 

cheap and I did not even inquire of their prices.’’ 

Affirmative defense No. 16 in Respondent’s 

‘‘Corrected Answer’’ is, ‘‘[t]he goods subject to the 

Charging Letter are of foreign origin and are 

therefore not subject to the prohibitions of the 

purported Denial Order.’’ Affirmative defense No. 

11 in his original Answer is, ‘‘[t]he goods subject to 

the Charging Letter are of foreign origin and are 

therefore not subject to the Charging Letter.’’ 

Respondent’s defense number 16 and 

any argument or purported evidence 

related to that defense be stricken in 

accordance with 15 CFR 766.9(d) but 

recommended that the decision be 

postponed until after ruling on the 

Motion for Summary Decision on 

Charges Two, Six, Nine, and Thirteen 

because that Motion can be resolved 

without discovery sanctions.12

Therefore, the undersigned ruled that 

any decision on discovery sanctions 

will be made after the decision on BIS’s 

Motion for Summary Decision. 

On November 16, 2009, the 

undersigned Denied the Motion for 

Summary Decision on Charges Two, 

Six, Nine, and Thirteen finding that a 

genuine issue of material fact exists 

concerning whether the items in the 

Charging Letter are ‘‘the foreignproduced direct product of U.S.-origin 

technology.’’ The undersigned also 

found Respondent’s claim that BIS had 

no statutory authority to issue the 

Denial Order because the EAA was in 

lapse is without merit. 

On November 18, 2009, the 

undersigned issued an ‘‘Order Denying 

Objections to Qualifications of 

Administrative Law Judges and All 

Other Members of Bureau of Industry 

and Security Decisionmaking Body’’ 

finding that Respondent’s bare claims 

and use of other, unrelated and 

unsubstantiated allegations pertaining 

to another agency fail to overcome the 

presumption of honesty and integrity 

that accompanies administrative 

adjudicators. Among those arguments 

the undersigned rejected as being 

unsupported by any evidence was 

Respondent’s bare claim that the 

undersigned and BIS initiated this 

administrative proceeding in retaliation 

for Respondent’s prevailing in a BIS 

criminal proceeding. 

On November 20, 2009, the 

undersigned issued a Scheduling Order 

setting January 15, 2010 as the deadline 

for BIS to file evidence in support of 

charges; February 16, 2010 as the 

deadline for Respondent to reply and 

file evidence in support of his defenses; 

and March 3, 2010 as the deadline for 

BIS to file its rebuttal. 

On January 15, 2010, BIS filed its 

Notice of Withdrawal of Charge Ten 

citing Section 766.3(a) of the regulations 

which provides that ‘‘BIS may 

unilaterally withdraw charging letters at 

any time, by notifying the respondent 

and the administrative law judge.’’ The 

Notice further states, ‘‘[i]n authorizing 

BIS to unilaterally withdraw all of the 

charges in a charging letter, Section 

766.3(a) also at least impliedly 

authorizes BIS to unilaterally withdraw 

fewer than all of the charges in a 

charging letter by providing notice to 

the presiding administrative law judge 

and the respondent in the matter.’’ The 

undersigned views this interpretation as 

reasonable and consistent with 

procedures followed by other agencies. 

The undersigned received BIS’s 

‘‘Submission of Evidence in Support of 

Charges’’ on January 15, 2010 and its 

separate ‘‘Memorandum on Evidence 

Submitted in Support of Charges.’’ 

On February 16, 2010, Respondent 

filed his ‘‘Application for Extension of 

Time to File a Reply and Evidence in 

Support of his Defenses’’ and on 

February 19, 2010, Respondent filed his 

‘‘Emergency Application for Extension 

of Time to File a Reply and Evidence in 

Support of his Defenses’’ asking that the 

deadline be extended from February 16, 

2010 to February 24, 2010. 

On February 22, 2010, BIS filed its 

‘‘Response to Respondent’s Applications 

for Extension of Time to File a Reply 

and Evidence in Support of his 

Defenses.’’ In its Response, BIS noted 

that it has been five (5) months since 

Montgomery was ordered to respond to 

BIS’s discovery requests and, as noted 

in the September 4, 2009 Order, 

Respondent’s intentional refusal to 

comply is evident. BIS asked that if 

Respondent’s request is extended to 

February 24, 2010, then the time for BIS 

to file its reply ought to be extended to 

March 16, 2010. 

On February 23, 2010, the 

undersigned issued an ‘‘Order Granting 

Respondent’s Request for an Extension 

of Time to File Reply and Evidence in 

Support of His Defenses’’ to February 24, 

2010 and that BIS’s reply is due March 

16, 2010. 

On February 24, 2010, Respondent 

filed his ‘‘Objections to Evidence 

Submitted by BIS in Support of the 

Charges in its Charging Letter’’ and on 

February 25, 2010, he filed his 

‘‘Memorandum in Defense to Evidence 

Submitted by BIS in Support of the 

Charges in its Charging Letter.’’ Also on 

February 25, 2010 Respondent filed his 

‘‘Motion for Immediate Stay of This 

Civil Penalty.’’ His reason for an 

immediate stay was to await a decision 

from the DC Circuit in Micei 

International v. United States, Nos. 09– 

1155 and 09–1186, and ‘‘Respondent’s 

intention to file suit in U.S. District 

Court to enjoin this civil penalty 

proceeding and transfer this matter to 

the U.S. District Court due to futility of 

this proceeding and institutional bias as 

has been continuously demonstrated 

throughout this proceeding and the 

proceeding before this tribunal in the 

matter of Micei International.’’ 

Respondent’s ‘‘Objections to Evidence 

Submitted by BIS in Support of the 

Charges in its Charging Letter’’ lists two 

Objections: (1) That he objects to BIS’s 

unsworn, unverified, unsubstantiated, 

and unauthenticated ‘‘evidence’’ 

supporting its charges; and (2) that he 

objects to the letter submitted to BIS as 

Exhibit I, as such letter does not 

constitute evidence but is inadmissible 

self-serving legal opinion. 

Respondent’s ‘‘Memorandum in 

Defense to Evidence Submitted by BIS 

in Support of the Charges in its 

Charging Letter’’ lists the following 

eleven (11) affirmative defenses: 

1. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking 

herein over Yuri Montgomery because the 

general Denial Order imposed against Yuri 

Montgomery which he is alleged to have 

violated was null, void, and of no effect ab 

initio because BIS did not have statutory 

authority to impose an order against Yuri 

Montgomery at the time said Denial Order 

was issued. 

2. This Court lacks jurisdiction to 

adjudicate this proceeding because the 

purported assignment of the Administrative 

Law Judge herein has been made in violation 

of the statute and regulations regulating 

assignment of administrative law judges to 

BIS’s civil penalty proceedings. 

3. This proceeding is defective and should 

be dismissed because it has been filed in 

violation of the prohibition against Double 

Jeopardy in the Constitution of the United 

States. 

4. Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking 

herein over Yuri Montgomery because the 

BIS’s claims are not colorable, i.e., they are 

both immaterial and made solely for the 

purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over Yuri 

Montgomery and are wholly insubstantial 

and frivolous. 

5. The charges sought by BIS to be 

adjudicated by the instant Motion should be 

dismissed as barred by the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel. 

6. The charges sought by BIS to be 

adjudicated by the instant Motion should be 

dismissed as barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. 

7. The monetary penalty proposed by BIS 

should not be applied as violative of the 

Constitutional prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishments. 


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8. No denial order may be imposed upon 

Respondent, as IEEPA provides no statutory 

authorization for such penalty. 

9. The charges of ‘‘acting with knowledge 

of violation’’ should be dismissed because 

they are a) duplicitous as interpreted by BIS 

and b) unauthorized by IEEPA as amended in 

2007. 

10. The penalty enhancement under 

IEEPA, as retroactively amended in 2007, 

cannot be applied herein because it is 

violative of the Ex Post Facto clause of the 

Constitution of the United States. 

11. All of the charges in the Amended 

Charging Letter should be dismissed because 

BIS has failed to allege in said Charging 

Letter and prove that any of the subject 

products were not ‘‘the foreign-produced 

direct product of U.S.-origin technology’’ 

which has been expressly exempted from the 

prohibitions of the Denial Order. 

On March 5, 2010, BIS filed its 

Opposition to Respondent’s Motion for 

Immediate Stay and on the same day the 

undersigned issued an Order denying 

Respondent’s Motion. However, 

Respondent eventually received his 

requested Stay on March 16, 2010 when 

the parties submitted their ‘‘Stipulation 

to Stay Proceedings and Extend Time so 

that the Parties Can Engage in 

Settlement Negotiations.’’ Among other 

things, the parties asked for a thirty (30) 

day stay. On that same day, the 

undersigned issued an Order Granting 

the Stipulated Motion for a thirty (30) 

day stay and also directed BIS to file its 

rebuttal to Respondent’s evidence in 

support of his defenses ten (10) days 

after the stay terminates. 

On April 22, 2010, BIS filed its 

‘‘Rebuttal to Respondent’s Objections to 

Evidence and His Memorandum in 

Defense to Evidence Submitted by BIS.’’ 

As previously ordered on June 5, 

2009, this matter is adjudicated on the 

record since neither party has 

demanded a hearing in writing. BIS has 

submitted its evidence in support of the 

charges in the Charging Letter consisting 

of approximately fifty (50) exhibits as 

well as its ‘‘Memorandum on Evidence 

Submitted in Support of Charges.’’ 

Respondent submitted his 

‘‘Memorandum in Defense to Evidence 

Submitted by BIS in Support of its 

Charges in the Charging Letter,’’ and BIS 

submitted its ‘‘Rebuttal to Respondent’s 

Objections to Evidence and His 

Memorandum in Defense to Evidence 

Submitted by BIS.’’ 

Attachment B 

List of Exhibits 

Agency Exhibits 

Exhibits Supporting All Charges 

A. Charging Letter of July 1, 2008 with 

copy of signed and dated certified mail 

receipt. 

B. Denial Order of September 11, 2000 

as published in the Federal Register of 

September 22, 2000, 65 FR 57,313, 

57314. 

C. BIS Requests for Admission. 

D. Respondent’s Response to BIS 

Requests for Admission. 

E. Copy of BIS’s Requests for 

Admission combined with Respondent’s 

corresponding responses. 

F. September 13, 2000 Letter to 

Respondent from Eileen Albanese, 

Director, Office of Exporter Services, 

Bureau of Export Administration 

(subsequently renamed Bureau of 

Industry and Security). 

G. October 24, 2000 Letter from 

Respondent to under Secretary Reinsch. 

H. December 21, 2000 Letter from 

Under Secretary Reinsch to Respondent. 

I. August 21, 2009 Certified BIS 

Licensing Determination. 

J. Respondent’s Declaration filed In 

the Matter of Micei International 

(Docket No. 08–BIS–0005). 

K. [Blank]. 

Exhibits Supporting Charges 1 and 8 

L. June 9, 2003 e-mail message from 

Respondent to R. Uber at Hi-Tec Retail, 

Inc. with the subject line ‘‘New Order 

(received today).’’ 

M. June 18, 2003 invoice from Hi-Tec 

Retail, Inc. 

N. June 17, 2003 e-mail message from 

Respondent to R. Uber at Hi-Tec Retail, 

Inc. with the subject line ‘‘Fw: Attn: 

Regina.’’ 

O. June 24, 2003 e-mail message from 

R. Uber to Respondent with the subject 

line ‘‘RE: C/C Info for Orders.’’ 

P. June 24, 2003 e-mail message from 

S. Milic at Micei International to R. 

Uber at Hi-Tec Retail, Inc. with the 

subject line ‘‘Order status.’’ 

Q. June 24, 2003 Hi-Tec receipt. 

R. July 2, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel 

invoice for the shipment of ‘‘Magnum 

boots’’ from Hi-Tec Sports to Micei 

International. 

S. July 2, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel air 

waybill for the shipment of ‘‘Magnum 

boots’’ from Hi-Tec Sports to Mecei 

International. 

Evidence Supporting Charges 2 and 9 

T. Series of 3 e-mail messages, the 

first on July 8, 2003 from Respondent to 

Steve Thomas at Range Systems, the 

second on July 11, 2003 from Steve 

Thomas to Respondent, and the third on 

July 15, 2003 from Respondent to Steve 

Thomas and Mitch Petrie at Range 

Systems. 

U. July 15, 2003 Range Systems 

invoice from the sale of two gun 

clearing devices to Micei International, 

Inc./Yuri Montgomery. 

V. July 15, 2003 Range systems sales 

order billing Respondent for the 

purchase of two gun clearing devices. 

W. July 18, 2003 air waybill issued to 

Range Systems by Kuehne and Nagel. 

X. July 18, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel 

invoice for the shipment of ‘‘Guardian 

Clearing’’ from Range Systems to Micei 

International. 

Y. October 24, 2008 facsimile from 

Range Systems to Special Agent Poole of 

annotated e-mail stating that the gun 

clearing devices were manufactured in 

the United States. 

Z. November 2, 2009 Declaration of 

Steve Thomas. 

AA. October 29, 2009 Declaration of 

Tiffany Godfrey. 

Evidence Supporting Charge 3 

BB. August 5, 2003 e-mail message 

from Respondent to F. Corsi at Galls, 

Inc., with the subject ‘‘Fw: Shoe/Boot 

Request (Attn: Francesca Corsi).’’ 

Evidence Supporting Charges 4 & 11 

CC. February 24, 2003 e-mail message 

from K. Taylor at Galls, Inc. with the 

subject ‘‘Lead for you * * *’’ 

DD. August 5, 2003 e-mail message 

Respondent to F. Corsi at Galls, Inc. 

with the subject ‘‘Payment of $2562.44.’’ 

EE. September 5, 2003 Kuehne & 

Nagel air waybill for the shipment of 

‘‘Oxford athletic shoes’’ and ‘‘Remote 

strobe tubes’’ from Galls, Inc. to Micei 

International. 

FF. August 8, 2003 Ekopak invoice for 

the shipment of ‘‘Oxford athletic shoes’’ 

and ‘‘Remote strobe tubes’’ from Galls, 

Inc. to Micei International. 

GG. September 5, 2003 Kuehne & 

Nagel invoice for the shipment of 

‘‘Oxford athletic shoes’’ from Galls, Inc. 

to Micei International. 

Evidence Supporting Charges 5 & 12 

HH. July 31, 2003 e-mail message 

from Respondent to A. McCabe at Save 

On Promotional Products, Inc. with the 

subject ‘‘Fw: Polo/golf Shirts by 

TriMountain #138 Navy Blue (ATTN: 

MS. ANNE).’’ 

II. August 1, 2003 Save On 

Promotional Products, Inc. invoice. 

JJ. August 1, 2003 Save On 

Promotional Products, Inc. credit card 

authorization form completed by 

Respondent. 

KK. August 4, 2003 e-mail message 

from Respondent to A. McCabe Art Save 

On Promotional Products, Inc. with the 

subject ‘‘info for text on boxes/ 

paperwork.’’ 

LL. August 4, 2003 Mountain Gear 

Corp. sales order. 

MM. August 13, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel 

air waybill for the shipment of 

‘‘accessories’’ from Mountain Gear Corp. 

to Micei International. 


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NN. August 13, 2003 Kuehne & Nagel 

invoice for the shipment of ‘‘accessories’’ 

from Mountain Gear Corp. to Micei 

International. 

Evidence Supporting Charges 6 & 13 

OO. September 9, 2003 picking ticket 

from Maintenance Products, Inc. 

PP. September 9, 2003 credit card 

receipt from Maintenance Products, Inc. 

QQ. September 9, 2003 invoice from 

Maintenance Products, Inc. 

RR. September 15, 2003 air waybill 

issued to first Chain Supply Company, 

a Division of Maintenance Products, Inc. 

by Kuehne and Nagel. 

SS. September 15, 2003 invoice from 

Kuehne and Nagel, Inc./from Elk Grove 

Village, IL, to Kuehne and Nagel 

D.O.O.E.L. in Skipje, Macedonia. 

TT. August 27, 2009 Affidavit of Gary 

Jones. 

UU. October 28, 2003 declaration of 

Gary Jones. 

Evidence Supporting Charges 7 & 15 

VV. October 8, 2003 e-mail message 

from Respondent to F. Corsi at Galls, 

Inc. with the subject line ‘‘Payment for 

order #25473620/017—pls release/ship 

ASAP.’’ 

WW. October 8, 2003 e-mail message 

from Respondent to F. Corsi to F. Corsi 

at Galls, Inc. with the subject ‘‘VISA 

Authorisation.’’ 

XX. October 16, 2003 Estes Express 

Lines bill of lading. 

Respondent’s Exhibits 

Respondent offered the Declaration 

from Sanja Milic of Micei and a 

purported e-mail from Range Systems. 

Since Respondent had not complied 

with Discovery, the Administrative Law 

Judge struck both proposed exhibits 

from the record in accordance with 15 

CFR 766.9(d). 

Attachment C 

Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact 

Agency’s Proposed Findings of Fact 

Since neither party filed a demand for 

hearing, the Administrative Law Judge 

adjudicated this matter on the record in 

accordance with 15 CFR 766.6(c). The 

Respondent offered no proposed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law 

and did not dispute any of the Agency’s 

proposed findings. Instead, Respondent 

offered many affirmative defenses 

which the Administrative Law Judge 

ruled on in this Recommended Decision 

and Order. 

The Agency’s proposed findings of 

fact submitted in support of the Charges 

in the Charging Letter are reliable, 

probative, and credible. They prove by 

the preponderance of the evidence that 

Respondent committed the violations 

alleged in the Charging Letter. 

Therefore, they are all Accepted and 

Incorporated into the Recommended 

Decision. The footnotes are accepted but 

not necessarily incorporated herein. The 

Agency’s Proposed Findings of Fact are 

as follows: 

Facts Relating to All Charges 

1. The Denial Order issued against 

Montgomery on Sept. 11, 2000. Exh. B. 

2. The Denial Order was in effect at 

all times from September 11, 2000 

through and including January 22, 2009. 

Exh. B; Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

2. 

3. Montgomery received actual notice 

of the Denial Order via a letter on or 

about September 13, 2000 from BIS 

informing him of, and including a copy 

of, the Denial Order. Exh. F; see also 

Exh. E at Request/Response No. 3. 

4. The Denial Order was published in 

the Federal Register on September 22, 

2000 (65 FR 57,313). Exh. B. 

5. The following month, by letter 

dated October 24, 2000, Montgomery 

wrote to then-Under Secretary William 

Reinsch requesting reinstatement of his 

‘‘export privileges denied on September 

11, 2000.’’ Oct. 24, 2000 Letter, attached 

as Exh. G hereto; see also Exh. E at 

Request/Response No. 5. 

6. Montgomery’s request to reinstate 

his export privileges was denied by 

Under Secretary Reinsch on December 

21, 2000. Dec. 12, 2000 Letter, attached 

as Exh. H hereto. 

7. Montgomery had notice of the 

Denial Order no later than October 24, 

2000, he knew that it was in effect at all 

times from September 11, 2000 until 

January 22, 2009, and he knew that he 

was subject to the Denial Order at the 

time of each of the transactions at issue. 

Exh. E at Requests/Responses Nos. 2, 5, 

7m, 8m, 9h, 10m, 11m, 12m, and 13m. 

8. Paragraph I of the Denial Order 

states that ‘‘Until January 22, 2009, Yuri 

I. Montgomery, also known as Yuri I. 

Malinkovski, 518 Howard Avenue, N.E., 

Olympia, Washington 98506, may not, 

directly or indirectly, participate in any 

way in any transaction involving any 

commodity, software or technology 

(hereinafter collectively referred to as 

‘item’) exported or to be exported from 

the United States, that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity 

subject to the Regulations * * *.’’ Exh. 

B, at Paragraph I. 

9. The Denial Order specifically listed 

as non-exclusive examples of prohibited 

participation, ‘‘[c]arrying on 

negotiations concerning, or ordering, 

buying, receiving, using, selling, 

delivering, storing, disposing of, 

forwarding, transporting, financing, or 

otherwise servicing in any way, any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the Regulations, or in 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations * * *.’’ Exh. B. (Emphasis 

added.) 

10. The Denial Order similarly 

provided specifically that Montgomery 

was prohibited from ‘‘[b]enefiting in any 

way from any transaction involving any 

item exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the 

Regulations, or in any other activity 

subject to the Regulations.’’ Exh. B. 

11. Montgomery encouraged Micei ‘‘to 

use my credit card for Micei purchases 

as much as possible as it would allow 

me to accumulate United Airline miles 

through the use of my United Visa 

credit card * * *.’’ Oct. 12, 2008 

Montgomery Declaration, at ¶ 12. 

12. On several occasions, Montgomery 

‘‘made inquiries for Micei of the 

availability on some of the products’’ 

purchased for Micei. Id., at ¶ 14. 

Additional Facts Relating to Charges 1 

and 8 

13. On or about June 9, 2003, 

Montgomery placed an order with the 

Modesto, CA, division of Hi-Tec Retail, 

Inc. (‘‘Hi-Tec’’), a manufacturer and 

retailer of footwear, for 61 pair of 

Magnum boots. See June 9, 2009 e-mail 

message from Montgomery to Hi-Tec, 

attached as Exh. L hereto; June 18, 2003 

invoice from Hi-Tec, attached as Exh. M 

hereto; Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

7a. 

14. Hi-Tec’s initial attempt to charge 

Montgomery’s credit card for the order 

was declined by the issuing bank, 

causing R. Uber at Hi-Tec to seek 

assistance from Montgomery. See June 

24, 2003 e-mail message from R. Uber to 

Montgomery, attached as Exh. O hereto. 

15. Because Montgomery had just 

arrived in Macedonia, he subsequently 

informed Hi-Tec through Sanja Milic 

(an employee of Micei) that the issue 

with his credit card had been resolved. 

June 24, 2003 e-mail message from S. 

Milic to R. Uber, attached as Exh. P 

hereto. 

16. With the payment issue resolved, 

Montgomery paid for the boots with his 

credit card. Hi-Tec receipt, attached as 

Exh. Q hereto; Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 7b. 

17. Montgomery was reimbursed by 

Micei for the purchase of the boots. See 

Exh. E at Request/Response No. 7i. 

18. The boots were intended to be 

exported to Macedonia. See June 17, 

2003 e-mail from Montgomery to R. 

Uber, attached as Exh. N hereto; freight 

forwarder Kuehne & Nagel invoice, 

attached as Exh. R hereto; Kuehne & 


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13Montgomery’s statement concerning the 

$15,000 in airline frequent flier miles relates to all 

seven transactions alleged in the Charging Letter. 

14Remote strobe tubes are components of the 

flashing emergency lights found on vehicles such as 

police cars. 

Nagel air waybill, attached as Exh. S 

hereto; Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

7e. 

19. The boots were exported from the 

United States to Macedonia on or about 

July 2, 2003. See Exh. R; Exh. S. 

20. Montgomery benefitted from the 

purchase of the boots, stating that, ‘‘[t]he 

charges made with my credit card 

directly attributable to the ‘violations’ 

alleged against Micei in the Charging 

Letter herein amount to approximately 

$15,000, which allowed me to 

accumulate approximately $15,000 

miles with United Airlines.’’ 13

Montgomery Declaration attached as 

Exh. J hereto, at ¶ 18; see also Exh. E at 

Request/Response No. 7j. 

21. The boots are items subject to the 

Regulations. Section 734.3(a); see also 

BIS Licensing Determination, attached 

as Exh. I hereto. 

22. At the time of the transaction, 

Montgomery knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 7m. 

Additional Facts Relating to Charges 2 

and 9 

23. At Micei’s request, Montgomery 

contacted Range Systems, a New Hope, 

MN-based manufacturer of firing range 

equipment, by telephone ‘‘to inquire of 

the availability and price for their 

product * * *.’’ Oct. 12, 2008 

Montgomery Declaration, at ¶ 20. 

24. In a July 8, 2003 e-mail inquiry 

Montgomery sent to Range Systems, 

Montgomery, describing himself as 

Micei’s regional office, stated that 

‘‘Currently we have one [bid] which 

calls for various products including 5– 

10 clearing traps such as your RRI 

Guardian (GDN) model. * * * Please 

quote the price of your RRR GUARDIAN 

(GDN) model and e/m me a complete 

price list if possible * * *’’ Series of email messages between Montgomery 

and S. Thomas at Range Systems, 

attached as Exh. T hereto. 

25. Range Systems provided the 

requested price quote in a reply e-mail 

sent on July 11, 2003. Id. 

26. Montgomery placed an order for 

two of the gun clearing devices via an 

e-mail sent on July 15, 2003. Id.; see also 

Range Systems invoice, attached as Exh. 

U hereto; Range Systems sales order, 

attached as Exh. V hereto; Exh. E at 

Request/Response No. 8a. 

27. Montgomery paid Range Systems, 

Inc. for the gun clearing devices with 

his VISA credit card. Exh. T; see also 

Exh. E at Request/Response No. 8b. 

28. In his e-mail, Montgomery 

directed Range Systems to export the 

gun clearing devices to Micei in 

Macedonia and also requested that 

Range Systems e-mail shipping 

information concerning the weight and 

size of the boxes to him, and to two 

representatives (Iki Malinkovski and 

Sanja Milic) of Micei. Exh. T. 

29. Montgomery was reimbursed by 

Micei for the purchase of the gun 

clearing devices. Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 8i. 

30. The gun clearing devices were 

intended to be, and were in fact, 

exported from the United States to 

Macedonia on or about July 18, 2003. 

See Exh. T; see also Air waybill issued 

to Range Systems, attached as Exh. W 

hereto; Kuehne and Nagel invoice, 

attached as Exh. X hereto; Exh. E at 

Request/Response No. 8e. 

31. The gun clearing devices were 

manufactured in the United States. See 

Oct. 24, 2008 facsimile from Range 

Systems, attached as Exh. Y hereto. 

Range Systems’ director of sales, who 

sent the Oct. 2008 facsimile to BIS, 

emphatically confirmed the country of 

origin for the gun clearing devices in a 

subsequent declaration, stating that each 

of the components used to manufacture 

the devices are of U.S. origin and that 

‘‘[t]he Guardian clearing device has 

always been manufactured by Range 

Systems in Minnesota.’’ Nov. 2, 2009 

declaration of S. Thomas, attached as 

Exh. Z hereto; see also Oct. 29, 2009 

declaration of T. Godfrey, attached as 

Exh. AA hereto. 

32. The gun clearing devices are items 

subject to the Regulations. Section 

734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing 

Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto. 

33. At the time of the transaction, 

Montgomery knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 8m. 

34. Montgomery benefitted from the 

purchase of the gun clearing devices. 

See supra text accompanying note 8; 

See also Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

8j. 

Additional Facts Relating to Charge 3 

35. On August 5, 2003, Montgomery 

sent an e-mail to Galls, Inc. (‘‘Galls’’), a 

Lexington, KY-based distributor of 

police and military equipment and 

apparel, identifying himself as Micei’s 

U.S. operations and requesting a price 

quotation for 10,800 pair of shoes and 

boots. See Aug. 5, 2003 e-mail message 

from Montgomery to Francesca Corsi at 

Galls, attached as Ex. BB hereto; Exh. E 

at Request/Response 9a. 

36. The boots and shoes were 

intended for export from the United 

States to Macedonia. In the e-mail 

requesting a quotation, Montgomery 

states that ‘‘the samples need to have 

arrived at our HQ in Macedonia by 

[August 14].’’ Exh. BB; see also Exh. E 

at Request/Response 9d. 

37. Montgomery carried on 

negotiations concerning the shoes and 

boots, stating in an e-mail to Galls that 

Micei ‘‘will be putting up the 

performance bond at 20% in cash. 

Therefore, please make sure you quote 

the best possible price you can so we 

can win this one, too.’’ Exh. BB. 

38. The boots and shoes are items 

subject to the Regulations. Section 

734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing 

Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto. 

39. At the time the request for 

quotation was made, Montgomery knew 

he was subject to the Denial Order. See 

Exh. E at Request/Response No. 9m. 

Additional Facts Relating to Charges 4 

and 11 

40. Micei’s account number at Galls is 

25473620. Feb. 24, 2003 e-mail from K. 

Taylor at Galls to F. Corsi, attached as 

Exh. CC hereto. 

41. On or about August 5, 2003, 

Montgomery contacted Galls to pay for 

a previously-placed order—order 

number 25473620/016. See Aug. 5, 2003 

e-mail from Montgomery to F. Corsi, 

attached as Exh. DD hereto. 

42. The items in that order number 

consist of shoes and remote strobe 

tubes.14 See Kuehne & Nagel air waybill, 

attached as Exh. EE hereto; see also 

Ekopak invoice, attached as Exh. FF 

hereto. 

43. In Montgomery’s August 5, 2003 

e-mail to Galls, Montgomery stated that 

he was advised to pay for the items with 

his credit card by Micei and he 

provided his credit card information to 

pay $2,562.44 for the order. Exh. DD; 

see also Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

10b. 

44. Montgomery was reimbursed by 

Micei for the purchase of the shoes and 

remote strobe tubes. See Exh. E at 

Request/Response No. 10i. 

45. The shoes and remote strobe tubes 

were intended to be exported from the 

United States to Macedonia. See Exh. 

EE; Exh. FF; Exh. GG; Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 10e. 

46. The shoes and remote strobe tubes 

were exported from the United States to 

Macedonia on or about September 5, 

2003. See Exh. EE; Exh. GG. 

47. The shoes and remote strobe tubes 

are items subject to the Regulations. 

Section 734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing 

Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto. 

48. At the time of the transaction, 

Montgomery knew he was subject to the 


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15The invoice states that $21.52 of the $169.05 

that Montgomery paid is for ‘‘freight.’’ This fact 

demonstrates the inaccuracy of Montgomery’s 

statement that he ‘‘never paid any shipping charges 

***’’ Oct. 12, 2008 Montgomery Declaration, at 

¶ 30. The invoice and credit card receipt also 

contradict Montgomery’s claim that the total 

amount charged to his credit card for the 

Maintenance Products transaction was $147.53 

(which is, not coincidentally, the total amount 

minus the freight charge). See Oct. 12, 2008 

Montgomery Declaration, at ¶ 18; Exh. PP; Exh. OO; 

Exh. K, at 6. 

16According to Gary Jones, the ratchet strap was 

manufactured in China. 

17This declaration demonstrates the inaccuracy 

of the assertion made in the Oct. 16, 2009 

declaration by Sanja Milic, filed with Montgomery’s 

opposition to BIS’s motion for partial summary 

decision, that when the items Micei purchased from 

Maintenance Products arrived in Macedonia, all of 

the items were marked as being made in China. 

Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 10m. 

49. Montgomery benefitted from the 

purchase of the oxford shoes and remote 

strobe tubes. See supra text 

accompanying note 8; See also Exh. E at 

Request/Response No. 10j. 

Additional Facts Relating to Charges 5 

and 12 

50. On July 31, 2003, Montgomery 

placed an order for 150 shirts from Save 

On Promotional Products (‘‘Save On’’), 

located in Sandy, OR. See July 31, 2003 

e-mail from Montgomery to A. McCabe 

at Save On, attached as Exh. HH hereto. 

51. Upon receiving Montgomery’s 

order, Save On, in turn, ordered the 

shirts from its supplier, Tri-Mountain/ 

Mountain Gear Corp., located in 

Baldwin Park, CA. Mountain Gear sales 

order, attached as Exh. LL hereto. 

52. Montgomery ordered the shirts for 

or on behalf of Micei and the shirts were 

intended for export from the United 

States to Macedonia. See Exh. HH; Exh. 

LL; Aug. 4, 2003 e-mail message from 

Montgomery to A. McCabe at Save On, 

attached as Exh. KK hereto; Save On 

invoice, attached as Exh. II hereto; 

Kuehne & Nagel air waybill, attached as 

Exh. MM hereto; Kuehne & Nagel 

invoice attached as Exh. NN hereto; see 

also Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

11e. 

53. Montgomery paid for the order 

with his credit card. Save On credit card 

authorization form, attached as Exh. JJ 

hereto; Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

11b. 

54. Montgomery was reimbursed by 

Micei for the purchase of the shirts. See 

Exh. E at Request/Response No. 11i. 

55. The shirts were exported from the 

United States to Macedonia on or about 

Aug. 13, 2003. See Exh. MM; Exh. NN. 

56. The shirts are items subject to the 

Regulations. Section 734.3(a); see also 

BIS Licensing Determination, attached 

as Exh. I hereto. 

57. At the time of the transaction, 

Montgomery knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 11m. 

58. Montgomery benefited from the 

purchase of the shirts. See supra text 

accompanying note 8; See also Exh. E at 

Request/Response No. 11j. 

Additional Facts Relating to Charges 6 

and 13 

59. Montgomery ordered two load 

binders, one ratchet strap, one binder 

chain, and one safety shackle, from 

Maintenance Products, Inc., located in 

Lowell, Indiana, on or about September 

9, 2003. See Maintenance Products 

picking ticket, attached as Exh. OO 

hereto and Maintenance Products 

invoice, attached as Exh. QQ hereto; see 

also Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

12a. 

60. Montgomery paid Maintenance 

Products, Inc. for the load binders, 

ratchet strap, binder chain, and safety 

shackle with his VISA credit card. 

Credit card receipt, attached as Exh. PP 

hereto; see also Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 12b.15

61. Montgomery was reimbursed by 

Micei for the purchase of the load 

binders, ratchet strap, binder chain and 

safety shackle. See Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 12i. 

62. The load binders, ratchet strap, 

binder chain, and safety shackle were 

intended to be, and were in fact, 

exported from the United States to 

Macedonia on or about September 15, 

2003. See Air waybill issued to First 

Chain Supply Co., attached as Exh. RR 

hereto; Invoice from Kuehne and Nagel, 

attached as Exh. SS hereto; see also Exh. 

E at Request/Response No. 12e. 

63. The load binders, binder chain, 

and safety shackle were manufactured 

in the United States. Aug. 27, 2009 

affidavit of Gary Jones, attached Exh. TT 

hereto.16 Maintenance Products’ owner 

subsequently provided a declaration 

reaffirming that the load binders, binder 

chain, and safety shackle were 

manufactured in the United States and 

demonstrating that those items were 

manufactured in the United States and 

marked accordingly. Oct. 28, 2009 

declaration of Gary Jones, attached as 

Exh. UU hereto.17

64. The load binders, ratchet strap, 

binder chain and safety shackle are 

items subject to the Regulations. Section 

734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing 

Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto. 

65. At the time of the transaction, 

Montgomery knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 12m. 

66. Montgomery benefited from the 

purchase of the load binders, ratchet 

strap, binder chain and safety shackle. 

See supra text accompanying note 8; 

See also Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

12j. 

Additional Facts Relating to Charges 7 

and 14 

67. In October 2003, Montgomery, 

describing himself as Micei’s North 

American operations, placed an order 

for uniform pants with Galls (Galls 

number 25473720/017). See Oct. 8, 2003 

e-mail message from Montgomery to F. 

Corsi at Galls referring to ‘‘payment,’’ 

attached as Exh. VV hereto. 

68. Montgomery, again describing 

himself as representing Micei, paid for 

the order with his credit card. Oct. 8 

2003 e-mail message from Montgomery 

to F. Corsi at Galls referring to ‘‘VISA 

authorization,’’ attached as Exh. WW 

hereto; see also Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 13b. 

69. A bill of lading from freight 

forwarder Estes Express Lines states that 

the uniform pants were to be shipped 

from Liberty Uniform in Spartanburg, 

SC (Galls’ supplier) to Micei in 

Macedonia. Estes bill of lading, attached 

as Exh. XX hereto; see also Exh. E at 

Request/Response No. 13e. 

70. Montgomery was reimbursed by 

Micei for the purchase of the uniform 

pants. See Exh. E at Request/Response 

No. 13i. 

71. The uniform pants are items 

subject to the Regulations. Section 

734.3(a); see also BIS Licensing 

Determination, attached as Exh. I hereto. 

72. At the time of the transaction, 

Montgomery knew he was subject to the 

Denial Order. See Exh. E at Request/ 

Response No. 13m. 

73. Montgomery benefited from the 

purchase of the uniform pants by 

earning airline frequent flier miles by 

making the purchase on his credit card. 

See supra text accompanying note 8; 

See also Exh. E at Request/Response No. 

13j. 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 2010 / Notices 82487 

Attachment D 

Notice to the Parties Regarding Review 

by the Under Secretary 

TITLE 15—COMMERCE AND FOREIGN 

TRADE 

SUBTITLE B—REGULATIONS 

RELATING TO COMMERCE AND 

FOREIGN TRADE 

CHAPTER VII—BUREAU OF 

INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

SUBCHAPTER C—EXPORT 

ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS 

PART 766—ADMINISTRATIVE 

ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 

Section 766.22 Review by Under 

Secretary 

(a) Recommended decision. For 

proceedings not involving violations 

relating to part 760 of the EAR, the 

administrative law judge shall 

immediately refer the recommended 

decision and order to the Under 

Secretary. Because of the time limits 

provided under the EAA for review by 

the Under Secretary, service of the 

recommended decision and order on the 

parties, all papers filed by the parties in 

response, and the final decision of the 

Under Secretary must be by personal 

delivery, facsimile, express mail or 

other overnight carrier. If the Under 

Secretary cannot act on a recommended 

decision and order for any reason, the 

Under Secretary will designate another 

Department of Commerce official to 

receive and act on the recommendation. 

(b) Submissions by parties. Parties 

shall have 12 days from the date of 

issuance of the recommended decision 

and order in which to submit 

simultaneous responses. Parties 

thereafter shall have eight days from 

receipt of any response(s) in which to 

submit replies. Any response or reply 

must be received within the time 

specified by the Under Secretary. 

(c) Final decision. Within 30 days 

after receipt of the recommended 

decision and order, the Under Secretary 

shall issue a written order affirming, 

modifying or vacating the recommended 

decision and order of the administrative 

law judge. If he/she vacates the 

recommended decision and order, the 

Under Secretary may refer the case back 

to the administrative law judge for 

further proceedings. Because of the time 

limits, the Under Secretary’s review will 

ordinarily be limited to the written 

record for decision, including the 

transcript of any hearing, and any 

submissions by the parties concerning 

the recommended decision. 

(d) Delivery. The final decision and 

implementing order shall be served on 

the parties and will be publicly 

available in accordance with Sec. 766.20 

of this part. 

(e) Appeals. The charged party may 

appeal the Under Secretary’s written 

order within 15 days to the United 

States Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia pursuant to 50 U.S.C. app. 

Sec. 2412(c)(3). 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that I have served the 

foregoing recommended decision & 

order via overnight carrier to the 

following persons and offices: 

Under Secretary for Export 

Administration, Bureau of Industry 

and Security, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, Room H–3839, 14th & 

Constitution Avenue, NW., 

Washington, DC 20230. Telephone: 

(202) 482–5301. 

John T. Masterson, Jr., Esq., Chief 

Counsel for Industry and Security, 

Joseph V. Jest, Esq., Chief, 

Enforcement and Litigation, Parvin R. 

Huda, Esq., Senior Counsel, Eric 

Clark, Esq., Attorney Advisor, 

Attorneys for Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Office of Chief Counsel for 

Industry and Security, U.S. 

Department of Commerce, Room H– 

3839, 14th Street & Constitution 

Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. 

Telephone: (202) 482–5301. 

Yuri I. Montgomery, 2912 10th Place 

West, Seattle, WA 98119. Telephone: 

(202) 283–4955. 

Hearing Docket Clerk, USCG, ALJ 

Docketing Center, 40 S. Gay Street, 

Room 412, Baltimore, Maryland 

21202–4022. Phone: 410–962–5100. 

Done and dated October 28, 2010, in New 

York, New York. 

Regina V. Maye, 

Paralegal Specialist to the Administrative 

Law Judge. 

[FR Doc. 2010–32563 Filed 12–29–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with NOTICES2