Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 11:00 a.m. EDT 

June 15, 2004 CONTRACT 

MANAGEMENT 

Contracting for Iraq 

Reconstruction and for 

Global Logistics Support 

Statement of David M. Walker 

Comptroller General of the United States 

GAO-04-869T 
Page 1 GAO-04-869T 

Chairman Davis, Ranking Member Waxman, and Members of the 

Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to discuss some of the 

work the General Accounting Office (GAO) is undertaking to address 

various operations and rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Specifically, GAO has a 

body of ongoing work looking at a range of issues involving Iraq, including 

Iraq’s transitional administrative law, efforts to restore essential services 

to the Iraqi people, and the effectiveness of logistics activities during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, among others. Importantly, given the challenging 

security environment in Iraq and the various other accountability 

organizations involved in the oversight process, we are attempting to 

coordinate our engagement planning and execution with other 

organizations as appropriate. 

Today, I would like to discuss (1) our report that we released yesterday on 

the contract award procedures for contracts awarded in fiscal year 2003 to 

help rebuild Iraq1 and (2) our preliminary findings on the military’s use of 

global logistics support contracts. These support contracts have emerged 

as important tools in providing deployed military services with a wide 

range of logistics services. 

Before I discuss our findings, I would like to briefly touch upon the scope 

of these two efforts. First, given the widespread congressional interest in 

ensuring that Iraq reconstruction contracts are awarded properly and 

administered effectively, we initiated a review under my authority that 

focused on reconstruction-related contract actions by the Department of 

Defense (DOD) (primarily the U.S. Army, including the Army Corps of 

Engineers), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and 

the Department of State. Specifically, we judgmentally selected 25 fiscal 

year 2003 contract actions, consisting of 14 new contracts awarded using 

other than full and open competition and 11 task orders issued under 

existing contracts. These 25 contract actions represented about 97 percent 

of the nearly $3.7 billion that had been obligated for Iraqi reconstruction 

through September 30, 2003. We conducted this work between May 2003 

and April 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

 1

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award 

Procedures and Management Challenges, GAO-04-605 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2004). 
Page 2 GAO-04-869T 

Second, our work on the military’s use of global logistics support 

contracts, initiated at the request of the Ranking Members of this 

committee and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, is one of 

a series of studies we have done on the military’s use of private 

contractors to support deployed forces.2

 This work looks broadly across 

each of the services and includes four contracts: (1) the Army’s Logistics 

Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract; (2) the Air Force’s 

Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) contract; (3) the U.S. Army, 

Europe’s Balkan Support Contract (BSC); and (4) the Navy’s Construction 

Capabilities (CONCAP) contract. We have completed our fieldwork and 

are now drafting our report, which we expect to publish this summer. In 

performing our work, we examined a wide range of contract documents 

and contracting guidance and met with contracting officers, contract 

customers, and the contractors to gain a comprehensive understanding of 

the contracts, the contract management process, and the issues related to 

using these contracts. We conducted this work between August 2003 and 

June 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

With regard to the award of fiscal year 2003 Iraq reconstruction contracts, 

we found that agencies generally complied with applicable laws and 

regulations governing competition when using sole-source or limited 

competition approaches to award new contracts. However, they did not 

always do so when issuing task orders under existing contracts. In several 

instances, we found that contracting officers issued task orders for work 

that was not within the scope of the underlying contracts. The out-ofscope work under these orders should have been awarded using 

competitive procedures or, because of the exigent circumstances involved, 

supported by a justification for other than full and open competition in 

accordance with legal requirements. In this regard, given the needs 

relating to and the challenges associated with Iraq reconstruction efforts, 

such justifications were likely possible but needed to be made and 

documented to comply with the law and protect the taxpayer’s interests. 

 2

 See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: 

Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-63

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 1997); U.S. General Accounting Office, Contingency 

Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans. 

GAO/NSIAD-00-225 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2000); and U.S. General Accounting Office, 

Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces But Are Not 

Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003). 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-869T 

We made several recommendations to the Secretary of the Army, including 

reviewing out-of-scope task orders to address outstanding issues and take 

appropriate actions, as necessary. We also recommended that the 

Secretary of Defense evaluate the lessons learned in Iraq and develop a 

strategy for assuring that adequate acquisition staff and other resources 

can be made available in a timely manner. DOD generally concurred with 

our recommendations. 

With regard to DOD’s use of global logistics support contracts, we found 

mixed results in each of the four areas we reviewed: planning, oversight, 

efficiency, and personnel. For example, we found that some DOD 

customers planned quite well for the use of the contracts, following 

service instructions and including the contractor early in planning. 

Conversely, we found that the use of the LOGCAP contract in Kuwait and 

Iraq was not adequately planned, nor was it planned in accordance with 

applicable Army guidance. Given the lack of early and adequate planning 

and contractor involvement, two key ingredients needed to maximize 

LOGCAP support and minimize cost—a comprehensive statement of work 

and early contractor involvement—were missing. We also found that while 

oversight processes were in place and functioning well in some places, 

there were several areas needing improvement, such as in reaching 

agreement on terms, specifications and prices of services to be delivered. 

We also found that while some military commands actively looked for 

ways to save money, others exhibited little concern for cost 

considerations. Finally, shortages in personnel trained in contract 

management and oversight is also an issue that needs to be addressed. Our 

report will make a number of recommendations to address these 

shortcomings. 

We found that the agencies responsible for rebuilding Iraq generally 

complied with applicable requirements governing competition when 

awarding new reconstruction contracts in fiscal year 2003. While the 

Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 requires that federal contracts be 

awarded on the basis of full and open competition, the law and 

implementing regulations recognize that there may be circumstances 

under which full and open competition would be impracticable, such as 

when contracts need to be awarded quickly to respond to unforeseen and 

urgent needs or when there is only one source for the required product or 

service. In such cases, agencies are given authority by law to award 

contracts under limited competition or on a sole-source basis, provided 

that the proposed actions are appropriately justified and approved. 

Compliance with 

Competition 

Requirements 
Page 4 GAO-04-869T 

We reviewed 14 new contracts that were awarded in fiscal year 2003 using 

other than full and open competition: a total of 5 sole-source contracts 

awarded by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Army Field Support 

Command, and USAID; and 9 limited competition contracts awarded by 

the Department of State, the Army Contracting Agency, and USAID. For 13 

of these new contracts, agency officials adequately justified their decisions 

and complied with the statutory and regulatory competition requirements. 

For example, USAID officials awarded seven contracts under limited 

competition and two sole-source contracts citing an exception to the 

competition requirements that was provided for under the Federal 

Property and Administrative Services Act.3

 USIAD concluded that the use 

of standard competitive procedures would not enable it to put in place 

foreign aid programs and activities for Iraq in a timely manner. We found 

that USAID’s justification and approval documentation supporting the 

award of these contracts complied with applicable requirements. As I will 

shortly discuss in more detail, we also found that the Army Corps of 

Engineers properly justified the award of a sole-source contract to restore 

Iraq’s oil infrastructure. In one case, however, the Department of State 

justified and approved the use of limited competition under a unique 

authority that, in our opinion, may not be a recognized exception to the 

competition requirements. At the same time, State took steps to obtain 

some competition by inviting offers from four firms. In addition, it is likely 

that State could have justified and approved its limited competition under 

recognized exceptions to the competition requirements. 

With respect to issuing a task order under an existing contract, the 

competition law does not require competition beyond that obtained for the 

initial contract award,4

 provided the task order does not increase the 

scope of the work, period of performance, or maximum value of the 

contract under which the order is issued. The scope, period, or maximum 

value may be increased only by modification of the contract, and 

competitive procedures are required to be used for any such increase 

unless an authorized exception applies. As we noted in our report released 

yesterday, determining whether work is within the scope of an existing 

 3

 The Act’s authority for waiving competitive contracting procedures that would 

impair foreign aid programs was recently recodified and enacted into positive law 

(40 U.S.C. § 113(e)). 

4

 If more than one contractor was awarded a contract, however, then all the contractors are 

required to be provided a fair opportunity to be considered for the task order. 
Page 5 GAO-04-869T 

task order contract is primarily an issue of contract interpretation and 

judgment by the contracting officer. 

• We found several compliance problems when agencies issued task orders 

under existing contracts. Specifically, of the 11 task orders we reviewed, 

7 were, in whole or part, not within scope. For example, the Defense 

Contracting Command-Washington (DCC-W)5

 improperly used a General 

Services Administration (GSA) schedule contract to issue two task orders 

to the Science Applications International Corporation with a combined 

value of over $107 million for work that was outside the scope of the 

schedule contract. One order involved developing a news media 

capability—including radio and television programming and 

broadcasting—in Iraq. The other required the contractor to recruit people 

identified by DOD as subject matter experts, enter into subcontracts with 

them, and provide them with travel and logistical support within the 

United States and Iraq. The GSA schedule contract, however, was for 

management, organizational, and business improvement services for 

federal agencies. In our view, the statements of work for both task orders 

were outside the scope of the schedule contract. 

• Another example of an agency issuing a task order that was outside the 

scope of the underlying contract involved the Army Field Support 

Command’s $1.9 million task order for contingency planning for the Iraqi 

oil infrastructure mission under the LOGCAP contract with Kellogg Brown 

& Root.6

 This task order, issued in November 2002, required the contractor 

to develop a plan to repair and restore Iraq’s oil infrastructure should Iraqi 

forces damage or destroy it. Because the contractor was knowledgeable 

about the U.S. Central Command’s planning for conducting military 

operations, DOD officials determined that the contractor was uniquely 

positioned to develop the contingency support plan. DOD also determined 

that developing the contingency plan was within the scope of the overall 

LOGCAP contract. We have concluded, however, that preparation of the 

contingency support plan for this specific mission (i.e. restoring Iraq’s oil 

infrastructure) was beyond the scope of the contract. Specifically, we read 

the LOGCAP statement of work as providing for contingency planning 

only when the execution of the mission involved is within the scope of the 

 5

 DCC-W, a division within the office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the 

Army, provides administrative support, including contracting support, to DOD components 

located in the National Capital Region. 

6

 The LOGCAP contract, which was competitively awarded in 2001, requires the contractor 

to provide the Army and other entities with planning and a broad range of logistics services 

in wartime and other operations. The Army has used LOGCAP to support both military 

operations and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 
Page 6 GAO-04-869T 

contract. In this regard, all parties—including GAO and DOD—agree that 

repairing Iraq’s oil infrastructure would not have been within the scope of 

the LOGCAP contract. Consequently, we concluded that planning the oil 

infrastructure restoration was also not within the scope of the contract. 

The Army Field Support Command should have prepared a written 

justification to authorize the work without competition. In light of the 

exigent circumstances, such a justification was likely possible but needed 

to be made and documented to comply with the law and protect the 

taxpayer’s interests. 

• DOD planners believed early on that issuance of this task order would 

result in Kellogg Brown & Root being uniquely qualified to initially execute 

the plan for restoring the Iraqi oil infrastructure, the so-called “RIO 

contract.” Subsequently, the RIO contract was awarded in March 2003 to 

Kellogg Brown & Root.7

 The contracting officer’s written justification for 

the sole-source contract outlined the rationale for the decision.8

 The 

justification was approved by the Army’s senior procurement executive, as 

required. We reviewed the justification and approval documentation and 

determined that it generally complied with applicable legal standards. 

We made several recommendations to the Secretary of the Army to review 

out-of-scope task orders to address outstanding issues and take 

appropriate actions, as necessary. DOD generally concurred with the 

recommendations and noted that it was in the process of taking corrective 

actions. DOD also agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense evaluate the lessons learned in Iraq and develop a strategy for 

assuring that adequate acquisition staff and other resources can be made 

available in a timely manner. 

I will now turn to discussing our ongoing work on DOD’s use of global 

logistics support contracts. As I previously noted, we looked at four such 

contracts, which have been used by all the military services to provide a 

wide array of services, including operating dining facilities and providing 

housing, in more than half a dozen countries, including Iraq, Kuwait, and 

Afghanistan. In total, the estimated value of the work under the current 

contracts is $12 billion, including $5.6 billion for work in Iraq through 

 7

 According to the Army Corps of Engineers, more than $2.5 billion had been obligated on 

the contract as of May 2004. 

8

 As we reported, DOD concluded that there was only one source with the capability to 

perform emergency repairs to the oil infrastructure given (1) the classified nature of the 

planning efforts, (2) the contractor’s role in those efforts, and (3) the imminent 

commencement of hostilities. 

DOD’s Use of 

Logistics Support 

Contracts 
Page 7 GAO-04-869T 

May 2004. Before summarizing our preliminary findings, let me first make 

an overall observation about the vital services that these types of contracts 

provide. The contractors and the military services have, for the most part, 

worked together to meet military commanders’ needs, sometimes in very 

hazardous or difficult circumstances. For example, the LOGCAP contract 

is providing life and logistics support to more than 165,000 soldiers and 

civilians under difficult security circumstances in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Kuwait, and Djibouti, and customers told us they are generally pleased 

with the service the contractor is providing. The AFCAP contractor is 

providing air traffic management at air bases throughout central Asia, 

supplementing scarce Air Force assets and providing needed rest for Air 

Force service members who also perform this function. Using the 

CONCAP contract, the Navy has constructed detainee facilities (including 

a maximum security prison) at Guantanamo Bay on time and within 

budget. Projects at Guantanamo have increased the safety of both the 

detainees and the U.S. forces guarding them and resulted in real savings in 

reduced personnel tempo. Finally, the BSC continues to provide a myriad 

of high quality services to troops in Kosovo and Bosnia, and the customer 

works with the contractor to identify costs savings. 

Within this overall context, we found mixed results in each of the four 

areas we reviewed—planning, oversight, efficiency and personnel—with 

variations occurring among the four contracts and among the various 

commands using them. Our report, which will be issued later this year, will 

make a number of recommendations to address the shortcomings we 

identified in these areas. 

In assessing DOD’s planning, we found that some customers planned quite 

well for the use of the contracts, following service guidance and including 

the contractor early in planning. For example, in planning for Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Army, Europe, was tasked with supporting the 

anticipated movement of troops through Turkey into Iraq, and our review 

of that planning showed that the command followed applicable Army 

guidance to good effect. In October 2002, the command brought 

contractor personnel to its headquarters in Europe to help plan and 

develop the statement of work. According to a briefing provided by 

U.S. Army, Europe, contractor planners brought considerable knowledge 

of contractor capabilities, limitations, and operations, and their 

involvement early in the planning efforts increased understanding of the 

requirements and capabilities, facilitated communication regarding the 

statement of work, and enhanced mission completion. 

Planning 
Page 8 GAO-04-869T 

Conversely, we found that the use of LOGCAP in Kuwait and Iraq was not 

adequately planned, nor was it planned in accordance with applicable 

Army guidance. Given the lack of early and adequate planning and 

contractor involvement, two key ingredients needed to maximize LOGCAP 

support and minimize cost—a comprehensive statement of work and early 

contractor involvement—were missing. Specifically: 

• A plan to support the troops in Iraq was developed in May 2003, but was 

not comprehensive because the contractor was not involved in the early 

planning and it did not include all of the dining facilities, troop housing, 

and other services that the Army has since added to the task order. 

According to an official from the 101st Airborne Division, there was a lack 

of detailed planning for the use of LOGCAP at the theater and division 

levels for the sustainment phase of the operation. He added that Army 

planners should develop a closer working relationship with the divisions 

and the contractor. 

• Task orders were frequently revised. These revisions generated a 

significant amount of rework for the contractor and the contracting 

officers. Additionally, time spent reviewing revisions to the task orders is 

time that is not available for other oversight activities. While operational 

considerations may have driven some of these changes, we believe others 

were more likely to have resulted from ineffective planning. For example, 

the task order supporting the troops in Iraq was revised 7 times in less 

than 1 year. Frequent revisions have not been limited to this task order. 

Task order 27, which provides support to U.S troops in Kuwait (estimated 

value of $426 million as of May 2004), was changed 18 times between 

September 2002 and December 2003, including 5 changes in one month, 

some on consecutive days. As of May 11, 2004, the contracting office, 

DCMA, and the contractor had processed more than 176 modifications to 

LOGCAP task orders. 

In some cases, we found that contract oversight processes were in place 

and functioning well. For example, the Defense Contract Management 

Agency (DCMA) had principal oversight responsibility for the LOGCAP 

and AFCAP contracts and the BSC,9

 and DCMA generally provided good 

overall contract oversight, although we found some examples where it 

could have improved its performance. For example: 

 9

 While oversight of a contract is the responsibility of the contracting officer, the 

contracting officer may delegate some oversight responsibilities to DCMA. 

Contract Oversight 
Page 9 GAO-04-869T 

• Effective oversight of the diverse functions performed under the contracts 

requires government personnel with knowledge and expertise in these 

specific areas. DCMA contract administrators are contracting 

professionals, but many have limited knowledge of field operations. In 

these situations, DCMA normally uses contracting officer’s technical 

representatives. Contracting officer’s technical representatives are 

customers who have been designated by their units and appointed and 

trained by the administrative contracting officer. They provide technical 

oversight of the contractor’s performance. We found that DCMA had not 

appointed these representatives at all major sites in Iraq. Officials at the 

101st Airborne Division, for example, told us that they had no contracting 

officer’s technical representatives during their year in Iraq, even though 

the division used LOGCAP services extensively. 

• For task orders executed in southwest Asia, the AFCAP procuring 

contracting officer delegated the property administration responsibility to 

DCMA administrative contracting officers. However, contract 

administrators in southwest Asia did not ensure that the contractor had 

established and maintained a property control system to track items 

acquired under the contract. In addition, DCMA contracting officers in 

southwest Asia did not have a system in place to document what the 

contractor was procuring in support of AFCAP task orders and what was 

being turned over to the Air Force. As a result, as of April 2004, neither 

DCMA nor the Air Force could account for approximately $2 million worth 

of tools and construction equipment purchased through the AFCAP 

contract. 

An important element of contract administration is the definitizing of task 

orders, that is, reaching agreement with the contractor on the terms, 

specifications, or price of services to be delivered. All of the contracts 

included in our review were cost-plus award fee contracts. These 

contracts allow the contractor to be reimbursed for reasonable, allowable, 

and allocable costs incurred to the extent prescribed by the contract and 

provide financial incentives based on performance. Cost-plus award fee 

contracts allow the government to evaluate a contractor’s performance 

according to specified criteria and to grant an award amount within 

designated parameters. Award fees can serve as a valuable tool to help 

control program risk and encourage excellence in contract performance. 

To reap the advantages that cost-plus award fee contracts offer, the 

government must implement an effective award fee process. Any delays in 

definitizing task orders, however, make cost-control incentives in these 

award fee contracts less effective as a cost control tool since there is less 

work remaining to be accomplished and therefore less costs to be 

controlled by the contractor. 
Page 10 GAO-04-869T 

While we found that AFCAP and BSC task orders were definitized quickly, 

and CONCAP task orders do not require definitization since the terms, 

specifications, and price are agreed to before work begins, we also found 

that many LOGCAP task orders remain undefinitized for months, and 

sometimes more than a year, after they were due to be completed and 

after billions of dollars of work had been completed. Because task orders 

have not been definitized, LOGCAP contracting personnel have not 

conducted an award fee board. I would like to note, however, that this 

condition is not limited to the LOGCAP contract. We stated in our report 

released yesterday that the Army Corps of Engineers has yet to definitize 

its March 2003 contract to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure or one of its 

contracts to rebuild Iraq’s electrical infrastructure and recommended that 

the undefinitized contracts and task orders be definitized as soon as 

possible. DOD agreed with this recommendation and identified a number 

of steps being taken to do so. 

We again found mixed results in evaluating the attention to economy and 

efficiency in the use of contracts. In some cases, we saw military 

commands actively looking for ways to save money in the contracts. For 

example, U.S. Army, Europe, reported savings of approximately 

$200 million under the BSC by reducing labor costs, by reducing services, 

and by closing or downsizing camps that were no longer needed. The 

$200 million is almost 10 percent of the current contract ceiling price of 

$2.098 billion. In addition to these savings, U.S. Army, Europe, routinely 

sends in teams of auditors from its internal review group to review 

practices and to make recommendations to improve economy and 

efficiency. In others, however, most notably the LOGCAP contract in Iraq 

and Kuwait, we saw very little concern for cost considerations. It was not 

until December 2003, for example, that the Army instructed commands to 

look for ways to economize on the use of this contract. Similarly, we found 

that the Air Force did not always select the most economical and efficient 

method to obtain services. It used the AFCAP contract to supply 

commodities for its heavy construction squadrons, although use of the 

contract to procure and deliver commodity supplies required that the Air 

Force pay the contractor’s costs plus an additional award fee. Air Force 

officials said that they used AFCAP because not enough contracting and 

finance personnel were deployed to buy materials quickly or in large 

quantities. AFCAP program managers have recognized that the use of a 

cost-plus award fee contract to buy commodities may not be the most 

cost-effective method and said that the next version of the contract may 

allow for either firm-fixed prices or cost-plus fixed fee procurements for 

commodity purchases. 

Economy and Efficiency 
Page 11 GAO-04-869T 

We found that shortages of personnel have also made contract oversight 

difficult. For example, while DCMA has deployed contracting officers to 

several countries throughout southwest and central Asia and the Balkans 

to provide on-site contract administration, DCMA officials believe that 

additional resources are needed to effectively support the LOGCAP and 

AFCAP contracts. Administrative contracting officers in Iraq, for example, 

have been overwhelmed with their duties as a result of the expanding 

scope of some of the task orders. Additionally, some Army and Air Force 

personnel with oversight responsibilities did not receive the training 

necessary to effectively accomplish their jobs. Finally, we found that 

military units receiving services from the contracts generally lacked a 

comprehensive understanding of their contract roles and responsibilities. 

For example, commanders did not understand the part they played in 

establishing task order requirements, nor did they fully understand the 

level of support required by the contractors. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the United States, along with its coalition 

partners and various international organizations and donors, has 

undertaken an enormously complex, costly, and challenging effort to 

rebuild Iraq in an unstable security environment. At the early stages of 

these efforts, agency procurement officials were confronted with little 

advance warning on which to plan and execute competitive procurement 

actions, an urgent need to begin reconstruction efforts quickly, and 

uncertainty as to the magnitude and term of work required. Their actions, 

in large part, reflected proper use of the flexibilities provided under 

procurement laws and regulations to award new contracts using other 

than full and open competitive procedures. 

With respect to several task orders issued under existing contracts, 

however, some agency officials overstepped the latitude provided by 

competition laws by ordering work outside the scope of the underlying 

contracts. This work should have been separately competed, or justified 

and approved at the required official level for performance by the existing 

contractor. Importantly, given the war in Iraq, the urgent need for 

reconstruction efforts, and the latitude allowed by the competition law, 

these task orders reasonably could have been supported by justifications 

for other than full and open competition. 

Logistics support contracts have developed into a useful tool for the 

military services to quickly obtain needed support for troops deployed to 

trouble spots around the world. Because of the nature of these contracts, 

however—that is, cost-plus award fee contracts—they require significant 

Personnel and Training 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 12 GAO-04-869T 

government oversight to make sure they are meeting needs in the most 

economic and efficient way possible in each circumstance. While the 

military services are learning how to use these contracts well, in many 

cases the services are still not achieving the most cost-effective 

performance and are not adequately learning and applying the lessons of 

previous deployments. Because of the military’s continuing and growing 

reliance on these contracting vehicles, it is important that improvements 

be made and that oversight be strengthened. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, this concludes my 

statement. I will be happy to answer any question you may have. 

For further information, please contact Neal P. Curtin at (757) 552-8111 or 

curtinn@gao.gov or William T. Woods at (202) 512-4841 or 

woodsw@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

include Robert Ackley, Ridge Bowman, Carole Coffey, Laura G. Czohara, 

Gary Delaney, Timothy J. DiNapoli, George M. Duncan, Glenn D. Furbish, 

C. David Groves, John Heere, Chad Holmes, Oscar W. Mardis, Kenneth E. 

Patton, Ron Salo, Steven Sternlieb, Matthew W. Ullengren, John Van 

Schaik, Adam Vodraska, Cheryl A. Weissman, and Tim Wilson. 

Contact and 

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