IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

May 1, 2018 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HOUSTON THOMAS WILKES

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County

No. 16-CR-64 Donald E. Parish, Judge

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No. W2017-00798-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Houston Thomas Wilkes, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that trial counsel coerced him into entering the guilty 

plea and that the State withheld potentially exculpatory evidence, such that his plea was 

not knowing and voluntary. He further argues that these circumstances led to manifest 

injustice, and the trial court therefore abused its discretion in refusing to allow the 

withdrawal of his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER and 

J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Benjamin S. Dempsey, Huntingdon, Tennessee, for the appellant, Houston Thomas 

Wilkes.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Assistant 

Attorney General; Matthew F. Stowe, District Attorney General; and Lisa Miller, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

 FACTS

The Carroll County Grand Jury returned a thirteen-count indictment against the 

Defendant on May 2, 2016. The indictment consisted of three counts of evading arrest;

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three counts of driving while his license was cancelled, suspended, or revoked; two 

counts of possession of drug paraphernalia; two counts of aggravated assault; reckless 

endangerment; possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver; and unlawful 

possession of a weapon. The State then filed a discovery list and a notice of intent to 

seek enhanced punishment. The Defendant entered into a plea deal with the State where 

he agreed to plead guilty as a Range II offender to two counts of evading arrest; one 

count of driving while his license was cancelled, suspended, or revoked; two counts of 

aggravated assault; and one count of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to 

deliver in exchange for an effective ten-year sentence to be served in the Department of 

Correction with 146 days of jail credit.

The Defendant filed a request for acceptance of plea of guilty and a petition to 

waive trial by jury and waive an appeal on July 15, 2016. He signed the request, which 

stated that he had discussed the indictment with his attorney and was not forced to plead 

guilty. The trial court heard the request the same day and questioned the Defendant 

regarding the circumstances of his plea. The Defendant affirmed that he had “ample 

opportunity” to discuss his plea with his attorney and was satisfied with his attorney’s 

advice. He further affirmed that he was pleading guilty of his own free will, was not 

threatened or forced, and understood the rights he forfeited by pleading guilty. The court 

accordingly accepted his plea, finding he made it freely and voluntarily, and sentenced 

him to the negotiated ten-year confinement. Judgment was entered on August 10, 2016, 

and on August 15, 2016, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stating

only that he would support the motion with testimony at the motion hearing. The 

Defendant subsequently requested and was granted additional time to file an amended 

pleading, though no such pleading was ever filed. 

Although the State filed a motion to dismiss the Defendant’s motion to withdraw 

on the grounds that it was facially invalid, the court conducted a hearing on the 

Defendant’s motion on February 17, 2017. At the hearing, the Defendant testified that he 

“felt like [he] was coerced” into accepting the plea agreement because trial counsel did 

not visit him in jail to discuss the plea. He further testified that trial counsel told him and 

his wife that the State was going to give him thirty years if he did not agree to ten years, 

causing his wife to cry and beg the Defendant to accept the plea deal. The Defendant 

stated that trial counsel “coerced [him] into signing the ten with fear, [be]cause he told 

[him] [he] was going to get thirty years” if he did not accept the plea deal. On crossexamination, however, the Defendant again stated that he entered his guilty plea freely 

and voluntarily. The Defendant further testified on cross-examination that although trial 

counsel did not tell him “what the evidence was” against him, he still had not reviewed 

the evidence at the time of the hearing and did not need to review it because “half of the 

charges . . . wasn’t even [him].” 
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The Defendant’s wife, Brandy Wilkes, also testified at the hearing that trial 

counsel told her the Defendant would be sentenced to thirty years if he did not accept the 

ten-year plea deal. Mrs. Wilkes echoed the Defendant’s testimony, stating that trial 

counsel did not share with her the State’s evidence, that the Defendant was innocent of 

some charges, and that the possibility of the Defendant serving thirty years in 

confinement scared her. 

At the close of the hearing, the trial court declined to allow the Defendant to 

withdraw his guilty plea, stating that the motion was “deficient on its face” and he had

presented “no legal basis” at the hearing to justify withdrawing the guilty plea. The court 

noted that without the plea agreement, the Defendant could have been sentenced to 

“significant” jail time based on the seriousness of the original thirteen charges. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to withdraw his 

guilty plea because it was not freely and voluntarily given, further arguing that he was 

pressured into entering the plea agreement, was not provided exculpatory discovery, and 

was innocent of some charges. The Defendant argues that these circumstances gave way 

to manifest injustice, and the trial court therefore abused its discretion in denying his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The State responds that the Defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea failed to state with particularity the grounds upon which it was 

made, and was therefore properly denied. Further, the State argues that trial counsel 

relaying the State’s intent to seek within-range sentencing is not coercion, and the 

Defendant stated both at his plea colloquy and at the motion hearing that he was not 

coerced. After review, we agree with the State. 

Before a guilty plea may be accepted, there must be an affirmative showing in the 

trial court that it was voluntarily and knowingly entered. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 

238, 242 (1969); State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1977). This requires a 

showing that the defendant was made aware of the significant consequences of the plea. 

State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Mackey, 533 S.W.2d at 340). 

A plea is not “voluntary” if it results from ignorance, misunderstanding, coercion, 

inducements, or threats. Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993). The 

trial court must determine if the guilty plea is “knowing” by questioning the defendant to 

make sure he or she fully understands the plea and its consequences. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 

at 542; Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904.
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Because the plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 

alternatives available to the defendant, the trial court may look at a number of 

circumstantial factors in making this determination. Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904. 

These factors include: (1) the defendant’s relative intelligence; (2) his familiarity with 

criminal proceedings; (3) whether he was represented by competent counsel and had the 

opportunity to confer with counsel about alternatives; (4) the advice of counsel and the 

court about the charges against him and the penalty to be imposed; and (5) the 

defendant’s reasons for pleading guilty, including the desire to avoid a greater penalty in 

a jury trial. Id. at 904-05.

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) provides that a trial court may grant a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea “for any fair and just reason” before sentence is 

imposed, or to correct manifest injustice after the sentence is imposed but before the 

judgment becomes final. Granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to correct manifest 

injustice may be warranted where (1) the plea was entered as a result of fear, fraud, or 

misunderstanding; (2) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and this failure influenced the entry of the plea; 

(3) the plea was not knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily entered; or (4) the 

defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with entering the 

plea. State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 742 (Tenn. 2005). The defendant has the burden 

of establishing that the plea of guilty should be withdrawn to prevent “manifest 

injustice.” State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Further, the 

motion must state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made. Tenn. R. Crim. 

P. 47(c)(1). The decision whether to grant a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty rests in

the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Drake, 720 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).

As we have set out, the Defendant stated at the plea colloquy that he had ample 

opportunity to discuss the plea agreement with his attorney, was satisfied with his advice,

and was not coerced or threatened into entering the plea. He echoed the same sentiment 

at the subsequent hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At the plea colloquy, 

the trial court thoroughly questioned the Defendant, who affirmed that he understood the 

terms of the agreement and the repercussions of entering a guilty plea, including waiving 

his right to trial by jury. The trial court accordingly accepted his plea as freely and 

voluntarily given. 

The Defendant argues that he suffered manifest injustice as a result of the trial 

court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although the Defendant concedes 

that he bears the burden of establishing sufficient grounds to withdraw his plea and was 

granted time to amend his motion, the motion states in its entirety: “Comes the Defendant 

and requests the Court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. In support the Defendant 
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will submit testimony at the hearing of his motion.” The trial court therefore found the 

motion deficient on its face, though the court still allowed the Defendant the opportunity 

to establish sufficient grounds to withdraw at the motion hearing. 

To demonstrate manifest injustice, the Defendant further argues that he 

involuntarily entered the plea because he was fearful, the State did not disclose 

potentially exculpatory evidence, and trial counsel was ineffective in assisting him with 

the plea agreement. The Defendant bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice. 

See Turner, 919 S.W.2d at 355. He argues that trial counsel coerced him into accepting 

the plea agreement by telling him of the State’s intent to seek a thirty-year sentence if he 

decided not to accept the plea agreement. However, he fails to address that the State filed 

a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment and notice of enhancing factors before the 

Defendant ever spoke with trial counsel about the plea agreement. The Defendant further 

testified at the motion hearing that his wife begged him to enter the plea agreement after 

learning of the jail time he could otherwise face, and he affirmed both at the plea 

colloquy and at the motion hearing that he entered the agreement voluntarily. As the trial

court noted, the Defendant could potentially have received significant, consecutive 

sentences if he had chosen to go to trial. There is no evidence in the record to suggest 

that trial counsel explaining the State’s decision to seek a thirty-year sentence amounted 

to coercion.

The Defendant also argues that the State withheld potentially exculpatory 

discovery and he would not have entered a guilty plea had he known what evidence the

State had against him. However, the Defendant again fails to address that the State filed 

a discovery and exhibit list, which listed the evidence the State possessed and stated that 

it was available for review at the district attorney’s office. Further, though the Defendant 

stated that he knew the State did not have enough evidence to convict him because he 

was innocent of some of the charges, he testified at the motion hearing that he still had 

not examined the evidence against him. He further implies that his guilty plea was 

involuntary per se based on this claim of innocence. However, as we have set out, the 

Defendant stated at the plea colloquy and testified again at the motion hearing that he had 

sufficient opportunity to speak with his trial counsel, had not been coerced, and had 

entered his plea freely and voluntarily. 

In deciding to deny the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court 

found:

There’s no indication that the State failed to disclose any information to him, 

and really, the Court can’t say that there’s any indication that [the Defendant] 

was made to make a mistake here, or to be in fear, or that there’s been a fraud 

practiced upon him. He certainly has had a change of mind . . . but that’s not 
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sufficient to justify withdrawing a plea of guilty . . . there’s just not a legal 

basis for you to withdraw the plea of guilty[.]

The Defendant stated both at the plea colloquy and at the motion hearing that he 

entered his plea freely and voluntarily after conferring with trial counsel. His motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea was deficient on its face, and he presented no legal or factual 

basis at the motion hearing to justify withdrawing his guilty plea. There is no evidence in 

the record to suggest coercion or withheld evidence; the Defendant thus failed to meet his 

burden of demonstrating that he suffered a manifest injustice. The record easily supports 

the determination that a manifest injustice has not occurred, and the Defendant is not 

entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, the trial court clearly acted within its 

discretion in deciding to deny the Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court.

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 ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE