[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-15123

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20353-BB-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

PAUL SIMPLICE, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(May 3, 2017)

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Paul Simplice appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Simplice contends that the district 

court erred in admitting at trial the parties’ stipulation that the firearm was 

manufactured outside of the State of Florida and moved in interstate or foreign 

commerce.

1 He argues that the evidence should not have been admitted because he 

lacked personal knowledge of the stipulated facts and that there was no other 

sufficient evidence to prove the “interstate commerce” element of § 922(g)(1). In 

addition, he argues that the district court plainly erred by instructing the jury that it 

had to accept the facts in the stipulation as proven for the case. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

The sufficiency of the evidence for a jury verdict is reviewed de novo. 

United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 234 (11th Cir. 2013). We view the 

evidence “in the light most favorable to the government and draw[] all reasonable 

inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). “Accordingly, the evidence will be sufficient to support a conviction if a 

reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 

2009) (quotation omitted).

 1 Although there is some indication that the firearm may have moved in only “foreign 

commerce” because it was manufactured in Austria and found in Florida, we generally use the 

term “interstate commerce” in this opinion to encompass either or both. 

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If the defendant failed to raise an error in the district court, plain error 

review applies. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th 

Cir. 2005). Plain error is: (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial 

rights, and (4) that calls into question the integrity of the judicial system. See id. 

To be plain error, there must be binding precedent that directly resolves the issue. 

United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). “Plain 

error” also means that the error is “clear” or “obvious.” United States v. Olano, 

507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (quotations omitted). To affect substantial rights, the 

plain error must have affected the result of the trial. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299. 

The defendant has the burden of proving substantial prejudice. Id.

We are bound by prior panel decisions unless or until they are overruled by 

the Supreme Court or by us sitting en banc. United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 

1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011). However, unpublished cases are not binding 

precedent. See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 1254, 

1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007). 

We are precluded from reversing the district court when a party has invited 

the error. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). The 

invited error rule applies when a party has induced the district court into making 

the error challenged on appeal. Id. We have applied the rule where a party invited 

a constitutional error. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1289–90 

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(11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the defendant invited any error by stipulating to 

admission of the evidence challenged on appeal). 

When a party raises the issue of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time 

on appeal, we will review the issue de novo, as a question of law. United States v. 

Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016). Parties cannot stipulate to 

jurisdiction, but they may stipulate to facts that affect jurisdiction. Id. at 1337. We 

then must address whether the stipulated facts provide jurisdiction. Id.

Under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that: (1) the defendant was a 

felon, (2) he knew he was possessing a firearm, and (3) the firearm “was in or 

affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 

(11th Cir. 2014). The statute covers “any firearm or ammunition which has been 

shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 

It does not require that the defendant knew the firearm traveled in interstate 

commerce. See id.

The government can prove the third element by showing that the firearm 

“traveled in interstate commerce.” United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1274

(11th Cir. 2001). In Scott, the government proved the third element by providing 

evidence that the firearm was manufactured in California and had moved in 

interstate commerce to where the defendant was arrested in Georgia. Id. The 

government can establish the interstate commerce element by showing that the 

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defendant possessed a firearm that was manufactured out of state. United States v. 

Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2001). 

As an initial matter, the invited error doctrine precludes us from reviewing 

whether the district court erred in admitting the stipulation. Here, Simplice 

stipulated that the firearm was manufactured outside of the State of Florida and 

moved in interstate commerce. By stipulating, Simplice induced the district court 

to allow the government to read the stipulation and to admit it as evidence, actions 

to which he did not object. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1289–90. He cannot 

challenge these actions that he induced the court to take and did not ask the court 

to correct. 

Although Simplice argues that the invited error doctrine cannot apply 

because we must review subject matter jurisdiction de novo, he is incorrect that the 

doctrine cannot apply to the stipulation. We permit parties to stipulate about the 

underlying facts to prove jurisdiction. See Iguaran, 821 F.3d at 1337. 

Simplice invited the district court to admit the stipulated fact that the firearm 

was manufactured outside of Florida, so he cannot challenge the presence of that 

fact in the record now. But while Simplice cannot challenge that fact because he 

invited any error in admitting it, we still must review de novo whether the 

stipulated and otherwise introduced facts conferred jurisdiction on the district 

court. See id. at 1336–37. In this case, it was undisputed that the firearm at issue 

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was manufactured outside of Florida and that it was discovered in Florida. Under 

de novo review, these facts were sufficient to prove the interstate commerce 

element (or “jurisdictional element”) of § 922(g). See Dupree, 258 F.3d at 1259–

60. 

Even assuming the invited error doctrine does not apply, the district court 

did not plainly err in admitting the stipulation about the firearm being 

manufactured outside of Florida and moving in interstate commerce. No precedent 

from us or the Supreme Court precludes a defendant from stipulating about the 

origin of a firearm or its movement in interstate commerce, even when he 

maintains that he has no personal knowledge about the firearm. The statute does 

not require that the defendant knew the origin of the firearm or that it traveled in 

interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Further, to require personal 

knowledge of a firearm’s origin or its traveling in interstate commerce seems 

incorrect based on precedent. It would likely require that the defendant acquire the 

firearm from its place of origin and carry it across state lines, see it travel across 

state lines, or see it in another state. These requirements would conflict with cases 

about what the government must prove under the interstate commerce element of § 

922(g). See generally Scott, 263 F.3d at 1274 (holding that the firearm “traveled in 

interstate commerce” under § 922(g) because the government showed that the 

firearm was manufactured in California and found in Georgia). Thus, under either 

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invited or plain error review, the evidence was sufficient to prove the interstate 

commerce element of § 922(g).

II. Jury Instruction 

We generally review the legal correctness of a jury instruction de novo. 

United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2007). We review 

the phrasing of the instructions for an abuse of discretion. See id. When the 

defendant fails to object with specificity to the jury charge as read at trial, we 

review for plain error. United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 973 (11th Cir. 1997). 

A defendant’s trial rights include the requirement of proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt and the requirement of a jury verdict. United States v. Hardin, 

139 F.3d 813, 815 (11th Cir. 1998). The defendant has the right to plead not 

guilty, to require the government to prove every element of the charge, and to 

require that the jury find him guilty of every element of the charged offense. Id. 

Here, the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury that it had to 

treat the stipulated facts as proven for the case. The plain error doctrine applies 

because Simplice did not object to the instruction. See Schlei, 122 F.3d at 973. 

Under the first element of the doctrine, the district court may have erred. It told 

the jury that it must accept, “as proved,” the stipulated fact that the firearm “moved 

in interstate or foreign commerce.” Although the court ultimately told the jury that 

it had to find that the defendant committed each element of the crime, it also

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instructed that the third element of the crime was whether the firearm moved in 

interstate commerce. Because the district court required the jury to accept the 

stipulation that the gun moved in interstate commerce, it is arguable that the 

district court infringed on Simplice’s right to require the jury to find that he was 

guilty of that element of the crime. See Hardin, 139 F.3d at 815.

If there was error, however, it was not plain. Neither our Court nor the 

Supreme Court has held that a district court may not require a jury to accept 

stipulated facts as proven when those facts concern the elements of the crime. 

Simplice cites an unpublished case that he asserts supports his position, but 

unpublished cases are not binding precedent on the district court. See Twin City 

Fire Ins. Co., 480 F.3d at 1260 n.3. Thus, even if it had been exactly on point, it 

could not support a conclusion that the district court plainly erred. See LejardeRada, 319 F.3d at 1291. 

Moreover, Simplice fails to carry his burden to show that the instruction 

resulted in substantial prejudice by affecting the result of the trial. See Rodriguez, 

398 F.3d at 1299. Simplice focused his defense on whether he had actual 

possession of the firearm and did not try to defend the interstate commerce element 

of the offense. If the district court had not given the instruction, the stipulation 

would still have been in evidence, and the jury likely would have found that the 

firearm moved in interstate commerce because the record contained facts that the 

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firearm was manufactured outside of Florida but was found within it. On appeal, 

as at trial, Simplice fails to point to any evidence that the firearm did not move in 

interstate commerce. 

Finally, the instruction did not jeopardize the integrity of the judicial system 

because it reinforced both Simplice’s admission that the gun moved in interstate 

commerce and the focus of his defense on whether he possessed the firearm. The 

instruction did not encourage the jury to believe that Simplice knowingly 

possessed the firearm. At the close of evidence, the court also instructed the jury 

that the government did not have to prove that Simplice knew the firearm traveled 

in interstate commerce. Neither the district court nor the government encouraged 

the jury to conflate the issues of whether the firearm moved in interstate commerce 

and whether Simplice knowingly possessed the firearm. Accordingly, Simplice 

fails to show that the district court plainly erred. 

AFFIRMED. 

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