U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Sixteen-Fatality Fire in 

Highrise Residence

for the Elderly

Johnson City, Tennessee

USFA-TR-039/December 1989

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the USFA in carrying 

out the Fire Reports Program.

The USFA appreciates the cooperation and assistance received from Johnson City Fire Chief Douglas 

W. Buckles, Inspector Arson Investigator Steve Shell, and Chief Building Inspector Charles Joe Cannon, 

as well as Tennessee Arson Investigators Johnny Robertson and Mike Donnelly.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Sixteen-Fatality Fire in Highrise

Residence for the Elderly

Johnson City, Tennessee

Investigated by: Daniel J. Carpenter, Jr.

This is Report 039 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted 

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-88-C-2649 to the United 

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Summary of Key Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

FIRE CAUSE AND DELAYED REPORT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

THE STRUCTURE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

SMOKE DETECTORS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

ESCAPE ROUTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

HUMAN BEHAVIOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

THE FIRE DEPARTMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CODE COMPLIANCE/VIOLATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

COMMUNITY RESPONSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Appendix A: List of Victims’ Names, Ages, and Location Discovered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Appendix B: Johnson City Fire Department Fire Incident Report, Master Personnel Watch 

Manifest, Equipment and Personnel Used to Control the Fire, and other Fire Departments, 

Rescue Squads, Businesses, and Community Organizations Involved in the Emergency 

Response and Recovery, and List of First Responders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendix C: Floor Plans Showing Point of Origin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Appendix D: List of Photographs and Slides. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

1

Sixteen Fatality Fire in 

Highrise Residence for the Elderly

Johnson City, Tennessee

Local Contacts: Douglas W. Buckles, Fire Chief

Steve Shell, Inspector Arson Investigator

Johnson City Fire Department

505 East Main Street

Johnson City, Tennessee 37601

(615) 461-1655

Johnny A. Robertson

Tennessee State Arson Investigator

Johnson City, Tennessee

(615) 928-0316

Mike Donnelly

Tennessee State Arson Investigator

Cleveland, Tennessee

(615) 472-3607

Charles Joe Cannon

Chief Building Inspector

Municipal & Safety Building

601 East Main Street

Box 2150

Johnson City, Tennessee

(615) 929-9171 Extension 224

OVERVIEW

A Christmas Eve fire that caused the death of 14 residents and two visitors occurred at the John Sevier 

Center, a highrise residence for the elderly, in Johnson City, Tennessee. It also injured about 50 other 

people including 15 firefighters.

One victim was found in the elevator lobby on the sixth floor, one in Room 107, and the rest, 14 

victims, on higher level floors in living units. (See Appendix A for the name, age, and location discovered of all victims.)
2

Summary of Key Issues

Issues Comments

The Building Eleven story “downtown” hotel, converted to apartments for the elderly in 1980.

The Fire Originated in apartment on first floor, spread into combustible ceiling space and extended to second floor. Smoke spread throughout structure, principally through open pipe chases and elevator 

shafts.

Casualties Sixteen fatalities, located from first through tenth floors of the 11-story building. Fifteen civilians 

and 15 firefighters were injured.

Fire Protection Features Each apartment had a hard-wired smoke detector connected to an enunciator.

Delayed Discovery Fire originated in living room of apartment. Single station smoke detector in apartment was 

separated from fire by closed bedroom door. Fire penetrated combustible ceiling void and spread 

before sufficient smoke traveled below the ceiling to activate corridor smoke detection system.

The fire started in Apartment #102 shortly after 1700 hours and traveled out of the apartment and 

across the ceiling above the main hallway smoke detectors (which would have activated the 9-1-1 

fire alarm system) across to the main lobby. Swirling smoke trapped many of the occupants on the 

upper floors of the 11-story building before any notification or alarm was heard by them. (See 

Appendix C for floor plan of apartment of origin.)

The alarm was received at 1711 by the dispatcher of the Johnson City Fire Department. The first 

units were on the scene within four minutes. Upon arrival, flames were observed on the first floor 

and additional calls were made for backup units to respond. More than five hours later, firefighters 

were still breaking windows and heavy smoke continued to hamper their rescue efforts. Johnson 

City firefighters, public safety officers, and hundreds of volunteer firefighters and civilians who had 

responded to the call assisted in the rescue and treatment of the injured. Almost every available 

emergency unit and crew from as far as 70 miles away answered the call. Helicopters from as far 

away as Virginia helped to move the injured from the fire scene to nearby hospitals.

Sub-freezing temperatures hampered rescue efforts and made some of the occupants resistant to 

leaving the building. The freezing conditions caused firefighters to have to force open exit doors.

The building had a history of “false alarms,” which may have caused some of the occupants not 

to be too concerned even if the alarm was heard. Many of those who were able to make it out on 

their own in the early stages of the fire simply wandered off, or were treated and released by rescue 

workers. Others were assisted by their families and friends. Red Cross workers tried desperately to 

determine who and how many occupants were still left in the building.

BACKGROUND

The fire on December 24, 1989, was the second fatal fire to occur at the John Sevier Center within 

two months. A previous fire, which occurred on October 25, 1989, caused the death of 76-year-old 

Joseph R. England. Fire officials attributed the cause of that fire to the accidental filling of a kerosene 

can with gasoline by friends of the deceased which was later used to fill a kerosene heater. The 

occupant died three days later from the effects of smoke inhalation.
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 3

Even though this fire prompted the Johnson City Commission to issue directions for all buildings in 

the downtown area to be inspected within two years, the John Sevier Center had only been inspected 

by building officials for repairs necessitated by the fire, because of time constraints.

The Johnson City Fire Marshal’s Office had investigated the fire which occurred on October 25, 

1989. A final inspection of Apartment #513 was also conducted during the week of November 

27. Another inspection of smoke towers and standpipes was also conducted because of reports that 

heavier than usual accumulations of smoke had traveled to the upper floors at the time of the fire. 

This heavy smoke accumulation was later attributed to a break in the pipe chase between floors, 

thereby allowing the smoke to travel freely to the upper floors of the building. Fire officials had 

attempted to correct the situation by working with building officials and engineers to convince the 

owner of the seriousness of this situation and bring the building into compliance.

Primary concerns with the building involved vertical penetrations, allowing smoke to travel upward 

between floors, the capacity and proper functioning of ventilation to remove and segregate smoke, 

and also the lack of sprinkler systems, even though the building did contain a standpipe system 

which met code requirements at the time it was renovated in the late 1970s.

At the time of the fire the John Sevier Center housed approximately 145 residents. Exactly how 

many were actually in the building when the fire occurred has not been determined. Several of the 

residents who were thought to be missing were later accounted for.

THE FIRE

According to Fire Chief Douglas W. Buckles, flames were visible on the first floor and choking smoke 

had already reached the upper floors of the John Sevier Center when the first fire units arrived at the 

scene, which was within four minutes after receiving the alarm.

At the time the alarm came in, Engines 1, 3, 4, and the tower truck were at Johnson City Country 

Club. Engines 2, 3, 4, Ladder 1, a tower, and a snorkel were dispatched to John Sevier Center at 

11:15. Ladder 1 arrived there about the same time as the apparatus coming from the country club. 

Public safety officers cross-trained as firefighters provided some of the staffing. Staffing for the first 

alarm companies was as follows: Engine 2: driver, three public safety officers; Engine 3: driver, 

three firefighters; Engine 4: driver, firefighter, two public safety officers; Ladder 1: driver, firefighter; 

Tower: driver; Snorkel: driver. Public safety officers arrived just prior to department apparatus in 

their own vehicles and had initiated rescue operations. Other public fire safety officers responded as 

well. (See Appendix B for complete list.)

A second alarm was immediately sounded and additional staffing requested. Eventually a call went 

out to all Johnson City firefighters, public safety officers, and rescue workers to report to their duty 

stations. (See Appendix B for Fire Incident Report, First Report, First Responders, Master Personnel 

Watch Manifest, Equipment and Personnel Used to Control the Fire, and a list of other fire departments, rescue squads, businesses, and community organizations that contributed staff support, 

equipment, and assistance.)

Even though the first alarm was apparently delayed because the smoke had traveled at ceiling level, 

above the hallway smoke detectors, the fire was confined to the lower two floors of the building.

Flames had already penetrated an open area which had served as a mezzanine when the building 

had been a hotel, which had been covered over with plywood and other materials. Recognizing the 
4

fire’s extent and the potential for further fire spread and risks to life safety, Chief Buckles immediately 

requested additional support by public safety and emergency rescue personnel.

The fire was brought under control shortly after arrival, and fire damage was limited to the floors. 

Smoke continued to fill the building, requiring ventilation and rescue operations to continue for at 

least another five hours.

More than 200 paid and volunteer firefighters responded along with public safety officers, emergency medical technicians (EMT), and rescue workers, from over 70 miles away to help combat the 

greatest tragedy Johnson City has ever experienced. Hundreds of others brought food and clothing 

for victims and rescue workers. Many acts of heroism were reported.

Fire and police personnel responded as planned and volunteer units provided the additional staffing 

and equipment so vitally needed at the scene and also to cover fire stations providing fire protection 

for the other areas of the city.

Sub-zero temperatures impaired the refilling of air bottles at the scene, because the pump on the 

portable unit was frozen. Other fire departments readily provided the many air cylinders needed as 

well as other equipment. According to Chief Buckles, each department seemed to know in advance 

where to position their equipment to the greatest advantage, and every member of that department 

went about his or her business in a professional manner, without adding confusion to such a major 

operation.

Media reports state that “Johnson City’s fire and police departments responded with the sort of efficiency we have come to expect.”

FIRE CAUSE AND DELAYED REPORT

While the cause of the fire had not been determined at the time of this report, it is generally believed 

there were several minutes between the time the fire originated and the time it was reported via the 

9-1-1 alarm system.

It is apparent where the fire occurred, however, and based on this knowledge, investigators believe 

the fire ignited a loveseat in the immediate area of origin in Apartment #102 and then traveled in a 

vertical path until reaching a dropped ceiling supported by wooden joists. The fire quickly traveled 

across the ceiling, gaining in intensity as it consumed combustible materials above the dropped ceiling. Only after the flames had progressed out of Apartment #102 and into an open lobby area was 

there sufficient smoke coming down from above the ceiling tiles to cause the automatic hall smoke 

alarms to activate.

THE STRUCTURE

According to building officials the building was approximately 65 years old. It was originally a 

highrise hotel that had been converted to a “residential highrise” in the late 1970s. At the time of 

conversion and renovation the building was periodically inspected to insure compliance with the 

building codes in effect at that time. The last time a major inspection was conducted by building 

officials was in 1980. Periodic fire inspections of public areas were conducted, with the last one 

(prior to the October 1989 fire) done in January 1989.

While city officials recognize that the building would not meet today’s building and fire codes, they 

were quick to point out that the Center met all of the city codes in effect in 1980.
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 5

However, because of the October fire and because of concerns it raised about smoke travel and 

reports of floors and walls being breached, fire officials were in the process of updating the building 

to meet present day codes. Sprinkler systems were planned and provisions were being discussed 

with owners and engineers to see if anything could be done to limit occupancy only to ambulatory 

residents, particularly on the upper floors.

Fire escapes were provided in the west and south wings, along the middle, and at the mezzanine 

level. Smoke fans were also provided in the west and south wing exits which leads directly to the 

street level. A center stairwell which was part of the old hotel was not marked as an exit, nor did it 

exit to the street. It apparently was to be used only by maintenance personnel and not the residents 

of the building.

SMOKE DETECTORS

Local smoke detectors were located in the bedrooms of each apartment and were monitored in the 

manager’s office. Hallway smoke detectors were strategically located throughout the Center and 

activated a 9-1-1 system both in the building and at the fire department dispatcher’s office.

Notification and early warning was delayed because of the rapid spread of smoke above the ceiling 

level and the fact that the bedroom door in Apartment #102 was closed during the fire. This fact 

prevented either alarm to function as it was designed to function and allowed the fire and smoke to 

enter above the detectors into the main lobby. Eventually detectors were activated, as were several 

others.

If heat detectors had been above the ceiling level, this might have provided earlier alarm and the 

additional time necessary to alert occupants.

ESCAPE ROUTES

Even though several of the occupants had already exited the building prior to the arrival of the fire 

department, many others hesitated to venture out into the sub-freezing temperatures. This caused a 

back-up of people trying to descend the stairways and may have caused some to believe the exit doors 

would not open even though they were equipped with panic bars. Reports indicate the firefighters 

may have had to force open these doors to gain access to the building and complete evacuations.

Some of the occupants may have even returned to their apartments to await rescuers rather then to 

attempt to find another exit. 

HUMAN BEHAVIOR

While thick smoke filtered up through elevator shafts and pipe chases, residents using crutches, walkers, and canes attempted to exit through narrow stairways from as high up as the tenth floor. Others, 

too frightened, too old, or too confused simply stayed in their apartments and waited for the rescue 

teams to arrive. Not all were fortunate enough to be found, however, before they succumbed to the 

deadly gases. Reportedly, one couple, found dead, had been sitting in their chairs reading the Bible.

Because of the frequency of seemingly minor fires or false smoke alarms, some residents may have 

simply ignored the alarm. Others, because of poor hearing, may not have even heard the alarm. 

This situation may have added to the already confused atmosphere that seemed to prevail, as many 

residents left their apartments to go into a hallway already filled with smoke.
6

Fire resistant doors had been installed at the entrance of each apartment. However, the automatic 

door closers were removed in many of them due to resident complaints the doors were too hard 

to open.

THE FIRE DEPARTMENT

The Johnson City Fire Department provides protection to a fast growing community with a current population of 48,000 people in a 29 square mile area. The department operates under the 

guidelines established by the Tennessee Commission of Firefighting, the Tennessee Fire Incident 

Reporting System (TFIRS) fire reporting system, the National Fire Protection Association, and the 

Johnson City Civil Service Commission. The Insurance Service Office (ISO) has rated it as a class 

three department.

The 74-person department responds from five fire stations and is augmented by 100 public safety 

officers who have been cross-trained in firefighting activities. From January through September 

1989, there had been 712 fire calls that had been answered, 669 fire prevention inspections, 27 plan 

reviews, 273 code enforcement investigations, and 42 fire investigations resulting in six arrests for 

arson.

Prior to the fire in Johnson Sevier Center, two fire prevention programs had been started. The Learn 

Not To Burn Curriculum was begun in the city’s public schools and the Juvenile Firesetters Program was 

developed through the Watauga Mental Health Center. Because of staff limitations and time constraints, other planned projects had not been implemented.

CODE COMPLIANCE/VIOLATIONS

Presumably the John Sevier Center met code requirements at the time it was renovated as a “highrise 

residential” property in 1980. There is no question, however, that a properly installed sprinkler 

system could have prevented the rapid spread of fire on the first two floors. Nor is there any question that heavy smoke traveled rapidly up elevator shafts and pipe chases causing most of the victims 

to die of smoke inhalation, even though the fire was contained to the first two floors. Questions 

remain in the minds of some residents, family members, building owners, elected and appointed 

city officials as to whether or not the building was properly classified at the time it was renovated 

and if it were properly inspected by building and fire officials before, during, and after completion 

of the renovation process.

While many documents provided by code enforcement authorities to attest to the fact the building 

had been inspected during this phase of the changeover, questions still prevail as to how thorough 

these inspections were and on how closely the existing codes were complied with. Were building 

permits obtained for all interior constructions since renovation?

Even as late as the previous fatal fire in October 1989 code violations were observed yet left uncorrected because time and the inspectors workload did not permit more thorough preliminary inspections or more frequent follow-up inspections.

The October fire had similar consequences due to rising smoke in the pipe chase areas. Even though 

a person died, the fire was not deemed to be “important enough” to have a sprinkler system installed 

at the time. The owners and managers of the building have said they planned to install a sprinkler 

system in the building in the Spring of 1990. Yet, large holes were left open between floors where 

smoke passed freely to the floors above.
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 7

COMMUNITY RESPONSE

While hundreds of people gathered food and clothing for victims and rescue workers to help fend off 

the below freezing temperatures, nearby hotels offered free rooms for the survivors and their families.

The American Red Cross had declared the Center a National emergency, thereby providing additional 

funds for the local chapter to help residents find housing and provide health care and other necessities. Of those residents not staying with friends or relatives, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and city 

officials provided temporary shelter and assistance in relocating them to permanent quarters.

Several community and civic organizations have also pledged support as have businesses, corporations, and individuals. J. C. Penney Company opened its doors Christmas day to allow residents to 

purchase clothing ad personal items through the Red Cross at substantial discounts. Those residents 

who had J. C. Penney credit cards were also allowed to defer payment on their individual accounts. 

Fast-food restaurants and motels also offered free meals for the residents.

A memorial service for the victims was held January 7 in Johnson City’s Freedom Hall.

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

Many of the events and circumstances leading up to this fire could have been detected and/or prevented.

Structure – This 65-year-old building was originally constructed before fire protection and building 

codes required sprinkler systems, which could have saved lives.

Smoke Detectors – Only one smoke detector was installed in the bedroom of the apartment where the 

fire began. Since the fire started in the living room and the bedroom door was closed during the 

insipient stages of the fire, the fire had ample time to travel up through a dropped ceiling and burn 

the wood bar joists above, thereby gaining sufficient headway into an open lobby area before being 

detected by the hallway smoke detector. A minimum of two smoke detectors in living quarters and 

heat detectors above dropped ceilings, and in attic and storage areas should be required.

Sign-out Roster and Visitor Log – Since the fire occurred on Christmas Eve, many of the residents were 

away visiting friends and relatives. While this may have been a blessing in one respect, it increased 

the anxiety of search crews who were trying to determine the whereabouts of those still remaining 

in the building. A sign out roster and visitor log could have alleviated this problem.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. When a tragedy such as this occurs, the Catastrophic Theory of Reform may be used to overcome apathy, raise public awareness, and stimulate legislators and citizens to implement 

necessary fire safety reforms.

This Christmas Eve fire, that killed 16 people, has prompted legislators and fire officials to review 

existing structures throughout the State of Tennessee. While interest is high following a major fire 

it is an excellent time for not only Johnson City, Tennessee, but all areas of the country to review 

code classifications and compliance procedures to assure thorough and timely inspections of all 

residential properties, particularly those used as retirement centers and/or nursing homes.

Legislation requiring sprinkler systems in all public places where “large gatherings” occur is 

already being considered as a positive move for the State of Tennessee.
8

2. Smoke detector requirements should be reviewed for adequacy, particularly in older buildings where large numbers of people reside.

Fire stops, false ceilings, and code compliance to meet today’s building standards must be 

reviewed.

3. Codes should be strictly enforced and when violated, severely punished.

4. Special efforts must be made to involve fire suppression personnel in fire prevention activities and pre-fire planning programs.

Greater emphasis and additional personnel assigned to the fire prevention and education functions of the fire service would help bring about citizen awareness.

5. Both building and fire code officials need to cooperate better to provide complete and thorough inspections when buildings undergo renovation.

They should not simply “sign off” when work is complete. Also, proper classification of existing buildings, as well as new construction, must be considered. Should the code requirements 

for a “highrise residential” structure which houses predominately elderly residents (who are or 

are assumed to be ambulatory) be any less strict than a “retirement home”?

6. Building owners and property managers should be educated in the limitations of the 

elderly.

Research is needed on what may be expected of the elderly in the event of an emergency, and 

what they may physically be incapable of performing.
9

Appendices

A. List of Victims’ Names, Ages, and Location Discovered.

B. Johnson City Fire Department Fire Incident Report, Master Personnel Watch Manifest, 

Equipment and Personnel Used to Control the Fire, and other Fire Departments, Rescue Squads, 

Businesses, and Community Organizations Involved in the Emergency Response and Recovery, 

and List of First Responders.

C. Floor Plans Showing Point of Origin.

D. List of Photographs and Slides.
10

Appendix A

List of Victims’ Names, Ages, and Location Discovered

Name of Victim Age Location Discovered

1. Juanita Ward 76 Room 107 1st Floor

2. Fred Kidd 66 Room 801 2nd Floor

3. Ivan Atwood 68 Room 710

4. Carmen Baughan 79 Room 1007 – Time 22:05

5. Lori Carlisle 78 Room 510 – Time 20:09

6. Brian Cozad 29 Room 1007 – Time 22:05

7. Ethel Francis 76 Room 608

8. William Carl Ogburne 51 Room 813 – Time 20:21

9. Cleo Range 89 Room 704 – Time 20:17

10. Doris Riening 72 Room 813 – Time 20:21

11. Emma Shade 85 Room 108 – Time 20:06

12. Blanche Shell 83 Room 604 – Time 22:55

13. Ethel Shelton 80 Room 803

14. Lora Shook 88 Room 403 – Time 20:20

15. Carolyn Somitch 31 6th Floor Elevator Lobby – Time 21:28

16. Josephine Eager 82 Room 503
11

Appendix B
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix B (Continued)
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 13

Appendix B (Continued)
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USFA-TR-039/December 1989 15

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USFA-TR-039/December 1989 17

Appendix B (Continued)
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Appendix B (Continued)
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Appendix B (Continued)
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Appendix B (Continued)
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Appendix B (Continued)
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 23

Appendix B (Continued)

First Responders on Johnson City Fire

Fire Marshal George Leonard

1st Alarm Engine 2 - Driver Gerald Moore

Public Safety Officers David Harris

R. Pierce

T. Ditto

Engine 3 - Driver Charles Alexander

Firefighter Mike Hamilton

Firefighter Don Nelson

Firefighter Buddy Collins

Engine 4 - Driver Chester Campbell

Firefighter Danny Jones

PSO Rick Stevens

PSO J. Vaughn

Ladder 1 - Driver Jerry Leonard

Firefighter Steve Weaver

Note: PSOs responded, but names are not known.

Tower - Driver Charles Hawkins

Snorkel - Paul Holder

PSOs responding - 8:20 Acting Assistant Chief Roger Tienart

8:21 Acting Lieutenant Stanley Daniels

8:22 Lieutenant Acting Captain Mike Nash
24

Appendix C

Floor Plans Showing Point of Origin
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 25

Appendix C (Continued)
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D

List of Photographs and Slides

Slides and photographs are included with the master report at the USFA. The pictures on the following pages were made from the items asterisked below. The diagram on the last page shows the 

position from which the photos were taken in the room of origin.

*1. Street view from Roan Street near library shooting up.

*2. Street view from Roan Street near library shooting level.

3. Shot from Fondo Circle looking at north entrance.

4. Shot inside from north entrance door, through lobby.

5. Controls for alarm panel (equipment).

6. AOT Fire Alarm Control Panel enunciator for fire alarm system.

7. Annunciator panel for general emergency and smoke alarm for individual rooms. Also, phone 

for fire use to individual floors for command office.

8. Shot of elevator in lobby north side elevation.

9. Overhead in lobby showing “L” shape vertical penetration to second floor.

*10. Shot of Apartment #102 from hallway showing drywall not going to ceiling deck. Only 

just above drop ceiling.

11. Standpipe hose system next to Apartment #102 (room of origin).

12. Inside the apartment adjacent to Apartment #102 looking up a wall between apartments 

(drywall did not go to top of ceiling deck).

13. Inside entrance to Apartment #102 (room of origin).

14. Inside Apartment #102 looking in corner lower left, left of couch.

16. Couch, front view (area of origin), in Apartment #102.

*17. Right side of couch, showing point of origin in corner at window.

18. Desk area from entry way.

19. Left side of door facing bedroom, left side.

21. Right side of door facing bedroom, right side.

22. View leaving Apartment #102 in hallway.

25. Inside of door frame, Apartment #102, showing where door closure had been removed.

26. Just outside of Apartment #102 in hallway showing burn pattern on door of Apartment 

#102 which may have been left open by occupant.

27. Smoke detector in Apartment #101 bedroom (similar to detector in all apartments).
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 27

29. Landing to second floor fire door.

*30. Second floor looking down to mezzanine through burn hole in plywood floor.

31. Outside view from Roan and E. Market looking northeast.

32. Outside view of third floor level from Market Street looking northwest.

33. Outside view of rear of structure from on top of parking garage looking northeast.

34. Outside view from corner of downtown loop and S. Roan Street, looking south.

35. Outside view looking southwest from S. Roan and library.

36. Outside view looking west from S. Roan at Mumsey Church, looking at room of origin.

37. Outside view from top of library looking southwest. 
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

1. Street view from Roan Street near library shooting up.
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 292. Street view from Roan Street near library shooting level.
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

10. Shot of Apartment #102 from hallway showing drywall not going to ceiling deck. Only just above drop ceiling.
USFA-TR-039/December 1989 3117. Right side of couch, showing point of origin in corner at window.
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

30. Second floor looking down to mezzanine through burn hole in plywood floor.