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30–837 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 109–676

MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERROR

FINANCING ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERROR FINANCING ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE

EAST, FOCUSING ON THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THE USE

OF CHARITIES TO FUND TERRORISM, AND THE PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER (13224) WHICH ALLOWS THE UNITED STATES TO

FREEZE THE ASSETS OF CERTAIN ORGANIZATIONS

JULY 13, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

(

Available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate05sh.html

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota

JACK REED, Rhode Island

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York

EVAN BAYH, Indiana

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

KATHLEEN L. CASEY, Staff Director and Counsel

STEVEN B. HARRIS, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SKIP FISCHER, Senior Professional Staff Member

JOHN V. O’HARA, Senior Investigative Counsel

VIRGINIA SNIDER, Staff Assistant

MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, Democratic Senior Counsel

STEPHEN R. KROLL, Democratic Special Counsel

JOSEPH R. KOLINSKI, Chief Clerk and Computer Systems Administrator

GEORGE E. WHITTLE, Editor

(II)

CONTENTS

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2005

Page

Opening statement of Chairman Shelby ................................................................ 1

Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of:

Senator Bunning ............................................................................................... 2

Senator Sarbanes .............................................................................................. 12

Senator Hagel ................................................................................................... 16

WITNESSES

Stuart Levey, Under Secretary, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,

U.S. Department of the Treasury ....................................................................... 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39

E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs,

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45

Response to written questions of Senator Shelby .......................................... 94

Nancy Powell, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement, U.S. Department Of State ................................................... 12

Response to written questions of Senator Shelby .......................................... 96

Dennis M. Lormel, Senior Vice President, Anti-Money Laundering Corporate

Risk International, Fairfax, Virginia .................................................................. 21

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55

Steven Emerson, Executive Director, The Investigative Project on Terrorism

(ITP), Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 23

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 62

Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Ph.D., Chair of Islamic Economics, Finance and Management, and Professor of Economics and Statistics, Rice University-Houston, Texas .............................................................................................................. 27

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 87

(III)

(1)

MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERROR

FINANCING ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC.

The Committee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD–538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Richard C. Shelby (Chairman of the

Committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RICHARD C. SHELBY

Chairman SHELBY. The hearing will come to order.

For the last 2 years, the Committee has been conducting a series

of hearings into the issues of money laundering and terror financing. During these hearings, the Committee and the public have had

an opportunity to hear from a number of witnesses, both government and private sector, on continuing weaknesses in our financial

system to exploitation by criminals and terrorists and on measures

taken and yet to be taken to address those weaknesses. A continuing series of instances of major banks here in the United States

being the target of civil and/or criminal proceedings in response to

marked failures to comply with anti-money laundering statutes and

regulations have served to keep us vigilant to the problems that

continue to exist, not just with the banks and financial institutions

themselves, but with the regulatory structure that is supposed to

provide oversight and prevent many of these transgressions.

Most recently, the New York branch of Arab Bank was cited with

a consent order for its failure to exercise due diligence with regard

to its customer base and for its failure to file suspicious activity reports, despite the enormous volume of financial transactions involved in an indisputably high risk region of the world. It is the

Committee’s concern that some of these transactions involved

known terrorists and terrorist organizations, including the Islamic

Resistance Movement, or Hamas, and Al Qaeda.

At the core of the Arab Bank case sits the Saudi Committee for

the Support of the Al Quds Intifada, a known conduit for money

destined for terrorist organizations in the West Bank and Gaza.

The New York branch of Arab Bank case is currently the subject

of a Department of Justice investigation, so there is little specific

about it that the Government witnesses here today, specifically

Under Secretary Levey, can say, but I raise the issue for the obvious evidence it provides of the failure of the Federal regulators to

adequately supervise that bank and for the bank itself to comply

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with U.S. regulations. The parallels to the Riggs Bank case are

striking, and frankly are disturbing.

I am particularly disturbed by the continued funding of terrorist

activities for, in addition to the obvious threat to innocent civilians

both here and abroad, two recent and glaring reasons. On June 15,

the BBC aired a report on the Spanish police raid on a number of

apartments used by suspected Al Qaeda terrorist cells, cells possibly implicated in the March 11 terrorist attacks that killed almost 200 people in Madrid. Particularly striking about the BBC

footage, and possibly little noticed, were the stacks of freshly minted $100 bills totalling tens of thousands of dollars, sitting in one

of the apartments. I have to ponder where the considerable cache

of brand-new bills originated. Terrorism is extremely cost-effective.

How many more deaths would have been attributed to that currency?

A second and more recent incident struck a little closer to home.

At 9:30 in the morning, as you know, of July 7, I was meeting with

the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit of Scotland

Yard in London with some of my staff who are here today. Fifteen

minutes into that meeting, the synchronized bombing of the City

of London subway and bus systems occurred, resulting in deaths of

around 50 innocent victims and the maiming and wounding of perhaps 700 more. The coincidental timing of my discussions of terrorism with British security officials as emergency vehicles raced

to the scenes of devastation served to bring home once again the

fragility of life and the threat under which we all live from the

scourge of international terrorism.

And, while the struggle against terror financing is but one component of the broader war against terrorism, it is an absolutely essential component. Money is the lifeblood of terrorism. And the

Middle East is ground zero for much of the money raised and

moved in support of terrorist activities. It is not, however, the only

place where money is raised and moved. The terrorist underground

in London responsible for last week’s attacks and the breath of terrorist fundraising in the United States are broad and deep. It is my

hope that the witnesses here today will help us to shed light on the

extent of the continuing challenge and what we can and are doing

to confront it.

Our first panel today includes Stuart Levey, Under Secretary of

the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Crimes and a regular visitor here; Anthony Wayne, Interim Under Secretary of State for

Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, and Nancy Powell,

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement and a former Ambassador to Pakistan. Secretaries Levey and Powell, Ambassador Powell, we all welcome you.

Senator Bunning, do you have an opening statement?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING

Senator BUNNING. Yes, I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman first of

all for holding this important hearing, and I would like to thank

all our witnesses for testifying today.

Last week’s dastardly attack in London showed the world once

again that terrorists will continue to attack the innocent. We must

stay vigilant in the war on terror. We must continue to take the

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fight to the terrorists and fight them on all fronts. One of the most

important fronts in the war on terror is on the financial front. We

must do everything we can to dry up the financing of the terrorist

organizations. We must continue to track down those who perform

these terrorist acts, but we also must hit terror organizations

where it hurts them the most: In their pocket books.

No matter how many terrorists we have captured, as long as terrorism has a funding source, there will always be another waiting

to step in and take their place. The United States needs to be able

to investigate and prosecute terrorist financiers wherever they

hide. To do this, we must have the cooperation and support of the

international community.

We have made some progress in finding and blocking some of

these funds, but there is a lot more we must do. We must turn off

the terrorism funding faucet and force these terrorists to dry up

and wither away. I hope our witnesses today will give us an update

on our progress in cutting terrorist funding. I hope they will shed

light on how far we have come, where we still have problems, and

what else we can do.

And just as an aside, I had a military LA who was a major in

the Marine Reserves, and he was sent to Fallujah. His reserve unit

was recalled. And I continue to get emails from him, and he said

Senator, the biggest thing you have to do is cut off their money.

And if we can do that, we can defeat these terrorists.

So, I am looking for information from you today.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SHELBY. Thank you, Senator Bunning.

Secretary Levey, Secretary Wayne, Secretary Powell, your opening statements will be made part of the record in their entirety.

You proceed at your risk,as you know.

[Laughter.]

We will start with you, Secretary Levey. Welcome back to the

Committee. You have spent a lot of time here, as much as we do.

STATEMENT OF STUART LEVEY

UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF TERRORISM

AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Mr. LEVEY. Yes; it is a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Shelby, Senator Bunning, thank you for inviting to me testify

here today about the progress that we are making in the fight

against terrorist financing and money laundering in the Middle

East. This Committee’s commitment to and, Mr. Chairman, your

personal leadership on this issue has been vital to our work, and

I thank you for it.

It is an honor to be testifying here today beside my State Department colleagues and particularly Under Secretary Wayne. Since

September 11, 2001, Tony Wayne has been a tireless and effective

advocate for U.S. interests in these matters around the world, including in the Middle East. We often speak about the excellent

interagency cooperation we have in this area, and Tony is a personal exemplification of that.

I am also pleased to be testifying in the same hearing with my

former colleague, Dennis Lormel. Dennis was a pioneer at the FBI

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in creating its terrorist financing capacity after September 11, and

I was grateful to be his colleague at the Justice Department.

As you mentioned, today’s hearing comes less than a week after

the terrible attacks in London, and I would like to express my condolences to the families of the victims. The brave resolve of the

British people that they have shown is the proper defiant response

to those terrorists who seek to disrupt our way of life. Last week’s

cowardly acts also remind us that our commitment to combat terrorists and their supporters must never waver. As you know, Senator Bunning, we must fight them on all fronts. There is too much

at stake.

Some have questioned the value of our efforts to fight terrorist

financing, suggesting that individual attacks can be carried out

with small amounts of money. But operating a terrorist organization requires more than explosives. Terrorists need money to acquire safe haven, train members, purchase false travel documents,

pay operatives and their families as well as to plan and stage attacks. Undermining the terrorist money flow by deterring donors,

freezing assets, and arresting facilitators degrades their overall capability.

Following the money continues to be one of the most valuable

sources of intelligence we have for investigating terror networks,

for a simple reason: Money trails do not lie. Financial intelligence

tends to be very reliable. I am happy to report that our efforts as

an interagency team are beginning to show results. Terrorist

groups like Al Qaeda and Hamas are feeling the pinch and do not

have the same easy access to money that they once did. With respect to terrorist financing in the Middle East, my written testimony addresses recent developments across a number of countries

in the regions. I do not have the time to review these developments

in this statement, but I would like to at least provide a brief overview of our engagement with Saudi Arabia, in which I know this

Committee has a particular interest.

The Committee is well-aware that the challenges posed by terrorist financing from within Saudi Arabia are among the most serious we have faced. Today, we believe that private Saudi donors

may be a significant source of terrorist funding, including for the

insurgency in Iraq. Saudi Arabia-based and funded organizations

also remain a key source for the promotion of ideologies used by

terrorists and violent extremists around the world to justify their

hate-filled ideology and agenda.

Saudi Arabian charities, including the IIRO, WAMY, and the

Muslim World League continue to cause us concern. We have pursued a strategy of sustained pressure and cooperation with Saudi

Arabia to address these and other challenges. Saudi Arabia has responded with increased counterterrorism cooperation, particularly

since the Riyadh bombings in May 2003. At this point, the Saudi

Arabian Government takes seriously the threat that terrorism

poses within the Kingdom and around the world, including the

United States.

Positive developments have included the formation of a joint terrorist financing task force, led by the FBI on the U.S. side, to foster

timely information exchange and selected joint action with the

United States. There has also been significant increased regulation

5

of much of Saudi Arabia’s charitable sector. There is much yet to

be done, and I can assure you that we are fully committed to this

engagement. I have recently expressed my concern on a variety of

these issues to Saudi officials and look forward to working with

them to resolve them.

At the same time, we cannot allow ourselves to lose sight of the

other concerns out of a single-minded focus on one country. There

are many terrorist financing challenges that we face in the Middle

East and that we need to work on with all of the countries in the

region, including Saudi Arabia. Perhaps the most pressing, which

was alluded to indirectly by Chairman Shelby, is the problem of

cash and cash couriers.

Particularly in the Middle East, where cash is a prominent part

of the culture, this is a serious danger, and cash is being used to

fund the deadly insurgency in Iraq as well. It is critical that Gulf

countries and countries throughout the Middle East lower their reporting thresholds for cross border transfers of cash and enforce

these provisions aggressively.

The creation of the Middle East-North Africa FATF is a tremendous step in the right direction in pursuing these sorts of standards, but we are clearly at the very beginning of the process. Some

Middle Eastern countries have not passed adequate money laundering laws. Some have failed to take action on cash couriers. Some

have no control over their informal Hawala sectors, and some have

not yet established financial intelligence units.

Our most important task in the Middle East is to ensure that

these standards are not only adopted but they are also implemented and enforced. We do not measure success by the number

of laws put on the books, but by changes made on the ground. Real

progress will come in the form of border stops, cash seizures, account blockings, arrests, and the like.

It is my job in this process to be impatient and impatient for

progress on all of these fronts, and I can assure you that I am. We

look forward to continuing our work with you on these issues, and

I would be happy to answer your questions.

Chairman SHELBY. Secretary Wayne.

STATEMENT OF E. ANTHONY WAYNE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC

AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. WAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senators

Hagel and Bunning. It is a great pleasure to be here again. Thank

you for your continued attention to these issues. It is very important to us, and I can tell you that this cluster of issues remains

a high priority for the Department of State.

The main theme of my written testimony, and of the little excerpt I will give orally now, is really that we have made significant

strides in bolstering the political will and the ability of governments in the Middle East and South Asia to act against terrorism

and terrorist finance, but clearly, we need to do much more.

We face a resilient, an adaptable, and a ruthless foe. As you were

in London, Mr. Chairman, I was in Gleneagles at the G–8 Summit,

and in Gleneagles, we were, of course, all struck by the impact of

6

this horrible attack in London. And we worked very quickly to reshape, to a degree, the good work that had already been done by

the G–8 experts on counterterrorism to help to put out a strong

statement on the steps that we in the G–8 can take ahead. And we

look forward to working very closely with our UK colleagues as

they have now also taken on the mantle of presidency of the European Union.

I saw that Chancellor Gordon Brown announced yesterday that

tackling terrorist finance was going to be one of his priorities in the

EU Presidency. And fortunately, Under Secretary Levey and I have

been working with the British and with the EU seriously in preparation for this. And we think there is much good that can be done

to tighten up that cooperation across the Atlantic.

Similarly, I just flew back in last night from Amman, where I

had met with Jordanian and Iraqi ministers. Though the agenda

was economic, you are not surprised, at all, I know, that terrorism

came up regularly. In fact, my Iraqi colleagues reminded me that

they faced the horror of these terrorist attacks every day, and they

urged us to do all we could to help them diminish and eliminate

these attacks that they are facing.

So, I come sit here today reinforced in my dedication to work to

ensure that our interagency process strikes the right balance of priorities and uses the right mix of tools in our effort to keep funds

out of the hands of terrorists. Our partnership with the Department of the Treasury is extremely important in this effort. We have

worked very closely together, and it is only in working together, not

just the two of us but with the rest of the interagency community,

that we are being effective, both at home and abroad. I particularly

am pleased to be testifying with Under Secretary Stuart Levey,

who does bring a persistence and an impatience, as he said, to the

process, which keeps us all moving in a positive direction, and of

course, Ambassador Powell has worked on the very front lines of

fighting terrorism and is now fulfilling an important post as my

colleague at the Department of State.

The many agencies in the U.S. Government bring a range of tools

to this effort, as you well know, and we are most effective when

we are able to ensure that we do have clear overall direction to assure information sharing, to choreograph all the value added and

the tools that each of our colleagues from the U.S. Government

brings together. We have worked over the past several years to devise a very effective interagency process now directed by the National Security Council that helps us to really maximize the impact

we can have.

One of the critical methods we have used in working the financing of terrorism is the process of designating individuals and

groups for asset freeze and for ban on travel. This has several benefits, which I would just like to underscore. Of course, it makes it

a lot harder for those groups and individuals to gather money and

to use the formal financial system. It also informs those unwitting

donors around the world and particularly in the region we are considering today where they have often thought they were giving to

good, charitable causes. It helps make them more alert, and it

makes, of course, more cautious those who knew exactly what they

were doing but thought they had found a safe way to do it.

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When we decide to designate a terrorist or a financier, the Department of State leads the interagency effort to get the broadest

possible international support for that designation. That, of course,

as you very well know, is essential to the very effectiveness of designations, because if other countries do not act to look for these individuals, to look for these accounts, to look for these groups, it is

not going to have much impact. Most of the money is flowing elsewhere, not through the United States.

We have had success in building partnerships throughout the region that we are talking about today in joining us and going to the

United Nations to designate people. Saudi Arabia has joined us;

India has joined us; Jordan and Iraq have joined us; and even, in

one case, Syria joined us, and this was the designation that took

place of an individual who was supporting terrorism in Iraq.

In this process, we realize that if we are more successful at tightening up the use of the formal system, as Stuart Levey indicated,

terrorists will try to find other means to try to get their money

around. They use cash couriers. They are using alternative remittance systems. They are using charities. And we need to be just as

smart and to help our partners be just as smart in tracking down

and in stopping these alternative means of moving the money forward.

So we worked very hard to provide types of training to governments around the world and particularly in this region in such

areas as trade based money laundering and customs training and

antiterrorist financing techniques; we have done case studies with

bank examiners; we have taught law enforcement officials general

finance investigative skills, all in the effort to have a more effective

financial coalition.

Let me just mention a few highlights from the country-specific

work that we have been doing. In recent months, the Government

of Saudi Arabia, as we are reminded on a regular basis in the

press, has continued a very vigorous counterterrorism effort on the

ground, apprehending terrorists and their supporters, but it has

also continued to publicize not only its counterterrorism efforts but

also to speak out denouncing terrorism inside Saudi Arabia, which

is very important.

Homeland Security Advisor Townsend and I attended in February of this year an international counterterrorism conference

which was organized by the Saudi Government in Riyadh. That

conference declared, as its final outcome, that there can be no justification for terrorism.

Since then, the Saudis have continued an effort to educate the

public about the dangers and ills of terrorism. They have also continued to fight on the ground. Just recently, on June 28, they

issued a new list of 36 most-wanted terrorists in the Kingdom to

replace the earlier list, where they had acted effectively. At least

one of these new individuals has been killed and another has surrendered since the list was released.

The Saudis report that they have seized $8 million to $10 million

as part of their efforts. They called at the February conference for

establishing an international counterterrorism center in Riyadh to

help cement cooperation among countries in curbing all aspects of

terrorism, including the financing of terrorism. They are also conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:35 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 30837.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
8

tinuing to work to create a fully operational financial intelligence

unit. Saudi officials say this unit could be up and running in the

next 2 to 3 months. We will continue to encourage and support that

process and also encourage the Saudi FIU to join the Egmont

Group, which is the group of financial intelligence units around the

world, as you know, in 2006.

As Under Secretary Levey mentioned, Saudi Arabia and the

United States have been working for a year and a half now in the

context of a joint task force on terrorist financing, which is led by

the FBI on the United States side. Much good work has been done,

but there also remains much work to achieve.

We believe the Saudi Arabian Government is implementing its

new approach to charity regulation. At present, we are told that no

charity in Saudi Arabia can move its assets located in Saudi Arabia

outside of the country without government approval. We continue

to stress in our discussions with the Saudis the need for full implementation of the new charity regime, which would include the establishment of a fully functioning charities commission.

We also believe that appropriate regulatory oversight is needed

of organizations headquartered in the Kingdom, such as the Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organization,

and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The Saudis tell us they

recognize this need, and at present, neither the IIRO or WAMY are

able to move money from their accounts to recipients outside of

Saudi Arabia. The Saudis tell us these organizations are subject to

the same restrictions that apply to domestic Saudi charities.

In Kuwait, the government has formed a new ministerial committee to develop strategies to combat terrorism and extremism. It

recently forbade its ministries and other institutions from extending official invitations to 26 clerics who reportedly signed a statement in support of jihad in Iraq.

The government is drafting new legislation specifically to criminalize terrorist finance and to strengthen its anti-money laundering and terrorist finance regime. The government has accepted

assistance from the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas

Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training, OPDAT, to review this legislation. Our embassy is working closely with the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, the Federal Reserve, and others, to look at counterterrorism training packages we can make

available.

The UAE is a very aggressive partner in enforcing anti-money

laundering regulations. In 2004, it enacted legislation criminalizing

terror finance. It has also been one of the leaders in trying to tackle the hawala phenomenon. In April of this year, it hosted a third

international conference to find ways to prevent the use of the

hawala system by terrorist financiers. We work very closely with

the UAE and have a very intense and regular dialogue with their

officials.

I was just in Jordan, and there raised with the Minister of Finance and the Central Bank Governor the urgency of having the

parliament pass a new anti-money laundering law which will significantly strengthen the legal authority there to tackle terrorist financing. Both express their commitment to do so and their hope

that the parliament will act in this summer’s special session.

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Turning to Pakistan, let me just note that we, of course, all welcome the concrete actions that it has taken to implement its U.N.

Security Council resolutions, the freezing of over $10 million of Al

Qaeda assets, and the terrorists they have apprehended, including

Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Al Qaeda’s operational leader. We are also encouraged that Pakistan is showing increased concern about the infiltration of terrorist groups into charitable organizations.

We have provided Pakistan with assistance in drafting its antimoney laundering and counterterrorism financing law, and we are

urging that a strong law be passed by parliament and put into action. As soon as that happens, we have additional training assistance that we will be able to make available to help a financial intelligence unit to get up and running.

At the same time that we are dealing with these specifics to go

after terrorist financing, we are also trying to address the longerterm goal of improving economic prosperity and employment opportunities in these priority countries, and as you remember, the September 11 Commission pointed out that we cannot neglect the need

to encourage prosperity and development in these countries.

The G–8 countries in Gleneagles just reiterated their support for

the broader Middle East and North Africa initiative, which is

aimed exactly at doing that and supporting reform and growth and

prosperity in the broader Middle East, working with the governments of the region and civil society groups and business throughout that region.

Our development policies reflecting the President’s National Security Strategy are also an important part of this effort. I might

just cite, this is true across the region, but in Pakistan, we have

specifically designed our development policies to help create alternatives for youth who might otherwise be susceptible for recruitment into terrorist organizations.

As the September 11 Commission report noted, practically every

aspect of U.S. counterterrorism strategy relies on international cooperation. Given that money gets into the hands of terrorists flowing all around the world, the only way that we are going to be successful in drying up their financial resources is through continued

active U.S. engagement in countries around the globe.

We hope that our efforts and assistance in these areas will result

in better coordination. We look forward eagerly to the Saudi’s financial intelligence unit and the charities commission becoming effective operational bodies. We look forward eagerly to Pakistan and

Jordan passing strong anti-money laundering legislation and to

Kuwait drafting its new legislation and putting it forward.

We need universal and rigorous implementation across the region to prevent terrorist financing. We need to have an active and

effective foreign financial intelligence units. We need to have more

activism in tackling cash couriers. We need stricter regulations on

money service businesses and hawalas. We need tighter controls on

NGO’s and charities, and we need countries to implement international conventions. As Under Secretary Levey mentioned, the Financial Action Task Force and its new regional counterpart, the

MENA FATF, is going to be very important in this one effort.

Finally, sir, your support is very important in this, both in providing the resources we need to go forward in this effort but also

10

in you reaching out to your colleagues around the world and encouraging them to cooperate, to take the tough decisions sometimes

to put the laws in place and then to implement those laws. We

have found it to be extremely effective when you and your colleagues travel and actually raise these issues with senior government officials and sometimes even the not so senior ones who are

charged with taking this work forward. So we very much encourage

you to do that.

I look forward to your questions and thank you again.

Chairman SHELBY. Secretary Levey, in your statement, you referenced the continued problems with Saudi cooperation on the

issue of international charitable organizations like the International Islamic Relief Organization and the World Association of

Muslim Youth. The Saudis have refused to acknowledge these organizations as a Saudi problem, arguing instead that they are multilateral organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia but otherwise

autonomous. They have gone so far as to suggest that their relationship to these organizations is identical to that between the

United States and the headquarters of the United Nations. It is a

far reach.

Could each of you—start with you, Secretary Levey and then

Secretary Wayne, comment on the measures the United States is

currently taking to address this rather significant weakness in

Saudi Arabia’s antiterror finance regime? The March 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report states with respect to

Pakistan—Ambassador Powell, you know a lot about that as former

ambassador there—the following: A nexus of private, unregulated

charities has also emerged as a major source of illicit funds for

international terrorist networks.

That is a very serious statement about a country on the front

lines of the war on terror with which we maintain a difficult but

essential alliance. Share your thoughts regarding the Saudi-based

charities and Pakistan’s terrorist links to charities. We will start

with you, Secretary Levey.

Mr. LEVEY. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman.

As you indicated, I did treat these charitable organizations based

in Saudi Arabia in my statement and my written testimony, and

I have indicated that the IIRO, Muslim World League, and WAMY

continue to cause us concern on several fronts. One, as Mr. Wayne

pointed out, we have been told that these organizations are no

longer free to send money abroad from Saudi Arabia, and that

would be a very positive development if it were fully implemented.

We continue to have concerns about whether it is fully implemented.

Two, and this is perhaps a positive point, there was a time when

they were setting up this charities commission that we have been

talking about where it appeared as if they intended to exempt

these organizations from the oversight of that charities commission.

This is one of the successes of our engagement. It is easy for me

to say that, because I was not personally responsible for the success. I think Mr. Wayne, Fran Townsend, and Juan Zaratti were,

but we have now gotten assurances that these organizations will

11

be subject to the oversight of that Commission, which I think is a

very positive development.

But as you note in your question, Mr. Chairman, this is exactly

the analogy that we have been given, which is that these organizations are akin to the United States relationship with the United

Nations.

Chairman SHELBY. You do not buy that, do you?

Mr. LEVEY. I do not buy that. I do not think anyone is buying

that, and I have expressed my very strong skepticism of that analogy to the Saudi Government. The perhaps positive response to

that was, okay, well, we are willing to work with you to try to control these organizations abroad.

I think it is important that we all recognize that these organizations are very, very much tied to Saudi Arabia; that their history

is very tied in with Saudi Arabia; and while the Saudi Arabians

may be able to say that they do not have technical control over

branches of these organizations abroad, they certainly have influence that they can bring to bear, and I hope that they will follow

through on their commitment to work with us to try to do that.

Chairman SHELBY. Thank you.

Secretary Wayne, do you have any comments on that?

Mr. WAYNE. Only to say, Chairman, that as we have engaged

with the Saudis, we have stressed the point that if there are significant sources of money either being raised in your country or

coming into your country, they need to be regulated. And that is

the key challenge here, and that is a challenge that every sovereign

government needs to take on.

Chairman SHELBY. It is particularly a challenge in the Islamic

world, is it not?

Mr. WAYNE. It is, because there has not been a tradition of

claiming donations in any way as we sometimes do for taxes, or

there was more of a duty, and you did the giving of money anonymously. So there has been an evolution in how you think about

charitable giving and how you track it.

But as Under Secretary Levey has said, we have seen an evolution in thinking as we have worked with our colleagues in Saudi

Arabia. They have now said that, in fact, they are applying their

current restrictions on all charitable giving to these organizations

and that they realize that there does need to be a regulatory oversight of them. They are still at work in that process as they are

at work in setting up their charities commission, but you can be

assured it will continue to be a very high level topic in our work,

and I do want to give praise to Homeland Security Advisor Fran

Townsend for continuing this very high level dialogue with the

Saudis persistently for a long period of time now to achieve this

progress and to build this partnership.

Chairman SHELBY. Ambassador Powell, do you have a comment

on the Pakistani aspect of that?

12

COMMENTS OF NANCY POWELL

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. POWELL. If I can comment briefly, the observation in the report was based on a number of sources but includes the conclusions

of an interagency team that looked at training and technical needs

that Pakistan has. I would also like to report that Pakistan has

created a Center for Philanthropy. It is a government institution

that was designed to register all of the nongovernmental organizations in Pakistan and to create a framework for primarily ensuring

that they were not fraudulent organizations, that those giving to

them could be assured that their money would be used for the purposes stated.

I met frequently along with other senior members of the embassy

staff with the director of the center to encourage that it cover areas

to make sure that the charities in Pakistan were not engaged in

activities or vulnerable to being used by the terrorists, even if they

had legitimate activities. I would also like to suggest that although,

as Secretary Wayne reported, the law has not been passed on

money laundering and other areas of concern in Pakistan, it is out

of the cabinet committee now as of last week and will be considered

by parliament. In the interim, particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission equivalent and the Bank of Pakistan have

used their extensive regulatory authority to try to address some of

these concerns, including this one.

Chairman SHELBY. Senator Sarbanes.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL S. SARBANES

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Could

I take a moment or two for an opening statement?

Chairman SHELBY. Proceed as you wish.

Senator SARBANES. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for once again scheduling an oversight hearing on this

very important issue. I fully share your commitment for the Committee to follow this matter closely, and of course, the tragic events

in London and yesterday’s suicide bombing in Israel give this hearing special immediacy.

A number of countries are making progress in putting in place

formal anti-money laundering systems, but the real question is the

implementation of those laws. I mean, they put them into place,

but the question is what is being done to carry them out and to

enforce them and what is the degree to which there is cooperation

with counterterrorism and anti-money laundering efforts around

the world. I take it—I saw you nodding—you would agree with

that, Secretary Levey; is that correct?

Mr. LEVEY. Very much so.

Senator SARBANES. And of course, you have a number of obstacles to meaningful progress: Lack of trained examination or enforcement personnel; the absence of sophisticated financial regulatory infrastructure; even disagreements about the definition of

terrorists.

I am concerned that a number of smaller countries, particularly

in the Gulf region, seem to want to create these offshore financial

13

free trade areas or financial centers as a way to secure revenues.

But these arrangements may well be an invitation to organized

criminals, terrorists, and those seeking to evade regulatory controls

to hide their funds, and I think it is very important to keep our

eye on that subject.

Now, Secretary Levey, having gotten from you the observation

that implementation is extremely important, I now want to ask you

this question: We are nearing the fourth anniversary of the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act. Section 312, which dealt with correspondent accounts, was a major part of Title III of the Act.

A proposed rule under Section 312 was published in May 2002,

more than 3 years ago. But despite repeated statements to this

Committee that Treasury recognizes the importance of the rule, it

has not yet been finalized. This is all the more surprising because

the Federal Reserve Board has issued at least two cease-and-desist

orders identifying correspondent banking failures in major international banks.

Why, specifically, has Treasury not acted, and is the rule being

held up for some reason? When will this regulation be finally

issued?

Mr. LEVEY. I was tempted to say I learned my lesson against

nodding, but I had a feeling I was going to get asked that question

anyway. Let me assure you, Senator Sarbanes, that there is no one

who wants to see this rule put out more than I do.

Senator SARBANES. Well, then, what is the hold-up?

Mr. LEVEY. On the one hand, it is a complicated rule. As you indicated, the proposed rule was put out approximately 2 years before I got to the Treasury Department, and it was one of my priorities when I got there to take a look at it and to provide input to

see what adjustments I wanted to advocate for within the Department.

What I can tell you is that there is no holdup on the rule. The

current status of it is that we have now sent it to the regulators

for review pursuant to the consultation requirement that we have

under this section. I have learned the hard way in other contexts

not to promise a particular timetable on when the rule will be finished, but that is the current status of it. I hope it will be a prompt

review by the regulators and that we will be able to issue it very

soon.

Senator SARBANES. This law was signed on October 26, 2001.

Mr. LEVEY. You are absolutely right, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. It will be 4 years this October. And it required you to not later than 100 days after the date of enactment

to delineate by regulation the due diligence portions of the rule,

and that was done. And then, everything came to a stop.

Mr. LEVEY. That is an accurate representation of what has happened. We have done the guidance but——

Senator SARBANES. Do you think if I were the official of one of

these countries we are trying to get to put in an anti-money laundering scheme and to implement it, and you went over and were

pushing me hard to do this thing, do you think I would be within

reasonable bounds if I said, well, now, Mr. Secretary, what about

this regulation you were supposed to put in effect under Section

14

312? You do not seem to have done that in your own country. How

can you be giving me a hard time about what I should do?

Mr. LEVEY. I do not want to make light of it, Senator, and I understand precisely the point you are making. I do think that we

have a fairly robust anti-money laundering system, so that when

I go around the world, and Mr. Wayne goes around the world, and

we ask for reforms that we are speaking from a position of authority and credibility. But you make an excellent point that we need

to do our work here as well.

Senator SARBANES. We could enhance it a little bit, I think.

Now, let me ask you: Has the Treasury Department met with

representatives of Islamic NGO’s to discuss terrorist financing

under the guise of charitable giving? Have there been such meetings, and what were their results?

Mr. LEVEY. Actually, Senator, we have done a fair amount of the

type of activity that you refer to. We have made it a priority to

reach out to the Muslim community, particularly with respect to

charitable giving. As I think Mr. Wayne indicated, our goal here is

not to stop charitable giving. Our goal here is to stop the use of

charitable organizations for funding terrorism.

A great majority of the people who give money to these organizations are pure of heart, and they want their money to go to real

humanitarian causes. And so, we have done what we can to try to

help the charitable community protect itself from that abuse and

so that people who have good intentions can send their money to

real humanitarian causes without fear that it is going to be devoted to terrorism.

Just yesterday, as part of this effort, we put on our website a

very comprehensive summary of all the actions that we have taken

as a Treasury Department with respect to charitable organizations

since September 11. It identifies all the charitable organizations

that we have designated pursuant to 13224, the Executive Order

for terrorist financing, and it gives a summary of why we have designated them, all of the aliases and AKA’s that the charitable organizations go by so that people have a resource to go to in order to

make sure that they are not giving money to an organization that

we have identified as being a supporter of terrorism.

This is something that we did in response to requests from the

Islamic community here in the United States saying that this

would be a resource that they would appreciate, and we are doing

that. We are also just about to issue another set of voluntary best

practices for charitable organizations, things that we suggest that

they can do to protect themselves from this abuse.

While these are voluntary, they have had a real impact in the

charitable community here in the United States, where they have

been viewed as almost obligatory, which I think is a positive thing,

and we will continue to try to do this.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SHELBY. Senator Bunning.

Senator BUNNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Levey, what are some of the other ways that charities or the

terrorists are raising money if it is not through charitable organizations? What are the other major sources of fundraising that you

15

have now spotted or, for that matter, the nontraditional fundraising areas that you have focused on?

Mr. LEVEY. Well, Senator Bunning, I think there are really two

answers to your question, two categories to the answer. One would

be how they are raising it and how they are moving it. Terrorist

organizations have traditionally looked to in addition to charities,

they have looked to simply wealthy donors to give money directly.

And that still remains a problem.

They have also raised money through petty crime. We have had

a number of—I should not say petty crime; sometimes petty crime;

sometimes not so petty crime. But we have had a number of cases

here in the United States where we have been able to show that

terrorist organizations were funding themselves through criminal

activity here; a very prominent case in North Carolina where

Hezbollah was raising money through counterfeit cigarette operations. But they may also be just having operatives live where they

intend to attack and having legitimate sources of income, which is

also a possibility that we need to be aware of.

In terms of the way they move money, as I think I discuss in my

written testimony, we see that one of the successes of our actions

is that we have driven terrorist organizations out of the easy ways

of moving money, simply wiring money back and forth to each

other and using the traditional banking system.

That is, in one sense, a success; in another sense, it is a challenge, because now, they move money in ways like cash couriers or

Hawalas that are a little bit harder, present a challenge in order

for us to regulate those sources.

Senator BUNNING. I have heard from some bankers, not a great

deal but most of them know their customers, and they have a pretty good idea when something fishy is going on in one of their

banks, but they are burdened by what they think are regulations

that could be better focused on possible illegal activities.

Is the Department of the Treasury working with banks to see if

they can better focus on accounts when given the activities that

seem irregular where it is more likely that something of a suspicious nature is occurring?

Mr. LEVEY. Actually, Senator Bunning, we are doing a great deal

of just the type of activity that you are talking about, and I would

like to commend my Director of FinCen, Bill Fox, who does this

with great energy. We have spent a lot of time not only reaching

out to the banking community but also really listening to them and

acting in response to what we have heard.

Senator BUNNING. You are listening, actually, to bankers? That

is not what I have heard.

Mr. LEVEY. I beg to differ, Senator. Just yesterday, for example,

the Justice Department amended its U.S. Attorneys’ Manual to

provide that all prosecutions and deferred prosecutions for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act will now have to be approved by the

Criminal Division in Washington. That sounds like an awfully technical thing, but I think the banking community is going to find it

significant, because it will ensure that prosecutions and deferred

prosecutions brought by the Justice Department will only be undertaken after there is an opportunity for the kind of good consultation between Justice and Treasury that I believe will occur, and the

16

banking community, as you might imagine is very, very sensitive

to and cognizant of prosecutorial decisions made by the Justice Department as well as to enforcement decisions made by regulators

and the Treasury.

Senator BUNNING. I am going to ask the question one more time.

Maybe you missed the question. Are you consulting with bankers?

Mr. LEVEY. Yes.

Senator BUNNING. Yes?

Mr. LEVEY. Yes.

Senator BUNNING. Big money center banks only or other bankers?

Mr. LEVEY. Other bankers as well; both myself, Mr. Fox more so

than myself spent a lot of time with bankers, making speeches,

going to conferences. I am surprised to hear that bankers are saying that they do not feel that they are——

Senator BUNNING. Well, maybe they are not big enough. Maybe, a $300 million bank is not big enough for money laundering.

Mr. LEVEY. That is not true. There are significant vulnerabilities

in small banks as well, and we spend time reaching out to them

as well.

Senator BUNNING. My time has run out.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SHELBY. Senator Hagel.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I want to pursue the line of Senator Bunning’s questions, and I

am going to ask a couple of specific questions in regard to the exchange that you just had with Senator Bunning.

I have been told that as you have done in your Financial Crime

Enforcement work, FinCen, and the Office of Terrorist Financing

and Financial Crimes is experiencing a backlog because of some of

the administrative process that is underway. My first question is

is there a backlog of financial reports in those two offices?

Mr. LEVEY. What I think you may be referring to is suspicious

activity report filings with FinCen.

Senator HAGEL. That is right.

Mr. LEVEY. I would not say that there is a backlog so much as

there has been a big increase in suspicious activity report filings,

which is something that we are taking very seriously. We want to

make sure that we do not have banks filing suspicious activity reports when they do not really believe that there is suspicious activity, because that degrades the process and makes it less valuable.

But I think we also have to remember that the Bank Secrecy Act

data that is filed in these suspicious activity reports is extremely

valuable, and we want to make sure that we do not take steps that

cut off the Government from extremely valuable data that is filed

through suspicious activity reports. Just last month, the head of

the Terrorist Financing Section at the FBI testified before the

House that they have 88,000 suspicious activity reports that they

are looking at that are related to terrorism investigation subjects.

That is the kind of thing that I do not think we can afford to lose.

Senator HAGEL. Let me ask it another way, specifically, is there

a backlog or is there not a backlog in these two offices of reports?

17

Mr. LEVEY. I do not believe that there is what I would call a

backlog.

Senator HAGEL. What would you call it?

Mr. LEVEY. And I will actually clarify that these reports are filed

with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and not with my

office, the Office of Terrorism Financial Intelligence. They are filed

with FinCen. They are getting a larger volume of information, and

it is presenting challenges for them to process it. They are also pursuing an information technology fix called BSA Direct, which

should be online in October, which should greatly improve their

ability to manage this data.

Senator HAGEL. So is there a backlog, or is there not a backlog?

You are up-to-date? You are not up-to-date?

Mr. LEVEY. I guess I do not know exactly whether all of the information is being entered as timely as I would like.

Senator HAGEL. Well, would you not think that that is fairly important? If you need more resources, have you asked for more resources in order to enter timely information and to make sure it

is current?

Mr. LEVEY. It is part of our budget request.

Senator HAGEL. Because it does not do us much good if it just

lays around or if it is not, in many cases, real time, I would suspect.

Mr. LEVEY. This information, though, is not just laying around.

It is being put out to the law enforcement community so that they

can review it as well.

Senator HAGEL. But if there is any kind of a backlog, how does

that happen?

Mr. LEVEY. All of the SAR’s that are filed are provided to the law

enforcement community, and they can review them. There are SAR

review teams in various cities.

Senator HAGEL. Well, let me get to a point that Senator Bunning

was making, and I hear this from many bankers, that in fact, one

of the reasons that you may be experiencing, as you noted, an increase in these suspicious activity reports is that these smaller

banks, medium-sized banks are filing them because they are filing

them to protect and will err on the side of caution, thinking that

they really do not have much to report but because of the field examiners overinterpreting the Bank Secrecy Act, they will get hit

with violations.

Now, is that a problem? Is that something that concerns you? Is

it something we need to look at? What is your take on that?

Mr. LEVEY. I think that phenomenon is a concern, and you are

exactly right. One of the problems that we have had is that while

we are trying to set policy in Washington, as you know, it does not

always translate out into the field. We have a problem where

banks are filing on precisely the types of transactions that you

have mentioned, where they do not really think it is suspicious, but

they think look, I do not want to be second guessed down the road.

Senator HAGEL. Well, what are we doing about that in the way

of educating field examiners? Are the field examiners overinterpreting the Bank Secrecy Act?

Mr. LEVEY. Well, as a matter of fact, we just put out, and I do

not remember exactly the date, but within the last few weeks,

18

though, a set of comprehensive exam procedures where we were

trying to unify the way all the regulators will handle these exams

so you will not have the problem you referred to; you will not have

one examiner or one agency interpreting the rules differently from

others. And there was a comprehensive set of exam procedures that

was put out jointly by FinCen as well as all the regulators to try

to address exactly this problem. This is something that we have

been taking very seriously and trying very hard to fix.

Senator HAGEL. Well, I would say—my time is up, Mr. Chairman—that as is the case with Senator Bunning and I suspect other

colleagues on this Committee as well as other Senators, they are

hearing from the bankers, and their bankers think that we are

wasting our resources, time, and focus on these kinds of procedural

issues when there is nothing there and taking our eye off of the

real threats.

And when you come back before this Committee, Mr. Secretary,

and I will follow up in a letter next week so we can get into a little

more detail, and maybe you can come in and talk about this, we

do not want this to drag on like has been the case with Senator

Sarbanes’ questions to you: It takes 4 years to get a law implemented. I do not know what service you are doing our country or

doing anyone when we let things drift to that extent.

So, I will ask if you can come in and see me, and I will formally

send a letter over to the Secretary and ask for more detailed information.

Mr. LEVEY. I look forward to the meeting.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. LEVEY. Because this is not something we have let drift.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. LEVEY. And I would be happy to tell you that.

Chairman SHELBY. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Secretary Levey, you mentioned the United States-Saudi Joint

Terrorist Finance Task Force in your opening statement. The

Banking Committee staff visited Saudi Arabia in February and

came away with a rather pessimistic view of status of that task

force. In short, rather than being a formalized, side-by-side, day-today operation, it is their conclusion that it is more of an ad hoc arrangement involving the same individuals from both sides who

meet regularly but hardly work together on a daily basis.

Could you expand here your comments for the Committee in

terms of how well the joint task force, in your opinion, is working?

Is the responsiveness of the Saudi half of the arrangement conducive to the level of cooperation necessary to accomplish the task

force mission, and are there political, cultural, or bureaucratic gaps

between the two sides that limit its effectiveness?

Mr. LEVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should start by saying that one of the very positive things that

has developed with the Committee is that I have developed a kind

of relationship with the staff where I am able to get that kind of

feedback, and I apologize: I meant to treat this particular issue, because I had heard about this concern after the trip.

I do think, and I have double checked since I heard these concerns, that the joint terrorist financing task force that you alluded

to in Saudi Arabia is something that we consider a very positive

19

development. You are correct that it is not a side-by-side physically

arrangement, but that, we think would be a rather unusual situation.

There are not very many countries where we are working dayto-day, side-by-side with our security and intelligence services in

the same room. There is good cooperation on cases that are being

worked both that we bring leads to them and we work cooperatively with them. That is not to say that this cannot be improved.

There are certainly improvements that we are looking to make. We

think that the way we like to describe it is that the groundwork

is laid for the cooperation, and we would like to see it broadened

and deepened.

But considering where we were with Saudi Arabia before 2003,

I think we should—and I am not one to throw this kind of phrase

around lightly—I think we should be looking at this as a success.

Chairman SHELBY. Is there a difference between the attitude in

Saudi Arabia in cooperating with us when something has gone

wrong in their Kingdom and we are helpful dealing with terrorists

against their own Government as opposed to our concerns here on

our own interests?

Mr. LEVEY. I can only speak in generalities, but I think we have

had cooperation on both of those categories.

Chairman SHELBY. You think it is better, but you do not think

it is on the level of the British-American cooperation, do you?

Mr. LEVEY. Maybe I should defer that—I am scared of causing

a diplomatic incident, but you are probably right about that, Senator.

Chairman SHELBY. The position of the United States. with regard to the Palestinian Relief and Development Fund, also known

as InterPal, is that it is unambiguously a financial supporter of the

Islamic resistance movement. Yet the British Government has repeatedly investigated InterPal and come to the conclusion that it

has no evidence of funding going through that organization to the

military wing of Hamas.

Their position is, as I understand it, is that InterPal funds go to

social welfare activities carried out by Hamas with little or no leakage to terrorist activities. I would like to know how you know that,

and could you comment for the Committee on the British position

on InterPal, and will it change after last week?

Mr. LEVEY. Well, I have to say that it is an ironic question after

the one you just asked.

Chairman SHELBY. Yes.

Mr. LEVEY. Because this is one where perhaps our closest ally

and we have a disagreement.

Chairman SHELBY. Sure.

Mr. LEVEY. And that happens, and that is perhaps healthy, although this one is frustrating to me. As you indicate, we believe

InterPal to be a conduit, one of the principal charities that was

used to hide the flow of funds to Hamas. We think that we designated it domestically here. I have raised it repeatedly with

my——

Chairman SHELBY. They have also raised a lot of money in the

United States of America, have they not?

Mr. LEVEY. Well, InterPal is a British——

20

Chairman SHELBY. I know that, but I am speaking Hamas has.

Mr. LEVEY. Oh, yes, you are absolutely right, and we have taken

action with respect to the charitable organizations in the United

States that we have been able to definitively tie to Hamas, and we

have shut them down. But as you indicate, this is one where we

disagree with the British, and we hope to see this change.

Chairman SHELBY. The Emirate of Dubai prides itself on the free

trade zones as an important component in its effort to become the

regional financial and commercial center of the Persian Gulf. Of

particular pride to the emirate and of particular concern to this

Committee is the Dubai International Financial Centre, which

Dubai hopes will facilitate its transformation into the region’s premier financial services hub.

The attraction of a free trade zone, of course, is its emphasis on

a minimal regulation of commerce involving both commercial goods

and money, developments at variance with U.S. goals of greatest

regulation in that region. Is this a concern, Secretary Wayne,

shared by your office and others? And if so, what have you done

or what can you do to address this potential weakness in the antimoney laundering regime? Seems like that they are using this

some as a transit point for nuclear components headed for sanctioned terrorist-supporting countries and a lot of other things. Does

this concern you?

Mr. WAYNE. Well, yes; having the United Arab Emirates, the

various points through which financial resources and other goods

and services pass have been a point of concern for us. It has also

been a point of concern for the authorities in the UAE and in the

specific emirates. So what we have worked to do is set up a number

of effective partnerships, as we have been trying to do in other

places, really, on an interagency basis, coordinated in our embassy

but working both at the Federal level and at the emirate level to

tackle these several different challenges, whether it be related to

weapons of mass destruction, terrorist financing, or other export

control dangers.

We have a very intense dialogue with the UAE. We have beefed

up the presence at our embassy, which now includes Homeland Security, former U.S. Customs, which is now called Immigration and

Customs Enforcement, ICE, personnel, in order to build a practical

relationship with the different authorities both Federal and in the

individual emirates. And we have found a very receptive set of

partners on the side of both the authorities in Dubai and at the

Federal level in Abu Dhabi.

And so, our intention is to keep making this an even more effective partnership than we have had. As I mentioned earlier, at the

level of terrorist financing, the central bank authorities in the UAE

have been among the very most forward leaning and aggressive in

the region at putting very effective and tough controls in place.

Chairman SHELBY. Senator Bunning, do you have any questions

at this time?

Senator BUNNING. No.

Chairman SHELBY. I want to thank the panel. I have a number

of questions for the record that we will get to you, and we hope you

would answer them promptly.

We appreciate your appearance here today.

21

Senator Sarbanes, do you have any questions of this panel?

Senator SARBANES. Not at this time.

Chairman SHELBY. Okay; thank you.

Thank you.

Our second panel will include Mr. Dennis Lormel, former Section

Chief of Financial Crimes Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and currently Senior Vice-President, Anti-Money Laundering,

Corporate Risk International; Mr. Steven Emerson, Executive Director of the Investigative Project and a long time tracker of the

sources of funds provided to terrorist organizations; and Dr.

Mahmoud El-Gamal, Chair of Islamic Economics Finance and Management, Rice University, and former Department of the Treasury

Islamic Scholar in Residence.

Dr. El-Gamal is not here to testify on sources of terrorist financing. He is here to educate us and enlighten us on Islamic banking

practices and whether the gradual spread of Islamic banking poses

challenges to the United States in understanding the movement of

funds in the Islamic world that may be unique to the western style

of banking currently prevalent throughout much of the Islamic

world.

I thank all of you for your appearance today. Your written testimony will be made part of the hearing record in its entirety, and

we will let you proceed summarizing—Mr. Lormel, thank you for

your appearance, and we will start with you, if you are ready, sir.

STATEMENT OF DENNIS M. LORMEL

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

CORPORATE RISK INTERNATIONAL, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

Mr. LORMEL. Thank you, Senator.

Very quickly, I would like to thank the Committee for the invitation, and like we have heard in the first panel, commend you guys

for the work you do. It is really important. And I would like to lead

off on that, on the questions that Senator Bunning and Senator

Hagel were concerned about.

You notice in my written testimony, I specify in there that those

are some areas that the Committee should be looking at for additional follow-up. I think I have developed a unique perspective

since leaving the Bureau. I work very closely with the financial

community, and I think there is a middle ground that needs to be

established there, Senator, and I do think there is communication,

but I also think that the feedback is insufficient, so it is an area

that really is an area that needs follow-up.

But moving on, I wanted to just summarize some of the things

I put in my written statement just in terms of some of the dimensions that we need to look at in terrorist financing. We should not

be looking at terrorist financing as just kind of one dimensional. It

is multidimensional in terms of on one hand, activities and individuals, because we are looking at financing of activities in terms of

operations, in terms of the fundraising, in terms of the use of the

funds beyond that: Technical support, administrative support, and

then, in terms of individuals, in terms of operatives, in terms of

suicide bombers, in terms of fundraisers, facilitators, and donors.

And each of those dimensions requires a different kind of funding

mechanism. When I deal with bankers now, I ask them who are

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you most likely to deal with, and in what capacity are you likely

to deal with those people? And they need to focus their compliance

and know your customer practices in that regard. And then, from

an investigative standpoint, and this is important, because when

you are trying to measure accomplishments and where we are in

the war on terrorism in terms of terrorist financing, I think you

need to break that down into three dimensions, one of them certainly being being strategic; one of them tactical; and one of them

historic.

And in terms of strategic, I think Stuart Levey at Treasury in

putting his operation together is doing a good job, because he recognizes the need for strategic intelligence, and he is trying to put

a component together, and it needs to have some time to develop

its credibility and resources, and I know that the FBI, right after

September 11, we recognized that, we put an entity together. And

in Stuart’s testimony, he talked about FinCen and their putting together BSA Direct, and it plays right back to Senator Hagel’s concern about suspicious activity reporting.

Suspicious activity reports are critically important. The information they contain can link, and as Stuart said, the person who took

my place at the FBI, Mike Morehart, testified before the House last

month that with this new robust capability we have in terms of analytical capability with SAR’s, they came up with 88,000 hits, and

I think that is really something that has a lot of potential in the

future, and I recommend that you get a briefing on that.

And in terms of the other recommendations I made, I would be

very happy to work with your staff, with some of the ideas that I

had or with what my perspectives are in that regard.

Moving on to the Middle East and your concerns, because, Senator, you asked questions; I will go right to the Joint Terrorism

Task Force. It is not a formal task force and it was not set up to

be that way. The dynamics were such that we did not have that

ability.

Chairman SHELBY. Is it more of an ad hoc group?

Mr. LORMEL. Well I would say it is more than ad hoc.

Chairman SHELBY. A grade above that?

Mr. LORMEL. Yes, I would put it above that, but I also know that

it has come a long way, and I think the starting point was we provided a lot of training, as Tony Wayne said, to different countries

in the Middle East and the region, particularly the UAE. The

model in the UAE is very good. We sent teams over there to train,

and based on that training, we established good will. And what the

UAE showed us was not only did they implement laws, but I think

they also have the wherewithal, at least the intent to follow-up, implement, and oversee those laws, where with the Saudis, the issue

is transparency, and are they genuine, or are they disingenuous,

and that is a big question and certainly a big challenge for my

former colleagues in dealing with them.

And I know, having been involved in that process that Fran

Townsend, David Aufhauser, and people like that, Cofer Black put

incredible pressure and persuasion on them to continue to move

forward. But going back to the task force for a second, Senator, I

think it is more than ad hoc. It is certainly not the best case scenario. It is a good case scenario, and the bottom line is that there

23

is a good exchange of information going on there; whether or not

the people sit side-by-side, they do meet regularly, and they are exchanging useful information, and that is the important factor there.

And overall, in the Middle East, as I mentioned, the UAE and Bahrain were very good partners in terrorist financing with us, and I

think it is important that we mention here the Middle East North

Africa Financial Action Task Force that was formed, that the Financial Action Task Force the World Bank and the IMF have recognized that formation, and I think that is a very positive move:

14 countries in the region participating in that particular task

force, and I think what we are going to see, as we see here in the

United States when you talk about accomplishments, accomplishments that are kind of incremental in being achieved. And I think

that is a process we are going to see, and I think it will be a very

good thing in dealing with the regulators and with the law enforcement community.

And I would like to close with asking the Members to consider

the USA PATRIOT Act and certainly the sunset provisions. From

a lessons learned perspective, one of the things that we learned

best from September 11 was the fact that we had to do things differently and implement and run with time sensitive and time urgent type of investigative mechanisms and protocols.

And we implemented some things like that, and they worked

very well, but two areas where they could work a little better for

us would be if the Bureau had administrative subpoena authority

in terrorism cases; again, from a time sensitive, time urgent standpoint, that would be very important, and I think the Director has

made it—and I have seen his, and I know when I was in the Bureau, he was very emphatic about the fact that we had a mandate

to protect people’s civil rights, so not to be abusive.

In the areas we did have administrative subpoena authority, I

think there is a good track record there; and then, another area

that John Pistole testified here before you back in October or September 2003 was production of subpoenaed records in an electronic

format. There is still no standardization there, and that is an area

that if the Bureau and other agencies could get that information

in electronic format, the analytical process could be done in a much

more time sensitive, time urgent manner, and again, I would be

very happy to discuss that in greater detail offline.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to come here.

Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Emerson, do you want to sum up your remarks?

STATEMENT OF STEVEN EMERSON

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE INVESTIGATIVE

PROJECT ON TERRORISM (ITP), WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. EMERSON. Sure; thank you, Senator, and Members of the

Committee for holding the hearing; it is especially timely after the

disclosure of the fact that four relatively young British Muslims

were involved in the suicide bombing in London, the first time suicide bombers were recruited and operated within the European

continent. And the terrorist operation by the Islamic Jihad yesterday that killed several Israili women.

24

I think that it is really important, as I listen to my distinguished

colleagues on the previous panel as well as my friend Dennis, that

we ensure that we understand that terrorism does not occur in a

vacuum; that we cannot measure the terrorism merely on the cost

of calculating the price of explosives, but rather, factoring in the

larger religious indoctrination, recruitment, religious immersion,

and training—all of the elements of a spectrum in Western societies are essentially invisible, not subject to government regulation,

and that are legal.

And yet, it is that very type of religious extremist ideology which

creates the environment and culture by which suicide bombers and

terrorist acts occur. If one looks at the September 11 attacks, one

can see that Mohammed Atta in 1994 was a secular, young, Arab

male living in Europe, and he became immersed in a religious vortex of Wahabbist Saudi ideology and religious extremism in Germany; it was only a short jump later that he began volunteering

for jihad.

So, I think that as we look at the price and costs of estimating

terrorist financing, we have to look at the other factors that contribute and which are actually more responsible. Now at this time

what I would like to do is to summarize some of the findings of my

organization, the Investigative Project on Terrorism, in assessing

the results of the war on terrorism; certainly complementing the

incredibly dedicated public servants who have been involved relentlessly in this war. But we also have to admit that we are now behind the curve, and there is a lot more we can do.

Unfortunately, I believe that some of the things that are responsible for our being behind the curve are self inflicted wounds. Some

of the reasons include bureaucratic rivalries, the compartmentalization of U.S. law enforcement intelligence; the absence of mass

digitization and electronic retrieval of information.

The fact of the matter is that at present, the war on terrorism

has been fought by trying to primarily shut down radical Islamic

charities serving as fronts. In that respect, since September 11 the

U.S. Government shut down at least five radical Islamic groups.

But according to new analysis and information that my group has

uncovered, actual new terrorist-affiliated fronts have been reconstituted by some of the previous officers connected with the charities

that were shut down. This has not gotten the attention yet of the

pertinent addresses within U.S. law enforcement and regulatory

agencies.

U.S.-based operative terrorist groups have been able to increasingly turn to drug trafficking, organized retail theft, black market

smuggling, the production and sale of counterfeit name goods, the

production and sale of baby formula, and even car theft rings in

order to raise money for terrorist organizations. Most recently,

there has been great concern that the number of cars and automobile exported to the Middle East both legally and illegally—some

smuggled through and some just sold on the open market—are

being used to finance terrorist acts or actually carry out actual

bombings. As has been the case discovered in Iraq, SUV’s registered in the United States were found to be in the possession of

terrorist organization.

25

The fact of the matter is that at present, we are hampered by

a series of factors, including the unwillingness of Western European Nations to get their act together in consistently opposing radical Islamic terrorist groups. The fact of the matter is that the EU

list is a wonderfully impressive list, but it has no teeth whatsoever,

because it depends upon the individual countries.

And to the extent that Britain has been involved in trying to

shut down the financial support of terrorism, unfortunately, its refusal to shut down InterPal is a glaring indication of the fact that

political appeasement still is an operative factor in decisionmaking

in Europe.

I would also like to note that with respect to Saudi Arabia, as

you Chairman Shelby have pointed out, I am not hampered by any

diplomatic niceties, so I will say exactly what I believe: You asked

whether the joint task force was an ad hoc. I call it an ad or a hoc.

The reality is it has done very little. And there has been a lot of

lip service paid to the role of Saudi Arabia recently in terms of its

funding, its willingness to oversee, regulate, and stop the flow of

funding to terrorist groups. But the reality is different again, as

you pointed out very correctly—when it disclaims any type of responsibility for its role in creating funding and still empowering,

the World Assembly of Muslim Youth or the World Muslim League,

two major $100 million charitable organizations that were created

by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and have line items in Saudi Arabia’s budget annually; they continue to pump money around the

world into radical Islamic mosques, organizations, and even are affiliated with terrorist groups to this day.

Both of these organizations are part of the Wahabbist network

that we believe have been proven beyond a shadow of a doubt to

be connected to Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorist groups. The

evidence that we have collected by examining tens of thousands of

reports, publications, internal records, and statements of both organizations clearly show overwhelmingly that the unwillingness of

Saudi Arabia to acknowledge this or to rein them in is a major

source of terrorism. It provides the basis for young Muslims such

as those in Britain and elsewhere, and God help us if we have this

in the United States, for them to be recruited into the ideology of

radical Islam that sees jihad and suicide bombings or other terrorist acts as an acceptable act of ‘‘protest.’’

The fact of the matter is that Saudi Arabia continues to pump

radical Islamic literature into the United States, publish Qurans

that call for incendiary incitement against the West, against ‘‘crusaders or Zionists,’’ i.e., Jews, and they continue to try to proselytize within prisons and the U.S. military, which I consider to be

a major national security threat.

In summary, I would like to think that we can get ahead of the

curve, because we have all the ingredients necessary to get ahead

of the curve. We have dedicated public servants that are incredibly

hardworking. We have a vast amount of data—perhaps too much

data—and we have the technology, except we have not put this together. And so, what I would like to suggest are a series of recommendations that I have included at the end of my testimony. I

am not going to recite all of them, but I would just like to mention

several of them, which I think can enhance the war on terrorism.

26

* 1APowerPoint presenatation held in Committee files.

One. I would like to see us create dedicated teams of forensic accountants that can be attached to roving Federal teams much like

the old Organized Crime Strike Forces. Two, create and standardize the expertise needed to graduate new career paths in

counterterrorism finance. We do not have that career track right

now; the FBI, in its rotational process, basically shifts agents from

one field to another, from one city to another, not long enough for

them to develop the expertise or the sources needed to cultivate, to

dominate in that arena of counterterrorism.

Three, we should create a special unit that tracks the charities,

foundations supporting terrorism, and also Islamic extremism that

operate out of the Middle East and Europe, and that unit should

collect and distribute intelligence, both classified and open source;

as well as do link analysis.

Last and perhaps even most importantly, this goes to the heart

of the whole issue of whether, in fact, militant Islam is able to hide

in the West under the veneer of serving as a ‘‘human rights group’’

or being a ‘‘moderate group.’’ I believe that deception goes to the

heart of why September 11 happened, and that goes to the heart

of how these groups continue to operate in the United States and

in the heart of Western Europe.

I think we have to ensure that when the Government engage in

dialogue, they need to empower genuine, not ersatz, Islamic moderates who convey to their communities that they should cooperate

with the FBI; that the United States is not engaged in a war

against Islam, which unfortunately, is message that has been communicated repeatedly and disseminated by mainstream Islamic

groups in the United States and Europe. We should insist that Islamic extremist groups be denounced by name; that it is not sufficient to simply denounce suicide bombings, but you must denounce

the perpetrator and to acknowledge rather than deny the existence

of a phenomenon of radical Islamic fundamentalism.

The denial that such a phenomenon exists by ‘‘mainstream

groups’’ which end up getting meetings with high ranking Government officials that are legitimized as the official spokespeople for

Islamic communities does a great disservice to the vast majority of

Muslims in whose name they do not speak.

Finally, I do believe that we need to get a much more streamlined operational process inside the U.S. Government for the vast

amount of data from open source intelligence that needs to be disseminated, collected, and subject to link analysis that I believe can

provide us with phenomenal leads. And time permitting, during the

question and answer period, I would like to show part of an analyst

notebook PowerPoint presentation that would, I think, show how

public source information can unravel hidden terrorist networks in

the United States. *

Thank you.

Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. Dr. El-Gamal.

27

STATEMENT OF MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, Ph.D.

CHAIR OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT,

AND PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

RICE UNIVERSITY-HOUSTON, TEXAS

Mr. EL-GAMAL. Thank you, Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member

Sarbanes, Senator Carper, and Senator Bunning. Thank you for inviting me, and as the Chairman kindly pointed out, while I did

serve, did have the honor to serve last year for 7 months at the

U.S. Treasury as Scholar in Residence, all of the remarks that I

make and in writing are my personal views and do not necessarily

represent views at Treasury.

In fact, my role at Treasury was mainly educational. I think it

was part of due diligence. Islamic finance is a fast-growing financial industry that was not well-understood within Treasury, so I

was appointed for a temporary period of time to educate staff both

at Treasury and other parts of the Government and various regulators about the mechanics of Islamic finance, and that is what I

hope also to discuss today.

In a nutshell, what Islamic finance tries to do as an industry is

to provide services that adhere both to the legal and regulatory

framework within whatever country it operates as well as classical

Islamic jurisprudence, as documented in medieval texts. So trying

to adhere to basically the stricter combination that is allowed

under both legal systems creates regulatory arbitrage opportunities

which are profitable to various financial institutions, be they funded and run by Muslims or others.

So at the very core, Islamic finance as an industry does not differ

much from regular finance. It does the exact same things, whether

at the retail level or at the investment banking level, and in my

written statement, I have given examples of how various types of

financial services and products are synthesized from simple contracts.

Now, this makes it, in a sense, an easier task for regulators and

law enforcement officials to subject Islamic finance as an industry

to the same standards to which regular finance is subjected, and

it should do so both here and in the Middle East and everywhere

else. Now, the negative side of this, of course, is that the sophisticated regulatory arbitrage methods that we invented here in the

West, the United States and the United Kingdom, mainly for tax

purposes, are quite complicated, and even here in the United

States, regulators have been hiring ex-bankers, MBA’s, Ph.D.s, and

so on to be able to keep track of these complicated transactions.

So the negative side is that to the extent that regulators and law

enforcement officials in the Middle East are not as sophisticated as

their counterparts here in the West, this poses a challenge and requires more technical assistance, more training, both from governments and from private banks, multinational banks who have

already been doing this, but more, definitely is needed.

On the positive side, however, since there is a large contingency

of Muslims around the world who refuse to deal with the mainstream financial sector, inefficient as the Islamic finance sector

may be, at least it brings these transactions potentially under full

sunlight, which is the best disinfectant, and allows us to subject

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those transactions to the same regulatory and law enforcement

standards.

So it is a challenge, but I think it is not one that should cause

anyone to panic. It just requires more work on everyone’s part to

train law enforcement officials and regulators.

Chairman SHELBY. Thank you.

Mr. Lormel, in your prepared statement, you state that as a result of some the successes in closing down certain funding sources

in the United States like the Holy Land Foundation, terrorist activities have placed an increased emphasis on the use of criminal

activities as a terrorist funding mechanism. As you heard from Mr.

Emerson, those charitable organizations successfully targeted to

date have been replaced by substitute mechanisms fronting as

charitable organizations.

Do you agree with Mr. Emerson’s assessment? If so, is it your

opinion that the FBI’s terrorist finance operations section is adequately responding to this alleged transformation?

Mr. LORMEL. I agree in part with Steve’s assessment. I do not

totally agree. I do agree that in certain instances, there has been

a reconstitution, and I also believe that there are investigations ongoing addressing those entities, which obviously, I am not involved

in now, so I cannot speak to but I do believe that in part, those

are being addressed.

I am aware of one in particular, and I believe Steve and I have

talked about that previously, in that area, I believe there is an ongoing investigation. I also believe that one of the areas from an intelligence standpoint that they are looking at are those instances

where the potential for that reconstitution exists and developing

the probable cause to initiate those investigations. I think that is

one of the challenges they confront.

And if I may, I also believe that there are mechanisms in place

from an investigative standpoint that, in terms of the financial investigations and analytical tools that do exist within the terrorist

financing operation section that kind of mirror exactly what Steve

wants to show you here.

Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Emerson, have you got a minute to expand on your knowledge of Hamas-affiliated entities in the United

States?

Mr. EMERSON. Yes.

What I want to do is just show you part of a PowerPoint, and

I just want to clarify one thing, because I do not disagree with anything Dennis said, and I hope he did not interpret my comments

to mean that the Government was not trying to unravel these reconstituted entities. What I was trying to point out is that the entities and the officers associated with Hamas and other groups have

been very cagey and very sophisticated in understanding the weaknesses of our system and understanding that it takes time to basically mount a prosecution to the extent you can.

Chairman SHELBY. Sure.

Mr. LORMEL. If I may just interject one thing in agreement with

Steve is that that adaptability factor. These terrorists, people who

are in the financial roles either as facilitators or as fundraisers,

know our system all too well, and they fully know and they do take

advantage and exploit where possible any gap in the system.

29

Mr. EMERSON. The reason that I wanted to show the PowerPoint

is this is all based on open source information, and I think open

source information sometimes gets discriminated against in the

Government, because once you stamp something classified, everyone says, oh, this is wonderful, and the end result is that we do

not look at something which is right before our eyes. These charts

are based on information that my staff had collected. If you look

at the screen, you will see the fact that Infocom, at the very top,

was a web hosting company that was shut down by the U.S. Government, its officers convicted and associated with terrorism-related charges and illegal exports.

The two companies that are surrounded by red borders were reconstituted entities that we believe are Hamas-affiliated groups.

One is called Synaptix, which essentially is a web hosting company,

and it has taken the place of Infocom. Synaptix was created by the

same people who created the Holy Land Foundation, which also

has been shut down and is connected with the Islamic Association

for Palestine, which has also been called a terrorist front.

The other entity that was created, was called DonationForm.com,

which interestingly enough, actually processes donations for nonprofits, thereby giving the operators of that site and that software

the ability to track other nonprofit groups and their donors.

Chairman SHELBY. Where did they originate out of?

Mr. EMERSON. I believe both companies originated out of Texas,

although I would have to get back to you on the articles of incorporation.

Chairman SHELBY. Would you do that for the record?

Mr. EMERSON. Absolutely; in fact, we would like to supply this

chart plus the associated backup material.

If you go to the next slide, these are Hamas front groups, and

these are different clusters. Jason, if you will, zero in on, let us say,

the Holy Land Foundation. You will see the relationships, in a

myriad listing of bars and arrows, but the reality is with this direct

information, phone numbers, dates of birth, corporate records, virtually any type of public source information, we are able to plug

it all in and find the lines of authority between the different entities.

If you go back to the next chart, this gives an overview here.

This is the larger overview of how these groups have been reconstituted. And again, it is all based on open source intelligence, which

I think can be of immeasurable help to law enforcement, because

part of the problem they face in these types of investigations is how

much classified intelligence to release. This provides the basis, I

think, for helping to ensure that prosecutions can be more efficiently mounted and for more designations to take place in an expeditious manner.

Thank you.

Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Lormel, given what is known about the

financing of terrorist operations with funds obtained through the

commission of crime and drawing on your long experience with the

Bureau, is it your opinion that the Federal Government today possesses the legal instruments that it requires or needs to combat

these activities, or are there additional legal authorities you believe

are warranted? And if so, what?

30

Mr. LORMEL. I believe in general, the authorities that we currently have sufficiently deal with the criminal problems. It is just

a matter of when you take the authority, for instance, overseas, basically, and in many of these instances, whether it is domestic or

looking at the criminal activity or criminal activity international,

it is the international side where we are going to have the issues

and the concerns and the problems in terms of mutual legal assistance treaties or the ability to work jointly and the able to share

information or the ability to trace information. Administrative subpoena authority in terrorism cases would be an important tool for

the FBI.

Chairman SHELBY. Doctor, it is said by some that Islamic firms,

by their very nature, are less likely to engage in money laundering

and other illegal acts. What exactly is it about their nature in particular that makes them adverse to such acts, if that is true, and

what is the Islamic banking industry’s opinion of the Hawala system? It is said that the Islamic banking system can be thought of

as bringing people into the sunlight that you mentioned; that is,

banking the otherwise unbanked.

Would the further growth of Islamic banking in Muslim communities diminish the influence of the Hawala, or would it make no

difference because of Islamic fee structures? What is the picture of

Islamic banking today in this country, too? What is the licensing

process like? Is it a difficult process to get an application through

the OCC, for example, and so forth?

Mr. EL-GAMAL. You have three questions that I counted, sir.

Chairman SHELBY. Yes.

Mr. EL-GAMAL. The first question about Islamic establishments,

be they banks or otherwise, are they necessarily more immune to

abuse? I do not know that an institution by virtue of calling itself

Islamic would necessarily be any more or less vulnerable to abuse

by its officers. Islam, like all religions, abhors violence, abhors

criminal activity, and so, if it is run truly Islamically, then, it

would be more likely to stay away from criminal activities, but I

do not know that the label necessarily indicates that it adheres to

the spirit of the religion rather than just the letter.

So, I would not make a statement that any institution that

claims to be Islamic necessarily by its very nature would have to

be more immune. If run properly, it would be, but I would not

know that.

The second question was about Hawalas. The Hawala system, as

discussed in the media, is an informal money transfer system, but

in Arabic, the term is also used for regular wire transfers. So to

the extent that Islamic banks provide services for fees, including

transferring money across countries as well as within various countries, they exercise a version of Hawala, but it is one that is documented the way it would be documented by other banks.

Would the spread of Islamic banking necessarily then drive the

informal Hawala sector out of business I think is a question of cost.

For that particular service, the person demanding the service does

not care whether they conduct it through an Islamic bank or a regular bank. It is a fee-for-service. They go; they transfer the money;

they pay the fee. I think the reason the Hawala system exists primarily for the legitimate purposes of expatriate workers sending

31

money to support their families, et cetera, is that its cost structure

is much more advantageous. It is faster, and it is cheaper.

So, I believe the way to drive the informal Hawala system out

of business is to make the formal sector faster and cheaper. There

is no way about that; Islamic banks as well as regular banks go

through the same channels, and it is still expensive. Driving at

least all the legitimate transactions through the formal system

would make it a lot easier to catch others.

The third about efforts to establish Islamic banks in the United

States; there are not any right now. There has been one attempt

to license an Islamic bank, which failed, and I do not know if there

are currently applications which are under review, but the general

view among providers of Islamic banking is that it is an uphill battle, as well it should be.

I think licensing is the gatekeeper; it is the way to reduce, in

economist-speak, adverse selection problems, to make sure that

whoever licenses a bank is going to run that bank according to the

best standards. So the benchmark should be high. It is difficult. I

do not have first-hand information as to whether there is anything

prejudicial against it.

I know that Islamic banking products are being offered by regular banks, but there are some services, obviously, that are more

difficult than others to offer unless you are licensed as an Islamic

bank. I do not know how much demand there is for such an institution. I do not know exactly what the barriers are.

Chairman SHELBY. Thank you.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want

to thank the members of the panel for their very helpful testimony.

Mr. Emerson, I was struck by a statement you made in your

statement right at the beginning, and I quote it. ‘‘All of the ingredients for a more vastly successful war on terrorism are present but

underutilized or artificially compartmented from one another.’’ And

then, you go on to mention some of the things, and then, at the

end, when we look at your conclusion and go through the steps that

you think would be very helpful that you have listed at the end,

the very specific steps, which I think is a very important contribution to this discussion, I mean, one is struck by the fact that if you

had someone within the executive branch, I do not want to say

waves a magic wand but had the backing or the authority and the

determination to just drive these things through that they could be

put in place on that basis alone.

You would have to knock some heads in order to do it, but there

is hardly any legislation that is needed. You might need some additional resources to do some of these things, but I think those would

be forthcoming from the Congress.

Would you agree with that perception?

Mr. EMERSON. One hundred percent. I mean, if you were to look

at the flow chart of the channels of the relationships now within

Treasury all of the myriad different departments, units, that do not

have horizontal relationships, let alone the issues of transferring,

exchanging intelligence with other agencies, with the FBI, with the

CIA, with DHS, it is a vast problem.

32

And one reason why my organization exists is to basically fill the

gap in public source dissemination. But you are 100 percent right.

If you have somebody at that higher level who could wave that

magic wand, there would not be a need for any kind of requirement

for any type of new legislation here. The problem is getting the bureaucracies to give up—and we have seen this in the discussion of

the post-September 11 changes, getting existing bureaucracies to

give up some of the powers and the budget authority that they

might have or to expand the budget authority of some other, higher

ranking official that he could command other agencies to share the

intelligence and streamline the whole issue of regulatory, prosecutorial, criminal, as well as other remedial actions needed to take

on terrorist groups.

Right now, it is a massive Rube Goldberg machine. It works, but

it could work a thousand times better.

Senator SARBANES. Let me ask you this question: How centralized is the financing of terrorism, or how decentralized is it? Can

you work it back to just a few sources of the funds, or do they

spring up as independent operations all over the place? Do you

have a perception on that?

Mr. EMERSON. I think it mirrors today the structure of militant

Islamic terrorism, which is decentralized, amorphous, nonconnected

cells, organizations, clusters of people. It ranges everywhere from

a financier in Saudi Arabia named Yassin al-Qadi, whom the

United States has designated but Saudi Arabia has never arrested

or frozen his assets, to Ahmed Rassam, the millennium bomber, or

the involvement of those cells in Madrid that self financed their

terrorist operations through criminal fraud or drug dealing.

And so, it ranges all over. That is why it is such a difficult problem, because there is not that one central source, repository from

where the money flows. It is coming from all over. It is coming

from the top down, and it is coming from the bottom up. And sometimes, would-be terrorists are told that if they want to carry out

an operation, ‘‘Self-finance it yourself.’’

Senator SARBANES. Has that always been the case, or is that a

new development?

Mr. EMERSON. Relatively new development following one, the

breakup of the Al Qaeda structure, because when one looks at Al

Qaeda and the bell curve, the highest point of its linear structure

was on September 10, 2001. And then, it essentially was forced to

disband because of what we did and how they dispersed.

Number two, you have essentially decentralized centers of gravity today of radical Islam around the world that did not exist 10

years ago; it took awhile for them to germinate and ferment. I am

looking right now, for example, at a 1998 fatwa by Osama bin

Laden. I came across this this morning. I was trying to grab things

that would be interesting and relevant to the attacks in Britain,

and I found something in one of my British folders, which was a

fatwa issued on February 10, 1998, and it was issued out of Britain, and it was a fatwa against the United States to attack U.S.

Government and British Government institutions, armies, interests, and airports.

This fatwa called upon all Muslims to carry out attacks, no matter where they were, against the United States and Britain. And

33

it was signed, interestingly enough, and very disturbingly by more

than 40 prominent organizations and Islamic centers in Britain.

And this represents the mainstream here. These were centers

that, in part, were funded by Saudi Arabia, but to the extent that

Saudi funding has been morphed into U.S. funding or British funding today, it no longer has that connection to Saudi Arabia, and

that is a real problem.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask a question

to——

Chairman SHELBY. Go ahead. Take your time.

Senator SARBANES. The GAO stated in a report entitled ‘‘U.S.

Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorist Use of Alternative

Funding Mechanisms,’’ issued in November 2003, the following:

According to the FBI’s terrorist financing operation section, most if not all terrorist cases involve a financial aspect known as a funding nexus, which is normally

considered to be a component of the overall investigation. The FBI does not currently isolate terrorist financing cases from substantive international terrorism

cases, and its data analysis programs do not designate the source of funding for terrorist financing.

Could you comment on that? What about this failure to look at

terrorist financing as its own phenomenon against which specific

efforts could be directed?

Mr. LORMEL. Well, I think that goes back, and quite frankly, I

was the FBI official that they dealt with on that report, and we

pointed out to them that we did not have traditional reporting

mechanisms or that prior to September 11, there was no mechanism to track.

And even when they came in in 2003, we had not developed that

mechanism; I mean, the case tracking as such and did not have the

classifications, so we could not give them statistics, but I think

what they were looking at more in the context of the overall report

were the alternate remittance systems and those types of cases,

and that, Senator, is so difficult to really quantify.

Mr. EMERSON. If I could add one thing, one problem is the institutional interests of the agencies doing the investigations. For the

FBI, it wants to find a crime under which it can prosecute. And so,

it is not necessarily going to investigate a local organized crime in

Cleveland that is laundering baby food formula or counterfeit goods

without a terrorist nexus, and so, that is left to local law enforcement, to prosecute; they can put some criminals away, but they

cannot find a terrorist nexus, and you do not have the marriage

there of the interests.

And what you really need is to go back to the first point is to

have somebody wave a wand and say we are going to make sure

you guys work together, share the intelligence, and force you to go

against, necessarily, your narrow institutional interests. If the FBI

does not prosecute, then it should go to the Treasury for a designation. But right now, there is too much competition right now and

proprietary control over the information.

Mr. LORMEL. If I may just follow up on that, again, I disagree

in part, because I think the policy coordinating committee within

the Government addresses those issues, and when I was involved,

particularly when David Aufhauser was General Counsel at Treasury, we had a pretty good mechanism in place to discuss the best

alternatives, and it certainly was not formal. If there would be

34

something formalized, it probably would work well, Senator. But

we did identify which were the best mechanisms: Was it an investigative response? Was it a designation response? Was it an intelligence response and in those cases, we went ahead, and we did

that.

But, you know, we have to look at—and going back to your original question, I think terrorist financing, as such, we stood up our

operation post-September 11, and it is an incremental process, and

all of the concerns that are being raised are very good concerns,

and I think mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that we

can come back with the accountability and reportability in those

areas, and I also believe that or I would like to believe that those

are being addressed and that those mechanisms are being developed. And I know that they have the institutional problems with

the overall case management system, so that exacerbates their

problem.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SHELBY. Senator Bunning.

Senator BUNNING. It is fascinating to listen to you gentlemen, because since September 11, the Congress of the United States, the

Senate and the House, has cooperated and tried to streamline the

ability of our Government to single out those things that you say

were missing that are wide open on a daily basis, Mr. Emerson.

Are you telling me why do you not come and tell us exactly what

to do if it is so dang easy? Why are we messing it up by creating

a Department of Homeland Security or a number one intelligence

coordinator for the Government? Why are they not able to focus in

on the obvious things that you are able to focus in on?

Mr. EMERSON. In part, Senator, it is because I do not answer to

a bureaucratic management, and I am not suggesting that these

are ‘‘bureaucrats’’ in any pejorative sense, because the people involved, like Dennis and others and tens of thousands of agents, analysts, and investigators from local law enforcement to Federal are

phenomenally dedicated, and the cases they have made are phenomenal.

But stepping back, I can see how agencies do not share; there are

bureaucratic rivalries. I can recite case after case that have been

stalled out because of the absence of sharing, and I deal with

agents and investigators in the field all the time. To a certain extent, they can confide in you more than they can confide in their

superiors, because there is nothing that can be done institutionally

at this point, unless there is a——

Senator BUNNING. Why?

Mr. EMERSON. Because the nature of bureaucracies is essentially

to become reconstituted when there is an external stick, such as

the reconstitution of our national security and homeland bureaucracy, and that was DHS. And that was a good faith effort, and I

think it has been working out quite well. But I also think we can

improve tremendously the issue of the exchange of information and

the issue of rationalizing our priorities.

Senator BUNNING. That is what we are trying to do. Where have

we failed? Tell us where we have failed.

35

Mr. EMERSON. I think unfortunately, where we have failed is

that there are too many different centers of gravity that have control over the information that they believe——

Senator BUNNING. But we put one person in charge of homeland

security. We have put one person in charge of intelligence gathering, so one person is responsible.

Mr. EMERSON. But they are not responsible for all counterterrorism and financial issues, and that is spread over at least five

to seven different departments. And those departments, in turn,

have different division chiefs and heads, and honestly, they all try

to make it work, but in the end, the fact of the matter is that they

are operating under different lines of authority. And yes, within

DHS they try to rationalize it——

Senator BUNNING. How do you correct it?

Mr. EMERSON. I have made some recommendations. I am not

going to come up and suggest I have a panacea here, but I think

that one, going back to Senator Sarbanes, perhaps there really is

a need for some type of financial intelligence terrorism czar; number two, I think there should be an open source directorate of information, because I think that there is a terrible bias against using

open source information. Let me give you a good example: Why is

it that my organization, with no more than 10 to 15 analysts, come

up with some of these discoveries before some Federal agency with

multibillion dollar budgets? Remember that I am not tasked with

stopping the next bomb coming across the border or the next airplane that——

Senator BUNNING. But if you stopped their money, you might be.

Mr. EMERSON. You might be, but that is a long range investigation. What we need to do is to detach some of the agents and analysts in the field from that immediate day-to-day struggle with

stopping that next terrorist bomb, which is the immediate priority

that they are tasked with, and being able to step back and say, all

right, I am going to insulate myself from those day-to-day picture

and look at that long range pressure and start crunching a lot of

data coming in. It will take 6 months to a year before I may come

up with anything.

But at the end of that one year, I will come up with all these

new link analysis discoveries that will make our lives a lot safer

in the next 5 years, and that long range detachment is difficult

right now in the environment in which we live, and I am not suggesting it is done out of maliciousness or——

Senator BUNNING. No, I disagree with that, because the fact of

the matter is there should be plenty of people that we can task to

do that job within a department and task them to do it with open

source information. If you know where those terrorist groups have

relocated with the same names and the same gathering ability of

monies for terrorist groups only different entities, my God, you

should be able to put it up on the wall and do it.

Mr. EMERSON. You should be. The only thing I would add is that

sometimes, the fear of collecting data that is not actionable or that

it does not come under the criminal oversight is a fear sometimes

within bureaucracies that they might be accused of invading the

rights of Americans by looking at data about where they live and

36

which is freely available on certain databases that are

commercially—

Senator BUNNING. In other words, do you think that maybe the

USA PATRIOT Act should be improved on?

Mr. EMERSON. Yes, I do believe that, absolutely.

Senator BUNNING. Mr. Chairman, I think that we should get all

the information we can from these three people and hand it over

to the Department of Homeland Security and our intelligence czar,

who is supposed to be coordinating our fight to stop terrorist financing, because that is the head, and if you kill the head, the

body will die.

Chairman SHELBY. You have it right.

Doctor, I would like to ask you another question. Is it Shar’ia,

is that what you call it, Shar’ia arbitrage? Your presentation makes

it abundantly clear that the tradition underlying Islamic finance is

to organize money according to the moral and ethical standards of

the Quran. But as I listen to the discussion on all of the layering

of transactions, I still see it merely as an avoidance of charging interest in the name of what you call Shar’ia arbitrage.

In order to compete with Western institutions, I read that many

Islamic banks stress that taking and paying interest is worse than

many other sins. What I am wondering is if the real nature of financial transactions is being thinly disguised, could an unhealthy

culture of anxiety and guilt result here? Could this function as another brake on the integration of Muslims into the Western societies that many, you know millions live in now and function in now

every day?

Mr. EL-GAMAL. That is a very difficult question. The first part

is easier to address. Legal systems evolve with very strange trajectories, and so, while the moral content of the law of usury, which

is not only Quranic but also Biblical, that moral tradition was interpreted differently in different traditions, and the vast majority

of Muslim jurists adhere to a particular interpretation as to what

constitutes interest in what types of contracts.

To the extent that economists like myself or sophisticated financial observers will say, well, this is just relabeling is beside the

point. In the religious realm, there is a long history of suspension

of reason, that this is religiously accepted because I say so. The important question is the one you posed at the end, would the spread

of Islamic banking, in a sense, create an Islamic sub-economy as

one writer, Timur Kuran, once wrote an article called ‘‘Islamic Economics and the Islamic Sub-Economy.’’

It would be very dangerous if that were to happen. The history

of Islamic banking is not alarming in the sense that the providers

of Islamic banking do not have to be Muslim, and the recipients or

the customers of Islamic banking do not have to be Muslims. Islamic banks like to advertise that they have customers who are

non-Muslims, and certainly, multinational banks like Citigroup,

UBS Warburg, Credit Suisse, and so on have been offering Islamic

banking.

So the fear that there is this disintegration of Muslims from society because of the spread of Islamic banking may be more theoretical than practical, but it is a point very much worth stressing

that integration is important.

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Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Lormel, I appreciate your attention here.

As a former leading Federal official in the war on terror financing and one of the fathers of the TFFOS, the Committee would be

interested, for the record, in an expansion of your opening comments with regard to SAR’s, suspicious activity reports, and currency transaction reports. Industry feels, and we hear from them,

unfairly burdened by the reporting requirements, and the problem

of defensive filing of SAR’s is clearly out of control.

As a retired Federal official with the FBI and currently in private industry, could you provide your thoughts on the value of

SAR’s and CTR’s to the effort of combatting money laundering and

terror financing, and have your views on the matter changed? Have

they evolved since you entered private practice? In other words,

there are thousands of SAR reports coming in now, and how do you

differentiate?

Mr. LORMEL. I think my level of sensitivity to the financial sector

has changed.

Chairman SHELBY. Sure.

Mr. LORMEL. Particularly understanding their frustrations on

some of the issues, but I think it is really a multidimensional——

Chairman SHELBY. And a cost burden on the industry.

Mr. LORMEL. Absolutely. It is one of the factors and clearly one

of the principal factors. But I think the defensive filing plays right

to the issue of inconsistent regulations or examinations, and I

think that, in part, has caused the defensive filing.

But as Stuart Levey pointed out, on June 30, the regulators and

FinCen came out with a new manual for examinations, so there

has to be a lot of training and an awful lot of interaction between

the banking community and the regulators in terms of implementation of the standards in that regard.

But on both sides, I go out and speak at a number of conferences

involving bankers, and one of the areas where the Government was

absolutely remiss is we did not provide feedback on the value of

SAR’s. So, I would look to go and talk to the compliance people and

those bankers, in particular, who have the issues and concerns.

And you need to balance the benefit and burden, and I think that

is a very sensitive area, and that is where both sides need to get

back together.

But it is critically important to understand that SAR’s do play

a very important role. The information, particularly now—my

former section in TFFOS and what Bill Fox is doing at FinCen in

terms of BSA Direct are going to create very robust capabilities in

being able to analyze and cull out information from those SAR’s

that will link directly to terrorism cases or to potential cases that

will be critically important, and there is a disconnect, because we

do not go back, and particularly in those instances where the SAR

was important, we do not go back to the financial institution and

say hey, thank you for filing that SAR, because at the end of the

day, we were able to do A, B, C, and D as a result.

So that is one of those areas where these needs to be a better

middle ground, and I know there is tremendous dialogue between

the American Bankers Association and FinCen in particular in

dealing with those issues and to a much lesser degree, the Bureau.

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When I was involved at the Bureau, we had working groups, and

Senator, your concern about were you just dealing with the major

banks? At one point, we were, but then, we reached out for midsize banks and smaller banks to get them involved and find out

what associations we needed to deal with. And unfortunately, there

is not enough continuity in that process, and there needs to be, and

there certainly needs to be a lot more.

Now, the area of CTR’s, I know the ABA is looking to have—they

do not see the necessity of CTR’s being filed, but again, we derive

some benefit out of that. I think there is a middle ground that

should be looked at, and I think there should be some consensus

between financial institutions the law enforcement community and

the regulators in terms of the benefits and thresholds

And again, with the bank fraud working groups that exist, I

think those issues are being addressed, but it would be certainly

an issue that this Committee should look at pretty strongly.

Chairman SHELBY. Thank you.

Senator Bunning, do you have anything else?

Senator BUNNING. I have one more question. Mr. Emerson, so

that we do not continue to add to the bureaucracy, I would like for

you to write me a nice letter and explain how exactly I can get a

czar to do exactly what you want done, in other words, somebody

who is above all of the other bureaucrats and is responsible for terrorist financing and the discovery thereof.

Mr. EMERSON. I would be very happy to do so.

Senator BUNNING. Would you do that?

Mr. EMERSON. Without doubt, I will get that to you immediately.

Senator BUNNING. Thank you.

Chairman SHELBY. Gentlemen, thank you for your insights and

also for your patience here. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[Prepared statements, response to written questions, and additional material supplied for the record follow:]

39

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STUART LEVEY

UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF TERRORISM AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

JULY 13, 2005

Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Sarbanes, and other distinguished Members

of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today about

terrorist financing and money laundering in the Middle East. I welcome this Committee’s ongoing focus on this pressing topic, and your dedication to help stop the

flow of funds to our Nation’s enemies.

This hearing comes less than a week after the terrible attacks in London and I

would like to express my sincerest condolences to the families of the victims. The

brave resolve that the British people have shown resonated around the world in defiant response to cowards who seek to disrupt our very way of life. These acts of

terror serve as a tragic reminder that our resolve to combat terrorism and terrorist

financing must not waver.

As I approach the end of my first full year as Under Secretary of the Office of

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the Treasury Department, I am constantly

assessing our progress in the fight against the financing of terrorism. To be sure,

we have achieved some important successes in this fight. We can point to multiple

successes which reflect the excellent coordination and teamwork of all U.S. Government agencies over the past year. Thanks to the State Department’s leadership and

concerted work with us, we are witnessing a growing consensus in the world about

the need to address terrorist financing in tangible ways. We have seen the culmination of a number of critical prosecutions investigated by the FBI-led Joint Terrorism

Task Forces and prosecuted by the Department of Justice, as I will discuss later

in this testimony. We at Treasury have designated numerous supporters of terrorism—including particularly significant figures such as Adel Batterjee—acting in

close coordination with our interagency and international counterparts. We have

used Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act judiciously and effectively against primary money laundering concerns, and we are seeing real results. One of the most

promising developments is the President’s issuance of Executive Order 13382, which

applies the same methods we have used successfully to block assets of terrorist supporters to those who aid in the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Our other

interagency partners—especially in the intelligence community—are constantly

working to stem the tide of terrorist financing, with little glory or recognition for

their tireless efforts. Our collective drive to hold financial supporters of terror personally responsible as terrorists is creating the desired pressure and deterrence. In

the end, we are starting to see encouraging results: Terrorist groups like Al Qaeda

and Hamas are feeling the pinch and do not have the same easy access to funds

that they once did.

Our most significant progress has been in bringing about a change in mind-set.

There is now near-unanimous recognition among nations that terrorist financing

and money laundering pose threats that cannot be ignored and there is widespread

agreement upon a shared set of standards to combat these dangers. We will not accept the protest that ideological differences or bureaucratic obstacles excuse nations

from the obligation to comply with global standards. As we were all brutally reminded by the attacks in London last week, we are facing a global threat with global implications. All civilized nations must meet their basic responsibilities to prevent

the financing and support of terrorism.

At the same time, we recognize that the range of threats and institutional frameworks across different countries necessitates flexibility and a range of approaches.

We cannot apply a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach to terrorist financing, nor can or

should we try to force countries to adopt a ‘‘U.S. model.’’ So long as internationally

established principles are given real effect, in law and in practice, there is room for

a variety of approaches. Indeed, we learn from the successes and failures of others.

Each country and institution presents unique challenges that require nuanced solutions.

The Middle East rightfully captures our attention at Treasury, and in the interagency community, as it is both a well-spring of and a target for terrorist financiers

and those who spread extremist ideologies that justify and fuel terrorism.

Terrorism is increasingly targeted at innocents in the Middle East. Recent terrorist attacks in Turkey, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar should be impetus to drive change throughout the region. Where the threat of terrorism does not

generate the will to take effective action, however, my office, working in close cooperation with all of our interagency counterparts, will push for action.

40

It would not be feasible to include a complete catalogue in this testimony of all

of our engagements in multilateral forums and bilateral discussions with respect to

terrorist financing in the Middle East. Instead, I would like to try give the Committee a general description and some examples that show how we are simultaneously (1) driving the adoption and implementation of common global standards to

prevent terrorist financing and money laundering, and (2) pressing individual countries and the private sector to do more to combat the terrorist threat we all face.

Common Approaches

In our common approach to the Middle East, one important objective is to persuade each country to attach the necessary priority to anti-money laundering and

counter-terrorist financing. This is not only important from an enforcement perspective, but also a prerequisite for any country looking to attract international business

and investment. For the most part, countries are increasingly recognizing this and

looking to comply with global standards and reassure international businesses and

investors.

I made a trip to Libya last month, representing the highest level delegation to

visit that country since the lifting of sanctions eleven months ago. While there, I

met with Colonel Qadhafi, the Central Bank Governor, and the Minister of Finance

and pressed Libya to adopt anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing

reforms as it attempts to emerge from isolation and engage increasingly in the

world’s financial community. The Libyan financial sector is in its infancy, but as it

develops, I conveyed that the United States expects anti-money laundering and terrorist financing initiatives to be high on their agenda as part of an overall

counterterrorism strategy.

We are also seeing that countries are responsive to the type of pressure that

comes from international standard-setting bodies. The Financial Action Task Force

(FATF) sets the global standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, and it is also through this venue that we promote results. Treasury, along

with our counterparts at State, Justice, and Homeland Security, has taken an active

role in this 33-member body which articulates international standards in the form

of recommendations, guidelines, and best practices to aid countries in developing

their own specific anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing laws and

regulations. FATF maintains the authority and has demonstrated its willingness to

take collective actions against jurisdictions that pose a threat to the financial system. We do our part to promote the multilateral effect of FATF standards through

focused bilateral engagement.

As an example, I recently visited Turkey to speak with the Finance Minister, Justice Minister, and several other high-level members of the Turkish Government.

While Turkey is not part of what we generally refer to as the Middle East, its geographic location—bordering on Syria, Iran, and Iraq—makes it an important part

of our strategy when we think about the threat of terrorism emanating from the

Middle East. Turkey has been a key NATO ally and has a long and painful history

of fighting terrorism within its borders. I expressed our appreciation for the close

cooperation we have enjoyed with the Turkish Government in combating terrorism

and in many other areas. However, as a FATF member since 1991, Turkey’s current

anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes need significant improvement. Turkey is looking to address these issues, and I encouraged Turkey to

redouble its efforts to comply with FATF standards in advance of its mutual evaluation scheduled for early next year. Turkey is too important a partner to us, and too

important a regional power to let its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist

financing regimes fall out of step. We look forward to seeing Turkey succeed in its

reform efforts over the coming months.

Although not a member of FATF, Jordan, another regional ally, is working hard

to bring its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing practices up to

international standards. The government has submitted a new AML law to the Parliament, which may consider it in its extraordinary session this summer. I visited

Jordan this past February in large part to encourage them to pass this law and implement it as quickly as possible. These steps will inure to their own economic benefit—bolstering the health and attractiveness of their financial sector—while also

aiding in the global fight against terrorist financing. Given Jordan’s prominent role

in the financial sector of the West Bank and Gaza, these improvements are also important to reduce the potential for terrorist financing in those areas of strategic concern.

The success and force of FATF lie not only in the mutual evaluation process to

which it holds its own members, but also in the emergence of FATF-style regional

bodies (FSRB’s) that agree to adopt FATF standards and model themselves accordingly on a regional level. The Middle East and North Africa body, or ‘‘MENA FATF’’

41

is one of the newest and potentially most effective organizations to emerge.

Launched in November 2004, this 14-member body held its first plenary session in

Bahrain in April 2005 and is preparing for its second plenary session in September

of this year, currently scheduled to take place in Beirut. It remains too early to tell

how effective MENA FATF will be, but the indications so far demonstrate considerable enthusiasm and energy. This body is already working on a process to assess

its members for compliance with international standards and have formed working

groups to address key issues like cash couriers, charities, and hawala. We support

this initiative and hope that it will succeed on the difficult road that lies ahead of

it.

The Egmont Group is an international body comprised of financial intelligence

units (FIU’s) across the globe. It is another example of a body that demands that

its members comply with certain standards and maintain those standards over time.

Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is currently working closely with

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait to develop their FIU’s; we have seen some

progress to date and are eager to see it develop further.

Implementation

Adoption of legislation and regulations is meaningless without strong and effective implementation. Some countries, eager to curry favor with their neighbors or

the international community, may believe that adopting an anti-money laundering

and counter-terrorist financing law will keep observers at bay. Such half-steps will

neither fool nor satisfy the United States and the international community. We will

continue to press for effective implementation, including investigations, prosecutions, designations, and other demonstrable actions.

Private Sector

Collective pressure to implement international standards has been effective in the

drive to bring countries on board with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist

financing efforts. At the same time that we are pressing at the government level,

though, we are also working with the international private sector. The potential,

both for information exchange and for combating the flow of illicit funds, is enormous. As but one example, we have seen financial institutions in the Middle East

and elsewhere voluntarily checking accountholders and transactions against Treasury’s list of designated entities, as well as other lists, and using that information

to determine whether or not to take on business or process a transaction. This

means that the rigorous efforts by Treasury and the U.S. Government to identify

and isolate key sponsors of terrorism, as well as sponsors of weapons proliferation,

are being given wide effect in private banks in the Middle East and the world.

We have also solicited the cooperation of some of the larger and more responsible

financial institutions to advocate for reforms among their colleagues and in their

various host countries. These institutions typically exhibit diligent anti-money laundering and terrorist financing practices even when their host countries do not require it. This puts these institutions at a competitive disadvantage vis-a<k-vis institutions that are less conscientious. Furthermore, these institutions are forced to

take measures to protect themselves when doing business with financial institutions

in countries with weak anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes. We therefore believe that it is in the interest of more responsible institutions

to create a momentum for reform among their colleagues, not just in the Middle

East but worldwide.

Alternative Financing Methods

One effect of U.S. and international action against terrorist financiers has been

to push supporters of terrorism out of the formal financial system and into riskier,

more expensive, and more cumbersome methods of raising and moving money, such

as cash couriers, charities, and hawala. While this hearing is not focused on alternative financing methods, I wanted to give the Committee a brief overview of our

work in these areas.

Charities

Terrorist groups have long exploited charities for several key reasons, including

the following:

• The ‘‘legitimate’’ activities of these charities, such as the operation of schools, religious institutions, and hospitals, can—if abused—create fertile recruitment

grounds, allowing terrorists to generate support for their causes and to propagate

extremist ideologies.

• Charities attract large numbers of unwitting donors along with the witting, thus

increasing the amount of money available to terrorists.

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• To the extent that these charities provide genuine relief, which nearly all of them

do, they benefit from public support and an attendant disinclination by many governments to take enforcement action against them.

• Charitable funds are meant to move in one direction only; accordingly, large purported charitable transfers can move without a corresponding return of value and

without arousing suspicion.

• International charities naturally focus their relief efforts on areas of conflict, also

prime locations for terrorist networks. Such charities provide excellent cover for

the movement of personnel and even military supplies to and from high-risk

areas.

The U.S. Government has confronted this problem head on in a coordinated manner. We have thus far designated more than 40 charities worldwide as supporters

of terrorism. Two notable examples are our actions against the U.S. branches of the

Al Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA),

both Al Qaeda-linked charities that were operating in the United States. In both

cases, law enforcement agents executed search warrants while Treasury’s OFAC simultaneously blocked the organizations’ assets, stopping the flow of money through

these groups. Thanks to the work of the State Department, we have persuaded

other nations to join us in bringing these and other charities to the United Nations

Security Council for designation, and to shutter these dangerous organizations in

their respective countries.

Designations and law enforcement actions are making an impact and are serving

as a valuable deterrent. Anecdotal evidence suggests that once-willing donors are

now thinking twice or balking altogether at sending money to terrorist groups. In

this regard, I would note that one advantage we enjoy in the terrorist financing

arena is the strength of deterrence—our targets have something to lose. In contrast

to terrorist operatives who may be willing to die for their hateful cause, terrorist

financiers typically live public lives with all that entails: property, occupation, family, and social position. Being publicly identified as a financier and supporter of terror threatens an end to all of this, lending our actions a real deterrent impact.

Hawala

Hawala, a relationship-based system of money remittances, plays a prominent

role in the financial systems of the Middle East. Domestically, we have worked with

our interagency partners to ensure that money service businesses like hawalas, register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and comply with applicable

anti-money laundering provisions. On the one hand, we are reaching out to this sector to educate businesses about their legal obligations. Enforcement of the USA PATRIOT Act’s criminal provisions against operating an unlicensed money service

business also plays a key deterrent role. Just this week, an ICE investigation led

to a guilty plea by an unlicensed money service business, who had sent millions of

dollars to Syria and other countries. While we are making progress, the effective

regulation of money service businesses continues to present a significant challenge.

Internationally, Treasury leadership in the FATF has brought the issue of hawala

to the forefront, resulting in the implementation of FATF Special Recommendation

VI, which requires all FATF countries to ensure that individuals and entities providing money transmission services must be licensed or registered, and subjected to

the international standards set out by FATF. Regionally, the UAE is playing a key

leadership role on this issue. We will continue to insist that hawala be subjected

to appropriate regulation and oversight.

Cash Couriers

As governments apply stricter oversight and controls to banks, wire transmitters,

and other traditional methods of moving money, we are witnessing terrorists and

criminals resorting to bulk cash smuggling. FATF Special Recommendation IX was

issued in late 2004 to address this problem and it calls upon countries to monitor

for cross-border transportation of currency and to make sanctions available against

those who make false declarations or disclosures in this regard. This recommendation has already prompted changes in legislation abroad. On the domestic front,

Treasury is working with the interagency community, particularly the Department

of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs

and Border Protection (CBP), to deter, disrupt, and apprehend cash smugglers. We

are also looking into technologies that will allow us to detect secreted concentrations

of cash, as well as tools that will allow us to track the movement of physical cash

around the world.

43

Case Studies

Syria

As a serious national security threat and a state sponsor of terrorism, Syria has

been the object of targeted Treasury action for some time. Syria continues to meddle

in Lebanon’s affairs, allows the Iraqi insurgency to be partially funded and fueled

from within its borders, and allows terrorist organizations and supporters to flourish

there as well. At Treasury, we are addressing this threat with a spectrum of targeted actions aimed at reversing this course.

On June 30, we designated Ghazi Kanaan, the current Syrian Minister of Interior,

and Rustum Ghazali, the Chief of Syrian Military Intelligence for Lebanon pursuant

to E.O. 13338 for their role in supporting Syria’s military and security presence in

Lebanon and support for terrorism. This was a very important first step at identifying high-level Syrian officials who are interfering in Lebanon’s political developments. With respect to the Iraq insurgency, in January of this year, we designated

the Syria-based supporter of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Sulayman Darwish, pursuant

to E.O. 13224 for acting as one of Zarqawi’s operatives in Iraq and serving on his

Advisory Council. The Syrian Government joined us in codesignating this individual

at the United Nations pursuant to UNSC 1267. On June 17, we designated Muhammad Yunis Ahmad, pursuant to E.O. 13315, for providing funding, leadership and

support from his base in Syria to several insurgent groups that are conducting attacks in Iraq. We also designated the Syria-based SES International Corporation

and two associated individuals, General Zuhayr Shalish and Asif Shalish pursuant

to E.O. 13315 for their support to senior officials of the former Iraqi regime. SES

acted as false end-user for the former Iraqi regime and facilitated Iraq’s procurement of illicit military goods in contravention of UN sanctions. Finally, President

Bush specifically designated Syria’s Scientific Studies Research Center (SSRC) as

one of the eight entities (the others were in North Korea and Iran) designated pursuant to the newly issued Executive Order 13382, which blocks the property of

proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters. SSRC is the Syrian Government agency responsible for developing and producing nonconventional

weapons and the missiles to deliver them. While it has a civilian research function,

SSRC’s activities focus substantively on the acquisition of biological and chemical

weapons.

Separately, in May of last year, we issued a proposed rule, designating the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS) as a ‘‘primary money laundering concern,’’ pursuant

to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The designation was premised on concerns

about financial wrongdoing at that bank, including terrorist financing. In connection

with the proposed rule, we presented a series of demands to Syrian authorities,

ranging from reform of their banking sector to immediate, effective action to cut off

the flow of funds across the Syrian border to the Iraqi insurgency.

We will continue to use the tools available to us to press Syria to take concrete

actions to address our concerns.

Saudi Arabia

We have pursued a strategy of sustained pressure and cooperation with Saudi

Arabia to address a number of challenges. This Committee is by now well-aware

that Saudi Arabia has increased its counter-terrorism cooperation since the Riyadh

bombings in May 2003, marked by ever more intense Saudi efforts to confront directly violent extremism in the Kingdom. The Committee is also well-aware that the

challenges posed by terrorist financing from within Saudi Arabia are among the

most daunting we have faced. Wealthy Saudi financiers and charities have funded

terrorist organizations and causes that support terrorism and the ideology that fuels

the terrorists’ agenda. Even today, we believe that Saudi donors may still be a significant source of terrorist financing, including for the insurgency in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia-based and funded organizations remain a key source for the promotion of ideologies used by terrorists and violent extremists around the world to

justify their hate-filled agenda. The Saudi Government has taken seriously the

threats posed to both the Kingdom and the United States by all of these issues, and

we have worked with and offered guidance to help confront the real threat of terrorist support. As a result, among other things, the Kingdom has made changes to

its charitable system and regulations to address certain vulnerabilities. This

progress is the result of focused interagency attention and cooperation, led by Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor Frances Fragos Townsend’s consistent

and direct outreach.

However, Saudi Arabian charities, particularly the International Islamic Relief

Organization (IIRO), the World Association of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and the Muslim World League (MWL) continue to cause us concern. The Kingdom of Saudi AraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:35 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 30837.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
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bia announced that it would freeze all international transfers until it had established an oversight commission to regulate its charitable sector. While that would

represent a satisfactory short-term solution if implemented fully, it is important

that the announced commission take shape. As we have stated previously to our

Saudi counterparts, these three charities must fall under the commission’s oversight. I recently conveyed my views on these issues to Saudi officials, and was met

with positive indications that they wish to redress these lingering concerns. I will

keep this Committee informed of progress in this area.

At the same time, it must be noted that there have been real and tangible improvements in Saudi Arabia’s cooperation on terrorism financing issues. Through

the Joint Terrorist Financing Task Force (JTFTF), we have built the foundation for

consequential and timely information exchange as well as selected joint action. We

expect to continue building on the initial success of the JTFTF and look forward to

broadening the cooperation in that area. In fact, the preliminary success of the

JTFTF has prompted us to consider applying a similar model to our efforts elsewhere in the Gulf.

Our work on cash couriers offers another example of the need for continuing work

with Saudi Arabia. Cash couriers present a serious danger, particularly because of

their use to fund the deadly insurgency in Iraq. It is critical that Saudi Arabia and

other Gulf countries lower reporting thresholds for cross-border transfers of cash

and enforce these provisions aggressively. We intend to work with Saudi Arabia and

others in the Gulf to pursue that goal.

Palestinian Territories

With respect to the Palestinian territories, we continue to grapple with the problem of charities being abused to support terrorism. Groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and others have infiltrated the charitable sector in the

territories and have corrupted badly needed relief organizations. We have been very

aggressive in acting against such charities. Most recently, Treasury designated a

PIJ charitable front, the Elehssan Society on May 4. The Elehssan Society served

as the fund-raising arm of PIJ in Gaza and the West Bank and distributed funds

to the families of PIJ prisoners and suicide bombers. Just this February, PIJ

claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack in Tel-Aviv that killed 5 and wounded

over 50. We will continue to pursue this organization and any that rise up to take

its place. The Justice Department has played a vital role in this arena. In April,

for example, the Department of Justice secured the conviction of three brothers

linked to the Holy Land Foundation for their conduct in concealing the continuing

ownership interests of Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook in their closely held private company.

We recognize that enforcement actions have sometimes cut off sources of relief to

communities in need and inadvertently decreased the support of charities and donors that deliver funds to legitimate causes. Our goal is not to deter charitable giving but instead to protect the charitable sector such that donors’ generosity is not

abused and they feel safe in providing their contributions. Therefore, there is therefore a particularly urgent need in this region for safe channels of assistance that

donors can be assured will not be subverted by terrorists. When I traveled to the

region in February, I discussed this problem with both Israeli and Palestinian officials. In speaking with President Abbas and in several follow-up meetings with Finance Minister Fayyad, I noted serious commitment on their part to cutting off the

flow of funds to terrorism, and welcomed the message they expressed that responsibility for accountable financial systems begins with the government. The Israelis

were also strongly of the view that it would be advantageous for all involved to find

a way to provide needed humanitarian aid, outside the control of Hamas or any

other terrorist group. We are currently working with the Palestinian Authority to

develop options through which such aid could be provided in a safe and effective

manner.

Conclusion

To combat terrorist financing and money laundering over the long-term, we are

vigorously and effectively promoting international standards and encouraging countries in the Middle East to adopt appropriate legislation and to implement those

laws. We are also taking the necessary actions to build political will at the highest

levels of every government to combat the financing of terrorism. Still, we have a

long way to go in the battle against terrorist financing in the Middle East, both in

terms of robust implementation of those standards and in responding to specific

threats and circumstances. Thank you again for holding this hearing and for your

sustained commitment to this topic. I would be happy to take your questions.

45

PREPARED STATEMENT OF E. ANTHONY WAYNE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JULY 13, 2005

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you the contribution of the Department of State to U.S. Government efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism in the

Middle East and South Asia. My colleague, Ambassador Nancy Powell, Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs is also here, and she can answer any questions on money laundering that

you may have. Combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism are vital

tasks and high priorities for the Department of State. Your interest and attention

to this key area is extremely valuable and much appreciated.

The main theme that you will hear throughout my presentation today is that we

have made significant strides at bolstering the political will and ability of governments in the Middle East and South Asia to act against the common threat of

terrorism and the financing of terrorism but that we need to do more. We face a

resilient, adaptable and ruthless foe and must constantly anticipate and help the

countries of these key regions prepare for the next move before it happens. This is

why your hearing today is especially important.

Mr. Chairman, your letter to the Secretary noted that your Committee is particularly interested in the Department of State’s perspective on the interagency effort

to execute this component of the war on terror. I have been working on the U.S.

Government’s campaign against terrorist finance since right after September 11,

2001 and agree with the September 11 Commission’s view that the current interagency structure has improved the coordination and effectiveness of our ability to

block funds to terrorists. Our efforts to combat terrorist finance serve many objectives and employ many tools. My goal today is to sketch for you the role the Department of State plays in the overall interagency process that aims to strike the right

balance of priorities and use the right mix of tools in our efforts to keep funds out

of the hands of terrorists in the Middle East and South Asia.

Tracking Terrorist Finances

The two major policy strategies utilized by the Administration in the terror finance area are: Freezing the assets of terrorist financiers and using information

about terrorist financiers to disrupt the terrorist networks themselves. As terrorists

largely operate internationally, a key component of the fight is to build international

cooperation. To achieve this goal, our approach has been to draw as appropriate on

a wide range of flexible policy tools, including:

• Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy;

• Law enforcement and intelligence cooperation;

• Public designations of terrorists and their supporters for asset-freeze actions;

• Technical assistance; and

• Concerted international action through multilateral organizations and groups, notably the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and the

United Nations.

Effective diplomacy is a key element in winning the political commitment from

which cooperation in other areas flows. Our diplomats are the overseas eyes, ears,

and voices of the U.S. Government in dealing with foreign governments and financial institutions on terrorism finance. Our diplomats meet additional responsibilities

in the many countries where we have no resident legal or Department of Treasury

attache ́. With enhanced cooperation, intelligence and law enforcement officers are

able to follow the money trail. With international cooperation on asset-freezes (as

well as travel bans and arms embargoes under UN resolutions), we force terrorists

into less reliable and more costly means of moving money. Designations also chill

support for terrorism—it is one thing to write a check or transfer money to terrorists when no one is looking; it is quite another to realize that such actions can bring

unwanted official attention and lead to prosecution. Public identification of charitable groups that funnel some of their donations off to support terrorists has also

proven a powerful tool to discourage further donations and to encourage other governments to monitor more effectively the activities of nongovernmental organizations.

Since September 11, we have ramped up our efforts and made substantial

progress. We also acknowledge that much remains to be done. Since September 11,

2001, we have:

46

• Developed a broad and strong international coalition against terrorist financing;

• Ordered the freezing of the U.S. assets of 400 individuals and entities linked to

terrorism;

• Submitted and supported the submission by other countries, including Saudi Arabia and several of our other Middle Eastern partners, of over 300 Al Qaeda- or

Taliban-linked names to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee (also known as the

Al Qaeda/Taliban Committee) for sanctions, including asset-freezing, thereby requiring all countries to act against these names;

• Worked closely with concerned agencies to designate three financiers of the

Zarqawi network, or Al Qaeda in Iraq, since the beginning of 2005 pursuant to

E.O.13224. The designations of Bilal Mansur al-Hiyari on April 13, ’Ayyad alFadhli on February 15, and Sulayman Kahlid Darwish on January 25 are helping

stem the funding of the Iraqi insurgency;

• Designated Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ) both as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and separately under E.O. 13224 on October 15, 2004 for having ties

to the al-Zarqawi network. At the request of the United States, the United Kingdom, Jordan, and Iraq, this organization was also listed by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee on October 18. On November 30, the USG amended the previous

designation of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (JTJ), to include its new alias

Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn and all its possible translations. On

December 2, Japan, joined by the United Kingdom and Germany, submitted to the

Sanctions Committee the new alias Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn

and all its possible translations and transliterations. The USG fully supported

those efforts.

• Designated charities funding Hamas for asset freeze; and taken action against

Saudi terrorism financiers and financial support networks;

• Frozen approximately $147.4 million and seized approximately $65 million in assets located internationally, including in the United States;

• Through our embassies, formally approached world governments internationally

to freeze the assets of each and every name we designate;

• Supported changing national laws, regulations and regulatory institutions around

the world to better combat terrorist finance and money laundering; including

working with the European Union, APEC, the Organization of American States,

and the Financial Action Task Force and their Members to strengthen their

counterterrorism finance regimes; and

• Made it harder for terrorists and their supporters to use both formal and informal

financial systems.

Effective U.S. Government Coordination

Key to our success in tackling terrorism finance in the Middle East and worldwide

is effective U.S. interagency coordination. A Policy Coordination Committee (PCC),

chaired by the National Security Council, ensures that these activities are well-coordinated. This strong interagency teamwork involves the intelligence agencies and

the law enforcement community, led by the FBI, as well as State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense collectively pursuing an understanding of the

system of financial backers, facilitators and intermediaries that play a role in this

shadowy financial world. As appropriate, PCC members also draw on the expertise

of financial regulators. The overarching lesson I draw from my experience since September 11 is the importance of overall direction of the terrorist finance effort by a

body that can direct all of the USG participants in the process to find the right

blend of instruments to use on a case-by-case basis. The NSC is ideally placed to

play this coordinating role against terrorist finance, as it has traditionally done in

other national security areas.

Treasury develops and coordinates financial packages that support public designations of terrorists and terrorism supporters for asset freeze action. Treasury also

leads our outreach to FATF and the international financial institutions. Justice

leads the investigation and prosecution in a coordinated campaign against terrorist

sources of financing. And, State initiates asset-freeze designations of terrorist

groups and shepherds the interagency process through which we develop and sustain the international relationships, strategies and activities to win vital international support for and cooperation with our efforts, including through UN action.

These efforts include the provision of training and technical assistance in coordination with Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, and the financial regulatory agencies. The U.S. Government’s task has been to identify, track, and pursue terrorist

financing targets and to work with the international community to take measures

to thwart the ability of terrorists to raise and channel the funds they need to survive and carry out their heinous acts.

47

Our diplomatic posts around the world are essential partners in implementing

this global strategy. They have each designated an official, generally the Deputy

Chief of Mission, as the Terrorism Finance Coordination Officer (TFCO). These officers chair interagency meetings at posts on a regular basis, not only to evaluate the

activities of their host governments, but also to develop and propose individual

strategies on most effectively getting at specific targets in their regions. The increased level of interagency cooperation we in Washington are seeing on this front

is generating new embassy initiatives focused sharply on terrorist finance. The ability of diplomats at our embassies to develop high-level and immediate contacts with

host officials in these efforts has built broad responsiveness around the world to various targeting actions.

U.S. Asset Freezing (E.O. 13224) Actions

One of our tools to prevent terrorism is to starve its practitioners of financial resources. A key weapon in the effort to disrupt terrorist financing has been the President’s Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which was signed on September 23, 2001. That

order, issued pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and

other authorities, provided new authorities that have been fundamental to an unprecedented effort to identify and freeze the assets of individuals and entities associated with terrorism. Under that order, the Administration has frozen the assets of

400 individuals and entities on 65 separate occasions. The agencies cooperating in

this effort are in daily contact, examining and evaluating new names and targets

for possible designation resulting in asset freezing. However, our actions in relation

to E.O. 13224 are not taken in isolation. We consider other actions as well, including

developing diplomatic initiatives with other governments to conduct audits, exchange information on records, law enforcement and intelligence efforts; and shaping new regulatory initiatives. While using E.O. 13224 to designate entities and

organizations as ‘‘specially designated global terrorists’’ is the action that is most

publicly visible, it is by no means the only action or the most important in seeking

to disrupt the financing of terrorism.

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

A second tool the Secretary of State has in the war on terrorist finance is the designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO). The Congress gave the Secretary

of State this authority in 1996, and 40 organizations are currently designated as

FTO’s. In addition to requiring the freezing of FTO assets by U.S. financial institutions that know they control or possess FTO funds, this authority renders FTO

members who are aliens inadmissible to the United States, and permits their removal under certain circumstances. Once an organization is designated as an FTO,

it becomes a criminal offense to knowingly provide material support or resources to

the organization. Offenders are subject to prison terms of up to 15 years (or, if death

results from the offense, life imprisonment). The designation of groups under this

authority is one of the steps most widely recognized by the American public in the

war on terrorism and terrorist finance.

United Nations Actions

Even before September 11, the UN Security Council (UNSC) had taken action to

address the threat of terrorism. It had adopted resolutions 1267 and 1333, which

collectively imposed sanctions against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

Following September 11, the UNSC stepped up its counterterrorism efforts by

adopting Resolutions 1373 and 1390. Among other things, Resolution 1373 requires

all states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and to freeze the

assets of terrorists and their supporters. It also imposes travel restrictions on these

individuals. Resolution 1390 (strengthened by Resolutions 1455 and 1526) expanded

sanctions, including asset freezes, travel restrictions, and arms embargos, against

Osama bin Laden, and members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and those associated

with them. The UN 1267 Sanctions Committee maintains and updates a list of individuals and entities subject to these sanctions, which all states are obligated to implement.

Through these actions, the UNSC has sent a clear and strong message underscoring the global commitment against terrorists and their supporters and obligating UN Member States to implement asset freezes and other sanctions. This is

extremely important, because: (1) most of the assets making their way to terrorists

are not under U.S. control; and (2) when the 1267 Sanctions Committee designates

individuals or entities associated with Al Qaeda, all 191 UN Member States are obligated to implement against those persons the applicable sanctions, which include

asset freezes. The 1267 Sanctions Committee has listed over 300 persons and over

100 entities that are subject to the sanctions. With respect to South Asia, we reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:35 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 30837.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
48

cently convinced the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee to list Pakistani supporters of

Al Qaeda for worldwide asset freeze and travel ban.

In January, then-Treasury Assistant Secretary Zarate and I met with the 1267

Committee to detail U.S. implementation of the resolution’s asset freeze, travel ban,

and arms embargo provisions. At this meeting I proposed several ideas aimed at

reinforcing current sanctions, including enhancing the sanctions list, promoting

international standards, and furthering bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The

Committee is actively encouraging other members to make similar presentations. In

mid-May, the UK addressed the Committee on their implementation efforts, with

an emphasis on oversight of charitable organizations. In July, Dutch and Australian

officials addressed the Committee on their implementation efforts. We have also

begun initial discussions with other Security Council Members on further steps to

strengthen the implementation and reach of these UN sanctions in the context of

a new resolution that the Council will consider this month; the United States is taking the lead in drafting that resolution.

In those cases where the U.S. Government decides to propose the inclusion of a

terrorist and/or the terrorist’s financier on the 1267 Committee list, State plays a

key role in recommending how best to gain the broadest international support.

First, we need to be sure that we can make an effective public case. This is much

more difficult and time-consuming than it sounds—but is crucial to the success of

this approach. Often, strong cases are based heavily on classified information, and

we must weigh competing priorities. If we go to the UN to propose a designation

and the unclassified information standing alone is weak, other Member States will

not support us. On the other hand, there are often compelling reasons not to declassify further information. The Department and our embassies help the interagency

team strike the right balance by providing advice and insights on what it will require for a designation to gain international approval. Once a designation proposal

is decided, the Department seeks international support in the form of potential cosponsors and must garner unanimous support from members of the UN Committee.

When a new name goes onto the Committee’s list, we bring it to the attention of

world governments to ensure that they are able to take effective and quick action

against the designee.

Improving National Laws, Regulations, and Standards

In addition to advances on the UN front, we have witnessed considerable progress

on the part of countries around the world to equip themselves with the instruments

they need to clamp down on domestic terrorist financing. Since September 11, about

90 countries in every region of the world, including the Middle East and South Asia,

have either adopted new laws or regulations to fight terrorist financing or are in

the process of doing so. This is an ongoing process with many countries refining

their laws and regulations to assure they have all of the tools needed to combat terrorist financing.

To ensure that these new laws and regulations are effective, the United States

has worked very closely with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a multinational organization whose 33 members are devoted to combating money laundering. In 2003, FATF revised its 40 Recommendations to combat money laundering

to include terrorist financing provisions. These Recommendations along with the

complementary Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, adopted in 2001,

provide a framework for countries to establish a comprehensive regime to fight

money laundering and terrorist financing. The two guiding principles the FATF has

identified as critical to fighting terrorist finance are cooperation with the UN (respecting, ratifying, and implementing antiterrorist treaties and resolutions) and

identifying, defining, and criminalizing terrorist financial activity.

The FATF continues to provide critical guidance on the development of comprehensive regimes to attack the full range of financial crimes, including terrorist

financing. In October 2004, the FATF added Special Recommendation IX on terrorist financing (to those approved in 2001), addressing the problem of cash couriers. It also continues its efforts to clarify and refine these Special Recommendations

by publishing interpretive notes and best practices guidelines to help regulators, enforcers, financial institutions, and others better understand and implement the most

technical recommendations. The FATF has also worked closely with the IMF and

World Bank to develop a common methodology to incorporate FATF’s Recommendations into the financial sector reviews that all three entities undertake.

The FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBS) worked throughout the year to adapt

the Recommendations to their particular regional requirements. The FATF approved two new FSRBS in 2004, (bringing the total to eight FSRBS): The Eurasian

Group (EAG) and the Middle East and North African Financial Action Task Force

(MENA FATF). These two new groups filled in critical gaps in global coverage, and

49

the United States is an observer in both. The EAG was inaugurated on October 6,

2004 by six member states: Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia,

and Tajikistan. Seven jurisdictions and nine international organizations were admitted as observers. EAG’s second plenary was held just this past April in Shanghai,

China. The fourteen founding members of MENA FATF are Algeria, Bahrain,

Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen. The group was inaugurated on November 29, 2004, and

held its inaugural plenary meeting the next day. Another plenary session was held

in mid-April in Bahrain at which the MENA FATF agreed to begin the first round

of mutual evaluations in 2006.

FATF is also working cooperatively with the UN Counterterrorism Committee

(CTC) and the G–8-initiated Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) to conduct assessments of selected countries’ needs for technical assistance to improve local ability to combat terrorist financing. FATF has conducted six of these assessments: Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Tunisia. FATF did not conduct an

assessment in Thailand as was requested because a recent IMF survey had been

done, or in Cote d’Ivoire due to political instability there. The UAE did not accept

a FATF assessment, indicating to the USG that a prior United States-conducted assessment was enough. CTAG donors have established a gaps/assistance matrix

based on the counterterrorism finance needs identified in FATF’s assessment. Although donors made a good start in meeting the needs of these countries, CTAG

agreed that sustained assistance over time would be required to close the gaps.

We have seen substantial progress in securing countries’ commitment to strengthen their anti-money laundering laws and regulations, which is inextricably linked

to combating the financing of terrorism. In large part due to FATF’s focus and our

technical assistance and diplomatic pressure, governments pass amendments to improve their ability to combat terrorist financing. For instance, the Indonesian

Parliament passed important amendments to its anti-money laundering law on September 16, 2003 that will improve the country’s ability to take actions against terrorist financing. Similarly, it was FATF’s efforts, in conjunction with our diplomacy

and technical assistance, which led the Philippines to pass legislation in March 2003

that will significantly increase that country’s ability to carry out meaningful

antiterrorist financing measures. FATF advises on whether such regulations and

legislation meet international standards and are effective instruments to combat

money laundering and terrorist financing.

In addition to providing countries with the guidance they need to develop effective

regimes, FATF also places pressure on difficult countries via its Non-Cooperating

Countries and Territories (NCCT) program, which provides for listing countries that

are noncooperative with respect to internationally accepted anti-money laundering

practices. FATF’s NCCT program creates an incentive for States to vigorously address their legal and regulatory environments to allow appropriate action against

money laundering. Nigeria and the Philippines, for instance, in December 2002 and

February 2003 respectively, took meaningful legislative steps to strengthen their

anti-money laundering laws to avoid imposition of FATF measures. Our extensive

efforts with the Philippines and Indonesia also played a key role in their removal

from the FATF Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories list.

As we, together with others in the international community, began to look into

how terrorist groups raised and moved their funds, the fact that much of this took

place outside regular banking systems quickly became apparent. As a result, international efforts underway to set standards for tackling terrorist financing are also

addressing how to prevent charities and not-for-profit organizations from being

abused by those with malicious intentions and also how to help keep cash couriers

and alternative remittance systems, such as ‘‘hawala,’’ from being used to finance

terrorism. The FATF, which has already addressed some of these issues through its

Special Recommendations on terrorist financing, is now working to develop guidelines and standards on wire transfers and regulation of charities and nongovernmental organizations. Setting new standards and norms in these areas is key to

making our international efforts more effective.

Economic Tools

U.S. policies to counter terrorism do include economic policies that encourage development. An important tactic to stamp out terrorism is to improve the economic

prosperity and employment opportunities in priority countries. Extremism and terrorism thrive in countries that lack freedom, political expression, and economic and

educational opportunity. People, especially youth, who live in poverty and have no

voice are more likely to be susceptible to extremist ideologies and to join terrorist

organizations. To support the reforms already underway in the region, the United

States and its G–8 partners joined at the 2004 Sea Island Summit to launch the

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Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative in partnership with governments and civil society groups from the region. BMENA includes initiatives to

increase democratic participation, promote the development of civil society, fight illiteracy, and support job-creating small businesses. These reforms will allow the

people of the Broader Middle East more opportunity to have a say in the direction

their societies are taking and help combat extremism.

As a matter of United States policy, development is central to the President’s National Security Strategy. Well-conceived and targeted aid is a potential leveraging

instrument that can help countries implement sound policies, reducing any attraction that anti-Western terrorist groups may have in failing states.

The Millennium Challenge Account represents a new compact for development—

a new way of doing business. It provides assistance to those countries that rule justly, invest in their people and encourage economic freedom. Good governance, which

attracts investment and allows the private sector to flourish, not foreign aid, is the

key to economic development. U.S. trade and investment flows to the developing

world dwarf our foreign aid. Unutilized capital in developing countries, owing to

weak policies and poor property rights, is estimated to be as high as $9 trillion.

Debt relief for the poorest countries is another element of our development strategy. Our long-standing support for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

initiative promotes debt sustainability and enables the poorest countries to devote

additional resources to reducing poverty and promoting economic growth.

Our aggressive multilateral and bilateral trade agenda to open agricultural and

nonagricultural markets and liberalize financial services, transportation, telecommunications, and government procurement all support development. Free trade

and open markets can be drivers for greater prosperity and job opportunities, especially for the young people in these key regions who are thirsting for a stake in the

future. Under the President’s vision for a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA)

by 2013, the United States has concluded a bilateral free trade agreement with Jordan. Agreements with Morocco and Bahrain should go into effect in the near future;

and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) talks with Oman and the United Arab Emirates

have just been launched. We also have Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA), which typically serve as precursors to an FTA, in place with most

Arab countries. We are also aiming to conclude a TIFA with Afghanistan. The

United States is working with countries in both the Middle East and South Asia,

such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, to assist them in their efforts to join the

World Trade Organization and become more fully integrated into the global trading

system.

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT’s) are another tool to promote the adoption of

market-oriented economic policies that can promote growth and new employment

opportunities. Historically, investors in many countries in the Middle East and

South Asia have too often faced discrimination or otherwise been treated in a biased

and nontransparent manner by host governments. As a result, foreign investors

have turned elsewhere. Our bilateral investment treaties address this problem by

assuring that certain core investment protections are available to investors, and by

providing access to an independent, nonpolitical mechanism for investors to enforce

those protections. We have held two rounds of BIT negotiations with Pakistan since

February, with a further round likely in August. Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in exploratory discussions on possible BIT negotiations, and we have also identified Algeria as a possible BIT candidate.

Capacity Building

On the technical assistance front, the interagency Terrorist Finance Working

Group (TFWG), chaired by the State Department, has provided over $11.5 million

in Foreign Assistance funding to provide technical assistance and training to develop and reinforce counterterrorist financing/anti-money laundering (CTF/AML)

regimes of frontline states, many of which are in the Middle East and South Asia

regions. To date, over twenty U.S. Government offices and agencies participating in

the TFWG, which include the Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security Departments and financial regulatory agencies, have provided assistance to eighteen countries on five different continents including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar,

Jordan, and Egypt in the Middle East and Bangladesh and Pakistan in South Asia

regions. These comprehensive training and technical assistance programs include

legislative drafting, financial regulatory training, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)

development, law enforcement training, and prosecutorial/judicial development.

We have provided several countries in the Gulf and South Asia with different

types of training related to sound counterterrorist finance practices, including the

detection of trade-based money laundering (moving money for criminal purposes by

manipulation of trade documents), customs training, antiterrorist finance techVerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:35 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 025856 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 30837.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4
51

niques, and case studies for bank examiners, and general financial investigative

skills for law enforcement/counterterrorist officials. Our international partners have

welcomed this type of training, and we plan to provide it to other vulnerable jurisdictions in other regions.

Burden sharing with our key coalition partners is an emerging success story. For

instance, the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, as

well as the EU, and the Asian Development Bank, have significant technical assistance initiatives underway in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan,

Malaysia, and Egypt. We have also funded the UN Global Program Against Money

Laundering to place a yearlong mentor in the Philippines to assist with further development of its FIU. Despite its importance in the overall counterterrorism effort,

and all the discussions about it, relatively few dollars are devoted to training and

technical assistance for AML and CTF. Congress could strengthen this tool by fully

supporting the Administration’s funding request for this crucial task.

Areas of Focused Cooperation

The Administration is actively involved in combating terrorist financing through

partnerships we have established throughout the Middle East and South Asia.

These activities rely on the full range of tools in our toolkit.

Saudi Arabia

We are working on this approach with many countries, but I want to highlight

for you the range of activities in Saudi Arabia, where we have used each of these

elements in a process steered by the NSC-led Terrorist Finance PCC. We have instituted a regular high-level diplomatic effort to urge enhanced emphasis by the

Saudis on combating terrorist finance. Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend has traveled regularly to Saudi Arabia to engage with the highest-level Saudi

authorities on this issue. The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and his staff also

reinforce these messages in their daily dialogue with a wide range of Saudi officials.

We have jointly designated, with the Saudis, over a dozen Saudi-related entities

and multiple individuals under UNSCR 1267.

As part of a State-led interagency assistance program, Federal banking regulators

have provided specialized anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing

training to their Saudi counterparts.

Demonstrating its commitment to address systemic factors contributing to the

flow of funds to terrorists, Saudi Arabia is working to establish a Charities Commission to regulate all charitable donations leaving the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia has

made important changes to its banking and charity systems to help strangle the

funds that support Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia’s new banking regulations place strict

controls on accounts held by charities. Saudi Arabia has also ordered an end to the

collection of donations at mosques and instructed retail establishments to remove

charity collection boxes from their premises. These steps have been extremely

challenging for the Saudi government, but they have been ordered because it understands that terrorists are more likely to use funds collected anonymously and without an audit trail than those that move through regular banking channels. We believe that Saudi actions have, in fact, significantly reduced the flow of cash from

Saudi Arabia to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region.

The Saudi Government has continued to publicize counterterrorism efforts and to

speak out denouncing terrorism. The declaration from the February 2005 International Counterterrorism Conference, hosted by the Saudi Government, in Riyadh

stated that there can be no justification for terrorism and called for greater religious

tolerance. Homeland Security Advisor Townsend led a large U.S. interagency delegation to the conference and spoke at the plenary session, emphasizing the need to

block the financing of terrorism. I participated in the working group on terrorist finance. The Saudi Government plans to establish an international counterterrorism

center in Riyadh which can further international efforts at curbing all aspects of terrorism, including terrorist finance. We plan to continue to work with the Saudis on

ways to make this center most effective. On the issue of greater religious tolerance,

the Saudi Government, on its own initiative, recently completed a comprehensive revision of textbooks to ‘‘remove objectionable language,’’ and these new textbooks are

now being used in Saudi schools. In 2005, the Saudis intensified their wide-ranging

antiterror public relations campaign. The campaign condemns terrorism and encourages moderation through statements by politicians and religious leaders. A mix of

television programs, advertisements, and billboards depict the graphic results of terrorism to send a strong antiterror message to the Saudi public. For the last 4 years,

the State Department has sponsored special International Visitors programs for

Saudi religious educators, to expose them to the nature of U.S. religious diversity

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and the role of religion in U.S. society. Two groups of 10 had visited so far in fiscal

year 2005, with another group of 10 scheduled in the fall.

Saudi Arabia has been working with us for a year and a half in the context of

the Joint Task Force on Terrorist Financing, led on the U.S. side by the FBI. As

part of the State-led interagency counterterrorist financing assistance program, experts from the FBI and IRS have completed a training module designed to strengthen the financial investigative capabilities of the Saudi security forces, with more

advanced courses to follow. The Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) will provide a week of cash courier-related training to Saudi customs officials starting July 16. That being said, this remains a work in progress. We have reason to believe that the new task force on

terrorist financing will be effective, but we need to see results.

We believe the Saudi Arabian Government is implementing its new charity regulations, but there too, we continue to stress in our discussions with the Saudis the

need for full implementation, including a fully functioning Charities Commission.

Additionally, appropriate regulatory oversight of organizations headquartered in the

Kingdom such as the World Muslim League, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is absolutely

necessary. The Saudi Government is working to train personnel to staff its nascent

Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and we will encourage the Saudi FIU to join the

Egmont Group in 2006. On June 19, a Ministry of Interior spokesman announced

that a ‘‘special department for tracing illegal financial activities in the Kingdom’’

(the FIU) will be completed soon. The September 2003 FATF mutual assessment of

Saudi Arabia found that the Kingdom has taken essential steps—closer bank supervision, tighter banking laws, enhanced oversight—critical to curbing terrorist financing and money laundering. On June 14, for example, the Council of Ministers

adopted a recommendation that private donations to beneficiaries outside the Kingdom be channeled only through the National Commission for Relief and Charitable

Work Abroad. There is more to do, and we will continue to press ahead with our

efforts with the Saudi Arabian Government and with other governments in the region.

Beyond these activities, the Saudis are also continuing to fight terrorism on the

ground. On June 28, Saudi Arabia issued a new list of 36 ‘‘most wanted’’ terrorists

in the Kingdom. At least one has been killed and one has surrendered since the list

was released.

Other Gulf States

The governments of the Arabian Peninsula are themselves on the front lines in

the war on terrorism, and have become essential partners of the United States in

countering the threat of terrorism in the region. We have developed highly cooperative and mutually beneficial relations with the Gulf States in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and terrorist finance. However, there is still more

that can be done. We will continue high-level engagement and will focus on sustaining the capacity of these governments to effectively address the terrorist threat.

Our efforts to combat the financing of terrorism are working, and now Al Qaeda

and other terrorist groups are increasingly resorting to cash couriers to move their

funds across borders to fund their terrorist activities. The USG is working with the

governments in the Gulf to combat the illicit use of cash couriers, which is especially

pertinent to these cash-based economies. We have recently provided training to the

Saudi Customs Service to identify cash couriers. We look forward to supporting

these governments as they enhance their cash courier regulations. Additionally,

FATF issued Special Recommendation IX in October 2004, under which member

countries should ensure that they have measures in place to detect, and appropriately sanction, those moving currency if suspected of money laundering or terrorist financing.

The Gulf States have made significant progress to improve their ability to combat

terrorist financing and have worked closely with us in this area. These nations have

diligently implemented UNSC sanctions.

Kuwait formed a ministerial committee to develop strategies to combat terrorism

and extremism, and forbade Kuwaiti Ministries and other institutions from extending official invitations to 26 Saudi clerics who reportedly signed a statement in support of Jihad in Iraq. There are regular consultations between United States and

Kuwaiti officials on ways to strengthen measures to combat money laundering and

terrorist finance. During a recent visit to Kuwait by Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Glaser, the Kuwaitis discussed some of the additional measures they

are taking to combat terrorist financing. The GOK has formed a working group to

draft a new piece of legislation that would specifically criminalize terrorist finance

and strengthen Kuwait’s anti-money laundering/terrorist finance (AML/TF) regime.

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The legislation is intended to address weaknesses in Kuwait’s current antiterrorist

finance legal regime (absence of a law specifically criminalizing terrorist finance;

prohibition of direct information-sharing by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)

without prior case-by-case approval of the Public Prosecutor’s Office; lack of restrictions on cash couriers). The USG has offered, and the GOK has accepted, USDOJ

Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT)

assistance in reviewing Kuwait’s legislation. GOK officials have also indicated that

they may ask the IMF and FinCEN for assistance. The Embassy is also working

with the Department of Justice, the Federal Reserve, and other agencies on a

counterterrorism training package for the Government of Kuwait.

In November 2004, Bahrain hosted the inaugural meeting of the Middle East and

North Africa (MENA) FATF, which will promote the implementation of the FATF

Recommendations to combat money laundering and terrorist finance. In April 2005,

Bahrain hosted a 2-day plenary session of the MENAFATF followed by a 2-day antimoney laundering/counterterrorist finance workshop cohosted by the World Bank

and IMF.

The UAE aggressively enforces anti-money laundering regulations and in 2004 enacted legislation criminalizing terror finance. In April, the UAE hosted the third

international conference where ways to prevent use of the hawala (informal money

transfer) system by terrorist financiers was discussed. We sent U.S. delegates and

a speaker to this conference, and over 400 participants from 74 different countries

attended. Conference attendees included representatives from financial institutions,

Central Banks, law enforcement agencies, FATF, the IMF, and the World Bank, as

well as other international officials involved in regulating money transfer systems.

The government registers hawala dealers.

Oman has implemented a tight anti-money laundering regime that monitors unusual transactions. Financial institutions plan to verify customer identities using sophisticated biometrics technology.

Qatar has enacted laws to combat terrorist financing and to monitor all domestic

and international charity activities.

Yemen routinely cooperates with United States law enforcement and took action

against Al Qaeda by arresting several individuals suspected of Al Qaeda ties and

prosecuting the perpetrators of several terrorist acts, including the 2002 attack on

the USS Cole.

We have conducted Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs with all of the

Arabian Peninsula states.

Now that MENAFATF is set up, it needs to become an effective, practicing institution. Members of MENAFATF should all set up operational FIU’s, conduct mutual

assessments, establish best practices, and meet overall FATF standards.

Jordan

The Government of Jordan has cooperated with us on a wide range of terrorist

finance issues, including designations at the UN. We urge passage of the new antimoney laundering legislation, which will strengthen significantly Jordan’s legal

basis for tackling the financing of terrorism and its international cooperation on

AML and counter-terrorism financing cases.

Syria

In May 2004, Treasury designated the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS) as a ‘‘primary money laundering concern’’ pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act

and proposed to implement a special measure against the bank. Since then, we have

worked with the Syrian Government and the CBS to strengthen their anti-money

laundering controls and their cooperation with the U.S. on money laundering and

terrorist financing issues. We have not implemented the special measure, which

would require U.S. financial institutions to sever their correspondent relationships

with CBS, pending an assessment of Syrian progress toward resolving United States

concerns. In addition, the Syrians joined us on the submission of Sulayman Khalid

Darwish to the UN 1267 Committee.

However, the Syrian Government needs to do more to address United States concerns about Syria’s continued efforts to influence Lebanese political developments,

its pursuit of WMD, and the use of Syrian territory by those supporting terrorism

and the insurgency in Iraq. On June 9, the Treasury Department designated a Syrian-based entity and its two managers pursuant to EO 13315, which is aimed at

blocking the property of the former Iraqi regime or those who acted for on its behalf.

On June 29, the Treasury Department designated another Syrian entity pursuant

to its newly issued Executive Order on WMD Proliferation Financing. On June 30,

the Treasury Department designated two Syrians for an assets freeze pursuant to

the provision in EO 13338 that is aimed at financially isolating those individuals

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and entities contributing to the Syrian Government’s military and security presence

in Lebanon.

South Asia

South Asia, and especially Pakistan, is a priority region for counterterrorist financing, due to the presence of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, porous borders,

and cash-based economies that often operate through informal mechanisms, such as

hawala. All countries in the region need to improve their terrorist financing regimes

to meet international standards, including the establishment of functioning Financial Intelligence Units. Both political will and technical assistance are needed to

make this region a more effective partner.

Turning to Pakistan specifically, we welcome the concrete actions it has taken to

implement its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions, including the

freezing of over $10 million of Al Qaeda assets. Pakistan has also apprehended terrorists, including Abu Farraj Al Libbi, Al Qaeda’s operational leader. We are encouraged by Pakistan’s concern about the infiltration of terrorist groups into charitable

organizations, and would welcome the opportunity to provide technical assistance to

help Pakistan meet international standards on preventing abuse of its nonprofit sector.

We have provided Pakistan assistance on drafting an anti-money laundering/

counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) law that meets international standards, but

this legislation is still awaiting parliamentary consideration. As soon as a law that

meets international standards is enacted, we will be able to accelerate training efforts, including assistance for the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit

(FIU). In the absence of an anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing

law, the State Bank of Pakistan has introduced FATF-compliant regulations in

know-your-customer policy, record retention, due diligence of correspondent banks,

and reporting suspicious transactions. Also in compliance with FATF recommendations, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan has applied know-yourcustomer regulations to stock exchanges, trusts, and other nonbank financial institutions. All settlements exceeding Rs 50,000 ($840) must be performed by check or

bank draft, as opposed to cash.

Afghanistan recently passed anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing

legislation, and many efforts are being made to strengthen police and customs

forces. However, there remain few resources and little expertise to combat financial

crimes, or to produce meaningful financial intelligence, and they have requested the

United States for assistance in building capacity to do so. Arrangements are underway to send an assessment team. The most fundamental obstacles continue to be

legal, cultural, and historical factors that many times conflict with more Westernstyle proposed reforms to the financial sector generally.

In India, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) became effective on

July 1. The Act provides the statutory basis for the Financial Intelligence Unit

(FIU) to perform its functions. It criminalizes money laundering and requires banks

and other financial institutions and intermediaries to report individual transactions

valued over $23,000 to the FIU. Two accounts belonging to terrorist individuals/entities have been identified, but the Government of India (GOI) has not frozen any assets to date. It is aware of the UN 1267 Committee list, however, and has conducted

investigations. India has indicated that it wants to join FATF. However, at a recent

FATF Plenary meeting in Paris, concerns were raised regarding India’s ability to

provide effective international cooperation in a timely manner, and to extend mutual legal assistance. The GOI maintains tight controls over charities, which are required to register with the government. The November 2004 amendment of the 1967

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act criminalized terrorist financing.

Speaking generally, South Asian countries lack sophisticated tools to combat the

financing of terrorism. Not one country in the region is a member of the Egmont

Group of countries with operational FIU’s, which is unusual given the large numbers and regional spread of Egmont’s membership. Anti-money laundering programs

also tend to be absent or not up to international standards. Nonetheless, there is

a degree of interest in all countries of the region, and we have seen some progress.

Efforts are underway to develop and implement international AML/CTF standards bilaterally and regionally through such organizations such as the Asia Pacific

Group on Money Laundering (APG). Bilaterally the United States has conducted

training and technical assistance assessments for most countries in South Asia. We

have provided AML/CTF legal drafting assistance, financial regulatory training, and

FIU development support. In Bangladesh we support a Resident Legal Advisor to

assist authorities in drafting and implementing AML/CTF laws as well as providing

specialized training for prosecutors and other law enforcement officials.

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Designations and Asset Freezes: Only Part of the Picture

The international designations and asset freeze process has helped us develop and

deepen a set of invaluable long-term relationships with our interagency and international partners. Through this collaborative international effort, we have built cooperation and the political will necessary to fight terrorism, both through designations and asset freezes, as well as through operational law enforcement actions. As

described above, U.S. Government agencies meet regularly to identify, track, and

pursue terrorist financing targets and to determine, on a case-by-case basis, which

type of action is most appropriate. Designation for asset freezing should not come

at the expense of taking appropriate law enforcement action. On the contrary, the

two approaches frequently complement each other. There are cases where operational law enforcement action can be initiated quickly to trace, prosecute, and shut

down terrorists. In other cases, for instance where long-term investigations are

under way, the better option may be to designate for asset freezing in order to stop

the flow of money that might be used to carry out terrorist activity until law enforcement actions can be taken.

We have used multilateral asset freezes, together with technical assistance and

the FATF multilateral standard setting process, as valuable devices to isolate terrorist financiers, drive them out of the formal financial system, and unite the international community through collective action. In these cases, designations are

preventative, making it harder for terrorists and their supporters to operate. We

continue to work together with our international partners to strengthen the multilateral designation process. By carefully working with our allies, we seek to build

international consensus, thereby preventing unwanted delays in the process. We

urge all foreign governments to fulfill their UN obligations to freeze assets without

delay. In cases where an individual or entity assumes a new name, we initiate action to designate the alias, thwarting their efforts to simply continue ‘‘business as

usual’’ under a new name. These actions prevent open fundraising, diminish support

to illicit charities, and act as an element of diplomacy to demonstrate international

resolve.

In the fight against global terrorism, the Administration must continue to use vigorously all of the tools at its disposal—including designations/asset freezing, law

enforcement/intelligence cooperation, and the establishment and enforcement of

international norms and standards. Given that the money that gets into the hands

of terrorists flows around the world, the only way we will be successful in drying

up their financial resources is through continued, active U.S. engagement with allies, friends, and other countries around the globe. We must continue to broaden

and deepen our efforts worldwide. These efforts have paid off—and they will continue to do so.

The Department of State plays a pivotal role in, and adds great value to, this

broadening and deepening of international cooperation. Officers in our embassies

and in Washington bring their experience to bear in judging the best approach to

a specific terrorist or group in a specific country or region. Their political, economic,

and cultural expertise allows them to weigh the pros and cons of various approaches

given the other political and economic dynamics of the countries whose help we are

enlisting in the war against terrorism. There are no ‘‘off-the-shelf’’ answers in this

field. Each case is different, and the State Department is uniquely placed to help

weigh options and craft tailor-made strategies to produce effective action.

—————

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DENNIS M. LORMEL

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

CORPORATE RISK INTERNATIONAL, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

JULY 13, 2005

Good morning Chairman Shelby and distinguished Members of the Committee.

Thank you for affording me the opportunity to participate in this forum. I applaud

the time, attention and consideration you have committed to the extremely complex

issue of terrorist financing. In my previous position as Chief, Terrorist Financing

Operations Section (TFOS), Counterterrorism Division (CTD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), I testified and/or participated in numerous Congressional hearings

and briefings. In addition, in many instances, I was responsible for preparing the

written statements of other FBI executives in hearings which focused on terrorist

financing. This is a subject which is extremely important to me because I have witnessed first hand investigative successes which have disrupted or deterred funding

56

intended to support terrorist activities. I am an ardent believer that terrorist financing is a critical component of the war on terrorism.

Terrorist financing is every bit as challenging today as it was in the immediate

aftermath of September 11, 2001 and as it was one year ago. Law enforcement, regulators, and intelligence agencies here, in the United States, and abroad, have

achieved noteworthy and meaningful accomplishments. New proactive and progressive methodologies have been developed and implemented in furtherance of such efforts. However, lingering concerns and the resiliency of terrorists to adapt to

change, coupled with the ease of exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in the financial sector will perpetuate the challenge of addressing the issues presented by terrorist financing.

By way of background, immediately following September 11, I was responsible for

the formation and oversight of the FBI led, multiagency, Financial Review Group,

which evolved into the TFOS. In that capacity, my perspective was government and

investigative driven. In my current position, as Senior Vice President, Anti-Money

Laundering (AML), Corporate Risk International, I continue to address AML and

terrorist financing issues. My perspective has shifted to one that is industry and

compliance driven. This provides me with a unique understanding of the responsibilities, sensitivities, challenges, and frustrations experienced by the Government and

financial sectors in dealing with AML and terrorist financing considerations.

One fact is quite evident; those responsible for addressing terrorist financing in

government and in industry share the desire and resolve to deny terrorists funding

mechanisms. The level of cooperation between the Government and the financial

sector has been consistently outstanding since September 11. Overall, financial

firms have been vigilant with respect to AML and terrorist financing compliance

consideration. However, an area of concern, which warrants this Committee’s continued scrutiny, pertains to the issues involving the benefits and burdens of Bank

Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting requirements. Such issues include adequacy of suspicious activity reporting, lack of guidance by regulators, consistency of regulatory

examinations, and feedback from the Government to the financial sector concerning

results of suspicious activity reporting. Interested parties on both sides of this issue

need to do more to establish a middle ground in terms of better understanding their

respective sensitivities and balancing the benefits and burdens of BSA reporting requirements. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the American Bankers Association (ABA) have taken a leadership role in addressing and

resolving these issues through the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group. Bill Fox, Director, FinCEN and John Byrne, Director, Center for Regulatory Compliance, ABA,

deserve recognition for visibly leading this effort in a responsible manner. As a result of the regulators and industry constructively addressing the issue of inconsistent regulatory examinations, the Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering

Examination Manual was released on June 30, 2005. This was an important step

forward in ensuring consistent future bank examinations are conducted and in emphasizing the responsibility of banking organizations concerning AML and terrorist

financing BSA compliance.

Although financial activity that supports terrorism is often simplistic, terrorist financing presents a myriad of complex challenges. By its nature, in most applications, the movement of funds to support terrorism is through legal and undetectable

means. We should be mindful that terrorist financing encompasses a wide variety

of activities. There are fundraising mechanisms, operational and administrative support mechanisms, and other considerations, which require use of the formal and informal financial systems. This variance is exacerbated by the range of positions and

responsibilities individual terrorists and terrorist supporters assume to include leaders, fundraisers, financiers, facilitators, operatives, and suicide bombers. Financial

requirements and funding flows for the full gamut of terrorists and terrorist supporters vary according to factors to include their role, location, culture, and affiliations. This is particularly true with respect to the Middle East.

Terrorist and terrorist financing warning signs are constantly evolving due to

changing dynamics in world events, such as the global response to terrorism and

the ability of terrorists to adapt to changing dynamics. Like characteristic indicators, warning signs are nonstatic. For example, in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. and international community took decisive steps to disrupt

and dismantle terrorist groups and their financing. In return, terrorists adapted

new methodologies to exploit systemic vulnerabilities. The same cycle was repeated

following other significant terrorist activities, such as in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004. As the investigation into the London bombings

of July 7, 2005, unfolds, it will be important to assess the methodologies employed

by the terrorist group responsible for the attack, to include the operation, logistical

support, communications, and financing.

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One of the true challenges in dealing with terrorist financing is the recognition

of the dynamics of change and understanding that terrorist and terrorist financing

methodologies will constantly change to avoid detection. As this Committee continues hearings addressing terrorist financing, it is recommended you assess mechanisms developed by Government agencies and the private sector to identify emerging trends adapted by terrorist and criminal elements. In view of the international

response to the London bombings, terrorist groups will likely be challenged to again

adapt to changing dynamics.

Lessons learned since September 11 should play a significant role in formulating

future detective and preventive measures. First, we must understand vulnerabilities

in terms of systemic societal vulnerabilities and areas of vulnerability to terrorist

interests. Systemic vulnerabilities represent systemic weaknesses that terrorists

and criminal elements, especially fraudsters, exploit in furtherance of their activities. It is incumbent that individuals and entities responsible for controls recognize

such weaknesses and implement mechanisms to minimize such exploitation.

The unfortunate reality is that terrorists will always have access to financing. We

cannot be discouraged by this fact and must use every tool in our arsenal to disrupt

and minimize funding flows to terrorists. The greater the level of disruption the

more difficult it is for terrorists to raise funds and carry out terrorist operations.

On September 25, 2003, former Treasury General Counsel David Aufhauser stated

before this Committee ‘‘Money is the fuel for the enterprise of terror. It may also

be its Achilles’ heel. It can leave a signature, an audit trail, which, once discovered,

might well prove the best single means of identification and capture of terrorists

and pinpointing their donors. Financial records are literally the diaries of terror.

Stopping the flow of money to terrorists may be one of the very best ways we have

of stopping terror altogether. That is a dramatic statement, but it is not possible

to overstate the importance of the campaign against terrorist financing. If you follow

and stop the money, you have gone a long way to diminish the killing and destruction.’’

Like terrorism itself, terrorist financing is not limited to the homeland but is global in scope. In dealing with terrorist financing, all solutions must be considered.

Outreach initiatives between government and private sectors within the U.S. and

internationally is important in establishing frameworks for cooperation and information sharing.

In view of the combination of law enforcement, regulatory, and diplomatic actions

taken in the U.S. and internationally, certain of the lucrative funding sources, such

as charity and wealthy donors, have significantly diminished. Anecdotal information

points to the difficulty terrorists have in raising, moving and storing money. This

has been particularly true in the Middle East where cases such as Holy Land Foundation, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Islamic American Relief Agency

have achieved significant deterrence value. As a result, there has been a greater reliance on criminal activities as a terrorist funding mechanism. This is noteworthy

because it exposes terrorists to greater risk of detection.

Since September 11, terrorist financing methodologies have been changing. Terrorists rely on two tracks of funding, the formal and informal financial systems. To

operate in western society, terrorists must rely more on formal mechanisms. To operate in less advanced financial venues, such as Afghanistan, more informal mechanisms are used. Following September 11, Al Qaeda took steps to exploit informal

financial structures in the Middle East and other venues, and to use formal facilities

on a more limited basis because of the investigative scrutiny and international pressure placed on the formal banking system. As just illustrated, the degree one system

is used in preference over the other depends on a number of factors to include culture, sophistication of the banking system in various parts of the world, accessibility, timing, situational considerations, the level of investigative scrutiny, and

other factors. Whichever system is used, terrorists move funds with the intent to

avoid attention and detection.

The specific regulatory and investigative focus on terrorist financing surfaced following September 11. Prior to that, there were no consistent and continuous mechanisms to prevent or deter terrorists from raising and moving funds. Anti-terrorist

financing efforts, both domestically and internationally, have consistently improved

and evolved with growth and maturation in an incremental fashion. It should be

noted that mechanisms developed and implemented in the U.S. have been in the

forefront worldwide. For example, the template established by the FBI’s TFOS, has

been mirrored by numerous countries. Even with being further advanced, it is incumbent that U.S. agencies continue to enhance their capabilities on a steady incremental basis with a focus on emerging trends.

Agencies should gauge, assess, and utilize financial information in three dimensions, strategic, tactical, and historic. Accomplishments should also be measured in

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accordance with these dimensions. Strategic financial information is intelligence oriented and should be used for trend analysis. This is an area that is emerging and

whose law enforcement and intelligence functionality has not reached it’s potential.

Stuart Levey, Under Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury, is in the process of developing a strategic intelligence capability, collateral to his primary responsibility of cutting off the flow of support to

international terrorist groups. It is important that Under Secretary Levey strive to

articulate to the government community the strategic mission and value of his recently formed entity in order to establish a sense of credibility and fraternity.

After we established the TFOS at the FBI, the importance of strategic intelligence

was a primary consideration. We established a Financial Intelligence Unit, to

produce actionable financial intelligence. A component of this unit was the Proactive

Exploits Group. This group has evolved into a new unit, that has developed and implemented advanced technological and data mining capabilities. It’s ability to access

and analyze BSA information, in conjunction with FinCEN, and other data sources,

has come to fruition and is generating significant intelligence information that is

actionable intelligence and can be utilized to initiate new investigations or supplement ongoing investigations. The value of this intelligence cannot be understated.

Often times it is a traditional financial crime that enables the FBI to execute search

warrants, make arrests, and in certain instances gain the cooperation of terrorist

subjects. The robust data mining search capabilities of the Proactive Exploits Group

have enabled the FBI to identify and link pertinent data from multiple date sources

in a time sensitive, effective and efficient manner. I encourage the Committee request a briefing about the emerging capabilities of the Proactive Exploits Unit at

the TFOS, FBI.

FinCEN is acutely aware of the differences between money laundering and terrorist financing. In its quest to effectively differentiate between the two, yet be able

to collect and assess data to detect both money laundering and terrorist financing,

FinCEN developed BSA Direct. The system, which is in the design and implementation phases, will assist investigators at identifying anomalies, trends, and patterns.

BSA Direct will assist in the process of connecting the dots and ferreting out money

laundering and terrorist financing. It relies on data mining and analytical applications with improved access for law enforcement and regulators. It is anticipated that

the BSA Direct initiative will be the cornerstone of FinCEN’s technology architectures.

FinCEN Director Bill Fox considers his agency to be a ‘‘collector’’ of information.

He believes it to be critically important to collect the best quality of information and

to share it with all constituencies in furtherance of efforts to diminish money laundering and terrorist financing. This underscores the critical importance of

Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR’s). Individuals responsible for completing and submitting SAR’s should ensure they are thoroughly completed.

This is one area where the Government and the financial sector need to do a better job. The financial sector must move away from filing defensive SAR’s and ensure

SAR’s contain thorough descriptive information. The Government, especially

FinCEN and the FBI, has developed more robust data mining capabilities, which

can better link descriptive data to terrorism investigations. In turn, the government

must do a better job of delineating new and emerging capabilities to industry. In

addition, the Government should more consistently provide financial firms feedback

concerning the investigative benefits derived from information reported in SAR’s.

The area that has generated the most significant level of success has been the

tactical investigative application of financial information. In this context, financial

information is used in a tactical operational capacity. For instance, during my tenure at the TFOS, FBI, we had a mechanism to track financial transactional information which assisted a foreign intelligence service in preventing six potential terrorist

attacks in their country. The tracking and tracing of financial information is an incredibly powerful financial investigative tool. The tactical dimension is best suited

to proactive investigative techniques.

The historic approach is the most challenging because it is reactive and relies on

historic tracing of funds. As money is moved from point of origination to point of

receipt, the ability to trace funds into the hands of terrorists becomes increasingly

remote. This is especially true when attempting to trace funds through conduits

such as charities and banks in the Middle East to groups such as Hamas and

Hezbollah, who are adept at disguising the end beneficiary of funds.

There is a school of thought which subscribes to the theory that terrorist financing is not a significant component of the war on terrorism and has limited impact.

In part, that may be true when looking at the historic dimension of terrorist financing. However, when taken in context with the strategic and tactical dimensions, terrorist financing plays a critically important role in the war on terrorism.

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One of the most significant lessons learned in the post-September 11 environment

is the importance of developing and implementing time sensitive investigative techniques, particularly time sensitive financial investigative techniques. The immediacy

and severity of terrorist threats require investigative strategies that present a sense

of urgency. More often than not, circumstances cause investigative strategies to the

threats at hand to be reactive and not proactive. More focus must be dedicated to

developing proactive investigative techniques. One area where proactive investigative strategies can be implemented is in terrorist financing. From a tactical standpoint, strategies have been implemented which allow the near real time tracking of

financial transactions. To reiterate, this is a truly powerful technique. It requires

close coordination and cooperation between law enforcement and the financial community. As mentioned above, this methodology was used to assist another country

to prevent potential terrorist acts.

With specific focus on the Middle East, U.S. Government agencies have made a

consistent, for the most part coordinated, and concerted effort to establish and maintain viable working relationships with countries in that region. With respect to Al

Qaeda, and the threat to the region caused by Al Qaeda, most countries have been

more willing to openly cooperate with the United States. A prime example of this

is Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of the May 12, 2003, bombings in Riyadh, the

Saudis became consistently engaged in the war on terrorism, whereas before that,

they were less consistent and more selectively engaged. Countries such as Kuwait

and Qatar have been formidable partners. The recent threats posed by Al Qaeda in

those venues have appeared to strengthen their spirit of cooperation. In my experience, Jordan, Israel, and Oman have been strong allies in combating terrorism.

With respect to the broader terrorist financing issues, the United Arab Emirates

(UAE) and Bahrain have been outstanding to deal with. Being two of the principal

financial centers in the region, their level of cooperation has been critically important to the United States. As an example, shortly after September 11, the UAE

passed strong AML provisions. In addition, they openly accepted training enabling

them to better implement and enforce AML and antiterrorism regimes. In conjunction with the U.S. State Department’s Coalition Building initiative, the Internal

Revenue Service (IRS) and the FBI’s TFOS provided a series of two week training

courses in the UAE focused on financial investigative techniques to include money

laundering and terrorist financing. The resulting goodwill led to development of a

close working relationship with the Central Bank in the UAE. This enabled the

FBI’s TFOS to gain direct access to important banking records.

As was the case in the United States, countries in the Middle East and throughout the world have improved their ability to address terrorist financing in an incremental fashion. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the most important vehicle in the world for promoting uniform standards for governmental action against

money laundering. In November 2004, countries in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region established the MENAFATF. The FATF, World Bank International Monetary Fund and other groups have endorsed the formation of the

MENAFATF. The purpose of its establishment was to create a platform for member

states to better join forces with the international community in the global fight

against money laundering and terrorist financing. One of the initial areas of focus

for the MENAFATF has been on the unregulated informal value transfer system

(frequently referred to as hawala or hundi). This system is one of the most vulnerable areas for exploitation by criminals and terrorists. The informal value transfer

system is especially prevalent throughout the MENA region and has grown throughout the world. The 14 founding members of MENAFATF are Algeria, Bahrain,

Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yeman. Lebanon currently holds the MENAFATF presidency and

is leading it commendably. Lebanon has progressed as a country in building antimoney laundering and counter-terrorist financing mechanisms.

Qatar will be receiving training through a private security consulting firm, which

will include anti-money laundering and terrorist financing components. Kuwait, the

UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt have taken active leadership roles in the MENAFATF.

Issues and concerns involving most countries in the Middle East in their relations

with the United States is not one of will or desire. Their resolve for dealing with

money laundering and terrorist financing is generally strong. The issue is rather

one of capacity in terms of limited resources and capability. This is where a sustained training initiative is critical to the incremental capacity building necessary

for these countries to progress. This specialized training places a strain on the U.S.

Government agencies involved, particularly State, the IRS and the FBI.

Concerning organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic

Jihad (PIJ), which have active fundraising mechanisms in the United States, international consensus is lacking as to whether they are terrorist organizations. Clearly,

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the United States has designated them as such. The lack of consensus makes it

more challenging to receive information in certain instances. This is an area that

the U.S. Government must continue to push vigorously and regularly in an effort

to gain international consensus recognizing these groups as terrorist organizations.

This will become increasingly more difficult as Hamas and Hezbollah, in particular,

become more engaged in political processes. With respect to Hezbollah, Hamas, and

PIJ, the United States has a very close working relationship with the Israelis. This

is especially true in matters concerning terrorist financing.

Saudi Arabia is one of the U.S. Government’s most important, yet heavily criticized, allies in the war on terrorism. Since the May 12, 2003, Al Qaeda attacks in

Riyadh, the Saudis have been aggressively involved in fighting Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia has been one of the most significant funding mechanisms for terrorist organizations, especially Al Qaeda. The Saudis have enacted strong legislation concerning

money laundering and charitable giving in order to attempt to stem the flow of

funding to terrorists. They formed a Charities Commission to regulate the giving

and distribution of money for charitable purposes. The Saudis have taken actions

against charities to diminish the flow of funds to terrorists. This was best illustrated

by the closure of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, the largest Saudi Charity. The

Saudis have received FATF acknowledgement for steps they have taken. However,

the Saudis are by their nature a closed society and as such lack transparency. This

is a matter of culture rather then intent. In any case, the lack of transparency is

a source of ongoing concern for the United States. The State Department and National Security Counsel (NSC) have worked very closely with the Saudis to ensure

they do more then merely enact laws and make statements about establishing certain mechanisms, such as creation of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Their lack

of transparency makes this a daunting challenge. Recently, Representative Sue

Kelly (R–NY), took the Saudis to task in a hearing she chaired in the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, and

through a follow up letter and subsequent visit to Saudi Arabia for failure to take

substantive actions such as establishment of a FIU. The Saudis, to their credit, responded by providing their view and inviting Representative Kelly to Saudi Arabia

for further discussion. The Saudis have since identified officers trained in financial

crimes by the FBI through the Joint Terrorism Financing Task Force (JTFTF) who

have been designated for assignment to the FIU. However, the FIU does not appear

to be functional at this juncture. A measure of the Saudis resolve concerning formation of an FIU will be for them to join the Egmont Group, which members consist

of FIU’s from 101 countries, who share information and support for their respective

AML programs. MENAFATF countries who are members of the Egmont group include the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, and Qatar.

In May 2003, Saudi Arabia and the United States agreed to establish the JTFTF,

mentioned above. The purpose of the JTFTF was to establish a mechanism for the

consistent, continuous and timely exchange of financial information of mutual benefit. The JTFTF is located in Riyadh. FBI and IRS personnel are assigned in a capacity to facilitate the exchange of information in a timely manner. The

functionality of the JTFTF is not a best case scenario situation but one that is a

good case scenario. The FBI and the Saudis are satisfied with the information exchange and spirit of cooperation. An early sign of the Saudis desire to succeed in

this initiative was the Saudis willingness to accept comprehensive financial training

from the FBI and IRS. This training was considered a foundation building step.

Since then, the flow of information has improved over time and benefited

counterterrorism investigations.

As numerous FBI and DOJ representatives have recently testified, to include Director Mueller and Attorney General Gonzalez, at various House and Senate hearings, the USA PATRIOT Act has served as an invaluable tool and has contributed

to significant investigative results. It is incumbent that Congress renew those provisions due to ‘‘sunset’’ at the end of the year. This will ensure that investigative,

intelligence, and regulatory agencies maintain the level of ability to proactively prevent or deter terrorist activities.

Terrorist financing investigations must consistently be conducted in a time sensitive, time urgent manner. Two areas where this Committee can be of assistance

in that regard include supporting Congressional approval for the FBI to issue administrative subpoenas in terrorism cases and encouraging financial institutions to

provide law enforcement with the production of financial records in electronic format.

The FBI has administrative subpoena authority for investigations of crimes to include drug trafficking, health care fraud, and child exploitation. Such authority is

lacking for terrorism cases. Approval of administrative subpoenas for terrorism investigations would enhance the FBI’s ability to conduct time sensitive, time urgent

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investigations. The Bureau has a proven record of issuing administrative subpoenas

in an appropriate manner. The FBI, as Director Mueller has consistently stated, is

mindful of and dedicated to protecting the civil rights of the American people.

Testimony I was responsible for preparing for current FBI Deputy Director John

Pistole for a hearing before this Committee on September 25, 2003, discussed the

importance of production of financial records in electronic format. Again, in this era

of time sensitivity, time urgency, the ability to work with electronic documents instead of paper documents is critical. Comments extracted from Mr. Pistole’s statement continue to be relevant today:

‘‘One of the biggest challenges facing law enforcement when it comes to financial records analysis is the unavailability of financial records in electronic format . . .. Future law enforcement investigations would be significantly enhanced if financial institutions were to develop and adopt standards of best

practices for the storage and production of financial records in electronic format.

Countless hours and resources on the part of private industry and the government could be saved if these records were stored and produced in a format that

eliminated the need for investigators to reinput or type the information back

into financial analysis programs . . .. However, as long as relevant records remain in paper form whether held by the financial institution or the government,

investigators are impeded in their timely dissemination and analysis. This can

have an impact on our preventative efforts.’’

I encourage the Committee to address this issue in greater depth with investigative agencies and the financial sector. This is one of those areas where a middle

ground needs to be better identified that best addresses the interests and concerns

of the two sides.

Timely and actionable information sharing initiatives are critically important keys

to succeeding in preventing terrorist attacks and diminishing their ability to raise

and move funds. There must be continued consistent communications, cooperation

and coordination in the interagency and business communities across all lines domestically, as well as internationally. All sectors must develop and maintain strong

working relationships. In certain instances, this will require establishment of a middle ground to address impediments. Through risk and vulnerability assessments, as

well as through other mechanisms, we must continue to identify emerging trends

and systemic vulnerabilities. Agencies and institutions must adapt and implement

methodologies to counter such trends and vulnerabilities. A final thought is that

regular candid operational assessments should be performed in order to sustain the

level of scrutiny necessary to disrupt and prevent terrorist activities, and to ensure

the most forward thinking deterrent methodologies are developed and effectively

employed.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, Ph.D.

CHAIR OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT, AND

PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, RICE UNIVERSITY—HOUSTON, TX

JULY 13, 2005

Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Sarbanes, and distinguished Members of the

Committee, thank you for inviting me to speak to you today about the modes,

strengths and weaknesses of Islamic finance as practiced in the Middle East, narrowly defined.

The conclusion of my analysis, as presented below, is that there is no reason—

in theory—to suspect that Islamic finance would be particularly immune or particularly vulnerable to abuse by money launderers or terrorist financiers. In this regard,

it is important to recognize that Islamic finance utilizes relatively sophisticated financial methods—originally devised for regulatory arbitrage purposes—to synthesize modern financial practices from simple contracts such as leases and sales.

The emergence of those sophisticated regulatory arbitrage techniques in the United

States and other developed economies has prompted regulators and enforcement

agencies in those countries to increase the level of sophistication of their staff (hiring Ph.D. economists, MBA’s, ex-bankers, etc.).

Unfortunately, regulators and enforcement officials in the middle-east may possess significantly lower levels of sophistication than Islamic finance practitioners

who utilize state-of-the-art regulatory arbitrage techniques. Moreover, the Islamic finance industry has been—thus far—largely self-regulating. This suggests that

development of a comprehensive regulatory framework for Islamic finance, and

training regulators and enforcement officials in the region, should be priorities for

governments in the region, as well as international financial institutions and other

governments providing technical assistance.

U.S. Treasury Efforts to Understand Islamic Finance

Islamic finance has attracted increasing levels of interest and scrutiny in Washington recently, due to its phenomenal growth, but especially following the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001. Shortly after those attacks, then Secretary of Treasury O’Neill and Under Secretary Taylor visited Bahrain—one of the main centers

of Islamic finance in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. They met with various leading practitioners of Islamic finance in the area at Citibank’s facility in

Manama. Needless to say, the primary concern that prompted interest at the time

was fear that Islamic finance may invite disproportionate participation of terrorist

financiers, and/or exhibit particular vulnerabilities to abuse thereby.

Having learned some of the basics about Islamic financial practices and regulation

during the Secretary and Under Secretary’s visit to Bahrain, U.S. Treasury organized an ‘‘Islamic Finance 101’’ workshop in April 2002, to educate Government as

well as Capitol Hill staffers about this fast-growing industry. Also, Treasury Secretary Snow and then Under Secretary Taylor attended the Second International Islamic Finance Conference held in Dubai, September 2003, where they gained additional information and understanding about Islamic finance.

Following that second visit, Treasury decided to create a post of ‘‘Scholar-in-Residence on Islamic Finance’’, which I had the privilege to occupy June through December 2004. During my tenure at Treasury, I provided more than a dozen workshops

for staffers of U.S. Departments, Government agencies, regulators, and House staffers. In addition, we coordinated our staff efforts with those of World Bank and

International Monetary Fund staffers, the latter having simultaneously and independently increased their involvement in Islamic finance. The interest of International Financial Institutions in Islamic finance aims—in part—to ensure the

application of best practices in anti-money laundering and combating the financing

of terrorism. Those efforts also aim to integrate Islamic finance within a regulatory

framework that ensures systemic stability and economic efficiency at national, regional, and global levels.

In the remainder of this written statement, I shall describe briefly the roots of

Islamic finance, its current modes of operation in the Middle East, and its emerging

regulatory framework in the region. Before I proceed, I need to highlight two limitations of my testimony before you:

1. I cannot quote any accurate figures regarding the size of this industry, or its

rate of growth, mainly due to the lack of official and/or credible statistics from

reliable and objective sources. Recent media reports quoted British Financial

Services Authority estimates of assets under management in Islamic finance in

the range of US$200 to US$500 billion. Other semi-official statements by GCC

officials suggested that ‘‘Islamic’’ deposits account for 10 percent to 20 percent

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of total deposits in those countries. However, with Islamic banking being practiced by dedicated Islamic banks as well as conventional banks, and with no official and publicly available data, one cannot rely excessively on those guesstimates.

2. I recognize that one of your objectives for this hearing is to obtain a better

understanding of the implications of Islamic financial modes of operation and

regulatory framework for efforts to combat money-laundering and terrorist financing worldwide. I shall try my best to answer your questions in this regard.

However, I must admit that my understanding of this area, and any statements

that I may make about the relative vulnerability or immunity of Islamic financial institutions to abuse by money launderers and terrorist financiers, must

be—like myself—academic in nature.

Historical Roots of Islamic Finance

The Canonical Texts of Islam—echoing and elaborating on Biblical Texts—forbade

‘‘usury’’ under the name riba (equivalent to the Hebrew term ribit), classically interpreted as any interest charge on matured debts or loans. While some Islamic scholars have argued for more restrictive definitions of the forbidden riba, the vast majority of contemporary Muslim jurists and scholars have equated the classical term

‘‘riba’’ with ‘‘interest.’’ This equation has led to paradoxical statements about Islamic

finance being ‘‘interest-free.’’ In fact, Islamic finance replaces interest on loans and

pure debt instruments (for example bonds) with interest characterized as rent in

leases or price mark-up in sales.

As Islamic finance began to take shape in the mid 1970’s, jurists also considered

the more subtle prohibition of gharar (excessive risk or uncertainty), which impacts

modern forms of insurance, management tools for credit and interest rate (rate of

return) risks, derivatives, etc. Islamic finance as practiced today aims to mimic modern financial practices (banking products, insurance products, money and capital

market instruments, etc.) with variations on classical (medieval) contract forms that

were deemed devoid of forbidden riba and gharar.

The historical roots of Islamic finance date back to the 1950’s and 1960’s, and the

theoretical literature from that period continues to shape the industry’s rhetoric to

this day. Islamic finance was mainly envisioned by leaders of Islamist movements,

such as Abu al-’A‘la al-Mawdudi, Sayid Qutb, and M. Baqir al-Sadr. They created

a field of study known as ‘‘Islamic economics’’, which subsequently flourished particularly in Pakistani and Indian-Muslim areas, and coincided with political independence movements in various Muslim countries.

This literature gave rise to numerous hypotheses about how Islamic finance would

operate within an ‘‘Islamic economy’’, one envisioned to thrive in an ‘‘Islamic society’’, ostensibly arising in newly independent nations like Pakistan. The main paradigm that emerged suggested that all finance would be interest-free, based on the

sharing of profits and losses. In particular, bank-alternatives were envisioned to

function on an equity basis, like mutual funds. Instead of lending, Islamic banks

were envisioned to engage in equity participations with their clients, thus sharing

in their profits and losses. The bank’s funds would in turn be raised through equity

participation in the bank’s portfolios of investments, thus ‘‘depositors’’ would share

in the pooled profits or losses of the bank.

When the oil boom of the 1970’s made Islamic banking a reality, emerging Islamic

banks—following a series of reported losses on their financing—quickly learned to

abandon profit and loss sharing in favor of debt-based forms of financing. Thus, conventional bank loans were replaced in Islamic banks with receivables from credit

sales or leases. More recently, other assets of conventional banks (including corporate and sovereign bonds, asset backed securities, etc.) have been replicated

through Islamized structures. On the liabilities side, however, Islamic banks have

continued to maintain that ‘‘investment depositors’’ must share in the banks’ profits

and losses, and Islamic finance promoters have continued to speak of profit and loss

sharing generally as ‘‘the ideal Islamic form of financing.’’

Contemporary Methods of Islamic Finance

Contemporary Islamic finance emerged in the mid-1970’s, with funding from the

oil-rich GCC region, following the first oil price shock of 1973 (the industry has been

booming in recent years, mainly fueled by high oil prices). Among the first Islamic

financial institutions were Kuwait Finance House, Dubai Islamic Bank, and Faisal

Islamic Banks in Egypt and Sudan. The GCC region remains to-date the primary

financier of Islamic finance worldwide. In addition, countries such as Saudi Arabia,

which had originally resisted the growth of Islamic finance within its own borders,

have recently allowed the ‘‘Islamization’’ of some of their largest retail banks, including National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia.

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1 Indeed, when this practice was applied in the United States by United Bank of Kuwait, the

OCC interpreted both murabaha financing, and lease-based ijara financing (discussed below) as

forms of secured lending, see: OCC interpretive letters #806 of 1997 and #867 of 1999 at

www.occ.treas.gov.

Indeed, while some of the earliest Islamic banks were pioneered and funded by

Saudis (Prince Muhammad b. Faisal Al-Saud and Sheikh Saleh Kamel), those pioneers were not allowed to operate Islamic banks within Saudi Arabia. The first Islamic bank in Saudi Arabia (and the largest in the Middle East) was Al-Rajhi,

which was only allowed to operate on the condition of avoiding the use of ‘‘Islamic’’

in its name. In recent years, excess liquidity in Saudi Arabia (due to high oil prices

and repatriation of funds after September 11, 2001) was migrating to Bahrain and

Dubai—which established themselves as competing centers of Islamic banking in

the region, attracting to Islamic finance international financial providers such as

Citi, HSBC, Credit Suisse, UBS, etc. To retain those funds, Saudi Arabia finally allowed the current trend of Islamization of its banking system to emerge. Given contemporary Islamic banks’ abilities to emulate most operations of conventional banks,

it is likely that banking systems within the GCC will become mostly or completely

‘‘Islamized’’ within few years.

Financing Modes—Murabaha (Credit Sale with Mark-Up)

As mentioned in the previous section, Islamic banks started from their earliest

days in the late 1970’s to mimic the asset structures of conventional banks. The instrument of choice to replace loans was murabaha (cost plus) financing. Under this

arrangement, the bank would first purchase the property desired by its customer,

and then sell it on credit at a mark-up price determined by market interest rates

(typically tied to the London Inter-bank Offer Rate—LIBOR; the industry in GCC

is heavily staffed and influenced by London-trained bankers). Many innovations

were introduced in this practice to eliminate the bank’s risk exposure beyond normal banking risks (such as interest-rate, credit and liquidity risks). For instance,

Islamic banks were permitted to obtain binding promises by virtue of which customers were obliged to buy financed properties from the bank once the latter acquired them—thus eliminating nonbanking commercial risks.

In the early years of Islamic banking, this transaction was used mainly for financing the purchase of durable goods (for example automobiles, real estate, etc.), which

made it tantamount to an elaborate form of secured lending.1 However, the practice

was soon utilized for trade financing, within which it can be used easily to synthesize conventional loans. For instance, a customer can obtain financing for the

purchase of $10 million-worth of aluminum or diamonds (owing the bank, say, $11

million at a later date), and then sell the commodities to obtain cash—thus obtaining credit without formally violating the prohibition on interest-based loans.

Financing Modes—Tawarruq (Credit Sale at Markup Followed

by Spot Sale)

A retail banking variation on this multitrade synthetic-loan transaction has

emerged in recent years in GCC countries under the name of tawarruq (literally:

Monetization—of the traded commodity). Under this form, the bank commonly performs all the necessary transactions to synthesize a loan: Purchasing the commodity

in its own name, selling it to the customer on credit, and then selling it on behalf

of the customer for its cash price. Banks now have standing agreements with commodities dealers for repeated use of their commodities in this type of transaction,

thus reducing transaction costs through large trading volumes/frequencies, and

logistical economies of scale. In addition, agreements with dealers eliminate residual

market risks (associated with commodity prices) to which banks and customers may

be exposed in murabaha financing followed by independent cash-sale of the financed

property.

It is noteworthy that tawarruq was only deemed acceptable by a small minority

of Islamic jurists, most of whom later rejected its systematic use by Islamic banks.

Despite that general rejection by the majority of jurists, this practice has been one

of the fastest growing forms of retail Islamic finance in the GCC.

Financing Modes—Ijara (Operating Lease)

Responding to criticism of credit-sale financing as thinly veiled interest-based

lending, Islamic bankers slowly migrated to lease financing as a favorite alternative

form of secured lending. In some instances, operating lease forms adopted by Islamic financial institutions also provided tax benefits in western jurisdictions, where

they were eventually used to structure corporate leveraged buyouts for subsequent

private placement to GCC investors.

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More recently, the volume of lease-based Islamic financing has also increased due

to its potential for securitization. In this regard, the majority of Muslim jurists have

maintained that accounts receivable (for example from credit sales) represent debts,

which may not be securitized or traded in secondary markets. In contrast, they argued, lease receivables represent rent based on ownership of underlying physical assets, and thus may be traded in secondary markets. The most significant application

of this paradigm has been in the area of Islamic bond-alternatives.

Financing Methods—Lease-Based Long-Term Bonds

The Monetary Authority of Singapore recently estimated that the outstanding volume of Islamic sukuk (an Arabic term meaning certificates or bonds) worldwide

stood at US$30 billion at end 2004. Long-term bonds are obviously intended for

trading on secondary markets, and thus the structure of choice is lease-based. For

instance, the US$700 million issuance by the State of Qatar (Qatar Global Sukuk)

in December 2003 was structured as follows: A special purpose vehicle (SPV) was

created for the bond (sukuk) issuance. The SPV issued the certificates and used

their proceeds to buy some land in a medical complex from the State of Qatar. The

SPV then leased the land back to the State of Qatar, thus collecting principal and

interest in the form of rent, which was passed through to the certificate holders.

At lease-end, the SPV is obliged to give the land back as a gift to the State of Qatar.

In other structures, the SPV is forced to sell the land back to the lessee. Similar

bond structures have been used by the governments of Malaysia and Pakistan, the

German State of Saxony-Anhalt, Dubai Civil Aviation Authority, World Bank,

among other governments and corporations.

While such lease-based certificates may—in principle—have financial risks different from conventional bonds, the legal structures are typically constructed to

eliminate all such differences. Thus, in their justification of the A+ rating that they

granted the Qatar Global Sukuk discussed above, Standard & Poors’ analysts argued that the only relevant risk based on the sukuk’s legal structure is the sovereign credit risk of the State of Qatar. In other words, despite the complicated

structure, the end result is in fact replication of conventional bonds, on which the

issuer (corporate or sovereign) pays the same interest it would have paid on regular

bonds (or nearly the same, accounting for higher transaction costs).

Financing Methods—Forward-Sale-Based Short-Term Bills

For short-term (bill-type) government bonds, the lease-based structure imposes excessive transaction costs. Thus, Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) has pioneered the

issuance of sale-based bills known as sukuk al-salam (certificates of prepaid forward

sales). In those structures, BMA collects the proceeds of bill sales as prepayment

of a forward price for the purchase of some commodity (say aluminum). Ostensibly,

BMA promises to deliver aluminum at the bill maturity date. However, BMA also

promises to arrange for the aluminum to be sold on the sukuk-holders’ behalf at a

predetermined price (equal to the collected proceeds plus interest based on the appropriate LIBOR plus credit spread). Those bills have been traditionally held to

maturity—mostly by Islamic banks looking for permissible instruments to manage

liquidity. In its effort to develop a liquid Islamic money market, BMA has recently

announced the development of a repo (repurchase) facility structure that will allow

for liquid trading of those bills.

Islamic Mutual Funds

Perhaps the easiest segment of the Islamic finance industry to develop was that

of equity investment in mutual funds that shun certain types of stocks. Providers

of those funds exclude stocks of ‘‘sin industries’’ (casinos, breweries, etc.), as well

as other industries whose primary business is deemed un-Islamic (for example participating in certain types of genetic research potentially leading to human cloning).

In addition, stocks of companies that pay or earn excessive interest are excluded

through various screens (for example, debt to moving average of market capitalization, or receivables as a percentage of revenues, exceeding certain thresholds.)

Within the remaining universe of securities, conventional portfolio management

techniques are utilized. It is interesting to note that despite the high publicity received by those Islamic mutual funds and their index-provider licensors (for example, Dow Jones Islamic Indexes), the total volume of assets managed by those Islamic funds remains very small (compared, for instance, to the estimated US$1 trillion of Saudi funds being invested in U.S. assets). One traditional explanation of

this phenomenon has been that customers who prefer ‘‘Islamic’’ structures may have

relatively low levels of risk tolerance, and the bulk of high net worth individuals

and institutional investors (with more tolerance for financial risks) in the GCC are

too sophisticated to participate in costlier ‘‘Islamic finance’’ (for instance, the most

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famous Saudi investor, Prince Al-Walid b. Talal, is not known to have shown much

interest in the industry).

Islamic Investment Banking

More sophisticated investors with an appetite for Islamic finance often invest in

United States and other western equities through investment banking and private

equity boutiques. Those Islamic investment bankers often operate independent or

semi-independent branches in the home countries of target companies, and use ‘‘Islamic’’ forms of leverage (for example lease-based as discussed above) in their acquisitions. Their generated assets are then privately placed through their GCC-based

home institutions and networks of investment advisers.

Advanced Financial Structures

To address the high level of risk aversion among retail GCC Islamic investors, Islamic financial practitioners have developed complicated financial structures to replicate payoffs that normally require trading in derivative securities (which is not

permitted by the vast majority of Muslim jurists). For instance, Al-Rajhi and National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia both provided protected-principal index

participation structures to their clients in the early 2000’s.

Those structures involved a partner or adviser, who is typically a conventional investment bank, with no qualms about trading in derivative securities. The partner

or adviser provided investors full or partial protection of their principal (which is

tantamount to a put option), and was compensated with a portion of returns and/

or returns above a certain threshold (which are tantamount to call options). In some

instances, call options were also directly synthesized from earnest-money-like downpayment trades known as ‘urbun, and used in those protected-principal structures.

In all cases, providers highlighted the fact that the principal was not ‘‘guaranteed’’

by the provider, and thus positive returns did not represent forbidden riba.

With investment bankers pursuing fees from new structures, Islamic finance providers have most recently begun marketing ‘‘Islamic hedge fund’’ structures that

promise ‘‘absolute returns.’’ It has been interesting to note that some of the indirect

publicity associated with one of those ‘‘Islamic hedge funds’’ has been—purposefully

or otherwise—playing on the confusion caused by the misnomer ‘‘hedge fund’’ (translated literally as sanadiq al-tahawwut). In one web article and at two conferences

in the middle-east, I have witnessed two jurists associated with an ‘‘Islamic hedge

fund’’ actively providing examples of hedging, and arguing that ‘‘hedge funds’’ are

vehicles for investors to hedge their market exposure.

Insurance Alternatives

The majority of jurists deem conventional insurance contracts to be impermissible

due to two reasons. First, the high-quality debt instruments in which insurance

companies normally invest their premiums (for example bonds, mortgage backed securities, etc.) are deemed forbidden based on riba. Second, the insurance contract

itself is deemed by those jurists to be a form of gambling (since the insured pays

a premium, but knows not whether he will ever file a claim), and hence forbidden

based on the canonical prohibition of gharar.

To solve both problems, providers of a cooperative insurance form—known by the

Arabic name takaful—have emerged. To solve the first problem, premiums are invested in Islamic variations on bonds, asset-backed securities, etc., like the ones discussed earlier. To solve the second problem, the relationship between insurer and

insured is not viewed as a commutative financial contract (in which the uncertainty

associated with claims would deem the contract impermissible). Instead, the takaful

company is said to pay claims based on voluntary contribution (tabarru‘), as a form

of social cooperation. Paradoxically, none of those companies ostensibly providing cooperative insurance are in fact structured in a mutual corporate form. Instead, the

companies are commercially owned by stockholders, but offer binding promises to

policyholders that they will make ‘‘voluntary contributions’’ whenever valid claims

are filed by an insured party.

Investment Accountholders at Islamic Banks

A number of thorny issues regarding corporate governance have been raised by

the quasi-equity position of investment account holders at Islamic banks. The most

important issue, which has been under study in a working group of the recently created Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB, based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) relates to protection of those investment account holders (IAH’s). In this regard, IAH’s

lack the protections of fiduciary depositors (who are creditors and first claimants on

the Islamic bank’s assets, but earn no interest), but also lack the protections of

shareholders (who are equity holders represented on the bank’s board of directors).

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Paradoxically, the solution through mutual corporate structures (for example as

used by mutual savings banks and credit unions in the United States.) has not been

a subject of serious discussion in the industry, despite having been utilized in the

earliest days of Islamic finance in Pakistan in the 1950’s. One explanation is that

growth in Islamic finance has been driven by profitability of providing financial

products to a trapped market segment with minimal competition, while mutual

structures are oftentimes implemented in nonprofit settings.

Issues Related to Criminal Financing

Investment Accountholders’ Liability

For the purposes of this hearing, one must address two aspects of Islamic bank

liability structure that relate to potential criminal financial abuses, especially in the

aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks: (1) Are investment account

holders to be deemed owners of the Islamic financial institutions; and if so, how responsible can they be held for any criminal financial activities in which the institution may engage? (2) In case of dissolution of an Islamic bank (perhaps due to its

prior engagement in criminal financial activities), what is the seniority of investment accountholders’ claims on the bank?

The answer to the second question is a difficult one that has been the subject of

intense study at the Islamic Financial Services Board. It is clear that IAH’s theoretically have lower seniority than fiduciary depositors (who receive no return on

their deposits), but higher seniority claims relative to shareholders. However, since

management determines the magnitudes of profits or losses disbursed to the IAH’s,

and consequently the amounts assigned to the residual claimant shareholders, it is

not clear how liquidation would in fact take place. The Islamic Financial Services

Board and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) have attempted so far to reduce this problem by setting transparency standards for the mechanisms used to assign profit and loss distributions.

However, the final standards have yet to be set on issues of ownership, control, and

seniority of claims to Islamic bank assets.

The answer to the first question may seem at first to be rather straightforward:

Since investment accountholders lack operational control of the bank’s activities

(even if in some cases they can earmark their funds for investment in specific sectors), it would seem most unlikely that they can be held responsible for the bank’s

illegal or criminal activities. On the other hand, complications might arise from differences of views on what constitutes criminal financial activities. For instance, an

Islamic bank may be known to disburse charitable contributions on behalf of its customers in certain venues. In this regard, it is no secret that certain charitable organizations and destinations of funding thereof were (and in some cases may continue

to be) viewed differently by different governments and different bankers.

This issue is clearly relevant for all Islamic banks’ and Islamic financial providers’

customers (mutual funds may also disburse charitable zakat contribution on behalf

of investors). Moreover, it is also a valid concern for most Muslims whose charitable

contributions are disbursed by specialized institutions.

Solutions to this problem require addressing the thorny issue of harmonizing

standards of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing agencies worldwide, and

establishing clear criteria upon which Islamic charities and financial institutions

can rely in their future dealings. Significant convergence has occurred over those

issues, but some confusion continues to this day.

Relative Vulnerability to Abuse

It seems rather naı ̈ve to think that a group intent on committing criminal activities would favor Islamic financial venues, especially since they are likely to come

under closer scrutiny in that domain following the terrorist attacks of September

11. On the other hand, it is natural to ask whether the mechanics of Islamic finance

make it particularly vulnerable to abuse by money launderers and terrorist financiers. In this regard, one cannot escape the fact that regulatory-arbitrage methods

used in Islamic finance to camouflage interest and other factors deemed forbidden

by the industry (an activity that I have labeled Shari‘a-arbitrage) bear striking resemblance to methods used in criminal financial activity in recent years. The ‘‘asset

(or commodity)-based’’ nature of Islamic finance, which the industry advertises as

its main virtue, may in fact be viewed as a source of weakness, since multiple-hop

commodity and asset trading at losses or profits is a standard method used to hide

the source (in money laundering) or destination and transmission route of funds (in

terrorist financing).

Of course, one must remember that this is merely a historical accident. The most

sophisticated methods used by Islamic financiers to hide debt and by criminal financiers to hide sources or destinations of funds, as well as the routing of those

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transactions through offshore financial centers, are simply methods of the regulatory-arbitrage structured-finance revolution of the 1980’s, meant initially to capitalize on various tax and regulatory advantages. Due to the increased utilization

of those methods, bankers, regulators and law enforcement officials have grown

more sophisticated in analyzing such dealings, and uncovering the underlying objectives of their parties. With offshore centers also applying increasingly better prudential standards, the risk of abuse has been diminished greatly, though obviously not

eliminated.

In this regard, one must admit that regulators and law enforcement officials in

the Middle East are relatively unsophisticated in dealing with those complicated financial structures, at least compared to their western counterparts. In this regard,

technical assistance through direct intergovernment interactions, indirect private

sector initiatives of multinational banks, and involvement of the World Bank and

International Monetary Fund, have all contributed to increased awareness.

On the other hand, with the possible partial exception of Malaysia, I am not

aware of any country that has a comprehensive regulatory framework for Islamic financial institutions. Such a comprehensive framework would have to take into account peculiarities of Islamic finance: For example, assets and commodities used as

degrees of separation in purely financial dealings, resembling ‘‘layering’’ methods of

criminal financiers. Laws passed for regulation of Islamic banks in GCC (for example in Kuwait, Bahrain, etc.) appear to be simple augmentations of conventional

bank regulations, with the additional provisions of appointing a religious ‘‘Shari‘a

supervisory board’’, etc. However, conventional bank regulators in those countries

generally lack the sophistication required to understand complicated financial dealings fully.

There may not be major cause for concern, since central bankers in the GCC region, where the bulk of Islamic finance takes place, are among the most sophisticated in the Middle East. That being said, regulatory standards and talents in the

region continue to lag behind those in advanced countries, and Islamic finance does

exist in a number of countries with inferior regulatory infrastructures, and does operate across borders—seeking regulatory arbitrage opportunities.

My recommendation in the short-run would be to bring all Islamic finance under

the same standards applied to conventional financial practice through a simple conversion operation: Reduce all Islamic transactions for regulatory and enforcement

purposes to their conventional counterparts. This has been the approach, for instance, partially used in Turkey with relative success. For the longer-term, we need

to enhance and support efforts by AAOIFI and IFSB toward developing a set of

standards for Islamic finance that harmonize their accounting and regulatory methods with best accepted international standards.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, Islamic finance differs from conventional finance only superficially.

However, that superficiality entails degrees of separation through superfluous

trades and leases that make regulation and law enforcement more challenging.

There is no reason in theory to assume that Islamic finance would be more or less

vulnerable to abuse by criminal financiers, based on its utilization of those methods.

On the other hand, fighting criminal financing in the traditional banking sector of

the Middle East is already a significant challenge, due to limited human resources

and regulatory infrastructure. The extreme measures that can be (and are occasionally) taken to eliminate criminal financing in that region could also stifle legitimate

financial activity—in a region that is in desperate need for enhanced economic efficiency and job creation.

To the extent that Islamic finance utilizes more sophisticated financial structures,

the challenge faced by regulators and law enforcement agencies in the region is increased. The goal should be eliminating criminal activities, while fully allowing legitimate financial activity. toward that end, more coordination with regulators and

enforcement agencies, including technical assistance and involvement in development of standards, remains crucial at this time.

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RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SHELBY

FROM E. ANTHONY WAYNE

Q.1. Can you comment on the ramifications for the war on terrorism of the disparate approaches to enforcing regulations or

freezing the assets of individuals designated by the United States

but not by the United Nations?

A.1. Approaches to freezing terrorist assets in the United States

and in other countries differ somewhat, but the general goal of denying funding for terrorists is broadly shared. Many prominent financial institutions worldwide, including several in the Middle

East, vet customers and transactions by using both the UNSC 1267

Sanctions Committee and OFAC lists. While using both lists may

not be required by host government regulation, it has the practical

impact of extending the reach of U.S. designations far beyond U.S.

borders. Moreover, the European Union (EU) and the United

States continually work together to expand cross-coverage on the

EU Financial Sanctions and OFAC lists. In general, there are some

variations on both lists, but this is the result of differences in authorities, and not ethnic or religious biases.

In addition, United Nations Member States have obligations to

freeze terrorist assets that go further than those of the United

Nations 1267 Sanctions Committee list, as it is limited to those associated with the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or Osama bin Laden. UNSC

Resolution 1373 requires Member States to ‘‘Freeze without delay

funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons

who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in

or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or

controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and

entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and

entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned

or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated

persons and entities.’’ However, UNSC Resolution 1373 does not

have a mechanism for listing specific names and thereby creating

an international obligation to freeze assets belonging to specific individuals and entities. The OFAC list also includes terrorists and

their supporters not associated with Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda,

or the Taliban, thereby underscoring our commitment to put an

end to the financing of terrorism in line with the obligations of

UNSC Resolution 1373.

In August 2005, the United Nations Security Council adopted

UNSC Resolution 1617, which improves the international community’s efforts to combat terrorism by more clearly identifying those

who may be listed by the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee. It also

extends the mandate of the Analysis and Monitoring Team by

assisting the United Nations Security Council to oversee the implementation of these sanctions originally imposed by UNSC Resolution 1267 and successor resolutions. The United States worked

closely with other members of the United Nations Security Council

in the drafting of UNSC Resolution 1617, which passed unanimously. The UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee continues to update

the consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with the

Taliban, Osama bin Laden, or Al Qaeda.

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Q.2. Have improvements in the Saudi financial and law enforcement communities improved to the point where senior members of

the world’s deadliest terrorist organization can no longer apply for

and receive credit cards?

A.2. Since the May 2003 terrorist bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has dramatically strengthened its efforts to combat terrorism

and the financing of terrorism, including more rigorous banking

regulations, thus making it more difficult for terrorists to obtain

access to credit cards and other financial services. At the same

time, United States-Saudi counter-terrorism cooperation has increased to an unprecedented level, particularly in financial regulation and law enforcement. The United States and Saudi Arabian

Governments established a Joint Task Force on Terrorism Finance

(JTFTF) in Saudi Arabia in August 2003. The task force is mainly

composed of FBI officials with representation from the Internal

Revenue Service (IRS).

The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the Saudi Arabian

Central Bank, established a counter-terrorism finance program, including enhanced due diligence and ‘‘know your customer’’ policies,

which is enforced throughout the Kingdom. In August 2003, the

Saudi Arabian Government adopted a law making money laundering and terrorist financing criminal offenses. To further enhance

the countering of terrorism finance, the Saudi Arabian Government

recently established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Once the

FIU meets Egmont standards, Saudi Arabian FlU officials plan to

apply for membership to the Egmont Group of FIU’s.

Since 2003, the FBI provided training for Saudi Arabian law enforcement officials to assist them in combating more effectively the

financing of terrorism and money laundering. While efforts to improve the implementation of the Saudi Arabian counter-terrorist financing and anti-money laundering regimes need to continue, the

results the Saudi Arabian Government shows in these areas will be

important indicators of its commitment to deprive terrorists of access to financial services in the Kingdom.

Q.3. Secretary Levey, Secretary Wayne, a lot has been made of the

conflict diamond story. Can you tell us if representatives of

Hezballah or Al Qaeda were ever present in West Africa and engaged in any way with the diamond, precious metal, or other commodity business? To your knowledge, has Hezballah or Al Qaeda

ever used diamonds, precious metals, or other commodities as a vehicle to move money out of the formal financial sector and into a

less obvious medium of exchange?

A.3. Hezballah continues to engage in fundraising activities, particularly in West Africa. We have found no evidence to confirm allegations that Al Qaeda engaged in trade in diamonds to finance

terrorist operations. The September 11 Commission’s Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph concluded that there is some evidence

that specific Al Qaeda operatives may have traded in precious

stones, but it cannot be extrapolated from the evidence that Al

Qaeda has funded itself in that manner. We are continuing to coordinate with other agencies to monitor these allegations.

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RESPOSNE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SHELBY

FROM NANCY POWELL

Q.1. Organized crime is a factor in money laundering in places like

Dubai and Israel. Yet, it does not receive much attention, and information on organized crime groups, particularly the Russian and

Indian organizations operating in Dubai, has been difficult to come

by. What is the known extent of organized crime in the Middle

East and how much of a factor is it in money laundering? Is there

a nexus between organized criminal activity and terrorism?

A.1. United States Government analysts believe that criminal organizations with international networks centered in Turkey, Pakistan, India, the United Arab Emirates, and Cyprus operate within

a centuries-old commercial tradition of moving contraband merchandise through the South Asia, Middle East, and Eastern Mediterranean regions. These groups use major commercial centers—

such as Istanbul and Dubai—to ship their illicit gains to and from

Europe and to launder their illicit proceeds both through formal

and informal financial sectors. The analysts agree that the extent

of organized crime activity in the region is increasing, although the

exact dimension is not known.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Israel has been a significant operating area for Russian criminal organizations. Prior to the

passage of an anti-money laundering law in 2000, strict bank secrecy laws made Israel a money-laundering haven. According to

Israeli police sources, organized crime groups have invested some

$4.5 billion in Israel since the 1990’s. A number of U.S. Government analysts have pointed to growing ties between some terrorist

groups and organized crime syndicates. Dawood Ibrahim, whom the

U.S. Treasury placed on its terrorism list in 2003, has pursued

dual careers as both a crime lord and terrorist leader.

Q.2. Secretary Wayne, Ambassador Powell: Pakistan has recently

strengthened its anti-money laundering regime through the passage of longer prison sentences if convicted. The most recent International Narcotics Control Strategy Report is critical of Pakistan’s

failure to have an effective anti-money laundering statutory regime

in place despite its role in the trans-shipment of narcotics from Afghanistan.

In your observation, will the recently announced actions represent a significant improvement in Pakistan’s approach to combating money laundering and terrorist financing? Is the will there,

in the first place, on the part of the Pakistanis? What is the status

of Pakistan’s financial intelligence unit?

A.2. There is significant political will at the highest level of the

Government of Pakistan to combat crime, corruption, and terrorism

and to reform Pakistan’s financial sector.

Pakistan’s draft anti-money laundering law was approved by the

Cabinet and sent to the Parliament. However, the draft law has serious deficiencies and loopholes. For example, money laundering

itself is not an autonomous crime and can only be brought forth if

the defendant has been convicted of a predicate crime.

The draft mandates the creation of a Financial Intelligence Unit

(FIU), but only financial institutions are required to report suspicious transactions. Non-financial institutions, professions, and

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businesses such as legal and accounting firms and money remittance businesses, are excluded from reporting requirements.

Terrorist financing is not explicitly mentioned in the draft law;

nor is it an autonomous crime in Pakistan. Pakistan is not a party

to the 1999 UN Convention against the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. We will continue to request that the Government

of Pakistan criminalize the financing of terrorism and become a

party to all relevant United Nations terrorist-related conventions

and resolutions, and we will continue to offer advice and assistance

to the Government of Pakistan in order to bring its anti-money

laundering law into compliance with international standards.

Q.3. Ambassador Powell, you are now here in your capacity as acting assistant secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. I would be remiss, however, were to ignore your recent

history as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan.

As you know, the relationship of some in the Pakistani InterServices Intelligence Agency to the Taliban is extremely close.

While President Musharaff has proven a committed ally in the war

on terrorism, and has recognized problems with the ISI relationship to the Taliban, are there continuing problems in working with

the ISI in combating the Taliban and Al Qaeda allies?

A.3. Since my service in Pakistan ended approximately 1 year ago,

I am not in a position to respond to the issues raised in the question. I would refer you to the Department’s Bureau of South Asian

Affairs.

Q.4. The countries of the Gulf Cooperating Council, known as the

GCC region, are the primary financiers of Islamic finance worldwide. In that connection, it seems likely, as Dr. El-Gamal will soon

point out on the next panel, that the banking systems within the

GCC will become mostly or completely ‘‘Islam-ized’’ within a few

years. This is a thorny issue to the extent that a number of countries, even non-GCC countries, may not have the technical sophistication to enforce strong anti-money and terrorist finance programs.

The questions coming to my mind are: What are your individual

assessments of the capability of the GCC regulatory and enforcement authorities, generally, to effectively manage the problems of

money laundering and terrorist financing? Which of your agencies

have sufficiently trained personnel in the art of Islamic financing

to render regulatory and enforcement assistance to nations practicing this form of finance? Which of your agencies will actually be

involved in providing assistance to the GCC, and any other country

that may request it? Do we need more than one agency involved

in extending this assistance?

A.4. The capabilities of the GCC countries to counter money laundering and terrorist financing have improved substantially since

September 11. Bahrain and the UAE have the most comprehensive

anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes in

the GCC. Bahrain and the UAE played key roles in establishing

the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and

Bahrain hosts its Secretariat. As of September 2005, three countries—Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, aided by United States assistance—have Financial Intelligence Units that belong to the Egmont

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Group, and three other GCCC countries are working to establish

FIU’s that meet the Egmont Group’s standards for membership.

All GCC countries have criminalized money laundering beyond

drugs and all are taking steps to better monitor and control charities.

However, only three GCC members—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and

the UAE—have criminalized terrorist financing.

Bahrain is the leader in the Gulf in regulating and monitoring

Islamic banking. Through its Monetary Agency, Bahrain endeavors

to establish the same strict monitoring system for its 28 Islamic

banks as it employs with non-Islamic banks. Bahrain is home to

the Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions that sets standards for accounting, auditing, and transparency for Islamic financial institutions throughout the region. As

a demonstration of its leadership in this rapidly expanding area,

Bahrain hosted the first international Islamic financial conference

in May of this year.

All Islamic banks throughout the world, including the growing

number within the United States, also come under the domain of

a Shariah Advisory Board of Islamic Scholars.

The Advisory Board reviews Islamic banks’ investments to ensure that these banks are operating in consort with Shariah law.

Given the uneven quality of regulation for non-Islamic banks

throughout the Gulf region, it is reasonable to assume that regulation of the Islamic banks is also uneven.

The rapid expansion of Islamic banking and financing globally,

including in the United States, requires adherence to international

standards regarding prudential supervision of Islamic banks and

their adherence to international standards regarding anti-money

laundering and terrorist financing. While the U.S. Government has

few experts in Islamic banking, we have many experts in prudential supervision and adherence to money laundering and terrorist

financing standards. These experts have provided advice globally

for several decades. In an effort to assist Islamic banking and financial institutions in their compliance with international standards, a team of banking and financial service regulators from the

Federal Reserve and Department of the Treasury’s Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency could assist in advising in prudential

supervision and compliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist financing standards.

The Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement

Network (FinCEN) could assist in the establishment of Financial

Intelligence Units in those Gulf countries that do not have them,

as well as instruct Islamic banks and financial institutions how to

report suspicious transactions to existing FIU’s. Another Treasury

expert could offer advice on adherence to international money laundering and terrorist financing standards.

A Justice attorney could advise on the drafting of any required

laws and regulations.

We will contact both Bahrain and Malaysia requesting that they

host a weeklong seminar for United States Government experts.

The seminar would discuss Islamic banking/financing and international standards.

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After this seminar, the United States team and the Islamic experts could jointly provide training to Gulf and North Africa countries that requested such training.

Q.5. The Department of State’s ‘‘International Narcotics Control

Strategy Report’’ (INCSR) released in March 2005, was critical of

both Pakistan’s failure to have an effective anti-money laundering

(AML) regime and its role in the transshipment of narcotics from

Afghanistan. Recently, however, Pakistan has announced measures

to strengthen its AML regime, the imposition of longer prison sentences among these measures.

Would you please identify the proposed AML measures and explain how close those measures are to being enacted? In your observation, will the measures represent a significant improvement

in Pakistan’s approach to combat money laundering and terrorist

financing? Is the political and national will present, in the first

place, on the part of the Pakistani? Finally, please provide an update on the status of Pakistan’s Financial Intelligence Unit.

A.5. There is significant political will at the highest level of the

Government of Pakistan to combat crime, corruption, and terrorism

and to reform Pakistan’s financial sector. Pakistan’s draft antimoney laundering law was approved by the Cabinet and sent to the

Parliament. However, in spite of our repeated efforts to assist the

Government of Pakistan in constructing a law that comports with

international standards, the draft has serious deficiencies. For example, money laundering itself is not an autonomous crime and

can only be brought forth if the defendant has been convicted of a

predicate crime. The draft mandates the creation of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), but only financial institutions are required to

report suspicious transactions. Non-financial institutions, professions, and businesses such as legal and accounting firms and

money remittance businesses, are excluded from reporting requirements.

Terrorist financing is not explicitly mentioned in the draft law;

nor is it an autonomous crime in Pakistan. Pakistan is not a party

to the 1999 UN Convention against the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. We will continue to request that the Government

of Pakistan criminalize the financing of terrorism and become a

party to all relevant United Nations terrorist-related conventions

and resolutions, and we will continue to offer assistance to the Government of Pakistan so that its anti-money laundering law comports with international standards.