J-A16030-19

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOEL REYNALDO HERNANDEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1973 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 29, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0003690-2018

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JULY 19, 2019

Joel Hernandez (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury convicted him of criminal trespass and simple assault.1 

Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts as follows:

On August 4, 2018, Joel Hernandez (“Appellant”) knocked on 

the door of 420 Maple Street, Reading, PA. Appellant used to live 

in 420 Maple Street with Yolanda Stevenson (“Yolanda”) but 

moved out from the house at least three months prior to 

this offense. Yolanda, the resident of 420 Maple Street, testified

that she was awakened by the knock and that she opened the 

door for [] Appellant. Yolanda did not want to be bothered by 

Appellant, who she shared a one year old child with, and stated 

that she partially closed the door. Appellant then entered 420 

Maple Street and got into [a] physical altercation with Yolanda 

which resulted in swelling in Yolanda’s head. After the incident 

was called in [to police], Officer Christopher Bucklin arrived at the 

scene. Appellant was sitting on a curb in front of 420 Maple Street 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3503(a)(1)(i) and 2701(a)(1).
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and when he saw Officer Bucklin, he placed his hands over his 

head and said “it was me, you can take me away.” After some 

inquiry, Officer Bucklin handcuffed [] Appellant and advised 

[Appellant] of [his] Miranda [rights]. When Officer Bucklin asked 

if Appellant was willing to tell his side of the story, Appellant told 

the officer that he kicked the door and entered 420 Maple 

Street and punched Yolanda.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/15/19, at 1-2 (citations to notes of testimony omitted, 

emphasis added).

Appellant was criminally charged as a result of the incident. The case 

proceeded to trial, and on October 29, 2018, a jury found Appellant guilty of 

the aforementioned crimes. The same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate 30 to 60 months of incarceration.

The trial court summarized the procedural history that followed:

On November 8, 2018, Appellant, through his counsel, filed a 

post-sentence motion and in response, on November 13, 2018, 

this [c]ourt denied the motion. On December 3, 2018, Appellant 

filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court and in response, on 

December 4, 2018, this [c]ourt ordered that a Concise Statement 

of Errors be filed and served pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure 1925(b). 

On December 21, 2018, Appellant, through counsel, filed a 

Concise Statement of Errors.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/15/19, at 1.

On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for review:

Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence 

to support a verdict of Criminal Trespass where the 

Commonwealth failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

that [Appellant] was not on the lease to the residence, or was 

otherwise not licensed or privileged to enter. 

Appellant’s Brief at 5.
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Appellant argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence to prove his criminal trespass conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Appellant specifically claims that because his name was on the lease of the 

victim’s residence and he was licensed to be there — and the Commonwealth 

failed to show that “some intervening event” terminated his license or privilege 

to enter the residence — the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction 

of criminal trespass. See Appellant’s Brief at 10.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our standard of 

review is well-settled:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency 

claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it 

establishes each material element of the crime charged and the 

commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence 

establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial 

does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with 

the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the 

presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute 

our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the 

evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a 

defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld.
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Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted). “As the ultimate finder of fact, the jury [is] free to believe 

some, all, or none of the Commonwealth’s evidence. The jury [is also] free 

to resolve any inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony in either 

party’s favor.” Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1078 (Pa. 2017).

Section 3503 of the Crimes Code defines criminal trespass:

A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or 

privileged to do so, he . . . gains entry by subterfuge or 

surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure or 

separately secured or occupied portion thereof[.] 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i). “[I]n order to prove that [a person] committed 

criminal trespass, the Commonwealth [must] prove that [a defendant] (1) 

knew he was not licensed or privileged to enter the [building,] and (2) that he 

entered the [building].” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 10 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. 

Super. 2010).

The Commonwealth may prove that a defendant is not licensed or 

privileged to enter a premises through circumstantial evidence. If the 

surrounding circumstances demonstrate that a defendant lacks permission to 

enter a building, “[t]he evidence available to the court enable[s] it to logically 

infer that [defendant] lacked license or privilege to enter the building . . . .”

Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 592 (Pa. 1991) (concluding that 

the prosecution offered compelling evidence of lack of privilege and license 

when the defendant kicked in the door for entry). Additionally, upon entry, a 
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defendant “must know [that] he is not privileged to enter the premises.” 

Commonwealth v. Quintua, 56 A.3d 399, 402 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Significantly, this Court has explained that the legal analyses of both 

criminal trespass and burglary convictions are analogous because “both 

require a finding that the actor lacked [a] license or privilege to enter the 

building or structure in question. Accordingly, case law interpreting the 

‘license or privilege’ element of burglary is relevant to our analysis of that 

same element of . . . criminal trespass.”2 Commonwealth v. Benito, 133 

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2 See § 3502 Burglary

(a) Offense defined. — A person commits the offense of burglary if, with 

the intent to commit a crime therein, the person:

(1) (i) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 

occupied portion thereof, that is adapted for overnight accommodations in 

which at the time of the offense any person is present and the person 

commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime therein;

(ii) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 

occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight accommodations in 

which at the time of the offense any person is present;

(2) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 

occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight accommodations in 

which at the time of the offense no person is present;

(3) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 

occupied portion thereof that is not adapted for overnight accommodations 

in which at the time of the offense any person is present; or

(4) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 

occupied portion thereof that is not adapted for overnight accommodations 

in which at the time of the offense no person is present.

(b) Defense. — It is a defense to prosecution for burglary if any of the 

following exists at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) The building or structure was abandoned.

(2) The premises are open to the public.

(3) The actor is licensed or privileged to enter. (Emphasis added).
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A.3d 333, 335 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 141 

A.3d 477 (Pa. 2016).

Evidence of “lack of privilege – and [a defendant’s] knowledge thereof 

– is evidenced by [a defendant’s actions].” Id. at 336. A defendant’s use of 

force to gain entry is probative that the defendant knew he did not have a 

license or privilege to enter. Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 

118 (Pa. 2001) (affirming burglary conviction where defendant, who was the 

victim’s estranged husband, kicked in the victim’s door to gain entry to the 

home); Benito, 133 A.3d at 336 (affirming criminal trespass conviction where 

defendant, the victim’s husband, also kicked in the door of the victim’s 

residence, evincing his knowledge that he lacked the privilege to enter).

In Benito, the wife was the only leaseholder on the apartment where 

she and her husband resided. 133 A.3d at 334. When the relationship 

deteriorated and the husband left the home, the wife told him not to return

and changed the locks. Id. Nonetheless, the husband returned to the 

apartment, knocked down the door, and forced his way into the apartment. 

Id. Under these facts, we found that the actions of the wife revoked the 

privilege of the husband, and on this basis affirmed the husband’s conviction 

of criminal trespass. Id. at 336. This Court expressly applied the definition 

of privilege in the context of a burglary conviction to affirm the criminal 

trespass conviction, stating:
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[A] person is privileged . . . if he may naturally be expected to be 

on the premises often and in the natural course of his duties or 

habits. . . . Further, a person who is privileged may still commit 

burglary if he would not reasonably be expected to be present[.] 

Benito, 133 A.3d at 335 (footnote and citations omitted).

We further opined:

. . . the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, supports the 

verdict in this matter. Benito’s privilege to be present in the 

apartment flowed directly from the license granted to him by [his 

wife]. Once [the wife] repeatedly made it clear to Benito that she 

did not want him on the premises, his privilege was revoked. This 

lack of privilege—and Benito’s knowledge thereof—is evidenced by 

the fact that he resorted to kicking in the door to gain entry. See

[Commonwealth v.] Stallworth, 781 A.2d [110,] 118 [(Pa. 

2001)](citing eyewitness testimony that defendant—victim’s 

estranged husband—had kicked victim’s door down as evidence 

tending to establish “lack of privilege or license” element of crime 

of burglary). 

Id. at 336.

Instantly, although Appellant’s name was on the lease of the home,

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evidence supports the inference that “he would not reasonably be expected to 

be present.” Id. at 335. Appellant had not lived at the home for more than 

three months, and despite being on the lease and having lived at the home, 

he first attempted to gain entry by knocking. N.T., 10/29/18, at 39, 43. 

Arguably, by knocking, Appellant evinced his awareness that he was not 

privileged to enter. After opening the door, the victim partially closed it

because she “didn’t want to be bothered.” Id. at 39-40, 43. Appellant then

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3 We note that Appellant never introduced the lease into evidence. See 

generally, N.T., 10/29/18, 1-103.
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forced his way into the home, punched the victim, and then left the home and 

sat outside on the curb. Id. at 41, 45, 52, 98. When Officer Bucklin arrived, 

Appellant walked toward the officer, placed his hands over his head and said, 

“It was me. You can take me away.” Id. at 52, 54. After being advised of his 

Miranda rights, Appellant stated that he “kicked in the door to my child’s

mother’s place[.]” Id. at 54 (emphasis added). Notably, Appellant 

described the home as “my child’s mother’s place.” Also, like the husband in 

Benito, Appellant demonstrated knowledge that he lacked the privilege to 

enter “by the fact that he resorted to kicking in the door to gain entry.” 

Benito, 133 A.3d at 336. On this record, we conclude that the jury could 

infer that Appellant “lacked [a] license or privilege to enter” the home. See 

McBride, 595 A.2d at 592.

While Appellant also argues that an intervening formal event is 

necessary to demonstrate the revocation of privilege to enter the home, we 

are not persuaded. An intervening formal event can illustrate the termination 

of a license or privilege. See Commonwealth v. Majeed, 694 A.2d 336 (Pa. 

1997) (holding that appellant lost his license to enter the house as a result of 

a PFA against him). However, an intervening event is not necessary to 

terminate a license to enter a residence because an individual can rescind 

their right by leaving. Commonwealth v. Baker, 201 A.3d 791, 798-99 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (“Appellant had previously been given a key . . . [but the]

change in circumstances and the subsequent unambiguous communication 
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from the leaseholder establishe[d] sufficient evidence . . . .”); Benito, 133 

A.3d 333; Commonwealth v. Woods, 638 A.2d 1013 (Pa. Super. 1994) 

(finding that appellant and his wife had been living apart and his use of force 

to gain entry evidenced that he was not licensed or privileged to enter the 

home). Mindful of the foregoing, we find Appellant’s sufficiency argument to 

lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/19/2019