PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN C. STANLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LIEUTENANT HEJIRIKA; CORRECTIONAL

OFFICER JOHNSON; CORRECTIONAL

OFFICER MCMILLEN; SERGEANT

KEENAN; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

DEMBY,

Defendants-Appellants, No. 97-6214

and

A. ROBINSON, Sergeant; LIEUTENANT

FREEMAN; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

BELLEMY; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

GUY; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JANAES;

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JENNIFER;

VICTOR JARAMILLO,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

James E. Kenkel, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-94-1454-S)

Argued: October 27, 1997

Decided: January 21, 1998

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Wilkins and Judge Williams joined.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Glenn William Bell, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Timothy Joseph Sullivan, SULLIVAN & SULLIVAN, College Park, Maryland, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

The magistrate judge in this case found that correctional officers

had used unconstitutionally excessive force in subduing the leader of

a group of rebellious prisoners in the context of a prison disturbance

and, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, awarded the prisoner $1,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000 in punitive damages. On the officers'

appeal, we reverse, concluding as a matter of law that in the context

of quelling a prison disturbance or rebellion, (1) the evidence was

insufficient to establish the requisite subjective culpability of the correctional officers, and (2) the correctional officers' conduct, taken in

context, did not exceed an objectively de minimis threshold for excessive force.

I

On January 6, 1994, the inmates in the A-Wing Segregation Tier

of the Maryland House of Correction-Annex in Jessup, Maryland,

rebelled after a correctional officer refused an inmate request for recreation. The A-Wing Segregation Tier is a special tier reserved for

inmates who have committed disciplinary violations. The inmates

began setting fires by dropping burning papers outside their cells.

They set off the sprinkler systems and stopped up their toilets in order

to flood the tier, and they threw objects from their cells. It took correctional officers five hours to restore order.

To quell the disturbance, Lt. Hejirika, the building shift supervisor,

assembled an "extraction team" of eight correctional officers. The

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team planned to remove the ringleaders of the disturbance from their

cells one at a time, search them, remove all their personal property

from the cells, and then return them to their cells. The activities of the

extraction team were to be, and in fact were, videotaped.

The officers compiled a list identifying seven inmates as the ringleaders or "primary troublemakers" of the disturbance. Steven Stanley

was first on the list. He was also the oldest inmate in the tier and was

looked up to by the others. Stanley has been an inmate at the Maryland House of Correction since 1979, serving a 20-year sentence for

armed robbery. During the period of his incarceration, Stanley has

had a history of unruly behavior as an inmate, having been cited on

various occasions for setting fires, creating floods, throwing objects,

and threatening inmates and correctional officers. He has also been

involved in at least one "takeover" of the tier. Indeed, during the

events involved in this case, Stanley was housed in the A-Wing

because of a disciplinary infraction.

As planned, the extraction team removed all seven"primary troublemakers" from their cells, searched the cells, removed all personal

belongings, and then returned the inmates to their cells. During the

process, the officers discovered at least one "shank," a homemade

knife. Two of the ringleaders were particularly uncooperative, and the

officers found it necessary to use pepper spray to subdue them.

Although Stanley's extraction proceeded without physical incident, he

was uncooperative and expressed anger toward the officers, warning

them, "Don't be grabbing on me," and threatening to "stab one of

these dumb bitches." According to the officers, when Stanley continued to encourage inmates to set fires and began"forcefully hitting"

his cell door, Major Waverly Ray, the shift commander, ordered that

Stanley be removed from his cell a second time and be placed in an

isolation cell. Before moving Stanley, the officers placed steel handcuffs on him. They then escorted him to the isolation cell where they

intended to remove the steel handcuffs and replace them with flexible

plastic handcuffs which were more secure. Stanley continued his verbal abuse, stating that he would "f--k this whole goddamn jail up" and

telling the officers that he would "f--k one of you bitches up."

The videotape shows two officers escorting Stanley to the bottom

tier where the isolation cell is located, but loses sight of him as they

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turn into the cell. Stanley testified that during this brief instant when

he was not on camera,

[Officer] Johnson took and mashed my head on the side of

the door. . . . I was telling [the officers] that I don't care

nothing about them grabbing on me, and he pushed me in

the back of the head, and my face hit the side of the wall

going in to the door.

The officers testified that after Stanley was taken into the cell and

braced against the wall to change his cuffs, he began to resist. At that

point, the tape shows an officer pushing Stanley firmly against the

wall with his forearm at the back of Stanley's neck. It shows other

officers then taking Stanley down to the ground, face down, and leaning on top of him to subdue him, while one of the officers ties the

"flexicuffs" around Stanley's wrists behind his back. Stanley is heard

complaining that he is being squashed and that he feels as if his arm

is being broken. The tape shows the other officers standing around

without much activity and Lt. Hejirika taking notes. Once the flexicuffs were in place and leg irons were placed on Stanley, he was

taken for medical treatment. The videotape shows Stanley complaining of pain about his mouth and arm, but it also shows his refusal to

accept any medical treatment. After that visit Stanley was returned to

the isolation cell.

It was during the period depicted in the videotape-- i.e., when

Stanley was first being taken to the isolation cell and having his cuffs

changed -- that Stanley claims the correctional officers used excessive force. In addition to what the videotape showed, Stanley

explained how he was being hurt. The magistrate judge characterized

Stanley's testimony as follows:

The plaintiff testified that at this point in the isolation confinement cell, his head was forcefully held against the wall

by defendant Johnson. He testified that defendant Johnson

hit him in the base of the skull, punched him in the face,

kneed him repeatedly while he was on the ground and also

choked him. He further testified that defendant McMill[e]n

twisted his arm while holding him.

 4
 Plaintiff also testified that defendant Demby twisted his

fingers back in order to obtain a reflex of resistance; pushed

his legs to cause him to hit the cell floor; that defendant

Keenan kicked him in the face; that unidentified members

of the extraction team were choking him and kicking his

side, legs, and ankles.

All parties agree that Stanley suffered injuries as a result of the

incident, which the magistrate judge found to be"bruising of his right

arm, left jaw, left and right wrists and back, and a tooth which was

loosened."

On May 31, 1994, Stanley filed the complaint in this case, and it

was assigned, by consent of the parties, to a magistrate judge for trial.

Following trial, the magistrate judge found for Stanley, awarding him

$1,000 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering and $2,000

in punitive damages. In reaching this conclusion, the judge found that

the defendants were motivated by malice and acted in concert to

administer a beating to Stanley. The judge relied on the videotape

which he found "clearly shows all of the members of the team acting

in concert in surrounding plaintiff and positioning themselves in such

a way as to allow a controlled beating to be inflicted with minimal

visual exposure." He concluded that Stanley's injuries, "while not

severe," were not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes, basing

that conclusion on a comparison of Stanley's injuries with those sustained by the prisoner in Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1 (1992).

This appeal followed.

II

The correctional officers contend that, as a matter of law, the force

that they used and the injuries that Stanley sustained in the circumstances of this case did not cross the de minimis threshold for excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. They suggest that "in an

apparent philosophical disagreement with the day-to-day management

of maximum security prisons, the court, in finding these officers liable, wrongfully substituted its judgment for that of State correctional

officials." They argue that in the context of a"major disturbance . . .

on the segregation tier, including fires and flooding," it is reasonable

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to assume that correctional officers must use some force. They also

argue that the officers used only justifiable force to handcuff a resisting and kicking inmate. Indeed, they contend that"these injuries,

mostly bruises . . . corroborate the version of the occurrence testified

to by the correctional officers."

In addition to the officers' argument that their use of force was

objectively reasonable, the officers also contend that "there was not

a scintilla of evidence" submitted to support subjective bad faith that

they acted with malice and ill will for the purpose of causing harm.

They argue that the only evidence on which the magistrate judge

relied to make a finding of malice was the videotape, which they

claim shows the contrary.

Stanley accepts the statement of historical facts made by the officers in their brief but contends that the conclusions to be drawn from

them must be what the magistrate judge found because he was in the

best position to review the facts during the two-day hearing and that

his findings were supported by substantial evidence. Stanley's argument on appeal rests squarely on the magistrate judge's factual findings and legal conclusions, and he urges that they be affirmed for the

reasons given by the magistrate judge.

While we review the magistrate judge's application of law to the

facts de novo, we review his findings of fact for clear error. In reviewing for clear error, we do not substitute our own judgment for that of

the trial court unless we are "left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed." Miller v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 720

F.2d 356, 361 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). We have also noted, however, that

"the conviction of mistake may properly be based upon a conclusion

that, without regard to what the actual facts may be, the findings

under review were induced by an erroneous view of the controlling

legal standard or are not supported by substantial evidence." Brice v.

Virginia Beach Correctional Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 1995)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Eighth Amendment protects against the infliction of "cruel and

unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This protection,

enforced against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, pro-

 6
tects inmates against the application of excessive force by correctional officers. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986).

Not every unpleasant action taken by prison officials against inmates,

however, violates the Eighth Amendment. "After incarceration, only

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes . . . cruel

and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Id. at

319 (internal quotation marks omitted).

To prove a claim that prison officials violated his constitutional

rights through the excessive use of force, an inmate must satisfy two

requirements. First, he must satisfy a subjective requirement that the

force used by the corrections officers "inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering." Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1993).

In the context of a prison disturbance, this question "ultimately turns

on `whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose

of causing harm.'" Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21). When

evaluating evidence to determine whether it is legally sufficient to satisfy the subjective component, a court may allow an inmate's claim

to go to the jury only if it concludes that the evidence, viewed in a

light most favorable to the claimant, "will support a reliable inference

of wantonness in the infliction of pain." Id. at 322.

In addition to satisfying the subjective requirement, the inmate

must also satisfy an objective requirement; he must show that correctional officers' actions, taken contextually, were"objectively harmful

enough" to offend "contemporary standards of decency." Hudson, 503

U.S. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether

the objective component is satisfied, the factfinder must evaluate the

force applied and the seriousness of the resulting injury against the

need for the use of force and the context in which that need arose.

Thus, in Whitley, the Court found that in the context of quelling a

major prison disturbance, a correctional officer's use of force in

shooting an inmate in the leg was "part and parcel of a good-faith

effort to restore prison security" and did not violate the inmate's

Eighth Amendment rights. 475 U.S. at 326. On the other hand in

Hudson, in the context of a verbal argument, the Court found that

blows deliberately directed to the inmate to punish him, causing

bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, were suf-

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ficient to support an excessive force claim in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. See 503 U.S. at 10.

In recognition that the prison environment is a dangerous one for

correctional officers, prison administrators must be accorded "wideranging deference" to design and implement policies and practices

that in their judgment are necessary for the preservation of order and

security. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22. Thus, when prison security

measures are taken in response to an uprising or prison disturbance,

the courts cannot always expect a perfectly measured response. "The

infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure, therefore,

does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it

may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or

applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense." Id. at 319 (emphasis added). On the other

hand, when a prisoner is held and calmly beaten by two guards in

response to a verbal argument, the de minimis level is more easily

reached.

In short, for an inmate to prove an excessive force claim, he must

satisfy not only the subjective component that the correctional officers acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, but also the

objective component that his alleged injury was sufficiently serious

in relation to the need for force to establish constitutionally excessive

force. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).

III

We now turn to the question of whether the magistrate judge correctly addressed the subjective component of the Hudson test. In

assessing this component, the magistrate judge found:

[I]t is clear that the defendants were motivated by malice

and ill will in the application of force against plaintiff, either

in retaliation for plaintiff's participation in the disturbance

or his continued abusive and hostile language and verbal

provocations. The court does not substitute its judgment for

that of the prison officials the decision to move plaintiff to

the isolation cell, nor does the court question the decision to

replace the steel handcuffs with the flex-cuffs. The critical

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question is whether in effectuating those two decisions the

defendants intentionally hit, kicked, twisted fingers and

slammed plaintiff's head into the wall. The videotape does

not show plaintiff resisting and clearly shows some"blows"

being administered. The videotape alone fails to match the

identity of a particular officer to a particular"blow"; however, the videotape clearly shows all of the members of the

team acting in concert in surrounding plaintiff and positioning themselves in such a way as to allow a controlled beating to be inflicted with minimal visual exposure. Further,

the medical records corroborate the types of blows plaintiff

alleges were inflicted. On these facts plaintiff has met his

burden of proof on the subjective test of Whitley and

Hudson.

On this basis, the magistrate judge concluded that the extraction team

acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing

harm." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. In arriving at this conclusion, the

magistrate judge relied primarily on the videotape, which, we agree,

is sensible because it covers the entire incident in question.

We too have viewed the tape and thus have had the same opportunity as the magistrate judge had to evaluate this non-testimonial evidence. From our review, however, we find that the tape reveals no

evidence of malicious or sadistic conduct. To the contrary, we are

struck by the rational reaction and measured response of the correctional officers to Stanley's resistance and threats. We ordinarily show

substantial deference to the factfinder in evaluating testimony because

the factfinder has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and make credibility judgments that we cannot make. But in

this case we are viewing the same evidence that was viewed by the

magistrate judge and have the same opportunity to evaluate what was

seen. If such a review is not de novo, as is the case when we review

a summary judgment record, then at the least we are in a better position to conclude that substantial evidence does not support the magistrate judge's finding. See Brice, 58 F.3d at 106.

The videotape shows a group of officers escorting Stanley into the

isolation cell and, as he resists, pushing him up against the wall. One

officer has his forearm up against the back of Stanley's neck and is

 9
obviously applying force. In an effort to remove the metal handcuffs

and apply flexible ones, the officers then take Stanley to the ground

and place him face down. The tape shows several of the officers holding Stanley on the floor, lying or sitting on him to immobilize him

while one officer is attempting to tie his hands behind his back with

the flexible handcuffs. In attempting to tie the handcuffs, the officer

is obviously moving his hand, wrapping the flexible plastic strips

around Stanley's wrists. The other officers are merely standing

around observing while one officer is taking notes.

In viewing this same scene, the magistrate judge found that the videotape shows a number of blows being inflicted upon Stanley. We

could not find that evidence. While the tape displays a pulling motion

which seems more like the action required to wrap and tighten a plastic flexicuff than a punch, we saw only one possible stomping motion

by one of the officers. But the evidence was by no means clear and

is certainly not sufficient evidence to conclude that Stanley was

repeatedly beaten with blows that were sadistically and maliciously

inflicted for the purpose of causing harm. While it is apparent that

Stanley was being treated roughly, we simply could not see any evidence of wanton sadism. The officers used significant physical force

in subduing Stanley, but they also had objectively reasonable grounds

to believe that such force was necessary. They were quelling a disturbance and seeking to retain control of the prison and not punishing

an inmate for verbal abuse.

Our review of the evidence leaves us with the "definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed" in finding that the officers acted sadistically and maliciously for the sole purpose of causing

harm. Because the evidence is insufficient to leave us with "a reliable

inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain," we must rule as a

matter of law that the subjective component has not been satisfied.

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322.

IV

We are likewise persuaded that Stanley's claim fails as a matter of

law under the objective component of the Hudson test. Our inquiry

is whether the injury of which Stanley complains is significant

enough, when viewed in its factual context, to amount to a violation

 10
of his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, a right which

"draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that

mark the progress of a maturing society." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101

(1958) (plurality opinion)). It is established, however, that prison officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment whenever it appears in

retrospect that the infliction of pain during a security measure could

theoretically have been avoided. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.

In this case, the correctional officers were in the process of quelling

a disturbance in a section of the prison which housed inmates with

disciplinary problems. Inmates had been lighting fires, flooding the

halls, and throwing objects across the tier. The tension within the

prison was understandably high. In removing the ringleaders from

their cells, correctional officers had to use pepper spray to subdue

two. Stanley himself stated several times that he was going to "f--k

the whole goddamn jail up" and "f--k this jail up," statements which

he explained later were threats to set more fires. The evidence supports no suggestion that the correctional officers responded to this

uprising for any reason other than to bring order. And Stanley could

not reasonably have expected treatment on the same level as if he

were in a civilized conference with the warden. He was angry, highly

charged, threatening, resisting, and kicking. Furthermore, he threatened to stab a prison guard -- a threat that is not hollow in a prison

environment. Indeed, the extraction procedure followed in this case

recovered at least one shank.

In this context, we take care not to impose our own judgment as

to what might be necessary for that of prison officials. When the correctional officers were removing Stanley from his cell to an isolation

cell, they found it necessary to act cautiously and with force. Several

officers held him firmly against the wall, and one officer put his forearm behind Stanley's neck. In taking Stanley to the ground to change

his handcuffs, force was again necessary and was applied, both to

take him down and to hold him in place to overcome his kicking and

resistance. If a punch or a kick did occur during these events, we cannot conclude "in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or

applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. The Supreme Court

has instructed that "not every push or shove, even if it may later seem

 11
unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's

constitutional rights." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting Johnson v.

Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).

The magistrate judge found that Stanley sustained bruising, swelling, and a loosened tooth. While he acknowledged that the injuries

were not severe, he found them constitutionally significant when he

compared them to the injuries that were evaluated in Hudson, concluding on that basis that the injuries presented to him were not de

minimis. In Hudson, however, not only were the injuries more severe,

but they were inflicted in a context totally different from that presented in this case. The Supreme Court noted that after Hudson and a

prison guard had argued, the guard

placed Hudson in handcuffs and shackles, took the prisoner

out of his cell, and walked him toward the penitentiary's

"administrative lockdown" area. Hudson testified that, on

the way there, [the guard] punched Hudson in the mouth,

eyes, chest, and stomach while [another guard] held the

inmate in place and kicked and punched him from behind.

He further testified that Mezo, the supervisor on duty,

watched the beating but merely told the officers"not to have

too much fun."

503 U.S. at 4. Prior to this beating, there was no evidence that the

guard had been threatened with any physical injury. Indeed, while the

state took the position that the guard's actions were not only unauthorized but also isolated, the Court noted that the two guards who punished Hudson also "beat another prisoner shortly after they finished

with Hudson." Id. at 12. The injuries sustained by Hudson were

bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate which

was rendered unusable for several months. Id. at 4.

In urging us to find the force excessive in the case before us, Stanley argues that his injuries were similar to those presented in Hudson.

In doing so, he overlooks the fact that the injuries in Hudson were

inflicted deliberately to hurt, without justification, and as punishment

for a personal disagreement between a guard and a prisoner. That context is important, indeed essential, to determining whether force is

excessive. This becomes readily apparent when we compare the con-

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text in Hudson with that in Whitley. In Whitley, the inmate was shot

in the leg while officers were attempting to quell a major disturbance.

While the uprising was a serious one, the Court nonetheless held that

because the officers were seeking in good faith to establish order, the

evidence did not support a "reliable inference of wantonness in the

infliction of pain." 475 U.S. at 322. Recognizing the importance of

context, the Whitley Court explained that the shooting was part of a

good faith effort to restore order to the prison. It therefore found the

shooting not to violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 326.

For the same reasons expressed in Whitley, we hold that the force

that the correctional officers used in this case to quell the disturbance

in the A-Wing Segregation Tier was reasonably necessary to restore

order and that the injury resulting from that force was not excessive.

As an additional reason for reaching our conclusion, we hold that

the finding that Stanley sustained a loosened tooth during the disturbance is unsupported by the record. While Stanley's loosened tooth

was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the force necessarily

used, that finding of injury was nevertheless inadequately supported.

The magistrate judge found that Stanley sustained bruises of his right

arm, left jaw, left and right wrists and back, and a loosened tooth. The

bruises are supported by the evidence admitted at trial, including

Stanley's medical records. When Stanley was taken for medical treatment immediately after the incident, he complained of pain about his

mouth and arms. Moreover, the day after the disturbance, Stanley was

seen twice, first for similar complaints plus a complaint that his flexible handcuffs had been attached too tightly. And when a nurse visited

Stanley later that same day, Stanley complained of pain in his leg,

back, wrists, and right arm. But during none of these medical consultations did Stanley complain about a loosened tooth. Moreover, both

when he filed a complaint with prison officials and when he filed his

complaint in this case, he described events of the disturbance in significant detail, including the nature of his injuries, but at neither time

did he mention a loosened tooth.

Stanley's medical records do reveal that he had a bad tooth, about

which he complained several months before the prison disturbance.

Also, almost two weeks after the disturbance, he complained again

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about the tooth hurting "while he is eating." The doctor found that

Stanley had a cyst or a cystic mass in his gum, but he indicated that

none of Stanley's teeth were loose. Finally, in April 1994, three

months after the disturbance, Stanley had the bad tooth extracted.

Nevertheless, at trial, Stanley attributed a loose tooth to the force

applied at the prison disturbance. When Stanley's counsel asked

whether Stanley had required "any other medical care or treatment as

a direct result of what happened to you on January 6, 1994 at some

later point on January 19, 1994," Stanley testified that he "put in for

a dental appointment" because his teeth were"messed up" during the

January 6 disturbance. His counsel then led Stanley with the following two questions, "Was the tooth loose?" and"Did it have to be

removed?", to which Stanley replied, "Yes." None of the contemporary data nor the medical records, however, link Stanley's bad tooth

to the incident on January 6, and we believe that the magistrate

judge's factual finding that a tooth was loosened is inadequately supported.

Even with the finding of a loosened tooth, however, we find that

bruises, swelling, and a loosened tooth sustained in a fracas that

occurred while prison guards were trying to quell a disturbance are

constitutionally insignificant and distinct from a loosened tooth and

a cracked dental plate sustained in the context of punishment deliberately inflicted by guards because of a verbal argument. Cf. Hudson,

503 U.S. at 4.

V

Because we find that the correctional officers did not use constitutionally excessive force in subduing Stanley and removing him from

a prison disturbance, we do not need to consider the officers' alternative argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district

court.

REVERSED

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