United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the 

House Homeland Security Committee

HOMELAND SECURITY

Management and 

Programmatic Challenges 

Facing the Department of 

Homeland Security 

Statement of David M. Walker 

Comptroller General of the United States 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

For Release on Delivery 

1 pm EST 

Wednesday, February 7, 2007 

 

GAO-07-452T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 7, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Management and Programmatic 

Challenges Facing the Department of 

Homeland Security 

Highlights of GAO-07-452T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

The Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) plays a key role in 

leading and coordinating—with 

stakeholders in the federal, state, 

local, and private sectors—the 

nation’s homeland security efforts. 

GAO has conducted numerous 

reviews of DHS management

functions as well as programs 

including transportation and 

border security, immigration 

enforcement and service delivery, 

and disaster preparation and 

response. This testimony 

addresses: 

• why GAO designated DHS’s

implementation and

transformation as a high-risk 

area, 

• management challenges facing

DHS, 

• programmatic challenges facing

DHS, and 

• actions DHS should take to 

strengthen its implementation 

and transformation efforts. 

What GAO Recommends

This testimony contains no

recommendations. However, GAO 

has made numerous prior 

recommendations to DHS in

reports addressing the issues 

identified in this statement.

Although DHS generally concurred 

with these recommendations, it has 

not identified whether it has taken 

corrective actions to address most 

of the recommendations made. 

GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 

because DHS had to transform 22 agencies—several with existing program 

and management challenges—into one department, and failure to effectively 

address its challenges could have serious consequences for our homeland 

security. Despite some progress, this transformation remains high risk. 

Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of 

DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of key management 

functions that will likely span a number of years. DHS has made some 

progress in these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure 

success. While DHS has developed a strategic plan, the plan does not link 

resource requirements to goals and objectives, and it does not involve key 

stakeholders to ensure resource investments target the highest priorities.

DHS has also issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on 

a function by function basis, but lacks a comprehensive integration strategy

with overall goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its efforts. 

The latest independent audit of DHS’s financial statements revealed 

10 material weaknesses and confirmed that DHS’s financial management 

systems still do not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not 

institutionalized an effective strategic framework for information 

management, and its human capital and acquisition systems require further 

attention to ensure that DHS allocates resources efficiently and effectively.

Since GAO’s 2005 high-risk update, DHS has taken actions to strengthen 

program activities. However, DHS continues to face programmatic and 

partnering challenges. To help ensure its missions are achieved, DHS must 

overcome continued challenges related to cargo, transportation, and border 

security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the employment of 

illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset capabilities. Further, DHS and 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency need to continue to develop 

clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities; necessary disaster

response capabilities; accountability systems to provide effective services 

while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the ability to conduct 

advanced contracting for emergency response goods and services. 

DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it will 

address its management challenges. Such a plan should define the root 

causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have management 

support, and provide for substantially completing corrective measures in the 

near term. It should also include performance metrics and milestones, as 

well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also be important for DHS to 

become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access 

to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and 

others can independently assess its efforts. DHS may ultimately require a 

chief management official dedicated to the overall transformation process in 

order to expedite and help ensure sustainable success over time. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-452T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Norman Rabkin 

at (202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee to address 

management and programmatic challenges facing the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). I have spoken extensively about the fiscal crisis 

our nation faces with the coming retirement of the baby boom generation 

and the related growth in entitlement spending. The current financial 

condition in the United States is worse than is widely understood and is 

not sustainable. Meeting the long-term fiscal challenge will require 

(1) significant entitlement reform to change the path of those programs; 

(2) reprioritizing, restructuring and constraining other spending programs; 

and (3) additional revenues--such as through a reformed tax system. These 

efforts will require bipartisan cooperation and compromise.

Irrespective of our fiscal situation, it is important for federal 

departments—including DHS—to operate as efficiently and effectively as 

possible in carrying out their missions. At the same time, we also face new 

and uncertain threats to our security, both overseas and at home, that 

require continued attention. Without this focus, the consequences can be 

catastrophic. We designated the implementation and transformation of 

DHS as a high-risk area in 2003 and continued that designation in our 2005 

update. In my testimony today, I will explain why we have decided to 

maintain this area on our 2007 high risk list. I will focus on four areas: 

• why we originally designated DHS’s implementation and 

transformation as a high-risk area, 

• specific management challenges that DHS continues to face, 

• examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and 

• actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and

transformation efforts. 

My comments today are based on our wide-ranging work on DHS since the 

2005 high-risk update, as well as our institutional knowledge of homeland 

security and various government organizational and management issues. 

We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. A listing of GAO reports related to the 

transformation, management, and program challenges discussed in this 

statement are contained in Appendix 1. 

Page 1 GAO-07-452T 
We first designated DHS’s implementation and transformation as high risk 

in 2003 because 22 disparate agencies had to transform into one 

department. Many of these individual agencies were facing their own 

management and mission challenges. But most importantly, the failure to

effectively address DHS’s management challenges and program risks could 

have serious consequences for our homeland security as well as our 

economy. We kept the DHS implementation and transformation on the 

high-risk list in 2005 because serious transformation challenges continued 

to hinder DHS’s success. Since then, our and the DHS Inspector General’s 

(IG) reports have documented DHS’s progress and remaining challenges in

transforming into an effective, integrated organization. For example, in the 

management area, DHS has developed a strategic plan, is working to 

integrate some management functions, and has continued to form 

necessary partnerships to achieve mission success. Despite these efforts, 

however, the DHS implementation and transformation continues to remain 

on the 2007 high-risk list because numerous management challenges 

remain. For example, 

Summary 

• Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management 

integration on a function by function basis, DHS lacks a 

comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, 

timelines, and a team dedicated to support its integration efforts. 

• The DHS strategic plan addresses five of six Government 

Performance and Results Act required elements and takes into

account its non-homeland security missions, such as responding to 

natural disasters. However, DHS and its components must also 

improve planning by linking resource needs to its goals and 

promoting greater stakeholder involvement to ensure resource 

investments target the highest priorities. 

• Several DHS programs have not developed outcome-based 

measures to assess performance. 

• While the Secretary of DHS has expressed a commitment to risk 

management, DHS has not performed comprehensive risk 

assessments in transportation, trade, critical infrastructure, or the 

immigration and customs systems to guide resource allocation 

decisions. 

• Since its creation, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified or 

“clean” audit opinion on its financial statements. The auditors 

continue to report 10 material internal control weaknesses and that 

DHS’s financial systems do not substantially comply with federal 

requirements. These weaknesses highlight the concern that DHS, 

the second-largest government agency, may not be able to account 

for all of its funding and resources or have reliable financial 

information for management and budget purposes.

Page 2 GAO-07-452T 
• DHS has not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for 

information management to, among other things, guide technology 

investments, and despite some progress, DHS’s human capital—the 

centerpiece of its transformation efforts—and acquisition systems 

will require continued attention to help prevent waste and to ensure 

that DHS can allocate its resources efficiently and effectively.

DHS has taken some actions to strengthen program activities in areas such

as cargo, transportation, and border security; Coast Guard acquisition 

management; disaster preparedness conducting advance contracting for 

goods and services; and immigration services. However, DHS continues to

face programmatic and partnering challenges. To help ensure its missions 

are achieved, DHS must overcome continued challenges related to: 

• strengthening cargo and passenger screening, visitor tracking,

efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens, and outdated 

Coast Guard asset capabilities; 

• balancing its homeland security and other missions, such as disaster 

preparedness; and 

• clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing 

necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing 

accountability systems to provide effective services while 

protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse at the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 

To be removed from GAO’s high-risk list,1

 agencies must do three things. 

First, they have to produce a corrective action plan that defines the root 

causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those 

problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures 

in the near term. Such a plan should include performance metrics and 

milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. In the spring of 

2006, DHS provided us with a draft corrective action plan that did not 

contain key elements we have identified as necessary for an effective 

corrective action plan, including specific actions to address identified 

objectives. Second, agencies must demonstrate significant progress in 

addressing the problems identified in their corrective action plan. To date,

DHS has not been transparent in its efforts in strengthening its 

management areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive 

work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been 

 1

GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks, 

GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2000). 

Page 3 GAO-07-452T 
receptive towards oversight and its delays in providing Congress and us 

with access to various documents and officials have impeded our work. 

Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a 

commitment to achieve any remaining key objectives and sustain various 

improvements in their performance over the long term. Although DHS 

leaders have expressed their intent to integrate legacy agencies into the 

new department, they have not dedicated the resources needed to oversee 

this effort and have not been responsive to many directions from Congress 

and recommendations from study groups and accountability organizations 

like the IGs and GAO. 

In an effort to strengthen homeland security following the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 and signed 

legislation creating DHS in November 2002.2

 The strategy set forth the 

overall objectives, mission areas, and initiatives to prevent terrorist 

attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to 

terrorism; and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from 

attacks that may occur. 

Background 

DHS, which began operations in March 2003, represented a fusion of 

22 federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of many 

homeland security activities under a single department. Although the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security identified that many other federal 

departments (and other nonfederal stakeholders) are involved in 

homeland security activities, DHS has the dominant role in implementing 

the strategy. The strategy identified 6 mission areas and 43 initiatives. DHS 

was designated as the lead federal agency for 37 of the 43 initiatives, and

has activities under way in 40 of the 43 initiatives. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, represented a 

historic moment of almost unprecedented action by the federal 

government to fundamentally transform how the nation thinks of 

homeland security, including how it protects itself from terrorism. Also 

significant was the fact that many of the 22 departments brought together 

under DHS were not focused on homeland security missions prior to 

September 11, 2001. Rarely in the country’s past had such a large and 

complex reorganization of government occurred or been developed with 

 2

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 

Page 4 GAO-07-452T 
such a singular and urgent purpose. The creation of DHS represented a 

unique opportunity to transform a disparate group of agencies with 

multiple missions, values, and cultures into a strong and effective cabinet 

department whose goals are to, among other things, protect U.S. borders 

and infrastructure, improve intelligence and information sharing, and 

prevent and respond to potential terrorist attacks. Together with this 

unique opportunity, however, came a significant risk to the nation that 

could occur if the department’s implementation and transformation efforts 

were not successful. 

Mission areas designated as high risk have national significance, while 

other areas designated as high risk represent management functions that 

are important for agency performance and accountability. The identified

areas can have a qualitative risk that may be detrimental to public health

or safety, national security, and economic growth, or a fiscal risk due to 

the size of the program in question. Examples of high-risk areas include 

federal governmentwide problems, like human capital management; large 

programs, like Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare; and more narrow 

issues, such as contracting at a specific agency. The DHS transformation is 

unique in that it involves reorganization, management, and program 

challenges simultaneously. 

We first designated DHS’s transformation as high risk in January 2003 

based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in 

implementing an effective transformation process, developing 

partnerships, and building needed management capacity because it had to 

effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees into 

one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of operational and 

management challenges that it inherited from its component legacy 

agencies. For example, many of the major components that were merged 

into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs Service, the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, brought

with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human capital, 

information technology, and financial management. Finally, DHS’s 

national security mission was of such importance that the failure to 

effectively address its management challenges and program risks could 

have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizens’ 

health and safety, and our economy.

DHS’s Transformation 

Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the 

creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large 

Page 5 GAO-07-452T 
organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than 

DHS, can take 5 to 7 years to achieve.

3

 On the basis of the need for more 

progress in its transformation efforts, DHS’s implementation and 

transformation stayed on our high-risk update for 2005. Further, in 

November of 2006, we provided the congressional leadership a listing of 

government programs, functions, and activities that warrant further 

congressional oversight.4

 Among the issues included were DHS integration 

and transformation efforts. 

Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity 

of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key management 

functions across the department, and partnering with stakeholders across 

the public and private sectors. DHS has made some progress in each of 

these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure 

sustainable success. Apart from these integration efforts, however, a 

successful transformation will also require DHS to follow through on its 

initial actions of building capacity to improve the management of its 

financial and information technology systems, as well as its human capital 

and acquisition efforts. 

DHS Must Address 

Key Management 

Challenges 

DHS Transformation and 

Integration 

Thorough planning is important for DHS to successfully transform and 

integrate the management functions of 22 disparate agencies into a 

common framework that supports the organization as a whole. Our past 

work has identified progress DHS has made in its planning efforts.5

 For 

example, the DHS strategic plan addresses five of six Government 

Performance and Results Act required elements and takes into account its 

non-homeland security missions, such as responding to natural disasters. 

Furthermore, several DHS components have developed their own strategic 

 3

GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a

Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

4

GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-235R (Washington,

D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006). 

5

GAO, Results Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS’s Planning Process Would

Enhance Usefulness and Accountability, GAO-05-300 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005); 

Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to 

Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006); Border 

Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector

Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 22, 2005). 

Page 6 GAO-07-452T 
plans or strategic plans for missions within their areas of responsibility. 

For example, U.S. Immigration and Custom’s Enforcement (ICE) has 

produced an interim strategic plan that identifies its goals and objectives, 

and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed a border 

patrol strategy and an anti terrorism trade strategic plan. However, 

deficiencies in DHS’s planning efforts remain. A DHS-wide transformation

strategy should include a strategic plan that identifies specific budgetary,

human capital, and other resources needed to achieve stated goals. The 

strategy should also involve key stakeholders to help ensure that resource 

investments target the highest priorities. DHS’s existing strategic plan 

lacks these linkages, and DHS has not effectively involved stakeholders in

the development of the plan. DHS has also not completed other important 

planning-related activities. For example, some of DHS’s components have 

not developed adequate outcome-based performance measures or 

comprehensive plans to monitor, assess, and independently evaluate the 

effectiveness of their plans and performance. 

Integrating core management functions like financial, information 

technology, human capital, and procurement is also important if DHS is to 

transform itself into a cohesive, high-performing organization. However, 

DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall

goals, a timeline, and a dedicated team to support its management 

integration efforts. In 2005, we recommended that DHS establish 

implementation goals and a timeline for its management integration efforts 

as part of a comprehensive integration strategy, a key practice to help

ensure success for a merger or transformation. Although DHS has issued 

guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by 

function basis, it has not developed a plan that clearly identifies the 

critical links that should occur across these functions, the necessary 

timing to make these links occur, how these interrelationships will occur, 

and who will drive and manage them. In addition, although DHS had 

established a Business Transformation Office that reported to the Under 

Secretary for Management to help monitor and look for interdependencies 

among the individual functional management integration efforts, that 

office was not responsible for leading and managing the coordination and

integration itself. In addition to the Business Transformation Office, we 

have suggested that Congress should continue to monitor whether it needs 

to provide additional leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary 

for Management or create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management 

Officer position which could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize 

DHS’s management initiatives. 

Page 7 GAO-07-452T 
Finally, DHS cannot successfully achieve its homeland security mission 

without working with other entities that share responsibility for securing 

the homeland. Partnering for progress with other governmental agencies 

and private sector entities is central to achieving its missions. Since 2005, 

DHS has continued to form necessary partnerships and has undertaken a 

number of coordination efforts with private sector entities. These include, 

for example, partnering with (1) airlines to improve aviation passenger 

and cargo screening, (2) the maritime shipping industry to facilitate 

containerized cargo inspection, (3) financial institutions to follow the 

money trail in immigration and customs investigations, and (4) the 

chemical industry to enhance critical infrastructure protection at such 

facilities.6

 In addition, FEMA has worked with other federal, state, and

local entities to improve planning for disaster response and recovery. 

However, partnering challenges continue as DHS seeks to form more 

effective partnerships to leverage resources and more effectively carry out 

its homeland security responsibilities. For example, because DHS has only 

limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it must continue 

to work with the chemical industry to ensure that it is assessing 

vulnerabilities and implementing security measures. Also, while TSA has 

taken steps to collaborate with federal and private sector stakeholders in 

the implementation of its Secure Flight program, these stakeholders stated 

that TSA has not provided them with the information they would need to

support TSA’s efforts as they move forward with the program. 

Financial Management and 

Internal Controls 

DHS has made limited improvements in addressing financial management 

and internal control weaknesses and continues to face significant 

challenges in these areas. For example, since its creation, DHS has been

unable to obtain an unqualified or “clean” audit opinion on its financial

statements. The independent auditor’s report cited 10 material

weaknesses—i.e., significant deficiencies in DHS’s internal controls—

showing no decrease from fiscal year 2005. These weaknesses included 

financial management oversight, financial reporting, financial systems 

 6

GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect 

Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, 

GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006); Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, 

but Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T

(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005); Homeland Security: Better Management Practices

Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006); and Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at

Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed, GAO-06-899T (Washington, D.C.: 

June 21, 2006). 

Page 8 GAO-07-452T 
security, and budgetary accounting. Furthermore, the report found two 

other reportable conditions and instances of non-compliance with eight 

laws and regulations, including the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity 

Act of 1982, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996,

and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.

7

 While 

there continue to be material weaknesses in its financial management 

systems, DHS has made some progress in this area. For example, the 

independent auditor’s fiscal year 2006 report noted that DHS had made 

improvements at the component level to improve financial reporting 

during fiscal year 2006, although many challenges were remaining. Also, 

DHS and its components have reported developing corrective action plans 

to address the specific material internal control weaknesses identified. 

In addition to the independent audits, we have done work to assess DHS’s 

financial management and internal controls. For example, in 2004, we 

reviewed DHS’s progress in addressing financial management weaknesses 

and integrating its financial systems.8

 Specifically, we identified 

weaknesses in the financial management systems DHS inherited from the 

22 component agencies, assessed DHS progress in addressing these 

weaknesses, identified plans DHS had to integrate its financial 

management systems, and reviewed whether the planned systems DHS 

was developing would meet the requirements of relevant financial 

management improvement legislation. On the basis of our work, we 

recommended that DHS (1) give sustained attention to addressing 

previously reported material weaknesses, reportable conditions, and 

observations and recommendations; (2) complete development of 

corrective action plans for all material weaknesses, reportable conditions, 

and observations and recommendations; (3) ensure that internal control 

weaknesses are addressed at the component level if they were combined 

or reclassified at the departmentwide level; and (4) maintain a tracking 

system of all auditor-identified and management-identified control 

weaknesses. These recommendations are still relevant today.

 7

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Independent Auditors’

Report on DHS’ FY 2006 Financial Statements. OIG-07-10. (Washington, D.C.: November 

2006). 

8

GAO, Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces Significant 

Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004). 

Page 9 GAO-07-452T 
A departmentwide information technology (IT) governance framework—

including controls (disciplines) aimed at effectively managing IT-related 

people, processes, and tools—is vital to DHS’s transformation efforts. 

These controls and disciplines include 

Information Technology 

• having and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as 

an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain IT 

investments; 

• defining and following a corporate process for informed decision 

making by senior leadership about competing IT investment options; 

• applying system and software development and acquisition discipline 

and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and 

maintaining systems; 

• establishing a comprehensive information security program to protect 

its information and systems; 

• having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities 

to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and 

• centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the 

organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer.9

In early 2006, we testified on DHS’s progress regarding its IT management 

controls. At the time, we reported that DHS had made efforts during the 

previous 3 to 4 years, to establish and implement IT management controls 

and disciplines, but progress in these key areas had been uneven, and 

more remained to be accomplished. Specifically, DHS had made 

improvements in its enterprise architecture by establishing 

departmentwide technology standards. It had also developed and initiated

the implementation of a plan to introduce a shared services orientation to 

the architecture, particularly for information services, such as data centers 

and e-mail. In addition, to strengthen IT investment management, DHS 

established an acquisition project performance reporting system, aligned

its investment management cycle and associated milestones with the 

department’s annual budget preparation process, and linked investment 

management systems to standardize and make consistent the financial 

data used to make investment decisions. Further, to develop more 

effective information security management, DHS completed a 

comprehensive inventory of its major information systems and 

implemented a departmentwide tool that incorporates the guidance 

required to adequately complete security certification and accreditation 

 9

GAO, Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on Department’s

Management of Information Technology, GAO-06-598T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006).

Page 10 GAO-07-452T 
for all systems. We have ongoing work that will update the status of DHS’s 

IT management controls.

Despite these efforts, DHS must do more before each of these

management controls and capabilities is fully mature and institutionalized.

For example, our reviews of key nonfinancial systems shows that DHS has 

not consistently employed reliable cost-estimating practices, effective 

requirements development and test management, meaningful performance 

measurement, strategic workforce management, and proactive risk 

management, among other recognized program management best 

practices. In addition, DHS has not fully implemented a comprehensive 

information security program; and goals related to consolidating networks 

and e-mail systems, for example, remain to be fully accomplished. More 

work also remains in deploying and operating IT systems and 

infrastructure in support of DHS’s core mission operations. For example, 

although a system to identify and screen visitors entering the country has 

been deployed and is operating, a related exit capability largely is not. In 

addition, the Automated Commercial Environment program has not yet 

demonstrated that it can accurately measure progress against its 

commitments because the data it uses are not consistently reliable.10 DHS 

must also ensure that the Chief Information Officer is sufficiently 

empowered to extend management discipline and implement common IT 

solutions across the department. Until DHS fully establishes and 

consistently implements the full range of IT management disciplines 

embodied in its framework and related federal guidance and best 

practices, it will be challenged in its ability to effectively manage and 

deliver programs. 

Human Capital Systems DHS has made some progress in transforming its human capital systems, 

but more work remains.11 Some of the most pressing human capital 

 10GAO, Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated Commercial

Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management Challenges and New

Risks. GAO-06-580 May 31, 2006. 

11GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training Important 

for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005); 

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the

Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and

Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006);

Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but Management

Improvements Are Still Needed, GAO-06-318T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006); and

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa

Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

Page 11 GAO-07-452T 
challenges at DHS include (1) successfully completing its ongoing 

transformation, (2) forging a unified results-oriented culture across the 

department (line of sight), (3) linking daily operations to strategic 

outcomes, (4) rewarding individuals based on individual, team, unit, and 

organizational results, (5) obtaining, developing, providing incentives to,

and retaining needed talent, and (6) most importantly, leadership both at 

the top, to include a chief operating officer (COO) or chief management 

officer (CMO). A strategic workforce plan is integral to defining the level 

of staffing, identifying the critical skills needed to mission achievement, 

and eliminating gaps to prepare the agency for future needs. In 2005, we 

reported that DHS had initiated strategic human capital planning efforts 

and published proposed regulations for a modern human capital 

management system.12 We also reported that DHS’s leadership was 

committed to the human capital system design process and had formed 

teams to implement the resulting regulations. Since our report, DHS has 

finalized its human capital regulations, and although certain labor 

management provisions are the subject of litigation, it is vital that DHS 

implement its human capital system effectively because strategic human 

capital management is the centerpiece of any transformation effort.13

Further, since our 2005 update, DHS has taken some actions to integrate 

the legacy agency workforces that make up its components. For example, 

it standardized pay grades for criminal investigators at ICE and developed 

promotion criteria for investigators and CBP officers that equally 

recognize the value of the experience brought to ICE and CBP by 

employees of each legacy agency. DHS also made progress in establishing 

human capital capabilities for the US-VISIT program, which should help 

ensure that it has sufficient staff with the necessary skills and abilities to 

implement the program effectively. CBP also developed training plans that 

link its officer training to CBP strategic goals. 

 12GAO, Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security Management 

Challenges, GAO-05-573T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2005). 

13The Homeland Security Act gave DHS authorization to design a human capital 

management system to meet its unique missions. In January 2005, DHS announced its final

human capital management system regulations. Although DHS intended to implement a 

new personnel system in 2005, court decisions have resulted in further delays. According to

DHS OIG, these delays will impact the cost of implementation, the current development 

and implementation contract, and the ability to properly manage the workforce. 

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Major Management 

Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, OIG-06-14 (Washington, D.C.: 

December 2005). 

Page 12 GAO-07-452T 
Despite these efforts, however, DHS must still (1) create a clearer 

crosswalk between departmental training goals and objectives and DHS’s 

broader organizational and human capital goals, (2) develop appropriate 

training performance measures and targets for goals and strategies 

identified in its departmentwide strategic training plan, and (3) address 

our earlier recommendations that its new human capital system be linked 

to its strategic plan. We have also made recommendations to specific 

program offices and organizational entities to help ensure that human 

capital resources are provided to improve the effectiveness of 

management capabilities, and that human capital plans are developed that 

clearly describe how these components will recruit, train, and retain staff

to meet their growing demands as they expand and implement new 

program elements. We are completing an updated review of DHS’s human

capital efforts and plan to report on our results soon. This report will 

discuss information on selected human capital issues at DHS: attrition 

rates at DHS; senior-level vacancies at DHS; DHS’s use of human capital 

flexibilities, the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, and personal services 

contracts; and DHS’s compliance with the Vacancies Reform Act. 

Acquisition Management DHS continues to face challenges in creating an effective, integrated 

acquisition organization. Since its inception in March 2003, DHS has made 

progress in implementing a strategic sourcing program to increase the 

effectiveness of its buying power and in creating a small business program. 

These programs have promoted an environment in which there is a 

collaborative effort toward the common goal of an efficient, unified 

organization. Strategic sourcing allows DHS components to formulate 

purchasing strategies to leverage buying power and increase savings for a 

variety of products like office supplies, boats, energy, and weapons, while 

its small business program works to ensure small businesses can compete 

effectively for the agency’s contract dollars. However, DHS’s progress 

toward creating a unified acquisition organization has been hampered by 

policy decisions. In March 2005, we reported that an October 2004

management directive, Acquisition Line of Business Integration and 

Management, while emphasizing the need for a unified, integrated 

acquisition organization, relies on a system of dual accountability between 

the chief procurement officer and the heads of the departments to make 

this happen.14 This situation has created ambiguity about who is 

 14GAO, Homeland Security: Success and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create an

Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2005).

Page 13 GAO-07-452T 
accountable for acquisition decisions. We also found that the various 

acquisition organizations within DHS are still operating in a disparate 

manner, with oversight of acquisition activities left primarily up to each 

individual component. Specifically, we reported that (1) there were 

components exempted from the unified acquisition organization, (2) the 

chief procurement officer had insufficient staff for departmentwide 

oversight, and (3) staffing shortages led the office of procurement 

operations to rely extensively on outside agencies for contracting 

support.15 In March 2005, we recommended that, among other things, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security provide the Office of the Chief 

Procurement Officer with sufficient resources and enforcement authority 

to enable effective departmentwide oversight of acquisition policies and 

procedures, and to revise the October 2004 management directive to 

eliminate reference to the Coast Guard and Secret Service as being exempt 

from complying with the directive. Unless DHS addresses these 

challenges, it is at risk of continuing to exist as a fragmented acquisition 

organization. Because some of DHS’s components have major, complex 

acquisition programs—for example, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program 

(designed to replace or upgrade its cutters and aircraft) and CBP’s Secure 

Border Initiative—DHS needs to improve the oversight of contractors and 

should adhere to a rigorous management review process. 

DHS continues to face challenges, many of which were inherited from its 

component legacy agencies, in carrying out its programmatic activities. 

These challenges include enhancing transportation security, strengthening 

the management of U.S. Coast Guard acquisitions and meeting the Coast

Guard’s new homeland security missions, improving the regulation of 

commercial trade while ensuring protection against the entry of illegal 

goods and dangerous visitors at U.S. borders and ports of entry, and 

improving enforcement of immigration laws, including worksite 

immigration laws, and the provision of immigration services. DHS must 

also effectively coordinate the mitigation and response to all hazards, 

including natural disaster planning, response, and recovery. DHS has 

taken actions to address these challenges, for example, by strengthening 

passenger and baggage screening, increasing the oversight of Coast Guard 

acquisitions, more thoroughly screening visitors and cargo, dedicating 

more resources to immigration enforcement, becoming more efficient in 

Programmatic 

Challenges Facing 

DHS 

 15GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition 

Organization, GAO-06-1012T (Washington, D.C.: July. 27, 2006). 

Page 14 GAO-07-452T 
the delivery of immigration services, and conducting better planning for 

disaster preparation. However, challenges remain in each of these major 

mission areas. 

Transportation Security Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in 

effectively executing transportation security efforts. We have

recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

more fully integrate a risk management approach—including assessments 

of threat, vulnerability, and criticality—in prioritizing security efforts 

within and across all transportation modes; strengthen stakeholder 

coordination; and implement needed technological upgrades to secure 

commercial airports.16 DHS has made progress in all of these areas, 

particularly in aviation, but must expand its security focus more towards 

surface modes of transportation and continue to seek best practices and 

coordinated security efforts with the international community. DHS and 

TSA have taken numerous actions to strengthen commercial aviation 

security, including strengthening passenger and baggage screening, 

improving aspects of air cargo security, and strengthening the security of 

international flights and passengers bound for the United States.17 For 

example, TSA increased efforts to measure the effectiveness of airport 

screening systems through covert testing and other means and has worked 

to enhance passenger and baggage screener training. TSA also improved 

its processes for identifying and responding to threats onboard 

commercial aircraft and has modified airport screening procedures based 

on risk. Despite this progress, however, TSA continues to face challenges

in implementing a program to match domestic airline passenger 

information against terrorist watch lists, fielding needed technologies to 

 16GAO, Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 

Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed, GAO-05-781 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005); Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen 

Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005; Rail Transit: 

Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State Safety Oversight Program, 

GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006); and Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of 

Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington,

D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

17GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures 

Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 28, 2006); Aviation Security: 

Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005); and Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in

Passenger and Checked Baggage, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington,

D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006). 

Page 15 GAO-07-452T 
screen airline passengers for explosives, and strengthening aspects of 

passenger rail security.18 In addition, TSA has not developed a strategy, as 

required, for securing the various modes of transportation. As a result, rail 

and other surface transportation stakeholders are unclear regarding what

TSA’s role will ultimately be in establishing and enforcing security 

requirements within their transportation modes. We have recommended 

that TSA more fully integrate risk-based decision making within aviation

and across all transportation modes, strengthen passenger prescreening, 

and enhance rail security efforts. We have also recommended that TSA 

work to develop sustained and effective partnerships with other 

government agencies, the private sector, and international partners to 

coordinate security efforts and seek potential best practices, among other 

efforts. 

Coast Guard Acquisitions 

and Non-Homeland 

Security Missions 

The Coast Guard needs to improve the management of its acquisitions and 

continue to enhance its security mission while meeting other mission 

responsibilities. We recommended that the Coast Guard improve its 

management of the Deepwater program by strengthening key management 

and oversight activities, implementing procedures to better ensure 

contractor accountability, and controlling future costs by promoting 

competition.19 In April 2006, we reported the Coast Guard had made some 

progress in addressing these recommendations. For example, the Coast 

Guard has addressed our recommendation to ensure better contractor 

accountability by providing for better input from U.S. Coast Guard 

performance monitors.20 However, even with these improvements, some 

Deepwater assets have recently experienced major setbacks due to design

concerns in two classes of replacement cutters. Further, other Coast 

Guard acquisition programs—such as the Rescue 21 emergency distress 

and communications system—have experienced major cost increases, 

schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. 

 18GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation 

Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 

14, 2006). 

19GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs Increased

Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 9, 2004). 

20GAO, Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program 

Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted, GAO-06-546

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2006). 

Page 16 GAO-07-452T 
The Coast Guard has made progress in balancing its homeland security 

and traditional missions. The Coast Guard is unlike many other DHS 

components because it has substantial missions not related to homeland 

security. These missions include maritime navigation, icebreaking, 

protecting the marine environment, marine safety, and search and rescue 

for mariners in distress. Furthermore, unpredictable natural disasters, 

such as Hurricane Katrina, can place intense demands on all Coast Guard 

resources. The Coast Guard must continue executing these traditional 

missions and balance those responsibilities with its homeland security 

obligations, which have increased significantly since September 11. 

Border Security and the 

Regulation of Trade 

DHS has made some progress but still faces an array of challenges in 

securing the border while improving the regulation of commercial trade.21

Since 2005, DHS agencies have made some progress in implementing our 

recommendations to refine the screening of foreign visitors to the United

States, target potentially dangerous cargo, and provide the personnel 

necessary to effectively fulfill border security and trade agency missions. 

As of January 2006, DHS had a pre-entry screening capability in place in 

overseas visa issuance offices, and an entry identification capability at 

115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. Furthermore, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security has made risk management at ports and 

all critical infrastructure facilities a key priority for DHS. In addition, DHS 

developed performance goals and measures for its trade processing 

system and implemented a testing and certification process for its officers 

to provide better assurance of effective cargo examination targeting 

practices. However, efforts to assess and mitigate risks of DHS’s and the 

Department of State’s implementation of the Visa Waiver Program remain 

incomplete, increasing the risk that the program could be exploited by 

someone who intends harm to the United States. Further, many of DHS’s 

border-related performance goals and measures are not fully defined or 

adequately aligned with one another, and some performance targets are 

not realistic. For example, CBP has not yet put key controls in place to

provide reasonable assurance that its screening system is effective at 

 21GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6,

2006); Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border 

Surveillance Technology Program, GAO-06-295 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2006); 

Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated Commercial

Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management Challenges and New

Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006); and Homeland Security: 

Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border Security Program Need to Be 

Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006).

Page 17 GAO-07-452T 
targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of containing

smuggled weapons of mass destruction, nor has it found a way to 

incorporate inspection results back into the targeting system. Other trade 

and visitor screening systems have weaknesses that must be overcome to 

better ensure border and trade security. For example, deficiencies in the 

identification of counterfeit documentation at land border crossings into 

the United States create vulnerabilities that terrorists or others involved in

criminal activity could exploit. We also reported that DHS’s Container 

Security Initiative to target and inspect high-risk cargo containers at 

foreign ports before they leave for the United States has not achieved key 

goals because of staffing imbalances, the lack of minimum technical 

requirements for inspection equipment used at foreign ports, and 

insufficient performance measures to assess the effectiveness of targeting 

and inspection activities. 

Enforcement of 

Immigration Laws 

DHS has taken some actions to improve enforcement of immigration laws, 

including worksite immigration laws, but the number of resources devoted 

to enforcing immigration laws is limited given that there are an estimated 

12 million illegal aliens residing in the United States. DHS has 

strengthened some aspects of immigration enforcement, including 

allocating more investigative work years to immigration functions than the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service did prior to the creation of DHS. 

Nevertheless, effective enforcement will require more attention to efficient 

resource use and updating outmoded management systems.22 In April 2006,

ICE announced an interior enforcement strategy to bring criminal charges 

against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. ICE has also 

reported increases in the number of criminal arrests and indictments for 

these violations since fiscal year 2004. In addition, ICE has plans to shift 

responsibility for identifying incarcerated criminal aliens eligible for 

removal from the United States from the Office of Investigations to its 

Office of Detention and Removal, freeing those investigative resources for 

other immigration and customs investigations. ICE has also begun to 

introduce principles of risk management into the allocation of its 

 22GAO, Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the

Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and

Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006);

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite

Enforcement Efforts, GAO-06-895T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006); and Homeland

Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Allocate 

Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006). 

Page 18 GAO-07-452T 
investigative resources. However, enforcement of immigration 

enforcement laws needs to be strengthened and significant management 

challenges remain. DHS’s ability to locate and remove millions of aliens 

who entered the country illegally or overstayed the terms of their visas is 

questionable, and implementing an effective worksite enforcement 

program remains an elusive goal. ICE’s Office of Investigations has not 

conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the customs and 

immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation by 

criminals and terrorists. This office also lacks outcome-based performance 

goals that relate to its objective of preventing the exploitation of systemic 

vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems, and it does not have 

sufficient systems in place to help ensure systematic monitoring and 

communication of vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations. 

Moreover, the current employment verification process used to identify 

workers ineligible for employment in the United States has not

fundamentally changed since its establishment in 1986, and ongoing 

weaknesses have undermined its effectiveness. We have recommended 

that DHS take actions to help address these weaknesses and to strengthen 

the current process by issuing final regulations on changes to the 

employment verification process which will reduce the number of 

documents suitable for proving eligibility to work in the United States. 

Some other countries require foreign workers to present work 

authorization documents at the time of hire and require employers to 

review these documents and report workers’ information to government 

agencies for collecting taxes and social insurance contributions, and 

conducting worksite enforcement actions. 

Provision of Immigration 

Services 

Although DHS has made progress in reducing its backlog of immigration

benefit applications, improvements are still needed in the provision of 

immigration services, particularly by strengthening internal controls to 

prevent fraud and inaccuracy.23 Since 2005, DHS has enhanced the 

efficiency of certain immigration services. For example, U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (USCIS) estimated that it had reduced its 

backlog of immigration benefits applications from a peak of 3.8 million 

 23GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien Files Are

Located when Needed, GAO-07-85 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2006); Immigration Benefits: 

Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Control

Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-259 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2006); and Immigration Benefits: 

Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and Ensure Quality of Adjudications, 

GAO-06-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2005).

Page 19 GAO-07-452T 
cases to 1.2 million cases from January 2004 to June 2005. USCIS has also 

established a focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control 

strategy that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is 

performing fraud assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud 

for certain benefits. However, DHS still faces significant challenges in its 

ability to effectively provide immigration services while at the same time 

protecting the immigration system from fraud and mismanagement. USCIS 

may have adjudicated tens of thousands of naturalization applications 

without alien files, and adjudicators were not required to record whether 

the alien file was available when they adjudicated the application. Without

these files, DHS may not be able to take enforcement action against an 

applicant and could also approve an application for an ineligible applicant. 

In addition, USCIS has not implemented important aspects of our internal

control standards or fraud control best practices identified by leading 

audit organizations. Such best practices would include (1) a 

comprehensive risk management approach, (2) mechanisms for ongoing 

monitoring during the course of normal activities, (3) clear 

communication agencywide regarding how to balance production-related 

goals with fraud-prevention activities, and (4) performance goals for fraud 

prevention. 

Disaster Preparedness and 

Response 

We have reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster 

preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.24 Since FEMA became part 

of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities have been dispersed and its role 

has continued to evolve. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster 

management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed

weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and

recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Our analysis showed the need 

for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and 

responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities;

and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast 

and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 

In September 2006, we recommended that Congress give federal agencies 

explicit authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic 

disasters when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS 

(1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the 

 24GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability 

Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and

Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Page 20 GAO-07-452T 
roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership, 

implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination 

problems; (2) direct that the National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and

its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust 

and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and 

direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to 

ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery 

responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in 

monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their 

responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness 

Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and 

how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic 

disaster. 

DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released its Supplement to the 

Catastrophic Incident Annex—both designed to further clarify federal 

roles and responsibilities and relationships among federal, state and local 

governments and responders. However, these revisions have not been 

tested. DHS has also announced a number of actions intended to improve 

readiness and response based on our work and the work of congressional 

committees and the Administration. For example, DHS is currently 

reorganizing FEMA as required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations 

act.25 DHS has also announced a number of other actions to improve 

readiness and response. However, there is little information available on 

the extent to which these changes are operational. Finally, in its desire to 

provide assistance quickly following Hurricane Katrina, DHS was unable 

to keep up with the magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims 

for disaster assistance, or ensure that there were provisions in contracts 

for response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in

all cases. We recommended that DHS create accountability systems that 

effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need 

to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We also recommended that DHS 

provide guidance on advance procurement practices (pre-contracting) and 

procedures for those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities under 

the NRP so that these agencies can better manage disaster-related 

procurement, and establish an assessment process to monitor agencies’ 

continuous planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs

and the maintenance of capabilities.26 For example, we identified a number

 25Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 303 (2006). 

26See GAO-06-618. 

Page 21 GAO-07-452T 
of emergency response practices in the public and private sectors that 

provide insight into how the federal government can better manage its 

disaster-related procurements. These include both developing knowledge 

of contractor capabilities and prices and establishing vendor relationships 

prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust 

the level of capacity to match the response with the need. 

To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a 

corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, 

identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for 

substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan 

should include performance measures, metrics and milestones to measure 

their progress. Agencies should also demonstrate significant progress in 

addressing the problems identified in their corrective action plan. This 

should include a program to monitor and independently validate progress. 

Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a 

commitment to sustain initial improvements. This would include a strong 

commitment to address the risk(s) that put the program or function on the 

high-risk list and provide for the allocation of sufficient people and 

resources (capacity) to resolve the risk(s) and ensure that improvements 

are sustainable over the long term. 

Actions Needed to 

Strengthen DHS’s

Transformation and 

Integration Efforts 

In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us a draft corrective action plan for 

addressing its transformation challenges. This plan addressed major 

management areas we had previously identified as key to DHS’s 

transformation—management integration through the DHS management 

directorate and financial, information, acquisition, and human capital

management. The plan identified an overall goal to develop and implement 

key department wide processes and systems to support DHS’s 

transformation into a department capable of planning, operating, and 

managing as one effective department. 

In the short term, the plan sought to produce significant improvements 

over the next 7 years that further DHS’s ability to operate as one 

department. Although the plan listed accomplishments and general goals 

for the management functions, it did not contain (1) objectives linked to 

those goals that are clear, concise, and measurable; (2) specific actions to 

implement those objectives; (3) information linking sufficient people and

resources to implement the plan; or (4) an evaluation program to monitor 

and independently validate progress toward meeting the goals and 

measuring the effectiveness of the plan. 

Page 22 GAO-07-452T 
In addition to developing an effective corrective action plan, agencies 

must show that significant progress has taken place in improving 

performance in the areas identified in its corrective action plan. While our 

work has noted progress at DHS, for us to remove the DHS 

implementation and transformation and from our high-risk list, we need to 

be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS has 

implemented many of our past recommendations, or has taken other 

corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, DHS 

has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough 

so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and economically 

using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually, and is providing 

the levels of security called for in numerous legislative requirements and 

presidential directives. Our work for Congress assessing DHS’s operations 

has been significantly hampered by long delays in granting us access to 

program documents and officials, or by questioning our access to 

information needed to conduct our reviews. We are troubled by the impact 

that DHS’s processes and internal reviews have had on our ability to 

assess departmental programs and operations. Given the problems we 

have experienced in obtaining access to DHS information, it will be 

difficult for us to sustain the level of oversight that Congress has directed

and that is needed to effectively oversee the department, including the 

level of oversight needed to assess DHS’s progress in addressing the 

existing transformation, integration, and programmatic challenges 

identified in this statement. 

Finally, to be removed from our high-risk list, any progress that occurs 

must be sustainable over the long term. DHS’s leaders need to make and 

demonstrate a commitment to implementing a transformed organization. 

The Secretary has stated such a commitment, most prominently as part of

his “second stage review” in the summer of 2005, and more recently in

remarks made at George Washington University’s Homeland Security 

Policy Institute. However, appropriate follow-up is required to assure that 

transformation plans are effectively implemented and sustained, to include

the allocation of adequate resources to support transformation efforts. In 

this regard, we were pleased when DHS established a Business 

Transformation Office, but we believe that the office’s effectiveness was 

limited because the department did not give it the authority and 

responsibility needed to be successful. We understand that this office has 

recently been eliminated. Further, department leaders can show their 

commitment to transforming DHS by acting on recommendations made by 

the Congress, study groups, and accountability organizations such as its 

Office of the IG and GAO. Although we have also seen some progress in 

this area, it is not enough for us to conclude that DHS is committed to and 

Page 23 GAO-07-452T 
capable of quickly incorporating corrective actions into its operations. 

Therefore, until DHS produces an acceptable corrective action plan, 

demonstrates progress reforming its key management functions, and 

dedicates the resources necessary to sustain this progress, it will likely 

remain on our high-risk list. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this completes my prepared 

statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or other

members of the committee may have at this time. 

For information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin, 

Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at 

(202) 512-8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov. Other individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony include Cathleen Berrick, Paul Jones, 

Christopher Conrad, Anthony DeFrank, Nancy Briggs, and Aaron Stern. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgements 

Page 24 GAO-07-452T 
Page 25 GAO-07-452T 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products 

Implementing and 

Transforming the

Department of 

Homeland Security 

Implementation and 

Transformation 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 31,

2007. 

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R. 

Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006. 

Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities, 

but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-899T. Washington, D.C.: June 

21, 2006. 

Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring 

the Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts. GAO-06-612. 

Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006. 

Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management

Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate. GAO-06-206. 

Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2005. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security 

Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities. 

GAO-05-434. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security 

Management Challenges. GAO-05-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005.

Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS’s Planning Process 

Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability. GAO-05-300. Washington, 

D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained 

Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration. GAO-05-139. 

Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005. 
Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal 

Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices. 

GAO-05-49. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2004. 

Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons 

Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal 

Agencies. GAO-03-293SP. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002. 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 

Risks. GAO/OGC-00-12. Washington, D.C.: August 2000. 

Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to 

Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts. GAO-06-553T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006. 

Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces 

Significant Financial Management Challenges. GAO-04-774. Washington, 

D.C.: July 19, 2004. 

Financial Management and 

Internal Controls 

Information Technology Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated 

Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing 

Management Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. May 31, 2006. 

Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More 

Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical 

Infrastructure Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006.

Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on 

Department’s Management of Information Technology. GAO-06-598T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006. 

Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization 

Program. GAO-05-805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005. 

Information Technology: Federal Agencies Face Challenges in

Implementing Initiatives to Improve Public Health Infrastructure. 

GAO-05-308. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005. 

Page 26 GAO-07-452T 
Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment 

Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements 

Continues. GAO-05-267. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005. 

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks 

of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006. 

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions 

in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R. 

Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. 

Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, 

but Management Improvements Are Still Needed. GAO-06-318T. 

Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006. 

Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training 

Important for Successful Transformation. GAO-05-888. Washington, D.C.: 

September 23, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition 

Organization. GAO-06-1012T. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006. 

Homeland Security: Success and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create

an Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-05-179. Washington, D.C.: 

March 29, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of

Special DHS Acquisition Authority. GAO-05-136. Washington, D.C.: 

December 15, 2004. 

Human Capital Systems 

Acquisition Management 

Transportation Security Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive 

Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened. 

GAO-06-795. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006. 

Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 

Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: Jul. 28, 

2006. 

Page 27 GAO-07-452T 
Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State 

Safety Oversight Program. GAO-06-821. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006.

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. 

GAO-06-864T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked 

Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,

D.C.: April 4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using PrivateSector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. 

Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 

Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 

Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: 

November 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 

Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005. 

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 

Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.: 

September 9, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 

Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. 

GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6. 2005. 

Aviation Safety: Oversight of Foreign Code-Share Safety Program Should 

Be Strengthened. GAO-05-930. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted 

Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005. 

Page 28 GAO-07-452T 
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, 

but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. 

GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 

Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management and 

Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition. GAO-06-623. Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program 

Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted.

GAO-06-546. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006. 

Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and 

Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical 

Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. 

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and 

Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2005. 

Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced 

Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GA0-05-404. 

Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 

Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 

31, 2005. 

Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs 

Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. 

GAO-04-380. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004. 

Coast Guard Acquisitions 

and Non-Homeland 

Security Missions 

Border Security and the 

Regulation of Trade 

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248. 

Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006. 

Page 29 GAO-07-452T 
Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks 

of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006. 

Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated 

Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing 

Management Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2006. 

Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border 

Surveillance Technology Program. GAO-06-295. Washington, D.C.: 

February 22, 2006. 

Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key 

Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented. GAO-06-296. 

Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2006.

Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from 

Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859. 

Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005. 

Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and 

Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005. 

Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of 

Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801. 

Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005. 

Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest 

Differences in Sector Performance. GAO-05-435. Washington, D.C.: July 

22, 2005. 

Enforcement of 

Immigration Laws 

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-06-895T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006. 

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions 

in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R. 

Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. 

Page 30 GAO-07-452T 
Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404. 

Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006. 

Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s 

Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 28, 2006. 

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-05-813. Washington, 

D.C.: August 31, 2005. 

Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien 

Files Are Located when Needed. GAO-07-85. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 

2006. 

Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy 

Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Control Benefit Fraud. GAO-06-259. 

Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006. 

Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and 

Ensure Quality of Adjudications. GAO-06-20. Washington, D.C.: 

November 21, 2005. 

Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call 

Centers. GAO-05-526. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005. 

Provision of Immigration 

Services 

Disaster Preparedness and 

Response 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 

D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and 

Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for 

the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: 

September 6, 2006. 

Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance

for Health Facilities Should be Addressed. GAO-06-826. Washington, D.C.: 

July 20, 2006.

Page 31 GAO-07-452T 
Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: 

FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant 

Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-655. Washington, D.C.: June16, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed 

to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International 

Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. 

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 

Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. 

GAO-05-577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. 

(440588) Page 32 GAO-07-452T 
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