United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland 

Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. 

Senate

BORDER SECURITY

US-VISIT Program Faces 

Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at 

Land Ports of Entry 

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:30 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, January 31, 2007 

 

GAO-07-378T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2007

BORDER SECURITY

US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, 

Operational, and Technological 

Challenges at Land Ports of Entry 

Highlights of GAO-07-378T, a report to a 

testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland 

Security, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. 

Senate 

This testimony summarizes a 

December 2006 GAO report on the 

Department of Homeland

Security’s (DHS) efforts to

implement the U.S. Visitor and

Immigrant Status Indicator

Technology (US-VISIT) program at 

land ports of entry (POE). USVISIT is designed to collect, 

maintain, and share data on 

selected foreign nationals entering 

and exiting the United States at air,

sea, and land POEs. These data,

including biometric identifiers like

digital fingerprints, are to be used

to screen persons against watch 

lists, verify identities, and record

arrival and departure. This

testimony addresses DHS’s efforts 

to (1) implement US-VISIT entry

capability, (2) implement US-VISIT 

exit capability, and (3) define how 

US-VISIT fits with other emerging

border security initiatives. GAO 

analyzed DHS and US-VISIT

documents, interviewed program 

officials, and visited 21 land POEs 

with varied traffic levels on both 

borders. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommended that DHS 

improve management controls for

US-VISIT; develop performance 

measures to assess the impact of 

US-VISIT at land POEs; and ensure

that a statutorily mandated report 

describes how DHS will move to a

biometric entry/exit capability and 

align US-VISIT with emerging land

border security initiatives. DHS 

generally agreed and said that it

has begun to or plans to implement 

GAO’s recommendations. 

US-VISIT entry capability had been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. 

Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved 

their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further 

enhance US-VISIT’s capabilities by, among other things, requiring new 

technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints (see photo, below 

left). While this may aid border security, installation could increase

processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space 

constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO’s 

work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems 

and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered.

For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites 

visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has 

developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that 

uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put 

US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. 

US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT 

exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact

on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology tested (see 

photo, below right) did not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric 

exit capability and thus cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country 

are those who leave. DHS had not yet reported to Congress on a required 

plan describing how it intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit 

program or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither 

DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program 

resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. 

DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land 

border security initiatives and mandates, and thus could not ensure that the 

program would meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at 

land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as 

one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or 

other documents at land POEs in 2009, is important for understanding the 

broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and 

potential facility modifications needed to ensure success. 

US-VISIT entry capability set up with computer and camera (left); nonbiometric exit 

identification readers mounted over highway (right) 

Source: GAO.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-378T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Richard Stana 

at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 
Chairman Feinstein and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to provide a summary of our 

December 2006 report1

 on the challenges facing the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) as it implements United States Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) at land ports of entry 

(POE).2

In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the need to secure U.S. 

borders has taken on added importance and has received increasing 

attention from Congress and the public. In an effort to avoid repetition of 

such attacks, and improve overall national security, Congress and the 

Administration have sought better ways to record and track the entry and

departure of foreign visitors who pass through U.S. POEs by air, land, or 

sea; to verify their identities; and to authenticate their travel 

documentation. Pursuant to several statutory mandates, DHS, in 

consultation with the Department of State, established an automated 

visitor system to integrate information on the entry and exit from the 

United States of foreign nationals, called the US-VISIT Program. According 

to DHS, the purpose of US-VISIT is to enhance the security of U.S. citizens 

and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity of 

the U.S. immigration system, and protect visitors’ privacy. The program is 

managed by the US-VISIT Program Office, which is headed by the USVISIT Director, who currently reports to the DHS Deputy Secretary. USVISIT is used in the field by officers with U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), a separate DHS component. 

US-VISIT is designed to use biographic information (e.g., name, 

nationality, and date of birth) and biometric information (e.g., digital 

fingerprint scans and photographs) to verify the identity of those covered

by the program. The program applies to certain visitors whether they hold 

 1

 GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.: 

December 2006), which is the publicly available version of our report entitled Border 

Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges 

at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-56SU (Washington, D.C.: November 2006). 

2

 A port of entry is generally a physical location, such as a pedestrian walkway and/or a

vehicle plaza with booths, and associated inspection and administration buildings, at a land 

border crossing point, or a restricted area inside an airport or seaport, where entry into the

country by persons and cargo arriving by air, land, or sea is controlled by U.S. Customs and

Border Protection. 

Page 1 GAO-07-378T 
a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country that has a visa waiver 

agreement with the United States under the Visa Waiver Program.3

 U.S. 

citizens, lawful permanent residents, and most Canadian and Mexican4

citizens are currently exempt from being processed under US-VISIT upon 

entering and exiting the country.5

 When foreign nationals subject to USVISIT arrive at a land POE, they are directed by CBP officers from the 

primary inspection area to the secondary inspection area for further 

processing. Visitors covered by US-VISIT who are determined to be 

admissible are issued an I-94 arrival/departure form, which, among other 

things, records their date of arrival and the date their authorized period of 

admission expires. The requirement that arriving nonimmigrants admitted 

to the United States, unless otherwise exempted, be issued a Form I-94 as 

evidence of the terms of their admission predates implementation of USVISIT and was incorporated into US-VISIT processing.6

Many aspects of US-VISIT program implementation have been driven or 

defined by various legislative mandates. These include a 2001 statutory 

requirement to focus particularly on the use of biometric technology in 

developing the integrated entry-exit system subsequently named US-VISIT; 

a 2002 statutory requirement to develop biometric identifier standards to 

be used to verify the identity of persons seeking to enter the United States

at POEs; and a requirement to install at all POEs equipment and software 

 3

 The Visa Waiver Program enables nationals of certain countries to travel to the United 

States for tourism or business for stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. Most 

western European countries participate in this program, along with Japan, Singapore, 

Australia, Brunei, and New Zealand. 

4

 To visit the United States, Mexican citizens generally need either a Mexican passport and

U.S. visa, or a Border Crossing Card (BCC), which is issued to Mexican visitors who wish

to enter the country for business or pleasure for no more than 6 months. The BCC contains

machine-readable biographic and biometric information. Mexican citizens with BCCs who 

are traveling within 25 miles of the border, (75 miles in Arizona, if entering through certain

POEs near Tucson) and who plan to stay no more than 30 days, are generally not subject to

US-VISIT processing upon entry. A Mexican citizen is subject to US-VISIT requirements, 

however, if a CBP officer determines that the entrant intends to stay more than 30 days or 

travel beyond the 25- or 75-mile limit. 

5

 On July 27, 2006, DHS issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, if finalized, would 

expand the scope of US-VISIT to include, among others, lawful permanent residents, aliens

seeking admission on immigrant visas, refugees and asylees, and certain categories of 

Canadians. DHS did not report how many additional persons would be covered by USVISIT if the rule was adopted.

6

 Visitors traveling on nonimmigrant visas are issued Form I-94 and visitors from Visa

Waiver Program countries are issued Form I-94W. Both forms show the date of arrival, port 

of entry, and date the authorized period of admission expires. 

Page 2 GAO-07-378T 
to allow biometric comparison and authentication of U.S. visas and other

travel and entry documents issued to aliens, as well as Visa Waiver 

Program participant passports. In addition, by law, an integrated entry and

exit data system was to be implemented at all U.S. POEs, including land 

POEs, by December 31, 2005, but there was no specific requirement to 

collect any new data on foreign nationals departing at land POEs by that 

date. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, on 

the other hand, did require the collection of biometric exit data for all 

individuals subject to US-VISIT, but it did not set a deadline for 

implementation of this requirement. 

This statement presents a summary of our December 2006 report on the

US-VISIT program, which was requested by the Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member of the House Homeland Security Committee and 

Congressmen Filner, Grijalva, Hinojosa, Ortiz, and Reyes. My testimony 

today provides a summary of our report and will focus on the following 

issues: 

• what the US-VISIT Program Office has done to implement US-VISIT 

entry capabilities at land POEs and what impact US-VISIT has had on 

these facilities, 

• the status of US-VISIT Program Office efforts to implement a US-VISIT 

exit capability at land POE facilities, and 

• what DHS has done to define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging 

border security initiatives. 

US-VISIT entry capability had been installed, as of November 2006, at 154 

of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites we visited reported that USVISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. 

DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT’s capabilities by, among other 

things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 

fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase 

processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where 

space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. 

We found that management controls in place to identify such problems 

and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. 

For example, we identified computer processing problems at 12 sites 

visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported to CBP’s 

computer help desk, as required by CBP guidelines. US-VISIT has 

developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that 

Summary 

Page 3 GAO-07-378T 
uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put 

US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. 

Our December 2006 report also stated that US-VISIT officials had 

concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability 

cannot be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE 

facilities. According to these officials, implementing a biometrically based 

exit recording system like that used to record those entering or re-entering 

the country is potentially costly (an estimated $3 billion in 2003), would 

require new infrastructure, and would produce major traffic congestion 

because travelers would have to stop their vehicles upon exit to be 

processed—an option officials consider unacceptable. US-VISIT officials 

stated that they believe technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years 

will enable the biometric verification of persons exiting the country 

without a major impact on facilities. The US-VISIT Program Office has 

tested radio frequency identification (RFID) technology as a nonbiometric 

means of recording visitors as they exit. RFID technology can be used to 

electronically identify and gather information contained on a tag—in this 

case, a unique identifying number embedded in a tag on a visitor’s 

arrival/departure form—which an electronic reader at the POE is intended 

to detect. While RFID technology required few facility and infrastructure 

changes, US-VISIT’s initial testing and analysis of this technology 

identified numerous performance and reliability problems, such as the 

failure of RFID readers to detect a majority of travelers’ tags during 

testing. Furthermore, the RFID solution did not meet the statutory 

requirement for a biometric exit capability because the technology as 

tested cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT—ensuring that visitors who 

enter the country are the same ones who leave. Specifically, the RFID tag 

in the visitor’s arrival/departure form cannot be physically tied to an 

individual, which means that while a document may be detected as leaving 

the country, the person to whom it was issued at time of entry may be 

somewhere else. By statute, DHS was to have reported to Congress by 

June 2005 on how it intended to fully implement a comprehensive, 

biometric entry/exit program, but DHS had not yet reported how it 

intended to do so, or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is 

finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and 

allocate program resources, including funds for any facility modifications 

that might be needed, plan for the program’s future, or consider trade-offs 

between traveler convenience and security. 

DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other land 

border security initiatives and mandates and could not ensure that these 

programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost 

Page 4 GAO-07-378T 
effectively. As we reported 3 years ago, agency programs need to properly 

fit within a common strategic context governing key aspects of program 

operations, such as what functions are to be performed, what facility or 

infrastructure changes will be needed to ensure that they operate in 

harmony and as intended, and what standards govern the use of 

technology.7

 DHS had drafted a strategic plan defining an overall 

immigration and border management strategy, but had not yet approved it, 

and did not provide it to us for review. Meanwhile, new border security 

initiatives or mandates are planned or under way that could potentially 

have an impact on US-VISIT operations and facilities at land POEs. For 

example, no later than June 2009, U.S. citizens and foreign nationals of 

Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico who enter the United States at land POEs 

from within the Western Hemisphere will be required, for the first time, to 

present a passport or other documents deemed sufficient to show identity 

and citizenship. It is not yet known what types of documents, other than 

passports, may be permitted at land POEs, or whether these documents 

and the equipment required to read them can be aligned with US-VISIT 

technologies. Until decisions for this and other initiatives are made, it 

remains unclear how this program will be integrated with US-VISIT, if at 

all—raising the possibility that CBP would be faced with managing 

differing technology platforms and border inspection processes at each 

land POE. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work in concert with other border 

security and homeland security initiatives and what facility or facility 

modifications might be needed could help Congress, DHS, and others 

better understand what resources and tools are needed to ensure success 

and ensure that land POE facilities are positioned to accommodate them. 

We made three recommendations to enhance the US-VISIT program at 

land POEs. Specifically, with respect to entry capability our report 

recommended that DHS (1) improve existing controls for identifying and

reporting computer processing and other operational problems to help 

ensure that these controls are consistently administered and (2) develop

performance measures specifically for assessing the impact of US-VISIT 

operations at land POEs. With respect to the mandated report to Congress, 

we recommended that the Secretary take steps to ensure that it includes,

among other things, (1) information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility 

of deploying biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs; 

and (2) a description of how DHS plans to align US-VISIT with other 

 7

 GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security

Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003). 

Page 5 GAO-07-378T 
emerging land border security initiatives to ensure that different 

technologies and processes work in harmony. DHS generally agreed and

said that it has already begun or plans to implement our 

recommendations. 

US-VISIT is a large, complex governmentwide program intended to Background 

• collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign nationals 

who enter and exit the United States; 

• identify foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms 

of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; 

or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; 

• detect fraudulent travel documents, verify visitor identity, and 

determine visitor admissibility through the use of biometrics (digital 

fingerprints and a digital photograph); and 

• facilitate information sharing and coordination within the immigration 

and border management community. 

The US-VISIT Program Office has responsibility for managing the 

acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT and has 

been delivering US-VISIT capability incrementally based, in part, on 

statutory deadlines for implementing specific portions of US-VISIT. For 

example, the statutory deadline for implementing US-VISIT at the 50 

busiest land POEs was December 31, 2004, and at the remaining POEs, 

December 31, 2005.8

 From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, total 

funding for the US-VISIT program has been about $1.7 billion.

In reports on US-VISIT over the last 3 years, we have identified numerous 

challenges that DHS faces in delivering program capabilities and benefits

on time and within budget. In September 2003, we reported that the USVISIT program is a risky endeavor, both because of the type of program it 

is (large, complex, and potentially costly) and because of the way that it

was being managed.

9

 We reported, for example, that the program’s 

acquisition management process had not been established, and that US-

 8

 See appendix I for a legislative overview of the US-VISIT program. 

9 GAO-03-1083.

Page 6 GAO-07-378T 
VISIT lacked a governance structure. In March 2004, we testified that DHS 

faces a major challenge maintaining border security while still welcoming 

visitors. Preventing the entry of persons who pose a threat to the United 

States cannot be guaranteed, and the missed entry of just one can have

severe consequences. Also, US-VISIT is to achieve the important law 

enforcement goal of identifying those who overstay or otherwise violate 

the terms of their visas. Complicating the achievement of these security 

and law enforcement goals are other key US-VISIT goals: facilitating trade 

and travel through POEs and providing for enforcement of U.S. privacy 

laws and regulations.10 Subsequently, in May 2004, we reported that DHS 

had not employed the kind of rigorous and disciplined management 

controls typically associated with successful programs.11 Moreover, in 

February 2006, we reported that while DHS had taken steps to implement 

most of the recommendations from our 2003 and 2004 reports, progress in 

critical areas had been slow.12 As of February 2006, of 18 recommendations 

we made since 2003, only 2 had been fully implemented, 11 had been

partially implemented, and 5 were in the process of being implemented, 

although the extent to which they would be fully carried out is not yet 

known. 

US-VISIT Scope, 

Operations, and 

Processing at Land POEs 

Currently, US-VISIT’s scope includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit 

of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter and leave 

the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs. However, most land 

border crossers—including U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and 

most Canadian and Mexican citizens—are, by regulation or statute, not 

 10 GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security

Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-04-569T (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 

11GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program

Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004). 

12 GAO, Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Key Border Security

Programs Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

Page 7 GAO-07-378T 
required to enroll into US-VISIT.13 In fiscal year 2004, for example, U.S. 

citizens and lawful permanent residents constituted about 57 percent of 

land border crossers; Canadian and Mexican citizens constituted about 41 

percent; and less than 2 percent were US-VISIT enrollees. Figure 1 shows 

the number and percentage of persons processed under US-VISIT as a 

percentage of all border crossings at land, air, and sea POEs in fiscal year 

2004. 

 13 Since the statute governing US-VISIT applies to foreign national arrival and departure 

data only, U.S. citizens do not fall within the scope of the program and therefore are 

exempt from US-VISIT screening. Also, in general, regardless of whether they are to be 

processed into US-VISIT, Mexican citizens must present either a passport and visa or a 

BCC when seeking admission to the United States, while Canadian citizens generally do not 

need such documents at this time (Canadian visitors at land POEs may need passports as

early as January 2008, however, under regulations implementing a new statutory provision

on passport requirements). According to US-VISIT, when a Mexican receives a BCC, the

data on the individual entered into U.S. databases at the time of their visa application are

accessible by US-VISIT—if they are to be processed into it for any reason. 

Page 8 GAO-07-378T 
Figure 1: Persons Processed under US-VISIT as a Percentage of All Border Crossings at Land, Air, and Sea Ports of Entry, 

Fiscal Year 2004 

1.4%

Source: GAO analysts of DHS data.

42.2% 38.8%

Total entering United States:

335.3 million

Total entering United States:

75.1 million

Total entering United States:

14.7 million

Land ports of entry Air ports of entry Sea ports of entry

Processed by US-VISIT

Not processed by US-VISIT

98.6%

57.8% 61.2%

Note: Persons processed by US-VISIT may include foreign nationals who were also issued an I-94 

valid for multiple entries and who have re-entered multiple times. Total entering the United States 

includes U.S. citizens who may have re-entered the country multiple times and foreign nationals, 

including those not issued I-94s, such as Canadian citizens and Mexicans with BCCs, and those 

issued multiple entry I-94s who also may have re-entered multiple times. U.S. citizens do not fall 

within the statutory scope of US-VISIT and therefore are exempt from US-VISIT screening. 

Foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT who intend to enter the country 

encounter different inspection processes at different types of POEs 

depending on their mode of travel. Those who intend to enter the United 

States at an air or sea POE are to be processed, for purposes of US-VISIT, 

in the primary inspection area upon arrival. Generally, these visitors are 

subject to prescreening, before they arrive, via passenger manifests, which 

are forwarded to CBP by commercial air or sea carrier in advance of 

Page 9 GAO-07-378T 
arrival.14 By contrast, foreign nationals intending to enter the United States 

at land POEs are generally not subject to prescreening because they arrive

in private vehicles or on foot and there is no manifest to record their 

pending arrival. Thus, when foreign nationals subject to US-VISIT arrive at 

a land POE in vehicles, they initially enter the primary inspection area 

where CBP officers, often located in booths, are to visually inspect travel 

documents and query the visitors about such matters as their place of birth 

and proposed destination. Visitors arriving as pedestrians enter an 

equivalent primary inspection area, generally inside a CBP building. If the

CBP officer believes a more detailed inspection is needed or if the visitors 

are required to be processed under US-VISIT,15 the visitors are to be 

referred to the secondary inspection area—an area away from the primary 

inspection area—which is generally inside a facility. The secondary 

inspection area inside the facility generally contains office space, waiting 

areas, and space to process visitors, including US-VISIT enrollees. 

Equipment used for US-VISIT processing includes a computer, printer, 

digital camera, and a two-fingerprint scanner. Figure 2 shows how U.S. 

citizens and most Mexicans, Canadians, and foreign nationals subject to 

US-VISIT are to be processed at land POEs. 

 14 Under the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-

173, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 543, 557-59), commercial air and sea carriers are to transmit crew 

and passenger manifests to appropriate immigration officials before arrival of an aircraft or 

vessel in the United States. These manifests are transmitted to CBP through the Advanced 

Passenger Information System (APIS), which helps officers identify (1) those arrivals for 

which biometric data are available and (2) foreign nationals who need to be scrutinized 

more closely. 

15At land border POEs, the Form I-94 issued to foreign nationals covered by US-VISIT who 

are deemed admissible is considered issued for multiple entries, unless specifically 

annotated otherwise. A multiple entry I-94 permits them to re-enter the country, generally 

for up to 6 months, without additional US-VISIT processing during the period covered by 

the I-94. 

Page 10 GAO-07-378T 
Figure 2: Overview of US-VISIT Processing at Land POEs for Visitors with and without Visas Entering the Country 

Sources: GAO (analysis), MapArt (map).

Land POE

Primary inspection:

all travelers stop at 

plaza booth for 

identity check

U.S. citizens, U.S. lawful permanent 

residents, Mexicans with BCC, and most 

Canadians

Entry into

United States

Most holders of nonimmigrant visas

Visa waiver country travelers

Digital fingerprints and 

digital photo taken

Biographic information 

from passport or visa

is captured and 

checked against 

criminal databases

and watch lists

Interviewed and 

approved for entry by 

CBP officer

Interviewed and 

approved for entry by 

CBP officer

I-94 

issued

Passport or visa

scanned

Entry into

United States

Proceed to secondary 

inspection for 

US-VISIT processing

With visa Secondary 

inspection

Without visa

With visa

Those without a

visa are enrolled 

in US-VISIT

With visa: fingerprints

checked against 

individual’s existing record

Without visa: fingerprints

checked against 

entire database

As of August 2006, there were 170 land POEs that are geographically 

dispersed along the nation’s more than 7,500 miles of borders with Canada 

and Mexico. Some are located in rural areas (such as Alexandria Bay, New 

York, and Blaine-Pacific Highway, Washington) and others in cities (such 

as Detroit) or in U.S. cities across from Mexican cities, such as Laredo and

El Paso, Texas. The volume of visitor traffic at these POEs varied widely, 

with the busiest four POEs characterized by CBP, in fiscal year 2005, as 

Page 11 GAO-07-378T 
San Ysidro, Calexico, and Otay Mesa, California, and Bridge of the 

Americas in El Paso, Texas. 

My statement will now focus on what the US-VISIT Program Office had 

done to implement US-VISIT entry capabilities at land POEs and what 

impact US-VISIT has had on these facilities. 

At the time of our review, DHS had installed the entry portion of US-VISIT 

at 154 of the nation’s 170 land POEs,16 usually with minimal new 

construction or changes to existing facilities. As required by law, the USVISIT entry capability includes biometric features—such as digital scans 

of 2 fingerprints—to help verify the identity of visitors. CBP officials at all 

21 land POEs we visited told us that US-VISIT’s entry capability has 

generally enhanced their ability to process visitors subject to US-VISIT by 

providing assurance that visitors’ identities can be confirmed through 

biometric identifiers and by automating the paperwork associated with 

processing I-94 arrival/departure forms. 

DHS Had Installed 

US-VISIT Biometric 

Entry Capability at 

Nearly All Land POEs, 

but Faces Challenges 

Identifying and 

Monitoring the 

Operational Impacts 

on POE Facilities 

Going forward, DHS plans to introduce changes and enhancements to USVISIT at land POEs intended to further bolster CBP’s ability to verify the 

identity of individuals entering the country, including a transition from 

digitally scanning 2 fingerprints to scanning 10. While such changes are 

intended to further enhance border security, deploying them may have an

impact on aging and space-constrained land POE facilities because they 

could increase inspection times and adversely affect POE operations. Our 

site visits, interviews with US-VISIT and CBP officials, and the work of 

others suggest that both before and after US-VISIT entry capability was 

installed at land POEs, these facilities faced a number of challenges—

operational and physical—including space constraints complicated by the

logistics of processing high volumes of visitors and associated traffic 

congestion. Moreover, our work over the past 3 years showed that the USVISIT program office had not taken necessary steps to help ensure that 

US-VISIT entry capability operates as intended. For example, in February

2006 we reported that the approach taken by the US-VISIT Program Office 

to evaluate the impact of US-VISIT on land POE facilities focused on 

changes in I-94 processing time at 5 POEs and did not examine other 

 16 US-VISIT was not installed at 14 of the 16 other POEs because visitors subject to USVISIT are not permitted to enter the country at those locations; at the other 2 POEs, DHS 

lacked the infrastructure needed to install the equipment. 

Page 12 GAO-07-378T 
operational factors, such as US-VISIT’s impact on physical facilities or 

work force requirements.17 As a result, program officials did not always 

have the information they needed to anticipate problems that occurred, 

such as problems processing high volumes of visitors in space-constrained 

facilities. 

Turning to another aspect of our work on US-VISIT entry capability, our 

December 2006 report stated that management controls did not always 

alert US-VISIT and CBP to operational problems. Our standards for 

internal controls in the federal government state that it is important for 

agencies to have controls in place to help ensure that policies and 

procedures are applied and that managers be made aware of problems so 

that that they can be addressed and resolved in a timely fashion.18 CBP 

officials at 12 of 21 land POE sites we visited told us about US-VISITrelated computer slowdowns and freezes that adversely affected visitor 

processing and inspection times, and at 9 of the 12 sites, computer 

processing problems were not always reported to CBP’s computer help 

desk, as required by CBP guidelines. Although various controls are in 

place to alert US-VISIT and CBP officials to problems as they occur, these

controls did not alert officials to all problems, given that they had been

unaware of the problems we identified before we brought them to their 

attention. These computer processing problems have the potential to not 

only inconvenience travelers because of the increased time needed to

complete the inspection process, but to compromise security, particularly 

if CBP officers are unable to perform biometric checks—one of the critical

reasons US-VISIT was installed at POEs. 

Our internal control standards also call for agencies to establish 

performance measures throughout the organization so that actual 

performance can be compared to expected results. While the US-VISIT 

Program Office established performance measures for fiscal years 2005

and 2006 intended to gauge performance of various aspects of US-VISIT at 

air, sea, and land POEs in the aggregate, performance measures 

specifically for land POEs had not been developed. It is important to do so, 

given that there are significant operational and facility differences among 

 17GAO-06-296. 

18 GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999) and GAO, Internal Control

Standards: Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G

(Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

Page 13 GAO-07-378T 
these different types of POEs. Additional performance measures that 

consider operational and facility differences at land POEs would put USVISIT program officials in a better position to identify problems, trends, 

and areas needing improvements. 

My statement will now focus on the challenges facing DHS as it attempts 

to implement a biometric exit capability at land POEs. DHS Cannot 

Currently Implement 

a Biometric US-VISIT 

Exit Capability at 

Land POEs and Faces 

Uncertainties as

Testing of an 

Alternative Exit

Strategy Continues 

Various Factors Have 

Prevented US-VISIT from 

Implementing a Biometric 

Exit Capability 

Various factors have prevented US-VISIT from implementing a biometric 

exit capability. Federal laws require the creation of a US-VISIT exit 

capability using biometric verification methods to ensure that the identity 

of visitors leaving the country can be matched biometrically against their

entry records.19 However, according to officials at the US-VISIT Program 

Office and CBP and US-VISIT program documentation, there are 

interrelated logistical, technological, and infrastructure constraints that 

have precluded DHS from achieving this mandate, and there are cost 

factors related to the feasibility of implementation of such a solution. The 

major constraint to performing biometric verification upon exit at this 

time, in the US-VISIT Program Office’s view, is that the only proven 

technology available would necessitate mirroring the processes currently 

in use for US-VISIT at entry. A mirror image system for exit would, like 

one for entry, require CBP officers at land POEs to examine the travel

documents of those leaving the country, take fingerprints, compare 

visitors’ facial features to photographs, and, if questions about identity 

arise, direct the departing visitor to secondary inspection for additional 

 19 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, § 7208, 8 U.S.C. § 1365b. See

also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 414(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 353 (2001); 8 U.S.C. § 

1365a(b)(2)-(4).

Page 14 GAO-07-378T 
questioning. These steps would be carried out for exiting pedestrians as 

well as for persons exiting in vehicles. The US-VISIT Program Office 

concluded in January 2005 that the mirror-imaging solution was “an 

infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but not limited to, 

the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure requirements, and 

potential trade and commerce impacts.”20

US-VISIT officials told us that they anticipated that a biometric exit 

process mirroring that used for entry could result in delays at land POEs 

with heavy daily volumes of visitors. And they stated that in order to 

implement a mirror image biometric exit capability, additional lanes for 

exiting vehicles and additional inspection booths and staff would be 

needed, though they had not determined precisely how many. According 

to these officials, it is unclear how new traffic lanes and new facilities 

could be built at land POEs where space constraints already exist, such as 

those in congested urban areas. (For example, San Ysidro, California, 

currently has 24 entry lanes, each with its own staffed booth and 6 

unstaffed exit lanes. Thus, if full biometric exit capability were 

implemented using a mirror image approach, San Ysidro’s current capacity 

of 6 exit lanes would have to be expanded to 24 exit lanes.) As shown in 

figure 3, based on observations during our site visit to the San Ysidro POE, 

the facility is surrounded by dense urban infrastructure, leaving little, if 

any, room to expand in place. Some of the 24 entry lanes for vehicle traffic

heading northward from Mexico into the United States appear in the 

bottom left portion of the photograph, where vehicles are shown waiting 

to approach primary inspection at the facility; the 6ix exit lanes (traffic 

toward Mexico), which do not have fixed inspection facilities, are at the 

upper left. 

 20 US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment—FINAL (Rosslyn, 

Virginia: Jan. 31, 2005). 

Page 15 GAO-07-378T 
Figure 3: Aerial View of San Ysidro, California, POE 

Source: GAO.

Exit lanes

Entry lanes

Other POE facilities are similarly space-constrained. At the POE at 

Nogales-DeConcini, Arizona, for example, we observed that the facility is

bordered by railroad tracks, a parking lot, and industrial or commercial 

buildings. In addition, CBP has identified space constraints at some rural 

POEs. For example, the Thousand Islands Bridge POE at Alexandria Bay,

New York, is situated in what POE officials described as a “geological 

bowl,” with tall rock outcroppings potentially hindering the ability to 

expand facilities at the current location. Officials told us that in order to 

accommodate existing and anticipated traffic volume upon entry, they are 

in the early stages of planning to build an entirely new POE on a hill about 

a half-mile south of the present facility. CBP officials at the Blaine-Peace

Arch POE in Washington state said that CBP also is considering whether 

to relocate and expand the POE facility, within the next 5 to 10 years, to 

better handle existing and projected traffic volume. According to the USVISIT program officials, none of the plans for any expanded, renovated, or

relocated POE include a mirror image addition of exit lanes or facilities 

comparable to those existing for entry. 

Page 16 GAO-07-378T 
In 2003, the US-VISIT Program Office estimated that it would cost 

approximately $3 billion to implement US-VISIT entry and exit capability 

at land POEs where US-VISIT was likely to be installed and that such an 

effort would have a major impact on facility infrastructure at land POEs. 

We did not assess the reliability of the 2003 estimate. The cost estimate did 

not separately break out costs for entry and exit construction, but did 

factor in the cost for building additional exit vehicle lanes and booths as 

well as buildings and other infrastructure that would be required to 

accommodate a mirror imaging at exit of the capabilities required for entry 

processing. US-VISIT program officials told us that they provided this 

estimate to congressional staff during a briefing, but that the reaction to 

this projected cost was negative and that they therefore did not move 

ahead with this option. No subsequent cost estimate updates had been 

prepared, and DHS’s annual budget requests have not included funds to 

build the infrastructure that would be associated with the required 

facilities. 

US-VISIT officials stated that they believe that technological advances 

over the next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to utilize alternative 

technologies that provide biometric verification of persons exiting the 

country without major changes to facility infrastructure and without 

requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles, thereby 

precluding traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. US-VISIT’s 

report assessing biometric alternatives noted that although limitations in 

technology currently preclude the use of biometric identification because 

visitors would have to be stopped, the use of the as yet undeveloped 

biometric verification technology supports the long-term vision of the USVISIT program.21 However, no such technology or device currently exists 

that would not have a major impact on facilities. The prospects for its 

development, manufacture, deployment, and reliable utilization are 

currently uncertain or unknown, although a prototype device that would 

permit a fingerprint to be read remotely without requiring the visitor to 

come to a full stop is under development. 

While logistical, technical, and cost constraints may prevent 

implementation of a biometrically based exit technology for US-VISIT at 

this time, it is important to note that there currently is not a legislatively

mandated date for implementation of such a solution. The Intelligence 

 21 US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment—FINAL (Rosslyn, 

Virginia: Jan. 31, 2005). 

Page 17 GAO-07-378T 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires US-VISIT to collect

biometric exit data from all individuals who are required to provide 

biometric entry data.22 The act did not set a deadline, however, for 

requiring collection of biometric exit data from all individuals who are 

required to provide biometric entry data. Although US-VISIT had set a

December 2007 deadline for implementing exit capability at the 50 busiest 

land POEs, US-VISIT has since determined that implementing exit 

capability by this date is no longer feasible, and a new date for doing so 

has not been set. 

The US-VISIT Program 

Office Tested 

Nonbiometric Technology 

to Record Travelers’ 

Departure, but Identified 

Numerous Performance 

and Reliability Problems 

US-VISIT has tested nonbiometric technology to record travelers’ 

departure, but testing showed numerous performance and reliability 

problems. Because there is at present no biometric technology that can be

used to verify a traveler’s exit from the country at land POEs without also 

making major and costly changes to POE infrastructure and facilities, USVISIT tested radio frequency identification (RFID) technology as a 

nonbiometric means of recording visitors as they exit. RFID technology 

can be used to electronically identify and gather information contained on

a tag—in this case, a unique identifying number embedded in a tag on a 

visitor’s arrival/departure form—which an electronic reader at the POE is

intended to detect. While RFID technology required few facility and 

infrastructure changes, US-VISIT’s testing and analysis at five land POEs at 

the northern and southern borders identified numerous performance and 

reliability problems, such as the failure of RFID readers to detect a 

majority of travelers’ tags during testing. For example, according to USVISIT, at the Blaine-Pacific Highway test site, of 166 vehicles tested during

a 1-week period, RFID readers correctly identified 14 percent—a sizable 

departure from the target read rate of 70 percent.23

Another problem that arose was that of cross-reads, in which multiple 

RFID readers installed on poles or structures over roads, called gantries, 

picked up information from the same visitor, regardless of whether the 

individual was entering or exiting in a vehicle or on foot. Thus, cross-reads 

 22 8 U.S.C. § 1365b(d). 

23 A US-VISIT program official explained that for vehicles exiting during RFID testing, one

could “reasonably expect” a read rate of 70 percent because vehicles are not required to 

stop upon exit. The official also cited vehicle speed, safety, and awareness (of optimal 

positioning of the arrival/departure form; for example, holding the form up to the window

of the vehicle) as factors that affected RFID read rates. 

Page 18 GAO-07-378T 
resulted in inaccurate record keeping. According to a January 2006 USVISIT corrective-action report, remedying cross-reads would require 

changes to equipment and infrastructure on a case-by-case basis at each 

land POE, because each has a different physical configuration of buildings, 

roadways, roofs, gantries, poles, and other surfaces against which the 

signals can bounce and cause cross-reads. Each would therefore require a 

different physical solution to avoid the signal interference that triggers 

cross-reads. Although cost estimates or time lines had not been developed 

for such alterations to facilities and equipment, it is possible that having to

alter the physical configuration at each land POE in some regard and then 

test each separately to ensure that cross-reads had been eliminated would

be both time consuming and potentially costly, in terms of changes to 

infrastructure and equipment. 

However, even if RFID deficiencies were to be fully addressed and 

deadlines set, questions remain about DHS’s intentions going forward. For 

example, the RFID solution did not meet the congressional requirement 

for a biometric exit capability because the technology that had been tested 

cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT—ensuring that visitors who enter the 

country are the same ones who leave. By design, an RFID tag embedded in

an I-94 arrival/departure form cannot provide the biometric identitymatching capability that is envisioned as part of a comprehensive 

entry/exit border security system using biometric identifiers for tracking 

overstays and others entering, exiting, and re-entering the country. 

Specifically, the RFID tag in the I-94 form cannot be physically tied to an 

individual. This situation means that while a document may be detected as

leaving the country, the person to whom it was issued at time of entry may 

be somewhere else. 

Our report also noted that DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 

2005 on how the agency intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit

program. As of October 2006, this plan was still under review in the Office 

of the Secretary, according to US-VISIT officials. According to statute, this

plan is to include, among other things, a description of the manner in 

which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a comprehensive entry 

and exit screening system—including both biometric entry and exit—and

fulfills statutory obligations imposed on the program by several laws 

enacted between 1996 and 2002.24 Until such a plan is finalized and issued, 

DHS is not able to articulate how entry/exit concepts will fit together—

 24 8 U.S.C. §1365b(c)(2)(E). 

Page 19 GAO-07-378T 
including any interim nonbiometric solutions—and neither DHS nor 

Congress is positioned to prioritize and allocate resources for a US-VISIT 

exit capability or plan for the program’s future. 

My statement will now focus on DHS efforts to define how US-VISIT fits 

with other emerging border security initiatives. 

DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT strategically fits with other land 

border security initiatives. In recent years, DHS has planned or 

implemented a number of initiatives aimed at securing the nation’s 

borders. In September 2003, we reported that agency programs need to 

properly fit within a common strategic context governing key aspects of 

program operations—e.g., what functions are to be performed by whom; 

when and where they are to be performed; what information is to be used 

to perform them; what rules and standards will govern the application of

technology to support them; and what facility or infrastructure changes 

will be needed to ensure that they operate in harmony and as intended.25

We further stated that DHS had not defined key aspects of the larger 

homeland security environment in which US-VISIT would need to operate.

For example, certain policy and standards decisions had not been made, 

such as whether official travel documents would be required for all 

persons who enter and exit the country, including U.S. and Canadian 

citizens, and how many fingerprints would be collected—factors that 

could potentially increase inspection times and ultimately increase 

traveler wait times at some of the higher volume land POE facilities. To 

minimize the impact of these changes, we recommended that DHS clarify 

the context in which US-VISIT is to operate. Our December 2006 report 

noted that, 3 years later, defining this strategic context remained a work in

progress. Thus, the program’s relationships and dependencies with other 

closely allied initiatives and programs were still unclear. 

DHS Had Not 

Articulated How USVISIT Strategically 

Fits with Other Land 

Border Security 

Initiatives 

According to the US-VISIT Chief Strategist, the Program Office drafted in 

March 2005 a strategic plan that showed how US-VISIT would be 

strategically aligned with DHS’s organizational mission and also defined an 

overall vision for immigration and border management.26 According to this 

 25 GAO-03-1083. 

26In commenting on our December 2006 report, DHS stated that this plan includes USVISIT’s draft response to the legislative requirement that DHS produce a report to Congress 

by June 2005 that describes a comprehensive US-VISIT entry/exit screening system, as 

discussed earlier in this report. 

Page 20 GAO-07-378T 
official, the draft plan provided for an immigration and border 

management enterprise that unified multiple internal departmental and 

other external stakeholders with common objectives, strategies, 

processes, and infrastructures. As of October 2006, we were told that DHS 

had not approved this strategic plan. This draft plan was not available to 

us, and it is unclear how it would provide an overarching vision and road 

map of how all these component elements can at this time be addressed 

given that critical elements of other emerging border security initiatives 

have yet to be finalized.

For example, under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

of 2004, DHS and the Department of State are to develop and implement a 

plan, no later than June 2009, which requires U.S. citizens and foreign 

nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico to present a passport or other 

document or combination of documents deemed sufficient to show 

identity and citizenship to enter the United States (this is currently not a 

requirement for these individuals entering the United States via land POEs 

from within the Western Hemisphere).27 This effort, known as the Western 

Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), was first announced in 2005, and 

some members of Congress and others have raised questions about 

agencies’ progress carrying out WHTI. In May 2006, we issued a report that

provided our observations on efforts to implement WHTI along the U.S. 

border with Canada.28 We stated that DHS and the Department of State had

taken some steps to carry out the Travel Initiative, but they had a long way 

to go to implement their proposed plans, and time was slipping by. Among 

other things, we found that 

• key decisions had yet to be made about what documents other than a 

passport would be acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of 

Canada enter or return to the United States—a decision critical to 

making decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the 

 27 In November 2006, DHS and the Department of State issued a final rule announcing that, 

beginning on January 23, 2007, citizens of the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Bermuda

generally are required to present a passport to enter the United States when arriving by air 

from any part of the Western Hemisphere (8 C.F.R. Parts 212 and 235 and 22 C.F.R. Parts 41 

and 53). According to DHS, a separate proposed rule addressing land and sea travel will be 

published at a later date with specific requirements for travelers entering the United States

through land and sea POEs. By law, these new requirements are to be in place no later than

June 2009. 

28 GAO, Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 

on the U.S. Canadian Border, GAO-06-741R (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006). 

Page 21 GAO-07-378T 
country, including what common facilities or infrastructure might be 

needed to perform these inspections at land POEs, and 

• a DHS and Department of State proposal to develop an alternative form 

of passport, called a PASS card, would rely on RFID technology to help

DHS process U.S. citizens re-entering the country, but DHS had not 

made decisions involving a broad set of considerations that included 

(1) utilizing security features to protect personal information, (2) 

ensuring that proper equipment and facilities are in place to facilitate 

crossings at land borders, and (3) enhancing compatibility with other 

border crossing technology already in use. 

As of September 2006, DHS had still not finalized plans for changing the 

inspection process and using technology to process U.S. citizens and 

foreign nationals of Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico re-entering or entering 

the country at land POEs. In the absence of decisions about the strategic 

direction of both programs, it was unclear (1) how the technology used to 

facilitate border crossings under the Travel Initiative would be integrated 

with US-VISIT technology, if at all, and (2) how land POE facilities would 

have to be modified to accommodate both programs to ensure efficient 

inspections that do not seriously affect wait times. This raises the 

possibility that CBP would be faced with managing differing technology 

platforms and border inspection processes at high-volume land POEs 

facilities that, according to DHS, already face space constraints and 

congestion.

Similarly, our December 2006 report noted that it is not clear how USVISIT is to operate in relation to another emerging border security effort, 

the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)—a comprehensive DHS initiative, 

announced last year, to secure the country’s borders and reduce illegal 

migration. Under SBI and its CBP component, called SBInet, DHS plans to 

use a systems approach to integrate personnel, infrastructures, 

technologies, and rapid response capability into a comprehensive border 

protection system. DHS reports that, among other things, SBInet is to 

encompass both the northern and southern land borders, including the 

Great Lakes, under a unified border control strategy whereby CBP is to 

focus on the interdiction of cross-border violations between the ports and 

at the official land POEs and funnel traffic to the land POEs. As part of 

SBI, DHS also plans to focus on interior enforcement—disrupting and 

dismantling cross border crime into the interior of the United States while 

locating and removing aliens who are present in the United States in 

violation of law. Although DHS has published some information on SBI 

and SBInet, it remains unclear how SBInet will be linked, if at all, to USPage 22 GAO-07-378T 
VISIT so that the two systems can share technology, infrastructure, and 

data across programs. 

Also, given the absence of a comprehensive entry and exit system, 

questions remain about what meaningful data US-VISIT may be able to 

provide other DHS components, such as Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), to ensure that DHS can, from an interior enforcement 

perspective, identify and remove foreign nationals covered by US-VISIT 

who may have overstayed their visas. In a May 2004 report, we stated that

although no firm estimates were available, the extent of overstaying is 

significant.29 We stated that most long-term overstays appeared to be 

motivated by economic opportunities, but a few had been identified as 

terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activities. Notably, some of the 

September 11 hijackers had overstayed their visas. We further reported 

that US-VISIT held promise for identifying and tracking overstays as long 

as it could overcome weaknesses matching visitors’ entry and exit. 

Developing and deploying complex technology that records the entry and

exit of millions of visitors to the United States, verifies their identities to 

mitigate the likelihood that terrorists or criminals can enter or exit at will, 

and tracks persons who remain in the country longer than authorized is a 

worthy goal in our nation’s effort to enhance border security in a post-9/11 

era. But doing so also poses significant challenges; foremost among them

is striking a reasonable balance between US-VISIT’s goals of providing 

security to U.S. citizens and visitors while facilitating legitimate trade and 

travel. 

Conclusions, 

Recommendations, 

and Agency Response 

DHS has made considerable progress making the entry portion of the USVISIT program at land POEs operational, but our work raised questions 

whether DHS has adequately assessed how US-VISIT has affected 

operations at land POEs. Because US-VISIT will likely continue to have an

impact on land POE facilities as it evolves—especially as new technology 

and equipment are introduced—it is important for US-VISIT and CBP 

officials to have sufficient management controls for identifying and 

reporting potential computer and other operational problems that could 

affect the ability of US-VISIT entry capability to operate as intended. For 

example, if disruptions to US-VISIT computer operations are not 

 29 GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered

Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004). 

Page 23 GAO-07-378T 
consistently and promptly reported and resolved, it is possible that a 

critical US-VISIT function—notably, the ability to use biometric 

information to confirm visitors’ identities through various databases—

could be disrupted, as has occurred in the past. The need to avoid 

disruptions to biometric verification is important given that one of the 

primary goals of US-VISIT is to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and 

visitors, and in light of the substantial investment DHS has made in USVISIT technology and equipment. To help DHS achieve benefits 

commensurate with its investment in US-VISIT at land POEs and security

goals and objectives, we recommended that DHS (1) improve existing 

controls for identifying and reporting computer processing and other 

operational problems to help ensure that these controls are consistently 

administered and (2) develop performance measures specifically for 

assessing the impact of US-VISIT operations at land POEs. 

With respect to DHS’s effort to create an exit verification capability, 

developing and deploying this capability at land POEs has posed a set of 

challenges that are distinct from those associated with entry. US-VISIT has 

not determined whether it can achieve, in a realistic time frame, or at an 

acceptable cost, the legislatively mandated capability to record the exit of

travelers at land POEs using biometric technology. Apart from acquiring 

new facilities and infrastructure at an estimated cost of billions of dollars, 

US-VISIT officials have acknowledged that no technology now exists to 

reliably record travelers’ exit from the country, and to ensure that the 

person leaving the country is the same person who entered, without 

requiring that person to stop upon exit—potentially imposing a substantial 

burden on travelers and commerce. US-VISIT officials stated that they 

believe a biometrically based solution that does not require those exiting 

the country to stop for processing, that minimizes the need for major 

facility changes, and that can be used to definitively match a visitor’s entry 

and exit will be available in 5 to 10 years. In the interim, it remains unclear 

how DHS plans to proceed. According to statute, DHS was required to 

report more than a year ago on its plans for developing a comprehensive 

biometric entry and exit system, but DHS has yet to finalize this road map 

for Congress. Until DHS finalizes such a plan, neither Congress nor DHS is 

likely to have sufficient information as a basis for decisions about various 

factors relevant to the success of US-VISIT, ranging from funding needed 

for any land POE facility modifications in support of the installation of exit 

technology to the trade-offs associated with ensuring traveler convenience 

while providing verification of travelers’ departure consistent with USVISIT’s national security and law enforcement goals. We recommended 

that as DHS finalizes the mandated report, the Secretary take steps to 

ensure that the report includes, among other things, information on the 

Page 24 GAO-07-378T 
costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying biometric and nonbiometric 

exit capabilities at land POEs. Our recommendation also stated that DHS’s 

report should include a description of how DHS plans to align US-VISIT 

with other emerging land border security initiatives and what facilities or

facility modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that 

different technologies and processes work in harmony. By showing how 

these initiatives are to be aligned, Congress, DHS, and others would be in a 

better position to understand what resources and tools are needed to 

ensure success and ensure that land POE facilities are positioned to 

accommodate them. 

DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and stated that it either

had begun to take or was planning to take actions to implement them. It 

acknowledged that the exit technology tested by DHS would not satisfy 

statutory requirements for a biometric exit system and said that it would 

perform research and industry outreach to satisfy the mandate. DHS, 

however, disagreed with our finding that the US-VISIT Program Office did 

not fully consider the impact of US-VISIT on the overall operations at 

POEs. It said that US-VISIT impacts are limited to changes in Form I-94 

processing time, which according to officials, improved, and that issues 

related to capacity, staffing, and other factors are “arguably” beyond the 

scope of US-VISIT. We agree that the approach taken to do operational 

assessments of the impact of US-VISIT land POE facilities focused on 

changes to I-94 processing time. Our concern is that the assessments did 

not examine other operational factors, such as US-VISIT’s impact on 

physical facilities, to help ensure that US-VISIT operates as intended. We 

believe more complete assessments of the impact of US-VISIT on land 

POE operations would better position DHS to anticipate potential 

problems and develop solutions, especially as additional US-VISIT 

capabilities, such as 10-fingerprint scanning, are introduced at these 

facilities. 

This concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to 

any questions that Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 

512-8816. John Mortin, Assistant Director; Amy Bernstein; Frances Cook; 

Odi Cuero; Richard Hung; Amanda Miller; James R. Russell; and Jonathan 

Tumin made key contributions to this testimony. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgements 

Page 25 GAO-07-378T 
Page 26 GAO-07-378T 

Appendix I: Legislative Overview of the USVISIT Program 

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 

originally required the development of an automated entry and exit control 

system to collect a record of departure for every alien departing the United

States and match the record of departure with the record of the alien’s 

arrival in the United States; make it possible to identify nonimmigrants 

who remain in the country beyond the authorized period; and not 

significantly disrupt trade, tourism, or other legitimate cross-border traffic 

at land border ports of entry. It also required the integration of overstay 

information into appropriate databases of the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service and the Department of State, including those used

at ports of entry and at consular offices. The system was originally to be 

developed by September 30, 1998; this deadline was changed to October 

15, 1998, and was changed again for land border ports of entry and sea 

ports to March 30, 2001.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management 

Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000 replaced the 1996 statute in its entirety, 

requiring instead an electronic system that would provide access to and 

integrate alien arrival and departure data that are authorized or required to

be created or collected under law, are in an electronic format, and are in a 

database of the Department of Justice or the Department of State, 

including those created or used at ports of entry and at consular offices. 

The act specifically provided that it not be construed to permit the 

imposition of any new documentary or data collection requirements on 

any person for the purpose of satisfying its provisions, but it further 

provided that it also not be construed to reduce or curtail any authority of

the Attorney General (now Secretary of Homeland Security) or Secretary

of State under any other provision of law. The integrated entry and exit 

data system was to be implemented at airports and seaports by December 

31, 2003, at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by December 31, 2004, and at 

all remaining ports of entry by December 31, 2005. 

The DMIA also required that the system use available data to produce a 

report of arriving and departing aliens by country of nationality, 

classification as an immigrant or nonimmigrant, and date of arrival in and

departure from the United States. The system was to match an alien’s 

available arrival data with the alien’s available departure data, assist in the 

identification of possible overstays, and use available alien arrival and 

departure data for annual reports to Congress. These reports were to 

include the number of aliens for whom departure data were collected 

during the reporting period, with an accounting by country of nationality;

the number of departing aliens whose departure data were successfully 

matched to the alien’s arrival data, with an accounting by country of 
nationality and classification as an immigrant or nonimmigrant; the 

number of aliens who arrived pursuant to a nonimmigrant visa, or as a 

visitor under the visa waiver program, for whom no matching departure 

data have been obtained as of the end of the alien’s authorized period of 

stay, with an accounting by country of nationality and date of arrival in the 

United States; and the number of identified overstays, with an accounting 

by country of nationality.

In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act provided that, in developing the integrated

entry and exit data system under the DMIA, the Attorney General (now 

Secretary of Homeland Security) and Secretary of State were to focus 

particularly on the utilization of biometric technology and the 

development of tamper-resistant documents readable at ports of entry. It 

also required that the system be able to interface with law enforcement 

databases for use by federal law enforcement to identify and detain 

individuals who pose a threat to the national security of the United States. 

The PATRIOT Act also required by January 26, 2003, the development and 

certification of a technology standard, including appropriate biometric 

identifier standards, that can be used to verify the identity of persons 

applying for a U.S. visa or persons seeking to enter the United States 

pursuant to a visa for the purposes of conducting background checks, 

confirming identity, and ensuring that a person has not received a visa

under a different name. This technology standard was to be the 

technological basis for a cross-agency, cross-platform electronic system 

that is a cost-effective, efficient, fully interoperable means to share law 

enforcement and intelligence information necessary to confirm the 

identity of persons applying for a U.S. visa or persons seeking to enter the 

United States pursuant to a visa. This electronic system was to be readily

and easily accessible to consular officers, border inspection agents, and 

law enforcement and intelligence officers responsible for investigation or

identification of aliens admitted to the United States pursuant to a visa.

Every 2 years, beginning on October 26, 2002, the Attorney General (now 

Secretary of Homeland Security) and the Secretary of State were to jointly

report to Congress on the development, implementation, efficacy, and 

privacy implications of the technology standard and electronic database 

system. 

The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 required 

that, in developing the integrated entry and exit data system for the ports 

of entry under the DMIA, the Attorney General (now Secretary of 

Homeland Security) and Secretary of State implement, fund, and use the 

technology standard required by the USA PATRIOT Act at U.S. ports of 

entry and at consular posts abroad. The act also required the 

Page 27 GAO-07-378T 
establishment of a database containing the arrival and departure data from

machine-readable visas, passports, and other travel and entry documents

possessed by aliens and the interoperability of all security databases 

relevant to making determinations of admissibility under section 212 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act. In implementing these requirements, the 

INS (now the Department of Homeland Security [DHS]) and the 

Department of State were to utilize technologies that facilitate the lawful 

and efficient cross-border movement of commerce and persons without 

compromising the safety and security of the United States and were to 

consider implementing a North American National Security Program, for 

which other provisions in the act called for a feasibility study. 

The act, as amended, also established a number of requirements regarding 

biometric travel and entry documents. It required that not later than 

October 26, 2004, the Attorney General (now Secretary of Homeland 

Security) and the Secretary of State issue to aliens only machine-readable,

tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use 

biometric identifiers and that they jointly establish document 

authentication standards and biometric identifiers standards to be 

employed on such visas and other travel and entry documents from among 

those biometric identifiers recognized by domestic and international 

standards organizations. It also required by October 26, 2005, the 

installation at all ports of entry of the United States of equipment and 

software to allow biometric comparison and authentication of all U.S. 

visas and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens and passports 

issued by visa waiver participants. Such biometric data readers and 

scanners were to be those that domestic and international standards 

organizations determine to be highly accurate when used to verify identity, 

that can read the biometric identifiers used under the act, and that can

authenticate the document presented to verify identity. These systems also 

were to utilize the technology standard established pursuant to the 

PATRIOT Act. 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 did not 

amend the existing statutory provisions governing US-VISIT, but it did 

establish additional statutory requirements concerning the program. It 

described the program as an “automated biometric entry and exit data

system” and required DHS to develop a plan to accelerate the full 

implementation of the program and to report to Congress on this plan by 

June 15, 2005. The report was to provide several types of information 

about the implementation of US-VISIT, including a “listing of ports of entry 

and other DHS and Department of State locations with biometric exit data 

systems in use.” The report also was to provide a description of the 

Page 28 GAO-07-378T 
manner in which the US-VISIT program meets the goals of a 

comprehensive entry and exit screening system, “including both entry and 

exit biometric;” and fulfills the statutory obligations imposed on the 

program by several laws enacted between 1996 and 2002. The act provided

that US-VISIT “shall include a requirement for the collection of biometric 

exit data for all categories of individuals who are required to provide 

biometric entry data, regardless of the port of entry where such categories

of individuals entered the United States.” 

The new provisions in the 2004 act also addressed integration and 

interoperability of databases and data systems that process or contain 

information on aliens and federal law enforcement and intelligence

information relevant to visa issuance and admissibility of aliens; 

maintaining the accuracy and integrity of the US-VISIT data system; using 

the system to track and facilitate the processing of immigration benefits 

using biometric identifiers; the goals of the program (e.g., serving as a vital 

counterterrorism tool, screening visitors efficiently and in a welcoming 

manner, integrating relevant databases and plans for database 

modifications to address volume increase and database usage, and 

providing inspectors and related personnel with adequate real time 

information); training, education, and outreach on US-VISIT, low-risk 

visitor programs, and immigration law; annual compliance reports by DHS, 

State, the Department of Justice, and any other department or agency

subject to the requirements of the new provisions; and development and 

implementation of a registered traveler program. 

Page 29 GAO-07-378T (440573) 
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