FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DEVELOPING

AND INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES:

COMPARING THE U.S.-JORDAN FTA

WITH MEXICO’S EXPERIENCE UNDER NAFTA

No. 2002-01-B

OFFICE OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER

U.S. International Trade Commission

Grace V. Chomo

Office of Economics

U.S. International Trade Commission

January 2002

The author is with the Office of Economics of the U.S. International Trade Commission. Office

of Economics working papers are the result of the ongoing professional research of USITC

Staff and are solely meant to represent the opinions and professional research of individual

authors. These papers are not meant to represent in any way the views of the U.S. International

Trade Commission or any of its individual Commissioners. Working papers are circulated to

promote the active exchange of ideas between USITC Staff and recognized experts outside the

USITC, and to promote professional development of Office staff by encouraging outside

professional critique of staff research. 

address correspondence to:

Office of Economics

U.S. International Trade Commission

Washington, DC 20436 USA
Free Trade Agreements Between Developing and Industrialized Countries: 

Comparing the U.S.-Jordan FTA with Mexico’s Experience Under NAFTA*

by

Grace V. Chomo

Abstract: Developing countries are participating in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in record

numbers. Despite their eagerness to improve market access, fears remain that trade liberalization with

large industrialized nations will erode infant industrial sectors, hindering the process of economic

development. Empirical evidence from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between

the United States, Canada, and Mexico has not supported fears that trade liberalization with industrialized

nations slows economic development in less-developed countries. NAFTA trade flows and foreign direct

investment into Mexico expanded at a greater rate following NAFTA implementation, taking into account

real exchange rate changes and capital flight during the 1995 peso crisis. Like Mexico, Jordan’s

improved access to the large U.S. market is expected to increase opportunities for Jordanian exports,

attract foreign investment, and stimulate economic development with trade as the engine of growth. This

study compares and contrasts Mexico’s experience under NAFTA with Jordan’s potential under the U.S.-

Jordan Free Trade Agreement.

*The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S.

International Trade Commission or any of its Commissioners.
Page 2 of 36

Introduction

Jordan’s improved access to the large U.S. market is expected to attract investment in the export

sectors, improve domestic productivity and competitiveness, and fuel economic development. Jordan is a

developing economy with a relatively small population, and thus a small domestic market. Jordan is

located in a region surrounded by other developing countries, limiting its potential for market growth. 

Without access to export markets in other parts of the world, Jordan has limited opportunities for

economic growth. Of course, the great distance and high transportation costs between Jordan and the

United States will influence the type of Jordanian goods that can compete in the U.S. market, even with a

free trade agreement. 

A developing country signing a trade agreement with an industrialized economy gains improved

access to a larger market for products that match the developing country’s relative factor-abundance

compared with the industrialized trading partner. Theoretically, a small developing nation should not lose

its industrial base by signing a free trade agreement with an industrialized country. Even for intraindustry trade, like products such as manufactures and agriculture can be produced with different

combinations of resources. Most bilateral and multilateral trade agreements between industrialized and

developing countries allow non-reciprocal tariff reductions for developing country members, extensive

phase-in periods, and safeguard measures to protect infant industry sectors that are most likely to be

injured by trade liberalization. Both the NAFTA and the U.S.-Jordan FTA give concessions to the

developing country members, namely Mexico and Jordan. Government revenues from customs duties are

another important issue for developing countries liberalizing trade. Developing countries, relative to

industrial countries, have large informal markets that fall outside the domestic taxation mechanism. This

causes developing countries to become reliant on customs duties as a primary source of tax revenue. The

U.S.-Jordan FTA addressed this issue by allowing special concessions on Jordanian automobile tariffs,

which are an important source of revenue. 
1

 The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement was ratified by the U.S. Congress May 1985, signed into

law (Public Law 99-47) June 11, 1985, and implemented September 1, 1985. 2

 The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) was ratified by the U.S. Congress August 1988, signed

into law (Public Law 100-499) September 28, 1988, and implemented January 1, 1989. 3

 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was ratified by the U.S. Congress November

1993, signed into law (Public Law 103-108) December 8, 1993, and implemented January 1, 1994. 4

 The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement was signed by the governments of Jordan and the United States

on October 24, 2000, U.S. implementing legislation was signed September 28, 2001, and implemented on

December 17, 2001. 

Page 3 of 36

The U.S.-Jordan FTA is an interesting case for examining the implications of trade liberalization

between countries at significantly different stages of development. The United States is a large,

industrialized country and an original signatory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and a

member of the World Trade Organization. The United States has historically placed priority on

multilateral trade liberalization, signing bilateral free trade agreements with only four countries; Israel1

,

Canada2

, Mexico3, and Jordan4. The case of Mexico under NAFTA is similar to Jordan in that both

countries are significantly less developed than the United States. Prior to NAFTA implementation,

empirical studies predicted the largest NAFTA-induced welfare gains for Mexico, the country with the

highest pre-NAFTA tariff and non-tariff barriers. Although the effect of reduced intra-NAFTA tariffs

and improved regional integration stimulated some increased volume of trade between Mexico and the

United States, important non-NAFTA economic factors were also present (Gould). The difficulty in

measuring the trade effects of NAFTA come down to the large influence of these other factors on the

economies of North America. Non-NAFTA factors influencing North American trade flows since

NAFTA implementation include changes in real exchange rates (the peso devaluations), the Mexican

recession, and high U.S. GDP growth rate.

The U.S.-Jordan FTA is expected to result in net welfare gains for U.S. and Jordanian consumers

from phased-in, reciprocal tariff elimination. Jordan is expected to gain relatively more from tariff

liberalization under the FTA for several reasons. First, Jordan’s economic distortions from import tariffs

is higher than for the United States. Reductions in Jordanian import tariffs on U.S. products, which

currently account for 10 percent of Jordanian imports, will allow domestic resources to adjust to more
Page 4 of 36

optimal uses. Secondly, U.S. international trade is overshadowed by U.S. interregional trade which

accounts for most of U.S. national income. Jordan is an insignificant trading partner of the United States. 

Impacts on the U.S. economy from trade liberalization with the small Jordanian economy will be

negligible, even at the sectoral level. This study does not address the impact of the U.S.-Jordan free trade

agreement on the U.S. economy. This study investigates the impact of U.S.-Jordan trade liberalization on

Jordanian export potential and economic development.

Trade Liberalization Between Developing and Industrialized Countries

Research by Frankel and Romer suggests that trade, whether interregional or international, raises

income. Larger countries tend to have more interregional trade and thus higher incomes than countries

with small domestic markets. Their research supports the hypothesis of exports as a potential engine of

growth for small developing countries. By accessing the larger international market, small countries can

benefit from economies of scale, such as efficiency gains from optimal plant size, that might not be

attained with limited domestic markets.

International trade theory suggests that countries should specialize in the products of their

comparative advantage, relative to their trading partners. Relative factor endowments are an important

determinant of comparative advantage with a trading partner, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O)

trade model. A drawback of the H-O trade model are the limiting assumptions that trading partners have

identical production technologies and tastes (Yarbrough and Yarbrough). This may be realistic for

countries at the same level of development, or countries from the same region with similar language,

religion, or culture. However, for trade between industrialized economies and the developing world,

these assumptions are not realistic. For developing countries, the business climate is another factor

constraining productivity of resources, where corruption, uncertainty (non-transparency), and lack of

incentives can reduce productivity. Adjustments have been made to the H-O trade model in empirical
Page 5 of 36

work by defining resources to include differences in labor quality (education, skills), technology, and

productivity differences.

Under the theory of comparative advantage, when a nation reduces barriers to a trading partner,

national resources adjust through specialization towards areas of comparative advantage relative to the

trading partner. Theoretically, Jordan attains a higher level of welfare from specializing in its areas of

comparative advantage with the United States. Through increased specialization and trade, Jordan can

increase consumption and attain higher net welfare. The net welfare position for Jordan will include

losses to factors in those sectors which are declining, especially returns to specialized labor and capital in

the industries in decline. These would include inefficient state-owned enterprises and protected domestic

industries with high levels of inefficiency due to market distortions stimulated by import-substitution

policies. Wages to labor and rents to capital will fall in these declining sectors and increase in the growth

sectors as the economy adjusts in response to changes in relative prices brought about by trade

liberalization policies and the resulting reduction in policy-induced market distortions. 

Developing countries have the potential for more efficiency and welfare gains from implementing

free trade agreements than their industrialized partners due to the high level of trade interventions and

resulting inefficiencies observed in developing countries. Gains from trade liberalization include

improved efficiency in sectors previously protected by trade barriers and increased transparency for doing

business. For example, the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism significantly improved access to legal

services for Mexican producers and workers involved in trade disputes with other NAFTA members. 

Efficiency gains from trade liberalization should be higher for the Jordanian economy under the U.S.-

Jordan FTA, than for Mexico under NAFTA, as the U.S. and Jordanian economies are significantly less

integrated than the U.S. and Mexican economies were prior to NAFTA. Protected domestic producers

and state-owned operations lead to domestic market inefficiencies that can affect the competitiveness of

export sectors, despite the advances made through trade liberalization policies. If non-tradable input

supply and service industries used by other sectors of the economy are inefficient, they can increase
Page 6 of 36

market inefficiencies and reduce the competitiveness of export sectors (Gillis, Perkins, Roemer, and

Snodgrass). Government focus on export policy alone is not enough for economic growth. All sectors in

the economy must develop along with the export sectors to prevent bottlenecks that hinder growth. 

Jordan’s government is in the middle of implementing numerous economic reforms designed to increase

transparency and reduce domestic market failures so the economy can attain maximum benefit from

recent trade liberalization policies. 

When examining trade flows and trade liberalization between two countries, it is essential to look

at resource endowments. The industrialized economy of the United States has a higher ratio of capital to

labor than the Jordanian economy. Workers in Jordan have access to less capital than workers in the

United States. Under the H-O trade model, we expect exports to be more intensive in the use of the

abundant factor (Yarbrough and Yarbrough). The United States should export capital-intensive goods to

Jordan and import labor-intensive Jordanian products. Trade statistics reveal Jordan as a net importer of

cereals from the United States. Jordan also produces cereals domestically. The isoquant in Figure 1

illustrates two different combinations of capital (K) and labor (L) that can produce a unit of cereals. The

Jordanian isocost line reflects the relative abundance of capital and labor in Jordan. The slope of the

Jordanian isocost line is the relative price of labor to capital (PL/PK). The factor price ratio (PL/PK) is

higher in the United States than in Jordan due to relatively greater capital abundance in the industrialized

U.S. economy. This leads to a different least-cost mix of inputs to produce a unit of cereals in the United

States compared with Jordanian cereal farmers. Jordanian cereal farmers substitute relatively abundant

labor for relatively scarce capital. Cereal farmers in the United States have a comparative advantage over

Jordanian farmers because of their access to agricultural technology and improved climate (rainfall) for

cereals production. Thus, Jordan is a net importer of cereals from the United States due to comparative

disadvantage.
Page 7 of 36

Jordanian and United States Comparative Advantage

Jordan produces and exports resource-oriented manufactured products, such as potash and

phosphate fertilizers, which is typical of many developing countries. Production of these products are

located near the input source, due to high costs of transporting the raw materials. High transportation

costs and distance prevent resource-oriented Jordanian products from having a comparative advantage in

the U.S. market, however they are competitive in the regional market. The United States imports light

manufactured products from Jordan, particularly textiles and apparel. Light manufactures are products

whose weight or volume do not change significantly during the production process. These products have

high value to weight ratios. Jordan produces and exports several types of light manufactures, specifically

textiles, apparel, and pharmaceuticals. These products are produced with an input mix representing the

relatively abundant labor compared with scarce capital in Jordan. United States apparel imports are the

second highest value import sector from Jordan. According to a study by the U.S. Congressional

Research Service (Ruebner), apparel “could prove to be the largest potential area of growth for Jordanian

exports to the United States under an FTA”. The U.S. effective tariff rates on Jordanian apparel (HTS

chapters 61 and 62) are relatively high, implying potential gains to Jordanian exporters from trade

liberalization. Jordan’s share of the U.S. apparel import market was 0.1 percent in 2000. This is an

insignificant share of total U.S. apparel imports $32.7 billion in 2000 (Figure 2). The U.S. also produces

apparel domestically, using a higher capital-labor mix reflecting the relative abundance of capital in the

U.S. economy. If Jordan doubled apparel exports to the United States, it would still be an insignificant

volume relative to the total U.S. market. Therefore, the terms of trade, how many units of exports are

exchanged for a unit of imports, facing Jordanian apparel exporters is determined by the larger U.S.

market. This is the small country assumption of international trade theory. Under the small country

assumption, Jordanian exporters face a flat U.S. offer curve.

The highest value U.S. merchandise export to Jordan in 2000 was cereals (HTS 10). U.S. exports

of cereals were $9,684 million in 2000, compared with U.S. cereal exports to Jordan of only $67 million,
5

 It will not be equal to U.S. opportunity cost due to market distortions such as tariffs, quotas, 

transportation costs, etc. which put a wedge between Jordanian export price and U.S. import price. 6

 The study used 1998 data and an Armington-type partial equilibrium model to estimate the effect on

U.S. exports in 1998 had there been zero tariff rates on U.S. cereal exports to Jordan.

Page 8 of 36

representing less than one-half of one percent of total U.S. cereals exports. In the two goods example, the

United States offers capital-intensive cereals in exchange for labor-intensive Jordanian apparel. The

Jordanian offer curve represents the quantity of apparel offered to the United States for various amounts

of U.S. cereals. In order for trade to take place between these two countries, the terms of trade of

Jordanian apparel for U.S. cereals must be lower than the internal opportunity cost of producing these

goods domestically.5

 This is a simplification as there are numerous goods and services traded between

the United States and Jordan. Figure 3 illustrates the potential gains from U.S. tariff liberalization. The

U.S. offer curve shifts, resulting in greater volumes of apparel and cereals trade between Jordan and the

United States. 

Current Jordanian tariff rates on corn and rice are 5 percent, and zero for wheat. Under the U.S.-

Jordan FTA, tariff rates of 5 percent or less should go to zero within two years. One study found that

elimination of Jordanian cereal tariffs would have resulted in a 14 percent increase in U.S. cereal exports

to Jordan in 1998 (USITC).6

 Taking this percentage change and applying it ad hoc to the value of U.S.

cereal exports to Jordan in 2000, we can illustrate the shift in the Jordanian offer curve from tariff

liberalization and the resulting change in U.S. cereal exports from $67 million to approximately $77

million (Figure 4). Both the volume of cereals and apparel trade between the U.S. and Jordan increases in

response to Jordanian tariff liberalization in this sector.

A commonly-used measure of comparative advantage is the revealed comparative advantage

index (RCA). The RCA measures the relative trade performance of a country in a given commodity

(Balassa). Balassa suggests the RCA can be calculated by dividing a country’s share of exports in a given

commodity by its share of all exports. An RCA index greater than one “reveals” a comparative advantage

in exporting that commodity. Haddad calculated RCA indices for MENA countries using the most recent
Page 9 of 36

United Nations data at the SITC two-digit level. For Jordan, Haddad reports revealed comparative

advantage in food, crude materials, animal and vegetable oils, and chemical products. Statistics on

Jordanian exports correspond with the results for some of her estimated RCA indices. Food products

contributed 12 percent of Jordan’s export value in 1999 (Central Bank of Jordan). Phosphates, potash,

and fertilizers contributed 30 percent, combined. Medicaments, a light manufactured product, contributed

10 percent of export value in 1999. Manufactured and miscellaneous manufactured products accounted

for 17 percent of Jordanian exports, despite an RCA index of less than one for both categories, indicating

Jordan does not have a revealed comparative advantage in manufactures. We should note that the broadly

aggregated classifications under the two-digit SITC codes may include sub-categories which have

comparative advantage with particular trade partners. Vollrath clarifies that “It is not unusual for a

country to have a comparative disadvantage for a composite commodity and yet have a comparative

advantage for a particular niche within this composite.” This appears to be the case for Jordanian exports

to the United States. Although Haddad calculated a revealed comparative disadvantage for Jordanian

manufactured products, the top Jordanian exports to the United States were light manufactures. The RCA

indices reveal Jordan has a comparative advantage in food exports with the world, although these

products are not competitive in the U.S. market. Much of Jordanian agriculture is produced using

traditional methods, specifically in the grains and livestock sectors, and cannot compete with capitalintensive North American agriculture. One possible explanation is high shipping costs between the

United States and Jordan for high-value perishable crops such as fresh vegetables and fruit. This could

contribute to Jordan’s comparative disadvantage in this sector of the U.S. market while Jordan exhibits a

comparative advantage in exporting these products to regional neighbors. Israel has been successful in

supplying off-season tomatoes to the U.S. market under the U.S.-Israel Agreement on Trade in

Agricultural Products. It appears that trade barriers may be the limiting factor preventing Jordanian highvalue specialty crops from competing in the U.S. market. Taking advantage of the warmer Jordanian

climate to supply high-value specialty crops during off-season months could be an area of comparative
Page 10 of 36

advantage under the U.S.-Jordan FTA. It is well-known that developing countries can improve

productivity and competitiveness in the agricultural sector by investing in agricultural technology (Tobey

and Chomo). Jordan may reverse its comparative disadvantage in the U.S. market for specialty crops by

attracting investment into this sector. Some modern farming regions have already developed in Jordan,

adopting greenhouse and drip irrigation technology for production of cut flowers and vegetables. Trade

liberalization under the U.S.-Jordan FTA may open this sector for Jordanian agricultural producers with

access to capital.

Comparing the Jordanian and Mexican Experiences

The Mexican and Jordanian economies

The net benefits accruing to the developing Mexican economy from liberalizing trade with its

industrialized North American neighbors stimulated the Mexican government to expand its free trade

policy. Mexico signed bilateral trade agreements with 10 countries over the last 7 years. These countries

included developing countries in Latin America as well as industrialized economies such as the EFTA

members and the European Union. The new Mexican FTAs are all modeled after the NAFTA, a rulesbased agreement with a clearly defined dispute settlement mechanism (Diaz). The Mexican experience

under NAFTA has shown a country rapidly expanding exports, not only to North America but to the

world. Mexico received increased infusions of FDI from investors around the world during NAFTA

negotiations and following NAFTA implementation. Mexico has been able to maintain economic

reforms, even under the severe financial crisis of 1994-95. Empirical studies of NAFTA trade

liberalization have indicated significant positive impacts for the Mexican economy from trade

liberalization with Canada and the United States (Kehoe and Kehoe).

 The Mexican economy was expected to experience the greatest adjustments under the NAFTA,

due to the small relative size of its economy and higher levels of protectionism. Lopez-Cordova reports

Mexican real per capita GDP only 34 percent of U.S. GDP in 1994, suggesting large factor endowment
Page 11 of 36

differences between Mexico and its northern neighbors. Large differences in factor endowments prior to

trade liberalization suggest large trade and production effects from liberalization. Jordanian per capita

GDP in 2000 was 5 percent of U.S. per capita GDP. Like Mexico, Jordan is expected to experience

efficiency and welfare gains from resource adjustments under the trade liberalization measures of the

FTA.

How do Mexico and Jordan compare as developing countries? Mexico’s population is

significantly greater than Jordan (Table 1). The Mexican population 

Table 1

Development Indicators for the United States, Mexico, and Jordan, 2000

GDP per capita Population Life expectancy Infant mortality Adult literacy

Million dollars Millions Years per 1,000 Percent

United States 34,266 281.6 77 7 100

Mexico 5,862 98.0 72 29 91

Jordan 1,694 4.9 71 26 90

World 5,150 6,054 66 54 76

Source: World Bank, found at Internet address http://www.worldbank.org.

is 35 percent of the U.S. population (281.6 million). By comparison, Jordan’s population is less than 2

percent of the U.S. population. Mexico’s economy is more developed than Jordan’s economy, even preNAFTA. Mexico instituted significant economic reforms much earlier than Jordan, starting in the 1980s. 

In addition, Mexico’s companies benefitted from over 30 years of production-sharing with U.S.

companies. Mexico’s share of GDP from industry was 28.4 percent in 2000, with the manufacturing

sector accounting for 20.7 percent. By comparison, industry’s share of Jordanian GDP was 24.8 percent,

with manufacturing contributing only 15.6 percent. This share has been steadily increasing, from 12.7

percent in 1980. Services, primarily tourism, are the largest share of Jordanian GDP, 73 percent in 2000. 

This has increased from 64.1 percent in 1980. Services also account for the largest share of Mexican

GDP, 67.3 percent. Agriculture’s share of Jordanian GDP fell from 7.9 percent in 1980 to 2.2 percent in
7

 Economy - Legislative and Regulatory Reforms, found at Internet address

http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo. 8

 World Bank, found at Internet address http://www.worldbank.org.

Page 12 of 36

2000. Although the Jordanian government’s share of consumption of GDP has fallen from 28.8 percent

in 1980 to 23.8 percent in 2000, it continues to burden the economy. By comparison, the Mexican

government’s share of GDP was 10 percent in 1980 and 11 percent in 2000. 

Jordan has undertaken significant economic reforms during the 1990s and continues to pass

economic reform legislation7

. In 1995, a new Sales Tax Law was passed. This law expands the tax base

and increases tax rates to provide government revenues which will be lost under recent trade liberalization

policies. An Investment Promotion Law was passed in 1995 that provides incentives to domestic and

foreign investors. This is necessary to encourage capital inflows into the capital-scarce economy for

further industrialization. Non-Jordanians are allowed to own 100 percent of businesses, with the

exclusion of mining, trade services, and construction. Investment in certain regions of the country will

receive “tax holidays” over a specified period of time. In 1997, the government passed the Securities

Law, creating a regulatory body called the Jordan Securities and Exchange Commission. The

Commission’s goal is to increase transparency and to safeguard investor’s rights. The government is

currently preparing a number of reforms to improve transparency, market efficiency, and the overall

business climate in Jordan; The Insurance Law, the Mutual Funds and Trust Law, the Secured Financing

and Leasing Law, The Safeguard Law, the Competition (Antitrust) Law, the Companies Law, the

Customs Law, and Intellectual Property Rights Legislation. Effective implementation of new and

pending legislation will enable Jordan’s economy to capture potential welfare gains from multilateral and

bilateral trade liberalization. 

The socio-economic development indicators for Jordan are not significantly different from

Mexico (Table 1). For example, life expectancy in 2000 was 72 years in Mexico and 71 years in Jordan8

. 

The world average was 66 years and in the United States life expectancy was 77 years. Infant mortality
9

 Import duties as a percentage of total imports at customs value. Calculated from official statistics of the

U.S. Department of Commerce. 

Page 13 of 36

rates in Jordan and Mexico are significantly below the world average of 54 deaths per 1,000 live births. 

Mexico had an infant mortality rate of 29 and Jordan had a lower rate of 26 in 2000. The adult literacy

rate for Mexico was 91 percent and 90 percent for Jordan in 2000. The United Nations Human

Development Index (HDI), constructed from life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, school enrollment,

and GDP per capita, ranks both Jordan and Mexico as countries with “medium human development” in

1999. Mexico ranked 51 and Jordan 88 out of 150 countries in the 2000 report. The HDI for Jordan is

0.714, compared to Mexico’s HDI of 0.790. The largest component contributing to the difference

between these two countries HDI indices is the GDP index. Jordan’s 1999 GDP per capita is less than

half that of Mexico. Even Mexico’s HDI for 1990 (pre-NAFTA) is higher than Jordan’s HDI in 1999. 

We have to look prior to 1980 to find a Mexican HDI value equivalent to Jordan’s value in 1999. 

Jordan’s income constraint, relative to Mexico, is a leading factor contributing to limited domestic

investment and slow economic growth. 

Tariff liberalization

The U.S. effective tariff rate9 on imports from Mexico was relatively low prior to implementation

of NAFTA (Appendix, Table 1). The average tariff rate fell from 3.1 percent in 1989 to 2.1 percent in

1993. Following implementation of NAFTA, the effective tariff rate fell to 0.2 percent in 2000. Israel,

which implemented a free trade agreement with the United States in 1985, has experienced an effective

tariff rate of 0.1 percent since1993, which is lower than Mexico. Canada, which implemented a free trade

agreement with the United States in 1989, faced a higher effective tariff rate than Israel. The effective

tariff rate on Canadian merchandise was 0.4 the year prior to NAFTA implementation, falling to zero in

2000. The effective tariff rate on U.S. imports from Jordan in 2000 was higher than the effective tariff

rate on U.S. imports from Mexico in 1993, prior to NAFTA implementation. This is partly due to the mix
10 USTR, “U.S. Trade Representative Designates Three New Duty-Free Zones in Jordan and Israel,” Press

Release 99-86, October 13, 1999, found at Internet address http://www.ustr.gov. 11 U.S. Trade Representative, “The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Fact Sheet,” found at Internet

address http://www.ustr.gov.

Page 14 of 36

of products imported from Jordan, mostly textiles and apparel which face significantly higher tariff and

non-tariff barriers entering the United States. Production-sharing between Mexican and U.S. companies

through the maquiladora program also contributed to lower average effective tariff rates on U.S. imports

from Mexico. Obviously, production-sharing is more feasible when two countries share a border, a

situation which does not exist for Jordan and the United States. Prior to NAFTA, Mexican products

could enter the U.S. with special duty provisions under HTS 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80 if they were

assembled or processed using U.S. inputs. The final products entering the U.S. market under special

rules-of-origins pay tariffs only on the value-added in Mexico. Mexican imports of U.S. inputs entered

maquiladoras duty-free, if the final products were re-exported. The maquiladora program was

implemented by Mexico in 1965. 

Effective tariff rates on U.S. imports from Jordan have come down in the late 1990s, partly in

response to initiation of a U.S. program to allow qualifying goods from Jordan, Israel, West Bank, Gaza

Strip, and Egypt to enter the United States duty free10. Jordanian qualifying products enter the United

States duty-free as products of Israel through a production-sharing scheme called Qualified Industrial

Zones (QIZ), under provisions of the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement of 1985. Legislation was

passed in October 1996 authorizing the U.S. President to eliminate duties on articles produced in these

qualifying regions. The President authorized the U.S. Trade Representative to designate QIZs in the

participating countries. The first zone was designated in March 1998. Four additional zones have been

authorized.

The tariff phase-ins under NAFTA were scheduled over 15 years, through 2008. For the U.S.-

Jordan FTA, tariff liberalization will be phased-in over 10 years, with 2001 designated as the first year of

tariff reductions11. Tariffs less than 5 percent will be eliminated over two years, tariffs between 5 and 10
12 Jordanian Ministry of Industry and Trade, “Jordan and the United States of America,” found at Internet

address http://www.mit.gov.jo.

Page 15 of 36

percent will be eliminated over four years, tariffs between 10 and 20 percent will be eliminated over five

years, and tariffs greater than 20 percent will be eliminated over 10 years12. Some non-reciprocal

concessions were given to Jordan under the U.S.-Jordan FTA due to its developing country status. For

example, Jordan can maintain high tariffs to restrict imports of socially-unacceptable products, such as

tobacco and alcohol. Jordan can apply temporary safeguard measures to protect domestic industries

during a 15 year grace period. The multilateral Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) will be

implemented by 2005, thus removing any trade-diverting welfare gains to Jordanian apparel exporters

from special access to the U.S. market. Given the long tariff phase-ins negotiated under the U.S.-Jordan

FTA, the welfare gains will be spread out over time and difficult to measure, as was the case with

NAFTA. For sectors with the highest tariff rates, liberalization will come near the end of the 10 year

phase-in period. Given the higher effective tariff rate facing top U.S. imports from Jordan, relative to

Mexico, the potential welfare gains to Jordan are higher than for Mexico under the NAFTA. 

Trade flows 

Mexican exports to the United States rose steadily since NAFTA implementation, however,

Mexican exports to the world also increased significantly (Appendix, Table 2). This export growth

cannot be attributed solely to tariff liberalization. As we have seen, NAFTA tariffs that were not already

low or zero in 1993 were scheduled to be phased-in over 15 years, to be completed in 2008. Part of the

post-NAFTA growth in Mexican exports can be attributed to the effect of the 1995 peso devaluation on

Mexico’s real exchange rate (Krueger). The fall in the relative price of Mexican exports increased North

American and world import demand, compounding the price effect of North American tariff

liberalization. The growth in Mexican exports to North America would have been smaller if NAFTA

tariff liberalization did not begin in 1994. Lustig refers to this rise in Mexican exports as the “engine of
Page 16 of 36

Mexico’s recovery”. But tariff liberalization alone cannot explain the phenomenal growth in intraNAFTA trade. 

Mexico was the number three trading partner of the United States in terms of volume of trade

prior to NAFTA. Mexico replaced Japan as the number two U.S. trading partner in 1999, when growth in

U.S.-Mexico trade outpaced the growth in U.S.-Japanese trade. U.S. imports from Mexico grew 31

percent in the five years prior to NAFTA (1989-93) and 48 percent in the five years following

implementation (1994-1998). By comparison, growth in the value of imports from Japan fell from 14

percent in the period 1989-93 to only 3 percent in 1994-98. Peso devaluation and the economic downturn

adversely affected Mexican import demand, with U.S. exports to Mexico growing only 35 percent in the

five years following NAFTA implementation, compared with 40 percent growth over the five years

preceding NAFTA. By comparison, U.S. exports to Japan grew only 7 percent during 1989-1993 and

1994-1999 periods. Jordan trade flows with the United States are extremely small compared with total

U.S. trade flows, and Jordanian exports to the United States are an insignificant share of total Jordanian

exports. Primary destinations for Jordanian exports in 1999 were India (20 percent), Saudi Arabia (14

percent), Iraq (12 percent), other Arab countries (35 percent), the European Union (9 percent), China (4

percent), and all other destinations combined (35 percent). On the other hand, the United States is a

significant supplier of Jordanian imports. Jordanian imports in 1999 were supplied by the European

Union (32 percent), Iraq (11 percent), the United States (10 percent), Arab countries (10 percent), other

European countries (7 percent), Japan (6 percent), South Korea (4 percent), and all other sources

combined (20 percent). The Jordan economy will experience welfare gains from removing import trade

restrictions on U.S. goods. 

Seven of the top 15 U.S. import categories from Mexico in 2000 at the HTS two-digit chapters

ranked by value are also in the top 15 U.S. import categories from Jordan (Appendix, Tables 3 and 4). 

Two of these chapters (HTS 98 and 99) are special provisions. As would be expected, Mexico and Jordan

are both net exporters of apparel products to the United States. In 1993, Mexican apparel entering the
13 Note that these are averages for the whole 2-digit chapters. There may be tariff peaks within these

chapters, with some tariff lines entering duty-free. It would be necessary to look at 8-digit classifications to

determine when Jordanian apparel tariffs will be liberalized under the U.S.-Jordan FTA phase-in schedule.

Page 17 of 36

United States under HTS chapters 61 and 62 accounted for 3 and 5 percent, respectively, of U.S. apparel

imports from all sources. They were the 5th and 9th highest value Mexican export categories to the

United States. These products faced U.S. effective tariff rates of 5.5 and 6.6 percent, respectively in

1993, the year prior to NAFTA implementation. The effective tariff rate on U.S. apparel imports from all

sources in 1993 was 17.6 and 13.9 percent, giving Mexican apparel producers an obvious competitive

advantage. Mexico had a price advantage over foreign competitors primarily due to special duty rates

granted under production-sharing with U.S. firms. Under NAFTA, the effective tariff rate for Mexican

apparel in the United States fell to 0.4 percent by 2000 in both HTS chapters. Mexican exports of apparel

significantly increased their share in the U.S. market, to 13.3 and 15.6 percent, respectively for HTS

chapters 61 and 62.

By comparison, Jordanian apparel entering under HTS chapters 61 and 62 accounted for only 0.1

percent of U.S. apparel imports in 2000 and paid effective tariff rates of 8.2 and 9.7 percent. This was

slightly lower than the effective tariff rates from all sources, which were 13.1 and 12 percent in 200013. 

Only Jordanian apparel exports produced outside of the QIZ program face the high U.S. effective tariff

rates. Under the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA), developing country textile and apparel exports faced

substantial tariff and non-tariff barriers in the industrialized nations, including the United States. The

1995 ATC phases-out the MFA over ten years, by 2005. At that time, Jordanian apparel exports will lose

their competitive advantage under the QIZ programs. However, Kheir-El-Din and Abdel-Fattah point out

that textiles and apparel exports represent a higher share of Mediterranean merchandise exports than

world exports in this sector, implying that the Mediterranean producers have a comparative advantage. If

this is true, Jordanian apparel and textile exporters should remain competitive in the U.S. market.
Page 18 of 36

Trade patterns between the United States and Mexico did not change significantly following

NAFTA implementation. The top four U.S. import categories from Mexico in 2000 were also the top

four U.S. import categories in 1993. The mix of products within the broad 2-digit HTS chapters have

changed somewhat. For example, under the electrical machinery chapter, insulated ignition wiring sets

(HTS 854430) was the top U.S. import category from Mexico in 1993. This product category was

bumped to second place in 2000 by reception apparatus for color television (HTS 852812), which wasn’t

even in the top 15 U.S. imports of electrical machinery from Mexico in 1993. Despite some changes in

the mix of products within the 2-digit HTS chapters, it is generally apparent that NAFTA did not

significantly change Mexico’s comparative advantage vis-a-vis the United States. What is noticeable is

the substantial increase in volume of trade in these categories. Insulated ignition wires contributed $1,621

million of U.S. imports from Mexico in 1993. This rose to $4,171 million in 2000. Passenger motor

vehicles from Mexico (HTS 870323) accounted for $3,416 million in U.S. import value in 1993. This

rose to $9,291 million in 2000.

Inferring from the Mexican experience, it is unlikely that tariff liberalization under the U.S.-

Jordan FTA will stimulate significant changes in the mix of U.S. imports from Jordan. Jordan’s top

export categories to the United States in 2000 were apparel, jewelry, leather goods, and art. Apparel

accounted for the top two value HTS chapters of U.S. imports from Jordan in 2000. These Jordanian

exports face high U.S. effective tariff rates. The volume of these exports should expand as U.S. tariff and

quota barriers are reduced. However, nine of the 15 top U.S. import categories from Jordan paid zero of

less than 1.1 percent ad valorum in 2000, therefore we wouldn’t expect to see great increases in trade

flows in these categories. 

Except for apparel, none of the top Jordanian exports to the United States were in the top 15 U.S.

imports from Mexico, such as electrical machinery and vehicles. At first glance it appears unlikely that

Jordan’s economy will expand into the top areas of Mexico’s comparative advantage with the United

States. Machinery and vehicles would require substantially more capital investment per worker and
Page 19 of 36

would have significantly higher transport costs to the U.S. market due to the great distances between

Jordan and the United States, relative to Mexico and the United States. Top Jordanian exports to the

world also differ significantly from Mexico’s top exports to the United States, suggesting a significantly

different resource mix for Jordan relative to Mexico. Jordan’s comparative advantage may change over

time as more capital enters the Jordanian economy and labor becomes more highly specialized. However,

light manufactures appear to have the most potential for growth under the FTA, given the great distance

between Jordan and the U.S. market. It may be more enlightening to examine Israeli trade with the

United States. Israel was the first country to sign a free trade agreement with the United States in 1985

and has a more advanced economy than Jordan. However, if we look at the mix of products imported

from Israel, we can see many similarities with Jordan (Appendix, Table 5). The top U.S. import from

Israel in 2000 was jewelry. This was the third highest value U.S. import from Jordan in 2000. The

second highest value import from Israel in 2000 was electrical machinery. Unlike Mexico, which exports

high weight per value electrical machinery (televisions) to the U.S. market, the Israeli electrical

machinery exports (semiconductors) are light manufactures. For light manufactures, transportation costs

are low relative to product value. It is possible for Jordan to diversify its exports to the United States

within the category of light manufactures (electrical machinery, pharmaceuticals) under the improved

market access offered by the FTA. Lack of investment capital will be the most likely factor limiting

diversification of Jordanian exports to the United States.

Domestic economic and regulatory reforms are essential to move Jordan away from previous

import-substitution policies towards trade liberalization and export promotion. Amerah lists necessary

reforms in fiscal, monetary, and commercial policies to enhance Jordanian “domestic producers’

competitiveness through market forces.” Many of these reforms have been implemented, such as trade

liberalization through the WTO and the U.S.-Jordan FTA, the Euro-Mediterranean Association

Agreement, and other Jordanian bilateral trade agreements. The QIZ program and Economic Free Zones
Page 20 of 36

have been launched to stimulate growth in the export sectors. Other significant reforms were discussed

on page 13.

Foreign direct investment

Kehoe and Kehoe report that the potential Mexican welfare gains from NAFTA trade

liberalization are substantially increased if NAFTA results in large capital flows into Mexico. Lustig

notes that NAFTA was significant in stimulating inflows of FDI into Mexico. Firms with FDI employ 20

percent of the formal sector workforce in Mexico, enjoying wages 48 percent higher than the national

average (Lustig). Improved market access to the United States is one component that stimulated postNAFTA investment into Mexico (Lopez-Cordova). Another important factor is investor confidence in

Mexican reforms and trade liberalization. Although the 1995 peso crisis caused a temporary flight of

capital from Mexico, Standard and Poor’s suggests the capital flight would have been greater without

NAFTA. Under the framework of NAFTA, the Mexican government was more likely to maintain its

package of economic reforms and not use trade barriers to remedy temporary balance of payments

problems. Raising trade barriers to solve balance of payments problems has been a regular device used

by developing countries. India extended implementation of tariff reductions under its WTO accession

package by claiming balance of payments problems. Argentina violated its tariff obligations to its

regional trade bloc (Mercosur) by adjusting tariffs to protect its domestic economy. The Mexican peso

crisis was the first real test of the will of a small, developing country to adhere to its bilateral trade

liberalization obligations with a large, industrialized economy. 

The Mexican economy was successfully attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) long before

implementation of NAFTA (Appendix, Table 6). Between 1980 to 1993, FDI in the Mexican industrial

sector rose 255 percent, while FDI in the services sector rose 2,000 percent, equivalent to simple annual

average growth rates of 20 and 145 percent, respectively (Mutti). Mutti jointly attributes the higher

growth in services investment to Mexican privatization of state-owned enterprises and NAFTA
14 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, found at Internet address http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca. 15 Bureau of Economic Analysis, found at Internet address http://www.bea.doc.gov.

Page 21 of 36

negotiations which were launched in June 1991. Standard & Poor’s reports FDI in Mexico increased

substantially during the NAFTA implementation period. NAFTA improvements in investment security,

transparency for foreign investors, and protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) are all factors

contributing to the increased investment flows into Mexico. A NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism

that provides for investor-state disputes is another investor-friendly feature that encouraged intra-NAFTA

investment. Canadian direct investment in Mexico rose from 530 million Canadian dollars in 1993 to

2,246 million Canadian dollars in 1998, a 300 percent increase over the first five years of NAFTA, with

only a slight dip in 1995 representing the capital flight under the peso crisis14. U.S. direct investment in

Mexico rose from $16,968 billion in 1994 to $26,657 billion in 1998, with only a slight dip in 199515.

FDI is encouraged by the Jordanian government through economic and regulatory reforms and

investment agreements with the United States and other trade partners. Jordan has undertaken

commitments to protect intellectual property rights in accordance with its obligations under the U.S.-

Jordan FTA. Proposed legislative IPR reforms in Jordan are likely to stimulate Arab and non-Arab

investment inflows. Domestic reforms, including reducing the lions share of GDP consumed by

government, must continue if Jordan is to achieve potential welfare gains from specialization and trade

under the U.S.-Jordan FTA and the WTO.

The countries of the Middle East region have chronically suffered from lower than world average

foreign direct investment. U.S. FDI in the Middle East has been very small (Appendix, Table 6). The

primary recipients of U.S. FDI in the region have been Israel and Saudi Arabia. The sectors receiving

U.S. FDI also differ significantly between North America and the Middle East. The petroleum sector

received 24 percent of U.S. FDI in the Middle East in 2000. Financial and banking services received 26

percent with 9 percent going into other services, such as tourism. The manufacturing sector received only
16 NAFTA Works, Embassy of Mexico, various issues, found at Internet address http://www.secofi.org.

Page 22 of 36

21 percent of U.S. FDI in the Middle East. By comparison, 58 percent of U.S. FDI in Mexico went into

the manufacturing sector in 2000. Capital accumulation is essential for Jordan’s economic development. 

Foreign capital investment in Jordan has been minimal for a number of reasons. Prior to recent reforms,

the Jordanian economy lacked necessary safeguards and regulatory infrastructure to attract foreign

capital. The recent reforms were made in preparation for Jordan’s accession to the WTO. For Mexico,

FDI inflows increased significantly while the NAFTA agreement was still being negotiated as investors

anticipated improved market access. The U.S.-Jordan FTA and Jordanian accession to the WTO should

signal international investors that Jordan is serious about recent economic reforms and will have greater

market access.

Mexico is geographically linked to the United States. Lopez-Cordova suggests that the

geographic location of Mexico is one of the key factors leading to the FDI flows and employment growth

that developed following NAFTA implementation. He suggests this unique proximity of a developing

country to the U.S. market would not be available for other hemispheric countries joining FTAs with the

United States. The amount of investment in maquiladora firms in many Mexican states increased

substantially following implementation of NAFTA16. GAO reports “...growth in shared production

activity and two-way trade suggests that increases in sector specialization, a mechanism through which

productivity may be improved, have occurred.” Lopez-Cordova reports maquiladora employment

doubled from 1994 to 1999. Large firms and foreign-owned firms contributed the bulk of manufacturing

employment growth in Mexico. Jordan is not geographically located near the United States, or even in

the Western Hemisphere. Thus production-sharing with U.S. firms is less likely to be stimulated by the

FTA than the maquiladora industry of Mexico. The U.S.-Jordan FTA does encourage production-sharing

through rules-of-origin. The FTA allows Jordanian exports with 35 percent Jordanian value-added to

qualify for the preferred U.S. duty-treatment. Up to 15 percent value can come from U.S. inputs. For
Page 23 of 36

example, if the maximum 15 percent value-added is from U.S. inputs, then Jordanian value-added needs

to be only 20 percent to qualify under the FTA. However, it is unlikely that the FTA will stimulate large

amounts of U.S. production-sharing with Jordan due to transportation costs. It is more likely that the

U.S.-Jordan FTA will stimulate regional production-sharing, as neighboring countries use Jordan’s

special trade status to access the U.S. market. Production-sharing opportunities between Jordanian and

Israeli firms which exist through the Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) program should increase, as QIZ

products will continue to receive special tariff treatment under the U.S.-Jordan FTA.

Conclusions

U.S.-Jordan trade liberalization will improve economic development of Jordan by eliminating

tariff distortions that led to resource allocations in inefficient sectors, and opening access to U.S. markets. 

However, like Mexico under NAFTA, maximum gains to Jordan will come if FDI inflows are stimulated

to invest in export sectors given the new access to U.S. markets. Jordan stands to gain improved

productivity from multinationals and regional production-sharing. Improved competitiveness will benefit

Jordan’s exports in the U.S. market as well as other world markets, multiplying the positive economic

effects of the U.S.-Jordan FTA. The key for Jordan is to attract investment funds. The Middle East

chronically suffers from lower than world-average foreign direct investment and Jordan has not been a

big recipient of the limited U.S. FDI in the region. However, Jordan has made great strides in improving

its investment climate, including a Bilateral Investment Treaty (1997) and a Trade and Investment

Framework Agreement (1999) with the United States. These steps, over time, should increase Jordan’s

attractiveness for FDI. 

Internal factors slowing Jordanian economic development include a small domestic market and

the lack of investment capital. Jordan’s small domestic market hinders the process of industrialization

and economic growth, especially when the government sector consumes such a large share of GDP. 

External economies of scale have been stimulated by government policies to promote industrial
Page 24 of 36

agglomeration through establishment of industrial estates. Locating these estates near Aqaba harbor and

the international airport have been especially beneficial in cutting transportation costs to export

destinations. Companies locating in these industrial estates benefit from pooled labor, shared

information, improved transportation and public services, and lower costs to their input suppliers. Further

efforts should be taken to identify and support development of cost-effective input supply industries to

improve efficiency of the domestic input and service sectors. 

The pre-NAFTA effective tariff rate for U.S. imports from Mexico was less than half the

effective tariff rate facing Jordanian exports. Thus, the potential welfare gains to Jordan from U.S. tariff

liberalization under the U.S.-Jordan FTA are relatively greater than for Mexico under the NAFTA. The

Mexican maquiladora program has been an integral part of U.S.-Mexico production-sharing since 1965. 

The number of maquiladoras grew substantially under NAFTA, contributing to the rapidly increasing

volume of intra-NAFTA trade. U.S.-Jordan production-sharing is less viable due to transportation costs. 

However, the 35 percent rules-of-origin under the U.S.-Jordan FTA should encourage Jordanian

production-sharing with other countries in the region. For example, the U.S. Qualified Industrial Zones

program authorized in 1996 stimulated production-sharing between Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and the

Palestinian territories. Regional production-sharing is a key to improving the Middle East’s share of

world trade and investment.

Integration with regional and international markets is the most likely engine of growth for small,

developing countries like Jordan. Jordan’s trade policy objectives have changed significantly, from

protectionism to export promotion. Jordan acceded to the World Trade Organization in April 2000,

signing a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with the industrialized countries of the European

Union, and supporting regional integration through a Mediterranean Arab Free Trade Area with Morocco,

Tunisia, and Egypt. The Jordanian economy has a lot of potential gains from trade liberalization with the

industrialized countries and its regional neighbors. Given Jordan’s top export products to the United

States (jewelry, apparel), it is unlikely to stimulate industrialization by focusing resources on expanding
Page 25 of 36

exports in these sectors alone. Jordan will gain most from the FTA by diversifying exports to the United

States into other light manufactures such as electrical machinery and pharmaceuticals.

Domestic economic reforms are essential for developing countries who sign multilateral and

bilateral trade agreements with industrialized countries. Trading agreements with industrialized countries

can give incentives to maintain economic reforms in times of macroeconomic crisis. NAFTA

membership helped Mexico maintain its economic reforms during the financial crisis of 1994-95. 

Jordan’s recent bilateral and multilateral trade agreements give incentives for the government to

implement reforms. Economic and regulatory reforms, along with laws on intellectual property rights,

should encourage necessary FDI, bringing capital, modern technology, and improved skills for

domestically hired labor. 

Non-economic external factors continue to hinder Jordan’s economic development. The Gulf

War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Palestinian refugees, and U.N. sanctions on Iraq are regional events

stifling Jordan’s economic growth. Iraq is Jordan’s neighbor and historical trading partner. Economic

sanctions that hinder the Iraqi economy indirectly damage the Jordanian economy. The lack of solutions

to the Palestinian refugees has stretched Jordan’s limited resources, reducing capital funds available for

economic development projects. Regional instability adversely affects the Jordanian investment climate. 

Tariff liberalization under a free trade agreement with the United States will have a minimal impact on

FDI in Jordan if regional instability continues. Although theoretical models discussed in this paper

illustrate welfare gains to Jordan from a U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement, these models do not include

parameters for non-economic factors. Anticipated dynamic gains to the Jordanian economy from tariff

liberalization with the United States will continue to be overshadowed by the negative impact of external

regional factors.
Page 26 of 36

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Lopez-Cordova, J. Ernesto. “NAFTA and the Mexican Economy: Analytical Issues and Lessons for the

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Publishing, 2000.
Page 28 of 36

K

--- Jordan

 L

cereals isoquant

(PL / PK) Jordan

labor (L)

capital (K)

K

--- U.S.

 L

Figure 1

U.S. Offer Curve

ROW Offer Curve

cereals trade

(million dollars)

apparel trade

(million dollars)

9,684

32,735

Terms of Trade

Figure 2
Page 29 of 36

U.S. Offer Curve

(Terms of Trade)

Jordan Offer Curve

cereals trade

(million dollars)

apparel trade

(million dollars)

67

42

Figure 3

U.S. Offer Curve

Jordan Offer Curve

cereals trade

(million dollars)

apparel trade

(million dollars)

67 77

Figure 4
Page 30 of 36

APPENDIX
Page 31 of 36

Appendix Table 1

Average tariff rates1

 (percent) for U.S. imports from FTA partners, 1993-2000

Exporter 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Mexico 2.1 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2

Canada 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0

Jordan 13.1 13.2 10.7 9.1 2.4 3.7 1.6 5.7

Israel 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

 1

 Import duties as a percent of U.S. imports by customs value, annual data.

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce
Page 32 of 36

Appendix Table 2U.S. trade flows with FTA partners, million U.S. dollars, 1993-2000

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 

Total U.S. exports 439,295 481,887 546,464 582,137 643,222 634,705 6

Mexico 40,265 49,136 44,881 54,686 68,393 75,369 Canada 91,866 103,643 113,261 119,123 134,794 137,768 1Jordan 361 287 332 342 398 351 Israel 3,952 4,368 4,813 5,069 4,835 5,680 

Total U.S. imports 574,863 657,885 739,660 790,470 862,426 907,647 1,0

Mexico 38,668 48,605 61,721 74,179 85,005 93,017 1Canada 119,482 128,753 144,882 156,299 167,881 174,685 1Jordan 19 29 29 26 26 16 Israel 4,424 5,218 5,722 6,421 7,320 8,619 

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce
Page 33 of 36

Appendix Table 3

Top 15 U.S. imports from Mexico in 2000, by 2-digit HTS chapters

HTS Description

Import value

(million dollars)

85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers,

television recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,640

87 Vehicles, other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof . . . 26,011

84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof . . . . . . . . . . . 17,037

27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral

waxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,338

62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,118

90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical

instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,452

98 Special classification provisions, nesoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,369

94 Furniture; bedding, cushions etc.; lamps and lighting fittings nesoi; illuminated signs,

nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,821

61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,499

73 Articles of iron and steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,584

07 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,582

99 Special import reporting provisions, nesoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,524

22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,264

39 Plastics and articles thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,184

72 Iron and steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,068

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Page 34 of 36

Appendix Table 4

Top 15 U.S. imports from Jordan in 2000, by 2-digit HTS chapters

HTS Description

Import Value

(million dollars)

62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.1

61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.3

71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semiprecious stones, precious metals; precious metal

clad metals, articles thereof; imitation jewelry; coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4

42 Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers;

articles of gut (other than silkworm gut) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.7

98 Special classification provisions, nesoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0

97 Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8

76 Aluminum and articles thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7

49 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other printed products; manuscripts, typescripts and

plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6

57 Carpets and other textile floor coverings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5

84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5

33 Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5

39 Plastics and articles thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4

99 Special import reporting provisions, nesoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3

90 Optical, photographic,cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical

instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3

63 Made-up textile articles nesoi; needlecraft sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags 0.3

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Page 35 of 36

Appendix Table 5

Top 15 U.S. imports from Israel in 2000, by 2-digit HTS chapters

HTS Description

Import value

(million dollars)

71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semiprecious stones, precious metals; precious metal

clad metals, articles thereof; imitation jewelry; coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,649

85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers,

television recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,401

84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof . . . . . . . . . . . 909

90 Optical, photographic,cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical

instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 771

98 Special classification provisions, nesoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525

61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373

88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

30 Pharmaceutical products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

29 Organic chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

39 Plastics and articles thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

82 Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal . . . 103

94 Furniture; bedding, cushions etc.; lamps and lighting fittings nesoi; illuminated signs,

nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth

metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

54 Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Source: Compiled from official statistics of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Page 36 of 36

Appendix Table 6U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in FTA partner countries, 1994-2000

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 

Million dollars

All countries 612,893 699,015 795,195 871,316 1,000,703 1,130,789 

N. America 91,189 100,371 108,943 120,676 124,857 143,313 Canada 74,221 83,498 89,592 96,626 98,200 111,051 Mexico 16,968 16,873 19,351 24,050 26,657 32,262 

Middle East 6,367 7,198 8,294 8,836 10,739 10,519 

Jordan

111111

Israel 1,483 1,831 2,045 2,071 2,837 3,051 

1 Suppressed by BEA-DOC to avoid disclosure of individual company data.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, found at Internet address http://www.bea.doc.gov/