NISTIR 7919

EXPLOSIVES STANDARDS FORUM 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

William G. Billotte 

Sharon B. Nakich 

 

March 2013

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7919
NISTIR 7919

Explosives Standards Forum 

Recommendations

William G. Billotte

Office of Special Programs 

Laboratory Programs

Sharon B. Nakich

Science Applications International Corporation

McLean, VA

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7919

March 2013

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Rebecca Blank, Acting Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director 
ii March 2013

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Federal, state, and local first responders who work with explosives and respond to 

improvised explosive device (IED) attacks rely on relevant documentary standards to make 

their jobs safer.

1 Per the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International 

Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Guide 2:2004, there are eight common types of 

documentary standards: basic standards, terminology standards, testing standards, product 

standards, process standards, service standards, interface standards, and standards on data to 

be provided.2 Explosives documentary standards that span many of these categories are 

available (for a cost), but as of September 2012, no explosives standards have been adopted 

by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).3

The DHS standards adoption process identifies appropriate and effective national standards 

that assist federal, state, and local equipment procurement processes, response, training 

development, and program coordination. Standards adoption assists with the following

• Encouraging and/or mandating that equipment purchased with federal dollars is 

certified to adopted standards (with exceptions noted when they exist);

• Achieving equipment interoperability;

• Developing training, exercise, and prevention programs;

• Harmonizing homeland security strategies, sharpening operational effectiveness, and 

maximizing efficiency within DHS and the federal government; and

• Encouraging uniform equipment purchases throughout the federal government based 

on informed input.

4

From September 2011 to September 2012, the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) Law Enforcement Standards Office (OLES), sponsored by the DHS

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Explosives Division, collected recommendations 

for the adoption and/or development of explosives standards by DHS and identified 

explosives standards gaps. NIST OLES named this effort the Explosives Standards Forum

(ESF).

 1 Per NISTIR 7614, there are two types of standards: physical measurement and documentary. This effort focuses on 

documentary standards. (http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/pubs/NISTIR_7614.pdf) 

2 See http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=39976 for more information.

3 See https://www.rkb.us/contentdetail.cfm?content_id=67919 for a full list of adopted standards to date.

4 See Explosives Standards Working Group (ESWG) documents and the Adoption of DHS National Standards: 

https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_106001_adoption_of_department_of_homeland_secur

ity_dhs_national_standards.pdf.
iii March 2013

The ESF

• Identified stakeholders in the explosives community, including

– Numerous federal agencies;

– State and local responders (primarily represented by the National Bomb Squad 

Commander Advisory Board [NBSCAB]); and

– Other subject-matter experts;

• Utilized stakeholder input to create a list of existing standards;

• Pared down the list and evaluated selected standards for DHS adoption;

• Analyzed standards gaps; and

• Produced a report detailing the final recommendations. 

On behalf of the federal, state, and local responder community, the ESF is recommending 

the standards listed in Table 1 for DHS adoption. This recommendation is based on the 

collected narrative of federal, state, and local stakeholders; the scores collected through a 

controlled Decision Analysis and Resolution (DAR) process, which is based on the 

Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) process improvement model;

5 and additional 

subject-matter expert analysis.

Table 1. Standards Recommended for DHS Adoption

Number Title 

NIJ Standard–0117.0 Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard

ASTM F792-08 Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security 

X-Ray Systems

NIJ Standard–0603.01 Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in Bomb Identification

ANSI N42.44, 2008 American National Standard for the Performance of Checkpoint Cabinet 

X-Ray Imaging Security Systems

ASTM Series for Robotsa

ASTM E2801-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot 

Capabilities: Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Gaps

ASTM E2802-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot 

Capabilities: Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Hurdles

ASTM E2803-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot 

Capabilities: Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Inclined Planes

 5 The DAR process (based on the CMMI model developed by the CMMI Institute, powered by Carnegie Mellon, 

www.cmmiinstitute.com) is a formalized decision-making process whereas decision criteria are developed, evaluated, 

and agreed upon at the beginning of a project. 
iv March 2013

ASTM E2804-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot 

Capabilities: Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Stairs/Landings

ASTM E2826-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot 

Capabilities: Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Continuous Pitch/Roll 

Ramps

ASTM E2827-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot 

Capabilities: Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Crossing Pitch/Roll Ramps

ASTM E2828-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot 

Capabilities: Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Symmetric Stepfields

ASTM E2829-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot 

Capabilities: Mobility: Maneuvering Tasks: Sustained Speed

ASTM E2830-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating the Mobility Capabilities of 

Emergency Response Robots Using Towing Tasks: Grasped Sleds

ASTM Series for Blast Resistant Trash Receptaclesa

ASTM E2639-12 Standard Test Method for Blast Resistance of Trash Receptacles

ASTM E2740-12 Standard Specification for Trash Receptacles Subjected to Blast 

Resistance Testing

ASTM E2831M-11 Standard Guide for Deployment of Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles in 

Crowded Places

a These have been bundled for analysis as one standard as they are complementary components regarding one 

technology or knowledge area.

State and local ESF stakeholders also highly ranked/recommended the National Guidelines 

for Bomb Technicians; however, the ESF at large is not recommending it for adoption at 

this time due to its law enforcement sensitive classification. 

The ESF has also identified the following standards gaps.

• Blasting Equipment. Participants discussed the variability in the performance of 

hand-held firing units on the market today. These are critical pieces of equipment 

used by bomb squads to detonate counter charges to defeat explosive devices. The 

participants agreed that the standard should specifically address energy output, 

disposal, and ruggedness, especially against falls and water. (Any research or standards 

development activity related to this gap should reference the Mine Safety and Health 

Administration’s [MSHA] materials and standards on this topic, which includes 30

Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 75.0-1 Subpart N.)

• Homemade Explosives/Continuing Education. Participants recognized a need 

for homemade explosives (HME) training standards/courses based on roles,

including bomb squads, operations, specialists, explosives workers, and ordnance 

workers.
v March 2013

• X-Ray Technology. Participants stated that x-ray standards should be developed or 

modified to account for new technology, including back scatter, dual energy, and 

millimeter wave.

• Robots and Interoperability. Participants were encouraged by the development of 

robot test standards and methods. However, they thought that there was a clear need 

for robot performance standards. In addition, consideration should be given to the 

development of standards to address robot interoperability and how robots 

communicate with one another and the bomb squads to work as a team.

• Communications. Standards for electromagnetic communications are not available 

outside the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Participants stated that an Explosive

Ordnance Disposal (EOD) communications standard should be considered. The 

standard would address inter-bomb squad communications, communications 

between the bomb squad and other responders, and robot/sensor communications.

In addition, the standard should address the security of information and intrinsic 

safety to prevent accidental detonation of an explosive device.

• Canine Teams Explosives Training. Participants noted that standards have yet to 

account for canine explosives detection activities. Test methods for canines are also 

necessary, and consideration should be given to the human-animal team. Any canine 

standard should also encompass incident mitigation once the canine has completed 

its task. Participants agreed that training standards for canine teams are paramount.

• Explosive Breaching. There are currently courses on explosive breaching, but there 

are no accreditation requirements for breaching training. Participants thought that 

standards for explosive breaching tools and training should be considered.

• Military Ordnance. State and local bomb squads are encountering an increasing 

amount of military ordnance in the U.S. Due to varying processes and procedures for 

incidents involving recovery of military ordnance. The participants indicated that 

standards addressing military ordnance response should be implemented.

• Explosive Containment Vessels and Total Containment Vessels (TCV). Fully 

enclosed TCVs were originally designed to contain an explosion but have evolved to 

include containment of toxic gases and biological or chemical agents. Manufacturers 
vi March 2013

make claims that the vessels can contain repeated explosions and toxic materials, but 

no standard or testing exists to determine if these claims are true.

• Development of a Program to Use DHS-NIST-ASTM International Standard 

Test Methods for Response Robots (E54.08.01). NBSCAB recommended that 

E54.08.01 be used as a way to self-train and self-evaluate robot operator proficiency 

compared to “expert” operator performance captured during the standardization 

process.

• Portable Hand-Held Shields/Ballistic Shield Protection. A standard should be 

developed for portable hand-held shields carried by special weapons and tactics 

(SWAT) bomb technicians to protect against fragmentation and blast/shrapnel. This 

standard could be developed leveraging the work being performed by the National 

Institute of Justice (NIJ) at the University of Denver. (A representative from the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives [ATF] strongly cautioned that 

this concept should be analyzed and determined safe before developing a standard.)

This report details the activities of the ESF from September 2011 to September 2012 and 

includes a detailed approach, documentation of all findings, and final recommendations. 
vii March 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..............................................................................................................iii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.........................................................................................................viii

LIST OF TABLES.........................................................................................................................viii

1.0 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................... 1

2.0 APPROACH ....................................................................................................................... 1

2.1 Identification of Stakeholders................................................................................... 3

2.2 Define Parameters.................................................................................................... 4

2.3 Research and Identification of Existing Standards.................................................... 4

2.4 Down-Selection of Standards for Evaluation ........................................................... 5

2.5 Conduct Federal Stakeholder Focus Groups............................................................ 7

2.6 Solicit State and Local Input at NBSCAB Meetings.................................................. 8

2.7 Solicit Additional Input............................................................................................ 9

2.8 Conduct Final Analysis and Produce Scores............................................................. 9

3.0 FEEDBACK AND FINDINGS ......................................................................................... 9

3.1 Input on Existing Standards for DHS Adoption ...................................................... 9

3.1.2 Federal Focus Group Input on Existing Standards for DHS Adoption........ 9

3.1.3 NBSCAB Input on Existing Standards for DHS Adoption ........................11

3.1.4 Additional Input.........................................................................................12

4.0 IDENTIFIED STANDARDS GAPS................................................................................12

4.1 Federal Focus Group-Identified Standards Gaps....................................................12

4.2 NBSCAB-Identified Standards Gaps......................................................................13

5.0 FINAL RECOMMENDATION/CONCLUSION...........................................................14

APPENDIX A ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

APPENDIX B LIST OF IDENTIFIED EXISTING STANDARDS TO DATE

APPENDIX C STANDARDS ANALYZED FOR DHS ADOPTION
viii March 2013

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Approach......................................................................................................................... 2

Figure 2. Conduct Focus Groups................................................................................................... 7

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Standards Recommended for DHS Adoption................................................................iii

Table 2. Sources of Existing Standards........................................................................................ 5

Table 3. Standards for Additional Analysis................................................................................... 6

Table 4. Standards Evaluation Criteria......................................................................................... 7

Table 5. Federal Focus Group DAR Scores ................................................................................11

Table 6: Standards Recommended for DHS Adoption..............................................................14
 1 March 2013

1.0 OVERVIEW

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes U.S. innovation and 

industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in 

ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life. Within NIST, the Law 

Enforcement Standards Office (OLES) directs programs and provides technical advice in a 

number of areas including criminal justice, public safety, forensic science, interoperable 

communications, emergency response, and counterterrorism. From September 2011 to 

August 2012, NIST OLES, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security Science and 

Technology Directorate’s (DHS S&T) Explosives Division, collected recommendations for 

the adoption and/or development of explosives standards by the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and identified explosives standards gaps. This effort is referred to 

throughout this report as the Explosives Standards Forum (ESF).

The following sections will describe the ESF’s approach, findings, and recommendations.

2.0 APPROACH

The ESF was executed as a collaborative effort between federal, state, and local stakeholders 

with a common goal to produce a list of recommended standards for DHS adoption and a 

list of identified standards gaps. The process was purposely inclusive and all input was 

considered in the final analysis phase. The major steps in the approach are discussed in 

Sections 2.1 through 2.8. Figure 1 illustrates the approach that the ESF followed.
 2 March 2013

Figure 1. Approach
 3 March 2013

2.1 Identification of Stakeholders

NIST OLES identified stakeholders in the explosives community at the federal, state, and 

local levels. Maximum participation and feedback was solicited at all levels of the process 

from individuals representing the following agencies:

1. Federal representation

a. Department of Defense (DoD)

i. Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) Technical Support 

Working Group (TSWG) 

ii. Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)

iii. Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division

(NAVEODTECHDIV)

b. U.S. Department of Treasury

i. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

c. DHS

i. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

ii. Federal Protective Services (FPS)

iii. DHS S&T Explosives Division

iv. Office of Bombing Prevention (OBP)

d. U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

i. National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Office of Science and Technology, 

Operational Technologies Division

ii. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Hazardous Device School (HDS)
4 March 2013

e. U.S. Department of Commerce

i. NIST OLES

ii. NIST Material Measurement Laboratory (MML)

2. State and local representation

a. National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB) (feedback by 

quorum)

b. Responder Knowledge Base (RKB) community (http://www.rkb.us/)

3. Explosives Standards Working Group (ESWG)6

2.2 Define Parameters

The ESF focused solely on explosives documentary standards (and did not address physical 

standards) for this effort. The ESF set forth the goals of recommending standards for DHS 

adoption and of recording all standards gaps put forth by stakeholders. 

2.3 Research and Identification of Existing Standards 

NIST OLES identified 34 existing published explosives standards, which included basic 

standards, terminology standards, testing standards, product standards, process standards, 

and service standards. Each source listed in Table 1 provided input. For the full list of 

identified existing standards, see Appendix B.

 6 The ESWG commenced in 2008 with the goal of providing “all DHS agencies with a forum/platform for collaboration 

and information exchange with national and international standards development bodies, other federal agencies, 

state and local government agencies and non-government entities on explosives related standards and conformity 

assessment measures.” The ESWG produced a number of materials and recommendations before it concluded in 

2010, and all produced materials were used as inputs to the ESF.
5 March 2013

Table 2. Sources of Existing Standards

Source Synopsis of Input 

2009 ESWG The 2009 ESWG plans, briefings, and documents were evaluated for input 

into this ESF process.

Federal Stakeholder Feedback The federal stakeholders identified a list of existing standards.

NBSCAB Feedback NBSCAB members provided an initial set of standards for consideration 

during their November 2011 meeting.

RKB NIST OLES analyzed top-viewed explosives standards for inclusion.

NIST OLES Standards Pilot An analysis was conducted on findings from the NIST OLES Standards 

Pilot for explosives standards applicability based on document requests 

or user feedback. These findings determined key equipment or training 

issues that the responder community has a strong interest in tracking and 

necessitated the inclusion of several of the radiographic standards on the 

evaluation list.

7

2.4 Down-Selection of Standards for Evaluation 

The ESF used stakeholder input (federal, state, and local) and the ranked popularity of the 

standards on websites such as the RKB and the Standards Pilot platform to pare down the 

list to a more manageable number of standards for closer evaluation. The downscaled list of 

21 standards included those that stakeholders deemed most relevant to the explosives 

community. The list of standards deemed most relevant for further evaluation is in Table 3.

Summaries of these standards are included in Appendix C.

 7 See http://www.nist.gov/manuscript-publication-search.cfm?pub_id=910380. 
6 March 2013

Table 3. Standards for Additional Analysis

Standard Number and Title 

NIJ Standard–0603.01, Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in Bomb Identification

ASTM Series for Robotsa

• ASTM E2801-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Gaps

• ASTM E2802-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Hurdles

• ASTM E2803-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Inclined Planes

• ASTM E2804-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Stairs/Landings

• ASTM E2826-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Continuous Pitch/Roll Ramps

• ASTM E2827-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Crossing Pitch/Roll Ramps

• ASTM E2828-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Symmetric Stepfields

• ASTM E2829-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Maneuvering Tasks: Sustained Speed

• ASTM E2830-11, Standard Test Method for Evaluating the Mobility Capabilities of Emergency 

Response Robots Using Towing Tasks: Grasped Sleds

ASTM E2520-07, Standard Practice for Verifying Minimum Acceptable Performance of Trace Explosive 

Detectors

ASTM Series for Blast Resistant Trash Receptaclesa

• ASTM E2639-12, Standard Test Method for Blast Resistance of Trash Receptacles

• ASTM E2740-12, Standard Specification for Trash Receptacles Subjected to Blast Resistance Testing

• ASTM E2831M-11, Standard Guide for Deployment of Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles in Crowded 

Places

National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians 2012

ASTM F792-08, Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security X-Ray Systems

NIJ Standard–0117.00, Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard

ANSI N42.47-2010, American National Standard for Measuring the Imaging Performance of X-Ray and 

Gamma-Ray Systems for Security Screening of Humans

ANSI N42.44-2008, American National Standard for the Performance of Checkpoint Cabinet X-Ray Imaging 

Security Systems

ANSI N42.45-2011, American National Standard for Evaluating the Image Quality of X-ray Computed 

Tomography (CT) Security-Screening Systems

ANSI N42.46-2008, American National Standard for the Determination of the Imaging Performance of X-Ray 

and Gamma-Ray Systems for Cargo and Vehicle Security Screening

a These have been bundled for analysis as one standard as they are complementary components regarding one 

technology or knowledge area.
7 March 2013

2.5 Conduct Federal Stakeholder Focus Groups 

The ESF solicited input on 21 standards during two

separate federal focus groups (in Washington, DC, and 

Gaithersburg, MD). The focus groups provided feedback

and ratings for each standard against established 

evaluation criteria utilizing a Decision Analysis and 

Resolution (DAR) process, based on the Capability 

Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) model.

8 Prior to the 

first focus group, specific evaluation criteria were 

developed based on input from the federal focus group 

participants and guidance found in DHS Management 

Directive 10600.1, Adoption of Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) National Standards. At the focus group, 

attendees reviewed and approved the criteria and assigned 

a specific weight to each related to level of importance.

Once the criteria and weights were finalized, attendees 

rated each standard against the criteria. The same criteria 

and weightings were used for all federal participant input 

during the first and second focus groups (see Figure 2).

These criteria are listed in Table 4.

Table 4. Standards Evaluation Criteria

Weight Criteria Criteria Considerations 

20% Was the standard updated within the 

last 5 years? • Is there a process to update the standard?

25% Is the standard relevant to state/local 

responders and industry?

• Does the standard promote and develop best 

practices and operations?

• Does it provide guidance in the purchase of 

effective, safe, quality, necessary, and 

interoperable equipment and promote confidence 

in that equipment?

• Does it define minimum performance 

levels/requirements, test methods, specifications, 

and operation procedures?

 8 The DAR process (based on the CMMI model developed by the CMMI Institute, powered by Carnegie Mellon, 

www.cmmiinstitute.com) is a formalized decision-making process whereas decision criteria are developed, evaluated, 

and agreed upon at the beginning of a project.

Figure 2. Conduct Focus 

Groups 
8 March 2013

15% Is the standard relevant to the federal 

response community?

• Does the standard assist with the Federal Grants 

Program?

• Does it assist in collaboration and information 

exchange between the federal and 

state/local/tribal governments and nongovernment entities?

• Does it promote standardized decisions/operations 

within DHS by developing clear and unambiguous 

requirements and performance objectives when 

assisting with explosives related programs?

20% Is the standard authored/developed by 

a reputable and recognized 

organization using open and 

transparent procedures?

• Is the standard based on data from reputable 

institutions?

• Is the document based on a consensus procedure?

• Were members of the responder community 

involved in the development of the standard?

15% Does the standard maximize 

responder effectiveness and not create 

any unnecessary burdens?

• Does the standard present clear benefits for safety 

or performance?

• Does it present a reasonable ratio of effectiveness 

to efficiency?

5% Is the standard easily accessible? • Is there a cost associated with obtaining the 

standard?

The DAR was based on a 100-point scoring scale. The final acceptance criteria received a 

weighted percentage to total 100 percent, and each standard was scored on a scale of 1 to 5 

for its applicability to each of the acceptance criteria. The DAR process accounts for scoring 

from multiple stakeholders, and the resulting calculations provide an averaged, weighted 

score for each standard. 

2.6 Solicit State and Local Input at NBSCAB Meetings

State and local input was solicited through the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory 

Board (NBSCAB). The NBSCAB’s mission is “to act in a leadership role for the bomb 

squad community, providing guidance and advice on important issues.” The NBSCAB 

focuses on initiatives to improve bomb squad tactics, techniques, procedures, training and 

equipment. Further, the NBSCAB sets guidelines and standards for the bomb squad 

community through its role as elected representatives for state and local bomb squads. In 

addition, numerous federal agencies involved in issues related to state and local bomb squads

regularly attend and contribute at the NBSCAB meetings.

9

 9 See http://nbscab.org/NBSCAB/nbscab_ex.php for more information.
9 March 2013

During the commencement of the ESF, DHS designated the NBSCAB to represent the 

responder community. The NBSCAB, per its by-laws, provided collective input by quorum

to the ESF. The input focused mainly on the specific needs of bomb technicians (local, 

state, and federal). During the ESF process, NBSCAB reviewed, approved, and 

recommended standards to be considered for adoption and identified standards to be 

developed.

2.7 Solicit Additional Input

NIST posted a question on the RKB website (http://www.rkb.us/) to solicit additional 

input from federal government users.

2.8 Conduct Final Analysis and Produce Scores

The DAR scores were not solely relied upon for final recommendations. Collected narrative 

was considered as valuable in determining the final recommendation. 

The final phase, per the established methodology, included reviewing all inputs from the 

various stakeholders, producing scores, and determining final suitability for adoption.

3.0 FEEDBACK AND FINDINGS

3.1 Input on Existing Standards for DHS Adoption 

This section details input from all solicited sources as related to existing explosives standards 

recommendations.

3.1.2 Federal Focus Group Input on Existing Standards for DHS Adoption

Both focus groups talked in depth about the existing explosives standards and related topics.

Comments were collected without attribution and paraphrased as follows:

• The federal focus group participants favored basic, product, or process standards for 

DHS adoption. While testing and service standards are valuable in the federal, state, 

and local responder community, the participants thought that performance standards 

were more desirable and useful.
10 March 2013

• Participants agreed that standards can quickly become expensive for a bomb squad. A 

federal focus group attendee pointed out that standards in the ASTM Series for 

Robots are $40.00 each, and the whole series totals $360.00. Participants were 

unaware of efforts by DHS to provide some standards at no cost to responders and 

generally thought that most responders were also unaware of this service.

• Participants indicated that they had found most standards related to explosives range 

from approximately $10.00 to $100.00. They agreed that standards for responders 

should be free, especially standards that were developed and published utilizing 

federal dollars. Participants noted that some federal agencies are not able to purchase 

standards in bulk and thus are not able to take advantage of economies of scale in 

buying. 

• Participants discussed the disconnect between the research and development 

community and the standards community. For example, a technology may be created 

or improved, but a standard may not be available to support the new technology. 

This leaves the responders and researchers unable to evaluate the technology’s

performance and applicability to the current needs. 

• One of the general observations by the participants was that bomb squads are 

moving toward using teams of robots for incidents. Participants agreed that the major 

standards issue with robots is communication between the robot and operator, 

between robots, and between the robot and other sensors.

• Participants stated that the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) had 

produced several relevant standards and agreed that these should be readily available 

to bomb squads.

Standards-specific feedback includes:

• ASTM E2520-07 does not address current threats, but the standard is in the process 

of being revised. 

• NIJ 0603.01 does not account for back scatter or dual energy devices; as a result, the 

standard does not address all x-ray technologies.
11 March 2013

• The National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians falls in the category of a process 

standard and is a valued resource; however, it is classified as law enforcement 

sensitive, making it more difficult to obtain and recommend for DHS adoption. 

Each federal focus group attendee rated the aforementioned standards per the evaluation 

criteria. Ratings were added up to produce a score for each standard. Ratings from the two 

groups were combined. Scores that resulted from the DAR process are shown below, in 

Table 4.

Table 5. Federal Focus Group DAR Scores

Score Standard 

87% NIJ Standard-0117.00, Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard

84% ASTM Series for Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles

83% ASTM F792-08, Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security X-Ray 

Systems

82% NIJ Standard-0603.01, Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in Bomb Identification

77% ANSI N42.44-2008, American National Standard for the Performance of Checkpoint Cabinet 

X-Ray Imaging Security Systems

76% National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians 2012

75% ASTM Series for Robots

64% ANSI N42.45-2011, American National Standard for Evaluating the Image Quality of X-Ray 

Computed Tomography (CT) Security-Screening Systems

62% ANSI N42.46-2008, American National Standard for Determination of the Imaging Performance 

of X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Systems for Cargo and Vehicle Security Screening

61% ANSI N42.47-2010, American National Standard for Measuring the Imaging Performance of 

X-ray and Gamma-ray Systems for Security Screening of Humans

54% ASTM E2520-07, Standard Practice for Verifying Minimum Acceptable Performance of Trace 

Explosive Detectors

3.1.3 NBSCAB Input on Existing Standards for DHS Adoption

After discussion, NBSCAB members recommended that DHS adopt the following 

standards:

1) NIJ Standard-0603.01, Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in Bomb Identification

2) National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians 2012

3) NIJ Standard-0117.00, Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard

4) ASTM Series for Robots
12 March 2013

The above standards are up to date, are relevant to the community at large, and maximize 

responder effectiveness. NBSCAB posed no objection to adoption of the remaining 

presented standards but opted not to specifically recommend them for adoption because 

they fall outside NBSCAB’s main area of responsibility.

3.1.4 Additional Input

The ESF received no additional input from the federal members of the RKB in regards to 

explosives standards to adopt or standards gaps that needed to be addressed.

4.0 IDENTIFIED STANDARDS GAPS

4.1 Federal Focus Group-Identified Standards Gaps

Both federal focus groups discussed the need for improvements to existing or the 

establishment of new standards for the explosives community. The participants thought the 

following were the highest priority for consideration.

• Ballistic Shield Protection. Current standards do not account for ballistic shield 

protection for bomb squads. Standards specific to portable, hand-held shields for 

blast, shrapnel, and overpressure protection should be considered. (This gap was 

combined with the Portable Hand-Held Shields gap in the final 

recommendations).

• Blasting Equipment. Participants discussed the variability in the performance of 

hand-held firing units on the market today. These are critical pieces of equipment 

used by bomb squads to detonate counter charges to defeat explosive devices. The 

participants agreed that the standard should specifically address energy output, 

disposal, and ruggedness, especially against falls and water.

• Homemade Explosives/Continuing Education. Participants recognized a need 

for homemade explosives (HME) training standards/courses based on roles,

including bomb squads, operations, specialists, explosives workers, and ordnance 

workers.

• X-Ray Technology. Participants stated that x-ray standards should be developed or 

modified to account for new technology including back scatter, dual energy, and 

millimeter wave.
13 March 2013

• Robots and Interoperability. Participants were encouraged by the development of

robot test standards and methods. However, they thought there was a clear need for 

robot performance standards. In addition, consideration should be given to the 

development of standards to address robot interoperability and how robots 

communicate with one another and the bomb squads to work as a team.

• Communications. Standards for electromagnetic communication are not available 

outside DoD. Participants stated that an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

communications standard should be considered. The standard would address interbomb squad communications, communications between the bomb squad and other 

responders, and robot/sensor communications. In addition, the standard should 

address the security of information and intrinsic safety to prevent accidental 

detonation of an explosive device.

• Canine Teams Explosives Training. Participants noted that standards have yet to 

account for canine explosives detection activities. Test methods for canines are also 

necessary, and consideration should be given to the human-animal team. Any canine

standards should also encompass incident mitigation once the canine has completed 

its task. Participants agreed that training standards for canine teams are paramount.

• Explosive Breaching. There are currently courses on explosive breaching, but there 

are no accreditation requirements for breaching training. Participants thought that 

standards for explosive breaching tools and training should be considered.

• Military Ordnance. State and local bomb squads are encountering an increasing 

amount of military ordnance in the U.S. Due to varying processes and procedures for 

incidents involving recovery of military ordnance, the participants indicated that 

standards addressing military ordnance response should be implemented.

4.2 NBSCAB-Identified Standards Gaps

NBSCAB recommended that standards or programs be developed related to the following 

explosives issues.

• Explosive Containment Vessels and Total Containment Vessels (TCV). Fully 

enclosed TCVs were originally designed to contain an explosion but have evolved to 

include containment of toxic gases and biological or chemical agents. Manufacturers 
14 March 2013

make claims that the vessels can contain repeated explosions and toxic materials, but 

no standard or testing exists to determine if these claims are true.

• Development of a Program to Use DHS-NIST-ASTM International Standard 

Test Methods for Response Robots (E54.08.01). NBSCAB recommended that 

E54.08.01 be used as a way to self-train and self-evaluate robot operator proficiency 

compared to “expert” operator performance captured during the standardization 

process.

• Portable Hand-Held Shields. NBSCAB encourages the development of a standard 

for portable hand-held shields carried by special weapons and tactics (SWAT) bomb 

technicians to protect against blast/shrapnel. This standard could be developed by 

leveraging the work being performed by NIJ at the University of Denver.

5.0 FINAL RECOMMENDATION/CONCLUSION

The ESF compared and normalized input from various stakeholders using detailed narrative 

analysis and formal DAR scores and considered the purpose for DHS adoption. The ESF 

recommends the following standards for DHS adoption:

Table 6: Standards Recommended for DHS Adoption

Number Title 

NIJ Standard–0117.0 Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard

ASTM F792-08 Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security X-Ray 

Systems

NIJ Standard–0603.01 Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in Bomb Identification

ANSI N42.44, 2008 American National Standard for the Performance of Checkpoint Cabinet X-Ray 

Imaging Security Systems

ASTM Series for Robotsa

ASTM E2801-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Gaps

ASTM E2802-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Hurdles

ASTM E2803-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Inclined Planes

ASTM E2804-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Stairs/Landings

ASTM E2826-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Continuous Pitch/Roll Ramps
15 March 2013

ASTM E2827-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Crossing Pitch/Roll Ramps

ASTM E2828-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Symmetric Stepfields

ASTM E2829-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Maneuvering Tasks: Sustained Speed

ASTM E2830-11 Standard Test Method for Evaluating the Mobility Capabilities of Emergency 

Response Robots Using Towing Tasks: Grasped Sleds

ASTM Series for Blast Resistant Trash Receptaclesa

ASTM E2639-12 Standard Test Method for Blast Resistance of Trash Receptacles

ASTM E2740-12 Standard Specification for Trash Receptacles Subjected to Blast Resistance 

Testing

ASTM E2831M-11 Standard Guide for Deployment of Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles in Crowded 

Places

a These have been bundled for analysis as one standard as they are complementary components regarding one 

technology or knowledge area.

These standards were all ranked higher than 70%, and verbal narrative from the stakeholders 

supported the scores. The National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians was recommended by 

NBSCAB; however, it was not included due to its law enforcement sensitive classification.

The ESF also identified the following standards gaps.

• Blasting Equipment. Participants discussed the variability in the performance of 

hand-held firing units on the market today. These are critical pieces of equipment 

used by bomb squads to detonate counter charges to defeat explosive devices. The 

participants agreed that the standard should specifically address energy output, 

disposal, and ruggedness, especially against falls and water. (Any research or standards 

development activity related to this gap should reference the MSHA materials and 

standards on this topic, which includes 30 Code of Federal Regulation [CFR] 75.0-1 

Subpart N). 

• Homemade Explosives/Continuing Education. Participants recognized a need 

for homemade explosives (HME) training standards/courses based on roles,

including bomb squads, operations, specialists, explosives workers, and ordnance 

workers.

• X-Ray Technology. Participants stated that x-ray standards should be developed or 

modified to account for new technology, including back scatter, dual energy, and 

millimeter wave.
16 March 2013

• Robots and Interoperability. Participants were encouraged by the development of 

robot test standards and methods. However, they thought there was a clear need for 

robot performance standards. In addition, consideration should be given to the 

development of standards to address robot interoperability and how robots 

communicate with one another and the bomb squads to work as a team.

• Communications. Standards for electromagnetic communication are not available 

outside DoD. Participants stated that an EOD communications standard should be 

considered. The standard would address inter-bomb squad team communications, 

communications between bomb squads and other responders, and robot/sensor 

communications. In addition, the standard should address the security of information 

and intrinsic safety to prevent accidental detonation of an explosive device.

• Canine Teams Explosives Training. Participants noted that standards have yet to 

account for canine mitigation activities. Test methods for canines are also necessary,

and consideration should be given to the human-animal team. Any canine standards 

should also encompass incident mitigation once the canine has completed its task. 

Participants agreed that training standards for canine teams are paramount.

• Explosive Breaching. There are currently courses on explosive breaching, but there 

are no accreditation requirements for breaching training. Participants thought that 

standards for explosive breaching tools and training should be considered.

• Military Ordnance. State and local bomb squads are encountering an increasing 

amount of military ordnance in the U.S. Due to varying processes and procedures for 

incidents involving recovery of military ordnance, the participants indicated that 

standards addressing military ordnance response should be implemented.

• Explosive Containment Vessels and TCVs. Fully enclosed TCVs were originally 

designed to contain an explosion but have evolved to include containment of toxic 

gases and biological or chemical agents. Manufacturers make claims that the vessels 

can contain repeated explosions and toxic materials, but no standard or testing exists 

to determine if these claims are true.

• Development of a Program to Use DHS-NIST-ASTM International Standard 

Test Methods for Response Robots (E54.08.01). NBSCAB recommended that 

E54.08.01 be used as a way to self-train and self-evaluate robot operator proficiency 
17 March 2013

compared to “expert” operator performance captured during the standardization 

process.

• Portable Hand-Held Shields/Ballistic Shield Protection. A standard should be 

developed for portable hand-held shields carried by SWAT bomb technicians to 

protect against fragmentation and blast/shrapnel. This standard could be developed 

by leveraging the work being performed by NIJ at the University of Denver. (A 

representative from the ATF strongly cautioned that this concept should be analyzed 

and determined safe before developing a standard.)
A-1 March 2013

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS
A-2 March 2013

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS

ANSI American National Standards Institute

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

BSR Board of Standards Review

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear

CFR Code of Federal Regulation

CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration

CTTSO Countering Terrorism Technical Support Office

DAR Decision Analysis and Resolution 

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DoD U.S. Department of Defense

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESF Explosives Standards Forum

ESWG Explosives Standards Working Group

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FPS Federal Protective Services

HDS Hazardous Device School

HME Homemade Explosives

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

ISO International Organization for Standardization

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
A-3 March 2013

MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration 

MML Material Measurement Laboratory

NAVEOD Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal

NBSCAB National Bomb Squad Commander Advisory Board

NIJ National Institute of Justice

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

OBP Office of Bombing Prevention

OLES Law Enforcement Standards Office 

RKB Responder Knowledge Base (http://www.rkb.us/)

S&T Science and Technology

SME Subject Matter Expert

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

TCV Total Containment Vessel

TSWG Technical Support Working Group

VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
B-1 March 2013

APPENDIX B

LIST OF IDENTIFIED EXISTING STANDARDS TO DATE
B-0 March 2013

APPENDIX B

LIST OF IDENTIFIED EXISTING STANDARDS TO DATE

 Number Title 

1 National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians 2012 (Law Enforcement Sensitive)

2 National Strategic Plan for U.S. Bomb Squads

3 ATF Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard and Evacuation Distance Tables

4 ATF Federal Explosives Law and Regulations

5 ATF Explosives Tracing Pocket Guide (Law Enforcement Sensitive)

6 ATF Detonator Recognition and Identification Guide

7 2010-1-A FBI Bomb Data Center Special Bulletin: Model for Bomb Squad SOPs

8 Weapons Technical Intelligence Improvised Explosive Device Lexicon

9 NIJ Standard-0603.01 Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in Bomb Identification

10 NIJ Standard-0117.00 Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard

11 NIJ Standard-0116.00 CBRN Protective Ensemble Standard for Law Enforcement

12 ANSI N42.44-2008 American National Standard for the Performance of Checkpoint Cabinet X-Ray 

Imaging Security Systems

13 ANSI N42.45-2011 American National Standard for Evaluating the Image Quality of X-ray Computed 

Tomography (CT) Security-Screening Systems

14 ANSI N42.46-2008 American National Standard for Determination of the Imaging Performance of 

X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Systems for Cargo and Vehicle Security Screening

15 ANSI N42.47-2010 American National Standard for Measuring the Imaging Performance of X-ray and 

Gamma-ray Systems for Security Screening of Humans

16 ANSI/IEEE N42.55 Standard for the Performance of Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in Bomb 

Identification

17 ANSI/IEEE C95.4-2002 IEEE Recommended Practice for Determining Safe Distances from Radio 

Frequency Transmitting Antennas When Using Electric Blasting Caps During 

Explosive Operations

18 ASTM F792-08 Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security X-Ray 

Systems

19 ASTM E2740-12 Standard Specification for Trash Receptacles Subjected to Blast Resistance 

Testing

20 ASTM E2639-12 Standard Test Method for Blast Resistance of Trash Receptacles

21 ASTM E2831M-11 Standard Guide for Deployment of Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles in Crowded 

Places

22 ASTM E2520-07 Standard Practice for Verifying Minimum Acceptable Performance of Trace 

Explosive Detectors

23 ASTM E2801-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Gaps

24 ASTM E2802-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Hurdles 

25 ASTM E2803-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Inclined Planes
B-1 March 2013

 Number Title 

26 ASTM E2804-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Stairs/Landings 

27 ASTM E2826-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Continuous Pitch/Roll Ramps

28 ASTM E2827-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Crossing Pitch/Roll Ramps

29 ASTM E2828-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: Symmetric Stepfields

30 ASTM E2829-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response Robot Capabilities: 

Mobility: Maneuvering Tasks: Sustained Speed 

31 ASTM E2830-11* Standard Test Method for Evaluating the Mobility Capabilities of Emergency 

Response Robots Using Towing Tasks: Grasped Sleds

32 BSR N42.40-200x Standard for Evaluation and Performance of High Energy, X-Ray Interrogation 

Systems for Detection of Contraband of Concern in Homeland Security

33 ISO 16934: 2007 Glass in Building—Explosion-Resistant Security Glazing—Test and Classification by 

Shock-Tube Loading

34 MIL-D-16191F NOT 1 Detectors, Explosive Vapor

Notes:

Highlighted standards have been bundled into one standard as they are complementary components regarding one 

technology or knowledge area.

* These standards will also be part of the Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Robot Standard that is 

currently under development.
C-1 March 2013

APPENDIX C

STANDARDS ANALYZED FOR DHS ADOPTION
C-2 March 2013

APPENDIX C

STANDARDS ANALYZED FOR DHS ADOPTION

Subject-matter experts prepared the following summaries and attempted to provide an 

overview of the standard. Participants at the federal focus groups and NBSCAB were 

provided the opportunity to read the full standard prior to discussions or rating.

C.1 NIJ Standard-0603.01: Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in 

Bomb Identification Summary

NIJ Standard-0603.01 

Author National Institute of Justice 

Date Published December 2007

Audience Owners, operators, and manufacturers of portable x-ray systems

Title Portable X-Ray Systems for Use in Bomb Identification

Purpose The purpose of this standard is to establish performance requirements and testing 

methods for portable x-ray systems for use in bomb disarming operations. This 

standard does not apply to cabinet x-ray systems, such as those used for security 

screening.

Summary This standard is applicable to battery-powered portable x-ray systems and to 

optional-powered (battery or AC-mains) portable x-ray systems. The standard 

includes diagrams of a test pattern (figures 3 and 4) to be used to test the proper 

functioning of the system. The pattern involves the specific placement of copper and 

tungsten wire and lead pieces behind a 10-mm piece of steel and a steel wedge, all 

mounted on a 6-mm-thick piece of acrylic. When testing the image quality of the 

portable x-ray system, place the test pattern parallel to and 10 mm (±3 mm) in front 

of the image capture unit, and place the x-ray generator module as far away from the 

test pattern as recommended by the manufacturer’s operational manual for a clear 

image on the full image capture unit. Activate the system five times and ensure that 

all of the lead, copper, and tungsten are clearly visible in the resulting five images. 

Furthermore, the entire image should be clear, within 12 mm of the edge of the 

image. To test the power capacity of the system, install fresh batteries and perform 

this test once every 10 minutes. Each image should be completely clear until the 

system indicates that the battery should be replaced.

The portable x-ray system should provide an exposure area of 39.1 cm square when 

the x-ray generator module is positioned 59 cm (±5 cm) away from the target. To test 

this, collect nine test patterns and create a 3x3 grid that is 480 mm high and 

660 mm wide. With the x-ray generator module positioned 59 cm (±5 cm) away from 

the target, acquire the image, and ensure that the field of vision is correct and the 

image is clear. 

The image acquisition period, which includes any discrete task needed to capture 

and display the image, should not exceed 240 seconds. This time can be measured 

with a stopwatch. 

Because x-ray generator modules may leak radiation, a qualified individual should 

test the amount of leakage in nine specific locations (figure 2 in the standard). After 
C-3 March 2013

covering the aperture with a 3-mm-thick piece of lead, measure the leakage dose 

rate at locations 1 m (±5 mm) above, below, right, and left of the x-ray generator 

module axis, which passes through the center of the machine collinear with the 

useful x-ray beam. Take these four measurements in the plane of the aperture and 

the plane of the anode. Finally, measure the dose along the x-ray generator module 

axis no more than 10 mm away from the rear of the module. These doses should not 

exceed 1 mSv in 1 hour. 

The x-ray generator module should fit on a typical photographer’s tripod with a 

1⁄4-20 UNC thread mount. The batteries required for the system should be easily 

replaceable or recharged, and the manufacturer should provide a battery tester. If 

the system includes an x-ray generator tube that is easily replaceable in the field, this 

should be accomplished with basic or manufacturer-provided tools.

The whole portable x-ray system, complete with travel cases and other required 

accessories should not exceed 50 kg and should work in a temperature range of 0 to 

110 degrees F. It should also operate correctly without leaking radiation after being 

bumped or dropped. To test the bump endurance, apply 100 bumps, each with a 

peak acceleration of 15 g, to each of the 6 sides of the system. To test drop 

endurance, place each section of the system in its transport case and drop it from a 

height of .3 m (±.03 m) on each face and corner. After these actions, the system 

should continue to operate to the level of the previous tests.

The portable x-ray system should have a visual control and display unit for the 

operator. Buttons on this control unit and other parts of the system should be no 

smaller than 5 mm across. Although the operator can activate the system through 

the control unit, the operator should also be able to activate the system remotely and 

view images at a distance of at least 6 m away. Systems should also feature a delay 

timer that will postpone exposure by at least 1 minute after activation and a 

separate timer that postpones activation by 1 minute after powering on remotely. 

The portable x-ray system should have distinct visual and audible alarms for each of 

three conditions: (1) the system has been powered on and is ready to emit radiation, 

(2) the exposure delay timer has been activated and the system is counting down to 

emit radiation, and (3) the system is actively emitting radiation. Finally, systems that 

use sensitized media to record images should be key-activated to avoid accidental 

media exposure, and this key should not be able to be removed while the system is 

operating.

Reference:

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/218586.pdf

C.2 ASTM Series for Robots

ASTM Series for Robots: E2801-11, E2802-11, E2803-11, E2804-11, E2826-11, E2827-11, 

E2828-11, E2829-11, E2830-11 

Author ASTM International 

Date Published 2011

Audience Owners, operators, and manufacturers of emergency response robots

Title ASTM Series for Robots: Standard Test Method for Evaluating Emergency Response 

Robot Capabilities for: (1) E2801-11, Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Gaps; 

(2) E2802-11, Mobility: Confined Area Obstacles: Hurdles; (3) E2803-11, Mobility: 
C-4 March 2013

Confined Area Obstacles: Inclined Planes; (4) E2804-11, Mobility: Confined Area 

Obstacles: Stairs/Landings; (5) E2826-11, Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: 

Continuous Pitch/Roll Ramps; (6) E2827-11, Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: 

Crossing Pitch/Roll Ramps; (7) E2828-11, Mobility: Confined Area Terrains: 

Symmetric Stepfields; (8) E2829-11, Mobility: Maneuvering Tasks: Sustained Speed; 

(9) E2830-11, Mobility Capabilities of Emergency Response Robots Using Towing 

Tasks: Grasped Sleds

Purpose The purpose of these nine standard test methods is to quantitatively evaluate the 

performance of robots for emergency response applications. These standards are 

not specifications for a standard robot of any kind.

Summary These nine robotic standard test methods were developed as a baseline for all 

emergency response robot applications. A specific set of standard test methods to 

evaluate response robot capabilities to counter vehicle-borne improvised explosive 

devices is currently being developed, and that project uses these nine standards as 

a set of pre-qualifying basic robotic abilities.

These test methods measure robot capabilities in mobility/maneuvering, 

energy/power, sensing, radio communications, manipulation, human-robot 

interaction, logistics, and safety to provide points of comparison for a variety of robot 

sizes and configurations prior to testing in more realistic scenarios. Statistically 

significant robot apparatus/procedures performance data captured within standard 

test methods measure incremental system improvements, highlight break-through 

capabilities, and support procurement/deployment decisions. The apparatuses used 

in these tests use terrains, targets, and tasks that are intentionally abstract and are 

built with readily available materials to facilitate fabrication by robot developers.

This standards development process involved periodic robot requirements 

workshops, standards committee meetings, and robot evaluation exercises at 

responder training facilities that gathered emergency responders, robot developers, 

and test administrators around draft standard test methods and practice deployment 

scenarios. These events allowed emergency responders to articulate essential robot 

capabilities, to validate proposed test methods, and to refine performance 

thresholds and objectives based on objective performance data captured across a 

class of robots. Emergency responders involved in the process learned about the 

state of the science in robotic capabilities and helped ensure that the test method 

apparatuses and procedures addressed their application needs. The events also 

informed robot developers about the reliability and applicability of their robots for 

actual deployment scenarios, the ease of use of their robots within the test 

apparatuses, and the emerging operational requirements.

For these test methods, the working definition of a “response robot” is a remotely 

deployed device intended to perform operational tasks at operational tempos. The 

robot should serve as an extension of the operator to improve remote situational 

awareness, to provide a means to project operator intent through the equipped 

capabilities, to improve effectiveness/efficiency of the mission, and to reduce risk to 

the operator. During these tests, the robots are operated by a remote “expert” as 

designated by the developer, and the performance data is collected by staff 

members. Each robot may attempt each test as many times as necessary to attain a 

satisfactory result. They may abstain from a particular test method when not 

applicable or when they may not successfully complete the set of continuous 

repetitions necessary to get reported in the data. In either case, the test will be 

marked as “ABSTAINED” to indicate that the manufacturer acknowledged the 

omission of performance data. These nine standards should be packaged together 

as a suite of standards for DHS adoption.
C-5 March 2013

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2801.htm

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2802.htm

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2803.htm

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2804.htm

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2826.htm

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2827.htm

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2828.htm

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2829.htm

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2830.htm

C.3 ASTM E2520-07: Standard Practice for Verifying Minimum 

Acceptable Performance of Trace Explosive Detectors

ASTM E2520-07 

Author ASTM International 

Date Published 2007

Audience First responders, security screeners, manufacturers/vendors
C-6 March 2013

Title ASTM E2520-07: Standard Practice for Verifying Minimum Acceptable Performance 

of Trace Explosive Detectors

Purpose This practice is intended primarily to assist first responder and security screeners in 

verifying the minimum acceptable performance of trace explosive detectors used to 

identify traces of high explosives. The practice can also be used by manufacturers to 

demonstrate that the equipment is performing properly to a minimum standard.

Summary This practice is used to demonstrate that detectors used to identify traces of high 

explosives by use of a test swipe meet a minimum acceptable performance. This 

practice is used to evaluate the detector response to evaporated residues of 

low-concentration solution of explosive compounds placed on test swipes. The 

concentrations of the solutions of explosive have been determined to be sufficient to 

provide a positive detector alarm signal. This practice uses three explosive 

compounds—RDX, PETN, and TNT—that are used to represent nitro-based 

compounds having a range of physical and chemical properties. This practice was 

developed using ion mobility spectrometry-based trace explosive detectors, but this 

practice should also be applicable to any explosive detector designed to analyze 

trace levels of high-explosive compounds collected on swipes.

The practice may be used to accomplish several ends: to compare detectors before 

purchase; as a demonstration by the vendor that the equipment is performing 

properly to a minimum standard; or for a periodic verification of detector 

performance after purchase. This practice establishes the minimum performance 

that is required for a detector to be considered effective and is considered to have 

“minimum acceptable performance” when it has passed all of the evaluation tests 

without a failure.

This practice outlines the necessary performance evaluation materials (test kits), 

procedures, analysis of the test swipes, and documentation of the test procedures.

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2520.htm

C.4 ASTM Blast Resistant Receptacle Series

ASTM Series for Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles: E2639-12, E2740-12, E2831M-11 

Author ASTM International 

Date Published 2011, 2012

Audience Managers with public assembly areas, manufacturers, and test laboratories

Title ASTM E2639-12: Standard Test Method for Blast Resistance of Trash Receptacles

Purpose This test method provides a procedure for characterizing the performance of a trash 

receptacle when an explosive is detonated within the receptacle.

Summary ASTM E2639 is a test method that provides a procedure for measuring the 

magnitude of an explosion when the explosion is detonated inside a trash 

receptacle. The procedure determines the extent and location of fragments produced 

during the explosion and whether breaches are created in the exterior surfaces of 

the trash receptacle. An appendix provides guidance for determining the magnitude 

of blast waves (that is, external overpressures).

This test procedure is used to measure two of the main effects of an explosive 

detonated in a trash receptacle as related to the type and amount of explosive
C-7 March 2013

charge and the location where the charge is placed in the trash receptacle. The two 

effects are the release of primary and secondary fragments and physical damage to 

the trash receptacle. 

For users having interest in determining overpressures created by detonation, an 

appendix provides guidance for making such determinations.

The test method is conducted in the following manner:

• A trash receptacle is placed on a steel plate in the center of an explosive test 

arena.

• An explosive charge is placed at one of four predetermined locations within the 

receptacle and detonated. 

• After detonation, the trash receptacle is examined for the presence of breaches 

(such as cracks, fissures, and holes) in its exterior surface, and the extent and 

location of fragments produced are recorded. 

• Note: Users of this standard testing the blast resistance of trash receptacles 

can, at their own option, measure the magnitude of overpressures created 

during the explosion. Guidance for performing such measurements is provided 

in the appendix. 

This test procedure is applicable to all trash receptacles, including lidded or 

non-lidded as supplied by the manufacturer. This test procedure is used to generate 

data for use in developing performance specifications for trash receptacles.

(Cont.)

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2639.htm

ASTM Series for Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles (Continued) 

Title ASTM E2740-12: Standard Specification for Trash Receptacles Subjected to Blast 

Resistance Testing

Purpose This specification provides performance requirements for trash receptacles when 

subjected to the explosive tests described in ASTM E2639.

Summary The trash receptacle test specimens shall be tested according to the requirements of 

Test Method E2639. Each test specimen shall be tested separately from the others 

in the group submitted with the charge at one of three locations. The testing 

laboratory shall randomly select the individual test specimen for each test from the 

group submitted.

Trash receptacles including accessory components shall be tested as supplied by the 

manufacturer for in-use service. For example, if the trash receptacle is intended to 

have a lid in service, it shall be tested with the lid in place. The lid shall be secured to 

the receptacle as recommended by the manufacturer. The mass of the explosive 

charge shall be the same for all test specimens in the group submitted. (Cont.)

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2740.htm
C-8 March 2013

ASTM Series for Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles (Continued)

Title ASTM E2831M-11: Standard Guide for Deployment of Blast Resistant Trash 

Receptacles in Crowded Places

Purpose This standard provides guidance on the deployment of blast resistant trash 

receptacles because the selection of deployment locations impacts both the 

mitigation of the effects of an explosion occurring within one as well as the 

convenience of using the receptacles.

Summary This guide provides general provisions for the deployment of blast resistant trash 

receptacles. Each facility or venue has unique features associated with factors such 

as demographics, location, and functions. The guide identifies key factors that 

should be considered prior to the receptacle deployment (in interior and exterior 

locations) and discusses the facilities and venues where the receptacles should be 

deployed.

The importance of a strategy and procedures for the deployment of blast resistant 

trash receptacles in crowded places cannot be overly emphasized. Trash receptacles 

in crowded places have been, and continue to be, an attractive repository for 

explosives. The selection of deployment locations impacts both the mitigation of the 

effects of an explosion occurring within one as well as the convenience of using the 

receptacles.

The deployment of blast resistant trash receptacles provides a means for decreasing 

injury and lethality during an explosive event, no matter their location when 

compared to the protection afforded by ordinary trash receptacles or clear plastic 

bags. Fragments resulting from explosions create the greatest danger to people, as 

fragments may travel several hundred meters and still have velocities that could be 

lethal or injurious. Blast resistant trash receptacles that meet the requirements of 

ASTM E2740-10 when subjected to internal explosions equal to or less than the 

force protection rating contain horizontal primary fragments and do not produce 

secondary fragments.

The guide is intended for use by individuals in both the private and public sectors 

who are considering the purchase and deployment of blast resistant trash 

receptacles.

Reference:

http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2831.htm

C.5 National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians

National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians 2012 

Author National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board/Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Date Published March 2010

Audience U.S. civilian bomb technicians

Title National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians 2012

Purpose Law enforcement sensitive

Summary Law enforcement sensitive
C-9 March 2013

Reference:

http://nbscab.org/NBSCAB/nbscab_ex.php

C.6 ASTM F792-08: Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging 

Performance of Security X-Ray Systems

ASTM F792-08 

Author ASTM International 

Date Published 2008

Audience X-ray manufacturers and security evaluators

Title Standard Practice for Evaluating the Imaging Performance of Security X-Ray Systems

Purpose The purpose of this practice is to establish a method to measure the imaging 

performance of x-ray systems used for the screening of prohibited items in baggage, 

packages, cargo, or mail.

Summary This standard practice establishes a method to measure the imaging performance of 

x-ray systems used for the screening of prohibited items, such as weapons, 

explosives, and explosive devices in baggage, packages, cargo, or mail. The practice 

applies to all x-ray-based screening systems with tunnel apertures up to 1 m wide by

1 m high, including both conventional x-ray systems and explosives detection 

systems, where the system provides a projection or projection/scatter image for an 

operator to interpret. The practice is intended for use by manufacturers to assess 

performance and by evaluators screening x-ray systems to verify performance. The 

practice is intended to establish whether the system meets the manufacturer’s 

specification or if the system’s performance has deteriorated over time. The practice 

may also be used for manufacturing control, specification acceptance, service 

evaluation, or regulatory statutes.

The practice relies upon the use of a standard ASTM x-ray test object that was 

developed to assess the system’s image quality/performance level in the following 

nine distinct areas:

• Wire Display: To characterize the system’s ability to display wires, including 

details such as gauge and spacing between wires.

• Useful Penetration: To determine how well the system can penetrate various 

thicknesses of aluminum to display wires under the aluminum.

• Spatial Resolution: To determine the gauge and spacing between narrowly 

spaced wires.

• Simple Penetration: To determine simple penetration with lead digits placed on 

top of steel that varies in thickness.

• Thin Organic Imaging: Using plastic samples of various thicknesses to 

characterize the system’s ability to image thin organic material.

• Image Quality Indicator: Using steel and plastic samples of various thicknesses 

with flat-bottom holes drilled in them to determine the depth and diameter of 

the holes and the thickness of the samples.

• Organic/Inorganic Differentiation: Ability to determine the difference between 

steel and plastic samples.

• Organic Differentiation: Ability to differentiate between plastic samples that 

shall have different effective atomic numbers but nominally identical 

attenuation.

• Useful Organic Differentiation: Using samples of plastic placed on top of steel 

that varies in thickness to determine useful differentiation of materials.
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This practice establishes quantitative and qualitative methods for evaluating the 

systems but does not establish minimum performance requirements for any 

particular application. The practice lists the specific testing procedures and outlines 

numerous evaluation considerations.

Reference:

www.astm.org/Standards/F792.htm

C.7 NIJ Standard–0117.00: Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard

NIJ Standard–0117.00 

Author U.S. Department of Justice, Standards and Testing Program, Office of Justice 

Programs, National Institute of Justice 

Date Published March 2012

Audience Certified public safety bomb technicians

Title Public Safety Bomb Suit Standard 

Purpose The purpose of this standard is to specify minimum voluntary performance 

requirements for bomb suits and to outline the associated certification program 

test methods for assessing that the performance requirements are met. This 

standard is for bomb suits used by certified public safety bomb technicians while 

performing hazardous device render safe procedures and assessing potential 

suspicious items. A second related document (Certification Program Requirements) 

defines the methods used to test the performance requirements, and a third 

document (Selection and Application Guide) is available to provide guidance on

selecting, procuring, using, and maintaining bomb suits. Since this standard is a 

performance and testing standard, it provides precise and detailed test methods. 

Summary This standard is a Voluntary Performance Standard with an accompanying 

Certification Program Requirements document. The standard addresses six key 

areas: fragmentation, impact, flame, blast overpressure, optics, and ergonomics. 

Fragmentation, impact, flame, and blast overpressure are hazards that a bomb 

technician needs protection from when performing render safe procedures. Optics 

and ergonomics relate to a bomb technician’s ability to perform render safe 

procedures while wearing the bomb suit. The standard balances the protection 

requirements against the bomb technician’s need for mobility, clear vision, and

dexterity. Within the six key areas, all bomb suit models shall meet or exceed the 

applicable performance requirements specified in the categories below.

• Ergonomics: Donning/doffing, body mobility

• Optics: Distortion, refraction, anti-fogging

• Flammability: Outer shell materials and helmets

• Electrostatic discharge: Grounding strap requirements

• Head protection: Impact, perforation resistance, and retention system

• Spine protection: Impact attenuation

• Fragmentation: Perforation resistance

• Blast integrity: Ability to remain intact when subject to blast overpressure

• Drag rescue: Handles to provide drag ability for downed bomb technician

• Label durability: Wear and chemical resistance 

• Optional foot protection slip resistance

All bomb suits used when testing against this standard shall be new. The bomb 

suits shall be designed to protect at least the wearer’s head, face, neck, 
C-11 March 2013

thorax/abdomen, pelvis, arms and legs. The suit shall be designed so no protected 

areas shall become unprotected due to body movement. Bomb suits shall be 

available in at least three distinct sizes with the following weight restriction 

requirements: 68 lbs. for the smallest size, 76 lbs. for midrange size, and 85 lbs. 

for the largest size. No optional accessories shall be required to meet the form, fit,

and performance requirements of this standard. If accessories are attached or 

integrated with the bomb suit, the suit with required accessories installed shall 

meet all of the form, fit, and performance requirements of this standard.

A major area of discussion during this standard’s development was the effect of 

blast overpressure. It was decided that research and data related to blast 

overpressure effects on the bomb technician wearing the suit was limited and 

would not be included at the time. The following aspects of blast overpressure will 

not be addressed until the necessary research is completed: blast head trauma, 

blast thoracic injuries, blunt thoracic injuries, blunt lower neck trauma, other neck 

injuries, and blast ear injury. NIJ anticipates publishing addenda or revisions to this 

standard when the necessary data are available and test methods are defined. This 

standard only addresses blast overpressure in terms of bomb suit integrity; i.e., the 

bomb suit’s ability to remain intact when subjected to an explosion. Additionally,

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection is not addressed in this 

standard but will be if additional data becomes available.

This standard does not address all safety concerns associated with wearing the 

bomb suit. The standard does not address search suits or reconnaissance suits or 

specific protection from projectiles from firearms.

Although agencies are advised to require their bomb suit procurements to meet or 

exceed the most recent version of this standard, this does not necessarily mean 

that an agency should remove bomb suits that they currently have in use, as a 

bomb suit that does not meet the current standard may well be better than no 

bomb suit at all.

This standard shall not restrict any supplier or manufacturer from exceeding the 

requirements of this standard and no manufacturer may claim compliance with 

only selected portions of the standard. The bomb suit model shall meet all 

applicable requirements of this standard including the associated Certification 

Program Requirements.

Reference:

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/227357.pdf

C.8 ANSI N42.47-2010: American National Standard for 

Measuring the Imaging Performance of X-Ray and Gamma-Ray 

Systems for Security Screening of Humans

ANSI N42.47-2010 

Author National Committee on Radiation Instrumentation, American National Standards 

Institute, Institute of Electrical Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

Date Published August 2010

Audience X-ray and gamma-ray system manufacturers, potential system users, and other 
C-12 March 2013

interested parties

Title American National Standard for Measuring the Imaging Performance of X-Ray and 

Gamma-Ray Systems for Security Screening of Humans

Purpose This standard applies to security screening systems that utilize x-ray or gamma 

radiation and are used to inspect people who are not inside vehicles, containers, or 

enclosures. Specifically, this standard applies to systems used to detect objects 

carried on or within the body of the individual being exposed. The purpose of this 

standard is to provide standard methods of measuring and reporting imaging 

quality characteristics and to establish minimum acceptable performance 

requirements.

Summary This document establishes standard test methods and test devices for measuring 

the imaging performance of x-ray and gamma-ray systems for security screening of 

humans. Minimum acceptable performance requirements are also provided.

The following types of systems are included in the scope of this standard:

• Systems designated as fixed, portal, re-locatable, transportable, mobile, or 

gantry.

• Systems employing detection of primary radiation (transmission systems) or 

scatter radiation (back scatter systems) or a combination of both.

• Systems that are primarily imaging but that also may have complementary 

features, such as material discrimination or automatic active or passive threat 

alerts. This standard will not address how to test these complementary 

features.

The imaging performance evaluation procedures used for this standard are as 

follows:

• Test Documentation: Documentation shall include testing of environmental 

conditions, image performance results, background conditions, description of 

systems tested, and identification of people involved in the test.

• Image Quality Measurement Objectives and Scope: The objective of the 

imaging performance measurement procedures is to provide standardized 

test methods that enable system manufacturers, potential system users, and 

other interested parties to establish a consistent indicator of the expected 

performance of the screening system when used for the inspection of 

individuals, to provide repeatable and verifiable imaging performance data, 

and to establish a benchmark that can be used over time to calibrate the 

system or detect any performance degradation.

• Body Phantom and Test Objects: The test objects for each of the image quality 

tests shall be mounted on a body phantom. The body phantom shall be made 

of high-density polyethylene.

• Location of Testing: At a minimum, all the image quality tests shall be 

performed at the reference location, which is defined as: (1) the surface of the 

body phantom and test object combination closest to the radiation source 

shall be at the optimum operating distance as specified by the manufacturer,

and (2) the center of the body phantom shall be in the center of the scan area 

and at a height 1 m from the ground.

• The Spatial Resolution Test: This test measures the ability to display as 

materials objects separated by a space equal to the object width. 

• Wire Detection Test: This test determines the minimum diameter of copper 

wire that can be detected. 

• Materials Detection on Body Test: This tests the ability to detect objects on the 

body that are of a density similar to that of the body. 

• Materials Detection in Air Test: This tests the ability to detect objects hidden in 
C-13 March 2013

clothing on the sides of the body when the image of the objects is not

superimposed on the image of the body.

• Penetration Test: This measures any degradation of spatial resolution and 

wire detection with increased body size. This test applies only to transmission 

systems.

This standard has a minimum acceptable imaging performance, which is detailed in 

a chart in the standard.

Reference:

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?punumber=5557723

C.9 ANSI N42.44: Performance of Checkpoint Cabinet X-Ray 

Imaging Security Systems

ANSI N42.44-2008 

Author National Committee on Radiation Instrumentation, American National Standards 

Institute, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

Date Published November 2008

Audience X-ray and gamma-ray system manufacturers, potential system users, and other 

interested parties

Title American National Standard for the Performance of Checkpoint Cabinet X-Ray 

Imaging Security Systems

Purpose Screeners frequently use the images provided by checkpoint x-ray systems to 

detect weapons and contraband materials as well as to verify manifests (to 

determine that the contents of a package are what they are purported to be). For 

these applications, this standard is intended to provide procurers and/or 

prospective users of checkpoint x-ray systems with test methods that facilitate 

performance comparisons among systems and the minimum acceptable 

imaging-performance requirements. Additionally, a variety of factors essential for 

the safe operation of checkpoint x-ray systems are assembled and standardized in 

this document.

Summary This standard specifies minimum requirements and test procedures for x-ray 

imaging performance, radiation-limitation requirements, and electrical, mechanical, 

and environmental requirements. This standard addresses technical image-quality 

performance, not threat-detection performance.

The test object used in this document is composed of fixtures for the following nine 

tests: 

• Test 1: Wire display;

• Test 2: Useful penetration;

• Test 3: Spatial resolution;

• Test 4: Simple penetration;

• Test 5: Thin organic imaging;

• Test 6: Image-quality-indicator sensitivity;

• Test 7: Organic/inorganic differentiation;

• Test 8: Organic differentiation; and
C-14 March 2013

• Test 9: Useful organic differentiation. 

The use of non-tinned, solid copper wires is required for Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3 

in this standard.

The test object shall be placed alone and in its case such that one surface of the 

case is in contact with the x-ray conveyor belt. The surface in contact with the 

conveyor belt should be chosen such that the test object is more nearly 

perpendicular to the x-ray beam axis. Thus, if the x-ray beam is primarily directed 

vertically upward (“up-shooter”), the case should lie flat; if the x-ray beam is 

primarily directed horizontally (“side shooter”), the case should be positioned on 

edge. An exception is permitted for systems in which the x-ray beam is primarily 

directed vertically downward (“down-shooter”), for which the test object shall be 

positioned with the bottom surface of the case parallel to the conveyor surface but 

may be elevated to a height above the conveyor belt of up to one-fourth of the 

vertical tunnel dimension. In all cases, the test object (in its case) shall be scanned 

with its long dimension parallel to the direction of the conveyor motion. The case 

may be positioned laterally (with respect to the direction of the conveyor motion) for 

optimal performance in any test. In all cases, the placement and orientation of the 

test object shall be reported in the test procedure with the corresponding test 

results.

The tests specified in this standard may be used for type testing. Type tests are 

intended to demonstrate that production systems made according to a specific 

design meet defined performance criteria.

Reference:

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?punumber=4667698

C.10 ANSI N42.45: Standard for Evaluating the Image Quality of 

X-Ray Computed Tomography (CT) Security Screening Systems

ANSI N42.45-2011

Author Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

Date Published 2011

Audience Owners, operators, and manufacturers of computed tomography (CT) 

security-screening systems

Title American National Standard for Evaluating the Image Quality of X-Ray Computed 

Tomography (CT) Security-Screening Systems

Purpose This standard provides test methods for the evaluation of image quality of CT 

security-screening systems. The quality of data for automated analysis is the 

primary concern. This standard does not address the system’s ability to use this 

image data to automatically detect explosives or other threat materials, which is 

typically verified by an appropriate regulatory body.

Summary: Security screening systems are generally used to scan parcels, including luggage, 

for the presence of illicit items such as explosives, drugs, or other contraband. 

Many of the screening systems currently used, particularly in transportation security 

applications, are based on CT imaging technology. Generally, as the parcel is 

transported through the system, the system collects a CT image of the parcel. This 

data is then subjected to automated analysis to determine whether a threat may be 

present or the parcel is considered clear. If the automated analysis determines a 
C-15 March 2013

threat may be present, the image is often presented to a system operator who can 

override the automated decision, clearing the parcel or referring it for further 

processing, such as opening it and manually searching for threats.

Historically, evaluation procedures to determine whether a system’s automated 

detection performance is adequate have been developed. Typically, vendors submit 

a copy of their products, including their software, to the regulator’s facility. The 

regulator runs a wide variety of parcels with threats through the system as well as 

parcels without threats that represent the typical stream of commerce. Detection 

and false alarm rates are determined and compared against performance criteria. 

If the criteria are met, the system is approved for use. This testing ensures that the 

specific system tested is capable of meeting the required criteria. Normal 

manufacturing variability, quality control issues, or aging of the equipment may 

degrade performance compared with what was observed on the article tested by 

the regulator. Replicating the original test on each machine in question is 

impractical. Transporting the regulator’s threat set to a factory site or to locations 

where the machines are in use, presents significant security and in some cases 

safety concerns. This standard seeks to address this issue.

The performance testing carried out by the regulators essentially evaluates the 

combination of the system’s ability to produce an image of the parcel along with its 

automatic analysis of that image data to reach a decision of threat or clear. The 

second part of this sequence, the analysis, is implemented through software. It 

should be noted that the regulators generally require that this software be designed 

so as to not devolve through use. The software used at all locations in the field 

must perform the same as the software did at the time of evaluation by the 

regulator. Configuration management of such software is a well known and 

straightforward art. Therefore, the real opportunity for performance variation comes 

from the imaging system that provides the data to the analysis software. If one can 

quantitatively validate that the quality of the image produced by the system in 

question is statistically equivalent to the image produced by the article evaluated 

by the regulator, one can be highly confident that the performance of the system in 

question is the same as what was originally approved.

This standard specifies a set of methods to apply in assessing CT image quality 

geared toward security screening. An application of this standard would be in the 

factory acceptance testing of equipment. The standard could be used to indicate 

whether the unit offered for sale produces the equivalent image quality as the unit 

that was tested by the original regulatory agency. This standard does not address 

image quality presented to the operator.

This standard specifies procedures for measuring a wide range of image quality 

indicators. Below is a list of the eight test procedures:

• Object length accuracy

• Path length CT value and Zeff

• Noise equivalent quanta

• CT value consistency

• Zeff and CT value uniformity

• Streak artifacts

• Slice sensitivity profile

• Image registration

Along with the eight procedures are the accompanying image-quality indicators they 

measure and the test object they use.

Each testing procedure generates a report when executing this standard. The first 
C-16 March 2013

part of the report is manually recorded observations of the test environment. The 

second part is the result of analysis of test article A, and the third part is from the 

analysis of test article B.

Reference:

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?punumber=5783277

C.11 ANSI N42.46: Determination of the Imaging Performance of 

X-Ray and Gamma Systems for Cargo and Vehicle Security 

Screening

ANSI N42.46-2008

Author Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 

Date Published 2008

Audience Owners, operators, and manufacturers of x-ray and gamma-ray systems for cargo 

and vehicle security screening 

Title American National Standard for Determination of the Imaging Performance of X-Ray 

and Gamma-Ray Systems for Cargo and Vehicle Security Screening

Purpose The purpose of this document is to provide standard, repeatable, and verifiable 

methods to describe and measure the imaging performance characteristics of x-ray 

and gamma-ray systems for cargo and vehicle security screening. It is not intended

to determine the capability of a security screening system under specific 

operational inspection conditions.

Summary This standard is intended to be used to determine the imaging performance of x-ray 

and gamma-ray systems utilized to inspect loaded or empty vehicles, including 

personal and commercial vehicles of any type, marine and air cargo containers of 

any size, railroad cars, and palletized or un-palletized cargo larger than 1 m × 1 m 

in cross-section. The standard applies to systems that:

• Are single or multiple energy, source, or view;

• Employ primary (i.e., transmission) and/or scatter (e.g., backscatter) radiation 

detection;

• Detect prohibited and controlled materials and/or verify manifests; and 

• Serve primarily as imaging systems but that also may have complementary 

features, such as material discrimination and automatic active or passive 

threat alerts. This standard does not address how to test these 

complementary features.

The below are the Performance Measurement Procedures that shall be consistent 

for all systems of similar type or size:

• General Requirements: Test objects and measurement procedures may differ 

to some extent depending on the type of imaging system (e.g., transmission or 

backscatter) or system size. Test objects and procedures shall be consistent 

for all systems of similar type or size.

• Standard Test Conditions: The tests defined in this standard should be 

performed on the standard commercial product as provided by the 

manufacturer.
C-17 March 2013

• Radiation Field Measurement: The x-ray and gamma-ray systems that are the 

subject of this standard use ionizing radiation to create an image of cargo and 

vehicles. For purposes of this standard, the resulting radiation field in and 

around the system and the radiation dose received by the inspected object 

also shall be measured as part of the characterization of system performance.

• Documentation: All testing environmental conditions, measurements, 

description of systems, etc. shall be documented, retained, and available for 

inspection for as long as any systems similar to those tested remain in service.

• Image Quality Measurement Objectives and Scope: The objectives are to 

establish a consistent indicator of the expected performance of the screening 

system when used for the inspection of cargo and vehicles, to provide 

repeatable and verifiable imaging performance data, and to establish a 

benchmark that can be used over time to calibrate the system or to detect any 

performance degradation.

• Test Object Positions: At a minimum, all tests shall be performed at a 

horizontal and vertical location.

• Penetration: The test should measure the maximum thickness of steel through 

which the orientation of a specified test object can be determined.

• Spatial Resolution: The test should measure the minimum separation between 

the features of a test object for which the individual features can be 

distinguished 

• Wire Detection: The test should determine the smallest diameter wires that 

are visible in the x-ray or gamma-ray image. The test objects and test 

procedures differ for transmission and backscatter imaging. In both cases, the 

test measures the minimum diameter copper wire that is visible in the image 

of a test object scanned in air.

• Contrast Sensitivity: The test should measure the minimum increase in steel 

thickness visible in an x-ray or gamma-ray image. The test objects and 

procedures differ for transmission and backscatter imaging.

Reference:

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?punumber=4606805