VIETNAM STUDIES 

CEDAR FALLSJUNCTION CITY: 

A TURNING POINT 

by 

Lieutenant General Bernard William Rogers 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1989 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-600007 

First Printed 1974-CMH Pub 90-7 

For laic by the Su~rinlendenl of Documenll, U.S. Governmenl Printing Offi(e 

Washington, DC 20407 
Foreword 

The Un ited States Army has mel an unusually complex chal. 

lenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, the 

Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an 

emerging nation to develop governmen ta l processes of its own 

choosing. free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging armed connict, the assignment in Southeast Asia 

has required superi mposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a 

modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting 

them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to CuHili the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing 

with the frustrations o f antiguerrilla operations, and conducting 

conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined 

regular units. 

As this assignment nears an end, the U.S. Army must prepare 

for other chall enges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats itseH exactly and that no anny ever prorited 

from trying to meet a new chall enge in terms of the old one, the 

Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its 

expe ri ence, its shortcomings no less than its achievements. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories 

will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience 

in Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum "'hereby some of the 

more sa lient aspects of that experience can be made available now. 

At the request o f the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senio r 

officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still 

carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prep;:;,red a 

series of monographs. These studies should be of great value in 

helping the Army develop futul'e operational concepts while at the 

same time contri buting to the historical record and providing the 

American public with an interim report o n the performance o f 

men and office rs who have responded, as others have throughout 

our history. to exacting and trying demands. 

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was 

accomplished while the war in Vietnam was al its peak, and the 

monographs frequently refer to events of the past as if they were 

taking place in the present. 

All monographs in the seri es are based primarily on o fficial 

'" 
FOREWORD 

records, with additional material from published and unpublished 

secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To 

facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography 

have been omitted from the published version; a fully documented 

account with bibliography is filed with the Office of the Chief of 

Military History. 

Lieutenant General Bernard William Rogers is especially well 

qualified to write Cedar Falls-Junelion City because of a broad and 

varied military career. His military experience includes action in 

Korea and Vietnam as well as assignments in Germany. In Korea 

he served in the 2d Infantry Division as commander of the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, and later joined the staff of the Commander 

in Chief, United Nations and Far East Commands, in Tokyo, 

Japan. While assigned to the 24th Infantry Division in Augsburg, 

Germany, he served as commander of the 1st Battle Group, 19th 

Infantry, and for fourteen months as chief of staff of the division. 

In Vietnam he served as assistant division commander of the lst 

Infantry Division, where he participated in Operations CWAR 

FALLS and J UNCTI ON CITY. 

General Rogers attended Oxford University, England, from 

1947 to 1950 as a Rhodes Scholar, receiving the B.A. and M.A. 

degrees in philosophy, politics, and economics. Later from September 1967 to June 1969 he served as commandant of cadets at the 

United States Military Academy. He was Chief of Legislative Liaison on the staff of the Secretary of the Army from January 1971 

until November 1972. He is currently Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Personnel , U.S. Army. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 June 1973 

iv 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General, USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turtling Point has been written 

al the request of General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff 

of the Army, who, concerned about the lack of authoritative 

accounts of various actions and activities in Vietnam, desired that 

a series of monographs be prepared to fill the void in the Army's 

historical library. 

Operations CEDAR FALLS and J UNCTION CITY took place during 

the first rive months o f 1967 and were the first multidivisional 

operations in Vietnam to be conducted according to a preconceived 

plan. They were to result in a turning point in the war: they confirmed that such operat ions do have a place in counterinsurgency 

warfare today; they brought an end to the enemy's thinking that 

his third phase of the war-large-sca le operations throughout the 

country-would besuccessful; they caused the enemy to re-evaluate 

his tactics and revert to smaller-scale guerrilla operations; they 

destroyed his camps, pillaged his supplies, and killed hundreds of 

his best troops; they proved to the enemy that his old sanctuaries 

were no longer inviolable, thus causing him to depend primarily 

upon those located over the border in Cambodiaj they helped convince the enemy lhat the maintenance of large bases and main force 

units near urban areas was risky business; and they enhanced 

immeasurably the confidence of the allied forces in South Vietnam, 

a confidence which had becn growing since the dark days of the 

first haH of 1965. Thus CtoAR FALlS and J UNCTION CIT¥ were to 

become the most important operations of the war 10 that time. and 

perhaps since. 

For the military history buff, Operation CEDAR FALLS will not 

be nearly so interesting as JUNCTION CIT¥ because it consisted primarily of sma ll unit contacts and the onerous tasks of finding and 

destroying base camps, storage facilities, and tunnels and of clearing jungles. CEDAR FALLS was unique. however, in that onc of its 

missions was to evacuate some 6,000 inhabitants of the Iron Triangle area and destroy their villages. JUNCTION CIT¥, on the other 

hand, was more varied in vicw of its scope and the fact that there 

were five battles interspersed among the air assaults and the 

numerous search and destroy activities. 

As an assistant division commander of the lst Infantry Division 

v 
PRHACE 

from November 1966 to August 1967. 1 had the opportunity firsthand to observe and participate in the planning and execution 

of the two operations. From a personal standpoint, it was an 

extremely rewarding experience to serve with the Big Red One 

during the period when its commanding general for CEDAR FALLS 

was Major General William E. DePuy and for J UNCTION CITY was 

Major General John H . Hay, Jr. Their intricate planning, rapid 

and decisive execution of actions, and employment of new concepts. coupled with the bravery and skill of our troops, made 

these two operations the success they were. 

I have expanded this monograph somewhat by including an 

introduction which covers those major events from the time of our 

initial commitment in Vietnam to Operation ATTLEBORO in November 1966, events which led to and influenced CEDAR FALLS and 

J UNCT ION CITY. The ho pe is that the introduction will assist the 

reader in putting these two operations in perspective. 

In assembling the data for this monograph, I have drawn primarily from after action reports and interviews, documented lessons learned, newspaper and magazine articles, personal letters. 

written and tape-recorded material, and my recollection of events. 

For the historical information contained in the introduction, I have 

relied exclusively upon the excellent document, Report on th e War 

in Vietnam. by Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp and Genera l William C. 

Westmoreland. 

I would like to thank the members of the Office. Chief of Legislative Liaison , Department of the Army, who have assisted in the 

compilation of the material for this monograph. T would particularly like to express my appreciation to Lieutenant Colonel 

John R.,Yilas for researching and organizing this document. The 

final product is mine. and for it I assume full responsibility. 

Washi ngton, D.C. 

15 June 1973 

v, 

BERNARD w. ROGERS 

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army 
Contents 

INTRODUCTiON 

PART ONE 

CEDAR FAI.LS, 8-26 January 1967 

I. BACKGROUND AND PLANNING. . . . . . . . . . . .. 15 

II. POSITiONING THE ANVIL-OPERATiONS 

FITCHBURG AND NIAGARA FALLS .......... 25 

25th Infantry Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25 

lsi Infantry Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 

Ill. D-DAY-BEN SUe.......... . . . .. . . ...... 30 

25th Infantry Division. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 

1st Infantry Division . ...... . ... . .. . .. .. . .. . , 31 

Ben Su.e Village . .......................... 31 

The Initial Assault . ........................ 34 

IV. PHASE 11-THE HAMMER SWINGS ........... 42 

3d B11gade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 42 

Task Force Deane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 44 

25th Infantry DivisiOn ...... . . . .. . . . .. . . .... 46 

Small Unit ActimlS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 46 

V. THE HAMMER STRIKES . .... .. .. . .. . .. . .... 51 

251h In/antry DivisiOn ...... . . . . . . .. 51 

lsi Infantry Division ...................... . 55 

VI. ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL OPERATiONS .... 60 

Bridge 011 the Thi Ti"h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 61 

jungle Clean"ng Operatio,ls" " " " . " " " " . " " .. " " . "" 61 

Tunnel Exploration and Destmctio,! " .. "" . . """"" 66 

vu 
C"'Plf~ Pdff 

The Engineer Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . .. 70 

Chemical Operntions . ....................... 71 

VII. THE RESULTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . .. 74 

PARTn¥O 

JUNCTION CIl'Y . 22 Fcbruary- 14 May 1967 

VIII. PLANNING AND PREPARATION ............. 83 

IX. THE WARM-UP TOSSES, GADSDEN 

AND TUCSON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 91 

Operation Gadsden. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 91 

Operation Tuoon ......................... 94 

X. PHASE I-THE HORSESHOE IS PITCHED . . . .. 97 

Combat Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 97 

D-Day, 22 February 1967 . ........ , ........... 101 

D Plus 1, 23 Februa ry . ...................... 103 

D Plus 2, 24 February. . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . .... 104 

End of Phase I, 25 February-17 March . ..... ..... 106 

Xl. THE BATTLES OF PREK KLOK ............... Il2 

PrekKlok l ..... ..................... .... 112 

Prek Kfok II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 117 

XII. PHASE II-EAST TO WEST .................. 122 

XIII. THE BATTLES OF AI' BAU BANG II, SUOI 

TRE, AND AP GU .......................... 129 

Ap Ball. &ng II .......................... 129 

Suoi Tre .............. .. .....•.......... 135 

Ap Gu .........................•....... 140 

XIV. PHASE Ill -TERM INATION ...... . ...•....... 149 

EPILOGUE ........................... . ••.•• . .... 154 

GLOSSARY ............................ . .. . ...... 161 

INDEX ..................................•...... 165 

Chart 

1. Communist Party Dominance in Enemy Organization . . 3 

vm 
N. Maps 

1. Corps Tactical Zones, Republic of Vietnam . . . . . . XII 

2. Major Battles Near Saigon, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. 6 

3. War Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8 

4 . ATTLEBORO (Operational Area) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9 

5. The Iron Triangle and CEDAR F.uLS Operational Area .. 16 

6. CED .... R FALLS (Concept of Operations) ............... 20 

7. CEDAK FALLS (D-Day, D + 1) ..................... 32 

8. War Zone C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . .. 88 

9. Operation GADSDEN, 3-21 February 1967 ............. 92 

10. Operation T UCSON (Concept of Operations) ........... 94 

11. Operation J UNCTION CITV (Phase I) ......... : .. • .... 98 

12. The Battle of Prek Klak I, 28 February 1967 .....•.... 113 

13. The Battle of Prek Klok II, 10 March 1967 ........... 118 

14. J UNCTION CITY (Concept, Phase II) ....... . ......... 125 

15. The Battle of Ap Bau Bang. 20 March 1967 .....•.... 130 

16. Battle of Suoi Tre, 21 March 1967 ............. • .... 136 

17. Battle of Ap Gu, 1 April 1967 ..................... 141 

Illustrations 

Elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade Arrive in Saigon 

From Okinawa, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 

105-mm. Howitzer Lifted Into Position by Chinook During 

Operation BIRMING ... ... M • . • • • • • • • . • • • . • • • . . . . • • . • • .. 7 

lO5-~n~: Howitzer Crew Fires in Support o f the 1st Infantry 

DIvIsion ....................................... 10 

Brigadier General Bernard W. Rogers Directs His Troops 

in Battle by Radio ............................... 22 

Armored Personnel Carriers Move Through Scrub Jungle .. 26 

Brigadier Genera l John R. Deane, Jr., Checks the Location 

~a~~ .....................................• 

Private First Class Willie Foxworth Takes a Position Behind Weathered Graves. . . . . . . .. ................. 36 

First Sergeant George l. Taylor Inspects Captured Enemy 

Mortar Hounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 43 

Members of the 503d Infantry and 11th Armored Cavalry in 

Thanh Dien Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 45 

Members of Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. 

Patrolling the Saigon River ........................ 53 
Tankers from the lst Squadron, 4th Cavalry, in a Rubber 

Plantation ..................................... 56 

American and Vietnamese Soldiers Assist Refugees. . . . . .. 58 

Rome Plow in Operation ........................... 62 

Preparing Landing Zone. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 63 

Engineers Rappelling off Helicopter .....•.....•...... 64 

Jnspecting an Enemy Booby Trap ........ . ..... . ..... 65 

Searching for Tunnels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .. 66 

flamethrower in Action .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 72 

Combined Arms at Work in the Iron Triangle ........... 75 

American Adviser and Vietnamese Soldiers Keeping Watch 

on Viet Cong Captives ............ .. ..... , . . . . . . .. 76 

Infantrymen Move Through Heavy Brush Near the Michelin Plantation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 95 

Individual Ammunition Issue ........................ 102 

Elements of the lIth Armored Cavalry Regiment Guarding 

Road to Rubber Plantation .. . , ...... . , .......... J04 

Moving Through the Jungle .. , ...... .. .............. 105 

Hacking Out a Trail .... , .......................... 107 

Company Sweep in War Zone ........................ lOS 

An Infantryman Returns Fire During an Enemy Attack .... 109 

First Leiutenant Edward Christiansen Calls for Air Strikes 

Over a Suspected Viet Cong Position ................. 117 

Guiding a Recovery Vehicle Across a River ............. 124 

A Huey Prepares To Land Near Awaiting Troops .. . ...... 126 

Infantrymen Dash From Helicopters To Move Against 

Enemy Forces . ........................... ...... 147 

Dropping Supplies North of Tay Ninh City ....... . ..... J50 

Armored Personnel Carriers Piled High With Captured 

Rice ....... . .................................. 152 

All illustrations are from Department of the Army files. 

THAILAND 

CAMBODIA 

PHNON PENH. 

GULF 

OF 

rHAILANO 

MAP J 

-, NORTH VIET N A M 

SOUTH 

n 

sourH 

CHINA 

CORPS TACTICAL ZONES 

Republic of Vietnam 

~ DetnoIolOrqed , _ 

~o ? lIO tOO I,UlES ' L.'i,.,".tt , -T-'-,---r'' ~ro'" , 0 ~Io ~o ,Jo Milownus 
Introduction 

The war in Vietnam is as highly complex as any in our country's 

history. It is a war with no front, no rear. There is often no easily 

identifiable enemy. The Communists deny that there are any 

North Vietnamese in the south. Those from the south live among 

the very persons they threaten. At the same time we engage multibattalion forces we also right against individual guerrilla bands 

numbering but a few men. (Map 1) 

We have been facing a Communist aggressor whose avowed 

objective is to gain control of the government, the land , and the 

peoples of South Vietnam. We have agreed to support the South 

Vietnamese against the enemy in order to buy time fOI" the south, 

lime in which the people can prepare to defend themselves and to 

shape their own destiny. 

We are engaged in a connict in which we are allied with forces 

whose approach to lire is different from ours and whose history 

goes back centuries before ours. Using sophisticated weapons in 

the hands of tough, well-trained American soldiers, we, along 

with our allies, have been fighting a dedicated and disciplined 

enemy in South Vietnam who employs no air power, liltle naval 

effort, and comparatively few mechanized vehicles. Yet he has 

forced us, the most powerful nation in the world, to fight the longest war in our history. 

This monograph concerns two operations conducted in early 

1967 which marked a turning point in this connict from the viewpoint o f the tide of baltIc and tactical doctrine. The conditions 

which led to this turning point had been developing over the years 

from the time of the withdrawal of the French from Indochina in 

1954 until Operation ATTLEBORO in late 1966. 

At the outset of this twelve-year period the United States 

endorsed the new Geneva Accords and offered, through President 

Dwight D. Eisenhower, "to assist the Government of Vietnam in 

developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of 

resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military 

means" in the hope "that such aid, combined with . continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent 

Vietnam endowed with a strong government.·' From this commitment stems our involvement in South Vietnam. 

Following this commitment by our Commander in Chief in 
2 CEDr\R FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

October 1954, the U.S. involvement in South Vietnam grew: a 

Military Assistance Advisory Group (later becoming the U.S. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) to organize, train, and 

equip the armed forces of South Vietnam was established; helicopter companies to support the Vietnamese Army were deployed; 

comba t and logistical airlift support was provided to South Vietnamese forces; Special Forces detachments were introduced, followed by Ihe 5th Special Forces Group; U.S. tactical aircraft were 

deployed to South Vietnam and used in close air support; B-52 

bombers were employed; and the deployment to South Vietnam of 

U.S. Army and Marine ground forces along with supporting air 

and naval forces was accelerated commencing in mid-1965. By the 

end of 1966 U.S. military forces in South Vietnam numbered 

385,000 men. 

Necessitating this increasing commitment of U.S. forces and 

resources to South Vietnam between 1954 and 1966 was the concomitant growth in the size and quality of Viet Cong and Nort h 

Vietnamese forces in the south. The Communist Viet Minh had left 

many cadres in the south in 1954 which were gro ~ped into a 

politi cal-paramilitary organization u nder orders of Hanoi. This 

organization, known as the Viet Cong, was infused with large 

numbers of "regroupees" who had gone north between 1954-1955, 

received intensive political and military training, and returned 

to the south as cadres and leaders for the Viet Cong units and 

infrastructure. Pursuing initially a policy of subversion, espionage. 

and terror, this organization would turn to intensified guerrilla 

warfare. culminating in the employment of large military units. 

By 1960 some battalion-size units had been formed, and in later 

years Viet Cong military activity was conducted more and more by 

larger forces. By 1964 regular North Vietnamese Anny units were 

starting to be deployed into South Vietnam to begin what Hanoi 

anticipated would be the final and decisive phase of the war. In 

that same year the enemy began to convert from weapons of various 

calibers and origins to a standard famil y of small arms. By the end 

of 1966 the total combat strength of the enemy was ove r 280,000 

plus an additional 80,000 political cadre. 

Tying together the various clements o f the insurgency in South 

Vietnam was the Lao Dong (Worker's) Party regional committee 

for Soulh Vietnam-the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). 

All Ihe various elements of the Communist organization in the 

south. military and civil , were and are responsive to directions 

from this office. Providing the administrative apparatus-the socalled Viet Cong shadow government-was the National Libera-
INTRODUCTION 3 

CIIART I COMMI ' I'IST PARTY DOMINANCf. IN ENF.MV ORGANIZATIONMILITARY 

fORCES 

Nof1" 

Vielnamen 

PARTY 

APPARATUS 

LAO OONG CENTRAL 

COMMITTEE IN HANOI 

Arm~ Hieh Ctlmm~n"l 

, I , COSVN , (PRP CENTRAL 

Headquaf1e'5 COMMITTEE) 

L,be .. t'on Army Military Fr1'"t Parly A".I,.. ........ Ctlmmllt .. Comminee 

Main Foren Re,lon 

P.", Parly 

COmmill" Committee 

Mlln & Local P,ol/Ince Fo.ce~ 

Patty r.rty 

CommillH Commillee 

L.oc:II foren Dillrict 

P.", Plrly 

CommlllH Commillee 

Guerrilln Villlae/ Hlmlel 

Party Part~ 

Chlpt". Chaple .. 

I 

CIVIL 

ORGANIZATIONS 

AOMINISTRATIVE 

LIBERATION 

ASSOCIATIONS 

NLF Centra, 

Commltlu 

.. '" Commltt" 

Re,lon 

... , 

Commltt .. 

Pr1",lnee 

Party 

COmmittee 

Dlu.let 

... , 

COmmlHee 

VIII.ae/ Hlmlet 

Party 

Chaplu 

INOIVIOUAL PARTY CELLS 

MASS 

ASSOCIATIONS 

Farm.,..' LIb. Anoc. 

Youlh LIb. Anoc. 

Woman~' Lib Assoc:. 

ele. 

Parly 

Chapte,. 

• 'fbI, ehnr' ~bGw~ Ib" r~IIIII"",,bll' ix'lwl'<!n Ihp mIlJ'" ~l~rII('III~ of Ib~ ~II""'Y nr· l:I'Iulutlnn. Althou.t:h Ih~ ml1lll1'Y IIIId eh·I1I." ~1"'11 .... t~ a ... • 1 ... rlrll)· ... 1 ...... 1) .. ~lf 

• .,tlllf. ...Ith th~ mlllt .. y Iud d"lIIl1n hfadq"arlp ... Mnl."I1I1'1: ~I\~b roeh"'n" /'If Ihtl. IH1~lInl ... tlo" dlft'('lly- lhflr .fIIl "rg~"lutlonnl ~lIb~l.nl:"O' ('"m~ frOlli . .. ,," .. ·. 11 Ir""'oeabLy 

UPd 10. Ihe INI'Iy. Thf attflW, 1~",nllg Ldl 111101 .11Ch! rrom .... eh leHI of Ih .. IliItl)' II,II'n'UIl" Lndlcat~ Ihe lruflLne\O of <'fIII""I. 

tion Front. All was controlled by the Lao Dong Central Commitlee 

in Hanoi. (Chart 1) 

Impacting considerably upon the developments of the period 

1954-1966 was the political situation within South Vietnam. 

Throughout the countryside the acts of lerror by the Viet Gong 

resulted in the assassination and kidnapping of many government 

officials and supporters. By the spring of 1963 President Ngo Dinh 

Diem was being accused of provoking an adverse reaction among 

the people. Especially were the BuddhislS unhappy. Demonstrations, immolations, and turmoil followed. Finally. on I November 

1963. Diem was overthrown and assassinated. There followed a 
4 CEDAR F'ALI..5-JUNCfION CITY 

- - " 

Eu ~n:NTS m-TilE 1731) AIRBORNE BRIGADE ARRIVE IN SAIGON FROM OklN .... WA. I965 

period of political instability which featured many coups and 

countercoups with military and political factions vying for political 

power with each other and within their own organizations. The 

effectiveness of the government deteriorated; governmental insliM 

tutions founded under Diem began to disappear. The impact of 

this instability was felt at every echelon of political authority in 

the south. The Viet Cong's position throughout the country grew 

stronger as that of the government declined. It was not until mid19651hal any sort of stability was injected into the Saigon political 

scene, this occurring when General Nguyen Van Thieu was proclaimed chief of state and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky was 

installed as premier. The Thieu-Ky government remained in 

power, and these two leaders were inaugurated in 1967 for a fouryear term as president and vice-president, respectively. 

From the termination of the French involvement in Indochina 

in 1954 until Operation ATTLEBORO in 1966, the tactics and employment of troops by the two sides underwent considerable changes. 
INTRODUCTION 5 

Until about 1960 the Viet Cong employed small units on missions 

o£terror: assassinations, kidnappings, destruction. In 1960 the first 

battalion-size auacks were conducted by the Viet Cong; by 1961 

the attacks had increased in frequency and had expanded to multibattalion. To counter the growing insurgency the South Vietnam 

government set about increasing its regular military forces, its 

paramilitary forces, and its pacification program. The combined 

U.S.-South Vietnamese eHort seemed to be leading to a shifting 

of the tide of battle by the end of 1962; however, with the growing 

political turmoil in the spring of 1963 followed in November by 

the overthrow of Diem, the bottom fell out of the military efforts 

of the South Vietnamese forces. Many of the government's strategic 

hamlets were lost, weapons losses increased, and many local paramilitary units simply faded away. 

By 1964 Viet Cong battalions were growing into regiments and 

regiments into divisions. Battles were won by both sides during the 

year, culminating with the Viet Cong 9th Division's seizure of the 

Catholic village of Binh Cia east of Saigon on 28 December. During the battle the division ambushed and destroyed a South Vietnamese Ranger baualion and a Marine battalion. This battle was 

a major event for both sides. The enemy considered it the beginning of the final "mobile" phase of the war, and the South Vietnamese saw it as the beginning of a military challenge they could not 

meet alone. 

The year 1965 saw the first commitment of regular North Vietnamese Army forces in South Vietnam with their apparent intention of cutting the country in half. By late spring of 1965 the 

South Vietnamese Army was losing about one infantry battalion 

and one district capital a week to the enemy. It was then that U.S. 

ground forces were requested and, starting in July, began to arrive 

in substantial numbers. By August 1965 U.S. forces were being 

committed to combat, but in less than division strength. By the 

end of the year the Viet Cong 9th Division was heard from again 

as its 272d Regiment overran the South Vietnamese 7th Regiment 

in the Michelin Plantation . 

1966 was a year of accelerated buildup and development and 

the beginning of majo r offensive operations by U.S. and South 

Vietnamese forces. There was a number of allied operations during 

the year, but the ones of concern to liS were those conducted near 

Saigon and in the major enemy areas near the capital such as in 

the Iron Triangle and in War Zones C and D. In April 1966, 

Operation A SILENE took place east of Saigon as a spoiling operation 

against an enemy move on the capital. (Map 2) In the same month 
THAILAND 

CA MBODIA 

GULF 

OF 

THAILAND 

MAP 2 

,., NORTH VIETNAM 

;.. ", , 

LAOS \/I"\,,., • OoNot19 

( I -/-1 

)0 +. 

rJL .r • \' '../ ( 

, 

\ 

, 

( 

, 

, 

SOUTH 

II 

MAJOR BATTLES 

SAIGON 

1966 

0- Bolli. ,lies 

SOUTH 

CHINA 

SEA 

NEAR 

..,,"". Oem,h,gmed lon. 
INTRODUCTION 7 

J 

A lOS·MM . HOWITZER Is LIFTED INTO POSITION bya CH-47 ';Chinook" helicop-

/er dun·ng Opera/ion Birmingham. 

Operation BIRMINGHAM. a move by the U.S. lst Infantry Division 

into War Zone C. uncovered great quantities of supplies. In June 

and July the U.S. lsi Infantry Division and the Vietnamese 5th 

Division conducted a series of operations, EL PASO II , on the eastern 

flank of War Zone C in order to open Roule 13 from Saigon 10 the 

major rubber plantations to the north, as well as to attack the Viet 

Gong 9th Division massing near the province capital of An Loc. 

Viet Gong losses were heavy. The 9th Division withdrew after that 

action into sanctuaries alo ng the Cambodian border in War Zone 

C. (Map 3) In late October 1966 this same division deployed its 

three regiments along with another North Vietnamese Army regiment into central Tay Ninh Province for the purpose of attacking the Special Forces camp at Suoi Da with one regiment while 

ambushing relieving forces with the other regiments. At the same 

time the recently arrived U.S. 196th Light Infantry Brigade was 

operating in the same area in search of rice and other enemy 

supplies. 
8 CEDAR FALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

, " .'[In .. 

~ l_ 

...l I . ~'"" " 

'--"(.S" , IOUTli 

CA" _ Vl UN'" • • • 

SOUTH 

CHINA 

WAR ZONES 

T, iii .j , 

• 

't 'j i j ...... , 1 I Jo ..... ..-.... 

MAP 3 

The stage was now set for Oper..llion Ar1'U;aOKO. 

ATTLUOII.O was to be a search and destroy operation conducted 

by the 1961h Light Infantry Brigade in an area generally described 

as a rectangle twenty kilometers wide by sixty kilometers long 

located east and north of Tay Ninh city. (Map 4) The operation 

was initialed by the 1961h on 14 September 1966 with the airmobile 

assault of a single battalion followed by a search and destroy opera-
MA.P 4 

ATTLEBORO 

(Optrcrtionol ArM) 

[_...,..,..,,..,. .... 

+. ___ ,.-....i •.... u I' ,' , I I j 

, 0 .ro..ooot .... 
• 

10 CEDAR FALLS-IUNCTION CITY 

A 105·MM . HOWITZER CREW m' A BAlTERY, 20 BATTALION. 330 ARTILLERY, 

fires in support of the lsI Infantry Diuisi011 

tion of but a few days in which only two significant contacts with 

the enemy were made. After the initial assault battalion was committed elsewhere, another battalion of the 196th continued the 

mission from 18 to 24 September; it made no significant contact. 

It, too, was diverted to another area bUI returned to ATTLE80RO 

on 6 October and conducted search and destroy operations for len 

more days. During this time the battalion destroyed tunnel complexes, trenches, and fighting positions and captured two Ions of 

rice. many documents, and some enemy arms. It was not until midOctober, as the result of a decision taken at the Military Assistance 

Command commanders' conference, that ATTLEBORO was expanded 

toa multi battalion opel·alion with the 196th committing two battalions to its search and destroy activities. Through the end of October action was light and sporadic with no major contact. In fact, 

the action was so light that between 4 October and 1 November only 

two immediate air strikes were called in to support the operation. 

Meanwhile, the Viet Cong 9th Division was starting to stir 

again. After its bealing in EL PA SO" in June and July 1966, the 9th 
INTRODUCTION II 

had withdrawn to its sanctuaries deep in War Zone C next to the 

Cambodian border and had retrained, re·equipped. and absorbed 

replacements. The plan of the 91h was to use these bases to launch 

a winter offensive against objectives in Tay Ninh Province. Among 

its objectives was to be the Special Forces camp at Suoi Da, located 

twelve kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh cily in the shadow of Nui 

Da Den, the Black Virgin Mountain, which rose, as if by mistake. 

some three thousand feet above the surrounding plain. The divi· 

sion also hoped to lure some allied forces into the area in response 

to an attack by one of its regiments so that these forces might be 

ambushed by the remaining regiments of the 9th. By late October 

the regiments assigned to the 9th Viet Cong Division-the 271st, 

272d, 273d, and the IOIst North Vietnamese Regiment-had com· 

menced deploying in War Zone C. On 28 October elements of the 

U.S. 1st Infantry Division made contact with a battalion of the 

273d just east of the ATTuaoRo operational area. The command· 

ing officer of one of the companies of the JOist North Vietnamese 

Army Regiment, captured on 8 November. revealed thllt his regi. 

ment had left its base area on the Cambodian border about 1 

November to move south along the eastern boundary of the ATTLE_ 

BORO area toward resupply camps. 

Sweeping operations by American units near Dau Tieng on 31 

October uncovered a major enemy supply base. On 1 November 

ATTLEBORO became a brigade·size operation with the 196th Brigade 

assuming operational control of a battalion from the 25th Division. 

Two days later an airmobile assault by this battalion made contact 

with elements of the 9th Viet Cong Division; on the same day, 3 

November, elements of the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group's mobile 

strike force, which had been inserted into landing zones near Suoi 

DOl, were also engaged by forces of the 9th Division. Operation 

ATTLEBORO was about to erupt. 

By 5 November it was apparent that a very large enemy force 

was involved; operational control was initially passed to Major 

General William E. DePuy, Commanding General, U.S. 1st Infan· 

try Division. and subsequently to the commanding genera l of 11 

Field Force. Before the operation ended on 24 November, the 1st 

Division, elements of the U.S. 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 

173d Airborne Brigade, and several South Vietnamese Army battalions were committed to it, over 22,000 U.S. and allied troops in 

all. It was the largesl U.S. operation or the war to that time. 

II was not only the number of U.S. and allied troops eventually 

involved which made A·rTLEBORO a large operation. There was also 

during November a total of over 1,600 close air support sorties 

flown. expending nearly 12,<XX> tons of ordnance (225 were B-52 
12 CEDAR FALLS- IUNCTlON CITY 

sorties ca rrying 4,000 Ions). Cargo aircnft new 3,300 sorties in 

transporting 8,900 tons of cargo and 11,500 passengers during the 

period 18 OCloOOI"-26 November. The enemy left 1,106 dead on the 

battlefield and had 44 captured. (Friendly losses were 155 killed 

and 494 wounded.) Later military intelligence reports confirmed 

the high casualties sustained by the enemy, listing 2,130 killedincluding over 1,000 by air strikes. almost 900 wounded, and over 

200 missing or captured. Headquarters of the Central Office of 

South Vietnam was reported struck by B-52 bombers on more than 

onc occasion with the destruction of great quantities of supplies, 

equipment, and documents. Four Viet Cong battalion commanders 

and 5 company commanders were reponed killed in the operation. 

Not only would its casualities pose a serious problem to the Viet 

Cong 9th Division, so too would the pillaging of its depot area by 

U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. Over 2,<XX> tons of rice were 

captured, as were many tons of salt. 19,000 grenades, 500 claymore 

mines, and many individual and crew-served weapons. Uncovered 

and destroyed were regimental and battalion headquarters sites, 

a mine factory, and a vast tunnel complex containing immense 

quantities of supplies ranging from bolts of cloth to weighing 

scales. As General DePuy commented, hit is the largest haul we've 

made." 

Hurting from the whipping it had taken, the 9th Division once 

again disappeared into its sanctuaries to lick its wounds. regroup, 

and reorganize. It would not be seen on the field of combat again 

until the spring of 1967. 

Operation ATTLESOMO introduced the large-scale, multiorganization operation to the war, albeit as an accident, in response to the 

Viet Cong 9th Division's Tay Ninh campaign. But An-LEHOKO 

proved that, within a matter of hours, well-trained and professionally led organizations with proper logistic support could 

deploy large numbers of battalions to an active operational area 

and commit those battalions to immediate combat against a highly 

disciplined enemy. It proved that large-sca le operations, perhaps 

involving the majority of the forces available in corps zone, have 

a place in modern counterinsurgency warfare and can e£fcctively 

destroy large enemy forces and equipment and neutralize major 

base areas. However, the nexl time such large forces were used in 

a single operation, it would nOI be by accident, as CEDAK F .... LLS and 

J UNCTION CITY were soon to verify. 
PART ONE 

CEDAR FALLS, 8-26 JANUARY 1967 

CHAPTER I 

Background and Planning 

Shortly after the completion of Operation BIRMINGHAM in May 

1966, General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command. Vietnam, directed Lieutenant General 

Jonathan O. Seaman, Commanding General, II Field Force, Vietnam, to plan an operation for War Zone C in northern Tay Ninh 

Province to start soon after the Christmas and New Year standdowns or 1966--67. (Map S) He rurther indicated that it should be a 

"big operation." Over the next several months the operation, to be 

known as J UNCTION CITY. was planned. As approved by General 

Westmoreland, the operation was to start on 8 January 1967, was to 

be multidivisiona l, and was to include a parachute assauh. The 

operation to commence on 8 January would not be JUNCTION CITY: 

the pre-cmptor was to be known as CEDAR F .... LLS. 

As II Field Force troop strength built up in 1966 and it became 

more capable of attacking the enemy in longtime havens, General 

Seaman's headquarters was considering the possibility of a po,."erful strike into the Iron Triangle. The Iron Triangle is generally 

defined on the southwest by the Saigon River, on the east by the 

Thi Tinh River, and on the north by a line running west from Ben 

Cat to the town of Ben Sue on the Saigon River. To the north lies 

the Thanh Dien Forestry Reserve. The Iron Triangle has been 

characterized as a dagger pointed at Saigon and, being only twenty 

kilometers away, was the enemy's largest haven close to that city. 

The area was heavily fortified and known to contain the Viet Cong 

headquarters for Military Region IV which directed military. political. and terrorist activities in the Saigon-Gia Dinh capital region 

complex. Viet Cong control of the Iron Triangle permitted the 

enemy forces to dominate key transportation routes in the surrounding area. This important center for controlling and supporting enemy operations had to be attacked decisively and in force if 

the attack were to succeed in rupturing and neutralizing the control 

structure. 

At a planning meeting in September 1966 General Seaman discussed the possibility of an operation in the triangle with General 

Westmoreland, who suggested a co-ordinated operation with forces 
MAPS 

THE IRON TRIANGLE 

'"' CEDAR FALLS Dp.rational Area 

' i 
RAC':K(;ROUNO ANn PI.ANNING J 7 

on both sides of the Saigon River. He envisioned troops mOl'ing 

into position on one side of the river to form an anvil followed by a 

rapid move from the other side to hammer the enemy against the 

anvil. Discussion also turned to the need for extensive clearing to 

strip the area and deprive the enemy of concealment. By November General Seaman's headquarters was planning not on ly for 

Operation JUNCTION Crrv but also for CWAR FALLS. Intelligence 

collection was directed at both operations. 

A new approach to assigning intell igence collection responsibilities in 111 Corps had been taken with the publication of a 11 

Field Force, Viel11am, intelligence collection plan. The plan 

assigned specific intelligence collection areas, tasks, and responsibilities to U.S. and allied units within the III Corps area; the objective was a closely integrated and co-ordinated effort by U.s. and 

allied agencies. Unit collection responsibilities werc assigncd on 

the basis of geographic areas. Close liaison was effected between 

U.S. and allied units from division through battalion leve l and 

between U.S. advisers and con'csponding commanders of South 

Vietnamese Army units or province and district chiefs. The plan 

was designed to provide for the collection of maximum information with minimum duplication of effort. 

A step was also taken to improve the intelligence collection 

effort through the establishment of a source control program in the 

III Corps area. When fully implemented, this program administratively controlled and identified confidential informants and 

sourccs, assisted in their evaluation, prevented utilization of each 

source by more than one agency. and avoided employment of 

unreliable agents. 

Operation CE.DAR FALLS .... 'as the first large-scale operation to 

benefit from "pattern activity analysis," a syslem begun in mid1966. This procedure consisted of detailed plotting on maps of 

information on enemy activity obtained from a variety of sources 

over an extended period of time. As more data were plotted, patterns of activity and locations emerged. 11 thereby became possible 

to focus prime attention on those areas of intensive or unusual 

activity. 

Aerial observation and photography, sensors, palrol reports, 

infrared devices, sampan traffic counts, enemy probes of Regional 

and Popular Forces posts, agent reports, civilian movement 

reports, reports of increased antiaircraft fire, disclosures of caches 

(and the amount and nature of the material in them), and captured 

documents-these sources and more revealed much about enemy 

intentions. Increases in road ambushes or bridge destruction 
18 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

usually meant that the Viet Cong intended to allack in a location 

where denial of the roads would aid the enemy. Some idea of the 

enemy's intent could be determined by checking even the amount 

of wood shipped into an area for making caskets or the number 

of civilians impressed as porters. The extent and nature of the 

enemy's own intelligence gathering revealed much about his 

intentions and even the size of the operation he was planning. 

Detailed plotting of all this information and careful analysis 

of the patterns enabled U.S. forces to launch spoiling attacks both 

with ground troops and with massive air strikes. Where no pronounced pattern developed in an area, efforts were concentrated 

elsewhere, thereby conserving forces. Pattern activity analysis was 

invaluable in developing broad long-range direction of military 

operations, while at lower echelons it provided commanders a 

basis for planning day-by-day operations. 

The excellence of the intelligence effort was vividly demonstrated by the results achieved. A comparison of installations 

discovered during Operation CEDAR FALLS with order-of-battle 

intelligence holdings collected before the operation disclosed a 

high degree of correlation. For example, of 177 separate enemy 

facilities found by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 156, or 

88.1 percent, were located within 500 meters of the locations 

previously reported. The average distance was about 200 meters. 

Intelligence information prompted General Seaman to recommend that Operation CEDAR FALLS precede JUNCTION CITY. General 

Seaman related the events surrounding the change as follows: 

In early December, if I recall correctly, J received a telephone call 

from [Brigadier] General Uoseph A.] McChristian, (Assistant Chief of 

Staff, Intelligence U-21. MACV) saying that he would like to come out and 

brief me on some intelligence information he had concerning the HI Corps 

Tactical Zone. He came out with several young MI (Military Intelligence) 

lieutenants who had been in some building in Saigon poring over (special) 

research reports, clandestine reports, and everything else available. The 

briefing lasted a couple of hours and was a most convincing presentation 

in that they had arrelty good idea where Military Region IV headquarters 

was, plus some 0 the support elements of Military Region IV. General 

McChristian said he wanted to bring this to my attention fbr whatever I 

felt should be done. I did a lot of thinking about all this and was convinced 

that he had some good solid, sound information. I called my staff in and 

told them to prepare plans for an operation to seal off the southwest side 

of the Saigon River and the Iron Triangle with the objective of seeing what 

we could find with respect to Military Region IV. We came up with a plan 

of operation that, to me, was pretty sound. I asked General Westmoreland 

to come to my headquarters so that I could brief him on a concept of operations for "Cedar Fans." We had developed a good cover plan so that we 
BACKGROUN D AND PLANN ING 19 

wouldn't compromise the operation. I was going to propose to him thai we 

postpone "J unction City" for two main reasons. 

First, I felt that the intelligence information we received from General 

McChristian and his people was so good that we had to cap italize on it. 

Secondly, the 9th Division was on its way from Fort Riley and would arrive 

in theater in December and earl y January. So, I felt that if we postponed "Junction City" for a month or a lillie 

more, Ihis would give me anal her division I could usc to take over some 

of the other missions Ihal were going on. Remember, we didn't conduct 

just one operalion at a time. . . . With those two fa clS in mind; intelligence, and Ihatthe 9th Division was on its way over, I felt that there was 

a great advantage in postponing "Junction City." 

General Weslmoreland \",as briefed on CEOA~ FALLS; the advantages and disadvantages were weighed and the decision made: 

Operation CEDA~ FALLS, rather than J UNCTION CITY, would begin 

on 8 January 1967. The mission : II Field Force, Vietnam, attacks 

the Iron Triangle and the Thanh Dien Forestry Reserve to destroy 

enemy forces, infrastructure, installations, and Military Region IV 

headquarters; evacualeS civilian population ; and establishes the 

Iron Triangle as a specified strike lOne to preclude its further lise 

as a support base for Viet Cong operations. 

General Seaman furnished further planning guidance: the Iron 

Triangle area was to be attacked violentl y and decisively with all 

forces avai lable in a "hammer and anvil " opera ti on. Deceptive 

deployments on seemingly routine operations wou ld pre-position 

the forces. The anvil would be positioned first and the hammer 

then swung th rough the Iron Triangle. The object ive area was to 

be sea led tightly throughout the operation to prevent enemy 

escape. The triangle itself was to be scoured for enemy installations, cleared of all civilians, stripped of concea lment, and declared 

a specified strike zone. The destruction of the enemy's Military 

Region IV headquarters was the principal objective of the operation. (Map 6) 

In addition to the Military Region IV headquarters, the other 

Viet Cong units in the area were suspected to be the 272d Regiment, the 1st and 7th Battalions of Military Region IV under the 

165th Viet Cong Regiment, the Phu Loi Loca l Force Battalion, plus 

three local force companies. (Although the suspected loca ti on of 

the 272d Regiment presented a threat during the initial stages of 

the operation, this unit displaced to the north as the operation 

progressed.) Other intelligence sources indicated the 2d, 3d, and 

8th Battalions of the 165th Viet Cong Regiment might also be 

encountered. 

The Thanh Dien forest and the Iron Triangle were known to 
IAr ,~ .. " 

CEDAR FALLS 

{ConC'PI of Oper<II,ool) 

..... saD SoooCfl_.""O) 

'--

I f-' { ~~---,=::;--1 !." ......... "" 

MAP6 
.Ii • 

THE IRON 

TRIANGLE 

OP£IIIAlIONS 
22 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

BRIGADIER Gt:NU .... L BERNARD W. ROGUS (nghl~ AsSISTANT DIVISION COM. 

MANDER OF TBt 1ST INF .... NTKy DIVISION, directs his troops in bailie by radio, 

operated by First Lieutenant Christopher j. Needels. (Photograph taken in 1966.) 

contain strongly fortified positions with the routes of approach 

mined and booby trapped. The terrain in the area consists of dense 

forests and wet, open rice lands. Cover in the rice paddies, marshes, 

and swamps is generally limited to road embankments and dikes. 

Fields of fire are poor in the forests. Vehicle movement is restricted 

to existing roads and some trails. What few slopes exist are very 

gentle; the highest points in the area do not exceed forty meters. 

The weather for CWAR FALU was most favorable during Janu· 

ary when the northeast monsoon develops to its fuliest, leaving the 

interior regions of the III Corps area with relatively clear skies and 

little precipitation. Except for periods of early morning fog and 

occasional morning and afternoon rain showers, cloud ceilings are 

unlimited and the visibility is excellent. The temperature varies 

from a low of 59 ° to a high of 95 °. 

The deception planned in positioning the various units was 

involved and critical. The lIth Armored Cavalry Regiment was to 

come rrom Xuan Loc, 100 kilometers to the east, and the 173d Air· 
BACKGROUND AND PLANNING 23 

borne Brigade was operating between Ben Cat and Phuoc Vinh. 

Elements of the 25th Infantry Division and I96th Light Infantry 

Brigade were to move from the areas of Cu Chi. to the south, and 

Tay Ninh city, some sixty kilometers to the northwest. The lst 

Infantry Division elements were to be air transported to complete 

the seal and invade the area. Numerous small-scale movements 

under the guise of local operations would position other forces. 

From the first planning conference. strict security measures 

were enforced to prevent disclosure of the operation. The planning 

group was held to a minimum within 11 Field Force headquarters 

and, wherever possible. preparations were made without specifically identifying them with CEDAK FALLS. AJI commanders were 

instructed on 19 December 1966 to minimize helicopter operations 

during January. Even the plan for the unprecedented mass evacuation of civilians from the area was not disclosed before the operation. Planning for the transportation and housing of refugees was 

co-ordinated only with Mr. John Vann, director of Region Ill's 

Office of Civil Operations. Although supplies were earmarked 

for shipment to a refugee relocation center at Phu Cuong, no construction or stocking was started until CEI)AK FALLS had commenced. General Seaman personally briefed the commanding 

general of the South Vietnamese 111 Corps on D minus 2.6 January 

1967. South Vietnamese troop participation was approved at that 

time with government forces assigned the missions of supporting 

AmeriCdn blocking forces, of securing and transporting civilian 

evacuees, and of supporting security forces in the An Loe and Quan 

Loi areas. The Vietnamese III Corps commander assisted in maintaining security by restricting dissemination of information on 

the operation. 

CEDAK FAus was to be conducted in two distinct phases. Phase I, 

~8 January, consisted of positioning units on the flanks of the [ron 

Triangle-Thanh Dien forest area. D-day was set for 8 January 

when an air assault on Ben Sue would take place. Ben Sue was to be 

sealed, searched. and, after evacuation of its inhabitants and their 

possessions, destroyed. Phase II of the operation was to start on 9 

January with an armored force attacking west from the vicinity of 

Ben Cat to penetrate the Iron Triangle. Simultaneously. air 

assaults in an arc around the Thanh Dien forest from Ben Cat to 

Ben Sue would complete the northern portion of the encirclement 

of the triangle. Forces would attack south through the entire objective area to the confluence of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. All 

civilians were to be evacuated from the area which would be 

cleared and the tunnels destroyed. Phase 11 of Operation CEDAR 

FALLS was planned to last from two to three weeks. 
24 CEDAR FALLS-JUNcrION CITY 

The task organization under II Field Force consisted of three 

divisions: the 25th Infantry Division under the command of Major 

General Frederick C. Weyand; the Ist Infantry Division commanded by Major General William E. DePuy; and the South Vietnamese 5th Infantry Division, Brigadier General Phan Quoc 

Thuan commanding. Forces supporting the operation were the 7th 

Air Force; lst Logistical Command; 3d Tactical Fighter Wing; II 

Field Force. Vietnam, Artillery; the 12th Combat Aviation Group; 

and the 79th Engineer Group. South Vietnamese supporting forces 

included the 3d Riverine Company (Navy), the 30th River Assault 

Group (Navy), and three Regional Forces boat companies. 

CEDAR FALLS was to be the largest and most significam operation to this point in the war. 
CHAPTER 1I 

Positioning the Anvil-Operations 

Fitchburg and Niagara Falls 

The u.s. 25th Division would form the anvil for CE.DAR FALU 

using one organic and one attached brigade positioned along the 

Saigon River on the southwest leg of the Iron Triangle to conduct 

search and destroy operations and to prevent enemy forces from 

escaping. Other elements of the 25th were not directly involved in 

the operation. The U.S. lst Infantry Division, employing two 

organic brigades and one attached brigade, had a threefold Mis· 

sion. Before D-day the division would position elements along the 

Thi Tinh River. conduct search and destroy operations, and 

assume screening and blocking positions to keep the enemy from 

escaping to the east. Commencing D-day (8 January), one brigade 

would seal, search, clear, and destroy the village of Ben Sue. The 

third task would be to swing the hammer element of this hammer 

and anvil operation; that is, to attack west and south with one 

brigade through the triangle and with another through the Thanh 

Dien forest. One organic brigade of the division would not be 

employed in CEDAR. FALLS. 

On 5 January (D-3), the two U.S. divisions began the deception deployment of the elements which were to participate in 

CmAR FALLS. 

25th Infantry Division 

For Operation CEDAR FALLS, the 25th Division employed its 2d 

Brigade and the 100th Light Infantry Brigade. Elements of the 

South Vietnamese 7th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, were also 

placed under the control of the division. 

The area of operations of the 25th extended on a line generally 

parallel to the Saigon River from the southern portion of the Boi 

Loi woods southeast to a north-south line four kilometers east of 

Phu Hoa Dong. This area was some twenty-five kilometers long 

and was designated Blocking Position YANKU. The division's area 

of operation encompassed former Viet Cong havens in both the Boi 

Loi and Ho Bo woods and in the Filhol Plantation. The 25th Divi-
26 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION C ITY 

Two ARMORED PU.SONNf.L c......RIERS OF CoMPANY C, 1ST BA1TALION, 5TH 

INFANTRY (MECHANIZED), move through Ihescrobjungle in search oflhe enemy. 

sian was also responsible for traffic control on the Saigon River. 

At night, ambushes were to be emplaced along the river; by day, 

patrols would secure the river, thereby releasing the majority of 

forces for search and destroy operations. 

The 196th Light Infantry Brigade. commanded by Brigadier 

General Richard T . Knowles. was deployed from Tay Ninh to the 

Ho Bo woods. Under the guise of a continuation of Operation 

FITCH8URG-an action initiated earlier in the Tay Ninh area-the 

1961h was to locate and destroy key enemy installations and fortifications, deny the use of the area as a logistica l base and headquarters. and establish blocking positions to prevent enemy escape 

across the Saigon River. The operational area of the 196th c;<>mprised the northern portion of the 25th Division zone of responsibility and was fifteen kilometers long. extending parallel to the 

Saigon River from the Boi Loi woods on the north to the Rach 

(stream) Son. immediately northwest of the Filhol Plantation. The 

task organization included two infantry battalions. two mechanized 
POSITIONING THE ANVIL 27 

infantry battalions, two cavalry troops. the 175th Engineer Com· 

pany, and a ballalion (+) of artillery. 

At 0540 on D minus 3 (5 January 1967) the 100th Brigade began 

the move to its CEDAIt FALLS operational area, using both ground 

and airlift. Only relatively light enemy contact was made by the 

1961h during this final phase of FITCIHIUItG. A1; planned, the move· 

menl placed the brigade forces in initial positions from which the 

northern portion of the 25th Division's area of operation could be 

controlled. Half of the anvil was now in place. 

As the 196th maneuvered into position, the 2d Brigade, 25th 

Division, commanded by Colonel Marvin D. "Red" Fuller, was 

preparing to be committed. The brigade task organization included 

two infantry battalions, one tank battalion, two artillery battalions 

(one each in direct and general support), and an engineer com· 

pany. Other brigade units included one troop of cavalry (attached 

on D·day) and a military intelligence detachment. 

The 2d Brigade area of responsibility was paraliello and west 

of the Saigon River from a north-south line four kilometers east 

of Phu Hoa Dong to the northern perimeter of the Filhol Planta· 

tion. The brigade's mission was to block along the Saigon River 

"early on D plus 1" (9 January) and prevent enemy escape from 

the Iron Triangle area. Other tasks included maintaining control 

over the river, preventing ils use by enemy forces, and destroying 

enemy forces and installations in the area of operation, to include 

the elimination of the hostile infrastructure in the village of Phu 

Hoa Dong. This last requirement was to be accomplished in con· 

junction with a South Vietnamese batta lion as a "Buddy" operation 

and was designed to expand government control over the village. 

Phu Hoa Dong, a complex of hamlets including Ben Co, Phu Loi, 

and Phu Thuan, located to the west of the Filhol Plantation, was a 

known enemy communications and liaison point. It was from Phu 

Boa Dong that commercial products and taxes could be procured 

by the Viet Cong 2d Battalion , 165th Regiment, a unit which 

occupied areas to the east of the town. 

Movement by the 2d Brigade into the blocking positions to 

complete the anvil would begin at 0400 on D-day. 

1st Infantry Division 

The 1st Infantry Division was to be employed both to block on 

the east and to conduct extensive search and destroy, tunnel and 

base camp destruction, and jungle clearing operations throughout 

the area. In addition, 1st Division forces would constitute the ham· 

mer or the operation. Like the 25th, the 1st Division initiated 
28 CEDAR FALL~:lUNCnON CITY 

BR IG .... DlER GENERAL JOHN R. DUNE, JR •• COMM .... NDlNG GENERAL OF TH! 

1730 AIRBORNE BRIGADE. checks thtt locah'on of /J palroL 

preparatory action for CWAR FALLS on 5 January, 0 minus 3, in a 

cover operation dubbed NIAGARA FA u.s. Major forces included the 

division's 2d and 3d Brigades plus the 173d Airborne Brigade and 

the J1th Armored Cavalry Regiment (minus one squadron) placed 

under operational control of the division. For this operation the 

173<1 was code·named Task Force DEANE, for its commander, Brigadier General John R. Deane, 11'". 

NIAGARA FALLS was a three-day operation assigned to Task Force 

DF.ANE; it began at 0730 on 5 January. Similar to Operation FITCII. 

SUR G conducted by the 1961h Light Infantry Brigade, NIAGARA 

F"u.s was a deception designed to place combat elements in position before striking the main blow. The area of operation included 

the terrain between the Thi Tinh River and Highway 13, bounded 

on the north by the Cau Dinh jungle and extending south approximately four IUlometers. This terrain lies immediately east of the 

southern point of the Iron Triangle.lt was believed that the 2d and 

3d Battalions of the 165th Viet Cong Main Force Regiment, the 
I'OSITIONING TI-It: ANVIL 29 

Phu Loi Battalion, and a Viet Cong company (the 63d) might be 

operating in the area. 

NIAGARA FALLS terminated at 1500 on 7 January without major 

incident. As with the 25th Division units, a deceptive move had 

resulted in lacticalunilS being positioned, in this case, in Blocking 

Position ZULU. Enemy escape routes to the east were now closed. 

Elements of Task Force DEAN¥. would form pari of the hammer 

forces swinging west through the triangle on D plus 1. 

Among the accomplishments of NIAGARA FALI.S, perhaps the 

most noteworthy was Ihat of the 1st Engineers. Working with a 

task fOI'OO of fifty bulldozers, Lieutenant Colonel j oseph M. 

Kieman, Jr.'s troops cleared 365 acres of dense jungle containing 

many Viet Cong installations and serving as an access route to the 

Iron Triangle. 

The 2d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division was to seal and 

searcll the village of Ben Sue, prepare to evacuate the inhabitants 

and their possessions, and eliminate the village as a center of Vi'Ct 

Cong operations. The tactical command post along with one infantry battalion left Oi An carlyon 7 January for a road march to the 

airfield at Bien Hoa. From there the units were airlifted 10 Dau 

Tieng. Also on the 7th, the lst Battalion, 26th Infantry. the unit 

designated to make the actual assault on Ben Suc, was air transported from Phuoc Vinh to Dall Tieng and came under the operational control of the 2d Brigade. As D-day approached. elements 

of the 2d Brigade waited in readiness, and the tension mounted. 

The third major element of the 1st Division, the 3d Brigade, 

was slated for search and destroy operations around and through 

the Thanh Dien forest as a part of the hammer. The operations 

order was issued to participating battalions of the brigade on 5 

January, and the subsequent days were used for planning and 

preparation . On 8 january the brigade's direct support battalion 

moved from Lai Khe to Artillery Base I. two kilometers from Ben 

Cat at the northeast comer of the Iron Triangle. The 3d Brigade 

was almost ready forits H-hour on 0 plus 1-0800, 9 january 1967. 

The "Blue Spaders" of the 1st Battalion. 26th Infantry, were 

set for their raid on Ben Sue; the anvil was ready for emplacement 

and the hammer was poised . CmAR FAt.l.S time had arrived. 
CHAPTER III 

D-Day-Ben Sue 

The II Field Force, Vietnam, tactical command post for Operation CWAIt FAl.LS opened at 0700 on D-day at Long Binh. Under 

its direction the twenty battalions allocated to the five brigades of 

the lst and 25th Infantry Divisions were ready for Phase II of 

CEDAR FA1.LS-the destruction of the enemy force. 

2SIh hlfanlry Division 

Elements of the 25th Infantry Division's 2d Brigade started its 

participation in CEDAR FALLS early on 8 January 1967. By 0730 the 

first contingent of troops had been airlifted to a forward base within 

five hundred meters of the Sa.igon River, near its junction with the 

Thi Tinh. and two ki lometers cast of Phu Hoa Dong. Enemy resistance was encountered on the second lift and, despite repeated air 

strikes and artillery barrages, contact continued throughout the 

afternoon; however, friendly casualties were light. The enemy 

withdrew under cover of darkness. Two companies of the 2d Brigade now anchored the southeastern Oank of the 25th Division. 

Later Chieu Hoi returnees reported the assault had confronted the 

battalion headquarters and a company of a battalion of the 165th 

Regiment, and some sixty Viet Cong had been killed and fifty-five 

wounded. Documents captured in the area confirmed the presence 

of this battalion; according to the 2d Brigade's report, "this was 

the only incident during the entire operation in which the Viet 

Cong elected to fight." To the northwest of this action, the brigade's 

other two battalions attacked northeast from Cu Chi through the 

Filhol Plantation and by nightfall were in position at the edge of 

the plantation, four to five hundred meters soulh of the Saigon 

River. 

To the northwest of the 2d Brigade's positions, the 196th Brigade continued its search of the 1-10 So woods, uncovering a small 

quantity of enemy supplies. 

The anvil was in position. 
D·DAY-BEN sue 31 

1st Infantry Division 

To the east, General Deane's task force remained in blocking 

positions along the eastern leg of the Iron Triangle. All that 

remained was to position the hammer forces, the 173d Brigade 

(Task Force DEAI'It:)and theSd Brigade of the "Big Red One." 

Task Force DtANE officially joined Operation CtDAIt FALLS at 

0800 on D·day with its headquarters located near Ben Ca t. Two of 

its battalions were lifted by helicopter from Bien Hoa to Phu Loi 

and then to Position BLUE, a staging area ten kilometers east of the 

triangle. On D.day the 11th Armored Cava lry (Blackhorse) Regi. 

ment, commanded by Colonel William W. Cobb, came under the 

operational control of the 1st Division and subsequentl y under 

Task Force DEANE at 1200. The cava lry had closed its trains and 

headquarters in a staging area north of Phu Loi at about midnight 

the previous day. The 3d Squadron of the 11th had moved from its 

base camp at Long Giao to a forward assembly area just east of the 

junction of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers, the last element 

arriving at 23150n D minus 1. 

The 3d Brigade (the "Iron" Brigade), commanded by Colonel 

Sidney M. ("Mickey") Marks, moved its forces to staging areas at 

Lai Khe and Dau Tieng without incident. The hammer was raised 

awaiting the next day, D plus 1. 

Meanwhile, to 1he northwest of the H o Bo woods the lst Divi· 

sion's 2d Brigade under the command of Colonel James A. "Alex" 

Grimsley had launched the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry (com· 

manded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. Haig), by air assault 

into the village of Ben Suc. (Map 7) 

Ben Sue Village 

Ensuring.the dominance of the Viet Cong in the Iron Triangle 

area was the village of Ben Sue, located in a loop of the Saigon 

River at the far northwest comer of the triangle. It was an enemy· 

controlled village. a fortified supply and political center, and the 

hub of an area estimated to contain approximately six thousand 

persons. The village had been under firm enemy control since at 

least 1964 when a South Vietnamese battalion was dri ven out by the 

enemy. Before that, the government's influence had been tenuous 

at best. The central organization for the Viet Cong's Long Nguyen 

secret base was located in and operated from Ben Suc. The people 

of the village were orga nized into four rear service companies. One 

company moved rice and other suppli es in sampans on the Saigon 
o 

MAP7 

CEDAR FALLS 

(c-OaY. D+1l 

"_,D'~"""'_' ''' __ & __ ,_D'I 

~_. ___ .O-•• "O'I, ...... --. .. _ .. ._-

( 
, 

... 

-, 

, 

\ 

;:' 1 

-----,.,/ 
34 CEDAR FALLS-:!UNCTION CITY 

River. A second company unloaded these supplies. The two 

remaining companies stored the materiel in and around the village 

or in the nearby jungle. Just as the Iron Triangle was the key to 

Viet Cong influence in Saigon-Gia Dinh, so was Ben Sue the key 

to Viet Cong control of the Iron Triangle. This fact was well known 

to the province chief of Binh Duong. who for some months had 

been urging a military operation against the village. 

Because of its imporlance to the enemy. Ben Sue had been 

marked for attention at the outset of Operation CEOAR FALLS. It was 

necessary to take this village and deny the enemy its future use; 

it was to be totally evacuated and destroyed. All inhabitants and 

their possessions-livestock, food , furnishings-were to be moved 

as humanely as possible to a government-operated relocation camp 

at Phu Cuong and ultimately resettled in another area. It was 

estimated that nearly 3,500 persons lived in Ben Suc and another 

2,500 in the vicinity, most of whom lived in the three villages of 

Rach Kien, Bung Cong, and Rach Bap along the northern edge of 

the triangle. These villages were also to be evacuated. 

The perimeter of Ben Suc was expected to be heavily mined and 

booby trapped. Viet Cong units reported in the area included the 

7th Battalion , 165th Viet Cong Regiment, and the 61st Local Force 

Company. 

This attack had to be a swift, decisive strike directly into the 

enemy stronghold, not the methodical probing technique used in 

previous operations. A plan for a massive assault by helicopter 

into the village itself was visualized-over four hundred men and 

sixty helicopters simultaneously-total surprise! There would be 

no preparatory fires. The air assault, placing one reinforced infan· 

try battalion inside the village within a minimum time, would 

quickly sea l the village. Further landings would bring in support 

troops and artillery as well as troops to initiate search and inter· 

rogation ; the orderly evacuation of the inhabitants would follow, 

and, finally, the village would be destroyed. 

The Initial Assault 

The sight of sixty helicopters flying in formation and zooming 

into Ben Suc at treetop level was one which none who witnessed 

will ever forget. Here is the way it was described by Staff Sergeant 

Frank P. Castro, writing in the 28 January 1967 issue of the lst 

Division paper, The American Traveler: 

In the early morning hours, January 8, people in Ben Sue Village went 

calmly about their tasks. At exactly 8 a.m., total confusion erupted. The 

once-dear sky filled with 60 helicopters. The choppers swooped in, allow-
O-DAY-BEN sue 35 

ing division soldicrs to unload and begin a sea l of the village. Minutes 

later the sky was fi\led agai n as the aircraft vanished as qu ickly as they 

had appeared. 

Planning of this dramatic air mission was assigned to the lst Aviation 

Battalion on 5 January. Major Nick J. Primis was the battalion operations 

officer. He explained : "We were faced with a multitude of problems. We 

had to lifL an entire infantry battalion in addition to an attached company 

from Dau Tieng to Ben Suc and we were sUllposed to put the battalion on 

the ground at exactly' 8 a.m. Further, the cement of surprise was in our 

hands. Nothing-artillery, airstrikes or gunships-was to hit the area until 

after wc had put the troops on the ground. 11us was the first time that we 

were goi ng to land in a town." 

The avi ation battalion commander, Lieutenll nt Colonel Algin S. 

Hawkins an d his staH prepared maps, photo mosaics, operations orders, 

and photo obliques. picked routes in and out of the village, and timed the 

miSSion to the second. 

Each night leader had clear. detailed pictures of his landing zone 

thanks to Ma/'or Cecil O. Carlile, the Aerial Surveillance and Target 

Acquisition P atoon commander. who flew a Mohawk airplane ovcr Ben 

Suc. photographing the entire area from 6,000 feet . At 6:00 A.M. in pitch darkness, six ty "slicks" (troop carriers) and ten 

gun ships began arriving at the Dau Tieng airstrip. Ser~eant Alton B. 

Pinkney was a pathfinder with the 1st Aviation Battal ion. HIS/'Obs included 

the marking of landing zones, directing aircraft to and rom loading 

areas, and supervising loading. On January 8th hc stood on the airstrip 

anncd with a large flashlight and two balonlike lights; twenty aircraft 

hovered overhcad awaiting his guidance to land. When the ships were 

finally loaded, Pinkney recalled, "TIley lifted orr beautifull y, but once 

they were airborne I wondered: How in the hell arc they going to get those 

ships lined up ?" 

!3y 7:25 the flight was orbiting Dau Tieng. The helicopters slipped 

ovcr, under, and around each othcr as pilots jockeyed their cra ft mto 

position less than fifty feet from the chop,p:cr in front. They had twenty 

minutes to form into two "V" formations, wllh three nights of ten choppers 

in each. 

The nineteen-mile route plotted by Colonel Hawkins ran almost due 

south from Oau Tieng over the dense 80i Loi jungle and then curved 

sharpl y to thc cast. So well timed was the trip that at one point the aviators 

passed a con trol poi nt just fifteen seconds ahead of schedule; a slight 

change in heading put them back on time. At a road junction near Suoi 

Cau (the third control poi nt in the route), the ships turned east and 

dropped 10 treetop level. They sk immed along at about eighty-five miles 

an hour. heading toward another control point and Ben Suc. 

At the hi ghway release point, the pilots spotted smoke tossed by pathfinders, cut left, hoppcd over the Cachua Forestry Reserve (at the southeastern tip of the 801 Loi Woods) at ave!' 100 miles an hour and swarmed 

into Ben Suc. 

Flying a gunship, Major George B. Fish, from the 1st Aviation Bat- talion, zoomed over the trees to mark three key landing zones while the 

main flight was one mi nu te out. 

H is crew chief recallcd, "We were fl ying in one area when I heard over 

the radio 'Rebel 36. go in for the mark.' We went in at low Icvel at about 
36 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

PRIVATE FIII.STeLASS WILLIE FOXWORTII. CO~fPANY A, 1ST BATTALION. 28TU 

I NfANTRY. wiles II porih'on behind u'#!fJlher-ed graves. 

eighty·live miles an hour. We received fire from a bunker and ret urned 

it. It didn't nrc anymore. And you look out to scc a 

whole bunch of choppers you see a fantaSlic mess 

beautifully coordinated and planned." 

Major Robert E. Oberg. Commanding Orficcr of 0 Troop. lsi Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and Captain William 8. Owens were orbiting sout h of 

the Cachua Reserve leading "choppers" loaded with light infantry fire 

Icams-"Eagle Flights." They followed the troop carriers into Ben Sue 

and blocked to the south, ultimalely accounting for five enemy killed , two 

prisoners, and thirty sampans destroyed. 

Major Donald A. Ice, the comma nder of A Company. Jed his night 

over the jungle and along the river to a landing zone In the northeast 

comer of Ben Sue. "As we flew along the river our skids were almost in 

the water." he recalled. "Then we jumped a treeline. nared up and popped 

into the landing zone. I had to push Vietnamese out of the zone. ihey 

didn't know what was happeni ng." 

The choppers touched down simultaneously in landing zones to the 

west, nonh, and cast of the town whi le the "Eagle ."light" guarded the 

south. In less than one and one-haH minutes an entire infantry battalion, 

some 420 men, was on the ground. 
I 

O-DAY-BEN sue 37 

Some small arms rire was rece ived but was quickly suppressed. 

The troops occupied blocking positions primarily to prevent movement out of the village. At 0805, prepJanned artillery and air 

strikes were directed into the woods north of the village to dis· 

courage the use of those escape roules. AI 0830 more troops were 

landed to the south of the village as a blocking force on that potential escape route. The village was sealed. 

Just after the assault ships had departed, helicopters with loudspeakers and South Vietnamese Army announcers aboard circled 

the village at low altitude and broadcast the following message: 

Attention people of Ben Sue. You arc surrounded by Republic of 

South Vietnam and allied forces. Do not run away or you will be shot as 

ve. Stay in your homes and wail ror rurther instructions. 

The inhabitants were then further instructed to go immediately 

to the old schoolhouse. 

Most of the villagers followed the instructions; those who 

attempted to evade and leave the village were engaged by the 

blocking forces. Adjacent rivers were patrolled for any escapees. 

Tactical surprise w.as almost complete; the enemy was unable to 

offer any cohesive resistance to the landing. 

By 1030, 8 January, Ben Sue was securely in the hands of the 

friendly forces and the 2d Brigade command post had been estab.-

lished in the village. During the two and one-ha lf hours since the 

initial landing, a total of [ony enemy had been killed in act ion, 

with only light friendly casuahies. 

Company A, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, was one of the first 

units on the ground and quickly formed up after clearing its landingzone. As the point squad moved forward from the landing zone 

toward its designated blocking position, tragedy struck. Two 

command-detonaled claymore mines exploded and IwO men fell. A 

large booby trap mounted in a tree exploded and its fragments 

dowlled two more men. The squad had wandered into an enemy 

minefield. Starr Sergeant Ernest Williams of San Francisco, California, rushed forward to set up security for the wounded and to 

get them medical aid. The platoon medical corpsman was injured 

when he stepped on an antipersonnel mine while trying to aid the 

wounded. Specialist Four Astor Rogers of Chicago, lIIinois. 

another medic, hurried forward. When enemy sniper fire began 

coming in on his position, Sergeant Williams brought his men on 

line and laid down a base of fire in co-orciination with his platoon 

leader. "Through enemy fire and a heavy mine field these men 

functioned with total disregard for their own lives and safety," said 
38 CEDAR FALI.S-JUNCTION CITY 

Captain Rudolf Egcrsdorfcr, Company A commander. "They are a 

credit to the unit." 

After the village was sealed and the troops had consolidated 

their positions, a South Vietnamese battalion was airlanded into 

Ben Sue to search the village and interrogate the villagers. (It was 

no coincidence that the South Vietnamese battalion selected was 

the same one which had been driven out of Ben Sue in 1964.) The 

search uncovered a number of tunnel and bunker complexes in 

which the South Vietnamese forces engaged the enemy sporadically for some three days and nights. In the destruction of these 

facilities. the South Vietnamese forces were assisted by the division 

chemical section tunnel team, attached to the lsi Battalion, 26th 

Infantry. The team was successful in using a new technique in tun~ 

nel destruction. After demolition charges had been strung throughout the tunne l system, the entrances were sealed and acetylene 

was pumped in and ignited throughoulthe system by the charges; 

this process rendered the tunnel useless and destroyed anything 

leCt inside. 

As the methodical search by South Vietnamese forces . continued, under some houses were discovered as many as three levels 

of carefully concealed storage rooms. Great stores of rice of high 

quality were found. Just outside the village, searchers turned up 

a large cache of enemy medical supplies, including surgica l instruments and SOO,OOO vials of penici llin. Of the more than 7,500 enemy 

uniforms found during CEDAR FALLS, many were uncovered at Ben 

Suc. 

The civilians were interrogated and classified into appropriate 

categories. interrogation was conducted by the 1st Republic of 

Vietnam Military lntelligence Detachment and members of the 

S-2 section of the 2d Brigade, 1st U.S. Infantry Division. All males 

between the ages of 15 and 45 were segregated for further questioning while other villagers were instructed and assisted in their 

preparations for evacuation. Since the inhabitants of Ben Sue had 

not received medical assistance for three years and were in on ly 

fair health, South Vietnamese and U.S. medical teams examined them and provided medical and dental care as they awaited 

interrogation. 

Following the interrogations and screening, 106 individuals 

were detained; of these, 28 were classified as Viet Congo Most of 

them were local Viet Cong who had virtually no information and 

were of little intelligence value. However, a Viet Gong platoon 

leader of Group 83-the major unit in the area-was captured. 

His platoon transported rice in the general area around Ben Suc. 

Among the well-dressed individuals picked up at Ben Sue were 
O·OAY-BEN sue 39 

some high-ranking political and propaganda cadres from Hanoi. 

Included in the group was a mathematics professor educated at 

Peking University who was caught trying to escape through the 

rice paddies on the south of the village. 

Although the responsibility for evacuating the inhabitants of 

Ben Suc and the vi ll ages on the northern edge of the triangle 

fell to the South Vietnamese, assistance on the U.S. side came 

under the control of Major Robert L. Schweitzer, commander 

of the 1st Division Revolutionary Development task force. 

(Major Schweitzer was familiarly referred to by his radio call sign, 

"Helper 6.") It was to be expected that uprooting the natives of 

these villages would evoke resentment, and it did. They had lived 

under and with the Viet Gong and had supported them for the past 

three years; nor was it easy for the natives to give up their homes 

and the land they had been working. The villagers were permitted 

to take with them anything they could carry, pull, or herd. to 

include their water buffalo. What they could not take was retrieved 

by the U.S. and South Vietnamese troops and returned to the 

natives at the relocation center. A total of 5,987 persons was evacuated (582 men, 1,651 women, and 3,754 children). Also moved to 

the relocation site were 247 water buffalo, 225 head of cattle, 158 

oxcarts, and 60 tons of rice. 

When the evacuation commenced there was no usable road into 

Ben Suc. Even though the engineers set about repairing the road 

from Rach Bap to Ben Suc over which supplies and evacuees were 

later moved, initially evacuation was by South Vietnamese Navy 

boats and U.S. Chinook helicopters. As pathetic and pitiful as was 

the sight of the natives of Ben Suc with their carts, Chickens, hogs, 

rice, and all else waiting to be transported to the temporary camp 

at Phu Cuong, there were still moments of humor, even for the 

evacuees. For example, a handful of soldiers tried unsuccessfully 

to get a huge-and dangerous-water buffalo loaded onto a boat, 

only to be embarrassed when the ll-year-old buffalo driver 

appeared and talked his animal on board. There was even one 

occasion when a search was made throughout the relocation camp 

for a particular buffalo driver whose assistance was needed back at 

the loading site at Ben Suc. 

At one point in the evacuation, a sow became separated from 

her twelve pigs as they were being loaded on one of the giant 

Chinook helicopters. She loudly made her loss kno\\'11. General 

DePuy, who happened to stop by the loading site and learned of 

the mishap, instructed: " I want that sow reunited with her pigs 

before nightfall." Before long, Helper 6 had the sow on her way to 

the relocation camp. 
40 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

Many difficulties were faced during the evacuation of the 

populace. Howeve~, they were relatively few and small in comparison with those problems facing the members of the U.S. OHice 

of Civil Operations who were charged with assisting the South 

Vietnamese in preparing and operating the relocation center. As 

General Westmoreland has stated: "Unfortunately, the resettlement phase was not as well planned or executed as the actual 

evacuation. For the first several days the families suffered unnccessary hardships." Part of the problem resulted from the security 

measures taken during the planning phase. Thanks to the immediate assistance of a task force from the Big Red One under Major 

Carl R. Grantham, latrines were dug, wood and water were made 

available. a buffalo wallow was dug and filled with water, a cattle 

enclosure was built, dozens of Arclic tents were pitched, and hardships were eased for the displaced families. 

On 10 January 1967, the South Vielnamese 1st Airborne Task 

Force of two batta lions arrived at Ben Sue with the mission of 

relieving the U.S. battalion of its responsibilities in sealing the 

village. Further, the task force was to assist in securing and screening the populace of Ben Sue and nearby villages. At this time tne 

South Vietnamese battalion already at Ben Sue was attached to the 

airborne task force. With the continuing, systematic evacuation of 

Ben Sue under the control of South Vietnamese forces, and with the 

village seal taken over by the South Vietnamese task force , U.S. 

1st Division troops were freed for deployment into other areas of 

the CWAK FALLS ope ration. All that remained for lst Division 

troops was the razing of Ben Sue after its inhabitants had been 

removed. 

As the villagers and their belongings moved out, bulldozers, 

tankdozers, and demolition teams moved in. Since Ben Sue was not 

yel totally deserted, the initial dozers set about clearing a scrub 

jungle area in the southwest corner of the village known by the 

troops as the briar patch. As Colonel Kiernan, commanding officer 

of the lsi Engineer Battalion. recalled: 

. . . I guess it was about twenty acres of scrub jungle. . . . TIle 

place was so infested with tunnels thaI as my dozers would knock over the 

stumps of trees, the VC would pop out from behi nd the dozers. We captured about . . . six or eight VC one morning. They just popped out 

of the tunnels and we picked them up. . . . After the civilians were 

taken from the lown. we went through and methodically knocked down the 

homes . . . tunnels were throughout the whole area. . . . 

The bulldozers moved through the former Viet Cong stronghold and razed the structures to the ground. crushing ruins, collapsing tunnels. and obliterating bunkers and underground 
D·DAY- BEN sue 41 

storage rooms. When the village had been flattened by the engineers, there was yet one more blow to be dealt to Ben Suc by 

Colonel Kiernan's professionals. A large cavity was scooped out 

near the center of the area , filled with ten thousand pounds of 

explosives-many no longer usable in normal operations, covered, tamped, and then set off by a chemical fuze within minutes 

of the predicted time of detonation. The hope was that the blast 

might crush any undiscovered tunnels in the village. 

One of the major objectives of Operation CEDAR FALLS had 

been achieved; the village of Ben Suc no longer existed. What 

about the hammer operation-had it swung and with what effect? 
CHAPTER IV 

Phase II-The Hammer Swings 

As dawn broke on 0 plus 1 (9 January 1967) the units forming 

the anvil of CEDAR FALLS were maneuvering into their final positions as the 1st Division's 2d Brigadccontinued its day-oJd operation 

in Ben Sue. The hammer forces of the lst Infantry Division (the 

organic 3d Brigade and Task Force DEANE) initiated their assault 

at 0800 with simultaneous allacks across the Iron Triangle and into 

the Thanh Dicn forest. The impact oCthe hammer on enemy forces 

was imminent. 

3d Bn"gade 

The miSSion of the Iron Brigade was to conduct airmobile 

assaults with rive battalions into the Thanh Dien forest, conduct 

scarch and destroy operations to kill or capture enemy forces, 

destroy enemy installations, and evacuate all inhabitants from the 

area of operations. The operations order had been issued to all 

participating battalions on 5 January, and the previous four days 

had been spent in detailed planning and preparation. The initial 

positions for the elements of the 3d Brigade formed a semicircle 

to the north of the Thanh Dien forest. Six landing zones (LZ's) were 

designated. The terrain in this area ranges from nat to gently roiling; the undergrowth is dense. The few streams in the area are 

fordable with minor difficulty. 

The 3d Brigade's area of operation, according to intelligence 

sources, was thought to be an important supply base and hospital 

area. The enemy units believed to be in the area were listed as base 

caretaker elements and headquarters defense units. The Americans 

expected to find base camps and supply installations and wellconstructed bunkers, tunnels, and trenches, all protected by extensive mines and booby traps. These expectations proved to be 

accurate. 

Major units constituting the task organization of the 3d Brigade 

included five infantry battalions. two cavalry squadrons, and one 

artillery battalion. 

At 0735, 9 January, an extensive air and artillery preparation 

began on Landing Zone I, the northernmost point of the ring of 

men and weapons Ihat was soon to be formed around the Thanh 
PHASE II-TI'IE HAMfo.lER ~\\'INGS 43 

FUtST SERCEANT GEORCE L. TAYLOR. COMPANY C •• 20 BATTALION. 28nl 

INfANTRY, Inspects captured e'lemy mortar rounds. 

Dien forest. For the 3d Brigade and the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, 

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William C. Simpson, Operation CEDAR FALLS began at 0800 as the first of sixty helicopters 

touched down. The entire battalion was on the ground in less than 

five minutes. The artillery and air strikes turned three kilometers 

toward the east and Landing Zone 2. At 0840 Lieutenant Colonel 

Rufus C. Lauell and the 1st Batlalion, 16th Infantry, joined the 

battle. At 0910 the first enemy reaction to this portion of the operation occurred in the vincinity of Landing Zone 1 in the forlll of 

small arms fire. There were no casualties. By this time the preparatory fires had shifted to the west and Landing Zone 3. 

The 2d Batlalion, 28th Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Elmer D. Pendleton, started landing al LZ 3 at 0920. 

As the battalion expanded its zone of operations, the first indications that the enemy was retreating were noted. Within twenty 

minutes the infantrymen had found several freshly dug foxholes, 

recent oxcart tracks, a tunnel containing a pot of steaming rice, and 

a cache of munitions. Located next was a 55-gallon drum of diesel 
44 CEDAR FAUS-JUNCTION CITY 

fuel, a 66-pound enemy mine. and a newly constructed base camp. 

Two light observation helicopters overn yi ng the area of operation 

were hit by ground fire and so damaged that they had to be evacuated. Small quantities of weapons and munitions continued to be 

found. 

At 1155 the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, commanded by Lieutcnant Colonel J ack G. Whitted, touched down on Landing Zone 5, 

located between Landing Zones 1 and 3, and began search and 

destroy operations. 

By noon the 2d Battalion. 28th Infan try, was reporting sniper 

fire and seeing an unknown number o f Viet Cong escaping to the 

south on bi cycles. Near Landing Zone 3 the battalion found an 

arms cache in an enemy base camp which included 2 recoilless 

rines, I 50-mOl. morlar, and 135 Russian rines. In the same area 

they soon uncovered some grenades, 24 gas masks, 75 tons of rice, 

and 4.5 tons of salt. 

By midafternoon the 3d Brigade set up a for.vard command 

post for communications at the now secured vill age of Ben Suc. 

The battalions of the brigade now in the operational area continued 

their search and were uncovering large quantities of materiel and 

abandoned enemy installations. 

At 1350 the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry (less Company A), passed 

to the operational control of the 3d Brigade and prepared to air 

assault into the operational area. At 1600. as the fi rst lift of the 

battalion under the command o f Lieutenant Colonel Lewis R. 

Baumann was going into a landing zone three kilometers south o f 

LZ 3, two claymore mines were detonated by the enemy. An alternate landing site was designated three kilometers to the west where 

the battalion landed withou t incident. The battalion then reverted 

to the operational control of the 2d Brigade. 

At 1820 the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, apprehended sixty persons four kilometers north of Landing Zone 3. They were moved 

to the evacuee holding area at Ben Sue. 

As darkness fell, night defensive positions were established by 

these fi ve combat battalions now in the Thanh Dien forest sanctuary of the Viet Congo 

Task Force Deane 

At 0800 on 9 January the 11th AmlOred Cavalry Regiment 

attacked west from its staging areas neal· Ben Cat. After securing 

the bridge across the Thi Tinh River and Position GIU:tN, one 

kilometer to the sOllthwest, the regiment knifed toward its objectives some seven kilometers to the west. By 1000 the Blackhorse 
PHASE II-THE HAMMER SWINGS 45 

MUfBI!.RS 0.· THE 5030 INfANTRY AND 0.· Till!. 11TH ARMOREO CAVALRY in 

Thanh Dien Jorest. 

Regiment had penetrated the entire width of the Iron Triangle 

from east to west and had severed it from the Thanh Dien forest 

on the north. Only slight enemy resistance had been encountered. 

The 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Robert H. Sigholtz, air assaulted at 111 5 into Landing 

Zone 4 on the northeast perimeter of the semi circle encompassing 

the Thanh Dien forest. By 1145 the battalion had linked up with 

the infantrymen of the lst Division who had landed earlier. 

Landing Zone 6, the eastern anchor of the tightening ring 

around the forest , was the next to be occupied by lsi Division 

forces. At 1235 the 4th Battalion of the 503d Infantry (- ), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Healy, air assaulted 

into Landing Zone 6 and seventy minutes later had joined forces 

with the 2d Battalion. Blocking positions were established and 

limited search and destroy operations conducted. These two battalions of the 503<1 brought the total number in and around the Thanh 

Dien forest to seven. 

Meanwhile, to the south, the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Lieu-
46 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

tenant Colonel Robert W. Brownlee), and 35th Ranger Battalion 

(with elements of the lsi Squadron, 4th Cavalry) maintained the 

blocking positions oppo~ite the southeast side of the triangle held 

since the termination of NIACARA FALLS. 

25th Infantry Division 

On D plus 1 the anvil forces of the 25th Infantry Division 

assumed, prepared. and improved their final blocking positions 

and actively conducted search and destroy operations along the 

west bank of the Saigon River. Tankdozcrs assisted in dearing the 

areas. 

Units of the 2d Brigade continued operations in the southern 

sector of the division area of responsibility. At 1645 at a point on 

the Saigon River four kilometers northwest of Phu Hoa Dong. 

Company B, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, engaged a raft with fifteen 

Viet Cong aboard. Employing 9O-mm. guns loaded with "cannister 

and shot," the men of Company B destroyed the raft and killed all 

occupants. The brigade continued to find quantities of munitions, 

weapons, and rice in the numerous huts, tunnels, and bunkers, 

many of which were mined and booby trapped. Three sampans 

were located and destroyed. 

The 196th Light Infantry Bl"igade continued its mission in the 

northern area of the division sector. The hamlet of A Go Noi (1) 

was searched and the inhabitants screened; a medical team, part of 

the search and destroy forces, treated the inhabitants. Nine Viet 

Cong were shot as they tried to cross the river during the hours of 

darkness, Several classified papers were captured during the day, 

documents which pertained to the postal, communications, and 

transportation section of Military Region IV, One paper classified 

lOp secret concemed economy of ammunition by Viet Cong units. 

It stated that ammunition could no longer be provided for American weapons and that in the future money would be furnished for 

the purchase of such ammunition, I.t went on to say that ammunition for Chinese weapons would be limited. The paper included a 

price list for weapons and ammunition that the Viet Cong should 

use when making purchases. 

Small Um't Actions 

Operation CEDAR FALLS was characterized by small unit actions. 

Typical are those of Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, on 

9 January as reported in the 173d Brigade's after action report. 

On the morning of 9 January Company C was located in Posi-
PHASE II- THE HAMMER SWINGS 47 

tion BLUE, ten kilometers east of the Iron Triangle. At 1055 the 

company was airlifted out of its pickup lOne and twenty minutes 

later landed in LZ 4 on the northeast corner of the perimeter surrounding the Thanh Dien forest.lts mission was patrolling, fomling blocking positions, and setting up night ambushes. 

Each rifleman of the company was armed with an M 16 rifle, 400 

rounds of ammunition, 2 smoke grenades, and 2 fragmentary grenades. There were 2 MOO machine guns in each of the three platoons; each gunner carried a total of 1,500 rounds of ammunjtion. 

In addition, each squad had 2 M79's (grenade launchers) with 45 

rounds per grenadier and an average of 2 claymore mines. The 

company as a whole was equipped with 3 81-mm. mortars with 30 

rounds per mortar. Each individual carried 3 C-ration meals 

while on operations. 

By 1130 on 9 January the company had cleared its landing zone 

and was establishing a blocking position. Captain Thomas P. 

Carney, the company commander, moved to the right flank to 

oo-ordjnate with the commander of the unit to the north-Company 

B, lst Battalion, 16th Infantry. With the co-ordination completed, 

the company's three platoons established defensive positions along 

an oxcart trail west of the Thi Tinh River. The company's area of 

operation was primarily dense jungle with the exception of one 

section which had been defoliated within the last year. Based upon 

an assessment of the situation and terrain by the two adjacent 

company cOlTlmanders, night ambush patrols were to be placed on 

an overgrown trail in the western portion of the perimeter. 

After the defensive position had been established. patrols were 

sent out to search the immediate area for signs of the enemy and 

for possible ambush sites. The 3d Platoon soon discovered a hut 

connected to a combination tunnel and bomb shelter. That the hut 

had been inhabited recently was confirmed by the freshly cooked 

rice which was found. Further search of the area revealed a cache 

of twelve bicycles and 200 pounds of polished rice on a concrete 

platform. Everything was destroyed with the exception of the 

bicycles, which were later to provide transportation (or the men of 

"Charlie" Company while in base camp. 

The 33-man weapons platoon found one small hut while screening to the rearof the company command post. After destroying the 

hut. the platoon moved east toward the Thi Tinh River and found 

a fordable stream. The platoon then returned to the company base 

area. 

Sergeant Nathaniel King was in charge of the lst Platoon's 

patrol. Two foxholes were discovered; neither showed sigm of 

recent use. Sergeant King also reported finding a footpath running 
48 CEDAR FAllS-JUNCTION CITY 

parallel to the overgrown trail in the western portion of the com· 

pany's position. Although the trail showed no signs of "cecnl usc, 

there was evidence that the small footpath was heavily traveled, 

probably because it could not be observed from the air. 

All patrols returned to the command post by 1630. Hot Arations and a .5O-caliber machine gun arrived by resuppl y choppers, and the company settled down to warm chow. 

During darkness the company employed three-man listening 

posts around its position. One post located between the 2d and 3d 

Platoon positions was occupied by Sergeant Frank Bothwell, 

Specialist Four Walter Johnson, and Private First Class Joseph 

Russo. They had moved into position shortly after nightfall, situati ng themselves three meters from one another in a triangular 

position for easy communication and 360-degree observation. The 

terrain was generall y flat and overgrown with elephant grass and 

bamboo. The men were instructed not to engage the enemy unless 

absolutely necessary. 

The three men lay quietly. After minutes of silence, movement 

was detected at about 1940 at a distance of approximately fifty 

meters. The noise became louder. Because of the thick vegetation, 

vision was limited. The men were prone and could not move without be ing detected. The enemy was now nearly on top of the posilion. Sergeant Bothwell knew that if he reached for his M16, the 

noise would be heard; he prepared to throw a fragmentation 

grenade instead. 

Johnson was in a better position to observe the enemy; however, 

he knew he must come to a sitting position to fire and would thereby 

expose himself and his comrades. However. as the enemy came 

closer, Johnson realized lhat the time for action had come. He 

sprang to a sitting position and fired approximate ly five rounds 

before his weapon jammed. An enemy grenade exploded and a 

fragment hit Johnson in the neck. In an attempt to have his grenade 

detonate on impact. Bothwell had pulled the pin. released the 

handle, paused three seconds, then tossed it toward the enemy. 

The grenade, however, exploded in flight and rained fragments on 

the position. Russo was wounded in the hand and was unable to 

fire his M79. Bothwell radioed back to the command post informing them of the casualties; he then sprayed the area with M16 

fire and, assisting Johnson and Russo. withdrew to the company 

position. 

The wound in Johnson's neck, although not fatal , was very close 

to the jugular vein. The medical evacuation helicopter arrived 

twenty-five minutes later and evacuated the two men. 

While the listening post was seeing action, an ambush patrol 
PHASE II_THE HAMMER SWINGS 49 

under Sergeant Julius Brown had been in position near the footpath. The patrol had left the command post at 1900 and moved 

south along the path, passing its ambush site and then backtracking 

to it to mislead any enemy elements following them. The ambush 

site had been chosen because of the cover available and the indications that the path was frequently Iraveled at this point. There 

were nine men in the patrol, six arnled with M16's, two with M79's, 

and one with an MOO machine gun. The patrol maintained radio 

silence but was able to receive any messages transmitted to it. 

Captain Carney received reports from adjacent units that movement had been detected near their company command posts. He 

warned Sergeant Brown to keep on the alert for infiltrating Viet 

Cong. 

At 1945 came the sounds of firing from Sergeant Bothwell's 

listening post. Shortly thereafter another warning of eneilly activity in the area was received. The ambush patrol lay quietly waiting. 

At 2045, sounds of movement were heard near the ambush site. 

Private First Class Gary Gaura became anxious and crawled to 

Sergeant Brown's position a few meters away to get instructions. 

Brown told him to do nothing and be still. When Gaura crawled 

back to his position, he coughed, and the enemy, now only about 

fifteen meters away, halted sharply. The Viet Cong remained 

silent and motionless for approximately len minutes and then 

moved on around the patrol's killing zone. Private Gaura counted 

fifteen silhouettes. The enemy crossed the trail, avoiding the 

ambush, yel r~mained in the immediate area. 

About one and a half hours later, the enemy column moved to 

the west and out of range and sight. Fifteen minutes later machine 

gun fire was heard from the direction of the adja~ent company. At 

2300 the sound of movement was again heard and out of the brush 

came a single enemy soldier. He cautiously moved toward the 

ambush position. Again someone coughed, alerting the enemy, but 

this time it was too late; there was no chance for escape. Private 

First Class Michael Farmer, armed with the MOO machine gun, 

squeezed off five rounds. The enemy fell wounded. Another enemy 

soldier emerged into the ambush site. He looked at the wounded 

man, turned, and walked away. The wounded man cried out. The 

straggler wheeled, sprayed the area with automatic weapons fire, 

and proceeded toward the man on the ground, walking so dose to 

the ambush position that he nearly tripped over the barrel of the 

MOO. Bending over, he lit a candle which illuminated both men. 

Private First Class Michael Hill fired his MOO machine gun but it 

malfunctioned; simultaneously Private First Class Martin Norman 

fired his M16. The candle went out. 
50 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

Silence was maintained until morning when the two enemy dead 

were found along with two AK47 weapons. Among their personal 

items was a document containing codes for the Military Region IV 

headquarters; it appeared that the second Viet Cong had been a 

courier whose job was to transport important documents. 

At 0630 the ambush patrol moved out of the area and retumed 

to the company command post. 

It later developed that the captured documents were one of the 

most significant finds of the operation and had a direct bearing on 

the subsequent capture of a high official assigned to Military 

Region IV. 
CHAPTER V 

The Hammer Strikes 

Action proceeded in the Iron Triangle and Thanh Dien forest 

as the hammer continued its swing toward the anvil. On the mom· 

ingo! 11 January, General Seaman sent a message to the commanding generals of the lst and 25th Divisions. After congratulating 

them on achieving initial surprise and on the encouraging results 

of the operation, he concluded by saying ". I want a thorough search to be made o f the area of responsibility. I 

particul arly desire that the Iron Triangle be completely covered." 

It was in the spirit o f this message that Operation CWAR FALLS was 

conducted until its termination sixteen days later. 

The operation was characterized by numerous small unit 

actions with both the hammer and anvil Corces continuing to 

uncover increasingly la rge amounts of supplies. The men o f the 1st 

and 25th Divisions searched meticulously, stripping the Iron Triangle and the surrounding area of all they could find that might be 

of value to the enemy. The enemy's defenses were weak and disorganized and had evidently been shattered by the mass and surprise 

of the attack. Mines, booby traps, and snipers were encountered, 

but there were no o rgan ized defenses or counterattacks. The 

enemy had evid entl y or(lered units to disperse and try to escape. 

Because of the tight seal around the triangle, this was not always 

easy. 

25th Infan try Division 

Forces of the 25th Infantry Division continued search and 

destroy and search and clear operations along the Saigon River. 

The action was typified by company-size sweeps of assigned areas 

of operations. An entry in the 2d Brigade's after' action report 

summarizes the activities of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, on 

17 January, which were fairly illustrative of the activities o f the 

other units: 

Co. A 1/27 conducted S&O (search and destroy) operations between 

AP NHA VIEC and the Saigon River. n 1/27 continued road clearing 

operations in sector. C 1/27 continued to outpost Saigon River. At 0947 

houn A 1/27 destroyed one sampan, one bunker. At 1223 houn C 1/27 

located 600 pounds rice. At 1350 hours C 1/27 destroyed four bunkers, and 
52 CEDAR FAU ~IUNCTION CITY 

located miscellaneous documents. AI IS15 hours A 1/27 destroyed three 

GnU's. AI 1517 hours C 1/27 destroyed t ..... o bunkers. At 1531 hours A 1/27 

located one VC KIA. At 1615 hours C 1/ 27 destroyed seven bunkers. six 

huts. At 1622 hours A 1/27 destroyed two bunkers. At 1720 hours A 1/27 

destroyed two bunkers, one building. 200 pounds salt. At 2200 hours C 1/ 27 

destroyed two sampans, two VC KIA (POSS). 

The locations cited for these entries were all within one kilometer 

of the Saigon River in the vicinity arits junction with the Thi Tinh 

River. 

The brigade clements also continued to work closely .... ·jlh the 

South Vietnamese 2d Battalion, 7th RCbriment. in and around the 

village of Phu Hoa Dong. 

Elements of the 25th Division continued to search the enemy 

base areas in the Ho So woods and Filhol Plantation while blocking enemy escape routes Oul of the Iron Triangle, Although most 

enemy contacts wer'e with small scattered groups attempting to 

escape, one company did engage an enemy platoon and another' 

destroyed a sampan with thirteen Viet Cong aboard: Buddy oper'ations employing U.s, troops and the Vietnamese 5th River Assault 

Group patrolled both banks of the Saigon River to help seal off the 

triangle, 

In accomplishing its objective of denying the enemy access to 

the Saigon River, the 25th Division employed various tactics, as 

described in a news release from the 25th Division's public information office: 

CU CHI, VIETNAM (IO)-Part of the 25th Infantry Division's mission in O\>cration "Cedar ."alls" was 10 seal off a portion of the Saigon 

River to a I traffic, -nle Saigon River is a favorite escape route of the Viet 

Cong and the banks of the river arc dotted with heavily fortified weapons 

emplacements. 

"Tropic Lightning" soldiers used aerial observers and gunners and a 

waterborne force of RAG (River Assault Group) boats manned by infantrymen armed with automatic weapons and rines. The RAG boats patrolled 

the river around the clock, rakmg the banks with their heavy firepower, 

while the gunships of the Division's D Troop. 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, peppered fortifications and sampans alike With aerial rockets and machine 

gun fire. 

As the operation continued, the Viet Cong began to realize that the 

airborne-waterborne, one-two punch made the Saigon River a boundary 

they cou ld not afford to come ncar, let alone cross. 

Even at night the river was sca led. The RAG boats used searchlights 

10 probe the darkened shoreline, and tanks used their high intensity 

Xenon lights to scan the water and the aviation units used the fireny team 

with a 1,750,000 candlepower beam to scan both areas. With these tools, very liule escaped their surveillance. 

Despite the destruction and sporadic contact which were occurring, the division forces found the time and occasion for civic 
TilE HAMMER STR IKES 53 

MEMBERS OF COMPANY C., 1sT BATTAI.ION. 27TH I NFANTRY. PATROLLING THE 

SAIGON RIVER 

action activities, as noted in the following extracts from the after 

action I'eport of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division: 

II Jan 1967 . . . 2d n'l, 27th bifantry . 

A MEOCAP (Medical Civic Action Program) was conducted on the outskirls of forward base camp and 38 palien15 .... ·ere Ireated. This number 

is not impressive except that Ihe people in Ihis area had been indoctrinated 

by Ihe VC that American medicine would harm them. One woman had an 

ill child bUI would not let the doctor give it medicine . Several days later 

this .... ·oman returned and allowed the child to be given medicine since she 

had seen that Ihe medicine did not harm Olhers who hlld luken it. On 

II Jan the M EOCAP also dis1I'ihuted ca ndy and toys to the children. 

15 Jan 1967. . 2d nil, 27tll l"lantry . 

Civic Action: MEDCAP operations were again conducted :H base camp, 

.... 'hel·O 163 patients were treated. 111is, it should be noted , was a tremen- dous increase over the first day's lotal of 38 patients. and indicates the 

continued progress in g"dining the respect of the local civilians. 

To the north of the 25th Division's 2d Brigade, the 196th Light 

Infantry Brigade was conducting similar operations in its area of 

responsibility. Using patrols, company-size search and destroy 
54 CEDA R FALLS-I UNCTION C ITY 

operations, and periodic platoon airmobile assaults, the brigade 

uncovered numerous installatio ns containing caches of enemy 

munitions, food, clothing, d ocuments, and equipment. One com· 

pany reported during this time that it had "engaged 14 bushes 

floating upstream resulting in 10 VC KIA (Possibl e)." 

Another !ow·key report was submitted on 18 J anuary by the 

lst Battalion, 5th Infantry, and stated simply: "At 1730 hours 

Company A discovered an extensive tunnel complex." H owever, 

it developed that this discovery probably uncovered the headquarters of Military Region IV or at least a significant portion of it. 

The tunnel system was located adja cent to the stream (the Rach 

Son) which marked the J96th Light Infantry's south boundary, on 

a narrow stri p o f rela ti vely clear land behveen the H o Bo woods 

and the Filhol Plantation . In the first few hours after its discovery, 

the vast compl ex yielded forty pounds of d ocuments including 

detailed maps of Saigon and the Tan Son Nhut area , maps showing 

the schemes of maneuver of friendly operations in the area and 

Viet Cong !"Cutes of movement from the Iron Triangle area to the 

Saigon River. 

Newsweek magazine described the tunnel discovery in these 

words: 

Entering the shah head rirst through a small hole that descended to the 

tunnel floor some 16 fee t below, the tunnel rats spread out through the 

winding galleries. Soon they realized they were on 10 somet hing big. In 

the ir haste to escape. the Viet Cong had left behind not only med ical 

supplies and weapons but maps, diagrams of U.S. billets in Saigon and 

other plans for terrorists raids. One of the documents outlined the plan 

for the December 4 raid on Tan Son Nhul air base. Brigad ier General 

Richard Knowles, commander of the 196th, was cl earl y conv inced that 

his men had found the headquarters for all Viet Cong activity in the 

Sa igon region. "This is by far the most important one yet," said Knowles 

last week. "This was his headquarters." 

Company A, together with o ther elemen ts o f the battalion, 

searched the tunnels during the next six days. Time magazine 

related the story of the complex's end: 

There were a few Viet Cong defenders left behind, and the G.I.s, 

equipped with silencer-mounted .38 pistols, pursued them through the 

labyrinth. After exploring the maze for 1,000 yards, the tunnel ra ts came 

up and turn ed the task over to units that pumped riot con trol agents 

through the system, then set about blasting it to dust. 

Small villages in the area were searched and cleared. Armed 

heli copters, used deceptively, orbited the villages before the 

ground forces moved in, as described by Geneml Knowles: 

Armed helicopters proved to be extremely valua ble in search and clear 
TI-IE HAMMER STRIKES 55 

operations of villages. It was observed on CEDAR FALLS thai armed helicopters on station would prevent the VC from Oeeing the villa~e into the 

rice paddies. Once armed helicopters would leave the area, It was discovered the VC would try to maKe their escape from the village being searched. One technique which proved successful was to have the armed 

helicopters leave the village area for four to five minutes. The ve, thinking the helicopters had left for good, would then try to make their escape. 

The helicopters would then return and observe the VC neeing and take 

them under fire. 

The 196th Light Infantry Brigade tenninated Operation CEDAR 

FALLS on 25 January when the last elements left the operational area 

and closed at their Tay Ninh base camp. The organic batlalion of 

the 25th Division which had been attached to the 196th was released 

and moved overland to Cu Chi, the base camp of the 25th Division. 

However, the 25th Division's operations had proved so profitable 

that elements of the 2d Brigade continued to search the area as part 

of Operation AU\. MOANA after the termination of CEDAR FALLS on 

26 January. 

lsi in/alltry Divisia,. 

On 10 January two South Vietnamese battalions relieved the 

lst Squadron, 4th Cava lry, of its security mission along the Thi 

Tinh River. and the squadron came under the operational control 

of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (and Task Force DEANE) 

and took over the blocking assignments of the 2d and 4th Battalions. 503d Jnfantry, along the east side of the Thanh Dien forest 

perimeter. The following day these two battalions. under the contl"ol of Task Force DEAN!':. turned southward. 

Having been relieved of the Ben Suc seal mission by the two 

South Vietnamese airborne battalions on 10 January. the lst Battalion, 26th Infantry. still under the 2d Brigade, was committed on the 

next day to assisting in the search of the Thanh Dien forest. 

1st Division forces combed the enemy sanctuary throughout 

the remaining days of the operation and found huge quantities of 

rice. hundreds of documents, and many enemy wcapons and much 

ammunition; destroyed enemy tunnels and bunkers; and stripped 

trees and underbrush from roads and trails and carved out landing 

lones for future operations. By 12 January 1st Division forces had 

captured 1,800 Ions of rice, 189 sma ll arms, and 971 grenades. The 

1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, had located a 100-bcd underground 

hospital complete with blankets and equipment along the northwestern edge of the Thanh Dien forest. 

The two battalions of the 503d Infantry attacked south into the 

triangle . ..... ith units of the 1 I th Armored Cavalry Regiment screening on the north and augmenting the infantry batta lions in search 
56 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION C ITY 

TANKERS FROM T H E 1ST SQUA D RON, 4TH CAVALRY, in a rubber plalztalioh. 

and destroy missions. Based upon its experience in the triangle, 

the B1ackhorse Reg iment reported a new approach to the discovery 

of rice caches: 

Ourin~ Operation CEDAR FALLS it was observed that anytime a large 

cache of nee had been discovered a flock of small birds had been frightened away by the approach of friendly troops. Accordi ngly, any time a 

nock of birds was noticed, a search for a rice cache was made in the area. 

Only light and occasional contact continued with the enemy 

while the task force moved south uncovering quantities o f material 

and numerous fortifications. 

As the operation continued, the number of enemy Chicu Hoi 

(open arms) ra lliers grew well beyond previous totals. Psychological Operations fi eld teams effecti vely exploited these ralliers by 

printing rapid reaction leanets contain ing surrender appeals from 

the ralliers to their Viet Cong friends. Typical of the messages 

dropped was one written by rallier Le Van Sa. Printed on both 

sides of 5x8-inch paper, 50,000 copies were disseminated in the 1st 

Infantry Division's area of operations: 
THE HAMMER STRIKES 57 

To my dear friends still in the VC Ranks, I am Lc Van Sa, medic of the 

medical teamofVH (MB 3(11).1 followed the VC by their false inducement. 

I found fault with our people and nation. I have gone the wrong way. But in 

time I found out what is nght and what is wrong. I have rallied to the GVN 

and have been warmly welcomed, well treated. At the prescnt time I am very 

happy at theCH (Chieu Hoi) Cen ter. I also saw my family who are living in 

the Resettlement CenterorG VN. I send toyou this letterso that you too could 

rally to the Government side where you can start a new life and see your 

families. My dear friends: Hung, Rong, Tieng, Chi, Tu Dan. Minh Nhan, 

Tha Luong, Tam Thu. Thanh. liuyen, Lion, Thau. Monf!: Tieng. Ut and 

Gan, all of you should return to GVN as soon as possible. Saying with VC, 

you will have no place to hide. You can use any Chieu Hoi leafl et and take 

the nearcst road toreport totheCovernment or Allied M il itary Installations. 

You will be treated as we. arc now. There are more than 300 VC who have 

returned to the Nationallwt Cause in a very short time. They arc having a 

good living here al the CH Center. TIleY have been well treated. My dear 

friends you should rally right now 10 avoid useless deaths. Tet is going to 

come very soon. Rally to reunite with your families. The door of the Chieu 

Hoi Ccnleriswide open for your return. 

The leaflet also bore a photograph of Sa. 

In addition to these quick reaction messages directed at individual Viet Gong by name, more general messages were also dropped 

encouraging the Viet Cong to give up. One such message read : 

To VC of South Ben Cat, the powerful GVN and Allied Forces will 

continue extensive operations in the area of Ben Sue and south Ben Cat. 

All base camps will be destroyed and the area will be subjected to continuous artillery fire and air strikes. Huge areas of jungle are being removed 

and there will be no safety for VC anywhere. You will no longer find shelter or supplies here, and you will not have safe base camps. All VC remaining in this area will meet inevitable death. 

From 8 to 15 Jan 67. 259 of your comrades have been killed and 60 

captured, and numerous other supplies. clothing and equipment have 

been captured or destroyed. More than 200 of your comrades have already rallied to the GVN and 

arc receiving good treatment. Rally now and start a new life of happiness, 

united with your families. Turn yourself in to the nearest government 

offi ce. A government office is located in Ben Cat where you will be welcomed with open arms and given protection. Walk to any road that leads 

to Ben Cat-stay on the road -walk at all times- if you run your intentions may be mistaken and you may be killed. Use the sketch map on the 

back of this lea net as your guide to safety and freedom. Rally now before 

it is too late! 

On the reverse side of the 5x8-inch sheet was a map of the Iron 

Triangle. 

Over five hundred Viet Cong surrende red during the operation, many as a Tesult of the Psychological Operations but most 

because the continued presence of allied troops gave them no 

choice when they becal'1e hungry, wet, and out of su pplies and 

support. 
.'>8 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS OF THE 1sT INfANTRY DIVISION AND 

5TH ARVN DIVISION assisl refulfeu al the toum 0/ Bung Coog. near the So.igon 

River. 

The evacuation of civilians from Ben Suc and the other three 

villages in the triangle continued through 16 January. About haH 

of the inhabitants made the journey to the Ph u Cuong resettlement 

camp in Chinook helicopters or South Vietnamese Navy craft down 

the Saigon River. After the road from Ben Cal 10 Ben Sue via Rach 

Bap was passable, the other 3,000 trave led by truck convoy_ T his 

unprecedented mass evaucation, executed on short nOlice, required 

a tremendous effort by U.S. and South Vietnamese military and 

civilian agencies; but it would be weeks before the latter could 

restore a sense of normality to the evacuees. Eventually they would 

have their own village wilh its school, raise their own crops with 

access 10 the Saigon markets, and have much·needed medical assist-
THE I-IAMMER STRIKES 59 

ance available. Meanwhile, a source of supply ami support for the 

Viet Cong had been elimi nated. 

By 14 J anuary the forces o f the lst Division were starting grad· 

ually to wind down CEllAR FAI.LS. However, before they did, the 

Blue Spade rs of the lst Battalion , 26th Infantry, mov ing to the 

northwest of Ben Suc, uncove'·ed o ne of the morc hi g hl y deve loped 

and stro ngly built enemy complexes to be found in the area located 

less than one kilometer from the Saigon River. This is the descrip· 

lion of it contained in the after action report of the Big Red One's 

2d Brigade: 

Building # I was approximately 9 feet wide by 18 feet long and 10 feet 

below the surface of the ground. The building had cement on all four sides 

and nooring about 5 inches thick. The only overhead protection was 

afforded by sheets of tin. On Ihe northwest comer ..... as a bunker with no 

overhead protection. Beds and tables were on the noor. 

Build #2 was approximately 9 feel wide by 12 (eet long and 10 (eet 

below the surface. It had concrete identical to Building #1. Overhead 

cover over one-half of the struct ure consisted of 5 inch logs and 3 feet of 

packed dirt. There were no fighting positions loca ted ncar the building 

and beds were located on the 1st noor and on top of the overhead protection. Building #3 and #4 were exactJy identical to building #2. 

Bunker #5 located north of the camp and connected by tunnel to build- ing #3 had overhead protection of 5 inch logs and 3 feet of packed dirt. 

There were fou r firing apertures, each 2 inches high and 4-6 inches wide 

and each could cover an area over 100m \Olide to the front. 

The second level tunnel going north was made so that at every 10-15m 

it came to a dead end; and a tnlp door on the noor connected with a tunnel 

which went down, around and back up to the other side and o n the same 

level with the fake dead end. There were IwO small holes in the dead end 

permitting one man to observe and fire through the tunnel. 

On 17 January the 2d Brigad e ended its participation in CEDAR 

FALLS By 18 J a nuary the 3d Brigade had withdrawn. Task Force 

DEANE terminated CEDAR FALLS on 25 January wh ile the lst Squadron, 4th Cavalry, continued road security in the triangle for the 

departing e ngineer work parties. At midnight, 26 January 1967, 

the operation came to a close. 
CHAPTER VI 

Engineer and Chemical Operations 

Starting with the construction of the O. S. (double-sin~ el Bailey 

Bridge al Ben Cat on 21 Dec 66, and ending with the demolition of the 

tunnel complexes on 26 Jan 67, Operation Cedar Falls was without exception the most significant combat engineering operation of the war 10 date. 

New concepts of jungle warfare using dozers to open heretofore inviolable 

VC strongholds; the emergence of a new "Secret Weapon," the dozerinfantry teams; and combined acety lene and HE (High Explosive) tunnel 

demoliLionsi all have proven unique, successrul, and of tremendous value 

to future operations. Operations Niagara Falls and Cedar Falls introduced 

massive jungle clearing in conjunction with tactical infantry operation on 

a scale never attempted before. A total of 54 bulldozers were under the 

OPCON (Operation Control) of the lsI Engineer Baualion. . . . 

So spoke lJeutenant Colonel Joseph M. Kiernan.1r .• commanding officer of the lst Engineer Battalion, in summarizing engineer 

operations during CEDAR FALLS. 

Engineer and chemical operations during CEDAR FALLS involved 

innovative techniques as well as others more familiar and routine. 

Engineer forces were assigned normal missions such as the construction of a 160-fool Bailey bridge before the operalion to facilitate the movement of the lIth Armored Cavalry Regiment into 

the Iron Triangle and the clearing and construction of landing 

zones, roads, and support areas. More unusual projects included 

the clearing and destruction of enemy underground complexes 

during search and destroy operations, the stripping of acres of 

jungle, and the establishment of a waterborne seal at the confluence 

of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rive"s to prevent enemy escape. The 

dropping of CS munitions from helicopters and the destruction of 

rice were entrusted to the chemical personnel. 

The engineer-chemical task force for CEDAR FALLS had under 

Colonel Kiernan's command some six hundred men from the 1st 

Engineer Battalion, flamethrower platoons from the 1st Squadron, 

4th Cavalry, the "tunnel rats" (tunnel exploration and demolition 

crews) from the 242d Chemical Detachment, and approximate ly 

three hundred engineers from the 79th Engineer Group. This last 

complement consisted of men and equipment drawn from four 

engineer battalions, a light equipment company, and a maintenance detachment. 
ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL OPEIV\TIONS 61 

Dn'dge Ott the Thi Ti,,11 

To provide rapid crossing for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regi· 

ment and supporting forces as they launched their sweep from Ben 

Cat toward objectives on the opposite side of the Iron Triangle. 

the lst Engineer Battalion of the Big Red One was directed to con· 

struct a Bailey bridge over the Thi Tinh River just west of Ben 

Cat. Work commenced on 21 December, well before D-day, at a site 

adjacent to an existing Eiffel bridge and a destroyed concrete 

bridge, The bridge site preparation included the destruction of 

the remains of the concrete bridge, the construction of headwalls 

on each bank, and the construction of an eight-pile pier in the cen· 

tel' of the river to support the 80-foot Bailey bridge sections, The 

assembly of the bridge was begun on 31 December, the launch 

made on 1 January. and the final welding done by 5 January, 

Disaster struck the new bridge on the afternoon of 9 January 

when a recovery vehicle towing a disabled M-48 tank crashed 

through the western span, AlltraHic was halted and an emergency· 

repair crew of the battalion was directed to remove both vehicles 

from the river and replace the damaged span temporarily with an 

AVLB (armored vehicle launched bridge). The Eiffel bridge, 

which had also been damaged by the collapse of the Bailey. was 

reinforced and'opened by 1630. although limited to medium truck 

traffic. To launch the A VLB, the Bailey span had to be removed 

from the pier and disassembled-a difricult and time-consuming 

task. The western approach was extended twenty feel by earth fill 

and was bolstered by damaged Bai ley parts. The shorter (6().foot) 

AVLB was successfully launched by 0515 the next morning. The 

bridge was opened to traffic at daybreak. 

Jungle Clean·ng Operations 

During late December 1966 and early January 1967, the engi· 

neer task force structure and support role in preparation for the 

vast amount of jungle clearing for CED .... R F .... LLS were developed and 

partially tested in Operation NI .... C .... RA FAUS. The tractor assets 

from the engineer battalions of the 79th Engineer Group we,·e con· 

solidated under the headquarters of one of its battalions, the 168th, 

to support the 1st Infantry Division. Experience in NIACAR .... FALLS 

had revealed that the tractors must have an "in·house" main· 

tenance capability 10 provide on·the·spot servicing and small 

repairs; thus, a composite maintenance task force was organized. 

There also was an attachment from a maintenance battalion which 

could fabricate parts. Unit and tractor·type integrity was main· 

tained by dividing the personnel and equipment into teams. 
62 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

R OME P LOW IN QI'EII. ... T ION 

The d ecision was made to employ the doze r-infantry team. 

Tan kdozers. bulldozers, Rome Plows,· and the infan try would cut 

into the enemy-infested jungle together, simultaneously clea ring 

the area of vegetation, conducting search and destroy operations, 

and destroying enemy fortifications. 

T he dozer-i nfantry learns used two techniques based upon the 

tactical situation and the basic characteristics of the equipment. 

One was a formation of two tankdozcrs at the point, followed by 

four bulldozers abreast. wilh two more dozers as a cleanup team to 

°A lankdozcr is an M-I8 medium lank with a bulldozer blade. The heavy armor provides 

prOl('ction Irom mo~t mines, booby m.ps, and snip,en. the tankdozer is a favored leading 

vehicle during jungle clearing operation5. The ROIfle PI()\O' is a large tractor with a spc<:ially 

configured dozer-type blade developed ~pecifi<;"lly for heavy-duty bnd clearing operation •. 

civilian and military, by the Rome Caterpillar Compuny of Rome, Georgia, The blade is more 

cu .... ·ed than the usual bulldolCr blade and has a prOlruding. sharply honed lo .. -er edge. The 

lower edge curve$ out on olle side to form a ' pike used to split trees too large to cuI wi,h lhe 

blade alone, but the blade il$elf Can , lice a tree of Ihree feet in diameter. Ban are added to lhe 

top of Ihe blade 10 force trees away from the tractor, ~nd there i,. safety feature - a "headache 

bar~ - over the open.or·s po5ition to protect him from falling debris. Some Rome Plows were 

. Iso modified to include light .rmor for the operator. 
ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS 63 

PK£.PA'UNG LANDING ZoNI!. 

windrow the vegetation that had been cut. Infantry supported the 

tractors. al the same time carrying oul sea rch and destroy missions. 

The second technique employed a Rome Plow in the lead followed 

by troops in armored vehicles. When contact with the enemy was 

made. the men in the vehicles provided fire support until the 

accompanying infantry could silence the enemy. 

A significant adva ntage of the dozer-infantry team was the additional time it gave the infantry to conduct search and destroy 

operations. During previous jungle operations the infantry often 

had been forced to stop to clear resupply landing zones by hand. 

With the dozers along they could do the clearing. and do it in 

minutes. 

The test of the jungle clearing concepts in NIAGARA FALLS had 

revealed that the three or four weeks planned for CEI>AK FALLS 

were not adequate to dear the entire jungle in the Iron Triangle. 

Instead. only 7 or 8 percent of the sixty-three square miles of jungle 

area could be cleared in that time. Therefore, only strategic areas 

such as those along roads and landing zones would be cleared. plus 
64 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCnON CITY 

ENCINHHS RAPP£LUN(; Off HEUCOf'TEII; 

spaced swaths to permit rapid deployment by mechanized and airmobile units in future operations. The swaths were defined as the 

operation progressed. 

The CEOAK FALLS clearing operations commenced on the aftcl"-

noon of D plus 1,9 January, the same day lhal three engineer base 

camps were scr.lIched oul of the north side of the triangle and 

spaced along the eight kilometers of road between Ben Cat and 

Rath Bap. A half mile of clearing along the roadway, fifty meters 

wide. was also cui that £irst day. On the following day over 3,300 

meters of jungle were torn apart. Also on the second day an engineer platoon with the mission of clearing a landing zone scrambled 

down the 7Q...foot ladder from a Chinook hovering over the jungle 

and joined the 1st Battalibn, 28th Infantry, in the Thanh Dicn 

forest . Two hours later the landing zone was ready to receive the 

first helicopter; later it was enlarged to accommodate four at 

a time. 

In this operation as in most utilizing a large amount of heavy 

mechanical equipment, the two major problems were fuel resupply 

and vehicle maintenance. Each dozer team consumed 600 gallons 
ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS 65 

INSI'ECTING AN ENU.IY BOOBY TltA.' 

of diesel fuel per day. Usually at least six refue ling locationssome supplied solely by 5QO..gallon pods brought in by air-were 

required daily. Several teams had to be supplied on site by air. 

When field pumps were in shon supply, trenches eight feet deep 

were dug and the fue l was gravity.fed from the top of the cut into 

the vehicles. Maintenance problems were compounded by the 

quantity of equipment involved and the distances between teams. 

Repairs were made in the field whenever possible; otherwise the 

disabled vehidewas moved by truck to Lai Khe where heavy main· 

tenance support was provided by elements of the 79th Engineer 

Group. The maintenance task force opera ted around the clock and 

was the significant fac tor in achieving the very low dead line rate 

(percentage of vehicles not usable because of needed maintenance) 

of 10 10 15 percent for tractors and dozers throughout the operation. 

Engineer clearing operations continued until 22 January with 

some impressive results. The jungle area cleared totaled 2,711 acres 

or 10.9 square kilometers, including 50 to 100 meters of jungle on 

each side of the major roads in the Iron Triangle as well as 34 land· 

ing zones tactically spaced throughout the triangle. Three of the 
66 CE.DAR FALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

SEARCHINC FOR T UNN ELS 

zones were cleared by engineers lifted into the jungle by helicopter, the remainder by dozer-infantry teams. In addition, numerous 

swaths were cui through the jungle, usually in widths from 50 

to 100 meters. During the clearing. many small engagements 

occurred between the engineers and enemy snipers, and, in 

onc instance. an enemy squad. Numerous booby traps were also 

encountered. However, the 1st Engineer Battalion had only 1 man 

killed and 7 wounded by hostile aclion during the operation, while 

the supporting engineer units had 7 wounded. 

Turmel Exploratio" and Destruction 

Enemy combat units generally did not use tunnel systems. 

Rather, as do most military forces, they relied on fighting positions, trenches, and bunkers for protection. Tunnel systems were 

dug by those relative ly stationary Viet Cong elements such as 

village and hamlet cadres, logistica l units. and headquarters elements. Consequently. tunnels were most often found in the enemycontroll ed vill ages and logistical base areas but not necessarily in 
ENGINEER AND C HEMICAL OPERATIONS 67 

combat unit base camps. Interrogated prisoners and returnees 

revealed that as a rule personnel of orga nized Viet Cong combat 

units did not know the locati on of such tunnels. They might frequently reveal the general location, but informa tion to loca te the 

tunnels precisely had to come usually from local cadres and rear 

se rv ice personnel. 

Extensive tunnel systems were found throughout the Iron Triangle-Thanh Dien forest area. Operation CWAR FALLS demonstrated that patience is the primary weapon to use against an enemy 

hiding in tu nnels: wait for him to run out of supplies 0 " to get 

curious about where you are or what you are doing. It was sometimes necessary to flush the enemy out with tunnel rats or riot 

control agen ts or to seal and destroy the tunnels. 

A tunnel rat team usually consisted of from six to ten men led 

by an o rricer or a noncommissioned officer. The individual in 

charge had the responsibility of drawing a sketch of the underground complex from information relayed from the team members 

within the tunnel. The lead element of the tunne l rat team was usually armed \", ith a pistol equipped with a sil encer (to fire in a tunnel 

without a silencer was to risk broken eardrums), hand telephone 

or "skull mike," fl ashlight, compass, and probe. One of the major 

problems in (un.nel reconnaissance was that of communications. 

The skull mike (a transmitter strapped to the back of the skull) 

often became inoperati ve after a short period. In addition, the 

heavier U.S. communications wire which had tQ be used in lieu 

of the scarc~ lightweight Canadian assault wire added considerable 

weight and bulk to the team. Lack of fresh air was also a problem 

for the men when deep in the tunne ls. The "Might y Mite" (an air 

compressor with blower) o r an auxiliary helicopter engine rigged 

with a 50- to l00-foot length of hose was often employed to force 

fresh air into the tunnel systems. 

The job of a tunnel rat was dimcult at best. Hot, dirty, and gasping for breath, he squeezed his body through narrow and shallow 

openings o n all fours, never knowing whether the tunnel might 

collapse behind him o r what he might find ahead around the next 

turn, and sensing the jolt of adrenalin at every sound. Surely this 

modern combat spelunker is a specia l breed. 

The following is a description of the search and destruction of 

a large tunnel complex located in the triangle approximately six 

kilometers south of Rach Bap and about six hundred meters to the 

east of Route 14. 

On 21 Janua ry a Viet Col1g sympathizer was app rehended by 

the I68th Engineers and admitted having helped dig the under-
68 CEDAR "'ALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

ground complex. A patrol was organized from the staff scclions of 

the 1st Engineer Battalion and was Jed by the sympathizer to the 

tunnel area where he pointed out several air holes and firing ports. 

Further examination of the area uncovered a base camp with several tunnel entrances. 

The next day, after posting seclII"ity forces, a thorough sea rch 

of the tunnels was begun by engineer tunnel rats with initial negative results. Thcn a breather hole was blown open revealing the 

entrance 10 hundreds of melCrs of additional tunnel. About six 

hundred meters into the tunnel the engineers ran into an accumulation of CS, and the exploration stopped. The many documents 

found in the complex were taken to the G-2 of the lsi Division; 

upon evaluation of the papers, the G-2 determined that the search 

of the tunnel complex should be cont inued. 

Next day the engineer tunnel rats returned accompanied by 

their counterparts from the attached chemkal platoon. After 

exploring an additional 800 meters of tunnel, they found and 

removed a trapdoor, disclosing additional chambers and documents. Over one kilometer of tunnel had now been uncovered. 

Further exploration revealed an exit leading to another enemy 

base camp. 

The exploration continued the follo\\'ing day, and more documents were uncovered and evacuated. As the tunnel rats crawled 

through the complex, they heard enemy voices. A CS grenade 

thrown by the team flushed five Viet Cong from the tunnel; they 

were captu red as they scrambled out. Above gr·ound, the security 

clements found a former hospital base camp complex 300 meters 

north of the camp discovered the previous day, and an investigation of tunnels of this complex was begun. 

Ear·ly the next morning, the fourth day of explora ti on, the tunnel rats returned to the former hospital complex. Five huts were 

unearthed, each dug into the brround so that the roof was at ground 

level. Medical textbooks and notebooks, small quantities of medicine. and medical instruments were discovered in the 300 meters 

of rooms and chambers. The tunnel team returned to the second 

tunne l complex where the Viet Cong had been flushed, but CS in 

the tunnel p,·evented further exploration. Tunnel destruction personnel from the l68th Engineers arrived that afternoon and 

remained at the ovemight position. 

On 26 January, the day CWAJt fALLS terminated , the tunnel 

destruction team left for the former hospital complex and the 

exploration team returned to the "CS tunnel" complex. Using conventional demolitions and acetylene equipment, the team rigged 
ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS 69 

the hospital complex for destruction aeter receiving word that no 

additional information had been found by those combing the 

underground labyrinth. The charges were detonated at noon; after 

the explosion, large cracks could be seen on the surface for a distance of approximately two hundred meters. The team then moved 

to the second tunnel complex and, again using a combination of 

conventional demolitions and acetylene, destroyed it. 

Because of the numerous enemy underground complexes discovered, there were too many burrows for the few trained tunnel 

rats to explore. Volunteers from the lst Engineers and other units 

often took on the task of exploration and destruction. As would be 

expected. the results when using trained. experienced, and properly equipped personnel were much more valuable-and far safer 

-than those gained through volunteers. Unless the tunnel was 

mapped as it was explored, the engineers who were to destroy the 

tunnel were required to go back in and map it, duplicating effort. 

There were also instances in which two learns were in a tunnel at 

the same time with neither team knowing of the other's presence. 

Luckily, no one was shot by mistake. 

A new method of tunnel destruction was deve loped and used 

during CmAII. FALLS It consisted of filling a tunnel with acetylene 

gas-forced in by blowers-then igniting the gas by demolition 

charges. Acetylene alone was found excellent for destroying tunnels with not more than seven feet of overhead cover. With deeper 

tunnels destruction was increased through the use of conventional 

demolitions in conjunction with the acetylene. Thirty-pound 

charges of TNT and 40-pound cratering charges were placed at 

critical locations (rooms, tunnel junctions, exits, and entrances) 

in the complex. ll1ese charges were dual primed, connected in 

series by detonation cord, and fired electrically. When detonated. 

the conventional charges acted as booster charges for the acetylene. 

These experiments, using high explosives and acetylene together, 

proved very effective on tunnels as much as fifteen to twenty feet 

below the surface. 

During Operation CEDAR FALLS the 1st Engineers and attached 

units discovered literally helicopter loads of documents, records, 

and plans, many of which belonged to the Viet Cong intelligence 

section of Military Region IV from 1963 through 1966. The documents listed the strengths of Viet Cong units, the names of their 

members, and the lowns and villages in which they operated; dis· 

dosed some of their meeting places; and revealed a great amount 

of information on exactly how the enemy operated and what his 

future plans were. In addition to intelligence gathering and 
70 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCl' ION CITY 

jungle destruction, 9,445 meters of enemy tunnels, 4 villages, 27 

base camps, 60 miscellaneous bunkers, and other facilities were 

destroyed by the engineers. 

The Engineer Navy 

The problem of sealing the confluence of the Saigon and Thi 

Tinh Rivers in order to prevent the escape of the Viet Cong by 

water during CEDAR F AI.l.S resulted in another new approach to 

counterinsurgency warfare, an engineer "navy." The initial plan to 

deny Ihis escape route to the enemy was to place a force on the 

banks of each of the rivers. The force would be armed with the 

newly acquired "quad-50" machine guns (four heavy machine guns 

that traverse from a single pedestal and which arc fired simultaneously by one gunner). General DePuy believed this mission 

could be more efficient ly accomplished by installing the quad-.50's 

on platforms placed in the river. The engineers agreed and were 

given the job. 

On 3 January Company E, 1st Engineer Battalion, was directed 

to procure and load the materials for two rafts to support the 

weapons and to move the materials to the Vietnamese Engineer 

School at Phu Cuong, twelve kilometers downstream from the 

juncture of the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. There each raft was 

built by connecting two bridge floats with aluminum decking, and 

a quad-.5O was mounted on each of the platforms. The construction 

was completed in one day. Additional firepower for each raft was 

provided by six .30-calibel· machine guns, and provision was made 

for riflemen and grenadiers behind sandbags to be on both the 

floats and the platform. Eventually dubbed Monitors, each raft 

was propelled by a 27-fool utility boal. 

The navy also included two armed utility boats and several 

river patrols using pneumatic assault boats. The river patrols consisted of fifteen men: two engineers and thirteen infantrymen. One 

engineer operated the boat whil e the other secured it during loading and unloading. 

Early on 5 January, with a command helicopter overhead, the 

engineer flotilla left Phu Cuong and moved up the Saigon River. 

Approximately two ki lometers from its destination, lead elements 

experienced sniper fire which was immediately countered by 

machine guns from the rafts and the helicopter; four enemy were 

killed. By nightfall the rafts were in position at the confluence of 

the rivers; one raft tied to the cast bank and the other anchored 

in midstream. 
ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS 7 1 

While the Monitors remained in the same general vicinity for 

most of the operation, the utility and assault boats actively 

patrolled the rivers. All Vietnamese river traffic was checked and 

some prisoners taken. In addition the boats ferried supplies to outposts along the river. The navy of the lst Engineers proved to be 

a great asset during Cf.I)Ait FALLS. 

Chemical Operations 

During CEDAR FALLS the chemical sections of both the 1st Division and 173d Airborne Brigade wel·e used to ach ieve excell ent 

results in combat operations and in denying materiel and facilities 

to the enemy. 

On 8 January the 1st Division chemical section conducted an 

experimental drop of 5S-gallon drums of CS munitions from a 

CH-47 (Chinook) helicopter in the Thanh Dien forest in the 3d 

Brigade's area of operation. On 13 January another drop of thirty 

drums of CS set to explode at treetop level was made on a linear 

target approximately fifteen hundred meters long just south of 

Artillery Base I. Excellent functioning of the explosives and coverage of the target were reported by the Air Force forward air 

controller observing the drop. On 16 January another 3O-drum 

drop was made on an enemy base camp outside of the CEDAR FAU-'l 

operationa l area. To produce better results on this broad target, 

two passes were made forming an X with fifteen drums dropped 

on each pass. Good coverage was again reported. Two more drops 

were made outside the Cf.DAR FAI.I-'l area the next day, again with 

excellent results. Such drops, when made under controll ed conditiolis in territory in friendly hands, kept the enemy from entering the area of the drop £01· many days unless he was masked. 

The chemical sections were also very active and effective in 

denying use of captured rice to the enemy. When conditions permitted, tbe rice was removed from the area. However, in some 

cases, in view of the large tonnages involved as well as the location 

of the rice, removal was impossible. For example, on 12 January 

450 tons of rice in tOO-pound bags, located in eight different caches, 

were destroyed by the chemical personnel of the 1st Division. To 

contaminate the rice, a hole was made in the middle of the cache 

and two 40-pound cratering charges were placed in the hole and 

detonated. The explosion caused the bags to burst and spread the 

rice over a wide area. Eight-pound bags of CS crysta ls were then 

placed in and around the area, linked with detonating cord. and 

exploded simultaneously. This system was often and effectively 

used during the opera tion. 
72 CEDAR FALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

FLAM ETHROWER IN ACTION 

Flamethrowers were also employed during Operation CEDAR 

FALLS for land clearing and against entrenched enemy troops. 

Flame throwers provided the best means of deslroying the windrows of trees and brush caused by jungle clearing operations. The 

flamcthrower-equipped tracked vehicles of the lst Squadron, 4th 

Cavalry, were used to burn the green jungle which had been cuI. 

It was found that 2,600 gallons of diesel fuel, 1,500 gallons of ga~ 

line, and 1,500 pounds of chemica ls were required to consume four 

windrows, each 50 meters long. This expensive opera tion was used 

rather sparingly. The 2d Brigade also employed flame throwers 

to assist in the capture of Viet Cong located in hunkers and tunnels. 

The flamethrowers reduced the amount of oxygen in the tunnels, 

to say nothing of producing a significantl y adverse psychological 

effect on the enem y. 

The main support of the tunnel search effort by the chemical 

sections, in addition to the actual tunnel rat teams, consisted of 

providing different types of air blowers for various uses. One use 

was to blow smoke into tunnels which had been loca ted (especially 

those with extremel y small diameters whiich were impractical or 
ENGINEER AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS 73 

too difficult to search) to nush out any Viet Cong and to locate 

other entrances, gun ports, or breathing holes. The BuHalo Turbine, a powerful blower, was often used lor this purpose along ..... ith 

3O-pound smoke pots. To assist in locating the smoke exiling the 

tunnels, observation helicopters as well as troops scouted the area. 

Because the smoke did not linger, the tunnels could be nushed 

by the blowers with relative ease so that tunnel rats could almost 

immediately search the tunnel. On 19 January this kind of smoke 

operation caused seven Viet Cong to nee a tunnel in the area of 

operations of the 2d Battalion, 503<1 Infantry. All were immediately 

apprehended, suffering from the effects of smoke inhalation. However, after an hour of nushing the tunnel with fresh air, a tunnel 

rat team was able to search the tunnel with no difficulty. At times 

the blowers were also used to fill the tunnels with CS. 

The Army engineers and chemical teams contributed significantly to the task of destroying the enemy's lacilities in the Iron 

Triangle and making its fu ture use difficult. As Time magazine 

put it as CEDAR FALLS was drawing to a close, "If the U.S. has its 

way, even a crow nying across the Triangle will have to carry lunch 

from now on." 
CHAPTER VII 

The Results 

During its 19-day duration CWAR FAtI.s compiled some impressive statistics. U.S. and South Vietnamese forces accounled for 

nearly 750 confirmed enemy dead and 280 prisoners. In addition, 

there were 540 Viet Cong Chieu Hoi Talli e r5, 512 suspects detained, 

and 5,987 refugees evacuated. Enemy equipment losses were 23 

crew-served weapons, 590 indi vidual weapons, and over 2,800 exp losive items such as mines, grenades, and mortar and artill ery 

rounds. Over 60,000 rounds of small arms ammuni tion were captured, as were many miscellaneous items of equipment, including 

over 7,500 uniforms. Some 1,100 bunkers, 525 tunne ls, and over 

500 structures were destroyed. Captured were 3,700 Ions o f riceenough 10 feed 13,000 Imops for a full year-and more than a half 

million pages o f assorted documents. 

U.S. battle losses totaled 72 killed, 337 wounded; those for the 

South Vietnamese, 11 killed and 8 wounded. U.S. equip-ment lost 

included I tank and 3 armored personnel carriers (APC's). Damage 

was sustained by 3 tanks, 9 APC's, 1 tankdozer, 2 quarter-ton trucks 

(jeeps), and 2 light observation helicopters. The South Vietnamese 

lost 3 individual weapons. 

In addition, eleven square kilometers of jungle were cleared 

and many miles of mad in the area were made passable. These 

roads, the landing zones cleared, and the swaths cut at intervals 

through the jung le would all make any future penetration of the 

area much simpler. 

As had been expected, main force elements were contacled only 

rarely. T he 1st. 7th, and 8th Viet Cong Main Force Battalions of 

Military Region IV did not conduct an organized defense of the ir 

areas, apparently having been directed to disperse and avoid COlltact. Task f'orce DEANE did report prisoners taken from the 61st 

Local Force Company of the Phu Loi Battalion and from small rear 

services elements. 

A review of the interrogation reports of those who rallied, were 

taken prisoner, or detained indicated that the majority were from 

Viet Cong infrastructure in the area. Over three hundred of the 

ralliers and prisoners were from local guerrilla units, primarily 
THE RESULTS 

, . -

75 

.... ... .. . ~ 

.1, •• 

, 

CoMBINED ARMS _INFANTRY, ARMOR, AND AIR_AT WORK IN THE IRON TRIANGLE 

from Ben Cat District. Personnel from combat support elements, 

such as farmers and laborers, accounted for the second largest 

category, about 25 percent. Only a few top·level cadres were identified in in terrogation reports, including an executive officer of Tay 

Ninh Military School, a captain from the M ililary Region IV political staH section, a lieutenant from a small guard unit, and two 

North Vietnamese political cadres, including the mathematics 

professor schooled at Peking University. 

It appeared from the near-total absence of enemy acts of sabotage or attacks on government posts in or around Saigon during 

the operation that the grasp of the inf.-astructUl-e upon the former 

inhabitants of the Iron Triangle area had been severe ly impaired. 

General Westmoreland. in commenting on CEDAR FALLS during a 

Mission Counci l meeting. stated that the opera tion had been a very 

disruptive one for the enemy in the I ron Triangle area. He added 

that it had been very impressive in its results, being the first operation in which the number of enemy captured and detained equaled 

the number of enemy killed. 
76 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTJO~ CITY 

AM}:RICAN ADVISER AND VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS keeping U'alch on Viet Cong 

captil!f!s. 

In ana lyzing CEI>AR FALLS, General Seaman discussed the OPCI"ation from several aspects. With respect to surprise, he wrote: 

Security in planning and deception in dcploymcni resulted in surprising 

the enemy. TIle light initial contact and the lack of a wcll-<:oordinatcd 

defense indicated that not only did the enemy not expect our allnck bUI 

was unable 10 react when it came. The final casualty figures show Ihal 

he had been in the Iron Triangle in considerable strength, despite his 

weak defense. 

Gcncml Seaman pointed oul that application of the principle 

of mass had quickly and effectively sealed and thoroughly searched 

the area of operations by using II highcr troop density than had 

cver before been used or been possible. This greatly improved the 

effectiveness of cordon and search tactics and was reflected in the 

high proportion of Viet Cong ralliers. "Not being able to hide or 

escape," he indicated, "their choice was to surrender." 

General Knowles of the 196th Brigade highlighted another 

factor which contributed to more ralliers than before: CroAK FALLS 

was a longer operation than most. 
THE RESULTS 77 

Operation CEDAR FALLS demonstrated the value of extended operations within VC controlled areas. The length of the operation gave the 

small unit commanders and the troops time enough to become familiar 

with the terrain, as well as the VC situation. Unlike many other operations 

where troops go i11l0 an area for two or three day search and destroy missions, CEDAR FALLS provided the much needed continuity of effort to 

effectively accomplish the mission. 

General Knowles also directed the following comments at the 

critics of mechanized units being used in counterinsurgency 

operations: 

Mechanized infantry has proven to be highly successful in search and 

destroy operations. With their capability for rapid reaction and firepower, 

a mechanized battalion can effectively control twice as much terrain as an 

infantry battalion. Rapid penetrations into VC controlled areas to secure 

LZ's for airmobile UllIts provides an added security measure for aircraft 

as well as personnel when introducing units into the combat zone. The 

constant movement of mech units back and forth through an. area keeps 

the VC moving and creates targets for friendly ambushes and artillery 

and air. 

In summarizing the effects on the enemy, General Seaman said: 

(1) A major portion of the enemy's base and conlrol center for operation against the Capital Military District has been destroyed. This represents the loss of an investment of twenty years. The enemy's offensive 

capability against the Capital Military District has been reduced by loss 

of personnel, equipment and fllcilities. 

(2) Over 3,700 tons of rice have been captured or destroyed. 

More significant than the loss ilSelf is the resultant diversion of manpower 

to reconstitute his stores. 

(3) All of the civilian inhabitants of the area, some 6,000 plus their 

livestock were evacuated. This will deny the enemy food, manpower, 

revenue, transportation and intelligence. 

(1) The capture of over 500,000 separate pages of documents including 

crypto-nlaterial, has given us valuable intelligence. The enemy's security 

programs have been compromised to include records continuity. 

(5) Realization of the seriousness of these losses by the leadership in 

North Vietnam, COSVN and the VC-doniinated populace will have a 

serious psychological impact. 

From every aspect, the enemy had surrered a great defeat . In 

the words of General Seaman, they would now have 10 "re-evaluate 

the relative capabilities of their forces as opposed to ours_" 

In his analysis of CEDAR FAlU, General Seaman also commented 

favorably upon another key area, the working relationship between 

U.S. and South Vietnamese forces: 

Cooperation between U.S. and Viet namese military and civilian 

agencies was excellent. This was particularly true in the evacuation of the 

civililln population. Bot h the ARVN airborne units and the River Assault 
78 CEDAR FALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

Groups provided invaluable assistance in securing and transporting the 

refugees. Civilian and military personnel of both nations worked in close 

harmony to organize and build the PHU CUONG refugee camp on very 

short notice. On the purely military side, ARVN units contributed significantly to the eHectiveness of the cordon. The ARVN River Assault 

Groups made a un ique contribution by their patrolling along the river 

lines. 

General DePuy, in his analysis of Operation CEDAR FAI.I.s, 

staled; 

Operation CEDAR FALLS was long overdue. The Iron Triangle and 

nearby village of BEN sue had been lucrative targets for some time. However, this was the first time sufficient forces and equipment were available 

to properly execute such an undertaki ng. 

The Triangle had been a notorious VC haven. from its confines attacks 

were launched on the su rrounding area, and VC con trol over such areas 

was uncontested. Ralliers confirmed that the T riangle contained numerous tu nnels and bunkers and huge stores of foodstuffs and equ ipment. 

Continual bombing and artill ery fires certainly disrupted VC activity, 

but civilian occupants in the area hampered free-fire activities. Additionally, 8-52 stri kes and artillery bombardment could not be exploited with 

ground troops. There were simply no access routes, air or ground , into 

the heart of the Triangle. T he few el(isting ox cart roads and foo t trails 

were heavily mined and booby trapped. The 100 square kilometers of the 

Iron T riangle prov ided a secure jungle haven which no one division could 

seal, search and destroy. 

We had no idea at the beginning that Operation CEDAR fALLS 

would tunl ou t to be the most significant operation thus far conducted by 

the 1st Infantry Division. It is most sign ificant in many respects. First of 

all, it was aimed at the headquarters, Military Region IV. This headquarters is responsible for operations in and around SAIGON. The headquarters directed attacks on TAN SON NHUT and on U.S. troop billets 

in SAIGON itself. 

For the fi rst time in the history of the war in Vietnam, infan tryengineer bu lldozer teams cut their way through the jungle, finding and 

destroying base camps, creati ng landing zones, push ing back the jungle 

from roads which can now be used for rapid repenetration of the area. One 

entire jungle area was completely eliminated. All in all, the engineers cut 

down 9 square kilometers of solid jungle. T his is a technique which will 

be used again in the penetration of other VC war zones and base areasa technique pioneered by the 1st Division. Everyone who worked with the 

engineers recogn izes the tremendous contribution they made to the success 

of the operation. 

In add ition to the destruction of the base area of Military Region IV, 

the most significan t and unel(pected result was the surrender of so many 

Viet Cong.lhis has never happened before in the war in Vietnam, and in 

th is area, at least, is a reflection of the complete breakdown in confidence 

and morale on the part of the VC. 

Although I do not expect the war to end quickly, I believe this has been 

a decisive turning point III the III Corps area; a tremendous boost to the 

mora le of the Vietnamese Government and Army; and a blow from which 

the VC in this area may never recover. 
THE RESULTS 79 

In nineteen days, II Field Force, Vietnam, had converted the 

Iron Triangle from a haven to a sealed battleground and then to a 

military no-man's-land. Years of work spent tunneling and hoarding supplies were nullified. The civilian population was removed , 

making any enemy attempt to rebuild doubly difficult. Concealment, particularly along lines of communication, was stripped 

away, exposing the area to future surveillance. Finally, the area 

was designated a specified strike zone so that it could be interdicted 

with ease should the enemy attempt to rebuild. A strategic enemy 

base had been decisively engaged and destroyed. 

By all accounts CEDAR FALLS had to be one of the significant 

operations in the Vietnam War. Certainly it was the significant 

operation in January 1967; however, that did not mean that there 

were no operations being conducted in other areas of Vietnam. In 

fact, in the III Corps Tactical Zone itself there wel'e eighteen 

separate major military operations conducted during that month, 

fifteen of them resulting in contact with the enemy. 

Intelligence sources summarized the situation in the III Corps 

area as CEDAR FALLS came to a close as follows, perhaps providing 

some insight into what the future might have in store : 

During Operation CEDAR FALLS the VC losses in personnel were 

the equivalent of three baHalions. These losses howe,'cr, were widely 

scattered and ca nnot be attributed to S\>ccific units. . . . [This defeat) 

coupled with the recent deCeat oC (9t} VC Division] regiments with resultant loss oC major supply stockpiles in the Iron Triangle, Tay Ninh 

and Phuoc Tuy Provinces indicate the VC .... ·ill require time for resupply, 

replacement, retraining. and re-indoctrination. To gain time the VC will. 

in all probability adapt their Winter Campaign Plan to divert attention 

from Tay Ninh and other areas selected Cor reoccu pation. 

But Generals Westmoreland and Seaman and II Field Force, 

Vietnam, were not going to give the enemy the time they required 

or the opportunity to divert attention from the areas in which they 

had been hit. On the horizon loomed JUNCTION CITY, an operation 

which was to carry the war deep into enemy sanctuaries in War 

Zone C for an extended period. 

PART TWO 

JUNCTION CITY, 22 FEBRUARY14 MAY 1967 

CHAPTER VIII 

Planning and Preparation 

J UNCTION CITY was to be the largest operation of the Vietnam 

war to date and the second one under control of 11 Field Force. 

Vietnam. Its primary mission would be search and destroy to 

eradicate the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) and Viet 

Cong and North Vietnamese Army installations. Also, various 

installations such as Special Forces camps and airfields were to be 

built. Two U.S. divisions, with the commitment of as many as 

twenty·two U.S. infantry battalions, fourteen artillery battalions. 

and four South Vietnamese battalions would be involved. JUNCTION 

CITY would also include the first major combat parachute assault 

since the Korean War. 

Like the Iron Triangle, War Zone C was a major Viet Cong 

stronghold and had been a sanctuary for insurgents for over twenty 

years. It was also believed to be the location of headquarters of the 

Central Office of South Vietnam; however, owing to the remoteness of the area and the strict secrecy with which the enemy treated 

the headquarters, few facts we re known about COSVN installations 

and units in the area. Clandestine operations conducted in September of 1966 and during Operation A TTLEBORO in November 

had, however, developed significant intelligence on War Zone C. 

In discussing the genesis of Operation J UNCTION CITY. General 

Seaman, commanding general of II Field Force, Vietnam, stated: 

. . . I've got to go back to Operation "Birmingham" which was conducted by the lsi Divisio n in War Zone C, in Mayor 1966. It was conducted 

along the Cambodian Border as far north as La Go (about 30 kilometers 

nonflwest of Tay Ninh City) and the p lan was to airlift a brigade into 

Ihe then suspected location of COSVN headquanen. The 1st Division 

airlihed one battalion to the area, intending to get an entire brigade there 

within the day ; but, unfortunately, the weather dosed in and the rainy season started a couple of weeks earlier than anticipated. So, the decision was 

made by the diVIsion commander, MG DePuy. to withdraw that one baltalion , feeling that he could not reinforce it if ther got into any difficulty. 

Following Operation "Birmingham," Genera \Vestmoreland said he 

wanted me to plan an operation in War Zone C to start as soon as possible 

after the Christmas and New Year's stand-downs of 1966-1967. H e said, 

in effect, "to think big." This operation was to start aoout the 8th of January 
84 CEDAR FA LLS-JUNCTION CITY 

1967, and would be a multi-division operation including an airborne drop. 

I (later) briefed General Westmoreland on the progress of our 

plans for "Junction City" and he approved my concept. 

The operation plan, originally named GADSDEN, had three 

majo r objectives: to engage the 9th Viet Cong Division and the 

101s1 North Vietnamese Army Regime nt; to destroy COSVN headquarters; and to destroy enemy base camps and installations in the 

area or ope ration. The plans included a parachute assault by both 

the lst Brigade, lOIst Airborne Division , and the 173d Airborne 

Brigade. Among other objectives, the operation was intended to 

convince the enemy that War Zone C was no longer a have n. 

The concept included deception operations prior to the main 

thrust into War Zone C. During this initial phase, units and up~ 

plies would be positioned to support the follow-up effort. 

Definitive planning for the operation started in late November 

1966. With all intelligence sources of 11 Field Fo rce, Vietnam, 

oriented toward collection of information on the operational area, 

more and more data were received as the starting date for the 

operation neared. Pattern activity analysis was used extensively, 

as it had been for CEDAR F.uLS; much of the data acquired in that 

operation was applied in planning J UNCTION CITY. Informatio n on 

the general location of COSVN and the movements o f enemy units 

of interest was furthe r refined. 

From the first planning conference, strict security measures 

were enforced to prevent compromise. The planning g roup was 

held to a minimum within II Fie ld Force, Vietnam, headquarte rs; 

whenever possible, preparations were made without specifically 

identifying them with the operation. However, in December 

the name of the main operation was changed to J UNCTION CITY 

because it was believed that the name GADSDEN had been compromised. GADSDEN was shifted to one of the two planned deception operations. 

Operation GADSDEN was to be conducted by the U.S. 25th Divi ~ 

sion in the extreme western portion of War Zone C, in the vicinity 

of Lo Go. The second preliminary operation, named T UCSON, 

would be conducted by the U.S. lst Infantry Division in Binh Long 

Province, eighty kilometers to the east, in an area generally defined by the Minh Thanh and Michelin rubber plantations and the 

village of Bau Long on Highway 13. This area also comprised the 

northern portion of the Long Nguyen secret zone. 

Both these preliminary actions were designed as individual 

division operations in the proximity of the normal division tactical areas of interest. In addition to moving forces for GADS[N and 

T ucsos, providing a cover for friendly troop buildup on the edges 
PLANNING AND PREPARATION 85 

of War Zone C, and establishing supply bases for JUNCTiON CITY, 

it was envisioned that the deception could possibly cause the 27lst 

and 272d Viet Gong Regiments to move into the central area of 

War Zone C from their then suspected locations. 

The plans for JUNCT ION CITY, GADSDEN, and TUCSON were published in early December 1966. D-days were sel as 3 January for 

GADSDEN and TUCSON and as 12 January for JUNCTION CITY. 

However, as was discussed above, in the middle of December 

General McChristian, Military Assistance Command J-2, briefed 

General Seaman on information concerning enemy activities in 

the Iron Triangle which led to the decision that Operation CEDAR 

FAl.LS would be conducted in January. JUNCTION CITY would be 

postponed until later in February; in turn, GADSDEN was delayed 

until 2 February and TUCSON postponed until 14 February. 

The intelligence concerning War Zone C was continuously 

being re-examined, and in mid-January the movement and relocation of the 9th Viet Gong Division and the enemy regiments were 

established. The 27ls1 Regiment was located on the Cambodian 

border near Lo Go, the 272d Reginlent had moved to the Michelin 

rubber plantation northeast of Dau Tieng, and the 273d was now 

located outside War Zone C near Tan Uyen, about twenty-five 

kilometers northeast of Saigon. The 271st and 272d were added 

as targets for Operations GADSDEN and TUCSON. Headquarters of 

the 9th Viet Cong Division remained in the eastern sector of War 

Zone C while intelligence indicated the 101st North Vietnamese 

Anny Regiment-now listed as subordinate to the 9th Divisionhad moved north to the vicinity of An Loc and Loe Ninh. This new 

and significant infonnation on the locat,ion of enemy units resulted 

in a shift in the area of primary interest from the eastern to the 

west central section of War Zone C. The target of major interest 

became the CQSVN headquarters elements. 

As D-day for J UNCTION CITY approached, II Field Force intelligence analysts provided these conclusions about the enemy: 

In view of the enemy's recent setbacks in Operation Cedar Falls, and 

in Tay Ninh Province (ATTLEBORO), the political rejection of the VC 

by the populace in the national elections (September 1966), and his fail- ure to achieve a major significant victory, the VC will increase guerrilla 

warfare and terrorism in an effort to wear down and tire the Free World 

Forces employed in Vietnam. The enemy will use his main forces, when 

ready, to attack targets that represent significant psychological victories 

at a minimum risk to his own rorces. 

The intelligence report listed the following probable enemy 

courses of action: 
86 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

I. Intensify guerrilla warfare. acts of terrorism, harusment. propaganda and interdiction of lines of communication. 

2. Conduct less than regimental size auacks against isolated forces and 

installations. 

3. Withdraw from main US combat units if he considers the situation 

unsuitable for a decisive victory. 

4. Attack selected targets with forces of regimenlal strength at a time 

and place of his own choosing. 

5. Continue to secure his base areas and lines of communication. 

Events over the next two months would validate these predictions. 

The operational area for JUNCTION CITY, War Zone C, is generally defined as the 8Ox50-kilometer area bounded on the west and 

north by Cambodia, on the east by Highway 13, and on the south 

by an east-west line drawn through Ben Cat and Tay Ninh and 

extending to the Cambodian border. The terrain in the northern 

and eastern portions rises to approximately one hundred fifty 

meters while the southern and western portions range in elevation 

from five to fifty meters. The generally flat, marshy land in the 

west changes· to gently rolling terrain, finally becoming irregular 

near the eastern province boundary. The predominant land feature in the area is the 987-meter-high Nui Ba Den. Two major 

rivers drain the area: the Yam Co Dong on the west and the Saigon 

on the east; neither is fordable. Numerous small streams are found 

in the eastern portion of War Zone C, the principal ones having 

steep banks and muddy bottoms. 

In the south, trafficability in the area of interest varied from 

good in the rubber plantations to difficult in marshy areas. In the 

north, particularly the northeast, movement was diHicult because 

of the heavy forests and dense undergrowth and bamboo but improved in the north and western portions of the province because 

of the relatively thin forests and scattered open areas. 

The ground was expected to be relatively dry during most of 

the operation. For all practical purposes, at the time JUNCTION CITY 

was initiated all significant bridges in the operational area had 

been destroyed, although footbridges had been constructed by the 

enemy on many of the trails that crisscrossed the area. 

At the beginning of JUNCTION CITY the skies over the operational 

area would be clear, with little precipitation. Later, some rain and 

cloudiness would occur with patchy early morning fog, limiting 

visibility in some instances to one mile. The fog generally would 

dissipate by midmorning. Temperatures would range from a high 

of 95 to a low of 59 degrees. 

Because of the vast area to be covered, the difficult terrain, the 
PLANNING AND PREPARATION 87 

enemy anticipated, the number and types of units involved, and 

the diversity in operations, the planning for JUNCTION CITY was 

extensive and complex. The mission assigned the planners of 11 

Field Force, Vietnam, read: 

a. Phase I- On order, II FFORCEV in coordination and cooperation 

with the III ARVN Corps conducts a major oHensive into War Zone C 

(northern Tay Ninh Province) to destroy COSVN and VC/NVA forces 

and installations. b. Phase II-On order, Il FFORCEV conducts coordinated airnlobile 

and ground assaults in eastern War Zone C to destroy COSVN and 

VC/NVA forces and installations. 

As originally planned. J UNCTION CITY was to have had only two 

phases; however, because of the success achieved, Phase III would 

later be initiated. Its mission: "Continued search and destroy 

operations north of Highway 247, secure Highway 26 south from 

Tay Ninh to the junction of Route 239 and secure the towns of Tay 

Ninh and Suoi Da." 

Initially two South Vietnamese regiments were to have par· 

ticipated; however, by January 1967 it was evident that this num· 

ber was too ambitious and it was reduced to four battalions. In 

addition, the lst Brigade of the U.S. IOIst Airborne Division was 

not made available. 

As envisioned by II Field Force, preliminary operations GADS. 

DEN and T UCSON, jumping off on 2 and 14 February respecti vely, 

would posit jon forces and materiel on the western and eastern 

extrem ities of the area of operations. Phase I of J UNCTION CITY 

would commence on 22 February with five U.S. brigades formin g 

a horseshoe·shaped cordon in the western half of War Zone C. 

(Map 8) The 25th Division would block on the west along the Cambodian border;' on the north, along the border, and on the east 

along Provincial Route 4 would be the lst Infantry Division with 

the I73d Brigade attached. On 0 plus 1 a brigade of the 25th Divi· 

sion and the 11th AmlOred Cavalry Regiment (attached to the 

25th), which had positioned themselves on the southern edge of 

the horseshoe the previous day, would attack north into the horseshoe. The horseshoe forces would conduct search and destroy 

operations in their areas. Simultaneous with the detailed and 

thorough search, a Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense 

Grollp camp near Prek Klok would be established for future interdiction of enemy supply and infiltration routes in War Zone C. 

An airstrip capable of handling C-130's would be constructed at 

the camp. A second simil ar airfield would be constnlcted in the 

vicinity of Katum. 
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90 CEDAR I-"AL1..S-JUNCTION CITY 

During the operation, particular attention was to be devoted to 

searching suspected locations of the political and military elements 

of the Central Office of South Vietnam. A thorough interrogation 

of all persons apprehended was to be conducted. 

During Phase II, II Field Force elements would focus their 

attention on the eastern portion of War Zone C. conducti ng search 

and destroy operations against COSVN, Viet Cong, and North 

Vietnamese forces and installations. The Saigon River was to be 

bridged at its intersection with Route 246 west of An Loc. At that 

site a Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp 

with an airstrip for C-I30's was to be built. 

In Phase Ill, J UNCTION CITY would be reduced to a brigade-size 

operation in the vicinity of Tay Ninh city in the southenl portion 

of War Zone C. The operational control for this phase would be 

passed from II Field Force to the 25th Infantry Division. 

Operation JUNCTION Crrv would demonstrate the ability of 

American forces to enter areas which had been Viet Gong sanctuaries to conduct successful search and destroy missions and construct facilities in these strongholds. In addition, in the weeks 

forthcoming each of tfie four enemy regiments under the 9th Viet 

Cong Division would be met and defeated. 
CHAPTER IX 

The Warm-Up Tosses: GADSDEN and TUCSON 

Twenty days before the beginning of JUNCTION CITY, prelimi· 

nary operations were started by the 25th Infantry Division under 

code name Operation GADSDtN. Twelve days later, on 14 February 

1967, the 1st Division's Operation TUCSON jumped off. The primary 

objective of these operations was the positioning of men and materiel on the western and eastern flanks of the J UNCTION CITY operational area; however, they would become significant in their own 

right. 

Operation Gadsden 

Officially classified as a search and destroy operation, G .... OSDEN 

employed two brigades of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division under 

the command of Major General Frederick C. Weyand. Involved 

were the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Marshall B. Garth, and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 

Brigadier General Richard T. Knowles commanding. 

The GADSDEN area of operation was some thirty kilometers 

110rthwest of Tay Ninh, in the vicinity of Lo Go and Xom Giua, 

South Vietnamese villages on the Cambodian border. (Map 9) The 

terrain is generally nat and the vegetation ranges from rice fields 

to triple-callopy jungle. During the operation grasslands in the 

area were as tall as six feet. There was some heavy mud in paddy 

areas, but most of the previously nooded positions had dried, thus 

facilitating overland movement. Weather was favorable for the 

operation. 

Before the operation it was suspected that elements of the 271st 

and 272d Viet Gong Regiments, 70th Guard Regiment, 680th 

Training Regiment, and miscellaneous elements subordinate to 

the Central Office of South Vietnam - including several medica l 

units-might be encountered. According to intelligence sources, 

Lo Go was a major supply center of the Viet Gong forces where 

shipments from Cambodia were transferred to local units. Therefore, the area of operation was believed to contain extensive supply 

and ammunition caches, communications storage areas, hospital 

facilities, base camps, and major training complexes. In addition, 
.I 

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OPERATION GADSDEN 

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THE WARM-UP TOSSES: GADSDEN AND TUCSON 93 

personnel and supply routes 10 and from Cambodia were expected 

to be found. 

The plans stipulated that Operation GADSDEN be conducted 

in several phases. During Phase [, forces would be positioned for 

the attack with combat elements established as close to the operational area as Trai Bi. Phase II, starting on D-day, would include 

a two-brigade attack to the west to seize two intermediate objectives, secure landing zones, and establish fire support bases. This 

would be followed by attacks on Lo Go and Xom Giua. Other 

objectives would be designated later. Search and destroy missions 

would be conducted in the zone, and blocking positions would be 

established to seal infiltration and exfiltration routes along the 

border during Phase III. During the last phase the units would 

expand the area of operation to the southeast to search for and 

destroy enemy forces and base camps. 

Using a combina tion of airmobil e assaults and attacks by 

mechanized battalions, the operation went as planned. During 

the 20-day duration of GADSDEN. the fighting was typified by small 

unit actions. Even though the fortifications encountered were 

extensive and many were capable of withstanding very heavy 

artillery and air strikes, the enemy chose not to stand and fight 

but rather to employ guerrilla tactics. 

Evidence was uncovered to confirm that in the operational area 

were located a training area for main force Viet Cong units wh ich 

included an obstacle course and an elaborate land navigation 

course; a rest and recuperation center including numerous medical facilities and supplies, as well as a l00-gallon st ill with 2,000 

gallons of mash and 50 bottles of alcohol; an ordnance facility for 

fabricating and storing bombs, art illery rounds, and grenades; 

and numerous caches of food and other material. Also identified 

in the area were the postal transportation section, the current 

affairs sectio'n, and the military staff directorate of the Central 

Office of South Vietnam. Captured documents and ralliers identified elements of the 3d Battalion, 271st Viet Cong Regiment; 

the 3d Battalion, 70th Viet Cong Regiment; the 680th Training 

Regiment; and a medical unit subordinate to the Central Orfice. 

In addition to confirming the location of various units and 

insta ll ations in the area, GADSDEN inflicted some fairly significant 

losses upon the enemy. His casualties totaled at least 161 killed 

and 2 captured. He lost 26 weapons, 390 tons of rice (of which 50 

percent was evacuated), salt, Sligar, tea, soap, cigarettes, and 550 

pounds of documents. Five hundred fifty huts, 590 bunkers, and 

28 sampans were destroyed, as were numerous items of explo-
94 

MAP 10 

CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

OPERATION TUCSON 

(ConCe'" o. 01>11'011 ..... ) 

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sives and ammunition. U.S. battle losses were 29 killed and 107 

wounded. 

GADSDEN also accomplished its primary mission of positioning 

tToopS and supplies for JUNCTION CITY. The chances of success for 

that operation were bolstered by the opinion expressed by Colone l 

Garth: "GADSDEN proved the ability of mechanized units to 

operate in heavily vegetated terrain and that U.S. forces have the 

capability of moving at their desire within War Zone C." 

Operation Tucson 

T UCSON was a lst Infantry Division operation employing the 

1st Brigade under Colonel William B. Caldwell and the 3d Brigade 

under Colonel Sidney M. Marks. The triangular-shaped area of 

operations was located in the southwestern corner of Sinh Long 

Province; the town of Minh Thanh was at the north corner, Sau 

Long on Route 13 at the east corner, and the eastern edge of the 

Michelin Plantation at the western corner. (Map 10) The terrain 

is gently rolling with the differences in elevation varying less than 
THE. WARM-UP TOSSES: GADSDEN AND TUCSON 95 

INFANTRYM EN MOVE THROUGH HEAVY BRUS H NEAR THE MICHEliN PLANTATION 

forty meters. Cross-country movement is generally good along the 

edges of the area and along the main roads, Routes 239, 242, and 

245. The other areas, moderate to dense jungle, are unsuitable for 

vehicular traffic and poor for foot traffic. 

The area was believed to be an enemy sanctuary containing 

numerous storage sites and base camps. In addition, it was this 

area, part of the Long Nguyen secret zone, which contained a 

portion of the "northern rice route," the major logistical and troop 

channel between War Zones C and D. Enemy units bel ieved to be 

operating in the area included elements of the 272d Regiment 

and the Phu Loi Battalion. Other Viet Cong units included the 

Ben Cat District (local force) Company and one local force platoon 

from Chon Thanh. Elements of the Binh Long Province and Chon 

Thanh District Committees were also thought to be in the area. 

The plan called for the lst Brigade to employ a cavalry squadron to attack south from Minh Thanh along Provincial Routes 13 

and 242 to secure a position in the center of the operational area. 

One battalion of mechanized infantry would sweep southwest from 

Minh Thanh on Route 245 along the edge of the triangular area, 
96 CEDAR F'ALLS-JUNC rJON CITY 

laking up blocking positions in a 15-kilometer arc along Route 245 

and in the northeastern portion of the Michelin Plantation. Two 

battalions of infantry would then attack southwest from Minh 

Thanh between the positions of the cavalry and mechanized forces 

and conduct search and destroy operations. On the east, under the 

conlrol of the division's 3d Brigade, a second cavalry squadron 

(3d of the 5th Regiment of the U.S. 9th Division) would attack 

north along Route 13 to Bau Long. then turn to the west for eight 

kilometers, establish a blocking pOSition, and conduct search 

and destroy operations. Two infantry battalions would make an 

airmobile assault into landing zones on the southern edge of the 

operational area between the 3d of the 5th's blocking position and 

the eastern comer of the Michelin Plantation. From there they 

would search and destroy. One infantry battalion would be held 

at Minh Thanh as a Rapid Reaction Force. 

The operation was conducted as planned with only sporadic 

contact with small elements of the enemy. Although captured documents revealed that the 272d Viet Cong Regiment had recently 

been in the area, only local guards for the caches and base camps 

were contacted. The period 14-17 February was used for search 

and destroy operations during which 1,700 tons of rice and 27 tons 

of salt were found, almost all uncovered by 3d Brigade elements 

in caches 50 to 200 meters from the trail along which their initial 

landing zones were located. (This rice would have fed thirteen 

enemy battalions for one year.) 

The enemy lost 13 killed; U.S. casualties were 3 killed and 65 

wounded. A few weapons and some small arms ammunition and 

explosives were found. About 150 installations were destroyed; 

among them was a regimental-size base camp with four mess halls 

and a barbed-wire-inclosed cage dug into the ground which 

appeared to have been a prisoner of war enclosure large enough 

for about 30 persons. 

It was with great disappointment and reluctance that the search 

and destroy operations came to a close after only four days, since 

it was obvious that only a fraction of the rice in the area had been 

discovered. However, it was necessary for the 1st Division to spend 

the next four days, 18-21 February, completing the primary mission of TUCSON, positioning its troops and preparing them for 

JUNCTION CITY. 
CHAPTER X 

Phase I-The Horseshoe Is Pitched 

Phase I of Operation J UNCTION CITY was conducted Crom 22 

February to 17 March and involved forces of the U.S. lsi and 25th 

Infantry Divisions and some South Vietnamese forces deployed 

in the shape of a giant horseshoe. 1st Division elements constituted 

the east and north portion of the inverted U; the 25th was assigned 

the northwestern and western portions and the mission of driving 

a force north through the open end. With a perimeter of approximately sixty kilometers, the western leg of the horseshoe extended 

north of Tay Ninh along Route 22 (with major concentration north 

of Route 247) to the junction at Route 246 on the Cambodian border. The top of the horseshoe was generally delineated by Route 

246 (which in that area was nothing more than a cart trail) parallel 

to the Cambodian border on the north. The east port jon continued 

along Route 246 to the vicinity of Katum and from there south 

along Route 4 to south of Prek Klok. It was through the southern 

opening of the horseshoe that 25th Division forces initiated their 

drive north to conduct search and destroy operations. To the west, 

south, and east of the horseshoe sweep operations were to be conducted by the units forming it. (Map 11) 

The controlling headquarters for J UNCTION Cln was II Field 

Force, Vietnam, under General Seaman. For the fi rst time in the 

war, II Field Force headquarters displaced to the field and opened 

a tactical command post at Dau Ticng on D-day. 

Combat Forces 

During Phase I of Operation J UNCTION CITY the Big Red One, 

commanded by Major General John H. Hay, Jr., employed two of 

its three organ ic brigades (the other remained active on Revolutionary Development operations) and was augmented by the 173d 

Airborne Brigade and two South Vietnamese units named Task 

Force WALLACE' the 35th Ranger Battalion and one troop from the 

3d Battalion, 1st Cava lry Regiment. Later in Phase I the 1st Brigade, 9th U.S. Infantry Division, joined the 1st Division to keep 

Route 13 open from Lai Khe to Quan Loi. The division's missions 
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100 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

for Phase I were locanduct air and ground assaults to block enemy 

escape roules in the northern and easte rn portion of the area of 

operations; conduct search and destroy operations; secure lines 

of communication from Tay Ninh to Kalum (consisting o f approxi~ 

mately forty-five kilometers o f Route 4); and provide securit y 

during engineer construction al Katum and Prek Klok. On D-day 

the 1st Brigade (Colo nel Caldwell), comprised of four infantry 

battalions and Task Force WAl.LACE. was to assault by air and establish blocking positions in the northern portion of the area. The 

173d Airborne Brigade (Brigadier General John R. Deane, Jr.) 

with three battalions was directed to assault by air on D-day and 

establish blocking positions from Kat uw. to the 1st Brigade area; 

this put the l73d on the northeast portion of the horseshoe. Responsibility for the eastern leg of the horseshoe was assigned to the 

division's 3d Brigade (Colonel Marks). His brigade included one 

mechanized battalion, an infantry baltalion, and the cava lry squadron with one tank company attached. This brigade was to attack 

north on D-day along Route 4, establish fire support bases, and 

link up with the 173d. Each of the brigades had at least one artill ery 

batlalion in direct support. 

During Phase I of Operation J UNcnON CITY. the 25th (Tropic 

Lightning) Division under Generell Weyand employed its organic 

2d Brigade with other units under di vision control , namely, the 

3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division; 196th Light Infantry Brigade; 

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-); and IwO South Vietnamese 

units, the 1st and 5th Marine Battalions (Task Jo ce ALPHA). The 

1st Brigade, 9th Infant.ry Divisio n, part of the division's task organization, was placed under the ope rational control of the 1st Infantry 

Division later in Phase I. 

Under the 25th Division's plan , the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry 

Division (Colonel Garth), would block and continue to conduct 

search and destroy operations from the area which it held at the 

close of Operation GADSDEN on 21 February in the far western portion of the operational area. Assigned to the brigade were one 

mechanized infantry battalion, two infantry batta lions, one troop 

of caval ry, and a company of armor. Operating closely with Garth's 

brigade was the 196th Brigade (Ge neral Knowles), which on D-day 

would conduct airmobile assa ults with its three infan try battal ions 

along the northwest po rtion of the horseshoe to establish blocking 

positions and sea l enemy escape routes into Cambodia. The positions of the 25th Division units would thus form the broad left leg 

of the horseshoe and wo uld complete, along with the 1st Division, 

the sea l o f the operational area. The division's 2d Brigade (Colonel 

Marvin D. Fuller) and Colonel William W. Cobb's 11th Armored 
PHASE I-THE HORSESHOE IS PITCHED 101 

Cavalry Regiment (-) constituted the hammer forces that on D 

plus 1 would drive north into the horseshoe to locate and destroy 

enemy forces and facilities. 

Both the Tropic Lightning Division and the Big Red One 

started deploying forces for JUNCTION CITY on 18 February (D 

minus 4) and were ready to roll by D-day. 

D-Day. 22 February 1967 

On D-day the operation order was implemented as envisaged. 

Nine infantry battalions conducted air assaults (eight airmobile, 

one parachute) to cordon the entire northern portion of the objective area. At the same time, the 25th Division adjusted its one 

brigade in blocking positions on the west while positioning additional units for the attack into the horseshoe; the 3d Brigade, 1st 

Division, pushed north up Provincial Route 4 to complete the 

horseshoe. 

The lst Brigade, lst Division, initiated the airmobile operations from Minh Thanh with one battalion making an airmobile 

assault at OB13 into a landing zone north of Route 246 and only 

1,600 meters south of the Cambodian border. Sporadic small arms 

fire was encountered from the southern portion of the landing 

zone; however, the zone was quickly secured. The other two battalions of the brigade air assaulted into LZ's to the west of the first 

battalion at 1130 and 1630. They were unopposed. 

Earlier that day, 845 paratroopers had boarded sixteen C-13O's 

at Bien Hoa and at 0900 the 173d Airborne Brigade began its combat jump. As the aircraft approached the drop zone (three kilometers north of Katum), the jumpmaster's voice rose above the roar 

of the C-I30: "Stand in the Door. " General Deane moved to the 

right door; taking his position in the left door was Lieutenant 

Colonel Robert H. Sigholtz, commander of the airborne task force 

composed of the 2d Battalion , 503d Infantry; A Battery. 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery; and elements of the 173d Brigade headquarters and headquarters company. As the green light flashed 

"go," General Deane jumped, leading the first U.S. combat parachute assault since the Korean War. There was no enemy contact 

during the jump. 

(Chief Warrant Officer Howard P. Melvin of San Francisco, 

California, then 53 years old, was participating in his fifth combat 

parachute assault over a period of some twenty years. His previous 

four were Gell!, Sicily, Salerno. and SI. Mere Eglise.) 

By 0920 all companies had established command posts. A heavy 

equipment drop commenced at 0925 and continued periodically 
102 CEDAR FAllS-JUNCTION CITY 

INDIVIDUAL AMMUNITION I SSUE 

throughout the day. By 1230 the battalion command POSI was estab~ 

lished. There had been only eleven minor injuries as a result of 

the jump. 

Almost simultaneously with the airborne assault, the 196th 

Brigade of the 25th Division began airmobile assaults in the vicinity of Route 246 along the northwestern portion of the horseshoe. By 1350 all three battalions had completed their assaults 

unopposed. 

The northeastern portion of the inverted U was completed by 

the two other battalions of the 173d Brigade. then at Quan Loi, 

making their airmobile assaults into four landing zones, three 

north and one south of Katum. 

Ground elements for the operation had started rolling at 0630 

on D-day as the lSI Division's 3d Brigade entered the action. While 

an infantry batta lion remained in Suoi Da, other forces of the 

brigade attacked north along Route 4 from Artillery Base I at the 

"French Fort." Following the attacking force, the mechanized 

infantry battalion moved into defensive positions at planned 

artillery bases near Prek Klok and three kilometers to the north. 
PHASE I-THE HORSESHOE IS PITCHED 103 

Artillery for the bases was in the column and was dropped off as 

the column cam~ to the appropriate fire base. In the column was 

also the annored company of the 173d Brigade which would revert 

to the brigade's control upon linkup. Although there were temporary delays in getting the column pushed through caused by 

mines, road repair, and the need to bridge some streams, the 

linkup with elements of the 173d just south of Katum occurred at 

1500,1 The division engineer elements in the column had had a 

busy day in making Route 4 passable and in launching three 

A VLB's over streams. 

The 2d Brigade, 25th Division, and the 11th Annored Cavalry 

Regiment (- ) moved to positions near the open (south) end of the 

horseshoe and poised for their attack to the north in the morning. 

The remaining brigade under the 25th Division continued search 

and destroy operations east of Route 22 and north of Trai Bi. 

Eighteen battalions, organized into six brigades, and one cavalry regiment were now deployed around the horseshoe. Thirteen 

mutually supporting fire support bases also ringed the operational 

area. 

Throughout the day enemy contact and casualties remained 

light with four Americans killed and twenty-three wounded; 

enemy losses were unknown. The Air Force had also had a busy 

day, having flown 216 preplan ned strike sorties in direct support 

of the ground operation. 

D Plus 1, 23 Februo.ry 

The combined elements of the 11th Anno red Cavalry Regiment 

(-) and the 2d Brigade of the 25th Division thrust northward 

through the open end of the horseshoe to trap the Viet Cong and 

locate and destroy COSVN and North Vi etnamese Anny-Viet 

Cong installations. The units immediately began to uncover significant caches of enemy supplies and equipment. Only four minor 

contacts, however, were made during the day's search. 

Around the horseshoe the units continued to improve their 

defensive positions, to secure routes in their areas, and to conduct 

sea rch and destroy operations. Contact remained light. One sig-

'When I IInded 1.1 the 17511 Brigade command post in late morning to make linal c0-

ordination for the linkupof 'he Sd Brigade column, I Will interested to observe both the Hnse 

of euphoriland the lassitude which obviously had enveloped many of the jumpers I ,!.IIW. The 

former feeling , I understand, resulted from the jump having been most successful; the lauer. 

I lpeoc . ClIme IS the aftermath 10 the H,'ere jolt of adrenalin mOlt of the juml)erJ must have 

rec:eived a.they contemplaled their firs' jump in months ~ing mlde into a polentially "ho' " 

drop zone located only fO\lr kilometers from the Cambodian border. Small wonder their 

glands were fUlK'lioninr;! 
104 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

ELEMENTS OF THE 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT 8U4rdinK road to rubber pumlillion, 23 February 1967. 

nificanl find in the lst Brigade, lst Division, area was a batta lionsize base camp complete with shower facilities and over 6,000 pairs 

of"Ho Chi Minh" sandals (made from worn-out truck tires). The 

infantry battalion of the 3d Brigade, 1st Division. which had 

remained at Suoi Da, air assaulted into a landing zone near Route 

4, three kilometers southwest of Katum. Another infantry battalion 

from Minh Thanh replaced it at Suoi Da. Task Force ALPHA 

consisting of the lst and 5th South Vietnamese Marine Battalions 

was airlifted from Saigon to Trai Bi and was attached to the 25th 

Division. Engineers continued to improve Route 4 and started the 

constrUClion of a timber trestle bridge about four kilometers south 

of Katul11 . Tactical air strikes for the day numbered 175. 

D Plus 2, 24 February 

General Seaman sent a message to the commanding generals 

of the 1st and 25th Divisions congratulating them on the speed 
I 

I 

PHASE I- THE HO RSESI-IOE IS PITCH ED 105 

• _ . ...::. ... ~~, .' 

M OVING TIIIWUG H T H E J UNCL£ 

and professionalism displayed during the placement of the cordon 

in western War Zone C. He concluded by saying ". I want a 

thorough sea rch to be made of areas of responsibility. I 

particularly desire that western War Zone C be completely covered." Just as a similar one sent in CEOAJI. FALLS had done. Genera l 

Seaman's message was to set the tone for J UNCTION CITY for the next 

twenty-one days. 

On 24 February Task Force ALP"'" conducted an airmobile 

assault into a landing lone secured by the 1961h Brigade at the 

northern end of its area of responsibility near the Cambodian 

border; the South Vi etnamesee marines utlacked south within the 

zone and prepared to continue operations farlher to the south. 

The infantry baualion of the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, which was 

at Suoi Dat moved to fi eld positions six kilometers south of Prek 

Klok along Route 4. 

The hammer forces of the 25th Division continued the attack to 

the north. The other II Field Force units on the horseshoe strengthened further their defensive blocking positions and continued 
106 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

search and destroy operations. The engineers continued to improve 

the road network and started to clear the jungle up to seventy-five 

yards from the sides of Route 4. Construction of the airfield at Katum 

also commenced. 

Resistance was light and scattered throughout the day and into 

the night; however, six enemy base camps were located and 

destroyed. The bases contained a signiricant number of weapons, 

ammunition, rice. and miscellaneous supplies of all types, "from 

fish-sauce to dynamite." It was on this day that a series of base 

camps in an area three kilometers south of the Cambodian border 

began to be uncovered by one of the battalions of the 1st Brigade, 

lst Division; and Ihey had to fight their way in. It appeared that 

the camps were part of the military affairs section of the Central 

Office of South Vietnam. There were large mess facilities, lecture 

halls, recreational areas, and supply depots. Among some of the 

unusual items found in them were over 30 excellent pOrlable tran· 

sistor radios made in Japan, over 4,500 batteries for such radios, 

reams of paper, 700 pencils, 500 ball·point pens. 1,750 erasers, a 

new Briggs and Stratton 3.hp. engine and generator, shower points, 

and ping.pong tables. A visit to one of these base camps revealed 

large underground living quarters and big, heavily built defensive 

positions. Above ground were some sleeping quarters and cooking 

areas with roofs made of leaves so they could not be seen through 

the jungle canopy. In one of these cooking facilities was a calendar 

pad nailed to a roof support. The date exposed was 23 February, 

the day U.S. forces first entered the general area of the base camps. 

The occupants had deparled in a hurry, leaving behind food par· 

tially prepared in the kitchens as well as their livestock and 

chickens. 

By the end of the third day of the operation, all was still going 

according to plan. Forty·two of the enemy had been killed and 1 

prisoner and 4 ralliers taken; U.S. losses were 14 killed and 93 

wounded. 

End of Phase I, 25 Febl1lary-17 March 

During the rest of Phase I (which was officially terminated at 

midnight of 17 March) the units of both divisions continued their 

meticulous search of the operational area. Since the hammer forces 

had completed their operations, the units of the 1st Brigade, lst 

Division, started leaving their portion of the horseshoe as early 

as 2 March when one battalion was airlifted to Quan Loi. A second 

battalion was lifted the fo llowing day to Minh Thanh, and on 4 
PHASE I-THE HORSESHOE IS PITCHED 107 

HACKING O UT A TRAIL 

March the lst Brigade tenninated Phase I. On 3 March the lst 

Engineers completed the Katum airfield;! the next day all of the 

battalion had tenninated Phase I and began relocating to the eastern edge of War Zone C. (For all intents and purposes the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division and the lst Engineer Battalion began Phase 

II on 7 March when they started operations west of An Loc along 

Route 246 and at the destroyed bridge site where that road crosses 

the Saigon River.) 

During this 21-day period the action was marked mainly by 

contacts with small forces (one to ten men) and the continual discovery of more and more base camps. Rice, documents. dried fish • 

• On 22 f ebru ... y .• her Iwenly-seven d.ys of I.bor, J) Comp.ny of the ilt Engineen h. d 

jillt fi ni,hed the con!truction of I C-I!O npable .irfield (covered with TI7 membn.ne) 

.t Suoi Ila. Two d.Y' later the company "1$ at Katum nart;ng work on another airfield. 

Within eight daYlthey cleared 680.000squ.re (eet of ju",le: opened • laterite Ilit : . nd gn.ded, 

crowned, dn.ined, comp.eted. and completed the laterite .irfield. On , MITch AiT Force 

ColoI"It!15 V. W. Froel ich of the 5l~h Air Command Wing.nd Hugh Wild, 834th Air Division, 

new in by transport .nd inspected and approved the field. They hauled out a load of c.ptured 

rice. 
108 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

COMPANY SWEEP IN WAR ZoNE 

ammunition and explosives, some weapons, and much communication equipment (including miles of wire) were the principal items 

found. Along Route 4 convoy vehicles continued to hit mines and 

be harassed by RPG2 antitank weapons and small arms fire. 

The two major battles fought during Phase I occurred at or 

near Prck Klok on 28 February and 10 March. However, there were 

other occurrences and sizable engagements during this period 

which are worthy of mention. 

On 26 February a company of the 3d Brigade, 4th Division, west 

of Route 22, engaged the 3d Battalion, 271st Viet Cong Regiment, 

in the latter's base camp. The company was completely surrounded 

and another company came to its re lief. Eleven enemy were killed 

with U.S. losses 5 killed and 19 wounded. 

Two days later the 173d Brigade northeast of Katum found what 

appeared to be the public information office for psychological 

propaganda of the Central Office of South Vietnam. in an underground photographic laboratory the troopers found 120 reels of 

motion picture film, numerous still photographs, and pictures and 
I}HASE I-THE HORSESHOE IS PITCHED 109 

AN INFANTRYMAN RETURNS Flu DUlIINC AN ENE~IY ATTACK 

busts of Communist leaders. This discovery proved to be one of 

the major intelligence coups of the war. 

On the following day, 1 March, a battalion of the lst Brigade, 

lst Division, sweeping in the same general area as the location of 

the COSVN military affairs section, found what appeared to be a 

school and propaganda center. There were light, offi ce-type huts, 

a mess hall, two dispensaries, and sleeping quarters, but no fighting 

positions. Among the items taken were a loudspeaker system complete with speakers and amplifiers, material for making identification cards, and a bag of documents. 

On 3 March a company of the 173d Brigade made contact with 

an estimated enemy company east of Katum. In an intensive fire 

Cight in which the enemy used small arms, automatic weapons, and 

M79 grenade launchers, and which lasted only thirty minutes, the 

enemy lost 39 killed and the U.S. 20 killed. and 28 wounded. 

On 6 March the 173d Brigade made airmobile assaults with its 

three battalions into three landing zones located one, three, and 

six kilometers south of Bo Tue (on Route 246 southeast of Katum). 
110 CEDAR FALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

The brigade was searching for the COSVN military intelligence 

bureau reported to be located south of Bo Tue. During the next 

seven days of search and destroy the battalions made sporadic contact, killing about 40 Viet Congo 

Having completed its participation in the hammer operation, 

the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) had tuned west on 26 

February to continue search and destroy in the 25th Division's 

operational area, On 6 March the two squadrons of the 11th 

Annored Cavalry began a sweep along the Cambodian border. 

The sweep was to cover a zone extending 1,500 meters from the 

border and was to start four kilometers southwest of the point 

where Route 22 hits the Cambodian border in the north and was 

to end at La Go. The sweep would include all the border in the 

"Little Elephant's Ear" proper. Just after noon on 11 March one 

troop was brought under small anns, automatic weapons, RPG2, 

and recoilless rifle fire from an estimated Viet Cong company at 

six kilometers northwest of Lo Go and within 200 meters of the 

Cambodian border. The enemy was in well-prepared positions 

with fortified bunkers and an extensive trench system. As friendly 

fires and air strikes increased, the Viet Cong were trapped on the 

near bank of the river which marks the border at this point; helicopter gunships kept the river under surveillance to prevent escape 

into Cambodia. During the night the position was kept under continuous illumination by flareships and under artillery and minigun fire from the flareships. However, the enemy slipped away 

during the night, leaving twenty-eight dead behind. The reason 

for the stiff resistance became readily apparent the next morning. 

Located in reinforced concrete bunkers fifteen feet underground 

were two large, electrically powered Chinese printing presses 

weighing nearly a ton each. Manufactured in Shanghai in 1965, 

each press had an hourly output of 5,000 printed sheets measuring 

17 by 24 inches; the presses also had cutting and folding attachments. A further search yielded several barrels of lead printer's 

type as well as thirty-one individual weapons. The presses were 

airlifted to the 25th Division's base camp. Indications were that 

the presses were being utilized by the COSVN propaganda and 

cultural indoctrination section. 

The Phase I operations started to wind down beginning 12 

March. On the 14th the 3d Brigade, 1st Division, turned over 

responsibility for the security of Prek Klok Special Forces Camp, 

the old French Fort, and Route 4 10 the 196th Brigade. Colonel 

Marks commenced repositioning his forces and prepared to relieve 

the division's 2d Brigade of its Revolutionary Development mis-
PHASE I- THE HORSESHOE IS PITCHED III 

sion so the brigade cou ld participate in J UNCTION CIT\' II. On 15 

March the 173d lefl the operational area and reverted to control 

of II Field Force; on the same day the 11th Cavalry (-) terminated 

its participation. At midnight on J7 March Phase 1 officially came 

to a close. The enemy had 1051835 killed, 15 captured, 264 weapons, 

and enormous quantities of supplies and equi pment. 
CHAPTER Xl 

The Battles of Prek Klok 

Prek Klok I 

The 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, had become a pan of JUNCTION 

CIT\' on D plus 1 (23 February) when it was airlifted from its base 

camp at Lai Khe to Suoi Da. There it assumed the mission which 

had belonged to the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, of being the 

reserve for the 3d Brigade; it also was assigned its portion of 

the Suoi Da defenses. In the ea rl y morning hours of 24 February 

the lst Battalion area received approximately one hundred twenty 

rounds of 82-mm. mortar, all within a few minutes; two were 

killed (including a company commander) and five wounded. 

Six hours later the battalion was airlifted to positions along Route 

4 north of Suoi Oa and, after considerable jungle clearing. went 

into a night defensive position on the east sid e of Route 4, six 

kilometers south of Prek Klok. (At Prek Klok was an artillery base 

defended by the 2nd Battalion, 2d Infantry [-]; the initial engineer activ ities leading to the construction of a Special Forces and 

Civ ilian Irregular Defense Group camp and airstrip were also 

under way.) The mission of the 1st of the 16th was to secure the 

road in its assigned sector and to engage in search and destroy 

operations. 

The 1st of the 16th was under the command of Lieutenant 

Colone l Rufus C. Lauell. This was the second time in less than a 

year that he had commanded "the Rangers." In mid-1966 he had 

been the commanding officer for about a month until he was 

wounded by a .50-caliber round in the battle of Minh Thanh Road 

on 9 July. The wound to his elbow was serious enough for him to be 

evacuated to the United States; upon his return to the division in 

November 1966, General DePuy gave him back his old command. 

On 25 February Colonel LaueH must have thought his outfit 

was hexed. First had been the mortaring at Suoi Da. This was 

followed on the 25th by one of his battalion's BI-mm. mortar rounds 

falling short and injuring two of his men. On the same day his 

position caught some .50-caliber machine gun rounds from a 

friendly mechanized unit conducting reconnaissance by fire during 
MAP 12 

THE BA"ITLES OF PREK KLOK 

THE BATTLE OF PREK KLOK 

28 February 1967 

'----- 2.$00 mews !OPlltO. ) 

(~ot to stote) 

) ) 3 

the early hours of darkness. The only damage was to an al-mm. 

mortar. The next two days went fairly smoothly for "Rufe's 

Rangers," but the 28th would be a busy day for them. 

What follows is the story of the first battle of Prek Klok and is 

in part drawn from an account carried in the December 1967 issue 

of the Big Red One's magazine in Vietnam, Danger Fonvard. It 

is also based upon o,ther references and upon the recollections of 

some of us who were there. (Map 12) 

At 0800 on 28 February, Company B of the 1st Battalion, 16th 

Infantry, left the battalion's night defensive position located along 

Route 4 and proceeded east on a search and destroy mission. 

Twenty-rive hundred meters to the front was the stream named 

Prek Kl ok; they would never reach it. 

The extremely slow movement through the thick and tangled 

jungle was made in two columns with the 3d Platoon in the lead, 

followed by the 2d and 1st Platoons. Captain Donald S. Ulm (who 

would later receive the Silver Star for his part in the action) commanded the company ; he and his command element were located 

between the 2d and l SI Platoons. 
114 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCfION CITY 

As the company pushed on, the jungle thinned somewhat and 

the primary obstacle to the infantrymen became the fallcn trees 

and brush-deadfall-which was encountered at 50- to 75-meter 

intervals. The company employed patrols in a cloverleaf pattern 

as the unit moved forward. Two such patterns had been completed 

by the time Company B progressed a little over one kilometer 

from its sta rting point that morning. 

AI 1030 the lead element of the 3d Platoon received small arms 

and automatic weapons fire from its front. The enemy force was 

initially thought to be and reported a company-size unit, but when 

Captain Ulm learned that three enemy machine guns had been 

observed, he correctly concluded that the enemy force was considerably larger. The enemy was well concealed, but not dug in and 

thus not fully prepared for the fight to follow. It was a meeting 

engagement of the two forces. 

The 3d Platoon, still in the lead, continued to receive heavy 

fire and was unable to gain fire superiority. Then the platoon 

reported being attacked on its right (south) nank as well as from 

its front to the east. 

As was the policy within the division for most operations of this 

nature, artillery marching fire had been preceding the company 

as it moved east; it was being fired by the 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery (lOS-mm.), located at Artillery Base II at Prek Klok. As soon 

as contact was made the artillery forward observer called for a shift 

of fires to the enemy's location. Within minutes one of the command and control Huey helicopters of the division was over the 

point of contact and in touch with both the division tactical operations center and, in the absence of the brigade and battalion commanders, the company on the ground. The tactical operations 

cenler was alerted to get a forward air controller airborne over 

the area anti to be prepared to get air strikes into the area at the 

rate of one each fifteen minutes. Since the enemy was not dug in, 

the ordnance requested was CBU (cluster bomb units), which are 

delivered almost at treetop level with a bursting radius of thirty 

meters. They could be delivered very close to friendly units and 

were a highly lethal weapon against enemy troops in the open, 

even in the jungle; it was the ordnance preferred by the Big Red 

One for these conditions. 

Captain VIm was requested to mark the position of his troops 

on the ground with colored smoke and to give, as best he could, the 

disposition of his company with respect to the smoke. It was 

quickly apparent to the airborne observer that the artillery (no~' 

supported by a battery of ISS-mm. howitzers at Artillery Base 1-
THE BATTLES OF PREK KLOK 115 

the French Fort to the south) had to be shifted if it were to be 

effective. The shift was made. 

Twenty minutes after the initial contact, the enemy launched 

an attack from the northeast. Contact was lost between the 3d 

Platoon and the command group. Captain Ulm theorized that the 

3d Platoon and possibly the 2d Platoon would be flanked from the 

direction of the renewed attack and directed the lst Platoon to 

move to the left flank of the 3d Platoon. As the men moved into 

position the entire company area was hit by small arms fire, rirIe 

grenades, rockets, and 6O-mm. mortar rounds. The firing was 

intense, but it resulted in few friendly casualties. The 2d Platoon 

moved to the right. 

At 1230 radio contact was re-established with the 3d Platoon. 

Captain Vim learned that the company was in an arc·shaped 

formation with the 3d Platoon in the center, 2d on the right, and 

lst on the left (north). From this information the airborne observer 

was better able to picture the disposition on the ground and adjust 

the artillery and air strikes accordingly. As each flight arrived 

over the target and its ordnance was determined, Captain Vim 

was asked where he wanted it placed. Each time, a colored smoke 

grenade was thrown by the unit on the ground, and the strike was 

brought in with relation to the smoke as desired. 

Captain Vim noted that much of the automatic weapons and 

small arms fire was coming from the trees and that the fire was 

extremely accurate. The company's efforts were now directed at 

the expertly camouflaged and well concealed snipers in the trees. 

At approximately 1300 the 2d Platoon detected movement to 

the west, and it appeared that the enemy was attempting to en· 

circle the company and attack the open (west) end of the perimeter. 

To meet this threat, a fire team from the lst Platoon was moved 

to the northwest and a squad from the 2d Platoon was moved to the 

southwest. As the squad from the 2d Platoon moved into position, 

it received heavy automatic weapons fire from the trees. The Cire 

was returned and artillery fire was called in on the western side 

of the company. 

Air strikes continued to be placed as directed by the com· 

mander on the ground. In more than one instance the word came 

to the forward air controll er: .. Drop it within thirty yards of the 

smoke." The artillery was also being brought in as close as was 

dared. By 1400 the battle had subsided into sniper fire , and by 1500 

contact was broken. Credit had to go to the fifty·four sorties of the 

Tactical Air Command and the intensive artillery fire. 

In the meantime Colonel Marks, the brigade commander, at 
116 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

1430 brought another company of the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, 

into a landing zone some six hundred meters to the northeast of 

the point of contact following the firing of preparatory fires around 

the zone. Upon landing onc man was wounded by small arms fire. 

A second company from another battalion securing Minh Thanh 

was lifted into the landing zone immediately after the first had 

secured it; this second company was dispatdled to assist Captain 

Ulm's unit. By 1645 a third company, also from the lst Battalion, 

landed to assist in securing the landing zone and in evacuating 

the dead and wounded who would be brought to it. 

lt was not until 2J30 that Captain VIm and his company, assisted by the relieving company. reached the landing lOne with 

their 25 dead and 28 wounded. It had been a long day. A sweep of 

the area of contact by the relieving company that evening and 

another sweep the following morning revealed 167 enemy dead 

and 40 enemy weapons captured or destroyed. A prisoner captured 

in the battle area the morning after turned out to be the assistant 

commander of a company in the 2d Battalion, IOlst North Vietnamese Army Regiment of the 9th Viet Cong Division. It was his 

battalion which had met Company B. It appeared that meeting 

engagemem with Captain Ulm and company prevented the North 

Vietnamese battalion from reaching Route 4 and attacking one of 

the many U.S. convoys traveling between Suoi Da and Katum. 

The morning after the fight was one of those beautiful mornings 

typical of that time of year. An officer walking among the survivors 

inlhe landing zone and chatting with them asked one of the young 

soldiers: "What did you think of the artillery and the air strikeswere they coming in a little close?" The soldier turned on a big 

grin and replied: "Sir, I was getting sprayed all over. But God it 

felt good!" 

In speaking to the assembled company before they choppered 

out of the landing zone later than morning, this same officer said: 

Although many of your leaders were wounded, the company never lost 

control of the situation. The NCO's and enlisted men performed like the 

truly magnificent soldiers they arc. . . . The medevac (medical 

evacuation) effort was outstanding. Considering the dense jungle in which 

they were working. the medical personnel, both on the ground and in the 

air, were professionals from beginning to end. 

With that, Company B loaded onto choppers and headed for 

Suoi Da to be refitted and receive replacements. Five days later 

they were back in action. 

Among those persons who more than qualified for accolades 

on that day, none was more deserving than Platoon Sergeant 
THE BATTLES OF PREK KLOK 117 

FIRST LIEUTENANT EDWARD CHRISTIANSEN, COMPANY A, 1ST BArfALION, 

16TH INJ'ANTR Y, calls lor air stn'kes over /I suspected Viet CO'IK position, 

Matthew Leonard of Binninghalll, Alabama. When his platoon 

leader was wounded during the initial contact, Sergeant Leonard 

organized the platoon defensive position, redistributed ammunition, and· inspired his men. While dragging a wounded soldier to 

safety a sniper's bullet shattered his hand, but he refused medical 

allention and continued to fight. Under cover of the main attack 

from the northeast, the enemy moved a machine gun into a location where it could sweep the entire position of Sergeant Leonard's 

platoon, Sergeant Leonard rose to his feet, charged the gun, and 

destroyed its crew despite being hit several times by enemy fire. 

When last seen alive, he was propped against a tree continuing 

to engage the enemy. Sergeant Leonard was awarded the Medal of 

Honor posthumously, 

Prek Klok JJ 

The second major battle of Operation JUNCTION C ITY took place 

on 10 March, The following description of that battle is also based 
lIS 

MAP 13 

CEDAR I-"ALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

IoIAtN 

THE BATTLE OF PRE K KLOK II 

10 hlorch 1967 C_IOK_' 

in part upon the account presented in the December 1967 edition 

of Dallger Forward. 

On the evening of the 10th, the 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 2d 

Infantry (minus Company B), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

Edward J. Collins, was securing the perimeter of Artillery t"ire 

Support Patrol Base II located at Prek Klok on Route 4, twenty 

kilometers north of Nui Ba Den. (Map 13) Inside the circular 

"wagon train" perimeter of the base were headquarters, Band C 
THE BATfLE$ OF PREK KLOK 119 

Batteries of the 2d Battalion, 33d Artillery (Lieutenant Colonel 

Charles D. Daniel), plus elements of the 168th Engineer Battalion. 

The engineers were busily engaged in building a Special Forces 

and Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp and airstrip. 

The 2d Battalion's APC's (annored personnel carriers) were 

placed at 5O-meter intervals around the base perimeter. The areas 

betwecn the tracks were protected by foxholes manned by infantry~ 

men, engineers, and artillerymen. 

Just after dusk fell , the troops on the perimeter fired a "mad 

minute" to test their weapons and provide a show of force to the 

enemy. Ambush patrols and listening posts Icft the perimeter for 

their positions in the surrounding jungle. At about 2030, men o f an 

A Company listening post to the east of the perimeter, while moving into position, reported seeing and engaging three Viet Cong 

with unknown results. Colonel Collins placed the battalion on 75 

percent alert as preplanned artillery harassing fires continued. 

At 2200 the Viet Cong commenccd a heavy mortar attack on the 

small circle of U.S. troops. Within two minutes after the first ex~ 

piosions, countennortar fire was initiated by the heavy mortar 

platoons led by Sergeant First Class Kenneth D. Davis. The fire 

was directed to the area where it appeared the mortar allack was 

originating. Sergeant Davis and his platoon fired a total of 435 

rounds during the battle. For some thirty minutes round after 

round of 120-mm., 82-mm., and 6O-mm. mortar ammuntion ex~ 

ploded inside the base. In addition to the estimated two hundred 

incoming rounds, the Viet Cong employed 75-mm. recoilless rifles 

and RPG2 antitank weapons against the perimeter of the base. 

Several tracks were hit; twenty U.S. troops were wounded. Cooks, 

maintenance crews, and medical personnel began carrying the 

wounded to the airstrip; helicopters evacuated the injured as they 

arrived. 

As soon as the mortar barrage ended, Coloncl Coll ins directed 

all his units to conduct a reconnaissance by fire of the area from 

200 to 600 meters beyond the perimeter. The relative stillness was 

shattered by the noise of .50-caliber machine guns mounted on the 

tracks and ground mounts. The reconnaissance by fire had no 

sooner ended than the enemy-two battalions in strcngthlaunched a ground attack along the eastern sector into the positions 

held by A Company. It was now about 2230. 

Among those firing-not now in reconnaissance, but in defense 

-was Starr Sergeant Richard A. Griffin of A Company. During the 

mortar attack Sergeant Griffin had run from his sheltered position 

to resupply his comrades along the perimeter with ammunition. 

When the ground attack began, he returned to his machine gun 
120 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

and placed a heavy volume of accurate fire on the enemy. He was 

later awarded the Bronze Star with V (valor) device. 

The 3d Brigade tactical command post at Suoi Oa had been 

requested to provide close tactical air support, artillery. medical 

evacuation for the wounded, and ammunition resupply. The 

response to these requests was immediate. Medical evacuation 

and resupply were provided with the dispatch of five Hueys and a 

light fire team. Sixty-four sorties were nown under fire into Bases 

I and II. With their landing lights on, the aircraft brought in sixteen tons of supplies by sling load. One hundred tactical air sorties 

supported the friendly forces. 

In otddition to the main allack from the east, the Viet Cong 

launched limited allacks Crom the northeast and southeast. [ntense 

fire from enemy recoilless rifles and automatic weapons struck the 

A Company positions. Three of their armored personnel carriers 

were hit by enemy RPG2 rounds; one track had received a direct 

hit from a mortar round. 

On the southwestern side of the perimeter, C Company met the 

enemy's secondary attack head on. Moving parallel to the highway along the western side of the road, the Viet Cong rushed across 

500 meters of open ground to hit C Company's positions from the 

southwest. Continuous fire from the American weapons quickly 

gained fire superiority. The company never reported sighting 

more than a platoon of Viet Cong in the clearing, although many 

more enemy soldiers fired from the woods. 

When the mortar atlack had started, the artillery defensive 

concentrations which ringed the entire perimeter of the base were 

fired. As the enemy attacks commenced, adjustments in the fire 

were made toward and onto the attacks. Nearby artillery units at 

Bases I and [[I as well as the artillery in the Prek Klok base itself 

swepllhe area around the perimeter with over five thousand artillery rounds, while the 3d Brigade's forward air controllers directed 

the air strikes. An anned C-47-"Spooky"-trained its miniguns 

on the Viet Cong forces to the east of the perimeter as it orbited 

the area. 

When the first Air Force flight had arrived in the area, Route 

4 was declared. a fire co-ordination line between the artillery and 

the aircraft. To the west of the road the artillery fired and broke 

the enemy's assault and prohibited him from regrouping, while to 

the east the fighters covered the area with bombs, rockets, and 20-

mm. cannon fire. The massive and devastating use of ail' strikes 

and artillery broke the back of the attack. 

After an hour of fierce fighting, the brunt of the Viet Cong 

attack had been repelled. Sniper fire continued as the Viet Cong 
THE BATI'LES OF PREK KLOK 121 

withdrew, and it was about 0430 before the last enemy round was 

fired. Early morning sweeps and aerial observation of the area 

disclosed 197 enemy killed. Five wounded Viet Cong were found 

and taken prisoner. U.S. losses were 3 killed and 38 wounded. The 

enemy left l2 individual weapons on the battlefield as well as a 

considerable amoun t of other equipment and gear. 

It was detennined that the attack had been made by two battalions of the 272d Regiment of the 9th Viet Cong Division. By now 

in JUNCTION CITY two of that division's regiments had attacked 

and been badly defeated. The remaining regiments would make 

their appearance in Phase II and be bloodied as well. 
CHAPTER XII 

Phase II - East to West 

Technically speaking, JUNCTION CITY II was scheduled to 

begin at one minute past midnight on the morning of 18 March. 

However, for some elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division it 

slarted much earlier as they repositioned themse lves and strove 

to complete the required facilities before the attack into eastern 

War Zone C began. 

By 3 March, two of the three battalions of the lsi Brigade, 1st 

Division, which had assaulted by helicopter on D-day into the 

northern port jon of the Phase I horseshoe, had been withdrawn 

from that operational area. The lst Division engineers had completed their operations in the Phase I area by that d ate as well; 

they too were withdrawn and repositioned along the east side of 

War Zone C. 

On 4 March the lst Brigade, 9th U.S. Division, came under the 

o perational control of the 1st Division. It was assigned the initial 

mission of opening Route 13 from Lai Khe north to Quan Loi for 

onc or two days in order that several large convoys might pass; 

includcd in those convoys would be the men and equipment of the 

lst Engineers. On 7 March the forces of the Jst Brigade, 1st Division, and of the lst Engineers would join and the preparatory 

work for Phase II would commence. The mission assigned the 1st 

Brigade of the Big Red One was to open Route 246 west and southwest of An Locand to secure the engineer construction party at the 

site where 246 crosses the Saigon River and the engineer work 

parties constructing the Special Forces and Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group camp and airfi eld o n the west side of the ri ver. 

The mission of the 1st Engineers was 10 improve Route 246 to the 

Saigon River, construct a Bailey bridge over the river, and commence construction of an airstrip just west of the bridge site. (The 

construction of the camp would be the responsibility of a nondivisional engineer unit.) After Phase II beg-an, the lst Eng-ineers 

had, in addition to ils usual support role. the mission of opening 

and maintaining Route 246 from the Bailey bridge to a fire support 

base which would be established at Sroc Con Trang, five kilometers 

northwest of the bridge. 
PHASE II-EAST TO WEST 123 

The bridge was started on the 8th; since it was 210 feet long it 

was necessary to construct a concrete center pier for support. By 

noon on the 12th the bridge was open for traffic. By 18 March - the 

opening of Phase ll-Route 246 had been opened and in fact 

improved to a distance of just over 6 kilometers west of the bridge 

site to the turnoff to Sroc Con Trang. By the 18th the jungle had 

been deared from 1,800 feet of the runway, shaping and compacting of the subgrade continued, and 400 feet of runway had been 

completed. Phase 1I could begin. 

The II Field l'orce mission for the second phase remained the 

same as for the first; all that changed was the focus of activity. 

During Ihis phase, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., succeeded General Seaman as the commanding general of II Field 

Force, Vietnam. 

The mission of the Big Red One for Phase II was to continue 

security of the bridge site and Routes 246 and 244 within the zone; 

to construct and secure the Special Forces and Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group camp and airfield; and to place two brigades 

astride the two enemy routes of communication in eastern War 

Zone C and have them conduct search and destroy operations. For 

resupply purposes it was also necessary to keep Route 13 open from 

Lai Khe to Quan Loi most of the period. 

In addition to. its organic lst and 2d Brigades (Colonels Caldwell and Grimsley), the lst Division would have available the lst 

Brigade, 9th Division (Colonel Maurice W. Kendall who was succeeded by Colonel Donald A. Seibert during the period), which 

would remain attached until 29 March; the 173d Airborne Brigade 

(General Deane), attached from 20 March to 13 April; and the 11th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) (Colonel Cobb), attached from 1 

through 15 April. One of the squadrons of the 11th would be 

attached for. the entire phase. 

The mission of the 1st Brigade of the lst Division would continue to be the security of Route 246, the bridge site. the camp 

and airfield, and some of the twelvc fire support patrol bases the 

division would establish (stretching from Lai Khe north to Quan 

Loi, west to Sroc Con Trang, and south on Route 244 from its junction with 246). The Lst Brigade, 9th Division , except for one week, 

would be responsible for keeping Routc 13 open from Lai Khe to 

Quan Loi, for escorting convoys along it, and for defending assigned fire bases in its operational area. (One such fire base at 

Ap Bau Bang was attacked on 20 March.) It would also conduct 

considerable searching and destroying-with some successadjacent to Route 13. On 1 April the 11th Arnlored Cavalry Regiment (-) was to be attached to the 1st Division and would assume 
124 CEDAR FALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

GUIDING A RECOVf.RY V.:HICLE A CROSS A RIVER 

the mission of the lst of the 9th until the end of Phase II. Escorting 

as many as two hundred vehicles a day through the 55-kilometer 

run, these units kept enemy firings upon convoys to very few (only 

two under the 11th Armored Cavalry with no damage). (Map 14) 

On 17 April the 2d Brigade, 1st Division, was relieved of its 

Revolutionary Development operations by the 3d Brigade and 

joined J UNCTION CITY for the first time. Commencing on 21 March 

the 2d Brigade would insert two battalions into Landing Zones 

BRAVO and CHARLIE in Objective Area FA UST northwest of Sroc 

Con Trang (and only 2 kilometcn south of the Cambodian border); 

they would conduct search and destroy operations south to Routc 

246. By 29 March the brigadc was to secure Fire Support Patrol 

Base THRUST along Route 244, 1,500 meters south of its junction 

with Route 246. On 30 and 31 March it was to conduct airmobile 

assaults with at least two battalions into Landing Zone GEORCE in 

Objective Area SIOUX, deep in War Zone C just 5 kiJometel's east of 

Bo Tuc and 2 kilometers north of Ro ute 246. (The battle of Ap Gu 

would take place in Area SIOUX on 1 April.) The 2d was also to 
PHASE II-EAST TO WEST 

JUNCTION CITY 

(CONCEPT, PHASE JI) 

-c> _eo _ "'''", _li_ ~--. 0 5 ............ 

I ! ,

_ ..Wo' -fT' ,",, ' '+---,---'- l"" I ............ 

MAP 14 

125 

secure Fire Support Patrol Base C (Sroc Con Trang) and its 

assigned portion of Routes 246 and 244. 

The 173d Airborne Brigade was not initially included among 

the forces to participate in Phase 11; however, as soon as Phase I 

ended the lst Division made representations to II Field Force for 

another brigade. Consequently, the 173d was attached to the Big 
126 CEDAR FALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

A UH-ID"Hu£y" H ELICOPTER PREPAR[STo LANONf.AR AWAITINCTROOPS 

Red One on 20 March with the mission of securing the staging area 

at Minh Thanh and conducting airmobile assaults into eastern 

War Zone C beginning 23 March. On the 22d the 173d established 

Fire Support Patrol Base P A RRY near Route 244, seven kilometers 

south of the junction of Routes 244 and 246. From 23 March until 7 

April the brigade conducted airmobile assaults and search and destroy operations southwest, west, and northwest o f PARRY; from 

9-11 April the brigade did the same to the south and southeast 

of that base. On 13 April Phase 11 terminated for the 173d and it 

returned to Bien Haa. 

The mission of the 25th Infantry Division in Phase JI was to 

continue offensive operations in War Zone C to destroy COSVN 

faciliti es and Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces and 

install ations. It was also required to secure the artillery base at the 

French Fort and the Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group camp and airfield at Prek Klok, keeping Route 4 open be~ 

tween these install ations and Suoi Da. Forces to be used for these 

missions were the 196th Brigade and the 3d Brigade of the 4th 

Division. 
PHASE II- EAST TO WEST 127 

Before the end of Phase I, the 1961h Brigade (General Knowles) 

had already assumed the mission of securing the two installations 

along Route 4 and ke.eping that road open. The brigade remained 

in the geneml area of the French Fort and Prek Klok until 28 

March, during which time it conducted search and destroy opera· 

tions and established blocking positions to the cast of Route 4 in 

conjunction with a sweep being conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th 

Division. Between 28 March and 7 April most of the brigade con· 

ducted "mobile brigade" operations in the northern portion of War 

Zone C. Moving every three or four days and conducting extensive 

search and destroy operations at each stop, the 196th succeeded 

in denying the Viet Cong freedom of access to the area. On 9 April 

JUNCTION CIT\' terminated for the 196th as it prepared 10 leave 

the 11 Field Force area and move north 10 Task Force OREGON 

in the I Corps zone. 

In performing its mission in Phase 11, the 3d Brigade, 4th Divi· 

sion (Colonel Garth), shifted its activities initially to the east. Its 

operational area was about in the center of War Zone C, bounded 

on the west by the 196th and on the east by the operational area of 

the 1st Division. On 19 March two infantry battalions and an arl iJ· 

lery battalion (-) were airlifted into Fire Support Base GOLD. 

loca ted in the southeastern portion of the operationa l area; o ne o f 

the infantry battalions secured the base and conducted operations 

around it, while the other conducted operations in the area to the 

west of GOLD. A mechanized infantry battalion and an attached 

tank battalion were also assigned operational areas. (On 21 March 

Fir'e Support Base GOLD would be the site of the battle of Suoi Tre.) 

These forces eventually turned southeast and conducted opera· 

tions back to their base camp at Dau Tieng, arriving on 8 April. 

On the 11th the brigade moved to an operat ional area in the 

southern port ion of War Zone C north of Nui Ba Den. The 3d 

Brigade conducted operations in that area, as well as securing 

Tay Ninh city and Suoi Da, until 20 April when it returned to its 

base camp in Dau Tieng. On that date it was re lieved of its mission 

by the 1st Brigade, 9th Division, and the 3d Brigade's participation 

in JUNCTION CIT\' had ended. 

During the twenty·nine days of Phase II ope l'ations in which 

intensive searching and destruction were performed, there were 

only three major battles, all initiated by the enemy. There were 

mortar attacks upon fire bases and upon battalion positions. For 

example, Fire Support Patrol Base C at Sroc Con Trang, Olle of 

the largest established in J UNCT ION CIT\', sustained eleven mortar 

attacks. Enemy mining and ambush activities were conducted 

on Routes 246 and 244 and were mainly concentrated on either side 
128 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

of the junction of those two roads. Viet Cong in small three- to 

four-man groups could maintain continuous pressure on the roads. 

Although there were many contacts and some heated fire fights 

with enemy forces, none of these (orces-except in the three 

battles-was significant. As the 173d Brigade found, it made contact 

of some type each of the twenty-two days it participated in Phase 

Il, but the contacts were with small groups, never larger than 

platoon size. By the last week of this phase the enemy became 

increasingly more difficult to find. But this failure to dig out 

the enemy should not detract from the success attained by friendly 

forces as they continued to find and destroy installations and to 

discover vast amounts of supplies and equipment. All of this 

tended to nullify the years of labor expended by the enemy in 

building, digging, and tunneling and in accumulating, hauling, 

and hoarding supplies. 

During Phase II the enemy left nearly 1,900 of his dead on the 

battlefield, had 19 captured, and lost over 240 weapons. And apparently in desperation for a big victory, the 9th Viet Cong Division had sacrificed its other regiments in futile attempts at the 

battles of Ap Bau Bang II, Suoi Tre, and Ap Gu. 
CHAPTER XIII 

The Battles of Ap Bau Bang II, Suoi Tre, 

and Ap Gu 

Ap Bau Bang 1I 

At 11500019 March 1967, A Troop, 3d Squadron. 5th Cavalry 

Regiment, commanded by Captain Raoul H. Alcala, deployed 

within the perimeter of Fire Support Base 20. A unit of the lst 

Brigade. 9th Infantry, attached to the 1st Infantry Division, the 

129-man company had six tanks, twenty M-1l3 armored perspnnel 

carriers, and three 4.2-inch mortar carriers. The unit formed into a 

circular- (wagon train) perimeter defense with the mission of securing the base for B Battery (JO~mm.) of the 7th Battalion, 9th 

Artillery. commanded by Captain Duane W. Marion. 

Fire Support Base 20 was located in relatively nat country 1,500 

meters north of Ap Bau Bang immediately west of QL 13. To the 

south of the position was a rubber plantation, while wooded areas 

were prominent to the north and west. An abandoned railroad 

track ran parallel to and thirty meters east of the highway. (Map 

/5) 

Intelligence sources had indicated that the Ap Bau Bang area 

was infested with local force guerrillas; they had also pointed out 

a well-used trail to the north which ran east and west. Captain 

Alcala senl his 2d Platoon commanded by First Lieutenant Harlan 

E. Short to establish an ambush along the trail at a point 1,500 

meters north of the fire support base and approximately 350 meters 

west of Route 13. The ambush was to be in position by 1800. The 

perimeter was manned on the west by the lst Platoon, commanded 

by First Lieutenant Roger A. Festa; occupying the eastern portion 

was the 3d Platoon under Second Lieutenant Hiram M. Wolfe, IV. 

At 2250 that night a Viet Cong probe signaled the start of the 

second battle of Ap Bau Bang. The probe was spearheaded by a 

herd of fifteen belled cattle being driven across Route 13 at a point 

150 meters northeast of the perimeter. Ten minutes later the Viet 

Cong started raking the northeast section of the perimeter with a 

wheel-mounted .5O-caliber machine gun located on the railroad 

track embankment. Specialist Four Eugene W. Stevens, command-
THE BATTLE OF 

AP BAU BANG _--

VC mortar positions 

appro~ 1500 meters 

of Ap Bou Bong 

MAP 15 

eosl 

1 61 Platoon 

B Troop 

(rel ief force) 

AP BAU BANG 
AP BAU BANG II, SUOI TRE, AND AP GU 131 

ing one of the tanks, trained his searchlight on the Viet Cong 

position and returned the fire with all his weapons. The fire fight 

was jOined by the weapons of three of the APC's and continued for 

about three minutes. The enemy gun sprayed the perimeter with 

only five separate bursts of fire before it was silenced by the 

response of A troop. 

During the lull that followed . the units. including the 2d Pia· 

toon still manning the ambush site. assumed a state of increased 

readiness. Reconaissance by fire was conducted by Lieutenant 

Wolfe's tank along the wood line to the east beyond the railroad. 

At 2310 Captain Alcala reported: "Firing has ceased now, we are 

using infra·red to scan the area for movement. " 

At 0030, 20 March 1967, the Viet Cong attack resumed as Fire 

Support Base 20 was hit with mortar rounds, rine grenades, rockets, 

and recoilless rine fire . The beginning of the main phase of the 

battle had been signaled. Lieutenant Festa's track was hit, wounding his sergeant. It was apparent that the Viet Cong were well 

zeroed in. The fire was now coming from the west. Caplain Alcala 

requested artillery support from the battalion he was securing and 

from Lai Khe. 

Brigadier General James F. Hollingsworth, assistant division 

commander of the 1st Infantry Division, later described this phase 

of the battle: 

Their mortar positions were located from 1500 to 2000 meters west of 

Ap Bau Bang in and around an old village that had been destroyed. The mar· 

tar positions were located by radar flail. the Lai Khe artillery oase. . . . 

I understood the counter mortar radar played an important ro le in pick· 

ing them up. However, the most accurate way of picking up the mortars 

during this battle was by two airborne artillery observers who could see 

the nashes from the mortars. I think that a combinalion of both brought 

about their location. 

As the instensily of the fire increased, another M-1l3 was hit. 

Then another APC received direct hits in the front and left side 

from recoilless rine rounds; three of the crew were wounded and 

the vehicle was set afire. Two of the 3d Platoon tanks were hit; 

however, both remained in the battle. 

Throughout the mortar and antitank bombardment, Captain 

Alcala maintained radio contact with his squadron commander, 

Lieutenant Colonel Sidney S. Haszard. located to the south . 

Within twenty minutes of the beginning of the mortar attack, 

the Viet Cong ground assault began with the main attack coming 

from the south and southwest and with a secondary attack from 

the north. The massed troops of the 273d Viet Cong Regiment 

emerged from the rubber trees and moved steadily forward 
132 CEOAR FALLS-J UNCTION CITY 

under a base of firc. The enemy soldiers were wearing black pajamas or dark colored fatigues and sandals, and carrying individual weapons. The attack was co-ordinated with the mortar 

fire. and not until the enemy came out in the open was its magnitude apparent. 

Caplain Alcala advised his headquarters at 0050 that he could 

handle the attack, hut asked that a ready reaction force be set up 

in case it was needed. Colonel Haszard acknowledged the message 

and alerted the lst Platoon of B Troop to the north of Ap Bau Bang 

and the 3d Platoon of C Troop to the south to move to Fire Sup"" 

port Base 20. He gave Captain Alcala permission to alert his 2d 

Platoon at the ambush site to prepare for movement back into 

the perimeter. Colonel Haszard noted the growing size of the 

enemy offensive and decided to move with his command element 

to A Troop's position. 

In the 3d Platoon sector on the eastern side of the perimeter, 

Lieutenant Wolfe detected Viet Cong movement and requested 

night illumination from a 4.2-inch mortar. As the light from the 

flare swung across the area, it was possible to see Viet Cong troops 

crossing the highway from east to west. The platoon commenced 

firing and the enemy movement stopped. Staff Sergeant George 

Hua reported, "I got two hits on top of my turret from 60mm 

mortar rounds, 2 rounds struck the gun shield below the gun 

tube. Another round hit the main gun's blast deflector, 

so we opened fire with everything we could lay our hands on." 

At 0100 Captain Alcala was advised that a flareship -Spooky 

742-armed with miniguns, and a light fire team of helicopter 

gunships were on the way. 

The enemy troops on the southwest portion of the perimeter 

were starting to swarm over some of the APC's. A voice from 

Track 10 came to Staff Sergeant Dorren in Track 17: "They are 

swarming all over my track. Dust me with canister." Sergeant 

Darren hesitated, concerned about the effects of canister on the 

crew. Once again came the plea, " My people are down, shoot!" 

Several rounds of canister wiped out the enemy in the area of the 

overrun track. StaIf Sergeant Ramos-Rasario also called for a 

dusting by canister. Sergeant Dorren fired several rounds in 

front of Track 11. eliminating the Viet Congo Another call for help 

came from Track 10. Sergeant Dorren fired again and then watched 

the track burst into a ball of fire as enemy mortar rounds scored 

direct hilS. The wounded crew escaped, but Private First Class 

Steve Lopez djed later of his wounds. 

Two more armored personnel carriers were hit, one of them 

Lieutenant Wolfe's track. Because the Viet Cong were in so close 
AP BAU BANG 11. SUOI TRE. AND AP GU 133 

to his line of APC's, Wolfe had to pull back about twentYMfive or 

thirty meters and realign the platoon, completing the move by 

0115. Lieutenant Wolfe's track was hit a second time by an RPG2 

rockel. The entire crew was wounded and evacuated to the medical 

clearing tent in the center of the perimeter. 

The troop's 2d Platoon came charging down Route 13 from its 

ambush site, the men firing intermittently as they came. The 

troopers, after arriving at the fire support base, manned the gaps 

in the hardMpressed southern hair of the perimeter. As they took 

their positions, they were hit with recoilless rifle fire and grenades. 

The elements of nand C Troops alerted earlier received the 

order to move and immediately raced to join the battle. The 3d 

Platoon of C Troop, attacking up Route 13 from its troop's position 

five kilometers to the south, ran through a barrage of enemy fire 

before reaching the perimeter at 0127. At the direction of Captain 

Alcala, the platoon swept 1,500 meters south of the defenders along 

the rubberMgrove tree line. Firing continually during their sweep, 

the cavalrymen swung west, then north, then doubled back and 

entered the perimeter from the southeast. The vehicles pulled into 

positions between A Troop's vehicles on the eastern portion of the 

perimeter defense. 

At this same time the lst Platoon of B Troop was tearing down 

Roule 13 from its position eight kilometers north. After blasting 

through a hastily built ambush just north of the perimeter, the 

troopers moved around to the south, firing as they went. Moving 

into the perimeter, the platoon look up positions between A 

Troop's vehicles on the western half of the defensive ring. 

The perimeter now contained Ihe artillery battery, all of A 

Troop, and the two relief platoons-a large quantity of armor for 

the size of the perimeter. Captain Alcala expanded the perimeter 

by forty meters with a counterattack at 0220. 

Two of the tracks hit previously continued to bum throughout 

the engagement. Lieutenant Festa moved forward with two APC's 

to evacuate the wounded lying nearby. Several Viet Cong attempting to remove the .5O-caliber machine gun from one of the 

burning tracks were killed, as were others attacking the foxholes 

containing the wounded. Lieutenant Festa and Specialist Four 

Abelardo Penedo, while under intense fire, dismounted and 

loaded the wounded into Festa's personnel carrier. 

Meanwhile Colonel Haszard, in an APC followed by another 

M-Jl3 bearing his command group, moved up Route 13 to the 

perimeter. Just short of the perimeter, Haszard's track was hit and 

disabled. Captain Alcala sent a tank out of the perimeter to assist 

the disabled track. Colonel Haszard dismounted in heavy small 
134 CEDAR ."ALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

arms fire and, warding orr the Viet Cong, attached the towline. 

The command track, with its valuable communications equipment, 

was pulled into the perimeter. 

At 0300 another attack was developing to the south of the perimeter. It appeared to Captain Alcala that this attack was an attempt 

by the Viet Cong to recover bodies. Behind a line of skirmishers, 

unarmed troops advanced carrying ropes and wires with hooks 

attached to recover the bodies left on the battlefield. The attacking force was stopped within fifteen meters of the perimeter. 

During this attack, and for the next four hours, minigtms and 

air strikes pounded the Viet Cong from aoove . An Air Force flareship kept the battle area continually lighted. Initi ally the artillery 

covered the northwest, west, and southwest sides of the perimeter 

while aircraft attacked on a north-south axis east of Route 13. Later 

a switch was made and the aircraft attack runs were made from east 

to west on the south and southwest sides of the perimeter. 

During the battle, resupply and "Dust-ofP' (medical evacuation) 

missions continued under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Paul 

F. Gorman, G-3 of the lst Infantry Division. Because of the nature 

of the battle and the preponderance of automatic weapons on 

annored v~hicles, two and in some cases three basic loads of .50-

caliber and 7.62-mm. ammunition were expended during the fight. 

At 0330 the enemy fire slackened ; resupply of the units and evacuation of the wounded was completed during the next hour and 

fifteen minutes while the artillery and air strikes continued. 

Twenty-six of the sixty-three men wounded were evacuated; many 

of the sl ightly wounded chose to stay in their positions and man 

their weapons. 

By 0450 it was nOied under the illumination of flares and tank 

searchlights that the enemy was massing for an attack on the south 

and southeast sides of the perimeter. The Viet Cong started their 

attack at 0500; the artillery shifted its fire to the west, and aircraft 

dropped cluster bomb units followed by napalm and 500-pound 

bombs on the attackers. The final assault of the Viet Cong was 

blunted and the noises of battle subsided. At 0700 the final air strike 

and artillery rounds were placed on the withdrawing enemy. 

Colonel Haszard delivered the foll owing message to the men 

who had taken part in the battle: 

I am extremely proud of every man in this unit for [his] actions last 

night. However, there are still many VC in the area. Therefore, you must 

take all precautions. 1 want you to have reaction forces ready for all elements in the way that you did today. . . . Sweep operations tomorrow must be done thoroughly. Insure that perimeters tonight are the best 

possible. 
AI' 6AU BANG II. SUO! TRE. AND AI' GU 135 

The battle of Ap Ball Bang III resulted in 227 (known) enemy 

dead. 3 prisoners taken, and the capture of much enemy equipment 

and weapons. Blood trails stood as mute evidence of the many 

bodies hauled away by the Viet Congo Although more enemy than 

usual are killed by small arlllS when attacks are made on cavalry 

and armored units, the majority of enemy deaths in this battle, as 

in others, resulted from artillery and air slrikes. In Ihis instance, 

29 air strikes delivered 29 Ions of ordnance, and the artillery fired 

nearly 3,000 rounds. U.S. battle losses were 3 men killed and 63 

wounded. Enemy prisoners identified the attackers as the 2d and 

3d Battalions of the 273d Regiment of the 9th Viet Cong Division. 

Intelligence experts believed Ihe whole regiment participated. 

As a result of the battle, General Hay wrole II letter 10 the 9th 

Division commander. Printed in Vietnamese in leaflet form, it was 

dropped into the enemy area. Translated, the text of the letter 

read: 

This is to advise you that during the battle of Ap Ball Bang on 20 

March the Regimental Commander of Q763 (273d Regiment) and his 

Battalion Commanders disgraced themselves by performing in an un· 

soldierly manner. 

During th is battle with clements of this Division and attached units 

your officers failed to accomplish their mission and left the battlefield 

covered with dead ilnd wounded from their units. We have buried your dead and taken care of your wounded from this 

battle. 

The letter bore the signature of General J. H. Hay. 

Suoi Tre 

The target (or the helicopters was an egg·shaped dearing close 

to Suoi Tre, near the center of War Zone C and ninety kilometers 

northwest of Saigon. It was just three kilometers away from the area 

in which, during Operation ATTLE80RO four months earlier, the 

lst Battalion, 28th Infantry, of the U.s. 1st Division had defeated 

elements of the 272d Viet Cong and lOlst North Vietnamese Regi. 

ments at the battle of Ap Cha 00. Events would reveal that the 272d 

had returned. 

On 19 March. in an area surrounded by a tree line of sparse 

woodland which had been blighted by defoliants, U.S. helicopters 

' Ap Bau Bing wu .tso the site 01 thl! £irst mljor Vietnam I(tion in whkh the 1st Infantry 

Diyi,ion participated on 12 November 196!i. In Ap Bau Bang 1 the 272d and 273d Regiments 

01 the 91h Viel Cong Diyision ~uM(ked the 2d Bauation. 2d Inl.",ry (-). defensiye perimeler 

and were repelled wilh lhe l a&illlllOe of lir strikel Ind dirKI hre Inillery II the cost to lhe 

Viet Con,; 01 198 killed. 
136 

MAP 16 

CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

FSB GOLD 

OF SUO] TAE 

21 Mcnch 1967 ___ $.e< __ , .. r .... I .... 

----+ A." •• , 

airlanded the 3d Battalion of {he 22d Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery (-), led by Lieutenant Colonels John A. 

Bender and John W. Vessey, Jr., respectively, under the control of 

the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Colonel Garth). Their 

mission was to establish a fire support base (GOLD) in support of 

Phase II of J UNCTION CITY. Heavy act ion was not expected. However, from the outset it was apparent that things would be different 

at Suoi Tre. (Map 16) 
AP BAU BANG II. SUOI TRE. AND AI) GU 137 

As the three lifts of choppers touched down, five heavy 

command-detonated charges were set off by the Viet Gong in the 

tiny clearing. Three helicopters were destroyed and 6 more 

damaged with a toll of 15 killed and 28 wounded.' A Viet Cong 

claymore-type mine was also detonated against C Company of the 

3d Battalion. wounding 5 infantrymen. 

Company B of the 3d Battalion. 22d Infantry, was assigned the 

east portion of the defensive perimeter. Company A the western 

half. Later that day the 2d Battalion. 12th Infantry, landed at 

Fire Support Base GOLD and moved to the northwest. Its last lift 

drew enemy fire, and another seven choppers were damaged. 

Work progressed rapidly on 20 March to improve the fire 

support base perimeter defenses, and fortunate it was for the 

occupants of the base. The battle of Suoi Tre was to begin the next 

day. 

At 0430 a night patrol from Company B operating outside the 

battalion perimeter reported movement around its ambush site. 

Minutes-then hours-passed and no further movement was 

detected. At 0630 the patrol prepared to return to camp. One 

minute later the 8I"ea exploded as the base came under heavy 

attack from enemy 6O-mm. and 82-mm. mortars. At the same time 

the patrol was attacked by a massive Viet Cong force. Within five 

minutes the patrol had been overrun, and all of its men were killed 

or wounded. 

The first enemy mortar round had impacted on the doorstep of 

a company command post; seconds later another exploded outside 

battalion headquarters. In all. an estimated 650 mOrtar rounds fell 

while the Viet Cong advanced toward the perimeter. As they 

moved closer. enemy machine guns and recoilless dOes joined 

'On the following dly. 20 Mar(h. a ,imilar misfortune might well hive occurred in the 

lit Division'Slrea. There the 1st Battalion. 26th Infantry, had moved by foot to selle Sroc Con 

Trang which wn to become Fire Suppon Patrol Base C for Phase 11 0' JUNCTION CITY. It 

_, unusual for the forces of the Big Red One nOt to mike an airmobile l.»8ult into lu.:h an 

area. !-towever, on 30 June 1966 the 1st Division hid (lptured a Viet Cong plln to Ittl(:" and 

annihilate a U.S. battalion on a Iinding lOne II Sroc: Con Tnmg. After the lst of the 26th had 

I«ured the uea. the !16th South Vietnamese Ranger Battllion. among other units. occupied 

and helped set:ure il. On 21 March the 94»h Ringer. di5COvered blUcr;u .nd a wire in Ihe 

wood line near the lire )Upporl ba$t:; following the wi~. they found lour hole, filled with 

upl05ives. There wu I center hole, and rad;.,ing from it was wire luding to three other hole, 

a\1 di~tance ol.bom twenty-five melen. In el.:h hole were the neceuary detonaling (Ii». In 

lheunter one Wl!'re also the following rounru: eight 7~mm .• seVl!'n 81.mm., louneen 6().mm .• 

and IO!I pounds 01 TNT. The olher holes had similar but smaller loads: only 3!o pounds 01 

TNT ea.:h and vlrious numbers and types of U.S. ordnlnce.lt was III set to be command detonated. From then on the BiX Red One. when it plat:ed anillery and air Itrih preparatory 'ira 

around and into Iny landing lOne into whkh il wu bringint troop,. IlwIY' used I number 01 

instantaneous fuled bombs to "rib the planned landing site 01 iu chopper lifu in order to 

cut any wires and yet not chl!'w up the terrain 50 mu.:h that it would be diUicuh to lind Ind 

travC'-nI!'. 
138 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

the attack. The Viet Cong made final preparations to assauh Ihe 

position. 

Within minutes the entire perjmeter came under heavy attack 

by waves of Viet Cong emerging from the jungle and firing recoilless rifles, RPG2 rockets, automatic weapons, and small arms. The 

heaviest attacks WCI'C concentrated on the northeastern and southeastern portions of the defensive perimeter. As the attack increased 

in intensity, the three artillery batteries initiated countermorlar 

fire in an effort to neutralize the heavy mortar concentrations 

which continued to rake the position. During the first assault 

Company B reported that its 1st Pl atoon positions on the southeastern perimeter had been penetrated and that the reaction force 

from the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, was needed to reinforce that 

sector. Artillerymen responded to the call, rushing to the perimeter to help repulse the continuing attacks. 

At 0700 the first forward air controller arri ved overhead in a 

light observation aircrah and immediately began directing Air 

Force strikes against the attackers. At the same time, supponing 

fire from two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers located at nearby 

fire support bases was brought within one hundred meters of the 

battalion's perimeter. At 0711, Company B reported that its 1st 

Platoon had been overrun and surrounded by a human-wave 

attack. Air strikes were ca lled in all along the wood line to the 

east to relieve the pressure on the company's perimeter. The forward air controller directing these strikes was shot down by heavy 

automatic weapons fire. At 0750 the Company B commander 

requested that the artillery fire its ';beehive" rounds (canisters 

filled with hundreds of metal darts) into the southeastern and 

southern sections of his perimeter. At 0756 Company B reported 

that complete enemy penetration had been made in the 1st Platoon sector and that they were desperate for ammunition resupply. 

Ammunition and a 2O-man reaction force from Company A were 

sent to assist B Company. At 08 13 the northeastern section of the 

perimeter was overrun by another human-wave attack. Two 

minutes later, elements of Company A which had established an 

ambush just outside the perimeter the previous night charged into 

the camp's perimeter and assumed defensive positions. Somehow 

all of the men had managed to elude the surrounding Viet Congo 

The commander of Company A reported the Viet Cong had 

penetrated the northern sector of the perimeter. Ten minutes 

later a quad-.50 machine gun located in that sector of the base was 

hit by RPG2 rocket rounds and overrun. As the attacking Viet 

Cong swarmed over the weapon and attempted to turn it on the 

friendly positions, the gun was blown apart by a well-placed round 
AP 6AU BANG II. SUOI TRE. AND AP GU 139 

from a lO5.mm. howitzer crew who had witnessed the whole 

action from their position some seventy·rive meters away. By 

0840 the northeastern, eastern, and southeastern portions of the 

perimeter had withdrawn to a secondary defensive line around 

the guns of the artillery batteries. The northern, western, and 

southern sectors were managing to hold despite intense pressure 

from large numbers of Viet Cong who had advanced as close as 

fifteen meters from the defensive positions. Attackers had infil· 

trated to within hand grenade range of the battalion command 

post and only five meters from the battalion aid station. 

The howitzers of the artillery battalion, with their tubes lev· 

eled, began firing beehive rounds into the Viet Congo At point· 

blank range, round after round of direct fire was delivered, each 

round spewing 8,000 finned steel missiles into the enemy. 

Air strikes were brought within as little as fifty meters of U.S. 

forces, and supporting artillery batteries threw up a continuous 

wall of shrapnel around the battalion perimeter. When the artillery 

inside the perimeter had exhausted its supply of beehive rounds, 

it began to fire high explosive rounds at point~blank range. By 

0900 the northern, western, and southern sectors of the perimeter 

were holding but still under Viet Cong pressure. The positions on 

the east had withdrawn even closer, but the line was still intact. 

The 3d Brigade headquarters had earlier alerted its other units 

which were conducting operations to the west. They were the 2d 

Battalion, 12th Infantry; the mechanized 2d Battalion, 22d Infan· 

try; and the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (-). When word of the 

attack reached these forces, they reacted immediately. The 2d of 

the 12th moved from the northwest traveling cross--country and 

avoiding traveled roads and trails. The mechanized infantry and 

armor battalions moved from the southwest until they reached 

the Suoi (stream) Sam at. An intensive search revealed only one 

suitable fording site. 

At 0900 the relief column from the 2d of the 12th broke through 

and linked up with the battered Company B. With the added forces 

and firepower, the unjts were able to counterattack to the east and 

re·establish the original perimeter. But the Viet Cong were still 

attacking. As they advanced, many of the soldiers could be seen 

wearing bandages from earlier wounds. Some, so badly wounded 

that they could not walk, were carried piggyback into the assaults 

by their comrades. 

Twelve minutes after the first relief unil arrived, the mech· 

anited infantry and annor column broke through the jungle from 

the southwest. With their 9O-mm. guns firing canister rounds and 

all machine guns blazing, they moved into the advanCing Viet 
140 CEDAR FALI..S-JUNCTION CITY 

Cong, cutting them down. Shortly thereafter, the enemy began to 

withdraw. By 0930 the original perimeter had been fe-established 

and by 1000 resupply choppers were arriving and began evacuating 

the wounded. By 1045 the battle of Suoi Tre was over. Elements of 

the mechanized and armor battalions pursued the fleeing enemy, 

and artillery and air strikes continued to pound routes of withdrawal. Sporadic contact continued until noon. 

The attacking unit had been decimated ; 647 bodies were 

recovered, 7 prisoners were taken, and 65 crew-served and 94 

individual weapons were captured. (Or the weapons captured, 50 

were RPG2's. a small bazooka-type antitank weapon.) U.S. losses 

were 3J killed and 109 wounded. 

Documents found in the area showed that intensive planning 

had been made by the Viet Cong before the attack. The attacking 

force was identified as the 272d Regiment of the 9th Viet Cong 

Division reinforced by elements of U-SO Artillery. The 272d was 

considered one of the best organized and equipped enemy units 

and was one of the few Viet Cong units that dared to make day· 

light attacks. But at Suoi Tre its troops had been scattered in a 

disorganized route to the northeast with artillery and air strikes 

pounding at their heels. 

Ap Gu 

On 26 March the lst Battalion, 26th Infantry (the Blue Spaders), 

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. Haig, was 

alerted to prepare for an assault deeper into War Zone C and near 

the Cambodian border. At that time the battalion was attached to 

the 2d Brigade of the lst Division and was located at Fire Support 

Patrol Base C at Sroc Con Trang. There it was engaged in perim· 

eter derense. road security, and occasional search and destroy 

operations. Now Colonel Haig turned his S-3 loose on the plan· 

ning for the assault. It was to be made in late morning on the 30th 

into Landing Zone GEOR.CE. some fourteen kilometers to the west 

in Operational Area SIOUX. The Blue Spaders would secure the 

zone for a follow·up landing by the lst Battalion, 2d Infantry, and 

then conduct operations in their assigned sector. Intell igence 

indicated that they cou ld expect to make contact with the enemy in 

that area. (Map 17) 

On the day scheduled for the assault, poor weather delayed the 

preparatory air strikes around and on the landing zone, resulting 

in a two--hour delay in H·hour. (The assault of the lst of the 2d was 

postponed a day.) It was not until early afternoon that the initial 

elements of the battalion touched down at GEOR.CE. (The landing 
LZ GEORGE 

BATTLE OF AP GU 

1 April 1961 

"'"' ....... 1 

MAP}7 
142 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

lone terrain consisted of open fields covered with tall, meadowlike grass. The area was surrounded by medium to heavy jungle.) 

The remainder of the battalion closed within an hour. Upon 

landing the battalion immediately dispatched cloverleaf patrols 

to seek the enemy. The patrols uncovered fortified positions in and 

around the landing 'lOne; however, they made no contact. That 

evening the unit organized its night defensive position in the 

vicinity of the zone. Fighting positions were dug as always with full 

overhead cover and interlocking fires all around. Listening posts 

were established and ambush patrols sent out. No significant 

contacts occurred that night. 

The next morning, 31 March, the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry 

(Lieutenant Colonel William C. Simpson commanding), was airlanded in GEORGE without incident. U(X>n landing, the lst of the 

2d moved to a position two kilometers southwest of the landing 

zone. The lst Battalion, 26th Infantry, began search and destroy 

operations in the surrounding area. Company A went south and C 

Company east. B Company remained in reserve, manning and 

patrolling the battalion perimeter at the landing zone. 

The battalion's reconnaissance platoon was searching the woods 

northwest of the perimeter. There it became obvious that the 

Americans were expected: from the trees hung small signs written 

in English warning that Americans going beyond the signs would 

not return. 

At 1300 the platoon moved farther to the north into a wooded 

area and was approximately five kilometers soutll of the Cambodian border when first contact was made. The platoon'S point 

man was hit by enemy fire. First Lieutenant Richard A. Hill, an 

infantry officer experienced in Vietnam combat, went forward to 

check the situation and was hit and mortally wounded. Only Hill's 

radio operator was left in contact with the battalion S-3. Before 

being hit. Hill had advised the battalion that the platoon was 

heavily engaged with automatic weapons, small arms, and grenades. Colonel Haig had called for artill ery support and, when 

advised that the platoon leader had been hit, immediately took 

action to oo-ordinate the artillery fire and air strikes in support of 

the platoon. 

At the same time, B Company was just closing on the perimeter 

after a sweep of the battalion's defensive area. When advised of 

the reconnaissance platoon'S desperate position and that its leader 

had been hit, the commander on his own initiative swung his company to the north and proceeded to the assistance of the embattled 

platoon. 
AP BAU BANG II. SUOI TRE. AND AP GU 143 

Colonel Haig boarded his helicopter, and it was not until he 

was airborne that he learned of B Company's move north. As Haig 

pointed out later, while this move to extract the platoon was necessary, the lack of accurate control of artillery fires and air support 

complicated the problem. As a result, B Company had entered the 

engagement without sufficient preparation and found itself heavily 

engaged along with the reconnaissance platoon. 

The B Company commander confirmed that he was confronting 

at least a battalion-size enemy force. His initially optimistic reports 

became progressively more pessimistic; the company was pinned 

down by heavy machine gun fire, rockets, mortars, and recoilless 

rines, and was running low on ammunition. Colonel Haig realized 

that he must reinforce and extract the units. 

Company A was alerted for action and moved forward to pass 

through and relieve ·B Company. 

Colonel Haig landed near the point of contact and had his 

battalion operations officer go airborne to control fire direction. 

Haig found Lieutenant Hill dead and the B Company commander 

wounded and in mild shock. Electing to stay with his units, Colonel 

Haig was joined by the A Company commander who had moved 

his unit through B Company and gained fire superiority over the 

enemy force. 

The intensity and accuracy of artillery and air strikes increased, 

pennitting all units, except initially two platoons of A Company 

still in contact, to be extracted. As the units moved back, the Viet 

Cong left their bunkers and moved forward to maintain contact; 

they were finally forced to ternlinate the engagement because of 

exposure to the incoming bombardment. Contact was broken at 

1705. The engagement resulted in seven Americans killed and 

thirty-eight wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown at that 

time. 

Meanwhile the division commander, General Hay, had ordered 

reinforcements into the area. At 1555 the first element of the 1st 

Battalion, 16th lnfantry, minus C Company, touched down at 

Landing Zone GEORGE under heavy sniper fire and occupied positions to the west and northwest of the 1st of the 26th. The battalion, 

under Colonel LazzeH, established its night defensive positions. 

The two battalions co-ordinated defensive plans. improved their 

fighting positions, established listening posts, and sent out ambush 

patrols. 

During the night, friendly harassment and interdiction artillery 

and mortar fires were placed in the area around the perimeter. 

From midnight until 0400 on 1 April, listening posts to the north, 
144 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

east, and south reported some movement to their front; however, 

there \\'"., no significant contact. Mortar fire was directed into areas 

of suspected enemy activity. 

At 0455 a single enemy mortar round exploded to the front of 

the perimeter of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry. Colonel Haig 

heard it and correctly interpreted it to be a registration round for a 

Viet Cong mortar attack. He immediately ordered all of his com· 

panies to a full alert posture and directed them to take cover and 

be prepared for an attack. He also recommended that the jst of 

the 16th follow suit. Colonel Lazzell's "Rangers" concurred and 

manned their fighting positions. 

Colonel Haig immediately requested artillery fire for east of 

his position. 

Five minutes after the enemy registration round had detonated, 

the first of several hundred rounds of 6O-mm., 82-mm., and 120-

mm. mortar rounds were fired into the northern portions of the 

battalions' areas. The rounds came from a position estimated 

to be a thousand meters northeast of the defensive perimeter. The 

mortars were so close that the U.S. troops could hear the rounds 

being fired. So many mortars were firing at once that the noise they 

made "sounded like loud, heavy madline guns." Because of the 

early warning, the rapid response to the first enemy round fired, 

and the defensive strength of the fighting positions, only twelve 

men were wounded. 

At the same time the mortar attack opened on the units in 

Landing Zone GF.OKC):, a co-ordinated attack started on Fire Support Patrol Base C, where much of the supporting artillery for the 

1st of the 26th and the 1st of the 16th was dug in. With the incoming 

mortar and 75-mm. pack howitzer rounds exploding around them, 

the artillerymen were not so efficient as usual in getting off the 

requested fires. However, they did not cease firing. In addition, 

the artillery that had moved into Fire Support Patrol Base THR UST 

on 29 March was not under incom ing mortar attack so that it could 

-and did-provide the usua l support to Colonels Haig and 

Lanel!. Why the enemy did not bring this base under attack has 

never come to light, but it was a mistake on his part. 

When asked later about his immediate response to the registering mortar round, Colonel Haig replied that he had sensed the 

ultimate ground attack, but not its extent or the size of the force 

involved. He felt, as he was sure the Viet Cong commander felt, 

that they had unfinished business as a result of the action the day 

before. "There were indicators available to both sides that followup action might be appropriate, and in the VC's case, especially in 

view of the fact that he had four or five battalions to employ 
AP SAU SANG II, SUOI TRE, AND A I) GU 145 

I [alsol was set to exploit what I thought had been a fairly 

successful action the day before," There was little question that 

another engagement was imminent; if not instigated by the Viet 

Congo then Colonel Haig would have taken the initiative. 

The heavy mortar attack on the two battalions ended at 0515. 

(It lasted an hour longer at Fire Support Patrol Base C.) During 

this time nareships. a light helicopter £ire team , and forward air 

controllers were requested from and furnished by the 2d Brigade 

tactical headquarters. Seven minutes later the Viet Cong launched 

their initial ground attack against the northeast edgeof the peri meter. 

The attack hit primarily Band C Companies of the lst Battalion, 26th Infantry, and A Compan y and the reconnaissance platoon 

of the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry. As the soldiers manning the 

friendly listening posts withdrew to the perimeter, the enemy had 

followed them in. 

Private First Class William Trickett, a fire team leader in C 

Company, described the attack: 

When the listening post came back in. they hit their (o ..... n) trip nares. . . . An (enemy) automatic ..... eapon opened up on them and I fired my 

M-79-1 believe I hit and silenced her. (The VC) came on in and wound 

up in the lsi Platoon area. It was a mix up arter dark. The next thing we 

know they're sprawling all over the field. Some way or another they came 

through our trip nares and were already in the fIeld digging positions. . . . We lost one of our machine guns that was hit by a morlar. The 

other one kept firing, but considering the people we had on the listening 

post and cvelJthing, our positions ..... ere just under strength-we just got 

hit. They reahzed our weakness and came through WI. 

It was apparent that the co-ordination of mortar fire with the 

unobserved movement of the enemy through the woods and tall 

grass immediately ahead of C Company had permitted surprise in 

their attack resulting in the capture of three bunkers and a penetration roughly fort y meters deep and a hundred meters wide in 

the C Company sector. Decisive hand-to-hand fighling was taking 

place in the penetration. 

(Colonel Haig later indicated that he had known {rom the day 

he selected the night defensive posilion that the natural wood line· 

leading into the northeast portion of the perimeter was the most 

vulnerable portion o f his perimeter. He realized that he was up 

against a very intelligent enemy when the commander picked this 

spot for his attack.) 

As described by Captain George A. Joulwan, S-3 of the battalion, 

the Viet Cong ". walked right through our mortar fire and 

artillery fire- they just kept coming so we knew we had a very 

large force out there. Charlie Company was fighting hand to hand 
146 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

in the bunkers as was our Bravo Company. We organized 

about seventy-five meters back cOi1solidated the line. and 

held." 

The commander of Company C, Captain Brian H . Cundiff. 

without regard to the intense enemy fire, moved among his men 

and mustered an erfective defense which held the shoulders of the 

penetration. During this time he also killed six. of the attacking 

enemy in hand-to--hand combat. Allhough wounded three times, he 

refused medical aid and continued to right and rally his force. 

At 0630 the reserve of the lst Battalion, 26th Infantry, the 

reconnaissance platoon, was moved into a blocking position behind 

C Company and. along with B Company, fought to re-establish the 

perimeter. Meanwhile the enemy was launching diversionary 

attacks from the east and west. 

The Air Force air strikes were now arriving over the target area 

at the rate of one flight each fifteen minutes, thus providing continuous air cover. Initially there was some difficulty in getting the 

flights armed with cluster bomb units.' 

It appeared that slowly the main Viet Cong attack was beginning to falter under the heavy volume of fire placed upon it. Light 

and heavy helicopter Cire teams were firing rockets and miniguns 

on the wood Hne to the northeast; artillery was massing fires along 

the east flank and in depth to the east. As the flights started arriving 

with cluster bomb units on board, the jets began striking within 

thirty meters of the American positions, littering the entire area 

on both sides of the perimeter with enemy dead. t As the ordnance 

began taking its toll, the Viet Cong started to run, many of them 

throwing down their weapons. 

In the meantime, Captain Cundiff led elements of C Company, 

reinforced by the 1st Platoon of B Company, in a massive counterattack which was pushing the remaining Viet Cong back into the 

deadly artillery barrages and air strikes. By 0800 the perimeter 

was restored. 

As the Viet Cong broke contact and began withdrawing, the 1st 

of the 2d and 1st of the 16th passed through the 1st of the 26th to 

pursue the enemy to the east and northeast. However, no significant contact was made. Artillery and air strikes (including two 

'Cluster bomb unil.$ were badly needed since they were the mOlt effective ordnance lor 

the situltion which eJEilted: enemy troops in the open, echeloned in depth, Ind in contlct with 

our own troops. Since the pilot an reln.te the smlll bomb uniu from their cannister It low 

level, he an drop them within thiny meters 01 our own troops. Ind, when they uplode on 

contlct, our troops Ire unhlrmed. , ince the leth,1 radiul of the ordnance;' slir;hlly less thin 

that distan<:e. 

'After the battle there wu one llrinr; of twenty·nine enemy dead in I line 1!iO meten 

lonr;; I clulter bomb Unil run hid literally curled them up. 
AI' BAU BANG II. SUO! TRE. AND AP GU 147 

INFANTRYMEN Of THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION dashjrom helicopters to motlt' 

against enemy Jorces oJ the 9th Viet Cong Division. 

8-52 strikes) were shifted to likely routes of withdrawal and known 

enemy base camps in the area. 

After contact was broken and the enemy routed, the Blue 

Spaders began to police the battldield. evacuate casualties, and 

bury the Viet Cong dead. Four hundred ninety-one bodies were 

found among their defenses and those of Colonel Lauell's battalion. After sweeps around the area had been made, the known 

enemy dead totaled many more. During the two-day battle, the 

enemy (all three battalions of the 271st Regiment of the 9th Viet 

Gong Division and elements of the 70th Guard Regiment) lost 

609 killed, 5 captured, and over 50 weapons of all types. U.S. casualties were 17 killed and 102 wounded. 

During the mortar attack on Fire Support Patrol Base C (where 

the 2d Brigade command post was located), Colonel Grimsley was 

wounded and evacuated; command of the brigade was assumed by 

General Hollingsworth. Later that day, command was turned over 

to Colonel Haig. 

During the fight artillery units of the lst Division had fired 
148 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

some 15,000 rounds into the battle area, while Air Force jet fighterbombers logged 103 sorties with over 100 tons of ordnance in 

support of the ground action. 

Asked at what point the pendulum of victory had swung in his 

favor, Colonel Haig replied: 

In the subjective sense there's no question: with the arrival of lhe air, 

tactical air and especially the ordnance, the CBU ordnance was the main 

factor. However, this is subjective . . . and while it was the straw 

thai broke the camel's back, I would be very remiss if I didn't say that the 

artillery . . . our mortars, and our own automaLic weapons were 

major factors. And had not all of these been employed to their utmost, 

and closely coordinated, and well integrated, no single factor by itseU 

would have changed the outcome. As it tumed out, the amount 

o f fire that we had falling by way of artillery and our own automalic fire 

and infantry weapons, [and,] may I add . . . the cnu, with the 

enemy configured as he was, that is, stacked in depth, in the open, and 

moving tOlWard, [it was this] combination of things that really made the 

difference. 

Colonel Haig had this further thought about the battle of Ap 

Gu: 

In this particular attack, 1 think, as in ATTLEBORO last fall , when 

you get belly to bell y with a large VC force, they are not suHiciently flexible to react especially inteHigentiy. They arc going to react like most 

soldiers and that is to allack. In this case, we were right on their doorstep. 

We found them by aggressive reconnaissance, the order was cal led, and the 

battle was started. t think this was a case of being in their backyard. confronting the comma nder . . . with a basic problem : When 

the enemy [the O.S. force} is there, do you run? Jf you run on top of the 

series of defeats, where do you stop? When do your men finall y realize 

this is a lost cause? t think this commander was confronted with that very 

lough decision and he came down hard on the wrong side -at least from 

the perspective of his future effectiveness. 

Back near the Cambodian border that Viet Cong commander 

probably would have agreed. 
CHAPTER XlV 

Phase III-Termination 

Phase II of J UNCTION CITY came to a close on 15 April. The 

original intention was that the operation would then cease; how· 

ever, the first two phases had proved so successful that Phase III 

was initiated. Control of this last phase was to be the sole responsibility of the 25th Infantry Division. which would commit a brigade 

to it. 

Phase III continued the objectives of J UNCTION CITY 1 and II, 

using the mobile brigade concept to conduct offensive operations 

in War Zone C. The 3d Brigade, 4th Division, had already relieved 

the 196th Brigade of these operations near the end of Phase II. 

Therefore when the final phase opened, the 3d of the 4th continued 

to secure the towns of Tay Ninh and Suoi Da and Route 26 south 

from Tay Ninh. and to operate throughout the lower western half 

of War Zone C. One battalion of the brigade conducted search and 

destroy operations north of Route 247, thereby affording a degree 

of protection for the completion of the Special Forces camp at Prek 

Klok. The brigade was deployed until 20 April, when it ended its 

participation in J UNCTION CITY. 

On the 21st the 1st Brigade, 9th Division, with a tank company 

and the South Vietnamese 36th Ranger Battalion attached, came 

under the operational control of the 25th Division and assumed the 

mission of the 3d Brigade, 4th Division. For the next twenty days 

the brigade forces conducted operations throughout the area, but 

the organized enemy units became almost impossible to find. 

Most of the contacts made were with relatively small Viet Cong 

groups; however, many bunkers and military structures were 

located and destroyed. Casualties sustained by friendly forces were 

primarily caused by mines and booby traps. h soon became evident 

that the enemy had dispersed to a new area. 

At midnight on 14 May 1967, Operation J UNCTION CITY, the 

largest military offensive operation of the Vietnamese conflict to 

that time, was brought to a close. 

The statistical results of J UNCTION CITY are impressive. All the 

regiments of the 9th Vi et Cong Division had been trounced. The 

final totals carried 2,728 enemy killed and 34 prisoners taken. 
-;y 

DROPPING SUPPLIES 40 KILOMETERS NORTH or TAY NINH ell!' 
PHASE III-TERMINATION 151 

There were 139 Chieu Hoi ralliers and 65 detainees. Among items 

of equipment captured were 100 crew·served weapons, 491 indi· 

vidual weapons, a,nd thousands of rounds of ammunition, grenades, 

and mines. More than 5,000 bunkers and military structures were 

destroyed. Over 810 tons of rice and nearly 40 tons of other food· 

stuffs such as salt and dried £ish were uncovered. Nearly one·hal£ 

million pages of assorted documents were taken. American person· 

nellosses were 282 killed and 1,576 wounded, while U.S. materiel 

losses included the destruction of 3 tanks, 21 annored personnel 

carriers, 12 trucks, 4 helicopters, 5 howitzers, and 2 quad·.50 

machine guns and carriers. 

In addition to these losses, the enemy suffered other serious 

setbacks. He had to take time to regroup, refit, reorganize, and 

receive replacements. Disruption of the headquarters of the Cen· 

tral Office of South Vietnam caused its forces to withdraw to Cam· 

bodia and affected its control over Viet Cong activity. Coupled 

with the loss of large quantities of important documents and the 

destruction of many important installations and communication 

networks, this disruption led to a reversal in planning and control 

during this period and for some time to come. But probably one 

of the most far.reaching effects of all upon the enemy was the 

realization that his bases, even in the outer reaches of War Zone C, 

were no longer havens. 

From a psychological standpoint, the enemy in War Zone C was 

a more difficult target than that normally encountered in the HI 

Corps area. The reason was that the target was composed primar· 

ily of hard-<ore North Vietnamese and Viet Cong; as a result, the 

usual Chicu Hoi propaganda appeals based on family hardship 

and separation were not so effective as they were with guerrilla. 

type unils. Early in the operation, quick reaction was recognized 

as the key to the successful psychological exploitation of hard-core 

targets. 

Commenting on this aspect of the operation, General Weyand 

had this to say in his Commander's Evaluation of JUNCTION CITY: 

During JUNCTION CITY wc dropped 9,768,000 leaflets and madc 102 

hours of aerialloudspcakcr appeals. Thc major engal?cments of 20, 21 and 

31 March were followed up with a wide variety of "qUick-rcaction" leaflets. 

They showed photographs of VC dead and contained surrender appea ls 

to the survivors. A speciall y designed memorandum addrcssed to thc CG 

of thc 9th VC Div was reproduced and distributed as a leaflet to further 

exploit our success of 20 March. A newsletter exploiting VC casualties and 

explaining the role of our forces was distributed throughout the III CTZ. 

Our military civic action projects supported the overall PSYOP effort. 

They added crcdibility to our centra l propal{anda theme : The Viet Cong/ 

North Vietnamcse Army destroy; the Govcrnment of Vietnam/ Unitcd 
152 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

ARMORED PERSONNI'.L CARRIERS piled high with rice captured [rom the Viet 

COIlg. 

States/Free World Military Armed Forces help the people. Civic action 

projects completed by our units in villages and hamlets along the JUNCTION CITY LOe (line of communication) included seven road bridges . . . five kilometers of roads, five wells, and twO Ooating docks. In 

addition, we repaired five road bridges, thirty footbridges . . . four 

hospitals. one market place . eleven kilometers of roads, six 

schools, three wells, one village water pump and one village power generator. A total of 59,690 patients were treated under the MEDCAP (medical 

Civic Action Program) II Program; and we distributed 295,041 pounds of 

food and clothing to local GVN officials who gave them to needy families. 

Our success in this endeavor is evidenced by the fact that 139 Hoi 

Chanh (Chieu Hoi returnees) were induced to rally despite the hard-.core 

nature of the target audience. The intensive use of PSYOP and Civic 

Action tcchn iques, coupled with our relentl ess tactical pressure against 

the ve, was responsible for the large number of ralliers. 

The mission assigned II Field Force for J UNCTION CITV had been 

to conduct a major operation into War Zone C to destroy COSVN 

and Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces and installations. All 

objectives were accomplished in considerable degree with the 

exception of the destruction of COSVN forces. In his evaluation of 
PHASE III-TERM INATION 153 

the operation, General Hay of the Big Red One set forth some of 

the reasons for this failure. 

Several factors contributed: 

The proximity of a privileged sanctuary to the reported locations of 

COSVN and Head9.uarters, 9th VC Division. 

The extreme difficulty of establishing a sea l with sufficient troop 

density to deny infiltration routes to VC units thoroughly familiar with 

the dense jungle terrain. 

The difficulty of gaining complete surprise, as a result of extensive 

repositioning of troops andlogisllcal support prior to D-Day. in spite of 

the efforts devoted to deception measures. 

Looking back many months after J UNCTION CITY ended, General 

Westmoreland, in his Report on the War in Vietnam, summarized 

the effect of the operat ion in this fashion : 

(In addition to the enemy losses) we conslruclCd three airfields capable 

of handling C-I30's, erected a bridge entering (War Zone C) on its eastern 

edge, cleared innumerable helicopter landing zones, and fortified two 

camps in which Special Forces teams with ClOG ga rrisons remained as we 

withdrew. Henceforth, we would be able to enter this important but difficult area with relative case and with much smaller forces. 

An inviolate Viet Cong stronghold for many years, War Zone C was 

now vulnerable to allied forces any time we choose to enter. 

General Giap pc:mrayed JUNCTION CITY as a "big victory" rather 

than the serious ~efeat It was. The North Vietnamese continued to perpetuate the myth of crippling U.S. losses and defeat. This time , if anyth ing, 

the reports were more exaggerated than usual. According to official North 

Vietnamese reporu, 13,500 allied soldiers were killed in JUNCTION 

CITY. . The enemy claimed 993 vehicles destroyed (800 of them 

armored) and the destruction of 119 all ied artillery pieces. Exag· 

geration of this magnitude by the enemy was a commonplace. Whether 

self-deception or carefully contrive!d myth. iu existence played an important part in future decisions the enemy Wall to make. 

However, General Giap's glowing account of victory was belied 

by high-level defectors a year later as they revealed the full impact 

of J UNCTION CITY upon the enemy: 

They commented-and captured documents confirmed-that the 

operation was essentially an enemy "disaster." According to these knowledgeable defectors, the loss of major base areas and the resulting deterioration of local forces in III Corps forced the enemy high command to 

make basic rev isions in tactics. JUNCTION CITY convinced the ellemy 

command that continuing to base main force units in close proximity to the 

key population areas ..... ould be increasingly foolhardy. From that time on 

the enemy made increasing use of Cambodian sanctuaries for his bases, 

hospitals. training centers, and supply depots. 

A turning point in the war had been reached. 
Epilogue 

This monograph about events in early 1967 has been written in 

retrospect afler four and a haH yeaTS; I found the view somewhat 

fuzzy. However, I also found that by immersing myself in the 

references available it was possible to refresh my memory con· 

siderably. Therefore. even with the aberrations which may result 

from the passage of time, I believe that the following observations 

concerning CEDA R FALLS and JUNCTION CITV are va lid. 

Building upon the experience ga ined in slapping together 

Operation ATTLEBORO while on the move, CEDAR FALLS-J UNCTION 

CITY confirmed that we could utilize large quantities of all types 

of available forces, weapons, and equipment in a successful, 

co-ordinated operation against large enemy main force units. 

These operations also confirmed the ATTLEBORO experience that 

such multidivisional operations have a place in modern counterinsurgency warfare. Thus it was that at the time the enemy believed 

he had the third and last phase of his planned aggression successfully under way - beginning with the battle of Binh Cia two years 

ea rlier-he now found himself facing even larger forces than he 

could assemble 

CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY also revealed that it was possible 

to plan for such large operations while maintaining a fairly high 

degree of secrecy about them. They also confirmed that properly 

planned and implemented cover and deception operations could 

permit the prepositioning of forces for the main operation without 

tipping our hand as to the size, location, or even the possibility of 

that operation. 

The intelligence which was developed prior to these operations 

was impressive in its accuracy. Not onl y was it gene rally correct 

concerning the activities of major enemy elements, it was also quite 

accurate with respect to the location of installations and facilities. Of the 177 separate enemy facilities uncovered by the 11th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment during CEDAR FALLS. 156 (88 percent) 

were located within 500 meters of the site shown in intelligence 

holdings before the operation. The average distance error was 2()() 

meters. During JUNCTION CITY the accuracy was slightly less than 

40 percent located within 500 meters of their predicted sites-still 

a respectable figure. Thus both operations lent credibility to the 

system of pattern activity analysis. 
EPILOGUE 155 

The engineer support which was provided during CEI)AR FALLSJUNCTION CITY was typical of that which I observed during my 

entire tour in Vietnam! outstanding. I found that there was never 

any mission too dirficult for the engineer commands. Even by mid1966 our engineers had changed the face of Vietnam; I can imagine 

how it must appear now. During CEDAR FALLS and jUNCTIOl'l CITY 

the tasks undertaken-many of them extremely difficult-were 

made to look easy. I The success of the jungle-destruction operation 

using Rome Plows, bulldozers, and tankdozers was particularly 

impressive. However. the discouraging aspect of such operations 

is that it takes but a short time for the jungle to grow again. After 

all, the clearing operation does not completely eliminate the jungle 

by digging it out by its roots; rather it cuts it off a short distance 

above the ground. Once the jungle has been cut, some system must 

be devised to keep it from growing back; otherwise. it must be cut 

again and again. 

Another outstanding aspect of CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY was 

the close air support provided by the Air Force; it was typical of 

the support the Air Force always gave the Big Red One, the only 

outfit for which 1 can speak authoritatively. The short reaction 

time; the intense desire by the forward air controller-and the 

pilots of the night he was directing-to put the ordnance exactly on 

the spot desired by the ground commander; the ability to lay down 

cluster bomb unit runs within thirty meters of friendly forces in 

order to cause the enemy to break contact ; and the ability to bring 

in air strikes at night under artifical illumination where one slight 

mistake in depth perception meant "so long" were all capabilities 

which left a lasting impression upon us infantrymen. Surely there 

were occasions when the flights arrived over the target without the 

kind of ordnance requested, but not often. I could not be more outspoken in my praise for the professionalism displayed by the supporting Air Force personnel. 

One of the unsung heroes of CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY was 

the logistical arm which kept us in food, clothing, ammunition, gas, 

weapons, medical supplies-everything we consumed or used. 

'If our military syslem has t.ught us anything over the yean it is thai' command i.a 

refleetion of il$ commander. There is no question in my mind but Ihll the hi Engineer BIIlalion of Ihe 1st Division, the engineer unit who.: openltonS I observed mott, attompli.hed 

the myriad tasu which faced it in to professional a manner IUJely because of itt: commander. 

Colonel Kieman. He had tnduated number one in hi. Wut Point clUI, WII a biK drappi"K 

man. had. Mean doM additude and an infl!d.ious M!nse of humor. and figured there wu nothing 

whiCh he and hi. command could not do-and he Will right. These chancteristiel permeated 

his command and made il what lurely must have been the finest engineer outfit in Vietnam 

amonK many which were ouutandinK. (Colonel Kiernan met a tragic duth when hi. helicopter did eauKhl • hiKh-tension wire as il new low under Ihe flight pattem of Bien HOI airport. Iud Mven day. before he WII 10 retum home., 
156 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

Logistical troops repaired our damaged equipment, evacuated our 

dead and wounded. The operations were the largest ever supported, and they extended over greater distances. During Phase I 

a forward logistical operations control center was established at 

Tay Ninh with the primary mi~sion of controlling three forward 

support areas located at Trai Bi, the French Fort, and Suoi Da. At 

Minh Thanh the Big Red One established a forward support element and the lst Brigade, 9th Division, received its supplies at Lai 

Khe. On five days of the first week of Phase I, the 173d Brigade and 

the 25th Division received airdrops. During that phase a trailer 

transfer point was establ ished at Tay Ninh which permitted the 

five-ton tractors from Saigon-Long Binh depots to drop their 

loaded trailers and return to the depots with empties. During 

Phase II the regu lar Tay Ninh Supply Point took care of the 25th 

Division units while a forward support area was established at 

Quan Loi. From 21 March to 7 April the 196th Brigade was supported primarily by airdrop. Also during Phase IL it was found 

possible to "throughput " artillery ammunition from the Long Binh 

Ammunition Supply Dump directly to the fire support bases, 

resulting in considerable savings in personnel, material handling 

equipment, transportation, and time. (The throughput operation 

also was quite exciting to the drivers and their "shotguns.") Except 

for resupplying the units at Minh Thanh by air, daily resupply 

from Saigon-Long Sinh during Phase 11 was by truck, with airlift 

backup available in an emergency. 

On occasion there were hitches in the logistics system, but, from 

my observation, they were few and far between. The logisticians 

should take pride in their performance. 

Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY con finned in the 

minds of most of us the decisive role played by artillery and air 

during major battles such as those fought with the 9th Viet Cong 

Division. They also verified the need to get as much firepower as 

possible on an attacking enemy without delay and, in this regard, 

to establish a rire co-ordination line and use artillery and air strikes 

simultaneously. Again these operations verified the need to have 

arlillery fire (preferably 105-mm., because of its rapid rate of fire) 

available to support any unit, regardless of size, when operating 

in an area in which contact with the enemy is possible. Further, 

CEDAR FAU.5 and J UNCTION CITY again showed us the wisdom of 

having fire support bases mutually supporting. 

There has always been much discussion about the type of fighting position one should require his men to dig and the manner in 

which a night defensive position should be organized. Different 

commanders have varying ideas, and a position for the nat terrain 
EPILOCUE 157 

found in most of the III Corps zone might not be the proper one 

for use in the Central Highlands. However. those of us in the Big 

Red One were convinced that the "DePuy" fighting position I was 

right for us. That position called for a hole deep enough for a man 

to stand in with his helmet on, with full'overhead cover reinforced 

by logs or steel rods, properly camouflaged, with two firing ports, 

each set at a 45-degree angle from a line directly to the fronl. An 

enemy weapon firing at the front oC the fighting position could 

not hit a firing port, but struck the thick benn in fronl. Each individual fighting position was so placed that it could mutually support the positions on either side. Thus, the night defensive position 

was mutually supporting all around with interlocking fires. (Our 

soldi ers didn't stop digging and building until their positions were 

finished.) The value of this concept was proved during the heavy 

mortar, rocket, and recoilless rine attack at the outset of the battle 

of Ap Gu on I April. Everyone was in his fighting position and 

only twelve men were wounded during the shelling. 

The experience of the 3d Brigade, 4th Division. on 19 March. 

when it went into a "hot" landing zone with unfortunate results, 

supported the contention of many of us that, unless there are civilians in the area, troops should never be brought into a landing 

zone on an ainnobile assault unless the zone and surrounding area 

have been covered by an artillery and air strike preparation. As 

mentioned above. the use of bombs with instantaneous fuzes was 

also essential for those specific areas in the landing zone where the 

lift helicopters would touch down in order to cut the wires leading to command-detonated explosives. 

With respect to the enemy contacted during the two operat.ions, 

we found most of them dedicated, well-disciplined, persistent, 

tenacious, and courageous. often displaying more "guts" than 

sense. It was a sheer physical impossibility to keep him from slipping away whenever he wished if he were in terrain with which 

he was familiar-generally the case. The jungle is usually just too 

thick and too widespread to hope ever to keep him from getting 

away; thus the option to fight was usually his. We also found it very 

difficult to prevent him from mining the roads at night. The routes 

were just too extensive for the number of troops available. We 

could not expect our men to outpost the roads all night and beat 

the jungle on search and destroy all day. We restorted to nightly 

"thunder runs" in which a small annored detachment ran down 

stretches of road at different times on different nights trying to 

discourage mining. Before using the routes the next day, mine 

I Nlmed for Major Genfral (now Lieutenant GeMnl) William E. I>4!Puy, then commandin~ ~nenl of the hI Inllnlr)' Oiyision, who dfliped il. 
158 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

clearing teams swept them; then they were outposted, with search 

and destroy operations away from the roads. 

One could not help but wonder about the efficacy of the enemy's 

intelligence system in light of his attacks during Phases I and 

II, particularly the ones on IO and 20 March against mechanized 

and cavalry units on the perimeters. To many of us these attacks 

seemed stupid. However. looking at the international scene, it may 

well have been that Hanoi wished to score a major victory about 

the lime of the Guam Conference between President Lyndon B. 

Johnson and officials of the South Vietnamese government held 

on 20-21 March. Having failed in his endeavors on 10, 20, and 21 

March, it appeared that out of sheer desperation he tried one more 

time to chalk up a victory at Ap Gu on 1 April. From these four 

battles he should have learned that if his attack is not successful 

enough to overrun the defensive position in the first few minutes, 

he risks being decimated by artillery and air strikes. 

One of the discouraging features of both CEDAR FALLS and 

J UNCTI ON ClTl' was the fact that we had insufficient forces, either 

U.S. or South Vietnamese, to permit us to continue to operate in 

the Iron Triangle lmd War Zone C and thereby prevent the Viet 

Cong from returning. In neither instance were we able to stay 

around, and it was not long before there was evidence of the 

enemy's return. Only two days after the termination of CEDAR 

FAI.l.5. I was checking out the Iron Triangle by helicopter and saw 

many persons who appeared to be Viet Cong riding bicycles or 

wandering around on foot. We set up some Eagle nights from our 

division cavalry squadron and went in, set up roadblocks, and 

picked up thirty-one men who were suspect. One of our choppers 

was fired upon as it went in. Later in the day we found some Viet 

Cong hiding in the extreme southeastern part of the triangle along 

the Thi Tinh River; they made the mistake of firing upon us. 

During the cease-fire for Te4 8-12 February, the Iron Triangle 

was again literally crawling with what appeared to be Viet Cong. 

They could be seen riding into, out of, and within the triangle. 

Finally, in frustration, I was able to get the South Vietnamese 

civilian officials to set up some checkpoints at appropriate places 

to monitor identification and proper documentation. There was 

a definite lack of enthusiasm on the part of the South Vietnamese 

to do such things during Tel; however, we did discourage the 

enemy from flaunting his Tel freedom in our faces. Periodic reconnaissance of the triangle confirmed Viet Cong activity within it. 

When warranted, artillery and air strikes were brought in to 

engage them and discourage their activities. 
EPILOCUE 159 

During Phase I of j UNcnoN CITY the lst Engineers went to great 

effort to build the air£ield capable of handling C-l30's at Katum, 

just south of the Cambodian borde,.; when that phase ended we 

packed up and left the airfield unsecured, expecting to use it the 

next time we went into that area (after checking it for mines and 

other devices). It did not take the enemy long to start mining it. 

Overflying the airstrip onc week after the end of Phase I. we could 

count about twenty-five holes dug in and around the laterite strip 

and. through binoculars, could see what appeared to be demolition 

material lying near the holes. 

In order to discourage the enemy from having complete freedom in War Zone C again, General Westmoreland had intended 

to use the 196th Brigade as a "floating brigade" to conduct mobile 

operations in the Phase I area. However, the situation in I Corps 

area compelled him to withdraw the 1961h in April and send it 

north . Reconnaissance flights over War Zone C following j UNcnON 

CITY revealed that the enemy was returning. 

These two operations provided what might be called missed 

opportunities when cvaluated in terms of what might have been if 

the commander could have written his own ticket; that is, had there 

been no constraints on time and forces available. For example, 

had we stayed in the CEDAR FALLS operation longer we could have 

rooted out more Viet Cong, received more ralliers, cut down more 

jungle, and destroyed more enemy facilities and installations. In 

J UNCTION CITY it appeared to some that at the beginn ing of Phase 

II, since we had already operated in the western half of War Zone 

C and had troops on the west at the end of Phase I, we should have 

made our push from west to east against a blocking force along the 

Saigon River. Or we could have left a blocking force along Rou te 4 

from Prek Klok to Katum and on northeast to the Cambodian border; our Phase II operation could then have pushed west against 

it. Another missed opportunity came as an aftermath to the battle 

of Ap Gu. Had forces been made available. they could have air 

assaulted into landing zones along the Cambodian border to block 

the withdrawal of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment as the 1st Battalion , 16th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, pursued them. 

But a di sc ssion of missed opportunities is akin Lo Monday morning quarterbacking and probably has about the same validity. 

The most lasting impression I have of these two operationsin fact of all my Vietnam tour-is of the magnificent American 

soldier who made them possible. Shortly after my return from 

Vietnam I had occasion to express my feelings about that soldier 

in a speech given on 19 October 1967 at the Yorktown Day celebra-
160 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

Lion in Yorktown, Virginia. I find those words still appropriate 

to describe the soldier who fought in CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION 

Cl"rv 

. who is this American soldier in Vietnam? He is a boy. about 19 

years of age. armed and in uniform, who did not choose to be there. He 

would have preferred to remain at home, comfortable, enjoying the many 

attractions and conveniences availabl e to Americans; secure in the com· pany of his family. his friends, his sweetheart. Thoughts of those persons 

at home creep into his mind. even al limes when he is trying 10 force himself to concentrate on the battle at hand. And in the jungles and rice 

paddies of Vietnam, this smooth-cheeked, bright-eyed, enthusiastic boy 

becomes a man. He lives with fear, he lives with carnage, he lives with 

death. Burned forever into his memory are ugly sights and awesome sorrows which at times are almost too much for a boy, just turned man, to 

bear. He kills the enemy but questions the waste and folly of war. He sees 

his buddy killed beside him and asks why? Why was it his tum to go today 

and not mine? He exults in the victories won by h is outfit, but he weeps 

with grief while attcnding the memorial services for his buddies who fell 

in the fight. He understands the cause for which he is fighting; his enthusiasm, dedication and motivation are contagious. He looks with disgust 

at reports of those back home who question his being and fighlin~ in the 

far-off place. He dismisses such reports with a shrug, remarKing 'Those 

guys back home jusl don't know what it's all about." 

You will 'See your soldier in Vietnam digging his defensive fighting 

position in a driving monsoon rain, up to his waist in water and mud, 

stopping occasionally to bailout the position with his helmet. Or you will 

find him combating the heat and misery of the jungle noor. Bl,lt whatever 

the conditions, he will greet you with a big smile and reassure you: "Don't 

worry about this position; we'll be ready; the Viet ConK will never take it." 

That's your soldier in .victnam today, a man, who knowing he has 12 

months to serve in that country. has resolved to do an outstanding job for 

lhat period. To match his spirit. his courage, his determination, enthusiasm and devotion with a comparable level of decisiveness. judgment, 

imagination and know-how is a challenge to every leader in Vietnam. 
ABI1. INE 

AK47 

APe 

ARVN 

ATfLEBoRo 

AVLB 

Bailey bridge 

beehive round 

the Big Red One 

BIIOIINGHAM 

the Blackhorse Regiment 

the Blue Spaders 

Buddy operations 

cnu 

Chieu Hoi program 

Chinook 

claymore mine 

cordon and search 

COSVN 

CS 

dozer·infantry team 

Glossary 

April 1966 allied operation conducted east 

of Saigon as a spoiling operation against an 

enemy move on the capital 

Soviet·designed and manufactured assault 

rifle, 7.62 mm. 

Armored personnel carrier 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

Operation resulting in a battle that took 

place September-November 1966 northwest of Saigon 

Armored vehicle launched bridge 

Standard Army military bridge using pre· 

fabricated steel panels 

Canisters rillcd with hundreds of metal darts 

U.S. 1st Infantry Division 

April 1966 operation in which the U.S. 1st 

Infantry Division moved into War Zone C, 

uncovering greal quantities of supplies 

U.S. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 

Men of the 1st Battalion, U.S. 26th Infantry 

Operations by combined U.S. and South 

Vietnamese forces 

Cluster bomb units 

The "open arms" prQgTam initiated by President Diem in April 1963 promising clemency and financial aid to guerrillas who 

stopped fighting and returned to live under 

government authority 

CH-47 helicopter 

A shaped, antipersonnel mine which when 

detonated propels small steel cubes in a 

fan-shaped pattern 

Operation to seal orr and search an area 

Central Office of Sou th Vietnam 

Riot control agent 

A team of tankdozers, bulldozers, Rome 
162 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

Eiffel bridge 

EL PASO II 

clm(s) 

FITCHBURG 

FSB 

FSPB 

G-3 

GADSDEN 

GVN 

Huey 

IIFFORCEV 

the Iron Brigade 

)-2 

KIA 

local force 

LTL 

LZ 

MI6 

MOO 

M79 

MACV 

mad minute 

main force elements 

Plows, and infantry which cui into the 

jungle 

Nonstandard mctal military bridge of French 

design 

A series of operations conducted in Ju ne and 

July 1966 by the U.S. 1st Infantry Division 

and the Vietnamese 5th Division on the 

eastern nank of War Zone C 

Elemcnt(s) 

January \967 operation III preparation for 

CEDAR FALLS 

Fire support base 

Fire support patrol base 

Assistant Chjef of Staff, Operations 

Original name for Operation J UNCTION CITY, 

later designating one of the deception 

operations in the first phase of JUNCTION 

em 

The government of the Republic of Vietnam 

UH-I D helicopter 

11 }'ield Force, Vietnam 

3d Brigade, U.S. 1st Infantry Division 

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence 

Killed in action 

Viet Cong combat unit subordinate to a 

d istrict or province 

Vietnamese interprov incial route 

Land ing zone 

U.S. lightweight, rapid-riring S.56-mm. rifle 

U.S. 7.62-mm. machine gun 

Shoulder-fired weapon employing an explosive 4O-mm. grenade-type round 

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Concentrated fire of all weapons for a specifi ed time at optimum rate 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military 

units subord in ate to the Central Office of 

South Vietnam, military regions, or other 

higher echelons of command 
marching fire 

MEDCAP 

meeting engagement 

NOP 

NIAGARA FALLS 

NVA 

OA 

pattern activity analysis 

PSVOP 

QL 

quad-.50 

RAG 

RPG2 

5-3 

search and dear 

search and destroy 

"Spooky" 

Task Force ALPHA 

GLOSSARY 163 

Fire delivered by infanLry in an assault, especially with rifle rired from the hip or rapidly from the shoulder 

Medical Civic Action Program 

Collision between two advancing forces, 

neither of which is fully deployed for battle 

Night defensive position 

Cover operation designed to place combat 

elements in position for CWAR FALLS before 

striki ng the main blow 

North Vietnam Army 

Objective area 

Procedure begun in mid-l966 which consisted 

of detailed plotting on maps of information 

on enemy activity obtained from a variety 

of sources over an extended period of time 

Rubberized SOO-gallon containers used to 

hold bulk Class III products 

Psychological operations 

Vietnamese national route 

Four heavy machine guns that traverse from 

a single pedestal and which are fired simu ltaneously by one gunner 

River Assault Croup (Vietnamese) 

Small Soviet-made bazooka-type antitank 

grenade launcher 

Operations and tra ining officer 

Offensive military operation designed to 

sweep through an area with the mission of 

locating, driving out, or destroying the 

enemy 

Orfensive operations designed to seek out 

and destroy enemy forces, headquarters, 

and supply installations, with emphasis on 

destruction rather than re-establishment of 

government control 

C-47 aircraft with two 7.62-mm. Gatling-Iype 

guns and illumination flares 

1st and 5th South Vietnamese Marine Battal-
164 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

Task Force DE .... NE 

Task Force WALLACE 

TL 

Tropic Lightning Div ision 

TUCSON 

VC 

ions under the control of the U.S. 25th Divi~ 

sian for Phase I of J UNCTION CITY 

U.S. 173d Airborne Brigade during Operation N I ACARA FALts 

Two South Vietnamese units (35th Ranger 

Battalion and one troop from the 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry) wh ich augmented the 

U.S. Ist Division in Phase I of JUNCTION 

Cm 

Vietnamese provincial route 

U.S. 25th In fantry Division 

Deception operation conducted to position 

forces and materiel for J UNCTION CITY 

Viet Cong 
Index 

A Go Noi (II: 46 

ABll£N!: S 

Acciden", combtl: 112-13 

Agen .. , employment of: 17 

Air blowers, laclial use: 72_73 

Air ddense, enemY" 17 

Air open lions. Su Tlctical lir luppon. 

Air strikes. 5., Ta(tical lir sUllporl. 

Air units, Army. Su Helioopter •. 

Airborne Billalions: 

hi. !I03d Brigade: ... ,5-46 

!d, S03d Brigade: 4~!IO,!IS, 73. 101 

4th.505d Brigade : <IS, SS 

Airborne Brir-del 

hi. 10ht Division: 84. 87 

173d: 11.22-23.28-29.31.46.71.84.87, 

97, 100-1I1,I!3 .12~26. 128, I~ 

Airdrops. 5., Airlil .. 01 troops Ind 

luppliet; Panchule assaults. 

Airfield construclion: 83. 87.90. 106-107. 

112, 119.122-23. 126. 153. 159 

Airlifl.1 of troops Ind supplia: 2. 12. 23, 

21.29-31. S<I. 47,112.120.121, 140, 1S6 

Airmobile luaulu: 8. 11 .23.30-31, , ... -36, 

38 .... 2-4S.S4.64-66.8~.93.96. 100-

102. 10<1-106. 109-10, 122, 124, 126. 

13S-37, ''''2, IS7, 1S9 

ALA MOANA : ~ 

Alall, Clplain Raoul H.: 129-34 

Ambush IClions: 26. 47-49, 77, 119. 129_32. 

142-43 

Ambush IClions. enemy: $, 7, 17. 121, 13S 

Ammunition supply: 47. 112, 120. 138. 1S6 

Amphibious openlion,. Su Republic of 

Vietnl m Nlvy. 

An Loc: 7, 23. 8S, 90.107,122 

Ap Ihu Bang : 123, 128-3$ 

Ap Cha Do: 13S 

Ap Gu: 124. 128. 140-<18. 157-59 

Armor units: 18.22-23, 100, 103. 127. J,29-

33. 139-40, 149 

Armored Blltllions, 2d, '4th Armor: 46. " ...... Armored Clvalry Regiment, 11th: 18,22. 

28-29.31,44, 55, ~I, 87. 100-11 , 

123-24, 1S4 

Armored penonnel arrien: 74, 119-20, 

129-33, 151 

A!'Senab. enemy: 93 

Artillery Bases 

I : 29, 71,102.114, 120, 126 

II : 112.114,118.120 

III: 120 

Anillery Blllilions 

!d. 33d Artillery: 114. 119 

!d. 17lh Arlillery : 136-40 

3d, 319th Al1i1lery: 101 

7th, 9th Al1i11ery: 129 

Artillery rire . uppon: 30, 31. "'2-43, 77-78. 

93, 100,100.110,114-16.119-20.13 1. 

134-3S. 137.., 138-44, 146-48. I!>6-SS 

Atrocitia. enemy: 3. S, 8$-86 

ArrUBOlto: I. 4. 8--12, 83, 85. 135. 148. 

'" Avillion Ballilion, isl: 35 

Base camps: 64. 83, 90, 112. 119. 122-23, 

126, 149. IS3 

Base camps. enemy: 21, 42, 44. 68. 70.84, 

86.95-96. tOol. 106-107, lSI 

SIU Bi ng: 131 

SIU lon,: 84, 94, 96 

Blumann, lieulenant Colonel Lewis R. : 44 

Beehive rounds: 138-:19 

Ben CII: 15.23, 29,31,44.58.00-61.64.86 

Ben Cat Di$lri(l: 75 

Ben Co: 'l7 

Bt:n Suc:: 15,23,25,29.31,34-42.44,55, 

58-S9.78 

Bender. LieUlenant Colonel John A.: 136 

8ien Boa: 29. 31.101.126 

8inh Duong: 34 

8inh Ci.: 5, 1S4 

Binh Long Province: 84. 94-M 

8 IRMINCHAM: 7. 15,83 

81.ck Vi",in Mountain (Nui Ba Den): 11. 

86. 118, 127 

Blocking Posilion, 

YANKEE: 25 

ZULU: 29 

80 Tuc: 109-10, 124 

80i loi woo,h: 25_26. 35 

'" 
166 CEDAR FALlS-JUNCTION CITY 

Booby 'nps_ enemy : 22, 37, 42, !l1. 18, 149 

Bothwell, S~nnt Frank : 48-<$9 

Bridle con3trudion, destruction, and 

repair: 17.60-61,66,90, lOS- lOot. 122-

23, 152- 53 

Brown, Sergelnt Juliul: 49 

Brownl~, Lieutenant Colonel Rober! W.: 

...... , 

Buddhi"" , 

Bufbln turbine: 73 

Bul1do~en : 62, 155. See aoo Land .. dearing 

opentions. 

Bunr Con,: 34 

Bunker syuems: 38, <10, 42, 47, M-S2, 55, 

59, 70.72,74.78,99, 110. \49, 151 

Caehul forestry Reserve: ' !:I-56 

Caldwell, Colonel William B.: 94. 100. I~ 

Cambodia : 7. I], M, 85-87. 91-93. 91-101, 

105- 106, 110, ]24, 140. 142, 148, 151. 

U3, U9 

C.mounlge, enemy: . 115 

C.pill l M ili"ry Dhlrict. Kepubli c of 

Vieln.m: 77 

Carlile, Major Cecil 0 .: 35 

Carney, Clpllin Thorn .. P.: 47, 49 

Caslro, Stdf Sergeant Frank P.: ,. 

CUlIl hies 

enemy: 7,12 ~, S6-37, 46, 52,~, 70. 74, 

79, gs, 96,106,108- 11,116,121. 128, 

I:J~. 140. 145. 147, 149 

Republic of Vietnlm: ~. 74 

United States: 12,~, '7. 66, 74.94.96, 

100, 106, 108-109, 112. 116. 119, 121. 

131"'~, 137. 140. 143-44, 147, 151 

Callie. enemy use of: 129 

C,U Dinh: 28 

Ca ... lry Squadron): 

ht. 4th Cayalry: 46, 5~, 509-60. 72 

3d, 4th C.Yllry : ~2 

3d, ~th ClYllry : 96. 129-35 

(Amtnl Highllnds: 157 

Centnl Oma of South Vietnam (COSVN): 

2-3. 12.77,83-84.87,90-91.93, 103, 

106. 108-10, 126, 1~ 53 

Chemical Det.chment. 242d: 60 

Chemical we3pons. use of: !I<I. 60, 68, 71-

ClUe" " ill)i pl"Ognm: 30, 56, 74, 76. 78, 93. 

106. 1~1-52 

Chon Th.nh: 9!1 

CiYic .ctions: 37-38, 46, ~2 S5. 1~1 52 

Ciyili,n IlTl'!;ular Defense Groups, 

Republic of Vietnam: 87,90. 112. 119. 

122- 25, IZti, I~' 

Civilians. eYlcullio,n Ind housin,; : 25, 29, 

34. 38-40, 58- .S9, 74, 77. 19 

Clothing distribution : 152 

Cluster bomb units: ~2, 114. 154. 146-48.I~ 

Cobb, Colonel Willi.m W.: 31,100,123 

Collins, Lieutenant Colonel Edward J.: 

118-19 

Combat Avillion Group. 12th: 24 

Combat unilS. Su Ground fon:ea. 

Communioltion" combat: 11~, 131 

Communications, enemy: 61 

Cordon·and-Klrch !aelia: 16 

Corps Tactical Zones 

J: 127.1509 

III: 11-18.22-24, 18-19, 81.1~1.153.157 

Cu Chi : 23, !IO, 55 

Cundiff. Clpt.in Brian H.: 146 

o.",.,r F_rd .. 113, 118 

D.niel, Lieuten.nl Colonel Ch.rln D.: 

II. 

DIU Tieng: 11 ,29,31, 35, 8~, 97,127 

Dlvi~. Sergelnt First CllUI Kenneth D. : 

Deadline "' nles: 65 

Deane, Bripdier GeRenl John R .• Jr.: 28, 

100-101, 123. Su "Iso TI&\r. Forces: 

DEAN!. 

Defolillion openl;on.: 41, 5~ 

Demolition oper1ltions: 38, 40-41, 68--69 

Dental servia.: 38 

DePuy, Mljor Genenl William E.: 11-12, 

24, 39, 10, 78,83, 112, 151 

Di An : 29 

Diem, N,;o Dinh: 3 

DiKipline, enemy: 1~7 

Di"ilIeries, enemy: 93 

Docu, con"""ction of: 152 

OocumenlS captured .nd destroyed : 10, 12, 

11,!IO, 46, 50, ~2, !I<I-~, 68-fi9, 74, 77, 

93.96, 101, 109, 137", 140, 151 

Donen, Staff Sergeant: 132 

Dmf!r-inf.ntry telms. !in Llnd·dearing 

opentKml. 

OU$tofr, . .H1I Helicopten: casualties, 

eYacultion by. 

Etersdorler, Capt.in Rudolf: 38 

Eisenhower, Dwiljht D.: I 
INDEX 167 

EL PASO II: 7,10 

Engin«f Ban.lions 

1st: 29, 40-<11, 60-71,107,122,155",159 

l68th: 61, 67-68, 119 

Engin~t Compilny, i15th: 27 

Engin«t Croup, 79th: 2-4, 60-61, 6!o 

Engineer operations' 103, 112, 119, 122, 

155 . .H •• /Jo by lubjecc. 

Engineer Scl1ool, Republic of Vietnam: 70 

Eqllipmentl~. 5.. Materiel losses. 

E".cuea. Su Ci"ilians, evacuation and 

housing. 

}'anner, Pri".te fin! Cllss Mich.el : -49 

fHta , fin! Lieutenant Roger A.: 129-33 

fie ld Force,lI: 11 , 1~24,:KI, 79, 83-90, 

97-111, 123. 125. 152 

}'ilhol Pl.nlllion: 25-27, 30, 52 . .5-4 

Fire power luperiority: 156 

Fire Suppor! B.ses: 156 

20: 129-32 

C: 125, 127, 1'711. 1-40, 1-44 ..... 7 

COLD: 127,136-'7 

PARRY: 126 

THRUST: 124, 144 

}'ish, Major Geort;e B.: 35 

}'ITOIRURG: 25-29 

Fllmethrowers, U$C! of: 60. 72 

t· ... 

di1tribution by U.s.: 152 

enemy los.ses: 10.12, SS. -43--'1-4, 0&6--47, 

51~2, .5-4-56. 60. 71, 74. 77_78, 93, 96, 

106-101, 151 

Fo ..... rd aifoontrollen: 115. ISS, 155 

Fo",hole ronJlrud;on: 156-57 

t'nnce, withd",wli by: I. 4 

t'rench Fort: 102, 110. 115. 126-27, 156 

Froelich. Colonel V. W., USAF: 107" 

Full"'r, Colonel Mal"'in D.: 27. 100 

GADSDEN: 84-87, 91-9-4 

Ganh, Colonel Manh.1I B.: 91, 9-4. 100. 

127. 136 

Caun, Pri""e FirSi ClaN Cary: 49 

Gene"a Accords: 1 

Gil Dinh : 15,'4 

Giap. General Vo N~yen. North Vietn.m 

Anny: 153 

Gonnan, Li"'utenlnt Colonel Paul F.: 134 

Grantham. Major Carl R.: -40 

Grenade ns.auhs: -47 

Gren.de au.ull1. en",my: 108-10, 115, 119-

20.131. 133, 142 

Griffin, Staff Serg""nt Richard A. : 119_20 

Grimsley, Colonel James A.: 31. 1-47 

Ground forces 

rommi!ment to the Republic of Vietnam: .., 

expansion: 5 

GUlm Conference: 158 

Guerrilla operations. enemy: 1-2. M-86, 

93. 129 

Hl ig. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M.: 

'I. 1-40-48 

Hasurd, Lieutenant Colonel Sidney S.: 

131-34 

H ... ·kins. Lieutenant Colonel Alvin S.: '5 

HIY, Mljor General John H .• Jr.: 97. 135. 

143. 153 

Helly, Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. : 45 

Helicopters 

au.ull1 by. Su Airmobile .... uhs: 

Tactiral lir ,upPOn, 

casualties, e"acultion by: 48, 116, 119-20. 

13-4. 1..0 

commitment 10 the Republic of Vie!nam: 

2 

damaged and destroyed: 44. 131, 151 

supply by. Set Airlifts of troops and 

supplies. 

Highway. :~, 97-106,108,110.112-13. 

116. 118. 120. 126-27, 15-9 

Highway 13: 7. 28. 84. 86, 9-4-96. 122-23, 

129, 133-'4 

Highway 14 : 67 

Highway 22: 97,103.108,110 

Highway 26: 87, 1-49 

Highway 239: 87. 95 

Highway 242: 95 

Highw.y 244: 123-27 

Hir;hway 245: 95-96 

HighwlY 2~: 90. 101-102, 107. 109. 122-

27 

Highway 247: 87, 97, 149 

Hill, Private Fin! CII» Michael: 49 

Ui11. Firs! Lieutenln! Richard A.: 142 ..... 3 

Ho So woodJ' 2~26. 30-'1. 52. ~ 

Hoi CMd. 5.a CII .. " Hoi propllm. 

Hollingswonh, Brigadier Cenen.1 

James F. : 131, 147 

Hospitals, construction of: 152 

Bua. StaffSert;unt Ceort;e: 192 
168 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

~. Major Donald A.: 36 

Illumination, baulefield: 52, 110, 131-32, 

i3~, 145, ISS 

Inlantry n an.lions 

bl,2d Infantry: 55, 140-48, 159 

1st, 5th Inlantry:!t<l 

hi, 16th Infantry: 0, 41,112-17,143-48, 

'" LII, 26th Inlantry: 29, 31. 37, 55, sg, ' 31.., 

H"--tO 

hi, 27th Inlantry: 51-52 

bl,28th Infantry: ., .... ", 6-(, "5 

2d,2d Inllnlry: 0, 112, 118-21. " 5 ... 

' 39-40 

2d, 12th Infanlry: 137--40 

2d, 18th Infantry: 44 

2<1,22d Inbnlry: 1!9-40 

2d, 27th Inrantry: 53 

2<1, 28th Infantry: 43-44, 112 

3d,22d Infantry: 136--10 

Infantry Bri,ades 

hi. Isllnlantry Division: 94-111.122-28 

151. 9th Inflmry Division : 97, 100, 12'2-

28, 129-35, 149, 156 

2<1, Ls. Inlantry Division: 28-29, 31, 37_ 

sa, 42, 55, 59, 72, L 10, 123-U, 1..0, 145 

2<1, 25th Infantry Divilion: 2!>, 27,~, 46, 

51,53,55, 100- 11 

3d, hi Inlantry Oivhion: 28-29, ' I, 42-

44,59,71 ,9-1-96, ]00-]2, ]20, ]24 

$d, 'Uh ]nfantry Division : 9], 100, ]08, 

]26-28, 1S6-4(l, 149, 1~7 

]96th Light : 7-a, II, 23, ~-30, -46, 5'--M, 

91, 100, 102, 105, 110, 126-28, ]49, ]56, 

nf~ntry '" Divisions 

in rounterinsu.,;ency opentions: ISo! 

ht , 7, ] I, 23-41, 45, 51, ~MI, 61, 68, 71, 

711. 1'1'\-9], 94-1] I, 122-29. ]31 , 13~. 

137", 140-48, 155_51 

4th: II 

9th: 19 

25th: II, 2,-SO, 46, 5 ]-55, 34-94, 97- 111 . 

126-28, 149, 156 

In fnrm devite5: 17,13 ] 

Intelligence estim.tes .nd opentiom: 12, 

17-]9,58-39,42.14_15,79,84--86,91, 

93.95. 109. 135, ]40, ISo! 

Intelligence e'Jtim"es and open . ion •. 

enemy: 110,158 

Iron Tri.ngle: 5. ]5, 18-42. ~5. 51-60, 63, 

6~. 67. 15-16, 18_79. 85. 158 

Johnson. Lyndon n .: 158 

Johnson. Speci.list four Walter: 411 

Joinl operation.: 21, 52. 11_18 

J .... lw~n, Capl~in CCOl'Sc A.: 14)-46 

Jungle de~ri g. Se. Land-c]earing 

openltions. 

K.tum; 87, 91-]00, 102- ]001 , 106-]09. ] ]6, 

,,, 

Kendall. Colonel M.urice W.: ]23 

K'em.n, Lieutenant Colonl" l Joseph M ., 

Jr.: 29, 40. 60, 155 .. 

King. Sergl"~nt Nathaniel: 41-48 

Knowles. Brig.dier Ceneral Rich.rd T .: 

26.54- 55,16-11.91. ]00, 127 

Ky, N~yen Cao: 4 

L.; Khe: 29. 91. 65, 91, 11 2. 122-23. 131. 

'56 . 

L.nd-cle.ring operations: 17.27,29.40,46. 

55, 60-66. 72. 74. 78. 106, 107". 112, 

123, 155 

I.anding 7.one 

IHI.AVO: ]24 

CII AJtUE: 124 

C!(InslnlClion: 60 

GEORG!: 124, 14G-44 

Lao Dong: 2-3 

l.uull, Lieutenant Colonel Rufus C.: 43, 

] 12, ]43-44 

l.I"anetJ. distribution. See I'l')'chological 

operations. 

Leonard, r latoon Se.,;eant M.uhew: 116-

17 

I.esson, from Vietnam: ]So!-60 

Lines of rommunication: HIO 

LiSlenin, posts: 48-49. 119, 142-43, 145 

"UUle Eleph.nt's Ear:- 110 

Lo Go: 83-85, 91-93. 110 

Lac Ninh: 85 

Lot!:iJlinl Comm.nd, bt: 24 

Logistical support , ]2, 155-56 

l OK"istical support, enemy: 95 

Long Binh : SO, 1.56 

Long Ciao,'1 

Long N,uyen: 31. 84, 95 

Lollel, Privlle t';nl Cl." Steve: 132 

Loudspeaker ' Pllells: 37, 15] 

McChristi.n, Bripdier General Joseph A.: 

18- 19,85 
INDEX 169 

Machine guns, types: 47,49, 70 

Maintenance and ~JHir! 65 

Maps 

capturtd from enemy : ~ 

preparation and U)e: 3!1 

Marum, Captlin Duane W.: 129 

Muks. Colonel Sidney 101 .: 31. 94.100.110, 

11!l-16 

Mag, principle of: 76 

~hterielloues : 74. 1!l1 

MlteriellO$SM. enemy: 7, 10, 12. 17, , '16, 

38.43- 44. -1(;47. !IO-!lI, !l1-!l!I, 68, 74, 

78_79.93.96. 103- 104, 106, 108. III. 

1]6. ]21 , 128. 135.140, 1!l1 

Mechanized unit •• employment of: 71, 93-

95.100, 102, 127. 190-40 

Mtdll of Honor award: 117 

Mtdic:a l services: 37-38. 46. !l3, 133-34. 

152. Su ,I/so Helicopten: c:a~ ualtie., 

e ... acuation by. 

Mtdic:a l sel"Yice5. enemy: 93 

Mel ... in, Chief Wa rnnt Officer Howard 1'.: 

,0> 

Michelin Plantl tion : 5, 84...a!1, 94, 96 

Military RC!"ions, Viet Cong 

III: 23 

IV: I!I. 18-19, 46, !IO.~. 69, 74-7!1. 78 

Mine5: 47 

Mine5, enemy : 22. 37. 42. 44, !II. 78,103, 

108, 127. 137, 149. 1!l7_!19 

Minh Thlnh : 94- 96. 101. ]04. 106, 116. IW, 

'56 

Minh Thl nh Pll ntltion: 84 

Moniton: 70-71 

Mon500ns. Su Weather, effec:l on 

operations. 

Morllrll and mortlr luaulu: 47. 112, ] 19. 

129, 138. 145 ..... 4, 148 

Mortan Ind mOM .. UAulu, enemy: 112. 

115, 119-20, 127, 131 -32, 137-38, '45-

.. MOlDr ... ehicle loue,: 74, 1!l1 

NII,,]m, combat U$C: 134 

National Liberation }'ront : 2_3 

N ..... l gunfire support: 2 

N''''f1Hd: !l4 

Nha Viec: !l1 

NI .... GAR.A f .... l.LS, 29. 60-61. 6S 

Ni!ht operations: 26, '!I. 48, !l2. 142 ..... '. 

Nonnan '*" , Privlte Fiot ClaM Martin : 49 

NOMh Vietnam. SH.1so Viet Con!_ 

auression in South : 2-9 

Wl r aims: I 

Nonh VielnameJe Army. Sn ,I/so Viet 

Cong. 

combat effecti ... en".: 2 

commitment to South: !I 

strength: 2 

IOlst Regiment: II , 84-8!1. 116, 13!1 

Nui 8a Den (Black Virt;in Mountain), II, 

86, 118, 127 

Obert;, Major il.obert E.: S6 

Office of Ci ... il Operations: 23. 40 

Operational Objective Areas 

fAUST: 124 

SIOUX: 124, 140 

Opportunities mi~ : 1!19 

Owens. Caplain William B.: 36 

Pacification programs: !I 

Palmer. Lieutenant General Bruce, Jr.: 123 

Parachute assaults: 15, 8'-s., ]01, ]03" 

Patrols, !"round : 17,26, 47 ..... 9, 53, 114, 137. 

,<2 

Pltrol!, ri ... erine: 71 . 77-78 

Paltem acti ... ity analysi,: 17-18.84, 1!l4 

Pendleton, Lieutenant Colonel Elmer D.: 

Penedo. " Specialist four Abco:l .. do: 199 

J'etroleum, oil,lubriQlnlJ (POL) supply : 

.. ..., 

Photography. combat U'I<!: 17. 3!1 

I'hu Cuon!" : 23, '4, 39, 53, 70, 78 

I'hu Hoa Dong : 25. 27, 90, 46.!l2 

I>hu 1.oi: 27. Sl 

I>hu Thuan : 27 

PhIlO(: Tuy Pro ... ince: 79 

I'huoc: Vinh : 23, 29 

Pinkn!!y, Sert;e.nt Alton B. : 3!1 

J'opular Forces. il.el'ublicof Vietn.m , 17 

Postal service. enemy: 93 

I'ower systems. construction of: 1!l2 

I'rck KIQk : 87. 97- 100. 102. ~. 108. 110, 

112-21. 126-27, 14\1, ]!l9 

l'rimis. Major Nick J.: 3!1 

I'r i~ners_ enemy: 12.36. S8-40. 44. 50 

!l6-57, 68, 13-74,106. III, 116, 121. 

128, 13!1, 140, 149. Sn.bo Cl,,~ .. HOt 

program. 

P5ychological operations: 97. !I6-!l7, 13!1. 

15]_52 
170 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

PsychologiCilI operations, enemy: 86, 108-

10, 142 

Quan !.oi: 23, 97,102.106, 122-23, I~ 

Rich 11Ip: 34, 39, ~, 64, 67 

Rich Kien: ~ 

Rich Sun: 26,!14 

itadu, (Ombal U~ : 131 

Ramos·Rullrio, Stiff Sergeant: ]32 

Rl tions: 41 

Recoilless riflc fire, e nemy : 110, 119-20, 

131, I". "7-38, 143 

ReronnailAnce, Icri. l: 17, !it, ~-~~, 158-

.. Reconnaissance, ground: 112-1'. 119, '3', ". 

Refugee •. Su Civilians. cVI(Ullion Ind 

houting. 

Regional Forces, Republic of Vietnam: 17. 

Repair " parts. Slit: tohinlenlnce and rep!lir. 

Rep"ri";on prognm .~. CIIKu HOI 

program. 

Republic of Vietnam 

polilial crises: !I-!J 

U.S. policy Ind commitment: \-2 

U.S. Ilrength : 2, 1M 

Republic of Vietnal1l .mlC~d forces, 

expansion: ,SIIt:.1so by name. 

Republic: of Vietnam Army 

airborne uniu: 77 

CIIjUlllies: 5, 74 

Ranger units: 5 

hi Airborne Tuk Force: 40 

hi 1>liIit.ry Intelligence Detachment : SS 

~ 8lttllion, hI Clvllry: 97 

~Ih Division : 7, U-~ 

71h Regiment: ~. 2~, ~2 

3~Ih Ranger 8a"a lion : 46, 97 

!16th Ibnger 8a"llion: 1"", 149 

Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps: ~, 

104_ IM 

Republic of Vielnam Navy: 24, 39, ~2, 77-

Revolution " ary Development: 97. 110. 124 

Riverine (Ipe:nti(lnJ: 70-71 

ROld mn$truclion and repair: 39. 60. 74. 

103- 104, 106 

Ro.d nelS: 22. See also High .... ys. 

Roo::ht a",uhs: 146 

Roo::ket a»lulu. enemy : 115. UI. ISS. 143 

Rogers. Specialist Four Astor: 37 

Rome plo ... : 62-63, I~S 

Routes. Su lIighwaY" 

RuleS: 19.22. 2S-29. 76. 84-8~. 1~3-~ 

Ru"", I'rivate .'ir'l Cia" Joseph : 48 

SI, Le Vln: 56-~1 

S.botage: 7~ 

S.igon: 5. 7. 15, 18,34, Sol. 15. 78.104. 1M. 

S.igon River: 1~18, 23-24. 26-27. 30-34, 

46. ~1-~2, ~9-00. 70-71.86.90. 107, 

122 I~ 

Sampans, aClions against: 46. ~1-~2. 93 

Schools, oon"ru(;tion of: 152 

Schweib;er, ~hjor Robert t .: 39 

Seaman. Lieuten.nt General Jonathan 0., 

15-24. ~1, 76-79. 83-84, 97, 104-10!!, 

Sean:h·.nd-destmy '" (Ipenti(lns: 8-10. 2~-

27.29.42. 44-46. ~l. S3-~, 77, 87. 90-

93.96-100. 103. 106, 110. 112-13. 12S24.126-27,10l0-I2, 149, I~ 

Searchlights. Se~ lIIuminltion, bllliefieid. 

Security measures' 23, 40. 76-77,84. 100. 

Securily '" measures. enemy: 83 

Seibert. Colonel Donald A.: 123 

SenIOr devices: 17 

Short. Fint Ueutenant Harlan E.: 129 

Sigholtz. Lieutenl l1t ColoneL Robert H.: 

0 . 101 

Silencers, use of: 67 

Simpson. Lieutenanl Colonel Willi. m C.: 

43. 142 

Smoke. lI(1ic-l use: 35, 47, 72, 114- 15 

Sniper", enemy: 37. 44. 51, 66, 70, II~ . 120 

Soldier. tribute to: 1~-60 

Speci.1 Forces, U.S. Anny: 2, 7, 11.83.87, 

90. !l0, 112. 119, 122-23. 126. 149. 1~3 

Speci.l Forces Group, th : 2. II 

SroeCon Trang : 122-25,127,19711.140 

Stevens. Speci.lisl Four Eu"ene W.: 129-

Stn.tegic " .ir support : 2 

Suo; Cau: 3~ 

Suoi Da: 7. 11.81,102. 104- IM. 107. ... 112. 

116, 120. 126-27, 149, 1M. 

Suoi S,mat: 139 

Suo; Tre: 127_28. 13~ 

Supply lo~. Se. Mlleriel 105~. 

Supply ,Ylteml and operations: 12, 604-6~, 

71. 8~, 123- 24 
INDEX 171 

Supply sy5tl!mS and opO!rttions, I!nl!my: 

'1-'4, SII, 41--42, 71. 91, ~ 

SurpriSO!, application of: !l4-,7, 76, 14!'!, I~!I 

Tlcliaol air support; 2, 10-12, 18, 90-'1, 

!l4, '7, 42 ..... ', 77_78, 93, 10!!-104, 110, 

114_16,120, 132, Is.t.-,!'!, I" .. , 1'8--0, 

146, 148, IS~SS. Su .Iro SI"'t~ic lir 

support. 

Tin Son Nhul: S4, 78 

Tin Uyeno 8!1 

Tlnk 105SeJ: 74, 1'1. 1!l1 

Tlnk unit,. Sn Armor units. 

TlnkdO>:O!T$. Su Lind-dearing opO!ralions. 

Tlsk forces 

ALPHA: 100. 10-4- IM 

DEANE: 28-29, SI, 42, 44-46. !I!I,!I'}, 74 

OREGON: 127 

WALLACE: 97_100 

Tay Ninh: 8, 23. 26, !I~, 86--87, 90-91. 97-

100. 127, 149, I~ 

Tly Ninh Military School, ViI!! Cong: 7S 

Tay Ninh ProyinC'O!: 7, 11_12. I!I, 79. 8!1. 87 

Tl!rnin {"lUres: 22, 42, 86, 91. 94_9!1, 142. 

1!I6-~7 

Terrorism. Se, Atrocitiu, I!nemy. 

Te/ C'O!ISO!·fi.O!: ISS 

Thanh Dien fOTutry RO!SO!rve: I!'!, 19-2!J, 

42, 44-4!1, 41, !l1-~, &I, 67, 11 

Thi Tinh RiyO!r: I~, 2', 2!1, 28, 30-31. 44, 

47, S2, S5, ~I, 70-71, 158 

Thieu, Nguyen Van: 4 

Trai Bi : 93, 10!!-104, I~ 

Thuln. Brig-diu General Phan Quoc, 

Amly of the Republic of Vietnam: 24 

Tim" !l4, 13 

Traffic control : 26 

Tnining program. and If us, enl!my: II, 

Trench " systems, I!nemy' 10,42, 110 

Trickett, Priyatl! Finl Class William: 10 

TUCSON: 84--81, 91. 94-96 

TunntlsySll!mt: 10. 12,23, SII, 4(1.-42, 47, 

S4-!lS, SQ, 66-10, 72, 74, 78-79, 128 

Ulm, Captlin Donlld S. : 11'-16 

United SlIles Air force : 11. to!!, 15S 

Tactical Air Commlnd: II!I 

~enlh Air )'orce: 24 

~ Tadiaol fighter Winl!;: 24 

United Stites MarinI! Corps: 2 

United SlIles Milillry ANi)l.nce AdviJOry 

Croup, Vietnam : 2 

United Slltes Milillry Assistance 

Command, Vietnam. Se. "I.., 

Westmoreland, Cenent William C. 

!!Ienesis: 2 

trl!n~h. See Republic of Vietnam. U.S. 

"TI':nl!;th. 

Vim Co Oong: 86 

Vlnn, John : 2' 

Vl!ssey. Lieutenant Colonel John W .. Jr. : 

136 

Viet Cong:. Su "I.ro North Vietnam: North 

Vietnaml!SO! Army. 

combat effectiveness: 2. 1!'I1-58 

strength: 2. 4_!'I 

tlcti(3: 5. 158 

9th Diyision : S. 7,10_12.79,84--85.90. 

116, 121. 128-49. ~1. 1~3, 1!If; 

70th Guards Ret;iment: 91. 93. 140--4S 

16~th Regiment : 19,27-28,3(1,34 

27lst Regiment : II, 8!'1, 91. 93, 108. 1«1-

48,I~ 

272d Ret;iment : S, II, 19, 8!1, 91, ~96. 

121. l3!1--40 

273d Regiment : II, 8~,I29-3~ 

680th Tnining Regiml'nl : 91. 93 

Phu Lai Saltalion: 19,~, H.!I!I 

lst Blltalion: 19. 74 

2d BIIUllion : 19 

~ Ballalion: 19 

7th B.llilion : 19, 7~ 

8th Ballalion : 19,14 

Ben Cal District Company: 95 

6ht Company : 34, H 

63d Company: 29 

U-80 Artillery: 140 

Vietnam War. lesson. from: 1S4-60 

WIT Zone C: S-1. II, IS, 79, 83-90. ~_9S, 

105,107, 122-27. I~S. 140. 149. ISI-~', 

1>8-" 

W.r Zone 0: 5, 9~ 

Wiler supply : 1~2 

Weapon510SKJ. SIt Materiel losses. 

Welther, effect on opO!ntions: 22, 83, 86, 

91, 140 

Wntmorel.nd, General William C.: I!I, 

18-19,..0. 7~. 79, 83-84, IS3, I~. See 

dt... United Stile. Milillry AssistlnC'O! 

Command, Vietnam. 
172 CEDAR FALLS-JUNCTION CITY 

Weyand. Major ~neral Frederick C.: 24, 

91. 100, ]51 

Whitloo, Lieutenant Colonel Jack G.: 44 

Wild, Colonel Hugh: 107" 

Williams, Stllff Sergealll Eme, l: 37 

Wolfe, Semnd lieutenant Hinom M" IV : 

129-33 

Xom Giua: 91-93 

Xuan Loc: 22