NITED STATES ARTMENT OF MMERCE

BLICATION NBS TECHNICAL NOTE 807

Building Performance in the

1972 Managua Earthquake

575?>

.SCI

1*113

tZ

U.S.

ARTMENT

OF

OMMERCE

National

Bureau

of

Standards
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

The National Bureau of Standards 1 was established by an act of Congress March 3, 1901. The Bureau's overall goal is to strengthen and advance the Nation's science and technology

and facilitate their effective application for public benefit. To this end, the Bureau conducts

research and provides: (1) a basis for the Nation's physical measurement system, (2) scientific and technological services for industry and government, (3) a technical basis for equity in trade, and (4) technical services to promote public safety. The Bureau consists of the Institute for Basic Standards, the Institute for Materials Research, the Institute for Applied Technology,

the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, and the Office for Information Programs.

THE INSTITUTE FOR BASIC STANDARDS provides the central basis within the United

States of a complete and consistent system of physical measurement; coordinates that system

with measurement systems of other nations; and furnishes essential services leading to accurate and uniform physical measurements throughout the Nation's scientific community, industry,

and commerce. The Institute consists of a Center for Radiation Research, an Office of Measurement Services and the following divisions: Applied Mathematics — Electricity — Mechanics — Heat — Optical Physics — Nuclear

Sciences 2 — Applied Radiation " — Quantum Electronics 3 — Electromagnetics 3 — Time

and Frequency 3 — Laboratory Astrophysics 3 — Cryogenics \

THE INSTITUTE FOR MATERIALS RESEARCH conducts materials research leading to improved methods of measurement, standards, and data on the properties of well-characterized materials needed by industry, commerce, educational institutions, and Government; provides

advisory and research services to other Government agencies; and develops, produces, and

distributes standard reference materials. The Institute consists of the Office of Standard Reference Materials and the following divisions: Analytical Chemistry — Polymers — Metallurgy — Inorganic Materials — Reactor

Radiation — Physical Chemistry.

THE INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED TECHNOLOGY provides technical services to promote

the use of available technology and to facilitate technological innovation in industry and

Government; cooperates with public and private organizations leading to the development of

technological standards (including mandatory safety standards), codes and methods of test; and provides technical advice and services to Government agencies upon request. The Institute consists of a Center for Building Technology and the following divisions and offices: Engineering and Product Standards — Weights and Measures — Invention and Innovation — Product Evaluation Technology — Electronic Technology — Technical Analysis — Measurement Engineering — Structures, Materials, and Life Safety * — Building

Environment * — Technical Evaluation and Application * — Fire Technology.

THE INSTITUTE FOR COMPUTER SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY conducts research and provides technical services designed to aid Government agencies in improving cost effec- tiveness in the conduct of their programs through the selection, acquisition, and effective

utilization of automatic data processing equipment; and serves as the principal focus within

the executive branch for the development of Federal standards for automatic data processing

equipment, techniques, and computer languages. The Center consists of the following offices and divisions: Information Processing Standards — Computer Information — Computer Services —

Systems Development — Information Processing Technology.

THE OFFICE FOR INFORMATION PROGRAMS promotes optimum dissemination and

accessibility of scientific information generated within NBS and other agencies of the Federal Government; promotes the development of the National Standard Reference Data System and

a system of information analysis centers dealing with the broader aspects of the National Measurement System; provides appropriate services to ensure that the NBS staff has optimum

accessibility to the scientific info.mation of the world. The Office consists of the following

organizational units: Office of Standard Reference Data — Office of Technical Information and Publications —

Library — Office of International Relations.

1 Headquarters and Laboratories at Gaithersburg, Maryland, unless otherwise noted; mailing address Washington, D.C. 20234.

3 Part of the Center for Radiation Research.

1 Located at Boulder, Colorado 80302.

* Part of the Center for Building Technology.
Building Performance in the

1972 Managua Earthquake

National Bureau c' APR 2 9 1974

Richard N. Wright and Samuel Kramer

Center for Building Technology

Institute for Applied Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

^TOPc

<v

/ V %

c

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Frederick B. Dent, Secretary

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Richard W. Roberts, Direcfor

Issued November 1973
National Bureau of Standards Technical Note 807

Nat. Bur. Stand. (U.S.), Tech. Note 807, 155 pages (Nov. 1973) CODEN: NBTNAE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Order by SD Catalog No. 013.46:807). Price $1.60
ABSTRACT

Following the Managua, Nicaragua, earthquake of

December 23, 1972, a team of engineers representing the U.S.

Department of Commerce's National Bureau of Standards (NBS)

and the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) performed

field investigations in Managua, Nicaragua, from December 26,

1972, to January 4, 1973. The objectives were to assist the

Nicaraguan government in surveying major buildings to determine whether each was suitable for emergency use, repairable,

or appropriate for clearance. The team also viewed the

patterns of successful performance and damage to identify

needs for improvements in building practices for mitigation

of earthquake hazards and opportunities for more detailed

investigations which could provide information for future

improvements in practices.

The Managua earthquake, estimated at Richter magnitude

6.25, was not a great earthquake, but the loss of life

approached 10,000, approximately 75 per cent of Managua's

450,000 occupants were rendered homeless, and property

damages are estimated to approach $1 billion. In general,

these damages cannot be attributed to unusual intensities of

ground shaking or severity of surface faulting. Most damages

appeared to result from deficiencies in building practices;

deficiencies which had been exhibited many times before in

previous earthquakes, deficiencies which would be avoided by

implementation of up-to-date provisions for earthquake

resistant design and construction. However, Managua did not

employ a building code with seismic design requirements

appropriate to its earthquake risk, and furthermore, did not

have a building. regulatory system capable of effective implementation of its building code provisions.

This report documents the observations of damages by the

NBS/NAE team and points out relationships to inadequacies in

the building practices employed. Most of these inadequacies

have been well known; however, the Managuan experience may

serve as an incentive to improvement of building practices in

many other areas which are subject to substantial earthquake

risks and have not consistently accounted for these risks in

their building codes and building regulatory system.

Key words: Building codes; buildings; earthquakes; hazards;

natural disasters; structures.

m
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT iii

1. INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 General Situation 1 1.2 Earthquake Characteristics 6

1.3 Disaster Investigation 7

2. GENERAL OBSERVATION 19

2.1 Taquezal Construction 19

2.2 Critical Facilities 19

2.3 Comparison of Shear Wall and Unbraced Frames 25

2.4 Performance of Housing 28

3. CAUSES OF DAMAGES 31

3.1 Inadequate Strength in Vertical Planes 31

3.2 Inadequate Strength in Horizontal Planes 31

3.3 Detailing for Energy Absorption 31

3.4 Adequate Clearances or Connections 32

3.5 Direct Hazards from Nonstructural Elements 32

3.6 Anchorage of Equipment and Industrial Facilities 33

3.7 Structural Effects of Nonstructural Elements 33

3.8 Additions and Modifications 34

3.9 Building Codes and the Building Regulatory System 34

4. REPORTS OF INSPECTIONS OF BUILDINGS 36

5. SUMMARY 37

REFERENCES 38

APPENDIX A 39

APPENDIX B 41

IV
BUILDING PERFORMANCE

IN THE

1972 MANAGUA EARTHQUAKE

by

1/ Richard N. Wright- and Samuel Kramer

1 . INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the field investigation conducted by a National

Bureau of Standards' team following the Managua, Nicaragua, earthquake of

December 23, 1972. The major emphases in the investigaiton were to assist

Nicaraguan authorities in evaluating the conditions of public buildings

immediately following the disaster, and to observe causes of building

failures for guidance toward improvements of practices for design, construction and occupancy of earthquake resistant buildings.

1.1 General Situation

Nicaragua, shown in figure 1, is the largest of the Central American

republics. Its area is approximately 57,000 sq. miles and its population

2/ was 2 million in a 1972 estimate [11- . Managua is located in the western

central portion of the country at the south edge of Lake Managua. A chain

of volcanoes traverses Nicaragua from the northwest to the southeast. As

noted by the Geological Survey [2], Managua earthquakes may arise from the

discontinuity in the line of volcanoes near Managua.

Managua has had earlier disasterous earthquakes, most recently in

1931 [3 and 41. The whole of western Nicaragua is a seismicly active

region. Geological theory attributes this activity to the relative

movements of crustal plates; the Cocos and Caribbean plates intersect in

the vicinity of the lines of volcanoes traversing western Nicaragua. An

aerial view of the city on December 26, figure 2, shows the line of

— Dr. Wright, formerly Deputy Director-Technical, Center for Building

Technology, is now Professor of Civil Engineering, University of Illinois,

Urbana, Illinois. —2/ Figures in brackets indicate the literature references at the end

of this paper.

C\J

sOl£

o

a> Q

en

aj>

•rcu <

s-en
Z5C

4-O

Q.

C\J

CO

CD
•I

C_3

14-O

s-Qi

+->

CD O

n3
volcanoes to the northwest and smoke arising from the damaged city.

The city of Managua, shown in figure 3, has a populated region of

approximately 10 kilometers from east to west and 4 kilometers from north

to south. The surficial deposits are volcanic in origin. In both the

1931 and the 1972 earthquakes, fault traces were observed in the central

portions of the city. Traces of the earthquake faulting transmitted

through the overburden material appeared as ground breakage lines trending

from the southwest to the northeast as shown in figure 3. In 1931 [3 and

4] the principal faulting was near the stadium in the west central portion

while in 1972 [2] traces traversed Laguna Tiscapa and the Aduana building

in the east central portion.

1.2 Earthquake Characteristics

A preliminary report on the earthquake characteristics has been provided by the Seismological Field Survey, National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) [5]. The main shock of the earthquake occurred at

06:29:42 GCT (12:29 a.m. Nicaraguan time) on December 23, 1972. The

Richter magnitude of the main shock was 6.25. The AR240 accelerograph at

the ESSO refinery (location A, figure 3) 4 kilometers west of the Estadio

General Somoza recorded the following peak accelerations in g's: 0.39 EW,

0.34 NS, and 0.33 V. The duration of shaking for peaks above 0.20g was

5 seconds. Seismoscope records, two at the ESSO refinery, one at the

prestressed concrete plant west of the city, and the other at the National'

Agricultural School near the Las Mercedes airport, showed no generally

pronounced directionality of motion. Since the ESSO refinery was about

5 kilometers west of the area of major faulting near Laguna Tiscapa, it

appears that peak acceleration in the center of the city may have

approached or exceeded 0.5g.

The population of Managua at the time of the earthquake was approximately 450,000. The initial damage survey by local authorities [6] showed

4,000-6,000 dead; 20,000 injured; 220,000-250,000 homeless; 13 km2 des2

troyed; 14 km damaged including water, sewerage, and power distribution

systems; 7,000,000 m of rubble; 53,000 dwelling units lost or seriously

damaged; 95 per cent of the shops and small factories lost or seriously
2

damaged; 400,000 m of commercial buildings lost or seriously damaged;

2 340,000 m of public and private offices lost or seriously damaged; 4

hospitals with a total of 1,650 beds lost or seriously damaged; 51,700

persons lost employment; and $851.1 million total loss in building,

equipment, inventory, emergency assistance, and accounts receivable. The

State Department reported [7] 10,000 people dead, 20,000 injured, 300,000

displaced from their homes, and 600 city blocks destroyed by the earthquake. Indications of the general extent of the damages are shown in

photographs taken from the Banco Central, looking to the south, figure 5;

southeast, figure 6; east, figure 7; northeast, figure 8; north northeast,

figure 9; north, figure 10; and northwest, figure 11.

1.3 Disaster Investigation

This section describes the conditions of the disaster investigation.

An earthquake striking a major metropolitan area creates needs for technical assistance in relief activities and provides valuable information on earthquake effects. Both responses must be prompt. Delay can mean

additional losses from use of hazardous facilities or destruction of

repairable facilities. Emergency response activities will remove valuable

scientific and technical evidence.

The situation for attaining access and conducting the investigation

is described here to guide future disaster investigations.

The National Bureau of Standards was informed of the earthquake on December 23, 1972, by the warning service of the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration. The preliminary notification included reports

of substantial damage to the city of Managua, and as a result of this

information NBS and N0AA activated plans for dispatching teams to the

disaster site. The situation was reviewed with Dr. Nathan M. Newmark

of the University of Illinois who indicated that the event could be of

substantial technical interest and that the National Academy of

Engineering was sending Dr. Mete A. Sozen of the University of Illinois

to investigate the earthquake. Mr. Samuel Kramer, Chief, Office of

Federal Building Technology, Center for Building Technology, arranged

for State Department authorization of a combined National Bureau of
s4->

CD O

O

o

(0 CO

CD

Q.O+>

O

S- 4-

+>

ZJo

«/5

cu

CU

s-en
S-c

CD o

o

o

c

CO

cu

Q.O

<T5 o

s_ M-

+->

l/J A3

CD -GO

CD

to

CD

i-
S-Eooe

rC CQ

OJ

4-» Q.O

+-> fOEO

S-

<i4->

«/) fO

a;

a;

CT>

10
s-

+-> c

CD OOc

CO

<u sz

Q.o

+-> o

M-

-t-> (/)

<T3

<L) JZ

S-o

<L>

co

0)

C7>

11
oo

CO

O)

Q.O

4->

rt3 O

S- M4->

«/) A3

CD -c

+-> s-oc

.c

s- • O r— C fOS- S +>

<1) c

•i- CD > O

0>

CD

CT)

12
S-

+->c

CD oooc

fO en

CD

CLo

+->o

s- 4--C

s-o

CD

CD

s_ZSCD

13

525-814O - 73 - 2
14
Standards/National Academy of Engineering (NBS/NAE) team to investigate

the disaster. The team consisted of Dr. Mete Sozen, Mr. Samuel Kramer

and Dr. Richard Wright, Deputy Director-Technical Center for Building

Technology, National Bureau of Standards. At the same time arrangements

were made for entrance of a team of seismologists from the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration led by Dr. S. T. Algermissen.

Authorization to enter Nicaragua was issued by the State Department

on the evening of December 24, 1972. The team members, who traveled from

Urbana, Illinois; Cayuga, New York; and Potomac, Maryland, met at Bethesda

Naval Hospital at 6:00 p.m. on December 25, 1972, to obtain necessary

immunizations and departed for Managua at 11:25 p.m.

While the commercial flights to Managua were not running on regular

schedules, the team managed to enter Managua by flying from Washington,

D.C. to Panama; from Panama to San Jose, Costa Rica, by LACSA airlines;

and from San Jose, Costa Rica, to Managua by TACA airlines, and arrived at

the Managua airport at approximately 2:00 p.m. on December 26, 1972. The

NBS/NAE team was the first United States group of professional and

research engineers responding to the earthquake to arrive on the site of

the disaster. The U.S. Embassy personnel at the airport, who were expecting the team, provided maps and transportation to a camp located on the

grounds of the residence of General Anastasio Somoza at El Retiro, (location B, figure 3). Tent quarters and C-rations at El Retiro were provided

by a detachment of the U.S. Army 3rd Civil Affairs Group, USS0UTHC0M

Disaster Area Survey Team (DAST), who were working on restoration of water

supply and power services. A view of the camp is shown in figure 12.

The NBS/NAE team was warmly received by the Nicaraguan authorities.

Immediately upon arrival on December 26, 1972, the team was escorted on

a preliminary survey of the city by Ing. Max Kelly who was acting as an aide to General Somoza. On December 27, 1972, the team continued informal

investigations of the damage with the assistance of helicopter transportation provided by General Somoza and ground transportation provided by the

Nicaraguan Army. At El Retiro contacts were made with various segments

of the Nicaraguan government, and liaisons were established with the

Nicaraauan Ministry of Public Works for coordinated efforts in investigations of building damage.

15
16
On December 28, 1972, the NBS/NAE team plus Mr. Karl Steinbrugge, a consulting structural engineer with the NOAA seismological team, were

granted a pass, figure 13, for access to the restricted areas of the city

and for conducting investigations of building damage.

The NBS/NAE team conducted its investigations in conjunction with

the Department of Construction and Maintenance of Public Buildings of the

Ministry of Public Works which is headed by Ing. Jorge Hayn. Ing. Raul

Amador of the Ministry of Public Works accompanied the NBS/NAE team in

most of its building inspections. Dr. Abdel Karim, Head of the Civil

Engineering Department of the University of Nicaragua, also worked closely

with the team during its investigations. These investigations continued

until January 4, 1973, when the NBS/NAE team returned to the United States.

In addition to those previously mentioned, the NBS/NAE team interacted with many agencies of the Nicaraguan Government, the Organization

of American States, international relief organizations, and U.S. Federal

agencies who subsequently responded to the earthquake. A list of principal

contacts is given in Appendix A.

The following chapters of this report describe the general observations of damage, causes of damages, and reports on the buildings inspected

in conjunction with the Nicaraguan Ministry of Public Works during the

disaster investigations.

The assistance rendered the Ministry of Public Works and the

observations noted were possible only because the NBS/NAE team arrived at

the site soon after the disaster. However, even at that time some documentation was lost since recovery actions had already been initiated and

some evidence of damaged buildings was removed. At the time of the

team departure, January 4, 1973, substantial portions of the city were demolished and actions were underway to fence off and virtually clear

an area of over 500 square blocks in the downtown area. This resulted

in the removal of most of the evidence of damage.

17
o

-a4U4

•H

*) •o4c4

r-l «H

60 t

CO

8.

CO a

tTMO

a;

•4-> O

-f->

4->

CO

CD

4-o

I/) a>aa

as

s-o

to

fO a.

•r- O

CO

<u

CD

18
2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

This chapter describes the overall performance of various classes of

buildings. In general, these observations are consistent with experiences

in earlier earthquakes [8],

2.1 Taquezal Construction

Much of the older residential and commercial construction in Managua

was of the type called "taquezal." This is timber framed adobe construction made up of wood posts approximately 4 in square, spaced on approximately 2 ft centers, and connected horizontally by wooden slats which were about 1/2 in by 2 in and spaced at 8 in vertically. The space between

the wooden slats was packed with mud, figure 14. These structures

usually had timber framed floors and roofs with the roofs often covered

by clay tile. The exterior surface would be plastered and painted,

figure 15, to form a building of substantial appearance. However, these

buildings were inherently quite weak, and heavy enough to generate large

lateral forces under ground shaking. In addition, the timber framing was frequently weakened by termites. Over much of the Managua area, these

buildings collapsed, figure 16; most of the deaths were suffered in this

type of building.

2.2 Critical Facilities

The damage in Managua provides many examples of the need to construct

buildings housing critical facilities in a manner such that they will be

functional when desperately needed following an earthquake. Most critical

facilities in Managua were destroyed. Examples are: the fire station

which collapsed upon the fire equipment, figure 17, the Red Cross building,

figure 18, which collapsed upon their ambulances and emergency supplies,

the INSS Hospital, figure 70-1—{ which suffered severe structural and

nonstructural damages making it not just useless, but definitely hazardous to its occupants. The General Hospital, figure 55-2, also suffered

37— Hyphenated figure numbers denote figures from Appendix B. The first

number denotes the report in Appendix B where the figure is located.

19
20
Figure 15 Taquezal construction where the substantial

appearance after plastering and painting is

belied by the resistance.

21
22
cuco

Q.

CUCOQ.

n3Oo

"I

4-> tc CO •

CD c

s- cu

•«- E

U_ Q.

CU =3 -c a- H- CU

CUS13en

23
too

<T5

c:ooa;

co

Gi- ro i— CO o a> a tC7> Q. C Q.

•r- 3

-o CO •^ >>

Z5 o

-Q

C

a> CO CD

co s- o a>

s_ E O CD -a xj

CD c

co

cu

CD

2k
very severe damage; fortunately, the critical medical supplies stored in

a warehouse behind the hospital were on steel shelving, figure 55-8, which

supported the building when its walls fell and columns sheared and kept

these supplies available for use following the earthquake. Radio communications were dependent on a very feeble building, figure 62-1; however, it was far enough south of town that the collapse was incipient rather than

actual. Similarly, the vital switch gear at the power generation plant,

figure 22-4, were located in a weak masonry building with a very heavy

roof; the building was close to collapse.

2.3 Comparison of Shear Wall and Unbraced Frames

There were examples of moment resisting unbraced frame structures

for which the structure endured the earthquake without severe damage, but

with motions great enough to cause extensive property losses and loss of

functionality. The Banco Central tower exhibited extensive cracking of

framed-tube columns and floor diaphragm cracking in the upper stories;

structural damage was moderately severe, but nonstructural damages were

very extensive, figure 52-3. An insurance building, Seguros la Protectora,

figure 19, showed severe nonstructural damage to the facade panels and to

the contents of the building, figure 20, but not extensive structural

damage. It may be questioned whether this constitutes successful structural performance when occupants of the buildings would be severely

threatened by falling lights, partitions, and shelving; exit doors jammed

and fire hazards were increased with the difficulties in egress. It is

questionable whether the property losses were appreciably less than they

would be if these buildings had collapsed completely.

Shear wall -frame buildings were much stiffer; the limited deformations

resulted in very little property loss and continuation of functionality.

However, some of these buildings showed sufficient structural damage to

call into question their safety for an earthquake of similar intensity but

longer duration. For instance, the ENALUF (electric utility company)

administration building looked sound from the outside, figure 23-1, but

exhibited definite structural damage. There was localized crushing of

certain shear walls on the ground floor at interruptions for a duct,

25
Figure 19 Severe exterior nonstructural

damage in unbraced frame building,

Seguros La Protectora.

26
27
figure 23-4, and for a telephone chase, figure 23-3. On the upper floors

there were many diagonal cracks in the shear wall, figure 23-5. The 17

story Banco de American Building also looked quite sound from the outside

and showed little nonstructural damage on the inside, figure 54-2. However, many tie beams connecting the four shear wall towers at the corners

of the core broke in shear at their mid-span where they were penetrated

for ducts, figure 54-1.

2.4 Performance of Housing

The generally poor performance of taquezal housing which led to

large losses of life and property has been previously discussed. Also

some modern houses, using materials such as prestressed concrete,

reinforced concrete, and masonry with precast members and prefabrication

techniques as well as other so called modern technologies, were designed

or constructed without adequate attention to the potential earthquake

forces and performed poorly. A housing development under construction with

reinforced concrete frames infilled by concrete block walls, figure 21,

showed wall failures because of inadequate attachment to the frames.

Some more expensive modern houses also collapsed, figure 22. A development of cast-in-place concrete houses, with prestressed, precast channel

roof elements approximately 8 ft wide by 20 ft long, failed due to

inadequate attachment of the roofs to the walls, figure 24-1. At best

the precast channels were connected only at the four corners by an inch

or two of small fillet weld, figure 24-3. On duplex units where two roof

channels bore on a party wall, it apparently was considered inconvenient

to make any connection whatsoever, figure 24-4.

While damage to housing in Managua was severe, it should be pointed

out that much of the modern housing in Managua performed excellently.

There were major developments of masonry or concrete houses with lightweight roofs in areas of strong ground shaking between the ESSO Refinery

and the center of town for which no damage could be observed from the

outside. Other houses, specifically designed to resist earthquake forces,

were virtually undamaged, while adjacent structures collapsed.

28
o

to

rC

T3

CD

S-o

-Cuc

fC • c

>> c r-• •1

CD +-> +J u

re 13 Z5 S- CT+J

CD 00 T3 c

rO o C o

•r" 5- M- <D O TC

CO 3

cu

s- 00 3 0) 1

00

re o

CM

CD

s13CD

29

5-814

O - 73 - 3
s

«3croo

CD

4-o

CD

COo

SCD T3O

4-O

CD

COQ.O

c_>

C\]

C\]

(L)

en

30
3. CAUSES OF DAMAGES

The field inspections conducted substantiate the need for recognizing

the forces that develop in structures subjected to earthquakes. The

deficiencies in design and construction which are the causes of damages

are discussed in this section.

3.1 Inadequate Strength in Vertical Planes

Many of the structural failures in Managua can be attributed to

inadequacy of the structural systems for the lateral forces imposed by

the earthquake. Heavy barrel shell roofs such as that of the Aduana

(Customs House), figure 68-3, sheared their columns, figure 68-4, and

collapsed or came to rest upon the contents of the building. Many

multistory reinforced concrete buildings collapsed such as the Guerrero

Pineda five story building, figure 74-2. Some modern one story buildings

such as the INCET (National Granary) administration building, figure 16-1,

appear to have been constructed with unnecessarily heavy roofs and framing

systems inadequate for the resulting lateral forces. There was evidence

in the Instituto Pedagogico, figure 46-3, that flat slabs showed some distress in functioning as the horizonal framing member between columns.

3.2 Inadequate Strength in Horizontal Planes

The need for proper horizontal distribution of the lateral forces

induced by the earthquake also was evident in many situations. Trussed

roof systems without lower chord bracing did not provide adequate

horizontal diaphragm action. In a laboratory addition to the INCEI

administration building, figure 16-2, the roof trusses severely displaced

the end walls of the building. A similar failure occurred for the same reasons in the gymnasium of the Ramirez Goyena School, figure 38-4.

3.3 Detailing for Energy Absorption

Many failures could be attributed as much to inadequate toughness as

to inadequate strength. The two story administration building for the

Aduana, figure 68-1, collapsed completely; the columns employed some undeformed bars and widely spaced ties, figure 68-2. The absence of

31
proper anchorage and energy absorbing capacity beyond maximum load

probably contributed to the collapse. Careful attention to anchorage is

needed for the reinforcement at corner connections between bond beams and

columns for reinforced masonry walls; damages in the Salvadore Mendieta

School, figure 25-2, appear to have been caused by such absence of anchorage. Elements of masonry intended to resist lateral forces should be

confined by reinforced columns rather than having the masonry elements

outside of the reinforcement as in the new, unused and unusable, Simon

Bolivar School, figure 35-5. Attention must be given to construction

joints to assure that planes of weakness are not developed in the structure

as they were in the nursery school of the Mercado Oriental, figure 4-1.

Cavity infill walls must be tied across the cavity and keyed to the frame

beams and columns to avoid the failures occurring at the Geographical

Institute, figure 75-2. Careful attention must be placed on achieving

adequate continuity for precast elements as exemplified by the Bello

Horizonte development, figure 24-3.

3.4 Adequate Clearances or Connections

Avoidance of earthquake damage requires very definite decisions on the part of the designer and constructors as to whether they wish elements

to be connected or to be separated. Indecisive details lead to damage

from pulling apart of inadequately connected elements or the pounding of

inadequately separated elements. Courtyards were created in the Supreme

Court building by omitting floor and roof slabs for certain panels but

leaving the exterior beams in place. These beams, figure 43-1, were not

adequate to keep adjacent parts of the building moving together. The

monumental structure of the National Palace was quite stiff and its

movements quite small; however, the separation between the legislative

chambers and the outer portion of the building was not enough to avoid

pounding damage, figure 3-4.

3.5 Direct Hazards from Nonstructural Elements

In addition to structural failures as previously noted, there are direct hazards from nonstructural failures. These include: heavy, weak

32
masonry partitions and curtain walls as in the INCEI warehouse, figure

16-3, and the Supreme Court building, figure 43-2; falling shelving, as

in the insurance building, figure 20; displaced light fixtures as in the

Central Bank, figures 52-3 and 52-4; parapets as in the Social Security

Clinic, figure 71-1; and inadequately attached exterior finishes as in

the Supreme Court, figure 43-4.

3.6 Anchorage of Equipment and Industrial Facilities

Equipment which should be functional following an earthquake must

be adequately designed and anchored for earthquake forces. The power

generation facilities for Managua were put out of service by small

movements of the generators, inadequate anchorage of the boiler columns,

figure 22-2, fractures of condenser castings, and sliding of unanchored

transformers. The grain storage tanks of the INCEI, figure 16-4, showed

uplifting of their anchor bolts to the south, figure 16-5, and local

buckling of the tanks to the north, figure 16-6, as well as near the top,

figure 16-4.

3.7 Structural Effects of Nonstructural Elements

A lack of attention to these elements during structural design does

not assure that they will not affect the performance of the structure.

Irregularly placed infilled walls stiffen portions of the structural

frame, and result in attraction of force, concentration of deformation,

and loss of energy absorbing capacity. This phenonemon led to local

damage in the IBM building, a multistory steel frame building, figure 72-3

and 72-4. The cracking of fully infilled masonry walls, as shown for the

General Hospital at El Retiro, figure 55-5, leads to failure of reinforced

framing members due to the concentration of deformation; there is no independent frame action. A sharp difference in stiffness of elements

intended to act in parallel, as caused by the partial height infilled

walls on the interior column line of the Ramirez Goyena School, figure

38-1, can lead to progressive failure and complete collapse, figure 38-2.

33
3.8 Additions and Modifications

Additions to buildings require careful attention in design because

adequate continuity is difficult to achieve. The additions to the fourth

floor of the Palace of Communications received their lateral support from

parapet walls rather than the shear towers of the building. When the

parapet walls failed, figure 5-3, complete collapse was prevented only by

diaphragm action of the roof. The capacity of the roof was barely sufficient, figure 5-4, for this unintended diaphragm action.

Care must be used in penetrations of structural elements for building

services to assure that sufficient structural capacity remains. Examples

of incipient failure appeared in the ENALUF administration building where

the shear wall was weakened by a telephone chase, figure 23-3, and by

penetration for a duct, figure 23-4. Duct penetrations also contributed

to shear failures in the beams connecting the shear wall towers in the

Banco de America, figure 54-2.

3.9 Building Codes and the Building Regulatory System

Discussions with Nicaraguan engineers indicated that the building

codes did not apply strict seismic design provisions. The subject had

received considerable attention by Nicaraguan professional engineers. In fact, Professor Mete Sozen had visited Nicaragua in February 1972 to

discuss the need for improved seismic design regulations.

A number of responsible engineers in Nicaragua have been applying

up-to-date seismic design provisions in their own work. However, in the

absence of legally enforceable requirements for earthquake resistant

design, it could be economical from a short term, pre-earthquake perspective, to employ architectural or engineering services which gave inadequate

attention to the threat of an earthquake. Seismic design provisions,

approximately comparable to those for Seismic Zone 3 in the United States,

had been considered for the Nicaraguan building code. However, it was the

understanding of the NBS team that the code adopted in 1972 used seismic

design provisions considerably less stringent than those originally

suggested.

34
It also was pointed out to the NBS team that adoption of strict,

up-to-date seismic design provisions in the Nicaraguan building code would

not alone assure earthquake safety. Apparently, Nicaragua at the time of

the Managua earthquake did not have a building regulatory system capable

of assuring compliance with the building code in either design or construction phases. It was indicated that zoning requirements were the only

enforced element of a building regulatory system.

In summary, most of the damages observed in Managua were caused by

deficiencies in design or construction which are well known to the

engineering profession [9], These are deficiencies in the sense of being

practices which are known to be inadequate in areas of strong ground

shaking. However, well designed and well constructed buildings did show

satisfactory performance in the Managua earthquake. This suggests that

the primary cause for the extensive losses of life and property in Managua

was the inadequacy of the building code for the existing degree of seismic

risk and the lack of an effective building regulatory system for code

enforcement.

35
4. REPORTS OF INSPECTIONS OF BUILDINGS

Appendix B presents translations of reports prepared for the

Ministerio de Obras Publicas following inspections of the cited buildings

by members of the NBS/NAE team in conjunction with Nicaraguan engineers.

Field notes and photographic records were consulted in preparation of the

reports given here from translations of the reports prepared in Nicaragua.

Therefore, those reports presented here are not literal translations. The

report numbers are those used in the Nicaraguan records. The location of

these buildings are denoted by the report numbers on the maps in figures

3 and 4. Gaps in the sequence of report numbers pertain to reports on investigations in which no member of the NBS/NAE team participated.

Indicated on each of the reports is the date of investigation, that

is the date in which the team visited the building, and the persons who

participated in the inspection. These must be viewed as screening reports

The objectives were to determine swiftly which buildings could be used

immediately with reasonable safety for vital emergency functions, which

buildings could be cleared immediately where repair would obviously be

uneconomical, and which buildings required more detailed studies but had

reasonable prospects for rehabilitation. The time available for most of

the investigations ranged from 1/2 to 2 hours, plans were generally

unavailable, and equipment was not at hand for stripping off trim and

finishing materials for close inspection of structural damage. It is

felt that these preliminary views are useful for the record, but it must

be recognized that more careful investigations will reveal damages not

noted in these preliminary investigations and provide improved hypotheses

for the causes of damages.

36
5. SUMMARY

This successful performance of much modern housing and many multistory buildings in Managua is additional evidence that good building

practices can provide resistance to strong earth shaking at moderate cost.

However, the many failures and large losses of life and property illustrate

that earthquake hazards threaten disaster for unprepared areas. Most damages appeared to result from deficiencies in building practices; deficiencies exhibited many times before in previous earthquakes,

deficiencies which would be avoided by implementation of up-to-date

provisions for earthquake resistant design and construction.

Managua did not employ a building code with seismic design requirements appropriate to its earthquake risk, and furthermore, did not have

a building regulatory system capable of effective implementation of its

building code provisions. The same statements apply to many seismic risk

areas of the United States.

The disaster investigation team, by virtue of its early arrival at

the scene, was able to assist Nicaraguan authorities when help was needed

and to document seismic effects before evidence was destroyed in emergency

and recovery activities. It is hoped that this information will be useful

in more intensive studies leading to improvements in earthquake resistant

building practices.

37
REFERENCES

[1] Republic of Nicaragua Background Notes, Department of State

(December 1972).

[2] Brown, R. D., Jr., Ward, P. L., and Plafker, G., Geologic and

Seismologic Aspects of the Managua, Nicaragua, Earthquakes of

December 23, 1972, U.S. Geological Survey, Geological Survey

Professional Paper 838, 34 pages (1973).

[3] Sultan, D. I., The Managua Earthquake, Military Engineer, 23 , (1931).

[4] Freeman, John Ripley, Earthquake Damage and Earthquake Insurance,

pp. 589-595 (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1932).

[5] Matthiesen, R. B., and Knudson, C. F., Strong-Motion Instrumental

Measurements, Managua, Nicaragua Earthquake of December 23, 1972,

Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, pp. 21-25 (May 1973).

[6] Evaluacion Preliminar de Danos Causados par el Terremoto de

Managua de 23 de Diciembre de 1972, Institute Centroamericano de

Administracion de Empresas, Apartado Postal 2485, Managua,

Nicaragua, 24 pages (5 Enero 1973).

[7] Annex to Nicaraguan Background Notes, Department of State (May 1,

1973).

[8] Lew, H. -S., Leyendecker, E. V., and Dikkers, R. D., Engineering

Aspects of the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, National Bureau of

Standards (U.S.), Buildinq Science Series 40, 419 pages (December

1971).

[9] Building Practices for Disaster Mitigation, National Bureau of

Standards (U.S.), Building Science Series 46, Wright, R. N.,

Kramer, S., Culver, C. G. , editors, 483 pages (February 1973).

38
APPENDIX A

List of Contacts

During the period of December 25, 1972 - January 4, 1973, the NBS/NAE

team made contact with many individuals. Among those contacted were:

Nicaraguan Government and Organizations

Gen. Anastasio Somoza

Director of the National Guard

Sr. Alfonso Lovo Cordero

Member of National Governing Council

Sr. Cristobal Rugama

Nicaraguan Minister of Public Works

Ing. Jorge Hayn Vogel

Director del Departmento de

Construcciones y

Mantenimiento de Edificios Publicos

Ministerio de Obras Publicas

Ing. Raul Amador Kuhl

Departmento de Construcciones y

Mantenimiento de Edificios Publicos

Ing Edmondo Roeder

Nicaraguan Highway Department

Mechanical Maintenance Division

Ing. Adan Cajina

Director

Departmento Nacional de Acueductos

y Alcantarillados

Col. Villata

Nicaraguan Air Force, Co 0.

Col. Franklin Wheel ock

Nicaraguan Air Force, CO.

Airport Manager

Col . Stan Threlfall

Staff of Gen. Somoza

Dr. Abdel Karim

Head of Civil Engineering

University of Nicaragua

Dr. Carlos Muniz

Oficina de Estudios Economicos

Banco Central de Nicaragua

Sr. Arturo Roa

ENALUF

Ing. Max Kelly

Nicaraguan Engineer

Sr. Enrique Pereira

Contractor

Ing. Gaston Penalba

Nicaraguan Engineer & Contractor

United States Government and Organizations

Mr. Turner B. Shelton

American Ambassador to Nicaragua

Mr. Karl V. Steinbrugge

Chairman, U.S. National Committee

International Association of

Earthquake Engineering

39
Mr. James Hargrove

Counsel

U.S. Embassy

Mr. Carl D. Koone

US/AID Nicaragua

Dr. S. T. Algermissen

Director

Seismological Research Group

N0AA/ERL/ESL/R10X4

Dr. R. B. Matthiesen

Director

Seismological Field Survey

NOAA

Mr. Charles F. Knudson

Geophysicist

Seismological Field Survey

NOAA

Major Merritte H. Wilson

3d CAGP

Ft. Clayton

Canal Zone (DAST)

Mr. Alfred Chase

Madden Hydrographic Office

Balboa Heights

Canal Zone, Representing Canal

Zone Red Cross

Miss Marlise Simons, Mexico City,

Mexico

Latin American Correspondent to

the Washington Post and Newsweek

International Organizations

Dr. Ca rr Donald

Organization of American States

(OAS)

Col. Claudio Luis Gutierrez

Representative of the SecretaryGeneral

Organization of American States

(OAS)

Mr. Leroy Anstead

American Geologist with the

Servicio Geodesico Interamericano

Others

Dr. Cinna Lomnitz

UNESCO Seismologist

National University of Mexico

Ing. Roberto Meli

Structural Engineer

National University of Mexico

Mr. Jan Sandquist

Rapport - TV 2

Swedish Broadcast Corporation

10510 Stockholm

Sweden

Captain M. M. Driver

Miami, Florida

(Lanica Airlines)

40
APPENDIX B

Appendix B presents translations of reports prepared for the Ministerio de Obras Publicas

following inspections of the cited buildings by members of the NBS/NAE team in conjunction

with Nicaraguan engineers. The report numbers are those used in the Nicaraguan records.

The location of these buildings are denoted by the report numbers on the maps in figures 3 and 4. Gaps in the sequence of report numbers pertain to reports on investigations in which

no member of the NBS/NAE team participated.

Report

Number Building

3 Palacio Nacional

4 Mercado Periferico Oriental

5 Palacio de Comunicaciones

13 Terminal de Pasajeros del

Aeropuerto Internacional

"Las Mercedes"

16 Edificio Administrativo (INCEI

22 Estacion Generacion ENALUF

23 Edificio Administrativo ENALUF

24 Subdivision Bello Horizonte

25 Centro Escolar Salvador

Mendieta

35 Centro Escolar Simon Bolivar

38 Instituto Nacional de Ramirez

Goyena

41 Edificio del Teatro Nacional

Ruben Dario

42 Hotel Intercontinental

43 Corte Suprema de Justicia

44 Edificio Administrativo del INSS

46 Instituto Pedagogico

52 Banco Central

53 Gimnasio Jorge Buitrago

54 Banco de America

Type Damage

Page

No.

Monumental RC Moderate 43

Frame RC Severe 47

Monumental RC Moderate 50

Frame RC Light 54

Various RC SteelLight-severe

Light-moderate

57

Steel Frame Light 63

Shear Wall RC Moderate 66

Precast RC Severe 70

Reinforced

Block Moderate 73

Frame RC Severe 75

Frame RC Collapse

Shear Wall RC Light

Frame RC Moderate

Shear Wall RC Moderate

Frame RC Severe

Frame RC Moderate

Flat Plate RC Moderate

Arches RC

Frame RC Moderatecollapse

Frame RC Severe

Shear Wall RC Light

41

79

84

87

90

95

98

102

105

108
Report

Number Building Type Damage

Page

No.

55 Hospital General El Retiro Frame RC Severe 110

57 Bodegas de Almacenamiento de

Casa Presidencial y Mocoron Miscellaneous Light-severe 115

60 Casa Presidencial Monumental RC Severe 121

61 Casa del Jefe Director Monumental RC Severe 125

62 Radio-Difusora Nacional Reinforced

Block Severe 128

68 Aduana Frame

Shell

RC

RC Collapse

Severe

130

70 Edificio del Hospital del

Seguro Social Frame RC Severe 133

71 Policlinica Central del INSS Frame RC Light 138

72 IBM Frame Steel Light 140

73 Country Club Tejapa Frame RC Collapse 144

74 Edificio Guerrero Pineda Frame RC Collapse 146

75 Instituto Geografico Nacional Infilled

Frame RC Severe 149

42
Report No. 3

Date of Investigation: December 29, 1972

Building: Palacio Nacional

Inspected by: Jorge Hayn V.

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Raul Amador

This is a massive reinforced concrete building with both bearing walls and

columns for vertical load bearing elements and beams and slabs for horizontal load bearing elements. It is a two-story structure with a semi-basement

occupying a full city block. It has four outside wings forming a hollow

square and a central building on the north/south axis which contains the

meeting rooms of the senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The building

replaces one destroyed in the March 31, 1931 earthquake and is reputed to

have been constructed with deliberate attention to earthquake resistance.

The exterior columns on the north and south facades, which appear to be

primarily decorative in function, all show cracking about one meter

above their base, figure 3-1. In general these cracks are very fine,

however, one was noted to be open about 1/16 in on the north facade.

Several minor cracks spaced about 45 in apart were noted in this column.

It appears that these cracks may represent working of construction joints

in these columns. There is extensive x cracking in the panels between

columns on the north and south facades of the buildings, figure 3-2. This

cracking is more severe where these panels have been pierced for the

installation of air conditioners. The panels on the east and west sides

of the vestibules for the north and south entrances of the building

appear to be major lateral force resisting elements. These are reinforced

concrete walls with columns of reinforcement revealed by substantial

cracking, figure 3-3. The eastern stairway to the second floor at the

north entrance is severely cracked. Substantial cracks cut through the

roof beams and slabs in the eastern portion of the north wing and the

northern portion of the east wing. There is pounding damage to the

43
Report No. 3

north wing, central building and south wing at their zones of contact,

figure 3-4.

None of these damages appear to have severely limited the safety of the

structure. However, these damages should be repaired so that the structural resistance is returned to its original level and a careful inspection

should be conducted to determine whether other damages have occurred.

The structure may be cleaned of broken glass and concrete which endanger

occupants and returned to function while the major repairs are conducted.

hk
Figure 3-1 Lightly cracked

columns in facade,

Palacio Nacional

Figure 3-2 Cracking in panels between columns where

pierced for air conditions, Palacio

Nacional.

45

25-814 O - 73 - 4
Figure 3-3

Figure 3-4 Pounding between

central building and

north wing, Palacio

Nacional.

Cracking of wall

columns at north

entrance to the

Palacio Nacional,

and

46
Report No. 4

Date of Investigation: December 29, 1972

Building: Mercado Periferico Oriental

Inspected by: Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Jorge Hayn V. Raul Amador

This is a group of one-story buildings occupying a full city block.

They are constructed of reinforced concrete and are from the period of

1963 to 1967. The building used by the police was given only cursory

examination but appears to have escaped major structural damage. The

nursery building has a heavy reinforced concrete roof supported by 12 in

x 12 in reinforced concrete columns with masonry infill walls. The

columns are severely damaged by the earthquake forces and appear barely

capable of supporting the gravity load from the roof. There is evidence

of poor, unbonded construction joints at the tops of the columns which

may have contributed to their failure, figure 4-1. This building is

unusable and questionably repairable.

The elementary school building shows some structural damage, but it

appears to be repairable. The differences responsible for the lesser

damages merit further investigation, figure 4-2.

At the principal entrance for the market, single columns support roof

slabs of differing elevations; there are column damages from the high-shear

forces generated by out-of-phase motions of these slab elements, figure

4-3. In the principal market building, the exterior columns are ruptured

by the concentrated deformations which followed cracking of the infill

exterior walls, figure 4-4. The interior columns, roughly on a 15 ft x 20 ft grid, show incipient flexural failures at both top and bottom.

This building shows yery substantial structural damage. A careful inspection should be conducted to assess the extent of the damage and to determine

whether repairs are feasible.

t+7
Figure 4-1 Column failure at

construction join in

nursery building,

Mercado Periferico

Oriental.

Figure 4-2 Less damaged school

part of the Mercado

Periferico construction

appears similar to

nursery.

48
Figure 4-3 Damaged canopy columns

at change of canopy

elevation, Mercado

Periferico Oriental.

Figure 4-4 Wall and column damage in market

building, Mercado Periferico Oriental

k3
Report No. 5

Date of Investigation: December 29, 1972

Building: Palacio de Comunicaciones

Inspected by: Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Jorge Hayn V.

Raul Amador K.

This is a four-story reinforced concrete building with a basement,

figure 5-1. It was completed in 1946 with only partial construction of

the fourth story. Since then, the fourth story has been completed by

use of steel roof trusses, and steel purlins supporting a corrugated

steel roof. The principal lateral force resisting elements of this

building appeared to be shear walls around towers located at the center

of the north facade and at the southeast and southwest corners.

The original part of the construction appears to have suffered wery

little damage in the earthquake. Only limited, light cracking was observed in the shear wall towers. Secondary beams in the north facade

show severe cracking. The decorative mural inside the first floor

entrance has crumbled as it tried to act as a shear resisting element,

and there are a number of cracks in the interior walls on the first

floor, figure 5-2. \lery little damage is observed on the second and

third floor; it is noted that the third floor is heavily loaded by

telephone switching equipment.

The new construction on the fourth floor is at a state of incipient

collapse, figure 5-3. The parapet walls along the eastern and western

sides of the building are strongly displaced out, hanging over the

streets below, and prevented from falling only by the tension forces in

the steel roof sheeting, figure 5-4. It appears that this failure

resulted from inadequate attention to providing lateral force resisting

elements in the additional construction or to tying it to lateral force

resisting elements in the original structure.

50
Report No. 5

It was recommended immediately to personnel of the Palacio de

Communicaciones that measures be taken to protect people in the streets

adjacent to the east and west sides of the building. It is also recom- mended that valuable communications equipment installed on the fourth

floor be relocated to eliminate hazards to the equipment and personnel

using it, since the roof structure easily could fail from a strong wind

or an earthquake aftershock. It is further recommended that the new

construction on the fourth floor be removed and reconstructed appropriately. Elsewhere, repair should eliminate glass, blocks, walls, and

other elements showing nonstructural damage. It is important to remove

glass panels from the third floor which are particularly dangerous to

people working nearby.

51
-i

Figure 5-1 Front of the Palacio de Comunicaciones,

limited damage except at fourth floor.

Figure 5-2 Main floor with light cracking of columns

and damage to infilled mural, Palacio de

Comunicaciones.

<« «<.:».!,

52
Figure 5-3 Side of the Palacio de

Comunicaciones, note the

tottering fourth floor

walls and roof.

Figure 5-4 Tube column split by pulling of roof

framing, Palacio de Comunicaciones.

53
Report No. 13

Date of Investigation: December 27, 1972

Building: Terminal de Pasajeros del Aeropuerto Internacional "Las

Mercedes"

Inspected by: Richard Wright

Samuel Kramer

Mete Sozen

The building is 21 modules long by four modules wide, each module of 6

meters, open to three floors in the north passage and the five central

modules of the lobby. The three adjacent modules to the east and west

of the central lobby are open from the second floor to the roof, figure

13-1. The building employs a reinforced concrete frame with slab roof

and floors, except that in the central lobby area the roof employs a metal truss with skylights.

The visible damages are essentially nonstructural. There are strong

cracks in the curtain wall to the east of the lobby which is built-in

between the beams and columns and attempted to perform as a shear wall,

figure 13-2. Cracks to the western curtain wall are less severe because

this one overlays the beams abd columns; there are deformations of

anchors of this wall to the supporting elements and some crushing of the

concrete around the anchors, figure 13-3. There is some cracking and

displacement of finishing materials. The principal structural elements

appeared to be in good condition. Some nonstructural elements of the

building require repairs for proper function and security of the building

occupants. The building may be cleaned up and returned to service

promptly.

54
Figure 13-1 Aisle on the ground transportation side showing

superficial damages, Terminal de Pasajeros

Aeropuerto Internacional

55
I'f

y

ejBMB

Mgure 13-2 Cracked infill wall east of lobby.

Aeropuerto Internacional

Figure 13-3 Overlayed curtain wall cracked at anchorage

to frame, Aeropuerto Internacional.

56
Report No. 16

Date of Investigation: December 30, 1972

Building: Edificio Administrativo (INCEI)

Inspected by: Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Raul Amador

This facility is composed of various buildings built at different times

using different systems. The nature of the buildings and their condition

are described in the following paragraphs.

Terminal No. 1 . This one story building is made of reinforced concrete;

the columns and roof are apparently in good condition except for one infilled wall on the west which has fallen. It is believed that this

building may be used following repair of minor cracks and a thorough

inspection of the structural system.

The Scale Building . This is a one story, four by three bays, reinforced

concrete building with infill walls enclosing six bays at the southwest.

The infill walls are cracked and bulging and some columns have severe

cracks. People using the northern aisle of the building are severely

threatened by the collapse of these walls; they should be evacuated.

The building encloses valuable scale machinery which would be damaged by

its collapse.

The building should be investigated carefully to determine whether its

repair is feasible and immediate measures should be taken to provide for

the security of its contents.

Administration Building . This one story building consists of a reinforced

concrete roof and lightly reinforced brick masonry infill walls. Exterior

infill wall panels are severely cracked and the cracks have penetrated

57
Report No. 16

and ruptured the enclosing columns and beams, figure 16-1. Interior

columns show local crushing at the top and bottom and permanent drift to

the east amounting to about one inch. The building is in very insecure

condition and will require extensive further study to determine whether

repairs are feasible.

A new laboratory building is partially constructed at the northwest

corner of the Administration building. This one story building has

reinforced concrete columns, masonry infill walls and a steel truss

roof. Because of the absence of diaphragms or bracing in the lower

plane of the roof, it has moved sharply north and induced lateral forces

in the walls which have damaged them severely, figure 16-2. It appears

most effective to remove the existing column and wall construction and

rebuild it; this time with appropriate attention to achieving adequate

lateral force resistance.

Plant Building . This is the major grain handling and storage facility

site. It consists of 18 major grain storage tanks in two rows. Each

tank is some 40 ft high and 20 ft in diameter. Six smaller steel tanks are located immediately north of these. A reinforced concrete frame

tower with masonry infill walls houses the elevator equipment which

lifts the grain to the conveyors loading these tanks. A one-story steel

frame shed at the south of the tanks is employed for grain handling

operations.

There is no apparent damage to the steel frame or cladding of the shed.

Some masonry interior walls show severe cracking and present a hazard to

the workers in the shed, figure 16-3. These should be rebuilt either to

move with the steel frame structure without undergoing damage or to

stand independent of it.

Some local shear buckling is visible in the walls of the 18 tanks in the

58
Report No. 16

upper panels, figure 16-4. At the base of the tanks, anchor bolts are

lifted as much as 5/8 in and some are broken, figure 16-5. Opposite the

lifted anchor bolts some of the tanks show local buckling due to com- pressive forces in the lower band, figure 16-6. These damages do not

appear to present hazards to personnel or use of these tanks. However,

careful inspection should be made of the conditions of the conveyor

systems at the top of the tanks, which was not observed in this

investigation, and appropriate repairs be made where damages have been

observed.

Benefico de Cafe . These are tall steel frame, steel clad mill buildings

located at the north of the site. There are two major buildings which

meet each other at an angle of approximately 15 degrees. They are connected by a gore in this region, it was interesting to note that the

buildings were stiff enough to prevent apparent damages in spite of the

differences in motion at this connection. There were some nonstructural

failures of masonry walls in offices at the north of these buildings.

These should be replaced by properly reinforced walls for the safety of

the personnel.

59
Figure 16-1 Severely damaged modern reinforced

concrete frame building, INCEI

administration building.

Figure 16-2 Damage from movement

of inadequately braced

roof, INCEI laboratory

60
Figure 16-3 Hazardous partition in an undamaged steel industrial

building, INCEI shed.

Figure 16-4 Shear buckling is

visible at tops of

INCEI elevators.

61

25-814 O - 73 - 5
Figure 16-5 Anchor bolts lifted

at base of INCEI

elevators.

N«lig

Figure 16-6 Compressive buckling | at base of INCEI

elevators.
Report No. 22

Date of Investigation: December 28, 1972

Building: Estacion Generacion ENALUF

Inspected by: Mete Sozen

Richard Wright

The steel frame buildings which enclose the turbines 1 (45 MW), 2 (15

MW), and 3 (15 MW) showed no structural damage, figure 22-1. There was

some breaking of glass and detachment of electrical wiring for the

overhead cranes. Some of the equipment was displaced from its

foundations because of inadequate anchorage. Boiler anchor bolts were

broken and firebrick walls were bulged, figure 22-2. A stack showed a

cracked weld at the top of the third segment, figure 22-3.

The one story, 30 ft x 50 ft switch gear house consisting of lightly

reinforced concrete block walls 15 in thick and a heavy reinforced

concrete roof supported by beams at 6 ft spacing showed very severe

cracking in the concrete block walls, figure 22-4. The building is very

close to collapse upon the vital equipment it encloses. It should be

braced immediately and given high priority for reconstruction since the

electrical supply for the city is dependent upon the equipment it

shelters.

63
Figure 22-1 Only window damage notable in the main

turbine building, Planta Electrica ENALUF

Figure 22-2 Broken anchor bolts in boiler columns,

Planta Electrica ENALUF.

64
Figure 22-3 Cracked weld in stack,

Planta Electrica ENALUF,

Figure 22-4 Severely damaged concrete block bearing

walls of switch gear house at Planta

Electrica ENALUF.

65
Report No. 23

Date of Investigation: December 28, 1972

Building: Edificio Administrative ENALUF

Inspected by: Richard Wright

Samuel Kramer

Mete Sozen

Abdel Karim

This is a reinforced concrete building with basement, ground floor and

six additional floors with a reinforced concrete frame braced by reinforced concrete shear walls around the central core of the building,

figure 23-1. In general the exterior of the building and the interior

space dividers are in excellent condition, figure 23-2. The shear walls

functioned effectively in reducing the earthquake deformations of the

building to a level producing little cosmetic damage. However, a substantial amount of cracking was found in the shear wall structure.

On the ground floor, local crushing of the shear wall was observed at a splice zone near the floor level where the wall was weakened by a telephone chase, figure 23-3, and at the ceiling level adjacent to a penetration in the shear wall for a duct, figure 23-4. Additional

cracking in the shear wall was noted at the basement level. Light

cracking in the shear wall was noted from the third through the fifth

floors of the building, figure 23-5. The absence of notable cracking on the first and second floors, perhaps was due to an unintended bracing

action of the decorative exterior arches. It was noted that the counter

weights for the elevators had been displaced by the shock, and other

minor cosmetic damage was visible in the building.

Since the damages to the shear wall represent a partial failure of the

structure, a detailed engineering inspection and repairs of the damages

are required before the structure is returned to service.

66
Figure 23-1 Shear wall -frame building with little

exterior damage, Edificio Administrative)

ENALUF.

Figure 23-2 Relatively light interior nonstructural

damage, Edificio Admini strati vo ENALUF.

67
68
Figure 23-4 Shear wall crushing near ceiling on first floor where penetrated by duct,

Edificio Administrativo ENALUF.

Figure 23-5 Cracking in shear wall on third floor,

Edificio Administrativo ENALUF.

69
Report No. 24

Date of Investigation: December 30, 1972

Building: Subdivision Bello Horizonte

Inspected by: Raul Amador K. Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

The houses of the subdivision are single and duplex units with cast-inplace reinforced concrete walls and prefabricated roof panels in the

form of a channel, figures 24-1 and 24-2. The dwelling units are approximately 20 ft wide by 40 ft deep. The prefabricated roof panels

bear on the precast concrete walls hich are about 4 in wide. The

concrete roof slabs are approximately 3 in thick with the flanges of the

channel approximately 12 in high; the panels are about 8 ft wide and 22

ft long. Metal pads at the four corners of the roof slabs are used for

connection to similar pads embedded in the walls. The connection is by

a 3/16 in fillet weld about 1 in long, figure 24-3. In single houses,

the roof slabs overhang the walls at each side by about 8 in. In the

duplex units, one wall supports two panels so that the zone of contact

is limited to about 2 in and welds may have been omitted.

In most of the dwelling units, the roof slabs were observed to have

broken loose from the walls and to have translated, sometimes enough to

allow the roof slab to fall into the dwelling unit, particularly for the

duplex units which have very little overlap of the roof slab on the

wall, figure 24-4. The degree of damage to the walls themselves appears

quite small; there were small cracks in the walls near the apertures and

sometimes cracking where the connecting pads were anchored in the wall

slabs. Most of these buildings appear to be repairable. In the repairs,

attention should be given to achieving a stronger connection between the

roof slab and the walls to prevent repetition of this damage in a future

earthquake.

70
Figure 24-1 The tilted precast roof channels have

slid off walls, Bello Horizonte.

Figure 24-2 Cracking in walls at attachment of roof

channel, Bello Horizonte.

71
Figure 24-3 Broken weld at connection of roof

channel, Bello Horizon te.

Figure 24-4 Unfastened roof channel in duplex unit,

Bello Horizon te.

72
Report No. 25

Date of Investigation: December 30, 1972

Building: Centro Escolar Salvador Mendieta

Inspected by: Ing. Raul Amador K. Ing. Samuel Kramer

Ing. Richard Wright

The Centro Escolar Salvador Mendieta, located in the Colonia Centro

America, consists of buildings with 6 in concrete block walls reinforced

with bond beams and columns and covered by a light corrugated metal roof

supported by timber trusses. The buildings of the school are connected

by a corridor covered by a slab of concrete supported on 4 in diameter

steel pipes as well as some panels of brick and columns of concrete.

This school is located in the area most damaged in the 1968 earthquake.

The block walls had been cracked in the earlier earthquake and repaired

and the supports for the covered corridor had been strengthened following

damages in the earlier earthquake, figure 25-1. Many of the school

walls are severely cracked by the recent earthquake with the cracks

penetrating the bond beams. Poor anchorage of reinforcement at the

intersections between bond beams and columns contributed to the damage

as did inadequate grouting of the reinforcing steel in the voids of the

blocks, figure 25-2. There is severe cracking in the curtain walls in

the areas of the bathrooms.

Because the roof is light, reducing the earthquake forces in the

structure, it appears feasible to repair these damages and return the

structure to service. Attention should be given to improving the

reinforcing of the block wall during the repairs.

73
Figure 25-1 New damage over repaired cracks from

the 1968 earthquake, Centro Escolar

Salvador Mendieta.

Figure 25-2 Failure of bond beam

and column near aperture, note inadequacy

of anchorage of reinforcement at corner.

7h
Report No. 35

Date of Investigation: December 30, 1972

Building: Centro Escolar Simon Bolivar

Inspected by: Ing. Raul Amador K. Ing. Samuel Kramer

Ing. Richard Wright

This school has two types of buildings. An old building of taquezal

(timber posts with wood slats on both sides at about 12 in spacing packed

with mud) wall construction and a tile roof has suffered major damage

which would require yery costly repairs, figure 35-1. The other two

buildings are two story reinforced concrete buildings, figure 35-2. The

southernmost of these is made up of two parts separated by an expansion

joint. These buildings have reinforced concrete frames with infill tile

exterior walls, and tile cross walls separating the classrooms. The

second floors are composed of concrete joist construction with block

fillers and finishing courses amounting to a total weight of approximately 60 psf. The roofs are of lightweight construction with steel

trusses at 3.6 meters supporting an asbestos cement corrugated roof.

Damages to the latter structures were confined to the first story. On

the south faces, the infill walls are interrupted by windows and on the

north faces by ventilation spaces. The columns and brick piers between

these windows or ventilators have been sheared, figures 35-3, 35-4, and

35-5. All of the fence around the school has overturned.

These buildings cannot be used without extensive repairs. One approach

to repair would be to place shear walls of reinforced concrete, reinforced vertically and horizontally and well -keyed into the second floor

framing. It is notable that these buildings were recently completed and

have never been occupied.

75
£=O

•r- +Jo

=3

S-

-4-> CO • C S- O rO o >

rC

O

N 00

CD3 C

cr o

re E 4-> -r-

</) 4-O S-rO C7)i— c o

pO

"O CO 3 o

-Q S- o c

r— <u o oI LO

CO

CD

S-CD

76
MM

Figure 35-2 New building of reinforced concrete and

masonry construction, Centro Escolar

Simon Bolivar.

Figure 35-3 Sheared columns above infill wall,

Centro Escolar Simon Bolivar.

77

525-814 O - 73 - 6
Figure 35-4 Fallen end wall and sheared columns,

Centro Escolar Simon Bolivar.

Figure 35-5 Arrows show masonry piers on either side

of reinforced concrete columns were ineffective, Centro Escolar Simon Bolivar.

78
Report No. 38

Dates of Investigation: December 30, 1972

Building: Instituto Nacional de Ramirez Goyena

Inspected by: Raul Amador

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

This school building is made up of three major wings. The west wing was

three stories tall plus a semi-basement with a central corridor and

classrooms on both sides. The south wing is two stories tall with offices

and classrooms on the south side and an open corridor on the north. The

east wing is two stories tall with a central corridor and classrooms on both sides. Connected to the east wing at the northeast side is a gymnasium. The roof is supported by steel trusses running north to south.

The trusses are supported by concrete columns infilled with concrete

block walls.

On the second floor of the east wing and on both floors of the south

wing, the interior columns are broken and sheared at the top of the

partial height infilled wall which separates the rooms from the

corridor, figure 38-1. The small section of column subject to deformation at the interior column line is much stiffer than the exterior

columns, attracts more load, fails, then the exterior columns must carry

the total earthquake and gravity forces.

The top two stories of the west wing and the stair tower at its northern

end are completely collapsed, very likely from progressive failure after

the type of failure of the interior columns observed in the other two

wings, figure 38-2 and 38-3. It was apparent that undeformed reinforcing

steel had been used in the construction of this building which was completed

in 1954.

There was no bracing in the lower chord plane of the trusses of the

gymnasium to transfer the lateral forces to the walls at the east and

79
Report No. 38

west ends. Therefore, the trusses have shifted north as much as 12 in

which fractured the columns and wall on the south side, where connections to the east wing of the building stiffened the supporting columns

and wall, and bulged the north wall of the building, figure 38-4. The

westerly columns and wall were severely cracked in shear but not

strongly displaced, figures 38-5 and 38-6.

The building appears to be in very insecure condition. The portions

which have not fallen may fall at any moment. The damages are so severe

that repair appears to be impracticable.

80
Figure 38-1 Sheared columns above partial height

wall, Instituto Nacional Ramirez

Goyena

Figure 38-2 Collapse of upper two stories of the west

wing from the courtyard, Instituto Nacional

Ramirez Goyena.

81
r

Figure 38-3 Street view of the collapsed upper two

stories of the west wing, Instituto

Nacional Ramirez Goyena.

Figure 38-4 Broken wall on south

side of gymnasium where

school wing connects,

Instituto Nacional

Ramirez Goyena.

82
Figure 38-5 Lesser damage of south wall of gymnasium

at more flexible west end, Instituto

Nacional Ramirez Goyena.

Figure 38-6 Shear of columns at west wall of

gymnasium, Instituto Nacional Ramirez

Goyena.

83
Report No. 41

Date of Investigation: December 31, 1972

Building: Edificio del Teatro Nacional Ruben Dario

Inspected by: Raul Amador

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

This building which was completed in 1969 has steel exterior columns at

the facade and a reinforced concrete shear wall and frame system at the

interior of the building, figure 41-1. There are two reinforced concrete

access bridges leading to the building.

The slabs of the access bridges are in perfect condition. There are minor damages at the abutements of the bridges resulting from hammering

out of the expansion joints and perhaps some settlement of the abutments,

figure 41-2. The columns which support the slab show light cracking at

various elevations. These do not appear to be important but a careful

engineering investigation should be carried out as part of the program

of repair.

The only damages visible from the outside of the building involve the

breaking of a few panes of glass and some damage to exterior masonry

walls. The interior could not be carefully inspected because of the

lack of electric illumination. There were some interior damages to the

Chiltepe block and a few panels of the suspended ceiling had fallen,

figure 41-3 and 41-4. However, there were no visible evidences of

structural damage. A careful examination of the structure should be

carried out as part of the repair program, but it appears that the

structure will be ready for use following the minor cosmetic repairs.

84
Figure 41-1 South facade of theatre showing some loss

of finish, Teatro Ruben Dario,.

Figure 41-2 Pounding of access pedestrian bridge on abutment knocked out

joint material

,

Teatro Ruben Dario.

85
Figure 41-3 Minor finish damage amounted to fallen

ceiling panels and some chips from the

chandeliers, Teatro Ruben Dario.

Figure 41-4 Fallen bust of Ruben

Dario, Ing. Raul Amador

of Nicaraguan Ministry

of Public Works, Teatro

Ruben Dario.

86
Report No. 42

Date of Investigation: December 31, 1972

Building: Hotel Intercontinental

Inspected by: Abdel Karim C.

Mete A. Sozen

The structure is a moment resisting concrete frame, figure 42-1. Preliminary investigation revealed two failed columns in the first floor.

The columns carrying the mechanical penthouse also have failed, figures

42-2 and 42-3. It is recommended that:

A. All beam-column connections (currently covered by architectural

details) be inspected.

B. The building reanalyzed before repairs for ground motion 1.5

times that measured at the Esso refinery or for ground motion

resulting from a site study.

87
Figure 42-1 General view of Hotel Intercontinental.

Figure 42-2 Minor facade cracking and displacement

of mechanical penthouse, Hotel

Intercontinental.

88
89
Report No. 43

Date of Investigation: December 31, 1972

Building: Corte Suprema de Justicia

Inspected by: Raul Amador

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

This building, which was completed in 1967, consists of two main wings.

At the east, there is a six-story tower on a semi-basement with a reinforced concrete frame and shear walls at each of the four corners.

On the west, there is a two-story plus semi-basement structure with a reinforced concrete frame. There are a number of courts cut into the

west wing by omission of floors and walls.

There is very severe damage to the finishing materials in the west twostory wing. Structural damages seem less severe. In the region where

courts have been out from the building, the beams crossing the courts

have been severely damaged, completely pulled apart in many instances by

relative movements of the nearly separated elements of the building,

figures 43-1 and 43-2. Columns adjacent to these courts show evidence

of severe damage. Where the interior columns lines change at the south

of this building (the northwest corner of the library) there is severe damage to the column apparently generated by the concentrated deformations induced from a crack in the reinforced concrete wall at the north

of the library which is framed in by this column. Here, the roof slab over the stairway is pulled loose and ready to collapse, apparently by

relative movements between the elements of the building which could move independently because of the interruption in the floor slabs.

This building has yery severe non-structural damage and some important

structural damage. The damaged non-structural elements should be removed

and a careful inspection carried out prior to planning the structural

repairs. The extensive failures of non-structural elements (decorative

grills, windows, tile walls, etc.) would have represented a severe hazard

90
Report No. 43

to the lives of the building occupants if the earthquake had occurred

while the building was occupied. The replacement non-structural elements

should be designed to be much less hazardous to the occupants. It appears

that the building is structurally repairable, however, consideration

should be given to means of strengthening the structure for future earthquakes when the repairs are conducted.

The six-story east wing of the building shows much damage to the covering

materials on the outside, figures 43-3 and 43-4. Again, the falling

marble panels constitute a severe hazard to personnel. There is substantial cracking in the walls around the elevator shaft and stairway at

the west of the building. The infilled tile walls for the penthouse on the roof have fallen out and access to the roof was difficult. However,

no visible damage to the penthouse frame could be observed from a vantage

point near the top of the access stairway. The columns of the building

showed evidence of structural damage only in the sixth floor where the

southwest column is crushed at the top of the parapet wall, and the

southeast, northeast and northwest columns are cracked at similar

positions. The four shear walls for the building show evidence of light

cracking in the first and second floors, figure 43-5, and some pounding

damage at the roof level of the two story wing. The remarks made about

replacement of the finishing elements with less hazardous material applied

to the six story building as well as the three story building. The

structural damage in the six story building is more limited, repairs are certainly required for the columns on the sixth story and a careful

inspection should be made of the shear walls and other column and frame

elements to determine whether any additional repairs are required.

In general, it appears that these buildings can be returned to service

following appropriate repairs which will include moderate repairs of

damaged structural elements and major repairs of the non-structural

elements of the buildings.

91
%r

Fiaure 43-1 Ruptured beams connectinq buildinq

elements across a courtyard, Corte

Sunrema de Justicia.

92
Figure 43-2 Extensive nonstructural damage in two

story wing, Corte Suprema de Justicia.

Figure 43-3 Nonstructural damage

on 6 story wing,

Corte Suprema de

Justicia.

93

525-814 O - 73 - 7
Figure 43-4 Extensive loss of exterior finish panels

on 6 story wing, Corte Suprema de Justicia.

Figure 43-5 Damage to shear walls at first floor

level, Corte Suprema de Justicia.

In

Hi

9k
Report No. 44

Date of Investigation: December 31, 1972

Building: Edificio Administrative del INSS

Inspected by: Raul Amador

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

This is a nine-story reinforced concrete frame building with two story

wings at the northeast and southeast corners, figures 44-1 and 44-2. The

building was completed in 1962. It appears to be a moment resistant concrete frame with two lines of cylindrical columns supporting the ninestory building, two intersecting lines of columns at the east support the

wings, major beam elements connect the columns; the floors are waffle

slabs with tile fillers. There was no indication of shear wall elements.

There is extensive damage to the curtain walls and windows, the walls

around the stairway, and the light concrete frame and infill masonry

2

walls around the elevator shaft, and in the masonry infill wall at the

west of the building. The only apparent structural damage in the main

frame appeared in the columns on the ninth floor. This consisted of small

flexural cracks at the tops of some columns and crushed column tops at the

east of the building under the mechanical penthouse. The mechanical penthouse on the roof had collapsed on the top of the water tank and elevator

equipment, figure 44-3.

It appears that the building is basically in sound structural condition

and suitable for repair. The damaged non-structural elements should be

removed, and the structure carefully inspected prior to restoration of the

non-structural elements. The replacement roof for the mechanical equipment

certainly could be of lighter construction.

1 Later investigations with access to plans note columns are spirally

2 reinforced.

Later investigators noted concrete walls around elevator shaft acted as shear walls. 95
Figure 44-1 Main entrance to nine story frame

showing absence of structural damage,

Edificio Administrativo INSS.

Figure 44-2 Facade shows limited

nonstructural damage

and collapsed mechanical

penthouse, Edificio

Administrativo INSS.

96
o

CJ

I-

-o

LU

00O

OJQ.

n3 W) O 00 C •—

JZ

O

U >

CD t- E +-> -o sCO CO Q.-I- o -o

97
Report No. 46

Date of Investigation: December 31, 1972

Building: Instituto Pedagogico (on Avenue Roosevelt)

Inspected by: Abdel Karim

Ricardo Morales

M. A. Sozen

The buildings include three types:

1

Old Two Story Building

These are made of sandstone and mixed taquezal-like construction with

wooden floors, figure 46-1. Although they survived the earthquake,

they would not qualify under an earthquake-resistant building code.

Suggest demolition.

2. Five Story Building

This "Reticular" flat plate building has a permanent deformation of

approximately 15 cm toward the west at the top floor, figure 46-2.

Cracks exist at bottoms of slabs along column lines where bottom

reinforcement was stopped or lapped, figure 46-3. Flexural cracks

appear in columns, figure 46-4. The structure is still intact and the

building may be restored by adding reinforced concrete shear walls

after an appropriate analysis. It should be closed until repaired.

3. Chapel

Several arches were structurally damaged by transverse motion, as well as the structure near the east end, figures 46-5 and 46-6. The

building is not in danger of collapse but should be repaired (after

an appropriate analysis) as soon as possible. It should be closed

until repaired.

98
• nil

Figure 46-1 Old building and chapel of the Instituto

Pedagogico.

Figure 46-2 Displacement of building

and cracking of slabs,

Instituto Pedagogico.
Figure 46-3 Slab cracking along column lines,

Instituto Pedagogico.

Figure 46-4 Cracking of columns,

Instituto Pedagogico.

100
Figure 46-5 Cracking in arches of chapel, InstitutePedagogico.

Figure 46-6 Damages at ends of beams at connections

to arch, Instituto Pedagogico.

101
Report No. 52

Date of Investigation: December 29, 1972

Building: Banco Central

Inspected by: A. Karim C.

M. A. Sozen

This report is limited to the main high-rise building of the bank, figures

52-1 and 52-2. The structure appears to have no critical damage in its

main load carrying elements. However, it is recommended that the following actions be taken before it is repaired and occupied.

1. Check connections of the columns and beams on the "skin", especially

at the fourth floor.

2. Check cracking of the shear walls below the seventh floor.

3. Check connections of the floor beams with the columns at levels above

the fourth story, especially on the west end of the structure.

4. Analyze the structure for a base motion input at least 50 percent

more intense than the one measured at the Esso Refinery on December 23, 1972 or according to the results of a complete site

study.

The frame was sufficiently flexible to allow extensive non-structural

interior damage, figures 52-3 and 52-4.

102
Figure 52-1 Banco de America (left) and Banco Central

(right) survived amid collapsed low buildings of taquezal construction.

Figure 52-2 Collapsed auditorium and cracked infill

walls on framed tube tower.

mmnmi

riniipiiiii

wmntn

!!I!!I!HH!

!!!!!!!!!!!!

!!!!!!!!!!!! U!»i!!!t!t! > a 1 " 1

J -,:. \, iB^fcp"^**:''

JOPSWWBB

rii»ri»!SS!S mmmnmm\l

mmmnmmn

nnmmnmmf

wummnmm.

mnnnmimm

nmnmmww

!!!!!MI!iEI!i!!lfl[

"--«*l3BBi ' » r » s- >

'

IMIIE

II

*u# .» .*.

103
Figure 52-3 Nonstructural damage in an office, Banco

Central

Figure 52-4 Suspended ceiling fallen to floor of main

lobby, Banco Central.

10*f
Report No. 53

Date of Investigation: December 31, 1972

Building: Gimnasio Jorge Buitrago (Catholic University)

Inspected by: A. Karim

Mete A. Sozen

The building is in precarious condition. Long prestressed concrete girders

appear to have no continuity with the columns, figure 53-1. Several slab

elements on the roof are detached, figure 53-2. The building should be

closed immediately. (On December 31, 1972, it was being used for food

storage with watchmen in the building.) Repair may be possible after

analysis and provision of a structural system to resist the shear forces

due to earthquake motions.

A one story building with a shell roof exhibits failures of the supporting

columns, figure 53-3. A multistory reinforced concrete frame building,

under construction and partially infilled shows frame failures in unfilled

stories, figure 53-4.

105

525-814 O - 73
Figure 53-1 Poor continuity of girders to columns of

gymnasium, Seminario Catolico.

Figure 53-2 Damaged framing of

gymnasium, Seminario

Catolico.

106
Figure 53-3 Severely damaged columns supporting shell

roof, Seminario Catolico.

Figure 53-4 Frame failures in building under

construction, Seminario Catolico.

••iiiii,,,,.

107
Report No. 54

Date of Investigation: December 30, 1972

Building: Banco de America

Inspected by: A. Karim

Mete A. Sozen

This is a 17 story reinforced concrete shear-wall frame building, figure

52-1. The main shear cores of this building have survived the earthquake

quite well. However, most of the connecting beams are destroyed, figure

54-1. The following actions are recommended prior to repair and occupation of the building:

1. Analyze the structure (in the form it is to be completed for a base motion input at least 50 percent more intense than the one measured at the Esso Refinery on December 23, 1972, or according

to the results of a complete site study).

2. Check shear walls for alignment in the vertical direction.

3. Check connections between slab and edge of columns and shear walls

at levels above the seventh floor.

4. Check slab between shear walls at levels above the 12th floor.

The good condition of the interior shows the advantages of the drift

restraint provided by shear walls, figure 54-2.

108
Figure 54-1 Failures of beams

connecting shear

wall towers, Banco

de America.

Figure 54-2 Good condition of interior due to control

of drift, Banco de America.

109
Report No. 55

Date of Investigation: December 28, 1972

Building: Hospital General el Retiro

Inspected by: M. A. Sozen

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Abdel Karim

This building with four, three-story wings on a semi-basement and a four-story, central portion was completed in 1962, figure 55-1. It appears

to be a reinforced concrete frame without shear walls. Damage at the

north front of the building is substantial, figures 55-2, 55-3, and 55-4.

Exterior columns in the walls of the wings are extensively broken by

cracks originating in the infill walls which caused concentration of

deformations in the columns, figure 55-5. Interior columns in the wings

show little distress, figure 55-6. The four story building at the intersection of the wings shows severe damage to columns and partial collapse

at the south of the third floor, figure 55-7. The damaged columns appear

to be reinforced with undeformed steel which is yery lightly tied.

Major repairs would be required to make the structure safe for future

occupancy. Changes in the structural system, such as additions of shear

walls, would appear to be necessary to avoid similar damages in future

earthquakes.

The insubstantial warehouse for medicines was essentially collapsed; the

vital supplies conserved by the strength of their shelving, figure 55-8.

no
Figure 55-1 Aerial view from the rear, Hospital

General El Retire

Figure 55-2 Damage at north

facade of Hospita

General El Retire

111
Figure 55-3 Column damage at entry canopy, column and

wall damage on wing, Hospital General El Retiro.

Figure 55-4 Damage at base of canopy columns, undeformed

reinforcing, Hospital General El Retiro.

112
Figure 55-5 Detail of column and wall damage in north

facade, undeformed reinforcing, Hospital

El Retire

Figure 55-6 Interior view at main entrance, only

nonstructural damage apparent, Hospital

General El Retiro.

113
Figure 55-7 Third floor of the

Hospital General El Retiro near collapse

at rear.

Figure 55-8 Medical supply warehouse supported by

shelving inside, Hospital General El Retiro.

Hit
Report No. 57

Date of Investigation: January 1, 1973

Building: Bodegas de Almacenamiento de Casa Presidencial y Mocoron

Inspected by: Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Raul Amador Kuhl

The Presidential house and its storerooms are located at the crest of the

extinct volcanic cone containing Lake Tiscapa. It appears that the ground

at the crest is sliding to the north down the face of the cone and to the

south into the lake. If there are any intentions to continue to use these

buildings and storerooms, it will be necessary to make topographic surveys

to determine how much movement occured during the earthquake of December

23, 1972, and whether this movement is continuing. There is considerable

danger of new motions during the rainy season, even if motions are not

presently occurring, and further motions in future earthquakes. Therefore,

while the following paragraphs apply to the condition of individual storerooms, it should be recognized that the whole site around the Presidential

house may be dangerously unstable and unsafe for any type of occupancy.

a. Storeroom located below the principal terrace of the Presidential

House, figure 57-1

In spite of the fact that the roof and structural framing of the

portico above this warehouse has collapsed on top of it, there is no apparent damage to the slab which forms the roof of the warehouse. We saw no damages of substantial magnitude. It may be considered secure while the rubble and the structure above do not affect it. The

structure above and the rubble from the damaged part should be

carefully removed to avoid damage from further collapses. The absence

of cracking in this storeroom indicates that its foundations, if they

have moved, have moved as a whole.

b. Storeroom next to the CCN.

In this storeroom, there are serious damages to the beams, columns,

115
Report No. 57

walls and floors caused by the motions and settlements of the

foundations. Its repair is not recommended while further motions or settlements of its foundations are possible; everything stored here

should be removed.

c. Storeroom of the Pines, figure 57-2.

This storeroom is located below the parking area and access drive to

the north of the Presidential house. The retaining wall which forms

the southern wall of this storehouse has failed completely at its

eastern end. The reinforced concrete columns which support the

ceiling of the storeroom (the slab of the parking area above) are severely crushed or cracked at the top throughout the length of the

warehouse. There are also strong cracks in the north wall and in the

interior and exterior floor slabs. It is clearly evident that there

has been sliding and settlement of the soil around and under this

warehouse to the north. It appears that the structure is ready to

collapse; it should be evacuated totally. The passage of vehicles

over its failing southern retaining wall should be minimized; those

vehicles which must pass should move as far to the south of the road

as possible. It may be possible to repair this storeroom if it has

been determined that its foundations can be stabilized. There is

substantial hazard that this storeroom will fail completely when its

supporting soil is weakened at the beginning of the rainy season.

d. Combination magazine.

This storeroom is apparently in good condition.

e. Gallery of the armored forces.

The columns of concrete which support the wooden roof trusses show

flexural failures at their bases. The damages may be repaired;

however, repairs should include development of a lateral bracing

system for the building capable of preventing such damages in the

future.

f. Medical dispensary.

This building is completely fallen.

116
Report No. 57

g. Artillery barricks.

The columns are severely damaged; major repairs and reconstruction are required,

h. School

All of the timber columns have failed. The general condition of the

structure does not justify its repair,

i. Storeroom of the water tank

The concrete structure supporting the old water tank is in good

condition. However, large cracks are seen in the surrounding soil

which indicate that the foundations of this structure are insecure,

j. The school of training for enlistees

This is completely fallen. The magazine below shows large cracks at

the entrance caused by the settlements of the surrounding soil.

Structural repairs should not be made until an investigation shows

that stable foundation conditions exist. It was not possible to enter

the storeroom to determine the conditions of the walls, columns, and

slab,

k. Electric plant

These buildings appear severely damaged and unworthy of repair.

1. The storeroom of the tower

This is damaged severely as a result of soil motions and foundation

instability,

m. Artillery magazine

Severely damaged

n . Ja i 1 This building is apparently on an unstable foundation; it should be

evacuated and demolished,

o. Storeroom under the residence of the Chief Director

This shows substantial damages to the columns, walls, and floors. It

is evident that there has been vertical and lateral displacement of

the building's foundation toward the lake. It is doubtful that the

117
Report No. 57

foundations can be stabilized to permit effective repair of the

building. It should be evacuated.

p. Storeroom in front of the barricks of Mocoron

This building is formed of concrete block walls with reinforced

concrete bond beams and columns. The east faces are seriously

deformed and cracked, the west wall has collapsed, the roof timbers

are broken under the corrugated metal roofing. The building appears

unstable and too severely damaged to justify repair. It should be

evacuated.

q. Storeroom Nos. 13, 14 and 15 at Mocoron

The structures are in good condition except that the wing walls at the

entrances of storerooms 14 and 15 have fallen and should be repaired

prior to the rainy season, figure 57-3. The metal door of storeroom

15 should be adjusted for easier use.

Note that separate reports Nos. 60 and 61 have been prepared on the

Presidential house and the residence of the Chief Director.

118
O

CDU

fO

S-S-<u

+->

s->o

4-OO

s_ . 4- <T3 O !-O

<DC

CO 0) Q.-0

CO •!- .— CO r— O) O SC_> QCD

119
Figure 57-2 Cracking in road in front of house above

retaining wall of the Storeroom of the

Pines, Casa Presidencial.

Figure 57-3 Wing wall collapsed at right of entrance,

Bodegas de Almacenamiento de y Morocon.

120
Report No. 60

Date of Investigation: January 1, 1973

Building: Casa Presidencial

Inspected by: Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Raul Amador K.

The building is located at the crest of an extinct volcanic cone as noted

in Report No. 57. It is a two story building constructed of reinforced

concrete, masonry, and some steel elements and evidently was constructed

in many stages, figure 60-1.

The coverings of terraces at the northeast and northwest of the principal

entrance have fallen, figures 57-1 and 60-2. These were steel truss roof

elements supported by reinforced concrete columns and beams. The ground

floor of the building shows extensive cracking in the reinforced concrete

walls and columns with a concentration of cracking at the levels penetrated

by doors and windows, figures 60-3 and 60-4. In these areas, the reinforcing was revealed to be undeformed bars. The floor at the back of the main

lobby is settled; it was not ascertained whether there was earthfill

or damaged structure below this. The western portion of the second floor

shows yery little damage. In the central portion, the fireplace wall

shows extensive cracking and the south central portion of the floor is

displaced south toward the crater lake Tiscapa. The roof of the building

does not show cracking but major elements of the building are separated.

The building requires extensive and expensive repairs. However, it would

be essential to assure stability of the foundations of the building prior

to any consideration of repairs. At present, the building site appears to

be sliding both to the north down the side of the hill and to the south

into the crater lake, figures 60-5 and 60-6.

121

525-814 O - 73 - 9
>

1 fttt

It

:.*—

SSLa^S

Figure 60-1 Main entrance showing extensive damage,

Casa Presidencial.

Figure 60-2 Detail of collapsed

terrace roof, Casa

Presidencial

122
Figure 60-3 Details of interior damage, Casa

Presidencial.

Figure 60-4 Interior damage in main lobby, Casa

Presidencial.

123
Figure 60-5 Cracking of walls at rear of building,

Casa Presidencial

Figure 60-6 Subsidence cracking in road at northwest

of Casa Presidencial.

12i+
Report No. 61

Date of Investigation: January 1, 1973

Building: Casa del Jefe Director (La Curva)

Inspected by: Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Raul Amador

This is a two-story reinforced concrete building completed in 1947 and

located to the east of the Presidential house.

One of the two roof towers has fallen and penetrated the ceiling of the

lobby at the entrance of the first floor, figures 61-1 and 61-2. The

other tower is sheared and ready to fall. There is extensive wall, beam,

and column cracking in the first floor of the building. In the basement

of the building there is heavy cracking of the walls, light cracking of

some columns, and heaving of the floor or penetration of the wall footings

At the west end of the basement, the east wall is heavily cracked, a west

end column is crushed at mid height, figure 61-3, and many columns are lightly cracked.

The foundations of the building and the site in general show evidence of

instability, figure 61-4. In this area, the movement of the building

appears to be down and south into the crater lake. Repair of the building

would be an extensive and expensive operation. It should not be undertaken unless stability of the foundations can be assured.

125
Figure 61-1 One roof tower near collapse, the other

fallen, Residencia Jefe Director.

Figure 61-2 Tower fallen through

ceiling of entrance

lobby, Residencia

Jefe Director.

126
Figure 61-3 Column crushed in

basement, Residencia

Jefe Director.

Figure 61-4 Slide movement in front of Residencia

Jefe Director.

127
Report No. 62

Date of Investigation: January 1, 1973

Building: Radio-Difusora Nacional (Road of the Colegio Centro-America)

Inspected by: Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Raul Amador

This is a one and two story building with some reinforced concrete columns,

lightly reinforced or non-reinforced concrete block bearing walls, and

concrete beams, figure 62-1. It employs a wood framed corrugated metal

roof.

There are severe cracks in the walls and some beams and columns of the

first floor. The walls of the second floor are partially collapsed and

partially broken and bulging in very unstable condition. The valuable

equipment in this building is seriously threatened by its instability.

The remaining structure on the second floor should be carefully removed

and the first floor walls, beams, and ceiling should be shored until the

structure can be repaired.

Instructions to carry out the removal and shoring activities were given

at once to the foreman in charge of repair works.

128
129
Report No. 68

Date of Investigation: December 27, 1972

Building: Aduana

Inspected by: Mete A. Sozen

Samuel Kramer

Richard N. Wright

The buildings of the Gerente General, the warehouse immediately west, and

the vehicle storage building to the southwest were inspected. The two

story building of the Gerente General which had a reinforced concrete

frame employing undeformed reinforcing, was completely collapsed, figures

68-1 and 68-2. The warehouse was made up of barrel shells, about 30 ft wide

and 200 ft long, supported by reinforced concrete columns at the edge

lines on approximately 20 ft spacing. The exterior columns have failed

completely at the top of partial height infill walls which increased the

column stiffness and thereby the column shear, figures 68-3 and 68-4.

Interior columns showed some damages at the top. Repair may be possible,

but will require substantial reconstruction and improvement of the roof

support system.

The vehicle storage for the Aduana consists of barrel shells about 35 ft

wide and 40 ft long. The supporting columns have failed, in part due to

poor anchorage of the column steel in the roof beams, and the roof has

collapsed on the vehicles below. It is unlikely that the roof shells can

be used again on a reconstructed support system.

130
Figure 68-1 View of general

collapse, Aduana

General de Managua.

Figure 68-2 Close up of columns

showing undeformed,

lightly tied reinforcement, Aduana

General de Managua.

131
Figure 68-3 General view of damaged barrel shed,

Aduana General de Managua.

Figure 68-4 Close up of sheared

exterior columns,

Aduana General de

Managua.

132
Report No. 70

Date of Investigation: January 2, 1973

Building: Edificio del Hospital del Seguro Social

Inspected by: Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

Raul Amador K.

This is a three story reinforced concrete frame structure completed in

1956, figures 70-1 and 70-2. It is a moment resistant frame building with

reinforced concrete beams and columns; the infilled walls are variously of

cement blocks, clay bricks and tile. The building has east and west wings,

partially separated by courts, which differ in structure plan.

The second floor facades on the north and east sides shows severe column

damage above the breast high infilled walls. The columns are approximately 14 by 12 in reinforced with four number eight bars. The corres- ponding columns on the west facade are much more lightly cracked. There

was fire on the third floor of the building which burned the wood frame

supporting the corrugated metal roof leading to collapse of portions of

the roof. The first floor structure on the east side of the building is

in reasonably good condition. Concrete block and heavy brick partitions

appear to have braced the frame. Second floor columns on the east side

are destroyed as noted above due to the concentration of deformations

caused by partial height walls, figure 70-3. The structural system on the

third floor of this east side appears to be in good condition in spite of

the fire. On the west side of the building, there is major damage to some columns and beams on the second floor. In this region, there is severe cracking and falling of partitions. The first floor shows some shear

cracking in stub girders where column spacings change between floors.

The repair of this building is possible but will be very expensive. It may be more economical to build a new hospital when the advantages of a modern building plan are considered. The present building cannot be

considered for any use prior to major reconstruction.

133
Report No. 70

Although the structure did not collapse, extensive damage to unreinforced

masonry partitions and infill walls made the building dysfunctional and

hazardous to occupants, figures 70-4 and 70-5.

13i+
Figure 70-1 East facade of the Hospital del INSS,

extensive second floor damage, note

roof collapse through third floor

windows.

Figure 70-2 North facade Hospital del INSS, much

wall and column damage.

135
Figure 70-3 Detail of wall and column damage on north facade, Hospital del INSS.

Figure 70-4 Structural and nonstructural damage on east wing, first floor, Hospital del

INSS.

136
f

CO

roE

-a

ro

s_

Z5 • +-> OO O OO

=5 ^

S- i—i +J

CO i

C CD o -o

T3 <T3 C 4J

rrj tQ. — CO

ro

O

O 00

s- s4-> rO OO 2

LDI O

137

525-814

O - 73 - 10
Report No. 71

Date of Investigation: January 2, 1973

Building: Policlinica Central del INSS (adjacent to the administration

building)

Inspected by: Raul Amador

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

This is a three wing reinforced concrete structure with two story elements

at the northeast and southwest corners. Portions of the building were

completed in 1956 and in 1960.

There is no evidence of major structural damage. Some parapet walls have

cracked and should be removed to eliminate the hazard to adjacent personnel, figure 71-1. It would be advisable to remove the undamaged

parapet walls at the same time. There is some cracking of filler walls

and some minor pounding damage of roof and wall elements at junctions of

building elements. There is a severe crack in the infilled wall at the

southeast corner of the building.

It is possible to clean out the building and put it to use immediately. A more thorough examination of structural and non-structural damages, and

development of repair requirements, should be carried out during this

clean up.

138
reS4-> C

<u o

roOo

ro

4-> Q)Q-

(0

S-fOO- •

<u ^ -i<i 1—1 u

fO >— o -o

CDsC7>

139
Report No. 72

Date of Investigation: January 3, 1973

Building: IBM

Inspected by: Raul Amador

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

This is a four story steel frame building without a basement, figure 72-1.

It is a moment resistant frame with corrugated metal floor decking on steel bar joists with 1 1/2 in of concrete floor surfacing. The exterior

wall cladding is steel above the first floor level.

There is evidence of inelastic deformation in the first floor columns.

Anchor bolts are lifted as much as 1/4 in along the north side of the

building, figure 72-2. Infill concrete block panels at the first floor

entrance have cracked; the resulting concentration of deformation has

deformed the column at the door frame on the west side, figure 72-3. The

weld of the staircase framing to the columns has fractured in this vicinity,

At the east side of the south wing of the building, partial height partition walls have led to concentration of deformations in the columns,

fiqure 72-4. This has broken a 6 by 6 in reinforced concrete column

reinforced with four number three bars and has deformed the Wl 2X31 steel

columns about two in horizontally to the north in the first story at the

southeast corner of the building.

On the interior of the first floors, concrete block walls are cracked in

the lavatory areas. Other partitions are lightweight and not damaged.

Several welded beam to column connections were inspected at the top of the

first story level and showed no distress. This included the connection at

the zone of the most severe deformation in the southeast corner of the

building. Damage on upper floors of the building was very limited. There

were signs of movement in the plywood fillers between flanges of the

columns and some blocks in the masonry curtain walls around lavatories

were displaced. The building's elevator was working.

140
Report No. 72

The building appears safe for occupancy. Structural connections should be

checked individually to look for weld cracking that is difficult to see in

a cursory inspection. A more careful investigation should be conducted to

define whether it is necessary or desirable to straighten the deformed

columns in the first story.

mi
Figure 72-1 General view of IBM building.

Figure 72-2 Lifted anchor bolts along north facade,

IBM.

lki
Figure 72-3 Column deformation at

IBM building caused

by cracked infill

panel.

Figure 72-4 Column damage caused by partial height

infill wall, IBM building.

I*t3
Report No. 73

Date of Investigation: January 3, 1973

Building: Country Club Tejapa

Inspected by: Raul Amador

Samuel Kramer

Richard Wright

The building is a two story reinforced concrete frame structure with a semi-basement. There is a main wing of social rooms and a wing of showers

and lockers at the southeast.

The main wing is severely damaged and partially collapsed, figure 73-1.

The eight in thick canopy slab has swayed more than two ft on its steel

pipe columns, figure 73-2. An attendant reported that the partial

collapse of the reinforced concrete main wing occurred on the first shock

of the earthquake. Although it was not closely inspected, the two story

wing at the southeast showed no evident damage from the outside. It was pointed out, that new cracking appeared in the entry drive in front of the

club at the time of the earthquake. This may be part of the fault breaking

in the earthquake since there are no strong slopes in the vicinity suggesting sliding action.

The main wing of the club appears to require complete reconstruction.

144
Figure 73-1 Severe structural damage in main building

of the Country Club Tejapa.

Figure 73-2 Sway deformation of heavy canopy slab,

Country Club Tejapa.

145
Report No. 74

Date of Investigation: December 28, 1972

Building: Edificio Guerrero Pineda

Inspected by: Richard Wright

Samuel Kramer

Mete Sozen

This was a five story reinforced concrete frame building at the corner of

Calle 27 de Mayo, one block from Bolivar Avenue. One column observed was reinforced with six No. 8 plain bars. A large portion of the building has

collapsed, figures 74-1 and 74-2. In the remaining part of the building,

it is evident that partial height infill walls contributed to failures of

the columns.

It is interesting to note the contrasting lack of damage to a building

across the street, figure 74-3.

l»+6
Figure 74-1 Four of five stories collapsed, Edificio

Guerrero Pineda.

Figure 74-2 Three of five stories of the Edificio

Guerrero Pineda standing at this end.

147
re -o

CDO

sa>

sSO) CDE • o a>

S- O) M- fOE

to ro to "O o

s- a; O i—

fO +->

+-> CTVic: r—

•r— "D l/l r— 2

•iO

CQ 1/1

CO

CD

SZJen

148
Report No. 75

Date of Investigation: December 28, 1972

Building: Institute Geografico Nacional

Inspected by: Richard N. Wright

Samuel Kramer

Mete A. Sozen

This is a one story reinforced concrete frame building with a column

spacing of about 16 ft, of approximately 12 ft gross height and an 8 ft

clear height inside the building. It is seven bays wide and 12 bays long

on the side investigated in detail; a similar building is connected to it

by a passageway, figure 75-1. The columns of the building are 12 in by 12

in and are reinforced by four No. 5 or 6 deformed bars. The columns are connected by 12 in by 12 in beams; seven concrete joists resting on top of

the beams span each panel and support 4 in clay tile which in turn are covered by a built up roof. The wall panels consist of two wythes of 4 in

concrete block separated by a cavity.

The building is extensively damaged. The cavity walls which were not tied

together across the cavity or tied to the columns or beams have suffered a number of failures, some leaning out, some completely fallen, figure 75-2.

Exterior columns are sheared at the top. Much of the suspended ceiling

has fallen inside the building.

The building should be evacuated and repaired before further use. Special

attention is required to repair and reforce the exterior walls and columns.

It may be desirable to provide a shear wall in place of the present curtain

walls.

149
Figure 75-1 Damages to canopy between buildings,

Instituto Geografico Nacional

Figure 75-2 Falling of cavity walls and shearing of

frame columns, Instituto Geografico

Nacional

150
FORM NBS-114A (1-71) U.S. DEPT. OF COMM. BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA

SHEET

1. PUBLICATION OR REPORT NO. NBS TN-8072. Gov't Accession No.3. Recipient's Accession No.

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

BUILDING PERFORMANCE IN THE 1972 MANAGUA EARTHQUAKE

5. Publication Date November 197 3

6. Performing Organization Code

7. AUTHOR(S)

Richard N. Wright and Samuel Kramer

8. Performing Organization

10. Project/Task/ Work Unit No. 4603190

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20234

11. Contract/Grant No.

12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address

Same as Item No. 9

13. Type of Report & Period Covered

Fi nal

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

16. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of most significant information. If document includes a significant bibliography or literature survey, mention it here.) r.ii., ,J_— j.u_ m m . . n of io-7o Following the Managua, Nicaragua, earthquake of

Dec. ^3, 1972, a team of engineers representing the U.S. Department of Commerce's National

Bureau of Standards (NBS) and the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) performed field

investigations in Managua, Nicaragua, from Dec. 26, 1972, to Jan. 4, 1973. The objectives

were to assist the Nicaraguan government in surveying major buildings to determine whether

each was suitable for emergency use, repairable, or appropriate for clearance. The team

also viewed the patterns of successful performance and damage to identify needs for improvemerits in building practices for mitigation of earthquake hazards and opportunities for mere detailed investigations which could provide information for future improvements in prac- tices. In general, the damages cannot be attributed to unusual intensities of ground shaking or severity of surface faulting. Most damages appeared to result from deficiencies

in building practices; deficiencies which had been exhibited many times before in previous earthquakes, deficiencies which would be avoided by implementation of up-to-date provisions

tor earthquake resistant design and construction. However, Managua did not employ a building code with seismic design requirements appropriate to its earthquake risk, and furthermore, did not have a building regulatory system capable of effective implementation

mdcImL . gJ code Pulsions. This report documents the observations of damages by the NBS/NAE team and points out relationships to inadequacies in the building practices

employed. Most of these inadequacies have been well known; however, the Managuan exper- ience may serve as an incentive to improvement of building practices in many other areas which are subject to substantial earthquake risks and have not consistently accounted

tor these risks in their building codes and building regulatory system

17. KEY WORDS (Alphabetical order, separated by semicolons)

Building codes; buildings; earthquakes; hazards; natural disasters; structures

18. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

fyi UNLIMITED.

I I FOR OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION. DO NOT RELEASE

TO NTIS.

19. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS REPORT)

UNCLASSIFIED

20. SECURITY CLASS

(THIS PAGE)

UNCLASSIFIED

21. NO. OF PAGES

155

22. Price $1.60

USCOMM-DC 66244-P7I

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1973 O - 525-814

NBS TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS

PERIODICALS JOURNAL OF RESEARCH reports National Bureau of Standards research and development in

physics, mathematics, and chemistry. Comprehensive

scientific papers give complete details of the work,

including laboratory data, experimental procedures,

and theoretical and mathematical analyses. Illustrated with photographs, drawings, and charts. Includes

listings of other NBS papers as issued.

Published in two sections, available separately:

• Physics and Chemistry (Section A)

Papers of interest primarily to scientists working in these fields. This section covers a broad range of physical and chemical research, with major emphasis on standards of physical measurement, fundamental

constants, and properties of matter. Issued six times a year. Annual subscription: Domestic, $17.00; Foreign, $21.25.

• Mathematical Sciences (Section B)

Studies and compilations designed mainly for the mathematician and theoretical physicist. Topics in mathematical statistics, theory of experiment design,

numerical analysis, theoretical physics and chemistry,

logical design and programming of computers and

computer systems. Short numerical tables. Issued quarterly. Annual subscription: Domestic, $9.00; Foreign,

$11.25.

DIMENSIONS, NBS

The best single source of information concerning the Bureau's measurement, research, developmental, co- operative, and publication activities, this monthly

publication is designed for the layman and also for the industry-oriented individual whose daily work

involves intimate contact with science and technology —for engineers, chemists, physicists, research managers, product-development managers, and company

executives. Annual subscription: Domestic, $6.50; Foreign, $8.25.

NONPERIODICALS Applied Mathematics Series. Mathematical tables, manuals, and studies. Building Science Series. Research results, test methods, and performance criteria of building materials, components, systems, and structures. Handbooks. Recommended codes of engineering

and industrial practice (including safety codes) de- veloped in cooperation with interested industries, professional organizations, and regulatory bodies. Special Publications. Proceedings of NBS conferences, bibliographies, annual reports, wall charts, pamphlets, etc. Monographs. Major contributions to the technical

literature on various subjects related to the Bureau's

scientific and technical activities. National Standard Reference Data Series.

NSRDS provides quantitative data on the physical

and chemical properties of materials, compiled from

the world's literature and critically evaluated. Product Standards. Provide requirements for sizes, types, quality, and methods for testing various industrial products. , These standards are developed co- operatively with interested Government and industry groups and provide the basis for common understanding of product characteristics for both buyers and

sellers. Their use is voluntary.

Technical Notes. This series consists of communications and reports (covering both other-agency and

NBS-sponsored work) of limited or transitory interest. Federal Information Processing Standards

Publications. This series is the official publication within the Federal Government for information on

standards adopted and promulgated under the Public Law 89-306, and Bureau of the Budget Circular A-86

entitled, Standardization of Data Elements and Codes

in Data Systems.

Consumer Information Series. Practical information, based on NBS research and experience, covering areas of interest to the consumer. Easily understandable language and illustrations provide useful background knowledge for shopping in today's tech- nological marketplace.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES

The following current-awareness and literature-survey bibliographies are issued periodically by the Bureau

Cryogenic Data Center Current Awareness Service (Publications and Reports of Interest in Cryogenics).

A literature survey issued weekly. Annual subscription : Domestic, $20.00; foreign, $25.00.

Liquefied Natural Gas. A literature survey issued quarterly. Annual subscription: $20.00. Superconducting Devices and Materials. A literature survey issued quarterly. Annual subscription : $20.00. Send subscription orders and remittances for the preceding bibliographic services to the U.S. Department

of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va. 22151. Electromagnetic Metrology Current Awareness Service (Abstracts of Selected Articles on Measurement

Techniques and Standards of Electromagnetic Quantities from D-C to Millimeter-Wave Frequencies). Issued monthly. Annual subscription: $100.00 (Special rates for multi-subscriptions). Send subscription order and

remittance to the Electromagnetic Metrology Information Center, Electromagnetics Division, National Bureau

of Standards, Boulder, Colo. 80302. Order NBS publications (except Bibliographic Subscription Services)

from: Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Bureau of Standards

Washington. D.C. 2023-1

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Penalty for Private Use, $300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE COM-215