STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

E.B., 

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner FILED 

January 27, 2017 

vs) No. 16-0090 (Cabell County 14-C-328) RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA West Virginia Regional Jail
 

and Correctional Authority
 

and Joseph Delong,
 

Defendants Below, Respondents
 

AND
 

E.B.,
 

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner
 

vs) No. 16-0092 (Cabell County 14-C-328) 

St. Mary’s Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a/
 

St. Mary’s Medical Center,
 

Defendant Below, Respondent
 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner E.B., by counsel Jay C. Love, appeals two orders of the Circuit Court of Cabell 

County, each entered on January 8, 2016, granting summary judgment in favor of respondents. 

Respondents West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority (“WVRJCFA”) 

and Joseph Delong, WVRJCFA’s executive director, appear by counsel William E. Murray and 

Natalie N. Matheny. Respondent St. Mary’s Medical Center, Inc. (“St. Mary’s”) appears by 

counsel Marc E. Williams, Robert M. Sellards, Thomas M. Hancock, and Sarah B. Massey. 

Though petitioner initiated these appeals with separate notices, we consolidate the matters for 

consideration. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the order of the circuit court is appropriate under 

Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

I. 

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While serving a term of incarceration in the Western Regional Jail, petitioner suffered an 

injury in March of 2013, for which she was transported to St. Mary’s. Doctors admitted her for 

observation. During her stay at the hospital, petitioner was guarded by several individual 

correctional officers, including Correctional Officer J.M. (“the correctional officer” or “J.M.”), 

an employee of Respondent WVRJCFA. After discharge from St. Mary’s and upon her return to 

the regional jail, petitioner reported that she had been raped by the correctional officer during his 

sixteen-hour shift while at the hospital. In response to her accusation, jail officials returned 

petitioner to St. Mary’s for administration of a rape kit. The correctional officer later admitted to 

having engaged in consensual sexual relations with petitioner, and he pled guilty to the felony 

offense of imposition of a sexual act upon an incarcerated person in violation of West Virginia 

Code § 61-8B-10. Petitioner denies that the intercourse was consensual. It is undisputed that 

petitioner did not report an assault to any employee of St. Mary’s during her initial 

hospitalization. 

Petitioner filed a civil complaint regarding the alleged assault in 2014. The complaint 

superficially sets forth eighteen counts, described to the apex of our understanding as follows: 

breach of the duty of care by St. Mary’s and WVRJCFA (Count I); breach of the duty of care to 

provide reasonable supervision by Respondent Delong and WVRJCFA (Count II); breach of the 

duty to “take reasonable precaution against harmful third[-]party conduct on its premises that it 

could reasonably anticipate” by St. Mary’s (Count III); breach of the duty to “take reasonable 

precaution against harmful third[-]party conduct on its premises or at its functions that it could 

reasonably anticipate” by WVRJCFA (Count IV); misrepresentation and failure to institute 

reasonable procedures and rules by Respondent Delong and WVRJCFA (Count V); intentional 

causation of severe emotional distress and bodily harm by WVRJCFA (Count VI); outrageous 

conduct by St. Mary’s resulting in severe emotional distress and bodily harm (Count VII); failure 

of the duty to protect by all respondents (Count VIII); breach of the duty to protect “from the 

known and substantial risk of physical abuse from correctional officers” by all respondents 

(Count VIII) (sic); breach of the duty to protect “from the known and substantial risk of physical 

abuse as well as a duty to provide a reasonably safe environment . . . to be medically treated . . .” 

by St. Mary’s (Count IX); breach of the “duty to intervene” by St. Mary’s (Count X); breach of 

the “duty of care . . . pursuant to the Constitutions, statutes and common laws of [West Virginia] 

and the United States of America” by WVRJCFA and Respondent Delong (Count XI); breach of 

the duty to “use due care in the supervision, training, and retention of correctional officers” by 

WVRJCFA and Respondent Delong (Count XII); breach of the duty of care by St. Mary’s 

(Count XIII); deliberate indifference by Respondent Delong (Count XIV); violation of the West 

Virginia Constitution, Article 3, Section 5, right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment 

(Count XV) by WVRJCFA and Respondent Delong; material misrepresentation by St. Mary’s 

(Count XVI), and violation of petitioner’s civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 

XVII). Within her recitation of several of the aforementioned counts, petitioner asserts that the 

conduct described therein resulted in the violation of her “established rights,” including, for 

example, “the right to bodily integrity, the right to be free from the use of excessive force, the 

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, [the] right to be incarcerated in a reasonably 

safe environment, and the right to be treated in a medically safe environment.” 

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A period of discovery was conducted.1 Thereafter, respondents filed motions for 

summary judgment. The court granted the motions as described above, finding that Respondent 

WVRJCFA was not vicariously liable for J.M.’s criminal act, inasmuch as J.M. was not acting 

within the scope of his employment; that petitioner failed to offer any evidence that Respondents 

WVRJCFA or Respondent Delong acted with deliberate indifference in the formulation of 

WVRJCFA policy; and that Respondent St. Mary’s owed petitioner no duty to protect her from 

an unforeseen criminal act committed by an individual not employed by St. Mary’s. The court’s 

findings related to Respondents WVRJCFA and Delong supported the court’s conclusion that 

those respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. 

II. 

With respect to the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to Respondent St. Mary’s, 

petitioner asserts the following thirteen assignments of error: (1) the court erred in finding that 

respondent owed petitioner no duty to protect her from an assault by the guard assigned by 

Respondent WVRJCFA to guard her during her hospitalization; (2) the circuit erred in finding 

that there was no evidence that respondent breached a duty to maintain a safe environment; (3) 

the circuit court erred in applying Aikens v. Debow, 208 W.Va. 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000), to 

the facts of this case, while ignoring Smith v. Cross, 223 W.Va. 422, 675 S.E.2d 898 (2009); (4) 

the court erred in finding the correctional officer’s act was the sole cause of petitioner’s injury; 

(5) the court erred in finding that Respondent WVRJCFA has the sole control of and discretion 

in the guarding of petitioner during her hospitalization; (6) the court erred in finding that 

Respondent WVRJCFA had the sole control of and discretion in determining the appropriate 

guarding and restraint procedures employed during petitioner’s hospitalization; (7) the court 

erred in finding that petitioner sought to impose a duty on respondent to “police the police”; (8) 

the court erred in finding that respondent had neither the right nor the duty to direct the guarding 

of petitioner; (9) the court erred in finding that petitioner offered no evidence supporting her 

allegation that an assault was a natural and foreseeable result of allowing her to be left alone in a 

hospital room with the correctional officer; (10) the court erred in finding that the correctional 

officer’s act was unforeseeable; (11) the court erred in “not applying the two exceptions to the 

general rule that a person has no duty to protect others from the criminal activity of a third 

party;” (12) the court failed to order the disclosure of certain of respondent’s records pertaining 

to allegations of sexual assault; and (13) the court erred in failing to address “the remaining 

counts in the complaint.” 

Petitioner asserts the following fourteen assignments of error concerning the circuit 

court’s grant of summary judgment to Respondents WVJRCA and Delong: (1) the court erred in 

applying the doctrine of qualified immunity; (2) the court erred in finding that Respondent 

WVRJCFA took reasonable measures to guarantee petitioner’s safety; (3) the court erred in 

1 We are unable to ascertain a more definitive timeline because the parties failed to 

include in the appendix record on appeal “[a] certified copy of the complete docket sheet in the 

case obtained from the clerk of the circuit court” as required by Rule 7(d)(7) of our Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Because no party has informed us otherwise, we assume that the parties 

had full discovery on all issues. 

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dismissing Count 11 of her complaint; (4) the court erred in finding that petitioner presented no 

evidence that Respondent Delong intentionally, or with deliberate indifference, failed to create a 

policy ensuring the same-sex guarding of, or the assignment of two guards to, hospitalized 

inmates; (5) the court erred in finding that Respondent “Delong had no reason to believe that . . . 

lack of policy [regarding same-sex guarding or the assignment of two guards] does not, in and of 

itself, violate any clearly established right;” (6) the court erred in ruling that there is no evidence 

that the correctional officer acted within the scope of his employment “when he committed the 

crime at issue”; (7) the court erred in finding that there was no evidence that Respondent 

WVRJCFA acted with supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of the correctional officer’s 

conduct; (8) the court erred in finding that Respondent WVRJCFA did not violate petitioner’s 

clearly established or constitutional rights; (9) the court erred in finding that Respondent 

WVRJCFA is not a “person” for purposes of analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (10) the court erred in 

finding that petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated by Respondent WVRJCFA’s 

“failure” to create a policy requiring the same-sex guarding of, or the assignment of two guards 

to, a hospitalized inmate (11) the court erred in finding that petitioner offered no evidence 

supporting her contention that Respondent WVRJCFA “acted with deliberate indifference by 

showing that the supervisory official’s failure to create a two-guard or same-sex-only policy 

caused or led to the ‘natural and foreseeable’ injuries that [petitioner] suffered as a result of [the 

correctional officer’s] criminal activities”; (12) the court erred in finding that there was no 

genuine issue of material fact; (13) the court erred in finding that petitioner offered no evidence 

supporting her argument that respondents’ “failure to change the existing policy” violated her 

constitutional rights; and (14) the court erred in granting respondents’ motions for summary 

judgment. 

Petitioner’s many challenges relate to the circuit court’s grant of two motions for 

summary judgment. “This Court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for summary judgment, 

where such a ruling is properly reviewable by this Court.” Syl. Pt. 1, Findley v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W.Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002). Relative to this appeal, we recognize that: 

[b]ecause appellate review of an entry of summary judgment is plenary, this 

Court, like the circuit court, must view the entire record in the light most 

hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable 

inferences in that party’s favor. An appellate court is not restricted to the circuit 

court’s reasoning but can affirm or reverse the entry of summary judgment on any 

independently sufficient ground. 

Asaad v. Res–Care, Inc., 197 W.Va. 684, 687, 478 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1996) accord Gray v. Boyd, 

233 W.Va. 243, 248, 757 S.E.2d 773, 778 (2014). 

In addition, because the circuit court rested its grant of summary judgment on immunity 

grounds, we note that: 

[t]he ultimate determination of whether qualified or statutory immunity bars a 

civil action is one of law for the court to determine. Therefore, unless there is a 

bona fide dispute as to the foundational or historical facts that underlie the 

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immunity determination, the ultimate questions of statutory or qualified immunity 

are ripe for summary disposition. 

Syl. Pt. 1, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W.Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (1996). Finally, we 

necessarily wade into the waters of federal law to reach our qualified immunity ground. Our 

reasons for doing so are detailed in State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 188 W.Va. 356, 359-60, 424 

S.E.2d 591, 594-95 (1992): 

First, litigation directed at state officials is most frequently brought pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a remedy for violation of federal rights committed 

by persons acting under color of state law. The interpretation of this statute by the 

federal courts has resulted in a substantial body of law regarding immunity for 

public officials. This law has developed by considering common law immunity 

concepts, as the United States Supreme Court observed in Owen v. City of 

Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1409, 63 L.Ed.2d 673, 685 

(1980): 

“In each of these cases, our finding of §1983 immunity ‘was 

predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically 

accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests 

behind it.’ Imbler v. Pachtman, [424 U.S. 409], at 421 [96 S.Ct. 

984, 990, 47 L.Ed.2d 128, 138 (1976)]. Where the immunity 

claimed by the defendant was well established at common law at 

the time §1983 was enacted, and where its rationale was 

compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have 

construed the statute to incorporate that immunity.” 

See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). 

Thus, these precepts are compatible with our common law traditions. 

Another reason for utilizing the federal law is the holding in Howlett v. Rose, 496 

U.S. 356, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990), that in Section 1983 litigation 

a state may not create an immunity for state officials that is greater than the 

federal immunity. The Court in Howlett pointed out that Section 1983 suits could 

be brought in state courts and that under the Supremacy Clause, federal 

substantive law must be applied in such actions. In Howlett, the Florida court had 

held that the state’s absolute immunity from suit applied to state governmental 

entities in Section 1983 actions. In rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court 

stated: 

“If the District Court of Appeal meant to hold that governmental 

entities subject to §1983 liability enjoy an immunity over and 

above those already provided in §1983, that holding directly 

violates federal law. The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal 

cause of action are defined by federal law.” 496 U.S. at 375, 110 

S.Ct. at 2442, 110 L.Ed.2d at 353. (Citations omitted). See also 

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Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 

(1988); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S. Ct. 553, 62 

L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). Thus, it would seem appropriate to construct, 

if possible, an immunity standard that would not conflict with the 

federal standard. 

Furthermore, in several instances, we have used federal official immunity law. . . . 

[For example,] analagous, from a substantive law standpoint, is Bennett v. 

Coffman, 178 W.Va. 500, 361 S.E.2d 465 (1987), which involved a civil action 

for damages against a police officer. We set out in the Syllabus, in part, of 

Bennett, this general test which comes from Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 

102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982): 

“Government officials performing discretionary functions are 

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 

We reduce petitioner’s arguments to their essence and evaluate her assignments of error 

according to these precepts. 

III. 

First, we consider petitioner’s assignments of error concerning the grant of summary 

judgment to St. Mary’s. Nearly all of these assignments of error (1) attack the circuit court’s 

ultimate findings that respondent neither owed nor breached a particular duty to petitioner, or (2) 

attack the rationale supporting those findings. As the circuit court aptly noted, “the threshold 

question in all actions in negligence is whether a duty was owed.” See Strahin v. Clevenger, 216 

W.Va. 175, 183, 603 S.E.2d 197, 205 (2004). We further note that the circuit court appropriately 

addressed the question. “The determination of whether a defendant in a particular case owes a 

duty to the plaintiff is not a factual question for the jury; rather the determination of whether a 

plaintiff is owed a duty of care by a defendant must be rendered by the court as a matter of law.” 

Syl. Pt. 5, Aikens v. Debow, 208 W. Va. 486, 488, 541 S.E.2d 576, 578 (2000). 

The circuit court concluded that St. Mary’s owed no duty to protect petitioner from a 

sexual assault by the correctional officer because it could not foresee the correctional officer’s 

actions, and a “person usually has no duty to protect others from the criminal activity of a third 

party. . . .” See Miller v. Whitworth, 193 W.Va. 262, 266, 455 S.E.2d 821, 825 (1995). 

Petitioner’s first eleven assignments of error concerning the grant of summary judgment to 

Respondent St. Mary’s strike at this conclusion, and we consider all of those assignments under a 

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single umbrella.2 The question before us is whether the circuit court correctly concluded that 

respondent neither owed nor breached a duty to petitioner. We find that the circuit court reached 

the correct conclusion, and settled principles of law preclude imposing tort liability upon the 

hospital for the unforeseeable crime committed by the correctional officer. In so finding, we 

agree with the circuit court that respondent had no duty to “police the police.” 

Our analysis begins with the foundation of the circuit court’s finding: that respondent had 

no duty to protect petitioner from the criminal activity of a third party. Petitioner argues that the 

“special relationship” existing between her and St. Mary’s precludes application of this tenet. See 

Miller, 193 W.Va. at 266, 455 S.E.2d at 825. The crux of the argument appears to be that, 

according to Smith v. Cross, 223 W.Va. 422, 675 S.E.2d 898 (2009), the circuit court was 

obligated to allow a jury to evaluate the question of negligence in light of whether a duty of care 

was created because St. Mary’s was entrusted with a “physically helpless” female who was 

“subject to confinement.” We disagree that the assertion of these facts removes the question of 

duty from the purview of the circuit court. 

We have explained that a “special relationship may be proven through evidence of 

foreseeability of the nature of the harm to be suffered by the particular plaintiff or an identifiable 

class and can arise from contractual privity or other close nexus.” Aikens, 208 W.Va. at 499, 541 

S.E.2d at 589. Petitioner offered no evidence that an assault by a correctional officer in a hospital 

setting was foreseeable. Petitioner’s own expert witness testified that sexual assault of a female 

inmate by a male correctional officer is not expected, but is a “possibility.” An act of sexual 

misconduct committed by a correctional officer with no known history of such misconduct is 

certainly possible, as this case demonstrates. However, the mere possibility of improper conduct 

is insufficient to impose liability on respondent hospital where, as explained in Aikens, liability 

for negligence arising from a special relationship has been determined by what is probable, not 

what is possible. Under the circumstances and evidence presented to us, the possibility that a 

correctional officer with no known history of sexual misconduct would assault the inmate-patient 

under his charge is too remote to be considered legally foreseeable. Thus, we find no error in the 

circuit court’s determination that St. Mary’s owed no particular duty to petitioner in this regard, 

and having found no established duty, we find no error in the circuit court’s determination that 

there was no breach. Accordingly, we find no merit in petitioner’s first through eleventh 

assignments of error related to the grant of summary judgment to St. Mary’s. 

There are two remaining assignments of error concerning St. Mary’s. Petitioner supports 

her final assignment of error (her twelfth, wherein she states that “the circuit court erred in not 

addressing the remaining counts in the [c]omplaint”) with a single argumentative statement: 

“Plaintiff incorporates by reference, herein, the cited evidence and the arguments made in the 

preceding sections of this brief.” We decline to address petitioner’s assignment of error for lack 

of any meaningful supporting argument.3 As we have repeatedly cautioned litigants, “‘[a] 

2 In doing so, we note that petitioner’s arguments supporting several of her assignments 

of error “incorporate by reference” her arguments supporting other assignments of error, often 

with little or nothing more offered. 

(continued . . .) 

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skeletal “argument,” really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim. . . .’ State, 

Dep’t of Health & Human Res. v. Robert Morris N., 195 W.Va. 759, 765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 

(1995) (citation omitted).” State v. White, 228 W.Va. 530, 547, 722 S.E.2d 566, 583 (2011). 

Pursuant to Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, the argument 

section of the petitioner’s brief “must contain appropriate and specific citations to the record on 

appeal, including citations that pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of error 

were presented to the lower tribunal. The Court may disregard errors that are not adequately 

supported by specific references to the record on appeal.” This Court previously has found issues 

asserted on appeal to have been waived as a result of a petitioner’s failure to comply with Rule 

10(c)(7). See, e.g., Evans v. United Bank, Inc., 235 W.Va. 619, 629, 775 S.E.2d 500, 510 (2015) 

(observing that petitioners’ argument failed to meet requirements of Rule 10(c)(7), and 

concluding, therefore, “the issue has been waived for purposes of appeal.”). For the same 

reasons, we find no merit in petitioner’s argument with regard to her penultimate assignment of 

error (her eleventh, wherein she states that the circuit court wrongfully denied her access to St. 

Mary’s reports of sexual assault).4 The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. 

IV. 

A. 

We turn our attention to petitioner’s fourteen assignments of error addressing the grant of 

summary judgment to Respondents Delong and WVRJCFA. These assignments of error, much 

like those asserted as to St. Mary’s, are threads in a common yarn. Each in some manner attacks 

the circuit court’s ultimate determination that these respondents enjoy qualified immunity with 

respect to petitioner’s allegations. We recently reiterated: 

“In the absence of an insurance contract waiving the defense, the doctrine of 

qualified or official immunity bars a claim of mere negligence against a State 

agency not within the purview of the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims 

and Insurance Reform Act, W.Va. Code § 29–12A–1 et seq., and against an 

officer of that department acting within the scope of his or her employment, with 

respect to the discretionary judgments, decisions, and actions of the officer.” Syl. 

Pt. 6, Clark v. Dunn, 195 W.Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (1995). 

3 For that matter, we decline to address this assignment of error for lack of any 

meaningful identification of the asserted circuit court failure. That is to say, petitioner has not 

identified any specific cause of action not addressed by the circuit court. 

4 The circuit court reviewed, in camera, certain documents provided to it by St. Mary’s; 

determined that those documents did not “contain any allegations of a similar nature to the facts 

of the pending litigation”; then ordered those documents filed in the circuit court, under seal. 

Petitioner filed no motion and took no action to make those documents a part of the appendix 

record on appeal or to otherwise make them available for the Court’s review. 

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Syl. Pt. 7, W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 234 W.Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751, 756 

(2014). Furthermore, 

[t]o the extent that governmental acts or omissions which give rise to a cause of 

action fall within the category of discretionary functions, a reviewing court must 

determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that such acts or omissions are 

in violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of 

which a reasonable person would have known or are otherwise fraudulent, 

malicious, or oppressive in accordance with State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 188 

W.Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992). In absence of such a showing, both the State 

and its officials or employees charged with such acts or omissions are immune 

from liability. 

Syl. Pt. 11, A.B., 234 W.Va. at ___, 766 S.E.2d at 756. 

B. 

Petitioner asserts that her claims are not grounded in mere negligence but, instead, 

concern a number of state and federal constitutional violations. We greatly understate the matter 

in observing that petitioner’s complaint is vague regarding the asserted constitutional violations. 

To the contrary, she tersely declares that her “federal and state constitutional rights were clearly 

violated[,] including but not limited to her right to be free from excessive force, her right to 

bodily integrity, her right to be free from assault[,] and her right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment.” Indeed, this terse declaration appears as a dormant afterthought in counts 

describing various breaches of duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 Only in the 

final count of her complaint does she briefly assert that the actions of the correctional officer, 

“while acting under the color of law, deprived [her] of . . . her right[s] to bodily integrity, . . . to 

be free from the use of excessive force, . . . to be free from assault, and . . . to be free from the 

use of cruel and unusual punishment. . . .”6 The deprivation of these constitutionally-protected 

5 While our jurisprudence leads our courts to construe a complaint in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, we caution litigants that 

liberalization in the rules of pleading in civil cases does not justify a carelessly 

drafted or baseless pleading. As stated in Lugar and Silverstein, West Virginia 

Rules of Civil Procedure (1960) at 75: “Simplicity and informality of pleading do 

not permit carelessness and sloth: the plaintiff’s attorney must know every 

essential element of his cause of action and must state it in the complaint.” 

Sticklen v. Kittle, 168 W.Va. 147, 164, 287 S.E.2d 148, 157–58 (1981). The virtues of a wellpleaded complaint are set forth in Rule 8(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure: each 

averment of a pleading shall be “simple, concise and direct.” 

6 This final count appears to state a claim against the correctional officer alone. However, 

because petitioner summarily stated in the jurisdictional statement at the outset of her complaint 

(continued . . .) 

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rights, she asserts, constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7

Having assessed petitioner’s 

protracted complaint, we note that while petitioner argues that she has pled more than 

negligence, some of her claims are, in fact, simple assertions of negligence. Those claims, as 

explained in syllabus point 7 of A.B., are barred as to both respondents where Respondent 

Delong acted in the scope of his employment. Petitioner recognizes in her brief that Respondent 

Delong testified that the development of policy falls within the duties of his position. We find 

that both respondents enjoy qualified immunity on these issues.8 

(more than thirty pages prior to the count setting forth the civil rights invocation) that “[f]or the 

purposes of 42 [U.S.C. §] 1983 and [f]ederal [c]onstitutional [c]laims in this [c]omplaint, 

[Respondent] Delong is being sued in his individual capacity[,]” we read the final count of the 

complaint most liberally. 

7 We explained in Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W.Va. 139, 151-52, 479 S.E.2d 

649, 661-62 (1996): 

Title 42, U.S.C.A., § 1983 provides in pertinent part: 

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.” 

This civil rights statute does not create substantive rights, but merely provides a 

claim for relief for rights elsewhere secured. Thus, § 1983 claims must 

specifically allege a violation of the constitution or “laws” of the United States. 

See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2694, n. 3, 61 

L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). In order to recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

show that (1) “the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting 

under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, 

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 

420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 

S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). 

(Emphasis in original.) 

8 Petitioner argues that WVRJCFA is vicariously liable for various actions of the 

correctional officer. She argues, for example, that WVRJCFA “is vicariously liable for [the 

correctional officer’s] decision to leave the door closed to [petitioner’s hospital] room[,]” 

because that decision was within the scope of the correctional officer’s employment. We 

explicitly reject petitioner’s attempt to mine the depths of the correctional officer’s criminal 

activity to extract some minute gem she would polish and carve into an employment-related 

endeavor. The correctional officer committed, at least, the felony offense of having sexual 

(continued . . .) 

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C. 

We turn, then, to the remainder of petitioner’s claims—that is, those wherein she purports 

to have pled a cause of action for which respondents cannot claim immunity—concerning 

constitutional and civil rights violations. The circuit court considered petitioner’s assertion that 

respondents violated her civil rights through their actions or inactions related to policy-making 

functions. Petitioner particularly advocates a “two-guard” policy, and argues that she was 

harmed because respondent failed to institute a policy that would have required two guards in her 

presence while she sought treatment at St. Mary’s, much like a similar policy implemented 

within the WVRJCFA facility itself. Petitioner further argues that Respondent Delong’s 

deliberate indifference to the need for such a policy evidences a constitutional violation that 

eradicates his qualified immunity protection. 

As noted above, some counts of petitioner’s complaint vaguely reference various 

constitutional violations. Likewise, the final count of her complaint—that in which she asserts 

that her civil rights were violated—names the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution, again without explanation, and her brief is 

somewhat conclusory with regard to the connection between respondents’ acts or omissions and 

her assertion of these various rights. We begin, then, with the most immediate and broadest point 

of clarity in the whole of petitioner’s claims, wherein she argues that her civil rights were 

violated in the denial of her constitutional rights, therein asserting a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. 

We have explained that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities 

are ‘persons’ under §1983” (see Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 

2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), and the circuit court acknowledged as much in its order. 

Moreover, we have clarified that 

[a]s it stands today, the issue of supervisory liability in connection with an alleged 

civil rights violation is clear: there is none. Under the holding of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), a supervising police 

officer may not be held liable for the wrongful actions of his or her subordinate 

officers in connection with an alleged civil rights violation because a supervising 

police officer is only liable for his or her own conduct and not that of his/her 

subordinates. 

relations with an incarcerated person. All activity related to that contemptible endeavor—yes, 

including the closing of the door, presumably done in order to initiate the deed—undertaken to 

further the criminal act was outside the scope of the correctional officer’s employment. 

Alternatively, should the Court review each step in an isolated universe, we would find that it 

was not the closing of the door that harmed petitioner. 

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Robinson v. Pack, 223 W.Va. 828, 837, 679 S.E.2d 660, 669 (2009).9 On these bases, we 

specifically find that WVRJCFA was properly found to have qualified immunity, and that 

Respondent Delong is not liable for the criminal act of the correctional officer. 

D. 

Having significantly narrowed our focus, we delve into the kernel of petitioner’s 

argument: that Respondent Delong failed to institute a policy assigning multiple guards or, 

alternatively, a female guard, while petitioner was away from the regional jail facility at which 

she was an inmate, and that this failure was based on Respondent Delong’s deliberate 

indifference to the needs of WVRJCFA inmates.10 

Again we note that petitioner’s elucidation of her constitutional claims is sparse11, but the 

support that she does offer tends toward her claims that her Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated. Our own jurisprudence explains the connection: 

The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that 

inmates have an actionable right against prison officials for “confinement in a 

prison where violence and terror reign.” Woodhous v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 

487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973); Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 672-73 (4th Cir. 

1977). Woodhous held that prison officials can violate prisoners’ Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by not providing adequate protection against 

inmate assault or violence. Certainly, if a state must take responsibility for inmate 

9 There is no allegation that Respondent Delong was aware that the subordinate 

correctional officer was engaged in conduct that would lead to a constitutional injury. 

10 We note that petitioner further asserts her “established right” to such a policy through 

state law: 

Protection. Inmates shall be protected from personal abuse, corporal punishment, 

personal injury, disease, property damage and harassment. In instances where 

physical force or disciplinary detention is required, only the least restrictive 

means necessary to secure order or control shall be used. Administrative 

segregation shall be used to protect inmates from themselves or other inmates. 

West Virginia Code of State Rules § 95-1-15.9. She also refers to WVRJCFA Policy No. 9029 

which calls, in part, for “specific precaution . . . to assure the safety of the inmates . . .” but does 

not specifically require same-sex guarding or guarding by multiple correctional officers. 

11 For example, petitioner offers one argument heading that claims her “right not to be 

assaulted or battered[,]” and offers in support only, “[s]ee Dingle v. District of Columbia[,] 571 

F.Supp.2d 87,97 (D.D.C. 2008)” with no discussion of the manner in which that case applies to 

the circumstances before us. She offers claims of violation of the state constitution, similarly 

supported. We discern only general references to the West Virginia Constitution in petitioner’s 

complaint. 

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violence toward their fellow prisoners, it must be responsible for its own violence 

visited upon inmates by its employees. 

Harrah v. Leverette, 165 W. Va. 665, 674-75, 271 S.E.2d 322, 328-29 (1980). 

Petitioner argues that respondents were required to “take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of the inmates” pursuant to Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844–45, 114 

S. Ct. 1970, 1982–83, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). In the context of Eighth Amendment claims, the 

United States Supreme Court clarified therein: 

Because . . . prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be 

said to have inflicted punishment, it remains open to the officials to prove that 

they were unaware even of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety. That a trier 

of fact may infer knowledge from the obvious, in other words, does not mean that 

it must do so. Prison officials charged with deliberate indifference might show, 

for example, that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a 

sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, 

or that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk 

to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent. 

In addition, prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to 

inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded 

reasonably to the [§] 1983 risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. A 

prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure “‘reasonable 

safety,’” Helling, [509 U.S. 25] at 33, 113 S.Ct. [2475] at 2481 [(1993)]; see also 

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S., at 225, 110 S.Ct., at 1038-1039; Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. [517] at 526-527, 104 S.Ct. [3194] at 3200-3201 [(1984)], a 

standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials’ “unenviable task of 

keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions,” Spain v. 

Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193 ([9th Cir.] 1979) (Kennedy, J.); see also Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-548, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878-1879, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 

447 (1979). Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison 

officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 844-45, 114 S. Ct. at 1982-83. Preceding the reasoning set forth 

above, the Supreme Court explained that the establishment of the constitutional violation 

requires, first, that the alleged deprivation be “sufficiently serious[,]” demonstrating a 

“substantial risk of serious harm[,]” and, second, that the prison official’s state of mind was of 

“deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s health or safety. Id. at 833-35, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. In 

short, the “official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837, 114 S. 

Ct. at 1979. 

As the circuit court aptly explained, petitioner “offered no evidence or testimony in 

support of her argument that failure to change [or expand] the existing policy caused a violation 

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of her constitutional rights.” In support of her argument, petitioner heavily relies on the 

testimony of WVRJCFA employee Cpl. Jeff Brewer. Petitioner vaguely asserts that Cpl. 

Brewer’s testimony demonstrates that WVRJCFA employees “were fully aware of the danger 

and risk from allowing a male officer to be with a female in a jail cell.” However, the cited 

transcript passages do not demonstrate a nexus between respondent’s policies and any assault. 

Rather, Cpl. Brewer testified that, when entering the cell of a female inmate at the facility, he 

does so only with another guard “[b]ecause that’s what I do. . . . That’s what we was trained.” He 

was unable to identify a reason for this practice, though, instead refusing to speculate and 

maintaining, “I’m just going to say that’s how I was trained.” We find no evidence in Cpl. 

Brewer’s testimony suggesting that Respondent Delong or WVRJCFA officials deliberately 

placed her or other inmates in harm’s way.12 Petitioner relates no other testimony to suggest that 

respondent’s policy formulation harmed her. Moreover, Respondent Delong testified that he had 

never been notified of sexual misconduct by a correctional officer in a hospital setting, nor had 

he been made aware of any allegation against the correctional officer that was assigned to guard 

petitioner during her hospitalization. 

Though the circuit court rested its grant of summary judgment on its finding of qualified 

immunity, we find that petitioner has failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could find that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional protections.13 Respondents were 

properly awarded summary judgment. 

E. 

Our conclusion that petitioner failed to present evidence supporting her ultimate claims 

should not be construed as a criticism or rejection of the circuit court’s application of qualified 

immunity to the constitutional claims. Indeed, we acknowledge that the question of qualified 

immunity is the threshold inquiry in a case such as the one before us, in order “to ensure that 

immune defendants’ right ‘“not to be subject to the burden of trial”’ remains inviolate.” W.Va. 

Dept. of Health and Human Resources v. Payne, 231 W.Va. 563, 570, 746 S.E.2d 554, 562 

(2013) (quoting Robinson v. Pack, 223 W.Va. 828, 833, 679 S.E.2d 660, 665 (2009)). However, 

inasmuch as petitioner’s failure to present “underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial 

danger” or deliberate indifference to such danger (see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45, 114 S. Ct. at 

1982-83) is evident, we find it unnecessary to assume the more arduous qualified immunity 

12 Moreover, though she references it, petitioner fails to identify how Cpl. Brewer’s 

testimony regarding training on the use of restraints is relevant to the policy question before us. 

13 Our discussion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments does not imply that we have 

ignored petitioner’s broad assertion that she may have suffered other constitutional violations. 

However, petitioner has limited her discussion to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and 

we decline to address what petitioner did not. 

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inquiry.14 Under the unique circumstances of the case before us, and based on the evidence 

presented, we find no error. 

14 By this, we mean that the qualified immunity analysis requires consideration of the 

requirement that the asserted violated right is “clearly established.” Here, petitioner has broadly 

asserted certain constitutional violations. This does not mean, however, that she has sufficiently 

identified violation of a right to withstand qualified immunity scrutiny. The United States 

Supreme Court instructs: 

The operation of [the standard of objective legal reasonableness], 

however, depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant 

“legal rule” is to be identified. For example, the right to due process of law is 

quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in 

which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that 

the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right. Much the 

same could be said of any other constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test 

of “clearly established law” were to be applied at this level of generality, it would 

bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness” that is the touchstone 

of Harlow [v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982)]. Plaintiffs would 

be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish 

into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of 

extremely abstract rights. Harlow would be transformed from a guarantee of 

immunity into a rule of pleading. Such an approach, in sum, would destroy “the 

balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’ 

constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties,” 

by making it impossible for officials “reasonably [to] anticipate when their 

conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” Davis [v. Scherer], 468 U.S. 

[183] at 195, 104 S.Ct. [3012] at 3019 [1984]. It should not be surprising, 

therefore, that our cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have 

violated must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence 

more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This 

is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the 

very action in question has previously been held unlawful, see Mitchell [v. 

Forsyth], supra, 472 U.S. [511] at 535, n. 12, 105 S.Ct. [2806] at 2820, n. 12 

[(1985)]; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must 

be apparent. See, e.g., Malley [v. Briggs], supra, 475 U.S. [335] at 344-345, 106 

S.Ct. [1092] at 1097-1098 [(1986)]; Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S., at 528, 105 S.Ct., 

at 2816; Davis, supra, 468 U.S., at 191, 195, 104 S.Ct., at 3017, 3019. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038-39, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 

(1987). On the face of the pleadings, and based on the noticeable absence of evidence or 

authority describing a “more particularized” violation, it appears that petitioner has fallen short 

of meeting this standard. 

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V. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: January 27, 2017 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Allen H. Loughry II 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Elizabeth A. Walker 

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