29–006 

108TH CONGRESS REPT. 108–488 " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session Part 1 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH INDEPENDENT 

REVIEW OF OSHA CITATIONS ACT OF 2004 

MAY 13, 2004.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. BOEHNER, from the Committee on Education and the 

Workforce, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 2730] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Education and the Workforce, to whom was 

referred the bill (H.R. 2730) to amend the Occupational Safety and 

Health Act of 1970 to provide for an independent review of citations issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 

having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 

amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass. 

The amendment (stated in terms of the page and line numbers 

of the introduced bill) is as follows: 

Page 1, line 6, strike ‘‘2003’’ and insert ‘‘2004’’. 

PURPOSE

H.R. 2730, the ‘‘Occupational Safety and Health Independent Review of OSHA Citations Act of 2004,’’ is intended to restore the 

original intent of Congress under the Occupational Safety and 

Health Act of 1970 (the ‘‘OSH Act’’) with respect to the relationship 

between the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(‘‘OSHA’’) and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (‘‘OSHRC’’ or the ‘‘Commission’’), the adjudicative agency specifically created by Congress to hear disputes arising under the 

OSH Act. Specifically, H.R. 2730 restores the intent of Congress 

that OSHRC decide cases without regard to the views of OSHA, 

and ensures that interpretation of the OSH Act is in accord with 

2 

1 See Hearing on H.R. 1583, ‘‘The Occupational Safety and Health Fairness Act of 2003,’’ before the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, Committee on Education and the Workforce, 

U.S. House of Representatives, 108th Congress, First Session, Serial No. 108–20 (hereinafter ‘‘Hearing on H.R. 1583’’). 2See 29 U.S.C § 659. 

Congressional intent by statutorily requiring that OSHRC’s rulings 

are the controlling interpretations of law under the OSH Act, so 

long as they are reasonable. 

COMMITTEE ACTION

H.R. 2730, the ‘‘Occupational Safety and Health Independent Review of OSHA Citations Act of 2003,’’ was introduced by Congressman Charlie Norwood on July 15, 2003, and was referred to the 

Subcommittee on Workforce Protections of the Committee on Education and the Workforce. A hearing on the measure was conducted 

on June 17, 2003, as a part of a more comprehensive hearing on 

H.R. 1583, the ‘‘Occupational Safety and Health Fairness Act of 

2003.’’ 1

Comments and views from experts in the field of safety and 

health and other concerned citizens were taken on H.R. 1583 at the 

June 17, 2003 hearing of the Subcommittee. At this hearing, the 

Subcommittee heard testimony from Mr. Brian Landon of Canton, 

Pennsylvania, testifying on behalf of the National Federation of 

Independent Businesses; Mr. John Molovich, Heath and Safety 

Specialist, United Steelworkers of America, of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Mr. Ephraim Cohen, a small business owner from New 

York; and Arthur Sapper, Esq., an attorney of the law firm 

McDermott, Will & Emery in Washington, DC, testifying on behalf 

of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Legislation incorporating section 7 of H.R. 1583 was subsequently introduced as H.R. 2730 on 

July 15, 2003. The content of H.R. 2730, as introduced, is identical 

to section 7 of H.R. 1583. 

On July 24, 2003, the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections favorably reported H.R. 2730, without amendment, by voice vote. 

On May 5, 2004, the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

considered H.R. 2730. An amendment by Chairman Boehner, 

changing the short title of the bill from the ‘‘Occupational Safety 

and Health Independent Review of OSHA Citations Act of 2003’’ to 

the ‘‘Occupational Safety and Health Independent Review of OSHA 

Citations Act of 2004,’’ was accepted by unanimous consent. The 

Committee ordered H.R. 2730, as thus amended, favorably reported 

to the House of Representatives by a roll call vote of 24 yeas and 

20 nays. 

SUMMARY

H.R. 2730 simply governs the relations between two agencies 

under the OSH Act: OSHA and OSHRC. The OSH Act confers rulemaking and prosecutorial authority on OSHA, but places a special 

limitation on the exercise of that authority in terms of an independent review of OSHA’s citations and assessments by OSHRC. 

The OSH Act makes clear that with respect to contested citations, 

OSHRC is specifically authorized to affirm, vacate, or modify either 

the citation or the proposed penalty.2 Since the OSH Act provides 

that all citations, whether contested or not, become enforceable 

only as final orders of the Commission, the Committee finds no 

3 

3See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 US 125, 140–142 (1976). 4See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 395 US 367, 381 

(1969). 5For example, OSHRC noted in its case law that many of OSHA’s standards resulted from 

the incorporation of existing voluntary standards produced before 1970 by voluntary groups of 

experts based on industry data and consensus. In such instances, OSHRC generally found that 

inasmuch as OSHA merely was adopting previously existing standards, OSHA possessed no special knowledge of the original intent of the standards, and was therefore, in OSHRC’s view, not 

entitled to deference. Instead, in such cases, OSHRC deferred to whatever information was most 

indicative of the original intent of the statute. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp., 5 BNA 

Continued 

basis for OSHA’s position that deference should be given to its interpretations of law, rather than that of OSHRC. To the contrary, 

by way of H.R. 2730, the Committee affirms the original intent of 

Congress—that OSHRC was to decide cases without regard to 

OSHA’s views—by statutorily requiring that reviewing courts grant 

deference to OSHRC, not OSHA, on questions of law, so long as 

OSHRC’s interpretation is reasonable. 

COMMITTEE VIEWS

In drafting the OSH Act, Congress extended new and unprecedented powers to OSHA to ensure a safer and healthier work place 

for millions of American working men and women. In granting 

OSHA those extensive powers, Congress also designed a unique 

check on their unfettered use. This check was intended to be discharged by OSHRC, through the process of an independent review 

by that Commission of all disputed items under the OSH Act. The 

record evidence before the Committee makes clear that this check 

is no longer functioning in the manner it was designed, and that 

legislative action is required to restore this necessary balance. H.R. 

2730 accomplishes this goal by ensuring that OSHRC’s review will 

be independent and meaningful by codifying in statute the guarantee that reviewing courts extend the judicial principle of ‘‘deference’’ to OSHRC’s, and not OSHA’s, interpretations of the OSH 

Act and its regulations. 

Background 

‘‘Deference’’ is a legal term of art used by courts to avoid ‘‘secondguessing’’ or substituting their own judgment with respect to administrative decisions made by an agency interpreting its own statute or regulations concerning questions of law. When the OSH Act 

was enacted in 1970, courts generally used one of two methods to 

give deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its 

own regulations. The first held that questions of law were for the 

courts to decide independently, though administrative interpretations were given great weight.3 The second held that agency interpretations were controlling, as long as they were reasonable and 

there was no compelling indication of error.4

OSHRC initially chose to follow the first, ‘‘independent interpretation’’ method, according varying degrees of weight and deference 

to interpretations of law and regulations made by OSHA. Generally, the more that OSHA’s interpretation reflected the original 

intent of a statute, or a technical view that resulted from OSHA’s 

uniquely-qualified expertise, the greater weight OSHRC afforded 

OSHA in its independent review. Conversely, where OSHA’s interpretation was not informed by a uniquely qualified expertise, 

OSHRC accorded less deference to OSHA’s interpretations.5

4 

OSHRC 1289, 1295 n. 9 (1977). In contrast, where OSHA incorporated existing natural standards under its authority found at section 6(a) of the OSH Act, OSHRC generally gave great 

weight to whatever evidence OSHA could produce that shed light on the promulgated authorities’ original intent. See, e.g., Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 13 BNA OSHRC 1177 (1987). Finally, 

OSHRC afforded great deference to OSHA in its interpretation of the standards OSHA itself 

had promulgated under its 6(a) authority. In these cases, since OSHA was obviously the originator of the standard, and thus in a position to be aware of original intent, OSHRC generally 

extended nearly dispositive weight to evidence of OSHA’s intent when produced in the form of 

preambles to standards and other relevant indications. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp., 11 BNA 

OSHRC 1441, 1444(1984). 

6 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 

7 Id. at 842–43 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 8The Committee would make clear that insofar as Chevron compels a reviewing court to give ‘‘deference’’ to the reasonable interpretation of a regulation by its administrative agency, no substantive change to the law is intended. Rather, H.R. 2730 merely directs which agency is afforded such deference in this particular instance, and restores Congressional intent by making 

clear that OSHRC’s, not OSHA’s, interpretations of law govern. 

Until 1984, while OSHRC generally extended varying degrees of 

weight to OSHA’s interpretations, it maintained its independence 

and chose not to strictly or uniformly give deference to OSHA’s interpretations. In 1984, however, in a case called Chevron USA Inc. 

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,6 the U.S. Supreme 

Court greatly extended the concept of administrative deference, 

mandating that a reviewing court give deference to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision of law unless the agency’s 

own position was unreasonable. As the Chevron Court explained: 

First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent 

of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 

court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the 

court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 

precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose 

its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary 

in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, 

if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 

specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 

agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 

the statute. 

* * * * * 

If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 

there is an express delegation of authority to the agency 

to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling 

weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 

contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit. In 

such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction 

of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 

made by the administrator of an agency.7

In the wake of the Chevron decision, OSHA renewed its demand 

for deference to its decisions over OSHRC’s, fueling the need for 

Congressional resolution.8

Compounding the problem, in 1991 the Supreme Court held in 

Martin v. OSHRC (CF&I Steel Corp.) that OSHA’s interpretation 

of an ambiguous regulation must be upheld if the interpretation is 

merely ‘‘reasonable’’—even if the reviewing court believed that the 

5 

9See 499 U.S. 144 (1991). 

10Testimony of Arthur G. Sapper, Esq., Hearing on H.R. 1583, at 69. 11See id. at 69–70 (detailing effects of CF&I case on OSHA enforcement). 12See Sec. 5., Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 8, 15 (1970). 13See id. at 54. 14See id. at 55. 15See id. at 56. 

interpretation of the regulation was incorrect.9 As one witness before the Subcommittee explained, ‘‘The [CF&I] decision awards 

OSHA a home run even if the Review Commission and a court 

think OSHA has only hit a foul ball.’’ 10 The record evidence before 

the Subcommittee details at length the wide-ranging and adverse 

effects of these decisions on the fairness of enforcement under the 

OSH Act: namely, that OSHRC is effectively required to defer to 

OSHA on questions of law.11

While the judicial principle of administrative deference is one 

with which the Committee finds no general disagreement, the Committee believes that in this context, granting deference to OSHA instead of OSHRC is in error in light of the clear legislative history 

of the OSH Act. 

Legislative history of OSHRC and the OSH Act 

The legislative history of OSHRC contained in the OSH Act 

makes clear that Congress intended OSHRC to provide a wholly 

independent review of OSHA’s functions; indeed, such a requirement was critical to reaching a final compromise on the OSH Act 

that was able to pass Congress. 

As originally conceived in both Senate and House versions of the 

OSH Act, OSHA was responsible for rulemaking, enforcement, and 

adjudication of issues arising under the statute.12 Opposition grew, 

however, in terms of concern over such a concentration of power in 

a single entity, especially in light of the sweeping unprecedented 

authority that the Department of Labor (which houses OSHA) 

would have over workplaces. This distrust led the Nixon administration to craft a competing bill which gave DOL only prosecutorial 

authority and proposed two independent boards to perform the 

rulemaking and adjudicative functions.13

In Congressional debate, the committees of jurisdiction focused 

much of their attention on the separation of functions under the 

OSH Act. Debate became so bitter as to seriously jeopardize the 

prospects for passage of the bill.14 As noted at the time by Senator 

Jacob Javits, a Republican from New York, such a concentration of 

power in a single entity created a situation where ‘‘any finding of 

OSHA in its adjudicative function could be a repudiation of the 

agency’s own self.’’ 15

Ultimately, what enabled passage of the OSH Act was a compromise authored by Senator Javits, which provided that an independent review commission—OSHRC—would be established as a 

check on prosecutorial excess by OSHA. That OSHRC was intended 

to be an independent agency which would not defer to OSHA was 

made explicitly clear during debate on the bill at that time: 

Mr. Holland. Would the Commission which would be set 

up * * * [be] controlled by the Labor Department or would 

it be an independent commission? 

6

16See Congressional Record at 37607, (Nov. 17, 1970) (debate on the Javits Amendment to 

the OSH Act) (emphasis added). 17 499 U.S. at 157. 

Mr. Javits. This is an autonomous, independent commission which, without regard to the Secretary, can find for 

or against him on the basis of individual complaints.16

Shortly after this assurance was given, the Senate voted to adopt 

the Javits compromise. 

The evidence before the Committee makes clear that Congress 

intended that OSHRC, not OSHA, would have the final administrative say in interpretation of ambiguities under the OSH Act, and 

that in fact such a compromise was critical to ensuring final passage of the bill itself. The record further confirms that Congress intended to limit OSHA’s prosecutorial power and to confer upon 

OSHRC the final compliment of adjudicative powers that are available to similar agencies. It is clear that Congress intended to vest 

OSHRC with this authority not only to ensure that the adjudicatory process would be fair to the regulated community, but also 

that there would be some reasonable check on the prosecuting 

agency’s ability to interpret the law it was to apply. To the extent 

that current law and practice to not consistently reflect the intent 

of Congress in this regard, H.R. 2730 codifies in statute that which 

Congress plainly intended: that OSHRC’s interpretation of ambiguities in the OSH Act and the standards and regulations adopted 

thereunder, be given deference over that of the prosecuting agency, 

OSHA, and that OSHRC’s review of OSHA’s decisions be meaningful and independent. The Committee does not intend that this bill 

affect judicial review more generally. As the Supreme Court stated 

in CF&I Steel, ‘‘We deal [here] only with the division of powers between the Secretary and the OSH Act.’’ 17

CONCLUSION

In H.R. 2730, the Committee affirms that the statutory structure 

and legislative history of the OSH Act clearly indicate an intent on 

the part of Congress that deference be extended to OSHRC, not 

OSHA, on questions of law, so long as OSHRC’s interpretation is 

reasonable. H.R. 2730 ensures that the original intent of Congress—namely, that the decisions of OSHA be subject to a full and 

independent review by OSHRC—is reflected in current law by 

statutorily mandating that such deference on interpretations of 

questions of law is given to the Commission.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short title 

This act may be cited as the ‘‘Occupational Safety and Health 

Independent Review of OSHA Citations Act of 2004.’’

Section 2. Independent review 

This section specifies that OSHRC’s rulings, not OSHA’s, shall be 

the controlling interpretations of law under the OSH Act, so long 

as they are reasonable. 

7 

EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENTS

The bill was ordered reported with an amendment to the short 

title. 

APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

Section 102(b)(3) of Public Law 104–1, the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA), requires a description of the application of 

this bill to the legislative branch. H.R. 2730 amends the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) to clarify the relation between the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(‘‘OSHA’’) and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (‘‘OSHRC’’ or ‘‘Commission’’)—that the OSHRC decide cases ‘‘without regard to’’ the views of OSHA. Section 215 of the CAA applies certain requirements of the OSH Act, to the legislative 

branch. The Committee intends to make the provisions of this bill 

available to legislative branch employees and employers in the 

same way as it is made available to private sector employees and 

employers under this legislation. 

UNFUNDED MANDATE STATEMENT

Section 423 of the Congressional Budget & Impoundment Control 

Act requires a statement of whether the provisions of the reported 

bill include unfunded mandates. The Committee received a letter 

regarding unfunded mandates from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office and as such the Committee agrees that the 

bill does not contain any unfunded mandates. See infra. 

8 

9 

STATEMENT OF OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF

THE COMMITTEE

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII and clause (2)(b)(1) 

of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee’s oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in the 

body of this report. 

BUDGET AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST

ESTIMATE

With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of 

the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to requirements of 

3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of Representatives and section 402 

of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate for H.R. 2730 from the Director 

of the Congressional Budget Office: 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, May 11, 2004. 

Hon. JOHN A. BOEHNER, 

Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2730, the Occupational 

Safety and Health Independent Review of OSHA Citations Act of 

2004. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Shawn Bishop. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, Director. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 2730—Occupational Safety and Health Independent Review of 

OSHA Citations Act of 2004 

H.R. 2730 would amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act 

to clarify that decisions made by the Occupational Safety and 

Health Review Commission (OSHRC) with respect to questions of 

law should be given difference by appellate courts. OSHRC is an 

independent federal agency created to adjudicate contests of citations or penalties resulting from inspections of work places by the 

Occupational Safety and Health Agency. OSHRC functions as an 

administrative court whose decisions can be appealed to the judicial court system. 

CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 2730 would not have any 

significant impact on the federal budget. 

H.R. 2730 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact is Shawn Bishop. This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget 

Analysis. 

10 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In accordance with Clause (3)(c) of House Rule XIII, the goal of 

H.R. 2730 is to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act 

(OSH Act) to clarify the relation between the Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration (‘‘OSHA’’) and the Occupational Safety 

and Health Review Commission (‘‘OSHRC’’ or ‘‘Commission’’)—that 

the OSHRC decide cases ‘‘without regard to’’ the views of OSHA. 

The Committee expects the Department of Labor to implement the 

changes to the law in accordance with these stated goals. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

H.R. 2730 amends the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and 

thus falls within the scope of Congressional powers under Article 

I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States to the 

same extent as does the OSH Act. 

COMMITTEE ESTIMATE

Clause 3(d)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison by the Committee of the costs that would be incurred in carrying out H.R. 

2730. However, clause 3(d)(3)(B) of that rule provides that this requirement does not apply when the Committee has included in its 

report a timely submitted cost estimate of the bill prepared by the 

Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of 

the Congressional Budget Act. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

SECTION 11 OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 

HEALTH ACT OF 1970 

JUDICIAL REVIEW

SEC. 11. (a) Any person adversely affected, or aggrieved by an 

order of the Commission issued under subsection (c) of section 10 

may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of 

appeals for the circuit in which the violation is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office, or in the 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing in 

such court within sixty days following the issuance of such order 

a written petition praying that the order be modified or set aside. 

A copy of such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk 

of the court to the Commission and to the other parties, and thereupon the Commission shall file in the court and the record in the 

proceeding as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States 

Code. Upon such filing, the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have 

power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it 

deems just and proper, and to make and enter upon the pleadings, 

11 

testimony, and proceedings set forth in such record a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part, the order of the 

Commission and enforcing the same to the extent that such order 

affirmed or modified. The commencement of proceedings under this 

subsection shall not, unless ordered by the court, operate as a stay 

of the order of the Commission. No objection that has not been 

urged before the Commission shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused 

because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Commission with respect to questions of the fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. If any party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court 

that such additional evidence is material and that such additional 

evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for 

the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken 

before the Commission and to be made a part of the record. The 

Commission may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new 

finding, by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed, and it 

shall file such modified or new findings, which findings with respect to questions of fact, is supported by substantial evidence on 

the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive, and its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its 

original order. Upon the filing of the record, with it, the jurisdiction 

of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall 

be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States, as provided in section 1254 of 

title 28, United States Code. The conclusions of the Commission 

with respect to all questions of law shall be given deference if reasonable. 

* * * * * * * 

(12) 

MINORITY VIEWS 

This bill would give the Occupational Safety and Review Commission policy making authority by allowing courts to give deference to the Commission regarding the interpretation of OSHA 

standards. This change would undermine the Department’s enforcement functions by encouraging challenges to the Secretary’s 

rules and interpretations. 

The Secretary is much better positioned to interpret her regulations than the Commission. Beyond the obvious fact that she issued 

the regulation in the first instance, as noted by the Court, it is the 

Secretary who has broader contact, and consequently greater expertise, with both the regulated community and with the impact of 

regulations on the community. Further, viewing the Commission’s 

authority as being similar to those of a court fully achieves the purpose of protecting the regulated community from biased interpretations of the Secretary’s authority. Finally, contending the Commission should have both adjudicatory and rulemaking authority, as 

the Majority does, creates unnecessary and unwarranted confusion 

by leaving two agencies responsible for determining policy. For all 

of these reasons, we conclude that the Court’s view of the Act is 

more reasoned and more sensible than is the Majority’s. H.R. 2730 

is not consistent with the OSH Act’s legislative history and does 

not reflect sensible policy. 

In Martin v. OSHRC, the Court specifically considered the issue 

of whether the Secretary or the Commission should receive deference regarding reasonable but conflicting interpretations of an 

ambiguous regulation promulgated by the Secretary. The Court 

concluded that based upon the Occupational Safety and Health 

Act’s legislative history and the Act’s split enforcement structure, 

it must be inferred that the power to render authoritative interpretations of the Secretary’s regulations is a necessary adjunct of the 

Secretary’s rulemaking and enforcement powers. 

The Court noted the ‘‘unusual regulatory structure established 

by the Act’’ under which the Secretary was granted enforcement 

and rulemaking powers, while the Commission was afforded adjudicative powers. 

[W]e now infer from the structure and history of the 

statute that the power to render authoritative interpretations of the OSH Act regulations is a ‘‘necessary adjunct’’ of the Secretary’s powers to promulgate and to enforce national health and safety standards. The Secretary enjoys 

readily identifiable structural advantages over the Commission in rendering authoritative interpretations of OSH 

Act regulations. Because the Secretary promulgates these 

standards, the Secretary is in a better position than is the 

Commission to reconstruct the purpose of the regulations 

in question. Moreover, by virtue of the Secretary’s statuVerDate May 04 2004 03:47 May 14, 2004 Jkt 029006 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\HR488P1.XXX HR488P1
13 

tory role as enforcer, the Secretary comes into contact with 

a much greater number of regulatory problems than does 

the Commission, which encounters only these regulatory 

episodes resulting in contested citations. Consequently, the 

Secretary is more likely to develop the expertise relevant 

to assessing the effect of a particular regulatory interpretation. Because historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first instance for the presumption 

that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to 

the agency rather than to the reviewing court, we presume 

here that Congress intended to invest interpretative power 

in the administrative actor in the best position to develop 

these attributes. Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. at 152, 153 

(citations omitted). 

Citing the Senate Committee Report (S. Rep. No. 91–1282, p.8), 

the Court noted that Congress intended ‘‘to hold a single administrative actor politically ‘accountable for the overall implementation 

of that program’ ’’ and that granting authority to the Commission 

‘‘to make law by interpreting [standards] would make two administrative actors ultimately responsible for implementing the Act’s policy objectives * * *’’ Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 499 at 153, 154 

(emphasis in original). 

Insofar as Congress did not invest the Commission with 

the power to make law or policy by other means, we cannot infer that Congress expected the Commission to use its 

adjudicatory power to play a policymaking role. Moreover, 

when a traditional, unitary agency uses adjudication to engage in lawmaking by regulatory interpretation, it necessarily interprets regulations that it has promulgated. 

This, too, cannot be said of the Commission’s power to adjudicate. Martin v. OSHRC, 449 U.S. at 154 (emphasis in 

original). 

The Court concluded, correctly in our view, that: 

Congress intended to delegate to the Commission the 

type of non-policymaking adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in the agency-review context. Under this 

conception of adjudication, the Commission is authorized 

to review the Secretary’s interpretations only for consistency with the regulatory language and for reasonableness. 

In addition, of course, Congress expressly charged the 

Commission with making authoritative findings of fact and 

with applying the Secretary’s standards to those facts in 

making a decision. Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. at 154, 155 

(emphasis in original). 

* * * We harbor no doubt that Congress also intended 

to protect regulated parties from biased interpretations of 

the Secretary’s regulations. But this objective is achieved 

when the Commission, and ultimately the court of appeals, 

reviews the Secretary’s interpretation to assure that it is 

consistent with the regulatory language and is otherwise 

reasonable. Giving the Commission the power to substitute 

its reasonable interpretations for the Secretary’s * * * 

14 

would also clearly frustrate Congress’ intent to make a single administrative actor ‘‘accountable for the overall implementation’’ of the Act’s policy objectives * * * Martin v. 

OSHRC, 499 U.S. at 156 (emphasis in original). 

* * * [A]lthough we hold that a reviewing court may not 

prefer the reasonable interpretations of the Commission to 

the reasonable interpretations of the Secretary; we emphasize that the reviewing court should defer to the Secretary 

only if the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable. Martin 

v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. at 158. 

GEORGE MILLER. 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY. 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH. 

DANNY K. DAVIS. 

BETTY MCCOLLUM. 

RON KIND. 

DALE E. KILDEE. 

MAJOR R. OWENS. 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA. 

ED CASE. 

SUSAN A. DAVIS. 

JOHN F. TIERNEY. 

TIM RYAN. 

RAU ́ L GRIJALVA. 

TIM BISHOP. 

RUSH HOLT. 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN. 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY. 

ROBERT ANDREWS. 

DONALD M. PAYNE. 

DENISE L. MAJETTE. 

DAVID WU. 

Æ