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THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 15, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1

Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 55

Responses of Secretary Rice to questions submitted by the following Senators:

George Allen ...................................................................................................... 73

Joseph Biden ..................................................................................................... 56

Barbara Boxer ................................................................................................... 74

Lincoln Chafee .................................................................................................. 90

Russell Feingold ............................................................................................... 75

Chuck Hagel ...................................................................................................... 95

Richard Lugar ................................................................................................... 101

Mel Martinez ..................................................................................................... 82

Paul Sarbanes ................................................................................................... 86

John Sununu ..................................................................................................... 124

George Voinovich .............................................................................................. 129

ABC News Poll: Life in Afghanistan, December 7, 2005 ...................................... 133

(III)

(1)

THE PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FOR FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2006

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Alexander, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Boxer,

Nelson, and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.

SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee

is called to order.

Secretary Rice will be with us in a few moments. She is en route

presently. Because we have a very restricted time period today,

from 9:45 to 11:45, we’re going to try to utilize each minute so that

we will have maximum fairness to each one of our members who

may have questions and dialog with the Secretary.

Let me mention that, at a point in which a quorum of the committee is present—that is, 10 members—at a convenient point, and

with the cooperation of the distinguished ranking member, Senator

Biden, we will pause for a short business meeting of the committee.

We have a substantial list of Foreign Service officers. We have a

number of ambassadors who have been heard in subcommittee or

full committee meetings, as well as State Department persons. We

will try to gain confirmation of those, at least in the committee,

and send those to the floor.

In the interest of attempting to expedite the hearing, I have a

substantial opening statement, which greets the Secretary, points

out the difficulties that both the Secretary and Congress have had

in getting the support that we need for our State Department for

foreign assistance, and for our other foreign policy objectives. It is

important that we formulate strategies to work effectively together

in those endeavors. I will submit that statement for the record and

may refer to it in my time of questioning.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Today the Foreign Relations Committee welcomes Secretary of State Condoleezza

Rice. We greet her as the President’s spokesperson on world affairs and the chief

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architect of U.S. foreign policy. We have many questions for her pertaining to a wide

variety of foreign policy issues, including the Bush administration’s plans for making further progress in Iraq and Afghanistan; the status of negotiations pertaining

to Iran, North Korea, and the Arab-Israeli peace process; and her assessment of the

State Department’s budget.

This is the first international affairs budget that has been developed under Secretary Rice’s guiding hand. This budget should be seen as the civilian counterpart

to our military budget. The missions and objectives funded by the international affairs budget must be strengthened if we are to secure America’s future. Secretary

Rice’s call for ‘‘transformational diplomacy’’ is evidence that she agrees. This budget

includes a welcome increase, but recent history suggests that the full request may

not survive the congressional budget process without vigorous and ongoing dialog

between the executive and congressional branches.

Last year, Congress slashed the President’s international affairs request by $2.1

billion—or about 6 percent. The year before that, Congress cut the request by a comparable amount. Thus, for two consecutive years, Congress has refused to give the

President what he says he needs to address global challenges through nonmilitary

means. Much criticism of administration policy in the war on terrorism is leveled

on the Senate floor and in various congressional committees, but the Congress itself

is limiting the number of people and programs that could be activated to address

terrorism, weapons proliferation, energy dependence, avian flu, religious extremism,

and innumerable other threats. None of these national security challenges can be

overcome purely through unilateral policy choices or through military action. We are

dependent on other nations to help us respond to these threats so that individual

Americans can enjoy the security they need to get an education, build a career, raise

families, save a nest egg, and live fulfilling lives. We cannot fully succeed in this

fundamental mission, unless the programs and people funded by this budget succeed.

The Bush administration deserves praise for its international affairs budget submissions. President Bush and Secretary Powell reversed the downward spiral in

U.S. foreign policy capabilities that was imposed during the 1990s. In that decade,

both Congress and the executive branch rushed to cash in on the peace dividend.

The defense budget was cut substantially, but in percentage terms, the much smaller foreign affairs budget suffered even more. During the 6-year period from 1992

to 1998, the 150 Account was cut every single year. As a percentage of GDP, this

6-year slide represented a 38-percent decrease in foreign affairs programs.

In the post-cold-war days, cutting the 150 Account seemed logical to many. But

by the time we confronted the tragedy of September 11, 2001, many of our foreign

policy capabilities were in disrepair. In 2001 the share of the U.S. budget devoted

to the international affairs account was barely above its post-World War II low and

only about half of its share in the mid-1980s. Embassy security upgrades were behind schedule, we lacked adequate numbers of diplomats with key language skills,

many important overseas posts were filled by junior Foreign Service officers, we possessed little civilian post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction capacity, and our

public diplomacy was dismal. Our diplomatic capabilities have made progress under

President Bush, but much work is left to be done.

Given Congress’s actions during the last 2 years, one might begin this hearing by

asking an obvious question: Namely, what $2 billion in this budget submission does

the administration prefer to be cut? But I believe that Secretary Rice genuinely

wants to devote every dollar of the request to aggressively safeguarding America’s

future. So instead, I would like Secretary Rice to explain in her remarks what the

President and his administration will do to guarantee that Congress preserves this

request and approves the supplemental funding for the 150 Account that we hear

will be requested soon.

What will the Commander in Chief do—in an era that members of his administration are describing as the ‘‘long war’’—to ensure that he has the civilian tools to

fight that war? What will he do to ensure that we have sufficient funding to build

secure embassies for American workers and travelers, to deny terrorists any hope

of official documentation to enter this country, to work with foreign partners to

track down terrorists overseas, and to secure dangerous weapons wherever they are

found?

I would cite one episode to illustrate the difficult atmosphere in Congress with

respect to the international affairs budget. During last year’s budget resolution, an

amendment was offered in the early stages of consideration to shift $410 million

from the 150 Account to another priority. The amendment passed virtually without

dissent, 96 to 4. The four Senators who voted against the cut to the 150 Account

were members of this committee.

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This lopsided defeat occurred despite the fact that 44 Senators had signed a letter

to President Bush shortly before strongly urging ‘‘a robust increase’’ in the international affairs budget. Even the Senators who had organized the letter voted

against the 150 Account in this first challenge to it. I do not question the judgment

of the 96 Senators who voted for the amendment. The account to which the money

was transferred was a compelling priority. But we must recognize that the budget

is full of compelling priorities, and historically, foreign affairs spending has been a

prime target for offsetting increases elsewhere.

Even today, when we are in the midst of a global struggle of information and

ideas, when anti-Western riots can be set off by the publication of a cartoon; when

we are in the midst of a crisis in Iran that will decide whether the nonproliferation

regime of the last half century will be abandoned; when we are soon to enter our

fourth year of attempting to stabilize Iraq; and when years of effort to move the

Arab-Israeli peace process are at risk—even then, the reservoir of support for international spending in Congress is shallow. Members of Congress may recognize the

value of the work done by the State Department and some selected programs may

be popular, but the 150 Account seldom will be defended against competing priorities.

Again, this year, 45 Senators have signed a letter to the President asking for increases in the 150 Account. But Congress, left to its own devices, is unlikely to give

the President what he has requested. The only way to achieve full funding of the

request is for the President, the Secretary of State, and other top officials to emphasize unequivocally and repeatedly over the course of months that this is the amount

that we need to keep the country safe and to meet our obligations. They must draw

indisputable connections between this funding and American national security.

To make a comparison, I recently interacted with the Department of Defense on

a program that they wanted to initiate. I received notes, telephone calls, and visits

from members of the Joint Chiefs, a combatant commander and top civilian leadership at the Pentagon. With this kind of legislative mobilization and willingness to

explain their requests, the Defense Department tends to succeed in debates on

spending and programmatic changes. We need a State Department with similar determination, backed up by Presidential support.

This committee will soon hold a hearing to examine policy options with respect

to Iran. That nation’s intransigence in the face of growing international opposition

points to a diplomatic showdown. We should not underestimate the impact of an Iranian Government possessing nuclear weapons. Beyond our concerns about what a

hostile government might do with such weapons, the development of an Iranian nuclear capability could destabilize the Middle East and undercut the efficacy of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The administration has sought a diplomatic solution to the problem working through allies and the United Nations Security Council.

At the U.N. Security Council last week, I told that body: ‘‘If Iran does not comply

with U.N. resolutions and arms agreements, the Security Council must apply strict

and enforceable sanctions. Failure to do so will severely damage the credibility of

a painstaking diplomatic approach and call into question the world’s commitment

to controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.’’ I am particularly interested in hearing from the Secretary if the administration has a set of sanctions in mind that it

believes would alter Iranian behavior. I believe that we must think two or three

steps beyond the question of whether we can obtain an original positive vote in the

Security Council.

Similarly, we are interested in your views on Iraq. Last week, this committee held

a hearing on the efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq, which revealed some

progress, but also some troubling deficiencies. The State Department is now the lead

executive branch agency in charge of stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq. As the

administration asks for additional funding for Iraq reconstruction, we must continue

to make certain that funds are being spent efficiently and according to a clear set

of priorities.

We are also eager to listen to your views on the Arab-Israeli peace process in the

wake of the election of Hamas. We applaud the personal efforts you have made to

preserve and advance the peace process.

I want to commend your work to develop a more efficient and coordinated U.S.

Government foreign assistance strategy. Your decision to name Randy Tobias as the

USAID Administrator and your advisor on developing a new, comprehensive approach to foreign assistance is welcome, and we are looking forward to his confirmation hearing.

Another area where your leadership is particularly appreciated is your support for

the State Department’s Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and your decision

to dedicate 15 of the 100 newly requested State Department positions to that Office.

As you know, Senator Biden and I initiated conversations back in 2003 about this

4

gap in the Department’s capability. It was clear to us that the State Department

and USAID needed to develop an ability to mobilize quickly in post-conflict situations. I hope that you will create the Active-Duty component of the response corps

that we envisioned in our legislation. We should work together to make certain that

both the $75 million conflict response fund and a robust operations budget is funded

for this purpose.

Madame Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you with us today. We look forward

to your insights on these matters and to the chance to engage you in a dialog on

the administration’s global strategic vision.

The CHAIRMAN. I will then, turn now to the distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, for his opening statement, following

which we’re hopeful that the Secretary will be able to give her

statement, and then we will proceed with a question period, starting with a round of 5 minutes for each member, moving around the

table from one side of the aisle to the other. Hopefully we will have

an excellent opportunity to explore all of our major issues.

It’s a privilege, as always, to have the Secretary of State. We look

forward to this hearing. We thank her for accommodating the

schedule to Congress, which made it necessary to postpone the

hearing yesterday due to rollcall votes on the floor.

I turn now to my distinguished friend, Senator Biden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S.

SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a longer statement that I’ll submit for the record, and I

will repeat some of this in my questioning to the Secretary.

But one of the things that I’d like to speak to the Secretary about

today is the overall rationale for this administration’s foreign policy. Four years ago, they announced that the ‘‘axis of evil’’ had to

be dealt with, they talked about Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Korea now

has the capacity to have at least four times as many nuclear weapons as they had before. We say that they cannot be a nuclear state,

when, in fact, they are. They are a nuclear state, and we seem to

be living with it. What are we going to do about it?

With regard to Iran, there was, I think, a paralysis for about 4

years on Iranian policy, but now I want to talk to the Secretary.

I think the administration has gotten the policy on track here, in

terms of working with the rest of the world to attempt to isolate

and thwart the aspirations of the present Iranian Government toward acquiring nuclear capability, or nuclear weapons capability.

And in Iraq the question is, Are we going to leave behind a nation more stable than we found it when we went in? We had a very

damaging, I thought, report by the inspector general about the status of our reconstruction efforts in Iraq in every measurable indicia

of progress—oil, potable water, sewage, et cetera. We are way behind. And we’re actually at prewar levels for the Iraqi people. And

it’s clear to me that we’re going to substantially draw down the

American forces. It’s clear to me we’re going to be below a hundred

thousand, by the end of this year; and at the end of 2007, significantly lower. And as you and I have talked, and many of us have

talked about it, there’s a need to galvanize international pressure

on Iraqi leaders to actually come up with a consensus government.

I’m not hopeful, based upon the deal made, apparently, with

5

Jaafari and Sadr. I’m not hopeful. And so, I’d like to talk about

that a little bit, because the policy seems not to be succeeding.

And I’d also want to talk about the policy of elections. I think

this administration is enamored with elections, and confuses them

with democracy. Elections a democracy doesn’t make. Democracies

cannot come to fruition without elections, but you need the infrastructure for democracy. And we’ve not done all that well in the

elections that have been held.

And in Lebanon, Hezbollah gains a democratic, ‘‘foothold.’’ We all

know what happened in Israel with Hamas, a difficult problem to

deal with. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iraq the elections

clearly went toward a clerical pro-Iranian tilt. Where does that go?

So, I want to talk about that.

I also want to mention the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission has given pretty bad grades here.

And I see the Secretary is here now. Madam Secretary, we

weren’t being disrespectful; we’re trying to save your time by us

doing our opening statements——

Secretary RICE. I apologize.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. In your absence. And we’ll repeat

some of this in questioning.

And I also want to talk, Mr. Chairman, a little bit about Darfur.

It is good news the United Nations has taken the step it has, but,

quite frankly, in the interim an awful lot of people are going to die.

And I firmly believe the United States should lead the way in

NATO to provide a small NATO protection force and a NATO-enforced no-fly zone to bridge the U.S. mission.

And, last, I want to commend the Secretary for thinking creatively with her proposal on the Foreign Service and coordination

of foreign assistance programs. And I’d like to speak about that a

little bit.

But my entire statement I’d like to be placed in the record, if I

may, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record in full.

Senator BIDEN. And I thank you for holding this hearing. I thank

the Secretary for accommodating our schedule from yesterday.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM

DELAWARE

Madam Secretary, welcome back to the committee.

Four years ago, the President warned that we confronted a dangerous axis of evil

in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and that by seeking weapons of mass destruction,

these regimes presented a ‘‘grave and growing danger.’’

Today, two members of the axis of evil—Iran and North Korea—pose an even

greater threat to our security than they did 4 years ago, and in the third, Iraq, we

risk trading a dictator for chaos.

We continue to have a great debate about Iraq. But we can all agree that an unstable Iraq is not in our interests.

The drawdown of American troops is already underway—I believe we will be down

to 100,000 Americans by the end of this year, and half that number by the end of

2007.

The critical question now is whether we will leave Iraq with our security interests

intact. The answer will depend on our success in three areas:

First, we must galvanize international pressure on Iraq’s political leaders to form

an inclusive government and agree to a consensus constitution.

6

Second, we must provide Iraqi security forces with the leadership, training, equipment, and logistical capabilities to operate on their own. We have made progress,

but there is still a long way to go.

Third, we must develop Iraq’s governing capacity and ability to deliver basic services.

Last week, we heard a dismal report on the current state of Iraq’s infrastructure.

By just about every critical measure—electricity, drinkable water, sewage treatment, and oil production—Iraq is worse off today than before the war. Unless these

shortfalls are addressed, they will continue to fuel the insurgency.

Perhaps the gravest danger to our security lies in Iran. If the world does not dissuade Iran from producing fissile material, or developing the capacity to produce

that material, then an extremist government that actively supports international

terrorism will gain a nuclear weapons capability.

Four years of policy paralysis in Washington during the first term did nothing to

stop Iran’s program. I commend you for the last year of determined diplomacy,

which has led to a broad coalition of support for reporting Iran to the U.N. Security

Council.

But that was the easy part. Now the world must take more tangible action to

show Iran how isolated it will be unless it reduces its nuclear ambitions.

The world must also convince the Iranian people that a nuclear weapons capability is not in Iran’s national security interest. I urge the executive branch to conduct careful studies of possible sanctions—and their impact—that could be implemented against Iran. It is equally vital for the administration to prepare the American people for some level of sacrifice in order to maintain economic pressure on

Iran.

The administration has stated that ‘‘The United States is not prepared to tolerate

a nuclear-armed North Korea.’’ I don’t know what that means, as most experts believe North Korea already has nuclear weapons, and that it probably increased its

arsenal from one to two weapons to as many as 10 over the past 5 years.

I do know this: Big nations should not bluff. And by any measure we are currently

tolerating a nuclear North Korea.

The United States is not to blame for North Korea’s intransigence. But the lack

of urgency and attention given to this problem is troubling.

In December, the 9/11 Commissioners issued their latest report card on the Government’s efforts to implement its recommendations. On the areas where the State

Department has responsibility, Madam Secretary, it did not make the Dean’s List.

The Commissioners gave out several ‘‘Ds’’—including on the issue of making a

maximum effort to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,

our policy on Saudi Arabia, and certain public diplomacy efforts.

I am not surprised by this dismal rating—for years, this administration has underfunded critical nonproliferation programs and failed to cut through redtape with

Russia.

The recent victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections is further evidence that

elections do not a democracy make. Indeed, the recent string of strong showings by

Islamists in the Middle East—Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, religious

parties in Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon—remind us that elections can produce

distorted outcomes when there is not equal emphasis on developing the institutions

of democracy, such as political parties, a civil society, a free press, and the rule of

law.

Hamas’s victory casts a pall on the future of the peace process. Israel cannot be

expected to negotiate with a party that calls for its destruction, engages in terrorism, and maintains an armed militia.

Unless Hamas changes it stripes, we must build international support to isolate

it.

I remain concerned by the inadequate response to the tragedy in Darfur. The initiative to establish a U.N. force for Darfur is welcome. But it will take up to a year

to deploy such a force. In the meantime, thousands more will suffer from genocidal

acts. The United States should lead the way in NATO to provide for a small NATO

protection force—and a NATO-enforced no-fly zone—as a bridge to the U.N. mission.

Finally, let me commend you for thinking creatively with your proposals on the

Foreign Service and coordination of foreign assistance programs. We still don’t know

all the details of these proposals, but we look forward to working with you to develop them in the months ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Indeed. And we greet you, Secretary Rice. We

thank you very much for making it possible for us to conduct this

hearing today, because your presence is the essential element.

7

I’ve submitted my opening statement for the record. Senator

Biden has summarized his, and it’s a part of the record. As I have

mentioned earlier, I’m hopeful that staff members will inform Senators as they are coming in, that we have a very important promotion list, as well as nominees to the State Department, and ambassadorships. At a time that we get a quorum, we will have a

short business meeting, and hopefully do business which will be

helpful to you and to American diplomacy in the process.

But we’re delighted that you’re here, and honored. I have informed all of us that our hearing must end at 11:45; therefore, we’ll

adopt a 5-minute question period so that members, hopefully, on

both sides of the aisle, can be accommodated.

It’s a privilege to recognize you, Secretary Rice.

STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF

STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator

Biden, Senator Hagel, other Senators. Thank you very much for

giving me the opportunity to address you.

I have a longer written statement, which I would like to enter

into the record, but I will not go through that statement, so that

we can maximize time for questions.

Mr. Chairman, it’s been a little over a year since I was confirmed

by this committee as Secretary of State, and obviously a lot has

happened in that year.

The President’s budget this year is in support of a foreign policy

that is devoted to the creation of a more hospitable environment for

the forward march of freedom and democracy. Democratic processes

must be supported around the world. These are transitional periods

in some part of the world—some parts of the world, like the Middle

East. And the democratic transitions are, indeed, difficult. But people have to have their voice, and the United States must stand for

a principle that democratic processes, no matter how difficult, are

always preferable to the false stability of a dictatorship.

You will notice that this year the President is requesting funding

for Iraq and Afghanistan, where young democracies are trying to

make their way toward stability. I will talk later, perhaps in questions, about developments in the Middle East; in particular, the

Palestinian elections. And let me just say that the United States

does want to congratulate the Palestinian people on having held an

election that was largely free of violence and largely believed to be

free and fair. The Palestinian people voted for change. We believe

that they voted for change against long-term corrupt practices that

have made their lives difficult and their progress difficult. What

has not changed is the Palestinian people’s desire to have a freer

and a better life. And, in that regard, Hamas, which won that election, now has both an obligation and a choice to fulfill the Palestinian people’s desire for a better life. That better life can only be

achieved in a peaceful environment, which can only be achieved

with a two-state solution. And so, Hamas is being confronted with

a choice by the international community. I think the Quartet statement speaks to that choice, that Hamas must recognize the right

of Israel to exist; disarm as a militia; and renounce violence. BeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
8

cause only under those circumstances can there be true international support for the next Palestinian Government.

We recognize, also, that other major challenges have arisen this

year. In particular, I would like to speak briefly to the Iranian

problem, the Iranian regime, with its destabilizing policies

throughout the region, policies that support terrorism and violent

extremism. The Iranian regime uses those tools to further ideological ambitions and policies that are, frankly, a challenge to the

kind of Middle East that I think we would all like to see, one of

tolerance, one of democracy. The United States will actively confront the aggressive policies of this Iranian regime. And, at the

same time, we are going to work to support the aspirations of the

Iranian people for freedom in their own country.

The Iranian regime is now deepening its own international isolation through toxic statements and confrontational behavior, most

especially in its pursuit of nuclear weapons and pursuit of policies

that are now being roundly condemned by the international community.

Mr. Chairman, I think it’s fair to note that no one wants to deny

the Iranian people or the Iranian nation civil nuclear power. Many

different options have been put before Iran. They have chosen to

isolate themselves instead. In a year of peaceful and patient efforts,

the United States has broadened the diplomatic consensus on the

threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. We have successfully convinced Russia and China and India and Brazil and Egypt and

many others to send the issue to the U.N. Security Council. The

community of nations is, as I said, not debating whether Iran

should have civil nuclear power, but how to safely do so without

a proliferation risk.

We must now expand the international consensus on the Iranian

regime’s nuclear ambitions to address the full scope of its threatening policies. In conjunction with our multilateral diplomacy, the

United States will develop sensible measures, security measures,

including looking further at our Proliferation Security Initiative

and those who cooperate with us to try and deny, to regimes like

Iran, North Korea, and others, the materials for covert programs

that threaten the international system.

At the same time, we are going to begin a new effort to support

the aspirations of the Iranian people. I want to thank the Congress

for giving us $10 million to support the cause of freedom and

human rights in Iran this year. We will use this money to develop

support networks for Iranian reformers, political dissidents, and

human rights activists.

We also plan to request $75 million in supplemental funding for

the fiscal year 2006 to support democracy in Iran. That money

would enable us to increase our support for democracy and improve

our radio broadcasting, begin satellite television broadcasts, increase the contacts between our peoples through expanded fellowships and scholarships for Iranian students, and to bolster our public diplomacy efforts.

In addition, I will be notifying that we plan to reprogram funds

in 2007 to support the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people.

Now, I’m sure that the members of the committee know that

going forward with this effort requires that we remove obstacles

9

that hinder our ability to support those courageous Iranians working for their country’s freedom, so we are working with the Treasury Department to overcome U.S. regulatory restrictions to allow

the U.S. Government to make grants to nongovernmental organizations for democracy promotion activities in Iran.

We want to expand our educational exchanges with the young

people of Iran who have never experienced democracy. In the

1970s, 200,000 Iranians studied in the United States. That figure

is 2,000 today. We must change this. And we will. And we’re beginning a new effort to dramatically increase the number of Iranians

who can come to study in America, the number of Iranian professionals who wish to visit. I’ve said, on a number of occasions, that

I’ve read that it is forbidden in some quarters to play Beethoven

and Mozart in Tehran. We hope that Iranians can play it in New

York or in Los Angeles.

Finally, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that Senator Biden

kindly mentioned the efforts that we’re making in the Department

to transform our workforce, to transform the men and women—the

skills and tools of the men and women—of the State Department

who must lead our transformational diplomacy. We have repositioned 100 Foreign Service and other positions—there will be

more—because we feel that the presence needs to match the global

challenges.

We have also undertaken, within the limits of my authority, a reform of foreign assistance so that we can get better alignment between USAID and State, so that we can be better stewards of the

American people’s money.

I want to be very clear that America will always care for, and

will always try to serve, the most vulnerable populations with humanitarian assistance and with help for child welfare and with assistance to disaster relief, when necessary. It is also our goal to

make our foreign assistance something that is not permanent for

countries as they transition to well-managed countries that fight

corruption, that govern wisely, that make investments in their people. And so, one of our goals is to make certain that we are serving,

also, the objective of the creation of well-governed democratic states

that, on their own, can attract foreign investment, attract trade,

and begin to move away from foreign assistance.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I’m now happy to take

questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT

OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to address the committee and to talk about America’s role in meeting the unprecedented challenges of our world today. I look forward to working closely with

Congress to ensure that America’s diplomacy has the necessary resources to secure

our interests, advance our ideals, and improve people’s lives around the world. In

all of these mutual efforts, of course, we must remain committed to our responsibility to be good stewards of the American taxpayers’ hard-earned dollars.

The President’s FY 2007 International Affairs Budget for the Department of

State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies totals $35.1 billion. President Bush

also plans to request supplemental funding to support emergency, one-time programs that are essential to the success of some of our highest foreign policy priorities.

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This money will do more than support our diplomacy; it will strengthen our national security. America today is a nation at war. We are engaged in a long conflict

against terrorists and violent extremists. Across the world, the members of our Foreign Service, Civil Service, and our Foreign Service Nationals are advancing America’s diplomatic mission, often working in dangerous places far away from their

friends and loved ones. Our Nation’s men and women in uniform are also shouldering great risks and responsibilities. They are performing with courage and heroism, and many have made the ultimate sacrifice to secure our way of life. Today,

I want to recognize these courageous public servants and their families, who endure

long periods of service abroad and painful separation with fortitude.

America’s enemies remain eager to strike us again, but our actions in the past

4 years have weakened their capability. Our diplomacy plays a vital role in defeating this threat. We are building partnerships with traditional allies and with new

partners that share our perception of the threat. Most importantly, we are working

directly with foreign citizens who wish to build thriving free societies that replace

hatred with hope.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to offer an overview of the current mission of

the men and women of the State Department—a mission that we have called transformational diplomacy.

A NEW DIPLOMACY FOR A TRANSFORMED WORLD

In his second inaugural address, President Bush laid out the vision that leads

America into the world: ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to seek and support

the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture,

with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’’

The President’s vision stems from the recognition that we are living in an extraordinary time, one in which centuries of international precedent are being overturned.

The prospect of violent conflict among great powers is more remote than ever.

States are increasingly competing and cooperating in peace, not preparing for war.

Peoples in China, India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil are lifting their countries and regions to new prominence. Democratic reform has begun in the Middle

East. And the United States is working with our democratic partners in every region of the world, especially our hemispheric neighbors and our historic treaty allies

in Europe and Asia, to build a true form of global stability: A balance of power that

favors freedom.

At the same time, other challenges have assumed new urgency. The greatest

threats today emerge more within states than between them, and the fundamental

character of regimes matters more than the international distribution of power. It

is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development goals, and our democratic ideals in today’s world. Our diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together.

So I would define the objective of transformational diplomacy this way: To work

with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves

responsibly in the international system. This is a strategy rooted in partnership, not

paternalism—in doing things with other people, not for them. We will use America’s

diplomatic power and our foreign assistance to help foreign citizens better their own

lives, build their own nations, transform their own futures, and work with us to

combat threats to our common security, including the spread of weapons of mass

destruction.

PRACTICING TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Faced with such extraordinary challenges, we must transform old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes, and we must empower our people to practice transformational diplomacy. With the generous support of the Congress, my

good friend and predecessor, Colin Powell, brought American diplomacy into the

21st century. Now, my leadership team and I are building on this strong foundation

and beginning the generational work of transforming the State Department. This

will not only strengthen national security, it will improve our fiscal stewardship. We

are committed to using American taxpayers’ dollars in the most effective and responsible way possible to strengthen America’s mission abroad.

In the past year, we have begun making changes to our organization and our operations that will enable us to advance transformational diplomacy. We are forwarddeploying our people to the cities, countries, and regions where they are needed

most. We are starting to move hundreds of diplomats from Europe and Washington

to strategic countries like China, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. We are giving

more of our people new training and language skills to engage more effectively with

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foreign peoples. We are enabling our diplomats to work more jointly with America’s

service men and women. And I have announced that I am creating a new position

of Director of Foreign Assistance. This reform will transform our capability to use

foreign assistance more efficiently and more effectively to further our foreign policy

goals, to bolster our national security, to reduce poverty, and to improve people’s

lives around the world.

We are making the initial changes using our existing authority, and the additional funding we are requesting in the FY 2007 budget will help us continue implementing our vision to transform the State Department to meet the challenges of the

21st century. For this purpose, we are requesting $9.3 billion for State Department

operations.

Transformational diplomacy begins with our people—ensuring that they are in the

right places, with the necessary tools and training to carry out their mission. We

are requesting $23 million for 100 new positions on the new frontlines of our diplomacy: Key transitional countries and emerging regional leaders in Africa, Latin

America, the Middle East, and Asia. These new positions will complement the 100

that we are already repositioning as part of our ongoing effort to change our global

diplomatic posture. This repositioning effort will require a renewed commitment to

secure and modernize our many posts overseas, and we are seeking $1.5 billion for

security-related construction and rehabilitation of our diplomatic facilities.

In addition to requesting new positions, we will continue to invest in our people,

our greatest resource. More and more, we are calling upon our diplomats to leave

their families and serve at unaccompanied ‘‘hardship posts’’ that now make up 20

percent of our yearly overseas assignments. With your help, as part of our effort to

modernize the Foreign Service, we will institute a new pay-for-performance system

that fairly compensates our men and women working abroad. We will also further

our efforts to train America’s diplomats to speak critical languages like Chinese,

Urdu, and Arabic, which they will increasingly need, in addition to more traditional

languages, as they progress in their careers. New training will also make full use

of dynamic new technologies, and we are asking for $276 million to integrate our

workforce with the latest information technology and to support professional training needed for success.

These new tools and training will better enable our Nation’s diplomats to tell

America’s story to the people of the world, and in turn, to listen to the stories they

have to tell. We have heard the legitimate criticisms that have been made of our

public diplomacy, and we are rethinking how we do business. I have stressed that

public diplomacy is the responsibility of every single member of our diplomatic

corps, not just our public diplomacy specialists. One idea we are beginning to implement is the creation of forward-deployed, regional public diplomacy centers. These

centers, or media hubs, will be small, lean operations that work out of our embassies or other existing facilities, enabling us to respond quickly to negative propaganda, to correct misinformation, and to explain America’s policies and our principles. The $351 million that we seek will be essential for us to continue revitalizing

our public diplomacy.

To complement our public diplomacy, we must ensure that America remains a

welcoming place for all tourists, students, and businesspeople, while at the same

time protecting our homeland from terrorists and criminals who would exploit our

open society to do us harm. The State Department, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, has taken new steps in the past year to realize the

President’s vision of secure borders and open doors through information technology.

Our request of $1.1 billion will fund the Border Security Program and enable us to

hire 135 new consular officers and passport staff to meet the growing demand of

foreign citizens seeking to travel to America, while maintaining our fundamental

commitment to serve each and every American citizen when they go abroad. At the

same time, we are seeking $474 million to support our educational and cultural exchanges, which increase mutual understanding between our citizens and the peoples

of the world.

Finally, we must continue to enable our Nation’s diplomats to work effectively

with their partners in the United Nations and other international organizations. We

seek $1.6 billion to fund U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions to international

organizations. The United States takes our international obligations seriously, and

we remain committed to strengthening the financial stability, efficiency, and effectiveness of international organizations.

DEFEATING TERROR AND ADVANCING LIBERTY

The President’s FY 2007 budget will help prepare the men and women of the

State Department to meet the goals of transformational diplomacy. Our principal

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objectives are to stem the tide of terrorism and to help advance freedom and democratic rights.

We are requesting $6.2 billion to strengthen the coalition partners who are standing shoulder to shoulder with us on the front lines in the fight against terrorism.

Our assistance empowers our partners to practice more effective law enforcement,

police their borders, gather and share essential intelligence, and wage more successful counterterrorism operations. In many states, our assistance will also help to bolster thriving democratic and economic institutions reducing the societal schisms

that terrorists exploit for their own ideological purposes. Our FY 2007 request includes, among others, $739 million for Pakistan, $560 million for Colombia, $154

million for Indonesia, $457 million for Jordan, and $335 million for Kenya.

Essential to winning the war on terrorism is denying our enemies the weapons

of mass destruction that they seek. Our diplomacy cannot focus on nonproliferation

alone; we must also develop new tools and new policies of counterproliferation: Actively confronting and rolling up the global networks involving rogue states, outlaw

scientists, and black-market middlemen who make proliferation possible. We are

building on the achievements of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G–8 Global

Partnership, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. We are working to stop

Iran and North Korea from succeeding in their quest for weapons of mass destruction, and we continue to do everything in our power to deny terrorists access to the

world’s most dangerous weapons, including threatening conventional weapons like

MANPADS. The FY 2007 budget proposes to increase funding for our State Department’s efforts to help countries fight the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials.

These requirements are essential and immediate, but our vision must look beyond

present horizons. To defeat the threat of terrorism, we must work to build a future

of freedom and hope. As President Bush has said, in the long run, liberty and democracy are the only ideas powerful enough to defeat the ideology of hatred and violence. Freedom is on the march today all around the world, and the United States

must continue to open a path for its expansion, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In December, over 12 million Iraqi people voted in free elections for a democratic

government based on a constitution that Iraqis themselves wrote and adopted.

Through their actions, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis are demonstrating that

they support freedom and oppose terrorism. The democratic government that is taking shape in Baghdad today should support human rights, foster new opportunities

for prosperity, and give all Iraqis a stake in a free and peaceful future. It should

separate stalwart Iraqis from the purveyors of terror and chaos. Iraq is on a track

of transformation from brutal tyranny to a self-reliant emerging democracy that is

working to better the lives of its people and defeat violent extremists.

Although Iraqis are undertaking this work themselves, international assistance

remains essential to Iraq’s success. United States assistance is helping Iraqis to

build their security capabilities, empowering civil society and democratic institutions, increasing and improving the production and availability of electricity, distributing millions of new textbooks, providing access to clean water for millions of

Iraqis, and helping protect millions of Iraqi children from disease.

The President’s request of $771 million, along with the forthcoming supplemental

request, is an essential part of our National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The funding for the Department’s operations and programs is a critical counterpart to the

efforts of our troops in the field as we pursue our integrated security, economic, and

political tracks to success in Iraq. The supplemental request will fund programs that

are integral to our counterinsurgency campaign and to the operating and security

costs of our diplomatic mission, while the FY 2007 request supports capacity development essential for Iraq’s transition to self-reliance. The money requested by State

will allow us to work effectively with our Iraqi partners to advance our strategy of

‘‘Clear, Hold, Build’’—clearing areas of insurgent control, holding newly gained territory under the legitimate authority of the Iraqi Government, and building economic

infrastructure and capable national democratic institutions that are essential to

Iraq’s success.

Our work also continues in Afghanistan. After the United States, along with our

allies and friends, removed the Taliban regime, the Afghan people set out to liberate

themselves. They did so with the international community by their side. And today,

the Afghan people have achieved the ambitious vision that we all set together 4

years ago in Bonn, Germany: A fully functioning, sovereign Afghan Government.

This government was established through successful Presidential and parliamentary

elections, in which millions of men and women voted freely for the first time. Today,

Afghanistan has a democratic constitution; an emerging free economy; and a growing, multiethnic army that is the pride of the Afghan people.

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Despite this dramatic progress, there is still much hard work to be done. President Bush’s request of $1.1 billion for Afghan reconstruction, along with supplemental funding to be requested, will allow us to continue helping the people of Afghanistan meet the remaining political, economic, and security challenges they face.

With your continued support, along with help from NATO, the United Nations, and

all other contributors from the international community, we can help the Afghan

people complete their long journey toward a future of hope and freedom.

The people of Iraq and Afghanistan are helping to lead the transformation of the

Broader Middle East from despotism to democracy. This is a generational challenge,

in which elections are an important and necessary beginning. The freedom to choose

invests citizens in the future of their countries. But as President Bush has said, one

election does not establish a country as a democracy. Successful democracies are

characterized by transparent, accountable institutions of governance; a thriving civil

society that respects and protects minority rights; a free media; opportunities for

health and education for all citizens; and the official renunciation of terrorism and

ideologies of hatred. On this last point especially, we will continue to insist that the

leaders of Hamas must recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism, and work for lasting peace. Helping the nations of the Broader Middle East to make progress in

building the foundations of democratic societies is the mission of the Middle East

Partnership Initiative, for which we are seeking $120 million. We are also requesting $80 million for the National Endowment for Democracy to continue its good

work in promoting lasting democratic change all around the world.

The progress of the Broader Middle East is hopeful, but it still faces determined

enemies, especially the radical regime in Tehran. Iran is a strategic challenge to the

United States, and we have a comprehensive view of the threat that Iran poses. The

regime is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. It is a leading state sponsor of terrorism. It is working to destabilize its region and to advance its ideological ambitions. And the Iranian Government oppresses its own people, denying them basic

liberties and human rights. Through its aggressive and confrontational behavior,

Iran is increasingly isolating itself from the international community.

In recent months, U.S. diplomacy has broadened the international coalition to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and Iran’s case will soon be heard in the U.N. Security Council. Our goal now is to broaden this coalition even further, to intensify the

international spotlight and encourage our many international partners to respond

to the full spectrum of threats that the Iranian regime poses.

For our part, the United States wishes to reach out to the Iranian people and support their desire to realize their own freedom and to secure their own democratic

and human rights. The Iranian people should know that the United States fully

supports their aspirations for a freer, better future. Over the past 2 years, the Department of State has invested over $4 million in projects that empower Iranian

citizens in their call for political and economic liberty, freedom of speech, and respect for human rights. We are funding programs that train labor activists and help

protect them from government persecution. We are working with international

NGOs to develop a support network for Iranian reformers, political dissidents, and

human rights activists. We will devote at least $10 million to support these and

other programs during this year (FY 2006), and we are eager to work more closely

with Congress to help Iranian reformers build nationwide networks to support

democratic change in their country.

MEETING GLOBAL CHALLENGES

Like terrorism and nuclear proliferation, many of the greatest challenges in today’s world are global and transnational in nature. These threats breach even the

most well-defended borders and affect all nations. Today’s global threats require

global partnerships, and America’s diplomats are helping us transform our relationships with countries that have the capacity and the will to work on a global basis

to achieve common purposes—countries like India, Japan, South Korea, Australia,

El Salvador, and our allies in Europe.

One major global threat comes from disease, especially the scourge of HIV/AIDS.

This pandemic affects key productive members of societies: The individuals who

drive economies, raise children, and pass on the customs and traditions of their

countries. The United States is committed to treating people worldwide who suffer

from AIDS because conscience demands it, and also because a healthier world is a

safer world. The hallmark of our approach is the President’s Emergency Plan for

AIDS Relief. This program is the largest international initiative ever by one nation

to combat a single disease. The Emergency Plan combines our strong bilateral programs with complementary multilateral efforts to fight AIDS and other debilitating

infectious diseases through contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TuberVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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culosis, and Malaria, of which America is by far the largest contributor since the

program’s inception.

The Emergency Plan is rooted in partnership. Our approach is to empower each

nation to take ownership of its own fight against HIV/AIDS through prevention,

treatment, and care. The results to date have been remarkable. In the past 2 years,

the Emergency Plan has expanded life-extending antiretroviral treatment to 471,000

people worldwide, 400,000 of whom are located in sub-Saharan Africa. And as of last

year, the Emergency Plan has extended compassion and care to more than 1.2 million orphans and vulnerable children. The President’s 2007 budget requests $4 billion, $740 million more than this year, to continue America’s leadership in the global fight against HIV/AIDS.

The 2007 budget also includes $225 million to fight malaria, which is a major killer of children in sub-Saharan Africa. This request is part of the President’s pledge

to increase U.S. funding of malaria prevention and treatment by more than $1.2 billion over 5 years. The United States is committed to working with the international

community to increase preventive and curative programs in 15 African countries

with particularly high rates of infection by 2010. We seek to reduce malaria deaths

by 50 percent in these countries after 3 years of full implementation.

The United States is also playing a key global role in preparing for the threat

of a possible avian influenza pandemic—providing political leadership, technical expertise, and significant resources to this effort. In September 2005, President Bush

announced the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza. The

partnership, which includes 89 countries and 9 international organizations, generates political momentum and coordinating action among all partners. At the January 2006 International Pledging Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza held

in Beijing, the United States pledged $334 million in current budget authority to

protect health in the United States and around the world. The most effective way

to protect the American population from an influenza outbreak is to contain it beyond our borders. The 2007 budget provides resources to continue these activities

in countries already experiencing outbreaks of influenza and in other countries on

the cusp of infection.

Another key global challenge is to curtail the illicit drug trade and to dissolve the

relationships between narco-traffickers, terrorists, and international criminal organizations. The 2007 budget requests $722 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which advances the President’s goal of strengthening democracy, regional

stability, and economic development throughout the hemisphere. The initiative provides funding for law enforcement, security programs, and alternative livelihood assistance for those at risk from the trade of illicit narcotics.

Finally, as we transform our diplomacy to meet the increasingly global challenges

of the 21st century, the United States remains committed to putting the power of

our compassion into action wherever and whenever it is needed. In 2005, the United

States led the world with our generous emergency responses to people suffering

from unprecedented natural disasters—from the Indian Ocean tsunami, to the

earthquake in Pakistan, to the mudslides in Central America. Our swift action has

helped to provide relief, to prevent the spread of disease, and to begin restoring livelihoods and rebuilding these devastated regions. The United States remains the

world’s most generous provider of food and other emergency humanitarian assistance. Throughout the world, we are also helping refugees to return to their countries of origin. When that is not a viable option, the United States leads the international community in resettling refugees here in our Nation. The FY 2007 request

of $1.2 billion for humanitarian relief, plus $1.3 billion in food aid, will ensure that

we are prepared to extend the reach of American compassion anywhere in the

world.

THREE GOALS OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The United States will continue to build strong partnerships to meet the global

challenges that increasingly define international security in the 21st century. But

we recognize that many states cannot meet the basic responsibilities of sovereignty,

including just and effective control over their own territory. In response, the United

States must assist the world’s most vulnerable populations through our transformational diplomacy—using our foreign assistance and working with our partners

to build state capacity where little exists, help weak and poorly governed states to

develop and reform, and empower those states that are embracing political and economic freedom. These are three main goals of our country assistance programs, with

the ultimate purpose being ‘‘graduation’’ from foreign economic and governance assistance altogether. Vibrant private sectors in free, well-governed states are the surest form of sustainable development.

15

Building state capacity

We must do all we can to anticipate and prevent the emergence of failed states

that lead to humanitarian crises, serious regional instability, and havens for terror

and oppression that threaten our security. On September 11, we were attacked by

terrorists who had plotted and trained in a failed state: Afghanistan. Since then,

we have spent billions of dollars and sacrificed precious lives to eliminate the threat

and liberate the brutally repressed people of Afghanistan. We must use all the tools

and resources available not only to prevent future failed states, but to help nations

emerging from conflict and war to become responsible, democratic states.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was established

to address complex and challenging situations around the globe. Partnering with the

international community, we will help countries in crisis achieve a path to lasting

peace, good governance, and economic development. Working in conjunction with

our lead regional bureaus, our Reconstruction and Stabilization Office is already beginning to advance this mission in the field. It deployed a team to Sudan to assess

the effectiveness of our assistance programs in implementing the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement, in negotiating a political settlement in Darfur, in delivering humanitarian assistance, and in establishing security. As a result of these assessments

and planning efforts, U.S. resources have been allocated more effectively to help

people in need in Sudan. Our office has also helped the Haitian people take a decisive step toward a better future, pinpointing problems with voter registration and

the electoral council in time for them to be remedied before last week’s historic elections.

The 2007 budget proposes to strengthen this Office’s ability to lead U.S. planning

efforts for countries and regions of most concern, and to coordinate the deployment

of U.S. resources when needed. The budget proposes $75 million, including a Conflict Response Fund to build our civilian response capabilities, to prevent failing

states, and to respond quickly and effectively to states emerging from conflict

around the world. With an early and effective civilian response, we can reduce the

need for a more robust and costly military commitment by more quickly shifting responsibility for key functions to civilian actors.

Our efforts to build state capacity continue in Sudan. The need for security is of

the utmost importance to this effort, and the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA)

points the way forward. The CPA, which ended 22 years of North-South civil war

in Sudan, is the framework for resolution of conflict throughout Sudan. The CPA

created a Government of National Unity that shares power and wealth, and establishes elections at every level by 2009.

Implementing the CPA is essential to ending the genocide in Darfur. The United

States is appalled by the ongoing atrocities that have persisted in Darfur, and we

continue to lead the ongoing international effort to aid the region’s displaced people,

assisting over 1.8 million internally displaced persons and over 200,000 Sudanese

refugees in Chad. I ask for your full support of the President’s upcoming supplemental request, which will include support for the African Union and for transition

to a U.N. peacekeeping mission to bring peace to this war-torn area. We are requesting $1.1 billion in the FY 2007 budget to transition to peace in Sudan, meet

humanitarian needs, lay the foundations for economic development, and strengthen

sustainable democratic institutions.

We are also continuing to partner with the people of Haiti to advance the cause

of freedom and build lasting foundations of a democratic state. Just last week, the

people of Haiti held fair and free elections. We now look forward to working with

the citizens of Haiti, their newly elected government, and the international community to help Haiti chart a positive path of freedom and prosperity by strengthening

good governance, improving security and the rule of law, fostering economic recovery, and addressing critical humanitarian needs.

As is evident by the hard work and sacrifice of the U.N. peacekeepers in Haiti,

international peacekeeping missions carried out by the United Nations and partner

organizations are essential to creating the secure conditions conducive for democratic elections and basic state capacity. The $1.3 billion request for these efforts

worldwide is also crucial to facilitating the delivery of humanitarian relief and providing a stable political and economic environment that fosters democratic institutions and development. To continue to provide well-trained, effective peacekeepers

that understand and respect human rights, I am requesting over $100 million for

the third year of the Global Peace Operations Initiative to train and equip 75,000

troops by 2010. Current missions and capacity-building efforts increase our security

at home and provide relief to the heroic troops in our own Armed Forces.

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Helping developing states and the most vulnerable populations

Where the basic foundations of security, governance, and economic institutions

exist, the United States is advancing bold development goals. Under President

Bush, the United States has embarked on the most ambitious development agenda

since the Marshall Plan, including a new debt relief initiative, the doubling of Official Development Assistance since taking office, and funding for the international

financial institutions that is linked to performance. Development is an integral pillar of our foreign policy. In 2002, for the first time, the President’s National Security

Strategy elevated development to the level of diplomacy and defense, citing it as the

third key component of our national security. States that govern justly, invest in

their people, and create the conditions for individual and collective prosperity are

less likely to produce or harbor terrorists. American diplomacy must advance these

development principles.

U.S. development assistance focuses on building the tools for democratic participation, promoting economic growth, providing for health and education, and addressing security concerns in developing nations, while at the same time responding to

humanitarian disasters. Such investments are crucial to improving the lives of people around the world and enhancing our own national security. At the same time,

we must invest in reform in countries so that these efforts will not go to waste, but

provide both the necessary tools and the right incentives for host governments to

secure the conditions necessary for their citizens to achieve their full potential.

Relieving the burden of heavily indebted countries is essential to ending a destabilizing lend-and-forgive approach to development assistance for poorer countries

and allowing these countries to progress on the road to prosperity. At the

Gleneagles summit last July, the G–8 agreed on a landmark initiative to provide

100 percent cancellation of qualifying Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ debt obligations to the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International

Monetary Fund. U.S. leadership was instrumental in securing this agreement. We

estimate that a total of 42 countries will receive up to $60 billion in debt relief as

a result of this initiative. The budget that I present to you today fully supports the

U.S. share of the multilateral debt forgiveness provided by the G–8 proposal.

The United States and our G–8 partners went much further than relieving debt.

I ask you to go much further as well and support our Government’s commitment

for the most ambitious package for Africa ever supported by the G–8. This package

will fight malaria, HIV/AIDS, and corruption and help create an environment where

democracy and economic opportunity can flourish. Specifically, the 2007 budget supports the President’s commitment to double our assistance to Africa between 2004

and 2010. In addition, the request supports the U.S. Government’s commitment to

help African countries to build trade capacity; to educate their citizens through the

4-year, $400 million Africa Education Initiative; and to combat sexual violence and

abuse against women through a new Women’s Justice and Empowerment Initiative.

Although Africa is a focus of our efforts to reduce poverty and invest in people

and reform, it is by no means the only continent on which our resources are directed. We seek a total of $2.7 billion for Development Assistance and Child Survival and Health funds. By investing in the citizens of developing countries, we are

investing in the future of the American people.

Empowering transformational states

The final goal of our country assistance programs is to empower those states that

are governing justly and to help them address key constraints to their economic

growth and poverty reduction. The flagship of our efforts is the Millennium Challenge Account, which is helping states that are making measurable progress to

achieve sustainable development and integration into the global economy.

In 2002, in Monterrey, Mexico, the nations of the world adopted a new consensus

on how to reduce international poverty. Developed nations agreed to dramatically

increase their amount of assistance to developing countries, and developing countries committed to making progress toward good governance, economic freedom, and

an investment in the health and education of their people. In response to this

Monterrey Consensus, our administration and the Congress created the revolutionary Millennium Challenge Account, which targets billions of dollars in new development assistance to countries that meet benchmarks of political, economic, and

social development. This innovative approach partners with and invests in low and

lower middle income countries that take ownership for their own sustainable development and poverty reduction.

In the past year, we have accelerated our efforts to negotiate and sign development compacts between transformational countries and the Millennium Challenge

Corporation. To date, the MCC has identified 23 countries eligible for development

compacts, and we have approved compacts worth a total of $1.5 billion with eight

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countries: Armenia, Benin, Cape Verde, Georgia, Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua,

and Vanuatu. Nine eligible countries have prepared proposals totaling $3.1 billion,

and another six will soon submit proposals of their own. We are seeking $3 billion

of new funding in the FY 2007 budget, with the goal of approving up to 10 new compacts.

As important as our foreign assistance is, free trade is ultimately the key to every

country’s sustained development and economic growth. As the President stressed in

the State of the Union, promotion of free trade is essential to enhancing the prosperity of the American people and to supporting developing countries in their effort

to participate fully in the global economy. The Bush administration has signed or

negotiated free trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman,

Morocco, Australia, five Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic,

and most recently, Peru. Fostering free trade is a vital part of our development policy. In the past 5 years, the United States has more than doubled our investment

in helping developing countries to trade freely and competitively in the global economy. We pledged at the recent WTO ministerial in Hong Kong to increase this assistance to $2.7 billion by 2010, and our FY 2007 request for trade-related development assistance will be an important step toward that ambitious and hopeful goal.

Mr. Chairman, America’s purpose in this young century is to marry our democratic principles with our dramatic power to build a more hopeful world. Our purposes are idealistic, that is true; but our policies are realistic, and we are succeeding. President Bush and I have called upon the men and women of the State

Department to practice transformational diplomacy, and they are rising to this challenge with enthusiasm and courage. They are helping our many partners around the

world to build a future of freedom, democracy, and hope for themselves and their

families.

Realizing the goals of transformational diplomacy will require a sustained effort

over the course of a generation. Most importantly, it will require a strong partnership with the Congress. We at the Department of State will do our part to use our

existing authority to make our foreign assistance more effective and to enhance our

ability to serve as responsible stewards of the American taxpayers’ money. Our goal

in establishing the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance is a first step. We

welcome a dialog with Congress about how we can work together to improve America’s foreign assistance further, enabling us to respond more quickly and more effectively to the world’s development challenges. By making America’s foreign assistance more efficient and more effective, we will help people around the world to improve their lives, we will strengthen the hope that comes with freedom, and we will

advance our national security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Rice.

I’ll begin the questioning period. And, as I mentioned, we’ll have

a 5-minute period. And I’ll offer at least one pattern that people

might want to employ. I’m going to ask three questions, and stop,

and let you respond in that period of time.

The first deals with Iran and the possibilities that the Iranians

will not be cooperative. There has to be at least some credibility

that we and the international community could effect sanctions or

some action beyond the diplomacy in which we are now involved.

So, I want to ask you, Is there currently vigorous discussion with

potential partners in this situation—namely, China and Russia and

India, whose cooperation would be essential—at various levels of

sanctions, particular types of sanctions that might be effective, that

are least injurious to the world as a whole, but perhaps effective

with regard to leadership of Iran?

Second, we had hearings last week on reconstruction in Iraq. It

was apparent to all Senators that income for Iraq, as well as technical assistance, will be needed for several years. And it is not clear

how that is to be paid for. So, I would like for you to give some

idea as to an intermediate program of financing for reconstruction

and maybe a request for some estimate as to what other countries

in the world might be willing to contribute—a quarter, a half—or

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how, in the postwar situation, with reconstruction and the building

of a viable democracy, others may participate.

Finally, in my opening statement I went into a long history of

unfortunate cuts year by year throughout the 1990s in foreign assistance and support for the State Department and for diplomacy.

The Bush administration has asked for more money. Last year, the

Congress responded by cutting $2 billion. That was about the same

as the response of the year before. So, I’m asking, I suppose, for

how we can effect a strategy to try to bring about a better result,

because the requests that you are now making are important. The

public needs to know that, very frequently, at the end of the day,

after several weeks and months of conferences, they do not occur.

And we must be more successful.

Could you respond to these issues?

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Chairman Lugar.

First of all, on Iran, I do think we’ve made a lot of progress in

getting an international consensus. And it was a major breakthrough to have Russia and China agree that this belonged in the

Security Council. And now that it is in the Security Council, and

we have the weight of the Security Council, including the possibility of chapter 7 action, which could then give greater confidence

and greater strength to IAEA efforts. I think we have a menu now

of options that were not there when we were just in the IAEA

Board of Governors.

We are, indeed, in constant discussion with our colleagues about

the course ahead. It will not surprise you that there are differences

about when and where and how to employ sanctions, should they

be needed. The first course, I think, will be to try to get to the Security Council and remind the Iranians that they are completely

isolated. Their activities that were announced today—there are

news stories today about enrichment and reprocessing having

begun—they have now crossed a point where they are in open defiance of the international community. Under Secretary Burns will

be in Europe next week for a meeting of the G–8. He will have discussions with his counterparts. Under Secretary Joseph has had

discussions with his. And I, also, with mine.

I think we want to keep our options a bit open on what specific

measures we have to take, but let me be very clear, the international community is going to have to act, and act decisively, if

Iran is to know that there is a consequence for their open defiance

of the international community. And so, we are working on precisely that.

In the first instance, we want to look at the effect on the international community, as a whole, of any actions that we take—

economies and the like. But we also want to try and not hurt the

Iranian people. And so, I think you will see us trying to walk a fine

line in what actions we take.

As to reconstruction, I think we’ve made progress on reconstruction, although I will say that the job was much bigger than any of

us imagined, with the deteriorated state of the Iraqi infrastructure.

I think none of us knew, for instance, that when we saw Baghdad

lit up as a city, that, in fact, the country probably only had 50

percent of the generating power that it needed, but it was being

mostly given to Baghdad; the rest of the country was in darkness,

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so to speak. We’ve evened that out. That has given greater demand—there is greater demand from consumers for this.

But, in specific answer to your question, we have made a lot of

investments in the infrastructure. We think that many of them

have taken hold, but we’ve been downscaling the kinds of infrastructure projects that we have. Reconstruction with a small ‘‘r,’’

rather than with a large ‘‘R,’’ is the way that I’ve been describing

it. More in the provinces.

And one way that we intend to support the new Iraqi Government is to have these provincial teams that can marry political and

military and reconstruction expertise on a more local level. On a

more national level, we have an extensive Ministry Assistance

Team Program. We have requested funding—some in base funding

and some will come in supplemental funding—for what we would

hope would be about a 2-year program to really help stabilize these

important functions.

But I am very actively, now, working to get support from Iraq’s

neighbors and also from other countries. I might note that Germany made its first contribution to the Iraqi Reconstruction Fund.

It was a small contribution, but it was a breakthrough for Germany, and I hope we will get more support.

Finally, on foreign assistance. Senator, I think we’re just going

to have to get out there and make the argument. America wants

to be compassionate, I think. And part of this is compassion—what

we do in HIV/AIDS, what we do in malaria prevention. But we also

have to make the case to the American people that this is also

about our own security and our own safety. We know what happened when Iraq—or when Afghanistan became a failed state, and

we paid for that, and paid for that dearly, with terrorist attack

after terrorist attack, culminating in the fall of the Twin Towers

and the Pentagon on September 11. And so, I now have begun to

talk about this as national security spending, because unless states

are capable of governing themselves, governing their borders, fighting terrorism, dealing with the challenges of proliferation and terror, we will not be safer. And so, I’ve begun to talk about it in that

way, and perhaps that will resonate with the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Rice.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask permission that I be

able to submit some questions to the Secretary——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Because the time is short.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be true for each Senator, and we’ll send

those questions over for the record.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you.

Senator BIDEN. I am confused a little bit by the administration’s

policy on elections. And they think they have turned out well. I

think it’s been a near disaster. I have a series of questions relating

to that.

I’d like to start with Iran. Iran has watched North Korea cross

the same boundaries. You and the President and others have said,

‘‘We cannot accept another partial solution that does not deal with

the entirety of the problem in Korea.’’ And yet, we were told, last

year, by the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency that North

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Korea can now arm a missile with a nuclear warhead. And so,

when you talk about Iran, my question is this. Has there been—

and you would not be able to discuss it, I suspect, openly—but has

there been an analysis done as to what impact an oil embargo

would have on Iran? Not just what impact it would have on us and

other nations, but Iran is a net importer of refined oil products,

and, according to what I have read, it would have a dramatic, dramatic negative impact. And, already, Ahmadinejad is preparing his

people for the need for sacrifice. So, my question is, Has such analysis been done?

Secretary RICE. Yes. We have been looking at analyses of the full

range of potential sanctions.

Senator BIDEN. The President said, ‘‘We’re sanctioned out with

regard to Iran.’’ I think that was his quote. Are there any sanctions

of consequence on the table other than energy and the oil sector?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, we are—we have heavily sanctioned Iran, obviously, after 1979, but the—there are still some

measures that we might even be able to take on our own, and we’re

looking at those. Obviously, anything that we can do multilaterally

will be much more effective. And I think, now, with the Security

Council resolution—or Security Council venue for Iran, we will be

able to begin those discussions.

As I said to Senator Lugar, it is not easy. There is not—there is

not common view on when or how sanctions ought to be taken. But

the Iranian regime is giving the world a very good set of reasons

to take serious measures. And the more that they do, and the more

that they isolate themselves, I think, the more you will see a willingness on the international community.

If I could just say, on North Korea, I think there’s one very important difference. For a variety of reasons, North Korea is an extremely isolated state that seems to revel in its isolation. And the

Iranians have not been. They’ve been isolated from us, for a variety

of reasons, but this is a state that trades with the world, that has

the diplomatic relations with the world, that has a population that

is sophisticated, that travels. I don’t believe that the Iranians want

to endure the kind of isolation that has been attendant to the

North Korea policy.

Senator BIDEN. In your absence, I complimented you and the

President on your bringing the world together with regard to Iran.

Now, you indicated that you want to work through some of the

bureaucratic hurdles of the executive order that existed before you

came to power, and since you’ve been in power, with regard to

helping democratic movements inside Iran. You and I talked at

some length about that a few years ago, when there was a democratic movement that was alive, and when Khatami was talking

about wanting to have exchanges, everything from students on. Assuming there was such a metamorphosis again, is that something

we would find in our interest to do?

Secretary RICE. Well, I think we find it in our interest now to

try and remove these bureaucratic hurdles and to see if we can’t

engage the Iranian population. And, in some ways, you could argue

that they need it even more now, because they are being isolated

by their own regime. The regime risks—the regime’s policies risk

the total isolation of Iran, and the Iranian people shouldn’t have

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to suffer for that. And so, when I speak of these differences, you

know, we learned, a little while ago, that we were unable, for instance, to publish the works of Iranian human rights activists in

the United States because of some of our licensing requirements.

And so, we want to look at some of those issues.

Senator BIDEN. If there is any help you need from this committee

on doing away with some of the, in my view, ridiculous impediments for trying to start, at least, the exchange of ideas—I would

hope you would ask us.

My last question relates to Darfur. I’ve been meeting with NATO

officials, including the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and

his counterparts. There is a feeling within NATO, at least expressed to me, that if a country took a lead—i.e., the United

States—in moving to insert a small NATO force within existing

forces—we’re training them now—that we could have a profound

impact. Is there any intention on the part of the administration to

try to have a bridge to the United Nations taking over this process

that would involve NATO being more engaged, with actually having some small number of boots on the ground inserted within existing African Union forces now?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, the United States was the country

that first raised this in NATO. I remember raising it in NATO and

asking for NATO participation in Darfur. We now have lent a planning element, as well as some lift, to the African Union forces that

are there.

We want to continue to do this within the context of the African

Union. It is extremely important, for a variety of reasons, to have

their support and to have the African Union have the lead ownership—I’m sure you understand why—in this mission.

We are prepared to talk with our NATO counterparts about what

more we can do to support the AMIS force. It’s our view, at this

point, that shoring up the AMIS forces until we can get the U.N.

forces is a better option than trying to build three different forces—

the AMIS forces, a bridge force, and then the U.N. force. You probably know we are president of the Security Council this month in

the United Nations, and we are trying to use that presidency to get

the resolution to really get going on the peacekeeping forces.

Senator BIDEN. I’m not suggesting we build a third force. In

meeting with AU officials, I have been told that they would welcome the placement of NATO forces within AU forces, not unlike

we’re doing with Iraqi forces. And that’s what I’m talking about. I

will lay out some questions in writing for you.

Secretary RICE. Absolutely. And let me just say, we will work

with NATO to try to enhance the capability of the AMIS force until

a U.N. force can get on the ground.

Senator BIDEN. I think we have to lead that.

Secretary RICE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Secretary

Rice.

First, Mr. Chairman, I will like—and would submit additional

questions, because of our time restrictions. I would appreciate having the opportunity to do that.

22

Secretary Rice, I want to compliment you, your team. I think

during your first year at State Department you have done what

you had told a number of us when you were here before this committee a year ago, and that is to reach out to the international

community, use the State Department career foreign policy diplomatic experts in a way that enhances our country and our foreign

policy. I think you’ve done the kinds of things—at least in this Senator’s opinion, it is critically important if we, in fact, are to deal

with these great challenges that face the world—not just the

United States; these are international challenges that will require

international responses—and to build back those relationships, and

to build back those institutions and strengthen the United Nations

and strengthen the IAEA and other organizations that we are very

much part of, I think, is absolutely critical.

With that, I want to go to two general areas, back to the—to Iran

and to Hamas, and the Palestinian issue. You and I have had conversations in the past, as well as other members of this committee,

and—about the regionalization of this issue of Iran or Iraq. We now

find a new development in the Palestinian territories with a new

government being formed. Iran is in the middle of all of this, as we

know; and that further complicates your efforts. And it, I think,

gives us, also, some opportunities, as well, because it gives us opportunities to reach out and—your specific points here about the

budget request that will include focusing on young Iranians, next

generation, in the Middle East, which is absolutely, probably, is

critical to our future security, as any one thing.

There was a story in the front page of the Wall Street Journal

yesterday which you may have seen, a big, blaring headline, ‘‘Iran

Plays Growing Role in Iraq, Complicating Bush’s Strategy.’’ And if

you didn’t read it, let me just take one piece of this and then get

to a question.

Talks about, ‘‘Iran’s influence is most apparent in Iraqi politics

where a Shi’ite-dominated coalition has just nominated a Prime

Minister with very close ties to Iran, but it also emerges in many

areas of Iraq—Iraqi life that get less notice. Iranian businessmen,

for example, are some of the largest investors in restoring Iraq’s

shattered infrastructure; nonprofit groups from Iran providing

basic health services that crumbled in the chaos following the U.S.-

led invasion; Iraq’s Shi’ite media are getting training from experts

across the border in Iran.’’ And it goes into considerably more detail.

My question is this. As you reach out, and as you formulate policy and present that policy in the form of a budget and other explanations, I’d like to have you try to capsulate all of this, because

Iran is the most powerful country in the Middle East. It is the most

difficult. It, from their perspective, is sitting there with the United

States military forces on both its east and west border. Israel has

nuclear capability. Pakistan and India have nuclear capability. And

as this is all thread together in the fabric of what we’re trying to

do to sort this out, if you could talk a little bit about how we’re

dealing with all of this—I hope we are now past the Chalabi days

of relying on that crowd, or that kind of policy or direction. I note

a significant difference, too, in the IAEA, versus where we were

going into Iraq, when we essentially dismissed the IAEA and their

23

inspectors, that they didn’t know, when they were an apologist

group for the Iraqis. I hope those days are over. It appears they

are; that we’re working closely with IAEA.

And then I’m going to top it off with this question. This is an

open hearing. I recognize that. And we’ll probably have to take this

up in a closed hearing, or at least in closed conversation, about any

efforts to try and deal with the Iranians in an off-channel way. I

am aware that an initiative was made in 2003 to the Iranians by

this Government. And tell us what you can about that; not necessarily the 2003, but any initiative for the United States to be engaging the Iranians in some way—not negotiating, not diplomatic

recognition. But I don’t see, Madam Secretary, how things are getting better. I think things are getting worse. I think they’re getting

worse in Iraq. I think they’re getting worse in Iran. I hope the

Hamas development will start to develop in a different direction.

But we are now at a point where sanctions, for example—Senator

Biden asked the question—consequences. Have we thought through

consequences of sanctions? What are we doing about sanctions?

Have we thought through why that would even be a feasible option?

Now, I’ve thrown a lot at you, but you like it that way, because

you can pick and choose and not answer some of the things.

[Laughter.]

But I would appreciate getting a broader sense of this, because

I do think it’s all connected.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

I do think your analysis that this is all connected is exactly right.

Iran is, through its policies in the Middle East, probably our biggest strategic challenge as a single country, because Iran is pursuing policies in the Middle East that are 180 degrees counter to

the kind of Middle East that we would build. You have to look only

at their support for Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, their, sort of,

sidekick with Syria with that relationship, even though Syria is

under deep suspicion in the international community. That relationship has grown. Certainly, we have wanted the Iranians to

have good relations with the Iraqis, their neighbors, but in a transparent way. And I think their relationships are not always transparent, because of Iranian activities, particularly in the south.

So, you are right, there are major challenges there, but I think

that we have to look at this in several bites. The first is, when we

talk about Iraq and Iranian influence in Iraq, we need to recognize

that, while there is Iranian influence in Iraq, there are also influences that are counter to that Iranian influence. And with the selection of Mr. Jaafari by the United Iraqi Alliance, the Shi’a group,

they still have to go now through a process of government formation, and, indeed, even confirmation of the Prime Minister, with a

block—or with people that are Sunni and Kurd and other movements, like the Allawi movement that won, also, large parts of the

vote. And so, there is going to have to be, now, old-fashioned politics to come to some conclusion. So, I would not overstate Iranian

influence by recognizing that it is diluted by a number of other

forces and factors that are deeply suspicious of Iranian influence

and of Iranian power.

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I would also note that in the region, if you look around the region, in the gulf countries and in other places, there is also suspicion of Iranian activities and Iranian behavior. And part of our

goal has to be to have, with others who are concerned about Iranian behavior, a kind of common dialog and discussion about how

to counter that Iranian behavior. And I’m going to go out to the

gulf next week. I expect to have some of those conversations. Because no one wants to see a Middle East that is dominated by an

Iranian hegemon, particularly one that has acquired nuclear weapons technology. And, in fact, the face of Iran now, President

Ahmadinejad, has crystalized the concern of the international community about Iran, because he speaks in blunter ways about Iranian ambitions than did prior Iranian Governments.

So, I think we have a number of levers. Leaving aside whatever

we might do in the Security Council, in terms of consequences for

Iran’s behavior, we need to think of this as a strategic approach to

many who are concerned about Iranian influence and growing Iranian influence.

Finally, let me just note that, in the long term, I think that the

Iranian geostrategic position doesn’t look all that good. If you look

at, now, a democratic Afghanistan that is, indeed, a good friend of

the United States, a democratizing Iraq that is—I think will be a

good friend of the United States, Iran finds itself in a different

geostrategic situation than it found itself just several years ago. It

will try to influence those events, it will try to influence those governments. But it’s going to have, I think, a hard time, in democratic processes, being a dominant force.

As to your question about contacts, the only contacts that have

been authorized with the Iranians for this government are for our

Ambassador in Afghanistan to have contacts with his counterpart.

We think it’s useful on counternarcotics. We think it’s useful on

issues of terrorism in Afghanistan. And so, Ron Newman is empowered to do that. Similarly, Zal—by the way Zal Khalilzad did that

when he was in Afghanistan. We do it with the United Nations. Zal

has similar guidance in Iraq. He can, as he sees fit—with guidance

from here, he can encounter and talk to his counterpart. So, that

is the way that we’re dealing with those near-term places where we

bump up against one another. I think any broader talks, I don’t

really see the point, because Iran’s policies are so belligerent and

so counter to our own that it’s difficult to see what that conversation would be about. But in terms of Iraq and Afghanistan, we do

have channels that we can use.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, the President said, during his State of the

Union Address, that we are winning in Iraq and he is confident in

his plan for victory. Unfortunately, the American people don’t

share this confidence. A recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll conducted January 26 through 29, 2006, shows that a majority of

Americans—52 percent—believe the President has failed to give

good reasons why the United States must keep troops in Iraq.

Similarly, 53 percent of Americans are less confident that Iraq will

25

come to a successful conclusion. They don’t share his confidence,

because they see what is happening on the ground. They see brave

men, like ABC’s Bob Woodruff and his cameraman, seriously injured while trying to report on, ‘‘the good news coming out of Iraq.’’

They see Jill Carroll, of the Christian Science Monitor, a young

woman who went to Iraq to tell the story of the Iraqi people, kidnaped and begging for her life, and we pray for her safe return.

And, of course, the death and the injuries keep climbing, up to

19,000 Americans either dead or wounded.

This administration’s rosy scenarios, like the VP’s statement that

the insurgency was in the last throes, your statement in 2005 that

the insurgency has been dealt several blows, just don’t match realities on the ground.

The number of attacks against coalition troops, Iraqi security

forces, and civilians increased by 29 percent last year. Let me give

you specifics. Insurgents launched 34,000-plus attacks in 2005, an

increase of 8,000 from 2004. Last year, the number of car bombs

more than doubled, from 420 to 873. The number of suicide car

bombs went from 133 to 411. Sixty-seven attackers wore suicide

vests last year, up from seven in 2004. Roadside bombs increased

from 5,000-plus to 10,000-plus.

Last week, a chart appeared in the New York Times depicting

the extent of casualties just in one month. And I just want you to

see this, because sometimes we don’t recognize what’s going on

there. More than 800 people were killed as a result of the insurgency.

And what do the Iraqi people think of all this? Sixty-four percent

of Iraqis believe that crime and violent attacks will decrease when

the United States redeploys out of Iraq. Perhaps more important,

73 percent of Iraqis believe there will be greater cooperation among

Iraq’s political factions when the United States redeploys.

So, I say to you, if we’re in Iraq to help the Iraqi people, then

we ought to start listening to the Iraqi people and start a redeployment.

Now, success in Iraq also depends greatly on the ability of our

forces to better secure Iraq’s oil infrastructure. Paul Wolfowitz told

Congress, in 2003, ‘‘We’re dealing with a country that can finance

its own reconstruction with oil, and relatively soon.’’ That was another rosy scenario. The reality is, Iraq’s oil production has dropped

from prewar levels. And I want to show you a headline from the

New York Times a little more than a week ago, ‘‘Oil Graft Fuels

the Insurgency.’’ The Iraqi Finance Minister has estimated that insurgents receive 40 to 50 percent of all oil smuggling profits in the

country. So, not only is the oil not financing the reconstruction, it

is financing the insurgency that is killing American troops.

Our main reason for going to Iraq was to get rid of the WMD,

or, as you said, ‘‘not to wait for the smoking gun to become the

mushroom cloud.’’ That was a farce. And the truth is coming out.

The CIA intelligence officer in charge of the Middle East intelligence from 2000 to 2005 wrote, ‘‘Intelligence was misused publicly

to justify decisions already made.’’

Our standing in the world is low. According to the Pew Research

Center—and the American people know it—two-thirds of Americans say there’s less international respect for the United States

26

than in the past. And when asked why, a strong majority, 7 in 10

Americans, cite, ‘‘the war in Iraq.’’ The war in Iraq is bringing our

standing down in the world. The American people are smart.

Now, you have cited elections in the Middle East as a sign that,

‘‘the neighborhood is changing.’’ But is the neighborhood changing

for the better? It doesn’t appear so. You’ve admitted to being

blindsided by the Hamas victory, saying, ‘‘I’ve asked why nobody

saw it coming. It does say something about us not having a good

pulse.’’ And I do appreciate your candor there. But this has become

a pattern. This administration was shocked by Hamas, shocked by

the election of the Iranian leader, shocked that Iraqis voted for conservative religious parties with ties to Iran instead of secular candidates like Ahmed Chalabi, whose party got not one single vote in

the Iraqi Parliament. I remember when he sat behind the First

Lady in 2004 at the State of the Union Address. This administration seems to have a tin ear when it comes to the Middle East, and

that tin ear is making us less safe.

Secretary Rice, do you really believe that elections in the Middle

East, where these kind of terrorists and extremists groups are

being chosen—and I know Senator Biden went into who they are—

do you think that’s working to the benefit of the United States?

And, in a broader sense, not just in the Middle East, but also in

places like Bolivia and Venezuela, do you agree that nations

throughout the world are electing more negative candidates who

run against America?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, if the option is not to hold elections, I think that would be a terrible——

Senator BOXER. That wasn’t my question.

Secretary RICE. Well, no, you asked, so let me answer. I think

if the option is not to hold elections and not to give people their

say, then that’s an untenable position for the United States.

Senator BOXER. That wasn’t my question.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I would like to answer your question.

Senator BOXER. Good.

Secretary RICE. Now, the Middle East. The question assumes

that there was somehow stability in the Middle East that we have

somehow disturbed, that the false stability of dictators like Saddam

Hussein, who put 300,000 people in mass graves, who twice attacked his neighbors, who used weapons of mass destruction, both

against his neighbors and against his own population, that that

false stability was preferable to the admittedly difficult course that

the Iraqi people are now set on to try to learn to deal with their

differences by compromise and politics rather than by repression.

It assumes that it was preferable for the Palestinian people to live

under the regime of Yasser Arafat, which was a regime of extraordinary corruption, and, indeed, incapable of governing the Palestinian territories in a way that spoke to the aspirations of the Palestinian people. It assumes that it was better for Syrian occupation

of Lebanon to continue for more than 30 years, Syrian occupation

that was——

Senator BOXER. Madam Secretary, could I——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. May I complete my answer?

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Just interrupt——

Secretary RICE. May I just complete my answer?

27

Senator BOXER [continuing]. In a very positive way for you?

Secretary RICE. May I just complete my answer?

Senator BOXER. Well, no, because you are not answering the

question.

Secretary RICE. No, Senator. You asked me if I thought that the

world was better now, and I’m telling you that I think it is.

Senator BOXER. Well, I asked you exactly this. Are these elections that have been held, and the people that have been elected,

including the leader of Iran—what is happening in Israel in the

Palestinian side—I am asking you—Venezuela, Bolivia—they

seem——

Secretary RICE. And, Senator——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. To elect——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I’m answering the question.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Anti-American candidates, is that

working to the benefit of America?

Secretary RICE. Senator——

Senator BOXER. I’m not asking you the——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Senator——

Senator BOXER [continuing]. Benefit of anybody else.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I have to answer in the following way.

Your question assumes that, had we not had elections, for instance,

in Lebanon, where, indeed, Hezbollah won some seats, that the

Lebanese people would be——

Senator BOXER. That wasn’t——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Better off.

Senator BOXER [continuing]. My question.

Secretary RICE. Or multicandidate elections in Egypt. Yes, I

think that the elections have made the world, in a transitional

state, a better place. And the United States is standing for its principles, which is that the people of the Middle East, the people of

Latin America, ought to be able to choose their leaders.

Now, there are times when elections turn out in ways that we

would prefer that they did not. Clearly, the election of Hamas is

a difficult moment in the prospects for peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis. But the Palestinian people got a chance to

go to the polls and express their desire for change. They have done

so. And now the international community will hold Hamas responsible for the policies that it undertakes. And I believe, as the Quartet does, that Hamas will have one choice, which is to make a

choice to recognize the right of Israel to exist, to renounce violence,

and to engage in a process that will lead to a two-state solution.

In sum, Senator, when you have dealt with a Middle East that

for 60 years had a freedom deficit, for 60 years where the United

States turned a blind eye to the authoritarianism that was there,

it is not surprising that perhaps the best-organized parties were

extremist parties. But that isn’t a reason to despair that elections

have happened in the Middle East. It’s not a reason to despair that

the people of the Middle East have had an opportunity to express

themselves. It is a call to work harder for the development of civil

society, to work harder for the development of political parties that

can occupy the middle. But I would not change a policy that affirms America’s belief that people ought to have a right to choose.

28

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I just must say one—wrap this

up this way.

I asked you, Do you agree that nations throughout the world are

electing more negative candidates who run against America? OK,

your answer is, ‘‘Elections are great, and anyone who thinks that

the world isn’t better somehow doesn’t want elections.’’ I just want

to say, because you attributed, in an oblique way to me, the fact

that I thought the status quo was wonderful, is incorrect. You

never answered this. And as we sit here today, American businesses are being burned down. Burned down. The Pew has just

done a poll indicating that our standing in the world has never

been lower. If you think this is good for America, that is fine. But

I would say we need to do better. We need to get our message

across. We need to have the people in these countries feeling good

toward America and electing candidates that feel good about America, not candidates that stand up and say, ‘‘Death to America,’’ and

‘‘America is the Satan.’’ And then we say, ‘‘Oh, this is better’’?

So, I think there is a disconnect here, Mr. Chairman. And I hope

that we will, in fact, change some of our policies so that we don’t

see that these elections keep electing people whose—who run on

these anti-American platforms. It doesn’t make us safer. And I’m

concerned about our people.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, it assumes that the Middle East

was safer when ideologies of hatred produced people that flew airplanes into our buildings on 9/11. The fact is that what we are

reaping now is policies—the implications and outcomes of policies

that for 60 years denied freedom in the Middle East. And we’re just

now on a path beginning to acknowledge and affirm the right of the

people of the Middle East to have freedom.

Yes, there are going to be some outcomes that are not perfect,

from the American point of view. But I don’t think that our policy

can be, ‘‘You can only have elections if you plan to elect American—or candidates that are friendly to America.’’

Senator BOXER. No one’s suggested that, either.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.

With the cooperation of the committee, I would note that a

quorum is present, and the committee will take a short recess to

hold a business meeting.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Secretary for this recess. We will

now resume the hearing, and I will call upon Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Chairman Lugar. And welcome,

Secretary Rice.

Following up on some of the conversations just taking place, if—

one of the ramifications of these elections and democracies is that

we don’t talk to the winners; and that, I see as a problem, if we

are not happy with the result. So, now we have—we’re not talking

to the Iranians, we’re not going to talk to Hamas, we’re not talking

with the Venezuelans, we won’t talk with the Bolivians. So, my

question is, Do we support the delay of elections in Egypt? And if

the Muslim Brotherhood were successful—if we do support those

elections, and the Muslim Brotherhood are successful, will we not

talk with Egypt?

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

29

Just let me note that we, of course, have a mission in Venezuela,

and an Ambassador there who engages the Venezuelan Government very often and at many different levels. In terms of Bolivia,

the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs went to

the inauguration of Mr. Evo Morales. And so I would just note that

we do talk to these people.

Where it comes to Iran, I would not put the Iranian election in

the same category with elections that have been held in other

places, because, of course, the Guardian Council decided who could

run in that election, and then they held elections. I think calling

that an election stretches the term in the way that we think about

it.

As to Egypt, no, we are disappointed that the elections have been

postponed in Egypt. The Egyptians have said that this is because

the municipalities were not ready to carry out elections, that the

lists were not prepared, and so forth. But we are going to continue

to press for the forward march of democratic values and democracy

in Egypt. The multicandidate Presidential elections and parliamentary elections that were carried out, while not perfect, did change

the composition of the Egyptian Government, the parliamentary

elections, in a substantial way. It has been our policy—because the

Muslim Brotherhood, as a party, is not legal in Egypt—to respect

the laws of Egypt. I do think that, as elections go forward in these

countries, that we are reaching out, within legal constraints, to the

broadest possible range of candidates.

Now, Hamas is in a different category. And I know you didn’t ask

about Hamas, specifically, but let me just mention, Hamas is a terrorist group. We have listed it as a terrorist group. We don’t have

discussions with terrorists. It is our hope that Hamas will take the

signals from the international community that it is not acceptable

to say that you want a peaceful life and then refuse to recognize

the partner; and that is Israel. But we will not have contacts with

Hamas, because we list it as a terrorist group. But there are any

number of countries where we find the government with policies

with which we do not particularly agree, with which we have contact, and intend to continue to.

Senator CHAFEE. OK. We can argue about our level of our contact with these countries, whether it’s Venezuela or Bolivians, but

there’s no doubt we’re not talking to the Iranians, no doubt we’re

not talking with Hamas. And now my next question is, Considering

our deep involvement in the Arab world, where does peace between

the Israelis and Palestinians rank in our—in your national foreign

policy priorities? And just recently, regarding the elections of

Hamas, Dennis Ross, who was our lead negotiator for 12 years in

the Middle East, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, said, ‘‘We had so many opportunities to stop this.’’ And

former President Bush, George H.W. Bush, envoy John Wolf concurred in this sentiment. So, why didn’t we take advantage of these

opportunities?

Secretary RICE. Well, I don’t know anybody who worked harder

to try and work with the Palestinian Authority to help it

reform——

Senator CHAFEE. First of all, where does it rank in our priorities?

30

Secretary RICE. It ranks extremely high, and certainly in the top

very few things. I probably spend more time on this issue than almost any other. You know that I have been to the region several

times. You know that I, personally, engaged to negotiate the Rafah

movement and access agreement. And so——

Senator CHAFEE. But you’ll argue—you won’t argue that whatever has happened has been disastrous. We have a terrorist organization winning elections.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I agree that this is a difficult moment for the peace process, but if Hamas will take the signals

being given it by the international community as to what it will

take to govern, it could, in fact, be a more positive development.

I would also note, Senator, that, in this same period of time, the

Israelis are now completely out of Gaza, out of four settlements in

the West Bank, and have begun to dismantle outposts. So, these

are——

Senator CHAFEE. All very well and good, but Hamas has just won

these elections. And Dennis Ross and John Wolf had said we

missed opportunities. Do you disagree with that?

Secretary RICE. Actually, Senator, I don’t think that the United

States of America is responsible for the election of Hamas. No; I

don’t. I think the—what has happened in the Palestinian

territories——

Senator CHAFEE. Dennis Ross and John Wolf are wrong.

Secretary RICE. Well, I don’t know precisely what they said. I’m

going to see Dennis tomorrow, so I can ask him precisely what he

said. But my——

Senator CHAFEE. He’ll probably say the summer of 2003, after

the fall of Saddam—let me finish——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. When Abu Mazen was elevated to

Prime Minister, and there was a hudna, a cease-fire, for that whole

summer, nothing was done. John Wolf was the envoy, and he said

nothing was done to back up our commitments. And then, again,

another opportunity, death of Yasser Arafat. Again, Abu Mazen

elevated to Prime Minister—President.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I just——

Senator CHAFEE. And——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I just——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. That’s the whole summer—that

whole year——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Senator, I just——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. Of 2005——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I just beg to disagree.

Senator CHAFEE. Nothing was done.

Secretary RICE. I just——

Senator CHAFEE. Nothing was done.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I’m sorry——

Senator CHAFEE. Opportunities missed.

Secretary RICE. I’m sorry, Senator——

Senator CHAFEE. And now we have——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I just disagree.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. A very, very disastrous situation of

a terrorist organization winning elections.

31

Secretary RICE. Senator, I just——

Senator CHAFEE. That’s what——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Beg to differ.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. That’s what Dennis Ross will say

tomorrow——

Secretary RICE. Well——

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. When you meet with him.

Secretary RICE. I will ask him. But I have to say that people

have been trying to make peace in the Middle East for a long time,

including Dennis—and, of course, couldn’t do it. And one reason

that it wasn’t possible when——

Senator CHAFEE. It was never this bad.

Secretary RICE. Well, we did have the 4 years of the intifada,

which was pretty bad. A lot of Israelis died, a lot of Palestinians

died. And so, we do have, now, a period in which Israelis have

withdrawn from the Gaza, and the Palestinians have the ability to

govern the Gaza, if they can. We have a situation in which they’re

withdrawing from parts of the West Bank. We have an agreement

on movement and access for the Palestinian people, so that they

can access the international border that is Rafah. There has been

some progress.

But as to the ability to deliver a two-state solution, Senator, people have been trying for a long time. And the one thing that has

changed—and, I think, changed for the better—is that the Yasser

Arafat regime, which was corrupt and which was self-serving and

which did not have the aspirations of the Palestinian people at its

core—is now gone. What we witnessed in the victory of Hamas is

a backlash against its residual, Fatah, which was also corrupt.

And let me just say, Abu Mazen tried to do some good things.

They reformed the Finance Ministry under Salam Fayyad. They

did try to do some good things. The relations with Israel improved.

They were able to deliver some goods for the people. But, ultimately, the Palestinian people voted for change, because the Fatah

did not change quickly enough. That’s the reason for Hamas’s victory. And now, it is our hope that Hamas, having to govern, will

understand what the international community has said to them.

Senator CHAFEE. And we should get ready for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, also.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, again, I think that the option of

not giving people a choice in who will govern them is just one that

the United States of America can’t stand for. We’re dealing with 60

years of policies in the Middle East, not 5. We’re dealing with policies in the Middle East that created a freedom deficit. We’re dealing with policies in the Middle East that supported authoritarian

governments that then closed off legitimate political space for political parties to develop. And it is, perhaps, too much to expect that

you are going to have, after a change in that policy, those political

parties develop overnight. I, nonetheless, would rather go through

a transition in places like Lebanon and even the Palestinian territories, certainly Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places, than to rest

my hope for security in the false stability of authoritarian governments and dictatorships that cut off any opportunity for the people

of the Middle East to legitimately express their views and their

choices.

32

Senator CHAFEE. Well, I agree with you, and I would wish that

these elections would go toward more peaceful——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. Advocating candidates. And that’s

our difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I really didn’t expect to say anything on this subject at all, but

I just wanted to pick up very quickly on what Senator Chafee said.

Holding elections themselves, Madam Secretary, doesn’t mean

you have a democracy. An election does not mean democracy. And

there was great intense desire on the part of Israel, as well as

President Abbas, not to have that election at that period of time.

And it was our insistence that the Palestinians proceed forward.

I happen to agree with the position that you can’t deal with

Hamas. I mean, I think that’s absolutely correct. You can’t sit

down with people, negotiate water rights and moving across the

borders and all the other things, and people are blowing you up at

the same time. So, I agree with that. But there really is a serious

question here about the overall approach.

I met with President Abbas the day he was elected—January, a

year ago—and he looked at me, and he said, ‘‘Senator, I know what

the expectations are, but I don’t have the capacity, I don’t have police cars, I don’t have radios, I don’t have trained people, I don’t

have the ability to do what they expect of me, and I need help.’’

And I’ve talked to Jim Wolfenson, as have others, and a lot of other

people. And the bottom line is, I regret to say, the West—not just

us—the West didn’t come through. And Hamas had a greater ability to deliver in the streets a year and half ago than Fatah. Now,

Fatah had its corruptions. We all understand that. But I believe

that there is a measure of responsibility for the West’s lack of adequate response with respect to trying to help. We’re not responsible

for the outcome, but we certainly are responsible for our actions in

between.

What I want to ask you—a number of questions, one about Iraq

and—a couple about Iraq. But, before I do, we learned, last week,

that Lewis ‘‘Scooter’’ Libby authorized—was authorized by his superiors—reportedly, Vice President Cheney; we don’t know the answer—to leak classified information from the prewar national intelligence estimate on Iraq to the press in the summer of 2003. And

my question is, Are you aware of any authorized leaks of classified

information, or anyone instructing someone to leak classified information, to members of the press?

Secretary RICE. Senator, this question has arisen in the context

of a legal issue and an investigation, and I’m just not going to comment on anything related to the case of Scooter Libby.

Senator KERRY. Well, can you tell us whether or not you have

personally ever authorized the leak of classified information to any

members of the press?

Secretary RICE. Senator, this question, again, arises in the context of the Scooter Libby case——

33

Senator KERRY. No, that arises in the context of your responsibilities within the White House at any time, or now. Have you ever

authorized the leak of classified information to the press?

Secretary RICE. I’m not going to talk about something that arises

in the context of an investigation in a case. I have always acted

lawfully within my duties as National Security Advisor and now as

Secretary of State.

Senator KERRY. Let me ask you this question. Do you support the

practice of authorizing individuals to leak classified information to

the press?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I believe that the protection of classified

information is one of our highest duties. I have always endeavored

to protect classified information and to make certain that, if classified information is going to be used in any way, that procedures

were followed, including procedures for making certain that the intelligence agencies were comfortable, or had agreed, that such information could be declassified. So——

Senator KERRY. So, you do not support it?

Secretary RICE. I’ve always followed the rules.

Senator KERRY. You do not support the leaking.

Secretary RICE. I believe that the protection of classified information is our highest—one of our highest duties.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

The other day, General Kimmett, Mark Kimmett, gave a speech

in London to the Institute of Strategic Studies wherein he reportedly said, ‘‘The United States will not maintain any long-term

bases in Iraq. Our position is, when we leave, we won’t leave any

bases there.’’ I wrote to General Pace to follow up on this, and General Pace wrote me back and said, ‘‘At present, the Department of

Defense has no plans for the permanent basing of U.S. forces in

Iraq.’’

This has long been an issue of contention. So, you know, General

Casey has said, ‘‘The sense of American occupation is part of what

feeds the insurgency.’’ The administration, however, has never formally said, ‘‘We’re not going to have permanent bases.’’

So, I would ask you today, Is it, in fact, the policy of this administration not to have permanent basing in Iraq?

Secretary RICE. I think General Pace has spoken to that, Senator, and he speaks for the administration.

Senator KERRY. So——

Secretary RICE. Senator, our job now is to use our forces to help

the Iraqis gain control of their own security environment, to train

their forces, to protect our people who need to go out in the field

to be a presence outside of Baghdad. That is the purpose of our

forces. As the President said, we don’t want to be there one day

longer than we need to be.

Senator KERRY. I understand that. No, and we all want that

transition. I’m just trying to figure out what the long term is, because I don’t think the administration has actually said that before

with clarity. So, if you are affirming, today, what the generals have

said as the policy, that’s a step forward.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, I think General Pace has spoken

to this. I don’t want to, in this forum, try and prejudge everything

that might happen all the way into the future. The policy of this

34

administration is to, as quickly as possible, turn over responsibility

for security to the Iraqis. And, as the President said, we will be

very pleased the day when American forces can come home.

Senator KERRY. So, the conclusion from what you’ve just said is

that the civilian leadership, which is how we lead the military in

the United States, has a different position from the uniformed leadership, which is, you’re reserving the right to make that decision

in the future.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I said I am not going to try to speak to

something that is that far into the future.

Senator KERRY. I heard what you said. I understand.

Secretary RICE. We are——

Senator KERRY. No, I——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. For instance——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Understand.

Secretary RICE. Yes, sorry.

Senator KERRY. I got your answer.

Finally, last area, because I know the light’s going on here. When

I was in Iraq a few weeks ago, I had a good meeting—I thought

it was a good meeting—with Abdul Aziz al Hakim. And he made

it pretty clear to me in that meeting that the SCIRI party had no

intention of changing the constitution, that they might accept some

so-called technical ministerial people in a couple of the key Ministries—Interior, Defense, Finance. But nobody, not even the Ambassador, who is very skilled and who we all have great respect for,

was able to identify who those people might be. Now, given alJaafari’s ratification as the new Prime Minister again, in a very,

very divided vote, and one that sends shivers through the Sunni,

can you tell us what is happening with respect to the efforts to leverage a real political reconciliation that, in fact, delivers to the

Sunnis sufficient guarantees that will undermine support for the

insurgency? Because every military leader has made it clear that

this insurgency does not get resolved at the barrel of a gun; it will

be resolved only through the political settlement. And the prospects

of that settlement, given what has happened already in this choice,

and the problems with Mr. Allawi’s party and their being left out,

et cetera, leaves major, major questions on the table. Could you

walk us through that a bit, please?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, I wouldn’t draw any conclusions

just yet as to the work that still remains for Mr. Jaafari and others

in bringing others onboard so that, in fact, they can govern. I

would remind that the Shi’a alliance does not have a majority. It,

therefore, has to form a broad national unity government, bringing

other parties in, even if the Shi’a alliance holds together. So, I

think they have a ways to go yet.

Senator KERRY. But you’d agree with me that the key to that national unity government, which we all understand is key——

Secretary RICE. Oh, of course.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. And we accept that——

Secretary RICE. It’s absolutely key——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. Is to get those ministries filled with

the proper people and to change the constitution.

Secretary RICE. It is, and it’s also very important that the Sunnis

have wanted some changes to the constitution. That is certainly

35

something that will need to happen. But I would let the Iraqi political process play out for a while here. There is a lot of politics still

to be done to bring together a coalition. We keep talking as if Mr.

Jaafari is the only issue here. He’s not.

Senator KERRY. No, I understand that.

Secretary RICE. He cannot govern without bringing others onboard. And so, I’m quite sure that there will be many demands

from others as to what happens now, going forward. That, indeed,

is the nature of politics.

Senator KERRY. But the fundamental division of federalism,

which is a SCIRI party goal, major goal, with major political ambitions attached to it, versus a national, ‘‘unity,’’ is a real—that’s a

big tension.

Secretary RICE. Of course it’s a tension, Senator. There are tensions in any political system. You know, our own political life

began by being, unfortunately, unable, for a number of years, to resolve the issue of slavery. We, nonetheless, managed to create ourselves as a union. I don’t think the Iraqis have anything quite that

bad yet on their plate. And so, I would say let’s let this maturing

political system now deal with the various tensions within it concerning what will happen about federalism, what will happen to

changes in the constitution. These are precisely the discussions

that are going to have to go on for Mr. Jaafari or whoever becomes

Prime Minister to form a national unity government. Yes; we do

know some of the people that are being considered for key posts.

I think, obviously, we want to reserve those discussions for the

Iraqis rather than publicly talking about their own process of government formation. But we’re very involved in helping them to

work through this extremely difficult period.

But this is the core of their politics right now. So far, they have

demonstrated a capacity to get through every single phase together

rather than split apart. They did get through the writing of a constitution together rather than splitting apart. And I think they will

continue to, because that’s what the political context is.

Senator, if I may just very briefly, though, on the elections, because I agree with you, elections don’t mean democracy. I’ve never

yet, however, seen a democracy begin without an election. And so,

we shouldn’t underestimate the importance of elections. What it

means is that in our policies we have to work harder to help develop civil society and moderate political forces into political parties. That can’t happen in an authoritarian environment. The notion that you can somehow have the practices of democracy underneath an authoritarian regime so that then when you have an election you have all of these well-developed parties that can compete,

I think, is just not logical. So, yes; I think you have to take, if you

will, the opportunity for an election to stimulate the political system, then to begin the process of building a full-fledged democracy.

As I said, elections don’t mean democracy, but I’ve never seen

one begin without an election.

Senator KERRY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comment.

Actually, the American democracy began with a revolution, not an

election. And——

Secretary RICE. Yes, they held an election.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. The fact is——

36

Secretary RICE. Fairly soon afterward, I believe——

Senator KERRY [continuing]. I understand. But it began——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Senator, and that’s when democracy

really began.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. With a revolution. Ultimately, we

had a civil war to resolve the issue of slavery, and there are many

people who argue that Iraq is already in a low-intensity civil war.

And if you don’t resolve the differences in this constitution, it will

get worse.

So, my point, Mr. Chairman, is simply that there are a lot of

players over there, and a lot of others, who do not see the pieces

of the political pie—can we get there? I believe we can. I think Senator Biden—there’s a lot of us who have felt—and we’ve sort of

stuck with this concept that success is critical. There’s a way to get

there.

Senator BIDEN. I think we’re getting beyond it.

Senator KERRY. But there are a lot of people who feel that opportunity after opportunity to realistically deal with that is just being

obliterated and ignored.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I would just urge a little patience with

the Iraqis. That was my point about the American democracy, is

it took us a while to work some of these issues out. I don’t think

the Iraqis are headed toward a civil war.

Senator KERRY. You say a little patience. The American people

have already sustained a war that has gone on longer than World

War II, longer than it took us to beat the axis powers, and have

invested in ultimately what will be up to $300 billion, and some

say $1⁄2 trillion before we finish. That’s pretty patient.

Secretary RICE. The Iraqis have been at the process of government formation for 1 year. That is really not very long——

Senator KERRY. The only point——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. In history.

Senator KERRY [continuing]. I’m making, Madam Secretary——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. They had to overthrow, Senator, a

brutal dictator. And, yes; they’ve had to learn the patterns of coming to terms with each other politically rather than through violence. And that takes some time.

Senator KERRY. All I point to are the fundamentals. And if the

fundamentals remain as divided as they are—and growing worse,

not better—we have a problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, maybe, it’s the beauty of America that we’re so strong,

we’re so rich, and we’re so powerful that there’s a sense if we just

did a little more, people would elect folks that, you know, we’d like

a little more. I would maintain that—again, the election of Hamas

is a horrible—it’s outrageous, and we have to deal with that, but

that—the failure of leadership is Abu Mazen. Failure is failure to

deal with corruption. And, you know, the democracy is a messy

thing. And I paraphrase Churchill. It’s the worst form of government, a messy form of government, but a far cry better than anything else. I think there is a fundamental question that’s being

asked here. Do we continue to support leadership that rejects, igVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
37

nores, the will of the people, or do we move forward with the democratic process? I would hope we would continue to have the courage

to move forward with the democratic process, because I agree with

your sentiments, Madam Secretary, that you can’t develop a rule

of law and civil society in oppressive regimes. And so, these are

some messy times now, but, goodness gracious, I appreciate your—

you disabusing us of the notion that somehow they were the halcyon days of intifada and Arafat, of Saddam, of Khomeini and the

Taliban. That just wasn’t the case. It’s tough today, but it was

downright brutal and ugly awhile ago.

If I can just shift gears, focus a little bit on one of my favorite

subjects: U.N. reform. One of the issues, the areas where there appears to be some movement, but an area of concern, is the Human

Rights Commission. Clearly, the reform movement has not taken

hold to the degree that we would like, but there is some progress.

I think Ambassador Bolton is doing an outstanding job. My concern

is, in particular, regarding the Human Rights Commission. We’re

still at a stage right now where we don’t have criteria for membership. Some of the things on the table would not allow for continuous membership. So, we would be off again, and we wouldn’t be

part of this body. And then, from everything that I’ve seen on the

table, we’re still facing the situation where Israel is the only nation

that’s still out of the process. Even in the Human Rights Council,

they’re still—the absurdity of our democratic ally in the Middle

East not even being part of the process.

Do we have some bottom lines, in terms of the Human Rights

Commission? Are we just going to accept, you know, something

transformed that keeps us out at some point, that doesn’t have criteria, and that continues to block out Israel? Or are we going to

say we’re—we want a Human Rights Council, but it’s got to be the

right kind of Human Rights Council?

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

We do not want just any Human Rights Council. We certainly

want something that is far better than the Human Rights Commission, which we are, thankfully, abolishing, a commission that once

had Sudan as its chair, when Sudan was under the sanction for

genocide, so—a finding of genocide.

We are working very closely. I talked to Kofi Annan about it

when he was down. I think people understand that this needs to

be a different kind of body. We have, for instance, proposed that

it should not be possible to serve on the Human Rights Council

while you’re under sanctions for terrorism or for human rights

abuses. This seems, to us, a rather self-evident matter. But it isn’t

a terribly popular position, it turns out. So, we will work with others to try and achieve some standards and some criteria that make

it possible to say that this Human Rights Council actually has

some standing to look at issues of human rights. No, Senator, we

don’t want just any Human Rights Council.

Senator COLEMAN. Well, I appreciate that. And, again, the issue

with Israel, and the United Nations has made some——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Reform there. They’ve recognized

the Holocaust. They’re dealing——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

38

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. With the issue of anti-Semitism

in a different way. But to continually exclude, to block out, is something that I—I think we have to draw some lines and say that’s

not acceptable.

Secretary RICE. Absolutely.

Senator COLEMAN. Let me, if I can, refocus—we’ve gone from the

big picture—really, you know, focused locally. You know, when I

was a mayor, you say that the most important park was not the

national park, but the one in your backyard. Western Hemisphere

Travel Initiative. Real security issues, in terms of folks moving—

getting in and out of this country. No question about that. But for

those of us who represent northern border States, I’ve got kids in

Minnesota who hop in a van, and they go play hockey with kids

right across the border, because there aren’t enough kids in—just

in one part or the other. There is a—economic ties that are strong.

And there are family ties. We have moved away, I believe, from

purely the passport perspective. But I just want to put on the table

and have your folks go back and reflect, we need something that

is, one, cost—you know, affordable. In Washington, 60 bucks, 70

bucks may be the price of a lunch. That’s a lot if you’ve got five

kids and you’re in Warroad, you’re in International Falls, you’re in

Roseau, Minnesota. And so, you know, 15–20 bucks may not be a

lot, but $60–$70 is a lot for American families who have got kids

shooting across the border to play hockey on a regular basis.

Portability, it’s—you know, I mean, can’t we, you know, talk to

MasterCard or Visa, and you get a little card you can stick in your

pocket, so if you’re fishing in—you know, on—in Rainy River, and

you—something falls in the lake or something, you can put it back

in your pocket and replace it, cheap? And the issue—other thing

is, you’ve perhaps noticed that there are businesses and others—

right now, we’re suffering. They happen to be—people believe that

you can’t go to Canada now without a passport. My son asked me

that the other day. As it is, we’re not looking to 2008, but there

are businesses that are being impacted now.

So, you know, perhaps do a pilot project, perhaps do something

that we can test whether it works. But this is one of those little

things, Madam Secretary, that’s a big thing. And I would hope we’d

continue to retool this, because I’ve got folks who are concerned

about their economic livelihood. As it is, there isn’t a lot of industry

up there. Tourism is a big part of it. And if they’re impacted—if

we put in place something that prevents families from easy access

moving across—dissuades folks from wanting to go up there, it’s

going to have a terrible—it’s going to have a negative impact in a

place that really can’t afford that kind of impact.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

We will continue to look at the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. Probably the first person who didn’t like the idea of passports was the former Governor of Texas, who came to us and said,

‘‘You can’t do this. You don’t know how traffic moves on the TexasMexico border’’—and, of course, for Canada and the northern

States. And so, Mike Chertoff and I have been working on this. We

have come up with the idea of this single card. We will obviously

try to make it as affordable as possible, as easy as possible, while

39

recognizing that there’s a good security reason for having some

form of identification that is standard.

Senator COLEMAN. Appreciate it. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, good morning. Since this is a hearing on the

President’s budget on foreign affairs, I want to ask you some specific questions about the budget and the policy reasons behind the

President’s priorities.

We have serious challenges all over Latin America, the Caribbean, and Central America. It seems to me that the policy driving

the proposed cuts in the President’s budget for assistance to various nations is a wrongheaded policy. So I would like to give you

a forum to explain, for example, the reason for the cuts in the assistance program to El Salvador from $22 million to $7 million.

Secretary RICE. Yes. Well, Senator, I was with the Foreign Ministers, last night, of El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama.

And we talked about the region and ways to strengthen American

and democratic influences in the region.

El Salvador is obviously a very important partner. We are about

to work with El Salvador—and it’s going very well—for a Millennium Challenge Account compact, which will be a substantial increase, then, in foreign assistance to El Salvador. And, as is the

case with Nicaragua and Honduras, some of the cuts in other kinds

of assistance are where there was some overlap in that kind of assistance that now we expect the Millennium Challenge compacts to

be addressing, but also something of a shift in the way that we are

going to, therefore, deliver foreign assistance to some countries that

we think are at a stage where they are governed wisely, where

they have largely rooted out corruption, and where we’re, therefore,

able to work with them in a different way through the Millennium

Challenge Program. It’s not that we have cut, overall. As we’ve put

Millennium Challenge money in, we haven’t cut development assistance as a routine matter, because we continue to do development assistance, and we continue to do economic support fund assistance for these countries.

Senator NELSON. Let me——

Secretary RICE. We will have a very large—a large compact with

El Salvador.

Senator NELSON. Well, let’s correct, for the record, just on your

statement there. You say you haven’t cut it, overall, but the President’s request for development assistance overall in Latin America

is cut by 281⁄2 percent.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I said worldwide, as a routine matter,

we have not, as we’ve gone in with Millennium Challenge, then decided, all right, we’ve got a Millennium Challenge, we’re going to

cut development assistance. It wasn’t in specific to Latin America.

Senator NELSON. Well, the nature of my questions are with regard to Latin America. We’ve covered other areas. And I don’t

think things are going too well for us in Latin America. I’m concerned that the Latin American people are not holding us in high

esteem. So I wonder why we suddenly have a policy of cutting deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
40

velopment assistance to Latin America. Now, you’ve explained

three countries—Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. You said

that even though those cuts occur—and they’re Draconian cuts—

you say that’s going to be made up with the Millennium Challenge,

if that is awarded. And they haven’t been announced——

Secretary RICE. Well, they have——

Senator NELSON [continuing]. To those countries.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. They have been, for Nicaragua and

Honduras. Those compacts are in place and announced.

Senator NELSON. Not in El Salvador.

Secretary RICE. El Salvador. El Salvador is still being negotiated.

That’s right.

Senator NELSON. So, you seem to make it up there, but what

about the rest of Latin America which gets a huge cut of 281⁄2 percent?

Secretary RICE. Senator, there are some cuts in development assistance to some countries in Latin America. I can get you an answer that goes country by country, because there are different explanations in many of these cases.

[The submitted written answer to the information requested follows:]

Foreign assistance for the region has nearly doubled since the start of the administration, rising from $862,452,000 in FY 2001 to $1,696,841,000 in FY 2007.

Although the current request for Latin America represents an overall decrease of

1 percent from the FY 2006 request, this does not reflect a reduced commitment to

Latin America. We have prioritized our foreign policy goals against available resources and competing demands for assistance. For example, reductions for middleincome countries where the need is not as great allows us to increase assistance in

areas such as Africa, where the need is greater. Moreover, in addition to our FY

2007 request, we will be providing Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funding to Nicaragua, Honduras, and Paraguay, increasing our overall assistance to the

region.

Since the MCC was established in 2004, it has approved compacts for Nicaragua

($175 million) and Honduras ($215 million). Bolivia submitted a proposal in December 2005, and discussions are pending Bolivia naming a senior negotiator. We expect

El Salvador to submit its proposal later this fiscal year for a significant amount of

assistance. On February 8, MCC’s Board approved a $37 million program for Paraguay as a Threshold Country, one that has shown political commitment to good governance but has not yet achieved the policy reforms that could make it eligible for

a compact. Guyana has also been selected as a Threshold Country, but does not yet

have an approved program. MCC funding has increased the total resources available

to the region.

We believe our overall funding is at a level that will help us achieve our foreign

policy goals in Latin America—even as we incorporate transformational diplomacy

strategies across the board that will result in more effective foreign assistance. We

have, in fact, requested additional resources to better focus on those activities that

will stimulate growth and be truly transformational. To stimulate growth in the

CAFTA–DR states, in addition to the $20 million in Economic Supports Funds

(ESF) and $20 million in Development Assistance (DA) that has been requested for

labor and environment, we have requested $30 million for rural development in the

Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala ($10 million each).

Our funding request reflects our commitment to focus assistance on trade and capacity building as we believe our greatest benefit can be drawn from trade and economic growth. U.S.-accumulated direct investment in the region is $325 billion, and

two-way trade between the United States and the region was $443 billion for the

first 11 months of 2005. We have free trade agreements (FTAs) in place with Canada, Mexico, and Chile. The CAFTA–DR agreement has now entered into force with

El Salvador as of March 1, to be followed as soon as possible with Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, and eventually Costa Rica. FTA negotiations were concluded with Peru on December 7, 2005, with Colombia on February 27, 2006, and are ongoing with Panama and Ecuador.

41

During the budget hearing, you asked Secretary Rice, specifically, about our funding for Haiti. Since 2004, we pledged over $400 million in assistance to help the

Haitian people and transform Haiti into a more stable, prosperous, and democratic

nation, This does not include our contribution of $261.5 million to the U.N. mission

(MINUSTAH) over this same period. We coordinate closely with donor partners to

ensure all priorities are funded and to avoid redundancies. Other donors pledged a

total of $970 million over the FY 2005–FY 2006 period. The multidonor Interim Cooperation Framework launched in July 2004 at the Haiti Donors’ Conference at the

World Bank will be extended until the end of 2007 to ensure continued support to

the next government. We look forward to the next high-level donors’ pledging conference slated for later this year to reinforce this close coordination among donors

and confirm the international community’s long-term commitment toward Haiti. As

Secretary Rice stated during her testimony, we will take a look at what level of support we will need to give, and what support we will need to get others to give to

Haiti.

USAID’s current multiyear Haiti strategy concludes at the end of FY 2006 and

a new country strategy begins in FY 2007. Our assistance program to Haiti funds

jobs, environment and natural resource management, vocational training, food assistance and medical care, as well as technical advice and budget support to the government. We provide healthcare services to over a third of the Haitian population,

and over 2.2 million vaccination doses for children. We are fighting AIDS by reinforcing prevention efforts, expanding testing, and providing antiretroviral treatment

throughout the country. In addition, we support civil society organizations and the

media, and provide credit to small and microentrepreneurs. With the inauguration

of the new government, we and our international partners will look for additional

opportunities to introduce new programs to strengthen the Parliament and improve

capacity at the local level.

As you are aware, 2006 is the year of elections across Latin America. We are looking at all of the new governments that may have new requirements and we very

much want to make sure that we fund them adequately. Enclosed are the individual

country and regional program descriptions from the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) that explain our request in greater detail.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The submitted information mentioned above from the Congressional Budget Justification was too voluminous to include in the printed hearing.

It will be retained in the permanent record of the committee.]

Secretary RICE. It is also the case that we have had to refocus

some of the assistance on places where we think there is greater

relative need.

Senator NELSON. Elsewhere in the world.

Secretary RICE. Elsewhere in the world.

Senator NELSON. Outside of——

Secretary RICE. Outside——

Senator NELSON. All right. Well, then let me bring you to a place

that we have an enormous amount of strife right now: Haiti. Haiti

needs a long-term commitment from the United States, as well as

the rest of the world, to have a chance to improve its situation. And

here we are, hanging by our fingernails every day now on a disputed election and so forth, and yet the administration, for example, in development assistance, has included a cut to Haiti in its

proposal to the Congress—we’re going to make the decisions, but

I’m trying to find out from you the policy reasons why, in the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, we would cut development

assistance from $29.7 million to $23.1 million, and child health and

survival, which includes vaccinations, that we would cut from $19.8

million to $15.8 million.

Secretary RICE. Senator, if you take our overall funding for Haiti,

it is level, if you look at economic support funding and the like. But

let me just note that we made a commitment to Haiti, in the donors conference, for 400 million dollars’ worth of assistance. That

was our commitment to Haiti. That has been apportioned as folVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
42

lows: 2004, $101 million; 2005, $209 million; and 2006, $194 million. So, we have met those requirements.

We will continue to look at what will need to be done in Haiti

now that there will be a new government. We have to remember

that we’ve also been supporting the efforts of others in peacekeeping, in election assistance, and the like. So, I think the development assistance piece doesn’t show the entire picture for what

we’re doing for Haiti.

But I would be the first to agree that we’re going to have to take

a look, as we look forward to next year’s budget, for now, with

hopefully a stable government in Haiti, not a transitional government, on what support we will need to give and what support we

will need to get others to give to Haiti. And I think that’s a fair

question. We will have to look at that level of support.

Senator NELSON. Well, this Senator is going to try to increase

that budget. Am I going to get some resistance from you?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I never like to turn down money, particularly in a good cause. I would just say that I think we believe

we’ve adequately funded our needs in Haiti, but we are well aware

that, in a couple of cases around the world—Haiti is one, Liberia

is another—we’re looking at new governments that may have new

requirements, and we very much want to make sure that we adequately fund them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Let the Chair just mention that we’ve tried desperately, from the

beginning, to make sure every Senator can be heard today. We

have four Senators still to be heard. We have about 24 minutes.

The Secretary will need to leave at 11:45. And so, the Chair will

ask each Senator to cooperate in trying to maintain something

close to the 5 minutes.

Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dr.

Rice, and welcome.

For Senator Coleman, I was up at the Super Bowl and met with

some of our Homeland Security people there, shippers and trucks

that go over the bridges and tunnel, and the ferry that goes across

there from Windsor to Detroit. They’ve done a great job using technology and making sure commerce is actually moving more quickly

than before 9/11. So, maybe that would be a model, where Homeland Security can work in Minnesota.

Two areas I want to discuss with you; Hamas and the Iran Sanctions Act.

On Hamas, Secretary Rice, what is the administration’s efforts

going to be to make sure that no U.S. funding finds its way to

Hamas? How do you plan to deal with the kinds of assistance that

are sometimes characterized as humanitarian? In your answer, if

you could, sometimes we fund various international agencies, it

might be the United Nations or others, that funding somehow could

get into the hands of Hamas. If you could share the administration

plan with me, because I don’t want a penny of American taxpayers’

money going to fund Hamas.

Secretary RICE. No, I understand, Senator, and neither do I. We

are reviewing all of our programs, and reviewing them piece by

43

piece, so that we know exactly how moneys would move, and the

like.

I’ve already let the Palestinians know that I have to secure moneys that were put forward for Gaza withdrawal reconstruction, because, frankly, that is money that would be available to the Government of the Palestinians. And if that government is Hamas,

then that government cannot have that money. So, we’re making

some efforts, already, to secure funding that may have been already granted.

On the matter of the rest of the funding, we do want to be responsive to humanitarian concerns. You know, we want to be able

to continue to support immunization of Palestinian children. We

want to be able to continue to support the refugees, something that

we have been doing for a very, very long time. We do it through

nongovernmental organizations and through U.N. agencies. But we

will look very hard at what the path, if you will, would be for the

use of those moneys.

I do think we want to continue to be responsive on humanitarian

needs. I think it would not be in our character to refuse to immunize Palestinian children because Hamas is in the government. But

that portion of the funding that would go to support the government, whether it is reconstruction projects or budget support or

anything of the like, we’ve been very clear that, unless the Palestinian Government, whatever its composition, is prepared to recognize Israel and to carry out the other requirements of the Quartet,

that no money will go to that government.

Senator ALLEN. Insofar as the refugees, what funding are you referring to?

Secretary RICE. Well, there are refugee camps in the Palestinian

territories, in Gaza.

Senator ALLEN. Right.

Secretary RICE. And we have—through the U.N. refugee fund, we

have given some funding, over many years, to support those refugee camps, much as we support refugee camps in Darfur or other

places. And I think we will want to look at how that works. But

I want to reserve that we really have to look hard at the humanitarian needs versus government support. And government support,

we absolutely will not do.

Senator ALLEN. Good.

Now, insofar as the Iran—actually, it’s my understanding the

Iran-Libya Sanctions Act will be expiring sometime this summer.

I believe it’s in August. I presume that it’ll be reauthorized. Are

there any specific suggestions that the administration will have to

that act? Changes, additions, deletions? If you could share those

with us, please.

Secretary RICE. Thank you. Thank you, Senator. I think we want

to do a careful look at where we are in a couple of months, in terms

of where we are with our allies. We are in a different phase now.

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, I think, has been very useful to us

as a tool, but we’re in a different phase now. And so, I appreciate

your suggestion, and I’ll take it as an invitation to review with concerned Members of Congress how we might think about the reauthorization under new circumstances. I’m not really prepared to

give you answers now, specifically, but we will do that work.

44

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Dr. Rice.

I’ll yield back the matter of seconds I have not consumed.

[Laughter.]

Thank you, Dr. Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.

Let me just mention that Senator Obama and Senator Martinez

have been with us well over an hour, and I’m going to recognize

them in that order, and then we’ll proceed back into the regular

order.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rice, let me—I want to touch on three things. And,

since my time is limited, I want to make sure everybody gets a

chance. You know, if we can keep our answers, and my questions,

relatively brief, that would be terrific.

First, on Iraq. Let’s stipulate that elections and democracy are

superior to authoritarianism and torture. So, we’ll—that, I think,

is a given. I think the concern that you’ve heard, from some of the

panelists at least, is that, although we recognize the need for patience in Iraq, that democracy takes some time, that the back and

forth between the various factions is not untypical of a fledgling democracy, there is a difference between what’s going on in Iraq and

what happened in the United States during our early formative

years, and that was, there wasn’t a third country—or there wasn’t

an outside power that was financing this entire experiment, our experiment. And, you know, we have spent, as has been mentioned,

$300 billion. You know, the estimates may be higher. We’ve lost a

substantial number of young men and women, who have served us

bravely. And so, I think the bottom line, I guess, is, At what point

do we say that we are going to start ratcheting down our involvement as the Iraqis figure out what it is that they want to do?

So, I think a lot of the questions are prompted not by some unrealistic notion of how quickly Iraqis should get their act together,

but, rather, the fact that we’re on the hook for blood and treasure.

And this administration has suggested that—has been open-ended,

in terms of its commitments. And so, let me be very specific on the

question. You know, there has been discussion about a phased

withdrawal. And the question is whether we can anticipate, given

the direction that negotiations between the various factions in Iraq

have been proceeding, whether or not such a phased withdrawal is

advisable, would help send a signal to the Shi’as that we’re not

going to be here forever, and that they need to negotiate with the

Sunnis, and would start signaling to the Iraqi population that, in

fact, we are not interested in permanent bases and long-term occupation there?

Secretary RICE. Well, on the latter point, first of all, the United

States is not seeking permanent bases around the world very much

anymore. And, in fact, we’re moving permanent bases out of most

of the world back to the United States. So, I think——

Senator OBAMA. I understand. But the——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. But——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. This is a specific perception on

the——

Secretary RICE. No.

45

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Part, and——

Secretary RICE. No; I understand, Senator. I certainly do. My

perception of this, or my way of thinking about this, is that rather

than talking about phased withdrawal, we need to talk about what

needs to be accomplished for the conditions to be proper for the

United States to begin to diminish its presence. We have gone from

17 to 15 brigades just——

Senator OBAMA. Well, then——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Just recently.

Senator OBAMA. I’m less interested in terminology. And I don’t

mean to interrupt you, but I’ve got a couple of other questions. So,

the—I guess what I’m saying is, Are conditions being met that

would then allow for a phased withdrawal?

Secretary RICE. I don’t want to use the term ‘‘phased withdrawal,’’ but I think the conditions are being met that will lead to

more and more transfer to the Iraqi forces themselves of responsibility for their security, for the control of their territory——

Senator OBAMA. So, you are optimistic that the direction——

Secretary RICE. I am——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. That the direction——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I am——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. That the democracy——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Optimistic——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Is leading——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. The direction; yes.

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. Will allow us to start bringing

troops home.

Secretary RICE. I am optimistic that the United States is seeing

Iraqis step up, take responsibility for security, take responsibility

for controlling their territory, that the government-formation process is moving——

Senator OBAMA. Madam Secretary, you’re——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Ahead.

Senator OBAMA. Very good——

Secretary RICE. Yes. And——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. But what I’m asking——

Secretary RICE. Senator——

Senator OBAMA [continuing]. You is——

Secretary RICE. Senator, I——

Senator OBAMA. You’re not going to answer the question, is what

you’re saying.

Secretary RICE. No. What I’m saying is, I do believe that this is

going in the right direction. And, as the President said, when it’s

going in the right direction, we have no desire to be there any

longer in any larger numbers than we need to be.

Senator OBAMA. OK. Well, the—we’re a little stuck here. And

you—you parried that well. I have to say that the question that the

American people want to know is, At what point can we end the

large-scale commitments that are costing us billions of dollars and

have, so far, cost us thousands of lives? And so, that’s really the

bottom line. And if—people are impatient not about Iraq, they’re

impatient about our commitments, which are putting us in the red.

Iran. There has been some significant progress in getting China

and Russia and others onboard to send a strong signal to Iran that,

46

in fact, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is not acceptable. My specific questions are, Have we reached the point where there is

agreement among Russians, Chinese, Indians, others, in the form

that sanctions or penalties or signals to the Iranians—what those

would look like? You don’t have—and then you may not want to articulate all of them. I’m sure that there’s a menu of choices. I guess

what I’m saying is, Do we have—is your sense that those folks are

moving along with us, or are they just saying a lot of pretty words,

but aren’t as committed as we are on this issue?

Secretary RICE. Well, earlier I had mentioned that I think it’s not

going to be easy to come to agreement about what the course ought

to be, in terms of sanctions. But I do believe that we’re having

those discussions. The more Iran does the kinds of things that it

did today, in starting enrichment and reprocessing, and, therefore,

defying the international community, the more I think you will see

people come together around a set of consequences for Iran’s behavior.

We are in very intense discussions with our colleagues about

what that menu might look like, about how that menu might play

out over time. I don’t want to get ahead of the diplomacy——

Senator OBAMA. I understand.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. But we are in those discussions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Obama, I——

Senator OBAMA. Am I out of time? Can I just ask one last question? And they’re—on this Iran topic?—and that is, the Russians

have proposed a very specific plan to provide some face-saving to

the Iranians, should they back down.

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator OBAMA. Is it the administration’s position that that is a

viable framework, provided that there was strong verification and

that, in fact, the Iranians were behaving?

Secretary RICE. We do support the Russian plan, because we believe it achieves the essential thing, which is not to allow enrichment and reprocessing to take place on Iranian soil. We also would

note that the President, all the way back in his speech at the National Defense University, talked about fuel assurances for countries that might want to build a civil nuclear power, but should not

have the full fuel cycle. And so, the Russian proposal is consistent

with those, although there are certain elements that I think we

would have to continue to work through with them. We are supportive of the Russian efforts.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.

Senator Martinez.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for

your courtesy.

And thank you, Madam Secretary. It’s good to see you.

I think that it’s important that, you know, we point out the fact

that elections do require more than—I’m sorry, democracies do require more than election day. And one of the troubling signals

we’ve seen in recent—the year or two—is the elections of Mr.

Cha ́vez in Venezuela not followed by democratic-like behavior, becoming more and more of a totalitarian. So, I hope when we look

47

at elections as being only determinative of what happened on one

given day, we do it across the board, and not just selectively.

I also want to commend the President for reaching out to Evo

Morales, a person who has not had publicly kind things to say

about the President—in fact, quite unusual for heads of state to

comment in that fashion—but that he did, in fact, place a phone

call to him, and—that I thought was a terrific moment of reaching

out.

And I guess what I would point out is that bad behavior around

the world does not always depend upon the actions of the United

States, but that people sometimes behave badly on their very own,

with or without the assistance of what we may or may not do.

And speaking of bad behavior, Iran and its troubling tendencies

appear to also be headed in our region. You know, Florida’s backyard is our Western Hemisphere, so I concern myself greatly with

what happens there. And in recent days, we’ve seen increasing diplomatic interaction between Iran and Cuba and Venezuela, two

countries that voted not to send Iran to the Security Council because of their very dangerous behavior in nuclear weapons.

I want you to—I’m going to follow the chairman’s example—I

want you to comment on that, if you would, in addition to also further comment on the fact that the MCA was, in my understanding,

not intended to take the place of other assistance. So, again, on the

issue of cuts to the region of Latin America, I’m greatly concerned,

and share the concern of Senator Nelson there.

And, third, if you could comment also on the migration accords

with Cuba. Recently, we’ve seen some very troubling situations

there. One is this incident with the bridge and the wet-foot/dry-foot

thing, which, frankly, no one can quite understand how we got to

that. And, second, yesterday, in the Wall Street Journal, it was

pointed out the story of the—a very compelling story of these two—

a couple, husband and wife, who were trying to be reunited with

their family here in the United States, escape Cuba, because Cuba

would not let them leave legally, even though the United States

had granted them a visa, and now find themselves in very deplorable conditions being detained in the Bahamas. Whether you’re

aware of the situation and what we might be doing to encourage

the Bahamas to behave neighborly and release these folks so they

might join their families here.

Secretary RICE. Thank you. Senator, I was not aware, until I saw

the Journal piece, and I will—we will get back to you with an answer.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The committee understands that the Office of

the Secretary of State provided the requested information orally to

Senator Martinez.]

Senator MARTINEZ. Ambassador Rood has been great on this——

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator MARTINEZ [continuing]. To the point of visiting them,

and so forth.

Secretary RICE. Yes.

Senator MARTINEZ. And we’ve been back and forth with letters.

But more action, I think, is required.

Secretary RICE. Yes. I understand.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you.

48

Secretary RICE. On Cuba, generally, as you know, we have tried

to have a humane migration policy, but one that does not somehow

encourage Fidel Castro to play games with our—with migration

policy, which he is wont to do, as you well know, from Florida. And

so, we have maintained a policy that I think balances those two

elements. But when we have a case of the kind that you are talking

about, we try to remember that, of course, Cuba is a terrible dictatorship, and that people are fleeing for reasons of political oppression, not just economic matters. And so, that’s why the policy on

Cuba has been different than the policy on some other places.

In terms of Iran, yes; it was interesting that those who voted

with Iran were Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela. And we have—we believe that it is very important that those in this hemisphere recognize that whatever they may think this is, in terms of sticking a

thumb in the eye of the United States, it’s really a thumb in the

eye of the international community, because that vote in the IAEA

was a solid one that included Egypt and China and all kinds of

countries in the consensus. And so, I think that’s a message that

needs to be sent.

And, finally, on the issue of elections, I agree that election day

is just election day. The follow-on that we’ve been emphasizing in

our region is that it’s not an issue for us of whether you’re elected

from right or left, it’s an issue of whether, after elected, you, in

fact, govern democratically. And that is the challenge, I think, in

our hemisphere, is to make sure that people who are elected, govern democratically.

But I just want to say, again, as you would agree, Senator, let’s

also not undervalue the fact that free and fair elections do matter,

because you cannot have a democracy unless there are free and fair

elections. It is not a sufficient condition, but it certainly is a necessary one. But then we have to make sure that we send the message that people govern democratically.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you here

this morning. I regret that we weren’t able to have the hearing yesterday, because I think you had set aside a considerable amount

of time for yesterday’s hearings. But apparently a political event

Monday night led to the cancellation of yesterday’s hearings, and

I regret that that took place.

Actually, I want to ask some questions about the President’s

budget for foreign affairs, which I understood to be the topic of the

hearing.

I’ve always been concerned about us lagging behind in the payment of various assessed obligations we’ve undertaken. Other countries are meeting them, but we fall behind. For instance, in the

Multilateral Development Banks, we’re now behind in our contributions to the Inter-American Investment Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Fund. And the administration isn’t seeking, in

this budget, to take care of those arrearages. At the Global Environment Facility, I gather there are no other countries, other than

49

the United States, in arrears there. Why aren’t we addressing that

problem?

Secretary RICE. Well, we do have budgetary constraints that

sometimes we have to live with some arrearages. We have tried to

make those minimal, and we’ve tried to live up to our obligations

to make certain that the organizations do not experience, in a

sense, a cash-flow problem because the United States is not paying.

And I think we are living up to that obligation.

Senator SARBANES. I have a suggestion for you, in the face of

your budget constraints. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is

building up huge balances. In fact, it’s estimated that, with the request you’ve just made, which is for another $3 billion—even if you

assume their most optimistic projections about paying money out

and signing these compacts—there will be over $31⁄2 billion in unobligated funds.

Secretary RICE. Senator, we just had the Millennium Challenge

Account board meeting. And, in fact, the numbers suggest that,

with the increased capacity that John Danilovich has brought on,

and with an active program, that they will seek to approve 11 new

compacts worth over $4 billion in fiscal year 2007. They’ve already

signed five compacts, over $900 million, to date. And they have another seven pending, which would be $2 billion. So, they would

have, by the end of fiscal year 2007, absorbed all appropriated requested funding. In fact, they, in the board meeting, were concerned that we might now be getting into a position in which we

would have to be—start to draw back on our negotiation of contracts, because we might not have the funding there.

Senator SARBANES. They’ve been telling us——

Secretary RICE. You will find that——

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. They’ve been telling us that for

a long time. We were told last spring that all of the $2.5 billion

that had been appropriated would be obligated by the end of calendar year 2005. The last quarterly report showed $435 million cumulative disbursements through 2005. Even if you take into account the compacts they’ve signed, totaling another $900 million,

they are still falling well short of coming anywhere near what they

had projected.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think it took some time to get this corporation up and running, and it took some time to get the right

processes in place. But they have fundamentally, and very aggressively, accelerated this process now, and they anticipate that, at

the end of FY 2007, they will have fully spent their appropriated

funding.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it’s on the radar screen. We’re going to

watch that very closely.

I want to ask one question about your peacekeeping. We’re lagging, falling behind, as well, in meeting our peacekeeping obligations.

Why have you not requested funding for the U.N. force in Cyprus? We’ve consistently funded that over the years, and the peacekeeping contribution for Cyprus has been zeroed out in the fiscal

2007 request.

50

Secretary RICE. Senator, the funding that we requested on peacekeeping, we believe, will meet our obligations. I will get back to you

with a specific answer on Cyprus.

[The submitted written answer to the information requested follows:]

The United States has been and remains a strong supporter of the United Nations

role in seeking a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. UNFICYP has been an important part of this effort, and we will continue to work closely with the mission

to ensure it remains an effective force supporting the eventual renunification of Cyprus. The Department’s FY 2006 appropriation includes $4,678,000 for UNFICYP.

As you noted, the Department’s FY 2007 budget proposal includes no funding for

the UNFICYP mission. UNFICYP’s mandate is expected to be renewed again for 6

months in June against current fiscal year funding. Should the pace of the political

process require further renewals into FY 2007, we believe we will be able to reallocate funds within the CIPA account to continue our support for UNFICYP and its

important mission.

Progress toward a Cyprus settlement will require creative thinking and constructive dialogue. The United States is encouraging the United Nations and the parties

to the dispute to work together to move the Cyprus settlement process forward. We

welcome all proposals that seek to break the current deadlock, and hope that all

parties will engage and remain flexible and creative. The United States stands

ready to assist the United Nations and the parties in this effort.

Secretary RICE. But we believe that this will meet our obligations. I will say that because there are new peacekeeping duties,

we did seek, in the supplemental last year, some help and relief for

peacekeeping funding. We did receive it, and this time, we believe,

in our 2007 budget, we have accounted for what we need to do the

peacekeeping that is immediately before us. I think you will see,

in the supplemental, that there will probably be some requests for

peacekeeping in Darfur, because that is not a part of the 2007

budget. But this funds our peacekeeping obligations as well as we

can do, given other budget constraints.

Senator SARBANES. No; I’m specifically asking about the Cyprus

money. The budget request assumes that the mission will be terminated in fiscal year 2007. And, of course, then you zero it out in

your chart, as well——

Secretary RICE. Well, of course, Senator.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. But why—what’s the basis

for——

Secretary RICE. Senator, we are, of course, working to try to get

a resolution of the Cyprus situation. Cyprus, of course, now is a

member of the European Union. There is a lot that is happening

on the political front in that regard. If it becomes necessary to continue that mission, then we’ll find the money for it and try to reprogram it, or try to meet the obligation. But we believe that a lot,

politically, is changing with that, including Cyprus’s incorporation

into the European Union.

Senator SARBANES. And how does that affect the peacekeeping?

Secretary RICE. Because, Senator, we’re working very hard now

to get back to where we were a year ago, which was, at the time

of the Annan plan, with which I know there were some disagreements, to actually resolve this conflict. Should there be need for

continued peacekeeping there, we’ll meet the obligation.

Senator SARBANES. Why don’t we do it the other way? Provide

the money, and then, if you don’t need it, then you’re in a better

position to take care of some of these other needs, as well.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, we have a lot of——

51

Senator SARBANES. I mean, we could——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. A lot of——

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. We could drop——

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Budget demands.

Senator SARBANES. We could put a zero line for a lot of things

in here, on some kind of favorable assumption about what’s going

to happen.

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, we have a lot of budget demands,

and we’re balancing a lot of requirements. But we’ll meet our obligations if we need to.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Murkowski, the final questioner of our Secretary.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

And my question, and probably the Secretary’s response will be

less than a minute, recognizing the Secretary’s time.

We’re going to get to the point where every time you look at me

you’re going to think of the Arctic and what we need to do there.

But—your responses have ranged all over the globe—but no concerns raised thus far, as they relate to the Arctic and Arctic policy.

And, as you know, that’s something that I have been encouraging

those in the State Department to work with us on, and we’re going

to have a lot more conversation about it.

Specifically, 2007 is the International Polar Year. All eyes are

going to be on Alaska and the United States and our role in that

international event. My question to you this morning is, What

funding, if any, is included in the budget for this international

event next year?

Secretary RICE. I will have to get back to you, Senator. I don’t

know the specifics.

[The submitted written answer to the information requested follows:]

The President requested funding to support this event as a part of the National

Science Foundation’s budget submission. There is no specific request for additional

funding for the International Polar Year (IPY) in the Department’s FY 2007 submission.

The Department is participating in activities associated with the IPY through the

Office of Oceans Affairs within the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES/OA). OES/OA has provided funding for the Arctic

Human Health Initiative, and Arctic Council IPY project and is currently reviewing

funding requests for IPY activities. The Department routinely receives a specific appropriation originated by Congress for the Artic Council, which supports activities

associated with events like the IPY.

Secretary RICE. Obviously, we have wanted to work with you on

the Arctic Council, because not only is it important, but it’s also

good for our relations, I think, with Russia, where we need more

cooperative efforts. And so, if we’ve not been as responsive as we

should on that issue, then we will try to be more responsive.

Senator MURKOWSKI. We look forward to working with you on

this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Dodd just appeared. Let me just say, the Secretary needs

to go, but I’ll recognize you, Senator Dodd, for——

52

Senator DODD. I understand that, and I apologize to you, Madam

Secretary. We had a—hearings on Katrina over in the Banking

Committee with Senator Shelby this morning, with our colleagues

testifying. And so, I apologize. Trying to be two places at once. I

just had a meeting with the delegates from Mexico over here. We

have the Interparliamentary meeting coming up in a couple of

weeks in Mexico, and I’ve attended those over the last 25 years.

And so, in preparation of that, as well, I apologize.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, I noticed, at Coretta Scott King’s funeral, a very full-throated Secretary of State during some of the

wonderful music that was at that ceremony. I was with my colleague from Delaware. We went down together for that. And I commend you——

Senator BIDEN. And neither one of us can sing. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD. Oh, I know. I was jealous.

Secretary RICE. I’m a minister’s daughter.

Senator DODD. I gathered that. I was——

Secretary RICE. I grew up in church choirs. [Laughter.]

Senator DODD [continuing]. I was thinking that. Let me raise a—

and I gather you’ve been over a lot of the issues that I would have

raised, and substantive matters here, before the committee—obviously, Haiti and occurrences in Latin America. And I know you’re

busy. I want to raise a subject matter with you, Madam Secretary,

that is obviously somewhat sensitive to people—but I know Senator

Kerry addressed this, to some degree—but the issue of these unauthorized wire taps has come up recently, and the declassification of

classified materials. And when you were the National Security Advisor, I gather decisions were made to go forward with these wire

taps, outside of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the FISA

Act. And I’d be remiss if I didn’t ask you here to shed some light

on all of this, since this was the time period when you were sitting

in that chair. What role, if any, did you play in the administration’s

decision to undertake any of these wire taps without warrants?

Were you aware they were going on at the time without recourse

to the FISA process? And why was this necessary? If you might

shed some light with us, please.

Secretary RICE. Certainly. Senator, I will not try to speak to the

authorities question. I think the Attorney General has spoken to

that, and is better positioned to speak to that. But this was done

under the President’s authorities, the constitution, and also under

statute. But from the point of the view of the National Security Advisor—that is, from——

Senator DODD. Right.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. The security point of view—I was,

indeed, aware. I felt very strongly that what the 9/11 experience

had told us was that we had a gap between what was going on—

an intelligence gap between what was going on inside the country,

in terms of cells that were operating here, hijackers who, indeed,

were operating in the country and communicating to people outside

the country about those terrorist acts, and that that was a scene

that we had to close. And the assessment of the professionals was

that the FISA—and, by the way, we used FISA, and used it aggressively—but that FISA would not permit the kind of rapid and flexible and quick use of the surveillance in order to pick up the conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
53

versations that would be taking place between people who might

have intentions to hurt us here and people plotting and planning

outside the country.

I was convinced, myself, that this was a program that was limited in its scope to terrorism, that it was a program that was under

the President’s authorities, and that it was a program that was absolutely necessary.

Senator DODD. Was there any debate about the issue of

sidestepping the FISA requirements, that you can recall?

Secretary RICE. I think, Senator, had the President believed, and

had we believed, that it was possible to do this under FISA, that

that would have been done. But the nature of what was being done

here, which is not against the kind of fixed——

Senator DODD. I think we agree on that.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Longer term targets——

Senator DODD. I think all of us sort of agree on that. I listened,

over the weekend, to our former Democratic leader, Tom Daschle,

and Jane Harman, as well as the two Republican leaders of intelligence, and I found that they sort of expressed my views. All of

us sort of agree that we ought to have a program that allows us

to be able to protect America, where there is conversations occurring here.

The issue really was about this—the issue of the warrantless decision. And that’s the hub of the question, really; not whether or

not there ought to be a program, but whether we step aside the

warrant approach on this thing.

Secretary RICE. I understand, Senator. And my only point to you

is that I was convinced—I think, along with others—that we did

not have the option of doing it under FISA, as it currently existed,

and that it did not give the kind of agility and flexibility that was

needed for the specific kinds of programs that needed to be run.

Senator DODD. Do you know—are you aware that FISA does

allow for retroactive approval? So, you can actually conduct the

wire tap, and then go back and get the approval, after the fact.

Secretary RICE. I am aware, Senator, but there—those who do

this for a living had conversations with the President, and with all

of us, about what was required, and that FISA did not give the

kind of agility and flexibility that was necessary to do it. And I,

frankly, felt that we were blind and deaf at the time of September

11, and that our highest obligation was not to be blind and deaf

again.

Senator DODD. Let me quickly—and I—again, you’re being patient with your time, and I appreciate it, but I wanted to ask about

the declassification of classified materials, as well. And I realize

I’m going back a bit here to your earlier job here. But there have

been reports lately that Scooter Libby was authorized to discuss

portions of the national intelligence estimate—I think that was the

report, anyway—of that document, related to Iraq, with reporters

by his superiors—that was the question there—by his—authorized

to speak by his superiors. And I wonder if you might share just a—

let me just ask a couple of these questions and have you respond

in general rather than going through question to question.

One, if you could share with us, Who were Mr. Libby’s superiors,

at least in your mind at that time? What was the process at the

54

White House and the National Security Council for declassification

materials, if there was one? Is it governed by executive order,

which I gather some have suggested might be the case? Or has the

President delegated this authority to others, which I gather he

might be able to do, as well? And do you have such authority—did

you have such authority, as National Security Advisor, that has

been discussed here? And do you have it now? And would it have

been appropriate for, say, the Vice President, in your view, to authorize Mr. Libby to discuss these portions of the national intelligence estimate on Iraq with reporters?

I mean, it’s a very important line of questioning here, in terms

of what happened on this thing. And I, again—you’re Secretary of

State today, but you were NSC, and it’s important that we try to

clarify it.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I don’t really think that I should comment on things that have arisen in the context of a legal case and

investigation. I would only say that, as I said—and Senator Kerry

asked a similar question—that I believe that it—that the protection

of classified information is among our highest responsibilities and

duties, that it must—that our responsibility to follow the law in

that regard is a very high duty. And I fundamentally believe that

I always did follow the law in the exercise of my duties.

Senator DODD. Putting aside Mr. Libby, per se, just as a process

question alone, is there—is there a process which allows for people

to talk with reporters about classified material, that we’re not

aware of, that we should be aware of?

Secretary RICE. Senator, there is a process of declassification.

Senator DODD. Right. We know that.

Secretary RICE. And I believe that I have always followed the

law in this regard. I really don’t think I can comment further, because this has arisen in a legal matter.

Senator DODD. OK.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I might just suggest, at some point, we may

want to, as a committee—I leave this up to you and Senator Biden

to talk about, but it might be worthwhile for this committee to—

maybe in a private setting, to be—have a further discussion about

this, because it’s an important matter, obviously, the declassification of materials and how it occurs, here. And I might suggest that

be a way we might proceed.

And, again, I—it’s not my intention here—maybe at the last

minute here—but, obviously, these are important questions, and

they did involve your—during your watch. And so, I felt compelled

to raise them with you and—here. And I’d like to pursue them a

bit further, if I could. But, obviously, we are stretching time limits

here. But those are two important matters I’d be interested, Mr.

Chairman, in seeing the committee examine in some forum that

might allow us for further discussion on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it’s an important issue, and—for the whole

Senate, and obviously for our committee. And so, I’ll take that

under advisement with the distinguished ranking member.

Senator DODD. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Secretary Rice——

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. For your testimony——

55

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And for your forthcoming——

Secretary RICE. Mr. Biden, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Responses. It’s great to have you

here.

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. It’s good to be with you.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM

CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing an opportunity for members of the committee to hear from Secretary Rice and to share our thoughts and concerns with her

on the direction of United States foreign policy and more generally on the standing

of the United States globally.

Madame Secretary, you have expressed satisfaction with the modest increase in

the FY 2007 foreign affairs budget. At the appropriate time I will be interested in

hearing from you how you see the various components of that budget furthering

U.S. interests around the world.

In glancing through the Department of State’s FY 2007 budget submission to the

Congress, I came across a quote from you, Madame Secretary. You stated, that ‘‘The

President set a bold mission for our Nation, and to achieve it America needs an

equally bold diplomacy—a diplomacy that not only reports about the world as it is,

but seeks to change the world itself.’’

It would seem to me to be quite a leap from ‘‘reporting about the world’’ to ‘‘changing it.’’ Shouldn’t we first be trying to develop a much greater understanding of

what is happening around the globe—in the Middle East, in Iraq and Afghanistan,

in Latin America, on the Korean Peninsula, in the People’s Republic of China, in

Russia and the former Soviet Republics?

Any why?

Why, for example did the Palestinian people vote for the likes of Hamas—a terrorist organization which openly seeks the destruction of Israel.

Why does the newly elected President of Iran seem not to miss any opportunity

to provoke the United States?

Why are our efforts to reach agreement on fundamental reforms at the United

Nations resisted by governments who should have every reason to want a strong

and functional United Nations?

Why has the Muslim community been so susceptible to efforts by agitators to use

the publication of a dozen admittedly objectionable cartoons in an obscure Danish

newspaper to mount violent protests in selected cities in Europe and the Middle

East?

Why is one Latin American country after another electing left of center, nationalist candidates to office?

It seems to me that it is very premature and dangerous to careen ahead remaking

the world in our own image without fully assessing whether we have any chance

of succeeding, how those efforts will be received by others around the global, and

most important of all, what those changes are likely to mean for U.S. economic, political, and national security interests.

I am encouraged of late by the more deliberative, cautious, and cooperative approach that the administration has adopted in a number of areas—with respect to

the recent Palestinian elections, a willingness to cooperate with European efforts to

thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions, a wait-and-see attitude toward the Bolivian elections to mention but a few.

I hope this is a signal that the administration has begun to chart a new course—

a course that embraces multilateral cooperation and respect for the rule of law, and

one that rejects preemption and unilateralism unless vital U.S. interests can only

be served by acting alone. I strongly believe that U.S. interests will be more effectively served by this approach.

Again, Madame Secretary, I join with my colleagues in welcoming you to the committee this morning.

56

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE

FOLLOWING SENATORS

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN

Question. In the formation of a new Iraqi Government and constitutional review

process thereafter, we are in the midst of what may be the last chance to convince

Sunni Arabs that they have a stake in the new Iraq.

(a) Please describe your strategy for involving Sunnis in the political process and

breaking them off from the insurgency.

(b) How are you coordinating international efforts to pressure the three groups toward creating a government of national unity and making constitutional promises?

What actions have you personally taken and do you plan to take to advance these

objectives? Have you revisited the idea we discussed during your last appearance—

and endorsed by Secretaries Powell, Kissinger, and Shultz—of establishing a contact

group that includes the major powers and key Iraqi neighbors?

Answer. (a) As articulated in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, we have

an integrated approach that incorporates political, economic, and security tracks

aimed at building a democratic, pluralistic, and stable Iraq. In partnership with our

Iraqi counterparts, MNF–I and the coalition members, we have pursued a strategy

to isolate those elements in Iraqi society who can not be won over to participation

in the political process, while at the same time engaging those entities who are yet

uncommitted to this process. As part of that strategy, we are urging regional leaders

to actively engage with influential Sunni Arab Iraqis. Much of our and the U.S.

military outreach is focused on Sunni Arabs. I met with their representatives on my

last two trips to Iraq.

The ever-expanding circle of players in the current Iraqi political environment, especially among Sunnis, is a good example of how our strategy appears to be taking

hold; large numbers of Iraqis participated in both the October referendum and December 2005 election. Strong Sunni Arab participation in both is an indication that

our Sunni engagement policy is achieving results. It is worth noting that in reaction

to the tragic Samarra shrine bombing and ensuing violence that followed, Iraqi leaders universally condemned the attempt to derail the political process and urged

calm and constructive dialogue to ease sectarian tensions. This is still another sign

of the growing support for democratic principles emphasizing debate and dialogue

over the use of violence and intimidation to achieve political goals. Iraq’s leaders

have also successfully hammered out major elements of the government framework

that can form the basis of a national unity government representing the full spectrum of Iraqi society. Finally, as further evidence that progress is being made, local

political leaders are now beginning to talk of mobilizing themselves in preparation

for the provincial elections. All of these developments are healthy signs that Iraqis

are moving forward to take responsibility for their own futures in a way that respects the diversity of others and rejects the use of violence. The success of our political track approach mutually reinforces our security and economic tracks decreasing

dependence on U.S. support.

(b) The USG is committed to actively engaging Iraq’s neighbors and all international partners on the future of Iraq and the stability of the region. Though it

is the Iraqis themselves who will need to come to an agreement on a government

of national unity, a clear and consistent international message regarding the importance of such a government is vital. The international community’s political and tangible support for a national unity government, once created, is also essential. With

this in mind, we have executed a coordinated diplomatic strategy with Arab and regional countries, coalition members, other partners, and international organizations.

Travel by Department principals to regional and other countries, and outreach to

international organizations, NGOs, and international financial institutions are also

aspects of our international engagement strategy. Ambassador Khalilzad has promoted engagement on Iraq in visits with Iraq’s neighbors including visits to

Amman, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi. The recent Arab League engagement with Iraq,

including plans to open an office in Baghdad, and the November Arab League Cairo

conference, is another initiative he helped sponsor. We are also very supportive of

efforts by regional leaders; here King Abdullah of Jordan deserves special credit to

reach out to Iraqis. Foreign ministerial meetings, international summits, bilateral

meetings, official visits, and many congressional delegations are also reinforcing our

objective of increased international support for an Iraqi Government of national

unity. In every appropriate venue, we will continue to urge international partners

to support Iraq politically by encouraging political compromise and the creation of

a government representative of all Iraq’s citizens.

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Our current focus on formal international engagement begins with the United Nations, in the Security Council, in a series of high-level ‘‘Iraq Strategic Dialogue’’

talks we conduct with the U.N. Secretariat, and on the ground with our close contacts with the Iraq U.N. Mission. We have agreed with the United Nations to consider a Baghdad-based neighbors and others contact group of ambassadors. We are

also working with two regional/international fora on Iraq—the Arab League initiative noted above, which plans a major Baghdad conference later this year, and the

World Bank/UNDP-led International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)

efforts to coordinate dozens of key international donors. Several major IRFFI meetings are also planned for this year.

Question. Earlier this month, the committee heard testimony from the State Department, USAID, GAO, and Inspector General Bowen. By most critical measures—

electricity, drinkable water, sewage treatment, and oil production—Iraq is actually

worse off today than before the war. And billions of dollars have gone missing.

Going forward, it is clear that most of the administration’s goals for the reconstruction program will not be met. As security costs rise, a ‘‘reconstruction gap’’ has

developed and hundreds of projects may end up unfinished unless additional reconstruction aid is produced in far greater amounts than the $735 million that is contained for Iraq in the FY 2007 budget proposal.

• How will we make up this ‘‘reconstruction gap’’ between projects planned and

projects likely to be completed?

• Are the initial goals of the Coalition Provisional Authority still operative, for

example, on electricity, oil production, and potable water? When the $18.4 billion has been expended, which of the CPA’s goals do you expect to be met and

which won’t?

Answer. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Special Inspector

General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) have provided valuable suggestions for

managing our reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In fact, as SIGIR points out, we will

complete fewer construction projects under the IRRF program than initially planned

in 2003. There are a variety of reasons for this.

Our reconstruction priorities have changed in response to the evolving situation

on the ground and priorities of the Iraqi Government, which has requested smaller

projects that are easier to sustain and have an immediate impact on individual communities. For these reasons, the initial CPA goals should not be considered the current measures of success. The increase in insurgent attacks since 2004 has resulted

in a greater percentage of IRRF funding being devoted to improving the capacity

of Iraqi Security Forces.

Despite many challenges, we have been successful in improving the delivery of essential services to Iraqis in several areas, including the water sector and sewage

services, where we have provided access to potable water for an additional 3.1 million people, and access to sewage treatment for an additional 5.1 million people. We

have increased immunization of Iraqi children against childhood diseases: Now more

than 96 percent of children under the age of 5 have been vaccinated against measles, mumps, rubella, and polio.

In designing the IRRF II program, initially of approximately $15 billion for civilian reconstruction (not counting the initial security forces component of $3 billion

placed in the IRRF legislation), the United States was aware that it could not ‘‘rebuild’’ Iraq’s infrastructure, which had been run down by decades of mismanagement, war, and tyranny. U.S. assistance programs are helping to build or refurbish

the basic infrastructure that will enable Iraqis to significantly expand the delivery

of essential services. In addition to ongoing projects, the level of service delivery will

be further enhanced by improvements in Iraqi capacity, subsidy reforms, and a decrease in infrastructure attacks as the Iraqi Security Forces continue to improve

their ability.

Question. After your October 19, 2005, testimony before the committee, among the

questions for the record I submitted to you, I asked that you provide the committee

with a breakdown by Iraqi governorate of both obligated and committed U.S. funds

across the country. Your response indicated that ‘‘the Department will seek to respond to your request for a breakdown of U.S. assistance programs, by governorate,

more completely by the end of November.’’ To the best of my knowledge, the committee has still not received this information. Please provide it.

Answer. Last fall, the Department promised to respond to your request for a

breakdown of U.S. assistance programs by governorate. We are pleased to provide

the attached set of seven maps, which provide an indicative picture of the distribution of construction programs in the following sectors of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF): Electricity; water and sanitation; justice, public safety, infraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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structure and civil society; oil; roads, bridges and construction (including school

projects); transportation and telecommunications; and health.

The totals in each of the sectors are current as of February 11, 2006, and do not

include overhead or contingency reserve funds, or projects which have not yet been

obligated. They also do not include construction contracts issued through the Multinational Strategic Transition Corps–Iraq (MNSTC–I), which deal with the security

sector of the IRRF. The distribution may change as remaining IRRF funds are obligated.

IRRF programs are designed, after consulting with Iraqi authorities, first and

foremost according to what is needed to facilitate Iraq’s transition to self-reliance

and prosperity. Equitable geographic distribution is a factor in this process, but is

not the sole determinant for any IRRF project.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The maps provided could not be converted for print and will be

maintained in the committee’s permanent files.]

Question. The President’s ‘‘National Strategy for Victory in Iraq’’ says that success

will depend ‘‘on the conditions on the ground in Iraq.’’ (emphasis in original) The

Strategy document lists the victory conditions as including: ‘‘Progress in the Iraqi

political process and the increasing willingness of Iraqis to forge political compromises, consolidation of gains in the training of Iraqi Security Forces, commitment to, and implementation of, economic reforms by Iraqi leaders, increased cooperation of Iraq’s neighbors, and expanded support from the international community.’’ You made passing reference to these conditions during your testimony.

(a) What constitutes success in each of these five areas?

(b) What specific metric is the U.S. Government using to determine progress in

each of these five areas? How are we performing against these metrics?

(c) What economic reforms have been undertaken by the Iraqi transitional government? In view of the administration, what further reforms are required once a permanent government is seated?

(d) What would constitute cooperative policies by the Syrian and Iranian Governments in Iraq? What, if anything, is the administration doing to promote them? How

do you assess current Syrian and Iranian policies in Iraq? Have there been any

areas in which Syrian and Iranian Governments have been constructively engaged

in Iraq?

Answer. (a&b) The President’s ‘‘National Strategy for Victory in Iraq’’ (NSVI) outlines goals and measures progress in Iraq along three tracks: Political, security, economic. The administration provides regular updates to Congress and the American

people on our progress to meet these goals and measures, including through the

Iraq Weekly Status Report, the Measuring Security and Stability Report, and the

U.S. Policy in Iraq Act Report.

Stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests

of all Iraqis, and facilitate Iraq’s full integration into the international community

constitutes success in the political track. The metrics used by the USG to measure

progress in this area include the number of Iraqis willing to participate in the political process, Iraqi integration into the international community, and political benchmarks set forth by UNSCR 1546 and the Transitional Administrative Law. Building

on two prior electoral successes, over 12.2 million Iraqi voters (78 percent of eligible

voters) went to the polls on December 15, 2005, despite the threat of violence, to

elect a Council of Representatives (CoR), the first step to government formation. The

result has been a political process that includes all of Iraq’s major communities with

broad-based, across-the-board buy-in. We are particularly heartened by both the

large Sunni Arab turnout in the December elections especially when compared to

the virtual boycott in January 2005, and the productive involvement of the Sunni

political leaders, whose groupings won over 20 percent of the parliamentary seats

in government formation and program talks.

In an effort to engage more Arab support for Iraq, the Secretary of State’s Special

Coordinator for Iraq initiated intensive consultations with key Arab States. The November 2005 Arab League meeting resulted in a call for Arab States to cancel or

reduce Iraqi debt, increase assistance, and enhance their diplomatic presence in

Iraq. International partners, excluding the United States, pledged over $13.5 billion

in economic aid at the 2003 Madrid Conference. The United Kingdom, Italy, and

others have expressed an interest in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Based on

the creation of the Iraqi Constitution, successful elections, support from the international community, and movement, albeit slow, on formation of a unity government in Iraq, the USG has seen substantial progress in the political track.

Along the security track, an Iraqi Security Force (ISF) capable of independently

providing security and maintaining public order in Iraq constitutes success in this

track. The USG uses specific metrics to track progress including, the number of

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trained and equipped ISF personnel, readiness of operational units, percentage of

operations conducted by Iraqis alone, and ISF progress in assuming battle-space

control. As of March 20, there were more that 111,000 trained and equipped soldiers, sailors, and airmen. More than 89,000 police have been trained and equipped.

Overall, more than 250,000 Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces have

been trained and equipped. Currently, 49 Iraqi Army battalions now control their

own battle space. Today, much of Baghdad is under ISF control along with Najaf

and Karbala as well as parts of other provinces. The increased capabilities of the

ISF, particularly the army, were illustrated in their efforts to prevent violence from

escalating after the February 22 Samarra bombing. Based on these and other

metrics, the USG has seen steady progress along the security track.

Success along the economic track is constituted by the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain essential services, rejoin the international economic community,

and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis. Success along this tract is measured

by GDP, per capita GDP, rate of inflation, provision of essential services such as

water and electricity, barrels of oil produced and exported, numbers of businesses

opened, and employment levels, along with progress of the reform agenda described

in (c) below. There have been some notable successes in the provision of essential

services thanks to U.S. funded projects, including increasing access to fresh water

for 5.1 million Iraqis and to sewage facilities for 3 million Iraqis. U.S.-funded

projects have also supported nationwide vaccinations against measles and rehabilitated approximately 30 percent of Iraq’s schools. The impact of U.S.-funded projects

in the oil and electricity sectors have been reduced by insurgent attacks. Despite

terrorist efforts, Iraq’s economy grew from $18.9 billion in 2002 to $33.1 billion in

2005. The IMF estimates that the real GDP grew by 2.6 percent in 2005 and expects

it to grow by 10.4 percent in 2006, with commensurate growth in per capita GNP,

and a recent significant drop in unemployment. While the Iraqi economy continues

to be overwhelmingly dependant on oil, other sectors are developing, including services and trade. Ongoing U.S. assistance projects will help Iraq enact economic reforms needed to sustain long-term growth, including commitments under the IMF

Stand-By Arrangement and reforms needed to join the WTO.

(c) Since 2003, Iraq has implemented a new stable currency, negotiated a historical debt relief agreement with the Paris Club, started the process of acceding to

the World Trade Organization, successfully concluded an Emergency Post Conflict

Agreement with the IMF, and negotiated a follow-on standby arrangement. As part

of its agreements with the IMF the government undertook several economic reform

initiatives. It legally established the independence of the Central Bank, and commissioned an outside audit of the Central Bank. It started reform of the national budget

accounting process, moving from the current manual system to a modern electronic

system that meets international standards. It took a major first step to reform Iraq’s

distorting fuel subsidy program by raising prices for all fuel products last December,

many by a factor of 500 percent. It is developing a national payments system that

will link the Central Bank to commercial banks, improving efficiency in the banking

system and strengthening bank supervision capabilities.

There are several priority items for continued economic reforms. The first is increasing budget transparency by adding meters on oil production, improving fiscal

discipline in the ministries, and improving ministerial capacity to manage contracting. Second, the independent government auditing institutions, Board of Supreme Audit, Commission for Public Integrity, and the inspectors general need to

be strengthened. Third, Iraq needs to continue its subsidy reform efforts to bring

fuel prices to regional market levels and to eliminate the government monopoly on

importing refined fuels. At the same time, it must continue development of a social

safety net to shield vulnerable populations from the impact of these price increases.

Finally, to encourage investment (both foreign and domestic) the government needs

to carry through on legal reform of its commercial code as outlined in its Foreign

Trade Memorandum to the World Trade Organization and it needs to reform and

modernize the moribund banking sector.

We are working with the government to support their efforts to implement these

priority reforms.

(d) The Syrian Government has not yet taken sufficient steps to better secure the

Syria-Iraq border and stop the transit of foreign fighters to Iraq. Syria remains a

transit point for anticoalition elements traveling to Iraq, both Iraqi Former Regime

Elements and foreign fighters, although Syria has tightened visa entry controls at

airports on our urging. Syria must stop its territory from being used by those seeking to destabilize Iraq and the region.

Syria must arrest former Iraqi regime officials who are supporting the Iraqi insurgency from Syrian territory and hand them over to the Iraqi authorities, just as

they handed over Sabawi Ibrahim Al-Hasan Al-Tikriti on February 24.

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Syria has made some progress on its economic commitments with Iraq. It returned the $262 million in Iraqi assets that were held by the Commercial Bank of

Syria to the Development Fund for Iraq. However, approximately $580 million in

disputed claims have yet to be finally resolved. The Syrian and Iraqi Governments

signed a Memorandum of Understanding on this issue, and working-level discussions have begun on the disputed claims. The Syrians insist on a formal high-level

trip from the Iraqis before establishing formal diplomatic relations, which may

speed up work on economic disputes.

Finally, terrorist financiers continue to operate from Syria in support of the Iraqi

insurgency, a problem that the Syrian Government has not yet addressed. Syrian

obstruction has prevented the resolution of a number of outstanding commitments

in Iraq, from economic obligations to border security.

We continue to pressure Syria to stop the flow of insurgents, weapons, and financing to Iraq by isolating Syria diplomatically and encouraging the international community, particularly the Arab League, to do so as well. We continue to train and

equip ISF to police the Iraq-Syria border and are both building new and refurbishing old Iraq-Syria border crossings.

Iranian behavior is counterproductive to the establishment of peace and security

in Iraq. The USG strongly objects to Iran’s support for militant groups in Iraq, including the provision of explosives-related equipment and technology. For several

months, Ambassador Khalilzad has had the authority to engage with his Iranian

counterpart in Iraq to discuss our concerns about Iranian actions that negatively

impact Iraq’s internal security, but for various reasons no talks have as yet taken

place. We will also continue to work closely with the Iraqi Government to address

all issues related to Iraq’s security and stability.

Question. The administration reportedly has decided not to move toward a free

trade agreement with Egypt at this time, in part because of the Mubarak government’s failure to hold free and fair elections and its arrest of opposition leaders.

• What specific steps would you encourage Egypt to take to make an FTA possible?

Answer. A free trade agreement with Egypt is a key component of the President’s

vision for a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013, and remains a priority

obective for the administration.

I will be traveling to Cairo next week to speak with President Mubarak, including

about a possible free trade agreement. When I am there, I will stress that the

United States enjoys an important strategic relationship with Egypt. There has

been real progress on domestic economic and political reform in Egypt during the

last 8 months, but I will note that there have been disappointments and setbacks

as well. I will talk candidly about these with Egypt—as a friend, not as a judge.

But as a friend, I will emphasize that we want to see an Egypt that is fully developing politically and along the lines of reform as well, and we will discuss the future

of this reform.

We are still discussing and will continue to talk about the FTA with Egypt. The

timing to announce the intention to begin negotiations is not right just now, but we

want to have an FTA with Egypt because we believe that it will make a difference

to economic reform and ultimately the economy in Egypt.

A key message that I will carry is that Egypt is a country of greatness, and the

Middle East region needs this country to be at the center of positive change.

Question. Last year, you told the committee that ‘‘The United States is not prepared to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea.’’ North Korea’s stockpile of fissile

material has grown dramatically over the past 3 years, and the former Director of

the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, told a Senate

committee last spring that North Korea can arm a missile with a nuclear warhead.

You have also stated to this committee that, in dealing with this threat, ‘‘We cannot

accept another partial solution that does not deal with the entirety of the

problem . . .’’

(a) How long will the administration tolerate North Korea’s possession of nuclear

weapons?

(b) Do you believe deterrence and containment are adequate policies to deal with

North Korea? What, if any, new policy approaches are you considering?

(c) Do you believe there are any viable military options to eliminate North Korea’s

nuclear programs?

(d) Are there any circumstances under which what you have called a ‘‘partial solution’’ would be preferable to no solution at all? Is a ‘‘partial solution’’ incompatible

with pursuing a lasting, permanent solution? Could not a ‘‘partial solution’’ be a

step toward a complete solution?

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Answer. (a) For over a decade, the United States has assessed that North Korea

has produced enough plutonium to make one or more nuclear weapons. Our objective remains the complete, irreversible, and verifiable elimination of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. We are pursuing that objective through the

multilateral diplomacy of the six-party talks. All six parties (the United States,

China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) have agreed on the goal of

denuclearization of the peninsula.

(b) The September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of Principles contains all the elements of a comprehensive solution that advances the interests of all parties—economic, political, security. For the DPRK, in the context of its complete

denuclearization, these include steps toward normalization of diplomatic relations

subject to bilateral policies, provision of energy and other types of economic assistance, and enhanced security. In addition, the directly related parties agreed to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the peninsula in an appropriate separate forum.

We have made clear that the process that would lead to the DPRK’s realization of

these benefits will not move forward until it returns to the table so that the process

of denuclearization and implementation of the principles can begin.

(c) When it comes to protecting our national security, no option is off the table.

(d) Our fundamental objective is the complete, irreversible, and verifiable elimination of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. Our policy is to

achieve this objective through the implementation by all parties of all the provisions

of the September 19, 2005, joint statement. We will also continue to take concrete

action to protect ourselves and our allies against any illicit and proliferation activities by the DPRK.

Question. The Eugene Bell Foundation has just launched a new people-to-people

initiative (Saemsori) designed to facilitate reunification visits for Korean Americans

with their North Korean relatives. There are 2 million Korean Americans, and experts estimate that perhaps as many as 250,000 of them have relatives in North

Korea. Another American nongovernmental organization (NGO), Amigos International, is completing construction of a private university in Pyongyang, the

Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, to be staffed largely by American

faculty. Amigos International also has several small-scale agricultural training programs underway inside North Korea.

(a) Does the State Department support these efforts?

(b) What specific steps will the State Department take to assist the efforts of

these and other NGOs engaged in humanitarian outreach to the North Korean people?

Answer. (a) The State Department welcomes efforts by American and other NGOs

aimed at bettering the lives of the North Korean people.

(b) Other than strictly humanitarian aid, most types of U.S. assistance to North

Korea are prohibited. The United States has been the largest contributor of humanitarian food assistance to the DPRK through the World Food Program, contributing

about 2 million tons over the last 10 years.

We are prepared to consider funding for proposals for humanitarian assistance

from NGOs. However, current limitations imposed by Pyongyang on access and

monitoring by international aid organizations and NGOs make it very difficult to

assure that the humanitarian assistance we might give would reach its intended recipients.

We have made clear to the DPRK that full implementation of the September 19,

2005, Joint Statement of Principles the six parties unanimously adopted in Beijing

would transform the nature of the relationship between our two countries in a way

that would make it possible for us to consider other forms of assistance to improve

the lives of the North Korean people. We remain prepared to discuss implementation of the provisions of the joint statement, but the process, cannot move forward

until the DPRK returns to the table.

Question. Indonesia has arrested eight suspects in the 2002 Timika murders.

• Will the administration continue to press the Indonesian authorities to ensure

that all those responsible for the Timika murders are brought to justice?

• Are you confident that Indonesia will follow the evidence, wherever it may lead?

• Will the FBI continue to participate actively in the investigation and monitor

the prosecutions?

Answer. The Department of State continues to work closely with the Government

of Indonesia on this case, in the interest of achieving justice for the death of all the

victims, including both Americans and Indonesians. The Ambassador and senior Department officials remain in close contact with Mrs. Patsy Spier, who was wounded

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in the August 31, 2002, attack and widow of one of the American citizens killed in

the attack.

Both the U.S. Government and Mrs. Spier have impressed upon Indonesian officials the importance of achieving justice through a fair and credible trial. President

Yudhoyono has vowed to follow through and has repeatedly expressed and demonstrated his determination to see that justice is served.

After the January 11 arrests, the Government of Indonesia assured the U.S. Ambassador that cooperation with the FBI on this case would continue; it has. The Indonesian National Police is collaborating closely with the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice in the investigation. The Indonesian Embassy in Washington also

arranged for Mrs. Spier to meet with the Indonesian Attorney General and Justice

Minister in March during their visit to the United States.

Question. President Bambang Yudhoyono has expressed his strong support for reform of the armed forces, and has already taken significant steps to advance democratic reforms, fight corruption, and improve the professionalism of the Indonesian

Arny.

(a) What steps will the administration take to promote reform of the Indonesian

Armed Forces?

(b) Will you press for an end to the impunity often enjoyed by members of the

army? Specifically, will you press the Government of Indonesia to hand over General

Wiranto, who has been indicted by an international tribunal for his role in crimes

committed by Indonesian Army units in East Timor? If not, why not?

Answer. (a) The administration is actively assisting the Indonesian Armed Forces

to continue its internal reform process toward becoming a modern, professionalized

force that respects the rights of its citizens and is accountable to civilian authority.

Our mil-mil assistance and engagement program with the Indonesian Government,

including IMET, FMF, JCETs, and other assistance is designed to emphasize and

facilitate such reform. Even more importantly, we are working on many fronts to

enhance civilian oversight of the military, including strengthening the Indonesian

Department of Defense (especially with respect to managing defense resources), the

Indonesian Legislature, and civil institutions, including the media. This year the

USG will provide over $140 million in assistance to civil society and less than $2

million in military assistance (IMET and FMF).

In February 2005, after a determination by Secretary Rice that Indonesian authorities were cooperating with the FBI in the Timika investigation, the administration reinstated International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance for

the Indonesian military. By exposing promising military officers to U.S. standards

for military professionalism and respect for human rights, the IMET program is a

critical component of the U.S. Government’s efforts to promote reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

The November 2005 national security interest waiver of congressional restrictions

on Foreign Military Financing and lethal defense exports has allowed the administration to begin constructively engaging a reforming Indonesian military in a climate of trust. However, it does not mean that the floodgates to advanced U.S. military hardware have been thrown wide open. All requests for military assistance to

Indonesia are considered case by case. Each applicant for U.S. training is thoroughly vetted for human rights abuses in accordance with Leahy guidelines.

The administration shares congressional concerns regarding respect for human

rights, accountability, and civilian control of the Indonesian military. As we normalize our military relations with Indonesia, we continue to stress, both privately

and publicly, that military reform and accountability are essential. Indeed, we have

more opportunities to do that now, because we are in more frequent contact with

the civilian government and the military. Additionally, the Yudhoyono government

is becoming more receptive to such engagement since we are no longer perceived

to be publicly criticizing Indonesia. In her March visit to Jakarta, Secretary Rice

discussed military reform with President Yudhoyono and highlighted its importance

in her speech at the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. We have made it clear that milmil normalization is dependant upon the Indonesian military’s continued reform efforts.

(b) The overall human rights situation in Indonesia has continued to improve over

the past year. Significant problems remained—particularly in areas of separatist

conflict—but the end of the country’s long-running internal conflict in Aceh Province

was a major step forward. Indonesia has made limited progress in establishing accountability for numerous human rights violations committed by the security forces,

and this is a key area for improvement. There is evidence that the TNI has been

willing to punish soldiers who have committed abuses during the conflict in Aceh,

including a total of 160 convictions for human-rights-related offenses in 2004 and

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2005. However, as enumerated in the annual State Department Human Rights Report, many cases of abuses remain unresolved.

Achieving accountability and ending the culture of impunity for members of the

Indonesian security forces is critical for the long-term success of Indonesia’s democratic transformation. The USG continues to emphasize the need to achieve credible

accountability for atrocities committed in East Timor in 1999, including any member of the Indonesian military who may have been responsible. After the failure of

previous efforts to punish those responsible, Indonesia and East Timor have established the Indonesia-East Timor Truth and Friendship Commission (TFC). The administration has emphasized to both Indonesia and East Timor that, in order to be

credible, the TFC must name the names of the perpetrators, be transparent, hold

public hearings, involve the international community, and protect witness confidentiality. The administration will continue to work with our Indonesian and East

Timorese democratic partners to strengthen support for justice within their societies. We are also awaiting the U.N. Secretary General’s briefing to the Security

Council on the U.N. Commission of Experts report submitted in May 2005.

Question. South Korea: South Korea is not currently a member of the Visa Waiver

Program (VWP), but the administration has announced the creation of a ‘‘roadmap’’

to facilitate Korea’s efforts to qualify for the VWP. South Korea is the world’s 11th

largest economy and our 7th largest trading partner, and almost a million South

Koreans travel to the United States every year. Yet we have only one place for

South Koreans to apply for visas in South Korea, and the Consulate in Seoul is the

busiest United States Consulate in the world.

(a) How close is Korea to qualifying for the VWP? Where is South Korea still deficient? What steps is the Department taking to assist ROK in qualifying for the Visa

Waiver Program? How quickly do you believe South Korea will be able to qualify?

(b) Do you support reopening a Consulate in Pusan, not only to improve visa services, but also to better represent U.S. interests in Korea and expand our presence

in this vital treaty ally? If not, is it a matter of resources or policy?

(c) What is your plan to strengthen consular services in South Korea to meet the

growing demand for nonimmigrant visas?

Answer. (a) Designation to participate in the Visa Waiver Program requires that

Korea meet legislative criteria including a low visa refusal and traveler overstay

rate and a determination that U.S. security and law enforcement interests would

not be negatively impacted by Korean participation in the program. We recognize

Korea’s work toward meeting some VWP legislative criteria including sharing lost

and stolen passport data and the development of a biometric passport.

Presidents Bush and Roh included the creation of a Visa Waiver Program roadmap for the ROK in their Joint Declaration In Gyeongju in November and we are

working to finalize this roadmap. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul and the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have established a Visa Issues Working Group that meets

quarterly to discuss consular issues of mutual concern, including steps the ROK

would need to take to meet the requirements for inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program.

(b) The Department is considering the establishment of a small limited-purpose

presence in Pusan, but no decision has been made at this time. However, these oneor two-person offices (designated as an American Presence Post) generally do not

issue visas or provide routine consular services.

(c) Seoul’s consular section has upgraded its facilities and added staff to process

Korean applicants more quickly and efficiently. Last year, we processed 400,000 visa

applications, an increase over the previous year. Appointment wait times have

dropped substantially, to 3 days currently, from 30 days a year ago.

Question. Since taking office, President Bush has generally pursued a policy of

quiet, personal diplomacy when managing the United States relationship with Russia. However, a number of recent developments raise serious concerns about whether this approach is yielding dividends. As you know, in the last few years, the Russia Government has restricted the work of nongovernmental organizations, consolidated control over Russia’s political system and natural resources, virtually

eliminated independent broadcast media outlets, interfered in the elections and

economies of neighboring countries, and offered to negotiate with the leadership of

Hamas. How much longer do current trends in Russia need to continue before the

administration reevaluates its approach to dealing with Moscow?

Answer. The United States constantly reevaluates its dynamic relationship with

Russia and other countries, in keeping with the Department of State’s mission to

‘‘create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.’’ Such review is an ongoing process.

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We are troubled by trends within Russia, especially with respect to democracy

and human rights, and have expressed those concerns to Russia, both publicly and

privately. The United States and its allies, for example, actively communicated their

concerns during the course of debate on the new NGO law that President Putin

signed in January. We are closely observing the process of its implementation, and

have emphasized to Russian officials the importance of fair, transparent, and consistent application of the law so as to foster, rather than hinder, the vital work

NGOs perform. We seek the same transparency, and hold the same frank dialogue,

in discussing domestic and international issues with Russia.

President Bush has repeatedly stressed—most recently at Freedom House March

29—that it is critical ‘‘for the United States to be in a position to be able to express

our concerns’’ to Russia, and that this involves a relationship of engagement enabling ‘‘candid conversation.’’ Those conversations do not always immediately lead to

our desired outcome, but they allow America’s voice and concerns to be heard loud

and clear.

Question. When you were in Moscow last April, you said (in an interview with

CBS): ‘‘What we need to do is to be very clear with the Russians that the deepening

of United States-Russia relations is in large part dependent on common values and

on continued democratic development in Russia.’’ Since then, you have been candid

about the setbacks to democracy in Russia, from its crackdown on NGOs to Putin’s

centralization of power—stating recently that Russia seems to be ‘‘going in the

wrong direction’’ with respect to democracy. And yet you have also said that the

United States has ‘‘very good relations with Russia, probably the best relations that

have been there for quite some time.’’ If improved U.S. relations with Russia depend

on continued democratic development there, then how can our relationship be the

best it has been for quite some time?

Answer. The United States is deeply concerned and very candid about setbacks

to democracy in Russia. We regret that President Putin has pursued policies in

many ways inimical to the robust evolution of Russian democracy. We have clearly

and repeatedly expressed our concerns about specific areas where Russia’s policy—

such as the new NGO law or the decision to appoint rather than elect regional governors—stymies democratic development. We have publicly urged Russia to embrace

democratic development more vigorously.

But, as I stated in an interview in February, it is also important to maintain some

historical perspective on the remarkable changes we have seen in Russia during the

past 15 years. ‘‘Obviously we are very concerned, particularly about some of the elements of democratization in Russia that seem to be going in the wrong direction.

[But this] is not the Soviet Union; let’s not overstate the case. I was a Soviet specialist. I can tell you that Russia bears almost no resemblance to the Soviet Union.’’

President Bush has also emphasized the importance of historical perspective: History is on the side of freedom. Speaking at Freedom House, March 29, he reminded

us that the ‘‘advance of freedom is the story of our time,’’ and that ‘‘it’s an interest

of a country like Russia to understand and welcome democracy.’’ That is why President Bush is committed to engaging with Russia in frank discussion, aware that

this path may not yield immediate solutions, but still promises the best long-term

way of achieving the kind of cooperative bilateral relationship we are seeking with

Russia on many of our key strategic interests.

Question. In the last year, the Government of Uzbekistan massacred several hundred unarmed antigovernment demonstrators in the city of Andijan, cracked down

on all forms of dissent in the country, and expelled U.S. forces from their base in

southern Uzbekistan, though the mission they were supporting in Afghanistan was

far from over. Since then, the administration has condemned the Uzbek Government’s actions and aided Uzbek citizens seeking refuge in third countries.

(a) What concrete steps has the administration taken since the Andijan massacre

to pressure the Uzbek regime to change its policies?

(b) Why has the administration not followed the European Union in imposing targeted sanctions against the Uzbek leaders responsible for the massacre?

Answer. (a) In response to the Andijan events, the U.S. immediately and repeatedly called for an independent, international investigation. We also undertook an

immediate review of U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan. As a result, aid to the Government of Uzbekistan was severely limited; numerous military, border security, and

economic reform assistance programs were canceled. Approximately $3 million of

these funds were reprogrammed to support additional democracy and human rights

programs in Uzbekistan. When allowed, the United States monitored the cases and

trials of dissidents and political opponents of the Government of Uzbekistan, includVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ing those accused of involvement in Andijon. The United States also supported and

voted for a U.N. Third Committee resolution on Uzbekistan.

(b) We note the European Union’s decision to impose sanctions on the Government of Uzbekistan for its failure to heed calls from the international community,

including the United States, to allow an independent, international investigation

into the tragic May 2005 events at Andijan.

We do not rule out the potential of imposing our own sanctions on Uzbekistan,

should respect for democracy and human rights continue to deteriorate. We have repeatedly stressed to the Government of Uzbekistan that our bilateral relationship

must include genuine progress on human rights and democracy.

Question. According to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG Report No. ISP–

I–06–13A, Inspection of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, January 2006, pp. 39, 41), in

September 2002 the Department awarded a $115 million cost-plus contract for embassy construction to the firm Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR). At the time of inspection, the construction had been drastically reduced in scope, was nearly a year past

its original completion date (December 2004), had already cost $147 million (28 percent more than the originally agreed amount), and had produced ‘‘work that is below

acceptable standards.’’

• Do you consider KBR’s record for work done on Embassy Kabul to be satisfactory? • Does KBR remain on the list of preapproved contractors eligible to bid on embassy construction projects?

Answer. The OIG report stated that, ‘‘Despite concerted efforts by Overseas Building Operations (OBO) personnel on site to hold KBR to high standards, OIG became

aware of some finish work that is below acceptable standards.’’ (p. 41.) The OIG

visit coincided with issuance of a certificate of substantial completion. As is standard in the construction process, those items not meeting standards were placed on

a ‘‘punch list’’ for the contractor to correct.

With regard to cost and schedule, the contract was originally awarded on a cost

reimbursement basis because it was determined that no contractor would be able

to assess the logistic and security risks associated with the construction without including enormous contingencies in a fixed-price bid. When it became apparent that

the original cost estimate would be substantially exceeded and the contractor had

obtained detailed familiarity with the work and conditions, OBO negotiated a contract modification with KBR to convert the contract to firm, fixed-price in order to

preclude any further price escalation.

As with other contractors that are eligible to bid embassy construction projects,

KBR participated in a source selection evaluation process that deemed the firm eligible to compete for additional work. Firms do not simply ‘‘remain’’ on a list of approved contactors but rather are evaluated against many factors including past performance each fiscal year.

Question. By letter dated February 4, 2005, other Senators and I wrote to express

concern that the administration would seek authority in the FY 2005 supplemental

for the Department of Defense to train police forces of other countries, including the

Afghan national police. You replied on March 25, 2005, stating that the funds requested in the FY 2005 supplemental for acceleration of the Afghanistan police

training program would be ‘‘directed to the Department of State, which is the

agency currently responsible for implementing this program.’’

• Is it still the case that the Department of State is responsible for the Afghanistan police training program, or is the Department of Defense the lead agency?

If it is the latter, what is the current role of the Department of State with regard to this function?

Answer. Public security and the rule of law are critical for all future rebuilding

efforts and for providing long-term stability to the people of Afghanistan. The goal

of the USG Afghanistan Police Program (APP) mission is to help Afghanistan develop a competent, professional, democratic police force with the necessary training,

equipment, infrastructure, institutional capacity and organizational structure to enforce the rule of law in Afghanistan.

In April 2005, Embassy Kabul reported on the arrangement State and DOD

reached to ensure that security sector reform efforts in Afghanistan are closely coordinated. State and DOD agreed that the Office of Security Cooperation—Afghanistan (OSC–A) would be established with program implementation and oversight responsibility for all security sector programs—including the Afghanistan Police Program (APP). OSC–A has since changed its name to Combined Security Transition

Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A), but State and DOD’s APP responsibilities remain the same.

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• INL continues to be responsible for implementation of training, mentoring, and

reform programs;

• The Chief of Mission continues to develop policy guidance; and

• DOD provides integrated oversight for implementation on the ground.

The Ambassador and the CFC–A Commander work very closely together to monitor all aspects of APP development, and there is strong interagency cooperation and

coordination between DOD and State on this program.

Question. Please explain in detail what assistance we are asking NATO to provide

the African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan in advance of the deployment of a United

Nations peacekeeping mission for Darfur? How does what we are requesting NATO

to provide in advance of a U.N. mission in Darfur differ from what NATO is already

doing to help the AU?

Answer. The United States strongly supports expanded NATO assistance to the

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). A precisely targeted assistance mission focusing on capacity-building and mentoring of AMIS headquarters elements during

the transition to a U.N. force in Darfur could help increase AMIS capability. NATO

should concentrate its assistance for AMIS headquarters on hands-on training and

staff capacity-building with particular focus on helping the AU establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) and a Logistics Coordination Hub in Darfur. NATO personnel

could deploy to AMIS headquarters to conduct courses on the structure and operation of a JOC and logistics hub and then remain in place to mentor AU staff officers. Additionally, the Alliance could consider the provision of intelligence and expanding capacity-building to AMIS sector headquarters in Darfur.

Finally, NATO would continue to airlift AU troop contributions into Sudan. If approved by the North Atlantic Council and the African Union, these assistance options would represent a significant increase in NATO support to AMIS. Previously,

NATO had airlifted 7 AU battalions, provided 14 NATO personnel to train 125 AU

staff officers in El Fasher and Addis Abba, and supported a U.N.-run training exercise. The measures currently under consideration at NATO would provide more

NATO personnel training a greater number of AU officers for longer periods of time

with the option of continued mentoring after training concludes. In particular, expanded capacity-building to AMIS sector headquarters outside of El Fasher could

significantly improve AMIS’s ability to coordinate and manage the mission in

Darfur.

Question. Are there currently legislative impediments that prevent the United

States from providing certain types of assistance that the administration feels are

necessary to support the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS)? If so, please explain what the impediments are, and what assistance, specifically, the United

States has been prevented from giving to the GOSS. Will the administration consult

with Congress to ease restrictions that it feels prevents provision of assistance to

the GOSS?

Answer. The United States foreign assistance to Sudan is subject to numerous

legal restrictions that result in significant delays in providing assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan. Restrictions have the most impact on exports of defense articles or services or other exports that may require a Presidential waiver

and congressional notification due to Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Providing timely assistance to transform the Sudan People’s Liberation

Army from a guerilla force into a viable army is key to developing long-term security in Southern Sudan. Additional authority would allow us to provide military and

defense assistance to the South and the GOSS more readily. The administration has

consulted with Congress on this matter and will continue to work with Congress to

ensure that we are able to provide effective assistance to the GOSS.

Question. The ‘‘Summary and Highlights’’ of the Function 150 budget issued by

the Department indicates that Development Assistance will fund programs in stable

developing countries that are ‘‘committed to promoting economic freedom, ruling

justly, and investing in people.’’

(a) These criteria have been used in the Millennium Challenge Account. Are they

now to be used also with regard to all development assistance? Please explain in

detail how a country’s commitment to these criteria will be measured.

(b) Does this mean that our foreign assistance program dollars will not be used

to support programs designed for such things as developing clean water treatment

activities, enhancing girls’ education or enhancing democracy in countries that are

too poor to sufficiently ‘‘invest in people,’’ or that have governments that are not

democratic?

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Answer. (a) Development Assistance funds will be used to fulfill the objectives of

‘‘ruling justly,’’ ‘‘investing in people,’’ and ‘‘encouraging economic freedom.’’ A country’s commitment to these criteria will be measured by the same indicators introduced with the Millennium Challenge Account, which will now be applied to all U.S.

Government assistance. For governing justly and democratically, these indicators include: Civil liberties, political rights, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. For economic growth, these indicators

include: Cost of starting a business, 1-year consumer price inflation; fiscal policy,

trade policy, regulatory quality, days to start a business. For investing in people,

these indicators include: Public expenditures on health as a percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), immunization rates for diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus (DPT3) and

measles, public primary education spending as a percent of GDP, and girls’ primary

education completion rate.

(b) Development Assistance (DA) funds will be used to help countries, including

those with a gross national income per capita of less than $3,255, to achieve improvement in country performance, measured by the indicators listed above. Focusing DA funds toward achieving the objectives of ruling justly, investing in people,

and enhancing economic freedom does not preclude support for programs such as

developing clean water treatment activities, enhancing girls’ education, or enhancing democracy under the new framework.

Question. What consultations has the Department undertaken with private voluntary organizations about your plans for transforming the foreign aid structure?

If you have not undertaken any, do you plan to do so?

Answer. The Department recognizes the valuable role that private voluntary organizations play in implementing U.S. foreign assistance funds. Staff from the Office

of the Director of Foreign Assistance will keep key private voluntary organization

representatives abreast of the changes that are happening with regard to the foreign aid structure.

Additionally, the Director of Foreign Assistance, Ambassador Randall L. Tobias,

will address the organization, InterAction, a coalition of more than 160 humanitarian organizations, as the opening keynote address at their annual conference on

April 10, 2006. During this speech he will discuss his vision for the future of foreign

assistance and take questions and answers from the attendees.

Ambassador Tobias will also address the Advisory Committee on Voluntary

Foreign Aid, which includes representatives from universities, international nongovernmental organizations, U.S. businesses, and government, multilateral, and private organizations. During this session, he will lay out the new foreign assistance

framework and address questions from the participants.

Question. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year

2006 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build

the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces. You were given a role,

by statute, in the process.

(a) Is it expected that this authority will be exercised in FY 2006? If so, when?

(b) Which office or offices of the Department will be involved in carrying out your

authority under this provision?

(c) In which countries will this authority be exercised?

Answer. (a) The Department of State is playing a major role in deciding how the

section 1206 train-and-equip authority is used. We’ve been working closely with our

colleagues in the Department of Defense in formulating plans to be exercised in FY

2006. We expect to soon forward these proposals to the President for his consideration.

(b) The Bureau for Political-Military Affairs is the State lead in jointly formulating plans to use section 1206 authority. Within State, they have worked closely

with all of the regional bureaus in developing the proposals.

(c) Our recommendation to the President will include proposals in a number of

geographic regions. As soon as the President has made his decisions, we look forward to briefing Congress on the specifics of the approved proposals.

Question. On September 26, 2005, the President issued Presidential Determination No. 2005–38. The determination waived the application of section 575 of the

FY 2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, ‘‘as well as any provision of law

that is the same or substantially the same as such provision, including subsequently

enacted provisions.’’

• What is the legal basis for the authority to make a determination made with

regard to a future, as yet unenacted, law?

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Answer. Section 575 of the FY 2005 Foreign Operations, Export Financing and

Relation Programs Appropriations restricts assistance for Saudi Arabia. The President exercised the waiver authority provided, certifying that Saudi Arabia is cooperating with efforts to combat international terrorism and that the proposed assistance will help facilitate that effort. Pursuant to this waiver, limited IMET funds

appropriated in FY 2005, but which were ‘‘no-year’’ funds, were obligated for Saudi

Arabia earlier during this calendar year.

Although the determination contained the clause referred to, the FY 2006 FOAA

provides an identical restriction and waiver authority, in section 582, which is comparable to section 575 of the FY 2005 FOAA. The administration has not as yet proposed any FY 2006 funds for Saudi Arabia and thus has not had to apply section

582. Were there a desire to provide assistance to Saudi Arabia using funds appropriated under the FY 2006 FOAA that are restricted by section 582, we would recommend that a waiver of section 582 be pursued at such time.

Question. By the administration’s estimates, the President’s request for Child Sur- vival and Health programs for FY 2007, if enacted, would mean a $211 million cut

in programs that provide health, nutrition, water and sanitation programs, immunizations and assistance for children displaced or orphaned by causes other than HIV/

AIDS. What specific programs and in what countries is the administration suggesting cuts for and why have those programs and countries been targeted for cuts?

Answer. The FY 2006 appropriation for the Child Survival and Health Programs Fund (post-rescission) is $1,569.150 million and the FY 2007 request is $1,433.000

million. The FY 2007 request is $136.150 million below the FY 2006 enacted level.

The primary reduction in funding is the Agency’s contribution to the Global Fund

to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria. The FY 2006 enacted level for the Global Fund

is $247.500 million and the FY 2007 request is $100 million. The FY 2007 consolidated USG request for the Global Fund is $300 million; $100 million each from the

Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Health and Human Services.

Question. The administration has requested nearly $1 billion more for programs

under the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative. All of the increases over the fiscal year 2006

projected budget appear, however, to be channeled toward the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which covers only 15 countries. The administration appears to be requesting $25 million less in fiscal year 2007 for nonPEPFAR countries than was appropriated for this fiscal year. Does the administration project that the HIV-infection rates and/or the number of HIV-infected people

in all of the nonfocus countries will decline? Why isn’t the administration asking

for an increase in funding to combat HIV/AIDS in nonfocus countries?

Answer. The overall request for PEPFAR funding in fiscal year 2007 is up dra- matically, from approximately $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2006 to $4 billion. Within

this overall increase, priority was placed on the focus countries. Without the fiscal

year 2007 level of funding for the focus countries, it will not be possible to meet

the 2-7-10 goals established by the President and Congress.

At the same time, however, the request does include a modest increase from the

fiscal year 2006 enacted level of funding for bilateral programs in other countries

(from $425.6 to $432.7 billion, not including funding for research). Beyond the focus

countries, the Emergency Plan targets $5 billion over 5 years to support HIV/AIDS

programs in an additional 108 countries, international research, international partnerships (including the Global Fund), and other activities. In fiscal year 2005,

PEPFAR directed $293 million to HIV/AIDS program activities in these 108 nations.

The President’s fiscal year 2007 request for the focus countries is, in part, an attempt to recover from the effects on focus country programs of the redirection of almost $527 million from focus country programs to the Global Fund and to other bilateral programs over the Emergency Plan’s first 3 years. Of these three broad areas

of the Emergency Plan, funding for the focus countries, originally planned to be $10

billion over 5 years, is the only one which has not been funded at the planned level

overall to date. Other USG programs, including those beyond the focus countries,

are on track to meet the $5 billion target level over 5 years as originally envisioned

for the Emergency Plan.

Question. I am deeply concerned by our budget to support U.N. peacekeeping missions. Both this year and in 2007. Assistant Secretary Silverberg has spoken about

a $500 million shortfall for this year, such that we will run out of money to pay

our peacekeeping assessments this summer.

• How is the Department going to handle this shortfall for the CIPA account in

fiscal year 2006?

• The President’s funding request for U.N. peacekeeping in fiscal year 2007 is

only slightly higher than that for last year, at $1.14 billion. Yet the U.N.’s total

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budget will increase next year, given the anticipated mission in Darfur. Why

is there not a higher request for fiscal year 2007?

Answer. The shortfall for FY 2005 of $145.010 million and the projected shortfall for FY 2006 of $376.752 million totals $521.762 million. The FY 2006 supplemental

budget contains a request of $69.8 million for the CIPA account for Sudan/Darfur

as well as language providing transfer authority from the Peacekeeping Operations

request which, in total, would offset a total of $129.8 million in the above total for

a net shortfall of $391.962 million at the end of FY 2006.

We expect that there will be no new shortfalls in FY 2007, i.e., that the request

will be sufficient to pay FY 2007 assessments. We have asked for an increase in

FY 2007 funding for Sudan operations in anticipation of the United Nations taking

over operations in Darfur.

Question. As you know, a law limiting our payments for U.N. peacekeeping to 25

percent has gone back into effect. We are now accruing arrears, because we are assessed at a rate of about 27 percent. I have introduced legislation to remedy this

problem (S. 2095), and the President has proposed similar legislation in his budget.

• Do you agree that it is important for the United States to pay its peacekeeping

bill in full? Do you support S. 2095?

Answer. The administration agrees that it is important to pay its U.N. peacekeeping assessments in full. We support legislation to enable the United States to

pay U.N. peacekeeping assessments at the rate used by the United Nations.

Question. As you know, the U.N. Headquarters building is unsafe, failing to meet

municipal fire and safety codes and drastically in need of security upgrades; however, plans to break ground for the new building have been delayed and costs are

increasing by the day. The United Nations has recruited a top-notch person, Fritz

Reuter, to work on the Capital Master Plan for renovation; however, I understand

that funding for his office will run out in a few months.

• What is the administration doing to support that a plan for construction be finalized as soon as possible? How are Ambassador Bolton and Department officials in Washington working to garner support among member states for getting

this project underway?

Answer. The United States appreciates and supports the work of the Secretariat

on the Capital Master Plan (CMP), in particular the efforts of Assistant Secretary

General Fritz Reuter and the Capital Master Plan Office. The United States supports this project, as renovations are strongly needed to make the U.N. facilities

safe and secure and a General Assembly decision on project strategy is, therefore,

critical. As both the United Nation’s largest contributor and host country, the

United States also has a direct interest in ensuring that the CMP is implemented

in the most cost-effective and transparent manner possible.

The General Assembly adopted a resolution on May 8 that provided an appropria- tion of $23.5 million, for the continuation of preconstruction activities, and $77 million in commitment authority, to be used to begin procurement of a temporary conference building and lease office swing space. The United States disassociated from

the consensus on this resolution. Without a decision on project strategy the administration did not believe it would be prudent to agree to the full $100.5 million, but

did endorse the appropriation of $23.5 million to complete design work. The administration will work constructively in the next resumed session of the General Assembly to resolve remaining issues on the CMP, in particular, the critical decision on

project strategy.

Question. You have noted that the President’s request includes $75 million to

strengthen the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which

will include support for a Conflict Response Fund. In addition to the fund, what

amount is requested to expand the operations of the Office itself? How many additional positions will this funding support? How, specifically, will these positions contribute to the mission of the Office?

Answer. In FY 2007, the President’s request includes $20.1 million in State Operations funding for Reconstruction and Stabilization management. This request includes $6.5 million in operating funds and $13.6 million in personnel costs ($5.2M

for permanent State FTE and $8.4M for nonpermanent State FTE) to expand the

operations of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

(S/CRS). Currently, S/CRS has 15 permanent positions, approximately 12 interagency detailees, and 48 nonpermanent positions funded by State (15 of which are

Active Response Corps). This funding will support an additional 15 permanent State

Department positions and maintain the 48 nonpermanent, State-funded positions already in S/CRS.

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The FY07 funding request, and the positions it would create, will allow S/CRS to

coordinate effective deployments to prevent or transform conflict—thereby institutionalizing the Department of State’s leadership role in planning for and implementing stabilization and reconstruction activities. We will build on pilot

interagency deployments, such as those in Chad, Haiti, and Sudan, and respond to

developing crises and conflicts by increasing the number of conflict assessment

teams and sectoral advisors deployed to provide expertise and to serve as catalysts

for follow-on interagency response. S/CRS staff also will focus on refining and testing operational response mechanisms, which will allow us to stand ready to deploy

interagency staff to work with the military at the Geographic Combatant Command

and field levels in the next crisis.

The additional funding and staff will allow S/CRS to coordinate multiple country

responses simultaneously—lending support to State regional bureaus and leading

interagency planning processes that link all USG programs and resources to a comprehensive strategy to address conflict prevention and transformation.

This funding will also allow S/CRS to increase cooperation and interoperability

with international partners—increasing the total international impact of efforts to

advance stabilization and reconstruction activities.

Question. A recent inspector general report on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security

(ISP–I–06–03) indicated that personal escape masks issued to overseas posts need

to be replaced in the next several fiscal years, but that under current budget estimates, ‘‘only a fraction of the masks can be replaced each year,’’ and that further

reduction will ‘‘decrease the number of posts that receive training’’ and other needed

equipment for employee safety in this area.

(a) What funds are provided in the baseline plan for FY 2006 and the budget for

FY 2007 for personal escape masks? How many replacement masks will such funds

purchase?

(b) How many personal escape masks are due for replacement in fiscal years 2006,

2007, and 2008?

(c) How many posts will not receive training in the case of escape hoods?

Answer. (a) As of the close of FY 2005, all overseas posts had fully equipped and

trained First Responder Units, and all overseas posts had received a comprehensive

chem/bio training package that included the provision of escape masks and the associated training. Over 110,000 masks were deployed. The FY 2006 plan includes $1.7

million for replacement of 15,887 masks; the FY 2007 budget includes $2.7 million

for replacement of 25,233 masks.

(b) There are 23,400 personal escape masks due for replacement in FY 2006 and

36,350 in FY 2007, on the basis of a 4-year replacement cycle. To address this shortfall, the Department sent a random sample of expiring masks to the U.S. Army’s

Edgewood Chemical Biological Command in Aberdeen, MD, to determine whether

the shelf life could be extended for a fifth year. If the shelf life can be extended,

the Department will have sufficient funding to replace all masks on schedule by FY

2010. If the shelf life of the masks cannot be extended for a fifth year, replacement

masks would be supplied to only critical and high-threat posts, due to a lack of

funding.

(c) All overseas posts have been initially equipped and trained with personal escape masks. New employees will be provided with escape mask training upon arrival at post. Refresher training is available for employees on an as-needed basis,

at the rate of approximately once every 2 years for each post.

Question. The ‘‘National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,’’ issued

by the Department of Defense in March 2005, states as a vulnerability of the United

States that ‘‘[o]ur strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those

who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and

terrorism.’’

• Do you regard engagement in international fora and use of judicial processes

as a ‘‘strategy of the weak?’’

• Do you regard it as equivalent to terrorism?

Answer. You are asking for an interpretation of a Department of Defense document. I think it would be more appropriate to address this question to that Department.

As for the underlying challenge to the United States being described by the

phrase that you quote, I understand this to refer not to the use of international fora

and judicial processes, which is undertaken regularly and legitimately by many, but

to the ‘‘abuse’’ or ‘‘misuse’’ of these fora and processes by some who would seek to

undermine by any means our national interests and those of our friends and allies.

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Question. What role does the Department have in extraordinary renditions undertaken by U.S. Government agencies? Please be specific.

Answer. The term ‘‘extraordinary rendition’’ is frequently used to refer to a rendition by one state to another state with the knowledge or intent that the receiving

state will torture the individual being rendered. The United States does not engage

in such extraordinary renditions—as we have repeatedly made clear, including at

the U.S. Presentation to the Committee Against Torture in May, the United States

does not transport, and has not transported, detainees from one country to another

for the purpose of interrogation using torture. The United States has not transported anyone, and will not transport anyone, to a country if the United States believes he or she will be tortured. Where appropriate, the United States seeks assurances it considers to be credible that transferred persons will not be tortured.

To the extent that questions have been raised about the rendition of individuals

outside of normal extradition procedures, the United States has acknowledged that

it, like other countries, has long used procedures, in addition to extraditions or other

judicial procedures, to transport individuals from the country where they were captured to their home country or to another country where they can be questioned,

held, or brought to justice. In this regard, after detainees held in Guantanamo have

been approved for release or transfer to other countries, the State Department has

played a role in such transfers by seeking, where appropriate, diplomatic assurances

of humane treatment, as well as assurances that the individuals in question will

not pose a threat to the United States or its allies.

Question. What has been the involvement of the Department with regard to the

construction of, maintenance of, or seeking the permission for use of, facilities to detain terrorist suspects in foreign nations? Please be specific.

Answer. The Department has the lead role in negotiating the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to their country of nationality or a third country, when appropriate.

For example, the U.S. Government and the Government of Afghanistan exchanged

diplomatic notes regarding the transfer of detainees from the United States to the

Government of Afghanistan, which committed to accept responsibility for the returning Afghan citizens and will work to ensure that they do not pose a continuing

threat to Afghanistan, the coalition, or the international community. The United

States is providing assistance to refurbish Block IV of the Pol-e Charki prison (PeC),

and to train and equip an Afghan guard force. Further information in reference to

this question has been provided in a classified answer.

Question. It is expected that the administration will send a large number of detainees currently in Guantanamo back to their home countries, including Afghanistan, where many will continue to be detained.

(a) If detainees are transferred to the custody of the Government of Afghanistan,

what will be their legal status?

(b) Do you expect them to be charged with crimes and prosecuted by the Government of Afghanistan? If not, under what domestic law will Afghanistan detain them

and for how long?

(c) If they are detained without charge, what impact will such detention have on

efforts to build the rule of law in Afghanistan? Will the International Committee

for the Red Cross and the Afghan Human Rights Commission have access to these

detainees.

Answer. One of the Department of Defense’s current missions is to use all necessary and appropriate force to defeat the al-Qaeda network and its supporters. In

the course of that campaign, which remains ongoing, the United States and its allies

have captured thousands of individuals overseas, virtually all of whom are foreign

nationals. Fewer than 500 of these foreign nationals are being held by the Department of Defense (DOD) at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO).

It is appropriate for DOD to detain these enemy combatants as long as hostilities

are ongoing. Nonetheless, as former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Matthew Waxman, has previously declared, DOD has no interest in

detaining enemy combatants longer than necessary. Where detention is deemed no

longer necessary, a detainee may be released to the control of another government.

The United States also transfers GTMO detainees, under appropriate circumstances, to the control of other governments for continued detention, investigation,

and/or prosecution.

In all such cases of transfer for continued detention, investigation, and/or prosecution, as appropriate, as well as situations in which the detainee is transferred for

release, the detainee is transferred entirely to the custody and control of the other

government, and once transferred, is no longer in the custody and control of the

United States. The individual is detained under such circumstances, if at all, by the

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foreign government pursuant to its own laws and not on behalf of the United States.

With respect to your specific questions regarding Afghanistan:

(a) If GTMO detainees are transferred by the United States to the Government

of Afghanistan, they will no longer be in the custody and control of the United

States and thus the Government of Afghanistan will determine their status.

(b) There is not a uniform policy or expectation with respect to all Afghan detainees that may be transferred from GTMO to the Government of Afghanistan. Furthermore, if an individual transferred is detained or prosecuted by the Government

of Afghanistan, such action would be taken pursuant to the laws of Afghanistan and

would not be done on behalf of the United States. The Government of Afghanistan

is currently conducting an assessment of its domestic laws to determine its detention and prosecution capabilities and we would not speculate as to the domestic

legal framework under which the Government of Afghanistan might charge or detain an individual detainee.

(c) We fully expect Afghanistan to detain the transferees in accordance with its

domestic laws and international obligations, which will help build the rule of law

in Afghanistan. We additionally anticipate that the Government of Afghanistan will

allow the International Committee for the Red Cross to have access to any individuals determined to be enemy combatants, if they are detained. However, this is a

matter that the ICRC will negotiate directly with the Government of Afghanistan.

Question. It is expected that the administration is planning to send a large number of detainees currently in Guantanamo back to their home countries, including

Saudi Arabia, where many will continue to be detained.

(a) If detainees are transferred back to the custody of the Government of Saudi

Arabia, what will be their legal status?

(b) Do you expect them to be charged with crimes and prosecuted by the Government of Saudi Arabia? If not, under what domestic law will Saudi Arabia detain

them and for how long?

(c) Will the International Committee for the Red Cross have access to these detainees?

(d) Given Saudi Arabia’s well-documented record of torture, how will the State Department ensure and credibly verify that detainees transferred there will not be tortured.

Answer. (a) Consistent with our discussion in the answer to the previous question,

if GTMO detainees are transferred by the United States to the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia, they will no longer be in the custody and control of the United States and

thus the Saudi Arabian Government will determine the status of any detainees

transferred.

(b) There is not a uniform policy or expectation with respect to all Saudi detainees

that may be transferred from GTMO to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore,

if an individual transfer is detained or prosecuted by Saudi Arabia, such action

would be taken pursuant to the laws of Saudi Arabia and would not be done on behalf of the United States. As a result, we cannot speculate as to how long Saudi

Arabia might or might not detain such individuals.

(c) As noted with respect to Afghanistan in the answer to the previous question,

any question of ICRC access to another countries’ prisons, is a matter for negotiation between the ICRC and that country.

(d) The United States does not transfer individuals to other countries where it believes it is more likely than not that they will be tortured. A country’s individual

human rights record is a factor in, rather than a substitute for, a case-by-case analysis, taking into account the particular circumstances of the transfer, the country

to which the transfer is being made, the individual concerned, and any concerns regarding torture or persecution that may arise.

The Department works closely with the Department of Defense and relevant

agencies with respect to the likelihood of torture or other treatment concerns in a

given country and the adequacy and credibility of assurances obtained from a particular foreign government prior to any transfer. In each of these contexts, as appropriate, the United States obtains assurances in order to be satisfied that it is not

more likely than not that the individual in question will be tortured upon return.

If, taking into account all relevant information, including any assurances received,

the United States believes that a person more likely than not will be tortured if returned to a foreign country, the United States would not approve the return of the

person to that country.

Finally, with respect to verifying any assurances made, as has been stated on numerous occasions, we would take steps to investigate any credible allegations of torture and will take appropriate action if there is reason to believe that diplomatic

assurances obtained are not being honored.

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Question. The United States has long condemned governments that engage in enforced disappearances—a practice generally defined as depriving an individual of his

or her freedom and then refusing to acknowledge where that person is being detained or even the fact of his or her detention.

(a) Does the State Department agree with this definition of ‘‘forced disappearances?’’ If not, how does the Department define the practice?

(b) Would the long-term detention without charge of a terrorist suspect in an undisclosed location to which the International Committee for the Red Cross has no

access constitute a forced disappearance? If not, why not?

Answer. (a) The definition of an enforced disappearance may vary under international law. During the negotiations of the recent United Nations Commission on

Human Rights Working Group to Elaborate a Normative Instrument to Protect All

Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the United States supported the following

definition:

For purposes of this instrument, enforced disappearance is considered to

be the arrest, detention or abduction of a person by or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the state, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, with the intention of removing that person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

(b) No. As we have repeatedly indicated, we believe that we are in a continuing

state of armed conflict with al-Qaeda, and that the law of war governs the treatment of al-Qaeda combatants captured in the course of our military obligations. The

interrogation and transfer of captured al-Qaeda members is more than an appropriate tool in this fight—it is critical to exercising our responsibility to protect our

own citizens from further attack. U.S. personnel are required to treat all detainees

consistent with U.S. law and treaty obligations, including prohibitions on torture

and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and prohibition against transferring

persons to be tortured.

Question. With the passage of the McCain amendment, no detainee in U.S. custody anywhere in the world may be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment that is banned by the 1st, 8th, and 14th amendments to the

Constitution of the United States, which, among other things, prohibit the treatment that violates due process or ‘‘shocks the conscience.’’ Some have argued that

these constitutional prohibitions operate as a sliding scale, with the definition of

what ‘‘shocks the conscience’’ shifting based on the governmental interest at stake.

• In the State Department’s view, are there circumstances where the government’s interest in gathering information is so great that, even after passage of

the McCain amendment, nothing short of torture would shock the conscience?

Or are there certain forms of treatment that would ‘‘shock the conscience’’ and

constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under any circumstance? If

it is the former—that under certain circumstances there are no limits on what

‘‘shocks the conscience’’—would you be willing to accept a foreign government’s

reliance on that same argument to justify its treatment of captured U.S. military personnel?

Answer. The Department of State refers questions regarding the application of the

McCain amendment to specific interrogation techniques to the Department of Defense, which is responsible for operational decisions regarding interrogation at the

Defense Department detention facilities. Questions regarding the scope of the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment found in the 5th, 8th, and 14th

amendment of the United States Constitution are referred to the Department of

Justice.

QUESTION OF SENATOR GEORGE ALLEN

Question. In light of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev’s threats to resume war

and Azerbaijan’s significant increase in military spending, can the President continue to certify that U.S. military assistance will not undermine efforts to negotiate

a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

Answer. Yes. U.S. security assistance to Azerbaijan is carefully targeted so as not

to undermine or hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between

Armenia and Azerbaijan, or to be used for offensive purposes against Armenia, as

per Public Law 107–115. The United States assists Azerbaijan by upgrading its capability to combat terrorism, to operate with U.S. and NATO forces, and to protect

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its borders against the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, illicit narcotics,

and other items that threaten international stability and U.S. national security.

The projected increased military spending of 76 percent in Azerbaijan in 2006 is

proportionate to the budget increase, due to dramatically increased oil revenues.

The increase in military spending may also be driven by fear of, and increasing political pressure from, its powerful neighbors, Iran and Russia.

The President and Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan have participated actively in a

series of meetings led by the OSCE Minsk Group (the ‘‘Prague Process’’) since 2004,

aimed at finding a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite

the stall in negotiations that resulted after talks at Rambouillet, France, in February 2006, we continue to believe that 2006 offers a realistic window of opportunity

to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict. We support the territorial integrity

of Azerbaijan and hold that the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh is a matter of

negotiation between the parties.

We are providing Azerbaijan with a level of military assistance consistent with

its crucial participation and cooperation in the war on terror. The Government of

Azerbaijan has made invaluable contributions to the war on terror, including, but

not limited to, blanket overflight rights, the use of Azerbaijan military bases, information-sharing, and law enforcement cooperation. Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the

United States Government has allowed us to achieve several significant successes

in disrupting terrorist cells and in bringing terrorists to justice.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. What is our strategy to make sure that this area (‘‘the lawless Pashtun

tribal areas’’) of Pakistan does not remain an area of sanctuary for the Taliban and

al-Qaeda?

Answer. To support Pakistan’s efforts to exercise stronger control in the tribal

areas, we are providing assistance for border security and socioeconomic development. Along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, we are supporting the building of

roads and outposts that allow for more effective control of the border. We are also

supporting construction of new schools, teacher training, microfinance programs,

health activities to improve child health services and installation of small-scale infrastructure projects such as dug wells and minihydroelectric schemes to secure

community support for Pakistan’s Government.

Our mutual aim is to enhance central government authority in the tribal areas

to ensure that the region will never again be a sanctuary for terrorists and militants.

We also participate with both Pakistan and Afghanistan in the Tripartite Commission, a military forum that meets regularly on cross-border military and security

cooperation. Through the commission we work with both Pakistan and Afghanistan

to bring improved field coordination and communication for security operations in

this region.

Question. Will the U.S. support efforts to pass a binding Security Council resolution calling for constructive action on Burma?

Answer. The United States remains gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation in Burma. We believe the Security Council has an important role to play in

promoting positive change there, and we are actively exploring ways to build UNSC

consensus on the need for further discussions and possible action on Burma in follow-up to the landmark Council discussion on December 16.

We are also advocating discussion of Burma in other U.N. bodies, such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Third Committee. Last year, the

United States cosponsored the European Union’s annual Burma human rights resolution at the United Nations General Assembly’s Third Committee, which called for

‘‘a genuinely inclusive’’ political process through the ‘‘unhindered participation of all

political parties and representatives of ethnic nationalities,’’ as well as the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners. Separately, we are supporting

the International Labor Organization’s request to place Burma on the 2006

ECOSOC agenda.

We will continue to encourage U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to remain engaged in Burma, and to work with the U.N. Secretariat to identify the best possible

successor for the Secretary General’s former Special Envoy to Burma, Razali Ismail.

Question. Secretary Rice, 60 Minutes recently ran a piece on the widespread

waste, fraud, and abuse that has plagued the Iraq reconstruction effort. Highlighted

in the piece was a contractor, Custer Battles, that was given tens of millions of dollars in contracts despite having no experience and no qualifications. Despite failing

75

miserably in every job it was asked to do, the Coalition Provisional Authority not

only refused to fire Custer Battles, it wrote a glowing review and continued to give

them contracts.

Secretary Rice, you were placed in charge of coordinating Iraq’s reconstruction in

October 2003. What involvement, if any, did you have with this particular case?

Answer. In October 2003, the National Security Council created an Iraq Stabilization Group with four interagency cells, including one on economics, in order to

strengthen interagency policy support for the Department of Defense and the Coalition Provisional Authority and to help prepare for the next phase of the reconstruction effort in Iraq. This interagency group had no direct involvement in reviewing

contracts. The Custer Battles case is now before the Federal district court in Virginia, and it would be inappropriate to comment on pending litigation.

On May 11, 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential Directive

in which he determined that the Secretary of State would be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. To that end, the

Department of State cooperates closely with the Office of the Inspector General

(OIG), the General Accounting Office (GAO), and the Special Inspector General for

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), each of which actively audits U.S. programs in Iraq.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question. Does the proposed increase in this budget request for the current U.N.

mission in Sudan take into account the likelihood that the African Union mission

in Sudan may be replaced by a new U.N. peacekeeping Mission later this year?

Answer. Yes, the $442 million Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account (CIPA) request includes $160 million for a U.N. peacekeeping operation in

Darfur based on the likelihood that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) will

transition to a U.N. operation this year. Though the U.N. Security Council has not

yet adopted a resolution authorizing that transition, we expect one within the

March timeframe to kick off the ‘‘re-hat’’ of AMIS, and a U.N. operation in Darfur

would become fully operational between end-September and end-December 2006. We

are pressing for this transition to take place as soon as possible to improve security

and humanitarian access in Darfur. The $442 million FY 2007 CIPA request also

includes $282 million to sustain the current U.N. peacekeeping operation in Southern Sudan (UNMIS).

Question. Has the State Department begun planning for the possible role of NATO

or a new U.N. peacekeeping mission in Darfur?

Answer. The Department is working with the United Nations, bilateral partners,

and the African Union to expedite a formal African Union (AU) request for a U.N.

re-hat of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and to obtain a U.N. Security

Council Resolution authorizing that transition shortly thereafter. In the interim before adoption of that resolution, we are working with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to advance the planning process authorized by our February 3 UNSC Presidential Statement, which directed DPKO to cooperate with the

UNSC members, the AU, and the parties to the Darfur conflict to begin planning

for a future U.N. peacekeeping operation in Darfur. We have provided DPKO with

four U.S. military planners from the joint staff and will continue working with

DPKO and the Secretary General’s office to expedite the planning process.

We are also exploring new ways to increase AMIS capacity in the interim. AMIS

needs additional expertise and, as the President has said, we believe NATO can do

more. NATO has already trained over 120 AMIS Force Headquarters staff and has

taken the lead in providing strategic airlift for thousands of newly deployed or rotating AMIS troops. We are working closely with European allies to determine how

NATO, in coordination with the EU, can provide more support and are optimistic

that, with a request for assistance from the United Nations or African Union, NATO

will be able to do more.

Question. What is the administration’s strategic plan for Sudan and how is it

linked to its budget request? Is your budget request sufficient to cover our strategy

in Sudan for the coming year?

Answer. The overarching U.S. policy goal is to achieve a peaceful and democratic

transformation that assures broad participation in the political process and fosters

civil liberties and to promote a just, viable political settlement to the conflicts in a

united Sudan. Our strategy to achieve this is multifaceted. One facet is a stable

Southern Sudan; demilitarized, at peace with its northern neighbors, and on the

path toward long-term reconstruction with immediate humanitarian needs met. AnVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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other is to help bring an end to the conflict in Darfur and facilitate the return of

internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes. The reconstruction of

Southern Sudan is a major subgoal of the United States strategy for rebuilding and

stabilizing Sudan. However, because events in Southern Sudan are closely connected and affected by events in other parts of the country, including Darfur, Eastern Sudan, and the North, the USG must take an integrated approach. The USG

assistance to Sudan is divided into three categories:

• Humanitarian Assistance: Meeting basic humanitarian needs—food, shelter,

and health services—of vulnerable and returning populations affected by conflict will reduce the threats to stability and thus strengthen the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. • Transitional Security: Elements that contribute to transitional security include

such activities as peacekeeping in Darfur; transformation of the SPLA into a

professional army; assistance to strengthen the rule of law and to mitigate conflict in the south; and support to the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). We also

believe a more robust peacekeeping effort is needed in Darfur and for that reason support a U.N. re-hat of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), but one that

would incorporate elements of AMIS. In a transition to a U.N. peacekeeping

force we would concurrently support and strengthen AMIS during the transition

period. • Reconstruction of Governance, the Economy and Social Services: Strategic investments for the south to provide essential services in communities that will

be receiving returnees; to mitigate local conflict over scarce resources; to rehabilitate infrastructure for the promotion of markets and freedom of movement;

to promote immediate agricultural and enterprise opportunities; and to support

the creation of a participatory and responsive government structure and system.

The Department of State’s FY07 budget request is specifically keyed to funding

these categories and objectives. We believe our FY07 request, when coupled with the

FY06 supplemental request, is sufficient to implement our Sudan strategy as outlined.

Question. Given that Somalia is a failed state, a breeding ground for terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, and a convenient base for pirates and criminal networks that are roaming around the region unhindered, why is the funding request

for Somalia so low?

Answer. The formation of a transitional governing entity known as the Somalia

Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) provides an opportunity for increased U.S.

engagement in FY 2007; however, Somalia’s continued instability, lack of security,

and low absorptive capacity hampers extensive U.S. direct bilateral assistance programming in many sectors in Somalia.

For example, in FY 2005, the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was forced to suspend the award of additional Democracy and Human Rights Funds (DHRF) due to

the inability to gain access to Somali territory to maintain appropriate project monitoring and financial controls. In addition, existing legislation prevents direct assistance to a Somali Government due to Somalia’s significant arrears to the United

States and further complicates our ability to program U.S. assistance in Somalia.

Despite these restrictions, we continue to program limited levels of U.S. foreign

assistance in Somalia in the areas of governance, conflict resolution, and support

for civil society. As a result, U.S. assistance programs in Somalia are currently supporting peacebuilding efforts by Somali civil society organizations in an effort make

the region less vulnerable to terrorist organizations seeking a safe haven. In addition, U.S. humanitarian assistance will address the humanitarian needs of the Somali people. In FY 2006, increased Public Law 480, title II assistance will address

the humanitarian needs of approximately 1.7 million people currently at risk of

starvation in southern Somalia. Vulnerable populations in Somalia, particularly in

the regions of Puntland and Somaliland, will also receive humanitarian assistance

through U.S. contributions to the Africa programs of the International Committee

of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. We will

continue to review opportunities for additional U.S. assistance activities and programs in Somalia as the ongoing political process develops.

Question. Does the administration have a comprehensive strategy to promote

peace and democratic governance in Somalia? Is the Office of Reconstruction and

Stabilization involved in assisting with the development of such a plan?

Answer. The administration’s strategy to promote peace and democracy in Somalia will build upon earlier successes in the reconciliation process and work with our

regional and international partners to support the reestablishment of stability and

effective governance in Somalia. U.S. policy toward Somalia is designed to support

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the reestablishment of a functioning central government in Somalia capable of

bringing the Somali people out of this long period of civil conflict and addressing

the humanitarian needs of the Somali people and the international community’s

concerns regarding terrorism. In order to achieve these policy objectives, we will coordinate our engagement with our international, regional, and donor partners to

support positive developments in Somalia. The administration’s strategy reflects

guidelines provided by the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

We are currently in the process of seeking and identifying the additional personnel and budget resources needed to implement this engagement strategy and

achieve U.S. policy objectives in Somalia. Our ability to engage effectively with a

nascent Somali Government and governing institutions, however, will be driven by

events inside Somalia and the progress made by various members of the Somalia

Transitional Federal Institutions. In this regard, we have closely followed the recent

convening of the first session of the Somalia Transitional Federal Parliament in

Baidoa. Through the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, we continue to urge all members of the Transitional Federal Institutions to resolve their differences peacefully

within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter.

Question. Is the United States coordinating with other donor countries and international organizations to maximize international assistance? What mechanisms or

bodies exist to do this?

Answer. U.S. assistance to Somalia is coordinated through the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) that was established in December 1993 and consists of a

variety of policy and sectoral committees in an effort to improve the impact of the

international community’s assistance to Somalia. The SACB is a voluntary coordination mechanism that provides a framework for developing coordinated approaches

for donor engagement in Somalia. A range of donors, including the United States,

has provided consistent support for SACB activities.

In addition, during a donor coordination conference in October 2004, the international community agreed that the United Nations should lead coordination and

cooperation of the international community with respect to Somalia and with the

Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). A Declaration of Principles was approved,

establishing a Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC). This framework created the highest level mechanism for coordination between the TFIs and the international community. The CMC is cochaired by the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government and the Special Representative of the United Nations

Secretary General (UNSRSG). The UNSRSG also chairs a weekly meeting that

brings together the international community on an informal basis to discuss political developments. Voluntary U.S. contributions to a variety of United Nations agencies, including the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), World Food Programme

(WFP), and U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF), also support multilateral donor engagement in Somalia.

Although sharp divisions within the TFIs have prevented the CMC from functioning since April 2005, we continue to work with our donor partners and regional

actors to develop and consolidate a common position to advance the reconciliation

process in Somalia. There is a separate monthly donor coordination meeting in

Nairobi chaired by a Troika of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Representatives

from USAID and State participate to the extent possible in the numerous coordination meetings in Nairobi.

Question. Was the administration monitoring the detainees linked to al-Qaeda

who recently escaped from prison in Yemen prior to their escape?

Answer. All 23 prisoners were held at a maximum security facility run by the Political Security Organization (PSO). The Yemeni Government specifically designated

this prison for terrorism-related offenders. U.S. Embassy officials were occasionally

granted access to certain prisoners based on written requests.

Question. What actions did the administration take to try to prevent a repeat of

the detainee escape that took place in 2003?

Answer. The two detainees who escaped from prison in the southern city of Aden

in 2003 were placed, after recapture, in the Sanaa Political Security Organization

prison where prison security was considered tighter.

Question. What assurances, commitments, and cooperation has the United States

received from the Yemeni Government with respect to prosecuting those responsible

for the attack on the USS Cole?

Answer. In July 2004, the surviving terrorists involved in the attack on the USS

Cole were brought to trial as a result of collaborative investigations by the Yemeni

authorities and the FBI. The trials were held with a USG representative present.

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The Attorney General maintained regular contact with the Embassy throughout the

process. In September 2004, a Yemeni court convicted the six terrorists charged

with planning and perpetrating the attack on the USS Cole.

Question. Does the current budget request reflect any changes to our assistance

to Yemen needed to address the prison break and any forthcoming changes to the

United States-Yemen relationship?

Answer. Currently there are no direct funding requests for additional resources

in the aftermath of the escape.

Question. Were you satisfied with our relationship with Yemen before the escape?

Answer. Since the post 9/11 forging of United States-Yemen counterterrorism

partnership, the Yemeni Government has significantly improved the security situation in Yemen and denied Yemen as a haven for al-Qaeda. United States-Yemen

counterterrorism cooperation prior to the January 2006 prison escape was positive,

although Yemen’s limited capabilities often posed challenges.

High-level engagement—e.g., visits to Yemen by Assistant to the President for

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Frances F. Townsend, and President

Saleh’s November 2005 visit to Washington—yielded successes and also highlighted

difficulties. For example, we remained unsatisfied with Yemen’s response to our requests to close down the private sector arms trade, install a modern inventory system to better account for military hardware, and improve information-sharing on

the interrogation of terror suspects. The U.S. Embassy in Sanaa remains focused

on these and other challenges as we continue to the effort to sustain effective

counterterrorism cooperation with Yemen.

Question. What role has this new office played in developing a strategy for addressing stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Sudan? How many people within

this new office are dedicated to Sudan-related work?

Answer. Deputy Secretary Zoellick asked S/CRS to assist the Bureau of African

Affairs (AF) in preparing an interagency conflict transformation plan, with a focus

on planning for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and

ongoing efforts to resolve the crisis in Darfur.

S/CRS facilitated meetings of the interagency to further develop and refine the

strategic goals and essential tasks of this plan. Metrics were identified to measure

progress to meet these goals. This process also provided a forum to synchronize

crosscutting efforts.

At the request of OMB, S/CRS also assisted the interagency in facilitating a review of the interagency Sudan budget requests to identify potential resource gaps.

This analysis helped decisionmakers formulate the FY06 supplemental and the

FY07 budget request.

At the peak of the planning effort in the fall of 2005, S/CRS dedicated four staff

full time to work on Sudan, with three others working half time or more. S/CRS

funded a core Secretariat of 3 personnel, located in the Africa bureau at State, to

improve information flow among the interagency, develop robust performance measures for the plan, and provide geospatial analysis to the reporting. Five S/CRS staff

continue to work part time on Sudan-related issues. S/CRS is providing a security

expert to assist in the Abuja talks, and has funded three positions at the Embassy

in Khartoum to assist in documenting USG-wide conflict transformation planning

and implementation by all USG agencies.

Question. Does the Africa bureau work closely with this new office?

Answer. S/CRS and the Bureau of African Affairs (AF) work collegially and cooperatively on a range of issues. On Sudan, we worked closely on the conflict transformation planning process, an interagency process to develop an overall USG strategy, including resource requirements, for achieving democratic transformation and

an end to conflict.

AF and S/CRS regularly dialogue on strategies to address potential conflict in

countries on the continent. Last year we jointly sponsored a roundtable and simulation on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which generated some new ideas for

the upcoming elections. More recently, S/CRS has cooperated closely with AF on

Chad by fielding a team to assess underlying causes of conflict and to assist Embassy N’Djamena and AF with conflict prevention planning.

Question. Is this new office part of discussions concerning the deployment of additional peacekeepers to Darfur?

Answer. The Bureau of African Affairs (AF), in conjunction with the Bureau of

International Organizations (IO), has the lead in supporting the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and working to transition it to a U.N. peacekeeping operation.

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S/CRS has focused its efforts on developing an overall strategic framework for postconflict reconstruction and democratic transformation in Sudan.

Question. Does the budget request provide adequate resources for its continued or

increased effectiveness? What is its operational budget request for FY 2007?

Answer.

• The FY 2007 funding request for State Operations will provide for 15 additional

personnel on a permanent basis for S/CRS. Because current staffing is largely

dependent on temporary detail arrangements, the additional resources in FY07

would allow us to regularize some of our current staffing and institutionalize

our efforts.

• Current levels of staffing and operations funding allow S/CRS to provide per

year:

Æ Leadership and management of three major country response efforts with regional bureau, including management of planning process;

Æ Support to conflict prevention efforts in three countries;

Æ Leadership of civilian participation in two major military exercises that test

military and civilian planning and deployment for R&S operations.

• Each such country engagement effort includes participation of numerous staff

from other bureaus, departments, and agencies.

Attachments

STATE PERSONNEL FOR S/CRS

Plan 2005 2006 2007

S/CRS and Active Response Corps*

Cumulative FTE .................................................................................................... 9 15 30

Cumulative Temporary Positions** ..................................................................... 22 48 48

Total Perm & Temp ......................................................................................... 31 63 78

* S/CRS staff supplemented by contractors and other short-term hires, as well as interagency detailees.

** Additional temporary State positions, not counting contractors or interns.

[Dollars in thousands]

Account FY05 actual FY06 estimate FY07 request

FY05 Supplemental Operating Funds* ................................................................... $7,700 .................... ....................

Bureau-Managed Operating Funds ......................................................................... **$737 $6,237 $6,507

Cost of Permanent Positions Funded ..................................................................... $1,485 $2,475 $5,250

(total FTE) ...................................................................................................... (9) (15) (30)

Cost of other State nonpermanent staff ................................................................ $2,950 $7,920 $8,400

(total positions; includes Active Response Corps) ....................................... (22) (48) (48)

S/CRS Total (State Operations—D&CP) ................................................... $12,872 $16,632 $20,157

Conflict Response Fund (Foreign Ops) ................................................................... 0 0 75,000

* Supplemental provided 2-year funding; $2.6M obligated in FY05 and $5.1M in FY06.

Question. How will the new Director of Foreign Assistance relate to NSPD–44 and

the role of S/CRS?

Answer. S/CRS was created to better organize our government to address the full

spectrum of conflict—from prevention to response. Our operating assumption has

been that S/CRS would manage to 2–3 post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization

efforts at one time.

We anticipate that S/CRS will be activated when the United States engages in

an effort that requires strategic planning, coordination, and interoperability among

multiple USG agencies in the use of foreign assistance as well as in military, diplomatic, and other areas. S/CRS is also charged with international coordination for

S&R operations, with creating a joint operations capability for managing a response,

and with developing deployable civilian capacity. The Presidential Directive on reconstruction and stabilization, issued in December, reinforces this mandate.

The Director of Foreign Assistance will manage the range of foreign assistance,

which includes about $19 billion in aid provided to 80 countries. This role is complementary to the efforts in S/CRS and in other parts of our Government to focus

on effective U.S. engagement.

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States are most at risk of failure in a transition from conflict because their institutions are weak, and they are often reliant on international assistance, which can

at times be slower in arriving than needed. In a crisis, speed is key. We have to

be able to quickly assess our resources, define goals and objectives, identify needs,

and allocate available resources as quickly and effectively as possible in anticipating, planning, and responding.

By establishing a central node to oversee foreign assistance more broadly, and

look across the entire pool of resources, we see an opportunity to further improve

our capabilities to manage strategies for country assistance programs. The new

structure will provide S/CRS with a valuable partner in our efforts to manage postconflict response.

Question. What relationship will the Director of Foreign Assistance have with the

Assistant Secretaries and Coordinators at the State Department and Assistant Administrators at USAID who currently have responsibility for designing and implementing foreign assistance programs?

Answer. I am establishing the position of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) to

align better our foreign assistance programs with our foreign policy goals, to align

more fully the foreign assistance activities of USAID and State, and to demonstrate

that we are responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars. I am investing the DFA with

authority over foreign assistance funding and programs to achieve these goals, not

to supervise Assistant Secretaries and Coordinators or Assistant Administrators.

Nor are the reporting relationships of Assistant Secretaries or Assistant Administrators expected to change. Instead, the Director of Foreign Assistance will work closely

with Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Administrators in exercising his authority

over foreign assistance funding and programs and developing coordinated strategies,

plans, and budgets.

Question. Who will control the funds that are currently apportioned to those individuals and how will the decisionmaking process work?

Answer. To the extent permitted by law, I will delegate to the Director of Foreign

Assistance the foreign assistance funding authorities consistent with and necessary

to achieve a single coordinated foreign assistance approval authority. Under my direction, the DFA will have approval and coordinating authority over all foreign assistance.

Question. How has the Department of State planned for managing a wide-scale

outbreak of avian influenza in Africa, and has your office developed contingency

plans to address the diplomatic, economic, and security concerns that an outbreak

of avian influenza may have in each major region of the continent?

Answer. The H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus has spread to

Africa, with the virus detected in Nigeria, Egypt, and Niger. We are particularly

concerned about the potential for spread of the H5N1 virus in Africa, given the relatively weak health and preparedness infrastructure in many African countries and

the continent’s high incidence of immunocompromised people. Further, the H5N1

virus is not just a health matter but an economic, security, and social issue. Outbreaks in birds cause economic hardships and may threaten food security in some

regions. The social, economic, and political impacts of a virulent human flu pandemic, whether sparked by the strain that is currently circulating in birds or by any

other new strain, could be devastating.

Our framework for action in Africa is predicated on measures in support of surveillance, preparedness, response, and containment.

The State Department has established an interagency African Avian Influenza

Network that was activated to respond to avian influenza outbreaks in Africa, starting with Nigeria. U.S. Ambassadors are instructed to encourage host governments

to promote strong interagency communication and coordination (particularly among

Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Information) to combat the threat of avian influenza. As in the case of Nigeria, U.S. Embassies are encouraged to work closely

with other donors and U.N. resident representatives to prioritize host country needs

and coordinate appropriate international responses. Our Embassies are instructed

to convey to host governments the importance of coordinating their efforts with

neighboring countries, and U.S. Embassies in neighboring countries also coordinate

closely among themselves. Regional organizations such as the Economic Community

of West African States (ECOWAS) have been engaged to develop regional response

strategies and resources, as outbreaks become more widespread.

Within the African Avian Influenza Network, the State Department’s Avian Influenza Action Group and the Bureau of African Affairs are coordinating closely with

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of

Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the DeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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partment of Defense (DOD) and other appropriate agencies, both in Washington and

in affected and high-risk countries, to develop assistance programs and technical

support for countries potentially affected by outbreaks. Both the interagency African

Avian Influenza Network in Washington and the country teams at U.S. Embassies

and consulates overseas are developing appropriate contingency plans for addressing

the anticipated diplomatic, economic, and security concerns of countries affected by

avian influenza in Africa. Our plans are coordinated with appropriate international

technical organizations including the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health

(OIE) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO).

Question. Do you believe the budget request includes enough support for regional

organizations and countries that need to strengthen their capabilities to respond to

such an outbreak in the coming year?

Answer. At the present time, we believe that $214 million in FY 2007 funds, in

addition to $280 million in FY 2006 supplemental appropriations will be adequate

to help support regional organizations and countries that need to strengthen their

capabilities to respond to such an outbreak in the coming year and to help contain

an influenza outbreak beyond the borders of the United States. The adequacy of

U.S. support must take into account the totality of contributions of the international

community, including financial and other support provided by multilateral, bilateral, and private sector donors. The reality of the threat of pandemic influenza is

that it is too large for any one country to address alone, and requires a comprehensive and coordinated response from the international community. It is also important to realize that building the capacity of many of these nations to adequately

respond will require time as well as funding (conducting training, building

laboratories, developing and establishing policies, etc.) and some tasks may require

more than a year to complete.

Question. Please provide a description of the new DOD-State transition planning

group for Iraq and Afghanistan led by GEN (Ret.) Kicklighter.

• Given how complex our stabilization and reconstruction operations in Iraq have

been, will this new planning effort for two countries dilute the quality of its

work?

• What are the primary products or processes GEN Kicklighter will deliver?

• Why wasn’t this new effort set up until last October or November?

Answer. The Iraq-Afghanistan Joint Transition Planning Group is a joint Department of State and Department of Defense team that has been asked by both Secretaries to review U.S. Government efforts to address medium- and long-range transition challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recognizing the complexity of the issues

and the number of interested agencies, the group has been asked to focus the scope

of their assessment primarily on security-related transition challenges.

Currently, the group is collecting data and engaging in initial analysis exercises;

the final product is still being contemplated.

Through the end of 2005, a major focus of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaign

plans was the training and equipping of the security forces. This remains a priority

but as the respective security forces start to command increasing responsibility, the

time has come to consider and prepare for security-related transitions in the

medium- and long-range timeframe.

Question. Would the U.S. Government render a suspect to a country that is known

to practice torture, as long as that government assured the United States that it

would not torture that particular suspect? What form would that assurance take?

Answer. The United States does not transfer individuals to other countries where

it believes it is more likely than not that they will be tortured. Decisions with respect to transfers are analyzed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular circumstances of the transfer, the country to which the transfer is being

made, the individual concerned, and any concerns regarding torture or persecution

that may arise.

In the immigration removal and extradition contexts, the United States reserves

the use of assurances for a very small number of cases where it can reasonably rely

on such assurances that the individuals being transferred would not be tortured.

In the context of decisions relating to the transfer or repatriation of individuals

detained by the U.S. Armed Forces at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba, the Department works closely with the Department of Defense and relevant

agencies to advise on the likelihood of torture or other treatment concerns in a given

country and the adequacy and credibility of assurances obtained from a particular

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foreign government prior to any transfer. In each of these contexts, as appropriate,

the United States obtains assurances in order to be satisfied that it is not more

likely than not that the individual in question will be tortured upon return. If, taking into account all relevant information, including any assurances received, the

United States believes that a person more likely than not will be tortured if returned to a foreign country, the United States would not approve the return of the

person to that country. Finally, in answer to your question regarding form, these

assurances, when obtained, are frequently transmitted through diplomatic notes.

Question. Do you seek similar assurances that individuals will not be subject to

cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment?

Answer. As a general matter it should be noted that article 3 of the Convention

Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

provides that ‘‘[n]o State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person

to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would

be in danger of being subjected to torture.’’ By its terms, this provision applies to

torture and not to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. That

said, it should be noted that in some contexts the Department of State seeks more

specific assurances, as appropriate. For example, if the receiving State in question

is not a party to certain relevant treaties, such as the Convention Against Torture,

the Department may pursue more specific assurances, which, for example, assure

that an individual will not be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

Question. As you know, the European Parliament is currently investigating

whether the CIA or other U.S. Agencies or other countries carried out abductions,

extraordinary rendition, detention at secret sites, and torture of prisoners in EU

countries or have used EU countries to transfer prisoners. Would you support a

similar inquiry by the U.S. Congress into these matters?

Answer. No, I would not. As this administration has repeatedly stated, and as I

made clear on my trip to Europe in early December, the United States does not condone torture. Nor does it transport detainees from one country to another for the

purpose of being tortured. Moreover, our policy has been clear that the United

States does not authorize interrogations that involve cruel, inhuman, or degrading

treatment, as defined by U.S. obligations under the Torture Convention, regardless

of where those interrogations occur. The Detainee Treatment Act codified this policy

into law.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR MEL MARTINEZ

WESTERN HEMISPHERE ACCOUNTS: USAID PROGRAMS

Question. The biggest regional funding setbacks appear to be in the two key

USAID Bilateral Economic Assistance programs: Child Survival/Health and Development Assistance, which suffered a combined decrease from last year’s actual funding of more than $85 million. Even counting the significant $31 million boost that

State Economic Support Fund (ESF) and the $22 million increase in funding for

HIV/AIDS in Haiti and Guyana, the net regional decrease (more than $32 million)

is troubling.

Why were these decreases to USAID programs necessary? Some of that decrease

may be the result of some countries naturally ‘‘graduating’’ or ramping off of certain

child care programs (e.g., El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Peru),

but it seems that even that money should be reinvested in the region. Did you consider shifting it to other countries in the region?

Answer. While the FY 2007 request for Development Assistance funding has been

reduced from $254 million to $182 million (28% reduction) and Child Survival and

Health (CSH) funding has declined from $141 million to $128 million (10% reduction), the overall foreign assistance request for the region has remained in line with

previous years because of increased Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) funding.

Most of the reduction in CSH is in the family planning budget category. The

Agency has recently developed criteria for phasing out USAID family planning assistance, based on two internationally accepted benchmarks in family planning:

Total fertility and contraceptive prevalence rates. Using these criteria, the LAC Bureau has identified six countries in which to phase-out family planning assistance

over a 2- to 5-year period. The Bureau will gradually reduce the amount of CSHfunded family planning assistance in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica,

Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru.

Much work remains to be done to improve equitable and sustainable access to voluntary family planning services in Haiti, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras—counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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tries that do not meet the Agency-defined criteria for phaseout of family planning

assistance. Therefore, these family planning programs are not being phased out.

The administration has determined that the majority of CSH resources will be

targeted to regions of the world that have greater need for health resources with

large population densities, limited access to clean water, and lack arable land. No

consideration was given to shifting resources to other countries in the region.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE ACCOUNTS: COUNTERDRUG & LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS

Question. The two key counterdrug programs for the region, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) ($60,885M to $54,800M) and Andean

Counter Drug Initiative (ACI) (from $727,155M to $721,500M) have been decreased

a total of $11,740M. This is the wrong time to trim counterdrug programs in the

region. Why were these funds decreased overall? Why were programs in Peru and

Bolivia decreased so much? (Peru: $106,920 to $98,500; Bolivia: From $79.2M to

$66M)

Answer. The decreased FY 2007 budget request for the Western Hemisphere

INCLE account primarily reflects a $5 million reduction in funding for Haiti in an

effort, to take into account the country’s capacity to absorb assistance and effectively

use the assistance we provide to rebuild law enforcement and judicial institutions.

The FY 2007 budget request for all of ACI provides virtually the same level of

funding as in FY 2006. However, the need to keep Colombia at viable levels, to meet

funding requirements for the Air Bridge Denial program, and to accelerate the Critical Flight Safety program necessitated funding adjustments within the ACI account. For example, we will continue the Air Bridge Denial program in FY 2007 by

funding it through the Colombia Interdiction line item instead of a separate line

item, as was the case in previous fiscal years. The FY 2007 ACI request also devotes

additional resources to the much-needed Critical Flight Safety Program. The increased request for this program will accelerate the Department of State’s Air

Wing’s efforts to upgrade its severely aged aircraft fleet to commercial standards in

order to sustain counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions in the Andean region.

At $66 million, Bolivia will have sufficient funds to maintain current program levels. New programs that were envisioned for FY 2007, such as forced eradication operations in the Yungas, will not be possible at this level of funding. However, while

the decision to reduce the Bolivia program to a level below the FY 2006 was made

prior to the election of Evo Morales as President, it does not appear that the Morales administration is planning on pursuing aggressive coca reduction policies in

the Yungas. USG-owned aviation assets in Bolivia will also benefit from the Critical

Flight Safety program, which will upgrade seven helicopters at an approximate cost

of $21 million.

The FY 2007 funding request for Peru mirrors the administration’s FY 2006

request of $98 million. An increased appropriation in FY 2006 plus our FY 2007 request, along with some internal shifting of program resources, will enable the Government of Peru to enhance levels of interdiction and eradication to address the 38-

percent increase in coca cultivation and meet program targets.

Question. The two key counterdrug programs for the region, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) ($60,885M to $54,800M) and Andean

Counter Drug Initiative (ACI) (from $727,155M to $721,500M) have been decreased

a total of $11,740M. This is the wrong time to trim counterdrug programs in the

region. Why was the Haiti law enforcement funding decreased—at a time when we

need to sustain support to Haiti?

Answer. We agree that Haiti needs sustained support. However, we must balance

our efforts to build an effective administration of justice and law enforcement structure with the absorptive capacity of the Haitian Government. We have made a longterm commitment to rebuild Haiti’s law enforcement and judicial institutions that

takes into account Haiti’s ability to use the provided assistance effectively.

We believe that the level of funding for law enforcement is appropriate given the

current situation in Haiti. We will continue to closely monitor the situation and recommend changes as necessary. We hope that our assistance will grow as a democratically elected government takes office and the fruits of our initial reform take

hold, increasing Haiti’s absorptive capacity.

84

WESTERN HEMISPHERE ACCOUNTS: FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF) AND

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND EDUCATION TRAINING (IMET) PROGRAM

Question. What is your assessment of how the FMF program is working in the

region?

Answer. The FMF program in the Western Hemisphere is working well, despite

the tight budget environment and American Servicemembers’ Protection Act prohibitions on some military assistance programs. FMF assists regional governments to

control their national territory, better defend maritime approaches to the United

States, and undertake defense modernization for participation in peacekeeping and

coalition operations. Among our larger programs, FMF supports Colombia’s

counterterrorism and naval interdiction efforts, which have resulted in a decrease

in terrorist attacks in that country from 1,257 in 2003 to 611 in 2005; modernization

and interoperability programs for El Salvador, which as a key coalition partner is

currently on its fifth rotation in Iraq and has committed to a sixth; and a new initiative—Enduring Friendship—to enhance security of our ‘‘Third Border’’ by promoting

Caribbean security and stability. In addition to individual country programs

through which countries receive assistance, the Enduring Friendship regional program would provide FMF funds to select Caribbean countries to support maritime

security efforts in the Caribbean Basin. Also, as part of the broader security assistance program for the region, four Central American countries have received peacekeeping operations funding in the past to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities

as part of a worldwide peacekeeping operations initiative and may again receive

funding in FY07.

Question. Should we consider delinking IMET—for specifically targeted countries—from constraints imposed by American Service Member Protection Act

(ASPA)?

Answer. First, it is important to remember why we pursue article 98 agreements.

We have major reservations with the International Criminal Court and its claim of

jurisdiction over U.S. persons. These agreements protect all U.S. persons and

servicemembers from surrender to the International Criminal Court without our

consent and thus remain a priority for the President and the Department of State.

The prohibitions the Congress included in the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) have been useful in securing many of the 101 article 98 agreements

we have signed to date. These are important agreements to protect U.S. persons

from illegitimate assertions of jurisdiction over all U.S. persons—particularly our

servicemembers acting overseas. We have authority in the ASPA to waive the prohibitions for important national interests and are now reviewing the remaining IMET

prohibitions on countries that have not yet signed an article 98 agreement to determine whether this prohibition is still helpful to our efforts to secure article 98 agreements and whether it is important to our national interest to restart IMET programs with these countries even in the absence of article 98 agreements.

Question. Do you agree that the sanctions that cut the flow of IMET money can

create a vacuum that other nations might fill and limit our contact? Is the executive

branch considering using the ASPA authority to allow IMET money for countries

that are ICC signatories—but do not have article 98 agreements? Do you think a

legislative fix would be required?

Answer. Attempts by countries such as China, the United Kingdom, Russia,

France, and India to expand their influence by offering military training predates

the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA), but the ASPA prohibitions

may have opened a wider window of opportunity for them in some countries. The

prohibitions Congress included in the ASPA have been useful in securing many of

the 101 article 98 agreements we have signed to date. These are important agreements to protect U.S. persons from illegitimate assertions of jurisdiction over U.S.

citizens. We believe we have adequate authority in the ASPA to waive the prohibitions for important national interests and are now reviewing the remaining IMET

prohibitions on countries that have not yet signed an article 98 agreement to determine whether this prohibition still provides leverage in our efforts to secure article

98 agreements to protect U.S. persons from surrender to the International Criminal

Court without U.S. consent and whether it is important to our national interest to

restart IMET programs with these countries.

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION

Question. Is the $3B in this year’s request enough? It appears that if you move

forward on planned compacts that are already in the pipeline—your funds could be

85

obligated by the end of this fiscal year. Is that accurate? What will happen if additional countries come on line seeking funding?

Answer. On April 3, 2006, MCC will sign its eighth compact, reflecting commitments of over $1.5 billion, in addition to having signed threshold agreements with

five countries for nearly $100 million. In the current fiscal year, MCC is on track

to finalize at least three more compacts totaling an additional $1.1 billion, which

will represent funding commitments of up to $1.7 billion for FY06, almost twice the

level committed in FY05.

MCC projects that in the FY07, we expect to sign between 9 and 12 new compacts, comprising commitments of more than $3 billion. As a result, MCC will have

total commitments approaching $6 billion, with up to 21 countries, by the end of

FY07.

Because of the robust demand of eligible countries, we are projecting that all currently available program funds from FY04, FY05, and FY06 will be exhausted by

the second quarter of FY07, making the FY07 request for MCC all that more critical

to our success.

At funding levels lower than $3 billion, MCC will likely delay negotiating compacts with some eligible countries, not to mention the newly eligible FY07 countries

that the Board of Directors will select this November. It would be unfortunate if

these countries who have undertaken significant political, economic, and social policy reforms, and those striving to be selected, find that meeting the criteria for eligibility does not result in actual funding of their development projects to achieve longterm sustainable economic growth.

As Chair of the MCC Board of Directors, this is something I, and the board, feel

strongly about, as noted in the recent letter to Senate and House appropriators that

each member of the board signed. I look forward to working with Congress to ensure

that MCC has sufficient funding as we move forward with our critical mission in

the developing world.

Question. I know that before the recent elections, the previous government in Bolivia submitted an ambitious project for the consideration of the MCC Board. What

is the status of that project? Has the MCC Board reviewed it? Is it a proposal that

has merit?

Answer. The Bolivian Government under President Rodriguez delivered an ambitious proposal to MCC on December 1, 2005, 3 weeks before the elections that

brought the Morales administration into power. At that time, MCC agreed with the

Bolivian Government and the Bolivian Embassy in Washington that MCC would

wait to review the proposal until the new government was established and indicated

whether it wished to proceed with the December proposal or develop a new proposal.

As of March 1, 2006, the Morales administration has not formally communicated

its intentions to MCC with respect to the December proposal. The MCC Board of

Directors has not reviewed the proposal. MCC staff has not undertaken a thorough

review of the proposal as MCC is awaiting the position to be adopted by the Morales

administration with respect to the proposal.

Question. Was this project coordinated with the Morales campaign? If so, what

have been the early signals on whether they will proceed forward vigorously with

this project?

Answer. The proposal submitted to MCC was not coordinated with the Morales

campaign directly but rather was developed through a consultative process to which

the Morales campaign and its major constituencies were parties. On several occasions during the process the Bolivian MCC program coordinator contacted the leaders of all the leading political parties with regard to the proposal being developed.

As of March 1, 2006, the Morales administration has not formally communicated

its intentions to MCC with respect to the December proposal.

Question. What linkage—if any—is there between awards of Millennium Challenge funding and other State and USAID assistance? Do we decrease State-ESF

or USAID DA or Child Surv/Health if/when a country receives MC assistance?

Answer. Funding for MCA has not resulted in reductions to traditional assistance

programs during this administration. Consistent with the commitments made in

Monterrey, Mexico, the administration has maintained or grown the core development accounts while ramping up the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). For example, in 2001,

enacted funding for Development Assistance and Child Survival & Heath accounts

totaled $2.12 billion. In the President’s FY07 budget, $2.71 billion is requested for

these two same core accounts. As MCA builds to full capacity and its intended funding level of $5 billion annually, it will become the principal U.S. assistance mechaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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nism in its partner countries, allowing USAID to continue to refocus its aid

resources where they can have the greatest impact on poverty reduction and key

development needs, like education and health.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR PAUL SARBANES

Question. On what basis do you estimate such sharply reduced (IDFA) needs for

FY 2007?

Answer. The requested level of funding should be sufficient to maintain the U.S.

Government’s ability to monitor and initiate responses to emergency needs worldwide.

IDFA funding for FY 2007 will also allow the U.S. Government to continue to improve emergency response and disaster mitigation capabilities of disaster-prone

countries.

The budget would not be sufficient to ensure an adequate U.S. Government response in the event of a large-scale natural disaster or major famine event (e.g.,

Asia’s tsunami, Pakistan earthquake, Ethiopia 2000–01).

Question. Can you explain why you have once again cut ASHA in the FY 2007

request?

Answer. FY 2007 is a tight budget year. We have allocated available resources

as best we can to meet a broad range of priorities. We continue to value ASHA programs.

Question. Despite a record of efficiency and results, acknowledged even by Ambassador Bolton, UNICEF faces a cut in the proposed U.S. contribution for FY07. Likewise, the budget request cuts over $14 million from UNDP, and earmarks nearly

half of the remaining $94.5 million for trust funds. What is the rationale for cutting

programs that have proven their cost-effectiveness?

Answer. The administration’s FY 2007 International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) request, which funds voluntary U.S. contributions, aims not to exceed $289

million, or 2.5 percent over the FY06 request. The requests for UNICEF ($123 million) and UNDP ($94.5 million) together account for 75 percent of the IO&P budget

request. The FY 2007 request for UNICEF represents a $9 million increase over the ad- ministration’s request of $14 million in FY06. The $9 million increase in the request

for UNICEF accounts for more than 100 percent of the total net requested increase

in the IO&P account ($289 million in FY07 versus $282 million in FY06).

The U.S. Government is the largest single donor to UNICEF. The United States

has played a leadership role in UNICEF since its inception and continues to do so

under the leadership of former Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman, as the

UNICEF Executive Director. The United States support for, and leadership in,

UNICEF activities offers compelling evidence of the U.S. commitment to the United

Nations, to multilateralism, and to addressing humanitarian crises and development

challenges.

With respect to UNDP, the administration’s FY07 request of $94.5 mil- lion is virtually the same as the FY06 request of $95 million. The FY07 request includes $50 million for UNDP’s regular budget to support administrative and general programming costs. It also includes $24.5 million and

$20 million respectively to UNDP trust funds for democratic governance

and crisis prevention and recovery. These are core UNDP functions.

Moreover, these allocations support the Secretary’s initiative to restructure foreign assistance by aligning our resources with our interests and priorities.

Question. What is the total of our current international peacekeeping arrears?

Why has the administration not requested funding to pay these arrears? Do you

support lifting the cap on peacekeeping contributions, which is the cause of our

going into arrears?

Answer. Prior to FY 2000, the U.S.-accumulated arrears of approximately $400

million primarily caused by a 25-percent cap on peacekeeping payments. Although

Congress appropriated sufficient funds each year from FY 2000 until FY 2005 to pay

annual assessments, the pre-2000 arrears remain outstanding, and in FY 2005 our

arrears grew by $145 million because appropriated funds were not equal to our assessments.

The shortfall for FY 2005 of $145.010 million and the projected shortfall for FY

2006 of $376.752 million totals $521.762 million. Due to the emergency situation in

Sudan/Darfur, the FY 2006 supplemental budget contains a request of $69.8 million

87

in the CIPA account for Sudan/Darfur as well as transfer authority language from

the peacekeeping operations request which, in total, would offset $129.8 million of

the above total arrears for a net projected new arrears of $391.962 million at the

end of FY 2006.

The administration strongly supports full payment of U.N. peacekeeping assessments to ensure continued American leadership in shaping the international community’s response to developments that threaten international peace and stability.

The administration requested authority to lift the 25-percent assessment rate cap

on payments of U.N. peacekeeping assessments during FY 2006, in order to permit

payments at the rate assessed by the United Nations, up to 27.1 percent. However,

this authority was not included in the enacted FY 2006 appropriations legislation.

Question. What do you estimate to be the increased costs for salaries, hardship

and danger pay, language training, educational allowances, security upgrades, and

other personnel-related expenses in connection with the ‘‘global repositioning’’ plan?

Answer. This summer we are beginning a shift of 100 personnel from Washington

and the European Affairs bureau (EUR) to overseas positions in the other regional

bureaus as well as within a number of regions. The initiative also includes new

Iran-related positions in Washington and abroad. As we are just starting the implementation process, the impact in FY 2006 will mostly be related to one-time startup

costs for establishing the new positions from EUR and Washington in other areas

of the world and shifting positions within some regions. We are going through a

process now to identify the net change in salary and position support costs, taking

into account the timing of when incumbents will vacate positions being abolished

and when officers will arrive in the newly created positions. These costs (approximately $5 million across all bureaus) are being incorporated into our FY 2006

spending plans and will pay future dividends by shifting our personnel and resources to critical needs posts overseas.

Question. What kinds of security studies have been done, or will be done, prior

to opening the American Presence Posts, where our diplomats would move outside

the Embassy to live and work and represent America in potentially difficult and

dangerous settings?

Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security participates in an interdepartmental

working group that is studying the concept of American Presence Posts (APPs) and

developing guidelines and procedures for opening APPs. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act (SECCA) of 1999 (Public Law 106–113) requires

that any new diplomatic facility meet collocation and 100-foot-setback statutory requirements. The collocation, setback, and waiver requirements uniformly apply to

embassies, consulates, and APPs. Once a post has identified a potential APP site,

the Regional Security Officer (RSO), in coordination with DS Headquarters and the

Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), will conduct a physical security

survey of the location to determine security requirements. APP sites must adhere

to, or be in, the final stages of compliance with the Overseas Security Policy Board

(OSPB) standards prior to occupancy. Additionally, waivers to SECCA and exceptions to OSPB standards must be obtained for any site deficiencies that cannot be

remedied.

Question. In the aftermath of September 11, Congress granted the President limited and conditional authority to waive section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. As

part of that waiver, there was also an agreement made between the administration

and Congress to ensure military parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However,

in this year’s budget, the President has requested $4.5 million in FMF for Azerbaijan and only $3.5 million for Armenia, as well as $885,000 in IMET for Azerbaijan and only $790,000 for Armenia. On what basis has the administration decided to depart from its previous commitment to provide equal amounts of military

assistance for Armenia and Azerbaijan? What actions has the United States taken

in response to belligerent rhetoric from Azerbaijan, such as President Aliyev’s statements that ‘‘this year defense spending has grown by 76 percent, we will create a

powerful army and will be able to liberate our lands at any time,’’ and that ‘‘hostilities could break out again’’ if the international community does not force Armenia to return Nagorno-Karabakh?

Answer. The waiver of section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act annually since

2002 has allowed us to provide military assistance that enhances Azerbaijan’s interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces. The proposed FY 2007 FMF level for Azerbaijan is linked to U.S. priorities in fighting terrorism and strengthening maritime

security to address WMD proliferation, terrorist transit, and drug trafficking on the

Caspian Sea. FMF will also enhance Azerbaijan’s capabilities to participate in international peacekeeping efforts.

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We share your concerns about the still-unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The minor increase in FMF for Azerbaijan as proposed in the President’s budget request in January does not signal any change in the U.S. position on NagornoKarabakh. We have communicated that very clearly to the governments of both nations. Furthermore, we provide all assistance on terms that clarify both its intended

purposes and the limitations on its use.

Question. How much of Iraq’s preinvasion debt has been forgiven by countries

other than the United States? How much debt remains, and to which countries?

Answer. Iraq’s sovereign debt outstanding in April 2003 was approximately $124 billion, of which about $100 billion was owed to other countries and $24 billion owed

to commercial creditors. Of the debt to other countries, $39.6 billion was held by

Paris Club creditors (which includes the G–8 and other developed countries). The

exact amount of Iraq’s sovereign debt will only be known once Iraq has reconciled

claims with all its creditors and negotiated debt reduction agreements.

The Paris Club agreed in November 2004 to forgive 80 percent of Iraq’s Paris

Club debt in three tranches (30% when the agreement was signed; 30% once Iraq

reached a standby arrangement with the IMF; and a final 20% after 3 years of successful performance under the standby arrangement). All but two of the 18 Paris

Club members have signed bilateral agreements with Iraq implementing the Paris

Club agreement. Iraq expects to reach agreements with the last two, Russia and

Australia, soon.

Iraq’s remaining debt to other countries, estimated at about $61.6 billion, is owed primarily to Arabian Peninsula countries ($44 billion). Iraq expects to resume discussions soon with these debtors over settlement of their claims, which remain to

be reconciled.

We have urged all non-Paris Club countries to give Iraq debt reduction at Paris

Club terms, if not better. Romania, Slovakia, and Malta have concluded debt agreements; we expect others to do so. At Iraq’s request, the Paris Club will send letters

to 11 of Iraq’s non-Paris Club creditors urging them to conclude agreements at Paris

Club terms.

Iraq has also made considerable progress with its commercial creditors, with

claimants holding nearly 70 percent of the commercial claims having accepted offers

to settle on terms comparable to Paris Club terms.

Question. Why does the FY 2007 budget request fail to account for the full costs

of ongoing war operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? How can these expenses be justified as ‘‘unanticipated emergencies’’?

Answer. The FY 2007 request for foreign assistance includes $771.19 million in ESF and other programs for Iraq, and $610 million in ESF and other programs for

Afghanistan. None of this money has been requested to fund ongoing military operations. This funding would support programs that are critical to continuing our engagement with Afghanistan and Iraq, and supporting their transition to self-reliance. For Iraq, these programs are broken down into two main areas. First, $276.5 million is for a range of programs to develop the capacity of Iraq’s national-level government, support economic reform, and develop the agricultural and private sectors.

Second, $494.69 million is requested to support a range of political, rule of law, and

democracy programs. While we believe that this funding will be critical in achieving

our goals of supporting Iraq’s transition, we are not seeking these funds on the basis

of ‘‘unanticipated emergencies.’’ In Afghanistan, the $610 million FY 2007 ESF request represents funding for the

large-scale USG reconstruction program taking place around the country. Like Iraq,

this funding request is not for military operations and we are not seeking it on the

basis of ‘‘unanticipated emergencies.’’ Almost half of the FY 2007 request—$276.5—

will be used to fund infrastructure projects (roads and electrical power projects). The

remainder of the FY 2007 ESF request, if approved, would be spread across various

sectors including: Education, Health, Agriculture and Alternative Livelihoods, Economic Governance, Democracy and Governance, and PRT Quick Impact projects.

Question. On January 5, the President announced the launch of a new ‘‘National Security Language Initiative’’ and promised to request $114 million in FY07. How

much of this funding is included in the State Department’s budget. Which new or

improved programs will these funds support?

Answer. The State Department portion of the $114 million is $26.7 million. This

amount will allow the Department to support study of critical languages by Americans and build on the achievements of the flagship Fulbright Scholarship program,

Gilman Scholarships for U.S. undergraduates and youth exchange programs

through the following activities:

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• U.S. Fulbright Students: Provide 6 months of overseas language study as an

add-on to U.S. Fulbright student grants for at least 150 selected participants

to study critical-need languages before beginning their academic projects. • Intensive Advanced Language Study: Expand intensive overseas summer language study institutes in critical-need languages for American university students at intermediate and advanced levels. • Intensive Introductory Language Institutes: Increase the study of critical-need

languages by American undergraduates through overseas summer language

programs for beginners. • Gilman Scholarships: Triple the number of opportunities for Gilman scholars

(U.S. undergraduates with financial need) to study abroad in critical-need language countries. • Fulbright Teaching Assistants: Expand the Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistant (FLTA) program to bring 300 foreign teachers to the United

States to help teach their native languages at U.S colleges and high schools,

while studying English and U.S. studies. • Teacher Exchange: Bring 25 foreign high school teachers of English to the

United States to teach Chinese, Arabic, and Russian in U.S. high schools and

send 50 American teachers abroad for intensive summer study of critical-need

languages. • High School Exchange: Expand academic year, semester, and short-term exchanges abroad for American high school students in critical-need languages. • Overseas Teaching: Increase support for USG-funded institutions providing critical-need language instruction abroad, such as the American Overseas Research

Centers.

In addition to the $26.7 million, the President’s request includes $1.2 million to

provide for 8 additional positions critical to the successful execution of these initiatives.

Question. Concerns have been raised within the academic community that the

Commerce Department’s proposed rule on ‘‘deemed exports’’ will have a significant

negative impact on our ability to attract and retain highly qualified foreign students

and researchers to U.S. universities. Do you believe there are fundamental differences between universities and private companies that should be reflected in the

final rule? When do you expect the Commerce Department to publish its response

to the rulemaking?

Answer. We are working with the Department of Commerce to ensure that should

there be any change to the deemed export regulation, such a change would balance

the need to protect national security with our ability to attract the best foreign researchers to our universities.

The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) already treats university research

differently and we don’t expect this to change. The vast majority of basic and applied science research conducted in U.S. universities results in open and published

information that is shared with the broader scientific community. This information

is considered ‘‘fundamental research’’ and does not require an export license under

the EAR. Such research can be distinguished from corporate and U.S. Government

sponsored research, the results of which are restricted for proprietary and national

security reasons.

We are encouraging the Department of Commerce to consult further with the academic community and others before publishing a proposed regulation.

Question. During the course of developing your recommendations for changes to

the U.S. foreign assistance structure, there has been virtually no consultation with

congressional Democrats or with private voluntary organizations that play a major

role in implementing foreign assistance programs. Why has there not been more

consultation thus far, and what will you do to improve the consultative process as

the reform effort proceeds?

Answer. The changes that have been made to date are internal and aimed at

seeking better performance under the authorities already granted us by the Congress. We welcome further discussions about ways to improve foreign assistance as

we move forward.

Question. Following your testimony before the committee on February 16, 2005,

you were asked a question for the record by Senator Biden, as follows:

Question. When do you anticipate providing the administration’s treaty

priority list for the 109th Congress?

Answer. The Treaty Priority List has been prepared and is being cleared

throughout the executive branch; we plan to submit it to the committee

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shortly. The Department recognizes the importance of this list in assisting

the committee to organize its work and is very appreciative of the cooperation it has received from the committee in the treaty law area during the

108th Congress.

Why has the Treaty Priority List for the 109th Congress never been submitted?

Answer. In a letter of April 5, 2006, the State Department provided Senator Biden

with a list of 16 treaties that had been identified in briefings by the administration

as treaty priorities or treaties for which the administration supported progress by

the Senate. These treaties are as follows:

• Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom

• Treaty with Japan on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

• Treaty with Germany on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

• Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish

Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean

• Convention for Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

Established by the 1949 Convention Between the United States of America and

the Republic of Costa Rica

• Agreement with Canada on Pacific Hake/Whiting

• Protocol of 1997 To Amend the International Convention for the Prevention of

Pollution From Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto

• Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage

• Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime

• United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and Two

Supplementary Protocols

• Protocol of Amendment to the International Convention on the Simplification

and Harmonization of Customs Procedures

• Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism

• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

• Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain

Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, with Annexes

• Stockholm Convention on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants

• Treaty with Sweden on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

Since last year’s briefings, we are pleased that the Senate took action on the treaties listed below:

• Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish

Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean

• Convention for Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

Established by the 1949 Convention Between the United States of America and

the Republic of Costa Rica

• Agreement with Canada on Pacific Hake/Whiting

• United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and Two

Supplementary Protocols

• Protocol of Amendment to the International Convention on the Simplification

and Harmonization of Customs Procedures

• Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism

We would appreciate the committee’s rapid action on the treaties remaining on

the original list. We also would be happy to discuss any additional treaties on which

you may have questions or an interest.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR LINCOLN CHAFEE

Question. Can you explain how this budget submission meets the needs of the new

Liberian Government as you currently view them, and amplify in what ways you

could envision your position changing if the Liberian Government says they need

more assistance?

Answer. Thanks to strong congressional support in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and

2006, the United States has been able to play the leading role in helping Liberia

begin recovery from 14 years of civil war, generations of corruption, and a near-total

absence of government services and of respect for human rights and the rule of law.

This funding is key to helping the new Government of Liberia establish the conditions for consolidating the peace and building prosperity.

The FY 2007 request of $89.945 million for Liberia should continue our support

for many programs:

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• Economic Support Funds (ESF) would continue to provide funding primarily for

quick-impact reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and government buildings in

county centers using war-affected youth, as well as rural road construction

needed to facilitate economic revival. It would also support transparent economic management (GEMAP), civil service retrenchment, national reconciliation

(TRC), judicial reform and police training.

• Child Survival and Health (CSH) would expand primary health care in targeted

communities; strengthen nongovernmental organizations and county health

teams organizationally; and expand health care training.

• Development Assistance (DA) would expand USAID’s community-focused, postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. DA would increase access to

justice, agricultural production and market access, train newly elected government officials, strengthen civil society, and support education.

• International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds would

provide civilian police to the U.N. mission to monitor, mentor, and reform the

Liberian National Police.

• Peacekeeping Operation funds (PKO) would support security sector reform

(SSR). This funding would help create a professional, capable, and fiscally sustainable Liberian military.

• Foreign Military Financing (FMF) would support ongoing SSR with sustainment training and some military equipment.

• International Military Education and Training (IMET) would fund leadership

and specialized skills training for the new Liberian military.

• Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) funding for Africa would support the

return and reintegration to Liberia of refugees and internally displaced persons

and Liberian refugees from Coˆte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.

We have ongoing discussions with the Liberian Government about the country’s

needs and will continue to consider those needs in conjunction with our policies and

budget priorities.

Question. Also, we have a large, vibrant, and important Liberian population in

Rhode Island, and they are justifiably concerned about what their immigration status will be with a newly elected government in Liberia. As you know, these brave

people came to a new country after fleeing a disastrous situation in their home

country and have set down roots, started families, become part of the community.

In addition to being an asset here, they are an important source of support, for instance through remittances, for family members that reside in Liberia. I know this

is outside your specific purview, but I think you are an important voice on this

issue: Can you share with me your view on the immigration status of Liberians residing in the United States as well as whether you support the goal of Senator Reed

and my bill, S. 656?

Answer. As you have indicated, many of the 15,000–20,000 Liberians living in the

United States fled their country’s long civil war. Now that peace is taking hold in

Liberia and a new, democratically elected government is in place, many of these Liberians will choose to return home. Many others will choose to remain in the United

States and move ahead on the path toward U.S. citizenship.

Some 3,792 Liberians are currently living in the United States under Temporary

Protected Status (TPS). As you are aware, the power to grant TPS is based upon

criteria outlined in section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8

U.S.C. 1254a, and is vested in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The

Secretary of Homeland Security exercises this authority in consultation with the

State Department and other appropriate agencies. On August 16, 2005, DHS announced an extension for a period of 12 months of the TPS designation for Liberia.

The State Department is consulting with DHS on country conditions in Liberia in

the current review of Liberia’s TPS status.

As for S. 656, the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 2005, the Office

of Management and Budget normally coordinates the administration’s position on

pending legislation. The State Department would be but one interested agency contributing to that overall position. I would not want to get ahead of that process here.

Question. In his State of the Union Address, President Bush spoke of the importance to U.S. national security of investing in the foreign affairs budget by stating,

‘‘Shortchanging these efforts would increase the suffering and chaos of our world,

undercut our long-term security, and dull the conscience of our country.’’ Secretary

Rice, could you comment on how the programs in your budget are an integral component of our country’s national security? Also, given the importance you and the

President have placed on development, democracy, and diplomacy, does this budget

provide enough funding to meet our national security needs?

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Answer. Assuring U.S. national security, both physical and economic, immediate

and long term, is our top foreign policy priority. It is the prerequisite to our freedom

and prosperity, and to our being able to advance these goals elsewhere. But our security interests cannot be achieved apart from our development goals and our democratic ideals in today’s world. Our assistance must integrate and advance all of

these goals together.

Accordingly, the primary objective of our assistance is to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. In the near term we must

give priority to nations that are strategically important in the war against terrorism. The largest single piece of our 2007 foreign assistance budget request is to

strengthen the coalition partners on the front lines in the fight against terrorism.

Our assistance empowers our partners to practice more effective law enforcement,

police their borders, gather and share essential intelligence, wage more successful

counterterrorism operations, and provide for their own defense. In many states, our

assistance will also help to bolster thriving democratic and economic institutions reducing the societal schisms that terrorists exploit for their own ideological purposes.

These programs support not only the security of our friends and allies, but ultimately the security of the United States.

Question. In 1975 Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed that ethnic influence has become ‘‘the single most important determinant of American foreign policy.’’ In the

last quarter century, global travel networks and communications technology have

enabled a growing number of the world’s population to simultaneously participate

in more than one society. What is the State Department’s perception of these diaspora communities? Do you think there are benefits, or negative consequences, to engagement with diasporas, specifically with regard to our foreign policy goals? Are

there any foreign aid projects currently being conducted, or planned on, through this

budget, that include diaspora research and engagement? In your opinion, are these

projects, if any, sufficient? What types of further initiatives—either specific projects

or more general policy-focused research—do you think could be useful?

Answer. The United States rightly celebrates its diverse population. Diaspora

communities can be a powerful force for positive change. Indeed, many of our programs in settings as diverse as India, Armenia, and Haiti are already building effective partnerships with diaspora communities to accelerate development.

At the same time, we recognize that this subject warrants more research and discussion which could generate new opportunities for collaboration. I welcome the opportunity to work with diaspora communities to encourage their contributions to our

foreign assistance efforts.

Question. Nearly 11 million children under the age of 5 die each year. Many of

these children live in the developing world, and the most common causes of death

are preventable or treatable diseases such as measles, tetanus, diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria. These illnesses are easy to diagnose and extremely cost effective to treat. To help address this problem, I am proud to have joined with Chairman Lugar, Senator Boxer, and many others in enacting the Assistance for Orphans

and Other Vulnerable Children in Developing Countries Act of 2005. More broadly,

in 2000, the United States joined 188 other countries in supporting eight Millennium Development Goals designed to achieve ‘‘a more peaceful, prosperous, and just

world.’’ Two of the Millennium Development Goals call for a reduction in the mortality rate of children under the age of 5 by two-thirds and a reduction in maternal

deaths by three-quarters by 2015. On September 14, 2005, President George W.

Bush stated before the leaders of the world: ‘‘To spread a vision of hope, the United

States is determined to help nations that are struggling with poverty. We are committed to the Millennium Development Goals.’’ Will the funding requested for child

survival and maternal health meet the goals we have committed to?

Answer. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include, inter alia, the

global targets to reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate of children under 5 and to

reduce by three-quarters the maternal mortality ratio by 2015. The MDGs are targets for all U.N. Member States, and we are working together with other donors

to make the most effective use of aid resources. Money alone is not sufficient to

meet the MDGs on time. According to UNICEF, for example, at the current rate

of progress it will take until 2045 (as opposed to 2015) to reduce under-5 mortality

by two-thirds in developing countries.

More important than money is building capacity to achieve the MDGs. U.S. foreign assistance programs work closely with countries on a bilateral level, as well

as on a multilateral level through our partners, the United Nations, and other organizations. Our programs in global health have had a great and lasting impact not

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only because we are committing more public and private resources, but also because

we are altering the landscape of our foreign assistance programs with a commitment

to results. Through a series of international conferences, treaties, and initiatives,

world leaders, governments, and donor agencies have developed strategies aimed at

reducing child and maternal mortality, halting and reversing the spread of HIV/

AIDS and other infectious diseases, insuring financing for these as well as other development needs, and formulating a global plan of action for sustainable development. Great strides have been made: Immunization programs have saved millions

of children’s lives; low-cost rehydration therapy has contributed to a 33-percent increase in life expectancy in the developing world; smallpox has been eradicated

worldwide; and in the past 20 years the number of the world’s chronically undernourished has been reduced by 50 percent.

Question. The President highlighted the importance of basic education, especially

the unmet educational needs of girls throughout the world, in the State of the

Union. I agree with him, and you, Secretary Rice, on the goals of improving basic

education, and it being a critical element of transformational diplomacy. Given its

importance, I am curious to why funding is not more robust. Can you speak to why

the administration has requested a cut in funding for basic education? Can you address whether the number of countries receiving basic education assistance will be

reduced, what countries will be affected, and if fewer children will be educated if

the budget request is enacted?

Answer. The administration has allocated 20 percent of its Development Assistance request for FY 2007 to basic education. This is the same proportion of Development Assistance (DA) funds as was allocated to basic education in FY 2005 and reflects the importance the administration places on improving basic education in its

overall development agenda.

In its FY 2007 Congressional Budget Justification, the Agency for International

Development proposed that 36 countries receive DA-funded basic education assistance. That is three fewer countries than are receiving DA-funded basic education

assistance in FY 2006. Benin, Madagascar, and Malawi are the countries that would

not receive basic education development assistance in FY 2007.

Question. I think our response to the tsunami and the Pakistani earthquake demonstrated our compassion as a nation. In addition to being the right thing to do,

it appears that we are benefiting from our actions in terms of improving our standing in the Muslim world. Many have said that the sight of the USS Abraham Lincoln, used as a base of operations following the tsunami off the coast of Indonesia,

and the sight of U.S. helicopters in Pakistan in relief operations after the earthquake were tangible evidence of U.S. power being used for good. With the military

humanitarian relief response ending, how are we continuing to visibly demonstrate

that we have a long-term commitment to helping these people recover? Also, are we

using the space that these events seem to have created to push for peaceful resolution to regional conflicts? I know we have seen notable successes in Indonesia, and

I am wondering if similar efforts are being made in Sri Lanka and Kashmir?

Answer. The humanitarian assistance provided by the United States after the tsunami and the earthquake vividly demonstrates America’s compassion, generosity,

and commitment to help those in need and has helped to improve the image of the

United States among both Muslims and non-Muslims in the developing world.

The United States will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the survivors of the October 8 earthquake after U.S. military in-kind support ends on

March 31. Our humanitarian assistance has been widely publicized in Pakistan

through Embassy Islamabad’s daily press releases and frequent local media placements. Relief supplies provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development

are required to be marked with the ‘‘USAID brand,’’ which indicates that the goods

are a gift from the American people. Projects funded by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance through its implementing partners are also ‘‘branded.’’ These

projects will continue to operate and remind Pakistanis of the U.S. contributions to

the humanitarian effort after the earthquake relief response ends.

Looking ahead, the United States signed a $200 million agreement with Pakistan

in January covering an ambitious 4-year U.S. reconstruction program (fiscal year

2006–fiscal year 2009) whose focus is to rebuild schools and primary health care facilities, ensure a trained workforce, and improve livelihoods. These permanent, seismic-resistant facilities will bear a plaque indicating that they have been funded by

the United States. The Embassy will continue to publicize the substantial U.S. contributions to relief and reconstruction to reaffirm our long-term commitment to help

Pakistan recover from the earthquake. The President’s budget request for fiscal year

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2007 includes $50 million in new funding to continue earthquake reconstruction

begun in fiscal year 2006.

Pakistan and India have used the earthquake to make modest progress in dealing

with the Kashmir dispute. We believe that both governments should take advantage

of this opening to advance the reconciliation process and resolve Kashmir peacefully,

taking into account the wishes of the people of Kashmir. On March 4 in Islamabad,

President Bush said, ‘‘The best way for Kashmir to be resolved is for leaders of both

countries to step up and take the lead. And that’s exactly what President Musharraf

has done, and that’s what Prime Minister Singh has assured me he wants to do,

and that is to resolve this situation. Obviously, there needs to be some confidence

in order for the countries to go forward, and therefore, the confidence-building measures that the governments have taken is beginning to bear fruits, in my judgment

. . . However, in order for a deal to get done, it requires commitment at the leadership level. And in my perspective, I’ve seen the commitment, and the role of the

United States is to continue to encourage the parties to come together.’’

The President alluded to some developments that occurred after the earthquake.

India and Pakistan opened five border-crossing points on the Line of Control. The

two countries are discussing proposals to permit the regular shipment of goods by

truck through these crossing points. Openings in the Line of Control have the potential to be significant, reversing more than 50 years of policy forbidding direct travel

between the two halves of Kashmir. The people-to-people contacts allowed by these

crossing points should greatly improve mutual understanding and encourage both

governments to continue to seek resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

Fifteen months after the tsunami struck Sri Lanka, the United States continues

to address many facets of the longer term rehabilitation and reconstruction effort.

Highlights include construction of a new Arugam Bay bridge, designed to last a century and the only direct link between two tsunami-devastated communities in the

east; repairs and upgrades of three damaged harbors, vital to the livelihoods of

coastal communities; rehabilitation or reconstruction of vocational as well as educational schools; and construction of playgrounds.

In the aftermath of the tsunami, the U.S. Agency for International Development

provided targeted support to 20 municipalities in tsunami-affected districts, focusing

on training and technical assistance for political parties at the district level to facilitate a consensus on community rehabilitation and service needs. The programs provided capacity development for community forums to create a network of citizen-led

advocacy groups. These initiatives increase the responsiveness of political actors and

government officials to community-based needs and opinions on peace and development issues.

The United States had hoped that the implementation of the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, a joint mechanism for managing tsunami relief and

reconstruction in Tamil areas, would have helped build confidence between the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and led to progress in the broader

peace process. Unfortunately, the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure

was never implemented after its constitutionality was challenged before the Supreme Court. President Rajapaksa has established a new government agency to

oversee tsunami reconstruction, including a program to replace the Post-Tsunami

Operational Management Structure.

We welcome the recent progress made in the peace process at the recent talks in

Geneva between the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and hope

this will lead to further cooperation in providing relief and reconstruction assistance

to tsunami-affected areas.

Question. With regard to Pakistan, while the improvement of our image following

our response to the earthquake was significant, how would you analyze our standing

now? Can you comment on the cartoons of the prophet Muhammed published in

Denmark last fall, and the current riots in Pakistan, and what that means for our

efforts there? Also, can you give us an update on what the President may bring up

on his visit to the region next month, and in particular focus on what efforts will

be made for further democratization?

Answer. President Bush’s visit to Pakistan highlighted several aspects of our relationship with Pakistan that directly address the interests of its people. Most importantly, the President underscored our commitment to a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan. This partnership will benefit the people of Pakistan through

greater engagement in fields including energy security, education reform, economic

opportunity, and science and technology. The President also reiterated our commitment to supporting reconstruction in earthquake-affected areas. Our relief and reconstruction efforts have always been designed to meet urgent humanitarian needs,

but they have also improved the popular image of the United States. We are conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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fident that our ongoing support for Pakistan’s reconstruction efforts will continue

to demonstrate America’s compassion, shifting perceptions over the long term.

President Bush and President Musharraf spoke about the need not to hurt religious sensibilities when the topic of the Danish cartoons arose. Many protests in

Pakistan were peaceful. We all support the peaceful right to protest. We do not believe that violence and rioting are acceptable political statements.

On democracy, President Bush said, ‘‘The elections scheduled for 2007 are a great

opportunity for Pakistan. The President [Musharraf] understands these elections

need to be open and honest. America will continue to working—working with Pakistan to lay the foundations of democracy.’’ President Bush also underscored the importance the United States places on democracy during his meetings with Pakistani

officials. The Department of State is working with the government, political parties,

and civil society organizations in Pakistan to ensure that all political parties will

have an opportunity to participate in free and fair elections in 2007.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

REGIONAL MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

Question. How does the United States consult with our Middle East partners, and

in particular the Gulf States, on the range of critical Middle East issues: Iran, Iraq,

Hamas, Hezbollah?

Answer. We have established productive consultative mechanisms with the governments of the region, covering a broad range of topics. In addition, senior officials,

beginning with Secretary Rice, frequently travel to the region, engaging on every

issue of concern. Secretary Rice was most recently in the Middle East April 26–27,

when she visited Iraq. Our Ambassadors and Embassy staffs also enjoy excellent access to officials at all levels through the governments of the region.

Question. Isn’t there a need for a better consultative mechanism with our gulf

partners that creates a framework for our relationships, and ensures we don’t consult with gulf countries only when we have a request?

Answer. Secretary Rice has met collectively with her Gulf Cooperation Council

counterparts three times since the fall: In September, at the United Nations

General Assembly; in November in Bahrain; and in February in the United Arab

Emirates. In addition, our Ambassadors and Embassy staffs enjoy excellent access

to officials at all levels through the governments of the region, and senior officials

frequently travel to the region to consult with their counterparts. We have almost

10 formal consultative mechanisms with the governments of the gulf that ensure

that we share our views regularly, and not just when we seek their assistance. They

cover topics from economics and trade to counterterrorism to a broad range of strategic discussions. The United States-Saudi Arabia Strategic Dialogue, for example,

was inaugurated last November and comprises Working Groups on Counterterrorism, Human Development and Exchanges, Military Affairs, Energy, Consular

Affairs, and Economic and Financial Affairs.

IRAN: U.S. DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

Question. Please provide a detailed description of U.S. assistance programming

based on FY05, FY06, and requested FY07 (including supplemental) funds. Are any

U.S. assistance funds being spent to increase access to the Internet for people inside

Iran?

Answer. Our foreign assistance programs for the Near East and North Africa are

contained in the Department’s Congressional Budget Justification, available on-line

at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60654.pdf. This document contains

both the requested funding levels and a detailed description of their aims. It includes both bilateral and regional programs, such as the Middle East Partnership

Initiative and the Multinational Force and Observers.

With regard to Iraq, our foreign assistance program is explained in two separate

parts: First, the bulk of the funding enacted in 2003 can be found in the document

entitled ‘‘Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Achievements Through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,’’ available on-line at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/60857.htm.

Second, our latest FY06 and FY07 budget proposals are highlighted in the document

entitled ‘‘Advancing the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.’’ This document is available on-line at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/62397.htm.

The United States is at a critical juncture in its concerns with the Iranian regime.

Iran’s support for international terrorism, rejection of the Middle East peace process, lack of respect for the human rights of its citizens, and its lack of democracy.

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Of course, as the President said, we are also deeply concerned about ‘‘the Iranian

Government defying the world with its nuclear ambitions.’’ These are serious impediments to Iran’s normal relations with the international community. These concerns are symptoms of this corrupt regime’s lack of transparency, political openness,

and respect for its people.

This year, a Department-wide effort will invest over $10 million in programs that

promote democracy and respect for human rights in Iran. This is the third year of

this effort. This effort aims to assist those in Iran who are working to bring about

increased freedom, better opportunities for all Iranians, and greater respect for

human rights. They include civil society activists, advocates for political and economic freedom, those promoting greater freedom of speech and the media, labor

rights activists and advocates for rule of law, and increased respect for human

rights. The process for awarding these grants is currently ongoing and no funding

decisions have yet been made.

In addition to these programs, part of the supplemental budget request the Secretary made to Congress was to expand our communication with the Iranian people.

Part of our effort to expand freedom of speech will include programs to provide information to Iranians via the Internet.

The Department has, for the past 3 years, been operating its own Persian-language Web site. The latest metrics show that visits to the site have increased 282

percent in the first 3 months of 2006 as compared to the same period in 2005, and

over 60 percent of the visitors come from inside Iran. The site offers content on democracy, U.S. policy, and global issues. The supplemental request would allow the

Department to add staff and increase translation to dramatically increase content,

provide interactive programs, including Web chat and Web casting, and significantly

increase marketing. The supplemental request would also enable the Department to

program speakers on democracy and governance topics in neighboring countries,

then sending the content back into Iran via neighboring country media and our Persian Web site.

Question. Will the U.S. Government provide any assistance for the purpose of developing Iranian opposition groups outside of Iran?

Answer. We have made clear that the United States strongly supports the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom and democracy in their country. As President

Bush said in the State of the Union Address, ‘‘Our Nation hopes one day to be the

closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran.’’

We plan to use $15 million of our supplemental request—in addition to the $10

million that Congress has already appropriated—to empower Iranian activists and

further human rights, support and strengthen civil society, help Iranians acquire

the skills of citizenry and advocacy, support alternative political centers of gravity,

improve justice and accountability, and increase tolerance and freedom of speech,

assembly, and other basic rights for the Iranian people.

Our projects focus on influential democratic actors and groups, including labor,

women, and students. To this end, the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the

Bureau of Human Rights and Labor will accept concept papers for over $10 million

in grants to accelerate the work of Iranian reformers and human rights and democracy activists.

Question. Aren’t democracy programs that use U.S. NGOs (such as IRI, NDI and

NED, or their intermediaries) going to be hampered simply because they are American or affiliated with the United States? Which Western NGOs currently operate

in Iran?

Answer. Iranian reformers find themselves in dangerous situations every day. We

recognize that Tehran is suspicious of foreign cooperation with domestic Iranian

NGOs and likely monitors those relationships.

This presents an obstacle to our promotion of democracy in Iran though not an

insurmountable one. The administration stands with courageous reformers who are

on the frontlines of freedom working to have a voice in their own future. To ensure

that our programs can be implemented safely, we do not publicly identify individual

recipients of U.S. funding.

A number of Western NGOs—including several U.S.-based NGOs operating under

OFAC licenses; the London-based Committee to Defend Women’s Rights in the Middle East, which has an Iranian cofounder; the Dutch-based Institute for Advocacy

for Development Cooperation; and the German-based Friedrich Ebert Foundation—

operate in Iran. These organizations focus on a variety of missions, including advocating for women’s rights, facilitating the exchange of ideas between European and

Iranian groups, working with youth groups and intellectuals, and capacity building

for Iranian civil society activists.

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Question. How does the administration engage the Iranian diaspora who live in

the United States?

Answer. We communicate with a broad spectrum of the Iranian diaspora worldwide, including in the United States. The American diaspora community can play

an important role in the promotion of political reform in Iran. U.S. policy recognizes

that political reform within Iran must be indigenous. The administration is prepared to support civil society and the cause of freedom in Iran.

IRAQ: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Question. In September, you told this committee that, as part of the clear, hold,

and build strategy, the administration would be standing up Provincial Reconstruction Teams in each of the non-Kurdish governorates, and one for the three Kurdish

governorates. Aside of the three consulates which have been renamed PRTs, how

many new PRTs are fully operational in Iraq? Please provide a specific timeline for

standing up the remaining PRTs.

Answer. Our three Proof of Concept PRTs in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hillah have been

up and running since November. The first evaluation of the synergy produced by

combining some military civil affairs operations with State and USAID political and

capacity-building operations is positive. The Baghdad PRT is our next highest priority, and we are now coordinating with the Iraqis, DOD, coalition partners, and

other U.S. agencies to roll out this PRT as soon as possible. Our British and Italian

partners are pressing ahead to roll out PRTs in Basra and Dhi Qar provinces, in

which the United States would participate. These PRTs could be ready by May. We

continue to refine our planning for other PRTs, and we expect the stand-up process

to continue over the next 6 months, as resources permit.

IRAQ: CORRUPTION AND OIL

Question. Oil exports are Iraq’s primary source of revenue, and Iraq’s primary

cause for corruption. Today, oil revenues are controlled by the central government

with little transparency and accountability.

• What are the United States, the IMF, the World Bank, and others doing to help

Iraq fix this problem?

• Why aren’t we leveraging our assistance to pressure the Iraqis to clean up the

distribution of its oil revenue?

• A recent Brookings report recommends a fixed distribution plan of oil revenues,

with portions of oil proceeds going directly to the central government, to local

and provincial governments, and to an infrastructure repair fund, etc. What is

the administration’s assessment of such a proposal?

Answer. The IMF, World Bank, United Nations, and United States agree that

more transparency in Iraq’s oil industry is crucial, and all are working with the

Government of Iraq to address this issue. The IMF, World Bank, United Nations,

and the Iraqi Government are members of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), established by the United Nations to provide transparency in

Iraq’s oil revenues. The United States is an observer to the IAMB. The IAMB provides oversight of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), into which all Iraqi crude

oil export revenues (the vast majority of Iraqi Government revenues) are deposited.

The IAMB mandate was authorized in UNSCR 1546. The mandate, which was extended in UNSCR 1637, expires on December 31, 2006, unless a new U.N. Security

Council resolution extends it further. The IAMB authorizes audits of the DFI, including reviews of cash receipts and payments from the DFI as well as an assessment of internal controls. In effect, the audits assess how well the Iraqi Government

is managing the execution of its budget (both expenditures and revenues). The assessments have led to a number of recommendations that the IAMB and other donors (including the United States) have discussed with Iraqi officials.

The IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) also contains recommendations that reinforce those made by the IAMB. In the area of fiscal management, recommendations

included the establishment of a special Ministry of Finance unit to prepare monthly

government cash-flow projections and an audit oversight committee to succeed the

IAMB by the end of 2006. The SBA also required a review of existing procurement

rules to bring them in line with international standards and the adoption of improved budget execution regulations. Specifically for the oil sector, the IMF recommended that Iraq install an oil metering system, restructure the sector to consist

of commercial enterprises overseen by the Ministry of Oil; and draft new laws to

regulate the hydrocarbons industry that would be in line with the new Iraq Constitution and international best practices. We agree strongly with the IAMB and

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IMF recommendations, which mirror many of our own recommendations to the government.

We are using IRRF funds to help the Government of Iraq install meters on the

Al-Basra Oil Terminal, the primary loading point for crude oil exports. This will provide better accountability and transparency for exports. This and other projects are

improving Iraq’s ability to implement the recommendations above and provide the

technical capacity needed to change the sector’s operational history. The Governments of the United Kingdom and Norway are also working with the Iraqis on technical training of officials in the area of oil sector transparency. In addition to its

role on the IAMB, the World Bank is providing policy advice to the government

based on its experience in other countries.

These reforms and others already underway will go far to improve the government’s ability to formulate, execute, and account for its fiscal processes. They will

also help add transparency to the process, which an emergent civil society can use

to hold the government accountable, thus deepening Iraq’s democratic foundation.

Regarding the Brookings report, the State Department agrees that ensuring sufficient budgetary resources to fund central and constituent government operations,

social services, and maintenance of key infrastructure (four of the five ‘‘baskets’’

mentioned in the report) will be crucial challenges for the next government, along

with the fiscal transparency and anticorruption issues mentioned above. Revenue

sharing arrangements in particular are a key issue in talks on finalizing the constitution.

The fifth basket in the Brookings report recommends an oil fund to provide annual direct payments to Iraqi citizens based on some percentage of Iraqi oil earnings. This recommendation is more problematic. The idea is attractive on its face

and we are optimistic that Iraqi oil production will eventually generate budgetary

surpluses that could be invested in various ways for the future. But at present Iraq

runs a large fiscal deficit and cannot afford to divert funds from pressing reconstruction needs and ongoing government operations to invest in a fund. There is no

budget surplus that could be redirected to an oil fund without shortchanging other

priorities, such as standing up security forces, maintaining key infrastructure, and

making the necessary investments in the oil section to fuel future Iraqi growth.

Moreover, case studies show that such funds rarely improve fiscal operations or

transparency in countries with challenged institutions and a history of breaking fiscal rules. In such cases, oil funds are generally more likely to reflect the problems

of the fiscal system they are created from. Iraq’s fiscal deficits and management

shortcomings strengthen the need to remain engaged with the Iraqi Government on

transparency, revenue sharing, and other anticorruption and good governance efforts, as planned under the U.S. assistance program.

IRAQ: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Question. According to Ambassador Jim Jeffrey’s February 8 testimony to the

SFRC, the international community has only obligated an additional $200 million

since September 2005.

• How do you explain the failure of the international community to better meet

its pledges to assist Iraq? Please describe any further obligations that you expect will occur by other countries in the coming 6 months.

Answer. The international community has already disbursed about $3.3 billion of

the $13.6 billion pledged to Iraq in Madrid pledges in late 2003. Most of those

pledges, made in late 2003, were to be disbursed over the 4-year period of 2004 to

2007. They are thus still in the process of disbursal.

Many of the pledges are in the form of loans, and have taken longer to disburse

because loan agreements must be negotiated with the Iraqi Government. Japan, the

second largest donor after the United States, has already disbursed all of its Madrid

pledge of $1.54 billion in grant aid, and we understand that it is close to finalizing

the first of its loan agreements from its $3.5 billion in pledged concessional loans.

The United Kingdom is also well along in disbursal of its $452.3 million Madrid

pledge, having disbursed $300 million by the end of February.

The new obligation since September 2005 that you refer to in your question is related to the European Commission’s announcement of an additional 200 million

euros for 2006. Due to its budgetary process, the EC pledged year by year for Iraq—

200 million euros each year for 2004, 2005, and 2006. Its 2004 and 2005 pledges

have already been fully disbursed.

In November 2005, the World Bank approved a $100 million loan for Iraq, its first

loan for that country in 30 years, representing the first part of its Madrid pledge.

The International Monetary Fund signed a $485 million Emergency Post Conflict

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Assistance (EPCA) loan in 2004, and a $600 million standby arrangement with Iraq

in December 2005.

We are working with the Iraqis to encourage other donors to accelerate their

pledge disbursals. We are not aware of any specific plans by other donors for new

pledges for Iraq, but we will support the new Iraqi Government as it seeks new assistance.

International partners have also extended considerable debt relief to Iraq. In the

historic November 2004 Paris Club agreement, and largely due to strong U.S. support, sovereign creditors agreed to forgive 80 percent of Iraq’s debt in three phases.

Nearly all Paris Club creditors have now formalized their accords with Iraq, and

we expect the remaining ones to do so in the coming 6 months. Three non-Paris

Club sovereign creditors have also matched or exceeded Paris Club terms, and we

are supporting the Iraqi Government as it seeks to obtain debt relief from other

non-Paris Club creditors. Key gulf creditors have assured us and the IMF that they

would offer debt relief to Iraq on at least Paris Club terms, and Iraqi authorities

indicate they will approach these creditors in the coming months to discuss such

debt relief.

U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Question. Why shouldn’t the Director of Foreign Assistance be a Senate-confirmed

position?

Answer. I have undertaken the current reforms as part of an effort to use existing

authorities for maximum effectiveness. Under my guidance, the Director of Foreign

Assistance (DFA) will systematically evaluate our progress and he will use this evaluation to identify any further changes that might be appropriate. We very much

look forward to working with Congress going forward to evaluate the appropriateness of the tools currently available to improve the effectiveness of foreign assistance.

Question. Under existing law, does the Director of Foreign Assistance have the authority to make all decisions regarding foreign assistance from State and USAID?

Answer. To the extent permitted by law, I will delegate to the DFA the foreign

assistance funding authorities consistent with, and necessary to achieve, a single coordinated foreign assistance approval authority. Under my direction, the Director of

Foreign Assistance will have approval and coordinating authority over all foreign assistance.

Question. Please describe any further changes, including legislative changes, that

the administration plans to implement on U.S. foreign assistance.

Answer. As I stated in announcing the new leadership position, the current structure of America’s foreign assistance risks incoherent policies and ineffective programs and perhaps even wasted resources. We must align our activities more fully

across the State Department and USAID and within the State Department itself so

that we are better able to achieve our goals and can be better stewards of public

resources. A driving purpose behind my decision to establish the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, therefore, is to apply a more strategic, results-oriented,

and long-term view to the use of foreign assistance funding. As we evaluate the efficacy of this reform, we look forward to consulting with the Congress and discussing

the need for further reform, if any.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY FOR DOD

Question. On July 19, 2005, you and Secretary Rumsfeld sent a letter to the Hill

asking Congress to give the Defense Department permanent statutory authority to

disburse military security assistance. Please explain to the committee how giving

DOD this authority is consistent with your effort to create a more unified and rational leadership structure overseeing U.S. foreign assistance.

Answer. The Department of State supports this new authority because it would

augment the resources and authorities available to the President to act quickly

when unforeseen events make the initiation or expansion of a training, equipping,

or advisory program necessary. In addition, I am able to lend my continued support

because the statute stipulates that State and DOD shall jointly formulate the execution of train and equip programs.

I look forward to working with Congress to develop the flexible tools we need to

win the global war on terror without compromising State’s primacy in foreign assistance.

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NORTH KOREA: FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

Question. How much hard currency does the North Korean regime receive from

its counterfeiting operations? (If necessary, please provide a classified answer to respond fully.)

How much do you estimate that the financial sanctions against the Banco Delta

Asia Bank (suspected of laundering the counterfeit U.S. currency produced by North

Korea) have cost the North Korean regime? (If necessary, please provide a classified

answer to respond fully.)

Answer. The responses to these questions are classified and are retained in the

committee’s secure safes.

ENERGY SECURITY

Question. What is your and the State Department’s role in addressing U.S. energy

security interests?

Answer. The objective of our energy policy is to ensure that our economy has access to energy on terms and conditions that support economic growth and prosperity. We must also ensure that the United States can pursue its foreign policy and

national security interests without being constrained by energy concerns. In addition, our policies must also be consistent with America’s broader economic and foreign policy goals and complement domestic policy initiatives.

To this end, the State Department:

1. Promotes the diversification of energy supplies, worldwide;

2. Works with other oil consuming countries to respond to supply disruptions,

particularly through the coordinated use of strategic petroleum stocks;

3. Encourages major oil producing countries to maintain responsible production policies to support a growing world economy and to reduce oil market price

volatility; and

4. Works with other countries to reduce global dependence on oil, including

through conservation, efficiency, and through the development of alternative

sources of supply.

Question. Do recent events on energy security such as Russia’s role as a supplier

to Europe, developing Central Asian reserves; the rising energy demands in Asia

have foreign policy implications?

Answer. Yes. Russia is a country of tremendous natural resources. Expanding oil

and gas production, particularly in remote regions like eastern Siberia, to meet domestic needs and fulfill export contracts will be a major challenge for Russia in

years to come. Russia could become a major supplier of liquefied natural gas to

world markets over the next few decades. Energy production in the Caspian region

is on the rise; like Russia, Caspian producers, especially in Central Asia, will have

to improve transport options to get their products to market. Those options may run

west, south, or east—to traditional markets in Europe or to meet new demand in

India and China. Energy efficiency and conservation also remain major challenges

for the former Soviet sphere, particularly in Russia and Ukraine.

We are encouraging Russia to improve its investment climate, work constructively

with foreign companies to enhance production and transport mechanisms, and lean

on its companies to engage in transparent, market-based activities. Given surging

demand, especially in Asia, incremental, non-OPEC production, such as that in Russia, will be very important in the global market. In Central Asia and the Caucasus,

we will also promote foreign investment, and encourage regional governments to

work together to expand and diversify pipeline routes. Russia has identified energy

security as a major focus for the G–8 Summit in St. Petersburg, which President

Putin will host in July.

Europe remains a net importer of energy; two-thirds of the EU’s total energy requirements will be imported by 2020. The EU currently imports 30 percent of its

gas from Russia. Bickering between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas supply

and transit, which led to temporary disruptions in supply over New Year’s, spurred

European leaders to refocus their attention on energy security, and in particular to

reevaluate options to diversify sources of energy imports and adopt new energy-saving technologies.

We will work closely with our European allies, as well as engage Russia and its

neighbors, to advance our energy agenda: To ensure that our economy has access

to energy on terms and conditions that support economic growth and environmental

stewardship. Energy is a critical issue for our friends in Europe, and the European

Union is helpfully focusing on a need for common approaches to shared energy challenges. At the same time, we will strive to bolster energy security across the European Continent and EurAsia region. President Bush’s Advanced Energy Initiative

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outlined U.S. efforts to develop alternative sources of energy and reduce foreign dependence. The United States and Europe were already collaborating on hydrogen,

clean coal, renewable energy, nuclear fusion, and clean transport. With the State

of the Union providing further guidance, we will redouble our efforts, and extend

them into the CIS.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

TROPICAL FORESTS AND CORAL REEFS

Question. Senator Biden and I recently reauthorized funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act, which we authored. The Department’s budget request cuts

funding for TFCA. How many dollars and how many projects are ‘‘in the pipeline’’

for TFCA? How difficult is it for the Department to encourage other governments

to comply with all the governance conditions of TFCA?

Answer. The administration has a significant amount of TFCA funding remaining

from earlier appropriations. According to the Treasury Department, approximately

$60 million in TFCA funding remains in the Treasury Debt Restructuring Account.

About $30 million of this amount has already been allocated to countries that have

been declared eligible for TFCA.

For the remaining funds, we are examining the possibility of TFCA programs with

other countries. However, we cannot say with certainty at this time whether countries that have applied for TFCA treatment will be declared eligible under the criteria set forth in the act, or whether countries with whom we are in preliminary

informal discussions will decide to apply for TFCA treatment. We anticipate that

the amount already on hand, together with any amounts the administration may

decide to allocate to TFCA from the FY07 budget, will be sufficient in the near term.

We believe the political and economic eligibility criteria set forth in the TFCA are

useful in identifying countries with a commitment to good political and economic

policies—policies that are necessary for the successful administration of long-term

programs like TFCA. However, we note that a number of countries expressing interest in TFCA have not met one or more of the eligibility criteria.

Question. There has been criticism that debt relief programs like TFCA ‘‘encourage bad behavior’’ in developing countries. Has the Department under review other

approaches to protecting tropical rain forests, and other critical ecosystems like

coral reefs?

Answer. We understand that there are sometimes concerns that debt relief programs run the risk of encouraging irresponsible borrowing in that borrowers may

expect future loans to be forgiven as well. We do not believe this is a problem with

TFCA, which is a small, selective program that deals only with concessional debt

incurred before January 1, 1998. In addition, TFCA can be described more properly

as debt redirection rather than debt relief. Under TFCA, the borrowing country is

still required to make payments in local currency for tropical forest protection that

are roughly equivalent in most cases to what they would have repaid to the USG

under the original debt obligation.

The administration considers TFCA an innovative approach to conserving tropical

forests that complements our bilateral and multilateral activities. For example,

USAID routinely provides grant assistance to eligible developing countries to support forest protection and sustainable management, including protection of biodiversity. USAID support in this area has been augmented recently through two innovative initiatives: (1) The Congo Basin Forest Partnership, a multidonor public-private

partnership launched by the Department in 2002, to which we are contributing $54

million over 4 years through USAID’s Central African Regional Program on the Environment (CARPE), and (2) the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, which was

initiated in 2005 and focuses on conserving biological diversity in the world’s largest

intact tropical forest.

Through our contributions to international organizations and financial institutions such as the International Tropical Timber Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Global Environment Facility,

the United States supports a wide range of projects in tropical countries designed

to protect, conserve, and sustainably manage their forests.

The USG, primarily through USAID, also provides about $20 million annually to

programs that benefit coral reef ecosystems in Meso-America, the Caribbean, and

Southeast Asia. The Department recently established an Environmental Regional

Hub in Fiji in order to enhance our coral reef conservation activities in the Pacific

Islands. In July 2007, the USG will assume the cochair with Mexico of the InterVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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national Coral Reef Initiative which the Department launched in 1993, giving us another platform to promote coral reef conservation worldwide.

Question. Is it your view that, if more money were available for nonproliferation,

counterproliferation, and weapons dismantlement programs, you would be able to

eliminate more threats faster and that this would be in U.S. national security interests?

Answer. I support the President’s budget, which supports our national security

goals in all respects, not just in counterproliferation and weapons dismantlement

programs. These are a vitally important element of our foreign assistance mix, but

so are also our efforts to strengthen our diplomacy and build democracy in places

where it is weak or absent. Within the parameters of the President’s FY 2007 request, I will work to allocate funds to enable the United States to develop and refine

sensible security measures, such as furthering our Proliferation Security Initiative

and enhancing the ability of those who cooperate with us to deny to regimes like

Iran, North Korea, as well as nonstate actors, including terrorist groups, the materials for covert weapons programs that threaten the international system.

Question. As you know, we have been working with the Department to update legislation that Senator Biden and I wrote to give statutory standing and needed personnel authorities to the Department for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. We asked for the Department’s views and support for the legislation a month

ago. How soon can we have your view on this legislation?

Answer. The Department appreciates the continuing focus on these issues that

you and your committee have shown. The legislation provides many useful personnel and funding authorities that would enhance the ability of the Department

and its partners in other agencies to respond more rapidly and effectively.

In addition to our earlier discussions on the State authorization bill, our staff will

continue to work with you to provide additional information.

Question. U.S. bilateral and multilateral energy discussions are, for the most part,

run through the Energy Department. Yet the issue of energy security must be a

paramount foreign policy consideration of the United States. How do you propose

that the State Department incorporate energy security into its core mission?

Answer. The United States imports almost two-thirds of its oil, and our energy

security is inextricably linked with developments that occur overseas. We rely on

the private sector to find, produce, and distribute oil and refined products. However

governments also have key roles:

(1) We need to minimize political constraints that may inhibit the smooth

functioning of global energy markets, and

(2) We have to ensure that we are free to pursue our broader foreign policy

objectives without undue concern over the possible impact on our country’s energy supplies.

The State Department deals with these issues in a number of ways.

• We work with the Department of Energy and the International Energy Agency

to maintain strategic petroleum stocks in consuming countries, and to coordinate their release in response to a supply disruption. This most recently occurred in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita last fall. • We engage with producing and consuming countries to try to ensure the smooth

functioning of energy markets worldwide. • We provide diplomatic support to private sector efforts to open up new sources

of energy supply, such as in the Caspian region. • More broadly, the goal of energy security is closely tied to our efforts to work

for regional security and economic development in many parts of the world.

Question. On November 17, 2003, President Bush transmitted the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime to the Senate for its advice and consent. The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the convention in 2004. In July of last

year, by voice vote the committee ordered the convention reported to the full Senate,

with a recommendation that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification.

The Senate has yet to act on the convention.

Does the administration continue to support U.S. ratification of the Cybercrime

Convention? How important is this convention in your view?

Answer. Yes, the administration continues to strongly support U.S. ratification of

the Convention on Cybercrime.

The Convention on Cybercrime is the only multilateral treaty to address the subject of crime committed against and using computer systems. It provides important

tools for U.S. investigators and prosecutors in their work to prevent and combat terrorism and organized crime, and for protecting the Nation from terrorist attacks and

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attacks on critical information infrastructure. It is also essential to securing the

international cooperation we need to enforce our criminal laws, including those

against piracy of intellectual property and purveying child pornography.

The convention provides all of these benefits to the United States without requiring any change to U.S. law, including to the protections guaranteed under the U.S.

Constitution. No country could use the convention to force the United States to do

an investigation or give evidence when to do so would transgress our well-established protections of free expression and freedom of religion.

A number of coalitions of U.S. businesses, including businesses in the information

technology, Internet, and content provider fields, have expressed their strong support for U.S. ratification of the convention. They believe it would not only improve

the security of the United States, but also help address the global problem of Internet crime, such as the spreading of viruses and worms, phishing attacks, and identity theft.

The Attorney General recently wrote to the Senate majority and minority leaders

to reaffirm the administration’s strong support for the convention. I join him in urging the Senate to act quickly to give its advice and consent to ratification of this

important instrument.

Question. It is not a national flaw that our hopes for a peaceful world exceed our

ability to provide for it. Your leadership in taking a hard new look at foreign assistance is welcome. Can you describe your philosophy in making the kinds of tradeoffs

that ultimately have to be made? For example, how do you weigh the value of MCC

assistance to well-governed poor countries versus assistance to nations that are

strategically important in the war against terrorism? How do you provide assistance

to failed and failing states when the reason they are failing is that they have corrupt and ineffective governments? What about regional tradeoffs—the importance of

boosting former Soviet States in their lean toward the West versus the need to influence nations with significant Muslim populations? How do you prioritize our foreign

assistance goals?

Answer. Assuring U.S. national security, both physical and economic, immediate

and long term, is our top foreign policy priority. It is the prerequisite to our freedom

and prosperity. But our security interests cannot be achieved apart from our development goals and our democratic ideals in today’s world. Our assistance must integrate and advance all of these goals together.

Accordingly, the primary objective of our assistance is to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. In the near term we must

give priority to nations that are strategically important in the war against terrorism. The largest single piece of our 2007 foreign assistance budget request is to

strengthen our coalition partners on the front lines in the fight against terrorism.

Over the longer term, to secure freedom and prosperity both at home and abroad,

we must provide real incentives to poor countries that demonstrate commitment to

ruling justly, investing in their people, and promoting market freedoms. The Millennium Challenge Account has already shown that it is a powerful incentive, one that

provides hope by promoting sustainable economic growth to reduce poverty in the

poorest counties. ‘‘Getting incentives right’’ is one of the key lessons of development

economics over the last 50 years, and it explains why the MCA is so important.

In the case of states that have failed or are failing because of corrupt and ineffective governments, we must insist on transformation as a condition of any assistance

to their governments. We are requesting funds to meet humanitarian needs, lay the

foundations for economic development, and strengthen sustainable democratic institutions in countries such as Sudan and Haiti.

Regionally, many areas of the world remain vulnerable to authoritarian, despotic,

and corrupt rulers—whether in former Soviet States, the Middle East, or elsewhere.

We cannot afford to ignore any region. Nonetheless, we recognize the special importance of helping countries overcome the legacy of Communism and the appeal of political Islamist ideology. For this reason, we continue to provide funding under the

Freedom Support Act to promote the rule of law and the growth of democratic and

market institutions in countries that just 15 years ago lived under totalitarian Soviet rule. We also place high priority on helping the nations of the Broader Middle

East to make progress in building the foundations of democratic societies, for example, through the Middle East partnership initiative.

As you note, prioritization of our foreign assistance goals is a complex process,

which must balance all of these and many other critical issues such as post-disaster

humanitarian relief and global health threats. In making such decisions, we must

consult widely, not only within the Department but also with other agencies, to ensure that the decisions are as well informed as possible. Other than assuring the

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national security of the American people as our top priority, there are no absolutes,

but rather a careful balancing of a wide variety of policy goals and assistance tools.

FOREIGN AID BUDGET

Question. What relationship will the new Director of Foreign Assistance have with

the Assistant Secretaries and Coordinators at the State Department and Assistant

Administrators at USAID who currently have responsibility for designing and implementing foreign assistance programs? Who will control the funds that are currently apportioned to those individuals? How will the decisionmaking process work?

Answer. I am establishing the position of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) to

better align our foreign assistance programs with our foreign policy goals, to align

more fully the foreign assistance activities of USAID and State, and to demonstrate

that we are responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars. I intend to delegate to the

DFA authority over foreign assistance funding and programs to achieve these goals,

not to supervise Assistant Secretaries and Coordinators or Assistant Administrators.

Nor are the reporting relationships of Assistant Secretaries or Assistant Administrators expected to change. Instead, the Director of Foreign Assistance will work closely

with Assistant Secretaries and Assistant Administrators in exercising his authority

over foreign assistance funding and programs and developing coordinated strategies,

plans, and budgets. Under my direction, the DFA will have approval and coordinating authority over all foreign assistance.

Question. What role will the Director of Foreign Assistance assume with respect

to the myriad other agencies that currently provide foreign assistance, including the

MCC? Will the administration establish a formalized coordination structure with

you at the helm? How will you ensure that State/USAID programs are not being

run at cross-purposes with DOD, Justice, Labor, MCC, etc.?

Answer. The Director of Foreign Assistance is intended to provide overall leadership to foreign assistance that is delivered through other agencies and entities of

the U.S. Government, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). By instituting integrated country strategies and operating plans, the Director of Foreign

Assistance will help ensure that USG agencies delivering foreign assistance are not

working at cross-purposes, that, in fact, we are taking advantage of agencies’ comparative strengths to create a U.S. Government program that is effective and makes

the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars. With respect to other U.S. Government

agencies, including the MCC, the Director of Foreign Assistance will work in concert

with these agencies to address the pressing issues that face developing countries

and to ensure that programming is complementary and stove-piping is curtailed.

Question. How many people do you envision will work in the Office of the Director

of Foreign Assistance? What capabilities/responsibilities will they have? How many

such individuals will be new hires as opposed to being pulled from current positions

within State and USAID? To what extent will you have input into the hiring, training, and assignment process at State and USAID to ensure appropriate expertise

is developed at these two agencies?

Answer. To implement foreign assistance effectively, the United States must have

the right people, with the right skills, in the right place at the right time. With regard to staff needs for the Director of Foreign Assistance, I intend for this Office

not to be duplicative, but instead to add value to the current environment. I anticipate an office that, when fully staffed, will bring together something in the range

of 50 to 100 positions, based on bringing together existing staff who are performing

common foreign assistance functions in the two organizations. The DFA will consult

with, and provide a full notification to, Congress once we have made the necessary

decisions about how to best utilize these existing functions. As the Director of Foreign Assistance and I define strategic priorities and develop comprehensive country

plans, we will consider whether our human resources align with program priorities

and resource availability.

Question. Some supporters of the restructuring believe it does not go far enough

and that the administration has missed an opportunity to launch a much more ambitious and necessary reform effort. Does this restructuring mark the first step toward a future and bolder reform effort?

Answer. I have undertaken the current reforms as part of an effort to use existing

authorities for maximum effectiveness. Under my guidance, the Director of Foreign

Assistance will systematically evaluate our progress and use this evaluation to identify any further changes that might be appropriate. We very much look forward to

working with Congress going forward to evaluate the appropriateness of the tools

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currently available to improve the effectiveness of foreign assistance and to determine whether further reforms may be necessary.

Question. Please comment on the concerns that some have expressed that the new

initiative may lead to a greater degree of aid politicization in which long-term development and poverty reduction goals will be overwhelmed by the demands of shorter

term strategic considerations. To what degree will USAID remain influential in

shaping U.S. development policy?

Answer. A driving purpose behind my decision to establish the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance is to establish mechanisms to promote a more strategic

allocation of our foreign assistance funds, targeted to specific results. Strengthening

the U.S. Government’s commitment to long-term, results-oriented development will

require the unique talents and voices of both State and USAID. Coherent, comprehensive, multiyear strategies will replace fragmented programming, and the

United States will promote greater ownership and responsibility on the part of host

nations and their citizens. As with the strategy that Ambassador Tobias employed

as U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, U.S. Government assistance must address immediate needs and crises, while at the same time laying the foundation for long-term

sustainability under the leadership and responsibility of host nations.

Question. In your initiative to implement transformational diplomacy, you identified several ways in which Foreign Service Officers will be affected, in terms of

training, skills, and assignments. Will these same changes also apply to USAID

staff, especially those posted overseas?

Answer. To implement foreign assistance effectively, the United States must have

the right people, with the right skills, in the right place at the right time. A key

advantage of these reforms is the ability to bring all strengths and resources of the

United States to bear in achieving foreign policy goals.

My vision is to ensure that our diplomatic corps and other human resources are

prepared to take on the challenges we face today. In some cases, that may require

new or additional skills and capabilities, including in areas such as strategic and

program planning, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation. Just as we seek to

apply a strategic approach to the implementation to foreign assistance, strategic approaches underway for the allocation of operational and human resources must continue.

USAID operates in some of the most difficult circumstances in the world where

having adequate resources are critical for implementing successful programs.

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Question. Your commitment to devote 15 new slots to the Office of Reconstruction

and Stabilization will bring the number of people in the Office up to about 100. Do

you believe that there is now enough critical mass to establish the active-duty response corps that is called for in our legislation? How have your experiences in staffing positions in Afghanistan and Iraq affected your view of the need for such a

corps?

Answer. Additional FTE appropriated to S/CRS will be used to regularize existing

staff positions that are currently not permanent, but provided through temporary

arrangements. The current staffing within the Office is 48 State personnel and 12

interagency detailee positions. There are already 6 members of the Active Response

Corps in initial training and all 15 will be on board by summer. They will participate in training, military exercises, and planning and will be available for deployment.

A truly ‘‘active’’ ARC requires dedicated funding so that the Department can create separate permanent positions to ensure availability of staff to plan, prepare, and

deploy. Without sufficient overall staffing levels for the Department, it will not be

possible for the ARC to expand.

Experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have demonstrated the need for

training and preparing staff in advance through training, military exercises, and

planning. Having staff available who have committed in advance, and are prepared

to deploy, ensures more rapid mobilization of the right skillsets.

Question. In your recent Georgetown speech, you said: ‘‘We have an expansive vision for this new office, and let there be no doubt, we are committed to realizing

it.’’ How does your budget request shore up that statement? How much funding did

the Department devote to operations of the Office in the 2006 budget? What do you

envision for 2007?

Answer. The following table outlines S/CRS funding for FY05 and FY06, as well

as our FY07 request.

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[Dollars in thousands]

Account FY05 actual FY06 estimate FY07 request

FY05 Supplemental Operating Funds* ................................................................... $7,700 .................... ....................

Bureau-Managed Operating Funds ......................................................................... **$737 $6,237 $6,507

Cost of Permanent Positions Funded ..................................................................... $1,485 $2,475 $5,250

(total FTE) ...................................................................................................... (9) (15) (30)

Cost of other State non-permanent staff .............................................................. $2,950 $7,920 $8,400

(total positions; includes Active Response Corps) ....................................... (22) (48) (48)

S/CRS total (State Operations—D&CP) .................................................... $12,872 $16,632 $20,157

Conflict Response Fund (Foreign Ops) ................................................................... 0 0 $75,000

* Supplemental provided 2-year funding; $2.6M obligated in FY05 and $5.1M in FY06.

Question. As you may know, we have updated the legislation giving this Office

statutory standing and will be working to have that pass the full Senate as freestanding legislation. It authorizes both a 500-person reserve component and a 250-

person active-duty component of a Readiness Response Corps at the Department.

Can you describe your current thinking on how you would use this new authority?

Answer. We currently have sufficient authority to create a standing response

corps within the Department. We will be requesting the necessary resources in FY

2008 and later to staff the Readiness Response Corps as requirements become further defined. Currently, we have a standby response corps that has helped identify

from within the Department and retirees, those who may be interested and ready

to deploy or to provide surge capacity within State in a crisis but who would continue to work in other positions until needed.

We are requesting some funding in FY 2007 to begin the development of a Civilian Reserve that would draw on nongovernmental skillsets to provide the USG a

standing corps of trained and preidentified employees who can deploy rapidly and

fill key sectoral gaps in rule of law and security.

• There are several components of staffing requirements:

Æ S/CRS core management staff;

Æ Department of State surge capacity—Active and Standby Response Corps;

Æ Other agency surge capacity;

Æ On-call Civilian Reserve;

Æ Implementing partner capacity (Global Skills Network of contracts, NGOs,

grantees).

• S/CRS has estimated a need for a core staff of 80 to provide leadership and

management of integrated USG planning and response and to manage development of comprehensive and interoperable civilian capabilities.

• Current staffing is a combination of permanent, nonpermanent, interagency

detailees, and temporary staff.

• We need to institutionalize a standing capability that will ensure lessons

learned are lessons applied. Our long-term plan is to convert nonpermanent

staffing to permanent and be able to reimburse agencies for detailees; both will

ensure that we are able to attract and retain the best employees.

• S/CRS estimates a need for 100 members of an Active Response Corps to provide the Department with a separate cadre of rapidly deployable, trained, and

exercised personnel who can augment Embassy operations, manage initial field

engagements, participate in the added workload of preparing plans for response,

and embed with military forces if deployed. While not deployed, they will train,

exercise, and work within bureaus to build capacity for response and address

conflict issues.

• Current funding provides for an initial 15 members of an Active Response Corps

in FY06 (all will be onboard by summer).

• In addition, there is a need to access additional personnel within State through

a Standby Response Corps made up of individuals who have expressed interest

in deployments or to surge into domestic efforts. This SRC has been identified.

• Other agencies also have, or are augmenting, their internal surge capacity to

be able to respond to demands for their expertise and program management capabilities.

• A Civilian Reserve system that would provide readily available outside experts

to serve in USG missions does not exist. We propose to build such a system initially focused on the need for rule of law personnel who have advance training

can be called up within weeks and deployed.

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• Existing implementation capabilities in State and USAID and other agencies is

frequently carried out through contractors, NGOs, and grantees. There is a need

to strengthen and widen those capabilities across the USG to ensure adequate

capacity.

Question. Although the administration’s FY 2006 request for the creation and

funding of a Conflict Response Fund was not included in FY 2006 Foreign Operations appropriations, funding authority for the transfer of up to $100 million for

the purposes of the fund was provided in the DOD authorization act (sec. 1207, Public Law 109–162). Have you requested, or do you intend to request, such a transfer

from the Secretary of Defense? If so, for what purposes?

Answer. We are currently working to develop proposals for use of the funding and

have worked with DOD on the process for requesting a transfer. We believe that

having a ready pool of resources to address conflict transformation priorities will

provide a valuable tool in addressing emerging needs in conflict situations. Our goal

will be to support ongoing planning efforts undertaken by S/CRS, to respond to unforeseen needs, and to build capacity to respond to conflict.

Question. S/CRS and Joint Forces Command have requested a study from the Institute for Defense Analysis on the potential costs of the civilian response corps that

you envision S/CRS as creating. What has the administration learned from that

study about the potential costs of such a corps? How do you respond to concerns

that the expansion of a civilian corps to carry out these activities will promote illconsidered interventions?

Answer. The IDA study was a good start in providing valuable information on civilian surge capabilities of other organizations, including their estimated costs. We

used such information and lessons from previous engagements to develop our own

concept for establishing a civilian reserve. The conclusion from outside and internal

experts, is that a standing capacity that can be readily accessed and which has high

degree of preparation and reliability will be needed. Assumptions we used to define

the legislative, management, and budgetary requirements for creating the concept

are now being validated through a comprehensive management study that S/CRS

has contracted to an outside firm. This study will address how to manage the reserve system including recruiting, hiring, and preparation.

Having the capacity to respond quickly and effectively will make U.S. engagements more successful. The USG will respond to national security challenges based

on our interests, the important difference will be that we will have additional civilian tools to complement our military assets.

Question. The budget request contains $11 million for preventive activities. This

appears to be the first request for such a category of assistance in the State Department budget. In what countries and circumstances do you believe this will be used?

How will such activities be coordinated with possible USAID activities for the

same purpose?

Has the State Department developed measures that would help assess whether

preventive programs can actually forestall conflict and result in budget savings

through the adoption of a policy of preventive diplomacy rather than dealing with

conflicts after they erupt?

Answer. The FY 2007 request includes $11 million in Economic Support Funds

(ESF) for Reconciliation Programs, a slight increase over the administration’s request in FY 2006. This is not a new program. In fact, Congress earmarked ESF for

reconciliation programs in FY 2004. USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and

Mitigation, with State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, oversees

the programs. They are currently funding 21 ongoing programs in the Democratic

Republic of Congo, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Mali, Burundi, Angola, Bolivia, Colombia, Yemen, Israel and the West Bank/Gaza. Since FY 2004, several additional

countries were made eligible including Guinea, Kosovo, Morocco, Russia (Northern

Caucasus only), Rwanda, and Uganda. Each year, before releasing a call for proposals, the country list is reviewed and revised in light of country need, foreign policy priorities, and the potential for real program impact.

This competitively awarded fund is used to support reconciliation programs and

activities that bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political

backgrounds from areas of civil conflict and war in order to address the root causes

of conflict. Programs that include mediation of specific disputes, mechanisms for restorative justice, dialogue, and training for conflicting parties or support of peace

processes are examples of the types of activities that will be considered. Programs

that bring together conflicting parties in an effort to implement practical solutions

to specific conflict issues (e.g., land use, unemployment, and natural resources management) are most likely to receive support under this fund.

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The funds made available under this earmark frequently complement ongoing

conflict mitigation activities in the field funded by USAID including the Office of

Conflict Management and Mitigation. Funded proposals must demonstrate complementarity rather than duplication.

Every program implemented under the reconciliation fund is designed with monitoring and evaluation plans that enable USAID to assess the results of the program

as measured against its stated goals and objectives. These evaluation plans are assessed by the proposal review committee to ensure that they adequately measure

project impact. Sample indicators that help measure progress in the prevention of

violent conflict are: The number of trained leaders demonstrating ability to guide

communities through divisive issues; number of land-related conflicts successfully

mediated; increased participation of community members in multiethnic activities,

meetings, and events by the end of the program; and community members negotiate

the establishment of truces and safe zones in areas of conflict.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. Though the Taliban has been removed from power and most al-Qaeda

elements have been driven out of Afghanistan, last year marked the most violent

year since 2001. Indications are that the security situation is unlikely to improve

and may even deteriorate in 2006. Will the intended transition to a NATO/ISAFled security sector for the entirety of Afghanistan adequately meet U.S. and Afghan

interests in stability and counterterrorism?

Answer. We are concerned about the increased violence and use of suicide attacks

and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and are working closely with Afghan security and intelligence forces to counter these threats. Indeed, Afghan forces have

thwarted a number of suicide attacks.

President Karzai has condemned these attacks as have provincial government and

religious leaders. In addition, Afghans—who have been the primary target of the attacks—have staged protests against suicide bombings. Relying on suicide attacks

will further alienate the Taliban from the vast majority of the Afghan people.

NATO forces are up to the challenge. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is expected to expand to southern Afghanistan by fall 2006. As

it expands from its current area of responsibility in the north, west, and in Kabul,

ISAF will enter a more challenging security environment. To meet those challenges,

NATO has updated its operations plan and rules of engagement. We are confident

that those rules give NATO commanders the robust and flexible framework they

need to carry out ISAF’s mission in the south.

Question. Responsibility for train and equip programs in Afghanistan has shifted

from the State Department to the Defense Department. Is DOD carrying out this

program under the supervision of the U.S. Ambassador? Has the State Department

been able to retain influence over the program? How responsive are DOD personnel

to political concerns expressed by State Department personnel?

Answer. The Chief of Mission has policy responsibilities for all USG programs in

Afghanistan and coordinates closely with the Office for Security Cooperation—

Afghanistan (OSC–A) which is responsible for reform of the security forces including

the ANP. The Ambassador and the CFC–A Commander work very closely together

to monitor all aspects of the ANA and ANP’s development, and there is strong interagency cooperation and coordination between DOD and State on this program. DOD

provides biweekly briefings on the status of the ANA and ANP to the Department

of State and briefs the Afghanistan Interagency Operating Group (AIOG) on the status of the ANA and ANP and funding.

In FY 2005, the State Department provided significant funding, including

$396.8M in FMF funds to train and equip the ANA, $945K in IMET funds, and

$15.5M in PKO funds for salaries. Congress also provided $795M in FY 2005 supplemental funds to the Department of Defense through the Afghan Security Forces

Fund (ASFF) to support ANA train and equip requirements, which also support

ANP activities (including $200M in FY 2005 supplemental). The FY 2006 budget includes $792K in IMET funds to continue ANA training at U.S. military facilities.

DOD’s FY 2006 supplemental request for the ANA is $823M to support training,

life support, maintenance, salaries, equipment, and infrastructure.

In FY 2005, the State Department provided significant funding, including

$424.5M in INCLE funds to provide training, mentoring, and reform assistance to

the ANP. The FY06 budget includes $58.5M in INCLE funds to continue ANP assistance. DOD’s FY 2006 ASFF supplemental request for the ANP is $1.3B, which

covers all facets of the program—including $585M for training, mentoring, and reform activities.

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DOD and State have worked closely together to develop this request, as required

by the ASFF, and will continue to work closely together in implementing the program. DOD will directly support the equipment, infrastructure, and salary needs of

the Afghan police while the intent is for DOD to transfer funds to the State to continue implementation of the critical training, mentoring and reform elements of the

program. State provides a senior civilian deputy for police to OSC–A to ensure coordination between OSC–A and Embassy Kabul.

Question. President Karzai has proudly stated that his country ‘‘now has a constitution, a President, a Parliament, and a nation fully participating in its destiny.’’

Despite these significant accomplishments, Afghanistan remains a fragile state.

How can we ensure the newly agreed-upon Afghanistan Compact is as successful

as its predecessor Bonn Agreement of 2001? To what extent is the United States

joined by other countries, including Afghanistan’s neighbors, in continuing the fight

against al-Qaeda, Taliban, narcotics traffickers, and warlords?

Answer. The Afghan people and their current President have much of which to

be proud. The progress that has already been achieved seemed almost unimaginable

only a few short years ago. The international community recognized Afghanistan’s

new status during the recent London conference. The Afghanistan Compact adopted

at the conference sets out a framework for a more mature partnership between the

Afghan Government and the international community, with mutual commitments by

each.

Afghanistan is a full partner in the new compact with benchmarks to achieve and

timelines to adhere to. Among the commitments made by Afghanistan are its

pledges to consolidate peace by disbanding all illegal armed groups, and to create

a secure environment by strengthening Afghan institutions to meet the security

needs of the country. Afghanistan also vowed to achieve a sustained and significant

reduction in the production and trafficking of narcotics over the next few years, with

a goal of their complete elimination. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and partner

nations agreed to provide strong support in establishing security and stability in

Afghanistan, in close coordination with the Afghan Government.

The Joint Monitoring and Coordination Board, also established in the compact,

provides a new forum for monitoring Afghanistan’s compliance and for coordinating

our efforts with those of the Afghan Government and other donors. For its part, the

international community has backed up its political commitments with financial

pledges totaling US$10.5 billion for the implementation of the interim Afghan National Development Strategy. With the country’s institutions maturing and the commitment of the international community remaining high, the new compact should

provide an even firmer basis for combating Afghanistan’s acknowledged challenges.

Question. The administration’s pledge at the London conference essentially

flatlines aid for Afghan reconstruction at $1.1 billion—the same amount budgeted

for the current fiscal year. The slow pace of reconstruction has generated popular

discontent, directed at both the government of Hamid Karzai and at the United

States. Given the resurgent strength of the Taliban, and a baseline of dissatisfaction

that erupted into violent anti-Western protests in early February, would it be advisable to raise our commitment to Afghan reconstruction?

Answer. An independent national survey in Afghanistan by ABC News in December 2005 measured opinions on a wide variety of issues related to the U.S. presence,

Taliban legacy, pace of reconstruction, and satisfaction with the Afghan Government. The results were overwhelming and unambiguous. According to the poll, the

Afghan people widely believe that despite still difficult living conditions, the U.S.-

led overthrow of the Taliban was a positive development (87 percent), strongly support the administration of President Hamid Karzai (83 percent), and firmly agree

that the Afghanistan of today is headed in the right direction (77 percent). There

is widespread sentiment that living conditions (85 percent), security from crime and

other violence (75 percent), and freedom to express political opinions (80 percent)

is better than it was under the Taliban.

Regarding the level of U.S. assistance for Afghanistan, Secretary Rice announced

at the London conference that the United States had provided a total of over $5.9

billion ($1.1 billion in FY 2006 + $4.8 billion in FY 2005) since the last donor gathering in Berlin. In addition, she announced that our FY 2007 budget request for

Afghanistan was over $1.1 billion.

The FY 2007 figure only represents the Department’s Foreign Operations budget

request. Funding from other agencies that typically contribute to Afghan reconstruction and security assistance (such as DOD) is not factored into the FY 2007 number

as it was for previous years. The reason for this is that it is still very early in the

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1See the ABC News poll at the end of the question and answer section.

FY 2007 budget cycle and the amount of USG funding that will be available from

other sources is not yet clear.

Thus, in terms of the Foreign Operations budget, the $1.1 billion requested for

Afghanistan in FY 2007 actually represents an increase of 27 percent, or over $200

million from the FY 2006 Foreign Operations request.

We are confident that this request for FY 2007 is the right amount of funding

necessary to support our vast reconstruction and security assistance programs in

Afghanistan.

Question. An [original question said ABC] NBC News Poll conducted in October

2005 found that a large majority of Afghans support the aims and effort of the

United States in Afghanistan. However, this may reflect expectations for the future

rather than satisfaction with the current unstable situation. Do you have a sense

that the people’s expectations can be met? How long does the government have to

meet these expectations before support for it drops?

Answer. Most Afghans think their life is already better. An ABC News poll in December 2005 1 found that 87 percent of Afghans surveyed believed the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban was good for their country. Eighty-five percent said that their

living conditions had improved, and 80 percent said their freedom of expression is

better. Seventy-five percent say their security from crime and violence has improved

as well.

Of course, to maintain widespread support it will be necessary to manage expectations while continuing to deliver real improvements in people’s lives. The political

institutions that have developed at the national level need to demonstrate their relevance by delivering security and governance at the local level. Economic growth,

in particular, will be key to meeting expectations. While it is not possible to predict

the future course of public opinion in Afghanistan, maintaining a productive level

of public support is most likely if the Afghan Government, with international support, keeps its focus on achieving progress in an equitable manner.

Question. The impact of the opium and heroin trade is undermining progress in

reconstruction and stabilization. How is the State Department ensuring that the

strategies and tactics of U.S. agencies and our international partners are coherent

and more cost-effective than they have been in the past? How much of the FY07

counternarcotics budget is devoted to demand reduction?

Answer. Indeed, the cultivation, production, and trafficking of opiates exert a destabilizing influence on any country, but trafficking is particularly dangerous to an

emerging democracy such as Afghanistan. The United States, with State’s INL Bureau in the lead, is working with international partners to make a long-term, comprehensive investment in countering narcotics in Afghanistan in an effort to reverse

forces that are hindering the development of the legal economy, fueling widespread

corruption, undermining good governance, and supporting traffickers and other

criminal elements. The following summarizes our efforts:

First, INL participates in all international fora advocating for full-partner participation in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. In 2006, both the London

Conference on Afghanistan and the Doha Conference on Border Management in

Afghanistan focused international community’s attention on the need for a unified,

integrated counternarcotics (CN) effort and solicited international support for CN

and police programs. We will continue to encourage the active involvement of INL’s

international partners in combating illicit narcotics production and trafficking in

Afghanistan.

Concurrently, the United Kingdom is a key partner nation in coordinating international CN assistance, and INL works closely with them on every front. Recognizing the availability of CN moneys from donors lacking a bilateral relationship

with Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, and the United Nations established the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF.) The UNDP oversees administration of this fund, while the Government of Afghanistan retains operational control

over allocation—$78.6 million has been contributed since the fund was established

in October 2005.

Also, Department of Justice prosecutors, working alongside United Kingdom and

Norwegian legal experts, mentor the Vertical Prosecution Task Force (VPTF), building long-term Afghan capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers and corrupt officials. Currently, the docket contains over 100 ongoing prosecutions. In a significant October 2005 victory, Afghanistan extradited its first high-value trafficker

to the United States. The 2005 Anti-Narcotics Law, formally decreed by President

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Karzai, now provides a legal structure that allows for modern investigative techniques and for expedited international extradition.

Moreover, it is important to note that the USG’s five-pillar CN strategy is dynamic, changing in response to changing conditions on the ground. Our five-pillar

CN implementation action plan contains programs that can quickly be modified to

address emergent needs. The January 2006 United Nations Office on Drugs and

Crime’s (UNODC) rapid assessment survey, anticipating sharp increases this year

in opium poppy cultivation in the southern Helmand province, in addition to anecdotal evidence from the field, prompted INL to further action. Specifically, Embassy

Kabul’s CN Task Force and the Narcotics Affairs Section, working together with the

Government of Afghanistan, United Kingdom, UNODC, and the U.S. military,

quickly developed and implemented a responsive plan augmenting Governor-led

eradication. This includes the deployment of additional security forces, the Afghan

Eradication Force (AEF), targeted public information campaigns, alternative livelihoods programs and interdiction operations. The task force interacts daily with

Helmand’s provincial government, which continues to show good cooperation. By

constantly reevaluating and improving the five-pillar strategy, the U.S. interagency

is ensuring that our actions to help Afghanistan are both coherent and cost-effective.

Finally, even as our international partners contribute in various ways to CN efforts in Afghanistan, it is important to underscore U.S. principles and actions. We

believe a credible show of force in tandem with substantive development activities

are the cornerstones to limiting poppy cultivation and opium trafficking. The establishment of a clear and consistent legal system is also crucial in providing long-term

traction necessary to implementation of counternarcotics policies and programs.

INL’s Interdiction pillar focuses on targeting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations while building Afghan CN law enforcement capacity. The Afghan Counternarcotics Police, collaborating with the DEA, are arresting and beginning to prosecute the command and control elements of these organizations. The Narcotics

Interdiction Unit, supported by the DEA’s Foreign Advisory Support Teams and the

Afghan Special Narcotics Force, interdicted 43.9 metric tons of opium and 6.1 metric

tons of heroin in 2005. The presence of INL Huey II helicopters will aid in increasing seizure statistics. Akin to rule of law initiatives, the Justice Reform pillar works

closely with interdiction efforts. A recent Afghan Presidential decree provides that

major CN cases will be transferred to Kabul for prosecution by the VPTF, comprised

of specially trained Afghan prosecutors and investigators.

As for FY07, INL will devote $2 million to demand reduction initiatives including

substance abuse prevention training; treatment techniques; technical assistance on

the creation of drug-free community coalitions; and research into the identification

of prevention and treatment ‘‘best practices’’ that can benefit demand reduction programs worldwide.

SELECTED COUNTRY ISSUES

Question. In November of last year, the military rulers of Burma began relocating

the ministries comprising the capital of Burma from Rangoon to Pyinmana. How do

the relocation plans of the generals impact plans for construction of a new U.S. Embassy in Rangoon?

Answer. These actions are not impacting the construction of the New Embassy

Compound (NEC). The project is proceeding on schedule to be ready to move into

by September 2007. The design-build contract for the Rangoon NEC was awarded

at the end of FY 2004, and notice to proceed was given to the contractor in January

2005. Construction on the NEC is about 40 percent complete at the end of February

2006. The Thai and Australians are also proceeding with ongoing diplomatic construction projects in Rangoon.

The move of the capital will make communications more difficult and further slow

responses to our requests—a situation that will hinder the activities of all the embassies in Rangoon. The new capital is still under construction, and we have been

informed that embassies cannot move to Pyinmana before 2008, which gives time

to determine if this move will actually hold. Currently government officials welcome

the opportunity to return to Rangoon to meet with us, but over time, we may have

to increase our in-country travel to Pyinmana, among other options.

Question. What is the status of construction of the new U.S. Embassy in Beijing,

China? At this point, is construction proceeding ‘‘on budget’’?

Answer. Construction of our New Embassy Compound (NEC) in Beijing was initiated in May 2004. The $434 million project is on schedule for completion before the

summer Olympics in 2008 and is proceeding on budget. Construction on the NEC

is 28 percent complete as of March 2006.

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By way of background, the Beijing NEC is being built on a 10-acre site in the

‘‘Liang Ma He’’ (3rd Diplomatic Enclave). In February 2004, the Department affirmed to Congress that the projected staffing was ‘‘rightsized.’’ The Beijing NEC

will accommodate 664 projected desk positions (both U.S. and local Chinese hires)

and collocate approximately 20 U.S. Government agencies.

In 2001, the Department developed a comprehensive plan to improve operationally and functionally inadequate U.S. facilities in China. The Beijing New Embassy

Compound (NEC) is Phase I of that plan. New consulates in Guangzhou and Shanghai are phases II and III, respectively. Full funding for the Guangzhou Consulate

is in the FY06 budget.

The United States and Peoples Republic of China signed the bilateral Conditions

of Construction Agreement (COCA) in November 2003, which applies to the simultaneous construction of our Embassy in Beijing and the PRC Embassy in Washington.

On the basis of reciprocity, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has begun construction of a new embassy in Washington. The status of the PRC Embassy project

is as follows:

• In January 2004, the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts approved the final design. • The Groundbreaking Ceremony for the new PRC Embassy in Washington was

held on April 22, 2005. • The project is scheduled to be completed in 2008.

Question. The administration is recommending $20 million in ESF to ‘‘continue

ongoing programs devoted to economic growth and reforms, good governance and

poverty alleviation, as well as attacking pervasive corruption’’ in the Philippines.

• What results can be demonstrated from previous ESF funds expended to ‘‘attack

pervasive corruption’’?

Answer. ESF funds supported Philippine Government anticorruption efforts at the

national and local levels, created greater public demand for reform, and enabled

civil society participation in activities intended to curb corruption. For example, ESF

funds were used to train investigators and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman (the Philippine Government office charged with combating corruption), which

they had not previously received, resulting in a significant improvement in the conviction rate from 13 percent in 2003 to over 30 percent in 2005. At the local government level, ESF funds were used to help Mindanao cities improve their business

practices and reduce corruption. A recent evaluation showed that these cities were

successful in drastically reducing the processing time of business permit renewals

from more than a week to just a few hours, which made their procurement transactions more transparent and removed opportunities for corruption. ESF was also

used to implement transparent government procurement and insure accountability,

as well as capacity-building in civil society organizations. Specifically, we provided

training for 700 volunteers as observers in bids and awards committees to facilitate

more rigorous monitoring of government procurement and to provide a means for

reporting procurement irregularities to the Office of the Ombudsman.

Question. India is increasingly looking to Iran to satisfy its rapidly growing energy

requirements, particularly in the gas sector. How can we bridge the gap between

our two countries’ divergent policies toward Iran? To what extent do U.S. officials

raise the issue of Iran with their Indian interlocutors? To what extent could India

rely on energy suppliers other than Iran to fulfill its energy requirements?

Answer. Rather than diverging, the gap between our two countries’ policies toward Iran narrowed last September and February when India voted in the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors’ meetings to refer Iran to the

United Nations over Iran’s violations of its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. The Indian Government does not want another nuclear-armed country in its

neighborhood, nor do we.

The United States avails itself of every opportunity to raise with the Indian Government our concerns and the concerns of the global community about Iran’s egregious behavior. Iran is a frequent focus of our Embassy’s daily engagement with the

Indian Government. During his recent visit to India, President Bush emphasized

that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranians would be dangerous for all of

us. We have told the Indian Government that we do not support the proposal for

an Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline and that such a project may invite scrutiny under

the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.

We recognize India’s growing energy needs and want to work with India to enhance its energy security. We have established joint working groups with Indian

counterparts on oil and gas, power and energy efficiency, new technology and renewable energy, and coal to identify and develop indigenous energy resources that

might be alternatives to Iranian imports, and to increase the efficiency of India’s

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energy utilization, which may reduce the country’s need for Iranian oil and gas. The

United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, if implemented, could also

help reduce India’s requirement for imported fossil fuels as India will have an opportunity to utilize the most modern and efficient technologies to develop its nuclear

power industry. In addition, we continually encourage the Indian Government to

seek stable and secure energy sources elsewhere in the Middle East and in Central

Asia.

Question. What is the rationale for continuing to provide large direct cash transfers to the Government of Pakistan, rather than programming increasing amounts

of our assistance through USAID projects? What might the costs be in terms of U.S.

policy toward Pakistan if the United States were to program more of our assistance

toward USAID-sponsored democracy, health, and education projects? Would there be

any potential gains for U.S. policy in the region in terms of countering anti-U.S.,

extremist attitudes?

Answer. In 2003, the United States committed to provide Pakistan $300 million

in Economic Support Funds per year in fiscal years 2005–2009. According to agreements concluded in 2004 with the Pakistani Government, $100 million of this assistance will be used for project aid, and $200 million will be provided as budget support to be used for mutually agreed purposes. The Pakistani Government’s budget

planning assumes the United States will honor this commitment. It is important to

establish our reliability.

The Pakistani Government for its part has upheld its undertakings in this process. According to the agreement, which is reviewed and updated annually, Pakistan

is to use the $200 million in budget support to achieve the goals it set for itself in

the Poverty Reduction Strategy it developed with the World Bank. Notably, these

goals include a commitment to increase spending on health and education significantly. Pakistan is, for example, committed to increase education spending from 2.5

to 4 percent of Gross Domestic Product within 5 years. The Pakistani Government

has, in fact, boosted education spending significantly, from 1.7 percent of GDP in

2002 to 2.5 percent in the fiscal year ending in June 2005. In short, our assistance

has leveraged large increases in Pakistani Government spending on critical social

needs. Budget support allows the USG the greatest input to build Pakistan’s capacity in meeting these critical social needs without requiring a larger staff to be in

country to administer the program. Security concerns still require us to limit staffing in Islamabad, and hence our ability to more closely monitor our activities.

Changing the mix of assistance from budget support to project aid is unlikely to

improve significantly our ability to counter anti-U.S., extremist attitudes. We believe that improved public outreach on USAID’s activities would better address

these concerns rather than just shifting funds to USAID programs in Pakistan; we

are actively undertaking efforts to that end. Cutting funds from GOP budget support, however, could damage our ability to effectively work with the GOP. It could

also result in decreased Pakistani Government spending on critical needs like education. The USAID mission in Pakistan has allotted $250,000 to launch a public information campaign that will build on the positive public response to our earthquake relief efforts and expand it to other parts of the portfolio.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING

Question. Given the clear cost savings and burden-sharing with U.N. missions

such as the one in Haiti, why has the administration not requested full funding for

its past obligations?

Answer. The inclusion of a funding request for arrears other than those related

to Sudan-Darfur was not made because the administration limited its request for

supplemental peacekeeping funding to the emergency situation in Darfur-Sudan.

Question. Estimates are that the United States will run out of money to pay its

peacekeeping dues by June of this year, with a shortfall of some half a billion dollars for 2006. Will this funding be included in the supplemental? If not, how can

we insist that the United Nations reform itself when we are not paying our bills

on time?

Answer. Prior to FY 2000, the United States accumulated arrears of approximately $400 million primarily caused by a 25-percent cap on peacekeeping payments. Although Congress appropriated sufficient funds each year from FY 2000

until FY 2005 to pay annual assessments, the pre-2000 arrears remain outstanding,

and in FY 2005 our arrears grew by $145 million because appropriated funds were

not equal to our assessments.

The shortfall for FY 2005 of $145.010 million and the projected shortfall for FY

2006 of $376.752 million totals $521.762 million. The FY 2006 supplemental budget

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contains a request of $69.8 million in the CIPA account for Sudan-Darfur as well

as transfer authority language from the Peacekeeping Operations request which, in

total, would offset $129.8 million of the above total arrears for a net projected new

arrears of $391.962 million at the end of FY 2006.

The inclusion of a funding request for these remaining arrears was not made because the administration limited its request for supplemental peacekeeping funding

to the emergency situation in Darfur-Sudan.

AIDS, MALARIA, AND AVIAN FLU

Question. How much of the funding already appropriated for avian flu will be used

for overseas programs? What specific programs will this funding entail? How will

the $55 million in the budget request be spent?

Answer. Of the nearly $3.8 billion appropriated in the FY 2006 supplemental request for avian and pandemic influenza, a total of $280 million will be used for overseas programs. This amount includes approximately $132 million managed by

USAID; $114 million managed by HHS (Note: $31 million of the HHS total is for

international research funding that is not counted as foreign assistance); $18 million

managed by USDA; $10 million managed by DOD; and $6 million managed by the

Department of State. The FY 2006 funds will be used for a wide variety of programs, including: Improving surveillance and response systems; support for the

World Health Organization (WHO); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO);

and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), international planning and

preparedness; prepositioning of supplies; training of rapid-response teams and medical personnel; improved monitoring of animal vaccine distribution and use; support

of human disease research; biosecurity enhancement; food safety and industrial

methods training; vaccine formulation; military-to-military partnership capacitybuilding; international public information programs; and international coordination

and support for the President’s International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic

Influenza.

The State Department’s $6 million will be spent on international response coordination involving foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations and diplomatic outreach. In addition to $280 million, agencies are exploring ways to increase

their international assistance. The FY 2007 budget request of $55 million for

USAID’s international assistance programs will continue to be spent on surveillance

and early warning preparedness, planning, prepositioned supplies and equipment

and communications.

Question. Does the administration intend to implement programs designed to prevent the spread of avian flu in developing countries? What is the anticipated impact

on the budget if avian flu spreads as some health experts fear it might? For instance, are we prepared to ramp up avian flu programs if the virus spreads Africawide?

Answer. Through the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza

announced by President Bush in September 2005, the administration is working

hard to improve global readiness, including in developing countries, by elevating the

issue on national agendas. In addition, the partnership brings together key nations

and international organizations to coordinate efforts among donor and affected nations; mobilize and leverage resources to mitigate the spread of the disease; increase

transparency in disease reporting and surveillance; and building capacity to identify, contain, and respond to a pandemic influenza.

At the present time, we believe that $214 million in FY 2007 funds, in addition

to $280 million in FY 2006 supplemental appropriations will be adequate, coupled

with contributions of the international community, including financial and other

support provided by multilateral, bilateral, and private sector donors. The reality of

the threat of pandemic influenza is that it is too large for any one country to address alone, and requires a comprehensive and coordinated response from the international community.

With regard to our efforts in Africa, the State Department has established an

interagency African Avian Influenza Network that was activated to respond to avian

influenza outbreaks in Africa, starting with Nigeria. U.S. Ambassadors are instructed to encourage host governments to promote strong interagency communication and coordination (particularly among Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and Information) to combat the threat of avian influenza. As in the case of Nigeria, U.S.

Embassies are encouraged to work closely with other donors and U.N. resident representatives to prioritize host country needs and coordinate appropriate international responses. Our Embassies are instructed to convey to host governments the

importance of coordinating their efforts with neighboring countries, and U.S. EmVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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bassies in neighboring countries also coordinate closely among themselves. Regional

organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

have been engaged to develop regional response strategies and resources, as outbreaks become more widespread.

Within the African Avian Influenza Network, the State Department’s Avian Influenza Action Group and the Bureau of African Affairs are coordinating closely with

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of

Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Defense (DOD) and other appropriate agencies, both in Washington and

in affected and high-risk countries, to develop assistance programs and technical

support for countries potentially affected by outbreaks. Both the interagency African

Avian Influenza Network in Washington and the country teams at U.S. Embassies

and consulates overseas are developing appropriate contingency plans for addressing

the anticipated diplomatic, economic, and security concerns of countries affected by

avian influenza in Africa. Our plans are coordinated with appropriate international

technical organizations including the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health

(OIE) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO).

Question. The administration is proposing $300 million for the Global Fund to

Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in FY 2007—less than Congress has provided in any of the last 4 fiscal years. To what extent does the administration’s emphasis on funding bilateral AIDS programs, rather than the Global Fund, reflect

disappointment with the work of the Global Fund? What is your assessment of the

effectiveness of Global Fund efforts to assure accountability in the use of its resources?

Answer. The Global Fund remains an important part of the Emergency Plan

strategy, and the U.S. Government remains by far its largest single contributor of

funds. The Emergency Plan originally anticipated allocating $1 billion to the Global

Fund over 5 years. However, we are now on track to provide over $2 billion to the

fund in 3 years. The President’s fiscal year 2007 request for focus country bilateral

AIDS programs funding—$2.717 billion within Foreign Operations and $2.776

total—is, in part, an attempt to recover from the effects of the redirection of almost

$527 million from focus country programs to the Global Fund and other components

of the Emergency Plan over PEPFAR’s first 3 years. If focus country budgets are

not fully funded again in FY 2007, the capacity needed for a dramatic expansion

of services in FY 2008 will not be possible—and no increase in FY 2008 spending

could undo this setback. Without the FY 2007 level of funding for the focus countries, it will not be possible to meet the 2–7–10 goals of the Emergency Plan—especially the goal of supporting treatment for 2 million.

At this point, the Emergency Plan can realize the most immediate impact through

its bilateral programs, which focus on building capacity for massive, rapid scale-up

of prevention, treatment, and care programs. The Global Fund plays an important

long-term role in the USG strategy, providing financing to enable developing countries to respond to the challenges of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. However,

the Global Fund model, with a lean Secretariat and no field staff, does not allow

funding to be deployed as quickly as USG bilateral programs. For example, from the

time the Global Fund announces a Call for Proposals when it launches a round of

financing, often a full year, at a minimum, passes until the time a grant recipient

actually begins programmatic work. The Emergency Plan, with a global presence of

dedicated full-time field staff, is typically able to program money within a much

shorter time span. While the USG seeks to build the Global Fund into a successful

international funding mechanism over time, in the immediate term, our judgment

is that any redirection of resources from bilateral programs to the Global Fund will

endanger our ability to reach the 2–7–10 goals by 2008 envisioned by the President

and Congress.

Each country needs to find the right mix of bilateral and multilateral contributions to get the most immediate results from its investment. For the USG, the 20-

year history of its bilateral programs means that these programs can move much

faster—especially in the focus countries—than the Global Fund. In fact, other governments have made similar determinations to invest heavily in bilateral efforts

rather than multilateral options:

• In 2004 the share of USG contributions that went to the Global Fund was more

than twice that of the United Kingdom.

• Countries with a much more modest presence on the ground than the United

States—such as Germany and Japan—are comparable to the United States in

terms of allocation of funding between bilateral and Global Fund contributions.

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The Global Fund has shown promise, but it remains a young organization, and

it must stick to its original vision as a performance-based, public-private financing

instrument. The USG is working with the Global Fund to focus on areas where improvement is needed, particularly those areas highlighted by Congress. In spite of

significant accomplishments, we continue to share concerns identified in the House

FY05 and FY06 appropriations reports, for example, about:

• Possible shift from project support to budget support; • Threats to the Comprehensive Funding Policy; • Deficiencies in performance-based funding system; • Concerns about adherence to rigorous progress benchmarks and results-based

disbursement; • Lack of coordination of technical assistance for grants; • Questions about the role of Local Fund Agents; • Domination of Country Coordination Mechanisms by host governments and

international organizations; • Devolution of authority from the Board to the Secretariat; and • Inadequate speed, efficiency, transparency, and accountability of grants.

If the Global Fund maintains its core mission and a model that Congress supports, and as the fund’s performance improves in the years to come, there will be

opportunities to reassess the level of USG funding for it. For FY 2007, however, it

is crucial that the USG continue to concentrate its resources on focus country programs.

Question. The State Department’s Global AIDS Initiative directs its work primarily in 15 focus countries, 12 of them in Africa as well as Haiti, Guyana, and

Vietnam. The FY 2007 budget proposes almost a 60-percent increase in assistance

to these countries, while bilateral programs for other nations appear to decline

slightly. Does the FY 2007 proposal enable the United States to adequately help

other countries facing grave threats from AIDS, such as impoverished Malawi in Africa, Honduras in Central America, or India, China, and Russia?

Answer. The overall request for Emergency Plan funding in fiscal year 2007 is up dramatically, from approximately $3.2 billion in FY 2006 to $4 billion. Within this

overall increase, priority was placed on the focus countries. Without the FY 2007

level of funding for the focus countries, it will not be possible to meet the 2–7–10

goals established by the President and Congress.

At the same time, however, the request does include a modest increase from the

FY 2006 enacted level of funding for bilateral programs in other countries (from

$425.6 to $432.7 billion, not including funding for research).

The President’s FY 2007 request for the focus countries is, in part, an attempt

to recover from the effects on focus country programs of the redirection of almost

$527 million from focus country programs to the Global Fund and to other bilateral

programs over the Emergency Plan’s first 3 years. Of these three broad areas of the

Emergency Plan, funding for the focus countries, originally planned to be $10 billion

over 5 years, is the only one which has not been funded at the planned level overall

to date. The President’s fiscal year 2007 request for focus country bilateral AIDS

programs funding—$2.717 billion within Foreign Operations and $2.776 total—is, in

part, an attempt to recover from the effects of the redirection of almost $527 million

from focus country programs to the Global Fund and other components of the Emergency Plan over PEPFAR’s first 3 years. Other USG programs, including those beyond the focus countries, are on track to meet the $4 billion target level over 5 years

as originally envisioned for the Emergency Plan.

Question. The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and

Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108–25) states the sense of Congress that by the end of

fiscal 2006, U.S. assistance programs should be providing antiretroviral therapy to

2 million patients. Are we on track to meet this target?

Answer. The USG will not meet the sense of Congress provision to support

antiretroviral treatment for 2 million people by the end of the third year of Emergency Plan implementation, fiscal year 2006. The provision did not adequately reflect the need to invest intensively in building local capacity for scale-up of prevention, treatment, and care programs. Taking this concern into account, the President

set a 5-year timeframe for meeting the Emergency Plan goals of supporting treatment for 2 million people, preventing 7 million new HIV infections, and supporting

care for 10 million people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, including orphans and

vulnerable children, in an accountable and sustainable way.

The USG has made dramatic progress in its efforts to support host nations in

building capacity, laying the foundation for long-term sustainability and continued

success. As of September 30, 2005, the Emergency Plan supported life-extending

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treatment for approximately 471,000 people with HIV/AIDS, 401,000 of them in the

15 focus countries. Based on the data collected through fiscal year 2005 and shared

in the recent annual report to Congress, we are confident that we will meet the

President’s goals.

The Emergency Plan remains committed to supporting national treatment strategies through partnerships with host governments, nongovernmental organizations

(including faith- and community-based organizations), and the private sector, together providing the full spectrum of services required for quality treatment. These

programs are providing services that achieve results while building the local, sustainable capacity needed for the long term. The services and capacity expansion supported to date include:

• Training for clinical and laboratory personnel;

• Training of counselors for treatment regimen adherence, prevention, and

healthy living;

• Physical infrastructure including improved clinical space and laboratory equipment; and

• Distribution, logistics, and management systems for drugs and other commodities.

In order to meet the Emergency Plan’s obligation of accountability, the Office of

the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator collects data on treatment and other results on

a semiannual basis.

Question. The legislation also requires that for fiscal years 2006 through 2008, 10

percent of authorized funds be devoted to helping orphans and vulnerable children.

How will you meet this target under the fiscal 2007 request?

Answer. The Emergency Plan has already supported care for nearly 3 million orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) through prevention, treatment, and care activities in the 15 focus countries. Based on currently approved funding activities as

of January 2006, we are already on target to meet the 10-percent budget requirement for OVCs in fiscal year 2006. The Emergency Plan will work to ensure that

it continues to meet the budget requirement in fiscal year 2007 as well.

As part of its efforts to ensure compliance with the 10-percent earmark in FY

2006 and beyond, the Emergency Plan has asked the USG teams in the focus countries to maintain focus on the following technical priorities in programming for

OVCs:

• Strengthening systems and structures at the family, community, and national

levels to achieve scale and sustainability for meeting the short- and long-term

needs of vulnerable children;

• Providing comprehensive quality services based on a menu of essential services;

and

• Facilitating a supportive context to reduce stigma and discrimination and increase child protection (e.g., advocacy, social mobilization, policy reform).

In the related area of pediatric treatment, the USG plans to accelerate progress

in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. Key initiatives include:

• Establishing targets for children on treatment at the country level;

• Working with domestic and international partners to ensure affordable pediatric

ARV formulations and diagnostic techniques, including:

Æ Improving laboratory infrastructure to support pediatric diagnosis;

Æ Working with private and public sector partners to ensure affordability of

medicines;

Æ Strengthening the supply chain to allow for delivery of life-saving medicines

to the children that need them.

• Training health care providers in pediatric treatment; and

• Working at the community level to fight stigma and provide support to children

and their caregivers.

Question. USAID has made recent changes in how it implements its malaria program in response to earlier criticism that a large portion of funds was being spent

on administrative overhead rather than insecticides, medical treatment, and mosquito netting. With the President’s pledge to spend an additional $1.2 billion

through FY 2010, do you anticipate any other changes to the program?

What are the obstacles to reaching the President’s objective of reducing malarial

deaths in target countries by 50 percent?

Answer. USAID does not envision further policy changes beyond those implemented in late 2005. The focus will be to fully implement these reforms throughout

the USAID malaria program.

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The single greatest obstacle to achieving the President’s goal of a 50-percent reduction in malaria deaths is the weak health infrastructure in many sub-Saharan

African countries. This includes a lack of adequately trained staff at all levels of the

health care system and weak logistics and management systems. Other obstacles

include: (a) The worldwide shortages of insecticide-treated mosquito nets and

artemisinin-based combination drugs that are expected to continue for another 1–

2 years; (b) delays in implementing Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and

Malaria grants in some countries; and (c) challenges involved in improving and controlling prescription and use of antimalarial drugs in both the public and private

sectors. The USAID malaria program, African Governments, and other development

partners are aggressively addressing these constraints. Each of the countries included in the President’s Malaria Initiative has a comprehensive malaria control

plan that was developed in conjunction with the National Malaria Control Program

and other partners.

USAID ACCOUNTS

Question. Is the United States paying adequate attention to countries that are not

selected to participate as focus or Compact countries in the MCA, PEPFAR, and malaria initiatives? Is U.S. economic assistance evolving into highly selective programs

that concentrate only on the ‘‘best performers’’ or those with most severe health

challenges? Have we made a decision not to address the needs of large populations

living in poverty in those countries that fall outside the ‘‘preferred’’ categories?

Answer. USAID focuses the bulk of its resources where the needs are greatest and

where expected results are highest, including countries where there is political commitment. That said, where the need is great and political will is weak, USAID still

provides support for humanitarian purposes to reach the poor, often through nongovernment channels. The United States provides assistance from a number of accounts to a wide array of countries—well over 100. Aside from Burma and China,

the United States has a significant aid program in every low-income country with

large numbers of poor people.

Further, the programs mentioned in the question are less concentrated than commonly recognized.

• The number of MCA eligible countries rose from 16 in 2004 to 23 in 2005. An

additional 13 countries are eligible for threshold programs aimed at achieving

MCA eligibility.

• PEPFAR resources are focused on 15 countries that account for about half of

the world’s 40 million HIV infections. There are five other bilateral country programs that receive over $10 million in USG assistance annually. Together with

the 15, they cover 70 percent of the world’s HIV infections. Overall, PEPFAR

funds are supporting programs in 123 countries, much of which is focused on

large, low-income populations, many of which are in Africa. The USG is the

largest bilateral donor to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS and through its contributions reaches additional countries.

• USAID currently supports malaria activities in 18 countries plus 2 regional programs. Most are in low-income countries in Africa where the malaria prevalence

is highest and the potential for impact is greatest. The President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) focuses increased resources on countries most affected by the disease, growing from 3 countries this year to 15 countries by 2008.

Question. What is the justification for the cut in the USAID Development Assistance account?

Answer. The FY 2007 DA and CSH combined request is a slight increase over the

FY 2006 President’s budget, so the administration has maintained our overall priority for funding. However there was a shift from DA to CSH to meet a commitment

for increasing malaria funding which resulted in less DA funding for programming

in all regions.

Question. Latin America is particularly affected by the cuts in the USAID Development Assistance account. Estimates are that aid to Latin America from this account will decrease by 28 percent. Could you please give us the overall amount for

Latin America envisioned in this budget once all aid programs are included, including Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),

and compare it to last year’s figure? Are cuts to the region justified? What are the

comparable figures for Africa, which is seeing a 4-percent cut in the Development

Assistance account?

Answer. While the FY 2007 request for Development Assistance funding has been

reduced from the FY 2006 enacted level of $254 million to $182 million (28 percent

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reduction), the overall foreign assistance request for the region has remained similar

to previous years because of increased Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) funding. In addition, the FY 2007 request for Economic Support Funds is $31 million

more than the FY 2006 level and will focus on rural development and market access. The FY 2007 level for USAID’s programs in Latin America and the Caribbean

is $92 million less than the FY 2006 allocation of $914 million (11 percent reduction); given this, LAC has begun a process of limiting sectors and retargeting resources to areas identified as weaknesses by the MCC.

In FY 2006, the MCA will be providing significant resources through Compact agreements to Nicaragua ($175 million) and Honduras ($215 million) and through

Threshold Country funding to Paraguay ($37 million). The Threshold Country program will be managed by USAID and is included in the Agency’s planned spending

for FY 2006. With the addition of MCA resources focusing on areas of rural development traditionally implemented by USAID, the FY 2007 budget request is adequate

to reach the Agency’s goals in the region.

Question. When the President announced the MCA initiative in March 2002, he

said funds would be in addition to, and not a substitute for, other U.S. economic

assistance. Nevertheless, in the FY 2007 budget request, for the six MCC Compact

countries where USAID maintains an aid program, overall economic assistance

would decline from FY 2006 levels: Honduras, from $32 million to $25.5 million;

Nicaragua, from $32 million to $22.7 million; Armenia, from $74.3 million to $50

million; Madagascar, from $21.5 million to $17.5 million; and Benin, from $12.3 million to $8.8 million. Has there been a change in the administration’s thinking that

regular U.S. economic assistance can be reduced in MCC Compact countries? Will

the compacts adequately substitute for the sector priorities funded in the past by

USAID? Is the same thing likely to occur as other countries sign MCC Compacts?

Answer. There are two countries in the Western Hemisphere with MCC Compacts: Nicaragua and Honduras. While, FY 2006 DA resources for these two countries have been reduced, it is not the result of the Millennium Challenge Account

fund. USAID reduced the FY 2006 levels for these countries to meet the administration’s commitment to provide resources for improvements to the labor and environment sectors under CAFTA–DR.

The FY 2007 funding is reduced by 26 percent for Honduras and 41 percent for

Nicaragua, while Honduras has received an MCC compact of $215 million and Nicaragua has received an MCC compact of $175 million. One focus of these compacts

is on agricultural development, including crop diversification and market access, developmental programs traditionally funded by USAID. Another focus of the MCC

programs is on the improvements in the highways and roads in both countries and

one port in Nicaragua. These projects will compliment USAID’s development programs in Nicaragua and Honduras at the local and national level.

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION

Question. The administration is requesting $3 billion for MCC again this year.

There has been skepticism in the past that the organization can spend this amount

of funding effectively and efficiently. Can you explain why $3 billion is justified this

year?

Question. On April 3, 2006, MCC will sign its eighth compact, reflecting commitments of over $1.5 billion, in addition to having signed threshold agreements with

five countries for nearly $100 million. In the current fiscal year, MCC is on track

to finalize at least three more compacts totaling an additional $1.1 billion, which

will represent funding commitments of up to $1.7 billion for fiscal year 2006 (FY06),

almost twice the level committed in FY05.

MCC projects that in FY07, we expect to sign between 9 and 12 new compacts,

comprising commitments of more than $3 billion. As a result, MCC will have total

commitments approaching $6 billion, with up to 21 countries, by the end of FY07.

Because of the robust demand of eligible countries, we are projecting that all currently available program funds from FY04, FY05, and FY06 will be exhausted by

the second quarter of FY07, making the FY07 request for MCC all that more critical

to our success.

At funding levels lower than $3 billion, MCC will likely delay negotiating compacts with some eligible countries, not to mention the newly eligible FY07 countries

that the board of directors will select this November. It would be unfortunate if

these countries who have undertaken significant political, economic, and social policy reforms, and those striving to be selected, find that meeting the criteria for eligibility does not result in actual funding of their development projects to achieve long

term sustainable economic growth.

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As Chair of the MCC Board of Directors, this is something I, and the board, feel

strongly about, as noted in the recent letter to Senate and House appropriators that

each member of the board signed. I look forward to working with Congress to ensure

that MCC has sufficient funding to as we move forward with our critical mission

in the developing world.

Question. As chairman of the board of the MCC, how do you assess the corporation’s first 2 years of activities? How would you characterize the changes put in

place by the new CEO, Ambassador Danilovich? Do you agree with his plan to fund

larger, but possibly fewer compacts in order to achieve greater MCC impact?

Answer. MCC’s first 2 years are ones of great progress and great learning. In February 2004, MCC started with just eight people, a budget and borrowed office space.

In executing its mandate, MCC experienced the usual difficulties inherent in all

startups, where virtually all activities were being done for the first time. The challenge of building an organization while working through its engagement with newly

selected countries on a new development concept was substantial.

MCC has successfully established itself as an organization and will soon have

eight compacts to show for its efforts so far. MCC took on many of the lessons from

its successes and shortcomings during this time of tremendous growth and continues to expand its capabilities and sophistication in its activities as it continues

to move forward, particularly under the new leadership of the new CEO, Ambassador Danilovich. For example, MCC has developed detailed guidance for partner

countries so expectations are clear on both sides and the compact development process can move much more quickly and smoothly.

No longer a startup, MCC has also implemented a range of internal management

provisions to improve its function as an organization. For example, MCC has spent

considerable effort since Ambassador Danilovich’s arrival to establish various internal fiscal and policy controls, an aggressive staffing plan to hire sufficient personnel

to handle the increasing workload, and a much improved budgeting process.

Last, I am fully supportive of Ambassador Danilovich’s push for larger compacts

in a limited number of countries. MCC’s mission is to transform poor countries

through funding and incentives so that our partner countries are the ones championing the necessary reforms and policy measures to increase economic growth and

reduce poverty through their own efforts and leadership. Development and the political will for development cannot be imposed from the outside, and MCC is targeted

to those countries that seek most seriously their own success.

Question. When the President announced the initiative in March 2002, he said

MCC would be in addition to, rather than a substitute for, other U.S. economic assistance. Nevertheless, the countries that are now MCC countries are seeing a drop

in regular assistance in the FY 2007 budget request. Is this a pattern that we expect to repeat in every MCC country? How do you see the relationship between regular assistance and MCC assistance?

Answer. The MCA is very much considered an addition rather than a substitute

for traditional U.S economic assistance. While I do not believe MCC is a substitute

for other funds, I do have an obligation to make choices among competing demands.

One criterion is to avoid overlap and duplication of funding efforts. Based on overall

need and commitment, I focused the resources where there is relatively high country

commitment and need. This resulted in proportionately more resources going to

Africa and South Asia, and fewer to Latin America. The request for the Development Assistance Account in the President’s Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) Budget is $227

million, lower than the 2006 enacted level. However, the administration has focused

funding in this account on transformational development and accountability for results, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the budget increases the

focus on countries that have the greatest need for assistance, along with the greatest likelihood of achieving results with this aid. Further, this account reduces funding for middle-income countries where the needs are not as great, and in MCA eligible countries where governments are proposing MCA programs that significantly

overlap with traditional accounts.

Question. How do you see the relationship between the MCC Chief Executive Officer and the USAID Administrator now that the USAID Administrator will be serving as your Director of Foreign Assistance?

Answer. I have every confidence that Ambassador Tobias, as Director of Foreign

Assistance and Administrator of USAID, and Ambassador Danilovich, MCC CEO,

will work hand-in-glove to address the pressing issues that face developing countries. MCC has already established a healthy and cooperative relationship with

USAID, particularly since USAID plays a key role in MCC’s Threshold Program,

and I expect that this will continue and strengthen under USAID’s new leadership.

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MCC will continue as an independent corporation, as it was originally designed, but

will work closely and in concert with the direction of the priorities and strategies

of the Director of Foreign Assistance.

TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Question. Do you foresee additional security needs as we launch more people beyond our Embassies to work in American Presence Posts outside capital cities?

Answer. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act (SECCA) of

1999 (Public Law 106–113) requires that any new diplomatic facility meet collocation and 100-foot-setback statutory requirements. The collocation, setback, and

waiver requirements uniformly apply to embassies, consulates, and American Presence Posts (APPs). Once a post has identified a potential APP site, the Regional Security Officer (RSO), in coordination with DS Headquarters and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), will conduct a physical security survey of the location to determine security requirements. APP sites must adhere to, or be in, the

final stages of compliance with the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards prior to occupancy. Additionally, waivers to SECCA and exceptions to OSPB

standards must be obtained for any site deficiencies that cannot be remedied. Once

all requirements are firmly identified, available Department resources will be

prioritized as necessary.

Question. Will the Virtual Presence Posts be combined with the Successful American Corners program where computers and American-generated literature are located in public and university libraries for use by the public and students?

Answer. Both the Virtual Presence Posts (VPP) and American Corners program

are options available to Chiefs of Mission overseas to improve outreach and engage

the local public. The programs are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, should reinforce one another. Depending on the post’s need and the local situation, one or both

of the programs may be appropriate for posts to use as a platform to reach out to

different communities in the host country. The offices responsible for the respective

programs are coordinating efforts and working together to provide guidance to posts.

Question. A recently submitted report to Congress on the level of language-designated positions at our Embassies shows that for FY05, none of these positions

have been filled in Baghdad by qualified Arabic speakers. Perhaps even more alarming, the report said that only four of all the positions in Baghdad were designated

as requiring Arabic. How can this be when we so desperately need to communicate

better with the Iraqis? In Kabul, another critical post, 11 out of 18 positions are

currently staffed by officers ‘‘meeting’’ or at least ‘‘partially meeting’’ the language

requirement there according to the report. Given the number of new positions that

Congress has authorized and funded for the Department, why aren’t more language

qualified officers filling these critical needs?

Answer. The U.S. mission in Iraq was established in June 2004 following an extensive interagency planning process resulting in the transition from the Coalition

Provisional Authority (CPA) to a full fledged U.S. Embassy. Employees were then,

and still are, significantly restricted from moving out of the International Zone,

given the security environment, although employees do regularly travel outside the

International Zone to fulfill mission requirements. Although Arabic language proficiency is an important element to many U.S. mission Iraq jobs, not every position

requires full working proficiency in the language. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) sought officers with well-rounded skills who could function effectively

in a very difficult environment. Many Iraqi Government, business and opinion leaders speak excellent English. Existing language gaps have been filled with the use

of talented interpreter/translators.

The Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the Human Resources Bureau (HR), and the

Bureau of NEA are developing a cadre of advanced speakers who will support transformational diplomacy and defend and advance U.S interests abroad. The Bureau

of Human Resources, in its Foreign Service recruitment process, has established incentives for Arabic and other hard language qualified officers to help meet the Department’s growing need for language proficiency. In the past 3 years, HR has recruited 30 professional proficient Arabic speakers. In FY 2003 through 2005, the

Foreign Service Institute reports 312 enrollments of State employees in courses designed to achieve Limited Working Proficiency (2 level) in Arabic (including Standard Arabic and Egyptian Arabic) and another 105 enrollments of State employees

in courses designed to achieve General Professional Proficiency (3 level) or higher

in Arabic. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs continues to provide long-term Arabic

training opportunities for Foreign Service employees, including training beginning

in September 2006.

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Question. A number of your proposals for transformational diplomacy—Foreign

Service officers trained to run programs, operational nation-building activities far

away from capitals, strengthening rule of law, improving health and reforming education—are all missions that are currently being carried out by USAID officials. Can

you describe where you see such missions overlapping and give us a sense of how

you see responsibilities dividing between USAID and State in the field?

Answer. As we transform to being more engaged in a ‘‘hands-on’’ fashion to try

to help people transform their lives, there will be enough work for both the Foreign

Service and the USAID corps. These roles are by no means redundant or competitive. USAID is our primary delivery mechanism for hands-on assistance and will

continue to play that role in even a stronger way, but a more coordinated way. A

strengthened USAID only augments these capabilities. Foreign Service officers are

and will continue to become engaged in a different kind of work than in the past,

while still maintaining traditional diplomatic roles, and must be well trained properly to do so.

Question. Since 2003 there has been a decline in the number of people taking the

Foreign Service exam. In addition, there was a gap in the number of training positions versus training goals at the Department. How will State make up that gap?

How do you plan to encourage more people to take the Foreign Service exam? What

effect might your transformational diplomacy have on Foreign Service applications

in the coming years?

Answer. In 2003, 20,342 applicants took the written examination; in 2004, 19,101;

and in 2005, 18,699. While it is true that slightly fewer people took the exam in

recent years, we still have a very large candidate pool for a relatively small number

of positions. Nevertheless, we have a number of efforts aimed at encouraging more

top quality people to take the Foreign Service exam, including internships, fellowships, partnerships with nongovernmental organizations, participation in a variety

of conferences, advertising, and the use of foreign language materials to reach out

to family members of potential recruits so they will better understand the challenges and rewards of a Foreign Service career. Our Diplomats in Residence identify, counsel, and mentor potential Foreign Service candidates.

It is our hope that transformational diplomacy will attract individuals to the Foreign Service in even larger numbers for a career where they will be on the cutting

edge of diplomacy, and where they are more than ever on the front lines as U.S.

representatives in new postings around the world.

The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative of Fiscal Years 2002 to 2004 included plans

for 512 training positions. In fiscal year 2004, Department appropriations fell 89 positions short of the DRI goal. In addition, due to the emerging requirements of staffing Iraq and Afghanistan, an additional 153 positions were diverted from training,

leaving the Department a total of 242 positions short of our DRI training goal.

Question. Please explain the proposed pay-for-performance system. Do you expect

that it will boost retention and recruitment? How competitive would this system be

with the private sector? What effect would this new performance-based pay system

have on the pay of current Foreign Service officers?

Answer. The Department understands that the final legislative proposal on Foreign Service modernization will be transmitted by the administration very soon.

Generally, the system would eliminate longevity-based pay increases and institute

a system similar to that already in place for the Senior Foreign Service, wherein

an employee’s annual pay adjustment is dependent on the previous year’s performance assessment. The proposal would also establish a global rate of pay for the Foreign Service to attract and retain a labor market for worldwide-available personnel,

based on the needs of the Service, consistent with other pay systems with similar

worldwide availability requirements.

We expect that the proposed system will enable the Department to continue to

recruit and retain top talent willing to spend a great portion of their career overseas. Currently the private sector and other components of the USG employ pay

structures for their worldwide deployable workforce that reward rather than penalize overseas service. This proposal will reward employees commensurately with performance and will restore the incentives for overseas service throughout an employee’s career.

The effect on current Foreign Service officers at the FS–01 level and below, like

the Senior Foreign Service, would also no longer be guaranteed an annual pay increase just for an additional year in service. As of April 2008, all increases in pay

would be performance-based. Further, the rank-and-file Foreign Service would no

longer take a pay cut for serving overseas, significantly restoring the incentive for

overseas service. Under the forthcoming proposal, as of April 2008, one global pay

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schedule would be used for Foreign Service personnel (FS–01 and below) regardless

of overseas or domestic location.

Although the system does not address the differences between the public and private sector on pay levels in general, it employs both private and public sector standards for pay benefits for professional staff who spend the majority of their careers

deployed worldwide on a rotational basis. The majority of the private sector, the

United Nations, most NGOs, and the USG intelligence agencies do not require their

employees to take a pay cut when deploying on assignment to an overseas location.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Question. The UNFCCC—Although the United States is not a party to the Kyoto

Protocols, the United States did ratify the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCCC). At a recent meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC

in Montreal, State Department officials signed a document pledging to a ‘‘dialogue

on long-term cooperative action to address climate change.’’ What is the Department’s strategy to achieve this UNFCCC dialogue? Does the Department foresee

this dialogue under the UNFCCC leading to regional, multilateral, and bilateral

agreements and treaties dealing with climate change? What part does the Asian Pacific Partnership play in this dialogue under UNFCCC? What other climate change

mitigation initiatives undertaken by the administration are part of this UNFCCC

dialogue?

Answer. The United States views the UNFCCC ‘‘Dialogue on Long Term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change’’ as an opportunity to advance our practical,

results-oriented climate policy, especially through showcasing our multilateral climate science and technology partnerships. The dialogue is not a negotiating forum,

as the UNFCCC decision establishing the dialogue makes clear, but a series of up

to four workshops in which we will share our experiences in addressing the climate

challenge—especially in the areas of sustainable development goals, adaptation, the

role of technology and the importance of realizing the full potential of markets. We

are actively engaged in preparing to participate in the first meeting of the dialogue,

which will take place in May.

The United States is currently involved in a wide range of multilateral agreements and other initiatives dealing with climate change that are consistent with

UNFCCC goals. They include:

• Leading nuclear technology research and development through the Generation

IV International Forum; • Pioneering hydrogen as a clean energy carrier, through the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy; • Developing cost-effective technologies to capture and store carbon emissions

from abundant fossil fuels under the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum; • Integrating and expanding global measurements to improve decisionmaking,

under the Group on Earth Observations; • Bringing cost-effective, energy-producing methane capture and use technologies

to developing countries through the U.S.-initiated Methane-to-Markets Partnership; and • Increasing access to modern energy services in more than 20 countries through

the Global Village Energy Partnership. The United States has also renewed its

participation in ITER, the international project to harness fusion energy.

The new Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI) will increase spending on clean-energy

sources that will reduce oil usage and change the way we power our homes and

automobiles. The initiative includes significantly increased funding in fiscal year

2007 for biofuels research, the Solar America Initiative, the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, and FutureGen, the world’s first zero-emissions fossil fuel plant. The Global

Nuclear Energy Partnership, a component of the AEI, is a comprehensive strategy

to enable an expansion of nuclear power in the United States and around the world,

to promote nuclear nonproliferation goals, and to help resolve nuclear waste disposal issues. DOE’s fiscal year 2007 budget request includes $250 million for this

effort.

Since 2001 the United States has negotiated bilateral climate change agreements

with 13 individual countries, a group of 7 Central American countries, and the European Union. Scientific research, clean energy technologies, and capacity-building

are emphasized, with policy discussions also underway.

In January, six countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the United

States) launched the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate

to help accelerate the global deployment of clean and efficient energy technologies

and practices. The partnership’s activities will be consistent with, and contribute to,

our efforts under the UNFCCC.

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We view these multilateral agreements and other initiatives as successful examples of practical approaches to achieving the objectives of the UNFCCC. Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere will require the development and deployment of new, transformational clean energy technologies, and we

are taking the lead through our domestic programs and by mobilizing the international efforts outlined above.

Question. Official Senate Observer Group—When President Reagan initiated arms

control negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1985, he asked the Senate to establish

an official observer group. This official Senate observer group greatly contributed to

bipartisan Senate support from the lengthy and complicated treaties resulting from

the negotiations. Treaties negotiated without this kind of strong bipartisan support,

like Kyoto, also contribute to international misunderstandings and American public

diplomacy problems when the Senate expresses opposition, as it did with Kyoto

through the Byrd-Hagel resolution. This committee has gone on record unanimously

calling for an official Senate observer group to participate in future negotiations

over climate change. Do you support such a role for the Senate? Are you willing to

work with the Senate on such a process?

Answer. The administration welcomes the participation of Senators and their staff

as observers on our delegations to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate

Change. We seek to advance our climate change approaches through the Framework

Convention, of which we are a member, and we seek to protect U.S. interests as

parties to the Kyoto Protocol move ahead on their agenda.

We note that congressional observers from both the Senate and the House regularly participate on U.S. international delegations. For example, this past December,

a Senator and nearly 30 congressional staff members traveled to Montreal, Canada,

to observe climate change proceedings as part of the U.S. delegation. Congressional

participants attended meetings of the U.S. delegation; received regular and frequent

briefings; and attended both formal and informal negotiating sessions.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR JOHN SUNUNU

DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Question. In addition to AID’s long-time primacy and expertise with regard to development assistance, DSCA has unique abilities with regard to security assistance,

and Congress recognized many years ago that other government agencies could

make similar unique contributions in their own areas of expertise. For which programs, accounts, and agencies do you intend the DFA to be responsible?

Answer. I am establishing the position of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) to

better align our foreign assistance programs with our foreign policy goals, to align

more fully the foreign assistance activities of USAID and State, and to demonstrate

that we are responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars. The DFA is intended to provide overall leadership to foreign assistance that is delivered through other agencies

and entities of the U.S. Government. To the extent permitted by law, I will delegate

to the DFA the foreign assistance funding authorities consistent with and necessary

to achieve a single coordinated foreign assistance approval authority. The Director

of Foreign Assistance will work closely with other government agencies in exercising

his authority over foreign assistance funding and programs and developing coordinated strategies, plans, and budgets. Under my direction, the DFA will have approval and coordinating authority over all foreign assistance.

Question. On what basis will the DFA have authority over those programs, accounts, and agencies? Will the DFA assume the statutorily based authorities of, e.g.,

the SEED and FSA coordinators? If not, how do you envisage the relationship between the DFA and programs with independent statutory authorities? How will the

DFA be able to direct and affect the design, implementation, and evaluation of specific programs?

Answer. To the extent permitted by law, I will delegate to the DFA the foreign

assistance funding authorities consistent with and necessary to achieve a single coordinated foreign assistance approval authority. The Director of Foreign Assistance

will work closely with coordinators in exercising his authority over foreign assistance funding and programs and developing coordinated strategies, plans, and budgets.

The DFA is intended to provide overall leadership to foreign assistance that is delivered through other agencies and entities of the U.S. Government. By instituting

integrated country strategies and operating plans, the Director of Foreign Assistance will help ensure that USG agencies delivering foreign assistance are not workVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ing at cross purposes, that, in fact, we are taking advantage of agencies’ comparative strengths to create a U.S. Government program that is effective and makes the

most efficient use of taxpayer dollars. With specific respect to agencies that have

an independent statutory existence, the Director of Foreign Assistance will work

closely with them to address the pressing issues that face developing countries and

to ensure that programming is complementary and stove-piping is curtailed. We will

respect statutory authorities, but also seek opportunities for synergy and efficiency.

The added value of the Director of Foreign Assistance role is not in interfering

with the core functions, specific responsibilities, or operations of the various agencies implementing foreign assistance; it is in ensuring that all activities are part of

a coordinated whole, and, therefore, that impact is greater than the sum of parts.

Question. What sort of support staff would the DFA have? There is nothing in the

FY 2006 or FY 2007 budget requests suggesting new positions are needed to implement this initiative. Is it your intention that this become an adjunct function of

AID’s Program Planning Coordination staff (PPC), since the DFA would also be the

Administrator?

Answer. With regard to staff needs for the Director of Foreign Assistance, I intend

for this office not to be duplicative, but instead to add value to the current environment. I anticipate an office that, when fully staffed, will bring together something

in the range of 50 to 100 positions, based on bringing together existing staff who

are performing common foreign assistance functions in the two organizations. The

DFA will consult with and provide a full notification to Congress once we have made

the necessary decisions about how to best utilize these existing functions.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ORGANIZATION

Question. Please provide the committee with a spreadsheet showing for each of

the years 1996–2005 the following:

• The number of PD (or USIA, for the preintegration years) officers, by grade (O–

5 to MC) and their average time-in-class (TIC); • The number of PD positions, by grade; • The number of new PD hires, by grade; • The number of retirements or other departures, by grade; • The number of PD officers promoted into that grade and their average TIC and

time-in-service (TIS); • The number of PD officers serving in non-PD-cone positions; • The number of non-PD officers serving in PD positions.

Answer. Reliable information on these issues is not available for 1996 to June

2000. See spreadsheet below for information from 2000 to 2005.

THE NUMBER OF PD OFFICERS, BY GRADE (O5 TO MC) AND THEIR AVERAGE TIME-IN-CLASS (TIC)

Grade

CY 05 CY 04 CY 03 CY 02 CY 01 CY 00

No. of Avg.

TIC No. of Avg.TIC No. of Avg.TIC No. of Avg.TIC No. of Avg.TIC No. of Avg.TIC

CM ................... 2 4.9 4 3.4 4 2.2 5 2.4 6 1.4 6 0.8

MC ................... 56 3.4 59 2.9 54 2.7 49 2.1 41 1.8 35 0.9

OC .................... 79 3.2 81 2.9 89 2.7 87 2.2 83 1.9 80 0.9

O1 .................... 171 3.9 178 3.4 175 2.9 170 2.5 181 1.8 182 0.8

O2 .................... 148 4.2 163 3.5 174 3.0 175 2.6 184 1.8 179 0.9

O3 .................... 141 1.4 79 1.5 65 1.7 74 2.2 81 1.6 88 0.8

O4 .................... 283 1.8 244 1.6 167 1.5 115 1.3 56 1.1 42 0.9

O5 .................... 83 0.9 94 1.0 100 1.0 74 0.9 50 1.0 14 0.7

O6 .................... 19 0.7 22 0.8 29 0.6 34 0.6 14 0.7 0 0.0

O7 .................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1

Total ........ 982 ......... 924 ......... 857 ......... 783 ......... 696 ......... 627 .........

* Average TIC only includes DOS time only, not USIA time.

Question. Is there a need for a midlevel hiring program to bring in experienced

public relations/communications professionals to contribute to our public diplomacy

efforts?

Answer. Thanks to robust hiring of entry-level officers under the 3-year Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, we have been able to fill many of the gaps that existed

in our midranks just a few short years ago. Our midlevel public diplomacy officers

receive in-depth training and are well prepared to meet the challenges of explaining

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U.S. policy abroad. We believe that under the experienced senior leadership in the

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy’s office, these committed career professionals

are doing an excellent job getting our message out.

Question. Please provide for the committee a bureau-by-bureau description of the

physical integration of public diplomacy officers into the regional and relevant functional bureaus (i.e., are they across town, across the street, in the same building,

the same general area of the building, or colocated with the policy offices).

Answer. Domestically assigned former USIA staff, apart from those in the Bureau

of International Information Programs (IIP) and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), are organizationally and physically integrated into the Department of State bureaus listed below. While many of these employees are housed

within the Department headquarters, the Harry S Truman Building, there are also

employees assigned to bureaus with offices located in various annexes within the

District of Columbia (DC) metropolitan area. Approximately 800 IIP and ECA employees remain in the former USIA Headquarters Building (301 4th Street, SW,

Washington, DC). However, the Department is working with the General Services

Administration to identify potential office space so these employees could be relocated closer to the Harry S Truman Building.

Question. Please describe their [public diplomacy officers in regional and functional bureaus] integration into State’s lines of authority (i.e., do they receive

taskings largely through a PD structure or are policy office directors and embassy

front offices managing their day-to-day activities)?

Answer. Public diplomacy officers in regional and functional bureaus and in embassies overseas are fully integrated into the bureaus’ structure and the embassy

country teams. In the Department, they report to a Deputy Assistant Secretary in

each of the bureau front offices, and overseas, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) reports directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). In addition, Under Secretary

Karen Hughes has recently introduced a network of Public Diplomacy Deputy Assistant Secretaries in each regional bureau who report both to the bureau assistant

secretary and to her. This ensures a direct reporting arrangement to the Under Secretary for the public diplomacy function.

Question. You have requested additional Public Diplomacy Program funding in

FY07. How will those funds be used in the field to enhance our efforts?

Answer. An increase of $10 million is requested for the Office of Public Diplomacy

and Public Affairs to support public diplomacy objectives through engagement, empowerment, and evaluation.

Speaker Program Expansion

With the $1,265,000 requested, the Department will create a new youth speaker

program, modeled after the U.S. Speakers Program, in which Americans from a variety of walks of life are recruited to travel and participate in programs developed

especially to engage younger groups. This proposal will provide a more strategic

focus for the U.S. Speaker Program to sustain and reinforce interaction with targeted overseas audiences using a mix of communication tools, including

videoconferencing and Web-based techniques.

Arabic and Chinese Language Services

The requested funding of $1,700,000 will expand the Department’s Arabic and

Chinese language services by making more information available in those languages. The Department will provide a more complete offering of policy statements,

texts, and transcripts and contextual materials, in formats that intended audiences

(Arabic and Chinese speakers) are most comfortable with, for example, Web sites,

listservs, Web-casting, text messaging, etc. Expanding Arabic language services will

support U.S. foreign policy in the broader Middle East, while expanding Chinese

language services will allow the Department to reach audiences in one of the fastest

growing regions in the world.

American Corners

The $3,200,000 requested addresses the President’s charge to the public diplomacy community to engage with international audiences—to tell America’s story

and also listen to the stories of others. American Corners provide the logistical foundation for interactive dialog and in most countries, the only source for that dialog.

American Corners make use of interactive technology and provide visitors access to

material about the United States in a multimedia format. Expansion of American

Corners will provide an opportunity to explore life and culture in the United States,

and in many localities will provide one of the best places to obtain accurate and curVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
127

rent information about economic, cultural, political, educational, and social trends

in the United States.

Countering Disinformation and Discrediting Terrorists

With the $2,000,000 requested, the Department will use a proactive approach to

an effort to discredit terrorists and diminish their appeal to win the war on terror.

The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) has created a program to

debunk false stories about the United States. The program will expose un-Islamic

behavior by terrorists; support partners in their campaigns to delegitimize extremists in their midst; and partner with foreign community leaders in public education

campaigns against terrorism and the terrorist messages of hatred and violence.

Television (TV) Cooperatives and Media Broadcast Projects

Television and video broadcasting products continue to be powerful strategic tools

for bringing America’s foreign policy message to worldwide audiences. The TV CoOp program has proven to be one of the most critical components of the Department’s overseas media outreach. The Department is seeking $585,000 to implement

additional TV Co-Ops that will target Arab and Muslim audiences in order to build

closer relationships, counter extremists, enhance the credibility of the United States

and reestablish the image of the United States as a partner for positive change.

Evaluating and Polling

With the $1,250,000 requested, the Department will establish a fully effective,

performance-based executive direction and evaluation capability. The Evaluation

Unit will develop a ‘‘culture of measurement’’ by training Public Diplomacy Program

managers on program planning, including needs assessments, audience research,

and early planning for monitoring and evaluation; designing and implementing outcome assessments; and creating a centralized program planning, management and

performance database that will include planning guidelines, needs assessment information, audience analysis data, and evaluation findings. The Department will also

expand its polling and survey program in Arab and Muslim-majority countries to

address negative views of the Unites States, U.S. policy, and the war on terrorism

in those Muslim-majority and Arab countries.

PALESTINIAN POLICY AND AID

Question. Your strategy for dealing with a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority appears to rely upon President Abbas as a counterweight. But we systematically built

up the Prime Minister’s position—rather than his—over the past few years and his

record to date is one of indecision and weak leadership. How do you envision moving

ahead?

Answer. Our policy decision regarding the Office of the President and the person

of President Mahmoud Abbas is clear: We intend to maintain contact with the interim government under his leadership until a new government takes charge. President Abbas has outlined his program for peace and mandated the new PA government to be formed to commit itself to these policies of partnership.

The international community has made clear that a new Palestinian Authority

government must disavow terror and violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and

accept previous obligations and agreements between the parties. This was the position taken by the Quartet—the United States, European Union, Russia, and United

Nations—in their statement of January 30.

These requirements are based upon longstanding principle and are applicable to

any Palestinian Government. But as Secretary Rice has said, Hamas, as the majority party in the new Palestinian Legislative Council, will now have to bear responsibility for the decisions it makes and face up to the consequences of those decisions,

which will shape the international community’s approach to issues involving the

Palestinians and regional peacemaking efforts.

We believe that it is critical that there be a Palestinian partner for peace, and

we intend to maintain a dialog with President Abbas. Our assistance program for

the Palestinians is currently subject to an interagency review. We will advise the

Congress of the outcome of that review, and consult further on next steps upon the

completion of that process.

Question. Your FY07 request includes $150 million for aid to Palestinians, appropriately caveated to indicate a review is under way in light of the outcome of the

January 25 elections. Quite aside from political turmoil, it is clear that an economic

crisis is brewing: The stock market in Nablus has already lost 25 percent of its capitalization; the fresh produce from Gaza which was intended to be a mainstay of

its economy is rotting, unable to reach Ben Gurion Airport for transport to export

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markets in Europe; the ability of the Palestinian Authority to pay teachers and

health workers after this month is in grave doubt. How can we address this under

current circumstances?

Answer. With the expected formation of a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (PA)

government, a comprehensive interagency review of all USG assistance to the Palestinians is underway. This review will ensure that our assistance continues to reflect U.S. policy goals and fully complies with U.S. law; it is informed by our abiding

commitment to meeting the basic humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people. We

will advise the Congress of the outcome of that review, and consult further on next

steps upon the completion of that process.

Until a new government is formed, we are cooperating with the international community to facilitate the work of the caretaker government and ease the suffering

of average Palestinians. We have worked closely with Arab governments and the

international community to stabilize the finances of the interim PA government.

The European Union has promised to provide approximately $140 million in support

to the caretaker government to cover salaries, utility bills, and humanitarian needs.

In February, the Qataris transferred $14 million, enabling the PA to pay its January wage bill, while the UAE has promised additional support, which we expect

would help the PA pay February wages. For its part, while Saudi Arabia continues

its $15.4 million bimonthly transfers, it has yet to deliver on its additional pledged

support.

Ultimately, as the majority party in the new Palestinian Legislative Council, the

burden falls on Hamas to fulfill the peaceful aspirations of the Palestinian people

and create a climate that encourages stability and economic growth. Hamas can

only achieve these outcomes by committing to the three principles laid out by the

Quartet (the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) in its

January 30 statement: Renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and accepting prior

agreements and obligations, including the roadmap. As Secretary Rice has said,

Hamas will now have to bear responsibility for the decisions it makes and face the

consequences of those decisions.

Lebanon

Question. Are you satisfied with the level of cooperation by the Syrian regime with

the United Nations investigation? Does that investigation have the resources it requires? Should the investigation be expanded to examine other politically motivated

killings in Lebanon?

Answer. We have not been satisfied with the level of the Syrian regime’s cooperation with the UNIIIC investigation; the two prior reports of the Commission reflect

a distinct lack of Syrian cooperation. As I said in my statement on January 11,

2006, we continue to call upon the Syrian regime to respond positively to the requests of U.N. Independent International Investigation Commission (UNIIIC). The

Syrian regime must cease obstructing the investigation into the assassination of

former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and cooperate fully, as required by U.N. Security Council resolutions. We intend to refer this matter back to the Security Council if Syrian obstruction continues.

We continue to work with our colleagues on the United Nations Security Council

to ensure that the UNIIIC has adequate resources at its disposal. The United States

stands firmly with the people of Lebanon in the pursuit of justice and bringing the

investigation to its ultimate conclusion.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1644, unanimously adopted by the UNSC, authorizes the United Nations to extend assistance to the Lebanese Government’s investigations into the other assassinations. We fully support this process. Continuing

assassinations in Lebanon of opponents of Syrian domination, including most recently the murder of journalist and Member of Parliament, Gebran Tueni, on December 12, 2005, create an atmosphere of fear that Syria uses to intimidate Lebanon. Syria must cease this intimidation and immediately come into compliance

with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

Question. Assuming senior Syrian officials are shown to be complicit, would you

support their referral to the International Criminal Court, expanding the mandate

of either of the existing International Tribunals (Yugoslavia, Rwanda), or creating

a new tribunal?

Answer. In unanimously adopting UNSC Resolution 1644, the U.N. Security

Council began the process of determining what international trial elements are

needed to assist Lebanon in seeking justice for the assassination of former Prime

Minister Hariri. In operative paragraph 6 of the resolution, the Security Council

‘‘Acknowledges the Lebanese Government’s request that those eventually charged

with involvement in this terrorist attack be tried by a tribunal of an international

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character, requests the Secretary General to help the Lebanese Government identify

the nature and scope of the international assistance needed in this regard, and requests also the Secretary General to report to the Council in a timely manner.’’

The Lebanese Government’s legal team is consulting with the United Nations on

possible mechanisms for a Lebanese tribunal with international elements. We anticipate the Secretary General will report on this matter, and the United States will

study the report.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is not a realistic option, including because

the jurisdiction of the ICC is restricted to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against

humanity, none of which apply to the Hariri assassination.

Question. The President’s FY 2007 budget includes a 500-percent increase in FMF

for Lebanon. For what is this intended?

Answer. As the Lebanese Government implements political, economic, and institutional reforms, we have a key opportunity to fill the void left by the withdrawal of

Syrian troops by assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces develop into a unifying national institution with the capacity to assert its sovereignty and deploy throughout

the country, as called for in UNSC Resolution 1559.

FMF is a critical tool to supporting the process of rebuilding and restoring the

operational readiness of the Lebanese Armed Forces to accomplish U.S. goals as outlined in UNSCR 1559 and 1614. Lebanon received no FMF in FY 2005, and only

$990,000 in FY 2006. The FY 2007 request is $4.8M. FMF in FY 2007 will enable

follow-on support and ammunition to sustain existing inventories of U.S.-origin

weapons, vehicles, and equipment. FY 2007 FMF will support the acquisition of repair parts and maintenance, ammunition, and body armor for the Lebanese Armed

Forces. The increased amount of funding is critical in order to enhance the operational readiness of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR GEORGE VOINOVICH

Question. The FY 2007 budget request reflects a proposed decrease in Assistance

for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, from $357 million to $273 million, a decrease of 23 percent. Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania have been phased out in FY

2007 and will receive no funding in FY 2007. Additionally, there are decreases

across the board for other countries, including a 16-percent decrease for Serbia and

Montenegro.

Please discuss the State Department’s rationale for decreasing SEED funding and

plans for phasing out the remaining SEED recipient nations. Specifically, does the

State Department believe that programs in the areas of rule of law, democracy,

anticorruption, and other areas are nearing completion in Southeast Europe? Several reports indicate that corruption remains rampant through the region and there

is much work to do to institute rule of law, democracy, and judicial capabilities

throughout the region. Please comment on the vision of U.S. assistance to Southeast

Europe.

Answer. In FY 2007, SEED assistance will continue to promote a Europe that is

whole and free, grounded in democratic principles and the rule of law, prospering

in a market economy, and integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Our work includes stabilizing war-torn Southeast Europe; supporting transition resulting from

Kosovo status talks and a possible Montenegrin independence referendum; supporting progress toward democracy and market economies in which transparency

and competition replace corruption and cronyism; strengthening U.S. partners in

the war on terror; and promoting Euro-Atlantic integration.

Two countries that will phase out of SEED funding in FY 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, have signed accession agreements with the European Union in anticipation

of joining as early as January 1, 2007 (with a ‘‘safeguard’’ clause that could put off

accession until 2008). Like these countries, Croatia will not receive FY 2007 SEED

funds as it has made significant progress on economic and democratic reforms and

looks to possible EU accession as early as 2009. All three countries received significant preaccession aid from the European Union in 2005.

Kosovo and Serbia, which are requested at $79 million and $62 million respectively, would receive the bulk of SEED funding in FY 2007—an important transition

period resulting from the Kosovo final status talks. For Bosnia, $31 million is requested for supporting reform as it institutes a new, more independent constitutional structure with state-level ministries.

Our request for Macedonia is $27 million. The European Union named Macedonia

a candidate country in December 2005. SEED assistance to Albania is requested at

$20 million; Albania just initialed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with

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the European Union. The request for Montenegro is $8.5 million. In each of these

countries (or republics), we will continue anticorruption assistance and support to

the justice sector. Since important work remains in the region to address justice sector reform, SEED funding in this sector will not phase out as early as in other sectors, as displayed in the chart below.

Plans for bilateral SEED assistance budgets also had to be considered against the

need to fund the U.S. contribution to the OSCE (FY 2007 is the third year the

SEED budget will fund U.S. contributions to the OSCE), as well as expenses for the

Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The FY 2007

OSCE request is $28.5 million, up from $24.4 million in FY 2006, due to growing

OSCE contributions.

Economic Democratic Social Law enforce- ment

Sector or program phaseouts—SEED assistance:

Albania .......................................................................... 2013 2013 2014+ 2014+

Macedonia ..................................................................... 2010 2010 2010 2011

Serbia/Montenegro ........................................................ 2010 2011 2011 2014+

Sector or program phaseouts 10 or more years:

Bosnia ........................................................................... 2014+ 2014+ 2014+ 2014+

(No phase out has been developed for Kosovo assistance)

Question. Please clarify how funds be allocated within Europe and Eurasia for

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), including with the Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) funds.

Answer. The NADR account crosscuts several key areas of our foreign policy concerns by supporting nonproliferation activities to prevent, security, and containing

WMD; strengthening international agreements on nonproliferation constraints; and

ensures peaceful cooperation regarding nuclear safety; preventing and countering

terror attacks on U.S. interests at home and abroad; and promoting peace and regional stability, while meeting humanitarian needs in post-conflict environments including nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance.

Four offices within the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation expend NADR program funds. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund is requesting $38 million for FY 2007. The NDF will not know how its FY 2007 funds

will be allocated until the third or fourth quarter of the fiscal year owing to the nature of NDF operations, but during the last 5 years a majority of its program funds

have been expended in Europe and Eurasia, though only about 20 percent of NDF’s

projects to date are in the former Soviet Union. The NWMDE programs are requesting $56.2 million for FY 2007. NWMDE will continue to expend the majority of its

program funds in the former Soviet Union. With the resources from the Iraq Relief

and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and NDF it has only been in recent years that it

has started scientist redirection programs in Iraq and Libya and they make up less

than 5 percent of the total program spending. The Office of Multilateral Nuclear and

Security Affairs is requesting $50 million for the voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency. These funds are used primarily for the IAEA’s safeguards, technical cooperation, nuclear security, and nuclear safety programs, of

which a significant portion goes to programs in Europe and Eurasia. For example,

approximately 25 percent of IAEA technical cooperation funds were expended in

2004, the last year for which figures are available. ISN is also requesting $19.8 million for its contribution to the International Monitoring System, which operates

globally.

EXBS is requesting $45.05 million for FY 2007. Of that, $17.495 million would

be expended for EXBS program initiatives in Europe and Eurasia. It is anticipated

that Slovenia will graduate to join Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria in the limited sustainment phase of the

EXBS program. In Southeast Europe, EXBS will concentrate on developing legal/

regulatory and licensing infrastructures as well as increasing interdiction and investigation capabilities. In Turkey, EXBS will concentrate on providing more sophisticated WMD interdiction equipment and on fostering greater government outreach

to industry. EXBS will focus on improving customs and border guards enforcement

in Russia, Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.

FY 2007 will mark the first year for an EXBS program in Georgia, which will

focus on enhancing border security, effective legal/regulatory and licensing infrastructure for strategic trade enforcement, and outreach to dual-use industries to assist them in establishing internal compliance. EXBS will be equipping key smugVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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gling routes in Central Asia and the Caucasus with inspection and radiation detection equipment and supporting efforts in the Caspian Sea area to detect and interdict WMD-related technology proliferation. EXBS will also deploy a new Maritime

advisor in Albania.

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs utilizes funds from three NADR subaccounts: Humanitarian Demining, the International Trust Fund for Humanitarian

Demining (ITF), and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW) destruction. The humanitarian demining request includes $1.5 million to continue demining in the region of Abkhazia in Georgia with the objective of declaring Abkhazia mine and

unexploded ordnance impact free by the end of 2007. We also plan to support increased demining capacity in Azerbaijan to meet the national strategic objective of

clearance of all accessible areas by 2008. The $10 million requested for the ITF in

FY 2007 will continue our mine action support in South East Europe. Our funds

leverage an equal amount of matched funds from other national and international

donors to foster humanitarian mine action in the region. ITF funds support comprehensive humanitarian mine action programs in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, and the province of Kosovo. The

SA/LW destruction program has requested $8.6 million in FY 2007 funds. Approximately half of these funds would be expended in Europe and Eurasia, primarily to

support continued reduction of large and aging stockpiles of SA/LW and associated

munitions, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is requesting NADR

funds for FY 2007 for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), the Counterterrorism Financing Assistance Program (CTF), the Terrorist Interdiction Program

(TIP), and CT Engagement with Allies. The ATA Program uses NADR funds to provide training and enabling equipment at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to law enforcement officials of foreign nations allied with the United States in

the global war on terrorism, but lacking in the expertise and/or resources to effectively engage the threat. Of the $135.6 million requested for ATA for FY 2007, $6.6

million would be used to support assistance planned for Albania, Armenia, Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Turkey, and some regional activities. The

CTF Assistance Program uses NADR funds to provide training and technical assistance with the objective of building sustainable, dynamic antimoney laundering and

counterterrorist financing regimes that adhere to international standards and implement effective programs in the legal, financial regulatory, financial intelligence,

law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and international cooperation fields. Of the

$9.08 million requested for CTF for FY 2007, $200,000 would be used for programs

in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey. TIP strives to constrain terrorists’ freedom

of movement between countries by providing participating nations with a computerbased watch listing system enabling immigration and border control officials to

quickly identify suspect persons attempting to enter or leave the country. TIP also

provides participating nations with increased capability to collect traveler data and

contribute to the global effort to understand terrorist methods and track their movements. Of the $11.8 million requested for TIP for FY 2007, $500,000 would be used

for funding deployment of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) to Georgia and Macedonia and to sustain/upgrade existing

programs in Kosovo and Malta. Finally, NADR funds for CT Engagement with Allies programs could be used to sponsor conferences to foster regional cooperation on

maritime security/terrorist interdiction, mainstream Muslims’ engagement against

extremism, border security, and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction and

their components. Of the $1 million requested for CT Engagement for FY 2007,

$100,000 would be used to help fund an Organization for Security and Cooperation

in Europe (OSCE) hosted workshop for regional counterterrorism organizations to

coordinate efforts, exchange best practices, and identify areas for future joint action.

Question. Please clarify the State Department’s policy regarding International

Military Education Training (IMET) funds and article 98 agreements. Provide a list

of the countries that have been prohibited from receiving IMET assistance because

they have not yet signed an article 98 agreement. Of these countries, which countries are actively seeking membership in both NATO and the European Union? Considering IMET funding promotes U.S. goals of interoperability, Western military

ideology, and bilateral military exchanges, does restricting IMET hinder progress for

NATO membership, MAP, or PfP goals? The President waived article 98 requirements for the NATO aspirants. Please comment on whether the State Department

has given consideration to requesting a waiver provision for the countries actively

seeking NATO membership (with U.S. support and encouragement) so that they can

receive IMET without an article 98 agreement?

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Answer. The prohibitions that Congress included in the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA) have been useful in securing many of the 101 article

98 agreements we have signed to date. These are important agreements to protect

U.S. persons from illegitimate assertions of jurisdiction over all U.S. persons—particularly our servicemembers acting overseas. We have authority in the ASPA to

waive the prohibitions for important national interests and are now reviewing the

remaining IMET prohibitions on countries that have not yet signed an article 98

agreement to determine whether this prohibition is still helpful to our efforts to secure article 98 agreements and whether it is important to our national interest to

restart IMET programs with these countries even in the absence of article 98 agreements.

Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, Tanzania, Samoa, Croatia,

Malta, Serbia-Montenegro, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico,

Paraguay, Peru, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and

Venezuela are all currently prohibited from receiving IMET assistance because they

are International Criminal Court members and have not yet signed an article 98

agreement.

Question. Public diplomacy is a key priority of mine. I am very interested in how

the FY 2007 State Department budget addresses a variety of key issues in the area

of public diplomacy. Please elaborate on how new funds will be allocated to advance

public diplomacy. Please explain whether the State Department will use funds to

provide additional personnel in the area of public diplomacy or additional training

for public diplomacy officers. Please elaborate on how the State Department will increase funding for language specialists and foreign language training in Arabic, Chinese, and other critical areas. Will the State Department also use public diplomacy

funding to increase educational exchange programs with countries in the Middle

East? Which countries and how much?

Answer. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has developed a strategic framework to ensure that America’s ideas and ideals prevail. This

framework has three key objectives:

• To offer a positive vision of hope that is rooted in America’s freedom agenda;

• To isolate and marginalize extremists and undermine their attempts to appropriate religion; and

• To foster a sense of common interests and values between Americans and people of different countries, cultures, and faiths.

An increase of $10 million is requested for public diplomacy to support these objectives through engagement, empowerment, and evaluation.

Speaker Program Expansion

With the $1,265,000 requested, the Department will create a new youth speaker

program, modeled after the U.S. Speakers Program, in which Americans from a variety of walks of life are recruited to travel and participate in programs developed

especially to engage younger groups. This proposal will provide a more strategic

focus for the U.S. Speaker Program to sustain and reinforce interaction with targeted overseas audiences using a mix of communication tools, including

videoconferencing and Web-based techniques.

Arabic and Chinese Language Services

The requested funding of $1,700,000 will expand the Department’s Arabic and

Chinese language services by making more information available in those languages. The Department will provide a more complete offering of policy statements,

texts, and transcripts and contextual materials, in formats that intended audiences

(Arabic and Chinese speakers) are most comfortable with, for example, Web sites,

listservs, Web-casting, text messaging, etc. Expanding Arabic language services will

support U.S. foreign policy in the broader Middle East, while expanding Chinese

language services will allow the Department to reach audiences in one of the fastest

growing regions in the world.

American Corners

The $3,200,000 requested addresses the President’s charge to the public diplomacy community to engage with international audiences—to tell America’s story

and also listen to the stories of others. American Corners provide the logistical foundation for interactive dialog and in most countries, the only source for that dialog.

American Corners make use of interactive technology and provide visitors access to

material about the United States in a multimedia format. Expansion of American

Corners will provide an opportunity to explore life and culture in the United States,

and in many localities will provide one of the best places to obtain accurate and curVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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rent information about economic, cultural, political, educational, and social trends

in the United States.

Countering Disinformation and Discrediting Terrorists

With the $2,000,000 requested, the Department will use a proactive approach to

an effort to discredit terrorists and diminish their appeal to win the war on terror.

The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) has created a program to

debunk false stories about the United States. The program will expose un-Islamic

behavior by terrorists; support partners in their campaigns to delegitimize extremists in their midst; and partner with foreign community leaders in public education

campaigns against terrorism and the terrorist messages of hatred and violence.

Television (TV) Co-Operatives and Media Broadcast Projects

Television and video broadcasting products continue to be powerful strategic tools

for bringing America’s foreign policy message to worldwide audiences. The TV CoOp program has proven to be one of the most critical components of the Department’s overseas media outreach. The Department is seeking $585,000 to implement

additional TV Co-Ops that will target Arab and Muslim audiences in order to build

closer relationships, counter extremists, enhance the credibility of the United States

and reestablish the image of the United States as a partner for positive change.

Evaluating and Polling

With the $1,250,000 requested, the Department will establish a fully effective,

performance-based executive direction and evaluation capability. The Evaluation

Unit will develop a ‘‘culture of measurement’’ by training Public Diplomacy Program

managers on program planning, including needs assessments, audience research,

and early planning for monitoring and evaluation; designing and implementing outcome assessments; and creating a centralized program planning, management, and

performance database that will include planning guidelines, needs assessment information, audience analysis data, and evaluation findings. The Department will also

expand its polling and survey program in Arab and Muslim-majority countries to

address negative views of the Unites States, U.S. policy, and the war on terrorism

in those Muslim-majority and Arab countries.

Costs associated with the establishment of new American officer positions are not

a component of the Department’s PD request. The Department is requesting an additional 70 positions, which may include public diplomacy positions, to support

transformational diplomacy as part of the overall FY 2007 Diplomatic and Consular

Programs funding request.

The Department’s training program for public diplomacy officers, including language training, is the principal responsibility of the Foreign Service Institute, which

has an innovative training strategy designed to directly support new and emerging

policy and management priorities. PD training courses that are presently being offered to American officers are being reviewed in an effort to insure that evolving

public diplomacy concepts and practices are being clearly disseminated. The Department will utilize additional funding requested in the Educational and Cultural Exchanges appropriation to address exchange programs with countries in the Middle

East.

ABC NEWS POLL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR LUGAR

[From ABC News Poll: Life in Afghanistan, Dec. 7, 2005]

DESPITE DEEP CHALLENGES IN DAILY LIFE, AFGHANS EXPRESS A POSITIVE OUTLOOK

Four years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghans express both vast support for the

changes that have shaken their country and remarkable optimism for the future,

despite the deep challenges they face in economic opportunity, security and basic

services alike.

An ABC News poll in Afghanistan—the first national survey there sponsored by

a news organization—underscores those challenges in a unique portrait of the lives

of ordinary Afghans. Poverty is deep, medical care and other basic services lacking

and infrastructure minimal. Nearly six in 10 have no electricity in their homes, and

just three percent have it around the clock. Seven in 10 Afghan adults have no more

than an elementary education; half have no schooling whatsoever. Half have household incomes under $500 a year.

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Yet despite these and other deprivations, 77 percent of Afghans say their country

is headed in the right direction—compared with 30 percent in the vastly better-off

United States. Ninety-one percent prefer the current Afghan government to the

Taliban regime, and 87 percent call the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban good for

their country. Osama bin Laden, for his part, is as unpopular as the Taliban; nine

in 10 view him unfavorably.

Progress fuels these views: Despite the country’s continued problems, 85 percent

of Afghans say living conditions there are better now than they were under the

Taliban. Eighty percent cite improved freedom to express political views. And 75

percent say their security from crime and violence has improved as well. After decades of oppression and war, many Afghans see a better life.

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More can be done; most say each of these is better, but not ‘‘much’’ better, than

under the Taliban. And in a fourth crucial area—jobs and economic opportunity—

progress is badly lacking: In this basic building block, just 39 percent see improvement.

In a separate measure, Afghans by nearly 2–1, 64–34 percent, say their own

household’s financial situation is bad (most Americans, by contrast, say theirs is

good). Yet that economic discomfort has not produced political dissatisfaction: Ratings of President Hamid Karzai, the current government and the newly elected parliament are all high.

Better hopes for the future are a likely reason. This poll finds broad expectations—expressed by two-thirds of Afghans—that life overall will improve in the year

ahead. That optimism, while encouraging, also carries the danger of discontent if

those expectations go unmet.

This survey was conducted for ABC News by Charney Research of New York with

field work by the Afghan Center for Social and Opinion Research in Kabul. Trained

Afghan researchers interviewed a randomly selected sample of 1,039 adults across

the country.

CONCERNS—Some results may raise particular concerns. One is that, despite

broadly favorable views of the United States, three in 10 Afghans say attacks

against U.S. forces can be justified. There are about 18,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with more than 250 killed to date—including nearly twice as many in 2005

as in any previous year.

Acceptability of attacks on U.S. forces spikes among disaffected and socially conservative Afghans, who account for about 15 percent of the population. In this group

just 29 percent say such attacks cannot be justified, compared with 60 percent of

all Afghans.

At the same time, even among all Afghans, 30 percent say such attacks can be

justified. That may reflect social mores in a country where violence is not an uncommon means of settling disputes, and perhaps specific grievances in areas where administrative or legal remedies are lacking.

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In another result that may give pause, one in four Afghans say there are circumstances in which it’s acceptable to grow poppies for opium production, a trade

that’s soared since the Taliban were ousted. Acceptance of poppy farming—if no alternative source of income is available—reaches 41 percent in the highest opiumproducing provinces as identified by the United Nations last year. And acceptability

soars in the two provinces that historically have been the country’s centers of poppy

cultivation, Nangarhar in the East and Helmand in the West. (While cultivation in

Nangarhar reportedly is down sharply this year, it appears that attitudes that tolerate it have not followed.)

Many fewer Afghans—just five percent—say poppy cultivation is acceptable in all

cases; more say, rather, that it’s acceptable only if no alternatives are available.

That suggests that the opium trade may be vulnerable, to the extent other incomeearning opportunities—such as the cultivation of alternative crops—can be provided

in its place. But it won’t be easy: The United Nations estimates that one in 10 Afghans is involved in cultivating opium poppies.

GROWING OPIUM POPPIES

Acceptable

Not acceptable Net In all

cases

If no alternative

All Afghanistan ............................................................................................ 26% 5 21 73

Non-opium provinces ................................................................................... 19 3 17 79

Opium provinces* ........................................................................................ 41 9 32 57

Nangarhar & Helmand ................................................................................. 75 20 55 25

* Opium poppy >10% of cereal cultivation, per U.N. 2004.

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The survey also finds substantial suspicion of cheating in the recent parliamentary elections. Nearly half of Afghans, 46 percent, believe there was vote buying,

intimidation of voters or cheating in the vote count in their area. Still, 77 percent

are confident nonetheless that the parliament will work for the benefit of the people,

although far fewer, 34 percent, are ‘‘very’’ confident that will be the case.

In terms of threats the country faces, most-cited is the Taliban, an insurgent

group since it was ousted with the fall of Kandahar on Dec. 7, 2001. Forty-one percent call the Taliban the biggest danger to Afghanistan, 28 percent cite drug traffickers and 22 percent say it’s local warlords. (The program to disarm those warlords enjoys vast popular support, detailed below.)

WOMEN—The survey also finds broad majority support for women’s rights in Afghan society, albeit, as in other readings, with more modest strength of commitment

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quarters support women holding jobs and two-thirds support women holding government office—remarkable in a country where the Taliban so thoroughly repressed

such rights. Perhaps surprisingly, support for most of these is nearly as high among

men as it is among women.

Women Men

Support for:

Girls’ education ....................................................................................................................... 93% 92%

Women voting .......................................................................................................................... 92 87

Women holding jobs ................................................................................................................ 78 69

Women holding gov’t office .................................................................................................... 71 59

At the same time, while 89 percent of Afghans support women voting, fewer, 66

percent, strongly support this right. And only about four in 10 ‘‘strongly’’ support

women taking jobs outside the home or holding government office. Even among Afghan women, fewer than half strongly support women working outside the home or

holding government office. Personal experience may be a factor: Just 14 percent of

Afghan women are employed, compared with about 60 percent of women in the

United States.

There also are ethnic and regional differences, with support for women’s rights

much lower among Afghanistan’s Pashtun population, Sunni Muslims who are dominant in the South and East of the country.

Also, support for women holding political office, in particular, is much weaker in

rural as opposed to urban areas, and weakest among rural men.

Support for women holding political office:

All—65%

Urban—87%

Rural—59%

Rural men—51%

Rural women—67%

CURRENT CONDITIONS—Afghans give positive reports to several aspects of

their daily lives: Eighty-three percent rate their overall living conditions positively,

and ratings are nearly as high both for local schools and the availability of food.

Just over seven in 10 likewise say their security from crime and violence is good.

In each of these, though, far fewer—ranging from just 15 percent to 28 percent—

say things are ‘‘very’’ good.

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Fewer overall, 59 percent, say clean water is readily available, and other basic

conditions—medical care, jobs and economic opportunity, roads and bridges and

power supply—are rated far worse.

LOCAL CONDITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Good (net) Very good

Overall living conditions .............................................................................................................. 83% 15%

Local schools ............................................................................................................................... 80 25

Availability of food ...................................................................................................................... 78 22

Security from crime/violence ....................................................................................................... 72 28

Availability of clean water .......................................................................................................... 59 18

Medical care ................................................................................................................................ 44 12

Jobs/economic opportunity ........................................................................................................... 35 5

Roads, bridges, etc. .................................................................................................................... 24 2

Electricity supply ......................................................................................................................... 17 4

There are significant differences in conditions across the country. Security is better in urban areas (of which the largest by far is Kabul, where about one in seven

Afghan adults live); 40 percent in urban areas describe their security as ‘‘very good,’’

compared with 24 percent in rural areas.

Both security and economic conditions are notably worse in the Southwest and

East (where the Taliban have been active) than elsewhere. And services seem weakest in the Northwest, where fewer than two in 10 report having clean water, good

medical care or good roads, bridges and other infrastructure. In Kabul, just 18 percent lack any electrical power; that soars to more than two-thirds in the North and

East.

SECURITY—Security is especially critical in a country so long wracked by war.

When the 77 percent of Afghans who say the country is headed in the right direction are asked in an open-ended question why they feel that way, three related answers dominate: Security, peace or the end of war, and disarmament.

Mentions of freedom, democracy and reconstruction follow; women in particular

mention freedom for women, who were repressed under the Taliban regime: Twenty

percent of women (compared with four percent of men) cite freedom for women as

a reason they say the country’s going in the right direction.

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Why is the country going in the right direction?

[Multiple answers accepted]

In percent

Security ................................................................................................................... 34

Peace/end of war .................................................................................................... 31

Disarmament .......................................................................................................... 27

Freedom/free speech .............................................................................................. 17

Democracy/elections ............................................................................................... 15

Reconstruction/rebuilding ...................................................................................... 15

Similarly, when asked the single most important priority for the country, 40 percent of Afghans say security from crime and violence remains paramount. That’s followed fairly closely by creating jobs and economic opportunities, then much more

distantly by the need for infrastructure improvements. When first- and second-highest priorities are combined, however, these rank about evenly. There’s much to do.

First priority first and second priorities

Security from crime/violence ....................................................................................................... 40% 45%

Economic opportunities ............................................................................................................... 31 49

Improving infrastructure .............................................................................................................. 14 45

Another expression of the importance of security comes in support for the country’s ‘‘DDR’’—disarmament, demobilization and reintegration—program. Largely

Japanese-funded, the program is said to have disarmed 70,000 fighters under local

warlords, offering them vocational training in exchange for their weapons. Not only

do 95 percent of Afghans support the program, but 72 percent ‘‘strongly’’ support

it, by far the highest level of strong support for any program, individual or entity

measured in this survey.

VIEWS OF THE U.S.—Eighty-three percent of Afghans express a favorable opinion of the United States overall, similar to the 87 percent who call the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban a good thing. That compares to favorable ratings of a mere

eight percent for the Taliban, and five percent for bin Laden. People who are unhappy with their local living conditions are twice as likely to have an unfavorable

opinion of the United States.

Support for the United States is less than full-throated. Far fewer, 24 percent, regard it ‘‘very’’ favorably. And while 68 percent rate the work of the United States

in Afghanistan positively, that’s well below the ratings given to Karzai, the United

Nations or the present Afghan government (83, 82 and 80 percent positive, respectively).

Still, an 83 percent favorable rating for the United States, and a 68 percent positive work performance rating, are remarkable—in sharp contrast to negative views

of the United States in many other Muslim nations. (Another contrast is Karzai’s

job rating—83 percent positive—compared with George W. Bush’s in the United

States, where just 39 percent of Americans approved in the last ABC News/Washington Post poll.)

Ex./Good Net Excellent Good

Rate the work of:

Hamid Karzai as president ...................................................................................... 83% 45% 38%

The United Nations in Afghanistan ......................................................................... 82 33 49

The Afghan government ........................................................................................... 80 27 53

The United States in Afghanistan ........................................................................... 68 20 48

Given the Afghan public’s security concerns—and distaste for the Taliban—there

is little demand for prompt U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Just eight percent

say the United States should leave now, and only another six percent say it should

withdraw within the next year. The most common answer by far: Sixty-five percent

say U.S. forces should leave Afghanistan ‘‘only after security is restored.’’

SHIITE/SUNNI—Notable in this survey is the similarity of views between Sunni

and Shiite Muslims, the two doctrinal groups so sharply at odds in Iraq. As in most

of the Arab world, Sunnis dominate in Afghanistan—85 percent of the population

is Sunni (including nearly all members of the Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups)

while 15 percent is Shiite (including nearly all ethnic Hazaras).

There are differences: Thirty-two percent of Sunnis say attacks on U.S. forces can

be justified, compared with 19 percent of the Shiite minority. And 51 percent of ShiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:38 Jan 26, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 800933.SEN sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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ites describe the Taliban (a Sunni group) as the biggest danger facing the country,

compared with a (still high) 39 percent of Sunnis.

But few Sunnis or Shiites alike view the Taliban favorably (nine percent and six

percent, respectively). Their ratings on improved conditions are similar, as are their

expectations for the future and their views on Karzai, the current Afghan government, the United Nations, the United States, the ‘‘DDR’’ disarmament program and

women’s rights.

WORK and POSSESSIONS—A simple accounting of household possessions tells

volumes about life in Afghanistan. Barely one in 10 households has a refrigerator

or a car. Three in 10 have a mobile phone; almost no one has a landline telephone.

Nearly everyone has a radio, but barely four in 10 have a TV. About half own a

work animal.

In percent

Household possessions:

Radio ................................................................................................................ 95

Bicycle .............................................................................................................. 63

Work animal .................................................................................................... 47

TV ..................................................................................................................... 43

Mobile phone ................................................................................................... 31

Motorbike ........................................................................................................ 26

Car ................................................................................................................... 12

Refrigerator ..................................................................................................... 11

Satellite dish ................................................................................................... 9

Landline phone ............................................................................................... 1

Farming is the main occupation; nearly a third of working Afghans are farmers

or farm laborers. As befits the low levels of education, illiteracy is high, 42 percent.

The population is largely rural, with 79 percent of Afghans residing in small villages. And it’s a young country, with a median age (calculated among adults only)

of 32 years, compared with 44 in the United States.

METHODOLOGY—This survey was conducted for ABC News by Charney Research of New York, with field work by the Afghan Center for Social and Opinion

Research in Kabul. Interviews were conducted in person, in Dari or Pashto, among

a random national sample of 1,039 Afghan adults from Oct. 8–18, 2005. Sampling

points were selected at random in 31 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, with households

selected by random route/random interval. The results have a 3.5-point error margin. Details of the survey methodology are available upon request.

[The full results of the ABC News poll can be found at http://abcnews.go.com/US/

PollVault/.]

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