Filed 9/19/19 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANDREW NEWMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B291412

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. 

No. MA070718)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.

Eric E. Reynolds, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Gerald A. 

Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
2

Andrew Newman broke into H’s bedroom, pointed a gun at 

her, and ordered her into his car. A jury convicted Newman of 

first degree burglary, assault with a firearm, and kidnapping. 

Newman makes three arguments: he moved H too short a 

distance to count as kidnapping; the trial court incorrectly 

instructed the jury; and we should strike assessments in light of 

People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas). We 

affirm. Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

I

H was a high school junior when she started dating 

Newman in 2013. Six months into the relationship, Newman 

began physically abusing H. The abuse continued almost every 

day until the relationship ended in 2016. 

Newman hit H with a metal pole as punishment for 

“anything [she] did bad.” In one instance, Newman hit H with 

the pole because she “folded a shirt that needed to be hung.” The 

pole left scars. Newman also scarred H’s stomach by pinching 

her hard. 

Newman held H’s head underwater in a tub. She “forgot 

what [she] had done wrong” for Newman to punish her this way. 

Newman punched H’s face over 11 times because he 

thought she said something wrong. 

He also threw H’s dog next to railroad tracks and held a 

knife to the dog until H apologized for something. 

H was afraid to leave Newman because he threatened to 

find and torture her and kill her and her family. The two broke 

up several times but Newman always convinced H to get back 

together by telling her things would change and she would not 

have to be afraid anymore. H eventually blocked all contact. 
3

On March 6, 2017 at 7:00 a.m., a loud crash woke H from 

slumber in her bed. Newman broke into her locked bedroom and 

pointed a gun at her chest. H was scared and screamed for help 

but no one else was home. Newman said he had “nothing else to 

lose.” He waved the gun and told H to go to his car. Newman 

pointed the gun at H as she got out of bed and went to the front 

door, which was 20 to 30 feet away. 

As H opened the door, Newman got in front of her and told 

her to start running. H ran about 35 feet from the front door to 

the entry gate as slowly as she could. The car was parked about 

550 feet from the front door. Newman turned around three times 

while pointing the gun at H and told her to run faster. H ran 

another 135 feet or so towards Newman’s car. H believed she 

would die if she got into the car so she ran into her neighbor’s 

house through their back door, which was unlocked. The 

neighbors’ back door was 25 feet away from their gate, which was 

past the driveway. H screamed, “He has a gun. He has a gun. 

He’s going to kill me.” Neighbors helped her call the police. 

Newman turned himself in to the police that day. 

The jury convicted Newman of first degree burglary (count 

1), assault with a firearm (count 2), and kidnapping (count 3). It 

also found Newman used a pistol for the assault with a firearm 

and kidnapping. The court sentenced Newman to 15 years and 

imposed fines and fees. 

II

Substantial evidence supports the kidnapping conviction. 

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

People to determine whether a rational jury could have found the 

crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. 

Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1263.) 
4

Newman limits his argument to the asportation element of 

kidnapping, which requires movement that is “substantial in 

character.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 235 

(Martinez).) He claims the distance he forced H to move was 

“short” and therefore insubstantial. 

This argument fails because the evidence was ample. 

Newman broke into H’s bedroom. Using a gun, he ordered her to 

his car. Newman pointed the gun at H as she got out of bed and 

walked to the front door. He made H run towards his car. At 

minimum, Newman made H move 190 feet before she broke free. 

A jury considers all the circumstances to determine 

whether the kidnapping movement was substantial rather than 

trivial. (Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237.) Based on the 

evidence, a rational jury could have found Newman made H move 

a substantial distance.

Newman’s substantial evidence challenge masks what is in 

reality his request that we declare 190 feet to be a trivial distance 

as a matter of law. He cites no precedent for this quantitative 

challenge, no case holding this distance is too short. We reject 

this proposal. Shorter distances are “substantial in character” 

under the Martinez standard, which considers all the evidence. 

(See People v. Arias (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1435–1436 

[moving victim 15 feet into his apartment met asportation 

requirement]; People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164, 168–

169 [moving victim nine feet from the front to the back of a store

was substantial].) 

Newman ordered H from her bed to his waiting car. He 

made plain he planned to drive her somewhere. Taking a victim 

from her bed, through her house, out the door, through the front 

gate, and almost 200 feet towards his waiting car is not trivial 
5

when the only reason the distance was not far greater was the 

victim got away en route. 

Newman argues he decreased the risk of harm to H when 

he forced her outdoors at gunpoint from her bed towards his car.

The jury was entitled to see matters differently. H believed she 

would die if she got in the car. The closer the two got to the car, 

the smaller H’s window of opportunity for some sort of action. 

Kidnapper and victim were not loitering but were on the move, 

events were rushing to some unknown outcome, and he had a 

gun. The jury could conclude the situation and the risks were 

spiraling upwards. (See People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 

616, 629–630 [forcing victim to move 40 feet to a car increased 

risk of harm even though victim escaped from the car].) 

This evidence of kidnapping was substantial.

III

The trial court had no duty to give an attempted 

kidnapping instruction.

We independently review a trial court’s failure to instruct 

on a lesser included offense and view the evidence in the light 

favorable to the defendant. (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 

Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.) 

A trial court must give instructions on lesser included 

offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all the 

elements of the charged offense were present. (People v. 

Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154.) But the court need not do 

so when there is no evidence the offense was less than charged. 

(Ibid.) There is no evidence Newman committed anything less 

than kidnapping, as we have just reviewed. Thus the trial court 

was not obligated to instruct on attempted kidnapping. 
6

IV

Newman forfeited his Dueñas claims. 

He concedes he did not object to the fines and fees in the 

trial court. He thus forfeited these arguments. (People v. 

Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153–1155; People v. 

Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

BIGELOW, P. J. 

GRIMES, J.