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[Senate Prints 109-74]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

109th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                            COMMITTEE PRINT                     
 2d Session                                                      109-74
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
                     LEBANON: ASSESSING THE CEASE-

                   FIRE AND PROGRESS ON STABILIZATION

                           AND RECONSTRUCTION

                               __________

                           STAFF TRIP REPORT

                                 TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       One Hundred Ninth Congress

                             Second Session

                           December 15, 2006

                                     

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
31-564                      WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                  RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island         PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio            RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee           BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
                 Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
              Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director

                                  (ii)

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v

Political Context................................................     1

Fragile Cease-fire Holding.......................................     1

Slowly Rebuilding Lebanon........................................     3

    Humanitarian Phase...........................................     3

    Reconstruction Phase.........................................     4

    The Problem of Cluster Bombs.................................     5

Extending the Government's Reach.................................     5

What Next? Recommendations.......................................     6

                                 (iii)

                                     

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                 Washington, DC, December 15, 2006.
    Dear colleagues: The committee sent Mr. Christopher Stevens 
of the professional staff to Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and 
Jerusalem in the fall of 2006 to assess the status of the 
cease-fire between Israel and Hizballah and evaluate the 
effectiveness of international and Lebanese efforts to help 
affected civilians and re-build damaged infrastructure.
    There is some good news. The cease-fire has continued to 
hold, Israeli forces have withdrawn from Lebanon, and the 
Lebanese army and U.N. peace-keeping forces have deployed to 
the areas in the south long controlled by Hizballah. In 
cooperation with the Lebanese government, international donors, 
including the United States, have directed hundreds of millions 
of dollars in relief and reconstruction assistance to Lebanon. 
On the other hand, other aspects of the cease-fire agreement, 
codified in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, 
are not being fully implemented.
    As this report went to publication, the Lebanese government 
faced a serious challenge from Hizballah, which demanded a 
greater role in the cabinet for itself and its allies, on the 
basis of their representation of the large Shi'ite population. 
This report points to the need for continuing U.S. diplomatic 
engagement with relevant parties inside and outside Lebanon, 
both to help the government reach an accommodation that will 
give it broad support, and to avert civil strife that could 
lead to another conflict with Israel.
    The report also recommends substantially increasing U.S. 
security and economic assistance to the Lebanese government. 
Finally, echoing the views of U.S. regional allies and the 
Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group, it proposes a renewed effort 
to forge peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors in order 
to bring stability to the region and reduce strong anti-U.S. 
and anti-Israeli sentiment among Arabs and Muslims.
    I hope you will find this report helpful.
            Sincerely,
                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                          Chairman.

  LEBANON: ASSESSING THE CEASE-FIRE AND PROGRESS ON STABILIZATION AND 
                             RECONSTRUCTION

                              ----------                              

    From October 31 to November 9, 2006, a member of the 
professional staff of the United States Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations traveled to Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and 
Jerusalem to assess the status of the cease-fire between 
Hizballah and Israel and evaluate the effectiveness of 
international and Lebanese efforts to help affected civilians 
and re-build infrastructure damaged during the conflict. Staff 
met with U.S. embassy officers, government officials, U.N. 
officials, and local policy analysts, academics and 
journalists.

                           Political Context

    In mid-August, the government of Prime Minister Fouad 
Siniora, backed by a U.N. Security Council resolution and the 
United States, France, and Saudi Arabia, among others, moved to 
secure the cease-fire between Israel and Hizballah by sending 
its army to the south and providing humanitarian assistance to 
the affected local population. Siniora was soon challenged by 
Hizballah, whose leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, threatened to 
topple his government unless he agreed to increase the number 
of Hizballah-allied ministers in the cabinet.
    Despite the political challenges posed by Hizballah, the 
Siniora government achieved some early successes in carrying 
out the terms of the cease-fire, reasserting the government's 
authority in the south and channeling assistance to civilians.
    On the other hand, it lacked the power to make progress in 
important areas, such as freeing the Israeli soldiers held by 
Hizballah or forcibly disarming Hizballah.
    By late November, the political tensions in Lebanon had 
risen even further, with the resignation of the remaining 
Shi'ite members of the Siniora cabinet, and the assassination 
by unknown gunmen of the Minister of Industry, a prominent 
Christian. Nasrallah and his allies continued with their 
threats to bring down the government, organizing mass 
demonstrations outside the Prime Minister's office.

                       Fragile Cease-fire Holding

    The August cease-fire between Hizballah and Israel, which 
ended the conflict that began on July 12 when Hizballah 
kidnapped two Israeli soldiers on the border, continues to hold 
but remains fragile and dependent on the acquiescence of 
Hizballah. According to the U.N. envoy charged with overseeing 
implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 (August 
11), which codified the cease-fire and spelled out other 
obligations for Lebanon and Israel, there has been some 
progress. Most important, the cessation of hostilities between 
Hizballah and Israel has held. Israel withdrew all its forces 
from south Lebanon while the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), 
supported by an enlarged U.N. peacekeeping force (UNIFIL), 
deployed to the area for the first time in several decades. The 
local population has largely welcomed the LAF and UNIFIL, 
viewing them as a stabilizing force. Relations between the LAF/
UNIFIL and Hizballah, while tense, are reportedly correct; 
Hizballah fighters have been instructed by their leadership not 
to display their weapons in public and to stay away from the 
border with Israel. UNIFIL and the LAF have reported seizing 
some illegal weapons. The U.N. is mediating talks between 
Hizballah and Israel over a prisoner exchange.
    On the other hand, there has been no progress in disarming 
Hizballah--a key requirement of Resolution 1701 and previous 
resolutions. Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who in the 
aftermath of the conflict enjoys immense popularity--his 
photograph appears everywhere on billboards and bumperstickers 
in Lebanon and Syria--has publicly vowed that his 
``resistance'' fighters will never relinquish their arms. 
Nasrallah points to continuing Israeli military overflights and 
Israel's ``occupation'' of Sheba'a Farms--a small patch of 
territory occupied by Israeli forces that Hizballah and the 
Lebanese government claim is Lebanese territory but that the 
U.N. considers to be part of Syria--as justification for 
maintaining an armed militia. According to the U.N. envoy, 
neither the LAF nor UNIFIL is prepared for a confrontation with 
Hizballah over its weapons. In the short term, Hizballah has 
kept its weapons out of public view, thus avoiding a 
confrontation with UNIFIL or the LAF. Both the U.N. envoy and 
the Lebanese government consider a political arrangement under 
which Hizballah voluntarily gives up its arms or integrates its 
fighters into the LAF as the only viable long-term solution.
    Similarly, there has been little progress in policing 
Lebanon's border with Syria. Israeli officials maintain that 
Hizballah is re-arming itself in preparation for another 
conflict by importing rockets and other weapons from Syria with 
financial backing from Iran. The U.N. envoy did not dispute 
this claim, but said that Israel had not provided the U.N. with 
specific evidence of smuggling that would enable U.N. forces to 
follow up. The LAF has deployed an additional 8,000 troops to 
the border area, and claims to have intercepted some arms 
shipments, but Israeli officials say that these efforts fall 
short and that weapons smuggling continues on a large scale. 
UNIFIL will not deploy to the border unless the Lebanese 
government asks it to do so, as stipulated in Resolution 1701. 
So far, the government has declined to make this request, 
probably because it fears a negative reaction from Syria, which 
has publicly warned that it would consider the positioning of 
foreign troops along its border to be a hostile act. A number 
of prominent Lebanese businessmen said that Syria has the 
ability to cause serious economic harm to Lebanon by closing 
the border, which it had done in the recent past.
    Israeli air force jets and drones have continued to make 
frequent overflights of Lebanese airspace, provoking protests 
from the Lebanese government and Hizballah and private 
admonitions from Washington and EU capitals. Israeli officials 
contend that these overflights are necessary for intelligence-
collection purposes related to arms smuggling, but concede that 
they are problematic politically (the U.N. considers such 
overflights to be violations of Resolution 1701) and say that 
they are considering less visible and provocative means for 
collecting the required information. The U.N. envoy is working 
with the Israeli and the Lebanese governments to address the 
overflight and smuggling issues.
    The envoy has also begun to address the Sheba'a Farms/
border demarcation issue, inviting U.N. cartographers to 
Lebanon to inspect the disputed areas. Some Lebanese observers 
contend that ``returning'' Sheba'a Farms to full Lebanese 
sovereignty would remove Hizballah's justification for 
maintaining an armed militia and facilitate the organization's 
transformation into an unarmed political party. Others, 
however, consider Hizballah's claim to Sheba'a Farms to be a 
groundless pretext for perpetuating armed conflict with Israel, 
and believe that Hizballah will find another pretext even if 
Sheba'a Farms' fate is resolved to its satisfaction. This 
skepticism is well-founded, as Hizballah officials in October 
were already publicly pointing to the border village of Ghajjar 
as another area worthy of liberation from Israeli occupation. 
According to the United Nations, however, Ghajjar is actually 
divided, with one-half of the village in Lebanon and the other 
half inside the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

                       Slowly Rebuilding Lebanon

    The United Nations and other international aid 
organizations divide the recovery and re-building tasks into 
two stages--an early humanitarian phase, which for the most 
part ended in October, and a longer-term reconstruction phase, 
which is expected to last several years. An August fact-finding 
mission to Lebanon led by Brookings Institution Vice President 
Carlos Pascual assessed Lebanon's total post-conflict needs at 
$5.1 billion: $600 million for humanitarian aid; $3.5 billion 
for reconstruction; and $1 billion for budget support, 
refinancing public debt, and restructuring the heavily 
subsidized electricity sector.\1\ Donors meeting in Stockholm 
in August pledged approximately $940 million; a follow-on 
conference in Paris, focusing on economic reform, is scheduled 
for January. The United States has so far pledged approximately 
$250 million for humanitarian, reconstruction and security 
assistance.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Testimony of Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Vice President and 
Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, U.S. 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 13, 2006.
    \2\ Press briefing by Ambassador Randall Tobias, Director of U.S. 
Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator, November 16, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Humanitarian Phase
    International relief efforts in the early relief phase 
focused on providing food, health, water sanitation, job 
creation, oil spill clean-up, and unexploded ordnance removal. 
The U.N.'s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) coordinated donor activities with the Lebanese 
government. In a positive sign, as of late October, 774,000 
(out of one million) Lebanese who fled the south during the 
conflict had returned to their villages.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ U.S. Government Situation Report, Lebanon Humanitarian 
Emergency, October 27, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The USG contribution to the humanitarian phase was 
approximately $100 million. Most of these funds have been spent 
or are obligated, according to USAID staff in Beirut. To 
coordinate USG assistance, the U.S. Ambassador in Beirut 
established an interagency team, which was augmented by an 
officer from the State Department's Office of Stabilization and 
Reconstruction (S/CRS) and a six-person USAID Disaster 
Assistance Response Team (DART). The DART worked effectively 
with the U.N., the Lebanese government, and major U.S. NGOs to 
identify the needs and direct assistance where it was required. 
The S/CRS officer played an important role in coordinating the 
Embassy team's activities with Washington offices.
Reconstruction Phase
    The Lebanese government is coordinating international 
assistance for reconstruction through the Prime Minister's 
office. According to the Prime Minister's reconstruction 
coordinator, Ghassan Taher, the principal tasks are re-building 
damaged and destroyed homes, roads, bridges, schools, and other 
public infrastructure. The cost of re-building homes alone will 
be $1.5 billion, he said, and Arab Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar) have pledged $1.1 billion to this effort.
    As of early November, however, the government had only 
dispersed $2 million for rebuilding homes in 10 villages in the 
south, out of a total of 270 villages that had qualified for 
assistance, leading to heavy criticism of the government in the 
press. As a result, the government was seen by many Lebanese as 
ineffectively competing with Hizballah, which was also 
delivering aid to a number of villages in the south, including 
some Christian villages. Reconstruction coordinator Taher 
acknowledged that the government needed to do a better job and 
that Hizballah was winning the public relations battle, even if 
its largesse was not proving to be as extensive as its leaders 
had promised. Indeed, the government is so unpopular in the 
south that the Prime Minister had not even visited the area 
since the conflict ended, out of fear for his safety, according 
to Taher.
    Taher said that the government had taken steps to guard 
against corruption--a long-standing problem--and ensure that 
assistance would be delivered in a fair and transparent manner. 
His office had hired an outside auditor to monitor the 
distribution and ultimate disposition of assistance funds, and 
reached decisions on assistance on the basis of recommendations 
from a regional council in the south. One political dilemma he 
faced, he said, was that a number of communities in northern 
Lebanon were also seeking assistance, arguing that, while their 
homes and public infrastructure had not been directly damaged 
by Israeli military action, their economic plight had 
nevertheless worsened as a result of the conflict. Tourism, for 
example, had plummeted.
    Other international donors have pledged funds to address 
needs beyond the re-building of damaged houses. For example, 
the U.S., through USAID, will spend roughly $59 million to re-
build bridges and roads, rehabilitate schools, assist with the 
clean-up of an oil spill and the disposal of unexploded 
ordnance, and support small loans for entrepreneurs. Much of 
the U.S. assistance is dedicated to projects in Beirut and the 
north, according to USAID staff in Beirut, in part because 
unstable security conditions in the south make it unsafe for 
U.S. NGOs to operate there.
    Despite these efforts, a Lebanese political analyst 
commented that U.S. assistance was ``a drop in the bucket'' 
compared to the massive needs, and would not affect the 
Lebanese public's strongly negative view of U.S. policy in the 
region. Many Lebanese remain angry with the U.S. for refusing 
to join the EU and regional capitals in calling for an 
immediate cease-fire and accuse the U.S. of prolonging the war 
and contributing to the loss of life and destruction.
The Problem of Cluster Bombs
    The presence in southern Lebanon of a large number of 
unexploded cluster munitions fired by Israeli forces in the 
final days of the conflict presents a continuing danger to 
Lebanese re-settling to the area and to humanitarian relief 
workers. According to the U.N.'s Mine Action Coordination 
Centre, which has assumed responsibility for the clean-up, 
there are an estimated one million unexploded sub-munitions, or 
``bomblets,'' out of a total of four million fired.\4\ Most of 
these are of U.S. origin, according to the U.N. The unexploded 
bomblets are located in a 32 square kilometer area, in towns, 
fields, and orchards. Israel has provided the U.N. with maps 
indicating where its forces fired the cluster munitions. 
Between the mid-August cease-fire and November 2006, unexploded 
cluster bomblets had killed or injured over 150 civilians. As 
of November 2006, the U.N. had removed 47,000 bomblets, and 
expects to complete the job by December 2007 at a cost of over 
$40 million. The principal donors funding the U.N. clean-up are 
the U.S., UAE, U.K., Netherlands, and Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Quarterly Report, July to September 2006, U.N. Mine Action 
Coordination Centre.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    Extending the Government's Reach

    U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 calls on the Lebanese 
government to deploy its forces ``throughout the South'' and to 
extend its control over all of its territory. To that end, the 
U.S. and other international donors have significantly 
increased their level of assistance to the Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) and other security entities. According to a 2006 
assessment by USCENTCOM, properly training and equipping the 
LAF would require an investment of $400-500 million.
    The U.S. Embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) has 
worked with the LAF to identify and prioritize areas requiring 
investment, geared to helping the LAF ``move, shoot and 
communicate.'' U.S. assistance alone has increased from 
$700,000 in FY05 to over $44 million in FY 06.\5\ Most of the 
initial U.S. funding will go towards providing the LAF with 
logistical support in the form of vehicles and spare parts for 
vehicles and helicopters, as well as individual soldier 
equipment and training, and small arms ammunition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Information Sheet, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy, 
Beirut.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other international assistance is harder to identify 
because donors have failed to agree on a mechanism for 
discussing and cross-checking their assistance, preferring to 
deal with the Lebanese government on a bilateral basis instead. 
The U.S. Embassy, however, has informally coordinated security 
assistance with the U.K., Belgians and others.

                       What Next? Recommendations

    While the cease-fire reached between Israel and Hizballah 
in August has held, Prime Minister Siniora and his ruling 
``March 14'' coalition are facing a serious challenge from 
Hizballah and its allies, who demand a greater role in the 
government. Unless an accommodation is reached, Lebanon could 
enter a dangerous period of civil strife, which could in turn 
lead to a renewed conflict with Israel.
    In the view of a number of experts and Middle Eastern 
leaders friendly to the United States, the current U.S. 
approach of backing the Siniora government and boycotting Iran 
and Syria is not succeeding and is in fact exacerbating 
tensions in Lebanon and in the region. Four suggestions for a 
change in the U.S. approach merit serious consideration:

   Help the parties in Lebanon come up with a formula 
        that will grant greater representation to the Shi'ite 
        population.\6\ The Arab League is already engaged in 
        such an effort, which the U.S. could support and/or 
        augment with other efforts. A successful negotiation 
        would not only resolve the immediate political crisis, 
        it would also give the government a broader base of 
        public support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Testimony of Dr. Paul Salem, Director-Designate, Carnegie 
Middle East Center, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
September 13, 2006; see also, Robert Grenier, ``If You Love Lebanon, 
Set it Free,'' OpEd, New York Times, December 17, 2006.

   Significantly increase U.S. security and economic 
        assistance to Lebanon.\7\ The needs are still great, 
        and in the competition with Hizballah for the public's 
        support, the government must be seen to be delivering 
        law and order and essential services to the people, 
        particularly in the historically under-served Shiite-
        populated south. U.S. generosity would set a positive 
        example for other international donors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Testimony of Ambassador Carlos Pascual, U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, September 13, 2006.

   Explore in a direct dialogue with Tehran and 
        Damascus whether it would be possible to reach a modus 
        vivendi in Lebanon and, perhaps, also in Iraq and 
        Israel/Palestine.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The Iraq Study Group Report, Recommendation No. 9: ``. . . The 
United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to 
try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and 
other regional issues.''

   Re-start peace talks between Israel and its Arab 
        neighbors.\9\ A broad effort that included 
        Palestinians, Syria and Lebanon would take the 
        initiative away from Iran and Syria, diffuse Arab and 
        Muslim anger toward Israel and the United States, bring 
        hope to the majority of Israelis and Palestinians who 
        desire peaceful co-existence, and help avert King 
        Abdullah of Jordan's sobering scenario of three 
        simultaneous civil wars in Lebanon, Iraq and Israel-
        Palestine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The Iraq Study Group Report, Recommendations No. 13-17.
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