J-S33026-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANDREW ENGDAHL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1058 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003018-2019

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JANUARY 31, 2023

Appellant, Andrew Engdahl, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, following his open guilty 

pleas to sexual abuse of children and related offenses.

1

 We affirm. 

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as 

follows: 

On October 4, 2019, [Appellant] pled guilty to one count of 

sexual abuse of children—manufacturing of child 

pornography, six counts of sexual abuse of children—

possession of child pornography, one count of unlawful 

contact with a minor—relating to manufacturing of child 

pornography, and one count of obscene and other sexual 

materials and performances—dissemination to minors. The 

charges arose from a complaint filed with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) in May 2017. The 

complaint detailed that a mother had become concerned 

about the nature of Facebook conversations between an 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312. 
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unknown individual and her seven-year-old daughter. This 

unknown individual was ultimately identified as Appellant. 

FBI agents later interviewed Appellant at his home in 

Quakertown, Bucks County, Pennsylvania, where he 

consented to a search of his cell phone. This search 

revealed explicit photographs of a minor female, who 

Appellant identified as being between 14 and 16 years old. 

A subsequent search of Appellant’s phone, pursuant to a 

warrant, revealed additional images of child pornography. 

The FBI referred the matter to the Pennsylvania Office of 

the Attorney General for further investigation. In 2019, the 

Attorney General’s Office charged Appellant with 14 criminal 

counts related to the images found on his phone by both the 

FBI and the Attorney General’s Office. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/17/22, at 1-2) (internal footnotes and some 

capitalization omitted). 

Following the entry of Appellant’s guilty pleas, the court deferred 

sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report. The court 

also ordered that Appellant submit to an evaluation by the Sexual Offenders 

Assessment Board (“SOAB”). On January 3, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a 

praecipe to schedule a hearing to determine Appellant’s sexually violent 

predator (“SVP”) status. Ultimately, the court conducted a sentencing hearing 

on February 10, 2020. At that time, the court denied the Commonwealth’s 

request for an SVP hearing.2 The court also sentenced Appellant to an 

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2 “At the time of the Sentencing Hearing, the Bucks County Court of Common 

Pleas had issued a moratorium on all SVP hearings as a result of the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 

A.3d 1212 (Pa.Super. 2017), which found SVP hearings and SVP designations 

to be unconstitutional.” (Trial Court Opinion at 7). 
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aggregate term of four (4) to twelve (12) years’ imprisonment, followed by 

four (4) years of probation. 

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on February 20, 2020. In 

it, Appellant claimed that the court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence 

“given the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, 

characteristics, and rehabilitative needs of [Appellant].” (Post-Sentence 

Motion, filed 2/20/20, at ¶10).3 On August 6, 2020, the court conducted a 

hearing on the post-sentence motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 

court granted relief in part and reduced the minimum term of incarceration

for the sexual abuse of children and unlawful contact convictions. Thus, the 

court imposed a new aggregate sentence of forty-four (44) months to twelve 

(12) years’ imprisonment, followed by four (4) years of probation. 

On October 25, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion requesting the 

scheduling of an SVP hearing. The court conducted the SVP hearing on 

January 19, 2022. At the hearing, the court received testimony from Kristen 

Dudley, Psy.D., the SOAB member who conducted Appellant’s 2019 

assessment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court deferred making a

decision and ordered the parties to submit briefs on the matter. Following the 

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3 On March 10, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal to our 

Supreme Court challenging the trial court’s refusal to conduct an SVP hearing. 

“However, on July 9, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a Praecipe for 

Discontinuance ... as a result of the Supreme Court’s holding in 

Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972 (Pa. 2020), which overruled the 

2017 Superior Court Opinion in Butler.” (Trial Court Opinion at 7 n.19). 
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submission of briefs, the court entered an order classifying Appellant as an 

SVP on March 11, 2022. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on April 8, 2022.4 On April 12, 

2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Following an extension, 

Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on May 18, 2022. 

Appellant now raises the following issues on appeal: 

Whether an aggregate sentence of forty-four months to one 

hundred forty-four months was manifestly excessive and 

unreasonable pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781? 

Whether an aggregate sentence of forty-four months to one 

hundred forty-four months was manifestly excessive, 

unreasonable and not in accordance with the sentencing 

norms set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 or under [the] 

Pennsylvania Sentencing Code? 

Whether the sentencing court erred in imposing an 

aggregate sentence of forty-four to one hundred forty-four 

months given the nature and circumstances of the offense 

and the history, characteristics, and rehabilitative needs of 

[Appellant]? 

Whether the sentencing court erred in designating Appellant 

as a “sexually violent predator” where the Commonwealth 

presented insufficient evidence to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that Appellant met the requirements to 

be classified as a sexually violent predator established by 

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4 Regarding the timeliness of the notice of appeal, “where a defendant pleads 

guilty and waives a pre-sentence SVP determination, the judgment of 

sentence is not final until that determination is rendered.” Commonwealth 

v. Schrader, 141 A.3d 558, 561 (Pa.Super. 2016). Here, Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence did not become final until the trial court entered the 

March 11, 2022 SVP order. Consequently, Appellant timely filed a notice of 

appeal within thirty (30) days of that order. 
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the Pennsylvania Sexual Offender Registration and 

Notification Act. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5). 

In his first three issues,5 Appellant asserts that he informed the 

sentencing court that he had been sexually abused by a family member, and 

it was difficult for him to work through this trauma. Appellant also emphasizes 

that he expressed remorse for his criminal conduct, took responsibility for his 

actions, and cooperated with law enforcement throughout the investigation. 

Despite these circumstances, Appellant contends that the court imposed an 

unduly harsh aggregate sentence without adequately considering his personal 

history, characteristics, and rehabilitative needs. 

Appellant acknowledges that the court provided an on-the-record 

statement of reasons in support of the sentence imposed, wherein the court 

noted Appellant’s need for treatment “to ensure the public would be 

protected.” (Id. at 16). Appellant insists, however, that “the record provides 

no evidence or guarantee such treatment would be provided in a state 

correctional institute.” (Id.) Absent more, Appellant argues that the court 

failed “to address Appellant’s rehabilitative needs or any rehabilitation 

Appellant may achieve while in prison.” (Id. at 17). Appellant concludes that 

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5 Although Appellant presented three distinct issues in his statement of 

questions presented, he combined the analysis for these issues in the 

“argument” section of his brief. (See Appellant’s Brief at 10-17). 

Consequently, we elect to address these issues together. 
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the court abused its discretion in fashioning his sentence, and this Court must 

vacate and remand for resentencing. We disagree. 

As presented, Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc), appeal denied, 633 Pa. 774, 126 A.3d 1282 

(2015) (stating that challenge to imposition of consecutive sentences as 

unduly excessive, together with claim that court failed to consider 

rehabilitative needs, constitutes challenge to discretionary aspects of 

sentencing). “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 

946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S. Ct. 

2450, 174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary 

aspects of sentencing issue: 

[W]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410 [now Rule 720]; (3) 

whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that 

the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2005)). 

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant 
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must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise 

statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of 

the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 

Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an 

appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal 

furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any 

challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging 

on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Phillips, supra at 112 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). “A substantial question exists only when 

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Caldwell, supra at 768 (quoting Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 

A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super. 2011)). An appellant’s “challenge to the imposition 

of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, together with his claim that 

the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs upon fashioning its 

sentence, presents a substantial question.” Caldwell, supra at 770. 

Here, Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal, he preserved his issue 

by including it in his post-sentence motion, and his appellate brief includes a 
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Rule 2119(f) statement. Appellant’s claim also raises a substantial question 

as to the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. See id. Accordingly, we 

proceed to address the merits of Appellant’s issue. 

This Court reviews discretionary sentencing challenges based on the 

following standard: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on 

appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its 

discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, bias or ill-will. 

Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Hess, 745 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2000)). 

“When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the particular 

circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant.” 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), cert. denied, 

545 U.S. 1148, 125 S. Ct. 2984, 162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005). “In particular, the 

court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal 

characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation.” Id. “Where [PSI] reports 

exist, we shall continue to presume that the sentencing judge was aware of 

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 101-02, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988)). 
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Instantly, the trial court initially sentenced Appellant, with the benefit of 

a PSI report, on February 10, 2020. Prior to imposing the sentence, the court 

provided an on-the-record statement of reasons to support the sentence. 

Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the court considered Appellant’s 

rehabilitative needs and personal characteristics: 

All right. So it’s the [c]ourt’s job in sentencing to consider 

all the factors that are relevant for this purpose. 

So I have done that. As I mentioned, I’ve studied the PSI 

in detail. I’ve also heard everything that was said today by 

both sides, including [Appellant’s] statement himself. 

So, obviously, a primary concern of the [c]ourt is the ...

degree of remorse of [Appellant]. And, frankly, I’m not 

certain about your degree of remorse. You said the right 

things in court today. You didn’t really say the right things 

not too long ago to the probation officer. You made excuses 

and you minimized. So what you really feel in your heart, 

[Appellant], only you know. 

* * *

So I’ve also looked at your criminal history and, certainly, I 

understand there’s been no prior arrests and no prior 

convictions with regard to this. 

Your age, which you’re 30 years old right now.... 

* * *

Your physical health and your emotional health, I certainly 

heard a lot about today, and I heard—or I read in the PSI 

about your chaotic childhood, and you had substantial 

trauma in your childhood. That’s got to be addressed in 

treatment. The trauma has got to be addressed. 

So I’ve also reviewed the sentencing guidelines and 

determined that among the mitigated, standard, and 

aggravated guidelines, that the standard guidelines are 
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most appropriate here in their applicability. 

And I do want to reiterate what’s been said. This is not a 

victimless crime. A 14-year-old girl has experienced 

something that no 14-year-old girl should experience. I am 

certain that it has made her distrustful of men and maybe 

people in general. I’m certain that it’s going to affect her 

ability to enter into healthy, normal relationships throughout 

much of her life. And I certainly recognize the pain that the 

father expressed in his victim impact statement. 

So there are also other victims, as the attorney general 

articulated, with regard to the children who are abused and 

their pictures are taken and they have a marketplace, so to 

speak, for folks to review their photographs. So they are 

victims as well. 

(N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 2/10/20, at 39-41). Thus, the court considered the 

relevant sentencing factors and felt the need to balance any mitigating 

circumstances against the necessity of punishing Appellant for the impact of 

his crimes on the victims. 

Even though the court provided thoughtful consideration of the relevant 

sentencing factors at the original sentencing hearing, the court opted to revisit 

these circumstances at the hearing on Appellant’s post-sentence motion. 

Again, the court provided a well-reasoned, on-the-record statement 

demonstrating its awareness of Appellant’s rehabilitative needs: 

I certainly gave your sentence a great deal of thought prior 

to February 10th, and I believe I did my best to balance the 

rehabilitative needs that you have and assessing your 

childhood and all the trauma and chaos that you have gone 

through, but also looking at the safety of the community. I 

continue to do that today. 

I have re-read the transcript from the February 10th hearing. 

I have heard all the testimony today, but what I want to do 
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is give you some further incentive to get the treatment you 

need so you can become a productive member of society 

once you’re on the street. And that means getting 

treatment not only in prison but once you’re on the street. 

And, certainly, it should be ... an absolute condition of your 

parole and a condition of your probation, which is 

consecutive to your parole. 

(N.T. Hearing, 8/6/20, at 76-77). Thereafter, the court granted Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion in part by reducing his minimum term of incarceration. 

(See id. at 77). 

On this record, the court did not commit an abuse of discretion. See 

McNabb, supra. The court’s reliance on the PSI report, combined with its 

on-the-record statements in support of the sentences, demonstrate that it was

aware of the relevant sentencing considerations. See Watson, supra. We 

conclude that the court appropriately weighed those considerations. 

Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing. 

In his final issue, Appellant contends that he never had physical contact 

with the victim, N.N. Rather, Appellant merely “requested N.N. send him 

pictures of her vagina and he sent her pictures of his penis.” (Appellant’s Brief 

at 23). Appellant also emphasizes that he did not have physical contact with 

any of the other children depicted in the images of child pornography that law 

enforcement recovered from his phone. Appellant argues that: 1) he never 

committed a crime before the instant offenses; 2) he did not re-offend during 

the two-year period while he remained at liberty; and 3) his risk of re-offense 
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is low, because N.N. was an acquaintance rather than a stranger. Based upon 

his analysis of the relevant statutory factors and the facts of this case, 

Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth did not present clear and 

convincing evidence to support his classification as an SVP. We disagree. 

Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s 

SVP designation are governed by the following principles: 

In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing 

court, must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found 

clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n 

SVP]. As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view 

all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will reverse a 

trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the 

Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing 

evidence that each element of the statute has been 

satisfied. 

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa.Super. 2015), 

appeal denied, 633 Pa. 763, 125 A.3d 1199 (2015) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1033 (Pa.Super. 2011)). “SVP” is defined as: 

A person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 

offense ... and who is determined to be a sexually violent 

predator ... due to a mental abnormality or personality 

disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory 

sexually violent offenses. In order to show that the offender 

suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, 

the evidence must show that the defendant suffers from a 

congenital or acquired condition ... that affects the emotional 

or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that 

predisposes that person to the commission of criminal 

sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to 

the health and safety of other persons. Moreover, there 

must be a showing that the defendant’s conduct was 

predatory. Predatory conduct is defined as an act directed 

at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has 
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been instituted, established, maintained, or promoted, in 

whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support 

victimization. Furthermore, in reaching a determination, we 

must examine the driving force behind the commission of 

these acts, as well as looking at the offender’s propensity to 

re-offend, an opinion about which the Commonwealth’s 

expert is required to opine. However, the risk of reoffending is but one factor to be considered when making 

an assessment; it is not an “independent element.” 

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 84-85 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 1038-39 (Pa.Super. 

2013)). 

SOAB evaluators must consider the following factors when performing 

SVP assessments: 

(1) Facts of the current offense, including: 

(i) Whether the offense involved multiple 

victims. 

(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means 

necessary to achieve the offense. 

(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the 

victim. 

(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim. 

(v) Age of the victim. 

(vi) Whether the offense included a display of 

unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission 

of the crime. 

(vii) The mental capacity of the victim. 

(2) Prior offense history, including: 

(i) The individual’s prior criminal record. 
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(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior 

sentences. 

(iii) Whether the individual participated in 

available programs for sexual offenders. 

(3) Characteristics of the individual, including: 

(i) Age of the individual. 

(ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual. 

(iii) A mental illness, mental disability or mental 

abnormality. 

(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to 

the individual’s conduct. 

(4) Factors that are supported in sexual offender 

assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of 

reoffense. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.58(b). 

Instantly, Appellant pled guilty to sexually violent offenses. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.12, 9799.14. In her report, Dr. Dudley, a SOAB member, 

addressed all factors set forth in Section 9799.58(b). (See SVP Assessment, 

dated 12/19/19, at 5-8). Regarding Appellant’s mental abnormality, Dr. 

Dudley indicated that Appellant met the diagnostic criteria for Paraphilic 

Disorder Specified, Hebephilic Disorder: 

Based on his behavior and his statements to law 

enforcement he has a sexual attraction to adolescent 

children. He has also acted on this attraction by initiating 

and then sexualizing conversations with N.N., a 14-year-old 

girl. He searched the Internet for websites showing naked 

adolescents and/or adolescents having sex with men. 
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(Id. at 7). This disorder “is considered a lifetime ‘condition’ which may wax 

and wane over time,” and Appellant “has a higher likelihood of re-offending 

unless or until he receives specialized treatment....” (Id. at 8). Dr. Dudley 

also opined that Appellant engaged in predatory behavior: 

[Appellant] initiated and maintained a private relationship 

with 14-year-old [N.N.] During the course of online 

conversations with her he sent her pictures of his erect penis 

and received pictures of [her] vagina, which he then used 

as masturbatory stimulus. This behavior does meet criteria, 

under the statute, to be deemed PREDATORY.

(Id. at 9) (emphasis in original). At the SVP hearing, Dr. Dudley provided 

testimony that was consistent with the findings announced in her report. (See

N.T. SVP Hearing, 1/19/22, at 17-85). 

The trial court analyzed Dr. Dudley’s report, as well as her testimony 

from the SVP hearing, and determined that the Commonwealth provided clear 

and convincing evidence to support the SVP classification: 

[The trial court] finds that Dr. Dudley thoroughly considered 

the requisite statutory factors ... as they relate to the 

circumstances surrounding the instant case. She assessed 

and pointed to several statutory factors that increased 

Appellant’s likelihood of reoffending, such as the fact that 

Appellant’s offenses involved multiple victims, the nature of 

Appellant’s contact with the Victim, his repeated requests 

for nude photos from her, the age of the Victim, as well as 

the age of the children in the photographs who were being 

sexually abused by adults. Dr. Dudley also determined that 

Appellant’s statements as to why he chose to work the night 

shift and when children should be permitted to engage in 
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sexual relationships to be significant.[6] We find, then, that 

while Appellant does not have a prior criminal record and he 

did not use overt force or coercion in the commission of his 

crimes, Dr. Dudley gave due weight and consideration to the 

requisite statutory factors as they relate to the 

circumstances of the instant case.

(Trial Court Opinion at 27-28) (internal record citations omitted). 

Here, Dr. Dudley’s report and testimony confirmed that Appellant suffers 

from a mental abnormality that makes him likely to re-offend. See 

Leatherbury, supra. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the trial court correctly determined that the Commonwealth 

presented clear and convincing evidence to support Appellant’s classification 

as an SVP. See Hollingshead, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 

of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/31/2023

____________________________________________

6 Specifically, Dr. Dudley testified about certain statements Appellant made to 

police during their investigation. Appellant “stated to the police that he liked 

working the night shift because there were no children around.” (N.T. SVP 

Hearing at 43). Appellant “also made statements about how he believes that 

children should be allowed to have sexual relationships when they are ready 

versus waiting for a prescribed age.” (Id. at 46).