United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking 

Minority Member, Subcommittee on National 

Security and International Relations, House of

Representatives 

RESERVE FORCES

Actions Needed to 

Identify National 

Guard Domestic 

Equipment 

Requirements and 

Readiness 

January 2007 

 

GAO-07-60 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2007

RESERVE FORCES

Actions Needed to Identify National 

Guard Domestic Equipment 

Requirements and Readiness 

Highlights of GAO-07-60, a report to the 

Ranking Minority Member, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, and 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee 

on National Security and International 

Relations, House of Representatives 

The high use of the National Guard 

for federal overseas missions has 

reduced equipment available for its 

state-led domestic missions, at the 

same time it faces an expanded 

array of threats at home. The 

massive state-led, federally funded 

response to Hurricane Katrina 

illustrates the Guard’s important 

role in responding to the effects of 

large-scale, multistate events as 

well as the difficulty of working 

with multiple state and federal 

agencies. To address congressional

interest in the Guard’s domestic

preparedness, GAO assessed the

extent to which (1) the Guard’s

domestic equipment requirements 

have been identified, (2) the

Department of Defense (DOD) 

measures and reports to Congress 

the equipment readiness of nondeployed Guard forces for 

domestic missions, and (3) DOD 

actions address the Guard’s 

domestic equipping challenges. 

GAO examined the National 

Guard’s plans and equipment status

and included case studies in

California, Florida, New Jersey, 

and West Virginia. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends updating the 

National Guard Bureau’s charter

and civil support regulation and 

improved reporting of the Guard’s

domestic readiness. DOD partially

agreed to report on plans to assess 

domestic readiness but disagreed

with our other recommendations. 

GAO reiterates the need for

changes in matters for 

congressional consideration. 

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to respond 

to large-scale terrorist events and natural disasters have not been fully 

identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would have 

roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated their 

plans. The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 catastrophic 

scenarios to guide federal and state governments in planning their response 

activities. While DOD is responsible for equipping the Guard for its federal 

missions and states plan for the National Guard’s activities within their 

borders, neither is comprehensively planning for the Guard’s role in 

responding to events like the national planning scenarios that may involve 

more than one state and be federally funded. Such planning has not been 

completed primarily because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating 

planning for the Guard’s role in large-scale events. As a liaison between the 

Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is well 

positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces. The bureau 

has facilitated some limited interstate planning for multistate events, 

although neither its charter nor its civil support regulation identifies this 

activity as its responsibility. Until the bureau’s charter and its civil support 

regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for 

multistate events, such planning for the National Guard’s role in these events

may remain incomplete, and the National Guard may not be prepared to 

respond as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

DOD does not routinely measure or report to Congress the equipment 

readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions. 

DOD’s legacy readiness reporting system and its annual National Guard 

equipping report to Congress address warfighting readiness but do not 

address the Guard’s domestic missions. While DOD has recognized the need

for greater visibility over the Guard’s domestic capabilities, its process and 

measures for assessing the Guard’s domestic readiness have not yet been 

fully defined. Until DOD reaches agreement on a specific approach for 

measuring readiness for domestic missions and requirements are defined, it 

will remain unclear whether the Guard is equipped to respond effectively to 

the consequences of a large-scale terrorist attack or natural disaster. 

DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment challenges 

but the extent to which these actions will improve the Guard’s domestic 

capabilities is uncertain because DOD has not finalized specific plans to 

implement and fund several initiatives. Some officials in case study states 

expressed concerns about the adequacy of equipment for nondeployed units 

under current Army plans. For example, until the Army defines the types and 

amounts of equipment that nondeployed Army National Guard units can 

expect to retain on hand within the United States, National Guard officials in

the states may be hampered in their ability to plan and train for responding 

to large-scale domestic events. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Janet A. St. 

Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 8

National Guard Equipment Requirements for Domestic Missions 

Not Fully Identified 12 

DOD Is Taking Some Steps to Measure National Guard 

Preparedness for Domestic Missions, but Efforts Are Not Yet 

Complete 18

DOD Has Some Efforts Under Way to Address National Guard 

Equipment Challenges, but Long-term Effect on Domestic 

Preparedness Is Unclear 29 

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34 

Matters for Congressional Consideration 36 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 36 

Appendix I National Planning Scenarios 44 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 46 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 48 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52 

Appendix IV Related Products

53 

Tables 

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles 10 

Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard 

Bureau as Essential to Support Domestic Missions 22 

Page i GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National

Guards Reporting Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to 

Respond to Typical State Missions 25 

Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment 

Items where the National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less 

of the Amount Authorized for Warfighting Missions, 

Including Substitutes 28 

Table 5: Homeland Security Council’s National Planning Scenarios 

and Summary Descriptions 45 

Figures 

Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, 

Including Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army 

National Guard Forces as of November 3, 2006 27 

Figure 2: The Army’s Proposed Force Generation Model 32 

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Page ii GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

January 26, 2007 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on National Security 

and International Relations 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The global security environment has changed significantly since the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the nation now faces 

adversaries who are committed to attacking American interests both 

overseas and at home. The National Guard with its dual federal and state 

roles has been in demand to meet both evolving overseas operations and

emerging homeland security1

 requirements. Since the launch of the Global 

War on Terrorism, the National Guard has experienced the largest 

activation of its forces since World War II. At the same time, the Guard’s 

domestic missions have expanded from routine duties, such as responding 

to hurricanes and forest fires, to include activities such as flying armed air

patrols over U.S. cities, providing radar coverage for the continental 

United States, protecting critical infrastructure against terrorist threats, 

and securing U.S. borders. 

Multiple state and federal agencies have roles in planning the response to 

the broad range of domestic events to which the National Guard may be 

called with the federal government providing more than 90 percent of the

Guard’s funding. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for 

 1

According to the Office of Homeland Security’s National Strategy for Homeland Security

(Washington, D.C.: July 2002), homeland security is a broad term that encompasses efforts 

to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks as well as

respond to an attack that might occur. DOD refers to its contributions to the overall 

homeland security efforts it expects to lead as “homeland defense” and activities DOD will 

perform in support of efforts led by other federal, state, or local agencies as “defense 

support of civil authorities.” 

Page 1 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
planning for the Guard’s use and the services for equipping its units for 

federal missions performed under the command of the President. In 

addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense has 

been established to supervise DOD’s homeland defense activities and the 

U.S. Northern Command is responsible for planning, organizing, and 

executing DOD’s civil support missions within the continental United 

States. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for 

developing a system to integrate federal, state, and local domestic 

emergency response and provides grants to the states to build their 

emergency response capabilities. Also at the federal level, the President’s 

Homeland Security Council2

 provides strategic guidance on terrorism 

prevention and has developed 15 national planning scenarios to guide 

federal, state, and local planning for catastrophic events (see app. I). 

States are responsible for planning for National Guard missions performed 

under the command of the governors. National Guard units are generally

expected to perform their state missions using the equipment DOD has 

provided for federal missions. However, the National Guard’s equipment 

inventories in the United States have significantly decreased because of 

overseas operations, particularly in the Army National Guard, at a time 

when the nation faces an increasing array of threats at home. 

We have previously reported that the high pace of operations has caused a 

strain on the Army National Guard’s equipment inventories that could be

used for domestic missions and that planning for the military’s response to 

large-scale, catastrophic events is not complete. In October 2005, we 

reported that nondeployed Army National Guard units had only about onethird of the equipment they needed for their overseas missions.3

 We also 

reported on the National Guard’s response to help manage the 

consequences of Hurricane Katrina, a large-scale catastrophic event.4

 Over 

50,000 National Guard members from all 50 states were activated to assist 

in the Katrina response effort, demonstrating the pivotal role National 

Guard forces play in responding to large-scale, multistate events. However, 

 2

The Homeland Security Council is composed of cabinet-level officials and coordinates 

homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies. 

3

GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 

Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives, 

GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005). 

4

GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s

Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 

2006). 

Page 2 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
we noted a number of serious deficiencies in planning for such events on

the federal and state levels. Two significant shortfalls of DOD’s pre-Katrina 

planning were that (1) the capabilities DOD could be called upon to 

provide had not been assessed and (2) planning did not fully address the 

division of tasks between National Guard resources under the governors’ 

control and federal resources under presidential control. DOD is now 

considering steps to address some of the deficiencies identified in 

Hurricane Katrina lessons learned reports. A list of related GAO products 

is included at the end of this report. 

Because of the National Guard’s important role in homeland security, you 

asked us to assess whether the National Guard has the equipment it needs 

to train and maintain readiness for the full range of its domestic missions. 

Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) the National Guard’s 

equipment requirements for domestic missions have been identified using

an analytically based process, (2) DOD measures and reports to Congress 

the equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for 

domestic missions, and (3) DOD actions address the National Guard’s 

domestic equipment challenges. 

To determine the extent to which the National Guard’s equipment 

requirements for domestic missions have been identified using an 

analytically based process, we reviewed the status of requirements 

planning for National Guard forces. We also conducted case studies in 

four states—California, Florida, New Jersey, and West Virginia—which 

face a range of homeland security threats to understand the status of the 

National Guard’s equipment and state planning efforts for the National 

Guard’s state missions. We also met with U.S. Northern Command, 

National Guard Bureau, and Department of Homeland Security officials to 

discuss planning processes for the Guard’s missions. To assess the extent 

to which DOD measures and reports on the equipment readiness of 

nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic missions, we reviewed 

documentation on DOD’s readiness reporting systems and its annual 

report to Congress on National Guard equipping, analyzed the inventory

status of equipment items determined by the Army National Guard as 

having a high value for domestic missions, reviewed state assessments of 

domestic capability shortfalls, and discussed these issues with state 

National Guard officials in four case study states. Further, we reviewed 

documentation on DOD, Army, Air Force, and National Guard Bureau 

actions to address National Guard equipping challenges to determine the 

extent to which they were derived from approved requirements and 

focused on high-priority needs. We conducted our review from December 

2005 through November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted

Page 3 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
government auditing standards and determined that the data used were 

sufficiently reliable for our objectives. The scope and methodology used in

our review are described in further detail in appendix II. 

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to 

perform its domestic missions have not been fully identified using an 

analytically based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate natural 

disasters and terrorist attacks, because states and federal agencies have 

not completed an integrated set of plans identifying the capabilities the 

National Guard would be expected to provide in response to events like 

those described in the Homeland Security Council’s 15 national planning

scenarios. The Department of Homeland Security, through the National 

Response Plan, has established a framework for federal, state, and local 

agencies to use in planning for domestic emergencies. While DOD is 

developing plans for the use of federal military forces in domestic 

missions, it assumes that the National Guard will respond to large-scale, 

multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina under the command of the 

governors and therefore does not prepare plans for the Guard’s use in 

those types of events. States plan for the National Guard’s use in the 

missions they will lead within their borders, such as responding to 

wildfires and floods. However, neither the states nor DOD have 

comprehensively planned and identified requirements for the National 

Guard’s role in responding to events such as the Homeland Security 

Council’s national planning scenarios that may involve more than one 

state and be federally funded. Such planning has not been completed in 

part because there is no formal mechanism for facilitating state planning

across borders for the Guard’s role in large-scale events. As the response 

to Hurricane Katrina illustrated, the National Guard Bureau can play a 

significant role in facilitating National Guard support among states. As the 

liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states’ National Guard 

forces, the bureau is well positioned to facilitate interstate planning for the 

use of National Guard forces in large-scale, multistate events. However, 

neither the National Guard Bureau’s charter nor its regulation on military 

support to civil authorities specifically defines a role for it in working with 

the states to facilitate the kind of comprehensive, pre-event planning that

is needed for a coordinated, efficient, and effective response to large-scale, 

multistate events. Moreover, neither the National Guard Bureau’s charter 

nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities has been updated 

to reflect the post-September 11, 2001, security environment, including the 

bureau’s role with respect to new organizations such as the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense, and the U.S. Northern Command. Unless the National

Results in Brief 

Page 4 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Guard Bureau’s charter and regulation on military support to civil 

authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland security 

issues the National Guard faces, the extent to which the National Guard 

Bureau will continue or expand its efforts to assist states with planning for 

and responding to these events will likely remain uneven. As a result, 

planning that fully identifies the Guard’s requirements for domestic 

missions and is integrated with plans for using other military and civilian 

forces is likely to remain incomplete, and the National Guard may not be 

prepared to respond to domestic events, such as those described in the 

national planning scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as possible. We 

are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of 

the Army and Air Force to (1) revise the National Guard Bureau’s charter 

to clearly define its roles in facilitating interstate planning for the National

Guard’s role in large-scale, multistate events, such as those contained in 

the national planning scenarios, and monitoring the Guard’s status to 

perform those missions, and (2) update the National Guard’s civil support 

regulation. We are also recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, National 

Guard Bureau, in coordination with DOD, U.S. Northern Command, U.S.

Pacific Command, the states, and other civilian authorities, to facilitate 

and coordinate interstate National Guard planning to identify the 

capabilities and equipment the National Guard would need to respond to 

large-scale, multistate events, consistent with the Homeland Security 

Council’s national planning scenarios and state and federal plans. 

DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness of nondeployed 

National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or report this 

information to Congress. The Secretary of Defense is required by law to 

establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system with which DOD 

can measure in an objective, accurate and timely manner the military’s 

capability to carry out the National Security Strategy, defense planning 

guidance, and the National Military Strategy. Until recently, it has been 

assumed that the National Guard could perform its typical state missions 

with the equipment it had on hand for its federal missions. However, the 

equipment demands for overseas operations have decreased the supply of

equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units, particularly in 

the Army National Guard. DOD has recognized the need to have more 

visibility over the capability that the National Guard has for its domestic 

missions and has begun to collect data on units’ preparedness; however, 

these efforts are not yet fully mature. DOD is implementing a new 

readiness reporting system that will include readiness information on the 

Guard’s federally funded state-led missions, but this system is not fully 

operational and it is not clear how equipment readiness will be assessed 

Page 5 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
without fully identified domestic mission requirements. The National 

Guard Bureau has developed a database to collect domestic capability 

assessments from the states, but in the absence of fully identified 

requirements for domestic missions the system relies on the subjective 

assessments of state National Guard officials and does not provide 

detailed information on National Guard equipping for large-scale, 

multistate events. Our analysis of these data found that a majority of state 

National Guard leaders assessed the capability of resources within their 

states to respond to typical state missions as adequate, although the Army 

National Guard has shortages of some equipment, such as generators and 

trucks, which could be useful for domestic events. In addition, National 

Guard officials in states we visited expressed concerns about whether they

would have enough equipment to respond to large-scale natural or 

manmade disasters such as Hurricane Katrina or those described in the 

Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios. Until DOD’s 

efforts to improve its readiness measures and reports are mature, decision

makers will lack information on whether the National Guard has the 

equipment it needs to respond effectively to the consequences of a largescale, multistate event. Further, Congress will have limited information 

making it more difficult to mitigate risks and prioritize investments for the 

Guard’s missions. We are recommending actions intended to improve 

congressional visibility over DOD’s efforts to assess the readiness of 

National Guard forces for their domestic missions. In addition, we are 

suggesting for congressional consideration the revision of the annual 

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report requirements to include

an assessment of the Guard’s equipping preparedness to provide support 

to civil authorities, the risks to those missions associated with any 

shortfalls, and mitigation strategies and investment priorities. 

DOD is taking some actions to address National Guard equipment 

challenges; however, it is not clear how these initiatives will affect the 

Guard’s preparedness for domestic missions since some of the initiatives 

are in the early stages of implementation and specific plans are still being 

developed. DOD plans to procure additional Army National Guard and Air 

National Guard equipment, such as trucks and communications gear, using 

$900 million that Congress provided in the 2006 Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act. In addition, the National Guard Bureau has begun 

implementing several initiatives, such as establishing joint force 

headquarters within each state and expanding chemical and biological 

response capabilities. However, these initiatives were recently approved

by DOD and have not yet been included in DOD’s Future Years Defense 

Program. The Army has also budgeted $21 billion for fiscal years 2005 

through 2011 to modernize the Army National Guard and augment its 

Page 6 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
equipment inventory. However, this equipment may be deployed to meet

overseas demands and the Army has not specified how much equipment 

will remain in the United States to be available for domestic missions 

because it has not finalized plans for allocating equipment to nondeployed

units under its new cyclical readiness and deployment model. In the 

absence of a specific plan that outlines how Army National Guard 

equipment will be allocated among nondeployed units, state National 

Guards may be hampered in their ability to plan for responding to largescale domestic events. We are recommending that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan and funding 

strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard baseline 

equipment sets. 

In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our 

recommendation to report to Congress on its plans for assessing National 

Guard domestic readiness, but disagreed with our recommendations to 

update the National Guard Bureau’s charter and civil support regulation 

for the new security environment, to direct the National Guard Bureau to 

facilitate and coordinate interstate planning for the use of Guard forces in 

large-scale, multistate events, and for the Army to provide a plan and 

funding strategy for providing baseline equipment sets to nondeployed

Army National Guard units. DOD stated that the National Guard Bureau’s 

existing charter authorizes a planning role for the bureau for large-scale, 

multistate events. However, because we found that planning for multistate 

events is currently uneven and the charter does not clearly define the 

bureau’s role in planning, we believe that clarifying the language in the 

charter to highlight the importance of these activities would improve 

preparedness for such emergencies. Further, DOD stated that it did not 

see a need to update its civil support regulation and that it is not 

appropriate for the National Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with 

other federal agencies because this is the responsibility, if required, of the 

Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders and would infringe 

on the authority of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and the 

governors. Our recommendation was not intended to designate the 

National Guard Bureau as the DOD entity to coordinate with other federal 

agencies or infringe on the governor’s role in coordination with federal 

agencies. However, the current regulation does not specifically address 

how coordination with organizations established since September 11, 

2001, should occur or how new planning tools should be used, and we 

believe that updating the regulation is an important step in strengthening 

pre-event planning and minimizing confusion about the use of National 

Guard forces. DOD further stated in its comments that it does not see a 

need for a report to Congress on the Army’s plans to equip nondeployed

Page 7 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Army National Guard units, and it did not specify any actions the 

department would take to measure and report to Congress on the National 

Guard’s equipment readiness for domestic missions. We continue to 

believe that the actions we recommend are important to improve 

interstate planning and visibility of National Guard readiness for domestic 

missions. Therefore, we are suggesting that Congress consider amending 

the statute prescribing the National Guard Bureau’s charter to include 

coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard’s 

use in large-scale, multistate events such as those contained in the national 

planning scenarios and requiring DOD to revise the National Guard 

Bureau’s civil support regulation to reflect this change. In addition, to 

provide information on what equipment will be available for the National 

Guard’s domestic missions under the Army’s force generation model, we 

are also suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary of 

Defense to include in the 2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment 

Report a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline equipment sets 

to nondeployed Army National Guard units. DOD’s comments and our 

evaluation are discussed in detail in the Agency Comments and Our 

Evaluation section of this report. 

The National Guard performs a range of domestic and overseas missions 

in its dual roles as a federal reserve of the Army and Air Force and as a 

state militia. DOD is responsible for planning and equipping the National 

Guard for its federal missions conducted under the command and control 

of the President. Within DOD, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense5

 supervises DOD’s homeland activities, 

including the execution of domestic military missions and military support 

to U.S. civil authorities, and develops policies, conducts analyses, provides 

advice, and makes recommendations for these activities to the Under 

Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Homeland Defense is also the DOD office responsible for 

coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security. While the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense supervises 

DOD’s homeland activities, U.S. Northern Command is the unified military 

command responsible for planning, organizing, and executing DOD’s 

homeland defense and federal military support to civil authorities’ 

Background 

 5

The office was established by the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 902 (2002). 

Page 8 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial 

waters.6

The services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping 

military forces, including the National Guard. The Army and the Air Force 

have different strategies for structuring and providing resources for their 

Guard components that reflect each service’s planned use and available 

resources. Using DOD planning guidance, Army National Guard units are 

provided varying levels of equipment according to their unit’s priority for 

resources, which generally increases as a unit nears availability for 

overseas deployment. Prior to the beginning of current overseas 

operations, the majority of the Army National Guard’s combat forces were 

supplied with 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment. Our prior work 

(see Related GAO Products) has shown that in order to fully equip units 

deploying overseas to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army National Guard had 

to transfer large quantities of items from nondeployed units, which 

depleted the inventories of equipment available for the Guard’s domestic 

missions. In addition, operational requirements to leave equipment 

overseas for follow-on forces and DOD’s lack of approved plans to replace 

these items have further compounded the Army National Guard’s 

equipment shortages and threaten its ability to maintain readiness for 

future missions. In contrast, the Air National Guard has been integrated 

into the Air Force’s operational force and is maintained at readiness levels

comparable to its active component counterparts. This approach enables 

the Air National Guard units to be ready to deploy on short notice and its 

units have not been as negatively affected by recent overseas operations 

as Army National Guard units. 

As a state militia, the National Guard responds to domestic events under 

the command and control of a state governor. When not participating in 

DOD’s federal missions, National Guard members and equipment are 

available to their respective state governors to perform state missions, 

such as responding to emergencies, disasters, civil disturbances, and other 

events authorized by state laws. National Guard state-unique equipment 

requirements are funded by the state. In some circumstances, National 

Guard personnel can also perform duty under state control that is 

 6

U.S. Pacific Command has homeland defense and civil support responsibilities for Hawaii 

and the U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean. 

Page 9 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
federally funded.7

 Since September 11, 2001, the President has authorized 

federal funding for several National Guard domestic missions conducted 

under the command of the governors, such as providing security at the 

nation’s airports in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 

attacks, assisting the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and 

providing security along the southwest border in 2006. Table 1 compares 

some differences—including differences in command and control 

responsibility, where the National Guard has been deployed, and how the 

National Guard was funded—in its different state and federal roles. 

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles 

State role Federal role 

State funded Federally funded Federally funded 

Command and 

control entity 

Governor Governor President

Mobilization 

authorities used

In accordance with 

state law 

Title 32 

(32 U.S.C 502(f)) 

Various Title 10

authorities 

Where deployed In accordance with 

state law 

United States Worldwide 

Mission types In accordance with 

state law 

Training and other 

federally 

authorized 

missions 

Overseas training and 

as assigned after 

mobilization 

Examples of 

domestic missions 

Forest fires, floods, 

civil disturbances 

Post-9/11 airport 

security, Hurricane 

Katrina, southwest 

border security

Air sovereignty,

missile defense, 

guarding DOD 

infrastructure 

Support law 

enforcement 

activities 

Yes Yes As limited by Posse 

Comitatusa

Source: GAO analysis.

a

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, prohibits the direct use of federal military troops

for domestic civilian law enforcement except where authorized by the Constitution or an act of

Congress. This act applies to the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, which are reserve 

components of the armed forces under 10 U.S.C. §10101. 

Although it is equipped by the Army and the Air Force for its federal role, 

the National Guard can use its equipment and capabilities, such as airlift, 

 7

National Guard members train for their federal missions under state control with federal

funding. Federal laws also authorize federal funding for some other state-controlled 

missions, such as the National Guard’s counterdrug support operations and weapons of

mass destruction civil support teams. 

Page 10 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
transportation, engineering, communications, logistics, medical, 

maintenance, and security capabilities, to support state and local officials 

in its domestic role. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 

the National Guard supported response and recovery operations in a 

number of ways. Among other activities, National Guard units performed 

helicopter search-and-rescue missions, augmented security efforts, 

supplied satellite phone communications, and provided humanitarian and 

medical treatment for victims of the disaster. The National Guard also can 

provide capabilities for responding to domestic weapons of mass 

destruction events, such as detection, assessment, and decontamination 

capabilities. 

In its domestic role, the National Guard works with the multiple state and

federal agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects of 

homeland security. The National Guard works with state emergency

management agencies to provide military support to state civilian 

authorities. In addition, the states have entered into mutual assistance 

agreements to provide cross-border assistance, including National Guard 

forces, when an event exceeds a state’s capacity to respond. The National 

Guard Bureau, established by statute8

 as a joint bureau of the Army and 

the Air Force, is responsible for the administration of the National Guard, 

including participating with Army and Air Force staff in developing and 

coordinating policies, programs, and plans affecting Army National Guard 

and Air National Guard personnel, and it serves as the channel of 

communication between the Army and the Air Force and the National 

Guard in the several states. The Secretaries of the Army and Air Force are 

directed by statute to jointly develop and prescribe a charter for the 

National Guard Bureau that sets out the bureau’s responsibilities.9

 The 

Chief of the National Guard Bureau has overall responsibility for the 

National Guard’s military support to civil authorities programs. As was 

demonstrated in the response to Hurricane Katrina, during civil support 

missions the National Guard Bureau provides policy guidance and 

facilitates National Guard assistance to the executing adjutants general 

who lead National Guard forces within the states under the command and 

control of the governors. National Guard forces also have some federal 

domestic missions, such as air and missile defense activities, that are 

federally funded and conducted under the command of the President. 

 8

10 U.S.C. §10501. 

9

10 U.S.C. §10503. 

Page 11 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Also at the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security and the 

Homeland Security Council both have responsibilities that could affect the 

National Guard’s domestic role. The Department of Homeland Security, 

which was established in 200210 to reduce America’s vulnerability to 

terrorism and to prevent terrorist attacks as well as respond to attacks 

that might occur, is the lead federal agency responsible for preventing,

preparing for, and responding to a wide range of major domestic disasters 

and other emergencies. In December 2004, the department issued the 

National Response Plan,11 which provides a framework for federal, state, 

and local agencies to use in planning for domestic emergencies. To assist 

in integrating state and federal responses to domestic emergencies, the 

Homeland Security Council developed 15 national planning scenarios in 

2004 whose purpose was to form the basis for identifying the capabilities 

needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The scenarios focus on 

the consequences that federal, state, and local first responders may have 

to address and are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of largescale, catastrophic emergencies for which the nation needs to be 

prepared. The 15 scenarios include a wide range of terrorist attacks 

involving nuclear, biological, and chemical agents, as well as catastrophic 

natural disasters, such as an earthquake or hurricane, and a large-scale

cyber attack. These scenarios are described in further detail in appendix I.

The types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to 

perform domestic missions have not been fully identified using an 

analytically based process, particularly for large-scale, multistate natural 

disasters and terrorist attacks, because state and federal agencies have not 

completed an integrated set of plans identifying the capabilities the 

National Guard would be expected to provide in response to events like 

those described in the Homeland Security Council’s national planning 

scenarios. DOD is developing plans for the use of federal military forces in

domestic missions, but assumes the National Guard will respond to largescale, multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina under the command of 

the governors. States plan for the National Guard’s use in missions within 

their borders, but have only planned to a limited extent for the Guard’s use 

in large-scale, multistate events such as those described in the Homeland 

National Guard 

Equipment 

Requirements for 

Domestic Missions 

Not Fully Identified 

 10The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101 (2002). 

11The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the Department of Homeland Security to

consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into a single integrated 

and coordinated national response plan. 

Page 12 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Security Council’s national planning scenarios. While neither the National 

Guard Bureau’s charter nor its civil support regulation explicitly defines 

its role in working to facilitate comprehensive and integrated planning for 

the National Guard’s use in large-scale, multistate events, the bureau has 

taken steps to facilitate limited interstate planning for potential domestic 

events like hurricanes, wildfires, and an influenza pandemic. However, 

without a formal mechanism to facilitate the development of 

comprehensive plans for the National Guard’s role in large-scale, 

multistate events, such plans are unlikely to be developed. As a result, the 

National Guard may not be prepared to respond to large-scale, multistate 

events as efficiently and effectively as possible. 

DOD and State Planning 

for the National Guard’s 

Use in Domestic Missions 

Is Incomplete 

The multiple state and federal agencies likely to be involved in the 

response to a large-scale, multistate event are a factor that complicates 

planning for how the National Guard should be used and equipped to 

respond to domestic events, particularly for events such as terrorist 

attacks and natural disasters described in the Homeland Security Council’s 

national planning scenarios. DOD, Department of Homeland Security, and 

National Guard documents, as well as our prior work on Hurricane 

Katrina, indicate that comprehensive pre-event planning that is 

coordinated and integrated to take into account the roles of federal and

state responders, including the National Guard, is a key step in facilitating 

an effective, efficient, and well-coordinated response to unexpected 

domestic emergencies. As was illustrated in the aftermath of Hurricane 

Katrina, the response to large-scale, multistate events may involve a 

combination of state and local civilian authorities; National Guard forces 

from across the nation operating in state status; federal civilian agencies,

such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and federal military 

forces, such as active duty Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces 

operating under the command of the President. However, the number of 

state and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different aspects of 

emergency response combined with their divided and decentralized 

planning responsibilities complicate the task of comprehensive planning 

and identification of the equipment the National Guard would need for the 

full range of potential domestic missions. National Guard assistance to 

civil authorities is normally provided when an event is so severe and

widespread that local and state governments are overwhelmed and civil 

resources are exhausted. As a result, in order to identify the capabilities 

the Guard will be expected to provide for domestic response efforts, state 

National Guard plans must be integrated with other responders’ plans and 

account for the contributions expected to be made by civil authorities as 

well as federal military forces. 

Page 13 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
DOD plans for the domestic use of federal military forces—which may 

include National Guard units in federal status—in the homeland defense 

missions it leads, such as air defense of the United States and missile 

defense, and the federal military support it provides to civil authorities as 

a result of natural or man-made disasters. The department, through the 

U.S. Northern Command, is currently developing a group of plans to 

address homeland defense missions and the missions federal forces may 

undertake in support of civilian authorities. However, DOD assumes that 

National Guard forces will respond to most domestic events, including 

large-scale, multistate events such as Hurricane Katrina and those 

described in the Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios,

under the command of the governors. Therefore, the department does not 

plan for the types of Guard units or establish equipment requirements for 

the National Guard’s use under state control in responding to these types 

of events. Moreover, a DOD directive prohibits the procurement of 

equipment exclusively for providing support to civilian authorities in civil 

emergencies unless specifically directed by the Secretary of Defense.12

Consistent with this directive, DOD’s 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense 

and Civil Support states that DOD will continue to rely on forces with 

both warfighting and domestic mission capabilities for consequence 

management and other defense support of civil authorities.13

States are responsible for preparing and maintaining emergency plans for 

the employment of the National Guard in response to civil disturbances; 

natural, man-made, or technological disasters; and other potential 

emergencies within their borders, such as wildfires and floods. In 

responding to such events, states generally have relied on the equipment 

that DOD has provided to their National Guard units for their federal 

missions. The degree to which states have developed plans for the use of 

National Guard forces and identified equipment requirements for the range 

of the National Guard’s missions, including large-scale, multistate events, 

varies. A recent Department of Homeland Security review of state 

emergency operations plans, which are the basis for state National Guard 

plans, found that a majority of state plans and planning processes are not 

 12DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, par. 4.4.8.2 (Jan. 15, 1993). 

DOD is developing a new directive for defense support to civil authorities that will 

supersede several existing directives, including its current military support to civil 

authorities directive. 

13Two exceptions to this are the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (a dedicated command and

control element) and the National Guard’s weapons of mass destruction civil support

teams. 

Page 14 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic events.14

According to the report, many state plans are created in isolation and are 

insufficiently detailed, and the states do not conduct adequate

collaborative planning as a part of normal preparedness efforts. Further, 

the report asserted that the lack of specificity and poorly defined resource 

requirements in state plans would hinder the timely identification, 

deployment, and employment of equipment, personnel, and other 

resources to support emergency response efforts. 

States have not completed the comprehensive and integrated planning 

necessary to identify National Guard requirements for responding to largescale events that may involve more than one state and be federally funded,

such as the Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios, for a 

number of reasons, including limited state National Guard planning 

resources and the lack of a formal mechanism to facilitate planning across 

state borders for the Guard’s role in these events. In some of the states we 

visited, National Guard officials stated that their planning resources are 

limited, and this affects their ability to develop detailed, integrated plans 

for the Guard’s use in domestic events. For example, the West Virginia 

National Guard had a single planning officer who was tasked with other 

duties, while California National Guard officials stated they lacked funding 

for full-time planners. States must work with each other to conduct 

planning for the National Guard’s use in large-scale, multistate events and

have done so to a limited extent for events like hurricanes and wildfires. In 

some cases, states have used mutual assistance agreements to supplement 

their National Guard forces when such events occur. However, there is no

formal mechanism to facilitate comprehensive interstate planning for the 

National Guard’s role in large-scale domestic events that is integrated with

the plans of the multiple federal and state agencies expected to be 

involved in response efforts. In the absence of such a mechanism, planning 

is likely to remain incomplete and the Guard’s full equipment requirements 

for domestic missions will remain unknown. 

 14Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report

(Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). The report presents the results of reviews and 

assessments of the status of state emergency operations plans as well as the emergency 

operations plans of 75 of the nation’s largest urban areas. For the purposes of this report, 

we have focused on report findings as they relate to state emergency operations plans. 

Page 15 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
While the National Guard Bureau is charged with performing a liaison 

function between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, neither its 

charter nor its regulation on military support to civil authorities 

specifically defines its role in working with the states to facilitate 

comprehensive and integrated planning for the National Guard’s use in 

large-scale, multistate events, such as those described in the Homeland 

Security Council’s national planning scenarios. 

The National Guard Bureau’s charter, signed by the Secretaries of the 

Army and the Air Force in 1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau responsibility for facilitating and supporting the training of 

members and units of the National Guard to meet state requirements, as 

well as responsibility for facilitating and coordinating with the 

Departments of the Army and the Air Force on the use of National Guard 

personnel and resources for several functions, including natural disasters 

and military support to civil authorities.15 The National Guard Bureau’s 

regulation on military support to civil authorities, last updated in 1996, 

describes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s overall responsibility 

for National Guard civil support programs and for issuing planning 

guidance on the National Guard’s role in providing military support to civil 

authorities. The regulation also provides guidance to the states on 

preparing emergency plans for the use of National Guard forces in a civil

support role, including coordination for external assistance beyond state 

capabilities.16 In its role as a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and 

the states and territories on National Guard issues, the National Guard 

Bureau played a significant role in facilitating Guard support among states 

during Hurricane Katrina. For example, the bureau acted as a conduit for 

communicating requirements for assistance in Louisiana and Mississippi to 

state National Guard leaders in the rest of the country. 

National Guard Bureau 

Charter and Civil Support 

Regulation Do Not Clearly 

Define National Guard 

Bureau’s Role in 

Facilitating 

Comprehensive Planning 

for the Guard’s Domestic 

Roles 

In line with these existing roles, the National Guard Bureau is well 

positioned to facilitate state planning for the use of National Guard forces 

in large-scale, multistate events. However, neither the bureau’s charter nor 

its regulation on military support to civil authorities specifically defines a 

role for it in working with the states to facilitate comprehensive and 

integrated pre-event planning for the use of National Guard forces in 

 15Army Regulation 130-5/Air Force Mission Directive 10, Organization and Functions of 

National Guard Bureau (Jan. 30, 2002). The National Guard Bureau Charter, dated 

September 1, 1995, is contained within this regulation. 

16National Guard Regulation 500-1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Feb. 1, 1996). 

Page 16 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
responding to large-scale, multistate events. Moreover, neither the 

National Guard Bureau’s charter nor its regulation on military support to 

civil authorities has been updated to reflect the post-September 11, 2001, 

security environment or how the state National Guards and the National 

Guard Bureau will work with new organizations such as the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense, and U.S. Northern Command in facilitating planning 

for the National Guard’s response to domestic events. In addition, the 

bureau’s regulation on military support to civil authorities does not 

provide guidance on how the National Guard state leadership and the 

National Guard Bureau should use the new planning tools that have been 

developed since 2001, to facilitate national preparedness, such as the 

National Response Plan and the Homeland Security Council’s national 

planning scenarios. 

In the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for facilitating state 

planning, the National Guard Bureau has taken some steps to facilitate 

limited interstate planning for the use of National Guard forces and 

equipment in large-scale, multistate events. For example, according to 

state and National Guard Bureau officials, during the past year the 

National Guard Bureau has helped facilitate a conference of southeastern 

states to discuss how those states can cooperate and share equipment in 

response to a hurricane as well as a similar conference of western states 

to address response efforts for the wildfire season. The National Guard 

Bureau has also facilitated state planning for the Guard’s role in an 

influenza pandemic, and is coordinating the development of state National 

Guard plans to support U.S. Northern Command’s new homeland defense 

plan and providing general planning guidance. While we believe these are

positive steps, they do not provide the comprehensive and integrated 

planning that would help identify the specific equipment the National 

Guard would need to respond to the types of events described in the 

Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios. Unless the 

National Guard Bureau’s charter and its regulation on military support to 

civil authorities are revised to address the expanded set of homeland 

security issues the National Guard faces and the roles the bureau will play 

in facilitating state planning for and the Guard’s response to large-scale, 

multistate events, the extent to which the National Guard Bureau will 

continue or expand its efforts to assist states with planning for and 

responding to large-scale, multistate events will likely remain uneven. As a 

result, comprehensive planning that fully identifies equipment 

requirements for the National Guard’s use in domestic missions and is 

integrated with plans for using other military and civilian forces may 

remain incomplete. 

Page 17 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
DOD’s legacy readiness reporting system and its annual report to Congress 

on National Guard equipment provide information about the National 

Guard’s readiness for its warfighting missions, but do not include 

reporting on its preparedness for its domestic missions. While DOD is 

taking steps to better assess the National Guard’s preparedness for its 

domestic missions, these efforts are not yet complete and are limited by 

the lack of fully identified requirements for the Guard’s domestic missions. 

Although DOD cannot quantify the degree to which the National Guard has 

the equipment it needs to respond to domestic missions, our analyses of 

the limited data collected by the department and the National Guard 

Bureau on the National Guard’s capability for domestic missions found 

that most state National Guard leaders assessed their forces’ capability as

adequate to respond to typical state missions. National Guard officials in 

the four states we visited expressed views that were consistent with our 

analyses, but some officials expressed concern about whether they have 

sufficient equipment to respond to large-scale, multistate events. Until the 

National Guard’s equipment requirements for domestic missions are fully 

identified and DOD collects and reports information that compares 

equipment on hand to those requirements, the department cannot provide 

Congress with detailed information on the National Guard’s equipment 

status for its domestic missions, and decision makers lack information to 

both assess whether the National Guard is appropriately equipped to 

respond to a large-scale domestic event and to target resources to assist 

the National Guard in mitigating any shortfalls. 

The Secretary of Defense is required by law to establish a comprehensive 

readiness reporting system for DOD to use to measure in an objective, 

accurate and timely manner the military’s capability to carry out the 

National Security Strategy, defense planning guidance, and the National 

Military Strategy.17 The Secretary is required to measure the capability of 

military units to conduct their assigned warfighting missions, identify any 

critical warfighting deficiencies in those units’ capabilities, and measure 

the risk those shortfalls pose to the units’ ability to carry out their federal 

warfighting missions. DOD’s legacy readiness reporting system—the 

Global Status of Resources and Training System—contains data that 

enable DOD to assess the capability of National Guard forces to carry out 

their warfighting missions. However, the system does not contain data that 

would enable DOD to assess the preparedness of National Guard forces 

DOD Is Taking Some 

Steps to Measure 

National Guard 

Preparedness for 

Domestic Missions, 

but Efforts Are Not 

Yet Complete

Current Readiness 

Assessments and Reports 

on National Guard 

Equipment Do Not 

Address Domestic Mission 

Requirements 

 1710 U.S.C. § 117. 

Page 18 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
for domestic civil support missions, including the extent to which those 

forces have the equipment they need, because DOD’s focus is on its units’ 

readiness to perform their warfighting missions. 

The Secretary of Defense is also required to submit an annual report to 

Congress on the equipment the National Guard and reserve components 

have and how DOD plans to meet the wartime equipment requirements of 

its reserve components.18 The report, known as the National Guard and 

Reserve Equipment Report, is required to include 

• recommendations on the type and quantity of major equipment items that 

should be in the National Guard’s and the reserves’ inventory;

19

• a list of each type of major equipment item required by the National Guard 

and reserves, indicating their full requirement for warfighting missions and 

the amount of that equipment in the inventory, as well as a separate list of

deployable and nondeployable substitute equipment for that item; and 

• a narrative explaining the Secretary of Defense’s plan to fill warfighting 

requirements for each type of major equipment. 

DOD is not currently required to include in the report information on the 

adequacy of the equipment that nondeployed National Guard forces have 

available to perform the full range of their domestic missions. Without this 

information, the report provides Congress with limited information to help 

it prioritize investments for the full range of National Guard missions, 

warfighting and domestic. The readiness of units for these two different 

types of missions might vary widely. For example, a National Guard armor 

unit might not have the tanks it requires to successfully perform its 

warfighting mission and therefore be assessed as not ready in the Global 

Status of Resources and Training System, but still have adequate 

equipment to provide support to civil authorities for a domestic event like 

a hurricane. Conversely, a National Guard unit may be assessed as ready 

for its warfighting missions but not have the equipment, such as trucks, 

 1810 U.S.C. § 10541. 

19Specifically, the language in the statute refers to equipment requirements for the Selected 

Reserve of the Ready Reserve of each component of the armed forces, including the Army

National Guard and Air National Guard. The Selected Reserve includes individual 

mobilization augmentees—individuals who train regularly, for pay, with active component

units—as well as members who participate in regular training as members of National 

Guard and Reserve units. 

Page 19 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
generators, communications gear, and engineering equipment, needed for 

its domestic missions. Until recently, it has been assumed that the 

National Guard could perform its typical state missions with the 

equipment it had on hand for its federal missions. However, some Guard 

units, particularly in the Army National Guard, may be less ready for 

domestic missions than they were 2 or 3 years ago because, as we have 

previously reported, large quantities of equipment have been sent overseas

to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, decreasing the supply of 

equipment available to nondeployed units. 

DOD has recognized the need to have greater visibility over the National 

Guard’s capabilities for domestic missions and has begun taking steps to 

assess the Guard’s preparedness for those missions. In a September 2005 

memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of 

Defense called for improved visibility over the readiness of National Guard 

forces operating in state status with federal funds. To achieve this 

improved visibility, DOD has decided to include information on the 

National Guard’s readiness to perform both its federal warfighting 

missions and its state-led, federally funded missions in the department’s 

new Defense Readiness Reporting System.20 Additionally, the National 

Guard Bureau has developed the Joint Capabilities Database as a 

mechanism to collect information on state capabilities, including those of 

the National Guard, to respond to domestic events. Both efforts are being 

implemented and refined, but the lack of requirements for the full range of 

the National Guard’s domestic missions limits their usefulness as a basis 

for identifying shortfalls and targeting future equipment investments. 

DOD’s new readiness reporting system, which will replace the Global 

Status of Resources and Training System, is expected to be fully 

operational by the end of fiscal year 2007. In contrast to the Global Status

of Resources and Training System, which focuses on resource levels, the 

new system reports on assessed mission capabilities. Commanders will 

use their military judgment to assess readiness based on unit performance 

as well as the availability of resources, such as personnel and equipment. 

The system will also contain measures describing the status of major 

equipment items, including the quantities of those items units require for 

their missions, the equipment units are authorized to have, and the 

Some Efforts Are Under 

Way to Better Assess 

National Guard 

Preparedness for Domestic 

Missions 

 20The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for

overseeing the fielding of the Defense Readiness Reporting System. 

Page 20 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
equipment they have on hand, as well as its condition and location. DOD 

officials plan to use that information to identify equipment deficiencies. 

DOD has directed National Guard units to report in the Defense Readiness 

Reporting System on their capabilities to perform state-led but federally 

funded domestic missions, such as border security. As a step toward 

assessing these capabilities, the National Guard Bureau has begun to 

identify the essential tasks that National Guard forces need to be capable

of performing for their domestic roles and missions. For example, the 

bureau is developing lists of essential tasks for state joint force 

headquarters, state joint task forces, and weapons of mass destruction 

civil support teams. Commanders will use these task lists to assess the 

readiness of their units to perform assigned domestic missions, such as 

counterdrug operations and hurricane response. However, in the absence 

of equipment requirements based on events like those described in the 

Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios to include in the 

Defense Readiness Reporting System, the system may not enable DOD or 

the states to fully assess whether nondeployed National Guard forces have 

an appropriate amount of equipment to respond to those missions. 

In addition to the information that will be available in the Defense 

Readiness Reporting System, the National Guard Bureau has developed a 

database that captures information on state capabilities to support 

domestic missions. This unclassified database, introduced in 2005 and 

called the Joint Capabilities Database, is a voluntary reporting by the 

states’ National Guard leaders to identify capability gaps in each state and 

help the states and the National Guard Bureau develop appropriate 

mitigation strategies. The database compiles subjective assessments from

state National Guard leaders on whether their states have sufficient 

capabilities in their Army National Guard and Air National Guard units to 

effectively respond to state missions. In reporting on their state’s 

capabilities for domestic missions, state National Guard leaders assess 

whether their Army National Guard and Air National Guard units 

collectively can provide adequate amounts of 10 core capabilities the 

National Guard Bureau has identified as being essential to supporting 

domestic missions. Table 2 lists these capabilities and provides examples 

of the type of tasks they represent. 

Page 21 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Table 2: The 10 Core Capabilities Identified by the National Guard Bureau as Essential to Support Domestic Missions

Core capability Examples of tasks associated with core capability 

Aviation/airlift • Provide aircraft to transport personnel and cargo during times of emergency 

• Provide aircraft to facilitate reconnaissance, command and control, and communications 

during emergencies 

• Support first responders using air assets 

Engineering • Provide engineer units to assist local and state agencies in debris removal; construction of

roads, bridges, and emergency housing; search and rescue; water purification and 

distribution; and power generation 

Chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, and high-yield explosive 

• Maintain a certified civil support team 

• Identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive agents and 

substances 

• Assess consequences, advise responders, and assist with requests for more support 

Communications • Establish and maintain interoperable communications with local, state, and federal

agencies, and volunteer organizations as necessary for domestic missions 

Command and control • Operate a Joint Operations Center to process information and serve as a focal point for the 

National Guard response 

• Provide reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for arriving forces 

• Coordinate and act as a liaison with state and federal agencies 

Logistics • Plan for and provide sustainment support to civil authorities to ensure continuity of 

operations 

• Rapidly deploy and monitor movement and placement of forces and equipment during 

support operations 

• Sustain deployed forces 

Medical • Support civilian emergency medical system during mass casualty operations 

• Assist the public health system in distributing and administering vaccines and antidotes to 

the public 

Maintenance • Ensure equipment is available for state missions 

• Sustain equipment during all phases of state missions 

Security • Provide a military force capable of assisting civil law enforcement agencies in maintaining

law and order 

• Provide security to critical infrastructure 

Transportation (surface) • Deploy the force and support first responders using ground transportation assets 

• Provide transportation assets to remove civilian personnel from affected areas and move 

supplies 

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data. 

State National Guard leaders are asked to assess the adequacy of their 

state’s capabilities for two levels of events: (1) state missions that have 

been routinely conducted by the Army National Guard and Air National 

Guard in the past 10 years and (2) larger, nonroutine events that are 

expected to rapidly overwhelm state assets and require immediate 

external National Guard or federal assistance. State National Guard 

leaders’ subjective assessments are to be based on the state’s unique needs 

Page 22 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
for National Guard capabilities as described in its emergency response 

plan and consider factors such as equipment on hand, training, and unit 

availability, although the assessments do not provide detailed information 

on the status of National Guard equipment. State National Guard leaders 

rate a capability as adequate if they think their National Guard units 

possess the resources and assets necessary to accomplish their missions; 

they rate a capability as inadequate if they do not think their National 

Guard units possess the resources and assets required to complete the 

mission without external assistance and explain the reasons why the 

capability is rated as inadequate. The National Guard Bureau has 

requested that state National Guards submit new assessments quarterly or

when events change their capability assessment. 

Data Indicate the Majority 

of State National Guards 

Have Capability for Typical 

Missions, but Shortages 

Exist and Concerns 

Remain about Ability to 

Respond to Large-Scale, 

Multistate Events 

Without analytically based equipment requirements for the National 

Guard’s domestic missions to compare against the National Guard’s 

current inventory of available equipment, we could not determine the 

extent to which nondeployed National Guard forces have the equipment 

they need to perform their full range of domestic missions. However, we 

collected and examined information from two sources—the National 

Guard Bureau’s Joint Capabilities Database and an Army National Guard 

equipment inventory—as rough substitute measures of the adequacy of 

National Guard equipping for domestic missions. To supplement this 

information, we visited four states—California, Florida, New Jersey, and 

West Virginia—and discussed the capabilities, including equipment, that 

would be available within the states for their typical missions as well as 

large-scale, multistate events. 

Our analysis indicated that the majority of states report having the 

National Guard capabilities they need to respond to typical state missions; 

however, some states and territories report capability shortfalls in one or

more areas.21 As of July 2006, 34 of the 54 states and territories 

(63 percent) reported having adequate amounts of all 10 core domestic 

mission capabilities for responding to typical state missions.22 Of the 20 

states and territories (37 percent) that reported an inadequate capability, 

National Guard Capability to 

Respond to Typical State 

Missions 

 21We did not analyze state assessments in the Joint Capabilities Database of their National 

Guard capabilities for responding to larger, nonroutine events because National Guard 

Bureau officials did not consider these data to be fully mature at the time of our audit. 

22The Joint Capabilities Database includes assessments from all 50 states as well as 

Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 

Page 23 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
13 reported being inadequate in only one capability, and 4 reported being 

inadequate in two capabilities. Table 3 shows the number and percentage 

of states and territories reporting either adequate or inadequate for each of 

the National Guard Bureau’s core domestic mission capabilities. Aviation; 

engineering; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield

explosive capabilities were most frequently reported by state National 

Guards as being inadequate for responding to typical state missions. Most 

states and territories that rated their chemical, biological, radiological,

nuclear, and high-yield explosive capability as inadequate did so because 

their weapons of mass destruction civil support teams had not been 

certified or were in the process of being established.23 For all other 

capabilities, the deployment of units was the most common reason state 

National Guard leaders gave for rating a capability as inadequate. 

 23Civil support teams are designed to support civil authorities in the event of a domestic 

weapons of mass destruction event by identifying weapons of mass destruction agents and

substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures,

and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. There are 55 civil support

teams—two in California and one in every other state as well as Washington, D.C., Puerto

Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. Thirty-six of these teams had been certified as fully 

capable as of May 2006; the remaining 19 will be certified by the end of fiscal year 2007.

Page 24 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Table 3: Number and Percent of State and Territory National Guards Reporting

Adequate and Inadequate Capabilities to Respond to Typical State Missions 

Adequate capability, 

number and (percentage) 

Inadequate capability, 

number and (percentage)

Aviation 46 (85) 8 (15)

Engineering 48 (89) 6 (11)

Chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and 

high-yield explosive 43 (80) 11 (20)

Communications 52 (96) 2 (4)

Command and control 54 (100) 0 (0)

Logistics 54 (100) 0 (0)

Medical 52 (96) 2 (4)

Maintenance 53 (98) 1 (2)

Security 53 (98) 1 (2)

Transportation 53 (98) 1 (2)

Source: GAO analysis of National Guard Bureau data in the Joint Capabilities Database as of July 2006.

Note: Typical state missions are those missions that have routinely been conducted by the Army 

National Guard and Air National Guard of each individual state or territory in the past 10 years. State 

National Guard leader assessments consider factors such as equipment on hand, training, and unit 

availability.

We also used the Army National Guard’s equipment inventory to determine 

the extent to which the Army National Guard has particular types of 

equipment, referred to as dual-use items, which units are authorized for 

their warfighting missions but could be highly useful in responding to 

domestic events. In 2005, the Army National Guard, in coordination with 

the Army and the National Guard Bureau, used military judgment and 

historical experience to identify more than 300 of these dual-use items. 

The list of equipment the Army National Guard identified includes types of 

trucks, generators, radios, medical gear, and engineering equipment. 

Equipment Available for 

Warfighting and Domestic 

Missions 

Our analysis of the Army National Guard’s equipment inventory as of 

November 2006 showed that nondeployed Army National Guard forces 

had less dual-use equipment overall than they were authorized and small 

available quantities of some specific types of dual-use equipment. 

However, since requirements have not been fully identified for the amount 

of equipment National Guard units need to respond to domestic events 

like those described in the Homeland Security Council’s national planning

scenarios, the extent to which amounts of equipment authorized for 

warfighting meet or exceed domestic requirements is unknown. According 

to Army National Guard officials, having the full amount of equipment 

Page 25 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
authorized for their warfighting missions would leave their units well 

positioned to respond effectively to domestic events. 

As of November 2006, nondeployed Army National Guard forces 

nationwide had about 64 percent of the total amount of dual-use 

equipment they are authorized to have based on their warfighting 

missions.24 However, inventory levels of the different types of dual-use 

equipment varied widely, from 0 to 100 percent.25 The average inventory 

level by type of equipment was roughly 42 percent nationwide.26 As figure 1 

illustrates, the average inventory level of dual-use equipment items also 

varied by state and territory, from under 40 percent in New Mexico, 

Washington, D.C., and Virginia to more than 60 percent in Georgia and 

Colorado. On average, states and territories had about 50 percent of their 

authorized inventory of dual-use equipment available for domestic 

missions. 

 24This figure includes substitute equipment authorized by Army regulation. Army 

Regulation 700-138, Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability (Feb. 26, 2004), defines 

substitute items as items authorized for issue instead of authorized standard items when 

the authorized standard items are not available for issue to the unit. 

25At the time of our analysis, the Army National Guard had identified a total of 342 types of 

dual-use equipment. Of these, 319 had available data and were included in our analysis. 

26The Army National Guard has over 90 percent of its authorized amount of 19 types of

dual-use equipment. For some of these types of equipment, such as rifles, the Guard is 

authorized large numbers of individual items. These large numbers of individual items

make up nearly half of the Guard’s inventory of dual-use equipment. When these large 

numbers are included in the Guard’s inventory, the overall percentage of equipment 

available is greater than the average of many of the other types of equipment. 

Page 26 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Figure 1: Average Inventory Level of Dual-Use Equipment, Including Substitutes, Available to Nondeployed Army National 

Guard Forces as of November 3, 2006 

Percentages of dual-use equipment available to nondeployed Army 

National Guard units vary significantly by equipment type. Table 4 

provides examples of some of the dual-use equipment items for which the 

national inventory is at 15 percent or less of the authorized amount for 

Page 27 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
warfighting missions, including substitute items. Items at 15 percent or 

less of their authorized amount include types of trucks, generators, 

communications equipment, and chemical protective gear. 

Table 4: Examples of Army National Guard Dual-Use Equipment Items where the 

National Inventory is 15 Percent or Less of the Amount Authorized for Warfighting

Missions, Including Substitutes

Number of items 

authorized

Percentage

available to

nondeployed

forces

Chemical biological protective shelter 168 0

Radio set (AN/PRC-148 urban version) 468 0

Dump truck (MTV W/E) 733 0

Diesel generator set (28 volt) 267 2

Navigation set: GPS receiver 25,382 5

Electromagnetic radiation meter (ME-513/U) 33 9

Thermal sight (AN/PAS-13A) 7,647 9

High mobility cargo trailer (3/4 ton) 5,656 9

Satellite communications terminal (AN/TSC-154) 40 10

Expanded capacity HMMWV (4x4, W/E, M1113)a2,591 15

Source: GAO analysis of Army National Guard data as of November 2006. 

Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. 

a

A high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle is a type of utility truck.

However, without clearly defined requirements for the National Guard’s 

domestic missions based on events like those described in the Homeland 

Security Council’s national planning scenarios, there is no benchmark to 

judge how many of these items Army National Guard units need to 

effectively respond. Amounts required for domestic missions may differ 

significantly from the amounts required for the National Guard’s 

warfighting missions. For example, a nondeployed National Guard force in

a state may have only a small percentage of the amount of a type of truck 

required for its warfighting missions, reflecting a shortfall. However, it 

may still have enough of that type of truck to perform its domestic 

missions, or may have other types of trucks it could use. 

National Guard officials in California, Florida, New Jersey, and West 

Virginia generally expressed the opinion that, while stressed by overseas

operations, their forces have the capability and equipment to address 

typical state missions. For example, New Jersey National Guard officials 

Page 28 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
said their units had enough equipment to respond to all state missions that 

took place during the peak of the state National Guard’s overseas 

deployments in 2004. Officials noted that nondeployed Army National 

Guard units continue to face equipment shortages caused by the need to 

transfer significant quantities of equipment to units deploying overseas.27

While reduced equipment levels caused by overseas operations 

complicated its response, the New Jersey National Guard adapted and 

used the equipment it had available to effectively respond to its missions. 

National Guard officials in California, Florida, and West Virginia expressed 

similar levels of confidence in their forces’ ability to respond to typical

state missions using currently available equipment. However, some state 

National Guard officials expressed concerns about whether they would 

have enough equipment to respond to large-scale events similar to 

Hurricane Katrina or those described in the Homeland Security Council’s 

national planning scenarios. 

We have previously reported that ongoing operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have significantly decreased the amount of equipment 

available to nondeployed Guard units to respond to domestic events. 

Moreover, the Guard’s experience with Hurricane Katrina helped to 

illustrate the types of equipment that are valuable in responding to 

domestic disasters. In response to these events, DOD is taking some 

actions to address National Guard equipment challenges and improve the 

Guard’s preparedness for both overseas and domestic missions. However, 

the long-term effect of these initiatives is unclear because some initiatives 

are in the early stages of implementation and specific plans are still being 

developed. For example, the Army plans to procure additional equipment

for National Guard units during the next few years but has not clearly 

defined how much equipment will be available for nondeployed units. 

DOD Has Some 

Efforts Under Way to 

Address National 

Guard Equipment 

Challenges, but Longterm Effect on 

Domestic 

Preparedness Is 

Unclear 

 27GAO-06-111. 

Page 29 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
To improve the equipment readiness of National Guard units, DOD has 

several initiatives under way. For example, DOD plans to use $900 million 

Congress provided in the 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act28

to procure equipment for the Army National Guard and Air National Guard 

that are useful for both warfighting and domestic missions, such as 

communications gear, tactical vehicles, trucks, and engineering 

equipment. In addition, DOD also plans to use $290 million Congress 

provided in the 2007 Department of Defense Appropriations Act to 

procure additional National Guard and Reserve equipment.29

DOD Is Procuring Items 

and Transforming Units to 

Increase National Guard’s 

Equipment Readiness 

The National Guard Bureau has also begun implementing four initiatives

intended to improve coordination and training of nondeployed National 

Guard units for domestic missions. These four initiatives, which involve 

both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, include 

establishing (1) a joint force headquarters in each state and territory to 

provide military command and control capabilities; (2) 12 National Guard 

teams trained and equipped to deploy within 6 hours to respond to 

domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield 

explosive incidents;30 (3) 10 detachments—one for each Federal 

Emergency Management region—trained and equipped to conduct mission 

assessments of defense industrial-base critical infrastructure; and (4) at 

least one joint interagency training capability to provide training to 

National Guard personnel on domestic missions. To date, the National 

Guard Bureau has funded these initiatives on a yearly basis by

reprogramming funds, but it has submitted formal proposals to DOD to 

 28Title IX of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148 

(2005) provided $1 billion for National Guard and Reserve equipment. The conference

report accompanying that act specified that of the $1 billion, $700 million should go to the

Army National Guard and $200 million should go to the Air National Guard. H.R. Conf. Rep. 

No. 109-359, at 483 (2005). 

29Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289 (2006). The

conference report accompanying the act states that the conferees intend for $150 million of 

the $290 million to go toward equipping the National Guard. In addition, the conferees 

directed that $2.94 billion of procurement funds provided in Title IX of the act shall be 

available for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, and that $500 million of these 

funds should be used specifically to meet the 10 core capabilities identified by the National

Guard Bureau as essential to support domestic missions. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-676, at

223, 372 (2006). 

30Section 412 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 

No. 109-163 (2006), authorized end strengths for reserves on active duty in support of the 

reserves. In the accompanying conference report, the conferees specified that the end

strength would include five additional teams. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at 687 (2005). 

Page 30 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
incorporate the initiatives into DOD’s departmentwide programming and 

budgeting process. At the time of our report, DOD had formally approved

the joint force headquarters and the establishment of 12 National Guard 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident 

response teams. Formal approval from DOD means that these two 

initiatives were approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 

which approves all new DOD requirements, and may now compete to be 

included in DOD’s Future Years Defense Program. However, because 

DOD’s priority remains its overseas warfighting mission, the extent to 

which these domestically focused initiatives will be funded remains 

uncertain. 

Army Plans for Balancing 

Equipment for Deployed 

and Nondeployed National 

Guard Units Are Not Well 

Defined 

The Army has budgeted approximately $21 billion for fiscal years 2005 

through 2011 to modernize the Army National Guard and augment its 

equipment inventory. These funds are intended to facilitate the Army 

National Guard’s conversion to modular brigades as well as to help fill 

long-standing equipment shortages. According to Army officials, items 

procured will be standard warfighting equipment and may be deployed to 

meet overseas demands and therefore may not always be available for 

domestic missions. The Army plans to manage all of its equipment for the 

active and reserve units using a new cyclical readiness and deployment 

model for its forces, including Army National Guard forces, which has 

implications for the National Guard’s readiness for its homeland missions. 

Under this model, Army National Guard units will have access to three 

types of equipment sets over time as they prepare for possible deployment 

once every 6 years: (1) a baseline set that would vary by unit type and

assigned mission; (2) a training set that would include more of the 

equipment units would need to be ready for deployment; and (3) a 

deployment set that would include all equipment needed for deployment, 

including theater-specific equipment and equipment from Army 

prepositioned stock. Figure 2 illustrates the movement of units through 

the reset and train, ready, and available phases of the force generation 

model. 

Page 31 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Figure 2: The Army’s Proposed Force Generation Model 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

In this phase, modular units are 

recovering from operations, restoring

equipment, and undergoing

individual training.

Units have minimal levels of equipment. 

At the end of this phase, 

units move to the Ready phase.

Reset/Train Pool

In this phase, modular units are 

available for deployment for 

operational missions. 

They are provided equipment 

based on operational requirements.

At the end of their available time, 

units return to the Reset/Train phase*

.

Available Pool

(for one year)

In this phase, modular units 

conduct unit-level training

 and mission preparation. 

Units share equipment located 

at training sites.

At the end of this phase, 

units move to the Available phase.

Ready Pool

Note: The Army’s force generation model proposes that Army National Guard units will be available 

for deployment 1 year in every 6 years. 

Army plans call for the baseline set to provide Army National Guard units 

in the reset/train pool, at a minimum, the equipment they would need for 

their domestic missions. As of September 2006, the Army was still 

developing proposals for what would be included in each of the three 

equipment sets. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the risks or the ability of 

units in the earlier stages of the cycle to respond to unforeseen domestic 

crises, such as large-scale natural disasters or terrorist attacks. Although 

the Army has worked with the Army National Guard to identify 

warfighting equipment that is highly useful for domestic missions, it is not 

clear whether nondeployed Army National Guard units will have sufficient 

quantities of such equipment during the early phases of the Army’s force 

generation model to respond effectively to their domestic missions. State 

National Guard officials in California and Florida expressed concerns that

their Army National Guard units will not have enough equipment for their 

domestic missions during the first 3 years of the Army’s new force 

generation model, which is when units’ equipment levels would be at their 

lowest. The Army has taken some temporary actions to mitigate this 

concern. In preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, the Army directed 

the temporary transfer of equipment such as trucks, night vision goggles, 

and floodlights from active Army units to Army National Guard units in the 

coastal states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 

Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. However, these states’ Army National 

Page 32 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Guard units were expected to return this equipment no later than the end

of the 180-day loan period. Moreover, until the Army makes decisions as to 

what equipment should be included in the baseline equipment set for 

nondeployed Army National Guard units, National Guard officials in the 

states may be hampered in their ability to plan and respond to large-scale, 

multistate events. 

With the challenging nature of the new security environment and potential

for large-scale, multistate events depicted in the national planning 

scenarios, the nation expects the National Guard to be prepared to provide 

an efficient and effective response to domestic events. Without a 

designated agency to serve as a mechanism to facilitate interstate planning 

for the National Guard’s role in large-scale, multistate events, the National 

Guard may lack plans that are complete and integrated with other DOD, 

state, and federal plans so that risks are identified and mitigated 

efficiently. Currently, the National Guard Bureau has facilitated limited 

multistate planning, but comprehensive planning that identifies equipment

requirements and is integrated with plans for using civilian and federal 

military forces may remain incomplete unless the bureau’s charter and 

civil support regulation are updated to reflect this facilitation role. As a 

result, the National Guard may not be prepared to respond to domestic 

events, particularly large-scale, multistate events such as those described 

in the national planning scenarios, as efficiently and effectively as 

possible. 

Conclusions 

DOD’s current readiness measures and reports do not provide a rigorous 

assessment of the extent to which the National Guard’s nondeployed units

have the equipment they need to respond to the full range of their 

domestic missions. While DOD has begun to collect data on the readiness

of nondeployed National Guard units using proxy measures and subjective 

assessments of military commanders, this effort is not fully mature and 

faces limitations. Without validated requirements for the types and 

quantities of equipment the National Guard needs for domestic missions, it 

will be difficult to measure units’ preparedness for those missions. Until 

DOD’s efforts to improve its measures and reports are mature and the 

Guard’s required capabilities are better defined and tracked, decision 

makers will lack information on whether the Guard has the equipment it 

needs to respond effectively to large-scale, multistate events. Moreover, 

Congress and federal and state decision makers will have limited 

information with which to mitigate risks and prioritize investments for the 

National Guard’s missions. 

Page 33 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
While DOD is taking steps to address the Army National Guard’s and the 

Air National Guard’s equipment challenges, the effectiveness of these 

initiatives to improve the National Guard’s domestic preparedness is not 

clear. Moreover, unless DOD, in coordination with other federal and state 

agencies that will be involved in responding to large-scale events such as 

the national planning scenarios, defines the requirements for nondeployed

National Guard forces, there is no benchmark with which to assess the 

effectiveness of the initiatives. In addition, because the Army has not yet

defined the amount and types of equipment that will be available to 

nondeployed Army National Guard units, state and federal agencies lack

information they could use to plan to respond to domestic emergencies. 

Specifically, they lack information on whether the Army National Guard 

will have sufficient quantities of equipment during the early phases of the 

Army’s force generation model to respond effectively to domestic 

missions. Until the Army makes decisions as to what equipment 

nondeployed Army National Guard forces can expect to have on hand, it

will remain unclear whether the National Guard has the equipment it 

needs to successfully perform its domestic missions, including responding 

to large-scale, multistate events. 

We recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions: 

• Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to add clarifying language

to the National Guard Bureau’s charter to clearly define its roles in 

coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard’s 

use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those contained in the 

national planning scenarios, and monitoring the Guard’s status to perform 

these missions. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, 

National Guard Bureau, to update the National Guard Bureau’s 1996 civil

support regulation to reflect the National Guard Bureau’s role in 

coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for large-scale, multistate 

events. The regulation should also be updated to formalize procedures for 

coordination with organizations that have been established since the 

regulation was last updated, such as the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, and U.S. Northern Command, as well as for the use of new 

planning tools like the National Response Plan and the Homeland Security 

Council’s national planning scenarios.

Page 34 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
• Direct the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the Chief, 

National Guard Bureau, in coordination with DOD, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the states, and other civilian 

authorities, to take actions to facilitate and coordinate interstate National 

Guard planning to identify the capabilities, including equipment, the 

National Guard would need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, 

consistent with the Homeland Security Council’s national planning 

scenarios and state and federal plans.

• Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 

submit a report to Congress on DOD’s plans for assessing and reporting on 

the readiness of National Guard units to perform domestic missions in 

response to natural disasters or terrorist events. This report should 

include 

• DOD’s progress to date in incorporating these missions into the 

Defense Readiness Reporting System; 

• the specific missions for which National Guard units will report their 

readiness; and 

• the standards, including any equipment measures, given to National 

Guard unit commanders to consider when making their readiness 

assessments for these missions. 

• Direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a plan 

and funding strategy for resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard 

baseline equipment sets. Specifically, the plan should include 

• a timeline for defining the requirements of nondeployed Army National 

Guard baseline equipment sets, 

• the analytical basis and domestic mission requirements used to 

determine the equipment required in the baseline set, 

• readiness standards and measures that will be used to track the status 

of the baseline equipment sets, and 

• the Army’s plan for funding and filling baseline equipment sets. 

Page 35 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Congress should consider amending the statute prescribing the National 

Guard Bureau’s charter to require language clarifying the National Guard 

Bureau’s role in coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the 

National Guard’s use in large-scale, multistate events, such as those 

contained in the national planning scenarios, and require DOD to revise 

the National Guard Bureau’s civil support regulation to reflect the 

clarification in the charter. 

In addition, to ensure that it is kept informed of the National Guard’s 

equipment status for its domestic missions, Congress should consider 

revising the statutory requirement for the annual National Guard and 

Reserve Equipment Report to include an assessment of (1) the Guard’s 

equipping preparedness to provide support to civil authorities, particularly 

for large-scale, multistate events; (2) the risks to those missions associated 

with any equipment shortfalls; and (3) mitigation strategies and investment 

priorities. Further, to provide information on what equipment will be 

available for the National Guard’s domestic missions under the Army’s 

force generation model, Congress should consider requiring the 

department to include in the 2009 National Guard and Reserve 

Equipment Report a plan and funding strategy for providing baseline 

equipment sets to nondeployed Army National Guard units. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written 

comments on a draft of this report. The department partially agreed with 

our recommendation that the department report to Congress on DOD’s 

plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National Guard units 

to perform domestic missions in response to natural disasters or terrorist 

events. The department disagreed with our recommendations that (1) the

National Guard Bureau’s charter be revised to include language clarifying

the National Guard Bureau’s role in coordinating and facilitating interstate 

planning for the National Guard’s use in large-scale, multistate events, 

(2) the National Guard Bureau’s 1996 civil support regulation be updated

to reflect the change to the National Guard Bureau’s charter and to 

establish procedures for state National Guards and the National Guard 

Bureau to use to coordinate with new organizations and for using new 

planning tools, (3) the National Guard Bureau take actions to facilitate 

interstate Guard planning to identify capabilities the National Guard would 

need to respond to large-scale, multistate events, and (4) the Secretary of 

the Army develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for 

resourcing nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. As 

we discussed in our report, state planning for the Guard’s role in 

catastrophic events contained in the national planning scenarios has not 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 36 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
been consistent or thorough. We continue to believe that the actions we 

recommend are important to improve interstate planning and visibility of 

the National Guard’s readiness for domestic missions. Therefore, we have

included these actions as matters for congressional consideration. 

Specifically, Congress should consider (1) amending the statute 

prescribing the National Guard Bureau’s charter to include coordinating 

and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard’s use in largescale, multistate events, such as those contained in the national planning

scenarios, (2) requiring DOD to revise the National Guard Bureau’s civil 

support regulation to implement this change, and 

(3) in addition to requiring DOD to report on the National Guard’s 

equipment readiness for domestic missions, require DOD to submit the 

Army’s plans and funding strategy for providing equipment to nondeployed 

Army National Guard forces for domestic missions in its 2009 National 

Guard and Reserve Equipment Report. 

In its written comments on a draft of this report, the department stated 

that our recommendation to change the National Guard Bureau’s charter 

is not needed because the current charter already authorizes the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau’s role in coordinating and facilitating state 

planning for the National Guard’s use in large-scale, multistate events. As 

our report discusses in detail, the charter, signed by the Secretaries of the 

Army and the Air Force in 1995, assigns the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau responsibility for facilitating and supporting the training of 

members and units of the National Guard to meet state requirements as 

well as responsibility for facilitating and coordinating with the 

Departments of the Army and the Air Force the use of National Guard 

personnel and resources for several functions, including natural disasters 

and military support to civil authorities. Despite the fact that the 

department believes that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has a key 

role in coordinating and facilitating state planning for the National Guard’s 

use in large-scale, multistate events, the charter does not contain language

specifically defining this role. Since the charter was last updated, the 

security environment in which the National Guard operates has changed 

significantly, with the National Guard now being used extensively for 

overseas military operations while needing to remain prepared for 

additional threats at home. Furthermore, new planning tools, such as the 

National Response Plan and the national planning scenarios, have been 

developed to guide federal, state, and local planning for large-scale 

domestic emergencies. As the response to Hurricane Katrina illustrated, 

there is a need for detailed planning for the Guard’s use in large-scale

natural or man-made domestic emergencies. As we discussed in this 

report, planning for the National Guard’s use in responding to events such 

Page 37 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
as the national planning scenarios is currently uneven. Although this 

interstate planning role is not clearly defined in its charter, the National 

Guard Bureau has taken some steps to perform this role to a limited 

extent. Our recommendation to add clarifying language to the National 

Guard Bureau’s charter to clearly define the bureau’s role in coordinating 

and facilitating multistate planning is intended to highlight the importance 

of these activities so that the National Guard is prepared to respond to 

multistate events as efficiently and effectively as possible. We continue to 

believe that this role is important and that making this activity an explicit

responsibility of the National Guard Bureau would further the goal of 

facilitating multistate planning and would increase the states’ and the 

nation’s capability to respond to large-scale incidents. Therefore, we have 

included as a matter for congressional consideration amending the statute 

prescribing the National Guard Bureau’s charter to include language

clarifying this role. 

The department also disagreed with our recommendation that the Chief, 

National Guard Bureau, should update the National Guard Bureau’s 1996 

civil support regulation to include the National Guard Bureau’s role in 

facilitating interstate planning and to address the creation of new 

organizations and planning tools. In its comments, the department raised 

two major concerns. First, the department asserted that the direction to 

update the regulation should come from the Secretaries of the Army and 

the Air Force. Therefore, we have modified our report to direct the 

recommendation to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to direct the 

Chief, National Guard Bureau, to update the regulation. Second, the 

department also commented that it is not appropriate for the National 

Guard Bureau to coordinate directly with other federal agencies because 

this is the responsibility, if required, of the Secretary of Defense and the 

Combatant Commanders—in the case of homeland missions, U.S. 

Northern Command or U.S. Pacific Command—and would infringe on the 

authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense over

homeland activities. We understand the responsibilities of the Secretary of 

Defense and the Combatant Commanders with regard to coordinating with 

federal agencies, and we understand that the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense has authority over the department’s 

homeland defense activities and responsibility for representing DOD on 

homeland defense-related matters in the interagency environment and for 

coordinating federal military support to civil authorities. Further, we agree 

with the comment that governors have responsibility for the coordination

and use of National Guard forces in state status and that the governors 

could coordinate with federal agencies if necessary. Our recommendation 

was not intended to designate the National Guard Bureau as the DOD 

Page 38 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
entity to coordinate with other federal agencies or to infringe on the 

governors’ role in coordination with federal agencies. Our intent was to 

recommend that the National Guard’s civil support regulation be updated

in order to more accurately reflect the National Guard Bureau’s role in 

coordinating and facilitating interstate planning for the National Guard’s 

use in large-scale, multistate events, and to formalize procedures for state 

and National Guard Bureau coordination with organizations established 

since September 11, 2001 and for the use of new planning tools. We have 

changed the language of our recommendation in the final report 

accordingly. Since September 11, 2001, many changes have occurred in the 

security environment, including the creation of entities such as the 

Department of Homeland Security as well as the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command within DOD.

Planning tools have also been created, including the National Response 

Plan and the Homeland Security Council’s national planning scenarios. 

The National Guard Bureau’s civil support regulation sets out the Chief of

the National Guard Bureau’s overall responsibility for civil support 

programs and for issuing planning guidance on the National Guard’s role 

in providing military support to civil authorities, and provides guidance to 

the states on preparing emergency plans for the use of National Guard 

forces in a civil support role, including coordination for assistance beyond

state capabilities. This regulation, last updated in 1996, pre-dates the 

changes to the security environment and does not specifically address 

how coordination with these organizations should occur or how these 

planning tools should be used. The changed security environment since 

September 11, 2001, has increased the need for federal, state, and local

authorities to work together to enhance preparedness. As the response to 

Hurricane Katrina illustrated, the nation relies on the National Guard to 

respond to the effects of large-scale, multistate emergencies and the 

National Guard Bureau can play a significant role in facilitating Guard 

support among the states when such an event takes place. The Katrina 

response also showed that there is a lack of pre-event planning and 

understanding among federal and state responders about the type of

assistance and capabilities that the National Guard can provide. Updating 

the regulation is an important step to minimize confusion about how the 

bureau and state Guard forces should work with organizations and 

planning tools established since September 11, 2001, how coordination of 

planning efforts for the Guard’s use among federal, state, and local 

authorities should take place, and where the accountability for 

coordination lies. The National Guard Bureau’s position as a channel of 

communication between the states and the Army and Air Force makes it 

uniquely positioned to facilitate interstate planning for events that may 

require support from multiple states or across state boundaries; we agree 

Page 39 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
with the department that it does play a key role in this capacity. We 

continue to believe that updating the National Guard Bureau’s regulation 

to reflect changes to the security environment and to clarify how the state 

National Guards and the National Guard Bureau will work with new 

organizations and use national planning tools to strengthen pre-event

planning for large-scale, multistate events is needed. Therefore, we have 

included as a matter for congressional consideration a requirement for the 

department to revise the National Guard Bureau’s civil support regulation.

In its comments, the department also disagreed that the National Guard 

Bureau should take actions to facilitate and coordinate state National 

Guard planning to identify capabilities the Guard would need to respond 

to multistate events and asserted that the responsibility for overall 

supervision of homeland defense activities within DOD resides with the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. First, while we 

understand that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

is in charge of federal defense support to civilian authorities, the Assistant 

Secretary is not charged with planning for National Guard activities that 

will likely be conducted under the command and control of the state 

governor. We are not recommending that the National Guard Bureau 

undertake the responsibilities of the state governors, but rather provide a 

facilitating and coordinating function between states for those events that

may involve the use of National Guard forces from multiple states. Second, 

in its comments, DOD said that the overall supervision of homeland 

defense activities within DOD is a function that should remain with a 

civilian official rather than a military officer. We agree and are not 

recommending that the National Guard Bureau supervise either federal or

state-led forces but rather that the bureau facilitate and coordinate 

interstate planning for domestic emergencies that involve Guard forces 

from multiple states and which may be federally funded. Third, in its 

comments, DOD also stated that training and equipping the National 

Guard is the responsibility of the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. As 

we stated in this report, DOD is responsible for planning for DOD’s federal 

missions and training and equipping the National Guard for these 

missions. As mentioned, training for the Guard’s federal missions is also 

federally funded. We did not recommend changes to the responsibilities 

for training and equipping the National Guard. Rather, our 

recommendation is directed to improving interstate planning for the use of 

National Guard forces for large-scale domestic events in their state roles 

that are likely to be federally funded. As DOD acknowledges in its 

comments on our first recommendation, the Chief, National Guard 

Bureau, plays a key role in coordinating and facilitating state-level 

planning for the employment of National Guard forces to meet large-scale 

Page 40 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
disasters. We agree with this assessment and therefore continue to believe 

that the National Guard Bureau is well-positioned to facilitate planning 

and promote cooperation in identifying regional and national assets 

needed for response efforts so that decision makers can prioritize 

investments to mitigate risks. This recommendation is consistent with a 

recommendation we made in our previous report examining the response 

to Hurricane Katrina with which the department agreed. In that report, we 

recommended that the Chief, National Guard Bureau, should work with 

the state governors and state Guards to identify capabilities the National 

Guard will likely provide for homeland security missions and make that 

information available to other organizations with federal military support 

to civil authorities planning responsibilities.31 We have raised as a matter 

for congressional consideration amending the statute that prescribes the 

National Guard Bureau’s charter to include this interstate planning role. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness submit a report to Congress on 

DOD’s plans for assessing and reporting on the readiness of National 

Guard units to perform domestic missions. DOD agreed that readiness 

reporting and tracking is critical to ensuring the execution of the Strategy 

for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, but commented that this 

includes the readiness to perform domestic missions of all 10 military 

components, not just the Army National Guard and Air National Guard. We 

agree that readiness reporting and tracking are critical and recognize that 

all 10 military components may participate in homeland defense and civil

support missions; however, the scope of our review was limited to the 

Army National Guard and Air National Guard. Moreover, in recognition 

that the National Guard has a unique role in domestic response, the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ guidance for the 

Defense Readiness Reporting System specifically directed the National 

Guard to include assessments of its readiness for state-led, federallyfunded missions in the new readiness reporting system. This information 

on the National Guard’s domestic readiness would be useful to Congress 

as it deliberates improvements to national preparedness. As a result, we 

continue to believe that the department should report to Congress on the 

status of efforts to measure National Guard readiness for domestic 

missions. 

 31GAO-06-643. 

Page 41 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
DOD also disagreed with our recommendation that the Army should 

develop and submit to Congress a plan and funding strategy for resourcing 

nondeployed Army National Guard baseline equipment sets. The 

department asserted that such a report would be unnecessary because 

Reserve component requirements are evaluated and prioritized within the 

department’s budget process and presented to Congress as part of the 

department’s overall budget. We did not recommend changes to the 

department’s budgeting process. Rather, our recommendation that the 

Army provide Congress a separate report on nondeployed forces’ 

equipment is based on the fact that Congress does not have visibility over 

the effects of the recent high use of National Guard equipment for 

overseas operations and the risks that depleted domestic equipment 

inventories pose to the National Guard’s ability to respond to domestic 

missions. Because nondeployed National Guard forces rely on the 

equipment they have on hand to respond to domestic events, the 

equipment they can expect to have available at all times is of primary 

importance to the state National Guard’s ability to plan for their domestic 

missions. Therefore, we continue to believe the Congress should be 

informed of the specifics of the department’s plans, including timelines 

and funding strategies, to enable it to consider current and future risks 

against proposed investments. As a result, we have included as a matter 

for congressional consideration a requirement for the department to 

include in the 2009 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report the 

Army’s plan and funding strategy for providing equipment for nondeployed 

Army National Guard units. 

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days 

from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Secretary of 

Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force; the Chief, National 

Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We 

will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 42 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-

4402. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to

this report are listed in appendix IV.

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 43 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios 

The Homeland Security Council has developed 15 national planning 

scenarios, whose purpose is to form the basis for identifying the 

capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of emergencies. The 

scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, state, and local first 

responders will have to address and are intended to illustrate the scope 

and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic events for which the nation 

needs to be prepared. Table 5 summarizes the 15 scenarios that have been

developed to assess the emergency response and preparedness 

capabilities of federal, state, local, and tribal governments as well as the 

private sector and describes their projected consequences. These 

scenarios have not been developed to identify events that are likely to 

occur; instead, they facilitate efforts by all government agencies to assess 

the full range of needs that might be required if events similar to these 

scenarios take place. 

Page 44 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix I: National Planning Scenarios 

Table 5: Homeland Security Council’s National Planning Scenarios and Summary Descriptions

Threat Description summary Projected consequencesa

Nuclear detonation Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear 

device in a large city 

450,000 or more evacuees, 3,000 square miles 

contaminated, and hundreds of billions of dollars 

in economic impact 

Biological attack Terrorists spray anthrax spores in a city 

using a concealed spray device 

13,000 fatalities and injuries, extensive 

contamination, and billions of dollars in economic 

impact 

Biological disease outbreak—

pandemic influenza 

Natural outbreak of pandemic influenza that 

begins in China and spreads to other 

countries 

87,000 fatalities, 300,000 hospitalizations, and 

$70 billion to $160 billion impact 

Biological attack—plague Terrorists release pneumonic plague into 

three areas of a large city 

2,500 fatalities, 7,000 injuries, millions of dollars in 

economic impact, and possible evacuations 

Chemical attack—blister agent Terrorists spray a combination of blister 

agents into a crowded football stadium 

150 fatalities, 70,000 hospitalized, more than

100,000 persons evacuated, and $500 million in 

economic impact 

Chemical attack—toxic industrial 

chemicals 

Terrorists use grenades and explosive 

devices at petroleum facilities

350 fatalities, 1,000 hospitalizations, 

50 percent of facility damaged, and up to 700,000 

persons evacuated 

Chemical attack—nerve agent Terrorists spray Sarin into the ventilation 

system of three commercial buildings in a 

city 

6,000 fatalities in buildings, 350 injuries 

downwind, evacuation of unknown number of

people, and $300 million in economic impact

Chemical attack—chlorine tank

explosion 

Terrorists use explosives to release a large 

quantity of chlorine gas 

17,500 fatalities, 100,000 hospitalizations, up to 

70,000 persons evacuated, and contamination at 

site and waterways 

Natural disaster—major earthquake A 7.2 magnitude earthquake occurs in a 

major metropolitan area 

1,400 fatalities, 100,000 hospitalizations, 150,000 

buildings destroyed, and hundreds of billions of 

dollars in economic impact 

Natural disaster—major hurricane Category 5 hurricane strikes a major city 1,000 fatalities, 5,000 hospitalizations, 1 million 

people evacuated, and millions of dollars in

economic impact 

Radiological attack— radiological 

dispersal device (RDD) 

Terrorists detonate “dirty bombs” in three 

cities in close proximity 

180 fatalities, 20,000 detectible contaminations in 

each city, and billions of dollars in economic 

impact 

Explosives attack—bombing using 

improvised explosive devise (IED) 

Terrorists detonate IEDs in a sports arena, 

use suicide bombers in a public transit 

concourse, and in a parking facility 

100 fatalities, 450 hospitalizations, local economic 

impact, and minimal evacuations 

Biological attack—food 

contamination 

Terrorists contaminate food with anthrax in

processing facilities 

300 fatalities, 400 hospitalizations, and millions of 

dollars in economic impact 

Biological attack—Foreign Animal 

Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease) 

Terrorists infect livestock at specific 

locations 

No casualties, huge loss of livestock, and hundred

of millions of dollars in economic impact 

Cyber attack Terrorists conduct cyber attacks on U.S. 

financial infrastructure 

No casualties, millions of dollars in economic

impact 

Source: Congressional Research Service. 

a

These hypothetical results are among those presented in the scenarios. They are intended to be 

illustrative to use in identifying the types of situations responding units should be prepared to address. 

Page 45 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed 

documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Northern Command, 

Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Air Force North (previously 

First Air Force), the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, the 

Air National Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security. We also 

developed case studies of four states: California, Florida, New Jersey, and 

West Virginia. These states were selected because they had an average to

high number of disaster declarations in the last 53 years, are 

geographically dispersed across the United States, reported varying levels

of National Guard domestic response capability, faced a range of 

homeland security risks, and were involved in National Guard Bureau 

domestic capability initiatives. 

To identify the extent to which the National Guard’s equipment 

requirements for its full range of domestic missions have been identified, 

we reviewed domestic operational planning documents, including the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army 

Campaign Plan, planning documents provided by case study states, and 

the National Response Plan. We supplemented this information by 

interviewing officials in DOD, U.S. Northern Command, the National 

Guard Bureau, the Department of Homeland Security, and our case study 

states to review their planning processes for the full range of the National 

Guard’s domestic mission. In each case study state, we reviewed plans for 

the use of National Guard forces and assessed the extent to which they 

addressed the national planning scenarios and the extent to which these 

plans identified specific equipment requirements. We also discussed with 

state National Guard leaders processes for planning and coordinating with 

multiple state and federal agencies and challenges to planning for largescale, multistate emergencies. We did not review case study state budget 

documents to independently verify the level of planning resources 

available to their state National Guards. 

To assess the extent to which DOD measures and reports on the 

equipment readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for the full 

range of their domestic missions, we reviewed documentation on DOD’s 

readiness reporting system, the Global Status of Resources and Training 

System, as well as the new system DOD plans to have fully operational in

late 2007, the Defense Readiness Reporting System. We also analyzed data, 

reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials about the National 

Guard Bureau’s state capability tracking system, the Joint Capabilities 

Database. Specifically, using data from the National Guard’s Joint 

Page 46 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

Capabilities Database, we determined the number of states that reported 

adequate capabilities for typical state missions, the capabilities most 

frequently reported as inadequate, and the reasons why. In addition, using 

Army National Guard data on equipment useful for both warfighting and

domestic missions, we compared the amount of equipment available for 

Army National Guard forces by state and item against the amount they are 

authorized for warfighting missions. Further, we examined DOD’s annual 

report to Congress on National Guard equipping, the National Guard and 

Reserve Equipment Report. 

To determine the extent to which DOD is taking actions to address the 

National Guard’s domestic equipment challenges, we reviewed and 

analyzed information about steps being taken to enhance the National 

Guard’s capabilities and increase equipment for nondeployed National 

Guard units. Information we reviewed included DOD appropriations 

documents, Army budget information, and National Guard Bureau change

request packages. Further, we reviewed and analyzed relevant DOD, Army, 

Air Force, and National Guard equipping strategies and policies and 

discussed the impact of the Army transformation plans on nondeployed

forces. We also reviewed Army documentation on plans for implementing 

its force generation model to determine the extent to which the plans 

define equipment available to nondeployed Army National Guard units for 

domestic missions. 

We conducted our review from December 2005 through November 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our 

objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they 

ensured their own data reliability and reviewed their data collection 

methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control 

measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and when 

applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and 

reliability. 

Page 47 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix III: Comments from the Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 48 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 49 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 50 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 51 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix IV: 

St

GAO Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 52 GAO-07-60

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant 

Director; Alissa Czyz; Matthew Dove; Paul Gvoth; Nicole Harms; Catherine 

Humphries; David Marroni; Kenneth Patton; Jerome Sandau; Jay Smale; 

and Suzanne Wren made major contributions to this report. 

Acknowledgments 

 Reserve Forces
Appendix IV: Related Products Appendix IV: Related Products 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for

21st Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington D.C.: September 21, 

2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 

D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More 

Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation 

Plans. GAO-06-745. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but 

Accountability Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and 

Focused Departmentwide. GAO-06-1042 Washington, D.C.: September 21, 

2006. 

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil 

Support Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges. 

GAO-06-498. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,

D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and 

Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard 

Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force 

Transformation Initiatives. GAO-06-111. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 

2005. 

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of 

Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926. 

Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005. 

Page 53 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
Appendix IV: Related Products

Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 

July 11, 2005.

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for

Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.: 

November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas

and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 

Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003. 

(350768) Page 54 GAO-07-60 Reserve Forces
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